

KIERKEGAARD'S LYRIC OF FAITH: A LOOK AT
*FEAR AND TREMBLING**

PROBABLY no book of Kierkegaard has been so widely read and so universally misunderstood as *Fear and Trembling*. In this paper I do not propose to enter into controversy with the existing interpretations of the book. I shall offer my own reading in the hope that it will show itself faithful to the letter and spirit of Kierkegaard's text. To those conversant with Kierkegaard scholarship, my differences from his other interpreters and the grounds of these differences should be evident from the following discussion.

Fear and Trembling is about faith. More specifically it is about Father Abraham and the Old Testament story of his near-sacrifice of Isaac. Kierkegaard is not interested in the historical and critical questions that might be raised by an exegesis of this text. He is concerned solely with the *figure* of Abraham, whom he regards as a *paradigm* for the life of faith. He allows his pseudonym, the poet John of Silence, to accept the data of the Abraham story as set down in the book of Genesis, and to extrapolate the meaning of faith lyrically and problematically from the given account.

In the career of Abraham, Kierkegaard discovers two *movements*, which he calls the movement of infinite resignation and the movement of faith. In obedience to God's command Abraham is prepared to sacrifice Isaac: this is his infinite resignation. By giving up Isaac he gives up the meaning and content of his own temporal existence for the sake of his relationship to God. But even while he climbs Mt. Moriah and draws the knife, Abraham *also believes* that God will restore Isaac to him *in time*: this is his faith, by which he re-

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covers his own life with its finite hope and its finite joy.

Kierkegaard assumes that Abraham's infinite resignation is humanly intelligible, and I think we may agree with him. We know what men will sacrifice for love. What might a man not sacrifice for the love of God? But Abraham's faith, Kierkegaard insists, is essentially absurd. To know that Isaac must be given up *in time* and yet to believe that he will be restored *in time* is a contradiction no logic can resolve. Again we may agree: this faith is absurd.

Nevertheless John of Silence praises the life of faith. The obvious question is, Why? What other than madness could motivate such an absurd belief? John of Silence describes Abraham's faith as a "humble courage."¹ But is it really humility and courage? Is it not rather presumption or despair? This is the question I shall try to answer, and by answering it try to make explicit what Kierkegaard means by faith.

In the spirit of Kierkegaard's poet I shall begin with a panegyric of my own—a sympathetic delineation of Abraham's predicament—and then go on to suggest some problematic conclusions.

I

"And God tempted Abraham and said unto him, Take Isaac, thine only son, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt offering upon the mountain which I will show thee" (Genesis 22: 1-2).

The command must have paralyzed Abraham. Was not Isaac the son of the covenant, born to Sarah in her old age, when it had ceased to be with her after the manner of women? Was he not the son of the promise by the faithfulness of God?

And now the same God by whose faithfulness Sarah had

conceived and borne a son commands: Take Isaac, thine only son (what that 'only' must have meant to Abraham!), whom thou lovest (can we imagine how Abraham loved Isaac?), and sacrifice him.

What can Abraham do? Tortured by the contradiction, he can curse God. He can hold up his life, with its tragedy, as an irrefutable protest against God and God's world. This we can certainly understand if we can understand a man like Ivan Karamazov. We can understand that a man might so defy God, and there is no small heroism in the defiance. But there is also (as in Ivan's case) unrelieved misery and perdition. What is it to be damned if not to be without God in the world, and therefore to live without joy or light or even hope?

Abraham can cling to the covenant, of which the living presence of Isaac is the fulfilment. He can refuse the command to sacrifice Isaac, and by insisting on his possession of him, refuse to let God play Indian-giver. I think we might understand this very easily. Who would not choose to keep what he had—the son that had been given him—rather than stake everything on the decrees of an inconstant God? Why give up the good one has—for nothing. For the command to sacrifice Isaac carries no promise of reward: if you sacrifice Isaac, I will give you. . . . It is a blunt and unqualified command.

Let us suppose Abraham decides to keep his son. Does he really possess *Isaac*? Can he escape the realization that he has kept Isaac in despite of the command of God and that his possession of Isaac is unlawful? Can he avoid the knowledge that he is a bastard father? Isaac is the son of the promise, the faithful fulfilment of God's covenant. But the Isaac that Abraham might keep in the face of God's 'No' is the son of defiance, the fruit of Abraham's self-will. He is not the son

"whom thou lovest" because he was *given*; he is the son of rebellion whom Abraham has *taken*.

