

RICE UNIVERSITY

Tracing the Last Breath: Movements in Anlong Veng

ផ្លាស់ចំណុះកាមជាន ការក្រដាមខ្យល់៖ ចលនានៅ អង្គជំនួញ


by

Timothy Dylan Wood

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

Doctor of Philosophy


APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:



James D. Faubion, Professor
Department of Anthropology



Stephen A. Tyler, Herbert S. Autrey Professor
Department of Anthropology



Philip R. Wood, Professor
Department of French Studies

HOUSTON, TEXAS
MAY 2009

UMI Number: 3362431

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3362431
Copyright 2009 by ProQuest LLC
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

ABSTRACT

Tracing the Last Breath:
Movements in Anlong Veng

by

Timothy Dylan Wood

Anlong Veng was the last stronghold of the Khmer Rouge until the organization's ultimate collapse and defeat in 1999. This dissertation argues that recent moves by the Cambodian government to transform this site into an "historical-tourist area" is overwhelmingly dominated by commercial priorities. However, the tourism project simultaneously effects an historical narrative that inherits but transforms the government's historiographic endeavors that immediately followed Democratic Kampuchea's 1979 ousting. The work moves between personal encounters with the historical, academic presentations of the country's recent past, and government efforts to pursue a museum agenda in the context of "development through tourism" policies.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The study, coursework, and research required to complete this work could not have been conducted without the generous financial support from Rice University, its Department of Anthropology, James T. "Doc" Wagoner Scholarship for Study Abroad, Advanced Study of Khmer Program, Center for Khmer Studies, Catherine Ames Murphy, Susan and Michael Murphy, and Douglas C. Wood.

Certainly, much of one's views of a foreign culture are garnered through one's ability to communicate in the native tongue, and I have been quite lucky to have received exceptional help from a variety of gracious instructors. My early informal familiarization with Khmer was provided by the staff at Phnom Penh's Duck Tub (Horng and Neary) as well as by a few generous Cambodian-Americans in the Houston area. I also received some formal schooling from *lôk krou* Vong Meng and University of Hawaii professor Channy Sak-Humphry during the Advanced Study of Khmer (ASK) program in the Foreign Language Institute at the University of Phnom Penh. While in California, I received guidance from the teachers at the Cambodian Literacy School, organized by the San Jose Cambodian Buddhist Society. Especially among these individuals, *paa krou* Kas Thon has provided enduring friendship as well as linguistic assistance (in the Saturday morning classes and out). Over the course of four or so years of tutoring sessions with Mme. Kem Bora, I feel tremendous gratitude to this friend, confidant, and pedagogue; her generous and patient instruction (especially in those Pali paleonyms)

fostered skills and perspectives that assisted my academic endeavors as well as my personal development.

Nuon Savin, who initially offered translation assistance, later performed the role of research assistant, and now remains a dear friend, provided significant guidance in the field, without which locating and conversing with informants would have seemed a Sisyphean task. Various individuals at the Ministry of Tourism and the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism, Chung Sokkhemarak in particular, allowed my work to proceed and welcomed me while in the field. Appreciation should be expressed to the families and friends in Anlong Veng District who answered my inquiries. For looking out for my safety and health, I thank in particular the Dom Chhony and Chen Savong families. In similar ways, the family at Seng Sokhom Guesthouse looked after me during many months in the Penh.

In the 'Bodge, I was surrounded by colleagues and friends who facilitated my academic work, creative play, and overall sanity. My early familiarity with the land of smiling Khmers was informed though much interaction with Eric Pape, Rich Garella, and Chris Decherd. Of course, មីក ប៉ូឡើ Mick Powell, devil in my ear, provided inspirations in numerous ways. Other enablers should be singled out: Rita Leistner, Jennifer Foley, Dougald O'Reilly, Michael Sullivan, Darren Campbell, Warren Fisher, Daniel Littlewood, and Dylan Bernstein. Musings abroad were also encouraged by George T. Stagg, A. H. Hirsch, William Larue Weller, Elijah Craig, Elmer T. Lee, and some others of this ilk. I am grateful to Stephen R. Heder, David P. Chandler, Leakthina Chau-Pech Ollier, and Tim Winter for looking over my work and sharing some of their insights.

During the course of this research in Cambodia, I was afflicted with a chronic headache condition that was likely tied to various bouts of dengue fever. A number of medical professionals in Cambodia, Thailand, and the United States made significant efforts to piece me back together for which I am especially grateful: Gloria Christie, Alfred Lerner, Robert Yao, numerous specialists at Bumrungrad Hospital, and the folks at Omneuron.

Throughout my academic training, I have been blessed with the guidance of some exceptional faculty. The individuals at Rice University who have overseen my intellectual pursuits deserve special recognition: Stephen A. Tyler, George E. Marcus, James Faubion, and Philip R. Wood. While in the Bayou City, I was lucky to enjoy the personal and intellectual companionship of some truly amazing individuals, in particular: Brian Scott Riedel, Lisa Catherine Breglia (and the Rice Cannonballs), and Tish Stringer. As well, Carole Speranza did a lot of behind-the-scenes work to smooth graduate student life.

The Flaming Goat must extend a special thank you to the most spirited Team West U Schwinn—Jeff Nielsen, Little Bo Peep, and Double D especially—for fostering fitness and fun through the rural landscape of the Lone Star Republic, circles at Alkek, and the backtrails of Memorial Park: No pride! No shame!

A number of close friends pushed me toward completion through various means: Jeffrey and Yolanda Marculescu, Marilyn Chovanec Dawlett, Chad Bronstein, Darren Selement. Much gratitude must be expressed to my family, especially my parents who have supported me through the long path to this degree's completion. Thanks to my sisters for always believing in my passion. Profound gratitude should be extended to Kay

Murphy who has taken a keen interest and contributed greatly to the various phases of my erudition. I am fortunate to have a close extended family who has been a source of strength and relaxation. Special recognition must be bestowed to my children: Donnella Eumily, whose playful interruptions of infancy provided comic relief through the write-up process, and Lavelle Arun, whose coming reminded me of the urgency of this tome's conclusion. Most significantly, my wife, Penh Sophoin, showed unyielding support and patience through what often seemed like an never-ending research and writing process. Without her patience and kind assistance, this work would never have come to fruition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>ABSTRACT</i>	ii
<i>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</i>	iii
<i>LIST OF TABLES & IMAGES</i>	ix
<i>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</i>	x
<i>PREFACE</i>	xii
CHAPTER 1: ARRIVING... OVER AND OVER AGAIN akin to arrival ~ early awareness ~ haphazards ~ first visit ~ re-arrival ~ momentum ~ project idea ~ third arrival ~ a blue sign preliminary ~ Ministry ~ the true ~ mines & funding ~ development through tourism ~ geographies ~ histories ~ the arrival scene	1
CHAPTER 2: INTERPRETING... “AUTO-HOMEO-GENOCIDE”? pre-triumph, pre-history, pre-zero ~ 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days ~ STV ~ variation ~ zones & sectors ~ the good East ~ pattern & scope ~ security apparatus ~ purges & assertive killings ~ centralized authority ~ antecedents, entrenched values, & culture ~ the toll ~ “genocide”	29
CHAPTER 3: TRACING... THE LAST BREATH	94
DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVES: textiles & souvenirs ~ offerings ~ assaults ~ open skies ~ regional cooperation ~ growing arrivals ~ pro-poor linkages ~ privatization	94
PARTIAL NARRATIVES IN THE LONG DITCH: circular edicts ~ the organization ~ ahistorical texts ~ the <i>Truth</i> sought ~ re-arrival & introductions ~ a local working group/research team ~ administrative hierarchy & security ~ MoT/DoT progress report ~ guides to history ~ mastering the plan ~ what/which museum? ~ a museum by any other author ~ patrons & <i>nipotes</i> ~ filling (out) the long hole	107
GUIDED NARRATIVES: movements ~ history on the move ~ continuing education ~ healthy functioning sites ~ shoring up ~ accuracy ~ arts ~ looting ~ logging ~ inherited land claims & eminent domain ~ “politics” ~ the story (un)told ~ developing access, bordering markets ~ demises ~ hospitable overlook ~ replica	176
NATIONAL NARRATIVES: history outside the text ~ cliques a-tryin’ ~ strychnine hillocks & “killing fields” ~ hated days, victory days ~ birthday Parties for the good East ~ win-win: dig a long hole and bury the past ~ <i>une</i> <i>victoire en miniature</i> ~ the last breath ~ holiday inn Cambodia	232

	viii
EPILOGUE: REFLECTING NOSTALGIA	267
APPENDIX 1: SITES & MARKERS OF ANLONG VENG	273
APPENDIX 2: MAPS	278
NOTES	288
CHAPTER 1	288
CHAPTER 2	294
CHAPTER 3	331
EPILOGUE	374
BIBLIOGRAPHY	376

LIST OF TABLES & IMAGES

Khmer Language Transliteration Chart	xxii
Road North to the Dangrek Mountains	28
Divisions of Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–79	34
Death Toll, Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979	68
Approximate Death Tolls in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979	70
The Structure for Subregional Tourism Coordination	101
Visitor Arrivals to Cambodia in 1998–2006 (by All Means of Transportation)	103
Growth in Tourism Sub-Sector, 2000–2005	103
Tourism Receipts, 2000–2005	103
Employment in Construction and Tourism-Related Industry, 2000–2005	103
Domestic Tourism, 1998–2004	103
Circular on Preparation of Anlong Veng to become a region for historical tourism	108
Ministry of Tourism Working Group on Anlong Veng	112
Historical-Tourist Signpost in Anlong Veng	144
Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Zones	149
Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Billboard	151
Battlesites around Anlong Veng	179
Tuol Sleng Prison (S–21)	236
Tuol Sleng Genocidal Center Guidebook	239
Day of Hate Re-Enactment	245
Anlong Veng (South)	278
Ta Mok’s Lakeside Villa	279
Anlong Veng District I (South)	280
Anlong Veng District II (North)	281
Pol Pot’s Secret House (Khlaing Kandal Village)	282
Dangrek Mountains Escarpment	283
Choam Pass	284
Darm Chrey	284
Darm Chrey to Kbal Tonsaong	285
Kbal Tonsaong I (North)	286
Kbal Tonsaong II (South)	287

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CGDK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (1982-1990) រដ្ឋាភិបាលចម្រុះកម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ
CPK	Communist Party of Kampuchea (1966-1981) បក្សកុម្មុយនិស្តកម្ពុជា
CPP	Cambodian People's Party (1991-) គណបក្សប្រជាជនកម្ពុជា
DC-Cam	Documentation Center of Cambodia មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលឯកសារកម្ពុជា
DK	Democratic Kampuchea កម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ
ECCC	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia អង្គជំនុំជម្រះវិសាមញ្ញក្នុងតុលាការកម្ពុជា
FANK	Khmer National Armed Forces (1970-1975) <i>Forces Armées Nationales Khmères</i> កងខេមរជាតិ
FARK	Royal Khmer Armed Forces (1954-1970) <i>Forces Armées Royales Khmères</i> កងខេមរភូមិន្ទ
FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia <i>Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif</i> គណបក្ស ហ៊ុនស៊ីនហ៊ុច
FUNK	National United Front of Kampuchea <i>Front Uni National du Kampuchea</i> រណសិរ្សរួបរួមជាតិកម្ពុជា
GRUNK	Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea <i>Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea</i> រាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលរួបរួមជាតិកម្ពុជា
ICP	Indochinese Communist Party បក្សកុម្មុនិស្តឥណ្ឌូចិន
KUFNS	Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation រណសិរ្សសាមគ្គីសង្គ្រោះជាតិកម្ពុជា

KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front រណសិរ្សរំដោះប្រជាពលរដ្ឋខ្មែរ
KPRP	Khmer/Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (1951-1960 and 1981-1991) បក្សប្រជាជនបដិវត្តកម្ពុជា
KR	Khmer Rouge ("Red Khmer") ខ្មែរក្រហម
KWP	Khmer Workers' Party (1960-1966) បក្សពលករខ្មែរ
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea កងទ័ពជាតិកម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea ភាគីកម្ពុជាប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ
PGNUNS	Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation រដ្ឋាភិបាលបណ្តោះអាសន្នសាមគ្គីជាតិនិងសង្គ្រោះជាតិ
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea (1979-1989) សាធារណរដ្ឋប្រជាមានិតកម្ពុជា
RAK	Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea កងទ័ពបដិវត្តន៍កម្ពុជា
RCAF	Royal Cambodian Armed Forces កងយោធពលខេមរភូមិន្ទ
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia (1993-present) ព្រះរាជរដ្ឋាភិបាលរួបរួមជាតិកម្ពុជា
SoC	State of Cambodia (1989-1993) រដ្ឋកម្ពុជា
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party គណបក្ស សម រង្ស៊ី
UIF	United Issarak (Freedom) Front [Khmer Issarak Association] រណសិរ្សប្រជាធិបតេយ្យខ្មែរ: [សមាគមខ្មែរឥស្សរៈ]
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

PREFACE

This dissertation emerges out of numerous years of involvement with Cambodia, beginning in 1998. Much of this time has been spent as researcher/student, but I have also worn the hats of volunteer, traveler/tourist, political monitor/advocate, and long-term ex-pat resident. Two initial four-month forays into Cambodia in 1998 and 1999 preceded, but gave impetus to, the research project that became this work. My return to Cambodia in 2002 began largely with a focus on (re-)acquiring the language proficiency that I had very much lost in the lapse between stays in the country. Later that year, my work in the field began. My research on the conversion of the last Khmer Rouge stronghold into an *in situ* museum site was carried out through a series of one-month-long stays in Anlong Veng, returning to the capital of Phnom Penh for a few weeks before my returns to Oddar Meanchey Province.

As much of my research activities were oriented toward historical mapping, sections of this text could be seen to complement the Tourism Ministry's unfinished "Anlong Veng Guidebook"—the history of the district, its individuals, structures, events, and decisions. This work was constructed with particular attention to making a contribution to those scholars who occupy themselves with the minutia of Cambodia's twentieth-century past and to whom I am greatly indebted and captivated. There were also some more anthropological topics in operation, and among these: the different forms of re-membling that express themselves in Khmer considerations of the past; commercialized pimping (versions) of the past; differences in understandings of a "museum"; the changing status of objects according to various institutional and local

arrangements; an ongoing influence of nationalism in the process of re-presenting and re-constructing histories; a growing pervasiveness of a concern for (scientific) “accuracy”; the “touristicization” of a rural village and its people; and the trend of mobility/migration that seems to recur through post-1970 Cambodian historical events. Initially, this project sought to ascertain: how the villagers that occupy the sites (and areas around them) conceptualize, feel about, react to, and involve themselves in the Ministry of Tourism’s museum project; what they see as important elements in the/their Khmer Rouge past; what/how they choose to present information; personal anecdotes and life stories that give greater understanding to daily life and interpretations in/of Anlong Veng. In sum, the goal of this research was to produce some understanding of how local informants relate to the sites that have been designated a “historical-tourist area” by national actors.

Predictably, these concerns became supplemented by other complexities in the process. The institutional arrangements that work to produce a museum in Anlong Veng warranted a fair degree of attention. In the realm of governmental institutions, some observations arose about organization/structure, personalities of officials, and the processes by which decisions come to be made. Consequently, this research came to focus partly on the relations between the national government, ministries, academic/knowledge consultants, provincial departments, local (district-level) officials, and individuals selected as legitimate bearers of historical knowledge.

Beyond the idea of garnering local reflection on a process of historical representation, guiding this work was a concern for the processes by which a national objective comes to be translated into an everyday reality in the Cambodian countryside. (There are a number of other contemporary expressions of this kind of observation,

including the debacles over the *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, the *Defense White Paper*, as well as the RCG's management of the forestry sector.) I believe these matters may address the pluralistic direction of ethnographic inquiry in anthropological attempts to grapple with the notion of a "world system"—links between the plurality of local voices about local history in Anlong Veng, in connection with the politically-invested objectives of a national government, in the context of international demands and pressures.

While the unfolding of fieldwork seemed to effortlessly follow an exponential trajectory—a relatively small quantity of fieldwork leading to massive description, reflection, and analysis, while simultaneously begetting larger inquiries (more informants, sites, relations, etc.)—I came to see my research as relatively conventional in its methodological expression; if there was a "giving over," it was only partial, heavily guided by the demands of a knowledge project. The circulation of research objects indicates that a drifting/following methodology (a-developin' among them others in different places, *autres lieux*) might have been more appropriate. Instead, my work in the field seemed to conform to quite traditional notions of participant observation, with formal and semi-structured interviews supplying the bulk of ethnographic data. I wondered if this more traditional approach is a preliminary requisite, falling in line with Marcus' notion of a "first project." The conventional methodology that emerged seemed necessary for becoming grounded, accepted, or embedded in the field site. After achieving a certain level of comfort in the region, perhaps a "second project" might enjoy greater possibility—including a series of breach experiments which continually come to mind (e.g., the subtle use of CPK vestments in interviews, or requesting Anlong Veng

villagers perform scenes from life under Pol Pot/Ta Mok for visiting tourists, etc.). There are ways in which the absurdity of this ministerial project summons the simulacral implosiveness of Baudrillardian games (Anlong Veng *à la* Disneyland or *à la* Colonial Williamsburg).

In addition to questioning regarding a not-so-experimental methodology, I harbored reservations about my intellectual capacity in the research process, especially as patterns and themes appeared as the natural(?) tendency of (my own) Western thought. Although the attempt to *grasp* patterns and concepts (*Begriffen*) out of perceived reality may make for adequate social science, this tendency drifts far from the emanation of difference, the interpretation of gaps and interruptions, or Stephen Tyler's estranging "vision quest," which might characterize more creative academic projects. Further, in the *writing* of culture, this text betrays the dialectical character of *écriture* (a *mise en scène* of ethnography): breaking within the coo-cooing of everyday running discourse, language seduces the subject with the supposed precision of assumed signifieds (a wordsmith's dilemma), but exhibits its radical instability in every moment of its paradigmatic-syntagmatic procession—a veiled [availed] impossibility waiting to irrupt at every utterance, every tear. In sum, I would offer that although this work produces interesting ideas and reflections (spurred by interactions with Khmers around the project of historical self-representation), this research, emerging from a fairly conventional methodological approach recurrently encountered the trap of thematization and its totalizing effects. Perhaps these hesitations will have affirmed an unbounded provisional saying, otherwise their own (*propre*), right here in this text (*en ce moment même dans cet ouvrage*)....

Notes on Informant Confidentiality

Names of most informants have been changed to protect these individuals. The exceptions to this rule are individuals who are seen to be already in the public spotlight, principally officials. Following this journalistic convention and obscuring identity through other means are warranted because of potentially severe consequences for individuals who disclose sensitive information. Cambodia's history of violence, tradition of revenge, and propensity for reprisals based on politics or patronage clearly demonstrate the need for this precaution.

Notes on Names

According to Cambodian convention, family name precedes given name. When referring to Cambodians, this text follows that convention; this is obvious in the bibliography where the comma separating "last" from "first" name has been omitted. More generally, this work follows the journalistic practice of using the given name for subsequent references; for example, Sam Rainsy [Sam = family name; Rainsy = given name] would be referred to as Rainsy or even Mr. Rainsy.

For Cambodians, one's actual name is reserved mainly for legal use; it is considered relatively impolite to address people by their proper names. Nicknames are the norm, and these are often derived from bodily characteristics—typically unfavorable characteristics, by Western or Cambodian standards (e.g. "Tubby," "Fatso," "Blackie," etc.)—or from a shortening of the given name, where generally the last syllable is used (e.g., Daravuth ព្រះវិហារ become Vuth វិហារ). This name may or may not be preceded by a

formal or familial form of address. As an example, this author, Timothy (តិម៉ូស្តី or តិម៉ូធី), might be called Thy (*thii* ធី), Mr. Thy (*lauk thii* លោក ធី, pronounced like “Mr. T”), Uncle Thy (*pou thii* ពូ ធី), or Older Brother Thy (*bâng thii* បង ធី).

Notes on Terminology

Cambodia (*khèmbaudea* កែមបូឌេ), Kampuchea (*kâmpuchea* កម្ពុជា)? Cambodian people generally refer to their country in two ways: the land of Khmers (*srok khmaer* ស្រុកខ្មែរ) or the country of Kampuchea (*brátés kâmpuchea* ប្រទេសកម្ពុជា). Descendants of Kambu (Kambu-ja) is one explanation of the original territorial designation. Thion offers interesting conjecture on the names of various countries within peninsular Southeast Asia; he asserts that names (references) pertaining to this area evolved from early Indian encounters, wherein the newly arrived re-mapped familiar ethnic or geographical terms onto new areas (*yuon* from Iona/Yona, *kambuja* from the Iranian Kambojas, *Champa* from Bengal).¹ He reasons that each of these (new) designations derived from prominent but partial characteristics that the Indians observed among the Southeast Asian peoples: “Champa meant ‘half-Hinduized,’ Kampboja ‘casteless’ and Yona ‘non-Hindu foreigner.’”² The rendering “Cambodia” seems to reflect Portuguese influences in the Western naming of this area. Officially the name of the country is the Kingdom of Cambodia (*preah reachanachakr kâmpuchea* ព្រះរាជាណាចក្រកម្ពុជា). Thus, “Kampuchea” indicates a more accurate transliteration of the Khmer signifier for Cambodia, but it is

¹Thion, *Watching Cambodia*, app. 5.

²*Ibid.*, p. 238.

imbued with the historical period of Democratic Kampuchea. In line with its explicitly-stated rejection of foreign influences the Khmer Rouge sought a rendering of its name which more accurately reflected the way the name of the country is pronounced in Khmer. (The irony of this official xenophobia *lies* in a number of areas: the modern concept of nation and Angkor Wat as a symbol of that newly-gifted nationhood as well as the extra-national origins of theories of revolution from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao.)

Cambodians and Khmer. “Khmer” (ខ្មែរ), used less often in this work as a reference to a group of people, denotes a person of a specific ethnicity. While dominated by people of this ethnic descent, Cambodia is in fact populated by groups of people who are of various backgrounds: Vietnamese, Chinese, Sino-Khmer, Cham, Kuy, Phnong, etc. In everyday use, “Khmer” (*khmaer*) is used to distinguish between groups, notably the ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese who populate the country; however, it is significant to note that Cambodians often refer to Sino-Khmer people simply as Khmer, neglecting any ethnic distinction. In this regard, this work will use “Cambodian” to refer to citizens of the country, without reference to ethnic origin. The spoken Khmer language rarely employs an equivalent of this term (*brâcheaporloroat khmaer* ប្រជាពលកម្ម ខ្មែរ or *brâcheachorn khèmbaudean* ប្រជាជន វែមបូគ្មាន); “Cambodian people” (*brâcheachorn khmaer* ប្រជាជន ខ្មែរ) re-translated into English would be “Khmer people.” “Khmer” has been a pivotal political rallying point as Cambodia was bequeathed a modern notion of the nation, with successive regimes making reference to the preservation and celebration of the “Khmer race” (*puch khmaer* ពូជខ្មែរ), where “race” broadly encompasses family, geno-, species, stock, seed (Sanskrit/Pali *bīja*).

Cambodia's Communists: "Khmer Rouge." This remains the least specific of terms used herein. Originally, this was the epithet Sihanouk gave the Cambodian communist movement in the 1960s: "red Khmer" (*khmaer krâhâm* ខ្មែរក្រហម). My informants used the appellation to cover various episodes of the communist movement: pre-1970 stirrings, FUNK/GRUNK (1970–1975), DK (1975–1979), and post-1979 after-effects. It is a label that spans the time prior to and after the formal existence of the organization that was led by Pol Pot. It can index the communist movement, its leadership, its peasant base ("base people"), the time period dating from 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979, a faction within the tripartite anti-Vietnamese coalition based along the border with Thailand, an outlawed guerrilla movement, and the villagers living in areas that ceased being under Democratic Kampuchea control in 1999. Nowadays, most English-language news reports refer to participants in this movement as *former* Khmer Rouge; however, a number of Cambodians (including tourism officials with whom I worked) continue to simply call them Khmer Rouge. Following the flexible use of the term by Cambodians (and informants for my research) in everyday speech, "Khmer Rouge" is used as a term of most general reference. When describing the moments within Cambodian Communist development, this work has attempted to eschew references to this vague label. In the context of discussing Anlong Veng, the term "Khmer Rouge" is used frequently, because it reflects (local) informant and Tourism Ministry usage; it also helps avoid the convoluted monikers that the movement assumed in its various post-1979 iterations (for purely pragmatic and strategic reasons): DK, CGDK, CPK, PDK, National Solidarity Party, PGNUNS, etc. Democratic Kampuchea is a more exact term. Although it is used to demarcate the "Pol Pot period" (1975–1979),

the official establishment of the government under that name did not occur until 1976. In this work, the broader definition is used, which incorporates the three years, eight months, and 20 days that began 17 April 1975. Similarly, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was founded in name in 1966. However, the organization bears roots from the Indochinese Communist Party (1931–1951). When the Indochinese Communist struggle was broken up along national lines (in accordance with the Geneva Convention), the Cambodian faction became the KPRP, later changed to the KWP to more accurately reflect its self-ordained Marxist-Leninist orientation. As the leaders of Cambodia’s communist movement sensed the maturation of their struggle, the name CPK was assumed. However, the existence of this Party was kept secret, publicly declared only long after victory and capture of Phnom Penh.

Notes on Language and Orthography

The Khmer alphabet consists of 33 consonants (with built-in redundancy—two “voices” or registers), 20 vowels (each expressing two possible sounds), and 14 independent vowels.³ The consonants are laid out in the Indic alphabet groupings (velars, palatals, retroflexes, dentals, labials, and miscellaneous). Technically, the Khmer language (its writing system/script) is categorized as an abugida or syllabic alphabet; that is, the component consonants each have an inherent vowel sound (e.g., *kâ* ក, *khâ* ខ, *kor* ក, *...*

³ The rarely-used independent vowels are included in the transliteration chart below, in boxes which correspond to their equivalent sound. These vowels are derived from the eight Pali vowel sounds (*sara* ស្រា): *a* (អ), *ā* (អា), *i* (ឥ), *ī* (ឺ), *u* (ឧ), *ū* (ឺ), *e* (ឺ), *o* (ឺ), and additionally *ai* (ឺ). In addition to these are the independent vowels (with Sanskrit equivalents): *ri* (ឺ *reu*), *rī* (ឺ *reur*), *lri* (ឺ *leu*), *lri* (ឺ *leur*). Lastly, the vowel ឺ (*av*), which is sometimes (mistakenly) interchanged with ឺ (*ov*) (Headley, *Cambodian-English Dictionary*; Huffman, *Cambodian System of Writing and Beginning Reader*; and Paen Setharin, *Reading Studybook* [សៀវភៅអាន]).

khor ឃ, etc.) which can be modified by the addition of a vowel or diacritic (e.g., *kaa* ក, *khaa* កា, *kea* កេ, *khea* កេរ, etc.). Subscript forms of consonants are used in consonant clusters (e.g., *srâ* ស្រ, *strâ* ស្រ, etc.)

Across English and French texts using Cambodian, the Khmer script has not been graced with a systematic or consistent transliteration system. Most authors implement their own system, sometimes building off previous attempts, other times inventing wholly new systems. The key sources for many transliterations are Huffman's adaptation based on the International Phonetic Alphabet and the more Roman-friendly system used by Heder and Ledgerwood.⁴ Encountering various renderings of the Khmer language in a Romanized script can be frustrating; thus, wherever possible I have included the Khmer script along with a transliteration. In choosing and developing a transliteration system, I pursued a couple goals, which sometimes became contradictory. With the system I have adapted (largely from Heder and Ledgerwood), I sought to preserve and convey the letters used in the language, even if letters are silent (e.g., *reastr* រេស្ត្រ) or radically differ from the English letter used (e.g., the final *s* on transliterated words, which would be pronounced as if it were an *h*). Additionally, I attempted to minimize the amount of diacritics that were required to render specific sounds. Exceptions to the scheme are names of places or people that are already commonly recognized and widely used, for example the province of Kratie (*krâchéh* ក្រាតិេ); as well, informants provided their own transliterations of their monikers, sometimes diverging widely from established convention. The transliteration scheme adhered to in this work is as follows.

⁴ Huffman, *Cambodian System of Writing and Beginning Reader*, pp. 6–11; Heder & Ledgerwood, *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia*, p. xvii.

Consonants		Transcription	
	1 st	2 nd	
Velar	ក	ក	<i>k</i>
	ខ	ឃ	<i>kh</i>
		ង	<i>ng</i>
Palatal	ច	ឆ	<i>ch</i>
	ឡ	ឡ	<i>chh</i>
		ញ	<i>ny/nh</i> ⁶
Retroflex	ដ	ឝ	<i>d</i>
	ត	ឝ	<i>th</i>
		ណ	<i>n</i>
Dental	ត	ទ	<i>t</i>
	ថ	ត	<i>th</i>
		ន	<i>n</i>
Labial	ប		<i>b/p</i> ⁷
	ផ	ព	<i>p</i>
	ផ	ក	<i>ph</i>
		ម	<i>m</i>
Miscellaneous		យ	<i>y</i>
		រ	<i>r</i>
		ល	<i>l</i>
		វ	<i>v</i>
	ស		<i>s</i> ⁸
	ហ		<i>h</i>
	ឡ		<i>l</i>
	អ		<i>â</i> ⁹

Vowels	Transcription	
	1 st	2 nd
- -	â*	<i>or</i>
- ៈ	â*	<i>ua</i>
- ្រ -	<i>aa</i>	<i>ea</i>
- ្រ ៈ	<i>a</i>	<i>oaléa</i> ⁵
ៈ	ឝ <i>e</i>	<i>i</i>
ៈ	ឝ <i>ei</i>	<i>ii</i>
ៈ	<i>oe</i>	<i>eu</i>
ៈ	<i>oer</i>	<i>eur</i>
ៈ	<i>o</i>	ឝ <i>u</i>
ៈ	ឝ <i>au</i>	<i>ou</i>
ៈ	<i>uo</i>	<i>uo</i>
្រ ៈ	<i>ar</i>	<i>er</i>
្រ ្រ	<i>oeu</i>	<i>oeu</i>
្រ ្រ	<i>ie</i>	<i>ie</i>
្រ -	<i>é</i>	<i>é</i>
្រ -	ឝ <i>ae</i>	<i>è</i>
្រ -	ឝ <i>ai</i>	<i>ey</i>
្រ - ្រ	ឝ/ឝ <i>ao</i>	<i>ó</i>
្រ - ្រ	ឝ <i>av</i>	ឝ <i>ov</i>
ៈ	<i>om</i>	<i>um</i>
ៈ	<i>âm</i>	<i>um</i>
ៈ ្រ	<i>am</i>	<i>oam</i>
ៈ ្រ ឝ	<i>ang</i>	<i>eang</i>
- ៈ	<i>ah</i>	<i>eah</i>

* To the non-Khmer-speaking reader, the long (natural) sound of the first register consonants will be indistinguishable from the shortened form produced by the *bântâk* [-] as in *dâp* [bottle] (long) and *dâp* [ten] (short).

⁵ Before a velar final, as in *neak* [person].

⁶ When the final consonant, it is written *nh*, as in *pénh* [full].

⁷ When the final consonant, it is written *p*, as in *yuap* [night].

⁸ When the final consonant, although written *s*, it has an *h* sound.

⁹ When subscript to another consonant, as in *s'aat* [clean].

Having hoped to use the Khmer Unicode recently developed for the Macintosh by XenoType Technologies, technical difficulties—the unpredictable nature of Apple font technology rendering complex scripts through various OS X releases—made this unrealistic. I have instead relied on the old system of using a font that depicts the Khmer script; this work uses almost exclusively the Limon S1 and Limon R1 fonts.

Notes on Money and Currency

The Cambodian currency is the *riel*. The *riel* is available in 50, 100, 200, 500, 1,000, 2,000 (rare), 5,000, 10,000, and 50,000 note denominations. There are no coins in the country's currency. The Cambodian economy is largely dollarized; that is, US dollars are the principal currency that are used throughout much of the country. Thai Baht and Vietnamese Dong are also used, particularly in border areas. In former Khmer Rouge zones (along the west, northwest, and northern parts of the country), prices are often quoted in Thai Baht (but conversion was quite simple, adding two zeros to the price Baht to arrive at the price in *riel*). Although the exchange fluctuated between 3500 and 4100 *riel* to the dollar during my stay in the country, this work generally uses the 4000 *riel* (i) to one dollar (US\$) rate to simplify conversion. Often, prices were discussed in dollars, in which case I have not converted them into *riel*; when monetary amounts were discussed in *riel*, I have supplied the US dollar amount according to a 4000 *riel* exchange rate.

Notes on Measurements

Cambodia follows the metric system. For the most part (some distances being an exception), this work has as well. Electricity (power) is measured in kilowatts (kW)

តម្លៃប្តូរ (ត.វ). Conversion rates for common measurements are as follows:

Area ក្រឡាផ្ទៃ

1 hectare (ha) ហិកតា (ហ) = 2.471 acres

10,000 sq. meters (m²) ម៉ែត្រការ៉េ (ម.ក) = 2.471 acres

Length ប្រវែង

1 kilometer (km) គីឡូម៉ែត្រ (គ.ម) = 0.62 miles (mi)

1 meter (m) ម៉ែត្រ (ម) = 3.28 feet (ft)

Weight ទម្ងន់

100 gram (g) ក្រាម (ក) = 3.53 ounces (oz)

1 kilogram (kg) គីឡូក្រាម (គ.ក) = 2.2 pounds (lb)

Volume ចំណុះ

1 liter (l) លីត្រ (ល) = 1.06 quarts (qt)

1 cubic meter (m³) ម៉ែត្រគីប (ម.គ) = 35.31 cubic feet (ft³)

*“So you been to school for a year or two
And you know you’ve seen it all...”*

CHAPTER 1

“Entering Cambodia by air from the west, the brief flight from Thailand to Phnom Penh offers a capsule view of many historic and contemporary features of the nation. One’s first sight of the country is forested mountains which appear deserted and impregnable. Yet, in many such regions of Cambodia, especially in the east, live ‘tribal’ peoples who are perhaps descendants of the earliest inhabitants of Southeast Asia. The next significant view is a glimpse of the famous Angkor Wat, once a magnificent complex of structures built during the glory of the ancient Khmer empire and now monumental masses of grey-brown ruins set within the encroaching green of the jungle. The flight continues over Lake Tonle Sap, like a huge inland sea dotted with fish weirs, then along the Tonle Sap River flowing south to meet the Mekong. In the lowlands is a ubiquitous pattern of irregularly shaped rice paddies, their dikes spreading a great web across the countryside, broken by waterways, roads, and clusters of houses in villages and towns. Finally the traveller lands at a small, modern airport in Phnom Penh to be enveloped by warm, moist air. A drive into the city gives a jumbled impression of green palms, black-clothed figures, European villas, pile dwellings, and glaring sun....¹

“Near the central food market in Phnom Penh is a line of buses painted in flamboyant colors as if to give moral support to their rattletrap bodies. Boarding the one that goes to Kompong Kantuot the traveller begins his journey to Svay. By regular car the trip takes about half an hour, but the bus ride lasts an hour or longer because of numerous stops along the way to discharge some passengers and pick up others, or to

satisfy the driver's whim to stop for a snack. Leaving Phnom Penh, one passes by large apartment buildings, stucco villas, and the airport which speaks of modernity. Then one enters the quiet countryside: miles of palms and rice fields, brilliant green in the rainy season and sere brown in the dry months, interrupted periodically by clusters of houses and shops, paths leading to distant villages, and serene Buddhist temples. Finally the bus coasts into the market place of Kompong Kantuot, the town nearest to Svay. The traveller now hails a remorque, a rural bicycle cab, for the three kilometer ride to Svay (often sharing the cab with other people who are returning home after marketing or a trip to the city). Going quickly past the shops lining the road through town, then the primary school, a temple, a village, and the inevitable rice paddies and palms, the remorque arrives at the path leading from the highway to West Hamlet Svay. Gathering one's bundles, one starts the short walk down the path that covers one's legs with mud in the rainy season and with dust in the dry season. If one has not already encountered villagers who are taking cattle to pasture or rice to the millers or going elsewhere, one is almost certain to see people fishing, wading, or bathing oxen at the huge waterhole along the path. The village is almost invisible behind the verdant growth of trees and bushes that encircle the hamlet, but one finally passes through a crude gate marking the entrance of West Svay. As one weaves among the thatch and wooden houses, people call out their usual greeting: 'Where are you coming from?' 'What do you have?' as they look up from their tasks or as they sit chatting at one another's homes. Children come running; the dogs set up a fearful clamor. One has arrived in Svay."²

More than three decades after May Ebihara's fruitful and happy arrival in the field, this researcher lands in the land of smiling Khmers and some of the same idyllic features will reveal themselves in a long-unfolding scene of arrival.



After ten hours in the air over the Pacific Ocean, I was sitting in the Narita airport, waiting for a connecting flight to deliver me to the balmy smog of one night in Bangkok. As I stared out the window, I saw that JAL had added a slogan to the tail of its Boeing 747—"We support UNICEF"—and I was reminded of the murky history that marks my earliest awareness of Kampuchea. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Halloween pleas for candy were accompanied by pleas for donations for UNICEF. The explanation of this practice that I received as a child was that we were raising money to help the starving Cambodians who were being bombed. Later on, more popular references to Cambodia/Kampuchea would emerge from the Dead Kennedys and Spalding Gray as well as brief moments of informational endowments from Robert MacNeil and Jim Lehrer. Cambodia was something of an unknown and uninvestigated for me, somewhat surprisingly, given my undergraduate attention to Marxist revolutionary movements.³

On the 4th of July weekend of 1997 in Seattle, Washington, I haphazardly ran into a friend from my days at UC, Santa Cruz, who had been working as a journalist in Phnom Penh. Having been familiar with my *brigadista* work in Nicaragua (shortly after the tenth anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution), he suggested I visit Cambodia. The enigma of the destination and the desire for another rewarding episode of solidarity work

drew me to this invitation. As we were ruminating on the possibilities of my travel to the far Southeast, a *coup de force* was unifying a bifurcated government that had been left in place by the United Nations. Although not clear at that moment, the fight—principally, a slaughter of FUNCINPEC political leaders and generals by Hun Sen loyalists—was intimately related to events around Anlong Veng and its fading leadership.⁴ As Prince Norodom Ranariddh's negotiators made agreements with the Khmer Rouge leadership, Hun Sen responded to the threat of being beaten to the punch of integrating the ex-communist outlaws. Yoked by cross-border trade with Thais along the Dangrek Mountains, these remnant forces had been eking out a troublesome existence.

A good portion of that initial five-month trip in the rainy season of 1998 was a long, and mostly unsuccessful, search for work of the solidarity or volunteer variety. With upcoming parliamentary elections, most agencies in Cambodia would not commit to putting an idle foreigner to work. Nonetheless, the highlights of this preliminary exposure included: election observation, vast travel through the country's environs, volunteer work at a Veterans International project in the remote rurality of Tbeng Meanchey, and much preparation for a return the following year to take the reins of spin doctor for the country's leading dissident.

In that next *fin-de-siècle* foray, I saw the supposedly democratic opposition dominated by an autocratic populism borne of an aristocratic heir to the country's most acclaimed abusive ambassador of an era passed.⁵ Pleasantly surprised by the critical capacities of the Party's cabinet members, I was simultaneously taken aback by the leader's desire to control every aspect of the Party as well as the nation's most militant trade union. Perhaps if I saw myself as Cambodia's hope for an incorruptible liberal

democratic tradition and had been the myopic target of a grenade attack a couple years earlier, I may have also seen the need to micromanage the vehicle for the country's populist expressions.⁶ The will of the personality governed and typically overrode the critical contributions of the Party elite, with his spouse (an heiress of another republicanism⁷) being the key exception. I established long-term friendships with the staff with whom I worked, and I greatly admired their youthful enthusiasm and critical thinking in attempting to shape the political destiny of their country.

The rainier visit of 1999 provided the opportunity to work for Sam Rainsy, receive proper instruction in the Cambodian language, and explore more of the lay of the Khmer land. Arriving late on my own arrival scene, with my connections to Cambodia already in motion, my field research on the museumification of the Khmer Rouge movement would not formally commence until 2002.



A voyage or two to the 'Bodge⁸ and the requisite intellectual preparation instilled a fascination with the people I had encountered as well as a profound interest in the complex history of this becoming-modern nation.⁹ Some of the lures that caught my fascination: the then-prince's political balancing act in the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum*¹⁰; the enduring presence of Sihanouk and the resurgence of familiar historical figures throughout Cambodia's post-colonial period; the excesses of the Khmer Republic led by the Western-oriented, yet-mystical Lon Nol; extreme tendencies (social leveling, collectivization, secrecy, brutality) of Democratic Kampuchea; some cultural and

historical constants that contextualize the rise of the Khmer Rouge, providing antecedents and continuities with other regimes; and Hun Sen's master politicking in a context that hints at a return to 1960/1970s-style turmoil.¹¹

The initial project idea for my dissertation on Cambodia was a community-based, collaborative museum endeavor that would invite locals into a space to share their recollections of the recent past of their country and participate in some form of historical representation. The museum would be the dissertation project to which all involved (informants and researchers) would play participant. Although this concept piece drew together my interest in Cambodian history as well as some seductive theoretical possibilities that underwrite an experimental methodology¹², the project was likely too ambitious for a doctoral dissertation, logistically difficult to implement, and culturally awkward (arrogant?) in suggesting that the foreigner was competent enough to share, in any managerial or collaborative way, the role of presenter of the native's history. Hun Sen's gift to my dissertation project arrived in the newspaper in late 2001; the prime minister decreed the preservation of sites within the Anlong Veng area for the purposes of preparing the region for historical tourism—a Khmer Rouge museum.

While intrigued by the government-led efforts to construct a history museum, my initial reaction to the idea of converting the Anlong Veng sites into a sort of tourist area was largely fascination at the seeming absurdity of the project, an ironic sense of appreciation. Laying over 400 km from the country's bustling capital and 125 km from its capital of antiquity, Anlong Veng is remote for a tourist destination. I maintained an ambivalent relation to the prime minister's idea, which I largely characterized as the Cambodian government's newest attempt at "pimping its history of suffering." The sense

of absurdity has consistently been noted and sensationally conveyed by journalists who have authored pieces on the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold-becoming-museum, emphasizing the oddity of a KR "theme park."¹³



A three-year hiatus from life in the *'Bodge* had taken its toll on my Khmer linguistic capacity. The January 2002 arrival in the capital allowed the re-initiation of my tutoring sessions with Mme. Bora. I was introduced to this fascinating and effective teacher by a friend in 1999, and by that time she was already a popular tutor among a niche of ex-pats residing in the country's capital. In the early 1970s, Mme. Bora studied for her M.A. degree in French Literature at the Institute for Foreign Languages at the University of Phnom Penh; she also received instruction at the National Institute of Pedagogy. She married a military man who became a captain in the armed forces of the Khmer Republic. Through this marriage, she was distantly related to the dynasty of Lon Nol; on the rare occasions that she would talk about her past, she mentioned large family gatherings at the Marshal's villa that she attended. When the Khmer Rouge came to power, her husband was killed. During the Pol Pot years, she lost her three children and was deported to Battambang Province to work in a kitchen. She believes that she was supposed to be killed, which might have been expected for the wife of a Lon Nol soldier especially in the notoriously brutal Northwest Zone. However, she thinks that the local DK leaders simply forgot about her. The malnutrition she experienced during the Pol Pot years led her to become partially paralyzed, but leaving her sharp mental acuity intact. My lessons with Mme. Bora followed the established Cambodian pedagogy of learning

by rote and repetition, using the Khmer language books that are used by Cambodian schoolchildren. This traditional educational approach was interspersed with reading and discussing articles in the anti-CPP newspapers as well as random conversations about events in each other's lives. A couple months of tutoring and re-acquiring some linguistic competence preceded the first venturing out to the long abyss of fieldwork.



The blue sign preliminary visit. In order to reach the long ditch of Anlong Veng from the capital, one risks life and limb on National Route 6 that follows the eastern coasts of the Tonle Sap river and lake to the town of Siem Reap 310 km away. Road conditions in Cambodia vary largely with the weather and national priority (political and economic), making arrival at one's destination by ground travel relatively unpredictable.¹⁴ I wagered that motorcycle provided the best odds for successful travel, but this mode of travel increased vulnerability in other ways. From Kompong Thom town, the mid-way point from the capital, much of the highway seemed very much like I had left it in 1999: a deteriorating road, showing remnant chunks of pavement from its pre-war life and large stretches of dirt track marked by large ruts, gouged by the wheels of cargo trucks. Construction was underway—commune elections in 2002 and national elections in 2003 may have contributed to that endeavor—with significant enough grading allowing some traffic to reach 100 kph. The complication of dry season was the fine dust that was stirred up by vehicles, which blinded all other travelers in their wake. Even through the challenges of road conditions, the rural thoroughfare provided

magnificent views: “miles of palms and rice fields, brilliant green in the rainy season and sere brown in the dry months, interrupted periodically by clusters of houses and shops, paths leading to distant villages, and serene Buddhist temples,” as an academic kin has already noted.

Arriving in Siem Reap absolutely filthy—after 4 hours in the dusty plumes of Kompong Thom Province—still left me 125 km from Anlong Veng. What became my monthly “commute” to my fieldwork site took me along the now-smooth circuit past the ancient temples of Angkor Wat, Pre Rup, Preah Khan, and, lastly, Banteay Srei where the bitumen ends and the laterite and hard pack begin. Rumors of an improved road quickly eroded as I maneuvered my way through a pitted dirt track past Kbal Spean, Srei Noy Village, and through the beautiful forest (*prey s'aat* វ្រៃស្រែក), which formed a natural defense shield around the greater Anlong Veng area.¹⁵ With time, I witnessed selective logging from this jungle, and each visit revealed the evidence of destroyed bridges and vehicles connected with de-forestation. Later, acreage of green was cleared to found new villages along the road through Oddar Meanchey Province. Like Longvek some 400 years earlier, the natural defenses of Cambodia—in this case, the jungle palladium around the Khmer Rouge’s last stronghold—were succumbing to the pursuit of wealth, only the trees were becoming the coinage themselves.¹⁶

After a 2.5-hour journey from Angkor to Anlong Veng, I arrived late on the scene: March 2, 2002. Not only had former Khmer Rouge military commander Ke Pauk recently passed away in the remote town,¹⁷ an entourage from the Ministry of Tourism led by Deputy Minister Dr. Thong Khon had toured the day before my arrival. However, I encountered their many remnants: about 30 little blue signs in the town of Anlong Veng

and its surrounding areas that demarcate sites of historical interest: “Pol Pot Was Cremated Here” (*kâlèng dot khmaoch pol port* កន្លែងដុតស្នាម ប៉ុល ពត), “Ta Mok’s House” (*phteah ta mok* ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក) (this appears in a couple locations), and “Pol Pot’s Secret House” (*phteah sâmngat pol port* ផ្ទះសំងាត់ ប៉ុល ពត), which was so secret I could not find it. The government delegation had erected signposts at the various sites within Anlong Veng district that would be included in its historical-tourist area. I caught up with the reports of journalistic acquaintances who conveyed the pronouncements that gave new interest to this once-embattled stronghold; Thong Khon stressed the pedagogical role of the historical sites for Cambodian youth as well as visiting internationals.¹⁸

Anlong Veng, the former Khmer Rouge stronghold in Cambodia’s northern border with Thailand, is rarely visited today, except by a handful of hardy foreigners. But if a government tourism zoning plan takes off, the jungles and mountains of the desolate area will become one of Cambodia’s most popular destinations after the Angkor temples....

Officials hope that many of the approximately 330,000 tourists that visit Angkor annually will make their way on to Anlong Veng.

The government has brushed aside criticism that it is morally unethical to make money from a horrific chapter in the history of the country that Cambodians are still trying to overcome.

‘We do this not as revenge but to educate the new generation about what the genocide has done to this nation,’ Deputy Tourism Minister Thong Khon said during a recent visit to Anlong Veng.¹⁹

From my first impressions²⁰, the town felt very small, the nightlife (and day life) was not much beyond generator-powered karaoke and movie VCDs, and the quality of the food seemed to attest to a lack of resources. The people of Anlong Veng were definitely poor, in ways that the former Khmer Rouge of Pailin were not, based on my

1999 visit to the Northwest. Some have speculated this difference may be tied to the fact that Anlong Veng was the last Khmer Rouge base to defect/surrender to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and that a significant level of distrust of the villagers still remains within the government and the RCAF. Hence, there may have been a diminished impetus for heavily subsidizing the reintegration process. Regardless, the inhabitants seemed optimistic about foreigners making the 4-hour car ride from Siem Reap²¹ to their town in order to visit the blue signs (many of the sites have yet to be rebuilt). It was odd (and perhaps bordering on the absurd), given that the residents seem unaccustomed to the presence of foreigners (*barang* ភ្នំ). There was a lot of staring going on: the villagers at this American (*aakeang* អាគីង) who could speak a bit of their language; and me at the villagers who were, as a whole, distinctively rural Khmer.

My first full day solo in Anlong Veng, as related in my travel diary, presents what may constitute an ordinary Westerner's experience of touring the area's Khmer Rouge sites:

Yesterday was my day to play tourist in Anlong Veng. I think I hit all the sites. I got up early and headed up the mountaintop. It is something of a rough road. Again, I can't imagine Anlong Veng being a big seller in the rainy season. The first site I stopped at was the place where Pol Pot was sentenced after his ousting. Not much to see but a partially built structure. There were some soldiers hanging out there—pretty funny guys. They had captured this small animal and were keeping it in a cage.... The soldiers were very helpful and pointed me in the direction of Pol Pot's house (10 km away); I had somehow missed the cut-off for the cremation site already. The station where the soldiers were is 200 m from the Thai border. It is so obvious that the KR danced in and across this border. It is also obvious how easily it would be (for the Thais)

to support this movement. All these soldiers are RCAF (and a Cambodian flag flies at each of the sites), but I am certain just 4 years ago these guys were fighting the RCAF. My general assessment is that everyone is happy that the war is over (except for Ta Mok maybe, who is no doubt missing his multiple mansions).

On the way to Pol Pot's house, there is Ta Mok's (other) house. The ruins of the structure itself was not that impressive, but the grounds and view were quite nice. From the cliff area, he had a magnificent view of Anlong Veng below (on a clear day). There were some benches set up on the cliff amongst the bamboo. Quite pleasant. There was also something described as a "school" on the premises.... My guide Rik (a real kind guy who was missing many of his front teeth, but made up for it in the number of dogs that crowded his/our presence), led me to the top and bottom of the waterfall on the premises. There was no water, so it was not as spectacular as it could have been. From the school to the waterfall is probably about a 1-km walk. At the bottom of the waterfall, there were many empty rocket shells. So the waterfall was not only of aesthetic value but also served as a dumping ground. There was a sign (in Khmer) at the school that suggested tourists give 1000r per person to the guide. Given this guy is not likely to see too many tourists for a while, and because I made him do the hiking to the waterfall, I left him with 3000r. A good day to be a tour guide.

I made the 7-km trek from Ta Mok's waterfall estate to Pol Pot's house. All the while, I kept thinking that these guys really had it good. They lived liked kings in these magnificent mountains of natural beauty. Remote and peaceful. Lots of trees and jungle brush. A few ponds along the road. This was peaceful living. On the way to Brother No. 1's 'house,' one passes a number of 'guard houses.' They have the requisite Ministry of Tourism blue sign, and they seem to be occupied. I can't see much tourist interest in actually "viewing" these, except to note the number of stations protecting Pol Pot. Just before Pol Pot's estate, there is

a sign that says 'Khieu Samphan's House.' There is a small, highly unused path which I opted not to follow. I think this structure must be on the 'to be rebuilt' agenda.

Pol Pot's house was in ruins. In fact, I am not even sure it was the correct site. There was just a slab of concrete and a couple walls. 'Khieu Samphan's Office' seemed to be in better shape. There was a massive open area that I guess could have had a house in it. It looked more like an area that would have been used as a pool (but is now dried out). Maybe I should have taken one of those soldiers with me as a guide (as they had offered).... The structures in Anlong Veng were less intact and rely heavily on the visitor's imagination and deep historical knowledge. The temples in Siem Reap (reconstructed or not—Ta Prom) offer more to the Western visitor. Just hanging out in Anlong Veng is probably the most interesting aspect to the area. The people speak and look a bit different than other Khmers, and they seem curious about the *barang* that visit. But even this charm is going to wear away with time.

From Pol Pot's ruined mansion, I headed back to find the cremation site.... I pulled up and a Khmer gentleman offered himself as a guide to the site. My guide, Somdara, has been tending to the site for the last three months. He said he was an international police in Phnom Penh before he decided to move to Anlong Veng. He led me down a path about 2 m wide, lined with red sticks put in place by CMAC. As one walks the path, one can see the holes left from previous mines that have been removed. This was a little sketchy as far as I am concerned. I have to state that mined territory really wigs me out. I am glad the Halo Trust is doing its job.

So Brother No. 1's last remains lay under a corrugated tin shelter. A small rubber tire is visible through the ash. Some bottles or adornments have been placed at the head/tail of the cremation site. And it lays in the midst of a mine field. This is the end of Saloth Sar, a man many people describe as kind and intelligent and others describe as the mastermind of

Cambodia's killing fields. Whatever one's thoughts or feelings about the man, this grave site is less than spectacular. About 10 m from the cremation site is the remains of the house in which he spent his last days. No walls in this rubbish, only a Western-style toilet that has been broken. About all that one can make out is that the house was quite small."²²



Contact with the Ministry of Tourism was initiated in June 2002. This began with a meeting with Dr. Thong Khon, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Tourism, who is most responsible for implementing the Anlong Veng museum. At the time that the Khmer Rouge came to power, he had been studying medicine, but the communists seizure of power arrested his doctoral endeavors. Eighteen members of his family died during Pol Pot's rule. A decade later, the People's Republic of Kampuchea government would appoint him mayor of Phnom Penh. In this role and his current position, he has consistently shown an appreciation for the government's role in education: increasing the number of teachers at all levels of instruction, enrollment of all school-age children, and the importance of education to the enrichment of the country's youth.²³ In my first informal interview, Khon laid out what he saw as the general aims of the project, principally to demonstrate "the crimes of the genocidal regime." The specific role of the movement's last stronghold to this end is as an historical site showing "the political life and lifestyle" of the Khmer Rouge, "for example, how Pol Pot worked, how the organization ran its meetings."²⁴ Reconstructing the structures which housed this lifestyle is a primary task.

The “museum” is to encompass 38 destinations in Anlong Veng and its surrounding area, including many residences of the last Khmer Rouge elites, Pol Pot’s cremation site, and the makeshift court where Pol Pot was sentenced by his former comrades. The dilapidated structures are to be reconstructed exactly as they were in the past by the same carpenters who built them originally.²⁵ Objects such as radio trucks, prisoner cages, wartime billboards, personal possessions (e.g., furniture) of the former KR elite, as well as video and photographic materials are to be put on display within one of the main structures of this *in situ* museum.²⁶ In order to accomplish this endeavor, the Ministry is compelled to proceed along some logical stepping stones as it authors its “master plan” for Anlong Veng: demining the areas where tourists will be visiting, the construction of a major signboard in the center of Anlong Veng town detailing the area’s historical offerings, training of tour guides, and locating funding to support reconstructions and restorations. Once completed, the master plan will go to the Royal Cambodian Government for approval, upon which the actual rebuilding of the sites will be able to commence.

In our initial conversations, one of Khon’s overwhelming concerns was the approach to the historical material that would generate the content and overall message of the historical-tourist areas. The method the Ministry of Tourism was to pursue would begin with accurate documentation; as Khon said, “First, we must get *exact, real* documents. Based on these, we can do everything.”²⁷ The Ministry, with the participation of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam), was to organize research teams to interview Anlong Veng residents about the history of specific sites in the area that related to the Khmer Rouge and its leaders. The Ministry would collect this

data and send it to DC-Cam for confirmations and corrections. The information provided by Anlong Veng locals would be cross-checked with documents, principally in the DC-Cam archives as well as some held by the Royal Academy.²⁸ DC-Cam has over the years become the *de facto* repository for documents and materials (photographs, video, etc.), relating to the Khmer Rouge while in power as well as any information about their time before and after Democratic Kampuchea, that might help shed light on the crimes committed under Pol Pot. As stated by its motto, the mission of DC-Cam is “searching for the truth.” The function of this organization is the preservation of historically relevant documents but also the collection and preparation of evidence for a trial of Khmer Rouge members who committed atrocities.

Authenticity/validity (principally, the idea of a singular truth about a series of historical events) and accurate documentation (as a means of securing truth) emerged as key themes in conversations with a number of Ministry of Tourism officials (working group members), as they pored over materials from DC-Cam, interviews with people from Anlong Veng, and other documents assembled by professors at the Royal Academy of Phnom Penh. Khon and others provided a sense that what is needed is a scientific approach, methodology, and understanding for the depiction of Khmer Rouge life—through the examination of documents deemed authentic, cross-referenced with interviews from individuals.²⁹

In late 2002, the key issues plaguing the Tourism Ministry’s efforts were landmines and a lack of funding. The Cambodian Mine Action Committee (CMAC) had been charged with clearing the mines from the tourists destinations in Anlong Veng. (The other major de-mining organization, the Halo Trust, which occupied a massive

compound in Anlong Veng town, was not involved in the tourism effort, as their mandate for the area focused solely on making land available to new inhabitants/farmers.) With funding from Germany, CMAC's Demining Unit 6 extended its normal humanitarian duties to include the removal of mines and UXO from tourist destinations in Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey Provinces, in conjunction with the Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, and the Apsara Authority.³⁰ In Anlong Veng, this work focused on mines in and around National Route 67 and the individual locations along the escarpment near the Thai border where tourists would be guided.³¹

Financing the establishment of a historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng proved to be the larger hurdle for the Ministry of Tourism. Although Prime Minister Hun Sen issued the edict to begin the conversion of the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold into an historical-tourist area, the Royal Cambodian Government was not prepared to supply funds for the initial signposts, nor did it allocate the US\$15,00–30,000 that the Ministry estimated it required to develop a master plan, which would be submitted for royal approval. As well, the national government would not be in a position to cover the lion's share of support for carrying out the actual reconstruction of sites and collection of artifacts that would come to constitute the museum. Tourism officials at all administrative levels repeatedly communicated that they lacked any monetary support to carry out this project and that, consequently, they were forced to seek funding from the business community.³²



Cambodia's western terrain is largely flatland in the center contained (and protected) by a series of low mountain ranges, clockwise from the southwest to the north: Elephant Mountains, Cardamom Mountains, and Dangrek Mountains. The areas of the east, and northeast particularly, are dominated by rolling hills covered in dense jungle. At the heart of the country is the great Tonle Sap Lake, a violin-shaped basin which quintuples in size as seasonal fluctuations in rainfall reverse the river's current.³³ Four rivers—Tonle Sap, Bassac, and the upper and lower Mekong³⁴—drain the floodplains of the country's interior; a *Quatre-Bras* cross (*châtomruk* ចតុមុខ), or an immense K, forms at the confluence of these rivers just outside the main gates of the Royal Palace in the capital city of Phnom Penh.³⁵ A complement of lesser rivers (*steung* ស្ទឹង) empty into the central lake, completing a hydrological network that appears "a bit like the spokes of a wheel."³⁶ The radial originating in the Dangrek Mountain Range, Stung Sreng (ស្ទឹងស្រែង), etches its reach to the shores of the great lake carving out a long pit or ditch (*Anlong Veng* អង្គរវែង) which cuts through Oddar Meanchey Province before dissecting Siem Reap from Banteay Meanchey.³⁷ Smaller rivulets, such as Anlong Veng's Chiik Stream (អូរ ជីក), supply the tributary with mountain-range runoff and floodwaters of the monsoon season.

The kingdom's territory is divided administratively into 20 provinces (*khaet* ខេត្ត) and four municipalities (*krong* ក្រុង).³⁸ Provinces range having from three to 11 districts (*srok* ស្រុក), called quarters (*khan* ខណ្ឌ) in the municipalities. Districts are further broken down into communes (*khum* ឃុំ) or subdistricts, called wards or precincts (*sângkat* សង្កាត់) in the municipalities.³⁹ A small number of villages generally make up one commune; the

unit of administration within the village is the household. Anlong Veng is one of five districts in Oddar Meanchey Province.⁴⁰ This northern province of victory is bordered by Preah Vihear to the east, Siem Reap (home to Angkor Wat) to the south, and Banteay Meanchey to the west. The district's five communes include: Lumtong (លួតុង), Anlong Veng (អង្គរវង់), Thlat (ថ្លាត), Trabaing Tauv (ត្រាបាំងតាវ), and Trabaing Prey (ត្រាបាំងជ្រៃ). The district stretches from a dense jungle in the south, *Prey S'aat* (ជ្រៃស្រាត), up to the Thai border in the Dangrek Mountains.

The town of Anlong Veng is about 12 km from the base of the mountain range, which forms the natural border with Thailand. Most of the 30 or so historical-tourist sites are within Trabaing Prey Commune, which technically includes the areas along the top of the escarpment along the Thai border. Informants describe “Anlong Veng” (the district below, or, Anlong Veng proper) in contrast to the various areas of the escarpment: Pass 808 (ប្រាសាទ ៨០៨), Choam Pass (ប្រាសាទ ជាំ), Mountain 200 (ភ្នំ ២០០), Kbal Ansaong (ក្បាលសំរោង). In terms of how Cambodians talk about the place, the primary sites of interest are: Ta Mok's house on the lake, Ta Mok's house on the cliff, Pol Pot's house, Pol Pot's cremation site. Some lesser sites include the building in which Pol Pot was sentenced, Khieu Samphan's house, the burial site of the Son Sen family, and Ta Mok's “hospital.” The sites are marked by the presence of little blue signs that simply state in Khmer and English the name of the site.

In 2002, the population of the district was said to be approximately 40,000. I received estimates that 20% of the residents are from other provinces (new arrivals, or “new people” to borrow a category from the past), while the remaining 80% are former

Khmer Rouge soldiers and families. A massive influx of people to the district, in search of economic opportunity, are equalizing that ratio. Ethnically, the area remains quite homogeneous, with Khmer (and Sino-Khmer, who often identify as Khmer) constituting almost the entire population; surprisingly (given the Khmer Rouge's war rhetoric and antagonistic relationship with Vietnam), a small number of ethnic Vietnamese have moved to the area, to take up employment in woodwork (ornate carving).⁴¹

Although administratively re-integrated, the area's technological infrastructure was very much on par with other remote towns in the Cambodian countryside. As early as 2002, rumors spread that mobile phone service was imminent. Since this communications means did not arrive until almost three years later, contact with the outside world was confined to local two-way radio (ICOM) and travel. Electricity was available through a local grid that was powered by a large generator; it ran from 6AM to 10PM with a two outage periods in the morning and the evening. Supplementary power was available for those residents or business owners who possessed smaller generators of their own. Well-water was available at some individual homes/businesses or was collectively shared at centralized pumps, which were typically hand operated, although some could be drawn by generator power. Besides lighting and power tools, electricity was consumed for television and karaoke. Given that reception offered only one or two Thai stations, much viewing was of movies on VCD (a lot of Chinese action flicks); the town seemed well-supplied with VCD equipment, harboring a number of food stalls, drinking establishments, brothels, and karaoke venues which broadcast VCD sound and images.

Three principal variety stores dominated local commerce, offering goods from hardware to office supplies to packaged food and drinks. The new market provided stalls of assorted household goods and cooking ingredients as well as fresh produce. Various repair shops were frequent, typically specializing in autos, trucks, motos, or hardware; sometimes these operations were linked to a petrol station. Four pharmacies intermingled with other business ventures, typically run by an employee from the hospital and his family (e.g., one shop vending drugs and nuptial materials).⁴² Non-governmental organizations with a presence in Anlong Veng included *Médecins Sans Frontières*, World Food Programme, Red Cross, CMAC, and the Halo Trust. Some Samraong-based agencies (e.g., Zola and Health Unlimited) also provided services in the district.

In 2002, Anlong Veng had seven guesthouses, two of which seemed to double as brothels. The most established accommodations were offered at the homes of two deputy district chiefs, October 23 and Prodigal Son guesthouses, the former being more established and the latter being more upscale. Four restaurants (*pôchniythaan* អាជីវកម្ម) with made-to-order food (*mhaup kommâng* ម្ហូបតម្រូវ) constituted the upper crust of local cuisine. Eateries (*haang bay* អាងបាយ), with pre-cooked offerings (*mhaup châmensrap* ម្ហូបចម្រើនស្រាប់) laid out in pots, abounded; the exact number becomes imprecise as market benches, offering small specialty meals, such as curried vermicelli noodles (*num bânchok* ណុំប្រឡាក់), and coffee shops, that provide pre-prepared snacks, mingle together in the market's food area. This variety is further supplemented by occasional fruitshake (*teukkrâlok* ទឹកត្រឡុក) and other roadside drink stands.



Anlong Veng's history can be demarcated in a number of ways. One might pinpoint the original pre-history of Anlong Veng as beginning in Year Zero or even before, as pre-triumph liberated zone or pastoral scene of the *Sangkum* era. The district town rested at a heavily-forested crossroads, where the old Route 63 from Siem Reap met Road 69 which joined Samraong and eventually Sisophon to the west and Choam Khsan (Preah Vihear) to the east, and where a village market was large enough to give Anlong Veng a plot on the map.⁴³ The long hole etched by the Stung Sreng had been referred to as "thieves' village" (*phum chaor* ភូមិចោរ) in earlier times, claim some of its current residents, as the remote locale might provide cover for bandits or criminals on the run. Rural economic life consisted of farming and extracting resources from the surrounding jungle, very much like areas of Cambodia that remain forested today.

An emergent historicity, a pre-History, encompasses the Democratic Kampuchea period, 1975–1979. Under Pol Pot and even during the war against Lon Nol, Anlong Veng fell within Region 106 (Siem Reap–Oddar Meanchey). At least as early as May 1972, it had already succumbed to the Khmer Rouge's growing liberated zone, providing a forested town not far from the eastern front of the NADK's drive to take over Oddar Meanchey completely.⁴⁴ (The following year it was well within the GRUNK's liberated interior.⁴⁵) Democratic Kampuchea administration consisted of seven zones (*phoumipheak* ភូមិភាគ) subdivided into regions or sectors (*tâmbân* តំបន់), both levels cut across pre-revolutionary administrative units.⁴⁶ The secretary of Region 106 (Siem Reap–Oddar Meanchey) was Pa Thol (*alias* Soth) who answered to his superior at the

North Zone, secretary Koy Thuon (*alias* Khuon).⁴⁷ After the early 1977 (26 February – 6 March) purge of most of the Zone’s top cadre, Anlong Veng fell into the re-designated Sector 44.⁴⁸ This early purge would ultimately put Thuon’s rival, North Zone military commander Ke Pauk, in charge of the area and send Soth and hundreds within his network (*khsae roryeak* ក្រុមៈ) of patronage to their tortured deaths at *Santebal*’s S-21 security office, now known as the Toul Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes. The net effect for the subjects of the communist revolution remaining in the areas around Anlong Veng were more severe living conditions: harsher punishments, communal eating, and more drastic adherence to *Angkar*’s policies.

The district’s becoming-historical takes off with the retreat of the Cambodian Communists into Thailand as the Vietnamese, that “historic enemy,” invades the territory and liberates the population from a revolution which had gone *awry* (bending north- and/or Westward). This “pre-History,” following Pol Pot, embeds itself within the post-DK but pre-Ta Mok years: the Vietnamese occupation and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), 1979–1989. Some of the post-revolutionary population fled to the Thai border with their old masters and found temporary accommodation, support, and oppression within a string of refugee camps dotting the border from Koh Kong to Preah Vihear. The Khmer Rouge and other seemingly patriotic, but noncommunist, factions formed bases and new recruiting (conscription) grounds, many of which were the very same camps that were meant to provide humanitarian assistance to the anticipated starving masses.⁴⁹ The June 1982 re-organization of the refugee system under UNBRO and the formation of the tripartite Khmer coalition transformed the “safe zone” of camps into a series of military bases for making war with Cambodia’s interior; put starkly, the

“volag archipelago” (with support from the US, China, Thailand, and the UN) helped sustain a guerrilla operation against a government in power and essentially resuscitated a Khmer Rouge on the verge of dying out.⁵⁰

Anlong Veng’s becoming-historical (for *post-mortem* purposes of tourist consumption) emerges with its capture by the NADK. With Vietnam’s September 1989 withdrawal of its occupying military forces, the Khmer Rouge was able to make inroads into the country’s territory. A scythe of bases was formed along the western to northern borders, and area commanders were reshuffled.⁵¹ From the 1990 to 1998, Anlong Veng’s struggle was headed by Ta Mok. The area was mobilized for war; however, Mok’s leadership saw infrastructural improvements attempted, funded by a guerrilla economy bolstered by logging. As the organization negotiated with the other factions of the prolonged conflict in the lead-up to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the Khmer Rouge, calling itself the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), pursued a strategy of “continuing to obey the rule just enough to make the UN believe that it wished to remain part of the process.”⁵² This strategy ultimately proved self-destructive, and through the mid-1990s, the Khmer Rouge suffered a series of military defeats and defections to the government which gradually left Anlong Veng as the sole stronghold from which to continue its military struggle, with Pol Pot setting up his headquarters in its mountain encampment in 1994. Engagements with government forces would force advancements and retreats across the district’s foothills, while Pol Pot and the new intelligentsia continued their international presence through their wild head offices at Kbal Ansaong.



Exiting the Beautiful Jungle that provides the cover of a provincial boundary, the traveler continues through less-densely forested former battlegrounds (still populated with the occasional military/security checkpoint), encountering the first few scattered huts on the fringes of Lumtong Commune. Passing through this subdistrict's major intersection—a wider patch of red-soiled road than the traversing Route 67—and passing by its major structures (an old school, a new school, and two soldier compounds), the final water-crossing into Anlong Veng town is reached: a wooden bridge made of locally-felled timber, tree rounds split in half and laying lengthwise to form a short crossway.

Huts of straw become houses of wood, and structures with concrete foundations begin to map the edges of the main drag. The wide boulevard shows the deep red of Cambodia's jungle soil mixing in the dusty beige of an oft-traveled country road. A moto repair shop, a car mechanic, a car washing station, a canteen style eatery, small pharmacy, nuptial paraphernalia rental outlet, a local bodega, and an electronics repair shop are some of the first establishments intermixed with residences along the east side of the route; a singular concrete row house (*phteah lvèng* ផ្ទះឈ្មួញ) peaks above this otherwise one- and two-story landscape. Woodworkers, the town's two prime restaurants (Mohaleap Guesthouse and Thour Thea), another car wash, and the new market consume the west side of this entrance. The market fruit sellers line the exterior (roadside) edge to the town's commercial center, mixed amongst and across from the moneychangers and jewelers; the clearing across from the produce marketeers forms a narrow taxi station and cargo depot. Further along, mechanical parts/hardware store stores, pharmacies, eateries,

variety stores, and another moto repair site fill the dusty thoroughfare before it intersects the town roundabout. In the distance, the wilderness that was once a decade-long battlefield still exhibits the lush green of the tropical flora.

The town circle is centered on a recently-contributed cement pyramid topped by a white dove perched on a globe; its circular foundation is populated by deer with *nagas* stretching the descents of the pyramid's cornered edges. Emblazoned on its southward-facing front lies the inscription: "*Gift of Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, Route No. 67, 104 km long, constructed by the Supreme Command's Military Engineering Forces lastingly built 19 June 2000.*"⁵³ Highway 67 forms the north-south continuing leg of a T-intersection, the offshoot to the east joins Anlong Veng with neighboring Trabaing Prassat District. That newly-graded eastward segment houses the World Food Programme compound, a police station, district office, and Region 4 Military Headquarters on its south. The northern landing, between this road and the lake, harbors a petrol station, car mechanic, and the three neighboring residences of the district chief and two of his deputies. Further to the east, the traveler will arrive at the radio communications center (TO 50), the regional ice factory, and the schools built under Ta Mok and under Hun Sen.

The road to Trabaing Prassat and the northern extension from the roundabout form the rounded corner of the lake which swelled when Ta Mok imposed a weir on the Chiik Stream in 1993. Present-day descriptions of this man-created reservoir often appeal to gothic or eerie references, focusing on the dead and decaying trees stretching up from the shallow lily-clogged waters.⁵⁴ Those of a productivist sentiment might view the lake for its ecological offerings, a rich source of decomposing plant material supporting

fish propagation or the hydrological foundations of a future eco-tourist resort.

Proceeding north from Hun Sen's roundabout endowment of township, passing wooden houses on both sides of the street, the visitor encounters the Ta Mok Hospital on the east, a medical compound and accompanying structures whose size resembles the health facilities of a provincial capital or even an urban hospital. Past the Halo Trust compound on the west, the traveler sees the town's largest dining venue, Choum No Tror Cheak Restaurant, just before the O Chiik Bridge. Beyond the weir and bridge, various small businesses—car washes, petrol stands, another radio communications center—and homes line the dirt thoroughfare. About 1.5 km from the Anlong Veng roundabout emerges another 3-way junction: the major line continues north toward the mountain border with Thailand; the westward spur leads to the provincial capital of Samraong and another border town, O Smach, whose infamy lies with a different stronghold.⁵⁵ At the heel of this spur rests the remains of the old market, dilapidated commercial stalls that are gradually becoming the domain of expanding neighboring residences.

The 10 km of Highway 67, which run between the old market site and the base of the Dangrek Mountains, becomes increasingly rural. The stretch exhibits rice fields and forest, and the sides of the red path are sparsely populated by more modest homes, many with small gardens of banana trees encircling their front and back yards.⁵⁶ Two schools are present along this route, occasional rickety drink stands (which also make for *tiendas* vending basic necessities) crop up, a few carpenters and wood carvers have set up workshops near their homes, and dirt single-tracks splinter off toward the more remote habitations within Anlong Veng's sparser jungle.⁵⁷ Two-thirds of the way to the foothill, the route is intersected by the ministerial village of Srah Chhouk. This community pays

historical tribute to the Ta Mok years, as woodworkers dominate the hamlet that was home to the now-destroyed saw mill, adjacent the new pagoda. Beyond the lotus pond village arise the foothills, forest, the escarpment, and scenes of historical tourism.

One has arrived in Anlong Veng, after the war.



Road north to the Dangrek Mountains

“...and other things that we will probably never know about in our lifetime— including, perhaps, an invisible cloud of evil that circles the Earth and lands at random in...”

CHAPTER 2

Scholars have argued that Cambodia’s historical fate has been significantly tied to its geography, positioned between the two rival powers of a Sinicized Vietnam (Annam) and an Indianized Thailand (Siam).¹ With the fall of the Angkorian empire in the 15th century, Cambodia’s rulers—regional warlords vying for territory, resources, and royal favor—alternately turned to one neighboring country for support against the existing sovereign who was allied with another neighboring country or foreign force.² In 1863, Norodom I was approached by the French (made interested in a backwater of potential riches by the writings of Henri Mouhot); Cambodia’s agreement with this outside power secured continued existence of the monarchy and kingdom under the French Protectorate in the *Union Indochinoise*.³ The last ruler enthroned by the colonial authorities, an 18-year-old Norodom Sihanouk, was chosen for his youth, apparent malleability, and for his genealogical confluence, which brought together two rival houses of royal ancestry.⁴ After a brief period of independence granted under Japanese occupation during World War II, Sihanouk royally crusaded for, and secured, formal independence from France in November 1953.⁵

This Lord Papa (*sâmdéché* or ស៊ីវ័ត្តេសី), as he is called, presided over what is retrospectively sometimes deemed Cambodia’s “golden years”: infrastructural achievements, massive support of education, artistic/architectural endeavors, and a beautiful, cosmopolitan capital city.⁶ The Sihanouk years can be nostalgically reconstructed to loosely conform to a vision of the royal social order, in which patronage

to the king and making merit at the pagoda find their return to the kingdom's subjects via great works, infrastructural improvements, and social institutions that benefit the majority of the population—a Buddhist social order that reproduces the monarchy and the country through the *sangha*.⁷ However, views of Sihanouk and the *Sangkum* era vary widely.⁸ Sihanouk abdicated the throne in order to “compete” in post-Geneva electoral politics, and through his *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* he played fulcrum and overseer to the aspirations of parties from the Right (Liberal Party) to the Left (Democrat Party and *Pracheachon* Group).⁹ While the atrocities of DK period may encourage a nostalgic rendering of the past, the conditions of social life during the *Sangkum* period were far from idyllic.¹⁰ Through the 1960s, with his *Sangkum* experiment, Sihanouk increasingly alienated the country's right wing (most notably, in halting the flow of US aid). This period witnessed a growing political divide between right and left, an economic divide created by (nepotistic) nationalization, decreases in foreign aid, increased pressures on peasants to produce more rice for less return, and the consequent socio-political opposition (exemplified by the April 1967 Samlaut rebellion).¹¹

An anti-US stance, nationalization of industries, and positioning leftists in government helped bolster Sihanouk's national popularity with the peasant majority and garner patience from leftist insurgents (further enforced by Vietnamese tutelage), but these policies created a situation which was intolerable to the Cambodian elite—army, businessmen, merchants, and administrators. This balancing act became increasingly strained as his “Buddhist Socialism”—which outwardly preached neutrality and non-alignment, but secretly allowed weapons to be floated across the country to Vietnamese

Communists—ired upper-class pro-US, republican interests.¹² Approaching the end of this decade, the personalistically-managed *Sangkum* began to unravel.¹³

On 18 March 1970, Sihanouk was ousted in a coup led by his formerly loyal General Lon Nol and his cousin Prince Sirik Matak, ushering in the brief period known as the Khmer Republic.¹⁴ The Lon Nol regime is marked by the country's dramatic entanglement in the Second Indochina War.¹⁵ Far from realizing democratic aspirations, Lon Nol's brief reign exhibits the broken promises of a liberal democracy as well as rampant corruption (particularly within the military); these detriments worsened in combination with the US bombers (recently freed from operations in Vietnam) ravaging the countryside and driving peasants into the city or the maquis.¹⁶ A capital beset by the influx of refugees from the provinces and mired in pro-Sihanouk demonstrations and anti-conscription protests exacerbated the widening division between the urban upper class on the one hand, and the urban and rural poor, on the other.¹⁷

In the countryside and clandestinely in the cities, veteran pro-independence fighters and communist agitators had organized in increasingly harsh and repressive circumstances; with the coup, the deposed monarch threw his lot in with the "red Khmers," which brought additional rural support as well as a respected public face. The revolutionary movement, which had come into existence under Vietnamese tutelage, owed much of their military success to their eastern comrades.¹⁸ Spurred by Hanoi's fear of a pro-Western regime in its neighboring country, the North Vietnamese Army stepped up operations within Cambodia, clearing out FANK troops and turning control over to GRUNK. By June 1970 (months after Operation Breakfast had served up a complicated repast of ordnance-infused vegetation), the neighborly comrades had helped liberate large

swaths of Cambodian territory.¹⁹ The December 1971 failure of Lon Nol's Chenla-II offensive (led by Col. Um Savuth²⁰) in Kampong Thom left a bleak military situation for the Republic.²¹ By 1973, a communist takeover appeared imminent; it would take the revolutionary organization another two years to complete its march to victory and seize the city as the country entered the new year of 2519 BE.²² In sum, what ensued after the overthrow of Sihanouk was the erosion of democratic ideals with the consolidation of Marshall Lon Nol's rule.²³ And this to be followed by the *betrayal* of communist ideals with the consolidation of Pol Pot's rule.



When the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea captured Phnom Penh in 1975, the CPK ordered the evacuation of the capital's population, which had swollen to 2 to 3 million,²⁴ and transferred them to the countryside to assume agricultural work.²⁵

Residents from the cities were functionally classified as “new people” (*neak thmei* អ្នកថ្មី) or “April 17 people,” even though an overwhelming number of them were refugees from the countryside, who had only recently fled the bombing in rural areas to seek safety in Phnom Penh.²⁶ These designations differentiated evacuees from the revolution's privileged “old people” (*neak chas* អ្នកចាស់) or “base people” (*neak moulathaan* អ្នកមូលដ្ឋាន).²⁷


The stated goals were the destruction of all remnants of feudal and capitalist society.

With what it described as “the end of over two thousand years of history,” DK brought the end of money, markets, private property, religion, the education system as well as the restriction of free travel, certain clothing styles, and traditional cultural elements.

In some ways the revolution was consistent and nationwide. Money was not in use anywhere, for example, and in national terms there was no education system, no freedom of movement, and no postal service. With rare exceptions, Buddhism, like all religious practices, was outlawed, and defrocked Buddhist monks were made to perform agricultural work.

Gambling, sport, jewelry, and extramarital sex were forbidden.²⁸

From zone to zone and even within zones, the intensity of these various aspects of DK life differed widely.²⁹ Writing of the most de-privileged group in DK, Heder's oft-quoted characterization summarizes that new people were "last on distribution lists, first on execution lists, and had no political rights."³⁰ As well, in its first wave of violence, the revolutionaries sought to physically eliminate the threat posed by lingering personnel of the *ancien régime*. Maintaining its secret existence until 1976—operating under the aegis of the (revolutionary) Organization (*ângkaar badevoat* អង្គការបដិវត្តន៍)—the newly victorious CPK set out an ambitious agenda of social transformation, guided by self-reliance (*khluon tii peung khluon* ខ្លួនឯងខ្លួន), independence-mastery (*aekreach m'chas kaar* ឯករាជ្យម្ចាស់ការ), and building and defending (*kâsaang kaarpear* កសាងការពារ) the country.³¹



Source: Chandler, *Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 268.

In addition to the violence that took hold, the comprehensiveness and *speed* of the transformation likely mark its unusual status in history.³² In the countryside, workers were assembled into cooperatives (*sâhâkâr* សហគមន៍).³³ “Those new rural proletarians and the somewhat better-off base people were organized into self-contained communities—villages, cooperatives—which had and were encouraged to have considerable autonomy to regulate internal affairs so long as the overall directives from the top were carried out.”³⁴ However, exceptional production goals from the Party were expected of each unit’s members, and long workdays were required in attempts to attain those goals.³⁵ Many scholars note a ten-day work cycle, which would be interspersed with one day of “rest,” filled with political education, livelihood meetings (*brâchum chiivapheap* ប្រជុំជីវភាព), or self-criticism (*kaartitien svayitien* ការមិព្រៀមស្វ័យមិព្រៀម) sessions.³⁶ Food was

rationed, and communal eating was enforced in almost all areas.³⁷ Subjects were questioned regarding their class background, which brought suspicion upon many. As failures arose, more violence followed. Rather than re-examining production goals and distributions plans, the CPK focused on finding and eliminating “enemies” who were sabotaging the revolution. More failure brought more violence, and the Party further purged its own ranks (including regional leaders), widening the scope of its inquisition, purification, and smashing (*kâmtéch* កំពត់) of enemies (*khmaang* ខ្មាំង). Vietnam was blamed for the supposed spies (*kinh* កឹង) frustrating the CPK’s efforts. Policies of violent aggression against its neighbor eventually led to full-scale war between Cambodia and Vietnam, with Vietnam quickly conquering the ailing DK regime.³⁸

Differing characterizations have been applied to the rule of the CPK from 1975 to 1979. Vickery, for example, deems the near-four-year rule as a revolution based on peasant resentment, which he takes pains to distance from the Marxist tradition.³⁹ His characterization of Cambodia’s conflict in the 1970s is based on a class analysis that focuses above all on a growing divide between a privileged urban elite (addicted to commodious living and foreign luxury goods) and a rural poor, *les autres* (long exploited by usury and taxation tied to the corrupt urban centers), which erupted into a violent confrontation.⁴⁰ Vickery gives an economic history of 20th-century Cambodia that emphasizes the possibilities for “Asian revolutions,” upon which he explicates characteristics of the Pol Pot faction (French-educated intellectuals)—“sensitivity to the national question” and sense of entitlement based on their “superior education”—that play out accordingly; this development combined peasant rage and anti-Vietnamese chauvinism.⁴¹ His description of pre-DK life gives the impression that the privileged

elite almost deserved the horrific retribution they received—the revolution was not the cocktail parties to which they had become accustomed.⁴²

Alternatively, Kiernan views the regime in terms of race (overshadowing class and organizational imperatives) and the growing centralized control exercised by one faction within the CPK—“racialist ideology and the quest for total power.”⁴³ Throughout his accounts of the DK era, he prioritizes centralized directives and the ethnic massacres they effected.⁴⁴ His examination of atrocities itemizes suffering and death along ethnic lines, with a particular focus on the “genocide” against the country’s Cham minority. His description of a becoming-dominant faction establishes his definition of DK as a racist totalitarian system.⁴⁵

Short devotes much attention to Pol Pot’s individual character—his ominous silence, the enigmatic nature of his pronouncements, monopoly on power while micro-managing the smallest details, a manipulative decision-making technique used for directing Party policy, and self-aggrandizement—and he seems to conform to a variation of Kiernan’s argument: Pol Pot saw socialism as a means, while the end was building up the Khmer race.⁴⁶ With this personalist twist, he argues that power over the revolution always remained in the hands of Pol Pot.⁴⁷

Chandler, whose position has been called a “conventional anti-communist perspective,” characterizes the policies and practices of the CPK as extreme examples brought on by “the purest and most thoroughgoing Marxist–Leninist movement.”⁴⁸ He argues that elements of DK find parallels (“standard operating procedure”) in other socialist countries—China’s Great Leap Forward, Soviet collectivization, and violent purges in both countries.⁴⁹ However, Chandler’s work often elucidates factors that imbue

DK with a distinctively Cambodian character, illuminating cultural continuities and discontinuities that are not adequately captured in the Marxist–Leninist label.⁵⁰

Heder, whose ideas about the internal workings of the movement have shifted and evolved over time, argues against both Vickery's non-Marxist rendering of the CPK movement as well as the racist totalitarianism that constitutes Kiernan's view.⁵¹ At the same time, his focus on the ideological upbringing in the movement's struggle tends to bolster some features of Chandler's viewpoint. Particularly in terms of the KPRP inception in the ICP and up to the CPK's 1975 triumph, Cambodian communism has exhibited the embrace of a Marxist–Leninist revolutionary model, transmitted through Vietnamese tutelage.⁵² His work has consistently examined how the concept of class has operated through the CPK exercise of power during DK.⁵³ These four perspectives delineate some of the emphases that emerge and reverberate through debates about issues of authority, killing, and genocide.



The period of Democratic Kampuchea, 17 April 1975 to 7 January 1979, meant considerable hardship and horror for the Cambodian people, and these difficulties have received significant attention from governments to social organizations to academics.⁵⁴ Through the waves of scholarly considerations, key points of contention and debate emerged, and some continue to persist. The issues that arise and still garner attention and scrutiny center on various characteristics of CPK rule: the structure of DK authority, the nature and scope of its violence, variation of conditions across time and place, the causes of mass killing, the DK security apparatus, opposition to its rule, ideological influences,

the death toll, the applicability of “genocide” to describe the atrocities, historical antecedents, and continuities with policies/practices of previous regimes vs. an “aberrant” phenomenon. The after effects of these debates spill over into other realms: legal definitions of genocide; trials for crimes against humanity; the character of revolutionary movements; manifestations of Marxist-inspired agendas; and the consolidation of ideological hegemony through presentations of history (narratives of history), which sometimes manifest in museums.

Early contributors who dominated the discussion of DK history (Kiernan, Vickery, Heder, Chandler, Barnett, Etcheson, and Thion) in the mid-1980s have been supplanted by more recent works (Short, Etcheson, and Heder), which resolved some of the controversial issues and offered new and modified views of the regime.⁵⁵ Very little information seeped out from the borders of Cambodia under Democratic Kampuchea, and early reports became the arsenals of propaganda and other political objectives.⁵⁶

One initial source for information on the revolution was refugee accounts, which Vickery claims still come to shape the dominant perception of life under the CPK. The vision of Cambodia 1975 to 1979 that emerges from these accounts—further circulated and sensationalized by journalists’ disseminations—Vickery calls the “standard total view” (STV) of Democratic Kampuchea. It is a composite of some of the most extreme examples from journalistic and refugee accounts, which he claims also circulates in some early academic writings as well as widely in media representations of the period, and he argues that it “has permeated public consciousness to such an extent that it has become conventional wisdom.”⁵⁷ He describes the perceptions associated with this historical version of the regime:

DK tried to exterminate all those who during the Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods had served in the military or had held civilian administrative posts, were otherwise urban elite, and all other 'intellectuals,' meaning all who had more than basic primary schooling, in particular doctors, teachers, technicians; and the members of these groups who survived only did so by concealing their identities between 17 April 1975 and early 1979, or whatever earlier date they managed to escape from Cambodia.

In addition to direct extermination of such class enemies, the STV holds that the regime deliberately abolished schooling, medical care, and religion; sought to destroy the family, in particular by tearing children from parents; and, through deliberate efforts to deprive the population of an adequate diet, caused the deaths of large numbers of those people who escaped the extermination dragnet. Ethnic minorities, in particular the Muslim Chams, are supposed to have been special extermination targets; and there have been statements to the effect that attractive women were in danger simply by virtue of their physical qualities.... The policies imputed to the new DK government, according to the STV, were perverse and had no rational basis in either economic or political necessity; and the people who were the chief victims, the former town dwellers, being tired of the war in 1975, welcomed the revolutionary victory, and would have cooperated willingly in efforts to restore and redevelop the country.

The basic STV also holds that the policies outlined above were invariant as to time and place; the scenario was true everywhere, all the time, between April 1975 and January 1979. The explanation offered for such aberrant policies is 'communism,' or by the more sophisticated, 'Maoism,' in particular its cultural revolution.⁵⁸

A centrally-planned, willful extermination of the population on a class or other basis or for no reason, led by irrational or "evil" people—a metaphor for hell on earth—seems to be the gist of the STV, which would appear as an academic strawman if elements of this

view did not continue to crop up in present-day representations of the Khmer Rouge.⁵⁹ Although he acknowledges that some elements of the STV may bear relative accuracy at some moments, Vickery challenges the *monolithic* character of this vision of DK rule. Consistent with his other works, this deconstruction begins with an emphasis on spatial and temporal variation, largely by privileging his first-hand knowledge of Cambodia over the accounts of refugees or versions publicized by journalists.⁶⁰

The best conditions for longer periods under CPK rule appear to have been in the East, Northeast, and Southwest Zones (but for different reasons) before 1977.⁶¹ “Temporal variation” in analyses of the DK period is essentially an indication that conditions countrywide began a serious decline in the 1977 to 1978 time frame, sharp in some areas and gradual in others.⁶² According to Vickery and others, the Southwest Zone (Kampong Speu, Takeo, Kampot, and Kandal Provinces), under Pol Pot and Ta Mok, was one of the best managed: enough food with unlikely executions unless the strict disciplinary guidelines were not observed. Detailed accounts confirm few random killings as well as a propensity to integrate willing “new people.” This comparatively more favorable situation emerged in the “zone of Pol Potism *par excellence*,” where discipline under the leadership of Ta Mok, was strictly enforced.⁶³ Vickery credits the zone’s favorable conditions in part to early revolutionary transformation of most of the sectors (dating to the early 1970s), a good supply of food (a result of a relatively successful agricultural organization), and well-fed, well-entrenched base people, who were not relocated, perhaps harbored support for the new regime, and were more ready to accommodate an influx of evacuees. Further, he indicates that there appeared to be no general policy (or at least a noncompliance with one) to kill professionals or military

officers from the Lon Nol regime, allowing regional leadership to sort out the new arrivals; the composition of this leadership appears strict but better educated than in other zones.⁶⁴ The fate of evacuated new people depended largely on the available food (which was adequate in most of the Zone's sectors), the ratio between new and base people, and the level of class animosity. "Life was best where a small number of new people were thoroughly mixed with the old, worst where a large community of new people was segregated from the base population."⁶⁵

Until the arrival of the Southwest cadre in 1977, the Northwest Zone (Battambang and Pursat Provinces) is generally recognized to have been the zone with the worst conditions. There is notable variation even within this zone. Battambang Province (Sectors 1, 3, 4, and 5) was historically Cambodia's leading rice producing area, and it also contained the site of the 1967–68 peasant rebellion at Samlaut. However, in spite of these favorable factors, social conditions were generally quite bad—brutal cadre, settling of personal scores, and the mismanagement of rice supplies—with Sector 3 being a notable exception.⁶⁶ In attempting to explain the emergence of this situation, Vickery considers a number of possible causes: Battambang was the last area to come under CPK control; the area's military commander, Gen. Sek Sam Iet, had negotiated a peace with the CPK in exchange for arms and food prior to 1975; and "in Battambang the rice merchants, users, landlords, and military were known as individuals and the object of personal grudges."⁶⁷ Within Pursat Province (Sectors 2, 6, 7), conditions were some of the worst in the country. The province had been one of the country's poorest, exhibiting a rough topography (mountains and forest), which made agricultural work especially harder for new people. This region seems to have had the highest numbers of deaths, but

mainly due to illness and starvation.⁶⁸ Perhaps most importantly, and true for the zone as a whole, was that the cadre who took over control of the Northwest were relatively new to the movement and lacked experience. They were also faced with an influx of evacuees from the Southwest Zone, the “second deportation,” in late 1975 and early 1976.⁶⁹

Drawing from information on Sector 5 and the second deportation, Kiernan enumerates four themes: food shortages; coping with a labour surplus (occurring at harvest time); a lowered priority for the peasantry, as it came to be swamped by new people; and the “intermittent use of terror for social control and labor discipline.”⁷⁰

In an early response to reports of brutality in Democratic Kampuchea, Kiernan offered an assessment of the Northwest Zone similar to that of Vickery.⁷¹ In this text, he points out that Battambang and Siem Reap were not strongholds of the Khmer Rouge movement during the war, and thus in 1975 cadre who took control of these regions were under-trained and understaffed; he further argues that there is a direct correlation between lack of training and high levels of brutality. In addition, this region had not been the beneficiary of Khmer Rouge irrigation and construction works in the early 1970s as other areas had (notably Kampot and Kampong Cham). Because of its agricultural potential and sparse population, Battambang was the recipient of numerous city dwellers evacuated from Phnom Penh (for lack of food). Kiernan argues that leadership by inexperienced soldiers in an area with unique, dramatic socio-economic tensions—numerous powerful moneylenders and widespread debt as well as a high proportion of landless peasants—which combined with the burden of a massive influx of city dwellers, set the stage for a brutality that was more extreme than in other areas under the Organization’s control.

In 1977, the leadership of the Northwest Zone was purged, and cadres from the Southwest Zone arrived to assume control, a move meant to accentuate the Party Center's control over the country. Vickery suggests a varied impact of the Southwest Zone cadre's seizure of control.⁷² Kiernan's version of events stresses starvation on a large scale, mass killings, and the disruption of rice production and distribution.⁷³ A second purge and re-organization occurred in mid-1978, this time carried out by the newly-trained cadres of the West Zone.⁷⁴

The West Zone (Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Speu, and Koh Kong Provinces) was carved out from the Southwest Zone in April 1975 and placed under the control of Chou Chet. Conditions were already dictated by the area's rough geographical circumstances, which meant poor soil and poor peasants.⁷⁵ Vickery's brief treatment of the Zone is varied; in many sectors, organization was solid enough to provide adequate food, but brutal leadership among some locales meant many killings.⁷⁶ Kiernan's treatment of the West Zone is confined largely to its expansion into the Northwest, shortly after the March 1978 elimination of Chou Chet.⁷⁷

Originally called the North Zone (alongside Special Regions 103 and 106), the Center Zone (Kampong Thom, Kampong Cham, and Kratie Provinces) shows dramatic local particularity.⁷⁸ Vickery reports that in most sectors before 1977, food was adequate and killings were restricted to officials and officers associated the Lon Nol regime.⁷⁹ Even prior to the purge, some areas within the North-Center Zone presented violent rule, while circumstances in neighboring sectors were tolerable. "Such extreme differences among contiguous units at that low level seem to have resulted from the personalities and attitudes of the village cadres rather than from factional divergence in policy."⁸⁰ In

addition to personality differences as a source for variation, Vickery stresses the context of an incomplete consolidation of administrative control of the zone at the end of the war, with key provincial towns remaining under Lon Nol authority up to April 1975, as well as a conflict of visions, with Koy Thuon's gradualist approach at odds with his deputy, Ke Pauk.⁸¹ Further, Vickery suggests that the persistence of sufficient food may be attributable to Ke Pauk's power: the North Zone was able to retain its rice stores without reprisal from CPK leaders.⁸²

Until the mid-1978 purges, the Eastern Zone (Prey Veng, Kampong Cham, and Svay Rieng Provinces) exhibited good food production and distribution as well as minimal oppression; this is credited largely to the different background and orientation of the Eastern Communists.⁸³ The governing faction was guided by a different vision of the implementation of communism, the relationship with Vietnam, and perhaps the role/usefulness of Sihanouk.⁸⁴ Vickery conveys that CPK policies in the East until 1973 tended to be popular with the peasants (as food was abundant, prices were low, and brutality was absent); after this time, peasants were confronted with greater hardship as they were called upon to provide provisions and personnel for the revolutionary struggle.⁸⁵ Prior to the 1978 purge, the East Zone was blessed with many productive agricultural districts and the administration was populated with disciplined Communists with much experience.⁸⁶ Vickery's claim to variation under Democratic Kampuchea over space and time has been largely embraced and reinforced in contemporary and subsequent accounts produced by scholars of the period.⁸⁷ However, what this diverse historical landscape says about the overall character of the revolution, its organization, and its influences remains in contention.



Out of the variation that characterized Democratic Kampuchea, a corollary emerges that links the members of the present-day regime—including Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim—to the CPK's pre-history: the narrative of "the good East," the Cambodian Communist alternative to the Pol Pot-dominated CPK.⁸⁸ Kiernan is the principal academic architect of this (re)vision of history, but other scholars echo his claims; the narrative's political existence is sustained in, by, and through the activities and individuals of the Cambodian People's Party.⁸⁹ The privileging of the East commences with a return to the early communist beginnings in Cambodia, the anti-colonial Issarak movement that made common struggle with the Vietnamese against the French.⁹⁰ The KPRP convened its First Congress in 1951, and up to half of its ranks were from the eastern provinces.⁹¹ In Cambodia, Saloth Sar and a group of French-educated comrades worked their way into the top positions of the party as early as 1960.⁹² The promotion of Saloth Sar to secretary at a February 1963 meeting, after Tou Samouth's mysterious disappearance, was clouded by irregularity as Sao Pheum lost the contest "not by a vote but by opinion."⁹³ While Saloth Sar's faction struggled to consolidate its control, the veteran communists, many in the East Zone, maintained their political positions.⁹⁴ Given a long history of military cooperation with the Vietnamese, the East Zone cadre were less willing to assume an offensive position *vis-à-vis* Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese demanded the continued use of Sihanouk through the 1960s and refused to provide arms to the CPK maquis, the nascent communist struggle

benefited greatly from Vietnam's support and guidance, a "relationship, it seems rich in nuance and complexity."⁹⁵ Consequently, the position of the faction of East Zone cadre (against the Pol Pot Center) was to favor an independent struggle, but one which was not hostile to Vietnam.⁹⁶ Vickery agrees in reasoning, "Since the leading cadres [in the East Zone] were largely from the *Pracheachon* and older ICP tradition, the special character of their zone may well have been due to a conception of socialism closer to that of the Vietnamese."⁹⁷

According to the good East narrative, the moderate communism of the veteran cadre manifested as some of the most humane policies, ensuring the best conditions during the Democratic Kampuchea period, at least until the purge that began in late 1977 culminated in military seizure and massacres in May 1978. The zone exhibited fewer executions, with large-scale deaths not occurring until late 1976.⁹⁸ With the exception of Sector 21 around Memut (which exhibited some starvation), food rations in the rest of the zone provided adequate nourishment for the first two years of DK.⁹⁹ Imposition on the zone's populace of the much-resented policy of communal eating was significantly delayed. Normal workday hours were followed, the practice of Buddhism was allowed, and varied forms of dress were tolerated; urban evacuees were allowed to search out relatives and friends, and restrictions on travel and on foraging were looser.¹⁰⁰ Relations between cadre and peasants were typically good, as the movement was long established in the region, and some policies had met with popular support.¹⁰¹ Unlike other areas, where suspicion of class background meant the dis-use of technical professionals, the East Zone provides examples where engineers were employed in the design of irrigation projects¹⁰² or at least were not targeted for their professional skills.¹⁰³ Kiernan cites Sao

Pheum's approach to administration: "the aim of the revolution was improvement in the standard of living, not the enforcement of poverty or misery in order to teach people what it was like to be poor."¹⁰⁴ An unsuccessful attack on Vietnam ordered in March 1977 combined with Sao Pheum's failure to arrest colleagues and clients who appeared on security lists (issuing from the security headquarters in Phnom Penh) brought suspicion on all the administrative cadre of the East Zone—Pheum and his entire network.¹⁰⁵ The 1977 purges, made possible by the alliance of Yin Sophi, Sector 21 Chief of Security (*santesok* សង្កែត), and Peam, head of the Eastern Zone Office (and appointed by Pol Pot), culminated with the military take-over of the zone in May 1978 by Ke Pauk's Center Zone troops.

It should be noted that this purge of perceived "enemies"—said to be "Vietnamese heads, Cambodian bodies" (*kbaal yuon khluon khmaer* ក្បាលយួនក្បួនខ្មែរ)—that peaked in March to May 1978, created a massive influx into the detention cells of S-21, the largest death toll of any zonal purge during Democratic Kampuchea.¹⁰⁶ Beyond the purge that brought the upper echelon to S-21, from June to July, Ke Pauk's troops massacred villages in an attempt to "sweep clean" the area. "In the most extended and systematic outburst of state-sponsored violence in the DK era, [pro-government forces] killed off entire villages suspected of harboring 'traitors.'"¹⁰⁷ From July 1978, much of the populace began to be forcibly relocated out of the East Zone, many of these migrants would die of starvation or selective killings in the process.¹⁰⁸ In this context, a number of lower-level and middle-level cadres escaped the purges by fleeing across the border into Vietnam, while others revolted against the newly-entrenched Center troops. These fleeing East Zone cadres formed the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation in

December 1978, under the leadership of Heng Samrin, a former commander of the zone's Division 4.¹⁰⁹ Weeks later with military support from the Vietnamese, the rebels resumed their assault, quickly conquered the Democratic Kampuchea forces, and proclaimed the People's Republic of Kampuchea.¹¹⁰ The Hanoi-trained veterans of communist struggle and the East Zone cadre who sought to foster a more moderate revolutionary transformation constitute the lineage to which the Cambodian People's Party traces its ideological and historical roots.¹¹¹

In sum, the narrative of the Good East suggests that the legitimate communist struggle began in 1951 under the support of the Vietnamese from the context of the Indochinese Communist Party. Although differences emerged within this regional solidarity, the support of the Vietnamese both on the battlefield and ideologically aided Kampuchea's victory over the Lon Nol regime and its US imperialist backers. However, according to the narrative, the revolution was hijacked by the "Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique," which savagely starved and murdered the Khmer people. The legitimate, or "good," communists, who came principally from the East Zone, narrowly avoided extinction at the hands of Pol Pot's military accomplices, Ta Mok and Ke Pauk, and his *Santebal's* torture/execution center, S-21, and fought back. The true revolutionary people's party ousted Pol Pot from power, bringing an end to the DK reign of terror, and thereby saving the Cambodian people and the Khmer race.¹¹² This national narrative would prove indispensable in the PRK consolidation of its control of Cambodia both domestically and in the face of international isolation.¹¹³ Frieson asserts that the PRK leaders demonstrated an interest in distancing their "Communist" government from the supposed communism of Pol Pot; the means by which this dissociation is effected emerge in 1)

maximizing the “genocidal” reading of DK and thereby 2) minimizing the PRK leaders’ (former) involvement in the brutality.¹¹⁴ The outward projection of a good East Zone, with better living conditions and kinder, gentler polices during the early, pre-KUNFS years, seems amenable to these ends.

In his first critique of the good East narrative, Heder points out how Kiernan’s account must perform intellectual acrobatics in order to establish a coherent “good East”: incomplete biographical data on leaders, temporary exclusions of certain sectors, and the selective exposition of sector/zone policies. “In comparing the East with other CPK structures and leaders, particularly the South-west Zone of Ta Mok, Kiernan overdraws his case and essentializes these structures to give them a false coherence, putting himself through numerous convolutions to do so.”¹¹⁵ At the core of this critique is the charge that piecing together evidence to show a difference between zones—and labeling one the good, pro-Vietnamese, moderate “revolutionaries”—retrospectively reproduces what was a political by-product of the fact of zones being demarcated. “The trope of evil Khmer Rouge is replaced by those of the evil Paris Group and evil Southwest versus the good East. Kiernan’s view is based on an ahistorical snapshot that freezes the dynamic in mid-1978, without taking into sufficient account what happened before and particularly after that juncture.”¹¹⁶ Heder maintains that contrary (and suppressed) evidence suggests Kiernan’s dichotomy, which privileges the East, is inadequate and that a much more varied and varying landscape was the rule.

In his attacks on Kiernan’s ideas about the CPK leadership, Heder asserts that Kiernan’s image of a “Party Centre,” dominated by a French-educated Pol Potist faction, is misleading, because: 1) Kiernan ignores how Party structures were largely inherited

from Chinese and Vietnamese Communism; 2) “friends” of Pol Pot were not exempted from purges; 3) the uppermost leadership (e.g., Nuon Chea and Ta Mok) were not French educated; 4) Ta Mok represented the kind of figure that Kiernan asserts the Pol Potists would eliminate; 5) the differential designation of “warlord” to describe Ta Mok and Ke Pauk but not Sao Pheum; 6) the misapplication of urban/rural labels as a means of denigrating the “Pol Potists”; 7) overstating the power of Pol Pot’s in-laws to the neglect of key (non-relative) individuals (e.g., Nuon Chea); and 8) failing to acknowledge that early opposition to Pol Pot came from within as well as outside the French-educated milieu.¹¹⁷ He succinctly asserts that Kiernan’s categories fail to explain the purge of Pol Pot protégés and that Kiernan’s portrayal of a confrontation between Pol Pot *et al* against the East Zone radically ignores a more dynamic widespread opposition to Pol Pot, which Heder examines by reference to S-21 confessions. It is the imminent purge in late 1978 of the Southwest Zone cadre for which Kiernan’s false dichotomy cannot account; ultimately, Kiernan’s work “reifies geographical expression to create positive and negative political labels and anthropomorphized political entities.”¹¹⁸

Heder’s most recent work offers a contrary view that radically contests the underpinnings of the good East narrative.¹¹⁹ The thesis of this new perspective is that the DK leadership (Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea) was not anti-Vietnamese (at least in terms of theory), but on the contrary, was very committed to a Vietnamese model of revolution. Ignoring Vietnam’s cautioning that this model was not appropriate to Cambodia, the leadership pushed forward with armed struggle and revolutionary violence, which produced (perceived) “successes” that further legitimated the correctness of their decisions and actions. Constituent to this argument is the assertion that the division

between “Khmer Viet Minh” and “Khmer Rouge” is a false dichotomy, and that the leadership (which until the end was dominated by ICP veterans) recurrently fell back on a Vietnamese model of revolution.¹²⁰ From Heder’s account, it seems *Cambodian* Communism commences with certain intellectuals beginning to differ with the revolutionary analysis imposed on them by their comrades to the east—that of a “national liberation revolution” subordinate to Vietnam locally and the Soviet Union globally.¹²¹ Heder’s strategic history of South Vietnam demonstrates how elements within the Cambodian Communist movement came to see a similarity (and equality) between the two countries.¹²² Nuon Chea’s decision for armed struggle, which Saloth Sar endorsed on 25 February 1968, demonstrated *de facto* Party approval for a decision made by leading cadre on the ground. Heder’s important assertion is that: although the KWP’s launching of armed insurrection broke with Vietnamese and Chinese advice, the Cambodian Communists still acted according to a Vietnamese scenario (the model for South Vietnam).¹²³ Heder aptly describes the defiance of Hanoi as the CPK engaged in its independent pursuit of the Vietnamese people’s war script.¹²⁴ From this analysis, a simple pro/anti-Vietnamese dichotomy, which underwrites the good East narrative, fails to capture the complexity (and influences) of the relationship between the struggles that unfolded in both countries.



Scholars generally approach the pattern and scope of violence during Democratic Kampuchea in terms of episodes within CPK rule. Two broad waves of violence appear in the period. The first was the immediate post-triumph elimination of the *ancien régime*.

