

- **USE OF PROPAGANDA IN CIVIL WAR:
THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE.**

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USE OF PROPAGANDA IN CIVIL WAR: THE BIAFRA EXPERIENCE.

ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of propaganda in the Biafran war. Nigeria, the show case of British colonial rule and Empire, and transfer to independence, was at the point of disintegration in 1967. A section of the country, the Eastern region had dared to do the unthinkable at that time, to secede. The British and Nigerian governments were determined that it would not happen. The break away region, which called itself Biafra was blockaded by land, air and sea, and starved of weapons and the means of livelihood. The only means available to it was propaganda. In the opinion of many commentators, Biafra employed propaganda admirably and effectively, sustaining the war for three years, against all odds. An investigation into the background of Biafra's successful propaganda thrust became a very compelling urge for me. But to arrive at that point, an examination is made of propaganda cultures that bear a family resemblance to that of Biafra. Because of the complete dearth of materials by media practitioners, or the protagonists, or actors on the Biafran media/propaganda scene, it has been necessary to travel to and from Nigeria several times to interview the key participants. The issuance of questionnaires was unsuccessful as no one had or found time to fill them in. Data and Statistics were non existent in any cohesive form. There is still even now a reticence by the principal actors to discuss the issues involving the war. To discuss a familial pattern, or any other form of family migration which might support the argument of the success of Biafra's propaganda, three models have been examined, ie; Hitler's/Goebbels' German propaganda, (as a watershed in modern war propaganda, Mao Tse Tung's Chinese propaganda, and Ojukwu's Biafran propaganda. However, other examples like the English, American, Russian, and French civil wars and revolutions, etc; are employed in the arguments and discussions. The thesis examines psychological warfare, the origins of propaganda, modern methods and concepts, the Biafran domestic and external factors; and suggests that the exploitative propaganda tools in most civil conflicts are religion, and/or tribal/ethnic/nationalistic tendencies. The difference is that in Biafra there was a first - hunger and starvation became a massively useful propaganda weapon.

ABBREVIATIONS.

| | |
|--------------|---|
| A.G. | Action Group. |
| B. B.C. | British Broadcasting Corporation. |
| C.I.A. | Central Intelligence Agency. |
| C.B.I. | Confederation of British Industries. |
| C.O.R | Calabar, Ogoja and Rivers State Movement. |
| Dr. | Doctor. |
| E.N.B.C./T.V | Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation and Television. |
| Fr. | Father. |
| I.B.S. | International Broadcasting Society. |
| MPs. | Members of Parliament. |
| Mr. | Mister. |
| N.B.C.T.V. | Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation and Television. |
| N.C.N.C. | National Council of Nigeria and Cameroun |
| N.N.A. | Nigerian National Alliance. |
| N.P.C. | Northern People's Congress. |
| O.A.U. | Organisation of African Unity. |
| PR. | Public Relations. |
| P.& T. | Posts and Telegraphs. |
| R.K.T | Radio Television Kaduna. |
| RTE. | Irish Television. |
| T.S. | The Sunday Magazine. |
| U.N. | United Nations. |
| U.P.G.A | United Progressive Grand Alliance. |
| W.N.B.S./T.V | Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service and Television |
| U.A.R. | United Arab Republics. |
| U.S.A. | United States of America. |

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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Hypothesis, and, Focus of the Study.

It may be helpful to start this thesis by posing certain questions -

1. What is propaganda in civil war?
2. Who makes propaganda?
3. Who receives propaganda?
4. Why propaganda?
5. What is the effect (result) of propaganda?
6. What role did all these questions, or the answers to them play in the Biafra Case - The Role of propaganda in Biafra?

However, it is necessary at this stage to state that the purpose of this thesis is not the discussion and analysis of propaganda 'per se', even though to understand the subject and object of the discussion, a study of propaganda is inevitable. The thrust of the discussion is to relate propaganda experiences to civil war as generally as can be done, and most particularly to the Biafra experience.

An immediate examination of this objective indicates the dearth of material on the subject of propaganda in civil war, most especially on Biafra. Some work emerged

after the first and second world wars, generally in the context of studies covering the wars. The cold war period also saw a few works, eg. Propaganda and Psychological Warfare by Terence Qualters, etc. In the years between the Gulf war of 1991 and 1995, many more books have come out dealing with propaganda in war, foreign policy, and advertising. Some of these include Propaganda edited by Robert Jackal, Propaganda and Empire by John M. Mackenzie, The Third Reich by David Welch, Propaganda and Persuasion by Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Weekend in Munich by Robert S. Wistrich, Goebbels by Ralf Georg Reuth, Age of Propaganda by Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, Ireland: The Propaganda War by Liz Curtis, Another relevant work in the context of this thesis was Revolution in Statecraft by Andrew Scott.

These and a lot of other materials were examined in arriving at the theme and hypothesis of this thesis. The analysis from these and other texts are discussed later in this chapter under the 'Review of relevant literature'. Nevertheless, there is a difference between propaganda in foreign policy and advertising, (which can be conducted either in peace time or in war time), and propaganda in war.

Andrew Scott for instance believes that propaganda in foreign policy is a polite way of engaging in political discourse- of achieving aims without resorting to war and its attendant ramifications. He maintains that Athens engaged in such cultural diplomacy extensively during the 5th century A.D.- a process described as an 'unhidden agenda'.¹

Some ex-Biafra technocrats and military have written accounts of their experiences in the war, but unfortunately none of the media people have written anything on either their roles or that of of the media.

Against this background, this thesis is written on the assumption that propaganda is an important part of strategic planning in warfare, which therefore merits an academic study in its own right. It will be argued that there is little difference between propaganda in international wars and civil wars- except for their target

constituencies. Civil war is a microcosm of global or international war, which could be internationalised through effective propaganda. For instance, did not the First World War begin as 'Civil War' in the Hapsburgh Empire?

In an effort to answer this and related questions, it may be helpful to organise the discussion under the following categories:

1. Motivation.
2. Mobilisation.
3. Sustenance (Sustainability)
4. Durability.

In order to understand why these sensitivities and sensibilities act as ingredients in propaganda or psychological warfare, it is necessary at this juncture to examine further the questions posed at the beginning of this introduction.

1.2. Review of Relevant Literature and Thematic Analysis.

1.2.1 (a) What is Propaganda ? (b) ... (in civil war)?

The Oxford Dictionary of current English defines PROPAGANDA as an organised scheme (etc.) for often (tendentious) propagation of a doctrine or practice; (usually derogatory); ideas etc. thus propagated; colloquially biased information'.²

A school of thought also looks at propaganda- as psychological warfare, hence the reference "propaganada war"- as borne out by an article in the Sunday Times of 17th February 1991, titled "Propaganda Targets Deserters".³

The word PROPAGANDA was originally an ecclesiastical latin term denoting the function of a committee responsible for the spreading of the Roman Catholic Faith, i.e. 'de fide propaganda'.

It was, according to J.H. Marshall of The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, transferred to a political context in 1790 with reference to an obscure alleged revolutionary organisation based in France, and was also used in the United States as a slogan- word to refer to the pro-slavery campaign after the Mexican war in the 1850s (see H. Sperber and T. Trittshuk, American Political Terms; An Historical Dictionary, Detroit, 1962).⁴

Its use as a specifically military term is difficult to trace without a careful survey of the relevant historical literature: the word does not appear in The Oxford Military Dictionary of the 19th century, but does feature in Edward S.Farrows' Dictionary of Military Terms (London, 1918).

It does not appear to have any older equivalent and seems to have been used in the first world war, and become well established in the years leading up to the second world war.⁵

Macropaedia Britannica defines PROPAGANDA⁶ as the more or less systematic effort to manipulate other people's beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols (words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, designs on coins and postage stamps, and so forth). Deliberateness and a relatively heavy emphasis on manipulation distinguish propaganda from casual conversation or the free exchange of ideas. The propagandist has a specific goal or set of goals. To achieve these, he deliberately selects facts, arguments and displays of symbols and presents them in ways he thinks will have the most effect. To maximise effects he may omit pertinent facts or distort them, and he may try to divert the attention of the reactors (the people whom he is trying to sway) from everything but his own propaganda. Selectivity and manipulation also distinguish propaganda from education. The educator generally tries to present various sides of an issue- the grounds for doubting as well as the grounds for believing the statement he makes, and the disadvantages as well as the advantages of every conceivable course of action. Education usually aims to induce the recipient to collect and evaluate

evidence for himself, and assists him in the requisite learning techniques. It must be noted, however, that a given propagandist may look upon himself as an educator, may believe that he is uttering the purest truth, that he is emphasising or distorting certain aspects of the truth only to make a valid message more persuasive, and that the courses of action that he recommends are in fact the best actions to take. By the same token, the recipient who regards the propagandist's message as self evident truth may think of it as educational; this often seems to be the case with "true believers"- dogmatic reactors to dogmatic religious or social propaganda.

"Education for one person may be "propaganda" for another.⁷ Schlesinger makes the point of news and information selectivity on British Television and Media in Putting 'reality' Together, when he enunciates the principle of "inclusion - exclusion". This involves a process of slant, bias or parochialism in editorial news selectivity and judgement for and on the British media.⁸

(b) Propaganda in Civil War

Information culled from research and archive files⁹ indicates that increased communications capabilities effected by the time of the American Civil War made it possible for each side in that conflict to conduct active propaganda, making appeals designed to strengthen its cause and weaken the opponent. The Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln in January 1863, irrespective of its force and merit was a masterful propaganda stroke , for once the war became characterised as a crusade against slavery, it became very difficult for any European government to support the Confederacy ...

The abolition crusade and the pro-slavery reaction laid the psychological basis for the war. Upon the outbreak of the conflict, press and pulpit, North and South, further stirred the emotions of the people.

In the South, propagandists devoted their effort to asserting the right to secede and to proving that the aggressive North was invading Southern territory. In the North, the preservation of the Union, patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the major themes. On both sides, atrocity stories abounded often, though not always, based on realities - largely concerned with the brutal treatment of the wounded, military prisoners, and political dissenters. Southern efforts in propaganda lacked coordination, but in the North the radical committee on the conduct of the war gave official direction to the gathering and dissemination of atrocity stories that professed to reveal rebel depravity and to show the felonious and savage nature of the Southerners. The Sanitary Commission and the Union Leagues were the Chief unofficial agencies in this work. Both sides attempted to influence European opinion and President Lincoln sent journalists and ecclesiastics to England and the Continent to create favourable sentiment. Illustrating this in "Propaganda and "Civil War, Propaganda and undercover Activities " in Dictionary of American History ed. by L.B.Ketz, the work also outlines a graphic thrust of both Confederate and Unionist propaganda which are analagous to the Federal Nigerian and Biafran propaganda during the Biafran War. Discussions and analyses will be made in this introduction and subsequent chapters to illustrate the similarites of these, and other possible comparisons.

1.2.2. Who makes Propaganda?

A rather obvious question with at first sight a similarly obvious answer. It is easy enough to state that both sides to a conflict engage in propaganda in order to mobilise and motivate their respective constituencies. It has already been shown that 'constituencies' may be defined as the "reactors". Since in motivation, propaganda must necessarily appeal to the senses and sensibilities of the the target audience, reactors is thereby appropriately used in this context, but this thesis will utilise

"constituencies" as a broad reactor's indicator, creating the semblance of an "audience", "viewers", "listeners", "readers", capable of objective analysis of the information with which they are bombarded.

They as recipients of the information, or messages are capable of making value judgements and therefore acting on their judgements.

However, on closer inspection the question of who makes propaganda in war is not as simple a matter as this indicates, although it maintains that "both sides to the conflict" are involved. There are instances where one side claims that the other is engaged in telling lies by way of propaganda whilst they themselves believe in telling the truth even though the claimant in this example controls its own information and its dissemination, therefore allowing it to be "economical" with the truth. For instance according to Gerard Mansell in Let the truth be told - the Politics of propaganda¹⁰, Churchill and Eden maintained that Hitler fed his constituencies with lies in the form of propaganda during the Second World War. Churchill in contrast believed that war must be won by deeds not words.

On the contrary, Hitler's view as he wrote in Mein Kampf, was that in war, words are acts'. As far back as 1933, in conversation with Hermann Rauschning, Hitler had laid stress on psychological dislocation of the enemy as a necessary preliminary stage to military offensive just as heavy artillery bombardment in the first World War had softened up the forward positions of the opposing army as a preliminary to the infantry assault. "Our strategy", he said, "is to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself. Mental confusion, contradiction of feelings, indecision, panic - these are our weapons".¹¹ Churchill, Eden and the then Director General of the B.B.C, Lord Reith believed that propaganda involved lies and was shortlived - the truth was more sustainable and therefore preferable. But, they controlled and decided what they thought was the truth, censoring what was disseminated to their publics.-on the principle of "inclusion-exclusion". However,

since this involved manipulation of information, it was propaganda, as defined earlier.

In so far as propaganda involves the manipulation of information to achieve victory, it may be said to consist of (a) psychological warfare (b) censorship (c) lies (d) distortion or omission, or being economical with the truth, all designed to arouse the emotions - sensitivities and sensibilities of the publics targeted. Western countries argue that autocratic and dictatorial regimes engage in propaganda. In modern times, however, protagonists of all kinds tend to employ some or all of the instruments listed, as borne out in the Gulf War in 1991.

For Example, the American propaganda machine, (as illustrated by the Sunday Times article earlier referred to),¹² with the use of television, radio, leaflets, and rumours of impending cataclysm in Iraq, may well have caused several thousands of desertions from the Iraqi frontline. It destroyed "the enemy from within" even before the first shots were fired. Propaganda was again at the fore in the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s with all sides trying to capture the eyes and ears of the world. In the Biafran case, both Nigeria and Biafra engaged in emotive propaganda. Biafra, however managed the propaganda better than Nigeria and therefore sustained higher propaganda results.

1.2.3. Who receives propaganda?

These, as defined earlier are: the recipients, the reactors, constituencies, publics, targets, or audience.^{1 3}

Taking the definitive ground rules of modern propaganda earlier enunciated, ie; - (the manipulation of information to achieve a certain objective) - it is fair to assume that there is very little difference in intent between propaganda in international or global war and propaganda in civil war. Both have to motivate and mobilise in the first instance the "home front", before the action.

In Shakespeare's Julius Ceasar, Mark Antony after Caesar's assassination urges the Romans to avenge Caesar with his famous speech of "Friends, Romans, Countrymen". After he had motivated and mobilised them, and they had rushed out to attack Brutus and Cassius and their men, Mark Antony proclaims "Mischief thou art afoot. Take thou what cause thou wilt".

The most powerful war leaders have been orators who know their constituencies and how to inspire them to action, e.g. Hitler, Churchill, Mao Tse Tung, John F. Kennedy, Odumegwu Ojukwu, to name a handful. The publics are therefore those to whom the message of propaganda is addressed. They then react accordingly after making their own value judgements. But as the message to the different targets is essentially tailored to the needs of the propagandist, the content delivered to the home front may be at variance with that directed at the international and foreign publics. And it is no easy task for either side in a civil war to motivate and mobilise the sympathy and active support of the international community, especially since the rival messages put out by the warring factions may tend to be confused.

1.2.4. Why Propaganda?

The answer to this question can be found first and foremost in the definition of propaganda already given at the beginning of this introduction. It is important to note that propaganda precedes the war in order to motivate and mobilise the various constituencies at which it is directed. It intensifies during the war to sustain the morale of the army and civilian publics and outlasts the war.

Those unfamiliar with the history of the American war of Independence are likely to be more familiar with the term "Boston Tea Party". Because of its appeal to the senses, it tends to be stored in the subconscious.

Propaganda in civil war is an application of the same ground rule as in international or global war. However the domestic sector achieves the same results by clever management of its limited scope, materials, and facilities. After all, both sides in a civil war concentrate their efforts in justifying their reasons to the outside world, (much more as the war progresses), rather than to the home audience. It starts from the inside looking out. The reverse is the case in international wars.

This brings one to the notion of justification of war- the theory of the "just war". The reason for going to war has to be justified to gain international as well as domestic support- material, political, physical and economic- and therefore a favourable terrain. The Russian Revolution, the Chinese Communist Long March, The Biafran cause in the Nigerian Civil War, to name a few all bear this out. The slogans vary, but the message tends to be similar: the liberation of the oppressed, and the creation of an egalitarian society.

The principles enunciated during the "Enlightenment", and taken up by the French revolutionaries are characteristic. A society "fair to all concerned" is a common denominator to all civil war propagandists around the world in premodern, and

modern eras. Further propagandist themes include, the emancipation of a people from suppression of basic human rights- religious, ethnic, linguistic, etc. The modern concept of prisoners of conscience is an indication of how civil struggles can arouse international concern. Allegations of pogrom, genocide and discrimination can also evoke international sympathy, as in the Biafra case. There, the United Nations together with regional international organisations such as the OAU and latterly EU can become propaganda forums, for people to air their grievances and attract the sentiments of a world. public. Churchill referring to the United Nations as part of this function had said that "Jaw! Jaw!" was better than "War! War!", and that as long as the world leaders had a piece of paper in one hand and a pen in the other, they would not reach out for the sword. The Gulf war of 1991 has, however belied such a belief.

John Renshaw states, in Overseas Broadcaster's Circuit, that "The radio does more than just report the news. In moments of chaos, like the military coup in Paraguay on the 3rd of February 1989, it can very easily change the course of events." The dramatic events in Paraguay illustrate one aspect of the power of the radio as a propaganda organ. In this case, the radio was virtually used to motivate and mobilise the populace into a state of revolution.¹⁴ He was discussing the role of the media, especially radio, on the day of that military coup in 1989, which coincidentally was also Paraguay's Patron Saint's day.

In the case of Biafra, when the capital, Enugu, was "sacked" or "liberated", depending on one's point of view, Biafra's existence was sustained basically by the media, especially radio - to maintain the morale of the Biafran army and citizenry, and to sustain the sympathy of the international community- even when the government was relocated elsewhere in Aba, Owerri, Umuahia respectively as the war progressed.

In pinpointing its target audience propagandists have to appeal to the sentiments of that audience. Generally, the reason for propaganda preceding a war is to demoralise the opposing army before the first shots are fired, and increasingly nowadays soldiers and ground officers like to give press interviews regarding war preparations, with a view to confusing or deceiving the enemy into unwise planning.

1.2.5. What is the effect of propaganda?

The data (already mentioned) culled from the research archives¹⁵ states that the United States Consul in Paris- John Bigelow, played a key part in the propaganda war in France. Seward, the Secretary of State, reached a wider public with leaflets extolling the opportunities provided by the Homestead Act, encouraging potential immigrants or helping public meetings- with resolutions endorsing emancipation. The administration's appointments to the main diplomatic posts in Europe were made for the usual haphazard mixture of reasons. The distinguished historian, John Lothrop Motley, became minister in Vienna; William L. Dayton was a safe, but undistinguished appointment as minister in Paris, but as luck and Seward would have it, Charles Francis Adams became minister in London. The son and grandson of American Presidents (who had also been ministers in London) Adams had impeccable credentials for his vital role and more than lived up to them. His coldness and austerity may have prevented him from being a great social success or a prominent public figure, but he scarcely put a foot wrong in all the intricate diplomacy of the war years. He moderated the effects of Seward's occasional excesses, but could be stiff and unyielding when the occasion required. He contrived to establish an effective working relationship with the foreign secretary, Earl Russell, and coped successfully with sporadic outbursts from Palmerston. If not much loved, he was widely respected and eventually emerged in his son's happy

phrase as "a kind of leader of Her Majesty's American Opposition". He was the right man in the right place at the right time, and did much to preserve British neutrality and therefore preserve the American Union.

The nub of the matter as far as the United States foreign policy was concerned was to make sure that the civil war, remained only a civil war, while it rigorously maintained a blockade and all its implications so troublesome to neutrals anxious to avoid a conflict on the high seas.¹⁶

The analogy to this in the Nigerian case was the Federal blockade of the Biafran territory by air, land and sea while maintaining to the outside world that Nigeria was only carrying out a "police action" to defeat rebellion and secession, and seeking to restore and maintain the unity of Nigeria- a point that struck a welcome cord with the British Government especially, and the American and Russian governments who did not want to see Nigeria break up.

Biafra on the other hand used media images and symbols of program, genocide, indiscriminate bombing and strafing of civilian populations in the churches, markets, and hospitals. This had the effect of arousing public sympathy around the world.

Church organisations like Caritas, the World Council of Churches and other humanitarian organisations rose to aid what they understood as the starving and dying millions of Biafra. Auberon Waugh in his book "Biafra, Britain's Shame", displays graphic images of Kwashiokor (bloated bellies resulting from malnutrition) ridden children, women and men of Biafra.¹⁷ The effects of such images and symbols tend to endure.

The credibility of the messenger (propagandist), the believability of the message and the efficiency of the mode of delivery of the message are important ingredients in propaganda package presentation. The language used is also germane since the different reactors respond more effectively if the message is in a language they can understand and imbibe.

One other important facet of this mesh is the tendency of protagonists to nurture a personality cult around the leader, a sort of "objective correlative",¹⁸ as T.S. Elliot would put it. In Biafra it was Odumegwu Ojukwu, in Russia, Lenin during the revolution and civil war, and Stalin during the world war, in China it was Mao Tse Tung. It is important in time of crisis for the constituency to have a personality- an outstanding credible figure- on whom and to whom people look for inspiration and admiration as a credible source of the message.

For Britain and for many in the British Empire, Churchill fulfilled that position during the Second World War, being able to motivate and mobilise the public, whether his message was true or false. The majority of Germans seem to have believed in Hitler because he seemed to have an answer to their problems, and gave them a sense of superiority.

It was a message they were prepared to die for. In like vein, Ojukwu was constantly telling Biafrans through television, radio and leaflets, (amongst others) that "the price of liberty is eternal vigilance" and so that they had to make sacrifices for their liberation from the tyranny of the Gowon regime. The Federal Nigerian government's own counter slogan was "to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done". Such propaganda tended to outlast the war. For example, some of the songs chanted by Biafrans as they went into battle are still occasionally sung by those who participated in or remember the war. This phenomenon seems to be a corollary to Bruce L. Smith's argument, in his Political Communication and Propaganda, when he refers to trust and credibility and maintains that the message and the messenger have to be believed, otherwise they are not effective¹⁹

1.2.6. Role of propaganda in Biafra.

Nigeria now has an estimated population of one hundred and twenty million. There are two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty various language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.

There are two main religious groups - Christianity and Islam. Other religions exist including traditional religions. There are two time zones between North and South - from Lagos to Maidugiri, from Calabar to Kano.

The geographical cultural, political terrain is as diverse as the political and religious terrain so described.

All this and colonial policy created a perfect setting for conflict following the immediate post independence period. However, the events that led to the Biafran war happened very rapidly. On the fateful morning of the coup of 15th January 1966, people in Eastern Nigeria woke to hear Effiong Etuk on the early morning programme on ENBC/TV Enugu, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio asking him to stop transmission of regular programmes and play only martial music.

On hearing this on his car radio, one of the coup leaders, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, who having assassinated the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and the Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie Eboh, in Lagos, was supposed to 'dash' to Enugu to assassinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of Eastern Nigeria, escaped into the bush. Okpara was thus saved. Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria, and Chief S. L. Akintola, the self-proclaimed Premier of Western Nigeria even though he had been expelled by his party, the Action Group, which formed the majority in the Western House of Assembly, were both assassinated. The country was dazed.

The media was muted by martial law, with the radio and television only playing martial music. As a result, for a while there was no overt propaganda. But according to Auberon Waugh, covert propaganda was instigated in northern Nigeria by civil servants loyal to the assassinated Sir Ahmadu Bello.²⁰ Muslims and loyal northern

followers were forming groups and pockets of meeting groups²¹ spreading secret propaganda documents in offices, market stalls, and through the post in the North, to the effect that the coup was Ibo instigated against the Hausa, Fulani, Muslim groups. The message spread to its target audience and became credible.

Consequently, the Chief of Army Staff, General Aguyi Ironsi, who had taken over the reins of the Federal Government in Lagos following the assassination of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in the January coup was himself assassinated in a Northern led revenge coup in July 1966, along with the Governor of Western Nigeria, Colonel Fajuyi.

Following these events, the media in the North became free to operate. The radio, television and newspapers directed overt propaganda against the Southerners in general and the Easterners in particular, the Ibos especially. There was counter propaganda from the South particularly from the radio and television in Enugu. This was overt propaganda, designed to motivate their respective constituencies.

Propaganda aroused latent tensions between the North and the South, the various language groups and ethnic communities, galvanizing and mobilising them to war, sustaining them through the war and helping them rehabilitate after the war. Most commentators argue that the message and organisation of the Biafran propaganda was better and more effective than that of Nigeria. For example, Luke Uka Uche in "Radio Biafra and the Nigeria Civil War: Study of War propaganda on a target audience",²² maintains that during the Nigerian Civil War of 6th July 1967- 12th January 1970, Radio Biafra was literally seen as the Biafran Government, per se. He argues that even when the Biafran leadership fled the enclave before the end of the war, people still believed in the concept of Biafra because the Biafran Radio Station identification was still "This is Radio Biafra Enugu". When eventually Radio Biafra went silent, that action formally concluded the thirty-month war. One of the opinion leaders interviewed for his research noted that once Radio Biafra announced the end of the war, he became convinced that the war had in fact ended. According

to Uka Uche, this partly demonstrates the quasi government role the mass media are capable of playing in a crisis situation any where. For example, he claims that in July 1966, Nigeria did not have any functionally operative government for more than three days at the time of the second bloody military coup d'etat, as the struggle for political leadership control raged among the military combatants. It was radio that constantly broadcast directives and literally governed in the absence of any legally constituted authority. When coups occurred, government agencies, ministries, departments and parastatals were always found to be in a great disarray as a leadership vacuum was created: nobody knew whom to be responsible to for directives. In these situations, people panicked and the radio medium seemed to have become their rallying point. In short during such periods, the radio medium became a "de facto " government. People sought directives from it, Uka Uche concludes.²³

This was just one facet of Biafra's propaganda package. The message was graphic and powerful and was addressed variously to the domestic and international constituencies with Odumegwu Ojukwu being cultivated as the saviour of Biafrans from genocide and pogrom at the hands of the Federal Nigerian Government. Nigeria on the other hand in a clear attempt to caricature Ojukwu, in order to reduce his cultivation as Saviour, portrayed him as a bigot who was leading his people to ruin. Western Countries use the same techniques against their opponents eg. Hitler, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, etc, have been variously described as mad, unstable men leading their respective countries to destruction. There was a process of migration and mutation of this and other propaganda principles and practices to Biafra, eg; Soon, Biafra's propagandists resorted to the caricature of Gowon. This thesis will expand on the propaganda methods employed by both sides in this bitterly fought war in which over one million Easterners lost their lives. It will examine how the international society got involved and the political configuration involved with

Britain, the United States and Russia being on the same side, Nigeria's, while France and some African countries supported Biafra.

1.3. Methodology and Sources of Data.

This study has adopted three research methods:

1. Qualitative archival and library research, to provide data for analysis of the historical development of propaganda, Hitler's/Goebbels' propaganda, Mao Tse tung's propaganda, and, the development of Nigerian political, geographical and historical structures, which set the scene for the civil war.
2. Structured interviews with media participants and protagonists on both sides of the divide in the Biafra war, leaders and key civil servants of Nigerian, and defunct Biafran governments, foreign journalists, and British Council and High Commission officials. Semi-structured interviews and discussions were also conducted with the publics of Nigeria, and former Biafran territory, to test their reactions to the propaganda messages they received.
3. Quantitative content analysis of Nigerian, Biafran, and foreign media broadcasts and materials, speeches by American, British, French, Russian and African leaders. It was important to examine and analyse the reactions of both Nigerian and Biafran publics to have a sense of their emotions during and after the war. Interviews and discussions were also conducted with the key military personnel of both, particularly the combatants at the frontline, and a qualitative analysis was carried out to determine how they were affected by the propaganda, and how that would have affected the conduct, and course of the war.

Qualitative research of archival and library materials was done both in Nigeria and Britain. The British locations included the British Newspaper Library at Colindale in London, the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics and Political Science, The Library of the American Embassy in London, the library of the Nigerian High Commission in London, the Library of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, the Bromley and Mottingham Libraries, the Imperial War Museum, the BBC Bush House Research Library and Archives, the BBC Broadcasting House Archives, the Catholic Centre for the Study of Communication and Culture in London, the House of Commons and House of Lords Archives, Palace of Westminster, the Archives of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Keesings Contemporary Archives, the Senate House Library, University of London, the City University Library, the University of North London Library, the Rhodes Library, University of Oxford, the Oxford University Press Archives, and the Tanzanian and Ghanaian High Commissions in London, the Royal African Society, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the United Nations Association, the Library of the French Embassy in London, the Confederation of British Industries (CBI), amongst a host of others. Archival and library materials, newspapers, magazines, periodicals, were examined and qualitatively analysed.

The Nigerian locations included the War Museum at Umuahia, the Federal Government Archives in Lagos, the Government Archives at Ibadan, the Government Archives in Kaduna, the Museum of Ancient History in Calabar, and the Archives of the Daily Times in Lagos, and New Nigerian Newspaper in Kaduna. The Archives in the East had been destroyed, as a result, nothing was forthcoming from there.

The only copy of the Biafra Sun, the Biafra Newspaper, was kindly donated by Father Michael Golden in Dublin.

Interviews were conducted in Britain, Nigeria, Ireland, France, Geneva, and Portugal. It has been necessary to travel twice yearly to Nigeria throughout the period of research to be able to get anything done. Some of the places visited in the course of the research in Nigeria include Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu, Umuahia, Aba, Owerri, Calabar, Ete, Okon, Kaduna, Kano, Jos, Ikot Ekpene, Port Harcourt, etc.(see map).

Several telephone call attempts to extract information and materials from the OAU Headquarters in Ethiopia were unsuccessful. A search of Geneva to find Markpress has also proved unsuccessful. Even the International Exchange enquiry was not helpful. The only information obtained was that William Bernhart, the Director, had folded up and returned to America. He, incidentally, was an American citizen.

The research has utilised extensively the knowledge gained from active participation in propaganda activities, and broadcasting on Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra, by the author. This has been enriched by discussions with and interviews of colleagues in the media in Britain, Nigeria, and defunct Biafra. The interviews with Generals Gowon and Ojukwu were immensely useful, and very enlightening, as to the political, and propaganda objectives of the two governments.

The thirty four volumes of Encyclopaedia Britannica, which had to be acquired for easy access, have been useful for references and pointers to other relevant materials and texts, for definitions, and for historical analysis, and development of theoretical arguments.

1.4. Contextual Definitions.

Familial: denotes the family resemblance between the propaganda policies and activities of different countries.

Sensibility: is the capacity to feel physically or emotionally hurt; the tendency to be exceptionally sensitive to messages received.

Sensitivity: portrays acute reaction to external stimuli or mental impressions; having sensibility to, or responding emotionally to propaganda.

Motivation: signifies the stimulation of the emotions of the targeted audience by the propagandist. Whereas sensibility may be passive, motivation activates, leading to mobilisation.

Mobilisation: means that having been motivated, the targeted publics react by doing the things that the propagandist demands of them.

Negative compensation: occurs when, a state makes negative public statements about another whilst enjoying the patronage and sponsorship of that other state. This is done to demonstrate independence of policies and actions.

Positive compensation: occurs when a state that benefits from the patronage and sponsorship of another makes positive public statements about that other, and also openly gravitates towards it.

Horizontal powers: are states that are of the same or similar status militarily and/or economically as the propagandist.

Vertical powers: are those that are militarily and/or economically stronger, higher or more powerful than the propagandist.

Other terms are defined within the context of the chapters and passages.

1.5. Arrangement of Chapters - TWO - SIX.

CHAPTER TWO: 'The Old Regime - (Pre 1939)' aims at tracing the origin, history and definition of propaganda (or psychological warfare). It will argue that propaganda is as old as war itself but the "modus operandi" pre 1939 was different because of the tools available at the time, the state of the world and international relations, and the behaviour of war leaders within the environment so prescribed. Was war "just or unjust"? Why was it necessary to justify war? It will examine whether propaganda was employed or involved in the whole process of 'just war'. What lessons arose from the American Civil War and War of Independence, the Russian Revolution, the French Revolution. What does the "Boston Tea Party", or 'Ojukwu's beard', or, 'Yabuku Wagon' mean in terms of propaganda?

CHAPTER THREE: 'Modern Methods and Concepts' continues with the theme from the preceding chapter in terms of De Fide Propaganda,, and asks; what did the Second World War bring? This chapter will examine German and Allied- British- attitudes towards propaganda. Hitler, unprecedented in history, set up the Ministry of Propaganda, run by Goebbels. What effect did this have on attitudes- and on the war? What has happened since the Second World War, It will analyse the lessons accruing from the Chinese, and other civil wars, as a basis for comparison with the Biafra experience. Are there meeting points for the old and the new? Is there a family resemblance in their propaganda structures?

CHAPTER FOUR: Biafra: The Domestic Factor.

From a combination of personal knowledge, interviewing of colleagues, archives and other sources on the war, this chapter will attempt to relive the experience of the media in Biafra and the effect thereof on the Biafran war constituencies (internal and external). It will examine through comparison with other wars- already discussed in preceding chapters- what modes and systems were employed in Biafra and to what effect. It will examine the lessons for Nigeria and Biafra resulting from the war. What effect did the Biafran slogan 'the price of liberty is eternal vigilance', and the Nigerian slogan 'to keep Nigeria one is a task that must be done' have on the combatants.

CHAPTER FIVE: Biafra: The External Factor.

Since this thesis argues that civil war can be internationalised through effective propaganda, here it will be explained. The chapter will look at the involvement of Britain, U.S.A., Russia, France, The Vatican, Portugal, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Israel and others. It will examine how much propaganda influenced their decision to be involved (on either side) and the extent to which it was determined by self interest.

CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion.

Drawing from all the above, a conclusion on the arguments will be extracted. The chapter will draw on the interviews with Gowon, Ojukwu, and other participants in the Nigerian civil war, to discover how effective and sustainable Biafran propaganda was. It will examine Nigeria's post civil war rehabilitation and status, and examine the lessons learnt from the war. The future direction of Nigeria's ethnic integration will be analysed, and conclusions will be drawn on suggestions from the protagonists, on the cause of the war, and what they see as possible solutions.

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33,36 - 37,60 - 6 1.
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Cross River State. He stated that T.S. Elliot enunciated
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CHAPTER TWO:

THE OLD REGIME: (PRE 1939).

2.1. Introduction.

This chapter will examine the theme that propaganda in war is as old as war itself.

In Chapter One, it was argued that propaganda has the constituents of psychological warfare and censorship - all amounting to the manipulation of information, to inform or disinform, in order to achieve victory against the adversary. The common denominator that spans the ages is the justification of war-the notion of the 'just war'. It is therefore appropriate to take a closer look at the notion; and the other constituents of propaganda pre-1939. In doing this, and in highlighting the arguments it will be necessary to juxtapose, compare, and analyse examples from different periods. There will be definitions and discussions of relevant contextual terms. Areas covered in the chapter include the just war, psychological warfare, and censorship.

2.2. The Just War:

The medieval European concept held that a ruler, by proper declaration and with proper motives, might employ armed force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify wrongs and punish crimes. He could, that is, take up arms for a just cause (which in practice was variously interpreted, but usually involved an appropriate response to a wrongful act). The concept developed as early as St. Augustine in the 4th century and was still accepted by the Dutch jurist and writer on international law Hugo Grotius in the 17th century. Its popularity thereafter declined,¹ though, in the 20th century, it enjoyed a revival in somewhat new form with the idea that a nation might resort to armed force in self-defence or in the execution of collective obligations toward international peace keeping operations. From this description of the 'just war', it may be observed that the

notion of 'the just war', tended to be propaganda oriented. Because of the authority of the rulers and war lords of the time, the constituencies to be motivated may have differed from what obtains in the 20th century, but the objective and the notion was the same. There had to be an appeal to the sensibilities of the other constituencies that could affect the course of the war vertically or horizontally.

There had to be 'justification' for going to war, and for sustaining it. The soldiers during the period had to be mobilised, and sustained at war, to defeat the enemy -the 'evil' or 'devil'. 'Justification'² in Christian theology was either (1) the act by which God moves a person from the state of sin (injustice), to the state of grace (justice); (2) the change in a person's condition as he moves from a state of sin to a state of righteousness, or (3) especially in Protestantism, the act of acquittal whereby God gives contrite sinners the status of the righteous. The term, is a translation of the Greek 'dikaiosis', (Latin - justificatio), originally a technical legal term derived from the verb "to make someone righteous".³

To justify an action requires the building up of a credible case. The process of building up the case involves the cultivation of an image of the enemy as evil. The message to those at which the image is projected is, 'propaganda'. The message and the messenger have to be credible for the constituencies - 'reactors' - to respond to the intentions of the messenger. The 'enemy' has to be destroyed in the eyes of the constituencies to justify the taking up of arms to obtain 'justification' in the interest of 'peace' and international order. The adversarial leader had to be caricatured to show that he was an eccentric who wanted conquest for his own selfish ends. He had to be made to look obnoxious to the foreign and domestic audiences. This practice establishes a trend that has spanned the ages.

The 'evil' ruler could not and would not by himself carry out actions that would 'redeem' himself, and free his subjects from persecution. Therefore it was up to the fair and

righteous (the good) ruler, in the interests of humanity, to 'redeem' the 'evil' by taking up arms against him; to correct his evil ways, move him from 'a state of sin to a state of righteousness' and redeem his subjects from persecution. The propaganda message during the pre-1939 period of history was mainly targeted at the 'international' community laterally or horizontally, dependent on whether the constituency being addressed was a major, medium or minor power. During the early modern period, the domestic constituency did not require too much motivation because the authority of the messenger, the ruler, was absolute. It had to be mobilised however, to wage and sustain the war. The motivating message was for the people to serve 'the King and Country' by going to war and making the supreme sacrifice. Posthumous decorations, however noble, were nevertheless, propaganda messages to convince those who might hesitate, that there was everlasting reward in making the supreme sacrifice. The evolution of sovereign states in Europe was foreshadowed by the publication in 1625 of Hugo Grotius', "De Jure Belli ac Pacis" (on the law of war and peace), which held that states are bound by a code of legally binding duties and prohibitions.⁴

Efforts to regulate warfare grew when weapons became more destructive. The Declaration of Paris (1856) abolished privateering. In 1863, during the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued general orders No. 100, 'Instructions for the Government of Armies in the Field', which were based on the Lieber code, a codification prepared by Francis Lieber that had great subsequent influence on the first Geneva Convention which was adopted in Switzerland in 1864, to protect those wounded in war. Conferences at the Hague in 1899 and 1907 codified many of the existing laws of war. The Geneva Conventions of 1906, 1929 and 1949 expanded and refined the law of war as applied to civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded and sick military personnel. Several treaties banned particular weapons. For example, the Geneva Protocol on Gas Warfare (1925) prohibited the use of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare.⁵

The issue of what constituted a just war was argued in a theological context. War was 'just' whatever its cause if undertaken by the highest authority, an independent prince. From the 18th century, through world war 1, each nation was deemed the sole judge of its need to wage war.⁶ This was the message of the 'age' and the authority was the messenger. However, the League of Nations Covenant held that aggression constituted serious international misconduct. The Kellogg-Briand Pact(1928) which condemned recourse to war influenced the Nuremberg trials of German war criminals after the second world war.

To galvanise international and domestic public opinion against an adversary, it was necessary to show that the aggressor had violated the law of war enunciated earlier and therefore was waging an unjust war against the 'messenger' or propagandist, or against weak, defenceless peoples. The message had to be strong, convincing and credible. The messenger had to be authoritative, dependable and believable. The total package was propagandist. The messenger had to be portrayed as almost a deity who was infallible, who could invite you to, and for whom you could, die in order to serve him. His cause, according to his message, was just and right, even though, the age recognised 'might as right'.⁷

David French⁸ says that Pitt the Younger did not rush into war with revolutionary France although his belief and his message to his domestic constituency was that the 'political nation had not lost its dislike of continental entanglements'. The British domestic constituency was informed that in 1789, the French revolution did not threaten Britain's European interests. This was reinforced by the rather reassuring message that the French were doing what the British had done during the 'Glorious revolution'. This 'positive' propaganda to the British constituency, reinforced by the traditional insularity and nationalistic instincts of the British, became a credible option of many Englishmen who, as

a result welcomed the consequent upheavals in France, hoping that they would have the effect of weakening their 'rival'.

Even in this case, the message had the positive effect of calming the British public, and not motivating and mobilising them to war against France, but it was negative as far as the international propaganda spectrum was concerned. This was because even when the French National Assembly declared war on Austria and Prussia in April 1792, abolished the monarchy and established a republic, Pitt did nothing. He would not go to war to save the French monarchy. This was a clear demonstration of the power of the French propaganda, which as stated, at the time was in accord with the traditional view of British national interests.

Whilst there was serious civil war in France, the international community was contained with an effective, credible, and sustaining message. This is a demonstration of how domestically generated propaganda in civil war can have either a positive or negative effect on the international spectrum. The object, in all cases was to create a more egalitarian society and bring justice to an unjust and cruel society.

David French says that during the American war of independence,⁹ Clausewitz's message to his audiences was that before 1793, war had been an affair for governments alone but that during the French revolution, 'suddenly war again became the business of the people' who threw the full weight of their nation's might into their struggles. He further states that the break between the limited wars of the eighteenth century and the era of unlimited war beginning in 1793 (and temporarily ending in 1815), was less sharp than Clausewitz suggested. Its beginnings can be discerned during the Seven Year's war. The means which the combatants adopted may have been limited but for at least one belligerent, Prussia, the ends were not.

The anti-Prussian alliance tried to deprive her of more than just a province; they wished to reduce her to the ranks of a second-rate power. And, had he looked across the Atlantic, Clausewitz might have noticed that in the 1770s and 1780s, the Americans had already

shown how the full weight of the people might be thrown into a national war effort. The American war of independence was unlike the wars which had been fought in Europe for dynastic aims earlier in the eighteenth century. It was not so much a struggle for territory as a contest for the political allegiance of the American people. The Americans proclaimed that they were fighting to liberate themselves from the despotism of British rule. The great cause for which they believed they were fighting filled enough Americans with patriotic zeal to enable the congress to mobilise the colonies' resources in a way which had not been seen in Europe since the Thirty Year's war.

Embedded in this project were two important notions - (1) the notion of psychological warfare, which will be discussed in detail in another section of this chapter. (2). the notion of justification. The American war of independence was a kind of civil war, in that subjects of the crown in a colony were rebelling against the King and Country, and the metropolitan authority. Nevertheless, they felt justified to take up arms to 'emancipate' themselves from the oppressive rule of the metropolitan authority.

Central to the age of the 'just war' were the English civil wars. The English civil wars also have a bearing on the two notions considered in this chapter - the 'just war' and psychological warfare. Robert Ashton opens his book The English Civil Wars,¹⁰ with a speech by James 1 to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall on Wednesday the 21st of March, 1609. The speech goes:

"The State of MONARCHIE is the supreme thing upon earth: for Kings are not onely GOD'S lieutenants vpon earth, and sit vpon GOD'S throne, but even by GOD himselfe are called GODS".

A second quote comes from John Shelden's Table Talk:

"A King is a thing men have made for their own sakes, for quietness' sake"; and a third relevant quote comes from 'Example for Kings: or Rule for Princes to govern by' :

"As in natural things, the head being cut off,
the rest cannot be called a body:
no more can in politick things a multitude,
or commonality, without a head be incorporate".¹¹

Such quotes - and it would not be difficult to find others, epitomised the ritual deification of the monarch. According to Robert Ashton, this message was so propagated that the monarchy was regarded as a divinely ordered institution, endowed with formidable, charismatic and supernatural powers.

One of the most spectacular manifestations of this was the power of magical healing, which the King was reputed to possess. Ironically, James 1 himself was sceptical of these magical powers. However, the appointment of Saul as King by God when the Israelites prayed to God for a King was often cited as proof of the divine and supernatural attributes of the monarch. Such an attitude created a feeling of awe among the subjects of the various Kings. Most historiographers have seen the attributes of divine Kingship as a form of propaganda. On 30th January 1649, the English cut off the head of their King. This was not, ofcourse, the first time that an English King had been done to death by his subjects. What differentiated it from earlier acts of regicide, such as the murder of Edward 11 in 1327, and of Richard 11 in 1399, was that Charles 1 was not furtively murdered in a dark and secret place, but executed on a public scaffold in Whitehall after a trial which, although the King denied the legality of the court, was, it was claimed, conducted according to due process of law. In more modern times, the execution of annointed monarchs - the public execution of Louis XVI in Paris in 1793 and the murder of Tzar Nicholas 11 and his family in an obscure Russian provincial town in 1918 - have been held to symbolise the passing of an order, and the inauguration of a new one.

There can be no doubt that some, though by no means all, of that minority of revolutionaries who were responsible for the regicide of 1649 intended that it, too, should

be symbolic of the birth of a new era, and many historians have been disposed to accept them at their word. To more than one person who lived through the events of 1649, regicide was in itself a blasphemy.¹² Robert Ashton cites Filmer as writing in 1652 that "even the power which God himself exercises over mankind is by right of fatherhood". According to Ashton, James I argued that "just as God is the father of mankind, so 'the stile of Pater patriae was ever and is commonly used to King'. Thus 'as the father...is bound to care for the nourishing, education, and vertous government of his children; even so is the King, bound to care for all his subjects".

The message was a patriachal argument directed at a constituency who were all of the King's subjects. It was not only that the King was the source of all authority, he was also the keeper of all his subjects, and caretaker of all their demands, and the supplier of all their needs and desires. Apart from Filmer, other royalists, like, John Maxwell, Thomas Jordan, Archbishop James Usher, etc; postulated and propogated this message during the 17th century.¹³ This propaganda message was so powerful that no one dared reveal any anti-monarchial feelings. The people's consciences were imprisoned with and by fear. The message contained a number of propaganda elements, such as:

- (1) psychological injunction,
- (2) positive compensation (see note 14),
- (3) negative compensation (see note 15),
- (4) justification.

A further examination of these propaganda elements aroused by the message indicate the following -

- (1) psychological injunction; this is aroused in that the conscience and emotions of the subjects became stultified;¹⁴
- (2) positive compensation; the message acted as enduring motivation for the monarchial and patriachal protagonists and propogandists of the time;

(3) negative compensation;¹⁵ this was intrinsic in the message because it had the effect of latent, though inert motivation for emancipation on the King's subjects, even from some of his beneficiaries, who became galvanised by anti-monarchists like Oliver Cromwell; and, (4) justification; the question that may well be asked is, how in the face of such a powerful and compelling message, is rebellion justified? The problem becomes more complex, because, the monarch, as well as being the keystone of the arch of order, was also the source of all privilege, inequality and social distinction. Deference and privilege pervaded the social arrangements of the 17th century to an extent which requires a real effort of the historical imagination to appreciate.

The royalist Sir John Berkeley quoted no less a person than Oliver Cromwell as saying that "no men could enjoy their Lives and Estates quietly without the King had his Rights". Revolt even against a tyrant was unthinkable, for revolt simply compounded the disorder created by the tyrannical actions which produced it.¹⁶

Nevertheless, despite the difference in historical context, similar elements are to be found at work in the immediate post independence period in Nigeria, when southerners felt deprived and oppressed by the Northerners who controlled the Federal government. Crisis and anarchy ensued in Western Nigeria. This, as will be discussed in chapter 4, led to the first military coup of January 1966, to a counter coup in July by Northern military officers, and to a military government again dominated by the North. The consequence was the civil war, resulting from a series of rapid events culminating in the South - particularly the East - accusing the North of genocide, and a pogrom on Easterners fleeing from the North.(see chs 4&5). In a situation of this nature, the deprived, the disenfranchised, the suppressed and oppressed, carried out covert propaganda, through the medium of secret meetings, word of mouth, and secret documents and pamphlets, in order to co-ordinate, motivate and mobilise their constituencies. The subsequent civil wars in England are replicated in the Biafran case. It is almost the inevitable consequence of absolute

propaganda, censorship and subjugation. The justification for going to war to rectify the situation is usually simpler to attain, ultimately.

