

ANALOGY AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: AN ECUMENICAL APPRAISAL

ROMAN CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT INTERPRETATIONS
IN RELATION TO THE DEBATE ABOUT THE ANALOGY OF BEING
BETWEEN ERICH PRZYWARA, S. J., AND KARL BARTH

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. *Analogy as a Perennial Theme*

Analogy is a perennial theme in both philosophy and theology. The widely differing outlooks and terminology used in technical discussion of the subject easily lead to confusion.¹ One knows well enough that analogy belongs to some types of epistemology and is applied in different ways in religion. However, the interrelations of its various forms, attribution and proportionality, intrinsic and extrinsic, *analogia entis* and *analogia fidei*, require clarification. Analogy has long been used to describe the nature and attributes of God. It would be a mistake to suppose that it offers any omnibus resolution of the problem of "God talk." On the contrary, questions must be answered about the nature of analogy itself with respect to content as well as orientation. Yet as a point of reference analogy does call attention to the importance of both language and structure.

The Hebrew-Christian tradition premises a transcendent deity who is at the same time immanent in the world. The faith claim that God is the source and end of all life has a variety of theological expressions. Biblical language itself is dramatic and metaphorical.² God is believed to be known in the mighty acts which reveal his presence and reality. In order to be systematic, theology as well as philosophy is required to ask about the metaphors and analogies which are used in religious speech. God has been described as king, father, and even as a shepherd. Of course, these terms are not intended to be understood literally. Are they, then, only figures of speech, or do they identify continuing relationships and meanings? The larger question is whether religious language yields knowledge of a transcendent reality or only of man himself. Is theology anything more than anthropology?

The theme of analogy relates to the contemporary discussion of hermeneutic at a number of crucial points.³ Analogy represents a traditional way

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of justifying "God-talk." It is an oversimplification to regard it merely as an epistemological vehicle. In its wider ramifications, the problem of analogical knowledge involves not only linguistics and logic, but the interrelation between different aspects of experience. The respective roles of faith and reason as well as theology and philosophy are in the background of its discussion. Assuredly, the contemporary investigation of hermeneutic is not to be identified with this single theme, yet the issues at question are not entirely different. Consideration of the problematic of analogy serves to broaden reflection on religious language as well as to relate it to historical traditions. The relations between immanence and transcendence are crucial in its definition. Analogy is a subtle and complex reference, and not limited to any single context or formulation, attribution or proportionality, being or faith alone. Although it need not be defined exclusively in terms of current debates, it ought not to be isolated from them entirely. Basically, it is a theme worthy of consideration in its own right.

Traditional explication of analogy has treated it as a mean between equivocation on the one hand and univocation on the other. Equivocation is really meaningless and without truth value. Univocation, on the other hand, premises unambiguous knowledge, disregarding mystery. Analogical predication has the intent of avoiding both extremes. Of course, the problem can be oversimplified as well as confused by this set of distinctions. The terminology of even the most elementary analogical predication of the divine attributes is more complicated than this threefold division.⁴ Interpreters have differed widely on the priorities to be assigned to the analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality, respectively, from Cajetan to Suarez to the present. More recently, discussion has focused on the differences between the analogy of faith and the analogy of being. There are theologians as well as philosophers who charge that the set of questions associated with the theme is characteristically scholastic, having been displaced in modern critical epistemologies. Yet it should be noted that the theme of analogy continues to appear under such diverse viewpoints as modern linguistic philosophy and existential theology. The more abiding, primary question is whether analogy—as a middle way—opens positive possibilities for reflection and description.

Epistemologically, this reference needs to be defined critically with clearly identified first premises. Christian theologians have claimed that analogy belongs more appropriately to theism than to pantheism, deism, naturalism, or agnosticism.⁵ It is generally agreed that analogy deals with the basic problem of likeness and difference, and more appropriately than metaphor represents an attempt to delimit carefully the use of symbols. In its Christian theological context, analogy joins immanence and transcendence. Of course, analogy should not be used to beg fundamental questions about God's existence or transcendence. Analogy, however, does clarify the kind of

evidence which is relevant as well as the kind of language appropriate to description of deity. Seen in historical context, it is more characteristically Greek than Hebrew; it became a self-conscious reference as Christian thought encountered Greek ontological categories.⁶ Nonetheless, it also has Biblical bases. Analogies can be taken from both the natural world and history. In the case of the Greeks it was primarily the former, and for the Hebrews the latter. To the extent that analogy belongs to faith seeking understanding, it inevitably shares the problems which appear as religious experience becomes reflective. The basic question is not whether Christianity accepted Greek philosophical perspectives, but only how it adapted them to its usage. Were its faith claims illumined and clarified or were they mitigated in an abstract intellectualism?

Christian theologians have employed analogy in a very specific and precise way. It does not signify that they have controlling knowledge of the God-man relation—only that real, although not exhaustive, knowledge of God is possible. Use of such a relational perspective in the explication of Christian experience has had a long conceptual development. In the scholastic period, analogy was used in the formulation of the natural theology which Thomistic thinkers still accept in principle.⁷ Traditionally, Protestants have argued for faith alone, scripture alone, and grace alone. Such claims, however, do not settle all questions of knowledge or being. In the modern period, Protestant thinkers have used analogy in a wide variety of ways, ranging from the natural theology of liberalism to the confessionalism of Karl Barth's analogy of faith. Analogy, like hermeneutic, premises an understanding of the relation between event and symbol, conviction and concept, in the attempt to define carefully what is affirmed about God. By his very nature, the God of the Bible is not just one reality among others, a being with other beings. He is believed to be the source of creation as well as righteous, living will. Can his reality and nature be described analogically in terms of likeness and difference?

2. Contemporary Relevance

Bishop John Robinson's *Honest to God* raised the problem of religious language in a dramatic way with the phrase, "our image of God must go."⁸

E. L. Mascall has written in critique:

from the beginning the Church has interpreted its notion of God 'up there' as analogical, as is shown by the fact that it has supplemented it by the equally analogical notion of God as *everywhere*. ... any mental picture of God may be a hindrance if it is taken univocally in its unqualified everyday sense, even such biblical pictures as that of 'Father' and 'Shepherd,' but ... ordinary Christians find very little difficulty in making the necessary adjustments, while professional intellectuals might be expected to know something about the discussions of Christian theologians on the analogical nature of our language concerning God.⁹

Professor John MacQuarrie of Oxford University has posed the question of analogy in a contemporary setting:

of all our ways of talking about God, the way of analogy is the one that has the most positive content. It is not, of course, a literal or direct way of talking about God, and yet it is a way that seems to give us assurance that our talk is not just empty, and that it does somehow impinge upon God and give us some insight into the mystery of Being. Analogy makes possible the language of scripture and liturgy that is at the heart of the practice of the Christian religion. Is this language really meaningful, or is it just, to put it bluntly, a kind of mumbo-jumbo. . . . Unless we can say that it is meaningful, I think honest people would want to get rid of the whole business. This means that unless we can produce some reasonable account of the logic of analogy, there is not support for our other ways of talking about God, except the *via negativa*; and, taken in isolation, this leads straight to atheism.¹⁰

Drawing from contemporary philosophical analysis, MacQuarrie argues that the very openness of language—its multi-valued character—seems to imply analogy. Only a widely ranging phenomenology which includes diverse symbols and meaning will save us from reductionism, he argues. MacQuarrie cites Newspeak, in George Orwell's *1984*, as the antithesis of this claim: "the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought." "Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly *one* word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten." MacQuarrie argues for a plurality of languages. Analogy is of basic importance in identifying appropriate symbols as myth is broken. In analogy, the conceptual dominates the emotional. Symbol alone runs the danger of becoming subjective and vague. Even as man's essence is expressed in his acts, so God's essence may be expressed and known analogically. The historical is joined to the transcendent in a metaphysical, ontological dimension. MacQuarrie understands analogy as joining the *via negationis* with the *via eminentia*. The former is an indispensable guard against the identification of God with any particular finite person or thing. To be sure, even in saying what deity is not, we are saying something about him. Yet if we are to be definite, the *via eminentia* must be invoked as well. Analogical description moves from creation to God as well as from God to creation, both from the human situation and the object of religious affirmation. MacQuarrie's discussion re-opens but does not settle in detail the problems which have traditionally attended the exposition of the theme under discussion.

3. *The Thomistic Pattern*

The Thomistic model, following Thomas Aquinas, has been causality, negation, and eminence.¹¹ Thomism presupposes that the world must have a first cause. The Hebrew-Christian view of creation is joined with Aristotle's doctrine of an unmoved mover and denial of infinite regress. God alone can be the final cause. Evidence of God's workmanship is seen in a

purposive, ordered universe. Man, in particular, bears the image of God. However, not just causality but negation and eminence are necessary to analogical predication. Negation is invoked, since we cannot speak of God directly in the same terms as his creation. All limitations, in particular any simply anthropocentric or imperfect mode of existence, are denied radically. Eminence premises God as the fullness of being and reality. Goodness and truth exist perfectly in his reality. Employing both references, negation and eminence, a variety of attributes is ascribed to deity analogically.

It must be emphasized that analogy is not limited to Thomism. To be sure, philosophers and theologians in this tradition have treated the theme in great detail. However, Aquinas's synthesis has its background in the thought of earlier patristic and scholastic theologians. His interpretation cannot be separated from them completely either in content or in method. Analogy premises that there is a logos, an abiding pattern of relations which yields authentic knowledge. To be sure, there was innovation in Aquinas's use of the Aristotelian world view. Equally important is the fact that he made a clearer distinction between philosophy and theology, natural and revealed knowledge, than most of his predecessors.¹² His anthropology, premising a harmony between nature and grace, was more optimistic than Augustine's. Yet the latter's "faith seeking understanding" was not abandoned any more than the major tenets of his theology. In its classical form, analogy is not bound to a single school of philosophy. Although the theme is still used apologetically by some commentators, recent historical studies have made it possible to "unpack" the idea.¹³ It has been separated from Aquinas's intellectualism in other Roman Catholic formulation as well as Protestant interpretation.

4. *Modern Language Philosophy*

The variety of types and uses of analogy make it virtually inevitable that there should be widespread doubts about its legitimacy. Discussion of our theme in modern language philosophy has been carefully reviewed by Aahmes Ely Overton in "The Problem of Analogy in Theological Method."¹⁴ Overton's study is one of the most discerning recent considerations of analogy theory by a non-Roman Catholic interpreter. It has both range and incisiveness. At the same time that he understands the necessity of analogical description, he seeks to guard against the ambiguities of an omnibus reference. He points out that some modern commentators seek to limit analogy to the role of a linguistic guide, arguing that it can give no real information about God. C. G. Prado in "A Note on Analogical Predication" holds that it can yield no authentic knowledge of God until his existence has been established independently by some other means. He urges that any moral qualities attributed to God remain more equivocal than analogical until the staggering problem of natural evil is solved.¹⁵ Frederick Ferré in his

Language, Logic and God allows that analogy may serve to "limit the proper employment of language within the framework of systematic assumptions."¹⁶ It is valuable as a linguistic guide if there is already a basis for a theological "universe of discourse" in doctrine, creed, and scripture. In such a context, analogy can describe "God's uniquely characteristic activity." However, Ferré is skeptical concerning analogy's ability to give "information about real properties of supernatural beings" and in particular denies any ontological identity between God and man.

Can religious language be given any public content or be tested empirically? A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* was forthright in its denial of the validity of religious language.¹⁷ Ayer applied the term "nonsensical" to theological discourse because he judged it to be hopelessly encumbered with analogous terms which have no empirically testable referent. Religion may invoke emotive language as private poetry, but those who use it must not be so confused as to believe that there is cognitive import. It should be noted that Ayer himself abandoned the earlier forms of his verification principle. Professor John McIntyre has called for a "counter-offensive" to show how often "the analyst's use of language *is itself* analogical," and to reveal how even the old positivist principle of verification was based implicitly on "a completely analogical view of the nature of language."¹⁸

Attempts have been made to appropriate the modern analytic tradition more positively. Wittgenstein's statement that words "are like *arrows*, deriving their meaning from the goals at which they are directed and from the purpose which they serve," is cited. In his *Lectures and Conversations*, Wittgenstein comments that words "designate" by "shooting at something" and thus establishing a "projection connection."¹⁹ W. S. Taylor holds that Wittgenstein's category of "family resemblances" functions in the same way as Aquinas's analogy of attribution. In both, the diverse particulars of an entity are "related to each other in virtue of a family resemblance which is thought to owe little or nothing to identical elements."²⁰ Instead, it is dependent on their common relation to something beyond themselves.

5. *Metaphysical Interpretations of Analogy*

Overton points out that a positive view of analogy belongs more characteristically to philosophers who accept the validity of metaphysics. Dorothy Emmet begins *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* with Emerson's comment: "Man is an analogist and studies relations in all objects."²¹ She argues that analogy, broadly conceived, is a necessary vehicle for acquiring knowledge about the relations which are found among things as well as within conceptual systems. It is presupposed in scientific induction as well as in the symbolic and mathematical references used in establishing a logical calculus or even probability theory. Overton identifies G. F. Woods as one of the most important recent commentators on analogy. Woods argues that

it is prerequisite to all forms of explanation, practical everyday knowledge, and specialized theory.²² He urges that we constantly make inquiries and decisions "which depend upon nothing more than analogical knowledge. We should perish without it."²³ It is not possible to anticipate all novelty in an exhaustive theory of knowledge. Instead, we must classify observed data in terms of new knowledge which is "neither quite like nor quite unlike anything we have known before." In short, "we live and continue to live by going beyond the limits of our actual experience. . . . We are bound to venture by analogy beyond the frontiers of our immediate experience." However, Woods urges that we "should never adopt this indirect procedure, if we could avoid doing so. It is not a matter of choice but of necessity."

Woods takes personal being as the key root metaphor or analogy of experience. All the rest of experience is to be explained from it. In some respects, he seems to be only reformulating the Thomistic analogy of being. However, as Overton points out, he substitutes a dynamic sense of personhood for the notions of being and spirit utilized by the Thomists. Woods finds that all means of explanation in history, science, and philosophy begin in the apprehension of personal being. Personal being is not a means of explanation which we establish ourselves. We do not choose personal being arbitrarily but discover its meaning. It is inevitable that we should think of other beings analogically in language which is taken "from our experience of our own being." The facts and the values of others are explained in terms "derived from our own experience of action and value." Analogy is necessary because we cannot understand anything which is completely and utterly unlike personal being. This is as much the case in science and history as it is in philosophy and theology. Woods argues that change in physics cannot be explained simply in terms of physical measurement. On the contrary, we must infer from knowledge of change in our personal being in order to understand what it means in a physical process.

Woods concludes that if there were an ultimate explanation of the world, it would have to be analogical to our own personal being. He does not have in mind the use of analogy to indicate a logical ratio or mathematical proportion between relations of defined and exact quantity. He believes that such analysis usually deals with precise likenesses which were known even before they were related. Rather, he means that all explanation must be done by the method of analogy as we reason from what we know best to what we know less well. Woods does not seek to refute Hume directly, but holds that it is impossible to prove that the "first cause" or "ultimate being" is impersonal. In this view, analogy is not only the foundation for a hierarchy or a principle of relations between all other explanations; it makes evident how explanations in all fields are possible.

Woods's analysis presupposes a kind of inclusive realism. How much is it an explication of theological premises and how much a philosophy of

religion? The question is perennial in the consideration of our theme. Woods argues that an analogy of personal being may be extended in such a way that it will yield "ultimate" explanation—a ground for other explanations and a capstone of a hierarchy of interrelated explanations. As ground of the whole causal series a first cause must be unique. All temporal experience is transitory and contingent. We are compelled to believe in "ultimate being" because there is no temporal being which in itself gives a full explanation of how it came to be. Although there may be no logically necessary argument for a personal "ultimate being," nevertheless "there are considerations which make it reasonably *probable* to believe that it is analogically like a personal being."

6. *Analogy and Isomorphic Models (Ian Ramsey)*

Overton also cites the reflection of Professor Ian Ramsey of Oxford University in his *Models and Mystery*. Ramsey makes more detailed reference to modern scientific discovery than does Woods. Ramsey compares the function of isomorphic models in science with that of metaphor and analogy in theology.²⁴ He urges that both types of reference lead to discovery in their respective spheres, giving results that are not possible from other perspectives. Whatever justification can be offered for the employment of isomorphic models in scientific investigation has its parallel in the similar effectiveness of analogy in theology. Ramsey explains why an isomorphic or disclosure model is often more effective than a simply mechanical one. It is a type of reference which enables one to see a Gestalt in a previously meaningless constellation, thus providing "insight into mystery." The Gestalt may be as simple as the pattern observed in the formation of dots on a paper. Or a formula may be used in such a way as to enable a chemist to see technical relations within the total structure of a family such as fatty acids. Ramsey does not look for parallels with natural science on the premise that it has a monopoly on the discovery of "truth." He believes the contrary. His claim is only that its methods and presuppositions have relevance for other areas of knowledge and life. Ramsey identifies a link between scientific and all personal insights in the human capacity for "intuition" which he defines as the capacity for receiving disclosures.

Ramsey draws on the description and analysis developed by Max Black, arguing that scale models cannot play the exhaustive role that was earlier ascribed to them in physics, for example. Ramsey's theological interest is not shared by Black. Ramsey is careful to disavow scholastic analogy theory, and his view is less precise and unified than traditional expositions of our theme. Yet he contributes to its discussion by urging that modern science use isomorphic disclosure models as builders of discourse; they make it possible to develop theories as "large-scale interpretations" of phenomena. For example, a theory about refraction can be developed when phenomena

of light are treated by the isomorphic model of linear propagation. Similarly, metaphor and analogy function as builders of discourse in theology, facilitating in the development of a "large-scale interpretation" of phenomena and religious experiences.

Model and analogy offer a "map" which guides the theologian through experiential religious phenomena in part paralleling the way in which scientific theory "maps" a path through physical or social data. Ramsey explains that theological disclosure (doctrine) is developed around a model (metaphor). Disclosure takes place with a tangential meeting of two diverse contexts. As the language of the second context filters into the language of the first context, there is disclosure and inroad into "mystery." Theological analogy is more than simile even as its counterpart, the isomorphic model, is more than mechanical scale model representation. The models of disclosure provide greater clarity and more precise identification of structural similarities. More than this, they also help to simplify phenomena and the network of theories which surround the explication, providing a map through the phenomenal forest of complex experiences and intricate doctrinal networks in religion.

Ramsey's concept of authenticity and validation is broader than that of the logical analysts. Moreover, it carries an acknowledged ontological interest. Not only does Ramsey explain that models must "chime in" and "echo" structurally the phenomena they are investigating; "there must be something about the universe and man's experience in it" which matches the model. Ramsey urges that the universe itself authenticates a model. For example, there must be something about a wave that matches experience if it is to be used as an isomorphic model for light. Similarly, there must be a likeness between the divine and human Father, an analogy of father which matches a human father. Even while arguing that the universe itself authenticates the characteristic model in both areas, Ramsey acknowledges significant differences between scientific and religious models. He finds that the more useful and accurate a scientific model is "the more prolific it is in generating deductions which are then open to experimental verification and falsification." In theology, a model is not judged as better or worse by the number of verifiable deductions it generates. Rather, it is to be evaluated in terms of "its stability over the widest range" of religious phenomena as well as by its ability to incorporate and relate diverse types of such phenomena.

In the end Ramsey, like Woods, invokes a human reference. He concludes that we cannot avoid distinguishing between the impersonal and the personal. Theology investigates the latter and not simply natural phenomena. Ramsey is emphatic that human experience cannot be duplicated mechanically. He insists upon the metaphorical use of language in science as well as theology, even though it is often less apparent in the former. However, there is a significant difference. In natural science, the same word contains the

function of the qualifier and of the metaphor. This is not the case in theological discourse; no model or analogy can occur without a qualifier. The qualifier determines how the nature of the disclosure which is evoked by the metaphor will be developed. Most important, qualifiers declare the inadequacy of all models to represent the structures and relations within religious experience.²⁵ Ramsey uses this claim to reply to the agnosticism expressed in the often cited parable of Anthony Flew. Use of the term "Father" with respect to deity, Ramsey argues, gives "life by a thousand enrichments," not "death by a thousand qualifications" as Flew charged.

Karl Barth's interpretation of God's power may be used to support Ramsey's claim. Barth has shown how God's power or omnipotence must be qualified by his Fatherhood in exposition of the Biblical material. Christian speech about evil, suffering, and the sin of the world is not independent of this reference. Analogy cannot be used responsibly unless it is qualified. For example, the parable of the prodigal son is not intended to show that God always acts as we would, but the opposite; context and qualifiers must be identified together. Ramsey urges that qualifiers dispel the notion that mystery is a religious experience which can be explained away, refuting the charge of nonsense. He emphasizes that modern science does not give an exhaustive description of reality. Even before one level of mystery is comprehended fully, another appears. Scientific models can increase mystery. Ramsey concludes that it now has become doubly evident that an open and meaningful view of experience, imagination, and intuition, not just pure measurement, is necessary to explanation. Analogy is relevant in such a context.

II. THEOLOGY OF ANALOGY

1. *The Przywara-Barth Debate*

The contemporary interest in analogy is not simply philosophical, but arose in the context of interconfessional discussion. The First Vatican Council emphasized that the existence of deity can be known with certainty apart from special revelation. Aquinas's distinction between the natural and revealed knowledge of God was part of the background of its pronouncements. Subsequent papal decrees directed that Thomism be made central in the curricula of Roman Catholic seminaries and universities.¹ Extensive research was undertaken in a variety of subjects related to analogy in the scholastic tradition. The analogy of being was expanded and developed as an apologetic reference during the modernist controversy in the early twentieth century. Paradoxically, Karl Barth's rejection of Protestant liberalism, following the first world war, with his accompanying reaffirmation of the Reformation, opened the way for Protestant discussion of analogy with

Roman Catholic theologians. The first premises of the Christian knowledge of God came under new scrutiny as the relation of nature and grace was debated in dialectical theology. Barth's complete rejection of the analogy of being led the way for discussion of the relation of faith and reason as well as ecclesiology in terms of this idea. In the end, Barth developed his own particular view of the analogy of faith, believing that it avoided the "idolatrous" consequences of the Roman Catholic synthesis of nature and grace.

It was the criticism of the German Jesuit, Erich Przywara, which forced Barth into a defensive stance against the analogy of being. Przywara, more than any other person, was responsible for reformulating the doctrine of analogy and bringing it to Barth's attention. Barth's relations with this philosopher-theologian date from the time of his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. In the preface of the fourth edition, he indicated that Przywara had been among the first persons who really understood his writing.² Przywara and Barth agreed that acceptance or rejection of the analogy of being is the dividing point between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. An important personal debate between the two theologians took place at Münster in 1929 and treated the basic premises of ecclesiology as well as the natural knowledge of God. Of course, the legitimacy of a point of contact between man and God apart from faith has been argued in a variety of contexts, metaphysical and confessional. Przywara advocated a type of analogy which joins philosophy and theology in the spirit of Aquinas. In earlier periods, scripture and tradition, faith and works, the sacraments, the nature of authority and the Church have all served to delimit the differences between the confessions. Analogy became a new reference point of division. Barth argued that no authentic knowledge of God remains after the fall. The image of God in man has been destroyed completely. Barth believed that the Roman Catholic attempt to speak of the natural knowledge of God from the analogy of being leads to a false religious alternative.

