

Exploring
The Pattern of Islamic Social Movements:
Four Case Studies

By:

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

Abstract

This thesis is a study of Iranian-Islamic social movements. Iran has witnessed four major social movements in the late nineteenth and twentieth century. Except for the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 which attracted a great deal of sociological attention, and the Constitutional Revolution which has received some specialist study, the other two, regardless of their importance and influence in the Iranian history, have been grossly neglected. In order to have a better sociological understanding and a more general model of this type of social movements there is need to review all of them according to the same theory and with an identical method. These cases which are explored in this study are: the Tobacco Movement (1892) - an 'anti colonialism' movement, the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1906) - a 'justice' movement, the 15th of Khordad movement (1963) - an 'anti modernisation' movement, and the last in chain, the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 - an 'anti imperialism' movement.

This thesis also attempts to provide a contribution to the theory of social movements with a review and synthesis of the existing major theories of the area. Ten key social movement theories are reviewed and a new synthetic one is developed. The models under review belong to Smelser (1962), Davies (1962), Toch (1966), Blumer (1969), Wilson (1973), Tilly (1978), Touraine (1981), McCarthy and Zald (1987), Melucci (1989) and Scott (1990). These theories identify quite different 'engines' of the social movement and thus can be classified according to whether they regard the individual, society, or their relations as the main cause or initiator of the social movements. Following the discussions of the relationship between the individual and society, this thesis recognises the need for an approach to social explanation which looks at the fine texture of the interrelationship of the structure, agency, and their relations, and so proposes a 'synthetic' theory of social movements which recognises the importance of the conjunction of the three elements of the individualist, the structural and the relationalist models. In this theory of social movements, social context provides the

ground for the underlying mechanism of the movement to be released. Ideology plays the part of the relational factor between the individual and the society. It is the main mobilisational factor of social movements. Actors then 'perform' the movements at three levels of social actions: leadership, distribution, and enactment of the outburst.

The synthetic theory provides a framework for a more comprehensive study of the four cases. Each of the movements is explained using it as a 'conceptual grid' and it is shown on each occasion to be useful tool in identifying the main agents, antagonisms, ideologies, social opportunities and constraints, and the accomplishment of the movements. So whilst the movements vary by 'focus' and by 'success' it is shown that it is Islamic ideology which shapes the goals of 'justice', 'freedom', 'independence' and 'democracy'. In all of the reviewed movements the authority of the shah came into dispute with the command of the ulama, and it was religious rituals and organisations which mobilised the people.

Whilst the synthetic theory proposed here can provide an analytic framework with which to compare the movements, the history of the analysed movements reveals the significance of the 'political sociology' of Iran's last hundred years. This dimension provides an understanding of some of the 'initial conditions' which underpin the Iranian social movements. The thesis attempts to outline some crucial elements in this socio-political history, and attest their importance by examination of one further Iranian social movement, the National Movement of Iran (1951-1953). This was a predominantly non-Islamic movement which failed because it declined to take the advantage of the authority of the ulama as one of the major sways at the socio-political setting of Iranian society.

The adequacy of the resultant knowledge from the proposed model of Iranian-Islamic social movements is further tested against the some writings of nine scholars on Iranian social movements: Fischer (1980), Milani (1988), Parsa (1989), Amuzegar (1991), Ray (1993), Zubaida (1993), Moaddel (1993), Foran (1994) and Keddie (1995).

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Table of Contents

<i>Subjects</i>	<i>Pages</i>
Abstract	ii
Acknowledgement	iv
Table of Contents	v
Table of Figures	x
Transliteration	xi
A Map of Iran	xii
A. Chapter One: Introduction	1
1. Introduction	2
2. Definition of Social Movements	5
3. Types of Social Movements	10
B. Chapter Two: Theories	18
1. Introduction	19
2. Individual and Society	21
3. Social Movements Theories	27
<i>a. Individualism</i>	28
<i>b. Relationism</i>	31
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	39
<i>d. Results</i>	49
4. A New Approach	53
<i>a. Ideology</i>	54
<i>b. Actors and their Behaviours</i>	58
<i>c. Social Context</i>	59
<i>d. Synthesis</i>	60
C. Chapter Three: Methodology	63

1. Introduction	64
2. The Operational Model of Theory	67
3. The Comparative Case Study	74
4. Methods of Historical Sociology	83
5. The Model of The Other Theories	88
D. Chapter Four: Social Historical Literature	92
1. Introduction	93
2. Historical Documents	96
<i>a. The Tobacco Movement</i>	97
<i>b. The Constitutional Revolution</i>	99
<i>c. The 15th of Khordad Movement</i>	101
<i>d. The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79</i>	104
3. Historical Interpretations	107
<i>a. Individualism</i>	109
<i>b. Relationism</i>	111
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	115
c.1. Structural- Functionalism	116
c.2. Marxism and Neo-Marxism	118
4. Conclusion	131
E. Chapter Five: The Tobacco Movement	133
1. Introduction	134
2. The Synthetic View	135
<i>a. The Social Context</i>	135
a.1. The Political Structure	141
a.2. The Religious Structure	143
<i>b. Ideology</i>	146
<i>c. Actors and Behaviours</i>	150
<i>d. The Movement</i>	153
3. Other Perspectives	155
<i>a. Individualism</i>	156

<i>b. Relationism</i>	157
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	161
c.1. Structural-Functionalism Perspective	162
c.2. Conflict Theory Perspective	164
4. Conclusion	167
F. Chapter Six: The Constitutional Revolution	172
1. Introduction	173
2. The Synthetic View	174
<i>a. The Social Context</i>	174
a.1. The State	180
a.2. The People	182
a.2.1. <i>The Ulama</i>	183
a.2.2. <i>The Merchants</i>	185
<i>b. Ideology</i>	187
<i>c. Actors and Behaviours</i>	191
<i>d. The Movement</i>	194
3. Other Perspectives	198
<i>a. Individualism</i>	198
<i>b. Relationism</i>	200
b.1. Tilly's Perspective	200
b.2. Melucci's Perspective	202
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	205
c.1. Structural-Functionalism Perspective	205
c.2. Conflict Theory Perspective	208
4. Conclusion	210
G. Chapter Seven: The 15th of Khordad Movement	213
1. Introduction	214
2. The Synthetic View	214
<i>a. The Social Context</i>	215
a.1. The Opposition	219

<i>b. Ideology</i>	222
<i>c. Actors and Behaviours</i>	226
<i>d. The Movement</i>	228
3. Other Perspectives	231
<i>a. Individualism</i>	232
<i>b. Relationism</i>	232
b.1. Tilly's Perspective	234
b.2. Melucci's Perspective	235
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	237
c.1. Structural-Functionalism Perspective	238
c.2. Conflict Theory Perspective	240
4. Conclusion	242
H. Chapter Eight: The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79	245
1. Introduction	246
2. The Synthetic View	247
<i>a. The Social Context</i>	247
a.1. The State	248
a.2. The Opposition	250
<i>b. Actors and Behaviours</i>	256
<i>c. Ideology</i>	261
<i>d. The Movement</i>	272
3. Other Perspectives	276
<i>a. Individualism</i>	276
<i>b. Relationism</i>	277
b.1. Tilly's Perspective	278
b.2. Melucci's Perspective	280
<i>c. Social Determinism</i>	281
c.1. Structural-Functionalism Perspective	281
c.2. Conflict Theory Perspective	283
4. Conclusion	286

I. Chapter Nine: Conclusion	288
1. Introduction	289
2. History of Iranian-Islamic Social Movements	291
<i>a. Social Context</i>	292
<i>b. Ideology</i>	295
<i>c. Actors and Behaviours</i>	296
3. Results in Historical Sociology	298
4. Conclusion	301
J. Appendices	305
1. Appendix I	306
2. Appendix II	307
3. Appendix III	309
4. Appendix IV	310
a. The Small Migration	311
b. The Great Migration	312
5. Appendix V	315
6. Appendix VI	318
7. Appendix VII	319
8. Appendix VIII	320
9. Appendix IX	321
10. Appendix X	323
K. Notes	326
L. Glossary	332
M. Bibliography	334
A. Books and Articles in English	334
B. Books and Articles in Persian	341
C. Newspapers	343

Table of Figures

Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the four-step sequence to membership (Toch 1966, 27).	29
Figure 2.2: The Mobilisation Model (Tilly 1978, 56).	36
Figure 2.3: Need Satisfaction And Revolution (Davies 1962, 7).	40
Figure 2.4: Social Movements In Industrial Societies (Touraine 1981, 11).	46
Figure 2.5: A Matrix of Theories: The relative position of the reviewed theories as regards their tendency to individualism, relationism, and social determinism, and their preference for empirical or analytical interpretation	52
Figure 3.1: The Model of Social Movements.	68
Figure 3.2: Ideal-type.	70

Transliteration

In transliteration this research follows the Persian pronunciation of the Persian and Arabic words. Each Persian or Arabic word will be shown in *italics* for the first time of its use. Their English meaning, except for the names, will be also appear in a bracket or vice versa. A Glossary at the end of the thesis shows the meanings alphabetically. In the quotes, Persian or Arabic words used by the other authors will remain as they are in their original text.



A Map of Iran

Chapter One

Introduction

Introduction:

This introduction serves four main purposes. The first is to establish the significance of the field to be studied and the relative lack of attention it has received hitherto. Secondly the basic research strategy of the thesis will be outlined, though more attention will be paid to this in the chapter devoted to research method. The third task is to engage in some conceptual ground-clearing and examine some key definitions of the concept of social movements. The concept of social movement is such an all embracing one that most commentators have decided that it is useful to differentiate between 'types' of movements and the final section of this chapter is devoted to a brief overview of these typologies. The latest part will also provide a very brief introduction to the scope of the study and the cases to be reviewed.

Social movements can occur in different fields and branches of the social life and can be seen in all types of societies all over the world. Nowadays, economic movements are widespread mostly in the third world countries, and 'new social movements' occur throughout in western societies. According to Rucht, '[f]rom the mid-sixties onward, many advanced Western countries experienced waves of various protest activities and social movements. Among the most significant were the student movement, the women's movement, the antinuclear and environment movement and the peace movement' (Rucht 1991, 9).

Social movements are especially important because they can be the source of social change. Wherever a successful movement has been experienced, a change has followed. In the contemporary world there are some social movements which have already caused transformations in the global perspective, such as industrial movement;

and, indeed, there are some others which have the potential for new changes on a similar scale, for instance, women's movement.

In 1973, Wilson wrote: that the subject of social movements is '... vast and complex, and despite ... of intensified effort since the civil-rights movements of the 1950's, the sociological literature on social movements is sparse and disturbingly unpredictable' (Wilson 1973, v). Since his attempt to produce a general theory from writings on social movements, many endeavours have been made in the field, but still our knowledge about social movements, according to Rucht, is 'underdeveloped': 'In comparison to sub disciplines of, say, medicine or physics, which are well co-ordinated on the national and international level and have their own established institutes, journals and congresses, the field of social movements is underdeveloped. This is due not only to a lack of organisational resources and co-ordination, but also to the specificities of the research object: its vague contours, its multifaceted nature, and its dependency on temporal and spatial circumstances' (Rucht 1991, 10).

On the other hand, it seems from most of the literature that all types of social movements, no matter what the level and the size of their influence, have a common pattern. Many social scientists have tried to unearth this pattern, but there is not complete satisfaction with progress gained to date. There are and have been many social movements in different societies throughout the world that we have not been able to completely understand, let alone predict their outcomes.

Giddens believes that '[T]he study of social movements has been distinctly under-represented within the social sciences as compared with the vast literature given over to the numerous vying elaborations of 'organisation theory'. There seems little justification for this in a century in which revolutions and the clash of rival doctrines oriented towards radical social change have been so prominent, and one must agree that Touraine and others are right to claim that the notions of organisation and social movement are of equivalent importance in the modern era' (Giddens 1984, 203). Therefore, we require more studies on different kinds of social movements in different

parts of the world with the hope that these diverse studies will lead us to a more complete theory of social movements.

In this study our prime effort will be devoted to reaching a basic *model* by reviewing past experiences and theories. Our main objective is to present a *comprehensive general framework* for studying social movements. While it may be possible to accomplish this in a theoretical context, it is obviously impossible in a practical scheme. Going into the details of all types of movements in different fields is beyond the reach of one person and one study; therefore, the new theory I will introduce will only be investigated within the context of the political sociology of the contemporary history of Iran. Four social movements from the last one hundred years of Iran's history will be the cases for inspection of my theoretical assumptions. Further studies are needed to discover the extent and limitations of the generality of the theory.

This study is developed using currents from *structuration* and *realist* theory using and incorporating some aspects of *realist* methodology. A combination of the ontological assumption of structuration and realist theory provide the framework for identifying the basic components of a social movement. According to this framework, the individual (agency), society (social system), and their relationship (e.g. structures and organisations) are the three essential parts of all social formations with their own properties. On this basis, different theories of social movements will be categorised, and a new model will be introduced. The combination of the prominent factors of social movements, considering their sequence of occurrence - 'time' - and location in the social context - 'space' - constitutes our theory. The second chapter elaborates further on this matter. The third chapter will discuss the methodology of the thesis.

In order to substantiate the suggested model, its validity for Iranian-Islamic social movements will be assessed. There have been four national Islamic social movements between 1890 to 1979 in Iran. These four cases will be analysed in the light of ten general theories of social movements as well as the proposed one. In a critical comparative analysis, the validity of the new theory will be corroborated case by case. Thus there will be one chapter for each case - from chapter five to chapter eight - each

of which includes three parts. One section analyses the case by the new model, the second explains it by the former theories, and the third compares the results of those two sections. Chapter four deals with a review of the literature of Iranian history and social history of the period of our concern. A brief introduction of each case will be presented in this chapter.

The application of the synthetic theory on Iranian-Islamic social movements signals the importance of certain crucial dimensions in social history of the political sociology of Iranian social movements. The significance of these factors will be attested using another Iranian social movement: the National Movement of Iran (1951-53). A comparison between the outcomes of this study will be conducted with some other social historical interpretations of Iranian social movements - introduced in chapter four - for its substantiation as a useful one. Chapter nine deals with these conclusions.

As a preliminary to the development of our new model it is necessary to reconsider some basic matters of definition and categorisation, and the next two sections of the present chapter are devoted to these purposes. The conceptual universe under study and a brief introduction to the examined cases will also be outlined in this chapter.

Definition of Social Movements:

Obviously, definition is one of the most important dimensions of any scholarly examination. Utilising a definition allows researchers to separate their subject of study from other phenomena and draws conceptual boundaries around the domain of enquiry. In other words, a definition should encompass the essential features of the topic to be studied (to be *inclusive*), and segregate it from the other subjects (to be *exclusive*). This part of the literature on social movements suffers from the lack of systematic attention. Few articles have devoted themselves to discussions about the precise definition of the social movements. The rather loose definition of the concept is

perhaps a reflection of the youthfulness of the field of social movements, and its lack of an accumulated literature, as compared with other fields of studies in sociology such as urban and industrial sociology.

Different writers in social movement use the concept according to their own selective understanding of the phenomena, and there is little conceptual consistency between the scholars of the field. Katawski's opinion about the concept of 'revolution', which is considered by many as a kind of social movement, is illustrative: 'There are two major reasons for scholarly confusion about the term 'revolution'. First, there is widespread disagreement about which phenomena are to be included among the referents of the term; and, second, scholars characterise revolutions differently, thus attaching different connotations to the term which consequently give it different meanings' (Katawski 1984, 403).

Without conceptual agreement there can be no accumulation of knowledge. As long as each researcher studies a subject, according to his or her own conceptual definition, how can we compare and add the results to each other? Therefore, having a conceptual consistency is essential (necessary but not sufficient) for improving our field of study. Having conceptual agreement does not, of course, mean banning the evolution of conceptual formations. The unification of concepts after enough debate, serves as a 'ground clearing' exercise which accelerates our accumulated understanding in the field. In this part of the study a new, initial definition will be presented on the basis of various existing definitions of social movements. The main concern is to work towards an 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' definition of social movements, so as render to more clearly the topic of the thesis.

In order to have a summation of ideas of the scholars of the field, eleven definitions of social movements have been studied. Different definitions of social movements often relate to various parts of the subject of study and present it from particular points of view. Summing up their main elements, it can be concluded that there are four important aspects of social movements. These components are: 'conscious collective activity', 'new idea, belief, interest, will, goal, or value', 'mobilising social opportunities

and constraints', and 'acting against a present order in the social context'. By the combination of these dimensions a new definition can be formulated which separates social movements from the other social actions, and explains their essential features. *Social movements are an organised and conscious collective activity, driven by a new idea (belief, interest, will, or goal), mobilised by a group of actors using social opportunities and constraints against the present order in a given social context.*

Historically, the discussions about social movements are rooted in writings about collective behaviours, therefore, some of the writers have tended to treat the two concepts of 'social movements' and 'collective behaviours' as identical. Other related concepts, such as collective action and social change, are also used as synonyms with social movements by other authors. For example, Smelser defines 'collective behaviour as mobilisation on the basis of a belief which redefines social action' (Smelser 1962, 8). His definition is an elaborated form of Blumer's which defines social movements as 'collective enterprises to establish new order of life' (Blumer 1951, 199). The underlying structures of these definitions are the same. Both scholars think about social movements (for Blumer) and collective behaviour (for Smelser) as collective activity that redefines or renews the social order. Smelser uses the phrase 'mobilisation on the basis of a belief' in place of the word 'enterprise' in Blumer's definition and 'social action' instead of 'life'. To Smelser 'redefinition of social action' is the result of collective behaviour and for Blumer 'to establish new order of life' is the aim of social movements. Smelser's term of 'collective behaviour' involves both 'collective movement' and 'collective outbursts' (Smelser 1962, 3). He argues that Blumer's definition does not have such a generality, and refers to 'organised [collective] behaviour' not the elementary unorganised forms of it (Smelser 1962, 7). Robertson believes that collective behaviour and social movements are two different sorts of social actions. According to him, collective behaviour is 'relatively spontaneous social action that occurs when people try to work out common responses to ambiguous situations' (Robertson 1988, 657), whilst social movements are organised and follow certain objectives. 'Although collective behaviour and social movements both represent a social response to problematic conditions, social movements are relatively more structured and long-lasting' (Robertson 1988, 534).

Touraine's approach is rather different. Presenting a theory encompassing social change, collective action, and revolution, he refers mostly to the term, 'social movements'. He, predominantly, considers social movements as political-cultural social action. 'Social movements are neither accidents nor factors of change: they are the collective action of actors at the highest level - the class actors - fighting for the social control of historicity, i.e. control of the great cultural orientations by which a society's environmental relationships are normatively organised' (Touraine 1981, 29). This definition reminds readers of Marx's class struggle but from a distinctly 'cultural' point of view. Melucci uses the concept of 'collective action' identically to that of 'social movements', but the former is a more general term than the second one. According to him, 'collective action [social movements] is rather the product of purposeful orientations developed within a field of opportunities and constraints' (Melucci 1989, 25).

The above definitions do not separate the concept of social movements from the other types of collective behaviours or collective actions. They discuss a range of phenomena of which social movement is one. In other words, we can state that they are not exclusive.

Other writers specify social movements as a particular phenomenon, but their definitions do not encompass all of the features of the subject. For example, Tilly insists on 'some particular set of beliefs' as being the core component of the social movements (Tilly 1978, 9); and for McCarthy and Zald 'a set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements ... of a society' is an important attribute of them (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 20). Wilson's definition is more inclusive. He believes that 'a social movement is a conscious, collective, organised attempt to bring about or reset large-scale change in the social order by non institutionalised means' (Wilson 1973, 8). The definition introduced by Giddens is even more inclusive. He presents his notion in the following way: 'A social movement may be defined as a collective attempt to further a common interest, or secure a common goal, through collective action outside the sphere of established institutions' (Giddens

1989, 624). Giddens' definition is more general than that of Wilson, but both of them refer to those social movements that are occurring 'outside the sphere of established institutions', while most of the movements, more or less, use established institutions in order to attain their goals, and, further, some of the specialised movements begin and grow within the established institutions. Pakulski considers the notion of established institutions, but in a vague manner. For him, social movements are 'recurrent patterns of collective activities which are partially institutionalised, value oriented and anti-systemic in their form and symbolism' (Pakulski 1991, xiv). The word 'partially' here does not show the exact extent of institutionalisation of the social movements.

Mario Diani investigates discussions by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Charles Tilly, Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci in order to develop a concept to 'differentiate social movements from related phenomena,... reflect recent developments in the field, ... and ... to identify a specific area of investigation for social movement research' (Diani 1992, 3). According to his conclusion, there are four common points in these scholar's definitions of social movements: 'a) networks of informal interaction; b) shared beliefs and solidarity; c) collective action on conflictual issues; d) action which displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life' (Diani 1992, 7). But he rejects 'the anti-institutional style of political participation or anti-systemic attitudes .. [as] a distinctive trait of the concept of social movements' (Diani 1992, 17). Thus, he defines social movements as: 'a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity' (Diani 1992, 13). This definition does not mention the opportunities and the constraints of the social context which are essential in social movements, according to the arguments of a group of authors, including Melucci.

The suggested definition of this study distinguishes social movements as a collective action and *covers* the social conditional aspects of the movements by, for instance, referring to the social opportunities and constraints. It involves their agencies aspiration, motivational, and solidarity factors, such as beliefs; and also includes the

interactional means of the movements, for example organisations. It shows the antagonism of social movements against an established order too. The definition *excludes* social movements from merely aggressive and unorganised collective behaviours namely riots, mobs, etc. It also distinguishes this phenomenon from other types of collective behaviours which are unwilling such as collective clapping or collective crying.

Types of Social Movements:

In presenting our typology of social movements we pursue a systemic logic. Following this logic, there is a 'system' (social movements) which is divided into several 'sub-systems' (types). With regard to this frame, if the subdivisions overlap or do not cover the whole system, our typology lacks precision.

According to our definition, social movements occur in a given social context. Considering society as a system with three main sub-systems: cultural, political, and economic, social movements may happen in the social context of each of them. In other words, cultural, political, and economic systems could be considered as separate social systems which would have social contexts. Social movements may occur in each of these social contexts. It would be the same for the sub and sub-sub systems of the cultural, political, and economic systems and so forth. Accordingly, we may have cultural, political, and economic movements, or movements belonging to their subsequent sub-systems.

The terms of 'reform' and 'revolution' are another pair of concepts differentiated in diverse ways in accordance with the preferred framework of their originators. In common usage reforms are changes 'within a system' and revolutions are changes 'against a system'. It therefore depends on the level of system or subsystem of a social context chosen by the observer to assign the title of reform or revolution to a particular

movement. There could be a cultural reform in a society, or there may be a revolution in a particular style of literature. A revolution may happen in a technique of cultivation (e.g. Green Revolution, which is a change in the whole system of cultivation of wheat, or food production), and a reform can happen in a large system of an economy (e.g. Keynes's reform in the theory of capitalist economy, which does not change the overall system). For a researcher Keynes's reforms may be considered as revolution when he or she studies the economic system of the United States in 1930s; and for some others the Green Revolution may be a kind of reform in the cultivation of crops while they look at the whole cultivation system.

While there is little conceptual consistency between the writers in the field, there is also little agreement about the types of social movements which might be identified. There are many different classifications of social movements in the literature that show the diversity of the authors' interpretations. In this section our aim is to present some major classifications of social movements after introducing the one to be followed in this study. The typologies to be discussed are those set forth by Blumer, Turner and Killian, Smelser, Aberle, Touraine, and Robertson.

Blumer divides social movements into three categories: 'general social movements', 'specific social movements', and 'expressive social movements'. In general social movements people seek new values or cultural trends. Specific social movements are reforms or revolutions with well-defined objectives or goals. Expressive social movements are divided into two groups: religious movements and fashion movements that have profound effects on the personalities of individuals and on the character of the social order. According to Blumer, the different types of movements can be mixed with each other. Two kinds of mixed movements are 'revival' and 'nationalistic' movements. They are specific-and-expressive movements (Blumer 1951, 199-220).

Blumer divides social movements according to *why* they occur. General social movements take place at a cultural level and involve the seeking new values. Specific social movements have distinct organisations and defined goals. Expressive social movements include some types of spiritual movements. Revival and nationalistic

movements are specific movements for renewing past or national glories (Blumer 1951, 199-220). He attempts to produce his typology in the form of an abstract set of concepts whilst simultaneously attempting to devise a practical classification that can be applied to concrete cases. Not being able to carry off such a compromise, his classification tends to be vague. There are many overlaps in his categorisation. All types of social movements can be specific ones, such as a well-organised cultural movement which would be regarded by Blumer as a general social movement; religious movements can be specific or general according to their cultural aim or whether they take the form of a reform or a revolution; and so forth.

In their book *Collective Behaviour* Turner and Killian divide social movements into three groups: 'value-oriented', 'power-oriented', and 'participation-oriented' movements (Turner and Killian 1957). In Wilson's words:

'value-oriented movements are those in which the principal support for the movement is derived from a conviction of the worth of the program for change.... Power-oriented movements are those which have as their primary orientation the acquisition of power, status, or recognition for their members.... Participation-oriented movements are centred around the provision of membership gratification mainly through self-expression.... Turner and Killian further sub divide this type into (1) passive reform movements, or those which merely await anticipated changes; (2) personal status movements, or those which offer a redefinition of the status system so that the standing of certain groups is enhanced; and (3) limited personal movements, or those which rest their appeal on their exclusiveness- such as lodges, secret societies, and fraternities' (Wilson 1973, 16-17).

Turner and Killian's typology is derived from the participants' point of view. They classify the movements according to the perception of the participants, and what they seek to gain by taking part in those movements. The obvious problem of rooting a typology here is that there can be different participants with diverse aims in each movement (see chapter two for detailed examples); and, moreover, movements have some features themselves that are separate from the aspirations of the individuals who take part in them. Turner and Killian's typology prompts us to an over-generalisation of participants' attitudes; and there are large overlaps in their classification. Power or values may be used as the means of self-expression by many people; there are power orientations in value-oriented structures; and self-expression may become a value itself.

According to Smelser, there are two types of movements. One is the 'norm-oriented' movement and the other the 'value-oriented' movement. 'Norm-oriented movement is an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalised belief' (Smelser 1962, 270). 'A value-oriented movement is a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalised belief' (Smelser 1962, 313). Norm-oriented movements cover social reform movements, and value-oriented movements include political and religious revolutions, the formation of sects, the nationalist, nativistic, messianic, millenarian, utopian, charismatic, and many other movements (Smelser 1962, 313).

Smelser's division of social movements is a general and complete one, according to a structural-functionalist view in sociology. To what extent we are able to divide values from norms, is a practical question that this stream of thought may struggle to answer, but the result, which is division between reformistic and revolutionary movements is generally accepted in the field. His detailed explanations about value-oriented movements, however, may bring hesitation to mind that some of them could be reforms as well.

David Aberle is another writer who has contributed a new typology to the literature. He argues that there are two types of social movements, one leading to 'social' change and the other to modification of the traits or personality of the 'individual'. The first one consists of 'transformative' and 'reformative' movements. The second includes 'redemptive' and 'alterative' movements. Transformative movements lead to far-reaching changes in society, such as revolutions and radical religious movements. Reformative movements are directed towards changing some aspects of the existing social order, for instance anti-abortion groups. Redemptive movements are aimed at rescuing people from ways of life that are seen as corruptive, for example many religious movements. Alterative movements are to secure partial change in individuals. The anti-addiction movements can thus be termed an 'alterative movement' (Aberle 1966, 315-333).

Aberle divides social movements by looking at their ultimate aims, whether they are affecting agencies or structures. This confronts sociologists with a classic problem since individual and society are integrated phenomena which have mutual influence on each other. The aims of a movement could indeed be directed at one or other of these levels, but in the actual enactment of the movement both individual and society will be affected. He differentiates two levels of reforms and revolutions. In subdivisions of 'social-aimed' movements, he distinguishes reforms from revolutions, and in 'individual-aimed' movements, he points to reformistic and revolutionary influences on individuals.

Touraine defines a social movement as a struggle and identifies three types of 'positive' struggles and three kinds of 'critical' ones. Positive and critical struggles can occur at the levels of historicity, institution, and organisation, according to him. Positive struggles occur in a 'totality' of the above mentioned levels, and critical ones are against a 'totality'. Positive struggle at the level of historicity is called social movement, at the institutional level he refers to it as 'institutional' or 'political pressure' and at the organisational level as 'claims' and 'protests'. For Touraine, critical struggle at the historicity level is 'revolutionary action', at the institutional level is 'pressure against obstacles', and at the organisational level is 'crisis behaviour' (Touraine 1981, 84-94). In this classification there are two struggles that can be regarded as social movements: positive struggle at historicity level and critical struggle at the same level. Touraine delimits them as 'social movements' and 'revolutionary action' respectively.

Touraine's classification of social movements is broadly the same as Smelser's but originates from a critical sociology standpoint. The main distinction is that Touraine regards cultural struggles as social movements, while Smelser considers some of the 'institutional' and 'organisational' struggles, using Touraine's terminology, to be norm-oriented social movements as well. Touraine's typology is more practical, as it shows the location of the social movements in the social structure, in contrast to the more abstract classification of Smelser. It can be said, here, that Touraine's classification as a

matter of definition identifies as social movements only those that are in the cultural level.

Ian Robertson, in his book *Sociology* (1988), discusses four types of social movements: a) 'regressive movements', that aim to "set back the clock", b) 'reform movements', which seek certain reforms in specific areas of society, c) 'revolutionary movements', that attempt to reorganise the entire society, and d) 'utopian movements', which envision a radically changed and blissful life, either on a large scale in the future or on a small scale in the present (Robertson 1988, 556, 557). Robertson's typology covers large scale and small scale social movements under the title of reforms and revolutions. He classifies the movements according to whether their aims look forward or backward as 'utopian' and 'regressive' movements. Each of these in turn may be 'reforms' or 'revolutions'.

This review of typologies now having reached its end, let us consider what we have found of greatest utility from the existing schemas. This will allow us to pigeon hole the movements in which we are interested, and place qualifications on the limits of ambition of the thesis. Looking for points of agreement in the above mentioned classifications, 'reform' and 'revolution' are two general concepts applied to small and large, inner-system or whole system changes, which are used commonly by the social thinkers, but with different interpretations and, sometimes, with different terminology. For instance, Touraine interprets them as 'struggles within a totality' (reforms) and 'struggles against a totality' (revolutions), while Abrele prefers 'reformative' and 'transformative' movements which aim to bring changes at the personal level or the social scale, respectively. The various classifications reviewed suggest that social movements may occur in all parts and at all levels of the social structure with different purposes. Also, we have learned that it is possible to classify them according to their aims, scope, and locations within the social structure. In order to present the most helpful classification and to avoid some of the problems of ideal, abstract, overlapping, over-general, partial and mixed-level typologies, this study has followed Touraine in focusing on the location, scope, and intention of the movements simultaneously. We depart from Touraine, however, by taking into consideration the whole social system

and not just the 'historicity' level. The aim is to produce a typology which informs us of the domain of influence of the movements. The chosen frame operates with a 'systemic' view of the society. The social context of systems and sub-systems of the society shows the location, scope, and general aims of the movements, whether they are, for example, cultural or political. The targets of the movements will be manifest by their position as reformistic or revolutionary.

Summing up, in this study social movements are categorised according to the general classification of society into 'cultural', 'political', and 'economic' systems and their subsequent sub-systems. Social movements can take place at all levels of the social system or sub-systems. Reform and revolution are used as two concepts for studying changes within or against a system respectively, according to the level of focus adopted by the researcher. By this type of classification, social movements are not looked at merely from a political viewpoint as anti-state collective actions. On the contrary, the state can be the initiator or at least a supporter of social movements in different parts of the society. The political system may even act as a catalyst in the formation of a party or different parties.

In this thesis Iranian society has been considered as a social system. Within this system the political sub-system has been selected as universe of study. In short, four Iranian social movements have been chosen for study in respect of the political macro environment of Iran. The political structure thus acts as the framework of this study without the possibility of going into every detail of its every sub-system. None of the systems or sub-systems of a society are, of course, isolated from each other, neither are the four cases independent in terms of history, space and time. But for the purpose of study we need to limit the boundaries and focus on a location in the social system. The social, cultural and economic systems are the close neighbours of the political system in the social structure. The political system in combination with economic and cultural ones forms the social system. Therefore, it has direct interaction with these fellow structures. In this study the information on, for instance social stratification from social, oil revenue and trade organisation from economic, and religion from cultural

system are taken on board as background conditions which influence the political environment, but they will not be taken as objects of study in and of themselves.

This study will consider the political movements of the whole of Iranian society in the period of 1890 to 1979. Such Iranian political movements, can be divided into two distinct groups: those initiated or supported by the state and those which were generated by the people. The social movements energised by the people were against the political structure or policies of their time, while the former ones were congruent with the dominant policies and, mostly, in contradiction with the cultural traditions of the society. The social movements enforced by the government were chiefly modernisation programmes. Modernisation in Iran was administered under the rule of Qajars mainly for increasing the efficiency of the state, and continued in the Pahlavis era in pursuit of further changes in the executive body of the country and the modernisation of the economy and culture.

This study will follow the second type of political social movements of Iran, the movements which were against the current political structures or policies in the chosen time period. There were five such social movements in this duration: the Tobacco Movement (1892), the Constitutional Revolution (1905-6), the National Movement of Iran (1951-53), the 15th of Khordad (June 1963) Movement, and the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. The National Movement of Iran was partly conducted by non-religious forces and organisations, but the rest were led by the clergy (the ulama) and had a version of Islamic understanding as their ideology. Therefore, we name these four - *Iranian-Islamic* social movements. The study's main focus is on this quartet of social movements, however the National Movement of Iran will be reviewed to attest the results of this thesis in the final chapter.

Chapter Two

Theories

Introduction:

This chapter aims to present a new synthetic theory for studying social movements. Reviewing the history of ideas, one can say that there is no single, well-accumulated path of theory and method in this field, and most of the writers examine the issues from their own perspective. New efforts are needed in order to produce a new summation of the different standpoints, with the goal of presenting an original synthetic understanding of the subject. The relationship between the individual and society is one of the essential ontological subjects of sociology and permanently a topic for dispute. The first aim of this chapter is to categorise existing theories of social movements according to their understanding of the individual, society, and the relationship between them. It will be seen that some sociological theories tend to the individualist, some are inclined to the social determinist, while another group leans to the relationist. Our first intention here is to identify the position of the principal theories of social movements in this respect. The second task is to develop a new model which would involve looking at the individual, society, and their relationship, as three dimensions of a single entity.

'Social movements' became a subject in sociology as part of general discussions about 'collective behaviour'. 'The field of collective behaviour, first given shape in the 1920s by the Chicago School of Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, was heavily influenced by the tradition of European mass psychology. The line of thought, represented by Gustave LeBon, Gabriel Tarde and Scipio Sighele, flourished in the Old World at the turn of the century' (Rucht 1991, 422). For some of the originators, social movements were abnormal mass behaviours because they were against the present social order. They were looked at from the point of view of the socialisation of their participants, who were not well adapted to prevailing social norms and values. This

kind of outlook continued as the main stream of thought on social movements until 1960s and took the name of 'psychological theories'.

Another group of writers on collective behaviour, looking at social movements from the sociological point of view, emerged in the 1960s. This approach to the understanding of social movements was founded by Smelser (1962) and continued by others, such as Davies (1962, 1971). According to them, 'structural strain' or 'social deprivation' *were* the source of social movements.

In the 1970s another new approach developed which is referred to as 'resource mobilisation theories'. This position was set out and developed by Anthony Oberschall (1973), William Gamson (1968, 1975), Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (1973, 1977), and Charles Tilly (1978). These authors stressed 'the organisational needs of movements' (Rucht 1991, 427), and separated social movements from collective behaviour as independent subjects.

Two other remaining paradigms in the field are: 'new social movements', and 'action-identity approach' (Pakulski 1991, 4). With the rise of new social movements in western societies, such as the student movement, peace movement, women's movement, etc., many sociologists began investigating them to find out the reasons behind and processes of (the 'how' and the 'why') these new movements. Habermas (1981), Melucci (1981, 1985, 1988), Offe (1985), and Scott (1990) are four well known writers who developed and followed this new social movements approach. However, there is surprisingly little internal consistency within this family of thought, even though their subjects of study are the same. The 'action-identity approach' is associated with Touraine (1981, 1985); who considers political movements and class struggles from a cultural perspective. Castells (1983) as another writer who takes this approach (according to Pakulski, 1991, 23). This pair of thinkers mostly deal with social change rather than reform.

In this study ten major social movement theories, exemplifying different themes of the above mentioned approaches, will be classified according to their perspective regarding

the individual, society, and the relationship between them. Subsequently a synthetic model will be designed. But first of all the ontological frame should be discussed.

Individual and Society:

Viewpoints on the different aspects of the relationship between the individual and society in social actions can be divided into three groups. The first includes those which locate dominance with the individual; the second, consists of outlooks accepting the priority of the social structures; and the third, comprises ideas which interpret the relationship between individual and society as the main subject of concern. The first category can be named *individualist*, the second group *social determinist*, and the third one *relationist*. Individualists consider the actors and/or their actions as dominant elements in social matters. They count cognition, ideas, ethics, beliefs, identity, consciousness, role and behaviour, as major factors of social formations. Social determinists look at society, social context, social conditions, social structure, classes, and so on, as the determinant of agencies actions and social relations. For the third group, relationists, the prime role goes to those phenomena that bring individuals together to make a society. According to the perspective, solidarity factors are important. Rules, organisations, ideology, collective interest, collective will, collective beliefs, collective identity, mood, and so forth are some examples of the crucial explanatory concepts. It should be mentioned here that these tendencies are not strictly divided from one another in practice. 'Agency', 'relations', and 'social conditions' all find some place in the descriptions of most writers, but how they are regarded and the amount of emphasis devoted to each differs markedly.

The classification of the writers into three main groups of individualist, relationists, and social determinists will give us a better understanding of the history of thought on this issue, and bring us a new insight while considering 'agency', 'relations', and 'social conditions' as three dimensions of one thing. This classification can also reveal the

limitations of each theory caused by looking at the subject from a particular angle. As in so many other spheres of social understanding, a one sided accentuation of the single ontological framework can lead to an overstretching of explanatory powers and an incompleteness of description.

In practical investigations, a focus on 'relations' reveals the aims and direction of a social movement; emphasis on 'society' leads us to the social context in which it occurs and its social consequences; and studying 'agencies' tells us who produces the movement. By studying relations we can find out *how* a social movement is taking place and by studying individualism and social determinist insights, *why* questions can be answered.

The interpretation of the relationship between the individual and society from the individualistic standpoint is well represented by Max Weber's work. By introducing the concept of 'meaningful action' he pointed out the importance of the individual's understanding in social processes. Without going into detailed analysis of his ideas, one may simplify his theory of emergence of capitalism as follows. Capitalism and the industrial revolution were facilitated by new beliefs - namely the Protestant ethic - that emerged in Europe and influenced the fundamental thoughts and motives of a large portion of the western population (Weber 1930). For him, Protestantism encouraged rationalisation and other kinds of individualistic interpretations to be incorporated in the life of the European communities, and these ethics facilitated the process of capitalism. This tradition has continued in sociological theories and constitutes a stream of thought that is regarded as 'Weberian', and we can see its influence, especially in Talcott Parsons's writings.

Domination of the society over the individual is mostly associated with the ideas of Marx. Marx speaks about the importance of social factors and their influence on the individual's actions. Simplifying his theory, one can say that he believes that the capitalist revolution followed from the history of the class conflict, and individuals were simply pursuing the inevitable rules of class struggle (Marx 1888). The Marxist tradition remains one of the major branches in sociological thought and has been

frequently renewed in the history of the discipline. Although, some currents of determinism are said to exist in other major thinkers in sociology, like Durkheim, the social deterministic viewpoint is largely associated with Marx.

The individual and society are two 'realities' with their own special properties. Reviewing the historical documents, the roles of famous individuals are frequently discussed; acting in their special social context, in regard to the opportunities and constraints of their time. Ignoring the role of individuals, it is impossible to explain the events; but ignoring social conditions, history will be endless sheets of paper filled with legends telling tales of these well-known individuals. Both of them, individual and society, have their own significance in the turn of history. The 'individual' has its own qualities, and 'society' exists with all its characteristics. It cannot be said that one is dominant over the other, or either is more influential. The long history of individualism and structuralism as two different schools of thought in sociology is itself a further reason for accepting the integrity of the concepts of the individual and society.

The relationistic understanding of social actions is associated with the school of social interactionists. They evaluate social interactional factors as the most influential aspects of social entities. It was supposed that they could put an end to the battle between individualism and social determinism, and would bring a new synthesis to social thinking. A new school of social knowledge emerged, but even here a 'second-phase' struggle between individualism and social determinism continued. Among this school some are those who tend to be individualist (like Mead), and others who lean towards social determinism (such as Erich Fromm). Focusing on interaction between the individual and society has its roots in dialectical logic. They are two identities that affect each other in the process of life and create each other through their interaction. They are two different objects inter-related by relations or symbolic interactions. Social interactionists try to draw a balance between the individual and society's influences by focusing on relational factors, but none have been completely successful in achieving such an equilibrium. In their writings either individual or society becomes dominant.

Archer develops this discussion by insisting on two concepts of 'downward' and 'upward' 'conflation'. The 'downward conflation', going from structure to agency, is a 'Collectivistic' understanding, and 'upward conflation', moving from agency to structure, is an 'Individualistic' type of interpretation of the relationship between the individual and society (Archer 1995, 3-4). She argues that agency and structure are distinct from, and irreducible to, one another (Archer 1995, 14). Archer believes that many of those who tried to solve the problem of relationship between individual and society by introducing the interrelational perspective are actually denying the separability of the individual from the society by properties and power (Archer 1995, 14). Instead of looking for 'interplay between agency and structure, they are preoccupied with "interpenetration" of them' (Archer 1995, 15).

Social interactionists brought the third dimension of the relationship between individual and society to our attention. According to symbolic interactionism, relations are like a carrier which make the connection of the two interactive objects possible. The interactive subjects should be somehow familiar with this medium. To give a simplified example, in a democratic society 'democracy' is a kind of relationship between the 'political system' and 'the people'. The 'political system' and 'the people' can be judged according to their loyalty to the principles of 'democracy' in such a society. If there were no such qualification - loyalty to the democracy - within the 'political system' and 'the people', democracy could not happen in that society. In other words, the 'political system' as a social phenomenon, 'the people' as the sum of individuals, and 'democracy' as the relationship between them are three important components that make a democratic society possible. If one of them becomes absent there would be no such thing as a democratic society.

Within the literature on the relationship between the individual and society, Giddens' ideas relating to his 'structuration theory' have won considerable repute. His attempt to bring a balance between the individual, society and their interaction seems to be more successful than most others. He introduces three main concepts in this respect: a) agent, b) structure, and c) social system. For him the role that the agent and the social condition play in relation to each other is as follows: 'In and through their activities

agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible' (Giddens 1984, 2). In more detail he proposes that: 'Human societies, or social systems, would plainly not exist without human agency. But it is not the case that actors create social systems: they reproduce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of *praxis*. ... In general ... the greater the time-space distancing of social systems - the more their institution bite into time and space - the more resistant they are to manipulation or change by any individual agent. This meaning of constraint is also coupled to enablement. Time-space distancing closes off some possibilities of human experience at the same time as it opens up others' (Giddens 1984, 171. Original italic.).

Structure is an important concept in his theory though, somewhat unusually, it does not refer to institutions but is, 'understood as rules and resources, structure is recursively implicated in the reproduction of social systems and is wholly fundamental to structuration theory ... structure can be spoken of as referring to the institutionalised features (structured properties) of societies' (Giddens 1984, 185). Going into more detail he explains: '... "structure" is a generic category involved in each of the structural concepts given below: (1) *structural principles*: Principles of organisation of societal totalities; (2) *structures*: Rule-resources sets, involved in the institutional articulation of social systems; (3) *structural properties*: Institutionalised features of social systems, structuring across time and space' (Giddens 1984, 185. Original italics.).

According to structuration theory, social systems 'comprise the situated activities of human agents, reproduced across time and space' (Giddens 1984, 25), and 'are organised hierarchically and laterally within societal totalities, the institutions of which form "articulated ensembles" ' (Giddens 1984, 170).

In this theory Giddens's emphasis is on the structure (or what I would prefer to speak of as 'relations'), although he does not ignore the individual and society. He looks at them in the same space and time. According to him, "society" is manifestly not external to individual actors in exactly the same sense as the surrounding environment is external to them' (Giddens 1984, 172). His preference is in contrast to those who

separate these three elements from each other and try to view the relationship between the individual and society from the angle of one of them. However, Archer argues that his emphasis on individual is more than on the other components (Archer 1995, 98), because her starting point is with the 'givenness' of the individual and society and not their relationship.

Criticising the reduction of one component to another, Archer looks at agency and structure, or the individual and society, through time. She criticises the structuration theory of Giddens for not separating these components. 'Because "structure" is inseparable from agency then, *there is no sense in which it can be either emergent or autonomous or pre-existent or causally influential*' (Archer 1995, 97. Original italics.). According to her, properties and power of the agency and structure form two levels of strata. Structures will emerge by the interaction of the agencies through the time, but they have their own autonomous properties. She also believes that the interplay between structure and agency can be analysed over time and space on the basis of two basic propositions: '(i) That structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) leading to its reproduction or transformation; (ii) That structure elaboration necessarily post-dates the action sequences which gave rise to it' (Archer 1995, 15). Apart from agency and structural power and properties, she does not single out any objective property 'attached' to or 'identifying' the relational factors, such as is the role of 'structure' in structuration theory.

In this thesis the investigation of the 'individual', 'society', and their 'relations' will assume that they have a mutual interrelationship in social realities. Our starting point is that of 'balance' between these three forces. Agencies are social actors and their deeds; the social system is a phenomenon with its own consequences and properties; and relations - rules, structures, and organisations, in Giddens's language - are the linkages between the individuals, whose collective accomplishments at a particular time and space form the social system. Archer's emphasis, as the other realist scholars, is on the two first elements - individual and society - and Giddens's stress is on the third - relations. In this thesis we are in effect following a combination of their ideas. One can distinguish between the individual, society, and their relationship but they are

inseparable in any social formation. They have their own properties and are not dominated by each other, as Archer believes for individual and society. Through the centuries we have had the 'individual', the 'society', and, also, the 'relations' as the social roads, boundaries and walls, according to Giddens, for individuals' activities, operating in social formations. Generally, *in all social systems, individuals affect society according to their characteristics, society influences them by its properties, and social relations play their own part as the routes for matching the individual features with the social opportunities, and vice versa. None of these elements is more important than the others, and none of them can be neglected. Each of them intervenes as a dimension of a social system. Over time individuals, being affected by the prior social conditions, act according to the constraints and opportunities of a social context and bring change to it.*

Social Movements Theories:

Utilising our understanding of the individual, society, and the relations between them, the following major theories of social movements will be categorised in regard of their tendency towards individualism, relationism, and social determinism. The theories that will be dealt are associated with ten prominent scholars in the field: Hans Toch, Herbert Blumer, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Charles Tilly, Alberto Melucci, James C. Davies, John Wilson, Neil J. Smelser, Alain Touraine, and Alan Scott. The criteria for choosing their models are the contributions they have made in the field and their relevance to our main ontological concepts. A general description of these theories will be presented, and their position in regard of three general dimensions will be examined. The strengths and weaknesses of each model in presenting their complete theory of social movements will be assessed in the course of the discussions. As a result a general map of ideas in social movements will be drawn, according to their tendencies to individualism, relationism, and social determinism.

In the last part of this chapter a new approach will be presented in an attempt to cover all important factors investigated in reviewing theories of social movements. The general assumption underpinning this synthetic pattern is, of course, our understanding of the interrelationship between agency, structure, and their relations, as the main dimensions of any social formation.

Individualism:

Within this stream of thought, agencies and their psychological state are considered to be the prominent factor intervening in the accomplishment of social movements. Toch's theory will be presented as an example of this approach. According to him, the participants' susceptibility to a problem is the main initiator of social movements. A group of 'susceptible' people using an 'ideology' form their 'appeal' in order to discover a solution of their 'problem'. In this perspective all the intervening factors are looked through the glass of the individual. In his book: *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*, published in 1966, **Hans Toch**, explains three following parts: the nature of social movements, the carrier of members, and determinants of motives of participants in social movements. His interpretations are, generally, individualistic. They are about collective problems and how concerned individuals try to find their solutions through the community. He denotes that an individual confronts a 'problem situation' in society. If there would be no impact from social agents or institutions in order to solve the situation, it would make a problem for him or her. If there were no reaction from the society to the problem, a reaction by the individual would emerge; so susceptibility would appear. Those individuals who are susceptible to the same problem will come together and form an appeal. In order to formulate their appeal they will choose an ideology, through which the social movement will emerge. His schematic sequence of membership in a social movement is as shown in the Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of the four-step sequence to membership (Toch 1966, 27)

The core subject of Toch's work is an examination of the participant's psychological state and their motives. A second theme is how susceptible individuals form a group and make a social movement. In this regard, belief plays an important part. For him, 'a set of related beliefs' which 'holds by a group of persons', is considered to be the ideology. It acts as a 'platform' for a social movement, according to Toch. He further says, 'The ideology of a social movement is what the members of the movement are trying to achieve together, and what they wish to affirm jointly. Such a statement points down the road along which the social movement is moving, and specifies the principles and objectives that guide its journey' (Toch 1966, 21). In a further explanation he denotes that ideology '*defines* the movement, and contrasts it with other movements and institutions. It also furnishes an objective description of solutions offered by the movement for the problems of its members' (Toch 1966, 21. Original italic.). It should be noted that the psychological theme dominates Toch's

interpretation and, thus, belief is conceived of from an individualistic standpoint. 'The ultimate test of how central a belief is, is not its position in the logical structure or its objective importance, but the way it is perceived by the believer' (Toch 1966, 24). According to Toch, purposes, goals, and directions of a movement are underpinned by the ideology

Toch does not go further than bringing to general attention the importance of society in social movements. Social situations cause dissatisfaction or frustration in individuals; in their turn unsatisfied or frustrated needs are the causes of social movements (Toch 1966, 247). Social movements have a natural death both because of social forms of 'inflexibility' and 'institutionalisation' (Toch 1966, 221). In his general view, social movements are abnormal collective behaviours from conventional society's point of view, but, indeed, he also believes that we have bad and good social movements (Toch 1966, 247). In other words in Toch's opinion, social movements are social phenomena which emerge in societies, eventually die in their social forms, and can be judged by the criteria of society. But the detailed explanations about mechanisms, causes, and effects of social movements are presented from an individualistic perspective by him. His concluding sentence clearly denotes his individualistic stand: 'through their existence, social movements alert us to unsatisfied or frustrated needs. They draw our attention to areas in which we can exercise the option of alleviating suffering and furnishing hope to our fellows' (Toch 1966, 247).

The psychological insights on social movements have been criticised by a number of writers. For example, Smelser avoided psychological explanations of collective behaviours and suggested a more sociological outlook. In his own words: 'with psychological variables alone we cannot discriminate between the occasions on which these variables will manifest themselves and the occasions on which they will lie dormant' (Smelser 1962, 20). According to McCarthy and Zald grievances may or may not be the base of social movements, and the psychological explanation ignores how a movement can utilise the environment and how persons and institutions from outside would become involved (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 17).

Relationism:

From this perspective social solidarity and structural factors, which bring individuals together in order to shape a social system, are considered the most important concepts in the formation of social movements. Reviewing different relationistic interpretations reveals the main concepts of this stream of thought. In this respect four theories will be studied here. According to Blumer, besides 'agitation', which is an individualistic item, 'ideology' and 'operating tactics' are the prominent factors of social movements; McCarthy and Zald believe that 'organisation' is the most prominent factor; Tilly's concentration is on 'mobilisation', 'organisation' and 'population beliefs'; and Melucci insists on 'collective identity' working in 'the three polar system'. The theories within this tradition become more analytical and multifactoral through the history of their presentation.

Herbert Blumer defines social movements as 'collective enterprises to establish a new order of life' (Blumer 1969, 99). As was stated in the first chapter, he recognises five types of social movements: general, specific, expressive, revival, and nationalistic, of which the two last are a combination of the first three. General social movements seek new cultural trends. 'The development of the new values which [some] ... cultural drifts bring forth involve some interesting psychological changes that provide the motivation for general social movements' (Blumer 1969, 100). The General social movements have two main characteristics: 'grouping and uncoordinated efforts', and a 'varied and ill-defined literature'. The leader in this type of movement is a 'pace-maker' and a 'voice in the wilderness'. The media of interaction is reading, conversations, talks, discussions and the perception of examples (Blumer 1969, 100-101). 'Especially in its earlier stages, general social movements are likely to be merely an aggregation of an individual line of action based on individual decisions and selections' (Blumer 1969, 101). It is, also, 'rather formless in organisation and inarticulate in expression' at its earlier phases (Blumer 1969, 102).

A specific social movement for Blumer 'has a well-defined objective or goal which it seeks to reach'. This type of social movement can be reformist or a revolutionary these differing from each other, but have the following similar characteristics: well-defined objectives or goals, an organisation and structure, recognised and accepted leadership, defined membership characterised by a 'we-consciousness', members loyalties, and 'it forms a body of traditions, a guiding set of values, a philosophy, sets of rules, and a general body of expectations'. This type of social movement is less organised at the beginning and becomes more organised as it progresses. It has a definite division of labour, and the members know their roles which make the social structure of the movement (Blumer 1969, 102-103). The stages of development of a specific social movement are: '1. agitation, 2. development of *esprit de corps*, 3. development of morale, 4. the formation of an ideology, and 5. the development of operating tactics' (Blumer 1969, 103. Original italics.). In the second stage in-group and out-group relations will develop, informal fellowships will emerge, and ceremonial behaviour will form (Blumer 1969, 106-107).

According to Blumer, one of the important elements in social movement formation is ideology. For him, ideology has the following characteristics: 'a statement of the objectives, purpose, and premises of the movement ... - direction; ... a body of criticism and condemnation of the existing structure which the movement is attacking and seeking to change ... - justification; ... a body of defence doctrine which serves as a justification of the movement and its objectives ... - weapons of attack; ... a body of belief dealing with policies, tactics, and practical operation of the movement ... - weapons of defence; ... and the myths of the movement ... - inspiration and hope' (Blumer 1969, 110-111).

Expressive movements have profound effects on the personalities of individuals and the character of the social order. Blumer considers two kinds of expressive movements: religious movements and fashion movements (Blumer 1969, 114). For him the revival and nationalistic movements occur when there is a situation of frustration. In that situation people try to find their self-respect and satisfaction in their past glories. Nationalistic movements have their motivation in a feeling of inferiority and the

seeking of 'liberty' and 'freedom'. They use the mechanisms of specific social movements. In addition they have the revivalistic slant to glorify the past of the people (Blumer 1969, 119-120).

Blumer has a social psychological perspective in his social movements theory. The solidarity factors are the main concepts of his theory. Within general social movements, cultural drifts create new values that lead to psychological change. The psychological change produces motivation for the movement. In this kind of movement his emphasis is on 'individual lines of action based on individual decisions' (Blumer 1969, 101) but the media of interaction, like reading, conversation, etc., are the means of social movements' formation. The specific social movement is the most organised type of movement, for Blumer. Its first stage is a psychological one, and the second, third, and fourth stages are the steps through which the relations of the social movement forms. An expressive movement is concerned with changing the personalities of individuals or their position in the social order, using Blumer's words 'the character of social order'. The revival movement starts with a situation of frustration which will only be contented by gaining self-respect and satisfaction from past glories. The individuals' loyalty to their nation and history is the basis for nationalistic movements. A 'feeling of inferiority' is the cause of nationalistic and sometimes revival movements. In these type of movements, for Blumer, the individual is important, but relations (social feeling of inferiority) are the essential aspect of the movements. 'Media of interactions', 'we-consciousness', 'organisation and structure', 'ceremonial behaviours', 'social frustration', 'philosophy', 'sets of rules', '*esprit de corps*', 'ideology', and social 'feeling of inferiority' are some of the relational factors he is using in the formation of his theory.

Blumer's social interactionist model is, then, a relationist one with some leanings towards individualism. The formation of a social movement, for Blumer, begins with individual and, for the most part, collective motives. Changed motivations will alter the social feelings and relations and lead to the social formation of movement and change. Except for 'change of values' in general movements, the role of society in raising motivations and formation of relations is not discussed by him.

Blumer's theory is criticised by Smelser as a model which describes *physical* or *temporal* features of social movement but not their defining characteristics. Smelser insists on 'belief' as a defining characteristic of collective behaviour and concludes that there are different ways for its communication, and that the 'defining characteristics of collective behaviour do not lie in any particular of communication or interaction' as Blumer believes (Smelser 1962, 10). According to Melucci's discussion of concept formation of collective action, Blumer's standpoint on social movement is an 'empirical' not 'analytical' one. He is said to concentrate upon examples of the particular features of social movements and not their generalised characteristics (Melucci 1987, 24).

John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald presented a relationistic theory, with emphasis on social organisations, in their 1987 book: *Social Movements In An Organisational Society*. Their explanation has two parts. The first, outlines the structure of their theory, and the second gives its dynamics by introducing some hypotheses. According to them, a social movement mobilises resources toward the goals of the movement. 'We view social movements as nothing more than preference structures directed toward social change' (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 20). For them, the structure of a social movement consists of three different organisations or groups of organisations: a) social movement organisation (SMO), b) social movement industries (SMI), and c) social movement sector (SMS). SMOs are the specialised organisations of a social movement. SMI consists of different SMOs that seek a special goal, and usually are considered as a social movement. SMS includes all the SMIs of the entire social movements of a society (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 20-22). These organisations mobilise individuals' and other organisations' resources for the attainment of the goals of social movements.

Individuals and organisations who would be utilised by social movements consist of adherents (those who believe in the goals of the movement), nonadherents, constituents (who provide resources), the bystander public (who are not opponents but witnesses of a SM), potential beneficiaries (who benefit directly from SM's goal accomplishment), conscience adherents (who do not stand to benefit from SM

directly), and conscience constituents (who are direct supporters of the social movement and do not stand for direct benefit). Elites of the movements are those who control larger resource pools (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 23).

McCarthy and Zald, using economic logic, explain how the rule of supply and demand of resources act in the social movement sector of a society. According to them, resources are: legitimacy, money, facilities, and labour (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 22). The above mentioned individuals and organisations control these resources; and SMOs have to mobilise them toward their beliefs, but with not complete freedom of choice as such. There are some intervening events such as: war, broad economic trends, and natural disasters which can affect the SMO's ability to garner resources (McCarthy and Zald 1987, 25). They do not differentiate between the individual and society, and do not consider any specification for them in their model. The individual and society are both considered as resources, and are mobilised by SMOs. Success and failure of social movements depend on how SMOs are designed and utilised, and how successful they are in mobilising resources.

McCarthy and Zald acknowledge that their theory is a partial one. In regard of our ontological assumption, they only explain one of the three dimensions of social movements, that is 'relations'. Their theory provides a discussion about how a social movement can finance itself in an organised society, and on whose support it may stand. As Melucci asserts, these writers mostly explain the structure of mobilisation organisation in a particular kind of social system and do not examine the process of mobilisation (Melucci 1989, 33, 34). They try to explain *how* a social movement forms but not *why* it takes place (Melucci 1989, 21, 22). Pakulski counts the tendency to 'domesticate' and 'over-instrumentalise' social movements as one of the failures of these writers' stream of thought (Pakulski 1991, 14).

Charles Tilly, as a well known resource mobilisation writer, believes that there are three main variables incorporated in each social movement with three other secondary ones. 'Interests', 'organisation', and 'mobilisation' are the prominent factors, and 'repression/facilitation', 'power', and 'opportunity/threat' are in juxtaposition. His main

stress is on 'organisation' and 'mobilisation'. In his book: *From Mobilisation to Revolution* he explains the process of social movements going from organisation to mobilisation to collective action and to revolution (Tilly 1978, 7).

'Interest' is the initiator of each social movement which has two roots: relations of production, that are predictors of peoples' interests on average and in the long run, and peoples' own interests, which explain their behaviour in the short run. 'We should deliberately treat the degree of conflict between individual and collective interests as a variable affecting the likelihood and character of collective action' (Tilly 1978, 61). According to him, collective interests are average and long run predictors of peoples' behaviour, while their own interests are the short run forecasters.

'Repression/facilitation', 'power', and opportunity/threat' represent the social conditions in Tilly's theory. They are lateral factors, as he pointed out (Tilly 1978, 7), and affect 'mobilisation' and 'collective action'. 'Organisation' and 'mobilisation' under the influence of 'social conditions' and 'peoples' interests' make the collective action. His model is presented in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2: The Mobilisation Model (Tilly 1978, 56)

According to Tilly, social movements are distinguished by their 'people's belief'. A movement emerges when 'a population' with the same belief acts collectively (Tilly 1978, 9). The population can change drastically, but if a collectivity of the people with identical beliefs continues to act together the movement survives (Tilly 1978, 10).

Social factors are secondary in Tilly's perspective, and the 'individuals' interest' is of the least significance. His theory is a relationist one. His emphasis is on relations while society and individual are the second and third prominent factors respectively. Tilly, as a Resource Mobilisation Theory writer, is criticised by Melucci for ignoring the *why* question of social movements and only speaking about *how* they take place (Melucci 1989, 21, 22). According to him, 'RMT postulates a process of actors' construction of their identity, without, however, examining the process' (Melucci 1989, 34). For Pakulski, besides the tendency to 'domesticate and over-instrumentalise' social movements, in this type of interpretation 'value-commitments and dedication are seen as merely "resources" tapped by movement entrepreneurs' (Pakulski 1991, 15).

Alberto Melucci, the Italian writer on social movements, contributed to this field from the 1970's. He thinks of collective action as a purposeful act. For him, cognition is one of the important factors of collective actions. He believes that individuals organise their behaviour according to their cognition of social possibilities and constraints. 'Individuals acting collectively *construct* their action by defining in cognitive terms these possibilities and limits, while at the same time interacting with others in order to 'organise' (i.e. to make sense of) their common behaviour' (Melucci 1989, 25-26. Original italic.). In other words 'individuals define themselves as collective actors by means of a variety of negotiated interactions' (Melucci 1989, 32).

In Melucci's theory 'collective identity' is the dominant factor of collective actions. 'Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place' (Melucci 1989, 34). He believes that 'collective behaviour is not a unitary empirical phenomenon'

but situated within a *multipolar action system*. The poles within which collective behaviour is located are: 'goals', 'means', and 'environment' (Melucci 1989, 26).

Social movements, for Melucci, are those collective actions which have three characteristics: '*solidarity*', '*conflict*', and '*breaks the limits of compatibility of a system*'. 'Solidarity' is "actors' mutual recognition that they are part of a single social unit" (Melucci 1989, 29); 'conflict' is 'opposition to an adversary who lays claim to the same goods or values' (Melucci 1989, 29); and by 'breaks the limits of compatibility of a system' Melucci means: 'its actions violate the boundaries or tolerance limits of a system, thereby pushing the system beyond the range of variations that it can tolerate without altering its structure' (Melucci 1989, 29).

According to our framework Melucci is a relationist. In his definition of 'collective identity' he denotes that it acts as a bridge between individuals orientation of action and the social opportunities and constraints. And he considers this identity as the most important factor of collective actions (Melucci 1989, 34). The general view of Melucci toward collective behaviour seems to cover the whole range of variables of social movements. However, his analysis of this general system does not lead us to the incorporation of these factors within the 'place' and the 'time' of a social movement . Variation of 'actors' and 'networks of meaning' is taken account of, but one cannot deduce a concrete social movement model out of his explanations. He is trying to produce an 'analytical' model and to avoid an 'empirical' one (Melucci 1989, 24), but ultimately any 'analytical' generalisation should be able to explain 'empirical' examples. If not it would tend to become, in a phrase coined by Scott (1991,67) (though speaking of another writer), a 'suggestive' theory.

Social Determinism:

The prominent factors in the emergence of social movements, according to the social determinist stream of thought, are social conditions. Five theories will be reviewed in this section. Davies's and Wilson's theories are on the borderline of social determinism and relationism. They pay special attention to social conditions as initiators of social movements, but what constitutes the outbursts for them are relational factors - 'relative deprivation' and 'ideology' - respectively. Smelser introduces a structural-functionalist point of view about the redefinition of norms and values. Touraine's and Scott's perspectives are two versions of conflict theory, with emphasis on cultural class struggles by the first, and cultural-political class struggles in post-industrial societies by the second scholar. Touraine thinks that 'identity', 'diversity' and 'totality' are the main elements of social movements; and Scott's stress is on 'social closure' and 'interest articulation'. The historical trend of social movements theories here, again, goes from 'empirical' and 'single factorial' to 'analytical' and 'multifactoral' analysis.

James C. Davies in his article: *Toward a theory of revolution*, in 1962, presented a then new theoretical framework for revolutions using three rebellions and revolutions as evidence for his new approach. He emphasises the role of 'individuals and their relation' and 'society' in revolutions in that paper. According to him, 'revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal' (Davies 1962, 6). In this definition his main stress is on society. The role of individuals and the relations can be traced, however, in another part of his article: 'political stability and instability are ultimately dependent on a state of mind, a mood, in a society ... It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produce the revolution' (Davies 1962, 6). His diagram of revolution is shown in the Figure 2.3.




Figure 2.3: Need Satisfaction And Revolution (Davies 1962, 7)

Two main questions may be raised here. Do all revolutions follow this curve? And, whenever such a condition emerges, would a revolution always take place? I think Davies's answer would be 'we... are still not at the point of being able to predict revolution, but the closer we get to data indicating by inference the prevailing mood in a society, the closer we will be to understanding the change from gratification to frustration in people's minds' (Davies 1962, 18).

Comparing the role of agency, relations, and society it can be perceived that the most important concept for Davies is 'individuals' and 'relations' and not 'society'. The same social situation in different societies may have different results. It depends on 'the state of mind' or 'a mood' in a society for it to have a special outcome. For him, a sudden fall in socio-economic development is a necessary, but not a sufficient cause for a revolution. But the state of mind or a mood in society, a feeling of relative deprivation, is both a necessary and sufficient phenomenon for a revolution. 'The actual state of socio-economic development is less significant than the expectation' (Davies 1962, 6). Moreover, he does not pay serious attention to the individual. His model merely explains the role of 'economic and social development' and its 'sharp reversal' in the potential raising of expectations of individuals and the causation of 'relative deprivation'. The influence of the last concept depends on the level of 'individuals' state of mind' - an individualistic factor - and 'a mood' - a relationistic element - in a society.

If we consider 'relative deprivation' as a solidarity factor for the participants of a social movement, then Davies's perspective can be categorised as relationist. Also, as this 'mood' is caused by the social conditions, his tendency to utilise social factors is of lower importance.

John Wilson in his book entitled: *Introduction to Social Movements* published in 1973, summarised previous ideas about social movements and introduced a new notion. He criticises the 'structuralist' model of social movements as a static theory that has a pathological approach to the social movements and looks at them as deviant group behaviour. According to him, this approach cannot explain why people join movements. Also, he rejects 'the relative deprivation' model, and adds that this mood is not the cause of every social movements. Moreover, he criticises the 'status inconsistency' model, which is a theory of motivation, for the lack of data in defining attitudes.

The theory presented by Wilson is a mobilisational one. For him ideology is the main factor of mobilisation of discontents. 'Ideology is the generic name given to those beliefs which mobilise people into action in social movements' (Wilson 1973, 91). He defines ideology as a phenomenon which 'states what must be done,... is total belief, ... means consistency, and is associated with collectivity' (Wilson 1973, 93-95). According to him, 'ideological structures consist of three parts, each of which is closely related to the others: a diagnosis of present problems; a solution to these problems and a vision of a better world; and a rationale for the movement' (Wilson 1973, 95). Ideology is considered as a relational factor by him which links individuals to the society. 'The ideology performs its mobilising function by connecting immediate social burdens with general ethical principles and thereby stimulating people to action' (Wilson 1973, 130); and 'ideology is, therefore, the vital bridge between attitude and action, between thinking and doing' (Wilson 1973, 131).