The justification in Biafra, as in the English civil wars, was that pleaded by rebels in all civil war situations - the emancipation of the oppressed and suffering, and the restitution of human dignity to the deprived. Cromwell and his men as well as Nzewu with his fellow coup plotters in Nigeria, Ojukwu and all other civil war leaders have applied the same justification. The message of 'FREEDOM' almost always has universal support and usually transmits from covert to overt propaganda. The surgical way to eliminate the domineering and overwhelming rival message, is the elimination of the source, eg. the monarch, the oppressors, the leaders of a regime, etc. This is what Cromwell achieved in the execution of the King, and the Nigerian coup leaders in the assassination of their heads of government. It is the most effective form of counter propaganda. It derives from the words of James 1 himself, quoted earlier, "the severance of the head from the body", rendering it non-functional.

2.3. Psychological Warfare:

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 'psychological' as a science of human mind; a treatise on or system of this; colloquially, mental characteristics.

It defines psychological warfare as - warfare achieving aims by weakening the enemy's morale.¹⁷

The Britannica describes 'psychological warfare' also called 'psywar', as the use of propaganda against an enemy, supported by such military, economic or political measures as may be required. Such propaganda is generally intended to demoralise the enemy, to break his will to fight or resist and sometimes to render him favourably disposed to one's position.¹⁸

Although often looked upon as a modern invention, psychological warfare is of ancient origin. Cyrus the Great employed it against Babylon, Xerxes against the Greeks, and Philip the second of Macedon against Athens. The conquests of Genghis Khan were aided by expertly planted rumours about large numbers of ferocious Mongol horsemen in his army; centuries later, in the American revolution, Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" was but one of many pamphlets used to strengthen the British-American colonists' will to fight. With modern scientific advances in communication, such as high speed printing and radio, together with important developments in the fields of public opinion analysis and the prediction of mass behaviour, psychological warfare has become a more systematic technique in strategy and tactics, and a larger ingredient in warfare as a whole.¹⁹ This theme is taken up more broadly in subsequent chapters of this thesis - (chs.4&5.).

The foregoing definitions lend strength to the postulate at the beginning of the chapter, that the 'Act of Propaganda' is as old as war itself even though the word 'Propaganda' appears to have a relatively modern or immediate pre-modern usage. Secondly, the dictionary definitions reflect the argument in this thesis, that is, that propaganda is designed to appeal to the sensibilities and sensitivities of the recipient targeted groups. The abstract and emotive aspects of psychological warfare bring to the fore the constituent structural elements of propaganda - the ground rules earlier defined, ie. (1) motivation, (2) mobilisation, (3) sustainability, and (4) durability.

In the references made earlier to Robert Ashton's 'The English Civil Wars', it could clearly be seen that the mental and psychological ability of the English to rise against the King in civil war was stultified. The argument here is that propaganda precedes a war, intensifies and sustains through the war, and outlasts the war. The passages from Robert Ashton are a clear indication of propaganda preceding a war. In order to counteract such enormous 'brainwashing' of a whole people, counter propaganda is necessary. The danger is that the

counter propagandist may 'fall out' with the law and authority of the land. In that case, covert propaganda is resorted to.

Brainwashing usually means intensive political indoctrination. In distinguishing between overt and covert propaganda; the former, is that in which the propagandist and perhaps his backers are made known to the 'reactor' - constituency; and the latter, which may include such things as unsigned political advertisements, clandestine radio stations using false names, and statements by editors, politicians or others, who have been secretly bribed by governments, political backers or business firms.²⁰

In the case of the English civil war, and Biafra, where the authority of the King on the one hand, and the military on the other, was supreme, it was essential to use intense covert propaganda by way of secret documents, meetings, word of mouth, pamphlets (etc.). The constituencies, though these secret documents are in most cases purely psychological instruments, are exposed to counter messages, and are therefore mentally reconstructed to resist the status quo. In the English civil war, the vindication for Parliament to go to war against the King, was stated thus -

"...The matter, with us, is quite and generally mistaken, and the question altogether wrong stated, viz, whether we should obey the King or parliament? For the King and parliament are not like two parallel lines, which can never meet, not like two incompatible qualities, which cannot be both in one subject; not like the ARK and Dragon, whom one house will not hold; not like God and Mammon, which one man cannot serve: For by siding with...the parliament, in those things which are according to law, we side with, and serve the King".²¹

From this it is easy to perceive the difficulties of parliament in what it intended to do, and in countering such propaganda as "...who can stretch out his hand against the Lord's anointed and be guiltless?" - an intense psychological line put about by the royalists - a quote from Samuel 26:9.

During the evolution of the theory of propaganda, early commentators observed that the archeological remains of ancient civilizations indicate that dazzling clothing and palaces, impressive statues and temples, magic tokens and insignia, and elaborate legal and religious arguments have been used for thousands of years,²² presumably to convince the common people of the purported greatness and supernatural powers of Kings and priests.

In ancient India, the Buddha, and in ancient China, Confucius, like Plato, in Greece, advocated the use of truthfulness, "good" rhetoric, and "proper" forms of speech and writing as a means of persuading men, by both precept and example, to live the good life. Toward 400BC. in India, Kautilya, a Brahmin believed to have been chief minister to the emperor Chandragupta Maurya, reputedly wrote the Arthashastra '(Principles of Politics), a book of advice for rulers, that has often been compared with Plato's Republic, and Machiavelli's much later work The Prince. Kautilya discussed, in some detail, the use of psychological warfare, both overt and clandestine, in efforts to disrupt an enemy's army and capture his capital. Overtly, he said, the propagandists of a King, should proclaim that he can do magic, that God and the wisest men are on his side, and that all who support his war aims will reap benefits. Covertly, Kautilya states, his agents should infiltrate his enemies' and potential enemies' Kingdoms, spreading defeatism and misleading news among their people, especially in capital cities, among leaders, and among the armed forces. In particular, a King should employ only Brahmins, unquestionably (according to him), the holiest and wisest of men, as propagandists and diplomatic negotiators. These morally irreproachable, experts should cultivate the goodwill of their King's friends, and of friends of his friends, and should also woo the enemies of his enemies. A King should not

hesitate, however, to break any friendships or alliances that are later found to be disadvantageous.²³ Similar advice is found in Ping-fa(The Art of War), by the Chinese theorist Sun Tzu who wrote at about the same time. He said:

"All Warfare" is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive;
when we are near, we must make the enemy believe
that we are far away; when far away, we must
make them believe we are near; hold out baits
to entice the enemy.
Feign disorder and crush him".²⁴

In 16th century Italy, Machiavelli discussed like Kautilya and Sun-tzu, before him, the uses of calculated piety and duplicity in peace and war. In Shakespeare's plays, Mark Antony and the Duke of Buckingham display the principles of propaganda and discuss them in words and concepts that anticipate the present day behaviour of political scientists (see Julius Ceasar Act111 and Richard111, Act111). They refer to such propaganda strategems, as the seizure and monopolization of propaganda initiatives, the displacement of guilt on to others (scapegoatism), the presentation of oneself as morally superior, and the coordination of propaganda with violence and bribery. It is fair to deduce from such writings that psychological warfare and propaganda are one and the same thing or at least integrally assimilable with one another. It follows logically, that despite the fact that the word "propaganda" was not used in ancient times, the 'Act' existed through psychological warfare. It is as old as war itself. Another element which has surfaced from the above discussion is 'deception'. This will be discussed together with censorship. The other pointer that arises from the foregoing references, is the fact that apart from being as old as war, the elemental objective of propaganda has not changed -(ie.) to dismember the enemy psychologically and emotionally, in order to defeat him, whilst at the same time emotionally motivating the propagandist's constituency to go to war to defeat the assigned enemy. The process of deception referred to in the foregoing discussion was applied in the

first world war, during the second world war by Hitler, and the Allies, during the Biafran war by Nigeria and Biafra alike and as later seen during the Gulf war of 1991.

Propaganda transcends time. It is necessarily a vital part of strategic military planning. It will be seen in chapters 4 & 5 how deception featured rather heavily in the Biafra war.

In cases where the propaganda status (eg. of the Kings, in England, or the military in Nigeria), is so immense, that counter propaganda, cannot reverse the psychological damage already done (to the counter propagandist's objectives), then it becomes necessary, to sever the head from the body: It becomes necessary to eliminate the messenger, the embodiment of the message that has become so overwhelming as to mesmerise the targeted publics.

In the English case, it was necessary to show that the King could be humiliated, and what better way to do it than to execute him publicly. The psychological effect was electric. It caused a reverse shock action. In the case of Biafra, the two earlier coups of 1966 (the first of January and the counter coup of July), were to achieve this aim. It proves that the "untouchables", the "deified" are after all reachable. It causes the psychological and moral superiority of the propaganda status quo to evaporate, and in reverse, the counter propagandist becomes the "strong one", "the dependable one", the credible messenger, whose message ought to be taken seriously and believed.

Just as Genghis Khan used to frighten his enemies by planting rumours of huge ferocious Mongols in his army, in Nigeria similar stories abounded. There were stories of 'native doctors', 'juju men' or (as the European colonialists preferred to call them, witch doctors), leading their different warriors into battle. If one part to the conflict lost, it meant, according to folklore, that the 'juju man' of the victors was mystically stronger.

There is a clan in Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria called the Ukpum Ete/Okon clan. A civil war erupted in the clan (about 100 years ago), between Ete and Okon regarding the ascendancy of the clan Kingship. Folklore has it that the leader of the Ete people was so

mystically powerful that he could invisibly penetrate enemy ranks. He was impervious to bullets, arrows, matchettes, spears or any other offensive weapons. The two communities fought several skirmishes between them over territorial borders, and over the Kingship. In the final battle, Ete, because of the powers of its leader Obio-Akama, discarded bullets, pellets, cartridges, and all traditionally offensive weapons, and loaded their hunting and shot guns with sheep and goat dung. The Okon people had live bullets, pellets and cartridges in their guns. It is claimed that none of the Ete warriors died from that battle, whilst the Okon people were slaughtered, routed and annihilated. Since then, Okon has not dared to attack Ete again.²⁵

This legend represents the epitome of psychological warfare.

It accommodates all the hypotheses postulated by this thesis. It acted to motivate, mobilise and sustain. It also outlasted the war. In his writings on the Ete warriors, Jackson Ufot,²⁶ likens Obio-Akama as the English to King Arthur or King George the dragon slayer, and equates the Ete warriors with the Knights of the round table. They were indestructible, at least by human beings. Obio-Akama's tomb is a place of pilgrimage for all descendants of the clan, even now. All 'bona fide' male children of the clan are taken there for a ceremony when they are born, because they are potential accessors to the throne - potential Kings. It is said that Obio-Akama never really died, but lives on.

These two communities of Ete and Okon became part of colonial Eastern Nigeria and were actively involved in the civil war. The influence of Biafran and Nigerian propaganda on these communities will be discussed in chapter 4. It is clear however that psychological warfare or propaganda has its own cultural base and constituency. The reaction of the various cultural groups depend on the language and form of the message they receive, on the messenger, and on the interpretation of the received message, by the various segments or groups within a particular community. It is clear also that psychological warfare has no territorial bounds. As a concept, it is global. It has been transmitted from primitive times

to modern times. If 'cowboy westerns' are anything to go by, psychological warfare was a potent weapon in the hands of the Ameri-Indians who were fighting skirmishes for survival against invading, occupying, and colonising 'white men'. Like the Ameri-Indians, the wearing of leopard skins, charms, amulets and the carrying of offensive weapons as a sign of prowess by an African warrior still endures amongst the Zulus of South Africa even today. That is why it was difficult to make them discard these things, no matter how much the South African Government and the African National Congress tried, during the period preceding the multi party elections in 1994. It is like trying to strip them of their last (psychological) propaganda weapon - like disarming them of their manly prowess. A community does not have to be literate, or educated to imbibe and interpret propaganda. It is in fact possible that an overly educated community would over-analyse and delay or obstruct the effect of propaganda messages. This is ofcourse arguable. Psychological warfare or propaganda is described as a system of education. The level at which this education takes place is important. The culture of the society is also important, and varies as from the Chinese community, through the English community, the Indian community to the African community. There have to be set goals for any propaganda message.²⁷ This thesis prefers to describe those goals as objectives. The achievement of the goals or objectives depends on the measure of achievement at the end of the war. It is a matter of 'finis opus coronat' (the end crowns the work).

Oral history deriving from the Ete and Okon communities, chosen as sample communities of Eastern Nigeria also suggests that covert psychological warfare was rampant during inter-communal and intra-communal wars. The implantation of rumours and agents to spread rumours within the enemy camp was a constant strategy. The issuance of pamphlets was not possible at the time, because of the people's level of education, but the rumours of invisible, invincible warriors, who could strike the enemy by pointing a finger to the sun, had impacted psychologically on the morale and emotions of the enemy.

Overtly, town criers (who still exist today), were used to put out certain announcements, first thing in the morning, and last thing at night all around the propagandist's territory. One of the objectives of this in war time was to put out false messages to the scouts of the enemy - a process of deception - discussed in detail in the next section. Here, the point to note is that it was a clear case of information manipulation to achieve optimum propaganda effect and mislead the enemy.

By the time of the first world war, Christianity had arrived in Ete. With it came church bells. The tolling of church bells in a particularly coded message acted as a motivating morse code in the event of an attack on the community. It is not clear how this originated, or how it was deciphered. However, some selected members of the community were responsible for responding to the message of the church bells by the scouts, and for rapid mobilisation - a sort of "rapid reaction force".

At the other end of the world spectrum, in Russia, civil wars were as rife as they were in Africa during the the old regime ie. the period up to 1939. Of great importance in this context is the period of the Bolshevik revolution. The propaganda that preceded it, was sustained during, and succeeded, this period, is part of the indelible history of Russia and the now defunct Soviet Union. According to John Daborn²⁸ it is befitting to start with Karl Marx's motto, 'De Omnibus dubitandum' (one should doubt everything)! He states that on International Women's Day, 8th March, 1917, the government of Tsar Nicholas 11 introduced a new round of bread and flour rationing in the capital, Petrograd. For thousands of women, housewives and factory workers, it was the final blow. They ignored the pleas of union leaders to remain calm. The banners carried on that day included more than demands for bread, but also an end to the war, and the overthrow of the autocracy. There were no casualties and the day seemed to end peacefully. However, the following day saw a mass strike involving half the factories in Petrograd. The demands for the overthrow of the Tsar now outstripped those for bread. It was on the third day, 10th

March, that the police began firing on the striking workers. By 12th March, many of the conscript troops of the Petrograd garrison began to listen to the pleas of the demonstrators. Some remained hesitant, others moved over to join the crowd and fire on the police. The volhynian Regiment (among others) killed their commander and went over to the workers. Hitherto latent, inert, civil discontent, had suddenly been motivated and mobilised into a bread riot, culminating in a revolution. On 12th March, Russia acquired not one, but two new governments. The Petrograd Soviet of workers deputies which had briefly existed during the 1905 revolution was revived. On the same day and in the same building, the Tauride Palace, the Duma ignored the Tsar's call to disperse, and hesitatingly formed 'a Provisional Committee'. This later became known as the provisional government. It was the politicians from this group who requested the Tsar's abdication on 15th March. This he did, once it became clear that he could no longer enjoy the trust of his army generals. The February revolution was over. It was regarded as a relatively bloodless coup since only 1,315 people were wounded or killed.

A society that thrives on revolutions, also invariably thrives on propaganda. As with the pre civil war, English Kings, and twentieth century military dictatorships, the Tsar was the Alpha and Omega of the Russian society before the revolution. Like all dictatorial and autocratic regimes, the subjects were reduced to non-entities, not only through physical domination, but also by the stories of the Tsar's enormous unquenchable powers. The message here was as uncompromising as that of the English Kings, and the military government in Nigeria, because, in any case the Tsar, the King, and the military, all ruled by physical and propagandist force. To counteract, the revolutionaries in any civil war have to address themselves to a simple uncomplicated message, in a language that would permeate the consciousness of the oppressed, and tap the sweet sap of the suppressed emotions, like an African tapper, tapping the sweet sap from a palm wine tree for public and mass drinking. In short, the message from the dictators and autocrats is total and

uncompromising, whilst the message from the revolutionaries should be simple and uncomplicated. The one is based on psychological pressure, on fear and intimidation; the other on redemption and emancipation - the common denominator in all revolutionaries.²⁹ The Russian situation witnessed carefully planned and executed covert propaganda against the Tsar, that motivated and mobilised the mass to take the action that resulted in the events of 8th to 12th March. It was an example of the revolutionaries understanding the needs of their constituencies, and using those needs to design a suitable message. In that circumstance, the message, even though propagandist, acts to motivate confidence, to coordinate and arouse inert and latent, mutual feelings, into spontaneous conflagration. After that, overt propaganda takes over, to sustain the actions of resistance, rebellion and revolution. John Daborn for instance, says that the Bolsheviks had come to power promising 'Peace, Bread and Land', and 'All Power to the Soviets'.³⁰ On peace and land, Lenin wasted no time in drafting decrees in the first two days of the new regime. Bread was a more intractable problem, since that was not a matter to be settled by decree. These were all the things that the people were deprived of under the Tsar. The revolutionaries knew this, and responded to their demands. No one, had a clear idea as to what 'All Power to the Soviets' meant, or how it would operate. He says that one tendency which is clear however, is that before the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in March 1918, the Bolsheviks passed through what is often described as their 'utopian' phase.³¹ At this point, optimism was at its height, and Lenin expressed himself time and time again on the capacity of the ordinary masses to administer the new social order. This was given practical force in the decree on workers' control of the factories. Political prisoners were released, if they promised not to attack the Soviet power, and the Bolsheviks entered into a coalition with the largest peasant party, the 'left SRS'. Revolutionary propaganda is usually a question of 'them against us', and whoever exerts the greatest psychological impact, motivates the constituencies to gravitate towards the exerting propagandist or messenger. The 'floating voters' have to be swayed one way or another. John Daborn

again states that since the days of Alexander II the opposition to the Tsar was united by the call for a representative assembly. In the 1905 revolution, Nicholas II had only managed to regain control of the country by offering a parliament or Duma. This was immediately negated by the promulgation of the Fundamental Law of 1906, which maintained that the Tsar remained an autocrat; in other words, the Duma would have no real power. In the first two Dumas, the Kadets, and after them the Social Democrats tried to contest the Tsar's power and as a result, the Dumas were dismissed. In 1917, the February revolution was hailed by all opposition parties as the beginning of the long awaited 'democratic revolution'. At this point in the history of Russia, the people needed to be propelled into a particular course of action, the revolutionaries knew this, counteracted the Tsar's psychology of brainwashing, identified with the people, tuned their propaganda into their frequency, and, stimulated their consciousness.

Consideration of the Russian revolution, apart from answering the questions of who makes, and who receives propaganda, also answers the question of what is the effect of propaganda. The effect is implicit and the result is explicit. The effect is the motivation and mobilisation of the constituency, and the result is the event of 12th March - the overthrow of the Tsar, and the introduction of 'democratic revolution'.

Sometimes, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary propaganda are like psychiatric treatment for people who have been subjected to prolonged mental brainwashing. The act is the reversal of conscious and unconscious beliefs and views held hitherto.³² It was not different in Russia, it was not different in Biafra, it is not different now. The Russian revolution also answers the question, which hopefully is self evident - why propaganda? - Without propaganda, the turning point would never have occurred. It is propaganda that coordinated mutual feelings of discontent, and motivated the confidence to act in unison. This will again be treated in greater depth in the concluding chapter. Here was also an

example of how civil war propaganda could be internationalised. John Daborn indicates that the Bolshevik view of the development of the revolution was intimately connected to the war, and the future international workers revolution, which Lenin believed would issue from it. Lenin's slogan in 1915 had been 'Turn the imperialist war into a civil war'. The Russian working class had done just this, but, although Brest Litovsk brought peace with Germany, it did not end the 'imperialist' war. The previous allies of Tsarist Russia (the Entente Powers, Britain and France), aided by the United States, Japan and the newly independent states of Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all declared war on Bolshevik Russia. Lenin maintained that his aim was to build a 'socialist order' (a worker's controlled state), inside Russia. He also envisaged that the international revolution would, within a matter of months rather than years, ensure the victory of the proletarian revolution, first in Russia, and then around the world, against all 'imperialist' dictatorships and governments.³³ This was his message to his constituencies domestic and international. He was therefore surprised when the German workers and socialist parties had not risen up against the 'excesses' of the Kaiser. Nevertheless, communism and socialism did spread from Russia around the world, particularly to under-developed and developing countries seeking to shake off the yoke of imperialism and/or colonialism.

As in the case of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria (etc.), a copiously rehearsed, well organised and carefully targeted propaganda, whilst having the effect of psychological warfare domestically, does also have the tendency of either sucking in the international community financially, morally, physically and militarily; or alienating them, dependent on the targeted publics and the interpretations of the message received. In either reaction, the messenger is affected negatively or positively. The effect of positive and negative propaganda will be taken up in the next section of this chapter.

In large measure, the Bolshevik revolution was an outcome of the dissatisfaction caused by the gross mismanagement of Russian first world war effort. This in propaganda terms had vertical and horizontal effects, with the Russian populace demanding a change in governance, at least to extricate the country from the war.

Also, there was a bilateral influence in propaganda activity, with the Bolsheviks wanting to spread the 'proletarian' doctrine to the rest of the world after the overthrow of the Tsar, and the allies of the Tsar (Britain and France), trying psychologically to influence the Russian masses to resist the overthrow. They did this by intimidating them with the threat of repercussions and reprisals from the weight and range of forces lined up on the side of the Tsar, against the Russian populace. There was also Germany to deal with, which relief only came after the treaty of Brest Litovsk, already discussed.

However, this period saw an immense display and exploitation of psychological warfare, covert and overt around the world. For instance, Major General J.F.C. Fuller, describes the first world war as a 'Carnival of death'.³⁴ General Fuller further states that fifty years before 1914, in the American civil war, when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed, a participant wrote: "our infantry were tired of charging earthworks. The ordinary enlisted men assert that one good man behind an earthwork was equal to three good men outside of it" - an example of a currency of propaganda during the period (showing the prowess of the riflemen), also outlasting the war. However, General Fuller goes on to say that his troops were motivated to battle with the belief that the 'rifle bullet was Lord of the battle' in the first world war. The implication, the message was that the soldiers should be motivated to go into battle without fear, because they were protected by the greater fire power of the rifle bullet, as things had moved on since the American civil war period, when the muzzle-loading rifle prevailed. Rather, according to General Fuller, the prevalent belief amongst soldiers, arising out of the message to the constituencies, was that "it was the rifle bullet, which had rendered the defence stronger than the attack (here he was

defending the incapacity of the generals to win profitable battles): it begot the rifle-pit and the trench, it sheathed the bayonet, it blunted the sword, it drove back the cannon, and it dismounted the horseman".³⁵

Leon Wolf states that because of this, and other similar psychological messages, which created confidence in the combatants, they even took on bets on the war ending within one year. When things changed, they were no longer making bets that "the war would be over by next year". They had begun, he says, to whisper that "it might last a life time", usually followed by the mocking: "They say the first seven years will be the worst". Nobody sang "Tipperary" any more - that dashing inspiring tune of earlier days. It had been replaced by "Take Me Back To Dear Old Blighty". He goes on, sardonically they hummed to the tune of "Auld Lang Syne"; and tunes like:

"We're here because we're here,
Because we're here, because we're here;
We're here because we're here,
Because we're here, because we're here".³⁶

This was a demonstration of positive psychological warfare (propaganda), turning negative when the objective is not achieved within specified parameters.

As in the case of the Bolshevik revolution, propaganda is legitimised when the objectives are not only just achievable, but achieved, even if the starting point was deception. When the objectives are not achieved within certain set parameters and goals, a negative effect results which becomes counter productive, as illustrated by the British soldiers (in the medium term) in the first world war. This does not mean that the war was not eventually won by Britain and the Allies; it only means that because the front soldiers, the survivors,

expected to see their families in a year, when victory did not soon materialise, the opposite motivation crept in. It is essential therefore to sustain the propaganda and intensify it during the war, in order to sustain morale. It might be necessary to alter the message and the form of sending it, in order to achieve this. In this case the British soldiers, having found themselves in a 'catch 22' situation, had to rouse their own morale with the kind of songs cited above. A constituency not only galvanises itself, but inwardly believes in its ultimate, if protracted victory.

2.4.. Censorship.

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines censor as an official with power to suppress whole or parts of books, plays, films, letters, news, (etc.) on grounds of obscenity, threat to security (etc.). (2).v.t. act as censor of; make deletions or changes in; (3). censorship n: censorial.³⁷

The Britannica defines censor,³⁸ plural censors, or censores, in ancient Rome; as a magistrate whose original functions of registering citizens and their property were greatly expanded to include supervision of senatorial rolls and moral conduct. Censors also assessed property for taxation and contracts, penalised moral offenders by removing their public rights, such as voting and tribe membership, and presided at the lustrum ceremonies of purification at the close of each census. The censorship was instituted in 443BC and discontinued in 22BC, when the emperors assumed censorial powers.

The censors, who always numbered two, were elected normally at five-year intervals in the 'Comitia Centuriata' (one of the assemblies in which the Roman people voted). Plebeians became eligible in 351BC for the originally patrician office. Judgements were

passed only with the agreement of both incumbents, and the death or abdication of one resulted in the retirement of the other.

In traditional East Asia, a censor was a governmental official charged primarily with the responsibility for scrutinizing and criticizing the conduct of officials and rulers. The office originated in China, where under the Ch'in (221-206BC) and Han (206BC-AD220) dynasties, the censor's function was to criticize the emperor's acts; but as the imperial office gained prestige, the censorate became mainly an instrument for imperial control of the bureaucracy, investigating acts of official corruption and misgovernment for the emperor. The censors checked important documents, supervised construction projects, reviewed judicial proceedings, kept watch over state property, and maintained a general lookout for cases of subversion and corruption. Although the functions of the censorate were maintained in the Chinese Nationalist, and to a lesser extent, the Chinese Communist governments, the institution effectively ended in China with the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911. However, a censorate apparatus was adopted by all the East and Central Asian states that copied the Chinese bureaucratic system. In Korea, because of the relatively weak position of the Korean King and the strength of the aristocracy, the censorate became a highly important organ, that not only scrutinized corruption, but criticized the policies of the monarch.³⁹

The Micropaedia Britannica⁴⁰ defines censorship as the suppression or prohibition of speech or writing that is condemned as subversive of the common good. It occurs in all manifestations of authority to some degree, but in modern times, it has been of special importance in its relation to government and the rule of law. In the ancient world, the regulation of the moral, as well as the political, life of a people was considered a proper, if not necessary role of government.

In the ancient Greek communities, as in Rome, it was assumed that the character of a people would and should be shaped by the government. Even the quite open society of Athens had limits, as indicated by the trial and conviction of Socrates in 399BC for his corruption of youth, and acknowledgement of unorthodox divinities.

In the Republic, Plato outlines a comprehensive system of censorship, particularly of the arts, as part of the development of the best possible regime.

Such censorship was an integral part of life in ancient Israel, where opinions and actions were routinely governed by the community. But, those in a position to know - the prophet Nathan, for example, were expected to speak out against abuses by those in power. This was possible because the community had been trained to share a group of moral principles grounded in thoughtfulness. It led to the encouragement in early Christianity of private individual testimonies of faith, bearing upon the eternal welfare of the soul.

Ancient China was perhaps the largest polity to be thoroughly trained on a vast scale. Of great importance were the systems of education and examination that determined one's place in a social structure that made much of the Confucian insistence upon deference to authority and respect for ritual. Under the Chinese system, control of information was retained by the authorities, who also determined the contents of the authoritative texts.

In Christendom, perhaps the most dramatic form of censorship was the Index 'Liberorum Prohibitorum', by which the Roman Catholic church for centuries policed the literature available to its followers. Other methods used by authorities (Catholic and non-Catholic alike), to control what people believed or thought, were the development of creeds, such as the 'Nicene Creed', and the conduct of trials, such as those of Joan of Arc (1431), and Thomas More (1535).

The struggle against censorship in the Anglo-American world began to take its modern form in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of special importance was John Milton's

Areopagitica' (1644), in which he argued against a government's right to license (or previously restrain) publication. Milton's definition of freedom of the press, however, did not preclude the condemnation of material after publication, a matter taken up by the 'First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America (1787).⁴¹

The question that now arises is, what is the role of censorship in propaganda? As has already been illustrated, propaganda is the manipulation of information to achieve the propagandist's objectives. Censorship, clearly involves massive manipulation of information. It will be seen in later chapters how in modern warfare, censorship is heavily applied in war time (civil, international or global), by dictatorial, autocratic and democratic states alike, to disinform or misinform the enemy. In monitoring and controlling what is disseminated from the propagandist's media and other sources, the enemy is not only kept in the dark about what the intentions of the propagandist are, he also receives only that information that the propagandist intends the enemy to receive. A vital part of this type of manipulation is deception. By controlling what goes out, and deliberately planting lies in the information available to the enemy, the possibility of altering or determining the enemy's war strategy is effected.

In Biafra, for instance, after the fall of Enugu, the Capital, Radio Biafra still announced that it was broadcasting from Enugu, throwing the Nigerian front line in the Enugu sector into confusion, whilst boosting the morale of the Biafran publics (military and civilian). In similar vein, during the Gulf war in 1991, by keeping tight control of, and manipulating what the press gained access to, General Norman Schwarzkopf gave the impression that he was planning an amphibious landing on Iraq, while all the time, he was in fact planning a land invasion. Thus censorship is a vital propaganda tool, and consequently, a major part of strategic planning. In the Biafran case, with the sacking (or liberation according to the Nigerian side), of Enugu, even when the radio was broadcasting from a mobile van or

from a bunker, the fact that it still claimed to be broadcasting from Enugu, helped to keep up the morale of the domestic scene and create some credibility within the international community. In the first world war, had the British soldiers not been led to believe that they were going to win the war in one year, it is anybody's guess what their motivation to go to war would have been. In summary, censorship and psychological warfare involve vital strategic manipulation of information to achieve certain set objectives. These are essential and important propaganda tools.

In relating censorship to propaganda, it is possible to argue that different sorts of polities, ranging from the democratic to the authoritarian, have attempted a variety of social controls over propaganda.⁴² In an ideal democracy, every one would be free to make propaganda, and free to oppose propaganda habitually through peaceful counter propaganda. The democratic ideal assumes that, if each is free to make propaganda, the ideas best for society will win out in the long run. This outcome would require that a majority of the general populace be reasonably well educated, intelligent, public spirited and patient, and that they not be greatly confused by an excess of communication. A democratic system also presupposes that large quantities of dependable and relevant information will be inexpensively disseminated by relatively well - financed, public - spirited, and uncensored news gathering and educational agencies.

The extent to which any existing national society actually conforms to this model is an open question. That the world social system does not, is self-evident.

Censorship, as a propaganda instrument in war, does not only involve the control of what information the propagandist's media (and sources) put out to the domestic, external, and enemy publics, it also involves the control of what comes from the external and enemy media into the domestic environment, which is likely to demoralise the civilian population and the military. Censorship as an instrument of propaganda in war is an organised exercise in damage limitation to the morale of the propagandist's targeted audience.

An element of control is required to be able to censor. Governments can censor what emanates from the government controlled media and sources whilst rebels, or freedom fighters, or civilian war lords (dependent on one's leanings), can censor whatever emanates from whatever media or sources they control. The period before the first world war saw much covert propaganda activity against the Hapsburg rule of the Balkan states. This culminated in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.

No doubt, this was a spark for overt propaganda, that transmitted from the civil, domestic Balkan act, and sucked in the rest of the world, leading to the greatest human carnage the world had ever witnessed - truly, a "Carnival of Death". This was an example of the effect of propaganda and manipulation of information (covert and overt), leading to a devastating result - a global conflagration.

Covert propaganda adopts the form of secret or (pirate) radio stations and well organised information dissemination sources, pamphleteering, secret meetings, oral transmission of subversive messages. The overthrow of the monarch (as seen in the English civil wars), or the dislodging of the establishment, or occupying military authority (as in Nigeria and Biafra), is never a task to be taken lightly. The related propaganda involves the risk of discovery, and possible death on discovery. It has to be a well organised network. There have to be linkages and connections to and with the external constituencies sympathetic to the cause of the propagandist. The polity, on the other hand has to try to censor the revolutionary propaganda of the freedom fighters or rebels. In some cases, this involves, imprisonment, death, bombing, destruction or setting alight the radio stations and other sources of dissemination. It also involves large scale seizure of published material. Where the materials have already been circulated, the authorities can issue a decree banning the possession, reading, posting, or publication of the materials in any form - a process of official counter propaganda. In cases where the radio stations of the revolutionaries are clandestine, and cannot be immediately discovered, a process of 'jamming' of the

frequency is employed. This, and pamphleteering were also largely employed during the first world war. Nigeria similarly employed a lot of 'jamming' on Biafran radio stations. They also air-dropped pamphlets on Biafran territory. Another method of official counter propaganda, apart from the ones discussed above, is the publication of official counter propaganda materials, and the use of official media to send messages. Sometimes, these are forced down the throats of often times reluctant domestic society, and a confused external society. This can produce a negative effect on a highly disciplined, well organised population, who treat the official counter propaganda with disdain and scorn, and become more resolute to press on with their cause.

An example of how resolute a group can be is implicit in a chapter titled "The Bluff", in John Glubb's Into Battle - A Soldier's Diary of the Great War,⁴³ chronicling his experience in the first world war. In most cases, the military constituency resorts to self motivating songs. As the odds against survival lengthened, John Glubb's military audience was entertained by a song that went thus -

"I want to go home! I want to go home!
I don't want to go to the trenches no more,
where the whizz - bangs and shrapnel they
whistle and roar.

Take me over the Sea,
where the Allermans cannot catch me,
Oh my! I don't want to die,
want to go home!"

According to Glubb, the song would be followed by loud cheers. He wondered whether the Boche intelligence had received copies of the song, and reported that the morale of the British army was cracking. That in itself, could have been a process of deception, meant to mislead the enemy into lowering its guard. It could be described as a horizontally transmitted military propaganda. There was also a popular song that was sung just before battle, called, "The Galloping Major".

The corporal sang a parody of this:

"Whenever we go to war,
we drive the enemy barmy,
Hi! Hi!
Never say die!
Here comes Kitchiner's Army."

The objective is implicit in the self motivating message of confidence. Any other type of message issuing from the military source at this time to the enemy, would have been censored, treated as treason, and resulted in the court martial of the 'traitor', unless of course, the individual was a scout or spy for the enemy, and transmitted his message covertly. Even then, on discovery he would be subjected to a traitor's punishment as defined. All this is a form of military censorship, which goes on, not only in war time, but all the time. As a constituency, therefore, the military is subjected, and subjects itself, to perpetual censorship. This is why the military should not be in government, because when they are, the military censorship so described, is transmitted and extended to the whole of the civil state. There can therefore be none of the required and necessary, fundamental freedoms whilst the military is in power.

Annette Tapert (Despatches from the Heart - An Anthology of letters from the front), published a poem written in the trenches by Siegfried Sassoon, on 10th February 1916.⁴⁴ It exhibits how the self motivation transmitted outside the immediate constituency (in this case the military), can have the opposite, negative interpretation by even other loyal, uninvolved constituencies (the civilian constituency). The poem is in three verses, and is published along with letters by other soldiers in the trenches, who were constantly writing to their loved ones, to let them know that they were still alive. The third verse of the poem goes thus:

"...And, then he thought: to - morrow night we
trudge
Up to the trenches and my boots are rotten.
Five miles of stodgy clay and freezing sludge,
And everything but wretchedness forgotten.
To-night he's in the pink; but soon he'll die.
And still the war goes on - he do'nt know why."

The civilian population, being confronted by these messages, these apparent musings from a soldier in the trenches, may tend to think that there was no justification for the war to continue, because the suffering in the trenches was unbearable, and that the soldiers were demoralised. It becomes arguable, therefore, whether even these sort of letters, and poems, should be censored also.

However, the songs, poems, and letters are indications of propaganda outlasting the war. The songs in themselves motivated and sustained morale during the war, but their endurance and indelibility have lived on. Generations, who otherwise would not have known, heard about. least of all remembered the first world war, would, through the songs, poems, and letters, paint mental pictures of the trenches during the war, and the people who fought in them. The effect of this is perpetual resentment for the perpetrators of the war. Therefore. even in the post war structure, propaganda still has a vicariously controlled motivating factor, forcing or enabling younger generations to go to war against old enemies. This is borne out in Israel - the age old struggle over Palestine between the Jews and Arabs; and in Yugoslavia, where the world is again witnessing almost a replication of the events that led (with Sarajevo again as a fulcrum), to the first world war. It is a conscious manifestation of subconscious feeling. The propaganda constituency becomes futuristic. This may not have in fact been the intention of the authors, but it does not obliterate the propaganda effect it creates.

I.T.V.Channel 4 shows paintings and poems of participants in the American civil war. As already discussed, these, together with the numerous 'cow-boy westerns' shown around

the world, create, and send propaganda messages of winners and losers, engendering a dual effect on four different constituencies. First, the vanquished, particularly the American Indians feel offended and humiliated, second, the blacks feel the objectives of their propaganda war thrusts have not been achieved, third, the Caucasians of the victorious North, (except a few) feel superior and elated, fourth, the Caucasians of the South, resented defeat, and want a return to their fore father's status quo.

Ironically, in Nigeria, the Biafrans have not regrouped to continue the struggle. The reasons for this will be elaborated on in chapter 4. But, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that the effects of propaganda are durable, and far outlast the war (negatively or positively).

However, as Niccolo Machiavelli⁴⁵ has shown, while some propaganda may have the effect of outlasting a war, it may not have had the same motivating effect during the war itself. His attempts to raise an effective militia strong enough to defend Florence were unsuccessful, except for a single defence against the Medici,⁴⁶ and even that collapsed eventually. Machiavelli published extensively, to motivate the people of Florence, his bitterness arising from the fact that foreigners (notably France and Spain), were ruling Italy. His principal loyalty though, was to Florence, which he hoped he could motivate, and mobilise, and use as an example to the other city states of Italy to take pride in themselves, and 'stand up to be counted'. He was first a republican, and second, a patriot. He was derided by some at the time, and had a rather checkered career. Nevertheless, his writings such as 'the Art of War, and 'the Prince', have outlived him, and in retrospect, have been taken seriously.

There are some arguments now on whether war has moved on from being just an 'art', to being 'pure science'. While this may not be of concern in the context of this thesis, it is important to observe that some schools of thought have noted that propaganda has evolved from being a mere 'art', to the 'science of propaganda'.

In the book, there is an interesting illustration of Machiavelli's attempt to motivate Florentines to build a good, strong militia, that would rescue the Republic, and subsequently act to encourage all of Italy to resist domination by foreigners.

"...Wise princes, therefore have always shunned auxiliaries, and made use of their own forces. They have preferred to lose battles with their own forces than win them with others, in the belief that no true victory is possible with alien arms. Now I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his conduct as an example. The duke used auxiliaries in his invasion of the Romagna, going there at the head of French troops. With those, he took Imola and Forli. But then, he decided that they were unsafe, and he turned to mercenaries in the belief that less risk was involved, hiring the Orsini and the Vitelli. In making use of these, he found them to be suspect, disloyal and dangerous; so he got rid of them and raised his own forces. And one can easily see the difference between these forces by considering the difference between the standing of the duke when he had only the French, and when he relied only on his own forces. He grew in stature at each stage; and he was held in real respect only when every one saw that he was absolute master of his armies."

The implication here is of a lack of motivation by the targeted constituency, resulting in the failure of the propaganda objective. It demonstrates how different segments of a particular constituency react to the same message. The Italian citizens would have been more motivated to fight for their 'Republics', than the mercenaries were; and they had to be motivated, to uphold the pride of the people. As a war strategy, this was analogous to the problems encountered by Biafra with conscripts from the minority areas, during the civil war.

There is of course a difference between conscripts and mercenaries, even in their motivation to war. Sometimes, mercenaries, fighting mainly for their money, are better trained professional soldiers, and can in certain circumstances be more reliable. Conscripts are usually reluctant participants, virtually in some cases, dragged against their will, to fight. There is no real commitment on their part. Several of such conscripts deserted their posts during the Biafra war, as did the Iraqi conscripts during the Gulf war, leaving open to the enemy large, easily penetrable flanks.

To justify his message, towards the end of 'The Prince', Machiavelli writes;

"It is necessary, therefore, to raise such an army, in order to base our defence against the invaders on Italian strength. Although the Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered formidable, nonetheless there are faults in both which would enable a third kind of army not only to hold them in battle but to be sure of conquering. The Spaniards cannot withstand cavalry, and the Swiss have cause to fear infantry-men, who meet them in combat with a determination to equal their own. Thus it has been found, and experience will prove that the Spaniards cannot withstand French cavalry and the Swiss succumb to Spanish infantry. There may have been no complete demonstration of this latter assertion, but there was some indication of its truth at the battle of Ravenna, where Spanish infantry troops clashed with the German battalions, which adopt the same line of battle as the Swiss. In the encounter, the Spaniards, making good use of their bucklers, with great agility thrust their way between and under the German pikes, and attacked with impunity while the Germans were defenceless. If it had not been for the cavalry which charged them, the Spaniards would have annihilated the Germans. So, having grasped the defects of these Swiss and Spanish infantry, you can develop a new type, capable of withstanding cavalry and undaunted by other infantry. This will be ensured by raising new armies and employing new formations. It is things of this kind which, when newly introduced, bring a new prince greatness and prestige.

In order therefore that Italy, after so long a time may behold its saviour, this opportunity must not be let slip. And I cannot express with what love he would be welcomed in all those provinces, which have suffered from these foreign inundations, with what thirst for vengeance, with what resolute loyalty, with what devotion and tears. What doors would be closed to him? What people would deny him that obedience? What envy would stand in his way? What Italian would refuse him allegiance? This barbarous tyranny stinks in every one's nostrils. Let your illustrious House undertake this task, therefore with the courage and hope which belong to just enterprises, so that, under your standard, our country may be ennobled, and under your auspices what Petrarch said may come to pass:

'Virtue 'gainst fury shall advance the fight,
And it i'th combate soone shall put to flight:
For th' old Romane valour is not dead,
Nor in the Italians brests extinguished'."

The above passage comes from the paragraph called 'Exhortation to liberate Italy from the barbarians', and is addressed to the 'new Prince' of Italy.⁴⁷

The purpose of reproducing this long 'ode-like' passage, is to demonstrate the fervour of Machiavelli's love for his country, the objective of his propaganda message, and his power of persuasion. It is surprising that he was not listened to. The last paragraphs are particularly moving, and could motivate and mobilise most modern constituencies. It is

possible that he, himself, his writings, or his propaganda, were rather futuristic for the people of Italy at the time, and so were anachronistic. Society, perhaps, was more practical at the time, and made little room for theorising. This is also, presumably, why he had to go into practical details of actual war strategies to assert his point, his conviction, and his message. It was a powerful message that he sent to the Italian publics.

Even though it may have seemed anachronistic at the time, the message has lived on after him, and in retrospect, perhaps, if he had been listened to and taken more seriously, the world map might have been drawn differently today. That, of course, is a matter of conjecture. The passage also shows that no words can be lost in propaganda. The language has to suit the environment in time and structure.

It may take one line to motivate some people; it may take lengthy passages to motivate and mobilise others within a given space and time: it still may take several repetitions of the same messages to motivate, mobilise and sustain some constituencies. Each case is a matter of tactics.

Mirian Kocham (*The Last Days of Imperial Russia*),⁴⁸ illustrates this when she says that in the midst of all the upheavals of the time in Russia, in January 1904, Russia embarked on an irrelevant, and in the event, wholly abortive war with Japan. Viacheslav Konstantinovieli Plehve, Minister of the Interior, had said that "in order to hold back the revolution, we need a small victorious war". War, on this occasion, did not constitute the universal panacea, despite the obvious propaganda strategic intentions.

It did not bind the disunited people of Russia together into one coherent, patriotic body. On the contrary, it brought to the fore all the discordant forces which until then had remained peripheral. The assassination by revolutionary groups continued. On 15th July, 1905 Plehve, himself a symbol of the government's policy of repression, its contempt for public opinion, anti-semitism and bureaucratic tyranny, was killed by a social

revolutionary's bomb. Dr. Dillon, the Daily Telegraph correspondent, happened⁴⁹ to be passing when:

"...two men on bicycles glided past, followed by a closed carriage, which I recognised as that of the all-powerful minister. Suddenly, the ground before me quivered, a tremendous sound as of thunder deafened me, the windows of the houses on both sides of the broad street rattled and the glass of the panes was hurled on to the stone pavements. A dead horse, a pool of blood, fragments of a carriage, and a hole in the ground were parts of my rapid impression. My driver was on his knees devoutly praying and saying, that the end of the world had come. Plehve's end was received with semi-public rejoicings. I met nobody who regretted his assassination or condemned the authors."

Most propagandists use external threat to seek to unify and galvanise domestic support in war. This goes for civil as well as international war. Biafra, for instance accused 'the muslim North' of wanting to exterminate 'the christian South' of Nigeria, and called on all christians to unite and fight for Biafra. It will be seen later how the domestic Biafran public, and the international, external public reacted to this type of propaganda (chs 4&5).

The cold war was sustained by both East and West on the basis of this type of propaganda of real or imaginary external, and/or nuclear threat, even though it was obvious that the super powers would never resort to war, least of all nuclear war. It was sustained for some forty years until the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving the West at a loss on how to justify its continuous arms build up and retention of nuclear weapons.

In a fragmented society, like Russia of the time, Biafra/Nigeria, Iraq, this type of propaganda is always 'risky', where absolute loyalties cannot be assured. Clearly, it failed in the Russian case, and produced, rather a negative interpretation of, and reaction to the intentions of the official propaganda message, from the domestic population. The populace was motivated in the opposite direction to the objectives of the official propaganda, leading up to the assassination of Plehve, and to a revolution.

In the American civil war, the situation was different. There was a polarity between the North and the South. Apart from the usual 'spies' and 'traitors', there was loyalty on both sides, making the propaganda objective easier to achieve. In the South, propagandists devoted their efforts to asserting the right to secede, and to proving that the aggressive North was invading Southern territory. In the North, the preservation of the Union, patriotism, and the crusade against slavery were the major themes. Atrocity stories - largely of brutal treatment of the wounded, military prisoners and political dissenters - the usual accusations prevailed. As in the Nigeria/Biafra case, one side usually gets on top in the propaganda war. Whilst in the American case, it was the North that succeeded; in the Nigerian case, it was Biafra in the South. The war can some times be won and/or lost, dependent on the effectiveness of the propaganda of each side. The South, in the American civil war, badly needed arms, but its propaganda organisation was dismal, and could not mobilise the external constituency to help; Biafra started with nothing, was blockaded on land, air and sea, (chs.4&5), but its effective propaganda motivated the external constituency, bringing in much needed external help to enable it to sustain the war for three years.

2.5. Conclusion.

The age of the 'just war' in Europe was also the period that saw 'might' as 'right'. It was held that a ruler, by proper declaration, and with proper motives, might employ armed force outside his normal jurisdiction to defend rights, rectify wrongs, and punish crimes. It was therefore necessary for the ruler to justify the existence of these conditions. It was also essential for him to possess the might to overwhelm the offending state. One way of overwhelming the enemy was by psychological warfare.

By making the enemy feel militarily inferior, he loses the will to fight. This could be done covertly and/or overtly. The other method employed was the prevention of the 'offending' authority from putting across its own arguments and defence. This was done by way of censorship. But, this required control over the means of message transmission of the transgressor. All this means that although the word propaganda might not have been used militarily, the ingredients existed in psychological warfare and censorship, because modern propaganda employs the same methods, as the next chapter illustrates.

Notes of chapter 2.

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pp.5,29,&85.
11. Ibid: p.156.
12. Ibid : p.119
13. Ibid: p.290, 291.
14. Prof. George Schwarzenberger, former Dean of the
department of law, University College, London,
explained in a lecture to the international
economic law class in 1974, that positive
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which benefits from another makes positive
public pronouncements and moves towards the latter.