2. *Neo-Scholastic Interpretation*

Seen in its larger historical perspective, a debate which began in the intensity of interconfessional confrontation, in the end led to the positive clarification of theological ideas. In particular, it contributed to a renewed understanding of the crucial role of analogy in religious knowledge. Although Roman Catholic theologians differ in their descriptions of analogy, a common obedience characterizes their reflection. Generally, it is formulated in terms of a natural-supernatural scheme. As illustration, the dogmatics of F. Diekamp as revised by Jüssen will be cited.³ Diekamp-Jüssen describe analogy in terms of measured likeness, relative identity, and likeness and unlikeness, premising a likeness in relation to being as between God and creation. They hold explicitly to a doctrine of a twofold order of knowledge,

natural and revealed. The structure and content of theology are to be arranged accordingly. The revelation in Jesus Christ can be understood and expanded by the natural light of reason. An adequate terminology can be construed from a philosophy premised on natural theology.

Diekamp-Jüssen describe man as characterized by intelligence and free will in the image of God; even after the fall, he is still able to reach his natural goal in spite of sin. The Neo-scholastic concept of nature is many-sided. Nature is not just a physical thing, antithetical to spirit. Interpreted with the help of Aristotelian metaphysics, it includes substance, material or spiritual, and has natural potency and teleological direction. Diekamp-Jüssen take for granted that a term such as "life," taken from the contingent categorical realm, relates to the transcendentals: being, truth, good, and one. In describing analogy, they emphasize that God is free from every human limitation as purely spiritual, eternal, and necessary being. Theologically, a likeness of creation to deity is presupposed in spite of sin and indeed without reference to Christ's revelation. Knowledge of divine being comes by analogy from the world order even apart from faith. A causal image-archetype context is developed. The identity of essence and existence in God, joined with the cosmological argument, serves as the basis for analogy. Diekamp-Jüssen criticize the Protestant, Karl Barth, for his denial of the universal ability of human words and names to speak of deity. Barth's nominalistic position, it is alleged, leads to an arbitrary deity.

3. *Nature, Supernature, and Grace*

The fundamental Roman Catholic theological premise is that grace does not destroy but supports and perfects nature. Grace as participation in the life of God is the higher order. All of life is to be brought under its direction. It is not just moral change, but a new higher being with a supernatural goal. Protestants have conceived of the relation of nature and grace differently, in terms of justification by faith. Man's knowledge of God is radically corrupted by sin. Sin and not nature is the antithesis of grace. Revelation cannot be construed in terms of intellectual belief as subtraction and addition in a parallelism of nature and grace. There must be a more vital dialectic between faith and knowledge. Interconfessional discussion of analogy has turned on anthropology as Roman Catholics and Protestants have debated their basic presuppositions concerning nature and grace. Kühn in a carefully documented study points out that a variety of options appears in Roman Catholic interpretation: nature beside grace, nature directed to grace in concrete unity with it, or nature redeemed through grace.⁴ Neo-scholastic school dogmatics has emphasized the first. It envisages two levels in the objective knowledge of God. The distinctions which it employs date not only from the high middle ages, but also from Baroque scholasticism. Although the

character of grace is more often debated in interconfessional discussion than the structures of nature, it is the role of the latter which requires careful consideration in the study of analogy.

Stanislas Breton in his *Les Noms Divins et le problème actuel de l'Herméneutique*, in a detailed exposition, attempts to relate Neo-scholastic analogy to the contemporary discussion of hermeneutic.⁵ It becomes meaningless to ascribe attributes to deity if one is only willing to speak existentially, he argues. Breton uses analogy to criticize the demythologizing which he regards as also a desubstantializing. Rejecting substance for existence, Protestant dialectical theology defines God as the wholly other. Protestant existentialists speak of God in terms of "that" and "how" but not as "what." The "what" remains identified as the wholly other and is in fact understood from Heidegger's analysis of being. Analogy as a positive reference invokes the absolute. Negatively, God is known as one, simple, eternal, and immutable. However, analogy is also used positively to designate life, intelligence, love, and wisdom. Goodness, truth, and being are premised together in the divine perfection. God's action, external to his being in creation, redemption, and sanctification, like the Holy Trinity, is described analogously. Of course, in speaking of the one good, eternal, all-powerful God who is ultimate, all determination is a limitation and in a sense dangerous. God in his aseity exists outside contingency. Yet the divine names bring purification and unification in describing a relation that is asymmetrical. God as spiritual substance is the absolute reality to which men bear living relation. A unity of opposites points to his reality which is yet above polarity. Negation and the absolute are joined analogously in the affirmation of his mystery.

L. Malvez in his *Transcendance de Dieu et Creation des Valeurs* develops the theme of analogy polemically against H. Dumery.⁶ Dumery, formerly a priest and now a professor of philosophy, has written extensively on the philosophy of religion. Critics such as Malvez argue that he has moved outside of the limits of Catholic orthodoxy. Malvez urges that Catholicism premises rational argument, deduction, and even proof in rejection of a simply pragmatic approach to deity. Analogy is not just a rational exercise, but a way of relating to the fullness of being in participation and love. It makes possible knowledge of reality which exists in a different mode from our own, not by direct intuition but by concept. Malvez emphasizes that God is activity and existence, not just an object or idea; the Trinity is a dynamic and not simply a static concept. For analogical predication, God is not merely the pinnacle of the rational order of creation. Rather, as creator he is above all structures—One and absolute, the ultimate mystery. Epistemologically, analogy implies a doctrine of the degrees of knowledge and being. Of course, the relation of the human to the divine is not to be conceived simply in terms of natural teleology. The key terms in analogical predication are spirit, value, and essence. God's initiative is supernatural and impinges

on the natural. Analogy makes explicit the ontological relation of creator-creation in a polarity of the one and the many.

4. *Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, and Gollwitzer*

Protestant treatment of the idea of analogy has been less carefully defined than the Roman Catholic. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's "Habilitationsschrift," *Act and Being*, was written before he began teaching at the University of Berlin; it represents some of his most systematic reflection and antedates the Church struggle against the Nazis.⁷ Bonhoeffer praises the subtlety of Przywara's interpretation of analogy. He indicates that he shares at least part of the Jesuit's interest in epistemological questions which are left undiscussed in Barth's "revelation positivism." Bonhoeffer's disagreements with both Barth and Bultmann are explicit. He attacks their premises as neo-Kantian and proposes a drastic epistemological reappraisal. As an alternative, Bonhoeffer mentions the *analogia entis*. In the end, Bonhoeffer agrees with Barth that this reference does not lead to transcendence. He rejects Przywara's metaphysical interpretation for a more confessional, Christological stance. In fact, Przywara's view was much closer to Bonhoeffer's own theological premise than he realized. Przywara's interpretation of the analogy of being did not separate nature and grace as much as Bonhoeffer supposed and included as well an ecclesiology. It is the Incarnation, Bonhoeffer believes, which destroys the illusion that the Eternal can be encompassed in speculative ideas. Our knowledge of the self as well as deity remains confused apart from the insight given to the Church in this event. God's character as holy, righteous, and loving is not separable from these concrete determinations.

Bultmann and his followers have raised the question of our knowledge of God with new radicalism. Bultmann more than Barth accepted philosophical categories—in part those of the early Heidegger. Protestant theologians in his school have moved away from substantialist, rationalistic interpretations to more existential, historical bases. Among contemporary Lutheran theologians, criticism of Bultmann's demythologizing has evoked fresh interest in analogy. In an essay which dates from 1935, "What sense is there in talking of God?" Bultmann commented: "God does not permit himself to be spoken of in general propositions, universal truths which are true without reference to the concrete existential situation of the one who is talking." In *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, Bultmann wrote: "The question of God and the question of myself are identical."⁸ Does Bultmann's attempt to speak of God only as a determination of personal existence, together with the prohibition against making assertions about God himself, threaten to reduce deity to the states and changes of human existence? If we are to avoid all objective language, why should not God himself be demythologized? Buri charges that deity is only "a last remnant of illogically retained mythology."⁹

Helmut Gollwitzer, who holds the chair of Protestant philosophy and theology at the Free University of Berlin, has emphasized the ambiguity of Bultmann's position:

There is no doubt that Bultmann wishes to speak but "of the living God in whose hands our time rests. ..." But having underlined this very point ... we must now go on to show the extent to which Bultmann adopts an indecisive intermediary position which allows him neither to speak plainly of God in his independent reality nor to regard talk of God as improper.¹⁰

Bultmann himself expressed approval of analogy, although never giving his view about it in detail.¹¹ Gollwitzer turns to analogy for knowledge of God, in an attempt to find a non-mythological way of speaking of God which is not simply existential-personal:

The problem of analogy is one that Christian theology as a kind of thinking that has to do with suitable human ways of speaking of God is essentially bound to face. Even when the answer given to this problem by the doctrine of *analogia entis* is rejected, that cannot mean the repudiation of analogical thinking of every kind. Christian talk of God has as such an analogical structure—the decisive point is the closer definition of the concept of analogy, not the question of its application or rejection.¹²

Gollwitzer wishes to reject the Roman Catholic metaphysics of theism for a more dynamic, personal analogy in the tradition of Karl Barth.

5. *Traditional Analogy Doctrines*

The language of analogy was developed most carefully in scholastic and Counter Reformation Roman Catholic writings. Even thinkers who attempt to give the idea new expression cannot ignore its earlier forms entirely. For example, the distinction between attribution and proportionality dates from Cajetan.¹³ Thomas de Vio (1468-1534) formulated the dominant tradition of Thomistic interpretation in his *On the Analogy of Names*. The Counter Reformation Jesuit, Suarez, challenged Cajetan's categorization, favoring the analogy of attribution. The definition of its intrinsic, inner form as distinguished from its external form dates from his work. Suarez's followers argue that extrinsic attribution yields only a picture image or rhetorical figure; the same name is used with a fundamentally different realization. Intrinsic predication, however, indicates a real relation, designating an attribute which is realized only imperfectly in the dependent member but perfectly in the principle: A and B are related to C. As applied in the case of creator and creation, a relation of dependence is expressed through a common name. God is the primary analogatum. It must be emphasized that Cajetan's strict followers deny the worth of both forms of attribution, extrinsic and intrinsic, and favor instead the analogy of proper proportionality: A:B=C:D. It is argued that this form of analogy alone preserves God's freedom, absoluteness, and aseity, while still allowing the creature his own relative autonomy.¹⁴ Advocates of this type of analogy

are careful to state that it does not bring deity into full comprehension or view in spite of its mathematical form. All persons are believed to have a relation to being which differs in mode. God's being is identical and necessary; that of the creature is not. Whereas improper proportionality is picture-like and uses metaphor, proper proportionality employs a similarity of relation rather than of likeness. Cajetan develops analogy as a concept in which God in his way and man in his are related in more or less essential, gradual differences.

It is necessary to distinguish between different school traditions in trying to understand the varied expositions of our theme. In contemporary reinterpretation, expositors tend to choose their particular form of analogy in view of the focus and goal of their interests. The Jesuits, more than others, have followed Suarez, favoring the analogy of attribution. Chollet, Descoqs, Frick, Limbourg, Santeler, and van Steenberghe advocate this type. Blanche, Coreth, Fehr, Feuling, Leeuwen, Leist, Manser, Ries, Veauthier, Wagner, Woestyne, and Wyser speak for the analogy of proportionality.¹⁵ Not only are there wide differences in exposition among these interpreters, but the two forms of analogy are combined in a third school. The proponents of the so-called mixed group, claiming a complementary relation between the analogies of attribution and proportionality, are the smallest in number. A variety of rationales is offered. Brugger, for example, argues that the analogies of internal attribution and proper proportionality do not exclude each other, but are logically partial aspects of the same relation.¹⁶ Feckes agrees with Penido that the analogy of proportionality often virtually includes an analogy of attribution. Santeler uses both types simultaneously.¹⁷ In the mixed group, Lyttkens includes Maritain and R. P. Phillips.¹⁸ Of course, there are critics such as Bange who demand a clearer distinction between the analogies of proportionality and attribution; others protest against the joining of the analogy of being and the analogy of faith.¹⁹ These two types of characterization, being and faith, which we will consider subsequently, are not competing forms with attribution and proportionality. Walker explains that they are not so much modalities as the expression of a particular understanding of the world, faith, and deity.²⁰

Metaphor, like the analogy of proper proportionality, has four terms. It is dynamic, but lacks the clear identifying definition in which every analogate is in a determined relation to the *proprium esse*. The *analogia entis* describes the relation of God to his being and the world to its being, as one of similarity and dissimilarity, likeness and difference. Similarity is in the relation to being, dissimilarity is its mode. Brugger emphasizes that analogical predication is not premised on a *tertium commune* between God and the creature.²¹ On the contrary, all creaturely modes of being have a common goal in God. Brugger regards the analogy of attribution as an essential enlargement of the analogy of proportionality. It is important to note that

commentators who follow Aquinas most carefully vary in their defense of analogy.²² Hengstenberg, for example, argues that analogy is possible only after proof of God's existence. Feckes, on the other hand, concludes that analogy is necessary to it. Feuling urges that being is the proper object of knowledge of the human spirit. Because man is made in the image of God, an analogy of faith alone is not enough. God in man and man in God in truth and in grace, requires the analogy of being for explication.

6. *Contemporary Roman Catholic Interpretation: Manser, Platzeck, Hengstenberg*

It would be a mistake to suppose that Roman Catholic commentators have not attempted to make contact with modern epistemologies. On the contrary, the analogy of being has been used as an apologetic reference. Emerich Coreth, S.J., who teaches at the University of Innsbruck, develops his exposition on the premise that man and being are in specific relation with each other.²³ He borrows from Heidegger, and a Bultmann-like *Vorverständnis* of being is implied in his view. It surrounds and exceeds the inquiring person. Man stands in an open horizon, already knowing about it. Coreth warns against viewing the concept of being from simply a single dimension. The very fact that man can ask the question of being implies a relation between the questioner and what is asked. Coreth introduces the analogy of being in consideration of the polarity between "already" and "never." It indicates that man is in tension between immanence and transcendence. Analogy allows that beings remain what they are in the comprehending unity of being. Plurality and univocity are together. However, analogy is first and univocity follows in abstraction. For Coreth, the concept of being is not derived from any other conceptual form; on the contrary, logic follows being. It is analogy which is the primary epistemological postulate as well as the presupposition of unity. Coreth argues that its basic metaphysical form is one between finite beings everywhere and infinite being. He distinguishes between the order of thought and the order of being. Whereas in the first analogy the relationship is primarily from below to above, in the second it is the reverse, from above to below. God as purely positive absolute cannot be reached directly and univocally. Yet analogy leaves open an unlimited possibility of ascent. There is a positive element even in negative affirmation as God is recognized to be mystery.

Gallus M. Manser defends Aristotelian-Thomistic realism in the tradition of Cajetan.²⁴ He favors the analogy of proportionality with bases in mathematics as well as metaphysics and attempts to give it precise epistemological definition. Manser remarks that the way in which the problems involved in the interpretation of analogy are resolved depends on the particular theory of knowledge employed. He rejects idealism, empiricism, and nominalism, alleging that all allow no real difference in things, as they deny the *conceptus*

objectivus of being. Being, in his view, is an inclusive reality which is in all as truth, unity, and goodness. Manser accepts Cajetan's description of analogy as relative identity in transcendental relation. Transcendental being is not a thing-in-itself, separated from the world of things, but out of and in things. Manser gives priority to the thing itself, the *ratio re*, which he regards as the object of human knowledge. Known first, it is subsequently interpreted. There is no direct knowledge of singulars as nominalism supposed, and Occam's rejection of analogy on this premise was unjustified. Manser acknowledges that univocity dominates in the categories: transcendentality is known only imperfectly in existence. However, it is in transcendental being that the locus of primary unity is found. Initially, concepts can come only from the categorical realm; it is analogy which gives them a transcendental meaning. Of course, we do not reach God's absolute wisdom. Nonetheless we may say that wisdom is intrinsic to both creator and creature. Analogical description is premised on the relative but essential difference that one is inferior to the other.

The major voice raised against the Thomistic analogy of being in the medieval period came from the Franciscans; today, they continue to argue for Scotus's *univocatio entis*. Timotheus Barth, Pacificus Borgmann, and Novatus Pickard all write in the Scotist tradition. Pickard argues that transcendental concepts are univocal.²⁵ Scholastic philosophy and theology were simply underdeveloped. They had not worked out the Greek concept of analogy sharply enough to distinguish uncertainty with *proportionalitatis interna* and *externa*. Borgmann argues that ontological and semantic-grammatical problems remain; the scholastic concept of being was not abstract enough and was loaded with hylomorphism. He finds chaos in concepts of univocation and analogy, and urges that clarification is necessary 1. ontologically, 2. grammatically, and 3. logically. The debate between Thomists and Scotists concerns questions of order. For the latter, analogy is not first and basic but subsequent and derived. It is important to note that some contemporary Roman Catholic theologians regard the alternative of *analogia entis* or *univocatio entis* as less definitive and an academic question. For example, Michael Schmaus of the University of Munich claims that univocity rather than analogy was basic for Albertus Magnus and Aquinas in the categorical realm.²⁶

Rolf Walker's study of analogy as concept and method ranks among the most comprehensive by any Protestant to date. Walker concludes that the majority of commentators leave the logical element in analogy unanalyzed. The most notable exception, according to Walker, is the Franciscan, Erhard-Wolfram Platzek.²⁷ Platzek argues that the idea of analogy has not been formulated adequately either in medieval or in modern logic. He speaks against a similarity of merely two relations in parallel, insisting on three proportions and six terms. Logically, the relation of finite "that" and "what"

to infinite essence must be expressed as not-not-existing and a not-Not-Something. Platzcek argues that causality is not logically expressible. The fact is that we cannot come logically to the second analogate as between total and partial cause. God's existence cannot be presumed to be known apart from his essence; one is as undefined as the other. Most traditional forms of analogy, Platzcek charges, develop Aristotelian causality on Neoplatonic premises. Platzcek attempts to clarify the existential moment in the God-man relation, in order to avoid this confusion. He agrees with Descoqs as against Penido that the analogy of attribution must be more than merely one of name. Platzcek's *Von Analogie zum Syllogismus* is a singular example of the type of research necessary to critical explication of the idea of analogy; it is an examination of his subject in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg, also a Roman Catholic, resolves epistemological ambiguities which appear in the definition of analogy on theological premises.²⁸ Hengstenberg's view is formulated in conscious criticism of Karl Barth's position, but is none the less influenced by it. Hengstenberg urges that the similarity between God and creation cannot be defined simply from Aristotelian metaphysical premises, but requires revelation. Aquinas was unable to offer any real content to analogy on his premises. Natural theology, although showing that God exists, gives too little knowledge about him. It simply does not offer enough determination to illumine concrete existence. For example, love remains impersonal and universal. Theology joins philosophy in Hengstenberg's view under the priority of the Trinitarian concept of God. He describes analogy as an unfolding of knowledge which we already have of the creator, together with the grace which binds us to him. Revelation has the dominant role in Hengstenberg's *analogia trinitatis*. It has a characteristically double form, positive and negative, in his exposition. There is an incomplete similarity to the perfections of God in direct analogy of being, essence, and love. An ever greater dissimilarity points to the creature's limitations in time, space and matter. Hengstenberg's Trinitarian analogy is a dynamic which joins the acts of God and creation and illumines love in its inner fullness. Created *esse* and pure act of God meet, and deity is disclosed as the absolute meaning of existence.

III. HISTORICAL SURVEY

1. Plato

Przywara finds that Plato, more than any other thinker, laid the basis for later interpretations of analogy. Whitehead's comment that all subsequent philosophy has been a footnote on his ideas, could be applied to our theme.¹

The method of analogy was used earlier in Greek religion and by poets and philosophers of nature. Eberhard Jüngel has shown that it was already present in the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus.² Yet it was Plato most of all who clarified and elevated its usage for both philosophy and religion. Przywara argues that his basic polarities of the one and the many, being and becoming, the eternal and temporal, all relate to it.

Unlike Przywara, Thomists generally hold that only the analogical structure of the notion of being, not the analogy of being itself, is to be found in Plato's works: the *Sophist* 15 is the closest he came to such a reference, which they find to be explicit in Aristotle.³ Pannenberg argues that all of Plato's analogies require at least a limited univocity of being. Whatever the differences with subsequent interpretation, it is clear that analogy had a central place in Plato's reflection as he attempted to deal with the problem of diversity of relationship. He believed that the unity of reality is such that the novel or unknown can be approached by negation. In effect, Plato used philosophical analogy as a resource for surpassing the particular and natural limits of individual human experience. He found a resemblance in spite of difference between objects given in our experience and others which escape it. Analogy is possible because this resemblance reduces to one of relations.

Grenet has made a careful study of analogy in the Platonic dialogues. He concludes that three elements are necessary to a rigorously stated analogy: 1. resemblance in the midst of dissemblance, 2. two terms from heterogeneous orders of reality or at least from two irreducible planes of knowledge, and 3. resemblance of relations and not just a relation of resemblance, a likeness of relation or proportionality and not just of things.⁴ Lyttkens argues that Plato was the first philosopher to use analogy without any direct relation to mathematics.⁵ His research shows that Plato employed this concept in three or even four different ways. First, its original mathematical character is retained in some of Plato's exposition. For example, like mathematical relations are assumed to exist between cosmic elements. Secondly, Plato identifies analogous general relations between various kinds of knowledge and spheres of reality. Thirdly, he employs analogy to designate similarity in function between two things. Instead of expressing like relations between two couples, it indicates only similarity of function in two different entities. Finally, Plato applies analogy to logical definitions of certain concepts and their uses rather than to likeness or relations between different phenomena. In such a role, it is used to indicate the nature of these concepts.

Plato looked for universal relational concepts amid the manifold of particulars. Objects which share the same prototype have a common self-identical essence and logos. Platonic analogy distinguishes pattern and structure in a system of relations. Being rather than non-being, the immanence and transcendence of truth is presupposed. However, meaning is not reduced to a single univocal pattern. Grenet describes Platonic analogy

as a way of expanding and extending knowledge which enables us to know the super-sensible even amid the limits of our situation in the world.⁶ Plato used notional synthesis for comparison of objects or groups of objects of radically distinct orders, for example, the sensible and intelligible. Grenet remarks that his discovery of analogy is epitomized in his belief that similarity of relations has an incomparable power of synthesis.⁷ In this context, analogy becomes a tool for representation of objects which are situated outside of human experience by mediation of conceptions taken from it. Earlier in religion, myth had been used for similarity of both persons and relations. Plato kept only the latter.