Beside ideology, there are other factors essential to social movements. He explains them in the following paragraph:

'In summary, mobilisation is the process whereby action is generated and formed out of social discontent. It has its spark in social conditions which create personal frustrations, inter group conflicts, and widespread loss of orientation and meaning but is conditioned by a number of factors in the course of its expression. Most important of these is ideology, but of consequence also are mobilising agents such as leaders, friends, and other group ties. The effectiveness of these mobilising agents is determined by social structural conditions which govern the extent to which social unrest is allowed expression and how much freedom or encouragement is given for the formation of new collectivities which express deviant norms. Finally, but by no means least important, the emergence of social movements is dependent upon the attitude taken by the forces of social control to the initial expression of discontent in occurrence of social unrest. The public definition of this unrest and the presence or absence of counter movements is also of importance here' (Wilson 1973, 148-149).

Formulating Wilson's model, according to the above mentioned paragraph, it can be said that social conditions bring discontent by creating 'personal frustrations, inter group conflicts, and widespread loss of orientation and meaning'. In order to express themselves, discontents need mobilisational factors such as leaders, friends, other group ties and, most importantly, 'ideology'. But, these mobilising agents' effectiveness is 'determined by social structural conditions' and, also, by 'the forces of social control, public definition of this unrest' and 'the presence or absence of counter movements'. According to this formulation, ideology, leadership, and social ties are important mobilising factors, but the most determinant factor underlying social movements is social conditions which create motives and controls the mobilising factors. Thus, Wilson in his general theory is social determinist, but in his explanation of the internal mechanisms of social movements he pays considerable attention to the relations between individuals. For him, social conditions define individual motivations and control the process of social movements. Ideology and other social ties express the movement under the influence of the social conditions.

Explaining the structure of social movements, Wilson includes the following items: 'leadership, organisation, ritual, process of admission, education and expulsion, opportunities for self-expression and the bases of conflict' (Wilson 1973, 156), but he does not organise them into a structured relationship. In this sense he does not present a concrete model for social movements. Moreover, some of these elements may overlap, such as 'organisation' which may include 'leadership'. When no specific

arrangement between structural factors is hypothesised, one cannot speak about the degree, time, and location of influence of each item on the others and the whole social movement.

Regardless of his extensive explanation about different social movemental concepts, the role of individuals is less emphasised by Wilson. In his theory, the individual is mostly a passive and not an active agents. His stress is mostly on social conditions, and, especially, ideology, as the organiser of social movements. Ideology however is clearly understood as been promulgated under the influence of social conditions. Overall, his theory should be categorised as a social determinist one.

In 1962, *Neil J. Smelser* presented a theory of collective behaviour in which he considers social movements as a type of this kind of social action. He believes that 'collective behaviour is guided by various kinds of beliefs ... and ... is not institutionalised' (Smelser 1962, 8). There are two types of social movements according to him: 'the norm-oriented movement, including the social reform movement ... and ... the value-oriented movement, including the political and religious revolution, the formation of sects, the nationalistic movements, etc.' (Smelser 1962, 2).

Borrowing the logic of 'value added' from economists, he analyses different forms of collective behaviours. 'The value-added logic implies a temporal sequence of activation of determinants, but any or all of these determinants may have existed for an indefinite period before activation' (Smelser 1962, 19). Accordingly, there are six additive steps for all kinds of collective behaviours: 1) *Structural conduciveness*; 2) *Structural strain*; 3) *Growth and spread of a generalised belief*; 4) *Precipitating factors*; 5) *Mobilisation of participants for action*; 6) *The operation of social control* (Smelser 1962, 15-17). He avoids physical, communicational, and physiological factors in construction of his theory (Smelser 1962, 9-12), and insists on presentation of a sociological model rather than a psychological one (Smelser 1962, 20).

Smelser's interpretation of social movements is famous as a 'strain theory'. He argues that a belief will emerge because of a social structural strain and will join people

together to make a new social action in order to change the situated order of social norms or values. In this formula his stress on social determinants of collective behaviour is almost the same as the relational ones, while he under-emphasised the individuals' role. He regards social factors as at the roots of collective behaviour, and relational items appear to mobilise individuals to make a non-institutionalised collective action.

Smelser's structural-functionalist theory is criticised by several writers. A. D. Smith believes that 'Smelser's starting-point is actually an intervening variable' (Smith 1973, 99), and he is not able to explain the source of change, because he does not pay attention to the historical factors. 'Smelser's scheme does not tell us why the new ideas arise and are then implemented' (Smith 1973, 100). He criticises the 'value-added' process of Smelser's theory which is not able to tell us about the differences between various revolutions. Also, he notes that 'one may question the assumptions underlying Smelser's scepticism [to psychological and historical factors]' (Smith 1973, 109). As an example he deals with the concept of 'values' as an ill-defined one by Smelser. The most important criticism of Smelser's methodology, according to Scott, is 'the inappropriateness of his conception of scientific method to the social sciences' (Scott 1991, 41). For Smelser, a social movement is a marginal phenomenon by virtue of his methodology, as well as his attitude. 'The combination of abstract methodology plus political stand point leads Smelser to believe that collective behaviour requires a qualitatively different form of explanation from normal institutional action. In effect, Smelser explains institutional behaviour in terms of reason for actions, and non-institutional behaviour in causal terms' (Scott 1991, 44, 45). Therefore, non-institutional action is treated as irrational, or at least as non-rational by him and his stream of thought. Also, collective action is regarded as a reactive phenomenon, and the social system is a given matter for him; and he fails to explain mobilisation (Scott 1991, 45).

Alain Touraine's theory of social action is presented in his book: *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*. According to him social movements are the main aspects of cultural control, and should be understood in social contexts. He

believes that 'social movements are the expression of the collective will' (Touraine 1981, 29). In analysing societies, the hidden antagonistic social movements must become apparent because society is constituted by such movements. This analysis should bring out 'whatever they have culturally at stake together behind the false positivity of order, behind the categories of social practice, and behind the ideologies' (Touraine 1981, 26). Sometimes social movements are weak or disorganised, but they are at the centre of social life in the historical societies (Touraine 1981, 26).

Actors in social movements - historical actors, to use Touraine's term - are determined by the cultural field and the notion of social conflict (Touraine 1981, 66), and their action is determined by social conditions. In his own words 'action is the behaviour of an actor guided by cultural orientation and set within social relations defined by an unequal connection with the social control of these orientations' (Touraine 1981, 61).

Social movements are a combination of three principles, according to Touraine: a principle of identity, a principle of opposition, and a principle of totality. 'The more closely these three dimensions of social movements (I-O, O-T, I-T) are integrated, the more one tends to describe the *project level* of a movement as being raised' (Touraine 1981, 81. Original italics.). 'A social movement is not an affirmation, an intention; it is a double relation, directed at an adversary and at what is at task. The perfect integration of these two components is never achieved, and most often, therefore, the movement reaches only a low *project level*, i.e. ... its picture of the domination exercised by the adversary over the cultural stakes of the struggle' (Touraine 1981, 80-81. Original italics).

According to Touraine, a social movement as a struggle operates in accordance with four principal conditions: 1. A committed population. 2. It must be organised. 3. It must fight against an adversary ... which may be a social group, e.g. modernising vs. anti-modernising. 4. 'It should be a social problem concerning the whole of society' (Touraine 1981, 82). The last principle separates an action struggle from a pressure group. Each social movement has an ideology, which is 'a representation of social relations' (Touraine 1981, 98).

There are two types of struggles, according to Touraine: positive and critical. The positive struggles occur within a totality and the critical ones happen against a totality. Both groups of struggles may take place in three levels: organisational, institutional, and historicity. Positive struggle at historicity level is a social movement, which is at the centre of his preoccupations. Critical struggle at such a level constitutes a revolution for Touraine. Other struggles such as political pressures, protests, crisis, etc., are also referred to by Touraine as social movements (Touraine 1981, 84-91).

Touraine argues that, in moving from industrial society towards programmed society, there are two historical points at which social movements appear. The first is when workers' movements rose up against capitalists after industrialisation, and the second is the contemporary period in which new social movements are increasing. The following figure shows these two instants in history.




Figure 2.4: Social Movements In Industrial Societies (Touraine 1981, 11).

Scott believes that Touraine's theory has 'deterministic and teleological overtones' (Scott 1991, 69) and is 'highly suggestive' (Scott 1991, 67). There is a contradiction in Touraine's ideas, according to Scott. Touraine speaks about 'open-ended, self-sustaining and innovative entities' of social movements on the one hand, and 'social periodization' on the other, 'which limits the possible range of social movement activity, and which forecloses a priori certain developments' (Scott 1991, 67,68). Furthermore, Scott believes that Touraine pays more attention to 'ideology' than

'organisation' and 'political context', and does not pay sufficient attention to 'calculation' and 'self-interest' factors in social actions (Scott 1991, 68, 69).

Touraine's theory is a social deterministic one. His presentation suggests that social action is determined by class and culture, and is set within social relations, whilst social relations (collective will and ideology) are products of class struggle through historicity. He himself differentiates his theory from Marxism in three respects. Regardless of Marxism, according to him, social movements are: 1. culturally oriented; 2. involve class action [culturally oriented not economically determined class action]; and, 3. are not necessarily progressive (Touraine 1981, 80). Touraine's theory of social movements is very general and he explains predominantly the relationship between society and social movements. He talks about social change more than about social movements. When he deals with different types of struggle at various levels he is predominantly presenting a theory of collective action, rather than one specifically about social movements. There are many questions about the main variables acting in social movements and the significance of the role of each factor, answers to which one cannot find to in Touraine's theory. Referring to three concepts: 'identity', 'opposition', and 'totality' does not reveal the whole mechanism of social movements. Summing up, he is a social determinist in his sociological theory and pays particular attention to social relations in his ideas about social movement.

Alan Scott in his book: *Ideology and New Social movements* concentrates on a discussion of new political movements. He notes: 'At least in terms of their social base, new social movements are class movements in Gellner's extended Weberian sense' (Scott 1990, 139). He thinks of political movements as realist ones. The characteristics of realist movements, as he quotes from J. A. Hannigan (Hannigan 1985, 436), are that they take place in the state, their aims are political/cultural integration, their orientation and their actors' orientation are institutional (Scott 1990, 133). According to him, over the last twenty-five years 'interest groups and especially parties, have failed to respond to popular demands and feed those demands into the political system' (Scott 1990, 9). This is why new social movements emerge. And he adds: 'new social movements

should be understood in the context of a general criticism of the system or long-term historical transformation of industrial/capitalist society' (Scott 1990, 9).

He advocates a middle range theory of social movements and criticises those who work on cultural movements. He thinks that there are three main factors involved in social movements: 'social closure', 'mobilisation', and 'interest articulation' (Scott 1990, 9). Social class produces ideology and through it social closure becomes possible. Mobilising the interests of a social closure in a process of political participation makes social movements (Scott 1990, Ch.6). Scott follows Hannigan (Hannigan 1985, 436) in this respect in mentioning that new social movements take place through institutions. They are not anti- or non-institutional movements (Scott 1990, 133).

Scott indicates that 'interests' and 'ideology' are class oriented. This means that the relational factor - ideology - and the agency determinant concept - interests - are resolved by the society. In other words the role of individual and relations are subordinate to that of society. 'Social closure' and 'political participation' are the most important elements in his model, whilst 'mobilisation' is recognised as a factor but given somewhat less emphasis. The individual's role disappears in Scott's theory, and society through its class formations and social institutions is the dominant factor. He mostly refers to political movements through parties or other social institutions, without mentioning the influence of individuals and the inner mechanisms of the movements. It can be concluded that he is predominantly a social determinist thinker in his sociological perspective, and believes that relational factors, like institutions, political organisations, and ideology, are the most important parts in the structure of social movement.

Results:

Reviewing the theoretical literature of social movements makes it clear that there are divergent trends with different insights into the problem, though a few conceptual agreements do exist. The general tendency has been a change from a psychological perspective to a sociological one and more recently to political ones. The early writers produced mostly empirical studies (such as Davies, Smelser, and Toch) while the recent ones are more analytical in their works (like Touraine, Melucci, and Scott). According to the ontological framework of the present study, social movements theories can be classified in regard of their tendency to individual, relationship between individuals, and social context. The first writers in the field placed primary emphasis on the role of the individual, while later on, relationist and social deterministic ideas became more common. Each of the reviewed theories focuses on one, and occasionally, two of these ontological building-blocks; and while elaborating the assumed main dimension(s) it looks at the other(s) from within the criteria of that core concept(s). The most discussed dimension in the literature of social movements is the relationship between individuals. Almost all the writers are concerned about this element, but there are some variety of interpretations. Most of them consider 'belief' and 'ideology' as the relational factor.

There are several types of classification of theories of social movements in the literature, such as the one that was presented at the beginning of this chapter. Most of them are *descriptive*. The location of theories according to their position in regard to the three constituent dimensions of a social formation - individual, relations or relationship between individuals, and social system - will provide a useful *analytical* insight into this body of theory. Dealing with only one of these can, of course, allow only a detailed knowledge of that component. Such an approach, moreover, will have shortcomings in having a deficient overall model and will cause a reduction of the other parts into the selected one, as Archer (1995) indicates. It should be noted, here, that some of the reviewed theorists' intentions were indeed a presentation of a limited and not a general theory, such as Toch's social psychological one and McCarthy and

Zald's partial theory. This study is not, therefore, questioning these perfectly honourable intentions of the said scholars, but their contribution to the overall explanation and analysis of the social movements. In the following, the line from individualism, through relationism, to social determinism will be reviewed and the priorities and shortcomings of each stage will be introduced. An elementary map of the reviewed theories in regard of their ontological tendencies and their situation from an empirical-analytical point of view will be presented.

Toch notes that social movements are initiated by some individuals' problem and susceptibility. They would produce a set of beliefs that would determine the movement's emergence and development. Individuals are performers within social movements but in which social context, and through which organisation? Individualists do not devote enough attention to other dimensions of movements, and thereby, are unable to answer some important questions. Furthermore, they usually consider the participants of social movements to be blameworthy against a sane social order.

The second group of theories are the relationists. Social solidarity factors, structures (from structuration point of view), and the determinants of direction of social movements are discussed by this stream of thought. Collective ideas, collective ethics, beliefs, ideology, organisations, and mobilisation constitute different levels of variables from individual to social positions that act as connecting factors in social movements. Thus Zald and McCarthy, by insisting on the centrality of 'organisations', epitomise the relationists most fully. For them, the identification of individual and society as a factor of social movement is determined by the organisation and its mobilisation process. In this group Blumer pays particular attention to the psychology of participants who use the means of relations, and Tilly considers social conditions to be a secondary factor alongside the relational (organisation and mobilisation) which he regards as primary ones. Melucci tries to introduce a comprehensive model by paying attention to 'individual needs' and 'cognition', on the one hand, and pointing out 'environment' as a pole of the collective action, on the other, while his main stress is on a relational factor (collective identity). According to all of them individual (actor) and society (social opportunities, constraints, and outcomes) are determined by social relations, however,

it is obvious that there would be no relation if there were no 'individual participant' as well as no 'social context'.

Davies's model is mostly relationist but gives a particular attention to the society. He argues that a social developmental gap causes social deprivation which is the reason for revolutions. In contrast, Wilson is actually a social determinist while his explanation of social movements is mostly based on relational factors, for instance ideology is well defined by him.

Smelser and Touraine are social determinists, with their second most important emphasis being placed on relations. The structure of their interpretations of collective behaviour are similar, but involve two different streams of thought. Both of them incorporate the concept of 'social action' but in different ways. Smelser investigates the structural-functionalist definition of it, and Touraine uses a conflict theory version. In the first case, social action is seen as a functional act of the social actor in the social system, and in the second interpretation, social action is an antagonism to a certain theses (e.g. modernism vs. traditionalism). Social movements are social actions caused by structural (normative or value) strain according to Smelser, and historical class-identity conflict according to Touraine. Both writers are in search of a general collective behaviour theory that includes social movements. Studying social movements in their social context, according to them, may lead us to a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some 'social causes' of social movements are also discussed by both of them. Scott's theory with its class-identity conflict background is another version of this stream of thought, but his emphasise is on the social/political dimensions of social movements rather than cultural struggle or structural strain.

Having promoted at length the significance of the ontological classification, another significant subdivision in the social movement literature needs to be introduced here. Social movement theories could be divided into two main groups: a) those which focus on the social movement as a social phenomenon, and b) those which view it in relation to the other factors. The writers in the first group are mostly relationist and the second group consists of those who may be classified as either individualist or social

determinist. The second group predominantly consider relations to be of a lesser importance.

As can be seen in Figure 2.5, the writers dealt with here can be classified according to their tendency toward an 'individualist', 'relationist', and 'social determinist' approach, on the one hand, and the preference for presenting an 'empirical' or 'analytical' interpretation of social movements, on the other. The empirical or analytical perspectives, incidentally, corresponds largely to the matter of preference for 'single' or 'multifactoral' presentations as well.

Figure 2. 5: A Matrix of Theories: The relative position of the reviewed theories as regards their tendency to individualism, relationism, and social determinism, and their preference for empirical or analytical interpretation. (Dotted lines show the borderlines.)

	<i>Individualism</i>	<i>Relationism</i>	<i>Social Determinism</i>
<i>Empirical</i>		McCarthy & Zald	
	Toch	Davies	Smelser
	Blumer		
		Wilson	
		Tilly	Touraine
			Scott
<i>Analytical</i>		Melucci	

In analysing the above mentioned theories, the following factors are the main ones involved in the social movements. From the individualistic point of view the main reasons for social movements may be the participants' 'susceptibility' (Toch) and/or 'agitation' (Blumer); according to relationistic perspective 'relative deprivation' (Davies), 'organisation' (McCarthy and Zald, Tilly), 'mobilisation' (Tilly), 'ideology' (Toch, Blumer, Wilson, Touraine), 'population's belief' (Tilly), 'collective identity' (Melucci), and 'social closure, and interest articulation' (Scott) could be the constituent factors; and in social deterministic views 'social conditions' (Wilson), 'redefinition of norms or values' (Smelser), 'developmental gap' (Davies), 'cultural

class struggles' (Touraine), and 'social/political struggles' (Scott) are the main defining factors of social movements.

The 'headline' propositions in the reviewed theories are as follows. According to the individualistic perspective, social movements are formed because of some susceptible or agitated peoples' 'appeal' in order to solve their problem by an appropriate ideology (Toch, Blumer). The relationists believe that social movements occur through the mobilisation of discontents through a state of feeling, belief, or identity, or by an organisation or ideology (Blumer, Davies, McCarthy and Zald, Tilly, Wilson, Melucci). And in social deterministic thought, social movements are formed by some social conditions such as redefinition of norms or values, developmental gap, cultural class struggles, or social/political class struggles (Wilson, Smelser, Davies, Touraine, Scott).

With regard to our own ontological point of view, a combination of the above mentioned factors and prepositions can help us to design a new comprehensive theory of social movements. This is the subject of discussion of the following part of this chapter.

A New Approach:

Our review of the main theories of social movements has brought the core concepts of this phenomenon into our attention. Individuals or agencies as participants and performers of social movements were described by some; relations as solidarity factors and direction determinants of the issue were presented by most of them; and social conditions as the background and location of the previous aspects were explained by the others. Accordingly, there are three main concepts which seem to be essential in the formation of movements. These factors are: actors with their behaviours (individuals), ideology (relations), and social context (society). A combination of these three aspects will provide us with a new cumulative insight. A description of these

principal concepts will be given and the nature of their combination as a synthetic theory will be presented in this last part of the chapter.

In structuration theory the individual, structure, and social system come together in space and time. 'The basic domain of study of the social sciences... is ... social practices ordered across space and time' (Giddens 1984, 2). In studying social movements another concept can be added to space and time which is 'aim' or 'direction'. The concept of 'direction' illustrates the goals and purposes of the movement. Each social movement takes place in a special location of social context (space), in a particular social-historical moment with its own sequences of time, and it has a particular aim or 'direction'. The arrangement of the above mentioned social movement factors in the time and space of each movement, as well as their direction, act as our guideline for the composition of the principal concepts in our model. The full explanation of our method for construction of the proposed theory will be given in chapter three.

Ideology:

Jorge A. Larrain in his book: *The Concept of Ideology* (1972 and 1992) classifies sociological interpretations of this concept, asking four questions. His first query is 'whether ideology has a negative or positive meaning' (Larrain 1992, 13). For those who think that ideology has a negative meaning, it is said to cause 'false consciousness' and distorts one's understanding of social reality. In other words 'the cognitive value of ideas affected by ideology is called in question' (Larrain 1992, 14). According to others, who believe in positive attributes of ideology, it is 'the world-view of a class ... in order to defend and promote it's interest' (Larrain 1992, 14). In this type of evaluation 'the cognitive value ... is ... set aside as a different problem' (Larrain 1992, 14). His second question is about the 'subjectivity' or 'objectivity' of ideology. For some writers, following psychological tradition of Pareto and Freud, ideology is a subjective matter. According to some others, like Durkheim, ideology is objective and has social properties. Following his third question, Larrain differentiates

between the interpretation of those who consider ideology as a particular kind of phenomenon: a superstructural one, and others who look at ideology as an 'equivalent to and co-extensive with the whole cultural sphere usually called the "ideological super phenomena"' (Larrain 1992, 14). His fourth question concerns the relationship between ideology and science.

In this study, it is not my task to evaluate ideologies, therefore, I do not attempt to say that they are either 'positive' or 'negative'. However, what seems to be obvious is that they are there, and we need to deal with them as a subject matter of research in order to find out their type of influence on the other related aspects of the society. My understanding of the phenomenon of ideology, accords with many others, and is based on the notion that it is one of the 'constituent factors' of social movements. According to Tilly, 'peoples belief' is the sign of each social movement (Tilly 1978, 9). For many writers of the field (such as Scott, Blumer, Toch, etc.) ideology is the basis of social solidarity and defines the movement's purpose(s). In the literature reviewed in this thesis, Wilson's definition of 'ideology' is the most detailed. He enumerates four characteristics for ideology: it 'a) states what must be done, ... b) is total belief, ... c) means consistency, ... and d) is associated with collectivity' (Wilson 1973, 93-94). According to him, 'ideological structures consist of three parts, each of which is closely related to the others: a diagnosis of present problems; a solution to these problems, and a vision of a better world; and a rationale for the movement' (Wilson 1973, 95). Blumer considers ideology as one of the important elements in social movements formation. He counts following characteristics for it: 'a statement of the objectives, purpose, and premises of the movement ... - direction; ... a body of criticism and condemnation of the existing structure which the movement is attacking and seeking to change ... - justification; ... a body of defence doctrine which serves as a justification of the movement and its objectives ... - weapons of attack; ... a body of belief dealing with policies, tactics, and practical operation of the movement ... - weapons of defence; ... and the myths of the movement ... - inspiration and hope' (Blumer 1969, 110-111). Thus, ideology defines the goal(s) and shows the direction and the way through which the followers are able to reach the purpose(s) of the movement

collectively. The rules, rituals and regulations of a movement are described by the ideology.

In the light of the above discussion one can say that ideology includes two parts: subjective and objective. It is a form of belief subjectively perceived by the agents which has objective properties in the social actions and structures of society. It is a subjective world-view which underpins its own objective properties in the culture of its' adherents, no matter if they consist a household, a minority group, a class, or a nation. The subjective and objective parts of ideology have a mutual interrelationship and influence on each other through an appropriate means of communication. For example, in Islamic ideology, which some of its movements are the subject matter of this study, Islamic beliefs will be enhanced in the mosques and the pulpets through clergy spokesmen and women. On the other hand, mosques will be built with funding from the believers who would in turn be informed through discussions and some other means of communication available in the community. In social movements, leaders take advantage of this process in the articulation and mobilisation of followers. And followers, due to the above mentioned mechanism, facilitate or enforce some limitation to the articulation and mobilisation processes. Appropriate means of communication such as 'language' and 'organisation' serve to reinforce the mutual influence. These means of communication would have their own properties, and sometimes encourage or sometimes hinder the influence of these two sides.

The identification of the origins of ideologies of social movements varies across the different theories; some refer to interests and appeals of participants of social movements (such as, Toch); others think that structural strain produces beliefs which facilitates its solution (such as, Smelser); and there are still others who view 'class-identity' as the basis of the ideology (such as, Touraine and Scott). A new idea or ideology may be imported into a society (e.g., modern democracy which was exported from some European countries to the other parts of the world); it can be adapted into particular context by intellectuals (e.g., communism in China); or may be obtained through discussions (e.g., different versions of Marxism); and some others are considered as religious ones (e.g., Christianity). In other words ideologies may have

individual, group, or social origins. They could be pure innovations, extensions from philosophical or religious thoughts, or tailored according to the present situation and problems of the social context.

Whatever the source of ideology in social movements, it contains something 'new' in contrast to the present social context; it presents a new hope for those who are going to participate in the movement; it opens a new horizon for them. Ideology is an innovation or a new idea in comparison with the existing opinions of the society. It is presented by an individual or a group. The persons or the group who are presenting that new idea to the society are among the leaders and/or the distributors of the movement. The new idea will be constructed as an ideology by them (mostly the leaders) in order to be practical. They will create or design a pragmatic scheme for acting upon that idea. It may be based on a well-accepted or previously-designed ideology (such as the Protestant adaptation of an established Christianity, or Mao's reworking of previous versions of communist revolutions).

Problems, interests, aims, and beliefs of the potential followers influence the design of the ideologies because such actors are the ultimate consumers of these products. Thus, the domain of influence of an ideology and the number of followers it can amass depends on its novelty in solving problems or fulfilling the interests, aims, and beliefs of different social groups, institutions and/or constituencies. Some ideologies have global influence (such as Protestantism); some of them can attract a particular class or group (for example, woman's liberation); some others are national (for instance, Egyptian revolution of 1952); whilst others can be racial or ethnic (to illustrate, black movements in the USA).

Ideologies must operate through their objective properties in the cultural, political, or economic institutions of the social system, whether they are individually or socially oriented. There may be ideologies associated with the political, cultural, or economic systems or the components of their subsystems. At the risk of stating the obvious: political ideologies activate political movements, cultural ones have potential to engender cultural movements, and economic ones are the possible cause of economic

movements. If there is a complete (political, cultural, and economic) ideological shift, a 'social revolution' may result. Alternatively, when a movement occurs in one of the institutions of a society the other institutions of that society will alter, but the main change takes place in that particular institution. Obviously not all innovations and ideologies can become the basis of a social movement. Each innovation in a special field has the potential of becoming the base of an ideology and making a movement in that particular setting; be it a movement in transportation, a movement in technology, a movement in arts, and so forth. It should be mentioned here that ideology, as with the other prominent factors, is a necessary but not sufficient defining factor of social movements. It is the combination of them which produces social movements.

Actors and their Behaviours:

Each social movement has three groups of actors: (i) The leaders of the movement, (ii) those who are distributing the idea or commands of the leaders, and (iii) the followers or executors of the movement. All these three groups are ideologically oriented and, are influenced by the social context. The leaders start a movement according to an innovative or new idea. They provide an ideology based on a fresh thinking in contrast to the social context. The first group of followers of the ideology constitute a circle of thought and a small organisation with the leaders of the movement. The first followers attempt to introduce the ideology to other people in order to become a larger and larger group. Some of the new followers will join the first circle of the movement, yet most of them accept the ideology but do not come to the core. Those who are in the first circle have the task of distributing the ideology and attracting new followers to the movement. Accordingly, we call them 'distributors' of the movement. Those followers who are not in the first circle will be named 'followers' or 'executors' of the movement. Their function is to 'perform' or 'enact' the movement. In other words, when they come onto the scene the 'outburst' of the movement will actually take place.

Three kinds of actions or behaviours should occur in each social movement: 'cognition', 'presentation', and 'action'. 'Cognition' is the first step for the leaders. They conceive an idea and attempt to form an ideology. The ideology is designed to be the main root of the movement's consciousness. Distributors need to 'learn' the ideology of the movement and followers should be 'aware' of it. The three groups of actors share the idea and the ideology of the movement in their cognition; however, the level of understanding from the leaders to the followers decreases. However, the knowledge of the particular, day-to-day tactics of the movement may take the reverse direction. The other task for the leaders is the presentation of the ideology. Leaders, usually, present the ideology to the distributors, and the distributors introduce it to the followers. And so the chain continues, with devoted followers presenting it to yet other potential followers. In summary we can say that presentation is one of the most important tasks of the distributors. Finally, we come to 'action' which is the ultimate behaviour of all actors. The potential leaders will come into the social scene with the intention of direct guidance of the movement. Distributors try to organise the followers, and followers perform the movement according to the commands of the leaders most often received through the distributors. This deliberately general classification of the action of the participants can be utilised in all types of movements and will be illustrated in the reviewed cases as the thesis progresses.

Social Context:

The role of social context in formation of ideas and the design of an ideology has been mentioned previously. Here its part in the performance of a movement will be discussed. The movement takes place in a social context. The social context is the 'space' within which the actors behave, in following the direction of the movement. The social context gives opportunities and brings limitations to the social movement. Avoiding limitations, the actors of a movement mobilise social opportunities toward the ideological goal(s). As noted above, 'context' in Giddens's, Tilly's and Melucci's sense of the terms both enables and constrains.

The social context has its own part in the formation of the personality of the actors and providing a condition for their behaviour. The division of labour between the actors in a social movement is shaped according to the opportunity and limitations of the social structure. The particular role of the actors is defined by the social conditions and the ideology; and the expected behaviour of each role is legitimated by both of them . Of course, the actors have their own autonomy in the formation of their personality and in achieving and performing their role, but social context shows the approximate limits and expectations, and ideology defines them.

Synthesis:

All the factors of social movement are important in their own respect, and none of them should be neglected. A systemic view is needed to consider all of them and allocate each to its own effective position. These factors: social context, actors, behaviours, and ideology, operate and interact with each other according to their specific properties. The social context offers the conditions, and the actors utilise them, according to the guidelines of the ideology, toward the aims of the movement. Each social movement is the product of the level of 'performance' of its actors, social context and ideology. Ability or weakness, best-practice or mispractice, exemplary action or misbehaviour in each of the above mentioned factors will have a direct effect on the process and formation of the social movements.

How does the new framework fulfil the above-mentioned schema of the relationship between the individual and society? In this approach individuals are considered from two dimensions. First, from their role, which we can label in terms of three different positions in each social movement: i) 'leadership', ii) 'assisting the leader' or 'distributing the leader's ideas and commands', and iii) 'following the directions'. The second aspect is the behaviour of the individual. There are three main behaviours that may be carried out by each actor; i) they recognise the direction and rules of the movement; ii) they present their understanding to others in order to make a more

powerful movement; and iii) they act according to their own cognition and commands of the leadership. As the proposed theory is directed explicitly at these behaviours, we can claim that individuals' actions are not neglected.

Social context is the 'space' of the movements. Its opportunities and limitations offer facilities and bring constraints to the actors of the movement. The combination of individual capabilities and social resources make it possible to create a movement. Sometimes social conditions are the inspirations for individuals to engage in the movement, and in some other occasions social opportunities will be mobilised by individuals motivations. Social conditions are the environment of social movements and can not be separated from them. The new approach attempts to take this reality in to account.

Ideology is the relational factor of the movement. 'Beliefs, rules and regulations', 'what is perceived as opportunity' and 'what is not', 'how the resources can be utilised', and 'operational ways of forwarding the goals of the movement' are all formulated by the ideology. Ideology links individuals to the social context. The individual's capabilities, through the ideological guidelines, add to social opportunities, and this combination constructs the movement in progressing towards the direction indicated by the ideology.

None of the above mentioned variables are the determinant factors of a movement. Their combination and co-ordination constitute the movement. The differences between diverse movements are the result of the variation between these items, or the way they combine with each other. As ideology is often considered the outward sign which shows the direction and assembles different aspects of the movement, it can be used as an indicator for separating particular movements from each other.

Leaders are at the core of the movement and are most aware of the ideology and social conditions. Distributors are the first group closest to them, the second most devoted party to the ideology, and the administrative tool for the leadership. Followers are not full time members of the movement, unlike the two previous groups. The actors

behave through the time and space of social context. The sequences of time start by cognition of the idea by a leaders' (such as the idea of Islamic government by Ay Khomeini in Islamic Revolution) which involves the general target or direction of the movement. It will continue in construction or selection of the ideology (e.g. *Velayat-e Faqih*, Governorship of the jurisprudence expert) and the presentation of it by the leader(s) and distributors (e.g. mostly direct and indirect students of Ay Khomeini). The social space (e.g. mosques, bazaars, streets, factories, offices, etc.) of these events is a relevant part of the social context (e.g. Iranian society) which provides the actors with facilities and limit them with its constraints. The outburst (e.g. strikes, demonstrations, etc.) of the movement will take place later on in order to fulfil the aims (e.g. establishment of the Islamic government) designed by the ideology. In this last stage the 'action' (e.g. strikes, demonstrations, etc.) of the 'followers' (e.g. Iranian populace), under the influence of the previous behaviours of the other actors, makes the movement. In a very general terms, a social movement is accomplished by the actors in a social context aiming toward an ideological direction. The ideology brings them together and leads them to their goals.

Sometimes a number of distributors seek their own interests within the movements and, therefore, are not completely devoted to its aims. Occasionally, such unintended consequences and pathways may be the case for a significant group or the majority of the followers. This is the potential weakness of any movement and sometimes the cause for its failure, with regard to its goals, or the reason for the change in its direction. In addition, positive outcomes in the four essential factors and their consistent conjunction, is needed for a movement to succeed.

In this chapter the ontological position of the study has been outlined, ten major general theories of social movements have been reviewed; and from them a synthetic theory for studying social movements designed. The aim of the remainder of the thesis is to test out the usefulness and adequacy of this synthetic theory as a comprehensive one for the Iranian-Islamic social movements in the last one hundred years. In the following chapter, the method of investigation of the introduced framework in the political sociology of present Iranian social movements will be discussed.

Chapter Three

Methodology

Introduction:

This is a study in 'historical sociology' and thus calls upon a range of methods and strategies commonly used in that sub-discipline. The political sociology of four Iranian social movements from 1890 to 1979 is under investigation. A new theoretical model has been developed. It will be applied to the Iranian-Islamic social movements and will be examined in comparison with several other existing general theories. Techniques of comparative-case analysis are used in order to support the claims for the validity and comprehensiveness of the theoretical model being proposed. Secondary historical documents are used as evidence. Our broad methodological strategy is the *realist* one with the frame of reference of 'system theory'.

This chapter will explain the methodology underlying the study in more detail. First of all, a brief explanation of the philosophical grounds of the study will be given. Secondly, the operational model of our theory will be presented. In the third part, the chosen method of comparative-case study will be discussed. Fourth, the type of historical sociology and historical document analysis used will be reviewed; and finally, the method of investigation of the other general theories with which our approach will be compared will be dealt with.

The principles of any methodology lie in the frame of references obtained from the chosen ontology and epistemology. These spheres of this study will be explained briefly here. 'Ontology ... is concerned with the question of *what* are the things we know; what are the objects of our knowledge' (Layder 1990, 29. Original italic.). The ontological outlook of this study is the '*systemic*' one. There are many sociological variants of this term, but the usage suggested in this part is, perhaps, the simplest. When some phenomena are related to each other in such a way that they act in an organised and unique manner we can call them a system. The system is a combination

of parts which is something more than the sum of its components. There should be coordination between the parts of a system in order for it to work properly. Sociologically speaking, social formations consist of individual or agency, their relationship, and society or structure, which terms were explained in the second chapter. In this study we are looking at this social-ontological frame of reference from a systemic point of view. That is, agencies (parts of the system) through their relations make social systems, and vice versa; that is to say social system affects agencies through the network of their relations. As has been explained, social movements are organised collective behaviours with particular aims. The anticipated performance of social movements according to these targets is due to the precise and concordant accomplishment of their constituent parts. Otherwise they would not take place at all, or certainly not in their fullness. That is to say, they will convert into other types of collective behaviours like riots, and would not reach their complete ambitions.

'Epistemology can be characterised by its concern with the source and modes of knowledge, as well as the scope and validity of such knowledge' (Layder 1990, 29). 'Rationalism' can be said to be the dominant epistemological aspect of this study. We follow Layder's definition of the term that 'on a general level it [rationalism] is committed to the idea of reason as a necessary prerequisite of any argument which is concerned with making truth claims' (Layder 1990, 45), and in a more specific proposition he refers to 'rationalism as a general epistemological posture which concerns itself with the function of theory and theoretical frameworks in the determination of knowledge' (Layder 1990, 46). Regarding this meaning of rationalism, when it comes to understanding complex social matters the systemic ontology dictates that we should look for interrelationships between concepts rather than single cause-effect connections. In social studies, due to the depth and range of the phenomenon studied, we are usually dealing with multiple interrelations between the factors and not a single 'causal relation'. Every single unit of a social phenomenon has meaning in its own context. Separation of a part from its system will change its systemic meaning. Therefore, by this frame of reference, in understanding complex social subjects, combination of factors should be studied in order to have a complete appreciation of that social phenomena. Social movements are not single-caused actions. They are

complex. Thus we ought to look at them as a unit of interacting factors. Furthermore, according to Pawson: 'Most post-empiricist theories use some version of a systemic or holist theory of meaning. The idea is to try and capture this idea that science is not the study of external relationships between discrete objects, but an investigation of a system of internal relationships brought about by the occurrence of an underlying mechanism which connects the parts of the system' (Pawson 1989, 134-135). Our theory was developed on this basis and its exemplification will be presented in this chapter. Generally speaking, in a specific 'social context' (system), 'certain actors behave in a particular organised manner toward the specific ideological aims' (the underlying mechanism) and thereby 'social movements' occur.

How can it be established that the theories presented here are sound? Layder draws on a well known contrast between 'cognitive adequacy' and 'practical adequacy' as the key validity criterion. He argues that the latter is the one used by the other realist sociologists/social psychologists which he reviews in his book: *The Realist Image In Social Science* (Layder 1990, 42-65). By using the systemic stand in practice and reasoning, the validity criteria used here is both: 'cognitive and practical adequacy'. While developing the theory of this study in relation to and in comparison with competing theories, cognitive adequacy is the validity criterion sought, and when dealing with the empirical cases, practical adequacy is the criterion of validity. The operational model of theory links these two adequacies together. It should be inspected rationally and practically. Its rational confirmation was presented mainly in the second chapter, and will proceed in the forthcoming analysis of each case, in which the contrast with the other theories continues to be developed. Its practical countenance will begin in the case-study chapters and will be completed in the concluding chapter.

The Operational Model of Theory:

Following our theoretical discussions, we have constructed a model by specifying the interrelationship between certain key concepts in time and space. Recalling from the second chapter: according to our ontological framework, there are three main aspects in each complex social formation: 'individual', 'relations', and 'social system'. It follows that each social formation has a three dimensional model. Developing this framework, social movements are naturally regarded as consisting of three main factors (though the reader will remember the sub-division of the 'individual' or 'agency' aspect into two further factors).

The main target of this study is to seek confirmation that the proposed theory of social movements is a general framework for Iranian-Islamic social movements. A three dimensional model is designed for this purpose. The dimensions are: *actors with their behaviours*, *ideology*, and *social context* and their interconnection is generated by the following underlying mechanisms: *Actors* 'perform' social movements with their behaviours in time. *Ideology* unifies the actors and behaviours towards the aims of the movement due to the facilities and constraints of the social context. The *social context* acts as the background for the realisation and preparation of actors and ideologies. Meanwhile the social context will itself change through the formation of the social movement.

Are these factors able to guide us to explain and analyse *why* and *how* Iranian-Islamic social movements emerged and developed? Are these factors and their relationships the *common* and prominent elements in all those movements? In other words, is this an adequate general framework for studying Iranian-Islamic social movements? In contrast with the other theories, is this model helpful in explaining and analysing the movements *more* adequately? What are the local, episodic *differences* between the prominent factors of the movements? How do these differences illustrate the evolution of Iranian-Islamic social movements through the time? Our methodology for settling the above questions will be presented in the rest of the chapter.

Following the realist strategy, the totality and interrelationship of the components of our theory are depicted as in figure 3.1. According to this model the system of social movements is generated from the social context. The leaders initiate a new idea (as represented by the smallest square in the diagram) with reference to the social context and produce an ideology (as represented by the middle square in the diagram). This ideology will be introduced to the original denizens of the social movement and the members of that circle will serve as the distributors through modes of presentation such as organisations, mass media, lectures, and so forth. The mass of the followers will accomplish the movement (as represented by the third square in the diagram) by their action. Generally speaking, actors with their behaviour through time will create the movement with the help of the solidarity and direction which comes from ideology. Social context as a generative space provides facilities and presents limitations. This model is our methodological frame of study.




Figure 3.1: The Model of Social Movements

The first task of the study is to propose a 'general framework' for understanding social movements. Nowak (1989) under the (sub)title of: *problems with testability and preciseness of 'general sociological theories'* considers four main problems with promulgating such a general theory.

(1) 'The concepts of many such explanatory approaches are not sufficiently clearly defined. This applies both to the "social units" (in particular, to the specification of their level or levels) to which each of these theories applies and to which it does not apply, and also to the properties of such units, denoted by the theoretical variables of such theory. If a theory should refer to several levels of social reality at the same time, involving the joint action of both "subsystemic" and "system-level" variables, these joint actions are not explicitly defined to a degree sufficient to make their meaning understandable to all. ... (2) The second problem is the exact meaning of the relationships between phenomena (variables) denoted by the broadly valid concepts (or referred to by the terms) of the theory. In many cases, they are not specified clearly enough; we often don't know whether the relationships postulated by the theory are supposed to be general, statistical, or in both cases, what is the shape of such relations, and their strength. ... (3) The concepts referring both to the phenomena (variables) of a theory and the relationship among these phenomena may be easily directly observable, or observable only with serious difficulty, or not observable at all. ... (4) Finally, theories may also have serious problems in their internal consistency, with a lack of a logical, deductive pattern of coherence between different propositions or of nondeductive patterns of internal structure.' (Nowak 1989, 42-44).

Nowak's concerns, therefore, may be summarised as the following: the problem of the exact time-space position of the variables, the precise meaning of the relationships between the phenomena, their observability or operationalisation, and the internal consistency of the theory. To take account of these principles and their pitfalls, our aim is to introduce an operational model and not an idealised one in the way we usually see them in functionalist or Weberian traditions. The factors and their relationships are not generalisations but consist of sensitising concepts observable through the historical documents and yet defined in the model by showing their position in time and space. Incorporation of time and space in designing the theory and the model enables us to present it as an operational one. The only general concept (in Nowak's sense) of the model is the 'social context'. It could be operationalised in various time and space locations. Once the social context of a movement is defined, the other aspects of the model will be operationalised within that context, without any need for abstract

interpretations. Moreover the operational definition of this concept, which is the generative base of each social movement, will show the exact level of model's operation. For example in the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, once the social context is defined as: the Shah's authoritative rule opposed by Ay Khomeini in 1979, the leader of the opposition, the distributors, the ideology of the revolution and the people of Iran who were executing the movement will become explicit.

The concurrent operation of parts will satisfy the internal consistency of a system. The arrangement of the active concepts of the theory in a concrete model according to the systemic view should provide the inner coherence of the theory. Ragin speaks about using the Weberian ideal-type case analysis as a kind of experimental investigation in comparative studies (Ragin 1987, 39). Ideal-types usually suffer from the problem of internal consistency as Nowak (1989) notes. The ideal-type is usually drawn from the intersection of some real cases. (Figure 3.2). The problem here is that this intersection does not correspond to any real case, but is an 'artificial' or 'accentuated' system. Also, as the figure and sociological literature show, it does not (and should not) resemble any of the real cases from which it is derived. The model of this study is *not* such an abstract ideal, but a synthetic construction built upon the analysis of the present social movement theories with an eye on the cases under study. Empirical support for the model is, of course, the aim of the research.




Figure 3.2 - Ideal Type.

In order to find out how far the constructed model enables us to explain the cases under study two comparative-case analyses will be practised. Historical events are

fixed. Nobody can change them. There are, of course, various interpretations or explanations of them but it does not mean that the sequence of events are changing *per se*. This is one of the great challenges of historical sociology. Each individual historian's interpretation is itself a construction but lying at the back of these will be a body of theory and the sociologist's role is to seek for general theories underpinning each explication. In the third section of this chapter we will have more discussion about this matter. In this research all relevant historical cases will be taken in to consideration. A comparative study of different cases will sustain our model as a *general* one for the Iranian-Islamic movements. The description and analysis of each case by the proposed model will also be compared with the narratives of other theoretical persuasions. The theory which is best able to answer the two questions of 'why' and 'how' those movements occurred will be considered more valid and comprehensive than others. Our theory, on the basis of its greater explanatory range, will be suggested as the *most* adequate theory of Iranian-Islamic social movements.

Moreover, by this device of the explicit arrangement of the factors of the study into a model, we will attempt to overcome Galton's problem, following the useful suggestion of Goldthorpe in his paper criticising comparative methodology. In his words: 'We should, rather, as Przeworski (1987) has indeed proposed, address the Galton problem, as it arises, by taking the modelling of interdependence as a key area for future methodological development' (Goldthorpe n.d., 16). Francis Galton questioned Edward Taylor, an anthropologist, in 1889 about the extent of independence of his observations. According to him, not just internal variables of an institution but the external ones in the context of cross-cultural relations should be observed. Using the modelling technique in comparative sociological investigations will give us this opportunity to trace all participating - internal and external - factors. In this study the internal factors of social movements and the external social context elements are investigated in a single model.

On the other hand, dealing with Galton's problem does not solve or even conceptualise the problem of concomitance. Investigation of further, especially external, variables may face our study with the problem of intervention of concomitant factors; those

factors which do not have any influence on the problem of our concern. The modelling technique enables us to prevent this danger as well. The designed model should explain the internal and external interrelationship of all prominent influential elements.

A further aspect of our operational model is its debt to the family of realist explanation. In the following I redescribe the model in frame of that perspective. Pawson advocates the realist strategy by insisting on theory as describing the *generative mechanism* for outcomes to be explained (1989). His main stress is on social *regularities* that ‘occur because of the action of underlying *mechanisms* in particular *contexts*’ (Pawson 1989, 324. Original italics). For empirical testing of a theory its concepts should be converted into an *abstract calculus* and their hypothetical model should be designed. Furthermore he believes that this model should be tested in an *adjudicatory* rather than verificatory fashion, in that it will be usually the case that we deal with two, three or many explanations for any given state of affairs (Pawson 1989).

The ontological theory of this study signals the key *generative mechanism* of the elements of our social movement theory as well as their regularities. The main ontological concepts - ‘individual’, ‘relations’ and ‘social system’ - have been identified in the ten different theories of social movement thus far reviewed. From a list of these different usage the most frequently occurring and prominent elements are identified. The most useful construction was then selected in an *adjudicatory* fashion. According to the theoretical, that is ontological theory, interrelationships of these elements their operative *mechanisms* in social movements are designed. Our hypothetical model of social movements (*regularities*) is composed in this regard.

The empirical testing of the designed theory will be *verificatory* by the historical evidence, which will be repeated commonly in different cases; its confirmation will be *adjudicatory* using a comparative analysis by investigation of the other theories explications of reviewed cases. In adjudications ‘cognitive adequacy’ due to the systemic logic is incorporated as the validity criterion and in the verifications ‘practical adequacy’ will be followed by the same logic.

Looking back to the second chapter, in that theoretical task our prominent factors and their relationship were chosen adjudicatorily; this means that we have chosen the most repeated concepts in various theories in regard of their roles. In the practical assignment our aim is to verify the theoretical assumption by investigation of historical evidence on different cases. Furthermore, the validity and comprehensiveness of our theory's explanation will be judged against the analysis of other perspective. We appear to just work at the two poles - adjudication for theoretical concepts, verification for empirical claims but there is always overlap. The conclusions, for each case and for the whole study, will come verificatory-adjudicatory. It means that empirical evidence will be combined with outcomes of discussions with the experts.

Layder introduces his version of realist methodology in contrast with 'middle-range theory' and 'grounded theory' (Layder 1993). He deals with two dimensions of 'time' and 'space' in preparing 'a resource map for research'. 'Self', 'situated activity', 'social setting', 'context' and 'history' are the prominent 'research elements' of his map. Research could be done in the space of any one of the four first concepts or, ideally, in respect of a combination of them, whilst they interact in the intersection of their 'history'. 'Power' 'commitment' and 'constraint' are three other concepts which should be investigated in any comprehensive study.

Through this methodology, Layder tries to achieve a compromise between several dichotomies in social sciences, most importantly theory and research. Other dichotomies he seeks to deal with are: objective-subjective, macro-micro, (theory-testing)-(theory-building), qualitative-quantitative, and (substantive theory)-(general theory). His answer to the question of the objective relationship between the dichotomies is a matter of locating any current single study, with one of the above mentioned polar qualifications, on the research map, and finding its polar situation in regard of the other studies on this space (research map).

In comparison with Layder's methodology, this study pays similar attention not only to the prominent concepts of the social-ontological theory, our 'research map' in Layder's vocabulary, but the relations between them as well. Furthermore, in order to

investigate some of the above mentioned dichotomies in a single study, it introduces the operationalised model in a means of appreciating both the 'micro and macro' and 'subjective and objective' components of the research, and of avoiding their separation as two poles of a continuum (see Layder 1994). The factors of 'individual' or 'agency' and 'social system' and their interrelationship are well defined in our theory in order to cover the micro and macro parts, and 'idea' and 'organisation' resembles the subjective and objective dimensions of the research.

There are some shortcomings with this synthetic model which deserves further studies. It serves as a conceptual grid for studying social movements but does not formulate the details of the main factors. It does not define the necessary weight of the combining factors either. These two weaknesses prevent us from having a detailed understanding of the internal mechanisms of the movements. For example, why was in the Tobacco Movement a short declaration from the leader made the protest, whereas in the Constitutional Revolution hours of speeches of the leaders were needed?

The model is investigated in four Iranian cases by techniques of comparative study. The details of these techniques are in the next section.

The Comparative Case Study:

'Thinking without comparison is unthinkable. And, in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research' (Swanson 1971, 145). More modestly we might say that using an appropriate comparative method will at least lead us to a better understanding of the subject matter under investigation. There has been the customary methodological dispute about the power of the comparative method, all the details of which I will not cover here. Coverage of these disputations often begins with Smelser's positivistic point of view in which he believes that comparative method is inferior to the statistical one (Smelser 1976). In contrast, Ragin outlines some advantages of the

comparative method as follows: 1) 'statistical method is not combinational; each relevant condition typically is examined in a piecemeal manner.' 2) 'application of the comparative method produces explanations that account for every instance of a certain phenomenon.' 3) comparative method does not have the problems of sampling and test of significance. 4) 'the comparative method forces the investigator to become familiar with the cases relevant to the analysis' (Ragin 1987, 15-16).

Ragin's principles have obvious affinity to this particular study. Given that each question demands its appropriate methodology, the comparative approach seems to be the pertinent one. There are four prominent Iranian-Islamic social movements in the period of study. Our investigation seeks to corroborate the proposed model across the *totality* of cases. The model will enable us to examine all of the main concepts of the cases in their time and space. Since we are taking the entire population of cases which fit our definition, there is no appropriate statistical method to be applied and, in particular, no sampling relevant to our considerations.

There are two kinds of comparative study, according to the classification of Ragin: case-oriented and variable-oriented ones. The former is typically qualitative and the latter mostly quantitative. Ragin explains the variable-oriented study in the following:

'In this approach cases are disaggregated into variables and distributions. Examination of pattern of covariation among variables is used as a basis for making general statements about relations between aspects of cases considered collectively as population of comparable observations. These general statements typically are linked to abstract theoretical ideas about generic properties of macro social units (such as societies). Because this strategy starts with simplifying assumptions, it is a powerful data reducer. Thus, it is an ideal instrument for producing broad statements pertaining to relatively large bodies of data encompassing diverse cases. However, the simplifying assumptions that make this approach possible often violate common senses notions of causation and sometimes pose serious obstacles to making interpretative statements about specific cases or even about categories of cases' (Ragin 1987, xiii).

He expresses some preference for case-oriented studies over variable-oriented ones because of being: a) 'sensitive to complexity and historical specificity', b) 'well suited for addressing empirically defined historical outcomes', c) 'often used to generate new

conceptual schemes', and d) 'more concerned with actual events, with human agency and process' (Ragin 1987, ix). These advantages make case-oriented studies, particularly, more appropriate for our historical case analysis.

The limitations of this method introduced by Ragin are follows: 'It is difficult, however, to sustain attention to complexity across a large number of cases. Furthermore, case-oriented researchers are always open to the charge that their findings are specific to the few cases they examine, and when they do make broad comparisons and attempt to generalize, they often are accused of letting their favorite cases shape or at least color their generalizations' (Ragin 1987, ix). In this study we are going to search all Iranian-Islamic social movements which had involved the whole of Iranian society. Therefore, it is a general analysis of the whole universe of the relevant population. The aim is the examination of a general model but not on the basis of few selected cases to 'colour the generalisation'.

The general feature of this type of analysis, according to Ragin, is to be holistic which gives it two priorities. First, 'the relations between the parts of a whole are understood within the context of the whole, not within the context of general patterns of covariation between variables characterising the members of a population of comparable units. Second, causation is understood conjuncturally' (Ragin 1987, x).

According to Yin, 'In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when "how" or "why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context' (Yin 1994, 1). As it was mentioned before, this study's intention is to find out 'why' and 'how' the Iranian-Islamic social movements took place, and what their general pattern has been. The chosen research strategy should be able to satisfy this objective. It thus seems that the case study is the most appropriate strategy for this purpose as well.

Case-oriented studies are usually confronted (self-evidently) with criticisms about the small number of cases (which is also a feature of Goldthorpe's paper about the comparative studies mentioned earlier), and the systemic level of propositions and

variables under investigation. According to critics, the small number of cases studied do not allow propositions based on them to be tested statistically, and looking within the cases will lead to the neglect of the potential interference of outer variables into the system studied. In regard of the first problem, in this study we are dealing with the whole set of cases and not a sample from a great number of them which would necessitate statistical analysis. And in order to avoid the second issue, *all* the social movements under investigation are going to be analysed in their *relevant* social context. In other words their surrounding environment will be considered as a prime factor in their explanation.

Systems or sub-systems of a society could be chosen as a case according to the ontological outlook of this study. Ragin categorised four types of case identification by summarising different researchers' intentions, according to the intersection of two main dichotomies: empirical-theoretical, and specific-general (Ragin 1992, 9-11). This study follows the systemic outlook to examine, according to our definition of social movements, those collective activities which are conscious, emerge according to a new idea, and use the social opportunities and constraints against the present order of the social context. The space of investigation is the socio-political structure of Iranian society from late nineteenth century to the time of the Islamic revolution of 1979 . The cases are those social outbursts which occurred in this period underpinned by Islamic ideas, and which were conducted consciously by religious leaders. There are four specific social movements according to this definition which occurred in the period under investigation. If the criteria of our definition of social movements are considered as empirical, the cases are empirical-specific or 'found' ones, in Ragin's vocabulary.

According to Hammersley, a case study 'involves the investigation of a *relatively small* number of *naturally occurring* (rather than researcher-created) cases' (Hammersley 1992, 185. Original italics.). He identifies three kinds of case selection strategies: 'case study', 'experiment', and 'survey'. His intention is to introduce a kind of 'trade-off' method combining the above mentioned strategies and techniques. For him 'case study' carries advantages with respect to the 'amount of detail' and 'degree of likely accuracy' in a study, whilst in 'survey' the benefits lie in greater 'number of cases', and

whilst in 'experiment' there is a larger 'degree of control' (Hammersley 1992, 183-200). He concludes his discussion in the following manner:

'So, in my view, we must not see research methodology in terms of competing traditions, but rather as involving a complex of assumptions and arguments, some of them in conflict, and a range of strategies and techniques that have advantages and disadvantages for particular goal and in particular circumstances. Moreover, the disadvantages of adopting one strategy or technique rather than another may be tempered through ameliorative modifications and perhaps even overcome through combination with other strategies and techniques' (Hammersley 1992, 197).

The aim of this study is to use the opportunity of 'case study' in a way to maximise its utilities, not in a trade-off policy which is suggested by Hammersley, but in a *verificatory-adjudicatory* way. Investigation of the concepts of the proposed theory will verify the model in four cases and this takes place in chapters 4 -7 in which the historical cases will be scrutinised. An examination of the broad family of social movements theories in respect of each case study allows a detailed comparison of their conceptual strengths and weaknesses. The jungle of historical evidence provides for a certain degree of justification for each separate theory, however, by concentrating upon the two key questions of why and how those movements occurred, the theories will be shown to contrast sharply in terms of their comprehensiveness. In order to find out which explication is more valid an 'adjudicatory analysis' is therefore needed. By 'adjudicatory analysis', I mean that our preferred model and generalisations need to be compared with those of others and a 'critical comparison' of concepts and models should to be practised.

Ideology, for example, has different definitions from different perspectives. For Toch 'a set of related beliefs' is ideology which 'holds by a group of persons', and acts as a 'platform' for a social movement (Toch 1966, 21). According to Wilson ideology is the main factor which mobilises discontent. 'Ideology is the generic name given to those beliefs which mobilise people into action in social movements' (Wilson 1973, 91). 'Peoples beliefs' are the paramount signs of each social movement to Tilly, and when 'a population' with the same belief acts together a movement emerges (Tilly 1978, 9). For Blumer, ideology has the following characteristics: a) shows direction; b) is the means

of justification; c) serves as weapons of attack; d) act as weapons of defence; and e) brings inspiration and hope (Blumer 110-111). According to Melucci, 'Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place' (Melucci 1989, 34). In Scott's theory social class makes ideology and through it social closure becomes possible. Mobilisation of interests of a social closure in a political participation process makes social movements (Scott 1990, Ch.6). Touraine believes that each social movement has an ideology, which is 'a representation of social relations' (Touraine 1981, 98). And for the synthetic view, ideology is the main theoretical or subjective (beliefs) and practical or objective (ritual organisations) solidarity factor and direction determinant of the movements.

Investigation of these contrasting definitions in an empirical context also reveals a diversity of practical features or properties for this concept. For example in the Tobacco Movement from an individualistic view (Toch) Shiite ideology assisted the protesters to find a peaceful way to protest against the tobacco contract between the Iranian government and Regie company. In relationism (Tilly and Melucci), Shiism prepared the organisation of the movement, was the root of the people's belief, and was the origin of their interest; and the fatva, which forbade all kinds of use of tobacco, established their collective identity in the environment of the Shiite culture. In social determinism (Touraine and Scott) Shiism defined the relations and articulated the interests of the participants of the movement. According to the synthetic view, the Shiite ideology was the initiator, organiser and interest articulator of the Tobacco Movement. The actors participated according to their beliefs and in accordance with the values and facilities of the religious organisation. Such critical comparison of theoretical and practical explanations of the concept of ideology thus improves our understanding of this factor. In other words, by this type of *verificatory-adjudicatory analysis* of the concept of ideology, its synthetic meaning has been enriched and discovered to be the most comprehensive. The same process has been conducted for confirmation and substantiation of the other concepts and is the basis for the claim that the model of this study as the most adequate for Iranian-Islamic social movements.

Taken together, this type of *verificatory-adjudicatory* corroboration of the suggested model, meanwhile, will help us to explain and analyse the movements in their historical position. That is, examining different assumptions in single historical cases brings the opportunity of full clarification of the historical events. The full narration of the cases and looking for the *differences* between them will enable us to find the historical evolution of the prominent factors in a final comparative analysis, which will be presented in the concluding chapter and will provide a new social historical explication of the last one hundred years Iranian-Islamic social movement.

Hence, the comparative case study method will be carried out in three different stages. In the first stage, various theoretical assumptions will be investigated in each of the historical cases in order to examine 'why' and 'how' they occurred. The interpretation of different theories will be compared in order to assess which one is the most appropriate model for our historical incidents. In this step, each historical case will be studied by all theoretical models under investigation in order to find out which assumption is able to explain it in a more precise and comprehensive manner. Analysing their similarities and differences in answering the two main questions of why and how the movements emerged and developed will validate the synthetic model of this study as the most appropriate view for explanation and analysis of the said social movements. Obviously the individualistic insights are going to explain well the psychology or social psychology of the actors of the movement, relationistic perspectives are going to be particularly useful in interrogating the solidarity factors present, and the social deterministic paradigms can be expected to deal usefully with the social background of the movements. But the synthetic model will introduce a yet more adequate framework for explication of these movements, not simply because it prompts investigation of a large number of factors, but because of looking at these main factors in a more appropriate configuration led by the underpinning assumption about ontological depth.

At the second stage, the historical events will be considered as the cases and the most appropriate model will be used to explain them. Whilst testing the generality of the proposed model of social movements by tracing the common concepts of the

theoretical explanations, the historical events will be compared by differences in their common factors and their chronological relationship will come more clearly into perception. The synthetic model will show the general structure or setting of each social movement. The prominent factors and their relationships will be considered as common concepts which make it possible to compare the parts and their interrelationship of each case with the others. In other words, the concepts and their relations provide the means of comparison of the four cases within the framework of the model. The model guides us to description of each social movement in terms of its prominent factors, on one hand, and facilitates the explanation of their differences in a comparative study, on the other. The similarities of the common factors are substantiation of the model as a general one, and their differences are going to show the evolution of the Islamic social movements in the history of Iran during the period of investigation. More specifically, the relevant social context, actors and their behaviours, and ideology of all social movements under study will be compared. The operation of the above mentioned factors as the constituent elements of all cases will give grounds for our claim about their generality. The difference between, for example, social context of all movements will denote the evolution of this phenomenon throughout the history of Iran since the late Nineteenth Century, and so forth for the other factors.

Looking at Iranian-Islamic social movements from 1890 to 1979 comparatively, generates a new insights into the history of the political sociology of Iranian-Islamic social movements. In order to deepen this socio-political understanding the National Movement of Iran (1951-53) will be investigated. Confirmation of our hypotheses on Iranian political sociology by this movement will further support the outcomes of this study. At the third comparative stage, the new explication of the socio-political history of the last century Islamic social movements in Iran will be compared with other recent interpretations in order to corroborate its validity in an adjudicatory manner. Our socio-political historical understanding of this period will be compared critically with nine other views (Fischer 1980, Milani 1988, Parsa 1989, Amuzegar 1991, Moaddel 1993, Ray 1993, Zubaida 1993, Foran 1994, Keddie 1995). This examination of the

proposed knowledge of socio-political history of Iranian-Islamic social movements will illuminate it and will substantiate its validity.

Comparative historical analyses mostly follow the logic introduced by John Stuart Mill in his: *A System of Logic*. According to him, there are two methods of agreement and difference which can be investigated in comparative studies. The “Method of Agreement” follows the similarities of several components of some cases, and the “Method of Difference” looks for differences in a number of cases in order to find out the causal relations. Each method or a combination of them are used by different scholars in order to find out the contributing factors and their outcomes or effects. Skocpol in her: *States and Social Revolutions*, uses a combination of these two methods. These methods enable the researcher to uncover single cause or the most important causes of events, but not ‘causal-conjunctures’ as in Ragin’s terminology (Ragin 1989, 69). The sum is something more than its elements. In this study, according to its theoretical assumption, the *mutual interrelationship* and *co-ordination* of several concepts in formation of the particular movements are going to be studied. Therefore, Mill’s method of agreement and difference is not relevant.

Finding the best formula for the exercise of the comparative method is a task which has taxed the minds of some of the greatest thinkers in the field. One aspect on which they would probably all agree is that the precise method employed must be tailored to the exact scope of the explanatory claims being pursued. In devising the strategy adopted here I should say in an overall summary that the comparative method is relevant when we are dealing with the similarities and differences of the common feature(s) of two or more subjects. The synthetic theory introduces the prominent concepts and their interrelationship arranged in the model of study. The model serves us as a framework for contrasting some assumed common features in four cases. Finding *similar* factors with *similar* interrelationships in all cases validate the generality of the model, and following the *differences* of the prominent factors of the cases can lead us to their chronological evolution in the last one hundred years history of Iran. The shortcomings of the case-oriented studies mentioned by Ragin can be overcome by investigation of the concrete or operational model of study (which is our aim) - or by further

investigation of the model in other types of social movements (which is not within the intentions of this study).

Methods of Historical Sociology:

Historical evidence on each of the chosen cases is utilised to investigate the theoretical model in order to examine its generality for Iranian-Islamic social movements and its adequacy in providing useful and comprehensive explanation of them. Looking at the history of social thought, it seems that Ibn-e Khaldoon in the 14th century was the first social thinker who used the sociological theory in historical analysis. Today, historical sociology has taken up this task intensively and combined the disciplines of sociology and history. According to Skocpol, there are three main methodological strategies in this field: a) applying a general model to explain historical instances, b) using concepts to develop meaningful historical interpretations, and c) analysing causal regularities in history (Skocpol 1984, 362). Evaluating these methodologies more carefully, one can conclude that none of them is free from the application of general assumptions. That is to say, interpretation of social-historical 'concepts' and search for historical 'causal regularities' in this field usually take place in some kind of general setting, either social or philosophical, of which the researcher is a part .

Generally speaking, every historical explanation or reportage carries its reporter's interpretation. That is, the general orientation of the reporter is there, consciously or unconsciously. This being the case, the search for the general theories embedded in sociological or even historical interpretation of the historical incidents is essential in formulating this influence and developing a better understanding of them. Hence, in my opinion, not even as a distinctive methodological strategy but as a necessary requirement, dealing with the general theories is one of the important tasks of historical sociology. This discipline can increase the precision of interpretation of the historical events by introducing more valid general theories. This is one of the main purposes of the present study in submitting a general model for studying Iranian-Islamic social

movements. In the other words, our intention is to use the first strategy, categorised above by Skocpol, not just for explanation of the historical occurrence but more importantly to introduce a general model for certain historical episodes which gives us a better understanding of them in comparison with its other alternatives.

Skocpol notes two weaknesses of presentations that use general theories in historical sociology which can make them 'seem very arbitrary'. The first is, taking the general theory as given, and the second, 'tailoring historical presentations to fit a preconceived theory' (Skocpol 1984, 365-366). She suggests three solutions for overcoming these weaknesses one of which is to investigate all the known historical cases (Skocpol 1984, 366) which is the chosen strategy used here. By investigation of all Iranian-Islamic social movements, we would have the chance of examining our model in all relevant cases and to test its applicability to all of them. Moreover, the designed model is considered as a framework for studying social movements generally. It is not intended to explain precise cause-effect outcomes. It does not have a preconceived interpretation of the success of the actors and results of the movements. It guides us to the groups of information which should be followed, and tell us how to combine them. Therefore, our approach tailors the conceptual framework of historical presentations but does not to fit them into a preconceived theory. In other words the presented model is not considered as a 'given' theory of social movements.

Another of the debates in historical sociology concerns the relative merits of the use of *primary or secondary data*. Goldthorpe revisited this debate in the *British Journal of Sociology* (June, 1991) and received some responses from different sides of the argument. Taking advantage of these debates, I would like to present here the position of this study about such matters. This thesis will use secondary data for several reasons. First of all, I agree with Goldthorpe about the separation of specialities of history and sociology without denying that overlap exists on occasion. Historians by the investigation of 'remnants from past generations' are able to tell us about the reality of the historical evidence. Of course, they are not free of their own interpretation in reporting these events. According to Bryant, historical works are 'woven from two distinguishable stands: what might be called *reportage*, on the one

hand, and *interpretation*, on the other' (Bryant 1994, 13. Original italics.). I consider that sociologists' works are mostly related to interpretation rather than reportage, while these priorities are reversed for historians. These two tasks are, however, interrelated with each other. Improvement in historical study, for me, means progress in reportage and sociological advancement implies development in interpretation. Therefore, there is no competition but a kind of academic co-operation between these two fields in this respect. This co-operation is mostly apparent in historical sociology, where the sociologists investigate historical events in order to develop social explanation. In contrast to Bryant, in my opinion, in this field of study the sociological task is not the evaluation of historical evidence itself but its explication. Sociologists, as experts on interpretation, are able to separate the historical explanations from the reported event. But historians, on the other hand, are expert in evaluating the validity and reliability of the reportage of the events. For instance, they reveal whether or not an incident occurred and what is its most apt description, keeping the difference between the description and interpretation in mind.