15. Conversely, in negative compensation, whilst a country benefits from the support of another, it nevertheless engages in antagonistic public pronouncements towards that other.
16. Robert Ashton; Op. cit.pp300 - 349.
17. R. E. Allen: The Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, O.U.P 1984.
18. The Encyclopaedia Britannica: Op.cit. Vol.9,p.764,1b.
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21. Robert Ashton: Op.cit.p.214.
22. The Encyclopaedia Britannica:
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Vol.4; p.488,2a.
Vol.18; p.260,1b.
Vol.26; p.1711a.
23. Ibid: Vol.15; p.215,1a.

29. Rebel leaders are usually so styled by the governments against which the insurgence occurs. It is a kind of caricature, to show that the leader of the movement has no legitimacy or territory.
30. John Daborn: Op.cit. pp.219 - 273.
31. Ibid. p.313 -315.
32. This is similar to the process of de-briefing.
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CHAPTER THREE.

MODERN METHODS AND CONCEPTS.

3.1. Introduction.

The period after the First World War, leading up to the Second World War witnessed physical and psychological developments in propaganda activity.

It was a period when the word 'propaganda', apart from being deeply rooted and applied in military activities, was developed and institutionalised. It has been seen how active propaganda activities were, leading up to the First World War. It is possible to argue that the setting up of the League of Nations was an attempt by some major world powers to institutionalise their propagandist manoeuvres on a global basis, in order to continue to dominate psychologically. Indeed, the League collapsed, because of the confusing and confused messages that emanated from it. It is also possible to argue that this was the first attempt at the international institutionalisation of propaganda. Having learnt from that failure, the second time round - with the United Nations - the major powers succeeded in effecting the institutionalisation of a propaganda forum; a place where 'jaw-jaw' was better than 'war-war'.¹

The different nations of the world applied propaganda in their dealings with each other, in foreign policy and conflict, with greater intensity, developing and imitating whatever precedent there was.

The First World War had a devastating effect on the world. It had destabilised and debilitated the world's human and material resources. It had also taught governments some lessons. It had taught them the art of massive warfare. It consequently taught them the art of building up to war - the art of propaganda. The world probably believed that never again would there be another war of that nature, that would be so devastating to the

human race. But no one anticipated the power of propaganda that was built up, scientifically and artfully manouvered and institutionalised within Germany. It was this power that led to the second greatest human carnage - the Second World War.

The Ministry of Propaganda, set up by Adolf Hitler and run by Goebbels was the culmination of marathon propaganda against the Jews, foreigners, and everything non-German, that had consumed German society. It led to the overthrow of the legitimate civil State, the holocaust, the aggression against the neighbours of the German State, the declaration of war, the putsch, and the Second World War. The whole of the Hitleric German State was borne out of propaganda, sustained on propaganda, and collapsed like a pack of cards with the collapse of the system. It was entirely systemic.

Since Nations of the world are copycats, this lesson was not lost on other States in their domestic, and external operations and decision making. Therefore, the birth of modern negative and positive propaganda became feasible.

The Biafran leaders must have been deliberating on these lines when they set up the Directorate of Propaganda during the Nigerian civil war. Also often called the Propaganda Directorate, it was responsible for organising Biafran internal and external war propaganda. The chapter is discussed under three headings - methods, concepts, and derivative concepts. Derivative modern concepts mirror modern concepts. The reflection is indicative of family resemblance - the capacity of states to imitate. In part, the latter might sound inevitably repetitive of the former.

There will be constant juxtaposition and interposition of the models and other examples, in order to expose the argument.

3.2. Methods:

The dropping of pamphlets behind enemy lines from overflying aircraft had already been a feature during the first world war. The jamming of frequencies of enemy radio stations was also used during the first world war. The oral and physical infiltration and penetration of enemy ranks both civil and military, with negative and damaging information was carried over to this period; it was a lesson learned from earlier warfare tactics. None of these methods collapsed with the first world war. The propaganda lessons of the first world war helped to improve on the utility, application, and method of propaganda. During the period, major world powers were still shuffling for influence, power, and atmospheric hegemony. Colonisation was rife, and so was the need to psychologically subjugate the colonised states in the various spheres of influence with and by tested methods, e.g;

a. Institutionalisation and other related methods.

By any standard of examination, the cardinal example of modern propaganda in war, is the German state of the post first world war, and immediate pre-second world war period, which was established by the National Socialists or Nazis. Inevitably, therefore, the propaganda of Hitler's Germany takes up most of the space in this chapter, which covers its methods and concepts.

Hitler was a corporal in the German army during the first world war. The experience of the war and the propaganda that accompanied it were not lost on him. The successes and failures of Germany in that war were also not lost on him. It is difficult to decipher what nurtured his ambitions then, but his rise to power through the economic depression of the interwar period is significant. A school of thought believes that the conditions and drastic sanctions imposed on Germany after the first world war, were so impossible to maintain and fulfil, that the resultant second world war was inevitable. Sir Edward Heath, in a speech after the Gulf war in 1991 referred to this when he argued against the repetition of

that kind of 'mistake' by the allies,² in imposing impossible and draconian conditions and sanctions on Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Nevertheless, whether it was this or the severe world wide depression of the 1930s, following the first world war, that was responsible for the rise of Hitler to power is difficult to tell. What is clear is that Hitler found a combination of these factors fertile ground to germinate his propaganda, which nourished, sprouted, sustained, and grew into an institution - the Ministry of Propaganda. It was the first time in history that propaganda activities had congealed into an official institution.

The process was to legitimise official and State propaganda. Radio was the chief weapon for the German Ministry of propaganda. Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf: 'In war, words are acts'. This lays emphasis on pronouncements made by rulers in war time, and even also in foreign policy, and in politics in peace time. The difficulty arises when such pronouncements are calculated to deceive and mislead. If 'words are acts', the question arises, which or what acts are to be believed or not to be believed.

In July 1992, The British Sunday Times,³ serialised the diaries of Goebbels, Hitler's chief propagandist in charge of the Ministry of propaganda. The diaries covered the period leading up to Hitler's mysterious death and Goebbel's reported suicide.

As an example of propaganda in war, the German case illustrates the argument of this thesis. The build up of the propaganda preceded the war, was sustained intensely through the war, and as recent events in Germany have shown, lingered on long after the war, even when the system had collapsed. According to Peter Millar (The Sunday Times, 5 July 1992)⁴, Goebbels' diaries give an insight into Nazi propaganda. They trace the moulding of the German society from 1933 to the putsch and through the war. The diaries highlight the 'Sudeten crisis' leading up to the Munich meeting with Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the Polish crisis, and the outbreak of war in 1939; the murderous purge of 'unreliable' Nazi Party members in the

1934 'night of the long knives'; Hitler's reaction to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; and the failed plot to kill Hitler in 1944'. Peter Millar maintains that the diaries reveal a callous cynicism on the part of the propaganda chief, notably in the passages leading to 'kristalnacht', in which Goebbels rejoices in the orgy of destruction: 'the sky is blood red...the synagoge is burning...bravo! bravo!'

Hitler's explicit role in ordering the pogrom is spelt out as Goebbels describes in the diaries how he gives Goebbels the first news of the demonstration against the Jews in Berlin, and how he 'decrees' that the demonstration should go ahead: 'withdraw the police. It is time the Jews felt the wrath of the people. That's right. I give the instruction to the police and the party'. As a result, Goebbels' 'stosstruppen', special action brigades, were sent out to urge the rioters to start fires.

Goebbels goes on to describe how the following day, Hitler sat in his favourite Italian restaurant in Munich, chatting contentedly about the night of the carnage. Hitler's tactics were both to build up, through effective overt and covert propaganda, the emotions of the German people to prepare to fight against a real or imagined enemy - first, internally - within Germany, and second externally. The home front had to be so completely consumed by this propaganda that when the time was right, mobilisation against the enemy internally and externally was easy. He motivated the German people to hate, as already discussed, first the Jews, second, all foreigners, third, other surrounding countries which were neighbours of Germany, and fourth, the rest of the world. His propaganda brainwashed the German people, preceded, sustained the second world war, and lingered on in the minds of youths who are even now still prepared to think of him as their hero.

Goebbels' diaries are an incisive revelation of the psychological state of Hitler's mind, and of the message transmitted to the German people, as the following passage reveals: 'I give an account to the Fuhrer in the 'Osteria'. He is in agreement on everything. His opinions

are very radical and aggressive. The action itself has gone off perfectly. 100 dead. But no German property damaged.'

Peter Millar maintains that the diaries also give an insight into Hitler's determination to lead Germany into war despite the caution of some of his advisers, and, the last minute dice-game played with Britain over the fate of Czechoslovakia in 1938, and critically in 1939. Up to the eleventh hour, with plans for the invasion of Poland formulated, the diaries reveal that Hitler was still passing messages via an intermediary to Chamberlain. Chamberlain, condemned for his appeasement of the Nazis was seen by Goebbels as 'an ice-cold old English man', and a 'fox', but not one that scared Hitler: 'the Fuhrer will show Chamberlain his map and that's it. Basta...London is immeasurably frightened of force...the English...will undoubtedly cave in, when they come up against hard opposition'. Peter Millar suggests that Chamberlain appears to have played a harder game than has been appreciated, because Goebbels recounts: 'the Fuhrer gives him his memorandum. A bitter row follows about certain points. Things go so far that at one stage Chamberlain suddenly gets up to go; he has done his duty, there is no point in continuing and he can wash his hands with a clean conscience'.

Goebbels spent hours reading transcripts of the tapped telephones, of the French and British Ambassadors in Berlin as they discussed the sensational news of the Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact. Within days, however, Hitler had decided on war, as Goebbels related on 31st August, 1939: 'To the Reich Chancellery. Everything very quiet. The Fuhrer has made his decision...' Even after Britain and France declared war, Goebbels reveals that Hitler did not believe they were serious. The Nazi leader predicted Chamberlain's resignation, but Goebbels foresaw trouble with the entry of Winston Churchill into the Cabinet.

Hitler's carefully masterminded and orchestrated propaganda not only motivated the German people against the 'real or imagined' enemy, it also built up a cult image around

him. He became a rallying point to all the German people. He was what in Ghanaian language is described as the 'Osajefo', the saviour. This was how the Ghanaian public described Kwame Nkrumah. Hitler, to the German's became the ultimate messenger. The act, however of setting up a Ministry of Propaganda was entirely new to the age, both in method and concept. The concept of this and other countries' propaganda exploits will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.

The reason why it is argued that the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany represented a watershed for the modern era is that directly or indirectly, during subsequent wars, propaganda - internal and external was planned and executed more seriously, meaningfully and strategically than before. As illustration of this, this chapter will examine the Chinese and Nigerian civil wars.

The origin of the 'Little Red Book', which became the ideology, not only of Mao's followers during the civil war, but later also of the entire Chinese State. was for Mao, a major propaganda success. It was highly successful in its methodical conceptualisation and execution of propaganda to achieve set goals.

The other core example in the context, not only of this chapter, but of this thesis, is the setting up of the Directorate of Propaganda by Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. This was a more direct imitation of the German example than even the Chinese case would appear to be, but the goals of all three were the same. There have been numerous examples since then of imitative actions that lend to the argument that propaganda is the same in all wars. The scope is only limited by the constituency, and the available technological capability of the messenger or propagandist.

The methods that seem to have pervaded the ages include:

3.2.1. The infiltration of enemy camps with debilitating rumours, as in the case of Gengis Khan, through the American civil war, through the world wars, the Chinese civil war, and the Biafran war.⁵

3.2.2. The dropping of propaganda leaflets behind enemy lines to confuse and demoralise frontline combatants since the days of the French Enlightenment civil wars, the American war of independence and civil war, the Russian revolution, the Chinese civil war, the Biafran war, and even latterly in the Gulf war of 1991.

3.2.3. The use of 'print' media has existed since man could write. It has existed since the days of the Pharoos, when messages were sent on tablets, through fiery war messengers, asking the enemy to surrender or be destroyed, even before the first arrow or the first spear was thrown. It has increased in intensity with technological developments.

The intention always is the debilitation of the enemy's morale, in order to weaken his resolve to commit to battle. The English civil wars are no exception (as already discussed), to all these methods. The objective of war is to annihilate the adversary. The objective of propaganda is to seduce, sedate, and set the enemy up for that annihilation. The goals of war therefore remain the same, because things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another.

In summary therefore, it has been stated that in setting up the Ministry of propaganda, Hitler institutionalised propaganda for the first time in history of warfare. This is an act that has been later, and largely imitated, especially in civil wars. Apart from the infiltration of enemy camps with demoralising rumours, the dropping of pamphlets behind enemy lines, radio was regarded as the most powerful instrument by Nazi Germany, during this period. Gerald Mansell,⁶ states that the German Ministry of Propaganda saw radio as its chief instrument. Ewald Banse, Professor of Military Science at Brunswick Technical College, wrote in 1934:

'It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spot, to undermine, crush, break down its resistance, and convince it that it is being

deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its own government...The originally well knit fabric of the enemy nation must be gradually disintegrated, broken down, rotted, so that it falls to pieces like a fungus when one treads on it in a wood'.

3.2.4. The caricaturing of rival leaders was also another device used during this period, which as seen before, also straddled the ages. This is a ploy that both sides of the military divide used immensely during the second world war. The reaction of the allied publics will be treated later in this section to determine the impact on them, and their reaction to Hitler's messages.

3.2.5. One new method that came into operation at this stage was the use of film. Often times, going to the cinema was such a popular leisure activity, that it attracted large audiences. Goebbels knew this. Consequently, he commissioned film scenarios that subtly promoted Hitler as saviour of the German people, built up animosity against the Jews, and extolled the virtues of the Germans as the superior race. The process of building up the protagonist is defined in this thesis as the process of 'edification'. As well as being methods of propaganda, caricaturing and edification of leaders were also concepts. They are discussed in full in the next section on concepts. Caricaturing is the attempt, usually by one side, to psychologically dent the image of the enemy leader or protagonist.

3.2.6. Counter Propaganda.

Even though Hitler's build up to the second world war propaganda was as a result of lessons he had learned about British propaganda during the first world war, the British public and the B.B.C were ill-prepared in many respects for the demands which the war was to bring.

Hitler in his 'Mein Kampf' had observed that the Germans, in the first world war, were not defeated on the battle field, but through propaganda, mounted particularly by the British.

Therefore, 'In war, words are acts', was not just a notion, but the basis of Hitler's philosophy of propaganda. This philosophy involved the conversion of ideas into ideals - the interpretation of words, symbols, motions, gestures - into action, a motivating force with cataclysmic results, as seen in the second world war.

In contrast, Churchill believed that war must be won by deeds, not words. These two conflicting philosophies formed the conceptual basis on both sides of the conflict.

However, the methods of disseminating information whether true or false, were much the same. As in the first world war, pamphleteering was always a useful tool. It was possible to drop pamphlets behind enemy lines directed at the enemy public. They also came in useful for reaching out to the domestic public. Also, as in the first world war, Britain, through the medium of the B.B.C. played a major role in informing the public at home on what the government wanted to be regarded as true, and in encouraging the soldiers, and all those who were involved at the front. Later in the war, the talented and resourceful British practitioners of 'black' broadcasting, showed themselves well able to match Goebbels in the use of deceit and fabrication. But, whilst this method was the core of Nazi propaganda and ideology, British 'black' broadcasting, whatever its effectiveness - and it had its undoubted success - was never more than a fringe activity. It was not as deep rooted as it was in Germany. Censorship was a more commonly applied method by the British war lords, Churchill and Eden. The B.B.C. under Reith, believed that though telling the truth was preferable to the direct lie, the truth had to fit the occasion.⁷

Therefore, demoralising news was censored. Those 'truths' that would help the cause of the allied forces took priority. There was no overall strategy by the B.B.C. at the initial stages of the war for developing foreign languages.

Nevertheless on Tuesday, 27 September, two days before the Munich Conference, the B.B.C. was asked by the war office to provide facilities that very night, for the

transmission of foreign languages. These included German, Italian, and French language versions of a broadcast to the nation, which the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was to make at 8 p.m. that evening.

The Foreign office, which had earlier undertaken to provide speakers and translation, found it could not. At 6 p.m. that evening, the Foreign office asked the B.B.C. if it could provide news bulletins in those languages, as well as translate the Prime Minister's broadcast. A frantic search ensued. J.B. Clark of the B.B.C. tracked down a friend, G. Walter Goetz, the German artist, who was drawing cartoons for the Daily Express, at a cocktail party, and sent him post-haste to Broadcasting House to do the German version. The Hon. Francis Rennell Rodd, later Lord Rennell, undertook the Italian version, having served as an intelligence officer in Italy during the first world war, and later worked in the British Embassy in Rome. Duncan Grinnel-Milne, a B.B.C. announcer, read the French version. The English text of the Prime Minister's broadcast was at 8pm, reaching the translators page by page, between 8.15 and 8.30pm, and each page was translated as it came in, and broadcast while the remainder of the speech was still being translated.

The first broadcasts were transmitted on all B.B.C. wavelengths and replaced normal scheduled programmes on medium wave intended for British listeners at home. They were also carried on short wave on all Empire Service frequencies, where, as with the home services, they replaced advertised programmes. The Prime Minister's address in English was reported to have made a particularly big impression in the United States, where President Roosevelt heard it in the course of a cabinet meeting at the White House. The news bulletins on that day also included translations of an appeal by Mrs. Roosevelt, which had been suppressed in Germany, and of the replies to it from France, Britain, and Czechoslovakia. The following day 28 September, they included the text of an appeal to Hitler by President Roosevelt himself, and of King George VI's proclamation, calling up naval reservists and marines.

Daily broadcasts in all three languages continued thereafter, throughout the period of the Munich Crisis, though the number of transmitters was gradually reduced.⁸

This presumably formed the basis for the B.B.C. language services that exist to date.

It will be seen in chs. 4 and 5 how analogous to the Nigerian situation this was. The use of radio and the translation of broadcasts in the different ethnic languages were methods effectively used by both Nigeria and Biafra. However, it was possible for Britain to respond in such an overt method because it was not occupied by enemy forces. It was similarly possible for America to do likewise.

Countries which are occupied during war cannot use such overt methods. France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, for example, and the other occupied territories, had to resort to more covert means of transmission of their propaganda messages. This is harder work.

In essence, therefore, the setting up of underground and sometimes mobile radio stations, pamphleteering, the planting of rumours, were used by both sides in the second world war. The essence remains the same - motivation and mobilisation. The sustenance of the act and effect of propaganda in all cases - overt and covert - is essential to bring about a positive aim to the messenger. Victory is always the ultimate aim. Ironically an occupied and beleaguered territory tends to have a greater interest in telling the truth, especially if it is about pogrom, genocide, and other atrocities perpetrated by the occupying or aggressive power. This attracts sympathy to the cause of the occupied territory.

Therefore, paradoxically, the occupied territory gains more, and loses nothing, by telling the truth. It also helps to motivate its own citizens, and fellow countrymen wherever they are. The occupying force in this case resorts to censorship, misinformation, and disinformation, in various cases, to protect its own position, and maintain the status quo.

3.3. Concept.

3.3.1. Definition.

The word 'concept', according to The Oxford Dictionary of current English means, generalised idea or notion (eg. the concept of evolution).⁹

The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'concept' as an abstract or general idea.¹⁰

In the analytical school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy is held to be the salient features of the language in which men speak of concepts at issue. Concepts are thus logical, not mental entities.¹¹

A typical instance is discussed in the article on the 'concept of mind' (1949), by Gilbert Ryle, an Oxford analyst,¹² which implies that the purpose of the author is not to investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e. by the methods of psychology) about the mind itself, but to investigate its 'logical geography'. Similarly, investigation of the logical features of discourse about pleasure or duty or remembering is concerned with the concepts of pleasure or duty or memory. To be able to use these linguistic expressions is to apply or possess, the concepts.

3.3.2. Concept Formation.¹³

This is the process of sorting specific experiences into general rules of classes. It figures prominently in cognitive development and was a subject of great importance to the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980). Concept formation is a complex phenomenon which can be distinguished for discrimination, the relatively concrete ability to respond to differences among stimuli. Various laboratory experiments have been devised to understand how concepts are formed. The process seems to involve two main phases: in the first a person identifies important characteristics, and in the second identifies how the characteristics are logically linked. Beyond simple classifications, concepts also may serve

as norms or models that account for the potential of some things to fluctuate in some respects while remaining constant in others.

While experimenters and theorists generally agree about observations of conceptual behaviour, there are wide metaphysical and epistemological differences concerning the nature and origins of concepts, the movement between intuitive and rational thought, and the question of 'cognitive universals'. The stimulus - response theory of U.S. psychologist B.F. Skinner disallows reference to mental contents, stating that learning occurs through trial and error.

The cognitive theory of Piaget contends that learning entails an understanding of unifying relationships and essences. The U.S. psycholinguist Noam Chomsky argues that cognitive structures are structurally innate in human beings. Piaget argues that a child's interaction with environmental 'universals' such as space, time, causality, chance, number and identity (conservation of mass) makes possible his cognitive development.¹⁴

3.3.3. Derivative Concepts from Nazi Propaganda Methods.

In the light of part (1) of this chapter, and the foregoing definition of concept and concept formation, it would be fair to ask: What concepts derived from Nazi, propaganda methods? What was Goebbels' dimension within the prevalent cognitive patterns of the German environment of that time? What 'cognitive universals' can be discerned from his and Hitler's propaganda actions and methods?

On the morning of 22 August, 1939, Hitler held a conference with his military chiefs at his rustic retreat on the Obersalzberg, 6,208 feet above Berchtengaden.¹⁵ The intention was to build on the propaganda effect and success of the earlier capture of Austria in 1938, and in March 1939, Czechoslovakia, against the advice of his generals. Undaunted by the threat by England and France to spring to the aid of Poland in the event of an attack, Hitler announced to a gigantic, enthusiastic rally of Nazi party faithful in Berlin, in 1939: 'conquest is not only right but a duty'.¹⁶

It will be recalled that during the first world war, the Fuhrer had served for four years as an infantry corporal, in the muddy trenches of France, where he had been wounded and decorated for gallantry. Just over two decades later, without benefit of university or military-staff training, he was Supreme commander of the German armed forces.

The lessons of this experience had not escaped him. He was therefore determined that never again would the Germans suffer both a propaganda and military defeat of that nature, as he explained in his Mein Kampf. He was bent on first a propaganda, and consequently a military victory. It became a matter of recognising the 'cognitive universals', or cognitive patterns of the world at the time, and pre-empting them.

Buttressed, goaded, and reinforced by the victories over Austria and Czeckoslovakia without a shot being fired, Hitler told his military chiefs in Berghof: 'there probably will never again be a man with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or lunatic. There is no time to lose. War must come in my life time'.¹⁷

Also, to create optimum propaganda effect, he announced that he had signed a Treay of friendship with the Soviet Union, a communist nation, and as such, a sworn archenemy. Though it would be but a brief marriage of convenience, it enabled him to declare 'we can now strike at the heart of Poland...as Great Britain and France will not dare to come to Poland's rescue without the aid of Russia'.¹⁸ He angrily lashed out at the leaders of England, France and Poland: 'our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich. I am only afraid, that at the last minute some "schweinhund" will produce a plan of mediation'. There is no escaping the principle of 'cognitive universals',¹⁹ or cognitive patterns here. It was the determinant, it would appear, for Hitler's every action. Hitler's demeanour seems to have been crystallised by the concept of vendetta. His whole being and existence had formed the concept of revenge for Germany's first world war defeat in propaganda

war and military combat, even though, as he claimed. and as most Germans believed, Germany was not defeated on the battle field, but by propaganda.

It can be assumed that his 'Mein Kampf' was in fact a 'charter', the idealisation of his conceptual formation, which then congealed into the creation of the Ministry of Propaganda. As will be seen later, this institutionalisation of propaganda was to have an effect on Biafran propaganda operations during the Nigerian civil war. This novel concept, Germany's Ministry of propaganda, was run by someone described as a charismatic figure, with excellent bedside manners - Goebbels.

3.3.4. Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda.

In an article titled "Goebbels and propaganda: the psychological dimension", David Wedgewood-Benn²⁰ argues that there was one characteristic of Goebbels which had long been well known, although perhaps too little highlighted. This was the incessant preoccupation with psychological consequences of whatever he was trying to achieve. Goebbels is rightly remembered as unscrupulous, mendacious, as a practitioner of dirty tricks, as a systematic repressor of dissent, and, more generally as a symbol of totalitarian propaganda. But this still leaves out a key ingredient; the psychological dimension. For no matter what his propaganda message at a given moment Goebbels always planned it in a highly intelligent way, with reference to its likely impact on the feelings and prejudices of the target audience.

The minutes of Goebbels' secret wartime conferences, one of the main channels through which his directives were conveyed to the media, provide some particularly graphic illustrations of this. Thus on 13 April 1940, just four days after Germany had occupied Denmark, Goebbels laid it down that propaganda to that country should be 'generous in all matters which do not cost us anything', and should aim to convince the Danes that 'whatever is happening now is the lesser evil'.²¹

This is analogous to Biafran propaganda to the minorities in Biafra to keep them within its fold. The Federal government, on the other hand, tried to turn them into subverting Biafra, with its own counter propaganda. One method applied by Nigeria, was the creation of States for minorities from areas that were still within Biafran control, which the Nigerians then had no way of administering.

However, according to David Wedgwood-Benn, in May of 1940, when the German armies were invading France, the Nazis set up a clandestine 'black' radio station purporting to be run by French communists and aimed at promoting defeatism. However, at the conference of 30 May, a complaint was noted that its programmes were too 'doctrinaire and dull',²² and Goebbels therefore asked to see the scripts. Meanwhile, on 7 July 1940, after France's capitulation, Goebbels gave instructions that the authors of anti-British press articles 'must not themselves get angry but must merely fan...anger, ie. they must not lose sight of the effect.'²³

In Biafra, general guidelines were given, but there was a regular daily morning conference setting daily parameters. It thus became more a matter of self-censorship. No one 'breathed down any body's neck'. There was no pre-censorship of scripts. The punishment for 'straying out of course', was after the crime, ie. if there was a deviation from the guidelines, and if that deviation acted against the interest of the Biafran war effort. As in Goebbels' case, the Director of the Propaganda Directorate, Dr. Ifegwu Eke, would demand to see the scripts, with his team of advisers. There were also occasional complaints of scripts being too doctrinaire, and therefore counter-productive.

According to David Wedgwood-Benn, a psychological strategy was no less clearly visible in Goebbels' directives, following the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April, 1941, which had itself followed on from a military coup in Belgrade the previous month, in

protest against Yugoslavia joining the Axis. Goebbels' briefing on the day of the invasion was not only carefully thought out, it had a surprisingly contemporary ring about it. In propaganda to Yugoslavia (a term which was not to be used), the primary blame for the war was to be pinned on the Serb generals' clique. In relation to Croatia, the official line should begin 'quite gently at first to remind Croats of the way the Serbs had treated them'. At the same time, clandestine stations beamed at Croatia were instructed that 'the only limit...is the credibility of what we say. Repeat again and again, at considerable length, what the Croats had to suffer at the hands of the Serbs'.²⁴

Nigeria and Biafra were strong believers in this method of "repetitive stress propaganda", for optimum effect.

Throughout his career, Goebbels relied on far more than censorship, or even the power to give orders to the media. He had a well developed flair for public relations, and was much exercised with the problem of credibility. The importance of the credibility of the messenger, and the believability of the message was discussed in ch. 1 of this thesis. Before and during the early stages of the war, he had made considerable efforts to woo the foreign journalists in Germany (even though they increasingly became subject to pressure and intimidation). On 14 August, 1940, he stressed 'what a useful weapon American press representatives in Germany are in the neutralisation of enemy lies'.²⁵ He complained on the same occasion about 'bureacracy', which had allegedly hampered visits by foreign correspondents to German occupied France.

During the civil war in China between Mao Tse Tung's and Chiang Kai Shek's forces, both are known to have placed a lot of emphasis on wooing the foreign press.²⁶ It is believed that during the 'Long March' by Mao and his troops, a number of journalists braved the elements and travelled some way with him, whilst others overcame the difficult terrain in most cases to catch up with him during his stops.

The cultivation of the foreign press was as important to Biafra as it was to Nigeria, since both had to justify their respective cause to the world. Some members of the foreign press, as will be seen later, became crusaders for the Biafran cause. The matter of vertical and horizontal justification to the external constituency was discussed in the introduction, and in ch.2 of this thesis.

Goebbels realised that propaganda could boomerang. Therefore, on 13 March, 1943, when the tide was already turning against Germany, Goebbels ordered restraint in publishing cartoons of Allied leaders which 'for the most part produce a totally different reaction from that intended', and might actually popularise the person attacked - the double edge of the 'concept of caricaturing'. Indeed, Goebbels, unlike some of the other Nazi leaders, seems at all times to have warned against the possible boomerang effect of conducting propaganda on the assumption that Germany had already won the war.

David Wedgwood-Benn postulates that all in all, one needs to separate two strands in Goebbels' technique. The first - based on media control, the intimidation of dissenters and the attempt to establish a monopoly of information - was of course a formidable weapon which could be described as 'coercive persuasion'. It closely resembled the Stalinist model, although it was not so heavy-handed. This explains the past Soviet unwillingness to publish the Goebbels' records. The second strand, which might be called 'manipulative persuasion', was something quite distinct. It involved a careful attempt to gauge the dispositions and prejudices of the audience, and then exploit them to serve the propagandist's purpose. Hence the meticulous attention to Danish and Croatian susceptibilities. Nor did the message consist only of lies.²⁷ Nazi propaganda to Yugoslavia had a long lasting effect in fanning undoubtedly genuine grievances. The residual reverberations of that effect can be seen in the civil wars that led to the break up

of Yugoslavia, and are continuing today in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia. As explained in ch.1., new generations are fighting old wars, indicating the sustainability of propaganda, and the argument that propaganda outlasts wars.

And indeed, the most long lasting of all the Goebbels' propaganda achievements was based on entirely truthful information. This was the revelation of the Katyn massacre of Polish prisoners of war in Russia in 1940. It was Goebbels, in April, 1943, who first broke the story which continued to run until April, 1990, when Moscow at last admitted Soviet guilt.

Biafra was in a similar situation, when it reported the genocide perpetrated against the Southerners - mostly Easterners - in Northern Nigeria before secession and the subsequent civil war. Nigeria tried for a while to deny these claims, until it finally admitted them, and General Gowon had to apologise. Nigeria and Biafra also applied the two concepts of 'coercive persuasion' and 'manipulative persuasion' in their approach to their different publics - domestic and external.

So did the Chinese in 1956: Chiang Kai Shek, who had greater control of the country and its media, used 'coercive persuasion' more than Mao Tse Tung who for logistical reasons and lack of media control, used 'manipulative persuasion'. The use of 'coercive persuasion' presupposes the capability, and the availability of the control facilities and means of propaganda transmission.

Perhaps the most candid statement of the Goebbels' propaganda philosophy was the one minuted at his conference of 30 October, 1942. On this occasion, Goebbels emphasised that 'it is... a mistake to conduct propaganda in such a way that it will stand up to the critical examination of intellectuals'. This was because 'the most primitive arguments are the most effective and meet with the greatest agreement among the masses'. 'Intellectuals always yield to the stronger, and this will be the ordinary man in the street'.

David Wedgwood-Benn maintains that techniques of this kind are rather like a virus, with a constant tendency to migrate and undergo mutations in the process. This thesis had, in ch.1, defined this process as that of imitations and replications, in arguing that there is little difference in the various war propaganda. This was particularly true of the two world wars, when each side closely studied the propaganda of its adversary. Many Germans managed to persuade themselves that their military defeat was brought about by the supposed skill of British propaganda, coordinated by Lord Northcliffe, the press magnate said to have been half admired, half abhorred in Germany. Nazi propaganda was purported to be a response to and partial imitation of British propaganda methods. David Wedgwood-Benn states that it is not surprising that one of the main postwar experts on Goebbels should explicitly have compared him with Northcliffe - since both in different types of society, were 'unorthodox masters of mass appeal and mass manipulation'. It is, in any case, certain that Goebbels absorbed many of the journalistic techniques which Northcliffe, among others, had helped to pioneer.

But what about the reverse process - the possible influence on the Western democracies? At least one expert on Nazi Germany, Richard Crossman, did on one occasion suggest an indirect influence. Crossman, had played a prominent part in helping to organise Anglo-American 'black propaganda' aimed at Nazi Germany - propaganda of a kind very similar to that which Goebbels himself had pioneered.²⁸

3.4. Derivative Modern Concepts.

3.4.1. Definition.

What, therefore, are the consequences of second world war propaganda?

Force and fraud have been recognised as the two cardinal virtues of war since the Chinese conqueror Sun Tzu recorded his military theories in 550 B.C: 'Undermine the enemy first,

then his army will fall to you. Subvert him, attack his morale, strike at his economy, corrupt him. Sow internal discord among his leaders, destroy him without fighting him'.²⁹

This declaration by Sun Tzu, should be juxtaposed with Hitler's declaration in Mein Kampf: 'in war, words are acts'. He had also in conversation with Hermann Rausching in 1939 declared: 'our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within himself. Mental confusion, contradiction of feelings, indecision, panic - these are our weapons'.³⁰

Alongside the two foregoing declarations should be placed the already cited writing by Ewald Banse. These declarations and writings, along with Machiavelli's, unconsciously formed the precepts for modern propaganda. All that happened afterwards was the process of 'migration and mutation' or 'imitations and replications' of these precepts, in the modern conduct of propaganda war generally. An examination of the statements, writings, and declarations from Sun Tzu in 550 B.C. through Machiavelli to Hitler, indicate a continuity in the general concept of propaganda, varied only by developments in communications systems. There is no anachronism in propaganda. The successful propaganda is that which appeals to 'primitive instincts', and not to 'intellectual analysis'.

Nevertheless, the development of information systems since the first world war, and subsequent use of these in propaganda activities has heightened and enhanced propaganda as a strategic instrument of war. As already discussed, the watershed for the modern era was the second world war. During the second world war, both the Allies (particularly the British, later the Americans), and the Germans blended these ancient precepts with modern technology to fight a secret war of devious machinations, as each side sought the edge that could mean the difference between victory and defeat.

Many 'shadow warriors' on both sides were involved in what Winston Churchill called 'the sinister touches of legerdemain'. Their principal weapons were not bullets or arms - but intrigue, deceit, fakery, stealth, skullduggery, and periodic mayhem. No holds were barred. No scheme was too brutal or immoral.³¹ The survival of nations was at stake.

It is therefore essential to re-emphasise the particular distinguishing features of this watershed period, in order to extract therefrom, derivative modern concepts, eg.

- (1) The concept of institutionalisation of propaganda.
- (2) The concept of edification.
- (3) The concept of caricaturing.
- (4) The concept of the charter.

There are other peripheral concepts which are not considered in the context of this thesis.

In considering these concepts, it will be helpful to consider three models:

- (1) The German Nazi model.
- (2) The Mao Tse Tung, Red army, Chinese model.
- (3) The Biafran model.

3.4.2. The Concept of Institutionalisation.

The Ministry of propaganda set up by Hitler's Germany was virtually unprecedented. It was a departure from the tradition of either the Ministry of Information, or the War Office, or the Foreign Office handling the dissemination of information in war time. The Ministry, run by Goebbels, became a power house for the coordination of Nazi propaganda activities. By the use of radio, film, theatre, pamphlets, print media, rumours, etc; it conjured up powerful images in the minds of the German people. It created a multifocal dimension - one, was the way the German people saw themselves, as the superior race; the second, was the way the Germans saw the outside world, as an inferior race which must be conquered. It glorified war. The third dimension was, the way the rest of the world saw Nazi Germany, as a group of people misled, heading for the destruction of themselves, and the rest of the world. They were led by a 'mad man', who must be stopped before it was too late. It was therefore in its concept a positive and negative force. It conjured up different images to its different constituencies.

Whether from admiration or not, the other two models considered here learned from Germany's experience. During the civil war in China, and the 'Long March', Mao Tse Tung did not have the facilities within his control to set up a 'Ministry'. Nevertheless, his manipulation of information was very akin to the lessons learnt in the second world war. When Chiang Kai Shek's forces encircled him and his forces in Southern China, to escape annihilation, he set off on the long march to Northern China. In the process, he conquered uncharted terrain, swamps, crocodiles, mountains, forests, malaria, other diseases, hostile native warriors, and Chiang Kai Shek's forces.³² The images created by this super human achievement were more than any institution would have been able to manufacture for him. He, became, and was the institution. The Red army, however, did not regard itself as the superior race. Rather, it regarded itself as the servant, and saviour of the Chinese people.

Later, after Mao's success over Chiang Kai Shek, and the creation of a Communist state in China, the Ministry of Propaganda was officially created. The process of 'migration and mutation', had certainly extended from Germany, through China to Biafra. The Biafrans imitated and replicated the institutionalisation of propaganda. It had an advantage over Mao, because it already controlled the facilities, and means of propaganda transmission right from the beginning. Its Propaganda Directorate under Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university don, combined fellow intellectuals, as in the case of the German Ministry, as well as Mao's handling of propaganda. Regular meetings every morning coordinated the daily propaganda activities of Biafra. It replicated in principle the notion of adapting intellectual and modern inputs into conjuring up primitive emotions in the minds of the Southerners first, and the Easterners, subsequently. Unlike the Nazi and Chinese cases, however, world public opinion was more sympathetic, even when their governments were not, as will be seen in chs.4 and 5.

3.4.3. The Concept of Edification.

The process of edification involves the injection of propaganda images principally into the domestic publics, who then build up the image of the protagonist, who in turn becomes the credible messenger. In the German case, it was Adolf Hitler, in the Chinese case, it was Mao Tse Tung, in the Biafran case, it was Emeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

In Nazi Germany, Goebbels contrived to build such powerful images of Adolf Hitler, that it is understood that the very mention of Hitler's name brought the soldiers to attention. It was like flying the national flag or playing the national anthem. Hitler was kept out of the scene as much as possible, for fear of overexposure. Hitler, who was merely a corporal in the German army during the first world war, was wounded in France, and later decorated. It is assumed that he started his build up after the war, having learned the propaganda lessons of that war. In Goebbels, he found a man who could intensify his crusade as the

Fuhrer - the saviour of the German people. He capitalised on the period of the depression in Germany. He whipped up primitive emotions in the German people against the Jews. He became a demigod to the Germans, and a belzeebub to non Germans, especially the Jews in Germany. The means of transmission in the Ministry of propaganda were used with optimum effect to bring this about.

Unlike Hitler, Mao Tse Tung was a highly educated leader. Unlike Hitler, he did not have a Ministry of Propaganda at the beginning of the civil war. This was created later.

However, he had an intellectually rich committee that marched and worked with him. He had daily early morning meetings. He mapped out both the military and propaganda strategies at these meetings. He worked late into the night. Like Hitler, he was built up from scratch. Like Hitler, he came from a poor background, with only propaganda to bring about his edification to the point of deification. He was variously described by his followers during the civil war, and later by the Chinese people as :

- (1) Mao the Romantic Revolutionary,
- (1) Mao the Peasant's friend,
- (3) Mao the Young Politician,
- (4) Mao the Upholder of the People's Will,
- (5) Mao the Creator of the People's Communes,
- (6) Mao the Supreme Commander of the Red Guards, and later the Red Army,
- (7) Mao the Statesman,
- (8) Mao the Myth.³³

He was accredited with driving out the Japanese from China, and with driving out the Kuomintang, and crushing Chiang Kai Shek. The success of the long march crowned his glory. He had learned his lessons by studying the propaganda tactics of the Germans, and comparing them with the successes and failures of communist propaganda under Stalin. The one was systemic, the other was ideological. He was built up to look better than both,

more intelligent than both, and more humane than both. He was edified as leader of the communist world rather than Soviet Union's Stalin.

During the long march, Mao was asked by a foreign journalist who caught up with him: What was the greatest gift he would give his people to make them follow him to the death. He answered: You give them arms to defend themselves; You give them food to eat; and you give them an unflinching belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership. He was then asked: If any of these were missing, what would you give them. He answered: You give them food to eat; and you give them unalloyed belief in you as their leader, and your leadership. He was further asked, if he had to take away from those two, which one of them he would retain. He answered: You give them unqualified, unflinching, unalloyed belief in you as their leader, and in your leadership. He was quoting an earlier Chinese sage and warrior, Sun Tzu. This, however, enunciated Mao's concept of edification. The difference between him and Hitler, is that Hitler led from the rear, whilst Mao led from the front. In the modern context, they both preceded Ojukwu, and Biafra.

The Biafran propaganda machine was more systemic than ideological. Unlike Hitler, but like Mao, Ojukwu was highly educated, having graduated from Oxford before going to Sandhurst. Like both Hitler and Mao, he was a soldier. Along with Gowon, he was regarded as one of the best gunners in the Nigerian army.

Society had never seen him as a future leader. He was not built up from scratch. He was born with a 'silver spoon in his mouth'. When the coup plotters of 1966 tried to enlist his help to overthrow the Federal government, he declined.

Even after he had been appointed Governor of Eastern Nigeria, he was not looked on as a future leader, but just one of the Governors. His edification was therefore both contrived and accidental. It was accidental in that he happened to be appointed to replace Hilary Njoku as Governor of Eastern Nigeria at the time of General Ironsi's assassination in a

counter coup in July 1966. There were many possible leaders for the East. But, he was there.

He was a soldier. His father was a prominent and wealthy Ibo man. He was well educated - something very much admired by the highly educated and enterprising Easterners - indeed by all Nigerians. There were very few highly educated people in the Nigerian army then. The army was regarded as a profession for dropouts, and lowly educated. It was therefore convenient for him to speak for the East, in negotiating with the Federal government in Lagos, whose head was Yakubu Gowon, another military man, a fellow gunner with a similar reputation. Better still, at the time, Ojukwu was a senior officer to Gowon in the army.

That is when the connivance at edification started. The Directorate of propaganda built him up as the instant Saviour. This rose to a crescendo at, and after the Aburi accord under the aegis of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Ojukwu was highly intelligent, and used his intelligence well. Like Hitler and Mao, he had a commanding personality. He became the protagonist - the credible messenger. Television, radio, music, the theatre, were brought to bear in the edification, as in Hitler's and Mao's cases. Music was written and made with, and in Ojukwu's name. As in Hitler's Germany, and Mao's China, his sayings were deemed to be instructive wisdom. He was also portrayed as the credible arbiter between Biafra and the outside world - the external constituency in propaganda terms. He had tremendous presence, and used it well in his television and radio broadcasts.

3.4.4. The Concept of Caricaturing.

This is the flip side of the coin to the concept of edification. Mostly, it is carried out by, and with opposing or enemy propaganda. The object is to destroy the image, and puncture the status and personality of the protagonist enemy. The belief is that if the head is cut off, or severely dismembered morally, the body cannot function. It is in this vein, that Britain

and its allies tried to label Hitler as a mad man who sought world conquest. Conversely, Hitler tried, to show that Winston Churchill by getting involved in the war, was leading the British people to their ruin.

This state of affairs was replicated in the Chinese civil war. Chiang Kai Shek presented Mao Tse Tung to the outside world as the 'communist rebel', and to the domestic Chinese public as a 'bandit chief', who was leading the people to ruin.

Again there are parallels in Biafra and Nigeria. Immediately after the declaration of the Republic of Biafra, Gowon used the Nigerian media to undermine Ojukwu. The message wanted Ojukwu captured dead or alive, and brought back to Lagos.³⁴ Ojukwu was described variously as a rebel, a bigot, ambitious, and leading the Eastern Nigerian people to ruin. It was claimed that he was not interested in Biafra; that his father had sent him to Oxford to study, so that he could return and govern Nigeria; that he was only using Biafra as a footstool. Because Ojukwu had grown a beard when the war started, the Nigerian media made quite a play on this. The beard was supposed to have enhanced Ojukwu's presence and personality. Some heavy artillery pieces, which were manufactured locally in Biafra from scrap, were now nick-named Ojukwu's beard. It was said that Ojukwu's beard was destroying the Nigerian soldiers in their droves. The Nigerians felt that this over enhanced Ojukwu's image, and edified Ojukwu, Therefore, every so often, propaganda was put out from the Nigerian side that Ojukwu's beard had fallen off, as a result of a chronic illness, and that he was no longer mentally and physically fit to lead the Biafran people. This is analogous to Hitler and Mao being variously described as mad men, mentally and physically unfit to lead their people.

Just as Hitler tried to counter by caricaturing Churchill, Mao countered by describing Chiang Kai Shek as an imperialist stooge, who cared nothing about the Chinese people. Mao accused Chiang Kai Shek of seeking self gratification only, with the help of the

Americans. The Biafran media, on their part, gave as much as they received, if not more. They claimed that Gowon was uneducated; that is why he could not understand Ojukwu's English at the Aburi accord (see ch.4). It is being held now that, for this reason, Gowon decided to go back to school after being overthrown as Head of State - evidence of the sustainability of propaganda. Gowon had his second son soon after the launching of Apollo 12. Peter Edochie, a continuity announcer, came on the air on the voice of Biafra, and said that Gowon was faster than Apollo 12; that he did nothing in Lagos but produce babies; that he was unfit to govern a country as educated, as populated, as rich as Nigeria.³⁵ Gowon was severally caricatured in the daily news talks emanating from Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra - delivered by Okokon Ndem, Nwora Asika, and Paddy Davies (myself). The anagram of his name was used: Yabuku Wagon, instead of Yakubu Gowon. Wagon in Nigerian 'pidgin' English is a dilapidated truck, just managing to totter along. Yabuku means absolutely nothing. Like Chiang Kai Shek, he was accused of being a stooge, although in his case of the Hausa/Fulani, even though he was from Benue/Plateau, which had for long engaged in an uprising against Hausa/Fulani rule. He was accused of hanging on to power with foreign help. He was described as the 'Sho Sho upstart'. Sho Sho is Gowon's native village.

3.4.5. The Concept of the Charter.

The Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines 'Charter' as a written grant of rights, especially by Sovereign or legislature; written constitution or description of organization's functions etc.³⁶

The Penguin Concise English Dictionary defines 'Charter' as a document granting a privilege or recognising a right; document incorporating a borough, university or company.³⁷

A charter is a document granting certain specific rights, powers, privileges, or functions from the sovereign power of a state to an individual, corporation, city, or other unit of local organization.³⁸ The most famous charter, 'Magna Carta' ('Great Charter'), was a compact between the English King John, and his barons, specifying the King's grant of certain liberties to the English people. Elsewhere, in medieval Europe, monarchs typically issued charters to towns, cities, guilds, merchant associations, universities, and religious institutions; such charters guaranteed certain privileges and immunities for those organizations, while also sometimes specifying arrangements for the conduct of their internal affairs.

By the end of the Middle Ages, monarchs granted charters that guaranteed European overseas trading companies monopolies of trade (and in some cases government) within a specified foreign geographic area. A corporation that was so endowed was called a chartered company. Virtually all of the British colonies in North America were established by charters; these charters granted land and certain governing rights to the colonies while retaining certain powers to the British crown.

Modern charters are of two kinds, corporate and municipal. A corporate charter is a grant made by a government body giving a group of individuals the power to form a corporation. A municipal charter is a law passed by a state government allowing the people of a specific locality to organize themselves into a municipal corporation i.e., a city. Such a charter in effect delegates part of the state's powers to the people for the purpose of local self government.³⁹

In most countries, the Head of State, is the head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Therefore, their utterances are very important, in propaganda terms, and make the headlines. It was particularly so in the three models considered here. In war time, because power resides in the head of state and/or government, who is also the

commander in chief, their speeches receive optimum media, political, and diplomatic attention. This attention is heightened if the speech becomes a motivator, a charge, or a charter.

That is why the 'Mein Kampf' by Hitler, the 'Little Red Book' by Mao, and the 'Ahiara Declaration' by Ojukwu represent charters, in the tradition of the above definitions. They were more than just authoritative instruments; they were propaganda gun powder. They may not have been 'Magna Carta'. But, they were a combination of thoughts, musings, commands and grants issuing from the protagonist authority, a charge to the people they represented - Germany, China (the Red Guard, the Red Army, and China), and Biafra, respectively. The three documents granted their different public rights, privileges, and responsibilities. They also charged them psychologically, motivating them to mobilise for military action.