The second wave can be divided into two series of purges that the CPK carried out within its ranks.¹²⁵ Throughout the DK period, “assertive killings” and deaths from disease, starvation, and exhaustion occurred, with more violence and worsening social conditions festering into a symbiotic downward spiral.¹²⁶

Quinn’s framework for DK atrocities articulates four realms in which violence was deployed: destroying the old society (evacuation, banning feudal and bourgeois social institutions and styles, and settling of scores), achieving rapid social transformation (“Purification Campaign” and the dismantling of cities, Buddhism, the family, private property, money, the monarchy, and individualism), “political prophylaxis” (suppression of rebellions, purges, *Santebal*), and defending against an external threat.¹²⁷ Locard traces out the development of “enemies” in DK (after the initial internal threat of the *ancien régime*, “enemies of the past,” had been addressed) as: “enemies of the present” (principally new people, but could be anyone, who voiced opposition to *Angkar*’s policies); “hidden enemies” within the revolutionary ranks, Party apparatus, or provincial administration; and “enemies of the future” (those who harbor counter-revolutionary beliefs).¹²⁸

Chandler argues that the Party Center followed the Maoist doctrine of “permanent revolution,” which thereby necessitated the creation of counterrevolutionary “enemies,” the search for and purge of which constituted crucial elements of the regime’s rule.¹²⁹ The CPK idea of “external enemies” included foreign powers—principally the US (CIA), USSR (KGB), and Vietnam—and it was conjectured that these powers were colluding together for DK’s overthrow. “Internal opponents” included “new people”—and those who were not of a *base* background were more politically suspect¹³⁰—but also, more

importantly, were hidden enemies (*khmang bângkâb* ខ្ញុំមេត្តា), “microbes” (*mérôk* មេរោគ) “burrowing from within” (*sii roun phtey knong* ស៊ីរ៉ូនប្រតេយ្យក្នុង), Party members betraying the revolution.¹³¹ Further however, like Stalin and Mao, Pol Pot saw potentially bourgeois thought (attitudes, sentiments, customs, etc.) as buried deep in the consciousness of all citizens. Taken together, *Santebal*’s task to root out internal enemies was to be vast, permanent, and merciless.¹³²

A significant share of the death under the DK regime has come to be interpreted in terms of local rule. Zone-, sector-, district-, village-, and cooperative-level cadre confronted with overambitious demands issuing from the CPK Standing Committee (e.g., Pol Pot’s *Four-Year Plan*) and ill-equipped and inexperienced in managing workers—many of whom themselves were adjusting to much harsher social conditions (especially insufficient food and a lack of health care) than they had been used to, either in the city or the countryside—often resorted to violence as a quick means to resolve challenges. This realm of violence cuts across Quinn’s four-fold schema, involving the settling of scores as well as the forced compliance with a rapid social transformation and may even be linked to a perceived threat. Local interpretations of directives from above, local implementations of Party policies, and the assertion of control by inexperienced and undisciplined cadre in demanding situations compose this remainder category, which Heder calls “discretionary” and Thion calls “assertive” killings.¹³³ Implications of this categorization attend both to Vickery’s description of violence as spontaneous acts, or poor responses to situations, as well as to Kiernan’s concerns about how “race” was addressed by directives for implementation in the countryside.

With the CPK triumph in April 1975, cities were emptied of their inhabitants and sent into the countryside to take up agricultural work.¹³⁴ The initial forced migration, a precondition for the CPK's radical social experiment, and subsequent deportations (in 1976 and 1978) contributed to non-violent death as residents were ushered out of urban centers on foot without provisions or tools.¹³⁵ The ultimate fate of "new people" would depend largely on the particularities of the zone and/or sector which became their destination. The geographical foundations for variation lie in each area's wealth or poverty of soil and the relative salubrity of terrain, and this combined with issues of manpower: in ideal situations, properly organized and sufficient quantity of workers, with enough harvest (or supplementary resources) to feed and reproduce the workforce. In contrasting the experiences of deportees ("new people") to returnees, Short demonstrates that while food was used as a means of control, the starvation of new people was not an issue of policy but resulted from a failed system—dangerously low grain stockpiles, non-existent health care, and the preponderance of patron-client relations—that perverted the CPK central directives.¹³⁶ He concludes that the contradictions that seemed embedded in policy were resolved by local cadre interpreting directives within real local conditions, which inevitably worked to the continued disadvantage of new people.¹³⁷ The social leveling at an exceptional pace in the early phase of Democratic Kampuchea rule, April 1975 to January 1976, appears to some as "war communism"; the regime hastily pursued its objectives with the Party carrying out "storming" attacks on the vestiges of the old society—institutions and personnel.¹³⁸ Centralization efforts contributed to a dire economic situation, as greater shares of harvests were expected to be transferred to the State.

De-centralization (in Party structure and historically) provided the political context for social conditions to vary, whereby areas with the most-established veterans of CPK struggle tended to be more disciplined, more able to pursue their vision of revolutionary transformation, and to minimize killing. Competing ideological factions within the Party Central Committee waged battle against each other in the terrain of zonal and regional administration. Pol Pot, who had secured control of the Party, formed an alliance with Ta Mok in mid-1975, and the Southwest Zone's security chief, Kang Kek Iev ("Duch"), rose to assume control over the national security apparatus at S-21.¹³⁹ "The central government attempted to gradually concentrate power, reduce the internal autonomy of the collective farms and cut back on the independence of the regional leadership."¹⁴⁰

The newly victorious revolutionaries were tasked with addressing a potential threat posed by the vanquished members of the republican army and government. However, in the April to June 1975 period, widespread killings appear as a disorganized elimination of the *ancien régime* enacted through popular anger and victim's empowerment.¹⁴¹ Initially, the directive against the defeated regime focused on the officer corps and police. Although the CPK issued orders (in September 1975) reversing the policy and ceasing the killing of Lon Nol officers and civil administrators, scholars' interviewees indicate in some areas the defeated personnel were still executed.¹⁴² The situation seemed to be: a policy to kill, followed by a policy to not kill, then an inability to stop. The CPK gradually brought the random killing to a close, and the Party more closely focused its approach to enemies. (From September 1976 to September 1977, more

formal procedures guided the round-up, interrogation, and execution of Lon Nol officials, student returnees, deserters, “Hanoi Khmer,” etc.)

The January to September 1976 time frame, Chandler describes as the apogee of the regime, even though social conditions deteriorated (especially in the Northwest).¹⁴³ The later phase (April 1977 to December 1978) appears dominated by an intensification of class warfare, specifically weeding out “enemies” within the revolution. Ambitious policies continued to be pursued, in particular the CPK’s *Four-Year Plan*. Chandler pinpoints the weaknesses of Pol Pot’s ill-conceived policies: over-reliance on “independence-mastery” and unquestioning faith in revolutionary zeal; rice as a sole priority; lack of attention to infrastructure; and unrealistic visions of heavy industry development.¹⁴⁴ The failures to achieve rapid success contributed to the turn toward focusing on “enemies” and saboteurs, but Pol Pot’s faction also claimed to be defending itself from coup attempts.¹⁴⁵ Unexplained explosions in Siem Reap (25 February 1976) and Phnom Penh (2 April 1976) provided greater motivation to the CPK leadership to defend against impending attack.¹⁴⁶

The process by which the Pol Pot faction consolidated its grip on the Party and the nation was through extensive purges, employing the loyal cadres of trusted zones to eradicate suspected/rival factions in other areas.¹⁴⁷ It is apparent that intra-Party political competition and the suspicion of enemies, traitors, and saboteurs became intertwined agendas; and the inability to meet production goals was consistently interpreted as a willful act of subversion.¹⁴⁸ Using the rhetoric of class warfare, the Pol Pot faction, via its centralized security apparatus (*Santebal*), arrested, tortured, and killed its opponents, and it produced documentary “evidence” (forced confessions) of its success in purifying

the movement.¹⁴⁹ The key mechanism by which the CPK carried out its purges was a school that had been converted into the head security office (S-21) for the DK regime.¹⁵⁰ Prisoners were apprehended for two reasons: 1) the Party's suspicion of the individual, and/or 2) being named in others' confessions. Routine torture was employed to extract confessions of treasonous activities on the part of the accused as well as to supply the names of co-conspirators. The techniques available were enumerated in the *Interrogator's Manual*, and their use is clearly discernible from notes appended to confessions.¹⁵¹

Numbers and the patterns of killing are plainly indicated in the well-kept execution schedules; an overwhelming majority of S-21's victims were from within the Khmer Rouge movement itself.¹⁵² The comprehensive nature of S-21 (extermination) and the climate of fear that its activities produced, facilitated the elimination of "strings," the "patronage networks which were the basis of political activity in Cambodia."¹⁵³ Given its purpose of "ferreting out and eliminating the *suspected, imagined, and potential* opposition," remnants of the "old society" ceased to enter S-21's cells by mid-1976.¹⁵⁴ With the obsessive search for "microbes," and the elimination of the Party intelligentsia, the end result was a cycle of paranoia and degeneration of the movement. "Tuol Sleng became literally and symbolically the Khmer version of the revolution devouring itself and its own."¹⁵⁵ Chandler highlights the ominous Josef K.-like situation suffusing S-21: prisoners guilty because they had been accused. Interrogators were compelled to "recover" memories (counterrevolutionary transgressions in the mind), validate the Party's (prior) verdict, and generate a historical text of the crime as evidence.¹⁵⁶

One of the earliest purges, especially of Central Committee members, was wrought on the network of Koy Thuon, secretary of the North Zone (until early 1976) who had been transferred to Phnom Penh to become Minister of Commerce.¹⁵⁷ Chandler maps out the purge of senior leaders, their shared characteristics, and their relationships beginning with Suas Neou (Chhouk), Ney Saran, Keo Meas, and Non Suon (in November 1976) then Koy Thuon, Touch Phoeun, and the “democracy activists” (in January 1977). The details of these key individuals’ backgrounds and positions clearly show that the initial purge focused on Party intelligentsia, whose vision differed with Pol Pot.¹⁵⁸ As well, Short provides evidence of a “low level insurgency” (which he describes as a Cambodian historical constant), which afforded a basis for the purge of certain DK cadre. In documenting the various policies the CPK leadership pursued in order to eliminate internal enemies (traitors) and external enemies (Vietnamese), Short describes S-21’s initial purpose as the furnishing of “proof” which would support purges that the Party “leadership had already decided to carry out,” but “generated a self-perpetuating cycle of suspicion and fear,” producing “new ‘evidence’ of Vietnamese perfidy.”¹⁵⁹ He characterizes the enemies in Pol Pot’s mind as “moderates”: those who thought the socialist revolution was too extreme and (relatedly) those who questioned the need to resist Vietnam.¹⁶⁰

Chandler asserts that two likely reasons spurred Pol Pot’s attack on the Northwest: 1) mixed results of agricultural expansion efforts, and 2) information from the S-21 confessions. His analysis of that area re-iterates the varied nature of conditions within the Zone, the predominance of new, inexperienced and unconnected cadre in local leadership, and the Center’s interpretation of its dire state resulting from saboteurs rather

than the unrealistic demands of CPK policies. Consistently refusing to fault their own extreme policies and unattainable goals, the Party Centre attributed shortcomings to 1) Party policies not being implemented fully enough and everywhere, 2) saboteurs, and 3) old class attitudes (e.g., “propertyism”); this became the basis of the April–May 1977 purge of the Northwest. The overwhelmingly inexperienced cadre were “accused of hoarding or destroying the harvest, deliberately starving the people under their jurisdiction, allowing others to flee the country, offering Cambodian territory to the Thais, plotting with Cambodian exiles, and trading rice with to Thailand.”¹⁶¹ In March 1978, Pol Pot’s faction purged Chou Chet and his West Zone; soon after, it targeted the East Zone cadre. The second (or extended) wave of purges clearly demonstrates a targeting of bourgeois/counterrevolutionary tendencies within the Organization (i.e., traitors in the Party) and within the individual via confessions and torture, which ushered in a profound reign of terror.

Chandler notes that the final purge, as the CPK began to instigate war on Vietnam, produced a dramatic swell of zone cadre into S-21. He also points out that the purges in late 1978 (before the collapse) had fewer, but higher ranking, targets (e.g., the Minister of National Defense); the illogic of the purge (i.e., the continuous need for enemies) and *Santebal*’s mission (i.e., to validate the Center’s suspicions) allowed no one to remain safe.¹⁶² The purges followed a familiar pattern: smashing the old leadership and replacing it with Ta Mok’s Southwest or Ke Pauk’s Center forces. Pol Pot’s goal of a purified Party with a well-fed, productive population ready to fight Vietnam produced dilemmas for local cadre trying to implement these policies, which inevitably led to terror and death. Successive purges and deportations exacerbated problems in the rural areas,

as a (new) leader's lack of connection to the governed tended to encourage the resort to violence. To explain its continued failures, Khmer Rouge leaders sought out new enemies *within*, propagated rumors of an imminent Vietnamese invasion, and became increasingly suspicious of zone secretaries who had prior contact with Vietnamese cadre. Generally, throughout Democratic Kampuchea, the forced leveling of all classes and the emphasis/obsession with treason (that motivated the purges) appear to have caused: 1) a permanent excuse for petty vengeance (manifesting in assertive killings) where cadres were inexperienced and undisciplined, and 2) the destruction of the best zone and the even the modest successes of others.¹⁶³ The deteriorating situation was exacerbated by Pol Pot's focus on national defense (more than the economy) and fighting Vietnam.¹⁶⁴ Emphasizing internal factors, Becker argues that what should have remained a limited border conflict quickly became an uncontrollable situation (ending in invasion) largely due to the CPK elite becoming victims of their own overblown rhetoric and their mentality of being true nationalists and saviors.¹⁶⁵



“When the *Angkar* prescribes a task, you must comply with the order!”¹⁶⁶ The nature of DK authority has figured centrally in debates among scholars of Cambodian history and politics. Vickery's ideas about variation and peasant resentment as primary factors in DK suggest a significant degree of decentralized control.¹⁶⁷ Whatever policies may have been dictated from the Party were filtered through regional elites whose localized authority (shaped by peasantist demands or rage) produced different interpretations and implementations, which accounts for much variation during the

regime's rule. Others have suggested that centralized authority was largely problematic due to the semi-autonomous regions that were effected in the struggle against Lon Nol.¹⁶⁸ Contemporaneous with claims of de-centralization in DK were accounts of a highly centralized authority. Barnett claims that the Pol Pot group always had the initiative after 1975 and sought to impose and further consolidate its rule; DK was ruled by terror, using the power of arbitrary execution to enforce its new policies (evacuation of the cities, destruction of money, elimination of private property, etc.).¹⁶⁹ According to this account, even regional differentiation in implementation of policy does not disprove that the central authorities were imposing their rule by terror from the beginning.¹⁷⁰

Kiernan's presentation of the CPK regime argues that, in spite of regional variation, the Center's quest for total power was increasingly successful.¹⁷¹ Having risen to positions of power with the Party as early as 1963 and exercised its dominance throughout the Party apparatus by 1973, the Pol Pot faction's consolidation of control nationwide found allies in the military commands of Ta Mok and Ke Pauk.¹⁷² This quest for power by this "CPK Center"—"unceasing, and increasingly successful, *struggle* for top-down domination"—and the (racist) means by which it pursued this end, ultimately generated more hardship, more struggles, and more opponents, all of which proved self-defeating for the CPK regime.¹⁷³ This view of top-down domination is echoed by Locard, who describes Cambodia under the CPK as a "vast prison."¹⁷⁴ Heder and Tittmore also document the coordinated chain of command that provides evidence of centralized control and responsibility for policies of mass execution: initially, Khmer Republic military officers and senior civil servants; in early 1976, enemies of the revolution; and from late 1976, spies within the Party ranks.¹⁷⁵

Etcheson's survey of the issue focuses the debate on whether the locus of violence was decentralized and the spontaneous result of vengeful peasants (*à la* Vickery) or centralized and thereby planned and controlled (*à la* Quinn).¹⁷⁶ Based on evidence garnered by DC-Cam—including newly-discovered bureaucratic records of security services as well as satellite mapping surveying—Etcheson concludes that the DK's economy of violence is clear: "violence was carried out pursuant to orders from the highest political authorities of the Communist Party of Kampuchea."¹⁷⁷ Following Ieng Sary's statements regarding a national security committee—consisting of Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Yun Yat—answerable to Pol Pot, Etcheson makes clear the command structure that governed the S-21 security facility (under Duch's directorship), even though this line of command from Pol Pot to Nuon Chea to Son Sen to Duch has been strongly suspected for a long time.¹⁷⁸ He admits that elucidating a further relationship between S-21 and zonal and sectoral security centers is complex and difficult, and yet his scattered evidence (i.e., a couple examples of communications) does little to concretize his repeated assertion that "the works of Democratic Kampuchea's internal security apparatus were ubiquitous across the territory of Cambodia and that these works were centrally controlled by the top leadership of the Communist Party."¹⁷⁹ Further, he describes data within DC-Cam's "evidence" that suggests a certain fraction of killings did not fall within this chain of command, but were the purview of local administrators; in addition, he leaves open the possibility of mass killings resulting from the violent spontaneity that Vickery describes.¹⁸⁰ By the conclusion of his discussion, Etcheson's arguments about violence pursuant to orders from CPK elites become more restricted to violence within the security system that was directly ordered by those who controlled the

security apparatus. However, local administrators or others—undisciplined and/or spontaneous—could have also carried out mass killings that are not directly traceable to Pol Pot *et al.*¹⁸¹ To the extent that the evidence shows the leading faction within the CPK using the security apparatus to eliminate its enemies and increasingly consolidate its control, Etcheson's claims simply echo Kiernan's assertions regarding a *quest* for total power. The upshot of Etcheson's contributions to this debate on centralized authority seems to be a latter argument supporting an increased estimation in the DK death toll, greater addends being attributable to supposedly better-documentable executions within the DK security system (and according to satellite-mapped mass graves).¹⁸²

Heder re-visits the question of authority and notes the propensity of a “top-down conspiracy paradigm” in interpreting the Holocaust and a reproduction of this tendency in the consideration of other situations of mass murder, including views of Democratic Kampuchea. This interpretative approach emphasizes personalist and authoritarian elements in what is perceived as an intention to commit genocide, and it is evident in Kiernan's *The Pol Pot Regime* as well as his own co-written piece with Tittmore, *Seven Candidates for Prosecution*.¹⁸³ His analysis divides killings into “obligatory” (ordered by the Center) and “discretionary” (committed by local delegated authorities); his depiction of Center, zone, sector, and district interactions supports the claim that a tight chain of command was sufficient for ensuring obligatory killings, but “probably most” of the killings were discretionary, in which a looser and more diffuse hierarchy arbitrarily expanded the categories of “enemy” (*khmang* កង្វា) according to the latitude afforded them.¹⁸⁴

Heder's analysis examines the ways in which various subgroups fared given the elasticity of the "enemy" category. With regard to the treatment of "new people," Heder presents/cites numerous Center directives that urge local cadre to practice compassion, re-education, and judiciousness toward evacuees. In a contradictory fashion, at special meetings and study sessions, leaders called for increased vigilance in seeking out "tigers" among the trees—remnants of the defeated military and police, spies, and saboteurs—leading to expansive executions.¹⁸⁵ Further, Heder argues that official policy of "non-punitive re-education" became an impossibility given the rural socio-economic situation, a situation exacerbated by the arrival of evacuees in the cooperatives and which thus contributed to discrimination against, and discretionary executions of, new people. Although there were no direct instructions to kill new people *en masse*, local cadre (following their orders to seek out enemies while applying "fantastic and elastic labels") killed new people for: complaining, stealing, perceived threats, "laziness," disobedience, attempted escapes, and organized opposition.¹⁸⁶ As well, the Buddhist *sangha* (*sâng* សង្ឃ) was to have its top leadership eradicated, analogous to the fate of the Lon Nol *bândasak*, leaving lower-level monks at the discretionary authority of lower-level cadre; this discretion varied widely, and thus the fate of the *sangha* can be said to mirror the general population as a whole.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, the Cham *leadership* was to be killed, but the remaining minority population was to be assimilated: only their *difference* was to be erased.¹⁸⁸ This ban on Islam met with open rebellion in September–October 1975 in Krauch Chmaar, which was met with nationwide repression by the CPK (and likely precipitated Pol Pot's November 1975 endeavor to split up Cham communities/concentrations). Lastly, Heder's discussion argues that while officially

Chinese were to be assimilated, many cadre suspected them because of their pasts as “new people,” “upper class,” and “special class strata” and thus treated them with brutality.

In re-evaluating these various data, Heder re-presents his 1997 analysis, which argued that the (1977 and 1978) killings were the result of an intensification of *class* struggle (not race) emanating from Pol Pot.¹⁸⁹ His recent reflections modify/extend the earlier analysis by asserting that the ever-escalating killings were the result of discretionary authority in the context of an intensification of struggle against ill-defined enemies, even as these killings went contrary to central policy (which was calling for assimilation and the abolition of social hierarchy).¹⁹⁰ Drawing on “revisionist” scholarship on Stalinism as well as (pre-1942/Wannsee) Nazism to scrutinize the totalitarian/intentionalist model, Heder concludes that autonomy at lower levels could derive from “centrally-authorized chaos” (as in the Stalinist case), demonstrating a “chaotic decision-making process in which increasingly radical and murderous improvisations by local officials played a significant role.”¹⁹¹ (In this way, “racism” is expressed in the (overzealous) attempt by local authorities to achieve uniformity and to adhere to the Party line.) Heder’s concern is not to subvert arguments that show responsibility falling on the DK senior leaders, but instead to extend the limited jurisdiction of those “most responsible” to include the culpability of district level cadre and thereby broaden and deepen investigations. His critique of the top-down model and his emphasis on “discretionary killings” reposition the “myriad thugs” or “instruments of terror” (as Locard calls them) who might otherwise be thought to be less responsible simply because they are seen to have been following orders.¹⁹²



Three decades after the Khmer Rouge was ousted from power, the human toll of Democratic Kampuchea's atrocities has yet to be exactly determined. The "unbearable uncertainty of the number" continues to spark discussion; while original estimates ranged widely from 30,000 to 4 million, more realistic contemporary figures vary between 740,000 and 3 million (see the chart below).¹⁹³ A part of the vast discrepancy in estimates can be attributed to the distinction between natural and excessive deaths, as many death toll figures fail to indicate whether the sum they are reporting includes persons who would have been expected to die during the near-four-year time period or not.¹⁹⁴ According to demographic definition, excessive mortality "includes all deaths that would not have occurred under normal conditions, that is deaths due to war, famine, overwork, absence of the most basic health care, migration to hostile epidemiological environments, etc."¹⁹⁵ A second conceptual divergence involves direct (executions) versus indirect deaths (starvation, disease, exhaustion, etc.); as there is dramatic difference in views of the nature and degree of direct violence perpetrated by the DK authorities, the magnitude of this difference is further reflected in the total estimate. In addition, the research continues to uncover more data about aspects of DK that (re-)shape ideas about the killings and their organization.¹⁹⁶ A third element that complicates calculations is the general dearth of reliable data points. While there is a consensus that the 1962 Cambodian census provides the most reliable population count prior to the war of the early 1970s, subsequent information is interrogated for its origin, the political

interests it serves, and/or its methodological rigor.¹⁹⁷ “Available figures vary widely and are occasionally ludicrous, depending on whether the source is friendly or hostile to the DK regime.”¹⁹⁸

Death Toll, Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979

Ieng Sary ¹	1987	30,000
Michael Vickery ²	1984	740,800 excessive
French Foreign Ministry ³	1984	800,000
CIA ⁴	1980	900,000 excessive (of 1.4 million)
Finnish Inquiry Commission ⁵	1984	700,000 – 1 million
Ea Meng-Try ⁶	1987	1 million
Banister and Johnson ⁷	1993	1.05 excessive (of 1.8 million)
Karl Jackson ⁸	1989	1.3 million
Philip Short ⁹	2004	1.42 million
Norodom Sihanouk ¹⁰	1980	1.5 million
Ben Kiernan ¹¹	1996	1.671 million
Steve Heder ¹²	2003	1.7 million
Marek Sliwinski ¹³	1995	2.16 million
Craig Etcheson ¹⁴	2005	2.25 million
PRK ¹⁵	1983	3,314,768
Jonathan Kent ¹⁶	2007	4 million

¹ Office of the Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Foreign Affairs, “What are the Truth and Justice about the Accusations against Democratic Kampuchea from 1975 to 1978?” (dated 15 July 1987), cited in Ashley, *Pol Pot, Peasants and Peace*, pp. 19–20. Sary attributed these minimal deaths to starvation. Subsequent quotes from Khmer Rouge elite have cited higher numbers, but these are attributed principally to invading Vietnamese.

² Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 200.

³ Cited by Etcheson, *Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, p. 148.

⁴ CIA, *Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe*.

⁵ Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*. The report cites a figure of “nearly one million” (p. 33) but offers the estimate of 700,000 when taking into account an adjusted 1981 population figure (p. 44).

⁶ Ea Meng-Try, “Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea,” p. 6.

⁷ Banister & Johnson, “After the Nightmare,” p. 90.

⁸ Jackson, *Cambodia 1975–1978*, p. 3.

⁹ Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*, p. 470.

¹⁰ Sihanouk, *War and Hope*, cited by Etcheson, *Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, p. 148.

¹¹ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 458.

¹² Cited by Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 117.

¹³ Sliwinski, *Le Génocide Khmer Rouge*, p. 40.

¹⁴ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 109.

¹⁵ People’s Republic of Kampuchea, “Report of the Research Committee on Pol Pot’s Genocidal Regime,” Phnom Penh, Cambodia, July 25, 1983 cited in Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 109.

¹⁶ Kent, “Justice Delayed Again for Cambodia’s Killing Fields.” This recent report states “as many as four million Cambodians were killed or starved to death during the four years the Khmer Rouge held power,” but it references no source for such an extreme figure.

Early in the process of estimating the Khmer Rouge death toll, two methods of accounting predominated. The first technique is a retrospective counting, in which random sampling was extrapolated to the population as a whole.¹⁹⁹ Before offering his own estimates, Kiernan surveys some previous approximations produced from the samples of other researchers (Osborne, Heder, Ebihara, Honda); this review sets a presumed realistic range for the figure he provides. Osborne's 100-person sample in early 1980 produced a death rate of 25 percent, which would produce 2 million deaths projected nationally; however, Kiernan reasons that the peasantry, which suffered lower deaths rates, is under-represented, and thus 1.5 million is assumed to be a more realistic projection.²⁰⁰ Similarly, Heder's 1,500-person sample from 1980–81 is broken down into categories with a corresponding death rate; the aggregated figure also yields 1.5 million (20 percent death rate nationally).²⁰¹ The projections derived from Ebihara's hamlet and Honda's survey suggest a death rate over 20 percent and thus a toll of 1.6 million, thus justifying a claim that overall "*at least 1.5 million*" excessive deaths occurred under Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979.²⁰² Kiernan's calculations rely on a sample of 500 Cambodian survivors in 1979 and 1980. The data dissects the sample into new and base people and further categorizes each subgroup as shown below:

Approximate Death Tolls in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975–1979

<i>Social group</i>	<i>1975 population</i>	<i>Number who perished</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
	“New People”		
urban Khmer	2,000,000	500,000	25
rural Khmer	600,000	150,000	25
Chinese (all urban)	430,000	215,000	50
Vietnamese (urban)	10,000	10,000	100
Lao (rural)	<u>10,000</u>	<u>4,000</u>	<u>40</u>
Total new people	3,050,000	879,000	29
	“Base People”		
rural Khmer	4,500,000	675,000	15
[Khmer Krom]	[5,000]	[2,000]	[40]
Cham (all rural)	250,000	90,000	36
Vietnamese (rural)	10,000	10,000	100
Thai (rural)	20,000	8,000	40
upland minorities	<u>60,000</u>	<u>9,000</u>	<u>15</u>
Total base people	4,840,000	792,000	16
Total Cambodia	7,890,000	1,671,000	21

Source: Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 458.

The chart includes a lengthy notation on the various addends from different sources used to reach the sum of new people.²⁰³ Drawing primarily from extrapolations from his sample, but also dabbling in, at times precarious, demographic projection, Kiernan’s 1996 survey estimates a death toll of 1.671 million. With greater attention given to demographic projections (Migozzi, Banister and Johnson, Heuveline) in 2003, Kiernan offers a slightly revised figure of between “1.671 and 1.871 million people, 21 to 24 percent of Cambodia’s 1975 population.”²⁰⁴ Problems appear in Kiernan’s method, such as inadequate information on the sampled population and the lack of (verifiable) death dates, complications which arise precisely out of the chaos created by Cambodia’s civil war and DK rule.²⁰⁵ As Heuveline notes:

The sample-based approach is of course much easier to implement than the census-based one and under certain conditions the results can be confidently extrapolated to the entire population. These conditions are difficult to meet in post-crisis situations that typically prevent the use of traditional sampling procedures. This might be particularly problematic when the mortality risks and patterns vary substantially across sub-

populations, as was the case in Cambodia among ethnic minorities and, among Khmers, between the new and base people, or simply across regions differently affected by civil war.²⁰⁶

He argues that the distribution of subgroups is not well documented, and therefore the relative size of “risk groups” can only be very roughly estimated. The survey is geographically limited; thus, accessibility to various risk groups varies, especially immediately following the crisis. Accordingly, Kiernan’s sample may be skewed toward former urban dwellers who were most at risk and therefore more likely to flee to the border camps (where most interviews were conducted). Politically and ethnically motivated killings insert another problematic angle, in that a surviving relative is required for mortality to be recorded; the complete elimination of a family will not be recorded at all, while surviving family members form statistical “clusters.” Given that it sometimes took years for family members to track down other surviving relatives, sampling risks the possibility of double counting.²⁰⁷

A second method for estimating the death of toll during Democratic Kampuchea employs demographic accounting techniques exclusively.²⁰⁸ Vickery, who offers the lowest estimate proceeding from this method, subtracts the normal deaths that would have been expected during 1975–79 from the total mortality to determine the excess mortality for which the Khmer Rouge can be held responsible. The seemingly simple operation of producing a mathematical difference is complicated by how one reaches the population figures at either end of the equation. Vickery begins with the 1962 census figure of 5,740,000 Cambodians. Subsequent estimates were achieved by the compounded application of a growth rate of 2.2 percent. “More sophisticated tinkering” with growth rates produced population estimates of 7,029,000 to 7,524,000 (for 1970)

and 7,864,000 to 8,768,000 (for 1975).²⁰⁹ The conflict between Lon Nol and the FUNK, the US bombardment of the countryside, and massive migration of newly-created refugees complicate an accurate projection of the 1975 population; the war “altered the normal growth rate and took a high death toll”; given the unreliability in the wide variance in estimates, Vickery assumes the CIA’s figure of 7 million for the 1970 population and 7.3 million for 1975, “as good a guess as any for our purposes.”²¹⁰ The 1980 CIA estimate begins with the UN 1970 population estimate of 7.060 million (projected from the 1962 census figure); taking into account birth rate decreases and death rate increases as result of the war, the CIA puts the “most likely” population at 7.384 million for 17 April 1975.²¹¹ Vickery deviates slightly from the CIA report, because of its “impressionistic” estimates of the death rates, which were combined with demographically-generated birth rates.²¹² He reworks the CIA birth rate figures, rejecting the division of rates into “new people” and “old people” categories; he asserts that in areas where conditions were better, both categories would have exhibited similar birth rates. Instead of a bisected birth rate varying through DK’s nearly four years of rule, Vickery asserts a crude average birth rate of 30 per thousand for the entire population, which yields an increase of 825,000; adding the absolute decline of 400,000, Vickery’s count for total deaths is 1,252,000. Given that he expects normal peacetime deaths to be 511,200 for the period, he arrives at “740,800 deaths in excess of normal and due to the special conditions of DK.”²¹³ He further claims that 300,000 resulted from execution, while more than half of excessive mortality was due to starvation, illness, and exhaustion.²¹⁴

Although Vickery admits the impossibility of determining the death toll with more accuracy, it is clear that his estimate succeeds or fails based on the figures he chooses (often rough estimates, good guesses, and “sophisticated tinkering”) and the birth and death rates he assumes.²¹⁵ In fact, the inaccuracy of any component data becomes amplified in the compounded estimated results, and the fact that he employs educated guesses suggests a greater margin of error for his numbers. At the time of the CIA report, the US was backing a coalition that included the Khmer Rouge and willfully ignoring charges of “genocide” that were leveled at the ousted organization. Thus, Vickery’s assumption of CIA figures may reproduce a desire (on the part of the US) to under-represent the 1979 population so as to produce a lower death toll and downplay Khmer Rouge atrocities.²¹⁶

Kiljunen’s estimation of the DK death toll, on behalf of the Finnish Inquiry Commission, is 1 million or slightly less. He begins with the UN calculation of the 1970 population of 7.1 million and a 1975 population of 7.3 million.²¹⁷ He asserts that a consistent rate of growth (2.8 percent) would have produced a population of 8.3 to 8.5 million in 1981; acknowledging the difficulty for the PRK government in estimating the post-DK population, he still accepts the census figure of 6.7 million. Taking into account the return of refugees, Kiljunen reconciles the difference to yield a figure of 7.4 million. Without detailed explanation, Kiljunen states that this number suggests a death toll of 1 million; however, incorporating a decreasing population growth rate due to war and DK policies (1.5 percent, for example) could yield a lower death toll, closer to 700,000.²¹⁸

These rough estimations find statistical brethren in Ea’s 1987 analysis of Kampuchea’s population trends, which approaches 1970 to 1980 as a decade of

demographic and socio-economic decline (with signs of recovery only beginning to surface around 1981).²¹⁹ Ea notes the difficulties associated with demographic data (i.e., reliance on individual estimates and fragmentary data as well as their political manipulation), and seeks to avoid these problems by comparing the “hypothetical population” of Kampuchea in 1980 (10 million) to his estimation of the actual population (6 million).²²⁰ Three observations are made immediately obvious in the analysis: a quasi-stagnant population 1970–74; a steadily declining population 1975–78; and a continued decline 1979–80. In attempting to quantify these trends, Ea asserts that 600,000 deaths due directly to war occurred during the Lon Nol period, with another 100,000 indirect and 600,000 normal deaths. Reacting to “impressions and unverifiable estimates,” Ea advances numbers and rates of growth “somewhat arbitrarily.”²²¹ By these rough calculations, death (normal and excessive combined) during the Democratic Kampuchea period are estimated at 1 million, broken down into 900,000 as a result of disease, starvation, etc. and 100,000 resulting violently. The strength of Ea’s analysis is its attempt to statistically account for the *cumulative* effects of catastrophe; however, the self-admittedly somewhat arbitrary (and somewhat logically reasoned) numbers are as open to criticism as the unverifiable sampling of Kiernan’s approach.

The demographic analysis of Banister and Johnson works backwards in order to attain a population modeling that links up the 1962 census figure with the Cambodian government’s Department of Statistics survey that calculated the year-end population in 1980 to be 6,589,954.²²² By examining sex and age composition in the 1980 survey they are able to generalize about 1970–74 population trends as follows: 1) “the underlying mortality conditions of the 1970s, though atrocious, were not terrible enough to account

for the excess losses among working age adults,” and 2) “no reduction in the birth rate resulting from famine or dislocation in the early 1970s, in spite of the civil war and bombing.”²²³ Similar to Ea, Banister and Johnson calculate a projected population that would have existed in 1975 had there been no disaster; starting with a 1970 population of roughly 7 million, they postulate a hypothetical 8 million.²²⁴ By taking into account emigration, fewer births (due to deaths and migration, but not a reduced birth rate), and wartime excess deaths numbering 275,000, the authors produce a 1975 population estimate of 7.3 million. They further estimate that the population at the end of DK rule was around 6.36 million. A no-disaster projection for the second half of the decade would render an end-year 1978 population of 8.2 million. The 1.8 million-person difference is explained by:

- Net emigration of 218,000.
- A dearth of 570,000 births compared to the expected level.
- Excess deaths totaling about 1.05 million²²⁵

The majority of deaths are explained by a lack of medical care, food shortages, and forced migrations during Democratic Kampuchea; however, this massive loss of life does not adequately account for the skewed effect on age within the post-DK population. By re-examining the mortality data of the early 1970s and applying the age-sex structure data from the 1980 survey, the authors further assert that “on average, during each year of the four Khmer Rouge years, ten percent of men and almost three percent of women in young adult and middle age were killed, above and beyond those who died due to the general mortality situation.”²²⁶

Heuveline, a determined demographer, evaluates the various attempts to estimate death tolls for 1970s Cambodia, acknowledging, “Demographic reconstruction is,

however, hindered by the uncertainties of measurement in each component, which are compounded in the estimate of the residual component.²²⁷ His 1998 article, the purpose of which is to locate an acceptable range of estimates, employs some sophisticated statistical reflections to estimate the “excess mortality”—1) violent death and 2) general increase in mortality beyond the expected 800,000—experienced by Cambodians from 1970 through 1979. The titular conclusion offers a range of 1.17 to 3.42 million excess deaths, achieved as a residual figure from forward projecting from 1962 (census) to 1970 and backward projecting from 1992 (UNTAC voter registration) to 1980.²²⁸ While this broad range is endowed with more certainty, it does not contradict outright any previous estimations.

Similar to Banister and Johnson, Heuveline employs age-sex structures in the population to analyze the causes of death, violent mortality as a component of excessive mortality. Violent deaths during this ten-year period ranged from 1.09 to 2.16 million, and the author estimates 600,000 to 2 million during 1975 to 1978 generating a middle value of 1.1 million.²²⁹ Although the statistical presentation appears sound and rigorous, it is clear that the decomposition of the excess mortality within these ten years remains problematic. The assertions about deaths resulting from various factors—1970–72 anti-Vietnamese pogroms, 1970s bombing, 1970–75 civil war, Khmer Rouge executions, general decline in mortality during Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnamese invasion fatalities, and the 1979–1980 famine—seem tenuous, even though the author has used age and sex structures to better approximate these figures. Further, what appears neglected is the sense of the cumulative effect of excessive death—increased infant mortality, decreased life expectancy, worsening social conditions—as each successive

year (1971, 1972,...) begets smaller and smaller population increases; the neglect of year to year developments arises from the author's choice of a "residual" method (which was warranted given the lack of reliable statistics).

Heuveline himself acknowledges the problems involved in statistical renderings of excess mortality that use two population estimates. First, he notes the unreliability of 1975 population estimates; the turmoil of the civil war in the early 1970s complicates any attempt at accurate estimation. Second, there is the questionable reliability of 1980s data, ranging from 5.7 million (US Bureau of the Census) to 7 million (Banister and Johnson); debate about the extent of the 1979 famine casts doubt on an accurate reverse projection of the population to the point when the CPK was ousted. Third, Heuveline questions the estimation of births; fertility decline cannot be accurately known, and the variation for this unknown could be as high as 300,000.²³⁰

While early estimates of the death toll based on sampling/interviews (Kiernan, Osborne, Sliwinski) produced higher figures than subsequent demographic analyses (Vickery, Ea, Kiljunen, Banister and Johnson), and no *bearable (soutenable)* figure was attained, there has been an upward trend in estimates over the last decade.²³¹ More recently, a second calculation by Heuveline and Etcheson's work alongside DC-Cam have approached approximations of excess mortality around 2 million, a significant numerical jump from the first wave of academic considerations and nearing the presumed exaggeration of the PRK government.

Heuveline's second calculation seeks a total for the decade 1970 to 1980, from which component causes of death (US bombing, civil war, famine, etc.) can be subtracted to produce a residual excess mortality for the DK period. To this end, he employs UN

data gathered in the run-up to the 1993 elections and an approach based on birth cohorts. Following a smooth growth rate from the 1962 population of 5.7 million, Heuveline arrives at 7.7 million for Cambodia's 1970 population. The retro-projection from the 1993 statistics gives a January 1980 population of 6.4 million.²³² The excess deaths (among people born in 1970) for the decade is given as 2.52 million—the average of two residual numbers (2.41 and 2.63 million), achieved from the two data points, projected forward and backward respectively, and accounting for various migrations. Adjusting this total for the civil war (300,000), the 1979 famine (300,000) and the excess mortality of those born after 1970 (300,000), Heuveline claims that Democratic Kampuchea exhibits 2.2 million excessive deaths.²³³ Following the assumptions of Heder, Sliwinski, Kiernan, and Vickery, Heuveline claims that half of excess deaths, 1.1 million people, were violent deaths.²³⁴

Etcheson's estimations derive from his participation in DC-Cam's Mass Grave Mapping Project. His quantification begins with the critique of the PRK death toll before incorporating an approach that appeals to a discourse of technological accuracy.²³⁵ House-to-house surveys conducted by the PRK government led the Research Committee on Pol Pot's Genocidal Regime to make public on 25 July 1983 that 3,314,768 people perished during Democratic Kampuchea.²³⁶ However, Etcheson highlights some flaws that show this number is inflated by as much as 50 percent. First, the surveying "did not adequately account for the fact that extended families are usually spread out across more than one household or village," which suggests double counting plagues the total.²³⁷ As well, the government exhumed mass graves and added the number of (unidentifiable) corpses to the number that emerged from the survey interviews.²³⁸ DC-Cam's 1995

review of the numbers determined that a logical overestimation of 50 percent would put the actual death toll nearer to two million. The mass grave survey research pursued by DC-Cam in the late 1990s and early 2000s combines GPS/GIS mapping with fieldwork to locate and investigate the 20,492 mass graves, which it dates to the CPK regime, and its 1,110,829 known victims (perhaps as high as 1.5 million).²³⁹ By proximity to the 125 zonal, sectoral, and district security centers and also from anecdotal evidence, Etcheson reasons that the mass graves contain the corpses of those who were almost exclusively the victims of execution.²⁴⁰

In order to ascertain more general figures on total mortality under Democratic Kampuchea, Etcheson returns to earlier sampling surveys. He notes the surprising similarity reached by various attempts using the sampling method: Kiernan's 1.67 million, Heder's 1.7 million, Sliwinski's 1.84 to 1.97 million. He also notes the apparent uncertainty scattered throughout demographic analyses: CIA's 1.2 to 1.8 million, Banister and Johnson's 1.05 million, and Heuveline's 2.2 million. Etcheson's third approach re-visits Osborne's assertion that 31 percent of deaths were by execution, which would suggest, when employing DC-Cam's findings, a total death toll of 3.3 million people. Similarly, Sliwinski argues that 40 percent died from executions (and 36 percent from starvation and 13 percent from disease); Heder's survey estimates 33 percent of deaths among new people were from executions, while among base people it was 50 percent; Heuveline's most recent estimate argues that 50 percent were due to violent death. Thus, Etcheson is led to conclude that the original PRK figure may not have been a propagandist exaggeration, but instead that "three million Cambodians died untimely deaths during the Khmer Rouge regime."²⁴¹ In the end though, Etcheson accepts

Heuveline's number of 2.2 million excess deaths, which reaffirms the 1.1 million number of executions determined by DC-Cam's mapping project.

Etcheson is keen to restate some of Vickery's early critique of mass grave data as a means of highlighting the conclusion that his mapping methodology suggests.²⁴²

Certainly, the idea that only forensic scrutiny would be needed to determine the timing, cause, and nature of death (whether execution graves or pits for starved persons or a combination of both) remains a valid point of skepticism, but one which DC-Cam has sought to clarify and presumably will be answered in time as it receives greater funding. More in line with Vickery's critiques of refugee accounts and the resurfacing of Issarak atrocities in Khmer Rouge horror narratives, Etcheson states:

Although it appears entirely possible that certain socially acceptable and politically shaped myths may influence the precise contours of the narratives collected by mass grave mapping teams, it seems highly improbable that these social pressures would extend so far as to the fabrication of ruins of former prison facilities, the placing of physical evidence such as shackles in those ruins, or the construction of anguished, but false, accounts of relatives killed in the Khmer Rouge extermination centers.²⁴³

Etcheson himself reviews the quality of the research teams, suggesting that quality has varied but generally improved over time; in fact, he provides an example in which a team's hesitation leads to an underestimating bias in the death toll. Two more examples lead him to assert an "inherent conservatism" underlying the project's numbers. He does give credence to some of Vickery's challenges (which are also echoed by Kiernan), notably the impossibility "to precisely apportion the number of deaths from execution versus those from illness and starvation," which leaves open to question

whether the security centers (and their executions) alone were filling the graves. Vickery cites an informant who states that the mass graves in one province were for hunger victims, while executions were carried out in isolated forested areas. He also suggests that the mass graves may also contain some of the 500,000 war dead, and it would be difficult to distinguish.²⁴⁴ Etcheson acknowledges the charges from Vickery and Kiernan with an example that exceeds the dependence on Yathay.²⁴⁵ Further complicating Etcheson's determination, and generating some additional "noise," is the question of discerning "normal" versus excess mortality for the remains that fill the mass graves.

What is the number meant to represent to an audience that receives it? Does it impart a sense of meaning to survivors of the murderous revolution? Are these large sums of victimhood a statistical sword wielded against the committed cadre who thought they were bringing a glorious utopia to the Kampuchean people? Does the wide variation in estimates come to insult one's intelligence by assuming that a reader cannot spot propaganda when it leaps out from the page? Does a higher death count endow more purpose or significance to a "genocide" trial? The (already-politicized) rendering of the death toll resulting from the policies and actions of DK cadre are subsequently re-deployed for political purposes. Early estimations—which continued to be reproduced and re-circulated in the media, academic presentations, and international agency reports—were often products of political agendas. For example, Kiljunen suggests, "By exaggerating the number that fell victim, the desire was to convince at first the international community of 'Pol Pot's policy of genocide' and thus justify the actions of Vietnam."²⁴⁶ Social science methodology is called upon to offer some sort of solace to either the propagandizing underestimating perpetrators or the suffering survivors or some

combination in between.²⁴⁷ It is a dark science that employs demographic analyses to crisis situations whose chaos leads to an inability to actually know the magnitude of its atrocity.²⁴⁸ Can it be that 1 million people's (excessive) deaths somehow went missing? Perhaps there is a sense of relief underlying Etcheson's newer number, because it purports that these (formerly missing) deaths will now be systematically and scientifically counted, using the most modern means available. However, Vickery's lowball estimates would lead one to charge that Etcheson's new-found mortality have been conjured from the statistical ashes—conjured precisely in the overestimation of the 1975 population—raising concerns that the magnitude of Cambodia's suffering is populated with “ghost casualties,” the distorted reflection of the ghost soldiers that populated Lon Nol's ranks.

These estimations of the human cost of Democratic Kampuchea answer to the demands of presentations of Cambodia that foreground/amplify Cambodians' suffering under CPK rule as well as a conscientious concern for an accurate demographic rendering of the effects of the atrocities.²⁴⁹ Perhaps a greater number offers an odd comfort to those that have survived, knowing that their personal suffering is somehow accounted for and reflected in societal-level suffering; higher estimates may reconcile better with survivors' own experience of their suffering. As Etcheson states, “Many Cambodians believe, almost as an article of faith, that the Khmer Rouge killed more than three million people during the Democratic Kampuchea regime.”²⁵⁰ The 3.3 million figure, this *unbearable* comfort, is annually re-affirmed by government propaganda on the Day of Hate (May 20) that re-broadcasts this death toll to Cambodians. The discomfiting academic estimates, even as they increase toward the government's “official” number, reinforce how

mediated the experience of the DK regime has become for those that have survived and especially for those pursue its complexity.



As Kiernan has stated, the outright denial of genocide in the Cambodian case, and even more so, attempts to block legal or academic inquiry into the case, should not be confused with differing viewpoints regarding the atrocities that occurred in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979.²⁵¹ Kiernan relates the tale of a small group of individuals who sought to stymie the founding of the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) as well as his appointment to its head.²⁵² Outright denial that genocide—or, that “anything serious occurred”—under DK is credited to Bunroeun Thach. Deemed a convert of Thach as well as a Khmer Rouge apologist, Kiernan criticizes Sorpong Peou for “having opposed legal accountability” for the leaders of DK.²⁵³ Interrogating the source of the *Wall Street Journal* attack, Kiernan itemizes the overt and covert anti-CGP campaigns launched by pundit Morris (and his Congressional Republican accomplices); the minutiae of Morris’ under-handed dealings in publications, politics, and power come to light in Kiernan’s play-by-play account.²⁵⁴ In the drawn-out narrative, Kiernan establishes a key point: the “political chicanery” (of KR allies seeking credibility for their demands regarding genocide investigations) should not “be confused with differing definitions of genocide or with scholarly debate about the nature of the tragedy.”²⁵⁵

It is up to the tribunal for the Khmer Rouge, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), to parse out the differences between various legal

charges—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression, mass murder (domestic law), etc.—and the nature of evidence required, and to measure it against the kind of documentary evidence available in the Cambodian case. However, the charge of “genocide” specifically has received much scholarly attention (in addition to the overtly political manipulation mentioned above). The international Genocide Convention states that the crime of genocide means killing members of a group “*with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.*”²⁵⁶ The application of “genocide” must confront the nature of the violence and killings under Democratic Kampuchea, specifically 1) the systematic killings that were carried out through the security apparatus as well as 2) the assertive killings which may or may not have devolved out of interpretations by local authorities. The cleavages that form within the debate among academics largely reflects how authors represent and analyze DK spatial and temporal variation, the scope of its violence, the nature of the regime’s authority, various explanations of how the atrocities occurred, as well as the death toll and the qualitative characteristics represented by those statistics.

Kiernan is one of the earliest and indeed most prolific advocates for labeling the CPK atrocities of 1975–79 “genocide.” Kiernan’s position contends that the CPK committed genocide (multiple genocides) against minority groups within the country, as the Party sought to systematically exterminate the ethnic Vietnamese and Cham populations. (He also claims that Democratic Kampuchea committed genocide against the Chinese, not because this group was targeted for execution, but because DK forcibly disallowed any Chinese community.²⁵⁷) While Kiernan’s works break down killings and harsh rule for all ethnic categories, Cambodia’s Cham minorities figure most prominently

in his argument.²⁵⁸ Even though Cham people themselves did not necessarily perceive their own victimization as constituting “discrimination”—because of the regime’s radical egalitarianism, regardless of race—Kiernan argues that their persecution by the CPK targeted their cultural distinction. “If this was merely the application of the same regulations to all citizens of Democratic Kampuchea, it must be conceded that the all-embracing nature of these regulations and their strict enforcement represented a serious attack on minority groups.”²⁵⁹ However, Kiernan’s second charge is that Chams were specifically persecuted and discriminated against for being Chams; that is, they were forced to eat pork, their language was prohibited, their urban and rural communities were dispersed and demoted to “depositee” in the process.

In his review of CPK political considerations of Chams, Kiernan asserts that concern for national and racial grandiosity was an underlying theme of the CPK Center and especially Pol Pot’s thinking (despite only one surviving statement by the regime directly about the Cham minority).²⁶⁰ Kiernan specifically states that by 1975 some restrictions on Chams (that may have been war measures) were in place, and there was “no sign of a CPK policy to disperse the Chams”; after 1975, the massacre of Chams became a centrally organized genocidal campaign, despite variation across areas. Displaying his peculiar sense of thoroughness, Kiernan proceeds by a sector-to-sector assessment of each zone.²⁶¹ His analysis sets the Cham death toll at 90,000 (over one third of the Cham population).²⁶² The “genocide” committed against the Chams is established by two points: 1) that Cham people were persecuted (targeted for their cultural distinctiveness and other reasons), and 2) the disproportionate character of their persecution in relation to other and Khmer groups—forced to eat pork, to speak only

Khmer, to disperse all Cham communities. Based on this different treatment, Kiernan argues that Chams were deliberately singled out because of their race and that Democratic Kampuchea “pursued a campaign of racial persecution against the Chams” and therefore conforms to the 1948 Genocide Convention.²⁶³

Etcheson as well has been a major proponent of applying the term “genocide” to describe the inhumanity that occurred under Democratic Kampuchea. His arguments suggest that previous uncertain hypotheses about the applicability of “genocide” resulted largely from a lack of adequate, reliable data or independently-verifiable evidence. “There was little or no physical evidence that would explicate the specific mechanism through which the Khmer Rouge could have carried out such large-scale killings, nor was there much hard evidence demonstrating that the Khmer Rouge leadership in fact had been in command of any such bureaucratic apparatus. This ‘data vacuum’ on the Cambodian genocide is now a thing of the past.”²⁶⁴ However, his summary of DC–Cam and CGP efforts since 1996—including the many on-line databases that have been created—is confined almost exclusively to records from *Santebal*, and it repeatedly details anticipated accomplishments to come.²⁶⁵

Both Heder and Chandler assert that Kiernan’s argument about ethnic minorities generally ignores the political aspects of their group (e.g., Chinese perceived as “urban” and “capitalist”). Chandler states:

While DK attacks on the Vietnamese minority (nine-tenths of whom had already been expelled in 1975) had racist overtones, the death rates for Chinese (half the 1975 population) and Cham (one in three) can be more simply explained by other factors: the Chinese as the country’s “capitalists” were political enemies and as urban dwellers were poorly prepared for arduous’ rural labor, while the Cham were one of the few

groups to resist DK depredations. It is difficult to construe DK policies toward the Chinese as racist and genocidal when the leadership assiduously cultivated links with Mao's China and when over 1,000 Chinese technicians resided under privileged conditions in DK. Most importantly, Kiernan's argument fails to explain why, if the 400,000 minority victims of DK were its principal targets, 1.3 million ethnic Khmer also died in the maelstrom of the late 1970s. Kiernan has written a prosecutor's brief to indict Pol Pot and his colleagues for genocide under the terms of the 1948 UN Convention—a text which recognizes ethnic and religious victims, but glaringly excludes political ones.²⁶⁶

Heder makes a similar argument, although he reaches somewhat different conclusions.

With regard to Kiernan's centerpiece analysis of the Chams, he fails to properly consider that the CPK approached that national question in terms of class (i.e., "non-proletarian-ness") rather than ethnicity, even if that meant Chams were persecuted with genocidal results.²⁶⁷ Kiernan's conclusions about the Chinese—that the genocidal persecution was not racially based—depends on his own stereotyping (i.e., all Chinese are bourgeois), which plays into the PRK categorization of Chinese as not real victims of the Khmer Rouge and therefore were less entitled to post-DK political posts.²⁶⁸ Conversely, Heder argues that the Cham and Chinese minorities faced the *same* problem: "the way in which ethnic stereotyping was fitted into a paradigm of class, such that every intensification of the class struggle meant the intensification of attacks on ethnic groups stereotyped as problematic in terms of class background and tendencies."²⁶⁹ Kiernan's own mortality statistics, according to ethnicity, suggests that mortality was based on class identity, with increased ethnic mortality as that category was correlated to a higher class. Heder's critique takes on the issue of intentionality as it operates in Kiernan's book: namely, that while the destruction of the country in the attempts to transform it can be viewed by

Kiernan as an unintended consequence, genocide is construed as centrally planned—thus conforming to a literal reading of the Genocide Convention’s “intent to destroy.”²⁷⁰

Rather than eschew the “genocide” label altogether, Heder draws off expanded notions from Hannum and Hawk as well as Fein’s sociological definition.²⁷¹ Heder produces an alternative interpretation that argues that direct or indirect destruction of a group, regardless of motivation or rationale, constitutes genocide.²⁷² Thus, Heder claims that the underlying dynamic to DK’s “genocidal” practices, far from being biology or ethnicity, was *socio-political*.

Vickery’s analysis of Cambodia’s “peasant revolution” largely denies the applicability of “genocide”: the systematic killings carried out by the CPK elite (i.e., purges) were political in nature (e.g., based on the perception of traitors/enemies) and at times were responses to rebellions; non-systematic killings in the countryside were the expression of peasant rage (against a privileged class) or the result of poor leadership in the face of difficult circumstances which had been exacerbated by the war; death from starvation, disease, and exhaustion varied according to regional and sectoral conditions.²⁷³ As for the Chams, Vickery asserts that his interviewees indicate that there was never a central policy to eliminate the Chams.²⁷⁴ The Vietnamese minority is perceived to have been too statistically small by 1975 to support an argument of genocide, a “benign bloodbath.”²⁷⁵

Like other scholars who disagree with the use of “genocide,” Locard finds other egregious offenses more applicable to the CPK’s deeds: crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression. However, Locard’s review of these atrocities focuses specifically on the Communist nature of the regime (contra Vickery’s non-Marxist

characterization of the Organization). “The mass killings the Khmer Rouge carried out... hardly fall within the terms of the 1948 International Convention on Genocide, since their crimes were political, not racial. They killed for ideological motives, and certainly not because the victims belonged to a particular race, as was generally true in Communist countries.”²⁷⁶ Although Locard sees DK as a small faction maintaining its power through a policy of violence and terror, he simultaneously views the repression as politically (not racially) guided, aimed at enemies real or imaginary; thus he prefers the term “politicide” to “genocide.”²⁷⁷ In Locard’s analysis, the war communism (beginning with the rustication of the cities’ inhabitants), that characterized the early phase of DK, made possible a series of criminal practices: radical breakdown of social institutions, suspension of liberties (religion, expression, association, travel), deprivation of physical liberty, summary executions, forced labour, torture, and exploitation.²⁷⁸ His review of the deaths of ethnic minorities (specifically the Chams) asserts that their persecution followed the political goal of abolishing religion. Locard claims that increased mortality among the Chams (40.6 percent of their population according to Sliwinski) was largely a result of resistance to the abolition.²⁷⁹ He further explicates the long process of mental degradation and abuse (forms of dehumanization) that preceded extermination. However, far from constituting genocide, Locard argues that these heinous crimes against humanity were driven by political considerations in the context of an authoritarian state (and a long-established autocratic tradition).

Short’s objections to “genocide” evaluate Cambodian society from a different angle. A key component of Short’s distaste for the use of the term involves the representation of the DK period as a “unique aberration.”²⁸⁰ As discussed above, Short’s

biographically-based tome argues for understanding Cambodian violence in a socio-cultural continuum which links atrocities of the Issarak, Sihanouk's violent suppression of opposition, DK atrocities, CPP-inspired attacks on Sam Rainsy and FUNCINPEC activists, vigilante justice, and acid attacks on mistresses. At the end of this enumeration of cultural traits, Short flatly states that the actions of the Pol Pot regime—having “not *set out to exterminate a national, ethnic, racial or religious group*”—do not conform to the clear definition laid out in Article II of the Genocide Convention.²⁸¹ While acknowledging “crimes against humanity”—the enslavement of the people “on so grand a scale and with such unrelenting savagery”—as a more appropriate label, Short's rejection of “genocide” (like many authors) quickly moves to evaluate the political interests underlying the charge.²⁸² Short documents the political use of “genocide” by the Vietnamese in 1979 at Tuol Sleng and by the US in the 1990s, and he charges that foreign powers' approach *vis-à-vis* “genocide” and a Khmer Rouge trial (making the crime fit the punishment) demonstrate a larger policy of non-involvement in Cambodia, even as its corruption and impunity are well documented.²⁸³ Similarly, Vickery contends that “genocide” only comes into consideration when politically convenient, or more generally, what counts as “human rights abuses” changes according to political circumstances; he claims that the term “genocide” was forbidden within UNTAC discourse, principally because any critical views of DK would undermine the international (i.e., anti-Vietnamese) effort against the PRK government.²⁸⁴ Locard notes that the first use of the term to describe the atrocities in Cambodia came from the USSR, defending the Vietnamese invasion of the country.²⁸⁵ Heder examines the ways in which a genocide trial has been politically manipulated by Prime Minister Hun Sen, shaping a

legal process that will allow impunity/amnesty when politically necessary. His analysis makes clear that “fairness and truth” are not the priorities underlying Hun Sen’s actions; instead, “genocide” circulates in rhetorical and legal venues as a means to control and neutralize (potential) political opponents, changing its definition to suit the needs of the moment.²⁸⁶

In discussing the Genocide Convention and Cambodia’s 1991 Paris Peace Accords, Thion notes how law and treaties are valued only when they do not contradict current policy. He estimates 1 to 1.5 million people died in Democratic Kampuchea, and he states that the 1970–1975 war, notably the drastic effects of US saturation bombing, was a pre-condition for “genocide.”²⁸⁷ However, he is exceptionally, and savagely, critical of the ignorance, unfounded idealism, and lack of imagination (which encouraged secrecy and brutality) of the Pol Pot clique within the CPK.²⁸⁸ Thion eschews suggestions that Chams were persecuted on the basis of race/ethnicity—or that there was a racist motive underlying CPK policies—but were victims of a general policy to eradicate religion.²⁸⁹ He acknowledges that the majority of human loss was due to starvation, disease, and exhaustion which had resulted from the CPK’s unrealistic economic policy. In his more extreme moments, Thion’s reflections on “genocide” (as it came to be defined but never used in a court of law) note how every mass killing will be considered genocide if its memory is being manipulated to achieve geo-political ends. Part of Thion’s argument is the Orwellian situation in which mass crimes, which obviously constitute “genocide” committed by world powers (e.g., massacres or suppression of aborigines), do not garner legal attention, while atrocities in other lands that fail to formally align with the Genocide Convention are pursued by these same world

powers.²⁹⁰ In considering the (lack of) applicability of the term to the Cambodian case, Thion examines the legal systems (traditional and colonial) in the country as well as the cultural regulations of behavior; more significantly, he demonstrates how a genocidal trial of a political elite would appear “ludicrous” to most Khmers, although leaving open the possibility of a cathartic reconciling effect.²⁹¹

If the multiple perspectives, which constitute an academic rendering of the use and abuse of DK history, do not resolve the “genocide” question, then everyday usage may make the definitive case: *ex post facto* convention rather than *de jure* Convention becomes the standard. In colloquial usage, the very general sense of “genocide”—suggestive of unjustified State-sponsored mass murder—seems to have taken hold. The designation, “crimes against humanity,” a broad category of offenses (which appears more apt), seems to fail to express the enormity of Cambodia’s historical episode. Thus, in names and discussions, “genocide” seems indelibly inscribed on the Kampuchean revolution of the 1970s: the stone placard announcing Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes, Yale University’s Cambodian Genocide Program, US Congressional records, and the numerous texts that bear the (more colloquial) indictment.²⁹²

Through the various analyses it becomes apparent that the most systematic killings committed during Democratic Kampuchea were carried out by the regime’s *Santebal*, the central S-21 office and its countrywide network of security facilities. The task was to hunt down “enemies,” a category itself that shifted with the needs and circumstances of the faction that was in a perpetual struggle to assert, consolidate, and maintain its control. The non-systematic (and even the obligatory) killings follow a political (and not racial/ethnic) rationale, whereby lower level cadre bore more authority,

and therefore more responsibility, for the decisions to execute. If Democratic Kampuchea is interpreted as “communist” in some sense of the word (without denying Cambodia’s particular historical antecedents, cultural trends, or other mitigating factors), then the question of genocide speaks to the way in which state-sponsored violence by Marxist-influenced regimes is interpreted and represented. This open-ended discussion will also touch on the political uses to which these representations (and their correlative concepts) are put to political or ideological use... or given voice in monuments to histories.

*“Now you can go where the people are one,
Now you can go where they get things done.”*

CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT NARRATIVES

By a stroke of comparative advantage, Cambodia’s agricultural economy, dominated for centuries by rice production, has been complemented in its post-war decade by two key growth areas: textiles and tourism.¹ Statements by international lending institutions indicate that Cambodia’s recent growth “continues to be underpinned by garment exports, tourism, construction, and agricultural expansion.”² In 2006, the garment industry grew by 20 percent, tourism increased 26 percent, and agriculture expanded by 4.4 percent.³ In addition to the country’s growth industries, it should be noted that the Cambodian economy is buoyed by substantial aid inflows, official development assistance (ODA), which averaged approximately 12 percent of the country’s GDP from 1999 to 2003.⁴ Since 1996, a group of Cambodia’s development partners—country representatives, lending institutions, international development organizations—known as the Consultative Group (CG) has met to formulate pledges of funds in direct assistance and loans to support Cambodia’s poverty reduction and overall development efforts.⁵ Over the years, these pledges have averaged US\$500 million per year, representing 17 percent of Cambodia’s GDP.⁶ These contributions do not include the services and products contributed from NGOs involved in development efforts, which do not factor into the national budget.

The gains in garments have been due largely to an export quota system between the US and Cambodian governments, which helped stimulate and maintain demand. The

PRK government formally recognized the private sector in the mid-1980s, and it was not until January 1992 that the US lifted its embargo against Cambodia. In October 1996, the two countries normalized trade relations; on 30 May 1997 (two months after the grenade attack on a Sam Rainsy-led demonstration), Cambodia was designated “least-developed beneficiary developing country” under the US Generalized System of Preferences easing the trade restrictions and tariffs involved in doing business with Cambodia for particular items of production. A bilateral textile agreement was signed on January 1999 which established the export quota system for Cambodian garment manufacturers.⁷ (The competitive bidding alone for garment export quotas in that year lifted government revenues by 40 percent, and the US became the largest market for Cambodian garments.⁸) In December 2001, this agreement was extended for another three years. During this period, garments grew from a US\$26 million industry in 1999 to US\$2 billion in 2004, employing some 245,600 people.⁹ However, the relaxation of trade restrictions from the multi-fiber agreement (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing) was set to expire in 2005, as mandated by the WTO; already in November 2004, two large factories closed, leading to the loss of nearly 10,000 jobs. Cambodia was left to scramble for ways to cope as it was put in competition with China in the realm of garments.¹⁰ Although the garment industry is the largest revenue generator for the Cambodian economy, it remains an industry clustered around the capital city of Phnom Penh whose factory floors staff a relatively narrow population segment, primarily women, a large percentage of whom are young and recently arrived from their rural communities of origin.¹¹ Similarly, although tourism is considered the country’s second key industry, its growth has been limited in terms of organization and breadth of benefits. With the end of

the quota system, “tourism is the only identified source of growth in the foreseeable future.”¹²

Cambodia’s tourist offerings are broad historically and geographically, and they can be roughly divided into four groupings.¹³

1. Foremost among these are the Angkorian and pre-Angkorian monuments, whose ruins and renovations draw the most tourist interest domestically and internationally. The Angkor Archaeological Park (including Angkor Wat, Bayon, Ta Prohm, Preah Khan, Banteay Srei, and many more) is the most famous, but grandeurs of the past in mixed states of (dis)repair can be found across the country: Koh Ker and the hotly-contested Prassat (Preah Vihear); Banteay Chmar (Banteay Meanchey); Phnom Chisor, Angkor Borrei, and Tonle Bati (Takeo); National Museum (Phnom Penh); Sambor Preah Kuk (Kompong Thom); and Wat Nokor (Kampong Cham).¹⁴
2. Nature-based tourism or natural recreation areas, based on geographic criteria (typically, a water body or mountain) and primarily frequented by Cambodians, also span the nation’s territory, with at least one of these geographical “resorts” (*rorm’niy’thaan* រមណីយដ្ឋាន) in each province: Teuk Chou rapids and the Popokvil falls (Kampot); the beaches of Kep and Sihanoukville (Kampong Som); waterfalls and coastline sites in Koh Kong; the shoreline of Tonle Bati (Takeo); Chambok stream and the pine forests in Kirirom National Park as well as Ompe Phnom riverfront resort (Kampong Speu); Phnom Da and Phnom Neang Kang Rey mountain picnic areas (Kampong Chhnang); Phnom Sompov (Battambang); Champey Waterfall Resort (Oddar Meanchey); Phnom Santuk Resort (Kampong Thom); Teuk Chha Resort and the twin mountains of Phnom Srey, Phnom Bros (Kampong Cham); Kampi Resort with Mekong dolphins (Kratie); waterfalls and Yeak Laom Volcanic Lake (Ratanakiri); Bou Sra and other waterfalls (Mondulkiri).¹⁵

3. Service-oriented tourism, with sites usually overseen by NGOs, invites visitors to familiarize themselves with artisans and their crafts by touring production facilities. Supplementing the dominance of Angkorian interests, Siem Reap offers many of these foreigner-oriented outings: Dr. Beat's Jayavarman VII Children's Hospital, the Siem Reap Silk Farm, *Artisans d'Angkor* wood and stone-carving facilities, the Crocodile Farm, and Akira's Landmine Museum.¹⁶
4. In addition to the ancient history offerings, historical tourism dealing with modern times has recently emerged. Some of these focus on 18th- and early 19th-century pasts, such as the old capital of Oudong or the Bokor casino and Kep seaside villas.¹⁷ Others highlight the country's wartime past: Siem Reap's War Museum which opened in 2002, the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes (Phnom Penh), and the Choeung Ek "Killing Fields" site.

Cutting across these four categories are a number of nationally-oriented sites, such as the Royal Palace/Silver Pagoda and the Cambodian Cultural Village theme park (completed in 2003), which one might position as a cultural supplement to the Angkorian offerings. Cambodia also provides tourists venues for extreme leisure activities, such as the firing range near Pochentong Airport and the numerous go-kart tracks in the capital and the seaside resort of Kampong Som.¹⁸

As recently as the mid-1990s, the lingering lineaments of the Khmer Rouge—particularly along the southwestern border as well as in areas near the northern stronghold of Anlong Veng—and their occasional attacks on travelers threatened to cripple the country's tourism industry.¹⁹ Although the war was waning through this period and large sections of the Khmer Rouge were defecting, the decreasing capacity of the outlawed group executed increasingly desperate and disparate attacks, seeking to rob the governing regime of its post-UNTAC legitimacy. In conformity with the


organization's desired logic, stories of attacks discouraged potential tourists from visiting; this avoidance was reinforced by political instability, exemplified in a 1997 grenade attack on an opposition party demonstration, carried out by forces close to Hun Sen.²⁰ Assaults plagued Cambodians and occasionally the country's foreign visitors: in April 1994, three foreign travelers were abducted from their taxi, which was *en route* to the seaside resort town of Kampong Som (Sihanoukville); three international backpackers were kidnapped from a train near Kampot in July of that year and executed after two months of captivity; a professor from Texas and her driver/guide were shot and killed while traveling to the Banteay Srei temple in a five-car convoy in January 1995; and Christopher Howes, a British de-mining expert and his Khmer interpreter were kidnapped by Ta Mok's forces in Siem Reap and shot at Anlong Veng in March 1996.²¹ With the death of Pol Pot in April 1998 and the capture of Ta Mok in March 1999, the aversion to risk-laden travel in the embattled territory subsided, but the reverberations of these events maintained a low arrival rate for tourists to Cambodia for some time. Cambodia's embattled heritage meant more than the languid threat of Khmer Rouge assaults; war-torn conditions also meant poor roads, sparse adequate accommodations, few capable staff, and a dearth of health facilities for would-be guests—all of which reflect a larger post-conflict situation plagued by a lack of human capital and weak government institutions.²²

A series of additional obstacles in the late 1990s confounded Cambodia's attempts to harness its tourist potential. The IMF suspended loans to the country in 1996 because of the government's poor performance in reforming and managing its forestry sector. The Asian financial crisis hit the following year, as did the grenade attack and factional fighting that signaled continued political instability. To curtail the

reverberations of these effects, the Royal Cambodian Government fostered peaceful sojourns through various endeavors. Outlined in the government's development plan are four initiatives for tourism: the open skies policy, the facilitation of visas, intra-regional tourism, and the prosecution of child sex tourists and drug traffickers.²³ Its development plan also notes that improved physical infrastructure and maintaining a climate of peace are essential to fostering tourism's continued growth.²⁴ A "visa upon arrival" practice was instituted to ease entrance and breath life into a fatigued tourism. The government piloted an "open skies" policy in 1997, but not until late the following year did a few flights from a singular carrier, Bangkok Airways, commence landings at Siem Reap Airport.²⁵ (Formerly, all international air traffic had been routed through Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport.) Even though the policy stipulated that visitors had to spend at least one night in Siem Reap, fears were confirmed that visitors would now skip the capital and shorten their stays, costing jobs and hurting the tourism industry in Phnom Penh.²⁶ Open skies led to increased arrivals in the country but decreased lengths of stays and therefore a decrease in revenue growth.²⁷ At the time, employment in the tourism industry was minimal and government revenues from tourism had remained small; prior to the new policy, visitors were already spending less time in Cambodia than they would on average in Thailand or Malaysia.²⁸ In order to lure greater numbers and take advantage of Siem Reap's growth, Cambodia's Tourism Ministry planned grand events and festivals to highlight its heritage headliner. A three-day millennium party (30 December 1999 to 1 January 2000) at Angkor Wat, billed as "Angkor Festival 2000," included thousands of dancers, traditional boat-racing, theatrical performances, and fireworks.²⁹ Subsequent opulent offerings at the ancient ruins included the exclusive José

Carreras concert in December 2002; for the US\$500 to US\$1000 tickets, guests were treated to a gourmet dinner as well as the tenor of opera entertainment at the ancient temple. Galas of this genre aimed to shore up a perceived lack of “first-class” service available to tourists, a reputation that had marred the industry’s development.³⁰

Since the cessation of domestic hostilities, Cambodia has engaged in significant regional cooperation measures and organizations to better integrate its economic development and to better promote its tourism potential specifically. Numerous regional cooperation frameworks encourage this integration; the major organs are ASEAN, Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Cambodia participates in additional inter-country forums, many of which are of limited resources, including Agency for Coordinating Mekong Tourism Activities (AMTA)/Mekong Tourism Coordination Office (MTCO), Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), Ayeyawady–Chao Phraya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), Bay of Bengal Initiatives for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Cambodia–Lao–Vietnam (CLV) Tourism Development, Emerald Triangle Cooperation Framework, Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Tourism Organization (WTO).³¹ The Asian Development Bank’s participation in the interstices of this matrix is schematized as follows:



Source: ADB, *The Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy*, p. 55.

In November 1999, Thai, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia agreed to launch a joint promotional campaign to attract visitors. The “Great Wonders of Suwannaphumi” included: Thailand’s Grand Palace and Wat Phra Kaew; Myanmar’s Pagan and Mandalay; Cambodia’s Angkor Wat; and Luang Prabang in Laos.³² To further this enterprise, the four Buddhist countries agreed to cooperatively develop road and air transportation links. On 1 August 2000, Thailand and Cambodia established a bilateral “Agreement for Implementation of Tourism Cooperation” for the 2001–2002 year. Signed by Cambodian Tourism Minister Veng Sereyvuth and the Chair of the Tourism Authority of Thailand, Adisai Bodharamik, this accord would facilitate visitor arrivals to and within the two countries through marketing- and infrastructure-related issues, destination development, and human resources.³³ According to the agreement, a

cooperative marketing venture, under the slogan “Two Kingdoms, One Destination,” was launched in November. Package tours emphasized one product, the “Khmer Civilization Route,” stretching from Thailand’s Nakorn Ratchasima Province to Cambodia’s Siem Reap.³⁴ The Thais agreed to assist the Cambodian Ministry of Tourism in its master plan for Preah Vihear, Ratanakiri, and Mondulhiri Provinces, which was finalized in September. Scholarships were made available for Cambodian tourism personnel to receive training in Thailand. In November 2002, the six countries of the GMS developed a strategy of 11 flagship programmes, including tourism (11th), because it was recognized as a major engine of socio-economic development in the region.³⁵

In addition to the facilitation of flight and entry, elite *grandes fêtes*, improving stability, a gradual mending of the infrastructure, and regional cooperation, Cambodia’s tourism has been boosted by considerable foreign direct investment (FDI). The subsector was the largest recipient of FDI from 1995 to 2005, which contributed significantly to the expansion of hotels, guesthouses, and travel agencies in Siem Reap, Phnom Penh, and Kampong Som.³⁶ The success of the tourism subsector—a composite from the services sector, including hotels, restaurants, transportation, communication, and construction—has been most often quantified in the dramatic increase of visitors to the country, with exceptional gains in the new millennium’s early years.³⁷ A growing middle class and a concomitant perception of safety and stability has encouraged tourism among Cambodians to rise significantly since the defeat of the Khmer Rouge; in 2006, the country’s 7.76 million domestic tourists made up 82 percent of total tourism numbers.³⁸

Visitor Arrivals to Cambodia in 1998–2006 (by All Means of Transportation)

Mode of Arrival	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Phnom Penh Int'l (PNH)	175,910	234,382	264,649	274,689	320,187	269,674	316,748	416,396	427,389
Siem Reap Int'l (REP)	10,423	28,525	87,012	133,688	202,791	186,298	309,373	440,125	599,675
Subtotal (by air)	186,333	262,907	351,661	408,377	522,978	455,972	626,121	856,521	1,027,064
Subtotal (by land & boat)	100,191	104,836	114,704	196,542	263,546	245,042	429,081	565,094	672,977
TOTAL	286,524	367,743	466,365	604,919	786,524	701,014	1,055,202	1,421,615	1,700,041
Percentage Change	+30.9	+28.3	+26.8	+29.7	+30.0	-10.9	+50.5	+34.7	+19.6

Source: Ministry of Tourism

Growth in Tourism Sub-Sector, 2000–2005

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Real Gross Value Added (billions riel)	821	1026	1118	959	1514	1933
Annual Growth Rate (%)	46.6	25.5	20.1	-14.3	47	27.7
Share of GDP (%)	5.8	6.9	7.1	5.7	8.4	8.9

Source: Ballard (CDRI), *Annual Development Review 2006–07*, p. 27, Table 2.3.

Tourism Receipts, 2000–2005

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total (US\$ millions)	304	380	454	389	603	840
Annual Change (%)	43.1	25.2	19.2	-14.2	55.1	39.1
Average receipt per tourist (US\$)	652	629	577	555	572	603
Percentage of GDP	8.3	9.6	10.6	8.5	11.5	13.4

Source: IMF, *Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*, p. 42, Table 7.

Employment in Construction and Tourism-Related Industry, 2000–2005

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Construction						
Total	70,000	84,000	120,000	153,000	195,000	234,000
Percentage of total	1.3	1.3	1.8	2.2	2.6	3.0
Hotels and Restaurants						
Total	19,000	10,000	24,000	27,000	30,000	43,000
Percentage of total	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5

Source: IMF, *Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*, p. 61, Table 25.

Domestic Tourism, 1998–2004

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Tourists	422,000	1,012,000	1,215,000	1,464,000	1,757,000	1,821,000	4,251,000
Growth	50%	140%	20%	20%	20%	4%	133%

Source: Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of the Interior (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 70, Table 4.5).

The importance of tourism to the country's economic development has been attested in government statements:

Tourism has indeed played a key role in the socio-economic development as it creates employment opportunities, enhances living standard [sic] of local people and generates national revenues. At the same time, tourism

brings in foreign direct investment and hard currency, thereby contributing principally and actively to the core objective of poverty reduction.

Furthermore, cultural tourism is a dynamic source of the influx of tourists, who admire and are aspired [sic] to explore cultural heritage. Therefore, the diversity of culture and heritage needs to be appropriately conserved, safeguarded and maintained for the benefit of next generations.³⁹

Issued by two of Cambodia's financial ministers, this statement provides the popular understanding of the benefits of tourism to socio-economic development.

Although formal economic indicators demonstrate growth for the country (i.e., national revenues), the social implications—and even the creation of jobs and raising of living standards—draw a less rosy picture of tourism's impact on life in Cambodia.

First, like other economies centered around tourism, Cambodia is subject to the instability that characterizes the industry.⁴⁰ Tourism is largely at the whim of international changes, external conditions that encourage or discourage travel and remain outside the control of the national government: oil prices, global recessions, currency fluctuations, military conflict, terrorism, political situations in neighboring countries (e.g., ousting of long-time strongmen), health epidemics (e.g., avian influenza pandemic), etc. Designated "Visit Cambodia Year," 2003 provides a striking example of how the infectious intersection of some of these factors can wreak havoc on a tourism-dependent economy. Instead of the million foreign arrivals the Tourism Ministry had forecasted, the sector's growth was dampened by anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh in January, the SARS outbreak, the US invasion of Iraq in March, and election-related uncertainties (i.e., FDI's "wait and see" approach in pre-election periods).⁴¹

Second, the majority of tourism revenue goes out of the country. Economic trends for tourism in the early 2000s demonstrate a sharp increase in foreigner arrivals

but without a commensurate growth in net revenue or jobs. Even as foreign arrivals increase, the country's tourism revenues do not necessarily parallel this growth. Despite a near 30 percent increase in arrivals in 2001, only 35 to 45 percent of tourist expenditures that year remained in country, most of the spent money went to foreign companies.⁴² More dire estimates put the domestic remainder at closer to 5 percent, as foreign countries provide the infrastructure, accommodations, transportation, food, and other supplies Cambodia's tourism has lacked due to conflict.⁴³ Further, the type of jobs thus far generated by tourism growth in Cambodia has been largely casual, non-skilled employment, such as construction work. More permanent jobs that would have a greater impact on poverty have remained statistically insignificant.⁴⁴

Although growth has taken hold, foreign tourism (like export-oriented garment manufacturing) concentrates around these three urban centers; the sector's expansion tends to favor high-income groups (as poverty is most severe in the countryside).⁴⁵ Even the growth for unskilled laborers (construction, in particular) demonstrates uneven benefits.⁴⁶ The labour and employment linkages to tourist growth, particularly in Siem Reap, have been largely shaped by proximity, road quality, social networks, and trust of employers. The physical infrastructure either hampers or enables a community's members to participate in the nearby tourism enterprises; jobs are secured through ties of family and friendship and reinforced through communication about the reputation of a potential employer.⁴⁷ In terms of agricultural linkages, poor soil, inadequate water (from a lack of irrigation capacity), and the widespread use of fertilizers and pesticides have largely excluded local producers from supplying food to the tourist centers, especially where there is tourists' preference for organic produce. Physical infrastructure further

mediates the supply of food; road improvements (e.g., from Poipet to Siem Reap) have enabled outside agricultural products to arrive quicker and therefore fresher.

Interestingly, although social networks significantly shape the supply and positioning of labourers, this networking is absent in the sale of agricultural goods, leaving farmers to confront the market as individuals; they compete against foreign wholesalers who enjoy purchasing arrangements with hotel and restaurant managers.⁴⁸ Thus, in addition to regional cooperation, Cambodian tourism efforts have been oriented toward “pro-poor tourism development” strategies. These include diversifying tourism destinations toward the involvement of rural communities, providing training in tourism-related skills, and improving agricultural and other linkages (roads and food).⁴⁹

In addition, random attacks credited to (Khmer Rouge) bandits still occasionally struck the itineraries of visitors. On 22 March 2000, seven robbers armed with AK-47s, pistols, and knives hijacked a tourist boat on the Tonle Sap, 30 km north of Phnom Penh; the 88 passengers (half of them foreigners) were tied up while the bandits made off with US\$100,00 worth of cash and goods.⁵⁰ Travel on rural roads through the remote countryside is still plagued by bandits, especially Route 64 linking Kampong Thom and Preah Vihear. The spread of banditry emerges out of the post-conflict conditions, where numerous disenfranchised but armed people in the countryside—former Khmer Rouge or others—make use of the tools available. In recent years, significant efforts have been made to eliminate the prevalence of guns throughout the country.⁵¹

PARTIAL NARRATIVES IN THE LONG DITCH

An overarching development strategy for Cambodian tourism has been to multiply possible destinations, through the new discovery of ancient monuments, improving access to previously remote ruins (e.g., Koh Ker), creating more water-side “eco-tourist” resorts, and fabricating more (modern) tourist sites. This is consistent with some economists’ perspectives that suggest, “Cambodia will need to sustain this growth by finding ways to diversify its tourism offerings.... Making new areas of Cambodia, beyond Angkor Wat, *true* tourist destinations will rest in large part on whether and/or when the government would be able to provide sufficient security and infrastructure.”⁵²

Two years after the last bastion of insecurity crumbled, to the list of diversifying tourist destinations was added the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area in remote Oddar Meanchey Province. The diversification into (and on top of) the recent past was initiated by Hun Sen’s 14 December 2001 decree, with development on the plan beginning the following year.

Kingdom of Cambodia
Nation-Religion-King

Royal Government of Cambodia
No.13 s.n.N.n [A.T.N.N.B]

**Circular on
Preservation of remains of the victims of the genocide
committed during the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1978),
and preparation of Anlong Veng to become a region for historical tourism**

Following the liberation of 7 January 1979, numerous graves were left behind throughout the entire territory of Cambodia as physical testimony of the crimes committed against the innocent Cambodian people by the genocidal Pol Pot regime. Right away, the authorities and citizens made efforts to take the remains of the victims and to preserve them carefully, some in stupas, and some in other forms of appropriate memorial. However, the government has observed that since that time these memorials have not been properly maintained.

In order to preserve the remains as evidence of these historic crimes and as the basis for remembrance and education by the Cambodian people as a whole, especially future generations, of the painful and terrible history brought about by the Democratic Kampuchea regime against the people and territory of Cambodia during the period 1975-1978, lasting 3 years, 8 months and 20 days, and especially to preserve and prepare the Anlong Veng region to become a historical museum for national and international tourists in the future, the government issue the following directives:

1. All local authorities at province and municipal level shall cooperate with relevant expert institutions in their areas to examine, restore and maintain existing memorials, and to examine and research other remaining grave sites, so that all such places may be transformed into memorials, with fences, trees and informative plaques for both citizens and tourists; the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts and the Ministry of Tourism shall issue further technical guidelines, and shall appoint expert officials to work together with the local authorities on this issue.
2. With particular reference to the Anlong Veng region, in the district of Along Veng, Otdar Meanchey Province, which was of historic importance in the final stage of the political life of the leaders and military organization of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, the Ministry of Tourism shall continue to make efforts, as previously directed by the government, to cooperate with the local authorities and with all relevant ministries and institutions, especially with the Ministry of Land Management, Construction, and Urbanization, Military Region 4, the Cambodian Mine Action Center and the Documentation Center of Cambodia to eradicate mines, to prepare a sound master plan, to research document, to establish a historical museum, and to search for sources of grant in order to preserve all historical evidence and to transform Anlong Veng into a national region of historical tourism. It is absolutely prohibited to encroach on or subdivide land in an anarchic manner, or to undertake any form of construction in Anlong Veng that has an impact on this historic region without government permission, except for construction of housing for residents of the village and commune, in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Land Management, Construction and Urbanization.
3. Efforts shall be made to implement the above provisions before 7 January 2002, the 23rd anniversary of the overthrow of Democratic Kampuchea. On receiving this directive, all relevant ministries and institutions and local authorities shall implement it effectively.

Phnom Penh, 14 December 2001
Prime Minister

[Signed and sealed]

Hun Sen

The circular puts into relation two very different kinds of historical evidence: 1) stupa and grave site memorials—“physical testimony of the crimes committed”—and 2) a region that formed the stronghold for the organization credited with these crimes. Not

only is the evidential physicality of a divergent nature, but the time periods that the prime minister addresses are temporally distant. The remains, and graves that housed them, date to the 3 years, 8 months, and 20 days in the late 1970s when Pol Pot's CPK ruled the country. The historical importance of the Anlong Veng region derives from "the final stage of the political life" of the organization long after its ouster, principally 1989 to 1999. However, both genres of historical memorialization are cited for the purpose of remembrance and education.⁵³ Initially when conveying the motivation for this project, Tourism Secretary of State Thong Khon had focused on the presentation of past crimes of Pol Pot, as a logical necessity of sites that relate to the Democratic Kampuchea past, a view which is consistent with general government statements. Later meetings with Khon revealed a strong concern that the younger generation was not being properly informed about the Democratic Kampuchea period or were tending to harbor disbelief.

Forgetting the past has become a growing concern, especially among older Cambodians. The country is populated by a super-majority of under-30 youth, who did not experience CPK rule themselves. Further, the country's war-ravaged recent past is not covered in the Cambodian educational curriculum. Soon after the 7 January 1979 victory of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, history of the Khmer Rouge was presented to young people in highly politicized terms that sought to foment revenge against the ousted regime and garner support for the Vietnamese-backed government.⁵⁴ Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, new textbooks were issued that omitted instruction on the Khmer Rouge, one of the established parties to the quadripartite reconciliation effort.⁵⁵ A decade later, the Ministry of Education designed and produced a 12th-grade social science textbook that included a chapter on the 1975–1979 period; it

printed 25,000 copies of this new attempt at coverage in 2002, only to recall the books because of problems of accuracy.⁵⁶ That same year, 15 high schools in Phnom Penh experimented with using a survivor's account, *First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of Cambodia Remembers* by Ung Loung, as the text for teaching about the DK years.⁵⁷ Most recently, DC-Cam released a concise history textbook (published in Khmer and English), *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)* by Dy Khamboly, that was specifically intended to fill the pedagogical lacuna. However, a government review panel deemed the work as unsuitable, suggesting that the text could play supplementary reading or reference source for a future Ministry of Education textbook due in 2009.⁵⁸


Given the long-term absence of historical instruction on DK within the country's education facilities, awareness and information about the traumatic past is largely left to surviving relatives (parents), popular culture, and conversations among friends.⁵⁹ Although many parents find it too difficult to discuss the details of the horrific episode with their children, knowledge of the Pol Pot years is frequently the received memories of elders. "In the absence of a shared national story about the Khmer Rouge, a thousand conversations, fractured by politics, rumor, myth and the varieties of human experience are being passed down to a sometimes skeptical younger generation."⁶⁰ A growing recognition has emerged that senses a disbelief on the part of children in response to the superlatives of suffering which reach their ears. As DC-Cam's director states, "We are not in a position to say how much the young people know exactly. They do not come out and say they do not believe, but they express doubts because it is so difficult to comprehend what happened."⁶¹ Previous ideologically-driven presentations and proclamations may contribute to a reticence to fully embrace stories of past suffering.

Other scholars argue that the disbelief among youth may also be reinforced by the lack (or severe delay) in justice being meted out to the CPK's senior leaders.⁶² Regardless of the specific causes of a tendency toward historical disbelief, the project initiated by Hun Sen and implemented under Thong Khon's leadership is cast as the preservation of "physical testimony" and "evidence" of the 1970s atrocities for future generations. In the 1980s context, government memorials and its staged trial indicated the content of this (new) history; more contemporary government statements about the pedagogical role of DK sites (for posterity) also reflect this re-use of history.⁶³



Thong Khon and other officials, who are also affiliated with the Anlong Veng project, presented the institutional organization of the historical-tourist endeavor. At the uppermost levels, the Ministry of Tourism was to spearhead the project in cooperation with a number of other ministries (Culture and Fine Arts; Economy and Finance; Education, Youth, and Sports; Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction), Chhang Youk at DC-Cam, academics at the Royal Academy of Phnom Penh (principally, History Professor Son Samnang), and the military personnel from RCAF's Region 4. Within the Ministry of Tourism, the Working Group on Anlong Veng was composed of: Minister of Tourism Veng Sereyvuth, chair; Thong Khon, deputy chair (and permanent representative for Anlong Veng); Ros Ren, in charge of cultural tourism development; directors from six of the ministry's departments (Cultural Tourism Development; Human Resources; Marketing and Promotion; Planning and Provincial

Development; Tourism Industry; and ASEAN and International Organizations); Chung Sokkhemarak, from the provincial tourism office in Oddar Meanchey; and Chum Sarak Vich, secretary. A further Secretarial Sub-Group of the Working Group on Anlong Veng has the duty to conduct research and formulate reports for the Working Group; its members include: Chum Sarak Vich, head; Dr. Sun Rany (Ph.D. in Tourism); one representative from Marketing and Promotion; and two representatives from the Administration and Financial Departments.



The national ministry oversees provincial-level departments that facilitate tourism activities. The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism is headed by Kan Rithy, who maintains communication with the ministry in the capital about activities and progress in Anlong Veng. The department is relatively new, having come into existence in 1999,

only after the parliamentary elections. The new office of the provincial governor also oversees the activities of the tourism department. Rithy's deputy director, Chung Sokkhemarak, represents the department at the ministry's Working Group on Anlong Veng, and he heads his own provincial-level Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism Working Group on Anlong Veng. His four subordinates in the working group all reside in Anlong Veng, three of which are former Khmer Rouge members. His deputy in the working group, is a young man, Sophorn, who describes himself as Ta Mok's adopted son. The other members are: Ly Kimheng, a woman who was a teacher during Democratic Kampuchea and later a medical officer in Anlong Veng; Nut Krem, apparently an appointment of the district chief; Chan Hana, the only non-KR member and the functionary who liaises with the military about the security situation in the area. This working group is to recruit local residents to act as tour guides within the historical-tourist area.

In addition to the inter-ministerial and institutional cooperation as well as the bureaus throughout the tourism hierarchy, development of the Anlong Veng tourist area is to be assisted by the participation of the RCAF.⁶⁴ In this district, military control ultimately rests with the Region 4 command.⁶⁵ Region 4 soldiers are expected to help secure old possessions of former KR elite, now in the hands of local inhabitants, as well as current information about the area. Additionally, their regular duty to maintain security and safety are also applied to the tourism effort, particularly as de-mining is one of the Tourism Ministry's most-urgent goals.



After my initial visit to the Ministry of Tourism, Solida, the administrative assistant to Secretary of State Thong Khon, became intent on me meeting his friend and colleague Khemarak, Deputy Director of the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism. This meeting transpired in Thong Khon's office, while Khon was in the United States attending to family matters. Also present was Vich, who was Deputy Director of the Tourism Ministry's Cultural Tourism Development Department and the Secretary of the ministry's Working Group on Anlong Veng. His duties with regard to Anlong Veng include examining technical aspects of the project, research, methodology, and budgeting. Vich's English was certainly stronger than that of Khemarak, so he provided most of the explanation and translation. Introducing himself via an enumeration of relevant curriculum vita entries as is typical in Cambodian business affairs, Vich said he received his B.A. in archaeology, and he had spent six years at the ministry, during which he received training in sustainable tourism development. There had been difficulty with the budget, but the first order of business was knowing the history about the sites and studying the history of the Khmer Rouge. Then, they would be able to write a text about Anlong Veng: the life ("ups and downs") of the Khmer Rouge. In studying the history, they would consult documents from the Cambodian Documentation Center. (At that moment, the working group—Sarak Vich and Khemarak—was waiting for guidelines from the ministry, before meeting with Chhang Youk.) Vich had participated in two of the several ministerial delegation visits to Anlong Veng District. The delegation included representatives from the Ministries of Culture and Fine Arts, Economy and Finance, Education Youth and Sports, and Land Management Urban Planning and Construction as

well as the Cambodian Mine Action Committee (CMAC) and Khemarak on behalf of the Oddar Meanchey Tourism Office. The delegation's purpose was to observe the general situation for making the master plan. The Ministry of Tourism, with the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction, was to generate the plan, which would require an initial US\$15,000 (70 million riel); the Ministry of Tourism was tasked with finding the funding source for tourism facilities, texts, and tour guides. No estimates were yet available about the total cost of the Anlong Veng project. Logically, the money would come from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, because the central government and the prime minister in particular were very keen to develop the area.

In Vich's view, the first point of this collaborative effort was to get true information and gather together all documents. The second priority was to interview people in order to compare their information with the documents. The third task was to write the final text on Khmer Rouge life. At the time of this initial acquaintance, the ministry's working group had not yet met as a whole, so hammering out a master plan seemed to be very much in process and proceeding slowly. Khemarak's main purpose for his upcoming visit to Anlong Veng would be to tour the sites, to formulate a questionnaire for garnering information, and to interview some people about the current situation. The questionnaire was designed to ask specifically about each site (Pol Pot's trial site, Ta Mok's house, etc.). They sought to ask everyone in the district about the sites; however, they were concerned that witnesses or important people, who are still living, may be afraid to give true information, which suggests a familiarity with propagandist articulations of history. Thus, the documents used for comparison would be of great importance. Based on the way Vich and Khemarak described the project, it

seemed that the museum's primary objects of representation are lifestyle (mostly communicated through residences) and historical narrative. They expressed a keen desire to reconstruct these sites as depictions of how the Khmer Rouge lived and went about making decisions, based on a thorough and *accurate* grasp of the regime's history and the history of the particular sites themselves. While Vich and Khemarak offered slightly variant ideas about methods and steps to complete the project than Thong Khon, they saw some ways that I would be able to assist them in their work. In particular, they wanted help preparing the English-language text on Anlong Veng (possibly derived from the Khmer version) for guides and visitors. They also asked about research and techniques, with a specific focus on the questionnaire. There was a general agreement about triangulation or double-confirmation of data as an appropriate means to achieve and ensure veracity.



DC-Cam was created out of the US Congress' Cambodian Genocide Justice Act of April 1994 which enabled the Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) at Yale University to bring the Phnom Penh center into existence as a field office the following year. Outliving its original two-year mandate, DC-Cam finds support from nationally-based aid programs and non-affiliated charity groups. The Center's activities are guided by two key endeavors: 1) to promote accountability for crimes committed during Democratic Kampuchea, and 2) to offer a permanent resource—recording and preserving historical knowledge—for researchers and the general public. Pursuant to these

interconnected objectives, DC-Cam has become the largest depository of information (evidence) about the 1975–1979 period, assumed the role of *de facto* recipient for newly uncovered primary material on the CPK, and continued research and documentation efforts. It is inundated with archival materials, much of which (some 30,000 photographs and 400,000 pages of documents) has yet to be properly catalogued and preserved. A significant section of this stock is records from the S-21 interrogation center and the CPK's *Santebal*. The Center's actions have included cataloguing archive material, documents preservation, numerous research endeavors, legal training workshops for those involved with the Khmer Rouge tribunal efforts, hosting conferences, presenting historical film footage, offering a public information room for researchers, and publishing a monthly (now quarterly) periodical in Khmer and English, *Searching for the Truth* (*svaeng rork kaarpet* ស្វែងរកការពិត). DC-Cam also disseminates historical data through its various publications on issues relating to genocide. In conjunction with Yale University, DC-Cam has compiled four extensive databases (bibliographic, biographic, photographic, and geographic) relating to the DK period.⁶⁶ DC-Cam's mission and historiographic endeavors align with scholars who seek an intellectual determination of genocide that purportedly assists understanding and, more importantly, prevention.⁶⁷ The center's research, documentation, preservation, and memorialization project has circulated internationally and has been suggested as a model for the study of other genocidal episodes (e.g., Rwanda). Presently, DC-Cam is seeking to erect a permanent site (training institute, library, museum) that would combine its public services and archiving capacities.

Chhang Youk, the Cambodian-American from Texas who directs DC-Cam, discussed the Tourism Ministry's decision to include him in the Anlong Veng project, mainly as a consultant on the authenticity of documents being used to reconstruct the political life of the Khmer Rouge. During my early conversations with Youk, his numerous activities included: overseeing new exhibitions at Tuol Sleng—"victims and perpetrators" and "then and now"—which had photos as well as a Khmer Rouge biography (from 25 years ago) and a present statement; dialoguing with holocaust museum experts from the Jewish Foundation; negotiating with USAID on innovating/renovating Tuol Sleng, with a projected budget of US\$275,000; opening a permanent center on the land that DC-Cam has near Tuol Sleng; hosting a group of Khmers from Chicago; and contributing to the War Museum in Siem Reap and the Kompong Cham museum in Memut. The historical-tourist plan for Anlong Veng was clearly a minor side-project for Youk and his center; in fact, given the project's tendency toward commercialism, his reluctant (and always self-minimizing) involvement is explained by his overwhelming concern for accurate documentation, historical preservation, and the true historiographic account of the Khmer Rouge.

DC-Cam has been involved with the tourist project in three ways. First, DC-Cam conducted interviews in Anlong Veng on two occasions, supplementing the Tourism Ministry's interview mission findings from February 2003.⁶⁸ Because of the sensitivity pertaining to a tribunal, DC-Cam only asks about dead people; they ask living people about the *sites* (who, how much, when, etc.). Second, DC-Cam worked on producing a GPS map of the sites in the area, which formed the basis for the Tourism Ministry's large billboard.⁶⁹ Lastly, DC-Cam researched and provided biographical information on Pol

Pot and Son Sen. There were formal meetings, but in Youk's view they were not constructive; usually after the meeting was completed, nothing got implemented.⁷⁰ The purpose of DC-Cam's participation in the project is to ensure the accuracy of the representation. Youk gives support in terms that will not lead to the commercializing of genocide sites, and he has a clear understanding of this role. He was asked to help, and he can provide information to educate the public about that part of the country and the leadership there. He states, "The sites should not be commercial, because it is a memory; a memory cannot be commercial." Youk's presentation of his involvement with the Ministry of Tourism was keen to divorce the pedagogical role of historical remembrance and memorialization from the commercial objectives of tourist development. In his mind, there is clearly a way to separate the (good) historical education from the (bad) dominance of the market. He flatly disagrees with supporting the project as it is being implemented. He describes what he sees as the typical approach to tourism development: when the government develops any tourist site, they will have "roast chicken and blue tents" right there at the sites. He harbors doubts about the fate of these historical sites, because he favors a deep understanding of these places. He wants to incorporate Anlong Veng into the genocide sites (which he is already in the process of maintaining); in his view, the purpose should be memorialization, not commercialization. This purist view appeals to sentiments that value the sanctity of sites and the requirement for them to not become the (over-)developed "blue tents and roast chicken" sites that are seen throughout Cambodia's (domestic) tourism resorts. (Although Thong Khon had expressed similar concern for the pedagogical, this was frequently tempered by the need to identify funding supports for the project.⁷¹) At the time I spoke to Youk, he mentioned people (including

ministry officials) speculating on land in Anlong Veng, and land prices were going up; a couple years later, numerous outside interests in the region had sparked a dramatic spike of land prices.

“Based on the way they develop, I can see that they do not understand tourist sites and therefore that they cannot understand historical sites.” Youk told an anecdote about a woman on a bike who could not cook. She was told by the government to make food for tourists who were fast approaching. She emphatically explained that she could not cook. However, the officials insisted that her cooking skills did not matter, because tourists would devour anything. While not a complimentary picture of visitors, the tale underscores the idea that opportunities abound in the path of tourists and should be seized regardless of what resources might be available. Youk argues that the Ministry of Tourism should take local input into what they want tourists to see. “The concept of tourism is unclear when it comes to local development. The ministry does not understand local tourism; they must educate the local villages. Nobody is going to tourist sites, because the vendors are too aggressive; it is because they lack an understanding of tourism. The Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum has a shop with souvenirs. But this is how the Ministry of Tourism sees tourism: roast chickens, drink shops, child sellers chasing after you, parking right in front of the temple.” Youk surmises that the government’s views, understanding, and edicts emerge from this experience of tourism.⁷²

Youk told Secretary of State Thong Khon and his Ministry of Tourism that they must: stay away from commercialization; produce accurate information using proper methods; provide original source material on the Khmer Rouge; prevent commercial development (before the business people begin); and not include Anlong Veng in the

“Cambodia 2003” package. However, the ministry wants DC–Cam only to verify the information which the ministry seeks to publish; it does not welcome feedback on the project’s larger, overall vision. Youk has had correspondence with the Royal Academy of Phnom Penh (Iv Chang and Sombo Marnara), and his center shared what documents it has. The academy sent interviews to DC–Cam, which the center corrected/verified and returned. DC–Cam sent information on Pol Pot and completed a book on the leader for the academy to use. Youk says openly that whatever they have asked for, DC–Cam has given them. DC–Cam has completed its visits, interviewed many people, collected enough information on Pol Pot and Son Sen, and possesses thorough biographies of these two. The ministry has sufficient information; whatever else they want to use, they will send a copy to DC–Cam for verification. That is all that Youk wished DC–Cam to be involved in the project, because he “does not believe in commercialization, but rather that knowledge should be preserved in a scientific way. Beyond that, we have no role.”

Youk holds a list of 77 genocide memorial sites in Cambodia. “These other genocide sites have no sponsor,” a reference to the Red Dot support for the signs in Anlong Veng. “They are memory. Why give attention to Pol Pot’s grave? I am there to preserve the memory; in things that are commercial, I do not have a say. [The Anlong Veng project] will expand, not the knowledge to the public about history, but expand the connection to Preah Vihear for tourists from Thailand. To me, I see it as an expansion of territory, to connect to Preah Vihear, to make Preah Vihear more accessible to tourists, in the sense that Anlong Veng is a route to Preah Vihear.”

When asked about the historical significance of Anlong Veng, Youk says he does not see why attention is paid to that part. Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea are not dead

yet; this project is “giving them honor before prosecuting them—it is confusing. Pol Pot’s and Son Sen’s graves are expected. It is logical to preserve historical sites, and Pol Pot’s grave is an historical site. In terms of *how* one preserves the houses of Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, why ask other people when one can ask the living people? The Ministry of Tourism does not dare ask the living people (Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Ta Mok). The political motivations are clear. Instead, they ask the villagers there who have a vague memory. Again, why preserve Khieu Samphan’s house? What is significant about where he slept? People cannot differentiate between information and propaganda.” Here, Youk’s critique of the government combines with a continued suspicion of the former Khmer Rouge rural villagers; their capacity for “accurate” memory of the past is questioned as well as their ability to discern the import of government messages. As for the leaders, Youk hints that the government’s representation of history in Anlong Veng emanates from ideological considerations: the government discounts the leaders’ accounts, because they are propaganda, even as DC–Cam agrees to assist in verifying the valued veracity of data from all sources.⁷³ Nevertheless, the thrust of Youk’s critique of the government remains focused on commercialism rather than possible (DC–Cam-approved) propaganda from the country’s new leaders.



Plans to meet my liaison from the Ministry of Tourism in Siem Reap were re-routed.⁷⁴ On a sunny day of the Lord, I left the Angkorian capital, expecting an afternoon

rendez-vous in Anlong Veng, at the house and hotel of a deputy district chief.⁷⁵ It is hard to underemphasize how the road conditions affect all activities in the Cambodian countryside. The better parts of rural routes through these northern provinces are covered in laterite, a red gravel that provides exceptionally efficient drainage: within a half hour of a drenching downpour, the road is dry enough to traverse again. Large vehicles scar the thin gravel layer, gouging deep ruts in the clay and dirt underbelly of the highway, which can pool water and muddy an otherwise smooth double-track.⁷⁶

The predetermined place of convergence was the (guest)house of Assistant District Chief Dom Chhony. Although the district chief and two of his assistants all offer accommodations to visiting officials and non-officials, Chhony's October 23 Guesthouse seems to be the most popular.⁷⁷ Being a new arrival, I was uncertain of the guesthouse's location. On first approach, I questioned the young children roaming in front of the lodging house. "The owner of this house is named Chhony?" Neighbors had already guided me to this structure, but the kids seemed to have no idea about whom I was inquiring. The lady of the house emerged, and I asked if a provincial tourism official was a guest. Shortly into our mutual confusion, Khemarak was delivered by moto to the guesthouse. His taxi ride along the potholes from Siem Reap had taken some five hours.⁷⁸

My lacerated landing in the long ditch allowed me to experience the district's medical offering first hand. I had sustained minor wounds, but a thorough cleansing was warranted. I arrived at the health center, a historical-tourist site, and the folks there said the doctor was out at lunch—emergencies during mealtime are not recommended. I was going to let my non-urgent care experience at Ta Mok's hospital pass, but after meeting

up with Khemarak, I had an insistent chaperone to accompany my return to the three-story hospital. A large white concrete building set behind the one-story wooden health center, this hospital looms in a large compound with lakeshore standing. A few patients occupied the cots that lined the open-air rooms. The general hygiene seemed on par with other provincial hospitals I had seen, certainly not spotless or even well-lit; a persistent layer of dirt that refuses to be mopped away from the tiles and the free flow of air seemed to also exhibit a free flow of bugs, bacteria, and dust inward and disease and medical supplies outward. For my minor injury, the care was impressive, a triple cleansing: a sterile water solution cleansed my soiled limbs; a familiar betadine scrub for antiseptic effect; and a colorful finishing coat of gentian violet to keep the scrapes clean and dry and otherwise *s'aat*. During my stays, many more visits to the Anlong Veng Health Center would be required, most for fieldwork, a couple for treatment.

Bandaged and ready for research, my liaison and I delivered two copies of the letter of introduction that Thong Khon had been kind enough to supply. This letter for provincial and district elites describes a research mission in the district's historical-tourist area and asks that they allow and aid my efforts. The first delivery was to District Chief Yem Sann. This former regiment commander conveyed toughness; he certainly seemed to be a veteran of Cambodia's wars: hard, muscled body with a long, cold stare. I felt intimidation emanating from this seasoned warrior. After warmly receiving the ministerial correspondence, the chief discussed with Khemarak the topic of Thai tourists traveling through Anlong Veng to get to Siem Reap. Anlong Veng's unofficial border crossing and the relatively straight shot to Angkor, albeit via uneven surfacing, makes the former Khmer Rouge stronghold a tempting conduit for the inflow of tourists from

Thailand. At this moment, the tours of Thai sightseers were infrequent, requiring special permission, since the border had not yet been formally opened. Our second dispatch delivery was to Region 4 military headquarters, which stands across the street and slightly east of the district chief's residential outpost, forming a convenient nexus of power east of the town roundabout. This brief acquaintance allowed me to greet an information specialist with the RCAF as well as the military liaison for Khemarak's working group. All in attendance seemed entertained (amused?) when I spoke Khmer, which lent a mood of humor and light-heartedness to my initial introductions, which always had something of an awkward air to them, perhaps because anthropology (*noreakvichea* នរវិទ្យា) is even less frequently heard in Khmer than it is in English.⁷⁹ As playing provincial postmen was our primary purpose, Khemarak and his foreign associate left further interviewing to future encounters.

A welcoming dinner for the new-arrived foreigner took Chumnor Tracheak by storm.⁸⁰ As it was our first meal together, this higher-end dining experience—the most upscale restaurant, offering spacious outdoor seating, a view of the lake, and the most exotic meats on any of the town's menus—seemed a suitable venue, and much-valued delicacies featured in the main course.⁸¹ Our partying twosome joined Sophorn and some of Khemarak's friends and former colleagues from the Department of Health who were in town holding informal seminars on HIV/AIDS. As I had picked up giardia in the tourist haven of Siem Reap and had quite reasonably started the antibiotic regimen to treat the invader, alcohol was contraindicated. This story of micro-organisms and medicines lacked any power of persuasion with my imbibing new friends, and “get the foreigner to drink” seemed to be the game of the night. Mealtimes, often imbued with alcohol,

became a dominant vehicle for Khemarak to provide his ideas and plans for the museum. He would be certain to include my presence at official meetings (presumably to add an air of formality), but discussions over food offered the more informative discourse. Khemarak seemed to enjoy the position of authority and especially the role of host. However, he also seemed to harbor an almost humorous relation to his own authority, as he would often grin, laugh, and act dismissive as he proposed his own ideas or pursued aspects of the project's implementation.



