

TOWARD THE COMMUNITY OF TRUE INDIVIDUALS

by David L. Norton

For purposes of this paper, "community" shall be taken to mean a form of sociality in which persons appear to one another as persons. The relations of community are personal relations.

By contrast, most social relations in our experience are abstract and impersonal, hence devoid of the definitive quality of community relations. So decisively is this the case that those lingering relations we suppose to be personal—romantic love, friendship, and family relations—have come to be regarded in compensatory fashion as one's refuge from the impersonality of social life on the whole.

I will begin by arguing that the impersonality of social relations on the whole is neither an accident nor an ineluctable fate, but a sought-for outcome of human design. The foundation of this design was a certain conception of personhood that was radically deficient, as attested by the historical explication of its implications in which we find ourselves today. My constructive endeavor will be to explicate the social implications of an alternative conception of personhood. Insofar as labels can be helpful, this conception can be termed *eudaimonistic*. Our thesis is that misconceived personhood has generated an abstract sociality attended by frustration, alienation, and *anomie*, and that the corrective lies in eudaimonistic reconception of personhood and the alternative kinds of sociality that such a reconception engenders.

By wide agreement among socio-political historians, the dominant fact of political modernity is the so-called "rise of the individual." Together, Jacob Burckhardt, R. H. Tawney, Max Weber, John Dewey, Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, and just now Quentin Skinner, discern the origin of political modernity in the endeavor to enfranchise the individual against the collective authorities of church and state. But it is

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deeply ironic from the standpoint of the eudaimonistic individualism for which I wish to speak that a concomitant of this "rise of the individual" was a strategy for depersonalizing social relations in the name of objectivity. The first step in this depersonalization was the doctrine that sociality itself, or at any rate its paramount form of "civil association," is a non-natural artifact. This emphatic and reiterated doctrine is an expression of the *realpolitik* resolve to dismiss ideals in favor of brute facts, therewith rejecting "natural law" in its teleological meaning in the endeavor to be scientific. Accordingly the conception of artifice here employed is explicitly disjunctive: what is artifactual is non-natural.¹ In terms of our thesis, what the doctrine means is that persons do not and cannot appear in the social relations of civil association. What appear instead are *cives*, which are the creations and embodiments of those artifactual relations themselves.

But depersonalization is as yet incomplete, and to show what came next I will make use of John Dewey's analysis of the transition from concrete to abstract as it appears in *The Quest for Certainty*. The first step, as Dewey presents it, is the substitution of "special symbols" for items of experience. In our sketch above, this is the step by which artifactual relata are substituted for persons in artifactual sociality. But the second step appears with the recognition that the special symbols exhibit purely symbolic relations and generate problems among themselves, wholly independently of concrete problems in the relations and relata they were originally devised to symbolize. In Dewey's words this produces the reframing of the symbols "in detachment from direct use and *with respect to one another*."²

In the depersonalization of social relations, what corresponds to the second step as identified by Dewey is *bureaucracy* as classically explicated by Max Weber. In Weber's study the process of bureaucratization is the rationalization, professionalization, centralization, and depersonalization of social relations, beginning with law and public administration. The images Weber uses to commend bureaucratization are revealing. He says for example that bureaucratized law and administration are "technically" superior to all prior forms, much as "machine production is superior to nonmechanical methods."³ He approves the "modern judge [who] is a vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together with the fee and which then disgorges the judgment together with its reasons mechanically derived from the code."⁴ He refers to bureaucracy as the "canonization of the abstractly impersonal."⁵ And he says that administrative efficiency, "with its appropriateness for capitalism . . . [is] the more fully realized the more bureaucracy 'depersonalizes' itself, i.e. the more completely it succeeds in achieving the exclusion of love, hatred,

and every purely personal, especially irrational and incalculable, feeling from the execution of official tasks.”⁶