The 'Mein Kampf' has already been discussed extensively. The 'Little Red Book', Mao's Charter, became virtually a Bible - the Mao-Chinese brand of communist ideology. A lot of the thoughts therein became a way of life in Mao's China.

A typical thought from the book was:

'The only group in the countryside that has always put up the bitterest fight is the poor peasants...

Without the poor peasants there can be no revolution...

To reject them is to reject the revolution'.⁴⁰

This was Mao striking a propaganda blow at the conscience of China. He was making the apathetic, the seemingly unaffected in China, aware of their rights to egalitarianism. He was motivating them to action. China had to listen, and did, as he muses again:

'All the nationalities of
China have always been
unwilling to submit to the
oppression of foreign peoples
and have striven to shake it
off by acts of resistance.

They accept union only on
the basis of equality'.⁴¹

The 'Ahiara Declaration', came after the unimplimented Aburi Peace Accord between Ojukwu and Gowon, under the aegis of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Like the Mein Kampf. and the 'Little Red Book', it was a charter, yet like them, also, a tremendous propaganda ploy. It had an uncanny resemblance in form, style, and structure to the 'Arusha Declaration' (earlier by Julius Nyerere himself), and the 'Little Red Book'. However, the significant point here is the continuity; the process of migration and mutation, imitation and replication.

3.5. Conclusion.

German Nazi propaganda was the watershed for modern propaganda in war. The Ministry of Propaganda, set up by Hitler and run by Goebbels, made use of every available facet of the media - stage, film, print, and the electronic broadcast media - to transmit its message. It sought to brainwash the German people, and it did. Because states of the world are copy cats, this lesson was not lost on them. A process of mutation and migration, or imitation and replication then ensued, with family resemblances of the German propaganda example occuring in subsequent wars of the modern era. Therefore, the methods and

concepts that emanated from the Germans are reflected in the other two models applied in this thesis - the Chinese and Biafran examples. This family reflection is described as the 'Derivative modern concepts'. Biafra, as will be seen in the next chapter, apart from reflecting the concepts, also derived and employed some of the German methods, for instance, in the setting up of the 'Directorate of Propaganda'.

Notes on Chapter 3.

1. Churchill is said to have said this, in justifying the setting up and existence of the United Nations. He went on to state that so long as the world leaders had a pen in one hand and a piece of paper in the other, they would not reach out for the sword:

Culled: 1. from a lecture at the University College, London in 1975 given by Dr. Jacobi on the law of International organisations.

2. from a lecture at the University of Vienna in July 1977, given by Prof Seidel Hohen-Velden.
3. from a series of programmes on propaganda on the BBC World Service in January 1992, produced by William Joyce. The one in reference was transmitted on 13.1.92, at 9.15am.

2. Sir Edward Heath made the speech first in Parliament after the Gulf War in 1991, and subsequently in radio and television interviews in 1991 and 1992.

Also see J.M.Keynes: 'Opposition to World War 1 Peace terms'
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Op. cit.
Vol. 21; 753:2a.

3. The Sunday Times London, 5th July 1992.
4. Ibid 12th July 1992.

5. See ch.2.

Encycopaedia Britannica: Op.cit; vols.19:745:1a;
5:180:3a; 1:129:3a;
16:106:2b; 213:2a;
25:479:2b.etc.

6. Gerald Mansell: Let Truth Be Told:
'The Politics of Propaganda'
London, BBC, 1982,pp.55-78.

7. Ibid: pp 55 -78

8. Ibid: pp 55- 78

9. The Oxford Dictionary
of Current English: Op.cit.p.147.

10.The Penguin Concise
English Dictionary:
G.N.Garmonsway,ed: London, Bloomsbury Books,
1969; p155.

11. Encyclopaedia Britannica:
Op.cit; vols.3:513:3b;
13:9:2a; 18:474:2a;

12. Ibid: vols. 3: 513:3b
Gilbert Ryle: The Concept of Mind:
Oxford, O.U.P. 1949, p.57.
13. Encyclopaedia Britannica:
Op.cit. vols.3:514:1a;
22:897:2a; 25:608:2b.
14. Ibid: vol. 3: 514: 1a
15. William B. Breur: The Secret War with
Germany: Airlife,
Shrewsbury, 1988, pp37-50.
16. Ibid: pp 37 - 50
17. Ibid: pp 40 - 48
18. Ibid: pp 45 - 46
19. See above - under the definition of concept, and concept
formation.
20. David Wedgewood-Benn: 'Goebbels and propaganda:
the psychological
imension'; The World
Today: London,

The Royal Institute of
International Affairs,
October 1992.

He also made a presentation on the same topic to the
General Seminar, Department of International Relations,
London School Of Economics and Political Science in
November 1992.

21. Ibid: part 1
22. Ibid: part 1
23. Ibid: part 2
24. Ibid: part 2
25. Ibid: part 2
The Sunday Times: 12th July 1992,
London, 1992.
26. Roger Howard: Mao Tse-tung and the
Chinese People:
George Allen and Unwin,
London, 1977, pp43-57.
27. David Wedgewood-Benn: Op.cit. parts 1 -2

28. Ibid: parts 1- 2
29. Encyclopaedia Britannica:
Op.cit. vols. 11:389:2c;
26:171:1a; 9:728:3b.
30. Gerald Mansell: Op.cit.
Open University: 'Propaganda': BBC2,
10.30am; Saturdays,
May 1992.
31. William B. Breur: Op.cit. pp 59 - 63
Gerald Mansell: Op.cit. pp 36 - 47
Open University: Op.cit. BBC 2, May 1992
32. Hugh Purcell: Mao Tse Tung:
Wayland; Hove England,
1977, pp 60-78.
33. Ibid: pp 60 - 78
Roger Howard: Op.cit. 50 -67
34. Radio Nigeria: Lagos, 1967.
35. Voice of Biafra: Enugu, 1968.

36. The Oxford Dictionary
of Current English: Op.cit. p 147
- 37 The Penguin Concise
English Dictionary: Op.cit. p. 155
38. Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Op.cit. vols.3:131:2b;
15:384:1a; 12:774:3a;
20:596:1b; 29:32:1b.
39. Ibid: vol. 3: 131: 2b
40. Dick Wilson: The People's Emperor:
Hutchinson, London, 1979,
pp.90-138.
Hugh Purcell: Op.cit. pp. 64 - 66
Roger Howard: Op.cit. pp 43 - 47
41. Ibid: pp. 48 - 52

CHAPTER FOUR.

BIAFRA - THE DOMESTIC FACTOR.

4.1. Introduction.

This chapter being the core of the thesis, is in two parts.

It has been divided further into appropriate sub-sections to accommodate a detailed analysis of the domestic scene. Part A includes: Prelude, The Dawn, The Spark, The Blaze; whilst Part B includes: The Operation of the Biafran Media, The Biafran Media and the Biafran People, The Sun Set, Back to the Fold, Epilogue.

As Biafran propaganda is the case study for this thesis, it has been necessary to segment this chapter in this way, in order to have a clear picture of the Biafran case. The next chapter -5 - will deal with Biafran propaganda and the external (international) factor.

Even though this thesis is not concerned with the civil war itself, nevertheless, this chapter will examine the remote and immediate causes of the war, the war period and its aftermath, and consequently the propaganda surrounding all those periods.

The chapter also examines ethnic attitudes on both sides of the divide. It will comment on the exploitation of the different ethnic nationalities by both Nigeria and Biafra, and draw conclusions from the fall-outs. Some material exists on the media in Nigeria, the media in Africa, and related topics. Materials also exist on the civil war itself. Extensive research reveals that there seems to be nothing available on the part played by the media in Biafra. This chapter will, therefore, invariably draw heavily from interviews of Biafran people and propaganda Directorate colleagues. The media include ENBC/TV, Radio Biafra, Voice of Biafra, Biafran Television, Nigerian media, politicians, and the publics on both sides of the conflict. Some of the Biafran media staff are now working in various fields in Nigeria.

Information will also be gleaned from the sources noted at the end of this chapter, and from any available sources on the civil war itself.

The chapter will relate to the principles and concepts of propaganda already enunciated, on a comparative analysis, (as will chapter 5).

It will pose the question of the influence of propaganda on the different players within Biafra on the one hand, and Nigeria on the other. It will examine Nigeria's reaction and response.

It will discuss the influence of the media and propaganda generally on the peace process, and the lessons thereof.

Finally, the chapter will examine what happened to Biafran media people at the end of the war. It will show what happened to the Radio and Television stations, etc; at the end. It will discuss the attitude of the protagonists, and their fate afterwards.

There will be an examination of the immediate post war peace and reconciliation that ensued in Nigeria as the guns went silent. Was this unique? Was there a precedent? Or, did Nigeria set the example for the process of migration and mutation, imitation and replication, in other parts of the world?

PART A.

4.2. Prelude.

The scene for the civil war in Nigeria was set long before the war itself. It was set, some would argue, almost from when Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain in 1960. A school of thought holds that nature itself conspired to complicate the Nigerian situation. Nigeria is a land of great climatic, territorial and ethnic variety.¹ The British, at colonisation, discovered that from the 400 mile long coast of tangled swamp and mangrove, a belt of dense rain-forest ran inland to a depth of about a hundred and fifty miles. This was Southern Nigeria, split into East and West by the Niger River flowing South from its confluence with the Benue River at Lokoja (see map).

In the Western part of the South, the predominant group was the Yoruba, a people with a long history of powerful kingdoms. Because of the British penetration through Lagos,

Western culture first reached the Yoruba and other tribes of the West at about the same time as it reached the peoples of the Riverine areas of the East.² In the Eastern part of the South lived a variety of peoples, predominant among them the Ibos, who lived on both banks of the Niger, but mainly East of it. Ironically, in view of their later speedy development and progress which finally enabled them to overtake the other ethnic groups of Nigeria in terms of European-style development, the Ibos and the other peoples of the East were regarded as being more backward than the rest by 1900.

North of the forest line was the woodland, verging into savannah grass and prairie, and finally to semi-desert and scrub. Along the Southern fringe of the enormous area runs the Middle Belt, inhabited by non Hausa peoples, who at the dawn of the twentieth century, were mainly pagan and animist in religion, but were nevertheless vassals of the

Hausa/Fulani, the latter having originally come South from the Sahara in conquest, bringing with them their Muslim religion.

All in all, Nigeria is a huge country (almost twice the size of Spain), and about four times the size of Great Britain.

As the colonial authority, Britain made little, if any, attempt at unifying the country.

Rather, it left it largely as it found it, apart from the amalgamation of 1914, discussed later in this chapter.

The film showing the attainment of independence sets the scene of how things looked at the handing over of the baton, from the British to the indigenous Nigerian government.

The speech of the Governor General, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe on the film "Nigeria Attains Independence", by the Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, was a plea for what looked like a coalition of Regions to come together and work together.³ Yet, from the start, the different media in the regions were fanning up tribal and ethnic differences instead of uniting the country.

The Nigerian Constitution handed down by Lord Lugard immediately before independence, had prior to that, created three regions - The East, The West, and The North.⁴ The Mid-West was carved out of the West after independence.

The media in these regions were utterly independent of, and sometimes at variance with each other. Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service, and Radio Kaduna were powerful instruments used by the respective regions to keep Nigeria apart through the promotion of ethnic and tribal differences. The aim, ironically, was to capture the centre, Lagos.⁵

According to the Confederation of British Industry (C.B.I.)⁶ and United Nations Populations office figures,⁷ Nigeria has a population of about 120 to 125 million. The

C.B.I. also forecast in the same report that by the year 2000, Nigeria would overtake the United States of America in population growth.

Nigeria has two hundred and fifty different languages. Within these two hundred and fifty different language groups, there are at least five hundred dialectical differences.

Barely three years after independence, in 1963, there was a census in Nigeria. The result of this head count has never been accepted. Since then, there have been three other censuses in Nigeria, in 1977, 1988, and 1991, all of which have been disputed by the different ethnic groups.⁸ Even the census of 1953 -54, organised by Britain, and held under their auspices, was rejected. However, after the 1963 census, the media in the West and the East of the country accused the Federal government of distorting the census figures in favour of the North, in order to attract more amenities to the North. Radio Kaduna responded aggressively in its numerous news talks.

This set a tumultuous scene in Nigeria. Such overt propaganda was inciting and confrontational. Yet, at the time, many assumed that it was no more than adversarial politics of the kind practised in Westminster. Nigeria was after all regarded by the British as a colonial show piece and trail blazer.⁹ Yet, several elements of propaganda, as enunciated earlier, can be discerned even at this early stage in the discussion of Nigerian/Biafran experience, eg;

4.2.1 Overt propaganda:

The media activities were a clear indication of overt propaganda. There were no punches pulled. All was given to maintain the loyalty of particular niches and constituencies.¹⁰ More was even given to capture the interest of the 'wavering souls' in the opposing camps. The language was abrasive propaganda, the mode of transmission was clearly overt.

He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.

Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war fare, and oil and economic war.(see ch.4). All three relatively impacted on the world stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children, women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.

Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of manipulative persuasion.

The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambiguous case of politics provoking a famine.

Father Mike Doheny, an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:

'We'd never seen hunger, never.
There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.⁴

Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen because of the blockade of Biafra on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from

4.2.2 Covert propaganda:

A lot of covert propaganda also ensued. For instance, when civil servants in the North, in a series of meetings, plotted the removal from the region of civil servants and workers of the South, particularly those of Eastern origin,¹¹ they planted rumours within the Northern populace to the effect that the Eastern civil servants were there, not to help the North, but to take the jobs of the Northerners and keep them under perpetual domination.¹² This inflamed latent, inert ethnic differences, leading to the first Kano (Sabongeri) riots of the 1950s. Such covert propaganda, was of course economical with the truth. It failed to mention that Northern apathy towards modernisation, in part because of its Islamic culture, meant that the work place and the civil service could not be filled by the British alone. Thus a few of such available posts - clerks, junior executives, accountants, switchboard operators, engineers, train drivers, waterworks superintendents, bank tellers, factory and shop staff, post office workers, and the like - were filled by Yorubas: most were filled by the more enterprising Easterners. By 1966, there were an estimated 1,300,000 Easterners, mostly Ibos, in the Northern Region, and about another 500,000 had taken up jobs and residence in the West. The bulk of the market stalls in the major commercial centres of Kano and Kaduna were owned by Easterners.

It is against these communities that the covert propaganda was directed. The similarity to Germany's experience between the wars is inescapable. Hitler's overt and covert propaganda against the Jews led ultimately, in Hitler's case to the holocaust; and in the Nigerian case, the propaganda against the Easterners led to the Kano riots of the 1950s and early 1960s, and the subsequent genocide and pogrom against the Easterners in the North. It was partly because of this, and partly because of their resilience and industry, that the Ibos described themselves as the Jews of Nigeria. The Ibos argued that the Jews

were persecuted in Nazi Germany for their resilience and industry, similarly, they were persecuted in Nigeria for the same reasons.

It would be entirely fair therefore to extract a process of migration and mutation, imitation and replication even here, (except for the gas chambers).

4.2.3. Propaganda preceding the war:

It is clear from the preceding that even though at this stage,¹³ civil war was not contemplated by any one in the country, a lot of propaganda preceded the war. It was the trigger. It enkindled fears in the minds of the ordinary people of the North, who otherwise would have lived peacefully with the Easterners, and in fact had lived peacefully with them over the years. It was propaganda that inflamed the inert and latent feelings of jealousies, envy and hatred that propaganda itself had implanted. In propaganda terms, it appealed to the sensitivities and sensibilities of the Northern populace. It was a case of manipulative persuasion. It was this build up, this preceding propaganda that caused the spark.

4.3 The Dawn:

The scene thus set characterised the pattern of political philosophy and thought in Nigeria. It decided the events that followed. However, it is important to point out that it was not always the East and the West against the North.

During the ensuing elections in 1959, into the Federal House of Representatives, and subsequent to the elections, the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Service was transmitting messages to the Eastern Regional people different from the pre-census era. The simple reason was that Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had resigned his appointment as Premier of Eastern Nigeria to contest the Federal House elections in 1959, in order to become

Governor General, had gone into coalition with the leader of the Northern Regional party, Sir Ahmadu Bello.

The alliance thus formed between the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), therefore altered and reshaped the attitudes of the media in the North and in the East. They both accused Chief Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the Action Group (A.G.), and Premier of Western Region, of tribalism.

The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service was by far the best broadcasting system in the country at the time, and fought back with aspersions on the other two parties and their leaders. It extolled Chief Awolowo as the Saviour of the Yoruba people, and the only possible saviour of Nigeria. It promoted him as the best person to govern Nigeria.

This was the new trend in the political set up. the coalition of the NPC-NCNC won the elections to the Federal House of Representatives, after the 1959 Federal House elections. The NPC held the North with 148 seats, the NCNC held the East and a proportion of the West (mostly those non-Yoruba parts which were later carved out as Mid-West State), gaining 89 seats, and the Action Group (AG), took most of the Yoruba speaking West, but gained only 75 seats ¹⁴

However, because of the powerful and penetrating transmission of the Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, combined with the vigorous and flamboyant campaigns of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group penetrated and captured constituencies in the North (particularly in the Middle Belt area), and the East, (amongst the minorities agitating for Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers' State - COR State).¹⁵ Chief Awolowo campaigned with helicopters, traversing, and spraying the country with political propaganda pamphlets; and launching and floating air-borne propaganda balloons, edifying and extolling Chief Awolowo and the Action Group. The Action Group, nevertheless, was in opposition at the Federal level.¹⁶

It can thus be argued, that the propaganda element of caricaturing was applied here; the caricaturing of Awolowo by the media in the East and North. By contrast, Ahmadu Bello and Azikiwe were edified, along with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, of NPC and the Federal Prime Minister (whom Ahmadu Bello described as his 'lieutenant'), as the leaders who had the interest of the country at heart. Awolowo was caricatured as a tribal, ethnic, sectional leader of the Yoruba tribe.¹⁷

The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service, for its part, caricatured Nnamdi Azikiwe as an opportunistic Ibo leader. It claimed that Zik, as he was popularly and favourably known, was only interested in 'ZIK', because all he wanted was to be Governor General, and later, President. WNBS described Ahmadu Bello as not in fact wanting the unity of Nigeria, but as a conniving Fulani tribal leader who was interested only in spreading Islam to the Southernmost part, and indeed all parts of the country.¹⁸ While WNBS described Abubakar as a stooge of Ahmadu Bello,¹⁹ Chief Awolowo was described as a pillar of strength, and a paragon of intelligence.

Apart from these different propaganda statements from the media and press from the regions, the utterances from the different leaders, Awo, (as he was popularly and favourably called), Zik, and the Sardauna (as Ahmadu Bello was popularly known, being also the Sardauna of Sokoto), buttressed what emanated from the media and press. Witnessed here therefore were the propaganda elements of edification, caricaturing, brainwashing, coersive, and manipulative persuasion. Nigeria was an epitomy of the principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication. No holds were barred. Ethnic, religious, and political differences were abundantly exploited.

4.4. The Spark:

A curious vista therefore emerged. Whilst the West and the East accused the North of distorting census figures for its benefit, Zik and the Sardauna were in coalition; in a marriage of convenience. Sir Ahmadu Bello (NPC), however, remained Premier of the Northern Region; Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (NPC), was Federal Prime Minister; the Rt. Honourable, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (NCNC) was Governor General, and later President, and a-political. Chief Obafemi Awolowo (AG) was Federal leader of opposition.

As if to complicate matters further, another twist was introduced to the political and propaganda horizon of the time. Zik, having been promoted from Acting Governor General, to Governor General, to President, became a-political surrendering his leadership of the NCNC. Ahmadu Bello declared that the Ibos were never friends of the Northerners, nor of any one else, and broke off the alliance between the NPC and the NCNC.²⁰

Then a systematic accusation of tribalism was instigated on Radio Television Kaduna (RKT) against the East. The Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation and Television (ENBC/TV) responded in like manner against the North and the Federal government. The Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service and Television (WNBS/TV), sided with ENBC/TV, reinforcing its own on-going propaganda against, what it called, the 'bigoted' leaders of the North, with Ahmadu Bello at the head.

By this time, another dimension was introduced to reinforce media activity. Eighty percent of the newspapers in Lagos were at the time owned by people from the mainly Western region, and had country wide circulation. The Northern regional newspapers circulated principally in the North and, because of the low percentage of literacy in English in the region, some were published in Hausa. The papers from the East were calculatedly, kept out of circulation in Lagos by the mainly Western regional mafia-like media based in

Lagos, the Federal capital, the centre of activity, and seat of the Federal government. This, clearly was censorship. The aim was to make it impossible for the Biafran message to be transmitted, domestically or externally, because the external sector could have picked up the message in Lagos.

4.4.1. The Media and the Advent of Broadcasting:

It is essential at this stage to understand, the strength of the media in Nigeria.

Broadcasting arrived in Nigeria in 1931 in the form of a relay service of the British Empire Service from Daventry, England, to Lagos.²¹ One year later, the Lagos station experimented with rediffusion service. The Nigerian Posts and Telegraphs Department (P&T), was authorised to devise a plan for programme distribution to subscribers in Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, operating in conjunction with the Empire Broadcasting Service. The first rediffusion service started in 1936, distributing programmes originating from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), in London, as part of its overseas service. Between 1940 and 1950, rediffusion spread to Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu Ode, Port Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Zaria, and was installed in most offices to supply regular news and musical programmes during working hours. It was also installed in the official residences of civil servants. Some private homes were later allowed to subscribe.

The Nigerian Broadcasting Service began formally on 1st April, 1951 with some limited to produce programmes catering for the interests of the audience in Nigeria, but with a colonial bias. Relay of news, current affairs, and other programmes still emanated from London.

The NBS later became the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation on 23rd August, 1954, following a bill in Parliament creating an instrument for the establishment of the Corporation. At self government, the Corporation devolved branches of the Corporation to the three regional headquarters, Ibadan in 1952, Enugu in 1954, and Kaduna in 1956; the Midwest, carved out of the West after independence, got its own station in 1962.

Television broadcasting began in Nigeria on 31st October, 1959, one year before independence. It was, as it turned out, the advent of television in Africa. The first station (in Africa), was thus established in Ibadan by the then government of the Western region of Nigeria, and its jingle said so: "First in Africa". It was called the Western Nigeria Television (WNTV). It became an essential arm of the Western Nigeria Ministry of Information, and therefore of government.

In October 1960, the Eastern Nigeria Television was established in Enugu (ENTV). Not to be outdone by Ibadan, its jingle said it was "Second to None". Again, it was a parastatal of the Eastern Nigeria Ministry of Information. This was also the year and the month Nigeria became independent. Two years lapsed before Radio Television Kaduna (RKT) was established, in 1962. It too was an arm of the Northern Nigeria Ministry of Information. Ironically, later that year, 1962, the Federal government at the centre, Lagos, rather belatedly established its own Television station, the Nigerian Television Service (NTS), Lagos. It should have led the way. This service, which was confined to the Federal Capital, Lagos, was set up and operated under a management agreement with an American Network, NBC-International, on a purely technical cooperation contractual basis. It was not long however before it was brought into the fold of the already existent Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), at the termination of the management contract with the American Network.

Before independence, the only independent media were the print (as was the case in many African countries). The most prominent amongst these was the West African Pilot. Such indigenous, privately owned papers were set up by people who had been abroad and studied there making contact with the West Indians and Black Americans whose struggle for the emancipation of the black man gave rise to Pan Africanism.

As can be seen, at the time, the tradition was for state and federal governments to set up, be responsible for, cater for, and subvent the electronic media. (This has now been altered by a decree in 1992). The result was a propaganda war between regions that were opposed to or at variance with the federal government, and the federal government itself, or between regions of opposing or different political complexions. The North - South dichotomy was at the core of these exchanges - culturally and politically.

4.4.2. Historical (socio-political) terrain:

Nigeria is regarded as the 'Giant of Africa', because of its population, size, economic potential, and complex language spread. During its early colonial heritage, it was ruled as two different entities - the North, with experimental headquarters at Zungeru, and the South, with headquarters in Calabar. Zungeru is, incidentally, within the same geographical location of the new federal capital territory, Abuja. In 1914, Lord Lugard brought about the amalgamation of the North and South in a fragile union.

There were differences in language, religion and culture between the two entities. The British however created this marriage of convenience to be able to administer the territory better through a single process of indirect rule. But, according to Frederick Forsyth this sort of arrangement had its own disadvantages which overweighed whatever apparent advantages it had: "Indirect rule maintained the federal structures, confirmed the repression by the privileged Emirs and their appointees, prolonged the inability of the

North to graduate into the modern world, and stultified future efforts to introduce parliamentary democracy".²²

However, all the British were interested in was the enhancement of their trade in raw materials to feed the industries at home. Luke Uka Uche states that contemporary evidence suggests that the European traders were anything but civilising agents: "Many of them had adopted legal trade only as a last resort when the original slave trading occupation had grown too hazardous. Brutal and disreputable as many of them were, they often suffered greatly from the precariousness of their position at the mercy of unpredictable coastal rulers". Samir Amin, Cedric Robinson, Michel Beaud, Chinweizu also adopt this theme and argument in their discussion of colonialism, and the spread of capitalism - Chinweizu more forcefully than others.²³

The history of Nigeria and the background to the conflict are longer and more complicated than described here. However, this brief background is meant to assist in the understanding of the beginnings of the process of factionisation, fractionalisation, and dissent - the dawn of disenchantment leading to the spark and blaze.

Official media during the pre-independence period was used by the colonial authorities to establish trade and cultural development, suitable for colonial peoples. The private press took on the duty of fighting the colonialists to bring about the emancipation of the territory from colonial rule. Printing was relatively cheaper and circulation was easier. Pamphleteering could also be carried out covertly. Ironically, nationalism was first promoted by non-Nigerians. Consequently, the enlightened, educated, indigenous, African graduates returning from abroad, who owned the private press, regarded it as a duty to fight colonialism. They included Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah and Tubman. Uka Uche suggests that the road to nationalism was paved by freed slaves from the West Indies and the United States of America. People like Blyden, Garvey, and Dubois, etc;

sought the cultural emancipation of the 'negro'. Their concern was on Africa as a whole, rather than the seemingly artificial units drawn up by the European colonial powers.

In the 1920s, Herbert Macaulay emerged as the Father of Nigerian nationalism, and, with his Lagos "Daily News" started unleashing nationalist attacks against the British.

He was later joined by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe who had just returned from studying in the United States of America. In the 1930s, the West African Pilot was formed. When the British turned on the heat against the nationalist papers, Nnamdi Azikiwe fled to Accra, Ghana, from where he continued to operate.

From this, it can be seen that whilst the print media was involved in emancipation, the electronic media was used (mostly radio at this time), to establish British culture and enhance British rule. The early educated people in Nigeria were trained as teachers, who would subsequently impart their often limited knowledge to the rest of the country - a feature identified also in other colonial countries.

Those who were able to proceed to study law, medicine, and engineering, were sponsored either by their communities, or their hard working families. These of course were few.

People were taught to think British, buy British, wear British, and adore the British, particularly in the South of Nigeria. The North remained largely intact, because of its feudal, hierachical, and largely muslim structure and culture.

The economy was geared towards the enhancement of British trade, and the development of the "Mother Country". Early broadcasters were trained either in London by the BBC, or by BBC trainers sent to Nigeria to organise training courses.

Graham Mytton observes that the history of the mass media is longer and more complex along the West Coast of Africa: "The press in English speaking West Africa grew up in a nationalist tradition. Newspapers were the mouthpieces of emerging campaigning nationalist politicians".²⁴ This is perhaps because printing was cheaper and newspapers

could be smuggled undetected to fellow compatriots fighting against colonialism, - a lesson in covert propaganda that was later adopted even before the war. One writer has made the observation that to study either nationalism or the press in British West Africa is to study 'the other'!. This is very true of contemporary civilian politics in Nigeria, where the mass media occupy a central place. However, the British used the radio to establish their influence.²⁵ This was because radio had a wider coverage, was received at all levels - literate and illiterate - and transmission was easier. It was therefore an effective instrument of overt propaganda transmission.²⁶ The newspapers, as indicated, were nationalistic. Television missed all that. The British had set about abolishing indigenous cultural societies, institutions, and traditions, describing them as fetish, heathen, and anti-Christian, particularly in the South.

Briefly therefore, whilst the South was being christianised and largely educated, the North remained largely uneducated and muslim.

The north was regarded as predominantly muslim at the time and therefore not susceptible to this intrusion. Also the British were anxious not to upset the Emirs and their feudal system, because it was a convenient instrument for indirect rule. This in itself created a cultural imbalance, which transmitted to the educational structure of the amalgamated halves. Television when it arrived one year prior to independence, rather than enhancing political and cultural unity, was employed to exacerbate the North-South dichotomy.

Thus, television, arrived at the peak of national intra-party political activity in Nigeria. The various political factions in the country used it to exploit all the existing ethnic, religious, language and dialectical diversities in the country, to foster their respective aim to succeed to, and capture the centre, Lagos.

It became more a propaganda tool set between region and region, party and party, and in certain cases, between the central Federal government and the regions.

Being audio-visual and instant - the potential force of television was brought to bear on the propaganda war.

Dr. Michael Okpara had become Premier of Eastern Region and leader of the N.C.N.C. Chief S. L. Akintola became Premier of the Western Region, but not leader of the Action Group. An interesting vista opened up at this time. The WNBS/TV accused Chief Akintola of sabotaging Chief Awolowo in support of Sir Ahmadu Bello. Chief Akintola was dismissed from the Action Group, and removed from office by the Governor of Western Nigeria. The Action Group, which held the regional parliamentary majority accused him of maladministration. He refused to go and broke into the Premier's office to occupy it. The Action group had appointed Chief Adegbenro as the Premier of Western Region to replace Chief Akintola. He formed a new government, whereupon a fight broke out on the floor of the Western House of Assembly. This was the spark that ignited the riot in Western Nigeria. The media in the East and the West warned the Federal Government of the impending crisis. The Federal Government, the media in Lagos, except the newspapers acquiesced. So did all the media in the North. Akintola appealed to the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, without going through the Western Regional Governor. The Prime Minister acting in collusion with the leader of the NPC and Premier of Northern Nigeria, overruled the Western Regional Governor and upheld Akintola's appeal.

Even though in May 1963. the Privy Council in London ruled that Akintola's dismissal by the Governor was valid, the Prime Minister, the Northern Premier and Akintola refused to accept it, and stuck to their guns. By now Akintola had formed his own party and allied with the NPC to form the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA).

Dr. Michael Okpara now leader of the NCNC in the East went into alliance with Chief Awolowo's Action Group to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Awolowo accused of plotting to overthrow the Federal Government, was tried, found

guilty, and imprisoned, along with Chief Anthony Enahoro, who had been his Minister of Information in Western Nigeria.

UPGA boycotted the 1964 General Elections. The President, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the National Chairman of the NCNC, Dr. G. C. Mbanugo advised against a boycott in "the interest of the unity of the country", counselling that the boycott would have "no constitutional effect". Dr. Michael Okpara, now joint leader of UPGA with Chief Adegbenro, insisted that it would have "a political effect". The NNA, with Abubakar as Prime Minister were inevitably returned to power at the Federal House without any representatives from UPGA.

There was intense media and propaganda activity. Despite Akintola, the media in the West was still loyal to Awolowo (who was at this time in jail), to Adegbenro and to UPGA. The media in the East backed the Western media in its orchestrations against Akintola, the Federal and Northern Nigerian Governments. The media in the North was vehement in its retaliatory and counter propaganda. The Federal media was split. The electronic media controlled by the Federal Government supported the Federal Government. So did the Federal government owned newspapers like the Daily Times, the Morning Post etc. The independent newspapers and magazines were still strongly in support of Awolowo, accusing the Federal Government of accumulating "trumped up charges" against Awolowo, whom they claimed was innocent.

It was the signal for a complete breakdown of law and order, even if it could truly be said to have existed before. Rioting broke out across the length and breadth of the Western Region. Murder, looting, arson, mayhem were rife. On the roads, gangs of rural thugs set up road blocks, by cutting down trees, and stopping motorists to demand their political affiliations. The wrong answer brought robbery and death. Within a few weeks, estimated deaths were between 1,000 and 2,000.

In face of the turmoil, Balewa, who had been so quick to declare a state of emergency in 1962 because of an uproar in the Western House of Assembly, remained quiescent. In vain, the media, student bodies with propaganda leaflets, several bodies and personalities across the country, appealed to him, to declare a state of emergency, dissolve the Akintola government, and order fresh elections. He declared he had "no powers."

The mighty Federation of Nigeria was crumbling into ruin before the eyes of foreign observers, who had only a few years before heralded Nigeria as the great hope of Africa.²⁷ Yet to the outside world hardly a word of this penetrated. Indeed anxious to keep up appearances, Balewa's government invited a Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference to meet in Lagos on the first week of January 1966, to discuss the question of restoring law and order in rebellious Rhodesia.

Mr. Harold Wilson was pleased to attend. While Commonwealth Premiers shook hands and beamed at each other on the apron of Ikeja international airport, a few miles away Nigerians were dying in scores, as the army moved in on the UPGA supporters.²⁸ The army could not restore order either, and at the insistence of the General Officer Commanding, Major-General Johnson Thomas Ummunakwe Aguyi Ironsi, the troops were withdrawn.

The majority of the ordinary infantry-men at that time serving in the Federal army were drawn from the Middle Belt, that is, the minority tribes of the North. These troops, particularly the Tivs who formed the highest percentage among them, could not be used to quell the Tiv riots still raging in Northern Nigeria, for they would probably not have turned their guns on their kith and kin. Thus most of the army units available outside Tivland were heavily salted with Tivs.

For the same reason that they could not be used in Tiv-land, they were not much use in the West either. Their sympathies lay not with the Akintola regime, for was not Akintola the ally and vassal of the Sardauna of Sokoto, persecutor of their own homeland? They tended to sympathise more with the rioters, being in themselves in much the same position vis-a-vis the Sardauna/Akintola power group.

By the second of January 1966, it had become clear that something had to give.

Subsequent portrayal by the Gowon military regime of what followed as an all-Ibo affair fails to take into account the inevitability of either a "demarche" from the army, or complete anarchy.²⁹

On the night of the 14th of January 1966, in the North, the West and the Federal Capital of Lagos, a group of young officers struck. Within a few hours, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Akintola, and Balewa were dead. Also dead was Chief Okotie Eboh, Balewa's friend, most loyal lieutenant and Federal Minister of Finance, and with them the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It was a bloody 'Coup d'etat'. The leader of the coup was Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the Mid-West state of Nigeria.

If the twists and turns of the Nigerian media and propaganda scene sound complicated, it is because it is complicated. John Wilkinson, retired Director of Corporate Affairs at the BBC, current Patron of the One World Broadcasting Trust in London, remarked recently that within the Nigerian Media Scene "there is never a dull moment". The responses, the twists and turns are in reaction to the twists and turns of the political spectrum.

One of the questions that arose in the course of this research was how the propaganda activity could be so intense without the necessary facilities, compared for instance to the situations in Mozambique and Angola. Clearly the situations are different.³⁰ Unlike most other African and indeed developing countries, Nigeria was immensely facilitated by way of media provision, as has been seen. It learned its lesson well from the British. It had the

men and material to initiate and sustain its propaganda activities. The different political factions employed both covert and overt propaganda methods in their attempt to destroy their opponents.

The media and propaganda objectives followed the usual cognitive patterns:

- (1) to motivate their supporters
- (2) to mobilise their support and spur them into action, physically and psychologically, and,
- (3) to sustain their actions, in order that the protagonists could continue to ride high.

Covert activities were carried out by way of rumours, secret clan, ethnic and supporter's meetings. It involved the injection of derogatory information against the opponents.

Whilst being caricatured, the opponents countered by extolling the factional leaders in order to edify them.

At the risk of constant repetition, it has to be noted, however, that the idea of civil war in Nigeria was never contemplated, not even at the trial of Awolowo. So the difference here, at least at this stage, was the presence of positive propaganda for factional and ethnic subjugation, like the ones carried out by Northern Nigeria. For instance, in 1947, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared to a British Official: "We do not want, Sir, our Southern neighbours to interfere in our development....I should like to make it clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people would continue their uninterrupted conquest to the sea". This brought accusations from the South, in a negative form of propaganda, that the Muslims of the North want to "dip the Koran in the Sea".

In May 1953, a delegation from the Action Group (AG) was due to visit Kano, the largest city in the North. Intense fomentation of public opinion against the visit was undertaken

by Mallam Inua Wada, Kano Branch Secretary of the Northern People's Congress (NPC). In a speech two days before their unscheduled arrival, Wada told a meeting of section heads of the native administration: "Having abused us in the South, these very Southerners have decided to come over to the North to abuse us... we have, therefore organised about a thousand men ready in the city to meet force with force..." The Action Groups's visit was cancelled, but on the 11th of May, a series of massacres began.³¹ Failing to find Yorubas, Hausas set about the Easterners with what the official report compiled by a British Civil servant termed "a universally unexpected degree of violence". In his autobiography, Sir Ahmadu Bello recalls that "Here in Kano, as things fell out, the fighting took place between the Hausas ... and the Ibos: the Yorubas were oddly enough out of it."

The official report was a conscientious effort. The rapporteur condemned Wada's speech as "very ill-advised and provocative". Of the conservative estimates of 52 killed and 245 wounded, he comments that: "it is still a possibility that more were killed than have been recorded, in view of conflicting statements by ambulance men and lorry drivers (who carted away the living and the dead)". Of the whole affair, he observed that "no amount of provocation, short term or long term can, in any sense justify their (Hausas) behaviour". But perhaps his most notable utterance was in the conclusion: "The seeds of the trouble which broke out in Kano on 16th May 1953 have their counterpart still in the ground. It could happen again, and only a realisation and acceptance of the underlying causes can remove the danger of recurrence."³² There was no realisation nor any attempt at one. And it did happen again!

Whilst this type of propaganda was positive in terms of the North, it was negative for the South and especially for the Easterners who suffered the ultimate negative effect. What happened in the North in 1953 was replicated, as will be seen later in this chapter, in

1966/67. It was, to use a contemporary term, "ethnic cleansing", of the kind that occurred in Bosnia in the 1990s.

To counteract, the Southern leaders and media indicated that they always knew that the intention of the North was not to unify the country but to conquer the South and "dip the Koran in the Sea." They said that they would never stand for that; that the Northerners were filthy illiterates who were unfit to rule the educated progressive and dynamic South. They accused Sir Ahmadu Bello of being a religious bigot and Abubakar of being his stooge, and unqualified to rule the country.

Even though there was no deliberate and systematic build up to the war, the propaganda exchanges, the caricaturing, the edification were almost similar to the other two models discussed in this thesis - Germany and China. The difference of course is that there were no strikingly outstanding personalities like Adolf Hitler and Mao Tse Tung, except that Sir Ahmadu Bello, in the eyes of the South fitted the description of Hitler and Stalin in his treatment of the Southerners, and his acquiescence at the massacre of the Southerners. Frederick Forsyth and Auberon Waugh argue that some may even say he tacitly encouraged and motivated his people to it, as his autobiography seems to suggest.³³ It is clear also that during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference on Rhodesia in Lagos, the Federal Government applied two propaganda techniques:

- (1) Censorship
- (2) Manipulative persuasion.

(1). Censorship: Since they were in control of the electronic media in Lagos, the seat of the conference, they dictated whatever was transmitted overtly.

(2). Manipulative Persuasion: In so doing, they hid the truth from the other Heads of State and Government, who by their very presence, may have even lent credence to the acts of the Abubakar Government. The Federal Government's organisation of the conference was a manipulation to divert attention from the tumult within the country. It is also entirely possible that through the process of censorship, an element of "coercive persuasion" was applied domestically whilst the outside world was being manipulated.

4.5 THE BLAZE.

The events that led to the Biafra war happened very rapidly.

On the fateful morning, people in Eastern Nigeria woke up to hear Efiog Etuk on the early morning programme on ENBC/TV, announcing that there were soldiers in the studio asking him to stop transmission of regular programmes and play only martial music.

On hearing this on his car radio, one of the leaders of the coup, Emmanuel Ifeajuna, who was on his way to Enugu to take command and assassinate Dr. Michael Okpara, Premier of Eastern Nigeria, abandoned his vehicle along with his lieutenants, escaped, and went into hiding. Okpara was thus saved. That morning also, The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, who had been officially visiting Eastern Nigeria, was being seen off by Dr. Michael Okpara and Sir Francis Akanu Ibiam, the Governor of Eastern Nigeria. When the army having waited for Emmanuel Ifeajuna in vain, finally seized the airport in Enugu and confronted Okpara, he refused to enter the jeep that he was ordered into. Both Archbishop Makarios and Sir Akanu Ibiam virtually bundled him into the vehicle. This, some commentators maintain, helped save him from being shot on the spot. It is claimed that Archbishop Mkcarios's experience in coup plotting may have helped here. Sir Ahmadu Bello of the North was killed by the coup leader, Major Chukuma Nzeogu, accompanied by his aide, Lieutenant Hassan Usman Katsina, a Hausa/Fulani muslim officer.

Chief S.L. Akintola, self declared Premier of the West and ally of Sir Ahumadu Bello was assassinated. The Prime Minister Sir Abubakar was killed. Chief Okotie Eboh, who, even though he was from the Midwest, and of the NCNC, was close to Sir Abubakar, and so was killed.

The country was dazed. No information came from the media who were playing only martial music. The newspapers could not publish. There was total confusion. Then it emerged that the Chief of Defence Staff and General officer commanding, Major-General Aguyi Ironsi, had taken over in Lagos and invited the leaders of the coup to surrender to him. When it became apparent that only leaders of the NPC and allies had been assassinated, while the leaders of the Action Group and NCNC were spared, Radio Television Kaduna came out with vigorous news talks against what was now in their own estimation, a Southern (East and West combined) organised coup against the Northern leaders and their allies. The Northern papers which came back into circulation, carried inflammatory editorials and messages in Hausa and English. These papers circulated in the army. The coup was blamed on the Ibos. There, therefore followed some disturbances in the North. In May 1966, a riot broke out where the southerners, and particularly the Ibos at Sabongeri market in Kano, were massacred again. There was a record with the tune "ewu ne be akwa", which had been released many years before. The literal translation is "the goat is crying". The Ibos have a tradition of playing loud music in their stalls to attract customers. This record had been on the charts for a while, but on this particular occasion, their Northern counterparts claimed that it was a mockery on the Northerners. The Northern traders covertly met, passed the word round, motivated and mobilised their forces and struck.

There followed an urgent meeting of the Eastern House of Assembly where the Speaker called on the Federal leader Major-General Aguyi Ironsi to take action to stop the killings. Nothing happened. Rather Ironsi stated that he wanted to form a unitary government which would bring peace and harmony to the country. To please the North, since he was an Ibo, he appointed two of his immediate aides from the Northern officers' ranks.

While Major-General Ironsi was on an official visit to Western Nigeria, the Northern officers carried out a counter coup in July 1966, where General Aguyi Ironsi was assassinated. Killed with him was his host, Governor of the Western Region, Colonel Fajuyi. For a while there was no effective government in Nigeria. The media were hungry for news, and the public was looking to the media to inform, guide and direct. The media, as John Renfeld stated, in such confused and chaotic situations, assumes a very important instrument. Luke Uka Uche also follows this theme, as will be seen later in this chapter. He and John Renfeld argue that the media fills the vacuum in these circumstances and becomes a sort of 'de facto' government.

Meanwhile, there was widespread massacre of Easterners in Northern Nigeria. The propaganda from the Northern media had penetrated the army.

The ENBC/TV accused Northern Nigeria of "genocide and program" on the Easterners. The rest of the media in the East joined in. Pictures of the exodus from the North and tales and scenes of the genocide on radio and television, filled the Easterners with revulsion and anger. While Radio Kaduna wanted the Ibos out of the North, the ENBC/TV wanted them to return to the East and help build up the region. There was mass exodus from the North to the East.

Lt. Colonel Chukwuma Odumegwu Ojukwu who had been appointed Military Governor of Eastern Region came on Radio and Television and made constant announcements, threatening retaliatory action if Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who had succeeded Major-General Ironsi, did not apprehend and punish the perpetrators of the genocide, and recompense the Easterners.

The Easterners were accused by the media in the North and Lagos (at this time the Federal Government was fighting back) of playing up the scope and effect of the

massacres. However, Mr. Schwarz, an independent journalist and an independent eye witness, refers to them as "a pogrom of genocidal proportions". Nor were they directed solely against the Ibos. The word Ibo is a singular generic term in the North - actually the Hausa word is 'Nyamiri', which is derogatory as well as descriptive - for all Easterners regardless of ethnic group. Thus not only the Ibos suffered, though they were undoubtedly in the majority. Efiks, Ibibios, Ogojas, and Ijaws were also singled out for butchery. As they came home and told their tales, a wave of rage swept across the East, mingled also with despair and disillusion. There was hardly a village or town, family or compound in the Region that did not take into its fold one of the refugees and listen to what he had to say. Thousands of the refugees were marred for life, either mentally or physically, by what they had gone through. Almost every one of them was penniless, for the Easterner traditionally invested his money in his business or in property, and few could bring away more than a small suitcase when they fled .

There is no better propaganda coup than the images and actual sights of the exodus of the suffering, the maimed, the homeless, the penniless. For Ojukwu, this was an important motivating force for all Easterners, and he publicly demanded the creation of a new constitution creating a confederation, where Easterners could be accommodated in a peaceful Nigeria. The federal media carried a rejection of this demand by Yakubu Gowon. Moreover Ojukwu had come into possession of a draft document by the Federal Government creating more states (about fourteen). There were several meetings in Lagos in an attempt to resolve the constitutional impasse.

In early September 1966, a number of Northern troops from Ibadan, capital of the West, raided Benin City in the Midwest, and snatched from prison a number of officers in detention for their part in the January coup. The Northerners among the detainees were

released in the North, whilst the Easterners were murdered. And, although Gowon had promised that those responsible would be punished, this did not happen.

Firstly, Gowon's dismissal of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference on 30th November, on the grounds that the Eastern delegates had not attended it since the original adjournment on 3rd October, was seen by the media in the East as dictatorial. The Eastern media claimed that the delegation from the East could not travel to Lagos because they were afraid for their lives. There then followed a bald announcement, a public admission by Gowon, as carried by the Federal media, that a new constitution would be drafted based on between ten and fourteen States. In the same broadcast on 30th November, Gowon stressed for the first time ever, that he would be inclined "to use force if circumstances compel". Naturally, the Eastern media saw this as provocative.

On the question of repatriation of troops, which had been considered at one of the constitutional conferences, Gowon explained that he had only meant that Easterners should be repatriated to the East, and Northerners in the East should return to the North. Although the Western 'leaders of thought conference' had unanimously agreed with the firm stand taken by the East on the repatriation from the West as well, Gowon said he had to keep Northerners there, as there were no Yoruba troops. At this, Colonel Robert Adebayo, Governor of the West, and a Yoruba, protested. But, the main question was the form of Nigeria, and of its army, in the immediate future.

Here, Ojukwu argued:

"As long as this situation exists, men from Eastern Nigeria would find it utterly impossible to stay in the same barracks, feed in the same mess, fight from the same trenches as men in the army from the Northern Nigeria...For these basic reasons the separation of forces, the separation of population is, in all sincerity essential, in order to avoid further friction and further killing."

Hassan Usman Katsina of the North and David Ejoor of the Midwest agreed.

Gowon was asked by the leaders of the East, and by the media, to apologise for the crimes against the Easterners, punish the culprits and recompense the Easterners. There were 'no regrets' by Gowon, despite an earlier promise. According to the Biafran media, Gowon had promised, during one of the meetings of the Council of State, to recompense the affected Easterners, and to publicly apologise to them. The media and propaganda war intensified.