Can Abraham possess Isaac on these terms? Can he enjoy the possession of this stolen son? If he keeps Isaac, is he not a desperate and defiant and damned old man, who *will* have what he wants at any cost, even the cost of making himself godless?

There is a third possibility. Abraham can sacrifice Isaac in obedience to the command, *but conclude* that God is a liar, a monster who seems to fulfill his promises only to withdraw them again, a Caliban whose sport is to torture men. He might sacrifice Isaac, renounce everything, and in so doing lose his trust in God. If he rejects the God of the covenant, he returns from Mt. Moriah without his son, without God, without hope or joy. In giving up Isaac he has given up that relationship to God on which his life was built, and which constituted its inner meaning.

Are there any alternatives left to Abraham? Is there any way for him to get off this contradiction on which he is racked, whole and undefeated? Has he any choice except the despair of having defied God or the despair of having forsaken God? We would not belittle the man who chooses defiance or hopelessness. There are times when defiance and despair are humanly speaking the only possibilities left to a man. Perhaps very few men can even bring themselves to this point.

There is one possibility yet open, not strictly a human possibility, not even Abraham's possibility except in a peculiar sense. It is the possibility of faith.

In this context faith cannot mean the assent of Abraham's mind to the nonsense that he can have his cake and eat it, kill Isaac and keep Isaac. Abraham is no fool, and he is not playing with logical puzzles. He is a sober man, and we are

obliged to assume that no sober man could even propose such foolishness to himself, much less believe it.

Abraham's faith, in this situation, can only mean: *his faithfulness to the faithfulness of God.*² He accepts both the covenant that gave him Isaac and the command that deprives him of Isaac, trusting that what God had promised He would yet fulfill even though He first took away all He had hitherto given. Abraham believes that *God* is faithful. He does not affirm the covenant by denying the command, nor does he honor the command by relinquishing the covenant. His faith is that *God* is faithful *both* in covenant *and* in command, that God who requires all will Himself provide all that He requires.

Yet this does not mean that he proposes this absurdity to himself as something he must believe. Because he is a man, Abraham cannot *decide to believe* what crucifies his understanding.

How can he then be faithful? By *enduring* the conflict in which his life is torn? No, for endurance is a form of defiance. Endurance means: whatever you send me, God, I can take it. Does he *joyfully surmount* his problem? No, for he is not greater than his own life which is threatened, and to presume to surmount this problem would again be defiance.

Can he continue to believe in God *in spite of* the absurdity and the contradiction? No, this is again defiance. To believe in God in spite of everything is the most extreme form of defiance. If a man wills to believe in God in spite of what God does to him, then he has rejected God.

The fact is that in human (reasonable and ethical) terms, Abraham *does nothing at all*. He is great, Kierkegaard says, by reason of his power which is impotence, great by reason of his wisdom which is foolishness, great by reason of his hope which is madness, great by reason of his love which is

hatred of himself (p. 31). Abraham cannot will the absurdity in whose strength ("by virtue of" which) he is saved and Isaac restored (pp. 46-64 *passim*). He cannot resolve to accept the contradiction; he cannot hope against what he knows. In this crisis he does not draw from himself any resources at all, for he is emptied of all strength and reason and hope by the absurdity of his situation. All that Abraham can do—the only thing that is not defiant—is to *receive* and to *obey*. In receiving what God bestows and in obeying what God demands, he receives the strength to endure and the freedom to rejoice. This is not defiance, because in so enduring and rejoicing he does not rely on himself. "He who loves God without faith reflects upon himself, he who loves God believingly reflects upon God" (p. 47). As over against God there is nothing a man can do but receive and obey.

Yet it seems that Abraham has avoided defiance at the cost of forfeiting his humanity. To receive what God gives and to perform what God requires: is this not a betrayal of human intelligence, human will, and human dignity? Is it not the summation of all the stupidity, all the submissiveness, and all the weakness of which we think when we speak with justifiable contempt of "blind faith"? Is Abraham's faith blind and therefore despicable?

It would be, Kierkegaard says, except for one thing: Abraham *loves* Isaac (pp. 42 ff.). In his obedience to the command he is not blind; he knows what he is doing. When he draws the knife he does not cease to love Isaac as a father loves his son. It is no sacrifice that a slave regards himself as worthless and gives his life for his master. That is blind obedience. He gave nothing because he did not love what he gave. Since he did not love himself, he was nothing and therefore had nothing to give. Sacrifice is always clear-sighted. Abraham does not refuse to sacrifice Isaac because he loves him.

