

THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD PEACE*

I

THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SCENE

IN any consideration of current problems in world affairs and the position of the United States in the total picture of the re-establishment of world peace, one of the first necessary steps is that of assessing the current situation. It behooves us to look at both the credit and the debit side of our present moment in world history, compare our situation with that of similar postwar eras, and find if there be any foundation stones, no matter how out of place, upturned, or even perhaps broken, which we can assemble and use and build upon in erecting a structure of world order.

Perhaps the first consideration which must be borne in mind in such an assessment is that of recollecting that many of the problems with which we are faced today are a result of the dislocation and damage caused by the war. This is, of course, a perfectly obvious point, but, like many other obvious points, it is sometimes overlooked. The proportions and degree of this war damage and dislocation give us some idea of the scope and magnitude of the problems of the rehabilitation of much of Europe and Asia, and the re-establishment of peace on a world-wide basis.

The recent war has been referred to as a trillion-dollar war. Now a trillion dollars is an amount of such size that it is

*A course of public lectures delivered on January 14, 15, and 16, 1947, by Wilbur W. White, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Graduate School, Western Reserve University.

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difficult to grasp, even by Americans who have been speaking freely of billions of dollars. This astronomical figure, however, scarcely covers direct military costs. Of the great powers of the world it has been estimated that the United States spent about 300 billion dollars, Germany 280 billion, Russia 136 billion, Britain 120 billion, Japan 49 billion, and France 34 billion on direct war expenditures. There are further scattered estimates of the costs of the war, such as the 61 billion dollars of war damage to Yugoslavia, 6 billion to Norway, and the 10 billion or more dollars of damage to Holland, including the destruction of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, fines assessed by the Germans, depletion of stocks, occupational costs, and forced exports.

The French have estimated that they have sustained losses of about 120 billion dollars and 1,200,000 people, of whom about twenty-five per cent died in battle and another twenty-five per cent were executed, massacred, or died in concentration camps. During the war the French population suffered a net loss of over three per cent. The losses further extend to a list of homeless which includes almost ten per cent of the population, a loss of 1,200,000 dwellings, partially or totally destroyed, the destruction of approximately another 500,000 business and public buildings, and a very extensive crop loss.

Estimates of Russia's war damage bring the figure to about 130 billion dollars. The list of losses includes over 70,000 towns and villages, 6,000,000 buildings, tens of thousands of schools, libraries, and factories, 40,000 miles of railway track, 13,000 bridges, and many millions of head of horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats. The Russian estimate includes some 5,000,000 soldiers and guerillas killed in the war, and a total of lives lost in the country approaching 20,000,000.

The total monetary losses due to the war, the loss in the most elemental and basic means of subsistence and sources of

foodstuffs, the almost complete economic disorganization in certain areas, the tremendous dislocation of populations, the many millions of people uprooted and transplanted, begin to give an idea of the reasons for some of the problems with which we are faced today. Our difficulties are all but overwhelming. Human ingenuity is taxed by the scope of the need. Were it not for one thing, we might despair of hoping that the world would ever be reconstituted on any basis similar to that which we have known in the past. That one condition is this: to a lesser degree wars in the past have always been followed by similar situations. The disruptions of economies, the loss of life, the disorganization of social ties and of political boundary lines, form a familiar postwar pattern which creates new difficulties at present only for two reasons, the magnitude of the recent destruction and the complication of the atomic bomb.

It may not be amiss, therefore, to remind ourselves of the postwar situation after World War I. In the light of our current difficulties we are prone to think back to the period 1918-1922 and come to the erroneous conclusion that everything progressed smoothly, that the war was quickly brought to an end, and that the treaties were promptly signed without major difficulties among the allies. The fact is, on the contrary, that the postwar period after 1918 was one in which the steps toward the re-establishment of world peace and prosperity were not taken either as promptly, or as smoothly, as we are inclined to think. The Treaty of Versailles, we are all quite aware, was signed June 28, 1919. It did not come into force, however, until January 10, 1920. The treaties with Austria and Bulgaria were signed, respectively, in September and November of 1919, and each came into force some ten months later. The treaty with Hungary, however, was not signed until June 4, 1920, and did not come into force until

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July 26, 1921, while the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey was signed in 1920, but was denounced by the Turkish government, with whom a new peace treaty was not concluded until July 24, 1923, at Lausanne, which treaty did not come into force until August 6, 1924.