The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng, headed by Khemarak, has five members, of whom the most active, involved, and public is Sophorn. This young-looking 21-year-old makes it immediately known to strangers that he was Ta Mok's "adopted son" (usually leaving aside the fact that Ta Mok had "adopted" at least 30 boys).⁸² Sophorn was born in Anlong Veng District on the Dangrek Mountains in 1981. His father is originally from Kompong Chhnang; his mother is from Kompong Cham. Sophorn has three younger brothers and two younger sisters. His parents joined the Khmer Rouge in 1970, and they moved into Anlong Veng Commune (down from the mountain) in 1990. His mother was a midwife and studied medicine in China for seven years. His father is a well-known surgeon and was a student of the most famous Khmer Rouge doctor and DK Minister of Health, Thiounn Thioeunn (ថ្មីន ត្បីន). Sophorn's father, Uy Koem Ly, performed almost all the amputations done in Anlong Veng District during the post-1979 war.⁸³ From age 7 to 14, Sophorn lived with Ta Mok.

As he retells the story, the commander had no kids but wanted to have a son, so he asked Sophorn's parents if their boy could come live with him. (In his version, Ta Mok had a son that died in the war in 1979; one son-in-law, Meas Muth, remained a close ally in the direction of DK territory.⁸⁴) Sophorn lived with Ta Mok in Thailand's Ubon Ratchathani Province for three years and studied Khmer. At age 10, he went to Anlong Veng with Ta Mok, because the Khmer Rouge was fighting the Cambodian People's Armed Forces. Sophorn lived at Ta Mok's house on the lake and soon began studies at the "concrete school" (i.e., Ta Mok's school). At age 14, Sophorn moved to the mechanic's office. He had long wanted to be an auto mechanic, straying far from the medical expertise demonstrated by his elder kin. Anlong Veng did not have many schools for developing his skill, so he studied in Thailand for four years learning how to work on cars and trucks. In 1998, he worked for the German Red Cross as a Thai-Khmer interpreter, which lasted one year. Because the war had ended, he could go to Phnom Penh in 1999 to live with his grandmother; he returned to Anlong Veng two years later.

From my initial interaction, Sophorn seemed very open about his past, and he offered to assist me in his capacity as a tourism official in the area. I frequently saw Sophorn "offer" his services to visitors to the region; he would typically be one of the first faces confronting foreigners before their further forays could commence. (It took a short series of visitors to get a sense of how his radar for newcomers operated.) Sophorn was certainly willing to share his personal narrative freely with me, specifically his close ties to Ta Mok. Almost surprisingly, he never seemed to have any fear of retribution/reprisals for discussing what he experienced.⁸⁵ He did occupy a unique position, being one of Ta Mok's many (adopted) "sons." While he would have access to

personal knowledge of Ta Mok's daily activities, the actions of the organization's elites must have been beyond his capacity to understand at such a young age. Nonetheless, Sophorn seemed to feel free to relate information about Anlong Veng as if he had experienced everything first hand. Although Sophorn comes across as being young, he also has an air of being well-off and well-educated (perhaps more in street smarts than formal education); it appeared that he wanted this his knowledge/training to be recognized. During his initial recounting of his life events to me, the priority of studying and getting educated was a recurrent point in the narrative. Sophorn enthusiastically expressed his interest in the Tourism Ministry's museum project, stating:

Because Anlong Veng has a lot of houses of Khmer Rouge bosses—Khieu Samphan, Pol Pot, Ta Mok—tourists want to come and see these sites. It is mostly Khmer people that want to visit here, when they have free time and money. They want to see Pol Pot's grave, Ta Mok's house, Pol Pot's house, Khieu Samphan's house, because they were the chiefs of the Khmer Rouge, and people want to know about the life of these chiefs.... The museum will change Anlong Veng for villagers; when many tourists come, business will be good.

In addition to working for the Department of Tourism, Sophorn maintained other ventures, primary among them was language instruction. Positioned across the street from the Ta Mok school, in a room attached to his parents' house, he founded the Thai-English Schooling House (*kreuhsthaan seksaa pheasaa ângklés-thai* គ្រឹះស្ថានសិក្សាភាសាអង់គ្លេស-ថៃ). With his housemate and business partner, Kevin, Sophorn managed this modest teaching facility that handled up to 60 language students, scattered into slots according to hour and level. Sophorn offered Thai classes to about 40 young locals, while Kevin provided English instruction to about 20. Kevin is originally from Kompong Chhnang

Province; he had only arrived in Anlong Veng two months prior to my own arrival. Sophorn had invited him to seize the business possibilities of the post-war era by moving his private tutoring from his home province to the newly-integrating, former Khmer Rouge stronghold.⁸⁶ His presence was part of the influx of “new people” that provided many of the owners and staff of frequented business establishments in Anlong Veng.⁸⁷

When Sophorn offered to help, it was clear his familiarity with the area’s people and places would be the greatest asset. Kevin also offered to assist my research, and his language skills enabled him to become an apt translator for my informant interviews. Kevin’s demeanor aided this interpretive work. He exhibits a gentle, almost shy and somewhat nervous, personae; these traits seemed to effectively play into the deference, respect, and obeisance that is typically expected in the face of elders and authority figures. At the same time, he humbly demonstrates that he is educated, remaining loyal to a penchant for accuracy, like when he would kindly help an informant by offering his *opinion* of how a word *might be* correctly spelled. These quiet and nearly sly interactions with people seemed to be borne from a keen awareness of social mores, an awareness he was willing to share by overtly making plain the customs for the visiting foreigner. His smaller frame and a mild disability from childhood (a lingering limp) perhaps augmented his disarming presence for interviewees. We encountered some typical translator issues (not to mention geographic challenges): sometimes I would receive summaries of answers rather than the whole answer; interrogations involving “how?” might produce opaque responses; my taking notes during the (Khmer) answer, only to realize with Kevin’s translation that I had totally missed the point.⁸⁸ The regular research routine would begin with the foreigner abducting the teaching staff from the Thai–English

School House, and the threesome would ride off on the big moto in search of subjects to be interviewed. Sometimes, Sophorn would arrange interviews in advance, allowing me to snatch away only half of the language school's faculty. The meetings that we arranged for research also assisted Sophorn in his role within the working group. Typically, Sophorn would allow me to direct the questioning, and he would listen contently, seeming to already know the texture of the memory being related. In the midst of some interviews, he might reference his small note pad to concur about dates on which events occurred or buildings were constructed. Occasionally, he would interject in the discussion and amend his inventory of dated data. A quadpartite, mutually-assistive dynamic often developed: Sophorn allowing my research to progress; me providing opportunities to confirm/modify his raw data (that would later inform the working group); the informant sharing thoughts and reflections, with Sophorn sometimes assisting his/her remembering; Kevin translating as well as interpreting the direction of conversation.

The five people who compose the provincial Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng, most of whom live in Anlong Veng, are almost all former Khmer Rouge. The Deputy Director of the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism, Khemarak, heads this group, and he is actively supported by Sophorn. Three additional individuals from Anlong Veng further assist Khemarak's endeavors. The group's deputy director, Cpt. Chan Hana, who escaped CPK rule in 1976, was recruited by Thong Khon to be a liaison between the military and the Tourism Ministry. His principal tasks have been to manage visitors on the mountain and accompany any delegations that arrive to complete work on the historical-tourist area. Nut Krem, permanent officer for Anlong

Veng in the provincial working group, was a company commander under Ta Mok, and he also describes himself presently as an aide to District Chief Yem Sann. Another member, Ly Kimheng, moved to a CPK-controlled liberated zone in 1970 and took up duties managing food distribution. After the 1975 seizure of Phnom Penh, she became a language teacher at a primary school. She came to the Dangrek Mountains in 1980, where she worked as a medical officer at first before returning to teaching. Her interest in the tourism project springs from business potential as well as sharing her memories, documents, and artifacts from the Khmer Rouge years; she has currency and textbooks to include in the museum. Through my occasional involvement with the working group, I came to see that Khemarak was the sole conductor of the slow-paced, cacophonous orchestration that was the historical-tourist project; he seemed to be the individual most actively involved and informed about the development of the "museum." Rarely spending long periods of time in the district, his *modus operandi* was represented in one- or two-day visits to the Anlong Veng, during which he would disseminate his decisions/plans for the museum (with prior Ministry of Tourism approval, presumably) and gather what preparatory information was needed for his next task.⁸⁹ The lack of phone service in the area complicated coordination; consequently, Khemarak's arrival in the district for his *blitz-forschung* was often something of a surprise.



After some consultation with and encouragement from my liaison, we decided it would be best to begin familiarization with Anlong Veng through formal interviews with

local administrative elites, military commanders, and tourism officials. The order of research would progress through the district chief, his three assistants, the district's five commune chiefs, and representatives from the many soldier compounds in and around the town.⁹⁰ We recognized that all these interviews might not be possible during this first visit, as Khemarak had a whirlwind tour of the province planned for my initiation to former Khmer Rouge country.⁹¹ The higher the rank of an Anlong Veng official, the more that person tended to know about the museum; they also had greater stakes in the outcome of the project. All of the district-level officials emphasized how life had become simpler and more enjoyable with the transition to peace. The district chief described this positive emergence in terms of a stable life in contrast to a mobile existence (i.e., constantly carrying supplies while advancing and retreating). "You can see by your own eyes that life is easier. People have their own houses, enough equipment, roads, schools, and a hospital. Compared to other areas, Anlong Veng is equal to other areas under government control before." An assistant district chief phrased the benefits of peace in terms of families being able to reunite, both in terms of relatives in other provinces and also soldiers coming home to their loved ones. There is a general recognition that the standard of living has improved, and infrastructural improvements, particularly roads and the new Hun Sen Primary School, have already benefited the community. New road work, performed by the prime minister's special engineering corps, connected Samraong, Anlong Veng, and Trabaing Prassat (in Oddar Meanchey) to Svay Chrum Village near the base of Preah Vihear Temple with wide flat dirt roads.⁹² (After years of guerilla fighting, the pot-holed Route 67 into Siem Reap also appeared as a major accomplishment.⁹³) There was a perception that, with the end of hostilities,

subsistence farming had become easier—“less dependent on weather,” as the upper-echelon informants would say—even as farming equipment was dramatically lacking. One assistant district chief asserted that land problems had been resolved. During the war, different factions had gone to different places; upon their returns, there were mutual claims to the land. These disputes were resolved by local authorities.⁹⁴

The celebrated post-conflict achievements formed a constellation of development for these higher-up officials: good roads for trade and travel, schools that would educate their children, and a proper hospital to prevent unnecessary deaths.⁹⁵ Education, in particular, was held up as a symbol of progress (the presence of schools) as well as familial success (erudition of their children). “War” (*sângkream* សង្គ្រាម) was consistently equated with a lack of development; “development” (*âphivoat* អភិវឌ្ឍន៍) was the new priority.⁹⁶ The contrast between the hardship of struggle and the accomplishments of peace was a much repeated theme among those grateful to resume life after decades of fighting. A government official, outlining his view of the district’s importance, emphasized the war’s cessation in Anlong Veng. “It is the site of the last battle. The fighters joined with the government to fight the Khmer Rouge. When finished, my people have land, houses, and rice fields, and nobody makes war anymore. My heart [*chett* ចិត្ត] and my people’s heart are the same; nobody wants to fight anymore.”⁹⁷ The sites of Anlong Veng are characterized as the remnant infrastructure for making war. In the eyes of a number of district personnel, the potential for tourists to be drawn to these relics of post-1979 Khmer Rouge life stands as an outgrowth of peace.

With the erosion/destruction of some minor ancient temples in the jungle and the transfer to Siem Reap of numerous Angkorian artifacts, which Ta Mok had amassed, the

new museum would represent a way for the district to participate in the country's growing tourism trade.⁹⁸ All the district-level officials seemed very optimistic about economic possibilities in Anlong Veng once the project is completed, including a "trickle down" to local subsistent farmers. They pointed to the museum as a possible vehicle for the promotion of local (already-existing) cottage industries. "If there is a new museum, Anlong Veng has handicrafts—wooden sculpture, furniture, and making pictures of Pol Pot—that could be included." A proud district chief underscored the resilience of his local subsistence economy in the face of tourist revenues or their absence:

If many tourists come or not, the residents' everyday business can survive by themselves without thinking about tourism; the business of farming allows people to feed themselves and make a living. On the other hand, when the Ministry of Tourism opens the museum, there will be many tourists. The local government in Anlong Veng District will have revenues from tourism; but the farmers will also get some money from tourism (e.g., selling things to the visitors—rice, other foods, rattan baskets, handicrafts). Villagers will have many profits; the weaker people [i.e., not so rich, with a low level of education] can make mats to sell at the market.

In addition to the potential difficulties facing residents (largely around farming by hand), some other challenges were also acknowledged. An assistant chief pointed to the remnant problem of landmines; the district's legacy as battlefield meant mines had been laid all over. The government was asked to use NGOs to clear the land. This official stated that everybody had land, although farming equipment was lacking; but in regards to mines, he stated that the "old land" (land long used for farming) was all cleared, but that "new land" (that people start to develop with rice fields and establishing villages) is still mined. However, he also shared grander visions of the tourism project, in particular

an idea to forge a road circumscribing the entirety of the O Chik lake, which would allow greater accommodations, excursions, and resorts for visitors. Consistent with barriers expressed at the Tourism Ministry, the key impediment to this leader's vision was a lack of committed investors to initiate the clearing and construction endeavor.

The idea of trickle down benefits from tourism reverberated at the commune level. Even though these lower leaders were less familiar with the overall project and were tasked with different duties of governance, they still were conceptualizing ways for their commune constituents to profit from an anticipated influx of tourists.⁹⁹ Trabaing Prey Commune is home to most of the sites included in the historical-tourist area; technically, the commune's borders include the areas upon the escarpment.¹⁰⁰ The chief of this commune had witnessed a proliferation of tourism signs, but his focus was oriented toward the basic infrastructural needs of those residing in his region (a five-year plan responsive to villagers' prioritization of their needs): schools, a medical clinic, wells, orchards, and irrigation for these gardens. He views the museum efforts as belonging to a separate branch of administration, and thus his involvement with the project's progression is unlikely. However, he acknowledged that the endeavor's completion may bring about some positive changes (namely, revenues) that will facilitate his local construction/improvement efforts. Having only vaguely heard about a project involving Ta Mok and Pol Pot properties by casual mention from higher-ups, the Thlat Commune Chief's immediate reflection was that Anlong Veng—the place of this “last breath of the Khmer Rouge leaders”—was important for tourist development objectives; however, his commune's 5-km distance from the town and its lack of historical sites meant the museum project might have little benefit to his community.¹⁰¹ In spite of this

perceived removal, he encouraged Thlat residents to provide guesthouses (for those traveling on to Trabaing Prassat District), to beautify the roads with flowers, and to offer comfortable rest stops that will allow visitors to appreciate the commune's landscape. Similarly, the Lumtong Commune Chief saw the supply of handicrafts (primarily, rattan baskets) as a potential effect of the museum project, even though his commune lacks any officially-designated sites. The leader of the most remote Trabaing Tauv Commune had been informed that the residences of certain Khmer Rouge elites were to be reconstructed, but his awareness of details was lacking. Nonetheless, he saw tourism in its capacity to foster happiness, "because people will see tourists and soldiers join together to ensure security in the district." He was also inspired to pursue separate tourist-oriented development in his own commune. A new dam under (re-)construction and its 10-km-long reservoir, south of the road to Samraong, have provided the logical possibility of a resort, not too far from Prassat Rovieng.¹⁰²



Not surprisingly, one of the immediate impressions for visitors to Anlong Veng is the overwhelming presence of various uniformed personnel associated with military, police, and security purposes.¹⁰³ Large compounds are visible from the main thoroughfare as well as occupying large tracts of cleared land amidst some of the more remote parts of the district's forest. The area hosts numerous bases and offices, whose staff duties overlap in geography and reinforce in functionality. Foremost among these facilities is the RCAF Region 4 District Headquarters, directly east of the Anlong Veng

District Office, under the command of two colonels and a brigadier general.¹⁰⁴ The duty of this group is to protect the border and natural resources as well as to deal with theft. The commanding officer stated that his duties with regard to the Tourism Ministry relate only to security problems that might arise; no issues have arisen that require his attention. An information specialist under his command claims to assist the tourism efforts by (secretly) observing sites on a regular basis and monitoring everyday activities of individuals in the district. Region 4's most senior encampments in Anlong Veng are: Brig. Gen. Yem Peum's Brigade 43 (*kângporl tauch* កងកម្រិតត្រី) in Lumtong, 10 km south of Anlong Veng town, which has no direct involvement in tourism; and the Regiment 403 (*kângvireasénaa thom* កងវិទ្យុស្រី) Ground Forces for Border Protection, located in Trabaing Tauv Commune, under the command of Lt. Col. Thoeung Thea, which ensures a safe environment for tourism and people in general (including foreign researchers) in areas along the border with Thailand.¹⁰⁵ The Front Headquarters for Division 2, which receives orders from the Ministry of National Defense, occupies a compound near the entry driveway to Ta Mok's lakeside villa. Five to ten high commanders reside in this camp to observe extraordinary developments in Anlong Veng's situation (and Oddar Meanchey Province generally).¹⁰⁶ Gendarmerie forces are encamped at two sites in the district: the 2nd Provincial Headquarters stands alongside (north of) the Lumtong Primary School; and the Anlong Veng District Headquarters occupies the compound between the Region 4 office and the Ta Mok schoolyard. The former is tasked with arresting soldiers who break the law, catching ordinary thieves and robbers, and escorting offenders to court, while the latter assumes more general duties of providing security for all of the district's residents as well as playing first responder for military police matters (i.e.,

before the 2nd provincial gendarmerie). Anlong Veng District Military Headquarters is south of Lumtong Primary School. In times of peace, the 20 soldiers under the command of 1st Lt. “Tha” have almost no duties; its typical authority is to provide protection along the road and maintain security throughout the district. The significant deployment and garrisoning of forces in Anlong Veng recalls the war-torn legacy of the district’s recent past; it also suggests, as some informants did, that the inundation of troops (on top of the integrated former Khmer Rouge fighters) reflects a continuing distrust or nervousness on the part of the central government in Phnom Penh.

Anlong Veng Police Headquarters rests on the west side of the Anlong Veng District Office, on the south side of the road to Trabaing Prassat.¹⁰⁷ The compound itself is home to four police groups: provincial police (5–6 officers), district police (100–200), provincial tourist police (3), and district tourist police (5).¹⁰⁸ The district police headquarters has a “jail” (a small room with shackles) where perpetrators can be held for 48 hours before being escorted by provincial police to the prison in Oddar Meanchey’s capital. The tourist police forces, which report directly to the Ministry of Tourism, have been established to protect visitors, to check special papers of those coming from Thailand, and to address tourists’ complaints. In addition to these more centralized provincial and district police bureaus, each commune maintains a small police contingent and station, although there may not be a separate office or jail. These local constables and their village-level counterparts (if there are any) deal with a wide variety of crimes and complaints, but perpetrators are brought to the district precinct.

The organizational relationship between the Ministry of Tourism and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces is expressed through the Region 4 military command, via

Regiment 403. The two companies, which are stationed on the Dangrek Mountain, have their normal duty to protect the border augmented by the (additional) demand to watch over sites of historical/tourist interest.¹⁰⁹ The current status of this relationship is maintained without financial contribution (salary, uniforms, food) from the Tourism Ministry, although promise of future revenues might operate as a guarantor or sign of good faith.



With all the ministerial and departmental organization, district and commune administration, and military-security management—all proceeding at a syncopated adagio—the idea of what constituted a museum remained elusive. The seemingly erratic character of Cambodian endeavors manifested in Anlong Veng, producing a prolonged multivocality in the conception of the object (and its form). Complexity and differences in people’s awareness, knowledge, and understanding of the “museum project” provided conflicting and vague presentations of what was to be done. There also seemed to be a division in how different administrative levels approached the issue of implementation.

Under direction from the prime minister (the 14 December 2001 circular), the Ministry of Tourism with assistance from other ministries was to construct a “museum” in Anlong Veng according to some notion of “historical tourism.” Even among individuals at this level, what was supposed to constitute the museum was highly varied—essentially, an accurate portrayal of political life during the Khmer Rouge regime (not necessarily limited to its post-1979 position) involving at least two primary

sites, Ta Mok's lakeside residence and Pol Pot's mountaintop house, and some 30 or so more secondary sites. There was a recurrently stated interest in making the primary sites "like before" by 1) gathering up many (already-looted) "artifacts," and 2) involving the constructors of the original houses. All of this was part of a stated effort to recreate the sites, according to descriptions provided by villagers presently residing in the area. This upper administration level (the ministries) worked mostly with district-level officials in Anlong Veng (evidenced if by nothing else than the fact that visiting ministerial delegations meet at the district officer's house rather than the district office, across the street).

Control of the enigmatic "museum" remained in the hands of central government officials in the capital (Phnom Penh), the Oddar Meanchey Governor's Office (in Samraong), and those in the highest positions within Anlong Veng District, to the almost total exclusion of the commune chiefs and their councils (let alone village-level leaders or ordinary villagers). Local-level governance had been part of an effort to decentralize decision-making and development (at least, that is what the liberalist propaganda proclaimed around the 3 February 2002 commune elections). The main responsibility of commune councils is infrastructural improvements; irrigation systems are an especially important concern during the rainy season, but schools—education = development—and roads are also common priorities. An outsider like myself would think that the participation of the commune chiefs and their councils would be integral to the (implementation of the) museum project, because the anticipated influx of tourists would put increased demands on the area's roads and irrigation systems as well as the daily activities of resident villagers. At the very least, one would expect a significant amount

of participation on the parts of the chiefs from Trabaing Prey and Anlong Veng Communes where the bulk of the historical-tourist sites reside. Surprisingly, the commune chiefs were radically uninformed about the government's efforts; most claimed to have only heard small bits from the district chief about what was in the works. They all seemed to be aware that a museum of sorts was being built, which would utilize the houses of Ta Mok and Pol Pot. As the commune chiefs were unaware of the tourism development details, the villagers tended to be even less informed. This underscored suspicions that these villagers, many of whom are former Democratic Kampuchea soldiers and farmers, are having their wartime past represented for them among the places they still inhabit. Seen in terms of a social history museum, the (tourist) project appeared radically lacking in community involvement, but hierarchy and top-down leadership are well-entrenched historical trends in Cambodia.

The tourist projects that tended to occupy the attention of some commune chiefs were "resorts," and these drew from a sketchy idea of "strategic tourism" that was being exploited by the *provincial* Department of Tourism and, perhaps, the Oddar Meanchey Governor's Office. The "resort" has a particular Cambodian expression, typically involving a water body lined with picnicking areas (often, wooden platforms with straw thatch roofs) and a variety of mobile food and souvenir sellers.¹¹⁰ Beyond the hyper-commercialization that is fostered, what seems particularly characteristic (and perhaps shocking) is that the "resort" area is pushed right up alongside whatever happens to figure as the tourist site. This sort of approach was already evidenced at the *in situ* restaurant at Ta Mok's cliff house in 2002. However, the "resort" as a commune-level endeavor in Anlong Veng District seemed to be in part the brainchild of the provincial tourist

officials. Beyond these grand manifestations of “strategic tourism” were more modest efforts at commune/village-level beautification, construction of guesthouses, and various local improvements that commune chiefs hope will persuade tourists to visit their area or even stop for the night.

To restate: early on, a division appeared among government levels with regard to tourism projects in Anlong Veng District. On the one hand, the Royal Cambodian Government (mainly the Ministry of Tourism) with district authorities (and perhaps some participation from the Oddar Meanchey governor) were involved in the construction of a not-yet-well-defined museum project that is understood in terms of historical-tourist development. On the other hand, there were commune-level efforts that appear to have their primary support from the provincial-level Department of Tourism (located in Oddar Meanchey’s capital) and are following a concept of “strategic tourism.” This situation produced odd contradictions. For instance, the fairly remote commune of Trabaing Tauv claimed to have secured the commitment of \$5 million from some US Army engineers for a well-defined project; meanwhile, the Ministry of Tourism was forced to seek out sponsors to proceed each step of the way to fund its not-yet-stable notion of a “museum,” with an anticipated US\$30,000 price tag for the drafting of its master plan.


This convenient bifurcation of the administration of tourist endeavors in Anlong Veng is complicated by the presence of the “Oddar Meanchey Provincial Working Group on Anlong Veng.” This entity was headed by the multi-sited Khemarak, who maintained a residence in Siem Reap, an office in Samraong (the Department of Tourism), and a work site in Anlong Veng. The working group, whose majority of members are former Khmer Rouge, conducted most of the on-the-ground work that was then presented to

Tourism Ministry officials (who have their own ministerial level working group) and then circulated to academics at the Royal Academy of Phnom Penh and experts at DC-Cam. Although the various ministries sponsor visits to Anlong Veng for the purpose of fact-finding, surveying the sites, and holding meetings (with the district authorities)—these outings sometimes seemed like tourist visits of their own—it was Khemarak’s working group that was most active in pushing the completion of the work (historical documentation, logistics of tourism management, etc.). All the “historical tourism” endeavors in Anlong Veng by the Ministry of Tourism (and likely the “strategic tourism” projects as well) were originally intended to converge as part of the ministry’s “Cambodia 2003” campaign, a (marketing) package that aimed to make that year the biggest for Cambodia’s re-nascent tourist industry.



In the course of my research, the Tourism Ministry’s Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area vision was never fully realized; in fact, the vision itself seemed to lack coherence throughout much of my stay in Cambodia.¹¹¹ Informants—working group members, individuals contracted to reconstruct sites, and caretakers of sites—were all quite honest about the relative lack of progress on the project, although a lack of funds was an often-cited reason.¹¹² Hun Sen’s circular had initiated the project, putting numerous government committees into relation under the Tourism Ministry’s direction, but it had not allocated a specific budget for its implementation.

Although a separate museum structure was not erected, scattered indications of progress irregularly materialized. Days before my first visit to Anlong Veng, the Tourism Ministry had erected blue signposts at nearly all the sites it wished to include in the historical-tourist area. In order to complete its first task, the ministry found funding from Red Dot, an advertising and publishing company that produces *Leisure Cambodia*, a magazine featuring articles on various aspects of Khmer culture, historical sites, food, and folk tales. In exchange for covering the cost of the informational signs, the sponsoring company was granted the right to supplement each sign with advertising.



Historical-Tourist Signpost in Anlong Veng

The bilingual signpost follows a basic design. The name of the site is centered at the top in rounded Khmer script (*âksâr moul* អក្សរមូល), with an English translation immediately below. The public service message calling for assistance in preserving the site and the identity of its institutional authority occupy the lower half of the placard. Immediately below the Ministry of Tourism identification rests the advertisement for Red Dot's magazine. Below and on the right side is an advertisement for the company itself, RedDot Ideas Unlimited. The irony has not gone unnoticed that the slogan for its periodical—"A

Tabloid Expounding Cambodia in Her True Glory”—is attached to sites associated with the Khmer Rouge, one example of the oddities that can emerge from the intersection of tourist marketing and a very marketable tragic past.¹¹³ The blue signs, put up in early March 2002, remained the most overt indicator of the Tourism Ministry’s endeavor for about three years; in 2005, none of the anticipated sites had been rebuilt, and administrative control over the project appeared to eroding (along with the dramatic transformation of a district newly at peace).¹¹⁴

Multiple ministries are involved in the implementation of the museum directive—coordinating and complicating its completion—and these government bureaus dispatched very short-term (often, one-day) reconnaissance delegations to Anlong Veng on an irregular basis. In August 2002, a four-person group from the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction, accompanied by Oddar Meanchey’s Third Deputy Governor Yim Thin and the Tourism Ministry’s Under-Secretary of State Ros Ren, arrived to discuss plans for the district’s historical areas. This conference was principally a forum to disseminate decisions that had been executed at various government offices. First, two groups had been established to work on Anlong Veng: the first group (geographical) was already in the midst of its 5-day mission to accumulate statistical information; when finished, this data would be supplied to the second group (preparation), located in Phnom Penh, which would provide detailed reports on the terrain. Second, the Ministry of Tourism had already generated three maps of the Anlong Veng area and were still amassing stories about the tourist sites in the district. Third, it was decided that the selection of tour guides, ten for Thai and ten for English, would occur through an application process with Khemarak as the point person and hiring

reviews to be completed by the Tourism Ministry's Director of the Department of Training. Fourth, the ministry would seek out guards (two to three per site) for the tourist destinations, asking the military to offer personnel but whose salaries would come from the ministry. Fifth, two tourism offices would need to be constructed, one in the flatlands near Anlong Veng town and one on the mountaintop. Sixth, guidebooks in Khmer, Thai, and English were to be produced by an inter-ministerial conference including Ros Ren and Chhang Youk; this discussion would select appropriate stories to be included from the national documents at DC-Cam, after which the prime minister will be asked to approve the texts.

At the time of the august visit, I was afflicted by my first bout of dengue fever, and some locally-purchased pharmaceuticals, taken with ever-increasing frequency, allowed me to be conscious and upright for the distinguished delegation. My attendance at the morning informational session was unnecessary, but accompanying the group in the afternoon tour of the Dangrek Mountains, from the bed of the district chief's pick-up, was strictly non-optional. Needless to mention, my role was definitely more silent observer than anything else, consumed with embarrassingly concealing my sweat-drenched, fevered state. As we toured the sites—running the gamut from Pol Pot's grave to Ta Mok's cliff house to Pol Pol's Kbal Tonsaong mountain retreat—there was some casual chatter about the sites before Sophorn would take on the role of tour guide. He had clearly supplemented his own memories with information provided from a host of former Khmer Rouge locals, as I would witness during our interviews in the months to come. He rattled off names and dates—who lived where, when things were built, by whom, etc.—in a rote manner. These presentations were reminiscent of the children who

used to populate the areas around Angkor Wat; these underage guides would grab visitors by the hand and lead them through the ruins while reciting, almost monk-like chanting (*sautr* ស្ត្រ) —because clearly they had learned this by heart (*rien sautr* រឿនស្ត្រ) —an ancient history lesson in a foreign language, an incantation (*sautr mon* ស្ត្រមន) for the tourist.¹¹⁵ Sophorn performed the role admirably, interjecting his own personal relation with Ta Mok alongside the second-hand information he had acquired about the sites: a prodigal son's recital (*kaar sautr* កាស្ត្រ) of historical facts.

Gradually at first, then all of a sudden... Khemarak spent a number of months negotiating with a property owner about using his house as a district tourism office. During a 3-hour drop-in visit to the district in late 2002, he formalized the lease of what might have become the Department of Tourism Anlong Veng Office. In the end (more than a year later), on a small patch of land, a modest, one-story structure was built (separate from the much admired house Khemarak had initially sought), which would function as the meeting room and informational outlet for tourist activities in the district. (No new office was erected on the mountain; however, a guard's station along the main road through Choam Pass, housed a man who assumed responsibility for tourist concerns.¹¹⁶) Other than Khemarak's office objective, progress on the construction of a Khmer Rouge historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng was largely at a standstill. For a several-month period at the end of 2002, the biggest development in terms of the museum was likely the foreign social researcher running around asking questions of officials and visitors. The Royal Academy and DC-Cam had largely concluded their research mission in 2002.¹¹⁷ CMAC de-mined the requisite areas, completing its mandate in early 2003

and yet leaving in its wake the message to stay on designated paths and to tour the mountain only with a local guide, as areas may still be mined.

There was always news of impending changes to (always immanently) occur—ticket sales, border opening, phone service—but these nearly always took more than a year to be realized. However, at the economic base, the formal integration of the budding services industry—restaurants and guesthouses—was executed quickly. The owners of local businesses were summoned to a meeting convened by Khemarak's department to discuss the licensing process that would allow them to (legally) operate their tourism-supporting enterprises. The provincial office was taking steps against “exploiters” (i.e., outlaw enterprises as well as corrupt officials) in Anlong Veng District and requiring accommodations and food providers to legally register their business and obtain a license. These permits were issued to individual owners to be displayed at their establishment in order to prevent police or other authorities demanding “informal fees” from them.¹¹⁸ The license cost 50,000 *riel* per year; once a business registered, it could simply renew the license annually.¹¹⁹ Any new businesses seeking to open must obtain a license and must contact the village, commune, and district chiefs as well as the Office of the Governor of Oddar Meanchey and the provincial Department of Tourism. This meeting and the regulations it sought to impose effected a positioning of economic endeavors within the government's administrative bureaucracy, the creation of legal/illegal categories of commercial ventures, a control mechanism for corruption, and a generation of revenue for the tourism office. A symbiotic system of revenues harnessed the business owners' interests to operate above board, protecting them from would-be off-the-cuff competitors as well as additional “official” demands for operating fees.

Further tourism income would eventually be sought through direct sale of tickets. Although the design and issuance of the tickets was conceptualized in late 2002, their actual dispensing would not begin until June the following year; even then, the sale of these visitor's vouchers would be rather erratic. I began to collect photos of sites to assist in Khemarak's design agenda as well as for him to include in a future guidebook and to make presentations to the ministry. The sites in the historical-tourist area would be divided into four zones for ticketing purposes; these zones roughly align with the clusters of structures associated with discrete regions: 1) Anlong Veng (from town to Srah Chhouk), 2) Chheng Phnom Village and Choam Pass, 3) Darm Chrey, and 4) Kbal Tonsaong.¹²⁰

Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Zones

<u>Zone 1</u>	<u>Zone 2</u>	<u>Zone 3</u>	<u>Zone 4</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ta Mok's Lakeside House • Pol Pot's House (lake) • Anlong Veng Primary School • Ta Mok's Middle House (lower) • Ta Mok's Sawmill • New Dam • Anlong Veng Lake • O Chik Bridge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Khieu Samphan's House • Ta Mok's Warehouse • Mine Production Site • Pol Pot's Secret House • Pol Pot's Cremation Site • Pol Pot's Sentencing Site • Khmer Rouge Statues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ta Mok's Middle House (upper) • Nuon Chea's House • Son Sen's House • Ta Mok's Cliffhouse • Ta Mok's Waterfall • Political Conference Hall • Guesthouse • Radio Site • Ta Mok's Mango Field 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Guardhouse • Second Guardhouse • Pol Pot's Holiday House • Khieu Samphan's Office • Khieu Samphan's House • Pol Pot's Mountain House • Radio Site

Purchase of these partitioned paper passes was to commence at the close of 2002; Thai and Western visitors were to be issued billets at a cost of US\$2 per zone. Cambodians would be allowed free entry, in line with the protocol of the Angkor Archaeological Park. A new, straw kiosk/checkpoint was erected in September 2003 along the driveway to Ta Mok's lakeside villa, and this irregularly staffed ticket booth made available entry passes only for this one site. (The ticketing of the other zones and sites was deferred to a future when the museum exhibited a more finished offering.) Statistics that were tracked toward the end of the year indicate that the district received

on average ten foreigners per month; many more Thai visitors arrived, but tourism officials believed a significant portion came for eco-tourism.¹²¹ Monthly numbers for Khmer nationals, from other provinces, ranged from 50 to 300.

In January 2004 tour guides were selected, ten English-speaking guides and ten Thai-speaking guides; their training would commence nine months later. Thong Khon's directives stated that candidates for tour guides (*meakkeatés* មេក្កាតេស) would be selected from among the villagers who know the actual history (*brâvoatt cheak sdaeng* ប្រវត្តិជាក់ស្តែង) of the area; consistent with this idea, former Khmer Rouge made up the majority of tour guides. Consequently, Khemarak saw to it that training impressed upon these individuals the importance of not saying good things about the Khmer Rouge. He emphasized this point by saying that the tour guides cannot tell visitors that Ta Mok was good, "because it will confuse tourists." In private discussions, he mentioned the problematic example of Sophorn, who is an active member of the working group and openly compliments Ta Mok's leadership to everyone, including journalists.

In mid-2004, the first five-page draft of the master plan was completed, although its contents were kept under pre-approval wraps at Ros Ren's office at the Ministry of Tourism. Around the same time, in the center of Anlong Veng on the northeast side of the roundabout, the Ministry of Tourism erected a new, much larger billboard detailing the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area. This mega-signpost employs the same map that has guided the project since its onset, but on a much grander scale. The singular pole for a foundation adds a very industrial look to the placard, as it towers above neighboring homes.



Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area Billboard

Toward the end of 2004, it was rumored that a guidebook was finally being composed.¹²² The ongoing efforts of the ministry and its accomplices included the difficult task of maintaining a 10,000 m² area around each of the remnant historical sites, because as Khemarak stated, “we are thinking 10 to 20 years into the future.” There are places where people have already set up businesses near the tourist sites, like the bustling bazaar sprawling between the sentencing site and Pol Pot’s ash heap. Khemarak appears unconcerned, stating “the market near Pol Pot’s grave is only temporary. In the future, we will move the market to a place along the road to Ta Mok’s middle house.” In addition to preservation, funding sources remained a primary concern.

There is quite a wide range of opinions about the significance (or lack thereof) of constructing a museum about the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng.¹²³ While the Ministry of Tourism (in Phnom Penh) offers one perspective, locals in the forested district offer a variety of alternative views. The variation is so dramatic that providing some examples is warranted. The significant differences revolve around why/how the museum should be conceived, for whom, and what purposes it serves. (There was a general concern about,

or desire for, involvement in the Ministry of Tourism's project. Whatever money tourism might bring, villagers harbored a clear idea that working with the ministry must make for lucrative employment.) In general, informants agree in differing ways with the statement that Anlong Veng is an expression of "the last breath" of the Khmer Rouge. A former tourism worker stated:

I think a museum is very important for this area; it is also my idea, which I have thought about for a long time, that a 'war museum' (*pipoa sângkream* ពិពណ៌នាសង្គ្រាម) be built here. If the Department of Tourism makes the museum, it would be better than now. I see many people arrive, and they do not know about the places. They only come and take pictures and then go home. If a museum is built in Anlong Veng District, it will provide many advantages. We can get money from tourists, and we can let the world know that Anlong Veng is peaceful and used to be the site of a hot battle. There are also a lot of connections between Oddar Meanchey and Siem Reap Provinces; so the Ministry of Tourism can get money from tourists. For example, if a tourist arrives in Siem Reap, they will travel for three days. They will have heard about Anlong Veng from the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism. They will come for one day, and then they will want to go to Prassat Preah Vihear as well. With regards to the museum, it has more advantages than I can tell.

Although there were some statements about the Anlong Veng museum performing an important educational function for Cambodians in regards to learning about Khmer Rouge history, officials affiliated with the Ministry of Tourism were quite frank about their optimistic hopes of this project garnering revenue; this pimping of the past begs the question of revenue for whom? A few local (military) residents also played up the significance of the museum in its pedagogical function for Cambodia's youth, specifically for conveying an understanding of the destruction wrought by war; as one

RCAF colonel noted, “because of war, we have nothing, just broken things.” However, the articulation of the educational and cultural preservation functions of the museum was rare among my informants. Instead, there was an overwhelming emphasis on the economic advantages of constructing the museum in Anlong Veng.¹²⁴

The Tourism Ministry’s hybrid designation of Anlong Veng as “historical-tourist” encapsulates at least two agendas which can be competing or contradictory. In the realm of historical memorialization, the Ministry of Tourism, the provincial Department of Tourism, and involved academics advance accuracy of representation as an overriding (over-writing?) goal. These agents seek to construct a/the representation of Anlong Veng history—posed as the “last breath of the Khmer Rouge”—and (re-)erect physical monuments to convey this understanding. Establishing the validity of any version of this past is fraught with discrepancies, contradictions, multiple perspectives, etc. to such an extent that even the most rigorous “scientific” approach might be strained to produce a presentation of any coherence.¹²⁵ Exemplifying how interpretive divisions manifest for locals, my informants’ responses fell into one of two camps: pro-Pol Pot and pro-Ta Mok. Although the majority side with the latter, it is clear that one’s affiliations show through in presentations of memories of events, sites, and movements.¹²⁶ Other sources, and possible realms of differences in “accuracy,” are journalistic accounts, which have demonstrated a poor track record during certain periods in Cambodian history. Officials at the ministerial level seem intent on depicting the horrors of the Khmer Rouge and how the Organization’s ongoing war devastated the country. While using KR-constructed sites as historical markers, the Ministry of Tourism seems to gloss over the fact these

sites are considered by a number of local villagers to be enduring testaments of the heroism of particular Democratic Kampuchea leaders.¹²⁷

Informants offered an increasingly wider range of reflections on the “museum” and the sites it contains. A key respondent suggested a notion of utility as an interesting criterion for evaluating historical importance: those sites that are to be endowed with significance are those places that provide a direct benefit to the people on a daily basis (e.g., the road and the dam). This response aligns easily with views of Ta Mok as a local hero whose accomplishments are still visible and usable; it casts historical importance according to endurance/utility, enduring utility. On the other hand, the Ministry of Tourism, which does not operate as if Ta Mok were a local hero, seems guided by the idea that any site with concrete remains (or simply the presence of concrete)—a historical foundation or a foundation for the “historical”—is worthy of receiving the blue historical-tourist site marker. For example, the newly-recovered “Khieu Samphan’s House” site is indeed a “site,” as opposed to a “non-site,” given that it harbors remnants of previous structures and inhabitation. There are certainly traces of a past, and the most notable (beyond scraps of wood laying asunder) are the wells. The earthy presence of remains reinforces the hypothesis that the Ministry of Tourism designated “historical-tourist” sites that exhibit foundations or “groundings”—such as a hole in the ground, a latrine, or a bomb shelter. This plays out similarly for “Pol Pot’s Secret House,” as the presence of a concrete slab, a perimeter wall, and a trench give evidence of a *real* site.

Although frankly stating his belief that the museum would bring tourists and money, another military official was very candid about sharing what he believes to be the thoughts of Anlong Veng residents regarding Ta Mok. In this informant’s eyes, the

leader's status as a great patron is attested by the enduring presence of man-made constructions: hospital, school, bridge, and dam. It seems that the construction of the "Ta Mok Museum" (as many Khmers refer to the project) might possibly augment this prestige. In a similar vein, the caretaker of Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa suggested that historical tourist sites are significant, because they are testaments to the fact that the Khmer Rouge were protecting Cambodia from neighboring countries. Thus, the importance of the museum is primarily local: either as a means to garner money from tourists for the district or as a monument reminding people (or reflecting their attitudes) of Ta Mok's achievements. (It is extremely doubtful that the ministry would cast Ta Mok in such a favorable light.)

Somewhat differently, one of Ta Mok's drivers appeared unaware, and even nonchalant, about the museum project. He downplayed the significance of the museum for Khmers, especially local residents, conveying that the site is mainly for interested foreign tourists (*tésâchâr bârortés* ចេតនាចារី). The attitude seemed to be that the museum (Ta Mok's lakeside villa) is nothing special, because all the Anlong Veng residents have visited and seen it. This informant provided a curious analogy: "People in Anlong Veng do not want to visit, because they have been here a long time. It is the same as having a daughter; you do not want to see your daughter all the time, you want to see another." There is certainly another end of the spectrum, especially common among the "base people" who I interviewed, which registers a lack of awareness with the ministry's plans, perhaps indicating a lack of local involvement or education about the project, even at the commune and sub-commune levels.¹²⁸

As it was relayed via Khemarak, ministry officials, and local tourism personnel, the plan for the museum seemed to shift. The idea of restoring and re-building structures remained relatively constant.¹²⁹ Over time, the re-construction plans became more selective, focusing on a few key sites (Pol Pot's house and the sentencing site).¹³⁰ Initially (and through 2002), Thong Khon had envisioned 28 sites scattered throughout Anlong Veng District, clustered around Anlong Veng Town, Choam Pass/Darm Chrey, and Kbal Tonsaong. In addition to select residences and other sites of historical importance, a new museum building would be constructed near the site where Pol Pot was tried and sentenced in 1997. The museum would exhibit artifacts from the post-1989 period as well as photographs, documents, and any video material the ministry could obtain. However, as the tourism office sprouted and Khemarak achieved limited successes in developing tourism in the district, the idea about the location, form, and content changed. Among the working group members, the (pre-master plan) working idea of the museum was to deposit any artifacts, acquired from former Khmer Rouge, at Ta Mok's lakeside residence. The meeting hall was a logical choice for a number of reasons. It was the most complete and stable of all the Khmer Rouge buildings: over-engineering meant that the floors, walls, and roof were intact. The near-total looting of the site meant that ample sheltered space was available for whatever contents could be amassed. Significantly, the robust structure was perhaps the most visited, given its proximity to town, easy access, and scenic views of the lake.¹³¹

In addition to the range of perspectives on what constitutes a "museum," there existed among my informants a variety of views regarding what should be considered content. The museum seemed so loosely-defined, or under-determined, that informants

perceived possible historical “artifacts” as diverse as: leadership documents, individual stories, a radio truck, and Khmer Rouge proverbs.¹³² As of 2004, the objects secured for (future) exhibition included: 30 photographs purchased from Anlong Veng residents, three iron cages that had been used as holding cells, and a video cassette that talks about the activities of Ta Mok and Son Sen when stationed at Preah Vihear Temple.¹³³

Khemarak had personally bought old Khmer Rouge documents from locals and sent them to the inter-ministerial group, which determined the documents’ fate with regard to the museum. The acquisition of artifacts became more complicated as former Khmer Rouge quickly became aware of the monetary potential of their paraphernalia.¹³⁴ Khemarak acknowledged that: “We really need to find all these different things (books, placards, etc.), but we also really need money to deal with the people who have these objects. People understand that the old things from the Khmer Rouge are very expensive, so if we want them, we have to buy them from them.”

Chhang Youk wrote about a young former Khmer Rouge soldier from Anlong Veng who traveled to Phnom Penh in an effort to sell memorabilia from DK’s post-1979 period. He was offering DC–Cam two photo albums (each picture priced at US\$1,500) and a video of Khmer Rouge leaders in conversation with one of Cambodia’s political parties. His offer of sale at the lowest price was skewed to favor DC–Cam, because “he would rather they be contributed to the Documentation Center of Cambodia’s cause of searching for the truth and finding justice for the millions of people who had been executed by the Khmer Rouge regime.”¹³⁵ DC–Cam’s “donations only” policy forbids the center from “trading memories of the victims’ agony for dollars” with enterprising Anlong Veng residents. Although Youk Chhang sees the post-conflict commercialization

of suffering as improper, the Ministry of Tourism, in its desire to develop Anlong Veng for the influx of tourists, does not share the ethic of placing objects from a history of suffering beyond value. A year after Youk Chhang's missive, Thong Khon explained to me that he had acquired a video from former Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng at a price of US\$3,000.



To complicate matters, not only did the conception of the museum portend multiplicity in terms of content and form (which? what?), but the museum's conception begot divergent stories of origin and author-ity (whose?). Stories of Ta Mok's historical preservation efforts emerged, and certain residents credited the whole idea of a museum to their local hero. One of Ta Mok's sons-in-law offered his idea about potential exhibition objects for the museum, stating "if the government thinks the museum is good, then it is good.... All the things have been destroyed, so we cannot find things to put in the museum. Everything is new. The history of Anlong Veng is important: what we did before, how people lived during the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng, and what the situation was then." He would like to make a "true document," a history of Anlong Veng, to be included in the museum. However, he continued his assessment by echoing the earlier museological intentions of Ta Mok:

Ta Mok said before that the house on the lake was not really his; it was to be made into a museum. Ta Mok's real house is in Teuk Chum. Ta Mok used to capture things from smugglers which he would then put in the house in which he used to live. When the government came, they took

some of these things. When Anlong Veng was liberated again, he tried to collect the old things again. Finally, the government army came and took all the things. Thus, he said that the house on the lake is no longer his house and that he wants it to become a museum with ancient artifacts such as statues, busts, etc. captured from Thai smugglers. Everything I am saying is true; I am Ta Mok's son-in-law, and I am afraid you do not believe me. Ta Mok wanted to put everything in the museum: ancient statues as well as documents and pictures from Democratic Kampuchea.

As it was explained, Ta Mok's idea was to transform his lakeside villa into an exhibition hall for local consumption, which would have included ancient artifacts captured from smugglers, paintings of locations of Khmer national interest, and even Democratic Kampuchea memorabilia. One informant claimed to have been enlisted to create a museum for Ta Mok on the land now occupied by the district chief and two of his deputies. He further asserted that Nuon Nov, Ta Mok's "minister of culture," had received THB10,000,000 specifically for the museum project. Ta Mok wanted him to include in the museum: 1) a book (translated into Khmer from Japanese) about the Vietnamese army entering Cambodia and killing many Khmer people; 2) ancient artifacts (Ta Mok asked people to collect antiques in Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat Districts, and Ta Mok had many artifacts at his lakeside house); 3) paintings/reproductions of photos in the Japanese book showing thin and sick children dying of starvation; and 4) paintings of rice farmers.¹³⁶

It is hard to imagine that a town and organization seized by war had the time or resources to erect memorial sites; further, the inclusion of revolutionary artifacts hints at a well-developed sense of self-reflection on the part of Khmer Rouge elites. Among the murals that already cover the walls of the villa are depictions of Angkor Wat and Prassat

Preah Vihear; according to the painters, Ta Mok's in-law, and other Anlong Veng residents, Ta Mok had intended to share these images of national grandeur with villagers, many of whom never had the opportunity to visit these sites. Further items for exhibition included statues and busts that were captured from smugglers, all of which have been subsequently seized by the government army. According to those relating Ta Mok's intentions, these objects were to be complemented by documents and pictures from the Democratic Kampuchea period.

The question of who advocated the idea of a museum first seems quite secondary to the way in which these claims about originality operate around the legend of Ta Mok and his organization. Beyond revering Ta Mok as a local and indeed national hero, these assertions cohere around a particular nationalist sentiment that portrays him and the Khmer Rouge loyalists in Anlong Veng to be defenders of Khmer sovereignty as well as conservators (and potential curators) of its glorious past. Given that the PDK renounced its commitment to communism in 1981 (albeit for pragmatic reasons), the popular anxiety around territorial incursions by the Thais and Vietnamese—derogatorily referred to as *siem* សៀម and *yuon* យួន, respectively—may have remained one of the lasting ideological elements that held sway through the movement's final decade.¹³⁷ This understanding fuels the belief that Ta Mok remains a hero of the Khmer people, and it is fueled by: 1) the fact that the Vietnamese were a major force (with Heng Samrin's Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation) in the 1979 invasion of Cambodia and control thereafter; 2) the decades-old dispute with the Thai government over Prassat Preah Vihear; 3) continuing claims of border incursions by both the Thais and Vietnamese; and 4) the more recent anti-Thai sentiment that exploded into riots in

January 2003.

However, the view of Ta Mok's greatness does not meet with unanimity among Anlong Veng's former Khmer Rouge. Some commune chiefs expressed differing views with regard to the two central historical figures of the museum site(s), while other residents offered hagiographic renderings of Pol Pot and/or Ta Mok. The style of leadership and relative personal merit of each focuses these discussions.¹³⁸ Ta Mok was Secretary of the Southwest Zone during the Democratic Kampuchea period, and it is widely acknowledged that his troops (with Ke Pauk's Central Zone soldiers) carried out the purges of the Northwestern, Western, and Eastern Zones that eventually allowed the Pol Pot faction to consolidate its control on the waning movement. Once ousted from power (by the invading Vietnamese army), DK control was broken into three areas: Koh Kong (West), Pailin (Northwest), and Preah Vihear/Anlong Veng (North), the last of which was under Ta Mok's control. Ta Mok initiated a trial of Pol Pot in 1997 for the slaying of Son Sen (in the Dangrek Mountains, a ministry-designated tourist site), and this trial allowed him to maintain command of the remaining Khmer Rouge that were active in Anlong Veng. Former employees (drivers, guards, painters, etc.) and other local villagers emphasize the gentle and intelligent nature of his governance. All informants who had close association with the leader, convey that he was thoughtful, reasoned, lacking feelings of resentment/vengeance, and took a very hands-on interest in the activities and labour of those under his rule. Most informants echoed the concise idea that: "Ta Mok always helped lighten people's burden by providing them clothes, mosquito nets, blankets, hammocks, medicine and food. He constructed a concrete bridge, a hospital, a school, an army headquarters, three gravel roads, an ammunition

factory, a sawmill and a plant that produced counterfeit money.”¹³⁹

One of the first informants to signal a divergence in views of Anlong Veng’s Khmer Rouge leadership framed the issue for museum representation:

We should compose texts about the Pol Pot leaders and write about how Khmer people fight each other. There will be differences between compositions from each person, because some people know a lot and some people know a little. Some people write that Pol Pot was a good person. The weakness of Pol Pot is that he did everything without law or courts. He did it himself without taking into account people’s ideas; but he made good because he made it easy for people to talk with each other.... In the past, the river had many fish and could feed everyone in Anlong Veng, but now the fish are depleted. Now, there is law, but people do not follow it. Some people say that Ta Mok is good. Some Khmer Rouge people in Anlong Veng District support Pol Pot, some support Ta Mok. In the past, Ta Mok and Pol Pot stayed together in the same boat [i.e., worked together]. After, they fought each other, and some people followed Pol Pot and some followed Ta Mok. The story is very complex (*smoksmaanh* ស្មុកសម្បាញ).

The informant’s own opinion favored Pol Pot. He conveyed familiarity with Pol Pot’s weaknesses: Pol Pot was wrong, because he did not establish the law (courts)—“when someone does something wrong, he is responsible for his mistake; maybe he will be killed without people hearing about it.” He thinks that Ta Mok wanted to orchestrate a coup against Pol Pot, but then it was only “a little fight.” “The commander never kills his subordinates, but subordinates kill their commanders. For example, Lon Nol set up the coup to overthrow Sihanouk. It is no different with Pol Pot and Ta Mok; Ta Mok tried to bring down Pol Pot.” The description of divergent leadership styles subtly segued into and out of political divergences. He explained that the split between Ta Mok and Pol Pot

emerged before UNTAC, during the Peace Accords, 1991 to 1993.

At the negotiations in Paris, Pol Pot discovered that communism had ended throughout the world. Because Pol Pot understood that communism was over, he told his people to negotiate with the government to stop fighting. He wanted his soldiers and people to join with the government so that there would not be two Cambodias. He asked Ta Mok about the money and told him he should give it to people as they return to their provinces, so that they can buy cows to set up farms upon their return. The amount for each person was to be one million riel. Pol Pot commanded Ta Mok to give out the money. Even though Pol Pot had asked Ta Mok to give one million riel, each person received only 20,000 riel. After dividing up the money, Pol Pot would ask people to go back to their birth provinces and stop fighting. Pol Pot sent Khieu Samphan to negotiate with the Hun Sen government; if negotiations had gone well, then Pol Pot would give the people money, ask them to stop fighting, and let them go home. This could not happen, because Ta Mok did not agree. Pol Pot thought that if Ta Mok took control, it would not last more than seven months. Ta Mok wanted to take control; he liked fighting and did not want to follow Pol Pot's ideas. Pol Pot is a good person, because he sees the situation in the world, changes his view, and supports an end to fighting. Pol Pot was educated in Paris and could speak many languages. Khieu Samphan is very educated, but Pol Pot was better because he could lead everybody.... When Pol Pot gave speeches, he did not have to look at the text. Ta Mok did everything without documents, only spoke; he never had meetings before doing anything. Some people like Ta Mok; some people like Pol Pot. But in fact, people stayed with Pol Pot, because he did not want Khmer people to continue making war. During Ta Mok, if I talked like this, I would be killed. Pol Pot gave permission to make farms on the mountain and allowed people to do business with the Thai. Ta Mok did not; he would not even let people use make-up. I speak truly, but that if you ask other people, they will speak differently. They will say that Ta

Mok is better. What I have seen with my own eyes, what I have lived, and what I did, I can tell you. I do not lie to you.

A commune chief offering similar reflections, said that Ta Mok (not Pol Pot) would often come visit people in his commune. "Pol Pot always remained on the mountain. Ta Mok's habit as a leader was to stay in direct contact with the people and to know the situation with his own eyes. He did not like to see documents from other leaders; although other leaders were satisfied with viewing documents, Ta Mok wanted to see if documents were right or wrong. For example, Ta Mok would ask people to make a bridge, and he would stand there and watch. Pol Pot was different; he only commanded from a distance."

In addition to local hero worship variances in conceiving a museum, a growing tension of originality and authority at the administrative level was exposed among my broadening informant base. As the story goes, the district chief knew that a man (one of my informants), who had been close to Pol Pot, was very clearly familiar with the sites, and he asked my informant to make a map of all the places belonging to Ta Mok, Pol Pot, and Khieu Samphan, providing him paper and markers. The district chief called a meeting in October 2000 with a Department of Tourism official who had come from Samraong (likely Khemarak). The draft of the map was displayed and taken into possession by the department official, without any compensation provided. In 2002, signs appeared at a number sites in Anlong Veng District. The meeting had included a number of local people who are familiar with the sites. At the time, the district chief was not content with the individuals who had been selected to work with the department, so he asked the local experts to work with the district tourism office. My informant, who had been put in charge of the district effort, describes this as being the reason "why the

district and the provincial tourism office are against each other.” He further explained that at a meeting with members of the department’s Working Group on Anlong Veng, he was told, “It is useless to be a district tourism officer, because you have not received the position from the province.” He was subsequently edged out of the project, mainly because his district-level appointment was not a paid position. From that time on, the district chief’s initial interest in the Anlong Veng museum had been taken over by the ministry and its correlative provincial Department of Tourism.

The identification of a tension between the Department of Tourism/ Ministry of Tourism and the administrators of Anlong Veng District elicit some interesting observations. If the district chief had been interested in the local development of a history museum in Anlong Veng, the character of the project may have been much different. Whatever the situation before, the district chief seemed to be already engaged in selecting and retaining together people who evidenced intimate knowledge of the sites and events. Given the accounts related by my informants, it seems the district chief’s project would have encouraged much greater involvement from people at the local level. Instead, the current project is being managed and implemented by relative outsiders; the more authority the new figures have in the project, they less they tend to know about the sites. Further, membership in working groups and positions in departments and ministries are typically purchased with cash, not historical knowledge. As it stands, the project unfolds quite slowly, while those who could implement the project in a local, “base” (*moulthaan* មូលដ្ឋាន), or self-reliant fashion are excluded from the decision-making process or tapped for information with no compensatory currency.¹⁴⁰ Regardless, the issues of acquisition of information/materials without compensation and intra-

governmental rivalries suggest a picture of a project which is more consistent with the Cambodian norm of corruption and personalist fiefdoms.



From 1998 to 2002, a group within the RCAF Region 4 Development Sector was tasked with researching and looking after the Khmer Rouge possessions as the army was securing its war victory.¹⁴¹ Rong Samlaut, a young soldier in this protective unit, stationed at Son Sen's Darm Chrey house, would occasionally guide tourists who arrived on the mountain, receiving a couple dollars for directing these visitors away from landmines. The experience overseeing war relics, interacting with visitors, knowing some English, reading and writing Khmer, and being related to a well-respected military commander made him a suitable candidate to work for the Ministry of Tourism, which he did at the beginning of 2002 as chief of a planning section in the district. The director of the provincial Department of Tourism appointed him to work on the mountain. Later in the year, Rong Samlaut asked to take a leave because his name had not appeared in the government's salary registry, which meant he was not receiving an income for his work, nor re-imbusement for work-related expenditures.¹⁴² "When I requested money to do research, they did not accept my request. I needed money to go study about each area. I used my own moto and my own money, repaired the moto myself, and spent my own money on petrol." Two months after stopping work, he heard that his name had been entered in the list. Officially, the government believes that Rong Samlaut is working at the Department of Tourism. The superiors at the Ministry of Tourism are not aware that

he no longer carries out this work, and the salary that he should be receiving is going to someone from the Department of Tourism who bought his name in the list.¹⁴³ (Rong Samlaut heard from a friend that someone was using his name.) Because the salary goes to the name of Rong Samlaut, the person who bought the name must use the moniker in official circumstances.¹⁴⁴

Rong Samlaut has met the tourism official who uses his name and in fact had been an acquaintance before the nominal purchase. “However, he has never told me that he bought my name; maybe he is shy/embarrassed. If [‘Rong Samlaut’] works well, I am very happy, because he uses my name. Many people know my name already. But when [‘Rong Samlaut’] does not work well, the reputation falls on [Rong Samlaut].” Although Rong Samlaut understands that, in some respects, his reputation is in the hands of “Rong Samlaut,” he conveyed no intention of confronting the nameholder or correcting the situation. He thinks that his imposter may have some problems when Ministry of Tourism officials arrive in Anlong Veng, because his photo is in his dossier at the ministry (the Department of Tourism only has the photo of the imposter). However, the practice of purchasing the names of individuals in the salary registry is so common, it is difficult to see how/why the ministry would confront the individual on his formal appellation. The name-exchange story offers one window into Cambodia’s well-established corrupt institutional practices. Lower-level (provincial) officials, unbeknownst (and not a concern) to ministry-level elites, sell names of employees and stock their offices with friends and family. Although name buying is presented as a common act, the “impersonators” are often too afraid/embarrassed to talk about it openly.

Late in my research activities, a key informant revealed a wealth of information about more shady dealings underpinning the Ministry of Tourism's museum project in Anlong Veng. He confirmed that the name of Rong Samlaut had been purchased for US\$500 and that the liaison for the exchange at the Department of Tourism was a well-established working group member. When asked why people would pay such a large quantity of money for a job, my informant replied, "because they think the authority from the job will give them money." And so, the imposter who works under the rubric "Rong Samlaut" received two new assistants in 2004, both of whom bought the names of others for US\$300 apiece, some of which went to "Rong Samlaut."

The Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism exhibits the expected corruption and nepotism of many other Cambodian government institutions. A key individual in the provincial office received his high posting because of his familial ties to a Tourism Ministry elite. Another tourism official had a reputation for antiquities acquisitions. These transactions were facilitated by a former Khmer Rouge who knows about ancient artifacts in Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat Districts and was subsequently granted a position in the department's working group. It seems that each member of the Department of Tourism's Working Group has engaged in non-transparent, nepotistic, or even criminal behavior to secure the job they have. The idea that the members have bought their way into the department—with money or through blood relations, or worse, helped arrange the illicit sale and smuggling of Khmer artifacts to Thailand—suggests a radical lack of commitment to completing the project. The primary goals of the participants seem to be garnering money and securing objects or positions that would bring more money. A self-interested assemblage, endowed with the responsibility of

building a museum, does not emit a professional image, and it is perhaps as absurd as Hun Sen's Anlong Veng museum dictate in the first place. Although overwhelmingly concerned with various (corrupt) paths to wealth, the working group's chief offers the possibility that an historical-tourist area might materialize. Khemarak demonstrates a genuine interest/passion in the project, and it seems his will is the primary force driving the museum endeavor. The various less-than-honest practices intersecting, and at times dominating, the museum project places the work in a more common/familiar Cambodian politico-administrative space.¹⁴⁵



While tourism endeavors appeared snail-paced, the socio-economic transformations afflicting the newly-peaceful former stronghold proceeded at break-neck speed. In the 2002–2003 timeframe, the areas of Anlong Veng District and to its south underwent considerable construction. Previously, long stretches along the road from Siem Reap exhibited no population, with only the occasional small village or military outpost. A number of these expanses came to be filled with entirely new villages or witnessed the growth of what were earlier villages of only a few houses. (The jungle stretch of road, 30 km south of Anlong Veng, remained the most uninhabited area.) Not only had there been a growth in number and size of villages, some of the areas of residence along the road in Oddar Meanchey Province exhibited numerous motos as well as some cars and trucks. It appeared that some wealth had settled in the former frontier area that separated Anlong Veng from the market town of Phum Srey Noy.

Logging in the Anlong Veng area was also underway. My observations suggest that before the dismissal of Global Witness as Cambodia's forestry monitor, much of the local timber was put to local use, building houses or making furniture. Later, it became readily apparent that some lumber was reaching Siem Reap while other wood was being illegally exported to Thailand; the effect of the logging conveyed a not-so-inconspicuous secret.¹⁴⁶ It is difficult to adequately hide logging activities (even at night), especially if the routes used are the same as those marketed as paths to tourist sites (or are the main routes of daily economic activity). It is clear that an (unlikely) growth in tourism might spark tension between this development strategy and the profit-seeking from logging. Before that possibility emerges, the muddy roads remain torn up by vehicles that would not enjoy public (or international, Consultative Group) scrutiny.

In addition to the roadside "development" on the way to Anlong Veng, the district itself was subject to many construction efforts. Along the roads through Lumtong Commune, to Thlat Commune, and through Trabaing Prey Commune, many large, wooden houses—mansions by rural Khmer standards—cropped up. A growing number of residents in this otherwise poor countryside had secured the necessary resources to construct large homes for themselves. Wood, harvested from the surrounding forest, remained cheap relative to other parts of the country. Exported timber from Oddar Meanchey Province can undergo a 400-percent mark-up before its arrival in Siem Reap.¹⁴⁷ The inflation on timber resulted not only from greed and scarcity, but from the long series of bribes that had to be paid to transport the (unprocessed) wood from Anlong Veng to other areas. The end result was that lumber traders could erect large wooden mansions in Anlong Veng that would cost enormous sums in other provinces.

The town of Anlong Veng itself was always undergoing a shifting facelift: new shops and residences were constructed along the main road through town, some completely new businesses, others reconstructions of older structures. The new construction sometimes re-shaped the town's main commercial artery, as houses and businesses were re-erected closer and farther away from the trafficked thoroughfare. Landmarks (in the form of structures) constantly shifted over time, as locations were built and rebuilt; descriptions of locations started to include references to no-longer-existent buildings. Logically, the skyline of Anlong Veng town also changed. There were no houses over two stories, and previously the only objects piercing the local sky were ICOM radio towers (notably, one at Ta Mok's lakeside villa and one at the UNICEF compound near the center of town). Two phone towers were erected in early 2003; however, service was long delayed due to, from what people told me, a "debate over costs" (fees to the district administrators).¹⁴⁸ Anlong Veng was blessed with phone service in October 2003, with both major providers—Mobitel (012) and Shinawatra (become CamShin) (011)—establishing networks.¹⁴⁹ This improvement encouraged business and facilitated the traffic of people and goods in/to Anlong Veng. As phone service came on line, a second power plant (near the old market) began operations. Beyond individually-run generators, the earlier singular power supplier (near the new market) had enjoyed a monopoly on the utility.¹⁵⁰ The ignition of competition had the immediate effects of 1) extending power supply to almost 24 hours per day (5 A.M. to 2 A.M.), and 2) reducing the cost from 5,000r/kW to 1,000r/kW. (At the same time, a water processing facility opened in Anlong Veng, which similarly lowered the cost of safe drinking water.¹⁵¹) Due to the reduction in cost and/or ubiquitous supply, electricity

usage dramatically increased—more lights at night, more and louder karaoke, more televisions—with an apparent disregard for cost or conservation.¹⁵²

Entertainment technologies became increasingly more modern as well as more used and abundant. Television offerings from Phnom Penh (TVK and TV5) lacking clear reception had been supplemented by two Thai stations. With improving electronics, television viewing took a distant backseat to VCDs, which principally offered karaoke and Chinese action films. For a small town, Anlong Veng became well-supplied with VCD equipment, harboring a number of food stalls, drinking establishments, brothels, and karaoke venues which broadcast the digital sound and images.¹⁵³ A well-frequented restaurant near the roundabout exceeded VCD reliance, for a time boasting the only satellite TV in Anlong Veng (an acquisition reliant upon pirating from Thai cable). In terms of cultural fare, this popular breakfast venue substituted its old movie viewing with the various sports offerings on cable; morning meals came to be served with sights of professional wrestling, women's volleyball, and occasionally auto racing.

The district's infrastructural accomplishments were largely completed in anticipation of the opening of the Thai-Cambodian border crossing at Sakngam/Choam Pass which was celebrated on 24 November 2003. A large ceremony of speeches, dancing, award-granting, and commerce was held in the space between the two checkpoints and attended by all the Cambodian district-level officials, tourism staff, and their Thai counterparts. The formerly forested frontier was transformed into a wide open performance space that would transition into formal visa inspection and issuance office. The finishing touches—including de-mining by CMAC (mostly removing caltrops) and a bit of road work—was accomplished in the hours before the grand celebration. The

opening witnessed a large number of Thai visitors to Anlong Veng town and a good sum of Khmers to the shopping area just beyond the Thai checkpoint.¹⁵⁴ The movement was heavily weighted southward, with a massive increase in busy-ness and traffic for the Cambodian side.¹⁵⁵ Lining Cambodia's national limit were vehicles waiting for cargo to be transported into the country. At Choam Pass, a vast crossroads filled with stalls vending a variety of goods (tobacco, alcohol, VCDs, wood products/furniture, and produce). The Khmer market abuts the west edge of the Pol Pot sentencing site and stretches as far as the road that leads to the deposed's last resting place.¹⁵⁶ The free trade frenzy is crowded with vendors, many of whom moved from O Smach in order to hawk their Cambodian wares to visitors that venture across this border.¹⁵⁷ From this nascent cross-border commerce, one can discern Anlong Veng's transformation from a rural town to a mid-sized commercial hub, and in quite rapid fashion, brought on by an influx of "day-traders," consumers, and eco-tourist/historical-tourist visitors from Thailand. Anlong Veng also came to be plagued by some of the urban social ills that have become the hallmark of many of Cambodia's border towns.¹⁵⁸ Methamphetamines (*yama*) and groups of juvenile delinquents described as "gangs" began emerging in the district just a short time after the border opened. A level of lawlessness was perceptible in the words of local residents and sometimes with a degree of deep frustration.¹⁵⁹

With the border opening negotiations came agreements about Thailand's assistance in making a new, paved road that would connect the international crossing to the town below (12 km away) and on to Siem Reap (another 85 km). That the entire stretch to Siem Reap would be graded and surfaced by the Thais was always highly questionable. However, de-mining and widening of the road by the RCAF began soon

after the border opened (January 2004) in the area north of the forest leading past Sralao Sraong to Lumtong and in most of the areas in Trabaing Prey Commune. Initial evidence of Thai involvement was the presence of a Thai construction team, residing at the district chief's house, lying in wait with five bright yellow-colored construction vehicles. While this equipment decorated the yard, Cambodians shared legendary tales of how well and how fast the Thais could build roads; they optimistically expected the stretch of Route 67 from the border to Prey S'aat to be finished before the first rainy season. According to my informants who inhabit roadside residences, controversy among local elites stalled road construction. The Thais brought materials to the base of the mountain, but locals reported that some "big men" were interested in changing the course of the road. These power barons, whose land holdings in Cherng Phnom and Srah Chhouk lie a distance from the existing main road, sought to have the road diverted (or a new road constructed) so as to pass next to their property.¹⁶⁰ Yielding to the elites seemed incredibly illogical given that de-mining along the existing road had already transpired. By 2005, the Thai workers had deserted the chief's residence, leaving the strings of patronage to determine the pot-holed passageway's mounting macadamization.

A year after the border opening (2004), the town and its surrounding area had undergone more tremendous structural change: more shops and restaurants cropped up; commerce and business-related activities increased; and land prices skyrocketed. Some of the new wealth (for the construction) was certainly tied to logging, lumber, and furniture enterprises. Travelers en route from Siem Reap encountered numerous small trucks and pick-ups carrying felled logs, cut lumber, and furniture (many tables, chairs, and bed frames); the traces of massive logging trucks were obvious in the destruction

wrought on the road and especially the bridges.¹⁶¹ A dramatic increase in vehicles in Anlong Veng points to a different socio-economic development. By 2005, the abundance of autos gave the impression that almost everyone had a car or a truck, providing the odd occasion to see sedans and other models parked at small thatch and wooden houses along the district roads.¹⁶² The number of SUVs—a status symbol of Cambodian elites—dramatically increased as well. The traffic and ownership patterns seemed to mimic Phnom Penh, suggesting a similar growing divide between rich and poor.

As one approached Anlong Veng from afar in late 2004, the clearest signs of development appeared in the skyline, as four towers prick the town's airspace.¹⁶³ Closer inspection revealed an incredible proliferation and augmentation of individual homes. However, the largest construction effort undertaken in that year was a new market to the east of the main road and south of the district office, called the "Anlong Veng New Market."¹⁶⁴ The owner of the land for the new retail space is the wife of a former DK ambassador; she worked in cooperation with a Siem Reap-based company, which provided investment and construction. The new market towers above a cement foundation (measuring 54 m by 63 m), topped with a broad, red roof that starts 4.5 m off the ground. Four hundred stalls make up this new market, each offered on 90-year leases to vendors. My recurring visitor's standpoint would suggest that in general, Anlong Veng's population was surging: a lot more people in town doing *a lot more business*.

Informants indicated that while there had been an increase in "new people" coming to Anlong Veng to start businesses, many poor local people were selling their land and returning to their home provinces.¹⁶⁵ This demographic shift suggests a tendency toward gentrification taking hold in the town: middle- and upper-class people

coming to constitute a local economic dominance focused around cross-border commerce and local industry (logging and woodwork). Many large houses sprung up along the road to the mountain as well as along the road to Samraong. Some of this construction was new residences on old plots of land, but there was also a significant degree of additional structures being added to existing residences.¹⁶⁶ The new construction occurs on land owned by those in positions of authority (commune and district level) and military commanders, those well-connected to powerful elites (through historical relations), and a couple wealthy “new people.” The combination of large estates of the few with the meager thatch huts of the (more remote) many further suggests an increasing (or increasingly apparent) discrepancy between rich and poor. The exodus of some residents from Anlong Veng may suggest a reintegration, either in other former Khmer Rouge zones (e.g., Pailin) or in their homelands—the beginning of a reconciliation for the Anlong Veng former Khmer Rouge as they more freely (re-)merge with the population as a whole throughout the country. However, in some ways, the economic processes which position Anlong Veng as tourist center and cross-border commerce hub have also generated disparities which are encouraging poor residents to emigrate; the irony is that these fleeing former Khmer Rouge are/were a primary draw for tourism (perhaps more so than the physical non-sites that make up the “museum”).

GUIDED NARRATIVES

Remnants of the Democratic Kampuchea in the north under Ta Mok’s leadership sought to found and maintain control of military sectors which followed the Dangrek Mountains, lining the border of Thailand and Kampuchea. This ushered in waves of

movement: mobility, migrations, adaptations, and changing names/places, etc.; the dates of demarcation (stable markers) for a "history" are left unclear and shifting.¹⁶⁷ From 1979 to 1989 (another "*pre-history*"), DK hangers-on found refuge in Thailand in border camps that were set up by the United Nations and other aid agencies. This "archipelago of camps" (Vickery) was thoroughly enmeshed in the political maneuverings and objectives of foreign nations, but the upshot was the resurrection of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge into a sustainable fighting force continuing to pester the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh. During this period, the whole of Anlong Veng was occupied by the government and Vietnamese soldiers and the Khmer Rouge sought refuge on or across the Thai border in the Dangrek Mountains. Various informants have described the region as simply covered with dense forest or barely visible Vietnamese military camps scattered amongst the trees. Thus, while Anlong Veng waited to be made historical, Ta Mok and other leaders gathered their strength in Thailand, ranging in places from Trat to Sakeo to Otrá and Phu Noy.


The 1989 Vietnamese withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea allowed the Khmer Rouge its "first" liberation of Anlong Veng, which marks the beginning of the area's history proper. With the end of a decade of Vietnamese presence, Anlong Veng 1989 to 1998 became the time of "the last breath of the Khmer Rouge."¹⁶⁸ An oscillating dry season offensive/wet season re-entrenchment cycle was set in motion. With the newly independent government army ill-prepared to fight a persevering guerrilla force, Ta Mok's troops secured a (re-) "liberation" of Anlong Veng. Capturing the town and mountain region did not automatically produce a scene of stability. As a former teacher related, "In 1994, after the UNTAC period, war re-erupted; there was fighting every year,

but a lot of damage occurred in 1994. That year, during the dry season, the government soldiers captured Anlong Veng for two months; perhaps in April, the Khmer Rouge fought back and won. In fact, it took the government army two months to secure control of all the communes in Anlong Veng; after arriving in Anlong Veng town, they only stayed for about one week before the Khmer Rouge pushed them back.” The seemingly secure(d) liberation continued to participate in the chaotic flow out of which it had emerged. Constant conflict characterized Anlong Veng, subjecting populations and sites to movement and reconstruction.¹⁶⁹

Within this historical timeframe, there are two moments which exhibit massive construction efforts, and these follow on the liberations of the Anlong Veng. The initial arrangement of villages occurred in 1990 with some residential efforts begun in the following year. The fighting of 1994 spurred a retreat, return, and rebuilding; this took on greater importance as key cadre emigrated to the area from other regions under Khmer Rouge control, notably Pailin and Koh Kong. With the initial secondary liberation, the site of Anlong Veng becomes transformed: it changes into Khmer Rouge “possession” (but an elusive grasp); and this possession effects (continues) ongoing change. It is during this period that physical markers of a Khmer Rouge presence—absence, a trace, ...—are founded, with most of the locales in Anlong Veng proper (what becomes the “historical-tourist area”) coming into being in the early- to mid-1990s. Sites that are both captured by and escape the Ministry of Tourism form a story of movement. The central idea, broadcast by informants, is that what remains in Anlong Veng is the legacy of an infrastructure for making war.¹⁷⁰ The sites are thus conceived as what was physically necessary to establish a stronghold, to fight the Vietnamese-backed PRK government,

and to build and defend (*kâsaang kaarpear* កសាងការពារ) the country of Kampuchea.¹⁷¹

Subject to the pressures of social life and war, these infrastructural remains were in their own state of movement.¹⁷²



Source: *Phnom Penh Post*, April 10–23, 1998, p. 8.

The areas of concern include the mountaintop regions of Pass 808, Mountain 200, Bruise Pass, Sago Palms, and the Wild Ox Head, although more bases stretching along the escarpment all the way to Preah Vihear (Sectors 1001 and 1002) could also be examined.¹⁷³ The national location of some of the sites are not clearly known; that is, in fighting to protect Kampuchea from Vietnam and Thailand, some of the bases were perhaps in Thailand at that time or have now fallen into disputed areas that will likely be considered Thailand in the future.¹⁷⁴ (Somewhat regrettably, this work will not address the remnants of the Otra and Phu Noy camps which have very clearly been on the Thai side of the border, in Sisaket province.) In recognizing the lasting sites as the potential

for future historical-tourist significance, it is interesting to note that continued movement (advances and retreats) may have established foundations for tourism in other territories had the war continued beyond 1999.

The Khmer Rouge leadership had divided the border regions of Cambodia amongst certain key cadre: Pol Pot in Koh Kong/Trat, Ieng Sary at Phnom Malai, etc. Ta Mok's consolidation of troops in 1989 initiated a particular migration. Not only were forces moved across the nebulous border, but his former associates from the Southwest Zone were summoned toward the northern citadel.¹⁷⁵ The arrival stories of informants provide partial views of the development of Anlong Veng's mobile infrastructure for warfare.¹⁷⁶ A violent political schism erupted in 1997, followed by Pol Pot's death in 1998, exacerbating a process of decomposition that may have already been underway (even before the Khmer Rouge assumed power in 1975). (The collapse of the Khmer Rouge organization due to mass defections is documented in some "departure narratives" provided by regiment commander informants.) Fighting between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government soldiers caused further splits as some units seized the moment to defect, and others joined Ta Mok in his retreat to Phu Noy in Thailand. (Informants sometimes describe this factionalization in geographical terms, noting that whole communes either retreated or defected.) Suffering further divisions, Ta Mok escaped with few supporters and found temporary refuge among border (de-)marcations. He was finally apprehended in 1999. The "reintegration" deals and procedures form the background for the commencement of a museum. With the area militarily secured and villagers becoming part of the dominant Cambodian society (again), the Ministry of Tourism initiated the plan to re-build Anlong Veng into a museum. Although nearly all

of these sites are in ruins (some only having a concrete foundation), the ministry's project was to design a master plan that would include detailed research about the locales, reconstruction of the buildings, and training of local tour guides. By following strict procedures for accuracy and validity, the ministry endeavors to transform a disparate and decaying mass of sites into an *in situ* "museum" (an historical-tourist area) for both local and foreign consumption.

The "historical-tourist" designation is both simultaneously a grounding (spacialization, the production of physicality) and based on groundings (physical foundations). In this respect, the agents of memorialization are attempting to produce certainty and accuracy out of mobility and instability.¹⁷⁷ This securing of stability takes place in physical, geographical form (sites) as well as "textual"—"*il n'y a pas hors...*"—form (History as presented in guide books).¹⁷⁸ The functionalist approach—perhaps a product of pragmatist tourist efforts rather than historical reflection—betrays a lack of creativity, perhaps part of larger social trends: rationalization (a predominance of MBA and management instruction in Phnom Penh) and imitation (foreign organizations' nostalgia and re-invention of culture—NGOs doing salvage ethno-practice), or maybe the product of the pressures of a cash nexus (a political economy of the contemporary Cambodian situation and the complications of corruption).¹⁷⁹



From 1982, the education facilities in Ta Mok's region of control—an escarpment above the district town of Anlong Veng—consisted mainly of very small schoolhouses dotting the liberated zone, along the Thai border. After seizing the town below in 1989,

greater improvements were sought. In 1993, a school was erected not far from the present-day district office. The school was built of concrete and stood three stories high; the period of construction lasted from 1993 to 1995. This became the facility at which students from grades 1 to 7 could receive instruction from the district's 14 teachers.

The students' lessons were arranged by a teacher's committee that sought to approve and select lesson plans from the Sihanouk years in combination with the new ideas of the Khmer Rouge elite and to synthesize these into study books for grades 1 to 7. At this time, there was war and study was realigned toward teachers assisting the transport of military materials and punji stakes to the central battlefields...

Because of the movements of battle, teachers sometimes could carry out instruction only a couple times per month. At this time, teachers did not receive a salary, but received some support in the form of useful materials and provisions. As well, teachers grew and developed with the added assistance from the teaching techniques of Thai instructors in Anlong Veng. From this undertaking in 1995, the school continues to be used to this day.¹⁸⁰

Informants elaborated on the degree of educational institutionalization before, during, and after the Democratic Kampuchea period (1975–1979). Specific to Anlong Veng, it seems that the defeated DK forces established schooling facilities, first throughout the villages and then concentrated in the main schoolhouse built under the direction of Ta Mok. Some outside observers' reports on the DK period have emphasized the organization's desire for a total elimination of education (and every other social institution). Although grand social upheaval transpired, hindsight seems to be demonstrating that these sensationalist accounts are overstated; my informants have provided recollections of various schooling endeavors at various times by the Khmer Rouge.¹⁸¹

Before 1975, in liberated zones under the control of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK) forces, village schooling was initiated or continued. Informants

stressed the teaching of the Khmer language as a focus. The Khmer Rouge teachers may have also taken on the role of youth leaders through the revolutionary youth organizations, as one informant indicated. Further, any skill in pedagogy could be used to instruct in a number of ways: formal schooling, youth groups, “soldiers’ discipline” training, political education, etc.

As early as 1982, the ousted Khmer Rouge forces outside Anlong Veng made efforts to begin schooling their young. A school was put together along the Thai border in the Dangrek Mountains, but because of the vagaries of war, the school was subject to some mobility. After the Khmer Rouge’s “first” liberation of Anlong Veng, each village had a small school, but in 1991/1992, the Khmer Rouge built a big two-story school out of wood, which was used until 1994. The structure was built in the same place the RCAF Region 4 military headquarters now stands, and it was approximately the same size. The school had two rooms on each floor, and each room could hold 40 students. Some levels (grades 1 and 2) were asked to continue studying at the village schools; the Khmer Rouge found it necessary to gather students of grades 3 and 4 to study at the new school. Grade levels counted upward from 1, with no grades higher than 5; grade 5 students studied with the grade 4 students. The school burned down in the fighting of 1994. The area of the former school is not designated a site by the Ministry of Tourism, and currently the area is used by the Cambodian military.

The Ta Mok school is located 600 m east of Anlong Veng’s central roundabout, along the road to Trabaing Prassat District. The aging white three-story concrete structure stands on the east end of the large school yard, dwarfing the newly-constructed one-story building painted in now-classic colonial *moutarde jaune*. Oddly, the royal blue

indicator sign at the entry gate to the compound, marking the ministry-designated historical-tourist site, reads (the same in Khmer and English): “Anlong Veng Primary School.” It is commonly acknowledged that the Ta Mok school is presently used for secondary education, while the new Hun Sen Primary School covers elementary instruction. Almost ironically, the sign appears to suggest that the newly-constructed education facility became immediately historically important. Regardless of the words conveyed by the sign, most informants simply refer to the historical site as the “Ta Mok School.”

Construction of the stone school began in May/June of 1993 and was completed at the end of 1995. When teachers finished instructing students for the day, they went to help the Thai engineers build the school. The school was not yet completed when fighting forced everyone to retreat again in 1994; when the Khmer Rouge returned, they rebuilt the school. In 1995, students from all the villagers were collected to study at one school. The school was used for a year, before the Khmer Rouge became afraid that government helicopters might attack the very visible school and kill all the students. Thus, the school was not used from 1995 until 1998. Anlong Veng district had an education committee composed of five members. Its first meeting was in 1990, and its duties included: to prepare study plans; to schedule the timetable; to prepare study techniques; and to instruct the teachers in pedagogy.¹⁸²

The narrative of a former superintendent indicates a serious concern for education (specifically in the post-1981 time frame, but also in the 1970–1973 period). Although he suggests that education focused around rudimentary learning (reading, writing, and arithmetic), the management of 124 teachers over two administrative districts (Anlong

Veng and Trabaing Prassat) seems to constitute a large task for a war-sieged regime. Further, the onset of construction of a large, three-story stone school in 1993 demonstrates significant resource allocation to this social need. The school superintendent of Anlong Veng and Trabaing Prassat was assigned to play principal to the 14 teachers who provided instruction at the new stone school. Advanced instructors were assigned to the stone school, while the remaining bulk of teachers (approximately 110 instructors) continued to teach at their village schools. Two different kinds of textbooks were consulted for use in the Anlong Veng schools (while under Ta Mok's control): 1) books that were part of the Democratic Kampuchea program which originated from Ieng Sary's office for education, and 2) books that came from UNBRO. The teachers were given the option of which to use, and most seemed to pilfer from both sources. It is significant that teachers developed their own textbooks, using materials from the government and Thailand. The very subject that was an exception to this self-generated instruction was history, which came directly from the top leaders.¹⁸³

When the large stone school stopped being used after one year, the five individuals on the education committee ceased gathering the teachers at the district; the committee divided itself so that members could go train teachers in the villages. In addition to village education in the post-1979 period, it is also clear that at least some Khmer Rouge teachers instructed at or near the Phu Noy refugee camp in Thailand. (This camp played sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge on an as-needed basis.) The physical manifestations of education in Anlong Veng are expressed in this series of schoolhouses: small schools in the villages, the large wooden school (at Region 4 headquarters), then a stone school (slightly east), and back to the villages. There is a certain mobility exhibited

through the district's education efforts (augmented by the education committee's own training movements), which parallels the movement of Anlong Veng "residents" in other ways.¹⁸⁴



The Anlong Veng Health Center received patients in the area for all kinds of care. Before, this health center was one small wood building that sat on the lakeshore. In 1992, additional construction was performed: a two-story concrete structure, which was Ta Mok's idea. It had 20 doctors that were divided into two groups, surgeons and general care. The doctors had some study from before 1975 and received some instruction from Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn and some Chinese doctors. The majority of admitted patients were victims of malaria. Other sick or wounded could be treated by the doctors, without having to send any patients (except for Khmer Rouge elite) to Thailand, except for a few upper echelons who sought treatment abroad. The average population of admitted patients was 120 to 150 people. Some of the medicines and other medical supplies came from aid and some were purchased. Since 1998, the hospital still treats patients suffering a variety of ailments.

Because everything associated with Ta Mok and Pol Pot is considered for historical-tourist value, Anlong Veng as a functioning town in Cambodia's rural north offers a number of "sites" that also involve everyday practices. The "Ta Mok Hospital," which was built in the early 1990s and went unused from 1995 until 1998 because of fears of helicopter attacks, remains the primary health outlet for villagers. The wooden health clinic is used for admitting patients as well as doing lab work (most commonly, malaria tests), and the large stone hospital houses those whose health needs require longer treatment. *Médecins sans Frontières* also contributed an office to the area

associated with the hospital. The “Anlong Veng Primary School” is now used for secondary students, Hun Sen’s Primary School having taken over from Ta Mok.

Although a new structure is being constructed to replace the old district office, this former meeting place is still used to conduct trainings and to hold special NGO events.

The dam/bridge forms a section of road that is daily traversed by villagers and creates the lake which provides for many local people’s livelihoods. The potential re-creation of “Ta Mok’s Sawmill” (even in the midst of a moratorium on logging) might constitute another functioning site for district production. To the extent that these sites are used, they appear quotidian or even commonplace. However, the drive to make the district into a museum area seems to imbue the locations with a significance beyond the everyday.¹⁸⁵



Before the lakeside villa, there was a small hillock upon which a small house and mango tree was planted (before the bridge was built). Ta Mok began building a larger house in 1994, but the house was burned down by advancing government forces as they approached the residence. The following year, he began construction anew of a stone house; the sand, concrete, and bricks were all supplied from Thailand, technicians were Khmer and Thai, and the plans were Ta Mok’s ideas. The construction workers who built this house were Moeung, Daul, Loun, Phon; after it was built, an artist named Eng (now in Cherng Phnom) drew the pictures of temples and the map. In the house were a wooden bed, a guest room, and a room below for materials and firearms (as well as a hiding place for safety when there was fighting). Ta Mok wanted to build on the lake shore, because he enjoyed the natural landscape it offered, and he appreciated special Khmer food dishes like turtle and very fine spirits. The building was constructed using eight wooden pillars, which formed a place for receiving Thai diplomats and leaders that came for meetings. The idea of using massive pillars in erecting the house belonged to

Ta Mok, who wanted to preserve the structure for posterity for future Khmer generations. Ta Mok lost his leg when he stood and watched a tractor pulling dirt and leveling the ground; the tractor touched a mine which exploded, causing Ta Mok to lose his leg at Point 1003 Village 50, after which he was taken to Thailand to recover (although some witnesses say that Ta Mok lost his leg by stepping on a mine himself when he went to oversee his own arms cache).

The villa consists of four structures that were constructed and re-constructed at different periods, beginning in 1990.¹⁸⁶ Over the course of time, these buildings housed a relatively stable group of people, including Ta Mok, various family members and adopted sons, bodyguards, drivers, and cooks. The site is located perhaps 500 m from the main town road, with a fairly rocky path leading to the property.¹⁸⁷ The dam blocking the O Chik was constructed through the early 1990s, creating what is now the lake, upon whose shore the villa now rests.¹⁸⁸

The O Chik Bridge lies 500 m from the roundabout in the center of Anlong Veng. It was built under Ta Mok's control in 1991. Pot Pol disagreed with Ta Mok about building this bridge. But Ta Mok did not listen to Pol Pot. The construction took place over a two-year period during which machinery and technicians were brought in from Thailand. Before the bridge construction, the O Chik stream was a small rivulet of 20–30 m width. Up until the time that Ta Mok arranged the construction of the bridge, the transport of all sorts of materials and armaments had been quite difficult. The construction of the bridge was divided in to three stages:

- 1) 1990–1991: making of a weir and traversing the stream at the bottom of the weir*
- 2) 1992: construction of a bridge that was lower than the weir, which was subsequently destroyed in 1994.*
- 3) construction anew beginning in 1994.*

The primary site at the villa, overlooking the O Chik Lake—the one which seems to capture the attention of informants—is the large meeting hall on the estate, whose

second/present incarnation was completed in 1996. The interior walls of this hall are painted with murals that depict various historical sites (Angkor Wat and Prassat Preah Vihear), a map of the country, and a waterfall scene. The first building that was constructed, a house, now forms something of a carport exhibiting one of Ta Mok's "tiger cage" prisons. The remaining two structures were residences for Ta Mok and his support staff.

Nowadays, the caretaker of the estate is a man in his 50s named Roeung who first arrived in the Dangrek Range in 1987. During his initial years in the Anlong Veng area, he looked after Ta Mok's house on the escarpment, an experience that led working group member Nut Krem to appoint him the custodian to the villa. Roeung's historical movements are summed up in following orders: "From 1996 to 1998, I stayed in the rear on the mountain and made mines. During that time, I worked in a number of fields: when they required me to work in handicrafts, I went; when they required me to clear mines, I went there; when they required me to make mines, I went." Roeung had a leg amputated in February 1982 after he stepped on a mine, but he says he has never stopped being a Khmer Rouge soldier. Roeung and his conflictive stories (*roeung* រឿង) form the welcoming presence that first greets visitors to the lakeside house.



When the group from Pailin broke away, the Thais had a stranglehold on the leaders. Pol Pot had built a secret house in Trabaing Prey in 1990, a place about which only the very high leaders knew.

Pol Pot's Secret House is so secret, it is easy to miss.¹⁸⁹ Built at the end of 1996,

the construction of the site seems contemporaneous with other construction efforts. Ta Mok had wanted all the top leaders—Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn, Chan Youran, Mak Ben, Tep Khunnal, Kao Bunheng, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan, and Pol Pot—to move closer to his house on the lake. He had intended to build houses for them along the main road. As one informant indicated, “After the Khmer Rouge became aware that Hun Sen had outlawed the Khmer Rouge, they became scared. Because they were afraid the government would come fight, the Khmer Rouge prepared a lot and began moving around.” The fear of RCAF/Thai cooperation in 1996 in an assault from the west seems the motivation for construction of these safe houses.¹⁹⁰

One notion of accuracy—the correctness of location—arose in the search for Pol Pot’s Secret House and Khieu Samphan’s House, both located in the flatlands below the mountain. With Sophorn’s momentum, stories had circulated that these two sites’ labeling had been switched. After many extended stays in Anlong Veng, I began to doubt some aspects of the memory of Ta Mok’s adopted son—become—tourism official, mainly on the basis of his age (an impediment to clear, first-hand knowledge). The time period that seems most crucial for the construction of what are now deemed historical-tourist sites is 1989 through 1994; Sophorn would have been between 8 and 13 years old during that period. It is quite possible, and even likely, that he is too young to have clear memories of sites, especially if he did not have a regular presence at them. The certainty he asserted with regards to destinations may derive from the work (interviews) he conducted with the Department of Tourism. Some of the information he presents to tourists (at a fee) is certainly second-hand, a product of work with government offices, because he would have been too young to know certain information or to have been

present at particular historically significant events.¹⁹¹ Regardless, he was insistent about the “Khieu Samphan’s House” site, which he claimed was mislabeled “Pol Pot’s Secret House,” and his insistence may be the sole or primary reason that the Ministry of Tourism was (entertaining the possibility of) acknowledging that the sites were mislabeled and the signs were misplaced/switched.¹⁹² This issue of proper demarcation, specifically in relation to these two sites, broaches the issue of whether his (intimate) knowledge of Anlong Veng areas flows from the Ministry of Tourism’s efforts and/or whether the ministry’s decisions are largely informed by his claims to know. With its overriding concern for “accuracy” and cross-checking, it is difficult to imagine the ministry endowing any one person with an overwhelming authority with regards to sites. The capture/seizure of “authority” seems to be one of the primary goals of this historical memorialization, aggregating the mini-prerogatives of informants into an edifice of authority.

My venture to the (newly discovered) “Pol Pot’s Secret House” site was guided by the resident owner of Ta Mok’s Middle House (lower) whose certainty about the location was admittedly established by village rumor.¹⁹³ It is difficult to gauge whether the rumor emanated from the presence of the Ministry of Tourism sign which states “Pol Pot’s Secret House” or whether the sign reflected the village expertise, even though my guide was skeptical about anyone in the hamlet knowing with first-hand certainty. Subsequently, other informants (from other villages) added corroborating information to give my guide’s “rumor” the status of “fact.”

The guide who led me to the “Khieu Samphan’s House” site seemed very matter-of-fact in stating the identity of the location, perhaps unaware that there would have been

any question as to the certainty of the site. He offered second-hand corroboration of his claim (a bodyguard he knew), which was further supported by the son of one of the higher-ups that used to occupy the area. Furthermore, some informants have not been shy in expressing their own unease about the lack of accuracy afflicting some of the Ministry of Tourism efforts. One informant expressed some subtle, and some overt, criticism of the ministry, suggesting that its officers are ill-informed or at least proceeding without clear information. Another informant, who spent many years with Pol Pot, commented on the mis-positioning of the Khieu Samphan sign, saying, “When the Oddar Meanchey Department of Tourism puts signs in the wrong places, people who know well about the places will laugh at them. I am afraid people will laugh, and I want to put the signs in the right places. The signs on the mountain are in the wrong places as well.”¹⁹⁴ From these comments and others, it has become clear that in the minds of some villagers, the Tourism Ministry and the provincial department are often viewed as outside forces, not emerging from the local expertise/experience of the district.



Built in 1990, the remnants of Ta Mok’s Middle House (lower) or Middle Warehouse—as the name of its surrounding village, Khlaing Kandal, indicates—has not achieved official designation (a blue sign) within the Tourism Ministry’s historical-tourist area; more recently, it has been considered for inclusion, under the name “Ta Mok’s Transport Depot” (*kânlaeng kaarthaan doekchorchounh* កន្លែងការដ្ឋានដឹកជញ្ជូន).¹⁹⁵ Informants indicated that originally Ta Mok lived at the middle house for two years, along with some

family members.¹⁹⁶ After Ta Mok ceased residing there, the middle house was converted into a warehouse which stored many vehicles, including five Land Cruisers (three for Ta Mok, one for Pol Pot, and one for Khieu Samphan). Further inquiry discovered that even after its existence as a transport depot, the area was a performance space for irregularly-scheduled theatrical performances that were subsequently re-played over the radio. In the aftermath of the Son Sen killing, the site was used as a resettlement camp to hold some 100 pro-Pol Pot families.

The theatrical use of the site for songs, skits, and radio indicates a well-developed cultural/arts component in operation by the Khmer Rouge after its 1979 overthrow.¹⁹⁷ Efforts by the ousted DK officials continued the use of airwaves as a means for propaganda and securing support. Informants involved in this piece of the cultural project report working under the supervision of Kheum Ngon, among whose duties were the managing of a section of the Department of Culture and Fine Arts.¹⁹⁸ The Department of Culture coordinated artistic endeavors, which included the painting of the murals on the interior walls of Ta Mok's lakeside villa. Two primary artists—the teacher (Mr. Eng, who organized activities in Ta Mok's Sector 1003) and his student—were endowed with the responsibility of depicting the grandeurs of Khmer history for Ta Mok (and their comrades). In addition to villa augmentation, these two painters were involved in the creation of signs/placards, which were used 1) to educate people about the situation in Anlong Veng, and 2) to encourage soldiers at the front.

From discussions with informants, the most significant cultural forms of post-1979 Democratic Kampuchea were: 1) songs broadcast on the radio, whose content were essentially intended to bolster support (moral and military) for the Khmer Rouge in their

battle against the Vietnamese, and 2) live theater which took the form of primarily dialogue-driven skits and plays. The primary vehicle for the transmission of post-Democratic Kampuchea arts was a band of four radio trucks, which broadcasted in pairs at different shifts. (One of these trucks remains at the Region 4 Military Headquarters in Anlong Veng, although thoroughly damaged/ scavenged.) A certain mobility emerged for these performers, within Koh Kong province (in the early 1980s), through Pailin (1985 to 1994), and on to Anlong Veng (in 1994). There seems to have been around three to five people (who worked closely with Pol Pot) who were primarily responsible for the composition and transmission of these politico-cultural elements; all final approval for these works came directly from Pol Pot. One informant in particular had daily ongoing association with Pol Pot, as he was responsible for writing news reports (in addition to his activities as a performer). Although Pol Pot would not speak live on the radio, other figures were more actively involved in the broadcasts; these included Khieu Samphan, Mak Ben, and Chan Youran. Aside from speeches from these officials, the three daily transmissions included primarily songs and news/propaganda. My cultural informants offered a sampling a some of these war-time tunes, albeit in a hushed voice for fear that others might hear.¹⁹⁹ The songs generally conveyed morals including prohibitions against drinking, stealing, gambling, and mistreating the people and encouragement to soldiers to live properly.



His house built in 1988, Khieu Samphan (who had been the State Presidium from 1975 to 1979, but lived mostly in Kampong Cham) had the support of Ta Mok, who

brought him to live nearby because it facilitated relationships with the outside. Khieu Samphan has four children (two sons and two daughters), and this house was used to hide him and his family. When he went with Ta Mok up the mountain, he had soldiers protect and look after the site and cultivate plants.

Although there was dissension about which is the correct path to Khieu Samphan's house, there has been a general consensus that the Ministry of Tourism's blue indicator sign is within the vicinity of the site.²⁰⁰ In addition to concern about the signpost location, informants have also indicated that the name of the site is slightly inadequate. Although Khieu Samphan did live there for short periods, numerous residences in the environs housed many ambassadorial elites as well, including: Chan Youran (Mali, China, Pakistan), "Pon," Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn, Mak Ben (Yugoslavia), In Sopheap (Egypt), Kao Bunheng, Tep Khunnal, "Phan", and "Khorn." The purpose of the residence was to offer a refuge from onslaughts that might occur on the mountaintop homes, with one informant calling the site a "mobile house." This justification would support the short time period and irregular frequency of Khieu Samphan's residency at the site, as a number of informants indicated. Given that the structures began to be built toward the end of 1996, this site may have been a response to increased military campaigns by the government, following Ieng Sary's defection in Pailin (with his tens of thousands of troops).

The site seems to have consisted of four or six residential structures (as well as some secondary structures like kitchens and outhouses) roughly aligned east to west. What remains of the houses are pieces of wood scattered in slightly overgrown clearings.²⁰¹ Given the lack of structures or even much *residuum*, the site seems to foreground (the presence of) an absence. There are only people's memories to constitute

this “site” as an historical-tourist site. Otherwise (to most tourists without a local guide), the location might simply represent random paths through the forest with an occasional clearing. The uncertainty engendered by the absence of structures may be the source of the Ministry of Tourism’s confusion in labeling. It is hard to understand how this far-away “site” will draw tourists; perhaps it will have some historical significance for local/Khmer tourists.

Its past significance for nearby inhabitants has contributed to its deconstructed historical stature. Looting is a typical issue for anthropologists/archaeologists, and it has a couple expressions in the context of Khmer Rouge tourist sites.²⁰² While there is the typical confiscation by those who seek a profit for items of historical significance (i.e., antiquities), there is also the destruction of property for its composite materials. Both of these forms of “looting” occur in Anlong Veng, and they provoke a relatively singular attitude from informants. At Ta Mok’s lakeside villa, the buildings are mostly barren inside; it is clear that much of what could be looted has been, including windows, doors, and pieces of the ceiling—perhaps another way in which objects are subject to struggle. The villa caretaker expressed some simmering hostility that lumped together those who criticize the Khmer Rouge (as being killers of the people) and those who have stolen nearly all the objects from the buildings. One of Ta Mok’s drivers also concurred that the looting of the villa had subverted the project of exhibiting the original (and, therefore, interesting) contents of the house. At Khieu Samphan’s house, the theme of “looting” emerged, and it is clear that the people who pillaged this site (perhaps only for its timber) are the reason no structures (any of the houses or various guard stations) remain. There is an implicit, sometimes explicit, judgment about those who have pillaged the historical

sites for their noteworthy objects: a general condemnation and frustration about the absence of these relics from their original (appropriate) resting place.

Looting (the prevention thereof) also occupies one of the central duties of military and police personnel in Anlong Veng who are cooperating with the Ministry of Tourism. In fact, there seems to be a fair bit of (clandestine) monitoring of the tourist sites, even though most of the sites have already been stripped of their contents. A couple informants who work in this area have stated that their job is to protect all people who visit the sites, but also to keep safe *all the objects* that remain. The Ministry of Tourism has also stated its interest in recovering the objects (not materials) from the Khmer Rouge cadre's houses, focusing mainly on furniture that has been removed and presumably remains in the hands of local villagers.²⁰³



From May 1990, there was a pioneering group of 12 people who began construction with Thai and Khmer technicians and machines bought from Thailand—seven table saws, two generators, 100 Hino-brand drag chains—that altogether took 32 workers. In 1993, the mill began sawing operations, but after six months, fighting had damaged 50 percent of the sawmill. In May, repairs were made to allow operations to recommence until March 1997. The size of the sawmill was 40 m x 72 m (counting the whole lumber yard, it is much larger than this). The sawmill processing capacity was 30 m³ per day. Son Sen's body and those of his relatives were taken to this cremation site in the area of the sawmill. Nowadays, Anlong Veng villagers have divided up the land from this sawmill into individual properties and kept one place to build a pagoda (already built). One of Ta Mok's daughters has built a house in this area.

The remnants of the concrete foundation and wooden pillars of Ta Mok's Sawmill

begin approximately 400 m east of the main road (about 150 m northeast of the Ministry of Tourism's blue sign), most easily accessed by the north fork of the cut-off. The newly-erected stone pagoda, Wat Srah Chhouk, stands quite close, perhaps ten meters, from the eastern edge of the foundation. (The older wooden pagoda sits about 20 m to the north of the remnants.) The site consists mainly of concrete passageways sunken in the earth, with the occasional stump of a wooden support pillar. The channels have now become overgrown with weeds and grass, and the sub-ground level areas are filled with stagnant water.²⁰⁴

In its previous state, the mill and lumber yard extended nearly two hectares, stretching from the location of the Ministry of Tourism signpost to the pagoda and 200 m north to south. According to the former chief of operations, construction of the wood-cutting facility began in April/May 1991 or 1992 and finished in 1993.²⁰⁵ Timber had been a trade that sustained the Khmer Rouge throughout its outlawed existence, particularly after China withdrew its explicit support for the movement.

In the last years of Cambodia's civil war, which ended in 1998, both the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh government used logging to fund military campaigns and then used military campaigns as a pretext for more logging. Cambodia's leaders have since found it hard to kick the habit of treating the country's forests as a slush fund for political campaigns, personal enrichment and rewarding key clients.²⁰⁶

According to the former chief of the sawmill, the lumber had been used for the people and soldiers; the wood went to build houses, the school, the bridge, the hospital, and the health clinic in front of the hospital. Contradicting claims that the timber industry in Anlong Veng and other places supported the Khmer Rouge through its defeat, the former chief claims that only a small amount of wood was sold to the Thais, and this

lumber would have been hauled up the mountain and across the border.²⁰⁷ Logging was an (emerging) industry in Anlong Veng's peace-filled afterlife. Throughout the district, the traces of the trade, licit and illicit, were ever-present: the roads torn up by trucks with weighty wooded cargo; the clear-cut areas visible from atop the Dangrek Range; sitting on the shoulders of the mountain, one could always hear the sound of chainsaws, tearing down the tree-filled canopy beneath.²⁰⁸

Fighting erupted at two different times after the sawmill's construction. In the early part of the Khmer New Year (May/June) of 1994, government soldiers managed to capture Anlong Veng and hold it for two weeks, during which time they destroyed half the mill. The burned site was damaged again slightly in the fighting of 1995, when the government advanced but did not succeed in seizing the district. In 1998, the sawmill ceased being used, because the Khmer Rouge retreated up the mountain. The former mill supervisor asserts that all the machinery was in excellent condition at that time with a significant quantity of good wood, but the combat between the retreating forces and the government soldiers led to the site's destruction. The remaining usable lumber was claimed by the victors.

The lumber yard is now mostly occupied by modest homes, among which lies the last resting place of the Son Sen family. One inhabitant at this grave site heard by word of mouth that the district chief was planning on taking the land—the plot, the yard, and house near it—to create a "Son Sen tourism area." These concerns echoed slightly through the views of those neighboring the grave site. Although the articulation of the issue was a bit confused, the status and control of the land (or, an as-yet-undesignated potential tourist site) seemed to be subject to a certain fluidity (mobility of ownership).

The land, once freely given by village authorities, might now be revoked by the same or higher-level authorities. Suspicions abound that the seizure of the land would be for the personal enrichment of district-level elites. More tragically, it seems the museum project might be used as an excuse for retaking tracts of land by the local government. These stories of possible land seizures in the environs of the lumber mill appeared to be the unfinished products of the village rumor mill, with only the slightest of ignitions. The ideas have been heard “from one person to another,” but no one seems capable of naming an individual (or authority figure) who firmly indicated that land seizures would occur in the future. One informant traced the origin of the rumor to a visit to the area by chiefs of varying administrative levels within the district. The government visitors likely communicated the Ministry of Tourism’s hope that it would be able to reconstruct all the sites in Anlong Veng.²⁰⁹ A local resident conveyed,

This land before belonged to Ta Mok, and he put a sawmill here. After Ta Mok lost power, the government gave the land to the local authorities to give to the people. Some local people think that in the future the government will take the land to rebuild the sawmill again, because the government officials want the opinion of the general public abroad to understand that this was the real situation before, under Ta Mok. Some people think the government will make a tomb on Son Sen’s grave. People say that if the government needs this land, the government should pay compensation money to the people so they can move to another place. Because everything belonged to the Khmer Rouge before, the government wants to show foreigners all over the world that the Khmer Rouge were really in Cambodia. The information is unclear; we have only heard it. This whole land belonged to Ta Mok, and the whole land was a sawmill. Then the local authorities gave it out to the villagers. On the other hand, some authorities say the government may take the land in the future. But

if the government takes the land, they will do according to the government's idea (i.e., to re-make a sawmill)."

