

DEMYTHOLOGIZING AND THE *PHILOSOPHIA*  
*PERENNIS*

BULTMANN, JASPERS, AND HEIDEGGER

*by Niels C. Nielsen, Jr.*

The idea of demythologizing proposed by the Marburg New Testament scholar, Professor Rudolf Bultmann, has become of increasing importance in theological discussion since the end of the second world war. Based on Biblical studies more than on later tradition, it poses a major alternative to the "Church Dogmatics" of Karl Barth.<sup>1</sup> Bultmann was associated with Barth in the early development of dialectical theology. However, his major work has been in Biblical studies rather than the history of doctrine. The particular term "demythologizing" did not appear in his writings until 1941, although it had long been implicit in his exegesis.<sup>2</sup> Bultmann did not follow Barth as the latter moved away from an earlier "existential" position, significantly influenced by Kierkegaard, to a more objective interpretation based on the ideas of Augustine and Anselm as well as Luther and Calvin. Bultmann, to Barth's dismay, centered his attention on historical and epistemological questions which seemed to have been rendered unimportant by Barth's strong confessionalism.

Bultmann's demythologizing arose from creative as well as critical Biblical scholarship, not from any desire to reduce the scope of theological inquiry. He differed from most confessional theologians by conceding that exegesis inevitably has philosophical presuppositions. Demythologizing is a mode of radical reconstruction, which arises from recognition that modern scientific man simply cannot accept the traditional natural-supernatural designation. It rejects initially any literal or fundamentalist interpretation of the psychology and cosmology of the Bible. Bultmann believes that both are so outmoded as to be irrelevant for modern scientific man. The three-story view of the universe with heaven above, earth in the center and hell beneath, is not essential to the Christian message. Bultmann's theories would not have evoked major debate if he had stopped at

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this point. Instead, he proceeded to emphasize that early Christianity had borrowed significantly from late Jewish apocalyptic and Gnosticism in its description of the work of the Saviour.<sup>3</sup> The "myth" of the descent of the God-man, for example, was not in the original preaching of Jesus.

Bultmann like most contemporary theologians does not use the term "myth" simply negatively to mean an untrue fable. Rather, it is a vehicle for conveying religious meaning appropriate to its time. From his New Testament research, Bultmann concluded not only that the Gospels reflect growing theological interpretation; demythologizing has its beginning even in the Biblical material itself. For example, with respect to eschatology—last judgment and resurrection—we can observe a changing attitude from the synoptics, Matthew, Mark, and Luke, to Paul and John.<sup>4</sup> Development is away from the early literal form of expectation of the kingdom of God to the realized eschatology of the Fourth Gospel. Bultmann has pushed the search for evidence in historical questions to the limits of knowledge. On first appearance, his position bears the guise of a return to an earlier modernism that belonged to Enlightenment rationalism more than to Christian orthodoxy. Yet his intent is not simply one of criticism but of reconstruction. It is this latter concern that has made him a center of controversy in contemporary religious discussion.

## I

In his re-interpretation, Bultmann has been significantly influenced by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger whom he came to know personally while both were teaching at Marburg.<sup>5</sup> Heidegger's phenomenology enabled the New Testament scholar to identify abiding existential relations, which remained after mythical modes of expression had been discarded. It is this "existential meaning," expressed religiously in eschatology more than in metaphysical statement, which distinguishes Bultmann from the earlier modernists. He believes that in Jesus of Nazareth God confronts man uniquely. The truth of this confrontation cannot be established simply historically, as an "external fact," but must be known as an "event" within man's inner life. Historical investigation alone can never supply religious meaning. Kierkegaard's dictum is relevant: "truth is subjectivity." Demythologizing has the intent of returning to what is primary in terms of existence.

In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger's major work published in 1927, he undertook a basic analysis of the human situation which he regarded as necessary prolegomenon to authentic philosophical statement.<sup>6</sup> Most traditional metaphysics, he believed, had ignored the question of man himself. Apart from an adequate phenomenology of human existence, all ideas of Being were necessarily incomplete if not mistaken. Heidegger attempted a critical

description of *Dasein*, existence in the world, insisting that death is the final limit of our horizon of knowledge. Man finds himself "thrown" into the world; his existence is inescapably time-bound and finite. Not only did Bultmann accept Heidegger's description of man as one who is destined for death; he regarded it as a discerning appraisal of the human condition apart from redemption. He adopted as well Heidegger's criticism of traditional philosophical expression.