As well as their chosen general theory for interpretation, the surrounding scholarly and social environment of historians may affect their mode of explication. For example, in the description of the Tobacco Movement, two types of explanation can be recognised presented respectively by Ann S. Lambton and Sheykh Hasan Isfahani Haeri. Lambton, being a British subject, refers mostly to the documents released by the British embassy in Tehran or the Foreign Affairs ministry of Britain (Lambton 1988, 223-276), and Haeri, as a socially active clergyman, looks to the events from the standpoint of ulama who were participating in the movement (Haeri 1373 AHS, Daftar-e Dovvom 1-213). The same problem could be raised about the documents reviewed for the Constitutional Revolution. Nazem-ol-Islam Kermani, a member of the Secret Society, therefore an active clergyman, and a follower of Ay Tabataba'ii in the Constitutional Revolution explains events mostly from his organisational position. But Kasravi, a modern educated intellectual, looks at the events from the nationalistic standpoint. In the explanation of the event in Kerman city in which a mojtahed was *bastinado* (beating with a stake or whipping at the sole of the feet) and banished by the governor of the province, Kasravi apportions blame to the mojtahed as a selfish man who was

raising riots against the other civilians (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 53), whereas for Kermani condemnation is reserved for the uncommitted Shiites who attacked some Jewish households (Kermani 1371 AHS, 245). The event is the same but are reported from two different standpoints. Going through more such documents could present us with even more dimensions of the same account, thus making our insights ever more elaborate about each historical occurrence.

In this study our attempt to cope with the problem of '*multiple accounts*' is, first of all, to look at several sources (at least two) which present a full explanation of each case but from different social points of view. In order to deal with the reports as evidence, the original explanation of a writer due to his or her social position is taken into account. The immediacy and availability of information for a particular historian would constitute an advantage for using his or her accounts. For instance, Lambton's documents about the Regie Company could be more accurate due to her opportunity to see the original records through the British Embassy in Iran or the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the historian's reportage about a historical occurrence which is particularly 'sensitive' or 'unfavourable' or 'demanding' because of the social environment in which they are writing, should be considered with caution. For example, highlighting the liberal affiliation of some of the ulama in the Constitutional Revolution by Kermani could be due to the liberal social milieu of that revolution not the exact amount of their commitment to this ideology. In the cases of disagreement about a historical event, if there is no priority for each historian according to his or her social situation, the 'minimum amount of agreement' is extracted, otherwise the event is not considered at all.

What is the '*minimum amount of agreement*'? In using the discipline of history in this sociological exploration we have relied on secondary data agreed upon by historians, and if there is disagreement on any historical description, we have used the minimal areas/points of consensus. For example, consider the following components of three descriptions of the origin of the Constitutional Revolution. There is no agreement on the exact date or in who began this revolution among the historians. According to Kasravi, the Constitutional Revolution begun in the early days of the year 1284 (i.e. the

end of March 1905) when two distinguished mojtaheds of Tehran - Seyed Abdollah Behbahani and Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii - allied to fight against the despotism (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 48-49). Ay Shaikh Fazlollah-e Noori joined them when they decided to migrate to Qom (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 106). He also emphasises the role of emerging associations (e.g. the *Anjoman-e Makhfi* or the Secret Society) in the revolution throughout his book. Malekzadeh counts the starting point of the movement on 12 Rabia-ol-Aval 1322 AHL (28 May 1904) when a secret meeting of about sixty persons took place in order to act against dictatorship of the regime (Malekzadeh n.d., 8). According to him this association brought two leading mojtaheds of Tehran together to act as the leaders of the revolution (Malekzadeh n.d., 24). Kermani believes that establishment of the Anjoman-e Makhfi (the Secret Society) under supervision of Ay Tabatabaii, on 5 *Zelhejeh* 1322 AHL (10 February 1905) was responsible for joining the ulama and others to the revolution (Kermani 1371 AHS, 162). They were joined by Shaikh Fazlollah-e Noori another reputable mojtahed of Tehran in their Great Migration which was to Qom (Kermani 1371 AHS, 426). The 'minimum amount of agreement' of the above mentioned historical documents denotes that the leaders of the movement were two Ays joined by the third one (Tabatabaii, Behbahani, and Noori) and besides the religious organisation, there were some associations that acted as the agents of the revolutionaries.

It should be borne in mind that there are some primary data, such as a reliable census, which are not the matter of discussion and can be used by sociologists with little need for an historical expert to confirm it. We do not have such an occasion in this study but it should be mentioned that they are not immune from problems of validity as well. The type of general theory and social environment of their production can also be said to affect them (Hindess, 1973).

The Model of The Other Theories:

We conclude this chapter by explanation of the method of investigation of the other social movement theories in this study. In order to find out how much other theories are relevant to the understanding of our particular cases, the main concept from that theory will be examined in the setting of the movements, and then the main proposition of that theory will be explored. Reviewing the literature, as it was classified in the second chapter, three main propositions emerge about *why* and *how* social movements are formed and established. According to the insight of individualism '*social movements are mostly initiated by peoples' susceptibility*'; for relationists '*social movements are mainly formed by mobilising factors*'; and in social deterministic views '*social movements are chiefly arranged because of the social conditions*'. Individualistic and social deterministic insights mostly refer to the question 'why' social movements have emerged, and relationists are predominantly dealing with 'how' they are formed.

According to the above-mentioned propositions the model of each relevant theory in the three mentioned approaches will be applied to find out how far they are able to explain the cases. Three major and general questions will be considered: What is (are) the constituent factor(s) of each movement? Why did they emerge? And how did they occur?

In the individualistic frame of reference the 'agency' or the 'psychology' of the participants is the prominent factor. In particular for Toch, as it was mentioned in the last chapter that the main concept is *susceptibility*. For him *social movements are formed because of susceptibility of some agitated people who want to capture their appeal through an appropriate ideology*.

In order to construct a model based on this proposition we should seek for the answer the following questions:

- A. What is the participant's susceptibility in each case?

- B. What led to the formation of that susceptibility?
 - a. Which problem makes the participants susceptible?
 - b. What was the problem situation?

- C. How did that movement form?
 - a. What was the appropriate ideology for solving the problem?
 - b. How did that ideology encourage people to join the social movement?

From the relationistic point of view *social movements occur through mobilising discontents by: a state of feeling, belief, or identity, or by an organisation, and/or an ideology*. The core concept in this point of view is *mobilisation*. For examining this proposition by the model of each relationistic theory in the cases we should follow several questions:

- A. What was the mobilising factor of the people in each case: a state of feeling, belief, collective identity, organisation, and/or ideology?

- B. Why did that mobilising factor(s) articulate the movement?

- C. How did that mobilising factor(s) coalesce the movement?

The identification of the mobilising factor(s) of each case will help us to refer to the particular theoretical model(s) of this group of writers in order to follow the second and third questions.

The social deterministic perspective suggested that *social movements are formed by some social conditions such as: redefinition of norms or values, developmental gap, cultural class struggle, or social/political class struggle*. Therefore from this standpoint we shall anticipate *social conditions* as the prominent factor of social movements by investigating the following questions:

A. What was the social condition of each case: redefinition of norms or values, developmental gap, cultural class struggles, or social/political class struggles?

B. Why was that particular social condition able to initiate that movement (what were the causes)?

C. How did that particular social condition become able to launch that movement (what was the process)?

The appropriate theory for exploring the second and third questions will be distinguished after the particular social condition of each case becomes clear.

Following the realist's point of view, investigation of the above mentioned questions will allow us to design the "model" of each theory and examine the cases according to those patterns. The 'why' question speaks about the 'context' or 'condition' of articulation of the main variable of the movement, and the 'how' deals with the 'mechanism' of its occurrence. Six theories were found relevant to be investigated as far as their main concepts were detected in the particular historical cases. These are the frameworks derived from the work of Toch, Smelser, Tilly, Melucci, Touraine, and Scott. In the individualistic insight the model is linear, as was mentioned with regard to Toch's theory in the second chapter. Smelser's theory is linear as well but with emphasis on social aspects not psychological ones: 'structural conduciveness' causes 'structural strain' which leads to the 'mobilisation of the participants for action' by the help of the 'precipitating factors' under the pressure of the 'system and means of control'. Tilly's model combines several variables with stress on three of them: 'interest', 'organisation', and 'mobilisation'. And the pattern of the Melucci's theory is tri-polar: 'collective identity' acts in three poles of 'means', 'goals', and 'environment'. Touraine regards the struggle between a new 'identity' and its 'opposition' in the context of a 'totality'; and Scott explains how an 'identity' will be articulated by an 'ideology' in the condition of a 'social struggle'.

Similar concepts appear to have been used by the different perspectives but a closer look shows that as the overall frame of analysis changes the definition of the particular concept will alter. For example, different definitions of the concept of 'ideology' in different perspectives was explained before. This idea of 'systemic meaning', of course applies to this research as well. Therefore, reviewing the other theories will enable us to uncover different dimensions of the social movements, but the investigated concepts should be defined in the context of their own theories.

Chapter Four

Social Historical Literature

Introduction:

In this chapter the historical literature which contributed to the thesis will be introduced, and a brief explanation of the four social movements under study will be presented. Some sociological interpretations of Iranian social movements will also be discussed. The later will provide familiarity with the historical elements which have concerned different scholars of the field and show how they have been incorporated in different theories and perspectives. Looking at the main concepts utilised in our theory in contrast with their use in other theories will illustrate the general historical outlook of those elements. Highlighting the primary factors in this chapter will guide us to search for them in detail in the four forthcoming case study chapters. The final evaluation of our social-historical interpretation generated by the case studies will be conducted in the final chapter in a critical comparative analysis with the social-historical understanding introduced in this chapter.

As was stated previously, this is a sociological study of the political history of Iranian-Islamic social movements. Thus, the historical materials and interpretations are incorporated from the political sociology standpoint of the Iranian-Islamic social movements. Many authors have addressed Iranian social movements, particularly after the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 but from quite different perspectives. Most of them are in the same (socio-political) field of this study, still others have searched diverse domains, such as economy and gender. For example, Turner in his book: *Capitalism and Class in the Middle East* (1984) addresses a Marxist and Neo-Marxist type of view regarding uneven development as the source of Iranian social movements. He rejects the importance of Asiatic mode of production and feudal mode of production as the determinant factors of Iranian movements because of the mixed pattern of land ownership in Iran (Turner 1984, 165). He believes that: 'both Marxism and sociology have not been particularly successful in producing a theory of the relationship between

religion and modes of production' (Turner 1984, 184). He also considers, that in the case of Islam, it is 'difficult to draw a clear division between the religious and the political', which causes the danger of 'misleading contrasts between distinctly secular realms and sacred phenomena' (Turner 1984, 184). Finally, he turns to the political reasons of the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah. According to him, Shiism has a built-in oppositional ideology which can de-legitimise the authority of the state; Islam has an anti-colonial potentiality; and the ulama could provide a powerful national and local organisation for mobilisation of the opposition (Turner 1984, 185-186).

Women effectively participated in different Iranian social movements, however, the 'gender problem' is mostly referred to in post revolutionary scholarship in Iran. Two distinct women's movements can be traced after the revolution. One of them based in Iran and the other mostly active outside of the country. The ideology of the first group is Islamic and that of the second is secular.¹ The *hejab* (veil) is one of the latter group's concerns. During the course of the Iranian-Islamic revolutions in all demonstrations almost all women wore their veils, because it was considered that they were participating in an Islamic task. After the establishment of the Islamic Revolution 1979, in the summer of 1980 veiling was made compulsory by the Iranian parliament. According to Moghadam, one of the adherents of this movement, the new regime, following its cultural revolution, attempted to rectify *Qarbzadegi* (Westoxication). It was considered that women were more vulnerable to *Qarbzadegi*, 'to deculturation and imperialist culture' (Moghadam 1994, 205). She explains the situation in more detail as follows.

The stereotypical "Westoxicated" woman was a middle-class and Westernized woman without productive contributions or reproductive responsibilities. If she worked at all, it was as a secretary, and her work was largely decorative and dispensable. Her access to money was considered a waste, because it was used to cover the cost of her own clothing, cosmetics, and imported consumer goods. She was preoccupied with her physical appearance and wore miniskirts and excessive makeup. She would mingle freely with men, smoke, drink, and laugh in public. If she read at all, she read romantic novels; she picked her role models from among Hollywood stars, American soap operas, and pop singers. Her light-headedness and lack of interest in politics and national issues had made her easy prey for commercialization and contamination by the West. The solution to this vulnerability to the slings and arrows of the imperialists was compulsory veiling.

... Women were also not allowed to wear cosmetics or perfume in public (Moghadam 1994, 206).

There were some objections to the measure. Some argued that social groups other than women are also vulnerable to *Qarbzadegi*. Some Marxist groups complained that whilst the social and economic foundations of contemporary capitalism, which was the base of monarchical order, exist cultural degeneration and stereotyping cannot be uprooted (Moghadam 1994, 206, quoting from the Fada'i Khalq (Majority) organisation.). The cancellation of compulsory veiling is thus one of the targets of some elements of this post-revolutionary women's movement.

The Iranian-based women's movement can thus be characterised as a 'rights-seeking' movement. Its adherents believe that, according to the Islamic rules, they have many rights which have been abolished in the patriarchal pattern of the society. They have argued, for instance, that the wife's income should be under her own control as opposed to the current position in which it is now considered as a part of the family budget by many. Also, they think that some of their rights are eliminated in the unjust socio-economic organisation of the nation. For instance following a period of inflation, they have demanded adjustment to compensate for the devalued amount of the 'unpaid dowry' to the brides and have recently gained some success through the women's fraction of the parliament. This type of movement is not studied systematically here, and information on them is amassing in newspapers or magazines, especially periodicals which are published for women. They believe in *hejab* and most of them prefer *chador* (Iranian traditional veil).

Following Iranian women's movements and the wider issues of role of body and gender in Iranian movements is an interesting subject which is beyond the scope of this study. Thus, we move to our main concern which is the political sociology of the Iranian-Islamic social movements, leaving the task for the other studies.

Historical Documents:

An examination of secondary documents on Iranian social-political history reveals that there are two main groups of writings: one with historical tendencies and the other which leaned to more sociological interpretations. Accordingly in this study, our intention is to use the first group as the source of historical evidence for verification of our theory of social movements, and the second one for evaluation of the ensuing social-historical interpretation. In the literature written in English, historical sources on Iranian social movements are few. Almost all of the English writers who presented their interpretations of these events, therefore, belong to the second group introduced above. Lack of English historical sources required the present author to translate some of these documents in order bring them to the attention of English readers. My intention was to choose those historical references which were written nearer to the time of the events. By this strategy, more first-hand details of the events could be gathered and utilised. This is arguably in reverse as far as interpretations of the movements go. The latest analysis and explanations benefited from more sociological investigations and these could provide us with a more comprehensive analytical base.

Among Persian writings, Haeri's work on the Tobacco Movement: *Tarikh-e Dokhaniye* (The History of Tobacco), reprinted in 1373 AHS (1994), from the original copy, and Kermani's book on the Constitutional Revolution: *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian* (The History of Iranian Awakening), whose fourth impression was published in 1371 AHS (1992), are original sources for most of the writers on these two movements. These books were written at the time of the events or slightly after them. *Tarikh-e Mashroote-ye Iran* (The History of Iranian Constitutionalism), written by Kasravi, which I have referred to its fourteenth impression, published in 1357 AHS (1978), is another Persian reference which is informed this study. Madani's *Tarikh-e Siyasi-e Moaser-e Iran* (The Political History of Contemporary Iran) (1361 AHS)

(1983) is another main historical source which is much used. It should be noted that use of Persian dates in references within the text demonstrates those documents which are translated from the above-mentioned references as well as others which can be followed in the Bibliography. In order to present a clear historical outlook to the reader, a brief review of them will be presented below, and their more elaborate chronology is presented in the Appendices.

Amongst historical records in English, Algar's authoritative writings on religion and state (1969, 1985, 1991) are used. Abrahamian (1982) informs us primarily on the history of modern secular political movements; Chehabi (1990) is used for understanding modern Iranian-Moslem movements; Katouzian (1981) is referred to on the political economy of Iran; and Lambton (1988) and Keddie (1966, 1983) provide mostly social and cultural information.

On the base of the above historical sources and a few other minor sources, an overview of the four cases will be presented prior to their in-depth investigation. Having a general idea about the historical nature of the studied movements will help us to follow the sociological investigations more felicitously.

The Tobacco Movement:

One of the key chapters in the history of Iran opened with the establishment of the *Safavid* dynasty (907-1135 AHL, 1501-1722 AD). The founder of the dynasty, *Shah Ismaeel-e Safavi*, was a Shiite Moslem and was honoured for being a descendant of the Prophet. He announced Shiism as the official religion of the country.² As Algar says:

'The elevation of Shi'ism to the status of national religion in Iran by the Safavids in the early sixteenth century brought a turning point in its history: it [Shiism] became finally and inalienably associated with Iran as its homeland and stronghold. It is also from the Safavid period onward that

one may meaningfully talk about the existence of a body of Shi'i ulama. Yet one essential element of pre-Safavid Shi'ism survived to be passed on, after temporary obscurity, to the Qajar period and beyond: the necessary and inescapable illegitimacy of the state' (Algar 1969, 5).

From this time the Shiite ulama became one of the most influential elements of the socio-political elite of the country.

At the time of *Fath Ali Shah* (1211-1250 AHL, 1797-1834 AD), the second king of *Qajar* (1210-1344 AHL, 1796-1925 AD), Shiism and the ulama's reputable position became more fixed with stabilisation of the political system. Under the rule of *Naser-ed-Din Shah* (1264-1313 AHL, 1848-1896 AD), the fourth king of the same dynasty, Iranian international relations widened drastically and the ulama's attention to the political affairs increased. Naser-ed-Din shah's period is well-known as the 'contracts era'. The two powers of the time, Britain and Russia, were competing for new contracts to gain greater economic concessions in different regions of the country. The Tobacco Movement is the first instance of significant political intervention by the ulama, backed by the people, against one of those contracts. It influenced the whole national and international relations of the country and became one of the peak points of the socio-political history of the nation.

Naser-ed-Din Shah, who ruled over Iran for about fifty years (according to the Lunar calendar), signed a contract with Major Talbot from England in 1890 AD. According to Algar, 'The preliminary negotiations were completed in London during Nasir-ud-Din Shah's third visit to Europe in 1889, and in the spring of 1891, the agents of the British company to which the monopoly had been granted began to arrive in Iran. All rights concerning the sale and distribution of tobacco inside Iran, and the export of all tobacco produced in Iran, were vested in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation,' (Algar 1969, 206). The British company was called *Regei*. The agreement was for fifty years, under which the company was supposed to give £15000 per year and one fourth of its annual profits to the Iranian government. Its income was free of taxation, and its imports and exports were exempt from any customs' tariffs and limitations. The estimated profit of the company was about £335,900 per year (Lambton 1987, 230).

With the signing of the contract, many English subjects went to Iran as Christian missionaries as well as company officials. The company established its offices in Tehran, the capital, and other big cities. Its office in Tehran was built in a strategic places position dominating the Shah's palace and the administrative buildings of the capital, rather like a fortress with its own armed guards (Madani 1361 AHS, 24).

The people, especially tobacco merchants who lost control of the trade, expressed their disagreement with the contract by writing to the Shah and complaining to their religious leaders. Naser-ed-Din Shah and his prime minister *Amin-os-Soltan* rejected all forms of protest, and forbade the people from acting against the covenant. They had received £40,000 for signing this agreement (Nahavandian 14). Gradually, under the leadership of the local religious authorities, however, protests against the contract were initiated, especially in the large cities such as Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad.

Ayatollah Shirazi the *Marja'* (religious leader) of the vast majority of the Shiite Moslems wrote two letters to the Shah warning him of the colonial dangers of the contract. Faced with the rejection of his warnings by the Shah, Ay Shirazi forbade the use of tobacco in any form in early December 1891. Responding to this call by the religious leaders, people stopped the usage and the trade of tobacco. The trade system came to a standstill. The Shah attempted to persuade the ulama to lifting the ban. Having been paralysed by the people's actions, the Shah agreed to the cancellation of the tobacco contract, and the government paid £500,000 as indemnity to the company.

The Constitutional Revolution:

There is no exact date recorded for the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, therefore the special social conditions which led to the revolution occurring will be reviewed here. Iran had failed in two wars with Russia (1813 and 1828) and had lost some of the northern parts of the country, and both Britain and Russia were in

competition in attempting to gain more economic concessions from the Iranian government. Most of foreign nationals had the right of immunity from prosecution in Iran. Accordingly, if they had committed any kind of crime in the country, the Persian courts could not prosecute them. Furthermore, the Qajar shahs were dictators and called themselves the Shadow of God. The financial situation of the government was weak and it was running the country using heavy loans. More than eighty per cent of the population were peasants living in the villages, and they were required to pay about forty kinds of taxes (Katouzian 1981). The people were treated harshly by the prime ministers, ministers and governors, and they did not have any political rights because of the dictatorship of the political system. On the other hand, the success of the Tobacco Movement made people conscious of their political power. The cultural and commercial contacts between Iranian society and European countries increased, as well, and, thereby, many of the Persians were informed of the Western social progress. The people urged the ulama, as their community leaders, to do something against the tyranny.

Using some pretexts, like a picture of *Naus* (a Belgian who was appointed as the head of the customs of Iran) attending a fancy dress party while wearing the religious dress of an Iranian clergyman, the leaders of the Revolution, the ulama, mobilised the discontented people. In their first attempts the unfinished building of the Russia Bank was destroyed and the market was closed on several occasions. Moreover, gatherings in the mosques served as demonstrations in opposition to the government and made the people more aware of the ideology of the Revolution through the speeches made by *voaz* (clergy speakers). Following two migrations and seeking asylum in two holy shrines: *Abdol Azim*³ and Qom, the ulama, merchants and the people, finally, forced the political leadership, the Shah, to establish the parliament, for the first time in Iran.

The 15th of Khordad Movement:

Succeeding the reign of Qajar, the Pahlavi dynasty was established in Iran in April 1926 by coronation of Reza Khan following his coup of May 1921 while he was the Minister of War (Katouzian 1982, 89-92). His intention was to build a new centralised nation-state called by him *Iran-e Nowin* (The New Iran). He enforced a modernisation movement through his dictatorship, and Reza Shah tried to oppress all traditional authorities and to build a powerful government. As a military man, he suppressed all local powers, such as landlords and tribes-leaders, and persecuted the religious authorities by limiting their administrative duties toward the people by the establishment of new educational and judicial systems. In an effort for the unification of dress in the country he even tried, although ineffectually, to change their special clothing. On the other hand, the religious leaders tried to built up their own educational system and avoid participation in politics in order to reduce the friction with the state. Non-involvement in political activities caused relatively moderate, but not necessarily supportive, treatment of the religious institution by Mohammad Reza Shah (ruled from 1320 AHS to 1357 AHS, 1942-1979 AD), the second king of the Pahlavi dynasty, as compared with his father's actions. For instance in response to the demand of the ulama, he removed the ban for *Moharram* (The first month of Lunar Islamic Calendar)⁴ ceremonies and prohibition of Islamic dress of women (hejab) at the beginning of his reign (Algar 1991, 745). Analysis of the modernisation movement in the Pahlavi era is not the subject matter of this study. Our concern is with those reforms which were related to the 15th of Khordad Movement and the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

After a coup in 1953 (1332 AHS) arranged by the Americans, Mohammad Reza Shah returned to power with the assistance of their consultants, and his powerful State Intelligence and Security Organisation (SAVAK), which made a 'reign of terror ... , especially with regard to the practice of military tribunals investigating 'political' offences, an abuse which continued down to the last days of the monarchy' (Hambly 1991, 264-265). The influence of the USA in the internal affairs of Iran steadily

increased. Just as an illustration and for example, 'specialists from Harvard University, financed by the Ford Foundation, were recruited to assist in formulation of a third plan' (MacLachlan 1991, 624), which ran from September 1962 until September 1967.

After the death of *Ay Borujerdi*, the Marja of the vast majority of the Shiites of the time, in 1961, it was supposed by the state that there would be little religious objection to the Shah's reforms. However, the uprising of the clergy against the 'provincial and district approval' of Alam's government opened a new battle front. According to the constitution of Iran those elected as provincial and district council members '1) should be faithful to the orthodox Islamic faith and should not have perverted beliefs; 2) should swear oath by the Holy Quran; and 3) women were prohibited from being candidates. They also did not have the right to vote' (IPO 1991, 33). On 16 *Mehr* 1341 AHS (8 October 1962), it was announced by the press that, according to the approval of Alam's cabinet, the members of the provincial and district councils could be from non-Moslem communities, and, therefore, were able to swear not only on the Quran but on any other 'Divine book'. According to the new provision, women were also granted the right to vote (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. I, 375).

There was a movement in protest of these changes led by the established mojtaheds of Qom, Tehran and other big cities, supported by the ulama of Najaf. It was backed by the religious population of the country, leading the government to annul its approval. *Alam*, the prime minister, announced the cancellation in the mass media (Rowhani 1363 AHS, 141-216). This political movement lasted two months, and intensified the religious community's concern about the political situation of the country.

After the resignation of *Amini*, who had been the prime minister of Iran from 1960 to 1962, (1340-1341 AHS), the Shah himself had taken the responsibility of the direction of the government. He had appointed Alam to be the prime minister in *Tir* 1341 AHS (July 1962). On 9 January 1963, the Shah declared a new modernisation plan which was called the 'White Revolution' or 'The Shah and The People's Revolution.' He announced a land reform, that had started under the administration of Amini, as one of the six principles to be approved by the Iranian population through a referendum.

Some of these reforms were contrary to the Islamic values and traditions of the country. For example, land reform contravened the principle of private ownership, and when it started to operate Ay Borujerdi had mentioned its contradiction with the religious rules to Amini's government. Moreover, it was considered, by some of the ulama and their followers, as a dictation of the 'west' and a basis for further political and cultural dependency (IPO 1991, 75-76). Thus, the religious community objected to the measures. The ulama, especially Ay Khomeini, began their complaints about the referendum and argued that it had no position in the formal legislation of the country. The Shah changed the name of the referendum to a national plebiscite, but according to Ay Khomeini, nothing had changed except the name. (See Appendix II.)

The political conflict between the state and the religious community, had not been manifested at the social level since the Constitutional Revolution, formed again. The Shah attempted to enforce his plan by all the available means; Ay Khomeini, also, tried to mobilise the whole religious institution and faithful Shiites against the reforms. Ay Khomeini directed the movement by banning the plebiscite at first, and, in the later stages, by denying the loyalty to the Shah and *Taqiye* (or hiding the opposition to the Shah's government). However, the movement was suppressed because of his arrest, and the arrest of other leading mojtaheds of the prominent cities of the country, active clergy, business fellows, university students, that were the other effective distributing agencies of the movement. The movement was also dis-organised; the whole of the religious structure did not participate, and the protest was harshly crushed by killing between 4 to 15 thousand demonstrators, according to different reporters, on 15th of Khordad 1342 AHS (5 June 1963).

The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79:

In the three previous movements, we have seen that the opposition between the people and the state showed its face in the disparity between the authority of the ulama and the authority of the shah in different ways. In the Islamic Revolution this discrepancy shaped in the confrontation of the monarchy system against the idea of Islamic government. The slogan of "Death to this dictator" in the 15th of Khordad Movement converted into the "Down with the Shah" in the Islamic revolution; and the conflict between the Shah's secular reforms and the Islamic reaction in the previous movement changed to the opposition of the Shah as the symbol of monarchy with Ay Khomeini as the sign of an Islamic government.

Keddie, in search of the causes of the Islamic Revolution, speaks about a cultural diversity which was caused by the rapid modernisation. She believes that 'rapid modernisation from above, with increasing Western participation, helped to create "two cultures" in Iran: those with Western-style education and employment who mimicked Western ways; and the peasants, nomads, bazaaris, urban migrants, and ulama' (Keddie 1983, 11). Abrahamian, rejecting this type of interpretation, notes that uneven development was the reason behind the Islamic Revolution. He explains in more detail

'that the revolution came because the shah modernized on the socio-economic level and thus expanded the ranks of the modern middle class and the industrial working class, but failed to modernize on another level - the political level; and that this failure inevitably strained the links between the government and the social structure, blocked the channels of communication between the political system and the general population, widened the gap between the ruling circle and the new social forces, and, most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past connected the political establishment with the traditional social forces, especially with the bazaars and the religious authorities' (Abrahamian 1982, 427).

The roots of the Islamic Revolution are actually located in the 15th of Khordad Movement. The harsh oppression of the protesters at that time led the revolutionaries, especially Ay Khomeini, to think about the reasons for their collapse. The first problem seems to be the organisation of the movement. The need for establishment of some organisations for the next movement was the first reaction of the religious community (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 101). The second aim was the presentation of an alternative political system, instead of the monarchy, as the governing body of the country which was prepared by Ay Khomeini in his thesis, 'Islamic Government', which played the part of the ideology of the movement.

The two above mentioned processes were going on side by side with the activities and changes enforced by the state⁵ in the direction of secular modernisation, dictatorship and dependency which prepared the social context of the final appearance of the revolution. The Shah, being proud of crushing the religious community, continued the secular changes and modernisation. His dependent dictatorship, aided by increases in oil revenues led to a kind of centralised-petrolic-despotism. The economic dependency of the nation on the oil made, according to Katouzian, a 'pseudo-modern petrolic despotism' which was not any kind of modern capitalism that was claimed by the Shah (Katouzian 1981, 266).

Alongside the modernisation programme, the Shah tried to make his political position stronger by his coronation ceremony in 1967, the luxurious commemoration of 2500 years of monarchy in Iran in 1971, and the formation of the single party, *Rastakhiz* (Resurrection) system in 1975 (Algar 1991, 754-755).⁶ In further suppression of Islamic ideas even the Iranian solar calendar, which has the migration of the Prophet of Islam as its starting point, was changed to an imperial calendar based on the starting date of the monarchy of Iran by Cyrus in more than 2500 years ago.⁷

The religion and the religious community were marginalised by these changes, becoming more and more alienated by the enforcing reforms. The opposition emerged through the development of the organisation of the religious community, designed by the first circle of Ay Khomeini's followers from the religious structure and Bazaar,

backed by the religious affiliation of almost the whole nation participated in the revolution. The hopes and expectations of Ay Khomeini's Islamic Government articulated the ambition of a new independent nation according to the national beliefs (i.e. Shiism) (Katouzian 1981, 346) (Rahnema 1990, 24-25). The Shah's Great Civilisation was no longer attractive to the commoners and the traditional middle class because of their alienation and depressed values. This was the case for the modern middle class who, besides their Shiite affiliations, gradually, saw the mismanagement and extravagances of the rulers of the country from within the state's organisation (Halliday 1979, 294). Therefore, by a single sign of 'political relaxation' which came from the state, the people pushed it back to its fall and voted for the establishment of the new regime.

The participants in the revolution were against the despotic regime that was not considering them the rightful members of the country. The Shah had changed the 'constitutional monarchy' to His Majesty's own 'Imperial System' (Katouzian 1981, 342). This was a factor causing the bitter feelings which united the Iranian population against the state. According to Rahnema:

'The revolution was the rebirth of a nation. A sense of national identity and pride that was the result of a common struggle prevailed. For once, this was the people's Iran and not the Shah's Iran. Nationalism, which was the Shah's monopoly during his international interviews, was now truly socialised. The world marvelled at a relatively bloodless revolution, which was neither the result of a self-righteous army coup wanting to impose law and order to defend 'democracy', nor the result of 'generous' aid of one or another 'friendly' power. The people had imposed their will with the minimum destruction and blood-letting' (Rahnema 1990, 2-3).

Historical Interpretations:

In the following, an interpretation of nine scholars who have addressed political features of Iranian social movements will be presented. This will provide us a general socio-political overview of the historical elements involved in the construction of the movements. In the concluding section, this review will also provide the basic general social-historical pattern of the main aspects of our theory of Iranian-Islamic social movements. Chapters five to eight, on the case studies, will then provide a detailed empirical test of the general theory. In order to further evaluate our social historical conclusion an *adjudicatory* analysis will be conducted with the other explanations in the concluding chapter of the thesis. By inspecting closely the similarities and differences of interpretations, by focusing on their points of consensus and unearthing the reasoning behind the disputed points, we will open up for further discussion our key explanatory concepts (context, ideology, actors and behaviours) in order to add refinement to our understanding of these movements.

To recapitulate. In aiming for a comprehensive view, we will look at the social movements from three prominent vantage points corresponding to the three ontological notions of agency, structure, and relations. In order to evaluate the efficiency of this strategy and the results of the study we have referred to the classic scholars of the social movements field. In the following section we move on to consider nine major recent contributions to the explanation of Iranian movements. Each of these works has, of course, its own epistemology and ontology, its own theory of social movements, and, inevitably, its own mass of historical explanation. In this section what I intend to deal with is the second element, namely the explicit and sometimes implicit theory of social movements utilised by each author. This enables me to give each work a rather special and deliberately contrived 'reading'. Each monograph will be presented in terms of their main points of contrast with the interpretations of *this* study. That is to say, each will be allocated to one of the

orthodox frameworks which have characterised the development of thinking in the sociology of social movements which we used as the organisational base of chapter two.

In order to classify the interpretation of the chosen scholars, we have begun with their stated ideas on the cause or initiator of the movements. Some of the contributors insist on single cause and some others suppose a conjunction of several factors acted as the main initiator of the Iranian social movements. According to the chosen element(s) their interpretation has, therefore, been classified into individualist, relationist, social determinist. To recall, according to individualists the main element in social formations is agency/individual or its properties; relationists are mainly concerned about the concepts describing the medium of social solidarity; social determinists' emphasis is on the structure/society.

Such acts of pigeon-holing always do some damage to the intentions of the original authors and it worths mentioning some of rules of thumb I have adopted. For instance, variations among the writings within each group are subdividable in terms of the particular social movement theory followed. Disciples of Tilly and Melucci appear within our 'relationist' category, and although their writing will be identifiable within that ontological stream they can be seen to be using different interrelating factors to describe the means of social solidarity in action. It also should be mentioned that writers assigned here to the 'single factoral positions' might have operated so because their focal point of study is to add to our knowledge in that particular dimension, rather than making claims for its all-embracing nature. My point here is to classify their underlying theoretical assumptions without excavating their full scholarly intentions.

One final note on the readings offered here is on the matter of historical differences between these authors and myself of the evolution of the social political history of Iran. The domain theoretical assumptions of each scholar have, of course, driven each work into dramatically different interpretations of the many different historical episodes that will be examined in this thesis. Recall that my empirical analysis traded deliberately, not on the interpretative works examined in this section but on presentations which were

mostly historical in their ambitions. Accordingly, I hold many disagreements on historical interpretation (both piecemeal and profound) with the various different authors. Alas, these have to be the subject of another study; as ever, more research is needed.

Individualism:

Mohsen M. Milani's interpretation of the Islamic Revolution and Iranian history in his book: *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic* is an individualist one. According to him: 'Revolutions are made by the deliberate policies and heroic actions of committed revolutionaries. The road between the objective preconditions and revolution is a long and complicated one that includes such intangible factors as the leadership quality of the incumbent rulers and leaders of the revolutionary movement and fortuna. This is why the revolutions are also called internal wars. And this is why the making revolution is a creative political act' (Milani 1988, 34). He refers to: preconditions, integrity of the opposition, Shiism as a justifying ideology that united the revolutionaries and promised them a bright future, attraction of the international support, and failure of the Shah in using all his oppressive tools, as the main factors to be followed in explanation of the Islamic Revolution (Milani 1988, 34). He believes that the ulama acted in this revolution as 'travelling salesmen' and produced it (Milani 1988, 34).

Milani notes that the Constitutional Revolution and the National Movement of Iran had nationalistic ideologies, but the National Front (*Jebhei-e-Melli*) and other secular parties, like Tudeh (Communist) and the rest of the communist groups, which had a good reputation in the second movement, had no popular bases in the 1979 revolution. He argues that the ulama, after the uprising of the 15th of Khordad, came onto the political scene and prepared themselves for the Islamic Revolution, (Milani 1988, 323). Describing the preconditions of the Islamic Revolution, he explains that: Iran was suffering from uneven development, which was caused by successful economic

progress and failure in the development of political institutions. In such a situation, the traditional class was threatened by the economic progress and the modern classes sought more political participation opportunities. 'The state stood on the one side and all other groups, except the ruling elite, on the other' (Milani 1988, 323). The economic progress demanded more liberation that the despotic Shah was reluctant to grant. This in collaboration with the United States' concern about the human rights constituted the psychological atmosphere of the revolution (Milani 1988, 323) and provides a Tochian 'problem situation' in Iran. Milani pays intensive attention to the chronology of the history of Iran, particularly the Islamic Revolution.

Milani confirms the opposition of the state and the ruling elite against the people as the main antagonism in the Islamic Revolution, however the role of the religious institutions in organising and mobilising of the discontents is not fully investigated in his analysis. He has an individualistic interpretation of the ideology of the revolution, therefore, does not look at the social dimensions of Shiism. According to him, 'it was because of Khomeini's charismatic leadership that a powerful Shi'i movement surfaced in the first year of the Islamic Revolution whose main base of support came from the shopkeepers and the lower classes' (Milani 1988, 326) and 'Shi'i fundamentalism ... was not the cause but the by-product of the Islamic Revolution' (Milani 1988, 327). Thus, adding this interpretation to his idea about emergence of the ulama onto the political scene after the uprising of June 1963, it would appear that he does not consider the ulama's authority as an institutionalised one throughout the socio-political history of Iran.

Relationism:

Larry J. Ray incorporates Habermasian theory for investigating global social movements. His model's main emphasis is on social organisations. In his words:

'The present volume offers a social theory of regulation which develops the Habermasian idea that modern systems have evolved mechanisms of crisis displacement and technocratic management of potential conflicts in ways which avoid threatening the identity of the system. In this context, however, an important insight from the regulationist will be deployed, namely their understanding of crises as complex events which might permit a re-stabilization of the system through a new set of consensual arrangements. In these terms, the onset of crises could be viewed as the beginning of struggles toward new forms of consensus, or as exit routes from social arrangements which have become unworkable. Systemic breakdown is then viewed as permitting the release of new problem-solutions and forms of integration, the vehicle of which are social movements, as carriers of new forms of social organization' (Ray 1993, xiii).

He elicits from Habermas two types of movements called defensive and offensive movements. "Purely defensive movements by contrast are particularistic, they 'conquer no new territory' for the lifeworld, and are orientated towards 'the defence of traditional values and social rank' as opposed to trying 'out new ways of co-operating and living together'. Offensive movements will eschew grand revolutionary schemes, but will also resist being integrated into established institutions" (Ray 1993, 62).

In interpretation of Iranian social movements, Ray follows the idea of modernisation and investigates how organisations conducive to the improvement of modern secular ideas were used or created. According to him, 'modernisation' emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century, anticipated by some new pre-modern movements, such as *Sheykhism* and *Babism*, within religious ideology and was followed, but in a more traditional Islamic form, in the writings and speeches of Seyed Jamal-ed Din Asadabadi and others (Ray 1993,136-137). These modernisers established their political-rationalisation in the form of constitutional government through the Constitutional Revolution, which was meanwhile challenging Islamic traditionalism (Ray 1993, 137).⁸

The attempts to separate religion from state, according to Ray, were pursued by the Pahlavis but in an authoritarian mode. This type of secular enforcement caused a 'centralised state capitalism without an independent civil society, which precluded an alliance with secular forces' (Ray 1993, 138); it modernised education, prohibited public displays of religiosity, and alienated the ulama. He concludes here that: 'It was not much the programme of 'modernization', then, which generated the backlash, but, on the contrary, the suppression of the secular opposition which left the field open to religious forces with a mobilization base in the mosques, seminaries and bazaars. In this sense politicized Islam was not so much the antithesis of the Pahlavi state as its mirror image, in the both substituted coercive statism for plurality and rational consensus' (Ray 1993, 138).

The way in which traditionalistic socio-cultural relations were sustained in Iran is described by him as follows:

'However, the Pahlavi state, which survived in 1953 only because of the CIA coup which removed Mosaddeq, had an even greater legitimacy-defect in that it could not claim the mantle of an anti-colonial war of independence. Its response was to attempt further secularization from above, aimed at consolidating central authority through artificial organizations of mass participation, whilst isolating opposition from any genuine channels of consensus formation. The effect of this political underdevelopment was to off-load opposition into an incipient alternative society, whilst blocking channels of communication between the political system and interest groups such as the *bazaari* and ulama. The ramifications of this can be illustrated with reference to the Pahlavi regime's programme of socio-economic modernization in the 'White Revolution' and the one-party state' (Ray 1993, 139. Original italic.).

...

'Thus culturally ingrained messianic ideals - of a just society, resistance to tyrants, struggle against overwhelming odds - were tacitly mobilised ... in the interest of the alternative elite' (Ray 1993, 141-142).

According to him, finally, radical clergy mobilised defensive social networks under the umbrella of a broader coalition of urban forces, including the ulama, the shanty towns, bazaari and students and advanced the revolution through the mosques (Ray 1993, 142).

Focusing on modernising forces as the main emancipatory potential in Iranian history causes Ray to overlook the role of traditional Islam in the Persian social movements against dictatorship and imperialism. Lack of attention to the role of the actors, further, leads him not to identify the ulama as one of the bases of authority in the social context of Iran. Regarding the ideologies of the movements, we can find a kind of compromise or debate between the traditional Islamic ideology, presented by the radical ulama, and modern secular evolution of the world, which attracts less attention from Ray. This debate brought about a kind of evolution in political ideology of Islam, which will be discussed in a comparative analysis of the ideologies of the Iranian-Islamic social movements.

Moreover, organisations are not the only prominent factors of social movements. As we will note, the same religious organisations were used in different episodes for expansion of a range of Islamic ideologies by the distributors which, of course, without them could not be dispersed. Using single organisations and producing different outcomes denotes that there were other factors involved in the process of movements as well. Organisation can be considered as a medium for a social movement but not its engine.

Misagh Parsa (1989) presents a structural analysis of the Islamic Revolution in his book: *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution*. He presents a relationistic view with particular emphasis on social structures. He mostly follows Tilly's perspective in his interpretation of Iranian social movements. In his sociological interpretation Parsa investigates several concepts. Introducing the main intervening factors, he argues that 'Sociological analysis of such conflicts should focus on state intervention in capital accumulation and its impact upon various groups and classes, capacity for collective action, solidarity structures, options for mobilization, opportunity structures, and likelihood of coalition formation' (Parsa 1989, 314-315). Following the above mentioned elements in Iranian social movements, his prime concentration is on 'structural conflict' and 'mobilisation'.

According to Parsa, the state was mostly responsible for the 'structural conflict' in the Islamic Revolution. Thus for him, the Iranian state was the main power within the economy, because of the oil revenues, and its policies were in the interest of a small upper class and multinational companies (Parsa 1989, 303). The condition for the revolution was prepared because of reduction of the oil incomes, rise of inflation, and mismanagement of the crises by the government (Parsa 1989, 62-86). Bazaaris were the main mobilising group in the revolution. The revolution was advanced by bazaaris who had been active in politics since the early 1950s, Parsa continued (Parsa 1989, 91-125). They were able to employ the bazaar as well as the religious organisations. The clerical opposition of June 1963 'provided bazaaris with an opportunity to oppose the government, especially because Ayatollah Khomeini, unlike other religious leaders, openly condemned the government's policies toward the bazaar' (Parsa 1989, 305). 'The [state's] repression severely weakened bazaaris' capacity for mobilization and collective action' in that uprising (Parsa 1989, 305). Other political organisations such as the National Front and Tudeh Party were not active in the 15th of Khordad Movement, or in the Islamic revolution, predominantly, because of their repression by the state, as well as not taking a radical position on these occasions (Parsa 1989, 310). In the first movement the worker's organisations did not participate because they were under the control of the state. In the following one, they were the second active strata, especially oil industry workers who had participated in the nationalisation of the oil industry in 1951. The fourth active group in the revolution was the white collar employees (Parsa 1989, 126-167). 'Ayatollah Khomeini, ..., became the supreme leader of the revolution because he had taken an uncompromising stand against the Shah's regime since March 1963, when he called for the overthrow of the government' (Parsa 1989, 311).

Parsa's resource mobilisation theoretical outlook, due to his emphasis on 'consolidation' and the bazaars as the main mobilising factors in the Islamic Revolution, took the shape of 'Third Worldism' when explaining the role of the state. According to him a high level of economic polarisation, dependency, crisis-prone economies, and low social differentiation were the main important factors for the consolidation of the people in the Islamic Revolution (Parsa 1989, 27). His

interpretation about the role of the state is rather like the other centre-periphery analysts who look at third world countries as nation states developed by the central capitalist societies.⁹

Parsa's analysis of the revolution, does not take the role of the agencies and ideology into consideration. Thus some major questions about the revolt can not be answered by his explanations. Why did the bazaar choose Ay Khomeini and not, for example Ay Shariatmadari¹⁰, as the leader of the outburst. Was it not the case that the interest of the bazaar could better be looked after under the constitutional type of government? Who determined what the targets of the revolution should be, and how did consolidation in the direction of the aims of the revolution take place? In summary we could ask of Parsa's explanatory structure as a whole - is it enough to have a high level of economic polarisation, dependency, crisis-prone economies, and low social differentiation for consolidation, or are there some other factors needed in order to be able to activate the solidarity of the discontents?

Social Determinism:

John Foran in his edited book: *A Century of Revolution, Social Movements in Iran*, presents a social deterministic viewpoint of social movements and coups in Iran over the last hundred years. His editorial consists of writings with different theoretical backgrounds, however, in his concluding section, which is the main concern of this study his position is social deterministic. He addresses two questions: Why did these social movements take place? And, what were their outcomes? Following these questions, he searches the causes, the process of rebellion, and the outcomes of Iranian movements in the last hundred years (Foran 1994, 226-233). According to him, there were five prominent factors which caused the Iranian social movements in the last century: 'the consequences of dependent development, the vulnerabilities of the exclusionary personalist state, the elaboration of effective political cultures of resistance and opposition, the grievances shaped by an economic downturn, and the

opportunities opened up by a favourable world-systemic conjuncture' (Foran 1994, 226). These factors are assumed by Foran to be the main causes of the social movements in Iran. Examining the nature of the above mentioned elements one can conclude that they are all social conditional factors.

In answering his question about outcomes, his basic argument is that all of the Iranian movements were defeated because of the breakdown of multiple coalitions of classes and ethnic groups after the revolutions. He notes the Tobacco Movement and the Islamic Revolution were initially successful because of a more complete coalition of such groups (Foran 1994, 231-232). The failures occurred, in short, because of the diversity of aims of different participating groups. Other factors underlying the failure of the movements, according to Foran, are: underdevelopment, outside pressures, and the diversity of state institutions (Foran 1994, 232).

Foran's concluding analysis does not add much to the social history of Persia. This can be said without belittling the author for he mentions this matter as one of the shortcomings of his study and requests future studies on this subject. An 'under-studied and difficult-to-study new area of inquiry on Iranian social movements lies in the field of social history. We need to know more - much more - about the everyday lives of the many classes and groups that have made up the social movements discussed here' (Foran 1994, 234). His concluding chapter concentrates upon social conditional factors to the neglect of relational ones, and therefore, it does not have any explanation of mobilisational factors and thus, generally speaking, about 'how' Iranian social movements occurred. The role of the actors in the accomplishment of Iranian social movements is absent.

Structural-Functionalism:

Jahangi Amuzegar presents a version of structural-functionalist interpretation of the events in Iran. His main emphasis is on political structural strain and the chronology of the events. He seeks the origin of the Islamic Revolution in the Constitutional

Revolution of 1906 in his book under the title of: *The Dynamics of the Iranian Revolution: The Pahlavis' Triumph and Tragedy*. He believes that social modernisation, economic diversification, and cultural rejuvenation emerged after the establishment of parliamentary government in Iran and caused subsequent upheaval. The conflicts between constitutional monarchy, Shiism, nationalism, democracy, economic development, military preparedness, and social welfare policies produced frictions which were manifested in several ways through the recent history. In his words:

'These stresses and strains have through the years manifested themselves in (1) a perpetual challenge to Iran's tradition of centralized monarch absolutism by modern, liberal, Western-oriented intellectuals; (2) a festering rift between the crown and the mosque regarding the primacy of legitimate power; (3) a latent divergence between Persian imperial pretensions and tribal, ethnic, and Islamic consciousness; (4) a nagging clash between a nationalistic desire for independence and self-reliance and oil-sanctioned global interdependence; and (5) a sharp encounter between the rapid tempo of economic development and the slow pace of political progress' (Amuzegar 1991, 6).

These types of structural strain combined with 'steady erosion of the regime's political power base (particularly after the advent of oil nationalism in 1950) and growing alienation between the people and the leadership (particularly after the 1974 oil boom)' (Amuzegar 1991, 7) led to the Islamic Revolution.

The relational factors and the role of the actors, as the prominent determinants of the subsequent movements, after the Constitutional Revolution, are not focused on by Amuzegar. Who were the participants of the movements? What was, exactly, the reason of their participation in the outbursts? What was the role of the Islamic ideology in these upheavals? Was it just for legitimisation of power, or has it further effects in these movements? These are some questions that can not find their answers in Amuzegar's explication of the social history of Iran, in the period under investigation.

Marxism and Neo-Marxism:

In this section four different versions of Marxist and Neo-Marxist interpretations will be presented. Fischer (1980), as an educational anthropologist, considers Islamic revolution as a petite bourgeoisie revolt which had followed a religious paradigm; Zubaida (1993) in a further de-Islamisation of social movements of the modern history of Iran, doubts the religious motive of the participants and looks at the religious leadership and structure of the revolution of 1977-79 as the only available oppositional instrument; Moaddel (1993) allows more influence for the ideology of the movement but, however, indicates that it was a product of class and political discourse; and Keddie (1995), sticking to the orthodox Marxism and Third Worldism, intends to present a comprehensive understanding of the internal and external forces of the Iranian-Islamic social movements. In the following these interpretations will be introduced in more detail.

Michael M. J. Fischer's main thesis in his book: *From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (1980) is that Islamic Revolution was not a religious revivalism but a protest against oppression, dictatorship, dependency. According to him, the religious symbolic cultural structures provided the framework of protest and articulated different strata under the common sense of mourning for the martyrs of Karbala¹¹. He considers that this pattern is repeated through last one hundred years history of Iran in all protestations and revolutions. 'The revolution [1977-1979] drew on two legacies: the repeated attempts at a bourgeois revolution (1905, 1952), and the repeated use of religiously phrased protest' (Fischer 1980, viii).

Fischer's study is in the field of anthropology of education. Through three levels of questions he attempts to find out how common-sense changes: intellectual questions 'about the organization of culture, the affiliation and sponsorship of ideas', sociological questions 'about the interest groups and power relations that cause ideas to succeed or be popular at one time rather than another', and historical questions 'about the reorganization of culture through new goals and new institutions' (Fischer 1980, vii).

His main theoretical assumption is that ‘religion, I have been trained to believe, provided a reservoir of symbolic terms people could use to create a meaningful world’ (Fischer 1980, x). Adopting this theoretical assumption to Iranian history he notes that ‘In 1970 Iran was poised for praxis. To be sure there was social change, and the shah attempted to elevate the Zoroastrian heritage into a nationalist symbolism, but the Islamic clergy (*ulama*) effectively blocked it from becoming a mobilizing vehicle: it was merely myth. In 1977-1979 an Islamic praxis began; wherever it leads it will probably leave Iranian Muslims and Shi’ism, as well as Iran, changed’ (Fischer 1980, x. Original italic.).

In anthropological studies the concept of culture is essential. Fischer believes that ‘culture is dynamic, with symbolic structures that grow and decay through repetition and the addition of meaning to symbols, or through the reduction of polysemic symbols into mere signs. This dynamism requires sociological and historical context for comprehension’ (Fischer 1980, 8). The symbolic structures of Iranian movements are driven from Shiism, he explains in more details:

Shi’ism, the established form of Islam in Iran, and its several forms of expression, such as preachments, passion plays, and the curricula and debates of the madrasa, can be viewed as cultural forms composed of symbolic structures. Within this perspective Islam is not a set of doctrines that can be simply catalogued. It is “language,” used in different ways by different actors in order to persuade their fellows, to manipulate situation, and to achieve mastery, control, or political position. There are in Iran at least four main style of using Shi’ism: the popular religion of the villagers and bazaars; the scholarly religion of the madrasa or colleges where the religious leaders are trained; the mystical counterculture of Sufism; and the privatized, ethical religion of the upper classes. One might add as a fifth style, the combination of the second and fourth, which Dr. Ali Shariati’s followers have argued is the ideology of the 1977-1979 revolution (Fischer 1980, 4).

Looking at the history of Iran, Fischer denotes that ‘the political struggle over religion in Iran has two dimensions: a class dimension and a related but separate dimension of state control’(Fischer 1980, 9). Following the second dimension he adds that ‘the struggle between the state and the religious authorities becomes highly subtle and interesting as soon as one realizes that the relative success of the state in suppression overt political opposition and critical discussion made religion the primary idiom of

political protest' (Fischer 1980, 9). Different social classes made their different form of ideologies on the common ground of the religion. 'Three broad ideological orientations will be considered: those of the secularized educated middle and upper classes, the traditionally educated religious students, and the popular folk. For an understanding of the common religious grounding, the learning of the religious students is pivotal. The religious center of Qum has itself been an arena of combat between the religious leaders and the state with its middle-class allies' (Fischer 1980, 9).

Fischer has an intensive study on the religious city of Qom and concludes that the symbolic structure of 'Karbala paradigm' is the common sense of all participants in the 1977-1979 revolution (Fischer 1980, 10). *Rawda* (mourning ceremony), especially for Imam Hossien, was a symbolic structure which 'articulates the learning of the ulama with popular belief, the efforts of modernizers such as Shariati served a similar function in articulating the discourse of the ulama with that of the modern middle and upper classes' (Fischer 1980, 179). Fischer's generalisation on the problematic articulation in Iranian social movements continues as such:

By focusing on this articulation and its difficulties one can see an emerging shift in the relative political strengths of the class constituencies of religious spokesmen, from land owners in the 1950s and the bazaar bourgeoisie in the 1960s to the modern middle classes in the 1970. One can argue that at least until 1978, the ulama's claims that Islam had rules for all aspects of life was but an expressive, generalized stance providing few positive articulative programs to those of the government. The ulama saw themselves as guardians of social morality, as social critics, not as planners. Nonetheless, on occasion the ulama took specific stands - for instance, against land reform in the early 1960s on the grounds that it would hurt small landowners (Milani), religious endowments (Behbahani), or the bazaar through competition of the proposed co-operative societies (Khomeini) (Fischer 1980, 179).

Not only in the 1977-1979 revolutionary movement but, according to Fischer, the Karbala paradigm articulated all Iranian social movements in the twentieth century. His explanation is as follows:

The social drama of 1977-1978 had been rehearsed many times, and it resonated with many associations of the past. It was a completion of the 1906-1911 Constitutional Revolution; throughout

the year, the revolutionaries had invoked the constitution, which had been set aside in all but name by the Pahlavi regime. It was a fulfilment of the Mosaddeqh interregnum of 1952-53, which had nationalized oil in an attempt to establish an Iranian sense of independence and self-direction. ... It was also a vindication of the 1963 popular insurrection against the shah's White Revolution, a fifteen of Khordad writ large; Khomeini had become a major symbol of opposition to the shah in 1963, and his vindication became the rallying point of the revolution. Finally, it was the ultimate passion of the Karbala paradigm, shifting from a passive witnessing of weeping for Husayn and waiting for the twelfth Imam to an active witnessing of fighting and working for the overthrow of tyranny. For years in rowdas the shah had been identified with the archtyrant Yazid, whereas Khomeini was seen to uphold the ideas of Husayn. In 1978, during Muharram, the religious leadership called for marches instead of the traditional mourning processions. As the passion on the year increased, more and more people called Khomeini "Imam Khomeini"; and the religious dates of the year became staging time for major demonstrations (Fischer 1980, 182-183).

He thinks that different social strata articulated by the ulama in the Islamic Revolution. He explains as follows:

The complaints against dictatorship, the feeling against forced changes in male-female relationships, the slogans of right to private property and right to earn an honest living in trade, all transcended particular land - or bazaar-linked interests. The middle class's desire for political participation and a stable commercial environment not subject to capricious shift in policy and bribery requirements found expression through these same complaints voiced by the ulama. And if today Khomeini still seems to represent an older terminology and constellation of interest, other leaders such as Shairatmadari and Taleghani seems to speak out more clearly for interests of the bazaar bourgeoisie, the modern commercial class, and the white collar professionals. These latter groups have their own spokesmen, both secular and religious: Mehdi Bazargan, the late Ali Shariati, and a large group of younger men, as well as the secular national Front. It was largely in this ideological space of the new and old middle classes that the revolution of 1977-1979 would be fought (Fischer 1980, 179-180).

His final argument is that 'What produced the Islamic form of the revolution was not Islamic revivalism so much as repression of other modes of political discourse' (Fischer 1980, 185). And 'The cause of the revolution, and its timing, were economic and political; the form of the revolution, and its pacing, owed much to the tradition of religious protest' (Fischer 1980, 190).

Examining Fischer's analysis of Iranian social movements will lead us to his main stress on the social contextual factors rather than relational and individualistic ones. In the problem of articulation, he leans to the relational role of the religion, however, he looks at it as a *symbolic structure*. The subjective dimension of the ideology and the agency's beliefs are neglected, thus, socially originated interests are expressed as the motivational factors of the participants in the revolution, and another dimension of their motivations before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, such as their aims, ideals, and hopes to the future are missed.

In his book *Islam, the People and the State* (1993) Sami Zubaida looks at the Iranian social upheavals in the last one hundred years from the secular point of view. In this attempt he expresses doubts about the religious motives of the participants in the social movements of this period. He believes that, in the absence of the secular leaders and organisations, Ay Khomeini and the religious organisation were able to articulate and mobilise the general discontent in 1979. The 'Islamic interpretation' of this revolution, was thus due to leadership and organisation rather than being fundamental to the motives of the participants. In this interpretation his emphasis is on social and political factors and, partially, relational ones, rather than on individualistic aspects. In the following we will introduce Zubaida's interpretation in more detail.

His general understanding of the Middle Eastern Islamic movements is contrasted with other types of interpretation in the introduction to the second edition of his book.

The continuing advance of the 'Islamic current' since the first publication of these essays has appeared to many observers and writers, in the Middle East and in the West, as a confirmation of the neo-orientalist accounts of 'Muslim society', that is one in a continuous historical essence of Islam. This has enhanced the tendency to read history backwards and to ignore or dismiss the secular and secularising forces, institutions and practices in the modern history of the Middle East and the lengthy episodes in which nationalist, liberal and leftist politics predominated. It obscures the fact that behind religious rhetoric and symbolism, social and political practice remains, for the most part, unrelated to religion, notably in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Zubaida 1993, xiii).

In the context of this general assumption, lies his strategy of studying the Islamic movements of the Middle East. 'The current dominance of Islamic politics in the region, like the dominance of Christian politics in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has to be explained in terms of social forces and political processes, not eternal essences' (Zubaida 1993, xxiv). In order to follow the social forces in Iran he looks at the 'class identities as political actors' (Zubaida 1993, chapter 3), and to understand the political processes of the country he looks for the key element of 'institutionalisation of religion in relation to the state' (Zubaida 1993, chapter 2).

In his search for Marxist class analysis in Iran, he fails to find any contemporaneous academic literature on the subject, thus he introduces the classifications introduced by the Tudeh party after the revolution. He also quotes Fischer's interpretation which argues that the prevalence of political fundamentalist Islam was 'the revolt of the petite bourgeoisie' (Zubaida 1993, 78). However, his conclusion is that: due to the 'considerable success [of the state] to eliminate any possible social or institutional base of autonomous political action or organisation' there was no class-oriented party or organisation, thus, the religious institutions and bazaar articulated the opposition for the revolution (Zubaida 1993, 80).

So, when the Shah in 1977 responded to a combination of internal problems and international pressures by introducing a small and grudging measure of political liberation, the secular intellectuals, lacking political organisation or experience, responded with meeting and petitions for civil rights which lacked clear political objectives. The only political force which was well organised, provided with funds, possessed of a strong leadership and having a clear strategy was the network of clergy and their students and supporters which consisted of Khomeini's associates and disciples. Aided by a populist and radical rhetoric, it was able to hegemonise the multitude of forces which were eager for revolutionary transformation, but lacked the organisation and resources to act autonomously. It was that political conjuncture which raised Khomeini Islam to the leading position in the revolution, providing common symbols and slogans for diverse forces. There was no intrinsic or organic link which tied that type of ideology to particular social classes (Zubaida 1993, 80-81).

Following the element of 'institutionalisation of the religion in relation to the state' Zubaida believes that in 'Qajar Iran religion, alongside other major social spheres, was

autonomously instituted' (Zubaida 1993, 56). He differentiates between different power structures of the time. 'Religious magnates formed part of local power structures involving landlords, tribal chieftains, and sometimes wealthy merchants' (Zubaida 1993, 56). He, also, believes that the ulama's authority since its establishment in the Safavid dynasty was subordinate to that of the Shah, but in the Qajar's era 'the context of the ulama's power was the general weakness, decentralisation and corruption of the Qajar state' (Zubaida 1993, 31). As the ulama had an autonomous base they were able 'to speak out against the government whenever any measures were introduced which threatened their privileges or influence among their followers' (Zubaida 1993, 31). On this basis they could agitate the people against the Imperial Tobacco company in 1981 and the Constitutional Revolution which they 'also played a prominent part' in that (Zubaida 1993, 31-32). He believes that 'the political alliance between liberal-nationalist intellectuals and sectors of the clergy in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was not based on ideological affinity, but on common objective against the absolutism of the Qajar monarchy and the increasing dominance of its European backers' (Zubaida 1993, 57).

According to Zubaida, the religious authority or the Islamic politics in Iran was largely confined to the clergy and religious institutions and was reactive until 1960s and 70s. 'Until Khomeini first came to prominence in the early 1960s, the character of Islamic politics was largely reactive, that is the clergy reacting against social and political development which limited their powers and privileges' (Zubaida 1993, 57). Zubaida notes that the political movements in the Qajar Iran did not result in a nation state until Reza Shah's government in 1924, which by suppression of the other authorities caused a nation state. However, he adds that 'the bases for their [the ulama's] institutional autonomy were not entirely eliminated: they still had the mosques, the religious schools, the religious charities, and the source of revenue from the contributions of the pious. All these maintained bases for autonomy, organisation and networks of patronage and influence. These were to be crucial factors in facilitating their leading role in the revolution' (Zubaida 1993, 57-58).

The manner in which the secular forces in Iran gained their hegemony and why they have lost it is described by Zubaida as follows. In ‘the period of the Second World War, when the British and Russians deposed Reza Shah for fear of his sympathy for the Axis powers, and installed his young son on the throne’, the political organisations and activity flourished (Zubaida 1993, 58). The Tudeh party and various nationalist and constitutionalist parties emerged which ‘allied after the war in the coalition called the National Front’ (Zubaida 1993, 58). They brought Dr. Mosaddeq to power as the prime minister who nationalised Iranian oil in the early 1950s¹² (Zubaida 1993, 58). Dr. Mosaddeq was replaced through a CIA coup and the Shah’s state suppressed all parties ruthlessly then after.

Ay Khomeini emerged into the political scene in 1963 and remained an uncompromised leader of the opposition benefited from the religious organisation and independent funding (Zubaida 1993, 58). He wrote his fundamentalist thesis of *Velayat-e-faqih* (the guardianship of the jurist) and implemented it in Iran through an Islamic *republic*: a modern ideological contest for the modern state (Zubaida 1993, 58-59). Zubaida notes that ‘the first and the most striking feature of Khomeini’s doctrine is that it is conducted exclusively in terms of traditional Islam discussions with hardly any reference to Western or Western-inspired political-ideological notions’ (Zubaida 1993, 13). However, what gives a modern form to Ay Khomeini’s thesis is his insistence of application and instrumentalisation of the Islamic laws as a form of state (Zubaida 1993, 16). Also, according to Zubaida, the concept of the people as ‘the nation’ as a political force which is used by Ay Khomeini ‘is distinctly modern’ (Zubaida 1993, 18). He contrasted the ideas of Shariati with that of Ay Khomeini and concludes that:

One may speculate that the kind of government achieved by Khomeini is profoundly different from that dreamed by Shari’ati. But then, Shari’ati’s ideas were neither systematic nor pragmatic: it is difficult to see how the unity of *Ummat* and *Imamat* could have been achieved outside a messianic fulfilment or be being forced through a stern disciplinary course of religious ‘enlightenment’ under an Islamic government, which is precisely what the clergy-dominated Islamic Republic is trying to achieve in the application of Khomeini’s doctrines (Zubaida 1993, 26. Original italics.)

In further de-Islamisation of the Islamic Revolution, Zubaida concludes that as they 'were looking to the common people for support against Western-oriented dominant social groups, institutions and parties: theirs is a populist nationalism with 'Islam' as the identifying emblem of the common people against the 'alien' social spheres in their own country which had excluded and subordinated them' (Zubaida 1993, 33). He doubts the religious motivation of the participants of the revolution and guesses 'that they were volatile and changeable, and certainly susceptible to agitation by any oppositional political group which could reach them, and the Islamic networks may have been the only avenue through which they could have been reached against the vigilance of SAVAK (acronym for the Shah's all-powerful secret police)' (Zubaida 1993, 61). Therefore, he concludes that the revolution in Iran succeeded because of

Khomeini's powerful and uncompromising leadership supported by networks of organisations revolving around religious institutions and personnel. It was this conjuncture which made the revolution, and made it an Islamic revolution. I have tried to show that the importance of religion in the modern history of Iran was due to the fact that it remained the only major sphere not completely incorporated and controlled by the state, and as such retained the possibility of autonomous action and organisation. This is quite different from the popular explanation of the Islamic revolution in terms of the effect of some religious essence inherent in Iranian culture and most readily appealing to the hearts and minds of Iranians (Zubaida 1993, 61-62).

Zubaida's interpretation of Iranian social movements is a social deterministic one and his emphasis on organisation derives mostly from its social dimension as a social solidarity structure. According to him, the people were susceptible to agitation by any oppositional political group and thus followed the only leader and organisation which was available. It is accepted by Zubaida that the religious institution acted as a political force in last one hundred year Iran, however, he emphasises secular force to be considerably more influential. There are thus some questions which remain unanswered by Zubaida. How did the religious structure and the clergy survive throughout the decades of suppression? How many pious people were there who funded this organisation so continuously that it remained widespread over the country? How did this organisation remain autonomous against a powerful, acronymous state backed by the imperialism? What is the role of the populace or the common people in prevalence of the religious structure? How much of the 'communalist solidarity' of the Iranian

nation is against or in conformity with their so called Shiite beliefs? Providing the other necessary factors were present, can the similarities between these two types of identities, 'communal' and 'religious', be the source of solidarity for participation in a collective action?

Mansoor Moaddel (1993) presents a type of Neo-Marxistic theory about the Islamic Revolution (according to him "Iranian revolution") taking social context and relational factors into consideration. For him class, politics, and ideology are the prominent factors of revolutions. He considers ideology as the 'episodic discourse' at the time of preparation for the outburst of the revolution, which will be produced by the intellectuals, class, and politics (Moaddel 1993, 15-19). Class, which is a structural phenomenon, according to Moaddel, is throughout history the product of economic forces and political and ideological configurations (Moaddel 1993, 19-21). And politics relates to the structure and the policies of the state, mostly in presenting its discursive ideology (Moaddel 1993, 21-23).

According to Moaddel, in the Iranian Revolution the main division was between the state and the people. The social structure had two overlapping conflicts: merchants and petty bourgeoisie versus international capital; and dependent bourgeoisie and workers against capitalists as influenced by the world economic fluctuations and induced inflation (Moaddel 1993, 23-24). A new Islamic revolutionary ideology, produced by Ay Khomeini, and new revolutionary interpretations, according to Islam, introduced by Ale Ahmad and Shariati, served as one side of the episodic discourse, and at the other side was a pre-Islamic kingship nationalism propagated by the state. The 1953 coup puts an end to a national-liberal period of history of Iran, therefore, Islamic ideology could arise after the decline of liberalism and communism, added Moaddel (Moaddel 1993, 140-154). Mobilisation of discontent took place through Shii revolutionary discourse by religious symbolic structures and ritualism, according to him (1993, 162).

Theoretically, Moaddel does not pay significant attention to the actors and their behaviours in analysing the social history of Iran. He considers ideology as a relational

factor and class conflict to be the structural component of each revolution, while the second element (social context) initiates the first one (ideology). Therefore his type of analysis could be classified as a social deterministic one with a considerable emphasis on ideology as a relational factor.