The key to Weber's endorsement of bureaucracy appears in the line, “every personal, especially irrational and incalculable feeling.” This is likewise a key to the objectivizing motif in socio-political modernity as first expressed in the doctrine of artifactual society. The personal is understood as the irrational and incalculable, and therefore social order to be order must preclude it. To be sure, this understanding by itself does not distinguish political modernity, for it is likewise foundational for example in totalitarianism. As Santayana wrote, “The constant compensation tyranny brings, which keeps it from at once exhausting its victims, is the silence it imposes on their private squabbles.”⁷ It is the principle by which Mussolini got the trains of Italy running on time. What distinguishes political modernity is the incorporation of depersonalized social order with popular sovereignty under the banner of individualism, which we can characterize as the agreement by associates to depersonalize themselves. A key feature here is the classical liberal innovation of the “private sector.” Doctrinally, the private sector is a portion of the experience of persons in which they are exempt from public regulation. In one light it appears as a trade-off and a compensation for the voluntary depersonalization of civil association, and the success of classical liberalism is attributable in large measure to the allure, the promise, in the private sector. Part of this promise was the prospect of creating *community* in the form of small, voluntary, private associations. I will call this the Rotary Club theory of community, and it is the theory of community advocated by classical liberals today. But the private sector was vitiated from the start by two considerations. In the first place conduct within it was non-criteriological. It was the place for the expression of the personal, and the personal was regarded as the irrational and incalculable. In the shelter of the private sector the conduct became that for which one was not to be held answerable. Therefore the private sector could be used with impunity for idle self-indulgence or what-not. Because objective worth is by definition public, the disjunctive conception of the private sector as first of all not public amounts to the subjectivization of value in the private sector, which portends the demise of value initiatives. If the sole support for what I deem worthy, right, or good, is my own conviction, then only my easy moral enterprises will be sustained; arduous ones will undermine my conviction.

To a large extent the second vitiating factor took advantage of this. *Realpolitik* opted for a narrowly circumscribed conception of man, namely economic man understood as selfish, utilities-maximizing man. It built social order on this constricted conception, to the exclusion of, for

example, religious man, philosophical man, and moral man, relegating these latter to the private sector. It merely reinforced the predictability of economic man and encouraged persons to conceive of themselves uniformly as such. As A. O. Hirschman documents in his study, *The Passions and the Interests*,⁸ the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a striking reduction in the meanings of such terms as "interest," "enterprise," and "worth" to the narrow meanings they still bear today of economic interest, economic enterprise, and economic worth. (Our meaning of "private enterprise" is epitomized, for example, in the Polaroid Corporation; but is not birdwatching a "private enterprise"?)

Historically, the predictable upshot was that the neophyte individual in his new-found haven of the private sector was wholly unprepared to muster the heroics of becoming the *causa sui* that Montaigne believed he would become, and Mill believed he should become. Rather, he merely took his economic self-conception with him into the private sector—so to speak "moonlighting," and depersonalizing the private sector in the process. He became just as predictable in private as in public, which is why for example the hedonistic calculus works to the degree that it does work.

In sum, the vitiating factors in the private sector were corrosive of the personal, which civil association had excised. And if the net effect was only implicit in the beginnings of socio-political modernity, today it is explicit as the disappearance of the personal as a social factor; i.e., as a basis of association. But we began by identifying community as a form of association based upon the personal. In as sensitive a conception of community as the literature of our century offers, Martin Buber rests it upon the capacity for what he terms "personal making present."⁹ Our historical excursus suggests that socio-political developments of the past four hundred years have served to extinguish the personal, which in community is to be made present.

What must be called into question in this socio-political history is the presupposition that the personal is the irrational and incalculable. The touchstone we will use is the concept of development. The personal may be undeveloped or developed. As undeveloped it is indeed irrational and incalculable, and with this fact *Realpolitik* is fully entitled to begin. In addition, it is true that the personal can be regimented by external control, but in this case it ceases to be personal, having become the objective product of the controlling agency. But the personal can also become ordered without ceasing to be personal, namely as the outcome of the *self*-development that produces self-responsible, self-determined individuality. In this case the personal is by no means antagonistic to social order; on the contrary, it is the foundation of an alternative kind of social order. Today all recognition of this alternative has been lost,

thanks to modernity's non-developmental, merely numerical conception of individuality; an individuality consisting in the bare fact that two things remain unalterably two and not one. The needed developmental recognition is, however, voiced, for example by John Dewey, who says in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, "Only in the physical sense of physical bodies that to the senses are separate is individuality an original datum. Individuality in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out."¹⁰