Heidegger's thought about the *philosophia perennis* is not of a piece. It is important to distinguish between his earlier and later periods.<sup>7</sup> Following the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, his orientation shifted from concern about *Dasein*, existence in the world, to a new interest in Being. Heidegger's basic conviction is that philosophy has come to reflect the limitation of the present situation in culture in general. The question of Being is no longer relevant to contemporary discussion, in part because it has been misstated. Being has been made an object—Thought, the Absolute Idea, or God. It is none of these. Heidegger's judgment of the *philosophia perennis* is more negative than that of Jaspers. He proposes the destruction (*Destruktion* not *Zerstörung*), that is, the dismantling of metaphysics as it has been practiced from Plato to Hegel.<sup>8</sup> Heidegger's choice of terms supports his own special viewpoint. He does not argue that philosophical reflection has been useless, but only that it has run its course in the Western tradition.

Ott identifies three interrelated stages in Heidegger's later development: a turning from nothing to Being, the overcoming of metaphysics, and the "step backwards."<sup>9</sup> The last is Heidegger's own phrase. *Sein und Zeit* was completed in only two of its originally intended three sections. Heidegger wrote in explanation of the unfinished part: "The section in question was held back because thinking failed in adequate articulation and did not achieve its goal by the language of metaphysics."<sup>10</sup> For Heidegger, the overcoming of metaphysics by a "step backwards" has meant a study of the history of concepts, even of their sounds; they are to be understood as historic rather than in general as universals. It has also brought an interest in poetry, notably, the writings of Hölderlin and Rilke. What the critical philosopher and metaphysician could not say was made explicit in the word of the poet, whom Heidegger calls the prophet of Being.

In *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Heidegger gives the following explanation of the change in his interpretation: "I have forsaken an earlier position, not to exchange it for another, but because even the former position was only a pause on the way. What lasts in thinking is the way."<sup>11</sup> Heidegger has made it clear that he did not wish to reconstitute the earlier type of metaphysics, which he designates as "onto-theo-logical." This type of *philosophia perennis* arises out of the effort of *Dasein* to ground itself.

It is based on the assumption that all beings are ultimately grounded in some supreme Being, itself an uncaused cause. It has led to an investigation of beings in the light of their being, but has not faced the problem of Being itself. Heidegger believes that his new understanding of the history of Western thought has laid bare its foundations and in the end undermined it.

The last possible form, the thingliest of things, appeared in Hegel's Absolute Spirit. Hegel, according to Heidegger, is the only occidental thinker who experienced the history of thought by thinking it.<sup>12</sup> With him the metaphysical tradition of the West came to its "*Vollendung in der Neuzeit*." Standing at the end of this development, Heidegger claims new and deeper insight. What Hegel did not understand is that Being, in revealing itself, dissimulates itself. In absorbing everything that is and can be, even temporality, into his system, he achieved the ultimate subjective "*Weltbild*." There remained only one way for subjectivism to go, namely, toward the denial of system in the affirmation of non-absolute subjective will. Nietzsche conceived the destruction of metaphysics by understanding its outermost possibility. Yet, he did not realize the full implication of his discovery. He was still bound to an onto-theo-logical mold, whose ultimate object he denied in his atheism. For Heidegger, Being and world are not two different things. Being is its revelation.

Heidegger describes Being as event, an unveiling or revealing.<sup>13</sup> Standing in its light means something else than having a point of view or a system of concepts. In particular, he criticizes the way in which thought is now judged from its correlation with logical rules. Heidegger wishes to go behind correspondence of idea with what is present to the disclosure of Being. As Being discloses itself to man, it constantly brings itself forward into openness. This coming forward is not an act of man but of Being. Our proper response is to let it be the way it is in itself. We are its guardians or shepherds. Heidegger's explanation is intended as a criticism of the traditional identification of thought with Being. Too often, philosophers have regarded Being as a penetrable essence. It is not only revealed; it is also veiled even in its illumination. Heidegger means to emphasize that it is historical and not just static; its essence is in its happening.

