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JAPANESE CULTURE AND SOCIETY

THE GROUP MODEL OF JAPANESE SOCIETY AND AN ALTERNATIVE

by *Harumi Befu*

INTRODUCTION

Upon the foundation laid by John Embree (1939) and Ruth Benedict (1946), numbers of Japan specialists have contributed toward the construction of a model to account for behavior of Japanese people. This model, sketched below, will be labeled here for convenience's sake the "group model." It has been widely accepted and used not only by anthropologists but by those in other disciplines as well. Historian Edwin Reischauer early accepted and elaborated on the group model in his book *The United States and Japan* (1951), and political scientist Nobutaka Ike (1972, 1973) sees the group-oriented behavior of Japanese as a foundation of political processes. It is not simply in scholarly fields, but also in more popular understanding of Japan and the Japanese that this model has been invoked. For example, the recent film *Growing Up Japanese*, produced by the U.S.-Japan Trade Council, and the NBC documentary *The Japanese* both capitalize on the theme of group orientation among Japanese. Herman Kahn's concept of *Japan, Inc.* (1970), depicting Japan itself as a monolithic corporation, is also an application of the model.

While the group model continues to enjoy a vogue, upon closer scrutiny it proves to be wanting in many respects. Yet the anthropological discipline and Japanese studies as a field lack any viable alternative so far. We must clearly recognize the shortcomings and limitations of the group model, offer more adequate alternative models, and correct popular misconceptions about Japanese (based on the group model).

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In what follows I shall first sketch the group model, then sample some of the problems attendant upon it, and follow with a trial formulation of an alternative model.

THE GROUP MODEL OF JAPANESE SOCIETY

It should be noted at the outset that no one has articulated the group model in exactly the way outlined here. What I describe below as a model is a composite picture formulated by putting together contributions of numerous scholars working in the Japanese field. Nakane (1970), if anyone, comes closest to describing Japanese society as I do here. There is no intention implied here, however, that I wish to single out Nakane for criticism. On the contrary, I should commend her ability for a lucid presentation of the model, integrating many facets and concepts in a way no one else, to my mind, has been capable of doing.

The group model of Japanese society assumes a hierarchical organization of a group, with a paternalistic leader at the apex, who is the source of satisfying both affective and instrumental needs of subordinate members. The psychological process supporting this structure is *amae* (Doi 1973). In *amae*, generally speaking, a person in a lower social position seeks emotional satisfaction by seeking indulgence of and depending on his social superior—although a reverse dependence of the superior on his subordinates is also possible. The hierarchical and affective features of *amae* are essential precisely because the genesis of this structure is to be seen in the mother-child relationship in the socialization process, as argued by Caudill and Weinstein (1969), Devos and Wagatsuma (DeVos 1973), Hara and Wagatsuma (1974), Lanham (1956), Norbeck and Norbeck (1956), Vogel and Vogel (1961), and many others.

During socialization, a close emotional bond develops through various mechanisms (which need not detain us here), dependence on which is encouraged rather than discouraged, so that in adulthood individuals continue to seek emotional security in and outside the family—in school through teachers, at work through one's boss, etc. As mother is a source of nurture as well as of psychic security, those in a superior position in one's group outside the family also provide satisfaction for both instrumental and expressive needs. Normatively, provision by a superior for his subordinates is summarized in the Japanese concept of *on*. *On* relationship implies a normative obligation—*giri*—for the subordinate to repay his debt through his loyal service. Benedict's early analysis (1946) of this concept still stands the test of time.

Cooperation and conformity among group members are prime virtues in such a group; conversely open conflict and competition (which

tend to counter mutual affective satisfaction among members) are taboos, enforced through means such as ostracism, as Smith (1961) has discussed with respect to rural community, and shame and ridicule, as Benedict (1946) reported. Emphasis on harmonious interpersonal relations goes hand in hand with the norm of ritualized, formal behavior patterns, which tend to reduce if not totally eliminate open conflict or embarrassment.