Attention needs to be directed to what Dewey refers to as the social sense of individuality. Modern political individualism grounded its doctrine of artifactual society in a conception of the individual as asocial as well as non-developmental—the doctrine of so-called "atomic" individuality of numerical particulars, separated by spaces in which no mysterious "social ties" are empirically manifest. To be sure, atomicity has been overturned by the subsequent sociological recognition that because persons begin their lives as dependents they are, in Marx's term, "social products"¹¹ and intrinsically social as such. Here is the secure starting point. But what has been left undone is exploration of the implications of subsequent development. As a historicist Marx himself was a developmentalist, but in a one-sided sense: he was concerned almost exclusively with history, understood as the collective self-development of the human species. The emphasis upon collective development to the neglect of the development of individuals is responsible for serious aberrations, not only in Marx but in the sociological perspective as a whole, but I cannot undertake to identify these here.

The eudaimonistic thesis is that persons are intrinsically social creatures in the beginning of their lives and also in the end, but the two socialities are emphatically not the same. The sociality of the beginning is the sociality of essential dependents; i.e., of children and of persons who developmentally remain children in later life. By the sociality of the end I refer to the sociality of persons who have become self-determined individuals through processes of self-development. Such self-development may be quite rare. This was the reason given by Hobbes for declaring it politically irrelevant.¹² But Hobbes misconceived it as a talent sparsely distributed by the natural lottery of birth. It is not this. It is a potentiality possessed by all persons, but rarely actualized, and the reason for the rarity is not far to seek. Self-actualization has necessary preconditions, some of which cannot be self-provided by individuals and must be otherwise provided. *Realpolitik* insured the absence of these conditions by its non-developmental conception of individuality. The task of implementing the alternative kind of sociality, which is the sociality of true individuals, is the task, first, of discerning the necessary conditions

of individual self-development and distinguishing among them those that can be self-provided by persons and those that cannot be self-provided. The second step in implementation consists in providing to all persons those conditions that persons cannot self-supply; such is a social responsibility and the supreme criterion of good government. Hobbes spoke for modern political theory as a whole when he declared self-regulating individuality politically irrelevant by virtue of its rarity. What will overturn this verdict is a plausible program by which to secure the generalization of self-regulating individuality, and plausibility is within our reach today thanks to recently acquired knowledge of personal development and its conditions. To be sure, generalization ultimately depends upon the initiative of persons as individuals and hence upon the attractiveness of self-development. The attractiveness consists in the intrinsic rewards of self-fulfillment, which, as Aristotle says, are such that they will be exchanged for no other by persons who are acquainted with them.¹³

Where development occurs there are two fundamental and incommensurable forms of sociality to be considered, corresponding to the *intrinsic sociality* of the person at two different and incommensurable stages in his life. I will follow my practice elsewhere¹⁴ of terming the two forms "antecedent sociality" and "consequent sociality." Antecedent sociality is the sociality into which we are born: it is involuntary; its associates are essential dependents; and its principle is the "at bottom" uniformity of associates consisting in the generic human nature that they instantiate identically. Consequent sociality is the outcome of self-development by those persons whom it associates: it is voluntary; the associates are not dependents but autonomous individuals; and its principle is not uniformity but the complementarity of perfected differences.

Antecedent sociality will not be analyzed or argued for here, for this work has been done by sociology and contributory disciplines. Indeed, it has been overdone to the extent that many persons today are incapable of envisaging any other form of sociality than the sociality of dependence, in which case sociological determinism wins out by default. In this climate and infected by the same incapacity, moral individualism has sometimes truculently paraded itself as anti-social, witness romanticism's glorification of solitude as epitomized in Schopenhauer's insistence that the only company he ever found worth keeping was his own. In light of this, what must be done is first to exhibit the intrinsic sociality of true individuality, and second to picture the form of sociality that true individuality entails.