In Moaddel's interpretation of the Islamic Revolution religious organisation and rituals have a symbolic role, and Islamic revolutionary ideology is constituted by the socio-economic and political conditions. His ideas have a certain conformity with our views in the following respects. Both look at the role of agencies in the preparation and distribution of the ideology. Both explore the part of the ideology in the manipulation of institutions and organisations within the social context. Both consider the action of ideology in the agitation and mobilisation of discontent. However, in this study we have emphasised the contribution of individuals and the influence of the social conditional factors in the making of the ideology, and this leads us to believe in another type of location for ideology within the whole system of social movements (see chapter two for more detail).

Not paying enough attention to the actors and their behaviours, and considering the ideology as a by-product of the socio-economic potentialities of the society, causes Moaddel to fail to conceive any independent political authority for the ulama besides the support of the socio-economic forces of each historical episode. He believes that the ulama established their religious reputation during Qajar era, when the Qajar tribe needed intellectual support from them for ruling the country (Moaddel 1993, 132). The Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Revolution occurred, mostly in consequence of the antagonism between the bazaar and landlords versus the state, with the ulama taking the merchant's side (Moaddel 1993, 133-136). And in the Islamic Revolution, for Moaddel the merchants, petty bourgeoisie and landowners became the social base for the unification of the ulama (Moaddel 1993, 140).

As our utilisation of the historical evidence will show, the basis of the ulama's authority in Iran was the religious belief of the Shiite community, which considered them as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, a doctrine which was established socially during

the Safavid dynasty. This belief remained unchanged throughout history, despite the changes which occurred in the productive forces of the society, and different configurations of social classes emerged, due to whatever reasons. The leadership of the tobacco boycott in 1891, the management of the conflict with the dictatorship of Qajar kings, the demands for the establishment of the Justice House in 1905-6, the agitation of religious people against 'White Revolution' reforms in 1963, and the leadership of the Islamic Revolution in 1978 are historical evidence demonstrating Moaddel's failure to take into account the continuing authority of the ulama, or at least the supreme mojtaheds of each era.

Nikki R. Keddie in her book: *Iran and the Muslim World* presents an account of the Iranian Islamic Revolution from a historical and regional point of view. She presents a Neo-Marxistic version of the Iranian social outbursts since the Tobacco Movement¹³. In searching for the causes of the Islamic Revolution, she utilises a kind of comparative method. 'For study of revolution, the question about comparative differences most relevant to causation is: what differences were there between the revolutionary country and non-revolutionary ones that can help to explain the revolution in the former?' (Keddie 1995, 21). She presents three causes for the Islamic Revolution, according to her, the conjunction of which had made the movement: '1) the evolution of the Shi'i clergy in Iran, which made a powerful Khomeini and his network possible, 2) the particularities of the shah and the way he ruled, and, 3) probably the most important, the major contradiction between an increasingly autocratic political structure and forced, inequitable, and rapid socio-economic changes that to some degree alienated all classes in society. All three of these factors interacted and changed over time' (Keddie 1995, 21).

For Keddie, all social movements in Iran, between 1891 and 1979, were against imperialism, colonialism, and the state which was the former's base in the country. 'The tobacco rebellion of 1891-92 shared with later revolutionary and rebellious movements a substantial anti-imperialist and anti-foreign component' (Keddie 1995, 99). 'Governments seen as complaisant to foreign nonbelievers were considered almost

as culpable as the foreigners themselves. Iranians held their government responsible for Western depredations in 1891, in the constitutional revolution of 1905-11, the oil nationalization of 1951-53 under Mosaddeq, the demonstrations of 1963 around Khomeini, and the revolution of 1978-79' (Keddie 1995, 100).

According to her, Shiite ideology was a personal feeling for Iranians. She argues that 'the strength of Iranian revulsion to foreign influence arose in part from the long-held belief that Western non-believers were out to undermine Iran and Islam. For many, Shi'ism and nationalism were part of a single blend' (Keddie 1995, 100). Keddie believes that the unification of different strata in Iranian rebellions was the result of the presence of a single enemy. 'The recurring alliance between the bazaaris and many of the ulama on the one hand and secularized liberals and radicals on the other has been largely based on the existence of common enemies - the dynasty and its foreign supporters - rather than on any real agreement about goals' (Keddie 1995, 99). Ideologies were changing in various revolutions because of the difference in the nature of the enemies, she adds (Keddie 1995, 108).

Regarding the social deterministic causes of the Iranian revolutions, Keddie denotes that: changes in the production relations, according to the Marxian orthodoxy, is the closest model for explanation of the socio-economic causes of the Iranian movements (Keddie 1995, 106). She proposes a combination of Islam and Third Worldism, which divides the world into two different areas of centre (first world) and periphery (third world), to explain the anti-imperialistic mood of the urban upheavals in Iran. 'The blend of Islam and Third Worldism fits an anti-Western, anti-imperialist mood, particularly among students and those sections of the urban population who were either poor or in the traditional economy' (Keddie 1995, 111).

Keddie's explication about the Iranian movements is mostly devoted to answering the 'why' question of the events not 'how' they had occurred. Her interpretation confirms the targets of the Iranian movements as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and against the state and acknowledges the main antagonism as that between the people and the state. She also follows a causal conjunctural type of explication of the movements.

Moreover, she regards religious ideology and structure as the main mobilisational factors of the movements. However, she includes relatively little discussion about how these structures or personal feelings actually mobilised the discontents against the dependent states.

Conclusion:

The above literature review has made us familiar with the main historical factors and patterns incorporated by nine scholars in studying Iranian social movements. According to this study's presented model, three factors are the main aspects of our study: social context, ideology, and actors and their behaviours. The dominant pattern of the political social context is a configuration of the decisive authorities who are present. Taking advantage of the above material, we can say that the main authorities of the country at the turn of the nineteenth century followed the dictates of the shah, the ulama, landlords, and tribe-leaders. The influence of landlords was on scattered rural areas. The tribe-leaders commanded, perforce, their own tribes. The authority of the shah and the ulama were based in the cities (but also extended to rural and nomadic areas) and concerned security and religious matters respectively. Historical evidence shows that after emergence of the dictatorship of Reza Shah, the authority of the landlords and the tribe-leaders diminished drastically following the suppression of the state. The authority of the ulama survived the repressions and re-emerged as a political opponent to the state in 1963, eventually to overthrow the shah's authority in 1979.

Another main concept of our theory of social movements is ideology. According to the above scholars adherents of imported secular, liberal and constitutional, or according to Adamiyyat (1354 AHS) (1975) 'social-democratic', ideologies participated in Iranian social movements in collaboration with the ulama. The ulama's ideological position within each movement will be presented in the sections to follow dealing with the 'ideology'. Additionally, the ideological position of the above intellectuals and

modern-Moslem intelligencia under the influence of the western ideologies, will be reviewed in the ideology sections or the parts on 'oppositional groups'. Following the role of the actors, it will be shown that the movements were conducted by the ulama, with the help of the other strata of the people, through the Islamic organisation. The modern educated intelligencia, acting under the authority of the ulama in the course of these events, could shape the results of some movements, as in the Constitutional Revolution, or act as a secondary force, as in, for instance, the Islamic Revolution.

What is the nature and configuration of these main aspects in different historical episodes? The four following chapters will discuss these matters according to the model of this study. In chapter nine our understanding of the social-history of Iranian-Islamic social movements will be brought to completion, and a critical comparative analysis of that understanding with interpretations reviewed in this chapter will make up the final part of that chapter.

Chapter Five

The Tobacco Movement

Introduction:

In this chapter the Tobacco Movement will be analysed using our synthetic model at first and other outlooks will be examined later. Each of these latter models gives a particular interpretation of the Tobacco Movement. Using Toch's theory introduces the social psychological perspective, utilisation of Tilly and Melucci's views describe the movement in process, and application of Touraine and Scott's insights explain the preconditions of the movement. Our main claim is that the new perspective put forward in this thesis is the more extensive one and it is able to give us a more precise analysis of the Tobacco Movement.

The secondary historical evidence used in this chapter mostly comes from Haeri (1373 AHS), Lambton (1987), Algar (1969), and Kasravi (1357 AHS). Haeri, a clergyman active in the movement, leads us to the ulama's point of view of the events. Lambton is British and introduces us to the Regie Company's perspective of the movement. Algar informs us of the relationship between the ulama and the state, and Kasravi gives us a nationalistic stand of the movement.

The Synthetic View:

In the synthetic theory the concepts of social context, ideology, actors, and behaviours were introduced, and it was proposed that the combination of these elements makes social movements. Our claim is that studying this configuration of elements enables us to find out 'why' and 'how' that movement emerges and develops, as well as to evaluate its relative success and the factors underlying that outcome. In the following, these prominent factors of the Tobacco Movement will be analysed and their inter-relationship will be examined according to the proposed model.

The Social Context:

A brief explanation of the political situation at the time of the Tobacco Movement was presented in the introduction of this chapter. Let us now explain further the general social circumstances at the beginning of this outburst and discover who was opposing whom in this movement. Sjoberg¹⁴ notes that the social stratification of the pre-industrial societies generally consisted of two classes: the upper class and the lower class. According to him, in most of the pre-industrial cities there is also a third group called 'out-castes'.

'[T]he pre-industrial city is characterized by a bifurcated class structure comprising the elite or upper class, that which manifests the highly valued criteria, and the lower class, or mass populace, that which does not. The elite, though small, forming perhaps less than 5 to 10 per cent of the total social order, dominates both city and society. At the minimum, this literate group comprises the upper ranks of the governmental, religious, and educational bureaucracies. The bulk of the lower-status urbanites and the vast peasantry, two groups that share many traits, form the great commoner, or lower-class, group.

'Few feudal societies and their cities are without an "out-caste" group as well. These persons are isolated from both the upper and lower classes, the respectable elements of the social order' (Sjoberg 1960, 110).

He believes that 'the privileged stratum in pre-industrial cities and their societies includes at the minimum the officials of the political, religious, and educational bureaucracies' (Sjoberg 1960, 118). The other occupational groups which could be included in the upper class, to varying degrees in different pre-industrial societies, are landlords, military elements and a few merchants according to Sjoberg (Sjoberg 1960, 120). The lower ranks of the religious and governmental structures are part of the commoner group. He adds: 'religious personnel, those who serve the commoners generally lack the highly valued objective criteria of class and are therefore part and parcel of the humbler group' (Sjoberg 1960, 121). Other elements of the lower class are: many merchants, the bulk of the artisanry, the handicraft workers, unskilled labourers, farmers, shopkeepers and peasantry (Sjoberg 1960, 121-123). Sjoberg counts the slaves, night-soil carriers, leather workers, butchers, many barbers, midwives, prostitutes, dancers, lepers, etc. as the out-castes of the pre-industrial societies (Sjoberg 1960, 133-134).

There are improvements in the categorisation of different classes in the discipline of sociology. For example, dealing with gender or ethnic groups and looking for the internal dynamics of various classes improves our understanding of social order. However, as this is not a social stratification study, our intention is to use the general schema of Sjoberg's explanation for understanding the main opposing groups in the Tobacco Movement. In the late nineteenth century, Persia as a pre-industrial society did not follow the exact pattern explained by Sjoberg but its social stratification was not too distant from his classification. Having a monarchy system, the shah was the head of the state and his family were at the top of the social hierarchy. His government and those who were attached to it were the other part of the upper class. Those religious leaders or ulama who were appointed by the government as *Imam Jomoa* (Friday prayer leader) or *Sheykh-ol-Islam* (head of the *shar'a* (religious jurisdiction) courts) could be classified as part of the upper class too. Some others, either from ulama or different ranks, who were married with one of the courtiers, were promoted

to this class as well. Being the head of religious and educational organisations, the other ulama were keen to be considered as the common people. Most of the ulama often went so far as to call themselves *mellat* (the people) in their correspondence (Namdar 1373 AHS, 24). Adapting the classification of Sjoberg to the Iranian society of the time, those who were courtiers or who belonged to the government, especially the higher ranks of it, were considered as the upper class. The rest of the people, excluding out-castes, were the lower class. Katouzian explains the relationship between these contrasting groups in the modern history of Iran in the following way:

'Down to the present day, the clearest line of social demarcation (even stratification) has been that which divides the state (*dowlat*) from the people (*mellat*). The Perso-Arabic term *mellat* does not mean 'the nation', as is invariably believed: it means *the people* as opposed to *dowlat*, *the state*. The people themselves obviously are classified into different ethnic, linguistic, professional and income groups and classes; yet the most persistent Iranian equivalent to European class conflict or antagonism has been manifested between the people as a whole and the state: a wealthy merchant without links with the state is regarded as *melli*, 'of the people', while a much less wealthy state official is categorised as *dowlati*, 'of the state' (Katouzian 1981, 16. Original italics.).

What gives a state legitimacy to rule over a nation? There are different answers to this question from different points of view. According to structural-functionalists the 'majority consensus' in a liberal and pluralist society offers this legitimacy. This consensus, for instance, can be caused by shared values (Johnson 1966, 32). or utilitarian consensus (Gurr 1970, ch.8). Marxist theories talk about coercive organisations being the 'backbone of the state'. For example, Lenin considers the police and army as the main instruments of the state power (Lenin 1975, 316). This stream of thought does not consider any autonomy for the state and always interprets it as a representative of the dominant class.

In structuralist form of thinking the notion of state has become very important. For Althusser, as well as Poulantzas, 'the state comes to be seen as the centre of the social formation and the continued existence of capitalist relations of production' (Craib 1992, 169). According to this stream of thought, the state has 'relative autonomy' (Skocpol 1979, 27) and fulfils its role in two ways: most of the time by "ideological state apparatuses" which ensure that people do what the underlying structure

demands', and some time by force: 'the army, the police, the "repressive state apparatuses"' (Craib 1992, 169). Some Neo-Marxist thinkers reject the causality of a single class to centralise power in the hands of the state. For instance, Therbon believes that the state is 'a materialized concentration of the class relations of a given society' (Therbon 1978, 34).

The above interpretations of state formulate the notion of state as appropriate to European or Western societies. In the case of Iran, which is our concern, the European feudalist or capitalist form of class struggle is not observable. The form of pluralist liberal type of legitimacy was not practised, at least, during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties either. Qajar rule on Iran was a tribal coercive one, and Pahlavi's rule was despotic too. Algar's interpretation of the position of the state after the Safavid era, which Shiism became the formal religion of the country, illustrates the situation at the time of our concern.

'It has been seen that Shi'i Islam denied legitimacy to secular power, and the occultation of the Imam removed all real authority from the sphere of this world. With the establishment of the Safavid state in 1501, the denial of legitimacy became partially obscured by the claim of the monarch to descent from the Imams and by the introduction of Sufi motives into the concept of rulership. At the same time, a body of Shi'i ulama emerged who, although equally deprived of ultimate authority, gradually acquired, through the exercise of a practical function, a de facto authority within the community. This development in their position was furthered by the fall of the Safavids and their replacement, after an interregnum, by the Qajars in the last quarter of the eighteenth century within the community.

'By the end of the interregnum, relations between the state and the ulama had been changed by two new factors. First, there took place an evolution in Shi'i fiqh which asserted the role of the mujtahid in directing the community and even in ruling it. One of the ulama, Shaykh Ahmad Ardabili, indeed reminded his monarch, Shah 'Abbas, that he was ruling over a "borrowed kingdom" (*mulk-i 'ariya*), but the ulama in the Safavid period did not openly contest the legitimacy of the state. Second, the establishment of Qajar rule presented the ulama with the spectacle of a state that made many of the same assumptions concerning the nature of royal power as had the Safavids but was itself deprived of the semilegitimacy provided by alleged descent from the Imams. The Qajars called themselves "Shadow of God" but the claim to divine appointment was only formal. Thus it might have been thought that some attempt would be made to justify, in religious terms, the claims of the state to the allegiance of its subjects.

'In the new situation, however, a political theory to accommodate the state within the system of beliefs was still not developed. Such a theory was probably impossible: the ulama, having established their position as de facto regents of the Imams, could not then have allotted the monarchy a similar position. Without such a position the monarchy was bound to be regarded as illegitimate. The contradiction was seldom stated explicitly but was nonetheless the ultimate cause of most of the friction between the secular and religious powers throughout the nineteenth century' (Algar 1969, 21-22. Original italic.).

The nature of the authority of the state in Iran was basically coercive but not in the same manner as Lenin expounded. The state's power did not reach over all aspects of the life of the people but only extended to security matters, either internal (theft, robbery, homicide, riots) or external (on the occasion of wars and military interventions). There was not a widespread bureaucratic organisation related to the state. Thus, it seems that the secular state was tolerated in Qajar Iran for fulfilment of security through its military and police force. As will be explained, the rest of the peoples' life activities were mostly conducted by the ulama according to the religious rules. The command of the state was not tolerated on occasions in which it attempted to extend authority beyond a security jurisdiction, of which the Tobacco Movement is one of them.

Algar explains the dichotomy between the people and the state in the historical context of the Tobacco Movement:

'The agitation was not merely a protest against a specific measure taken by the government, for although centred on the question of the tobacco monopoly, it was essentially a confrontation between the people and the state, in which the leadership exercised by the ulama showed a new determination and sense of direction. If before the agitation, the struggle of the ulama with the state had been one of the recurring themes of Qajar history, it was thereafter the dominant one until the granting of the constitution. After three-quarters of a century the issue was intensified to a point where the triumph of one side or the other seemed inevitable. The ulama's determination was paralleled by the ruthlessness of the state. The agitation took place, moreover, in a context of increasing foreign involvement in Iran, and this above all inspired it with a sense of urgency, of concern for the very survival of Iran. Thus the traditional dual role of the ulama -opposition to the state and resistance to foreign

encroachment- found its greatest expression. This duality was passed on by ulama to the constitutional movement' (Algar 1969, 205-206).

The tobacco sector was one of the main economic activities of the country. About one fifth of the Iranian population were engaged in this industry (Madani 1361 AHS, 24). The monopoly of the tobacco business was given to the company by the contract. Regardless of the covenant (Lambton 1987, 224), the Iranian producers and merchants were requested to sell their product or goods at the company's prices not the market's (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15). This meant that they had no more control over their business.

The political leaders ordered the governors to help the agents of the company as much as possible, and the company's authority was increasing gradually (Keddie 1966, 50). Company officials treated Iranian subjects harshly and paid little attention to the commands of the governors (Mulkara 1325 AHS, 114). Moreover, it was determined later that they imported considerable armaments. This situation made people suspicious about the intentions of the company (Madani 1361 AHS, 24). As Algar says, 'Lord Salisbury, early in 1891, warned Lascelles, British ambassador in Tehran to "guard against the suspicion that we are not labouring for the development, but only for the exploitation of Persia"' (quoting from R. L. Greaves's *British Policy in Persia, 1892-1903*). He concluded that: 'He [Lascelles] appears to have had little success in so doing' (Algar 1969, 208). The experience of the East Indian company in India and the colonialization of that country worried Iranians about the future role of the company.

The Regie's contract was also disappointing economically for Iranians, in comparison with the similar agreement with the Ottoman government with more revenue. The Ottoman government, the western neighbour of Iran, had a similar contract with England but with £360,000 income per year in addition to one fourth of the company's annual profits (Madani 1363 AHS, 24). It was claimed that the Ottoman Empire's tobacco production was less, in quantity and quality, than Iran's (Lambton 1987, 231-232) (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15).

The above mentioned historical explanations help to reveal how the opposition formed in the social context of the Tobacco Movement. The political structure was an

authoritarian one. The Shah had despotic power with no rules to limit him. He and his government gained a percentage of the profit from the contract. This meant that the state (dowlat) or the upper class, was in agreement with the arrangement. Among the opposition, some of the ulama, as the most educated and authoritative stratum of the people (mellat), were encouraged, mostly by the merchants, to act against the deal. The ulama's reputation among the political power elite and their respect among the people enabled them to influence the situation. They had already begun to act against different contracts signed with foreigners by Naser-ed-Din Shah by advising the government and warning people about the danger of dependency (Najafi 1373 AHS, 85-108). But when the tobacco concession was drawn up their reaction was more severe and the result was more extreme. In this case the authority of the ulama or the religious system stood against the authority of the Shah or political structure. Let us now examine the details.

The Political Structure:

The political system of Iranian society was headed by a king or 'shah'. He had a prime minister and several other ministers. *Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Asadabadi*, a distinguished clergyman and political reformist of the time, in a letter to Queen Victoria of England, described the Iranian internal political situation. The letter was published in the newspapers shortly after the annulment of the tobacco concession (Moheet 1350 AHS, 216-241). (See Appendix I.)

According to him, the political structure was corrupt. The Shah had scattered the lords and nobles and dispersed their people and peasants. The prime minister, traditionally, used to act as a moderator between the king and his peasants. He was supposed to take care of the profits of the people and the shah similarly, but the current prime minister was not acting in this manner. There was no constitution but the tyranny of the shah and his prime ministers. Seyed Jamal predicted a new riot in Iran for justice and constitution in his letter. He pursued the support of European governments to put an end to the dominion despotism of the shah (Moheet 1350 AHS, 216-222).

Seyed Jamal explained some parts of the structure of the Iranian government of the late nineteenth century in another part of his letter. He admitted that the governors had to pay the shah, the prime minister and the ministers in order to attain positions. There was a governor ruling each province with about 300 agents, none of whom received salary with the exception of the soldiers. On the contrary, they were obliged to pay the upper ranks in cash or goods. Meanwhile, they received what ever they could from those who were under their rule. At the bottom of the hierarchy the people with money paid in exchange for protection, and the poor were coerced into paying. Positions were not attained by qualification but by the amount that was paid to the upper ranks, most of the time in advance in order to sustain the post. Those who paid more could gain better jobs. There were no certain regulations and no formal rules in attainment of the positions (Moheet 1350 AHS, 222-241).

The Shah and his Prime Minister, who had received their percent, and the heads of the political system described above were in agreement with the tobacco contract. As the country had no constitutional law, the payments of the Regie Company were considered to be the property of the king, and the heads of the government may also have gained some advantage from them too. It should be mentioned here that nor all of the merchants opposed the contract. Some who gained benefits from the company, by acting as their agents for example, were in agreement with the covenant (Mahdavi 1373 AHS, 109-120). Therefore, the political elite backed by some of the merchants of Iran supported the contract. This constitutes one side of the rivalry in the social context of the Tobacco Movement. The rest of the country can be located on the other side of the dispute because they lost out in one way or another. A 'solidarity factor' and an 'organisation' was needed to crystallise the resentment. This was provided by religious belief and the religious structure.

The Religious Structure:

The religious system, as a part of the social context, became the vehicle for the opposition to combat the tobacco contract. It was actually a social facility used by the leader and the distributors of the movement in order to *unify and mobilise* the people for the protest. The religious system was also the institutional base of the ideology.

The religious structure was dominated by the ulama. Positions in the structure were held according to the criterion of the religious knowledge (Algar 1969, 9). The mosques, educational and judicial system were managed by the clergy. They led religious ceremonies and managed people's personal and social affairs through religious rules and regulations (Algar 1969, 11-13). The most powerful allies of the ulama were merchants of the market (*Bazaar*) (Algar 1969, 209).

Each province had a leading *mojtahed* (the upper rank in religious studies) who had the supervision over the religious organisations and affairs of the population of that province. Mosques and schools were mostly under his surveillance, each of which was led by a clergyman. Donations and religious taxes were usually paid to him and any expenditure was authorised by him.

Shar'a courts were the other part of the religious organisation of that time. There was another type of court under the political administration (*urf* courts), which were responsible for those claims that were related to the state or public security. Social and economic affairs litigations or claims were held by the Shar'a courts. Algar describes the similarities and differences of these two fora of justice in the following manner:

'Although there was no precise demarcation of the respective jurisdictions of 'urf and shar', it is possible to ascertain a certain division: the former dealt primarily with offences directed against the state or public security, such as rebellion, embezzlement, forgery of coins, spreading false rumour, theft, banditry, and drunkenness; the shar' courts were concerned more with disputes and litigations of a personal or commercial nature. Theft and drunkenness might, however, come within the jurisdiction of a shar' court' (Algar 1969, 12-13).

There were many *Maktab Khane* (houses of learning) led by clergymen and under the authority of the religious structure which should be mentioned as another part of the religious system. These houses were for educating the nobles and, sometimes, ordinary people. They usually taught Quran, Persian literature, and some of the religious books that were useful for everyday life, such as the Islamic economic rules for merchants.

Hosseinie was another religious place for lamenting in *Moharram* (the name of a month in the Lunar calendar) for *Imam Hossein*, the third Imam of Shiites, and his companions. Mourning for Imam Hossein is the greatest ceremony which occurs in the Shiite communities on the occasion of the anniversary of his and his companions' martyrdom in the month of Moharram of the year 61 AHL (680 AD).¹⁵ Each *Hosseinie* was under the administration of a clergyman and had a grieving group. The grieving groups were another part of the religious organisation composed of the common people. They were funded by the market and/or religious donations and were managed by those who founded them. Each of the groups was established in a district of the cities, and there was a kind of competition between them. Each one intended to show its great sorrow in the most glorious manner.

Religious organisation was funded mostly by endowments (*Owqaf*), and some by taxes in cash or goods (*Khoms* and *Zakat*). Every Moslem has to pay *Khoms*¹⁶ and *Zakat*¹⁷ as annual taxes. Holy Shrines, mosques and schools had some properties which were contributed by religious people as endowments. The amounts of these places' foundations depended on their importance in the eyes of faithfuls who donated to them. The income of the clergymen who managed or were enrolled in those places was received from the profit or income of the endowments. These properties were managed by the ulama. In accord with the request of the presenters, there were some endowments donated to and managed by the state, as well. Usage of *Khoms*¹⁸, *Zakat*¹⁹ and *Vaqf* (endowment) provided a kind of welfare system supervised by mojtaheds. This tax and donation system was designed in such a way as to gain from the wealthy, and give to those who are in need. Besides their religious beliefs, this could be one of

the reasons for ulama's popularity. Furthermore, this type of funding made religious organisation independent of and self sustained in relation to the state.

The religious organisation was a most elaborate one. Even political organisations were not so widespread over the country. Moreover, the people were dependent upon this organisation much more than in any other. The influence of this system ranged from the top of the hierarchy of the political structure of the country to the heart of individual Shiites in their prayers and mornings. Even the shah, who was not a mojtahed, was obliged to be *moqalled* (a follower in religious duties) of a certain mojtahed according to the Shiite principles (Algar 1969, 23). On the other hand, there were some associations in certain particular respects between the ulama and the state which Algar describes as follows:

'To the state belonged the traditional duty of appointing *shaykh ul-Islam's* to supervise the shar' courts in each town, and *imam jum'as* to lead congregational prayer and pronounce the Friday sermon. In making these appointments, the monarch did not act against popular wishes, and the imam jum'as, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, generally behaved impartially and independently. Acceptance of such posts did not bring forfeiture of popular respect or absorption into the administrative apparatus of the state' (Algar 1969, 23-24. Original italics.).

But, overall, the ulama were keen not to have association with the state. Algar explains the situation: '...[A]ssociation with the state was largely shunned by the ulama. Since the state per se represented tyranny, any close relationship with it came to be regarded as disqualification for the position of marja'-i taqlid [the top rank among mojtaheds]' (Algar 1969, 23).

Religious organisation thus shaped the adversarial positions in the Tobacco Movement, but it was not able to articulate the opposition alone. An appropriate ideology was needed to do the job. Therefore, the Shiite ideology with the following specifications became another prime factor of the movement.

Ideology:

According to our synthetic theory ideology is the main source of social solidarity of movements, as well as, a key determinant of their direction. Shiism as the dominant ideology of the country at the time of the Tobacco Movement became the ideology of the movement. Adapting Wilson's vocabulary, it represented a 'total belief', it articulated the 'consistency' and mobilised the 'collectivity' toward what 'must be done' (Wilson 1973, 93-95).

It was mentioned before that since the time of the Safavid dynasty Shiism has been the official religion of Iran. The vast majority of the population were Shiite Moslems. The religious ideology was the dominant one in the society and its adherents were concerned about the tobacco monopoly concession. In the ulama's and the fateful Shiite's views, the contract amounted to selling one of the major industries of a Shiite country to foreigners and exerting undue control over the livelihoods of many Shiite Moslems by non-Moslems. Due to the importance of the notion of 'leadership' in the Shiite ideology, accepting the situation was against their beliefs.

As Algar notes, 'The dominant theme of Shi'i Islam is clearly and indisputably the *Imamate*, an institution of a succession of charismatic figures who dispense true guidance in comprehending the esoteric sense of prophetic revelation' (Algar 1969, 2. Original italic.). According to Motahari, 'Prophethood is a sort of guidance and Imam is a sort of leadership' (Motahari 1991, 446). He declares that, for Shiites, after Mohammed, the Prophet, Divine guidance came to an end but Divine leadership did not. He also emphasizes that, leadership of *ummah* (the Moslem population) is an endless matter (Motahari 1991, 445, 446). 'According to the Shi'ah belief, as Prophethood is conferred by Allah, Imam is also granted by Him' he continues (Motahari 1991, 445). In describing the qualifications of *Imams* [Divine leaders] Motahari says, '*Imams* are the Quranic technicians. Their knowledge does not belong to the world of senses. It is Divinely inspired or at least especially acquired knowledge' (Motahari 1991, 452. Original italic.).

There are different branches of Shiism in respect of the number of Imams accepted and interpretation of the concept of Imamatus. The first Imam is Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and there are eleven others, according to the dominant Shiite idea in Iran. As Pinault says, among the Shiites 'it is believed that as a child, in the year 874, the twelfth Imam was taken into occultation by God ... this 'Hidden Imam' has not been seen in the world since 941, when he entered the 'Great Occultation' ... True worldly authority, then, rests with the Hidden Imam, but in his absence leadership of the Shiite community has devolved upon the Ulama' (Pinault 1992, 6). This is the ideological base of the ulama's authority in Iran. Algar explains the role of the ulama in the Qajar period in the following way:

'A comparison may be drawn between the relationship of the ulama to the Hidden Imam and that of the Imams to God. The ulama were, in a limited sense, intermediaries between the community and the Imams, with some of the authority of the latter reflected upon them: they were 'proofs' (*hujaj*) of the Imams. Similarly, the Imams were intermediaries between the source of divine guidance and the community. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this comparison that the ulama possessed any authority similar to that of the Imams, or that they could legitimately lay claim to infallibility. The resemblance of the ulama to the Imams lies rather in their supplying a living source of reference and leadership for the Shi'i community. The lavish devotion accorded to some of the great mujtahids should be attributed to this resemblance rather than any overestimation of their function and authority. The mujtahids came to personify the leadership of the community, and this was one of the chief sources of their political and social influence in Qajar Iran' (Algar 1969, 5-6. Original italic.).

According to Pinault, 'Ulama are scholars trained in Islamic law, which has as its foundations Quranic scripture and the voluminous biographical traditions concerning the attested actions and sayings of the Prophet and the Imams' (Pinault 1992 6-7). A mojtahed is a scholar who is usually recognised by more than three tutors as sufficiently learned how to extract the practical Islamic rules from the texts. The knowledge of extraction of rules (*ahkam*) from the texts is called *feqh*, and one who is expert in this knowledge is *faqih* (see Motahari 1359 AHS). Those who are not expert in the extraction of rules from the texts must choose an expert (*faqih* or *mojtahed*) and follow his instructions (Golpayegani 1)²⁰. The Shiites are free to choose their marja' but they must choose the most learned, living expert. So, those who are considered

more learned are more popular, and a few experts have the chance of being the marja' of the Shiites in each era.

Thus the ulama were actually the leaders of the Shiite communities. This was the main source of the contradiction between the monarchy and the ulama's authority which was not always manifested but was the source of confrontations between the king's command and the religious one throughout the nineteenth and, also, the twentieth century of Iran. As Algar notes 'the ulama, having established their position as de facto regents of the Imams, could not then have allotted the monarchy a similar position. Without such a position the monarchy was bound to be regarded as illegitimate' (Algar 1969, 22). The shah's supremacy was tolerated because of its military capabilities and an ancient national tradition.²¹

The ulama in their response to an illegitimate ruler follow the examples of their Imams, especially Imam Hossein. Allamah Tabatabai explains Imam Hossein's act against Yazid, the second caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, in his book: *Shiite Islam* (Tabatabaei 1971, 196-199). (See Appendix II). According to him, Imam Hossein, who was the second child of Ali and Fatimah, after the martyrdom of his brother, Imam Hasan, became Imam through Divine Command and his brother's will for a period of ten years. At the time of his Imamate in the middle of the year 60 AHL Moawiye, the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, died and his son Yazid took his place. According to an old Arabic tradition, everybody, especially the well-known persons, should pay allegiance (*beyah*) by shaking hands with him. It was the sign of agreement, obedience, and support to the new ruler. Moawiye had asked the distinguished among the people to give their allegiance to Yazid before his death, but had not imposed this request upon Imam Husayn. 'He had especially told Yazid in his last will that if Husayn refused to pay allegiance he should pass over it in silence and overlook the matter, for he had understood correctly the disastrous consequences which would follow if the issue were to be pressed' (Tabatabaei 1971, 196). But Yazid ignored his father's advice and after his father's death ordered the governor of Medina either to force a pledge of allegiance from Imam Hossein or send his head to Damascus.

Imam Hossein migrated to Mecca and sought refuge in the sanctuary of God which in Islam is the official place of refuge and security. Meanwhile, the people of Iraq, particularly the city of Kufa, invited the Imam in a flood of letters to go to Iraq and accept the leadership of the populace against Yazid. Imam Hossein headed for Iraq. About seventy kilometres from Kufa, in a desert named Karbala, the Imam and his convoy were surrounded by the army of Yazid. They were asked to choose between “allegiance or war”.

‘On the tenth day of Muharram of the year 61[A.H.]/680 [AD] the Imam lined up before the enemy with his small band of followers. Less than ninety persons consisting of forty of his companions, thirty some members of the army of enemy that joined him during the night and day of war, and his Hashimite family of children, brothers, nephews, nieces, and cousins. That day they fought from morning until their final breath, and the Imam, the young Hashimites and the companions were all martyred. Among those killed were two children of Imam Hasan, who were only thirteen and eleven years old; and a five-year-old child and a suckling baby of Imam Husayn’ (Tabatabai 1971, 199).

Following the example of Imam Hossein, *seeking sanctuary* in a holy place and *migration* from a place with unjust social circumstance to another in order to be able to follow justice were two political actions which were practised in Iran at the time of the Tobacco Movement. These two rituals were also rehearsed widely in the Constitutional Revolution which will be explained in the next chapter. Imam Hossein’s *martyrdom*, also, raised the influence of this strategy in the Shiite communities. In the view of the faithful Shiites, they, and especially the ulama, have the duty to resist at the time of direct confrontation between Islam and unjust rulers, even if it costs their lives. Martyrdom is considered to be a great reward for them, as it was for Imam Hossein and his companions. In order to keep Imam Hossein’s memory alive there are still many grieving ceremonies in Iran, especially in the first thirteen days of Moharram, at holy shrines, Hosseinies, mosques, houses, and even in streets like demonstrations

In the history of Shiism, sometimes a mojtahed or fagih took the position of the Marja’ of the majority of the Shiites of the world. In such a case his fatvas were followed by the preponderance of Shiites, and he was, literally, their leader. At the time of the

Tobacco Movement, *Mirza Hasan Shirazi* had such a position in the Shiite Moslem world. He had supremacy over all the other ulama of his time and, as Seyed Jamal noted when writing to him (Appendix III), was responsible for protecting Shiite faith and the country where its adherents live. He was considered to be the deputy of the Hidden Imam, according to the Shiite ideology. Thus, his fatvas were followed by the large majority of Shiite Moslems. The ideology of the Tobacco Movement was essentially his forbidden fatva.

So far, we have elucidated the social context at the time of the Tobacco Movement in terms of the two struggling powers, the political and the religious structures. Also, we have clarified the social solidarity factor - ideology - which determined the direction of the movement. These two prominent factors alone were not sufficient to make the movement. The behaviour of the actors, their special positions, and their relationship to the targets of the movement also need to be considered, and are discussed in the following section.

Actors and Behaviours:

According to our synthetic view, three groups of actors are involved in social movements: leader(s), distributors and followers. They have to recognise and develop the movements idea, distribute the ideology and mobilise the movement. Their positions would be developed in the particular social conditions of the time, such as the position of Mirza Hasan Shirazi which was described above. The Tobacco Movement agitation started in a preliminary way from the people, and, through the distributors, the leader was convinced to act against the contract and combat the monopoly. The social movement formed by his fatva, which was distributed by the provincial clergymen, was then followed by the people.

The people, mainly tobacco merchants, expressed disagreement with the contract between the government and the British company through the means of writing to the

Shah and complaining to the ulama. The Shah rejected all forms of protest, and threatened the people with punishment should they do anything against the concession. On the contrary, through administration of the local religious leaders, objections were increasingly raised against the tobacco agreement, especially in large cities like Tehran, Tabriz, Shiraz, Isfahan, and Mashhad. The Shah, meanwhile, continued to intimidate the protesters.

Publication of the newspapers was not widespread at the time of the Tobacco Movement, therefore, proclamations were one of the most significant types of media for the movement. Kasravi quotes a proclamation from Kermani's book: *Tarikh-e Bidari-e Iranian*, with the name of 'The National Article'. He believes that the writer of the article was one of the ulama. In this proclamation, which was fixed to the walls of the streets on those days, the writer began with the rational argument that anybody should protect his or her property. It is obvious that one must not let his or her friend enter his or her house if that friend intends to conquer the house, the article adds. It is much more obvious that one would have to protect his or her home strongly if not a friend but his or her enemy threatens to capture the house and kill him or her, the writer continued. There is evidence in the proclamation from India and Egypt that England has conquered them with an economic contract without any battle. The article recounts some other evidence and comes to the conclusion that the king should revoke the tobacco contract (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 17-18).

According to Algar, 'Feuvrier [the French physician of the Shah] noted the first disturbances in the capital on May 22, 1891, and shortly afterward agitation extended to the large provincial cities' (Algar 1969, 206-207). In Tehran a letter of objection was written to the king through *Amin-od-Doleh*, the governor of the province (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15). Merchants of Isfahan wrote a letter to the prime minister, Amin-os-Soltan through the Jomoa' (Friday) prayer leader for cancellation of the contract (Madani 1361 AHS, 25). In Shiraz, shops were closed and people gathered in the *Vakil* Mosque, one of the most important ones of the city. *Seyed Ali Akbar Faleasiri*, the leading clergyman of the province, addressed them and menaced the company's agents with a sword not to enter the city. He was banished to Basra by the governor of the

province in a humiliating way with the order of Amin-os-Soltan because of this threat (Mulkara 1325 AHS, 114). Some of Faleasiri's followers were killed by the governor's troops in a demonstration which took place in opposition to his exile in the Shrine of *Shah-e Cheraq* (Haeri 1373 AHS, 75). In the Azarbayjan province people did not let the company's agents enter the city of Tabriz and removed their announcements from the walls, replacing them with their own proclamations urging people to act against the company (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 16). *Agha Najafi*, the leading clergyman of Isfahan, went on to forbid trade and use of tobacco (Madani 1361 AHS, 25-26).

As the provincial and scattered protests failed to alter the government's decision, the religious leaders asked Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the leading Marja' of Shiites, to do something. The potential distributors contacted him and encouraged him to lead the movement. For instance, Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Asadabadi wrote him a letter. Seyed Ali Akbar Faleasiri, who was exiled in Iraq, contacted him and explained the situation (Mulkara 1325 AHS, 115). Agha Monir-ed-Din, a representative of Isfahan's ulama, came to Samara to ask Mirza Hasan Shirazi what to do on this occasion (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 79).

The letter of Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Asadabadi is one of the notable documents of Iranian history in the late 19th century. It is a brief explanation of the macro political problems of Iran at that time. Seyed Jamal listed various concessions given to England and Russia, and the king's un-Islamic behaviours and attitudes. According to him, Mirza-ye- Shirazi, as the leading Marja' of his time, was the only person who could solve the problem. No one except Mirza had sufficient authority to challenge the king. It was his duty, according to Seyed Jamal, to rise against Naser-ed-Din Shah and his corrupt political machinery. Mirza Hasan Shirazi's position in the political context and religious organisation of his time may be inferred from this letter. The position of deputation to the Hidden Imam had been given to him over the other ulama, according to Seyed Jamal-ed-Din. So, he was the leader of the people and was obliged to take care of their rights without fear even of martyrdom (Moheet 1350 AHS, 197-207). (See Appendix III)

On 26 of January 1891, Mirza-ye-Shirazi wrote a letter to Naser-ed-Din Shah, protesting against mistreatment of the ulama, and expressing his disagreement with the monopoly of the tobacco concession (Haeri 1373 AHS, 80-81). It could be considered as his first act as the leader of the movement after recognising the situation and determining to protest against the contract. The King did not answer, but *Kamran Mirza Nayeb-os-Sltane* (one of the Shah's sons who was his deputy) and *Mirza Zeinol-Abedin*, the Jomoa' prayer leader of the capital, replied to him by defending the contract. The person in charge of the supplies of the Embassy of Iran in Baghdad went to him to explain benefits of the contract as well, but Mirza-ye-Shirazi was not satisfied (Haeri 1373, AHS, 81-84). In September 1891, he wrote another letter to the Shah explaining the negative elements of the contract (Haeri 1373 AHS, 88). There was a short and inadequate answer to Mirza-ye-Shirazi from the Shah and his deputy (Haeri 1373 AHS, 90). As Mirza was still not convinced, he wrote a letter to *Mirza Hasan Ashtiani* and asked him to protest against the contract on his behalf (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 97). Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, the most distinguished religious leader of the capital, Tehran, was one of his students (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 92).

Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, as a distributor, acted with the collaboration of the other leading mojtaheds of the provinces, as the other distributing agents of the movement, and organised the people in favour of the targets of the revolt. Algar explains this situation as follows: 'The ultimate source of opposition to the monopoly was thus in Samera, but the determination of the ulama and people of Iran, particularly in the capital, was equally important in the agitation' (Algar 1969, 213). The above mentioned actors, with the benefit of the other contributing factors previously explained, thus created 'the movement'. We reach the final part of our model

The Movement:

In early December of 1891, a disclosure was released in Tehran which forbade any form of use of tobacco (Kermani 1371 AHS, 12). According to the fatva, the use of

tobacco in any form was equivalent to war against the Hidden Imam, that is *haram* (forbidden) (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 92). There has been much debate about the source of the declaration, but the dominant belief was that it came from Mirza-ye-Shirazi (Algar 1969). With this ban the whole system of tobacco trade stopped. Not a single historian has reported the usage of the tobacco in any form. All tobacco shops were closed. Clergymen decided not to attend their classes in order to show their opposition to the contract (Algar 1969, 209). The threats of the government were not effective, and the strike commenced. According to Edward Brown, one of the merchants even set twelve thousand bags of tobacco on fire in order not to become obliged to sell them to the company (Mahdavi 1373 AHS, 119).

The company complained to the Shah who tried to break the boycott. The Prime Minister said that the fatva was not Mirza-ye-Shirazi's own assertion but a writing of the manager of the tradesmen's guild. Rumours regarding this declaration circulated in Tehran and other cities; but people did not pay any attention to them (Algar 1969, 212). The Shah and the company tried to come to a compromise. They limited the activities of the company to exporting the tobacco and left the internal system to the Iranian merchants (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15). But this policy did not appease the protesters.

Kamran Mirza invited Mirza Hasan Ashtiani into his palace and asked him to break the ban. He replied that he could not (Haeri 1373, 120-121). The state arranged a meeting between seven distinguished ulama of Tehran as the representatives of the Mellat and seven from the state side: the Shah's deputy, the prime minister and five other ministers. The result was a letter written to Mirza-ye-Shirazi. They asked for his advice about breaking the prohibition in the new situation whereby the monopoly was limited to the export of the Iranian Tobacco (Haeri 1373, 121-131). Mirza-ye-Shirazi's reply expressed his hope for the abolition of the whole of the contract with the foreigners (Haeri 1373, 138).

Naser-ed-Din Shah wrote a furious letter to Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, ordering him to rescind the ban by smoking Hubbell-bubble among the audience or to leave the city

(Teymoori 1363 AHS, 135). On 4 of January 1892, Mirza Hasan Ashtiani made preparations to leave the city. His followers gathered near his home, however, and prevented him from leaving (Kermani 1371 AHS, 159). The market was closed and about 4000 demonstrators, wearing shrouds to show they are ready for *jihad* (the Holy War), massed around the King's citadel (Kermani 1371 AHS, 161). Their slogans were against the heads of the state and mostly shouted by the women in the crowd (Haeri 1373 AHS, 155-156). Even Imam Jomoa of Tehran was not safe from the screams of the women, as he was defending the contract in the *Shah Mosque* at the same time (Haeri 1373 AHS, 156). Kamran Mirza asked the people to leave (Kermani 1371 AHS, 161). However, they were hostile towards him, and he went back to the fortress (Molkara 1325 AHS, 117). The pressure of the peoples protest increased, until the order to fire was given. Some protesters were killed, and the demonstrators withdrew on the advice of the ulama, who arranged a gathering two days later in the Shah Mosque (Haeri 1373 AHS, 163). Naser-ed-Din Shah became convinced that he could not support the monopoly any more. He sent *Anud-ol-Molk* with the present of a ring to Mirza Hassan Ashtiani and promised to annul the contract (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 170). The Shah cancelled the contract, but the ban continued until 26 January 1892, when Mirza-ye-Shirazi asked people to return to their ordinary jobs, by a telegram from Samara (Kermani 1371 AHS, 45).

Other Perspectives:

In this part we are going to look at the Tobacco Movement from a variety of other perspectives. The possible alternative interpretations of the Tobacco Movement using some major theories will be examined, in order to make a comparison between these influential theories with our synthetic view. With this comparison we will assess the usefulness of the synthetic view as a more comprehensive and adequate interpretation of the Tobacco Movement.

Individualism:

From Toch's individualistic standpoint, we might say that in the Tobacco Movement the people were susceptible against the tobacco concession granted to the Regie company. The problems which made them suspicious of the contract were the fortress type building of the company's office in Tehran, the monopoly of the whole industry and the great authority they had gained from state support. On the basis of this authority, they acted harshly towards the Iranian subjects; and due to the monopoly, they rendered some merchants and peasants powerless over their trade and products. The writings of the ulama, in the form of proclamations and articles, about the cultural harm of this and the other contracts with the foreigners to the Iranian nation were a further source of the peoples susceptibility to the opposition of the tobacco contract (Haeri 1373 AHS, 53-56) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 35-36).

This situation entailed a dominant Islamic culture with about one fifth of the population participating in the tobacco enterprise. They had lost their income and the management on their business by the contract. Their cultural values were threatened. The experience of the colonisation of Egypt and India involving the use of similar economic contracts worried the people. Appealing for the cancellation of the contract, the Shiite Ideology assisted them in finding a peaceful means of protest. The fatva, banning the use of tobacco in any way, caused the system of monopoly to come to a stand still, and the Shah was obliged to annul the concession.

In this interpretation of the Tobacco Movement, one is able to follow the events from a social psychological point of view. It is not an analytical explanation of the movement but a chronological description of the occurrences without enough attention being given to the main factors of the outburst. For instance, by not paying enough attention to the social context, it does not illustrate the social and historical position of the events and factors. There are some important questions about this movement that cannot be answered using this type of explanation of the movement. For instance, what was exactly the source or the cause of the movement? There are *some* reasons for

people's susceptibility to the contract identified using this interpretation. However, which of them is the most prominent, or how are we able to rank them in importance? The tobacco contract was a political and economic matter. What was the reason for not having a political or economic oriented ideology for its cancellation, rather than a religious one? Why were the religious leaders at the core of this movement, not the politicians, nationalists, or merchants? Furthermore, the roles of the participants are unclear. Who organised the protests? How were these protests arranged? In addition, there is not enough analysis of the organisation of the movement. These questions about the essential factors of the Tobacco Movement cannot find their answers in Toch's individualistic interpretation. In other words, this view is able to analyse the susceptibility or susceptibilities of the participants of the revolt, and the possible source or sources of it or them. However, it is not able to present us a comprehensive understanding and explanation of the movement.

Relationism:

From this perspective the main mobilising factor(s) of the Tobacco Movement can be examined using the theories of Tilly and Melucci. These are the most relevant relationist approaches for analysing the Tobacco Movement due to the breadth of their approaches. Their theories will be examined in order to see how far they are able to successfully analyse the movement.

Shiism, as a 'belief' in Tilly's terms, was not sufficient to form the movement. There were two 'identities', from Melucci's perspective, 'nationalism' and 'Shiism', but these 'identities' alone were not able to motivate discontents around the objectives of the Tobacco Movement. The religious 'organisation', using McCarthy & Zald's perspective, might be thought to be most significant, but the organisation alone was not responsible for the creation of the movement. Blumer's and Wilson's views may also be appropriate to define the 'ideology' of the Tobacco Movement, but ideology was insufficient alone to mobilise the movement. Using the relationist approach we can

see how useful the ideas of Blumer, Wilson, Tilly and Melucci might be in explaining the Tobacco Movement.

Shiism, as the dominant belief of the country at the time of the Tobacco Movement, became the ideology of the movement. The fatva which was derived from it was a 'total belief'; it articulated the 'consistency' and mobilised the 'collectively' toward 'what must be done', according to Wilson's definition of ideology (Wilson 1973, 93-95). From Wilson's perspective, Shiism 'performs its mobilising function by connecting immediate social burdens (the tobacco monopoly by a foreign country) with general ethical principles (acting against Hidden Imam) thereby stimulating people to action' (Wilson 1973, 130).

Forbidding the use of tobacco in any form, according to the fatva, 'stated what must be done' (Wilson 1973, 130), and showed the 'direction' in Blumer's terminology. Not using tobacco had its own 'justification' as an anti-colonialistic act; it was the best 'weapon of attack' against the monopoly, and made the whole system stand still. Following Blumer's definition of ideology, the ideological legitimacy of the fatva was a proper 'weapon of defence' as a peaceful struggle against the king's decision; it gave the 'inspiration and hope' of the freedom from the dependency; and, if the movement did not succeed, there was the hope of salvation in the Day of Judgement by following the fatva (Blumer 1969, 10-11).

From Tilly's perspective 'mobilisation', 'organisation', and 'interests' are the prominent factors of social movements. Applying these concepts to the Tobacco Movement we could say that Shiism, as the 'population's belief', was the dominant one in the society. A great majority of the Iranian population were Shiites who lived according to their ideology, and their social and economic affairs were arranged by the religious rules and regulations. The religious leaders (mojtaheds) and mostly Shara' courts were their reference for finding their duties and sorting out their daily lives. The tobacco contract threatened their social and economical 'interests'. It alienated them from their jobs and was a possible means of acting for colonialisation. New rules and regulations, established by the company, were altering their traditional ones and were

eradicating the control of the ulama and even the Iranian state over their affairs. Thus, looking at the movement from Tilly's point of view denotes that the contract was against the people's common interests.

The religious 'organisation' was the most widespread and elaborated one. Using Tilly's perspective, 'mobilisation' of the 'population's interests'- an anti-colonialistic act, i.e. abolition of the tobacco contract which has the danger of colonialisation - took place by this 'organisation' and made the Tobacco Movement. By using the authority of a marja for 'mobilising' the population, the 'organisation' may have utilised the social 'facilities' and 'opportunities' against the contract.

From Tilly's perspective one could regard the anti-colonial affiliation of the population with reference to their religious belief, as the prime factor for their mobilisation by the religious organisation. It considers the social conditions to be of secondary importance in the Tobacco Movement. The religious reasons were very important but the conflict between political and religious structures was essential too. This struggle made the religious ideology appropriate for acting against the contract. The played role of the agencies is not discussed by this view either.

Relying on Tilly's insight, one cannot answer, however, why other organisations, for example the market (Bazaar), were not at the core of the struggle? Why were the religious leaders, not the other leading strata, such as merchants, so concerned about the contract? What was the difference between the religious, political, or economical interests in that movement? The tobacco merchants were one of the groups most oppressed by the contract. Why did they not lead the movement? Why did a nationalistic or economic ideology not serve as means of mobilising the population? These are some of the questions which the Tilly's relationistic type of interpretation can not answer.

Contrary to what Tilly's theory would lead us to believe, as we saw before, the religious 'facilities' and 'power', close to the religious 'beliefs' and 'interests', were not marginal components but the prominent ones in the Tobacco Movement. This view,

also, leads us to believe that the 'national-religious interest' of the population in the cancellation of the contract was less important than the 'fatva', as the prime factor of the 'mobilisation', and the 'religious organisation'. But, actually, it was the main concern of the movement and has the same effect as the other prominent factors in the movement.

Using Melucci's theory, 'following the fatva' may have served to create a 'collective identity' in the Tobacco Movement. The 'goal' of the protesters was 'cancellation of the contract'; they used 'religious organisation' as their 'means'; they were acting in the 'environment' of the 'Shiite culture', which has its own authority and did not consider the Shah's authority to be a legitimate one. When these principles came into action the 'fatva' and the 'Shiite culture' brought 'solidarity' to the participants of the movement. Making use of other important concepts from Melucci's theory: 'solidarity', 'conflict' and 'breaking the limits of compatibility of the system', this type of analysis may be continued as follows. The 'conflict' took place against the 'Shah' and 'colonialisation'; 'the abandonment of the use of tobacco in any form' 'broke the limits of compatibility of the system' of the tobacco industry, caused its collapse and forced the king to cancel the concession.

Melucci's type of interpretation is valuable if applied to the mass movement. Using his assumptions we may analyse the collective surface of the Tobacco Movement. However, it provides no explanation of the agency's depth of passion. Who was the leader of the Tobacco Movement? Who was the organiser? How did they manage the collective activity? There is no answer to these questions from this perspective. The depth of the social condition is missed as well. There is no explanation of the historical background of the movement, from either an internal or international outlook.

Social Determinism:

Social determinist views provide further potential interpretation of the Tobacco Movement. They emphasise the role of social conditions in the emergence of social movements. Davies, Smelser, Touraine and Scott are the major thinkers whose theories will be examined here. Smelser's view describes the movement from a structural-functionalistic stand point, and Touraine and Scott's approach introduce a conflict theory perspective.

According to Davies, 'relative deprivation' is the main basis of social movements, and is in turn the result of a 'developmental gap' in certain societies. Katouzian divides 19th century Iran into three periods according to features of its political economy: 1800-50, 1850-70, and 1870-1900. 'Period I corresponds, roughly, to the reign of Fath'ali Shah, and Muhammad Shah II; Period II separates the accession of Nasir al-Din Shah (in 1848) from the events of the early 1870's - the famine, the decline of Persian silk, the ill-fated Reuter Concession, and so on; and Period III covers the rest of Nasir al Din's reign, until his assassination in 1896' (Katouzian 1981, 28). He notes that the first period was one of relative stabilisation and consolidation, and in the second period the socio-economic situation was somewhat better than in the following thirty years (Katouzian 1981, 28-29). 'Indeed, it is in these last three decades that the process of socio-economic disintegration clearly reveals itself, in the growth of foreign imperial power, the sale of trade concessions, the accumulation of foreign debt, the widening balance-of-payments deficits, the rapid decline in the value of money, the growing socio-political unrest, the weakening of central control over the provinces, and so forth' (Katouzian 1981, 29). The Tobacco Movement occurred in the third phase. Katouzian does not report any socio-economic growth in these three phases. According to him, the political economy of Iran was in a gradual decline across the entire century (Katouzian 1981, 48-49). Therefore, as there was no development at all, it can be concluded that the Tobacco Movement was not the result of a 'developmental

gap', in the sense of Davies's interpretation of revolutions. We shall not consider Davies' argument further in any detail.

Applying Smelser's perspective, there was not a redefinition of norms or values in the Tobacco Movement but a protest against the danger of colonialisation which was altering the norms and the values of the society. With the tobacco contract, the monopoly of the tobacco industry was given to the Regie Company. The company was changing the structure of this sector. Consequently, its influence on the social structure was very obvious. The linear model of Smelser will be investigated further in order to evaluate this type of interpretation of the Tobacco Movement.

Structural-Functionalist Perspective:

According to Smelser, 'structural conduciveness' is at the back of each social movement. The monopoly granted to the Regie company altered the existing system of the tobacco enterprise. The merchants and producers of tobacco were supposed to sell their goods and products to the company. Their role in the socio-economic structure of the firm was changing into employees of the new company. These structural changes led to some 'structural strains': the loss of profits and dependency on a foreign enterprise. Importing armaments, setting up offices in different parts of the country, especially in Tehran in a strategic place like a fortress, harsh treatment toward the Iranian subjects by the fully supported agents of the corporation, served as the 'precipitating factors' using Smelser's concepts.

The people compared the role of the Tobacco Regie with that of the East Indian Company and concluded that this monopoly was a means of their colonialisation. Therefore, they protested against the concession, and, using Smelser's words, a 'generalised belief' in favour of acting against the tobacco contract emerged.

Smelser believes that 'when the world-view is religious, then, protests against the world invariably become defined in religious terms' (Smelser 1962, 321). Among

different organisations of the country the religious one was the most elaborate, and ulama as the leading personalities of the people were the most concerned group to the problem. The society was a devout one, thus the ulama were among the first groups to respond to the monopoly. As their separate protests were not sufficient, Mirza-ye-Shirazi, the supreme marja of the time, acted as a charismatic leader and forbade any form of the use of the tobacco. By his fatva religious institutions could 'mobilise' the population against the monopoly, and the trade system came to a standstill.

The 'control system' may be seen as acting where the state reacted against the fatva in the following way. The Prime Minister said that it was not Mirza-ye-Shirazi's fatva, but a writing of the manager of the tradesmen's guild. These type of rumours around the fatva circulated in Tehran and other cities; but people did not pay any attention to them. The King and the company arranged a compromise (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15), but this did not satisfy the protesters. The Shah ordered Mirza Hasan Ashtiani either to smoke Hubbell-bubble among the audience or leave the city. As a result he made arrangements to leave the capital (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 135). Kamran Mirza Nayeb-os-Sltane ordered the people who had surrounded the king's citadel to leave the area (Kermani 1371 AHS, 161). They reacted by attacking him, and finally the order to fire was given. As the people were not content and the ulama instructed the later demonstration in the Shah mosque, Naser-ed-Din Shah annulled the contract. Mirza-ye-Shirazi asked the people to return to their ordinary jobs, and the Tobacco Movement succeeded by resisting the 'social control' aspects.

Looking at the Tobacco Movement from this perspective, there is little or nothing about the 'historical factors', 'ideological' importance, and 'agencies' aspects, whilst the historical documents showed that these factors could be considered as prominent or at least important ones of the outburst. There were religious and nationalistic 'values' playing a part in the agitation of the people. Which ones were more important? Were the agitated people 'mobilised' because of fear of colonialism or in favour of their religious values? By this view we are not able to find out the relationship between these two sets of values and distinguish the amount of their influence. To find this we need more information about the social context of the movement. Why were none of

the merchants or the nationalist leaders leading the movement? Was it because of just the religious world-view of the country, or were there some other historical reasons?

The role of the leadership from Smelser's perspective is regarded as a sub-category of a prime element: 'mobilising factors', but in the Tobacco Movement the part of the leader was definitely more important than this suggests. Without the fatva of Mirza-ye-Shirazi there would not be such a movement, but some separated protests here and there. Comparing the historical events before and after releasing the fatva will show the extent of its influence on the events. There were some important differences between the role of Mirza-ye-Shirazi and the other religious leaders of the movement as well. The above mentioned explanation does not differentiate between them. There was the forbidden fatva of Agha Najafi from Isfahan, but it could not bring the whole nation together, as his religious authority only held sway in one province. In contrast, Algar states that, the effect of Mirza-ye-Shirazi's fatva 'was immediate and total: throughout the country the use of tobacco was abandoned' (Algar 1969, 211).

Conflict Theory Perspective :

An application of the conflict theory perspective to the Tobacco Movement highlights the role of the religious institutions backed by the market and religious people against the state. The state leadership stood to gain considerable profit, but the rest of the population were disadvantaged by the contract. In other words, there was a conflict, in terms of the concession, between the upper class or the political elites headed by the Shah, and the lower class or the common people, led by the religious authorities. This notion could be viewed as a cultural struggle from Touraine's perspective, or a social/political struggle from the perspective of Scott's theory. The Shah supported the contract and the ulama were opposed to it. Consequently, there were two structures confronting each other: the state and the religious ones. There were two sets of ideas in a struggle: the notions of dependency and independence. This conflict between the shah's and religious authority had historical and ideological roots. From a social

determinist perspective, the struggle between these two social structures or systems was the main reason for the Tobacco Movement.

Social movements as struggles should match up to four principle conditions, according to Touraine. First, there must be a 'committed population'; second, they must be 'organised'; third, they must fight against an 'adversary'; and fourth, 'it should be a social problem concerning the whole of society' (Touraine 1981, 82). In the case of the Tobacco Movement the problem of colonialism concerned almost the 'whole of society'. New economic relations, the entry of many English people in to the country, their activities, and the religious authorities' speeches and proclamations combined to make the society conscious about the problem. An 'adversary' was there - the tobacco contract or Regie Company - and the participants were fighting against it. At first, the struggle was against the company. For example, in Azarbayjan people removed the announcements of the company from the streets' walls and put up their own proclamations instead of them (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 15). At this point the religious leaders protested against the contract to the Shah. For instance, Mirza Hasan Shirazi sent two telegrams to the Shah listing the ills of the contract and asked for its cancellation (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 16). In the end the religious leaders decided to forbid the use of tobacco in order to force cancellation of the contract (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 16). The population were 'organised' against the contract by the forbidding fatva. They were informed by its distribution by hand, its display on the walls, or reading telegrams and attending speeches at the mosques. They stopped using tobacco even in the Shah's house (Haeri 1373 AHS, 110). The 'committed population' was evident as the Shiites followed the fatva of their Marja'.

Therefore, the struggle between two social classes, organised in two institutions brought about the Tobacco Movement. The four conditions, according to Touraine's view, conformed to the potential antagonism of a social movement. 'Identity' was at the cultural level - Shiism, 'opposition' was on a national scale - the contract versus the religious fava, and the 'totality' was the whole Iranian society, adopting Touraine's words. The 'project level' was at 'historicity'. Thus the Tobacco Movement was a 'social movement' using his principles (Touraine 1981,80-81).

Scott's perspective suggests that a social/political struggle will become a social movement through 'social closure' and 'interest articulation'. In the Tobacco Movement ulama may be seen as an interest group that confronted the political structure. Their interest lay in the preservation of a Shiite country under threat from colonialism. This was in the interest of the population of Iran as well. Therefore, in terms of Scott's concepts, they used the ideology of Shiism as a factor of 'social closure', and the religious organisation to 'articulate' the interests of the people. Shiite ideology states that the believers have to follow the fatvas of their marja'. The fatva was clear: it forbade the use of tobacco in any form. The religious leaders and clergymen articulated the people's interest according to their beliefs through the distribution of proclamations and announcement of the fatva in mosques and religious gatherings.

However, there were some prominent factors playing a part in this movement which are not fully investigated by the conflict theory view, for instance, the role of agency, especially leadership. Ideology, also, played a greater part in the Tobacco Movement. It was not only the 'social relations', in Touraine's sense, or the 'social closure' factor in Scott's terms, but the initiator and organiser of the movement, as well as the source of solidarity around their interests. Political ideas and economic benefits were at the back of the protests, but what initiated the people's movement was their religious belief, and their supportive obedience to their Marja'. The fatva gave direction to the peoples action and led them to their purpose. The cancellation of the tobacco contract with Regie Company was the main aim of the movement, not just a part of the 'conditions' or 'adversary', in Touraine's terms. The real antagonism was with the state.

Touraine's perspective does not adequately account for 'how' the Tobacco Movement took place, and Scott's ideas do not help us to find out the answer to 'why' this movement appeared. However, both of them do emphasise the importance of the social conditions and the background of the movement. In Touraine's type of explanation there is no information about the agencies of the movement. Who was the leader?

What was the role of the other participants in the movement? There is not enough examination of the ideology in the outburst either. It speaks about the fatva as the organiser of the population without any distinction between the role of it and that of the religious organisation.

Using Scott's theory, the ideology, fatva, and the religious organisation are the prime factors of the Tobacco Movement. These two factors acted in the context of the struggle between the political elite and lower class. However, what was the role of the agencies of the movement such as the ulama? Reducing the role of the ulama and the religious beliefs and organisation into an interest group and organisation is not supported by the historical evidence. The ulama, as the deputy of Hidden Imam, ideologically, were considered more legitimate for ruling the community than the Shah and his government. The Shah's leadership was considered by the ulama a borrowed and illegitimate kingdom. Moreover, all the participants of the movement, or all the followers of the fatva, were not completely aware of the danger of colonisation. They were fulfilling their religious duty by following their Marja'. Therefore, we can not claim that the religious organisation was 'articulating the interest' of the whole community in its liberal political sense.

Conclusion:

A comparative analysis of the above mentioned insights of the Tobacco Movement enables us to note the advantages of the synthetic theory in the explanation and analysis of this movement. There are similar concepts adopted by different perspectives but a close look shows that as the frame of analysis changes the definition of that concept alters too. Examination of the range of theories reveals different dimensions of the social movements in general, but the concepts should be interpreted in the context of their theory and have to be examined in practice. Thus, in this part we are going to confirm the role of each constituent factor of our theory, and its relationship to others

as applied to the Tobacco Movement in comparison with the other interpretations. By this comparison our theory will be enriched and its validity will be sustained.

In all other theories the roles of the key participants of the movement are given relatively little attention. Even in the individualist standpoint there is no explanation about the agencies and their effective roles except the masses. According to the synthetic view, in the Tobacco Movement Mirza-ye-Shirazi played an important part which was not possible for the other participants. There were a lot of rumours around the origin of the fatva after its distribution in the country with the hope to put an end to the abundant of the use of tobacco. These rumours show that the declaration was very important. 'Much confusion surrounds the origin of the fatva, doubtless in large part created by the government in the hope of lessening its effect' (Algar 1969, 211). The forbidden assertion by Agha Najafi from Isfahan could not bring the whole Shiite community together. Only the Mirza-ye-Shirazi's fatva, *as the head of the Shiites*, could unite the population of the country for the movement. Therefore, his role was one of the prominent factors of the movement.

Mirza Hasan Ashtiani's role in the articulation of the population was essential. As Algar says, 'In Tehran the movement against the tobacco monopoly was led by *Mirza Hasan Ashtiani*... The disorders accompanying the boycott in the capital centred on his person. The unity of the people was as much to his determination as to the obligatory nature of the fatva' (Algar 1969, 213). The role of the other distributors in the religious organisation was crucial as well. In Shiraz, Seyed Ali Akbar Faleasiri, in Isfahan, Agha Najafi, in Tabriz, *Haji Mirza Javad* and other leading mojtaheds in the other cities played an essential role in agitating and organising the people for the movement. If we omit the role of these intermediary persons from the explanation of the outburst there would be an incomplete description of the movement.

In our synthetic theory the specific behaviour of the participants are considered important as well. The consciousness of Mirza-ye-Shirazi was important for his participation in the movement. Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Asadabadi's letter was one of the motivators of Mirza-ye-Shirazi for his fatva. The banishment of Seyed Ali Akbar

Faleasiri was important in Mirza-ye Shirazi's awareness of the social condition of Iran too. Amin-os-Soltan realised his mistake in his banishment and tried to bring him back, but did not succeed (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 72). The role of the other representatives from other ulama who came to him and explained the situation was important as well. Algar explains how Ay Shirazi was convinced to act in the movement. 'It has been suggested that the urgings of Sayyid Jamal-ud-Din Asadabadi caused him [Mirza-ye-Shirazi] to abandon his caution. His contacts with the Shi'i ulama of Iran, however, were more direct and continuous and were probably of greater importance than one letter from the pen of Jamal ud-Din. In particular, Sayyid 'Ali Akbar Faleasiri, no less aggrieved than Jamal ud-Din at being banished from Iran in humiliating circumstances, appears to have encouraged Mirza Hasan to use his authority' (Algar 1969, 210). The provincial religious leaders acted as intermediary factors between the people and the head of the religious organisation. They made Mirza-ye-Shirazi aware of the situation and the people's problem; and, then, distributed his fatva to the people. Mirza-ye-Shirazi was not able to lead the movement directly from Samera, especially given the weak means of communication of the time. Therefore he asked Mirza Hasan Ashtiani to act on his behalf. Distribution of many copies of the fatva in Tehran and other big cities occurred because of the appropriate action of Mirza Hassan Ashtiani and the other provincial clergymen.