In such a group, ideally speaking, all members are selflessly oriented toward the group goal and are loyal to group causes. The leader leads with benevolence and magnanimity. He will help, support, and protect his followers at all costs. Followers in turn are expected to express their loyalty and devotion.

As Japan's rapid economic growth became a subject of academic study, many scholars sought to explain the whys and hows of Japan's economic success by the paternalism of Japanese economic enterprise, in which management supposedly looks after its workers with benevolence, providing fringe benefits, practicing permanent employment, etc., while at the same time claiming workers' devotion and loyalty. The Japanese term *marugakae* ("total embracement") is often used to characterize this situation. Abegglen (1958) early presented this position; but more recently Brown (1966), Ballon (1968), Rohlen (1974), Yoshino (1969), and many others have demonstrated essentially the same thesis in their works.

In addition to business organizations, the family (Kawashima 1957), the master-disciple relationship in the traditional arts and crafts (Nishiyama 1959), labor gangs (Bennett and Ishino 1963), underworld gangs (Ino 1973; Iwai 1963), political behavior (Mitchell 1976), and even the (prewar) Japanese state as a whole (Mitchell 1976) have been analyzed in terms consistent with the group model.

A social group based on hierarchical relationship and psychological interdependence, buttressed by the normative values of *on* and *giri*, may be called "paternalistic," as it was by Bennett and Ishino (1963). I have used the expression "ritual kinship" to describe some of the paternalistic groups in Japan, emphasizing the phenomenological continuity from kinship through ritual kinship to non-kinship paternalistic groups (Befu 1964). Hsu (1975) recently has discussed what is essentially the same institution under the rubric of *iemoto*. An excellent recent summary statement representing this position is Lebra's *Japanese Patterns of Behavior* (1976). It is not far from the mark to say that most of American social scientists concerned with Japan's social structure and behavior of Japanese, myself included, have either contributed to the construction of this model or at least endorsed it.

CRITIQUE OF THE GROUP MODEL

One of the major problems that the group model faces is that it is predicated upon internal harmony when in reality the society is ridden with all kinds of conflict and competition. The assumption of harmony derives from the assumed structure of the group wherein all members are selflessly concerned with maintaining group integration and working toward its goals. Examples of conflict and competition are legion. In highly competitive schools, although it is true that aggression arising out of competition is in part deflected from classmates toward impersonal tests, students are keenly aware of their relative ranks and vie with each other for top positions; as a result, hostility and animosity inevitably develop among classmates. Rohlen (1974) describes the stiff competition bank employees face among themselves throughout their careers.

A widespread failure of a supposedly paternalistic organization to look after the welfare of its members, and even outright exploitation of its members, are indications of inadequacy of the model. For example, the current retirement system of business enterprises forces their supposedly loyal workers to retire at an early age of fifty-five or thereabouts with retirement pay far inadequate for subsistence, hardly in keeping with claims of benevolent paternalism. Genji Keita's novel, *Teinen Tai-shoku*, gives a graphic picture of a man who is facing retirement in a few months and is having to go through the humiliating experience of asking his friends and acquaintances to find a post-retirement job for him.

A structural parallel of the neglect of post-retirement workers is the neglect of elders in the family. While the government social security system and company retirement funds have not expanded enough to provide true security to retirees, elders are often ignored or taken out of the household and are subjected to economic and psychological insecurity and social isolation. Old age in Japan is nowadays a time of worry and dissatisfaction for a large number of people, as Plath (1972, 1973) has well argued, and Palmore's picture of old age in Japan (1975) is unacceptably rosy.

Historically, exploitation of tenants by landlords or feudal lords—extracting rents even when tenants are near starvation and not giving humane consideration to tenants' welfare—led to numerous peasant uprisings in the late feudal (Tokugawa) and early modern periods. Mistreatment and exploitation of workers (e.g., overwork with underpay) by management in the textile industry was a common practice before and immediately after World War II (Hosoi 1925).