In connection with the treaties it perhaps should be added that, although the United States signed the Treaty of Versailles in June of 1919, the Senate refused to concur in its ratification the following year, and it was not until August 25, 1921, that we concluded our own treaty of peace with Germany, which, it should be noted incidentally, was merely an adoption of nine of the fifteen parts of the Treaty of Versailles, word for word, including all the so-called iniquitous provisions regarding war guilt and reparations, but lacking only the first twenty-six articles, namely the Covenant of the League of Nations, the specific territorial delimitations, and Part XIII on the International Labor Organization. The ratifications of this treaty were not exchanged until Armistice Day of 1921, but prior to all this Congress officially reached the conclusion, by a joint resolution of July 2, 1921, that we were no longer legally at war with Germany. President Truman's proclamation of December 31, 1946, declaring the cessation of hostilities, did not legally end the state of war, but was a first step in that direction in terms of internal wartime controls.

In addition to the fact that the peace treaties were not in reality all completed and brought into force promptly after the First World War, is the further fact that on the constructive side of postwar international relations the period following 1918 also left much to be desired. After the First World War the League of Nations was made an integral part of the new foundations of the peace, but the League never included the United States. It did not include Germany until

1926, and did not include the Soviet Union until 1934. Other constructive aspects of international relations to a considerable extent waited upon the establishment and organization of the League. In other words, as it has been described, peace was organized from the top down, and it was several years before there came into operation the subsidiary organizations of the League whose functions were to aid in world health, prosperity, and morality, and reduce the number of potential causes of war.

In the third place, it may finally be added that the postwar era following 1918 was not, as we fondly tend to assume, in fact a period of peace. Many corners of the world were torn by minor wars and insurrections, any one of which in a different setting might have been a contributory cause toward a major conflict. British, American, and Japanese troops intervened in the Soviet Union to try to prevent the success of the Bolshevik government. Although the number of troops by these outside powers was limited, it is an interesting commentary on our thinking at the time that we built a permanent building as the American barracks in Vladivostok.

We perhaps need to be reminded that in 1919 and 1920 both Russia and Poland separately invaded Lithuania, and that between these incursions major military operations were carried out in which Russian troops forced their way to the gates of Warsaw and then were driven back by the Poles the hundred odd miles to Brest-Litovsk. We may have forgotten also that the treaty of peace with Turkey, referred to a moment ago, came only after a sizable "war after the war" in which allied troops, chiefly Greek, advanced to within some sixty miles of Ankara, the new Turkish capital, and were in the end repulsed and forced to evacuate from Smyrna as late as September of 1922.

We are inclined to overlook also the revolts of the subject

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peoples and the forceful attempts, generally unsuccessful, of the Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Indians, and, as late as 1925, the Syrians to effect their independence. All in all, a backward glance at the years succeeding World War I should lead us to the conclusion that our present world, in terms of the signing of the treaties and the re-establishment of peace, is perhaps inching along at not much less than a normal rate, that in terms of overt violence we have in China, Greece, and Indo-China what might be expected as a normal situation, and that we have in the Near East and Europe, generally speaking, more peace and quiet, albeit because of military occupation, than we should expect.

Although our progress warrants no moment for relaxation and self-congratulation, after having viewed this earlier picture our present plight appears, if not brighter, perhaps a little less futile and hopeless than many have assumed. If it took five years to complete the peace treaties after the First World War, we should not be excessively discouraged with only five preliminary treaties completed in eighteen months. That is, admittedly, not a very fair comparison. It is evident that after the last war the German treaty was the one of major importance, as it is today, and it may be stated, as many a writer has done, that we are getting the cart before the horse in drawing up our less important treaties first. In many ways that is probably a correct appraisal, and yet, in terms of procedural questions and certain of the approaches on the German treaty, it may conceivably be said that, having drawn up the less important treaties first, the German treaty will be easier to negotiate. If this reverse order results in a better German treaty, it will have compensated somewhat for the delay.