Neither does he love him less because he has to sacrifice him. The same is true when he receives Isaac again: if he did not love Isaac, he would have no joy in the receiving. Blind faith is meaningless because it is inhuman. But Abraham is a man, he does everything humanly possible, he loves Isaac as his own life.

Yet confronted with the impossibility of keeping Isaac, he gives him up. He resigns what he loves in obedience to what he cannot understand but cannot reject, and he receives again what he loves by the power of the absurd, a power he cannot comprehend but only believe. That it is better to give than to receive, Kierkegaard says, is the lesser mystery. The greater mystery, the mystery of faith, is that "it is far more difficult to receive than to give—that is, if one has had courage to do without and in the hour of need did not become cowardly" (p. 113). Abraham's faithfulness—his obedience to God's command and his reception of God's gift—is no blind subservience. It is the courageous suffering and the humble joy of a man who has fulfilled and exhausted his humanity. It is not the defiance of a man who will use his freedom—a freedom he has even against God—to damn himself. It is not the servility of a man who will not even be a man, and so being nothing to himself is nothing before God. Defiance and servility are only the counterfeits of Abraham's faith, that dialectical passion of humble courage, whose passion and whose dialectic I have here tried to trace.

"And God tempted Abraham and said unto him, Take Isaac, thine only son, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah, and offer him there for a burnt offering upon the mountain which I will show thee."

Abraham is subjected to a trial. Of course he does not know it is a test of his faith. If he knows this, it is not a trial,

but a competition, an endurance contest between Abraham and God.

Like Job, Abraham has a case at law with God. And like Job, whom Kierkegaard discusses in *Repetition*, Abraham wins his case by the very fact that he loses it.³ For he loses against God. Woe to the man, Kierkegaard says, who wins against God. Abraham has the strength not to be strong at that point where strength is weakness and weakness strength. He strives with God and overcomes God by his impotence (p. 31). For the faithfulness of God conquers even Abraham's will (which is a real human will) and grants what Abraham by himself cannot attain: Isaac, Abraham's life, Abraham himself. What he once received as a gift, now through his faith he receives again.

Kierkegaard describes faith as the "new immediacy." It is Abraham's receiving again what he was once given, what was his sole desire, and what he has had to give up. It is not that God *requires* Abraham to believe an absurdity, so that we must ask, Why would any man want to believe this? Abraham is in faith *permitted* by the power of the absurd to believe what he must with all his passion want to believe if only he may. The miracle of faith is that a man *may* believe that with God all things are possible, even that impossible thing he himself wants.

Perhaps we can now understand this statement:

Faith is precisely this paradox, that the individual as the particular is higher than the universal, is justified over against it, is not subordinate but superior—yet in such a way, be it observed, that it is the particular individual who, after he has been subordinated as the particular to the universal, now through the universal becomes the individual who as the particular is superior to the universal, for the fact that the individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. (p. 66)

Abraham was subordinate to the universal; he loved his son

and was a righteous man. He was subordinate to the universal until it broke against the command of God. It is only *through* his constancy in the universal that he comes to this point at which he stands alone before God and is justified because he is strong enough to be weak before God, wise enough to be foolish before God. He is justified *by* God (the absolute), *as* himself (the particular), *over against* himself (the universal). *Through* the universal Abraham becomes the individual justified by God *over against* the universal.

This is the situation of Abraham, as sympathetically as I can present it, and I hope true to Kierkegaard's own presentation. For Kierkegaard, Abraham is the *type* of the man of faith, the paradigm according to which all the cases of faith are to be declined.

But this immediately suggests the question, Why? Why is Abraham the "father of faith"? What is the universal human meaning of this story? On the basis of our consideration of Abraham, can we say anything about the relevance of faith to the life of every man who is not Abraham and not subjected to Abraham's trial?

I shall suggest Kierkegaard's answer to this question in my "problemata," which are the substance of the next and final section of this paper.

II

Abraham's faith as I have described it above is structured by a *dialectic of human possibility*. This dialectic is itself the structure of those "stages on life's way" which in Kierkegaard's thought are the moments in the process of existential self-questioning, self-assertion, and self-discovery. In Abraham's case we have: immediacy (Isaac is given to Abraham and Sarah in their old age), the ethical (Abraham fulfills his

father's duty), and the religious (in resignation he sacrifices Isaac and by faith receives him again).