The Japanese labor movement also provides evidence countering the group model, which implies consensus, not conflict, within it. The conventional approach to the group model has been to regard "enterprise

unionism" as something supporting a paternalistic management structure. An enterprise union is said to share the fate of the company and not to make unreasonable demands upon the management. This depiction of enterprise unionism—*goyoo kumiai*—contradicts management's real dislike and suspicion of union leadership. Union activists are often punished by being given unimportant jobs and positions that do not lead to rapid promotion.

If enterprise unions were actually wedded to management, strikes and other disputes would not be expected to occur, but the fact is that thousands of strikes are reported every year. Granted, as Hanami (1974) points out, there are peculiarly Japanese patterns in strikes and negotiations precisely because of the close relationship between union and management, and a certain style of strike and negotiation characterize Japanese labor-management relationship. Nonetheless, strikes cannot help but diminish the harmonious relationship claimed by the model between workers and management. Strikes conducted by the Japan National Railway (JNR) Workers Union, involving tens of thousands of members, are good examples, inasmuch as Nakane (1970) gives JNR—with its motto of *Kokutetsu Ikka* ("JNR, One Family")—as an example of paternalistic enterprise. The union's strikes and sabotages (*jumpoo toosoo*) and the JNR management's sanctions against union leaders—ranging from outright firing through docking of wages to reprimand—portray anything but a benevolently paternalistic, cooperative work organization. The group model ignores the existence of conflict, competition, and strife in groups, since the group model has no way of accounting for them.

The loyalty and harmony themes of Japanese organization may be questioned from another angle. Studies by Marsh and Mannari (1976), by Cole (1971), and by Whitehill and Takezawa (1968) indicate that loyalty in the sense of commitment of workers to their company irrespective of their own interest or fate ("sink or swim with the company," "share the fate of the company") is not as strong as one might have assumed. Their findings show that workers are quite self-interested and that many are willing to share the fate of their company only to the extent that such sharing is profitable to their own objectives. Furthermore, blue collar workers, who are outside the "elite course" of advancement as charted in the paternalistic model, tend to be more dissatisfied and less committed to the company than managerial workers. One may also recall in this connection Rohlen's extended discussion (Rohlen 1974) of a large number of white collar employees of the bank he studied who at one time or another contemplated quitting, although few, in fact, did quit. The fact that so many consider quitting manifests weak commitment of the workers to the organization (Befu 1976b).

The notion that the entire Japanese nation is one harmonious family, too, seems doubtful. There is no question that at the height of Japanese nationalism much was made of this notion, in which the emperor was to his subjects as a father was to his children. But there is much evidence that this notion was not so much part of the indigenous ideology of the folk as it was a concept created by political leaders and its propagation engineered by the machinery of the state. This point is well argued by Kenneth Pyle's study (1973) of the "technology" of Japanese nationalism. That much engineering was necessary is shown also by the fact that, according to Tsurumi (1970), in the late nineteenth century one out of ten eligible men evaded conscription into the Imperial Army, and one out of twenty sought exemption by being adopted or by establishing branch families and qualifying as heads of households. "Engineering" of nationalism during the Pacific War assumed even the form of outright repression and suppression of heretical thoughts. Need for such a police-state-like technology suggests that Japan was not the harmonious family it was pronounced to be.

In examining Japanese society as a whole as fitting the group model, there is another issue, indirectly derived from the group model, namely, whether or not Japan has a class system. Those accepting the group model argue that Japan has hierarchical ranking of individuals expressed in terms of social superiority, social equality, and social inferiority, and that such ranking constitutes the fundamental nexus of the group, but that social classes as a system of stratification of the entire society as found in Western societies are absent in Japan. This argument is probably based on the fact that a class system *à la* Marx assumes conflict between classes. Since the group model of Japanese society is predicated on the absence of conflict and emphasis on harmony, a model of society that assumes inherent conflict is not acceptable. This argument, that social classes are nonexistent in Japan, is suspect, whether one adopts the objective or subjective definition of social class. Objectively, it is quite obvious that stratification systems can be formulated by using various criteria, such as income, occupation, or education, as has been done by Norbeck (1970), Odaka (1964), Tominaga (1970), Yasuda (1971), and others. Emically, too, Japanese have a wide variety of native concepts referring to social classes, such as *joryu shakai*, *chukan kaikyū*, *kasō*, *shakai no teihen*, etc. No doubt these concepts are not identical to English glosses such as "upper class," "middle class," etc. But the issue is not whether Japanese have terms of stratification identical in concept with those of the West; it is whether Japanese conceive of their society as being made up of horizontal strata. The existence of these Japanese terms clearly indicates that indeed the Japanese conception of society includes a notion of stratification.