The land in Srah Chhouk village that surrounds the Ta Mok Sawmill (and lumber yard) and Son Sen's grave was part of a land distribution effort under the direction of the former co-chiefs of the village. After their belated defections (spending the greater part of 1998 with Ta Mok in the Phu Noy Camp area in Thailand), these chiefs returned to the land on which they had formerly resided. Through official complaints to the commune and district chiefs, they eventually secured the land for themselves and for other villagers who were without property. Some 179 hectares were distributed (at not cost) to 131 families, averaging over one hectare per household. When the land was given, there was no indication that the government would seek to reclaim the land. The only area that seemed difficult to transfer was the area around Son Sen's grave, because villagers refused to take it. Ultimately, the land was given to a couple of new people, who were instructed to tend to the grave site. The actual site of the sawmill (what now remains a series of water-filled trenches and foundations) was never disbursed. The new pagoda of Srah Chhouk village is now located right beside these ruins.

One former village co-chief expressed extreme certainty in the villagers' right to their land: "Hun Sen said that people who used to live on the land would have the same land when they returned [from the mountain], and authorities would not be allowed to take the people's land." However, there was some discrepancy in how this respondent addressed possible development: if authorities want to develop, "they must compensate the villagers for their land," but also "they must adhere to the villagers' decision" about how the land is used. These not necessarily incompatible statements hint at a tension between government promises (perhaps emanating from Hun Sen personally) at the time

of reintegration and the always-present claim to “eminent domain” which may be exercised by the Ministry of Tourism at some point in the future, in the name of development through tourism. The tension which emerges out of this state of un-resolution produces effects in district-, commune-, and village-level government as well as among the villagers who believe in the certainty of their land titles but also recognize the power of the authorities.

Fears were not allayed, because it seemed the village chief had hinted at the possibility of the government taking back the land associated with the sawmill and the larger area which was its lumber yard. The dispute over the land of Ta Mok’s wood processing site, and including Son Sen’s grave, seems rooted in a change of local authorities. The previous village co-chiefs distributed the land out to people in need; the new village chief who took over in February 2002 is the figure that appeared to be promulgating the fears of eminent domain. This village chief recounted that he was approached by two Department of Tourism officials in May 2002 who asked him to look after the tourist areas in Anlong Veng, to keep them for the purposes of historical-tourism. The officials did not explain what their purposes with the land would be, and they did not re-approach him after that initial meeting. The chief did not understand what the government representatives wanted to do with the former sawmill land, supposing that they might build a resort around Son Sen’s grave. He seemed confident that something would be done with the land in the future, because it belonged to the Khmer Rouge—“the last area of the Khmer Rouge.” He knew that the former chiefs distributed the land to villagers; however, he thought the residents do not have formal ownership and only live on the land temporarily, because he believed the government understands the

land to be in its possession. In his opinion, the sawmill site should be kept as an historical-tourist place, so that the nation and internationals can know this place belonged to the Khmer Rouge. Thus, he agrees with what he believes is the perspective of the government tourist officials, even though he had only one encounter with them and was not fully cognizant of their aims.

The sawmill must certainly have been a significant site, not only for its sheer size but also for its importance to the local economy. However, the current village chief, who was also the former sawmill supervisor, likely prioritizes this Khmer Rouge site in particular, because he was chief of its operations. This hypothesis invites validity given that although he was village chief, he did not seem to be guarding the villagers' interests (their livelihood, which is tied to the land), as the previous co-chiefs had done. Instead, he seemed committed to establishing and preserving the sawmill area, even if it meant relocating villagers who had now begun to eke out a living from this area.

There are at least three inter-related tensions that are brought to the fore in this aspect of the museum project: inheritance (of land and land issues), eminent domain, and the effects of Ministry/Department of Tourism actions in local governance. The village chief's land issue (villagers' claims vs. the government's tourism efforts) seemed to be inherited from the two former village chiefs. Perhaps guided by a different interpretation of the government's aims or unaware of them, these previous local leaders distributed the land to villagers. (On the villagers' side of the equation, the issue of property often boils down to a problem of documentation: of use, residence, inheritance, or ownership.) This scenario hints at the possibility that land in general is a problem of inheritance—the government “inheriting” the territorially-based memorialization imperatives from the

Khmer Rouge. The Cambodian government seems to have inherited the mobility of Ta Mok, the grounding patriarch who forms the central figure of the Anlong Veng museum, the “Ta Mok Museum.”²¹⁰

The relation between memorialization and land ownership seems to emerge out of the reverberations of Ministry and Department of Tourism actions in local government and then, consequently, in village life. The probability of land seizure was likely the product of the village chief’s particular *interpretation* of the message he received (on one occasion) from the Department of Tourism’s Working Group on Anlong Veng. The fact that preservation was not aggressively pursued since the *possibility* was mentioned in May 2002 suggests the enduring threat arising from: the chief’s understanding of the Ministry of Tourism’s aims with regard to the reconstruction of sites; his respect for government authority; and his personal prioritization of the sawmill site.²¹¹

This also points to how national objectives are interpreted and implemented locally, often hinting at a rural (periphery)/urban (capital) split that has long plagued Cambodian politics. In Hun Sen’s 2001 circular, it is not clear that the exercise of eminent domain over all sites of historical import necessitates the seizure of villagers’ land. The actions around the museum in relation to land ownership suggest that a radical (mis)translation occurs between what is said, or maybe even intended, within the capital of Phnom Penh, and how local leaders makes sense of those directives, or make those directives into “sense” (*sens*), according to the conditions of life in the countryside.²¹²



The site of the Son Sen family grave site has undergone a number of transformations: rice fields, sawmill/lumber yard, cremation site, and home with the possibility of it re-becoming a “sawmill,” reconstructed by the Ministry of Tourism for tourist visual consumption (i.e., not wood production). Although as yet to receive official blue-sign demarcation by the ministry, the grave is located within the larger area demarcated by Ta Mok’s lumber yard), which is now a relatively populated area within the large village of Srah Chhouk.²¹³ From first-hand accounts, the grave is said to contain ten bodies (although other news reports indicate 11 or 12), including Son Sen, Yun Yat (his wife), their children, as well as some extended and adopted family members.²¹⁴ The cremation/burial site itself lies within the perimeter fence, in the front yard of a villager’s house, the owner of which was given the land by local officials sometime after 1998. The inhabitants of the house tend to the grave, clearing weeds, lighting incense on holy days, and beautifying the mound with flowers; these actions are followed so as to ask for mercy and protection from the spirits of the dead.²¹⁵ The village chief of Srah Chhouk provided the structure-free land to the husband; in exchange for back-pay owed him by his employer, the husband took wood which he used to build the simple home behind the cremation mound. “Nobody dared to take the land, because they were afraid,” indicated many residents. When the recently-received resident came to live at the house, she was afraid of the spirits of the dead (*khmaoch* គ្រូរាម). She lit incense and put it on the grave. Every holy day (*thngai soel* ថ្ងៃសីល), she follows this grave ritual to ask for mercy from the spirits of the dead, requesting that they not frighten her family but bring them happiness while they inhabit this land. In her account of these appeasement practices, she mentions others’ supernatural encounters with the site. Some neighbors

told her they had seen (relatively small) fire flying from the grave, up and outward, and they claimed to have seen this fairly often; after a prayer ceremony, the fire ceased and did not return.²¹⁶

The story of Son Sen's demise is a thread that weaves together a large swatch of the Anlong Veng fabric, not without its knots and dangling remainders. The story of his presence and eventual exit on the escarpment connects with a number of sites: various houses, the sawmill, the platform at which Pol Pot was sentenced, the location of a radio truck, Ta Mok's homes on the mountain and below. The tale of Son Sen's murder was a sensitive piece of information to elicit. A close aide to Ta Mok claimed, "it is difficult to explain, because it is a secret story involving a personal conflict between individuals," while a neighbor to the gravesite said, that it "maybe a story of political problems." The term "politics" became a frequent enunciation in the course of interviews, particularly among former Khmer Rouge, but not necessarily limited to upper cadre. "Politics" (*noryôbay* នយោបាយ) would indicate a (impending) silence, a discursive marker that identified the broaching of a sensitive area of discussion. In this regard, the conversational warning sign operated as a catch-all term for any information that was either too sensitive or too complex to explain to the outsider. The realms of inquiry that invoked this signifier included: the actions of higher-level cadre, especially disagreements; how well one was acquainted with, or engaged in, the endeavors of Ta Mok or Pol Pot; explanations of why/how particular battles were fought; reasons for decisions on collective action; and in particular, events surrounding Son Sen's death. (Some respondents offered more nuanced answers that acknowledged a difference of opinion about upper-level cadre, but they still marked the area of discussion as "politics")

and therefore did not elaborate much further.) The reticence to discuss topics of a political nature—including information that exceeds the boundaries of ordinary political activity, such as the nature and manner in which decisions were carried out and what attitudes were conveyed or evoked by such decisions—seemed at odds with the Tourism Ministry's expressly-stated purpose to re-present the “political lifestyle” of the Khmer Rouge leaders while their movement spent its last days in Anlong Veng.²¹⁷

In the gaps of silences, a (composite) narrative could be gleaned from various sources—with attendant inaccuracies, inconsistencies, biases, and a general lack of coherence. Son Sen was the DK Minister of National Defense and also had *santebal* responsibilities (attested by documents from S-21 that bear his writing/notations).²¹⁸ After 1979, he represented the Khmer Rouge in the Supreme National Council during UNTAC, and he came to control Sector 1001, the area of the NADK's northern front in Preah Vihear and Stung Treng, east of Route 12.²¹⁹ His execution occurred on the night of 10 June 1997.²²⁰ Informants identify the reason for the killing of Son Sen emanating from an “argument with Pol Pot.” Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Ta Mok stayed in one area on the mountain (near Darm Chrey); Pol Pot stayed at his house at Kbal Tonsaong. Pol Pot had asked Son Sen and Nuon Chea to meet with him to do some work for the struggle; when they returned, Son Sen reported Pol Pot's plans to Ta Mok, with which Ta Mok disagreed. Pol Pot thought that Ta Mok wanted to co-operate with the Cambodian government, which enraged him and led him to order his commanders to kill Ta Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea.²²¹ Ta Mok and Nuon Chea escaped Pol Pot's plans, but Son Sen and his family were killed.²²² One long-time neighbor and acquaintance of Son Sen provided as detailed an account of the event as he could remember:

The forces were 300 strong (the many soldiers that had protected the path to Pol Pot's house at Kbal Tonsaong), and nobody knew they were coming. They were commanded by Ta Roeun [Gen. So Saroeun] and Ta San [Gen. Nhem San], high commanders (originally from the Southwestern Zone) who received orders directly from Pol Pot. The soldiers reached my house first, woke me, and warned me, "When you hear something, stay calm and do not do anything. When you see the incident, do not fight back." The whole area was already surrounded as two cars, packed full of soldiers, drove toward the residences of Son Sen and Nuon Chea, one to each house. When the headlights focused on Son Sen's house, the shooting began. (After one car went to shoot at Son Sen's house, another car went to capture Nuon Chea, his wife, their daughter, two grandchildren (one boy and one girl), an older granddaughter, and their adopted daughter.) Two houses made up the Son Sen family residence, a house for the parents and a house for the children. When the soldiers arrived, they shot two people, Son Sen's son-in-law and his nephew. When Son Sen heard the shooting, he opened the door of his house, but his wife exited before him; the soldiers shot her and she fell to the floor. Son Sen was shot as he approached his wife. (That night Son Sen had a Chinese-made K-59 handgun and two clips of bullets on his waist, but he did not manage to shoot the attackers.) After shooting four people, Pol Pot's soldiers took another six members of Son Sen's family away to be killed, about one kilometer from their house, along the road to Kbal Tonsaong. These individual's were: Yun Yat's younger sister and niece; Son Sen and Yun Yat's daughter, niece, and nephew; and their adopted daughter. Pol Pot's forces withdrew toward Kbal Tonsaong, taking Son Sen's captured relatives. These relatives were not shot but beaten to death. Before being beaten, the women were undressed and some of them were burned. Ta Mok had left five days before the attack on Son Sen in order to stay at his lakeside house in Anlong Veng. Ta Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea had plans to move down from the mountain, and

Ta Mok had already moved. Ta Mok was furious with Pol Pot, and he prepared his forces to fight back. Three forces were amassed: a group of 300 soldiers advanced from the middle house on the mountain, and two units of 300 soldiers each, armed with regular weapons, ascended the mountain through the jungle directly to Kbal Tonsaong. The orders were given the night of the attack, and the two sides fought until 7 AM, when Pol Pot retreated from Kbal Tonsaong. Two days later, around 11 AM or noon, Ta Mok's large units, who had scaled the mountain through jungle, captured Pol Pot.

Another informant, who became an impromptu undertaker, was living about one kilometer from Son Sen's residence on the night of the massacre. When Son Sen's family was killed, two bodies (Son Sen and Yun Yat) were immediately buried in the ground on the mountain; although more graves had been dug, the children and other relatives were yet to be interred. However, two days after the killing, Ta Mok asked that all the bodies be brought to Srah Chhouk and called the villagers to assemble at the sawmill. Ta Mok asked the gravedigger to deliver the bodies to the lumber yard to let people see the bodies, to say that Pol Pot ordered someone to kill Son Sen's family, and to make people angry with Pol Pot so that they would prosecute Pol Pot. Hundreds of people, from all the villagers around, came to see. Although no lumber was at the (present) grave site, the cremation site was surrounded on all sides by logs. Ta Mok commanded those assembled to prepare the grave and cremate the bodies, which all the villagers did together. After Son Sen was buried (originally), Ta Mok ordered all of his commanders to capture Pol Pot. At that time, Ta Mok's troops outnumbered those of Pol Pot; thus, Pol Pot's men retreated taking a radio truck along with him and broadcasting that Son Sen had betrayed the Khmer nation and people. Pol Pot was captured at Choam Pranong in Thailand, after which a corrective speech was broadcast by Khieu Samphan,

stating that Pol Pot had in fact betrayed the people.

The sawmill operator understood why Ta Mok had put the grave in that location: “There was an argument within the Khmer Rouge, and Son Sen was killed. Ta Mok took the bodies there to show people that the killer is very savage, so that the people could remember. That was Ta Mok’s purpose.” He clearly wanted to use Pol Pot’s murderous excess to his advantage, and thus selected a suitably public venue for Son Sen’s cremation and final resting place. The motive for choosing the lumber yard seems based on securing the most viewing exposure of the event on a daily basis.²²³



Pol Pot’s remains lie 1300 m from the Anlong Veng roundabout on the Dangrek Mountains. Pol Pot died on 15 April 1998 in a small house in which he was imprisoned, after Ta Mok sentenced him for killing Son Sen, about 100 m from his cremation site. Before Pol Pot died, he heard that they were going to deliver him to Thailand, after which he would be taken to the UN for legal prosecution. Upon hearing this, he let his wife dye his hair black in order to not let them recognize him in his plan to run away at night with his wife and daughter to Thailand in order to mix with Thai people. That night, 15 April 1998, his harsh punishment and his ill health caused his death. Of the people that looked after Pol Pot each day, Uncle Kov (living in Tuol Snuol Village) came to see his body and confirmed that Pol Pot was in fact dead and brought 2 blocks of ice from Thailand to put on the corpse to prevent its decomposition and injected a medicine. Then the family came to take Pol Pot’s body to cremate 10 m in front of the house. Because the cremation was to occur in the area surrounding the house, Kov could not find anything but car tires to use for the pyre. After the cremation, Pol Pot’s wife and daughter went to a camp at Phu Lay, Thailand, where they made consecrating merits once again in accordance with Khmer tradition.

Of the sites presented on Anlong Veng's tourist menu, Pol Pot's cremation site draws the largest recognition and outside focus. Journalists' accounts take the mythically-empowered grave as the centerpiece of reportage on the upcoming "Khmer Rouge theme park"—free marketing that extends beyond the audiences the Ministry of Tourism initially tapped. The site seems to foster the flourishing and embellishment of narratives, heaping legend onto the DK leader's newly lauded long home. People come to pray to his spirit, which, good or bad, is seen as powerful. Some Cambodians have made pilgrimages to the pyre in hopes of securing lucky lottery picks.²²⁴ Random ghost tales and historical conjecture swarm about the border among the more recent occupiers of the area. Some youth who went to draw water from a local pond reported seeing a ghost wandering about, very big, very black, and naked (except for underwear briefs) with lots of hair. Others have seen a ghost roam without a head and carrying a gun on its shoulders. The narrated reactions are likely indicative of new arrivals' responses to the mysteriousness and trepidation associated with Khmer Rouge sites. A young woman, originally from Pursat but residing at Nhoen's former house at Choam Pass, somewhat disbelievingly stated, "The people who see the ghosts think maybe these are the ghosts of Khmer Rouge, because here was the front line of the Khmer Rouge. They're just speculating." She has never seen a ghost, but if she did, she would be too afraid to remain at the residence. Pol Pot's non-undead wandering also figures in features of fantasy. On 15 April 1998, Brother Number One passed away from a heart attack. However, stories abound about Pol Pot's possible persistent being. The usual rumor ponders the odd presence of hair dye at the leader's last abode, suggesting a disguised disappearance across the border, into Thai territory, and beyond. Although some believe

that the convenient timing of his passing suggests foul play, close family members describe rapidly declining health.²²⁵

While the grave site receives attention for the notoriety of the movement's deceased leader, the physical landscape shows the growing encroachment of private property and commerce, making plain the death of the CPK's purported economic agenda. The area around Pol Pot's cremation site has been drastically cleared. Through 2004, the grave destination became inaccessible via the footpath that meandered through the landmines, which had figured so prominently in early visitor accounts. The former single-track route became increasingly occupied by border market sprawl; CMAC mine-clearing and the accompanying tree-cutting from the main thoroughfare, hundreds of meters northwestward, hacked out a massive (and singular) access to Pol Pot's grave. Travelers arrive at the site via this very cleared area that once contained one of Ta Mok's common houses (now converted into a carport for oversized industrial vehicles)—CMAC's 10-plus-hectare ravine-shaped expanse of de-mined, clear-cut, de-vegetated land, which would have previously shrouded the western face of the funerary glade. Once a secluded ash pile in a small clearing, near a well, at the end of a mine-lined dirt path, the site of the cindery *sáp* (សាប) of Saloth Sar has been ob-scenely opened for view from the main road through Choam Pass by the vast clearing that was claiming the forest cover. Except for the increased accessibility and the lack of surrounding trees, Pol Pot's grave itself has undergone only minor changes: soda bottles planted around the pyric perimeter, a post-and-rail *garde-fou*, and a more robust, Thai-style spirit house (*khtorm néaktaa* គ្រួសារក្រុង). The detritus that marked the big man's last hut (*khtorm néakthum* គ្រួសារក្រុង), while under house arrest, was moved uphill about three meters (and across the

footpath) from where it was previously.

The entrepreneurial invasion of Pol Pot's residuum took hold in the wake of the 2003 border opening. The sprawl of the market is one of the most significant and obvious transformations on the mountain. The stalls—which sell cigarettes, wood sculptures, toiletries, digital music and video, etc.—are interspersed with shack-style brothels (and these huts of ill-repute perhaps seduce and ensnare greater clientele than the depressing string of retailers). Economic intercourse has spread over the area where one was erected a house and kitchen belonging to Ta Mok's economics chief. The expanse appears so chaotic that some disorientation clouds the exact determination of the previous (non-designated) sites. Although growing in hope and hectareage, this commercial spirit certainly has not yet met with the strong hand of the law, which stipulates by edict: "It is absolutely prohibited to encroach on or subdivide land in an anarchic manner, or to undertake any form of construction in Anlong Veng that has an impact on this historic region without government permission, except for construction of housing for residents of the village and commune, in accordance with the Ministry of Land Management, Construction, and Urbanization."²²⁶



The gathering for the sentencing of Pol Pot for the killings of Son Sen and his family included Kheum Ngon (chief of the court), Kao Bunheng, Tep Khunnal, Nov, and Seng (governor of Anlong Veng and its surrounding areas) as well as approximately 400 people who arranged chairs for the court. Among those present was the foreign face of journalist Nate Thayer. At first, Pol Pot took the seat of honor in front of Kheum Ngon, who invited Pol Pot to vacate the seat of honor and sit to the side, after which the

sentencing of Pol Pot commenced. At that time, the people saw that Pol Pot had killed the Son Sen family with commanders Phan and Ry from Div 980. Then the people's court concluded the trial by sentencing Pol Pot and his side to life in prison starting from 1997.

The site where Pol Pot was sentenced was a large wooden covered area that currently sits 100 m from the Cambodian border checkpoint. After the killing of Son Sen and Pol Pot's capture in Thailand, Ta Mok asked the villagers to come together on the mountain and loudly proclaim "*Chayo!* Pol Pot betrays the nation!" and "Don't allow the people to follow Pol Pot's examples!" Pol Pot was not tied up; he sat in a chair with his head held low while the villagers shouted. After the boisterous sentencing ceremony, Ta Mok asked Khieu Samphan to make a radio speech explaining the situation. Pol Pot was sentenced to live alone with his family in a small hut (near what became his cremation site) without the right to speak or work.

A much longer story describes the trial and how the leader of Democratic Kampuchea came to sit accused before his most loyal general and the populace of the *Angkar's* last stronghold. Bearing in mind the museum's significance as the infrastructure of war, the Khmer Rouge–government battles from 1989 to 1999 looked like an even more protracted version of the ill-executed (counter-)offenses during the Lon Nol regime. In the early 1990s, the PDK headquarters was moved from Malai to Phnom Chhat, under the command of So Hong (Pol Pot's nephew), who controlled Sector 102. After a surprise attack by government troops overran Phnom Chhat in August 1993, the headquarters was moved to the stronghold at Anlong Veng. Ta Mok had previously controlled the area and the lion's share of the NADK *under* the command of Pol Pot; with the abandonment of Phnom Chhat, political and military leadership meant control of the new headquarters' areas *with* Pol Pot.²²⁷

The government launched an ill-fated dry season offensive from January to April 1994, which captured but quickly relinquished the strongholds of Anlong Veng (February) and Pailin (March/April). At the conclusion of the four-month operation, the PDK ended up with greater territory than it had controlled at the start.²²⁸ Both sides were seeking gains ahead of negotiations that took place in Pyongyang on 27 May (but yielded no substantive results, especially given the NADK's success). On 7 July 1994, the National Assembly passed the "Law Outlawing the Democratic Kampuchea Group" which, while banning the Khmer Rouge, also allowed King Sihanouk to grant pardons to surrendering leaders and prolonged the amnesty program (begun in 1993) for lower-level defectors. With the legislated attempt at splitting the PDK, Pol Pot and his leadership became increasingly isolated. In response to the anti-KR legislation, Khieu Samphan announced the PDK's formation of a "Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation" (PGNUNS) with him as premier and defense minister.²²⁹

In mid-1994, on Pol Pot's directive, the PDK sought to re-impose the strict social policies of the DK period, and foremost among these was a comprehensive ban on private property and a clampdown on trade.²³⁰ Rowley argues that international aid (principally from China) had softened the "self-reliant" ideology of the ousted DK; however, moderation was further fostered by social intercourse with the outside world. The cessation of that support meant a retrenchment and return to the strict policies of the past.²³¹ In the afterlife of DK, the leadership's anti-Vietnamese rhetoric increasingly diverged from reality, especially given the neighbor's unilateral withdrawal of forces, one year ahead of schedule. As well, the socio-economic benefits (from gems, logging, and business ventures in Thailand) were unequally distributed, giving the impression of a

continued struggle that enriched an elite few. Perhaps 80 percent of the NADK had been recruited after 1979, largely through conscription at refugee camps.²³² These younger cadre were less likely than their leaders to see the rationale behind unending war.²³³ The ousted DK leadership feared retribution and thus argued for continued struggle, while the youth could not reconcile the hardships of war and thus tended to favor peace and re-integration.²³⁴

Partly as a means for Pol Pot to re-assert control and partly in response to Ieng Sary's "loss" of \$10 million, Son Sen in the west was dispatched to order the relinquishing of privately-held possessions (including much-needed items like motorbikes and other consumer goods), which only served to increase growing tension and distance between Pailin and Pol Pot's headquarters at Anlong Veng.²³⁵ The fall-out between Ieng Sary and the old guard (Pol Pot and Ta Mok) also emerged in the context of long-standing personal disputes which saw Ieng Sary's demotion in the early 1990s, a growing regional autonomy in the aftermath of the CGDK military break-up, and growing financial strain due to China's end of support and pressure on Thailand to refrain from commerce with the outlawed organization.²³⁶ In July 1996, Pol Pot's delegation—Ta Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea—met with Ieng Sary and Y Chhien in Phnom Malai; Ta Mok's rigid support and enforcement of Brother Number One's orders inflamed the situation, which helped precipitate revolts in the northwestern areas.²³⁷

In August, Ieng Sary, Lt. Gen. Y Chhien (Division 415 at Pailin), and Gen. Sok Pheap (Division 450 at Malai) negotiated with the government while their forces continued to battle Ta Mok's soldiers.²³⁸ In November, the rebel faction allied with the government under an agreement that allowed them semi-autonomy (under Ieng Sary's

Democratic National Unity Movement). Ny Khon who commanded Front 250 (Sector 32 at Ta Sdao) sided with his brother (Son Sen) and Ta Mok, but lost.²³⁹ He was defeated and captured along with another brother, Son Chhum, and Ta Mok's son-in-law, Meas Muth in October; the three joined the government on 18 December. The 1996 defection proved especially damaging to Pol Pot's organization. Given the areas' importance for gems and timber, the loss in the northwest was felt financially; in addition, an elite DK leader as well as 15,000 soldiers and civilians was a military and political blow. With the failure to maintain control over the areas, the 15 December return to Anlong Veng of Ta Mok, Son Sen, and Nuon Chea was met with their "house arrest" by Pol Pot.

On Valentine's Day 1997, 15 government officials seeking negotiations with elements within the Khmer Rouge (Long Tem and Kheum Ngon)—on the side the house-arrested—were ambushed by forces allied with Pol Pot's faction. (Ten days later, Pol Pot called a meeting to announce new political and military leaders, replacing Ta Mok with Gen. So Saroeun as chief of staff and giving military command to Gen. Nhem San.) In spite of the earlier attack, negotiations with the government (FUNCINPEC) were resumed on 16 May 1997 with Tep Khunnal and Pech Bunreth negotiating on the Khmer Rouge's (Ta Mok's) behalf. On 1 June, Khieu Samphan took over negotiations and met with Prince Ranariddh, leader of FUNCINPEC; Nhiek Bun Chhay raised controversy when he publicly claimed to have made an agreement with Khieu Samphan.²⁴⁰ A reconciliation ceremony was planned for 5 July to occur at Preah Vihear Temple, where Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, and their 4,000-strong Anlong Veng faction would fuse with Gen. Nhiek Bun Chhay's forces (the RCAF, but along FUNCINPEC lines).

In the meantime (just after midnight on 10 June 1997), Pol Pot ordered his

commanders to kill Son Sen and his family. Ta Mok counter-attacked; with Ta Mok's forces in hot pursuit, Pol Pot fled north toward Thailand with Khieu Samphan, Chan Youran, Mok Ben, Kao Bunheng, In Sopheap, and others along with some radio equipment; So Saroeun engaged Ta Mok's approaching units, but Pol Pot's fixer was captured. Others in Pol Pot's party were detained amidst the continuing pursuit; ultimately, Pol Pot's flee for the border dwindled to a small band of escorts: Khieu Samphan, Meas Son "Muon" (his wife), Mul (his daughter), and five protectors (one named Ngeth).²⁴¹ The ailing Brother Number One, yoked in a hammock and saddled with an oxygen tank, was shouldered by bodyguards in his acromion escape through the Dangrek Range.²⁴² Some US\$5 million in cash had been secretly stashed while Pol Pot's heavies were burdened with lugging three other bags holding another US\$3 million. Four of the five guards would betray the languishing leader, take the suitcased sums, and join RCAF units under Gen. Khann Savoeun.²⁴³ Ngeth was dispatched to Thailand with US\$25,000 to seek out help; his capture led to the coordination of Pol Pot's apprehension in anhelation on 19 June.

In addition to fleeing fratricidal foes, the early-June courting by Ranariddh of the Khmer Rouge sparked some skirmishes in Phnom Penh. A day after second-Prime Minister Hun Sen warned that FUNCINEPC was undermining the government, bodyguards of National Police Chief Hok Lundy exchanged gunfire with royalist party security in the capital. Just over a fortnight later, this would erupt into a full *coup de force*, as a weekend of battles would unseat Ranariddh as co-Prime Minister, lead to the killing of over 100 FUNCINPEC loyalists (including the co-chief of the national police, Ho Sok, who was shot within the Ministry of Interior compound, and other military

leaders that were executed near Pochentong Airport), and the retreat of FUNCINPEC's military to its border stronghold at O Smach.²⁴⁴

The 15 June 1997 broadcast on the Radio of the Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia included a statement by the PGNUNS and National Solidarity Party from Anlong Veng:

I. Treason by Pol Pot took place from the night of 9 June to 14 June 1997.

II. This incident was resolved and normalcy was restored as of 14 June 1997 by the force of great union and in the spirit of great responsibility for the destiny of the nation, the people, the ranks and the National Army as a whole who have been rallied around the Provisional Government of National Union and National Salvation [PGNUNS] and the National Solidarity Party [NSP] headed by His Excellency Khieu Samphan, prime minister of the PGNUNS and president of the NSP.

III. The masses, the people and the National Army as a whole are cheerful and rejoicing because they have brought the treason of Pol Pot to an end. This treason has made it clear to the cadres, the combatants and the masses what was wrong and what was right, what was bad and what was good, who was wrong and who was right, and who was bad and who was good; and it helped to further strengthen solidarity and unity among the cadres, combatants, army, ranks, and people under the leadership of the PGNUNS and NSP with H.E. Khieu Samphan as prime minister and president.

IV. The PGNUNS and NSP maintain their policy of uniting with all national forces in the struggle against a war of aggression and genocide of Communist Vietnam and its lackeys, the puppets with Hun Sen as the most active ringleader. The PGNUNS and NSP continue to uphold the stand of supporting the National United Front [NUF] with Prince Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh as the chairman and the 14-point policy of the NUF.

V. The PGNUNS and NSP appeal to all combatants, cadres, ranks and masses to continue uniting as a single body with the entire Cambodian nation and people in launching an offensive against the aggressive and genocidal Communist Vietnamese enemy and his lackeys, the puppets with Hun Sen as the most active ringleader in an increasingly vigorous and militant manner to attain the goal of ending the aggressive and genocidal war of Communist Vietnam and achieving genuine national reconciliation and genuine peace in an independent, peaceful, sovereign and neutral Cambodia with all of its territorial integrity intact.²⁴⁵

On 25 July 1997, Pol Pot was tried by a “people’s tribunal,” at which he (and his commanders) faced the charge of murder for Son Sen and family, the detentions and attempted murders of Ta Mok and Nuon Chea, and the subversion of national reconciliation. A new Standing Committee was formed, composed of Ta Mok protégés—Nhorn, Kheum Ngon, Khem Tem, Nuon Nov—backed by Nuon Chea and with ultimate authority deriving from Ta Mok; the “intellectuals,” who were seen to have favored Pol Pot, were sidelined.²⁴⁶

In 1998, Ta Mok re-asserted strict control over the remnant movement, taking swift definitive action against free enterprise. However, there were reports that his grandiose military plans and growing paranoia about the ever-presence of enemies significantly undermined support from among his followers. Receiving some forewarning of a mutiny, Ta Mok gathered his loyalists and the movement’s “intellectuals” and retreated from the Anlong Veng escarpment at Darm Chrey.²⁴⁷ Civilians were stationed at Mountain 808; Ta Mok and his forces were ensconced at Mountain 200. Revolts erupted on 23 March, and Ke Pauk defected to the government, taking with him Yim Phanna and Nuon Chroeun of Division 980.²⁴⁸ These defections found roots in the longstanding loyalty to Pol Pot (disrupted by the previous year’s “people’s tribunal”),

government enticements involving lucrative logging concessions and offers of cash, promises of semi-autonomy, as well as war weariness.²⁴⁹

In early April 1998, Ta Mok and his army chief of staff Kheum Ngon were looking (pleading) to give over Pol Pot (to an international tribunal) in a *last ditch* effort to rescue their meager remnant forces, languishing in the disease- and mine-ridden jungle above Anlong Veng. Pol Pot died while in Ta Mok's custody on 15 April 1998. On 4 May, Ta Mok ceded control of Mountain 200 and retreated to Kbal Tonsaong, while civilians at Mountain 808, numbering an astonishing 15,000 crossed into Thailand's Sisaket Province establishing two "refugee" camps (under the control of Ta Mok loyalists). On 11 June, the "intelligentsia" of the waning movement (Chan Youran, Mak Ben, Thiounn Thioeunn, In Sopheap, and Kao Bunheng) defected to the government. On 4 December at Prassat Preah Vihear, a number of Ta Mok's military commanders defected—Khem Tem, Kheum Ngon, Nuon Nov, Meas Muth, and Im Phan—brought about by negotiations with Hun Sen that had been spearheaded by Kheum Ngon, Ta Mok's former army chief of staff.²⁵⁰

On 25 December, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan defected to the government after assurances they would not be arrested; in fact, the two aging DK veterans were treated to a luxurious tour of the country from Sihanoukville to Siem Reap to Pailin. Commenting on the manner in which Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan should be received, three days later, Hun Sen said Cambodians "should dig a hole and bury the past and look ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate."²⁵¹ Hun Sen's official statement on the defection (on 1 January 1999) emphasized the hopes of reintegration: "I have decided to welcome Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea to return to join in the national

reconciliation, reunification and to end the political and military organization of the Khmer Rouge.”²⁵² The two former KR elite were officially welcomed by Chea Sim at the CPP 7 January 20th anniversary celebration of Pol Pot’s overthrow, in which the defection was noted as “a positive phase that brings a definitive end to the war, and strengthens peace and national unity in Cambodia.”

From late 1998 until March 1999, Ta Mok and his loyalists were camped just across the border at Nga-Saam Pass, shield by Thailand’s military (Special Unit 838 as well as one infantry battalion).²⁵³ Ta Mok and his commanders were “invited” to a 6 March 1999 meeting at Chhorng Sangum Pass (Thailand) at which they were detained, driven to Anlong Veng, and quickly whisked off by helicopter to Phnom Penh. Ta Mok, the last Khmer Rouge (often referred to by English-language journalists as “the butcher”), was initially charged with breaking the 1994 law that outlawed his organization.²⁵⁴ Special legislation was enacted to maintain his (indefinite) pre-trial detention of him (and former director of S-21, “Duch”) beyond Cambodia’s limit of six months; separate charges of “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” allowed him to be detained for additional three-year terms beyond the original legislation. Ta Mok died at the Preah Khet Mealea Military Hospital in Phnom Penh on 21 July 2006, while still in custody.



Ta Mok’s mountaintop house was a resting place as well as a command center. Using the geographic conditions of a heavily forested mountain, Ta Mok installed heavy artillery and machine guns of various caliber in order to shoot at and attack government troops stationed anywhere in Anlong Veng District. There were two houses: one covered

with tile that had a place to store water jugs on a stone wall and another bigger house that had a pond. Among the various special plants and fruits that were cultivated were two champaka trees [ដើមផ្កាចំប៉ី = *Michelia champaca*]. There was an eating area and a table for sitting and discussing work. One unfinished house in the area had only walls, made of 20-cm-thick concrete and topped with razor wire. This razor wire was 8 mm thick, and the other parts of the structure were fashioned from 2-cm-thick planks of samraong wood [ដើមសំរោង = *Sterculia lychnophora*]. From the mountaintop one can see across Anlong Veng District.

A restaurant/guesthouse, sitting on Ta Mok's ledge (*loy ឈរ*), welcomes foreigners and Cambodians, the general public and official delegations. Over the years that I researched Anlong Veng, the establishment's proprietor, Mr. Ruon, continued to develop and upgrade his restaurant/guesthouse. The enterprise now has a series of six typical Cambodian elevated, thatch-covered seating areas (*kânhchoh កញ្ចប់*), which line the area near the cliff, as well as four cabins that constitute the "guesthouse." A larger common restaurant has been built further back from the escarpment's edge (and closer to Ruon's luxurious mountain abode). Gardens of flowers populate the area along with a spirit house (*khtorm neaktaa ខ្នងអ្នកតា*) and numerous avian creatures—geese, pigeons, doves, myna birds, chickens (of multiple varieties), and three turkeys (*moan barang ម៉ាញ់បារាំង*) (or *dindons*, as Ruon liked to speak French to me). The sound of chainsaws and sights of greater clear-cutting are still evident from the overlook at Ruon's picnic area.

Ruon arrived in Anlong Veng in the dry season of 1999, holding the rank of major and positioned as the deputy high commander of the RCAF's Region 4 Development Zone. His first stationing within the area was Ta Mok's middle house and its secondary structure near the cliff, "Ta Mok's headquarters for meetings of high commanders." This

middle house estate contained two houses, which Ruon claims had already been looted by soldiers and had been surrounded by mines.²⁵⁵ After four months of being stationed at the middle house, Ruon began to explore this area called the overhang (*perng phnom* ពើមភ្នំ), and he was awed by its surrounding beauty. He made a small road, some foreigners came to visit, and these visitors gave him the idea to establish a guesthouse. After more ideas from foreigners, he started to build the restaurant; he and his daughter started offering food in 2001.²⁵⁶ Ruon started building the kitchen and the three bungalows (whose long roofs give the impression of jungle chalets), which started to attract mostly foreign customers. He received permission for these entrepreneurial endeavors from officials at the Department of Tourism, even before operating licenses had been instituted for the district.²⁵⁷

Ruon's aims to shift his focus from historical-tourism to eco-tourism. He sensed that although many people are familiar with the Khmer Rouge, there is a greater demand for places of natural beauty (which also concurs with his own interest in the area). He has been a soldier for a long time, and he seeks a place of calm to enjoy and also to pursue a profitable business with the 11 family members that have come to assist him. He plans to make many small resorts in many places for people to come and play. He will make some small paths in the forest so people can see nature and Ta Mok's waterfall, 1 km away.²⁵⁸ In 2004, Ruon's restaurant received on average 20 Khmers per day and 10 to 15 Thais per day, a dramatic surge since the border opening. The guesthouse only gets Khmer guests once in a while, but about four to five foreigners per week stay there.



Pol Pot's house, in Kbal Tonsaong and fortified by two walls, the bricks and arrangement of which were Thai, had a meeting place below as well as a place to keep supplies, money, and other various objects. The area of Pol Pot's house before was a place for Ta Mok to raise animals (cows) until he prepared the area as a residence for Pol Pot in 1992.

Perched on the frontal lobe of Kbal Tonsaong, Pol Pot's mountain house is located about 7 km down the road from Ta Mok's cliff house. Built during 1992 and 1993, the structure originally was composed of two above-ground floors and a basement, with a separate kitchen. The building was commissioned by Ta Mok while Pol Pot was with Ieng Sary in Malai, after which Brother Number One was invited to inhabit the house. In its present state (having been severely looted), the ruined residence barely indicates the existence of an upper floor. Almost all the walls are demolished, and light blue tiles persist as some of the only evidence of what the structure may have been like.

The original retreat was erected by three construction workers, who had arrived in the Dangrek Range in 1988. These men, now in their early 50s, express a special relationship to their achievement. The sentiment can be traced in comments about the locale's present condition, in repeated statements that "if the houses were not looted, they would still be standing." (An implicit judgment regarding the acts of others (outsiders?) wanted to be conveyed.) Further, as one builder stated, "if they were not looted, the houses would gain money for the government to give to the district. Many tourists would come to see the houses." The awareness of tourism potential is perhaps their second concern with regard to the museum. When asked about their attitudes toward the project, another construction worker responded, "the museum is important because it is built to

remind people about history and old things that the Khmer Rouge left. On the other hand, we have a border foundation between Thailand and Cambodia. We are afraid Thailand takes our land, so we build the museum and the house near the border.” A third builder concurred, explaining that Ta Mok had asked them to measure the land between Thailand and Cambodia and to build the house near the landmark, because he was afraid the Thais would move the landmark further into Cambodia.²⁵⁹

Although the actual term “replica” (*voattho chamlâng* វត្ថុចម្លង)—literally, “object-copy”—was not deployed by informants, their descriptions indicate that *in situ*, life-size reconstructions of the major sites constitute a key aspect within the overall vision of the Anlong Veng museum project.²⁶⁰ “Same as before” (*dauchmun* ដូចមុន) is a more common colloquial expression of this emergent concept.²⁶¹ The verisimilitude of these new reconstructions is largely dependent on the mental image in the minds of those who originally erected the buildings. The field of representation opens to numerous pressures and various perspectives on the relationship between originality and historical reconstruction. One of Ta Mok’s drivers was articulate in explaining an obstacle to representing Anlong Veng history. He conveyed contemporaneous reflection on the desires of tourists (to see the current state of sites in Anlong Veng and the actual remnants of the old accomplishments), a commitment to authenticity (the old accomplishments themselves), and an acknowledgement of the practical demands of historical-tourist (re-)construction (construction of a “replica” by the original builders as if according to a picture). There was certainly an awareness that any replica is not exactly the same as an original. A son-in-law of Ta Mok commented: “Everything the government needs, the government should take.... People should not put false things in

the house; for instance, documents that came from Anlong Veng should not be changed or corrected. Anything we do not have, we should not make again. What we have, we should make the same, but not make any modifications.”

Another informant conveyed a complex understanding of the relationship between authenticity (i.e., unaltered objects)—which has been almost completely lost to destruction, looting, and scavenging—and re-presentation (i.e., making anew but exactly as before). Accordingly, the plan to rebuild sites seems framed in terms of an original/replica dialectic, which highlights competing pressures from attempts at historical accuracy and the drive to attract tourists; simultaneously, there appears to be tension between local and national agendas around the idea of “preserving” historical authenticity.²⁶²

The essential goal of the ministry, with regard to remnants of structures that housed Khmer Rouge cadre, is the simulation of an originality with regard to structures (creating spaces) that have housed individuals of historical significance.²⁶³ “Re-construction” in Cambodia is not new, as many of the temples in the country have been the product of similar (archaeological) efforts. However, in the case of Anlong Veng, the original builders are repeating the exact same (!) construction work they were commissioned to do by other authorities roughly a decade before—claiming a precise repetition.²⁶⁴ There is therefore an assumed greater “legitimacy” or “accuracy” of the re-presentation, because the builders are seen as capable of making the sites precisely the “same as before.”

The Ministry of Tourism is calling upon these three men to (re-)build on the foundations of ruins; this endeavor will expand to include the other sites to be (re-

)constructed as they will have been (like before). Tourism officials have approached the men on two occasions to solicit their services in reconstituting Pol Pot's mountain house. In 2001, the district chief asked the men to venture to the ruined remnants to survey the site. Following the chief's instructions, the men spent 30,000 riel each of their own money; over a year later, the district had not reimbursed them for their expedition expenses. The district chief told them when the houses are built, they will know the cost and then give the men all the money they are owed.²⁶⁵ The construction workers provided details to the district chief and agreed to build the house, because when the construction is completed they will receive payment. However, they expressed concern, because they did not know when restoration work will begin. In June 2002, Khemarak asked the three men to measure the dimensions of Pol Pot's house. In fact, they were asked to plan the reconstruction of six house sites in three areas on the mountain: the houses of Pol Pot, Ta Mok, Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Son Sen, and Chan Youran. While they were encouraged by being contacted again regarding the tourism project, they harbored doubt on their future involvement.²⁶⁶

There appear to be at least three notions of accuracy (sometime discussed as "truth") operating in and around the Anlong Veng project. First, there is a concern, principally expressed by local informants and echoed to some degree by tourism officials, about spatial correctness. The informed former Khmer Rouge residents made repeated statements arguing that mistakes committed by the Ministry and Department of Tourism demonstrated that these agencies should not be taken seriously.²⁶⁷ Another aspect to this nominalist issue is correct labeling of sites, for example attributing correct ownership or primary residence to the correct inhabitant.²⁶⁸ Addressing both of these dimensions

appears relatively straightforward, although it is somewhat complicated by the mobility over the course of two decades. Nonetheless, the concerns of Anlong Veng residents could be largely allayed by securing confirmation of site identifications with more informed locals, per the ministry's stated methodology.²⁶⁹

It was common for informants (even relatively high-ranking figures) to defer to higher authorities when responding to inquiries, suggesting an invalidation of one's own opinions because of one's social position, but also simultaneously a paying of proper respect to those of higher status. In terms of content, this deference covered informants' attitudes, memories, and opinions about events as well as in the degree of their responsibility for actions and policies.²⁷⁰ A number of individuals made explicit deferential statements that the district chief knows the most/best about the history of Anlong Veng—as if obliging this figure to play primary informant would provide all the (relevant/legitimate) *knowledge* one could possibly want about the area's history.²⁷¹ Others, particularly those officially involved with the Tourism Ministry's project, suggested three additional figures as bearers of historical knowledge. These individuals—a DK public works official, Ta Mok's secretary, and Ta Mok's adopted son (whose recognition stems at least in part from his active role in the Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng)—posed locally sanctioned sources for historically accurate information (i.e., the “designated” historians). The stated credentials for their occupying this position of responsibility included: experiences, which were most relevant to the events and sites; outstanding memory capacities (mental acuity); continued study/reflection of the area's history; selection by higher officials in an attempt to consolidate a consistent history; and/or political orientation (i.e., pro-Ta Mok).

The construction of “history” from those in recognized positions entails some implications for how one understands “history” and its making and writing: history as negotiation as well as negotiated (re-)constructions of history. The first dimension of this dialectic involves understanding history as a perpetual process of struggle/negotiation/re-configuration (*à la* Gramsci), whereby historical formations or conditions are the products of the antagonistic/agonistic playing out of actors’ interests. In the case of Anlong Veng, the forces that made history—the Khmer Rouge and the Royal Cambodian Government primarily, but also international forces—are continuous with those involved in the process of this history’s re-presentation in the form of a museum.²⁷² The reconstruction of historical narrative—as a consensus on facts among Anlong Veng villagers or as a museumification of a version of that history—parallels the operations that dominate the making of history, as various forces with differing perspectives and interests produce (textual) renditions of the past. However, while the authority of narrating the story of Anlong Veng was endowed to the most supreme local government official and a designated expert triumvirate, informants appeared quite capable and willing to share their knowledges and memories about particular sites.²⁷³

A second notion of accuracy, the one broached by the task confronting the builders of Pol Pot’s house, deals with resemblance. The ministry’s conscripting the construction workers assumes that these individuals are the most capable in creating an accurate re-construction, replica, of the mountaintop abode, and thereby ensures a certain authenticity to the site. While the authentic and true are addressed in terms of correct historical accounts (Ministry of Tourism) and accurate identification of locations (many Anlong Veng residents), the (constructed nature of the) authenticity that the historical-

tourist area seeks to provide—*in situ* and resembling reconstructions and replicas—is not overtly addressed by the tourism officials tasked with realizing the museum project.

A former Khmer Rouge doctor conveyed a local's view of authenticity, which hinges on (the perception of) "original achievements," plainly stating: "So when the Oddar Meanchey tourism office rebuilds the museum and all the places, all the things they build will be new and not the original achievements of the Khmer Rouge. Then we will have no places left. How important is it? Because all the places will not be achievements of the Khmer Rouge; they will be achievements of tourism." His brief appraisal is insightful as it shows how the re-construction of sites is first a destruction of the original site, and second a creation (copy?) which does not have an inherent relation to the past/original achievement.²⁷⁴ This local Anlong Veng, former Khmer Rouge sense of "authenticity"—a relationship to sites with which current residents actually interacted (or still interact, such as the Ta Mok school and hospital)—can be contrasted with the Ministry of Tourism's notion of "accuracy" which operates as the legitimizing alibi of the museum project. Put differently, this comparison could be cast as the difference between an embodied, everyday relationship to a site ("real" or "authentic") and the abstract, rational(ized) determination of "accuracy" as it circulates in a discourse of truth and validity (providing the intellectual basis for the physical re-presentation of history). A local vision/relationship of "authenticity," as the doctor conveyed it—a native cherishing of what (actually) was before—seems in tension with another local perspective, based on the desire for money/development. While some informants are concerned about acknowledging the correct achievements of the Khmer Rouge, other seem ready to pimp this past (according to a variety of possible forms) on the promise of revenues from

tourists.

A third area of “truth,” which the Tourism Ministry frequented addresses in terms of accuracy, involves historical presentation. For the most part, the ministry pursues this true and accurate record in terms of correct historical information, specifically facts. This data (dates, places, events, personae) form the foundation for a historical narrative (i.e., the guide book), which is largely expressed as site-specific chronologies. Implicit in these mini-stories and explicitly in the training of tour guides is the inherent interpretation that governs the presentation of the past, a narrative that subtly demonizes Anlong Veng’s *ancien régime*, even as commercial success provides the guarantee for this interpretation’s circulation.



NATIONAL NARRATIVES

Hun Sen’s 2001 circular that initiates the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area project positions these latest (collection of) sites along a historical/historiographical continuum that also subsumes: the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes, the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center, and multiple memorial stupas that house remains of genocide victims. These recent endeavors can be placed alongside the (PRK) government’s efforts *vis-à-vis* Democratic Kampuchea more generally—the formation of a “national narrative”—whose mechanisms involve museum efforts, annual holidays, and historical manifestations.²⁷⁵ Chandler’s recent work argues that the Royal Cambodian Government’s (specifically, Hun Sen’s) post-1993 approach to the DK period has been

“officially enforced amnesia,” a turning away from its earlier emphasis on demonizing the Khmer Rouge.²⁷⁶ Offering a more variable reading, Williams argues that there has been a reversal from the policy of sustained hatred toward a policy of forgiveness and forgetting (1991–1994), national reconciliation (1996–1998), and memorialization (2001 onward).²⁷⁷ The historical moments and monuments that underlie these readings are elaborated below.

At the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal convened at the Chaktomuk Theatre on 15–19 August 1979, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were tried and condemned to death *in absentia* on the basis of a month-old anti-genocide law, *Decree Law No. 1*.²⁷⁸ Minister of Propaganda, Keo Chanda, presided over the court; a former vice president of the DK People’s Assembly, Mat Ly, acted as lead prosecutor. At the time, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia was perceived as a violation of national sovereignty by the non-Soviet-aligned elements of the international community; the ostracism and isolation the new regime faced included: the denial of UN representation, in favor of the CGDK (led and represented by Khmer Rouge elite); withholding/cessation of aid; a trade embargo; and the military resuscitation of the CGDK factions.²⁷⁹ On the domestic political scene, the new regime’s leaders had to differentiate themselves from the CPK and DK, from which many of them had fled as late as 1977. Furthermore, the administration needed to pursue social policies that would further garner legitimation for its (socialist, but not-DK) rule. The importance of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal to the regime is attested by the fact that the grand event was pursued in spite of a dramatic lack of resources.²⁸⁰ In this context, the political function of the tribunal was stated explicitly by the presiding judge on the eve of the trial: “Trying the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique for the crime of genocide

will on the one hand expose all the criminal acts that they have committed and mobilize the Kampuchean people more actively to defend and build up the people's power, and on the other hand show the peoples of the whole world the true face of the criminals who are posing as the representatives of the people of Kampuchea."²⁸¹


Particularly interesting is the intellectual gymnastics that were performed to specifically attribute responsibility to Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and avoid mention of other DK leaders.²⁸² Furthermore, their Marxist–Leninist affiliations—and, by extension, any connection to Vietnam—were discarded in favor of adjectival labels of “fascist” and “genocidal.”²⁸³ By focusing exclusively on Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and their “clique” as those responsible, government policies left open the possibility of co-opting Khmer Rouge resistance fighters, including such senior leaders as Nuon Chea.²⁸⁴ This strategy was formalized in a circular that differentiated the culpability of leaders and those (lower-level) cadre who acted under orders but who could repent and embrace the (PRK) revolution.²⁸⁵ As Gottesman notes, it becomes apparent that the greater crime was not DK-era offenses but continued resistance against the new regime. He further suggests that the trial was one of the first instances in which the new government would deploy “carefully constructed language” to distinguish its (communist) ideology from the (“Maoist”) ideology of Democratic Kampuchea.²⁸⁶ Heder has flatly stated that: “‘Justice’ was used crudely and straightforwardly as a political tool to craft a history acceptable to those in charge of overseeing its dissemination.”²⁸⁷ Some specific policies and approaches of the PRK government, the KNUFNS, and the KPRP emerge from the tribunal: a differentiation of PRK communism from DK communism (conceived as “fascist method,” “reactionary” policies, “Maoism”) bolstered by a particular reading of

DK history; the limiting of responsibility to a small group of leaders (naming only two principals)²⁸⁸; an offer of clemency to remnant Khmer Rouge as a means of co-optation; the specific identification of Eastern Zone cadre as a distinct political body; the obfuscation/sanitization of the possible culpability of East Zone defectors holding posts in the PRK government; an all-inclusive “victim” status extended to survivors throughout society; the unification of opposing internal factions (Hanoi veterans and East Zone defectors) as well as surviving pre-revolutionary elite²⁸⁹; and a public enactment of justice (condemnation of *genocide*) seeking domestic justification/legitimacy for the Vietnamese-backed regime and the erosion of international support for the resistance factions that would become the CGDK.²⁹⁰



Two Vietnamese photojournalists stumbled upon an abandoned prison in January 1979; this interrogation center had been evacuated in haste, leaving behind its last fourteen victims to die in its torture rooms. Just over a year after its discovery, the S-21 security center would become the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime. S-21 operated as the central office of DK’s *santebal*, with numerous smaller prisons scattered about the country. Its uniqueness with regard to the CPK lies with its role in accounting for and documenting perceived traitorous networks, which the CPK leadership believed to be sabotaging the Kampuchean revolution—the purge (*bôs sâm'aat* ពេទ្យសម្លាប់) of hidden enemies. Although S-21 prisoners were drawn from a variety of backgrounds, the

overwhelming target of *santebal*'s operation was those from within the movement thought to be betraying the revolution.



Source: Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 1 (photographs section).

In the pre-revolutionary era, the structures that became S-21 composed the Tuol Svay Prey Secondary School and the Tuol Sleng Primary School (alongside to the west).²⁹¹ After the CPK seizure of power, the classrooms of the high school's four three-story buildings were used for detention, interrogation, torture, and the storage of vast documentation and many dossiers, which detailed the alleged sabotage committed by its inmates.²⁹² Individuals brought into S-21 were not told where they were being taken. Immediately upon arrival, they would be photographed and shackled. Through interrogation sessions, inmates were made to recount their "life story" (*brâvattiroup* ប្រវត្តិរូប); if this autobiographical "confession" did not elicit (anticipated) acts of sabotage, the respondent would be subjected to various types of torture and forced to revise their narrative. Consequently, the hundreds of thousands of pages of confessions bear

concoctions of conspiracies—many of which quite complicated and unbelievable—that involve CIA, KGB, and/or Vietnamese plots to overthrow Democratic Kampuchea. In scrutinizing prisoners' (false) confessions, Chandler describes each dossier's self-critical life story format as a uniquely Communist writing genre, particularly important in China and Vietnam.²⁹³ From confessions extracted under torture, the regime “exposed” traitorous networks (*khsae kbât* ខ្មែរគ្រប់) *everywhere it looked*.²⁹⁴ Prisoners were compelled to implicate their associates; these (false) accusations became the grounds for the culling, detention, interrogation, torture, and execution according to these strings of implication.²⁹⁵ The pathological logic governing the *autos-da-fé* at S-21 becomes apparent: CPK suspicions (due to reflections on adverse conditions in the countryside or reactions to sporadic rebellions, or arising from leaders' personal vigilance) lead to the arrest of cadre already considered guilty; interrogators, themselves under threat from above to expose/produce traitorous activity (lest they be deemed traitors), extract “evidence” by means of torture; the confessions produce more enemies which thereby confirms the Party's suspicions; at the same time, the “smashing” (*kâmtéché* កំប្រុក) and “discarding” (*bâh chaol* បាត់បង់) of traitors attests to the (limited) success of the purge process.²⁹⁶ Of the approximately 14,000 men, women and children that entered S-21, only seven survived.²⁹⁷ After a satisfactory confession had been secured, prisoners were thrown away; some of the dead were buried in the surrounding areas (in the westside yard of the elementary school); with intensifying purges in 1977 and after, many of S-21's inmates were transported 15 km from the capital, where they were killed and buried in mass graves.

The Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime (*sarakmorntir aukrettkam brâlaypuchsaas tuol slèng* សារមន្ទីរ ឧក្រិដ្ឋកម្មប្រលាម័ត្តសាសន៍ “ទួលស្លែង”) is poised on a hillock of strychnine (*tuol slèng* ទួលស្លែង) in present-day Boeng Keng Kong III Ward, Chamkar Mon Quarter of the capital.²⁹⁸ The tourist destination, opened in July 1980, was the accomplishment of Mai Lam, a Vietnamese colonel and museum expert. He had assembled Ho Chi Minh City’s Museum of American War Crimes, traveled to Poland’s Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum for research, and worked with East German museum specialists in the transformation of S-21 into Tuol Sleng.²⁹⁹ Commencement of the project was contemporaneous with the organization of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal and subject to many of the same objectives. “In turning S-21 into a museum of genocide, Mai lam wanted to arrange Cambodia’s recent past to fit the requirements of the PRK and its Vietnamese mentors as well as the long-term needs, as he saw them, of the Cambodian people.”³⁰⁰

TUOL SLENG

In the past, the Museum "Tuol Sleng" was one of the high schools in the capital called "Tuol Svay Prey" High School. After April 17th, 1975, Pol Pot clique had transformed it into an office called "S-21" (Security 21) which was the biggest prison in Cambodia. It was surrounded with a double wall of corrugated irons which were surmounted by very thick barbed wires. The classrooms on the first and second stories were pierced and divided into single cells; whereas the ones on the third story were used for large detention.

Many thousands of victims were imprisoned and exterminated with their wives and children (Peasants, workers, technicians, engineers, monks, ministers and some cadres in Pol Pot government, soldiers of all ranks, doctors, teachers, students, the Corps Diplomatique, foreigners, etc...).

Right here, you will see a lot of evidences proving the atrocities of Pol Pot clique: cells, torture instruments, dossiers and documents, books of victims' names, victims' photos, their clothes and belongings....

We have found a few mass graves here and there around this prison especially the big ones in Chæung Ek village, Dang Kor district, Kandal province (about 15 km from Phnom Penh in the South—West)

Source: Tuol Sleng Genocidal Center Guidebook, inside cover.

Each building within the interrogation center compound offers a view of a different aspect of *santebal*'s functioning. The first-floor rooms of Building A exhibit metal bed frames and other implements used for torture; on the walls are blown-up photographs that show the state of each interrogation cell when it was discovered, many of which harbored blood-drenched corpses anchored to bed frames amidst pools of bodily fluids. To the still-visible blood stains on the orange-and-white tile floors are added the security regulations (in Khmer and English) that governed interrogations, posted just outside the interrogation rooms.³⁰¹ The large rooms making up the first floor of Building

B are lined with photographs of hundreds of S-21's victims; more recently, these images have been arranged according to categories (women, foreigners, youth, etc.). The vast display of portraits is perhaps the most striking for visitors, and its display has circulated beyond Tuol Sleng's walls.³⁰² The floors of Building C offer walk-in tours of various detention spaces, from the large classrooms where multitudes were ankle-shackled together to the brick-and-mortar solitary cells reserved for important cadre. Building D exhibits some remnant implements of torture, victims' possessions, pictures of S-21 staff, photographs of Phnom Penh in the 1970s, maps, as well as artwork depicting *santebal*'s methods. The last item in the gallery was a map of Cambodia composed of human skulls with the country's main water bodies (Tonle Sap and Mekong) dyed blood red; this map was dismantled in March 2002.³⁰³

The Choeng Ek Genocidal Center (*morchak morndorl brâlaypuchsaas cherng aek* មជ្ឈមណ្ឌល ប្រឈមពុជសាសន៍ ជើងពក), commonly called the "Killing Fields," complements Tuol Sleng the interrogation center. One of hundreds of sites that contain mass graves, Choeng Ek—the renownst (*cherng aek* ជើងពក) of remembrance—was also converted into a memorial museum by the Vietnamese in 1980.³⁰⁴ Prior to becoming an ill-fitted resting ground for counter-revolutionary corpses and innocents, the area covered a fruit tree orchard and Chinese graveyard. Echoing the minimalism of Tuol Sleng, some 15 km away, the visitor walks among Choeng Ek's expanse of disinterred gravesites without much guidance beyond brief descriptions of the pits' former contents. A memorial "stupa" erected in 1988, houses hundreds of skulls and offers views of DK's victims. Farm implements (hammers, hoes, axes, saws)—the tools of bludgeoning—populate the memorial site's environs.³⁰⁵

At Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, visitors are presented with sites that suggest an unmediated encounter with the past. The environs are largely left to guests' exploration, with a minimal amount of guidance.³⁰⁶ Tuol Sleng is presented to the visitor as how the torture center was discovered in 1979. In so doing, it tends to efface its own curatorship; or, it designates that which stands "just as it was" (e.g., the interrogation rooms) and that which is being presented as it was (e.g., the enlargements of portraits correlated to inmate dossiers). Choeung Ek similarly seeks to present the mass graves "as they were," but most of the tracts have been excavated, so that the visitor can better "see" how they were—toward the "obscene." The windowed memorial "stupa" allows the visitor to look in on the victims (an assemblage of ossified remains), and the collections of implements and possessions underwrite the evidence of death.

A variety of analyses indicate the obvious fact that the PRK government was attempting to shape the historical record with its (presumably-accurate-because-undisturbed) representations of history at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek.³⁰⁷ It is clear that one of the overriding objectives, in the creation of Tuol Sleng especially, was the justification of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, an exhibition of the criminal acts of the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique that warranted its overthrow by the KUFNS.³⁰⁸ PRK claims to legitimacy were rooted in exposing atrocities of the DK regime and arguing that the KUFNS had in fact saved Cambodia (and the Khmer race) from destruction by the evil Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique. Simply, the greater the past suffering, the greater legitimacy endowed to the PRK. The locality of the museum (its truth of place) in concert with the photographic and textual "evidence" lend an authoritative character to the PRK's representation of DK horrors (and Vietnam's rescue).³⁰⁹

Ledgerwood treats Tuol Sleng as “the central site for construction of memories of Democratic Kampuchea,” and she undertakes to analyze the correspondence between the “master narrative of the successor state” (PRK) and a “popular narrative” (largely coincident with Vickery’s “Standard Total View”).³¹⁰ As a legitimation of the new PRK regime, the master narrative foregrounds Tuol Sleng in a way that positions the government as savior of a revolution that was stolen and perverted by the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique. The “monological historical explanation” remaps the revolutionary accomplishments in Cambodia, such that the PRK state is the re-alignment of the (good) communist movement that was derailed in 1975 by a clique of genocidal monsters: “the [April 1975] victory... was stolen by a small number of murderous criminals who killed true revolutionaries, many in this facility.”³¹¹ The tripartite message that Ledgerwood locates in the State’s publications emphasize: 1) Cambodians want to remember the clique’s murderous acts so as to 2) disallow the Khmer Rouge’s return, and 3) that there is an irresolvable anger/agony (*chheur chap* ឆឺតចាប់)—“born of betrayal and frustration”—directed at “Pol Pot.”³¹² With this message in mind, the analysis confronts Vickery’s STV, not in terms of its content, but on the presumed sources of the narrative. Vickery claims that the STV largely originates with refugee accounts that are selected, circulated, and sensationalized by Western journalists and anti-Communist governments.³¹³ Ledgerwood argues that Vickery’s idea of an extreme STV—“killing for the sake of genocide”—encapsulates the PRK/State narrative, the narrative of Tuol Sleng. Further, the museum offers an interpretive framework for “a shared perception of facts as remembered now by Khmer who experienced it.”³¹⁴ In sum, Ledgerwood’s “telling” presents a government-initiated site of memory-interpretation based on and reinforcing an

extreme standard total view of the DK period. Furthermore, the victory script that posits the KUFNS as saviors of the Khmer race, emphasized in Tuol Sleng (as well as in the Days of Hate) draws significantly from the “good East” narrative that simultaneously 1) acknowledges a debt to the Vietnamese people while establishing independence from them, and 2) establishes the true (communist) patriots in contradistinction to the murderous clique that had attempted to pervert the revolution and to annihilate the Khmer race. The persistent and outlawed Khmer Rouge become the new “traitors” documented in S-21-become-Tuol Sleng³¹⁵; the search for enemies extends toward Anlong Veng.




In August 1983, the government declared May 20 as the “Day of Hatred for the genocidal Pol Pot–Ieng Sary–Khieu Samphan regime.”³¹⁶ The auspicious annual appointment with anger alluded to a meeting on 20 May 1975, at which Pol Pot and his cadre had put forth a policy (total agrarian collectivization) which entailed the differentiation of social classes, the elimination the *ancien régime*, and ensuing death from overwork/exhaustion.³¹⁷ Deriving truth from location, the appropriate venues for the original activities were any place that had seen torture or killing during DK, including Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and local “killing fields” sites as well as memorial stupas erected to preserve victims’ remains. Victims of the Pol Pot clique were invited to share their stories of suffering and denounce the genocidal regime. Hughes’ review of the early practices around this State-designated day indicates that the act of sharing memories was simultaneously combined with forward-looking action, revolutionary vigilance against

the continued threat of the Khmer Rouge.³¹⁸ The Day of Hate was less about examining the individualized memories of victims and more directed to fostering and sustaining anger at Pol Pot's (and the CGDK's) continuing war against the Khmer people.³¹⁹ Hughes also notes how the international target audience of the commemoration shifted over time, with messages tuned to Vietnam and the Soviet Bloc in the late 1980s and broadening toward the UN in latter manifestations.³²⁰ Post-independence *Cambodge* exhibits a well-established tradition of State-sponsored demonstrations of a political nature, and the Day of Hate iteration augments this practice by harnessing personal memory, experience, emotion, and vitriol to larger national and international aims.

Although formal government promotion of the day ceased with the 1991 Paris Peace Accords, this suspension did not prevent some local municipalities from continuing to foster commemorative events. Latter-day celebrations of the day resumed attempts to meld personal reflection with political interests, albeit in a less-staged and more multi-vocal manner. The Day of Hate was officially revived in 1999 in the context of discussions of an international tribunal for surviving DK leaders.³²¹ With the bumpy take-off of the ECCC, the Day of Hate has seen a recent resurgence. Certain localities engage in Buddhist ceremonies as a means to honor victims of Democratic Kampuchea, others combine religious observance with spectacle. The 2008 ceremony at the Choeung Ek "Killing Fields" was marked by a re-enactment of Khmer Rouge violence. Phnom Penh Municipal Governor Kep Chuktema commented, "We have this ceremony to celebrate justice for the Cambodian people. And also highlight the [upcoming ECCC] trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders who have made this a devastating killing field."³²²

Day of Hate Re-Enactment



Source: Cambodia Daily

Similar to the Day of Hate, the commemoration of 7 *Makara*, the national holiday—marking Victory over the Genocidal Regime Day, 7 January 1979 (*tivea cheychumneah ler rorbâb brâlaypuchsaas* ទិវាជ័យជំនះលើរបបប្រល័យពូជសាសន៍)—experienced a period of remission.³²³ The holiday was reintroduced by a government circular in 1996, which was the first time Victory Day was to be celebrated following the post-UNTAC formation of a coalition government.³²⁴ From the CPP's perspective, the holiday celebrates the liberation of Cambodia from DK rule (with Vietnamese assistance); for its coalition partner FUNCINPEC, the date marked the invasion of Cambodia and its ten-year occupation by the Vietnamese.³²⁵ In protest of the holiday's re-commemoration, 12 FUNCINPEC Parliamentarians expressed their opposition in a letter to King Sihanouk. Although subject to some controversy, but without the dramatic re-enactments or compelled performance of memory of May 20, Victory Day typically involves oratory occasions for leading CPP figures. Chea Sim, Party Secretary and President of the Senate, has taken the opportunity to recount the historical accomplishments of the

KUFNS, KPRP, PRK, and CPP with the support of the Vietnamese. His address on the 25th anniversary of the Front's victory highlighted the "independence, peace, freedom, and prosperity" achieved by the liberation of Cambodia from DK rule as well as the government's further accomplishments in preventing a return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime.³²⁶ This speech also singles out those who opposed the celebration of 7 *Makara* as outlaws: "Such immoral attitude is only tantamount to legalizing the Democratic Kampuchea regime and at the same time constitutes an insult on the revival of our people."³²⁷ His 2008 speech marking the same event went further, accusing some "insane circles for taking themselves for the enemies of the 7 January victory and of the people's revival, seeking all possible means to overthrow the people's power with the aim of bringing back the genocide regime."³²⁸ The occasion for remembrance also provides the opportunity to identify traitors.³²⁹



The narrative of the Party, as documented in official histories, provides greater detail on the interpretations of the past that underwrite the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, the Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek museums, and the official holidays sponsored by the PRK; it also provides a context for CPP motivations behind the drive to construct an historical-tourist area in Anlong Veng.

Faced with the danger of extinction of the nation and loss of the country about to fall in the hands of the reactionary Beijing Chinese expansionists, in December 1978, a number of true Kampuchean communists gathered patriotic forces and created the Kampuchean United Front for National

Salvation, and incited the people to rise up and annihilate the genocidal regime. In response to the pressing (*cham bach*) wishes of the Kampuchean revolution, the Vietnamese people and army helped us truthfully in every way to fight for the historic victory of 7 January 1979, to destroy completely the regime of Pol Pot, to put an end to the danger of genocide, to liberate our country from the ferocious teeth of the Beijing Chinese expansionists, and to found the People's Republic of Kampuchea.³³⁰

Thus is founded the victory script that legitimates the PRK government. Frings' examination asserts that KPRP historiography not only seeks to legitimate PRK rule, but also aims to establish a sense of independence and equality for Cambodia (specifically in its relation with Vietnam). In its first decade of rule, it also sought to present the KPRP as the *proper* inheritors of a Marxist–Leninist tradition, largely rooted in regional (*Indochinoise*) cooperation, a movement that had been hijacked by the (bad) communists under Pol Pot's leadership; that is, the KPRP sought to distinguish itself from Pol Pot's CPK while also re-asserting the Party's political lineage. The demonization of Pol Pot, his massacre of the Kampuchean people, was also framed in terms of expansionist aims, emanating from China.³³¹ From 1979 onward, the Party—through its various incarnations (KNUFNS, PRK, KPRP, CPP)—has consistently pointed to its role as savior of the Khmer people from annihilation. The PRK's history writing was initially constrained by the occupation of the country by Vietnamese troops. In order not to be seen as a puppet or client state of its assistive neighbor, Party history also needed to emphasize a degree of independence; however, given the massive support under-writing the PRK regime, any hostility toward its eastern neighbor was impossible.³³² This tension was largely resolved by appeal to “militant solidarity” with the countries of the

old ICP as well as with states within the Soviet bloc.³³³ However, this idea also had to shift according to the historical circumstances of the pre-1979 communist struggle.

Divergences begin at the (re-)beginnings of the Party. Chandler and Frings contrast the torturous CPK battle over the Party's founding date to the PRK (re-)writing of Party history after the ousting of DK. The revised foundations of the CPK is brought to light in the Pol Potist CPK's 1976 shift from the 1951 origins of the KPRP to its 1960 name change to the KWP. This was in tune with Pol Pot's desire to separate the CPK (and DK) from its period of Vietnamese/ICP linkages.³³⁴ Further, the ascendant faction within the CPK sought to physically eliminate counter visions of the Party's formation. Pol Pot had distanced the CPK from Vietnam politically (and historiographically) due to the neighboring communists' strategic subordination of the Cambodian struggle to the ends of the Vietnamese struggle. Pol Pot's early demand to pursue armed struggle—in line with his “imitation” of the (South) Vietnamese model—was discouraged, given Sihanouk's permissive attitude toward arms shipments to the Vietnamese across Cambodian territory and the strategic use of borderlands. Thus, the revisionist history that Pol Pot's CPK attempted to violently institute underscored Kampuchea's independent accomplishments against the expansionist aggression of the Vietnamese.³³⁵

While the CPK imposed its re-naissance in 1976, the PRK re-tracing of its particular steps occurred a decade later.³³⁶ The 1986 KPRP Party History re-affirms the foundational split in the earlier KPRP, during the Second Congress held 28–30 September 1960. “Pol Pot's entry into the Party Centre shook the composition of the Party; the opportunistic clique came to hold the important leadership positions; the authentic cadres and Party members were progressively discarded.”³³⁷ Looking back, the

commencement of armed struggle by the CPK (unauthorized by the Vietnamese) becomes a silent period in the PRK historiography: events in the pre-1970 struggle go undiscussed, Party members disavow membership in the CPK during this time, actions and roles are minimized/obfuscated, etc.³³⁸ After the ascension of the US-backed Lon Nol regime, the story of Vietnamese support is re-inserted and framed in terms of a regional alliance fighting an imperialist power.

Echoing the convergence of successor state victory narrative and STV (in Ledgerwood's analysis), Chandler states "Ironically, what people were told to think about DK in the 1980s and much of what was written about the Khmer Rouge under the PRK often coincided, in a pleasingly Manichean fashion, with what most people remembered later on, and with what was published about DK by expatriate survivors."³³⁹ In October 1991, the KPRP became the CPP; Marxism–Leninism was eschewed, but Party and government officials remain the same. With the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army in 1989, and especially the post-UNTAC integration of PRK/SoC, FUNCINPEC, and KPRLF factions, the government's struggle against the remnant Khmer Rouge in its various bases in the west and northwest projected independence, national unity, and socio-economic development.



Begun in 1996, Hun Sen's "win-win policy" sought to achieve peace and national reconciliation without any losers, except for the select "hard-line chieftains" (which came to mean only Ta Mok).³⁴⁰ Code-named the "One Sen Plan" (*phaenkaar muoy saen*

ជំនាញ ឬ ឈ្មោះ)—borrowing the singularity of the Prime Minister’s moniker for its implementation—this policy worked toward national unity by using enticements that would increasingly chip away at the lingering Khmer Rouge resistance movement.³⁴¹ In addition to amnesty, defectors would be guaranteed resettlement and equivalent posts in the government. Through military and politico-diplomatic means, Hun Sen sought to court these Khmer Rouge fighters into re-joining the national fold: “...to put an end to the Khmer Rouge we cannot use only military means, nor can we finish their political and military organizations by allowing them to come to Phnom Penh, by keeping them as a political counter balance, or by negotiating with them as a political and military organization. Therefore, the win-win solution or policy through the process of pacification in the remaining territory, is the only measure taken in accordance with law and morality to end these prolonged wars.”³⁴² News of the policy, especially as a *post mortem* account of victory, was used in a number of circumstances by CPP higher-ups. In describing his continued offensive against the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen counter-posed his “win-win policy” to the Khmer Rouge “iron erosion” strategy.³⁴³ In a preamble to discussing the CPP’s accomplishments in overcoming conflict, President of the Council of Ministers Sok An outlined the policy’s “five facets: ‘divide, isolate, finish, integrate and develop’ in which the Khmer Rouge political and military structure was ended, including by military assaults, but those Khmer Rouge who defected and surrendered were assured of their physical safety and survival, the right to work and to carry out their professions, and the security of their property.”³⁴⁴ Addressing recent defectors, Hun Sen explained their actions as “not a surrender or a confession, but an obligation to be fulfilled by all Cambodian sons and daughters in joining efforts to put an end to the war

which the previous generations started.”³⁴⁵ The strategy was also referenced in the re-initiation of the Day of Hate.³⁴⁶ In terms of an historical narrative that incorporates the last bastion of Khmer Rouge resistance at Anlong Veng, the “win-win policy” points to the CPP’s already accomplished rescue of the Khmer people from the genocidal clique as well as its further success in securing peace (again and again) in a manner that promotes unity and acceptance (re-integration) as well as reconstruction (employment and involvement in development). The Party that keeps giving peace, by tying together an ever-greater national unity.³⁴⁷

On the occasion of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan defecting to the government in December 1998, Hun Sen stated: “We should dig a hole and bury the past and look ahead to the 21st century with a clean slate... if a wound does not hurt, you should not poke at it to make it bleed.”³⁴⁸ Chandler notes how this quote indicates that the historiographic policies of the KPRP/ CPP have moved from an emphasis on demonization to an enforced “collective amnesia”; the trajectory of this *dénouement* proceeds from summoning history to its *enterrement*, to the diminishing significance of the Khmer Rouge past as a political issue (“devoid of interest” due largely to a changed geo-political context), to a forced forgetting as the most appropriate means toward socio-economic development and national reconciliation.³⁴⁹ Although State-sponsored activities have diminished, the collective amnesia of which Chandler writes resides largely in this lingering absence of official observances, the lack of a history book in the Cambodian educational curriculum, and Hun Sen’s “bury the past” message—a policy partially in force—which is now being complicated by the beginnings of a Khmer Rouge Tribunal. In the decade leading up the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of

Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (the tribunal's official designation), Hun Sen and the CPP appeared to vacillate in their disinterest in pursuing legal prosecution.³⁵⁰ Certainly, it is too early to discern what the outcome and effects of the legal proceedings will be for historical concerns or national reconciliation, but the fact of their occurrence re-presents the problem of historical narrative.³⁵¹ (Although it may be correct to ascribe an enforcement of collective amnesia to the *aims* of the CPP, circumstances still somewhat beyond the Party's control demand an historical accounting of sorts.) It is possible that the shift away from remembering the past for political purposes is best exemplified in the use of history for revenues from tourism.³⁵² That is to say, the PRK's explicitly political approach to historiography in the 1980s—responding to international and domestic pressures, while also converging with popular memory at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek—is giving way to a post-win-win emphasis on socio-economic development that deploys historical sites for commercial benefit in the context of the country's fastest-growing industry. In sum, the successor state national narrative—written, re-written, performed, and monumentalized—appears to be yielding to the pimping of history for tourist revenue, still capitalizing on the control of historical narrative. A supplementary or modified historical narrative, even a post script, is still effected, particularly through these monuments that demand visitation.



The impetus for the Historical-Tourist Area of Anlong Veng began in 2001, and to this day, it remains an unfinished project. In spite (and partly because) of its partial character, the project provides indications of the historiographic tendencies of the CPP. Although Anlong Veng's designated sites date to 1989, the script that endows the district with importance is the (continued) demonization of the Pol Pot. The subject matter for the sites in the northern province of victory is primarily the resumed struggle of the outlawed Khmer Rouge against the internationally-recognized, independent, free, and democratic Cambodia; in this, it is the decline and dissolution of the organization that figures most prominently (the last residence, grave, and final sentencing site of Pol Pot). The sites provide the reminder of that earlier historical period (1975–1979) that occasions the need for remembering. There is a shift away from the memorialization effected by the mutually reinforcing successor state narrative and STV/popular narrative. The Anlong Veng “history” which resorts to demonizing—Pol Pot in his new/post-DK history, but still guilty in association with the past—appears more as officiated state history, but one that coincides with the expanding national unity achieved via win-win. The State-generated meaning endowed, tied (*chomnâng* ជំនាញ), to Anlong Veng locates the (former) local leaders as outlaws now domesticated and de-armed into harmlessness.³⁵³

The new historical representation re-deploys the “genocidal monsters” script that is largely subsumed in the STV and performed at the 1979 tribunal and the genocidal tourist destinations. Demonization can be extended beyond the two-headed clique that dominates at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, although Anlong Veng's most significant leaders remain an antagonistic twosome (Pol Pot and Ta Mok). The harsh policies of the 1970s are paralleled and reinforced by reference to the consistent (re-introduced)

extremism of Pol Pot's policies—withdrawal from the peace process, repression, terrorizing villagers, and unending warfare—and the implements of punishment for opposition (e.g., tiger cages). Some historical contextualization is necessary to ensure the profitability of the historical-tourist area. Although the inundation of State-sponsored demonization events and texts have diminished, Anlong Veng still floats at the latest end of the PRK-become-CPP continuum of national (perhaps becomes Party) narrative. It exhibits a reminder of achievements—peace, development, independence—delivered again and again by the CPP. In sum, the project *implicates* the Khmer Rouge past—two connected pasts, 1975–1979 and 1989–1999—but is primarily pursued in terms of tourist revenues, often with the alibis of pedagogy and posterity.³⁵⁴

Certain themes and issues come to the fore in the Ministry and Department of Tourism's construction of the historical-tourist area, among these are the *re*-cognition of past crimes, the political life of Khmer Rouge leadership, an extension of Tuol Sleng and memory sites, the notion of truth *in situ*, the importance of replicas and representations “as is”/“as was,” and pedagogy. The political thrust of the modified national narrative no longer appeals to the good communists of the East/KUFNS, although accomplishments and gifts to the people from the CPP are publicized.³⁵⁵ The good East narrative bolstered the historical narrative that dominated 1980s PRK historiography; the post-good East narrative—the selective (retroactive) privileging of the ex-DK factions that ascended to power with Vietnamese backing—is authenticated in the objects and sites (consumed by death) that the Tourism Ministry chooses to put on display. The “militant solidarity” of the 1980s does not need to be foregrounded, because Cambodia survives in spite of the outlawed Khmer Rouge's attempts to terrorize the independent (post-1979 Vietnamese

withdrawal) and unified Cambodia. The earlier government historiography, especially in the Tuol Sleng presentation, was compelled to assert an independence from Vietnam; so too in Anlong Veng, this theme re-arises. With a diminished emphasis on socio-economic issues in the PDK agenda, the political thought of Pol Pot's message came to exclusively capitalize on nationalist sentiments, with the threat of the historic enemy—the lowly Vietnamese (*a-yuon ព្រង្រ*)—as its primary trope.³⁵⁶ The sites of Tuol Sleng, Choeung Ek, and Anlong Veng are involved in attempts to found a new (independent) sense of nation.³⁵⁷

As discussed above, the Tourism Ministry works in association with the Royal Academy of Cambodia and DC-Cam. This collaborative engagement seeks to produce an accurate history of the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng. As evidenced by Ros Ren's guiding draft, the content of this accurate narrative is predominantly factual information (dates and places). Through a series of interviews and cross-checkings, the ministry has achieved a reliable list of persona, locations, events, and their times of occurrence. This data is combined with the omni-present “genocidal monster” script to produce a rough historical interpretation of the significance of Anlong Veng. In this historically-productive process of situating the Khmer Rouge's death, the Ministry of Tourism deploys a number of modes of truth. Foremost among these is an appeal to the truth of place. The Historical-Tourist Area of Anlong Veng is pursued as an *in situ* museum zone. The claim to original place is expressed in two ways, both of which play off a certain minimalism that pervades the sites. The district's significance for attracting tourists rests with the claim that history happened “here.” This place is where the Khmer Rouge resided. This site is where Pol Pot was tried by his own organization. This house

is where Ta Mok and other leaders met and strategized the continued terrorization of the Cambodian people. This ash heap is where Brother Number One was cremated; in fact, *this* is all that remains of the leader. Leaving the history passed, the *in situ* nature of the project also claims legitimacy in terms of an “undisturbed” present: here and *as it is* (now). The remnant sites have not been adorned or changed in attempts to make the sites more amenable to tourists. The only augmentation are the blue signs that demarcate sites, setting them within the bounds of the historical-tourist area (and simultaneously outside the everyday). The non-participation of the ministry is attested by the remains’ decay over/from time, the destructed ruins due to war, and the absences marked by looting.³⁵⁸ Lastly, and building off the original, the ministry’s plans include an appeal to truth based on (fabricated) resemblance (restoration/replica): here and *as it was* (then). Reflections on accuracy from ministry officials and locals seem to concur that the resemblance to the past—“just as it was before”—is an important piece to developing the tourist destination. It is likely that Anlong Veng in its finished manifestation will exhibit both these aspects of the *in situ*, the Ta Prohm model (left to nature and time) as well as the Angkor Wat model (rebuilt to better illustrate the past).

The Tuol Sleng Museum hinges on an intersection of both forms of minimalism: the museum is undisturbed except for the accoutrements that help to better understand how it was before. S-21 is exhibited *as if* “as is,” providing grounds for authenticity (“I was there,” “It happened right here,” etc.); or rather, Tuol Sleng is presented *as if* the grounds had not been properly curated by a museum expert (Mai Lam).³⁵⁹ While Tuol Sleng the museum tends to efface or delimit its own curatorship, the lack of any museum expert/curator for the Anlong Veng project, in a way, reverses the issue. The Ministry of

Tourism drives the project in Oddar Meanchey, not the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, nor the Ministry of Information and Propaganda; and this suggests a different possible agenda than that dictated by the 1980s context of PRK historiography and museumification. Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek, which were constructed/curated to bring legitimacy to the successor regime and erode the PRK's isolation, became successful genocide tourist sites. At the same time, the sites seemed to offer a way for Cambodians to situate their memories. Now, the hope for a new successful tourist destination *assumes* the curatorial effects of the past.³⁶⁰ Without a museumologist designing the outcome of Hun Sen's circular, the ministry's new KR destination replicates an *in situ* model already tried and tested in the country's genocide tourism repertoire. The minimalist character from the government's capital—Tuol Sleng's "strangely quotidian, un-monumental appearance" and the "relatively untouched nature of the memorials"—becomes repeated in the former stronghold of the Khmer Rouge.³⁶¹ However, if the Ministry of Tourism hopes the Anlong Veng project can ride the coattails of Tuol Sleng's mode of representation, then it is the ministry that is seduced by the (government's own) "as is" claims to authenticity. As a corollary, even the replicas/renovations/reconstructions participate in this as is/as was before logic.

The anti-architects of the Anlong Veng project—Ministry of Tourism officials along with Department of Tourism personnel—(re-)embrace the stark "realism" that was curated in(to) Tuol Sleng. Similar claims to truth (locality/*in situ*, reflection/reconstruction of the past as such, etc.) allow a seemingly unproblematic historical representation.³⁶² Whereas the Tuol Sleng Museum's focus is almost entirely on the victims of DK, Anlong Veng dwells on its leaders.³⁶³ As the organization came to

increasingly rely solely on its xenophobic rhetoric, the minimalism enacted at Anlong Veng might divert attention from the role of the Vietnamese (seen as occupiers).³⁶⁴

While the unintentional glamorization of the Khmer Rouge is an unlikely concern for the Ministry of Tourism, the 1990s' message of the outlawed organization *vis-à-vis* the "historic enemy"—the erasure of a social policies focus toward exclusive reliance on nationalist war rhetoric—produces a tenuous situation for the inclusion of artifacts.

Radio messages (condemning the Vietnamese puppet regime), signboards calling for war against the *a-yuon*, 1980s-era battle sites, and other monumental elements that

foreground the war against the Vietnamese will need to be balanced out of the exhibits.³⁶⁵

The organization's brutality (evidenced in graves and cages), its murderous calculations and strategizing (evidenced by meeting rooms and political halls), and its pernicious persistence (evidenced in leaders' residences and large architectural accomplishments) can be offered in the government's prosecution of history's representation. Given that the sites within the historical-tourist area gain increasing importance as they approach 1999, the late history narrative—post-1989 withdrawal of Vietnamese soldiers—facilitates the task of avoiding the sticky issue of a neighboring country's explicit military domination.

Tuol Sleng is the centerpiece of the genocide-tourism offerings within Cambodia, with minor local memorial sites speckling the periphery outside the capital site. The Choeng Ek Killing Fields acts as proximate supplement, or simple complement, in the prisoner's path from interrogation to torture to killing. Anlong Veng, the after-thought, forms a temporal supplement, as such because of the Khmer Rouge's historical formations as well as the KPRP/CPP constitution of national narrative.³⁶⁶ Tuol Sleng as

constitutive of a national narrative that helps Cambodians explain the inexplicable finds its supplement in Anlong Veng, and one which necessarily changes the narrative's direction. That is, Anlong Veng supplants Tuol Sleng in the government's (re-writing of) history, while it is simultaneously an addition to that monumental effort.³⁶⁷ It is not the other (the former KR)—that Real/present that stands outside—that haunts the Anlong Veng project, but the other as constructed by the government: a need to account for the threat which is always supposed to be no longer threatening. The determination of the meaning of history that narrates the de-threatening of the movement concludes in the definitive end to the Khmer Rouge. The defecting dis-arming—a dis-membering that will become re-membering—is articulated in terms of life, breathing; specifically, the political life and the elites' habitations are re-contained in the situated museum's re-representation. Breathing life into the historical locales (absences of past and future presents) for tourist consumption is organized around a guaranteed death, the *last* breath marked by the various remnants, debris, and traces and (future) replicas on display.³⁶⁸ The specter of Pol Pot remains contained in the meaning-production of the historical-tourist area. In addition, Anlong Veng the supplement foregrounds the museum-making (museumology) of the PRK, also re-calling into question the intersection of Tuol Sleng as museum and torture center.³⁶⁹ That history is re-membered and offered for consumption for various objectives comes to the fore in the Anlong Veng case, as evidenced by critiques of the project's commercialism.³⁷⁰

While there is a subtle, assumed, or partial story of the past for display at Anlong Veng (even in its not-yet-completed state), the organization and implementation of the project suggest that memorialization and historiography may not figure as the prominent

priorities pushing the project.³⁷¹ In particular, the absence of a curator in defining and implementing the historical-tourist sites points to the overwhelming prioritization of development (conceived quite narrowly in terms of revenue). The primary role of the Ministry of *Tourism*, as opposed to other more memorial-driven institutions, in executing Hun Sen's edict emphasizes this point.³⁷² Further, financing appears as the ever-present, overriding concern for those involved with the project, although accuracy of historical information also attracts significant attention. In the informal dissemination of the plans to Anlong Veng locals, an alibi of potentially lucrative enterprises guarantees the (anticipated) efficacy of the historical-tourist area.³⁷³ Indeed, informants were quite eager to welcome the near-future flow of tourists that would infuse cash into this remote hideaway. The view of tourism expressed by many residents echoes a standard view of tourism (an SVT?); they appear willing, even eager to participate in the commodification of culture that accompanies the tourist gaze. The influx of visitors will bring opportunities for profitable business ventures; if there are dangers to be considered, these are largely conceived as comfort (i.e., appropriate accommodations and "resort" activities) and safety (e.g., steering clear of landmines).

The macabre and *outré* certainly offer marketable points for the (future) attraction of Anlong Veng. This coverage has been pursued largely in the anticipatory sensationalism of journalistic accounts, a recurrent theme in the free marketing supplied by reporting on a "KR theme park."³⁷⁴ The hyper-absurdity has already been laid bare and played out in the textual circulation even before the Ministry of Tourism finalizes decisions on the form/content of the museum. Treatments in the press of the plans for Anlong Veng also foreground the commercial aspect of the government's endeavors,

which can also conjure ethical questions of dollarizing trauma and profiting from the past; the ethics debate has been ignited and largely already structured.³⁷⁵ As an economically-minded venture, Anlong Veng moves as one more vehicle like Tuol Sleng for the post-conflict re-integration of Cambodian society into the global order by means of foregrounding its conflict period.³⁷⁶ The reminder message of peace achieved by the CPP also suggests a control through (economic) reintegration of former Khmer Rouge. For Anlong Veng, the reconstruction begun in the wake of the win-win policy issues the historical record that repenters are called to live out *in situ*, further bolstered by promises of (tourist) development.



The movement of this work has sought to evoke the personal intersecting the historical intersecting the ethnographic. Retracing the arrivals into the scene of research highlights the disciplinary kinship underlying the ethnographic project: homage, paleonymies, and already-unfolding historical movement, etc.³⁷⁷ The museum project that would convert the last Khmer Rouge stronghold into an historical-tourist area puts into play further intersecting trajectories. At Cambodia's national level (and principally for domestic purposes), there has been the need to re-iterate a victory narrative, that traces the achievements of the champions of the good East through: victims of Pol Pot's perversion of communist ideals, saviors of the Khmer race, defenders of Cambodian independence, guarantors of peace, and providers of socio-economic progress. The chapters marking this narrative's development include: the demonization of the

revolutionary *ancien régime* at the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, in a context of international isolation; Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek presenting an (unmediated) history for political purposes, following a Marxist-Leninist historiography and justifying/necessitating Vietnamese rescue and PRK (and, later, Hun Sen) rule; the performance/structuring of memory for national purposes in the Days of Hate; a singular, politically-crafted version of the country's communist past effected in the KPRP/CPP History; a win-win socio-economic strategy that entices/co-opts former opponents into a unitary nation; a "burying of the past" (i.e., enforced collective amnesia) that seeks to sublimate historical renderings into purely economic enterprises (and thereby obfuscate the question of the singularity/truth of the State's history). The consolidation and extension of this national narrative, which underwrites an empowered network, betrays academic determinations as performed in the good East narrative, the representation of atrocities by the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique (at Tuol Sleng), the effected memories in the populace, the integration of the vanquished Khmer Rouge, the interpretative casting of outlawed experience (in Anlong Veng), and the production of a post-Democratic Kampuchea Pol Pot group for domestic and foreign consumption.

The latest episode in this evolving story is inscribed on the environs of Anlong Veng, an *in situ* historical-tourist area that re-presents the last breath of the Khmer Rouge.³⁷⁸

Clearly, the representational effects sought in this endeavor also demonstrate the interests of the government (most specifically the ruling CPP) in controlling the narrative of the DK past.³⁷⁹ The museumification in the province of northern victory fortifies the CPP's stronghold of (stranglehold on) History, the/its past. However, the impetus for pursuing such a project is also largely embedded in the prioritization of tourism in the country's

socio-economic development programme.³⁸⁰ The Cambodian government appears under pressure to harness its glorious past for national revenues, and the success of this development through tourism policy has met with some success. Anticipated gains have bolstered efforts to offer up sites of the country's *non-glorious* past. The initiative in Anlong Veng offers an opportunity for consolidating historiographic goals; it also presents revenue possibilities as the government tries to 1) diversify its tourist destinations and 2) capitalize further on its already-successful genocide tourism.³⁸¹

This most recent historical-tourism endeavor inherits the accomplishments of a national narrative (manifested through museums, trials, national holidays, Party history, and a restrained history curriculum) as well as existing venues that transform genocide into a consumable tourist product. At the same time, the earlier historical sites of genocide remembrance undergo their continued transformation. Tuol Sleng, which offered to the world a gruesome example of why the PRK should be recognized as a legitimate government in 1980s Cambodia, also provides the national narrative that renders comprehensible (albeit in a manner that closely follows Vickery's STV) a past that remains largely inexplicable for the Cambodians who lived through it. More recently, the Museum of Genocidal Crimes has come to constitute the centerpiece of a dark tourism that harvests the country's traumatic past for profit.³⁸² Choeung Ek follows a similar trajectory while also posing the possibility of the Cambodian government allowing its history of trauma to be managed and administered by (foreign) private firms.³⁸³

In national terms, the project in Anlong Veng exhibits the same pressures as other moments in the post-DK construction of history: the continuing need to demonize Pol Pot

through an STV-like history, reliant upon and extending the victory narrative of the good East cadre; the alluring promise of riches brought on by hordes of tourists; and the temptation to reap income from giving historical sites over to private control. The various national dynamics become refracted at the local level:

- controversy in constructions of Cambodia's past exhibited in academic determinations of history as well as government projects (monuments, memorials, museums, tourist destination) and local re-tellings of experiences and memories
- concern about the transmission of the past, and its forgetting
- documenting the Truth—either through rigorous scientific work or local familiarity—potentially at odds with the Tourism Ministry's "blue tents and roast chicken" approach to historical tourism
- an undefined notion of "museum" form (that echoes the minimalist *realism* of previous efforts) that contends with a disappearing, scavenged, and looted locale
- contradictions/tensions in the impetus and organization of the tourism effort (Ta Mok vs. Hun Sen, DC-Cam vs. Ministry of Tourism, national ministry vs. provincial department, government vs. people, former Khmer Rouge vs. post-PRK affiliates, and the operational dissonance of Anlong Veng tour guides)
- a related conflict of perspectives in which official history (Royal Cambodian Government, Tourism Ministry, DC-Cam academics) confront local knowledge (where memory manifests as the irrepressible excess of history)
- a divergence in form/content further reflected in the ministry-vs.-local dynamic as well as Pol Pot vs. Ta Mok perspectives
- a "true" and "accurate" restoration based on the idea of "as before"
- the stated goal of pedagogical endowment increasingly subsumed by the stated goal of revenues

Anlong Veng residents are drawn into the globalized (and globalizing) culture industry of tourism by the government's project. However, the activities within the district have participated in and exacerbated certain social tensions as well. The context in which the Tourism Ministry pursues its work has been subject to rapid social transformation: new wealth, logging, social ills, increased commerce, new people filling positions related to tourism (guesthouses, restaurants, transportation, etc.), greater development and better infrastructure, increased emigration, border opening, casino construction, and the increased frequency of foreigners. In the realm of corruption, the project encourages the already-present tendencies toward name-buying (where a concern for accuracy is not extended to identity in the organization of history-making), prioritization of personal gain, and patronage. The national consolidation of the Hun Sen network becomes mirrored at the local level with the newly-integrated leaders extending the patron-client relationships at sub-district levels, and with this, the individual benefit for those that partake of the museum endeavor. Related to this incorporating process is the Anlong Veng project's functioning as a means to legitimate the (character of) reintegration of former Khmer Rouge forces. The greater integration effected by "win-win" policies brings (the signs of) development (following on Ta Mok's infrastructural gifts), a roundabout endowment and primary schooling as well as re-graded rural routes.

However, Tourism Ministry movements also generate chaos, uncertainty, and potential for greater conflict in its museum environs. Land speculation runs rampant as a steady flow of cash-holding foreigners is anticipated. Meanwhile, the threat of eminent domain looms over certain zones within the historical-tourist area. The conflict within notion of accuracy persists in spite (because) of the ministry's unfinished project. The

determination of historical knowledge by the Tourism Ministry—by triangulation, double-confirmation, etc.—fosters a narrowing of sought information (dates, places, events, persons, etc.), toward the omission of interpretation. This instrumental scientism confronts a local *episteme* that values the knowledge of the highest authority over competing concerns of correctness, without any other why or wherefore (*sans autre forme de procès*).³⁸⁴ In the end, the government will have achieved a singular, stable, uni-vocal history/truth, circulated as accurate, correct, real, which relies on the demonization of criminally insane monsters and a celebration of peace-giving saviors, and achieves an ever-increasing incorporation of society's members through win-win reintegration efforts and promises of commercial success.

"I will always lament its romantic past and sentimentalise the grand adventure of death we lived through in the midst of such ravishing beauty. Perhaps I am deceived by unworldly dreams. Perhaps I weave too many illusions about the past. But I don't believe it was just a romantic fantasy."

EPILOGUE

Route 67 to Anlong Veng from Siem Reap dramatically worsened between 2004 and my last visit to the district in August 2005, perhaps on par with my earliest travails along the route. The road from Banteay Srei to Phum Srei Noy was essentially the same as ever.¹ However, the Oddar Meanchey section of track (which was graded in January 2003) seemed to have almost completely gone without maintenance.² In many instances, the bridges were crumbling beyond their last leg; two or three had been completely replaced, but wood had been substituted for previous ironworks. The road through Prey S'aat became a muddy mess. New villages along the road still remained, but not much development, expansion, or improvement was obvious from 12 months previous.

Anlong Veng economic environment expanded in length and width: businesses lined the street, starting from the lateral log bridge entering town all the way to the crossroads to O Smach/Samraong. A new gas station near the entrance bridge and a nearby concrete home mark the new limits of the town's core. The area and economy also broadened with the completion of the new New Market of Anlong Veng. This newest shopping venue offers a tall open-air commerce center with a concrete foundation and tin roof. The market peddles the same wares as the earlier new market—produce, meats, household items, clothing—although there is likely a larger portion of Thai goods available. A taxi depot has been designated in the market's large compound; however,

hired vehicles still line the main road through town across from the old “new market.” At least three or four new guesthouses had been added (with Monorom, across the street from the hospital, reputed as the nicest/priciest). Numerous new restaurants had sprouted along the main thoroughfare. The wood business—cutting as well as carving and carpentry—remains Anlong Veng’s primary industry.³

As a partial consequence, the condition of the town road has declined, marked by numerous sharp ruts and potholes. The road from the roundabout to Cherg Phnom had degenerated severely, obviously due to very large vehicles in conjunction with the monsoon weather.⁴ Massive ruts scarred the track nearly the entire distance from town to the mountain. The beaten path up the escarpment had similarly worsened. Much of the rocky terrain had been covered over with mud, making the ascent quite slick at various moments. It is all too apparent that large cargo trucks (carrying wood and perhaps other supplies) contributed to this decline. In 2004, a casino on the mountaintop was in the works. A large lot (approximately 4 ha), cast between Choam Pass and the Darm Chrey bluff, had been cleared of all vegetation, and cement pilings were installed.⁵ However, this gambling deal, which locals indicated was bankrolled by a brother of Defense Minister Tea Banh, folded after a controversy over its proximity to the border. The ambiguities of markers and a possible violation of territorial integrity led the Thai government to block transport of construction materials to the site.⁶ Instead, the high rollers have taken their dealings to higher plateaus. “A kilometre (half-a-mile) down the road from the grave, a different kind of attraction is being built: Cambodian defence minister Tea Banh’s brother and tycoon Ly Yong Phat are throwing up a casino and hotel to attract Thais.”⁷ Mountain 200, no longer the eroding site of a former munitions

factory, was being transformed in a newly-clear-cut chasm of casino cacophony. Two tower cranes peaked out above the jungle canopy.⁸

The most dramatic visions of change on the mountain arose from the rampant cutting in various regions: Kbal Tonsaong, Darm Chrey, west of the border market, and Mountain 200. Some of this was meant to open areas for new building, while the felled flora certainly was fed into the timber business. Approaching the summit pass, deforestation efforts were apparent in the access path to the Pass 808 road, such that the military encampment, once hidden in the trees, became now visible from the main road. Across the road from this point, and on a peak, a new telephone network service tower (Mobitel/012) has been erected.

The sprawl of the market offers additional evidence of mountaintop transformations. The stalls—which sell cigarettes, wood sculptures, toiletries, digital music and video, etc.—are interspersed with shack-style brothels (and these perhaps do much more business than the depressing string of retailers). Ironically (or appropriately), the market has occupied the area that contained the house, kitchen, and common house of Ta Mok's economic minister, Nuon Nov. The expanse appears so chaotic that some disorientation makes the exact determination of the previous sites difficult. The market on the south and west sides of the road (one stall deep) surrounds the area of Nhoeun's house and the previous structures, blocking the view into the area. A fire in the 2004 dry season destroyed some of this shallow market annex and damaged some of the languishing leftovers of questionable historical value. In spite of its burnt state, the charred leanings of Nhoeun's abode still offer a loading site for cut lumber.⁹ The area across the road to Darm Chrey from Nhoeun's house (formerly Kov's residence) has

been taken over by tourist police offices. The entire field in which the remains of Kov's house was located had been cleared and built upon. The road approaching the border and the government control offices appear unchanged in any major way. Similarly, Pol Pot's sentencing site remained a series of wood pillars, only with market stalls slightly encroaching on the site's fringes. All along the trail from Choam Pass to Darm Chrey, the Dangrek's escarpment had been parceled into property. Areas that were long fields of shrubs and semi-dense forest were broken into sections lined with wood fencing, metal linings, or barbed wire. Land speculation was well entrenched, while logging appeared to put idle hands to work. From Ta Mok's ledge, the cutting was quite obvious: if one could not see it with one's eyes, one could surely hear it in the constant buzz of chainsaws.

The more remote area of Kbal Tonsaong was less affected by the rapid development afflicting the mountain's concentrated clusters nearer the border checkpoint. The road toward Pol Pot's principal precipice seemed very much unchanged, although numerous new sub-paths had been cut into the forest to allow for logging. The main road through the trees was slightly more eroded in sloped parts, but all the small bridges remained intact. Throughout the Kbal Tonsaong area, fewer soldiers appeared to be occupying/protecting. The brigade base was dismantled, leaving behind a singular residence near the encampment's former entryway. The "Guardhouse" (near the large pond) remains standing, still without any correction clarifying that it was a provisions office. The last remaining beams of wood at Ta Mok's pig house had fallen and/or been taken, leaving an obscured concrete foundation in tall grass. Access to Pol Pot's waterfall was discretely marked, but the path had become heavily overgrown (in spite of the CMAC certification that mines had been cleared). The compound of Pol Pot's house

appeared relatively undisturbed, with an intact perimeter wall. Access to Khieu Samphan's office had been facilitated by the clearing of some vegetation. Pol Pot's residence, on the other hand, looked to have been abandoned to the vegetative forces of nature. The "swimming pool" was reduced to pockets of stagnant, algae-filled water. The lack of upkeep throughout the area and the absence of traffic leave the impression that neither tourists nor other visitors are making the long trip to the snout of Kbal Tonsaong.

Finally, it remains unclear how the ongoing revision of the master plan—its latest draft produced in 2007—meshes with the publicly proclaimed pursuits of private protagonists. On the heels of privatization efforts at Choeung Ek and the ongoing capitalization of Angkor ticket sales by Sokimex, individual firms approach the Ministry of Tourism in hopes of laying claim to the last home of Cambodia's "Original Khmer" (*khmaer darm* ខ្មែរ ដើម) and the surrounding deathbed of its revolution.¹⁰ The *dernier cri* in re-touching the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area is heard in a proposal by Nhem En.¹¹ This last protagonist posed as the photographer at S-21, who captured the dying moments of suspected traitors as the strings of victims entered DK's central security center. In the abyss (*anlong* អង្គរ) left by the Tourism Ministry, Nhem En is now taking shots at developing and framing the last breath of the Khmer Rouge movement, adding a new *obscurantism* to his camera.



After roughly three years, eight months, and 20 days in the 'Bodge, after many perfect moments, it was time for my departure, waving farewell like Spalding Gray driving away from a *Killing Fields* set. Left unfinished, encroached upon by business ventures, subsumed in commercialization, subject to historical revisionism and the re-invention of memory, irrupting with hints of social tension, yielding to nature, time, and the vagaries of human behavior, the "museum" seems to become the fragmented partial tracings of the ethnographer through the field recorded as his/story. The multiple connections that become eclipsed by the (de)terminations—settings in time and place according to concrete foundations—of movement emerge in the diverse narratives that mark a long *dérive* through the long ditch.



APPENDIX 1

Sites & Markers of Anlong Veng, Oddar Meanchey Province¹⁷

<u>Anlong Veng Commune</u>		<u>ឃុំអន្លង់វែង</u>
1.	Anlong Veng School (Ta Mok School) សាលារៀន អន្លង់វែង	N 14° 13' 46–83", E 104° 05' 27–53"
2.	Ta Mok Headquarters ទីបញ្ជាការ តាម៉ុក (នៅខាងកើតទីរួមស្រុកអន្លង់វែង)	N 14° 13' 54–57", E 104° 05' 00–66"
3.	Anlong Veng Health Center (Ta Mok Hospital) មណ្ឌលសុខភាព អន្លង់វែង (មន្ទីរពេទ្យ តាម៉ុក)	N 14° 14' 05–13", E 104° 04' 50–21" elev. 49 m
4.	Brick Kiln ឃ្នាំង អំបិល និង ឡឥដ្ឋ	N 14° 14.161', E 104° 04.783' elev. 47 m
5.	Salt Warehouse ឃ្នាំង អំបិល និង ឡឥដ្ឋ	N 14° 14.299', E 104° 04.691' elev. 49 m
6.	Chik Stream Bridge & Weir ទំនប់ និង ស្ពាន អូរជីក	N 14° 14' 12–98", E 104° 04' 44–56" elev. 48 m
7.	Ta Mok's House (lakeside) ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក (មាត់បឹង)	N 14° 14' 29–04", E 104° 04' 50–42" elev. 57 m
8.	Pol Pot's House (O Chik Lake) ផ្ទះ ប៉ុល ពត (នៅក្នុងបឹងអូរជីក)	
9.	Ta Mok's Mine Production (O Chik Lake) កន្លែងផលិតមីនែរ តាម៉ុក	300 m north of Ta Mok's house
10.	Kheum Ngon's House ផ្ទះ ខឹម អុន	
<u>Trabaing Prey Commune</u>		<u>ឃុំត្រពាំងប្រើប៉ី</u>
11.	Ta Mok's Teuk Chum House ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក នៅភូមិទឹកជ្រូក	N 14° 15.240', E 104° 04.850' elev. 55 m
12.	"Pol Pot's Secret House" sign ផ្លាកសម្រាប់ ផ្ទះសំងាត់ ប៉ុល ពត	N 14° 16.109', E 104° 04.834' elev. 57 m
13.	Ta Mok's Middle Ware/House (Arts Group House, Ta Mok's Transportation Site) ផ្ទះកណ្តាលក្រោម តាម៉ុក (ផ្ទះនៃក្រុមសិល្បៈ . កន្លែងការដ្ឋានដឹកជញ្ជូន តាម៉ុក)	N 14° 16.060', E 104° 04.709' elev. 61 m
14.	Pol Pot's Secret House ផ្ទះសំងាត់ ប៉ុល ពត	

¹⁷ This comprehensive listing includes the names and locations of sites included in the Ministry of Tourism's Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area (in boldface) as well as many supplementary locales which have been omitted from the "museum" project.