Eudaimonistically conceived, self-development is self-actualization, i.e., the discovery and progressive actualization of potentialities within

the self. This is the process by which value appears in the world. The worth manifested by the self-actualizing individual is objective worth. To say this means that it is of worth by no means only, or even primarily, to the self-actualizing individual. As objective it is of worth in principle to all other persons, and in fact to those persons who in themselves fulfill the conditions of appreciation of worth of the distinctive kind manifested by the individual in question. One of these conditions, of course, is acquaintance, for one cannot appreciate something without knowledge of its existence. But some of the conditions are developmental: for example, to appreciate Stravinsky's *Petroushka* requires cultivated capacities in the listener, beginning with the cultivated capacity for sustained attention.

Because self-actualization aims at objectively worthy living, it is intrinsically social. Objective worth implies worth for others as well as oneself, and self-actualization is incomplete without realization of this valuation by, not to be sure *all* others, but some others. The romantic glorification of solitude is a reaction-formation. Doubtless it can and has happened that assiduously self-developed individuals have found no one with the cultivated capacities to appreciate the distinctive worth in their persons or their cultural contributions. This, in our thesis, constitutes genuine injustice. But the temptation in this situation to declare oneself sufficient unto oneself must be resisted, for it is suicidal, if not to the individual, then to individualism. There will be a few heroic spirits who can thus sustain themselves, but they will be so few as to confirm the Hobbesian verdict of political irrelevance. And in my judgment such of these heroic spirits as have existed, have with few exceptions been contaminated by the powerful corrosive of resentment, and thereafter teach the wrong things.

If appreciation by some others is a condition of self-fulfillment, and if such appreciation presupposes cultivated capacities in those others, then this is a condition of self-fulfillment that cannot be self-provided by individuals. Our thesis is that it is a social responsibility to secure sufficient generalization of self-actualization that each true individual has a reasonable expectation of appreciation of his worth by some others. Here is our paramount criterion of good government.

It must be emphasized that "appreciation" in the paragraphs above implies utilization, and a corollary to our thesis is that utilization of others is not *per se* exploitative. Specifically, when our utilization of another follows from the other's autonomous self-actualization, not only is it not exploitative, but it represents an indispensable condition of the other's self-fulfillment. Kant's imperative about treating other persons always as ends in themselves does not, despite frequent misrepresentation, preclude our treatment of them as means; it is carefully framed by Kant to preclude our treatment of them as means *merely*.

A collateral argument for the intrinsic sociality of true individuals consists in the interdependence of true individuals that derives from natural division of labor as the expression of qualitative individuality. To be a qualitative individual in the normative eudaimonistic sense is to be responsible for actualizing a distinctive kind of human value that requires supplementation by other and different kinds of human value. It is not to be responsible for actualizing in oneself all human possibilities. Because individuality reflects the Spinozan principle, *omnis determinatio est negatio*, it is opposed to what Durkheim called the "malady of infinite aspiration."¹⁵ The romantic conception of fulfilled individuality as perfect self-sufficiency is, once again, a reactive phenomenon and a false ideal. As social beings we are dependent upon others to do what they are responsible for doing, and very often they prove unreliable at this. Where the effect upon us of others' defaults is severe and frequent, it understandably generates in us a vision of complete self-sufficiency as a bulwark against further frustration. As an occasional compensatory fantasy and recognized self-indulgence there is perhaps little harm in it. But as a working ideal it is vicious, for it thwarts our own self-fulfillment, for example, by suppressing the generosity that is native to it. What our frustration by the defaults of others must turn us to instead is an investigation of the conditions under which persons, ourselves included, become reliable at doing what they are responsible for doing.