Heidegger's description of our response to the call of Being is clarified, in part, by his analysis of the Pre-Socratics.<sup>14</sup> Assuredly, this part of his interpretation is among his most original and creative work. Heidegger refuses to view the Pre-Socratics through the eyes of their successors, particularly Aristotle. They are not to be understood simply as precursors of Plato or Aristotle, but as making a more basic contribution in their own terms. For them, Heidegger argues, Being did not lie beyond the sum total of physical things. Rather, they regarded all as one in the primordial "presence of what was present." Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides

all conceived of Being as *Anwesen*, unveiledness. They did not think in terms of "one" or the "good," thought of thought or *actus purus*. In short, they did not regard Being as lying beyond the sum total of physical things. Rather, all was one in the primordial "presence of what was present." It was Plato and Aristotle who mistakenly conceived of the "presence of the present" as idea or *energeia*. (The root of *energeia* is the "thought of thought.") Such an outlook began the wandering in the forgottenness of Being, under the domination of interest in beings rather than Being. Plato and Aristotle were mistaken in relating the idea of Being to transcendence, when it is primarily a question of existence in the world.

The brilliance of Heidegger's re-evaluation of Greek thought must be acknowledged, whether or not one agrees with him. Karl Löwith has been outspoken in asserting that Heidegger has re-written history to fit his own claims about Being. Whatever judgment historians may pass on the details of his exposition, Heidegger's dominant conviction stands out clearly: philosophers from Plato to Hegel have looked for an idea or thing beyond the world. They have confused "*Sein*" and "*Seiende*," seeing Being among beings.<sup>15</sup> The resultant onto-theo-logical metaphysics has inevitably bred confusion. Since the time of Plato, the image-copy pattern has led to misunderstanding of both freedom and history. Concern for a realm of being beyond the world was intensified by the religious convictions of Plato's and Aristotle's successors in the medieval period. Inevitably, the inacceptability of such a view led to the forgottenness of Being in modernity.

Heidegger believes that the only way to overcome nihilism is to pass beyond the question of God or its negation. Philosophy, he argues, cannot say whether God is or is not; the question is not relevant to its situation and data. Yet we can know Being, with its favor, revealing itself to us. For Heidegger, the rediscovery of Being depends on the meaningful use of language. Truth is not exhausted by static definition; rather it is an "unveiling." Being brings itself into openness in a situation of encounter. Although Heidegger's attempt to speak of authentic existence easily passes over into religious language, he does not mean to accept traditional theistic categories. This is clear, for example, in his attempt to link Being and the holy without accepting the Christian idea of God.

## II

Jaspers' appraisal of the Hebrew-Christian tradition has been a more open one. However, his exchanges about demythologizing with Bultmann were broken off without recognition of their larger common interests.<sup>16</sup> Jaspers more than Heidegger was prepared to speak of transcendence, whose meaning is to be read from the "ciphers," the symbols of ultimate



meaning. His evaluation of Christian orthodoxy is given at length in one of his later books, *Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung*.<sup>17</sup> Jaspers does not believe that it is possible to identify universally valid religious meanings. If God had spoken in an Incarnation, as orthodox Christianity teaches, history and freedom would be at an end. Christianity is identified with doctrine and sacrament. Yet Jaspers made the classical themes of Biblical religion an intimate part of his philosophy.

Jaspers joins a deep personal appreciation for the Hebrew-Christian religious heritage with what he calls philosophical faith. He describes three levels of meaning: *Dasein* or existence in the world, freedom, and transcendence. These are to be seen in interrelation, but one is not reducible to the other. The *philosophia perennis*, in Jaspers' usage, designates basic concerns about the self, value, and transcendence that have appeared in the philosophical tradition. Jaspers believes that it remains the necessary goal of all authentic philosophical inquiry, although it has never been achieved fully. In short, there are common problems even when different language is used. Jaspers' continuing interest in the *philosophia perennis* is made explicit in his study of pivotal thinkers of both the Eastern and Western traditions entitled *The Great Philosophers*.<sup>18</sup> Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus are included with Plato, Spinoza, and Kant. Prophecy, mysticism, and metaphysics are not separated from each other absolutely. Instead, philosophy for Jaspers has a wider scope than pure reason alone. Strongly influenced by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, he is skeptical of any single ontology and wishes to remain always open to new experience. Philosophy does not provide a finished set of answers in advance of man's free choice. Jaspers, like Heidegger, believes that it demands a looking within man himself. Yet, his reconstruction is not as radical as that proposed by Heidegger or Bultmann.