Plato's intellectualism must be distinguished radically as an alternative to the popular analogies which depicted the divine from the world of men. He believed that the limits of man's being can be clearly identified in terms of corporeality. The *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus* give evidence of his conviction that the body is an obstacle to the fullness and purity of thought. The physical stands in the way of complete attention to intelligence. Moreover, the Platonic spiritualism is inevitably aristocratic. Philosophers have the ability to know both beauty and the forms. Vulgar men are not able to apprehend the divine. Homer as well as the divination of the poets had described the gods anthropomorphically. Popular religion tended to destroy the mystery of the sacred by substituting anthropomorphic analogy for the divine mystery. With different motivation, philosophers of nature applied analogy in more impersonal forms in search for the causes of phenomena. Anaxagoras, for example, mixed the mechanical analogy of water in rotation with the more philosophical analogy of intelligence. In his philosophy, Heraclitus drew on the notions of war and fire in his attempt to describe the universe. It was the genius of Plato's more profoundly metaphysical solution that it rejected an immanentistic pantheistic monism as well as the absolute transcendence of irrational mysticism.

How much can Platonic analogy be claimed for later Christian theology? Grenet argues convincingly, citing particular passages, that Platonic analogy is qualitative and not simply quantitative.⁸ Plato's dialectic is characterized by a profound sense of the purity of spiritual being, together with a logos and structures which can be known intellectually. Plato uses myth consciously for pedagogical purposes even as he rejects the anthropomorphic analogies common in Greek popular religion. His tale of the fashioning of the world by the Demiurge from a model reflects his underlying dualism as well as the fundamentally esthetic character of his analogy. This assuredly limits his usefulness for later Christian theology. Przywara speaks of an "undying struggle" between God and demons.⁹ Biblical voluntarism and theodicy are not present. Yet claims are made for a just providence in the dialogues. Calhoun emphasizes that Plato did not regard the Good as ineffable in the later Neoplatonic sense.

Calhoun argues that Plato constructs an analogical notion of a universal intelligent cause through the accumulation of empirical notions.¹⁰ Using an exterior analogy, he speaks of a "divine engineer"; "chief," "guide," and "father" are used more personally. Construction of an analogical notion of intellect is based on a metaphysical hypothesis. The Good is identified with intelligence and intelligence with cause; anthropomorphism is rejected. Plato often substitutes a more familiar image for a less known object. The limitations of our knowledge are evident in the fact that even the soul itself can be known only by substituting a sensible image. Physical objects cannot be grasped because of their mobility and require such an image. However, with respect to the divine, one cannot substitute an image but must speak analogically. An analogical notion is substituted for the pure form in describing deity. Negation is used in rejection of anthropomorphism. Platonic analogy presupposes a positive reference. God as essentially good is not the cause of evil nor is he susceptible to imperfections or change.

Grenet acknowledges that analogy is increasingly mathematized in Plato's later works.¹¹ For example, the soul of the world is given a mathematical structure. Against this orientation, he notes the importance of artistic imitation. Mathematics itself may reflect harmonies. We should not identify beauty in itself with its exemplifications, but instead must have recourse to analogy in its description. For Plato, religious, moral, and artistic activity stand together. Religion is imitation of the divine. Through analogy, an object essentially different from that given in human experience becomes none the less knowable.¹² Lyttkens calls attention to the indefiniteness of Platonic analogy. Plato, although establishing analogous relations in the hierarchy of being, gives no direct account of their similarity. Of course, a partial explanation is to be found in the correspondence between the degree of truth or reality of an object with the degree of its clearness in the subject. Analogy does not presuppose that all terms have a common property, e.g., reality or truth, but only that the degree of such a property is comparable.

Cosmological references to the concept of analogy appear primarily in the *Republic* together with the *Timaeus*.¹³ Plato describes it as a unity-creating bond that makes the world symmetrical, harmonious, and in accord with itself. He invokes geometrical analogy to establish a series of mutually corresponding proportions. A fixed numerical relation establishes the qualities of each element and their intensities together with that of contrary qualities. It is in this way that Plato attempts to correlate the two fundamental elements, earth and fire, by means of a third which serves as a link between them. The indefiniteness of his analogy is evident, inasmuch as he does not state specifically how we are to conceive the mathematical relations for which these four elements are terms. Rather, he tells us only that the Demiurge joins them in such a way as to form an analogy. Of course, the basic conviction is clear: the intrinsic agreement of the world is one of

analogy and symmetry. Plato believed that the harmony in the universe depends on these different elements being connected in such an agreement. Analogy as used in this context is not mathematically exact, because the activities of the Demiurge are restricted by necessity. Lyttkens finds that Plato shifts from saying that certain things belong to an analogy through similarity of relations to a qualitative similarity signifying a given structure or function of a thing.¹⁴

For Plato, knowledge built on the visible world will always be inadequate. True knowledge comes from true reality, which is found in the world of ideas. His epistemology identifies similar interrelations of things and "typologizes" particular concepts and their uses. Analogy is a mean which bears a relation to, but is not identical with, truth. Plato emphasizes that the nature of our concepts depends on the objects they represent. He is explicit that human nature itself prevents us from possessing divine truth fully. He suggests further that we must necessarily use temporal categories in speaking of God, although only an eternal present can be applied properly to deity.

2. Aristotle

Although Aristotle did not use the phrase "analogy of being," it is often claimed as a constituent category of his philosophy. Clearly, his primary interest was logical, ethical, and metaphysical rather than religious.¹⁵ Christian theological significance became attached to his interpretation in Aquinas's effort to relate faith and reason positively. Allowing the largest, most ample differentiation, and premised on likeness rather than identity, Aristotelian analogy was transferred to the Christian deity. Aristotle, like Plato, used analogy to link different fields of knowledge and to express interrelationships. Lyttkens has studied the place of Aristotelian formulation in Thomism in detail. He holds that Aristotelian analogy originally had a mathematical source, citing the definition in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1131a, 31f, which describes the equality of two proportions, that is, a proportionality.¹⁶ Platzcek, a Franciscan, has attempted to demonstrate how Aristotle gave analogy a more definite logical form than Plato.¹⁷ Puntel questions whether such a conclusion, even if established, solves the problem of analogical predication.¹⁸ Plato had linked the sensible world to the realm of ideas by a proportion, and the image-prototype relation was primary in his view. As a biologist, Aristotle proceeded from concrete things, attempting to determine whether or not they have the same properties. His analogy is more multivocal. He employed this reference to classify likeness between different genera; analogy identifies similarity of function even in very different entities.

The *Nicomachean Ethics* is cited as evidence for the claim that Aristotle understood being as an analogical concept. He uses analogy to compare two or more qualities in ethics. Virtue is described as the capacity to be in

between. Analogy as applied to ethics is a middle or mean which enables us to view qualities in harmonious or disharmonious relation. In all the unidentical relationships of friendship, for example, it is analogy which expresses unity in difference and difference in unity. Good is not merely a homonym or synonym; it has no univocal universal concept in all categories. However, Aristotle does not make the threefold distinction between univocal, equivocal, and analogical. His classification is only a double one. All things are synonymous with a common name and logos, or simply homonymous with just a name in common. Aristotle has not decided whether relational statements belong to homonym or synonym. Pannenberg emphasizes that homonym is not metaphorical analogy; the image-copy reference is avoided.¹⁹ For Aristotle, metaphysical analogy is at most a border possibility. His orientation of all being on substance was expanded in the Neoplatonic cosmos, as it was used to describe what is common to the known and the unknown.

In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle uses analogy to denote qualitative likeness of structure. He proceeds on the assumption that a concept may be transferred from one thing to another by reason of general correspondence or similarity. Lyttkens finds that it is difficult to decide what analogy really signifies as a means of describing metaphysical structure; it is only a general likeness.²⁰ To be sure, Aristotle tries to be more specific. Book V of the *Philosophical Dictionary* describes analogy as likeness of relations without designating any particular kind of similarity. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of unity: numerical, specific, generic, and analogous. In each case, the wider unity comprises the narrower; thus analogy comprises the generic but the generic does not constitute the analogous. In the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains that the four causes and three fundamental metaphysical principles (form, privation, and matter) are analogously common to all things. Two other principles, actuality and potentiality, are analogously the same. However, they not only vary in diverse entities but also apply to things in a different way.

Pannenberg warns that Aristotle's first principles are not univocal concepts from which the manifold can be abstracted.²¹ No universal synonym is affirmed for being. Concepts, although multivocal, treat properties with corresponding functions. Analogy becomes a kind of comprehensive category used to identify connections between things whose qualities cannot be compared directly; it is applied to a plurality of things which are believed to have a corresponding function, and allows for gradations and tensions in being in a variety of perspectives. Lyttkens finds that Aristotle transfers analogy from the likeness of proportions of two couples to likeness of function of two properties.²² But functions are not independent of proportional terms as in mathematics. Whereas the mathematical analogy states the actual likeness of relations univocally, form and matter are con-

cepts which are applied to a multitude of different things. Lyttkens protests that analogy is used to join different categories without consideration of what constitutes the likeness of relations. Puntel finds that unity and difference and the eventfulness of being are not clarified. These limitations, Puntel believes, are carried over into later analogy doctrine in a Christian context.

The Thomistic appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy in the formulation of a metaphysics of analogy remains of continuing importance. Aalders has attempted to summarize the contribution of Aristotle for later doctrines of the analogy of being. He emphasizes that being for Aristotle is not a minimum but a maximum; it is not an abstraction but a reality.²³ In Aristotle's view, the world is characterized by endless differentiation as well as synthesis. Attempting to place everything in relation, he avoids strong identity as well as sharp antithesis. He believes that the higher does not exclude but includes both the general and lower. The distinction between potential-actual affords a logical basis for many different levels and nuances of reality in life as well as thought. Connection and relation have a primary place in Aristotle's understanding of the world. Analogy is relevant in a view which claims that thinking and what is thought have a unity but not identity. Even as we make distinctions in consciousness, we remain related to essential being. Reality is not deduced from anything, but is always present in some concrete way. Aristotle's metaphysics finds a logical place for everything in the cosmic rhythm of being and becoming. Being as immanent unites all categories, matter and form, potentiality and actuality. It shows itself in experience. However, it is not self-complete in the world. Beyond all temporal, finite reality is the unmoved, unchanging eternal being, actuality without potentiality and form without matter. Even as it causes everything else, it remains unchanged in itself. Everything outside of it is moved by it, follows it, and participates in it.

3. *Neoplatonism*

The difference between the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ethos is evident. Plotinus rejected Aristotle's theory of the categories. He remarked that if anything at all from sensible substance applies to the spiritual, it is only because of homonym, that is, a common name. Neoplatonic belief was that the whole universe emanates from a single principle. It viewed the cosmos as a hierarchy of both vertical and horizontal series. Vertically, everything has its source in the One. Horizontally, a first monad on each level is the cause of all that exists. Pannenberg has pointed out the obvious dangers in such an approach: pantheism on the one hand or a harmless transcendent on the other.²⁴ Knowledge of God all too easily disappears in a dialectic of negative theology. Plotinus described God as the One beyond all form or idea and transcending the antithesis between subject and object.²⁵ All

concrete relations were subsumed under more universal ones in an analogy of only two members in different grades of being. Things were no longer believed to participate in ideas in the earlier sense of Plato. Plotinus held that the soul sees the intelligible intuitively and need not travel the long way round of the senses.

Analogy can proceed from above downward, making transfers from the intelligible to the sensible world. Plotinus's view is distinguished from earlier philosophy by its radical emphasis on mystical seeking; such seeking is the knowledge of the highest Good. A common logos with the spiritual world can never be expressed adequately, as God transcends all logical priority. Although the soul is in contact with the intelligible, the unfathomable One remains above both the self and conceptual knowledge. Neoplatonism conceived of effects as remaining in as well as emanating from and reverting to their cause. What the one has primarily the other has secondarily. This is possible because the difference between them is primarily in intensity rather than degree. There is continuity from higher to lower. Prototype is related to image, ideas to things, in effective causality. In general, likeness is understood to mean that the effect as the secondary member has something which corresponds to the primary one, the cause. The same characteristic, although differently realized, is common to different spheres of reality. It is important to note that later Neoplatonists debated whether knowledge of God is equivocal or analogical, and the majority favored the former.

The Neoplatonic heritage was mediated through Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. His writings were accepted as from the apostolic age, and he was identified with the disciple of Paul described in Acts 17:34. Three constituents of analogy doctrine can be identified in his interpretation.²⁶

1. As in the *Timaeus*, elements of things are ordered in proportional relation.
2. A mathematical theme is present in terms of a proportional, distributive justice. God gives rank to each thing analogously. The highest Good lights nature. Whether we are near or far, its light draws us to it in knowledge. Illumination is espoused but does not bring one immediately to God.
3. Analogical relations are beginning points for the divine knowledge. Effects help us to see God the cause who is finally nameless. Pseudo-Dionysius does not identify any constant, abiding structure or limits as in Plato. He quotes Plato's statement that God has created all things because of his goodness. As God wishes to draw them into community with himself, he has appointed for each according to its own analogy. The divine justice orders individual things in their appointed numbers and preserves the analogy of each. Analogy denotes a thing's grade in the hierarchy.

4. Augustine

Is the *analogia entis* to be found in Augustine? Lyttkens reports that he

knew the analogy of proportionality, but did not employ it extensively.²⁷ Commenting on Cicero's version of Stoic analogy, Augustine argued that there is no *ratio comparationis* between God and the creature. Yet this is not all that he had to say about the problem of analogy. Augustine's conversion was inspired by the reading of Pauline texts from the New Testament together with later Neoplatonic philosophy. His interpretation joined these two references, Pauline and Platonic. He affirmed that all things exist from and receive their individuality by participation in the divine ideas. The mark of the divine workmanship is evident in the truth and beauty of the world. Early in his career as a Christian, under Neoplatonic influence, he premised a hierarchy of being based on differing participation in *esse*. However, unlike Neoplatonism, Augustine's approach to God was not simply negative. He speaks more positively, often in Biblical terms. The truth of all things is dependent on a likeness to Christ who is the truth. The Son is the absolute and perfect likeness of the Father.

Przywara argues that the analogy of being was already implicit in earlier patristic thought. It came to its fullness in one major form—personal rather than cosmological—in Augustine's writing.²⁸ The Augustinian way finds the presence of God within the human person as it reflects on the soul's ascent to its source and end. To be sure, analogy is not simply internal-personal in a subjective sense. All creatures have their origin in God, but exemplify only imperfectly in their contingency the being which deity possesses in fullness. Augustine viewed God as absolutely simple; creation in its different grades reflects his authorship. Although of different nature, the divine and the human are related analogically. Augustine's strategy is first to take away everything changeable and imperfect from human concepts in a *via eminentia* and then to conceive of the divine attributes more perfectly. Everything belonging to the sensible world must be removed from God, as he is purely spiritual. Although a trace of the Trinity may be seen in material things, it is man alone who bears the image of God. The soul—memory, intellect and will—reflects the divine pattern. It is when the soul turns away from the external, sensible world and contemplates itself that it moves toward the knowledge of God. All of God's attributes are identical, the same as God himself and his *esse*. It is the contingency characteristic of creation which makes our knowledge less than a unity. Yet seen in a larger context, it may be a step on the way to God.

The Augustinian approach is illuministic in both its epistemology and its metaphysics. Analogy in such an outlook is not primarily cosmological or based on abstraction as in Thomistic formulation. Does it then yield knowledge at all? Faith seeking understanding is premised from the outset. Interpreters such as Przywara find the analogy of being implicit throughout Augustine's writings, in the polarities of finite-infinite, temporal-eternal, relative-absolute. J. V. Langmead Casserley in *The Christian in Philosophy*

argues that it is not an analogy from the world—cosmological—but a more personal one—from the self to God—which has been determinative for Christian theistic interpretation.²⁹ Augustine and not Aquinas was the chief architect of the Catholic synthesis. Turning inward, Augustine found the presence of the absolute in the soul in a relationship which was experienced before it was ever described analogically.

Casserley urges that earlier Greek philosophies left no place for the concrete individual. The major classical philosophers moved from the universal to the particular and from the particular to the universal. Augustine's Christian Platonism embodied a radical innovation. His voluntarism allowed a more thoroughgoing personal identity and sense of the singular as well as of history. It is important to note that the main traditions of classical Greek philosophy do not separate object and idea in the sense of nominalism. Being is known from three sources: the external world, God, and the self. Casserley emphasizes that it is the latter two which have priority in Plato and Augustine. Because there is not identity between God and the soul, an analogy reference becomes necessary and relevant. Augustinian analogy is a "knowing in a greater not-knowing," as concept opens "over-out" to mystery.³⁰ The Augustinian tradition continued in Anselm and Bonaventura, Descartes and Hegel, giving priority to the structures of the self and its mode of knowledge more than to the external world.

Casserley interprets the ontological argument as characteristically Platonic-Augustinian rather than Aristotelian-Thomistic. He describes its classical Christian form in Anselm as an affirmation of the unique singularity of being. Anselm no more than Augustine attempted to produce experience from thought, but to know the self. Casserley argues that analogy alone can express the concrete particularity of historical experience. Anselm concluded that all rational men must believe in God because he is in fact present in inward experience in a unique singularity which can be expressed only analogically. Anselm attempted to demonstrate that we know God even in advance of concept. Essence does not presuppose existence except in this one case. God is both immanent and transcendent. Thomists have urged that Augustinianism perennially mixes philosophy and religious experience in a way which makes argument unclear. Casserley finds that their nature-supernature distinction does not make clear how faith and reason are in perennial dialectic. He conceives of the cosmological argument as an expression of faith seeking understanding and not in itself conclusive.

Both Casserley and Przywara urge that Augustine's anthropology is of decisive importance for his doctrine of analogy. Writing in the concluding chapters of his *Confessions*, Augustine describes time as measured in the soul. He points out that our consciousness moves between past and future in a specious present. The present leaves us as soon as we recognize it. The notes of a piece of music are related in memory, fading away even as we hear

their sound. God by contrast unites past, present, and future as in a timeless moment. For us, self-knowledge does not stand alone in its finitude, but is related analogically to deity. The soul seeks certainty but doubt continues. What cannot be doubted, Augustine asks; and replies, one's own act of doubting and the self which doubts. Even in its finitude, created being bears the marks of a reality which transcends it and is inexplicable apart from the absolute. Casserley urges that Augustinian analogy is joined to a sense of singularity and history. In revelation, an analogy relation between God and the world is made known in event. The Biblical view is dramatic and personal. Analogy does not make experience; it discovers rather than invents the eventfulness of history. Przywara's way of stating the matter is to say that Augustine joined existential emphases to a doctrine of structure and essence. In contemporary terms, the analogy of being and the analogy of faith may be said to be interrelated in his view.

5. *Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura*

There is a lack of continuity of development between the earlier Neoplatonic and later scholastic concepts of analogy.³¹ The beginning of the scholastic distinction between equivocal and univocal is found in Boethius. His commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle utilize this distinction. In his writings, however, analogy is not yet identified as a middle or mean between the two extremes of univocation and equivocation; it remains a particular kind of equivocation. It was Alexander of Hales, drawing on Averroes, who explicitly defined analogy as a mean between univocation and equivocation and brought the so-called middle view into favor.³² Alexander joined the Neoplatonic causal scheme with the ideas of this Jewish philosopher, utilizing insights found in Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus. Pannenberg notes that the analogy of proportionality is not present in his thought. Instead, Alexander applied substance and accident categories to the creator-creation relation and interpreted essence and existence as a single unity in God.³³

It is the Neoplatonic illuministic metaphysic along with causality, however, which made possible description of an analogical relation between God and creation.³⁴ In high scholasticism, the Neoplatonic approach is developed most fully in the image-prototype pattern of Bonaventura. Analogy is interpreted in terms of illumination. The image of God in creation has different grades, reflecting the Trinitarian deity as creator, reconciler, and redeemer. Bonaventura, like Alexander a Franciscan, premises a similarity of form in qualitative relations. There is not an identity of nature, but only an order and proportion of relations. In such a context, the knowledge of God is not immediate but only from his effects. There is no participation in the divine essence. Nonetheless, the divine light changes the human spirit.

The knowledge of God which comes with the divine help is only one part of the process of *imitatio* as *confirmatio*.

6. Aquinas

Aquinas does not speak directly of an analogy of being. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that the phrase expresses his fundamental outlook concerning the relation of God and man. He bases analogy on a theological premise, even as he develops it both philosophically and theologically. *Analogia entis* becomes *analogia scientiae* in his usage. Aquinas begins from being as an evident and simple first principle. It is always subject and never predicate; we think about it without creating it. All principles are based upon it and it excludes non-being. To be sure, being has many different forms. Aristotle has shown how many-sided it is. Created beings are not absolute, but limited and temporal in accordance with the capacity of their natures as received from God. The divine being is immaterial, imperishable, and eternal. Only God exists in himself; everything else has its existence from him. The source of being is not to be found in any species or genus. God is *ens simpliciter* as well as *ens maximum*.

Aquinas's formulation premises a careful methodological balance. In the order of being, priority is with deity. The world is designated from God and derives its conceptual significance from him. However, in the order of knowledge, we must proceed from the world to God. Likeness is always on the side of creation. Our knowledge requires a concept taken from the world. Through analogy, Aquinas attempts to formulate a perspective which makes God accessible to our human conceptuality as well as divisible into different properties. Such division is only from our point of view, inasmuch as God is absolute unity. In order to express a divine property in a human manner, Aquinas employs names from which an abstraction is possible. Lyttkens remarks that the more indefinite the concept, the easier its transfer to God.³⁵ Presupposing the causal bond, Aquinas turns to an absolutely indefinite and undefined *esse*, disregarding mode. He premises analogy on the claim that God and creation both have the property of *esse*; both exist.

Aquinas believes that knowledge of God is possible because the world is an effect which resembles its creator. Causality is the premise of his negative as well as his positive theology. He speaks of a three-fold way to God, using a distinction of Pseudo-Dionysius: causality, *via negativa*, and *via eminentia*. If they are regarded from the point of view of what has been received, all the perfections of creation may be ascribed to God as effects. However, he is far above any of these; the characteristics ascribed to him must be understood to exist in a higher and more perfect way. Negatively, we know God as the first cause, immovable prime mover, and highest being. Positively, we may speak of him through the causal analogy or by deduction from some property

which is known from the proofs of his existence. It is the causal analogy which enables us to understand how varied names can be applied to God without contradicting his unity. Both the positive and negative are used together in analogy. The first is relevant as effects are understood to imitate the divine essence in different ways. The second is necessary as one considers the limits under which they are invoked and understood.