Obviously, the negotiation of the German treaty will not be facilitated unless the various great powers within and

among themselves can develop greater clarity and consistency in what they believe a desirable policy toward Germany. Until the present moment they are not sufficiently agreed for the establishment of a central government in Germany capable of accepting a treaty of peace. Incidentally, it should be noted that those who have been most insistent on the necessity for an early peace treaty with Germany rarely seem agitated by the lack of progress toward a treaty with the other major enemy, Japan.

In regard to the constructive aspects of world organization, our postwar period compares quite favorably with the period following 1918. This may be less a matter of virtue, statesmanship, and foresight, than it is the natural tendency to build upon previous practice, but the fact is that within less than a year after the close of the war the United Nations Organization had been set up and was taking its first steps as a going concern. In this connection it should be pointed out that the various countries of the world are taking the United Nations seriously in terms of the caliber of men sent as representatives, as well as in the gravity of the questions submitted for consideration.

In addition to the establishment of the Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations, and in no less striking a fashion, the simultaneous development of the Economic and Social Council and subsidiary organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, and the Bretton Woods setup of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shows an interesting effort to build the peace this time, particularly on the constructive side, not merely from the top down, as was the case in 1920, but concurrently from the

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bottom up. If wars are caused in part by food shortages, economic restrictions, the kind of friction that may arise over a lack of rules for civil aviation, and a general absence of international understanding, it may clearly be said that we are more active in our efforts at such war prevention at the moment than we were following World War I.

In addition to these general considerations regarding the re-establishment of peace, there are certain special questions, some new, some old, which require particular consideration. Probably the first of these is the matter of the very sizable number of troops of the great allied powers scattered about over the world. Americans have been considerably irked by the large number of Russian troops in most of eastern Europe. The Russians, on the other hand, have indicated their irritation at American troops in China, Iceland, and the Japanese Islands, and at British troops in Greece, the Near East, and, earlier, in Indonesia. Both we and the Russians should remember, however, and make allowance for the fact, that these troops are, with almost no exception, precisely where they were located at the cessation of hostilities.

It is true that the Russian influence is much greater in eastern Europe and probably greater in the Far East than it has ever been before because of another phenomenon which deserves some explanation. Throughout its modern history Russia has faced, around most of its eastern and southern perimeter, and particularly on its western boundary, more or less continuous political pressure from one or more great powers. Japan has now disappeared as a great power. China is rent by internal dissension, although, paradoxically, she is more free from many-sided external influence than she has been for over a century. Britain is relatively weaker from China to Turkey than she has been since Napoleon. And in Europe, where Russia has had to face the might of a strong

Sweden, Poland, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany, there is an almost complete absence of political power between herself and France.

Politics is a form of nature which, like other forms, certainly abhors a vacuum. In the same way that the great powers were in the nineteenth century irresistibly drawn into the vortex of the decaying Ottoman Empire in what is commonly referred to as the Eastern Question, Russia is naturally being drawn toward Manchuria, China, India, the Middle East, and particularly toward central Europe. Were Russia the least imperialistically minded of the powers, she could hardly stop the extension of her sphere of influence into these vacuum areas, and particularly into a predominant position in central Europe, until she meets the pressure of the influence of some other great power. Present-day Russia, not being noticeably reluctant to extend its power, is quite naturally tending to fill this vacuum. In the Far East it is meeting and will continue to meet the power of the United States. In the rest of Asia it is meeting and will continue to meet the power of Britain, which, however, is in the process of diminishing, particularly in India. In Europe she meets no really competitive power east of the British and American zones of Germany. In such a situation it is certainly no wonder that in Europe, at least, Russia has secured the zone of so-called friendly governments which she desired.

Another one of our special questions, which in this case is something of a repetition of that of 1919, is the difficulty which results from the political immaturity of many of the peoples of the world. The United Nations has taken as one of its premises the ultimate independence of the various national groups. The fact is, however, that the ability of certain of these peoples to stand alone, as the League of Nations Covenant put it, varies tremendously from country to

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country. The internal responsibilities for law and order and self-government, and the external responsibilities of meeting one's international obligations in a community of nations, are things which are difficult to impress upon groups of people for the first time feeling the freedom of national independence.