Srah Chhouk Village

ភូមិស្រែនឈូក

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 15. | “Ta Mok’s Sawmill” sign
ផ្ទះកសិកម្មរាប់ រោងចក្រឈើ តាម៉ុក | |
| 16. | Ta Mok’s Sawmill
រោងចក្រអាវឈើ តាម៉ុក | N 14° 18' 32–63", E 104° 04' 48–69" |
| 17. | Ta Mok’s House
ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក (នៅខាងលិចរោងចក្រអាវឈើ តាម៉ុក) | 100 m west of sawmill
(near a banyan tree) |
| 18. | Son Sen Family Grave
ផ្ទះខ្មោច (កន្លែងដុតសព) សុន សេន និង សាច់ញាតិ | N 14° 18' 30–13", E 104° 04' 48–72" |

Cherng Phnom Village

ភូមិជើងភ្នំ

- | | | |
|-----|---|---|
| 19. | “Khieu Samphan’s House” sign
ផ្ទះកសិកម្មរាប់ ផ្ទះ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 18.546', E 104° 623'
elev. 66 m |
| 20. | Ta Mok’s Arms Warehouse
ឃ្នាំងគ្រាប់ តាម៉ុក | on right side of road to Khieu Samphan’s
house |
| 21. | Khieu Samphan’s House
ផ្ទះ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 19.111', E 104° 02.642'
elev. 71 m |
| 22. | “Ta Mok’s Warehouse” sign
ផ្ទះកសិកម្មរាប់ ឃ្នាំង តាម៉ុក | N 14° 20.137', E 104° 04.783' |
| 23. | Ta Mok’s Warehouse
ឃ្នាំង តាម៉ុក | N 14° 20.087', E 104° 04.800'
elev. 85 m |
| 24. | Khmer Rouge Statues
រូបចម្លាក់ខ្មែរក្រហម | N 14° 20.236', E 104° 04.185'
elev. 181 m |

Mountain 200

ភ្នំ ២០០

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| 25. | Mountain 200 road
ច្រកចូលឡើង ភ្នំ ២០០ | N 14° 20.255', E 104° 03.659'
elev. 246 m |
| 26. | Munitions Factory
រោងចក្រគ្រាប់រំសេវ | N 14° 19' 54–50", E 104° 03' 24–25" |

Pass 808 / Chrach

ច្រក ៨០៨ / ច្រាច់

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| 27. | Pass 808 road
ផ្លូវថ្នល់ ច្រក ៨០៨ | N 14° 20.236', E 104° 03.390'
elev. 287 m |
| 28. | House East of Chrach
ផ្ទះនៅខាងកើតច្រាច់ | N 14° 20.710', E 103° 58.923'
elev. 391 m |
| 29. | Chrach Dam
ម៉ែនប៉ៅច្រាច់ | N 14° 20.985', E 103° 58.677'
elev. 388 m |
| 30. | Chrach Housing Area
នគរ្តូងភ្នំប៉ៅមាត់ផ្តេន ច្រាច់ | N 14° 21.022', E 103° 58.617'
elev. 383 m |
| 31. | Chrach Arms Warehouse
ឃ្នាំងអាវុធជាច្រាច់ | N 14° 21.216', E 103° 58.487'
elev. 384 m |
| 32. | Ta Mok’s Pass 808 Border House
ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក នៅច្រក ៨០៨ នៅព្រំដែនថៃ | N 14° 21.141', E 103° 58.608'
elev. 387 m |

Choam Pass

ច្រកជាំ

- | | | |
|-----|--|--|
| 33. | Ta Mok's Choam Pass Common House
ផ្ទះរួមគ្នានៃ តាម៉ុក | N 14° 20.501', E 104° 03.483'
elev. 324 m |
| 34. | Nuon Nov's House
ផ្ទះ ឆួន នៅ | N 14° 20.536', E 104° 03.511'
elev. 325 m |
| 35. | Nuon Nov's Common House
ផ្ទះរួមគ្នានៃ ឆួន នៅ | N 14° 20.536', E 104° 03.533'
elev. 329 m |
| 36. | Nuon Nov's Kitchen
ផ្ទះធ្វើម្ហូបនៃ ឆួន នៅ | N 14° 20.535', E 104° 03.544'
elev. 328 m |
| 37. | Pol Pot's Grave
កន្លែងដុតខ្មោច ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 20.566', E 104° 03.468'
elev. 322 m |
| 38. | Pol Pot's Last Hut
ខួបចុងក្រោយនៃ ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 20.556', E 104° 03.459'
elev. 326 m |
| 39. | Pol Pot Sentencing Site
កន្លែងកាត់ទោស ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 20.591', E 104° 03.643'
elev. 334 m |
| 40. | Thai-Cambodian Border
ព្រំដែនថៃ | N 14° 20.667', E 104° 03.705'
elev. 336 m |
| 41. | Nhoeun's House
ផ្ទះ ញើន | N 14° 20.523', E 104° 03.661'
elev. 335 m |
| 42. | Choam Pass Common House 2
[Pol Pot Arms Warehouse?]
ឃ្នាំងគ្រាប់ ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 20.498', E 104° 03.629'
elev. 336 m |
| 43. | Choeun Kov's House
ផ្ទះ ឈុន កូវ | N 14° 20.565', E 104° 03.673'
elev. 336 m |

Darm Chrey

ដើមជ្រៃ

- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 44. | Medicine Storage House
ផ្ទះដាក់ថ្នាំពេទ្យ | |
| 45. | Nuon Chea's House
ផ្ទះ ឆួន ជា | N 14° 20.733', E 104° 05.012'
elev. 343 m |
| 46. | "Son Sen's House" sign
ផ្ទាំងសម្រាប់ផ្ទះ សុន សេន | N 14° 20.685', E 104° 05.038'
elev. 334 m |
| 47. | Son Sen's House
ផ្ទះ សុន សេន | N 14° 20.669', E 104° 05.013'
elev. 341 m |
| 48. | Son Sen's Children's House
ផ្ទះនៃដុំកូន សុន សេន | |
| 49. | Salt Warehouse
ឃ្នាំងអំបិល | N 14° 20.875', E 104° 05.082'
elev. 361 m |
| 50. | Ta Mok Mango Orchard Guesthouse
ផ្ទះសំណាក់ តាម៉ុក នៅចំការដើមស្វាយ ជិតព្រំដែនថៃ
ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក កណ្តាលលើ | N 14° 20.852', E 104° 05.071' |
| 51. | "Ta Mok's House" sign (Darm Chrey)
ផ្ទាំងសម្រាប់ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក | N 14° 20.798', E 104° 05.148'
elev. 341 m |

- 52. **Ta Mok's (Middle) House**
ផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក N 14° 20.779', E 104° 05.161'
elev. 351 m
- 53. **Ta Mok Dayhouse**
ផ្ទះកំសាន្ត តាម៉ុក N 14° 20.710', E 104° 05.155'
elev. 334 m
- 54. **Provisions Storehouse**
កន្លែងស្តុកស្បៀង
- 55. **Darm Chrey Restaurant/Guesthouse**
ភោជនីយដ្ឋានលើភ្នំ នៅកន្លែងផ្ទះ តាម៉ុក N 14° 20.709', E 104° 05.206'
elev. 343 m
- 56. **"Ta Mok Waterfall" sign**
ផ្ទាំងសម្រាប់ ទឹកធ្លាក់ តាម៉ុក
- 57. **Ta Mok Waterfall**
ទឹកធ្លាក់ តាម៉ុក N 14° 20.763', E 104° 05.404'
elev. 336 m
- 58. **Pol Pot Political School entry**
ផ្លូវទៅ សាលានយោបាយ ប៉ុល ពត N 14° 21.039', E 104° 05.470'
elev. 355 m
- 59. **Pol Pot Political Hall Kitchen**
ផ្ទះធ្វើម្ហូបនៅ សាលានយោបាយ ប៉ុល ពត N 14° 21.066', E 104° 05.493'
elev. 358 m
- 60. **Pol Pot Political Hall Elite Guesthouse**
ផ្ទះរួមគ្នានៅ សាលានយោបាយ ប៉ុល ពត
- 61. **Son Sen Relatives Killing Site**
កន្លែងការកាប់សំលាប់វិនៃ គ្រួសារ សុន សេន N 14° 21.075', E 104° 05.868'
elev. 369 m
- 62. **O Kranhoung Old Radio Guardhouse**
អគារយាមចាស់ វិទ្យុ អូរក្រញ៉ង់ N 14° 21.184', E 104° 06.020'
elev. 375 m
- 63. **New Radio Guardhouse**
អគារយាមថ្មី វិទ្យុ N 14° 21.363', E 104° 06.177'
elev. 390 m
- 64. **Radio Station road**
ផ្លូវទៅ ស្ថានីយវិទ្យុ N 14° 21.380', E 104° 06.195'
elev. 392 m


Kbal Tonsaong

ក្បាលទន្សោង

- 65. **Kbal Tonsaong Guardhouse**
រោងយាម ក្បាលទន្សោង N 14° 22.252', E 104° 07.165'
elev. 376 m
- 66. **Kbal Tonsaong Secret Guardhouse**
រោងយាមសំអាត ក្បាលទន្សោង
- 67. **8 Pol Pot Guardhouses road**
N 14° 22.197', E 104° 07.180'
elev. 376 m
- 68. **"Second Guardhouse"**
[Economic Support Specialist House]
ផ្ទះនៃ អ្នកដឹកនាំ N 14° 22.084', E 104° 07.175'
elev. 366 m
- 69. **Pol Pot Holiday House**
ផ្ទះកំសាន្ត ប៉ុល ពត
- 70. **Pol Pot Holiday House Kitchen**
ផ្ទះធ្វើម្ហូបនៅ ផ្ទះកំសាន្ត ប៉ុល ពត
- 71. **Pol Pot's Nephew's House**
ផ្ទះកូនប្រុស ប៉ុល ពត
- 72. **Hong's House**
ផ្ទះ ហុង
- 73. **Ta Mok's Pig Barn**
អាគារចិញ្ចឹមជ្រូក N 14° 22.012', E 104° 07.141'
elev. 374 m


- | | | |
|-----|---|--|
| 74. | Music Studio | N 14° 21.691', E 104° 07.134'
elev. 367 m |
| 75. | Radio Generator Facility | |
| 76. | 2 Radio Trucks | |
| 77. | Protection Wall | |
| 78. | Cassette Player House | |
| 79. | Radio Operator Houses | N 14° 21.658', E 104° 07.051'
elev. 359 m |
| 80. | Kbal Tonsaong Hospital
មន្ទីរពេទ្យភ្នំពេញ | N 14° 21.633', E 104° 07.226'
elev. 363 m |
| 81. | Kao Bunheng's House
ផ្ទះ កោ ប៉ុនហេង | N 14° 21.556', E 104° 07.186'
elev. 364 m |
| 82. | In Sopheap's House
ផ្ទះនៃ អ៊ិន សុភាព | N 14° 21.554', E 104° 07.186'
elev. 362 m |
| 83. | Mak Ben's House
ផ្ទះនៃ ម៉ាក់ ហេន | N 14° 21.540', E 104° 07.185'
elev. 362 m |
| 84. | Thiounn Thioeunn's Children's House
ផ្ទះនៃផ្ទះកូន លោកគ្រូពេទ្យ ជួន ជឿន | N 14° 21.509', E 104° 07.178'
elev. 362 m |
| 85. | Thiounn Thioeunn's House
ផ្ទះនៃ លោកគ្រូពេទ្យ ជួន ជឿន | N 14° 21.509', E 104° 07.161'
elev. 360 m |
| 86. | "Khieu Samphan's House" sign
ផ្ទាំងសម្រាប់ ផ្ទះ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 21.326', E 104° 07.176'
elev. 339 m |
| 87. | Khieu Samphan's House
ផ្ទះ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 21.346', E 104° 07.202'
elev. 337 m |
| 88. | Khieu Samphan's Children's House
ផ្ទះនៃផ្ទះកូន ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 21' 20-07", E 104° 07' 11-36" |
| 89. | Khieu Samphan's Second Office
[same as above?]
ការិយាល័យទី២ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 21.317', E 104° 07.189'
elev. 342 m |
| 90. | "Pol Pot Waterfall" sign
ផ្ទាំងសម្រាប់ ទឹកធ្លាក់ ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 21.312', E 104° 07.213'
elev. 334 m |
| 91. | Pol Pot waterfall
ទឹកធ្លាក់ ប៉ុល ពត | |
| 92. | Kbal Tonsaong Communications Center
មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលការទាក់ទងគ្នា ក្រសួងទំនាក់ទំនង | N 14° 21.277', E 104° 07.293'
elev. 348 m |
| 93. | Staff Houses from Communications Center
ផ្ទះបុគ្គលិក ពី មជ្ឈមណ្ឌលការទាក់ទងគ្នា | |
| 94. | Chan Youran's House
ផ្ទះ ចាន់ យ៉ូរ៉ាន់ | N 14° 21.281', E 104° 07.319'
elev. 342 m |
| 95. | Khieu Samphan's Office
ការិយាល័យ ខៀវ សំផន | N 14° 21.261', E 104° 07.272'
elev. 340 m |
| 96. | Pol Pot's House
ផ្ទះ ប៉ុល ពត | N 14° 21.229', E 104° 07.270'
elev. 338 m |
| 97. | Pol Pot's Hideaway Hut
ខ្ទមលាក់ខ្លួន (នៅខាងកើតផ្ទះ ប៉ុល ពត) | |
| 98. | Kbal Tonsaong School
សាលារៀន ក្រសួងទំនាក់ទំនង | N 14° 21.737', E 104° 07.280'
elev. 366 m |

APPENDIX 2


Maps of Anlong Veng, Oddar Meanchey Province¹⁸

¹⁸ Numbers on these maps correspond to the list of sites in Appendix 1.


**Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa
Along Veng Village, Commune, District**




Anlong Veng District I (South)
Anlong Veng & Trabaing Prey Communes, Anlong Veng District




Anlong Veng District II (North)
Trabaing Prey Commune, Anlong Veng District




Pol Pot's Secret House
Khlaing Kandal Village, Trabaing Prey Commune, Anlong Veng District




Dangrek Mountains Escarpment




Choam Pass
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District




Darm Chrey
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District




**Darm Chrey to Kbal Tonsaong
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District**



Kbal Tonsaong I (North)
Dangrek Mountains, Along Veng District



Kbal Tonsaong II (South)
Dangrek Mountains, Anlong Veng District



References

CHAPTER 1

¹ May Ebihara, *Svay, A Khmer Village in Cambodia*, pp. 17–18.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.

³ In his discussion of “bifocality” on the part the multi-sited ethnographer, Marcus highlights the importance of a pre-existing personal connection that informs a changing subject’s relation to the object of study through multiple frames over the course of a project. “The chain of preexisting historic or contemporary connection between the ethnographer and her or his subjects may be a long or short one, thus making bifocality an issue of judgment and a circumstance even of the personal, autobiographical reasons for pursuit of a particular project, but its discovery and recognition remains a defining feature of the current modernist sensibility in ethnography” (George E. Marcus, “Requirements for Ethnographies of Late-Twentieth-Century Modernity Worldwide,” p. 69). Elsewhere, I argue that the motivating power of personal affinity guiding multi-sited ethnography, of which Marcus writes, can constitute a kind of momentum for the “objective” unfolding of project, a strategic weakness in a giving over to the object (Wood, *Following in/of/as Para-Sites*, pp. 21–28). For my part, the initial awareness (arrival of awareness) of Cambodia/Kampuchea emerged from an almost-forgotten childhood experience—a short connection—and this (lack of) familiarity occurred through the lens of charity work. It seems ironic that my lasting impression of most charity organizations in Cambodia would focus on the professionalization of the NGO culture, the economic divisions they fosters, the self-perpetuating nature of their industry, the disconnection from the resident populations, and what appears to an informed observer as a dramatic waste of financial and human resources.

⁴ As Abney describes the July 1997 fighting: “This complete takeover of the entire Cambodian political system has resulted in the unchallenged authority of strongman Hun Sen” (Abney, *Familiar Ground: The Breakdown of Democracy in Cambodia and Implications for US Foreign Policy*, p. 36).

⁵ Sam Sary, Rainsy’s father, was Sihanouk’s ambassador to London in the late 1950s; however, he was recalled in 1958 after stories emerged “about his alleged beating of his children’s governess” (*New York Times*, January 22, 1959, p. 16), who was also his mistress (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 100). His fall from *majesté* led him to found the antiroyalist Democratic People’s Party; by then, he was known by the US Department of State as “the staunchest friend of the United States in Cambodia” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 99). Sary’s conspiracy in the Bangkok Plot of 1959 led to his disappearance and alleged execution by agents of FARK Commander Lon Nol in 1961 (Corfield & Summers, *Historical Dictionary of Cambodia*, p. 360). (In November of that year, Lon Nol was promoted to lieutenant general.)

⁶ It is now widely believed that it was members of Hun Sen’s Bodyguard Unit who carried out the March 1997 grenade attack on Sam Rainsy at a demonstration near the National Assembly (see “‘Second’ FBI Report” to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, dated 24 November 1998, which Ron Abney, a victim of the attack, helped circulate).

⁷ Nhiek Tiouloung, Saumura’s father, rose up through the ranks of government administration during the French colonial period, Japanese occupation, and post-independence. He received embassy postings through the 1950s as well as the position of Minister of Defense; during the Second Indochina War (US-Vietnam War), he facilitated the flow of supplies from Cambodia’s southwestern port to the Viet Cong bases on the eastern border. His intention to retire was interrupted by national events and a loyalty to Sihanouk, and he assisted the efforts of GRUNK and later FUNCINPEC.

⁸ I credit Rita Leistner with coining this abbreviated nickname for the Kingdom of Cambodia, derived from the French *le Cambodge*.

⁹ A recurring personal affinity, the momentum continues; in fact, numerous travelers I encountered in the *Bodge* would convey this sense that Cambodia is a place you never completely leave, a destination to which you know you will return. In some ways, this sense of a need to return seems to (re-)perform the romantic lure of tropical Indochina as conveyed in such works as Jon Swain’s *River of Time*. On the becoming-modern of nationhood, see Penny Edwards, “*Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation 1860–1945*,” which fleshes out in detail the idea that the French Protectorate, through various mechanisms,

fostered and spurred Cambodia's nationalist yearnings largely by uncovering and popularizing the iconography of Angkor and instilling a particular vision of the Khmer nation.

¹⁰ The existence of the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* organization, often translated as "Popular Socialist Community" (*sangkorm reastr niyorm* សង្កមរដ្ឋស្រីយុម), marks the period of Sihanouk's rule from 1955 to 1970, when he formed what was essentially a political country club that cut across the entire spectrum of existing political parties, but membership in which became a *de facto* requirement for holding any political office. Through this mechanism, which hosted left and right politicians, Sihanouk was able to control and manage (for a time) the domestic political arena.

¹¹ The surplus of credentialed but unemployed/unemployable graduates (MBAs and other degrees) and the dramatic extraction of wealth from the countryside (both in terms of rice production and forestry resources), spent on luxury goods for the urban elite, suggest parallels to the social dynamics that eroded the *Sangkum* and cleared the stage for the Lon Nol and Pol Pot experiments.

¹² See my *Following in/of/as Para-Sites* (2002) and "Fatal Pursuits: Following as Para-Site" (2004), which trail Baudrillard's ideas on giving over to the object and feeding off an external agency in relation to Marcus' "multi-sited ethnography," particularly in its emphasis on the theme of following. In these works, I propose an ethnographic approach which follows the object (as informant, concept, or cultural process) through multiple sites and contexts in ways that open new spaces of inquiry and make a hospitable host of the proliferating social code. The open-endedness of this new gaming methodology puts at risk the privileged points of modern research agendas: the alibi of the social, difference as a palliative for the Other, and the agency and ob-scenity of the researching subject.

¹³ "Journalistic accounts in the foreign press seem to be doing much of the Ministry's promotion work by textually seizing and exploiting the area's piecemeal oddities and by deeming the collection of residues of Khmer Rouge life as a (future) 'Disneyland' [Crampton, "Rough Road to a Theme Park," p. 2; Falby, "Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland," p. 16], 'Colonial Williamsburg' [Sipress, "Visit Cambodia! Package Tours to a Despot's Hideout," p. A17], or tourist resort in the country's northern jungles [Berger, "Roll up to see mass murderer Pol Pot's ashes for two dollars," p. A16; Sheridan, "Pol Pot's lair to become a tourist resort." p. 26]. The absurdity of the Royal Cambodian Government's blatant commercialization of the remote destination may also contribute to this sensationalism; meanwhile, district elites take the economic promises seriously and continue to construct and expand lodging" (Wood, "Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge," p. 189).

¹⁴ According to an ADB assessment, "Road transportation is the dominant mode of transportation in Cambodia, accounting for about 65% of passenger transport and 70% of goods transport (according to SEDPII); with a few exceptions, the road network is in poor condition. Decades of conflict, civil unrest, and excessive flooding have resulted in a deteriorated or destroyed road system. In addition, periodic and routine maintenance have been mostly neglected. Most of the road system needs to be rehabilitated, some of improved and increased capacity, and almost all of improved maintenance. The total road network is 36,399.53 km.... Approximately 2,700 km of the road network is of all-weather construction, and much of the remainder can only be used by motorcycles or four-wheel drive vehicles" (ADB, *Road Safety in Cambodia*, pp. 2-3). As for political motivation, the dusty and pot-holed streets of Phnom Penh seemed to get paved in the months prior to elections. On the economic incentive side, my 1998 trip to Monduliri Province was made especially easy in parts due to the "Sam Ling Highway," a wide, flat, straight stretch of road that was cleared through Cambodia's jungle by a Malaysian logging company to facilitate the extraction of tropical hardwoods. There is also the story of the section of National Route 6 from Siem Reap to Sisophon that was in such disrepair that complaints after a visit from Hun Sen led to the immediate paving of the road; however, the work was done with such haste that one rainy season undid the largely cosmetic smoothing of the thoroughfare. Through its road rehabilitation program and its military engineers, the Cambodian government had intended to pave all major national routes by 2005, a deadline that came and went.

¹⁵ "There were big ruts, but those were easily avoided. Again, oncoming traffic created the hazard of blindness. This place is remote. It is rural. I feel like I am far from civilization. It was so strange to think about going to Anlong Veng—in 1998, all the news about this place was that it was the last bastion of KR activity. Now it's trying to prostitute its past in the tourism trade. I can imagine in the rainy season, this place will not garner too many visitors. That 2.5-hour speed mission will turn into a full-day mudfest come

the monsoon months. Since this is one of my research sites, I am bound to have to make that trek” (Cambodian Journal entry: Monday, March 4, 2002 6PM, Anlong Veng).

¹⁶ Chandler relates the legend as a possible condensation of “remembered” tales of Angkorian defeats (A *History of Cambodia*, p. 85). His version (taken from the report of Gustave Janneau, a French scholar from the 19th century) retells the fall of Longvek (sometimes written Lovek) (*lorngvèk* ល្បែក) at the end of the 16th century. The citadel was home to *Preah Ko* ព្រះគោ (sacred cow) and *Preah Kaev* ព្រះកែវ (sacred gem); in the belly of these statues, it was said, were books of gold through or in which one could garner the knowledge of the universe—these statues were “impregnated with the creative soul of the Khmer nation” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 213). A natural barrier of thick bamboo, impenetrable to foreign invaders, surrounded the fortress at Longvek. Knowing that access to knowledge of the universe was to be had, the king of Siam ordered an attack. When the army arrived, their cannons shot silver coins into the thick bamboo forest, and then they retreated. In order to obtain these coins, the Khmers cut down the bamboo. Thus, in the following year when the Thai army returned, the capture of the citadel as well as the two sacred objects was a facile enterprise. Cambodians offer interpretations of this tale that state how Khmer greed has served to undermine their people’s knowledge and intelligence (and allowed neighboring Siam to flourish while Cambodia entered a period of decline). The Buddhist teaching that grasping is the source of suffering further underscores the centrality of this legend within Cambodian culture. *Preah Ko* is said to metaphorically represent the Brahman influences in Khmer culture, and *Preah Kaev* is a metaphor for Buddhist legitimacy. On the one hand, the legend functions as a historical account of the fall of Longvek in 1594; however, it also serves as a potential metaphor for the more general decline of Angkorian superiority and the rise of Thai power in the region over centuries. In July 1971, Lon Nol retold the legend of Longvek’s capture by the Siamese to US Ambassador Emory Swank as a way of explaining Cambodia’s decline relative to its neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as a basis for motivating the struggle for the nation’s soul against the unbelievers (*thmil* ឥម្បិល), the Khmer Rouge (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, pp. 5, 213).

¹⁷ As one of the Khmer Rouge’s top military commanders, Ke Pauk assumed control over the North Zone. His rule is associated with the increased severity that seized that zone following the purge of Koy Thuon (see below). Kiernan’s obituary for Ke Pauk details some of the deceased’s more gruesome assaults: “One of his soldiers described Pauk’s rule: ‘In the Kompong Thom region the Organisation (was) led by very severe men... Their discipline was terrible; there were many executions... Buddha statues were destroyed and the pagodas secularised... there were camps for women, children, young women and young men; meals were eaten communally and rations consisted only of rice soup without meat... children were forbidden to respect their parents, monks to pray, husbands to live with their wives.’ The totalitarian system of Pol Pot’s ‘democratic Kampuchea’ was emerging in northern Cambodia” (Kiernan, “Ke Pauk”).

¹⁸ “Dr Thong Khon said: ‘We want the tourists to come and we want to educate all people to know about the Khmer Rouge, the genocide and how they destroyed our nation, especially the young generation’” (Fawthrop, “The Khmer Rouge tour”).

¹⁹ Ker, “Touting former Khmer Rouge stronghold as tourist stop.”

²⁰ “This town really doesn’t get many foreigners. In fact, this place is not set up to be a thriving tourist center (at least, not at the moment). These people are poor, simply put. And they have had one really interesting past. I am trying to imagine whose idea it was to tell foreigners to go see Ta Mok’s house or Pol Pot’s cremation site. What were/are they thinking?! Oh yeah, money. As I tried to visit the sites (and occasionally ask someone where to go), I really felt like I was prying into their privacy. Because the Ministry of Tourism has decided to pimp this town’s KR history, all of a sudden I have the right to bluntly ask where their former leader’s residence is located?! I feel like I should gradually bring this up in conversation, but when you’re sitting on a remote road, looking at a tourism sign, there’s not much more to say than ‘where is this place mentioned on the map?’... I am back at the guesthouse, and I am wondering about doing research here. I think its good to get a view at how these people think and feel about the presentation of these sites, but I am getting that nauseous feeling that something wrong is being done to the Other. But in this case, the Other is at least somewhat taking part in their own exploitation. I think it’s like they don’t know what they are getting themselves into. In five years, when the road is paved from Siem Reap to Anlong Veng (and Thailand) to Preah Vihear, this place will swarm with self-proclaimed history buff tourists that will demand these people perform their tragic life experiences of the last days of the Khmer Rouge. They will be financially compensated which is maybe all that matters (to them at the

moment?). But to me, it seems to cheapen and make superficial the ways these individuals give meaning and understanding to their experiences. It's funny how money always seems to undermine more reflective modes" (Cambodian Journal entry: Monday, March 4, 2002 6PM, Anlong Veng).

²¹ Based on reports I received from other travelers and from my own experience, the 125-km trek from Siem Reap to Anlong Veng can take two to five hours on a motorcycle and three to seven hours in a car, depending on the season and the general condition of the road.

²² Cambodian Journal entry: Wednesday, March 6, 2002 6PM, Siem Reap.

²³ These observations come from interviews with the deputy minister in 2002 as well as from a December 1989 interview organized by the American Friends Service Committee (Young, "Urban Revival: A Talk with Thong Khon, Mayor of Phnom Penh," pp. 13–15).

²⁴ Thong Khon, interview with author, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 26 June 2002.

²⁵ "The carpenters are still alive and can rebuild an exact copy" (Thong Khon, interview with author, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 26 June 2002).

²⁶ Khon has already spent US\$3000 on Khmer Rouge documents and a videotape, purchased from Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng (Thong Khon, interview with author, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 29 November 2002).

²⁷ Thong Khon, interview with author, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 26 June 2002.

²⁸ The interview sessions are structured around interviewee's biographical data. There is a bit of a dark irony in the oblique parallel to the way that autobiographies-become-documents worked as the means by which the Khmer Rouge established the "truth" of the secret spy network (CIA, KGB, and Vietnamese infiltrators), which it saw undermining the revolution of Democratic Kampuchea—life histories secured through torture at S-21 which became "evidence." The production and use of autobiographies is addressed in future chapters.

²⁹ Having left all my Comte, Spencer, and Parsons behind, I was somewhat surprised to encounter this emphasis, with its underlying positivistic notions of social science. The "adequacy of representation" perspective that dominates in Western thought seemed to be cropping up where documents/texts form the privileged referent for this construction of truth. That these officials were so focused on a properly rational/scientific orientation seemed unusual to me, as the need to pay proper respect to authority and the overwhelming need to keep things on a light tone generally takes precedence.

³⁰ CMAC emerged out of the cooperation of the Cambodian government and UNTAC in 1992, and the organization conducts mine awareness campaigns as well clearing activities. A major scandal erupted around the organization in July 1999 when an internal audit identified corruption, nepotism, and financial impropriety by on-the-ground de-miners as well as senior managers principally in Kampot Province. The most disturbing breaches to be exposed in the report were incomplete de-mining, forging of documentation, and for-profit sale of de-mined land. Perhaps most shocking was the illegal contract-demining of private land belonging to former Khmer Rouge commander, Colonel Chhouk Rin, who was involved in the kidnapping and execution of three foreign backpackers in July 1994; one of the backpackers was an Australian citizen, and the Australian government had been providing the majority of backing to CMAC. "The conclusions of the report are proof positive that '...enriching powerful interests instead of aiding the poor and landless were the main focus of CMAC authorities in Kampot and Kampong Speu'" (Kyne & Sainsbury, "CMAC damned—and doomed?," p. 4). Perhaps still echoing the scandal or perhaps offering their own assessment of CMAC's continued efforts, acquaintances from the Anlong Veng Halo Trust unit commented that they were distrustful of CMAC's quality of work and had found mines in supposedly CMAC-de-mined areas previously. They insisted that the Halo Trust's mission confines its de-mining to humanitarian ends, suggesting that the affiliation with the Cambodian government made CMAC the likely entity to carry out de-mining as a foundation for tourist development.

³¹ Although CMAC had completed its directives for clearing the tourism area in Anlong Veng, a warning sign was posted at the base of the Dangrek Mountain (alongside the road up the escarpment) that warned visitors about possible remnant mines and encouraged them to seek a local as a guide for the tourist areas.

³² Funding is an issue that arises for all endeavors in Cambodia. A novel response to this dilemma for historical sites has been to turn control and management of the sites over to private businesses. The Choeung Ek "killing fields" was leased to a Japanese firm in 2005. (This issue is further addressed in Chapter 3.)

³³ Mouhot, *Travels in Siam, Cambodia, Laos, and Annam*, p. 211 and Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien*, pp. 55, 59.

³⁴ The Mekong (*tornle mékong* មេគង្គ or មេគង្គ), previously known at various spans within its Cambodian flow as the Great River (*tornle thum* មេគង្គ), springs from the snows of the Tibetan Plateau, snakes through six nations, breaks into nine estuaries in Kampuchea Krom, and empties into the South China Sea. The name derives from components that literally render it the “mother” or “master” (*mé* មេ) river/waters (*kung* កង or *kungkea* កង) and relates to the Ganges River (Sanskrit/Pali *gangā*), an offspring of the Himalayas (Meru).

³⁵ Cambodians typically deal with waterways of three sizes: major river (*tornle* មេ) (equivalent to French, *un fleuve*), tributary river (*steung* ស្ទឹង) (*une rivière*), and stream or rivulet (*aur* អូរ) (*un ruisseau*). Other waterways, not typically discussed in terms of comparative size, include canal (*prèk* ជ្រក) (*un canal*) and irrigation ditch (*brâlay* ប្រាសាទ) (*un fossé, une rigole*).

³⁶ “... *un peu comme les rayons d'une roue*” (Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien*, p. 57).

³⁷ Informants suggested that the name of Anlong Veng emerged from this long tributary that causes a narrow ravine to extend from the Dangrek Mountains to Siem Reap.

³⁸ Current Cambodian geographical divisions proceed according to village, commune, district, then province. Military zonal demarcations cut across some of these areas; Anlong Veng District falls within RCAF Region 4.

³⁹ Some earlier English-language texts describe this administrative level as “subdistrict,” perhaps in an effort to prevent false associations with “communal living,” implying collective living with shared possessions. The term “commune,” which is used throughout this text, emerges from the French territorial demarcation of administrative units. See “*Le Khum*” in Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien*, pp. 199–201.

⁴⁰ Being historically located within the Province of Siem Reap, Anlong Veng was for various periods after the founding of the French Protectorate within the national borders of Thailand. The treaty between France and Siam in 1867 ceded Battambang and Siem Reap to Thai control, in exchange for the northwestern relinquishing its suzerainty over *Cambodge*. In 1907, the French re-secured the provinces, and re-secured them again following their return to Indochina after WWII. (A 1942 map of Southeast Asia shows the north-south border between French Indochina and Siam as a straight line from Stung Treng to a bubble around Siem Reap town (that maintains its Cambodian nationality) and from the northern tip of the Tonle Sap directly southwest to the Gulf of Siam (cutting through present-day Pursat Province.)

⁴¹ Perhaps economic concerns have come to trump nationalist sentiments for the former Khmer Rouge.

⁴² As reported from a number of NGO workers whose organizations support hospitals in Cambodia’s countryside, a consistent problem has arisen that plagues many provincial health centers. Employees find it more profitable to sell pharmaceuticals (often stolen or purchased at discounted prices at the health offices) and their services from their home. The result of this free-lancing is typically a hospital stripped of inventories and lacking staff, which in turn fosters a cycle of patients seeking treatment and medications from physicians at their private (home) practice.

⁴³ Anlong Veng would have aligned essentially with Delvert’s description of the “*village-marché*” (*phum phsaar* ភូមិផ្សារ): “*ces petits centres ruraux sont en effet indispensables à la vie paysanne; c’est là que le paysan livre ses récoltes; c’est là qu’il se procure les produits qui lui sont nécessaires... Ils sont installés un peu partout à des carrefours de route*” (Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien*, p. 217).

⁴⁴ According to the GRUNK/FUNK map, “*Cambodge, Situation (Mai 1972) de la Libération du Cambodge par les Forces Armées Populaires de Libération Nationale du Kampuchea*” (DC–Cam).

⁴⁵ “*Cambodge, Situation (Mai 1973) de la Libération du Cambodge par les Forces Armées Populaires de Libération Nationale du Kampuchea*” (DC–Cam).

⁴⁶ Different scholars translate these two related terms somewhat differently. I have chosen to translate *phoumipheak* as “zone”; although somewhat inconsistent, I differentially interpret *tâmbân* as “region” (when no substantial subdivisions were apparent, as denoted by three-digit numbers) and “sector” (when a multiplicity of single- or two-digit areas composes a larger zone). After reviewing the various terms and permutations for translating *phoumipheak* and *tâmbân*, Vickery also acknowledges that the grounds for one rendering over another are essentially arbitrary (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p.331n5).

⁴⁷ To be more precise, the April 1970 organization demarcated a North Zone consisting of Sector 31 (Kampong Cham, north of the Mekong), Sector 32 (Kampong Thom), Sector 35 (Siem Reap), Sector 36

(Oddar Meanchey), and Region 103 (Preah Vihear and the western part of Stung Treng). This large zone, filling a wedge formed by the country's two major rivers, was administered by secretary Koy Thuon, deputy secretary Chor Chhan (*alias* Sreng); its military was under the command of Ke Pauk (*né* Ke Vin) (Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp. 315–317). In 1975, a renumbering and slight modification created Region 106 (Siem Reap and Oddar Meanchey) under secretary Soth, Region 103, and Region 303 (the areas from Sectors 31 and 32). Koy Thuon had been moved to Phnom Penh to assume his duties as Minister of Commerce. After the early 1977 purge, the North Zone was split in two: the new North Zone consisted of Sector 44 (formerly Region 106) and Region 103; a newly-created Central Zone consisted of Sector 41 (Kampong Cham, north of the Mekong), Sector 42 (southwestern piece of Kratie), and Sector 43 (Kampong Thom) (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 71, 73; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 337–340). The significance of this purge is elaborated in Chapter 2.

⁴⁸ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 71.

⁴⁹ Vickery offers a scathing critique of the use and abuse of refugee camps (“Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand,” pp. 292–331). In this work, he goes beyond the humanitarian rhetoric that was circulated as support for the Cambodian refugee camp system and scrutinizes the political uses and economic benefits drawn from the perpetuation of that system. He provides some controversial, if well-supported, assertions: the condition of the many Khmer “refugees” was on par with rural Thais (and other “Third World” people); the opening of Khao-I-Dang required the searching out of refugees to fill the new massive site; Cambodians entering the camps did not technically (according to international agreements and protocols) qualify as “refugees;” the refugee camp system acted as a magnet drawing people who could have otherwise stayed in Cambodia, a movement which helped de-stabilize the Cambodian economy; the bureaucratic and professional aspirations of some people in the volunteer agencies (“volags”) encouraged the camp system to assume a more permanent character; the principal motivations for Khmer “refugees” were to re-establish relations with relatives abroad, conduct border trade, and/or join/organize a paramilitary group. One of Vickery’s key points is to demonstrate how refugees had to be created/encouraged, suggesting that Thailand and the US aimed to use the refugee population against the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh; he argues that essentially the large refugee problem was created for political reasons.

⁵⁰ Vickery, “Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand,” pp. 323–324. Prior to the June re-organization the public face of the DK government had been seated at a mountain base at Pass 808 in the Dangrek Mountains above Anlong Veng (Kamm, *Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land*, pp. 178–183; Short, *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 413–420, hereafter referred to as *The History of a Nightmare*; Barber & Bou, “Tip-off allows Mok to fight on,” pp. 1, 8). Although this area is not part of the Tourism Ministry’s designated “historical-tourist area,” Pass 808 is described in Chapter 3.

⁵¹ In January 1980, the area commanders were: “So Hong at Kla’ngop, Sok Pheap at Malay; Nikân in Sampou Loun; Phi Phuon in Kamrieng; and Y Chhean in Pailin” (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 412); Son Sen took up the Eastern Front at Paet Um, Ke Pauk assumed control of the Northern Front in Kampong Thom, and Ta Mok maintained authority of the Southwestern Front at Phnom Aural. By 1990, the area commands shifted such that (moving counter-clockwise from due north): Sector 1001 (Tonle Lpov, “the triangle”) and Sector 1002 (Prassat Preah Vihear) were under Son Sen and Ke Pauk, with their divisions (105, 612, 800, 801, 802, 612, and 920); Sector 1003 (from Pass 808 to Chuprun) under Ta Mok (Divisions 417, 607, 616, 785, 912, and 980); from Road 68 and Malai to Pailin, an area sometimes called “Pass 102” was under Ieng Sary; from Pailin to Koh Kong was under Pol Pot and Nuon Chea (compiled from interviews with: a former doctor at Ta Mok’s Hospital, 8 September 2003; a former journalist under Pol Pot, 20 September 2003; Ke Pauk’s son-in-law, 21 January 2004; Anlong Veng’s former minister of economy and trade, 7 October 2005). Short offers a different take on this leadership structure for June 1993, wherein the Northern Front is maintained by Ta Mok (at Anlong Veng) and Pol Pot (at Phnom Chhat) and the Southern Front is headed by Son Sen (at O Da, between Pailin and Malay) and Nuon Chea (at Samlaut); Son Sen’s key subordinates were Y Chhean (in Pailin) and Sok Pheap (in Malay) (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 431, 436).

⁵² Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 429.

⁵³ Emphasis added. The word in this dedication used to convey the “gift” is somewhat odd. Rather than use the more typical word for gift (*âmnaoy* អំណោយ), which derives by infixation from “to give” (*aoy* អោយ), or a more literary term like “endowment” (*teaycheatean* ព្រឿនចំណូល), which echoes the Pali word for dowry

(*dāyajja*), the inscription employs a narrowly used word (*chāmnāng dai* ឯងដៃ), which refers to a wedding gift, the threads tied around the wrists of the bride and groom. The chosen verbiage derives from “to tie” (*chāng* ង), suggesting the gift is a knot, link, or tying together. In fact, it might be fair to suggest that the string (*khsae* ខ្សែ) being tied/wedded to Anlong Veng (around its wrists) is Hun Sen’s patronage network (*khsae hun saen* ខ្សែ ហ៊ុន សែន).

⁵⁴ “The house itself sits on a spit of land in an eerie artificial lake dotted with the hulks of dead trees killed by the rising water. Residents say Ta Mok raised crocodiles in the lake, which he built in the early 1990’s” (Crampton, “Rough road to a theme park,” p. 2).

⁵⁵ As Second Prime Minister Hun Sen ousted First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in the July 1997 *coup de force*, FUNCINPEC elite found themselves under violent attack and being charged with making deals with the outlawed Khmer Rouge. While some of the FUNCINPEC cadre were assassinated at Pochentong Airport, behind the Royal palace, or within the Ministry of Interior compound (e.g., Minister Ho Sok), others retreated from the capital to the Thai border. Led by General Nhiek Bun Chhay, some 400 soldiers fled but few found refuge at the familiar sanctuary of O Smach, a hilltop border town that had previously housed a refugee camp for FUNCINPEC’s non-communist resistance through the 1980s. Allowed to breathe through the nose of Thai suzerainty during their second occupation of O Smach, FUNCINPEC leaders continued to court Khmer Rouge from Anlong Veng who could prove they had broken with the hardliners (Becker, “O Smach Journal; On Its Last Legs, the Saddest Cambodian Army”). The retreat to the O Smach enclave bears with it the legend of Nhiek Bun Chhay’s run, a trek from Phnom Penh to the Thai border largely on foot. The lone protagonist, protected by a “magic vest”—a simple jacket whose pockets were filled with amulets and talismans—from which bullets would bounce, fought the elements including a bout of malaria and a 15-kg loss in body weight. The physical endurance was matched by his traits of character; he is said to have distributed 10,000 *riel* notes to his accompanying soldiers as they set out, so that if lost they would have “money to buy food and not rob from the villagers” (Chea & Lenaghan “General eludes dragnet,” pp. 1, 12) His own reticence toward superstition adds credence to the powers of the vest: “Before, I didn’t believe in this magic thing, but now I believe that something was helping me” (Nhiek Bun Chhay, “Leaner Bun Chhay vows to fight on,” p. 7). FUNCINPEC’s military faction, or *para*—“the saddest Cambodian army” (Becker)—and the wearer of the magic vest occupied the hilltop enclave—the “only real democracy” in Cambodia (US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher)—from July 1997 through the July 1998 cease-fire, only to be re-integrated in the post-election coalition deal between Hun Sen’s CPP and Ranariddh’s FUNCINPEC in November 1998.

⁵⁶ The rice fields have been carved out of the forest—converting dense forest into what is typically called “garden” (*chāmkaar* ក្រាំង) or plantation (rice) farming—and many rice fields exist deeper into (and thus obfuscated by) the brush.

⁵⁷ The singletracks which cut through the shrubbery and trees of this district are mostly accessible by moto and oxcart; in the rainy season, oxcart and travel by foot are the most reliable means by which to navigate the thick mud into which the trails devolve.

CHAPTER 2

¹ Cambodia’s geographical situation is one of the key themes that Chandler identifies in the country’s history, playing a major factor in terms of foreign and domestic policy at numerous moments (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 1 and chaps. 6, 7). Noel suggests that concerns over expansionist neighbors dominated Cambodia’s foreign policy under Sihanouk (Noel, *Cambodia and Thailand*). Kiernan notes the fear of becoming swallowed up following the example of the Champa kingdom, and he notes that “historical enmity” played into nationalist concerns of the CPK (Kiernan, “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” p. 9; *idem*, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp. 41–55). This fear of being devoured by neighboring countries continues to haunt Cambodian political discourse; Sihanouk’s March 2005 charges of bordering forces “nibbling away” at Cambodia underscore the concerns of territorial integrity (Sihanouk quoted in Mathews, “Border issues show how Sihanouk still in political fray,” p. 14). Hood and Ablin document how geography encouraged various moments of fending off extinction of the country, often by seeking the assistance of outside powers (Hood & Ablin, “The Path to Cambodia’s

Present,” pp. xv–xx). Tracing Cambodia’s relationship to a Siamese society, Thion shows how a “galactic policy” (Tambiah’s concept) has been repeatedly played out (most recently with the Thai military’s control of the Khmer Rouge), with the Cambodian periphery replicating the Siamese center of the *mandala*, along with the paradoxes and contradictions of usurpations, rebellions, and rivalries (Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” p. 151; Tambiah, “The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia,” pp. 80–82, 91–92).

² Cœdès, *The Making of South East Asia*, pp. 198–201. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 113–116. This process of employing countervailing powers continued into Cambodia’s modern relations with Thailand and Vietnam (Leifer, “Cambodia and Her Neighbors”). Thion argues that the most recurrent and distinctively Khmer pattern in politics (from ancient to present times) is factionalism, which he describes as a “modernized version of the old patronage system.” (Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics,” p. 163). In noting Cambodia’s cultured differences from Western and Chinese politics, Thion emphasizes its abrupt and brutal changes, a certain lack of realism, quests to obtain honorary titles from the king, and individualistic (warlord) power contests. He further asserts that kinship solidarity has not been automatic and typically becomes a means to more power. Even the emergence of parliamentary democracy (supposedly based on principles) offered new opportunities for the pursuit of self-interest, nepotism, and corruption.

³ France’s initial presence in Indochina appears more geared to 1) colonial competition with Britain who had complete control over India, and 2) Catholic concern about converts in Vietnam; in these respects, Cambodia was secondary to interests in its neighbor to the east. Interestingly, internal challenges to King Norodom’s rule helped cement his embrace of French authority over Thai suzerainty. See Chandler’s account of the establishment of the French Protectorate (*A History of Cambodia*, pp. 140–142). The 1897 transfer of authority for collecting taxes, making decrees, and appointing officials to the *résident-supérieur* combined with growing French disillusionment about Cambodian wealth, which meant ever-rising taxes would become a key element of colonial rule experienced by the majority of the Khmer people; this issue would become a motivating factor for sporadic peasant rebellions, in 1916 and 1924–1926 in particular (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 153–159, 167–169; *idem*, “The Assassination of Resident Bardez,” which offers greater elaboration; and Osborne, “Peasant Politics in Cambodia”). Osborne suggests that early 20th-Century rural activism indicated widespread peasant resentment at the *corvée* system (prestations and requisitions), tax system, and corrupt administration as well as disorientation and incomprehension at the social changes that ensued following Norodom’s death (Osborne, “Peasant Politics in Cambodia,” pp. 219–220, 239–240). Like colonial rule in other countries, the Tricolor brought significant influence in shaping Cambodian institutions and bringing new institutions into existence. The production of “nationhood,” as described by Chandler (*A History of Cambodia*, pp. 162–172), Edwards (*The Cultivation of Nation*), and Becker (*When the War Was Over*, chap. 2), emerged as a cultural enterprise, or process of “Cambodian self-awareness” (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 163), that came to infuse all subsequent political discourse: the symbol of Angkor Wat (its re-discovery by the French), the establishment of the Buddhist Institute, political activism at *Lycée Sisowath*, and the education and politicization of Cambodian intellectuals in Paris. The French re-discovery of Angkor and its endowment of a glorious past are of key importance (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 163). In spite of the consistency of the icon of Angkor permeating the political imagery of every modern regime in Cambodia as well as its preeminence as the symbol of Khmer identity, Keyes notes the irony of such a shared privileging failing to prevent fratricide (which in some senses has been associated with differing interpretations of aspects of Angkorian civilization) (Keyes, “The Legacy of Angkor,” pp. 57–59). Even still, Cambodia’s more dramatic transformations in social life and politics would erupt in the latter part of the 20th Century.

⁴ Sihanouk’s lineage was seen to appease competing branches (Sisowath and Norodom) of the royal family. He is the great-grandson of Norodom I, and his mother, Princess Kossamak, was a princess from the Sisowath side (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 166–167; Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*, pp. 20–21).

⁵ On 9 November 1953, Sihanouk assumed the reins of the country from his former instructor from Saumar Cavalry School and commander of France’s forces in Cambodia, General de Langlade (Osborne, “Independence King’s greatest political achievement,” p. 8). Sihanouk’s rapid march to post-coloniality stole the wind from the sails of the anti-royalist independence struggles of Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Issarak, absorbing nationalists into an emerging bureaucracy (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 184–190; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, chap. 4; Summers “Democratic Kampuchea,” pp. 413–414).

⁶ Chandler provides a succinct summary of accomplishments that might encourage a view of at least the first decade of Cambodia's independent rule as a golden age: "Nearly everyone had enough to eat. Nearly all the farmers owned their own land. There was plenty of cultivable land in most of the country, and there were still opportunities for employment in the towns. Exports of primary products such as rice, rubber, and pepper earned foreign exchange sufficient for Cambodia's needs. Foreign aid from France, the United States, and the Sino-Soviet bloc provided hospitals, schools, a deep-water port, and a highway linking the capital to the coast. Salaries for the army and the costs of military equipment were paid by the United States. Health care and sanitation, still rudimentary by Western standards, improved dramatically. The incidence of malaria and infant mortality decreased. Hundreds of thousands of men and women who had been illiterate a decade before learned to read, thanks to government programs. Hundreds of thousands of their children and grand-children flocked into newly constructed schools. For the first time since 1945, the kingdom was at peace" (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 89). The capital city of Phnom Penh in particular was envied by other regional leaders for its beautiful boulevards, parks, and intricate architecture. Counterpoising his wartime memories with his initial impressions of Cambodia, Swain (refracting some of the romanticized retrospective of an enthralled new arrival) offers evidence for such a vision of pre-war Phnom Penh: "Buddhist monks in saffron robes and shaven heads walking down avenues of blossom-scented trees; schoolgirls in white blouses and blue skirts pedalling past with dazzling smiles, offering garlands of jasmine to have their picture taken; lovers strolling in the evening along the placid river bank by the old Royal Palace; elephant rides in a park; tinkling bells coming from the shrine on top of the mound from which the city takes its name.... There was hardly any visible poverty. Life revolved around the family, Buddhist festivals, the rhythm of the seasons, as it had done since the time of Angkor, the pinnacle of Khmer civilisation. These Cambodians were not wily like their quicksilver Thai and Vietnamese neighbors, but pleasure-seeking, insouciant, with a childish faith in the ability of westerners to solve their problems" (Swain, *River of Time*, p. 13).

⁷ Heine-Geldern describes the worldview with a god-king (*Devarāja*) at the center and *embodying* the universe, including Cambodia's uniquely anatomical interpretation of the cosmology under King Sisowath (Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," pp. 21–22). Osborne examines how this cosmological vision held together an increasingly diverging society. He argues that a historical lack of strong and efficient administration from the (political) center fostered regional autonomy in terms of provincial leadership, but this was tempered by a worldview that posited the king as center of the universe and guarantor of its stability ("Regional Disunity in Cambodia," pp. 326–327). This echoes the replication of the center in periphery and cosmology in reality, which is constituent to Tambiah's "galactic polity" (Tambiah, "The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia," pp. 72, 80).

⁸ Etcheson calls it the "Magic Kingdom that never was" as he documents a series of social, political, and racial tensions underlying the apparent unity of the *Sangkum* (*The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 8–12). One example where social good seems to produce adverse social conditions was in the realm of education. Sihanouk devoted large sums to the Cambodian education system. Because education became the key to employment in the Cambodian state apparatus, the massive education emphasis in the 1950s resulted in the production of a class of credentialed semi-intellectuals who only tended to desire office work. The inability of the state to absorb the multitudes of graduates left them an expensive but unemployable resource as well as a political liability (Thion & Vickery, "Cambodia 1981: Background and Issues").

⁹ The 1954 Geneva Accords stipulated that Cambodia hold national elections the following year. As Heder and others argue, post-Geneva Agreement circumstances dramatically weakened the Communist movements in both Cambodia and Vietnam—pre-election repression in the former and outright anti-Communist hostilities in South Vietnam. However, the 1955 election period allowed Saloth Sar to infiltrate the Democrat Party and build alliances with individuals who were sympathetic to the Pracheachon Group (and also the covert communist movement) (Heder, *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model. Volume 1: Imitation and Independence, 1930–1975*, pp. 37–43, hereafter cited as *Imitation & Independence*). The personalist rule of the *Sangkum* government is epitomized in the National Congress, a "Cambodian Pnyx" (as Pym calls it), where the ex-King-become-head-of-State would respond directly to issues raised by "his children"; Sihanouk "was a better rhetorician than almost all his fellow-politicians, and could make the Khmer *demos* eat out of his hand" (Pym, *Mistapim in Cambodia*, p. 66.). Noel notes that these bi-annual, open-air royal hearings functioned as a people's court of appeal and demonstrate how Sihanouk's demagogic control of politics by informal means (e.g., humiliation and ridicule at the Congress)

was (presented as) rule by popular consent (Noel, *Cambodian Politics III: The Prince and the People*, pp. 2, 10–13).

¹⁰ A less optimistic view of this time, pointing to deteriorating circumstances for the rural poor, might address hierarchical control through patronage networks, upward mobility for those who acquired foreign-oriented skills, the predominance of rice farming on family-sized plots of land, widespread agrarian debt to usurers, and a growing (yet subordinate) administrative structure, which formed the pool of the modern Cambodian political elite (Vickery, “Cambodia (Kampuchea): History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” pp. 40–44, hereafter cited as “History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future”). Vickery further states that: “Contrary to conventional wisdom, Cambodian rice agriculture, the largest economic sector, was poor with little prospect for improvement. Yields were among the lowest in the world, and could not be improved without considerable investment in fertilizers, irrigation and new techniques. Peasant incomes were not sufficient to permit them to invest in the improvements which might have increased rice yields, nor to attain a living standard, in terms of consumer goods, approximate to shopkeepers, mostly non-Khmer, or low-level bureaucrats, nearly all Khmer. Even with the large foreign aid programs, Cambodia still ran a large and throughout the 1950s and 1960s increasing trade deficit, and in the 1960s budget deficits, not for productive investment, but for elite consumption” (Vickery, “The Cambodian Economy: Where Has It Come from, Where Is It Going?” pp. 48–49). The adoption of foreign-oriented lifestyles on the part of Cambodian elites becomes a theme in Vickery’s (and others’) analysis of the economy and the revolutionary violence of the 1970s. Thion and Vickery analyze the historical development and perpetuation of a tripartite class system (peasants, officials, and royalty) with minimal social mobility and a lack of incentive or possibility for land/wealth accumulation, and reinforced by the Buddhist belief in merit. Portions of surplus produced by the peasantry typically went back into the country through the construction of pagodas and support of local artisans. The post-colonial socio-economic transformation encouraged wealth, squeezed from the peasantry, to be spent on luxury goods and foreign assets (rather than a reinvestment in the country) as officials took over French administrative positions as well as their consumption practices (Thion & Vickery, “Cambodia 1981: Background and Issues”). Vickery and Thion are not alone in pointing to extreme difference in socio-economic class and consumption patterns. As early as 1967, other scholars were demonstrating that foreign aid to Cambodia was allowing “expenditure well beyond the earned income of the country” (Leifer, *The Search for Security*, p. 16). The view of disenfranchised peasants exploited by the city had also been previewed by other leftist scholars early on. “Although these peasants produce food and the wealth of the country, they have always been divorced from political power. That power has traditionally remained above and beyond them—in the cities of Cambodia, where the country’s elite reside, absorbing the peasant’s products—and ruling in his name” (Frederick, “Cambodia: ‘Operation Total Victory No. 43,’” p. 14).

¹¹ Vickery, “History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” pp. 42–44.

¹² Vickery, in fact, describes the 1970 coup as an internal affair between two factions of the ruling class: Sihanouk’s favored courtier-bureaucratic group and those wanting modern capitalist bourgeois democratic government (“History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” p. 44).

¹³ Leifer, “The Failure of Political Institutionalization in Cambodia,” pp. 125–140. Leifer argues that the *Sangkum* had been the key institution for the maintenance of the political system, operating as a coercive forum for urban elite political objectives. Meanwhile, a combination of traditional and charismatic authority secured support for Sihanouk among the country’s large rural population. With a sense of foreboding, Leifer argues that Sihanouk’s capacity to contain extreme conflict had overextended itself; the personalist leadership acted as a façade of stability over an underlying structural weakness, or simply, the lack of an *institutionalized* political system. (Drawing parallels to the weak state and personalist rule of Hun Sen might suggest a similar unraveling.)

¹⁴ “Henceforth in Khmer problems, both the remains of the monarchy and of Sihanoukism will no longer have the power to continue haunting us. The wheel of history spins forward, never retreating. Only two political forces confront each other: the free Khmer Republican regime and the force of the communists” (Ith Sarin, “Regrets of the Khmer Soul” in Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussions*, p. 54). Keyes shows how the coup disrupted the legitimacy of the tradition of kings, which was at the center of the Buddhist cosmological order (Keyes, “Communist Revolution and the Buddhist Past in Cambodia,” p. 53–55). Traditionally, the monarchy was the sole source of unity holding together a fissiparous polity. According to Thion, the 1970 coup caused a gap between politics (in town) and kingship (among the peasantry), and Cambodia quickly returned to squabbling petty leaders and

patron-client style relationships. He argues that modern concepts associated with “nationalism” had not permeated beyond the educated classes; thus, Cambodian politics remained largely tied to kingship as the source of legitimacy as well as guarantor of harmony between nature and the world—a role which none of Sihanouk’s successors could assume or displace (Thion, “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics”). Smith examines a somewhat similar understanding of events among US Khmer immigrants. Two themes in the informants’ interpretations of their traumatic pasts suggest an importance of: 1) Buddhist prophecy (*put tumneay* ព្រះពុទ្ធសាសនា), legends, and folktales, and 2) the Khmer Rouge occupying a place in a Khmer tradition of violence and mythical existence (Smith, *Interpretive Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant World View*). The legitimacy of the royal order, with a god-king at its apex, was seen to unravel with the ousting of Sihanouk. The coup is identified as a motivating factor for rural peasants to join the FUNK, because per Sihanouk’s speech, aligning with the communists in the jungle was perceived as expressing support for the monarchy (Frieson, “Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970–1975,” pp. 35–37.) This was a frequent reasoning cited by my (former Khmer Rouge) informants in Anlong Veng to describe their joining the revolution (*chaul badevoat* ចូលរួមដឹកនាំ); however, it is possible that joining in defense of Lord Papa, rather than for a defeated ideology, may be a more appealing way to understand and relate their biographies in the present day.

¹⁵ Corfield’s *Khmers Stand Up!* offers the most detailed account of the Lon Nol regime, as it devolved within the confines of the capital; at moments, the book gives what is literally a minute-by-minute account of events in Phnom Penh. With that acknowledged, the work’s weakness is an almost complete lack of any account of activities and events in the countryside. At the time, Frederick asserted that the coup and Nixon’s “Operation Total Victory No. 43” invasion (30 April 1970) only contributed to the existing tensions between city elite (wealthy and educated) and the rural overwhelming majority (poor and illiterate), and the rural disaffection could only increase support for the Khmer Rouge. Almost prophetically, she argues that Lon Nol’s coup and the US invasion generated a situation in which a “middle path” (*à la* Sihanouk) or refuge through neutrality became no longer possible; the extremes would battle each other and Cambodia would be plunged into the Indochina conflict (Frederick, “Cambodia: ‘Operation Total Victory No. 43,’” pp. 15–16). Even at the time, the brutality that was to befall Cambodia had been foreshadowed by some observers (Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussions*; *idem*, “The Unexpected Victory,” pp. 28–31; Ith Sarin, *Regrets of the Khmer Soul*; Kirk, “Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?”).

¹⁶ Becker graphically describes the degree of corruption: “The army became the richest sector of society during the war, the one with direct access to millions of American aid dollars, and the most criminal. The generals were openly dissolute. They drank cognac and sodas before noon, built cement mansions, imported limousines, and opened Swiss bank accounts with money robbed from the United States and their own troops” (Becker, *When the War was Over*, p.16). Shawcross and Kiernan make some psychological generalizations about the effects of the US carpet-bombing of Cambodia, and these suggestions have been taken up in other interpretations (for example, Chomsky & Herman, *After the Cataclysm*, pp. 219–224, 281–283). The Paris Peace Accords of 27 January 1973, which was to put an end to the Second Indochina War, in military terms allowed Cambodia to become “the only game in town,” and America’s B–52s focused their payloads on this singular battlefield (CIA Director William Colby quoted in Shawcross, *Sideshow*, p. 265). The “blind” aerial assaults surged to their most intense in 1973, before the US Congress finally halted Operation Arclight in August of that year. While some of the ordinance hit uninhabited areas such as the eastern jungles, significant tonnage also fell on more densely populated rural towns (e.g., the accidental strike on Neak Luong on 7 August 1973). Shawcross asserts that the bombings caused “irreversible psychological damage,” which in turn contributed to the brutality of the CPK when it came to power (Shawcross, *Sideshow*, pp. 298–299). Kiernan details some of the horrific effects within specific villages, at one point noting how the incomprehensible suffering wrought from above led to a paranoia wherein the most proximate potential “spy” might be accused of calling in the attacks (Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp. 349–355). Although logical and perhaps true, these would be difficult to prove in any significant way. Further, the psychological affects in and of themselves would not adequately explain the content or style of rule that would follow the cessation of the war. (However, psychological and infrastructural affects combined with a history of socio-economic deprivation and exploitation become the foundation for Vickery’s argument regarding DK.) Rural villagers were presented with the choice of risking death in the war zone of the countryside—where republican FANK soldiers battled the Sihanouk-

endorsed “Khmer Rouge,” while US B-52s dropped bombs from above—or migrating to the city. As the war raged, nearly 2 million residents from the countryside opted for the latter and became urban refugees among Phnom Penh’s usual population of 1 million (US Department of State, “Background Notes—Cambodia,” Washington DC, 1987, p. 6). Numerous authors have pointed to the effects of the civil war on the revolutionary maquis; typically they identify the ways in which US bombing campaigns became a basis for FUNK recruitment (or a reason for fleeing toward the city) (Frieson, *The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970–1975*, p. 169; *idem*, “Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970–1975,” pp. 35–37; Hood & Ablin, “Path to Cambodia’s Present,” p. xxix; Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp. 349–357; *idem*, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 16–25). They also point to how the bombing produced the opposite of their intended effect, making the CPK more resolute and perhaps more extreme (Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” pp. 280–284): the movement “dug in its heels” and “launched ferocious attacks” (Frieson, *The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970–1975*, p. 168). Kiernan gives significant credit to Kissinger and Nixon for the CPK centralization of power (and elimination of moderates), contending that the US bombings of the Southwest in particular helped drive CPK factions to Pol Pot’s “Centre” group (Kiernan, “Roots of Genocide: New Evidence on the US Bombardment of Cambodia,” pp. 20–21). Supported by Ith Sarin’s depiction of life in the liberated zones, Locard offers credence to the view that the revolutionaries’ brutal and radical policies drove people in the countryside toward the capital (Ith Sarin, *Regrets of the Khmer Soul*; Locard, “Yes, indeed! Why did they kill (so Many)?” pp. 8–9). Kirk concurs by supplying reports from escapees from liberated areas (Kirk, “Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?” pp. 8–10). Chandler is keen to note how early “rumors” of strict and brutal rule in CPK-controlled areas were dismissed as anti-communist propaganda (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 208).

¹⁷ “Phnom Penh remains apathetic, fatalistic and corrupt. Most of the expensive restaurants are open even though the children of the door are dying of starvation, and the rich have electricity while most of the rest of the city goes without” (Greenway, “5-year-old War leaves Cambodia Drained, Apathetic,” *Washington Post*, 23 February 1975, quoted in Corfield, *Khmers Stand Up!*, p. 214). A slightly fictionalized account also conveys the direness of the situation: “‘Heavy fighting on all the main highways,’ Keller [a journalist] intoned, at near dictation speed. ‘Rocket attacks at night, plastics during the day, Lon Nol thinks he’s god and the US Embassy has hot flushes supporting him, then trying to throw him out.’ He gave statistics, ordnance, casualties, the scale of US aid. He named generals known to be selling arms to the Khmer Rouge, and generals who ran phantom armies in order to claim their troops’ pay, and generals who did both. ‘The usual snafu. Bad guys are too weak to take the towns, good guys are too crapped out to take the countryside and nobody wants to fight except the Coms. Students ready to set fire to the place soon as they’re no longer exempt from the war, food riots any day now, corruption like there was no tomorrow, no one can live on his salary, fortunes being made and the place is bleeding to death. Place is unreal and the [US] Embassy is a nut-house, more spooks than straight guys and they’re all pretending they’ve got a secret. Want more?’

‘How long do you give it?’

‘A week. Ten years’” (John Le Carré, *The Honourable Schoolboy*, p. 347, quoted in Corfield, *Khmers Stand Up!*, p. 191).

¹⁸ Porter provides a brief but succinct history of the movement’s development (“Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards Kampuchea 1930–1970”). Kiernan provides more detail on the break with Vietnam as well as the US bombing and the growing centralized control within the CPK (Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, chap. 8). Carney documents the means by which Vietnam helped develop the revolutionary administration in Cambodia (Carney, “The Unexpected Victory,” pp. 22–26). A more complex understanding of how past involvement with the Vietnamese communists played out in terms of factions and policy comes from Heder (*Imitation and Independence*, discussed below, particularly in the context of a “good East” narrative). In brief, Vietnamese leaders had consistently sought an Indochinese Federation (allied with the Soviet bloc), but this priority shifted according to historical, geo-political circumstances. The earliest influences in Cambodia were in the establishment of the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party in 1951 as an incipient communist movement. (Vietnam was consistently unimpressed with the development of objective conditions for revolution in Cambodia and Laos.) The 1954 Geneva Convention led Vietnam to cease its direct assistance of the KPRP. By the time Saloth Sar seized control of the movement, North Vietnam had already found a reliable regional ally in Sihanouk. As Sihanouk allowed Vietnamese bases in Cambodia, the Vietnamese strongly encouraged the Khmer communists to take a

gradualist approach toward politics, which infuriated Saloth Sar and his colleagues. Vickery summarizes this relationship: "Vietnam's advice to the Cambodians seems to have been classic Marxist: Cambodia was not ready for its own Socialist revolution, should first cooperate in a Vietnamese victory, and then follow Vietnam to socialism" (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982*, p. 285). By the time of the Lon Nol coup, the Khmer Rouge had had five years to develop hostilities toward Vietnam's policies; nonetheless, Vietnamese "support" continued for three years after the coup, as these tensions grew.

¹⁹ Shawcross (*Sideshow*) offers some of the most detailed information on the military struggles, particularly from the standpoint of the US government: Operation Breakfast and the Menu bombing campaigns (pp. 15-35) as well as the Chenla-II offensive (pp. 202-205).

²⁰ Lieutenant-Colonel Um Savuth is something of a minor legend from the Khmer Republic days. He "was an astonishing personality, a thin, twisted man who walked with a long white cane, drove his jeep at terrifying speeds, and was nearly always drunk. Early in his military career he had, in a moment of high spirits, ordered a subordinate to place a cat on his head and then, from a considerable distance, shoot the animal off. The subordinate refused. Um Savuth insisted that it was a direct order. The man pulled the trigger and a part of Um Savuth's head was blown away. Ever since, half his body had been paralysed, and he had to drink quantities of beer and Scotch to kill his constant pain.' Donald Kirk recorded that Americans had assured him that Um Savuth was 'better drunk than most Cambodian officers sober'" (Corfield, *Khmers Stand Up!*, p. 61; Shawcross, *Sideshow*, p. 202).

²¹ Becker charts Lon Nol's ascension before and within the coup, noting particularly how his obsession with the occult led to the military devastation of the Khmer Republic, especially the Chenla I and II offensives (Becker, *When the War was Over*, pp. 122-133). The Marshall's "strategic" approach to the crusade against the non-believers prioritized sites of Khmer-Mon glory and significance over points of military advantage.

²² A 48-day US airlift operation in the early months of 1975 only temporarily bolstered the capital which had been surrounded, cut off, and under siege by FUNK forces. Kirk notes that Lon Nol's FANK was incapable of successfully countering its enemy's onslaughts, a lack of effectiveness that was compounded by rampant corruption within the ranks, including ghost soldiers on payrolls and the sale of arms to the enemy, and buoyed only by US support (Kirk, "Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?," p. 11-12). (The Khmer Republic was further challenged by Phnom Penh's leftist student community who protested the regime's ineptitude and extreme corruption.) However, GRUNK's forces, the "Khmer Rouge," were similarly incapable of driving their enemy from the provincial centers or the capital. In this back-and-forth fighting, Kirk notes the development of an extreme ferocity in the Khmer Rouge's strategy and tactics, perhaps most exemplified in the 18 March 1974 capture, razing, and subsequent massacre of Oudong (pp. 1-2). From all refugee accounts, the Khmer Rouge had embraced the use of terror tactics to subdue the populace under its control. In addition, denigration of Sihanouk *within Khmer Rouge territory* seems to have begun in April 1973 (shortly after the Prince's tour of Ratanakiri) (pp. 14-15, 17-18). Oddly, Kirk's 1974 report frequently foreshadows the problems and atrocities to emerge in Democratic Kampuchea, for example in noting: the most inexperienced and illiterate cadre being placed in local leadership positions; the promised bloody purge of the *ancien régime*; and the dramatically increasing refugee population in the capital and in the surrounding areas of provincial centers. Kirk answers the report's titular inquiry by stating that the Khmer Rouge are both revolutionaries *and* terrorists, enforcing their determinant vision of radical change by a directed program of terror (p. 15). His conclusion offers what seems a balanced (rather than condemnatory) account of the movement's actions and endeavors. Largely driven by a range of frustrations as well as a determination for revolution, the movement's cadre "could not accomplish these aims as the peasant masses clung stubbornly to their time-honored ways" (p. 23). And lastly, the Khmer Rouge "longed for a total revolution by which they could reverse centuries of tradition, culminated by the period of neo-colonialism of Prince Sihanouk" (p. 23).

²³ Becker characterizes Lon Nol's regime as "fascist," given its authoritarian and nationalist character, which also coupled with anti-Vietnamese xenophobia (traits she sees reflected in the CPK movement). She argues that the pro-Republic bourgeoisie found itself trapped between the communist guerrillas and Lon Nol's militaristic occult Buddhism; Lon Nol's view/treatment of the Vietnamese (both South and North) further complicated Cambodia's situation (*vis-à-vis* American support) (Becker, *When the War was Over*, pp. 121-130). Swain's unromantic vision of Phnom Penh descends into the particulars of the country's republican decline. "Everyone knew in their bones that Lon Nol had lost the war: the unscrupulous generals in their Mercedes; the cyclo-drivers carrying the wounded to hospital; the blind soldier-minstrels

wandering the streets; the legless cripples; the fortune-tellers; the women grappling with unaffordable food prices; the shopkeepers; the soldiers; the bargirls. When lightning split the spire of the shrine on the top of the little Phnom hill [Wat Phnom], the fortune-tellers said it was a bad omen" (Swain, *River of Time*, p. 104). He proceeds to descend further into the heartwrenching, and sometimes darkly absurd, tales of Phnom Penh's misery and demise: the end of shipping, the British diplomatic exodus, social life in dire circumstances, Khmer parents auctioning off their children for adoption, a besieged medical system completely incapable of treating the vast number of daily arriving wounded; and hopeful tales of recovery cut short by the fall of the city (pp. 104–113).

²⁴ The figure for the population of the capital is the one most often cited (see for example, Ea, "Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea," pp. 4, 13n2–3, which uses UN and US Bureau of Census figures; Banister & Johnson, "After the Nightmare," p. 107, 136n168–169; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 48. The CIA's calculation was 4 million: "As the fighting intensified in the early months of 1975, more people crowded into the cities. By the time the Lon Nol regime fell in April 1975 the urban population probably was on the order of 4 million, more than half the total population" (CIA, "Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe").

²⁵ Locard notes how the standard message—"Brother and sisters must leave Phnom Penh for a little while (for fear that the Americans are coming to bomb)"—was simply a form of deceit (Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, pp. 128–129, my modification of his translation). Instead, he argues that the evacuation ("ruralisation") was for security reasons (Locard, "State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)," p. 120). Etcheson offers a succinct list of the reasons underlying the decision to evacuate: 1) security against counter-revolutionary elements; 2) problems of health, sanitation, and food supply; 3) ideological belief in an agrarian revolutionary society; 4) consolidation of internal party power by Pol Pot; 5) fear of US bombing (Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 144–145. Chandler's explanation of the decision to evacuate, which had been made three months prior, enumerates 1) a genuine lack of food in the capital, 2) difficulties of administering such a large population, 3) concerns about security, and, most significantly, 4) a desire to demonstrate the countryside victory over the city (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 210–211). Similarly, Rousset stresses infrastructural disrepair and a dearth of provisions, in addition to the security argument put forth by Ieng Sary (Rousset, "Cambodia: Background to the Revolution," p. 517). Kiernan consults many first- and second-hand personal accounts (from interviews, books, etc.) to argue that the 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh was mainly a means of mass control and ethnic cleansing by the CPK Center (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 39–64). He also argues that the differential manner in which the evacuation order was implemented demonstrates it was motivated by largely political concerns (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," pp. 50–51).

²⁶ Ebihara, "A Cambodian Village under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979," p. 52; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 87.

²⁷ Heder offers a detailed list of the various labels that were attached to the two groups, and includes a reminder that this simplistic binary of "new" and "base" betrays the more complex class categories that were employed by the CPK (Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, pp. 5–6). In his bountiful inventory, three particular categories received significant use, and typically illustrated an individual's status *vis-à-vis* becoming Party members (*bākuchorn* បុក្កុន): "full rights" (*pénh seth* ពេញសិទ្ធិ), "candidate" (*triem* ត្រីម), and "depositee" (*bānnhar* បណ្ណ).

²⁸ Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 265.

²⁹ As stated in chapter 1, CPK administration of the country was divided into seven geographic zones (*phumipeak*) and two special regions (*dāmban*). The zones were subdivided into sectors (*dāmban*), which were referred to by number. Sectors and regions were divided according to pre-revolutionary administrative units: districts (*srok*), commune (*khum*), and village (*phum*). At each level, a three-person committee (secretary, deputy secretary, and member) governed. Ten to 15 village households constituted a group (*krom*), and conglomerations of villages formed cooperatives (*sāhākār*), which formed the productivist unit of the DK economy (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 71–73; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 167; Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 126–128). The variation across zones/sectors (and its importance) is discussed below.

³⁰ Heder, *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, p. 6. Vickery aptly summarizes: "In general living was best where evacuees were distributed among established peasant villages, and worst where evacuees were

settled on undeveloped land and forced to create and plant fields without either knowledge of how to carry out such work or adequate food supplies pending their first crop” (Vickery, “History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” p. 46).

³¹ The secrecy of the Party was maintained for a year and a half, while its leader, Saloth Sar, operated under the *nom de guerre* Pol Pot. (The moniker “Saloth Sar” is used throughout this text when discussing the individual’s pre-DK life; otherwise, the revolutionary alias will be used.) Chandler describes the build and defend motive: “*Building the country* meant many things. It referred to increasing agricultural production and in particular the yields of rice. The process also involved building dams and irrigation works to permit double-cropping. Political education sessions also aimed at building new personalities that could serve the Revolutionary Organization.... *Defending the country* meant maintaining the offensive spirit which had defeated ‘the American imperialists and Lon Nol’” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 256). Self-reliance and a national(ist) independence meant that Cambodia sought to harness its sovereignty and domestic capacities without assistance or guidance from outside (Jackson, “The Ideology of Total Revolution,” pp. 39–49).

³² Becker describes the early phase of this “ultimate revolution” (1973 to January 1976) as war communism—drawing unacknowledged inspiration from Stalin’s concept and Mao’s Great Leap Forward—evidenced by authoritarian cooperatives, evacuations of urban centers, and reliance on increased hard work from the populace (which also resonated with visions of Jayavarman VII) (Becker, *When the War Was Over*, pp. 181–187). Chandler also entertains the idea of war communism to describe Pol Pot’s 1976 *Four-Year Plan* and its rapid implementation (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 214–215). Jackson notes how the haste for modernization was a key aspect of “total revolution” (Jackson, “The Ideology of Total Revolution,” p. 65). The CPK expressed this velocity in its grand ambition: “The Super Great Leap Forward, this is a big leap beyond all reality” (*morhaa lôl phlâh morhaa hâh rumlorng* មហាឆ្នោតធ្លាក់មហាឆ្នោតរំលោភ) (Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, p. 72).

³³ The collectivized agricultural system through the 1970s functioned primarily around “mutual assistance groups,” which were meant to develop into “high-level cooperatives” (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 167–168). Dismal accounts plague the history of DK economic mismanagement (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, pp. 258–262; Twining, “The Economy,” pp. 125–132; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 163–169).

³⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 286–287. Kiljunen offers a more somber view of administration: “Soldiers, village leaders and the cadres of the Communist Party were recruited from among the poorest of the peasantry: typically they were young, even small teenage boys. The fanaticism and intolerance of the young were thus exploited in building a new society. Supervision of the collective farms was in their hands and often also an absolute power which could lead to random executions for the merest show of insubordination” (Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 17). The implications of differing views on (de/centralized) authority are discussed below.

³⁵ Three metric tons/hectare was the CPK’s stated goal (“Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Question,” p. 3; *idem*, “Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism,” p. 54, Table 3). This tremendous increase in production capacity was meant to provide the resources to build socialism in all other spheres. “Strike, crush, and win absolutely the production goal of three tons per hectare!” (*vaay sâmrok bok kâmtéch sdaar séthkech muoy héktaa bei taon aoy baan dachkhaat!* វាយសំរុកបុកកំទេចស្តារសង្គមនិរន្តរ៍ មួយហិកតាបីតោនឱ្យបានដាច់ខាត) (Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, p. 242).

³⁶ The livelihood meetings were meant to cleanse the individual of non-revolutionary thought (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, pp. 283–284). Ith Sarin, who lived in a liberated zone prior to the CPK victory, notes how the self-criticism sessions created a process that re-enforced the betterment of cadre and collective; without much judgment, he states that self-criticism was to follow five principles or themes: “manual activities; state of morale, feelings; instructions given by higher-ranking chiefs; personal position regarding policy and the Party; and revolutionary solidarity” (Ith Sarin, “Nine Months with the Maquis,” p. 40). A note on translation: Locard uses the term *svaytitién* (ស្វ័យចិត្តវិចារ) for “self-criticism,” which really means “criticism” (Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, p. 90); DC–Cam uses the term *chiivatos* (ដីវឌ្ឍន៍), which underscores the importance of one’s outlook, perceptions, and ideology (DC–Cam, *Two-in-*

One Democratic Kampuchea Glossary, pp. 14, 60); I am using the term as it appears in the Khmer version of Ith Sarin's *Regrets of the Khmer Soul* (*Srânâh Prorleung Khmaer* គ្រូណាមៈព្រធិប្រវត្តិ), p. 56.

³⁷ Kiernan claims that Nestlé's condensed milk cans, which could hold roughly 250 g, were used to measure individual rations; pre-war rice consumption in Cambodia was 600 g *per capita per diem* (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 163–164).

³⁸ The deterioration of relations between DK and Vietnam are chronicled by Vickery: land and sea skirmishes after 1975; serious warfare diffused by 1976; markedly increased interest in disputed territorial areas followed by greater military attacks in 1977; a negotiated peace in mid-July 1977 that temporarily assuaged hostilities; renewed violence in December 1977 followed by full-scale war at the end of 1978 (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 202–210). Vickery suggests that “hyper-chauvinism” of Democratic Kampuchea policy 1) led the regime to readjust borders by force, and 2) may have been the basis for purges of Khmers thought to be pro-Vietnamese (p. 209). Becker examines deeply the relations (historical tensions) between Cambodia and her neighbor to the east. In so doing, she examines not only the divergent cultural influences of the countries over centuries, she also analyzes with keen insight the more recent networks of relations and interests of China and the USSR in shaping the nature of support or scorn between Cambodia and Vietnam. Focusing on the “boat people” as an expression of Southern Vietnamese (and ethnic Chinese) dissatisfaction, Becker locates China as the perceived culprit (and historic enemy) in Hanoi's revolutionary failures, thus positing an invasion of Cambodia as a legitimate attack against China (Becker, *When the War Was Over*, pp. 329–363).

³⁹ At most, he describes the DK movement as “peasant armies led by ‘Marxist’ petty bourgeois intellectuals” (Vickery, “The Cambodian Economy: Where Has It Come from, Where Is It Going?,” p. 49). He also states, “In spite of ostensible allegiance to Marxism–Leninism, they followed policies contrary to all previous Marxist theory and practice. They held neither to Marx's view that communism would come through proletarian revolution and working class rule after capitalism had reached its highest level of development, nor Lenin's programme of vanguard intellectual–proletarian leadership in a largely peasant society, nor even Mao's of the peasantry as the leading revolutionary class, but supported by industrial development and a large, skilled urban working class. Nor did they adopt a Stalinist programme of forced primitive socialist accumulation from the peasantry to build an industrialized urban sector” (Vickery, “Notes on the Political Economy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK),” pp. 438–439). Etcheson also notices the oddity of Vickery's “attempt to dissociate Pol Pot's organisation from the label, ‘communist.’ It is as if he does not want to sully the terms ‘socialist’ and ‘communist’ by associating them with Pol Pot's Kampuchean Communist Party” (Etcheson, “Reflections of Kampuchea,” p. 978).

⁴⁰ “Whatever else the conflict was, it was also, if not first of all, a war between town and countryside in which the town's battle was increasingly for the sole purpose of preserving its privileges while the rural areas suffered. The argument here, then, is that in 1975 Cambodia was divided into two numerically comparable camps, one of which had suffered immeasurably more than the other for five years, but nevertheless having won would dominate the other for the next four years, inflicting equal or greater damage on it, partly due to objective circumstances and partly out of revenge” (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 39).

⁴¹ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 280–283. Vickery's matrix of possibilities for revolution—a flow chart approach—takes two possible initial circumstances: anti-colonial struggle and domestic repression. The available strategies against the colonial power will boil down to bourgeois revolution or socialist revolution; a peaceful (bourgeois) move to independence may spur repression and lead to (peasant) revolution anyway. Kiernan's critique of Vickery's position admits that the CPK enjoyed widespread peasant support and peasants engaged in initiatives of their own (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 167); as for the Center being “pulled along” by the peasants (p. 164), Kiernan charges the Center's policies of social control (e.g., atomization) guarantees that the Party was increasingly leading (pp. 166–168). Kiernan's caveats are explicitly aimed at Frieson's differences with Vickery, largely informed by Scott's *Weapons of the Weak*; Frieson argues that peasant support was not widespread and that the secrecy of the Organization meant that peasants were engaging in survival strategies to confront turbulent times (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 166; Frieson, *The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970–1975*, p. 11). Frieson re-states this argument arguing that, in fact, a failure to bridge peasant politics to Party politics was largely DK's undoing (Frieson, “Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970–1975”).

⁴² “The city, or at least its poorer strata, and indeed anyone trying to live honestly on a government salary, did begin to suffer from hunger at least by 1972—first because of inflation and then an outright lack of food; but anyone who would argue that it was thereby disadvantaged with respect to rural areas would then have to admit that the Communists, in spite of war losses and damages, were carrying out a very successful organization of agricultural production. Although certain journalistic accounts vividly describe the shelling of Phnom Penh, particularly during the last year of the war, those incidents, bad as they were for their victims, cannot compare with the artillery and air attacks on the countryside, some of which as early as 1971 were clearly visible just across the river from Phnom Penh where they served as an amusing fireworks display for city people on an afternoon promenade or sipping drinks on their balcony. These were the people—spoiled, pretentious, contentious, status-conscious at worst, or at best simply soft, intriguing, addicted to city comforts and despising peasant life—who faced the Communist exodus order on 17 April 1975. For them the mere fact of leaving an urban existence with its foreign orientation and unrealistic expectations to return to the land would have been a horror, and a horror compounded by their position on the receiving end of orders issued by illiterate peasants. On the whole they cared little or nothing for the problems of the “other half” of their countrymen, and would have been quite content to have all the rural rebels bombed away by American planes. Even having seen the damage done to the country during the war they seemed to exclude it from their thoughts, almost never mentioned it unless asked, and then seemed astonished that anyone would take an interest in what happened in the rural areas before they arrived there in 1975. These are the people who, by nature of their circumstances, have been the main object of study for most post-1975 research on contemporary Cambodia, and also until late 1980 the main source of information about conditions inside the country. Even without conscious misinformation or exaggeration their portrayal of those five years could not help but be very one-sided; and the straight reporting of what they wish to say will inevitably give a distorted, sometimes even false, picture, of little use in understanding the revolutionary regime or for situating it properly within wider contemporary history” (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 27–28). These statements seem to follow quite closely, Mao’s proclamation (echoing Lenin), “Revolution is not a dinner party... A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another” (Mao, “Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan” (March 1927), *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 28, quoted in Mao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, pp. 11–12). And in fact, the CPK version is quite similar: “Revolution’s triumph over imperialism [*badevoat chakrâpoat* បដិវត្តន៍ក្រហម] is not inviting guests to go dine... Revolution is seething rage at a class, striking and overthrowing a class” (Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, pp. 155–156, my modification of Locard’s translation).

⁴³ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. vii, 26–27.

⁴⁴ His work emphasizes the implications of (near-)homogeneity, stating: 1) “Prerevolutionary Cambodia was 80 percent peasant, 80 percent Khmer, and 80 percent Buddhist,” and 2) that ethnic minorities remained largely un-integrated within the country, and 3) cities were dominated by Chinese and Vietnamese (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 5).

⁴⁵ Both Vickery and Heder have taken issue with the way in which race is used in Kiernan’s accounts, although from slightly different angles. Vickery argues that a central policy to exterminate the Chams never existed (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 194–195; *idem*, “Comments on Cham Population Figures,” pp. 31–33). Heder’s argument suggests that the killing of ethnic minorities under DK is better understood in terms of the CPK’s class categorization and resultant suspicions thereof (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide in Ben Kiernan’s *The Pol Pot regime*,” pp. 104–108, hereafter cited as “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide”). The questions of centralizing authority and understandings of race versus class distinctions in DK practice are discussed below.

⁴⁶ Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 343. In this context, he aligns the CPK not with the grand figures of Soviet and Chinese Communisms, but with “the sixteenth-century Englishman Thomas More, the Hébertists of the French Revolution, and the utopian socialists of nineteenth-century Russia, whom Lenin had castigated as ‘the carriers of a reactionary petty bourgeois ideology [promoting] stagnation and Asiatic backwardness.’” (Compare Lenin’s words with Vickery’s characterization of the CPK elite.)

⁴⁷ With CPK/Pol Pot power consolidated, the “revolution without a model” proceeded toward the introduction of 1) ever larger cooperatives, and 2) communal eating, which resulted in greater social divisions and discontent—all this while the elite were afforded extreme luxury and other benefits of hypocrisy. Simultaneously, the CPK leadership squandered its natural and human resources by consistently

placing ideological position before practical benefit, for example: the ban on foraging in the face of starvation; the refusal to employ qualified technicians because their minds were not ideologically pure; and the complete repudiation of the past (and with it, its resources such as housing). In spite of this “irrational radicalism” (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 349), the country saw progress in defense (China strengthening Cambodia’s military capability) and irrigation. In spite of greater control over water as well as a bigger work force, cooperatives produced less than the regime believed. Short’s explanation of this mystery is the lack of motivation on the part of the workers. Rural cadre hid the underproduction in their areas but were assessed levies based on the achieved quotas they did report. When food shortages became apparent, the CPK leadership decided that enemies within the ranks must be to blame.

⁴⁸ The label comes from Kiernan (*The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 26), the characterization from Chandler (*Brother Number One*, p. 3). “Like Sihanouk’s fashioning of Buddhist socialism or Lon Nol’s entertaining ideas of Khmer-Mon hegemony, the CPK leadership choosing to wage revolution everywhere in Cambodia did not spring from a study of Cambodian social conditions or from consultation with others but from a conviction on the part of the CPK’s leaders that a recognizably Communist revolution needed to be waged” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 239). This echoes, in an awry fashion, Pol Pot’s boasting that DK was “building socialism without a model.”

⁴⁹ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, p. 4. This is also the view held by Quinn who argues that Pol Pot was largely mimicking China’s Great Leap Forward (*morhaa lôt phlâh* មហាវត្តមាន) and Cultural Revolution and using (Stalinist-style) terror and violence to achieve the Party’s radical aims (Quinn, *The Origins and Development of Radical Cambodian Communism*). The works of other scholars have underscored elements of a Stalinist tendency within the CPK, noted especially in terms of the Party’s classifications and purges (Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, pp. 260–269; Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 45–47, 164–169, 192–193; Jackson, “Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge,” pp. 248–250). The regime’s peasantism and privileging of “self-reliance” has led some scholars to (also) highlight Maoist tendencies (Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, pp. 260–268; Ponchaud, “Social Change in the Vortex of Revolution,” pp. 151–152; Quinn, “Explaining the Terror,” especially pp. 228–231). In spite of these suggestive elements, Vickery still argues that “nationalism, populism, and peasantism really won out over communism” (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 309). However, Chandler explicitly notes how the historical interplay of Soviet and Chinese models are also refracted through DK. “After 1975, at least as far as ends and means were concerned, the revolution drew on Russian and Chinese experiences, moving smoothly from something resembling Soviet war communism (1919–21 in the UUSR, 1973–75 in Cambodia) to the collectivization (in 1976–77 in Cambodia) of the sort that had gripped the USSR after 1927 and China after 1949—skipping over, as the Chinese had done, the relatively pragmatic, unrevolutionary model provided by the USSR’s New Economic Policy in the early 1920s” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 245). Chandler also examines the Soviet show trials as well as Chinese and Vietnamese models of “re-education” in the context of DK’s security apparatus (*Voices from S–21*, pp. 122–127, 149–150).

⁵⁰ Some of the continuities that have shaped the movement’s overall character include: emphasis on and celebration of the country’s glorious past, privileging of the Khmer “race,” antagonism toward the hereditary enemy (Vietnam), and personalist rule (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, pp. 237–238). In terms of discontinuities, Chandler stresses: prioritization of social transformation and control, the dissolution of the market economy, revolutionary violence, and the imitation of foreign models (pp. 240–246). Thion argues that the CPK’s class analysis in the late 1960s was borrowed from Vietnam (Thion, “The Cambodian Idea of Revolution,” pp. 22–23); Heder has devoted significant attention in elucidating imitation of Vietnamese models in the course of struggle (Heder, *Imitation & Independence*).

⁵¹ Heder has applied to the Pol Pot/Ta Mok/Duch leadership coalition the Marxist–Leninist label “ultra left,” “its revolution was so extreme as to create feelings of either hatred for or disillusionment with the revolution, not only among its natural enemies, but ever-increasingly among its natural allies and friends” (Heder, “Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages,” p. 18).

⁵² In fact, Heder’s insight stresses the commitment to one particular model of revolution, which had been (mis-)applied to South Vietnam, even as the movement struggled to assert its independence from Vietnamese domination (Heder, *Imitation & Independence*). His recent book makes significant achievement in sorting out the ideological influences, their transmission, and realization in practice. He argues that the Cambodian Communists consistently (even dogmatically) sought to follow the

revolutionary model that Hanoi (mis-)applied to South Vietnam, even if this meant defying Hanoi. In this respect (and through discussions of Marxist ideology), Heder elucidates the nature and extent of Vietnam's "training" of the CPK. Heder also provides sound reasoning for differentiating the movement according to a non-Communist face (Sihanouk), the French-educated "Khmer Rouge" façade (Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, Hu Nim), and the real power in the CPK Standing Committee (Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, etc.).

⁵³ Heder, "Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Democratic Kampuchea Crimes: Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective," hereafter cited as "Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders."

⁵⁴ "Democratic Kampuchea" is used to denote this entire period, even though the regime's title was not officially inaugurated until the promulgation of its *Constitution* in January 1976.

⁵⁵ Lavoix approaches the scholarship on DK in terms of three "waves": 1) writers sorting out facts and factors, confronted by a dearth of information, 2) the rise of controversy as scholars (e.g., Vickery and Kiernan) stake positions based on a growing access to data, and 3) a shift toward systemic explanations, particularly those emphasizing processes associated with nationalism (Lavoix, "Cambodia").

⁵⁶ For a critique of the early abuse of news from Kampuchea, see Vickery on Barron and Paul, on Ponchaud, and on Hildebrand and Porter (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 46–48, 48–50, 50–51, respectively). Kiernan offered one of the earliest defenses of the revolution against propagandist representations ("Cambodia in the News: 1975/76"), a view he would later revisit and significantly recant in 1979 ("Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea"). His 1976 essay asserts that refugee accounts of a "communist bloodbath" are overstated and reflect experiences peculiar to the Northwest region; in addition, Kiernan claims that there is no evidence to suggest the state of affairs were a result of centrally-organized government policy. In this critique of Australian press coverage of Cambodia, he directs attention to the composition of the refugee population (mostly former city dwelling elites) and the motivations underlying their accounts. He asserts that the class position of urbanites combined with a lack of food is the logical basis for the April 1975 evacuation of Phnom Penh. He further explores the unique socio-economic context of the Northwest as well as the lack of experienced cadre as the factors contributing to the disproportionately violent behavior; thus, he argues that stories from this region could not be generalized to the country as a whole. Kiernan notes the distortions and exaggerations of the press, citing the unfounded reports of exponential increases in refugees. He further cites the mass dissemination of photos that were widely accepted to be fake, and he also explains how some refugees participated in exaggerating atrocities, so as to persuade Thai border authorities to admit them. Taking the brief article as a whole, Kiernan borders on apologist for DK actions, but he also shows the mechanism by which newspapers sensationalize and overstate the situation, even if some of his claims (e.g., about returning Khmers) turned out to be false. Other early critiques can be found in Chomsky and Herman's analyses of reports from *Time* magazine, Simons (*Washington Post* correspondent), *Newsweek* magazine, Barron and Paul, Shawcross, Ponchaud, and Kamm (of *The New York Times*) (Chomsky & Herman, *After the Cataclysm*, pp. 163–207). Burgler begins his work with an inventory of oft-repeated hyperboles that appear in the media (Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, pp. 1–2). Shawcross offers a summary of press representations and reactions to them in "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster," pp. 238–243. The Barron and Paul account of Democratic Kampuchea (summarized in *The Reader's Digest*) sparked a combative debate among leftist academics; as this exchange bled across multiple issues of the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, see: Retboll, "Kampuchea and the *Reader's Digest*"; Barnett, "Inter-Communist Conflicts and Vietnam"; Summers, "In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much"; and Kiernan, "Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea." Even in the waning years of the Cold War, versions of Cambodian history became the textual armament of geo-political forces, although this period exhibits greater alignment along Cold War ideological lines: US, UN, and China versus the USSR.

⁵⁷ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 40. Along these lines, the period of Democratic Kampuchea has been labeled using a host of descriptors, including the "killing fields regime," "auto-genocide," "the worst auto-homeo-genocide in modern history," and "one of the 20th century's most brutal and radical regimes" (coined by Dith Pran; coined by Jean Lacouture; Gray, *Swimming to Cambodia* (film); Mydans, "Death of Pol Pot"). The typical journalistic characterization of the DK years sometimes emphasizes the personalist leadership of the regime and often highlights the forms of suffering experienced by most of the country's populace. "The radical Communist Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, during which time

1.7 million people were killed outright or died as a result of torture, disease, overwork and starvation" (Mydans, "Prosecutors Identify Suspects in Khmer Rouge Trial").

⁵⁸ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Vietnamese propaganda circulated the term "Hell on Earth" (Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, p. 216). Spalding Gray, whose 1987 monological account draws largely from Ponchaud and Shawcross, provides a formidable, if nuanced, example of the STV:

"April 17, 1975. Cambodia Year Zero. The Khmer Rouge marched in in their black pajamas. Lon Nol's army threw down their guns and raced to embrace them, thinking that the country would be reunited again. But the Khmer Rouge did not smile back. They took strategic positions in the town. Some of the kids, who grew up in the jungle and never saw cars before, jumped in and started ramming them into first gear and getting stuck in first gear, driving into walls and trees. And then the Khmer Rouge systematically began to empty the city of Phnom Penh. "Out!" they said. "Everyone out, out, out!" "Into the fields," they say. "The Americans are going to bomb," they say. "There's no more food left." When the people ask who will provide for them, they say "Angkar! Angkar will provide. Angkar..." like some perverse Wizard of Oz, Kafkaesque thundercloud meant to rain down *manna* on the people in the fields. "And take *nothing* with you." You had to go into the fields with no possessions.

"And then, if you couldn't walk or were in the hospital, they'd chuck you out the window—seventh-story, tenth-story—a kind of weird survival of the fittest. And then the killing began. Eyewitnesses said anyone that was educated was killed. Any civil servant was killed. Anyone carrying their own cooking pot was killed. People wearing glasses would be killed. The motto was: "Better to kill an innocent person than to leave an enemy alive." "But..." bmf. Dead, dead.

"Kids were doing the killing, ten, eleven, twelve years old. They were too weak from their diet from barks and bugs and lizards and no more ammunition left, so they were trying to knock in skulls with these ax handles and hoe handles. But they were too weak to knock them in. So eyewitnesses said the kids were taking bets on how many whacks it would take to knock in a skull. And they were laughing. A lot of laughter going on, a *lot* of laughter. And eyewitnesses said if you pleaded for your life, they would laugh harder. If it was a woman pleading for her life, the kids would laugh even harder. And then they would take the half-dead bodies and drag them into American bomb craters, which acted as a kind of perfect shallow grave.

"It was a kind of visitation of hell on earth. Who needs metaphors for hell? or poetry about hell? This actually happened, here, on this earth. Pregnant mothers disemboweled, eyes gouged out. Kids, children, torn apart like fresh bread in front of their mothers. And this went on for years until two million people were either systematically killed, or starved to death, *by the same people*.

"And no one can really figure out how something like that could have happened. Certainly we could research that other Holocaust in Germany, because people speak a lot of German and read and write German, and Hitler's either dead or living in Argentina. But Cambodia is far, far away, and no one speaks enough Khmer, and Pol Pot is still alive and waiting up here on the Thai-Cambodian border, with 35,000 troops supported by the Red Cross, by the United Nations, and by the United States of America. Because so many people would rather see him back in Cambodia with his nationalist coalition rather than the Vietnamese who are in there, and they came in in 1979. Some people, the British particularly, saying that it was a liberation. Others saying it was a xenophobic piece of cake, just biting off Cambodia to protect themselves from China. And I get very confused..." (Gray, *Swimming to Cambodia* (film), 52:45–55:55; *Swimming to Cambodia* (book), pp. 48–52, which differs slightly from the above). Within the description of horrors, Gray's monologue exhibits a procataleptic emphasis on accuracy ("really," "actually") and referenced sources ("eyewitnesses said..."), an emphasis that is mirrored in the Tourism Ministry's historical-tourist project in Anlong Veng (developed further in the next chapter).

⁶⁰ Vickery, "Democratic Kampuchea: Themes and Variations"; *idem*, "History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future."

⁶¹ "Although there are plentiful reports of brutality against the population during 1975 and 1976, there are also a number of equally reliable reports of peasants not being badly treated and of peasant support for the revolutionary movement *in that period*" (Kiernan, "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," p. 58). The fact of spatial variation can be at least partly drawn from the semi-autonomous zones, which were organized during the war with Lon Nol; one might also want to stress the historical antecedent of regional warlordism that dominated Cambodian politics for centuries. With regard to the best zones, Chandler states, "In general, the Northeast, East and Southwest had the largest number of experienced

cadre, the longest history of CPK indoctrination, and the greatest number of base people. These zones were thus relatively more benign, at least as far as newcomers were concerned, and for a time more reliable in the eyes of the CPK leadership" (*The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 269). Kiernan gives some consideration to the Northeast Zone (Ratanakiri, Mondulakiri, and Stung Treng Provinces), examining the CPK administration during the war and its consolidation of control (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 80–86) as well as the CPK's attempted "revolutionary transformation" (Khmerization) of the region's hilltribe minorities (pp. 305–309). He concludes that generally the Northeast Zone, along with the Kratie Special Region 505 (up until the 1977 purge), was one of the best areas in which to live.

⁶² When the entire country is being transformed toward a slave state, the idea of favorable and unfavorable conditions seems relative. Vickery's distinction in this regard is helpful. He generally evaluates sectors based on reports of the numbers of executions and the quantity of food. (This stands in opposition to those accounts that might emphasize the difficulties for urban dwellers adjusting to agrarian labour, in which most sectors would be described as unfavorable.) For "good" areas, few killings (and only for typically criminal behavior) and adequate food might also be augmented by a "benign attitude of the cadres." He makes plain the possible correlation of factors that might foster better conditions: "Where food was plentiful, people could work better, disciplinary infractions were less frequent, and the cadres could afford to adopt a more tolerant attitude and treat breaches of regulations more lightly" (Vickery, "Themes and Variations," p. 110). For Vickery, "bad" situations exhibit two principal types. "First, there were the hitherto under-developed areas, often forested, into which 'new' people were dumped to clear and plant or build irrigation works, dependent on external supplies of rice. Usually there were shocking death tolls from hunger and illness, even where executions were few.... The second type of 'bad' area was where death from hunger might not have been a major problem, but where executions ran riot" (Vickery, "Themes and Variations," pp. 110–111). In an alternative manner, Kiernan's method for assessing conditions evaluates informant responses according to a rough rating scale: "not good" (*át l'or* អត់ល្អ), "tolerable" (*kuorsám* គួរសម) or "all right" (*kroanbar* គ្រាន់បី), "good" (*l'or* ល្អ), and "not a problem" (*át ei té* អត់អីទេ) (Kiernan, *Pol Pot Regime*, p. 209; *idem*, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," pp. 140–141). Both approaches to assessment are dependent on a solid sample of informants—an adequately large number, representing various sectors within zones, and a corollary variety of class backgrounds—which often becomes the source of mutual criticism between scholars.

⁶³ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 93, 105. The characterization of the Southwest Zone as origin of CPK power is one with which Kiernan agrees: "clan politics was solidifying into a baroque hierarchy of caste" (*The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 169, 186.). Vickery further notes that marrying off his daughters to rising political and military cadres assisted Ta Mok's expansion of his military power over most of the country (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 106–107). Kiernan concurs with the description of familial power networks, but characterizes it as the Pol Pot family dominating the national level and "the Mok family dynasty at the Southwest Zone and region levels"; he further argues that kinship considerations supplemented categorization based on class background (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 186).

⁶⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–82*, pp. 93–94, 97–98, 105–106.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106. Kiernan's more detailed review of the sectors of the Southwest acknowledges a relative prosperity immediately following the war. His analysis also examines the hardships faced by those forcibly moved to the zone. Conditions deteriorated particularly in 1977 and afterwards; food quality and quantity diminished, and the rate of killings increased (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 168–204). Vickery also suggests that before 1977, killings had been few, restricted mainly to those associated with the Lon Nol regime (*Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 97).

⁶⁶ Vickery postulates that one factor that perhaps encouraged better treatment in sector 3 was the residence of Nuon Chea's mother (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 118). Kiernan confers with Vickery on conditions in Sector 3 (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 221). Broadly speaking, the degree of favorable variation rests largely on the lower-level cadre in the sector.

⁶⁷ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 108. The late imposition of control meant a lack of well-established cadre to oversee CPK revolutionary policies as well as an absence of cooperatives until April 1975.

⁶⁸ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 125. Vickery cites reports (principally Yathay) that argue, "In general those who worked well were on good terms with the cadres, and if work was done well there were no problems" (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 124).

⁶⁹ The first “deportation” (April 1975) is the evacuation of Phnom Penh and the forced movement of the populace to the various regions in the countryside. The timing of the second deportation suggests that the evacuees provided (planting) labour in the Southwest but were deported prior to harvest, leaving the underpopulated Northwest to feed the new arrivals without a commensurate increase in its harvest. Kiernan gives much attention to the challenges that Zone leaders faced as 800,000 new people and “unclean” base people were deposited in the Northwest; he provides sector-specific descriptions of this migrating population (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 216–246).

⁷⁰ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 219–220.

⁷¹ Kiernan, “Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia,” p. 372 and *passim*. Kiernan points to dramatic variation in levels of discipline, organization, political education, and commitment within the movement with particular attention given to the unique circumstances of the Northwest. In this early piece, Kiernan critiques the claims of both refugees and Democratic Kampuchea radio that the situation in Cambodia was uniform and centrally directed. As a corollary, claims regarding a “communist bloodbath” are argued to be relevant to the country’s Northwest. In examining Democratic Kampuchea’s lack of strong governmental control, Kiernan highlights a wartime breakdown of communication as well as a long history of a highly decentralized Cambodian state. Even as the revolutionaries gained territory, the organization was in a poor position to administer its expanded area.

⁷² Vickery provides the following patterns to describe the differential affect that the arrival of the Southwest cadre had on life in the Northwest Zone: “(1) in those places where the intellectual cadres of the Northwest had favored, or given soft jobs to, former urbanites of the Southwestern personnel removed the cadres, put the favored new people out to hard physical labor, and even killed some of them; (2) wherever there had been massive brutality against new people and severe hunger, the old cadres were removed and the conditions of the new people improved, although sometimes only temporarily if it proved impossible to increase food production—a major problem when, as from 1978, much food was being stockpiled; (3) where things had been going smoothly, as in most of *damban* 3, there was very little change, either among lower-ranking cadres or in the life of the evacuees” (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 128).

⁷³ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 243–245.

⁷⁴ The series of purges carried out by the CPK is discussed below.

⁷⁵ Vickery suggests the possibility that Chou Chet was put in control of the West Zone, with its insurmountable conditions, in order to set him up for failure and thereby provide an excuse to eliminate him and his network of support (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 129).

⁷⁶ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 129–131.

⁷⁷ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 416–423.

⁷⁸ “If the Northwest were characterized by noticeable differences among *dambans*, the North shows few discernible *damban*-level features and very great variations in living conditions among even contiguous villages” (Vickery, “Themes and Variations,” p. 123). Kiernan’s evaluation of the North Zone is conducted primarily in terms of Ke Pauk’s purge of Koy Thuon, his populating the administration with relatives, the rebellion at Chikreng (in Special Region 106), and power struggles within the CPK (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 337–345).

⁷⁹ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 132–139. (With enough food or game resources, there was a greater chance of death by violence than starvation.)

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134. “In areas where the new Communist administration was not well-established, village-level cadres made up of local peasants had a free hand to interpret policy guidelines as legitimation for the settling of scores” (Vickery, “Themes and Variations,” p. 125).

⁸¹ Vickery, “Themes and Variations,” pp. 123–124.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁸³ This assessment is confirmed by Kiernan (*The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 204–210), Chandler (*The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 269), and, to a large degree, Heder (*Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*, p. 7).

⁸⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 141. Much has been made of the importance of this faction, sometimes called “liberationist” (*rumdâh* រូមដា). Kiernan describes the differently clad Eastern troops that occupied parts of Phnom Penh in April 1975 as presenting a more tolerant approach in addition to its different appearance (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 41–43, 65–68; *idem*, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants”). Similarly, Vickery cites reports of a more assistive character to the East Zone troops in the capture and evacuation of the capital in April 1975 (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 141).

Heder identifies a dissident faction within the CPK, largely composed of East Zone cadre, whose defensive military strategy *vis-à-vis* Vietnam and interest in domestic reform brought suspicion on them and ultimately led to their purge (“Khmer Rouge Opposition to Pol Pot: ‘Pro-Vietnamese’ or ‘Pro-Chinese’?” in Heder, *Reflections on Cambodian Political History: Backgrounder to Recent Developments*). As is indicated below, the conception of a more moderate or lenient communist faction, which was brutally eliminated by the Pol Pot clique, forms the basis of narrative of “the Good East” informing PRK historiography. The origin and various referents of the liberationist label are complex. Quinn describes a division within FUNK during the war against Lon Nol, a CPK element he calls “*Khmer Krahom*” (red Khmer, Khmer Rouge) and a pro-Sihanouk element he calls “*Khmer Rumdoah*” (liberation Khmer) (Quinn, “Political Change in Wartime: The *Khmer Krahom* Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970–1974,” p. 6). As early as 1972, the Communist element began to rid the movement of any and all references to the old society, and Quinn documents internal fighting between the two factions in southwestern and eastern parts of the country, with the ultimate vanquishing of the Sihanoukists in 1974 (pp. 8–10). Kiernan repeats this analysis of factionalism and consolidation in his description of pre-triumph regional differences (Kiernan, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, pp. 341–347). In retrospect, it might be clearer to distinguish between a hard-line dominant group and a more moderate faction, which may have seen a use for Sihanouk. Vickery pinpoints the confusion in Quinn’s definitions, perhaps deriving from the fact that the aim of some units was only the removal of Lon Nol. However, Kiernan notes pre-1975 conflicts between the *Khmer Krahom* “blackshirts” (the Pol Pot–Ta Mok Party “Center”) and the *Khmer Rumdos* “greenshirts” (Chhouk and Sao Pheum of the Eastern Zone), and he sees this division played out in zone-based policies under CPK rule (Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants”). The “*Rumdo*” in Etcheson’s account continues Quinn’s hazy depiction of CPK factions; Etcheson describes this group as “the followers of Norodom Sihanouk, and this group included a broad mix of democrats, republicans, and monarchists. Allied to the [Communist Party of China] center, they tended to be conciliatory to the Vietnamese. Based in the north, west, south, southwest, and east, this group was unique in that it had no independent military apparatus” (Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 164–165). It is interesting to note that Etcheson places Sao Pheum, secretary of the Eastern Zone, in the “Internationalists” faction, which he describes as pro-Vietnamese with democratic tendencies.