Attention to the idea of likeness between God as cause and creation as his effect belongs in particular to Neoplatonism.³⁶ Lyttkens points out that Aristotle does not use the idea of likeness between cause and effect to describe the relation between God and the world.³⁷ He acknowledges that Aristotle does argue that the cause of an effect transfers a form of the same type as its own. However, he concludes that three important Neoplatonic claims underlie Aquinas's interpretation. First, that unity precedes the manifold. The higher in the hierarchical scale, the greater is the unity. At the same time, the higher comprises all that is subordinate and more divided. With respect to deity, this means that God in himself comprises all of his effects while creation constitutes a dwindling scale of likeness to him. Second, Aquinas adopted the Neoplatonic claim that a cause is superior to its effect. Equivocal are distinguished from univocal causes in that a property in the effect exists in the cause in a more perfect way. Third, Aquinas accepted that the effect exists in the cause in the mode of the effect. This premise allows for a difference in likeness and unlikeness between God and creation. Aquinas associated likeness between God and the world primarily with a likeness of form. He speaks of effects as pre-existing intellectually in the divine essence. The Neoplatonic mode is developed by direct analogies taken from Aristotle.

It is important to note that Aquinas does not teach that God and creation have a common being through which they are interrelated. There are not three references, God, creation, and the being common to both. Aquinas speaks only of God with his being, and creation which receives its own particular nature and existence from him. There is ultimately only one last reality, namely, God. God's being alone is self-existent. Yet Aquinas's interpretation does leave a place for a variety of different forms and gradations of being in the world. The connection between object and thought, fully perfect in God, is present gradationally throughout all creation. Thought and existence in space-time are not opposed to being; rather, various forms of being are constituted as differentiated steps toward God. Although an indefinite number of predicates may attach to it, its value and reality are never empty or undetermined. All being has its source and ground in God and is per se good. There is truth in all things because of their relation to the highest truth of the divine mind. *Esse* is based phenomenologically and metaphysically as well as religiously.

A number of careful post-war studies have provided a new critical, comprehensive interpretation of Aquinas's interpretation of *esse*. The distinction

between *essentia* and *esse* is indispensable to Aquinas's analogy doctrine. They are united only in deity, as God and his being are the same. *Essentia* and *esse* are interrelated but not identical in a wide variety of relations in the world. *Essentia* is possibility, the form which gives *esse* reality in the material. *Esse*, conceived and known in *essentia*, is self-evident but complex. Does their polarity denote a "real" difference, Puntel asks?³⁸ *Esse* exists primarily in God and only secondarily in the creature. Yet if one does not know God's *esse* directly, how is understanding possible? Puntel argues that the ontological difference is defined as it were "from above," primarily in terms of God's being rather than that of the creature. He charges that the divine perfection, although described substantially, remains undetermined historically. There is formal identity but no real difference in distinguishing between righteousness, wisdom, truth, and goodness in God. Analogy is based on the concept of *esse*, but this concept is never clearly defined, particularly at the point of difference between man and God. In fact, Puntel concludes, such a model never really "enables" the deity to get "outside" of himself in real historical relation to the world.

Aquinas presupposes that things are made like God insofar as they exist. Analogy makes it possible to speak together of God and the creation. Limitation is imposed in the sense that correlation between God and creation is unilateral. Aquinas is careful to speak of gradations only in relation to each other and not to deity. God, the first and general principle of all being, is beyond completion, the measure of all measures as well as being in itself. Creation resembles God but God does not resemble it. From the divine point of view, according to Aquinas, all of God's properties could be designated by a single name. The divine unity is without any division into different properties such as goodness or truth. However, we are unable to designate God except from his several effects. Thus there is plurality from below, as it were. Various analogous concepts must be used, inasmuch as the essence of God cannot be expressed by one concept.

7. Thomistic Schools

Cardinal Cajetan's systematic interpretation of Thomistic analogy has been definitive for the dominant tradition. He composed his *De Nominum Analogia* when only thirty years old, at the beginning of a distinguished career. John of St. Thomas wrote: "the difficulties concerning analogy which are more metaphysical, have been argued so thoroughly and subtly by Cajetan in the opusculum *On the Analogy of Names* that no room is left to find out anything further."³⁹ Cajetan's systematic explanation of Thomistic analogy in terms of fundamental principles follows a careful logical sequence. He identifies three fundamental modes of analogy: inequality, attribution, and proportionality. He believes that they correspond with those described by Aquinas in the *Sentences* as according to being but not according to

intention (inequality), according to intention but not according to being (attribution), and according to both intention and being (proportionality). Cajetan's analogy of inequality was illustrated by the term "body." Its perfection is not realized according to an equal grade, but as inferior or superior according to analogy. Yet it remains the same for all bodies. "The logician refers to analogous terms of this type as univocal. The philosopher, on the other hand, regards them as equivocal, the difference coming from the fact that the former considers the intentions expressed by the names and the latter their natures."⁴⁰

Of his second major type, Cajetan wrote, "Analogous by attribution are those things which have a common name, and the notion signified by this name is the same with respect to the terms but different as regards the relationships to this term."⁴¹ Cajetan uses as example predication of the term "healthy." It is applied to animal as the subject, urine as a sign of health, and medicine as its cause. Diversity of relationships is present, but the term through which they are expressed is one and the same. The essential character of this mode of analogy is that "only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally, whereas the others have it only by extrinsic denomination." By contrast, "analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name and the notion expressed by this name is proportionally the same." Or to say the same in a different way, analogous by proportionality are called those things which have a common name, and the notion expressed by this name is similar according to a proportion. Proper proportionality must be distinguished from those cases when the common term has absolutely one formal meaning which is realized in one of the analogates and predicated of the other by metaphor.

A less accepted but nonetheless important tradition comes from the Spanish Counter Reformation Jesuit, Suarez.⁴² In his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, he charged that Cajetan misinterprets Aquinas's doctrine of analogy at two primary points. Suarez denied that Aquinas teaches an analogy of proper proportionality in which the analogous name is predicated properly and intrinsically of all the analogates. He insisted that every valid analogy of proportionality includes an element of metaphor and impropriety. Moreover, Suarez held that Aquinas not only teaches an analogy of extrinsic attribution, but one in which the analogy denominating form is found intrinsically in all terms. It is in one absolutely and in the other relatively, through intrinsic relation to the former. Suarez's claim as against Cajetan's is that Aquinas taught an analogy of intrinsic attribution between God and creation. For Aquinas, substance is being in the primary and absolute sense. Accident is designated from its own proper and intrinsic reality rather than by extrinsic denomination from the being of substance. Suarez denies that creation is called being because of any kind of proportionality to God, but rather as it is something in itself and not absolute nothing. Lyttkens finds

a Scotist influence; being is taken in its most general sense as fact. It is on this premise that Cajetan's claim that an analogous property exists perfectly in one term and in the other on account of a proportion or comparison is rejected.

Cajetan's position has been under attack in recent decades as traditional school distinctions have been reviewed in recent research. Lyttkens's careful research has been influential among Roman Catholics as well as non-Roman Catholic scholars. Chavannes, accepting Lyttkens's conclusions, uses them in comparison of Thomistic and Barthian analogy.⁴³ It is denied that Cajetan's designations can be applied to the analogy of the one and the other found in *De Potentia* 7.7, *Summa contra Gentiles* I.34, *Summa Theologica* I.13.5. In this view, Aquinas accepted the analogy of proportionality for a limited period, but in the end abandoned or at least fell silent about it in favor of attribution. Suarez is mistaken in finding it to be entirely absent from Aquinas. Lyttkens identifies three types of analogy which are based on direct resemblance of cause and effect: 1. an analogy of extrinsic attribution which enables one to say that created truth and goodness are from the divine goodness, 2. an analogy in which the image is designated from the prototype, 3. an analogy designating a cause from its effect. The analogy of proportionality found in *De Veritate* 2.3 in Aristotelian form and *De Veritate* 2.11 in Neoplatonic form premises an indirect resemblance.

IV. ERICH PRZYWARA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ANALOGY OF BEING

1. *Development of Przywara's Thought*

Although Barth made rejection of the analogy of being primary in his refusal of Roman Catholic claims, analogy was only one concern among others in his theology. Przywara, by contrast, oriented his entire thought on this theme; his philosophical as well as his cultural analysis was centered on the idea.¹ He admitted that his encounter with dialectical theology was crucial for his own reflection. Barth's interest was almost exclusively theological. He raised the question of faith as well as ecclesiology in the most radical way in debate at Münster in 1929. Przywara, unlike Barth, always proceeded from explicitly defined metaphysical premises. He made an Augustinian-Thomistic realism his primary reference.² Przywara's interpretation was highly individualistic and by his own admission often misunderstood. Nonetheless, he significantly influenced the direction of German Catholic philosophy in the pre-Nazi period.

Unlike Barth, Przywara held no permanent academic position and had no large group of disciples. However, he ranked with Romano Guardini as a leading German Roman Catholic apologist in the period between the two world wars. Przywara lectured widely at universities throughout Europe and wrote a large number of articles and reviews for a select audience in Catholic

intellectual and scholarly journals. Living at Munich, he was a contributing editor of the German Jesuit magazine, *Stimmen der Zeit*. Incisive as well as often outspoken in criticism, he evoked strong antipathies as well as admiration. An illness at the end of the second world war limited his personal appearances and travel. In spite of difficulties, he completed two large volumes, *Mensch* and *Humanitas*, which were published in the fifties.³ In both, he used the analogy of being to develop a philosophy of culture and history as well as of world religions. Przywara's own metaphysics is needlessly confusing if one fails to understand that it is not simply scholastic. This is very clear from his own description of the development of his thought over a period of decades.

Przywara describes the chronology of his study and writing in the preface of his brief, compact volume entitled *Analogia Entis*.⁴ Aquinas's *Quaestiones disputatae* and *De ente et essentia* were researched intensively in an early period of study at Valkenburg College in Holland before the first world war. He describes his intent as one of understanding the text as against later reformulations. Attempting to delineate the interrelation between philosophy and theology, Przywara read Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and the German mystics. Subsequently, he was attracted to Goethe's interpretation of polarity as well as to the heroism of Nietzsche and the dynamism of Troeltsch. In the development of his apologetic, he read and reflected on the works of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. Cowpers divides Przywara's career into four periods.⁵ His first major book combined ideas from John Henry Cardinal Newman and Max Scheler. Already in this writing, he identified the analogy of being as an inner Catholic principle which preserves the unity of the natural and supernatural as well as philosophy and theology. Przywara was concerned to show that Newman was not the father of modernism. Scheler's phenomenological method provided the key for the analysis of religious experience, although it premised an immediacy of knowledge which Przywara rejected. His *Religionsbegründung* was in part an answer to Scheler's *Eternal in Man*.⁶

A second stage of Przywara's concern dates from the debate with Barth. Earlier his approach to the analogy of being had been primarily philosophical. Przywara speaks of the necessity of crossing weapons with Barth, who drove him back to theological presuppositions. A third stage, overlapping somewhat with others, is to be described from the perspective of his criticism of the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger. Przywara appraised Husserl's phenomenology in discussion with Edith Stein and developed his own notion of creatureliness in answer to Heidegger. A fourth stage is marked by his response to the French-Belgian Thomism which took its orientation from J. Maréchal's *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique*.⁷ Maréchal attempted to reconstruct Thomistic philosophy employing Kantian epistemology. Przywara believed that Maréchal's formulation neglected the unity

of philosophy and theology in Aquinas even as it misunderstood the role of negative theology. In particular, he criticized Neo-scholastic claims for an intuition of being.

Przywara's early writings have been republished in a series edited by his former student, Hans Urs von Balthasar.⁸ Przywara's basic outlook was already clear in his five lectures entitled *God*, delivered in 1924 at the University of Leipzig. Sponsored by the bishop, the series attempted to clarify the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant thought in relation to the philosophy of religion. An Augustinian theme of "God in us and God over us" was explicit and dominant. Przywara's study *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie*, appeared in 1926 as part of a series for which Emil Brunner wrote the companion Protestant volume.⁹ Characteristically, it combined philosophical and theological themes in a metaphysics of analogy. Translated by A. C. Bouquet under the English title of *Polarity*, it is the only one of his books available in English. Przywara argued that the Augustinian and Thomistic positions complement each other, and explained the analogy of being from a phenomenological, historical point of view. *Analogia Entis* I, published in 1932, contains a careful account of this theme in the thought of Plato and Aristotle as well as a commentary on Augustine and Aquinas as their Christian successors. The first volume of *Analogia Entis* bears the sub-title "principles," and is highly concise. Przywara projected a second volume which was never completed. His lengthy unpublished lecture notes from the period between *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie* and *Analogia Entis* have been available in typewritten form for this study. Together with *Mensch* and *Humanitas*, they supply the background for the often summary claims of *Analogia Entis*.

Przywara's use of the expression *analogia entis* dates from 1922. As early as 1915, he had spoken of "God in us and God over us" to designate the "last" religious relation between God and creation. The analogy of being has this meaning in his thought. It is the key to understanding the tension between immanence and transcendence. Analogy in this form defines the dynamic "in-over" relation which is the basis of his metaphysics. Religiously, it can be described by the words "love" and "night."¹⁰ Even a cursory review of Przywara's works soon makes clear that he does not regard the analogy of being as a deductive reference for the attributes of deity as in Neo-scholastic usage. Much less is it a formula from which Roman Catholic dogma can be derived as Barth implied in his early polemic. For Przywara, Thomism is not the only Roman Catholic formulation of the themes and relationships which analogy makes explicit. The existential relations of immanence and transcendence are not to be exhausted by any single formula. Przywara's approach is fundamentally phenomenological in the Roman Catholic tradition. In defense of his many-sided interpretation, he insists that *analogia entis* has had a variety of different historical forms. Six basic

types are identified in his *Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie*: early Patristic, Augustinian, Thomistic, Scotist, Molinist, and the nineteenth century mode of Newman.¹¹ Przywara believes that all six types have an existential as well as essential unity in Roman Catholic reflection and devotion and he refuses to debate the distinctions between different Catholic schools in detail. His typology in the end reduces to two basic forms, Augustinian and Thomistic. These are complementary and to be understood as "both/and" rather than "either/or." Not Augustine *or* Thomas but Augustine *and* Thomas, he wrote.

2. *Analogia Entis as a Roman Catholic Principle*

No doubt there are advantages and disadvantages in Przywara's broad identification of analogy as the principle of form and structure in Roman Catholic thought. Such a premise gave him a many-sided reference for his debate with Protestant dialectical theology as well as non-Catholic philosophy. It is important to note that in his *Analogia Entis* he ascribes greater originality to Plato than to Aristotle in developing this idea. His inclusive Catholic context, which took as much from Augustine as Aquinas, was not always understood by his friends, much less his opponents. Przywara did invoke Aristotle at one important point, using his potentiality-actuality distinction against Heidegger's view of being, as well as in redefinition of the idea of creation as against dialectical theology. In principle, he called on the "essentialism" of the Hebrew-Greek synthesis against that which he regarded as the incompleteness of modern existentialism and theological irrationalism. The phenomenology of Scheler and Husserl, in particular, seemed relevant in overcoming the "immanentism" and "subjectivism" which he found so dominant since the Enlightenment. Of course, their contribution was philosophical more than theological.

Przywara argued that his analogical approach has much deeper roots in the Christian theological tradition than Barth's attempt to deny all natural theology. Like Paul Tillich, he believed that the perennial human question is one of being.¹² Although philosophical truth is to be distinguished from Christian revelation, the two are not antithetical. In fact, a concern for reality unites philosophy and theology and both impinge on mystery. Only an incomplete answer can be given at the philosophical level; however, the natural knowledge of God, and not faith alone, is the appropriate beginning for Christian reflection. Ever since his early study of Scheler and Newman, Przywara favored phenomenology over existentialism in reinterpreting the patristic-scholastic analogy of being. The antithesis between life and form, the empirical and the rational, *a posteriori* and *a priori* were highlighted by Scheler. Przywara linked these polarities with the essence-existence categories of Thomism. A key premise, dominant in all of Przywara's writings since his earliest study of Aquinas's works, appears in the priority which he

assigns to the polarity between existence and essence. Phenomenologically, no moment in human experience encompasses existence or essence in their fullness. The tension between the two characterizes all of creaturely life but not that of the deity. Przywara insists that our reflection cannot collapse existence into essence or the reverse. The analogy of being not only explains the dynamic reciprocal movement between essence and existence, but shows as well how both are directed "over-out" to deity.

Przywara's appreciation of the essence-existence polarity was enriched psychologically by phenomenology. He describes the human ego as showing a double direction: on the one hand, it has a dynamic toward the self-enclosedness of self-contained immanence; on the other hand, it looks toward an object beyond consciousness which is characterized by transcendence. Thought, feeling, and will all share the polarity between immanent unity and direction to outer fullness in an infinite object. Such analysis has consequences for religion. Too often, it has been understood exclusively either as an act of man or of God. Przywara identifies a third basic mode which transcends these extremes: an infinite striving which relates the two types and makes clear that the absolute is not man but God. In principle analogical, it allows dynamic tension as well as openness to a transcendent source of creativity. From such a phenomenology, the analogy of being can be described as a mean which unites immanence and transcendence in dynamic tension as well as openness to an independent source of creativity. The underlying premise of this third view is the unity in tension of immanence and transcendence, God in us and over us. An analogical reference relates the two positively rather than causing them to break apart in disjunction. Przywara premises that polarity between essence and existence can be explained only from a second unity in difference, namely, that between creator and creation. If God is the ground of being as Tillich explains, analogy is implicit in the tension between the infinite and finite, absolute and relative, temporal and eternal.

Przywara's presupposition that finite being is analogical in its immanent structure and dynamic, "from God out" as well as "to God," has Augustinian as much as Thomistic bases. He believes that creation by its very nature stands over against the transcendent and absolute, characterized by a restless need for completion beyond itself. No analogy would be necessary if the absolute were realized fully. However, man is a unity of being and non-being and lives in tension between the universal and a need for experience. Although he seeks for total possession of the object of knowledge in complete understanding, distance remains. Nonetheless, finite being is bound analogously to a transcendental logos in God himself. This is in part the meaning of the doctrine of creation. Although we ourselves possess no comprehensive logos, there is no need to abandon thought to contradiction. The analogy of being enables us to think from the deepest mystery of God himself without

over-stepping the limits of our finitude. We exist as independent beings outside the divine yet in likeness as well as unlikeness to deity. Analogy becomes the central point from which all else is judged when we come to understand our finitude. Non-being is understood from being. All that we possess in the relative completeness of our person is nothing but total dependency on the absolute ground. In the broadest sense, analogy signifies that the human person has a transcendental openness in thought to being.

Przywara believes that every philosophy which seeks to treat the meaning of reality "in depth" must face the question of analogy afresh. A transcendental relation to an absolute is implicit in all thought. Yet one must be led to the absolute by the non-absolute. Pre-Christian formulation of the idea began when the Greeks asked how it is possible to have a plurality of beings in a fundamental unity of being.¹³ In the end, their reflection turned to the relation of the finite and infinite as well as the one and the many. Analogy was used to explicate the relation of finite being to a transcendental cause. It implies a hierarchy in which a single and infinite transcendental term is implicit from the beginning. Agnosticism is avoided as it is recognized that knowledge can be true without ceasing to be finite. The dialectic of thought moves amid many different possibilities, seeking to identify a logos but still separated from it in tension; the logos stands beyond all immediacy in the world. Analogy makes clear that absolute being is transcendent while still immanent in the world, as the origin of finite creatures as well as their last goal. Imperfection has a direction toward perfection. In this way, all beings have a greater or lesser part in the unity of being.

Przywara believes that Barth's proposal to deny all natural knowledge of deity and then recover the field by special revelation gives away too much. He defends the natural knowledge of God against fideism as much as agnosticism.¹⁴ His analogy of being is an attempt to formulate an inclusive but specific answer to the question, "How can we speak of God?" Analogy allows valid but not exhaustive understanding. Przywara attempts to treat knowledge of God and the world in an inclusive rather than a reductionistic context. He claims that the analogy of being is both a metaphysical and religious principle which allows theology its own proper scope in freedom while still relating it to the *philosophia perennis*. Roman Catholic philosophy need not speak of deity in simply confessional terms, because its religious premises clarify the relation between immanence and transcendence, bringing balance and inclusiveness to Roman Catholic thought and life.¹⁵ Joining nature and supernature, it proceeds on the premise that God is the ground and goal of creation, its beginning and end. Analogical description makes explicit that God is immanent in the world, present by his power while still beyond all likeness of the creature. Przywara believes that the analogy of being is a unique resource for making explicit an asymmetrical relation between God and the world of creation. He emphasizes that for the Catholic

tradition of the metaphysics of theism, God is not limited to matter or spirit, but beyond all creation "over out."

Is Przywara justified in making the analogy of being the structural principle of the metaphysics of theism? His claim is that such a perspective alone offers the possibility of authentic religious knowledge. Christian truth has its source in a reality which is not just immanent but transcendent. Revelation affirms God's active providence together with his mystery. The analogy of being makes possible a rationally negotiable knowledge of God. Przywara describes it as premising a mean between the two extremes of pantheism and theopanism. The first limits the divine to immanence while the other attributes all efficacy to God alone in his transcendence. The analogy of being bridges the extremes as a middle way. Premised on Aquinas's principle of second cause, it allows positive freedom for the creature while still affirming God's all-effective power. Without such a mean, Przywara argues, contradiction replaces polarity in the relation between immanence and transcendence. According to Przywara, the Protestant refusal to consider the problem of religious knowledge apart from faith tends to lead to a perspectivism and relativism which vitiates any positive relationship between God and the world. Of course, Barth's view, as much as that of Przywara, is premised on the Augustinian doctrine of faith seeking understanding. Yet more than Barth, Przywara insists that there are structures of understanding in the world which, although incomplete, are nonetheless valid. The analogy of being does not destroy the tension between creation and creator. Rather, it is a hermeneutical principle which premises a dynamic relation between man and God.

Cowpers points out that Przywara's often obtuse and complicated terminology may be explained in part as an attempt to penetrate beyond stereotyped meanings.¹⁶ He wishes to "see" as well as to experience. His position is distinguished from Neo-scholasticism at this point: words have a discovering and explicative function which is only partially apparent in the first naming of reality. Meaning cannot be calculated directly, but requires sensitivity together with originality. It becomes known more fully through continuous contact with experience. Przywara's analogy analysis has an evident twofold premise. He first describes a polarity between essence and existence in human thought, and secondly, a tension between man's finite being and its absolute ground. Human thought and being are analogous in a double way. We are never in total possession of or identical with our being. More than this, human life and thought are always directed beyond themselves to the infinite. Analogy makes explicit that the absolute is immanent in our thought even as it remains transcendent. Analogy enables us to understand the unity and diversity of history from the inside out, as it were. It denotes an "in-over" which is the dynamic intellectual basis of all finite thinking. Acknowledging the contingency of both past and present, Przywara

nonetheless seeks an objective synthesis. The unity in the history of thought is not only transcendental, one may say, but also transcendent. Not finite but absolute being is its ground. Przywara urges that our understanding is always in tension with thought in its purity. Not only is this true for each concrete individual thinker, it is reflected as well in the organic development of human thought. The analogy of being enables us to identify structure and arrange data systematically. Indeed, it enables us to put ourselves at the central point of historical critical reflection from the beginning.