Being predicated upon a hierarchical alignment of members, the group model neglects the egalitarian, or horizontal, structural element in Japanese society, which was known in traditional rural Japan long before the war, as has been forcefully argued by Norbeck (1962, 1967). Horizontal, egalitarian organization has been a subject of much discussion with respect to typological classification of rural communities among Japanese scholars, such as Fukutake (1967) and Izumi and Gamo (1952). Called *kogumi* type by Fukutake, this egalitarian organization has been prevalent throughout rural southwestern Japan. While the group model, with its hierarchical structure, is well adapted to accounting for the "northeastern" type (called the *dozoku* type by Fukutake), which is the structural antithesis of the *kogumi* type, the model cannot accommodate the *kogumi* structure.

A social process associated with the *kogumi* is reciprocal exchange of gifts, goods, and services. This type of exchange, well described in Embree's *Suye Mura* (1939) and more recently with respect to urban Japan by me (Befu 1967, 1968, 1974a, 1974b, 1976a, 1977a) again, has no place in the group model, since the model's structural alignment is always vertical.

In the group model, the leader has (or had) unilateral power over his followers whether the group be a labor gang or the whole nation. But of late, residents' movement, especially in connection with consumerism and environmental issues, has demonstrated the power of those who are supposed to be powerless. Ordinary citizens, victims of pollution and the like, have organized themselves into effective pressure groups and taken the government, the court, and business to task and successfully put through their demands (see Kuroda 1974; Lewis 1975; McKean 1974).

Since the group model is concerned with describing the internal structure of a group, how two different groups are related to one another in any systematic fashion is obscure. The only way the group model can cope with inter-group relations is by constructing an overarching group that would contain two or more smaller groups, or by conceiving a larger group to consist of smaller groups and thereby applying the model to the larger group. Leaders of smaller groups, then, would constitute the followership under the leader of the larger group. The same hierarchical, paternalistic structure, then, obtains. In the absence of such an umbrella structure, the group model is unable to account for inter-group relations. As we shall see, it is here that social exchange as an analytical framework can be used with profit.

Lone surviving soldiers of World War II, such as Yokoi and Onoda, who were hiding in islands of the South Seas for twenty-odd years, are

also unaccountable in terms of the group model. For these men had no group to support and sustain them. Is their loyalty to the emperor alone sufficient to explain their behavior? My feeling is that in addition to their loyalty, they must have had some inner spiritual strength to overcome the hardship and loneliness they encountered. This spirit, or *seishin*, masterfully discussed by Rohlen (1973) and Frager and Rohlen (1976), is one of the often-overlooked fundamental elements in accounting for behavior of Japanese.

One of the rather elementary points that has led the group model into difficulties has to do with an overlooked distinction between ideology and behavior. Much of what the group model purports to account for is in the ideological realm of how the society *ought* to be, how human relationships *should* be. Ideology, however, is often confused with behavior, and the model is used to explain behavior as presumably emanating from ideology. It is false to assume that the relationship between ideology and behavior is isomorphic. Thus, two errors are committed in the group model: first, instead of trying to account for ideology of the society alone or behavior of members of the society alone, one and the same model is used to account for both, and second, a false assumption of one-to-one relationship between ideology and behavior is adopted.

Another question has to do with timeliness or timelessness of the group model, that is, whether the model is meant to account for traditional Japan (whatever that may mean), modern Japan, or, as Nakane suggests of her model, Japan of all periods. The model is obviously better suited to account for traditional Japan; but even there, there are doubts and problems, as with respect to egalitarian organization in rural Japan and the frequent occurrence of peasant uprisings. Greater problems are encountered in observing the rapidly changing modern Japan.