⁸⁵ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 141–142.

⁸⁶ This lends credence to the claim that inexperience and a lack of prior grounding in regions and sectors was a key factor that contributed to escalations of violence. The East Zone area itself carries pre-war importance for the CPK, as Kampong Cham Province was home to the Party’s Office 100 headquarters, where Saloth Sar worked under Vietnamese tutelage.

⁸⁷ See Becker, *When the War was Over*, chaps. 5, 6, 8; Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 211–226, 271n4; Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, p. 170; Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, particularly chaps. 5 and 6 on the “indentured agrarian state” (as cited above); *idem*, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens, and Cormorants”; Kiernan & Boua, *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942–1981*, especially Part III; and Thayer, “New Evidence on Kampuchea.”

⁸⁸ From my research, it appears that Heder is the first to critically evaluate the privileging of the East Zone in historical accounts in a way that operates as a creation myth for the current government (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide in Ben Kiernan’s *The Pol Pot regime*,” pp. 117–123). Ledgerwood also flushes out this “national narrative” in the context of representations at Tuol Sleng (Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative”). In the following chapter, I argue that the narrative of “the good East” is the historiographical precondition for (the Anlong Veng historical-tourist project’s position in) the CPP’s legitimization discourse.

⁸⁹ Kiernan lays out the foundations and structure of this narrative in: *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 14–15, 65–68, 205–210, 369–376, 392–411, 440–442; *How Pol Pot Came to Power*; “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants”; *Cambodia: The Eastern Zone Massacres*; “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement”; “Origins of Khmer Communism”; and “New Light on the Origins of the Vietnam–Kampuchea Conflict.” Much of the detail of Kiernan’s work on the East Zone derives from interviews with members of the CPP and Heng Samrin in particular. Vickery provides a similar accounting, especially in his works that seek to refute criticism of the PRK government in: *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 140–148, 202–253; *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and Society*, pp. 25–59; “Themes and Variations,” pp. 107, 128–130; and “History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” pp. 47–49.

⁹⁰ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 12–16; *idem*, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, chaps. 2 and 3; *idem*, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” pp. 153–158; Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 210–213.

⁹¹ After the 1954 Geneva Conference, over 1,000 early communist/Issarak fighters went to Hanoi. Vickery traces a conflict back to a growing division within the party between Saloth Sar’s faction and the veteran ICP-inspired cadre, whose “Khmer Hanoi” would be the object of purges as early as 1973 (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 210–217).

⁹² When in power, Pol Pot deemed 1960 as the CPK’s founding date (under the name of the Khmer Workers’ Party), eliminating the 1951 First Congress and the fraternal ties with Vietnam that went along with it. Chandler very clearly draws out the implications of pursuing this change in the Party’s founding (Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea”).

⁹³ Eastern Zone Military Political Service, “Summary of Annotated Party History,” quoted in Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 213. “It would seem that poorly-educated and rural based cadre like Phim, and even former Bangkok law student Nuon Chea, deferred with characteristic peasant reticence to the dynamism and self-confidence of French-educated intellectuals from well-off backgrounds” (Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” pp. 153–154).

⁹⁴ These veterans of the struggle included Sao Pheum, Phuong, Chhouk, Keo Samnang, and So, who were all in the Executive of the Eastern Zone Party Committee.

⁹⁵ Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 156.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161. Kiernan also describes the faction as “the one now led in Phnom Penh by President Heng Samrin, consists of people attracted to the Vietnamese socialist model. Coming from more modest social backgrounds, and more cautious politically than [the pro-Cultural Revolution faction associated with Tiv Ol] (while sharing with it an internationalist perspective), many of them received training in Vietnam, although many did not. They were most active in the eastern Zone (Prey Veng, Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng provinces) but also in the Southwest Zone and the Special Zone (Kandal province) during the 1970–75 war” (Kiernan, “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” p. 8). Kiernan’s tripartite categorization of the factions in the early 1970s is as follows: 1) the black-clad “cormorants” (*k’aik teuk ក្រុកម្លឹក*), *Khmer Krahom*, or Pol Pot Center faction; 2) the fatigue-wearing troops under Chan Chakrey and Sao Pheum of the East Zone, Khmer Liberation (*khmaer rumdâh ខ្មែររំដោះ*), “farm chickens” (*moan srok ម៉ោនស្រុក*); 3) “Hanoi Khmer” returnees, “wild chickens” (*moan prey ម៉ោនព្រៃ*) (Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants”). He lays out the details of conflicts between the Pol Pot faction and the “pro-Vietnamese” Communists during the 1970–75 war, demonstrating the military efforts deployed by the Pol Pot group in consolidating its rule of localities and zones (Kiernan, “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” pp. 26–50). In particular, he documents the return of the Hanoi Khmer, only to be assigned menial tasks by Pol Pot’s cadre before most of them were targeted for assassination; this policy of elimination while deriving from Pol Pot and carried out by the Party’s security branch, *Santebal* (ស័ន្តេបាល), occurred in the East Zone territory without Pheum’s initiative or opposition (Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 160). Certainly, the purge signalled to the East Zone faction and others the danger of not accepting the supremacy of Pol Pot. It should be noted that some “Hanoi Khmer” did not return to build and defend Democratic Kampuchea but remained in Vietnam; some of these individuals, like Pen Sovan, would return only after Pol Pot’s defeat in January 1979 and assume important positions within the PRK government.

⁹⁷ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 216.

⁹⁸ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 206–207; *idem*, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 139. He even states that most of the individuals taken off “to study” (a euphemism for execution) actually returned from their apprehension. Describing examples from Sectors 22, 23, and 24, he asserts that “re-education,” instead of outright execution, appears as the predominant principle in the governing of the East, although elite new people who were considered enemies were put to death (*The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 207–208; “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 143). (Kiernan further quotes a 21 September 1976 US Embassy report that states executions were much fewer in the East “because the more sympathetic Khmer Rumdos are in control there” (*The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 205; “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” pp. 200–201).) Vickery also confirms the preference for re-education and re-integration over execution, particularly as a means to weed out real enemies (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 146).

Etcheson takes issue with some of the details in these accounts, specifically the involvement of East Zone cadre in killings. Following Locard, he argues that a significant level of extrajudicial killings were occurring prior to 1978 (even though executions would dramatically increase with the purge of the zone), and “at least some authorities in So Phim’s Eastern Zone were largely cooperating in a plan to liquidate many members of the class of Cambodians labeled as ‘New People’” (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 106, referencing Locard’s 1995 unpublished research paper “The Khmer Rouge Gulag: 17 April 1975–7 January 1979”); Etcheson’s point is to suggest that those escaped cadre, who returned to fight in the KUNFS, were likely complicit in the terror and killings in Democratic Kampuchea.

⁹⁹ Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 139.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 198n1; Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 72.

¹⁰¹ Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 141.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 138, referencing Martin, “*La riziculture et la maîtrise de l’eau dans le Kampuchea démocratique*,” pp. 28, 34. She states, “*À Prey Veng, on a même utilisé les compétences d’un ingénieur évacué de Phnom Penh le 17 avril 1975 qui a dressé les plans pour l’ensemble de la province. De même à Kompong Cham*” (p. 28).

¹⁰³ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁴ Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 144, paraphrasing Vickery (*Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 146; *idem*, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society*, p. 34). Chandler’s summary of the favorable uniqueness of Sao Pheum’s zone states: “By the end of 1977, after fighting had broken out with Vietnam, the party had admitted its existence under prodding from China, and the suspicions of the party leaders had shifted to the Eastern Zone, where Sao Phim still enjoyed widespread, threatening popularity. Here and there in the east people were allowed to wear their own clothes in place of the black peasant uniforms decreed by authorities elsewhere. People were allowed to forage to supplement their diets, and communal eating, the widely unpopular practice ordered on a national scale at the beginning of 1977, was slow to catch on, particularly in isolated districts, where, as one confession put it, “visitors were few.” By the middle of 1977, Sao Phim’s name had surfaced in several confessions at S-21. Over the next twelve months, many of his military commanders, protégés, and former associates were purged” (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 296).

¹⁰⁵ Sao Pheum’s personal demise is quite intriguing. According to Kiernan’s account, Pheum’s comrades in the East had pleaded with him to flee to Vietnam, but he refused. Pheum could not believe that the Pol Pot faction actually intended to eliminate him (or that the revolution would take such a turn). When summoned to meet with Ke Pauk, he sent a bodyguard to inquire regarding the reasons. The bodyguard did not return, but another “invitation” arrived. Pheum sacrificed another bodyguard in his attempts to ascertain the intentions of the Party. A third summoning caused Pheum to send his nephew to discern the fate of the bodyguards. A fourth sacrifice, a representative from the Center who was posted in the East Zone Office, was dispatched to his death at Tuol Sleng. Ke Pauk moved his troops into the East Zone, and Pheum resolved to ascertain the Party’s motives personally. On 3 June 1978, on the eastern shore of the Tonle Tauch in Peareang, watching the approaching troops traversing the river, Pheum finally accepted what the Party had in store for him; at that moment, he shot himself in the chest then the mouth (avoiding a tortured end at S-21). That night, his wife and children would be massacred as they made funerary preparations for the patriarch (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 399–400; *idem*, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 188–191).

¹⁰⁶ Kiernan, “Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants,” p. 187. According to documents from Tuol Sleng, the dramatic surge in the first half of 1978 derived principally from the intake of personnel from the East (Boua, Kiernan & Barnett, “Bureaucracy of Death”). Chandler suggests that trucks full with prisoners were turned away at the S-21 gate and diverted directly to Choëung Ek (Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 73). Locard correctly emphasizes the mental, rather than anatomical, interpretation of the “Vietnamese heads, Cambodian bodies” slogan (Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, pp. 179–181). Rather than an expression of ethnic targeting, this slogan suggests CPK purges sought to expunge a “way of thinking” that evidenced sympathy for or collaboration with the Vietnamese. Contra Kiernan, Heder offers an alternative metaphor, “Khmer political structures under Vietnamese leadership,” recalling Saloth Sar’s frustration during the struggle under Vietnamese tutelage (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” pp. 150). Further, he notes that the mere fact of pursuing a slower implementation of socialism appeared to the Party Center as “pro-Vietnamese” (p. 151).

¹⁰⁷ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 74. Kiernan estimates the death toll for the East Zone (S-21 and village-level executions as well as rural massacres) conservatively at 100,000 and probably around 250,000 dead (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 404).

¹⁰⁸ Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," p. 197. Kiernan makes an odd note of the use of blue *krama* (traditional Cambodian scarves) to mark former East Zone people during this deportation, arguing a case for premeditation evidenced by the massive import of blue cloth from China (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 405–411); others have suggested that this detail of DK control is not supported and that a wide variety of colors of *krama* were worn by CPK members, base people, and evacuees (Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," pp. 147–149).

¹⁰⁹ The move to seek support from a neighboring country, often repeated in Cambodian history, was framed again in terms of the survival of the Khmer race: "We have no mastery of the situation. We cannot solve the livelihood problems of our people. We have only to contact the Vietnamese again for the Kampuchean people to survive" (Heng Samrin, quoted in Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," pp. 194–195).

¹¹⁰ The exact timing of the offensive seems to have been decided by the Vietnamese, who desired dry terrain as well a waiting rice harvest for its soldiers (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 31). Chandler dates Vietnam's initial plans to overthrow DK to February 1978 (Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 72), which suggests significant forethought.

¹¹¹ Vickery underscores the added legitimacy that results from this association. The elite cadre of the East Zone having been almost totally purged, cadre that came to form the KUFNS came from the second-tier of fealty to the East Zone leaders. "[Second-echelon members of the old party veteran-Pracheachon tendency] represent party continuity from the earliest Cambodian Communist organizations, in that sense are more legitimate than Pol Pot, and that the cooperation with Vietnam is an old tradition to which they are heir" (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 216). Former East Zone cadre who filled the posts in the new PRK government included: Heng Samrin (Prime Minister), Chea Sim (Minister of Interior), Hun Sen (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Tea Sabun (Minister of Social Action), Ouch Bun Chhoeun (Minister of Justice), Sim Ka (Minister for the Inspection of State Affairs), Mat Ky (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), and Sin Song (Deputy Minister of the Interior) (Kiernan, "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants," p. 198; Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and Society*, pp. 73–74, 80–81).

¹¹² Note that the narrative is quite the opposite of the STV for the PRK that Vickery outlines (*Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 39–40), which emphasizes Western/CGDK characterizations of the regime as an imperialist occupation or regional hegemonism by "the hooligans of the East" (as Deng Xiaoping labelled the Vietnamese), which sought the elimination of the Khmer race.

¹¹³ Gottesman suggests that the "imagined history of revolutionary glory" was prefigured in Heng Samrin's speech in Snuol at the founding of the KUFNS: "The speech... in which he extolled the 'glorious victory of April 17, 1975,' was an attempt to mythologize the revolution and to blame its implosion on the actions, taken 'a few days after liberation,' by 'the reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng Sary gang and their families.' The Vietnamese and the Cambodians who had taken refuge in Hanoi in 1954 were looking further back into Cambodia's revolutionary past, seeking to re-create a period when the two countries' communist movements were more united. They were also attempting to cover up current and historical Vietnamese domination" (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 34).

¹¹⁴ Frieson, "The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea," pp. 405–406. Similar to Vickery's endeavors, to read DK as non-Marxist, the PRK leadership has sought to invalidate CPK claims to being communist. As well, via its memorialization efforts (victor's history)—most notably, the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes and the Choeung Ek "Killing Fields"—and juridical efforts (victor's justice)—the August 1979 People's Revolutionary Tribunal of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique—this leadership (i.e., the good communists) has accentuated the "genocidal" aspects of DK. It should be noted, as Schabas does, that in the PRK trial of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, "genocide" was not defined according to the 1948 Genocide Convention, but rather "an idiosyncratic definition that is substantially akin to the concept of crimes and humanity" (Schabas, "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?," p. 37).

¹¹⁵ Heder, "Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide," p. 118. For example, with regard to the evacuation, Kiernan argues that the East zone cadre were opposed to and delayed the carrying out of the order. However, Heder shows that there was no difference in the order issued for evacuation, but that a delay in its execution may have flowed from logistical issues, such when a cadre might have had an order confirmed

(e.g., a week later) (pp. 118–119). In addition, Heder points out that Kiernan constructs Sector 21 Secretary Chan as a Pol Potist, such that the (good/real) East Zone cadre are exonerated of responsibility for Cham massacres. Further, Kiernan fails to mention that after the supposed Pol Potist took control of the sector, conditions improved (pp. 121–122).

¹¹⁶ Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” p. 103.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 124–127.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 133. Heder sees that tendency reflected in Kiernan’s claim that the Party Centre sought to reclaim Kampuchea Krom (“Lower Cambodia,” what is still southern Vietnam). Through wild conjecture—including misinterpretations of meetings and statements, improper attribution of responsibility, and mistranslation of a CPK document—Kiernan falsely asserts a DK policy to reconquer its ancient territory. He claims the minor border irritations, which grew into large-scale assaults in 1977, were motivated by the Southwest Zone cadre’s irredentism; Heder’s sources suggest cross-border animal theft was much to blame, covered by irredentist rhetoric (although adjustments in the land frontier became a factor in mid-1977). In various moves to shift responsibility for attacks off the East Zone, Kiernan backdates (by a year) the change in the Zone’s power structure and leadership. Heder devotes intense scrutiny to Kiernan’s false chronology, providing numerous references for the details of times, places, and people in the late 1977 onslaught. Ultimately, he asserts that evidence supports the idea that the attacks were “a gross overreaction to minor border problems” (p. 143) and even the aims of the major offensive were “to maintain the border as [the CPK leadership] argued it should be delineated” (p. 144). Heder’s well-articulated version of events substantially invalidates Kiernan’s notions of an irredentist Party policy. Further, Heder asserts that the counter-offensive from Vietnam overwhelmed the East Zone forces, which thereby raised the Organization’s suspicions and precipitated the mid-1978 purges. In another explication of the purges, that encouraged the formation of the KUFNS, Heder provides a very detailed account of various factions (many individuals from which do *not* originate from East Zone leadership positions). The *apparent* united front is broken down into three main constituents: 1) Khmer Viet Minh or “veterans of the struggle” (*neak tâsou chas* អ្នកគាំទ្រ) who formed the core of the KUFNS; 2) “ex-‘domestic’ [knong brâtés ក្នុងប្រទេស] Communists” who differed with Pol Pot/Ta Mok over strategies and tactics for dealing with the “acute enemy”; and 3) various non-Communists, including those who escaped to Vietnam and were treated as refugees, former supporters of FUNK, and non-FUNK bourgeois elements that threw in their lot with the Vietnamese (Heder, *Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages*, pp. 19–27).

¹¹⁹ Heder, *Imitation and Independence*.

¹²⁰ The peculiar element that crops up in this analysis is the over-commitment (expressed as a formulaicism) to a Marxist–Leninist revolutionary model that was “objectively” inappropriate to the context of the Cambodian Communists, suggesting that earlier scholarly interpretations misunderstood the nature of the divisions within the leadership. Heder delves deep into Marxist–Leninist, Stalinist, and Maoist ideological doctrine to clarify some of the influences and components within early Vietnamese-dominated Cambodian Communism; such sustained scholarly analysis of the Marxist tradition with regard to the Cambodian revolution has long been needed. However, through his analysis of documents and statutes, Heder tends to neglect a social history which would indicate the impact of these early Communist endeavors or how widespread the movement was (beyond an urban Vietnamese and Chinese population in Phnom Penh? beyond the predominantly Vietnamese rubber industry workers in Kampong Cham?). While Heder emphasizes the (Vietnamese) training of leaders who were later to become important, he also gives the impression that “Cambodian” Communism was in fact Vietnamese Communists (and their military) advancing their vision, establishing some subordinate satellite organizations, and recruiting some lower (Cambodian) cadre to carry out their program.

¹²¹ While the Vietnamese agents (Pham Van Ba and Nguyen Thanh Son) maintained direct contact and direction, influence from Vietnam started to decrease in 1957 as Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea began conducting research for their own Party Congress (Heder, *Imitation and Independence*, pp. 43–47).

¹²² In terms of struggle, this ascendant faction (Tou Samouth, Nuon Chea, and Saloth Sar) continued to adhere to Vietnam’s prescriptions of unarmed mass mobilization efforts until 1960. Heder is keen to itemize the dissent within the movement. Sao Pheum sought a resumption of armed struggle due to knowledge of the violent suppression of Communist activists in the East. Ieng Sary and other intellectuals favored political struggle *independent* of the Vietnamese and pushed for a national united front (including Sihanouk) against US imperialism. Sihanouk’s inclusion of key leftists (Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and

Hu Nim) in the *Sangkum* government helped Nuon Chea and Saloth Sar obfuscate the nature of Cambodia's Communist movement as they researched and prepared for a Party Congress and a strategy of violent national people's democratic revolution. Heder illustrates how the Cambodian Communists sought to assimilate recommendations for South Vietnam (which in turn demonstrated Hanoi's assimilation of 1940s Stalinist–Maoist re-thinking with regard to “national people's democratic revolution”); in so doing, the KWP was asserting an equal rather than subordinate comparison with Vietnam's struggle (Heder, *Imitation and Independence*, pp. 49–70). He acutely examines the KWP's 1960 Congress and its adoption of Marxist–Leninist doctrine, and he exposes how the model for South Vietnam made even less sense for Cambodia's conditions. The country's social structure was radically misinterpreted likely because Saloth Sar and Nuon Chea were more interested in making revolution than in the actual details of Cambodian society. Nonetheless, the 1960 KWP Standing Committee pursued an initial strategy of political struggle which included armed self-defense and armed propaganda. Heder argues that the Party allowed Sihanouk to misread these French-educated intellectuals as being the leaders of what Sihanouk was calling the “Khmer Rouge,” a move which allowed the Party to maintain its secrecy. While Saloth Sar and others would have become familiar with VWP documents (like the December 1963 “Resolution 9”), which encouraged armed struggle, such outright revolutionary violence was denied to the KWP leadership by Hanoi and Beijing. In September 1966, Saloth Sar became increasingly determined to break with Vietnamese and Chinese prescriptions and prepare for armed struggle. At its Party conference, the KWP pushed toward preparations for making a people's war, changed its name to the CPK (demonstrating an implicit belief in the superiority of the Cambodian struggle), and resolved to reject large-scale military and political intervention from the Vietnamese, as such assistance was perceived as VWP domination (pp. 71–75).

¹²³ Heder, *Imitation and Independence*, pp. 128–132. He details a zone-by-zone assessment of armed struggle in 1968 and 1969, noting that for the most part the insurrection resulted in serious setbacks or near-liquidation of Communist units; the key exceptions were Ta Mok's Southwest Zone and Saloth Sar's Northeast Zone. (In these descriptions, Heder does not forget to note the degree of brutality and destruction carried out by Lon Nol forces as well as the KWP's initial use of VWP-style terror in its people's war.) Heder documents Sihanouk's misunderstanding of the Cambodian Communist leadership and asserts that in fact while reliant on the Vietnamese presence and back-up, the leaders were in fact “Khmer Viet Minh” who however remained independent in decision-making from the Vietnamese and Chinese (pp. 133–146). Despite past disagreement about the armed struggle in Cambodia, once the long-awaited coup occurred, Vietnam and China praised the KWP for its 1968 decision. Ironically, Vietnamese agreement with the KWP regarding the coup and its increased support did not improve relations between the two movements; KWP leaders refused Vietnam's proposed “mixed commands” and assistance to establish local revolutionary state structures, but Vietnam pursued these ends regardless. (pp. 147–157). In late 1970, Saloth Sar decided to gradually seize control of the movement from Vietnam beginning with halting Vietnamese recruiting of Cambodian troops; this independence was formalized at the 1971 CPK Congress, even though Vietnamese military intervention would be required as late as August 1973.

¹²⁴ Heder, *Imitation and Independence*, p. 166. The novelty of Heder's claim decreases as the time frame approaches 1975. While the pre-triumph form of struggle may have followed the Vietnamese people's war script, Heder fails to show how conditions in the early 1970s begin to explain the rationale of the policies adopted during Democratic Kampuchea. Exposition on events ends at 1973, suggesting the possibility of a break with the model in the 1974 to 1975 time frame, which would help explain the policies of the Democratic Kampuchea period. A hint of this development is offered in his analysis of how the CPK's radicalization of its policies after mid-1973 increasingly relied on coercion and violence (and thus demonstrates a lack of popularity for the CPK revolution).

¹²⁵ Chandler follows this bifurcated scheme—initial violence (April to June 1975) then subsequent purges—and further divides the latter phase: September 1975 to September 1976 and April 1977 to December 1978 (Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, pp. 45–49). Vickery examines the violence and killings in terms of two broader waves: 1975, aimed at officials from the Khmer Republic; 1977 onward, a widening purge of cadre from areas of production and distribution failures (Vickery, “History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future,” p. 47). Regardless of the specific timeframes adopted, what is key to note is that the successive purges gradually shifted the approach to “enemies.”

¹²⁶ This schema parallels Thion's tripartite breakdown of DK victims: Lon Nol regime personnel, intra-Party purges, and assertive killings (Thion, “Genocide as a Political Commodity,” p. 166). Hawk also

describes a “three-tier structure of murder” by the Pol Pot regime (Hawk, “Tuol Sleng extermination centre,” p. 25). The base layer of the pyramid, labelled “conditions of life,” includes exhaustion, starvation, and disease. The middle tier encompasses summary, extra-judicial executions or “massacres directed against disfavoured groups.” The uppermost layer accounts for murder—arrest, interrogation, torture, and execution—by the Khmer Rouge regime’s “nation-wide prison-execution system,” the apex of which was S-21 (Tuol Sleng) where nearly 20,000 people were killed.

¹²⁷ Quinn, “The Pattern and Scope of Violence,” pp. 180–207. Quinn’s discussion of violence and, more specifically, terror, under Pol Pot traces out the patterns that the Cambodian regime shares with conceptions of totalitarian regimes. Quinn examines Arendt’s idea (from *Origins of Totalitarianism*) that the initial phase of violence will focus on the recently vanquished, after which terror will intensify as the entire population becomes subjected (p. 179). He follows ideas from Friedrich and Brezinski (*Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*) about how a sense of righteousness encourages this latter growth of terror (p. 180). One of the problems that arises in Quinn’s account of DK violence is his filling in areas of unknown with theoretical projections and examples from other historical moments (e.g., the “Four Olds,” “new socialist man,” etc.). Vickery has called this “reverse intellectual history” whereby the intellectual precursors are discredited by reference to atrocities attributed to DK (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. ix). As well, though he draws on individuals’ testimonies about social conditions, his essay certainly conveys the impression that these appear true throughout DK time and space. Further, all intention and authority is seen to derive from Pol Pot, ignoring how local cadre may have affected the implementation of policies. Finally, the realms within Quinn’s scheme are not distinct categories; for example, evacuation (particularly of Phnom Penh) is often interpreted in terms of a political prophylactic means by which Pol Pot sought to weaken his rivals within the CPK. Additionally, “discretionary” or “assertive” killings (discussed below) are difficult to confine to one Quinn category. Nevertheless, Quinn’s chapter on DK violence appears in many discussions of the atrocities committed by the “Khmer Rouge.”

¹²⁸ Locard, “State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004),” p. 124. Locard does not sequentialize the categories of enemies, suggesting instead that these four groups were targeted throughout the period. Although this may be true (as expressed through assertive killings), in terms of systematic killings (especially those that filled the cells of the security offices), most scholars suggest that the slaughter of the “enemies of the past” became more formal in 1975, after which the Party’s killing machine turned on its own revolutionary cadre.

¹²⁹ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 41. He examines the rhetoric in Pol Pot speeches to explain the need to smash enemies (following Mao) and how enemies were defined (following Stalin and Mao).

¹³⁰ “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution... To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution” (Mao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung*, pp. 12–13).

¹³¹ Echoing Stalin’s “ulcer in a healthy body,” the micro metaphor comes from Pol Pot’s 20 December 1976 speech, “Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political Tasks of 1976” (pp. 183–184; the allusion to Stalin is highlighted by Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 361). Much of the report is a frank assessment of “key tasks,” development goals such as water management, raising livestock, strategic crops, and agricultural productivity. Pol Pot calls for an intensification of class struggle—to “wage a deep, extensive socialist revolution” (“Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political tasks of 1976,” p. 184)—especially geared toward stopping the propagation of hidden enemies (p. 190). He prescribes verification of everyone through “life histories” (*brâvoattirup* ប្រវត្តិរូប), a process that would build up the Party (pp. 203, 208) as well as expose and smash “networks of enemies” (*bântaanh s’trauv* បណ្តាញនៃសត្រូវ) or “strings of traitors” (*khsae kbât* ខ្សែភ្នំ) (pp. 184, 210–211). Significantly, as Chandler notes, no criteria are provided for judging who is an “enemy,” leading to his conclusion that such intentional ambiguity primarily served to allow the Party freedom of maneuver (Chandler, “A Revolution in Full Spate: Communist Party Policy in Democratic Kampuchea,” pp. 177–178). The report is seen to offer an “elastic” notion of enemy (Heder, “Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders”), which becomes significant in evaluating DK authority.

¹³² Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 44. He is keen to note the quasi-medical rhetoric of Pol Pot's speeches on enemies and the metaphors of impurity (akin to Lon Nol's "non-believers" (*thmil* ឥដ្ឋ)).

¹³³ Heder differentiates these from the "obligatory killings" of the security system purge of enemies (Heder, "Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders," pp. 382–384); the implications of Heder's distinction are discussed below. In Thion's tripartite scheme, of the estimated 1 to 1.5 million deaths under DK, violent deaths can be divided into Lon Nol personnel (100,000 to 200,000), CPK purges (up to 200,000), and "assertive killings" (an unknown, but "massive," figure) (Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 166).

¹³⁴ These urban departure sites included Phnom Penh, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Siem Reap, and Kampong Thom.

¹³⁵ Similar to Kiernan (*The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 39–44, 49–51, 171–180, 217–230, 405–411), Chandler notes three waves of evacuation/deportation (Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, p. 248). The first wave occurred immediately after the CPK takeover of Phnom Penh, and the capital's inhabitants were randomly transferred into the countryside along the national routes. The second wave, in 1976, was a relocation of peasants from the Southwest (and East) to the Northwest and Northeast. The third wave followed on the purge of the East Zone in 1978, when residents were deported from the East Zone in various directions.

¹³⁶ Short, *The History of Nightmare*, pp. 320–322.

¹³⁷ This echoes Vickery's description of the parameters of DK variation.

¹³⁸ Becker, *When the War Was Over*, pp. 182–192. Chandler suggests the term may be applicable to the *Four-Year Plan* that was unveiled in 1977 (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 215). Echoing Chandler's essay title, Locard describes the "revolution in full spate": "It included communal eating, collectivisation of all farm animals and implements, together with cooking utensils, and the setting up of special camps for children and work units for adolescents and young adults. People were submitted to concentration camp-like daily routines with long hours of arduous work (agriculture in the rainy season, irrigation projects in the dry season), starvation diets, short hours of sleep and long nightly propaganda meetings. Religions (mainly Buddhism) were abolished, along with feasts, ceremonies such as traditional marriages, the usual calendar and all cultural activities. The *Angkar* substituted a revolutionary set of celebrations, with a rest day every ten days. Apart from literally working the people to death, the paramount obsession of the leadership was to hunt down the 'enemies of the revolution'; traitors and spies were said to stalk the country. A prison network was developed down to the district and often the commune levels, where the innocent citizenry were chained, tortured and executed in their hundreds of thousands" (Locard, "State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004)," p. 123). As the revolutionary slogan went, "Through rapid development, our country must surpass the Angkor period" (*kâsaang cheat aoy baan choeunloeun lers sâmay ângkor* កម្ពុជាជាតិឱ្យបានលឿនលឿនលើសម័យអង្គរ) (Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, p. 73).

¹³⁹ Heder develops a solid explanation of Pol Pot's affinity for Ta Mok's Southwest Zone, as part of an attempt to consolidate real power bases beyond an already-accomplished official Party dominance (Heder, "Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages," pp. 7–14).

¹⁴⁰ Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 19. One of the means by which the Party/State (re-)asserted its control was the July 1975 re-founding of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, where each zone committed its forces to the central committee.

¹⁴¹ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 45.

¹⁴² Evidence of a directive can be traced to a 20 May 1975 conference at which Pol Pot made the point to "execute all leaders of the Lon Nol regime beginning with the top leaders" (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 55). Kiernan marks the date of the halt to the killing as 28 May 1975, but he suggests that it was quickly countermanded ("Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement," p. 51).

¹⁴³ Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 213. During this period, the regime promulgated its Constitution. Chandler's early analysis of this document remarks on what would become major themes underwriting the regime's policies: a non-academic revolution with no precedent and emerging from the revolutionary aspirations of the people, with a stress on mass mobilization. He further notes the dominance of an inflexibility throughout the manifesto-style text as well as no mention of mechanisms to protect the Cambodian people (Chandler, "The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Change"). It was during this period also that Democratic Kampuchea was officially founded

with Khieu Samphan as Head of State, Pol Pot as Prime Minister, Ieng Sary as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Son Sen as Minister of National Defense. On 27 September 1976, Pol Pot was temporarily removed from power “for reasons of health,” and some have argued that this change in power within the CPK was precipitated by events in China (Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, pp. 174–177; Kiernan, “Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” pp. 287–288; *idem*, “Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement,” pp. 56–57). As Deng Xiaoping rose to power in October 1976, China’s leaders no longer wanted to maintain relations with a Hanoi that was seen as a Soviet client state. Although acknowledging a lack of evidence (and pondering Pol Pot’s brief respite from power in October 1975), Quinn proposes a hypothesis “based on the assumption of an extremely close link between China’s leftists and Cambodia’s leaders as evidenced by the similarities between some aspects of the Cultural Revolution and Cambodia’s radical new socio-economic order and Pol’s eulogy of Mao. Proponents of this theory note that Sihanouk’s demise followed closely upon the death of Chou En-lai (reportedly the Prince’s protector) and the ascendancy of the radicals. They now find it intriguing that Pol Pot’s relinquishing of power comes so soon after Mao’s death and the concomitant decline of the leftists” (Quinn, “Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion,” p. 47). Pol Pot’s resumption to health was quickly followed by renewed and deepened efforts to eliminate infectious opponents.

¹⁴⁴ Chandler, *Brother Number One*, pp. 114–122. In repeated instances, Chandler shows how the plan for 1977–1980 slavishly mimicked endeavors in China. Becker aptly describes the economic policy of the time as a “criminal perversion of the self-sufficiency the Khmer Rouge claimed as the moral and economic genius of their revolution,” and she proceeds to document an enslavement of the people, whose products were sold at reduced prices to China (Becker, *When the War Was Over*, p. 294).

¹⁴⁵ The first “attempted coup” had occurred in July 1975, with a second in 16–18 September 1975. Pol Pot describes these assassination plots as emanating from Vietnamese spies (Democratic Kampuchea, *Black Paper*, p. 76).

¹⁴⁶ Contra the Western scholars, Ieng Sary maintains that no bombing had occurred, contending that there had been an uprising instead (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 354, 598). A rebellion did in fact emerge in the Chikreng District of Siem Reap in March 1977; it seems that the rebellion was in part due to living conditions, partly to the removal of leaders, and partly to the encouragement from new leadership (who were subsequently purged) (Slocomb, “Chikreng Rebellion: Coup and Its Aftermath in Democratic Kampuchea”). A revolt would also break out in the East Zone, following the purge of its leaders.

¹⁴⁷ In the DK lexicon, the word for “purge” (*baos sâm’aat* បាវសម្អាត) literally means “to sweep (and) clean.”

¹⁴⁸ “The Pol Pot group could and would not accept failures and criticisms. The setbacks and failures that occurred were, therefore, blamed on those responsible for executing the policies, accusing them of treason” (Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, p. 263).

¹⁴⁹ The word for DK’s security apparatus, *Santebal* (*sântibaal* សន្តិបាល) was derived by combining security (*santesok* សន្តិសុខ) [Pali: *santi* “peace” + *sukha* “health”] and police (*norkorbaal* ព្រហ្មករ) [“guardians of the city”]; in an awry manner, its etymology renders “keepers of the peace.”

¹⁵⁰ S–21 (nowadays, Tuol Sleng), formerly Tuol Svay Prey Secondary School during the Khmer Republic, is composed of four three-story concrete buildings, arranged in a “C” shape. The classrooms in these building were used to hold prisoners—mass detentions in some rooms and hastily-constructed brick-and-mortar solitary imprisonment for more important captives—and some first-floor rooms were used for interrogation/torture. Its maximum capacity at any one time was 1,000 to 1,500. This chief site worked in conjunction with security centers at the zone and sector levels as well as district-level “re-education” centers (*morndorl kâsaang khluon* មរណ៍ទីក្រុងខ្មែរ), literally “self-building” centers (*mandala*).

¹⁵¹ The manual notes “doing politics” (*thwer noryôbay* ធ្វើនយោបាយ) and “imposing torture” (*dak tearunkamm* ដាក់ទារុណកម្ម) as two interrogation techniques for exposing the enemy. Chandler notes that in the former, similar to Vietnam’s “*truy buc*” (constant repetition), interrogators were given contradictory, confusing, or uncertain instructions on how to carry out their questioning (Chandler, *Voices from S–21*, pp. 114–115), which encouraged fear and suspicion within the security apparatus itself.

¹⁵² The registration numbers for S–21’s victims were 200 in 1975, 1622 in 1976, at least 6300 in 1977, and at least 5084 in 1978; some records are missing (Chandler, *Brother Number One*, p. 123; *idem*, *Voices from S–21*, pp. 35–36). The monthly figures correspond to zone purges, with higher entrants during the

February to April 1977 purges of the North and Northwest and during the April to June 1978 purge of the East. When the makeshift cemetery at S-21 ran out of space (in 1977), victims were taken 15 km away to Choeung Ek, the site today known in the tourist guides as the "Killing Fields." In an unusual manner, Short's description of S-21 attempts to relativize the significance of S-21 internationally (by reference to the French army in Algiers as well as many modern democratic states that have/had secret prisons) as well as historically (French antecedents of torture techniques in Cambodia in the early 1950s). He asserts that its uniqueness rests with the fact that rather than being an institutional aberration (as is typically the case in modern societies that enjoy certain freedoms), S-21 was "the pinnacle, the distillation, the reflection in concentrated form of the slave state which Pol had created" (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 365). He further explains that S-21's role derived from the approach to political conflict that emerges from the "Khmer mentality" of extreme/total violence (Short quoting Bunchan Mol) or "conquer-or-be-conquered" tradition in Khmer politics (citing Thun Saray).

¹⁵³ Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 366.

¹⁵⁴ Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 30 (emphasis added). Hawk traces ideological underpinnings of the CPK Centre to illuminate some criteria by which to judge who is an enemy, for example: differing views on Sihanouk, the relationship between the Cambodian and Vietnamese revolutions, and the correct path to socialism. Further, he asserts that zone secretaries had achieved significant autonomy during the war with Lon Nol, and these regional power bases (with their own ideological tendencies) harbored divergences from Pol Pot's Party Centre (pp. 28-30). Thus, S-21 offered the instrument by which the CPK elite extended and consolidated its control over the entire country and the whole revolutionary process, by "smashing" regressive factions.

¹⁵⁵ Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 31. The institution's documentation exhibits a process that is "fantastical, bizarre, unimaginably senseless, even within its own twisted logic" (p. 28). Although "CIA" and "KGB" operate as generic signifiers for "enemy," it also is clear from the compilation of plots contained in the CPK's "Last Plan" that the prison's staff and officials took seriously that the CIA, KGB, and Vietnamese were colluding together against the revolution (Democratic Kampuchea, "The Last Plan," pp. 299-314).

¹⁵⁶ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, pp. 77-78. He suggests that the "exigencies of secrecy" (the need to keep S-21 hidden) led to nearly all entrants being killed; among those who knew about the facility, it was sometimes referred to as the "place to enter and not exit" (*kânlaeng chaul ât chénh* កន្លែងចូលតែមិនចេញ). Chandler also states that the ways prisoners were chosen, summoned, and collected remain unclear; even if guilty by association, each prisoner was forced to confess *his own crimes* as well as implicate his "string" of traitors.

¹⁵⁷ Although the "Last Plan" charges that this consolidation of power in early 1977—eliminating a rival network whose vision of socialist transformation differed with the break-neck social leveling of Pol Pot's faction—proceeded on the grounds of these traitors building up CIA agents and "Vietnam annexationists" (Democratic Kampuchea, "The Last Plan," p. 300), it is also cast in terms of abolishing feudal and bourgeois remnants. Overt charges leveled against Koy Thuon focused less on his leniency or moderate revisionism, and more on his bourgeois indulgences and the abuse of power exercised to attain these. "The group of Koy Thuon in sector 304 created an atmosphere of pacifism, luxury and excitement entertained by arts, girls, reception and festivities; fostered house alignment and planting of banana trees along the streets; stimulate prestige, ranks and relation with the enemy" (p. 307). In fact, Ponchaud presents evidence to suggest that Koy Thuon, along with his zone deputy, his military commander, and numerous subordinates, had been conspiring for a coup as early as September 1976: "*Ils étaient en relation avec Chakrey, un chef militaire de Phnom Penh, et le coup d'État était prévu pour le premier janvier 1977. C'est Chakrey semble-t-il qui devait en prendre l'initiative à Phnom Penh, et une station radio installée à Oddar Méan Chhey devait appeler au soulèvement général*" (Ponchaud, "*Situation interne du Kampuchéa Démocratique dans 1977*," p. 3). There is also a possibility that the initial suspicion of Koy Thuon was sparked by a personal squabble, jealousy over a love interest (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 355).

¹⁵⁸ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, pp. 60-68.

¹⁵⁹ Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 359, 363.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 360.

¹⁶¹ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 68.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 75. Peasants had filled S-21's execution schedules, and lines of associations identified in confessions crept nearer to the Party Centre (e.g., Son Sen). Hawk offers a sobering, but perhaps ironic,

assessment by including the later reflections from Khmer Rouge leaders on deaths during their rule; Pol Pot (in 1981) and Khieu Samphan (in 1984) asserted that little or no mistakes were made with regard to spies and saboteurs, except that perhaps the Party had been *too trusting or too slow in moving against enemies* (Hawk, "Tuol Sleng extermination centre," p. 31).

¹⁶³ This is the conclusion that Vickery draws in "Themes and Variations."

¹⁶⁴ Short stresses DK's bloody border attacks, Vietnamese reprisals, both countries' geo-political situations (China vs. USSR), and China's attempts to oversee a negotiated solution. By their recourse to foreign powers, Short describes the process by which Vietnam and Cambodia's border conflict mushroomed into what had not yet been a "proxy war" between China, the US, and Cambodia on one side and the USSR and Vietnam on the other; it produced once again a situation in which "the paranoid miscalculations of [Cambodia's] leaders meant that its fate would be decided not by its own people but by outside powers" (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 380).

¹⁶⁵ Becker, *When the War Was Over*, pp. 291–293. The bankruptcy of these strategies led Ieng Sary to attempt to improve Democratic Kampuchea's image by inviting international journalist delegations to tour the country and increasing the food available to peasants (pp. 321–326). (During one such delegation, in which Becker participated, the British scholar Malcolm Caldwell was shot and killed.) Even with those (overdue) efforts, mass killing in the countryside and purges at S-21 continued, with the last being Vorn Vet's Ministry of Industry. Short also itemizes this 1978 easing of policies, a united front strategy that sought to initiate an opening up of Democratic Kampuchea within and abroad. He too notes that this increased tolerance and openness was largely simultaneous with the regime's most murderous purge (the East Zone), killing between 100,000 and 250,000 people. This "rotting from within" is the theme Short uses to explain the CPK's downfall and defeat by Vietnam (Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 382–386). Kiljunen also weighs in on this final phase, late 1978 just before the Vietnamese invasion, arguing that the regime appears to have been on the verge of overcoming the *material challenges* to its economy and infrastructure (Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 20).

¹⁶⁶ Locard, *Pol Pot's Little Red Book*, p. 119 (*ângkaar thaa yaang méch, trauv thwer yaang neung* អង្ការតាប៉ាងម៉េច ត្រូវធ្វើយ៉ាងហ្នឹង).

¹⁶⁷ This argument more closely follows a view of traditional Cambodian statecraft, which aligns more along the vectors of personal rivalries and patron-client loyalties.

¹⁶⁸ Becker highlights problems caused by administration through semi-autonomous zones (notably Ta Mok's Southwest Zone and Sao Pheum's East Zone), which forced Pol Pot's first post-triumph task to be consolidating a base of support, digging deeper than the upper echelons of the CPK Centre (Becker, *When the War Was Over*, chap. 5).

¹⁶⁹ Barnett, "Democratic Kampuchea: A Highly Centralized Dictatorship," pp. 212–229. Similarly, O'Kane asserts a "rudimentary totalitarian" character of the CPK revolution, which emphasizes the regime's total domination of the individual (O'Kane, "Cambodia in the Zero Years," pp. 735, 741–743.). Becker also examines the relevance to Cambodia of Arendt's assertion that a reign of terror is founded on the atomization of society, which is ultimately self-destructive. Using individuals' narratives to explicate key issues of the DK period, Becker's work similarly stresses: the ban on romantic involvement, a differential classification in the cooperatives, deportations, the Southwest's purge of the Northwest, unrealistic economic goals and inhuman social policies, a drive for "racial" purity, inexperience leading to terror, and the destruction of Buddhism (and other cultures) (Becker, *When the War Was Over*, particularly chap. 6).

¹⁷⁰ Barnett's case for centralized authority, whose consolidation of power rested only on terror, is overstated. His argument, based on a supposed ubiquity of terror, makes very little reference to Cambodia (seeking instead to make his argument by analogy to Stalinist USSR). His essay remains more a position piece on the use of terror than a solid explication of the specifics of DK rule. The repeated caveats about regional differences, the lurking precariousness of the DK victory, and admissions of ongoing power struggles undermine the claim that central authority reigned throughout.

¹⁷¹ Numerous points in Kiernan's key work arise in which the (acknowledged) variation appears to contradict the author's claim about ever-increasing systematic and centralized control (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 139–140, 280–282, 290–296, 299–301, 337–339, 391–411, 415–420). Thion has seized on this issue and has argued that the struggle for control was far from complete/stable—"the State never stood on its feet" (Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," p. 28). In a dramatic break with other scholars,

he argues that the leadership did not maintain central control over cooperatives or the national economy, state power, army, Party, and possibly even S-21. He provides a picture of a group riddled with political factions, resembling/re-enacting the regional warlordism of Cambodia's past, the *komlang* (*kâmlang* កង្កែប) concept of linear loyalties: a hierarchical network of clients, subsumed under the rubric of "force" (pp. 12, 28).

¹⁷² Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 15–16; *idem*, *How Pol Pot Came to Power*, particularly chaps. 6 and 8. The overall argument running through this latter work is that because of various socio-political circumstances and personal endeavors, the Pol Pot faction of the CPK was able to consolidate and centralize its hold on the organization. The text makes the "CPK Center" look quite coherent (even if there was intra-party struggle, mainly with the Hanoi Khmer/East Zone cadre), even as it accedes variation among pre-1975 zones.

¹⁷³ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, pp. 26 (emphasis added). Jackson similarly assesses the CPK's demise in stating: "Pol Pot's regime purged and repurged itself in a fratricidal search for ideological purity and internal security. In the end, striving for security at any price proved counter-productive; the government fundamentally alienated its people, frightened critical cadres into an alliance with Vietnam, and weakened the country to the point that it could offer little organized resistance when Democratic Kampuchea faced the third and conclusive invasion from Vietnam in late December 1978" (Jackson, "Introduction: The Khmer Rouge in Context," p. 3).

¹⁷⁴ Locard, "Le Goulag Khmer Rouge 17 avril 1975 – 7 janvier 1979," p. 129. "Le parti, l'État, l'administration ne font qu'un dans pays totalement militarisé et où règne la terreur. Une étroite oligarchie monopolise tout l'appareil d'État et contrôle toute l'économie: il ne reste plus le moindre secteur privé... ni plus aucun chômeur" (p. 131). Beyond the idea of a total state, Locard's characterization focuses primarily on the centrally-organized security system.

¹⁷⁵ Heder & Tittmore, *Seven Candidates for Prosecution*, pp. 26–27. While the focus of the evidentiary brief remains with the policy against the *ancien régime* (in 1975) and the security apparatus (similar to Locard), Heder and Tittmore also note that the centralized authority extended into practices in the countryside: "Arrests and executions in rural areas were reported by lower-level officials to central authorities, and reveals that arrests and executions were discussed in meetings of military commanders. Accordingly, whereas policies of murder and torture could previously be inferred from the pattern of such crimes and were suggested by certain general official statements, the documentation we have reviewed confirms that many, if not all, of these crimes were committed as a matter of policy and that senior officials were knowingly involved in their development and implementation" (Heder & Tittmore, *Seven Candidates for Prosecution*, p. 10). Heder has subsequently critiqued his own formulation in this work, the model of top-down domination, for reasons discussed below (Heder, "Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders").

¹⁷⁶ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 78. A focus on political violence (rather than authority over all policies) would necessarily make the case that the security system in operation during DK extended throughout the entire countryside and was solidly within the grasp of the faction who exercised direct control and, thereby, how security policies were implemented. By refining the claims about authority, this perspective can accommodate regional autonomy (fostered during the civil war) and variations in social conditions (not associated with systematic executions). Etcheson conceives of the victorious CPK in 1975 as a "coalition of revolutionary groupings" (p. 88) from which a distinctive area, such as the East Zone, could emerge.

¹⁷⁷ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 78. The "newness" of Etcheson's data and findings seem to date to the mid- to late 1990s. Although Etcheson states that previous hypotheses regarding the DK period (e.g., those of Vickery and Quinn) have been largely washed away by contemporary findings, his assertion does not relegate earlier efforts to the status of anachronistic placeholders for immature guesses of the past, on the rim of the dustbin of academic history. This is significant because some primary monographs on the DK period (Vickery's *Cambodia 1975–1982*, Kiernan's *The Pol Pot Regime*, and Chandler's *Brother Number One*) were either published or re-issued subsequent to the new data which Etcheson puts forth. Second editions of two of these works re-stake the authors' theses that DK represented a revolution guided by peasant anger (Vickery) or that xenophobic totalitarian aspirations of a French-educated clique led to genocide (Kiernan). It would be foolish to assume these scholars are not aware of how the "recent data" might challenge their claims. (It may be that Kiernan's book was re-released in light of increased attention

on Cambodia due to an impending trial and that his version of events filled the void where an authoritative and comprehensive monograph on Democratic Kampuchea was absent.) Both works—Vickery’s 1999 imprint and Kiernan’s 2002 edition—are re-issues without any significant changes made to the contents, details, or arguments of the earlier versions. In addressing the dynamics underlying Cambodian genocide, Kiernan states, “The phenomenon is notable for its explosive combination of totalitarian political ambition and a racist project of ethnic purification... DK was the only communist regime systematically to disperse its minorities by force and to make punishable by death the use of minority and foreign languages.... Thus, racist and ideological strands intertwined in a tapestry of tragedy” (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime* (Second Edition), p. xiv), and again, “This clear-cut racial stereotype disguised as class discrimination served a policy of targeted ethnic repression” (p. xv). Vickery’s newly imprinted introduction bluntly states that “no changes are required” of his original release (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. v), then it proceeds to 1) critique the foundations of those who opposed the substance of some of his earlier claims, and 2) explain the continued interest in his book.

¹⁷⁸ The corner notations, of which Etcheson writes, which confirm the members and positions of the security committee seem to merely supplement knowledge of the hand-written marginal notes on confessions that have been identified as belonging to Son Sen, Nuon Chea, and Pol Pot. However, Etcheson asserts that the activities of Tuol Sleng were monitored on a *daily* basis.

¹⁷⁹ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 83. Throughout the section on the security network in the provinces, the author makes repeated claims that future reviews of the findings will shore up the insufficiencies that plague his argument.

¹⁸⁰ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, pp. 84–85.

¹⁸¹ Brown also picks up on this remainder. Although otherwise praising Etcheson’s work, Brown charges that he leaves unanswered the question of whether the central authority was “strong enough to eliminate the possibility of local Khmer Rouge officials pursuing personal agendas and expanding the scope of killing” (Brown, “Review: *After the Killing Fields*”). Given the ambitious aims of Etcheson’s collection, this lingering question constitutes a major lacuna.

¹⁸² Estimations of the Democratic Kampuchea death toll are addressed below.

¹⁸³ Heder, “Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders,” p. 378.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 382. Thus, local conditions varied widely depending on the discretion of the local cadre, meaning *district* security cadre and co-operative militia forces (*chhlorp* គ្រួសារ). Specifically, Heder details the evacuation of Phnom Penh and other provincial towns and notes how specific cadre exceeded the Center’s order to execute only commissioned officers of the Republican military and civil service (*bândasak* ប្រធានការី)—the ranked defenders of the *ancien régime*.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 386–387.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 399–401. The examples of situations in which cadre told Chams that they would be relatively safe from harm if they did not *do* anything different, meant that the Chams were denied the practices of being a minority (practical extermination) instead of suffering death (physical extermination).

¹⁸⁹ Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide.” Kiernan suggests that the Pol Pot regime was racist and totalitarian, ultimately seeking top-down domination consolidated under a French-educated elite group (whose racism found parallels in its militarist expansionism) (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*). Heder points to a lack of definition of “race” and “totalitarian” as the initial source of problems plaguing Kiernan’s theoretical categories, followed by absent or incomplete ideas about Cambodian revolutionaries other than Pol Pot. Heder acknowledges that Democratic Kampuchea was racist and that its racism was exercised through institutional means; however, he argues that this racism constituted a “part of a particular project of political modernization through rapid communization” (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” p. 105). He demonstrates that, in other countries, the obliteration of national minorities went along with Communist progress and that Marx’s theory of history advocates the assimilation of local specificities to the centralized state. Collectivization meant the enforced elimination of differences; claims otherwise, for independence or minority recognition, were viewed as counter-revolutionary. Democratic Kampuchea’s war communism and the rapid collectivization without regard to minority identities places it within the larger Communist tradition (which, it should be noted, remained free of the charge of “genocide,” for very specific historical reasons). Heder keenly notes that DK’s discourse on race posits a

multiplicity of races who collectively work toward progress for the *Kampuchean* nation—an avoidance of the ethnically exclusive term “Khmer”—contradicting Kiernan’s claims regarding Khmerization, which are undermined by Kiernan’s own narrative. Kiernan’s quote that “everyone becomes Khmer” (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 271) is interpreted in a way that ignores the CPK’s enforced proletarianization.

Similarly, Kiernan’s portrayals of DK’s prioritization of irrigation and the Organization’s tripartite division of membership as *sui generis* grossly ignores inspirations from other Communist states, most notably Vietnam (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” pp. 109–110).

¹⁹⁰ “Ever-increasing killings resulted not from specific orders from the top of the chain of command, but were the ultimate expression of discretionary local implementation of generalized guidelines demanding an intensification of vaguely defined enemies” (Heder, “Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders,” p. 404).

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 408, paraphrasing Browning, *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution*. The “revisionist” scholarship on Stalinism to which Heder refers includes Getty, Fitzpatrick, and Weitz; on Nazism, it includes Kershaw & Lewin and Browning.

¹⁹² Locard, “State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004),” p. 125.

¹⁹³ Heuveline, “*L’insoutenable incertitude du nombre. Estimations des décès de la période Khmer rouge.*”

¹⁹⁴ This is particularly true in journalistic accounts, typically stating 1.5 or 1.7 million, without explaining the demographic methods used to arrive at such a figure or even a source.

¹⁹⁵ Heuveline, ““Between One and Three Million,”” p. 50.

¹⁹⁶ For example, Osborne notes that unfolding investigations modify ideas about execution totals: “One reason for giving credence to a figure much higher than 100,000 [executions] is the research that is continuing, particularly into the provincial prisons that operated during the DK years and which some analysts suggest may have tortured and killed in a fashion similar to what occurred in S-21” (Osborne, *The Khmer Rouge Tribunal*, p. 5).

¹⁹⁷ For example, significant skepticism is cast upon the 1980 census conducted by the PRK government, whose interest would be to underestimate the population so as to render a higher death toll for the DK regime, from which the PRK leaders had liberated the people. Separately, Migozzi is seen to offer the most accurate rates for subsequently calculating population growth, but mutual charges over the use of his figures cloud the debate over the demographic catastrophe.

¹⁹⁸ Ea, “Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea,” p. 5.

¹⁹⁹ Kiernan and Sliwinski exhibit this approach. The latter offers a nationwide death toll of 1.843 to 1.871 million for the 1975–79 period (Sliwinski, *Le Génocide Khmer Rouge*, p. 57). The former arrives at 1.671 million as illustrated.

²⁰⁰ Osborne, “Pol Pot’s Terrifying Legacy,” quoted in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 456.

²⁰¹ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 457.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 457 (emphasis added); Ebihara, “A Cambodian Village under the Khmer Rouge,” pp. 51–63, and Honda, *Journey to Cambodia*, pp. 48–50, 56–62, both cited in Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 459.

²⁰³ The statistics of an international agency worker, W. J. Sampson, who happened to be carrying out a census of Phnom Penh in February 1975, is put together with projections from Migozzi’s 1968 estimates (Cambodge, p. 228) and some observations from Kirk (“The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?,” p. 9). Similarly, the April 1975 national population (7.894 million, un-rounded) requires inferences and projections from Migozzi’s demographic inputs, which becomes one of the focal points in the debate with Vickery largely played out in the pages of the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*.

²⁰⁴ Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia,” p. 587.

²⁰⁵ Heuveline, ““Between One and Three Million,”” p. 50. For example, the CPK’s officially reported nationwide vital statistics reflect propaganda strategy more than statistical efforts (Heuveline, “The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises,” p. 106).

²⁰⁶ Heuveline, “The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises,” p. 107.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 107–108, 118–119. Double counting has been the most frequent criticism of Kiernan’s method and numbers.

²⁰⁸ This approach is attempted in various ways by Vickery, Kiljunen, Ea, and Banister and Johnson, with variation amongst the estimations due mainly to which statistics and rates are privileged or what modifications are applied based on logical reasoning.

²⁰⁹ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 198.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

²¹¹ The report also offers most likely population estimates for 1 January 1979 (5.845 million) and 1 December 1979 (5.160 million) (CIA, "Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe," p. 3). Vickery is keen to point out that these figures demonstrate that the CIA accepts not only a decrease in the rate of growth, but also over 500,000 war dead (for the period which includes Operation Arclight and Operation Total Victory Nos. 42 and 43).

²¹² The four phases demarcated in the CIA report—17 April to 1 July 1975, July 1975 to January 1976, January 1976 to January 1977, January 1977 to January 1979—more closely correspond to the purges, forced migrations, and harvests.

²¹³ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 200. These calculations are restated with greater elaboration and more attention to criticizing journalists and other scholars in Vickery, "How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea?," pp. 70–73.

²¹⁴ It should be noted that Vickery's figure of 300,000 violent deaths is higher than some accounts but far from the uppermost extremes of estimations from Kiernan's "half," roughly 800,000 (*The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 456), and Sliwinski's 720,000 (*Le Génocide Khmer Rouge*, p. 79).

²¹⁵ Kiernan has made the charge that Vickery disregards the more reliable figure of 7.9 million for the 1975 population provided by Migozzi and opts for the CIA's lower "guess" of 7.1 million, which accounts for a large part of the discrepancy in their totals (Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 457). In fact, Kiernan affirms Migozzi's last chapter claim that the Cambodian population would continue to grow due to demographic inertia (even in times of war), suggesting a relative accuracy of his 1975 projection of 8.5 million Cambodians. Taking into account 750,000 people that he claims are missing in Vickery's work and accounting for the expulsion of Vietnamese, Kiernan stakes a total death toll of 1.5 million (Kiernan, "The Genocide in Cambodia, 1975–79," p. 38).

²¹⁶ In fact, this is the underlying substance of Vickery's own charge against the CIA report in "Democratic Kampuchea—CIA to the Rescue." In this 1982 article, Vickery is particularly interested in the CIA's attribution of the most and worst killings under Democratic Kampuchea occurring in 1975 to 1976, and thus ignoring the 1978 series of killings (which many others as well as refugee accounts suggest was the worst). Vickery asserts that the CIA's portrayal of Democratic Kampuchea can only be a propaganda effort to show that the Heng Samrin government is worse than the Pol Pot regime.

²¹⁷ Kiljunen argues that a *number of observers* concur on this figure, including the Heng Samrin (PRK) government, which estimated 7.25 million, and the US CIA (Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, pp. 30, 43–44n13).

²¹⁸ Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 44n17.

²¹⁹ Ea "Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea," pp. 3–15.

²²⁰ Ea's "hypothetical" is the population of Cambodia in the absence of crises; thus, the 1970–1975 period would have demonstrated a 3 percent growth rate, and the 1975–1980 period would have exhibited a 3.2 percent growth rate.

²²¹ Ea, "Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea," p. 6. For example, his approximation of the birth rate for the 1976 to 1978 period rejects the underestimated rate that the CIA report claims among "new people," because Ea is suspicious of refugee testimonies. Simultaneously, he questions the officially reported rate of 50 births per 1,000 ("Statement by Pol Pot on the nineteenth anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Kampuchea," 12 September 1978, Phnom Penh). Vitiating the extremes, he "prefers" a rate of between 20 and 25 births per 1,000 for the period.

²²² Banister & Johnson, "After the Nightmare," pp. 83–84.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 87. The 1970 figure is achieved by applying a rapid annual growth rate of 2.6 to 2.7 percent for the years after the 1962 census.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²²⁷ Heuveline, "'Between One and Three Million,'" p. 50.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²²⁹ Heuveline, "'Between One and Three Million,'" p. 59. Heuveline is keen to note the dramatic variation in 1970–75 wartime excessive mortality estimates: Sihanouk, 700,000 (*Prisonnier des Khmers Rouge*, p. 144); Ea, 700,000 ("Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea," p. 5); Kiljunen, 600,000 (*Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 30); Ablin & Hood, 500,000 to 1 million (*The Cambodian Agony*, p. xxxi); Sliwinski, 310,000 (*Le Génocide Khmer Rouge*, p. 48); and Banister & Johnson, 275,000 ("After the

Nightmare," p. 87). He critically assesses these diverse offerings before approaching the DK period and the violent deaths it wrought.

²³⁰ Heuveline, "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises," pp. 119–120.

²³¹ Even Vickery's 1999 re-affirmation of his 1984 calculations and his hints that the estimate actually might be slightly too high are offset by the admissions that much guesswork underlies his own and Kiernan's numbers (*Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 198–201). In fact, he states that accepting Migozzi's statistics, "the excess of deaths over normal would reach a figure of something over one million" ("How Many Died in Pol Pot's Kampuchea?," p. 73). Osborne indicates that Chandler's most recent reflections on the matter have suggested that "perhaps as many as two million" died (Osborne, *The Khmer Rouge Tribunal*, p. 19n3)—an implied increase from his earlier statements about "over one million people" (one in seven people), with outright executions totaling "perhaps as many as one hundred thousand" (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, p. 212).

²³² Heuveline, "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises," p. 123.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 124. As Heuveline himself notes, these figures, particularly the famine figure, are the subject of controversy and their possible values range widely.

²³⁴ Heuveline, "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises," p. 125.

²³⁵ One of the earliest formulations of Etcheson's ideas on the death toll and means to calculate it was a 1996 conference paper, "Digging in the Killing Fields: New Evidence About the Internal Security Apparatus of Democratic Kampuchea." At that time, Etcheson claimed to resolve the debate between two schools of thought regarding the nature of violence under Democratic Kampuchea: 1) violence was local and often a result of spontaneous excesses by undisciplined peasants (Vickery), and 2) violence was central and resulted from a carefully planned and centrally coordinated security apparatus (Quinn). He claims the correctness of the latter based on two genres of evidence produced by the Cambodian Genocide Program over an 18-month research period. The new evidence emerges from satellite mapping of zones inventorying execution centers as well as from official, bureaucratic records documenting a line of command. (Given its brevity, the argument remains too underdeveloped to either discredit the Vickery view or adequately validate the Quinn perspective. Much more explanation and elaboration of how the "evidence" fits in the historical context would be required for the debate to be settled.) The themes and much of the text resurfaced in a widely circulated essay, "'The Number'—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia" which appeared on line as well as within the folds of DC-Cam's periodical, *Searching for the Truth*. Most recently, the text has been incorporated as a chapter, "Digging in the Killing Fields," in Etcheson's book, *After the Killing Fields*.

²³⁶ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 109. Etcheson notes that Pen Sovan in April 1979 offered a death toll of 3 million long before any research had been conducted (pp. 214–215n2).

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 109–110.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112, Table 7.1. Note that these numbers are slight decreases from the 20,492 mass graves and 1,112,829 victims that appeared in "'The Number'—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia," *Searching for the Truth* 15 (March 2001), p. 27.

²⁴⁰ Etcheson, "'The Number'—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia," *Searching for the Truth* 15 (March 2001), p. 27; Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 111.

²⁴¹ Etcheson, "'The Number'—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia," *Searching for the Truth* 16 (April 2001), p. 28.

²⁴² This is the conclusion to Vickery's analysis of the "human cost" (which Etcheson cites): "Given the lack of precision inherent in all the data and estimates, it is impossible to reach more accurate final totals, or to apportion more precisely the decrease between executions, deaths from illness and hunger, or failure to reproduce due to changed living circumstances. Some of the burial pits discovered provide the evidence that mass executions occurred, but there is as yet no way to count the number of executions separately from death due to other causes. Yathay pointed out that in Pursat in 1976–77 mass graves were for those who died of hunger and illness, while executions took place in isolation in the forest. Moreover, some of the five hundred thousand war victims are buried in mass graves, and without forensic tests it is probably impossible to determine whether death occurred before or after 1975. A decline of four hundred [thousand] does, I would say, indicate failure of the DK system, but some of the more extreme estimates of deaths from execution and hunger must be relegated to the realm of black propaganda. It is simply impossible to take the generally accepted population figure for April 1975, the population alive today, demographically

acceptable birth rates, and project an extermination figure of 1–2 million” (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 200–201).

²⁴³ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 121.

²⁴⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 123–124, 200–201. “The misleading language (‘all of the mass graves contain victims whose cause of death was execution’—possibly true but still unproven) by no means establishes the cause of death for all ‘1,110,829’ uncounted corpses” (Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia,” p. 587). Both scholars are retelling and building from the same account of life in Pursat Province (Yathay, *L’Utopie Meurtrière*, pp. 140–142, 149, 163). Kiernan is horrified by the dramatic increase represented by Etcheson’s new estimate. He goes so far as to state that “Exaggerating a horrific death toll, [Etcheson’s work] contributes to the ethnic auctioneering of genocide research” (Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia,” p. 588).

²⁴⁵ “For example, in the 1999 mapping data for Banteay Meanchey, several mass graves in the vicinity of the Thmar Puok District Office were said by local witnesses to be filled with victims from co-located Khmer Rouge security centers. However, witnesses also described a nearby Khmer Rouge hospital facility, which was very poorly managed. ‘Most patients who came to the hospital died,’ according to one witness who had worked in that hospital. Given that large numbers of bodies were apparently being produced both by a Khmer Rouge hospital and two Khmer Rouge security centers at the same general location, it is not at all clear how one can be certain of the origin of the bodies in any mass grave in that immediate area. This type of uncertainty—even though it is the exception rather than the rule in the overall data set—can raise questions about the validity of the data. Documentation Center mass grave mapping teams need to exercise caution in filtering such ‘noise’ from their data” (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 126).

²⁴⁶ Kiljunen, *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide*, p. 30.

²⁴⁷ Does the demography account for the returnees who sought to better Kampuchea’s revolutionary society? Are they included themselves or by their parents in the 1962 census, a chance return that comes to be calculated as an excess death rather than an emigration? And what of the elderly grandmother of nine who dies in 1976 because of a lack of adequate health care? Is her excessive death in 1976 cancelled out by an executed subject fulfilling her expected/normal death in 1978? And if she died after 7 January 1979, would the excessiveness of her death need to be calculated as some sort of partiality?

²⁴⁸ Sharp offers a critical evaluation of four methods of calculations (reconstruction from census data, sampling from surveys, mapping, and cohort analysis), and although he proposes an approximate figure of 2.18 million, he highlights the uncertainties, lacuna, and the ways he confronts these while also emphasizing that *the number itself matters less than the acknowledgement that real people were the victims of the DK horror* (Bruce Sharp, “Counting Hell”).

²⁴⁹ Vickery points out how the Cambodian death toll had been circulated with moral condemnation by journalist accounts that neglect comparative evaluations which might look at similar mass killings (e.g., Indonesia) or social conditions in neighboring countries (Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 196–197). The level of suffering has been deployed in various arenas for economic, political, or social benefit. For example, refugee communities’ perceptions of loss have played out in at least two directions. Immediately following the DK era, some refugees emphasized their traumatic experiences in order to secure assistance from social workers. “[Cambodian immigrants] try to reconstruct lives of importance, attempting to mobilize their suffering and their experiences as victims, both in the homeland, the refugee camps and since, to gain respect and power... They did so immediately after arrival, for example, by relating their Pol Pot experiences to gain additional resources and services, both as a collective and as individuals. Many continued to do so for years whenever possible, emphasizing their suffering to gain the attention of agency personnel or sympathetic neighbors. A Cambodian family in a small town was given an apartment and furniture by neighbors shortly after their resettlement who ‘felt sorry for them because of their hard lives.’ Seven years later, when both adults had good-paying jobs, the neighbors gave them a car—long after they really needed any assistance. But, as the household said, ‘I’m not going to say no when people feel sorry for me!’” (Mortland, “Legacies of Genocide for Cambodians in the United States,” p. 169.) There are also ways in which perceptions have translated into greater motivation for immigrants in a new environment. “Others turned their perceptions of themselves as survivors and victims into a determination to regain control over their lives by getting good-paying jobs, securing shelter and food, and ensuring that their children became educated and securely employed in the workplace” (p. 167.) The presentation of suffering, underscored by estimates of a high death toll, is a well-learned tool among moto-taxi drivers in Cambodia’s tourist centers; often too young to have experienced the DK horrors themselves, they present

“first-hand” accounts to tourist fares hoping for a generous tip. In an article written in support of Kiernan’s credentials, Thion critiques the use of the term “survivor” as an appendage to signatories’ names. “If ‘survivor’ becomes a quasi-professional definition, a kind of job, the situation is very bad. These people have to stage their old suffering and turn it into a moving spectacle. They cannot avoid becoming theatrical and ridiculous. By becoming professional witnesses, they destroy their own credibility” (Thion, “Kiernan, Colby, Pol Pot *et al*: the politics of ‘Genocide,’” p. 8). On the national stage, one might argue that the non-Angkorian offerings for tourist consumption *pimp suffering*—a “moving spectacle”?—as a means to generate revenues for development. This idea is pursued in the following chapter.

²⁵⁰ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 109.

²⁵¹ Kiernan, “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice.” Etcheson has also confronted the issue of (pro-Khmer Rouge) genocide deniers, in the person of Bun Than Eng. However, his treatment is less about politics, focusing instead on denial (by perpetrators and their ideological heirs) as a logical if disturbing phenomenon that emerges with/after episodes of mass killing (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, pp. 107–108). Etcheson’s discussion focuses on the guilt of perpetrators and the continuation of de-humanization effected by the denial; he casts his documentation efforts, the “truth,” as a forceful remedy to the “evil” of denial (pp. 108, 127–128). The implications of a disbelief in genocidal events (although not necessarily a “denial”) are taken up in the following chapter, specifically in terms of a challenge that guides the Tourism Ministry’s memorialization efforts.

²⁵² Kiernan, “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice,” pp. 93–96. The rehearsal of events commences with the (*Asian Wall Street Journal*) accusing Kiernan of Khmer Rouge sympathies followed by *ad hominem* attacks as well as calls for the US Congress to revoke CGP funding. This first challenge was overcome by an outpouring show of support for Kiernan as head of this newly-founded project; however, further attacks on Kiernan and the CGP mission ensued. Kiernan’s examination of the *Wall Street Journal* charges is couched in a discussion of genocide denial and suppression of investigation.

²⁵³ He contests Peou’s *pragmatism*, which asserted that advocating prosecution within the political context of the time (1997) would have been more destructive than seeking reconciliation (e.g., incorporating Khmer Rouge defectors into the government ranks). The quotes that Kiernan deploys do not convincingly cast Peou as an apologist, so much as someone who is overwhelmingly focused on political context/strategy. In the thick of a discussion on genocide denying (Kiernan, “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice,” pp. 93–96), Kiernan lays charges against Heder (portrayed as a “colleague of Peou’s”), which center on an apparent change of position between two working papers (from 1991 and 1996) that dealt with loyalty, differing visions, and varying support/backing within the CPK elite—principally, the commitments and culpability of Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. The contradiction that Kiernan supposes within Heder’s writings involve *perceived historical culpability* in relation to the *availability* of documentary evidence to prove such guilt.

²⁵⁴ Important to Kiernan’s piece, beyond various denials of genocide in Cambodia, is the position of acknowledging that genocide occurred but blocking investigation of it. Kiernan charges Jeldres with attempting to suppress the findings of the CGP and cites Jeldres’ affiliation with Chile’s Pinochet regime, his siding with the KR during DK and in the CGDK (as was Sihanouk), and playing mouthpiece for Pol Pot (Kiernan, “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice,” pp. 97–98). Guilt by association (via character assassination) appears to be Kiernan’s primary concern, as Jeldres’ quotes simply imply a different perspective from the CGP rather than any sustained attempt at suppression.

²⁵⁵ Kiernan, “Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice,” p. 98. (It might be formidable to pretend that academics should not be used for politics and vice versa; all the same, it seems naive to fail to see that these endeavors are always to some extent ideologically imbued, a point Kiernan comes close to recognizing when he states, “both the creation of historical memory and its erasure depend upon contemporary politics as much as history itself” (p. 103).) One position—attributed to Vickery, Chandler, and others—meets with Kiernan’s respectful disagreement, which he calls a “technical denial of genocide”: the atrocities under Democratic Kampuchea were murderous but do not constitute genocide as such. Thion is not included in this, “quite legitimate” if “incorrect” camp (p. 97), because Kiernan claims that Thion denies the idea of genocide (and cites Thion’s Holocaust revisionism in an attempt to discredit his assertions about Cambodia).

²⁵⁶ United Nations, *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, 9 December 1948, Article II (emphasis added to highlight points that have sometimes been the focus of controversy with regard to the Cambodian case). The UN deemed that there was sufficient evidence for “requisite

intent” and “as such” to pursue investigations for a trial of genocide and to allow a court to decide the appropriateness of genocide (UN, *Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135*, Article V, Section A.1, paragraphs 63–65). As well, a 1995 study for the US State Department also confirmed: “We find *prima facie* culpability for acts against religious and ethnic groups, such as the Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese communities, and the Buddhist monkhood” (Abrams & Ratner, “Striving for Justice: Accountability and the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge,” quoted in Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, pp. 54–55). However, legal scholar William Schabas disagrees, asserting that what is being described by “genocide” more closely fits the definition of “crimes against humanity” as they are articulated in Article VI of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Schabas, “Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?,” p. 37; *idem*, “Cambodia: Was It Really Genocide?,” pp. 472–475). His reading of the scope established by Article II of the Genocide Convention states that destruction of cultural institutions (i.e., Buddhism) and forced assimilation (i.e., of the Cham minority) do not conform to genocide’s criteria; in fact, the US and Canada had specifically sought the exclusion of “cultural genocide” fearing its application to indigenous groups (Schabas, “Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?,” p. 39). Linton agrees with the position that Schabas puts forth, although she suggests that the scope laid out in the Genocide Convention may warrant modifications over time and welcome contributions to addressing this issue (Linton, “An Internationalized Domestic Tribunal?,” p. 36). The need to address particularities is a recurrent theme in Linton’s work, as her advocacy for a “truth commission” highlights the specific needs and context of “transitional justice” in Cambodia (Linton, “KR trials are vital, but won’t solve everything,” p. 7).

²⁵⁷ Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime*, p. 463. Kiernan argues that the Chinese were targeted as the “archetypal urban dwellers” and presumed not to be of poor origin; his region-by-region detailing argues against the idea of a “racial vendetta” even though Chinese deaths were disproportionately higher than the overall population (Kiernan, “Kampuchea’s ethnic Chinese under Pol Pot: A Case of Systematic Social Discrimination,” pp. 18, 20–26).

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 460–463. Kiernan contests the claim that “virtually all” ethnic Vietnamese were expelled from the country prior to 1975, even though massacres of this group were carried during the Khmer Republic (p. 460).

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

²⁶⁰ Kiernan, “Orphans of Genocide.” Interestingly, Kiernan introduces the Cham people by briefly recounting their history and ethnological migration, with a focus on religious elements. The formation and migration of the descendants of the Champa Empire into a minority population within Cambodia transpired principally in 1693 and again in the 1790s. Kiernan notes that most studies of the Cham population have misrepresented the group as the remnants of a disappearing people (“victims of history”), arguing (along with Ner) that the Cham community was increasing in numbers and cultural identity. In his political analysis of the Chams, two figures rise to prominence: 1) Colonel Les Kasem who headed a Cham battalion notorious for exterminating Khmer Rouge forces, and 2) Sos Man, who was an early ICP and CPK member who promoted communism among Cham communities.

²⁶¹ Kiernan details the suffering of Chams in the East Zone—Sector 21/Krauchmar and Tbaung Khmum (Kampong Cham), Sector 22/Peareang (Prey Veng), Sector 24/Kampong Trabek (Prey Veng), and Sector 23/Romeas Hek District (Svay Rieng)—and the common description in these testimonies are: the destruction of religion, introduction of communal eating, harsh work requirements, and dispersal of the community in the early years of Democratic Kampuchea. The last year, with the Southwest Zone’s purge of the East Zone beginning in May 1978, is characterized by massacres. Kiernan’s sector-by-sector account of the North/Central Zone—Sector 31/41 Chamcar Loeu District (Kampong Cham), Baray District (Kampong Thom), and remote areas of Preah Vihear Province (Sector 103)—depicts brutal repression of all “races,” but particularly of “new people” (which, Kiernan claims, was often the category used for Chams, despite their base living) beginning in 1976. The account of the Southwest Zone—Koh Thom (Kandal), Treang District (Takeo), and Phnom Penh—shows strict regulations for all people, with harsher conditions and escalated killings occurring in 1978. The unique category of “deportee base people” for Chams seems to have been used only in Ta Mok’s zone. The survey of the West and Northwest Zones depict a devout Cham community in Kampong Tralach District (Kampong Chhnang) in which the Khmer Rouge crackdown on Chams began in 1973, with each subsequent year bringing greater repression (Kiernan, “Orphans of Genocide”).

²⁶² Vickery argues that Kiernan is “tinkering with the statistics in a tendentious manner in an attempt to prove the case for genocide in Democratic Kampuchea” (Vickery, “Comments on Cham Population Figures,” p. 31); Vickery’s calculations work out to around 30,000. Kiernan’s rebuttal (“Genocide in Cambodia, 1975–79,” pp. 35–37) begins by asserting that “genocide is not a matter of statistics” and whose more conceptual definition Vickery avoids. Re-justifying his calculations, Kiernan works in reverse attempting to show how Vickery consistently underestimates death tolls under Pol Pot. With an agreed 1982 figure of 182,256 Chams, Kiernan’s back extrapolation proceeds on a 3 percent per annum growth based on what he claims was “an historic baby boom” following the Democratic Kampuchea period (p. 36). Ner’s 1936 base number (88,000), Ner’s point that Chams were rapidly increasing in numbers, and supposedly following Migozzi closer than Vickery allow Kiernan to claim validity for his 1975 figure (250,000) and 1979 estimate (170,000). This raw drop (80,000) is added to the natural population growth (approximated at 10,000) to achieve Kiernan’s death toll for the Chams at 90,000. Interestingly, Kiernan puts responsibility on the Pol Pot regime for 1) non-excessive but violent deaths (e.g., the cancer patient who is shot), and 2) additional deaths canceling out the low natural population growth rate.

²⁶³ Kiernan, “Orphans of Genocide,” p. 33.

²⁶⁴ Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 54.

²⁶⁵ The CPK security apparatus is one mechanism through which Cambodians were killed; however, other, non-systematic killings may constitute a larger share of the regime’s victims. The idea of discretionary killings is addressed further below. In another venue, Etcheson uses the fate of the ethnic Vietnamese to advocate the applicability of “genocide” (Etcheson, “Nightmare of a History,” p. 9). His example of the Vietnamese proves poor, given that the Lon Nol regime was predominantly responsible for deporting, executing, and thereby vastly reducing the number of Vietnamese (*before* 1975); Locard also picks up on Etcheson’s poor choice of examples in his review of Short’s new history (Locard, “Short’s *History of a Nightmare* draws a Locard,” p. 15).

²⁶⁶ Chandler, “Review: *The Pol Pot Regime*,” p. 1064.

²⁶⁷ Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” p. 112.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 113–115.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

²⁷¹ Hannum & Hawk, “The case against the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea”; Fein, *Genocide: a sociological perspective*.

²⁷² On the issue of “auto-genocide” (and Kiernan’s story of the blue krama), Heder sees a “more complex phenomenon” in which the logic of class struggle meant the elimination of all those who failed to live up to “Pol Pot’s expectations of what a proletarianized people could achieve, how they should behave and what they should believe” (Heder, “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide,” p. 150).

²⁷³ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 148–153; *idem*, “The debate to apportion blame,” p. 7.

²⁷⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. 194. Although tenuous and admitting speculation, Vickery reasons that areas where Cham massacre did occur were 1) in the proximity of where Les Kasem’s battalion had operated during the civil war, or 2) had higher concentrations of Cham bourgeoisie. Also, he argues that this minority group was not allowed to practice religion (as *all Khmers* were denied their religion). He remains skeptical of statements about the forced eating of pork, given the dismal supply of food in most parts of the country (pp. 194–195).

²⁷⁵ Chomsky and Herman, quoted in Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, p. vii. In fact, Vickery is more concerned with the genocide committed against the Vietnamese in the 1992–1993 period, when the DK leadership was pursuing a policy of targeting ethnic Vietnamese within Cambodia.

²⁷⁶ Locard, *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book*, pp. 179–180.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 303. Locard’s study of slogans used throughout the DK period exhibits no examples aimed at Chams or Chinese. Anti-Vietnamese slogans abound—including the oft-repeated “Vietnamese head, Cambodian body”—but (along with Vickery) Locard argues the Vietnamese “had the good luck to be chased out of the country at the beginning of the regime.” It is important to note that Locard (with Sliwinski’s demographics and contra Short) recognizes a more difficult situation confronting Chams, even though the killing during DK is interpreted as politically motivated (Locard, “Short’s *History of a Nightmare* draws a Locard,” p. 9). The term “politicide” comes from Harff and Gurr; their six-point typology of genocides and politicides includes “revolutionary politicide,” to which they assign the Kampuchean case: “mass murders of class or political enemies in the service of new revolutionary

ideologies" (Harff & Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides," p. 360). The advantage of this category is its inclusion of discretionary/assertive killings, which occurred in the service of the revolution but largely outside the central security apparatus. However, the CPK purge of its own ranks, in the unceasing search for "enemies"—the *best-documented* violence of the DK period—would seem to conform to Harff and Gurr's "repressive politicide," because it specifically incorporates factions "engaged in some form of oppositional activity"—even if imaginary?

²⁷⁸ Locard, *State Sponsored Crimes Against Humanity and "Genocide" in Cambodia*, pp. 9–15.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5. He reminds his audience that "purity" in CPK rhetoric and analysis never referred to race or ethnicity, but focused on ideology (specifically, an independence from Vietnamese thought).

²⁸⁰ Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 11.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 446 (emphasis added). Short's "Afterword" proclamations on genocide do not mention the Chams or other minority groups. The treatment of Cambodia's Muslim minority is given brief attention earlier. Short's position is that the suppression of "everything that had given colour and meaning to Cambodian life" was a policy of uniformity, not racism (p. 326). He further asserts that the killing of Chams may have been exacerbated by the group's historically-inherited increased reluctance to abandon their cultural specificity, which in turn generated or increased suspicion of Chams being anti-revolutionary (p. 327). Short even ventures to suggest that a certain amount of death can be expected to accompany any revolution (an abomination).

²⁸² Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, p. 446.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 446–447. Short's examination of these political dimensions lends support to Thion's assertion: genocide as a political commodity.

²⁸⁴ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. vi–vii.

²⁸⁵ Locard, *State Sponsored Crimes Against Humanity and "Genocide" in Cambodia*, pp. 2–4, referencing Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, p. 158. He further notes that the Soviet Union (and the Eastern bloc) was the country that ardently argued for the non-inclusion of "political" groups in the 1948 Genocide Convention.

²⁸⁶ Heder, "Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia," pp. 220–221.

²⁸⁷ Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 165–166.

²⁸⁸ Keng Vannsak receives a fair share of blame for Pol Pot's misguided utopian vision of a Khmer democratic village state. The severity of Thion's tone is demonstrated in the following characterization: "Pol Pot, a much watered-down imitation of a faded Chinese copy of Uncle Joe, was and still is an unimaginative idealist, a forest monk, lost in dreams" (Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 168).

²⁸⁹ Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," pp. 170–171. This is the source of Short's argument regarding uniformity rather than racism.

²⁹⁰ He offers relatively cynical remarks on the use of terms for their political value, when world powers' political actions and context are culpable. Following this sentiment, Thion advocates a trial of all those involved in the Cambodian catastrophe (US, China, Thailand, etc.). Although his vitriol cuts through the hypocrisies and paradoxes of addressing the deeds of murderous powers in the past and present, his wish for an accounting of all seems sadly unrealistic. However, it seems to be a shared sentiment; I witnessed a number of occasions (presentations, conferences, and informal discussions) where the culpability of the US in particular—for pre-1975 bombing and post-1979 CGDK support—was emphatically signaled by Cambodians as warranting legal redress.

²⁹¹ Thion, "Genocide as a Political Commodity," p. 180. There has been considerable debate on how a trial would be received by Cambodians. Thion's assertions in this regard are rare. Some have speculated that legal proceedings against Khmer Rouge leaders might spike social unrest, ranging from civil war (e.g., former Khmer Rouge taking up arms in defense of their former leaders) to greater trauma (as Cambodians are called upon to re-visit a decades-old past from which they have moved on). Others, especially Etcheson, Jarvis, and DC-Cam, have stressed the reconciliation process, of which a tribunal is one key component.

²⁹² Both Locard and Schabas pick up on this inertia that confronts the effort to undo the terminological pairing of "Cambodian" and "genocide" (Locard, "Short's *History of a Nightmare* draws a Locard," p. 15; Schabas "Was it Really Genocide?" pp. 474–475), that it has "irrevocably entered our human rights nomenclature" (Schabas, "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?," p. 39). Schabas reasons that "genocide" is favored by many observers for 1) its weight as the

most serious crime against humanity and 2) the clear international legal obligations pertaining to cases of genocide (p. 36).

CHAPTER 3

¹ Although Cambodia can be said to possess *de facto* “advantages” for its economy—the world heritage site of Angkor Wat and a diverse complex of ancient Khmer temples (absolute advantages) as well as a long-established tradition of rice production (a relative advantage, however non-intensive the use of the land may be)—the theory of “comparative advantage” seems largely a tool of economics deployed to retroactively legitimize, or naturalize, the export articles of developing. In fact, economies of the industrializing world seem to be largely a result of some historical givens (“advantages,” in terms of the ease which they are produced) as well as the power relations among unequal trade partners, multinational domination, and relations of economic dependence foisted upon former colony states. It becomes clear that the “advantages” Cambodia has enjoyed have been frequently fostered by outside powers, whether a textile quota system or a re-discovery of a jungle-covered temple.

² World Bank, *10 Years After the Crisis*, p. 46, in reference to real GDP growth of 10.5 percent for 2006. A decade earlier, Cambodia’s first rice surplus since the 1960s came to fruition (Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia’s Economic Review 2001*, p. 1).

³ World Bank, *10 Years After the Crisis*, p. 46. “The story of industrial and service sector growth in Phnom Penh and other urban areas to date appears to have tracked that of the East Asian miracle countries in their early stages of development. Because of the phenomenal growth in garment manufacturing, construction and tourism services, notably labor intensive sectors, in Cambodia’s urban hubs, workers and especially the unskilled in the lower end of the distribution have benefited disproportionately. The country’s general economic reform strategy, which includes globalization or opening up of the economy to trade and foreign direct investment, has transformed the livelihood opportunities of the urban population” (World Bank, *Sharing Growth: Equity and Development in Cambodia*, p. 51).

⁴ World Bank, *Cambodia at the Crossroads*, p. 29

⁵ The participants in the Eighth Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia in March 2006 included: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund, United Nations Development System (UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, FAO, UNDP, and others), and the World Bank. Official observers included: China, India, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Poland, Russian Federation, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand.

⁶ Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia’s Annual Economic Review 2001*, p. 1.

⁷ A quota-free, duty-free trade agreement with the E.U. was negotiated in 2001 under its Everything But Arms system of preferences, which also encouraged growth in Cambodia’s textile sector. However, the US has been the principal recipient of Cambodian garments, seizing 70 percent of the export market to the E.U.’s 25 percent in 2003 and 64 to 29 percent in 2004 (USAID, *Measuring Competitiveness and Labor Productivity in Cambodia’s Garment Industry*, p. 12).

⁸ Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia’s Annual Economic Review 2001*, p. 9. The (classification of) export quotas for Cambodian garment factories were laid out in a Ministry of Commerce ordinance (PNPRK360, dated 1 February 1999). According to this ordinance, quotas from the US were granted to factories *in operation* in Cambodia; thus, during the November 1998 negotiations, Cambodia secured quotas for its 111 operating companies, which were employing some 72,000 workers. In 1999, there were suggestions from the opposition Sam Rainsy Party that corruption, fraud, and favoritism had plagued the granting and management of the quotas while social factors of production had been ignored (for example, see SRP Members of Parliament’s question to the government, dated 3 May 1999.)

⁹ USAID, *Measuring Competitiveness and Labor Productivity in Cambodia’s Garment Industry*, pp. 3–4.

¹⁰ One general strategy to head off an impending loss, which has already been adopted, is a re-branding of Cambodia that promotes the fair social conditions of the country’s production, emphasizing labor standards, workers’ rights, and working conditions.

¹¹ In 1999, Cambodia’s garment exports were worth US\$553 million (50 percent of the country’s total exports), of which 88 percent went to the US; in 2000, their worth was US\$985 million (70 percent of exports), with 76 percent going to the US (Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia’s Annual Economic Review 2001*,

pp. 49–50). As 136,000 of the 160,000 workers in the garment industry in 2000 were women principally from the countryside (p. 57), some social observations about the impact of this urbanization tendency among young women should be acknowledged. The key insight is that rural girls tended to remain at home with the family, following the schedule and demands of household and farm work, until they were married. This paradigm stands in stark contrast to the work demands and hours involved in the garment industry. While work life becomes increasingly regimented and work becomes longer, female factory workers are also experiencing new forms of social freedoms.

¹² Coe *et al.*, *Cambodia: Rebuilding for a Challenging Future*, p. 8.

¹³ Each of these grouping exhibits differing pressures that direct their unfolding as successful tourist destinations. The prestige of ancient grandeur is presided over by the post-colonial state. Enduring natural beauty is subject to the opposing demands of national resource extraction and “resort” tourism. Modern trauma representations are directed the government ministries (significantly guided by the CPP) in association with historically-concerned institutions (DC–Cam) and to a certain extent the presentations of foreigners.

¹⁴ Angkor Wat was designated a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in December 1992. Ticket sales for the Angkor park are administered by Sokimex, the politically-connected petroleum company that sustains an ever diversifying business portfolio. (A one-day ticket costs \$20. Admission is free to Cambodian nationals; in order to avoid ticket collection, guards at the various sites inquire as to a national’s homeland, seeking aspects of confirmation in the respondent’s speech. A Cambodian passport or other identification can be demanded as an ultimate resort.) As the country’s largest company, Sokimex has been the recipient of contracts from the government often in suspicious circumstances (e.g., gas imports, the monopoly of the supply of medicines, and the furnishing of military and police uniforms) (O’Connell & Yin, “All that glitters seems to be... Sokimex,” pp. 8–9). The company secured the management of ticket sales through discrete discussions with government officials in April 1999; the price for this concession was an annual flat fee of US\$1 million. Total ticket sales for 1999 was US\$3.8 million (Vong & Marcher, “Sokimex and Government revisit Angkor deal,” p. 3). The August 2005 renegotiation of the deal at an inter-ministerial meeting, absent of competitive bidding, reaffirmed Sokimex’s concession but on terms more favorable to the government. If gross sales are less than US\$3 million, then the government receives 50 percent of the revenues; if sales exceed US\$7 million, then the government’s share is 70 percent. The government portion is intended to support Apsara Authority, which oversees conservation but remains heavily subsidized by foreign funding (Kanmwerayotin, “Show Us The Money”).

¹⁵ In this list, one might also include the foreigner-oriented Butterfly Garden (Siem Reap) or the Snake House (Kompong Som), although these are mainly establishments that augment their food offering with bestial novelty. In conversations with informants in Oddar Meanchey, any water body became the topic of potential development for tourism/resort purposes, including Ta Mok’s lake, the narrow waterfall at Ta Mok’s cliffhouse, and the jungle-embedded reservoir in Trabaing Tauv Commune. Essentially, this meant cleaning the site of UXO or natural debris, constructing open-air huts where food would be available, and advertising. The word for “resort” (from the Sanskrit/Pali *ramaṇīya*) emphasizes a pleasant and attractive site. The term “eco-tourism” and its conceptual implications (wildlife preservation and conservation,) have only recently been applied to some of these sites. A notable exception is Ratanakiri’s Yeak Laom Lake, managed by the Forestry Department, which uses the environs as a means to educate visitors about native flora and fauna (as well as providing a deep swimming hole). Tours of the Prek Toal Bird Sanctuary in the Tonle Sap also more closely conform to the philosophical impetus of “eco-tourism,” as relating to an ecology. In terms of language, Cambodians refer to “nature tourism” (*téschâr thoamm’cheat* ភ្នំពេញ ភ្នំពេញ)—“tourism” from Sanskrit/Pali *desa-* place, region + *-caraṇa* walking about; “nature” from Pali *dhamma-* + *-jati*, which might be rendered “all things born (*jati*) of the natural order of things (*dhamma*)”—rather than the more closely equivalent “eco-” (*bârihthaan* បរិវេណ), from Sanskrit, *paristhāna* surrounding, residence (akin to Greek *oiko-*).

¹⁶ A plethora of restaurants, bakeries, and retail shops which employ disenfranchised youth, training them in various vocations, could also be added to this list.

¹⁷ The casino/look-out station at Bokor Mountain (Kampot) and the colonial-era villa ruins (Kep) allow the opportunity to wander about and see, but no historical explanation is provided, beyond the (textual) guidance the visitor brings. These southwestern sites combine visions of (the remnants of) upper-class life under the *Union Indochinoise* as well as the actions of the CPK: Bokor, once a casino and hotel for the

French elite later became a base from which military units could launch attacks; Kep's seaside villas were partially demolished by CPK forces, it is said, to send a message about luxury lifestyles.

¹⁸ Taiwanese businessman Victor Chao's Marksmen Club was established beyond Pochentong Airport in 1997, as a visitors' venue alternative to tourist attractions like Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek that "depress people" (Dupont, "'War Disney': Cambodian tourism hits its mark?," p. 16). It added a newer facility with newer toys near the existent Kambol firing range operated by the government.

¹⁹ Shenon, "Khmer Rouge Threaten Cambodian Tourism." The apparent reasoning behind the attacks suggests that the outlawed Khmer Rouge were seeking to disrupt all investment in the country so as to undermine the largely credible Royal Cambodian Government that had come to power through UN-sponsored elections in 1993. In this context, "Khmer Rouge" is used to denote the ousted CPK regime that regrouped via the refugee camps, participated in the Paris Peace Accords, ultimately withdrew from UNTAC, continued isolated attacks, and were banned in 1994, even though the organization operated under a number of different auspices: Democratic Kampuchea, Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (which included Son Sann's KPRLF and Sihanouk's *Mouvement de Liberation Nationale du Kampuchea/Armée Nationale Sihanoukienne/FUNCINPEC*), and the post-1982 Party (or, *Partie*) of Democratic Kampuchea as well as its military arm, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea. While this blurs the individuated identities the organization has assumed, it is consistent with the way the RCG cites the group in its planning and documentation.

²⁰ Although Hun Sen's direct responsibility has not been formally pursued, information provided by a US casualty of the attack, Ron Abney, and gleaned from the confidential FBI investigative report, indicate that members of Hun Sen's Bodyguard Unit #2 (2nd Battalion, 17th Regiment), specifically Gen. Hing Bun Heang, planned the attack and harbored the escaping assailants (including, Kong Samreth, code-named Brazil) (Garella & Pape, *A Tragedy of No Importance*, chap. 9; Doran, *Report to the U.S. Senate Investigation on Grenade Attack*).

²¹ While it does not completely explain or excuse the violence, an examination of the details of the events suggest that the deaths of these foreigners resulted during attempts to traverse Khmer Rouge-held territory. The three backpackers (Australian, Briton, French) had managed to board a train bound for Kampong Som (Sihanoukville), at a time when foreigners were forbidden to ride the train for security reasons. The three travelers were taken to the Khmer Rouge base at Phnom Voar, where they were killed under Pol Pot's orders, two months into ransom negotiations. Trials spanning 1999 to 2006 eventually found three Khmer Rouge officers responsible: Gen. Nuon Paet who ordered the attacks, his superior Gen. Sam Bith, and Col. Chhouk Rin who led the troops in the ambush of the train. An excellent presentation on these events, characters, court proceedings, and politico-legal implications for Cambodia's judiciary can be found in John Hall, "In the Shadow of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal." The convoy to the Citadel of Women, 30 km from Siem Reap town, rambled out when the area was still off-limits to visitors; after the attack, it was determined that the shooters were "bandits" with Khmer Rouge backgrounds. (This was the security situation problem as I traveled through the country three years later: although the Khmer Rouge had small pockets of support, the real threat of "bandits"—former (Khmer Rouge) soldiers still toting their guns—permeated the Cambodian countryside.) Although the story of the Howes killing took two years to surface, it appears that he was initially instructed to leave to seek ransom for his de-mining crew, but his refusal (an act of solidarity with his co-workers) meant that the team was released and Howes was executed. Scotland Yard determined that those responsible for Howes execution were: Ta Mok, Gen. Kheum Ngon, Col. Kong, and members of Kheum Ngon's bodyguard unit (Rim, Lim, and San) (Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 115).

²² An unquantified segment of arrivals to Cambodia seem driven at least in part by a sense of adventure tourism (the leftovers of war tourism), which takes advantage of a lack of infrastructure and potential instability. Cambodia's listing in the first edition of Pelton's quasi-guide book, *The World's Most Dangerous Places*, may encourage this sentiment to seek out adrenaline rushes among the country's hazards. Other textual portrayals of the untamed destination in the mid-1990s narrate tales of extreme adventure and sex tourism, for example, Gilboa's *Off the Rails in Phnom Penh: Into the Dark Heart of Guns, Girls, and Ganja* and, quite differently, Vollman's lesser-known *Butterfly Stories*. A more recent work by UN workers, *Emergency Sex (and Other Desperate Measures)*, depicts dangers, dedication, and drunken dealings during the UNTAC period, albeit not in a tourist-guide style.

²³ Royal Cambodian Government, *National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010*, p. 56. Consequent to the rampant commercialization of all aspects of cultural life brought on by the tourist gaze, Cambodia has

been plagued by some of the more severe social ills associated with tourism and worsened by its weak state and dilapidated infrastructure. A 1999 survey of travel agents showed that 21.7 percent of tourists to Cambodia came for sex, and an unknown fraction of them came for child sex; it is argued that Thailand's and the Philippines' success in their anti-pedophilia measures has led to new, poorer destinations, like Cambodia, to be sought (Nuon, Yit & Gray, *Children's Work, Adults' Play*, p. 36). Chea Huot, a CDRI researcher, offered similar numbers for 2000, citing the success of anti-sex trade legislation in neighboring countries as a causal factor (*Straits Times*, "Sex draws nearly a quarter of tourists to Cambodia").

²⁴ Royal Cambodian Government, *National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010*, p. 57.

²⁵ A lull afflicted Cambodia's tourist growth from July 1997 (political instability manifested in factional fighting) until after the 1998 elections, further fueled by the regional economic woes. Years after the "open skies" policy was formalized, it opened up direct flights servicing Siem Reap Airport to regional airlines arriving from Taipei, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, Vientiane, as well as cities in Thailand and Vietnam. The "open skies" approach to encourage tourism had been pursued in 1968 when China assisted in the construction of the Siem Reap airport; however, political turmoil in 1970 effected an abrupt halt to the tourist blossoming (Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001*, p. 69). The US\$18 million upgrade to the Siem Reap Airport was unveiled in August 2006.

²⁶ Perhaps the most significant casualty was Royal Air Cambodge, which had long enjoyed a *de facto* monopoly on domestic commercial air travel; the airline ceased all its operations in October 2001.

²⁷ In 2001, the average duration of a stay direct to Siem Reap was 3 days and to Phnom Penh 5 days; only 12 percent of Siem Reap's visitors continued on to the capital (Sok & Sarthi, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002*, p. 22).

²⁸ In 2000, arrival by air to Siem Reap tripled, flights arrivals grew by only 14 percent, and the total number of foreign tourists increased by 32 percent; because of the shorter stays (among direct-to-Siem Reap visitors), income from tourism increased by 24 percent, compared to a 40 percent increase the year previous (Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001*, p. 7).

²⁹ Thong Khon, deputy festival organizer, helped oversee the US\$500,000 budget, which was originally priced at US\$1.7 million. King Sihanouk opposed this use of the country's national icon.

³⁰ Tourists have expressed disappointment in the quality of accommodations, vehicles, and the knowledge of guides in this developing country (Sok, Chea & Sik, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001*, p. 76). The Carreras *fête* brought together: 150 dancers, 32,000 flowers, 20 life-size ice carvings, four elephants, and 70 chefs.

³¹ ADB, *Technical Assistance Consultant's Report*, p. 19. (The ADB has been a key actor in coordinating the various efforts and specialties of these different frameworks and organizations.) Tourism is one of the five key areas of cooperation spelled out in ACMECS' *Bagan Declaration* of 12 November 2003. The Emerald Triangle's *Pakse Declaration* of 2 August 2003 more specifically spells out the commitments by which cooperation will be effected between Cambodia (Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey), Thailand (Ubon Ratchathani and Sisaket), and Laos (Champasak and Salavanh), including infrastructural improvements, human resources, facilitated border crossings, and joint promotion of investment. MGC has specialized its working groups such that Thailand leads in tourism, Cambodia in culture, India in education, etc.

³² The name derives from the Suwannaphumi Peninsula (*sovanna phum* សុវណ្ណភូមិ), "golden region," which was the ancient toponym of mainland (insular) Southeast Asia.

³³ Also at this meeting, Sereyvuth expressed his desires for a Tourism Development Zone, a cultural theme park for recreating history.

³⁴ This was the formulation in the November 2000 implementation of the agreement. The initial accord put forth two package tours, the "Khmer Cultural Tourism Route," with the following trajectories: 1) Bangkok–Aranyaprathet/Poipet–Siem Reap, and 2) Bangkok–Trat/Koh Kong–Kampong Som–Phnom Penh–Siem Reap–Aranyaprathet/Poipet–Bangkok.

³⁵ The six countries are Cambodia, China (Yunnan), Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.

³⁶ Hing & Tuot, "Pro-Poor Tourism," p. 34. Post-1993 government economic reforms allowed for the quick absorption of FDI, generating dramatic growth in garments and tourism (Chea & Sok, "Integrating Cambodia's Economy into the World," p. 54).

³⁷ World Bank, *Cambodia at the Crossroads*, p. 29. Tourism is the major contributor to growth in the services sector and second only to the garment industry in boosting economic growth (Royal Cambodian

Government, *National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010*, p. 56). CDRI, using its own data combined with that received from government ministries, offers slightly lower totals for tourist arrivals than the official numbers from the Tourism Ministry—323,000 in 1998; 412,000 in 1999; 515,000 in 2000; and 662,000 in 2001—but still acknowledges a 30 percent increase in arrivals from 2000 to 2001 (Sok & Sarthi, *Annual Economic Review 2002*, pp. 21–22).

³⁸ Hing & Tuot, “Pro-Poor Tourism,” p. 33. Analysts from CDRI, Economic Institute of Cambodia, and World Bank all suggest caution when evaluating domestic tourism numbers, as the figures are difficult to count with certainty and definitions vary. The World Bank defines a Cambodian tourist as a person who travels more than 10 miles and spends money during the trip (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 69).

³⁹ Chea & Keat, *Statement at the Joint Annual Discussion*, p. 5.

⁴⁰ The ADB has consistently argued that the Cambodian economy needs to move away from its dependence on garments and tourism for economic growth (ADB, *Asian Development Outlook 2006*, pp. 192, 195; *idem*, *Asian Development Outlook 2007*, pp. 202, 205; *idem*, *Asian Development Outlook 2008*, pp. 195, 197–198).

⁴¹ The overall effect on GDP was softened by an agricultural rebound that year (IMF, *Cambodia: 2004 Article IV Consultation*, pp. 9–10).

⁴² Sok & Sarthi, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002*, p. 22. Ballard notes that up to 70 percent of the income generated by tourism leaves the country (*The Impact of the Tourism Industry in Siem Reap on the People Who Live in Angkor Park*, pp. 2, 19–20).

⁴³ A senior government official cited in Kammerer, “Show Us The Money.” As the industry and country develop, greater “spin-off benefits” would fall on the Cambodians. It is important to observe that the growth in tourism (as well as garments) has been less determined by government policies and management and more a result of favorable happenstance. As the World Bank notes, “weak formal institutions and excessive, unclear and overlapping regulations impose very high costs (formal and informal) on households and firms attempting to do business in Cambodia” (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 57). What the bank does not analyze is the ways in which politically/socially well-connected firms can more easily navigate the economic landscape than (foreign) firms that require formal and transparent market mechanisms in order to compete. Thus, Cambodia’s patronage system works as a buffer (or rebuff) to the foreign companies who are typically more capable of rapidly deploying and maintaining services on a major scale. The World Bank approaches this issue in terms of “good governance,” endemic corruption, and the persistence of a post-conflict state apparatus or “‘perverse’ forms of social capital,” rather than the re-assertion or endurance of pre-war social relations (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, chap. 7, particularly pp. 131–139, 141–147, 148–151). Thus, a weak state is analyzed in terms of its difficulty in creating a favorable investment climate with legal guarantees that promote efficiency and accountability.

⁴⁴ Hing & Tuot, “Pro-Poor Tourism: Siem Reap Case Study,” p. 36. Tourism created 5,000 jobs in 2001, growing to 65,000 total (Sok & Sarthi, *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002*, pp. 35–36). “The argument against tourism as far as social capital is concerned is that tourism exploits freely and profits from the output of social capital but seems to reciprocate poorly” (Mingsam, “Tourism: Blessings for all?,” p. 16).

⁴⁵ Hing & Tuot, “Pro-Poor Tourism,” p. 36. “As is well-documented, garment manufacturing and tourism services are concentrated in urban areas, and both sectors, driving Cambodia’s growth in the last decade, are intensive in unskilled labor” (World Bank, *Sharing growth: equity and development in Cambodia*, p. 49). It is important to highlight that although Angkor Wat has been the primary engine of the country’s tourism draw, its home province of Siem Reap ranked the third poorest in the country in 2004 (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 2).

⁴⁶ Ballard, “Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction,” p. 87. This is further confirmed by the Economic Institute of Cambodia study for the World Bank on communes surrounding Siem Reap town (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 71).

⁴⁷ CDRI reports demonstrate how social relations mediate participation in the labour market. One tells how a relative’s job at a large hotel became a gateway for other family members (whose village was connected to town via good roads) to assume various jobs at the hotel (Hing & Tuot, “Pro-Poor Tourism,” p. 53). Conversely, another shows how information on disreputable construction firms (e.g., which failed to pay its

employees as work neared completion) circulates among job-seekers (Ballard, "Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction," pp. 87–88). Ballard stresses proximity as well as social networks, which he describes as a means to navigate bribes and middlemen that lead to jobs (*The Impact of the Tourism Industry in Siem Reap on the People Who Live in Angkor Park*, pp. 8–9).

⁴⁸ Ballard, "Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction," pp. 90–92. "The failure of Siem Reap's farmers to meet the hotels' and restaurants' demand for food has fairly prosaic, production-side problems; small land holdings, and often poor soil, a lack of water control infrastructure, and difficulties getting produce to the town in good condition have all made it hard for local farmers to compete with cheaper imports from Thailand and Viet Nam" (World Bank, *Halving Poverty by 2015?*, p. 71).

⁴⁹ Although it has not been directly stated as such, the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area fits well with the pro-poor tourism development program that seeks to strengthen linkages between historic tourist attractions and their rural communities (ADB, *The Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy*, p. 44). Further, the Anlong Veng project bolsters and participates in the diversification of Cambodian tourism as a modern historic site as well as a midway point on the path to Prassat Preah Vihear. The transfer of skills is perhaps largely limited to the training of tour guides by the Department of Tourism's Working Group on Anlong Veng. Agricultural linkages were perhaps most secure when the remote location was dependent on local and provincial produce; the border opening in November 2003 creates the opportunity for more visitors and greater consumption/trade of Cambodian goods, but it also allows the budding tourism project to become underwritten by foreign goods and services, as has been the case in Siem Reap.

⁵⁰ In my own travels in 1998 (to Ratanakiri via Kratie and Stung Treng), our convoy came across an abandoned NGO vehicle full of supplies; locals said the driver, a Khmer, had been abducted by bandits within an hour of our arrival on the scene.

⁵¹ The NGOs, Japan Assistance Team for Small Arms Management in Cambodia (JSAC) and European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia (EU ASAC), have been the prominent actors in reducing the surplus of weaponry. The organizations estimate the number of outstanding weapons in an area, assess the area's development needs, and make commitments to fulfilling these needs based on the number of weapons surrendered. Dispossessed weapons are amassed in grand incineration events, known as "flames of peace." JSAC's first collection ceremony in Anlong Veng was held on 12 June 2003.

⁵² Oum & Sok, *Cambodia Economic Watch*, p. 13 (emphasis added).