What follows cannot be a complete account of the stages on life's way, but only a brief sketch of the dialectic of human possibility, designed to show the parallel between Abraham's case and the case of every man.

Every man is by nature an object of concern to himself. If he is not self-concerned, he is no man. Every man is concerned to know and to actualize his peculiar human possibilities.

At first it seems that *all things are possible*. Whatever I desire I can secure for myself: so thinks, for example, the very young child. But it soon becomes clear to this (aesthetic) attitude that the satisfaction of desire is not guaranteed. It is possible that I shall get what I want, but *only* possible, and therefore *impossible*.⁴ Perhaps my desires will be fulfilled, but it does not depend on me and my doing. The possibility that my wishes will be granted is not my *possibility* but my *fate*. In reality the freedom of the life of immediacy is a stifling fatalism, born of the knowledge that frustration is as likely as fulfilment and that nothing can be done to avert it. The certainty and finality and untimeliness of death is enough in itself to drain immediate existence of its possibilities and its freedom.

Is there any escape into freedom out of the reign of fortune? Fortune and misfortune are the lords of nature, of that world which the man of immediacy regards as the real world. To escape their sway he must escape the world over which they rule. He may therefore flee to the realm of imagination and reason, to poetry and to philosophy. In poetry and in philosophy it must indeed be the case that *all things are possible*. I can think anything and imagine anything; imagina-

tively and speculatively I can *enjoy* all possibilities indiscriminately.

But in losing reality the poet and the intellectual lose possibility as well. The fancies of poetry and speculation are *only* possibilities; enjoyed for their own sake, they are day-dreams. Because they are the products of a retreat from reality, they cannot be realized, and so they are not real possibilities. The possibilities I only think and fancy to myself are not *my* possibilities, just because I have them only in fancy and in thought. The poet and the speculative philosopher are melancholics. They live a life that is cut adrift from the world, sailing forever like the flying Dutchman on a sea of *mere* possibilities.⁵

Thus, following Kierkegaard, a life which is immersed in nature (living out of natural impulse) and a life which is in perpetual flight from natural exigence are equally impossible. They run dialectically into the same impasse: both are destructive of the real possibilities of human life. The aesthetic mode of existence results finally in a corrosion of individuality and a dissolution of personality into blind fatalism or effete detachment.

The ethical understanding of life seems to open a way out of the aesthetic impasse. The moral man thinks he can discover his real possibilities in a life of freedom made actual in decision. By *choosing* to be what I am, he thinks, by making my possibilities my own, I shall make my own possibilities. In freedom I create myself—not *ex nihilo* of course, but by taking as my own, and making myself responsible for, that life which in fact I have. Whatever I am, therefore, I am by my own will, for I accept and affirm myself as what I am. Whatever I am is my own self-chosen and self-realized possibility, and therefore my possibilities are all mine. *All things are possible* to me because I am a being who in freedom can

and does choose to be whatever he is and to do whatever he does.⁶

But this ethical mode of existence, Kierkegaard holds, is also self-destructive, because it is premised on a basic dishonesty about what it means to be human. Ethically regarded, I am an autonomous man. I acknowledge only that law which is prescribed by my own humanity, and I require myself to justify by that law whatever I do. I am to be my own legislator, plaintiff, defendant, judge and executioner.

But can I in fact justify myself before the law that is (autonomously) written in my heart? Kierkegaard says, No. Suppose, for example (to use Kierkegaard's own illustration), that I want to have a holiday in the park. Can I justify this diversion ethically? Actually I cannot, for there is no dialectic by which I can bring this harmless and accidental triviality into relation with my self-imposed duty. I cannot see in this simple recreational activity a fulfilment of that law by which I presume to determine myself. If I am at all honest, I cannot avoid the conclusion that I have my holiday just because I *want* to. As a human being with ordinary human needs and desires I cannot carry out the project of living ethically.

Thus I arrive at the paradox that as a free man I cannot go for a holiday in the park. I cannot make it my duty to go to the park, or as Kierkegaard says, I cannot express the universal in this and every particular. I am involved in a contradiction between my assumed autonomy and my recalcitrant humanity. As a free man I am a slave to my own freedom.