Another consideration has to do with the emic distinction between *tatemae* and *honne*, the former being what is stated *ex cathedra* as the officially correct view, and the latter being what one has in one's mind. *Tatemae* often parallels the ideological part of the ideology/behavior dichotomy mentioned above; but *honne* does not parallel behavior. Instead, it is also in the realm of thought processes, as is ideology. These two need to be clearly distinguished because Japanese place especially high value on formal correctness. An expression of this is seen in the formalized or ritualized behavior patterns that Japanese are well known for. Inasmuch as behavior is required to be formalized, one's inner thoughts, feelings, and convictions—in short, one's *honne*—tend not to be directly expressed. In this *tatemae/honne* distinction, the group model seems to deal only with *tatemae* (ideology) and ignores *honne*.

As the model focuses on the primacy of the group, to which individual members are supposed to owe loyalty, no independent basis of motivation to conform to or to act against the group norm is recognized. Individuals in the group model tend to become automatons or robots without will and without freedom of choice, simply acting according to the demands and the norms of the group. The model is badly in need of an independent basis of motivation for individuals to act according to or against group norms.

GENESIS OF THE GROUP MODEL

In terms of the sociology of knowledge, the question why scholars have focused so much on the group model finds its answer at least in part in the fact that those responsible for the model's construction and perpetuation were by and large trained in the heyday of the structural-functional approach in the social sciences, i.e., in the 1930s through the 1950s. Structural-functionalism assumes integration and consistency between norms and behavior, and found its empirical validation in the study of small, close-knit primitive societies and peasant communities. It is safe to say that all the community studies in Japan in the pre- and immediate post-war periods were done basically from the structural-functional approach. The notion of "corporate peasant community" as used by Beardsley et al. (1959) in their *Village Japan*, is a direct product of this approach (via Eric Wolf). Nakane, a latterday spokeswoman for the group model, is explicit in her earliest version of her *tate shakairon*, as it appeared in *Chuo Koron*, about her debt to British social anthropology in the construction of this model. Those who contributed toward the psychological processes of the group model, too, were bent on demonstrating the functional fit between psychological and social processes and the psycho-social basis of societal structure.

There is another factor leading scholars (especially Western scholars) toward focusing on the group model. As noted above, the group model describes ideology of the group more accurately than behavior. Being "official" statements, ideology emphasizes "public" aspects of the society, which are easier for outsiders to grasp than inner feelings. Second, as this ideology emphasized virtuous values, such as harmony and cooperation—what Japanese call *kireigoto*—Japanese are ready to discuss it with Westerners, whose approval they seek. Third, Japanophile that they are, Western scholars are predisposed to see Japan through rosy glasses, making them susceptible to accepting a model that depicts Japan in a favorable light from the standpoint of Western values. At a deeper, unconscious level, anyone, especially if he has to deal with Japanese

closely and has to return to Japan for professional reasons, would want his Japanese colleagues to think well of him. One who propounds a model depicting Japan as well-integrated, harmonious, etc., is more likely to be well received than one whose model presents Japan in an unfavorable light. Thus, there is subconscious motivation to accept the "official" ideology as the theoretical model. At still another level of analysis, as Dore once pointed out, those who study Japan tend to be like Japanese in their personality disposition (and those who study Latin Americans tend to be like Latins). As Japanese are concerned with harmonious relations, Westerners studying Japan also tend to have the personality disposition that accepts the same ideology. This disposition further makes it easier for Westerners to "understand" Japanese society through such a model.

A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE MODEL

Clearly the heretofore received model of Japanese society is inadequate and incomplete. An alternative is therefore called for, to correct the shortcomings of the group model. The model I propose to construct is a descriptive, rather than an explanatory one. Building blocks of this alternative model would include (1) group ideology, (2) social exchange, and (3) *seishin* concept. In addition, a conceptual distinction between *tatemae* and *honne*, one between "formal" and "informal" behavior, and finally one between ideology and behavior will be recognized.