Przywara interprets Christian theological analogy as at the same time an appropriation and criticism of Greek metaphysics, in a conversion made possible by revelation. However one evaluates this claim, it is clear that he takes a critical rather than a simply cumulative view of the philosophical tradition. Moreover, his interpretation of Greek philosophy is in part a refutation of Heidegger's exposition.¹⁷ Przywara describes the Platonic view of knowledge as a dynamic mean between being and becoming. It does not allow us to speak of the many without reference to the transcendent one which in turn can be known only analogically in terms of the many. Przywara's religious epistemology is in a variety of respects more Augustinian than Thomistic. He insists that conceptualization does not exhaust meaning and finds an element of ineffability in all knowledge. He is not prepared to give up the quest for unity, but finds that it is never self-complete in the world. Przywara's approach is less propositional than intuitional, from the center outward as it were. He concludes that it does not matter whether we begin with the empirical or the rational, experience or thought. All meanings are interrelated in a context of being. The immanence-transcendence relation implicit in all quests for truth applies in particular to religious experience. Przywara believes that he can identify an analogical pattern of distance and approach, fear and love, in all Roman Catholic piety.

3. *Przywara's Interpretation of Analogy*

Przywara's own distinctive interpretation joins the two major types of analogy identified by Cajetan, the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality, in interdependence. According to Przywara, the first has its completion in the second.¹⁸ The analogy of attribution is only the first impulse of a rising movement in our knowledge. Indeed, unity, essence, truth, good are affirmed of God and the creature. However, the analogy of attribution does not bring the differences between the two into balance. If it did, this balance rather than being itself would have become the basis of our explanation. Instead, resemblance rests finally on a relation to a transcendent and dissemblant term. Przywara argues that the analogy of attribution is exceeded by one of proportionality at the limit of our intelligence. The movement of the creature is brought in balance beyond its inner limitation by the being of God. The ever-greater mysterious being of deity

is recognized as the basis of the first analogy. It is in this context that Przywara develops a descending analogy of attribution in order to make clear that the divine essence, although above all concepts, is not just an ideal limit. Rather, God's transcendence breaks through and dominates all immanence.

The natural disclosure of God in the initial analogy of attribution identifies the divine being as the absolute foundation, goal, and meaning of created essence. Przywara argues for a point of contact: the human being itself is a disclosure of God, who has created man as a free agent. Analogy is possible only as it is recognized that created being is a real second cause. However, even at this initial level it becomes clear that analogy is a disclosure of difference more than resemblance; absolute truth belongs to the transcendent and different alone. Theism must avoid the magical deduction of pantheism in which everything comes out of non-being and becomes divine. It cannot regard the finite as a manifestation of the absolute in the contingent. Instead, it affirms a greater dissimilarity than similarity between creative cause and contingent effect.

Przywara abandons any simple attribution in terms of cause and effect. Created reason, he argues, has no ground in itself. In the end, God's infinite and inexhaustible positiveness dominates participating truth. Analogy makes clear that we cannot sacrifice either the non-absolute or the absolute. Sacrifice of the first ends in theopanism in which God is regarded as the alone-working, and of the second in the magical deduction of pantheism in which everything comes out of non-being. Analogy is a formal expression of a movement toward the absolute which is present in every existence. It is not a principle by which the deity becomes manageable or can be derived; instead, it makes for openness. The analogy of being identifies creaturely being in its total potentiality as directed toward its source, goal, and meaning. The starting point or source is not non-being. Rather, we begin from the fullness of reality in deity.

Przywara's distinctive "conversionist" position is made clear in *What is God?*, published soon after the second world war.¹⁹ The analysis in this brief study develops six stages or steps toward the knowledge of God. His divergence from Barth's position is evident from the outset, as he indeed premises a natural knowledge of God. Initially, the divine is known as a quality of creation. It is the last depth of the world, evident in life and spirit as well as the careers of great men. Such an experience of the numinous, although authentic, is only a first step on the way to growing understanding. At a second stage, God is known as a formal limit who is over against man as finite and timebound. Deity, by contrast, is absolute, infinite, and perfect. In a third and successive stage, God is known as an immanent ideal of pure truth, goodness, and beauty. The "conversionist" character of Przywara's approach is especially clear in his description of the fourth level. It reflects

the appreciation for the *theologia crucis* which characterizes his post-war writings more than his earlier works. Deity is known as personal; God is not just pure being, but the living one, judging, righteous, and merciful. At a further stage, God is understood as struggling over his creation, personally and historically, in love. He is a destroying fire, but also paradoxically the silent, powerless God, forced outside the world by the sin which has crucified him. Yet this is not all. At a final level, God is seen as overpowering and blinding light, ever greater over all.

Przywara begins with a direct, positive theology which attempts to unite the absolute and the personal, the unchangeable and the living. He turns to an indirect dialectical theology of darkness as conflicting claims develop. How can God be all and yet be free, we ask? Przywara's response to this question, like that of Barth, is fundamentally Christocentric. His final reference in the doctrine of God is neither nature nor spirit, but crucifixion and resurrection—light appearing in darkness. Christ alone is the fullness of revelation. Those who have seen him have seen the Father. Przywara develops a similar multi-level conversionist approach in his Christology. Christ is seen as the shepherd, friend, bridegroom, and brother. Our first knowledge is direct and concrete. In the Incarnation, God appears as the ideal of the creature, but on the border of human life. Even as he is known in the fullness of his love, God is still a mystery which must be sought after. We must proceed indirectly in dialectic. Not simply in essence but in existence, the analogy of being joins immanence and transcendence. In the end, the analogy of being yields knowledge in the fact that grace is effective. As the limit of creation, God is not just an ideal but power, a source of spiritual life.

At its first level, Przywara's analysis of analogy appears to deal with a purely external relation. However, in reality there is an intrinsicism under the extrinsicism. He finds that no single created essence can be the basis of the whole, and concludes that intrinsic resemblance, not just a third term, is necessary for analogy. The causality identified in the analogy of proportion must be carried to its final consequence in reflection. The incomplete being of the resemblance leads to recognition of difference. There is no total resemblance between any two essences. Extrinsicism disappears in the perfection of the analogy between God and creature. Intrinsic resemblance belongs to the attribution itself. It is a perfection not completed simply by our thought. The predicate in analogical judgment is caused by God who is its subject. It is not just an element which happens in a particular case, but necessary in any positive attribution. Hence, Przywara concludes that the analogy of attribution surpasses itself in the analogy of proportionality, but is not replaced by it. Proportionality cannot be separated or made fully self-sufficient from attribution. The end would be verbalism and agnosticism. Ultimately, all three movements which Przywara describes constitute a

single analogy. The analogy of proportionality seeks to represent the infinite distance between God and the creature without giving up resemblance. Actually, the transcendent unity of all being and intelligibility cannot be represented by any concept. Analogy can only indicate a direction. Concepts are not false, but totally insufficient. We know God only through his manifestations as he both reveals and hides himself in the finite context.

For Przywara, the analogy of attribution is more appropriately described as a necessary foundation rather than a starting point. In order to grasp the unity of finite and infinite even in limited degree, we must follow the direction toward the absolute present in all our judgments. Beginning with the finite essence, we move away from it in proportionality. Przywara finds a continually transcendent movement in all manifestations of our spiritual activity. Of course, the power of our representation in thought is irrevocably surpassed by the infinity of the object. The "in-over" tension in which we ground the transcendence of God is at the same time the tension from which the finite is designated as finite. In most explications of analogy, the idea is invoked only after the existence of God has been proved. It does not stand at the beginning of metaphysical reflection as in Przywara. He admits that a full understanding of analogy must come at the end of our reflection. However, he emphasizes that a minimum has been presupposed from the outset. A metaphysic based on analogy is conscious of its distance from the transcendent; there is no direct knowledge of God. Yet its metaphysical values are from the absolutely transcendent.

4. *Evaluation and Criticism*

It is Przywara's fundamental premise that the natural universe has its fullness in a sacramental one. He is sure that the absolute and eternal can be known in the world. Concept and mystery are interrelated in a universe filled with meaning. Man's being is directed beyond itself to transcendence. Reason and faith stand in positive relation to each other. Although God transcends every hierarchy and any essence, any ultimate irrationality or voluntarism is excluded. For Przywara, philosophical analysis and religious authority join to confirm that we are existentially in touch with reality. The fundamental issue remains as to whether he has established analogy as a link between God and creation, or he simply presupposes it? The epistemological questions directed by Thomists as well as other philosophers against Przywara's eclecticism cannot be ignored. Przywara's initial point of reference appears to be more anthropological than cosmological, namely, the analogy tension in man himself. Cowpers charges that he really has no systematic epistemology.²⁰

If it were charged that Przywara's first premises cannot be proved logically, he would no doubt reply by pointing to the tension between essence and existence. As against existentialism and idealism, he argues that life in the world has a logos of both thought and being; there can be no "either/or"

between the two. If it is argued that he takes an ontological dimension for granted, he could reply that he explicates it phenomenologically. Przywara's interpretation is strongly influenced by Neoplatonism even though he accepts Christian revelation. God is beyond all categories and conceptual knowledge. In Przywara's view, the negative leads to the positive in a fuller knowledge. How does Przywara's interpretation stand in relation to the longer tradition of analogy usage? Does he agree with Cajetan, Suarez, or Scotus? The answer must be that Przywara's own view is eclectic; in the end, he champions a mixed type of analogy. His synthesis is based on his own extensive historical research and is not limited to any single school.

One may ask specifically, what can be known about God? It becomes evident, in reply, that Przywara is arguing for a relation between the infinite and finite more than for any definite content. The fullness of the relation between God and man, both epistemologically and ontologically, has an existential religious basis in the Church.²¹ It needs to be recognized that Przywara's analogy of being represents a modification of the epistemological bases of the scholastic synthesis, especially at the point of the natural knowledge of God. His fellow Roman Catholic, Pflanze, is very specific in charging that a "kathodic" rather than "anodic" view is represented.²² The key to much of Przywara's view, as well as its limitations, appears in his use of phenomenology. His claim for general revelation allows him to invoke analogy in an inclusive phenomenology which looks to the word of the Church for definitive statement. Przywara used this method for theological as well as philosophical ends, and in this respect exceeded any intent of Husserl. In his view, religion and metaphysics have an intrinsic interrelation and can be separated only relatively. Of course, the religious appropriation of phenomenology is evident in Max Scheler's Catholic period before his "relapse" into naturalism. It is questionable whether phenomenology as a presuppositionless philosophy yields the ontological bases necessary to support Przywara's theism.

It is dialogue with Protestants which calls the basic presupposition of the earlier synthesis of nature and grace into question. Przywara offered a rationale in its defense with his analogy of being. He recognized that Aquinas's assumptions about the human person, faith, and reason represent only one expression of the Christian consciousness. However, he limited authentic variation to a Roman Catholic context. Driven back on theological claims, his philosophical analysis weakened as much as it strengthened his apologetic stance. Gertz has written an extended exposition of Przywara's *analogia fidei*, arguing that it has the dominant role in Przywara's post-war writings.²³ At very least, this represents a shift from Przywara's earlier claims for the analogy of being as a principle of form in the *philosophia perennis*. One is left with a religious base, to be sure, already explicit in Przywara's *Deus Semper Maior*. The question remains as to whether analogy, interpreted in such a predominantly ecclesiastical context, is an adequate premise for philosoph-

ical claims. If the natural knowledge of God is not distinct from faith, the analogy of being alone cannot serve as an initial reference. Przywara's position appears to have a circular character at this point. Our question is, how much he can defend analogy apart from a religious *a priori*? He develops a kind of Augustinian existentialism in terms of "faith seeking understanding." However, he insists as well on inclusive and objective metaphysical structures for synthesis.

The analogy of being may be described as a convergence principle, *Vorverständnis* or a beginning point for reflection, but in no case is it simply abstract. For Przywara, it is not a formula for deriving deity but a movement toward him. As a negative reductive reference, it reflects the rhythm of the creator-creation relation to which all returns. Yet it allows for the ever new and is most radical and open. Metaphysically necessary, it is yet theological. Religion and metaphysics have reciprocal inclusion rather than congruence in Przywara's view. The unity of creaturely essence is not in us but over us, from and in God. Although there is no direct unity in essence of man and God, the self-reflection of the knowing subject, itself a union of essence and existence, has an analogical relation to truth. Przywara's exposition presupposes at least two degrees of being.²⁴ The first, an "immanent creaturely" one, has its basis in the tension between essence and existence. Man as finite is never identical with his essence. Instead, it unfolds before him temporally. The finite, never totally what it is, cannot be absolute. Essence remains above existence. Analogy expresses the immanent-transcendent relation. It makes clear that religion is not exclusively an act of God or man. Natural religion leads to the supernatural, the act of man to the act of God. In the end, analogy means *potentia obædientialis* to the divine command.

Analogy is premised on our capacity to know and resemble absolute perfection. Such perfection is experienced as a lack in being by the finite essence. The positive attribution derived from natural theology yields to negation but is more than agnosticism. The analogy relation itself is imperfect, one-sided, and partial. Only finite being is immediately accessible to us. The deepest basis of analogy lies in the tension between the absolute and finite, God and creation. God is actively present to the creature, knowable and still above it. The more God opens himself, the more he is covered by mystery. In the end, Przywara's formulation is a mean between an immanent creaturely analogy and a second analogy between an immanent and transcending term. In the first, there is a tension between two non-transcending terms. In the second, absolute transcendence is invoked. The critical question is whether Przywara uses analogy equivocally. It is important to note that the "in-over" relation has a very different meaning in the second as against the first level of analogy. Przywara's defense of his position turns on appraisal of his doctrine of positive potentiality. He refuses to make potentiality into an absolute as in Heidegger's metaphysics of finitude. Pure potency cannot be a metaphysical

nothing, as Heidegger supposes. Theologically, Przywara argues that "Nothing" is a relation through the agency of "God as creator from nothing."

Cowpers emphasizes that the distinctive character of Przywara's interpretation lies in the fact that he does not conceive of the analogy of being as static; instead, he premises a tension between experience and rationality. Although our understanding expresses itself in fixed points, it nonetheless remains open in receptiveness as well as spontaneity.²⁵ More than most Neo-scholastics, Przywara emphasizes the historicity imposed by finitude. Creatively knowledge is the rationalizing of experience. Przywara does not mean that philosophy, much less theology, can be deduced from his analogy reference. On the contrary, both have a realistic character. Analogy has a necessary historical basis. Experience is characterized by an inevitable dialectic between logic and experience, the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* in the structure of the human mind itself. Contingency remains even when we seek to know in the most complete and perfect way. Even in the midst of history, the analogy of being enables one to discover the rational order and build on it. Premised on the intelligibility of being, it enables us to penetrate to the deepest center of meaning. Przywara uses analogy to think through problems logically and develop a balanced systematic interpretation. Yet systems are relativized and even dissolve in his view. His belief in universals is qualified by the conviction that nothing is ever completely definite. Analogy is a necessary reference in the end because we never possess the truth in totality. Przywara believes that philosophers and theologians need to guard in particular against the repetition of identifying phrases as if they were exhaustive. No formula is definitive. At most, it is a temporary fixation point from which we may proceed to new insight.

Przywara's *Deus Semper Maior* has strong affinities with Barth's view of transcendence.²⁶ Przywara is explicit that the God of creation and revelation is not derived from analogy. On the contrary, analogy is necessary because God has revealed himself. According to Przywara, Aquinas emphasized the independence and integrity of nature.²⁷ The order of salvation is also concrete; Christ is the middle. It must be pointed out that man as conceived concretely, in Przywara's view, is not simply natural being. The human person cannot be understood as simply neutral. His choice is between the gods of the heathen or the one personal God of Catholicism, between Christian and anti-Christian humanism. Przywara believes that all creation has a relation of negative potentiality to God. His interest is in the historical, factual world order, and he uses phenomenology to develop a concrete epistemology. He deals with the concrete man phenomenologically in terms of "heilsgeschichte." He insists that nature has its own freedom even as he describes man as having a natural-supernatural nature.²⁸ Przywara views original sin as Barth does, as an overbearing grasping of creation toward God. In the fall, there was not simply loss but usurpation and perversion.

Sin is not just a lowering of the creature's relation to God, but its tearing and reversal. In his exposition of Romans 1:18, he distinguishes between recognition and acknowledgment. Przywara does not conceive of original sin just in terms of the loss of the supernatural and relapse to nature alone. Fallen man has no way to a universal concept of the supernatural. He must turn to the cross instead. Recognition of the antithesis between law and Gospel appears in Przywara's later works. He identifies a dialectic as between wrath and promise, law and Gospel, not only in man but God. Przywara even speaks of philosophy being given life through death.

Przywara's specific Roman Catholic apologetic claim is made clear in an article entitled "The Range of Analogy as the Fundamental Catholic Form." He notes that the formula with which he describes it, "great similarity in ever greater dissimilarity," comes from a source which antedates Aquinas's writings, namely, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. This twelfth ecumenical council met under Pope Innocent III, and rejected Joachim of Floris's interpretation of the Trinity. Joachim spoke of a "fourness" in God, citing John 12:22ff. The Church, he argued, is one with the Father and the Son in the Holy Ghost. The different persons are one *essentia*, *substantia*, and *natura*, but not "unitas vera et propria," "sed collectivam et similitudinarium." The Council interpreted the passage from the Fourth Gospel as an injunction to be perfect as the Heavenly Father is perfect. The analogy is between the divine perfection which is a quality of God by nature and the perfection by grace, a quality which man receives. Przywara interprets this to refer to the analogical relation between God and created forms of life. Each has a perfection in its own mode.

Even without mentioning analogy explicitly, Przywara concludes, the Council affirmed it as the principle of structure of Catholic belief. "Qui inter Creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda." In making a clear distinction between creator and creation, the Council at the same time affirmed the sovereign ecclesiastical authority of the Church over against pneumatism. Przywara emphasizes that its decree was not bound to the language of any particular school of theology. There were, in fact, three major alternatives current at the time. The Greek tradition viewed nature as a purely passive potentiality, the becoming side of participation in God. Augustine interpreted it in terms of the antithesis between the effect of Adam's sin and the divine work of Christ. The scholastics regarded it as active potency. The Council's own theology was expressed without subservience to any one of these views. Analogy becomes explicit as nature and supernature are joined analogically through participation in the divine nature. Przywara insists that the sovereignty of the divine will is made visible in the Church and transcends any specific formulation. There is a real supernatural order in which the whole of God is present as a continuation of the Incarnation; the Church itself is an

analogous union, immanent and transcendent. It was Aquinas's contribution to correct Gnostic identity by law and a sense of distance as he distinguished between creator and creation in terms of different relations to being.

V. ANALOGY IN THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH

1. *Barth's View of the Knowledge of God*

Analogy has become of importance in ecumenical discussion primarily through the influence of one man, Karl Barth. More than any other Protestant theologian, he has understood its continuing importance. To be sure, Barth's Roman Catholic critic, Przywara, gave it a more inclusive scope. It was Przywara who forced Barth's outspoken rejection of the analogy of being as the Antichrist. Yet it is important to note that this rejection does not explain the totality of Barth's position. If all that he had to say about analogy were simply negative, the subsequent discussion of this theme would not have developed. In fact, it became of increasing importance in Barth's later thought. Basically, he was interested in the question of the knowledge of God which he believed to be badly handled in Roman Catholicism as well as in Protestant modernism. More than this, throughout his long career, Barth was concerned to come to terms with the primary affirmations of the Christian faith in such a way as to make clear their basic structure and intention. He developed a perspective which interpreters such as von Balthasar even in criticism designated as analogous.

Barth's epistemology is not simply existential or post-Kantian, but theological. It is in the latter sphere that he has had his greatest impact—for example, in debate with Przywara. He perennially drove his opponents back to religious first principles. One cannot find a simply philosophical epistemology, much less a philosophy of religion, in Barth. This is not to say that he is philosophically uncritical or without metaphysical affirmations. However, he resists all joining of philosophy and theology, nature and grace in eclectic synthesis. It is not the question of being, a term which Barth does not hesitate to use, but God which is primary. Of course, faith has a central role in Barth's exposition, but it is always faith seeking understanding. Analogy became important in the attempt to see a synoptic whole as well as to identify structure.

Barth's rejection of the Enlightenment Protestant outlook, dominant throughout the last century, led the way in a renewed emphasis on the classical tradition of the Reformation. His so-called "theology of crisis" was characterized by a fresh and urgent consciousness of the actuality of deity. Particularly outspoken against the confusion of trust in man with faith in God, Barth refused all religious experience and philosophical reflection as ways to deity. Major attention first came to him with the publication of his

commentary on the Epistle to the Romans in 1919. Barth emphasized that the Christian God is not just a timeless being, but one who acts in history. Theology is not speculation about him, but premises his Word of grace uttered in his mighty acts. Barth spoke of an infinite qualitative difference between man and God. Deity is to be distinguished from all earthly reality as holy. God's Word brings a crisis to human life as it "breaks in" eschatologically. Barth refused to argue the question of God's existence. Instead, he insisted that Christian and non-Christian claims are confused irresponsibly if anything other than revelation is made primary. God is not just an idea but the One who is gracious.

The idea of analogy did not come into clear focus in Barth's early writings.¹ His subsequent revolt against nineteenth-century theology drew on the negations of Overbeck and Nietzsche as well as Kierkegaard and Dostoevski. Modern New Testament research contributed a new eschatological sense which broke down traditional metaphysical structures. Christendom, in particular, was subjected to radical reappraisal. Barth's claim that Christianity is outside of history had even Platonic overtones, and made reference to primordial history (*Urgeschichte*), a term used by Overbeck. His attack, based on a Christian conviction about the transcendence of God, was the antithesis of philosophical skepticism. However, it was not higher criticism but a renewed sense of sin which motivated Barth most deeply. Kierkegaard's paradoxical understanding of faith, Dostoevski's conviction that Christ's presence brings antithesis rather than harmony, joined with a Pauline sense of the judgment which comes with grace. He refused all religious *a priori* in man of the type championed by Protestant liberalism. His break with the analogy of being became definitive following his debate with Przywara at Münster.

Barth's rejection of all natural knowledge of God as well as religion in general has been widely debated. He refused metaphysics and mysticism alike on the grounds that they blunt the fundamental alternatives of Christian faith. Barth's own theology is an actualism, premised on the claim that God can be known only through God. He believed that confusion inevitably follows when Christianity is interpreted as a philosophy or world view. Barth's primary concern was not whether God exists, but who he is. The attempt to prove that Christianity is the most comprehensive and true speculative system, or that it conforms most fully to man's religious needs, inevitably compromises its message of judgment, grace, and forgiveness. Revelation does not take its meaning from the world but from the living reality which is above and beyond it.