In the past such political irresponsibility and immaturity have been taken advantage of very often by imperialistic powers. Now, presumably such aggressive imperialism is not to take place. The problem of tutelage still remains, however, and the question arises as to the basis on which such immature nations can be taught their national responsibilities.

This does not necessarily mean that political maturity implies that these young nations should do things in our way. As a matter of fact, we should hope that they will learn to solve their problems in a better way than we have met some of ours, but there is a danger, in leaving them to an utterly free choice, that they may not follow a pattern likely to promote the general welfare. In other words, what happens if a newly independent nation, such as the Philippines or the Indonesian Republic, should set up a dictatorship? We have blithely assumed that, if states became independent, they would, of their free choice, establish democracies. It just may be, however, that this, at least in the short run, will not always be the case.

Presumably, the test should be an international test and the criterion should be whether the new states are peace-loving members of the international community, rather than whether they are democracies, as we understand the term. On the other hand, the democracies are thus presented with an even more impelling responsibility to demonstrate the superior value of their form of government to those who are newly presented with a free opportunity to choose their own political institutions.

Another question, stemming from the fact that problems of foreign policy create peculiar responsibilities in a democracy, is the presentation and our digesting of news and information on foreign affairs. We are blessed in this country with the best news coverage available to anybody on earth. We are blessed, moreover, with a coverage that is the most free from governmental restraint and censorship. The presentation of the news which comes to us is not merely the best in the world. It is the best in the history of the world.

The handling of this news, the fact that it is necessarily less than complete, and our reception of it, however, make it difficult to place this information in its proper focus and perspective. Such an avalanche of selected facts and interpretation rolls in upon us every day that it is easy to reach the conclusion that it is all of equal and vital importance. The radio commentators, more than the newspapers, tend to reinforce this assumption by giving us much of the news in a voice tense with the emotion of describing breathtaking and worldshaking events. Now, the fact is that there are some days, and even some weeks, when there are no breathtaking and worldshaking events. The newspapers try to indicate the varying importance of their dispatches by the size of headlines and the position that the news is given in the newspapers. This type of evaluation of foreign news, however, is subjected to the vagaries of the news in competing fields. Unfortunately for international understanding, the great international conferences have to take their chances in our newspapers with local murders, overwhelming acts of nature, the World Series, and even John L. Lewis.

Part of the exaggeration of the sense of urgency and importance imparted to the foreign news is the fault of the statesmen themselves. Some of their arguments are not as important as their words would indicate. It does seem, for

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example, that the tremendous importance which Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov, respectively, placed on two different dates for the opening of the Paris Peace Conference last summer was out of all proportion to the intrinsic value of either one. Who among us remembers that date? And yet at the time one would have thought that there was no more important substantive issue before the conference than the date on which it was to convene.

And, speaking of statesmen, we are faced with yet another question. It is certainly a cruel and tragic historic jest that the world is presented at this critical time with double inadequacy in the leadership of its international relations. In the first place, major responsibility for the peace of the world comes to rest naturally in the hands of the two strongest powers, which, unfortunately, by history, tradition, and inclination are the least capable of assuming vast world responsibilities at this time. Every other great power except Japan has had more experience, more knowledge, and more awareness of the problems of world politics than the United States and the Soviet Union.

Similarly, it is a sad chance that finds several relatively inexperienced individuals in the positions of responsibility in the three great powers whose fate it is to determine in the near future the question of world peace. This is not presented as any reflection on the abilities of the men charged with the execution of the foreign policy within their respective countries, all of whom evidence considerable rapid learning. The plain fact is, however, that, as in any other great and complicated business, there is a tremendous amount of know-how in the administration of a foreign policy, which, like other technical knowledge in any important administrative enterprise, can be learned only the hard way, by experience. It is fantastic that at this critical hour there should be such a

small background of experience in international affairs to be found in the leadership of the three great powers.