Jaspers' inclusive perspective, which in part parallels Heidegger's idea of Being, is what he calls the "all-encompassing"—*das Umgreifende*.<sup>19</sup> He believes that Being is more than the subject-object dualism in which we experience it. Things appear in a particular space-time context. Yet, we ourselves and others are not simply objects in the world. Unlike Heidegger, Jaspers does not believe that an incisive this-worldly definition of *Dasein* is possible. Instead, he proposes to relativize the world in a way that Heidegger does not. *Dasein* must be understood in relation to freedom, that is moral freedom, and freedom in relation to transcendence.

Jaspers agrees with the later Heidegger's renunciation of any Promethean direction of metaphysics in which the cosmos or even deity is established from the inner life of man. Yet even in this "existential" openness to Being, Jaspers continues in the tradition of the *philosophia perennis*. He wishes to participate critically in meanings shared by philosophical reflection ever

since its earliest self-knowledge, not to bring it to an eschatological end as Heidegger wishes to do. We have no perspective on Being which will allow us to stand outside of the tradition or philosophical faith, as he calls it.<sup>20</sup> The philosopher's task is one of reliving past decisions, not of abandoning their insight. Freedom and meaning are together. Jaspers like Heidegger is emphatic that reason is not autonomous and cannot be made its own ground and end. Finally, the ciphers, the meaning of transcendence must be read individually by every man in his freedom. More than with Heidegger, freedom leads to moral decision in the spirit of the practical reason of Kant.

### III

Heidegger and Jaspers both draw on traditions in which philosophy and theology have been in dialectic with each other for centuries. Heidegger's phenomenology has its sources in religious as well as secular thinkers: Scotus, Luther, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dilthey and Husserl. Bultmann found it a penetrating rejection of Enlightenment anthropology as well as any notion of self-redemption. Jaspers, by contrast, retained a larger emphasis on moral autonomy in his philosophical faith. Heidegger's understanding of man's situation as threatened by death seemed an appropriate prolegomenon to theology. His claim that *Dasein* cannot transcend to a ground outside itself opened the way for faith. In the end, no religious answer is possible from the point of view of immanence alone. The question raised by Heidegger's later works is whether this really follows. His interpretation of Being now appears to be a more inclusive and positive one than Bultmann allowed. It is our thesis that Heidegger's growing interest in Being not only has brought him into more direct confrontation with the *philosophia perennis*; it has increased the range of reappraisal called for by his ideas. The followers of Barth have looked favorably on Heidegger's later works, whereas Bultmann's school has preferred the earlier Heidegger. Fundamental issues remain which neither group of theologians has treated comprehensively.

Traditional theistic description, drawing more inclusively on the *philosophia perennis*, has recognized the subtlety and complexity of the problem of Being. Bultmann did not misjudge the fact that Heidegger's new phenomenology required reappraisal of the problem of religious knowledge. His demythologizing, like Heidegger's dismantling of metaphysics, is a creative attempt to establish a new perspective for evaluation of the essential truth of the past; in the case of Christianity, this is the *kerygma*. Yet Bultmann's existential, post-Kantian orientation does not appropriate the full resources of present philosophical re-appraisal. Not only does he propose to relativize earlier world views, in particular the two-story, natural-supernatural version of the universe. He regards modern science as essen-

tially non-mythical in its outlooks and perspectives.<sup>21</sup> The presuppositions of its world view remain almost totally unquestioned. Heidegger, like Jaspers, is much less favorably disposed to the modern ethos and regards it as leading to the forgetting of Being. They believe that it can give neither an inclusive view of reality nor any abiding meaning. Seeking both, Heidegger has turned instead to poetic symbol. While raising the problem of Being anew, he denies any metaphysical idea of God. The traditional questions of monotheism, the unity of God, transcendence, and theodicy cannot be treated legitimately within the bounds of his phenomenology.