Barth's position is epitomized in his cryptic statement that there is no way from man to God but only a way from God to man. Religion as the antithesis of revelation embodies sinful man's attempt to achieve salvation apart from sin and grace. Not the holy as it has appeared perennially in the history of

religion, but faith alone brings true knowledge of God. Barth's radical theocentrism is a protest in principle against all claims to religious truth apart from revelation in Jesus Christ. He rejected Protestant natural theology as an attempt to encompass revelation in a pre-understanding; Roman Catholic sacramentalism seemed to him to seek to control grace after the event. He has insisted that the Word of God is an actuality which can be known only after its occurrence. His critique was directed against natural theology in Protestant scholasticism as well as liberalism.

Barth's criticism of the misuse of analogy in other theologies, past and present, may be summarized as follows: analogy ought not to be abstract nor can there be any authentic but neutral concept of deity.² All noetic or ontic use of the analogy of being as a means for achieving knowledge of God is refused. The abyss between God and man can be bridged only by Christ, revelation, and grace. Barth's rejection of natural theology is intended to make clear that we possess no available analogate of God. God cannot be subsumed under a category or genus; in fact, Aquinas is specific that this is not possible. However, Barth in criticism of Thomism denies that analogical description can be premised on any harmony of nature and grace. Analogy can only be "against us" and "out from us" to God who is lord and creator, reconciler and redeemer. Barth seeks to substantiate this position from an exegesis of Romans 1:18; he explains that man is confronted by God as a Thou and not an it. There is no universal truth of revelation. Analogy is not from our seeing or reflection but God's Word. A valid doctrine of analogy must show how God is really transcendent over all our works as well as our concepts. God is disclosed and hid, uncovered and covered at the same time. Fallen man, wishing to play rich, claims to cooperate with God in the work of redemption. Synergism even implies that salvation is only partly in God. Yet real correspondence is only through God's free gift. Revelation reverses our words but is not univocal. Barth turns to analogy because he will allow no doctrine of double truth.

2. *Barth's Analogia Fidei*

Pöhlmann's study of Barth's analogy doctrine is one of the most definitive to date. He argues that Barth has developed his own original synthesis which must be examined side by side with the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Thomistic views. He identifies the sources of Barth's description of analogy as highly diverse. A doctrine of the exclusiveness of grace is taken from Anselm and Luther. Barth's actualism draws on German idealistic philosophy as well as Luther's nominalism. A Reformation dualism from Calvin and a distance pathos from Kierkegaard are present along with Christomonism, which has its roots in the pietism of both Zinzendorf and W. Herrmann. Barth's position is distinguished by its actualism. He proposes a Christocentrism which is antithetical to "ontocentrism." Analogy is *a posteriori* and comes exclusively

from one side, that of deity. Neither rational nor universal, it moves between a protological "not yet" and an eschatological "no more," in which any analogy of being is excluded. Pöhlmann refuses the charge of theopanism against Barth's view. Barth affirms that God wills a free and independent creation. Christian analogy must be actualist and not substantialist.

Pöhlmann finds the following sequence in Barth's analogy doctrine: 1. We do not know God's Word until 2. grace makes us free to do so. 3. The Word, which is then known is one of identity.³ Barth's claim is that God is *actus purus*; merely God is not God. Deity is not bound to any categories and must remain absolutely free. We must be careful lest God become an absolute essence or universal, identical with fate. In explanation of his own doctrine of analogy, Barth uses such texts as Galatians 2:20, Romans 6:3, and Hebrews 11:1. I Corinthians 13:12 is cited in defense of Barth's claim that the analogy of being is precluded in a twofold way: the Word of God is hidden by reason of both human finitude and the rebellion of sin. There are thus double grounds for Barth's rejection of the analogy of being. Pöhlmann questions his exegesis of this passage, denying that Paul refers to both finitude and sin. Pöhlmann observes that for Barth, analogy is a kind of Word of God. Barth cites Galatians 4:8 and Romans 12:6. Pöhlmann also disputes his exegesis of the second passage, urging that it refers only to the limitation of charisma by faith. In his attempt to make analogy a kind of Word of God, Barth does not always distinguish carefully between equal and unequal predication. He prefers the language of similarity in dissimilarity to that of equality or likeness.

Yet it is clear that Barth does not intend to deny the relevance or validity of this reference. Indeed, his criticism of the analogy of being has led to fresh theoretical reflection by both Roman Catholics and Protestants. Knowledge of God is not one of being but of becoming, and analogy describes the way man can speak of God specifically. The question is not whether God can be made an object of metaphysical knowledge, but rather of the divine disclosure and election. It is revelation which extends the otherwise impotent speech of sinful men, enabling them to speak of God. To refer merely to a difference of being as between God and his creation, misunderstands divine holiness. Even though there is no analogy to revelation, we may still speak of a correspondence and likeness and unlikeness between man and God. Barth uses a variety of terms in describing analogy: *relationis, revelationis, gratiae, naturae, causae, operationis, attributionis, proportionalis, and inequalitatis*.⁴

The presupposition of Christian theological analogy is that God comes to man in his Son, Jesus Christ, creating a new relation on his own initiative. Analogy is implicit, as God is other than his works; they do not exhaust his reality. Perennially, we mistake his revelation as an "it," making becoming into being in a static rather than a dynamic understanding. Barth insists that

the analogy of being cannot be justified from scripture. Indeed, it is excluded by the infinite qualitative distance between God and man. Barth believes that the being of God and man cannot be made abstract, comprehensible, and graspable, or described from parts or qualities. This is too static. Indirect knowledge cannot be made direct and rendered harmless through the analogy of being. The difference between God and man is not calculable. Instead, God remains hidden. The sovereignty of God is not to be placed on a neutral basis with sinful man.

Barth's exposition of the analogy of faith is found in sections 41 and 45 of the third volume of his *Dogmatics*. He holds that the word "person" applies to deity pre-eminently and to man only secondarily. While accepting the idea of analogy, Barth has continued to insist that the introduction of philosophical analysis of the problem of language leads to a false theology. He understands philosophy not so much as a systematic rational view of the world as a human way of thinking about anything. Its object is abstract while that of theology is an absolute event. Barth treats philosophy less as a systematic rational view of the world than as a human way of thinking about everything. In his actualism, he insists that Christian analogical knowledge of God cannot be from the point of view of the spectator. God's Word to man determines his existence. It is a new possibility, an uncreated reality identical with God himself. Barth criticizes the Lutheran scholastic theologian, Quenstedt, for attempting to develop an analogy of being based on the distinction between absolute and relative, instead of an analogy of faith and grace.⁵ Quenstedt's formulation makes being rather than deity primary, without an adequate sense of God's continuing hiddenness. Its analogy of intrinsic attribution in part parallels that of the Jesuit, Suarez. Barth holds we cannot premise a correlation between finite and infinite or man at one extreme and God at the other. Analogy is "unavoidable" not because it is imposed by man, but because it is chosen by God. "Pressed . . . by the true revelation of God, we are pushed to the word 'analogy'."

3. *Development of Barth's Analogy Doctrine*

Barth's positive reinterpretation of analogy is developed in his criticism of nineteenth-century Protestant theology as well as scholasticism.⁶ Indebted to both the Enlightenment and pietism, Protestant theologians of the period did not regard religious experience as rational in its own right. When Barth described the Word of God as a rational event, he committed himself to analogy in the context of revelation. Theology, he insists, takes its character from the rationality of its proper object. The Word of God, in Barth's view, is a kind of concrete universal. His criticism of medieval theology, realist or idealist, is that it did not achieve a proper subordination of its thought forms to their proper object. He views nominalism as a protest against an inadequate theology rather than a satisfactory positive position in itself. Indeed,

he finds that it was latent in the later scholastic separation between the being and action of God in description of the divine attributes. Barth's own analogy of faith is not based on nominalism or existentialism, but "faith seeking understanding." He interprets Anselm's premise in terms of a dynamic rationality which presupposes the active self-communication of divine truth. The utter objectivity of God prescribes the manner and limits of our knowledge, while it is at the same time the basis of analogical predication. Professor Thomas F. Torrance of the University of Edinburgh explains:

Thus along with Anselm's notion of dynamic rationality there goes a notion of dynamic analogy carrying a relationship of adequacy and inadequacy, or partial likeness and partial unlikeness, between the knowledge of faith and its proper object.... the inadequacy of theological statements does not mean that they are false, but on the contrary reflects the *truth* of their relation to their object.⁷

As distinguished from scholasticism as well as the Enlightenment, Barth conceived of both man and God actualistically without any necessary reference to nature or essence. The Christian view is not predictive but "post-dictive." Barth is linked to medieval theology through his study of Anselm, which he completed just before beginning his *Church Dogmatics*. Charles Hartshorne evaluates Barth's exposition of Anselm's ontological argument as an especially discerning one.⁸ However, even Anselm is included in Barth's rejection of all natural theology; Barth finds no autonomous metaphysic in his writings. He insists that Anselm's statement was made "in the Church" as an attempt to clarify the Christian confession. Anselm's argumentation is theological and not anthropological. Even for Anselm, knowledge of God is only from God's word in faith. He did not attempt to develop an autonomous metaphysic from the analogy of being. It is the presupposition of a second moment, apart from faith, that leads to a Pelagianism in which grace is made a quality and the divine placed at human disposal. Gottlieb Söhngen, a Roman Catholic who taught at the University of Munich, distinguished Anselm's position from that of Aquinas as *intellectus fidei* but not *scientia fidei*.⁹

Barth believed that both Luther and Calvin would reject all natural theology in the contemporary context. Even more than the Reformers, he refused all attempts to establish God's existence apart from faith.¹⁰ Reflecting an indebtedness to scholasticism even in revolt against it, they presupposed a natural knowledge of God as the basis for moral responsibility. Even though Luther was strongly influenced by nominalism, he did not dismiss all general revelation. Calvin emphasized that the God who is revealed in the Decalogue as lawgiver is also redeemer in Jesus Christ. Barth's sole criterion is the Word of God in Jesus Christ; there is no relation in being between man and God apart from grace. Barth is emphatic that Christian interpretation requires other intellectual bases today than those of the traditional meta-

physics. He is not a theological nominalist and explicitly allows that philosophical terms may be used in a context of faith, but this can be only from the premise of revelation. Within the limits of his own position, Barth is quite consistent and even rationalistic. Essentially, he asks, why attempt knowledge from below when there is a clear word from above? In Barth's view, analogy has its basis in the decision of God and man, not as equals but unequals. It is possible only as the believer is united with Christ through a free decision of God in faith which also evokes human decision. Analogy stands at the limit between man and God, denoting similarity in dissimilarity.

Barth criticizes specifically the First Vatican Council claim that the existence of God can be proved by reason alone, charging that it depends on a mistaken separation of God the creator from God the reconciler and redeemer. Jesus Christ alone must be our reference in the knowledge of God.¹¹ Barth insists that God's creative action in his Word is primary. God is the wholly other, not because he is an unknown object. Rather, he is hidden even as he is disclosed in his revelation. Barth's view resembles the Platonic to the extent of claiming that God is outside of essence. We do not know God the creator independent of his Word and action. In short, there is no autonomous knowledge of deity from creation, but only knowledge of the Trinitarian God from his special revelation. Barth agrees with Aquinas that God is not known immediately but only indirectly. Yet Barth rejects the scholastic antithesis between essence and existence as irrelevant for our knowledge of God. He takes his clue from Luther: we do not know God naked in his nature, but only from his works. Barth believes that claims for natural theology have led to confusion about the proper importance of theology; it is linked to work righteousness. He holds that traditional natural-supernatural distinctions often mask naturalism.

4. Specific Analogy Designation in Barth's Theology

Pöhlmann examined some two hundred and twenty cases in Barth's writings and concluded that more than half represent an extrinsic analogy of proportionality.¹² Even though this is an analogy of inequality, Barth describes it in terms of proportion rather than proportionality. Indeed, Pöhlmann finds that he does not distinguish between the two. Pöhlmann concludes that Barth does not use the idea of analogy to describe a relation between relations as in classical description. Man and not God is the analogue. Barth proceeds to equate words of likeness, reflection, and parallel, using such terms as father, patience, mind, wisdom, spirit, and lordship. According to Barth, analogy cannot be developed on the pattern of creator: creation = God: world. We may not proceed as in natural theology from a likeness in the world itself. Analogy means instead that God appropriates and uses an analogon from creation; creation is not the bearer of an inherent

power. Truth is not first and primarily in human thought and speech. Love, community, sonship, and right must be known from Christ.

Barth cites as example of Biblical analogy the parallels of father and child, king and people, lord and servant.¹³ Genesis 1:22 is used as Biblical reference. Analogy is from above and not dependent on human reflection, but on God's creative act and being. This claim is very clear in Barth's treatment of causality. God and creation are not comparable causes. When we speak of God as cause, Barth urges, it must be with the understanding that God is the ground and beginning of all causal series, *causa sui* and *sui generis*. Creation has a double relation. It is subject to the divine causality and also has its own causal sequences. Barth's primary reference is faith and covenant rather than cosmology. He develops his own positive interpretation in a many-sided way. In a Christocentric, actualistic context we may say GG:MM, GM:MM, GM:MG. As God is to God in the Trinity, a monopluralism, so man is to man. As God is to man, man is to man. As God is to man, man is to God. The one pure mirror of God is Jesus Christ and this alone allows us to speak positively of analogy. Barth's premise is that only God can make the image of himself, and he does so in man. The image is from grace, a task, hope, and historical dynamic. We may not speak of the image of God either in terms of intellect or in terms of the soul. Yet man is a social being who can be taken as God's partner in an image of grace. But it is God who builds this community. Barth is emphatic that no all-inclusive concept follows from this fact. Reflection does not lead us to the exemplar. It is God alone who brings potentiality.

Barth refuses to allow any intrinsic image of God in man, either formal or material, and concludes that the knowledge of God can be given only in faith as a new created fact. The natural and historical are seen in relation as it is understood that Jesus Christ is the fulfillment of the covenant. Barth is explicit that the latter is always other than God wills, different from its ground in Jesus Christ. God is the subject of the history of the covenant, not out of nature but as he creates a new man. God repeats in man a relation in himself, I and Thou. Man is an I-Thou from God who is also I-Thou. Man is anchored in his creative ground through the covenant. Barth cites the man-woman relation, created by God, as the image and model for the history of covenant and salvation. However, we must be very clear that it is Jesus Christ who shows what the image of God means. I-Thou has its proper identity in him alone. We may speak of analogy in terms of Father to Son, Son to Father, and God to man. Barth cites Jesus' prayer recorded in John's Gospel that the Father will glorify his followers with the glory that has been given the Son. Barth's references are diverse. He speaks of an analogy of heaven and earth. Like Przywara, he uses the figure of marriage. He even includes an analogy of nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*); the Satanic can function only with the power of God. Man's life is characterized by a holy

unrest. He finds that the history of the world and the history of salvation are in restless tension with each other. The world is a "showplace of the divine" even though there is an infinite qualitative difference between the two. It bears a likeness to God even though not in him or a part of him. The Calvinistic doctrine of the exclusive glory of God seems to have influenced Barth's thought at this point.

5. *Criticism*

Critics point out that Barth does not consider in detail the differences between the various schools of analogy interpretation. Clarification of the concept of analogy involves epistemological problems which are not encompassed simply by affirmation of faith alone. Barth's Roman Catholic critics continue to charge that he fails to recognize the difference between false and incomplete knowledge. Their distinction between natural and supernatural does not inevitably lead to partitioning of God's being. Our natural knowledge of God can be authentic even though not exhaustive. It is the basic relation between nature and grace which is under discussion in the question of theological analogy, and Barth's emphasis carries its own peculiar limitation. Most Protestant theologians have not accepted Barth's rejection of religious experience and all natural knowledge of God without qualification. For example, the Dutch Protestant theologian, G. C. Berkouwer, has described Barth's theological approach as "the triumph of grace."¹⁴ However, Berkouwer distinguishes between general revelation and natural theology, accepting the former but rejecting the latter. The question is not whether particular theologies, notably scholasticism, have confused Christian faith claims even in attempting their philosophical defense. It is from the perspective of this context that a historical or rational claim about God's existence is to be evaluated. Inevitably, Barth's critics, Roman Catholics and Protestants, continue to ask how God's self-disclosure is to be understood. Barth's Christomonism, they have charged, does not allow for the variety of Biblical claims about our knowledge of God, much less discussion of their truth, but is only an affirmation of the centrality of revelation. This premise is accepted by all Christians. Analogy concerns not simply "that" but "how," the mode.

Emil Brunner's controversy with Barth was prolonged, often sharp and outspoken. He rejected Barth's substitution of the analogy of faith for the analogy of being, calling it unique in the history of Christian theology. Brunner insists that there is no place for analogy apart from some inner relation of man and God. Some correspondence of being is necessary to analogy, he argues. Barth has reacted against a rationalistic and naturalistic theology, but his nominalism is not legitimate. R. Prenter agrees with Brunner that Barth is not really free of the analogy of being.¹⁵ Brunner remarks that Barth's sharp "Nein" against him was in effect taken back in

much of what Barth said in his new doctrine of creation. Inevitably, theological concepts must come from the world. Pannenberg makes strong statements in his criticism of analogy, even though he is sympathetic to Barth. He criticizes the encounter character of Barth's extrinsic attribution, concluding that a dynamism and actualism yield no real analogy. Pannenberg charges that Barth demolished the ontological structure of analogy, breaking the analogy concept. Taken out of the objective sphere, analogy is meaningless.

The three volume study of Barth's thought written by the French Jesuit, Henri Bouillard, includes an important critique on analogy.¹⁶ Bouillard points out that the extended use of the analogy of being as a defense against skepticism and rationalism in the modernist controversy gave it an enlarged scope. He denies any fundamental connection between the natural theology of his Church and the natural theology against which Barth protested in his early period. Roman Catholicism refuses the *a priori* knowledge of God claimed in some Protestant liberalism. Nonetheless, it insists that the natural knowledge of God is a condition of faith. The Roman Catholic position is not that we know *a priori* what God is, but only that there is a rational moment in faith. Such natural knowledge is not an independent moment, although to be sure it is a second one. Bouillard charges that Barth often confuses problems of knowledge with questions of salvation. However, Barth really does not offer an alternative view of analogy. His terminology is not well defined and at times he uses analogy to signify even a spatial representation of the essence of God's being. Bouillard emphasizes that analogy does not have as uniform a definition among Roman Catholics as Barth supposes.

After Barth made rejection of Roman Catholic natural theology the dividing line between the Roman Catholic and Protestant positions, Hans Urs von Balthasar replied that his Church's tradition does not conceive of nature apart from grace. Von Balthasar argued that a distinction between philosophy and theology is fundamental at only two points: affirmation of a limited natural knowledge of God apart from special revelation and the relevance of metaphysics in explication of revelation itself. In a careful study von Balthasar argues that Barth's early dialectical perspective was replaced by an analogy view throughout the later volumes of the *Dogmatics*.

The substitution of analogy for the principle of dialectic does not occur abruptly. It cannot be grasped in a determined text; it is realized progressively and insensibly in the first volumes of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, and can be considered as finished in the third volume (*Die Lehre von Gott*, 1940) and in the works which are its contemporaries (*Credo*, 1935; *Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesdienst*, 1938). The second volume (1938) examines its principles without taking the occasion to develop them. The doctrine of analogy will unfold in an ever more manifest fashion from volume to volume in such a way as to become the central theme of the treatises devoted to creation (1945), to man (1948) and to predestination (1950). Whoever does not take this development into account will search in

vain in the first volume of the *Kirchliche Dogmatik* (1932) for a precise formulation of this doctrine.¹⁷

The question is, what kind of analogy? Von Balthasar even claimed that Barth's analogy of faith is in principle dependent on an analogy of being, a view that Barth did not accept. Von Balthasar, learning from Przywara, does not interpret nature and grace in terms of different levels of metaphysical addition and subtraction. His Christocentric theology is characterized by an actualism and concern for the singular. With Przywara, he speaks of one factual order of grace with different moments of creation, the fall and redemption. From von Balthasar's point of view, there is no purely theoretical knowledge. The natural side of the knowledge of God rests on (*eingebettet*) the supernatural. Von Balthasar argues that the First Vatican Council decree on the natural knowledge of God applies only to nature as defined theologically. In criticism of Barth, he insists that nature is not cursed. Rather, it is elevated, empowered and fulfilled in grace. Even in original sin, man is never without supernatural help. Sin represents a contradiction of the creation against the creator. Von Balthasar takes his orientation from the Council of Chalcedon. He speaks of a concrete essence which is natural-supernatural. In Christ, he argues, supernature appeared in the form of kenosis. God has revealed his inner life.

Defense of the analogy of being has not come from Roman Catholics alone. H. G. Pöhlmann, a Lutheran, charges that Barth's position is a panactualism. Barth regards God as totally act and not substance. Pöhlmann concludes that Barth's attempt to abolish the distinction between substance and accident, the actual and potential, is unsuccessful. He argues that Barth's actualism leads to equivocation; theologically, Christomonism follows from this one-sided view. Barth believes that act means being and being alone can be in act. God is himself only in his divine act. Hence, analogy can be neither ontic, substantial, nor inherent. All static systems are excluded in Barth's *analogia relationis*. Pöhlmann points out that in the later volumes of the *Church Dogmatics*, the alternative is no longer between faith and being as much as between subsistent and actual being. He urges that the Biblical outlook, unlike that of Barth, is statico-dynamic; it teaches that reality endures. Being has a double character, according to the Biblical writers. In their view, it "happens" and "exists." The Old Testament describes the cosmos in static terms: earth and heaven remain firm. The status and limits of the self are fixed. Our heart is to hold fast in trust in a God who abides. Pöhlmann argues further that the language of the New Testament does not have to do simply with action, but includes a static element. Constancy is presupposed in distinguishing between God and creation.

Pöhlmann finds that being manifests itself in act and potency, not just in one or the other. He criticizes Barth's actualism on the grounds that accidents and substance belong inevitably to our experience. He holds that substance

need not be viewed as simply material or self-contained. Recognition of this fact, he believes, enables us to avoid a simply spiritualistic or materialistic monism. Pöhlmann believes that an intrinsic analogy structure enables us to understand God's Word. He argues that only the material image of God was destroyed by the fall, citing Genesis 5:1 and 9:6, together with I Corinthians 11:7 and Matthew 22:20, in defense of *imago formalis* in post-Lapsarian man. To allow a limited natural theology in this context is not to accept the Roman Catholic claim that the formal and material image of God remains intact together. Pöhlmann cites Bonhoeffer's conviction that God is not bound by his world, but has bound himself to it in his covenant. Man can forsake God's Word but God's Word will not leave him. Barth rightly argues that God's act roots in his being. However, he then isolates the divine Word from creation docetically. Barth's refusal of any concept of nature leads to a false either/or. One must choose between sin and God. This strategy leads to confusion in ethics. For example, the state is made an order of grace under the kingdom of God or Antichrist rather than being allowed a more neutral position. A doctrine of creation must make clear that God's relation to the world is not simply one of wrath. Pöhlmann urges that Barth carries anti-abstraction too far in denial that Biblical religion deals with the universal as well as the concrete. Barth's actualism in the analogy of faith does avoid creating a second center beside grace in the pope, doctrines or ecclesiology. However, Pöhlmann will not concede that every analogy of being necessarily leads to this impasse or is without concern for sin. Unable to derive any knowledge of transcendence from the world of creation, Barth speaks of an infinite qualitative difference. Pöhlmann replies that the Bible teaches that the substance of creation is good and not just an accident of grace. Biblical writers comment repeatedly on the way in which the world reflects God's glory and compare him with light and fire. Such a symbolism appears especially in the Fourth Gospel. Basically, however, it is man rather than the world which is the image of God. On this premise, the Bible allows a legitimate analogy with the non-Christian religions. Although Pöhlmann bases his comments on Biblical exegesis, he raises a number of philosophical questions. He does not treat the more inclusive problem of the metaphysics of theism; indeed, he wishes to avoid such a perspective. He does not raise the question of the relation of nature and grace directly, but it is clear that he presupposes a Lutheran as against a Roman Catholic position. Nonetheless, it is significant that he believes that a limited analogy of being is possible and indeed necessary in such a context.