First, the new model will retain the ideological aspect of the group model as defining the normative orientation of group members. The iconoclasm above should not be understood to imply that I believe the group model contains no shred of truth in it. On the contrary, I recognize much to recommend in it, but as only one of the normative systems that orient members of the society toward meaningful action. Further elaboration of the model would not be attempted here.

I have outlined the theoretical framework of exchange theory (Befu 1977b). Social exchange assumes that each individual possesses some resources that he gives to others in exchange for some other resources that another person has. These resources may be material, like money or wealth; they may be personal connections, like having influential friends; or they may be skills or knowledge; last, they may be of affective sorts, like expression of respect, love, friendliness, etc. Social exchange assumes furthermore that one gets what he wants or needs by giving what others want or need in return. It is thus that Japanese parents rightfully expect

their children to care for them in their old age because they took care of them as children. The Japanese concept of *on*, or indebtedness, epitomizes this, although spheres of social exchange range widely into all areas of life, and are not limited to narrow fields in which the concept of *on* applies. Parents who pick just the right kind of gift to take to their child's teacher in order to influence the teacher's behavior toward their child are calculating their behavior in exchange terms. A businessman gives contributions to politicians and expects political favors in return. A politician, as a member of the Diet, may soft-pedal his questioning of government bureaucrats on the floor of the Diet precisely because he, the politician, wants a bureaucrat to do him a favor at a later date. And this favor may be one requested by a business that has given political contributions (Befu 1974b). Gift-giving, in which few peoples of the world can outdo Japanese, is of course an integral part of social exchange. In social exchange a Japanese often acts to maximize his opportunities by strategically allocating his resources, distributing them to individuals who need them most and are most likely to bring him bountiful returns. Thus, a good *oyabun* is one who knows how to select and recruit *kobun* who are good workers. A successful businessman is one who broadcasts his favors among many (but carefully selected) individuals who are likely to return his favors.

But social exchange has a non-instrumental side, too, where parties to an exchange benefit by mutually supplying non-material rewards, such as affection or approval between parents and children, between friends, etc. Last, instrumental resources can be exchanged with affective resources. A more accurate way of putting the matter is to say that whenever individuals enter into a relationship, exchange of either instrumental or affective resources or both types takes place, as has been demonstrated for Japanese family relationship by DeVos and Wagatsuma (DeVos 1973:Ch. 1). In fact, strong emphasis on both instrumental and expressive relationship in the same pair of individuals, which we find in Japan (as against functional distinction and separation of the two in American interpersonal relationship), is to be sought in the socializing setting of the family.

These remarks should make it clear that group ideology and social exchange are not mutually exclusive. They overlap in the sense that a single phenomenon may be analyzed from either of the two perspectives. Thus, a company may pronounce as its ideology loyalty and cooperation of workers and paternalistic benevolence of the management. At the motivational level, however, loyalty and cooperation are realized only because and to the extent that each worker stands to gain by being loyal and cooperative, and the management dispenses "benevolence" insofar

as such dispensation is profitable to the management. Seen thus, "group behavior" of Japanese can be understood in terms of a general theory of social exchange. In an analysis of *Shiroi Kyoto* by Toyoko Yamazaki (1965), a best-selling novel about an ambitious associate professor trying to move up the academic ladder through the manipulation of the election system of the academic council, I observed (Befu 1977a:87):

A reexamination of empirical cases of the so-called "group orientation" in Japan would probably reveal that group orientation is more apparent than real, and that behind the appearance of group solidarity one will find each member being motivated more by personal ambitions than by his blind loyalty to the group. Put another way, in many cases Japanese are [or anyone is, for that matter] loyal to their groups because it pays to be loyal.

Overlap between group ideology and exchange behavior, however, is only partial. There are groups in which the leader indeed exploits his subordinates, taking advantage of the fact that they are dependent on him for resources he controls. In such a case, the group ideology is well-nigh absent, and the situation is best analyzed in terms of social exchange, where although the leader and subordinates are mutually dependent on each other's resources, relatively greater dependence of subordinates upon the leader for needed resources creates a power advantage for the leader. This situation presents an opportunity for an unscrupulous leader to use the subordinates for his gain without giving them adequate returns.