There appear to be three separate sets of such conditions. One set consists of judicially imposed punishments for default. A second consists of the administration of extrinsic rewards for performance of responsibilities. These two sets are combined in our familiar sociality, and serve to identify it as dependent sociality. But there is a third set of conditions under which persons become reliable at doing what they are responsible for doing, a set that has been neglected in modernity and that is to be identified with what I have been terming consequent sociality. It centers in the intrinsic rewards of living responsibly when one's responsibilities are self-determined and self-fulfilling. If, as eudaimonism postulates, there is for every person a meaningful work with which he or she will identify and which he or she will invest with moral necessity, then this third set of conditions is filled out by discovering the conditions under which all persons can discover themselves in terms of their meaningful work. Such work will be divided according to the innate inclinations and disinclinations of persons themselves, constituting a natural division of labor. For "individuality" in this context means that among the countless different kinds of productive activity that a diversified society incorporates, each person will experience intrinsic rewards at only an interrelated few, while being indifferent or disinclined to many.

The reason that division of labor *per se* has been falsely conceived to

be alienating is that division of labor as we have known it has been externally imposed, in disregard of the inclinations and disinclinations of persons as individuals. The way to individual fulfillment and self-responsibility is not by abolishing division of labor, but by generating division of labor from the innate inclinations and disinclinations of persons as individuals. In effect this amounts to an inversion of the priority of social utilities over productive performances. It means giving priority to meaningful work, and generating social utilities therefrom. This is, in fact, the natural order. Both logically and temporally, work is first expressive and thereafter useful, for knowledge of the utilities of a performance is empirical, and presupposes the performance. The apparent priority of social utilities is an aberration produced by the fact that history is the product of successive generations. Originally an expressive performance by a given person or group is discovered to possess social utilities. Those who benefit from these utilities come to depend upon them and expect them, and when the original providers of the utilities die, the socialized expectation is directed upon their successors, who at this point exist as dependents and are unable to resist. In this way division of labor becomes objectivized in the abstract sense, and demands the self-alienation of persons through their adoption of roles, and participation in the abstract relations of roles and practices. Beneath this lies hidden the implicit sociality of true individuals, which is nowhere explicit and manifest because the self-development by persons of their individuality does not occur. It will of course be invisible to the *realpolitik* resolve to recognize only existing facts.

By virtue of the interdependence of true individuals, as just argued, eudaimonism must reject any meaning of "autonomy" that precludes interdependence. In the eudaimonistic meaning each person is an innate excellence to be actualized, and thus an end in himself. By self-actualization he affords utilities to others; and he determines for himself what utilities he will derive from the self-fulfilling performances of others. Here is the interdependence of autonomous individuals that represents the sociality here termed "consequent." Indeed, what consequent sociality is consequent upon is precisely this autonomy, understood as a developmental outcome from dependence in the growth of the individual. And "antecedent" sociality is the sociality of persons who lack autonomy and are thereby dependent upon external authority. It should be noted that development furnishes the criterion of this external authority. Because the dependence in question is provisional dependence, the authority is required to be provisional authority. The authority is legitimate when its exercise serves progressively to diminish the dependence of its subjects, and illegitimate when its exercise serves to perpetuate or increase their dependence.

We have carried our demonstration of the intrinsic sociality of true individuals as far as space allows, but before I undertake to describe that sociality, let me call attention to a distinguishing feature of the eudaimonistic thesis as a whole. It is that the virtues of community, as personal sociality, are to be found not behind us, in a pre-individuated sociality that is to be recovered by undoing modernity and the "rise of the individual"; rather they are to be gained by rescuing individuality from modern misconceptions, and forwarding it.

Turning to the task of describing consequent sociality, I will begin not with an abstract schematization of it as a whole, but with a concrete description of an important and suggestive element of it. The element I have in mind is the virtue of generosity. What requires to be shown is that this virtue is none of three things it has regularly been mistaken to be, but is something else entirely. It is not a talent distributed to some and denied to others by the natural lottery of birth. It is not a socializing or moralizing "side constraint" on natively acquisitive conduct. And it is not a portable attribute, learned independently and thereafter attached to selected behaviors. Rather, it is a natural expression of self-actualizing individuality. There is a deep and ineradicable strand of generosity in meaningful work, and it is expressed in two ways. In the first place, meaningful work is self-actualizing work, and self-actualization is the objectivization of the self, which is to be understood as the gift of the best that one is to others. But "objective" as it appears here is to be strictly distinguished from the meaning of the term as it has shaped modernity, notably in the objective social structures endorsed by sociology. In their predominant modern usage, "objectivity" and "subjectivity" bear mutually exclusive meanings, and endorsement of the objective has been accompanied by active disparagement of the "merely subjective." But this is an abstractionist fallacy. There is nothing that is "merely subjective." Every human impulse is subjective in its inception but objective in its intended outcome, and because its outcome is within it implicitly in the beginning, it is never "merely subjective."