⁵³ Two other related sites, which have served the tourist, educational, and remembrance goals, are omitted in this directive to preserve, and these are the already-well-established Toul Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime and the Choeung Ek Killing Fields.

⁵⁴ "The curriculum on Khmer Rouge history provided by the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) Ministry of Education... was a political tool designed to mainly justify the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. Children from grade one and up were taught via textbooks to hate and fear the Khmer Rouge" (Dy, *Genocide Education in a Global Context*, pp. 12–13).

⁵⁵ Minister of Information Khieu Kanharith has asserted that the removal of instruction on the Pol Pot years was effected following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords; he claims it was the international community's distaste for the use of the term genocide that prompted the government to cease instruction on the Khmer Rouge (Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," p. 2).

⁵⁶ Unmacht, "Unveiling a dark chapter in Cambodia's past," p. 13; Pin, "Prime Minister Orders Recall of Textbooks," p. 15; Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," pp. 1–2. The chapter's content was based largely on the personal experiences of the six members of the Ministry of Education's committee tasked with addressing the DK period, members who considered themselves to be "living documents" not in need of much source material. (A previous textbook from 2000 to 2001, covering the 1953–1998 period, gave scant attention to the Khmer Rouge; as well, the CPP victory in 1998 was included, but FUNCINPEC's victory in the UNTAC-sponsored election was not, provoking charges of bias from the royalists.)

⁵⁷ Woodsome, "Schools Get Book on KR," p. 1. The book recounts the memories of a girl (age five to eight) during DK: the gradual break-up of her family, the execution of her father (a major in Lon Nol's army), and the harsh conditions of life in a child labour camp.

⁵⁸ Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport, *Minutes of the Meeting on the Review of the Draft of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea"*; Kinetz, "In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer Rouge," p. A14; Kinetz & Yun, "Textbook on KR Spotlights Cambodia's History Wars," pp. 1–2. DC–

Cam had anticipated this review by the government, even four years before, when the work first commenced. Much of the debate about the presentation of this period in history has focused on interpretive bias, fears of propagandizing, as well as implied culpability (for the ex-CPK members who are the country's current leaders). In order not to offend political sensibilities and stir controversy, Khamboly's descriptions take great pains to state facts using neutral language. For example, rather than claiming the Vietnamese "liberated" or "invaded" Cambodia in 1979, he simply states that they "fought their way into" the country and "helped to create a new regime in Phnom Penh" (Dy, *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)*, p. 2; Kinetz & Yun, "Textbook on KR Spotlights Cambodia's History Wars," pp. 2, 61). In the ministry's review of Dy's work, participants critiqued the 11-chapter work for: exceeding the 1975–1979 time frame (e.g., describing the development of CPK thought out of ICP anti-colonial struggle); not waiting the "60 years" that is required for a fact to become history; the mention of individual names; the excessive length of the account; possible affects on a nascent climate of peace; preponderance of author's opinion; the style not being in accordance with a pedagogical methodology; and the inconsistency/differences on statistics (e.g., the toll).

⁵⁹ Museum and memorial sites gain increased importance in this absence, especially for imparting a national narrative (discussed below).

⁶⁰ The thoughts of a leader of a local rights group told in Kinetz, "In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer Rouge," p. A14.

⁶¹ Chhang Youk quoted in Prak & Wasson, "KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum," p. 2.

⁶² Etcheson's treatment of this new phenomenon follows a distinction between *knowing* about the past and *believing* it: while children are very aware of the stories, events, and figures from the DK period, they simply do not believe that it happened (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 2).

⁶³ "This preservation-for-education practice sees remains, objects and sites—'primary' artifacts—as capable of instructing and unifying the society around knowledge of what has come before" (Hughes, *Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia*, p. 271).

⁶⁴ The high command at the Ministry of National Defense divides the country's army into five military regions and a number of autonomous infantry brigades. Region 4 is headquartered in Siem Reap; it includes Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and Preah Vihear Provinces.

⁶⁵ Anlong Veng is saturated with various military groupings, most of which are subdivisions within, or reporting to, RCAF Region 4. Other specialty forces, such as the gendarmerie, also operate in the area. The complex military arrangement in Anlong Veng is addressed below.

⁶⁶ These databases are accessible on line from Yale University's CGP website: www.yale.edu/cgp.

⁶⁷ Cook describes this effort as the "attempt to capture and record, using all extant sources of information, the full scope of an episode of state violence aimed at destroying a particular group" ("Documenting Genocide: Lessons from Cambodia for Rwanda," p. 225). There appears to be a teleological vision underlying the "complete account of genocide"—in a single data structure and using "the best of ethnographic, historical, and forensic research methods"—that suggests proper documentation and understanding will lead to the prevention of genocide (p. 234). The scientist imaginary of Harff and Gurr seeks to gather "systematic information on the universe of episodes" of genocide/politicide in order to "develop convincing multivariate theories of the phenomena" (Harff & Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides," p. 360).

⁶⁸ The Ministry of Tourism holds a copy of the 174-page transcript of these interviews in Khmer.

⁶⁹ Youk has made two trips to Anlong Veng, in January and August of 2002. One of the problems he has had is that the sites are too close on the map; he has asked some local experts to enlarge the map. At the time, he was needed to work out some small linguistic issues in the translation and transliteration of Khmer names of sites into English.

⁷⁰ Youk maintained correspondence with Thong Khon through Ros Ren, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Tourism (who worked at the Ministry of Culture during the 1980s). Ros Ren is very involved with the information garnered from DC-Cam and the circular issued by Hun Sen.

⁷¹ Another, perhaps more cynical, view might argue that the memorialization of Anlong Veng is simply an alibi for the extraction of resources (material or ideological). I examine different aspects of this perspective below, specifically with regard to the opportunities opened up by the project as well as its potential for constituting a different form of Khmer Rouge "trial."

⁷² Youk has had some less than satisfying interactions with government officials seeking to represent Cambodia's war legacy for tourists. DC-Cam was contacted by the War Museum in Siem Reap, because

the center had discovered a big gun in Mondulkiri, left there since 1962. Youk's organization instructed the museum that it would have to study the object, not just put the object in the museum. DC-Cam ended up doing the study for them (see Chuong, "Reminders from the Bombing at Dak Dam"). He has also shared openly this criticism of the Tourism Ministry and Minister Veng Sereyvuth (letters to the editor of the *Cambodia Daily*).

⁷³ Among mid-level government officials affiliated with the Anlong Veng project, it seems that the priority of accuracy in the representation of Khmer Rouge political life in Anlong Veng may be a reaction to or correction of the "distortions" of history that dominated the Democratic Kampuchea period. Whatever one wants to claim about history as simulation, the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea were engaged in successive historical (re-)constructions according to a political program and driven primarily by interests of expedience and mass control. Thus, it is a fairly simple observation that those involved in the re-representation of the Khmer Rouge, being aware of and/or having endured its distortions, would be quite interested in presenting a history that is corroborated by evidence, facts, and the like. This concern may also guide the actions/ thoughts (not necessarily consciously) of former Khmer Rouge soldiers living in Anlong Veng. (However, I also wonder if the rigorous methods for the accurate representation of history might also derive from, or be an extension of, a residual Marxist-Leninist revolutionary praxis: a correct assessment of situations that is tested in the realm of practice, a methodology that seems to be in operation in information-gathering in the district.) The director of DC-Cam has noted the government's cowardice in approaching those with the most reliable (and thus "accurate") knowledge—the living Khmer Rouge cadre: Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, Khieu Samphan—instead relying on the "vague memories" of villagers that had only peripheral involvement with the historical sites. Late in my fieldwork stay, I attempted to interview Ta Mok. Captured in 1999, the one-legged general was imprisoned at a military base in the Boeng Keng Kong Quarter of Phnom Penh. His jailed residence was in fact only four or five blocks from my flat on the south side of Tuol Sleng. I had completed a significant amount of preparation, including much photographic material for Ta Mok's review, which touched on earlier methodological inspirations. However, the attempt was short-lived, (knowingly) in vain, and ultimately unsuccessful. Rather than seek approval from above, which I felt would be futile and also draw too much attention to the issue of privileged informants and freely-floating foreigners, I chose to greet the gatekeeper. I approached the checkpoint at the entryway where I was flagged by a guard. I asked about Ta Mok's confinement at this location and how one might go about gaining access. The guard refused to acknowledge anyone's whereabouts and suggested that I remove myself from the premises. Further questions made him more uncomfortable, but certainly not hostile; following theater of the absurd *non sequitur* dramatics, it became apparent that we were (not) in dialogue over access that could (not) be granted to a person/place that could (not) be confirmed. Concluding our interlocutory non-encounter (*à la* Ionesco's *La Cantatrice Chauve*), the dutiful sentry refused to accept any materials that might go to any unconfirmed inmate who may or may not be within the confines of the military base, and we each returned to our normalized routines.

⁷⁴ Departing the capital too long after sunrise to make a well-lit journey, I was caught motorcycling through the sandy national route in the dark. Ruts, now invisible, and a smudge-dusted and bug-blotted visor complicated my involvement with apparitions emerging from the blackness—pedestrians and bicyclists. Slower speeds and last-minute swerving to miss these wandering locals were the constant reminders to always depart the capital earlier. Bugs, attracted by the headlight and finding their way into my eyes, and large cargo carriers (not affected by my headlight) added to my self-imposed travel punishment and my own amazement at how I arrive safely at my Cambodian destinations. I took the opportunity to ruminate on every possible fear that my neurotic intellect could conjure: getting robbed by bandits, breaking down in the dark, riding off the road (which almost-happened frequently), getting run over, running over someone, animal attack... the list grew longer and more pathetic as my mind was allowed to wander. I arrived in Siem Reap filthy and exhausted, a scene that would be repeated numerous times throughout my research efforts. I sought rest with my friend Dara at his restaurant. Having been well looked after by Khmers during my travels through their country in the past, I was comforted by seeing a familiar face after a harrowing evening expedition. Conversing with Dara about his personal and work life afforded a glimpse into the feel of tourist development in the environs of Cambodia's primary draw. Dara tells me that the business at his eatery has decreased even though national statistics on visitors to Siem Reap show a dramatic increase; he knows of at least four restaurants that recently had to close. He believes that food establishments have been hit hard because more and more guesthouses are offering breakfast and lunch included with a room; accommodation taxes are based on occupancy, but restaurants are taxed at a set rate,

which had doubled in the previous year. My input consisted mainly of a suggestion to form an association of restaurant and business owners to collectively address the shared concerns of entrepreneurs trying to profit from the country's resurgence of tourism.

⁷⁵ Khemarak had hoped for us to meet some former Khmer Rouge in Siem Reap before we headed to Anlong Veng. After a two-day delay and numerous phone calls back and forth, the meeting did not materialize, and I was basically left with two days to spend amongst the tourists. I wasted no time in contracting a stomach intruder, giardia, which seems to happen with a certain regularity with my bodily immersion in Cambodia. While the medication (metronidazole) is readily available at all the small pharmacies and the treatment is fairly simple, one contraindication, alcohol, can be difficult to explain to your Khmer hosts.

⁷⁶ About 60 km before Anlong Veng, the moto and I got up close and personal with the red groundcover. Believing the beaten track to have bravely bore the passage of heavier traffic, my mighty speed manifested a minor error. After traversing a bridge, the moto veered into deep loose laterite that would not allow any quick maneuvers and ultimately threw me to the ground. My corporeal arrival in Anlong Veng was marred by a bloody scrape down my arm and cuts on my hands. A minor injury, but avoiding infection became a priority after earlier incidents. (My two previous extended stays in Cambodia had concluded with moto-inflicted injuries that got infected: a slow motion head-on collision at the intersection of two boulevards in Phnom Penh cut open the top of my foot, and a sudden stop on loose rock on the road to Battambang ended in an incision in my thigh; both gouges progressed to infection.)

⁷⁷ The significance of October 23 refers to the date of the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, that officially ended the civil war between the Vietnamese-backed government (PRK) and the exiled forces of Son Sann's republican KPRLF, Sihanouk's royalist FUNCINPEC, and the strongest faction, the ousted DK.

⁷⁸ The saga about "Chhony" and "Khemarak" not being familiar to those being questioned, was another testament to how little used are proper names. I had heard stories from Khmers that they have gone their whole lives not knowing the name of someone with whom they have spent significant time, because the person was always called "uncle" (*pou* ឪ or *om* អី) or "older sibling" (*bâng* បង). Often, in lieu of the proper moniker, only a nickname is known. However, the exception tends to be people in positions of authority; logically, the helpful neighbors knew the name of the assistant district chief, but I wrote off the kids' (feigned?) non-understanding as suspicion of the foreigner or simply poor pronunciation on my part. In the end, Dom Chhony's residence would be where I cast my lot for my many stays in the field. Khemarak also stayed at October 23, as his regular residence lay 100 km away in the provincial capital of Samraong. He made irregular visits to Anlong Veng, and his (impending) presence provided the opportunity to replay the name game. Since his given appellation was unknown to most, I came to know about him as Lauk Thak (roughly translated as Mr. Chubby), or people would simply describe him as the heavyset Chinese-looking guy. And while most people called me Lauk Thy (លាក់ ថី from ធីម៉ូស៊ី or ធីម៉ូធី), i.e., Mr. T (the American popular icon being unfamiliar to my acquaintances), Khemarak preferred the two-syllable abbreviation of my name: (*maussy* ម៉ូស៊ី), auditorially falling between "mousey" (like a rodent) and Maussy (like someone interested in gift exchange).

⁷⁹ Like many scientific neologisms, the Khmer word follows a similar etymological derivation to the English compound: នរ = *nara* (Sanskrit, Pali) = man, person, comparable to *anthrōpos* (Greek); វិជ្ជា/វិទ្យា = *vijñā/vidyā* (Pali/Sanskrit) = knowledge, science comparable to *logos*, word, thought, science. (Anthropology, alternately spelled នរណាសាស្ត្រ, draws from the Sanskrit *śāstra*, knowledge, science, education.) The Khmer word is so unusual the topic received added attention whenever it would arise in my Khmer lessons, in the US and Cambodia. I stayed clear of even more technical (recondite, academic) terminology that would draw on even lesser-known Pali and Sanskrit elements: for example, ethnography (*cheatpontosastr* ជំនាញសាស្ត្រ), *jāti* (Sanskrit, Pali) birth + *bandha* (Sanskrit, Pali) bond, connection + *śāstra* (Sanskrit). Because "anthropology" was so rarely understood, I would explain that my studies were similar to sociology (*sāṅkumvichea* សង្គមវិទ្យា), archaeology (*boraanvortovichea* បុរាណវិទ្យា), or history (*brāvoattisastr* ប្រវត្តិសាស្ត្រ).

⁸⁰ At the time of my arrival in Anlong Veng, the town had four establishments that could be properly labeled as restaurants (*phôchneathan* ភោជនីយដ្ឋាន), while lesser eateries (*haangbay* ហាងបាយ) also populated the main drag, and small food stalls filled the perimeter of the market. Numerous snack and drink stands also cropped up along the roads leading in/out and through town. The number of business establishments grew over time and space, the restaurants growing the town toward the mountain and the provincial capital. Upon my arrival, the restaurants proper included: Mohaleap (“Great Fortune”), Thour Thea (“Well-off,” but also the compounded names of the owners’ two daughters), Chumnor Tracheak (“Cool Breeze”), and Dara Raksmei (“Starlight”).

⁸¹ Given the use of food consumption as a venue for project updates, this guest was treated to a number of specialty dishes only available in the country’s hinterland, including stew of black soft-shelled tortoise (*Trionyx ornatus/Amyda cartilaginea*) (*sâmlâ kântheay* សម្បុកឆ្មារ), stir-fried monitor lizard (*Varanus nebulosus*) (*chaa trâkuot* ចាត្រកួត), and raw chevrotain (*Tragulus pygmaeus*) venison salad (*phlea sach chhlous* ផ្លាសាច់ស្នួល).

⁸² Sophorn’s relationship to Ta Mok might be more accurately described as “fostering” (*chinhchoem* ចិញ្ចឹម) since his being raised and supported (as the Khmer term indicates) did not afford him a kin relationship. (Adoption, in a strict sense, would entitle one to inheritance of property, name, etc.) However, given the high status of his birthparents, his position as a son “raised by Ta Mok” may have been more a case of his parents lending their son to a leader who they liked and respected. Ebihara’s discussion of the forms of extended family and the various ways children are “adopted,” or come to live in a household, confirms this possibility (Ebihara, *Svay*, pp. 136–137n2). Her work identifies: formal (legal) and informal (socially recognized) adoptions; “guardianship,” where more or less permanent residence in the home does not carry the status of adoptee; “lending”/“borrowing” between families, when a child is sent to live with an affluent kinsman for a time but maintains ties with the parents; and “amiable unions” (*thoa* ថ្លៃ)—“a fictive kin relationship” (sometimes translated as “god-” parent)—that arise from a shared sense of closeness, which can result from a variety of circumstances (e.g., a friend in an unfamiliar setting that helps one navigate the surroundings, one’s best friend’s parents, etc.) but do not follow the residence patterns associated with adoption (pp. 177–180). Sophorn is certainly aware that claiming to be *the* adopted son of Ta Mok carries a certain currency, which he has obviously used to his advantage in the Tourism Department as well as among tourists and other visitors.

⁸³ I had hoped to interview Sophorn’s father, but during the years I was there, Sophorn always said that his father wanted to remain private. I wondered if Sophorn might have felt the threat of being upstaged by his more famous and more accomplished progenitor.

⁸⁴ Corfield and Summers mention four sons of Ta Mok, all of which became CPK members in Takeo Province, but they do not mention their fates (*Historical Dictionary of Cambodia*, p. 408); this account perhaps confuses the fact that Ta Mok was the eldest of four sons, and his younger brothers occupied ranking positions within the CPK at the district and commune levels. My informants, including two of Ta Mok’s daughters, do not mention any sons. The account of Mok’s sister, Ung Poun, states that Ta Mok had four daughters with his wife, Uk Khoem (Sann Kalyann, “I only want justice,” p. 7). Meas Muth (Khe Muth) was a prominent figure in Tramkok District during DK and headed Sector 1003 with Ta Mok in the Dangrek Mountains after 1989; he currently holds the rank of general in the RCAF, having defected in December 1998. He is considered a candidate for prosecution (as Meah Mut), because of his knowledge and involvement in purges of CPK members (Tittmore & Heder, *Seven Candidates for Prosecution*, pp. 99–113).

⁸⁵ Of the memories he shared, he recalls many people having been killed under orders from Ta Mok. Sophorn knew some of the executing soldiers but not all of the victims. Ta Mok had believed there were traitors (ជនក្រៀម) working with Hun Sen. Sophorn states that many traitors were killed, and he specifically remembered one incident where five monks were killed. In 1994, he saw the monks in a car on the way to Prey Kuoy ប្រៃ ក្លូយ—a place he described as a “killing field,” (on the north side of the road to Trabaing Prassat District)—and he heard the gunshots. He was aware that this information was sensitive, and that some people did not want to tell newspapers about the killings because they are scared. DC-Cam believes a “killing field” site containing 3,000 bodies, dating from 1993 to 1997, sits 6 km from Anlong Veng town (Rowley, *Second Life, Second Death*, p. 214).

⁸⁶ Kevin's English capacity was partially self taught and partially grew out of his own determination and diligence. His earliest translation work occurred with his embrace of Christianity, when a pastor hired him to help translate sermons to potential converts in Kampong Chhnang.

⁸⁷ The use of the term "new people" (*neak thmei* អ្នកថ្មី) is deliberate, to highlight a "re-occupation" of Khmer Rouge territory by the non-Communist urban-oriented folk of which the Khmer Rouge had attempted to rid the country (or harshly assimilate) in the 1970s.

⁸⁸ My Khmer was sufficient enough that I could understand when the question was misunderstood; I tried not to push the issue too much—asking the same question over and over again—as keeping things light-hearted seemed the Cambodian priority. Typically, I would ask a question in Khmer, and Kevin would rephrase with some grammatical "corrections" for the informant. Often, it seemed that only word order was being re-arranged, a modification Mme. Bora suspiciously described as the change necessary to transform my urbane (Phnom Penh) language into rural (uneducated) speech.

⁸⁹ This was certainly the case in his establishment of an office as well as design of entry tickets; it also became apparent how those residing in Anlong Veng and involved in the project must/do wait for the mysterious figure to appear before proceeding.

⁹⁰ Individuals at the district level are involved with any and all ministerial endeavors in the area by definition. I had developed a list of simple questions that I would use as a springboard into further investigation of the lives, stories, and worldviews of my informants. The informant sample of district, commune, and military was composed almost exclusively of former Khmer Rouge soldiers who migrated to Anlong Veng as they were fighting the government. (This very systematic approach to the informant sample deviated widely from the experimental methodological concerns I had proposed in "Following in/of/as Para-Sites.") With the defections and reintegration process, the government doled out local governmental positions based on rank within Ta Mok's hierarchy; thus, the higher an individual was in the DK army or political structure, the higher the official is today. After the openness of conversations with Sophorn earlier, I was a bit surprised by the guarded answers provided during my first interview with an assistant district chief. After scant biographical information, I was asked my purpose for wanting to know. I informed the respondent that I wanted to know a bit about the people I was interviewing, but that he was not obligated to answer all my questions. At that point, he asked that there be no more questions about his life. Although I had thought that this would become a recurrent problem, informants' suspicion of my purpose was quite rare and principally confined to the offspring of Ta Mok and Khieu Samphan.

⁹¹ After the initial stint in Anlong Veng, Khemarak took me on tour: to witness market activity (smuggling), towering casinos, and karaoke in the border town of O Smach; to consume specialty jungle feasts involving water fowl and red ants; to join in a rain dance at Prum Keul Temple in drought-plagued Chong Kal District; to take in the official and unofficial tourist happenings in Oddar Meanchey's provincial capital of Samraong.

⁹² A couple bridges on this fine route were still under construction in 2002.

⁹³ The entrance to Anlong Veng via Route 67 was changed toward the end of conflict in 1999. The road had previously cut east on the northern outskirts of Prey S'at, run past the old airstrip, and joined the district closer to Thlat Commune. A dilapidated 100-meter bridge has rendered the old access unsuitable in all but the driest of months.

⁹⁴ The claim to resolving the initial land disputes was confirmed by many informants of various socio-economic strata: for the most part, returnees either received the land they had worked prior to fleeing, they were given new (equivalent) land, or they were compelled to purchase their land back. However, new land concerns began to erupt during my stay. In addition to property speculation, which soared with the November 2003 opening of the border at Choam Pass, the Tourism Ministry's museum plans fomented land security worries (see below, the guided narrative around Ta Mok's sawmill and the Son Sen family grave).

⁹⁵ These are the same "monuments" that mark Ta Mok's history in the area; that is, the sites cited as manifestation of development were also the accomplishments that constitute the DK rebirth to victory narrative.

⁹⁶ The social priorities reverberate in the names of the post-1999 founded communities: Development (*Āphivoat* អភិវឌ្ឍន៍), Peace (*Sântepheap* សន្តិភាព), Unity (*Aekâpheap* ឃុំភ្នំ) Villages.

⁹⁷ The common translation of this word is "heart," as the seat of emotion. However, the term (from Sanskrit/Pali *citta*) actually conveys a wide range of meanings, including: feeling, emotion; will; intention;

thought, opinion, mind. It is the root in character traits such as generous (*chett l'or* ចិត្តល្អ), honest/reliable (*chett trâng* ចិត្តត្រង់), dispassionate (*chett dach* ចិត្តដាច់), two-faced (*chett piir* ចិត្តពីរ), and malevolent (*chett aa-krák* ចិត្តអាក្រក់). It also forms the basis for psychology (*chett-sastr* ចិត្តសាស្ត្រ), philosophy of art (*chett-vichea* ចិត្តវិជ្ជា), and moral conscience (*moneaksikaar kaang plauv chett* មនសិការខាងផ្លូវចិត្ត).

⁹⁸ The multiplicity of potential “museums” arose with various informants: Ta Mok’s ancient artifact museum, the district chief’s tourism effort, and the Ministry/Department of Tourism’s historical-tourist area (itself a subject of multiple reflections). This refraction of the museum idea is discussed below.

⁹⁹ Importantly, the chief of Anlong Veng Commune had received formal notice from the governor’s office that an historical museum was being planned, but he remained unaware of which sites would be included, who would implement it, how it would impact the commune, or what measures he might take to be involved.

¹⁰⁰ In reality, the Dangrek Mountains areas—Choam Pass, Darm Chrey, Kbal Tonsaong—are secured by two RCAF companies (see below), and thus the benefits of this chief’s communal administration do not apply.

¹⁰¹ This leader reported that in Thlat Commune there are no places concerning important things during the Khmer Rouge period, but it had a very small, ancient temple, which was a place for devoted Buddhists to go meditate and achieve a pure heart. However, it is now broken down with stones scattered about. Thlat is also home to the pagoda that houses Ke Pauk’s remains.

¹⁰² The commune chief had claimed to have been contacted in May 2002 by a representative from the US Army, who expected US\$5 million to be allocated for the completion of the dam and repair of the road. With management from the provincial governor and the Department of Water Resources, he was interested in helping to build lakeside dayhouses for tourists as well as providing boats for waterplay in the reservoir.

¹⁰³ One manifestation of this presence is the groups of personnel—civvies-clad or in partial uniform, armed with K-59 handguns or sometimes AK-47s, and engaged in heavy drinking—who populate the local eating establishments, roadside snack shacks, and karaoke clubs from dusk to late night.

¹⁰⁴ RCAF Region 4 is one of the country’s five military regions (*phoumipheak* ភូមិភាគ), which are geographically arranged and report to the Ministry of National Defense. Military Region 4 covers four provinces: Oddar Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Preah Vihear. It has three subordinate groups. First, there are four sub-provincial military operations, one for each province (and named accordingly); the Oddar Meanchey sub-provincial operation is located in Samraong, under the command of Mok Sovann. Second, Region 4 oversees three brigades: 41 (Samraong), 42 (Phnom Kulen), and 43 (Lumtong). Third, the military region oversees three regiments that are stationed along the Thai-Cambodian border from O Smach to Preah Vihear: 401 (Preah Vihear), 402 (O Smach), and 403 (O Ongrey in Trabaing Tav Commune). At the Anlong Veng base, the commanders in charge are (in order of chain of command): Col. Heom Sean, Front Region High Commander; Col. Ho Krui, Deputy Front Region High Commander; Brig. Gen. Yim Peum (former Khmer Rouge), High Commander of Brigade 43.

¹⁰⁵ In order to tour two specific areas along the escarpment, I required the permission from this lieutenant colonel. Mountain 200, the site of a munitions factory and marked with a Tourism Ministry sign, was closed to all unauthorized traffic; given its official standing in the museum and its clear standing inside Cambodian territory, its shuttering (to those without proper papers) likely arose from the dramatic clearing efforts—the uprooting of all trees and vegetative matter—along the path leading to the factory foundations. The second site, Pass 808, required military approval and escort because the mountain paths that led to this undesignated historical area traversed territory where the border was not yet cleared demarcated/agreed; without a guide, an unfamiliar traveler could very easily end up deep in Thailand’s Sisaket Province without knowing it.

¹⁰⁶ Division 2 is one of seven military divisions (*kângporl thom* កងកម្រិត) which are functionally arranged and report directly to the Ministry of National Defense. Divisions should be composed of 8,000 to 10,000 troops, with each division divided into three functional battalions (artillery, tanks, and anti-aircraft); these should include three platoons per battalion, numbering 100 to 120 people each. The historical issue of whether Cambodia’s adequately fills its rank designations with the requisite number of troops, especially in the war between government forces and those of the Khmer Rouge, has been addressed by a number of analysts (Carney, “The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cambodia,” pp. 189–190,

201–202; Peschoux, *Les «Nouveau» Khmers Rouges Enquête (1979–1990)*, pp. 84–88, 120–122, 126–130). My informant in Anlong Veng confirmed that what numbers *should* constitute larger military units may not concur with the actual status of forces, echoing Peschoux's suggestion that "*il ne s'agit là que d'effectifs théoriques. Il est douteux en effet qu'aucune des grandes divisions [kângporl thom កងពលធំ] de l'ANKD [NADK] atteigne réellement 10 700 hommes*" (Peschoux, p. 121).

¹⁰⁷ The security hierarchy is geographically enumerated along the south side of the road (from west to east): Anlong Veng Police Headquarters (provincial and district, general and tourist), District Office (across the street from the houses of the district chief and two of his assistants), RCAF Region 4 District Headquarters, and the Gendarmerie District Headquarters. (This last site sits across the road from the radio communication center, ICOM "TO 50," which was the government's operation command post for the final offensive against Ta Mok's forces in 1999.) This helm of district authority is concentrated just east of the town's endowed roundabout.

¹⁰⁸ The descending chain of police command follows: Gen. Hok Lundy, the notorious National Police Commissioner at the Ministry of Interior; the provincial police chief (in Samraong); Maj. Pov Ri, deputy director of provincial police, in charge at Anlong Veng; and Cpt. Roeun in charge of the district police precinct. The organization of forces, particularly the police, seems redundant, exposing a microcosm of the larger bureaucratic state apparatus that dominates Cambodian political and administrative spheres. In terms of police, at least at the outset of my research during peacetime, it seemed difficult to imagine that local affairs would require such a large pool of personnel.

¹⁰⁹ Patrol and protection of/in Choam Pass, Darm Chrey, and Kbal Tonsaong is provided by the 150 to 200 soldiers who compose Company 2, under the command of "La," and Company 5, under the command of "Rith." The military liaison with the Anlong Veng Working Group works regularly with the soldiers in these two companies, making frequent trips the mountain to manage their standard of living, salary, weapons, and the border.

¹¹⁰ Numerous examples can be cited: the Tonle Bati riverside in Takeo, the Teuk Chou rapids in Kampot, the mountain base at Oudong outside Phnom Penh, and the seafront at Kep.

¹¹¹ I remained in the country from January 2002 through October 2005, spending extended stays in Anlong Veng as well as monitoring developments there from Phnom Penh.

¹¹² It is also clear that climate plays a role, although no one would cite this quotidian influence. With its weather pattern—something on par with Houston, but impacting a more spartan infrastructure—I immediately learned how torrential downpours, lasting from three to ten hours, hindered conducting fieldwork as well as almost all commercial activity and ministerial agendas. Roads become (temporarily) impassable and people simply remain in whatever location at which they were caught when the storm began. The monsoon season will pose a perennial problem to sustained tourist development.

¹¹³ Falby, "Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland," p. 16.

¹¹⁴ I harbored the perception that long absent accomplishments would materialize in a sudden manner. Having seen plans and projects languish previously in various parts of the country, I had witnessed break-neck paces achieved, once a final decision had been made.

¹¹⁵ These silky (*sautr* ស្រួល) recitations at tourist sites weave threads (*sautr*; Sanskrit: *sutra*) that form a historical fabric, enveloping the visitor.

¹¹⁶ My own (tourist) concern was how incredibly drunk this man was one afternoon, when I passed by on my way back from Pol Pot's grave. Half-dressed and shouting with rifle in hand, he explained to me and my visiting cousin that we required his permission to visit the historical sites (even though no one had been present when we had entered). It was unclear what he wanted us to do, now that we had broken his version of the rules. After about ten minutes of ranting, happenstance came to the rescue: the restaurant owner and military officer from Ta Mok's cliffhouse pulled up on his moto and quickly silenced the guard and ushered us on our way. For my own part, I was not exceptionally concerned, knowing that I had become a familiar face in the district and living with the family of an assistant chief who frequently looked after my well-being. Indeed, I was a bit incredulous at how upset the drunk guard had become. However, I pondered the implications for residents' anticipated tourist influx, and I related these concerns to a receptive Khemarak. In the land of smiling Khmers, even former Khmer Rouge, visitors would be turned off by tourist guardianship such as I had witnessed.

¹¹⁷ One of the tasks that the Ministry of Tourism (and DC–Cam) accomplished was interviewing a number of former Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng, garnering some biographical data and information on the

historical sites. The interviews were sent to DC–Cam for verification and editing, and the corrected 174-page transcript (in Khmer) resides with the ministry. I have also probed informants for biographical data. In the midst of an interview with one commune chief, he spontaneously offered to write down his “autobiography” for me. (This came in the context of giving differing impressions of Ta Mok’s and Pol Pot’s characters and actions.) The offer and the format it would take warrants notice, as “autobiography” is a well-established genre in Cambodia. Developing out of the Marxist–Leninist (Stalinist) tradition of “self-criticism,” this format was employed by the CPK at large group meetings as well as in the “confessions” acquired at S–21. The function of life stories, as a means of garnering information, shifts through various contexts: for purges (exposing traitors), for museum (explicating the truth), for research (evoking the ethnographic).

¹¹⁸ Business owners appeared interested in following the law, likely for their own protection from (exploitative) authorities. It is hard to know whether the licensing program was a response to a local concern or a high-level decision that presumed local concern and was consequently well-received. The licenses also operate within an established Khmer interest in credentials and documents to (officially) sanction their status and activities.

¹¹⁹ This is on top of a district business tax of 10,000 *riel* per month per restaurant/guesthouse owner, which goes to support the district’s administrative work.

¹²⁰ This alignment is rough primarily because of the confusion around the location of Pol Pot’s Secret House (see the guided narrative below). In addition, a number of sites that are included in the zonal listings are/were not part of the original sites established by the Ministry of Tourism (e.g., Khmer Rouge statues, Ta Mok’s Mango Field, and the two radio sites). Among these are locations that are merely designations (some disputed) that lack any indication of historical presence, let alone a signpost. Obviously, the zone lists for ticketing omit some sites that have already been marked with indicators (e.g., Anlong Veng Health Center, Mine Factory at Mountain 200, Pol Pot’s waterfall).

¹²¹ The idea of a foreigner (*bārortés* បារ៉ាតេស) typically refers to Western visitors (“French,” *barang* បារ៉ាង), but can also include north Asian tourists. Especially in Anlong Veng, Thai visitors are tallied separate from the *barang* and other *bārortés*.

¹²² An earlier draft of what would become the guide book, dated 25 July 2002, circulated between the Tourism Ministry and DC–Cam. This document forms the basis for the guided narratives below.

¹²³ There is a bit of divergence of perspective on what constitutes a “museum” in Anlong Veng. Some folks believe the 30 or so sites (that is, the whole district) is the historical tourist area, while others believe that Ta Mok’s lakeside residence and possibly Pol Pot’s mountain house will be places that reflect a more traditional understanding of a curiosity cabinet housing artifacts and narratives. Although these views are not mutually exclusive, they did indicate a lack of consensus.

¹²⁴ The individuals in the district appeared very interested in hawking their Khmer Rouge history so as to reap the economic benefits of an influx of (probably mostly Thai) tourists, on their way to Angkor Wat or Preah Vihear. I would venture to guess that the development of these historical tourist sites also functioned as a means to get Anlong Veng’s border crossing to be officially opened; this would lead to even more lucrative benefits: “smuggling” goods into Cambodia for local (elite) consumption as well as allowing the Thai companies to plunder the district’s timber resources (as the Thais have done with the gem resources in Pailin)—Cambodia exhibits a peculiar consistency in squandering its natural resources and allowing foreign forces to easily extract what assets the country possesses.

¹²⁵ The lack of agreement in the works of foreign scholars on Cambodian history—Chandler, Vickery, Kiernan, Heder, Etcheson—attests to a similar difficulty in addressing larger periods of the Khmer Rouge past.

¹²⁶ On a more practical level, even those who seem to agree on events often possessed different accounts of dates and times. This proved to be the case with those who are socially designated as the holders of historical knowledge. (The Ministry of Tourism also conducted approximately 30 interviews in 2002, which included some of these “designated” informants; it is unclear whether the information they garnered was consistent enough to produce the “accurate” account of Anlong Veng history the government sought.)

¹²⁷ There was certainly no lack of “data” or “knowledge” to be remembered or conveyed about Anlong Veng; in fact, there was an overabundance of information, which appears internally conflicting and often subject to the political/personal goals of those relaying memories and/or those seeking to put these stories into a history (for public consumption). In terms of a tourist agenda, a combination of differences emerged

in aims and perspectives. The indeterminacy of what actually would constitute a/the “museum” underlay the source of variation in opinion about how the tourist endeavor will be implemented and subsequently benefit the local inhabitants. When money for the project becomes available to the ministry, a clear definition of how the sites are supposed to function as tourist destinations may be worked out.

¹²⁸ The lack of formal involvement of commune-level officials was evidenced in their hazy visions of what the museum might constitute (a haziness that may have also been the product of the national government’s lack of a clearly-defined plan). However, most local leaders and villagers recognized that Ta Mok’s lakeside would be the central draw for tourists.

¹²⁹ With regards to the museum structure, Khemarak ruminated that “the plan of the government is to follow the old style of the house and the situation there. Maybe they will make a wax statue, like the activity of Ta Mok working during the Pol Pot time [like at the Cambodian Cultural Village in Siem Reap]. They will repair and rebuild the old buildings, in the whole area, anywhere that is broken down.”

¹³⁰ The 2007 Royal Decree on the arrangement of the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area listed only 14 places for the project (some of which included multiple sites).

¹³¹ Road conditions and seasonal weather largely dictated the accessibility of historical sites. Ta Mok’s house on the lake was a facile excursion even during a monsoon; unlike almost all the other sites, the house provided shelter from storms. Expeditions up the escarpment (to visit Pol Pot’s grave, Ta Mok’s cliffhouse, or Pol Pot’s mountain retreat) were significantly complicated by rain and road damage from heavy (weighty) traffic. The ascent from Chheng Phnom Village to the border crossing at Choam Pass could be a precarious trip in the wet season, as the rising track was composed of slick mud, jutting boulders, and deep tire-dug ruts.

¹³² The Thlat Commune Chief had suggested a variety of objects to display in a Khmer Rouge museum: mines, old Khmer Rouge weapon materials/arms, bamboo punji sticks, proverbs the Khmer Rouge used to tell people, other Khmer Rouge documents, Democratic Kampuchea money. The proverbs were usually against the Vietnamese enemy and about leadership strategy (*yuthasas doeknoam* យុទ្ធសាស្ត្រដឹកនាំ) and how to make war (e.g. “follow up, discuss, [then] take action”). In general, responses I received demonstrated an unrestricted creativity in the minds of (potential) participants. Someone in a position of power, who has some strict ideas about content, will perform the castratory act that will establish meaning out of this excessive *jouissance*—a clear vision shall emerge.

¹³³ These items had yet to be gathered together, let alone out on display. The “tigers cages” were in three different villages spread across the district. The photographs were kept at the Ministry of Tourism office, and Thong Khon personally secured the videocassette.

¹³⁴ A man who had managed documents for Ta Mok had freely shown me his photo collection in 2002. A year later, he was offering viewings of this same gallery to tourists for US\$5.

¹³⁵ Chhang Youk, “*Letter: Memory Exploitation*,” p. 1.

¹³⁶ The informant believed that this was only a partial list of what Ta Mok had intended to commemorate. Ta Mok’s possession of ancient artifacts had been indicated as early as 1994; reports from the successful siege of Anlong Veng by RCAF forces include stories of capture of numerous antiquities (e.g., 12th-century Angkorian lintels) that ensconced various parapets around Ta Mok’s estates (Dodd, “High life of hated Ta Mok is laid bare,” p. 9).

¹³⁷ Vickery’s understanding of the post-DK years suggests little change in the movement even through its waning days at Anlong Veng. In his comments on the 1997 sentencing of Pol Pot, he says: “Peasantism and nationalism are still the KR themes, as they always were, and now they claim to be for liberal democracy and the free market.... Their policies were always in principle pro-peasant, yet they severely damaged peasant livelihood. Now, with a small population dependent on them, and vast wealth from timber sales over the years, it is easy to subsidize their way into popularity among those peasants.... So far, their free market activity has meant stealing the national forests and selling them across the border, and if this is what Cambodia has to hope from them, the country might just as well stick with its current rulers. As for their commitment to liberal democracy, I think we may fairly disbelieve.... As for nationalism, that means aggravated hatred of Vietnam, which was probably the single most destructive element of DK policies, and the motive for most of the officially sanctioned executions” (Vickery, “A non-standard view of the ‘coup,’” p. 11). Some of Kiernan’s work has claimed that nationalist concerns overshadowed revolutionary goals among a Pol Pot faction, which eventually gained control of the movement; however,

there are a number of problems with the substance and structure of his argument, notably the ways in which a preoccupation with making a case for genocide crowds out other analytical factors.

¹³⁸ A difference in leadership style/strategy is apparent at least as early as the DK army's arrival in Anlong Veng (as my research suggested), if not before (as other historical texts demonstrate). Ironically, the demand for "accuracy" in representation will likely omit the persistent differences/contestations in points of view—"the museum as the spectacle's petrification of history."

¹³⁹ Huy, "Anlong Veng Residents Believed Ta Mok did not Commit Crimes," p. 28.

¹⁴⁰ The tension between the two administrative levels helps explain the district chief's late-onset non-cooperation with my research, especially if he identified me (as another outsider) with the Ministry of Tourism. The issue of whose museum and authority has most recently shifted back to memorialization efforts taken on by former Khmer Rouge, as Nhem Em, the S-21 photographer and a present resident of Anlong Veng, has stated his personal interest in creating a multi-media museum in the former stronghold.

¹⁴¹ As early as 1998, the government was conscious of the "artifact" status that Pol Pot possessions might carry, and it was aware that ancient antiquities might be in the Khmer Rouge's hold. To this end, the government deployed armed soldiers to guard the objects and sites. Clearly, some harvesting must have occurred, as relics, both ancient and modern, have arrived at their place *propre* (appropriate; own/ed).

¹⁴² When he received the job, Rong Samlaut [not his real name] was promised he would be given a salary. When one's name is entered in the government list, the job becomes a legal position; often, the new-hire pays the interviewer to have the appointment registered. Rong Samlaut believed that he did not have to pay to get his name on the list, because he had been hired on his merits—even if one of those is being the son of a high commander. One of the two other tourism "employees" with whom he worked, similarly abandoned the work to seek gainful employment elsewhere.

¹⁴³ From my conversations with the two individuals named Rong Samlaut, it is clear that the impostor had purchased the name a few months prior to the real Rong Samlaut deciding to leave his position.

¹⁴⁴ In casual situations, the use of someone's proper name is considered rude. Thus, most interactions with "Rong Samlaut" operate under whatever nickname by which he is called.

¹⁴⁵ The local patronage network, itself a somewhat competitive milieu, is the medium or face that filters/absorbs (the desire for) the infusion of capital that comes with tourist development. The "pervasiveness of patronage" and hierarchy in Cambodian social relations constitutes one of Chandler's four recurring historical themes (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 2, 104–108, 259n22), even as he acknowledges that the nature of these relations has changed over time (p. 19). Certainly, a more comprehensive study of Cambodian patron-client relations, specifically with regard to new (tourism) development endeavors is warranted, developing beyond the work begun by CDRI (Ballard, *Annual Development Review 2006–07*, pp. 190–197). Further work might tie together the "strings" (*khsae* តែ) of clients bound to a patron (*mé* មេ), or "spine" (*khnâng* ក្បា), relations that dominate Cambodia's social organization and increasingly direct its political arena; additional research might also weave in investigations of the ideas of "corruption" and "nepotism" that have dominated (Western-oriented) critiques of authority at all social strata in the capital and the countryside. However, it is beyond the scope of this work to adequately address this vast topic. With that acknowledged, it is important to recognize some contemporary efforts that analyze the changing nature of patronage in Cambodia, its role in rural decision-making, and its inter-imbrication with the political realm. Ledgerwood and Vijghen, arguing against views of post-conflict atomism or a return to a pre-revolutionary state, suggest modifications to the classic model of patron-client relations; their work suggests an approach that addresses relations as being: flexible, under negotiation, rather than permanent; including, rather than in contrast to, kin relations; drastically imbalanced in regards to the protection/benefits provided to the client; and reflecting a decreased influence of Buddhism (Ledgerwood & Vijghen, "Decision-Making in Rural Khmer Villages"). Similarly, Marston adapts the dyadic relationship in discussing the *inscription* of social inequality in modern Cambodian hierarchical relations (Marston, *Cambodia 1991-94*, chap. 4). Hughes also argues for a modification of the traditional model of patronage (from Scott) in Southeast Asian cases, and describes the new character of these post-colonial and post-socialist relations (e.g., the concentration around state bureaucratic institutions) (Hughes, *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition*, pp. 60–67, 70–77). She also examines the way in which the "strongman" figure of Hun Sen plays out through networks of support and how this organization of power shapes ideas about correctness versus effectiveness in Cambodian politics (Hughes, "Dare to Say, Dare to Do," pp. 138–145). In her treatment of the specific

practice of gift-giving in the Cambodian political context, she asserts a more complex interplay of obligation and coercion, beyond the simple notion of enlisting support through material reward (Hughes, "The Politics of Gifts"). Un examines that ways in which the CPP has used the apparatuses of the State—democratic institutions (particularly elections)—to deepen and extend its patron-client relations; his critique of the political façade asserts that the CPP's patronage strategies do not foster "genuine popular political participation" while they simultaneously encourage the spread of corruption (Un, "Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy"). In fact, he echoes Hughes claim that the state bureaucracy becomes "networks of obligation and flows of resources between officials" (Un, p. 227; Hughes, "Dare to Say, Dare to Do," p. 127). These reflections on the political aspects of new forms of patron-client relations would be benefited by an examination of the economic entrenchment of Hun Sen's network (for example, Heder, "Hun Sen's Consolidation"). Burgler, following Thion, has examined the importance of how patronage lines superceded political association as a basis for the wide scope of the CPK's purges: "The individual's political choice centres on questions of personal loyalty more than on an identification with the political line. Conflicts within the top leadership about general policy, ideology, the exercise of power and other such issues that seem purely political at that level, lose more and more of their political character and become more and more a question of loyalty as they descend down to the lowest echelons" (Burgler, *The Eyes of the Pineapple*, p. 124). In tracing out the nepotism of the DK years, one could highlight the positioning of familial folk in the DK administration and CPK hierarchy: Khieu Ponnary (Pol Pot's wife) who was head of DK's Women's Association; Khieu Thirith (Ieng Sary's wife) Minister of Social Action; Yun Yat (Son Sen's wife), Minister of Culture, Education, and Learning; Pol Pot's nephews and nieces at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ieng Sary's daughter who headed Calmette Hospital; and his niece who did English translation work at Radio Phnom Penh. A fuller analysis might establish a consistent social pattern across political regimes.

¹⁴⁶ On the night of 9 September 2003, the traffic of large vehicles could be heard rumbling by the October 23 Guesthouse, perhaps coming from the direction of Trabaing Prassat. On the morning of 10 September 2003 on the way to Cherng Phnom Village, I encountered eight or ten empty large trucks that appeared to be returning from on top of the mountain. These suspicions were confirmed when a business operator on the escarpment related (complained) that the road to the mountaintop had been badly damaged by the trucks, to the extent that even he (a daily traveler to and from the mountain) had a minor moto accident along the road.

¹⁴⁷ A foreigner involved in purchasing materials conveyed that merawan timber (*Hopea odorata*) (*koki* កកិ) was selling for US\$62 per cubic meter in Anlong Veng, while the same wood would sell for US\$300 in Siem Reap town. He noted that processed and used wood were assessed differently than the fresh timber that was legally forbidden from crossing provincial lines.

¹⁴⁸ The expected arrival date of service from both network towers had been the subject of locals' ongoing varying estimations, with some saying "one week more" and others saying "one month"; similar guesses were ventured over a six-month period. While delays persisted for whatever reasons, the town's two radio communications centers remained the only means of contacting outside areas (besides travel by road) until late 2003.

¹⁴⁹ The CamShin tower was the first to be erected, and it resides next door (to the west) of the district chief's house. The Mobitel tower is south of the newest market and on the east side of the main road (almost directly across the street from Mohaleap Restaurant/Guesthouse).

¹⁵⁰ At that time, power was supplied from 6 AM until 11 PM with two short outage periods, one in the late morning and one in the early evening/late afternoon.

¹⁵¹ Some shops in town offered the local purified product at 1500r for a six-pack of one-liter bottles. Nationally, prices for water were re-settling to 2000r after the bottling shortage following the Thai riots (January 2003) had been overcome. Prices for water in Anlong Veng had typically hovered around 2000r with some variation (2500r to 1800r) from store to store. Although the low price may have been enabled by a local supplier, most shops still tended to sell water from O Smach or even Samraong.

¹⁵² Although residents perceived this new power as cheap (relative to times immediately preceding), the price for electricity in Anlong Veng (similar to other rural areas) was more than threefold that charged in Phnom Penh.

¹⁵³ When the family at the October 23 Guesthouse acquired a television and VCD player/video game unit, the new gear seemed to eclipse time otherwise spent chatting with neighbors.

¹⁵⁴ Even as the crossing is an international border, Thais were only allowed to enter Oddar Meanchey Province (not Cambodia as a whole), and Khmers were only allowed to enter Sisaket Province (with passes issued on their respective sides).

¹⁵⁵ The most intense day was the border opening when hundreds of pick-up trucks raced between the mountain pass and the town, stirring up a red haze of dust that lasted all day and into the evening.

¹⁵⁶ The market spans both sides of the road, south to the old site of Nhoen's house and north just beyond where Nov's kitchen stands in disrepair. With the greater number of resident sellers at Choam Pass also came an increase in the quantity of trash in the area, heaped and strewn in areas not used for selling, but still an unavoidable eyesore. Some of the historical sites valued for tourism potential are cordoned by long piles of market rubbish—an exiting (non-Trotskyist) minority confined to a trash heap of history.

¹⁵⁷ A reciprocal Thai market for Khmer consumers was set up on the other side, but later reports indicated this plaza's existence was short-lived.

¹⁵⁸ I became involved in documenting some of these ills in 1999, especially the pernicious spread of HIV/AIDS in border areas, where a perceived lawlessness is fostered and reinforced (Wood, "Site Assessment Study Koh Kong, Cambodia"). Growing political attention has been given to the socio-economic degradation that occurs with the dominance of casino enterprises at the border. (By law, Cambodians are not allowed entry to casinos; the venues are established on the border to provide gambling opportunities to visitors from Thailand, where casinos are outlawed.) In 2002, opposition members of the Cambodian National Assembly questioned the government regarding "the increasing crime associated with the thriving drug production, drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering industries, which are led by the mafia behind the facade of casinos" (Sam Rainsy Party, "Mafia and Money Extortion in Poipet"). This illicit activity that flourishes in the border areas, especially Poipet, and its effects on Cambodian governance have received international scrutiny (US Department of State, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report—2003*, vols. 1 and 2; Lintner, "Betting on The Border," pp. 53–54).

¹⁵⁹ One specific case, which drew my attention to the issue, was the arrest of a skirmish of youth, which included the son of the owners of a well-established restaurant. The kids were detained at the Gendarmerie base near the Anlong Veng primary school. The restaurant owner expressed her wish that they keep her son locked up, because his behavior had gotten out of control, he had started spending a lot of time with these delinquent juveniles, and more incidents were erupting. This level of parental resignation—certainly absent from any previous conversations—followed only five months after the border opened; a general sense of fear/crime was related by numerous acquaintances in that same period of social re-adjustment to outside influences.

¹⁶⁰ Precedent for new roads enabling fresh roadside enterprises for elites was established with the Prime Minister's 1999 directive to re-route the entry to Anlong Veng, abandoning the airstrip and founding the new market.

¹⁶¹ Three bridges in Prey S'at became unusable. Other bridges, which had not yet collapsed, showed significant signs of stress; large ruts became larger; formerly smooth sections of road grew new potholes.

¹⁶² Even more noteworthy was the phenomenon of limited parking. So few cars had roamed the district in the past that the small areas in front of local eateries or guesthouses had remained spaciously open. With the post-peace, post-border opening, post-development vehicular inundation, the accommodation of patrons' transports became a daily issue.

¹⁶³ These were: the ICOM near the UNICEF office; CamShin (011) tower; Mobitel (012) tower; and the newest phone service addition, Samart (016). Along with these accomplishments in the realm of telecommunications, Anlong Veng offered a cable TV service, its office located on the south side of town (not far from a new clinic). In spite of these improvements, a connection to the internet from the former KR stronghold remained elusive through my departure in 2005.

¹⁶⁴ Like many business initiatives in Anlong Veng, the new "new market" was embroiled in some controversy. It seemed that the district chief had been attempting to arrange a re-vamping of Anlong Veng's old market, near the junction of the road to Samraong/O Smach. A number of business owners followed this indication, and some new shops and restaurants began to populate the area around the junction. However, some form of mass appeal to elite authorities in Phnom Penh allowed the newest market to be built in the area south of the district office. (This move marks a decreasing capacity on the part of the district chief to impose his will on Anlong Veng developments and, therefore, an inability to reap the profits from those impositions as well. Local residents have become more willing to make clear some of the chief's efforts and how they have not worked.)

¹⁶⁵ The influx may congeal with the Ministry of Tourism's plans for the area as it tends to "dilute" the previously dense population of former Khmer Rouge, a process CPK elite would have interpreted as microbes infecting their base. The takeover by economically-oriented "new people" marks a definitive end of the revolution.

¹⁶⁶ For example, a commune chief with whom I had frequent interactions, had built a beautiful large new home made of high quality wood; this new house sits perhaps five meters back from his former meager abode. As well, a former aide to Ta Mok, and already the owner of a stately residence, began construction of a rather unique-looking second house near Arpiwhat Village. The guesthouses that are owned by assistant district chiefs, continued with upgrades and additions. The "Prodigal Son" guesthouse added a second structure of hotel-like units; next door at the October 23 Guesthouse, construction an additional building was following suit (at an estimated cost of around US\$30,000).

¹⁶⁷ Given that an overwhelming majority of residents in the district (and all but one of my informants, the chief of a rather remote commune) originate from other provinces, the "coming to Anlong Veng" narrative is a common story, and it often involves a multiplicity of arrivals. Most of my informants were Khmer Rouge soldiers, so typically they first "came with the Democratic Kampuchea Army"; others have come to the district following the 1999 peace in hopes of business opportunities, and their migration tales offer differing motivations and storylines. In conversations with most informants, "struggle"—in the form of war (and urban evacuations), military/social reintegration, (inter/nationally-sponsored) "development," and looting—seemed to recurrently invoke the theme of (re-) "arrivals." The expression of this mobility/circulation manifested as: soldiers' inter-provincial immigrations, ending in Anlong Veng (when Ta Mok called the forces together); the successive retreats and advances of the Democratic Kampuchea Army and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces from the Dangrek Mountains to the district proper and back again; cross-border movement of the outlawed organization to/from Thailand (perhaps in tandem with military advances/retreats or commercial stimuli); shifting, multiplying, and re-constructing residences; driving cars and road repair (the infrastructure of circulation); a growing influx of "new people" seeking business opportunities and NGOs seeking development; and the visitation of foreigners—journalists and tourists (and social researchers)—to sites within the district. This theme and these phenomena should be put in contrast to the Ministry of Tourism's historical tourist endeavors which (attempt to) fix a determination, preservation, and even re-construction of sites/stability (for the purposes of consumption), with a consequent elimination of indeterminacy and change. (The very notion of a site exposes some assumptions about the possible stability of objects of re-presentation.) Further description of how this theme arises is provided in the site-specific guided narratives (below), as each site exhibits the differing historical pressures and forces that shape its location, structural remnants, and characteristic traces.

¹⁶⁸ The inchoate prior—largely discarded by the ministry but also very unclear to the resident informants—is the chaos out of which lines are drawn, sites are recognized, concepts established, *the* History is composed, and "historical-tourist" areas are designated.

¹⁶⁹ In conversations with villagers, it has become clear that many locations throughout Anlong Veng district exist under two names, attesting to the mobility and paleonymy of the district's internal divisions. When the Khmer Rouge moved down from the mountain, beginning in 1989, they demarcated areas to arrange villages according to the unit forces that stayed with the village; each village may have taken on a subsequent designation which may describe a physical characteristic (e.g., Tuol Tbeng, Tuol Kandal) or an abstract concept (e.g., Ekapheap, Aphivath). Sometimes, the military unit number remains the predominant reference for a village (such as Village 105). Unraveling the former hierarchy seems intertwined with the geographical mapping of the area. I was able to decipher a number of these duplicitous villages: Divisions 920 and 800 formed Tuol Sala; 920 also encompasses O Thom, O Chik, O Beng, and Chrak villages; 980 became a village on the way to Thlat commune; 105/Thnal Kaing; 507/Phteak Chram. Interestingly, Srah Chhouk, a large village that was intended to become its own commune under Ta Mok, did not have a division number associated with it; it was a place of factory (sawmill) workers, medical staff, engine mechanics, and carpenters, and it was referred to as the "Ministry." Adding to the challenge of mapping out these sites, a couple informants have described areas on the mountain which were formerly inhabited by Khmer Rouge (e.g. Teuk Keo, under the previous control of Division 785) but which have now simply been taken over by the jungle. Further, it seems that villages and communes have moved and taken their names along with them. Thus, informants talked about areas where Lumtong and Trabaing Tauv communes as well as O Chunchean/Yeang Kang Cherng Village used to be.

¹⁷⁰ The manager of Ta Mok's warehouse reasoned: "This place is a characteristic of war. All the places where the Khmer Rouge built—the warehouse or the houses for public leaders or the sawmill—all these things the Khmer Rouge used for fighting the government. If the Khmer Rouge did not build these, they could not fight the government. To make war on each side, they must have people living in the base and also have soldiers stationed at the front. The people at the bases have to work hard, farm rice, and do everything to support the soldiers, and they need leaders to guide them in making war. For example, if we have fish and no salt, the fish goes bad. But if we have salt, we have fish. Salt can be like the leaders, and the people at the base are like the fish. People cannot make war without their leaders, so all the signs which are put everywhere in Anlong Veng District are very important, because people want to see how the Khmer Rouge made war with the government. People can see the last base of the Khmer Rouge, and the other bases of the Khmer Rouge are not different from the last one."

¹⁷¹ Recall that Cambodia can be seen as the victim of outside forces under perpetual threat of extinction.

¹⁷² This suggests an arbitrary character of the ministry's founding of History on *concrete* remains.

¹⁷³ Pass 808, also referred to as Chrach or Ba Traveng, was the (public) Khmer Rouge headquarters from 1981 to 1985, before most of this staff moved to the Thai side of Choam Pass. A small handful of informants have memories of this area, and my own tour of the border-hugging former encampment in 2002 uncovered only faint residues of a prior command center. Kamm and Short (developing Kamm's description) indicate that "Base 808" was a public seat of the ousted DK government from 1980 until June 1982 (Kamm, *Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land*, pp. 177–183; Short, *The History of a Nightmare*, pp. 413–414, 420); thousands of Khmer Rouge civilians, detached from Ta Mok's retreat in April 1998, took refuge at the lapsed base (Barber & Bou, "Anlong Veng death rattle," p. 8).

¹⁷⁴ A history of borders—1955 diplomatic relations, Brevie line, etc.—edges up to the assertion that Cambodia has been a victim of its geographical placement/outside forces.

¹⁷⁵ This movement evokes some socio-historical tendencies: 1) patron-client relations, nepotism, and networks as a cultural constant in Cambodia for 1500 years, and 2) parallel regionalism in the pre-1975 "Communist" movement, FUNK.

¹⁷⁶ The tellings about movement to, from, and within Anlong Veng suggests a rear base as "residence" for divisions fighting in other provinces.

¹⁷⁷ "Instability" becomes an obstacle to development as seen by tourist officials as well as Khmer Rouge when reflecting on their past.

¹⁷⁸ Ultimately (what is), the fragments of the sites themselves form ellipses: remnants (and a denied, but perhaps recreated, wholeness); unanswered questions about sites (un-specificity), "enduring unknowns"; ongoing transformation (looting/de-construction, logging, touristicization (guesthouse/restaurant), natural decay ("jungle"), parcelization,....

¹⁷⁹ Even within the emphasis on commercialization a number of alternatives come to mind: from the blue tents and roasted chicken to Tuol Sleng-style sobriety to Williamsburg, Virginia (a hyperconformity to the past).

¹⁸⁰ The italicized paragraphs that begin each section are my translations of Ros Ren's site summaries which will form the basis for the Anlong Veng guidebook. The summaries were drafted in a letter that circulated between the Ministry of Tourism and DC-Cam, dated 25 July 2002. These sections are intended to textually mimic the guided explorations of Anlong Veng's history: an explanation of the mountaintop sites with the aid of a journalist who daily worked with Pol Pot; a tour of Pass 808 and the Mountain 200 mine production factory with one of Ta Mok's former drivers; a trip to Son Sen's house and other key residences on the mountain with a man who lived with the former Defense Minister; and a guided venture to Ta Mok's Warehouse with a local villager who had guarded the forest-hidden site. The descriptions synthesize fieldwork, Tourism Ministry research, DC-Cam addenda, and news clippings to provide a view of the histories and uses of the sites in Anlong Veng as well as to express a wide range of issues that arise at these destinations. A more complete listing of the names and locations of sites—those officially included as well as supplementary loci—can be found in Appendix 1. Maps of the areas are laid out in Appendix 2.

¹⁸¹ It is widely established that the Khmer Rouge sent cadre abroad (to China), for training and education, but it is also known that certain education efforts were undertaken within the country as well. A first-hand testimony by a French woman, Laurence Picq, *Au-delà du ciel*, explains how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the "B1" office, in her case), under the direction of Ieng Sary, was involved in the education of young cadre in Phnom Penh throughout the entire period of Khmer Rouge rule. One of my informants, who spoke openly about his education during that period, further showed how this experience is what

enabled his personal associations and connections with higher-ups within the Khmer Rouge. He arrived in the capital in 1975, and Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary asked him to study languages (at a site to the west of the Railway Station, near the current Council of Ministers office, near the statue of two deer). Nuon Chea's three children (two daughters and a son) also studied there. In the first year, there were more than 300 students asked to study: 50 studied English, 50 studied Chinese, 25 studied Vietnamese, and others studied a variety of other languages. (In 1977, Vietnamese instruction was ceased, and more students were encouraged to study Thai, French, and Spanish.) The school was run by Mr. Veun and Mrs. An Sai. Mr. Veun was a department chief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of adolescents while they were studying. Mrs. An Sai was the wife of the DK Ambassador to Thailand as well as a department chief in the ministry; she collected together the documents used for instruction. Mr. Sohong is identified as vice director of the ministry, under Ieng Sary. Along with a number of other students, my informant's roundabout arrival in Anlong Veng (via Svay Sisophon, then Malai, and through Chreik Village in Thailand) was overseen and organized by Mr. Sohong. This story demonstrates (again) that Democratic Kampuchea attempted to educate people; however, it seems this education (e.g., language instruction) was reserved for a select few. It also seems clear that once educated, Democratic Kampuchea officials deemed those students to be assets of sorts that should be preserved. Thus, Mr. Sohong taking the students to the Dangrek Mountains seems consistent with *Angkar's* agenda of conserving its intellectual capital. Furthermore, the schooling of elites' offspring suggests not only a degree of privilege afforded to a particular echelon, but it also demonstrates a reproductive (or symbiotic) relationship between rulers, education, and the regeneration of authority figures.

¹⁸² Every Thursday, teachers were asked to gather at the wooden school for training in pedagogy and mathematics. One informant, who used to teach at the wooden school, said that he taught grade 5 as well as geography, geometry, history, natural sciences, and mathematics. Thai was the only foreign language allowed to be taught. He obtained documents from Thailand and from the Cambodian government; from these two sources, he composed lessons for the teachers. In the subject of history, students were taught about the history of Vietnamese soldiers invading Cambodia; in geography, students were taught from the same material used by the Cambodian government. History books could not be prepared by the teachers themselves; they were received from the Khmer Rouge leaders through the superintendent of schools.

¹⁸³ There are parallels in how regimes prioritize the control of history. First, it was not until recently that the government in Phnom Penh allowed history books which covered the 1970 to 1979 period of Cambodian history, mainly because the determination of the presentation was an extremely controversial exercise. Second, the Ministry of Tourism is attempting to *determine* and establish/present the history of the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng.

¹⁸⁴ Over the course of my research, it became apparent that former Khmer Rouge with greater education were more forthcoming with the political reasons explaining how they came to joined the Khmer Rouge. A couple informants could trace their involvement back to student groups in which they participated or to the intellectual reasoning behind their support for the Khmer Rouge. The key ideas underlying these political explanations are: 1) a change was required in order to help Cambodian society, and 2) the fact that the Khmer Rouge demonstrated a concern for the poor. Like the population in general, the bulk of my informants are minimally educated peasants, and their primary stated reason for joining the revolutionary forces emanated from the Sihanouk's March 1970 post-coup instructions to the "children" of his kingdom.

¹⁸⁵ An odd mimesis of Williamsburg is opened up in the everyday.

¹⁸⁶ Although structures may conventionally thought to be stable or stationary, these objects (places) were perhaps equally subject to struggle as their inhabitants. In fact, recurrent liberations of the Anlong Veng territory made (re-)constructions of the houses possible. The mobility of the structures—from both struggle (war) and looting—suggests an "arrival" of sites themselves. Although the various buildings on the property owe their provisional existences to the area's history of conflict, Ta Mok's Lakeside Villa figures as a cornerstone of the Ministry of Tourism's museum (stabilization) effort.

¹⁸⁷ It is clear that Ta Mok had at least three principal residences at various times through his stay in Anlong Veng. Initial research indicates that some of these were constructed at the same time, and they were clearly understood in relation to one another. The three largely acknowledged residences include: the cliff house residence (the middle house at Darm Chrey), the "middle house" (in Khlaing Kandal), and the lakeside villa. Family members indicated a fourth residence of the leader, which was also near the lake in Teuk Chum village, a few kilometers away from the villa. The Teuk Chum lakeside residence was described as the "real house" of Ta Mok, as the lakeside villa was intended to be given over to the villagers as a

museum. However, Ta Mok spent more time at the villa than at this secondary lakeside residence. Almost every piece of wood from the Teuk Chum site seemed to have been scavenged, leaving the area overgrown. Even the former guardhouse and bodyguard residence associated with the house are empty sites. Not surprisingly, this site has not been granted historical-tourist recognition by the Ministry of Tourism. (A short distance from this site, close to the main road, is a dilapidated hut, which is said to have been a warehouse that stored uniforms.)

¹⁸⁸ A boat trip on Lake O Chik makes possible an up-close familiarity with the locations that were of former importance (before occupation of the territory by government forces and before the construction of the dam). Pol Pot's riverside residence, built in 1992, was formerly situated on the banks of O Chik (Dig Stream). The house, along with many others, was burned down in 1993 by Ta Mok's soldiers as the government army approached. As the dam was built in the following years, the burnt remains are presently under water. (Despite its relative absence, the site is demarcated on a Ministry of Tourism map of the historical tourist area.) The house had been built of wood and stone, and given that the lake/reservoir is quite shallow, one might be able to walk on the partially-submerged foundational remains of the structure. Above-water clearings in the lotus plants and other freshwater shrubbery are the only indications of a trajectory that would parallel the route of a road (to the residence) below the surface. The submerged sites in the lake suggest how objects/sites are subjected to struggle (war—advancing and retreating armies) and human labour/intervention (the impact of the dam), in similar ways to how local (mobile) populations have been effected. Although the structures are basically invisible, the boat tour of O Chik offers some potential interest for tourists, providing excellent views of the town and other historical sites (e.g., the hospital, lakeside villa, etc.). A ten-minute canoe ride from the lakeside villa brings the visitor to the only above-water structural remains. It appears as a concrete closet, and it was likely part of the tallest building in the immediate area. The structure was explained to be a vault (although there is disagreement among informants), a building to hold the money of Democratic Kampuchea (examples of which informants have shown me). This debilitated site was somehow involved in the organization's regulation of local commerce and trade. (While Thai baht were used for the purchase of goods from Pailin, DK money was used for goods that had been acquired from Thailand and then (re-)sold in Anlong Veng. It is clear that the circulation of this money was tightly controlled, with cadre expecting surpluses to be kept in the vault.) In 1993, the Khmer Rouge elite had plans to stop the circulation of Democratic Kampuchea script; they had intended to gather up all the bills and keep them in this vault. It would be ironic that, given the reports of how Democratic Kampuchea sought to abolish money (in the 1970s), the only (above-water) standing testament of the presence/existence of DK residence in the man-made (Khmer Rouge-made) lake is the trace of a place to store currency, both DK bills and Thai baht. Huy Sophorn chronicles this post-1979 clash of cash (Huy Sophorn, "A Pure Society is One without Money," p. 25).

¹⁸⁹ In fact, my "initial" tour of the site seems to have followed the confusion that claims the Tourism Ministry's blue signs for Khieu Samphan's House and Pol Pot's Secret House are switched. Some reliable informants indicated that the indicator sign for the site called "Pol Pot's Secret House" is in the correct location. (It may be that my "previous" visit to the site simply ended at a random clearing in the woods.) The (newly-discovered) site lies 4.1 km north of the central Anlong Veng roundabout. The sign on the west side of the road correctly marks the path which proceeds through Khlaing Kandal village. Along the route (about 250 m west of the road) resides "Ta Mok's Middle House" (lower) on the south side of the road. Pol Pot's Secret House can be accessed by a foot path (or "short-cut" as my guide referred to it) which breaks off the primary path 50 m west of the broken dam (built in 1997, perhaps two weeks before Son Sen was killed), continues almost invisibly through rice fields and forest, and arrives at the southeast edge of the site. A road also proceeds to the site and travels along its west side; however, this road was built after integration, suggesting that the footpath short-cut may have been the primary means of access. (The road to the site proceeds west off the main road, past the middle house, and following the detour that links the two pieces of road separated by the broken dam. Shortly after the dam, the road splits; in order to arrive at the south entrance to the site, one must follow the north fork and proceed north by northwest.) Around the house was built a sconce (perhaps 1 to 2 m high and 1.5 m wide), square in shape with each side measuring 50 to 70 m, which even in its current state, would obscure any internal structures from vision. One wooden house was built in the compound; concrete was about to be laid when the war flared up. The site has one bomb shelter, two entrance/exit gates (one near the northwest corner and one on the south side), two ponds inside, and one large pond outside (to the northwest, visible from the entrance point).

¹⁹⁰ Two possible events may have sparked this fear. Hun Sen's move to outlaw the Khmer Rouge may have generated some panic when the implications of the ban became fully understood in Anlong Veng. Ieng Sary's defection may have also led Anlong Veng elites to believe that the RCAF would be able to more fully concentrate its forces on the Khmer Rouge's last stronghold.

¹⁹¹ Like some Khmer males, he seems to play at being a "big man," and it appeared that he would attempt to use his experience living with Ta Mok as a means of asserting his personal importance. The possibility that his memory might be inaccurate in a few instances may constitute a loss of face or a challenge to his self-confidence.

¹⁹² This insistence led us to visit what he was calling "Khieu Samphan's House" (in Khlaing Kandal), which was essentially a non-site not very far from the (actual) site of Pol Pot's secret house.

¹⁹³ The rumor, however, was consistent, as there was no presence of a counter-rumor throughout the village suggesting a different demarcation or identification.

¹⁹⁴ His idea that the sign was "misplaced" derived not from it being switched with another site. Khieu Samphan's House lies 3 km from the main road, and two turn-offs can lead to this destination. The informant's charge was that the sign was 1) too far from the actual site, and 2) at the trailhead for the longer route to get there.

¹⁹⁵ The site is located 150 m west of the main road on the south side of the path that would proceed on toward "Pol Pot's Secret House" (sometimes confusingly called "Khieu Samphan's House"). What remains is a long water basin that is so hole-shot that it can no longer hold any liquid volume. Adjoining this long remnant is a large square concrete expanse. A wooden house on stilts has been constructed next to the concrete slab. According to the residents, the middle house had originally been constructed from wood and brick, but invading government soldiers looted the house in order to build a military camp and left one wall remaining. That final wall has subsequently collapsed. The nearby elevated residence was built more recently on the site, next to the large cement foundation; the owner went off to fight in the war, and government soldiers arrived and took control of the new wooden residence. The current owner indicates that the military had the intention of selling the property, but in 1998 she persuaded a high commander to give it to her and her daughter, simply because she is poor. It is curious to see a site of historical significance such as Ta Mok's middle house and performance arena (although not yet designated by the ministry) to be given away to an impoverished woman and her daughter; the story seemed somewhat unbelievable, but perhaps it is a striking example of Khmer compassion and generosity. (This transfer of ownership stands in contrast to the issue of land claims in the area surrounding Son Sen's grave, discussed below.)

¹⁹⁶ Ta Mok seems to have built houses in sets of three. On the mountain, there are a house-become-warehouse located near the current border checkpoint office, the vegetative void of a "middle house" that bordered a mango field, and a cliffhouse whose foundations in Darm Chrey have become a restaurant and guesthouse in peacetime. (According to some conflicting details, the "middle house on the mountain," built in 1994, refers to two houses in the same area on the mountain and these housed eight or nine men and their families. When Son Sen arrived on the mountain in the 1996/1997 dry season, this house became the residence for him and his family; Nuon Chea took up residence in the other house quite close to Son Sen's place. These were the homes that were attacked by Pol Pot's henchmen in 1997, in an attempt to exterminate Son Sen, his family, and possibly others.) Many informants reasoned that the "middle house" (whether the mango orchard house or the cliffhouse) received its name because it lay between Choam Pass and Kbal Tonsaong. In the flatland area below, Ta Mok had a "middle house" (lower) in Khlaing Kandal, which informants claimed, received its name from being between the Darm Chrey cliffhouse and the residence on the O Chik). Completing the trio in the flatlands are the lakeside villa, which consisted of a varying number of structures over time (the most significant being the meeting hall), and a lesser-known/lesser-recognized residence in Teuk Chum Village, which was also quite close to the lake. Supplementally (and adding confusion only in terms of tourism demarcations), there was also a *matériel* warehouse (*khleang bârikhaasoek* ភ្នំបរិក្ខារ) in Cherng Phnom Village—a large structure surrounded by some smaller guard houses, all obscured by a tropical canopy subject to contemporary encroachment—which the Ministry of Tourism has placarded "Ta Mok's Warehouse" a separate destination from the Middle Warehouse ruins.

¹⁹⁷ An earlier phase is discernible in the development of a DK politico-cultural apparatus. The initial endeavors were journalistic, taking the form of newspapers (*Revolutionary Flag* and *National Liberation*

Front)—under editors Touch Ren (alias Kren) and Chou Chet (alias Sy)—and radio (Voice of Democratic Kampuchea). Touch Ren was a member of the Southwest Zone Standing Committee, later worked with Hu Nim at the Ministry of Information, and now lives in Paris; Chou Chet was CPK Secretary of the Western Zone until he was purged by the Organization in March 1978. After DK's ousting, Touch Ren controlled the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports and the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts (by some accounts, these are combined into one ministry). Through these ministerial posts, he trained select students and maintained the radio station. In 1980, a group of 46 students (43 males and three females) were selected from all over to live near Pol Pot at Phnom Kravanh (in Koh Kong Province). Touch Ren took charge of training these young cadres. From my informants' perspectives, the intention of the organization's elite was to draw off the specialties of these students and assign them to appropriate departments in the formation of a new government. In 1982, Pol Pot sent 20 students to study different subjects in China for six months (essentially, different aspects of radio broadcasting). Out of these domestic and foreign trainings emerged a number of people who were later to provide the cultural material and technical expertise for the transmissions over Voice of Democratic Kampuchea.

¹⁹⁸ Kheum Ngon figures in a prominent narrative among the Anlong Veng locals. Popular local belief states that Kheum Ngon is a primary reason the Khmer Rouge were ultimately defeated in Anlong Veng. As the story goes, he fell sick and was sent to a hospital in Thailand. From there, he established communication with Hun Sen, providing information that enabled the government army to seize Anlong Veng. After the peace, he became a brigadier general in Phnom Penh; throughout the early 2000s, his lakeside estate in Anlong Veng was rarely graced with his presence. In November 2007, he was charged with the abduction and killing of British de-miner Christopher Howes. The mini-narrative of his betrayal stands in contrast to popular views of Ta Mok as a local hero.

¹⁹⁹ "My Oxcart" was about Democratic Kampuchea making people grow rice and not allowing them to join the Vietnamese army and the Hun Sen army (KUFNS). "The Landscape of Kravanh Mountain" (in Pursat) praises the beauty of nature and the moment of struggle. "Legend Song" addresses a Vietnamese story about a high commander sent to fight in Cambodia. The song attempts to disgrace the legend, because the protagonist seeks to take Cambodia. "Get Up Brothers and Sisters and Join Against the Vietnamese Army," a rather upbeat song, encourages "para" troops (KPNLF and the Sihanoukist army) and the DK army to join together. My informant said there were thousands of songs that he sang for the Khmer Rouge radio. "Soldier's Precepts," written in 1996, is specifically about Anlong Veng culture.

²⁰⁰ The sign stands in Srah Chhouk Village, about 250 m north of the market area (and cut-off to the pagoda). Many informants have indicated that the sign should be moved north 800 m to Cherng Phnom, just north of the village's southern boundary marker. My access to this site suggests that the change would make for a more direct approach to the area, although villagers have indicated that the two roads merge about 2.5 km down the path. Proceeding along this northerly path (from Cherng Phnom), approximately 3.45 km from the main road lies the turn-off (north) for Khieu Samphan's house. (Continuing straight/west, instead of turning, leads to Thkeam Romeas Village; the road, which the Khmer Rouge built, used to extend to O Smach but is now broken.)

²⁰¹ In terms of layout, the houses seem to have been constructed in pairs. The easternmost house is in an area of high grass on the north side of the road with remnants of wood marking its location. The most recognizable feature in the remains are two small stakes sticking up just above the grass. This house seems to have had a kitchen attached to it. Further west lies another residence, and it remains a patch of grass with bits of wood. Significantly, toward the southeast corner of this second house, lies a well which is now overgrown with bushes; the wood pieces lining the top edges of the well are still visible through the shrubbery. The path entering the area forks just beyond the first two houses, composing what appears to have been driveways for the western houses. Only a few pieces of wood are present at the clearing of the third house; however, there are a number of very aged and rusty food containers. These included tomato (paste) cans, canned milk, anchovy tin, and a ketchup bottle, all of which seemed to be of Thai origin. To the north of this third structure lies another well, and to the northwest of the well is an outhouse (a hole in the ground with planks of wood, which one informant claimed was built by and for the bodyguards of the area). The fourth house is the hardest to discern in terms of structural traces. My guide explained that some villagers cleared the area for rice farming and in the process burned some of the wood that made the westernmost residence. The houses resided on the edge of what is now a large clearing (perhaps a product of the villagers' recent efforts), which affords a view of the mountain.

²⁰² For a contemporary archaeological example in a Cambodian context, see Dougald O'Reilly's work recovering bangles, beads, and epaulettes at a late prehistoric cemetery in Banteay Meanchey (Lon Nara, "Phum Snay ruined, other sites in danger," p. 5). After the looting of this Northwestern site, O'Reilly went on to found Heritage Watch, an NGO that seeks to reduce artifacts smuggling through government policy and education.

²⁰³ Local inhabitants are not the only people mildly concerned about artifacts. The ex-pat claimant of Pol Pot's toilet seat expressed nervousness about the possession of the commodious curio, especially given statements by the government about historical artifacts; Pol's pot was removed from its place of prominence at Siem Reap's Ivy Bar (Gee, "Travelers Attracted by Khmer Rouge Sites and Souvenirs," p. 17).

²⁰⁴ The building appears to have been quite large, extending 30–40 m north to south and another 30 m east to west. The channels may have been areas for the large saw blades or access passages to the machinery above. In the cement foundations, there are three Khmer inscriptions. The first is almost certainly incorrect (off by one decade); it reads "16.6.84" followed by some unclear Khmer script (perhaps a name, Ahn). The second inscription, located one or two meters south of the first, reads "Solidarity Group Srah Chhouk Commune Sawmill 28.6.94." The third inscription, right beside the second, reads "United to build the sawmill are the national force and our national force 28.6.94." The markings (excepting the first) indicate that the foundations were laid in June 1994, shedding doubt on the accuracy of one informant's account.

²⁰⁵ During the construction, a group of 30 Thais assisted 32 Khmers; the Khmers did the construction, and the Thai engineers did the mechanical/engine parts. The long construction time is accounted for by the fact that the sawmill had seven engines used for cutting wood and two additional machines for planing and leveling. The mill's typical daily capacity was 30 cubic meters of wood. Usually, a staff of 30 laborers worked the site, with an additional 20 to 30 brought in when greater work was required.

²⁰⁶ Global Witness, *Cambodia's Family Trees*, p.12. Global Witness had been a tenacious monitor of the illegal logging business in Cambodia through the 1990s, producing detailed reports exposing the areas and individuals involved (Global Witness, *Logs of War*, pp. 17–22; *idem*, *Thai-Khmer Rouge Links and the Illegal Trade in Cambodia's Timber*, which provides details on cross-border timber trade via specific Khmer Rouge border encampments). For its sin of perseverance, it was appointed to become the government watchdog for the country's forestry sector in 1999; for over-achieving in that official capacity, the organization was dismissed as forestry monitor in 2003.

²⁰⁷ The sale of timber to the Thais was a recurrent issue in the post-UNTAC period, as the international community understood the significant revenues the Khmer Rouge continued to secure from harvesting wood. Logging and gem-mining generated US\$100–150 million for the organization (Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 105); Global Witness suggests that in 1995 timber alone netted the Khmer Rouge US\$10–20 million per month (Global Witness, *Logs of War*, p. 18). Fawthrop also inventories Ta Mok's Thai business deals through the Khukan Aroonsawat Group, which included a logging company, gas station, and restaurant. Fawthrop's point is to demonstrate the complicity and involvement of Thai military officials and businessmen in sustaining the Khmer Rouge while it lingered in Anlong Veng (Fawthrop, "Ta Mok: A guerilla with a taste for business," p. 6). The UN enacted sanctions on Thailand in the early 1990s forbidding the country from conducting cross-border timber deals (with the Khmer Rouge), and there were times when logs rotted in Anlong Veng as the Thais abided; the US 1997 Foreign Operations Act further increased pressure on the Thais as it threatened cessation of military aid to countries that engaged in trade with the Khmer Rouge (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 133).

²⁰⁸ The most flagrant logging adventure that this impromptu "local witness" observed occurred shortly after Global Witness was removed from its position (for being too good at its oversight). Soon after the more lenient, elite-friendly *Société Générale de Surveillance* (SGS) took over, the nighttime convoy through Anlong Veng occurred. Trees were harvested from the mountaintop along the border with Thailand and transported down the rocky precipice and the district's main drag, making a left turn at the roundabout to lumber by the district chief's house and on to a secret border crossing near Tumnuop Daich in Trabaing Prassat District.

²⁰⁹ The immediate realization of this vision was quite unrealistic given the state of the museum's organization and funding.

²¹⁰ With a trajectory that originates in Takeo, arrives in the Dangrek Mountains, crosses borders, produces various residences and moves between, the mobile Ta Mok is progenitor and condition of possibility for

“Anlong Veng” as museum. Inheritance implies not only a benefitting from previous efforts but also something owed to the past—initiation of a debt/gift requiring a counter-gift?—and perhaps this museum is the Ministry of Tourism’s return.

²¹¹ The possibility of the government taking villagers’ land for the purposes of a museum (or a “resort”) is disturbing, particularly for the instability it would likely produce in the lives of those who have only recently come to know a certain stability since 1998. Further, the *grounds* for making such a claim to the land border on the preposterous. Every place in Anlong Veng belonged to the Khmer Rouge, and it is no secret that they occupied the area. It would be conceivable, if absurd, to cordon off the entire district and relocate the entire *historical* population (while erecting blue indicator signs stating “Khmer Rouge villagers lived here”). Land ownership, mobility/transformation of sites, and the administration of village life in relation to the demarcation of an “historical-tourist” area warrant greater development, explanation, and discussion, specifically in terms of the events of “defection” and “reintegration.” (The plans and procedures for this process were certainly clearly expounded at the time.)

²¹² I would risk re-asserting some of the social divisions that plagued the Lon Nol period (and Sangkum Reastr Niyum) in claiming that central dictates from the urban core become divergently implemented in the Cambodian countryside. (This may align with the accounts of Vickery and others who interpret the Democratic Kampuchea regime as regionally and temporally variant according to the local leaders’ implementation of interpreted policy.)

²¹³ The destination is roughly 300 m east of the main road (on the south fork), which proceeds along the road that goes through Srah Chhouk and continues on to Tumnup Leu.

²¹⁴ The most complete list provided by my informants named: Son Sen ស៊ែន សេន, Yun Yat យុន យ៉ាត, Lim ស៊ឹម (Son Sen’s son-in-law; Mon’s husband), Pai ប៉ៃ (Son Sen’s nephew), Thea តា (Yun Yat’s younger sister), Mean ម៉េន (Thea’s daughter), Mon ម៉ុង (Son Sen’s daughter), Nang ណង (Mon’s daughter), Vicheka វិចេកា (Mon’s son), and Rim រឹម (Son Sen’s adopted daughter).

²¹⁵ The lady of the house, a Kampong Cham native, had only recently relocated to Anlong Veng in order to be with her husband, who had been doing woodwork in the area since around 1998.

²¹⁶ Fire emanating from a grave suggests the presence of a radiant phantom (*preay* ព្រឿង), who are believed to travel by night and cause illness. These spirits usually emerge from trees, and they are noticed by blue flames above or in the leaves of the trees. They are born from people who have died, and thus they are usually identified by names (e.g., the Son Sen phantom). These spirits of the dead are differentiated from tutelary/ancestral spirits (*neak taa* អ្នកតា). Although also borne of the deceased (and thus named), ancestral spirits typically inhabit stones, (banyan) trees, or forests, and they occupy a higher position than *preay* in the folk religion pantheon. Ancestral spirits can be asked for protection by making offerings of food; they can also punish wrongdoers who trespass in their area of residence.

²¹⁷ Mme. Bora related the popular understanding that doing politics is tantamount to having accidents. Cast in a larger historical understanding, it seems reasonable to equate political struggles with “accidents” (*kruahthnak* ក្រ្រាហ្វ្រាក់), a not-so-subtle euphemism; one might attribute much of the suffering of the Cambodian people to the *political* aspirations of the King, Lon Nol and company, and the revolutionaries of Democratic Kampuchea. The brief example of the March 1997 grenade attack on a Sam Rainsy demonstration—accidents that befell some attending a parked presentation—underscores the point in more contemporary terms, as do the continued assassinations of local political activists in the countryside (particularly in periods leading up to elections).

²¹⁸ Historians suggest that Son Sen had come under suspicion by his own organization, but that his purge was deferred by the hostilities with and ultimate invasion by Vietnam (Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, pp. 74–75; Heder, *Pol Pot at Bay*, pp. 10–12).

²¹⁹ Some informants described the area as the existing district of Trabaing Prassat (the neighboring district to the east of Anlong Veng); some located the area of operations as “the triangle,” highlighting the polygonal joining of Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos (near Choam Khsan); others simply referred to Tonle Lpov (*tonlé rorrov* តូនៀ រ៉ូរ៉ូវ) (a site within the sector, on the border with Laos) to hint at Son Sen’s area of control. The confusion may emerge from the subsumption of Ke Pauk’s Sector 1002 (west of Route 12) into Sector 1003; the entire northern front was re-designated Sector 1005 under Ta Mok’s command in May 1992. Son Sen’s control of forces was ceased in February 1992 (Heder, *Pol Pot at Bay*, p. 204);

although some accounts suggest he was “reinstated after ‘confessing’ his mistakes” (Barber, “KR succumbs to hidden rivalries,” p. 4).

²²⁰ For informants, the exact date was of little concern and agreement (some claimed April 10, 1997 and others placed it in mid-May), in contradistinction from Pol Pot’s publicly-pinpointed passing on 15 April 1998.

²²¹ Some speculation emerged that the savagery of killing of the entire family, although following the DK-era purge *modus operandi*, may have been the ultimate resolution of a personal feud between the executing commander, So Saroeun, and the deceased (Thet & Piore, “The Final Chapter”); however, Pol Pot admitted to Nate Thayer that he had in fact ordered the massacre: “You know for the other people, the babies, the young ones, I did not order them to be killed. For Son Sen and his family, yes. I feel sorry for that. That was a mistake that occurred when we put our plan into practice. I feel sorry” (Thayer, “Day of Reckoning,” p. 15). While suspicion of Son Sen’s negotiating with the government was the immediate target (as indicated by Khieu Samphan’s VoDK radio charges of conspiring with the Vietnamese and their puppet), the issue of intimate knowledge of the security operations of the CPK (especially at S-21) while in power would certainly provide and additional concern.

²²² A reconstruction of the political context and turning alliances is presented in the guided narrative of Pol Pot’s sentencing site below.

²²³ This also seems true of the sentencing event of Pol Pot which is described as more of a public hazing/shaming than a trial or prosecution.

²²⁴ Falby, “Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland,” p. 16; Thet, “In Anlong Veng, Prayers for Pol Pot’s Return,” pp. 1, 17.

²²⁵ There are ideas that Pol Pot’s natural death may have been helped along by others’ agency, like Ta Mok’s withholding of oxygen (Thet & Piore, “Final Chapter”). Given that Ta Mok was defending against revolts and was forced to flee to the escarpment, the priority of maintaining Pol Pot’s livelihood was likely diminished, save for the potential value of bargaining chip number one in a peace negotiation. The low value of life is demonstrated in the execution of So Saroeun and two other Pol Pot accomplices (who lacked any bargaining benefits) on 26 March 1998.

²²⁶ Royal Cambodian Government, “Circular on Preservation of remains of the victims of the genocide committed during the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1978), and the preparation of Anlong Veng to become a region for historical tourism.” “The Ministry [of Tourism] wants to find out why the size of the land around Pol Pot’s cremation site [sic] is getting small—from seven hectares to only 0.7 hectares today,’ [planning officer] Long Von said..... [Oddar Meanchey Governor] Pich Sokhin met with tourism and land management officials... to determine how to reclaim land illegally claimed by villagers near the cremation site. ‘We would like to inform people that this area is protected for a historical site illustrating the end of Pol Pot’s life,’ Tourism Ministry Secretary of State Thong Khon said” (Kimsong, “Firms Eyeing Pol Pot Site as Tourist Draw,” p. 2).

²²⁷ During various periods of CPK/PDK rule, personal differences were often diffused through the regionalized authority; the consolidation of control at Anlong Veng increasingly denied the geographical diffusion of personal tension between Pol Pot and Ta Mok.

²²⁸ The success in the northwest was so great that the advancing NADK was only stopped on the outskirts of Battambang City.

²²⁹ The Khmer Rouge’s 10 July 1994 re-creation under the PGNUNS name was composed of the following leaders: Khieu Samphan as Prime Minister and Minister of the National Army; Chan Youran (former ambassador to China) as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of the Defense of the National Culture, Literature and Customs; Mak Ben as Minister of Rural Areas, Agriculture and Water Conservancy; In Sopheap as Minister of Immigration (dealing with problems of Vietnamese immigrants in Cambodia); Kao Bunheng as Minister of Labour and the Situation in Phnom Penh and other cities; Pich Cheang (another former ambassador to China) as Deputy Minister of the National Army; and Dr. Thiounn Thioeunn as special adviser to the Prime Minister on the People’s Health and Sanitation (Brown & Zasloff, *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers*, p. 256; Thayer, “Split formalized as KR declare ‘govt,’” p. 11). The “intellectuals” at Kbal Tonsaong—particularly Khieu Samphan, Chan Youran, Tep Khunnal, and Mak Ben—could provide legitimacy to the Khmer Rouge, because they were more acceptable to the Cambodian populace, “the last sliver of legitimacy the KR could claim to have as a political movement rather than just a bunch of bandits and killers” (Barber & Bou, “Dangling by a thread,” p. 7).

²³⁰ As foreign support had dwindled in the early 1990s, PDK cadre increasingly engaged in trade, which in turn exposed the guerrillas to the world of peace and freedom (Ashley, "The End," p. 23).

²³¹ Rowley, *Second Life, Second Death*, pp. 213–214.

²³² *Ibid.*, pp. 208, 222–223.

²³³ The manager of one of Ta Mok's warehouses indicates the conflicted loyalties felt by some as the strict policies were newly instated: "At that time [1983], I asked myself: why do I work hard for *Angkar*? Because the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. As well, the Khmer Rouge elites did not educate the people badly; they always encouraged people to work hard for the country and to think about the nation. This was the political idea of the unit. In politics on the international stage, the United Nations also supported the Khmer Rouge movement, and the United States closed its eyes and asked the Thais to support the Khmer Rouge. This is what the top leaders told us as well as what we heard on the radio. We each had our understanding. We listened to Voice of America. Sometimes a group of people listened to VoA and understood differently. I also wondered: the Khmer Rouge are communists and the Thais are democrats, so why does Thailand support the Khmer Rouge? And now we still wonder why. They supported the Khmer Rouge for what? As I said before, the United States also knew this, but they closed their eyes.... After the accords, everyone realized that they had freedom to go to their own country, and everyone understood the war should be ended. I still lived with the transport unit along the border, and during the 1993 elections there was still fighting.... I did not tell you about the story of my hard life. From 1976 to 1982, I lived in the forest and did not have rice and only ate roots in the forest. I had a bit of an easy life in Thailand when I was in charge of the warehouse. When along the border, there was a lot of fighting, and I was often on the move. When in Thailand, my heart was okay, but my body was difficult, because I had to carry bags of rice all the time. I told you before; I have been cheated by politicians. *Angkar* told me if we liberated the country, the poor people would be rich. But the whole time until now, I still have the same position, and I am still poor. When I was with the Khmer Rouge, I was very sad, because *Angkar* did not have many kinds of ministries (like the Ministry of Tourism or the Ministry of Agriculture). They did not have a market or allow people to make business or go places. If *Angkar* would have let me live like I do now, I would have been happy, because I can meet NGOs and tourists. During the Khmer Rouge, I never met any foreigners; therefore, it was not progressive. Now it is okay; we have foreign friends, the Ministry of Tourism, and many ministries. This is my own understanding."

²³⁴ Rowley, *Second Life, Second Death*, pp. 211, 220.

²³⁵ Thet & Piore, "The Final Chapter."

²³⁶ Thayer, "KR hardliners – down but not out," pp. 4–5. China had officially ended its support of the Khmer Rouge in 1991. This had the effect of dramatically diminishing Ieng Sary's role, which had already aroused suspicion and anger, because China had insisted that Ieng Sary be the key individual to distribute all arms and cash issuing from the Middle Kingdom.

²³⁷ Gen. Kheum Ngon told Nate Thayer in 1997 the same story that was repeated almost verbatim by my informants five to six years later: "In July 1996, Pol Pot sent Ta Mok to western Cambodia to settle the problems within our organization in that area. But once Ta Mok arrived in that area it was too late... The people rejected Pol Pot already and they rose up against him because the people cannot support Pol Pot's policy" (Thayer, "Brother enemy No. 1," p. 8).

²³⁸ Troop strength estimates for the defecting divisions indicate 1,500 troops and 13,000 "civilians" from Division 415 and 900 troops and 8,500 "civilians" from Division 450; Khmer Rouge civilians were noncombatant personnel who, however, participated in the struggle as transport and supplies support (Watkin, "KR forces may be slashed in half," p. 3). (Khmer Rouge leaders in Thmar Puok district, Banteay Meanchey—Divisions 519 (under Prum Sue) and 518—began seeking to defect as Ieng Sary's side battled Ta Mok.)

²³⁹ Ny Khon's troops—including Divisions 320, 705, 948, 531—totaled a mere 1,000 troops (Watkin, "KR forces may be slashed in half," p. 3).

²⁴⁰ Nhiek Bun Chhay's statement included a provision that would allow Pol Pot, Ta Mok, and Son Sen to flee to Laos.

²⁴¹ A convoy carrying Chan Youran, Mak Ben, Thiounn Thioeunn, Tep Khunnal, Pech Bunreth, and Kao Bunheng was captured on 16 June 1997.

²⁴² The sharing of responsibility as well as helping to carry on one's shoulder are conveyed in one Khmer word (*chuoy rək ធុម្រែក*); the yoke, from which the mountains nominally break forth, is borne in a similar

pole (*dânggrèk* ដង្កែក). The weight of this historical figure, history itself, bears (responsibility) down on these people and this place—“this very moment” to be recuperated into the totality of an historical thought that will determine its truth.

²⁴³ Shortly thereafter, Gen. Khann Savoeun was forced to flee to the FUNCINPEC refuge at O Smach. The money was said to have been turned over to Nhiek Bun Chhay, who denies any knowledge of its existence.

²⁴⁴ The term “*coup*” to describe the fighting of 5–6 July 1997, largely embraced by journalists, was challenged by Hun Sen as well as some academic observers; distinctions between a *coup d'état* and *coup de force* have also been used in attempts to properly situate the “events” in political science conceptualization. The post-electoral negotiations of 1993 had rendered a diarchic government, wherein all ministerial positions were duplicated, one for each party (FUNCINPEC and CPP). Roberts points to international meddling confronting Cambodia’s political culture as underwriting the 1997 context. He asserts that the enforced power-sharing wrought by the Paris Peace Accords as largely incompatible with the operation of Cambodian politics, “characterized by deeply entrenched personality-dominated closed political cultures with extended power bases” (Roberts, “Meddling while Phnom Penh Burned,” p. 22). When the Phnom Penh fighting erupted, then-second-Prime Minister Hun Sen declared he was (legally) protecting the government from sabotage by Ranariddh who was making deals with the outlawed Khmer Rouge and illegally importing weapons to that cause. Hun Sen’s own attempts to integrate the Khmer Rouge might be viewed as a means to undermine the ailing movement’s capacity, while Ranariddh’s efforts can be construed as a means to militarily bolster one political party (FUNCINPEC) operating within the country (Roberts, *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–99*, pp. 141–142). In order to formalize his argument regarding a non-*coup*, Hun Sen compelled FUNCINPEC remnants in Phnom Penh to offer a replacement for the wanted Ranariddh; Ung Huot became first-Prime Minister in August. It would take international negotiations and a royal pardon for Ranariddh to be allowed to return to his country and compete in the 1998 parliamentary elections.

²⁴⁵ *Phnom Penh Post*, “KR radio turns on Pol Pot,” p. 4.

²⁴⁶ Ashley, “KR Papers show rebels still living the past,” p. 9.

²⁴⁷ The individuals who joined Ta Mok’s 22 March move included: Khieu Samphan, Chan Youran, Tep Khunnal, Nuon Chea, and the arrested Pol Pot.

²⁴⁸ On 21 March, two divisions about 30 km from Anlong Veng revolted; on 24 March, another division mutinied; and on 29 March, one more.

²⁴⁹ Thayer, “Nowhere to Hide,” p. 12; Barber & Bou, “Tip-off allows Mok to fight on,” p. 8.

²⁵⁰ Thet & Piore, “The Final Chapter.” Meas Muth and Im Phan, who had defected to the government in Pailin in 1996, rejoined the military struggle against Hun Sen in the aftermath of the CPP–FUNCINPEC fighting of July 1997.

²⁵¹ Mydans, “Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge,” p. A1. Hun Sen’s big hole and clean slate comments followed on Khieu Samphan’s suggestions to “let bygones be bygones.”

²⁵² Hun Sen’s defense of his welcoming Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea is telling: “Without peace, justice cannot be found. I have said in the past, we should not talk about how to cook the fish while it is still in the water—first you need to catch the fish.... Compare the way I received Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea and the way others have received them in the past. I received these people as they surrendered to the government, to live a life as normal citizens. From 1979 to 1994, others received Khieu Samphan as head of state and even provided him with escort cars when he went with Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to speak in New York at the UN. They were received as equals with other heads of state. Before the 1993 elections, when I met Khieu Samphan at the royal palace, I carried with me the Genocide Convention of 1948. I read the articles of the Genocide Convention to Khieu Samphan and told him: you have to be arrested. Then, nobody did anything to Khieu Samphan! In fact, I was ordered by UNTAC [United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia] to provide them with better security. The ones who supported the Khmer Rouge in the past should be courageous enough to state the facts. As for a trial [of people responsible for genocide and war crimes]—we take it as a fait accompli. In my 1997 letter [to the UN requesting a trial] I only referred to 1975–1979. My position is: if they decide to stage such a trial, they can go ahead. I have given no guarantees that anyone is exempt from trial. In a trial we need to lay all the cards on the table. We cannot hide anything. We have to ask who helped the Khmer Rouge to survive. Even [former Singapore prime minister] Lee Kwan Yew cannot escape justice. He pressured Prince Sihanouk to establish the tripartite government [in alliance with the KR] on the border. Those who supported the KR and helped the

KR should be concerned, including those who had good relations in the last two years, which led to the [1997] fighting. If we talk about justice, everyone must have justice" (Jarvis, "PM Hun Sen: 'First you need to catch the fish,'" p. 3).

²⁵³ Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 132. Ta Mok had initially been detained by the Thai military on 4 December 1998 along with Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan (Thayer, "End of Story?," p. 23). The lack of amnesty for the lone standing leader made further struggle necessary if futile. It is likely that Hun Sen's long-standing desire to allow the leaders to "disappear" may have enabled Ta Mok's persistence (see Adams, "Justice for Khmer Rouge crimes is there for the taking," p. 8).

²⁵⁴ "For the record, when fancy becomes fact: Scholars say that Ta Mok's nickname 'The Butcher' was made up by journalists, probably in the 1980s. So all the reams of news copy of late which read 'known as the Butcher' is basically stuff just pulled out of some other reporter's story. Most Khmers have never heard of it, except from Western news stories. In his home district in Takeo, he's still known as Achar Mok. As one scholar told the *Post*, 'In Khmer, you can either be a "mass murderer" or a "man who cuts meat." You can't be both.' If any expat reporters took the time to go out and ask a Cambodian they might find out, but that would require work. Then again, why ruin a good headline?" (*Phnom Penh Post*, "The Gecko," p. 12). I interviewed the butcher of Anlong Veng, who was able to shyly provide insights into the infrastructural underbelly of the town. If the slaughterhouse is any indication, 2003 represented a year of increasing regulation for Anlong Veng, as part of the government's organizational consolidation. The takeover of local enterprises (formerly managed by local police and soldiers) by increasingly higher levels of government—Agricultural Department's managing of meat processing, the regulation of (electrical) power generation by provincial authorities, the licensing of businesses by the Department of Tourism, etc.—signal the material socio-political transformation of Anlong Veng as it becomes *properly* re-integrated into the national fold. A former Khmer Rouge originally from Kampong Cham, the abattoir operator took on meat vending in the absence of other work in Anlong Veng's post-war shambles. His butchery processes at least ten pigs and typically one cow each night. "It is difficult to talk about how to kill the animals. You have to come and watch at 4 A.M. We have our own method for killing cows." Describing the process, he states that he "puts a big rope around the neck of the cow, ties one end to a pole and the other end to another pole, and pulls it taut. The small rope on the nose is pulled to the ground. If a cow is mean, I tie a rope around the cow's waist, pull it toward another pole, and make it fall down. Then I tie its feet, the front together and the back together. Finally, I hit the cow on the back of the head with an ax. Cows are easier to slaughter than pigs. Pigs have to be hit five times with an ax and still may not die, but cows only have to be hit once. Some cows take a long time to die; I hit them with an ax, and they bleed from the eyes and mouth. For pigs, I stab them in the neck first, then I hit them on the head. I have to hit it on the head, because the pig is still alive and does not die quickly from bleeding. When I have slaughtered the animals already, the owners come to pick up the meat themselves." Although Cambodia is an overwhelmingly Buddhist society, the butcher says there is no real social stigma associated with doing his work; he believes some people may be afraid to talk to him, because he is a pig and cow killer. He flatly states that he is afraid to kill humans. "Humans are not easily killed, unless they are tied. We can kill humans with poison. Humans are not easily killed, because usually they are not fastened and tend to put up a fight."

²⁵⁵ The RCAF had stationed 42 soldiers on the mountain with duties divided between two divisions, with unit groupings all along the escarpment: Division 23 took responsibility for the area from Ta Tum to the middle house; from the middle house to the boundary with Preah Vihear Province (at Preah Bralay) was under the control of Division 24.

²⁵⁶ Ruon repeatedly emphasizes that the restaurant/guesthouse was from foreigners' ideas and suggestions. This repeated claim seems to have a few points of importance. First, quite simply, Ruon is quite outgoing towards foreigners, to such an extent that I imagine he spent a long time in the company of internationals. He seems to want to extend some solidarity to (Western) foreigners, evidenced by his continued gesture of speaking French with me (even as he knows that I am American). His French is quite good and he seems to maintain correspondence with a group of acquaintances abroad. Second, if the ideas come from foreigners, then it should attract foreigners, which is one of the stated interests of the Ministry of Tourism. Thus (third), any question of whether this development of the site should have occurred finds credence in the fact that foreigners want this kind of tourist/visitor offering.

²⁵⁷ Before 2003, all the guesthouses and restaurants did not have official government permission to operate. All were controlled by the police. Before tourism officials came to do research for making a tourism area,

police were the local authorities. The tourism officials came in 2000; Ruon took them up the mountain to stay with him and show them some places. His purpose was to persuade them to protect all the places in order for them to become a historical-tourism area. He claims that the plans that the Department of Tourism is presently following originally came from him. He drew up those plans in 2000 for the department, and he has maintained a close relationship with the tourism officials for along time, “since we had only an old market and no new market.”

²⁵⁸ It is hard to know the source of Ruon’s ideas and aspirations for eco-tourism in Anlong Veng, but he certainly harbors some very specific images about how this might be realized (e.g., paths to waterfalls, paths for allowing night observation of wildlife, etc.). On the one hand, these new ideas about nature resorts may be extensions of local tourism destinations in Thailand—the water bodies, shores, and natural environs—that populate the countryside and are clearly demarcated by government-erected signs. On the other hand, some of Ruon’s specific imaginings may have been garnered from the National Geographic or Discovery channels on television, both of which are quite popular with Khmers. The idea of creating little mini-resorts for “people to come play” seems a bit contrived (and may not cater well to foreigners), but maybe this is what works in neighboring Thailand (or other parts of Cambodia). It is hard to imagine this “eco-tourism” as not being just another oversold idea on the development-though-tourism bandwagon.

²⁵⁹ The construction workers indicated that Ta Mok had intentionally constructed a number of residences on the mountain near the border landmarks in order to secure land claims against the Thais (a view confirmed by the caretaker of the lakeside villa). A key example of this approach is Ta Mok’s house/bunker on the Thai border at Pass 808 in Chrach/Ba Traveng. (Note that these statements underscore the view of Ta Mok as a local, if not national, hero.) It was curious that the border issue arose in discussing the museum’s importance. On the one hand, territorial encroachment (by both Thailand and, more significantly, Vietnam) is a recurrent theme in the contemporary Cambodian political discourse (and it forms much of the stated basis for the strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment that is so common through the country). At the same time, demands about territorial integrity seem somewhat *out of place*, given that in practice the Khmer Rouge was receiving crucial support through and from Thai forces across a very permeable border. However, a clearly demarcated border allows for a clearly demarcated refuge/sanctuary, Thailand; so, the idea of a border could be used to the Khmer Rouge’s advantage as well. Certainly, in hindsight, it is more amenable for former Khmer Rouge to recall a clear border of national integrity, which simultaneously understates the role of a secondary historic enemy in abetting their movement while simultaneously playing up the heroic role of their leaders in defending the motherland.

²⁶⁰ Unlike a reply or folding back (Latin *replicare*), the primary root derives from Pali *vatthu* (Sanskrit *vastu*) for “ground” and also object, thing, property, field, site, subject, substance. The Khmer ending denotes “to copy, to recopy, to transcribe”; by infixation, it is also carries over “to ferry, to cross”

(*châmlâng* ចម្លង < *chhlâng* ង្គង), which bears idiomatic relation to giving birth (*chhlâng tornlé* ង្គងទង្គៀ).

²⁶¹ Some informants used different variations of this phrase: “exactly like before” (*dauchknea piimun* ដូចគ្នាពីមុន), “do the same as before [in the beginning]” (*thver tam dauch piidarm* ធ្វើតាមដូចពីដើម), etc.

²⁶² One might draw parallels between this reconstruction effort and the debates around Ta Prohm in relation to the other temples in Siem Reap.

²⁶³ These claims to authenticity/origin (of reproduction) only betray the bankruptcy of the projects of “the authentic” and “the original.”

²⁶⁴ As if, rather than the *École française d’Extrême-Orient* reconstructing the “bronze tower” Baphuon with its reclining Buddha, the 11th-century subjects of Udayadityavarman II were brought to piece together the scattered shards.

²⁶⁵ The lack of repayment appears to be a possible means by which to conscript further labour from the construction workers; that is, if they want to be paid for previous work, they will have to finish the work.

²⁶⁶ After my first interview with the three construction workers, they requested my assistance in securing their position as re-constructors of Pol Pot’s house with the Ministry of Tourism. I explained what individuals at the ministry and Khemarak had explained to me: that the names of the three construction workers were known and already chosen for the job.

²⁶⁷ See the section above on proper signage around Khieu Samphan’s house and Pol Pot’s secret house.

²⁶⁸ Again, “Khieu Samphan’s House” is at stake, because the seven houses that populated this area housed a number of upper echelons, mostly ambassadors, from the movement.