Apart from Adebayo's protest, the Western media sided with the East. Awolowo announced that if the East broke away from Nigeria, the West would follow suit, creating an Oduduwa Republic.³⁴ Chief Awolowo and his retinue visited Ojukwu in cabinet in Enugu, and confirmed this by way of an understanding. Ojukwu's hand and that of the Assembly in the East were thus strengthened. This turned out to be a propaganda ploy by Awolowo. When he got back to Lagos, there was a stalemate.³⁵

Ojukwu declared to a journalist: "I cannot wait indefinitely for Lagos, so I have to make other arrangements".³⁶

Then came the 'Aburi Accord'. Aburi was Nigeria's last chance before the putsch. There was, country wide, increasing popular pressure that the regional military Governors should meet to sort out the problems, a view strongly shared by Colonel Ojukwu. But since there was nowhere within Nigeria he felt he could go in personal safety, it was agreed to hold the meeting at Aburi, Ghana, under the auspices of General Ankrah of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

It was there in ex-President Nkrumah's luxurious country seat in the hills above Accra that the Supreme Council of Nigeria met on 4th and 5th January, 1967. Present were:

Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the four Regional Military Governors, - Colonel Robert Adebayo (successor to the assassinated Colonel Fajuyi), and Lieutenant Colonels Katsina, Ojukwu and Ejoor. Four others from Nigeria were also on the Council,

representing the Navy, Lagos Territory, and two from the Federal Police. But the real talks hinged on the five Colonels.

The deliberations returned to the central issues of the Constitution and separation of forces. Also discussed and agreed were the matters of compensation for the fleeing Easterners from the North. Since the problem of refugees and abandoned property stuck out like a sore finger, there was an agreement to set up a commission to handle these. Again Gowon promised to express public regret about what had happened - (see appendix for details of the Aburi Accord).³⁷

Within a few days of Gowon's return to Lagos, the Aburi agreement began to die on the vine. Federal civil servants, led by the permanent secretaries, met in Lagos and resolved to advise Gowon that it was not in the interest of Nigeria to honour the Aburi Accord - (see appendix).³⁸

It is obvious from the foregoing that several elements of propaganda were present and employed. Personalities were edified and caricatured to suit the propaganda objectives of their different constituencies. Because the different interest groups had control of the means of transmission, overt propaganda was widely employed. Covert propaganda was applied, through secret meetings, word of mouth, and pamphleteering. Ethnicity/tribalism was exploited. Sensibilities were evoked, and the reactors were motivated and mobilised. The principles of migration and mutation, imitation and replication are easily discernable. Nigeria had virtually become a propaganda theatre. Media activity was at its peak.

The collapse of the agreement was a further provocation. Predictably, the media in the East screamed. Rather, within ten days, the Federal Government published a book called 'Nigeria 1966', which gave the Federal, ie; Northern, version of everything that had happened since the January coup.³⁹ At the time it caused a furore in the East. When

Ojukwu protested over the phone that it had been agreed not to publish any more official versions, Gowon told him that there had been a leak. Later, Ojukwu learned that far from being a leak, the booklet had appeared simultaneously in London, New York, and several other capitals with all the usual publishers' ballyhoo, including cocktail parties at the High Commissions and Embassies. When Ojukwu protested again on the phone, Gowon put the phone down on him. The conversations were recorded by Ojukwu and broadcast on the media in the East.

Ojukwu had to protect himself against the wrath of the people in the East, who at this time demanded separation against his wishes; he preferred confederation. Therefore, after transmitting these conversations on the Eastern media, he also transmitted the Aburi deliberations, which he had secretly and unknown to the other participants, recorded. So, whilst Gowon attempted to seize the propaganda initiative with the world-wide, simultaneous, publication of the book 'Nigeria 1966', Ojukwu's counter propaganda thrust was a deadly blow aimed at the heart. It found its targeted point.

To modify the effect of this, on 26th February, 1967, Gowon called a press conference in Lagos, in which to put his own views and interpretation of the Aburi Accord. At the press conference, he presented the minutes and final agreements at Aburi. He also juxtaposed these with the texts of the minutes of the Federal civil servants in Lagos. (see both appendices) This was his way of criticising the Aburi Accord.

It also turned out to be a further propaganda coup for Ojukwu. Gowon was furious that Ojukwu had secretly recorded the Aburi deliberations, and broadcast the recordings. The broadcast tapes portrayed Gowon as unreliable, and unserious, while Ojukwu's intelligence superseded all the others present.

The media in the East claimed that Ojukwu "went to Oxford and Sandhurst while Gowon only went to Sandhurst; as a result, Ojukwu's Oxford English was too difficult for Gowon to comprehend". Ojukwu was edified. Gowon was caricatured. Gowon accused Ojukwu of betrayal and arrogance.

"On Aburi We Stand", became the slogan on all the media in the East. It became such a propaganda punch line, that it acted as a negotiating ploy and euphemism everywhere one went in the East.

Ojukwu refused to attend further meetings of the Supreme Military Council until the Aburi agreements had been implemented, partly because the meeting scheduled was in a Benin City liberally sprinkled with Northern soldiers, partly because he knew he could go no further. In a broadcast at the end of February, he said: "If the Aburi agreements are not fully implemented by 31st March, I shall have no alternative but to feel free to take whatever measures may be necessary to give effect in this Region to those agreements".

On that day the departure of Eastern Nigeria was fully expected. Journalists arriving in Enugu for a press conference already had their headlines mapped out. Instead, still playing for the last chance of staying inside 'One Nigeria', Colonel Ojukwu told them that he was issuing a Revenue Edict appropriating all Federal Revenue collected in the East as a means of paying for the rehabilitation programme.⁴⁰ The decree did not affect oil revenues, as these were collected in Lagos. The reporters were stunned; they had expected brimstone, and were being confronted with a fiscal programme. Mildly, Ojukwu told them the East would only pull out of Nigeria if she were attacked or blockaded. This was a clear instance of manipulative persuasion. By blowing hot and cold, he was attempting to attract the sympathy of the journalists, and the admiration of the domestic constituency, all of which edified him more.

The Federal Government replied with Decree Eight, a document that appeared at first glance to implement the major points of the constitutional agreement of Aburi; if not the fiscal arrangements. Decree Eight, like Aburi, vested the legislative and executive powers in the Supreme Military Council, and decisions on vital matters could only be taken with the agreement of all the Military Governors. Within their own regions, the Governors were to have virtual autonomy.

It looked good, and was hailed as such by the media in Lagos and the West. The Eastern media cautiously welcomed it as a climb down, and change of heart by Gowon, although it went no further than what had been agreed at Aburi four months earlier. That was until the small print was read again and more carefully. Then it could be seen that the 'extras' on the small print virtually nullified the main paragraphs.

One of the extra clauses was to the effect that the Regional Governors could not exercise their powers "so as to impede or prejudice the authority of the Federation, or endanger the continuance of the Federal Government". Although it looked harmless, it was presumably up to the Federal Government, ie; Gowon, to decide precisely what would "impede or prejudice the authority..." Another section enabled the Federal Government to take over the authority of a Regional Government which was "endangering the continuance of the Federal Government", the criterion being again left in Lagos.

Most menacing of all to Eastern eyes was a paragraph, under which, a state of emergency could be declared in any region with the agreement of only three Military Governors.⁴¹

As the declaration of a state of emergency usually implies sending in troops, and as the other three Military Governors were either Northern or governed regions occupied by Northern troops, Colonel Ojukwu saw this as being specifically anti- Eastern. He rejected the decree in a broadcast on Eastern Nigeria media.

The mounting unpopularity of the Gowon regime now grew elsewhere in the South. In the West there had been growing resentment over the failure to repatriate the Northern troops, a measure that Aburi had restated, and Chief Awolowo led the revolt. His following had traditionally been among the proletarian and radical elements in the West, and these were the people who resented most the occupation of the Northern soldiers. At a meeting of the Western 'leaders of thought' in Ibadan in late April, 1967, he resigned as the Western delegate to the impending Ad Hoc Conference, stating in his letter: "It is my considered view that whilst some of the demands of the East are excessive, within the context of a Nigerian Union, most of such demands are not only well founded, but are designed for smooth and healthy association among the various national units of Nigeria".⁴²

Chief Awolowo had just returned from a visit to Ojukwu in Enugu, to witness for himself the depth of feeling in the East. According to Ojukwu, in a press conference following the visit, Awolowo had asked if the East would pull out, and the reply had been that it would not until and unless it was absolutely offered no other alternative.

After seeing the situation for himself, Awolowo sympathised with the sufferings of the Eastern people, and asked that if the East was going to pull out, he be allowed twenty four hours forewarning, and he would do the same for the West. This, he was promised. Later, he got his forewarning, but by that time, he had been swayed round by other attractions, and failed to fulfil his intent. Frederick Forsyth maintains that from the point of view of the Yorubas, this was regrettable, for if Awolowo had stuck to his guns, the Federal government, unable to face two simultaneous disaffections, would have been forced to fulfil the Aburi agreements to the letter.⁴³

As the deadlock continued, the media acted as snipers for their respective governments. One precaution Ojukwu did feel obliged to take, nevertheless, was to import some arms.

The departure of the Enugu garrison with all its weaponry, and arrival back home of the Eastern troops without any, had left the East defenceless. Moreover, Ojukwu had come into possession of a document from an Ibo diplomat in Rome showing that a Northern army Major, Sule Apollo was in Italy buying large quantities of arms.⁴⁴

Gowon was emboldened by pronouncements from the Northern media, conveying their support for his actions, including the creation of more States in Nigeria (a major turn around for the North for propaganda reasons). Early in May 1967, Gowon imposed a partial blockade on the East. It extended to postal and postal order services, but also affected telephones, cables, telex machines, and other forms of communication, all of which were routed through Lagos. The effect was to leave the East cut off from the outside, the more so as Nigeria Airways flights were also banned.⁴⁵

In Enugu, Ojukwu remarked to Reuters: "I think we are now rolling downhill. It will take a great deal to halt the momentum. We are very close, very, very close".

There was one last peace move. A group calling itself the National Conciliation Committee, headed by the new Federal Chief Justice, Sir Adetokumbo Ademola, a Yoruba, and including Chief Awolowo, visited Ojukwu on 7th May. They listened to his views, accepted all his demands, and called on the Federal Government to implement them. These demands included little more than the implementation of the August 9th, 1966 agreement to post the troops back to their regions of origin, and to call off the economic sanctions. News broadcasts and commentaries from both the Nigerian and Biafran media at the time confirmed this.

On 20th May, 1967, Gowon accepted all the recommendations. He announced the lifting of the ban on Nigerian Airways flights, along with other sanctions. But, the Director of the Airways privately admitted that he had had no orders to resume flights. As for the troops, Colonel Katsina flew from Kaduna to Ibadan to inform the troops that they were

to be moved - but only to the town of Ilorin, about a stone's throw over the border between West and North, and lying on the main road to Lagos.

All this, in propaganda terms, was a catalogue of lies and deception, a process of disinformation, in order to keep the other side guessing, and destabilised.

Ojukwu, by the time, had dissolved the House of Assembly, and set up a Consultative Assembly with 335 members, of people from all ethnic groups in the East, and from all walks of life. They met on 26th May (with the clamour for separation ringing in their ears), and gave him a unanimous mandate, at the end of a noisy session, to pull the East out of what was now, according to the Eastern media, "the defunct Federation of Nigeria", 'at an early practicable date', by declaring the Eastern Region:

"A FREE SOVEREIGN AND INDEPENDENT STATE BY THE NAME AND TITLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA".

Gowon activated his plans the next day. He declared a state of emergency, and simultaneously published a decree, abolishing the existing regions, and dividing Nigeria into twelve new States. It was clearly a propaganda ploy, meant to be provocative, directed at the heart of the Eastern demands; but it was also an appeal to the sensibilities of the minorities of the East. There had been no consultation, which was contrary to the constitution, even though despite the mandate granted him by the East, Ojukwu had not in fact, seceded. It contravened the spirit of Aburi. It contravened the provision that all the Regions would participate fully in any determination of the country's structural adjustment in the form of association. More important was the division of the East into three States - Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers States, thus satisfying the yearnings of the Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers'(COR) State Movement, which comprised the non-Ibo politicians of the East who, for long, had agitated for a separate State, carved out of the Eastern Region.

Also, Port Harcourt, the industrial city of the East, was removed by Gowon's arrangement, and made capital of Rivers State. The Rivers and Cross Rivers States were the oil producing areas of the region, and the country. The action was described by the media in the East as "an open challenge to secede". In the same broadcast on the Federal media, Gowon announced the reimposition of the blockade, the abrogation of Decree Eight, earlier mentioned, and accorded himself full powers " for the short period necessary to carry out the measures which are now urgently required".

Clearly, there was no way the Federal Government could administer the new States it had created within Eastern Nigeria, because the government of the soon to be declared Republic of Biafra, had territorial and military control.

In the small hours of 30th May, 1967, diplomats were called to the State House, Enugu, soon to be renamed Biafra Lodge, to hear Colonel Ojukwu read the Declaration of Independence:

"Fellow Countrymen and women, you the people of Eastern Nigeria:
Conscious of the Supreme authority of Almighty God over all Mankind; of your duty to yourselves and posterity;
Aware that you can no longer be protected in your lives and in your property by any government based outside Eastern Nigeria.
Believing that you, are born free and have certain inalienable rights which can be best presented by yourselves;
Unwilling to be unfree partners in any association of a political or economic nature;
Rejecting the authority of any person or persons other than the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind of nature upon you;

Determined to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria;
Prepared to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign State within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and conditions as best to subserve your common good;
Affirming your trust and confidence in me;
Having mandated me to proclaim on your behalf and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a Sovereign Independent Republic,

NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO THE PRICIPLES RECITED ABOVE, DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND TERRITORIAL WATERS SHALL HENCEFORTH BE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF "THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA."⁴⁶

The die was thus cast.

What Radio Nigeria and Television in Lagos chose to describe as 'police action' started, to 'bring Eastern Nigeria back to the fold'. The slogan on Radio Nigeria and Television was 'to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.

Within a few months of the declaration of independence, a remarkable array of forces had ranged themselves to crush the new country.⁴⁷ Gowon launched the Federal army behind the slogan above. Phrases like 'One Nigeria', 'to preserve the territorial integrity of Nigeria', and 'crush the revolt' were constant features on the Nigerian media.

The counter slogan on what was now 'Radio Biafra and Television', was 'the price of liberty is eternal vigilance'.

The media in Lagos announced that the army had been instructed to enter the Eastern Nigerian territory to regain the territory in a police action. They were also expected 'to capture Ojukwu dead or alive, and bring him back to Lagos'.

Seeing that war was imminent, both sides went forward with feverish preparations, the Biafrans to defend themselves, the Nigerians to bring about a quick finish to what they regarded as a "childishly easy task".

The first shells were fired over Biafra's northern border at dawn on 6th July, 1967.

Full scale war broke out.

CHAPTER FOUR, PART B.

4.6. The Operation of the Biafran Media.

The Radio was by far the most powerful instrument in the Biafran war.

By 1967 there were two television stations in Biafra - Channel 6 in Enugu and Channel 4 in Aba. However, it was the Eastern Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation in Enugu which reached out to all parts of the region and beyond. There were also repeater stations in all the provincial headquarters of the Region. Apart from local newspapers in Aba, Calabar, Onitsha, with circulation only in the provinces, the main newspaper was owned and controlled by the Biafran government with a regional circulation. This was called the Biafra Sun. (see appendix.) In addition there were the numerous government propaganda leaflets. It is necessary to emphasise that even though the people of Calabar, Ogoja, and Rivers Provinces were killed along with the Ibos in the North, they did not want to be part of Biafra. That meant that the whole of the Eastern Region did not speak with one voice. Consequently propaganda was directed from Lagos at the people in the three dissenting areas to sabotage Biafra. Conversely there was a vast amount of propaganda from the Biafran media to keep them in the Biafran fold.

Since at this time, Biafra had military control of the area, the Biafran media prevailed. To further consolidate this hold, listening to Radio Nigeria and reading Nigerian newspapers was made illegal and treated as sabotage. It is not clear whether the Biafran government ever caught and punished anybody under this law, but there were indications that some people who were caught were mobbed to death by angry crowds or summarily shot by soldiers, though clearly not at the command or with the Knowledge of superior officers of the Biafran government.

At the beginning of the war, Radio Nigeria Enugu, which was an offshoot of the Federal Radio Nigeria was taken over by the Biafran government. All the broadcast systems were brought under one umbrella for effective control. The Ministry of Information was converted into The Propaganda Directorate headed by Dr. Ifegwu Eke, a university lecturer. The air and sea blockade mounted by the Federal Nigerian Government against Biafra meant that it became difficult, indeed almost impossible, to import and export from the Biafran territory. Biafra then established the Voice of Biafra to reach out to the rest of the world, to come to her aid.

Propaganda dictated the pace of the war. Territories were gained and lost on radio. Newspapers could hardly be produced for lack of paper, and spare parts. The Radio subsisted on a repair culture. Sometimes Biafra existed only on radio. Even when the capital Enugu fell to the Nigerian soldiers, the station built underground in Umuahia in a bunker was still announcing the retention of Enugu. The stations were boosted. People were encouraged to produce more radio from scrap. People were encouraged to buy and carry radios. Bushes and forests became radio stations and palm and cotton wool trees their antennae.

4.7 The Biafran Media and The Biafran People.

The operation and activities of the Biafran media are a clear demonstration of the modalities of successful propaganda postulated by this thesis, namely:-

- (1) Motivation
- (2) Mobilisation
- (3) Sustainability (Sustenance)
- (3) Durability.

It will be expedient therefore to examine these themes in turn;

4.7.1 Motivation.

Prior to the civil war, the Biafran media was used as an instrument to build up unity, confidence and morale of the Biafran people. Pictures of Easterners being massacred in Kano and different parts of the North were repeatedly shown on what was then the Eastern Nigeria Television, and in the region's newspapers. This angered all parts of the East, not just the Ibos. Most families of the East were affected either directly or indirectly by the massacres. People were returning to the East from the North by all available means - bicycles, trucks, planes, trains, some even lay on top of trains. The Eastern Television stations, Channels 6 & 4, and the newspapers were full of the images. Even the Western Nigeria television and newspapers at this stage carried the pictures. The radios ran interviews with the streams of people pouring into the East. The images of the exodus were roundly condemned by Easterners.

The resettlement of the refugees, or "returnees" (as they were called in the East), affected everybody's life in the region. The radio was not left out of this. Together with Television and Print, it carried out several interviews with the "returnees", broadcasting them to all nooks and crannies of the region.

As has been seen, the media played a major role in caricaturing Gowon's inadequacies, whilst edifying Ojukwu's virtues at the peace conferences leading up to the declaration of Biafra.

4.7.2 Mobilisation.

In this case, there was a very fine line between motivation and mobilisation. The one flowed into the other.

It should be stressed that the most important things that the media did, either as Eastern Nigeria media or the Biafran media, were:

- (1) The conveying of the Declaration of Secession and (Independence).
- (2) The announcement of the Ahiara Declaration
- (3) The announcement of the cessation of military activities, and surrender speech by General Philip Efiang, Biafran Deputy Head of State, and an Ibibio.

These were cardinal landmarks which stand out amongst the other activities of the secessionist State media.

The declaration of secession and of the Republic of Biafra, was both a motivator and mobiliser for the people of Eastern Nigeria. It was a momentous occasion for friends and enemies of Biafra, within and beyond the territory. It was exhilarating for some, and ominous for the others. It was onerous. People were expectant and reflective; they knew the die was cast.

A hurriedly assembled "Biafran Army" was enveloped by a sense of awe - for what was to come. The 'Ahiara Declaration' which resulted, both from the failure of the 'Aburi Accord' and the Declaration of Independence, was regarded, as already stated, as a 'Charter' for Biafra and Biafrans. It was both a motivator and mobiliser, and from this point of view, can be compared, with 'Mein Kampf', and the 'Little Red Book', as well as more immediately, Nyerere's 'Arusha Declaration' on which it was modelled. Ojukwu admired Nyerere, who in turn had great respect for Mao.

The paradox was that Nyerere was a socialist, whilst Ojukwu was a capitalist. The Arusha Declaration for its part was modelled on Mao's Little Red Book. The Biafran media repeated pronouncements and announcements of the Ahiara Declaration several times over, to motivate and mobilise. There were passages for all strata of society. It became a 'bible', a way of life and conduct, for Biafran Servicemen, Civil Servants, Businessmen and Civilians. Passages were treated as wise sayings.

4.7.3. Sustainability (Sustenance).

The Biafran media commissioned, drama, and sketches in praise of Biafra, and edification of Ojukwu. Nigeria on the other hand was portrayed in a predictably bad light, and Gowon was caricatured. Peter Edochie's story about Gowon's production of children, earlier told, was one example, the story of the coconut tree another, of the sort of either subtle or abrasive propaganda that went on. To reiterate, the story of the coconut tree went thus; three people went in search of coconut. They all gathered at the trunk of the coconut tree. The first, a Hausa-Fulani, sat down and said 'Allah will provide', the second, a Yoruba looked up watching for the coconut to fall for him to pick, the third, an Ibo, climbed up and plucked the coconut.

The fiercest battles of the war were fought at Ikot Ekpene, Aba-Azumini-Ekpat Akwa, especially at Ogbor Hill; and at Port Harcourt, Abagana, and Umuahia-Uzuakoli. The Biafran commanders at these battle fronts were extolled by the media for their prowess, intelligence, and bravery. In this way, the war was sustained. The media created and enkindled confidence in the Biafran people. It gave them hope that they were being sufficiently defended, and protected from annihilation. Some of the commanders, like Colonel Archibong of the Ikot Ekpene front, Colonel Achuzia, Port Harcourt front, Colonel Ananaba, Adazi front, were extolled as possessing mystical powers, which could not be penetrated by enemy forces. It was claimed that Colonel Archibong was impervious to enemy bullets. According to Biafran propaganda, he was indestructible. This was analogous to claims made during the Ukpum Ete/Okon battles, demonstrating the continuity of propaganda.

Even when Colonel Archibong was finally killed, and given a military burial in Lagos by Gowon, the Biafran people did not believe it; just as they did not believe that Aguiyi Ironsi could be successfully assassinated. These sort of beliefs were not restricted to Biafra. The Northerners had believed that Ahmadu Bello was above human destruction.

Songs like "Ojukwu Nyem Egbe", "Military Police", "Biafra Win The War", and several others, were constantly repeated on the Biafran media. Song writers, musicians, band leaders, like Miki Nzewi, Nwokolobia Agu, Ojukwu (no relation), and performing groups, wrote and performed numerous songs and sketches on the media, and at the war fronts, to sustain the war effort. Several drama sketches were written, and directed by prominent figures, amongst whom were John Ekwere, Cyprian Ekwensi, Ralph Opara, Okokon Ndem, Kalu Uka, Ezenta Eze, Mazi Ukonu Ukonu.

When Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe escaped to Nigeria, and announced that he was happy to return to his fatherland; the Biafran media announced that Zik had left his "motherland", for his "fatherland". This was the Biafran way of saying that Zik was running with the hare and hunting with the hounds; that he was a deserter, who could not be trusted not to abandon ship in heavy storm. Zik, incidentally wrote the Biafran National Anthem, before he escaped from Biafra. (see appendix). The National Anthem itself, like the Biafran currency, (see appendix) and Biafran stamps, were landmarks in the sustenance of the war effort. They were reflections of Biafran images, aims and objectives, struggles, motivations, purposes, ambitions and successes. The Anthem, ensign, currency, stamps, coat of arms and crest, were all designed to encompass all of the Biafran peoples, their cultures, and their aims, and not only the Ibos'.

The announcement of the secession of hostilities, and military activities, and surrender speech was the last performance of the Biafran media. General Philip Efiang, an Ibibio, Deputy Biafran Head of State, undertook the awesome, but onerous task. Ojukwu had fled to exile the week before surrender. After the speech, all activities of the Biafran media were brought to a halt. The media ceased to exist.

Everything went dead.

4.7.4. Durability.

As a test of the durability of Biafran propaganda, this thesis has fallen back on two studies - (1) A study conducted in the course of research for this thesis on the Ukpum Ete/Okon Clan discussed earlier; and (2) A study conducted by Luke Uka Uche in some urban areas of Nigeria, and rural Ibo communities.⁴⁸

These two studies, it should be noted, are relatively recent. Luke Uka Uche's study was done in 1987, while the one for this thesis was done in 1992. The Ukpum Ete/Okon community was discussed in chapter 1. They are a community in the South East of Nigeria. They were a part of Eastern Nigeria, then of Biafra; 'liberated' by Colonel Adekunle's Nigerian commandos in 1968, they became a part of the South Eastern State created by Gowon. Latterly, they have become a part of Akwa Ibom State, carved out of South Eastern State by General Ibrahim Babangida.

They, are therefore a strategically suitable group for study. They form part of the Ibibio language group. There were newstalks in Efik/Ibibio, who are the fourth largest language group in Nigeria; and were the second largest language group in Biafra.

General Philip Efiog, as already stated, is an Ibibio. He was Deputy Head of State in Biafra. Mr. N.U.Akpan, who was Secretary to the Government of Biafra, is an Ibibio. The Director General of Biafran Broadcasting Services, Chief John Dickson Ekwere, is an Ibibio. Ukpum Ete/Okon, therefore, possessing all the ingredients of being within the Biafran territory initially, captured in 1968 by Colonel Adekunle's Nigerian commandos, had the benefit of both propaganda thrusts - Nigeria's and Biafra's. Also, being within the COR State demand territory, Nigeria and Biafra wooed it. A lot of the newstalk were directed at such areas from the Biafran media. However, the study revealed that even though they were opposed to Biafra, and actually helped the Nigerian soldiers, they missed Radio Biafra after it ceased to exist. They still, even now, reflect on, repeat and chant, the 'one liner' songs and propaganda that emanated from Radio Biafra. The Biafran

media, according to them, made compelling listening, and the propaganda therefrom was indelible.

Luke Uka Uche's study involved Aba, Abayi, Amaoji, and Ihie, in the heart of Ibo land in Eastern Nigeria - as a sample of rural village opinion. He chose Benin City in the Midwest of Nigeria, and Lagos at the centre, for a sample of Nigerian and urban opinion. The study revealed that Biafran propaganda was more convincing than Nigerian propaganda even in Federal communities like Lagos and Benin. The Ibo communities still chant the songs, repeat the stories, and keep the symbols of the war period.

Research for this thesis has also discovered that some buildings in Ibo land that were riddled with bullets have been left untouched as a memento for posterity. The Ibos cannot forget the motivating influence of the Biafran media.

According to Uka Uche, one Ibo leader interviewed observed: "Radio Biafra was a constant reminder of how Igbos were slaughtered up North. It reminded me that we had always been cheated..."

One of the propaganda 'one liners' that the Ibibio people still remember arose from a newstalk in Ibibio directed at them by Okon Atakpo from Radio Biafra. One of the lines was a deep rooted Ibibio idiom which had a double edged meaning: "Nsasak asok asak, ete atat adan", meaning "the robin is roasting, but the onlookers claim it is shedding oil".

4.8 The Sun Set.

The involvement of the major powers in the Biafra/Nigeria conflict may have been as a result of oil, politics or Biafran and Nigerian propaganda, but it was the only occasion since the second world war that Britain, the U.S.A. and Russia were on one side. France however supported and aided Biafra.

Under the aegis of the O.A.U. the African countries tried several times and by various means and through several personalities to intervene. One such attempt was the 'Aburi

Accord' which was instigated by President Julius Nyerere and the Ghanaian Head of State. (see ch.5)

The international involvement meant that the United Nations urged the O.A.U. to mediate. Biafra tried unsuccessfully to be admitted into the United Nations. The other angle adopted by Biafra in its propaganda war was religion. It accused the 'Mostly Muslim North' of seeking to annihilate the 'Christian East'. This attracted sympathy from the World Council of Churches and the Vatican, and large supplies from Caritas.(see ch.5)

Ironically, the instrument for propagating the Biafran cause was also used by one of its foremost soldiers to sabotage Biafra. Emmanuel Ifeajuna, one of the leaders of the 1966 coup had joined Biafra along with Chukwuma Nzeogu. Ifeajuna had his own ambition. He wanted to take back Lagos and become Head of State. He then played both ends against themselves. He made a secret pact with the Nigerian army to hand Biafra back to Nigeria, his main aim being to use the opportunity as a footstool to recapture Lagos. He then put out certain messages on Radio Biafra which at the time he claimed were coded messages to the Biafran forces at the war front. But, in fact he was sending veiled messages to the Nigerian forces to come and take Enugu. The message read "The apple is ripe and must be eaten. Go to the lake and catch the fish. Andrew Lilian will cooperate". He was found out, but too late, Enugu had fallen. He was shot. No doubt this started some back lash against the Onitsha people, homeland of Ifeajuna. The Biafran scene was tumultuous. There were suspicions, accusations and distrust even amongst media people. There were struggles for power, and sycophancy and ethnic differences between Ibos and non-Ibos were rife.

Internal strife neither helped the propaganda network nor the Biafran war. Nevertheless there were a number of prominent non-Ibo broadcasters who were very efficient in Biafra. The perpetual news talks against Nigeria were given by Okokon Ndem, an Efik, Paddy Davies, an Ibibio, and Nwora Asika, an Ibo. John Ekwere, an Ibibio, was Director General for the co-ordinated Biafran broadcasting services. The O.A.U. forces stepped in.

The Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra went silent and into hiding. Even when the Nigerian army regained the territory, they did not discover the stations.

4.9 Back To The Fold.

Just before the end, a fourth station was set up. Tests were being run.

It was called "The Fourth Dimension". This was to carry a very powerful transmitter, and to be beamed to Europe and the Americas. Whatever effect this would have had on the war is a matter for conjecture.

However, Radio Biafra was taken back to Enugu and incorporated into Radio Nigeria, Enugu since it had a short wave transmitter. The Voice of Biafra was secretly carted away to Calabar by the Engineer-in-charge, who came from Calabar, David Andrew Bassey, to be used at Calabar. Television Stations at Enugu and Aba were incorporated into the Nigerian Television, and the Radio Stations were all taken over by the New State Governments or the Federal Government.

The process of reabsorption signified the magnanimity of the then Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon. Despite all the insults on him personally, emanating from the Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra, during the war, he welcomed everybody back and rehabilitated them. It would be interesting to see where else such bitter wars have been fought, and there have not been any official recriminations at the end.

Some of the Biafran broadcasters have since risen to positions of authority within the Nigerian fold.

4.10. Epilogue.

Somehow, none of the active participants in Biafra's propaganda effort has written about their experiences. This thesis may turn out to be the first such account. It incorporates the views and reactions of prominent participants and colleagues, some of whom include; Cyprian Ekwensi, John Ekwere, Chinua Achebe, Kalu Uka, Sam Nwaneri, Sebastian Ofurum, Eno Irukwu, Okokon Ndem, Kevin Ejiofor, David Andrew-Bassey, Gloria Fiofori, Kalu Nsi, Ifegwu Eke.

Part of the reason for the lack of exposition of Biafran propaganda, is that at the end of the war, the word Biafra became a "dirty word" in Nigeria, even to the ex-Biafrans. The ex-Biafrans were more concerned with rehabilitation and reconstruction. And, the Nigerians were frightened, lest another propaganda war would start, and another civil war. The Federal Nigerian Government of General Yakubu Gowon was anxious to bury the hatchet and speed up rehabilitation and reconstruction. Some books have eventually emerged but mainly on the civil war itself, not on the media.

One observation from these reflections is worth comment; the African attitude towards reconciliations. Unlike other parts of the world - the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and Europe - where repercussions still reverberate over crimes that were committed at war decades ago, Africans, as demonstrated in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, reconcile, accommodate, bury the hatchet, and forget.

Hopefully, this will happen in future in Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, etc. There are no widespread postwar recriminations. This does not happen elsewhere in the world.

Perhaps, since the reconciliation example migrated from Nigeria to Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, the African mutation formula may, in due course be imitated and replicated around the world.

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CHAPTER FIVE

BIAFRA: THE EXTERNAL FACTOR.

Introduction

This chapter, which is in three parts, examines the international factor in Biafran propaganda under the following headings:

Part A: Biafra's external propaganda;

Part B: Biafra and Africa; Biafra and Britain; and

Part C: Biafra and the World.

With the establishment of the Voice of Biafra, which reached out to surrounding African countries, sympathy began to emerge from some African countries. The countries included parts of the Camerouns, despite the attempt by the Camerounian leader to stop it, Gabon, Tanzania, Zambia, Ivory Coast and Zaire.

Outside Africa, Israel, France, Portugal, South Africa and Haiti, were sympathetic. By accusing Nigeria of continued genocide and instituting pogroms, Biafra also attracted some non-governmental sympathy from the people of Great Britain and the United States.

The voice of Biafra expressed the appreciation of the Biafran people for the support.

The media - Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra - accused Nigeria of waging the war to steal the abundant mineral wealth of Biafra. They called it an 'oil war', because Biafra was the main source of crude oil in Nigeria. In 1967, in the early part of the war, Biafran soldiers

successfully captured and incorporated the Midwest, the other oil producing area. But, the Nigerian army took back the region.

The people of Biafra were asked through mounting propaganda to starve Nigeria of crude oil, fuel, and by-products. The sale or export of these products was punishable by death. Despite this, the black market flourished, and traders amassed vast amounts of Biafran money.

A broadcast from the Voice of Biafra in December 1967, accused the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, of supporting Nigeria, and ignoring the cross party consensus in the British Parliament against his policy. According to the Voice of Biafra, he advised the Nigerian government to get the United States and the Soviet Union on her side quickly. The Biafran government, however, claimed that even though Britain officially supported the Nigerian government, it indirectly and unofficially sympathised with Biafra. There appears to be no official source for this piece of information which seems to have emanated either from Biafran government sources, or the propaganda directorate. But, the 'rumour' spread like wild fire in Biafra boosting morale. Whether this was propaganda or not, is difficult to determine, but Auberon Waugh maintained that Sir David Hunt, who was British High Commissioner in Nigeria at the time, tacitly worked in favour of the Nigerian government, and also convinced the British government to do the same.¹

This chapter will examine these themes in greater depth, and analyse the effectiveness of Biafran propaganda in attracting or repelling sympathies from the different participating external constituencies it addressed.

It will be seen that while the British government appeared to 'encourage'² the activities of the Nigerian government, British journalists were active on both sides of the divide, for example, Colin Legum, then Africa and Commonwealth correspondent of the Observer, and Frederick Forsyth, then of the B.B.C. were involved with feeding the world with information, the former from Nigeria, the latter from Biafra. Others, like Angus

McDermid and Auberon Waugh also became deeply involved at different times in the propaganda war.

PART A

5.1. External Propaganda:

Mode, Method, Execution and Effect.

This part analyses the mode of transmission of Biafran propaganda to the outside world, and the method used to execute the spread. It examines the effect this had on the policies of the recipients.

5.1.1. Mode

The mode was entirely 'manipulative persuasion' by both Nigeria and Biafra, but more so by Biafra, whose propaganda was better organised and more efficient. The means of control of the external forces was non-existent, and so it was difficult to gauge the mood, reception and reaction of the external constituency. Therefore the methods discussed in the next section had to be employed.

Dr. Ifegwu Eke, when interviewed for this thesis, explained that Biafra had also carefully studied the propaganda results and responses in the other models - China and Germany, etc. and learned both from their mistakes and successes,³ and decided what to adapt and tailor to suit its own particular propaganda goals. From this, it is fair to argue that a process of migration and mutation had occurred. The Biafrans had gestated the ideas thus imbibed, imitated and replicated them, with adaptations to suit their particular messages and recipient audiences. The external audiences responded, and reacted variously to the messages received. Their reactions and responses varied depending on their interpretations of Biafran material. Their respective motivations were to variously mobilise humanitarian help, and arms.

No doubt, censorship as a mode of propaganda was also heavily applied. Each side only issued statements, and released messages and information favourable to it. Two typical examples demonstrate this clearly:

(1) During the upheaval in Western Nigeria, the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference was being held in Lagos. Yet, the Federal Government controlled, manipulated and stifled the information that reached the Heads of State and Government, even at such a close proximity; such as the riots, the killings, the burning and looting that went on. The propagation of a 'police action', whilst waging all out war, is a further example.

(2) The best illustration of such a control by Biafra was the continuous announcement that Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra were both still broadcasting from Enugu, long after Enugu had been sacked. In fact, Radio Biafra had moved three times, first to Owerri, then to Umuahia, then to a bunker, and finally to Obodo Ukwu near Orlu, where it survived in the forest till the war ended.

Voice of Biafra had also moved three or more times, finally situating in Eke Ututu near the Biafran airport at Uli, until the end of the war.

Throughout all this movement, the stations were housed in mobile portakabins - an act of considerable engineering ingenuity, considering the propaganda achievement over a period of three years.

5.1.2. Method.

In 1968, the first puzzling signs of famine began to emerge from Biafra - images of famine that were to reveal the true scale of the so called 'small bush war', and transform it into a major front page story in the West. The journalist responsible for the transformation was Frederick Forsyth.

He had been in Biafra during the early days - the exodus and the declaration of independence. He was recalled by the BBC, but returned to Biafra independently, because he was moved by what he saw in his earlier visit.

Biafra's early propaganda thrust were three fold - pogrom and genocide, religious war fare, and oil and economic war.(see ch.4). All three relatively impacted on the world stage, but, as has been seen, despite strong words, did not motivate any external mobilisation in aid of Biafra. But, famine - and the pictures of Kwashiorkor children, women and men achieved what religion, genocide and pogrom, and oil, did not.

Famine has struck countless communities throughout history, but the impact had always been local and gone largely unnoticed in the rest of the world. In this case, the isolation was swept aside because the media was made to take interest - an excellent case of manipulative persuasion.

The Biafran famine was caused directly by the civil war. It was a clear and unambiguous case of politics provoking a famine.

Father Mike Doheny, an Irish Holy Ghost Father, who had lived as a missionary in Eastern Nigeria from 1945 to 1959, recalls:

'We'd never seen hunger, never.
There was no shortage of food.
People lived very simply,
there was a lot of disease
but no starvation as such,
and when we saw it for the first time,
when we saw Kwashiorkor,
it really shocked us to our foundations.
We weren't prepared for it
and we could'nt understand it for a long time'.⁴

Kwashiorkor, a protein-deficiency disease principally affecting children, had arisen because of the blockade of Biafra on land sea and air by Nigeria. Previously, Eastern Nigeria had been self sufficient in fruits and carbohydrates, while importing salt from

Niger, and meat from Northern Nigeria. It imported stock fish - dried cod - from Scandinavia.

With the economic and military blockade, everything stopped coming. Biafra accused Nigeria of seeking to starve Biafran citizens into submission, and of using starvation as a weapon of war. Biafra had no hard currency to exchange for goods and materials because it could no longer export. Insurance cover was denied to all shipping lines venturing beyond Lagos port - apart from the threat of being boarded and searched.

The area was described by Nigeria as a war zone, while claiming that it was only carrying out a police action 'to keep Nigeria one'.

Biafra launched two schemes called 'Back to Land', and 'Operation Feed the Nation'. It propagated the planting of all sorts of crops, an increase in the production of chicken and egg, extensive fish farming, salt production from sea water etc. But, as the war progressed, these measures became inadequate for the needs of both the military and civilian populations. Gradually, Biafra began to lose even the farming territories to the invading Nigerian army. As the rural areas fell, refugees flocked to the centre of Biafra, exacerbating the famine.

Thus, by May 1968, starvation was almost at its peak. Biafran propaganda on the issue of starvation also heightened, whilst Lagos was determined to play it down.

It censored every information emanating from Biafra. The two hundred Christian Missionary groups in Biafra were the first to react to this aspect of Biafra's message, and responded immediately. They were to play a key role in attracting the world's attention to the ever increasing volumes of Biafra's starving children especially, and women and men generally.

Earlier, it was seen that Eastern Nigeria unlike the North and West had totally accepted Christianity. This was to have its rewards. As a result of this acceptance, various denominations had built churches, hospitals and schools. As town after town fell, the missionaries who ran these institutions could not carry on with their normal daily

activities. They therefore turned their energies into helping the refugees and the starving. They risked their lives in most cases, to take food into remote villages to reach those who had been cut off and inaccessible to the refugee centres. Some of them even became involved in buying or hiring ships and planes to bring in vital supplies via Lisbon and Sao Tome.

Father Doheny explains:

Suddenly we realised that
we were all in the same boat
with our people getting hammered.
The children were starving
and I realised for the first time
the meaning of Paul's phrase:
"You are my children
whom I have begotten in the Lord".
I had once taken that
as a pious kind of statement,
but now I realised that it was a fact.
I was feeling:
"Here are children I have baptised,
and here they are starving.
They are mine, may be in a very true sense.
Even though it's not a natural child,
it's a spiritual child, a reality".
And that's what drove us.
And here were all these missionaries
finding the same thing,
their children were starving,
and so to help them they had to come together.
And they came together
not by talking but by doing.
They started Joint Church Aid - JCA,
which combined all their resources at Sao Tome.
They hired planes and pilots
to fly them in overnight to Biafra'.⁵

Unlike the journalists who flocked into Biafra when news of the famine broke, the missionaries had lived in the area for a long time. They knew their whereabouts.⁶ They

also knew the advantage and power of the media - and they used it. The missionary infrastructure was good and strong, and their local knowledge was useful to the media. The media knew this and utilised it. The relationship became, unconsciously, a quid pro quo. Therefore, what started as propaganda, repeated often enough, materialised in fact, into a truism. Father Mike Doheny's brother, Father Kevin Doheny was as prominent amongst the missionaries as his brother. He had resided and worked in Eastern Nigeria since 1954. He was particularly outspoken and journalists often sought him out precisely because he refused to mince his words.⁷ He was quoted in the Daily Sketch of 22nd June 1968 as saying: 'I came here to these people and will stay here until I am killed'.⁸ He brought many stories of the bombing of undefended villages and the like to the attention of Frederick Forsyth and the journalists. Father Kevin Doheny recalls one occasion in 1969 when Mike Nicholson of ITN came out to Biafra:

Because of anti-British feeling,
he wasn't allowed to take any photographs
or any films.
I asked the Ministry of Information
if he could stay with me,
and they said yes.
He stayed with me in a hoouse in Umuahia.
We were there when
the Illyushin jets came right over our heads,
strafing the church and the Priest's house.
Mike had his camera just at the right time
in the right place,
because the Catholic Church was
overlooking the town
so he got marvellous film
of the whole of the bombing episode'.⁹

Father Mike Doheny had been in the habit of shooting films since the 1960s purely as a hobby, but the war brought a new dimension to his favourite past time. Television became an outlet. Demand for films from Biafra had grown. The dangers and expense of sending a crew to the front were enormous, so the stations developed an appetite for anything that

came out - any footage at all, they even abandoned their normal reluctance to use super-8 film.¹⁰ As it happened, Father Mike Doheny was at the scene when Owerri was recaptured from Nigeria by Biafra in April 1969. He recalls:

I had taken shots of Owerri
and the unfinished Cathedral
and the Bishop's house with bullet holes
and strafing marks on the walls.
By this time
I'd got to know a lot of these media guys;
you'd meet them out there and they'd say:
"Give us a buzz when you're next in London".
They'd want to hear the latest news.
So this time when I got to London,
one of them asked if I had any film.
He had a look at it
and asked if he could use it .
I said yes, on condition that I was in no way
identified as the person who made it.
It was a very delicate diplomatic situation
at that time.
That night, it appeared on News At Ten
which was OK,
as they didn't identify me.
But the following night
RTE (Irish Television) showed it,
saying who I was,
without so much as a 'by your leave'.¹¹

5.1.3. Execution.

Two wars were fought in Nigeria. The first was the military, which eventually the Federal side won.¹² The second was conducted in the media, and there is no doubt that the Biafrans won that one hands down.¹³ The Easterners had dominated the Nigerian media and they were fully conscious of the need for publicity to attract outside support. Angus McDermid cites a British diplomat, who had once been a professional public relations practitioner, as saying rather grudgingly, that in his opinion the Biafrans had mounted 'the most successful public relations campaign of all time'.¹⁴ They hired a

Geneva-based PR Manager, Markpress, which also held the Chrysler account, to promote their cause. Markpress bombarded British MPs, newspaper editors, radio and television correspondents, businessmen and academics with over 700 press releases and other material during the war.¹⁵ The Catholic Church also played an important world wide role in the propaganda war.

Since most Easterners were Catholic, it was natural for the Church to sympathise with them, and individuals like Fr Mike, Fr W.J. Dowling, Fr Michael Golden, Fr O'Marley, Fr Owen Reid spared no effort to publicise the Biafran cause as widely as possible. In the case of Fr W.J. Dowling, who had once been Parish Priest in Essene, Opobo, Pricipal of Holy Family College, Abak, St Patrick's College Calabar, and Regina Coeli College Essene, devoted his life to the Biafran cause. Like Fr Mike, he had baptised so many children, and seen so many of them through school, that he could not stand idly by and watch them die. When the Nigerian soldiers entered the South East, he was captured, sent to Lagos, deported, and banned from Nigeria. He has ofcourse since returned as Parish Priest in Abakaliki near Enugu. Fr. Michael Golden was sent to Northern Nigeria, where he contracted polio, and became paralysed from the waist down. He was flown back to Dublin, but still manages even now, despite his disability, to pay regular visits to Nigeria. Fr. O'Marley went to Rome to work in the Research Department of the Vatican, while Owen Reid returned to Northern Ireland.

In France, the combination of Catholicism and President De Gaulle's desire to weaken Nigeria, meant that the Biafrans got every support short of 'de jure' recognition.

In America, Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Sub-committee on Refugees tried to tilt official policy towards Biafra. (see part 3 of this ch.)

In Ireland, Holland and Germany, there was also significant support for Biafra.

The missionaries often talked of the conflict in terms of a 'Holy War' between Christianity and Islam. This was an over-simplification, which ignored the Christian belt in the largely Muslim North of Nigeria, and the fact that the predominantly Christian West supported

the Federal side. But it is true that strong support for Federal Nigeria came from the oil-rich Arab countries, while Egyptian pilots flew Russian-built Ilyushin jets for the Nigerians after Britain declined to do so, thus serving to enhance the notion of a Holy War.¹⁶

When it came to television, the Biafrans were far more adept than the Nigerians. As Colin Legum of the Observer explains:

'The Biafrans stole a march
by flying in everybody who wanted to come
and taking them up and showing them everything.
Thus much of the filming on television,
which is what upset the Federals,
was on the Biafran side,
showing the devastation caused,
first by the air bombing
and then later by the famine.
So in that sense the reporting became one-sided
because the Federals refused to let the cameras in,
or placed great obstacles in the way'¹⁷

In time the Nigerians handled the media abysmally. They were defensive, secretive and very formal. They were reluctant to supply even the most basic information to the 20 or so foreign journalists normally based in Lagos and they made it almost impossible for them to get to the front. No army casualty lists were ever supplied.

Angus McDermid's recollection is that 'you had to go round squeezing out news'. The Federal side had nothing to rival Markpress. He goes on:

'The journalists relied heavily on
what were laughingly called
"diplomatic sources".
We did the rounds of the embassies.
We tried to get stuff out of the Ministry of Defence,
but there were very few regular press conferences,
and the idea of daily press handouts was laughable.

Scraps of Information came from the generals
who went out with the army
and would give you a briefing
when they got back.
The government itself was very reluctant
to say anything.
You might get an individual soldier
telling you something.
It was extremely difficult and unsatisfactory;
in fact it was an affront
to our sense of professionalism'.¹⁸

For McDermid, it was of all reporting jobs the most difficult to get anything absolute:

'I used to amuse myself in the long nights
by thinking about a situation
and making a coefficient of reliability.
Something that I gave ten points to,
I had seen happen myself.
Then gradually I worked down to the things like
"who told me about this;
what would his reason be for telling me?
Have two people seen this?"
and so on until you got down to about three,
which was the rumour stage.
It was a most weird task to report the war,
and Markpress were no help;
they were sending out
disastrously incorrect stuff'.¹⁹

Forsyth agrees with this assessment of Markpress bulletins. He 'very quickly came to regard them as being as foolish and as exaggerated and propagandist as the Federal bulletins'. But he was given far greater freedom than McDermid. According to Paul Harrison and Robin Palmer, in News Out of Africa, when Forsyth returned as a freelance to Biafra, Ojukwu gave him accommodation, the loan of a Volkswagen Beetle and petrol vouchers, access to the one telex and freedom to travel where he liked, saying: 'If you want to get your head blown off, get your head blown off, but don't blame me!'