When objectivization is understood as the expression of subjective selfhood in objective and public form, then the generosity inherent in self-actualization becomes apparent. Self-actualization expresses the intention to live a worthy life, which, as objectively worthy, is of worth to whoever is capable of appreciating it as such. It is in this sense a gift that by its own nature selects its recipients, and it is intended as such by the self-actualizing individual. The gift comprises, distinguishably but inseparably, the distributable products of the enterprise of self-actualization, and that non-distributable product that is the self-actualizing individual himself. If this is correct, then the corollary of the labor theory of value, that the products of labor are by nature the ex-

clusive property of the laborer, is a grievous error. It derives from the error of conceiving of persons atomistically, as exclusive of one another, and we have confused atomism by our arguments for the intrinsic sociality of personhood both in the beginning and in the end. But atomism does not afford a sufficient account of the error of regarding the products of labor as the private property of the laborer in the exclusive sense. To achieve sufficiency we must take into consideration theft, which not only thwarts generosity, but can turn it into the reaction-formation of possessiveness and hoarding.

Theft has many forms, and whatever our newspapers may shout, it is not embezzlement or purse-snatching that lays first claim upon our attention. What ubiquitousizes theft under the aegis of law is the egalitarian supposition that at bottom all persons are alike, and that everyone is by nature equally entitled to everything. This doctrine effectively thwarts the intrinsic generosity in self-actualization, for in giving oneself, one distinguishes one's recipients by virtue of the qualitative distinction of the gift. The gift is *meant* for those who can appreciate and utilize the qualitatively distinctive values embodied in it by the expressive labors of its maker.

I will recount a little story here. In a shop on the Royal Mile in Edinburgh is a Mr. Glenn, who is one of the two or three premier bagpipe makers in Scotland. Mr. Glenn will not sell a set of his pipes to anyone who is not sufficiently skilled and sensitive to be able to utilize the qualities that distinguish Mr. Glenn's pipes from merely adequate sets. I know this because I tried to buy a set of pipes from Mr. Glenn. He gave me two alternatives. He told me where I could purchase a lesser set of pipes. Or, he said, I could purchase a chanter from him and practice on it for two years and then come back to see him. Though I did not ask, it was clear that I could not purchase pipes from Mr. Glenn were I to offer twice the going price. No doubt in the context of our society Mr. Glenn's is a privileged position. But the task of discovering in consequent sociality the community of true individuals is the task of generalizing the very privilege Mr. Glenn enjoys—the privilege of caring.

This brings us to the second form in which generosity appears as the expression of self-actualization. I refer to the appreciation by the individual of the distinctive worth of other persons as individuals, whether that worth be actual or merely potential and presumptive. This is the eudaimonistic meaning of respect for others. In operation it means entrusting to others the responsibility for actualizing values each of them alone can actualize. Here I am not hesitant to employ a term emphasized by J. S. Mill,¹⁶ but decidedly out of favor today. The term is "deference," and today it connotes obsequious self-effacement. But in fact deference to the distinctive virtues of others is an entailment of self-

knowledge. For in the first place, self-knowledge is knowledge of one's deficiencies as well as one's sufficiencies, thereby affording recognition of those who surpass us and from whom we can learn by example. And second, because the self is a qualitatively distinctive potentiality, self-knowledge includes knowledge of differentiae, and is therefore knowledge of alternative varieties of value, values to be actualized by other persons. In sum, to defer to others where their fundamental responsibilities and distinctive potential excellences lie is not self-effacement but the opposite—it is a concomitant of self-actualization.