American leadership has changed almost entirely at the top since the death of President Roosevelt less than two short years ago. Prior to that there had been a considerable continuity, but when, at the close of the war, need for constructive leadership is greatest, we have a new president and a new secretary of state, whose experiences in the Senate and elsewhere were not especially directed along the lines of foreign relations. Similarly, in Great Britain between VE Day and VJ Day foreign affairs were taken out of the hands of a prime minister long connected with Britain's foreign policy, and a young foreign minister of very considerable experience in foreign affairs. Even in the Soviet Union we find the head of their Foreign Office with a relatively short prior peacetime experience, as a successor in 1939 to Litvinov, who had had a much longer and more varied background in the direction of Soviet foreign relations. In all three nations there is only one person, Marshal Stalin, who presents a considerable continuity of personality in administrative office; and, although his responsibilities for foreign policy have always been of very great importance, even he lacks the experience of foreign travel and participation in a wide variety of international contacts and conferences abroad that are helpful in meeting international issues as they arise. Interestingly enough, our major continuity does not come from the administrative side at all, but from Senators Connally and Vandenberg.

In the current situation with all its general dislocations, friction, and destruction and all its special difficulties, we are faced with certain short-run and long-run problems. The short-run problems revolve about the question of the legal re-establishment of the community of nations, the formation

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of the new footing upon which the defeated states can begin again to have peacetime relations with the rest of the world, the question, in short, of the peace treaties.

Now, it must be pointed out that a peace treaty re-establishes peace only in a technical manner of speaking. It does not itself re-establish all the prewar relationships of trade, commerce, and international good will. It merely sets up the legal skeleton upon which the substance of the body of the international community may take form. In so far as a peace treaty does not in itself re-establish the complete, harmonious relations of the states of the world, there cannot be what might be called a good peace treaty. With every treaty much is left to its later development and to the use which the nations make of it. This difficulty of even approximately meeting the responsibilities of a peace conference has been admirably stated in the fifth volume of the monumental work, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley, probably the leading historian of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919:

The great and absorbing preoccupation of a Peace Conference is, or ought to be, to make peace. Until peace is made, the state of war continues; an armistice is not peace; and every day that the state of war continues is an untold misfortune to all concerned, even though fighting has ceased. The urgent necessity is to bind up the severed ties, to set going once more the current of life between countries, which was blocked by the war, and to do it as quickly as possible. It is necessary to insist on this truism, because it is so apt to be forgotten by brilliant and inventive critics. A Conference must aim at the possible, not the ideal. Otherwise, it will dissolve in long academic discussions, and lose sight of its practical object. It is fatal for it to be ambitious. If it can make peace quickly, and at the same time do nothing to prevent future development on sound lines, it has done a very great deal, and as much as can be expected of it. Some people expect too much of a Conference, and bitter disappointment is the inevitable result. In matters financial and economic there is no finality. Boundaries can be fixed, and if they are rightly fixed can be expected to

endure for a considerable period, and to become part of the permanent framework of nations. Even if the boundaries are badly drawn, it often happens that they become accepted. But economic and financial relations cannot be fixed with the same definiteness and permanence. They are constantly growing or changing. No treaty which deals with such matters can do more than mark a certain stage, adjust difficulties which have already arisen, and give a fair opportunity to the future to develop on good lines.

Moreover, every peace treaty carries within itself certain elements of punishment, as well as reconstruction, and very often these two elements are at variance with each other. Historically, victors have almost universally imposed on vanquished one or more of the following limitations: disarmament of some kind, including demilitarization and the razing of fortresses, certain annexations of territory, or at least rectifications of frontiers, and some indemnity or reparation.

All of these provisions may in various cases have the aspects of both punishment and reconstruction. Demilitarizing the enemy may be both punishment and a contribution to future peace. Reparations may be looked upon at the same time as both fines and damages, and although many boundary changes may be criticized as being purely in the nature of territorial larceny, there have been many cases of boundary changes which may be fairly considered as introducing a greater justice to the borderlands concerned. As a matter of fact, it is extremely unwise to commit oneself emotionally to the fairness or justice of many of the international boundaries of the world. In such areas of mixed-up populations as we find in southeastern Europe, for example, one may say with some accuracy that there is no such thing as a just boundary. The Russians have a saying that what is good for a Russian will kill a German; but it is equally true that in Transylvania what is just for Rumanians may be unjust for Hungarians;

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and in that geographic expression known as Macedonia, if by any stretch of the imagination a settlement could be achieved which would be fair to Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia, it would be looked upon as manifestly unfair by most of the local inhabitants, who consider themselves not true citizens of the states mentioned, but Macedonians.