Söhngen has offered an alternative to the positions of Przywara and Barth.¹⁸ He defines analogy as a method of interpretation which gives knowledge through likeness. Conscious of Protestant criticism, Söhngen attempts to identify the analogy of faith more exactly as a hermeneutical principle. The analogy of faith shows the unity in the different orders of

religious knowledge. It makes explicit: 1. the unity of meaning in scripture, 2. the unity of scripture with the Church's doctrinal teaching, 3. the unity and interrelation of the mysteries of faith, 4. the unity of nature with obedience to grace and faith. Söhngen emphasizes that the language of the Bible is not metaphysical like that of Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, or Hegel. Instead, it uses the more dynamic *analogia metaphorica*. Söhngen warns that we must be careful not to attempt to purify Biblical language from philosophy, exchanging theology for metaphysics. He finds no direct relation between the analogy of faith and the analogy of being in the constitution of likeness. He is explicit that the analogy of being as metaphysical-ontological necessarily fails to reach deity. It is only through revelation and faith that man is raised up and made into likeness of God. Faith is likeness to the inner divine life. Analogy is real alone through the work of God. The problem is not one of a universal concept, but how we understand sin, revelation, grace, and redemption in terms of passages such as Romans 1:20. The priority which Söhngen gives to faith may be illustrated from the analogy of Heavenly Father. He believes that the Word of God, not nominal being, declares man a real child of God, introducing him to participation in the divine life.

Söhngen's stance is not abstractly speculative but moral. He appraises nature from the history of salvation rather than metaphysics. Analogy in his view moves between the act of God in salvation and the concrete essence of man. Man, although made in the image of God, is now sinner by nature; he can no longer see God's likeness which is written in creation. The analogy of faith is possible because God comes out of himself to man. Söhngen argues that I Corinthians 2:11-13, Philippians 2:6, 7, and John 1:14 refer to the analogy of faith and not the analogy of being. He develops his positive interpretation of analogy from a doctrine of creation. All human names ultimately are from God who made the world. Man is limited as a worldly essence; it is God who calls and names. Human existence is perfected in communication with God's essence and reality. The names which we apply to deity analogically do not mean that he is contained in them; instead, they put us in relation to him.

Söhngen finds a reciprocal relation between the Greek static and Hebrew-Christian dynamic view. Whereas the *analogia metaphysica* is purely conceptual, the *analogia metaphorica* is imageful. The latter gives depth and fullness which would otherwise remain lacking in pure conceptuality. Scripture and faith give us new understanding of nature through grace. Both references are necessary; nature and grace receive new insight and clarification from each other. God's Word of likeness mediates between the mystery of the hidden deity and the pardoned, grace-receiving man. Söhngen insists that nature has an ontological relation to God and speaks of an assimilation of God's Word to man and his word. He distinguishes two movements, one from above to below and another from below to above. Direction of move-

ment is of fundamental importance in appraising analogy. Although God's Word comes in human speech forms, it is God who makes the likeness. The images and concepts of the created world of the analogy of being are used in the analogy of faith. It is not as God but as man that Jesus Christ is the last and highest likeness, the one mediator between God and man. Söhngen urges that the God of creation and salvation has metaphysical relevance. The *analogia metaphorica* gives the *analogia metaphysica* its fullness of meaning. He distinguishes mode and form, *modus significandi* and *res significata* in theological concepts.

Söhngen's interpretation like that of Przywara draws on Augustine as well as Aristotle and Aquinas together with Newman. An emphasis from Bonaventura is also important. Citing Anselm, Söhngen describes the analogy of being as healed through grace by a higher likeness in the analogy of faith. He points out that it was Plato who first called attention to the relation between participation and analogy. However, according to Söhngen, philosophy proceeds from the *ens commune* and knows no participation in the divine nature. It is only as the participation of faith is added to the participation of being through redemption that man shares and participates in the divine life. Aquinas's analogy expresses an order of rank as well as the causal relation of dependence. The language of *primus analogatus* and *analogata inferiori* is used to express dependence, as being is communicated from God. Barth, holding to Luther's *simil iustus et peccator*, finds an antithesis between the two. Barth has praised Söhngen's emphasis on the analogy of faith. However, as Walker has pointed out, the Neo-scholastic understanding of the relation of nature and grace remains in principle. The analogy of being is prolegomena to revelation in a kind of natural theology. Söhngen emphasizes the remaining natural image of God after the fall as against Brunner. The analogy of faith is not set against the analogy of being but builds on it. The created order is healed and clarified through Jesus Christ.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. *The Ecumenical Debate*

A study of the *analogia entis-analogia fidei* debate cannot avoid the question of the contemporary status of the analogy problem. Indeed, the question has been implicit throughout this writing. There have been two kinds of significant study of analogy in the period following the second world war. One has been primarily historical, and appears in the so-called renaissance of research on this theme in St. Thomas.¹ The other has used historical studies as data in a more far-reaching reappraisal. Puntel's unusually incisive and comprehensive volume is an example of the second type. Added to Roman Catholic reinterpretation and research is the work of such Angli-

cans as Casserley, Farrer, and Mascall, as well as philosophers of religion such as Ramsey and Woods. It is important that Roman Catholic writers are engaging in theological and not just philosophical dialogue about analogy. Moreover, it is now evident that Protestant philosophical interest was not destroyed by Barthianism, and that concern for the meaning of religious experience in general continues. The widespread interest in hermeneutic has raised questions about epistemology as well as kerygma. Earlier in this study, attention was called to the similarities between this interest and analogical interpretation. One contribution of hermeneutic has been to emphasize that religious language must be used precisely and with a careful choice of context.

The textbook exposition, against which the theologians of the Second Vatican Council have polemicized in many different areas, assuredly does not exhaust the meaning of analogy. An Aristotelian substance-accident metaphysics is of only limited value for the exposition of our theme in a context of Protestant dialectical theology as well as post-Kantian philosophy in general. Puntel points out that a number of questions must be considered in attempts at reconstruction:² Is analogy anything more than an analogy of names in Aquinas's writings? Had he really thought through the question of ontological difference in relation to God and the world? What, for example, is the relation between analogy and being? Aquinas concludes each of his proofs, in effect, by stating that "this is what all men understand by the term God." Assuredly, a host of questions in the history of religions is begged in such an omnibus statement.

A basic watershed in the interpretation of analogy appears in the debate as to whether it is primarily an epistemological reference. Bouillard has argued convincingly that in Aquinas's exposition it is a mode of judgment rather than an ontological concept.³ The later scholastic schools gave it a conceptual reference that Aquinas never intended. Of course, Neo-scholasticism has made it primary in the predication of the divine attributes.⁴ Evidently enough, Przywara's treatment extended the theme far beyond this usage, developing it as a principle of structure in metaphysics. To justify his point of view, he surveyed its larger historical setting and significance. Przywara did not limit himself to defining its meaning in one type of philosophy or theology alone. Rather, he employed it to defend the metaphysics of theism as well as to justify a particular type of theological expression. Not exclusively Thomistic, Przywara was sensitive to the philosophical trends of the time, trying to appraise their intention positively and not just negatively.⁵ Inevitably, such an outlook joined epistemological and metaphysical concern. Przywara pressed further to specifically religious themes, attempting to explicate them philosophically. Analogy gave him a stance at the meeting place of philosophy and theology with an inclusive orientation in both.

If Przywara's contribution was to give the idea of analogy a wider refer-

ence, expanding it beyond school controversies, Barth's service was to put it in a radically theological context. In Barth's interpretation, it had to do with faith and not speculation. In what seemed to his critics a one-sided emphasis, he introduced a new dimension into the discussion of its meaning, one that has been reflected in Roman Catholic reinterpretation. Not only did Barth use post-scholastic philosophical categories; he was highly critical of any dependence on them apart from the radical priority of faith. The analogy of faith long had been used as a principle for relating and harmonizing different doctrines. Barth gave it a new meaning by going to the root issue in any Christian knowledge of God: speculation can be idolatrous. His rejection of all syntheses of nature and grace drove those who challenged him back to their own confessional premises, requiring them to disclose their primary presuppositions. Faith, Barth insisted, is not just mystical knowledge. It is the sin-grace and not the nature-supernature antithesis which belongs to the Bible. The analogy of faith does not describe the knowledge of God in general, but Christian truth. Knowledge is determined from the categories of Christian faith and not other meanings which are alien or extrinsic to it.

Przywara argued that consideration of the theme of analogy raises the problem of the relation between philosophy and theology. Puntel urges that Przywara's approach is unique: he has attempted to think through the entire history of Western thought with analogy as its dynamic structural principle.⁶ For Przywara, analogy is not just one theme among others, but the often unexpressed presupposition of the synthesis of Greek and Hebrew perspectives in the Christian metaphysics of theism. Puntel is emphatic that Przywara's analysis does not stand alone. The German Catholic philosophy of recent decades would have been impossible without his reflection and leadership.⁷ The exchanges between Barth and Przywara, in effect, bypassed the long legacy of school distinctions between different types of analogy. These distinctions along with questions of causality and proofs of God's existence became of secondary importance. Przywara himself was not interested in the detailed reconstruction of Aquinas's position or in forcing his thought into exact conformity with it. Of course, one can ask whether justice can be done to the issues when the traditional apparatus of analogical predication is ignored.

2. Contemporary Relevance

Przywara argued that the very nature of Christian theological doctrines, incarnation and grace as well as creation and providence, makes analogy indispensable to theistic interpretation. Simply in terms of the history of ideas, it is quite impossible to avoid the Greek philosophical categories in which the concept was explicated, no matter how they are evaluated. Of course, today the question of religious knowledge is treated differently in a

wide variety of contexts, ranging from language analysis to existential explication of kerygma. Przywara used analogy to clarify what he regarded as the perennial role of metaphysics in theology. To be sure, acknowledgment of this orientation is only the beginning and not the end of evaluation. One must ask not simply of its definition but its usage. The complexity of the issue, however, need not obscure its perennial character. Theology requires that the Word of God have clear articulation in concept. The subtlety and many-sidedness of metaphysical explanation can be missed all too easily in kerygmatic statement. In the longer view, Przywara argued, the dominant philosophical ethos does affect religion as well as vice versa. For his own part, he did not deny a theological reference in philosophy, implicit if not evident from the outset. Yet the fact of religion need not destroy the integrity of philosophy, and epistemology is not irrelevant to theology, as Barth supposed.

Analogy becomes of contemporary relevance in the debate as to whether there can be a simply existential interpretation, either in philosophy or theology. Both Barth and Przywara use existential themes in their formulation. Although Przywara has an Augustinian sense of mystical encounter, he does not allow it to stand alone. His question is whether it is possible to ignore all form or essence, and he argues that this reference returns in spite of all attempts to avoid it. Analogy in his view joins essence and existence, but not in a simply secular context. Przywara's later works develop a suggestive phenomenology of religion in general, premised on the Catholic doctrine of the natural knowledge of God. In a very different way from Barth, he drove his opponents back to their religious presuppositions. Przywara finds continuity, not just discontinuity, between philosophy and theology. He attempts to speak of God from the creator-creation relation, developing a perspective which joins them metaphysically. In the scholastic period, analogy was formulated in terms of natural theology as well as dogmatics. It is dubious whether or not Roman Catholicism ever embraced the fully autonomous natural theology which has been ascribed to it in some contemporary discussion.⁸ If one accepts the scholastic apparatus without modification, it can be used as the basis for theological synthesis. It is only when the first premises of this synthesis are challenged that the question arises as to the negotiability of such a description.

Barth called attention in a dramatic way to the faith-reason problem. However, the question remains as to the extent to which analogy is a legitimate reference in a phenomenology of religion. As developed by Przywara against Barth, the analogy of being was based on religious life and practice as they join reflection. Breton describes it as the essence of the mystical experience.⁹ One of the aspects of Barth's analysis, now challenged radically, is his rejection of all religion as idolatrous. His analysis, although powerful in argument and polemic, was restrictive.

Religion, like metaphysics, is many-sided and perennial. Barth's total rejection of both of these references oversimplified the problem of language as well as being. No doubt any attempt to reconstruct the metaphysics of theism must take place in the midst of a variety of conflicting epistemologies. Yet the critique of earlier substantialist doctrines does not necessarily leave only an existential or pragmatic alternative. The question is not simply one of a return to a pre-Kantian view, much less the intellectual deduction of the attributes of God apart from religious experience. Rather the issue revolves around the question of whether finite being is as closed in on itself as much of contemporary existentialism has supposed. Is there little more which remains than a leap of faith in response to revelation? Must one not ask about the relation of time and eternity, the one and the many, essence and existence, as Przywara has maintained? To be sure, it is easy enough to show that analogies have been important in the history of religion and theology. The further question concerns itself with the existential reference which will be used in controlling them. This was the crucial issue in the Przywara-Barth debate. For the Protestant, Roman Catholic speculation was in danger of reducing grace to nature.

We have noted that Przywara's thought took a new direction following the second world war. Philosophical synthesis seemed broken; earlier hopes for a new Catholic intellectualism in Germany had come to naught. His new outlook even left a place for a *theologia crucis*. Bernhard Gertz has written an extended study of Przywara's later thought after extensive personal consultation with him.¹⁰ Gertz claims that the analogy of faith, a theme virtually ignored by Przywara before the war, became more and more the center of his reflection. It is this type of analogy more than the analogy of being which determines and directs Przywara's later writings. Assuredly, his categorization became increasingly more dogmatic and mystical. Przywara formulated an extensive typology of the old and new covenants, finding discontinuity between the two and developing the analogy of faith from the latter. Analogy denotes substantial revelation in the incarnation, which is known symbolically and even mythically. Earlier, Przywara had attempted to evaluate a variety of perspectives from the point of view of the *philosophia perennis*. Later, he viewed the totality of philosophy almost entirely from the point of view of Catholic theology.¹¹

3. *Karl Rahner's Roman Catholic Reinterpretation*

Both Kühn and Puntel point out that Przywara's earlier interests have not been without influence in the post-war era.¹² The Jesuit Karl Rahner has been one of the leading Roman Catholic theologians in the era of the Second Vatican Council. The philosophical reinterpretation of analogy, initiated by Przywara, continues in his writings, to be sure with major differences and modification.¹³ Rahner's exposition uses Kant's emphasis on the subjective

forms of understanding and joins it to Heidegger's appreciation of the historicity of being.¹⁴ He comments that the modern period is one of the subject, but need not be one of subjectivism. Contemporary theology must speak to man and not just of deity in isolation from the creature. Yet Rahner's approach is not simply existential, much less from a theory of knowledge alone, although it includes both dimensions. In principle, it appropriates the classical Catholic tradition of metaphysics, but with a more radical sense of history than the scholastics. Rahner does not reject Aristotle's description of man as a rational animal overtly; however, he believes that it tells too little. Time belongs to the essence of man; the unity of experience is in his subjectivity rather than in an abstract scientific ideal.¹⁵

Rahner finds that nature was interpreted too much from things and not enough from personal being in the last century as well as in antiquity. The Greek concept of nature is sub-human; taken alone, it reduces man to a thing. Too often, it has been appropriated uncritically in Christian reflection, he argues. Human nature is not to be found in any concretely experienceable essence which appears before our eyes. Contemporary existentialism has emphasized again that man's nature is never fully concrete in his existence. Rahner criticizes the rigid traditional distinction between nature and grace, even as he argues the impossibility of drawing a sharp line between the two.¹⁶ The intent of his reconstruction is clear as he holds that no single philosophical category, modern or scholastic, can be taken over without modification. Thus faith claims become relevant to a doctrine of analogy. Rahner's doctrine of a supernatural *existentielle* makes explicit its theological basis. Why the introduction of the concept of nature if man's being is fulfilled in its deepest character by God alone? Rahner replies that the concept of nature helps to make clear that grace is a free gift. In the supernatural life, we must accept God's communication as wholly gratuitous. Man's essence is not closed in on itself. Rather, it is *potentia obædientialis* to revelation; this is the basic meaning of the analogy of being.¹⁷

Rahner, like Barth, attempts to overcome merely static theological categories. However, his approach is a different one. He rejects a simply fideistic view of revelation on the one hand and a merely natural religion on the other. Rahner's view of spirit works against both. Only a relation to God can fulfill man's deepest needs. Rahner does not suppose that God is a fact immediately given in experience or just another subject. These alternatives are precluded by analogical description which at the same time makes explicit the relation between the human spirit and the divine spirit. God supports the world, working in and through it even as he is ultimately beyond it. The very nature of the human spirit is self-transcendence, Rahner argues. It projects beyond itself. Yet it cannot recognize itself for what it is without positing an absolute and unlimited unity of being and knowing as actually existent. Absolute being should not be interpreted simply as a self-relating totality, but as

dynamic moving power. The primeval unity and source of being and knowledge is in spirit.

Rahner agreed with Przywara that the analogy of being is the hallmark of Roman Catholic reflection and devotion. Yet his appropriation of the ideas of Heidegger as well as the new French theology is much larger than in the case of Przywara. Rahner conceives of metaphysics as existential reflection about being rather than any self-complete definition of essences. He speaks in terms of "having being" (*Seinhaben*) in order to avoid abstraction. "Having being" belongs principally to God alone in his unity of essence and existence. God is not known merely as an object but as concrete transcendence. For both Przywara and Rahner, analogy explains the motivation and direction of human thought. Each emphasizes *excessus* more than negation or comparison. Their interpretation is more open and indefinite than that of Neo-scholasticism. Rahner accepts Maréchal's appropriation of the Kantian critique of knowledge, one that was rejected by Przywara. More than this, Rahner begins theology as well as philosophy from his anthropology. Yet he retains Roman Catholic school distinctions more than Przywara.

Rahner's position is related to Henri de Lubac's *Supernatural*, an important study of the new French theology which appeared in 1946. De Lubac, a fellow Jesuit, attacked the extrinsicism of grace together with a static and self-complete view of nature which he found dominant in Neo-scholasticism. Rahner has argued strongly, supporting this criticism in his own interpretation. However, de Lubac also held that the desire for the beatific vision belongs intrinsically to the human person. His critics replied that grace could not be really gratuitous in this view. Rahner rejected de Lubac's formulation, urging that man's concrete essence and not his nature is directed to the vision of God in a supernatural *existentielle*. The transcendental opens "over-out" to the transcendent. The human person seeks to affirm his own being in relation to absolute and perfect being. Ultimately, fulfillment is possible only through grace.

A number of new emphases appear in Rahner's later writings. He has given special attention to the doctrine of the Trinity.¹⁸ In most of classical theology, God is described as one and the creation as plural. Analogy is built upon this dualism. The Trinitarian God, however, Rahner explains, is both one and many. God is not just a static unity, nor are the divine attributes to be predicated only in terms of his simplicity. Spirit in man as in God is many-sided. Of course, it is the Thomistic premise that will follow and is governed by intellect. Other interpretations of analogy are more voluntaristically oriented as in Protestant Reformation theology. Walter Kern, a German Jesuit, commenting on Rahner's interpretation, points out that both intellect and will belong to spirit.¹⁹ They have all too easily been applied to God abstractly and without historical reference. Rahner's sense of the tension between these two explains part of his emphasis on history. To be sure,

Rahner has not been without his critics among Roman Catholics. Bernhard Lakebrink argues that Rahner has broken with the realism of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition.²⁰ Being has become a question rather than a reality in a new subjectivism. Analogy is no longer used for inclusive metaphysical formulation, but only theological affirmation. Lakebrink classifies Rahner and Barth together as Neo-Kantian. Przywara probably would agree at least in part, since he rejected Maréchal's approach outspokenly. Yet his categories, like those of Rahner, are more theological than philosophical.

4. *Protestant Reinterpretation: Pannenberg, Ott, Tillich, Brunner*

It is evident that differing anthropological premises underlie particular confessional interpretations.²¹ Thomism explains the fall of man in terms of the loss of preternatural gifts. Human nature, especially reason, is believed to be still intact even though weakened and imbalanced. The fulfillment of nature in grace remains possible. Reformation theologians in contrast have described the fall as a more radical corruption. Human nature is perverted if not destroyed, and must be reconstructed, not simply fulfilled in grace. They argue that the Biblical doctrine is not one of the harmony of nature and grace, but the antithesis of sin and grace. Biblical religion embodies a critique of all religion which identifies God with nature; it is oriented toward his self-disclosure in history. Any attempt to harmonize nature and grace runs the danger of missing the essential character of the Biblical insight. At most, the nature-supernature distinction is relatively late in the history of theology and of secondary importance. Even Protestants who accept the analogy of being admit that it has all too easily mixed belief and unbelief in the past, ignoring the abiding tensions between faith and reason. In such circumstances, analogy has become a promiscuous omnibus category. Speculation and mysticism have been joined in analogical affirmation. Only after the limits of the natural knowledge of God are identified can there be appropriate consideration of the analogy of faith.

A part of the difficulty in reconstructing analogy for a Protestant context arises from a Protestant emphasis on the doctrine of justification by faith alone. One must ask whether this doctrine excludes all metaphysics of theism in a contemporary mode. Bultmann even more than Barth has answered affirmatively.²² To Przywara, the refusal of all substantial metaphysics seemed equally as one-sided as the self-contained immanence of an agnostic or atheistic existentialism. One was closed to the world, and the other to deity. The Protestant Reformers did not reject the analogy of being explicitly. This is Barth's original position. Nonetheless, as Aalders points out in defending Przywara's view, revelation not reason, grace not nature, faith not works were given priority in the Protestant soteriological setting.²³

Aalders argues that the being common to man and God was generalized and became secondary to the promise of God to creation in Reformation

theology. He concludes that the Reformers' appeal to the judgment of God invoked a totally different realm which had nothing in common with the order of being. Not *esse* as such but its quality, *bonum esse*, became dominant. Antithesis and difference received priority. At most, analogy could only express a faith which was completely and directly the work of God. Of course, Luther's criticism of Thomistic intellectualism was drastic. However, his position assuredly was not a skepticism about the use of language, but only a drastic emphasis on the distinction between the role of reason in the natural world and with respect to faith. His metaphors at times premise a correlation between God's being and that of the creature which invites the designation *analogia metaphorica*.²⁴ Aalders finds that Calvin allowed a more explicit place for analogy than Luther; however, the primary context continued to be theological.²⁵ Calvin gave priority to the living *esse* together with the will of God, premising a positive relation between the one creating and the many created beings.