This form of generosity, like the gift of oneself that self-objectivization represents, is a natural expression of developed individuality. But there is more to be said about it, specifically with respect to the egalitarian doctrine. To respect another is to acknowledge his responsibility for actualizing the distinctive potential value he is. But it is at the same time to affirm his entitlement to those goods which are conditions of his exercise of his responsibility. These goods will likewise be distinguished qualitatively. The other, because his responsibility is distinctive, is not entitled to all or any goods indiscriminately, but to the distinctive kinds of goods, in the limited amounts, he needs in order to fulfill his distinctive responsibility. Likewise we ourselves possess not indiscriminate entitlements but distinctive entitlements. As here expressed, the generosity in true individuality is the affirmation of others' entitlements to goods to which we ourselves possess no claim, and advance none. On the other hand egalitarianism extinguishes this form of generosity by supplying mindless envy with spurious warrant.

Let me now direct attention to the status of generosity as it has here been described. It is not an extraneously introduced side constraint, nor an artifact of civil association, but an expression of developed, individuated personhood, and therefore it is what Buber calls a "personal making present." I have chosen generosity because it is the most obviously social of the traditional virtues. Our extended thesis is that what is true of generosity holds alike for the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, honesty, wholeheartedness, fidelity, and resourcefulness. Alike, these virtues are natural expressions of developed individuality. They constitute the terms of a social order that is implicit in personhood from the beginning, and that is progressively explicated by the development of personhood through self-actualization. This sociality is community in what we took to be its definitive sense at the outset, namely that persons are associated as persons, which we now understand to mean as self-responsible, self-determined individuals.

Provided we are sufficiently on guard against the dangers of abstractionism, it can be useful here to distinguish form from content in consequent sociality. As with other kinds of sociality, there is here a

form that endures through the succession of generations of individuals. But this form is not a non-natural artifact; it is the expression of principles of association implicit in personhood itself. It is therefore natural form, not however in the sense of primitive, but as the form achieved by cultivated development out of primitive potentialities in all persons. As such, this form presupposes other and different kinds of sociality prior to itself, corresponding to prior stages in the development of persons. Eudaimonistic analysis reveals the indispensability of two prior forms of sociality. The first is the sociality of dependence, which requires external governance by trustworthy authority; the authority is trustworthy when its exercise serves progressively to diminish the dependence of its subjects.

The next form of sociality is what Michael Oakeshott terms "collective enterprise association."¹⁷ This is association on the basis of common purpose, and its mode of government is collective self-determination. Professor Oakeshott has decisively demonstrated that government as collective enterprise association is incommensurable with the self-government of individuals, where "individual" has the meaning he gives it in *On Human Conduct* and I give it in this paper. But the point I would urge upon Professor Oakeshott is that self-governing individuality is a developmental outcome, and the stage of government I speak of here corresponds to a stage in the development of persons at which they are not yet self-governing individuals. Moreover, development removes the contradiction Professor Oakeshott identifies between government as collective enterprise association and the self-government of individuals. Both can without contradiction be predicated of persons *seriatim*, as appropriate to successive stages of development. Finally, there is one collective purpose that does not contradict individual self-determination, and that is the purpose of securing to all persons the necessary preconditions of their individual self-determination. Paramount among these are self-knowledge and self-trust. These are the intrinsic obligations of the second stage in the development of persons, and the purpose of collective enterprise association in the second stage is to secure their recognition and fulfillment generally.

The form, then, of consequent sociality rests upon two prior forms of association and government. It is a natural form, but a developmental outcome that subsists as mere latency in the beginning.