The peoples' part was very important too. As studying collective action is the main subject of social movements, all insights have a particular description about this aspect of the movement. The Individualist view illustrates the participant's psychological situation; relationists explain how they were organised; and social determinists emphasise their antagonism with the adversary. From the synthetic point of view they made the movement by their conscious attendance on the political scene of the country. The crowd around Mirza Hasan-e Ashtiani's house and the Shah's castle, along with their faithful obedience to the fatva were determinant efforts for cancellation of the contract. Absence or malfunctioning of any group of actors: leader, intermediary agents, and the people, could stop or face the movement with disappointment. Paying attention to all of them is essential for having a comprehensive explanation and analysis of the movement.

Moreover, it should be mentioned that the social context of Iran made the situation ready for the intervention of the ulama. They opposed the contract which was potentially able to put the nation in the danger of colonialism. The social deterministic view looks at this aspect as the cause of the movement. According to Smelser's type of analysis, the tobacco contract caused social structural strain, and for Touraine and Scott's kind of interpretation people acted against the contract in the framework of the class conflict: the struggle between the power elite and the commoners. The other perspectives do not pay enough attention to this aspect. For the synthetic stand the social context provides for the participants facilities and means of justification: subjectively (by presentation of the ideology and defined position of the ulama and the state) and objectively (by its religious organisation and bazaar). In some of the reviewed perspectives subjective aids of the social context are discussed under the title of ideology (Blumer and Wilson), and objective facilities are classified as organisation and facilities (Tilly) or means (Melucci). The social and political background was prepared already for the protesters to act according to it. The tension between religiously illegitimate state and the Shiite people under the influence of the ulama made the social context of the Tobacco Movement.

In this social context, Naser-ed-Din Shah granted the monopoly of the tobacco trade to Regie company, as well as other contracts to representatives from Russia and England. The company's action heightened the suspicion of the danger of colonialism within the nation and caused the ulama to act against the state. After failing to change the Shah's mind about annulling the contract the religious leaders acted independently using the religious ideology and organisation against the Shah's decision. Intermediary agents and their followers acted properly according to the guidelines of the ideology. Ideology bounded all different factors together. Actors behaved according to the religious oriented organisation and regulations. The whole system pushed the state back and caused the abolition of the contract.

The role of ideology is mentioned in different insights in different ways. In the individualistic view Shiite ideology assisted the protesters to find a peaceful way to

protest against the contract. For a relationist approach Shiism prepared the organisation of the movement and acted as the people's belief and showed them their interest (Tilly), and the fatva caused their collective identity in the environment of the Shiite culture (Melucci). In social determinism insight Shiism defined the relations (Touraine) and articulated the interests of the participants (Scott) of the movement. According to the synthetic view, the Shiite ideology was the initiator, organiser and interest articulator of the Tobacco Movement. Three groups of actors involved in the movement participated according to their beliefs and in accord with the religious organisation.

The synthetic view by looking at the macro and micro factors of the Tobacco Movement introduces us to the most adequate and precise explication. The action of the participating agencies was investigated and the influence of the social context was reviewed. These two parts reveal the initiators of the movement from two different dimensions: the individual and the society point of view, and enable us to answer the 'why' question of the movement. Ideology prepared the subjective - beliefs - and the objective dimensions - organisation - of the mobilisation. The explanation of this section mostly shows 'how' the Tobacco Movement happened. Ideology determined the target of the movement. Looking at the historical evidence the fulfilment of the aim of the discontents give us the idea of the success of the movement. On the contrary, if the target was not fulfilled the synthetic model could lead us to the reasons by investigation of the enactment of the constituent factors. Exploration of the other Iranian-Islamic social movements will sustain these results in some other episodes of Iranian history. The next case is the Constitutional Revolution which will be reviewed in the chapter five.

Chapter Six

The Constitutional Revolution

Introduction:

There are various possible interpretations of the events making up this revolution. The task of the present chapter is to provide a valid explanation and analysis of the revolution. In the first section the events of the Constitutional Revolution will be interpreted using our theoretical model. In the second part other potential interpretations will be considered. The secondary historical documents used in this chapter are mostly taken from Kasravi (1357 AHS), a nationalist secular scholar, and Kermani (1371 AHS), a clergyman who was a member of the Secret Society, operating under the rule of *Ay Tabatabaii*. The role of the participants in the revolution is extracted predominantly from Kasravi's *Tarikh-e Mashroote-ye Iran* in order to avoid exaggerate about the personalities, especially the ulama; and the internal news of the revolution usually relies on the writings of Kermani's *Tarikh-e Bidari-ye Iranian*. Other resources are used according to the expertise of the writer in the subject of concern. For example, Katouzian's work (1981) is referred to for its political economy, and further secondary sociological evidence is drawn from Lambton (1988). Algar's (1969) work is used chiefly to trace the contradictions between the ulama and the state.

The Synthetic View:

In this section our theoretical model of the social movements will be applied to the Constitutional Revolution. The prominent features of the revolution - 'social context', 'the behaviours of actors', and 'ideology' - will be analysed. The combination of them according to our model should lead us to develop a valid analysis of the Constitutional Revolution. Evaluation of other theoretical frameworks in the second section will provide a comparative examination of possible alternative analyses.

The Constitutional Revolution can be divided into three distinct phases (see Appendix IV for more detail). Firstly, there were scattered protests in Tehran and other cities of the country in opposition to the dictatorship and dependency. The second stage is famous as the 'Small Migration' (*mohajerat-e soqra*), when the ulama, followed by the people, sought asylum in the shrine of *Hazrat-e Abdol Azim*. The third phase is the 'Great Migration' (*mohajerat-e kobra*), when the ulama migrated to Qom in order to demand the fulfilment of their claims for constitutional reform by the Shah. At the same time many merchants and *tollab* (clergy students) in Tehran sought asylum in the British Embassy. The first phase can be considered mostly as the background of the movement which will be described chiefly as part of the social context of the Constitutional Revolution. The second and third phases will be discussed in the explanation of the movement.

The Social Context:

In this part we will show that the government of Iran was corrupt and, due to the mismanagement and extravagances of the heads of state, financially weak. The people's demand for justice, freedom, and progress increased, as they sought political

reforms. *Two lines of thought were influencing the ideas behind the socio-political aims: the ulama urged socio-religious reforms, and the western educated intelligentsia followed the European social models of democracy.* The conflict between the people and the state was the general context of the antagonism. The authority of the shah as the head of the state, conflicted with the authority of the ulama as the leaders of the people. The Constitutional Revolution emerged in this social context.

In 1275 AHS (1896), Naser-ed-Din Shah was killed by Mirza Reza Kermani, supposedly a follower of Seyed Jamal-ed Din. On 8 June 1896, *Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah* entered the capital. Soon after he took the throne with the help of a loan from the Imperial Bank to cover the expenses of his coronation (Amin-od-Dole 1341 AHS, 222). The regime was suffering from financial weakness, due to Naser-ed-Din Shah's extravagance and mismanagement by his prime minister, *Amin-os-Soltan*. According to Algar, this financial weakness was the chief source of unrest in the reign of Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah (Algar 1969, 222).

Receiving loans from other countries was the policy of the Shah and his state in order to overcome this weakness. In 1900, a twenty-two and a half million Roubles loan was given to the Iranian government by Russia to be repaid in seventy-five years at 5 per cent interest. The conditions were to pay £500,000 to the British owned 'Royal Bank' as the tobacco contract annulment indemnity, and not to borrow from any other country until the loan was paid off. The earnings from customs in the northern part of the country were pledged toward repaying this loan. The loan of the 'Royal Bank' was repaid, and the rest of the money was spent on a trip to Europe by the Shah and his companions (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 24-25). The second loan, 10,000,000 Roubles from Russia, was used to finance a second tour for the Shah and his associates to Europe in the summer of 1281 AHS (1902). Reduction of customs tariffs for the Russian and Ottoman goods was one of the conditions for granting this loan, along with the concession of the road of Jolfa to Tabriz to Qazvin to Tehran (Teymoori 1363 AHS, 386). The influence of Russia on the Iranian state was increasing in line with these

loans. Russia was an old enemy of Iran and had captured some of the northern territories of the country in two battles less than one hundred years earlier.

After the Tobacco Movement, the ulama and the people recognised their power in the political affairs of the nation. Moreover, the cultural and the commercial relationship with the European countries informed them, especially the more educated ones, of a modern type of relationship between the people and the state, namely democracy. European countries had achieved unique successes due to the industrial revolution and the newly developed social relations. Hence, the people were dissatisfied with their situation, and increased their demands on the state.

Katouzian explains the social-psychological conditions underlying the Constitutional Revolution according to his point of view:

'The growth of foreign trade was only one aspect of Iran's greater contact with European countries. The Anglo-Russian rivalry weakened the Iranian state without replacing it by direct colonial rule. It laid bare the helplessness of the Shah and the bureaucracy, and it humiliated the Iranian people, who blamed the political system as the sole reason for the country's subjugation. It demonstrated European standards of living, education, and so on, which the intelligentsia thought of as being exclusively the result of constitutional forms of government. It taught them that, in an alternative system, private property could be safe and powerful, political power could be shared, official posts could be less insecure, and life and limb could be better protected against arbitrary decision. And this, they thought, was all that was necessary for a free powerful and prosperous Iran' (Katouzian 1981, 55).

According to Katouzian, socio-political problems were more important than economic ones within the social context of the Constitutional Revolution. His analysis of the economic situation of Iran at that time could not be more illustrative. He notes that there was no developmental gap or drastic change in the country's economy, and the conditions at the beginning of the 20th century were the same as the late 19th century:

'The balance of payments remained in chronic deficit throughout, and foreign debts went on accumulating. Iran exported oil and industrial raw materials (mainly to Britain), and traditional manufactured products, notably (primarily to Russia). Likewise, she purchased between 80 and 90 per cent of her imports from the Russian and British empires.

'There were no significant changes in the economic structure or technology. About 90 per cent of the country's labour force was involved in agricultural production and rural handicrafts; the remaining 10 percent in commerce, state and other services, and urban manufacturing. Accumulation of physical capital was very limited, and most of the investment in new plant and equipment was in domestic (as opposed to imported) capital goods, using traditional techniques of production. Expansion in roads, communications, health and other infrastructural facilities was insignificant; investment in modern secondary education advanced, in purely relative terms, somewhat more rapidly than did investment in the other basic sectors' (Katouzian 1981, 66-67).

In more detail, Lambton explains the cultural context of the Constitutional Revolution.

'It is noteworthy that Persia was still often referred as the *Mamalik-i islam* by Persian writers and orators in the nineteenth century and that the shah was similarly addressed as the *shahinshah-i islam*. Moreover, the protests of the protagonists of the movement for reform which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution were directed against the encroachment of foreigners on 'the countries of Islam' and the 'Muslims' rather than on 'Persia' and the 'Persians'" (Lambton 1988, 301. Original italics.).

According to her, there was a modernising movement started in the 19th century Iran prominently advocated by *Mirza Malkam Khan*, *Mostashar od-Dole* and Seyed Jamal ed-Din Asadabadi which was a 'dual movement, directed both against corruption and against foreign influence, and hence became at once nationalist and Islamic' (Lambton 1988, 305).

'Prominent among Nasir al-Din's ministers who advocated reforms was Mirza Malkam Khan. A Persian Armenian from Julfa (Isfahan), he was educated in Persia and eventually in 1872 became Persian Minister at the Court of St James's, which post he held until 1889, when he was dismissed over the affairs of the Lottery Concession. His influence was felt mainly among the official classes and the intellectuals. In an essay entitled *Kitabcheh-i ghaybi*, which he submitted to Nasir al-Din, and later in the paper *Qanun*, first published in London in 1890, he advocated the introduction of a code of laws. Also during the reign of Nasir al Din Mustashar al-Dawla, the author of *Yak kalima*, a treatise comparing the rights of man and the laws of Europe with the Qur'an and Traditions, warned Muzaffar al-Din when he was heir apparent, in a letter dated 1306/1888-9, that the power of the kingdom had been dissipated by the actions of the court and that Persia could only escape from the dangers that threatened her by the institution of reforms and new laws such as would enable her to regain among

civilized countries the respect and standing which ancient Persia had enjoyed. Government officials ought, in his view, to be made subject to the law, and equality before the law afforded to all. Only by the adoption of just laws, in keeping with the principles of Islam, freedom of thought, legal equality and modernization, he asserted, could the encroachments of 'progressive' countries be prevented' (Lambton 1988, 303-304. Original italics.).

Mirza Malkam Khan tried to establish *Jami'ai Adamiyyat* (Humanist Community). His aim was explained to Wilfred Scawen Blunt the writer of 'The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt', quoted by Lambton as follows:

'... I went to Europe and studied there the religious, social and political systems of the west. I learned the spirit of the various sects of Christendom, and the organization of the secret societies and freemasonries, and I conceived a plan which should incorporate the political wisdom of Europe with the religious wisdom of Asia. I knew that it was useless to attempt a remodelling of Persia in European forms, and I was determined to clothe my material reformation in a garb which my people would understand, the garb of religion' (Lambton 1988, 306).

He established *faramush-khaneh* which were the lodges of the freemason party in Iran (Lambton 1988, 305). 'The foundation of the first *faramush-khaneh* is attributed to Mirza Malkam Khan; and most of the original members are alleged to have been former students of the Dar al-Funun School (founded in Rabi' I 1268/Dec. 1851-Jan. 1952), and the first school in which modern sciences were taught. The ostensible head of the first *faramush-khaneh*, which was not recognised by English or French freemasonry, is said to have been Mirza Malkam Khan's father, Ya'qub Khan' (Lambton 1988, 305-306. Original italics). This association was banned by Naser ed Din Shah on 12 Rabi' II 1278/19 October 1861 (Lambton 1988, 306), thus Ya'qub Khan was exiled to Istanbul, but Mirza Malkam Khan continued his activities in Iran and it was his 'claim that he had founded a new religion, the religion of humanity, and had gained many followers' (Lambton 1988, 306).

As noted by Lambton, Mirza Malkam Khan's audience were mostly state officials and the intellectuals, but Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Asadabadi addressed the people and the ulama on some occasions as well. However, he manifested his last regret in his final

letter, written from *Bab-e-ali* prison in Istanbul to his counterparts, that he should put all his efforts toward the people's enlightenment (Mohit 1350 AHS, 281).

Lambton reveals that the semi-secret societies known as *anjumanha-yi melli* (nationalist or 'popular' societies) were formed at the end of the reign of Naser ed-Din Shah, but she is not sure how much this was related to the activities of Mirza Malkam Khan. 'Although some at least of them were interprofessional their members seem to have been drawn predominantly from the middle ranks of the *'ulama'* (Lambton 1987, 307. Original italics.). These associations were active in 'articulating the interests' (Scott, 1990) of the discontented people in the Constitutional Revolution.

It was mentioned, in the last chapter, that in Iranian society the struggle between dowlat (state) and mellat (people) was the most essential basis of social conflicts. The ulama were the leading figures of the mellat, and merchants and artisans were the two other reputable strata among them who were mostly involved in the Constitutional Revolution. Lambton summarises the relationship between the government, the ulama, and the people in the following:

Government officials came into contact with the population mainly over the collection of taxes and the levy of soldiers. There was no sense of community between them and the people. The 'Ulama', on the other hand, were in constant touch with the people, Matters of personal law were decided by them, title-deeds were written by them, and attested before them; disputes were often settled by them; commercial affairs which required the witnessing of documents were referred to them; and education was largely in their hands. Functions connected with birth, marriage and death all required the assistance of the 'ulama'. These events, together with the religious festivals, ta'zieh, rawzeh-khwanis and assemblies in Ramadan were the chief events which relieved the monotony of the life of the ordinary people; and with these occasions the religious classes were closely connected. It was to them, therefore, and not to government officials, that the people naturally looked for the fulfilment of their aspirations and, above all, for protection (Lambton 1988, 281. Original italics.).

Generally speaking, within the social context of the Constitutional Revolution the conflict between the people, led by the ulama, and the political structure was of considerable importance for the course of events. The despotic political system placed the country into debt for some loans which were used not for development but for the

pleasure-seeking of the Shah and his courtiers. The people demanded justice and reform of the political system. More details about these conflicting groups and their purposes will be explained in the following sections of this chapter.

The State:

The structure of the government was examined in the last chapter, and the new situation during the reign of Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah will be dealt with here. After the Tobacco Movement, the government tried to involve the ulama, its most distinguished opposition, much more in political decision-making. The clergymen, for their part, were perfectly willing to have more involvement in political affairs. However, according to Algar, 'the ascendancy gained by the ulama through the repeal of the tobacco concession was not immediately exploited by them for any serious attempt at weakening the Qajar dynasty. Indeed there appeared to be even co-operation between ulama and state' (Algar 1969, 221).

Because the political system was unstable, Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah changed his prime ministers five times within a period of about seven years. On 24 November 1896, in the first year of Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah's reign, Amin-os-Soltan, the Prime Minister was displaced by *Abd-ol-Hosseïn Mirza Farmanfarma* (Amin-od-Dole 1341 AHS, 228). The new Prime Minister followed the policies of his predecessor. The meetings of the cabinet were attended by representatives of the ulama. However, their views at most were taken account of only in the appointment and dismissal of provincial governors and other officials (Amin-od-Dole 1341 AHS, 331).

One year later, at the end of 1897 (*Rajab* 1315 AHL) *Amin-od-Dole* was appointed as the Prime Minister (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 124). He opposed the intervention of the ulama in political affairs and established *Anjoman-e Maaref* (Council on Education) and, under its direction, *Roshdiye* primary school in Tehran. These schools taught Persian alphabets in a new style and were considered to be a threat to the monopoly of the ulama over the system of education (Algar 1969, 224).²² He encouraged the

publication of the newspapers as well, whose number increased through his encouragement. He also made a great attempt to reform the government budget. In this respect, he arranged limited salaries for the Shah and others in the court (Kermani 1371 AHS, 124-126). In 1287 AHS (1898) Amin-od-Dole employed three Belgians to assist in modernising the customs of the country. The head of them, named Naus, was appointed the chief of the customs, and he worked under the supervision of the Prime Minister. The Belgians were not considered to be a colonial danger to the country. New tariffs were established and the traditional ones vanished by the order of the Shah. Due to his reforms, Amin-os-Soltan, the former prime minister, many of the courtiers and some of the ulama opposed Amin-od-Dole. Their pressure caused his resignation on 15 Moharram 1316 AHL (4 June 1898), and Amin-os-Soltan took his place (Amin-od-Dole 1341 AHS, 273).

Amin-os-Soltan, whose mismanagement had been experienced during the time of Naser-ed-Din Shah, strengthened his position by appeasing all groups. He feigned agreement with different social strata, such as the ulama, Sufis, secularists and so forth (Kermani 1371 AHS, 127). Once he found that there was nobody to compete with him, he began austere treatment towards them all (Kermani 1371 AHS, 129). His foreign policy favoured the Russians, and three major loans granted by the Russian Bank were due to his efforts. Under his supervision, the facilities of the customs, managed by Naus, were mostly used for Russian's interests, and through him, Naus also had enormous influence, especially when he became one of the members of the cabinet. At the time of the Shah's and his Prime Minister's preparation for their first trip to Europe, Naus had been upgraded to be the minister of customs. According to Kasravi, the ulama and merchants opposed Naus and the new tariffs. There were two reasons for this: they did not like a foreigner being in such a high level position, and the merchants considered the new tariffs hostile to their profits. Riots occurred and complaints against them were made in Booshehr, Shiraz, Yazd, Isfahan and Tehran (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 29).

The ulama, merchants and some political elites became allied against Amin-os-Soltan, and due to their efforts Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah dismissed him and *Ein-od-Dole* was

appointed the Prime Minister at the end of Shahrivar 1282 AHS (October 1903). However, there was no change in the general political policy of the country, and Einod-Dole remained a dictator. Naus maintained his position of authority through him, and the governor's harsh behaviour to the people of provinces continued.

As previously noted, there was no major change of policy during the period of the Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah reign in spite of the changes of prime ministers. The political system was a dictatorship, and the Shah was weak and feckless. Thus, nobody was able to stop the prime ministers and governors from their acrimonious actions. Moreover, the political structure was becoming increasingly dependent on the foreign powers. The influence of Russia was increasing and political leaders were subordinated to foreign counsellors like Naus and other Belgians. Every modernising effort seemed directed toward making the head of the political structure more powerful in ruling the population. Virtually all loans and income from Russia, the customs duties and other sources were spent by the Shah, the prime minister and other political elites for their pleasure seeking, such as tours to Europe.

The People:

The people were oppressed by governmental agents everywhere. They had no legislative and political rights. The position of the ulama was under threat because of the new policies enforced by the state. The merchants, as the second respective group among the commoners, were under pressure of new tariffs and were subordinated to harsh treatment from the governors. The other strata of the people were oppressed in one way or another as well. In the provinces, as happened in Fars, the governors occupied the lands of landlords without concern for their rights (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 52). As has been noted, more than eighty per cent of the population were living in rural areas while the rate of their taxes was about 30 to 40 percent (Katouzian 1981, 33).

In order to overthrow the tyranny and oppression, the leading mojtaheds in the capital became allied with merchants and determined to act against the dictatorship in order to

change the political structure of the country (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 48-49) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 162). As it was mentioned in the section on the social context, the modern intelligentsia supported the reforms. Some of the political elites were in agreement with them as well²³. The main leading strata of the people will be described in the following section.

The Ulama:

Ulama were considered reputable by the people and had a very close relationship with the other groups of the nation. Lambton describes the situation as follows:

‘The relations of the religious classes with the merchants classes were close and of mutual benefit, The merchants needed the services of the *‘ulama’* in order to carry on their day-to-day affairs: documents had to be drawn up and witnessed and the goodwill of the *‘ulama’* was necessary because of their influence in the bazaar and with the population generally. A call from the religious leader could close the bazaar or lead to a boycott of a certain kind of merchandise, as it did in the case of tobacco in 1891. But, on the other hand, it was largely the merchants to whom the religious classes in the towns looked for the payment of *zakat* and the provision of funds for assemblies in the months of Ramadan and Muharram and for celebrations of religious holidays.

‘There was similarly a close bond between the craft guilds and the religious classes. The mosque was the place where the guilds naturally congregated; and they often took part in religious occasions as corporate entities. This brought them into close contact with the *‘ulama’*. Both the merchants and the craft guilds looked to them for protection; and in time of trouble often sought sanctuary in the house of a *mujtahid*. The fact that education was largely in the hands of the religious classes further strengthened the ties between them and merchants and artisans, who relied almost entirely on the religious classes for the education of their sons. There was also considerable mobility between the *‘ulama’* and the merchant classes in various ways, including marriage alliances.

‘The peasants also looked to the religious classes with respect’ (Lambton 1988, 283. Original italics.).

In order to purify their wealth and income, merchants believed that they should follow the Islamic rules for their occupation. Among the clergy some were expert in the Islamic rules of earnings or business. They taught a course with the name of *Makaseb*

(Occupations) to the merchants, dealers and even shopkeepers. It was one of the sources of connection between the merchants and the ulama and indicates a reason for the influence of the ulama over the bazaar.

The religious organisation was generally the same as in the case of the Tobacco Movement, but some minor differences had emerged. After the death of Mirzay-e-Shirazi, there was no single dominant mojtahed for the world community of the Shiites. In Najaf, the centre of Shiism of the time, *Molla Mohammad Kazem Khorasani* and *Mirza Hossein Tehrani* were the most distinguished mojtaheds (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 31-32), and in Tehran *Sheikh Fazl-ollah Noori*, *Seyed Abdollah Behbahani*, and *Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii* were the leading ones. So, the religious organisation did not have the same degree of unity in respect of the leadership, which it had experienced at the time of the Tobacco Movement. Moreover, the establishment of new primary schools in Tabriz and afterwards in Tehran and other cities threatened one of the domains of the ulama; although Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii established the 'Islam' school in the capital, and *Sheikh Hadi Najmabadi*, one of the other clergymen managed the Roshdiye school after the dismissal of Amin-od-Dole (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 38).

The system of mass communication was managed mainly by the ulama at the time of the Tobacco Movement. Mosques and schools were the leading communication agents of the society, although, there were some official newspapers published by the state, and some private ones, like *Akhtar*, which was published in Istanbul, *Hekmat* in Egypt, and *Qanoon* in London. At the time of the Constitutional Revolution, several other Persian newspapers were founded as well. *Habl-ol-Matin* from Calcutta, *Tarbiat* in Tehran, *Thorayya* and *Parvaresh* in Egypt, and *Al-Hadid* in Tabriz added to the mass communication system of the country. Publication of these newspapers reduced the ulama's control over the mass media.

Having a powerful, centralised government was the aim of the state and it was in contradiction with the authority of the ulama in many respects. The government tried to enforce some limitations, none of which were, however, successful. As Lambton

argued, 'These various measures - the limitation of the right of sanctuary, encroachments on *shar'i* jurisdiction, tentative attempts to control *waqf* revenue, a reduction in the allowance to the '*ulama*' and the spread of secular education - aroused the opposition of the '*ulama*', who feared a loss of power' (Lambton 1988, 293. Original italics.).

To enforce the state's authority over the ulama in Tehran in *Mehr* 1282 AHS (September- October 1903) Ein-od-Dole ordered the arrest of fourteen tollab in consequence of a fight between two groups of them. They were beaten with sticks, chained together and exiled to Ardebil, one of the coldest outposts of Iran. The ulama and the people showed their displeasure in public speeches and by closing markets in some cities (Kermani 1371 AHS, 132-138)²⁴. One extreme example of the confrontation between the state and the ulama was the bastinado (beating at the soles of the feet) of a mojtahed in the city of *Kerman*, followed by some struggles between religious minorities. The ulama in Tehran referred to this event and caused the removal of the governor of Kerman in *Aban* 1284 AHS (November 1905) (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 53-54). (See Appendix IV for more details.)

The Merchants:

The most powerful allies of the ulama were the merchants. Closing the market in the political-economic conditions of those days was considered to be a strong political instrument. Trade was the most important sector of the Iranian economy. Katouzian explains the general economic features of Iran in the following paragraphs:

'On the basis of the arguments and evidence of the previous chapters we make the following assertions: (a) Persia was not a feudal society; (b) during the nineteenth century there had been very little industrialisation and technical progress in production; (c) there is little or no evidence for a systematic growth of per capita income; (d) there was a shift of resources away from the production of food and traditional manufacturing products; (e) this structural change did not stimulate growth of productivity in agriculture, and technical progress in manufacturing, but led to greater food and machine made imports; (f) there was a growing inflation and balance-of-payments deficit. ...

'There can be little doubt that the increase in volume of foreign trade had led to greater concentration of commercial capital. ...

'Nevertheless, it is true that the growth of foreign trade benefited the big Iranian merchants; and by increasing their actual fortunes it directly increased their potential political power, at the expense of the state' (Katouzian 1981, 54-55).

Besides the religio-nationalist affiliations, there were other factors which pushed the main body of merchants into the opposition to the state. Belgian customs officials were biased against the Iranian exporters and importers. In particular, they demanded higher tariffs from the Moslems and acted offensively towards them, whilst favouring the Christian traders (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 29). Consequently, in 1289 AHS (1900 AD) there were some riots in Iranian cities by merchants, when the Shah was on his trip to Europe (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 29). The protests continued after the Shah came back to the country but without any result. For example, in 1280 AHS (1901 AD) a new tariff system, written by Naus and signed by Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah, was introduced. It amounted to a new concession being given to Russia. This contract, exchanged between the two countries in 1280 AHS (1902 AD) was supposed to start on *Bahman* 1282 AHS (Feb. 1903 AD). It provided financial facilities for Russian imports, but heavy tariffs on the goods that were imported from other countries and those which were exported from Iran. The new tariff system caused harm to merchants, peasants, and cattlemen in Iran, and opposition arose in other countries as well. Due to pressures, several months later the government arranged new tariffs for British merchants (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 37).

Another humiliating act to the established merchants took place when the price of sugar rose because of the war between Russia and Japan. The Prime Minister intended to reduce the price by force. By his order the governor of Tehran ordered to bastinado a reputable sugar merchant and several others, no matter if they were traders of sugar or not (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 58-59). This caused a riot in the city which led to the Small Migration to Abdol Azim two days later. (See Appendix IV for more details.)

Ideology:

The Shiite Ideology acted as the main mobilising force of the movement. According to Ay Taleqani, the Constitutional Revolution did not have a very distinctly elaborated ideology (Taleqani 1334 AHS, 10-11). The strategies which were designed in the proclamations, speeches, and newspapers declared that the people were against despotism and dependency and sought justice. In this respect they had their own justification according to their religious beliefs. One of the essential principles in Shiism, besides Towhead (monotheism), Prophethood, Resurrection, and Imamat, is Divine justice. According to their belief, 'Divine justice means that Allah does no injustice and in both of His creational and law-making systems acts according to what is right and fair' (Motahari 1991, 111). Motahari explains the social application of this principle in the Moslem communities in the following:

'Most of the Shiah and a section of Sunnis, known as the Mu'tazilah reject the theory of human compulsion and direct operation of Divine destiny in the world. They consider this view to be contrary to the principle of justice, and besides advancing arguments based on reason quote from the Holy Qur'an and the *hadith* in support of what they maintain. That is why they have come to be known as '*Adliyah*', that is the supporters of justice.

'From the above it is evident that notwithstanding the fact that the principle of justice is a Divine principle and is related to one of the attributes of Allah, it is also a human principle, because it equally concerns human freedom and power of choice. Therefore a belief in the principle of justice on the part of the Shi'ah and the Mu'tazilah means a belief in human freedom, human responsibility and the constructive role of man' (Motahari 1991, 111-112. Original italics.).

The writings on the history of Islam illustrate the meaning of justice, in its political perspective, as being a feature of its early models of Islam in Mecca and Medina. Deeds of Mohammad, the prophet, and Ali, the first Imam of the Shiites, are personified justice, according to Shiism. The ulama were the interpreters of their acts, and presented their understanding to the people in their speeches on the religious occasions in mosques and on the religious ceremonies.

Apart from such a fundamental belief of justice, Zargarnezhad admits that there was not even a short article about the aims of the revolution written before the establishment of the parliament (Zargarnezhad 1374 AHS, 14). Even the requests for *Edalat Khane* (House of Justice) and enactment of the Islamic laws merely followed the judicial aims and not the political ones (Zargarnezhad 1374 AHS, 14). Looking at one of the speeches of one of the leaders of the revolution illustrates the situation.

Addressing the people on a pulpit (*menbar*) in a mosque, on the occasion of the anniversary of the passing away of the Prophet's daughter, Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii explained briefly the ideology of the Constitutional Revolution, on 14 of *Jamadi-ol-ola* (July 1906). He started his discourse by praising God and the Prophet and recited several verses of the Quran about rights and justice.²⁵ He translated the Arabic verses into Persian, and after a brief explanation of them added: "today *koffar* (non believers) and other nations are following justice but we, Moslems, have turned against it and are acting unjustly and oppressively or are assistants of those who are unjust. It is about eight months or more in which we have been speaking about nothing but justice on menbar and other places" (Kermani 1371 AHS, 374).

He emphasised in another part of his speech that the protesters did not seek constitutional change and were not republicans. "We want a council or assembly in which people could raise their rights and get free of the oppression of unjust governors. ... Our purpose is fairness and justice in order that the subjects would not be dispersed, and the people would not seek asylum to the foreigners, and the country would not be corrupted", he continued. Ay Tabatabaii referred to the example of the people of Fars province who were granted sanctuary in the British consulate, because of the brusque manner of their governor and warned the state against losing the support of the people in this way (Kermani 1371 AHS, 375-376).

Ay Tabatabaii urged people to follow the example of Imam Ali's followers and revolt against injustice. He declared that the Prime Minister was brutal, and the people should rise against him. "The Shah is kind and compassionate and sick. ... He does not know

what is going on in the country", he added. He also complained about peoples' shortcomings and told them that if they were educated with traditional and modern sciences such as mathematics, foreign language, law, international laws, and history, they would be able to find out the meaning of Kingdom and justice (Kermani 1371 AHS, 377-378).

Tabatabaii continued his speech with an explanation of this assumption that 'human beings are social subjects by their nature'. He explained the reasons for the division of labour in society and offered some justifications for the necessity of the position of the ruler in all communities. He clarified that the people would give money (taxes) and life (soldiers) to the rulers (shahs) in order to be protected and managed by justice (Kermani 1371 AHS, 377-378).

He explained further that the ulama were not seeking the leadership of the country. "We are not republicans. We are not asking for constitutional change in the near future; it means that the population of Iran are not educated enough to be able to handle the constitution and a republic, because constitutional government requires that the people would be learned. We are asking why are you doing this much injustice and oppression to the subjects" (Kermani 1371 AHS, 378). Ay Tabatabaii continued that if they wanted to kill him, he would be ready because his ancestor (Imam Hossein) was similarly executed, and had become distinguished all over the world. He added: "If I would be killed my name would remain until the day of Judgement, and my blood will strengthen the justice and will reject and object the cruelty and cruel." (Kermani 1371 AHS, 379). He continued that every illness has a prescription; the prescription for injustice is justice, and the prescription for dictatorship is consultation and deliberation (Kermani 1371 AHS, 381).

After an explanation about injustice suffered by the daughter of the Prophet and Imam Hossein, he summarised his message as follows: "Today our true shah and head is the Hidden Imam (ATF). We are the servants of his holiness, and we are not afraid of anybody to be killed in the way of justice; we ask his holiness for help and approval, and insist on our purpose even if it would take one year or ten years. We want justice

and house of justice. We want Islamic rules to be practised. We want an assembly in which a shah and a beggar would be equal according to the law. We are not saying that we want constitution or republic but: *Islamic Justice House Assembly*" (Kermani 1371 AHS, 381).

In his speech Tabataba'ii clarified the point on several occasions that revolutionaries were not against the Shah but rather against the Prime Minister and the 'tyrannical governmental system' (Kermani 1371 AHS, 375-381). The contradiction between this speech, around the constitutional changes, and the result of the movement illustrates two directions in the ideology of the Revolution. The religious leaders sought an 'Islamic Justice House Assembly' but the modern educated participant's aim was a constitutional regime, following the European model. The change in the targets of the movement designed by the ulama can be followed by the change in the resolutions of the revolution. The final order of Mashroote, signed by Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah, was also issued twice due to these differences. In the first resolution issued after the Small Migration revolutionaries demanded for Edalat Khane. Their further resolution issued by the British Embassy asylum seekers, during the Great Migration, declared the demand for *Dar-osh-Shora* (House of consultation). In the first order of Mashroote, legislation according to Islamic principles was not emphasised, but, three days later another order was issued which declared such an emphasis. The name of the Congress in the previous announcement changed to the Islamic Congress in the new royal writing as well (Kermani 1371 AHS, 458-476) (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 119-120). These two lines of thought in the Constitutional Revolution produced two contradictory movements after establishment of the parliament with the names of the Constitutional Seekers (*Mashroote Khahan*) and the Religious Seekers (*Mashrooae Khahan*), the analysis of which is outside of the scope of this study.

Some other aspects of the Shiite ideology were important in this revolution as well. Martyrdom is one of the great concepts in Islam, especially in Shiism because of the example of Imam Hossein. Shiites believe that their ten other Imams were also martyred in one way or another. Their martyrdom followed their objections to the political system of their time (Tabataba'ii 1971, 190-209). Therefore it is not accidental

that almost all well-known mojtaheds of the capital joined the revolutionaries on the occasion of the martyrdom of *Abdol Hamid* (a clergy student) and crowded in the Jomoa Mosque which was followed by the Great Migration. (See Appendix IV for more details.) Mourning rituals also played an important part in the mobilisation of the population. The grieving ceremony of Abdol Hamid in the Jomoa Mosque illustrates this aspect of the movement as well.

Following the example of Imam Hossein in seeking sanctuary with his family, another dimension of Shiism used in the Constitutional Revolution was asylum. Imam Hossein, in opposition to the rule of Yazid, migrated with his family for Mecca in order to seek asylum in the House of God. (Appendix II, chapter 5) This act was followed by the ulama in the asylum seeking in Hazrat-e Abdol Azim (the Small Migration), Jomoa Mosque, and Qom (the Great Migration). (See Appendix IV for more details.)

Actors and Behaviours:

According to the historical evidence the distributors of the Constitutional Revolution were the religious institutions led by the ulama, and the associations which were mostly founded by the ulama with collaboration of the merchants and intelligentsia. The newspapers played a significant role in distributing the revolutionary ideas as did the proclamations of the ulama and their speeches. Their fellow Shiites and those who were anxious for the justice acted as the followers. The role of the market was very significant among the followers particularly because of the social and the political importance of its closure.

Sheikh Fazlollah-e Noori and Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii, two well-known mojtaheds of Tehran, were allied against Amin-os-Soltan (fame as *Atabak*), the Prime Minister, at the beginning of the 20th century. Some of the courtiers were their associates in this opposition (Kermani 1371 AHS, 130). Mojtaheds of Najaf in Iraq were concerned about the problems of the Shiite country of Iran as well. Two of them:

Molla Mohammad Kazem Khorasani and Mirza Hossein Tehrani were against the tyranny of Atabak, and it was suggested that they had excommunicated him (Algar 1969, 234). The *Habl-ol-Matin* newspaper also opposed him. In *Shahrivar* 1282 (September 1903) due to the pressures of opponents, Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah appointed Ein-od-Dole as the Prime Minister instead of Atabak (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 31-32).

According to Kasravi, the Constitutional Revolution begun early in 1284 AHS, the end of March 1905, when two distinguished mojtaheds of Tehran, Seyed Abdollah Behbahani and Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii, became allies in the fight against the dictatorship (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 48-49). They strengthened their alliance on the night of 24 of *Ramadan* (the fasting month of Moslems) 1322 AHL (November 1905), after the bastinado of Mirza Reza mojtahed in Kerman (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 54), and they were later joined by Shaikh Fazlollah-e Noori another established mojtahed of Tehran (Kermani 1371 AHS, 426). They used every pretext to agitate the people (Algar 1969, 233), and all riots and strikes in Tehran have been ascribed to their leadership.

In the provinces the leading mojtaheds also used every excuse to agitate the people against the dictatorship and dependence. For instance, joined by the merchants who were against the new costume tariffs, a riot took place in Tabriz, led by Mirza Hasan-e Mojtahed, against bars and guest houses which sold wine in Tir 1282 AHS (June 1903). (See Appendix IV for more details.)

Malekzadeh refers to an association consisting of about sixty revolutionaries, including his father, as the starting point of the revolution which formed on 12 Rabia-ol-Aval 1322 AHL (28 May 1904) to act against dictatorship of the regime (Malekzadeh n.d., 8). According to him, this association brought two leading mojtaheds of Tehran together to act as the leaders of the revolution (Malekzadeh n.d., 24). And Kermani believes that establishment of a secret society, with the name of *Anjoman-e Makhfi* (the secret society), of which he himself was a founder, under supervision of Ay Tabatabaii, on 5 *Zelhejeh* 1322 AHL (10 February 1905) was responsible for recruiting the ulama and others to the revolution (Kermani 1371 AHS, 162). This association was established against despotism by nine revolutionaries including *Seyed Jamal-ed-Din*

Vaez Isfahani, Malek-ol-Motekalemin, and Dowlat Abadi that mostly distributed secret proclamations under the authority of Ays Behbahani, Tabatabaii, and Noori (Madani 1361 AHS, 55).²⁶

The minimum amount of agreement of the historians reveals that the leaders of the movement were two Ays joined by the third one (Tabatabaii, Behbahani, and Noori) and, they were supported by the religious organisation. It would also appear that there were some associations acting as the agents of the revolutionaries. These associations were mostly established by and acted under the supervision of the ulama (Lambton 1988, 297). The modern intelligentsia were mostly active through these associations and through the newspapers.

Merchants participated in the revolution as well. For instance, the merchants of Tehran wrote a letter to Ein-od-Dole complaining about double tariffs that Naus was putting on their goods. The Prime Minister did not pay any attention at first but afterwards, through the intermediary of *Saad-od-Dole* the Minister of trade, he arranged a meeting between the heads of Tehran merchants and Naus in court, on 5 *Ordibehesht* 1284 (25 April 1904). In that meeting the merchants condemned Naus, and he used offensive language towards them. To seek their revenge, on the advice of Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii, the market and shops closed and merchants and shopkeepers with some others, went to Abdol Azim seeking sanctuary (Kermani 1371 AHS, 217-219). According to the *Habl-ol-Matin* newspaper, the haven seekers' opposition was to the new tariffs, harsh treatment of customers, and Naus's hostility towards Iranian merchants; hence their demand was that he be dismissed (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 51). They sought sanctuary for five or six days. Mohammad Ali Mirza, the Crown Prince, was in Tehran to act as his father's representative. The Shah was on his way to begin a third trip to Europe. Mohammad Ali Mirza intervened and promised the merchants and Seyed Abdollah Behbahani, who backed them, that he would ask for Naus's dismissal by the Shah after his return. Therefore, as the Shah started his tour, the protesters temporarily stopped their opposition (Kermani 1371 AHS, 219). This event illustrates the co-operation of the ulama, merchants, and the intellectuals in the process of the revolution.

The Movement:

The leaders of the Constitutional Revolution were Ays Behbahani and Tabatabaai during the two first stages, and aided by Ay Noori in the third stage. Ay Noori was one of the leading figures of the ulama active in politics since the Tobacco Movement, however he did not participate in the early disturbances of the Constitutional Revolution as a leading agitator. His companionship in the Great Migration added to the power of the revolutionaries because, according to Kermani, he was more knowledgeable than the two other leaders and had more management capability (Kermani 1371 AHS, 426). The ulama, tollab and merchants acted as the intermediary agents of the movement through the religious organisations, ceremonies, bazaar and associations. The newspapers were among the distributors of the ideas and news of the movement as well. The people followed them in the form of mourning ceremonies, asylum seeking, demonstrations, and closing their shops. The efforts of these groups accumulated causing the political structure to yield and the Shah to sign the order of the Mashroote.

In order to suppress the people's protests one day after the bastinado of the established merchants of Tehran, *Mirza Abol-Qasem*, the *Jomoa'* prayer leader of the capital, pretending to build an alliance with the movement, invited the leading ulama and merchants to the Shah Mosque. When a revolutionary speaker named 'the Shah', Mirza Abol-Qasem shouted at him and called him *Kafer* (out of religion), and ordered his men and the government agents, who were prepared with clubs and pistols, to attack him and the audience. It was intended that this suppression would put an end to the movement, but the reverse occurred and the leaders accelerated the revolution. The ulama and their households migrated to Hazrat-e Abdol Azim, seeking sanctuary. They asked the Shah to establish Edalat Khane in all parts of the country, to dismiss Ala-od-Dole and Naus, and to rule the Islamic laws all over the nation. They were joined by

Tollab and the people with the merchants supporting them financially. This movement formed the Small Migration (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 62-67).

The Shah accepted the asylum seekers' demand, received through the Ottoman ambassador in Tehran, but the ulama remained in the sanctuary; they could not trust the Prime Minister, Ein-od-Dole. They sent four representatives to negotiate their demands with the Prime Minister, by suggestion of the governor of Abdol Azim, who was the nephew of Ein-od-Dole. The ulama's representatives were kept under arrest in the Prime Minister's house, and as the people rioted further the markets of Tehran and Abdol Azim were closed. In response the seven kilometre road between Tehran and Abdol Azim was crowded by the angry people. Ein-od-Dole accepted some of the demands and promised the establishment of the 'governmental justice house' all over the country. The Shah approved the Prime Minister's response to the revolutionaries' demands, and added that Islamic laws should rule over the nation.

Regardless of the Shah's warm welcome to the heads of the revolution on 22 Day 1284 AHS (12 January 1906), and the people's celebration of the victory by the slogan of 'Long live the king of Islam' (*Padeshah-e Eslam*), and 'Long live the people of Iran (Mellat)' (Kermani 1371 AHS, 302), Ein-od-Dole sought to disregard the agreements. First of all, he banished some of the state officials who were in agreement with the political reforms, such as Saad-od-Dole, the Ministry of Trade, and *Dr. Mohammad Khan Ehya-ol-Molk*, one of the court physicians (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 76-77). He also sought opposition to the revolutionaries from the other members of the cabinet in the *Baq-e Shah* meeting (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 80). Moreover, he aimed to convince the leaders of the revolution not to follow the reforms. For instance, he spoke to Ay Tabatabaii (Kermani 1371 AHS, 327-328), and asked *Naser-ol-Molk*, one of the distinguished politicians of the capital to write a letter to Tabatabaii and argue the lack of preconditions for freedom of the people (Kermani 1371 AHS, 382-388). The Prime Minister's wave of terror continued. The case of the attack on the house of *Mehdi Gavkosh*, one of the champions of a district of the capital, who was assisting Ay Behbahani, is one example (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 89). Banishment of the pro revolutionaries from different strata, like Roshdiye, the founder of the new schools,

Majd-ol-Islam, one of the Prime Minister's employees, and *Mirza Agha Isfahani*, who had come from Istanbul as a lawyer, was carried out as well (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 88-89). The riots of the people were brutally repressed everywhere, for instance, in Shiraz and Mashhad (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 83-84). (See Appendix IV for more details.)

Ay Tabatabaii wrote two letters to Ein-od-Dole and the Shah requesting enforcement of the reforms, but achieved no results (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 81-82) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 338-342). Behbahani and Tabatabaii decided to have talks with the people to keep them in their revolutionary position. Each of them explained the aims of the revolution to the audience in two different mosques on two separate nights of the week (Kermani 1371 AHS, 345). In response, to enforce limitation on the gatherings, Ein-od-Dole banned any kind of traffic in the city starting three hours after sunset until dawn (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 88).

Ein-od-Dole then ordered the arrest of *Sheikh Mohammad Vaez*, one of his critics from the menbar. Tollab of the *Haj Abol-Hasan-e Memar Madrese* and Mosque attempted to close the way to the police who had arrested him, and during this a Talabe named *Abdol-Hamid* was killed. His body was taken to the Jomoa Mosque and almost all the well-known mojtaheds of the capital gathered there with their households. Troops surrounded the mosque and prevented food and water from being given to them. At a resultant demonstration several people were killed by police shooting. Ay Behbahani asked the people to leave the mosque and wanted the shopkeepers to open their shops in order to prevent more loss of life. The ulama asked the government to implement the reforms. Otherwise, they said they were ready to be killed; they also said they wished to be allowed to leave the country to go into exile in Iraq. The third of their demands was agreed by the Shah. On 25 of *Jamady ol Aval* 1324 AHL (1906), they headed for Qom, and other distinguished mojtaheds of the capital, who were not among them in the Jomoa Mosque, including Ay Fazl-ol-Lah Noori, joined them. About one thousand people involving the mojtaheds of the capital and their households, accompanied by their close associates, migrated to Qom. This action formed the Great Migration of the Constitutional Revolution (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 98-101, 106-107) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 412-414, 426)

The people continued to demonstrate in the capital. The participation of women was remarkable, as they made up most of the demonstrators. They asked for the return of the ulama (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 107), and some of the merchants decided to seek sanctuary at the British embassy in Tehran. The aims of the British policy in Iran were compatible with those of the revolutionaries. According to Katouzian, 'the British support for the revolution was consistent with both their interests and their ideology: by supporting the revolution they were both scoring diplomatic points against the Russian government, on whom the Iranian court had become increasingly dependent, and siding with the cause of freedom and democracy, with which they identified the British system. Indeed, this is the light in which their role and position were viewed by the Iranian intellectuals at the time' (Katouzian 1981, 59). After receiving the permission of Ay Behbahani, on 27 Tir (18 July), two days after the departure of the ulama, the merchants sought asylum in the embassy (Kermani 1371 AHS, 431-433). At first, about fifty of them and tollab went there but gradually over five days more than 14,000 people gathered in the embassy. The market was closed and merchants funded expenses of the sanctuary seekers (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 109-110). The Shah ordered the embassy to be surrounded. Some of the soldiers encircling the embassy, however, gradually moved to the side of the revolutionaries. In order not to lose the support of the army, the Shah accepted the demands of the people. The requests of the asylum seekers were presented to the Shah by the foreign minister, who had received them by the charge de affairs of the embassy of Britain in Tehran. There were five demands as follows: a) to return the ulama from Qom, b) to depose Ein-od-Dole from his position, c) to establish Dar-osh-Showra, d) to punish the murderers of the people, and e) to return those who were banished (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 112-113).

According to Kasravi the Shah tried not to accept all of the requests but the people insisted and the government of Britain also encouraged him to do so (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 119). Consequently, the Shah deposed Ein-od-Dole, and sent two Qajar princes to Qom to bring back the migrants. He signed the order of *Mashroote* (limited to the constitution) on 13 Mordad 1285 AHS (4 August 1906). As the people were still not satisfied with that order, he completed a subsequent one on 16 of Mordad (7 of

August) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 458-476). The first election laws were written (Kermani 1371 AHS, 515-519) and at the end of Shahrivar 1285 AHS (first days of September 1906) the election in Tehran was held (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 124-125).

Other Perspectives:

In this section a brief explanation of the application of the possible alternative theories to the movement will be presented. This exploration will show that it is possible that the use of some of these 'standard' theories would lead to a misinterpretation of the causes of the movement. Comparing our interpretation of the Constitutional Revolution with these potential alternatives will also help us to validate our theory of social movements. According to the strategy of the study, the movement will be explored from three different points of view - individualism, relationism, and social determinism.

Individualism:

Using Toch's theory, in the Constitutional Revolution the following could be mentioned as the reasons for the people's 'susceptibility'. The most important was the dictatorship of the Shah, his Prime Ministers and governors. The people were 'susceptible' to a change in the political system, because the government had run up heavy debts due to their mismanagement, extravagance, and pleasure-seeking and was oppressing the people in its efforts to build up a powerful centralised state. The Prime Minister and governors were severe to the respected people of the country, like distinguished merchants and clergymen. Secondly, people, particularly merchants, were agitated by the actions of Naus, a Belgian who was appointed, first as the head of the

customs in Iran and, then as a minister. They could not tolerate his position and brutal behaviour towards Iranian, and particularly Moslem merchants.

Improvement in the trade and cultural relationship with European countries caused people to be dissatisfied with their political situation. Moreover, while the people of the country were suffering, the Shah and his companions were putting the resources of the country into debt to the Russians to pay for their own pleasure-seeking. A new tariff system and other restrictions made the merchants discontented, and persecution of the ulama caused their sensitivity to the political structure. Beating and exiling the well-known merchants, tollab, and the ulama made the people move against the government. The main 'problem' was dictatorship of the state.

Summing up, from the individualistic point of view, the Iranian populace became 'susceptible' to their 'situation' due to the injustice and dictatorship of the political leadership. In order to solve their 'problem', namely the dictatorship of the political structure, they 'appealed' for the establishment of Edalat Khane, using the Shiism as the 'ideology' of their movement. The individualistic view may be able to examine the events of the movement chronologically, but it cannot analyse them in their broader causal relationships. Why did Shiism act as the main ideology for uprising the people against dictatorship? Why did the ulama lead the revolution and not members of the other strata, like merchants or political elites? What was the special role of the different participants of the movement? How did their aims force the Shah to accept the demands? These are some of the questions that the individualistic perspective is not able to answer because of the analytic weaknesses it has.

Relationism:

In the Constitutional Revolution there was 'a state of feeling' against the dictatorship which ruled the country. The people sought justice and hated the pleasure seeking of the rulers and their self-indulgence in putting the country into pledge to Russia. But this 'state of feeling' itself was not sufficient to mobilise them toward their purpose. Their 'belief' was in justice and they demanded it with all available means. Their 'collective identity' involved seeking Islamic justice and acting against a corrupt political structure. Religious 'organisation' was the vehicle for their goals, as it had been in the Tobacco Movement. Islamic 'ideology' had a clear scheme of justice expressed in the Quran and located in the political rule of the early Islamic state. All previously mentioned mobilising factors were important in the articulation of the Constitutional Revolution and none of them alone was able to do the job. Regarding the combination of these mobilising factors, Tilly's and Melucci's theories might lead us to an understanding of the Constitutional Revolution. These theories will describe to us 'why' and 'how' the mobilising factors were drawn together to make that revolution.

Tilly's Perspective:

According to Tilly, 'interests' are rooted in the 'production relations' and individuals' own interests; 'production relations' produce collective interests which are average and long-run predictions of peoples' behaviour, while individuals' own interests are short-run determinants (Tilly 1978, 61). However, as I have shown above, economic factors were less important than the socio-political ones. Individuals' 'interests' had their roots in their religious beliefs, and the religious leaders were responsible for their articulation and mobilisation.

Tilly's perspective provides a potential explanation for 'why' the Constitutional Revolution occurred, that is, because of the political dictatorship and justice seeking of

the Iranian populace. The religious ideology together with its organisation was able to form the movement. The example of Imam Hossein in migrating to Mecca and seeking asylum there and the concepts of martyrdom and justice mobilised the ulama and the people in that movement. The religious organisation was the main structure of the movement with collaboration of some associations which were established by the ulama, merchants and the intelligentsia. The previously established newspapers and the new ones were effective in contributing to the mobilisation of discontent.

In the Constitutional Revolution the power of the masses and the ulama operated against the power of the state. The main 'opportunities' (Tilly 1978, 7) that emerged in this revolution can be identified as the destruction of the Russian Bank, which showed the direction of the population's agitation against the state's foreign policy, the events at Shah Mosque which resulted in the migration to Hazrat-e Abdol Azim, and martyrdom of Abdol Hamid which led to the assembly at the Jomoa Mosque and then the migration to Qom. The 'repressions' were the banning of traffic three hours after sunset to dawn in order to prevent participation of the people in mosques listening to the ulama's lectures, using military forces to stop the mourning ceremonies and breaking the market and shopkeepers strikes. The state's 'threats' included the banishment of well-known ulama and people like Mirza Reza in Kerman, and Roshdye and others in Tehran. Also, arresting the speakers and activists of the revolution could be considered as 'threats' to this movement. The 'facilities' involved, besides the financial ones, that were mostly provided by the merchants, were religious institutions like mosques and shrines, foreign embassies and socio-economic pressures, such as closing the market.

Thus, from Tilly's perspective, in the Constitutional Revolution the religious 'organisation' in collaboration with the bazaar, associations and newspapers, and the people's belief in the principle of justice, according to Shiism, used the above mentioned 'opportunities' and 'facilities' against the states 'threats' and 'repressions'. The use of the 'power' of the ulama and masses against the 'power' of the state, drove the revolution toward fulfilling the 'population's interest': the establishment of the parliament.

Using Tilly's perspective does not, however, enable an in-depth discussion about 'why' the Constitutional Revolution took place, although, 'how' this revolution emerged, it does provide an elaborate explanation. According to this view, religious organisation was the structural base for mobilisation of the population by the Shiite ideology. Thus, the preconditions of the revolution are not fully explained and the emphasis is on factors such as 'facilities', 'repressions' and/or 'opportunities' of the movement. For example, destruction of the unfinished building of the Russian Bank could be considered as an 'opportunity', in this view, to show the power of the masses to the authorities. However, such an opportunity has its roots in one of the preconditions of the revolution, that was increase in the influence of Russia in Iran, and there is no way to analyse this if we restrict ourselves to Tilly's perspective. His theory is most useful in explaining the process of the movement, but we need to know more about the preconditions and the causes of the Constitutional Revolution. Tilly's conceptual scheme is also deficient in explaining the agencies of the revolution and their influence. There were personalities acting for and against the goals of the revolution but there is insufficient explanation about them by this insight. The role of the leaders of the movement is covered by the discussion about the 'organisation'. However, we know from Tilly himself, that the organisation is a structure; but somebody is needed to activate it. Even ideology which is a mobilising factor for him, must be operated by the agencies. It cannot move by itself. Tilly's theoretical perspective does not explain who utilised the Shiite ideology and the religious organisation in the Constitutional Revolution.

Melucci's Perspective:

Melucci's framework, applied to the Constitutional Revolution leads us to the concept of 'justice seeking' as the main basis for 'collective identity' (Melucci 1989, 34) of the revolutionaries. The dictatorships of the shahs throughout history, especially the corrupt political structure of the Qajar dynasty, were often at odds with the prevailing

religious attitudes. The Iranian populace can be said to have risen in 'seeking justice' and to be acting against the corrupt political system.

Collective identity acts in a three polar system. 'Goals', 'means' and 'environment' are theoretical poles according to Melucci (Melucci 1989, 26). As the Iranian people sought justice, their 'goal' was the establishment of Edalat Khane. Their 'means' to reach the goal was utilisation of the Islamic attitudes, traditions and organisation. The 'environment' they acted in was a changing cultural-political system, both regarding internal events such as the Tobacco Movement, and an enlarging set of international relations. European countries had achieved new successes due to the new technology and social relations. The Iranian political system was falling more and more under the influence of Russia. In other words, the dictatorship of Iran was becoming more attached to the dictatorship of the Tsars. In such an 'environment', by using Islamic attitudes, traditions, and organisation the revolutionaries sought Edalat Khane.

The use of Melucci's theory resulted in the above interpretation of the Constitutional Revolution. 'How' this revolt took place could potentially be explained by applying three other concepts introduced by him: 'solidarity', 'conflict' and 'breaking the limits of compatibility' (Melucci 1989, 29). There was 'solidarity' across various sub-groups of 'revolutionaries' consisting of ordinary people, merchants, and religious clergymen, due to the 'collective identity', aimed at 'seeking justice'. Other religious beliefs like 'martyrdom' and religious rituals like 'mourning ceremonies' could be named as solidarity factors of the movement as well. The political system and the political elites were totally against what the people believed. Little blame was attributed to the Shah himself, because as with the other Qajar shahs he carried with him the title of Zell-ol-Lah (Shadow of God), and, by receiving their leaders warmly after their Small Migration, he pretended to be in favour of Islamic laws and the ulama. He also announced this belief in his writings to Ein-od-Dole accepting the sanctuary seeker's requests. But the Prime Minister and governors were apparently against what people expected. The 'conflict' was with this political structure.

How did the adversaries 'break the limits of compatibility' of the political system? Three major 'means' were used by the revolutionaries. First, closing the markets; second, seeking asylum in holy places, especially by the ulama; and third, using available foreign pressures. Alongside closing the bazaar which stopped the main economic organisation of the capital, asylum seeking in Hazrat-e Abdol Azim, in Jomoa Mosque and in Qom by the ulama was important due to its stopping most of the 'social affairs' of the people, such as weddings which were conducted by the ulama, education because of closing the Maktab Khane, and the legal system for those who referred to Shara' courts. In other words, interrupting the religious functions curtailed a great part of the social fabric. It was thus a considerable force and was able to shake the 'limits of compatibility' of the state. Foreign embassies served as intermediary agents between revolutionaries and the Shah, and the seeking of asylum in the British embassy enabled the people to influence the political system. When ambassadors were intermediary agents, the Shah was obliged to have a proper and clear response to the peoples' requests, because of his own political reputation. It was thus another means which the revolutionaries used to 'break the limits of compatibility' of the state in order to establish Mashroote. Forces of the two first 'means' added to the third, and undermined the resistance of the political system. By signing the order of Mashroote the Shah was persuaded to change the political structure and, thereby, limit his own and his Prime Minister's and governors' roles in the new system.

Applying Melucci's theory to the Constitutional Revolution provides a useful analysis. Using this kind of explanation of the movement enables a consideration of many different intervening aspects of the revolution, but this account looks primarily at the role of the masses and the tactics they followed to reach their objectives. There is less emphasis on the organisers and initiators of the movement. This approach does not explain the role of the agencies, and does not fully investigate the pre-conditions, and, therefore, the causes of the movement. In the Constitutional Revolution the roles of Seyed Abdollah Behbahani and Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii were prominent in mobilising the people and the other ulama, and retaining them within the political arena. Moreover, the role of the 'negative' personalities of a revolution, like Naus and Ein-od-Dole in this case, is seldom discussed in this perspective. The social context is

largely reduced to the concept of 'environment' in Melucci's insight. Thereby, there is little place for explaining the depth of historical background of the revolution and dealing with the historical social causes.

Social Determinism:

From the social deterministic point of view Smelser, Touraine, and Scott's perspectives may be applied to our examination of this revolution. There were redefinitions of norms and values. The whole political structure of the country was under scrutiny, and the values of justice and freedom were sought instead of dictatorship. This being the case, Smelser's pattern of analysis presents us with a structural-functionalist perspective of the Constitutional Revolution. As was mentioned in the chapter of the Tobacco Movement, there was a conflict between state and people in Iran. This applied at the political-cultural level (dictatorship vs. justice and equality seeking) and, also, resembles a social/political class struggle (state vs. people). Hence, Touraine's interpretation of social movements and Scott's understanding of them could be usefully investigated to find out more about the Constitutional Revolution from a conflict theory point of view.

Structural-Functionalist Perspective:

According to Smelser's model, 'structural conduciveness' leads to 'structural strain', and through 'precipitating factors' the 'generalised belief' of the revolution emerges (Smelser 1962, 15-17). There was disagreement between the political elites and the ulama which showed its socio-political features in the Tobacco Movement. Since then the ulama became more active in political affairs. This antagonism resulted in several changes of prime ministers, but the problem of despotism, which was the major challenge of the people to the state, could not be solved. Using Smelser's terms the 'structural conduciveness' remained and led to the 'structural strain'. Thus, some

leading mojtaheds of the capital became allied with certain merchants in order to overthrow the dictatorship.

The following events might be seen as the 'precipitating factors' in the Constitutional Revolution. The establishment of *Dabestans* (new primary schools) in Tabriz, Tehran and other cities; the events in Kerman and bastinado and banishment of Mirza Mohammad Reza mojtahed; the distribution of the picture of Naus and other Belgians in the fancy dress party; harsh treatment by Belgians of Iranian, especially Moslem merchants; the events in Tabriz and destruction of hotels, Dabestan's and bars' furniture; the new custom tariffs; growth in the publication of newspapers and other new mass media like books and revolutionary poems; the bastinado of reputable merchants; and the events in the Shah Mosque. All of the above contributed to the 'generalised belief' of the establishment of Edalat Khane. Headed by three mojtaheds of Tehran, the revolutionaries including merchants, some political elites, and religious and secular entrepreneurs decided to change the political system. Their demand according to Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaii was the 'Islamic justice house assembly'.

'Mobilisation' of the revolutionary forces focused around the Shiite ideology. The leaders benefited from the religious ideology, used the function of various aspects of the religious institution, like mosques, mourning ceremonies, seeking sanctuary in holy shrines, and martyrdom, in addition to the new associations in order to fulfil the purposes of the revolution. By seeking asylum in the British embassy they made a claim that their corrupt political system was not able to protect them, and that they were so discontented with the political situation that they were persuaded to seek asylum with foreigners.

For its part the political system imposed its 'control system'. For example, Ein-od-Dole offered some money to the ulama to convince them to leave their sanctuary seeking in Hazrat-e Abdol Azim. He, also, detained the representatives of the leaders of the revolution while they were in his house, and the state arrested, banished, and bastinado the reputable politicians, merchants, and the ulama. The persuasion of Ay Tabatabaii, to convince the ministers in the *Baq-e Shah* (a garden in Tehran) meeting, banning

water and food on the sanctuary seekers, and shooting at the demonstrators can be named as some other parts of the control system.

In short, the possible application of Smelser's theory to the Constitutional Revolution reveals that this view looks at the Constitutional Revolution from the standpoint of the political structure. The 'structural condusiveness'- dictatorship pattern - in the political structure led to 'structural strain', that is the struggle between courtiers and the ulama backed by the agitated people, especially merchants and some of the political elites. Different events throughout the country caused the 'generalised belief' of seeking justice. The ulama used new associations, religious institution, values, and norms - holy shrines, mosques, schools, justice, martyrdom, mourning ceremonies, and sanctuary seeking - for 'mobilisation' of the people. The head of the political structure - the Prime Minister who was authorised by the Shah - used his 'control system' to stop the revolutionaries, but he failed and the first phase of the Constitutional Revolution succeeded by the order of Mashroote signed by Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah.

In this view there is not enough explanation of the reasons for the involvement of the ulama and the Shiite ideology in the political activities. They are participating because they were among the cultural elements. There is no particular explanation for them to be considered as the main factors or preconditions of the revolution. Similarly as they were able to manage the Tobacco Movement they also interfered in the Constitutional Revolution. Due to the absence of exact reasons for their involvement in the revolution, the roots of the events are not clear. The ulama and the Shiite ideology were there incidentally and made the 'generalised belief' - justice seeking - of the revolution deliberately. Of course, they were important in determining the consciousness of the masses, but the generalised beliefs were mostly rooted in the religious attitudes or ideology of the people not just the political structure. Some of the 'precipitating factors' occurred because of the religious beliefs, rather than exactly because of political structural strain. For instance, the event of Tabriz which resulted in the destruction of the place of guest houses, bars, and Dabestans and the event of Kerman, the struggle between religious minorities, were not exactly rooted in the dictatorship of the political structure but mostly in religious beliefs. Why did these

religious oriented events result in a political demand? What was the relationship between political and religious affairs of the people? Generally speaking, we can answer that they were two cultural aspects of the society which could influence each other. Yes, but how? Shall we just look at events and explain the ways they had influenced each other, or is there a rule which can determine this relationship in the Constitutional Revolution and any other social movement? Why was not the 'control system' able to suppress the revolution? In some social movements the 'control system' is sufficient to limit or offset the movement. What was the particular situation in the Constitutional Revolution that the 'control system' did not work? There is no explanation in this type of interpretation about the nature of the contention and some times collaboration between a movement's activities and the means of control. In the case of the Constitutional Revolution, for example, the events at the Shah Mosque and the martyrdom of Abd-ol-Hamid, among the means of control, caused the acceleration of the movement.

Conflict Theory Perspective:

Using Touraine's approach as a possible conflict theory of the Constitutional Revolution, it took place across the political structure of the society (totality); the majority of the population of Iran were against the dictatorship of the political structure (opposition); and the people sought Islamic justice through asking for Islamic Justice House Assembly (identity); hence, the whole political institution of the society was involved and the 'project level' was at the level of 'historicity' (Touraine 1981, 80-81). Moreover the struggle was against the political structure not within it, therefore, a 'critical' struggle rather than 'positive' one. So, it was a 'revolutionary action', using Touraine's perspective (Touraine 1981, 84-91). This 'revolutionary action' had four possible preconditions: a 'committed population' - the population of the Iranian revolutionaries, especially in the capital Tehran; 'it was organised' by the religious leaders through the religious organisation, ideology and the new associations; it was 'fighting against a diversity' - justice and freedom seeking against dictatorship; and was 'a problem that concerned the whole society' (Touraine 1981, 98).

Touraine's type of analysis does not touch the events of the Constitutional Revolution. It examines them in a manner that makes it impossible to explain how and exactly why this revolution took place. It only presents a large picture of the Iranian population seeking justice and freedom against the dictatorship of the Shah and his government. Why does this revolutionary action take place? And, how did it operate? Besides the description of the general picture of the Iranian population's revolutionary action there is no further explanation and no more analysis of the Constitutional Revolution can be derived from this insight. Who were the agencies of the revolution? How did they agitate the people and articulate them toward the aims of the movement? Why did such a diversity between the two competing classes emerge? There is no answer to these important general questions in this standpoint.

According to Scott's interpretation of social movements, the social/political struggle will lead to a social movement through 'social closure' and 'interest articulation' (Scott 1990, 9). In the Constitutional Revolution the idea of justice and freedom extracted from the religious beliefs was the solidarity aspect for the masses. There were some entrepreneurs affiliated to the European culture who were interested in these concepts in the way they were practised in western politics, but the main aspect of social closure of the revolution was due to the Shiite or Islamic interpretation of justice, as it was mentioned in Tabatabaii's speech.

Thus, continuing Scott's type of interpretation of the revolution, the means of 'interest articulation' were the religious organisation and the new associations established in Tehran and other major cities almost all under the supervision of the ulama. The means of communication in this 'interest articulation' were mostly menbars in the mosques, news papers, and secret proclamations.

Scott's perspective overlooks the causes of the revolution and reduces the whole initiative factors to the struggle between state and people. Some of the social closure and interest articulation from this point of view are, actually, among the causes of the movement - such as justice seeking, religious leaders and means of communication. In

other words, not looking at the causal conjuncture of the revolution will lead to misunderstanding the prominent features of the movement. The religious organisation in the Constitutional Revolution, despite what Scott's perspective reveals, was not acting as a political organisation, but was actually defending its territory which was coming under the influence of the new centralised policies enforced by the government. Increased interventions by the government in the people's affairs, such as the new taxation system, which used to be under the authority of the ulama, caused them to seek its regulation and justification due to the dominant religious ideology.