Overlap of group ideology and social exchange is incomplete in another sense. When two individuals who are not members of a group interact, the relationship cannot by definition be explained in terms of group ideology, but is eminently accountable in terms of social exchange, as in the case of the relationship between a businessman and a politician or between a Diet member and a bureaucrat.

If the group ideology tends to portray Japanese as being devoted to the group cause, being self-sacrificing, and placing high value on satisfying each other's emotional needs, then social exchange theory tends to depict Japanese as being self-centered, hedonistic, and pragmatic. If the Japanese in the group model is motivated by altruism, the Japanese in the exchange model is driven by self-interest. The group model tends to show Japanese in a favorable light, whereas the exchange model seems to highlight the ugly, seamy, and unflattering side of Japanese. This may seem like conceptual inconsistency; but it is so only on the assumption that ideology and behavior must be in one-to-one relationship. I reject this assumption.

Turning now to the *seishin* model, we are concerned with Japanese as individuals *qua* individuals, not as members of a group or as partners in an exchange relationship. *Seishin* has to do with one's spiritual disposition, one's inner strength, which results from character building and self-

discipline. It is ultimately related to physical strength and physical training as a means to spiritual ends, as a way of attaining inner balance and harmony. In this context, hardship and suffering, physical or mental, are not evil—not even necessary evils—but acquire the status of positive virtues.

One, but only one, manifestation of this concept is *bushido*, or the way of the warrior. *Hagakure*, which is considered to be a distillation of the warrior philosophy, declared that the essence of the warrior's way of life is in dying, with emphasis on the manner of dying rather than on death itself. Mental and spiritual preparations leading to this solitary act are themselves highly solitary. They demand absolute resolution of inner conflicts and attainment of inner strength, enough to overcome fear of death and to face death with utmost tranquility—witness the ceremonial *seppuku* death sentence of Tokugawa warriors.

Lest one may think that talking about *bushido* of bygone days is anachronistic, one can point to Zen Buddhism as a religion and philosophy that attempts to accomplish a similar objective where character building is concerned. The absolute discipline, denial of carnal desires, and negation of self through meditation supposedly lead to the building of inner strength as epitomized in the concept of *seishin*.

Here, one pictures the World War II soldiers who volunteered for suicidal fighter-plane attacks on American targets. Too, one understands better what sustained Yokoi, Onoda, and many others who survived in tropical jungles for years by themselves. In short, it is their *seishin* that helped maintain their sanity. Here, too, I recall my high school principal in Japan, who at the height of the Pacific War publicly denounced the Japanese government for not maintaining consistent leadership, comparing it with the consistent leadership supplied among the Allies. This same principal, after the war, during the Occupation, publicly denounced Douglas MacArthur for not allowing Japanese to worship their emperor. This man was not insane, but he was certainly not acting with the support of any group or expecting any material return from anyone. His action was based on his inner conviction and was made possible through his inner strength. Japanese history is replete with men like him. These men, who must be relegated to the class of "exception to the rule" of the group model, and regarded as "enigmatic" Japanese as far as the group model is concerned, are readily brought back into the fold of the Japanese society in the model proposed here.

Seishin training as an unintended consequence is seen in Japanese high school students burning the midnight oil night after night, denying themselves the pleasure of vacations, movie-going, and relaxation. We see the same in company training programs as was masterfully reported by Rohlen. We see it when members of college sports clubs are engaged in physical exercise far beyond what is necessary or justifiable for training in

the specific sports concerned. Whatever one may think of the value of studying until late at night every night at so young an age or of undergoing torturous exercises, these experiences have the effect of building one's character and inner strength to withstand hardship later in life, whether in group situations or without. They teach the value of asceticism, perseverance, and endurance.