Turning to the *content* of consequent sociality, we see that it is none other than the virtues, understood, as I have argued, as the expression of self-actualized individuality. Ultimately the excellence or perfected individuality of every person is unique; it is what the Greeks termed one's *daimon* and the Romans one's *genius*. The content, then, of consequent sociality is the diverse objective excellences of individual associates, and

the relationship among them is that of complementarity, not replication. What the traditional virtues (honesty, courage, temperance, justice, and the rest) represent are the varied manifestations of complementarity in significantly different situations when these situations have been grouped into classes. In the juridical context, for example, justice is not imposed objectively and impersonally by the court, but is expressed in the acknowledgment by the litigant who as the person with the lesser claim agrees that his claim is the lesser. It should be added that so-called "adversary proceedings" are inappropriate as the model for conflict-resolution in a sociality whose principle is the complementarity of diverse excellences. I cannot here undertake to describe the appropriate form, but the name for it is "dialectical proceedings."¹⁸

As the form of consequent sociality is the manifestation of principles latent in personhood in prior stages of development, so the content of consequent sociality expresses qualities of personhood that are developmental outcomes. I am speaking here not of the virtues of self-actualization but of the indispensable resources of self-actualization. And from this point of view, the rationale for underpinning consequent sociality with prior stages is to secure the development of the personal resources by which the terms of consequent sociality become meaningful as opportunities. In the history of moral individualism it has been a favorite self-indulgence of individualists themselves to lament the fact that the vast majority of persons are incapable of the self-responsible self-determination moral individualism expects. Thus when Nietzsche's prophet, Zarathustra, announces that God is dead,¹⁹ he sees by the disarray and confusion this produces that the news comes too soon, which is to say his hearers are unready for self-determination, and will invent new gods to obey. Similarly Oakeshott speaks of persons who, at the introduction in the Renaissance of the opportunity of individuality, were unready or unwilling to accept it, and traded liberty for subservience in new guises. He terms such persons *individuals manqués*.²⁰

One of the problems with moral individualism is the truculent and even embittered flavor it quite characteristically has, in consequence of heretofore widespread disregard or rejection of the opportunities it holds forth. I believe responsibility for this must be laid at the doorstep of individualists themselves, for their failure to take development seriously. Qualitative individuality is a developmental outcome whose antecedent conditions date back almost to birth. It is because this is so that Aristotle was profoundly correct to identify man as *zoon politikon*, and politics as the work of securing these preconditions. Moral individuality is not sink or swim, but first discovering that one floats and then venturing a dog-paddle.

It seems to me that as we stand, the most seriously misjudged and

mishandled stage of life is the stage of adolescence. The responsible expression of the search for community, I would urge, is neither to seek out those few souls (to put this in Schopenhauerian language) whose company we can keep without demeaning ourselves, nor to make God our companion and our consolation, as do Kierkegaard and the *promeneur solitaire* of Rousseau. It is to work toward a social reconception of adolescence that understands in it the intrinsic requirement for wide exploration of alternative productive activities, life styles, and vital choices, in the interest of self-discovery as the precondition of self-actualization.

NOTES

1. For demonstration of the disjunction in the case of Hobbes, see Michael Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), pp. 26-28.
2. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons Capricorn Books, 1960), p.152, emphasis Dewey's.
3. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Oxford University Press Galaxy Books, 1946), p. 214.
4. *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, ed. Max Rheinstein, trans. Max Rheinstein and Edward Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 354.
5. *From Max Weber*, pp. 219-220.
6. *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, p. 351.
7. George Santayana, *Reason in Society* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p. 79.
8. A. O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), esp. pp. 31-42.
9. Martin Buber, *The Knowledge of Man, Selected Essays*, ed. Maurice Friedman, trans. Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), ch. III.
10. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 194.
11. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), pp. 151-152.
12. Oakeshott, *Hobbes on Civil Association*, p. 124.
13. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1166a, 20-23.
14. David L. Norton, *Personal Destinies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 253-254 *et seq.*
15. Cited in Steven Lukes, *Essays in Social Theory* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 78.
16. J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, ed. with introduction by Curran V. Shields (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Library of Liberal Arts, 1958), e.g., p. 182.
17. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), part II.
18. See R. G. Collingwood, *The New Leviathan* (Oxford, 1942), pp. 181-182.
19. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 73, 2. See also *The Gay Science*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 95-96.
20. Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, e.g., p. 275.