A number of alternatives present themselves in the variety of Protestant interpretations of analogy. Pannenberg and Schlink both question whether analogy can be a legitimate reference in theology.²⁶ Pannenberg's "Habilitationsschrift" was written on the theme of analogy at the University of Heidelberg. Not only does he challenge the Roman Catholic synthesis of Greek and Biblical categories; he questions the vitality of the basic designation of analogy as a mean between univocal and equivocal. Pannenberg points out that simple definition of analogy as a middle position masks a variety of ambiguities. He concludes that an identifiable type of orientation develops in theology or metaphysics whenever one accepts this definition. Barth's view, he argues, has significant resemblance to Neoplatonism in spite of all Barth's attempts to avoid philosophy and mysticism. Only a limited number of alternatives is available if one takes the way of analogy. Barth moves from negation to affirmation, correlating relations between God and creation "from above."

Advocates of analogy argue that it is perennial in Christian theology—whether it is intended or not. Karl Barth's successor at the University of Basel, Heinrich Ott, describes it as an "in between" and draws on the ideas of Heidegger and Buber in his exposition.²⁷ God's reality transcends our consciousness, yet he cannot be described as simply another object, Ott argues. Religious symbols have to do with empirical experience, decision, and responsibility. They are not transcategorical, but phenomenological, and in Christianity should not be speculative but represent faith in God. Ott attempts to clarify the meaning of expressions concerning God's wrath in the Old Testament, and he considers the relation between anthropomorphism and personality. He concedes that God's wrath cannot be described literally in terms of a correspondence with our mood or its effects.

Ott, like Rahner, attempts reconstruction in terms of an *existentielle* rather

than a classical deduction. The latter, he finds, lacks the basic premise of personality. Ott warns against the danger of mixing philosophy and theology or of making analogy absolute or even dependent on the Church's teaching office as in Aquinas. Ott develops his own view as an exposition of the situation of belief, decision, and responsibility before God. In his explanation, he speaks of an analogy with our relation to our fellowmen. There is an "in between" of moral responsibility. Of course, Ott's phenomenology is a very imprecise tool; his reference is to faith rather than to being. Walker asks whether he is not really dealing simply with fideistic posteriority rather than any qualitative difference. In terms of traditional analysis, he appears to argue for a univocal logos and specific genus even as he refuses traditional distinctions of analogous predication. Ott's exposition makes evident the need for Protestant theory to consider the entire historical range of analogy interpretation.

Paul Tillich acknowledged the analogy of being as the basic premise of his interpretation. Replying to the American Jesuit, Gustave Weigel, he wrote:

I speak of analogical knowledge and mean with it exactly what St. Thomas means with *analogia entis*. The reason I used symbol more than analogy is a methodological difference between St. Thomas and myself.²⁸

At the same time, Tillich explicitly acknowledged his indebtedness to Barth's dogmatics. In disagreement with Barth, Tillich emphasized the ontological context of revelation. Greek and Hebrew thought forms, the problems of classical philosophy, and the answer of revelation came together in his system. Rhein finds the novelty of Tillich's exposition in its joining of justification by faith with the analogy of being. However, the latter is not used in a context of the traditional metaphysics of theism. Tillich conceived of the relation between faith and reason in more paradoxical terms than the supporting and complementary mode of Roman Catholicism.

In illustration of Protestant interpretation based on the *analogia entis*, the ideas of Tillich and Emil Brunner will be compared. Brunner writes: "... the doctrine of the *analogia entis* which has been such a controversial topic of late, is not peculiar to the Catholic Church, but it has been part of the common Christian inheritance of belief from the earliest days of the Church; for it simply expresses the fact that it has pleased God so to create the world that in and through it His 'everlasting power and divinity' may be made known."²⁹ Brunner argues for general revelation "because the Holy Scriptures teach it unmistakably."³⁰ It is the witness of the Fathers of the early Church and the Reformers. "God gives revelation in order that man may know Him, but man turns this into an illusion."³¹ Brunner expresses a characteristically Protestant attitude in identifying "the point at which the doctrine of the Reformers diverges from that of the Catholic Church, in

accordance with their differing views of the sinful corruption of man." They emphasized the cognitive significance of sin. Man left alone with knowledge of God from the world cannot help misconstruing analogy in a pantheistic sense. Brunner believes that the analogy of being does not, in fact, give sufficient ground for the construction of a natural theology. "The sinful reason always understands this 'likeness' in a wrong way, without perceiving the radical 'unlikeness' at the same time, which is rooted in the fact that God alone is God, that He is Creator and Lord."³²

Brunner's position is that historical revelation and the faith which it creates are needed to see the truth of analogies from creation. Yet he is emphatic that these analogies do not exist because of faith, but only become visible to it. Hence the analogy of being cannot be replaced by the analogy of faith as Barth holds. The question remains, however, as to whether analogy as interpreted by Brunner really has an epistemological value. To be sure, Brunner argues that the analogy of being is a necessary premise of all Christian theology. As an analogy of creation, it expresses the illumination of the inner eye of man through God's Word. It is not a principle of natural theology but of Biblical religion which makes explicit God's revealed essence and revelation to man. Walker argues that Brunner's analogy is a broken one, at most only with the outer contour of similarity in greater dissimilarity.

Brunner draws on the ideas of Calvin, who, more than Luther, developed a view of the universe as ordered and structured. Man as blinded by sin does not recognize the creator's workmanship. It is only as he is restored by faith that he comes to the true knowledge of God. Natural theology accepts a point of contact between man and God, but does not necessarily imply an autonomous understanding apart from faith. Brunner argues that the transcendence of essence and being have not been clearly distinguished from one another. "Transcendence of essence means that God is God alone, and that His 'Godhood' is absolutely and irrevocably different from all other forms of being."³³ However, "transcendence of Being, understood in the absolute sense, would mean that God is not immanent in the world in any sense at all . . . the statement of extreme Deism." In short, God is immanent in the world even though unrecognized by sinful man. Brunner is explicit in his opposition to the Roman Catholic analogy of being so far as it is connected with Neoplatonic ontology and natural theology. Analogy can be employed legitimately only from within historical revelation. The Neoplatonic view and its speculative ontological theory of a hierarchy of being mistakenly seek to achieve knowledge of God by way of abstraction.

Tillich finds a more positive relation between classical Greek philosophy and Biblical religion. In his commentary, "Some Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," he remarks: "It seems to me that the Stoic doctrine in which the logos embraces the structure both of mind and reality is nearer to the early Christian and even Johannine doctrine than Brunner admits."³⁴ For

Tillich, the divine self-manifesting logos through whom the world received its structure and meaning is the same one through whom estrangement is overcome and the world reunited with God. Tillich does not accept Brunner's sharp dichotomy between the Greek philosophical logos and that of the incarnation. Presupposing that the logos of man's existence in the world has a correlation with the divine disclosed in Jesus Christ, Tillich writes:

If the knowledge of revelation is called "analogous," this certainly refers to the classical doctrine of the *analogia entis* between the finite and the infinite. Without such an analogy nothing could be said about God.³⁵

In reply to Father Weigel, Tillich explained further: "I believe you are right when you say that my understanding of *analogia entis* is more negative protesting than positive-affirming." It was part of his Protestant conviction that no single expression of Christian faith is exhaustive or relevant for all times. Symbols achieve power but may also lose it. Cultural modes of understanding are not timeless. It is in this way that Tillich's interpretation avoids many of the problems of traditional analogical description.

A part of the difference between Brunner and Tillich lies in the latter's more positive attitude toward Neoplatonism. Tillich's use of analogy is very general; Ford charges that his concept of being is really univocal, based on those properties which are common to all beings. Ford writes:

Analogia entis can simply mean the semantic fact that in order to speak of that which transcends finite being, we must use a language which is produced by the encounter with finite being. . . . This is not *analogia entis* in the mode of traditional theology, but it is semantic analysis of the relation of religious language to other types of language, a task required of both analysis philosophers and systematic theologians.³⁶

McLean objects that Tillich allows no intrinsic relation between man and God, although to be sure he speaks of participation. McLean charges that Tillich's symbols give us no new information concerning God, no additional "belief that" but only "belief in."³⁷ We can speak of God in encounter but not of the knowledge of God himself. Tillich's answer would seem to be that beings can of themselves be symbols of the divine precisely because of the divine depth dimension within them. The affirmative element in the analogy is the divine itself, but this must be valued in a mystical sense.

5. Confessional Differences

In perspective, it is clear that the Przywara-Barth debate treated only some aspects of the problem of analogy. Barth limited the concept to a single reference, ignoring longstanding distinctions. Przywara made the theme even more inclusive and central than is usual in Roman Catholic interpretation. Aalders urges that Barth allows too little, while Przywara is too expansive.³⁸ Whereas one works too antithetically, the other is too

synthetic. Aalders believes that the problems which emerge from Przywara's exposition of the analogy of being are not due to his formal development of the idea as much as to his flexible application. Aalders, himself a Roman Catholic, complains that everything seems to fit together logically; yet we lack a clear statement of real difference.³⁹ Przywara's analogy of being can function at the natural or supernatural level, enabling one to find or make connections. Being and consciousness, the formal and material, faith and reason, are affirmed together. Analogy identifies permanence in change and the presence of one and the many. Przywara premises that human thought in all its diverse forms is analogous. Experience discloses a pattern of meaning, a logos and depth which are discovered rather than invented. Analogy means that our knowledge is not self-complete but opens "over-out" to Truth and Being.

In the longer view, a shift from analogy based on a static concept of nature to one premised on history is evident. Przywara suggested such a changed orientation in his refusal to view nature-grace separately, but only in concrete unity together. Przywara and Rahner both distinguish an abstract doctrine of human nature from the existential condition of man. Man is oriented dynamically toward or away from God. The human situation is not simply neutral, but has highly negative "demonic" as well as positive possibilities. Such an interpretation leads to an emphasis on history of salvation and even, in Przywara's case, to a *theologia crucis*. It is too simple to predicate perfection of the divine and then to ascribe attributes to God in terms of his unity. The real problem is rather to give the divine names, love, goodness, and righteousness, a relational context as well as religious meaning. In abstraction, they may be irrelevant if not meaningless in the face of evil. The meaning of revelation has been radicalized. As against traditional interpretation, new questions have been raised concerning the natural knowledge of God and the context in which faith is to be explicated. Creation has been set in a context of grace. In such a situation, the question of analogy is not simply epistemological. Analogy may be a barrier to hermeneutical investigation unless it is carefully defined. When its theological setting is clarified, it illuminates anthropology together with the basic claims of revelation.

The positive gain from the Przywara-Barth debate appears in a new understanding of the interrelation between the analogy of being and the analogy of faith. To say the least, Barth's polemic made clear that the former cannot stand alone in a Christian theological context. Chavannes, defending St. Thomas's interpretation, argues that the analogy of being is not really isolated from the analogy of faith in his writings.⁴⁰ Aquinas was not simply a philosopher but a theologian. Chavannes holds that both the analogy of faith and the analogy of being are relevant and necessary in explaining Aquinas's position. If this is the case, the interrelation between the two becomes the central issue. We have pointed out that Protestant commenta-

tors generally deny that the analogy of faith can be clarified as much from the analogy of being as Roman Catholic interpreters propose. Instead, priority is to be given to the analogy of faith and the analogy of being appraised from it. Of course, a more independent, dialectical relation between the two types of analogy appears among some Roman Catholic interpreters, more than has been true in the past. Przywara treats nature and grace in concrete synthesis in the world, not just as abstractions. A number of thinkers influenced by him, von Balthasar and Rahner for example, do not use "nature" to build a metaphysic but only as a limiting concept to indicate the separateness of creation from God even in its dependence upon him.

Can one conclude with Przywara and Barth that the basic Roman Catholic thought form is the analogy of being and the Protestant form the analogy of faith? Only confusion will result if this dualism is accepted without qualification. In fact, both types of analogy belong to each confession in varying expression. Much of traditional analogy theory has premised an unhistorical, metaphysical relation between man and God without cognizance of the "history of salvation." Protestants have reason to complain when the analogy of being is treated simply metaphysically, apart from consideration of the reality of human sin. However, the interpretations of von Balthasar and Söhngen, as well as Przywara and Rahner, cannot be criticized fairly on this ground. Are Roman Catholic thought forms basically ontological and the Protestant personal? Against such an oversimplified claim, it must be argued that Protestant interpretation has an implicit ontology together with philosophical implications. Assuredly, Barth was correct in recognizing that analogy had been uncritically and too inclusively applied. In his own exposition, Barth did not succeed in transcending all traditional problems and distinctions. Nonetheless, there has been gain in the debate he engendered about the theological context of analogy. Traditional questions have been put in a new setting and first premises clarified.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Cf. E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (London: Longmans, Green, 1949), pp. 92-121.
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4. James F. Anderson, *The Bond of Being, An Essay on Analogy and Existence* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), pp. 25-31.

5. Austin Farrer, *Finite and Infinite* (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1943), pp. 1-5.
6. Casserley, *Christian in Philosophy*, pp. 24 and 51.
7. Anderson, *Bond of Being*, pp. 93 and 229.
8. John A. T. Robinson, *Honest to God* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963).
9. E. L. Mascall, *The Secularization of Christianity* (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 117.
10. John MacQuarrie, *God-talk, An examination of the Language and logic of Theology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 214-215.
11. L. Bruno Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit* (Freiburg: Herder, 1969), pp. 81 and 92.
12. Étienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. Edward Bullough (St. Louis: Herder, 1939), p. 37 *et seq.*
13. Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit*, p. 32.
14. Aahmes Ely Overton, *The Problem of Analogy in Theological Method* (unpublished dissertation, 1971, Northwestern University).
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20. W. S. Taylor, "Analogical Thinking in Theology," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, XVII (September, 1964), 283.
21. Dorothy Emmett, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking* (London: Macmillan, 1946).
22. G. F. Woods, *Theological Explanation: A Study of the Means of Explaining in Science, History and Theology* (Welwyn: Nisbet, 1958), p. 115.
23. G. F. Woods, "Use of Analogy in Christian Theology," *Journal of Theological Studies*, VII, 226-238.
24. Ian Ramsey, *Models and Mystery* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).
25. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

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1. By Pope Leo XIII in 1879.
2. Karl Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, tr. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: 1933).
3. Franz Diekamp, *Katholische Dogmatik nach den Grundsätzen des hl. Thomas*, 3 vols., vols. 2 & 3 ed. Klaudius Jüssen (Münster: Aschendorff, 1952-1954).
4. Ulrich Kühn, *Natur und Gnade* (Berlin: Lutherisches Verl., 1961).
5. Stanislas Breton, *Les Noms Divins et le problème actuel de L'Herméneutique*. Lectures printed privately.
6. L. Malvez, *Transcendance de Dieu et Création des Valeurs* (Paris-Louvain: Desclée de Brouwer, 1958).
7. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Act and Being*, tr. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper, 1962).

8. Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, "The Question of Natural Revelation," *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*, tr. James C. G. Greig (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 90-118. *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Scribners, 1958).

9. F. Buri, "Entmythologisierung oder Entkerygmatisierung der Theologie," in *Kerygma und Myth*, English tr. (SPCK, 1953), vol. II, p. 92.

10. Helmut Gollwitzer, *The Existence of God as Confessed by Faith*, tr. James W. Leitch (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965), pp. 30-31.

11. Rudolf Bultmann, *Kerygma & Mythos*, ed. H. W. Bartsch (Hamburg: Reich, 1952), vol. II, p. 196 *et seq.*

12. Gollwitzer, *Existence of God*, pp. 183-184.

13. Cf. Ralph M. McInery, *The Logic of Analogy* (Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), p. 3.

14. Cf. Rolf Walker, *Die Analogie als Begriff und Methode in katholischen Denkformen und in der protestantischen Dogmatik* (Münster/Westfalen, Inauguraldissertation (unpublished), 1963), p. 490.

15. Walker's exposition has been used in assembling this list. Cf. *Die Analogie*, pp. 475-481.

16. Walter Brugger, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch* (Vienna: Herder, 1948), p. 10. Also, *Scholastik*, XXX (1955), 554-563.

17. Josef Santeler, "Die Lehre von der Analogie des Seins," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, 51 (1931), 1-43.

18. Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World, An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktycheri, 1952), p. 366.

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3. Paul Grenet, *Les Origines de l'Analogie Philosophique dans les Dialogues de Platon* (Paris: Boivin & Cie, 1948), p. 15.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 234-237.

5. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 18.

6. Grenet, *Analogie Philosophique*, p. 18.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
9. Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis* (Munich: Kösel und Pustet, 1932), p. 146.
10. Robert Lowry Calhoun, "Plato as Religious Realist," *Religious Realism*, ed. D. C. MacIntosh (New York: Macmillan, 1931), pp. 195-251.
11. Grenet, *Analogie Philosophique*, p. 148 *et seq.*
12. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 21.
13. Lyttkens cites the following: *Timaeus* 29c, 31bff, 32c, 37a, 53cff, 69b; *Republic* 510a, 534a.
14. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 21.
15. Wolfhart Ulrich Pannenberg, *Eine kritische Untersuchung der Geschichte des Analogiebegriffs in der Gotteserkenntnis* (Heidelberg Habil.-Schrift, unpublished, 1955), p. 36.
16. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 31.
17. Platzbeck, *Von Analogie zum Syllogismus*, p. 63 *et seq.*
18. Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit*, p. 22.
19. Pannenberg, *Geschichte des Analogiebegriffs*, p. 40.
20. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 40.
21. Pannenberg, *Geschichte des Analogiebegriffs*, p. 37.
22. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 47.
23. W. J. Aalders, "De Analogia Entis in Het Geding," *Mededeelingen Der Koninklijke Akadademie, Van Wetenschappen (Afdeling Letterkunde, Deel 83, Serie A, No. 2)*, p. 15.
24. Pannenberg, *Geschichte des Analogiebegriffs*, p. 53.
25. Cf. Jaspers, *Die grossen Philosophen* (Munich: Piper, 1957), pp. 667-671.
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33. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 91 *et seq.*
35. Lyttkens, *Analogy Between God and World*, p. 406.
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37. *Ibid.*, p. 29 *et seq.*
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40. Battista Mondin s.x., *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963), p. 37.
41. *Ibid.*

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43. Henry Chavannes, *L'Analogie entre Dieu et Le Monde selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin et selon Karl Barth* (Paris: Cerf, 1969), pp. 106-107.

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2. Przywara, *Polarity*, pp. 142-210.

3. Erich Przywara, *Mensch, Typologische Anthropologie I* (Nuremberg: Glock und Lutz, 1958). *Humanitas, Der Mensch Gestern und Morgen* (Nuremberg: Glock und Lutz, 1952).

4. Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, pp. 6-10.

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11. Przywara, *Polarity*, p. 94.

12. Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie*, p. 144. Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 23.

13. Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 99.

14. Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie*, p. 164.

15. Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 56.

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17. Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, p. 133.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

19. Erich Przywara, *Was ist Gott? Summula* (Nuremberg: Glock und Lutz, 1947), (not translated into English).

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22. Johannes Pflenge, "Anodische und katholische Analogia Entis," *Die Beständige Aufbruch*, Festschrift für Erich Przywara (Nuremberg: Glock und Lutz, 1959), pp. 48-56.

23. Cf. Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie*, pp. 283 et seq.

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25. *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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28. Kühn, *Natur und Gnade*, p. 106.

CHAPTER V

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-107.
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5. *Ibid.*, II/1, 265-272.
6. Karl Barth, *Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert* (Zollikan-Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1952).
7. Torrance, *Karl Barth*, pp. 189-190.
8. Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery, A Re-examination of the Ontological Proof of God's Existence* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1965), p. 53.
9. Gottlieb Söhngen, *Philosophische Einübung in die Theologie* (Freiburg/Br.: Alber, 1955), p. 2.
10. Brunner, *Natural Theology*.
11. Cf. Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, I/2, 812 *et seq.*
12. Pöhlmann, *Analogia entis oder Analogia Fidei*, p. 108.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 126 *et seq.*
14. Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer, *General Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), pp. 37 and 87.
15. R. Prenter, "Glaube und Erkennen bei Karl Barth," *Kerygma und Dogma*, II (1956), 176-192.
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17. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Cologne: Hegner, 1962).
18. Gottlieb Söhngen, "Die Weisheit der Theologie durch den Weg der Wissenschaft," *Mysterium Salutis*, Grundriss Heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1965), pp. 905-940.

CHAPTER VI

1. Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit*, p. 32.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 291 *et seq.*
3. Henri Bouillard, *The Knowledge of God*, tr. Samuel D. Femiano (London: Burns & Oates, 1969), p. 105.
4. R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and His Nature*, tr. Dom Bede Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1948), II, 214 *et seq.*
5. Erich Przywara, "Thèmes Anciens et Modernes de la Philosophie Allemande," *Les Études Philosophiques*, Oct.-Dec. 1956, 647-652; April-June 1957, 220-226; Oct.-Dec. 1957, 368-375.
6. Puntel, *Analogie und Geschichtlichkeit*, p. 165.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
8. Bouillard, *Knowledge of God*, p. 21 *et seq.*
9. Przywara used analogy as a structural principle in relating, evaluating, and criticizing a wide variety of religious phenomena. Breton, *Les Noms Divins*.
10. Gertz, *Glaubenswelt als Analogie*, pp. 5-6.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 105 and 168.
12. Kühn, *Natur und Gnade*, pp. 92 and 112.
13. Cf. Ulrich Browarzik, *Glauben und Denken, Dogmatische Forschung zwischen der Transzendentaltheologie Karl Rahners und der Offenbarungstheologie Karl Barths* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), pp. 17 and 25.
14. This is evident in Rahner's *Spirit in the World*, tr. William Dyoh (New York: Herder, 1968). This is Rahner's doctoral dissertation which was not accepted by a Neo-scholastic professor at Freiburg.
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21. This is the theme of Kühn's study.
22. Cf. Bultmann, *Kerygma & Mythos*, "The Question of Natural Revelation."
23. Aalders, "De Analogie Entis in Het Geding," pp. 23-24.
24. Walker, *Die Analogie*, pp. 649 and 653.
25. Aalders, "De Analogie Entis in Het Geding," p. 24.
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30. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
34. Paul Tillich, "Some Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," in *The Theology of Emil Brunner*, ed. Charles Kegley (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 104.

35. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 131.
36. Lewis S. Ford, "Tillich and Thomas: The Analogy of Being," *Journal of Religion*, XLVI, No. 2, 229-245.
37. George F. McLean, "Symbol and Analogy: Tillich and Thomas," in O'Meara and Weisser, *Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought*.
38. Aalders, "De Analogie Entis in Het Geding," p. 50.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.
40. Chavannes, *L'Analogie entre Dieu et Le Monde*, p. 212.