Heidegger has developed his own religious category of immanence in his study of the Pre-Socratics.<sup>22</sup> Early Greek religion understood that earth, sky, gods, and mortals were together in an original unity. Men dwell on earth and wander under the sky, sojourning in the proximity of the divinities. Heidegger separates the question of Being and the holy from that of the One. The mortals who have the capacity for death as death are to spare the earth, receive the sky, and expect the gods. In the end, Heidegger's treatment of Greek religion may turn out to be more of a personal commentary than a historical exposition. Mircea Eliade, in his *Cosmos and History*, develops a theory of archetypes.<sup>23</sup> Ritual and myth, sacred space and sacred time, he argues convincingly, re-enact the heavenly activity of the gods following the archetypes. His whole analysis, based on extensive historical studies, suggests a dualism more akin to Platonism than to Heidegger's naturalistic view of religion.

It is important to consider how much Heidegger's interpretation has its background in the ideas of Nietzsche.<sup>24</sup> "God is dead," wrote Nietzsche, prophetically proclaiming that the nineteenth-century union of culture and religion was broken. Heidegger proposes reconstruction which goes beyond the nihilism Nietzsche foresaw. Philosophy ought not to dream of a timeless realm of Being. Its concern should rather be this-worldly. Can the theist allow this latter premise as much as Heidegger supposes? Heidegger, like Nietzsche, rejects idealistic metaphysics and any vital religious experience of transcendence. The issue is not whether nineteenth-century idealism, at times a surrogate for religion, can be resurrected. It is whether existence in the world can be understood apart from transcendence. Heidegger refuses the resources of the *philosophia perennis* which assign ultimate meaning and mystery to the Being of God. May not the philosophical experience be more open to transcendence as Jaspers suggests?

Jaspers' position is a more inclusive one, concerned with "*Dasein*, *Existenz*, and *Transcendenz*."<sup>25</sup> To be sure, he takes Nietzsche's warning against system seriously; no single world view is valid for all time. In the end, however, he does not accept Nietzsche's rejection of traditional categories and perspectives in the thoroughgoing manner of Heidegger. Funda-



mental questions and modes of approach are perennial. Walter Kaufmann has pointed out that Jaspers moved increasingly away from Nietzsche's orientation in later works.<sup>26</sup> In fact, reports Kaufmann, he never really accepted Nietzsche's position in principle. For Jaspers, philosophy and religion are together in the *philosophia perennis*. He accepts Nietzsche's dictum that Western man's intensity for truth would have been impossible without Christianity. Jaspers' devaluation of the nihilistic implications of Nietzsche's thought arises from his appreciation for the Jesus of history as well as from his philosophical faith. Skepticism concerning the Jesus of history has led a number of contemporary Protestant theologians, in the tradition of Bultmann, to embrace a situational ethic. Jaspers, by contrast, emphasizes the abiding significance of Jesus' ethic.<sup>27</sup> He grounds his acceptance of it in philosophical as well as religious commitment. Finally, the problem of the meaning of Jesus' teaching cannot be separated fully from the question of whether there are categories of interpretation which are not simply epochal. In spite of an Enlightenment anthropology, Jaspers calls attention to perennial insights of the Christian tradition.

Heidegger's exposition, however difficult of understanding, has a host of explicit points of reference to the *philosophia perennis*. No doubt, he has given modern philosophical inquiry a new and fresh context by raising the question of Being. In the end, however, he offers not metaphysics but a phenomenology of immanence. Bultmann, borrowing from Heidegger, has broken new ground and avoided the traditional Lutheran dismissal of all philosophical prolegomena as "Law" rather than "Grace." Our question is whether philosophy, if allowed a place in discussion of demythologizing, ought not to be appropriated in its fullest range of insights. Is the experience of Being as epochal as Nietzsche and Heidegger suppose? No doubt, "Sein" and "Seiende" have often been confused in theistic statement. Yet, one may still wonder whether the whole of Western philosophy has been as mistaken about Being as Heidegger suggests.