²⁶⁹ The district chief made this plain when he was asked about the historical aspect of the ministry's project: "With regards to the museum, nobody can talk untruly. For example, Ta Mok's house has a bedroom; the bedroom has a bed and a chair; the house has a big lock; so nobody can say that Ta Mok was a small man and had nowhere to sleep. Ta Mok's house happened truly. A second example is Pol Pot's house: no one can talk untruly, because Pol Pot had his own house to sleep in, a place to work, and a storeroom to keep his materials; nobody can say anything besides this. For myself, what belongs to Ta Mok and Pol Pot, I can tell you; other things that do not belong to Ta Mok or Pol Pot cannot go into the museum." Subsequent comments demonstrated a strong concern for objects (being returned), and the power of objects and sites in securing the truth of Ta Mok's and Pol Pot's histories. Other local leaders have emphasized the evidential nature of documents and artifacts. The Trabaing Prey Commune Chief expressed three ideas for the museum project which highlight this concern: "First, they should prepare historical documents. Second, they should ask people to take responsibility in the museum. Third, they should preserve old evidence of the past so that people can see—evidence like what people have done and the changes in society from time to time."

²⁷⁰ An aspect of this issue can be traced to the cultural priority of demonstrating appropriate respect, but the added complication of a possible war crimes trial may also lead informants to seek out increased unaccountability for anything they have done (whether those actions are perceived to be illegal or not). Deference to authority combines with denials of responsibility. While motivations and intentions are not necessarily of interest here, it is clear that, in giving information on Anlong Veng's history, concerns of self-preservation/self-defense against a possible onslaught of legal proceedings shape the character of the information communicated.

²⁷¹ In these discursive moves, informants equated authority with (legitimate) knowledge/familiarity: because the district chief is the highest official, he therefore knows the stories most clearly. My first interview with the district chief indicated that he was more in tune with his possible *inability* to remember stories than villagers might give him credit, whether that potential forgetting was genuine or strategic.

²⁷² My own ethnographic data-gathering was subject to the same forces and interests that continue to shape the Cambodian political scene. Thus, although amassing information on personal and collective memories and attitudes on re-constructions of Khmer history, the research tended to reproduce an obvious refraction of the country's contemporary politics, a system/process of negotiation. One of the key issues to emerge was: the complexity of struggle in the making (and subsequent re-presentation) of history becoming overshadowed by the attempts to secure a stable understanding of Anlong Veng's past. Whether as an account from the highest (former Khmer Rouge) official or as a rigorously-researched then re-constructed museum, the need for security/stability in understanding eclipses notions of a negotiated history, complexity, multivocality, and perspectivalism. The hesitations and ellipses faced in encounters with former Khmer Rouge—informants who "may not remember" or who do not want to talk about "politics," silences operating to cover complexities—betray the efforts of a government-sponsored intellectual apparatus that requires a stable, yet politically-interested, re-presentation of the Cambodian past.

²⁷³ This produced the seemingly-odd situation whereby informants gave information about when and who, but they would not venture to explain how and why this data might figure in a larger story, leaving that dimension to those with the clearest/highest capacity for memory.

²⁷⁴ This vision is somewhat complicated by the fact that the majority of sites have already decayed due to nature or have been thoroughly looted into oblivion, often by the locals who had an "original"/"authentic" relation to the sites.

²⁷⁵ Ledgerwood's work develops Anderson's idea of a national "biography" in situating Tuol Sleng's role in a PRK national narrative (Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 204–206; Ledgerwood, "Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes"). She asserts that the state narrative of genocide and death forms the "biography" of Cambodia, with Tuol Sleng serving as a centerpiece. Anderson contrasts the personal biography of parental begetting *down time* to one's death with the national narrative that work *up time* toward some telos; this inversion of narrative temporality is marked by deaths (assassinations, war, holocausts, etc.) that are taken up and "remembered/forgotten as 'our own'" (p. 206). In Ledgerwood's analysis, the remembering of deaths (at Tuol Sleng) proceeds according to the successor state's revolutionary progression; but the story of these deaths is also remembered as "our own" by mutual reinforcement with a popular narrative (very much in line with Vickery's STV). The project in Anlong Veng may be viewed in similar conceptual terms, but according to differing pressures of temporal, spatial, political, and historical contexts and purposes. These divergences are traced below.

²⁷⁶ Chandler, "Cambodia Deals with its Past," p. 356. For the moment, I would like to leave open the status of Chandler's claim, especially given that the policy "remains *partially* in force" (p. 357, emphasis added), evidenced by the "third," "even more macabre" Khmer Rouge tourist site, Anlong Veng (pp. 356, 361, Chandler referencing Wood, "Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge"). As the historical-tourist area project in Anlong Veng is left to languish, the disinterest, forgetting, and burying of the past may be the actual and intended ends of this (unfinished) museum. This *partiality* in the history of Anlong Veng offers the possibility of "demonisation" (post-1979 policy) and amnesia (post-1993 policy) simultaneously.

²⁷⁷ Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," pp. 249–250.

²⁷⁸ The charge of "genocide" was broadly conceived, including practices that ranged from torture and killing of ethnic minorities to destruction of the economy and forced labour (People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, *Decree Law No. 1*, Article 1); the broad scope of the crime has been frequently remarked (Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, pp. 42, 45–46; Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 62; Heder, "Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia," pp. 190–191).

²⁷⁹ Fawthrop and Jarvis map the international community's "sympathy for the devil" approach to the Kampuchean crisis (Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, pp. 52–69). Other authors offer particularly scathing critiques of the use of the refugee issue in these endeavors to punish the PRK government and its Vietnamese backers (Reynell, *Political Pawns*; Vickery, "Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand").

²⁸⁰ "The resources with which the PRK was built up were pitifully few. Pol Pot's terror had decimated the ranks of Cambodia's initially small class of educated and professionally skilled people, and many of those that survived took advantage of the chaos that followed the Vietnamese invasion to flee the country. But it was not just a shortage of suitable people—almost everything was lacking. Even in February 1980, when there was a clearly functioning administration, it had to do without almost all the usual paraphernalia of modern bureaucracy. There were pens and paper, but they were not easy to come by. There were no telephones, and hardly any typewriters" (Evans & Rowley, *Red Brotherhood at War*, pp. 160–161). The conditions led arriving participants "to wonder why anyone was bothering to hold a criminal trial, when so much needed to be done to restore normal life" (John Quigley quoted in Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 64). A Ministry of Justice had yet to be formed; thus, the tribunal was conducted by the Ministry of Propaganda. In the case of Anlong Veng, it is telling to note that an improved socio-economic situation for the government has not meant the rapid development of the historical-tourist destination.

²⁸¹ Keo Chanda, "Press Conference," 1.01bis, p. 49.

²⁸² Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 42; Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context," pp. 836–837; Chandler, "Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?," pp. 71–72. "For Vietnam and the new PRK state in 1979, [personalizing DK's record with the name Pol Pot] was simply the easiest way to quickly assure the demonization of their enemies; for other Cambodians it was a way to avoid examination and self-criticism of their own society; for concerned western regimes it was a way to escape from their own responsibility in the destruction of Cambodia; and for academic specialists, at least in English-speaking milieus, concentration on personalities rather than social and economic structures was an ingrained habit in their work. Thus both among the Cambodian population and western observers 'Pol Potism' as an aberration of one evil man, or at most a small coterie, replaced 'Democratic Kampuchea,' which should have been viewed as an unfortunate episode in Cambodia's integration into the modern world requiring close study and explanation in its totality" (Vickery, "A non-standard view of the 'coup,'" p. 11).

²⁸³ A defense lawyer described his clients as "criminally insane monsters" (Stevens, "Closing Argument," 3.03a, p. 507).

²⁸⁴ "Vietnam had disseminated the notion of a 'Pol Pot–Ieng Sary clique' since mid-1978, at a time when it believed other Standing Committee members might be sympathetic to overthrowing Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. Although one of them, Sao Pheum, Secretary of the Party's East Zone, had committed suicide in June after his Zone was subjected to a massive purge, the Vietnamese apparently placed hopes on at least two others, Party Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea and Standing Committee Candidate member Son Sen, who was currently Democratic Kampuchea Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of National Defense and had overseen matters of internal security" (Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11).

²⁸⁵ "Circular on Punishment for Those Who Committed Offenses Against the People During the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary Regime," outlined in Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, pp. 61–62.

²⁸⁶ Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 60. Gottesman argues that this move was intended to spare the PRK's Marxism-Leninism from the "taint of genocidal associations" (p. 61). A different historiographical approach, that pursued by Vickery, would be to argue that DK was not communist or Marxist, but manifested a peasantist rebellion; this more theoretically-involved argument appears outside the realm of possibilities for the Party establishing the foundations of its "true" communism in the same political apparatuses that produced the KPRP/KWP/CPK.

²⁸⁷ Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11. One might enlarge the statement to include multiple forms of representation, operating under the rubric of justice, memorialization, museumification, tourism, etc. (e.g., "Historical-tourism was used crudely and straightforwardly as a political tool...").

²⁸⁸ Khieu Samphan was appended to the dyadic clique in public denouncements, following his ascent to vice president of the CGDK.

²⁸⁹ Whatever tensions may have permeated the KUFNS, the PRK Government, and the Cambodian Communist Party/KPRP, it is clear that the political actors had learned from DK's mistakes and taken to overcoming, or at least glossing over, these internal divisions. "Cambodia's previous revolutionary experience was that the reactionary clique of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary constantly divided cadres and made them commit offenses against each other, even killing each other, which led to the defeat of the revolution. This is the painful and pitiful lesson of the Cambodian revolution" (Resolution, [Cambodian Communist] Party Central Committee (Doc. 8-71), quoted in Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 69).

²⁹⁰ The tribunal's guilty verdict, presented to the UN Secretary-General, specifically identified China's (continuing) role in support of the Khmer Rouge. Gottesman gives significant attention to the internal Party politics that crafted the tribunal proceedings and its judgment. His analysis uncovers a tension between KPRP Hanoi veterans and Eastern Zone defectors, demonstrating the former's distrust of the latter's loyalty and experience. Of particular concern was the presence of former DK cadre in the new administration and Party offices, who have "blood debts" (culpability) (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, pp. 66-69). Heder similarly points to the trial judgment as a "compromise position" among the Party's internal factions, which brought to light the crimes of DK but cast greater shadows on culpability: "Like its Tokyo predecessor, it served the purposes of official history by demonizing those whom it had been decided should take the blame for what had happened while sanitizing or glossing over the record of those who were victors or the victors' allies. It was an attempt, first, to codify an official view of the history of DK's crimes and opposition to the regime, and second, to solidify relations among the various elements that comprised the new political order" (Heder, "Victors' Genocide in Cambodia," p. 11).

²⁹¹ Prior to the Khmer Republic, the secondary school was named Ponhea Yat High School. The secondary school structures are what constitute the Tuol Sleng Museum; the site of the primary school has now been converted into housing.

²⁹² Current museum literature indicates that, initially, all the classrooms were converted into prisons, while interrogations were conducted in the houses in the surrounding area. However, due to the frequent occurrence of rape of female inmates, prison director Kang Kek Iev ("Duch") moved interrogations into the S-21 compound (Royal Cambodian Government, "Genocide Museum Tuol Sleng," p. 2).

²⁹³ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, pp. 88-90. He also highlights a few similarities with pre-revolutionary Cambodian police reports (e.g., *procès verbale*). More significantly, this work notes how the self-critical autobiographies were broadly collected and intended to purify cadre and reinforce solidarity while displaying the CPK's empathy and vigilance. In deciphering some meaning in the confessions, Chandler repeats Heder's key insight that "CIA" and "KGB" came to operate as generic terms (metonymies) for "enemy"; further, he draws parallels to the Soviet experience whereby affiliating prisoners with foreign intelligence agencies suggested the prisoner was "non-Khmer" (pp. 93-94). Chandler's survey also shows how the hidden enemies *du jour* (e.g., Vietnamese in 1978) became objectified fantasies in confessions. Further, he demonstrates how ordinary past errors/offenses (e.g., breaking an instrument) were retroactively elevated to treason, as evidenced by the prisoner's arrest (p. 103). Future-oriented plots, the confession's "Plans" section, are logically discounted as "the least revealing and probably the most consistently concocted portions" (p. 105). In exploring the psychological aspects to the tortured confessions, Chandler argues that prisoners' confessions can be viewed as "objectified fantasies" for the interrogator's need for "truth" and a sense of eliminating the enemy (Chandler, "S-21, the Wheel of History, and the Pathology of Terror in Democratic Kampuchea," p. 18). (Although this article entertains a Freudian interpretation of the prison, with caveats, that interpretation is ultimately discarded.) In this investigation, Chandler conveys provocative ideas on Khmer Rouge historiography—serving as regalia of the regime, celebrating and

legitimizing its actions; a process of uncovering/peeling away to get at truth (hidden history); use of self-critical autobiography (format and content conforming to the Party's needs and understandings of history); and the ongoing construction of Party history, evidenced in the serial destruction of Party enemies—which open up the possibility for some interesting historiographic comparison across regimes (and I would argue specifically, the current administration's re-construction of history at Anlong Veng as a substitute/supplement for a trial).

²⁹⁴ “Tuol Sleng’s director Duch was a model of efficiency in keeping the confessions flowing to the party leaders, confessions that served the function of confirming Pol Pot’s delusion that all economic setbacks could be blamed on enemies and treacherous moles sabotaging the glorious revolution. The confessions varied from a few pages to several hundred in the case of important cadres deemed to be prime enemies of the state and traitors to the revolution. By contrast with the general incompetence of most aspects of the regime, S21 was a showcase of efficiency with, in its own terms, a striking rate of productivity in the manufacture of confessions and corpses” (Tom Fawthrop, “The Secrets of S21,” p. 80).

²⁹⁵ Chandler and others are right to highlight the Kafkaesque (Josef K.) nature of S–21 practices: “they had not been accused because they were guilty; they were guilty because they had been accused” (Chandler, *Voices from S–21*, p. 77).

²⁹⁶ The nature of the purges, especially of the East Zone in April to June 1978, is discussed in Chapter 2.

²⁹⁷ The actual number may be quite higher, as children were not typically included in the prisoner lists. One survivor was the inmate Vann Nath, whose artistic skills saved him from execution; he was put to use producing busts and images of DK’s Brother Number One. Vann Nath’s post-DK work—graphic painting of torture techniques and suffering at S–21—hangs on the walls of the museum’s exhibition hall, Building D.

²⁹⁸ The poisonous tree (*Strychnos nux-vomica*) is remarked upon in the museum’s literature: “In English the word ‘*Tuol Sleng*’ is recognized as the location where the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime, more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge (KR) regime, set up a prison to detain individuals accused of opposing *Angkar*. However, in the Khmer language, the word ‘*Tuol Sleng*’ connotes a terrible meaning in itself. It is perhaps only a strange coincidence that the KR regime used this specific location as a prison. According to the Khmer dictionary published by the Khmer Buddhist Institute in 1967, the word ‘*Tuol*’ is a noun. It means the ground that is higher in level than that around it. The word ‘*Sleng*’ can be a noun and also an adjective. When the word ‘*Sleng*’ functions as an adjective, it means, ‘supplying guilt’ (*del aoy tos*) or ‘bearing poison’ (*del noam aoy mean toas*) or ‘enemy of disease’ (*del chea sat-trov ning rok*). As a noun, ‘*Sleng*’ means the two kinds of indigenous Khmer poisonous trees. The first kind is ‘*Sleng Thom*’ or ‘*Big Sleng*’ that has a big trunk, leaves and fruit. The second type is ‘*Sleng Vour*’ or ‘*Sleng Vine*’ which is shaped almost like a vine with small fruit. They are both poisonous. Therefore, from the above translation we can see that Tuol Sleng literally means a poisonous hill or a place on a mound to keep those who bear or supply guilt [toward *Angkar*]” (Royal Cambodian Government, *Genocide Museum Tuol Sleng (Former Khmer Rouge S–21 Prison)* [brochure], first two paragraphs, p. 1 of 6; transliterations, italics, and brackets in original). Etymological priorities dominate the opening paragraphs of this new guidebook where the original introduction (below) addressed prison structure, victim population composition, torture implements, and killing sites.

²⁹⁹ Chandler, *Voices from S–21*, pp. 4–6; Thion, “Genocide as a Political Commodity,” pp. 181–182; Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 248. “Although Mai Lam remained in Cambodia until 1988, working at Tuol Sleng much of the time, he concealed his ‘specialist-consultant’ role from outsiders, creating the impression that the initiatives for the museum and its design had come from the Cambodian victims rather than from the Vietnamese—an impression that he was eager to correct in his interviews in the 1990s” (Chandler, *Voices from S–21*, p. 6). The story of the KUFNS victory over DK (and halting the atrocities at S–21) shows some parallels to the Soviet socialist savior ceasing the suffering and death at the Eastern European concentration camps; while it is clear that Mai Lam sought to harness some of the representational methods of Holocaust memorials (e.g., stockpiles of victims’ clothes) to the depictions at Tuol Sleng and Choeng Ek, it is also clear that the Cambodian case does not correspond to the same framework. As Chandler’s study of S–21 makes quite clear, while concentration camps acted as labour pools and extermination centers, Tuol Sleng answered to more quasi-legal endeavors: “those in S–21 were treated almost as if they were subject to a judicial system and their confessions were to provide evidence for a court of law” (p. 7). The evidentiary nature is further confirmed by visits to the “crime scene” of Tuol Sleng during the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 64).

It should be noted that although Tuol Sleng did not open until July 1980, as early as March 1979 tours of the site were allowed by the government, as it *made its case* for the legitimacy of the Vietnamese-backed PRK to the international community. During its first week of officially being open (from 13 July 1980) Tuol Sleng attracted 32,000 visitors (Ledgerwood, “Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 88). Visitations during the 1980s were principally locals and nationals from socialist countries; in addition, the government compelled visiting journalists to play witness to Tuol Sleng and Choeng Ek; the audience broadened to include more Western nationals following UNTAC.

³⁰⁰ Chandler, *Voices from S-21*, p. 5. Chandler’s work offers some of the most valuable reflections on S-21, examining the structure, staffing, practices, and philosophical issues raised by S-21. One of the earliest accounts of the atrocities at S-21 appeared in 1980, and it sketched the horrors of the center while also conveying the immediate shock of S-21’s discovery (Boua, Kiernan & Barnett, “The Bureaucracy of Death”).

³⁰¹ During Democratic Kampuchea, the regulations were etched on the small blackboards in each interrogation (class)room; a more official reprinting of the contemporary display added French. The security regulations (*vinay sântibaal* វិន័យស័ន្ទិកាម) are listed as follows:

1. You must answer accordingly to my questions. Don’t turn them away.
2. Don’t try to hide the facts by making pretexts this and that. You are strictly prohibited to contest me.
3. Do not be a fool for you are a chap who dares to thwart the revolution.
4. You must immediately answer my question without wasting time to reflect.
5. Do not tell me either about your immoralities or the essence of the revolution.
6. While getting lashes or electrification you must not cry at all.
7. Do nothing, sit still and wait for my orders. If there is no order, keep quiet. When I ask you to do something, you must do it right away without protesting.
8. Don’t make pretexts about Kampuchea Krom in order to hide your jaw of traitor.
9. If you don’t follow all the above rules, you shall get many lashes of electric wire.
10. If you disobey any point of my regulations you shall get either ten lashes or five shocks of electric discharge.

³⁰² The walls of photographed faces is one of the iconic images that is immediately associated with the museum and, frequently, with the history it portends to represent. Beyond the bounds of domestic (tourism) goals, the photographic archive from S-21 was used in a 1993 art/capacity-building project—Photo Archive Group—led by photojournalists Douglas Niven and Christopher Riley, which took 21 portraits from the interrogation center on international tour as “Facing Death: Photographs from S21: 1975–1979.” On portraiture and exhibition with regard to Tuol Sleng, see Hughes, “The Abject Artifacts of Memory”; French, “Exhibiting Terror”; Leistner & Wood, “Hanging the Past”; and Williams, “Witnessing Genocide.”

³⁰³ Ledgerwood notes that Ministry of Information literature pointed out that skulls in the map were recovered from “killing fields” in each of Cambodia’s provinces (Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 91). In spite of this soft nationalist appeal, the map and the exhibition of human remains in general have been a point of contention for Cambodians. In the lead-up to the discontinuation of the map’s use, King Sihanouk commented that the artwork amounted to a second persecution of the dead. Deviating from Khmer Buddhist customs, the lack of cremation for these victims as well as their continued public display dis-allow the souls of these dead to rest. Hughes offers a thoughtful analysis of this issue in her work on remains displayed at the Choeng Ek Memorial (Hughes, *Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia*, pp. 275–277). Her work underscores how the representation of remains at Choeng Ek assumes a legal character, the remains posing as *evidence* of DK’s atrocities (pp. 270–272).

³⁰⁴ Choeng Ek has 129 mass graves, most of which have been excavated. Some observers have noted that soil saturation due to heavy rains can still unearth some remnant bones and fragments.

³⁰⁵ On the creation and design of the Choeng Ek Memorial “stupa,” see Hughes, *Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia*, pp. 273–277. Management of the Choeng Ek Genocidal Center was sold to a Japanese firm, JC Royal, in 2005. The English-language press in Cambodia has offered numerous occasions for adverse reactions to the privatization moves (Kuch, “Japanese Firm to Manage Choueng [sic] Ek”; Kuch, “Official Linked to Choeng Ek Tourism Deal”; Kimsong, “Firms Eyeing Pol Pot Site as

Tourist Draw”; Lodish & Prak, “Japanese Lease Results in Better Roads Leading to Choeung Ek”; Kinetz & Kuch, “Progress Questioned 3 Years After KR Site Lease”).

³⁰⁶ Writing on a similar experience within memorialized concentration camp sites, Young states: “Nothing but airy time seems to mediate between the visitor and past realities, which are not merely re-presented by these artifacts but present in them. As literal fragments and remnants of events, these artifacts of catastrophe collapse the distinction between themselves and what they invoke. Claiming the authority of unreconstructed realities, the memorial camps invite us not only to mistake their reality for the actual death camps’ reality but also to confuse an implicit, monumentalized vision for unmediated history” (Young, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust*, p. 174).

³⁰⁷ “At Tuol Sleng, one walks across bloodstained tiles to the metal bedframes where suspects were found shackled and bloodied. To the extent that the museum’s curators offer any interpretation, it’s meant to shock.... Such images help the current government, led by heavy-handed former communist Hun Sen, to remind Cambodians that it is a more benign presence than the Khmer Rouge. (What government isn’t?)” (Ramos, “Benefits of Cambodia’s Tourism Boom Unclear,” p. 2, rhetorical parenthetical in original). “Shock” may be a more common reaction attributed to the foreign visitor, as the site offers a means for Cambodians to mediate and re-member their own memories and sense of profound loss. Even if heavy-handed reminders are not the message (“more benign?”), it is clear that the museum subtly shapes the historical and personal understandings of a variety of its visitors.

³⁰⁸ “The Museum’s photographs and artefacts recount the horrors of S–21 (and, by extension, of Democratic Kampuchea) so forcefully that Vietnam’s incursion appears as a humanitarian intervention, providing the salvation of the Cambodian people from further suffering under Pol Pot” (Hughes, “Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes, Phnom Penh, Cambodia,” p. 178). Drawing a clear line of continuity from the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal and the establishment of Tuol Sleng, Williams states, “Mai Lam sought to distinguish between legitimate communism practiced by the Vietnamese and perverted, even ‘fascist,’ DK communism” (Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 248).

³⁰⁹ Drawing off Sara Colm’s interview with Mai Lam, Ledgerwood relates that the museum was pursued as “evidence” against the DK regime by the curators. Williams points to the (minimalist) exhibition of photos and remains as offering commemoration but not encouraging “any kind of reconciliation with the past”; he suggests that the preservation of Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek is “a reminder of the need for action” (Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 247), suggesting that the sites’ witnessing by visitors underscores an absence of justice. This may be a response principally experienced by foreign visitors. From the PRK/CPP perspective, the State’s “memorial” sites may well be a needed action already accomplished, an effected historical consciousness, produced in the national narrative which Ledgerwood explicates (and in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the memories of Cambodians).

³¹⁰ Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 82.

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91. Ledgerwood cites Watson’s use of Kilgman’s term (p. 90; Watson, “Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism,” p. 2; Kligman, “Reclaiming the Public,” p. 395). Kligman is addressing the (re-)birth of civil society and different interpretations made possible only after the December 1989 fall of Ceaușescu, emphasizing the totalizing tendencies of the previous regime. Watson’s point, however, is to identify ongoing oppositions—“unofficial pasts”—concurrent with the dominant historical representations. Ledgerwood argues that this antagonism between enforced, totalizing history and “unsanctioned remembrances” (Watson), typical of socialist states, is reconfigured in the Tuol Sleng narrative. (The re-establishment of the Party’s past in official histories is mapped out by Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context”; a discussion of these historiographic efforts follows below.)

³¹² Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 91. This “rage born of agony” (*kâmhoeng chheur chap* កំហឹងឆើតាម) was harnessed in the May 20 Day of Rage commemorations, discussed below.

³¹³ Vickery, *Cambodia 1975–1982*, pp. 30–38. A fuller description of the Vickery’s “standard total view” is provided in Chapter 2.

³¹⁴ Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 93. Contrary to Thion’s claim that PRK propaganda has hampered people’s ability to build retrospective understandings (Thion, “Genocide as a Political Commodity,” p. 183), Ledgerwood argues that the PRK state narrative (although one of multiple explanations) is one of the most powerful and encompassing “tellings.” Rather than

offering “new” memories for Cambodians to remember (as Watson identifies in Soviet bloc states and China), the Tuol Sleng historical narrative offers a way to *explain the inexplicable* suffering that Cambodians experienced. “The metanarrative of the PRK state, of criminals committing genocide ousted by patriotic revolutionaries, framed and provided an explanation for seemingly incomprehensible events” (p. 93).

³¹⁵ Ledgerwood notes this ironic twist, and points out the rhetoric of a 1995 Hun Sen speech that describes a “nest of terrorists” and “worms that destroy the society” faintly echoing Pol Pot’s language regarding “hidden enemies burrowing from within” (Ledgerwood, “The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” pp. 95, 97n30; Ker, “Hun Sen: the ‘worms’ that must die,” p. 3).

³¹⁶ The national remembrance holiday, typically referred to as the Day of Hate (*tivea châng kâmhœng* ទិវាចងកំអែង), can also be rendered Day of Anger or Day of Rage. The connecting term (*châng* ចង) derives from “to tie,” and can yield the opposing ideas of “to establishment friendship” (*châng mètrei* ចងមេត្រី) as well as “to not forgive someone’s mistake” (*châng tôs* ចងតោស) or “to bear/hold a grudge” (*châng kumnum* ចងកុំណុំ). “Holding” and “maintaining” the anger are the senses favored by Chandler and Fawthrop and Jarvis, respectively (Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 362; Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 74), although these connotations would be more readily reflected in the Khmer roots “hold” (*kan mâ*), “look after” (*reaksaa* រក្សា), and “keep” (*tuk ធុរ*).

³¹⁷ Little evidence for this supposed 1975 meeting suggests that the chosen date echoes 20 May 1973, when the CPK openly broke with Vietnam (Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” p. 834; Hughes, “Remembering May 20,” p. 40). Others claim that 20 May 1976 bears the significance as the day that the *implementation* of the radical collectivization program was initiated (Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 362; Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 74).

³¹⁸ Hughes, “Remembering May 20,” p. 41. She also notes that events included conciliatory statements with regard to the Khmer people’s debt to the Vietnamese. Emphasizing political manipulation, Williams argues, “Hate Day was arguably designed not so much to begin healing the emotional wounds of survivors as to sustain an implacable hatred of the KR, which in turn helped secure allegiance to the government’s war with the still-formidable KR forces” (Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 249). Similarly, in discussing the PRK’s 1983 Research Committee on Pol Pot’s Genocidal Regime (which produced the official DK death toll of 3.3 million), Etcheson entertains the possibility that the research project along with other state-sponsored activities—such as the Day of Hate ceremonies—fostered “a trope for the socially and politically acceptable Cambodian genocide survivor story,” a trope disposed toward the generation of a “national myth” (Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields*, p. 215n4).

³¹⁹ The CGDK had been formed the year before the Day of Hate was founded.

³²⁰ She cites the composition and presentation of petitions to international governing bodies emerging out of Day of Hate activities, specifically condemning international support of the CGDK/PDK or calling for a trial of DK leaders (Hughes, “Remembering May 20,” p. 42).

³²¹ Hughes, *Memory and Sovereignty in Post-1979 Cambodia*, p. 283. Various appropriations of the day have been attempted. In 1999, the Sam Rainsy Party sought to rescue the commemoration from an endless cycle of violence (anger and revenge) by establishing May 22 as an annual Day of Forgiveness, incorporating Buddhist rituals and ceremonies (Sam Rainsy Party statement, “SRP Calls For Day of Forgiveness”); the new date marked the 1996 assassination of a steering committee member of Sam Rainsy’s (Khmer Nation) Party. Fawthrop and Jarvis note that the “Day of Maintaining Rage” was officially re-named to “Day of Remembrance” in 2001 (Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*, p. 74).

³²² Eang, “‘Never Again’ Is Message at Day of Hate Event,” p. 2.

³²³ “Vietnamese soldiers entered the Cambodian capital on the morning of January 7, their jeeps roaring down the city’s deserted avenues. At noon, radio broadcasts announced that the Front had liberated Phnom Penh. By evening hundreds of Cambodian soldiers—Khmers who had fled the Khmer Rouge and taken refuge in southern Vietnam—arrived. Housed in Phnom Penh’s airport, they joined Vietnamese troops in scouting the empty streets and buildings for lingering Khmer Rouge soldiers, engaging the few they found in rounds of gunfire. Over the next few days, pronouncements poured forth on behalf of the Cambodian leadership” (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, p. 11).

³²⁴ First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (CPP) both signed the 5 January 1996 circular.

³²⁵ “By remembering January 7, we do not forget the assistance of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Vietnamese soldiers and people who sacrificed their lives to rescue the Cambodian people. We express our gratitude to Vietnam [for] that time, in order to show that the truth remains the truth” (Hun Sen speech on 4 January 1996 quoted in Ker, “Funcinpec MPs rally against Jan 7 holiday,” p. 1). In his 7 January 1996 inauguration of Hun Sen Park in Phnom Penh, Hun Sen re-iterated, “Today is the day that saved us from Pol Pot’s genocide, the day that gave us the second birth... had it not been for January 7 [1979], there wouldn’t have been the Paris Peace agreement, nor UNTAC in Cambodia and everything we have today” (p. 3).

³²⁶ Chea Sim, “Speech on 25th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime.”

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Chea Sim, “Speech marking the 29th anniversary of the victory of 7 January.”

³²⁹ Similar moves were expressed on official occasions during Democratic Kampuchea. In his September 1977 speech delivered at Phnom Penh’s Olympic Stadium, “Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea,” Pol Pot combined triumphant forward-looking rhetoric with warnings to enemies (Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, pp. 221–222).

³³⁰ The KPRP’s 1982 Party History quoted in Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” p. 845.

³³¹ This influence was referred to as “an ideology of extreme chauvinism” (*cheatniyum châng’iet-châng’âl huos haet* ជាតិមិយមចង្រ្កតចង្រ្កតអង្គការសហប្រជាជាតិ) (Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” p. 840). In 1991, as Chinese support for the PDK was ceasing, this language diminished, and subsequent overt references to China were absent (p. 836n106).

³³² In fact, following *Decree Law No. 2* enacted in 1980, “betraying the revolution” included distributing anti-Vietnamese propaganda, thereby splitting the political field into traitors and those who support the PRK (Gottesman, *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, pp. 77–78).

³³³ Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” pp. 811, 826, 836, 845–846.

³³⁴ Chandler, “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea.” Chandler’s post script notes the (temporally) close revisionisms marked by the CPK’s self-dissolution in December 1981 and the PRK rulers’ June 1982 establishment of the KPRP’s founding date as 28 June 1951 (not 19 February nor 30 September). “The party’s birthday is still a moveable feast, and its other anniversaries depend on the needs of the regime in power in Phnom Penh. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*” (p. 300).

³³⁵ See DK’s *Black Paper* for some of the more severe renderings of these xenophobic and irredentist politics. One might (re-)state this conclusion for the KPRP: thus, the revisionist history that Hun Sen’s PRK attempted to sometimes violently institute underscored Kampuchea’s independent accomplishments against the expansionist aggression of the Chinese.

³³⁶ In PRK historiography, the legitimate Party congresses were held in 1951, 1960, 1979, 1981, and 1985; the 19 February 1951 Second Congress of the ICP is seen to have given birth to the KPRP, although the PRK’s preferred date is 28 June (due to the chronological demands between Party and Armed Forces). Over-writing its own formation, the CPK history as enforced by Pol Pot sets the First Congress in 1960, with subsequent gatherings in 1966, 1975, and 1978 (Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” pp. 809–810, 817–819, 823–826).

³³⁷ Quoted by Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” p. 829. At the same time, she notes that PRK revisionism marks the beginning of Pol Pot’s reign as 17 April 1975 (CPK liberation of Phnom Penh), in spite of the fact that “the Pol Potists deviationist policies” had taken hold in the countryside two years previous, while the Vietnamese were still actively supporting the Cambodian communists (pp. 833–834).

³³⁸ Frings, “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context,” pp. 840–842.

³³⁹ Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 358. He aptly summarizes the effect of PRK historiography in terms of responsibility: “Unsurprisingly perhaps, no one in the PRK era publicly raised issues of individual or collective responsibility for what had taken place under DK. No one suggested that Marxism–Leninism as practiced in Vietnam and in a diluted form in the PRK might be as unsuitable (or as indigestible) for most Cambodians as its ‘Maoist’ form had been under the Khmer Rouge. No one

remembered that the Khmer Rouge movement, until the early 1970s, had benefited from extensive Vietnamese assistance and had attracted thousands of willing disciples. Finally no one dared to suggest that officials of the PRK who had served, in many cases, contentedly under DK should be held accountable for anything they had done in those years. Throughout the 1980s, thousands of men and women who had committed crimes against their fellow Khmer between April 1975 and January 1979 resumed their pre-revolutionary lives and in many cases were rewarded with administrative positions. Although former Khmer Rouge cadre lived all over the country, often alongside their victims, they were nowhere to be found. ‘The Pol Pot time’ was evil, but the men and women who had administered DK, except for a phantasmagoric ‘genocidal clique’ had disappeared. In other words, a hole had been dug, and parts of the past had been buried” (p. 363).

³⁴⁰ Different government officials mark the commencement of this strategy at different times. Khieu Kannarith stated the policy had been followed from 1987; Sok An suggests the mid-1990s; and Hun Sen has variously indicated 1996 to 1998. By 1998, the policy had extended a “warm welcome” to any Khmer Rouge, save Ta Mok, Nuon Chea, and Khieu Samphan (Fontaine, “Hun Sen suspicious of KR trial motives,” p. 3). On the “warm welcome” and leniency toward repentant defectors from December 1978 onward, see Gottesman (*Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge*, pp. 9, 75, 225–226, 353–354) who quotes Heng Samrin, President of the KUFNS: “The Front intended ‘to warmly welcome, and create favorable conditions for, officers and soldiers, as well as public servants, in the administration of the reactionary regime to rally with the people and fight back against the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary gang to save the motherland and their own families... To practice leniency toward those who sincerely repent. To give appropriate rewards to those who had performed feats of arms in service of the revolution’” (p. 9). The foundation for offering amnesty in return for defection (repentance and a demonstration of new loyalty) was already laid in this 1978 speech, codified in the 1994 law to outlaw the Khmer Rouge, and re-confirmed in the 1979 tribunal, which charged by name only Pol Pot and Ieng Sary for the crime of genocide. Heder stresses that the post-7 January 1979 “warm welcome” represents a turnabout from the stricter political line that offered a narrow window of opportunity for the reactionary cadre, fighting the KUFNS and Vietnam, to join the “pure patriotic revolutionaries” (Heder, “A fluid policy trail on how to treat ‘ex-DK,’” pp. 10–11).

³⁴¹ The singularity of the codename could also point to a multiplicity, “one hundred thousand” (*muoy saen* មួយសែន) plans; however, Hun Sen claimed the policy in his own name. Some comparisons might be drawn between Hun Sen’s “win-win” focus on national reconciliation and unity, and bringing all sides into the fold (albeit unequally), and the approach underlying Sihanouk’s personalist Sangkum “party” that similarly sought to reign/rein in conflict and opposition under the royal *samdech*’s direction.

³⁴² Hun Sen, “Escrpts [sic] of Samdech Hun Sen’s Speech to a Grand Peace Meeting,” p. 1.

³⁴³ “This is not a matter of rust destroying iron, it is of iron wiping out rust” (Hun Sen quoted in Fontaine, “Hun Sen suspicious of KR trial motives,” p. 3).

³⁴⁴ Sok An, *The Rule of Law and The Legacy of Conflict*, p. 3.

³⁴⁵ Hun Sen, “Escrpts [sic] of Samdech Hun Sen’s Speech to a Grand Peace Meeting,” p. 1).

³⁴⁶ The success of the strategy in uniting and reconciling the nation arose in a speech at the re-initiation of the Day of Hate at Choeng Ek in 1999 (Mydans, “A Word to the Dead,” p. A4).

³⁴⁷ See Chapter 1 (note 53) for a description of how Hun Sen’s endowments (*châmnâng dai* ចំណងជ័រ) are tied to recipients.

³⁴⁸ Hun Sen quoted in *New York Times*, cited with Khmer equivalent by Shipler, “Twenty Five Years Later, from the Shadows of Truth,” English p. 40, Khmer 49: «យើងគួរតែដឹករណ្តៅ កប់អតីតកាល បើយើងមិនដោះទៅ សតវត្សរ៍ទី២១ ដោយបំភ្លេចទោស ឬអតីតកាលខ្មៅងងឹត... ប្រសិនបើដោះមិនឈឺ កុំយកឈឺទាក់ ឱ្យចេញឈាម ។» The hole to which Hun Sen refers is not the long hole (*ânuang* អង្គរ) of Anlong Veng, but the large pits/graves (*rorndav* រណ្តៅ) of the kind that populate the “killing fields” at Choeng Ek.

³⁴⁹ Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 356.

³⁵⁰ Many observers sensed a persistent disinterest mixed with a healthy dose of leading on the United Nations. The process began with the government’s request for UN assistance in 1997; in 2001, legislation was passed which enabled the founding of court, but the ECCC was not formally established until early 2006. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this work to retrace the unfolding of these newest efforts to bring the leaders of Democratic Kampuchea to international or hybrid “justice.” Works that focus on Cambodia’s culture of impunity and the possibilities for the Khmer Rouge tribunal include: Etcheson, *After*

the Killing Fields, particularly chaps. 8–10; Fawthrop & Jarvis, *Getting Away With Genocide?*; and Heder, “Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia.”

³⁵¹ Chandler is correct to assess the situation as follows: “Whether the tribunal will produce closure, re-open a range of traumatic recollections or sink without a trace remains to be seen but with a budget of almost U.S. \$60 million, provided almost entirely by foreign donors, it promises to be a significant operation” (Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 356).

³⁵² A certain forgetting can be attributed to the minimalist character of the Anlong Veng sites as well as the prolonged absence of a “museum” exhibition. Anlong Veng seems to have become a somewhat forgotten project. This partial character of the Tourism Ministry’s achievements lends credence to Chandler’s argument regarding the fading focus on Khmer Rouge history.

³⁵³ In other places, I have argued that Anlong Veng is continuous with government attempts to relegate the Khmer Rouge to subhuman status: at Tuol Sleng, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary are portrayed as fanatics unfit to be labeled “socialist”; in Anlong Veng, Pol Pot and Ta Mok are shown as outlaws that contested the country’s new rule of law. “The last breath of the ousted regime emanating from the jungle encampments is framed as an outlawed organization that continued to massacre the Khmer people in the bloody offensives it executed against the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) savior and, later, the legitimized post-UNTAC government” (Wood, “Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge,” p. 187).

³⁵⁴ Chandler notes that “In a departure from the praxis of previous Cambodian leaders, Hun Sen places no iconic value on Angkor, sees the site primarily as a source of revenue from tourism. His refusal to be mesmerized by Cambodia’s past or by the sociology of victimhood are refreshing aspects of his harsh style of rule” (Chandler, “Cambodia Deals with its Past,” p. 368n49). Similarly, the post-history of the Khmer Rouge would be harvested/pimped solely for its potential tourist revenues: “intrinsically unimportant and irrelevant to those in power” beyond a money-making scheme (p. 363). The *implication* of the past at Anlong Veng responds to the partiality of the enforced amnesia of which Chandler writes.

³⁵⁵ Although there are few re-statements of the communist legacy of the CPP, the Party’s origins are still celebrated as beginning in 1951.

³⁵⁶ Ashley’s analysis of the 1985–1991 period starkly lays out the purely pragmatic interests governing the PDK, especially in its shedding of its “communist” label and *stated* embrace of liberal capitalism; re-examining the nationalist and irredentist rhetoric of the DK period, he shows that post-1985 Khmer Rouge political rhetoric was largely pre-occupied with the “ceaseless struggle” against the Vietnamese (Ashley, *Pol Pot, Peasants and Peace*). The move to singularly blame others for their 1979 defeat was obvious in the PDK’s charge that DK’s collapse was brought about by foreign agents. Later, the PDK denied mass killings, arguing that “killing fields” were staged by the invaders. These convenient rationalizations reinforced the already-established xenophobic rhetoric of DK’s leaders. Khieu Samphan provides a concise demonstration of a post-DK, former Khmer Rouge worldview in arguing that the past struggle was patriotic, pro-independence, and pro-territorial integrity (Khieu Samphan, *Cambodia’s Recent History and the Reasons Behind the Decisions I Made*, pp. vi–vii, 118–121). This position—the efforts of the Khmer Rouge were consistently aimed at preserving the country from outside aggression—was also recounted by many informants in Anlong Veng.

³⁵⁷ This move for independence enacted in part at museums, may be akin Pelley’s reading of Vietnamese “post-colonial” (de-colonization) historiographic endeavors. Cambodia, sometimes framed as “Vietnam’s Vietnam,” parallels this trajectory to the extent that it de-links its national sovereignty from its neighbor in the most recent time frame; the de-colonization from France in the Cambodian case remains a separate issue. See Sutherland’s tracing of this idea through Vietnamese museums in “Repression and resistance? French colonialism as seen through Vietnamese museums.”

³⁵⁸ “In the rhetoric of their ruins, these memorial sites seem not merely to gesture toward past events but to suggest themselves as fragments of events, inviting us to mistake the debris of history for history itself” (Young, *The Texture of Memory*, p. 121). Ledgerwood issues the same quote as it applies to Tuol Sleng (Ledgerwood, “Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes,” p. 89).

³⁵⁹ Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 243.

³⁶⁰ The lack of a curator indexes the curatorial accomplishment in Phnom Penh, and the capital’s seemingly realist exhibit should be subject to at least minimal attention.

³⁶¹ Hughes, “Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes,” p. 176; Williams, “Witnessing Genocide,” p. 235.

³⁶² The Cambodian government thereby avoids an Enola Gay-style controversy but arrives at a similar unremarked/unremarkable, post-cancellation end-product (see Linenthal & Engelhardt, *History Wars*, especially Kohn, "History at Risk"). However, the guidebook and its unproblematic singular history—the script that will properly/truthfully/accurately situate the seemingly self-evident *in situ* historical area for visitors—may bear re/marks.

³⁶³ "Almost entirely" because torture implements can cut both ways and also because Building D's exhibit provides some views of the life of the S-21 staff. As well, more recent video contributions to the building have explored the thoughts, actions, and reflections of both the victims and perpetrators of violence.

³⁶⁴ An extreme minimalism at Anlong Veng might steer clear of a sympathy/fascination with the perpetrators and their murderous logic. Linenthal address this "boundary of representation" with regard to the exhibition of Nazi paraphernalia at the commemoratively-conceived US Holocaust Memorial Museum. "As in so many Holocaust memorials, the common denominator, wrote council historian Sybil Milton, 'is a universal willingness to commemorate suffering experienced rather than suffering caused.'... [quoting Appelbaum] 'So we avoided putting out a lot of Nazi memorabilia. The songs and the banners and the objects are alluring. So we avoided that and instead we created what we hope to be reverential moments with elements of rescue and righteousness..." (Linenthal, *Preserving Memory*, p. 199).

³⁶⁵ While reviewing some audio research materials at my apartment overlooking Tuol Sleng, some electricians overheard the hateful speech and songs of VoDK radio which I was reviewing. My apologies for allowing the broadcast within earshot were met with fascination and a request to hear more.

³⁶⁶ Put differently, the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes demonstrates genocide, marking DK's first death, and the Anlong Veng Historical-Tourist Area marks a dying life after death. History museums occur, it would seem, twice: "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce" (Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," p. 594). Tracing this mist further, Anlong Veng's reminding effect might indicate: "Like a conjurer under the necessity of keeping the public gazed fixed" on itself, the Party (a Front's substitute) executes a *victoire en miniature* every day (p. 617). The farcical nature of the project is harvested in journalists' ironic celebrations of a future "KR Disneyland."

³⁶⁷ The play with Derrida, "with a touch of Rousseau," is intended. The dual sense of supplement offers a replacement (supplant, substitute) [*suppléance*] and addition (surplus) [*supplément*]; it can signify the adding of something to something that is already complete in itself, or it can mean the adding of something to complete something (Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, p. 144–5).

³⁶⁸ The "last breath" (*trâdâr khyâl* ត្រាដាដាខ្យល់) is the self-translated phrase that Cambodians would offer when describing the significance of Anlong Veng. It might be rendered "last gasp," emphasizing how the term draws from "to keep trying in spite of fatigue" (*trâdâr* ត្រាដា); there is a sense of impending death associated with the effort (e.g., someone drowning making an effort to swim). Like a *pharmakon*, breath, air, wind (*khyâl* ខ្យល់) can be associated with illness—fainting (*khyâl kor* ខ្យល់ក្រ), dizziness (*khyâl chap* ខ្យល់ចាប់), and other aches—as well as the remedies that would rectify these ailments, such as the preferred liniment, tiger balm (*bréng khyâl* ប្រេងខ្យល់).

³⁶⁹ Hughes notes how S-21 the prison and Tuol Sleng the museum come to be confused (misrecognized) in the tourist experience (Hughes, "Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes," pp. 184–185).

³⁷⁰ And more than a museological supplement to Tuol Sleng (already a supplement to the People's Revolutionary Tribunal), the Anlong Veng project can operate as a supplement to justice—the historical-tourist areas as substitute/additional trial.

³⁷¹ The general trend toward privatization of tourist destinations and their management—giving ticketing control to Sokimex at the Angkor Archaeological Park, turning the Choeung Ek "killing fields" over to a Japanese firm, and relying on Red Dot for Anlong Veng signage—may also indicate the government's desire to cash in on its history.

³⁷² Proof of this profit motive—and the underlying priorities of other historical efforts—is found in the Tourism Ministry's responsibility for Anlong Veng; the People's Revolutionary Tribunal executed by the Ministry of Propaganda; Tuol Sleng and Choeung set up by the Ministry of Information and overseen by the cooperative efforts of the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts and DC-Cam; and the Siem Reap War Museum's closest government sponsor being the Ministry of National Defense.

³⁷³ It may also be possible to locate the agential forces on the demand side of the tourism curve, similar to Alneng's description of the growing commodification of the Vietnam War spurred by international visitors (Alneng, "What the Fuck is a Vietnam?," pp. 483–484). A similar reading of "the whole genocide thing" in Cambodia might link the "Killing Fields" (movie) imaginary with extreme tourist possibilities (shooting ranges, brothels, etc.—chaotic leftovers) tempered by the tragic narrative of Tuol Sleng/Choeung Ek complementing the STV "phantasm" (p. 465) as sidekick (sideshow), in the same flight path of carpet bombing consuming. The unruly character of a border town might encourage this reading. As in other tourist destinations, the distinction between the global and the local (generated for external consumption) becomes blurred; what is up for sale is the historical narrative—responding to the desire for a "Khmer Rouge" Cambodia?

³⁷⁴ The seemingly picayune tourist offerings of Anlong Veng and the (former) Khmer Rouge may aptly engage with the idea of "dark tourism" that has received growing attention. Although the draw of death-centered tourism makes for an interesting topic, it is beyond the scope of this work to offer a comprehensive account of how this new theorization of travel and destination could negotiate the Tourism Ministry's efforts in Anlong Veng. The centerpiece of death, disaster, and destruction in tourist sites can be visited in several key textual destinations. Much of this work deals with examining visitor motivations as well as de-limiting the contours or categories of these destinations. (In fact, much discussion of individual sites becomes pre-occupied with definitional issues framed according to an emergent form of tourism; for some reflections on categorization and how academic discourse has taken up the new topic, see Stone, "A dark tourism spectrum.") The systematic contribution of Lennon and Foley argues that commodified death and tourism experiences drawn by death and disaster represent a recent and growing phenomenon made possible by and influencing globalizing communications technologies; further, these new sites produce a sense of anxiety about the modern world that produces these deaths (and produces them as tourist sites) (Lennon & Foley, *Dark Tourism*). Similarly, Rojek theorizes these fatal attractions as postmodern spectacles, called "black spots," which are reliant on new technologies for their report and repetition (*Ways of Escape* and updated in "Indexing, dragging and the social construction of tourist sights," pp. 62–64). Dann's work examines the motivational influences governing the attractions of a wide variety of sites that "milk the macabre" (Dann, *Dark Side of Tourism*). Seaton examines historical development of death as a draw for visitors to various sites (Seaton, "Guided by the Dark").

³⁷⁵ Williams entertains a number of concerns, many of which suggest a potential for conflict in the post-peace push for profitable tourist experiences: "Hun Sen's determination to develop more memorial sites may increase genocide's value as a tourist ticket. The question of what happens to local memory when objects associated with it are turned into tourist attractions is complex. If a site is to uphold local significance in most cases, it will contain elements (a stress on regional language or custom, or restrictions of use) that are incompatible with a hospitable tourist 'product.' This contradiction between sacred space and public access is particularly likely if the site is politically and culturally sensitive, or if it possesses spiritual significance. A tourist product that ignores the wishes of local inhabitants could turn history and suffering into a choreographed spectacle to be consumed as an 'experience.' If the new government-run War Museum in Siem Reap is any indication, the Communist [sic] People's Party shows more interest in the financial benefit of exhibiting objects of "dark tourism" than in national reconciliation" (Williams, "Witnessing Genocide," pp. 250–251).

³⁷⁶ "Critics assail the idea as bizarre and unlikely to succeed. Some worry it will perpetuate Cambodia's image of death and destruction. Others say it exploits the souls of about two million Cambodians who died at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from 1975–79, since it seems to commercialize the crime. (The critics don't object to tourists at the Tuol Sleng museum in Phnom Penh, because they argue that the one-time Khmer Rouge extermination center isn't overtly and tastelessly promoted)" (Wain, "Tourist Trap," p. A1).

³⁷⁷ Khmer Rouge (re-) "arrivals" in Anlong Veng (chap. 3n167), whose discernment is complicated by the fog of struggle, are positioned next to the researcher's arrivals into Cambodia (chap. 1), whose overdetermination is made apparent in ethnographic tropes hinting at an already embeddedness—already tied to, already unfolding—late on the scene to/in which we have already been connected, attracted to (a hosting-parasiting momentum in) movements already in motion. Some similar dynamics can be seen in tourism endeavors and travelogues: personal connection to a destination, a draw, a tourist attraction; the traumatic arrival; the emersion in all performances of culture.

³⁷⁸ Taking the Anlong Veng project according to its constitutive terms re-iterates the contained divergences in the undertaking. The *historical* references a singular, accurate, "true" account of the past; the *tourist*

incorporates the priorities of economic benefit and development; and *area* presents a mystery term that alludes to an as-yet ambiguous understanding of space and structure.

³⁷⁹ “Who controls the *past*... controls the *future*; who controls the *present* controls the *past*” (Orwell, 1984, chap. 3).

³⁸⁰ The development focus on tourism entails a number of socio-economic challenges for the nation even as it produces a disparate array of consequences in terms of historical representation. The key growth sector includes an inherently volatile industry, dependent on a number of uncontrollable international factors, and recent evidence suggests that the waxing and waning benefits have been largely non-pro-poor.

³⁸¹ A process in which tourism acts as an agent of (cultural) change has been long established. Tourism initially effects the commodification of objects, persons, and spaces for consumption, typically by foreigners; the meanings of exhibited cultural objects become quickly eclipsed by their potential exchange-value (Greenwood, “Cultural ‘authenticity’”; *idem*, “Culture by the Pound”). As the commodification effect grows, tourist offerings are shaped/created to accentuate the perceived draw of the destination, the phenomenon of “staged authenticity” (MacCannell, “Staged Authenticity”; Picard, “‘Cultural Tourism’ in Bali”). Cohen describes the ways in which natives are taught to play (at/up) native so as to convey authenticity (Cohen, “Authenticity and Commoditization in Tourism”; *idem*, “The Pacific Islands from Utopian Myth to Consumer Product,” pp. 19–21). Kirshenblatt-Gimblett provides numerous examples in which objects and people are made to perform their meaning (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, *Destination Culture*). The intensification of the commoditized performance process leads to the decreasing desire of tourists for the authentic and the decreased authenticity for natives at well-developed tourist destinations, a sort of mutual alienation effect. In terms of the Cambodian government’s recent endeavor in Oddar Meanchey, there is certainly no interest in playing up the former Khmer Rouge character of Anlong Veng’s present inhabitants, but the Ministry of Tourism seeks to re-stage the past structures of the fallen movement. MacCannell suggests the possibility of the “staging of a site as remote” to entice (*op. cit.*, p.594), which would appear relevant to the project in Anlong Veng; however, the sense of adventure tourism has been largely taken up by foreign tour operators, and not a point highlighted by the ministry. In fact, if anything, the ministry prioritizes ease and comfort—in travel, accommodation, etc.—in its presentation of the developing destination.

³⁸² The museum also demonstrates its capacity to offer a national icon, second to Angkor Wat, in its gallery of portraits.

³⁸³ One might say that Tuol Sleng was always already a foreign creation in that 1) Mai Lam, an internationally trained curator of Vietnamese nationality, oriented the museum toward an international audience, and less obviously 2) the foreign-inspired security techniques that were pursued during S–21’s functioning.

³⁸⁴ This hierarchical rendering of accurate data appears to fall between Aesop/LaFontaine—“*Le raison le plus fort... est toujours le meilleur*” (*The Wolf and the Lamb*)—and Mao—“Where do correct ideas come from?... Generally speaking, those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect... There is no other way of testing truth” (Mao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, pp. 206–208).

EPILOGUE

¹ The highway between Phnom Penh and Siem Reap was paved the entire way (except for maybe 7 kilometers); travel time has been reduced to four hours.

² Some folks claimed the road’s condition had improved, perhaps using its pre-graded state as the point of comparison; in any case, “better” becomes quite relative when discussing a dirt road that has been subjected to logging trucks and successive wet seasons.

³ Activities on the mountain near the border checkpoint make bare that logging and brothels couple as the primary industries.

⁴ This was reminiscent of roads out of Sisophon, particularly the one going to Poipet, in the late 1990s.

⁵ The old site remains cleared and flattened; stubby pillars of concrete are scattered about the site, but it seems the foundation was never poured.

⁶ Note that this criterion of proximity does not bar the casinos in O Smach from their long runs; both gaming houses sit nearly on top of the border, between the crossing gate and the customs checkpoint. Although proximity was the stated explanation, it is more likely that assumptions of boundaries was the

more pressing stake—recalling Ta Mok’s motivations for founding residences near the moveable territorial boundary.

⁷ Brown, “Cambodia maps out plan to lure tourists to Khmer Rouge sites.”

⁸ Above the Khmer Rouge statues but not quite at the summit, there was a road next to a large pond that went up a mountain. A Tourism Ministry marker indicated the uphill existence of a munitions factory, but nearby was another placard that read: forbidden to enter (presumably due to construction hazards). Perhaps 150 m beyond this signage atop a very large, flat cleared area, the construction cranes stood multiple stories tall, towering above the trees. As access was interdicted, it was impossible to determine how the new casino relates with the remains of the Khmer Rouge munitions factory (in addition to complicating historical-tourist access).

⁹ During a randomly-timed midday visit, entering through the wide driveway break in stalls, I happened upon a session of illegal lumber loading. A large truck and wood pile occupied the ground floor of what was Nhoen’s house. A group of about 15 men were busy stacking the wood of various widths and lengths onto the vehicle. A man who appeared to be a supervisor (holding a cell phone) did not allow any photos to document these dealings. It seems the cuttings on the mountain are shipped down the hill, through town, and on to the neighboring district, where a less official (unregulated) border crossing awaits the timber-laden vehicles. Ever since Global Witness was sacked, the parties involved made less of an effort to hide their actions. That did not stop mountaintop porters from eying me with suspicion; maybe it had something to do with the fact that through their eyes I might have looked a bit like one particular Global Witness worker (tall, long hair, blondish, foreign looking, etc.) who was denied re-entry to the country in 2005.

¹⁰ O’Connell & Yin, “All that glitters seems to be... Sokimex”; Vong & Marcher, “Sokimex and Government revisit Angkor deal”; Kuch, “Japanese Firm to Manage Choueng [sic] Ek”; *idem*, “Official Linked to Choeung Ek Tourism Deal”; Lodish & Prak, “Japanese Lease Results in Better Roads Leading to Choeung Ek”; Kinetz & Kuch, “Progress Questioned 3 Years After KR Site Lease”; Kimsong, “Firms Eyeing Pol Pot Site as Tourist Draw”; Ramos, “Benefits of Cambodia’s Tourism Boom Unclear.”

¹¹ Thet, “KR museum construction stalls,” p. 5; Sam, “For Anlong Veng, there’s gold in them there atrocities,” p. 6; *idem*, “Ta Mok’s property becomes a draw with tourists,” p. 4; *idem*, “KR museum to draw tourists north,” p. 5; Yun, “KR Photographer Planning For-Profit Museum,” p. 16.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abney, Rob. *Familiar Ground: The Breakdown of Democracy in Cambodia and Implications for US Foreign Policy*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations. 105th Cong., 1st sess. July 16, 1997.
- Adams, Brad. "Justice for Khmer Rouge crimes is there for the taking." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 11, no. 19 (September 13–26, 2002): 8–9.
- Alneng, Victor. "“What the Fuck is a Vietnam?": Touristic Phantasms and the Popcolonization of (the) Vietnam (War)." *Critique of Anthropology* vol. 22, no. 4 (2002): 461–489.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. rev. ed. New York: Verso, 1991 [1983].
- Ashley, David W. "The End of the Revolution." *Searching for the Truth* nos. 16–18 (April–June 2001): 16: 42–44; 17: 39–40; 18: 44–45.
- . "KR Papers show rebels still living in the past." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 13 (July 3–16, 1998): 9, 12.
- . "The End." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 8 (April 24–May 7, 1998): 16, 23.
- . *Pol Pot, Peasants and Peace: Continuity and Change in Khmer Rouge Political Thinking, 1985 – 1991*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1991.
- Asian Development Bank. *Technical Assistance Consultant's Report. GMS Sustainable Tourism (TA 6279–REG) Final Report*. Manila: Asia Pacific Projects, April 2008.
- . *Asian Development Outlook 2008: Workers in Asia*. Hong Kong: ADB, 2008.
- . *Asian Development Outlook 2007: Growth Amid Change*. Hong Kong: ADB, 2007.
- . *Asian Development Outlook 2006: Routes for Asia's Trade*. Hong Kong: ADB, 2006.
- . *Asian Development Outlook 2005: Promoting Competition for Long-Term Development*. Hong Kong: ADB, 2005.
- . *ADB–ASEAN Regional Road Safety Program. Road Safety Report CR 2: Cambodia*. Manila: ADB, 2005.
- . *The Greater Mekong Subregion Tourism Sector Strategy*. Manila: ADB, 2005.
- Ballard, Brett M. "Pro-Poor Tourism in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region: A Survey of Five Case Studies." In *Pro-Poor Tourism in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region*, CDRI (ed). Development Analysis Network (DAN) Paper no. 5. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resource Institute, July 2007.
- (ed). *Annual Development Review 2006–07*. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resource Institute, February 2007.

- . “Linking Tourism to Poverty Reduction—A Siem Reap Case Study.” In *Annual Development Review 2004–05. Issue no. 1*, K.A.S. Murshid and Brett M. Ballard (eds). Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resource Institute, December 2005.
- . *The Impact of the Tourism Industry in Siem Reap on the People Who Live in Angkor Park*. Phnom Penh: Cooperation Committee for Cambodia, Analyzing Development Issues (ADI) Project, December 2002.
- Banister, Judith, and E. Paige Johnson. “After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia.” In *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, Ben Kiernan (ed). Monograph Series no. 41. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993.
- Barber, Jason. “KR succumbs to hidden rivalries.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 5, no. 17 (August 23–September 5, 1996): 4.
- Barber, Jason, and Bou Saroeun. “Dangling by a thread: the Khmer Rouge puppet.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 8 (April 24–May 7, 1998): 7.
- . “Tip-off allows Mok to fight on.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 7 (April 10–23, 1998): 1, 8.
- . “Anlong Veng death rattle.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 7 (April 10–23, 1998): 6, 8.
- Barber, Jason, and Chea Sotheacheat. “The life and crimes of Ta Mok.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 1 (January 16–29, 1998): 11–13.
- . “Ta Mok—the new Brother No. 1.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 26 (January 2–15, 1998): 14–15.
- Barnett, Anthony. “Democratic Kampuchea: A Highly Centralized Dictatorship.” In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1983.
- . “Inter-Communist Conflicts and Vietnam.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 11, no. 4 (October–December 1979): 2–9.
- Becker, Elizabeth. “O Smach Journal; On Its Last Legs, the Saddest Cambodian Army,” *New York Times* (October 20, 1997).
- . *When the War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*. New York: Public Affairs, 1986.
- Berger, Sebastien. “Roll up to see mass murderer Pol Pot’s ashes for two dollars.” *The Daily Telegraph* (November 8, 2004): A16.
- Boua Chantou, Ben Kiernan, and Anthony Barnett. “The Bureaucracy of Death: Documents from inside Pol Pot’s Torture Machine.” *New Statesman* vol. 99, no. 2563 (May 2, 1980): 669–676.
- Brown, Frederick Z. “Review of Craig Etcheson, *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*.” H-Genocide, H-Net Reviews, March 2006.

- Brown, MacAlister, and Joseph J. Zasloff. *Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers 1979–1998*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Brown, Samantha. "Cambodia maps out plan to lure tourists to Khmer Rouge sites." *Agence France-Presse* (April 13, 2005) [On-line: <http://www.fourelphants.com/travel.php?sid=286>].
- Burgler, Roeland A. *Eyes of the Pineapple: Revolutionary intellectuals and terror in democratic Kampuchea*. Saarbrücken: Verlag breitenbach Publishers, 1990.
- Central Intelligence Agency (US). *Kampuchea: A Demographic Catastrophe*. Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency, 1980.
- Cesarani, David. "Lacking in Convictions: British War Crimes Policy and National Memory of the Second World War." In *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (eds). New York: Berg, 1997.
- Carney, Timothy Michael. "The Heng Samrin Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cambodia." In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- . "The Unexpected Victory." In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- . *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussions*. Data Paper no. 106. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, January 1977.
- Chandler, David P. "Cambodia Deals with its Past: Collective Memory, Demonisation and Induced Amnesia." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* vol. 9, nos. 2/3 (June/September 2008): 355–369.
- . "S-21, the Wheel of History, and the Pathology of Terror in Democratic Kampuchea." In *Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays*, Judy Ledgerwood (ed). De Kalb: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002.
- . "Will There Be a Trial for the Khmer Rouge?" *Ethics & International Affairs* vol. 14, no. 1 (March 2000): 67–82.
- . *Voices from S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999.
- . *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot*. rev. ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999.
- . *A History of Cambodia*. 2d ed., upd. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996 [1983].
- . "Review: *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979* by Ben Kiernan." *Journal of Asian Studies* vol. 55, no. 4 (November 1996): 1063–1064.
- . *The Tragedy of Cambodian History: Politics, War, and Revolution since 1945*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1991.

- . “A Revolution in Full Spate: Communist Party Policy in Democratic Kampuchea.” In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- . “Revising the Past in Democratic Kampuchea: When Was the Birthday of the Party?: Notes and Comments.” *Pacific Affairs* vol. 56, no. 2 (Summer 1983): 288–300.
- . “The Assassination of *Resident Bardez* (1925): A Premonition of Revolt in Colonial Cambodia.” *Journal of the Siam Society* vol. 70, parts 1 & 2 (January–July 1982): 35–49.
- . “The Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia): The Semantics of Revolutionary Change.” *Pacific Affairs* vol. 49, no. 3 (Autumn 1976): 506–515.
- Chea Chanto and Keat Chhon. *Statement at the Joint Annual Discussion*. IMF & World Bank Group, Boards of Governors, 2004 Annual Meetings. Washington, DC: October 3, 2004.
- Chea Sotheacheath and Nick Lenaghan. “General eludes dragnet” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 15 (July 25–August 7, 1997): 1, 12.
- Chea Samnang and Sok Hach. “Integrating Cambodia’s Economy into the World.” In *Cambodia Economic Report 2004. Issue 1*. Phnom Penh: Economic Institute of Cambodia: October 2004.
- Chea Sim. “Speech marking the 29th anniversary of the victory of 7 January.” Delivered at CPP headquarters, Phnom Penh, January 7, 2008.
- . “Speech on 25th anniversary of the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime.” Delivered at CPP headquarters, Phnom Penh, January 7, 2004.
- Chhang Youk. “*Letter: Memory Exploitation*.” *Searching for the Truth* no. 17 (May 2001): 1.
- Chomsky, Noam, and Edward S. Herman. *After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology. The Political Economy of Human Rights. Volume II*. Cambridge: South End Press, 1979.
- Chuong Sophearith. “Reminders from the Bombing at Dak Dam.” *Searching for the Truth* no. 28 (April 2002): 26–27.
- Coe, David T., Il Houn Lee, Wafa F. Abdelati, Damien Eastman, Robert Hagemann, Sumio Ishikawa, Alejandro López-Mejía, Srobona Mitra, Sònia Muñoz, Koji Nakamura, Nadia Rendak, and Sibel Yelten. *Cambodia: Rebuilding for a Challenging Future*. Washington, DC: IMF, 2006.
- Cœdès, Georges. *The Making of South East Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966 [1962].
- Cohen, Erik. “Authenticity and Commoditization in Tourism.” *Annals of Tourism Research* vol. 15, no. 3 (1988): 371–386.

- . “The Pacific Islands from Utopian Myth to Consumer Product: The Disenchantment of Paradise.” *Cahiers du Tourisme Série B*, no. 27. Aix-en-Provence: Centre des Hautes Études Touristiques, 1982.
- Cook, Susan E. “Documenting Genocide: Lessons from Cambodia for Rwanda.” In *Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays*, Judy Ledgerwood (ed). DeKalb: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002.
- Communist Party of Kampuchea Central Committee. “Report of Activities of the Party Center According to the General Political tasks of 1976.” Phnom Penh, 20 December 1976. In *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Boua Chanthou (eds). Monograph Series no. 33. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988.
- . “Party’s Four-Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields, 1977–1980.” Phnom Penh, July–August 1976. In *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Boua Chanthou (eds). Monograph Series no. 33. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988.
- . “Decisions of the Central Committee on a Variety of Question.” Phnom Penh, 30 March 1976. In *Pol Pot Plans the Future: Confidential Leadership Documents from Democratic Kampuchea, 1976–1977*, David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Boua Chanthou (eds). Monograph Series no. 33. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988.
- Corfield, Justin. *Khmers Stand Up!: A History of the Cambodian Government 1970–1975*. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia no. 32. Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1994.
- Corfield, Justin, and Laura Summers. *Historical Dictionary of Cambodia*. Asian/Oceanian Historical Dictionaries, no. 43. Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2003.
- Crampton, Thomas. “Rough road to a theme park: Tourism among land mines.” *International Herald Tribune* (August 21, 2003): 2.
- Crane, Susan A. “Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum.” *History and Theory* vol. 36, no. 4 [Issue Theme: Producing the Past: Making Histories Inside and Outside the Academy] (December 1997): 44–63.
- Dann, Graham M. S. *The Dark Side of Tourism*. Études et Rapports, Série L–14. Aix-en-Provence: Centre International de Recherches et d’Études Touristiques, June 1998.
- Dann, Graham M. S., and A. V. Seaton (eds). *Slavery, Contested Heritage and Thanatourism*. New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2001.
- Davids, T. W. Rhys, and William Stede (eds). *The Pali Text Society’s Pali–English Dictionary*. Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2004 [1921].

- De Nike, Howard J., John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson (eds). *Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.
- Delvert, Jean. *Le Paysan Cambodgien*. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1994 [1961].
- Democratic Kampuchea. *Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation of Vietnam Against Kampuchea*. Phnom Penh: Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978.
- . "The Last Plan." Phnom Penh: State Security Service, 1978. In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Documentation Center of Cambodia. *The Two-in-One Democratic Kampuchea Glossary*. Phnom Penh: DC–Cam, March 2006.
- Dodd, Mark. "High life of hated Ta Mok is laid bare." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 3, no. 4 (February 25–March 10, 1994): 9.
- Doran, James P. *Report to the U.S. Senate Investigation on Grenade Attack by the Foreign Relations Committee, September 21, 1999*.
- Dupont, Kyra. "'War Disney': Cambodian tourism hits its mark?" *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 25 (December 19, 1997–January 1, 1998): 16.
- Dy Khamboly. *Genocide Education in a Global Context: A Comparative Study of the Holocaust and Khmer Rouge Regime*. Phnom Penh: DC–Cam, February 8, 2008 [Online: http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/Genocide_Education.htm].
- . *A History of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)*. Phnom Penh: DC–Cam, 2007.
- Ea Meng-Try. "Recent Population Trends in Kampuchea." In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- Eang Mengleng. "'Never Again' Is Message at Day of Hate Event." *Cambodia Daily* (May 21, 2008): 2.
- Ebihara, May Mayko. "A Cambodian Village under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–1979." In *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, Ben Kiernan (ed). Monograph Series no. 41. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993.
- . "Return to a Khmer Village." *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 3 [Cambodia 1990] (1990): 67–70.
- . "Khmer." In *Refugees in the United States*, D. Haines (ed). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985.
- . *Svay, a Khmer Village in Cambodia*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Anthropology, Columbia University, 1968.
- Edwards, Penny. *Cambodge: Cultivation of Nation 1860–1945*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of History, Monash University, January 1999.

- Etcheson, Craig. *After the Killing Fields: Lessons from the Cambodian Genocide*. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2005.
- . “Nightmare of a History: Philip Short’s *Pol Pot*.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 13, no. 26 (December 17–30, 2004): 8–9.
- . “‘The Number’—Quantifying Crimes Against Humanity in Cambodia.” *Searching for the Truth* nos. 13–18 (January–June 2001): 13: 30–33; 14: 25–28; 15: 25–27; 16: 26–30; 17: 28–30; 18: 22. [on line: http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Maps/Mass_Graves_Study.htm].
- . “Digging in the Killing Fields: New Evidence About the Internal Security Apparatus of Democratic Kampuchea.” Presented at the International Conference on Khmer Studies, Phnom Penh, August 26–30, 1996.
- . “Reflections of Kampuchea.” *Third World Quarterly* vol. 9, no. 3 (July 1987): 976–983.
- . *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- Evans, Grant, and Kelvin Rowley. *Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since 1975*. New York: Verso, 1984.
- Falby, Patrick. “Anlong Veng: future KR Disneyland.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 12, no. 12 (June 6–19, 2003): 16.
- Fawthrop, Tom. “The Secrets of S21.” *Index on Censorship* vol. 34, no. 1 (2005): 78–81.
- . “The Khmer Rouge tour: Cambodia to turn the area where Pol Pot died and was cremated and 28 other key Khmer Rouge sites into tourist spots.” *The Straits Times* (March 5, 2002).
- . “Ta Mok: A guerilla with a taste for business.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 6 (March 19–April 1, 1999): 6.
- Fawthrop, Tom, and Helen Jarvis. *Getting Away With Genocide?: Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal*. London: Pluto Press, 2004.
- Fontaine, Chris. “Hun Sen suspicious of KR trial motives.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 7, no. 9 (May 8–21, 1998): 1, 3.
- Frederick, Cynthia. “Cambodia: ‘Operation Total Victory No. 43.’” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 2, no. 3 (July–September 1970): 3–20.
- French, Lindsay. “Exhibiting Terror.” In *Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights*, Mark Bradley and Patrice Petro (eds). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002.
- Frieson, Kate Grace. “Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970–1975.” In *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*, Ben Kiernan (ed). Monograph Series no. 41. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993.
- . *The Impact of Revolution on Cambodian Peasants: 1970–1975*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Politics, Monash University, 1992.

- . “The Political Nature of Democratic Kampuchea.” *Pacific Affairs* vol. 61, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 405–427.
- Frings, K. Viviane. “Rewriting Cambodian History to ‘Adapt’ it to a New Political Context: The Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party’s Historiography (1979–1991).” *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 31, no. 4 (October 1997): 807–846.
- Garella, Rich, and Eric Pape. *A Tragedy of No Importance*. On-line: <http://www.cambodiagrenade.info/>. Viewed on April 16, 2005.
- Global Witness. *Cambodia’s Family Trees: Illegal logging and the stripping of public assets by Cambodia’s elite*. Washington, DC: Global Witness Publishing Inc., June 2007.
- . *Logs of War: The Timber Trade and Armed Conflict*. Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, 2002.
- . *Thai–Khmer Rouge Links and the Illegal Trade in Cambodia’s Timber*. London: Global Witness, July 1995.
- Gottesman, Evan R. *Cambodia After the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003.
- Gray, Spalding. *Swimming to Cambodia*. New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1985.
- Greenwood, Davydd J. “Cultural ‘authenticity.’” *Cultural Survival Quarterly* vol. 6, no. 3 (1982): 27–28. [On-line: <http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/cultural-authenticity>].
- . “Culture by the Pound: An Anthropological Perspective on Tourism as Cultural Commoditization.” In *Hosts and Guests: The Anthropology of Tourism*, Valene L. Smith (ed). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977.
- Harff, Barbara, and Ted Robert Gurr. “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases Since 1945.” *International Studies Quarterly* vol. 32, no. 3 (September 1988): 359–371.
- Hart, Lain. “Authentic Recreation: Living History and Leisure.” *Museum and Society* vol. 5, no. 2 (July 2007): 103–124.
- Hawk, David. “Tuol Sleng extermination centre.” *Index on Censorship* vol. 15, no. 1 (January 1986): 25–31.
- Headley, Robert K., Jr. *Cambodian–English Dictionary, Volume 1*. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1977.
- Heder, Stephen R. “Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Democratic Kampuchea Crimes: Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective.” In *Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence before the Cambodian Courts*, Jaya Ramji and Beth van Schaack (eds). Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, September 30, 2005.
- . “Hun Sen’s Consolidation: Death or Beginning of Reform?” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2005): 113–130.

- . *Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model. Volume 1: Imitation and Independence, 1930–1975*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004.
- . “Hun Sen and Genocide Trials in Cambodia: International Impacts, Impunity, and Justice.” In *Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays*, Judy Ledgerwood (ed). DeKalb: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002.
- . *Pol Pot at Bay: People’s War and the Breakdown of the 1991 Paris Agreements*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1999.
- . “Victors’ Genocide in Cambodia.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 5 (March 5–18, 1999): 10–11.
- . “A fluid policy trail on how to treat ‘ex-DK.’” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 6 (March 19–April 1, 1999): 10–11.
- . “Racism, Marxism, labelling, and genocide in Ben Kiernan’s *The Pol Pot regime*.” *South East Asia Research* vol. 5, no. 2 (July 1997): 101–153.
- . “The Resumption of Armed Struggle by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea: Evidence from the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea ‘Self-Demobilizers.’” In *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under Untied Nations Peace-keeping*, Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (eds). London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- . “Khmer Rouge Opposition to Pol Pot: ‘Pro-Vietnamese’ or ‘Pro-Chinese’?” In *Reflections on Cambodian Political History: Background to recent Developments*, Stephen R. Heder. Working Paper no. 239. Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, September 1991.
- . “Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages.” In *Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia: Papers and discussion of the Conference held at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, 18–21 June 1980*, Khien Theeravit and MacAlister Brown (eds). Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1983.
- . *Kampuchean Occupation and Resistance*. Asian Studies Monographs no. 027. Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, January 1980.
- . “Kampuchea’s Armed Struggle: The Origins of an Independent Revolution.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 11, no. 1 (January–March 1979): 2–24.
- Heder, Stephen, and Judy Ledgerwood (eds). *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under Untied Nations Peace-keeping*. London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Heder, Stephen, and Brian D. Tittlemore. *Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge*. Washington, DC: War Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, American University, 2001.
- Heine-Geldern, Robert. “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia.” *Far Eastern Quarterly* vol. 2, no. 1, (November 1942): 15–30.

- Heuveline, Patrick. "The Demographic Analysis of Mortality Crises: The Case of Cambodia, 1970–1979." In *Forced Migration & Mortality: Roundtable on the Demography of Forced Migration*, Committee on Population, Holly E. Reed and Charles B. Keely (eds). Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2001.
- . "L'insoutenable incertitude du nombre. Estimations des décès de la période Khmer rouge." *Population* (French Edition) vol. 53, no. 6 (November–December 1998): 1103–1117.
- . "'Between One and Three Million': Towards the Demographic Reconstruction of a Decade of Cambodian History (1970–79)." *Population Studies* vol. 52, no. 1 (March 1998): 49–65.
- Hing Vutha and Tuot Sokphally. "Pro-Poor Tourism: Siem Reap Case Study." In *Pro-Poor Tourism in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region*, CDRI (ed). Development Analysis Network (DAN) Paper no. 5. Phnom Penh: Cambodian Development Resource Institute, July 2007.
- Hood, Marlowe, and David A. Ablin. "The Path to Cambodia's Present." In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- Huffman, Franklin E. *Cambodian System of Writing and Beginning Reader*. New Haven: Yale University, 1970.
- Hughes, Caroline. "The Politics of Gifts: Tradition and Regimentation in Contemporary Cambodia." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* vol. 37, no. 3 (October 2006): 469–489.
- . *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- . "'Dare to Say, Dare to Do': The strongman in business in 1990s Cambodia." *Asian Perspective* vol. 24, no. 2 (2000): 121–51.
- Hughes, Rachel. *Memory and Sovereignty in Post 1979 Cambodia: Choeung Ek and Local Genocide Memorials*. Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series no. 1. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 2004. [Also published in *Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives*, Susan E. Cook (ed). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005.]
- . "Nationalism and Memory at the Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes, Phnom Penh, Cambodia." In *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory*, Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (eds). New York: Routledge, 2003.
- . "The abject artifacts of memory: photographs from Cambodia's genocide." *Media, Culture & Society* no. 25 (2003): 23–44.
- . "Remembering May 20—Day of Anger." *Searching for the Truth* no. 12 (December 2000): 39–42.
- Hun Sen. "Speech of Samdech Hun Sen at the Closing of Open Academic Forum Commemorating the 15th Anniversary of the Political Settlement on the Cambodian Conflict." Delivered in Phnom Penh, October 21, 2006. [On-line:

- www.un.int/cambodia/Bulletin_Files/November06/HS_statement_fifteen_anniversary.pdf]
- . “Escrpts [sic] of Samdech Hun Sen’s Speech to a Grand Peace Meeting.” *Cambodia New Vision* no. 5 (April 1998): 1–2. [On-line: http://www.cnv.org.kh/cnv_html_pdf/CNV5.PDF]
- Huy Sophorn. “A Pure Society is One without Money.” *Searching for the Truth* no. 26 (February 2002): 22–25.
- Huy Vannak. “Anlong Veng Residents Believed Ta Mok did not Commit Crimes.” *Searching for the Truth* no. 30 (June 2002): 28–29.
- International Monetary Fund. *Cambodia: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*. IMF Country Report no. 06/265. Washington, DC: IMF, July 2006.
- . *Cambodia: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report*. IMF Country Report no. 04/328. Washington, DC: IMF, October 2004.
- Ith Sarin, “Nine Months with the Maquis.” Translated from French in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussions*, Timothy Michael Carney. Data Paper no. 106. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, January 1977.
- . *Regrets of the Khmer Soul*. [Srành Prorleung Khmaer ស្រពន្ធព្រលឹកខ្មែរ]. Phnom Penh, 1973. Partial translation in *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussions*. Timothy Michael Carney. Data Paper no. 106. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, January 1977.
- Jackson, Karl D. “Introduction: The Khmer Rouge in Context.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- . “The Ideology of Total Revolution.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- . “Intellectual Origins of the Khmer Rouge.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Jarvis, Helen. “PM Hun Sen: ‘First you need to catch the fish.’” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 4 (February 19–March 4, 1999): 3, 13.
- Kamm, Henry. *Cambodia: Report from a Stricken Land*. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1998.
- Kanmwerayotin Supapohn. “Show Us The Money.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 164, no. 18 (May 10, 2001): 76.
- Karp, Ivan, and Steven D. Lavine (eds). *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991.
- Kent, Jonathan. “Justice Delayed Again for Cambodia’s Killing Fields.” KQED, Pacific Time, March 15, 2007, 6:30 P.M.

- Keo Chanda. "Press Conference of Keo Chanda, Minister of Information, Press, and Culture, Chair of Legal Affairs Committee, July 28, 1979." Procedural Document 1.01bis in *Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary*, Howard J. De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson (eds). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.
- Ker Munthit. "Touting former Khmer Rouge stronghold as tourist stop." *Associated Press* (April 15, 2002).
- . "Funcinpec MPs rally against Jan 7 holiday." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 5, no. 1 (January 12–25, 1996): 1–2.
- . "Hun Sen: the 'worms' that must die." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 4, no. 24 (December 1–14, 1995): 3.
- Keyes, Charles F. "Communist Revolution and the Buddhist Past in Cambodia." In *Asian Visions of Authority: Religion and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia*, Charles F. Keyes, Laurel Kendall, and Helen Hardacre (eds). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994.
- . "The Legacy of Angkor." *Cultural Survival Quarterly* vol. 14, no. 3 [Cambodia 1990] (1990): 56–59.
- Khieu Samphan. *Cambodia's Recent History and the Reasons Behind the Decisions I Made*. Phnom Penh: Ponleu Khmer, 2004.
- Kiernan, Ben. "The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80." *Critical Asian Studies* vol. 35, no. 4 (2003): 585–597.
- . "Ke Pauk." *The Guardian* (February 21, 2002).
- . *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79*. 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002 [1996].
- . "Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice." *Human Rights Review* vol. 1, no. 3 (April–June 2003): 92–108.
- . "Roots of Genocide: New Evidence on the US Bombardment of Cambodia." *Cultural Survival Quarterly* vol. 14, no. 3 [Cambodia 1990] (1990): 20–22.
- . "The Genocide in Cambodia, 1975–79." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 22, no. 2 (April–June 1990): 35–40.
- . "Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 20, no. 4 (October–December 1988): 2–33.
- . "Kampuchea's ethnic Chinese Under Pol Pot: A Case of Systematic Social Discrimination." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* vol. 16, no. 1 (1986): 18–29.
- . *How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930–1975*. London: Verso, 1985.
- . "Wild Chickens, Farm Chickens and Cormorants: Kampuchea's Eastern Zone Under Pol Pot." In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David

- P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1983.
- . "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean Communist Movement." In *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942–1981*, Ben Kiernan and Boua Chanthou (eds). London: Zed Press, 1982.
- . "Origins of Khmer Communism." *Southeast Asian Affairs* (1981): 161–180.
- . "New Light on the Origins of the Vietnam–Kampuchea Conflict." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 12, no. 4 (October–December 1980): 61–69.
- . *Cambodia: The Eastern Zone Massacres: A report on Social Conditions and Human Rights Violations in the Eastern Zone of Democratic Kampuchea Under the Rule of Pol Pot's (Khmer Rouge) Communist Party of Kampuchea*. Documentation Series no. 1. New York: Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, 1980.
- . "Conflict in the Kampuchean Communist Movement." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* vol. 10, nos. 1/2 (1980): 7–74.
- . "Vietnam and the Governments and People of Kampuchea." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 11, no. 4 (October–December 1979): 19–25.
- . "Social Cohesion in Revolutionary Cambodia." *Australian Outlook* (December 1976): 371–386.
- . "Cambodia in the News: 1975/76." *Melbourne Journal of Politics* no. 8 (1975–1976): 6–12.
- Kiljunen, Kimmo (ed). *Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide. Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission*. London: Zed Books, 1984.
- Kimsong, Kay. "Firms Eyeing Pol Pot Site as Tourist Draw." *Cambodia Daily* (April 10, 2006): 1–2.
- Kinetz, Erika. "In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer Rouge," *Washington Post* (May 8, 2007): A14.
- Kinetz, Erika, and Kuch Naren. "Progress Questioned 3 Years After KR Site Lease." *Cambodia Daily* (April 18, 2008): 1–2.
- Kinetz, Erika, and Yun Samean. "Textbook on KR Spotlights Cambodia's History Wars." *Cambodia Daily* (April 25, 2007): 1–2.
- Kirk, Donald. "The Khmer Rouge: Revolutionaries or Terrorists?" Mimeograph, date stamped 12 September 1974, draft paper submitted for discussion at the seminar "Communist Movements and Regimes in Indochina" of the Southeast Asian Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) of the Asia Society (New York), October 1974.
- Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara. *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998
- Kligman, Gail. "Reclaiming the Public: a Reflection on Creating Civil Society in Romania." *East European Politics and Societies* vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 393–438.

- Kohn, Richard H. "History at Risk: The Case of the *Enola Gay*." In *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past*, Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (eds). New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Co., 1996.
- Kuch Naren. "Official Linked to Choeung Ek Tourism Deal." *Cambodia Daily* (April 5, 2005): 1–2.
- . "Japanese Firm to Manage Choueng [sic] Ek." *Cambodia Daily* (April 4, 2005): 1, 17.
- Kyne, Phelim, and Peter Sainsbury. "CMAC damned—and doomed?" *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 14 (July 9–22, 1999): 1, 4.
- Lavoix, Hélène. "Cambodia." In *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, Jacques Semelin (ed). November 2007 [http://www.massviolence.org/Article?id_article=50].
- Ledgerwood, Judy. "The Cambodian Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crimes: National Narrative." *Museum Anthropology* vol. 21, no. 1 [Special Issue] (1997): 82–98.
- Ledgerwood, Judy, and John Vijghen. "Decision-Making in Rural Khmer Villages." In *Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays*, Judy Ledgerwood (ed). DeKalb: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002.
- Leifer, Michael. "The Failure of Political Institutionalization in Cambodia." *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 2, no. 2 (1968): 125–140.
- . *Cambodia: The Search for Security*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- . "Cambodia and Her Neighbors." *Pacific Affairs* vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter 1961–1962): 361–374.
- Leistner, Rita, and Timothy Dylan Wood. "Hanging the Past, a photo-essay on Cambodia's Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocidal Crime." *Idea&s* vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 23–29.
- Linenthal, Edward T. *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1995.
- Linenthal, Edward T., and Tom Engelhardt (eds). *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past*. New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Co., 1996.
- Lintner, Bertil. "Betting on The Border." *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 166, no. 48 (December 4, 2003): 53–54.
- Linton, Suzannah. "KR trials are vital, but won't solve everything." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 11, no. 26 (December 20, 2002–January 2, 2003): 7.
- . "An Internationalized Domestic Tribunal?" *Searching for the Truth* no. 25 (January 2002): 36–39.
- Locard, Henri. "Yes, indeed! Why did they kill (so many)?" *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 14, no. 18 (September 9–22, 2005): 8–9.

- . “Short’s *History of a Nightmare* draws a Locard.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 14, no. 5 (March 11–24, 2005): 9, 15.
- . “State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979) and Retribution (1979–2004).” *European Review of History—Revue européenne d’Histoire* vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2005): 121–143.
- . *Pol Pot’s Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004.
- . *State Sponsored Crimes Against Humanity and ‘Genocide’ in Cambodia (1975–1979)*. Paper presented to a Conference on Genocide, Phnom Penh, March 5, 2003.
- . “Le Goulag Khmer Rouge 17 avril 1975 – 7 janvier 1979.” *Communisme* 47/48 (1996): 127–164.
- Lodish, Emily, and Prak Chan Thul. “Japanese Lease Results in Better Roads Leading to Choeung Ek.” *Cambodia Daily* (September 26, 2007): 21.
- Lon Nara. “Phum Snay ruined, other sites in danger.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 12, no. 9 (April 25–May 8, 2003): 5.
- MacCannell, Dean. “Staged Authenticity: Arrangements of Social Space in Tourist Settings.” *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 79, no. 3 (November 1973): 589–603.
- Mao Tse-Tung. *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966.
- Marcus, George E. “Requirements for Ethnographies of Late-Twentieth-Century Modernity Worldwide.” In *Ethnography through Thick and Thin*, George E. Marcus (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Originally published as “Past, Present, and Emergent Identities: Requirements for Ethnographies of Late Twentieth Century Modernity Worldwide.” In *Modernity and Identity*, Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (eds). London: Blackwell Publishers, 1991.
- Marston, John. *Cambodia 1991-94: Hierarchy, Neutrality and Etiquettes of Discourse*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, 1997.
- Martin, Marie. “La riziculture et la maîtrise de l’eau dans le Kampuchea démocratique.” *Études rurales* 83 (July-September 1981): 7–44.
- Mathews, Verghese. “Border issues show how Sihanouk still in political fray.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 14, no. 11 (June 3–16, 2005): 14.
- Mingsam Kaosa-ard. “Tourism: Blessings for all?” Paper presented at the Workshop on Mekong Tourism: Learning Across Borders. Social Research Institute, Chiang Mai University, February 25, 2005.
- Mortland, Carol A. “Legacies of Genocide for Cambodians in the United States.” In *Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays*, Judy Ledgerwood (ed). DeKalb: Southeast Asia Publications, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 2002.

- Migozzi, Jacques. *Cambodge: faits et problèmes de population*. (Atlas Ethno-Linguistique, Recherche Coopérative Sur Programme no. 61). Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), 1973.
- Mouhot, Henri. *Travels in Siam, Cambodia, Laos, and Annam*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000 [1862].
- Mydans, Seth. "Prosecutors Identify Suspects in Khmer Rouge Trial." *New York Times* (July 19, 2007): A19.
- . "Choeung Ek Journal; A Word to the Dead: We've Put the Past to Rest." *New York Times* (May 21, 1999): A4.
- . "Cambodian Leader Resists Punishing Top Khmer Rouge." *New York Times* (December 29, 1998): A1, A8.
- . "Death of Pol Pot." *New York Times* (April 17, 1998): A14.
- Mysliwiec, Eva. *Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of Kampuchea*. Oxford: Oxfam, 1988.
- Nhiék Bun Chhay. "Leaner Bun Chhay vows to fight on." *Phnom Penh Post*, vol. 6, no. 16 (August 15–28, 1997): 7.
- Noakes, Lucy. "Making Histories: Experiencing the Blitz in London's Museums in the 1990s." In *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (eds). New York: Berg, 1997.
- Noel, Don O., Jr. *Cambodia and Thailand*. Paper no. 10. Washington, DC: Alicia Patterson Fund, March 1, 1967.
- . *Cambodian Politics III: The Prince and the People*. Paper no. 9. Washington, DC: Alicia Patterson Fund, February 15, 1967.
- Norodom Sihanouk, *War and Hope: The Case for Cambodia*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
- . *Prisonnier des Khmers rouges*. Paris: Hachette littérature générale, 1986.
- Nuon Rithy Niron, Yit Viriya, and Laurence Gray. *Children's Work, Adults' Play: Child Sex Tourism—The Problem in Cambodia*. Phnom Penh: World Vision, September 2001 [July 2000].
- O'Connell, Stephen, and Yin Soeum. "All that glitters seems to be... Sokimex." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 9, no. 9 (April 28–May 11, 2000): 8–9.
- O'Kane, Rosemary H. T. "Cambodia in the Zero Years: Rudimentary totalitarianism." *Third World Quarterly* vol. 14, no. 4 (November 1993): 735–748.
- Osborne, Milton. *The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: An Ambiguous Good News Story*. Perspectives. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 27, 2007.
- . "Independence King's greatest political achievement." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 12, no. 23 (November 7–20, 2003): 8.
- . *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994.

- . “Pol Pot’s Terrifying Legacy.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* (June 6, 1980): 20–22.
- . *Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979.
- . “Peasant Politics in Cambodia: The 1916 Affair.” *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 12, no. 2 (1978): 217–243.
- . “Regional Disunity in Cambodia.” *Australian Outlook* (December 1968): 317–333.
- Oum Sothea and Sok Hach. *Cambodia Economic Watch*. Issue 1. Phnom Penh: Economic Institute of Cambodia, October 2004.
- Paen Setharin. *Reading Studybook* [អង្គការអប់រំ]. 3d ed. Tokyo: Cultural Aid Project for South-East Asia, October 1996.
- Peschoux, Christophe. *Les «Nouveaux» Khmers Rouges Enquête (1979–1990): Reconstruction du mouvement et reconquête des villages*. Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1992.
- People’s Republic of Kampuchea. *Tuol Sleng Genocidal Center* [guidebook]. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Information and Culture, n.d. [1980].
- People’s Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea. *Decree Law No. 1: Establishment of People’s Revolutionary Tribunal at Phnom Penh to Try the Pol Pot–Ieng Sary Clique for the Crime of Genocide*. Procedural Document 1.01 in *Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary*, Howard J. De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson (eds). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.
- Peou Sorpong. “Cambodia in 1997: Back to Square One?” *Asian Survey* vol. 38, no. 1 (January 1998): 69–74.
- Picard, Michel. “‘Cultural Tourism’ in Bali: Cultural Performances as Tourist Attraction.” *Indonesia* vol. 49 (April 1990): 37–74.
- Picq, Laurence. *Beyond the Horizon: Five Years with the Khmer Rouge*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989.
- Pin Sisovann. “Prime Minister Orders Recall of Textbooks.” *Cambodia Daily* (April 29, 2002): 15.
- Phnom Penh Post*. “The Gecko.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 8, no. 6 (March 19–April 1, 1999): 12.
- . “KR radio turns on Pol Pot.” Unofficial translation of June 15, 1997 Khmer Rouge radio broadcast. *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 13 (June 27–July 10, 1997): 4.
- Ponchaud, François. “Social Change in the Vortex of Revolution.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

- . “*Situation interne du Kampuchéa Démocratique dans 1977.*” Romainville: Ponchaud, 1978.
- Porter, Gareth. “Vietnamese Communist Policy Towards Kampuchea 1930–1970.” In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New haven: Yale University, Southeast Asian Studies, 1983.
- Prak Chan Thul and Erik Wasson. “KR Virtually Absent From History Curriculum.” *Cambodia Daily* (July 19, 2006): 1–2.
- Pym, Christopher. *Mistapim in Cambodia*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1960.
- Quinn, Kenneth M. “The Pattern and Scope of Violence.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- . “Explaining the Terror.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- . *The Origins and Development of Radical Cambodian Communism*. Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, 1982.
- . “Cambodia 1976: Internal Consolidation and External Expansion.” *Asian Survey* vol. 17, no. 1 (January 1977): 43–54.
- . “Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970–1974.” *Naval War College Review* vol. XXVIII, no. 4/Sequence no. 259 (Spring 1976): 3–31.
- Ramos, Dante. “Benefits of Cambodia’s Tourism Boom Unclear.” *Cambodia Daily* (November 7, 2007): 1–2.
- Retboll, Torben. “Kampuchea and the Reader’s Digest.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 11, no. 3 (July–September 1979): 22–27.
- Reynell, Josephine. *Political Pawns: Refugees on the Thai-Kampuchean Border*. Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, 1989.
- Roberts, David. *Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–99: Power, Elitism and Democracy*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001.
- . “Meddling while Phnom Penh Burned: The U.S. Role in the Cambodian Secession, June 1993.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 30, no. 3 (July–September 1998): 14–24.
- Rojek, Chris. “Indexing, Dragging and the Social Construction of Tourist Sights.” In *Touring Cultures: Transformations of Travel and Theory*, Chris Rojek and John Urry (eds). London: Routledge, 1997.
- . *Ways of Escape: Modern Transformations in Leisure and Travel*. London: Macmillan, 1993.
- Rousset, Pierre. “Cambodia: Background to the Revolution.” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* vol. 7, no. 4 (1977): 513–528.

- Rowley, Kelvin. *Second Life, Second Death: The Khmer Rouge after 1978*. Genocide Studies Working Paper no. 24. New Haven: Yale University, MacMillan Center, September 1, 2004.
- Royal Cambodian Government. *Minutes of the Meeting on the Review of the Draft of "A History of Democratic Kampuchea."* Phnom Penh: Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sport, December 14, 2006. [On-line: <http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Genocide/Minute%20of%20the%20Review.htm>].
- . *National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010*. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning, December 22, 2005.
- . "Circular on Preservation of remains of the victims of the genocide committed during the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1978), and the preparation of Anlong Veng to become a region for historical tourism." No. 13 s.r.N.n. Phnom Penh: December 14, 2001.
- . *Genocide Museum Tuol Sleng (Former Khmer Rouge S-21 Prison)* [brochure]. Phnom Penh: Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts, Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum, Documentation Center of Cambodia, n.d. [1999].
- Sam Rith. "KR museum to draw tourists north." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 19, no. 19 (January 28, 2009): 5.
- . "Ta Mok's property becomes a draw with tourists." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 16, no. 9 (May 4-17, 2007): 4.
- . "For Anlong Veng, there's gold in them there atrocities." *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 15, no. 18 (September 8-20, 2006): 6.
- Sann Kalyann. "I Only Want Justice." *Searching for the Truth* no. 8 (August 2000): 6–8.
- Sharp, Bruce. "Counting Hell: The Death Toll of the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia." August 25, 2005. [On-line: <http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/deaths.htm>].
- Schabas, William. "Should Khmer Rouge Leaders be Prosecuted for Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity?" *Searching for the Truth* no. 22 (October 2001): 37–39.
- . "Cambodia: Was It Really Genocide?" *Human Rights Quarterly* vol. 23, no. 2 (May 2001): 470–477.
- Seaton, A. V. "Guided by the dark: from thanatopsis to thanatourism." *International Journal of Heritage Studies* vol. 2, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 234–244.
- Shawcross, William. "Cambodia: Some Perceptions of a Disaster." In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1983.
- . *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia*. London: Hogarth Press, 1986 [1979].
- Shenon, Philip. "Khmer Rouge Threaten Cambodian Tourism." *New York Times* (January 1, 1995).

- Sheridan, Michael. "Pol Pot's lair to become a tourist resort." *The Sunday Times* (November 18, 2001): 26.
- Shipler, Michael. "Twenty Five Years Later, from the Shadows of Truth: Khmer Rouge Trials in an International Context." *Searching for the Truth* no. 5 (May 2000): 39–40; 48–50 (in Khmer).
- Short, Philip. *Pol Pot: The History of a Nightmare*. London: John Murray Publishers, 2004.
- Sipress, Alan. "Visit Cambodia! Package Tours to a Despot's Hideout." *Washington Post* (April 24, 2004): A17.
- Sliwinski, Marek. *Le Génocide Khmer Rouge*. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1995.
- Slocomb, Margaret. "Chikreng Rebellion: Coup and Its Aftermath in Democratic Kampuchea." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* vol. 16, no. 1 (April 2006): 59–72.
- Smith, Frank. *Interpretive Accounts of the Khmer Rouge Years: Personal Experience in Cambodian Peasant World View*. Wisconsin Papers on Southeast Asia. Madison: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, 1989.
- Sok An. *The Rule of Law and The Legacy of Conflict*. Paper presented at the Rule of Law and the Legacy of Conflict Conference, Gaborone, Botswana, January 16–19, 2003.
- Sok Hach, Chea Huot, and Sik Boreak. *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2001*. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, August 2001.
- Sok Hach and Sarthi Acharya. *Cambodia's Annual Economic Review 2002*. Issue no. 2. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, August 2002.
- Stevens, Hope R. "Closing Argument of Hope R. Stevens, Defense Counsel (Attorney and Counsellor at Law, Member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court, Co-Chairperson of the National Conference of Black Lawyers of the United States and Canada)." Indictment and Judgment Document 3.03a in *Genocide in Cambodia: Documents from the Trial of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary*, Howard J. De Nike, John Quigley, and Kenneth J. Robinson (eds). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.
- Stone, Philip R. "A dark tourism spectrum: Towards a typology of death and macabre related tourist sites, attractions and exhibitions." *Tourism: An Interdisciplinary International Journal* vol. 54, no. 2 (2006): 145–160.
- Stone, Philip R., and Richard Sharpley. "Consuming Dark Tourism: A Thanatological Perspective." *Annals of Tourism Research* vol. 35, no. 2 (April 2008): 574–595.
- Straits Times* (Singapore). "Sex draws nearly a quarter of tourists to Cambodia." *Straits Time* (October 6, 2001).
- Summers, Laura J. "Democratic Kampuchea." In *Marxist Governments: A World Survey. Volume 2: Cuba–Mongolia*, Bogdan Szajkowski (ed). London: Macmillan Press, 1981.

- . “In Matters of War and Socialism, Anthony Barnett Would Shame and Honor Kampuchea Too Much.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 11, no. 4 (October–December 1979): 10–18.
- Swain, Jon. *River of Time*. London: Vintage, 1995.
- Tambiah, Stanley J. “The Galactic Polity: The Structure of Traditional Kingdoms in Southeast Asia.” *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* vol. 293, no. 1 (1977): 69–97.
- Thayer, Carlyle A. “New Evidence on Kampuchea.” *Problems in Communism* vol. 30, no. 3 (May–June 1981): 91–96.
- Thayer, Nate. “End of Story?: Last Khmer Rouge defections don’t bring closure—yet.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 161, no. 51 (December 17, 1998): 23–24.
- . “Dying Breath.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 161, no. 18 (April 30, 1998): 18–21.
- . “Nowhere to Hide.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 161, no. 17 (April 23, 1998): 12–14.
- . “Day of Reckoning.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 160, no. 44 (October 30, 1997): 14–20.
- . “Brother enemy No. 1.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 16 (August 15–28, 1997): 1, 8–9.
- . “Show Trial: Secret talks lead to final purge.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 16 (August 15–28, 1997): 10–12.
- . “Brother Number Zero.” *Far Eastern Economic Review* vol. 160, no. 32 (August 7, 1997): 14–18.
- . “KR hardliners – down but not out.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 5, no. 20 (October 4–17, 1996): 4–5, 9.
- . “Split formalized as KR declare ‘govt.’” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 3, no. 14 (July 15–28, 1994): 11.
- Thet Sambath. “KR museum construction stalls.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 18, no. 75 (November 21, 2008): 5.
- . “In Anlong Veng, Prayers for Pol Pot’s Return.” *Cambodia Daily* (April 18, 2006): 1, 17.
- Thet Sambath and Adam Piore. “The Final Chapter: The Veil of Secrecy is Lifting On the Last Days of the Khmer Rouge.” *Cambodia Daily* (April 8–9, 2000): 7–8.
- Thion, Serge. “Kiernan, Colby, Pol Pot *et al*: the politics of ‘Genocide.’” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 4, no. 21 (October 20–November 2, 1995): 8–9.
- . *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993.
- . “Genocide as a Political Commodity.” In *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle*, Serge Thion. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993. [Paper

- originally presented at Raphael Lemkin Symposium, February 1992, organized by the Schell Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School.]
- . “The Pattern of Cambodian Politics.” In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- . “The Cambodian Idea of Revolution.” In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1983.
- Thion, Serge, and Michael Vickery. “Cambodia 1981: Background and Issues.” In *Watching Cambodia: Ten Paths to Enter the Cambodian Tangle*, Serge Thion. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1993. [Originally written with Michael Vickery and published in Phnom Penh: Church World Service, September 1981.]
- Twining, Charles H. “The Economy.” In *Cambodia 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death*, Karl D. Jackson (ed). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Un Kheang. “Patronage Politics and Hybrid Democracy: Political Change in Cambodia, 1993–2003.” *Asian Perspective* vol. 29, no. 2 (2005): 203–230.
- Ung Loung. *First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of Cambodia Remembers*. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
- United Nations. *Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 52/135*. A/53/850, S/1999/231. March 16, 1999.
- . *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. A/RES/260(III), UNA(01)/R3. Adopted by the General Assembly, December 9, 1948.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID). *Measuring Competitiveness and Labor Productivity in Cambodia's Garment Industry*. Washington, DC: USAID, June 2005.
- United States Department of State. *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report—2003. Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control*. Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2004. [online: <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/index.htm>]
- . *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report—2003. Volume II: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*. Washington, DC: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1, 2004. [online: <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol2/html/index.htm>]
- Unmacht, Eric. “Unveiling a dark chapter in Cambodia's past.” *Christian Science Monitor* (March 6, 2001): 13.
- Vickery, Michael. *Cambodia 1975–1982*. Chiang Mai: Silksworm Books, 1999 [1984].
- . “A non-standard view of the ‘coup.’” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 6, no. 17 (August 29–September 11, 1997): 11.
- . “The debate to apportion blame.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 4, no. 16 (August 11–24, 1995): 7.

- . “The Cambodian Economy: Where Has It Come from, Where Is It Going?” In *Indochina Economic Reconstruction & International Cooperation: papers and proceedings of a symposium held at the Institute*. IDE Symposium Proceedings no. 12. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1992.
- . “Refugee Politics: The Khmer Camp System in Thailand.” In *The Cambodian Agony*, David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood (eds). Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990.
- . “Comments on Cham Population Figures.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 22, no. 1 (January–March 1990): 31–33.
- . “Notes on the Political Economy of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* vol. 20, no. 4 (November 1990): 435–465. [Paper presented at the JCA 20th Anniversary Conference on Asia: Capitalist Development and the Future of Socialism, Manila, November 10–12, 1989.]
- . “Cambodia (Kampuchea): History, Tragedy, and Uncertain Future.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 21, nos. 2–4 (April–December 1989): 35–58.
- . “How Many Died in Pol Pot’s Kampuchea?” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 20, no. 1 (January–March 1988): 70–73.
- . *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and Society*, London: Pinter Publications, 1986.
- . “Democratic Kampuchea: Themes and Variations.” In *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays*, David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan (eds). Monograph Series no. 25. New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, 1983.
- . “Democratic Kampuchea—CIA to the Rescue.” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* vol. 14, no. 4 (October–December 1982): 45–54.
- Vong Sokheng and Anette Marcher. “Sokimex and Government revisit Angkor deal.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 9, no. 17 (August 18–31, 2000): 3.
- Wain, Barry. “Tourist Trap: Cambodia Themes Park To Cash In on Cache of Khmer Rouge Curios.” *Wall Street Journal* (Europe) (Feb 19, 2002): A1.
- Watkin, Huw. “KR forces may be slashed in half.” *Phnom Penh Post* vol. 5, no. 17 (August 23–September 5, 1996): 3.
- Watson, Rubie S. “Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism: An Introduction.” In *Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism*. Rubie S. Watson (ed). Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1994.
- Whitmarsh, Andrew. “‘We will remember them’: Memory and Commemoration in War Museums.” *Journal of Conservation and Museum Studies* no. 7 (November 2001): 1–15.
- Williams, Paul. “Witnessing Genocide: Vigilance and Remembrance at Tuol Sleng and Choeung Ek.” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 2004): 234–255.

- Wood, Timothy Dylan. "Touring Memories of the Khmer Rouge." In *Expressions of Cambodia: The Politics of Tradition, Identity and Change*, Leakthina Chau-Pech Ollier and Tim Winter (eds). New York: Routledge, 2006.
- . "Fatal Pursuits: Following as Para-Site." Refereed paper presented at Gambling Theory. London: University of Western Ontario, October 2004.
- . *Following in/of/as Para-Sites*. Major Paper II: Methodology. Department of Anthropology, Rice University, April 11, 2002.
- . "Site Assessment Study Koh Kong, Cambodia." Report prepared for CARE Cambodia. Phnom Penh: CARE, August 1999.
- Woodsome, Kate. "Schools Get Book on KR." *Cambodia Daily* (November 14, 2002): 1–2.
- World Bank. *Sharing Growth: Equity and Development in Cambodia*. Report no. 39809–KH. Washington, DC: World Bank, East Asia and the Pacific Region, June 4, 2007.
- . *10 Years After the Crisis*. Special Focus: Sustainable Development in East Asia's Urban Fringe. Washington, DC: World Bank, East Asia and Pacific Region, April 2007.
- . *Halving Poverty by 2015? Poverty Assessment 2006*. Report no. 35213–KH. Washington, DC: World Bank, East Asia and the Pacific Region, February 7, 2006.
- . *Cambodia at the Crossroads: Strengthening Accountability to Reduce Poverty*. Report no. 30636–KH. Washington, DC: World Bank, East Asia and the Pacific Region, November 15, 2004.
- Yathay Pin. *L'Utopie meurtrière*. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1980.
- Young, Evans (ed). "Urban Revival: A Talk with Thong Khon, Mayor of Phnom Penh." *Cultural Survival Quarterly* vol. 14, no. 3 (1990): 13–15.
- Young, James E. *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.
- . *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
- Young, Marilyn B. "Dangerous History: Vietnam and the 'Good War.'" In *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past*, Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt (eds). New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Co., 1996.
- Yun Samean. "KR Photographer Planning For-Profit Museum." *Cambodia Daily* (November 6, 2007): 16.