Regardless of what the conflict theory perspective suggests, the conflict between dowlat and mellat, due to the dictatorship of the political structure, was a part of the cause of the Constitutional Revolution not the whole of it. Other factors like leadership and ideology were prominent, not just in articulation of the movement but in the creation of it. The event of the Jomoa Mosque showed that the role of the leading mojtaheds of the capital, even after the withdrawal of the people from the mosque, was important for the enforcement of the revolution's purposes. The emphasis of the conflict theory perspective is on one of the important aspects of the revolution not all of them.

Conclusion:

This analysis of various, possible, alternative interpretations of the Constitutional Revolution highlights the way in which our view is the most comprehensive one. None of the other perspectives speak about the agencies of the movement, even the individualistic insight. The prominent role of the three Ays in leading the revolution from its preliminary stages to the level of establishment of the parliament is neglected by the other approaches. As described on the section on actors and behaviours, without their efforts discontented people could not find their way to the goals of the movement. The asylum seeking by the leaders and the distributors of the revolution in the Small Migration and the Great Migration were the most important elements of the

revolution, which combined with the great outburst of the people and closure of the bazaar in both cases causing the government to withdraw. This part of the revolution can only be explained and analysed through using our theory which deals with the role of the actors of the movement.

In the Constitutional Revolution the opposition between dowlat and mellat (state and people) made a clear distinction between the two groups of political activists. The courtiers (darbari) were against the people. Anybody who was with the state was considered as a courtier and those who were with the people were considered as melli (belongs to the people). Even those ulama who were in co-operation with the government, such as Mirza Abol-Qasem Imam Jomaa of Tehran, were considered and acted as darbari (belongs to the court). This type of conflict between the two social classes was not the cause of the revolution, although the conflict theory perspective would suggest this. This type of conflict constituted the social context and the environment of the revolution. Moreover, our analysis shows that it was one of the causes of the revolution, without such a conflict no movement could be imagined.

The state sought to establish a powerful centralised government and, therefore, intended to restrain the authority of the ulama who were very close to the people and had the position of the community leaders in every part of the country. Enforcing such reforms by the state caused the ulama and the people to remain against it. They could not trust the political system due to its internal corruption. This struggle increased the brutal and despotic features of the state, and the people became more aggressive in demanding political reforms in their own right.

Ideology played a prominent role in the Constitutional Revolution as well. It has two subjective and objective features in the movement. The principles of Imamate and Divine Justice played their roles, subjectively, in agitating the people as well as providing a justification for the aims of the movement. The objective use of the Shiite ideology was through its organisation and rituals. Mosques, holy shrines, and religious schools were proper locations for the people and the ulama to distribute their ideas and

to show their oppositions by delivering speeches, issuing proclamations, and holding demonstrations. Ideology served the movement as the solidarity factor as well.

Finally, it should be emphasised that there were two ideological lines in the revolution. First, the religious interpretation of justice, which was followed by the ulama and the people, and, second, democratic ideology which was believed by the modern intellectuals participating in the revolution mostly as the distributors. The religious group sought establishment of the Islamic Justice House Assembly, and the intelligentsia demanded the parliament. In mass demonstrations the slogans were for the Islamic Justice House but at the time of decision making, as there was no clear idea about how this justice house could be designed and operate, the idea of the practised parliament in western societies was enforced. The religious ideology had a very clear idea about justice, and it was one of the main principles of the Shiite beliefs, but how it could be practised in form of a political structure was not clear. Hence the demand for the House of Justice turned to the establishment of the parliament which in the political life of the European countries was the main tool of the participation of the people in the political activities and thereby enforcement of their interests. They asked for the parliament but with the prefix of *Islami* to rule the Shara (Islamic) laws all over the country: 'Islamic Justice House Assembly' in Ay Tabataba'ii's language, and 'Islamic Parliament (*Majles-e Showray-e Islami*)' in Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah's order (Kermani 1371 AHS, 381, 476).

Chapter Seven

The 15th of Khordad Movement

Introduction:

This chapter, in the same way as the preceding case studies, will explain the 15th of Khordad Movement according to our theory and individualism, relationism and social determinism perspectives. Historical resources on the 15th of Khordad Movement are scarce. This study's secondary data mostly relies on the following scholars: Algar (1991) explains the role of the religious forces in the twentieth century Iran; Madani (1361 AHS) is another writer who reports the events from the point of view of opposition groups, as does our other source: I.P.O. (1991); Abrahamian (1982) looks at the occurrences from a conflict theory perspective; and Katouzian (1982) deals chiefly with the political economy of the time.

The Synthetic View:

The operational model of our theory will be applied to the 15th of Khordad Movement in this section. Accordingly, we will show that the modernisation programmes of the Shah was rejected by Ay Khomeini's Islamic ideas in the broad context of the conflict between the shah and the ulama's authority. The ideology of the movement in its succeeding phases was based on Ay Khomeini's declarations in: forbidding participation in the referendum of the White Revolution, rejecting loyalty to the Shah, and showing objection to his secular reforms. Ay Khomeini participated in the 15th of Khordad Movement as its leader; his close followers from the ulama and mojtaheds were the distributors; his Shiite followers and the followers of the other involved mojtaheds acted as the executors. The followers, protesting against the Shah's reforms

and Alam's government, pursued their religious duty as defined by Ay Khomeini in different stages of the movement. However, they were harshly suppressed by the troops on 15th of Khordad, while they were not well organised. Their leaders were arrested, and many of the ulama withdrawn from the movement. In the light of the operational model of our theory, the following sections will analyse the 15th of Khordad Movement in more detail.

The Social Context:

Despite Pahlavi's efforts to weaken the religious structure of Iran, the opposition between the state and the ulama was still intact at the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement. As was noted in the two previous chapters, there were two important competing authorities in the Iranian political system: the authority of the shah which was a traditional historical one, and the authority of the ulama that was socially established in Iran at the time of Safavid dynasty as the representatives of the Hidden Imam of Shiites. The first authority was the surrogate of the power elite or the upper class and the second one was adhered to by the commoners or the lower class of the Persian society. At the time, the formal domain of the religious authority had largely been taken over by the state. Although a new middle class was emerging, the orthodox bipolar social stratification was still dominant.

Through his modernisation plans, Reza Shah caused the religious organisation to lose many of its roles and much of its formal authority. Algar describes the modernisation programmes of Reza Shah from the religious peoples' point of view: 'The sixteen years of rule by the first Pahlavi can fairly be described as a period of intense hostility to Islamic culture and institutions; what western authors have approvingly called "reform" and "modernisation" was experienced by many - if not most - Iranians as a brutal assault on their culture, traditions and identity' (Algar 1991, 739). Change in the legal system of the country can be given as an example.²⁷ Reza Shah's intention was not to ban the ulama from the courts but to assure that supervision of the legal system was

under the full control of his government. He also imposed further cultural reforms to reduce the sphere of religious authority to the benefit of the new political realm. Algar explains the situation in the following:

'Reza Shah was not content to exclude the ulama from the administration of law. In 1928, a law was passed providing for state examination of religious students and the licensing of religious teachers. Taken further by a law in 1931 that provided for the establishment of a syllabus for all *madrāsas*, this was an unprecedented attempt to carry the hegemony of the state into the very heart of the religious institution. In December 1928, Reza Shah promulgated (in imitation of Atatürk, his mentor in many such matters) the Uniform Dress Law which made it obligatory for men to wear a round peaked cap; exempted only were religious scholars and students whose status, in this case too, the government took it upon itself to confirm. Still more offensive to most of contemporary Iranian opinion was the compulsory uncovering of women which was decreed in a law promulgated on 7 January 1936 and enforced with considerable vigour. Finally, mention may be made of the Endowments Law of November, 1934 which gave the state wide discretionary power to intervene in the administration of the *auqaf* and assume functions formerly fulfilled by the ulama.

'In addition to all these measures, religious ceremonies, especially those connected with the commemoration of Imam Hossein's martyrdom at Karbala, were subject to harassment or outright prohibition; this was true even of Qum and Mashhad. The whole Pahlavi enterprise was, moreover, under girded with the attempt to create a surrogate, state-sanctioned culture, based on a cult of modernism and ethnic nationalism, that was designed to destroy by attrition the cultural hegemony of Islam in Iran' (Algar 1991, 741-742. Original italics.).

The religious organisation reacted to these measures as detailed by Algar:

'In effect, although not in intention, the most important response of the ulama to the policies of Reza Shah was the renewal and development of the religious teaching institution (*hauza*) in Qum by Shaikh Abd al-Karim Hairi. His scholarly and administrative achievements, amplified and confirmed by those of Ayatullah Burujirdi, enabled Qum to become a bastion first of Islamic learning and then of Islamic militancy, thus defying the secularising tendencies of the two Pahlavis' (Algar 1991, 743).

By not getting involved in the political activities, the two Ayatollahs built up the *Howzeh* (religious teaching institution) to protect Islamic rules and traditions. Both of them were the marja' of the vast majority of the Shiites of their own time and strengthened their authority as the religious leaders through the educational institution.

The nature of the state's legitimacy, as it was the case in Qajar era, comes from its coercive power. However, in comparison with the former dynasty, its influence was more widespread, because of the suppression of the other authorities belonging to the ulama, landlords, and tribe-leaders. Although it was 'parliamentary legislation' which was propagated, everything was transmitted from the top of the hierarchy and the people followed by dictat. However, there was a brief interlude of freedom during and after the second world war which caused the emergence of new Islamic and secular parties and groups. All of them were suppressed after 1953 coup. (See Appendix X and chapter nine for more details.)

Due to the modernisation programmes of the Pahlavi dynasty, a new middle class was emerging in the cities, especially in Tehran. Almost all of them had received modern education and were employees of the government in the modern established institutions. This class was mostly affiliated to the state rather than the commoners, especially the administrative officials among them. The rest of the lower class of the society were in their previous traditional positions. In order to change the traditional institutions, a new plan under the title of the 'White Revolution' was designed by Mohammed Reza Shah's state which transformed the country into a pseudo-capitalist one. The main emphasis of the programme was on the land reform, privatisation of state owned factories and participation of the women in social activities.²⁸

According to Katouzian, the Shah could benefit from these reforms in several ways. 'The 'revolution', would, *and did*, present him as a powerful and progressive leader to the outside world; rally the (apolitical) Iranian peasantry to his side, at least for a crucial period; eliminate the landlords, together with their power base, as a class; restrict traditionally autonomous and potentially dangerous communities such as the *bazaar* and, especially, the religious leaders; and throw into confusion the broadly democratic and, particularly, left-wing opposition, (Katouzian 1982, 225. Original italics.).

Abrahamian notes that the land reform did not have a radical content, and was organised in Amini's administration (Abrahamian 1982, 424). It involved land distribution according to which the landlords were supposed to join the new middle class of the society to be the new share holding stratum by investing their assets in the factories. Katouzian explains the landlord's opposition to the land reform and their position in the 15th of Khordad Movement as follows.

'The landlords realised that the White Revolution would spell doom for themselves not only in pure economic terms, but also in the broader sociological scene: that is, it would eliminate them as a powerful socio-economic class. Their old-school political allies - ...- were also unhappy. But the most important challenge to His Majesty's White Revolution came from the religious community' (Katouzian 1982, 227).

Some of the religious leaders and political activists of the country showed their disagreement with the programme. The slogan of the latter was against dictatorship and not especially against the reforms, while the complaint of the religious leaders was that the programme was anti-Islamic (Abrahamian 1983, 461) (Algar 1991,753). The Shah did not consider the ulama's opposition to be serious (Fardoost 1369 AHS, 510). According to the proclamations of Ay Khomeini (Appendices II-IV), the un-Islamic nature of the programme and its potential to increase dependence were at the basis of the uprising of a group of ulama against the Shah's regime. Their first intention was to oppose the referendum as an illegal act, but this aim changed to opposition to the White Revolution and the Shah's government as a whole .

The Islamic, anti-dependence and anti-dictatorship intentions of the opposition were interpreted and propagated by the government to be the opposition of a handful of 'black reactionaries'. In Hambly's words: 'The government directed this opposition as "black reaction", the work of a handful of reactionary clerics opposed to the extension of women's rights and the prospect of losing *vaqf* income. The opposition was in fact much broader than either the government admitted or foreign observers realised. It objected not so much to reform as to the way in which the shah was using the widespread desire for social amelioration to legitimise his autocracy' (Hambly 1991, 279. Original italic.).

According to Abrahamian a range of different strata participated in the movement. The protesters of June 1963 included 'thousands of shopkeepers, clergymen, office employees, teachers, students, wage earners, and unemployed workers [who] poured into the streets to denounce the shah. The call for the denouncing came from the guild leaders, the Bazaar merchants, the National Front, and, most significant of all, a new figure in the opposition - Ayatollah Khomeini' (Abrahamian 1982, 424). Therefore, the participants were mostly from the lower class and the lower stratum of the new emerging middle class and led predominantly by the religious opposition. What were the characteristics of this opposition? The following section aims to address this question.

The Opposition:

In the 15th of Khordad Movement the opposition consisted of several groups, the most distinguished of which was the clergy. Other elements included the bazaar and some political organisations established mostly by the modern educated political oppositions in recent decades with chiefly nationalist affiliations. But over all, 'during Muharram 1963, it was the religious leaders and not the political parties that inspired and encouraged the masses' (Abrahamian 1982, 461, Quoted from "The Lessons of 1963", Khabarnameh, 7 (July 1969), 1-2). This opposition was against the Shah's government which it regarded as being backed by imperialism.

The religious organisation constituted the main body of the movement. It was very small compared with what it had been at the turn of the century. Due to the modernisation programmes adopted after the Constitutional Revolution, the religious organisation had lost many of its functions. With the modernisation of the country's education system only religious studies remained the responsibility of the clergymen. The rest of the system was controlled by the state in a secular manner. The Shara' and urf courts were converted into state courts under the control of the Ministry of Justice. Rules and regulations adopted by the parliament or/and state legislative organisations

managed almost all social affairs of the Iranian population without any need to refer to the clergy, except in some small towns or villages that were outside of the direct influence of the governmental organisations. Following the mojtaheds was limited to personal practices of prayers, fasting, and paying Khoms and Zakat by the religious people. Some endowments were still under the direction of the ulama. The only institutions that remained under the control of the ulama were the mosques, Holy Shrines, marriage rituals, and some other ceremonies such as mourning for Imam Hossein. The mourning ceremonies, which had been banned at the time of Reza Shah, began at the time of Mohammad Reza Shah (Algar 1991, 745) and were held in Hosseinies, mosques, Holy Tombs, houses, and streets. However, the mourning groups of each district of a city were reduced to less than a handful.

Each province had one or several distinguished mojtahed but due to the improvement of the means of communication people mostly referred to their marja, not necessarily resident in their province. At the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement no single marja was followed by the majority of Shiites. Ay Borujerdi, who had had such a position, passed away in April 1961 (Farvardin 1340 AHS). The people were in the process of choosing their new marja. There were some well-known candidates like Ays Khomeini, Shariatmadary, Golpaygani, and Marashi Najafi in Qom, Behbahani, and Khansary in Tehran, Mohallati in Shiraz, Qomi and Milani in Mashhad, and Hakim and Koi in Najaf (Madani 1361 AHS Vol I, 362-385) (Algar 1991, 751).

From the beginning, especially during the recent movement against the 'provincial and district approval' of Alam's government (see Appendix V), all of the above mentioned mojtaheds acted together. But, while the 15th of Khordad Movement was going on, Ay Khomeini was assisted by only a few of them because of the harm which was associated with political opposition at the time. Thus, only a small section of the religious structure, which was under the influence of a few marja, participated in the movement. Ay Khomeini's complaint about the silence of Qom and Najaf in one of his speeches reflects the position (IPO 1991, 89-90)²⁹.

The bazaar and guild organisation were active within the movement as well. Alongside the clergy and the bazaar there was another group supporting the movement. It was the Liberation Movement of Iran (*Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran*), headed mainly by Ay Taleqani, *Bazargan* and *Dr. Yadollah Sahabi*. According to Abrahamian, it attracted 'a number of young professionals and radical technocrats, who, although modern educated, sought to synthesise Islam and Western sciences' (Abrahamian 1982, 462). Ay Taleqani was the founder of the National Resistance Movement (*Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli*) (Algar 1991, 750) and the head of *Hedayat* Mosque, while Bazargan taught at the University of Tehran, and was the founder of the Islamic Student Society of the university (*Anjoman-e Daneshjooyan-e Mosalman-e Daneshgah-e Tehran*). They established the Liberation Movement of Iran with the collaboration of Dr. Yaddollah Sahabi, who was a professor of geology at the University of Tehran (Abrahamian 1982, 462). They mobilised the students and modern educated people in support of the aims of the movement through the Hedayat Mosque and the University of Tehran. Their organisation was officially banned after the movement's demise.

There was a political alliance between the modern educated opposition parties and groups of the country called the Second National Front. This National Front (*Jebheye Melli*) involved the Iran Party (*Hezbe Iran*), the National Party (*Hezbe Melli*), the Socialist Society (*Jame-aye Socialistha*), and the Liberation Movement of Iran. The latter was in favour of an alliance with the anti regime ulama, and therefore, against the Shah's reforms. The slogan of the other organisations was 'Reform Yes, Dictatorship No' (Abrahamian 1982, 460-461). Apart from propagating this slogan, the National Front was not highly active in the movement. 'During the months of preparation for His Majesty's Revolution, the Front had passed no comment at all on the various 'principles', except that in its earlier little pamphlet it had implied that, since there had been no feudalism in Iran, a land reform would be meaningless' (Katouzian 1982, 226).

Ideology:

In the 15th of Khordad Movement some of the Shiites followed their mojtahed whom they considered to be the representative of the Hidden Imam. Ay Khomeini was a new emerging marja encouraging other ulama and his followers to act against the Shah's reforms through such Shiite traditions and rituals as delivering speeches, gathering in or banning mosques, participating in demonstrations, and shouting slogans particularly on religious occasions. The guidelines he presented expressed opposition to the referendum, the White Revolution programme, and the Shah's government through the movement. He used mostly religious occasions such as Moharram and Ashoora, Ramadan and the anniversary of the martyrdom of *Imam Jaafar-e Sadeq*, the sixth sinless Imam of Shiites, to justify his targets by Islamic values and advocated the defence of Islamic traditions and protecting the Shiite country from the influence of the aliens.

He publicised his reasons for disagreeing with the plebiscite and the government's programmes in a proclamation which was distributed in Tehran and other big cities of the country, and which motivated the religious people to respond (Appendix VI). This announcement constituted the ideological guidelines of his opposition to the referendum. In it he announced that he had warned the Shah, unsuccessfully, through his messenger, Mr. Behbudi, about the defects of the referendum and the programme. Then he continued: 'In my opinion referendum which has been named as a national plebiscite in order to overcome certain problems is contrary to the view of the ecclesiastical society of Islam and the decisive majority of the nation, provided intimidation or allurements is avoided and the people know what they were up to' (IPO 1991, 63). He listed his legal objections to the referendum as follows: '(1) Iranian laws do not provide for a referendum. ... (2) It is not known as to which authority is entitled to hold a referendum. ... (3) In countries where a referendum is a legal process, sufficient time is given to [the] nation to discuss each and every item of the proposal. ... (4) The voters should have sufficient knowledge to understand what they are going

to vote for. ... (5) The voting should take place in a free atmosphere' (IPO 1991, 63-64). He added that none of the three last conditions applied in Iran at the time. Ay Khomeini continued in the proclamation that if the Shah were really interested in reforms, the religious programmes should be adapted with collaboration of the ulama to gain the benefits and blessing of both this world and the world Hereafter. He concluded that the government programmes caused the spiritual leaders to feel a sense of danger for the Quran and the religion (IPO 1991, 64).

The referendum took place and Ay Khomeini used the occasion of the martyrdom of Imam Jaafar-e Sadeq which was concurrent with the celebration of the new year in Iran to agitate among the ulama and Moslem population of the country against the White Revolution plan. (See Appendix V for more details.) He distributed a proclamation in Qom and other big cities on the first night of the new year, announcing that the religious community was not going to celebrate this new year because of the anti-Islamic deeds of the government. In this proclamation he widened the ideology of the movement and emphasised the reasons for his objection to the reforms. According to him, these reforms were the cause of cultural corruption and dependency. He accused the government of being anti-Islamic, anti-Constitutional, and despotic and asked for its removal. He also warned the state of a revolution because of its ill-intentions (IPO 1991,75-76).³⁰

In order to neutralise the ideology of the movement the government argued that religion should be separate from politics. An article issued in the Ettelaat newspaper on March 6 is an example of this effort:

'... Religion and politics are two different components. Politics is the matter of every day life while the religion is an eternal subject. What is said today in politics may be changed tomorrow. On the contrary, the religious materials today are what it was yesterday and shall be the same for tomorrow and the days after. The effects and manifestations of the politics change with the time but the religion's effects and manifestations are not alterable. It is because religion superimposes itself on the time while politics is under the influence of it. Nowadays the people of Europe and America have reached the heights of civilisation. They arrived at the level of domination over the space in science and technology; whereas religion is their great moral and spiritual support. The church is the most esteemed and the most favoured place in these nations view. ...' (Ettelaat 1341 AHS, No. 11042).

The attack of the troops at Feiziyye, the major religious school of Qom, is one of the prominent events of this movement. It caused some of the ulama to retreat from their opposition, but Ay Khomeini accelerated his resistance. He issued a declaration (Appendix VII) rejecting loyalty to the Shah and forbidding the people from hiding their opposition to (*taqiye*) the state. In other words, according to him, from then on, all those who were not in agreement with the functions of the government should not hide their attitude, and ought to show their disagreement with the Shah's regime as a religious duty. Not showing their disagreement was considered to be committing a sin and would have punishment on the day Hereafter. This announcement developed the ideology of the movement into an anti-regime outburst. He condemned the attack on the School as a supportive act to the Shah and oppressive to a Shiite centre: 'Loyalty to the Shah means destruction, insult to Islam, aggression on the rights of Muslims and attack on the centres of knowledge and learning'. He forbade the hiding of opposition to the state, because of the threat to Islam: 'The Qur'an and the religion are facing a threat. In such a situation *taqiyyah* is *haram* and it is *wajib* [religious obligation] to state the facts (whatever might happen)' (IPO 1991, 86. Original italics.). He accused Alam's government of attacking the bazaar and Feiziyye, the people, and the ulama in another part of this proclamation (IPO 1991, 86).

Moharram 1383 AHL was another occasion for mobilising the Moslem people in support of the Shiite belief. The government announced its policies intended to prevent any type of opposition. 'The religious preachers were ... called to the SAVAK and they were told to observe the following three factors: 1. Not to say anything against the first person of the country. 2. Not to say anything against Israel. 3. Not to constantly preach to the people that Islam was in danger' (IPO 1991,107). On the contrary, Ay Khomeini made a speech before his followers in Feiziyye on Ashoora (Appendix VIII), which shows clearly how he combined the religious concepts with the political ones and expressed his anti-regime idea. Some parts of his speech are as follows:

'It is the afternoon of the day of 'Ashura' ... At times when I think about the events that took place on the day of 'Ashura', a question comes in my mind that if the Umayyads and the regime of Yazid ibn Mu'awiyah were bent upon fighting Husayn (AS) only, why did they let loose the barbaric and

inhuman treatment towards the unprotected women and innocent children? What was the fault of the women and the children? ... In my view they were concerned with the very foundation. The Umayyads and Yazid's government were opposed to the Prophet's (AS) family. ... The same question is here. The despotic regime of Iran was in conflict with the *maraji' al-taqlid*. It is opposed to the '*ulama*' of Islam. What did they have to do with the Qur'an? ... What did they have to do with the students of Islamic theology and divine sciences? ... (IPO 1991, 101. Original italics.).

Ay Khomeini also added: 'We come to the conclusion that they are concerned with the base. They are opposed to the very foundation of Islam and the clergy'. He accused the attackers of the Feiziyye as the agents of Israel and said that Israel intended to destroy the Islamic Ummah and its economy in order to take them under control. Then he advised the Shah not to follow such a policy and attitude. He also criticised SAVAK for enforcing the above mentioned limitations on the religious speakers, and said that these three are our main problems how we can not speak about them? He finished his speech with the following sentences: 'We are very worried about the affairs of Iran on account of the conditions of this worn out country, on account of this government and its censor officials and authorities. We pray to the Almighty Allah to improve the affairs' (IPO 1991, 101-104).

In this section, it has been explained that, using the current legal context of the country and Islamic values and principles, Ay Khomeini developed the ideology of the movement from opposition to the referendum to an anti-regime protest. According to his fatva (declaration), the followers ought to avoid participation in the referendum and, in the second stage, should not have loyalty to the Shah and should not hide their disagreement with his plans, otherwise they were committing a sin and must be prepared to defend themselves at the Divine Court. At the final step, his fatva announced that the followers must oppose the Shah's government. The next section will deal with the actors and their behaviour within the movement.

Actors and Behaviours:

The leading personality of the religious community's opposition was Ay Khomeini. He announced his disagreement with the referendum by providing a clarification sought by a group of faithful of Tehran. As leader of the movement he was assisted by some leading mojtaheds and the other clergymen and tollab who were his students or followers and who served as the distributors of his messages and aims. They agitated the people through mosques and religious ceremonies, especially mourning ceremonies for Imam Hossein in Moharram, in different cities, but mostly in Qom and Tehran. The bazaar and guild organisations were under their influence. The Liberation Movement of Iran, which regulated the opposition groups of the religious students and some religious modern educated people - i.e. not clerics, acted as distributors as well.

Katouzian denotes that 'the leadership was passed on to the religious community because of the traditional role and significance of Shi'ism and its leaders as a powerful autonomous social force; because of the clarity of mind of religious leaders and the faithful regarding the nature of the events - a clarity that was in total contrast to the confusion of the National Front leaders (and the Tudeh Party leadership); and the historical, moral and physical courage of leading religious figures, most notably Ayatullah Khomains's' (Katouzian 1982, 228).

After Ay Khomeini's forbidden statement against the referendum, the bazaar was closed and demonstrators were gathered in the house of two leading mojtaheds of Tehran Ays Khansari and Behbahani. Behbahani and Khansari both expressed opposition to the referendum. On this occasion the mojtaheds and the clergy speaker of Tehran acted as distributors and the demonstrating people were the followers. (See Appendix V for more details.)

Ay Khomeini as the leader of the movement asked all of the ulama not to attend the mosques on the holy month of Ramadan. This ban did not last long however. On the

occasion of the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Jaafar-e Sadeq, which was concurrent with the New Year ceremonies, he sent a telegram to the ulama of the provinces announcing the 'public mourning' instead of celebrations. This telegram declared that the provincial ulama should enlighten the people about the dangers confronted by Islam and the Moslem nation. (See Appendix V for more details.) Consequently they played the role of distributors for the movement.

The event of Feiziyye caused some of the ulama to refrain from showing their opposition. However, Ay Khomeini forbade people from hiding their opposition to the state, and asked them to participate in protests. Forty days after the government's attack on Feiziyye, Ay Khomeini distributed a proclamation against the Shah's regime and there were some mourning ceremonies in Qom, Tehran and many other cities. The police attacked one of the ceremonies and banned any others. Many of the ulama who could have acted as distributors, however, did not participate at this last stage of the movement and withdrew gradually. (See Appendix V for more details.)

Another distributing group besides the ulama, as mentioned before, was the Liberation Movement of Iran. 'Hedayat Mosque ... was a meeting centre for a small group of radical clergymen' (Abrahamian 1982, 458) which became a centre for the 'Liberation Movement'. This organisation was responsible for mobilising the students and other modern educated people, especially on 14th and 15th of Khordad.

On these two days the role of the people was very prominent. In Qom as well as in other cities, there was a gathering of religious people, on Ashoora, 13th of Khordad. There were some rumours that the military troops were going to attack the demonstrators in Qom. In order to make the most of this day, Ay Khomeini had gone to one of the mosques in each district of the city every night from the beginning of the Moharram. He invited the ulama to gather in Feiziyye Madrese on the tenth of Moharram, and he intended to express his ideas about the government and the Shah's reforms there. The demonstration in Tehran was huge. The demonstrators shouted 'death to this dictator' when passing by the Shah's palace. There were grieving ceremonies in other cities of the country too. The peak point of the movement was the

people's reaction to the arrest of Ay Khomeini and other ulama from Qom, Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz, and Mashhad, on the 15th of Khordad which led to many being killed or arrested. The bazaar was closed for 14 days. (See Appendix V for more details.)

The Movement:

At the beginning of the movement the forbidden statement of Ay Khomeini against the referendum led to the bazaar being closed by the bazaaris themselves, and demonstrators gathered in the house of one of the leading mojtaheds of Tehran, Ay Khansari. The demonstration took place in several streets besides the bazaar and in the house of Ay Behbahani the other established mojtaheds of the capital. Falsafi spoke against the referendum. Behbahani and Khansari, also, opposed the referendum, and it was announced in that demonstration that the market would be closed for three days (Madani 1361 AHS, 14).

The referendum took place, regardless of the opposition of the religious centres and groups, on 26 January 1963. Ay Khomeini continued his opposition to the White Revolution programme by announcing lamentation for the beginning of the spring which Iranians traditionally celebrate as the beginning of the new Islamic solar year. On 22 March 1963, there was a mourning and protest congregation in Feiziyye. Government agents attacked the ceremony and in a heavy clash with clerical students many were killed by shooting, and religious books were set on fire. In order to reduce the aggression of the people following the attack on a religious school, the government announced that the clash was between peasants, who agreed with the land reform, and clergymen who were against it. Ay Khomeini, in order to increase the agitation of the people, said this was an obvious attack on the religious schools and religion, and stated that the widespread opposition to the Shah's regime should be shown. Few of the ulama followed him, both because of an idea of the separation of politics and religion, and threats from the regime (IPO 1991, 89-90). (See Appendix V for more details.)

Due to the depoliticisation of the ulama the title of 'political clergy' was considered as an insult to them (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol I, 372). Later on, the Shah denied the anti religiosity of the reforms, speaking in the holy city of Mashhad (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 24-28).

Moharram 1383 AHL was another occasion for agitating the Moslem people according to the beliefs of Shiism. The government announced its policies for this month in order to prevent any type of opposition. Meanwhile, the radio and the newspapers, which were under the control of the regime, were promoting the White Revolution and the new horizon it was opening for the Iranian nation by the reforms (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 34). Ay Khomeini invited the ulama to gather in Feiziyye Madrese on Ashoora. The head of the SAVAK of Qom told him, on behalf of the Shah, not to give any speech on that occasion or the commandos would attack the school (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 36-37). In that ceremony Ay Khomeini compared the attack of the Shah's troops on Feiziyye with that of Yazid to Imam Hossein and his family in Karbala and criticised the Shah's reforms and SAVAK (IPO 1991, 101-104). There was a massive demonstration in Tehran on the same day. One day later, there was a huge gathering in Tehran. Demonstrators passed several streets, moving towards the University of Tehran and shouting for the leadership of Ay Khomeini and against the dictatorship of the Shah. The university was closed. The demonstrators passed the Marmar Palace and, as in the previous day, screamed "Death to this dictator" (Rowhani 1356 AHS, 440-443).

At midnight the police and the military troops rushed to Ay Khomeini's house in Qom and arrested him. Early in the morning of 15th of Khordad the people of Qom crowded in the tomb of *Hazrate Maasome* shouting for his release. The ulama gathered in Ay Golpaygani's house and asked for his freedom through issuing an announcement. The market was closed, and military troops attacked the people in the streets. Fighting with troops went on until five o'clock in the afternoon when the people withdrew (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 45-46). In Tehran the riot was fierce. Besides the religious people of the city many had come from nearby villages. They rushed to the radio station, the administrative offices and police stations and set some military trucks on fire (Madani

1361 AHS, Vol II, 46-47). There were riots reported as well in other big cities of the country like Mashhad, Tabriz, Isfahan and Shiraz. Between 4 and 15 thousand, according to different reports, were killed in the demonstrations of that day (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 46). Many of the ulama and the demonstrators were arrested.

The market of Tehran was closed for 14 days. The leading ulama gathered in Tehran and asked for the release of Ay Khomeini, and many of the ulama sent telegrams to Tehran demanding his freedom. On 29 Tir 1342 AHS (20 July 1963) some of the arrested ulama were set free. It was supposed that Ay Khomeini would be banished from the country. Many proclamations were issued by the ulama in order to prevent his banishment (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol II, 54). Ay Khomeini was released on 2 August 1963, but he was kept under arrest with Ay Qomi and Ay Mohallati, who were jailed with him, in a district of Tehran. Four months after the 15th of Khordad, on the 15th of Mehr 1342 AHS (7 October 1963), the government let the three mojtaheds go back to their native cities (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 59). Overall Ay Khomeini was under severe surveillance for ten months.

The movement failed for several reasons. According to Fardoost, the head of the Special Intelligence Office (*Dartar-e Vizhe-ye Ettelaat*) of the Shah at the time, if the demonstrators had been organised they could have won the battle on the 15th of Khordad (Fardoost 1369 AHS, 513). The Bazaar and the religious organisation, the main distributing structures, just agitated the people to complain against the Shah's programmes. What caused them not to follow a clear goal was the fluid definition of the aims in the ideology which could not give a concrete direction to the followers at the final stage of the movement. The designed aims of the protestations were not able to persuade all or enough ulama and other groups of opposition too. The first purpose, not participating in the referendum, was clear. But non-committed followers of the mojtaheds from the new emerging middle class and the new or potential land owning peasants backed the state in partaking in the plebiscite, and according to the official news five million and six hundred thousands voted for the programme. The second and the third phases' objectives of the movement declared merely to show the opposition and protest against the Shah's reforms. The committed people expressed their

disagreement and the troops crushed them. The leading mojtaheds were arrested and the people shot down in the streets. There was no other destination to follow and the leader and some of the main distributors were in jail. The final protest against the ulama's arrest took the shape of a riot and was harshly oppressed by the troops. According to Fardoost, the Shah and the foreign embassies in Tehran considered the movement to be a broad organised attempt to overthrow the regime. While, on the contrary, there was no preparation for such an accomplishment in the opposition groups (Fardoost 1369 AHS, 513-514). Many of the ulama, and accordingly their followers, did not participate in the movement.

Other Perspectives:

This section assesses the individualistic, relationistic, and social deterministic views in relationship to the 15th of Khordad Movement. 'How' and 'why' this social movement had occurred will be discussed in order to highlight the usefulness of the synthetic analysis. An individualist interpretation of the movement could be used to examine the chronology and the religious nationalist psycho-social atmosphere of the movement. The relationist approach might emphasise the religious organisation as the prominent mobilisation factor, and the Shiite identity of the participants which unified them in the protest. The social deterministic perspective might focus on the structural strain caused by the modernisation programme in the traditional system of the society. The cultural struggle between the modernism and traditionalism could be emphasised using the conflict theory perspective. The social/political struggle among the state's authority and religious authority may also relate to another aspect of conflict.

Individualism:

Using the individualistic insight of Toch, the 15th of Khordad Movement took place because of a group of religious people's 'susceptibility' to some modernisation activities of the government, predominantly the White Revolution, and the potential influence of the USA and Israel on the Iranian affairs. The susceptible population was gathered together by the use of Shiite ideology and appealed against the referendum, the White Revolution programme, and the Shah's regime. The regime was able to oppress them because it convinced the majority of the ulama, by encouraging some and threatening the others, not to interfere in political affairs.

There are some questions about the social conditions, organisation, and ideology of the movement that this perspective is not able to answer fully. This standpoint is able to give an overt chronological view of the events of the movement but cannot analyse the events according to the social political factors of the society. It does not report the interrelationship between the factors either. Why was the Shiite ideology chosen for acting against the referendum and other targets of the movement? Why did a clergyman become the leader of the movement? Why were the other political activists of the country not participating in the movement? Was it true that the regime was against Islamic values or dependent upon the USA, or was this notion of dependency due to the suspicions of the leader and the participants of the movement? The state tried, through its propaganda, to reduce the people's frustration, but did not succeed, especially for Ay Khomeini and his followers.

Relationism:

The mobilising factor is the most important aspect in the view of the relationist theorists. At the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement, a group of people were

susceptible to participating in protest against the state because of some of its anti-religious activities and the increase in the USA's influence in the internal affairs of the country. This was their 'state of feeling'. Their 'belief' was in Shiism and a mojtahed was agitating them on the basis of this belief. Their 'collective identity' was mostly Shiism, which served the movement not merely as an identity but an 'ideology'. The core 'organisation' that mobilised the population was the religious one.

Following Wilson's theory we might argue that in the 15th of Khordad Movement the Shiites were supposed to follow their mojtahed who was considered as the representative of the Hidden Imam. Shiism was the total belief of the followers of Ay Khomeini as an emerging marja; this ideology served as the means of consistency between his followers; and it showed how to act in a collective form - gathering in mosques, participating in demonstrations, and shouting the same slogans.

Applying Blumer's interpretation of ideology, the 'direction' of the movement was determined by the marja-e-taqlid (Ay Khomeini), and followers were supposed to follow his guidelines. The commands were: objecting to the referendum, White Revolution programme, and the Shah's regime. Defending Islam which, according to their leader, was in danger, served as a means of 'justification' for participating in the movement, as well as protecting their country from alien influence, as Ay Khomeini declared in his speeches. Their weapons of attack and defence were participation in demonstrations, shouting slogans, gathering in mosques, closing their shops and attacking the troops and government offices in a collective form and on religious occasions, especially Ashoora. And their 'inspiration and hopes' were to protect their religion, fulfil their religious duty to have God's blessing, and to abolish the dictatorship of the Shah and influence of imperialism.

Both scholars elaborate this concept more than the others and they emphasis on the determination of the direction of the movement by ideology. However, according to them ideology is an abstract entity. For Wilson it mostly serves as a mobilisational factor with few references to its organising capacity, and Blumer presents a descriptive impression of this term.

Tilly's Perspective:

Using Tilly's perspective, identifying the 'interests' could enable us to see 'why' the 15th of Khordad Movement took place, and looking for 'organisation' and 'mobilisation' might provide us with the answer to 'how' this movement occurred. In summary, a mojtahed used his religious authority, benefited by the opportunities of the religious ceremonies and facilities such as distribution of proclamations, telegrams, and religious speakers in mosques and holy tombs, agitated people against imperialism and the Shah's referendum, White Revolution, and the regime in accord with their Shiite beliefs, through the religious organisation of the time. Threats from the government caused the other mojtaheds to step back and the people to withdraw, because of the killings on the 15th of Khordad. Those aspects of repression, like the label of 'political clergy' and the arrest and imprisonment of the active and leading mojtaheds, reduced the number of mojtaheds willing to become active in the movement.

Looking for 'interest' as the result of the production relations, as Tilly expresses it, should lead us to the group or groups who were mostly suffering from the changes that were emerging from the White Revolution reforms. The only economic group whose interests were under threat by this programme were traditional landlords called 'feudals' by the Shah. However, as we have seen in our analysis of the movement in the earlier sections of this chapter, they were not even among the protesters, let alone the leadership. Regardless of Tilly's theory, it was not the production relations which formed the 'interest' of the participants of the movement, but this outburst was a socio-political reaction to the modernisation programmes and the political influence of the USA and Israel, as it was claimed by Ay Khomeini in his speeches.

The 'mobilisation' of the clergymen and masses took place through the leadership of Ay Khomeini through proclamations and speeches delivered in the religious occasions by means of the described 'organisation'. A part of the religious organisation was the main body of the movement and was very small compared with what it had been at the turn

of the nineteenth century. The main incentive for 'mobilisation' of the population was their Shiite belief. Following their mojtahed and experiencing their religious rituals, according to the clergymen's instructions, caused the people to participate in the demonstrations and close the markets.

How the 15th of Khordad Movement took place is well described in this view, although it does not look at prominent personalities of the movement. Using this theory the starting point of the movement would appear to be vague. There is not enough explanation provided by adopting this approach about why this movement took place. Why were the clergymen leading and agitating the people? Why did Shiism become the ideology or the belief of the participants of the movement? Under which condition(s) did the people participate in the movement? These are some of the questions that Tilly's theoretical perspective is not able to clarify.

Melucci's Perspective:

Regarding Melucci's theory in analysing this movement, the 'collective identity' of the participants is the main concept of the model. We have seen how Shiism was the dominant ideology of the protesters and they were following the guidelines of their marja about their religion and home country. Thus, this movement can be considered to have been an Islamic one with a 'collective identity' of Shiism with some emphasis on the Iranian nationality. Those Shiite principles which were dominant over the movement were: following the religious fatvas of a marja, following the example of Imam Hossein in protesting against an un-Islamic ruler, and participating in Imam Hossein's mourning ceremonies in Moharram, especially on Ashoora.

The 'collective identity' acts in a three polar system, according to Melucci's theory. In the 15th of Khordad Movement 'goals' were banning the plebiscite that was announced by the Shah; opposing the White Revolution programme because of it being a threat to the Shiite country's political and social affairs; and at the last stage opposition to the Shah's regime which was acting against Islamic traditions and nationalism of a Moslem

country by following the influence of foreign policies of the USA and Israel. The 'means' of the movement, using Melucci's approach, were religious rituals and organisation. The 'environment' was a part of the system too (Melucci 1989, 27). The environment of the 15th of Khordad Movement could be considered as follows. It was soon after the Ay Borujerdi's death that the 15th of Khordad Movement took place. Ay Borujerdi was the marja of a vast majority of Shiites of his time. After his death, several other mojtaheds had the potentiality of being marja of the Shiites. Ay Borujerdi's policy was not to interfere in political affairs. Therefore, depolitisation of marja was the dominant environment. Ay Kashani who was active in politics and once the head of the parliament, about ten years previously, was one of the leaders of the oil nationalisation movement, but did not participate in politics thereafter, and died several months after Ay Borujerdi. The Shah was in power after the coup of 1953 with the assistance of American consultants and aids and his powerful SAVAK. In such an 'environment' Ay Khomeini attempted to lead the movement by the previously mentioned 'goals' and 'means'.

Following Melucci's perspective the 'solidarity', 'conflict', and 'breaking the limits of compatibility of the system' (Melucci 1989, 29) should be examined as well. The participants 'solidarity' was satisfied by their collective identity as followers of Shiism. Shiism served to bind the participants of the movement by their beliefs with the 'means' of religious rituals used into a new political way. The 'conflict' was going on between the religious community and the Shah over the social changes that the Shah aimed to bring about with the White Revolution in the Iranian society. The movement 'broke the limits of compatibility of the system' by opposing the prime minister - Alam, refusal of the ulama to receive the Shah in his trip to Qom, standing against the plebiscite, White Revolution programme, and the Shah's regime, and making a harsh riot in opposition of the arrest of the leaders of the movement. These caused the regime to use its oppressive power in opposition to religious leaders and masses, and at last, to remove them as obstacles to its reforms.

Melucci's perspective facilitates some analysis of 'how' the 15th of Khordad Movement took place without going into more detail about why it happened. The environment of

un-unified marja for the Shiites after Ay Borujerdi's death, depolitization of the ulama, and political dominance of Americans, along with the regime's reign of terror could only be considered superficially by this type of analysis. The role of the agencies of the movement is not dealt with fully either. Why did Ay Khomeini become the leader? Who helped him in the movement? How did the other agencies become able to agitate the people? The organisation of the movement is not described in detail by this perspective either. This part of the social movement is only discussed under the title of means without any other guideline of analysis. So, using Melucci's perspective analyses the 'how' question, but, it does not enable us to give sufficient attention to the social context, the role of agency, or details of the organisation of the movement.

Social Determinism:

The social deterministic perspective's emphasis is on the social conditions underlying the movement. In this section by following the concept of 'social condition', from different points of view, the most relevant deterministic theories will be examined.

The period of 1960-1963 was a stabilisation period for the Iranian economy. 'The previous boom, inflation and balance-of-payments deficit had forced the state to tighten credit, impose import surcharges, reduce public expenditure, and go begging abroad' (Katouzian 1982, 228-229). Meanwhile, the oil earnings were increasing year by year. The amount of \$34 million oil revenues in 1954-1955 increased to \$181 million in 1956-1957; and from \$358 million in 1960-1961 to \$437 million in 1962-1963 (Abrahamian 1982, 420, Quoted from Fesharaki 1976, 133). Therefore, 'the economy was depressed but not stagnant' (Katouzian 1982, 229). If this period of depression could be considered as a developmental gap, Davies' theory can be seen as more relevant to this case than to the other movements considered in this thesis. Katouzian further argues that 'a number of bankruptcies and bank failures' and a reduction in 'domestic saving and investment' occurred at this time, but due to the oil revenues expenditure there was a growth in manufacturing and construction, as

Katouzian reports (Katouzian 1982, 229). Therefore, there could have been a gap between 'need satisfaction', in Davies' terms, of a group of people, presumably the modern middle class, at the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement, but 'how much' it was the source of their agitation and 'how', is not clear. Davies's theory can just explain a part of the social context but not exactly 'why' and 'how' the movement took place.

The White Revolution programme was intended to bring a rather great change in values and norms of the society by the state. It was concerned with some dominant socio-economical norms and values. Changing the status of land ownership, and the status of women in society were two important targets of the programme. The first one was able to change the function and structure of the economic institution, and the second one was intended to bring some changes in the institution of the family. Thus Smelser's model will be investigated as a possible explanation of this movement.

The difference between the state and the ulama remained, but after the Constitutional Revolution, due to the modernisation process and the dictatorship of Reza Shah, the religious structure weakened. At the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement, due to the efforts of Ays Haeri and Borujerdi, the clergymen had gained back some of their former reputation and authority but not at a level comparable to that of their predecessors one hundred years previously. Thus, opposition between the state and the ulama was generally converted into the conflict between modernism and traditionalism, with the overall dominance of the first over the second. Touraine's approach would seem to be relevant in this context. Furthermore, there was a struggle between the state and the people in this social/political context, and Scott's perspective seems to be relevant as well.

Structural-Functionalist Perspective:

After the death of Ay Borujerdi in 1961, who had not been willing to participate in the political activities, a new generation of mojtaheds emerged to the political scene started by their disagreement with the provincial and district approval of the Alam's

government. This would appear to be the 'structural conduciveness' of the movement in Smelser's terms. When the Shah announced his White Revolution plan, which was considered by some to be against the Islamic traditions of the society, 'structural strain' emerged. The Shah tried to gain approval of his reforms, but some of the ulama, headed by Ay Khomeini, decided to oppose them. The Shah used all his power in the political system, and Ay Khomeini utilised the clergy system, some religious occasions, and the faithful followers. These religious occasions served the movement as the 'precipitating factors'. The 'generalised beliefs' of the faithful followers shaped against the regime by the Shiite beliefs in the clergymen's speeches. The Shah's regime was compared to the Bani-Ummayyed dynasty, that was against the household of the Prophet especially the first and the third Imams: Ali and Hossein. The 'mobilisation of participants for action' took place by distribution of the proclamations, sending telegrams, and delivering speeches, predominantly, by Ay Khomeini who agitated the people in order to fulfil the targets of the movement. In this process a part of the clergy system, the Islamic Student Society of the University of Tehran, the Liberation movement of Iran, the bazaar and guild organisation followed him in agitating the people and closing the shops. The regime applied its means of 'social control'. The SAVAK and troops were two important features of this. They investigated the active personalities and organisations of the movement. The SAVAK agents, at first, warned Ay Khomeini and the people directly or by distributing rumours about attacking the shops and ceremonies. Secondly, they attacked them and arrested the active ulama, students and politically active people. Killing the demonstrators after the arrest of the leader of the movement was the last and the most effective means of 'social control' that the state used to oppress the movement.

Although this shows how Smelser's model may be applied to this case, in this type of theory there is no explanation about the inter-relationship between the factors of the movement. There is not enough emphasis on the social context, organisation, and the actors of the movement either. According to this view, a section of the Shiite belief system became the 'generalised belief' of the movement, but, why did a part of the religious system respond to the reforms? Why was a great part of the religious system against the participation in political activities and a part for this movement? How did

the religious rituals become the precipitating factors of the movement? What was exactly the organisation of the movement? There are many questions in regard of the exact social context of the movement, its organisation, and the identity of each of its prominent factors in the network of the social system of Iranian society at the time of the movement that we can not find answers to them in this type of explanation of the movement.

Conflict Theorists' Perspective:

Touraine's analysis seems to be mostly relevant to the preconditions of the movement, rather than why it occurred. The modernisation plan of the Shah was a problem which concerned the whole society and caused the confrontation between the ulama, as the representatives of the traditions of the community, and the state. Since all preconditions of a revolutionary action, according to Touraine's theory, were there, the 15th of Khordad Movement took place. In this movement the 'committed population' was the Shiite community of Iran; it was 'organised' through the mourning ceremonies and groups, by the ulama, the Liberation Movement, and the Islamic Society of the Students of the University of Tehran; they were 'fighting against' the White Revolution programme introduced by the Shah; and it was a problem which 'concerned the whole Iranians', or at least the whole Shiite community of the Persian society.

In the 15th of Khordad Movement the 'identity' of the followers of Ay Khomeini was Shiism. The matter of concern was a national one which was looked at from the perspective of Shiism. The 'opposition' was the state which supported modernisation. The state opposed the people's traditional values by the planned reforms. The 'totality' of the Iranian society, Shiite community, which was more than ninety percent of the Iranian population, was generally concerned about the problem. The 'project level' of the movement was at the cultural or 'historicity' level, adopting Touraine's vocabulary, and it was a 'critical struggle' as it was in opposition to the political structure (Touraine 1981, 80-81). Therefore, it was a 'revolutionary action', according to the logic of Touraine's theory (Touraine 1981, 84-91).

How this outburst happened is not clear in this kind of interpretation. How did the social condition mobilise the movement? How did the leading agents organise the people? Why did the modern educated students participate in the movement? What was the nature of the modernity introduced by the Shah? What was the appeal of the traditionalists? Without referring to the other prominent factors of the movement, besides the social conditions, one can not find an adequate answer to these questions.

Scott's perspective places particular emphasis on the social context of social movements, and the logic of this analysis would suggest that the opposition between dowlat and mellat, converted into the difference between pro-modernism and pro-traditionalism, would be the cause of the movement in this instance. The White Revolution as a modernisation programme was opposed by the protectors of the traditional Islamic culture. This antagonism, shaped in the historical struggle between dowlat and mellat lay at the basis of the movement with the social closure of Shiite belief and articulation of religious organisations, ceremonies, and the bazaar .

At the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement the struggle between dowlat (state) and mellat (people) existed but the dowlat was much more organised and dominant. 'Social closure' was achieved through the religious beliefs. Following the marja as the representative of the Hidden Imam caused the faithful participants to join together in the matter of objecting to the state's reforms. The 'articulation of interests' of the people took place through the religious organisation and rituals. Comparing the present regime with Bani-Umayyed, and the position of the Shah with Yazid, caused the mellat to rise against the state, to close the bazaar and to participate in demonstrations. However, due to the weakness of the organisation of the revolutionaries and the dominance of the regime over the troops, this movement could not achieve its goals.

Reduction of the position of the opposition group in this movement to an interest group will lead us to an underestimation of their potential power. Moreover, there are some questions here to which one can not find the answers in this perspective. What

was the role of the actors of the movement? Were the Shiite beliefs only the social closure factor of the movement or something more? Was the diversity between *dowlat* and *mellat* the only cause of the movement or were there some other important factors which could be named among the causes such as the leadership and the content of the ideology?

Conclusion:

Looking at the social context of the movement our analysis has led us to a more realistic understanding of it. The difference between '*dowlat*' and '*mellat*' shaped the conflict between the authority of the shah and that of the ulama during the last one hundred years in Iran. The first to be representative of the upper class, and the second one to stand for the commoners or the lower class of the country. Converting this difference into the struggle between modernism and traditionalism, or opposition of an interest group to the state, as it was explained in the social deterministic insight of the movement, can not illustrate the full characteristics of the competing groups. For instance one missing aspect of such justifications is explained by Lambton. According to her, the initiator of the movement was 'injustice (*Zulm*) [which] had passed all reasonable bounds' alongside the oppositions to the land reform and women's rights (Lambton 1964, 120-121). From Ay Khomeini's point of view, suppression of the Islamic idea and the influence of imperialism through the reforms were the main reasons of the objections (see Appendices). This can be interpreted in the historical frame of objections of the ulama and the state in the way it was explained in our analysis. The anti-Islamic, dictatorial, nature of the Shah's reforms, and their dependency on the USA and oil revenues, prepared the social conditions for the confrontation of the two authorities.

In this opposition the Islamic camp had already lost many functions of its organisation and, thereby, a great deal of its power of influence and authority. Moreover, due to

depolitisation of the religious institutions, this structure did not participate in the movement to its full capacity. So, Ay Khomeini was backed only by a few established mojtahed and their followers. On the contrary, the Shah was in power, thanks to an American coup in 1953 and their financial assistance. This situation added to his power but, at the same time, combined the danger of secular modernisation with the potential harm of dependency upon the USA, in the view of the religious community.

Ay Khomeini acted as the leader who presents the aims and targets of the movement, and in some parts as the distributor of those ideas too. His direct speech to the people agitated them for participating in the movement. His students and those mojtaheds who followed him acted as the distributors of the ideas among the faithful population of the major cities of the country. Ay Khomeini started his opposition, in the context of the present laws of the society, against the referendum. At the second stage he spoke against the government, the modernisation programme and complained about the danger to Islam, and at the third step he spoke out against the Shah's regime as a brutal-non-Islamic one, and opposed its dependency on the USA and Israel. Going from one target to the other the opposition to the state became more radical, but the number of Ay Khomeini's followers decreased, because of the reduction in the number of other mojtaheds who were acting as the distributors of his or the same ideas and aims among their followers. They withdrew because of the increase in the state's pressures, and the background of the depolitisation of the religious structure.

The menbars, mosques, holy shrines, mourning ceremonies of Imam Hossein, religious proclamations and telegraphs, and Ay Khomeini's tape of speeches, and addressing the people were the means and opportunities of the social context that were utilised for the dispersion of the ideas. The Shiite ideology introduced the direction and linked the social context facilities with the behaviour of the participants of the movement. The principle of Imamatus, dictated them to follow their Marja as the representative of the Hidden Imam and shout against an anti Islamic traditions programme and the dependent regime. Following the example of Imam Hossein, gave them an example to sacrifice their life for their belief. Combination of the beliefs and the organisation, to be the subjective and objective parts of the ideology of the movement, was presented in

our analysis in a way that shows how they enhanced each other through the process of the movement.

In our analysis we have shown that the mass of the people objected to the despotic state in order to push back the reforms which were betraying their religious values and traditions and was thought that will pull them under the influence of imperialism. From our standpoint we have looked at the religious feelings involved in agency, as well as the social contextual and social solidarity elements in the historical development of the movement.

Chapter Eight

The Islamic Revolution of 1978-9

Introduction:

This chapter deals with the Islamic Revolution of 1978-9. This social movement will be explored using our synthetic theory. The chronology of the revolution is presented in the Appendix IX. In the later parts of the chapter we will substantiate our analysis of the revolution as the most useful explanation of the movement in a comparison with other potential explanations. This chapter will show that examining the causal factors of the Islamic Revolution and their conjunctions in the framework of the synthetic model will present us with a full account of this movement.

On this case, in contrast to the previous ones, there are many books and articles, most of them analytical interpretations of the revolution from different dimensions. We need, *here*, the historical explanation of the events to be investigated by the introduced theoretical frameworks. However, as it was denoted in the methodology chapter, there can be no historical explanation without an underpinning theoretical interpretation. Therefore, we will refer to several historians with different theoretical backgrounds in order to employ divergent types of explication of the events.³¹ In this chapter our secondary data are mostly drawn from the following writers: Abrahamian (1982) who has a conflict theory view of the events; Rahnema and Nomani (1990), Keddie (1983), and Afshar (1985) who look to the affairs mainly from a functionalistic position; and Algar (1991) and Madani (1361 AHS) who predominantly interpret the occurrence from the religious standpoint. Katouzian (1981), the same as in the other chapters, mostly, informs us of the economic situation of the society.

The Synthetic View:

According to the synthetic view, in the Islamic Revolution Ay Khomeini, as the leader, and his close followers from the clergy and bazaar, organised in newly established religious organisations, using the facilities of the remnants of the traditional religious organisation, funded mostly by the bazaar, made the revolution. They, benefited by the conflict between the state and the ulama's authority, organised the commoners and the traditional and modern middle class Shiites through the new understanding of the Islamic government and rejection of the monarchy system. The people, alienated from the state, followed them and overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty. In this part the prominent factors of the above mentioned general picture of the Islamic Revolution will be analysed to see 'why' and 'how' this revolution happened.

The Social Context:

After the coup of 1953 the Shah came to power with the help of the USA (Abrahamian 1982, 426) careless about any support from national political forces. He enjoyed the overt support of the Americans and relied on the increasing oil revenues for manipulation of the modernisation programmes, mostly after the White Revolution in 1963. His reform machinery incorporated a centralised dictatorship tendency and caused the national forces, either traditional or modern, to become alienated from the state. The disappointed forces found their alternative national authority and fought against him in the Islamic Revolution.

In the following part the general features of the state will be discussed and the main body of the opposition will be examined. The action of the revolutionaries in regard of the organisation and ideology of the revolt will be presented in the two succeeding sections.

The State:

The Shah's intention through the White Revolution, as stated in the preceding chapter, and other succeeding modernisation programmes, was to change the traditional institutions of the society, such as land ownership, to modern ones. But by enforcing all reforms, using the oil revenues and foreign aid, he was, actually, fighting against the native national social forces who, mostly, had their roots in the traditions. Katouzian explains the general situation of the political economy of the country after the 15th of Khordad Movement as follows:

'In this year [1963], the conservative and conventional radical opposition were defeated, landlords lost their economic *power base*, and the people's revolt (organised and led by the religious community) was crushed; soon afterwards, the religious endowments began to be 'administered' by the state. At the same time, the Treasury began to experience a rapid increase in the oil revenues flowing into it. Therein lay the main cause of the rise and the specific feature of petrolic despotism, which - ... - also contained the seeds of its own destruction' (Katouzian 1981, 244. Original italics.).

The intention was to change the agrarian base of the state into a modern capitalist one, but due to the despotic tendency of the Shah's rule he was not completely successful and, according to Katouzian, a 'pseudo-modernist petrolic despotism' resulted with emphasis on development of the military machinery and organisations. The situation is well summarised by him in the following paragraph:

'In short, *the traditional institutions of direct land State clientele had been replaced by the novel policy of indirect capital (i.e. oil revenue) assignment to them: the state was still the monopolist of economic and financial resources from which it granted privileges to (and withdrew them from) whoever it pleased.* Apart from that, the state 'investment' is itself likely to camouflage many other things, including construction for military purposes, and the purchase of 'machinery and equipment' for the armed forces. *This was 'capitalism' in no sense whatsoever; it was pseudo-modernist petrolic despotism'* (Katouzian 1981, 266. Original italics.).

This policy resulted in a centralised administrative state with 152.5 per cent growth in the government employees from 1966 to 1976 (Zahed 1369 AHS, 51) and a very rapid

growth of the cities: 4.75 percent in the same period (Zahed 1365 AHS, 12). Due to the growth of the urban income and consumption and the decline in the agriculture and the peasantry the rate of the migration from the rural areas to the cities and from small cities to the large ones increased drastically (Alizadeh 1363 AHS, 70). The 'pseudo-modern petrolic despotism', therefore, involved the centralised state being primarily dependent on the administrative offices and modern educated employees, all of whom were supported by the oil revenues. Moreover, it pushed the religion and the ulama and the religious community to the border of the social sphere of the society. Again in Katouzian's words:

'The growth of oil revenues added to the quality and quantity of the financial independence and political power of the state relatively to the propertied classes and religious institutions; the growth of state bureaucracy (on which it was partly dependent) increased the demand and supply for European-type education, which became the most important channel for higher bureaucratic positions; and the interdependence of these changes with other material and ideological factors pushed religion, and the religious community, to the periphery of the socio-economic complex' (Katouzian 1981, 244).

From the political dependency point of view, due to the efforts of two prime ministers, Alam and *Hasan Ali Mansoor*, the judicial immunity of the American citizens in Iran was approved by the parliament in 1343 AHS, (1964) (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 75-85). Ay Khomeini delivered a speech against the legislation and was exiled to Turkey and shortly after that to Iraq. Mansoor was killed by the guerrilla branch of a recently established religious organisation: *Heya't Hay-e Moe'talefe-ye Islami* (The Allied Islamic Association), when he was going to the parliament, and *Amir Abbas-e Howeida* took his position for thirteen years. Howeida followed the Shah's policies.³² During his time, all opposition, in the form of political gatherings or strikes, was harshly oppressed by the SAVAK.³³ In 1356 AHS (1978), *Jamshid-e Amuzegar* replaced Howeida and was supposed to follow the political development policies of the state in accord with the modernisation programme of the country. However, a 'political relaxation' period occurred under his administration following the advice of Carter's Human Rights Committee. In such an environment the revolutionaries were able to show their opposition and the features of the Islamic Revolution were gradually manifested. (See Appendix IX for more details).

During the eruption of the revolution, within five months, four prime ministers were changed. Amuzegar resigned 8 days after the Rex Cinema in Abadan was set on fire, and *Sharif Imami* introduced his reconciliation cabinet. The 'Black Friday' and the massive demonstration of *Eid-e Fetr* (a day after Ramadan on which Moslems have a thanksgiving celebration for being able to fast for a month) occurred at this time. Less than three months later the military government of *Azhari* was appointed for a little more than one month before Moharram in which the protests were expected to increase. The last prime minister of the Pahlavi dynasty was *Bakhtiar*. The Shah appointed him and left the country three days later introducing the Monarchy Council as his representative. (See Appendix IX for more details).

The Opposition:

This revolution took place against the monarchy headed by the Shah, which was representative of the privileged class, promoted by the new modern and traditional middle class and the commoners, who followed the authority of the ulama. Abrahamian reports that the traditional and modern middle class were the original substance of the movement. According to him, the traditional middle class consisted of the merchants (bazaaris) and the clergy (Abrahamian 1982, 533).³⁴ He believes that the bazaars and the religious structure were the main organisations of the revolution.

'Whereas the traditional middle class provided the opposition with a nation-wide organisation, it was the modern middle class that sparked off the revolution, fuelled it, and struck the final blows. Lawyers, judges, and intellectuals began the campaign to publish open letters and form human rights associations. University students started the street demonstrations. White-collar workers, especially bank clerks, civil servants, and customs officials, crippled the economy. Finally, guerrilla fighters, most of whom were college students, brought the revolution to a successful completion' (Abrahamian 1982, 533).³⁵

The growth of the cities added to the population who were dependent on the state for employment, housing, etc., mostly a modern middle class, and the state was feeding

them all by the oil revenues; but, according to Katouzian, one group was increasing in wealth and prosperity independent of state: 'the domestic wholesale and retail trade' (Katouzian 1981, 293). This group, which could be considered as a part of the traditional middle class, mostly centred in the bazaars, played an important role in the Islamic Revolution. According to Abrahamian: 'The only sections of the society still independent of the state, the bazaars and the religious establishment, provided Khomeini not only with generous financial support but also with a nation wide organisational net work' (Abrahamian 1982, 533).

Rahnema and Nomani make much the same point. According to them, the bazaar was one of the most influential supporters of the ulama in the revolution. 'The traditional merchant class which held on to its old bastion of power, the bazaar, was well in the foreground of the movement. The closure of the bazaar or central market, had important political significance' (Rahnema 1990, 13). 'The traditional commercial bourgeoisie had long-standing strong ties with the clergy. The merchants were one of the few remaining social categories among which one could find members who still paid their religious dues - *khoms* and *zakat* - to the clergy. Many among this class helped the religious movement with generous financial contributions throughout the revolution' (Rahnema 1990, 14. Original italic.).³⁶

Nearly all of the mosques in the country were active in the direction of the foundation of a new Islamic regime. Ay Taleqani's Hedayat Mosque and *Dr. Hojjatol Islam Mofateh's Qoba* Mosque were of the most well known and active ones. In almost all provinces there was, at least, one established mojtahed who was active in revolutionary actions such as leading demonstrations and distribution of Ay Khomeini's proclamations and tapes (Rahnema 1990, 10). Ays. *Sadoqi* in Yazd, *Taheri* in Isfahan, *Qazi* in Tabriz, and *Dastqeib* in Shiraz could be named among the others.

Besides the bazaar and the religious system, which were the main structures of the revolution, there were some other organisations participating in the rebellion. One of them was the Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran). Algar describes this organisation and its position in the Islamic revolution as follows: This movement,

'loosely affiliated to the National Front, was one of the most important oppositional organisations during the 1960s, a fact attested by the repeated imprisonment of its leadership. Essentially a reformist group, it demanded implementation of the 1907 Constitution and attempted to harmonise Islamic and liberal-nationalist sentiment. Most members of the provisional government appointed by Imam Khomeini as the revolution was reaching its end belonged to the Nahzat-i Azadi,' (Algar 1991, 750).

Abrahamian considers the Liberation Movement of Iran as a part of the National Front. This front was in opposition to the Shah's state after the National Movement of Iran and was suppressed by a coup in 1953. However, according to Abrahamian, the influence of its secular part on the Islamic Revolution was not considerable. He explains the internal evolution of the National Front to the National Resistance Movement and the Second National Front as follows:

Most of the National Front leaders that had been arrested in August 1953 were released in the course of 1954. Although many of them emigrated or retired from politics, some maintained secret contact with Mossadeq [the leader of the National Movement of Iran] (who remained under house arrest until his death in 1967) and in late 1954 re-emerged under the new name of the National Resistance Movement (Nahzat-i Moqavemat-i Melli)....

Although the National Resistance Movement began with high hopes, within four years it was in complete disarray. A number of factors accounted for the collapse. In 1956 the regime arrested almost all its leaders on the ground that the organization was undermining the "constitutional monarchy". Moreover, the leadership divided: some - notably Bazargan and Taleqani - insisted on denouncing the shah by name and dismissing the whole regime as illegitimate, whereas others preferred to focus their attacks on specific issues and on particular ministers. The Iran party was convinced that if America restrained SAVAK, Mossadeq's supporters could win enough Majlis seats to become a genuine parliamentary opposition. Khalel Maleki [a Marxist intellectual who changed the name of his Third Force to the Society of Iranian Socialists after the 1953 coup] went even further and argued that the opposition could help destroy feudalism if it openly support the liberal wing of the upper class against the more reactionary landlords. This gave the public the impression that secular radicals were wishy-washy reformers but religious radicals were uncompromising revolutionaries. Furthermore, the religious radicals, notably Bazargan, hoped to establish a working alliance with the 'ulama, whereas the secular radicals feared that such an alliance would tarnish their reputation as progressive reformers. Thus internal conflict and police repression combined to destroy the National Resistance Movement.

But the sight of relaxation of police control in 1960-1963 revitalized the opposition. Taking advantage of the new situation, Snjabi [the dean of the law faculty in Tehran University and the minister of education in Mossadeq's last cabinet], Forohar [a lawyer and the founder of the pro-Mossadeq National party], and Khalel Maleki recreated, respectively, the Iran party, National party, and Socialist Society, and then re-established the National Front, naming it the Second National Front. Meanwhile, Taleqani, Bazargan, and a circle of like-minded reformers formed a group named the Liberation Movement of Iran (Nahzat-i Azadi-i Iran), and joined the new National Front. In joining the front, the Liberation Movement declared that its main goals were to strengthen the National Front and to "serve the people's religious, social, and national needs" (Abrahamian 1982, 457, 459-460).

The Second National Front was active for three years but due to internal friction, especially over organisational issues, it broke into two rival blocs - one of them, the Third National Front. Abrahamian explained this situation in more detail in the following:

One bloc, formed mostly of Iran party members, retained the title Second National Front, intensified its activity among the confederation of Iranian Students in Europe, and continued to publish *Bakhtar-i Emruz* and to call for the establishment of a secular democratic state in Iran. The other bloc, formed of the Liberation Movement, the National party, and the Socialist Society, declared itself the Third National Front. Active among students in France and North America, the Third National Front published two newspapers - *Iran Azad* (Free Iran) and *Khabarnameh* (Newsletter) - and tried to establish a working relationship with exiled religious leaders, especially Khomeini in Iraq. As *Khabarnameh* stated in an article "The Lessons of 1963,"

'During Muharram 1963, it was religious leaders and the political parties that inspired and encouraged the masses. The major lesson to be drawn from 1963 is that the 'ulama have a crucial role to play in our anti-imperialist struggle - just as they did in the tobacco crisis of 1891-1892, in the constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, and in the nationalist movement of 1950-1953.' [Quoted from: *Khabarnameh*, 7 (July 1969), 1-2.]