In the long run, on the other hand, our problems are less those of the immediate drafting of peace treaties, although the new *status quo* set up by the peace treaties is a condition precedent for the solution of long-run problems. They are more the reconstruction of the peaceful channels of world politics and world economic relations, the recognition of a community of interests in the nations of the world, and the building of an international political structure which will aid in the positive and constructive aspects of these problems, as well as deter and possibly prevent destructive outbreaks of violence.

A war situation arises when there is a conflict of interests between two nations or groups of nations which they consider worth fighting for, and when each nation or group of nations thinks, if the test is submitted to the test of force, that it has a chance to win. This analysis poses a fundamental problem of international government. We must be prepared to reduce and, as far as possible, to eliminate the sources and causes of international frictions that may result in open war. At the same time we should, if possible, establish an international authority of sufficient strength and prestige so that no state will consider when its interests are in question that, if it resorts to the use of force against this international authority, it has a fair chance to win. The violent aggressors in our time did not plunge their countries into war with the intention that it would add to the illustrious pages of our military history and that of our allies. Hitler, Mussolini, and

the Japanese war lords embarked upon their expeditions of conquest, we must not forget, in the expectation that they would win. In the future it is clear that the need is for international sanctions strong enough so that it is evident in advance that the chances are that such a resort to force will not be victorious.

As one views the difficulties besetting the path to world peace, certain rather obvious obstacles and questions arise. In the first place, if there should be any degree of good will common to the victorious powers, the natural and most easy assumption in regard to the dangers to the peace would arise in regard to the states which have just been defeated. Germany, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, their satellites are full of revenge. In spite of our efforts to re-educate them, they have shown a very human resistance to such re-education. The result is that one may confidently expect that, if the Germans and Japanese were by any chance permitted at any early date to acquire the strength to re-embark upon the path of war, they would in all likelihood do so without the slightest compunction. Their economic, political, and particularly boundary situations are such that they feel that they have in full measure the first criterion for the outbreak of war, namely a conflict of interests worth fighting about. Unless the Germans and the Japanese have acquired a greater sense of peace and responsibility for the international community than vanquished states usually show, they would be quite willing to change their present status by a resort to force, if they believed that there was any chance that such a resort to force would be victorious. Germany and Japan then are the first keys to world peace.

To a number of students of international affairs it is an axiom that Germany and Japan cannot forcibly disturb the peace of the world. As of the present moment, I think we can

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all agree no one believes that these powers are able to make an overt attempt to overthrow the present situation by a resort to force. The question is one for the future, five years, ten years, or twenty years hence. The Germany of 1918 was hardly in a better position to deny the will of its conquerors than is the Germany of 1947, but in less than twenty-one years the new and revived and remilitarized Germany was inflicting on Poland a lightning war, the impact of which had never before been seen in all the annals of military history.

From time to time we have received in this country reports of certain observers who have been to Germany and Japan, particularly the former. They have often arrived at two conclusions. The first is that Germany has no military strength or power of revival, and is no threat to the peace. The second, delivered almost in the same breath, is that if we do not cut Germany's heavy industry and particularly the armament business, if we free the Nazi leaders, if we do not supervise Germany in one way or another for at least twenty years, Germany will again set out upon the path of aggressive war. One cannot, therefore, assume it as permanently axiomatic that Germany and Japan cannot start another war. It is one of our duties to see that they cannot, preferably, of course, that they do not desire to, but practically that they shall be unable to build again the forces which would make possible another major conflict.

Most students of international affairs, however, are quite aware of the fact that the powers who are at present most able to resort to force in the pursuit of their objectives are not the late losers, but are the powers that were victorious in the recent war. Very frankly, a source of possible conflict in the near future may arise from the relations between Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Thus, the relations of these great powers are, if possible, worthy of

even fuller study than the threat of the late Axis aggressors.