But (to continue the figure) I do go to the park in a thousand ways every day. Not only in actions that are manifest, but in countless invisible thoughts and subtle inclinations, I live extraneous to my conception of myself and my duty.

For this reason, Kierkegaard says, I must acknowledge the ineluctible and absolute *guilt* of my situation as an ethical man.⁷

To speak of absolute guilt may seem extreme. But Kierkegaard wants to say that to be human is literally to be in extremity. To be human means, in ethical terms, to take your life into your own hands. By Philistine or by aesthetic standards this is excessive. Nevertheless the ethical freedom of man (and therefore the basis of human equality, Kierkegaard's "universal") is just this fact, that he may take his life into his own hands, and to do so is an extreme thing.

The extremity in which I am, therefore, is guilt. My guilt, however, is not that I intermittently or even regularly fail to do my duty. Guilt names a contradiction implied by my very human self-assertion. My guilt is not that I sometimes fail; it is rather that I *undertake at all* to be my own justification and my own destiny. Guilt is the dishonesty of conceiving human existence in terms of ethical autonomy.⁸

The ethical man's life expresses his conviction that all things are possible to freedom. But his life includes the contradiction that *nothing* is possible to freedom. His own life, with its holidays in the park, is not possible. It is unjustified, it stands outside of and is condemned by its own law. And the impossibility of a self-justifying human life is absolute guilt.

Thus the endeavor by a human being to comprehend and enact his own existential possibilities, by freedom, runs like the aesthetic life into a dead end. No particular theory of ethics is in question here; rather, the assumption of freedom necessary to any ethical self-understanding is self-contradictory. Guilt is the explicit existential predicament in which the self-annihilating consequences of ethical freedom are made manifest. Guilt is just the moral situation of man as

such, and in guilt the impossibility of achieving selfhood by freedom is made actual.

Now we have come to the essence of Abraham's stalemate. Isaac, whom he could not have by nature, he cannot have by freedom. He cannot give Isaac to himself by freedom, as Isaac was not his by nature in the first place. And Isaac is Abraham's own life. Isaac is lost.

But at this point—and this is the one point Kierkegaard wanted to make—comes the command to *give up* Isaac.

In what form, generally, does this command come, and what does it mean to men in general? For Kierkegaard the command to give up Isaac meant the claim of *religion* that only the man who loses his life shall save it. In particular this is the claim of Christianity, with its doctrines of creation (immediacy), sin (the ethical), and redemption. If Abraham believed by virtue of the absurd, Christianity was for Kierkegaard *the Absurd*: the absurdity that in the aesthetic and ethical impotence of man, his being is first definitively and positively made possible, by a power which is only effective when it is most impossible. The Christian doctrine of redemption and recreation is the impossible possibility, the offense, the contradiction and the Paradox by which alone health of the spirit is possible.

Apart from theological considerations, the existential meaning of Christian faith is the same as that of Abraham's faith: the life which is not to be had by nature (aesthetic) and cannot be won by freedom (ethical) must be given up. Then and only then (you may believe this miracle) it will be *given again* to him who is at once able to renounce it and happy to receive it. As Kierkegaard puts it:

God is that all things are possible, and that all things are possible *is* God; and only the man whose being has been so shaken that he became spirit by understanding that all things

are possible, only he has had dealings with God. (pp. 173-174)

This is a translation into reflective terms of that text of Paul from which the title of Kierkegaard's book is derived: "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure" (Phil. 2: 12-13).

Religious faith is faith in the absurdity (not *demande*d of a man, but *allowed* him) that with God *all things are possible*, even his own life, if he will receive it as a gift after having given it up as his right. The relevance of the absurdity to every man is that the absurdity is the only possibility for human life that is not self-destructive. Faith is man's only possibility this side of despair.

It is Kierkegaard's belief that the human situation is essentially a religious situation. And that means, a situation in which man confronts the absolute power and reality. This he does in the absoluteness of his own extremity, in that extremity of guilt in which his self is trapped and stifled. This situation is religious in the sense that it leaves no alternatives but faith or despair. *Either* the recognition that the only possibility open to me is not my own, but the absurd power of God; *or* the annihilation of my self in defiance of this power. The command to give up Isaac contains dialectically the impossible possibility of his restoration. Only the man who loses his life shall save it, and it is saved for him in his very act of giving it up. Resignation and faith therefore become two aspects of one and the same thing: the impossibility of the self (humanly speaking) is the arena in which (divinely speaking) all things are possible.