The problems of lack of information on the Federal side and deliberate misinformation on both sides were further compounded by the fact that it was virtually impossible for journalists to cover both sides of the war. Once a journalist had gone to Biafra, he/she was automatically barred from Nigeria. Winston Churchill, then a special correspondent for The Times, did go to both sides, to Nigeria first and then to Biafra - but he would not have been allowed back into Nigeria again.

Eventually the Federals did give a small contract to a London PR firm, Galitzine Chant Russell, but that did not change things very much because they continued to be very secretive and their army continued to behave 'pretty badly', according to Colin Legum. The Nigerians constantly complained that they were getting a bad Western press, and the issue soured Nigerian-British relations long after the end of the war, but they remained chronically incapable of remedying the situation. In fact the Western press was very much divided on the issue.

It is interesting to note that Forsyth, who was pro-Biafran, and Legum, who was pro-Federal, both considered themselves to be in a minority. Because Legum had written so movingly about the atrocities committed against the Easterners in the North in 1966, he was regarded as pro-Biafran. In fact, he supported the Federal side, believing secession to be 'a nonsense which wouldn't work'.

5.1.4

The Effect.

For Biafra, the great media breakthrough came in the summer of 1968, almost by accident. Forsyth recalls that as with the missionaries, it took time for the full implications of the famine to hit the journalists. The first photographs, taken by the Daily Express's David Cairns were dismissed by his editor as mere Oxfam posters of no news value or interest whatever to the British people. In June 1968 a party of five journalists went out to Biafra at the invitation of Markpress. It included Michael Leapman of the Sun as

Commonwealth Correspondent, this paper having replaced the Daily Herald in 1964. He went to Biafra with a photographer, Ronald Burton.

As far as Leapman was concerned, it was a war assignment. But, he recalls a visit to a hospital in Biafra with Alan Hart of the ITN, at the invitation of Fr Kevin:

'It was the pictures
that really made that first story,
some marvellous pictures
of kids in great distress.
And talking to the Doctor, who said:
"This one here is going to die tomorrow".
It was very moving stuff.
I'd never done much
of the heart-throbbing, sob-story stuff before;
I'd been mainly in diplomatic reporting.
I wrote down what he said
and reported it back.
And the Sun ran it as a series
over about three days and sent me back
about a week later!
It was at that time
that I think the Biafrans realised that
if they wanted to get the sympathy of the world,
they could actually exploit this.
And they did.
They then took people around.
But it wasn't their initial intention.
They did that when they realised
what the reponse was to that story,
compared to the very limited response
to the other stories
that had been written!'²⁰

Leapman's first story appeared on the morning of 12th June, while Hart's ITN coverage went out that evening. Leapman's article was entitled 'The Land of No Hope' - a phrase which The Sun was to make great play with. The front page carried a picture of a child dying of hunger in a nurse's arms.

On page two there was an article headed 'Why British arms count' about arms supplies to Nigeria, and a picture of Biafran soldiers with a case of British made ammunition captured from the Nigerians.

Page three carried a picture of a child in Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Umuahia, with a caption 'Boy suffering from malnutrition hides under a cot during an air raid'.

This was later used in an appeal run by The Times, headed, 'We can't sit and wait for a million people to die'.

Leapman's main report said that several thousand children had already died; that hundreds of thousands would starve to death that summer, and by August more than a million might be dead. The problem was exacerbated by the massive influx of refugees into an ever-diminishing area and by the Nigerian blockade. The hospital was receiving 2,500 malnutrition cases every week. Biafra needed 200 tons of protein daily, but was getting only 20 tons weekly. This report coincided with an emergency Commons debate on arms supplies to Nigeria, and copies of the Sun were sent to every MP. The next day a Sun editorial called for a massive international rescue operation and for more vigour by the British government.

A similar story appeared in the Sun's rival, the Daily Sketch on 17th June. Its front page carried a picture of a starving child and proclaimed 'Scandal of Biafra: the Sketch says the children need milk - Britain sends bullets'. The Sketch had decided to send out half a ton of full cream dried milk, enough to keep 200 children alive for just two weeks. It appealed for more. On 22nd June Brian Dixon, who had followed in Leapman's footsteps, filed a report in the Sketch under a heading 'Milk - not murder'. He described Biafra as 'today's Belsen', and said he had seen 200 children dying that day, that those he had spoken to would probably not be alive by the time his report was read, and that nearly 3 million children were thought to be near death:

'The grey hair on their heads

is the sign that there is no hope.
The sign that they have a few days to live.
They sit like decrepit old men.
Their bones are covered with only
tightly stretched skin,
their eyes bulge and they look around them
as if they know they are doomed'.²¹

The impact of the ITN and newspaper reports was instant. Forsyth remarks:

'Quite suddenly, bingo, we'd touched a nerve.
Nobody in this country at that time
had ever seen children looking like that.
The last time the Brits had seen anything like that
must have been the Belsen pictures.
Even in Vietnam they didn't starve.
Those first few pictures did it.
There was suddenly a tidal wave
of applications from Fleet Street
to the little office the Biafrans maintained
in London for space on a plane, for access.
And then it all started.
What they wrote
shook the conscience of the world...
Only after those pictures appeared
did the Fleet Street editors
override the advice they were getting
from the Commonwealth Office.
Only at that point did they say:
"Bugger you, we are going to investigate
And the guys they sent down
weren't African experts,
they were hard-nosed reporters,
who went out with no prior conceptions
or emotional baggage.
They were just down there to report a story.
And report it they did. With cameras.
Then came the television
and then came the foreigners.
The war itself would never have
set the Thames on fire,
but the pictures of starving children
put Biafra on to the front page
of every British newspaper

and from there to newspapers all over the world.
People who couldn't fathom
the political complexities of the war
could easily grasp the wrong
in a picture of a child dying of starvation'.²²

After this, Biafra became a beehive of world journalists. The world was brimming over with the Biafran story.

Charity organisations across the globe fell over themselves to get into the act of relief shipments to Biafra, all to the chagrin of Nigeria.

Predictably therefore, public opinion and government policies around the world reacted variously to the massive media coverage, as discussed in the remaining parts of this chapter.

PART 2

5.2. Biafra and Africa.

It is necessary to state at the start that, there was a big difference between the propaganda messages sent out from Biafra to Africa, and those sent to the rest of the world. This is because where Africa was concerned, at least initially, Biafra had a problem convincing the other countries, especially within the O.A.U, that if successful, its secession would not create a domino effect across the continent.

It was therefore more difficult to get African sympathy for Biafra. Conversely, the African countries' fear of a secessionist domino effect was the very same sentiment that Nigeria played on to counteract the Biafran argument. In a speech welcoming the O.A.U

Consultative Committee on Nigeria in 1967, General Gowon stated

'The O.A.U has rightly seen our problems as a purely domestic affair, and in accordance with the O.A.U resolutions, your mission is not here to mediate.'²³

The O.A.U, as it was formed in 1963, represented a compromise between two groups.

Professor Emmanuel Wallerstein, has defined these as the progressive core which saw unity as a movement, 'a key rallying point' with the aim of transforming Africa, and a periphery which regarded unity as 'an alliance among the governing groups to share in the immediately available portion of the pie allocated to their countries in the existing world market'.²⁴

This division corresponded roughly to the radical 'Casablanca' and moderate 'Monrovia' groups, named after the venues of two conferences that had been held in 1961.

The main difference between the two was their attitude towards events in the Congo; the Casablanca States supporting the Lumumbist elements and the Monrovia group attempting 'to consolidate the defeat of the Lumumbist elements in the Congo by creating

a Pan-African structure that would build very firmly on the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.²⁵

Non interference had thus been consecrated in the O.A.U Charter as a principle on the insistence of those who feared subversion and were deeply concerned about internal security. In return, a commitment to help liberation movements in Southern Africa and in other African territories still under foreign domination was also incorporated into the Charter.

When President Tshombe of the Congo began systematically to recruit South African and other white mercenaries to deal with the Lumumbist revolutionaries, backed by strong material assistance from the United States and other Western powers, the O.A.U called an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. This established an ad hoc ten member commission charged with restoring normal relations between the Congo and some of its neighbours, and with helping and encouraging the efforts of the Congolese government 'in the restoration of national reconciliation'.²⁶

In effect, this meant that the OAU had asserted that national reconciliation within a member state was its legitimate concern - an important principle three years later when the organisation had to deal with the Nigerian crisis.

This African debate on the Congo was to be highly relevant to the issues involved in the Biafran secession. It was inevitable that Biafra should be compared with Katanga, and Ojukwu with Tshombe. Nigerian emissaries at international meetings, particularly at the OAU and the United Nations invariably made this point, forgetting perhaps that Nigeria - one of the key protagonists of the Monrovia group - had not been among those which had supported Lumumba, or protested at the Stanleyville rescue operation. President Mobutu of Zaire was not at first among those who took the view that Katanga was comparable to Biafra, since the secession of Katanga had been brought about by foreign financial interests, while the secession of Biafra was the result of internal forces against Nigeria.²⁷

The same view was held from the start by President Nyerere of Tanzania, In 1969, he expanded it in an analysis of the Nigerian crisis. Outlining the similarities between the two cases, he acknowledged that Katanga was part of a United Congo - similarly Biafra was part of a United Nigeria.

Both decided to secede, and in both cases the centre objected and war broke out. Katanga had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very interested in this vast amount of wealth, and these economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the centre. Similarly Biafra had vital oil resources. The former colonial power was vitally interested in this vast amount of oil, and these interests were threatened in the conflict - but in this case the threat came from the secessionists. In the case of the Congo, Belgium joined the side supported by the copper companies - Katanga. In the case of Nigeria, Britain was on the same side as the oil companies - the centre.²⁸

Nyerere further argued:

'Let those who love
the superficial similarities of secession
have the courage and honesty to accept
this unpleasant fact also.
In Katanga, Belgium
and the copper companies were on one side;
in Nigeria, Britain
and the oil companies are on one side.
This is the one constant
and crucial factor in both cases
around which everything else
can be variable
In both cases, the former colonial power
and the vested economic interests
are on one side.
Tshombe was a stooge
of the copper interests:
they filled his coffers
with their vast financial resources.
Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests.
They refuse to pay him a penny
from the wealth they derive

from Biafran oil...
Only great simplicity -
or extreme naivety
could lend anyone to accept that
Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria,
or African unity in general.
She is defending
her own economic interests...
Who is Biafra's Tshombe?
Who in Biafra represents
the copper companies?
Africa appealed to the United Nations
to support Patrice Lumumba;
why are we not appealing
to the United Nations
to support General Gowon,
who on this analogy
would be Nigeria's Lumumba?
Perhaps the true answer is
that it is not necessary;
he already has strong support.
But why is it not necessary?
Because the Ibos are simply
fighting for their own survival
and therefore have no strong supporter.
That is their strength and weakness:
it is the major difference between
Katanga and Biafra.
In the one case,
foreign economic interest was on the side
of the secessionists,
and that made them very strong;
in the other case
foreign economic interest
is on the side of the Federalists,
and makes them too very strong.
They can even quote the O.A.U Charter
on non-interference in the internal affairs
of a member State'.²⁹

This statement is of particular importance as Julius Nyerere was later to spearhead the campaign for recognition of Biafra by African States, an unprecedented act, in

contradiction of the O.A.U. Charter. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia held a similar view as Nyerere. He too was to later recognise Biafra, along with Ivory Coast and Gabon. Even though Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah was regarded as the protagonist of the radical - Casablanca group, by 1967 Nyerere's Tanzania, had emerged as one of the radical front runners. He had an ally in Kenneth Kaunda who shared his views on international affairs.

Nevertheless, the other 'radicals' ³⁰ were firmly opposed to Biafra's secession. Most of those in this category were Muslim States; in their case the Biafran religious propaganda had a negative - indeed an opposite - effect on them.

Thus President Boumediene attacked countries and relief agencies aiding Biafra in a tirade which described them as imperialist stooges in a conspiracy against Nigeria 'whose unity we are all proud of'. Similar views were expressed by Guinea, Egypt, Mali, Somalia and the Sudan - all countries which voted with the 'progressives' on African issues.

Their difference with Nyerere on the Nigerian question became particularly marked in that they found themselves in the same group as Malawi and the Malagasy Republic, two of the most conservative African countries, which were as fully behind Lagos as the North African radicals.³¹

In 1968, the President of the Malagasy Republic condemned Tanzanian recognition of Biafra as 'not an honest act vis-a-vis a brother state in the O.A.U...what would the Tanzanian leaders do if a part of their country seceded?' He warned against 'imperialist traps' and said; 'There is oil in Biafra and this smells of oil'.³² For Dr. Banda, 'non-intervention in Nigeria's domestic affairs meant that he would support anything Gowon chose to do in Nigeria on the understanding that Gowon would refrain from interfering in what Dr. Banda considered to be Malawi's internal affairs. The fact that Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda whom he had long accused of fostering subversion in Malawi, had recognised Biafra may also have influenced him. South Africa reacted to Tanzania's

recognition by predicting that this action would split the O.A.U, and suggesting that Chinese Communist influence would invade West Africa.³³

There was ofcourse an element of double standards by Algeria who on the one hand supported the Eritrean Liberation Movement, whilst decrying Biafran secession. For instance, the Algerian government kept Biafran representatives out of Algeria during the 1968 summit of the O.A.U, while allowing the Eritrean Liberation Movement, which had opened offices in Algiers a few months earlier, to lobby among the African delegations attending the summit. The reasons were purely religious.

Thus, the reception of and reaction to Biafran and Nigerian propaganda, by African governments were varied and complex, as will be seen later in this chapter.

There certainly is a link between Islam and politics on the African continent, and in some cases with government and governance.³⁴

The Islamic, and, feudal structures of Northern Nigeria had emerged relatively unscathed from the effects of colonialism. Eastern Nigeria, the area that became Biafra, was not penetrated, as mentioned earlier in this thesis, by Islam. The all conquering Fulanis, who spread Islam to West Africa, were obstructed in the South by the dense rain forest and Tsetse fly.

Western Nigeria was partly converted because of the proximity to the North, and partly because of Yoruba trade with Arabic Kingdoms north of the Sahara.

The East remained firmly and predominantly Christian, preventing Islam from 'dipping the Koran in the sea', as Biafra claimed in its euphemistic propaganda during the war.

Within hours of declaring independence, Radio Biafra announced that Ghana, Togo, Gambia, Ethiopia and Israel had recognised Biafra, with more recognitions being expected. This was denied by the countries concerned. The inclusion or anticipation of recognition by Israel merely acted in a negative propaganda fashion, in that it stiffened the opposition of the Islamic African countries to Biafran independence. There was caution

and concern in the various African countries. Mostly all the African countries wanted mediation and reconciliation to occur.

Nevertheless, mediation offers were principally initiated from West African countries. For instance, Dahomey, one of Nigeria's closest neighbours, fearing an eruption of the war, sent a mission headed by its Foreign Minister, Dr. Zinsou, which was turned back at the border by the Nigerian government.³⁵ The Gowon Government was nervous about any form of mediation which looked like an interference in the internal affairs of Nigeria.

This was because Ojukwu had used the Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra to call on the African countries to mediate.

Any mediation attempt therefore appeared to Gowon to be an attempt to respond to and side with Ojukwu. The Federal government was opposed to this in principle because intervention by Heads of State might have been regarded as a form of recognition for Biafra: it implied that Gowon and Ojukwu were being approached as equals, and Ojukwu's refusal to accept the authority of Lagos was of course the basic issue. The main comfort for Lagos at this stage came from outside Africa - significantly - from the ruler of Kuwait, who sent a message of goodwill, and solidarity to Gowon, stating that he regarded the Nigerian crisis as a purely internal matter.³⁶ The Nigerian government then reinforced its propaganda message that it was merely carrying out a police action in the East to restore law and order, and secure Nigerian unity. It claimed that it was not a religious war at all as propagated by Biafra, even though Lagos enjoyed the total support of the Islamic countries.

On 29th June, Dr. Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria's Foreign Minister left Lagos with a message from Gowon to President Mobutu of Zaire. Simultaneously, Radio Nigeria, drew a parallel between Biafra and Katanga, ignoring Nyerere's earlier argument to the contrary. Mobutu had already offered to mediate: he had also pointed out that contrary to what 'some politicians' had claimed, Biafra's secession could not be compared to that of Katanga.

The war broke out while Presidents Kaunda, Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were meeting to prevent it, and all they could do was to issue a communique which appealed for an immediate end to fighting. But it was too late. Nyerere commented that only South Africa and Rhodesia could rejoice over Nigeria's war, and repeated his call for a ceasefire. He also criticised Britain's 'shameless involvement', while other African countries called for 'African action' to stop the war.³⁷

'African action' meant intervention by the O.A.U and the employment of the mediation offices of the O.A.U. The summit meeting of the O.A.U was scheduled that year to be held in Zaire. The chorus of African action found favour with Biafra. The Biafran media incorporated this in its propaganda thrust, and Voice of Biafra and Radio Biafra carried the statement that 'The problem must be solved by Africans, if the O.A.U is to justify its existence.

In anticipation of the summit, media and diplomatic activities became frantic on both sides. The Nigerian media claimed that Biafra acquired arms from Czechoslovakia which were paid for in U.S. dollars. It blamed the C.I.A. for not preventing it. It announced that Communist Chinese guerrillas were fighting alongside the Biafrans against Nigeria. All this was an attempt to consolidate the support of the West for Nigeria, which it already enjoyed. Russia, for that matter, also supported Nigeria. Radio Nigeria further warned Ghanaian media against supporting Biafra, threatening that disintegration was contagious, waving 'the sword of an Ashanti' revolt over Ghana's head. The Biafran propaganda machine countered, accusing Nigeria of recruiting ex-SS mercenaries in Bonn, and repeatedly warning African countries of the 'new Anglo-Soviet imperialist threat to Africa'. Close to the conference, the Nigerian media raised vehement objections to the O.A.U. discussing the war without approval from Lagos. It maintained that Cameroun, Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Niger and Gabon had expressed

'enthusiastic support' for the Nigerian stand. It, claimed that these countries had also promised not to raise the issue at the summit.³⁸

When it became clear that there was heavy African pressure, particularly from Ghana, Liberia and Zaire itself, for a discussion of the Nigerian crisis, the Nigerian government indicated that in the event of a negotiated settlement, it would not accept Ojukwu as spokesman for Biafra. The media in Lagos demanded that the Biafrans could either surrender 'and seek honourable peace under a new leadership or they could fight "to total destruction" under Ojukwu'.³⁹ The crisis was not in the official agenda of the summit, but it was discussed. On the 14th of September, the conference set up a mediation committee,⁴⁰ with Emperor Haile Selasie as chairman. Avoiding the use of the word 'mediate', the conference resolved '...to send a consultative mission of six Heads of State to the Head of the Federal government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria'.⁴¹

The mission was also, according to the official communique, to 'explore the possibilities of placing the services of the Assembly at the disposal of the Federal government'.

The communique expressed concern at the 'tragic and serious situation in Nigeria'. The Assembly thus achieved a dual purpose of respect for the internal affairs of a member state whilst reiterating its 1964 precedent when it appointed an ad hoc commission to help the Congolese government in the restoration of national reconciliation.⁴² Apart from Haile Selasie, other members of the mission were Presidents Mobutu of Zaire, Hamani Diori of Niger, Ahidjo of Cameroun, Tubman of Liberia and General Ankrah of Ghana. Since Nigeria was acclaimed to be the economic and military regional super power, the countries immediately bordering her were severely affected economically by the war. These included the Cameroun, Niger, Dahomey, Chad and Sao Tome - particularly Fernando Po.

The 'frontline States' - the countries bordering South Africa and Rhodesia, resisting white rule and domination - were also affected. This was because Nigeria contributed large funds to the liberation struggle. The total liberation of Africa from colonialism and foreign domination was the core of Nigeria's foreign policy.

In the Cameroun, the situation was more complicated. President Ahidjo, a Northern Fulani who was actually born in Northern Nigeria clearly sympathised with Lagos. However, he bore Nigeria a political grudge: the Northern Cameroun - a trust territory had been joined to Nigeria, after a United Nations plebiscite in 1962, but Cameroun had refused to accept the decision, holding an annual day of mourning to commemorate the sad event. Besides, West Cameroun, which had once been administered together with Eastern Nigeria but which had chosen to join East Cameroun on independence, subsequently found she was not very happy in this predominantly Francophone union and the nostalgia for the pre-independence day generated a wave of sympathy with Biafra across the border. It was a sentiment which Ahidjo as a wise politician could not ignore.⁴³

Popular opinion in most West African countries particularly Ghana, and Liberia was sympathetic to Biafra. Their leaders however were restrained by the non-interference clause in the O.A.U. Charter. Emperor Haile Selassie and the Zairen President seemed to find themselves in this same situation.⁴⁴

Biafra hailed the O.A.U. mediation committee, describing it as 'a move to mediate in the war'. Ojukwu stated on the Biafran media that the O.A.U. had recognised 'the international nature of the conflict', by setting up the committee.

This antagonised the Nigerian government which sought to prevent the visit of the committee to Lagos.⁴⁵ The Biafran media accused Nigeria of applying delay tactics to obstruct the committee. The Nigerian media denied this. In the interim, they announced that Biafra had lost Enugu, its capital, prompting an announcement in London by the Nigerian High Commissioner that the war was 'fast coming to an end'.⁴⁶

The Biafran media vigorously denied these claims, and Biafra stiffened its military resistance. The committee finally met in Lagos on the 22nd of November. President Tubman of Liberia, and Mobutu of Zaire were absent.

Gowon's welcome address to the committee stated: 'Your Mission is not here to mediate'.⁴⁷ He repeated the same statement to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, when he visited Lagos in March 1969.⁴⁸ In both instances, Gowon raised the spectre of contagious infection of seperatism in Africa, if Biafra were allowed to succeed. To the relief of Nigeria and the wrath of Biafra, the Committee agreed with Gowon. The war of arms and words thus continued for three years, belying the so called 'police action'⁴⁹ that Nigeria had claimed it was carrying out.

The African countries got weary and impatient - the supporters of Lagos with Biafra, and the supporters of Biafra with Nigeria. In April 1968, President Nyerere of Tanzania recognised Biafra.

In explanation, he stated:

"Unity by conquest is impossible...
even if military might could force
the acceptance of a particular authority,
the purpose of unity
would have been destroyed.
The general consent
of all the people involved
is the only basis
on which unity in Africa
can be maintained or extended.
The Biafrans might be wrong
in their belief
that they had been rejected by
a Nigeria whose government had been unable
or unwilling to protect them
from persecutions and pogroms;
if so , they would have to be persuaded
that they were wrong,
but they will not be convinced
by being shot.

Nobody had talked more about the need
for African unity
than the leaders of Tanzania,
but it seemed to us that by refusing
to recognise the existence of Biafra
we were tacitly supporting a war
against the people of Eastern Nigeria -
and a war conducted in the name of unity.
We could not continue doing this
any longer"⁵⁰

The Nigerian media labelled Nyerere a puppet - a charge that did not stick. The Biafran media acclaimed him an African statesman, maintaining that Tanzania had nothing to gain except undiluted principle. Subsequently, in barely five weeks - between April and May of that year, three more recognitions of Biafra followed. These were by Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast.

While the war of arms and words was raging, there were several attempts by at mediation, intervention and settlement, by both individuals and institutions.. One of these following immediately on the four rapid recognitions of Biafra was by the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. It initiated the setting up of peace negotiations, with Kampala as the venue. The process went through preliminary and substantive stages, but failed because of the intransigence of both sides to the conflict.

On the 15th of July, after the failure of the Kampala peace talks, the O.A.U. Consultative Committee was invited to reassemble in Niamey. Five of the six members of the committee attended. Mobutu again was absent. Chief Obafemi Awolowo led the Nigerian delegation, but General Gowon joined the meeting the following day, 16th July 1968, and declared himself only as an 'observer'. He warned, in his self declared observer status speech, that if the 'rebels persist in their contemptuous attitude to the conference table, the Federal government will have no choice but to take over the remaining rebel-held areas...In military terms, the rebellion is virtually suppressed already'.⁵¹ Ojukwu was invited to attend.

The meeting proposed a ten-mile-wide demilitarised zone patrolled by neutral international troops to allow relief supplies to pass to Biafran refugees. Gowon is said to have rejected this,⁵² and his comments and attitude seemed to confer that he would not have been able to guarantee the actions of his soldiers at the fronts. Niamey radio broadcast the main points of the resolution and the rejection. It also announced that Ghana and the Camerouns offered their services for the transportation of relief materials; and offered shipping facilities.⁵³ Gowon left for Lagos within two days.

The Biafran delegation headed by Ojukwu arrived on the 19th. He flew in on Houphet Boigny's private jet. The delegation included Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former Governor General and President of Nigeria, Dr. Michael Okpara, former Premier of Eastern Nigeria, Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and Chief Justice of Biafra, and Dr. Eni Njoku, former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos.

At the end of the meeting between Ojukwu and the committee a communique was issued.

There appeared to be two versions. According to Niamey radio,:

'The O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria announces with great satisfaction the following decisions: (1) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to meet immediately in Niamey under the chairmanship of President Hamani Diori in order to begin preliminary talks as a speedy resumption of Nigerian peace negotiations; (2) the Nigerian Federal Military Government and Colonel Ojukwu have agreed to resume as soon as possible peace negotiations in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the O.A.U. Consultative Committee on Nigeria'.⁵⁴

The version broadcast by the Nigerian media was different from that of Niamey radio. Radio Nigeria announced that the Committee had called on both parties to resume peace talks as soon as possible, '...with the objective of preserving Nigeria's territorial integrity and guaranteeing the security of all its inhabitants'. It further claimed that the committee indicated that 'it will be in contact with the Federal Military Government, and Ojukwu or his representatives may at any time contact any member of the committee'.

The Lagos broadcast included two other items that were absent in the Niamey radio broadcast. These concerned relief, appealing to both sides to undertake various measures to alleviate suffering among war victims.⁵⁵

The next round of peace talks opened at Addis Ababa on the 15th of August. The Consultative Committee failed to turn up. Gowon did not appear. The O.A.U. Secretariat was left to cope unsuccessfully. The Biafran delegation which was without Ojukwu stayed on for a while, on his instructions, Ojukwu had been earlier blamed earlier for breaking off the Kampala peace talks, because they did not go the Biafran way. He therefore told the Biafran delegation to 'stay there even if it takes a thousand years'⁵⁶

Subsequently, Diallo Telli, then Secretary General of the O.A.U, said in an interview with 'Le Figaro' "We must ask ourselves if we should not reconsider the principle of unity at any price, which has been for Africans the main stay of our policy'.⁵⁷ His annual report to the O.A.U. that year, 1969 also called for a redefinition of the idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. After this, every subsequent attempt at mediation by the O.A.U. failed. The only condition Lagos accepted from the O.A.U. was the allowing of the O.A.U. troops to observe the surrender by Biafra. Even this was done out of pressure from the United Nations Secretariat.⁵⁸

5.3. Biafra and Britain.

The initial lack of African support for Biafra was one of the arguments employed by the British Government to justify its active support for the Nigerian Government. The British Government argued that an international embargo against Nigeria would be received with 'deep hostility by most African States'.⁵⁹

Mr. Michael Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, applied the domino theory to the African situation - arguing that secession in one part of Africa would generate the disintegration of the African Continent into tribal States. The Johnson and Nixon administrations employed the same arguments in America,⁶⁰ because American policy towards Africa was heavily weighted towards the British view. They believed that Britain, as the former colonial power, knew the area better. On the other hand, Biafra claimed that the British Government had encouraged Nigeria to blockade Biafra by land, sea and air - thus depriving the Biafran people of the means of self defence, with the aim of starving the Biafran people into submission and surrender.⁶¹ British policy in Lagos had always been solidly in favour of anything which looked like being able to hold the Nigerian Federation together.

Nigeria was Britain's proudest colonial achievement, the home of thousands of British subjects, easily the most populous country in Africa, and potentially the most prosperous. Britain already had some five hundred million pounds invested in the Federation, and the field for future exploitation - especially the oil deposits in the East and the Midwest - was almost limitless.⁶² Oil was a particularly sensitive commodity because both Nigeria and Biafra used the oil arguments in their propaganda war. Biafra accused Nigeria of wanting to capture Biafra because of oil reserves. Nigeria accused Biafra of appropriating unwilling minority areas, eg, Calabar and Rivers Provinces into Biafra because of their oil deposits.

Nothing which threatened radically to alter the unity of Nigeria was acceptable to Britain. Auberon Waugh maintained that it was British influence which prevented General Gowon

from honouring the 'Aburi Accord'.⁶² This was hotly denied in Whitehall, but according to Waugh, there is evidence to suggest that it was Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, the then High Commissioner in Lagos who dissuaded General Gowon from announcing the break-up of the Federation in his broadcast of 1st August 1966. The evidence is credited to Professor Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos in an interview with Susan Cronje. It is stated that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the incident to Professor Njoku and Sir Louis Mbanefo, former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and later Chief Justice of Biafra. As seen above, the two were also later members of Biafran peace delegations. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis Mbanefo's residence in Enugu when the British High Commissioner paid a farewell visit before leaving Nigeria early in 1967.⁶⁴

The assumption by the British Government initially was that this was a storm in a tea cup which would soon blow over.

It was the repudiation of the Aburi Accord which made war inevitable.⁶⁵ This action of the Gowon regime cornered Ojukwu, leaving him with very few choices, and the Biafran people with their backs to the wall. There was a pervasive sense of insecurity in Biafra. However, the British government clung to its 'storm in a tea cup' theory, seeing the crisis as the type of tribal warfare that plagued Africa, and would blow over as in other ex-colonial African countries: it pointed to similar pressures in other countries and urged (quite rightly in many cases) that tribal fragmentation of this nature did nothing but harm to the economic prospects of the people involved; it also pointed to the tribal diversity of Nigeria itself, and argued, that disintegration along tribal lines would not be conducive to the general good, and should therefore be discouraged; finally, it argued that if ever one such tribal pressure were to prevail, in what were admittedly exceptional circumstances, then it inescapably followed that every single other such tribal pressure would be similarly successful.⁶⁶

It is worth noting that at the inception of the war, all the information at the disposal of the British Cabinet - if not the Foreign and Commonwealth office - suggested that the war would be over in a matter of weeks; at which point it seemed that there was no need for the British government to do anything but express public regret, for domestic consumption, that such a 'police action',⁶⁷ as claimed by Nigerian propaganda, should have been necessary.

On the basis of available information, to have withheld arms supplies and to have repudiated existing arms contracts would certainly be interpreted as hostile to the recognised government in Lagos, and would also have been singularly pointless, since it could only have prolonged the hostilities while Nigeria sought arms from other sources. Indeed, so effective had been the British High Commission in persuading Whitehall that the war would be over in a matter of weeks, that the cabinet allowed itself the moral luxury of refusing to sell General Gowon any military aircraft, on the grounds that that would not be needed and would only add to the mess.

As a result, Chief Anthony Enahoro, the Federal Commissioner for Labour and Information, was sent to Moscow where he successfully negotiated an agreement to receive both Mig fighters and Ilyushin bombers, and the arms race began in earnest. This episode also provided the British Foreign office with a further justification for the Commonwealth Office's policy - namely the spectre of Russian presence in West Africa. It was this 'Russian threat' argument which later converted Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Chief opposition spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to the government's policy.⁶⁸

Exactly how the British Cabinet came to be so misinformed is a matter of permissible speculation. Until the third month of the war, there was a British Deputy High Commissioner in Enugu, the Biafran Capital. He was in a position to inform the British government on the extent of Biafra's preparedness for the war and also on the extent of her will to resist. All the evidence suggests that the Deputy High Commissioner, Mr.

James Parker, did, in fact, fulfil his duty in this respect until the time of his departure after the fall of Enugu. Unfortunately, from Biafra's point of view, all Parker's intelligence had to go through the British High Commissioner in Lagos. The new High Commissioner, Sir David Hunt (who succeeded Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce in November 1966) turned out to be a very good friend of Nigeria, and a man whose assessment of the military situation was strikingly different from Parker's.⁶⁹ Presumably, the papers will be available in 1999, under the thirty year rule, and then it will be known in what form Parker's information reached London, unless placed under a special embargo. What is absolutely certain is that it was Sir David Hunt's assessment which prevailed.⁷⁰

It is clear that, like Churchill, Eden, and Reith, during the second world war, who used censorship effectively to stifle Hitler's propaganda thrust into Britain, Wilson and Gowon believed that censorship was the most effective propaganda weapon to use against the Biafrans. Conversely, like Hitler and Goebbels , Ojukwu believed in massive propaganda bombardment of the enemy constituencies.

However, it is fair to say, even at the risk of repetition that at the time that Biafra seceded on 30th May 1967, official British actions were muted and ambivalent. In the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. Herbert Bowden, said only that there was some association between the British representative in Enugu and the authorities there, 'but at this stage there can be no recognition of the Eastern Region by ourselves, nor has any other country recognised it'.⁷¹ Lord Watson, Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Trade, is quoted as stating in June 1967: 'We have been watching carefully - indeed anxiously - what has been happening in Nigeria, and we have done so for many reasons...We have a vast trade with Nigeria...There are ofcourse, the relatively newly discovered oil deposits which are being exploited now with such enormous success...'⁷²

The British Government's ambivalence and preoccupation was understandable. Apart from the traditional fears of being cut off from its sources of oil, the closure of the Suez Canal threatened to affect Britain's desperate attempts to achieve a balance of payments surplus. Mr. Harold Wilson subsequently recalled that 'in the spring of 1967 we were almost within sight of balancing our overseas trade and payments when the Middle East war and the closure of the Suez Canal inflicted great damage on us - a major factor in forcing devaluation upon us later in the year'.⁷³ On the 6th of June 1967, Egypt blocked the Suez Canal, and the following day, George Brown, then Foreign Secretary, said that urgent steps were being taken to readjust the pattern of oil supplies to Britain. By the end of June, Britain began to feel the oil shortage.

The loss resulting from the Middle East situation as a whole was about £ 10 million a month from July to September, and double that level for the rest of the year.⁷⁴

With these points in view, it is not surprising therefore that oil featured prominently in the propaganda war between Biafra and Nigeria. It is possible that if Parker's reports had reached London in the form they were sent, Britain may have sided with Biafra, and the course and outcome of the war would have been completely different. This is only a matter of conjecture. It will also remain a matter of conjecture which factors weighed more with the decision makers in the British cabinet - oil reserves and wealth; the British economy; the unity of Nigeria; or the contagious, infectious disintegration of Africa. Suffice it to say that Biafra maintained in its propaganda that Britain erred on the side of oil reserves, and selfishness. If that is true, then the unity of Nigeria and Africa were secondary in the circumstances that Britain found itself economically after the closure of the Suez Canal by Egypt.

It has to be said, that public support for secession is very rare, and was particularly non-existent during the cold war. In fact, up to 1971, after the Biafran war, secession might have been regarded as futile. The fact that Biafra attracted public sympathy at all, was the success of its propaganda.

The Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London in January 1969, was the first since the meeting presided over by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in Lagos. It seemed to many Africans to have belonged to a previous age. In any event, the Conference kept the Nigerian crisis carefully in the background.

Sierra Leone's Prime Minister Siaka Stevens, tried to persuade the Commonwealth countries to launch a new peace initiative through Emperor Haile Selassie or the Liberian Prime Minister William Tubman, but Nigeria's Head of Delegation, Chief Awolowo, headed this off, stressing the OAU's exclusive right to act as mediator. Officially, the Federal position remained rock-hard. Awolowo maintained 'bluntly, one side or the other has to give in. You could say we're both fighting for the soul of Nigeria'. However, he did see Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda, Biafra's two Commonwealth backers, privately, and explained the Federal Government's uncompromising attitude in more detail and in less abrasive language.⁷⁵

At the end of March 1969, Harold Wilson, Britain's Prime Minister, arrived in Lagos. He had offered to come the preceding Christmas to try to arrange a temporary truce, but the Federal government had made plain their opposition.

This time, the mediating motive, officially denied by both Lagos and Whitehall, was ascribed to a fact finding trip.

It was the watershed of British policy towards the Nigerian civil war. It became clear then, if there were ever any doubts, that officially, Britain was not only firmly behind Nigeria but intended to maintain this support. The presence of a British Prime Minister in Lagos, and the fact that he visited Federal occupied parts of Biafra, where he made speeches declaring Britain's support for 'One Nigeria', constituted the final imprimatur of the policy of the British government.⁷⁶

Even though it criticised the visit, the Biafran propaganda Directorate was rather cautious about the way it handled criticisms of the British. Biafra had always maintained that the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was acting against the will of the British people, members

of his party, and of parliament. There was still hope in Biafra that they could win Britain over, as the war progressed. All they had to do was to 'hang in there', until Nigerian credibility waned, and the outside world asked more questions.⁷⁷ Rather, Biafra directed its propaganda at Gowon, calling him a puppet. They claimed that he could not take decisions on his own, that was why he had to invite 'his Lord and master' to come and show him what to do.⁷⁸

With some justification, Biafra maintained, as it had done all along, that the British public was behind her, because the World Council of Churches and other charity organisations were raising aid, collecting clothes, food, milk, etc for Biafra. Voices were raised against the reports of genocide that were appearing on British television. As a result of the part played by organisations like Save the Children, in helping Biafran children, and Caritas, in flying provisions into Biafra, these organisations along with the Red Cross were banned from Nigeria. Save the Children has still not reopened its offices in Nigeria.⁷⁹

Chief (Dr.) K.O.Mbadiwe, Ambassador plenipotentiary, Joseph Wayas, and many other Biafrans were despatched to Britain via Gabon and the Camerouns to raise 'public awareness', and to raise funds for Biafra.⁸⁰

To illustrate the nature of the public debate in Britain, it may be helpful at this point to reproduce a sample of quotations from public speeches:

1. 'The Ibos quite unknowingly appeared to take the position of the Irish in the former United Kingdom; they had never formed part of the Roman Empire and never come under the Law. The result was that they would never conform. The Ibo had never come up against the Fulani and their administrative genius... they lapped up education... they filled important professional and technical posts all over the North...'

- Sir Rex Niven,
former colonial official in Northern Nigeria.⁸¹

- 2. 'We are neutral to both sides,
but there is clearly a
recognised government in Nigeria'.
- Lord Shepherd, 25th January, 1968.⁸²

- 3. 'Neutrality would mean supporting a rebellion'.
- George Thompson, 21st May 1968.⁸³

- 4. 'Neutrality was not a possible option
for Her Majesty's government'.
- George Thompson, 27th August 1968.⁸⁴

- 5. 'I do not believe in neutrality'.
- Lord Shepherd, 27th August 1968.⁸⁵

- 6. 'Britain was probably the only country
in the world that could not,
in fact or in honour, be neutral about this'.
- Michael Stewart, 30th June 1969.⁸⁶

- 7. 'What we have pressed for
is a ceasefire on the basis of
recognition of the Federal system in Nigeria,
with adequate safeguards for the very fine people
who live in the Biafran area'.
- Harold Wilson, October 1968.⁸⁷

- 8. 'We at least used our influence
with the Nigerian government
together with others
to persuade them to invite observers
into the areas concerned
to provide some...guarantee that
there was no genocide...
This was totally successful and the

reports showed that there was no genocide'.
- Harold Wilson, April 1971.⁸⁸

9. 'The Nigerian Airforce
does not have the capacity of
interdicting the rebel airfield complex at Uli'.
- Colonel Scott,
British Defence Adviser, December 1967.⁸⁹

10. 'So that I can take pleasure in the prospect
of greater industrialisation in Nigeria;
not merely because we are pleased by
the prosperity of our friends but also because
I look forward to an industrialised Nigeria
as an increasingly better customer
for those sophisticated and expensive goods
by whose export Britain now lives.
Long live a modern, enterprising, prosperous
and industrialised Nigeria'.
- Sir David Hunt, British High Commissioner
in Nigeria, November 1967.⁹⁰

Such was the range of arguments, and the varying degrees of neutrality exhibited by the authorities in Britain towards the Nigerian conflict.

Nevertheless, in November 1969, a Biafran government statement which aroused much speculation declared 'Biafra's only interest in wanting Sovereignty is that it provides security for its 14 million people. It then went on to describe 'the ever recurring incidence of massacres suffered by the people of the former Eastern Region living outside their own areas in 1945, 1955 and 1966'.⁹¹ It continued: 'The only logical remedy, as Biafrans see it, is their separate existence. However, since our attachment to sovereignty is functional and not sentimental, Biafra will be prepared to accept, at the suggestion of no matter whom, any alternative arrangement that can guarantee a non-recurrence of the massacres of the last twenty five years'.

This was, hailed in London and elsewhere as a sign of a more flexible Biafran attitude, until a further statement issued a couple of days later announced that Biafra's basic attitude remained unchanged. The Biafrans were then accused of inconsistency.⁹²

Earlier, in June 1968, when the British government was under heavy pressure over its arms supply to Lagos, it spelled out certain conditions under which it would, consider 'and more than reconsider' its policy towards Nigeria.

In the words of Mr. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary:

'if we make the supposition
that it were the intention
of the Federal government
not merely to preserve the unity of Nigeria
but, to proceed without mercy
either with the slaughter
or the starvation of the people
or if we were to make
the supposition that it were the intention
of the Federal government
to take advantage of a
military situation in order to throw aside
with contempt any terms
of reasonable resettlement,
then the arguments which justified
the policy we have so far pursued
would fall, and we would have to
reconsider, and more than reconsider,
the action we have so far taken'.⁹³

A few days after these words were spoken, it became obvious not only that Biafran civilians were starving, but that General Gowon had given the order for 'the final push' into the Biafran heartland.⁹⁴

The critics of Mr. Harold Wilson's policy considered that Gowon's 'final push' fulfilled the second of the conditions enunciated above by Mr. Michael Stewart, and angry MPs demanded a vote.

According to the procedure this could only be taken if the final speaker, Mr. Whitlock, ended the speech before the set time limit. But despite repeated appeals and points of order from backbenchers of all parties he refused to do this. The end of his speech was drowned in cries of 'shame', and 'sit down', joined by shouts of 'murderer' and 'liar' from the public gallery until a few of the spectators were ejected.⁹⁵

Thus by applying a process of filibustering the British government under Harold Wilson actually succeeded in obliterating any demands for a review of its policy, which they had no intention of changing in any case. In the final explosion and pandemonium Mr. Wilson and his colleagues hurriedly moved out of the chamber, followed by a torrent of abuse.⁹⁶

The Labour Party Conference in Blackpool was approaching, and in preparation for the event, 'Peace News', the Pacifist Weekly, circulated a pro-forma statement which was signed by many prominent Labour Members of both Houses of Parliament. In part the declaration read:

'On the Nigerian - Biafran issue
the government has withheld
the truth and concealed vital information.
It has pursued its course willy-nilly,
outside the "democratic process".
There has been every effort - successful at that -
to curb and stifle legislative debate,
and popular indignation
has been brazenly disregarded.
We are now confronted not
only with an entrenched problem of foreign policy
- how to halt the suffering
of the peoples of Nigeria and Biafra -
but also with what is perhaps
the most serious domestic
problem of our times:
What kind of democracy are we going to
have in this country?'

The signatories included such leading members of the 'Tribune Group'⁹⁷ as Stan Orne, Stan Newens, Frank Allaun and Eric Heffer, and Labour Peers like Lord Gifford and Lord Soper. The statement was presented to Mr. Michael Stewart on three separate occasions by delegations led by Frank Allaun. At last on 24th December 1968, well after the Blackpool conference, Mr. Maurice Foley, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied to it. In a letter to Frank Allaun he stated:

'Our position is certainly not an inflexible one. While we have always taken the view that the future welfare of Nigeria depends to a substantial degree on the country's ability to maintain its unity, the nature of a settlement has to be decided by the people themselves. It is flexibility on the part of belligerents that is required to end this war'.

The only possible compromise - a loose association between Nigeria and Biafra entailing close cooperation between equal partners on a voluntary basis - was unacceptable to Nigeria and did not receive British official support. Biafra would have had to concede its formal sovereignty; Nigeria would have had to relinquish its claim to political authority over Biafra. Ojukwu had offered an internationally supervised referendum in 'disputed areas' - those inhabited by the minority groups in the East and, perhaps, the Ibo parts of the Mid-West. This was refused by the Federal government. If 'flexibility' meant anything, it meant a compromise on those lines.⁹⁸

The news of the final push and the consequent uproar and furore was so awkward for the British government that it tried to deny that the campaign was in full swing. But since the evidence that it was taking place was irrefutable, the Foreign Office renewed its efforts to persuade Lagos to invite 'impartial'⁹⁹ international observers who could certify the good behaviour of Federal troops and, above all, produce 'evidence' that

Biafra's charges of genocide were false. Gowon subsequently spoke of the great reluctance with which he had invited the foreign observers.¹⁰⁰

The Nigerian government announcement about the establishment of an International Observer Team came two days after the stormy August 1968 debate in the British Parliament.

A Federal Nigerian government spokesman said that the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, Britain, Canada, Sweden and Poland had been invited to send one member each. The Nigerian government subsequently relented sufficiently to allow each of these observers one or two deputies, but it refused to enlarge the team, despite pressure from the governments which had sent representatives.¹⁰¹ A spokesman for the Commonwealth Office said that the British government was willing in principle to take part in the scheme, provided that the other parties agreed to it. He stressed that 'this should not be taken to mean that the British government is aware that an offensive is taking place, or is, in fact, imminent'.¹⁰² Nobody else was in any doubt that it was well under way. The Times of the same day carried a long report by its own correspondent, datelined 'near Aba, Nigeria, August 29th' under the prominent headline 'NIGERIAN TROOPS CLOSE IN ON IBO HEARTLAND'.¹⁰³ While declaring itself ready to send a representative, the British government stated that there was no intention to seek Biafran reactions to the invitation of observers.

The continued Biafran resistance, despite the fact that Gowon had forecast victory inside four weeks was put down in London to large quantities of French arms which were said to be supplied nightly to the Biafran troops; these shipments had 'prolonged the misery and the agony', according to Mr. Harold Wilson.¹⁰⁴ The British government rejected suggestions that 'British bullets' might have similar effects.

At the end of September, Lord Shepherd was despatched to Lagos on an undisclosed, unidentified mission, because even though the Foreign Office maintained that he was there

to discuss peace and relief, Lagos seemed surprised at his visit. They seemed not to have expected him. After that Mr. Maurice Foley arrived in Lagos on a trip that achieved very little, if anything.

In defence of Gowon against Biafra's accusations of perpetrating genocide on the Biafran people, Lord Hunt, who had been sent to Lagos in 1968 to solve the relief problem, came back 'convinced from my personal meeting with him General Gowon is a man of high ideals, of deep sincerity and real humanity.'¹⁰⁵

Perhaps the most appropriate way to round off this section is to recall the words of Professor H.G.Hanbury:

'If the government had waited
to consider the merits of the quarrel
before taking sides, with the stronger party,
other powers would doubtless have done the same,
though Britain has, through it's policies,
been reduced to second- class status
among nations, yet surely,
in a matter concerning the Commonwealth,
her lead would have been followed.
But it chose to place expediency before right,
it can only be the realisation
that it has long ceased to represent
the people whom it presumes to rule,
that preserves Biafrans,
with their innate sence of justice,
from unreservedly condemning
the entire Bitish Nation.
Four nations there are,
which have reversed their priorities,
and placed right above expediency,
in recognising Biafra
as a Sovereign State.
These are Tanzania, Gabon,
Ivory Coast and Zambia,
who have set a splendid example of fair dealing
to the rest of the world.
Though the "federal government",
in senseless resentment and spite,

at once broke off relations with them,
it must be sensible
of the spirit of indignation and compassion
which will, it is hoped
pervade the rest of Africa, and the world,
before it is too late.

Mr. Wilson should read the moving statement
by M.Houphouet Boigny,
probably the most revered figure
in Africa today,
who pointed out that the war
which Nigeria launched on
Biafra has, in ten months,
accounted for more deaths than
has the Vietnam war in three years.