Similarly, *Mujahed* (Freedom Fighter), the organ of the exiled Liberation Movement, declared in an editorial on "The Struggles of the Religious Leaders":

'The Shi'i leaders have always helped Iran's struggle against despotism and imperialism. Since the days of the constitutional Revolution, since the bleak years of Reza Shah's repression, and since the bloody demonstrations of 1963, the 'ulama have allied themselves with the masses, Ayatallah

Khomeini, who has lived in exile since 1964, is now the main opponent of the regime. The shah, the so-called religious experts paid by the regime, and other national traitors do their very best to drive a wedge between us and the progressive religious leaders. We will do all we can to create unity between the political opposition and the religious leaders, especially Ayatallah Khomeini. United we will destroy the hated regime.' [Quoted from *Mojahed*, 1 (September 1972), 1-2.] (Abrahamian 1982, 461-462. Original italics.).

The above-mentioned documents, once again, consider the ulama and the religious structure as the main body of the revolution.

There were some guerrilla movements participating in the revolution as well. In 1965 the *Hezbe Melal-e Eslami* (Islamic Nation's Party) formed the idea of preferring guerrilla activity to the mass uprising against the Shah's regime (Algar 1991, 755-756). This idea became the target of several other groups founded in the 1970s. One of them was the *Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran* (The Organisation of People's Strugglers).³⁷ Some other small guerrilla groups like *Groh-e Enqelabi-ye Abuzar* (The Abuzar Revolutionary Group), the *Mahdaviyoon* (Followers of the *Mahdi* [Hidden Imam]), and the *Groh-e Allah-o Akbar* (The "God is Greatest" Group) came into being in the 1970s, and 'their remnants came together after the triumph of the revolution in the *Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Inqilab-i Islami* (The Organisation Of Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution)' (Algar 1991, 759. Original italics.). The highly oppressive position of the state could be one of the reasons for the emergence of small guerrilla groups. Nobody could trust more than a few close friends. All of the above mentioned political and guerrilla organisations acted toward the goal of the establishment of an Islamic government in Iran.

In addition to the Islamic guerrilla groups, there were some communist ones, of which *Sazman-e Cherikhay-e Fadaii-e Khalq-e Iran* (The Organisation of the Iranian People's Guerrilla Freedom Fighters) was the most distinguished. But, according to Abrahamian, the communist and Marxist groups, like *Tudeh* (Mass) Party, played only minor roles in the Islamic Revolution (Abrahamian 1982, 450-473). Moreover, 'By 1976, the guerrilla organisations, both those of Islamic and those of Marxist

inspiration, had effectively been crushed, and it was not until the closing stages of the revolution that they re-emerged, mostly under new leadership' (Algar 1991, 759).

According to Abrahamian, there were four major reasons that Tudeh Party was not that much active in the Islamic Revolution. First, the police repression of the party and its members after the 1953 coup (Abrahamian 1982, 451). Second, an intense propagation against the Tudeh by the regime (Abrahamian 1982, 451). Third, the rapid modernisation tended to weaken the Tudeh through the emergence of four million peasants who were not in the political arena of the 1945s, into the urban labour, and the emergence of a new intelligentsia consisted of bazaar families who had opposed the Tudeh in the past (Abrahamian 1982, 452). 'Fourth, the Tudeh leadership was weakened by deaths, infirmities of old age, and defections' (Abrahamian 1982, 452). Three groups split from the party: the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, The *Tofan* (Storm) Marxist-Leninist Organisation, and the Revolutionary Organisation of the Tudeh Party Abroad. The two last groups viewed themselves as Maoist (Abrahamian 1982, 454). Abrahamian concludes that:

Despite these defections and setbacks, the Tudeh managed to survive and even regain some ground during the early 1970s. Its headquarter in exile received enough help from other communist parties, especially those of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Italy, and France, to keep some fifty full-time workers in Europe. These workers ran a radio station called Paik-i Iran (*Iran Courier*), published two regular papers - the newspaper *Mardom* and the theoretical journal *Donya* - and in 1960 helped create in Europe a broad-based anti-shah organization called the Confederation of Iranian Students (Abrahamian 1982, 454. Original italics.).

...

Moreover, the Tudeh managed to iron out its old-time differences with the Democratic Party of Azarbaijan. After a series of joint meeting between 1956 and 1960, the two merged to form a new organisation named The Tudeh Party of Iran - The Party of the Iranian Working Class (Abrahamian 1982, 455).

According to Abrahamian, by 1977 little was remained of the two Maoist parties - the Revolutionary Organisation and the Tofan group. 'The Tudeh, on the other hand, had some five thousand members in Europe and Iran; published, in addition to *Mardom* and *Donya*, *Nuyid* (Harbinger) in Tehran and *Shu'leh-i Jenoub* (Southern Flame) in

Khuzistan; and had small underground cells in Tehran University, in oil regions, and in the major industrial centers' (Abrahamian 1982, 457. Original italics.).

Meanwhile his generalisation on the question of why could not the Tudeh and the National Front attract the young generation and played minor role in the Islamic Revolution is as follows:

Students of the government-controlled media found nothing but intellectual stagnation, endless praise for the monarchy, and mindless imitation of the West. But an examination of the lively underground press shows a young generation of intellectuals thriving on new ideas, adopting them to their Shi'i culture, reconsidering the theories and tactics of their forerunners, and posing again and again the vital question, "What is to be done?" In fact, the twenty-five-year repression produced a new intelligentsia that formulated ideas far more radical than those of the Tudeh and the National Front. Moreover, the new generation helped shape the uncompromising character of the revolution that eventually destroyed the monarchy (Abrahamian 1982, 451).

How did oppositional movements come together and make the Islamic Revolution? How were the two main structures, the bazaar and the religious organisation, involved in the movement? The answer to these questions lies in an analysis of the role of the revolutionary actors and their behaviours, and the ideology of the revolution.

Actors and Behaviours:

Ay Khomeini was the leader of the revolution. He was a mojtahed with a new Islamic idea and was followed by the vast majority of the Iranian population who were against the Shah's despotism. His clergy students, or followers, distributed his ideas by the help of Ay Khomeini's close bazaari followers through the religious structure, bazaars and some newly established organisations. They made his aims and his opposition to the regime widely known in the country. Katouzian explains the psycho-political situation of the mass of revolutionaries and Ay Khomeini's leadership of the opposition as follows:

'The *mass* of ordinary Iranian people were prepared to follow Khomeini's lead alone, because they regarded the Shah as the very symbol of all they were fighting against, Khomeini as the very symbol of their total rejection of the Shah, and religion - although not a traditionalist Islamic state, of which they knew very little - as the binding force and the obvious channel for the war against the Shah's pseudo-modernist despotism (Katouzian 1981, 346. Original italic.).

Generally, according to Abrahamian, 'in the years after the 1963 crisis, three fluid, overlapping, yet identifiable groups formed within the religious establishment. ... The first group ... consists of ... apolitical ulama. ... The second group ... did not call for the overthrow of the monarchy, but ... the establishment of a genuine constitutional monarchy. ... The third group ... headed by Ay Khomeini ... aimed ... the establishment of a new form of Islamic government' (Abrahamian 1982, 473-475). The revolution started with the participation of the second and third groups, and, under the leadership of Ay Khomeini, led to the targets of the third one.

Ay Khomeini forbade the hiding of opposition to the state by urging the people to show opposition to the Shah's regime in the 15th of Khordad Movement, and was active in the opposition since then, leading the main stream of the discord. As Algar says:

'Contrary to what is sometime supposed, Khomeini did not disappear from the public consciousness in Iran or re-emerge, almost accidentally, as the leader of the revolution in 1978. His name frequently surfaced in the anti-government demonstrations: for example, in those at Tehran University in December 1970 and those at Qum in June 1975. Nor was it a question simply of memories from 1963: throughout his period of residence in Najaf, Khomeini issued proclamations and messages concerning events in Iran ..., which were smuggled into Iran and circulated there' (Algar 1991, 754-755).

According to Abrahamian, Ay Khomeini was 'a charismatic revolutionary leader' (Abrahamian 1982, 532) and was supported by

'the traditional middle class, especially the bazaaris and the clergy. ... He won their staunch allegiance in part because he spoke their language: in part because he personified the virtues of Imam Ali - courage, honesty, and political astuteness; and in part because the regime by declaring war on the

bazaars and the religious establishment, had driven the moderate opposition and even the apolitical clergy into his arms' (Abrahamian 1982, 533).

There was a group of clergy directly or indirectly studying at his school who acted as the major distributors of his ideas, proclamations, and tapes of speeches. The most well known and effective among them was *Ay Motahari*. As Afshar says, 'In a sense , Morteza Motahari can be regarded as the Islamic revolution's first ideologist, for not only had practically all the leading figures in the revolution, from both a traditional and a university background, been his pupil, but also his lectures and writings came second only to those of Ayatollah Khomeini himself in forming the foundation for post-revolutionary ideological trends' (Afshar 1985, X). Ay Motahari 'was a well-known teacher first in Qom and from 1954 at the Faculty of Theology at Tehran University' (Afshar 1985, X). He organised the *Anjoman-e Mahane-ye Dini* (The Monthly Religious Society) in 1960, with collaboration of *Ay Beheshti* and some other well known scholars. Their popular lectures were published under the title of *Goftar-e mah* (Discourse of the Month) and were about the relevance of Islam to the contemporary matters. This society was banned in March 1963 (Akhavi 1980, 118-119).

Ay Motahari and his other clergy colleague's main purpose was to expand the religious authority to those spheres of social strata which have been surrendered by the state during the Pahlavi era. For instance, they founded *Hosseiniye Ershad* in Tehran. The institution's aim was to attract secular educated youths to Islam. It was opened in 1965 and closed by the government in 1973 (Algar 1991, 750). *Dr. Ali Shariati* was one of the well known speakers at this institution who had a distinguished role in agitating young intellectuals in favour of the revolution. 'He [Ay Motahari] was [also] involved with such societies as the *anjumanhayeh Eslami* (Islamic Associations) which included students, engineers, doctors, merchants, and formed the nucleus of the movement which was to become, eventually the revolution' (Afshar 1985, X. Original italics.).

An active organisation was constructed by Ay Khomeini's clerical retinue and his followers from the bazaar which was one of the main distributing structures of the movement. Ays Motahari, Beheshti, *Anvari*, *Mowlaii*, and others like *Dr. Hojjatol*

Islam Bahonar, Hojjatol Islam Rafsanjani, Mohammad Ali Rajaii, Askarowladi, and Araqi constituted the board, and were members of that organisation which was established under the supervision of Ay Khomeini and Ay Milani, as his representative, with the name of *Heiathay-e Moatalefe-ye Islami* (The Allied Islamic Association) (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 101). This institution was founded at the beginning of 1342 AHS (Spring 1963) (Badamchian 1374 AHS, 1) about the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement in Tehran and had branches throughout the country with the purpose of propagating and training people in Islamic ideology. It changed its targets to political and military actions after Ay Khomeini's exile to Turkey (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 101). This organisation was composed of three groups with the name of *Groh-e Masjid-e Sheikh Ali* (The Group of Seikh Ali Mosque), *Isfahaniha* (The Group of Isfahanies), and *Jebhe-ye Mosalmanan-e Azadeh* (Free Muslims Front) (Askarowladi 1375 AHS, 5).

Through the distributors of the movement, some of them located in the traditional religious structure, and due to the religious authority of a marja', Ay Khomeini's commands were distributed and well accepted by the majority of the Iranian population. According to Abrahamian, Ay Khomeini 'created a broad alliance of social forces ranging from the bazaars and the clergy to the intelligentsia and the urban poor, as well as of political organisations varying from the religious Liberation Movement and the secular National Front to the new guerrilla groups emerging from Shari'ati's followers in the universities. Khomeini has often been described as the traditional mulla. In fact, he was a major innovator in Iran both because of his political theory and because of his religious-oriented populist strategy' (Abrahamian 1982, 479).

How the ulama were able to mobilise the people is reported by Rahnema and Nomani. They describe the operating organisation of the revolution in the following manner:

'The clergy's power to organise and mobilise the people was embedded in their control over the mosques and the spiritual and social respect which they enjoyed among the masses. The activities of each neighbourhood were organised by its own neighbourhood committee - a co-operative organisational form which had arisen due to the scarcity of certain goods during the strikes. The neighbourhood committee was, in turn, responsible to and took its lead from the local mosque. The

local mosque acted as the organisational brain of the closely knit network. It organised and coordinated the activities of a whole neighbourhood on the basis of the instructions it received from the national organisers of the religious movement. They, in turn, received their general directives from Ayatollah Khomeini who was abroad. These directives came in the form of widely circulated letters and tapes. However, the tactics used by the people, such as going to the roof tops at night and chanting anti-Shah slogans to demoralise the soldiers, were quite spontaneous' (Rahnema 1990, 10).

Who were the followers? The social strata who followed the movement are revealed by different scholars in various ways. According to Abrahamian's analysis, besides the traditional middle class, who were the backbone of the movement, the modern middle class and urban working class and even peasants were among the followers (Abrahamian 1982, 533-537). In addition to the clergy and the bazaaris, the other groups who participated in the revolution were the working class, the students, and the lumpenproletariat, as Rahnema and Nomani report (Rahnema 1990, 9-15). Using Katouzian's terms, *mellat* was against *dowlat*. When the revolts started at the beginning of 1978, the employees of the administrative parts of the *dowlat*, mostly the modern middle class, gradually joined the main grassroots: traditional middle class and commoners, through their strikes and demonstrations. The last organisations were military ones that joined the people after two days loose battle with the revolutionaries. (See Appendix IX for more details).

According to Katouzian, the main solidarity factor of different strata of the people in the revolution was their Shiite belief that they were proud of:

'All ... social classes - merchants, petty trades, workers, immigrant peasants (as well as those remaining on the land) - have one thing in common, in spite of the vast differences in their wealth, income, social status, lifestyle, and so forth: they make up those Iranian social classes the majority of whose members are practising Shiite Muslims. This is part of the country's cultural tradition, which - as social classes - they alone have fully inherited, or, at least, have not had a chance of being alienated from; for they have been brought up that way, and it influences every aspect of their lives - birth, death, marriage, community relations, methods of settling disputes and differences, and so on. They do not suffer from an inferiority complex towards modern European and American culture; and, as a result, they have no superiority complex about the facts and fictions of pre-Islamic Iranian glories' (Katouzian 1981, 337).

What were the specifications of this belief in the Islamic Revolution? The next section will explore the ideology of the movement in its historical context. This ideology was the solidarity factor as well as the aims determiner of the revolution.

Ideology:

Two distinguished lines of thought manifested in the ideology of the Islamic Revolution: one developed by the modern-educated Moslem intellectuals, and the other by the ulama, predominantly Ay Khomeini and his clerical followers. In the confrontation between these two lines of thought, Ay Khomeini's understanding of Islam finally became the dominant ideology of the movement. 'Independence, Liberty, Islamic government' and 'Neither the East, Nor the West, Islamic Republic' were two slogans of the Islamic Revolution which were repeated more than the others except the three following ones: 'Allah-o Akbar' (God is the greatest), 'La Elah-a Ell-a Llah' (there is no god except God), and 'Down with the Shah'. These five slogans show the direction and the summation of the ideology of the revolution. According to them, the targets were: ending the Shah's regime and establishment of an Islamic government in the form of a republic. This Islamic Republic should not be dependent on the western political ideologies or systems, nor the eastern ones, and should not be an imitation of them.

The idea of an independent ideology came to the political-intellectual literature of Iran mostly through an article written by *Jalal-e Al-e Ahmad* (d. 1969) with the name of *Qarbzadegi* (Westoxication) (Keddie 1983, 11). His own life was also an example for the religious based modern-educated Iranians who sought a new independent-Islamic idea. Keddie describes him and his work in the following sentences: 'A molla's son early attracted by communism and then by progressive secularism, Al-e Ahmad wrote a famous essay, *Gharbzadegi* (Westoxication), a word he borrowed and made famous. He criticised the blind, superficial imitation of western consumerism and other Western ways, implicitly (because of censorship) criticising the regime's Westernist and pro-

American policy - for which reason his book was banned' (Keddie 1983, 11). Al-e Ahmad returned to Islam and made a pilgrimage to Mecca and wrote his experience in a book with the name of 'Khasi Dar Miqat' (A Twig In Miqat).³⁸ This work, too, became one of his most influential writings on the modern educated Moslem youths.

The second influential person on the modern-educated Moslem people and, later, revolutionary forces was, according to Keddie, a charismatic speaker: Dr. Ali Shariati (Keddie 1983, 12). He 'was born at Mazinan near Sabzevar into a traditional religious family that later settled in Mashhad' (Algar 1991, 756). As a student of the University of Mashhad he was active in the short-lived group of '*Sosyalistha-ye Khodaparast*' (The Socialist God-Worshippers) and *Nehzat-e Moqavemat-e Melli* (The National Resistance Movement), the second one led by Ay Taleqani. He was jailed in 1959 for several months because of his political activities and went to Paris in 1960 for his doctoral studies. Akhavi further explains Shariati's stay in France as follows:

'The consensus is that Shariati was radicalized on third-world issues as a student participating in the political extracurricular activities of Iranian students in Paris. More specifically, his contributions to the Algerian nationalist newspaper, *al-Mujahid*, played no small role in his emergence as a protest leader. According to some who knew him in Paris, he also played a leading part in the organisation of the Iranian student opposition in Europe. His inclination toward sociology was likely stimulated more by his political commitments than his formal course work.

'... His doctoral degree was not in sociology but in medieval Iranian philology under Professor G. Lazard' (Akhavi 1983, 126. Original italic.).

'Returning to Iran in 1964, Shariati was arrested at the frontier and detained for several months' (Algar 1991, 757). He was permitted to teach in the secondary-school system of Mashhad. In 1965 he obtained a teaching position in the department of History at the University of Mashhad and introduced a course in the sociology of Islam which made him popular and caused his dismissal from there. He went to Tehran and soon after became the main source of attraction to the Hosseiniye Ershad (Algar 1991, 757). This institution was established by a board including Ay Motahari who left there, because of some points of disagreement with Shariati's views, before its closure by the regime in 1973 (Algar 1991, 756). Shariati was kept in prison for two years and under

a severe surveillance until May 1977 when he left Iran for England, where his body was found on 19 June 1977. His sudden and mysterious death roused many suspicions, including being killed by the Shah's secret intelligence organisation, and, therefore, being considered as a martyr by some (Algar 1991, 757).

Shariati's views were more than the others, influenced by the works of Durkhiem, according to Amir Arjomand, when he interprets the concept of 'ideology' as Durkhiem's 'collective consciousness' (Amir Arjomand 1982, 98). He believes that Shiism, as an ideology, has two types of interpretations - the ideal one (*Alavi*) and the actual one (*Safavi*). 'The former was dynamic, liberating, and embodied by the Imam Ali, whereas the latter is sterile, exploitative, and represented by the ulama ever since Shiism became Iran's state religion under the Safavids' (Chehabi 1990, 68). Shariati's social thought is reductionist. He interprets the sociological notion of 'class struggle' in a Quranic way by introducing two poles of Cain and Abel. The prophets and their true believers are always at the pole of Able while the pole of Cain is composed of the usurpers of power and wealth and hypocrites, the official clergy, who justify the former's wrongdoing (Shariati 69-70).

Whatever the content of Shariati's writings, which are mostly the collection of his speeches, his influence was predominantly on modern-educated Moslems, especially youths, who sought a new Islamic ideology. He created a new spirit in the direction of the Westoxication of Al-e Ahmad and returning to Imam Ali and his wife and the daughter of the Prophet, Fatima's tradition of Shiism. Algar classifies Shariati in the line of Bazargan one of the founders of the Liberation Movement of Iran, 'although he was an infinitely more radical and imaginative thinker' (Algar 1991, 758). 'Bazargan had been educated in the France of the 1930s, and when he started to write on social, political, and religious problems his main aim was to make Iran an equal among equals on the international scene. ... Bazargan had tried to formulate an alternative to secularism, which is more a mentality than an ideology, but Shariati reacted directly to Marxism, an ideology par excellence' (Chehabi 1990, 70).

From Bazargan's liberal political point of view religious affairs and socio political matters are separate but their separation is asymmetrical, according to Chehabi, 'while politics must never interfere with religion, religion should inspire and inform all acts social and political' (Chehabi 1990, 56). According to Bazargan, the Moslem people should apply the Quran and Islam to their everyday life activities through parliamentary legislation. Everybody should participate in the choosing of the government, but politicians must not use the religion for their partisan aim and clergymen should not assume any privileged rights for themselves in interfering in politics. Moreover, according to Chehabi, 'for Bazargan, the prominence of Islamic jurisprudence (*feqh*), and consequently the Islamic jurisprudence experts (*foqaha*), is a result of the general decadence of Islamic societies that set in soon after the death of the Prophet. As a result of this exclusive preoccupation with *feqh*, other aspects of Islam - especially its ethical injunction - have been consistently neglected' (Chehabi 1990, 57. Original italics.). Therefore, Chehabi concludes that, according to Bazargan, 'in the absence of the Prophet and the Imams, it is the people themselves who must ensure the foundation of an Islamic government. They themselves choose their rulers, and the government can only handle those matters that the people have placed in its care. That, for Bazargan, is the meaning of *velayat*' (Chehabi 1990, 57). This meaning is in contradiction with the idea of *velayat-e faqih* which was set by Ay Khomeini and will be discussed later.

Besides Shariati, the Islamic guerrilla movement of the 1970s, the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (The Organisation of People's Strugglers) also can be characterised as the radical offspring of the Nehzat-e Azadi (Algar 1991, 758). Abrahamian explains their ideology in the following:

'The first major theoretical work of the Mojahedin was entitled *Nahzat-i Hussein* (Hussein's Movement). Written by Reza'i, the book argued that the *Nezam-i Towhidi* (Monotheistic Order) sought by the Prophet was a commonwealth fully united both because it worships only one God and because it is a classless society that strives for the common good. Reza'i further argued that the banner of revolt raised by the Shi'i Imams, especially Hussien, was aimed against feudal landlords and exploiting merchant capitalists as well as against usurping caliphs who had betrayed the true cause of the *Nezam-i Towhid*. For Reza'i and the Mujahedin it was the duty of all Muslims to continue this

struggle to create a classless society and destroy all forms of oppression, which, in the modern age, included imperialism, capitalism, despotism, and conservative clericalism' (Abrahamian 1982, 490-491. Original italics.).

Rezaii and Hanifnezhad mostly were the ideologues of the Organisation of People's Strugglers. 'They followed the path of the LMI [Liberation Movement of Iran] in reinterpreting Islam but came to more radical conclusions. These resemble those of Ali Shariati, but it has to be borne in mind that the main corpus of Mojahedin ideology had already been elaborated by the time Shariati's most prolific period at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad began' (Chehabi 1990, 212). In further explanation of the development of their ideology Chehabi adds:

'The PMOI [OPS] started military operations in 1971, in an attempt to disrupt the celebrations of the 2500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. In the repression that struck back as a result of these actions, the Mojahedin lost their entire original leadership, through executions or in street battles with the security forces. After this they turned more and more to the left, until in 1975, a split occurred in the organisation: a leftist fraction, including Ay Taleqani's son Mojtaba, discarded Islam altogether and became a purely Marxist-Leninist organisation. Another faction kept its Islamic allegiance, although their ideology is heavily trained by Marxism' (Chehabi 1990, 212).

The ideologies whose views have been discussed above sought innovative versions of Shiism for a new political arrangement or revolution against the dependent-despotic regime of the Shah. Bazargan's idea was mostly in favour of the Constitution as he declared in his trials in 1963 (Chehabi 1990, 212), but Shariati and the Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran (OPS) pursued the notion of a new Islamic regime.

On the other hand, Ay Khomeini presented a new fundamentalist understanding of the position of the ulama in the political structure of the society by his series of lectures at Najaf between Jan. 21 and 8 Feb. 1970. Referring to some evidence from Quran and Traditions about the situation of foqaha to be the representatives of the Hidden Imam, he argued that they should rise and mobilise the people against the dependent-dictatorship of the Shah and establish the Islamic government. 'The lectures were recorded and transcribed by a student, and then published in book form' (Algar 1985, 25). The printed text of the lectures was distributed in Iran (Algar 1991, 755).

This book deals with three topics on the subject of the Islamic government: a) reasons for the necessity of Islamic government; b) the form of Islamic government; and c) programme for the establishment of the Islamic government. Ay Khomeini aimed to introduce a new feature of Islam, the true Islam according to him, which would be able to mobilise the discontent against imperialism and injustice and could enact a new Islamic government that would introduce a better humane way of life for Moslems. In his own language which is translated by Algar:

'Islam is the religion of the militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism. But the servants of imperialism have presented Islam in a totally different light. They have created in men's minds a false notion of Islam. The defective version of Islam, which they have presented in the religious teaching institution, is intended to deprive Islam of its vital, revolutionary aspect and to prevent Muslims from arousing themselves in order to gain their freedom, fulfil the ordinances of Islam, and create a government that will assure their happiness and allow them to live lives worthy of human beings' (Algar 1985, 28).

In rejection of the traditional Islam he continues:

'In order to demonstrate to some degree how great the difference is between Islam and what is presented as Islam, I would like to draw your attention to the difference between the Quran and the books of *hadith*, on the one hand, and the practical treatises of jurisprudence, on the other. The Quran and the books of *hadith*, which represent the sources for the commands and ordinances of Islam, are completely different from the treatises written by the *mujtaheds* of the present age both in breadth of scope and in the effect they are capable of exerting on the life of society. The ratio of Quranic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections of the corpus of *hadith* containing the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man toward his Creator and Sustained. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and all the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political - in short, the gestation of society' (Algar 1985, 29. Original italics.).

One of the barriers to Ay Khomeini's success in the 15th of Khordad Movement was the idea of separation of politics and religion, therefore, he rejected their division as the

false propaganda of imperialists against Islam and the Moslems world. He insisted on the governmental institutions of Islam and complained about the propagation of imperialists against Islamic government. He noted that Islam has a legislative function and certain laws as well as the method for enforcing them (Algar 1985, 36). He wanted the ulama to participate fully in political activities and to be with the masses and those who are struggling for freedom and independence in order to shape the Moslem societies according to the religion (Algar 1985, 38).

Furthermore, Ay Khomeini criticised the apolitical clergy and wanted them to deal with the social misdeeds of the political system not just the minor sins of some followers. In other words, analysing the social and political situation of Iran at his time, he argued that imperialists, from either West or East, were plundering the country through the Shah's dependent government. Therefore, the ulama had to deal with the "consumption of what is forbidden" at a macro level not only on a micro scale. He, then, asked the ulama to participate in the revolt against the plundering of the country as a religious duty or sacred jihad if they can, and if not work to gain that power (Algar 1985, 115-116).³⁹

Ay Khomeini showed his opposition to the Shah's regime throughout his lectures on several occasions. He criticised the Constitution of Iran and its Supplementary Law as non-Islamic and noted that the monarchy and the hereditary system was abandoned by the Prophet when he rejected the governments of the Byzantine Empire, Egypt, Iran and Yemen. 'Islam, then, does not recognise monarchy and hereditary succession; they have no place in Islam', he added (Algar 1985, 31). He, also, argued against the activities of unjust governments with particular reference to the Shah's oppressive actions and extravagances in the millenary celebration and his 'coronation and the abominable festivities that accompanied it' (Algar 1985, 86-87).

Ay Khomeini put forward two general reasons for establishment of Islamic government. First of all: 'A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor' (Algar 1985, 40). He conveyed the example of the

Prophet as the head of the Islamic state in his own time and the appointment of his successor and concluded that: 'Islam has therefore established an executive power in the same way that it has brought laws into being. The person who holds this executive power is known as the *vali amr*' (Algar 1985, 41). 'Second, if we examine closely the nature and character of the provisions of the law, we realise that their execution and implementation depend upon the formation of a government, and that it is impossible to fulfil the duty of executing God's commands without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs' (Algar 1985, 44).⁴⁰

Further he explained the general features of the Islamic government and its difference from existing regimes. According to him, an Islamic government is 'neither tyrannical nor absolute, but constitutional'. He refused the current sense of the word constitutional which is 'based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority' and added that Islamic government 'is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Quran and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger' (Algar 1985, 55). He believed that in the Islamic government the laws and ordinances of Islam must be observed. Therefore, it may be defined as the rule of divine law over men (Algar 1985, 55). 'Individual opinion, even if it be that of the Prophet himself, cannot intervene in matters of government or divine law; here, all are subject to the will of God', he added (Algar 1985, 56-57).

According to Ay Khomeini, in Islamic government the planning organisation would take the place of the legislative one, unlike the present republics or constitutional forms of government:

'The fundamental difference between Islamic government, on the one hand, and constitutional monarchies and republics, on the other, is this: whereas the representative of the people or the monarch in such regimes engage in legislation, in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. ... It is for this reason that in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly that is one of the three branches of government. This body draws up programmes for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam and thereby determines how public services are to be provided across the country' (Algar 1985, 55-56).

He also believed that the Islamic government is the most populist one because of the people's belief in the Islamic laws by their faith in the Quran and Sunna:

'The body of Islamic laws that exist in the Quran and the Sunna has been accepted by the Muslims and recognised by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people. In contrast, in a republic or a constitutional monarchy, most of those claiming to be representatives of the majority of the people will approve anything they wish and then impose it on the entire population' (Algar 1985, 56).

Who can be the ruler of the Islamic government? The answer, according to Ay Khomeini, is: somebody who has the knowledge of the law and is just. 'In addition to general qualifications like intelligence and administrative ability, there are two other essential qualifications: knowledge of the law and justice' (Algar 1985, 59). '[T]he ruler should be foremost in knowledge of the laws and ordinances of Islam and just in their implementation' (Algar 1985, 61). 'The ruler must also possess excellence in morals and belief; he must be just and untainted by major sin' (Algar 1985, 60). And he concluded that: 'If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom be peace and blessings) in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him' (Algar 1985, 62). In the further explanation about the duties of the faqih as the ruler, Ay Khomeini believed that: 'It is the duty of the Imams and the just *foqaha* to use government institutions to execute divine law, establish the just Islamic order, and serve mankind' (Algar 1985, 66. Original italic.).⁴¹

Ay Khomeini divided the society into two groups; the minority of oppressors and the majority of those who are oppressed and concluded that this type of differentiation is imposed by the imperialists on the Islamic societies through their political agents and imposed unjust economic order. He continued that the ulama are duty bound to help the oppressed, and to be an enemy to the oppressor. 'This is nothing other than the duty that the Commander of the Faithful (upon whom be peace) entrusted to his two great offspring in his celebrated testament: "Be an enemy of the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed"' (Algar 1985, 49-50). He continues that "The scholars of Islam have a

duty to struggle against all attempts by the oppressors to establish a monopoly over the sources of wealth or to make illicit use of them. They must not allow the masses to remain hungry and deprived while plundering oppressors usurp the source of wealth and live in opulence...' (Algar 1985, 50).

Ay Khomeini drew the guidelines of the struggle against the Shah's regime in the following way: propagation of revolutionary Islamic ideas through the religious ceremonies and gatherings such as congregational prayers, Friday prayers, pilgrimage (*hajj*) and Ashoora (Algar 1985, 126-131). 'If you present Islam accurately and acquaint people with its world-view, doctrines, principles, ordinances, and social system, they will welcome it ardently (God knows, many people want it)' (Algar 1985, 131). He noted further that the first step for introducing the proper interpretation of Islam is to change the programmes and atmosphere of the religious schools and get rid of 'pseudo-saintly mentality' and 'court-affiliated *akhounds*' (Algar 1985, 135-136).

His practical prescription for isolating and objecting to the Shah's regime was as follows: 'Let us overthrow tyrannical governments by: (1) severing all relations with governmental institutions; (2) refusing to co-operate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural, and political institutions' (Algar 1985, 146).

As the above mentioned guidelines show, Ay Khomeini had designed a long-term programme in opposition to the monarchy of Iran and was preparing his students and followers for this struggle. He objected to the extravagances and un-Islamic activities of the regime in his proclamations on different occasions. In regard to the radical ideas of those who sought a new anti-imperialist and anti-despotic Islam, Ay Khomeini's ideology could be considered attractive. Even the concept of 'Safavid Shiism' of Shariati, which is thought by some to be an anti-ulama idea, could be traced in his writings. Ay Khomeini's programme covered the other Islamic group's ideologies as well. The concept of Westoxication of Ale Ahmad; the ideal (Alavi) and the actual (Safavi) Shiism and two social poles of Cain and Able of Shariati; the rejection of a class society of the Mojahedin; and the liberation of Moslems from dictatorship of the

LMI could find their hopes and ideals in his speeches. Even his strategy of opposition, by insisting on the Imam Hosseins tradition, was in agreement with the most radical ones among them.⁴² Thus two clear targets unified all Islamic groups under the leadership of Ay Khomeini: overthrow of the Shah's regime, and establishment of an Islamic government.

Moreover, he had the position of a marja, and therefore, he was able to influence the other ulama and the majority of the Shiite population of the country. He occupied a unique place in the social context that none of the above mentioned people and organisations could have. While in Najaf and Paris, he rejected receiving any assistance from the leftist or communist organisations such as Tudeh (Mass) Party or others. And he did not approve those Islamic groups that incorporated the Marxist ideas in their ideologies (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 218-221), although they all were participating in demonstrations and strikes.

The summary of the ideology of the rebellion was presented in the three first articles of a seventeen-article resolution that was read at the end of Ashoora's objections occurred in almost all cities of the country and , according to different estimations, by about one to three million participants in Tehran (Rahnema 1990, 23). They are as follows:

'Article 1: Ayatollah al-uzma [the supreme mojtahed] Imam Khomeini, is the leader of the *ummah* and his demands are those of the whole people. This march, is once again a whole-hearted vote of confidence in him and a sincere expression of gratitude of Iran's Moslem and struggling people put towards the highly esteemed *maraje*.

'Article 2: An end should be put to the absolutist monarchical system and the Shah should be overthrown. An end should be put to all types of foreign domination and colonialism which are closely linked to internal despotism and power should be transferred to the Moslem and struggling people of Iran.

'Article 3: A just Islamic government should be established on the basis of universal suffrage and the maintenance and protection of Iran's national sovereignty and independence. The provision of

individual and social freedoms within an Islamic framework and according to Islamic criteria should be assured.

'Article 1 and 3 are clear indications of an unchallenged acceptance of Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolution and Islam as its predominant ideology' (Rahnema 1990, 24-25. Original italics.).

This resolution was signed by the distributors of the movement under the title of 'The Organising Committee of the *Tassua* [ninth of Moharram] and Ashura Marches', dated 19 and 20 Azar 1357 AHS (10 and 11 December 1978) (Rahnema 1990, 35). The same article was read at the end of the rallies of all cities of the country which were participated by the majority of their population. These articles clearly show that Ay Khomeini was accepted as the leader of the movement and his new interpretation of Islam was the ideology of the Islamic Revolution.

The Movement:

This part deals with the eruption of the movement. As seen above, the social context of Iranian society had two competing authorities which were struggling against each other in different ways during the previous one hundred years. In the Islamic Revolution this took the form of the monarchy versus the idea of Islamic government. The Shah as the head of the monarchy was on one side and Ay Khomeini was the leader of the potential Islamic government on the other. These two forces gradually formed after the 15th of Khordad Movement and collided at the beginning of the period of political relaxation that was imposed on the Shah by the USA. The revolutionary outburst began at that time.

Rahnema and Nomani believe that the Islamic Revolution began in the period of political relaxation granted to the Iranian people by the state following the pressure from the USA. 'In response to the pressure brought to bear by the Carter administration for an improvement in Iran's human rights record, the Shah slightly

eased the rigid controls which he had maintained on social and political expression. The new period came to be called, 'the period of political relaxation'' (Rahnema 1990, 8). According to them, it was the Iranian intelligentsia who started the revolution. 'In May 1977, the Iranian intelligentsia and the professionals were the first to take advantage of the new opening in the political atmosphere in order to press for freedoms that were unheard of before' (Rahnema 1990, 8).

Algar, analysing the role of religion in 20th century Iran, describes the beginning of the Islamic Revolution as follows:

'The immediate antecedents of the Islamic Revolution can be traced to the events of the summer and autumn of 1977, when letters of protest against the repressive policies of the regime began to circulate openly, demanding freedom of expression and the respect of legality. These were reformist rather than revolutionary aims, and it was in conjunction with the person of Ay Khomeini that the series of events constituting the revolution properly speaking began' (Algar 1991, 759).

And in further explanation of the events he adds:

'In late October 1977, Hag Seyyid Mustafa Khomeini, the eldest son of the Imam, a man of great talent and a principal aide of his father, suddenly passed away in Najaf. His death - like that of Shariati earlier in the year - was widely ascribed to the Shah's security police, and demonstrations condemning what was held to be murder were held in Tehran and elsewhere. A further affront to Ayatollah Khomeini and to public feeling came on 7 January 1978, when the semi-official daily *Ettelaat* published a scurrilous attack on him, accusing him of treachery and collusion with foreign enemies of Iran. The next day, a furious mass protest took place in Qum; it was suppressed by the security forces with heavy loss of life. This clash was the first link in a chain of popular confrontations with the Shah's regime that, gathering momentum throughout 1978, soon turned into a vast revolutionary movement, demanding the overthrow of the Pahlavi regime and the installation of an Islamic government' (Algar 1991, 759-760).

The religious community of Qom responded to the article abusing Ay Khomeini in *Ettelaat* newspaper by a demonstration on 8 January 1978. This demonstration was put down by the police. On the next day, more demonstrators marched into the streets and a violent clash took place. The demonstrators rushed to some banks and the troops

opened fire with the result that about 80 to 90 were killed, and many more were arrested. (See Appendix IX for more details.)

The mourning ceremonies of the fortieth day of death (*Chelle*) of those who were killed in Qom was arranged in Tabriz, and as a result yet more demonstrators were killed by the troops. The story of the Chelle ceremonies went on in Yazd and then in other cities with proclamations of Ay Khomeini against the Shah and arrangements of distributing agents. The demonstrations were continued on the other Islamic occasions, especially Ramadan and Moharram and particularly on Tassua and Ashoora. Some precipitating factors, such as firing in the Cinema Rex on 19 August 1978, were used for the agitation of the people as well. (See Appendix IX for more details.)

Resolutions of the largest rally in the history of Iran, up to that time, on Eid-e Fetr and after that on the even larger rallies on Tassua and Ashoora clearly pointed to the leadership of Ay Khomeini as a *marja'* and demanded Islamic government and abolition of the monarchy system (Rahnema 1990, 24-25). In other words, the ideology of the movement developed by Ay Khomeini was propagated by the distributors and close followers, some of whom were appointed as the members of the revolutionary council on 22 Day 1357 (12 January 1979). The distributors acted through the religious organisations. These included traditional ones - such as, mosques and the Bazaar; political groups - for instance, the Heiathay-e Moatalefe and Liberation Movement of Iran; previously guerrilla ones - such as, Sazman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran with new leaders, and smaller ones later joined as Sazman-e Mojahedine Enqelabe Eslami.

The monarchy adopted different policies towards the revolution during this period, sometimes involving repression, and at other times reconciliation. Announcing martial law by the government in the cities and broadcasting the future hopes by the Shah to show the golden gates of the Great Civilisation under his rule brought no reduction of protests. Meanwhile, the burning of Cinema Rex in Abadan, with 400-700 of the audience burned to ashes, caused many to join the revolution. Release of political prisoners did not reduce the rage of the people. Sharif Imami's reconciliation government, established on 5 Shahrivar 1357 AHS (27 August 1978), proved to be

useless in stopping the marches after about three months. It witnessed the great demonstration of Eid-e Fetr, the increasing awareness of the people of misdeeds of the regime through the recently arranged criticisms of the members of the parliament, and the largest massacre of 'Black Friday' with more than 4000 killed. He was replaced by General Azhari with a martial government. The opposition took to the roofs instead of the streets with demonstrations at night rather than during daylight; and great strikes started. The huge rallies of Tasua and Ashoora took place at this time, with an emphasis on the leadership of Ay Khomeini and the demand for an Islamic government. (See Appendix IX for more details.)

After Azhari, *Shahpoor-e Bakhtiar* a moderate opposition leader, was appointed as the prime minister by the Shah, on 13 Day 1357 (3 January 1979). The Shah appointed the royal council as well, on 26 Day 1357 (16 January 1979), and went to Egypt. Ay Khomeini announced the establishment of the revolutionary assembly and returned to the country after about 15 years of banishment. He was received by a massive crowd of the people who covered both sides of the 33 kilometres of road from Mehrabad Airport to *Behesht-e Zahra* (the cemetery of Tehran) who supported his car by hand for most of the way. He declared the government of Bakhtiar to be unlawful in his speech in the cemetery, and assigned Bazargan to be the first prime minister of the revolutionary regime four days later. The Shah's regime collapsed totally on 22 Bahman (11 February), after two days of battle between the revolutionaries and those who remained faithful military forces to the Shah (Madani 1361 AHS, 350-353), and the Islamic Republic was established on 12 Farvardin 1368 AHS (1 April 1979), by a referendum. (See Appendix IX for more details.)

Other Perspectives:

As with the other social movements considered here, our theory has been verified by the analyses of the Islamic Revolution above. Its further validation as an explanation and analysis of the Islamic Revolution will be achieved through an adjudicatory comparison with three other main potential explanations of the revolution. The individualist, relationist, and social determinist approaches will be examined in the following section.

Individualism:

Applying Toch's individualistic approach, the people were susceptible to mobilisation against the Shah's regime because of its secular modernisation programme, and the increasing influence of the USA on the internal affairs of the country. The 'problem situation' (using Toch's terms) was the secular modernisation programme started, significantly, about 15 years ago under the title of the 'White Revolution', under overt supervision of the USA. Ay Khomeini, as a reputable mojtahed, had a 'problem' with this programme and had shown his opposition in 1963 which led to the 15th of Khordad Movement. Through his and his close follower's agitations the Iranian population, especially the religious community, or at least a part of it who were the followers of Ay Khomeini and who had a 'problem' with the Shah's secular modernisation programmes, became 'susceptible' to mobilisation against the reforms and the international relations. The 'susceptible' religious community, and later on the majority of the population of Iran formed their appeal against the regime and came together, selected their ideology and promoted the revolution. The general 'appeal' of the revolution can be seen in the dominant slogan of the demonstrators: "Down with the Shah", and "Long live Khomeini". The importance of the day of Ashoora in the

ideology of the Islamic Revolution, which was Shiism, brought this opportunity to the leading personalities of the movement to present their exact 'appeal' on this day. They asked for an overthrow of the Shah and the monarchy, and the establishment of an independent Islamic government. The Shah's efforts like establishment of the martial law, changes in cabinets, limitations brought to the administrative and economic activities of the royal family, ordering to kill the demonstrators and attack the mosques and holy shrines could not stop the mostly peaceful marches of the people and strikes of bazaar, universities, schools, ministries, and factories. Finally on 22 Bahman (11 February), the people overcame the troops and established the new state headed by Ay Khomeini.

In this way Toch's individualist perspective may explain the source of the susceptibility of participants - dependent secular modernisation - as the main factor of group formation, and introduces the Shiism ideology as the practical way for formation of appeal - replacement of the Shah's regime - and its satisfaction. However, there are some essential questions about this revolution which cannot be answered using this perspective. Why did Shiism become the ideology of the revolution? Was it because of the leadership of Ay Khomeini, or was there some other reason for it? There were some intellectual pro modernisation groups participating in the revolution. Why did not they follow the other ideologies? There were some Moslem modernist currents participating in the movement as well. What was their susceptibility and the reason or reasons for their agitation? Why did Ay Khomeini become the leader of the revolution? Why was not the oppressive activities of the regime successful in stopping the demonstrations and revolutionary actions? What was the inter relationship between the revolutionary actions and the regime's activities?

Relationism:

Using Tilly and Melucci's perspectives 'Shiism' can be interpreted as the 'beliefs' (Tilly) or 'collective identity' (Melucci) of the Islamic Revolution. The 'organisation' is another

important factor in Tilly's perspective, while it can be considered as 'means' in a three polar system of 'goals', 'means' and 'environment' for Melucci. In the Islamic Revolution, the religious institutions and the bazaar, predominantly, served as the 'organisation' (Tilly), and the 'means' (Melucci) of the revolution. In this part the Islamic Revolution will be examined in relationship to Tilly and Melucci's theories in order to find out how far these two theories may be able to explain this movement.

Tilly's Perspective:

Did 'interests' in the Islamic Revolution, really, follow from the production relations, as Tilly's perspective would suggest? The production relations, thanks to the so called 'White Revolution' in 1963 were supposed to be capitalist, but turned to the petrolic despotism, according to Katouzian, due to the increase in the oil revenues (Katouzian 1981, 244). In the social context of the Islamic Revolution the struggle was between two socio-political classes. The ulama and the religious community consisted of commoners and traditional middle class and the modern middle class, located within the state, were against the dictator-dependent-rich state, supported by imperialists and oil revenues. According to Abrahamian, declaring war on the bazaars and the religious establishment, the regime had driven the moderate opposition and even the apolitical clergy into Ay Khomeini's arms, and these establishments provided him not only with generous financial support but also with a nation wide organisational net work (Abrahamian 1982, 533). Thus, using Tilly's perspective, the population of Iran followed their 'belief' in the Islamic Revolution, but this 'belief' did not necessarily result from the relations of production as he notes (Tilly 1987, 61).

The 'organisation' of this revolt, as Abrahamian explained, was provided by the bazaar and the religious establishment. Rahnema and Nomani placed emphasis on the role of the mosques and neighbourhood committees under the supervision of the national organisers of the religious movement who were receiving their directives by letters and tapes from Ayatollah Khomeini who was abroad (Rahnema 1990, 10). According to Rahnema and Nomani, the 'mobilisation' of discontents took place under the power of

the clergy due to their control over the mosques, and their spiritual and social respect (Rahnema 1990, 10). Abrahamian believes that the mobilisation of the revolution was through the modern middle class: 'it was the modern middle class that sparked off the revolution, fuelled it, and struck the final blows' (Abrahamian 1982, 533). Generally speaking, adding these two historical interpretations, using Tilly's perspective, the Islamic Revolution occurred through the organisations of bazaars and the religious institution, and the people were mobilised by their Shiite beliefs by the clergy or the modern middle class. However, this type of interpretation does not enable us to decide which historical explanation is more reliable.

Applying Tilly's concept of 'interests', to the case of Islamic Revolution one cannot find the exact answer to the question of 'why' this revolution took place. The 'petrolic despotism' had oppressed almost all social classes of the country to such a degree that they became alienated from the Shah's regime. But why did they follow their religious beliefs in such a wide range, and with such sincere devotion? This cannot be explained just by following the concept of 'interests' in the way Tilly uses. Using the concepts of 'organisation' and 'mobilisation' to find out 'how' this revolution took place brings us only a *mechanical* understanding of the bazaar, the religious institutions, the modern middle class and Shiite beliefs at the time of the revolution. To have a fuller *analytical* understanding of these institutions we need to know their historical background and interaction in the social context of Iran, which is missing if we try to apply Tilly's model.

Consequently the following issues cannot be addressed using Tilly's approach. Why did Ay Khomeini become the leader of the revolution? Why did the Shiite beliefs become the mobilising factor of the movement? Why did not other ideologies such as liberalism or communism lead the movement? How and why did the traditional and modern middle class with different ideologies or at least different interpretations from Islamic ideology co-operate in making the revolution? What was the role of bazaar in conjunction with the mosques and other religious institutions in the revolution? Were bazaars just the physical locations, or had they some part in the 'mobilisation' of the masses as well? What is the exact border line between the 'organisation' and

'mobilisational' factors in this revolution? When applying Tilly's concepts to the Islamic Revolution, these are some essential questions to which one cannot find the answers.

Melucci's Perspective:

Looking at the Islamic Revolution from Melucci's point of view gives us another possible alternative insight into this revolution. The participants of the revolution were against the despotic regime. The Shah had changed the 'constitutional monarchy' to His Majesty's own 'Imperial System' (Katouzian 1981, 342) with the help of the Americans. Consequently there was a bitter feeling which was uniting the Iranian population against the Shah's state. They sought relief from this by using the national-independent materials of their culture. Thus, Shiism as the national religion of the majority of the population, became the main source of their 'collective identity', using Melucci's terminology. This 'collective identity' used the bazaars, mosques and religious ceremonies and occasions as its 'means' and asked for a new independent Islamic regime as its 'goal'. The 'environment' of this movement was a new phase of political relaxation, dictated from the Human Rights Policy of Carter, in the despotic political atmosphere of Iran.

The religious community, mostly traditional and some educated in religious schools, and the modern educated or most westernised community of the country could have their own reasons for entering into the movement and protest against the Shah's regime. However, their 'solidarity' was due to their national religion and its traditions, and their 'conflict' was with the despotic dependent regime of the Shah. The huge demonstrations and heavy strikes undermined the social, political and economic structure of the regime and 'broke the limits of compatibility of the system' (Melucci 1989, 29).

Melucci's theory may be used to consider many of the important factors of social movements from a mass behaviour point of view, but two important factors, agencies and historical backgrounds are largely missing from it. Using Melucci's type of

explanation of the Islamic Revolution, there is no clarification about the important personality of Ay Khomeini and other significant figures who made this event in collaboration with the agitated masses. What was the exact role of Ay Khomeini in this revolution? What was the role of the other political or religious personalities? Why did this revolution in this particular period of Iranian history take place? Why were not the other political or social personalities and/or organisations at the core of the revolution? Why did the people reject the royal system, and demanded a new Islamic one? Why the traditional community and the mostly modernised groups came together under one flag which was in the hand of a mojtahed? These questions find no answers in this view.

Social Determinism:

Looking at it from the social deterministic theories point of view, the underlying social conditions of the Islamic Revolution could be either 'redefinition of norms and values', 'cultural class struggle', or 'social/political class struggle'. The people's demand was for a total change in the political institution: abandonment of the Pahlavi's regime and establishment of an Islamic Republic, according to the dominant slogans of the revolution. Thus 'redefinition of the norms and values', at least in the political system, was their wish, according to Smelser's approach. To reach their objectives, they ought to have a cultural (Touraine) or social/political (Scott) struggle with the Shah's state.

Structural-Functionalist Perspective:

Due to the Human Rights Policy of Carter, the Shah was obliged to open a new political phase in Iran called 'the period of political relaxation' (Rahnema 1990, 8). For instance, ten evenings of poetry readings were arranged at the Goethe Institute in Tehran, in October 1977, and the Human Rights Association in Iran was established on 10 December 1977 (Madani Vol. II, 1361 AHS, 238). Some political prisoners were

also released (Rahnema 1990, 8). The new plan engendered a 'structural conduciveness' in the dictatorship-political-structure of the country.

An article published in Ettelaat newspaper, abusing Ay Khomeini in personal terms, caused the religious community to respond in Qom through demonstrations. The suspicious death of Seyed Mostafa Khomeini in Najaf, after the death of Shariati earlier in the year was another event which led to the 'structural strain', to use Smelser's concept. The 'structural strain' increased further by the fortieth day ceremonies of people killed in each city and caused Amoozgar's cabinet to announce martial law in some cities of Isfahan province. He resigned soon afterwards because of the increase in rage against the state because of the firing of Cinema Rex.

Using Smelser's view, has a tendency to produce a linear chronological description of the revolution. In the case of the Islamic Revolution, in this type of explanation, there is no exact criterion for the classification of the events under the prominent concepts of the theory. For example, the changes of the cabinets were due to the 'structural strain' of the political system of the Shah's regime, but could also be considered as a tactic of the 'control system' as well. 'Mobilisation of the participants for action' could be interpreted as the result of the leadership of Ay Khomeini through religious occasions. Meanwhile the religious occasions can be interpreted as 'precipitating factors' as well. These overlaps of the concepts would make the interpretation of the Islamic Revolution from Smelser's insight rather vague.

There is no adequate explanation about the role of the leadership and its importance using Smelser's model. One cannot find much explanation about the historical background of the movement either. Was 'the period of political relaxation' really the cause of the movement? Was the critical article against Ay Khomeini the only cause of agitation of the religious community? Were only the proclamations of Ay Khomeini leading the people or were the religious ceremonies the important factors for mobilisation of the discontents? If both, what was the role of either? Was the Islamic Revolution a confrontation between religious institution and a political one, using structural-functionalist vocabulary, or was it a conflict within the political system?

What was the social solidarity factor in this revolution? How did the people come together to fight against the Shah's regime? Was this unification, only, through the religious institution and/or religious ideology, or did something else unite the religious community with the other groups with different ideologies? These are some questions that one cannot find the answers to in this type of explication of the Islamic Revolution.

Conflict Theory Perspective:

The conflict between the state and the people was manifested in the struggle between the 'Shah's pseudo-modernist despotism' and the 'Shiite identity' of the Iranian population. This Shiite 'identity' was against the Shah's regime as the 'opposition' in the 'totality' of Iranian society, following Touraine's analysis of social movements. This cultural conflict was based on the fact that the Shah was supported by the overt aid and assistance of the Americans after the 1953 coup and, like his father, insisted on the pre-Islamic Iranian glories for construction of the new modern Iranian nationalism. Both factors: relying on American aid and pre-Islamic nationalism, as the supporters of his authority, were considered to be inferior aspects, according to the people's Shiite identity (Katouzian 1981, 337). Therefore, according to Rahnema and Nomani, 'the revolution was the rebirth of a nation.' In fact, the people's Iran was against the Shah's Iran (Rahnema 1990, 2-3). Using Touraine's view, the Islamic Revolution was a 'revolutionary action' because its 'project level' was the whole Iranian culture, or 'historicity'; and it was a struggle against the Shah's despotism; so, it can be considered as a 'critical struggle'.

Following this perspective, in search of 'why' the Islamic Revolution took place we should look for four preconditions of the movement. There was a 'committed population' - the population of Iran, which was 'organised' by the religious leadership and institutions with the help of bazaars and other middle class groups, according to Abrahamian's interpretation of events. This organised population was 'fighting against' the 'diversity' of the Shah's 'pseudo-modern petrolic despotism', using Katouzian's

concept, and this opposition was a problem that concerned the whole society and changed the Shah's Iran to the people's Iran, according to Rahnema and Nomani's understanding of the historical facts.

As discussed previously, Touraine's theory is mostly devoted to the 'why' question of the movements and does not deal with 'how' they occur. The historical struggle between 'dowlat' and 'mellat' emerged in the diversity between the Shah's despotism and the Shiite Identity of Iranian society at the time of the Islamic Revolution. The Shah's state was dependent on the west, especially the USA, dictatorship, and with secular tendencies. Whilst the people of Iran sought an independent-Islamic-republic. So far this can be explained, using Touraine's theory. But there are some remaining questions. How were the people able to change the political system? Was the diversity and struggle between two social groups enough for a movement to reach to its aims? What were the other prominent factors in conduct of the Islamic revolution? There is no explanation about the mobilising factors of the revolution in this perspective.

Applying Scott's perspective, the Shiite identity served as an 'ideology' and acted as the means of 'social closure' in the Islamic Revolution. There was a 'social/political struggle' between the Shah's monarchy and the religious institution. The authority of the Shah was opposed to the authority of the ulama. The people's 'interest' was to approve their independent-religious-identity, and to be liberated from the dictatorship of the state. The well known slogan of 'Independence, Liberty, Islamic Republic' in the demonstrations can illustrate the 'interest' of the people using Scott's model.

The people sought an Islamic Republic in order to claim their chosen identity. This identity could bring back their respect, as a nation, while they had been humiliated by their leader (the Shah) on his obedience to the Americans and his insistence on the pre-Islamic glories of Iran. As Rahnema and Nomani explained, this foundation was able to make a new people's Iran rather than that of the Shah's. That much they knew about the ideology and the experience of the last generation who had fought according to it in the Constitutional Revolution, it could bring them liberty as well; providing there would not be any more king to renew the despotism again. So, Ay Khomeini

articulated their 'interest' by religious rituals and ceremonies on the important religious occasions and organised strikes and different types of protest by leading the nation in accordance with the new identity.

Scott's theory insists on social conditions as one of the prominent factors. However, it mainly explains the 'how' question of the social movements. In the case of the Islamic Revolution the struggle between the state and the people was shaped in the conflict between the Shah's dictatorship and the religious institution in collaboration with the bazaar. The people sought their demands - independence, freedom, and Islamic Republic - under the leadership of a marja' whose authority was the only one in the social context that was able to confront the Shah's government. Ay Khomeini, an opponent mojtahed with the political background of leading the 15th of Khordad Movement 15 years ago and continuous opposition to the Shah's regime, was the best leader for them. Therefore, they followed his proclamations and guidelines through the religious organisation and overthrew the Shah's regime.

The agencies and their importance in utilisation of the facilities of the organisations are almost neglected by this type of interpretation. The concept of 'interest articulation' used by Scott mostly emphasises the origin and structure of the aggregation, not the process of it. Who was important in this articulation? Was it just Ay Khomeini and/or the religious institution that became able to bring the people into the streets, over the roofs, and made them strike, or were there some others who arranged these activities? Ay Khomeini was outside of Iran when the demonstrations were going on. Who was leading the internal organisation of the revolution? What was the role of the other political opponents who were not under the umbrella of the religious authority? How much were they influencing the revolution? Was the ideology a structure for the revolution or has it some parts in the content of it as well? There are still some 'why' questions that their answers are not quite clear according to this point of view. Why did the religious people participate in the opposition even when demonstrations occurred on days that were not religious occasions? And why was the religious leader in agreement with those activities which had no apparent traditional religious feature?

Conclusion:

In this part the critical comparative analysis of these possible alternative explanations will be followed in order to assess the validity and comprehensiveness of the synthetic view in the interpretation of the Islamic Revolution. It explains the micro and macro dimensions of the revolution and considers the subjective and objective factors of it. Using the other insights, one or two dimensions of this revolution can be explained. Individualist interpretation leads to the psychological explanation of the participants of the revolution and its chronology. The structural-functionalist view looks at the structural strain and the chronology of the revolution from the position of social structures. The relationistic stand shows the subjective factors of solidarity or mobilisation, or the objective organisations of mobilisation. While the conflict theory provides insights about the social conditions from the struggling cultural or social/political structures view.

Our theory analyses the social context of the Islamic Revolution by taking the opposition of the state and the people into account. This opposition was manifested by the difference between the monarchy system under the authority of the Shah and the newly demanded Islamic government under the authority of Ay Khomeini. The first authority was backed by the ruling class of the society and the second one was supported by the commoners and the traditional middle class, and, in with the outbreak of the revolution, could gain the support of the modern middle class as well. This is taken as the social condition in the political sociology of the Islamic Revolution by the synthetic view. The social context for the structural-functionalist interpretation is the 'political structural strain' appeared after enforcing the political relaxation phase of political development of the country according to the modernisation programme. This concept from the conflict theory perspective was defined as the cultural struggle between the 'monarchy national identity' and 'the religious nationalist identity', that is Shiite identity (for Touraine), or social/political struggle amid the 'dependent monarchy

nationalism' under the authority of the state and the 'Shiite nationalist attitude' under the authority of the religious organisation (for Scott).

The synthetic theory considered two relational, i.e. solidarity-mobilisational, factors operating in the Islamic Revolution: one subjective and the other objective part of the ideology. The belief in the Islamic government served as the subjective solidarity-mobilisational factor, and the religious rituals and organisations, traditional and the newly established ones, acted as the objective organisations for adapting the roads for maintaining the relations between the participants in the revolution. These organisations benefited from the financial and social support of bazaars. Applying the relationist perspective we saw that there were two types of interpretations in this regard: for Melucci the Shiite identity was the conscious solidarity factor, and for Tilly the religious organisation backed by the bazaar mobilised the discontents according to their Shiite interests. In the individualistic view Shiism caused the susceptible people to come together following their appeal, and in the social deterministic ideas, mobilisation took place through the religious institutions using their organisation and people's beliefs (Smelser), or articulating the people's national-Shiite interest by religious organisation (Scott).

In these other perspectives the role of the masses is discussed, but there is no explanation about the particular part played by agents of the revolution. Even in the individualist insight the social psychology of the masses is taken in to consideration not the individual agencies. Looking at the performance of the agents our synthetic view introduced three layers of actors considering their roles and behaviours. Ay Khomeini acted as the *leader* of the revolution, his clergy and bazaari followers like Motahari, Beheshti, Bahonar, Rajaii, Askaraowladi and the others acted as the *distributors* and the faithful Shiites followed their lead. Examining the role of the actors in the social context of the revolution other personalities, who acted as the distributors, maybe unintentionally, such as Dr. Shariati, were discussed as well. Using this approach we have more complete analysis of the role of the participants.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

Introduction:

Having examined the usefulness of our theory in explanation and understanding Iranian-Islamic social movements in last four chapters, in this concluding section our aim is to analyse the historical outcome of application of the theory. In the previous four chapters, each of which took as its subject a specific Iranian-Islamic social movement, the primary thrust of the analysis was to compare the efficacy of different interpretations or models in order to substantiate the synthetic theory as the most adequate. In this concluding chapter the emphasis shifts to an examination of some of the trends and changes through the history of these movements. There were some common factors incorporated to the synthetic view which enabled us to study four Iranian-Islamic social movements. *Similarities* of the position of these factors and their interrelationship in all reviewed movements show their generality, and reveal the synthetic model as a comprehensive framework for Iranian-Islamic social movements. Certain subtle *episodic differences* between apparently common factors will be examined in order to show their development over-time. Each succeeding movement, of course, contains a 'memory' of the preceding one and it is this evolution which is the subject of this chapter. This will lead us to identify the most significant changes in the social context, ideologies and actors and their behaviours within the social movements. Ultimately, looking at the aggregation of these changes, will introduce an elementary understanding and interpretation about the social history of Iranian-Islamic social movements in the period of our concern. Is this interpretation able to improve our understanding of Iranian social movements rather than merely Iranian-Islamic social movements? A part of our aim in the chapter is to find out the answer to this question.

As was mentioned in chapter three, the key general concept of our social movement theory is the 'social context'. Once the social context is specified the other factors of the social movement - ideology, actors, behaviours - will become tangible. In this study Iranian-Islamic social movements were examined from the standpoint of political sociology. The leading authorities of the opposing social groups were studied in the social context of the movements; the chief active ideologies and organisations were similarly reviewed; and the involved personalities were identified according to their roles. The history of these particular socio-political aspects of Iranian-Islamic social movements reveals a schism between certain crucial elements in the social context of Iranian political social movements in the period of study. That is, reviewing the antagonism between different authorities in the last one hundred years leads us to the most prominent of them: namely that between the state or the shah and the authority of the ulama. Considering the confrontation of these authorities as an important aspect of the social context of Iranian political social movements, and investigating the synthetic theory on this basis, introduces a new interpretation of Iranian political social movements. Examination of this interpretation in analysis of other Iranian political social movements in the last century will, hopefully, show its utility.

To recall, there were five major anti-state national political social movements in the last one hundred years of Iranian history. Four of them have come under the microscope in this thesis as the *Iranian-Islamic* social movements because of the crucial component of having Islamic ideologies and leadership. The fifth one can be named as a 'national movement' or *Iranian* social movement due to its dominant ideology and prominent actors. The nationalisation of the oil industry was its target, the underlying ideology was not purely Islamic and owes some of its justifications to secular parties. Regardless of participation of Ay Kashani and his followers in this movement, national and secular personalities, organisations and parties were also among the main actors, particularly in the last stage of the movement. This movement will be analysed on the basis of the postulated social context of this study and the synthetic theory. Using secondary historical data and evidence exposed by some local historians, adequate explanation of this movement will support our overall theory and will attest its applicability in this extension to all of the main, modern Iranian political social movements.

This chapter will also examine the alternative interpretations of various scholars resulting from their application of other theories to the analysis of Iranian social movements, most especially the Islamic Revolution of 1978-9, which were introduced in chapter four. Yet another critical comparative analysis will help us to support the thesis. An adjudicatory analysis will be conducted in order to show the usefulness of the interpretation of Iranian political social movements of this research. Following the similarities and differences of interpretations, by focusing on their shared aspects and deciphering the reasoning behind the rival points, will open up some further dimensions and provide a better understanding of these movements.

In this study our theory is examined in explanation and analysis of the Iranian political social movements. Further studies are, of course, needed to confirm its utility for the explication of the other types of movements.

History of Iranian-Islamic Social Movements:

The comparative analysis of the prominent concepts incorporated in the synthetic theory will provide a picture or a middle range theory of the history of Iranian-Islamic social movements. The main features in the political sociology of the last one hundred years of Islamic social movements in Iran are: the struggles between the authorities of the ulama and the state; the ideologies of discontent are the specific interpretations of the ulama on the basis of Shiite principles and rules according to the situation of each episode; the main organisations are the religious ones backed by the bazaars; and the actors are predominantly Shiite followers from different strata of the society acting according to their religious duty and social frustrations and targets on spiritual occasions. The struggles are against dictatorship, colonialism, imperialism, and aim to capture more of the authority which falls under the surveillance of the state in favour of

the people led by the ulama. The comparative evaluation of the four movements in more detail will be presented in this part.

Social Context:

Two distinct authorities were posed against one another within the social context of the movements reviewed: that of the shah and of the ulama. Each had its own sphere of influence. At the turn of the nineteenth century the state began to interfere within the ulama's arena, but in the Islamic Revolution the latter authority achieved a dominant position.

At the time of the Tobacco Movement, the Shah was the head of the state and representative of the privileged class. The state was mainly responsible for internal and external security of the nation. Foreign policies and relations were conducted by it, and internal policing was its duty. The Urf courts, administered by the state, were responsible for criminal matters like robbery, and so forth, and the military apparatus was under the control of the shah. Agents of the state received taxes in order to support and protect the property of the people. The ulama were representatives of the lower class. They were the head of the people's communities. The socio-economic relations of the nation were supervised by them. The bazaar as the main economic sector of the society was under their rule. According to their beliefs, the religious taxes, like Khoms and Zakat, were delivered to them by merchants, shopkeepers, artisans, cattle owners, peasants and so forth, in order to purify their wealth. These taxes were used to support the domestic welfare system led by the clergy, and, partly, to fund the religious community in its mainly research and educational endeavours. The 'endowment' or *Owqaf* was another financial support donated by the wealthy people to the religious structure. The Shara' courts were responsible for the social and economic affairs of the people. Marriage and divorce were under the rule of the clergy, and the educational system was managed by them. They conducted the socio-economic affairs

of the society not by their own legislation of rules but rather by extracting them from the religious sources by the knowledge of jurisprudence.

At the time of Naser-ed-Din Shah, international contacts increased and new contracts were agreed. Concessions with the other nations were in the sphere of the country's international relations and, therefore, were the responsibility of the Shah and his government. However, the effect of such contracts were not just in the Shah's realm, as they mostly affected trade with the other nations which was managed by the merchants, and this in turn affected the economic institutions, such as banks and loan systems, which were under the responsibility of the ulama. In these cases the Shah's decisions had an impact on the domain of the authority of the ulama and that of the merchants in the economic system. This interference caused dissatisfaction among the ulama and the merchants, but the Shah enforced his will due to his despotic position in the political system. The dictatorship of the state, which was formerly well-tolerated in security matters, was no longer endurable in the socio-economic domain.

The tobacco contract shocked the whole nation across its political, economic and cultural dimensions. When the Regie company built its centres like fortress and imported soldiers and armaments, it had the capacity to be the potential cause of the colonisation of the country, as had occurred for instance in India and Egypt. It removed the authority of trade and business from almost one fifth of the active population. And the European style behaviour of the agents of the company, such as being unveiled and careless about drinking wine, grossly offended the people's cultural values. In the meantime, an increase in the number of Christian missionaries was another sign of danger for the culture of the country in the eye of the ulama and other religious people who formed the majority of the nation. In such a social context the Tobacco Movement took place and, as we have seen in chapter 4, led to the annulment of the contract.