The question why Japanese espouse the group ideology while their behavior seems to betray a theme contradictory to that ideology now seems answerable. That is, the *ex cathedra* statement of *kireigoto* belongs to the realm of "public relations," and dictates the interpersonal relations of the sorts characterized as being "ritualized" or "formal," corresponding to what Goffman has called the "front" stage of interaction. Apart from this formal, "public" statement of what social life is supposed to be about, one may observe how the real social life is in fact conducted. This life is not always motivated by the official ideology, but is also affected in varying degrees by self-interest, and this part of social life is best explained by the theory of social exchange. Integration of the group ideology and social exchange comes about as individuals see their self-interest match the group norm. When workers see that it "pays" to stay with their company for life, when they calculate that staying with the company will bring more rewards to them than changing jobs, their self-interest is consonant with the company ideology.

Serving the group cause out of self-interest, however, is not always a pleasant thing. Social exchange theory claims not that what one does always brings pleasure, but that it is at least less unpleasant than doing something else. Indeed, living a group life and serving a group cause very often involve self-sacrifice. Endurance for this is made easier through *seishin* training—character training and self-discipline. To the extent that *seishin* training is done in a group context, such as training of new company recruits or in a college sports club, it also fosters group solidarity. But *seishin* training as such need not serve group purposes. In fact, in its essence, it has nothing to do with groups; it merely has aspects that can be taken advantage of to enhance group life. At the same time, *seishin* can aid an individual to be on his own, to stand on his principles, or to endure even absence of group support, as in the cases of Onoda and Yokoi, the World War II soldiers who refused to surrender and remained in jungle hiding places for over thirty years.

The Japanese distinction between *tatemae* and *honne* is important in distinguishing ideology from behavior and in thus avoiding the false assumption of an isomorphic relationship between ideology and behavior. This is important not only in the context of the group model but also in analyzing Japanese social life in general. A closely related distinction is between formal vs. informal behavior in face-to-face interaction. Formal,

ritualized behavior patterns (both verbal and nonverbal) are often demanded of individuals in ongoing interaction. The degree of formality varies depending on (1) the context of the situation and (2) the degree of intimacy of the interacting individuals. These three variables—of ideology/behavior, *tatemae/honne*, and formal/informal—should be considered theoretically independent of one another so that stated ideology may coincide with either *tatemae* or *honne*, so that one's behavior may validate *tatemae* or *honne*, so that formal, ritualized behavior may express *tatemae* or *honne*, etc. This is not to deny tendencies for certain of these features to coalesce into a definite pattern. For example, ideology, *tatemae*, and ritual formality seem to go hand in hand as a "natural" combination in Japanese society.

CONCLUSION

I have outlined a trial formulation of a model that would do more justice to the reality of contemporary Japanese culture and society than the previously developed group model. It distinguishes between the ideology of group orientation and behavioral reality, which may or may not coincide with the ideology. This distinction is made through the emic concept of *tatemae* as against *honne*. Etically, the separation between ideology and behavior somewhat parallels this. Social exchange deals with behavior, not from the point of view of a "superorganic" group having its own *raison d'être* apart from and logically before the individual, but from the point of view of individual needs and desires. Social exchange theory tries to fulfill certain needs by exchanging what he has with what others have and he desires. Social exchange takes a pair of individuals as the basic social unit, rather than a group *qua* group as the basic unit.

Third, the *seishin* concept attempts to account for the individual's motivation to act strictly on the basis of his inner dynamics. Above all, it tries to explain what enables Japanese to persevere and endure hardship, delay gratification and defer pleasure. If the group ideology tends to portray Japanese as conformists to group norms and automatons, and if the social exchange concept seems to make Japanese look selfish and egoistic, the *seishin* concept succeeds in depicting Japanese as having inner strength to withstand and endure enormous and even extraordinary hardship.

These three perspectives of group ideology, social exchange, and *seishin* should not be regarded as contradictory. Each offers a perspective and way of analysis at different levels and of different sorts. Certain phenomena are best analyzed from the perspective of the group ideology,

while others are best accounted for from the point of view of social exchange or through the *seishin* concept. Some others may demand a multiple use of these different approaches. Through the use of these three concepts, then, Japanese behavior becomes more comprehensible than through use of the group model only.

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