Langan has pointed out that the key to Heidegger's view of Being is his intention to be post-Kantian, post-Hegelian, and post-Nietzschean.<sup>28</sup> Heidegger concluded, from his study of Kant, that no objective, categorical, or causal analysis can lead to the discovery of metaphysical principles which have abiding validity. Only projections, viewpoints, horizons, or epochs remain. Heidegger takes from Hegel the notion that history is the self-extension of its source of unity, unfolding ecstatically as freedom. He does not raise the possibility that history might have less relative significance. Are there points of reference by which present ideas should be judged, to avoid distorting the past arbitrarily? Finally, by orienting his interpretation of Nietzsche's declaration that God is dead, he was saved from the idealistic absolutism of Hegel and enabled to place the source of

Hegel's view of history within the horizon of *Dasein*. Having so structured his thought, Heidegger at the same time proposes to appropriate all that is possible from the metaphysical eras, placing it within his radically finite context, devoid of any reference to transcendence. Langan criticizes Heidegger further for lack of specificity about the "presence of the present." As in the case of Bultmann, the world of nature, like the transcendent eternity of God, tends to dissolve into a single horizon of personal temporality.

Set in their larger context, the ideas of both Bultmann and Heidegger are highly suggestive for the continuing dialectic between philosophy and theology. Seen only in their negative, destructive implications, they easily become sectarian positions. Discussion of their positive contribution has led to reappraisal of the analogy of being, an issue which we cannot treat at length here. Arnold B. Come, in an essay in *The Later Heidegger and Theology*, reports a modification of Barth's earlier intransigence against the *analogia entis*.<sup>29</sup> By 1950, Hans Urs von Balthasar had convinced Barth that the Protestant's *analogia relationis*, like Aquinas' *analogia entis*, is in fact a form of the analogy of proportionality. Robinson, in the same series of essays, recounts that Heidegger himself espoused an analogy doctrine at the 1960 meeting of the Old Marburgers.<sup>30</sup> He asks whether Heidegger's interpretation of Being does not make it possible to avoid the pitfalls which Barth found earlier in the *analogia entis*: thought seeks control over the existence of God and describes only a static relation.

Robinson finds that Barth's objection to the analogy of being was directed against a particular Roman Catholic formulation, in particular, that of the Jesuit, Erich Przywara. Whether Przywara ever understood the *analogia entis* in the way Barth supposed is highly dubious. Przywara did not limit the idea to one particular formulation but regarded it as representative of all types of Roman Catholic theology, Augustinian, Scotist, Molinist and Thomistic.<sup>31</sup> He insisted that the relation of philosophy and theology be conceived in the broadest possible terms. Przywara argued for authentic but not exhaustive intellectual knowledge of Being. If Being is acknowledged to be analogical in character, the *philosophia perennis* is at least open to theism; Przywara insisted that it is implicitly theistic. Is Heidegger's dismantling of philosophy to be explained in part from his rejection of the *analogia entis*?

This possibility deserves careful attention in any theological appropriation of Heidegger's later thought. The *analogia entis* is a characteristically Platonic-Augustinian as well as an Aristotelian-Thomistic theme.<sup>32</sup> Whether a philosophical or theological reference or both, it expands and structures phenomenology. Heidegger's charge that Plato and Aristotle began the wandering in the forgottenness of Being bears directly on his

rejection of theism. Bultmann seems to have considered analogy only briefly, not distinguishing it sufficiently from myth.<sup>33</sup> Attempts to revise his position while still accepting the questions he has raised, make clear that this reference cannot be avoided. For example, Schubert Ogden has proposed to supplement Bultmann's theories by reference to process philosophy, in particular the ideas of Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.<sup>34</sup> Important as this may be, it is hardly possible unless there is some re-evaluation of Platonism. Whitehead treated Plato's thought more positively than Heidegger in his remark that all Western philosophy is a footnote to Plato's ideas.

Heidegger has not been able to avoid symbolic language any more than Plato; he has only restricted it to temporal modes of "immanence." It is clear that Heidegger and Jaspers have made a singularly important contribution to re-evaluation of the *philosophia perennis* by calling attention to the fact that "*Sein*" need not be interpreted as "*Denken*." They have shown that an assumed correlation between the two has often obscured existential realities. Yet it was Hegel, not Plato or Aristotle, who attempted to bring this correlation to its fullness. Rapprochement with the *philosophia perennis* must consider that analogy is not simply a "rationalist" principle; in its classic Greek and Christian expression, it relates essence and existence (without identifying them except in God's transcendent Being). Although Christian particularism drastically modified Greek intellectualism, it remains indebted to Plato and Aristotle for the idea of analogy.