It's perusal might, even
at the eleventh hour, induce him:
(1) to follow the excellent example of
Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Netherlands,
and abandon his evil policy
of supplying Lagos with arms;
(ii) to make it clear
to the "federal government"
that, in the event of their victory,
which may God forbid,
he will not hasten to clasp their hands,
red with the blood
of women and little children, but that any form
of overseas aid will be withheld,
until the rights and dignity of such
Ibos as are left alive
will be inviolably safeguarded'.¹⁰⁶

It is important to stress that Biafran propaganda was not carried out only on the media. Biafra invested heavily in foreign emissaries to spread the news, convince the people, raise funds, and lobby members of foreign National Assemblies. It engaged numerous friends, intellectuals, and sympathisers in foreign countries, to help disseminate its message, and propagandize its case. In this way, it circumvented the censorship and embargo placed on it. This was another demonstration of Biafra's aptitude at counter propaganda.

Implantation of information, censorship, counter propaganda, all demonstrate elements of migration and mutation, immigration and replication.

PART C

5.4. BIAFRA AND THE WORLD.

5.4.1 Haiti.

The best way to kick off this section, is with the last, and only non-African diplomatic recognition that Biafra received. It was the least expected and the most bizarre.

On 22nd March 1969, the Republic of Haiti recognised Biafra, and even senior Biafran government officials in Umuahia could not take it seriously, dissolving into laughter when Ojukwu read out the cable from 'Papa Doc' Duvalier, who signed himself 'President for Life'.¹⁰⁷ The circumstances surrounding this move are obscure, but it seems to have sprung from a fit of pique against the British - Graham Greene's highly critical novel about Haiti, 'The Comedians' had just been made into a film - and the fact that nobody apparently had solicited 'Papa Doc's' opinion or assistance in world affairs before.

The recognition was considered as a quirk by some Biafra watchers and commentators. One of the reasons suggested for the recognition was that one of Papa Doc's old school friends, Dr. Ikejiani, happened to be an Ibo, and one of Ojukwu's emissaries.¹⁰⁸ The significance of the recognition nevertheless was that it was the first outside the African continent; it was neither overtly or covertly solicited, and it acted to swell the number of recognitions for Biafra.

5.4.2. South Africa.

Towards the end of 1967. Nigeria accused South Africa of helping Biafra. The accusation followed a court hearing in Cape Town, where it was alleged, that an outlawed African Nationalist movement had its headquarters in Lagos.¹⁰⁹

The Nigerian Federal government in its denial of this claim, countered that it 'was an obvious attempt by the South African government to justify its active support for the

rebels in Nigeria'. Both sides accused each other - Nigeria and Biafra - from time to time, of having South Africans among their respective mercenaries, and in both cases the accusations were justified. In 1967, while Lagos was claiming active South African support for Biafra, the Nigerians themselves employed South Africans, Britons and Egyptians as pilots to bomb and strafe Biafran targets.¹¹⁰ One of the reporters covering the war from Lagos, Norman Kirkman, claims that: 'A Nigerian Air Force DC-3 with 250lbs bombs taxied slowly past me to the runway. A South African at the controls grinned and gave me a thumbs-up sign as he began another bombing mission. The appearance of South Africans among the mercenaries has caused some surprise in view of apartheid. But they were recruited on a strictly commercial basis to train Nigerians. They have been flying because air operations were necessary before training was complete'.¹¹¹ There were similar reports from other correspondents.¹¹²

While there was no concrete or substantial evidence of South African involvement on either side, Biafra's Portuguese connections aroused speculations of South African support for Biafra. Nigeria's disintegration would have been a welcome bonus for the whites in Pretoria; already the bloody conflict in itself was employed to support South Africa's contention that Black Africa was unstable, and not sufficiently mature to govern itself. By helping Biafra to continue the resistance, Pretoria might well have wished to buttress its argument and perpetuate the conflict.

5.4.3 France.

M. Joel Le Theule, the French Secretary of State for Information made the first official pronouncements about Biafra on 31st July 1968. He said: 'The Biafrans had demonstrated their will to assert themselves as a people, and the war had to be settled by appropriate international procedures on the basis of the right of peoples to self determination'.¹¹³ As was to be expected, this was received with absolute exhilaration by Biafra.

Peace talks in Addis Ababa were about to start, under the auspices of the OAU. Nigeria ascribed Biafran 'obstinacy' at the peace talks to encouragement from France.

Before the official statement of July 1968, Biafra had made no attempts to deny Nigerian and British accusations that France backed Biafra. Ivory Coast Radio had indicated the number of times that President Houphet Boigny had to meet with President De Gaulle before announcing his recognition of Biafra. Gabon, according to Nigerian propaganda, was also said to have been encouraged by France to recognise Biafra.

Nigerian propaganda was quite sure that France was bringing pressure to bear on the Francophone African countries - particularly the West African ones to support Biafra.

On his way to France before the recognition of Biafra, Houphet Boigny had stopped off in Tunisia. After a meeting with Habib Bourguiba, the two Heads of State issued a communique condemning the 'reckless, unnecessary pogrom and genocide that was taking place in Nigeria'. They called for a ceasefire.¹¹⁴

As earlier stated, the British Prime Minister, had also ascribed Biafran intransigence and obstinacy to the large number of French arms in Biafra. On 9th September, 1968, the day the Addis Ababa conference broke down, President De Gaulle declared in a press conference that he was not sure:

'that the concept of Federation '
which replaces in certain places
that of colonisation,
is always a very good one,
or very practical, especially in Africa...
even before the present tragedy of Biafra
took place, one could ask oneself
if Nigeria would live in view of the upheavals
it was going through...
In this affair, France has assisted
and is assisting Biafra
to the limit of her possibilities.
She has not taken the step...
of recognition of the Biafran Republic,
because she thinks that the development

of Africa is above all a matter
for Africans.
Already, there are, some African States of
the West and of the East
which have recognised Biafra.
Others will also perhaps recognise it.
This means that for France the decision
which has not been taken cannot be
excluded in the future.
Moreover, one can imagine the Federation...
transforming itself into some sort of Union
which could reconcile the right of Biafra
to decide its own fate and the links
which would remain between it and
the whole of Nigeria'.¹¹⁵

This was a rather ominous statement and Biafra's hopes were raised high after it.

According to the Voice of Biafra, starvation, had reached its peak, but Gowon's 'final push' was in full swing.

Even though Biafra was short of supplies and equipment, the aims of the 'final push' were not achieved; the annihilation of Biafra in one final fell swoop failed at this time. Gowon attributed the failure to a let down by Nigeria's arms suppliers, whilst on the other hand, 'French arms were pouring into Biafra'.¹¹⁶ Ojukwu, countering this, maintained in an address to the Biafran Consultative Assembly on 26th September 1968, that 'the increased international acceptance of Biafra's right to self determination, and its improved supply position, had boosted Biafra's capability and resolve'. Press reports in Britain talked of massive airlifts of arms from France to Biafra via Libreville in Gabon.

The reports were denied by the French Foreign Office in Paris, maintaining only that relief materials were being airlifted to Biafra through Libreville. The statement from the French Foreign Office pointed out that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Michel Debre had proclaimed an embargo on arms to both sides earlier in the year, and that this remained the official position.¹¹⁷ This did not satisfy the British Press. A headline in the Observer read: BIAFRA SHOCK: FRANCE STEPS UP AID TO THE REBELS.¹¹⁸

France would have been happy to see the dislocation of Nigeria. It was envious of Nigeria's Anglophone credentials, because of its potential wealth, size, population and strength vis- a- vis the Francophone African countries.¹¹⁹

During the civil war, Nigeria had accused France of being interested in the oil deposits in the areas in conflict.

However, De Gaulle had stopped short of full recognition of Biafra. Of this, Ojukwu remarked to Phillipe Decraene of Le Monde:

'The attitude of the French Government towards us is encouraging. But our enemies have been so impressed by the moral aid given to us by France that they have savagely stepped up their military operations against Biafra. What we need now is for this moral aid to be matched by military and diplomatic measures. My feeling is that France is now in a position to grant us recognition. A move of this sort would have a dramatic effect on Nigeria, it would force Gowon at long last to sit at the conference table... Where it would have a really decisive effect is on the French-speaking African countries'¹²⁰

But, De Gaulle did not go the extra mile and recognise Biafra. Two diametrically opposed reasons have been offered for this, both authoritative.

Both agree that President Houphet Boigny's intercession had helped to bring the French Government out into the open in supporting Biafra's aspirations. But, according to Francois Debre, the French Foreign Minister under De Gaulle, Houphet Boigny himself advised against full recognition, saying that the matter was an African affair.¹²¹ This view was supported by other sources in the French Foreign Office. Susan George, a journalist and writer on Biafra, states that she discovered this in an interview with Princess Elizabeth Du Croy, a leading figure in the French - Biafra lobby, who said after the war, that she had

been told about Houphet Boigny's advice by 'highly placed figures' - like the Quay d'Orsay.¹²²

On the other hand, Ralph Uwechue, the Biafran Representative in Paris, who was involved in all the relevant diplomatic exchanges until he left the Biafran Service at the end of 1968, maintained that Houphet Boigny tried to persuade De Gaulle to extend recognition, but failed.¹²³ In his own book, Uwechue explains that 'French officials made no secret of their intention to keep clear of the struggle, which they regarded essentially as an African affair'.¹²⁴

Whatever the truth is, France kept Biafra suspended in a diplomatic limbo. After Biafra's surrender in January 1970, a Biafran official complained of France: 'I wish they had never opened their mouth. They did not really help us much, and it only annoyed the British'.¹²⁵

5.4.4 United States of America.

The initial reaction from the United States was that the civil war in Nigeria was an 'African Affair'. Washington was more inclined to tow the same line as its ally, Britain, which was also the former metropolitan colonial power.

This combination of Britain, America and later the Soviet Union tilted the scales heavily against Biafra, in favour of Nigeria. It is not clear that America was initially aware of this, nor whether it intended it to happen. Nevertheless, it looked to the OAU to solve the problem, despite the fact that the organisation had proved itself inadequate to do so. It was clear, or should have been that every attempt by the OAU to mediate had been rebuffed by Nigeria.

However, despite this apparent apathy, Auberon Waugh and Susan Cronje maintained that the most blatant and significant pre-war intervention occurred at the end of July 1966, after the second coup, when the US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, and the British High Commissioner, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, persuaded Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon at the last minute to strike out of his speech the actual words announcing the

dissolution of the Federation. Had the various parts of Nigeria been allowed to drift apart - a natural development after the political nightmare of the previous two years - a looser association might have been formed, which would probably have prevented any large scale military conflict.¹²⁶

Dr. Eni Njoku, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Lagos is said to have told Susan Cronje that Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce related the incident to himself and Sir Louis Mbanefo, the former Chief Justice of Nigeria, and later former Chief Justice of Biafra. The conversation is said to have taken place in Sir Louis' residence in Enugu when the British High Commissioner paid a fairwell visit before leaving Nigeria early in 1967.¹²⁷ The restatement of this point, which was made earlier, is important because of its importance.

Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, the American Ambassador, intervened again after the Aburi meeting - which would have given the regions a certain amount of autonomy - by assuring Gowon of American support in his refusal to implement the essential conditions of the agreement. The Eastern Region, on the other hand, was told in no uncertain terms that the United States would not stand behind it, if it refused to cooperate with the policies which came out of Lagos, and which were in direct contradiction with what had been agreed at Aburi.¹²⁸

The apparent initial apathy appears to have been a smoke screen therefore to camouflage America's real intentions. As in the case of Britain, the reports from the American Consul in Enugu, were at variance with those of the Ambassador in Lagos. The difference between them was regarded in the State Department as a 'personality conflict'.¹²⁹

An American Senator, Eugene McCarthy maintained that in preventing the dissolution of the Federation, and in giving the policies of Lagos full support while opposing those in Enugu, the United States and Britain actively interfered in Nigerian affairs.¹³⁰ He disputed the claim by the United States that diplomatic recognition of Biafra would constitute intervention into purely African affairs.

Senator McCarthy stated: 'Non-recognition is also intervention. There are faults of omission as well as commission. The United States has already intervened repeatedly in the area: first by propping up General Gowon when he assumed power; later by backing him when Nigeria abrogated the Aburi agreement; and also by exerting pressure on a number of African nations not to recognise Biafra'.

A similar account of American interference in Nigeria during 1966-67 was given in a Republican Party publication, the Ripon Forum.¹³¹ The Ripon Society Incorporated is a Republican Research and Policy Organisation. The editor states: 'In publishing this magazine, the Ripon Society seeks to provide a forum for fresh ideas, well researched proposals and for a free spirit of criticism, innovation, and independent thinking within the Republican Party'.¹³²

The official American account maintained a discreet silence concerning the second coup, and events in Lagos during July 1966. Mr. Joseph Palmer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs until May 1969, in a statement made before the sub-committee on Africa of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations on September 11th 1968,¹³³ suggested that the cause of the July coup was revenge because the new government, 'led by General Ironsi, (an Ibo), was not strong enough to punish the leaders of the original coup, despite strong demands to that effect from the North'. He conceded: 'After the second coup, in the period before secession, the US government urged both sides to negotiate their differences. When negotiations broke down we counseled against secession through our Consul in Enugu, and Ambassador Mathews flew to that city to try to dissuade Colonel Ojukwu from this course'.¹³⁴ Susan Cronje stated that she was at State House in Enugu at the beginning of April 1967 when a stormy interview took place. Both men emerged from the conference room looking angry, but at that stage Lt. Col. Ojukwu was by no means set on secession. In fact he had just appealed for African mediation in the hope of avoiding the disintegration of the Federation. The argument with Mr. Mathews arose out of an

American attempt to persuade the Biafran government to accept the authority of Gowon, which it did not recognise.¹³⁵

On his return to Lagos, Mathews issued a more specific and terse statement. In a letter he sent to the Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce a few days after the outbreak of war early in July 1967, he stated:¹³⁶

'The facts are simple.
My government recognises
the Federal Military Government
as the government of Nigeria.
We have repeatedly made known
our complete support
for the political integrity of Nigeria.
Many times we have expressed our hopes
that Nigeria would continue to remain
a united country.
This is not only an official view,
but one that is also felt
by American businessmen
engaged in the rapidly growing trade
between our two countries...
Despite the uncertainties of the
past eighteen months,
there have been notable expressions of
continued confidence in Nigeria's future
by investors from the United States.
The expansion of your own organisation
and the formation of counterparts like it
in the United States
indicate the continuing importance
of our mutual economic activities
Following the military coup of January 1966,
and through all subsequent difficulties,
the United States has consistently
expressed it's hopes that Nigerians
would resolve their differences
and maintain the cohesion
of the country.
Both alone, and together with other governments,
the United States has urged Nigerian leaders
to seek a solution that would insure

a stable future.
Repeatedly, we have stated that Nigeria,
as an independent country,
should solve its own problems.
We regard these as internal matters
for the Nigerian people themselves.
As a consequence of this policy
we have not during the current crises
supplied arms anywhere in Nigeria.
It is our deepest desire
that the present hostilities
may be brought to a steady end
and that Nigeria would resume
uninterruptedly her dynamic development'.

Nevertheless, the decision not to supply arms to Nigeria was received in stony silence by Lagos. On the other side, the Biafran media remained sceptical of American intentions. It believed that the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk had stated that Nigeria was 'the primary responsibility of Great Britain'.¹³⁷ The West Africa Magazine also held the same view. The Voice of Biafra claimed that Joseph Palmer, who was a former Ambassador to Nigeria, had engineered the policy of America allowing Britain to be the arms supplier to Nigeria. According to the Biafran media, he was committed to 'One Nigeria', as the showcase of Western democracy in Africa, just as was Britain. All indications are that there was closer cooperation on policy between America and Britain than was apparent. When, for instance, Britain announced that airlifting of food for Biafra was inadequate, and wanted Biafra to accept a land corridor, America concurred.¹³⁸ But, for some Americans this attitude was inadequate. Senator Eugene McCarthy called on President Johnson in July 1968 to ask the United Nations for a mandatory airlift of food to Biafra, and to persuade Britain to stop arms shipments to Nigeria. He said that America should be prepared to back a division of Nigeria according to self-determination, and he accused the Johnson administration of passivity and inaction. His rival for the Democratic Party nomination, Vice President Hubert Humphreys called for the Red Cross to 'take prompt and risk taking initiatives'¹³⁹

The matter of Biafran starvation became a subject of American internal politics. On 9th September 1968, Presidential candidate Mr. Richard M. Nixon issued the following statement:

The terrible tragedy of the people of Biafra has now assumed catastrophic dimensions. Starvation is daily claiming the lives of an estimated six thousand Ibo tribesmen, most of them children.

If adequate food is not delivered to the people in the immediate future, hundreds of thousands of human beings will die of hunger.

Until now efforts to relieve the Biafran people have been thwarted by the desire of the central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide.

But genocide is what is taking place right now - and starvation is the grim reaper.

This is not the time to stand on ceremony or to "go through channels", or to observe the diplomatic niceties.

The destruction of an entire people is an immoral objective, even in the most moral of wars.

It can never be justified; it can never be condoned.

Voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross, the World Council of Churches and Caritas have rushed thousands of tons of foods to the vicinity of the stricken region.

Much of the food remains nearby while these children starve to death.

The time has long passed for the wringing of hands about what is going on.

Whilst America is not the world's policeman, let us at least act as the world's conscience in this matter of life and death for millions.

The President of the United States

is a man charged with responsibilities
and concern all over the world,
but I urge President Johnson
to give to this crisis
all the time and attention and imagination
and energy he can muster.
Every friend of humanity should be asked
to step forward to call an end
to this slaughter of innocents in West Africa.
America is not without
enormous material wealth and power and ability.
There is no better cause
in which we might invest that power
than in staying alive
the lives of innocent men and women
and children who otherwise are doomed'¹⁴⁰

Richard Nixon was elected President in November 1968, and proceeded to set up an emergency task force on Biafra under the Secretary of State, Mr. Nicholas de B.Katzenbach at the end of the month of his election.

The new move was seen both as an effort to give the Biafran crisis a higher priority in government policy-making, and to force a sweeping review of US policies.

A key source in Washington was quoted as saying: 'The time is fast approaching when the United States can no longer stand by and hope for a purely African solution to this problem'.¹⁴¹

But in a statement in December,¹⁴² Mr. Katzenbach said that 'a solution to the conflict must be pre-eminently Nigerian and African'. In the same breath he said that the British 'who have traditionally trained and supplied Nigeria with arms have continued to do so... I do not really see how they could have made any other choice. Their position is clearly different from others who have been interlopers or Johnnies-come-lately in the Nigerian arms picture. If they had stopped their sales they would, in fact, be helping to support the dismemberment of a fellow Commonwealth country with which they have had a special relationship since it's independence'.

This was after the OAU's fifth attempt to deal with the conflict had failed. At about the same time, Mr. Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Foreign Minister, criticised the OAU for having washed its hands of the affair: 'the only advice the African States had given was for Biafra to lay down its arms'.¹⁴³

It would appear therefore that despite Nixon's pre-election strong words, and the immediate subsequent setting up of the task force, America was at a cross roads on policy on Biafra. It was split between loyalty to Britain, revulsion at the atrocities in Biafra, and bringing pressure to bear on African States and the OAU to find a peaceful solution. Again, therefore, just as in the case of France, America did not formulate a definite and credible policy until the war ended. However, it can be argued that Biafra's use of starvation as a propaganda weapon immensely affected United States's foreign policy and public opinion towards the conflict.

5.4.5. The Soviet Union.

Sam Ikoku, a leading Nigerian socialist politician stated: 'The Federal Government's decision to purchase arms from the USSR and obtain military aid from the UAR knocked the bottom out of the Anglo-American diplomacy over arms supplies...'¹⁴⁴

The Soviet attitude towards the plight of Eastern Nigeria before secession was a mixture of sympathy and understanding as testified by Russian journalists visiting Nigeria.

Amongst these was Yevgeny Korshunov, who, while in Nigeria in 1967 met Herbert Unegbu, editor of the West African Pilot, and Paul Nwokedi, President of the Nigeria-Soviet Friendship Society. The two briefed him on the pogroms on Easterners in 1966 in Northern Nigeria and the subsequent exodus of Easterners from the North.

Korshunov was 'disturbed by the passion and resolution expressed' by, people he knew to be 'supporters of African unity in the face of imperialist intrigues'. But he was impressed by the way the refugees were being integrated.

He wrote:

'Today the whole of Eastern Nigeria has turned into a building site...they are cutting down the jungle and cultivating new land...they are receiving from the government on easy terms hundreds of thousands of chick incubators and are raising poultry...frankly, one's heart rejoices when one sees this bubbling life...'

In admiration of Ojukwu, he recalled how, previously, the government had blocked the spread of socialist ideas in the East. He described How 'Ojukwu has publicly declared at a meeting of trade union workers that, for Africa, he saw just one path for development - the socialist one...'

Ojukwu, he said, did not tire of repeating that 'in the present circumstances there is but one way towards the preservation of the unity of Nigeria - the creation of a confederation instead of the existing federation. He continues in this search with great stubbornness, and with all the force at his command. He tries to secure the support of the West and Mid-West against the North. And without result'.

Korshunov concluded that there was chauvinism in the East, but that 'not all the Easterners whom I happened to meet were completely gripped by the wave of nationalism. Some tried to look to the future, asking themselves whether the East would not lose more than it would gain by "defecting". Those who thought like this took the view that "Nigeria is one country, and that the successful solution of the problem lies not in a greater or lesser autonomy for her regions, but in a uniting of all progressive forces on a basis of wholly national interests in the struggle for a better life for the working masses in all regions and all nationalities in Nigeria'.¹⁴⁵

This article, which appeared soon after Biafra's declaration of independence was in concurrence with Radio Moscow which in November 1966 announced: 'It must be clear that an end to tribal hostility will not solve the Nigerian crisis, as the Western Press has been suggesting, but only the coming together of progressive nationalists'.¹⁴⁶

Pravda simultaneously declared that 'only the firmness of the military government in rising above tribal interests and the consolidation of all truly democratic forces can help Nigeria'.¹⁴⁷

The first overtly official statement on the war, came by way of a letter from the Prime Minister, Mr. Alexei Kosygin, in 1967, to General Gowon on the war. It was released in Lagos on 17th October, and in Moscow on 1st November 1967. It read:

'The Soviet people fully understand the desire of the Nigerian Federal government to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian State and to prevent the country from being dismembered. The Soviet Union has tried to help African States in every way in their noble desire to strengthen their political and economic independence'.¹⁴⁸

Despite this ambivalence, Biafra had made early overtures to the Soviet Union by sending George Krubo, as Biafra's emissary to Moscow. According to the Voice of Biafra, he was well received on arrival.¹⁴⁹ Apart from being Biafra's representative in the Soviet Union, he was also to negotiate the sale of arms by Moscow to Biafra. The tragedy was that for reasons that are not immediately clear, George Krubo defected to the Nigerian cause while in Russia, and chose to negotiate the purchase of arms for Nigeria instead.¹⁵⁰

Predictably, therefore, even though the Soviet authorities could not really explain how they came to support Nigeria, and be on the same side as the great enemies - Britain and America, to the Biafrans, it was obvious. For them, it was easy to guess how and why - to their chagrin.

They felt betrayed.¹⁵¹

5.5. Conclusion.

The watershed for Biafran propaganda was the discovery that starvation was a powerful, and exploitable propaganda weapon. Having used genocide, pogrom, religious and ethnic extermination, economic and political domination and subjugation, with limited successes, starvation struck a chord with the world's conscience. Biafra without weapons could not win a military war. It had one telex link to the outside world, and made this available to foreign journalists who sympathised with its cause. It employed the services of a Geneva based public relations organisation, Markpress, and literarily 'invaded the West' with its propaganda, drawing on the world's sympathy to attract unprecedented massive aid, and some might say, sustenance. Even though starvation and kwashiorkor were real, it was the conversion and manipulation of these images for a propaganda purpose, that demonstrated Biafra's dexterity at manipulative persuasion. The international publics were motivated by the images and messages that came out of Biafra.

Britain, which regarded Nigeria as the show piece of African colonies, did not want the disintegration of the country. The British government believed that the war would blow over in a few weeks. It did not. It lasted three years and, according to Auberon Waugh, cost one million Eastern Nigerian lives. Whilst Vietnam was America's television war of the 1960s, Biafra was Europe's. Until Biafra, civil wars in Africa were largely unreported in the West.

The recognition of Biafra by five countries was unprecedented at least on the African continent. The use of hunger and starvation as a propaganda weapon was a 'first'. Nigeria's attempt to censor information emanating from Biafra failed woefully. Nigeria may have won the military war, but it never matched Biafran propaganda.

Notes on Chapter 5.

1. Auberon Waugh
& Suzanne Cronje: Op. cit; p.51.
Frederick Forsyth: Op. cit; p.96.
2. Ibid.
3. Radio Biafra and Voice of Biafra: December 1967.
Dr. Ifegwu Eke explained in a discussion in December, 1967 that the policy section of the Propaganda Directorate would study both systems, and adapt what was useful in the circumstances of Biafra 'to add to what Biafra already knew and had'. This was carried on both media.
4. Interview with Cyprian Ekwensi,
Director of Information, Biafra;
and Dr. Ifegwu Eke,
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CHAPTER SIX.

CONCLUSION.

Certainly, in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, two wars were fought - the bush war, and the propaganda war. There is little doubt that whilst Nigeria won the former, Biafra won the latter. In order to examine this view, it was essential to discuss the following prevailing questions:

1. What is propaganda.
2. Who makes propaganda.
3. What is the objective of propaganda.
4. What is the Biafra experience.

1. Propaganda was defined as the manipulation of information to achieve certain objectives. Even though there are studies being undertaken into various aspects of propaganda, eg. propaganda in foreign policy, and in advertising, the particular concern here was with propaganda in war, and in civil war especially. In relating this theme to the discussion, three models have been studied. These have been - Germany under Hitler and Goebbels; China under MaoTse Tung; and Biafra, the main case study. The word 'propaganda' does not appear to have come into military usage till the latter part of the 19th century or the early part of the 20th century. The 'act' nevertheless existed. It was variously described as psychological warfare, or psyche war-(in the case of the American war of independence). A juxtaposition of Sun Tzu in China in 550 BC. with Hitler's utterances in Mein Kampf, and Ojukwus speeches and broadcasts, demonstrate an apparent continuum from the ancient to the modern - ie. from psychological warfare to propaganda. (see chs. 2-5.) The word 'propaganda' seems to have ecclesiastical origins, deriving from the Roman Catholic Church. It was used to describe the activity of propagating the faith. It is argued that in terms of this definition, there is very little

difference between propaganda in world, international, or civil wars, except in the constituencies addressed, and the facilities available. The language, message, culture and design are adapted in each case to suit the prevailing set of circumstances.

2. In war situations, and in civil wars especially, the question of 'who makes propaganda' is always difficult. This is because, no one side to a conflict ever admits to being engaged in propaganda activities. The reason for this is that each side to conflict accuses the other of lying, and of leading its constituencies astray. Propaganda activities therefore tend to be treated as lies and deceit. This was amply demonstrated in the second world war, (ch.3.), when Eden and Churchill maintained that they did not want to engage in propaganda activities, because that meant telling lies to the British people. However, they and the BBC applied strict censorship to what was broadcast. This brings up the question of 'censorship' in the realms of propaganda. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (ch.2.) clearly puts censorship within the definition of propaganda. Furthermore, going by the earlier definition of propaganda as being the 'manipulation of information', then, it is fair to argue that censorship is within the definition, and therefore an aspect of propaganda. It follows therefore that whatever the arguments, accusations and denials, both side to a conflict make propaganda.

3. The objective of propaganda, according to Sun Tzu, (ch.2), and Hitler, (ch.3), is to disable the enemy psychologically before the first bullets are fired in battle. The aim is to create an inferiority complex in the enemy, to make him turn and run. It is also necessary, through this process, to caricature the leader or protagonist of the enemy, and cause a loss of confidence within the rank and file of the enemy publics - military and civilian. Conversely, a process of edification of the leader of the propagandist is pursued. The examples of Mao Tse tung, Hitler, and Ojukwu are demonstrations of this (ch.2,3,4.) The objective demands total, unquestioning and unalloyed loyalty from its targeted audiences.

However, this depends on whether the propagandist is applying what David Wedgewood-Benn describes as; coercive persuasion, or manipulative persuasion', (ch3). Coercive persuasion, as in the case of the Soviet Union, involves total control of propaganda facilities, while manipulative persuasion does not. Nevertheless, in a war situation, the two are usually applied, dependent on whether the propagandist is addressing the domestic or the external audience. It is easier to use coercive persuasion on the domestic audience as in the case of Mao Tse Tung, Hitler and Ojukwu,(ch.3&4), while manipulative persuasion is applied to external targets. An effective propaganda precedes, intensifies during, and outlasts the war. The intention is to motivate, mobilise and sustain the varied constituencies. The important things are the credibility of the messenger, and the belieavability of the message. Therefore, there is a tendency to 'brainwash', particularly the domestic audience. Total submission becomes essential. Goebbels believed that propaganda was not meant for the intellectual, but for those who could not question the essence of the massges with which they were bombarded . (ch.3). The audience is not expected to have time to think and question. If they did, then the objective had failed.

4. In the case of Biafra, a process of migration and mutation,(ch.3), seems to have occurred; ie the authorities adapted certain aspects of the German and Chinese examples, and tailored them to their particular circumstances. Despite this, the peculiarly African nature of the conflict affected the resolution of the conflict, as will be seen in the discussion under the following headings:

1 RECONCILIATION.

2 THE EFFECT.

3 THE LESSONS.

These segments are so interactive, that in some cases, they may overlap, in a rather complementary form to and with each other.

6.1. Reconciliation.

"In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God"...1

"And God said, let there be light: and there was light...

And God called the light Day, and the Darkness He called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day.

And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide into waters from the waters...

And God called the firmament Heaven..."²

Such sentences demonstrate the power of the word. At a party for newly qualified Doctors at St. Thomas' Hospital London, one of the graduates, a self confessed religious sceptic remarked that the Bible was a propaganda document, and that the immaculate conception was a 'con'. Another graduant countered that if that were true, then the propaganda and the 'con' were immensely powerful and durable. The Bible itself is replete with the word - spoken, written, uttered, and in so many other forms and symbols that it is unique. The acceptance and belief in them is an act of faith. This unquestioning faith is what the Catholics describe as 'The Mystery Of Religion. The followers of this faith, acceptance and belief, are the faithful. Modern Christians or followers of any religion are sometimes accused of being brainwashed. Propaganda, and the targets of propaganda - the followers create an analogy to the faithful - are sometimes accused of being brainwashed. The Bible itself exploited the symbolic power of words, to convert, to admonish, to restrain, to keep within the fold of believers; eg; as in the 'The Lord's Prayer', 'The Beatitudes', the casting of the devil into the herd of swines, 'The Ten Commandments', 'The Baptism', the turning of wine into water, the parables and other numerous miracles, etc. The only thing modern Christians have inherited from the fathers of Christianity are the words and symbols. It is total, unquestioning and absolute loyalty that keeps them attached to their faith. It is easier, perhaps to be an agnostic, or an atheist, than to believe in the unknown, unseen, and some might say, a void. The scriptures,

creeds, prayers and images are all different forms and symbols of the of the word, and the 'mystery of religion', according to the Roman Catholic Church, is in the total acceptance of the faith without investigation and questioning; it is an act of absolute faith. The Pope to the Roman Catholics is infallible. The followers of the Church have accepted this from time immemorial. As a result, his utterances are tantamount to decrees. The moment followers begin to question the papal decrees, they are questioning the structure and culture of the Church. Afterall, propaganda is a catholic church derivative, demonstrating the analogy in the demand for absolute faith and loyalty, whether the propaganda is temporal or spiritual. Those who question and investigate are potential sceptics who may 'fall by the way side'. That is why in Biafra, support had to be unquestioningly strong, even for the followers to imagine or envisage the success of the secession, against the odds. That is why, when the end came, some Easterners, particularly Ibos were completely devastated. There was uncertainty about what was going to be everybody's fate. Emeka Obinwa and Willy R. Murray-Bruce, both Biafran airforce pilots decided at the eleventh hour that they had to marry immediately, 'and produce children to leave something behind'.³ Many broadcasters did the same.⁴ As a result, a lot of the surviving young women came out of the war pregnant. Many of the marriages have survived, some have not. The children - 'products of the war', may or may not ever be told the reasons for their being brought into the world. However, the end of the war came like a flash of tropical lightning, momentarily illuminating a half - remembered landscape, and reimposing itself on the consciousness of a world which had already pigeonholed the conflict, along with Vietnam and the Middle East, as insoluble. It took everyone by surprise, including the victorious Nigerian armies as they raced across great tracts of Biafran territory long denied them. The initial reaction was one of disbelief; the cry of 'victory' had been heard too often in the past to retain much credibility. Then, outside Nigeria there was an emotional outburst of unprecedented proportions as the whole world - or so it seemed - expressed the direct fears for the fate of the Biafrans, and frantically

tried to rush relief and other supplies in, only to have the door slammed firmly in its face by an angry and xenophobic Federal Nigerian Government. The first news that something serious was happening appeared in the Paris evening papers on Saturday, 10th January 1970. French relief workers, evacuated from Biafra to Gabon, carried tales of a Federal breakthrough in the Southern sector: Owerri and even Uli appeared to be threatened. In answer to journalist's questions, Biafran officials abroad could only say that they were having 'communication problems with Biafra', but that they had however been in touch by telex with Biafra earlier, and confirmed that Uli - the airport was still safe. The next morning, in the London Sunday Times, Richard Hall, the last foreign journalist to leave Biafra, opened his dramatic account with the terse sentence, 'Biafra is dying'. Four days later, after two and a half years of anguished but heroic existence, the Republic of Biafra, 'Land of the Rising Sun', was dead.⁵

After the Biafran media, principally the radio stations at this time, had performed their last duties of transmitting the secession of violence, it also went dead.⁶ But despite the fact that oral form of propaganda had silenced itself, the other symbols remained - the posters, the images, domestic and external would not be easily erased. Nevertheless, Owerri which was the heartland of Biafra and its last stronghold witnessed a mass retreat of Biafran soldiers. Many of them were still armed, some were not. Quite a number of them had buried their arms on hearing of the cessation of violence on the radio, and simply fled. The media governed their lives and actions till the last moment. They ran, they walked, they jogged tiredly and helplessly, looking for relatives, friends, family, homes, whatever they could find, whatever remained of people, of houses. Some, described as 'artillery', who were the heavy gunners during the war were still shell shocked, and virtually visually stupefied, and unaware of either themselves or their environment. Mingled amongst them, and sometimes following closely behind, were armed Nigerian soldiers, not in combat readiness, but with their guns slung over their shoulders. With the Nigerian soldiers were others in bluish uniforms who the Easterners learned were peace and surrender monitoring

troops from the OAU - the only ones the Nigerian government was at last willing to tolerate and accommodate. The Federal government had always maintained that it would allow a monitoring team only to oversee Biafra's surrender. These were the memories and images that would not go away. The others that have not gone away are the bullet ridden houses, some of which have been preserved as they are, for posterity, the numerous war-maimed-turned-beggars, the bunkers of the Radio Biafra, the songs, the poems, the currency, the stamps, the insignia and coat of arms, the National Anthem of Biafra. Radio Nigeria, the Nigerian Television, and Nigerian print media re-took the initiative. Pronouncements were made about the team to travel to the Biafran heartland, led by General Olufemi Obasanjo, to pick up General Effiong and his officials to Lagos for the surrender ceremony. Time and dates were announced. Everything went like clockwork. It is important to note that none of the Biafran stations were ever captured by the Nigerian soldiers, nor was Uli, the Biafran airport, ever captured. Gowon painstakingly ensured that the press, domestic and international, was heavily represented at the surrender ceremony in Lagos. It was extensively covered. The greatest, and the most enduring sight was seeing Gowon, Effiong, and members of both teams, all embracing each other - in a truly African tradition - thus setting up an unprecedented reconciliation process.⁷

6.2. The Effect.

On 28th April 1968, William Norris wrote in the Sunday Times:

'I have seen things in Biafra this week which no man should have to see Sights to scorch the mind and sicken the conscience. I have seen children roasted alive, young girls torn in two by shrapnel, pregnant women eviscerated, and old men blown to fragments. I have seen these things, and I have seen their cause: high flying Russian Illyusian jets operated by Federal Nigeria, dropping their bombs on civilian centres throughout Biafra'.⁸

A commentator on the Biafran war, Arthur Nwankwo wrote in a book published in 1969, in the thick of the war:

'The extended family, that resilient traditional umbrella in whose comfortable and protecting shade the Biafran always finds a welcome place in times of need is useless today. The umbrella itself has been torn to pieces by the invading Nigerian forces. Makeshift refugee camps are set up in every available space (which is rare).

After my first visit to a camp I couldn't sleep for two days... It was terrible enough to live from hand to mouth, not sure of the next meal; to think of such things as electric lights, gas, stoves, fans, air conditioners, milk, ice cream, cake, beer, tinned food, soft drinks and anything that savoured of twentieth century civilisation (except, of course, guns, bombs and modern instruments of destruction) is to think of luxuries of far remote times'.

He continues:

'My first visit to the refugee camp was not planned. I ran across an old school mate whom I hadn't seen for years. He was an administrative officer -in-charge of one of the camps. He invited me for a weekend and I went. The camp was in what used to be an elementary school compound. (Education is also a thing of the past world in embattled Biafra). My friend graduated from a Nigerian University and shared a room with a co-worker also a graduate of the same University. The first thing my host did was to take me round the camp. It was a nightmarish affair. The refugees clustered in groups (family groups, probably) and gazed listlessly at us as we passed. Of course they were human skeletons. There were hundreds of children, with swollen tummies and legs, large skully heads, withered chests, pleated and sallow skins, yellowish hairs, flattened buttocks and sunken pale eyes'.⁹

The reason for reproducing this in full is to elicit the full effect of the war, despite the positive propaganda on both sides of the divide. It gives credence to the adage that 'when the elephants fight , it is the grass that suffers'. There were two wars - the military, and the propaganda. As already stated, Nigeria won the one, and Biafra the other, but both were fought intensely. But, it is necessary to stop and think of the effect both their wars had on the civilian population of Nigeria and Biafra. Arthur Nwankwo was an Ibo, from Biafra, who was studying in the United States. After several attempts to reach home during the war, he finally succeeded, travelling through Lisbon, South Africa, and on to Biafra, in a manner that has never been sufficiently explained. However, if his writing, reproduced

above, is juxtaposed with that of William Norris, also reproduced above, there is no doubt about the physical effect of the war on the Biafran population. The two writings are self explanatory. They paint a picture and summarise a tiny portion of an essay on the total mental and physical suffering of the Biafran population. Yet, Biafran propaganda had kept them going. It kept them believing in Biafra. If, at the time in 1969, any of those people in the refugee camps were tempted to flee to Nigeria, they would have spurned the idea.

They were conditioned by a process of both coercive and manipulative persuasion to think that way. They were scared of the unknown. What they knew was what they had and saw in front of them. The alternative, they were made to believe, was worse than death. And indeed they did believe it.

Air raids, for instance had the effect (after so many of them) of bringing out propaganda songs from the affected areas. These songs were either orchestrated, planted, taught, and/or started off by members of 'BOFF'. This was an elite group trained in the manner of the British 'SAS'. They never wore uniforms. Their task was to defend Biafra with their lives, if necessary. They mingled with the domestic crowds, and rooted out 'suspected saboteurs'. They crossed enemy lines and carried out kamikaze type assignments. Within the Biafran population, 'BOFF' was given different interpretations. Some people thought it meant Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, others believed it was Biafran Offensive Forces. Every indication is that the former is more accurate. As 'BOFF' was more or less elusive, secretive, and elitist, it was difficult to discover what it meant, what it was, and what it did. One typical song that most of the population were taught, including children - and which would echo round the camps immediately after air raids went thus:

'We are Biafrans
Fighting for survival,
By the name of Jesus
We shall conquer.
They may bomb us
Killing all our children,

But by the name of Jesus
We shall conquer'.

It was one of many. The other regular one in that sort of circumstance was; 'Anyi ge nwe mmeli', meaning, 'we shall overcome'. This was also sung soon after heavy shelling by the Nigerian forces. The Biafran media also made a point of incorporating these songs, poems and wise sayings into their different broadcasts, programmes, and write-ups. The effect of each air raid intensified the belief of the people that their survival lay in resisting to the bitter end. Biafra had learned, as Goebbels had taught in Germany, to turn disasters into drama, poetry, and music - thus affecting people's psychological leanings, beliefs, and loyalties. The strength of this loyalty lay in maintaining the propaganda momentum, without giving the mass populace time and space to think or question the rationale or effect of the 'brainwashing'. The policy section of the propaganda directorate worked round the clock, studying other examples in particular circumstances, producing reactions and response, advising, commissioning songs, drama, dance, and all sorts of diversions and entertainment. Punch lines and one liners were constantly produced to catch the ear or eye, and therefore the sentiments of the populace, Biafran musicians like Nwokobia Agu, Miki Nzewi, and Sam Ojukwu were kept very busy writing, composing, producing and entertaining. Dramatists like John Ekwere, Okokon Ndem, Ralph Opara, Ezenta Eze, and Paddy Davies were kept very busy writing, producing and acting. So were the poets, the numerous University dons who had flocked back to Biafra from different parts of the country. There was an abundance of artistic input. On the other hand, the Nigerian populace was perplexed at the resilience of Biafrans. They lived more in fear of Biafra's success. When during the initial stages of the war, the Biafrans bombed Lagos, the teeming capital of Nigeria emptied within minutes, with people in flowing robes scuttling in all sorts of transport back to their villages. Biafra, however could not keep this up because of the inadequacy of its air force. Ironically therefore, Nigerians were more frightened, than they need have been. Biafra and Biafran success, sometimes virtually

existed only on radio. So, despite the fact that the bulk of Nigeria was relatively untouched by the physical and military war, they were grossly affected psychologically by the propaganda war. Conversely, to quote Arthur Nwankwo again;

'The psychological effect of this war on the total Biafran population has been most profound, though this is hardly recognised. The knowledge that one stands a very good chance of being dead the next minute is a rather exacting strain. One moment you are chatting with a neighbour, a friend or a brother. The next moment a bomber swoops into the town, there is an explosion and he is dead. It could have been you. And there is no knowing that it won't be your turn next. When a bomber arrives, my younger brother always says, "say your last prayer, which may not be your last". He does it jovially; but how profound it is!'¹⁰

Propaganda or not, the fact is that this avidly describes the true situation in Biafra. This is clearly an element of positive propaganda, demonstrating that the underdog need not lie.

3. The Lessons.

In the course of this research, certain important questions have arisen, which fall into the context of this section. These included:

- (1.) How was it that the Biafran war, received greater publicity and world attention than other civil wars, that were raging at the time, and had gone on for longer periods than the Biafran war?
- (2.) What were the lessons for Africa?
- 3.) What were the lessons for Nigeria?

The answers to these questions provide the backdrop for this section: (1). The answer to the first question is all embracing. It involves the attitude of States and International Institutions at a particular time in history. It involves their reactions to secession and disintegration, to rebellion and threats to the modern State. The effect of propaganda on these is implicit. Propaganda helped to shape public opinion in the respective external constituencies that had to deal or react to the warring parties, therefore affecting the course of their foreign policies towards them. If the examples of Britain, America, France,

and the Soviet Union,¹¹ are re-examined, it may be discovered that even though Britain, for instance, had stood firm behind Nigeria at the official and governmental level, public opinion was behind Biafra. This is not only because Biafran propaganda said so, but also because of the uproar that arose out of the debates in Parliament on the crisis. It is also borne out of the multifarious humanitarian activities that emanated from Britain in support of Biafra. As time went on, the Biafran attitude was almost exactly like that of the Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s - keep holding on, and keep repeating your propaganda often enough, and the tide turns in your favour. Most Biafrans still believe even now that the weight of public opinion would have swayed the British Government attitude towards Biafra, if the war had not ended when it did. This will never be proven.

As argued earlier, the case of America was slightly different.¹² The Biafran media believed that the American public had been convinced of Biafra's right to self determination.¹³ The attitude of Biafran propaganda operators was a bit fuzzy at first. Generally, they maintained an attitude of not antagonising the external publics, even when they felt that they were being hard done by. Rather, they made a point of caricaturing Gowon and his leadership before the world. It was more or less a matter of positive propaganda in putting across the Biafran cause, and negative propaganda in attempting to destroy the reasons put forward by Nigeria for attacking Biafra. The watershed for Britain and America however came with the pictures of starving Biafran children, women and men on media around the world.¹⁴ Richard Nixon's pre-election statements condemning the genocide, discussed in chapter 5, put Lyndon Johnson's government in difficulty. Hitherto, America was minded to go along with British policy towards Nigeria, as Britain was the former colonial master. The election of Nixon as President, and his instant reaction of setting up the emergency task force for Biafra met with a lot of praise and jubilation on the Biafran media. Nigeria, not surprisingly thought this was an unnecessary

interference in Nigeria's internal affairs. Biafra even ventured to think that America might recognise Biafra.

It is impossible to say whether any propaganda affected the Soviet Union in its attitude to the crisis. It is fair to argue, as demonstrated earlier,¹⁵ that the Soviets were mainly interested in arms sales. It would appear that if Colonel Krubo, whom the Biafrans sent as Ambassador to Moscow had not defected to the Nigerian side, the Soviets would have backed Biafra. This is a matter of conjecture. Also, it is worth noting that utterances from the Soviet authorities and media were not supportive of rebellion, disintegration, secession, or separation. They were mindful at the time of their own tribal and ethnic problems. The unique lesson and consequence of all this was that the Biafran war became the first time since the second world war that America, initially, Britain, and the Soviet Union were more or less on the same side. The case of France seems a little more complicated. It was the only major country that supported Biafra, all be it covertly at first. Earlier arguments have demonstrated that France was affected by the potential of Nigeria on the African continent - it being an Anglophone colossus. It has also been shown that it was swayed by the attitude towards Biafra of the Francophone African countries, particularly the Ivory Coast and Gabon. It may be fair to argue therefore that complementarily, Biafran propaganda, 'via' the same route of Francophone African countries, affected French actions and decisions. Since Ivory Coast in particular was persuaded to recognise Biafra, and held a sway of respected opinion with the Gaullist Government, it seems likely that the French were also persuaded by this means.

Apart from contributing a member of the observer team to Nigeria, and U. Thant attending the OAU meetings, on the Nigerian civil war as an observer, the UN was very much on the periphery of the conflict. The Secretariat did however, eventually, ask the OAU to try to settle the conflict.

This was at a time in history when non-interference in the domestic affairs of a member State was sacrosanct. Nigeria sent a delegation to the General Assembly to make sure that

this was upheld. Biafra attempted to join, and was never allowed to see day light. Any attempts, in any case would have been blocked by Britain. It was only after Nixon's assumption of office, that he threatened to raise the matter of genocide at the security council.¹⁶ Biafra hailed this. Nigeria reacted angrily. All this meant that Biafran problems were acted out on the world stage, and on the world media. This brought the matter to the fore of world opinion, but somehow in the act, overshadowing the other preceding and existing domestic conflicts around the world. It was a clear lesson of the success of a well organised propaganda. It can also be said that since about eighty percent of the world media is controlled by the English speaking media, the coverage in Britain and America given to the conflict, had an immense bearing on this aspect of the propaganda outcome of events.

2. The success of organised propaganda transmitted to the reaction of African countries and the OAU. The OAU in its Charter maintains the sanctity of States. It upholds very strictly the non-interference principle in the domestic affairs of member States. It has reason to.

The very nature of the African Continent is that of a continent consisting of States with multifarious ethnic backgrounds, religions, language, and dialectical diversities, with all the attendant problems. Therefore, member States were careful not to 'upset the apple cart'.