There is one final consideration which should be presented in concluding the picture of the *status quo*. The question often arises as to the immediacy of the likelihood that open conflict will again break out. In this connection it should be observed that there appears to be in international affairs a more or less distinguishable difference between what might be called a postwar and a prewar era. Following World War I the world had something over a decade in which to bind up its wounds. Efforts were made toward the re-establishment of peace in terms of adjusted political boundaries, establishment of peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes, the setting up of an international organization, suggestions for disarmament, and efforts for international economic collaboration. During that time, in spite of the minor wars which have been alluded to, there was no disposition, coupled with ability, on the part of any great power forcibly to disturb the general international situation.

With the Japanese campaigns in Manchuria in 1931 and at Shanghai in 1932, German remilitarization in 1935 and reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and the entrance by Italy into a war with Ethiopia in 1935, however, a prewar era was clearly begun in which particularly the last two of these great powers publicly proclaimed their desire to overturn the existing *status quo*, both regionally and generally, by a resort to armed force. With such clear and unequivocal statements of aggressive intention, accompanied by corresponding actions, the likelihood of a major war became increasingly serious. In such an era it is obvious that the prospective victims of aggression should not merely strive to keep their powder dry, but should follow a policy of rearmament and seeking alliances in an effort to meet the evident threat. A postwar period, on the other hand, is characterized by the

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prostration of the losers and the exhaustion and demobilization of the winners, and is generally susceptible of all kinds of constructive efforts toward keeping the peace. In such a period the outbreak of a world war seems generally improbable, and time is available for constructive peace efforts.

Observation of our current period leads one to believe that we are now in such a postwar era. There is no immediate threat to the general peace from Germany, Italy, Japan, or the satellite states. Current talk of war, and the amount of this prevalent in the United States amazes every visitor or returning American, proceeds from the theory that an early outbreak of open hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely. On the face of the evidence, one can hardly conclude that this is the case. Both the United States and the Soviet Union not merely have very great reason for wanting a period of peace; they have greatly demobilized their armed forces in the last year and a half. Russia has no navy worthy of the name. She apparently has no atomic bomb. Neither does she have a strategic air force. Our navy, like our army, has suffered greatly in efficiency from a period of demobilization, and our air force is certainly far below what anyone would call combat strength. Moreover, there is no clear indication in either country that any branch of its armed forces is currently being built up to wartime combat strength.

At the same time, the two powers are consistently and continuously seeking to settle between themselves their outstanding political issues. These efforts are not proceeding rapidly, or too successfully, but there is no indication that either is seriously contemplating dropping such negotiations and preparing to settle these issues by a resort to force.

As opposed to a prewar era, in which every measure should be taken in view of a nation's defense needs, certain other

policies become possible in a postwar era, in which, apparently, we currently find ourselves. This is a period for disarmament. It is a period to establish a new and, if possible, more just *status quo* among the nations. It is, thirdly, a period in which we should bend every effort to the achievement of multilateral steps for the maintenance and preservation of peace.

It may be said, also, that in a postwar period there is less need of urgency than there is in a prewar era. Peace is always an urgent matter, but in a postwar period deliberation is not fatal. We have seen, within the last few months, many outstanding issues on which we differed from the Russians reach a reasonably acceptable compromise solution by patient effort, extending over a long period of time. As of any given moment, some international questions have no solution. If two diametrically opposite views are maintained, it may be better in some cases not to raise as an issue a clash of opinion, but to postpone for solution such a problem which may become easier to solve when subsidiary questions are settled, or when conditions which have led to an intransigent attitude on the part of one, or both powers, may have changed. This also is different from the situation in a prewar era, in which every postponement, every hesitation, every sidestepping of a major issue, may in fact lead to disaster. In a postwar period there is no time to waste, but undue haste should not endanger the quality of decisions; and we have certainly seen some cases, as, for example, the Trieste question, on which a solution was impossible during the year 1945, brought to a kind of compromise settlement during the year 1946.

Our current situation is not exactly rosy. Our problems are all but overwhelming. The path before us is rough and steep, and with one misstep we may, with our atomic bomb, go bouncing off into oblivion. But the situation is neither an

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act of God, nor some Greek tragedy inevitably compelling us toward impending doom. We are face to face with man-made problems, most of which, down through history, have been met many times before. They must be susceptible of solution by man. Intrinsic to such a solution is the relation of the great powers, which will be the theme of the next lecture.