Augustine's theology represents the classic synthesis of Christian faith and the *philosophia perennis*. Taken as a whole and not just from his Anti-Pelagian writings, it provides a comprehensive reference for consideration of the themes raised by Heidegger and Jaspers. In the Reformation, Protestantism drew primarily on Augustine's later works. Especially since Kant, it has attempted to avoid the idea of Being. Bultmann's demythologizing brings the possibility of re-evaluation of this position. Exegesis can no longer proceed from a self-contained doctrine of Scripture, in view of the findings of higher criticism. Demythologizing has encouraged a much needed revival of interest in epistemology as well as the history of ideas. It is our thesis that re-evaluation cannot take place in this direction without reference—implicit or explicit—to the *philosophia perennis*. Bultmann's acknowledgment of the relevance of philosophy as a prolegomenon to theology may in the end require Protestant thought to speak more directly to questions of Being.

## NOTES

1. Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, Zürich, Evangelischer Verlag, 1952, 6th edition. Barth's *Dogmatik*, now twelve printed volumes, is being translated into English and published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.
2. Cf. Heinrich Ott, *Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1955, p. 4.
3. Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. Kendrick Grabel, New York, Scribners, 1951-1955, 2 vols.
4. Rudolf Bultmann, *The History of the Synoptic Tradition*, trans. John March, New York, Harper and Row, 1963. Much of Bultmann's work on the synoptic problem preceded his use of the term "demythologizing."
5. John MacQuarrie, *The Scope of Demythologizing*, London, SCM Press, 1960. This is a companion volume to MacQuarrie's, *An Existentialist Theology*, published by SCM in 1955.
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7. Vincent Vycinas, *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1961. Heinrich Ott, *Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie*, Zürich, Evangelischer Verlag, 1959.
8. Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1952, p. 193 *et seq.*; *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Pfullingen, Günther Neske, 1954, p. 71 *et seq.*
9. *Denken und Sein*, p. 26, *et seq.*
10. Martin Heidegger, *Über den Humanismus*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1949, p.17.
11. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Pfullingen, Günther Neske, 1959, pp. 98-99.
12. *Holzwege*, p. 105 *et seq.*, pp. 296-299.
13. Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1943.
14. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Section III.
15. *Holzwege*, pp. 340-343. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Seinsfrage*, Frankfurt, Klostermann, 1956. Cf. also, Karl Löwith, *Heidegger Denker in Dürftiger Zeit*, Frankfurt, S. Fischer, 1953, Chapter II.
16. Karl Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann, *Die Frage der Entmythologisierung*, München, Piper, 1954.
17. Karl Jaspers, *Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung*, München, Piper, 1962.
18. Karl Jaspers, *Die Grossen Philosophen*, München, Piper, 1957.
19. Karl Jaspers, *Von der Wahrheit*, München, Piper, 1947, Section I.
20. Karl Jaspers, *Reason and Existenz*, trans. William Earle, New York, Noonday Press, 1955, Chapters IV and V.
21. Ott, *Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte*, p. 29 *et seq.*
22. *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 145 *et seq.*
23. Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, New York, Harper, 1959.
24. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Pfullingen, Günther Neske, 1961, 2 vols. These volumes are a collection of Heidegger's writing on Nietzsche since 1936.
25. *Reason and Existenz*, Chapter II.
26. Walter Kaufmann, "Jaspers' Beziehung zu Nietzsche" in Karl Jaspers, ed. P.A. Schilpp, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1957, pp. 426-430. Cf. Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity*, trans. E. B. Ashton, Chicago, Regnery, 1961.

27. *Die Grossen Philosophen*, p. 186 *et seq.*
28. Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 216 *et seq.*
29. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., eds., *The Later Heidegger and Theology*, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, p. 122.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
31. Erich Przywara, *Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie*, München, Oldenbourg, 1926, pp. 66-82.
32. Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, München, Kösel & Pustet, 1932, p. 99 *et seq.*
33. MacQuarrie, *The Scope of Demythologizing*, p. 202 *et seq.*
34. Schubert F. Ogden, *Christ Without Myth*, New York, Harper, 1961, pp. 132, 146-147. Cf. also Schubert F. Ogden, "What Sense Does it Make to Say 'God Acts in History?,'" *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. 43, 1963, pp. 1-19.