All this created a problem for Biafran propaganda. If it played the ethnic card, the States would shy away more from supporting it for fear of awakening internal problems at home - fear of the domino effect. If it played the religious card, then it stood the chance of alienating Muslim States, particularly those of North Africa, as has been seen.¹⁷ So, Biafra tried them all, before it struck on the note of hunger, and starving children, women, and the elderly. The card of pogrom, and genocide was always there as the safety net when there was a lull, for Biafra to dip into. This thrust into the starvation, pogrom, and genocide propaganda emboldened the so called 'radical' States¹⁸ like Tanzania, Zambia,

Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, to press ahead and recognise Biafra, to the chagrin of Nigeria. Again, this was a first - an unprecedented step - the recognition of a secessionist entity. Comparisons of the Biafran situation with the Katanga situation were made by the Muslim North African States, which were dismissed by Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kaunda of Zambia. This further demonstrated the power of Biafran propaganda. It showed that with properly organised propaganda, most things were possible in war. Nigeria was content to sit back and play the non-interference card - a rather negative propaganda ploy, in short, propaganda of omission.

3. In the Nigerian context, the lessons were numerous. Whether the Nigerian people have learned from them or not is another matter. Two cardinal points deserve mention. These are; the problem of ethnicity and tribalism; and the matter of the effective use of the media to achieve optimum results. Biafra created many 'firsts', amongst which were:

(1) the first secessionist territory to be recognised internationally, during a civil war.¹⁹

Certainly, on the African continent, this fact is undisputable. Elsewhere, research has not revealed any evidence to the contrary. Buchheit, for instance, describes Biafra as a 'precedent' in the study of secession in international law. But does not answer this particular point either way.

(2) the first entity to institutionalise propaganda in a civil war situation, by creating the Directorate of Propaganda: and the second in the world to set it up at all since Hitler's Germany in the second world war.²⁰

(3) the first ever situation where starvation became the all conquering propaganda weapon.²¹

(4) the first crisis since the second world war that initially at least, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain supported the same side.

All these were not only lessons for Nigeria, Africa, but also for the world. These and other matters already discussed all happened because of effective manipulation of information. It was a question of the messenger discovering what was most suited to its

target audience, and directing the message appropriately. It was the utmost effective use of both coercive and manipulative persuasion. Biafran intellectuals who made up the Propaganda Directorate had studied carefully the propaganda tactics of Hitler, Goebbels, and Mao Tse tung.²² They had also studied the effect of 'psyche war', the exploits of the French 'Enlightenment',²³ modified, modernised, and converted them to suit their own situations - their needs and commitments. It is therefore right to argue that here, a process of migration and mutation, imitation and replication had ensued.²⁴

Nigeria was slow to catch up, and never really did catch up.²⁵ Ojukwu stated this in an interview in 1993. He was however more interested in talking about Nigeria at present, as he was one of the Presidential aspirants at the time. He nevertheless indicated that present events in Nigeria have vindicated 'the stand we have always maintained', that it is suicidal for any one group in Nigeria to dream of subjugating the others. He said the East had its share of conflict, and was not prepared to assist any one else to resolve their problems. He said: 'it is now our turn to sit and watch by the side lines. He maintained that those asking for civil war in Nigeria now, are doing so because they have had no experience of civil wars, and so don't understand the repercussions. He paid glowing tribute to all those who were involved with Biafran propaganda, 'for giving their all to keep us going'. But, according to him, all that is in the past. 'We did what we were called upon to do, and now, we must move on, look forward'. He warned Nigerians against calling for civil war, and maintained that he was better placed than any Nigerian to understand that. He blamed the press in Lagos for always wanting to fan up trouble.

The symbols are still there - the songs, the poems, the scars.

The Biafra experience, coming at the time that it did, was a clear, and undoubted demonstration to Nigeria, Africa, the World, that ethnicity remained an immanent potentially explosive, and exploitative propaganda weapon,²⁶ and still remains the greatest threat to the modern state. General Gowon stated this in April 1993, in a discussion. He said that his main aim has always been to keep Nigeria united without

mentioning any particular ethnic groups, he maintained that the reason for dividing up the country was to satisfy the yearnings of the minorities and eliminate conflict. But, according to him, this does not appear to have 'cured the cancer'. Almost in the same vein as Ojukwu, he warned against 'those who want to mislead the Nigerian youth of today to start trouble'.

He said: don't be misled, don't be deceived. And, as if in echo, he repeated exactly what Ojukwu had said a few months earlier, that Nigeria was mightier than any one man. He remained very hopeful where Nigeria was concerned. He said 'it would be to your credit for your supervisors to know you have interviewed me'. He stated: my motto has always been - to keep Nigeria one, is a task that must be done'.

Notes on Chapter 6

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2. 'Genesis Ch. 1', The Holy Bible.
3. Interview with Flt. Lt. Willy R. Murray-Bruce, Biafran Airforce Pilot. London, 1992.
4. Interviews with Kevin Ejiofor, Kalu Nsi, Sebastine Ofurum, Eno Irukwu, Biafran Broadcasters, and Dr. (Mrs) Eke - wife of Dr. Ifegwu Eke, Director of the Propaganda Directorate. Enugu, September, 1993.
5. John de St. Jorre - The Nigerian Civil War,
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972;
pp.391,392.
6. See Ch.4..
7. Ibid: ch. 4
8. The Sunday Times. London, 28th April 1968, William Norris.
9. Arthur A. Nwankwo The Making of a Nation
Samuel U. Ifejika Biafra - 'My People Suffer',
London, C. Hurst and Company,
1969; pp.273,281.
10. Ibid: p. 273
11. See Ch. 5..
12. Ibid: ch. 5
13. Voice of Biafra, December 1969.
14. See Ch. 5..
15. Ibid: ch. 5
16. Voice of Biafra, December 1969. Voice of Nigeria, December 1969.
Also See Ch. 5..
17. See Ch. 5.
18. Ibid: ch. 5

19. See Ch.4..

20. See Ch.4..

21. See Chs. 4 & 5.

22. See Ch. 3.

23. See Ch. 2.

24. See Ch. 3.

25. Interview with Gen. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu.

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Enugu, February - March 1995

26. Interview with Gen. Yakubu Gowon.

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Obot Akabio.

Chief N.U. Akpan.

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Mfon Inam.

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Ft. Lt. Willy R. Murray-Bruce.

Ikenna Ndaguba.

Okokon Ndem.

Kalu Nsi.

President Sam Nujoma.

Sam Nwaneri.

Miki Nzewi.

Egbuna Obidike.

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
Radio and Television

Seminars and Conferences.

Personal involvement, and experience
of the operation of Biafran Propaganda.

APPENDIX

NIIGERIA
JANUARY 1966



Railways —————
 Roads ————
 International Boundaries - - - - -
 Regional Boundaries - - - - -
 Tribes IBO
 Major Ethnic Boundaries

V

THE BIAFRAN NATIONAL ANTHEM

Land of the Rising Sun

Land of the rising sun, we love and cherish,
Beloved homeland of our brave heroes;
We must defend our lives or we shall perish,
We shall protect our hearths from all our foes;
But if the price is death for all we hold dear,
Then let us die without a shred of fear.

Hail to Biafra, consecrated nation,
Oh fatherland, this be our solemn pledge:
Defending thee shall be a dedication,
Spilling our blood we'll count a privilege;
The waving standard which emboldens the free
Shall always be our flag of liberty.

We shall emerge triumphant from this ordeal,
And through the crucible unscathed we'll pass;
When we are poised the wounds of battle to heal,
We shall remember those who died in mass;
Then shall our trumpets peal the glorious song
Of victory we scored o'er might and wrong.

Oh God, protect us from the hidden pitfall,
Guide all our movements lest we go astray;
Give us the strength to heed the humanist call:
'To give and not to count the cost', each day;
Bless those who rule to serve with resoluteness,
To make this clime a land of righteousness.

NNAMDI AZIKIWE

APPENDIX

ABURI ACCORD

1. In order to follow clearly the immediate political development preceding the civil war, it is necessary to understand the salient points agreed to at the Aburi meeting by the Nigerian Military leaders. The meeting lasted for two days 4th and 5th January 1967. Here, with courtesy, the summary of conclusions reached on the various subjects considered at the meeting is reproduced.

Opening:

2. The Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt-General J.A. Ankrah declaring the meeting open, welcomed the visitors to Ghana and expressed delight that Ghana had been agreed upon by the Nigerian Military leaders as the venue for this crucial meeting. He considered the whole matter to be the domestic affairs of Nigeria and as such, he refrained from dwelling on any specific points. The General, however, expressed the belief that the Nigerian problems were not such that cannot be easily resolved through patience, understanding and mutual respect. Throughout history, he said, there has been no failure of military statesmen and the eyes of the whole world were on the Nigerian Army. He advised that soldiers are purely statesmen and not politicians and the Nigerian Military leaders owe it as a responsibility to the 56 million people of Nigeria to successfully carry through their task of nation-building. Concluding, the General urged the Nigerian leaders to bury their differences, forget the past and discuss their matter frankly but patiently.
3. Lt-Col. Gowon invited the Nigerian leaders to say a "joint thank you" to their host, and all said thank you in unison in response to Lt-General Ankrah's address. At this point the General vacated the Conference table.

Importation of Arms & Resolution Renouncing the Use of Force:

4. Lt-Col. Ojukwu spoke next. He said that the Agenda was acceptable to him subject to the comments he had made on some of the items. Lt-Col. Ojukwu said that no useful purpose would be served by using the meeting as a cover for arms build-up and accused the Federal Military Government of having engaged in large scale arms deals by sending Major Apolo to negotiate for arms abroad. He alleged that the Federal Military Government recently paid £1m for some arms bought from Italy and now stored up in Kaduna. Lt-Col. Ojukwu was reminded by the Military Governor, North and other members that the East was included in an arms build-up and that the plane carrying arms which recently crashed on the Cameroons border was destined for Enugu. Lt-Col. Ojukwu denied both allegations. Concluding his remarks on arms build-up, Lt-Col. Ojukwu proposed that if the meeting was to make any progress, all the members must at the outset adopt a resolution to renounce the use of force in the settlement of the Nigerian dispute.
5. Lt-Col. Gowon explained that as a former Chief of Staff, Army he was aware of the deficiency in the country's arms and ammunition which needed replacement. Since the Defence Industries Corporation could not produce these, the only choice was to order from overseas and order was accordingly placed to the tune of £3/4m. He said to the best of his knowledge, the actual amount that had been paid out was only £80,000 for which he signed a cheque on behalf of the General Officer Commanding The £80m about which so much noise has been made was nothing but a typographical error in the Customs in recording the payment of £80,000. As to why these arms were sent up to the North, Lt-Col. Gowon referred to lack of storage facilities in Lagos and reminded his Military Colleagues of the number of times arms and ammunition had been dumped in the sea. This was why, he said, it became necessary to use the better storage facilities in Kaduna. The arms and

M. N. JOKU: A TRAGEDY WITHOUT HEROES

A Tragedy Without Heroes

ammunition had not been distributed because they arrived only two weeks previously and have not yet been taken on charge. After exhaustive discussion to which all members contributed and during which Lt-Col. Ejoor pointed out that it would be necessary to determine what arms and ammunition had arrived and what each unit of the Army had before any further distribution would take place, the Supreme Military Council unanimously adopted a Declaration proposed by Lt-Col. Ojukwu, that all members:

- (a) renounce the use of force as a means of settling the Nigerian crisis;
- (b) Reaffirm their faith in discussions and negotiation as the only peaceful way of resolving the Nigerian crisis; and
- (c) agree to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunition available in each unit of the Army in each Region and in the unallocated stores, and to share out such arms equitably to the various Commands;
- (d) agree that there should be no more importation of arms and ammunition until normalcy was restored.

Reorganisation of the Army:

6. The Supreme Military Council, having acknowledged the fact that the series of disturbances since January 15, 1966, have caused disunity in the Army resulting in lack of discipline and loss of public confidence, turned their attention to the question of how best the Army should be re-organised in order to restore that discipline and confidence. There was a lengthy discussion of the subject and when the arguments became involved members retired into secret session. On their return they announced that agreement had been reached by them on the re-organisation, administration and control of the army on the following lines:-
 - (a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
 - (b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
 - (c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.
 - (d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.
 - (e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.
 - (f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.
7. In connection with the re-organisation of the Army, the Council discussed the distribution of Military Personnel with particular reference to the present recruitment drive. The view was held that general recruitment throughout the country in the present situation would cause great imbalance in the distribution of soldiers. After a lengthy discussion of the subject, the Council agreed to set up a Military Committee, on which each Region will be represented, to prepare statistics which will show:
 - (a) Present strength of the Nigerian Army;
 - (b) Deficiency in each sector of each unit;
 - (c) The size appropriate for the country and each Area Command;
 - (d) Additional requirement for the country and each Area Command.The Committee is to meet and report to Council within two weeks from the date of receipt of instructions.
8. The Council agreed that pending completion of the exercise in paragraph 7 further recruitment of soldiers should cease.
9. In respect of the organisation of the Nigerian Army, implementation of the agreement reached on August 9, 1966, it was agreed after a lengthy discussion,

Appendix

that it was necessary for the agreement reached on August 9th by the delegates of the Regional Governments to be fully implemented. In particular, it was accepted in principle that army personnel of Northern origin would return to the North from the West. It was therefore felt that a crash programme of recruitment and training, the details of which would be further examined after the Committee to look into the strength and distribution of army personnel had reported, would be necessary to constitute indigenous army personnel in the West to a majority there quickly.

**Non-Recognition by the East of Lt-Col. Gowon
As Supreme Commander:**

10. The question of the non-recognition by the East of Lt-Col. Gowon as Supreme Commander and Head of the Federal Military Government was also exhaustively discussed. Lt-Col. Ojukwu based his objection on the fact, inter alia, that no one can properly assume the position of Supreme Commander until the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander, Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, was known. He therefore asked that the country be informed of the whereabouts of the Major-General and added that in his view, it was impossible, in the present circumstances, for any one person to assume any effective central command of the Nigerian Army. Lt-Col. Ejoor enunciated four principles to guide the meeting in formulating an answer to the question of who should be Supreme Commander. These were the:
- (a) Problem of effective leadership;
 - (b) Crisis of confidence in the Army;
 - (c) Disruption in the present chain of Command;
 - (d) Inability of any soldier to serve effectively in any unit anywhere in the country.

Lt-Col. Gowon replied that he was quite prepared to make an announcement on the matter and regretted that a formal announcement had been delayed for so long but the delay was originally intended to allow time for tempers to cool down. He reminded his colleagues that they already had the information in confidence. After further discussion and following the insistence by Lt-Col. Ojukwu that Lt-Col. Gowon should inform members of what happened to the former Supreme Commander, members retired into secret session and subsequently returned to continue with the meeting after having reached agreement among themselves.

11. At this point, the meeting adjourned until Thursday 5th January.

**The Powers of the Federal Military Government,
Vis-A-Vis the Regional Governments:**

12. When the meeting resumed on 5th January, it proceeded to consider the form of Government best suited to Nigeria in view of what the country has experienced in the past year (1966). Members agreed that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should remain in the Supreme Military Council to which any decision affecting the whole country shall be referred for determination provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination must be referred to Military Governors for their comment and concurrence. Specifically, the Council agreed that appointments to senior ranks in the Police, Diplomatic and Consular Services as well as appointments to superscale posts in the Federal Civil Service and the equivalent posts in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council. The Regional members felt that all the Decrees or positions of Decrees passed since 15th January, 1966 and which detracted from the previous powers and positions of Regional Governments should be repealed if mutual confidence is to be restored.

After this issue had been discussed at some length the Council took the following decisions:-

H. M. NJOKU. A Tragedy Without Heroes

A Tragedy Without Heroes

The Council decided that:

- (i) On the reorganisation of the Army:
 - (a) Army to be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government.
 - (b) Establishment of a Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff.
 - (c) Creation of Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under the charge of Area Commanders.
 - (d) Matters of policy, including appointments and promotion to top executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police to be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.
 - (e) During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors will have control over Area Commands for internal security.
 - (f) Creation of a Lagos Garrison including Ikeja Barracks.
- (ii) On appointment to certain posts:

The following appointment must be approved by the Supreme Military Council:-

 - (a) Diplomatic and Consular posts.
 - (b) Senior Posts in the Armed Forces and the Police.
 - (c) Super-scale Federal Civil service and Federal Corporation posts.
- (iii) On the functioning of the Supreme Military Council: Any decision affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council. Where a meeting is not possible such a matter must be referred to Military Governors for comment and concurrence.
- (iv) That all the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on the 14th of January and list out all the Decrees and provisions of Decrees concerned so that they may be repealed not later than 21st January if possible.
- (v) That for at least the next six months, there should be purely a Military Government, having nothing to do whatever with politicians.

Soldiers Involved in Disturbances on 15th January, 1966 and Thereafter:

13. Members expressed views about the future of those who have been detained in connection with all the disturbances since 15th January, 1966 and agreed that the fate of soldiers in detention should be determined not later than end of January, 1967.

Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference:

14. The Council next considered the question of the resumption of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Committee and the acceptance of that Committee's recommendations of September, 1966. After some exchange of views, it was agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume sitting as soon as practical to begin from where they left off, and that the question of accepting the unanimous recommendations of September, 1966 be considered at a later meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

The Problems of Displaced Persons:

15. The Council considered exhaustively the problems of displaced persons, with particular reference to their rehabilitation, employment and property. The view was expressed and generally accepted that the Federal Government ought to take the lead in establishing a National Body which will be responsible for raising and making appeal for funds. Lt-Col. Ojukwu made the point, which was accepted by Lt-Col. Katsina, that in the present situation, the intermingling of Easterners and

Appendix

Northerners was not feasible. After each Military Governor had discussed these problems as they affected his area, the Council agreed.

- (a) On rehabilitation, the Permanent Secretaries should resume their meeting within two weeks and submit recommendations and that each Region should send three representatives to the meeting.
 - (b) On employment and recovery of property, that civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily paid employees) who have not been absorbed should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31st March, 1967 provided they have not got alternative employment, and that the Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problem of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons. Lt-Col. Ejoor disclosed that the employment situation in his Region was so acute that he had no alternative but to ask non-Mid-Westerners working in the private sector in his Region to quit and make room for Mid-Westerners repatriated from elsewhere. Lt-Col. Ojukwu stated that he fully appreciated the problem faced by both the Military Governor, West, and the Military Governor, Mid-West, in this matter and that if in the last resort, either of them had to send the Easterners concerned back to the East, he would understand, much as the action would further complicate the resettlement problem in the East. He assured the Council that his order that non-Easterners should leave the Eastern Region would be kept under constant review with a view to its being lifted as soon as practicable.
16. On the question of future meetings of the Supreme Military Council, members agreed that future meetings will be held in Nigeria at a venue to be mutually agreed.
 17. On the question of Government information media, the Council agreed that all Government information media should be restrained from making inflammatory statements and causing embarrassment to various Governments in the Federation.
 18. There were other matters not on the Agenda which were also considered among which were the form of Government for Nigeria (reported in paragraph 12 above) and the disruption of the country's economy by the lack of movement of rail and road transport which the Regional Governors agreed to look into.
 19. The meeting began and ended in a most cordial atmosphere and members unanimously issued a second and final Communique.
 20. In his closing remarks the Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council expressed his pleasure at the successful outcome of the meeting and commended the decisions taken to the Nigerian leaders for their implementation. Lt-Col. Gowon, on behalf of his colleagues thanked the Ghanaian leader for the excellent part he had played in helping to resolve the issues. The successful outcome of the meeting was then toasted with champagne and the Nigerians took leave of the Ghanaians.
 21. The proceedings of the meeting were reported verbatim for each Regional Government and the Federal Government by their respective official reporters and tape-recorded versions were distributed to each Government.

H. M. Ajoku: A Tragedy without Heroes

'LAGOS JUNTA IS A FRAUD'

Gowon Accused Of Treason

The Eastern Nigeria Government said yesterday that the so-called creation of more states by the chief rebel in Lagos, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon and the declaration of a state of emergency in the country cannot apply to the East.

The Government statement went on: "A stunned country and her friends have heard with amazement the ominous and disastrous announcement of Gowon proclaiming himself the dictator of Nigeria, in what amounts to one-man coup d'etat.

By this act, Gowon has made May 27, 1967, the darkest date in the history of freedom and respect for human feelings in this country.

Gowon, has unceremoniously dismissed the Supreme Military Council, contemptuously brushed aside the most senior military officer available in the country by proclaiming himself the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of a Federal Government that is now to consist of himself alone.

He has banished from

Dishonesty

"It is manifestly clear that Gowon does not even know the political geography of Eastern Nigeria and therefore cannot expect anyone to take him seriously.

"Besides, Gowon knows that he cannot enforce any of his decrees in the East.

"The whole exercise is therefore dishonest, cowardly and farcical because it serves as a cloak for a permanent subjugation of the West by the North; for it is clear that the declaration of the so-called state of emergency is directed principally against the occupied areas of the South, namely, Lagos and Western Nigeria.

"We in the East know our stand. The people of the East cannot be



Akpo People Protest

Akpo community in Iwajowa Division, Awka

An indigenous company for the manufacture of nail and wire was opened recently at Port Harcourt. Picture shows

Administrators Declare Assets

The text of the code of conduct subscribed to by the newly appointed Biafra Provincial Administrators appointed on Monday by the Military Governor, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu has been published.

Under the code of conduct approved by the Military Governor, the Administrators declared all their assets showing their landed property with the value at the time of their assumption of office, amount of money they have in the bank, investments in any undertaking and value and income from any other sources.

The Administrators also solemnly swore on oath and bound themselves not to accept gifts, decorations, gratuities, pensions, salary or title from any foreign government nor will they accept gifts, loans or other perquisites from any person or source with a view to influencing their decisions or actions in regard to their public duties.

The Administrators also bound themselves

Refugee Workers Told To Register

All refugee civil servants and corporation staff, whether already resettled or not, have been requested by the Biafra Republic Rehabilitation Commission to register their names with the commission as refugees.

In a statement in Enugu yesterday, the commission disclosed that of the 30,000 refugee civil servants and corporation staff already

CONGRATULATIONS

The Board, Management of the BIAFRA CORPORATION Lt. Col. Chukwu Military Governor of BIAFRA and great, progressive and industrial Federation of Nigeria into the of peace and abundance under

Long live the Republic of Biafra

VACANCIES

Vacancies exist in a progressive young men and girls with the and office work. Apply in own

BIAFRA SUN


Every Sunday

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ENUGU, Tuesday, May 30, 1967

Three Pence

A NATION IS BORN



Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, by virtue of the authority, and pursuant to the principles, recited above, do hereby solemnly proclaim that the territory and region known as and called Eastern Nigeria together with her continental shelf and territorial waters shall henceforth be an independent sovereign state of the name and title of "The REPUBLIC of BIAFRA".

AND I DO DECLARE THAT —

- (i) all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved;
- (ii) all subsisting contractual obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person, authority, organisation or government acting on its behalf, with any person, authority, organisation or government acting on its behalf, with any person, authority or organisation operating, or relating to any matter of thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall henceforth be deemed to be entered into with the Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra and on behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of Biafra, and the persons and organisations subject to this Declaration.

AN EDITORIAL

WE SALUTE BIAFRA

A NEW NATION came into being today. By the grace of God and the will of the progressive people of these parts, it is the Republic of Biafra. A free, independent and sovereign State, it covers the whole of the area until yesterday known as Eastern Nigeria.

precedented pogrom have shown neither remorse nor regret, and have in fact conducted themselves most arrogantly and contemptuously, leaving no one in any doubt that given another opportunity they would gladly repeat the performance.

Conceived in freedom and inspired by the grim determination of a people to

There was no doubt whatsoever that the aim of the enemy was the late mi-

ODUMEGWU OJUKWU
Historic declaration

Biafra became the independent
Republic of Biafra early this morn-
proclamation by Lt. Col.
Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military
Governor of the new nation.

His declaration, announcing the pulling
of the Eastern Region from
Nigeria, was made early this morning
at State House, Enugu.

BIRTH OF REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

Following is text of the Proclamation made by the Governor, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu declaring the former Eastern Nigeria the REPUBLIC of BIAFRA:

It is right and just that we of this generation of Eastern Nigeria, should record for the benefit of posterity, some of the reasons for the momentous decision we have taken at this crucial time in the history of our people.

The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria has, in a series of publications, traced the evils and injustices of the Nigerian political association through the decades, stating also the case and standpoint of Eastern Nigeria in the recent crisis.

Throughout the period of Nigeria's precarious existence as a single political entity Eastern Nigerians have always believed in fundamental human rights and principles as they are accepted and enjoyed in civilized communities. Impelled by their belief in these rights and principles and in their common citizenship with other Nigerians after Amalgamation, Eastern Nigerians employed their ideas and skills, their resourcefulness and dynamism in the development of areas of Nigeria outside the East.

Eastern Nigerians opened up avenues of trade and industry throughout the country: overlooked the neglect of their homeland in the disposition of nation-

East's Stand

which it purported to guarantee for the citizens. Thus were sown, by design or by default, the seeds of factionalism and hate, of struggle for power at the centre, and of the worst types of political chicanery and abuse of power.

One of two situations was bound to result from that arrangement: either perpetual domination of the rest of the country by the North, not by consent, but by force and fraud, or a dissolution of the federating bond. National independence was followed by successive crises each leading to near disintegration of the country. Some of the

in its own way. Complete disorder followed. Yet, the Federal Government dominated by the North fiddled.

With the issue and even refused to recognise what the whole world had known namely, that Nigeria was on the brink of disaster.

Only the Armed Forces remained politically uncommitted and non-partisan. Some of their officers and men revolted against the injustices which were perpetrated before their very eyes and attempted to overthrow the Federal Government and Regional Government.

In desperation, the Ministers of the Federal Government handed over power to the Armed Forces under the supreme Command of Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

The Military administration under Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi made the first real attempt to unite the country and its peoples. The Northerners saw in his efforts the possibility of losing their control of the affairs of the country. So while its leaders

ed by Northerners. They were killed in the North, in Western Nigeria, in Lagos; some Eastern soldiers in detention at Benin were forcibly removed from prison by Northern soldiers and murdered.

At the time of the incident, millions of Eastern Nigerians resided outside the East, and persons from other parts of the country lived in this Region. While Eastern Nigerians who assembled at Northern airports, railway stations and motor parks were set upon by Northern soldiers and civilians armed with machine guns, rifles, daggers and poisoned arrows, the Army and the Police in the East were specifically instructed to shoot at sight any Eastern Nigerian found molesting non-Easterners living in the Region.

Non-Easterners

By early October, the sight of mutilated refugees, orphaned children, widowed mothers and decapitated corpses of Eastern Nigerians arriving

people of Eastern Nigeria to solve the crisis, and of the bad faith with which these attempts have been received.

On August 9, 1966, representatives of the Military Governors meeting in Lagos made decision for restoring peace and for clearing the way for constitutional talks, notably the decision that troops be all repatriated to their region of origin. These decisions were not fully implemented.

On September 12, the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference consisting of delegates representing all the Governments of the Federation met in Lagos, and for three weeks sought to discover a form of association best suited to Nigeria having regard to the prevailing circumstances and their causes, and future possibilities. This conference was unilaterally dismissed by Lieutenant Colonel Gowon, the Head of the Lagos Government.

It had become then impossible for the Supreme

the Military Leaders agreed at Aburi on what the Permanent Secretaries correctly interpreted as confederation, he unilaterally rejected the agreement to which he had voluntarily subscribed. When in May 1967, all the Southern Military Governor and the Leaders of Thought of their Regions spoke out in favour of confederation he dismissed the Supreme Military Council and proclaimed himself the Dictator of Nigeria — an act which, to say the least, is treasonable.

Following the pogrom of 1966, some two million Eastern Nigerians have returned from other regions, refugees in their own country. Money was needed to care for them — not to give them mere relief, but to rehabilitate them and, in time, restore their outraged feelings. The Lagos Government was urged to give the Eastern Nigeria Government its share of the statutory revenues. Lt. Col. Gowon refused to do so in the hope that the

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BIRTH OF BIAFRA REPUBLIC—Continued

trative division in Eastern Nigeria and other sectors of the community were summoned. The delegates to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference placed a full report before them, and by a resolution dated October 7, 1966, the Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders advised as follows:

"1. Places on record its deep gratitude to the Eastern Nigeria Delegation to the constitutional conference in Lagos for the diligent and faithful way in which, under conditions of severe strain, tension and fear they carried out the mandate given to them by the Consultative Assembly and the Chiefs and Elders of Eastern Nigeria.

2. ENDORSES the stand of the Eastern Delegation at the Lagos constitutional conference.

3. URGES that as an interim measure, a beginning be made to implement those aspects of the recommendations as relate to the Armed Forces at least to the extent of returning them to their Regions of origin and vesting the operational control of the regional contingents in the respective Military Governors.

4. RE-AFFIRMS its acceptance of the Report of the committee on the pattern of constitution for Eastern Nigeria within the Federation of Nigeria and the additional suggestions proposed by the Graham-Douglas constitutional committee regarding the

prised within such area the wishes of each such grouping must be separately ascertained and respected.

(d) The population, area and economic resources of any new state which it is proposed to create must be reasonably commensurate to the enormous functions which the states will be expected to perform under the new constitutional arrangements envisaged for Nigeria.

7. In view of the fact that the desire on the part of the minority groups for self-determination is the motive force behind the demand for the creation of more states, and since in the context of present-day Nigeria minorities are defined by reference to tribe, AFFIRMS its belief that the best hope for a satisfactory solution to the problems of Nigeria lies in the recognition and preservation of the separate identity of the various tribal or linguistic groupings and their right to develop each along its own line and at its own pace; accordingly RECOMMENDS that the creation of states throughout Nigeria should be on the basis of tribal or linguistic groupings or mutual consent between the linguistic groupings.

Resolutions

8. ADVISES that, until the agreements reached by the personal representatives of the Military Governors on August 8

Observing that, even though the decision to appoint the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference was a unanimous agreement of the Governments of the Federation, yet, the adjournment was made without consultation with or consent by the Eastern Nigeria Government;

Having also noted that the many acts of bad faith on the part of the Gowon Government and its inability to fulfil promises or implement agreements unanimously reached;

Finding now that there is a plot hatched up by certain civil servants and other officials with the active involvement of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon to impute confidence of the people to a constitution and certain other measures on Nigeria;

Re-affirming the implications of Eastern Nigeria in His Excellency, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu and assuring him of the solidarity of Eastern Nigeria and their support and admiration for the way he has handled the present crisis facing Nigeria;

Also assuring His Excellency of the admiration of the people of Eastern Nigeria in the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria and their desire for its continued administration until it has achieved its objective of creating a new society in Eastern Nigeria; WE DO HEREBY RESOLVE that our Military Governor be advised as follows:

(1) To take any measure he considers appropriate

Nigeria.

LASTLY, we assure Your Excellency that no Eastern Nigerian, whether living inside or outside this Region has the mandate or support of the people of this Region to speak for or represent them UNLESS appointed with the recommendation and approval of Your Excellency acting on behalf of Eastern Nigeria. Dated 23rd November, 1966.

(A. IKOKU)

CHAIRMAN

EASTERN NIGERIA CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY.

Since that date, matters had become worse; sanctions had been imposed on Eastern Nigeria, warlike preparations made against her; her isolation was complete. Men and women in the Region, incensed by the treatment meted out to them by an unrepentant Lagos and the North, called for the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as a sovereign independent state.

In these circumstances, the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders was reconvened for a clear statement on the future course of action. After an appraisal of the development in Nigerian crisis past and present had been presented to the joint session, a telegram just received from the Lagos Government was read. The full text is as follows:-

TATIVES OF ALL GOVERNMENTS CAN MEET WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TO PLAN FOR SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY ALL YOUR COLLEAGUES OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL X "MOST IMMEDIATE"

On the evening of Saturday, May 27th, 1967 the joint session of the enlarged Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders, after full deliberations, passed a resolution the text of which is as follows:

"We, the Chiefs, Elders and Representatives of Eastern Nigeria gathered at this Joint Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders and the Consultative Assembly do solemnly declare as follows:

"Whereas we have been in the vanguard of the national movement for the building of a strong, united and prosperous Nigeria where no man will be oppressed and have devoted our efforts, talents and resources to this end;

"Whereas we cherish certain inalienable human rights and state obligations such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess and defend property; the provision of security; and the establishment of good and just government based on the consent of the govern-

ment;

"And whereas the object of government is the good of the governed and the will of the people its ultimate sanction.

NOW, therefore, in consideration of these and other of facts and injustices, we, the Chiefs, Elders and Representatives of all the Twenty Provinces of Eastern Nigeria, assembled in this joint Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders and the Consultative Assembly, at Enugu this 27th day of May 1967, do hereby solemnly.

(a) MANDATE His Excellency, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria to declare at the earliest practicable date Eastern Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state, by the name and title of the REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.

(b) RESOLVE that the new Republic of Biafra, shall have the full and absolute powers of a sovereign state, and shall establish commerce, levy war, conclude peace, enter into diplomatic relations, and carry out, as of right, other sovereign responsibilities.

(c) DIRECT that the

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the blame will not be
ours. Gowon will bear the
full responsibility while
we, for our part, will do
our duty.

"There are two im-
portant asides which one
must make. The first and
rather pathetic one is that
after purporting to create
two new states in the
East he has imposed full
diplomatic, political and
economic sanctions against
Eastern Nigeria including
even his new states.

"The second is that in
his broadcast Gowon stated
as follows:

"Faced with this final
choice between action to
save Nigeria and acquies-
cence... I have assumed
the power of Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and Head of the
Federal Military Govern-
ment for a short period
necessary to carry out all
the necessary measures
now urgently required."

"At least Gowon has
been able to admit public-
ly that up to now there
has been no Commander-
in-Chief because none was
appointed following Aburi;
and that there has been
no Federal Military Gov-
ernment since July last
year because no Head
existed.

"This is exactly what
the Military Governor of
the East has been saying.
It follows then that all
actions hitherto taken in
the name of a non-exist-
ent Federal Military Gov-
ernment have been
fraudulent. Every right
thinking Nigerian will
condemn Gowon's present
action in subverting all the
laws and constitution of
Nigeria as treasonable."

to take immediate action
in order to avert further
trouble.

The petition recalled
that in September 1963,
the then civilian Govern-
ment of the East, ap-
pointed a high-powered
commission headed by Mr
Justice J. C. Phil-Ebosie,
to inquire into the bloody
riots which broke out
between Akpo and Achina
communities over a pro-
tracted land dispute.

As a result of the re-
commendation of the
Commission, the people
of Achina who were held
largely responsible for
the disturbances were
fined a total sum of
£11,826: 8s: 9d.

Jailed 12 Years

Chidiegwu Iheukwumere
24, wa yesterday at the
Enugu Chief Magistrate
Court sentenced to 12
years' imprisonment with
hard labour having been
found guilty of stealing
the sum of £4, property
of Sunday John.

Biafra Collects £119,500

A total of £119,526
was collected as rents on
State Lands in the Repub-
lic of Biafra by the Minis-
try of Lands and Survey
during the quarter which
ended on March 31, this
year. This was contained in
a quarterly bulletin of
the Ministry for March
1967, just published in
Enugu.

The bulletin said that
during the quarter under
review £117,928 was real-
ised from Stamp Duties,
Premium, Survey, Deeds
and Temporary Occupa-
tion Licence fees.

It further stated that
the Biafran Military
Government paid the
sum of £64,118. 9/- on
acquisition of land during

the period and £7,933 10s
6d was paid as rents on
private government quar-
ters.

It added that a further
sum of £57,410 was
spent on development of
state lands and Town
Planning, while £480: 8/-
was paid out as refund
of rents to Voluntary
Agencies.

YOUTH LEAGUE THANKS GOVT

The Biafra Republic Youth League has
congratulated the 20 newly appointed Provin-
cial Administrators and called upon them to
justify the confidence reposed in them by doing
their duties according to the code of conduct
set for them.

In a statement in Enugu
yesterday, the Adminis-
trator of the League, Mr
S. K. Udensi, thanked the
Military Governor for the
appointments and assured
him that the new adminis-
trators who are members
of the League will prove
that no better choice
could have been made.

He assured the Military
Governor of the League's
continued loyalty and sup-
port in his task of build-
ing a new nation and pro-
tecting its people and in-
terests with all their
might and power.

The League has per-
sonally congratulated its
Executive President, Mr.

Ihenacho Also Commended

F. O. Ihenacho on the ap-
pointment.

Other members of the
League so appointed are
Mr S. O. Mgbada; Mr P. K.
Ndem; and Mr D. Njiribe-
ako.

In a statement yester-
day, the Nsukka Federat-
ed Union congratulated
Mr Francis Onyeke on his
appointment as Adminis-
trator of Nsukka and also
thanked Lt. Col. Odume-
gwu Ojukwu for the ap-
pointment.

6 Ogui Road, P. O. Box 709, Enugu.
Phone 2886.

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Machine Tools, Ruston Engines and Gener-
ating Set, Pumps, Hand Tools, Welding
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Nuts, Brass, Copper Sheets, etc. etc.

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YOUR WAY TO SSF 2 SUCCESS SYNDICA
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Relax Awhile With SSF 2
MAGIC FIGURE PUZZLE NO. 19
Choose any number 1 — 50, NO FRACTIC
ONCE SO that

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£2,000 To be Won
Winning Points, 24,
23, 22, 21 & 20.
4 pts awarded to
you already
First entry is 2/-
additional is 1/-
each

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| | | |
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each:
Vertical — 48
Horizontal — 48
Diagonal — 48
CLOSING DATE
2nd June, 1967
Result 3rd June,
1967

ENTRY PAYMENT:

As a result of difficulties in present Postal Orders
system, entry payment should be (a) Payment in ADVANCE
by unit of 5/- 10/- or £1 Currency Notes Receipt is issued
and "ADVANCE PAYMENT ACCOUNT" opened and
operated in your name. All you do is to stake, Quote your
A/C No. and despatch Form for correction. When the
money is finishing, if you like, you can make a further
advance payment. Your BALANCE is refunded with
pleasure, any time you ORDER.

(b) OPEN POSTAL ORDERS if available.
ATTEMPTS over 100 entries workable. More entries more
chances of winning ALWAYS ENCLOSE SELF-ADDRESS-
ED STAMPED LONG ENVELOPE for your result Best of
luck. GOWON BLOCKADES ARE NON-SENSE.

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such ports as Calabar and Bonny, they knew nothing of the hinterland, until the startling discovery in 1830 that the Niger entered the Bight triggered off their interest in the hinterland.

The discovery proved both an invitation and a challenge to them to penetrate the interior.

Beecroft Appointed

On June 30, 1849, Beecroft was officially appointed Her Britannic Majesty's Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra with headquarters at Fernando Po.

He had powers to regulate trade between the ports of Benin, Brass, New and Old Calabar, Bonny, Bimbia and the Cameroons and above all, to stop the slave trade along the ports of Biafra.

Immediately after the Berlin Conference in 1885, Britain declared the Niger Delta area the Oil Rivers Protectorate.

Palm oil trade in the Bight of Biafra was in the hands of private merchants. The same was true of trade along the Niger until 1886, the year the Royal Niger Company took it over. The Company's monopoly ended in 1900.

In 1893, the British Government extended the Oil Rivers Protectorate to the hinterland and christened it the Niger Coast Protectorate.

In 1900, the Niger Coast Protectorate was proclaimed the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalga-

Kaduna/Lagos regime.

The people of Eastern Nigeria patient to the last mandated the Military Governor with absolute powers to declare Eastern Nigeria the Democratic Republic of Biafra.

One year after the May 29, 1966 pogrom against Easterners, the Governor implemented the mandate.

The independent Republic of Biafra lies east of the River Niger and south of the Benue valley between 4° — 7° North and 5½° — 9½° East and covers an area of 29,484 square miles.

Realistic Solution

The physical features comprise a Scarpland that runs in a north-south direction from south of the Benue to the valley of the Niger; an Eastern Highland made up of the Oban and Obudu Hills; a plain — the Cross River Plain; a coastal lowland; and a delta — the Niger Delta — of which Mary Kingsley wrote: the "great swamp region of the Bight of Biafra is the greatest in the world, and . . . in its immensity and gloom it has grandeur equal to that of the Himalayas."

It has a wonderful system of natural canalisation which connects all the branches of the lower Niger by means of deep creeks

With a population of over 14,000,000, and an average density of 480 persons per square mile, Biafra has one of the highest population densities in Africa. She has four

ble the ready absorption in 1966 of two million displaced Biafrans from other parts of Nigeria.

Rich Cultural Heritage

Biafra has a tropical climate tempered down in the Eastern parts by Oban and Obudu Hills and in the northern areas by the Nsukka scarplands.

Biafra has a rich cultural heritage that finds deep expression in our traditional religious arts and crafts, music and dances, literature and architecture.

This rich culture suffered a period of decline as a result of the activities and misguided enthusiasm of the early missionaries and their converts.

Ironically enough, other classes of Europeans were at the same

At the village level, life is at its simplest. Strict checks are maintained against the forces that tend to undermine cherished values and long-established traditions.

Social life in the towns follows the pattern in other African towns and is characterised by a degree of detribalisation and sophistication.

Catering establishments ranging from ultra modern hotels to non-descript 'pubs' are a feature of the country. Recreational facilities abound even in the remotest areas.

Tourism is a young industry in the young Republic of Biafra, but one that bristles with prospects of success. The establishment of Hotel Presidential gave a boost to tourism in the Republic.

weaving respectively.

Natural Resources

There are also the various traditional religious and social festivals held all the year round throughout the country which are characterised by so much colour and pageantry.

The Republic of Biafra is blessed with almost unlimited natural and mineral resources. Biafra produced 70 per cent of the export produce of the now former Republic of Nigeria.

Cocoa and rubber were recently introduced to diversify the economy of the young Republic.

Biafra's crude oil production now stands at 364,000 barrels a day or 65 per cent of the total amount of crude petro-

The Republic of Biafra is today one of the best industrialised countries of Africa.

This remarkable achievement derives from the Government's prudent industrial policy which allows for the attraction of foreign investment capital, encourages the establishment of industries by private indigenous or foreign concerns, and allows for government participation in industrial projects.

Biafra has three airports, none of them of international standard as a result of the discriminatory policy of the Federal Government of the former Republic of Nigeria against what was then known as Eastern Nigeria.

The Republic of Biafra has a port of international repute — Port Harcourt. Bonny Bar, the Republic's oil loading base was recently dredged to enable it take ocean going vessels.

1962 marked a turning point in the industrial life of the Republic of Biafra. Prior to this date industries were financed by foreign capital.

Government investment in industrial establishments was minimal because of its preoccupation with the provision of the basic services such as communications, education, health and water supply — all of which, however, paved the way for industrialisation.

The Republic of Biafra is today one of the best industrialised countries of Africa.

This remarkable achievement derives from the government's prudent industrial policy which allows for the attraction of foreign investment capital, encourages the establishment of industries by private indigenous or foreign concerns, and allows for government participation in industrial projects.



BIAFRA AND I PEOPLE

In 1922, a Legislative Council was established for the whole country, although the Governor-General in Lagos continued to legislate for the North by Proclamation.

In 1939, the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was split into the Eastern and Western Provinces with Enugu as the capital of the Eastern Provinces.

In 1954, Eastern Nigeria achieved full regional status following the regionalisation of the country. In 1957, she attained internal self-government.

The Bight of Biafra has variously been described as 'an arm of the Gulf of Guinea', 'an inlet of the Atlantic Ocean on the West Coast of Africa', and 'the innermost bay of the Gulf of Guinea'.

According to "Travels in West Africa" by T. J. Hutchinson published in 1858, it extends from Cape Formosa (which an admiralty map placed in about 1858 between the Nun and Sen-gana outlets of the Niger) in lat. 4° 21 N., long.

Independence for Nigeria came in 1960 and three years later, she became a Republic. But right from 1954, she was plagued by tribal and religious differences, and by the political ambition of the North to rule the rest of the country for ever, and their use of force to achieve this political end.

In January 1966, an Army coup which aimed at curing Nigeria's ills took place and was widely acclaimed

Later in the year a series of brutal attacks on innocent Eastern Nigerians in other parts of the country shocked the world



The Ibos and Ijaws have their kith and kin living in the Mid-West and Western Regions of Nigeria respectively

time surreptitiously carting away our best works of art which now adorn the museums and art galleries of Europe and

A net-work of Progress Hotels and other catering establishments provide added incentive.

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
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sons other than the former Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or nature upon you;

- * **DETERMINED** to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria;
 - * **PREPARED** to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and conditions as best to subserve your common good;
 - * **AFFIRMING** your trust and confidence in ME;
 - * **HAVING** mandated ME to proclaim on your behalf, and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign independent Republic,
- Now therefore I, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka

- (vii) we shall protect the lives and property of all foreigners residing in Biafra; we shall extend the hand of friendship to those nations who respect our sovereignty, and shall repel any interference in our internal affairs;
 - (xi) we shall faithfully adhere to the charter of the Organisation of African Unity and of the United Nations Organisation.
 - (x) it is our intention to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations in our right as a sovereign, independent nation.
- Long live the **REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA!**
And may God protect ALL who live in HER!!



We are happy to announce that as from today, the 'Nigerian Outlook' has been re-christened 'Biafra Sun' -EDITOR

of a progressive people who are contending with the forces of reaction and despotic feudalism. That man is Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Head of the new State of the Republic of Biafra.

While rejoicing at our new lease of life, we should not forget both the conditions that compelled and inspired the coming into being of the Republic of Biafra and the compelling implications of this glorious phenomena in our history as a people. This the people of Biafra must do in order to make a success of the venture, cherish freedom, and defend their independence and sovereignty.

We in the new Republic as well as progressives in the foreign countries west of Biafra and in the foreign, enemy country north of the new State Biafra, are aware of the tragic events since May 1966. The mad dogs of feudalism and reaction were unleashed. 30,000 of our people murdered and two millions more had to flee the North. Up till now the perpetrators of this un-

declaration is s

As we strike must be conscientious and at the time the people are realising what these years - a democratic society man will be

We have a nationhood, of deadweight elements, which calls for forebearance

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- throughout the country.
- (b) The creation of states must take place simultaneously throughout the country.
- (c) The creation of any new state must be based upon the consent of the people of the area which is to be included in the proposed

gates to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference, and our confidence in them, and having noted with regret the indefinite adjournment of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference by Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon for alleged inability to agree upon the venue of the meeting as well as according to him, because

Military Leaders and the reconvening of the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference under conditions of adequate security satisfactory to Your Excellency.

(9) To ensure that only men and women of integrity and merit are appointed to public offices in the Region and that a code of conduct for public officers

ESSENTIAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS FUNCTIONS X PROGRAMME WILL ENSURE FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY X

THEREFORE I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO CO-OPERATE TO ARREST FURTHER DRIFT INTO DISINTEGRATION X ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING REPRESENT-

vernment" to implement these and other Agreements notwithstanding the fact that they were freely and voluntarily entered into;

"Whereas the Federation of Nigeria has forfeited any claim to our allegiance by these acts and by the economic, political and diplomatic sanctions imposed against us by the so-called Fede-

tournament last Saturday night when they won return first round match in Chicago by one goal nil.

In the first leg in Houston, the two countries played a goalless draw. Last Saturday night's was scored by right winger Rubba Daniels.

Bermuda will play Jamaica in the next round. (AFP)



GOWON HATES YOU!



**CRUSH
the rebellion**



(Above left)
'Gowon points the way': Ogoja, a 'minority' area of Biafra, liberated by Federal Nigerian troops during the first month of the war.

(Above right)
Biafran poster depicting genocidal fate of the Ibos if they surrendered to—or were overrun by—the Federal troops.

A popular poster in Federal Nigeria during the war: Ojukwu's head under the boot of unity.

C-N


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REPUBLIC OF BIATRA

DW 0473694

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£1

Charles H. York
GOVERNOR

[Signature]
DIRECTOR


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MAP OF THE TWELVE STATES



John de St. Jorre: The Nigerian Civil War.

L. Uka Uche: Kado Biafra and Pro-Spade




Fig. I. The most consistently used media for information during the entire duration of the Nigerian Civil War among the Urban Opinion Leaders (N=30)




Fig. II. The most consistently used media for information during the entire duration of the Nigerian Civil War among the Rural Opinion Leaders (N=20).

L. Uka Uche: Radio Biafra and Propaganda



BIARRA
FIGHTING A WAR WITHOUT GUNS

TIME WATCH:
BBC TV CH 2
30th JULY 1994