At this point, unfortunately, it must be said that Kierkegaard was so ingenious at depicting the conflicts of faith—

its dread and distress, its fear and trembling—that he outsmarted himself. In the *Postscript* Kierkegaard wrote: “While aesthetic existence is essentially enjoyment, and ethical existence, essentially struggle and victory, religious existence is essentially suffering, and that not as a transitional moment, but as persisting.”⁹ This statement bears witness to Kierkegaard’s own contention that subjectivity is truth,¹⁰ and that a man can understand no more than his life expresses.¹¹ He himself was so full of *Sturm und Drang*, so romantically absorbed in his own genius and the sufferings of his genius, that he never gave up Isaac. *Pace* his uncritical biographers, he never really relinquished Regina. He tricked himself out of her by trying to give her her freedom, and by presuming to give her her freedom, he played God with her. If I had had faith, I would have married Regina, he declares in a moment of complete consistency.¹² But he did not have faith, and he did not marry her. Because he had to be a genius (aesthetic), he never became a man of faith or a husband. Instead he made a life and a career for himself out of poising on the thin edge of resignation. Consequently his understanding of faith was always only a poetic understanding.

On his own showing in *Fear and Trembling* the statement above should conclude: religion is suffering constantly overcome by *joy*. How else can we understand the joy of Abraham when he returns home with Isaac after his trial? But in the very same book Kierkegaard gives us a picture of the “knight of faith”—with his make-believe wife preparing a little make-believe supper—that is sheer self-deception, Kierkegaard’s own self-deception (pp. 49-51). If the argument of *Fear and Trembling* is correct, faith is not make-believe or irony, but the power which makes life possible. To have faith, Kierkegaard said, is to be out over 70,000 fathoms of water—and to be glad. But when he himself ventured out on

the deeps, he was like St. Peter walking on the water: he couldn't help wondering how he did it, and so he sank.

This was Kierkegaard's personal problem, but it reflects and is reflected in his discussions of faith, which build up to the point of indicating the relevance and the meaning of the absurdity—but then tend to dissipate in arch, ironic, or merely clever delineations of the life of faith, or else to remain in uneasy equilibrium at the point of resignation, cultivating for its own sake the fear and trembling of the religious crisis. Sometimes the books, like the man, succumb to the demonic temptation, always at hand in the religious life, to confuse oneself with God. The concrete delineation of the meaning of faith, of the very worldly sense in which human life is possible if it is lived by the power of the absurd: this is what Kierkegaard cannot consistently supply.

The purpose of this paper has been to describe the nature of faith and the relevance of faith as Kierkegaard sees them. All I would here claim for Kierkegaard is that he does define the dialectic of human existence by which, in which, and to which alone the claim of religion is meaningful. And in a formal way he has understood the situation of the religious man, the man who lives by virtue of the absurd, by a power which is not his own and which he cannot understand, but which he also cannot refuse without at the same time denying himself. The joy of this situation, the substance of that life which a man has at the hands of God, is something which Kierkegaard, like his poet John of Silence, could only marvel at but not comprehend.

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NOTES

1. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death*, Garden City, 1954, p. 59. This paperback is a revision

and correction of the hardcover edition. All further references to *Fear and Trembling* in this edition will be set in parentheses in the text.

2. This phrase has echoes of Karl Barth's *The Epistle to the Romans*, but nothing of Barth's meaning is here implied.
3. Cf. Kierkegaard, *Repetition*, Princeton, 1946, esp. pp. 110-113, 121-134, 149-159.
4. Cf. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Princeton, 1944, pp. 121-122.
5. Cf. Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, Garden City, 1959, Vol. I, "Diapsalmata" *et passim*, and Vol. II, "Equilibrium." Cf. also *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Bk. Two, Pt. Two, Ch. III.
6. Cf. *Either/Or*, Vol. II, *loc. cit.*
7. For Kierkegaard's elaborate and masterful "Deer Park" parable, see *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 422-446.
8. Cf. *inter alia* *Either/Or*, Vol. II, "Ultimatum," and the discourse *Purity of Heart*, New York, 1938, *passim*.
9. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 256.
10. *Ibid.*, Bk. Two, Pt. Two, Ch. II.
11. Alexander Dru, *The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard*, London, 1938, No. 870.
12. Cf. *ibid.*, No. 444, No. 367.