International relations were under inevitable change due to the modernisation of the European countries. On this basis, the intervention of the authority of the state in the realm of the other authorities could not be stopped. This being the case, a group of

ulama and intelligentsia decided to challenge the nature of the authority of the state in order to rationalise it, and to bring its activities under the control of the nation. They aimed to change the dictatorship to a kind of democracy with a justice house (Edalat Khane), which became the parliament, the main legislative organ, in the final stage of the revolution. A group of ulama, leading the revolution and being, traditionally, from the strata of legislative experts and practitioners, possessed complete confidence in the dominance of the ulama's authority in the new system. Moreover, later on they gained the right of veto over all legislation of the parliament. This right was granted to them in a constitutional amendment after a series of struggles between different groups participating in the Constitutional Revolution.⁴³ The people were in agreement with the aims of the ulama, because they knew these clerics as the head of their community and as their trusted representatives; the ulama were the deputies of the Hidden Imam, according to their religious beliefs. The Tobacco Movement was started by the protests of the people and the ulama subsequently led them, but the Constitutional Revolution was initiated by the ulama and the intelligentsia before they managed to agitate the population.

The Constitutional Revolution enabled the ulama and the people to defeat the authority of Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah in 1906, but a new dictator dominated the Parliament, and, therefore, established his own despotic authority over the nation following a coup in 1926. Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, oppressed all other claimants of authority, and renewed and extended the control of the state in almost all realms.⁴⁴ The ulama were pushed to the periphery of the social sphere; and a new middle class emerged, consisting of the government employees, who were educated in the secular schools, managed by the new national education system and administered by the Ministry of Culture.

In the 15th of Khordad Movement, an emerging marja' used his authority to protest against the Shah's reforms. He was backed by the religious faithful from the ordinary people, the bazaar, and modern educated Muslims. As the protest was not well organised under the harsh suppression of the movement by the Shah, this did not allow the ulama's authority to move further than it remained after the reforms of the Pahlavis

era. The religious rituals, religious schools, mosques, holy tombs and Hosseiniyes were under the supervision of the ulama. On the other hand, there was a counter-movement (the White Revolution) enforced by the state, and the Shah benefited from the establishment of new organisations and, more importantly, the mass media.

The two competing authorities confronted, again, in the Islamic Revolution. The traditional position of the ulama, due to the reforms of the Shah, was inferior to what it had been at the time of the 15th of Khordad Movement. The religious community formed some new organisations, led by the ulama with collaboration from the bazaar and the modern-educated Muslims. Thus, unlike the previous movement, the authority of Ay Khomeini, attracted the support of the lower class as well as the traditional and modern middle class. These alliances permitted it to win the perpetual confrontation, and made the authority of the ulama dominant over the nation, by finally excluding the authority of the monarch.

Ideology:

The Shiite ideology, in the Tobacco Movement, took the form of a single ban. Mirzaye Shirazi's statement forbidding the use of tobacco was followed by an already agitated Shiite population and, acted as a solidarity factor uniting them all against the contract. Thus the Shah's decision was contested successfully. In the Constitutional Revolution the idea of justice was the main target of the revolutionaries. They were seeking 'consultation' against 'dictatorship' and 'justice' against 'despotism'. This ideology, in conjunction with the other factors, enabled them to overcome the authority of the Shah and made it *Mashroot* (limited) to authentic Islamic rules under supervision of the selected ulama, called guardians of jurisprudence (*Fogaha-ye Negahban*). However, this arrangement did not operate successfully due to the strength of the Pahlavi dynasty. The last effort of the weakened ulama, to use the framework of the constitution and enforce some limitation over the Shah's power, was made by Ay Khomeini in the 15th of Khordad. In this movement, his statement opposing the

referendum and his further call to reject the loyalty to the Shah and his government was subsequently enforced in the framework of the Constitution. As history shows, it did not work. Therefore, the idea of designing a replacement for the monarchy system gained support, and the plan of enacting the rule of the representatives of Hidden Imam was developed by Ay Khomeini. This was a purely Shiite idea positing the ulama as being responsible for the whole sphere of life of Muslim society; the domain that they were only responsible for, at a theoretical level, up to that juncture. Shiism, as a national belief, could act, as a factor of social closure, and unite the people against the despotic rule of the Shah, who was predominantly looked upon as a puppet of imperialism.

Actors and Behaviours:

In the Tobacco Movement the leader was a clergyman, and the distributors were clergymen, collaborating with bazaaris. They used the religious structure, and directed the agitated Shiite followers towards the specific targets of the ideology of the movement (cancellation of the contract). In the Constitutional Revolution the ulama, collaborating with some intelligentsia, filled the leadership positions as well as those of the distributors of the movement with the help of bazaaris. They agitated the Shiites and freedom-seekers through the religious structure, backed by the bazaar, and thus fuelled the movement. The bazaar was active in both movements as a supporter of the revolutionaries and in the position of the distributors and followers. The mosques, the holy shrines, religious schools, bazaars and streets were used as the tools for propagation of the ideology, for agitating the discontent, and serving as the manifestation of the protests for both movements. In the Constitutional Revolution the British Embassy was used in the same way too. These physical localities of various organisations acted as the pressure centres on the state. Distribution of announcements, pamphlets, telegrams, and delivering speeches featured in both movements, and in the Constitutional Revolution, newspapers were also used for the distribution of the ideas and aims of the revolutionaries.

In the 15th of Khordad Movement a part of the ulama, especially Ay Khomeini, were the leaders and the distributors of the movement, assisted by a part of the new middle class, modern-educated Muslims, as the distributors. Followers were, mostly, faithful Shiites from the bazaar, ordinary people, and university students. The actors used religious and national occasions, especially in Moharram, to demonstrate their protests to the state. The mosques, holy tombs, religious schools, bazaars, and streets were used as the launching pads in the performance of the movement. Proclamations, telegrams, and tapes of Ay Khomeini's speeches addressing the people in the mosques and religious schools were used as the crucial media by the protesters in this movement.

Ay Khomeini was the leader in the Islamic Revolution; his clergy followers and members of the modern and the traditional middle class were the distributors as well as followers; and the lower class should also be numbered as the followers of the revolution. The revolutionaries used the newly established organisations, universities, schools, factories, administrative offices of the state as well as the more traditional mosques, holy shrines, religious schools, bazaars, streets, houses and their roofs for agitating the people, organising demonstrations and articulating their aims and objections. The newspapers, proclamations, tapes of speeches of Ay Khomeini and other religious speakers, books (mostly written by Ay Motahari and Dr. Shariati), pamphlets, telephones, and radios were used to introduce the ideology of the movement, to explain its targets and record its progress. As with the other movements reviewed here, the religious structure acted as the backbone of the organisation of the revolution supported by the bazaars.

We see across the episodes a consistency of actors and behaviours, with the Ays as the leaders and the ulama or modern educated Moslems as the distributors and the faithful Shiites as the followers. All that essentially changes is the circumstantial features of the delivery of the movement.

Results in Historical Sociology:

Pulling these various currents together, we can summarise the history of the reviewed social movements as follows: *In the period of our concern, Iranian-Islamic social movements occurred in the framework of conflict between the authority of the shah, as the head of the state, and that of the ulama, as the head of the people's community. In the reign of Naser-ed-Din Shah, one hundred years ago, the authority of the king began to dominate the authority of the ulama. Several social movements emerged subsequently in response to this shift in balance of power. Almost a century later, with the abandonment of the monarchy in 1979, the status of the ulama was reclaimed and the balance of power swung back with additional responsibilities for the clergy involving the national and international security of the Iranian nation.*

If one considers this proposition as a prominent background trend of the political social context of the Iranian society, it enables us to analyse its social movements in a more precise manner. To recall, the National Movement of Iran is another nation-wide movement against the state which occurred during the period of our concern. It thus has a pivotal position amidst the socio-political change. In reviewing the processes and outcomes of this movement, we will be able to affirm this periodisation of social context and its utility for our interpretation of the Iranian social movements.

The National Movement of Iran (see Appendix X for more details) is rooted in the 14th period of the Iranian parliament (1943-1947). It started in 1943 and continued to 1953, when an American coup took place and deposed the government of Dr. Mosaddeq, the prime minister of the time. This decade can be divided into three distinct phases: a) nationalisation of the oil industry, b) premiership of Qavam, and c) the second premiership of Mosaddeq. In the first phase through a parliamentary debate Mosaddeq, as the head of the oil commission of the parliament, passed the bill nationalising the oil industry of Iran in March 1951. He was the leader of this

parliamentary movement and was backed by the other members of the congress, particularly Ay Kashani who simultaneously was agitating the people in favour of the bill through demonstrations. Using our standard conceptual framework, parliament and a section of the religious community can be said to have acted as the organisation of the movement and Ay Kashani was its main distributor. Its ideology was anti-imperialist and national. Its initial objective was nationalisation of the oil industry. Most of the activities took place through debates in parliament, the United Nations and other international organisations. In this period the antagonism was between the nation and the British Petroleum Company. Mosaddeq was regarded as a national hero and, consequently, was appointed as the prime minister. An economic ban was subsequently enforced on Iranian oil by the international companies. Mosaddeq asked the parliament for some legislative rights and requested authoritative power from the Shah to enable him to enforce his own policies in ruling the country. Ay Kashani was the head of the parliament at the time. Neither he nor the Shah agreed to give Mosaddeq these supplementary powers. Therefore, Mosaddeq resigned. (See Appendix X for more details.)

The Shah appointed Qavam as the prime minister. Qavam's rule lasted just four days. Because of the policies in his previous premiership (1945-1948) in granting some rights to the Americans, and the dictatorial tendency of his rule, Ay Kashani led a movement against him. This resulted in some rioting and bloodshed and to the rapid dismissal of Qavam. The result was the second premiership of Mosaddeq on 30 Tir 1331 AHS (20 July 1952). In this movement Ay Kashani was the leader and the religious and national structures, for instance the parliament and political parties, such as the National Front and the Communist (Tudeh) Party, were organisations; their members acting as the distributors. Anti-dictatorial and anti-imperialist beliefs were the ideology of the movement. The conflict in this second phase of the National Movement was between the Shah, backed by imperialism, and the people, led by the authority of a clergyman, in collaboration with the national and secular organisations and parties. (See Appendix X for more details.)

Mosaddeq became the prime minister for a second time. He was appointed as the head of military forces by the Shah and was allowed to establish some legislation through his cabinet without referring to the parliament. He enforced a national-liberal-secular policy regardless of the objections of Ay Kashani. Mosaddeq asked for a further extension of the right of legislation from the parliament. Ay Kashani did not agree. Therefore Mosaddeq called a referendum and thereby dismissed the parliament. Ay Kashani in his last letter to Mosaddeq asked him to change his policies and be aware of the potential of a coup against his government threatened by General Zahedi. Mosaddeq's reply declared that he had the support of the people and, therefore, had no need of Ay Kashani's help. On 28 Mordad 1331 (18 August 1952) through a CIA manufactured coup Mosaddeq was arrested by General Zahedi - the head of the coup and the new prime minister. In this phase, Mosaddeq's authority was posed squarely against that of the Shah. In this phase, the National Front, as the main vehicle for nationalist, liberal, and secular forces, and the Tudeh Party which was the most powerful political party of the time, both backed Mosaddeq. The religious authority was neutral, and the parliament, which previously had served as one of the prominent organisations for distribution of the aims and ideas of the people, was closed. (See Appendix X for more details.) Looking at this historical evidence of the reach of the rival bases of power, we can conclude that in this phase of this movement the authority of the National Front and the Tudeh Party was completely overshadowed by that of the Shah in mobilisation of the people.

The significance of the authority of the shah and the ulama as the most important ones at the background of the social context of the Iranian society can be also documented with a brief mention of some other cases (of which space restrictions preclude a full discussion). In addition there were three secular (communist-democrat) movements, which have led to claims about their significance as Iranian social movements (Foran, 1994; Ray, 1993). These uprisings, however, led only to the establishment of regional states and not national ones - in three localities of Iran, Kordestan (January 1946-December 1946)⁴⁵, Azarbayjan (December 1945-December 1946)⁴⁶, and Torkaman-Sahra (for several months in 1979)⁴⁷. None lasted for more than a year. The first two were defeated by the Imperial Iranian Army (under the authority of the shah), and the

third one was defeated under the authority of the ulama, after the Islamic Revolution. These further fragments of historical evidence once again substantiate our proposition that the most authoritative points of command in Iran were those of the state, headed by the shah, and that of the ulama. The authority of the ulama was supported by the Shiite ideology, and the command of the shah was a national historical one and little else has been able to survive in the space between these power blocs.

Looking at these social movements under the light of the concluded historical interpretation, one can say that the aims of these social movements over the last hundred year indicate that when the state had not been able to guarantee the rights of the people, whether under attack from internal dictatorship or external forces, the populace and the ulama have come together to mutually defend their position and purposes.

Conclusion:

In this concluding part, the validity of the interpretation of this study in regard of the historical political sociology of Iranian social movements in the last hundred years will be supported against the reviewed interpretations in chapter four. The explications will be critically compared in regard of three common and crucial factors of social movements: social condition, mobilisation, and agency.

'Uneven development', 'dependent development', or 'rapid development' are three general reasons or conditions behind the Islamic Revolution, according to the reviewed interpretations. In more general terms, *imbalance between social forces* due to the modernisation programmes produced the social condition for Iranian social movements in the last century. Dependent development, dictatorship, economic downturn (Foran), class conflict produced in the process of history by economic, political, and ideological forces (Moaddel) centre-periphery struggle (Parsa), and antagonism between

modernisation and traditionalism (Amuzegar, Keddie, Ray), oppression, dictatorship, dependency (Fischer) are some of the detailed reasons or conditions behind the Iranian social movements covered by the explanations under review. The *conflict between the state and the people*, identified as two confronting classes in the last hundred years of Iranian history by the synthetic theory, shows the apparent feature of the above mentioned dualisms. The state was the most powerful political and economic force which manipulated modernisation programmes. Therefore, according to the people, it was responsible for abolishing the traditions and imposing uneven, dependent, and/or rapid development. This situation causes the imbalance, and thus, the confrontation between the state and the people.

In Iranian social movements the mobilisation of discontent took place because of the role of Shiite ideology according to Milani, Moaddel, Keddie, Fischer and Amuzegar. This task was performed by organisations such as the bazaar in Parsa's interpretation and mosques in Ray's view. The synthetic theory introduced ideology as the main mobilisational factor, too, and considers two dimensions - subjective and objective or abstract and concrete- for it. The people's belief in following the ulama - which took its own particular form in each movement, following the fatva of their marja in the Tobacco Movement, demanding justice in the Constitutional Revolution, protesting against the Shah's dependent and secular reforms in the 15th of Khordad Movement, and opposing the dependent Shah in the Islamic Revolution - served as the subjective or abstract component of the ideology, and Islamic rituals - such as mourning ceremonies for Imam Hossein, and religious organisations, including mosques - acted as the objective or concrete part of it. The bazaar supported this Islamic ideology in all movements. Means of communication linked the subjective and objective parts together and caused their unity. In short, in the general environment of the above mentioned social thinkers, the presented theory can be said to introduce a more elaborated and detailed understanding of this prominent aspect of the movements.

Agency is dealt with in a rather general way by the interpretations under review without a concrete description of its exact role. Milani named the ulama as the 'travelling salesmen' in the Islamic Revolution. Moaddel, Keddie, and Zubaida referred

to radical clergy or Shii clergy and pointed out Ay Khomeini as the leader of the revolution. Ray emphasised the role of the modern intelligentsia and the radical clergy as the main emancipatory forces in the Iranian history over the period of our concern. And Parsa counts radical clergy and bazaaris as the main revolutionary forces and Ay Khomeini as the leader. In this respect the presented theory, whilst not rejecting the above mentioned interpretations, described three different roles of the participants and identified them according to the historical documents.

The combination of the above-mentioned factors in the previous three paragraphs produced the social movements of the late nineteenth and twentieth century Iran. This combination is presented by our synthetic theory in an elaborated manner. Following the theoretical model, the relationship between the elements of the social movements is pinpointed precisely. The social context produced the underpinning mechanisms of all intervening factors. At the time of the outburst, religious organisations in the social context acted as the objective or practical body of the ideology and mobilised the discontent according to their beliefs through the means of communication such as menbar. Agitation took place under the influence of the leaders and the distributors activated the people's religious beliefs towards the aims of the movements. The consistent conjunction of the prominent factors fulfilled the aims of the revolutionaries. Conversely, if there had been no such concordance, the aims of the movements would not have been met.

Our theory provides a comprehensive framework to study the four cases. It introduces us the main constitutional factors of the movements: in the Tobacco Movement the authorities of the shah and a religious leader (Marja) struggled because of the tobacco contract between Iran and the Regei Company from England. In this confrontation the religious organisation using the traditional Islamic ideology mobilised the people and cancelled the contract. In the Constitutional Revolution the religious influence of some leading religious scholars as followed by the intellegencia and the people challenged the shah's authoritarian power in order to bring a new democratic order to the country. The Islamic interpretation of justice, freedom and democracy was as the ideology of the movement. A new parliamentary system established as a result. In the 15th of

Khordad Movement the supremacy of an emerging Marja opposed the command of the shah. The traditional Islamic ideology was against the shah's modernisation programme. The movement did not reach to its target. In the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 the Shah's control, backed by the imperialism, confronted the Marja's authority with a new political interpretation of Islam - 'Islamic government'. Different social strata: traditional middle class, modern middle class, and the mass of the people united against dictatorship and imperialism and overthrew the monarchy. The first and the third movements can be interpreted as the preludes of the second and the forth revolutions.

This summary outlines the key, general features of the movements under review. But as with any finite investigation, we are left with unanswered questions. This thesis has studied what might be thought of as the more crucial or 'first level' of prominent factors of Iranian-Islamic social movements. Each of these mechanisms is comprised of sub-systems and understanding their emergence would requires more detailed theoretical and historical investigations of 'second level' factors. E.g. Why, in Iran, was the opposition between the people and the state the prominent social divide as opposed to some other stratification factor? What exactly was the hierarchy of the people in terms the ability of one strata to influence others? What was the nature of the state and how, from its point of view, were the movements regarded? What exactly were the aims and interest of different groups in the movements and why were some more involved than others? What was specific role of different classes or sub-groups - such as women - who participated in the movements? What was the effect of international currents on each movement and what was the influence of these movement at the global scale? These are some of the questions which warrant further investigations in order to elaborate and deepen the dimensions and findings of the present thesis.

Appendices

Appendix I:

Some parts of Seyed Jamal-ed-din-e Asadabadi's letter to Queen Victoria which was published in the newspapers of the time in French, translated from Persian text.

The Kingdom of Terror in Iran

My country has become corrupted and its population has been decreased. ...

.....

It is necessary to be known that there is no law, at all, at the time of the kingdom of this monarch. Rather it can be said that there is no true government.

Previously, as a tradition, the prime minister acted as an intermediary agent between the king and his peasants, and he sought the interests of both equally. He was from the nobility, and some times from the great ministers, and had a sort of co-operation and co-ordination with the Iranian aristocrats. The lords had some authority over the people and were the head of their inhabited lands and properties. Now the situation has changed. The monarch has scattered the nobles and has captured their possessions and has undermined their authority and dispersed their people and peasants.

.....

This is the situation of the Iranian government. The dynastic chain of the lords has been abolished; a few of them are undercovered; some are exiled; a certain number are in prisons and still others had died; all of them have lost their reputation and most of them are purged and the Iranian state had missed these kind of persons who could enhance its progress.

In this case how can we say that there could be a law or this government could be tolerated, or be considered as a true government?

.....

The Iranians had received a lot of injuries and had suffered all kinds of encroachments. Most of the Eastern people are used to the harsh behaviours and oppressions, but this harm has reached its highest point. And they seek reforms. The harms have reached a degree that all of the Iranian population is capable of riot. The situation of the people is so, that now they pursue the support and aid of the European governments. And from this mood it can be understand that there will be a riot in Iran in a near future. In order to be ruled by equity everybody talks about justice. The Iranians say that: death is better for us than being alive and suffer from continuous various kinds of oppression, infringement, and aggression.

Jamal-ed-Din, as returned from Europe ... was looked to by many who were asking for law.

This law, what ever it would be is good. It is enough to have rules, because we do not have any regulations and are not ruled by any justice. Neither our life nor our property is secured.

....

For instance, a person requests the governorship of a state - like Azarbayjan or Khorasan. His first task is to present some money to the king. The amount of this gift is different for various states. It changes from thirty to one hundred thousands Tooman depending on the credit of that state. One Iranian Tooman is almost equal to seven Shillings of England. Then he should pay an amount of pledge for the annual revenue of imports of that state which should be more than what was paid last year by the last governor who was responsible for the imports. When the monarch's present was given, if he does not want more than that, the governor will receive his agreement with the words of 'yes it is correct'.

While the governor hears these words from the mouth of the 'Shadow of God' his duty is to convince the ministers. Their admiration and agreement will be received by offering some more cash presents. And, as he could gain the position his behaviour will change drastically to a brutal irresponsible aggressor.

Now it is his turn to receive gifts from those who want any position in his governor ship. The ruler of each state, most often, needs three hundred employees like: scribe, servant, coffee-house keeper, valet, and other office boys, master of the horses, position, vanguard, groom, cooker and others like mace-bearer, and gatekeeper.

All of the above mentioned persons should pay the new governor in order to be enrolled in a position. One who pays more will have the better position.

After sorting the jobs in their favourite way, each one who has a particular assignment will go to his own mission, and the state which has a new ruler should expect any noble kind of robbery and oppression. All parts of the government earn their own incomes by encroachment, aggression and plundering the peoples' household.

.....

None of the governors and their employees receive even a penny as their salary - this is an old tradition in the Orient and no one remembers its origin, and the people are somehow satisfied with it.

But when a ruler would settle in a government the people knew their duties. His aim is to receive enough from them to cover what he has given as the present, and more for having a luxurious life, and, farther, could save some to pay for his future governor ship.

These persons, from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, are not certain about the duration of their governor ship. Because if there would be someone who pays more than the present governor, the assigned ruler with his companions will be dismissed. No attention will be paid to the eligibility of the governor or the welfare of the subject.

The major ruler in order to endure his governorship would make some present of funds to the ministers and the king occasionally; and, as there are no rules and regulations for taxation and percentage or penalty, the governor and his companions will receive from the rustics as much as they could by force.

This is the case for the minor rulers, deputies, administrators and so on ... In fact the oppression and aggression is the rule everywhere.

Promotion in the military positions follows the same rules as well.

... If the soldiers could obtain one or two months of their salary in a year they consider themselves very lucky. Their unique way of livelihood is that to steal from the people (Mohit-e Tabatabaei 1350 AHS, 227-241).

Appendix II:

A brief summary of Imam Hossien's life and his objection to Yazid quoted from the book: *Shiite Islam*, written by Allame Tabatabaei:

'Imam Husayn (Sayyid al-Shuhada', "the lord among martyrs"), the second child of Ali and Fatimah, was born in the year 4 A.H. and after the martyrdom of his brother, Imam Hasan Mujtaba, became Imam through Divine Command and his brother's will. Imam Husayn was Imam for a period of ten

years,... [I]n the middle of the year 60 A.H. Mu'awiyah [the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty] died and his son Yazid took his place.

'Paying allegiance (bay'ah) was an old Arab practice which was carried out in important matters such as that of kingship and governor ship. Those who were ruled, and especially the well-known among them, would give their hand in allegiance, agreement and obedience to their king or prince and in this way would show their support for his actions....

'Mu'awiyah had asked the well-known among the people to give their allegiance to Yazid, but had not imposed this request upon Imam Husayn. He had especially told Yazid in his last will that if Husayn refused to pay allegiance he should pass over it in silence and overlook the matter, for he had understood correctly the disastrous consequences which would follow if the issue were to be pressed. But because of his egoism and recklessness, Yazid neglected his father's advice and immediately after the death of his father ordered the governor of Medina either to force a pledge of allegiance from Imam Husayn or send his head to Damascus.

'After the governor of Medina informed Imam Husayn of this demand, the Imam, in order to think over the question, asked for a delay and overnight started with his family toward Mecca. He sought refuge in the sanctuary of God which in Islam is the official place of refuge and security. ... This news spread throughout the Islamic world. On the one hand many people who were tired of the iniquities of Mu'awiyah's rule and were even more dissatisfied when Yazid became caliph, corresponded with Imam Husayn and expressed their sympathy for him. On the other hand a flood of letters began to flow, especially from Iraq and particularly the city of Kufa, inviting the Imam to go to Iraq and accept the leadership of the populace there with the aim of beginning an uprising to overcome injustice and iniquity. Naturally such a situation was dangerous for.

'Imam Husayn was determined not to give his allegiance to Yazid and knew full that he would be killed. ... Some of the outstanding people of Mecca stood in the way of Imam Husayn [to Iraq] and warned him of the danger of the move he was making. But he answered that he refused to pay allegiance and give his approval to a government of injustice and tyranny. He added that he knew that wherever he turned or went he would be killed. He would leave Mecca in order to preserve the respect for the house of God and not allow this respect to be destroyed by having his blood spilled there.

...

'Approximately seventy kilometres from Kufa, in a desert named Karbala, the Imam and his entourage were surrounded by the army of Yazid. For eight days they stayed in this spot during which the circle narrowed and the number of the enemy's army increased. ...

...

'On the ninth day of the month [of Moharram] the last challenge to choose between "allegiance or war" was made by the enemy to the Imam. The Imam asked for a delay in order to worship overnight and became determined to enter battle on the next day.

'On the tenth day of Muharram of the year 61[A.H.]/680 [AD] the Imam lined up before the enemy with his small band of followers. Less than ninety persons consisting of forty of his companions, thirty some members of the army of enemy that joined him during the night and day of war, and his Hashimite family of children, brothers, nephews, nieces and cousins. That day they fought from morning until their final breath, and the Imam, the young Hashimites and the companions were all martyred. Among those killed were two children of Imam Hasan, who were only thirteen and eleven years old; and a five-year-old child and a suckling baby of Imam Husayn (Tabatabai 1971, 196-199).

Appendix III:

Keddie has quoted some parts of Seyed Jamal-ed-Din's letter written to Mirza-ye-e Shirazi, translated by Edward G. Brown, in her book: *Religion and Rebellion In Iran*, as follows:

'Verily the King's purpose wavereth, his character is vitiated, his perceptions are failing and his heart is corrupt. He is incapable of governing the land, or managing the affairs of his people, and hath entrusted the reins of government in all things great and small to the hand of a wicked freethinker, a tyrant and usurper, who revileth the Prophets openly, and heedeth not God's law, who accounteth as naught the religious authorities, curseth the doctors of the Law, rejecteth the pious, contemneth honourable Sayyids and treateth preachers as one would treat the vilest of mankind. Moreover since his return from the land of Franks he hath taken bit between his teeth, drinks wine openly, associates with unbelievers and displays enmity towards the virtuous. Such is his private conduct; but in addition to this he hath sold the foes of our Faith the greater part of the Persian lands and profits accruing therefrom, to wit the mines, the ways leading thereunto, the roads connecting them with the frontiers of the country. ... Also the river Karun and the guest houses which will arise on its banks ... and the highway from Ahwaz to Tihran. ... Also the tobacco ... with the chief centres of cultivation, the lands on which it is grown, and the dwellings, carriers and sellers, wherever these are found. He has similarly disposed of the grapes used for wine, and the shops, factories and wine-presses appertaining to this trade throughout the whole of Persia; and so likewise soap, candles and sugar, and the factories connected therewith. Lastly there is the Bank: and what shall cause thee to understand what is the Bank? It means the complete handing over of the reins of government to the enemy of Islam, the enslaving of the people to that enemy, the surrendering of them and of all dominion and authority into the hands of the foreign foe. ...

'Then he offered what was left to Russia as the price of her silence and acquiescence (if indeed she will consent to be silent), namely the Murdab (lagoon) of Rasht, the river of Tabaristan, and the road from Anzali to Khurasan, with the houses, inns and fields appertaining thereto. But Russia turned up her nose at this offer, and declined to accept such a present; for she is bent on the annexation of Khurasan and occupation of Azerbaijan and Mazandaran, unless these agreements be cancelled and these compacts rescinded - agreement, namely, which involve the entire surrender of the kingdom of Persia into the hands of that most contentious foe. Such is the first result of the policy of this madman.

'In short this criminal has offered the provinces of Persian land to auction amongst the Powers, and is selling the realms of Islam and the abodes of Muhammad and his household (on whom be greeting and salutation) to foreigners. But by reason of the vileness of his nature and the meanness of his understanding he sells them for a paltry sum and at a wretched price. (Yea, thus it is when meanness and avarice are mingled with treason and folly!)

'And thou, O Proof, if thou wilt not arise to help this people, and wilt not unite them in purpose, and pluck them forth, by the power of the Holy Law, from the hands of this sinner, verily the realms of Islam will soon be under the control of foreigners, who will rule therein as they please and do what they will. ... And thou knowest that the '*ulama* of Persia and the people thereof with one accord (their spirits being straitened and their hearts distressed) await a word from thee wherein they shall behold their happiness and whereby their deliverance shall be effected. How then can it beseem one on whom God hath bestowed such power as this to be so chary it or to leave it in abeyance?...' (Keddie 1966, 69-71).

Appendix IV:

The details of the prominent events during the three phases of the Constitutional Revolution: the preliminary disturbances, the Small Migration, and the Great Migration.

Some of the preliminary events:

1. Due to the banning of drinking alcoholic beverages in Islam, some of the ulama's protests were against drinking wine, especially in public places. In *Tir* 1282 AHS (June 1903) in Tabriz two days of rioting erupted and the market was closed. The reason was that, *Mirza Ali Akbar*, one of the clergy students (tollab) passed by one of the bars in the *Armenian* (Christian minority) district of Tabriz and was invited to a glass of wine by a drunken man. The invitation made him angry and he told his story to the other tollab in his school. They considered this event to be an insult to the ulama and went to the house of the leading marja' of the province, *Mirza Hasan-e-Mojtahed*, and gathered with him in the *Shahzade* Mosque. Merchants who were disappointed with customs' tariffs and Belgians, closed the market and protested with the ulama. The protesters asked for the dismissal of *Monsieur Prim*, the Belgian head of Azarbayjan's customs, and the closing of bars and guest houses. The guest houses, like bars, were founded by Armenians and sold wine (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 30-31). *Mohammad Ali Mirza*, the Crown Prince who was the head of the province, wrote a note to the protesters saying that he had banished Monsieur Prim from the city and had ordered the bars, guest houses, and *Dabestans* (new primary schools) to be closed. As soon as the note was read in the mosque, the tollab rushed to the bars, guest houses and *Dabestans* and destroyed their furniture. Regardless of his note, Mohammad Ali Mirza sent a carriage to return Monsieur Prim, who was staying in a village near Tabriz for about ten or twenty days, to the city. To add insult to injury, the Crown Prince, banished Mirza Hasan-e-Mojtahed to Tehran (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 31).

2. According to Kasravi, there was a religious sect with the name of *Karim Khanian* or *Sheykhian*, which was opposed by another religious group called *Motesharean* (the followers of mojtaheds). *Mirza Mohammad Reza*, who recently had finished his clerical studies in Najaf, was the chief mojtahed of the province and, according to Kasravi, was leading the opposition against Sheykhian. In a clash between the two groups in the claim for a mosque, owned by Shaykhian, the governor's troops, in defence of Sheykhian, killed several and injured some others. Mohammad Ali Mirza, who was his father's representative in Tehran, in order to calm down the battle, replaced *Rokn-od-Dole*, the governor of Kerman, with *Zafar-os-Saltane* (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 52-53). The struggle between religious minorities continued. Kasravi admits that a group of Mirza Mohammad Reza's followers rushed to the houses of some Jewish people in the city and broke their wine jars. Mirza Mohammad Reza was asked by the new governor, Zafar-os-Saltane, to stop the struggles against the minorities. He prepared himself to leave the city for Mashhad. People crowded in his way and returned him to his house. The governor ordered the troops to fire on the crowd, and the people withdrew. Mirza Mohammad Reza and three of his companions were arrested. They were bastinado and banished to Rafsanjan, a city about one hundred kilometre east of Kerman, by the order of Zafar-os-Saltane. His followers gathered in his house and mourned for several days. The prayer leaders of the mosques in the city abandoned their prayers as well. Tehran's ulama referred to this event, and Zafar-os-Saltane was dismissed from the governorship of Kerman during *Aban* 1284 AHS (November 1905) (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 53-54).

3. In those days, as Kasravi reports, sugar was imported from Russia. The Prime Minister intended to reduce the charge by force. He ordered *Ala-od-Dole* the governor of Tehran to cut the price of sugar. On 20 *Azar* 1284 AHS (11 December 1905), Ala-od-Dole gathered several distinguished merchants of Tehran, no matter if they were the tradesmen of sugar or not, to his office and ordered them to be bastinado. Regardless of warnings from *Saad-od-Dole* the Minister of trade, he also ordered one of the most reputable sugar merchants, who had donated three mosques and several other institutes to the

city, to be bastinado as well. *Moshir-od-Dole*, the foreign Minister, tried to conciliate but it was too late, the people rioted and the market was closed. People crowded at the Shah Mosque demonstrating against the government (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 58-59).

4. The story of the destruction of the Russian Bank building, recounted by Kasravi, can be considered to be an example of the typical role of each group of the participants of the movement. The building of the Bank was under construction in an old cemetery of Tehran. There were many discussions around the religious rights involved in the construction of a foreign bank on the site of an old Moslem cemetery among the mojtaheds of Tehran and even Najaf. Many of the ulama were against it and the politically active among them (the leaders) had been agitating the people through their speeches. They asked Ein-od-Dole and his ministers to do something to stop the construction, but they did not. Having exhausted legal means they decided to destroy the unfinished building of the bank. On 4 Azar 1284 (25 November 1905) one of the clergy speakers of Tehran with the name of *Sheikh Mohammad Vaez* (the distributor) mounted the menbar and agitated the audience against the Russian Bank, inviting them for mourning in the old cemetery. About two hundred workers were at work in the building. When they saw the congregation (the followers) they fled. The crowd, already oppressed by despotism and concerned about the independence, destroyed the building within two hours (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 54-56).

The Small Migration:

One day after 20 Azar 1284 (11 December 1905) in which Ein-od-Dole ordered Ala-od-Dole to bastinado the merchants of Tehran, *Mirza Abol-Qasem*, the *Jomoa'* prayer leader of the capital, pretending alliance with the movement, asked the leading mojtaheds, merchants, and the people to congregate in the Shah Mosque. He directed one of the revolutionary speakers, *Seyed Jamal-ed-Din Isfahani*, to mount the menbar and complain about the brutal acts of the government. During his speech, while the speaker was criticising the political system, he referred to 'the Shah' in one of his sentences whilst not intending to blame him. Mirza Abol-Qasem shouted at the vaez: 'why are you abusing the Shah; you are *Kafer* (out of religion)'. Then he ordered his men and government agents, who were prepared already with clubs and pistols, to pull him down. Those agents attacked the speaker and the audience as well; every body escaped terrified (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 60-62).

As Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaai said at that night to his colleagues, because of this occurrence the revolution moved faster than the leaders had expected (Kermani 1371 AHS, 298). There was the possibility of a fight between the followers of Imam Jomoa and those who were following the leaders of the movement on the next day, and, thereby, the arrest of the leaders of the revolution was probable. Therefore, revolutionaries decided to migrate from Tehran to Abdol Azim and seek asylum in the shrine of *Hazrat-e Abdol Azim*, and put their demands forward to the Shah (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 63). On 22 Azar 1284 (13 December 1905) the leading ulama and their households went to Abdol Azim separately. A few of the merchants joined them because Ein-od-Dole had ordered the retailers to keep the market open otherwise their goods would be plundered by the soldiers. Tollab of different schools joined the sanctuary seekers too (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 64-65). According to Kasravi, about 2000 migrants gathered there. The merchants of Tehran were supporting the asylum seekers financially.

There were some personal hostilities between government officials and courtiers; some of them were in agreement with the revolutionaries; some others worried about their own future because of the peoples' anger; but Ein-od-Dole intended to break the protesters. He offered some money to the ulama to convince them to cancel their sanctuary but did not succeed (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 66). The main request of the revolutionaries was his dismissal, and they were not able to put their demands forward to the Shah through him. Therefore, they asked the Ottoman ambassador in Tehran to be their intermediary and pass their appeal to the Shah (Kermani 1371 AHS, 295-296). The list of their demands was as follows:

- 1- Dismissal of *Asqar Garichi*, the transportation contractor between Tehran and Qom. The ulama and Tollab of Qom were angry with his acrimonious treatment with passengers.
- 2- Returning of Mirza Mohammad Reza from Rafsanjan to Kerman.

- 3- Returning of the *Towliat* (endowment management) of *Khan-e Marvi Madrese* (a school) to *Sheikh Morteza*. (Ein-od-Dole had appointed Imam Jomoa to that position in the time of ulama's sanctuary in Hazrat-e Abdol Azim.)
- 4- Establishment of *Edalat Khane* (house of Justice) in all parts of Iran.
- 5- The Islamic laws to be ruled all over the country.
- 6- Dismissal of Monsieur Naus.
- 7- Dismissal of Ala-od-Dole the governor of Tehran.
- 8- Cancellation of direct tax of income that was begun one year earlier (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 67).

The Shah accepted the demands and ordered Ein-od-Dole to return the ulama back to Tehran (Kermani 1371 AHS, 298). Ein-od-Dole appointed his nephew, *Amir Khan-e Sardar*, as the governor of the Abdol Azim to handle the case. The new governor asked the ulama to return to Tehran. They did not accept because they could not trust the Prime Minister. By the insistence of Amir Khan-e Sardar they agreed to send their representatives to meet Ein-od-Dole (Kermani 1371 AHS, 298). *Mirza Abol-Qasem*, the elder son of Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaai, *Seyed Ala-od-Din*, son in law of Seyed Abdollah Behbahani, *Mirza Mostafa Ashtiani*, and *Mirza Mohsen*, who were secretaries of the two leading mojtaheds, went to Tehran to meet Ein-od-Dole. The Prime Minister kept them in his house. He knew that they were acting as the prime agents of the leading ulama, and therefore he decided to detain them. As the people of the capital felt that the ulama's messengers were in danger, they rioted. Women, especially, played a great part in that protest (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 68-69). The use of force by Ein-od-Dole and Ala-od-Dole made people more angry, and many of them went to Abdol Azim. The market of Tehran and Abdol Azim was closed. The road between Tehran and Abdol Azim (several kilometres) was almost fully crowded by the upset people. The Shah ordered Ein-od-Dole to take the ulama back or that he will do so himself (Kermani 1371 AHS, 299-301). Ein-od-Dole telephoned the ulama that as the Shah had accepted your demands, you should come back to Tehran. They did not agree. In order to keep the control of the events, Ein-od-Dole wrote a letter to the Shah asking for some of the protesters' inquiries as his own demands. According to Ein-od-Dole the list of requests had four items:

- 1- Reduction of the price of stamps;
- 2- Returning of Mirza Mohammad Reza;
- 3- Punishment of Asqar Garichi and his dismissal; and,
- 4- Establishment of 'governmental justice house' (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 71).

The Shah replied with emphasis on his agreement with the establishment of the governmental justice houses all over the country in order to rule the Islamic laws (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 72).

As the writings of the Shah were distributed, the sanctuary seekers were satisfied and decided to return back to Tehran. According to *Nazem-ol Eslam-e Kermani* it was on Day 16 (8 January 1906) that the people dared to shout 'long live mellat' for the first time. Their slogan was 'Long live the king of Islam (*Padeshah-e Eslam*), and Long live the people of Iran (Mellat)' (Kermani 1371 AHS, 302). On Day 22 (January 12) the Shah ordered the ulama to be taken back to the capital in a respectable manner. The heads of the revolution were received by the Shah in his palace. He received them warmly and asked them to tell him directly whenever they had any demand. The people celebrated their victory (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 73-74) (Kermani 1371 AHS, 306-307).

The Great Migration:

Ein-od-Dole sought to disregard the writings of the Shah. He banished Saad-od-Dole, the Ministry of Trade, and *Dr. Mohammad Khan Ehya-ol-Molk* from Tehran in order to weaken the political elites who were in agreement with the civic reforms (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 76-77). A month after the celebration of the people, he ordered Seyed Jamal-e Vaez, who had criticised him from the menbar, to leave the city for Mashhad. Behbahani asked him to go to Qom. Ein-od-Dole tried to gain the opposition of other ministers to the peoples' demands and the Shah's orders in a meeting arranged in the *Baq-e Shah* (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 80). He was searching for a way to dismiss the requests, thus revoking his promise to Tabatabaai in a secret meeting he had arranged in order to convince the revolutionary leader of the movement to stop his activities (Kermani 1371 AHS, 327-328).

Tabatabaïi wrote a letter to him asking again for the reforms but he refused to pay any attention (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 81-82). The oppression of the people was still going on. In regard of them some riots took place in Shiraz and Mashhad. The outburst of Shiraz was due to the occupation of some of the villages by the governor of Fars without paying any attention to the landlord's rights. In *Farvardin* 1285 AHS (March-April 1906), in Mashhad, some protesters against the rise in price of bread and meat, led by some local tollab, sought asylum in the shrine of the eighth sinless Imam of the Shiites. The troops attacked there in order to oppress the protesters (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 83-84). These events confirm that the governors of the provinces did not change their attitudes towards the people's rights yet. Even the religious shrines were not safe regardless of their holiness according to the values of the society. The ulama complained about these events on menbar, and the revolutionaries distributed secret proclamations condemning the state (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 83-84).

Tabatabaïi wrote another letter to the Shah complaining about the ruthless treatment of the governors' agents to the people and the sufferings of the Iranian population. Ein-od-Dole did not allow the letter reach the Shah, but rather answered it himself (Kermani 1371 AHS, 338-342).

Behbahani and Tabatabaïi decided to have talks with the people to keep them in their revolutionary position. Each of them explained the aims of the revolution to the audience in two different mosques on two nights of a single week (Kermani 1371 AHS, 345). To counter this and to enforce oppression on the gatherings, Ein-od-Dole banned any kind of traffic in the city starting three hours after sunset to dawn (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 88). In order to add to his government of terror he ordered the arrest of three distinguished opponents, who were not actually members of the revolutionary organisation. Roshdiye, the founder of the new schools, *Majd-ol-Islam*, one of the Prime Minister's employees who had demonstrated his objections to Ein-od-Dole on occasion, and *Mirza Agha Isfahani*, who had come from Istanbul as a lawyer and had claimed an ability to write a 'new constitution' for the country (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 88-89).

The Prime Minister also ordered the arrest of *Mehdi Gavkosh*, one of the champions of a district of the capital, who was assisting Ay Behbahani. The soldiers ransacked his house, killed his son, beat his pregnant wife, who subsequently lost her child, and took him to Ein-od-Dole. The Prime Minister ordered him to be beaten by a whip and jailed. The rumour of his death was distributed among the people (Kasravi 1357, 89). All such activities by Ein-od-Dole were to oppress the people and frighten them from following their demands. According to Kasravi, some were indeed frightened but some others became more agitated (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 89).

Adding to the Prime Minister's procedure of the oppression of the revolution there was an attempt to persuade the leaders of the revolution to leave their premises. For example, *Naser-ol-Molk*, one of the distinguished politicians of the capital wrote a letter to Tabatabaïi and discussed the lack of preconditions for freedom of the people. He counted education as one of the most important necessities for liberation of the populace and concluded that as there is no sufficient system of education in the country, therefore, it is not the time of political reforms but rather dealing with the system of education (Kermani 1371 AHS, 382-388).

Following his policies Ein-od-Dole ordered the arrest of *Sheikh Mohammad Vaez*, one of his critics from the menbar. Tollab of the Mosque and Madrese *Haj Abol-Hasan-e Memar* attempted to close the way to the police who had arrested him. He was eventually jailed in a police station nearby. Tollab and others surrounded the police station and freed him in a *melee*. The head of the police ordered his men to fire. One protester was injured. *Abdol-Hamid*, a talabe, who was passing by, went to the head of the policemen and shouted at him: "Aren't you a Moslem? Why did you order to fire?" *Ahmad Khan*, the head of the police, became angry and shot him. The crowd took Abdol-Hamid's injured body to the mosque. Many people gathered there. A major riot was building up in the capital. One of the leading personalities of the revolution, *Sadr-ol-ulama*, ordered taking the body of Abdol-Hamid, who was by now dead, to the Jomoa Mosque. Almost all distinguished mojtaheds of the capital, with their companions, merchants and shopkeepers came to the mosque. It was on Tir 19 (July 10) that ulama decided to seek asylum there till the establishment of Edalat Khane. Kasravi wrote that women were participating effectively in this demonstration. Sanctuary seekers mourned Abdol-Hamid's corpse in the mosque and gathered together in the shape of a demonstration on the streets around the mosque

as they had in Moharram on the occasion of mourning for Imam Hossein. The number of soldiers increased in the city. The government announced every body should open up his shop or the soldiers would loot it. Nobody took any notice, just the bakeries and shops selling fresh supplies were opened. On the next day, the mourners decided to go outside the mosque again. Ay Behbahani did not allow them to do so. He was worried about the possible shooting by the soldiers. Tollab and others insisted and at last they convinced him and moved outside the mosque. Soldiers blocked their way, but the protesters did not pay any attention and continued their mourning. The soldiers' commanders ordered their troops to fire. They shot the demonstrators and killed some of them (twelve, according to the government, and more than one hundred according to the revolutionaries). The demonstrators once more escaped back to the mosque (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 98-101).

The mosque was surrounded by the soldiers who cut off the water supply (Kermani 1371 AHS, 410). Meanwhile, intermediary agents of the Prime Minister were there to convince the sanctuary seekers to leave the mosque. Even the Shah sent a letter to the leaders of the movement delivered by his son to encourage them to leave. Ays Behbahani and Tabatabaai tried to disperse the people but they were not willing to leave. At last, Behbahani took a *Quran* in his hand and said that the government disappointed them. "You asked for justice but they answered you by the bullets", he continued. Then he asked them, according to their faith in the Book, to leave the mosque and to open the shops. He believed that the pressure of the government on the sanctuary seekers would grow. At the end of the day, most of the people gradually left the mosque. Only the ulama with their households, tollab and some others remained (Kermani 1371 AHS, 412-414).

The next day, the market opened and people returned to their ordinary jobs. Ein-od-Dole ordered a further ban on water and food for the sanctuary seekers. The head of the soldiers came to the mosque and announced that he had the order to take them to their homes. The ulama replied demanding either the establishment of the Edalat Khane or killing them. He left the mosque. On the following day the sanctuary seekers again appealed: "establish the house of justice, or kill us, or let us leave the country to Iraq". The Shah agreed for them to leave the country, and signed their passports himself. However, the leaders of the revolution decided not to leave the country, and headed instead to Qom on the next day, and were joined by the other ulama and their households. On 30 Tir 1285 AHS (21 July 1906) the convoy of the major ulama of the capital and their households reached Qom after a six day trip, and they were about 1000 people (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 106-107). By this migration the third phase of the movement began. In this period Shaykh Fazlollah Noori joined the revolutionaries (Kermani 1371 AHS, 426) and became one of the leading figures of the following events of the outburst.

Sporadically, people in the capital showed their opposition. Women demonstrated and asked for the returning of the ulama (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 107). Some of the merchants decided to seek sanctuary at the British embassy in Tehran. According to Kasravi, on the previous occasion, when the ulama were in Hazrat-e Abdol Azim, the ambassador of Ottoman played the role of intermediary between them and the Shah. In the present case as the Ottoman government had attacked the western boundaries of the country, Behbahani decided to ask the British ambassador to take their demands to the Shah (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 109-110). After receiving the permission of Ay Behbahani, on 27 Tir (18 July) two days after the departure of the ulama, the merchants sought asylum in the embassy (Kermani 1371 AHS, 431-433). At first, about fifty of them and tollab went there but gradually more than 14,000 people gathered in the embassy within five days. The market was closed and merchants funded expenses of the sanctuary seekers (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 109-110).

The requests of the asylum seekers were presented to the Shah by the foreign minister, who had received them by the charge de affairs of the embassy of Britain in Tehran. There were five demands as follows: a) to return the ulama from Qom, b) to depose Ein-od-Dole from his position, c) to establish *Dar-osh-Showra* (House of Consultation), d) to punish the murderers of the people, and e) to return those who were banished (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 112-113).

According to Kasravi the Shah tried not to accept all of them but the people insisted and the government of England also encouraged him (Kasravi 1357, 119). Consequently, the Shah deposed Ein-od-Dole, and sent two Qajar princes to Qom to take back the migrants. He signed the order of *Mashroote* (establishment of parliament) on 13 Mordad 1285 AHS (4 August 1906). As the people were still not satisfied with that order, he completed a subsequent one on Mordad 16 (August 7)

(Kermani 1371 AHS, 458-476). The first election laws were written (Kermani 1371 AHS, 515-519) and at the end of Shahrivar 1285 AHS (first days of September 1906) the election in Tehran was held (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 124-125).

Appendix V:

A brief overview of the history of the 15th of Khordad Movement.

On 9 January 1963, the Shah announced his white Revolution plan and asked for its approval in a referendum by the people. Ay Khomeini forbade participation in the referendum by a proclamation. His statement called on the shopkeepers and merchants to close the bazaar and to demonstrate, joining the other groups of people, and to gather in the house of *Ay Khansary*, one of the distinguished mojtahed of Tehran, on 2 Bahman 1341 AHS (22 January 1963). The demonstration took place in several streets besides the bazaar and in the house of *Ay Behbahani*, another established mojtahed of the capital. *Falsafi* one of the well-known religious speakers of Tehran addressed the crowd against the plebiscite. Behbahani and Khansari, both, forbid the referendum, and the market was closed for three days (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 14). In the afternoon of the same day the crowd was supposed to have a demonstration in the *Seyed Aziz-ol-Lah* Mosque. This demonstration was repressed by the police and military troops. They did not let Behbahani and Khansari attend the mosque and attacked the people. Many were arrested (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 14).

In response, the Prime Minister - *Alam* - expressed to the mass media that there was a minor agitation in the bazaar which was repressed by the government. He assured the people that any objection will be severely crushed (Ettelaat, Bahman 3, 1341 AHS, No. 11006). The Shah decided to convince the ulama himself. Therefore he decided to have a visit to Qom on 24 January 1963. There was a demonstration against his visit to Qom on 23 January 1963, and the market and shops were closed. The marchers shouted the following slogans in the streets: "We are the followers of Quran, we do not want referendum", and "Islam is victorious, down with the oppressor". The demonstration was attacked by the government agents and the slogan of "Long live Shah" was shouted on the loud speakers. The troops attacked some of the closed shops and announced that all of them would be ransacked the following day. They wanted them to be opened and hoisted the imperial flag (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 15-16).

Next day the shops were opened and some people were brought to the city to receive the Shah, but none of the ulama welcomed him as Ay Khomeini had asked them. His appeal and condition for meeting the Shah were the dismissal of Alam from the premiership and ending the police action and oppression of the religious people (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 16). The Shah became very angry and did not visit the holy tomb of *Hazrat-e Maasome (AS)*, the daughter of the seventh infallible Imam of Shiites, located in Qom, regardless of the traditions. He said that our referendum is for progress of the country and the 'black reactionaries', who are living in the nineteenth century, are intended to stop our reforms (Ettelaat, Bahman 4, 1341 AHS, No. 11007).

On 24 January 1963, the leading ulama of Tehran had a meeting at the residence of *Ay Qaravi* to unify their activities against the national plebiscite. The meeting was attacked by the police and secret police known as SAVAK, and many of them were arrested. On the same day, there was a demonstration in the University of Tehran which was attacked by the troops as well (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 14-15).

On 6 Bahman 1341 AHS, 26 January 1963, the referendum took place, regardless of the opposition. It was announced in the evening newspapers of 27 January 1963 that five million and six hundred thousand votes were for the plan and four thousand one hundred and fifty against it (Ettelaat, Bahman 7, 1341 AHS, No. 11010).

As the national plebiscite took place, Ay Khomeini widened the target of the movement to disagreement with the White Revolution programme. The holy month of *Ramadan* started on 27 January 1963. Ay Khomeini asked all the ulama not to attend the mosques to show their opposition to the program. This ban could not last long because of the government's threats. The Shah tried to attract the agreement of those ulama who had the moderate position to his reforms. In the Ramadan he went to *Sepah Salar* Mosque and held talks with the Tollab (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 18). His intention was to separate the religious affairs from the politics, and Ay Khomeini's aim was to keep the ulama in the political scene and continue his opposition with the Shah's regime. He warned the clergy students of the hardships in the future (IPO 1991, 71).⁴⁸

Ay Khomeini announced the celebrations of the beginning of the new solar Islamic year as mourning for the Iranian Moslems because of the anti-Islamic reforms of the Shah's government. He sent a telegram to the ulama of the provinces as follows: 'Shawwal 16, 1382 AH[L] (12th March, 1963). In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. To the dignified and the exalted '*ulama*' and Hujajul-Islam-may their blessing[s] continue and may the Almighty Allah bless them with good reward. As you are aware [know] the ruling regime has directed all its efforts to wreck all the essential Islamic laws followed by actions which threaten Islam, therefore, I will, on the '*Idi Naw Ruz*, sit in grief to express feelings of bereavement to the Imam of the Time (the 12th Infallible Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi (AS), may Allah the Sublime hasten[s] his appearance, I also pronounce danger to the people. It is requested that you gentlemen also adopt the same attitude so that the Muslim nation may be enlightened about the calamity which has befallen Islam and the Muslims. May peace and Allah's blessing be on you! Ruhullah al-Musavi al-Khumayni' (IPO 1991, 74. Original italics.).

On the 2nd day of Now Rooz, 22 March 1963, there was a mourning ceremony in Ay Khomeini's house. Government agents tried, unsuccessfully, to interrupt that ceremony. In the evening of the same day there was a mourning ceremony in the *Feiziyye* school that the government agents disrupted and a heavy clash took place between clergy students and them. Many were killed as the result of the shooting, and religious books were set on fire. The government announced that the clash was between peasants who were in agreement with land reform and the clergymen who were against it. On the contrary, Ay Khomeini said that this was an apparent attack on the religious schools and religion itself, and stated that thereby a wide spread opposition to the Shah's regime should be shown. Later on, the Shah denied the anti religiosity of the reforms, speaking in the holy city of Mashhad (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 24-28). Many of the religious leaders stepped back because of the regime's attack to *Feiziyye*, but Ay Khomeini denied the loyalty to the Shah and forbade the hiding of opposition to the state (*Taqia*) and asked the nation to show their disagreement with the Shah's regime as a religious duty (*Vajeb*).

Ayatollah Mohsen Hakim who was living in Najaf sent a telegram to the Iranian religious leaders asking them to migrate to Iraq. Before reaching them, the telegram was read by the government agents. The government told the religious leaders not to make a noise about it, but said they were free to go wherever they wished. Ay Khomeini did not agree with the migration. He said that if the clergymen migrated to Iraq an Islamic centre (*Qom*) would become closed. He asked religious leaders to unite against the Shah (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 28-30).

Forty days after the government's attack in *Feiziyye*, due to the religious tradition of *chelle*, Ay Khomeini distributed a proclamation against the Shah's regime and there were some mourning ceremonies in *Qom*, *Tehran* and many other cities. The police attacked one of them and banned any others. Through a speech, Ay Khomeini criticised those religious leaders who were not participating in the political activities (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 30-31).

On the tenth of *Moharram*, which was the peak of the mourning ceremonies, due to the religious traditions, the followers of Ay Khomeini gathered in the *Haj Abo-l-Fath Madrese*, carrying his pictures and shouting some slogans for him. The *Madrese* was surrounded by the police. The crowd increased and moved outside the *Madrese* to the nearby streets. The policemen were not able to control the demonstrators. The people moved to the other streets of the capital and passing by the *Marmar Palace* shouted "Death to this dictator". The demonstration of the university students started

from Hedayat Mosque, had joined this demonstration and all of them went to the Haj Abo-l-Fath Madrese, continuing their grieving. These demonstrations continued till three o'clock in the afternoon (Rowhani 1356 AHS, 435-440).

On the same day, in Qom there was a gathering of religious people even from the other cities. Ay Khomeini held a speech in the massive demonstration in Feiziyye. He compared the Shah's regime against the ulama with that of Yazid against Imam Hossein, and counts the government's policies as dictations of Israel (IPO 1991, 101-104). In Mashhad a policeman was killed in a collision between those who were reading the Ay Khomeini's proclamation and the policemen who intended to tear it off the wall (Ettelaat Newspaper, June 4 1962, No. 11106). In Shiraz the wine shops were broken, some struggle took place between the demonstrators and the police, and some were arrested.

A day after Ashoora, there was a big demonstration in Tehran. Demonstrators started from the Shah Mosque passed through *Topkhane* Square and *Ferdowsi* street headed to the Tehran University. The university was closed. The slogans were for the leadership of Ay Khomeini and against the dictatorship of the Shah. Some were shouting for *Dr. Mosaddeq* as a national leader as well. He was one of the leading personalities of the National Movement between 1951-1953 (1329-1332 AHS) for nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry. The demonstrators passed the Marmar Palace and, like the day before, shouted "Death to this dictator". This was on the 14th of Khordad (Rowhani 1356 AHS, 440-443).

At midnight the police and military troops rushed to Ay Khomeini's house in Qom and arrested him. They took him to Tehran, jailed him in the military officer's club, and sent him to the *Qasr* prison at the evening of the next day - the 15th of Khordad. At the dawn on the 15th of Khordad the population of Qom were informed of Ay Khomeini's arrest. They crowded in the tomb of Hazrate Maasome shouting their slogans for him. The ulama gathered in *Ay Golpaygani's* house and asked for his freedom by releasing an announcement. The market was closed and military troops attacked the people. Fighting went on until five o'clock in the afternoon when the people withdrew (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 45-46).

In Tehran the riot was fierce. Besides the religious people of the city there were many who had come to the city from nearby villages. They rushed to the radio station but could not get in because of the machine-gun fire of the troops. They rushed to the administrative offices, police stations, and set some military trucks on fire (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 46-47). Military government became able to suppress them in the evening of that day because of not being well organised (Fardoost 1369 AHS, 513-514). There were some riots reported from the other big cities of the country like Mashhad, Tabriz, and Shiraz. About 4 to 15 thousand were killed (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 47).

The market of Tehran was closed for 14 days. The leading ulama gathered in Tehran and asked for the release of Ay Khomeini. They worried about his health. Many of ulama sent telegrams to Tehran for his freedom. On 29 Tir 1342 AHS (20 July 1963), some of the arrested ulama were set free. It was supposed to banish Ay Khomeini from the country. Many proclamations released by the ulama in order to prevent his banishment (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 54).

Ay Khomeini was released on 11 Mordad 1342 (2 August 1963), but he was kept under arrest with *Ay Qomi* and *Ay Mohallati*, who were jailed with him, in a district of Tehran. On the first day of his release many people and some of the ulama went to meet him, but from the second day the government rejected any meeting except with some close relatives. After four months, since the 15th of Khordad, on the 15th of Mehr 1342 (7 October 1963), they let the three mojtaheds go back, to their native cities Qom, Mashhad and Shiraz, because the government was assured that the movement was under control (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 57-59).

Appendix VI:

Some parts of Ay Khomeini's proclamation on the occasion of the referendum for approval of the White Revolution programmes:

'In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Though I did not want that a stage comes where I had to express my opinion. I therefore informed His majesty through Mr. Behbudi about the needs and defects and fulfilled my obligation but it was not accepted. I shall now have to perform my religious duty. In my opinion [the] referendum which has been named as a national plebiscite in order to overcome certain problems is contrary to the view of the ecclesiastical society of Islam and the decisive majority of the nation, provided intimidation or allurement is avoided and the people know what they were up to. Presently I will not mention some of the religious aspects which would go to prove that basically a referendum or national plebiscite has no standing in Islam. I will also refrain from describing some of the fundamental legal objections keeping in view the national interest. However, I would mention only a few.

(1) Iranian laws do not provide for a referendum. There is no precedence in the past but for one exception. That too was proclaimed illegal by some authorities. A group of people was [were] arrested for this fault and was [were] deprived of some social rights. It is not known why was this action an illegal one then and if so how can it become a legal action now?

(2) It is not known as to which authority is entitled to hold a referendum. This is what the law should decide upon.

(3) In countries where a referendum is a legal process, sufficient time is given to [the] nation to discuss each and every item of the proposal. The opinion expressed for and against the proposal is published in the newspapers and periodicals and brought to public notice. It is not appropriate to place a proposal for people to express their views at short notice and in an ambiguous form.

(4) The voters should have sufficient knowledge to understand what they are going to vote for? Therefore, an overwhelming majority does not have the right to vote in such cases. It is only a few residents of the cities having the power of discernment who are qualified to vote for the six points of the plan; they too are opposed to it without expressing a single doubt.

(5) The voting should take place in a free atmosphere. No intimidation, allurement, pressure or force be applied. This is not practicable in Iran. [The m]ajority of people have been subjected to threats by government organisations all over the country and pressure is put on them from all sides. As a matter of fact the referendum is held with a view to defile the indictable infringements of law which the responsible officers of the government are forced to do. Those who are answerable to the people and before the law have misled His majesty stating that this is being done for the uplift of womenfolk. If they wanted to do something for the good of the people they should have adopted an Islamic plan in consultation with the Islamic theologians. The implementation of such a plan would have guaranteed the welfare of all the sections of society and ensured heavenly blessings both in this world and in the world Hereafter. What for [Why] do they want to create a co-operative fund? It is because they want to plunder the peasants' hard earned money. With the creation of such a co-operative fund, the Iranian market will totally go out of hand. The merchants and the farmers will be doomed to destruction and even other sections of society will meet the same fate. If the Iranian people surrendered to the Islamic laws and asked the government to implement Islamic financial programmes in consultation with the ulama, the entire nation will lead a life of prosperity and comfort.

The spiritual leaders sense danger for the Quran and the religion. It appears that this forcefully imposed referendum is only the beginning to abolish the provisions regarding religion. The Islamic scholars, on account of the precedence of government behaviour during the elections for state and provincial assemblies, have sensed danger for Islam and Qur'an. It appears that the enemies of Islam

want to impose the same old scheme of things on the simple hearted beguiled people. The Islamic 'ulama' are duty bound to inform the Muslim nation as and when they feel there is a danger for Islam and the Qur'an so that they are not held responsible for negligence in the Divine Court. We pray the Almighty Allah to protect and preserve the Holy Qur'an and the freedom of the country. Ruhullah al-Musavi al-Khumayni' (IPO 1991, 63-65).

Appendix VII:

Some parts of Ay Khomeini's proclamation after the attack to the Feyziyye School:

'In the name of Allah, the Merciful and Beneficent. 'Surely we are for Allah and to Him we shall surely return(2:156)'. ...To renowned '*ulama*' ... It was gratifying to receive your telegram of condolences at the great tragedy which has befallen Islam and the Muslims. The attack by the commandos and government's security agents in disguise supported and accompanied by the policemen on the spiritual centre (Faydiyyah) has revived the memories of the Mongols... Raising the slogan of "Long live Shah", they subjected the centre of Imam Ja'far al-Sadeq (AS) and his progeny both physical and spiritual, to a sudden attack... They threw down young boys aged 16/17 years from the roof. Books and Qur'an... were torn into pieces.

'Now the theology student and clergy's life in this city is insecure.... The agents threaten that they shall damage all the schools as they did to the Faydiyyah.... They, while raising the slogan of loyalty to the Shah hurl insult on things of religious sanctity. Loyalty to the Shah means destruction, insult to Islam, aggression on the rights of Muslims and attack on the centres of knowledge and learning. Loyalty to the Shah means striking blows on the body of Islam and Qur'an, and burning the symbols of Islam.... Obedience to the Shah means suppression of Islamic laws and making alteration in the laws of the Holy Qur'an. Love for Shah means crushing the clergy and demolition of the signs of the prophet hood. The principals of Islam are in danger.

'The Qur'an and the religion are facing a threat. In such a situation *taqiyyah* is *haram* and it is *wajib* to state the facts (whatever might happen). Now that there is no competent authority in Iran to lodge a complaint with and the affairs of the state are being administered in a lunatic and Maddening manner, I call on Mr 'Alam who holds the post of Premier-ship, in the name of the people, to explain the loyal authority which permitted him to attack the bazaar in Tehran two months ago. On what authority did he beat and injure renowned '*ulama*' and Muslim people? On what authority did he arrest the '*ulama*' and people from other sections of society, many of whom are still in the prison? What authorised him to spend the country's budget to hold the so-called referendum? The referendum was called for by the Shah and he, by the grace of Allah, is one of the richest men on earth.... What authority did you have to loot the bazaar in Qum? Why did you beat the students and arrest them? On what authority did you despatch the commandos and the security agents in disguise and in an exceptional manner to Madrasah Faydiyyah on the day of the demise of Hadrat Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (AS) and bring about the calamity? I have now prepared my heart for the bayonets of your agents but I shall not submit myself to your force nor your aggressive designs... Ruhullah al-Musavi al-Khumayni' (IPO 1991, 85-87. Original italics.).

Appendix VIII:

Some parts of Ay Khomeini's speech on 10th of Moharram (Ashoora) (13th of Khordad 1342 AHS):

'It is the afternoon of the day of 'Ashura' ... At times when I think about the events that took place on the day of 'Ashura', a question comes in my mind that if the Umayyads and the regime of Yazid ibn Mu'awiyah were bent upon fighting Husayn (AS) only, why did they let loose the barbaric and inhuman treatment towards the unprotected women and innocent children? What was the fault of the women and the children? What had Husayn's (AS) six-month old child done? (Wailing noise of people). In my view they were concerned with the very foundation. The Ummayyads and Yazid's government were opposed to the Prophet's (AS) family. They did not want Bani Hashim. Their intention was to uproot this noble family tree. The same question is here. The despotic regime of Iran was in conflict with the *maraji' al-taqlid*. It is opposed to the '*ulama*' of Islam. What did they have to do with the Qur'an? In what way they were [were they] concerned with the students of Islamic theology and divine sciences? What did they have to do with our 18-year old Sayyid? (People's cries...). What did our 18-year old Sayyid do to the Shah? What did he do to the government or to the despotic regime? (People cry bitterly).

'We come to the conclusion that they are concerned with the base. They are opposed to the very foundation of Islam and the clergy. They do not want this base to exist. They don't want our old and young to remain alive. Israel does not want any scholars or scientists in this land. Israel destroyed the Madrasah Faydiyyah through its agents; destroying us; and destroying you, the Islamic *Ummah*. It wants to usurp your economy. It wants to destroy your agriculture and trade. It wants to take your wealth under its control. Israel, with the help of its agents, wants to remove from its path all those elements which create hurdles and difficulties. The Qur'an is an obstacle in their way so it should be removed. The clergy is a hurdle, it should be crushed. The Madrasah Faydiyyah and other centres of Islamic knowledge and learning are the impediments, so these should be destroyed. Maybe the students of Islamic theology become a stumbling block in future, they should, therefore, be killed. They should be thrown down from the roof. Their hands and heads should be broken. The government of Iran, following the motives and machinations of Israel, is insulting us so that Israel may achieve its selfish motives.

...

... I advise you, you Mr Shah, you the King, I advise you to keep your hands off from such a policy and attitude. I do not like that the day comes when the masters want thee to go, the people resort to thanks giving. ...

... If what is said about thee that thou art opposed to Islam and the spiritual leaders, thy views are no good. If all this is dictated and handed over to thee, give it a little thought; why do you speak without thinking?

...Are clergy and Islam black reactionaries? But you, the "black reactionary", brought a "white revolution"? What white revolution have you brought? What a white revolution? Why doth thou want to befoul the people? Why doth thou threaten the people so much?

Today I am informed that some Islamic preachers and orators of Tehran were taken to the SAVAK's office and were threatened. They were told not to speak ill of the Shah; secondly, they should not attack Israel; and thirdly, they should not say that Islam is in danger. They are free to say [speak] on subjects other than these three. All our problems and differences are on these three issues. If these three issues are set aside, there are no differences. Let us see that if we do not say that Islam is in danger, would it be free from danger? If we do not say that the Shah is so and so, would he become other than what he is? If we do not say that Israel is a danger for Islam and Muslims, will it not be a

danger? And, as a matter of principle what is the relationship between the Shah and Israel which compels the SAVAK to say that nothing should be said about the Shah and about Israel? Does the SAVAK feel that the Shah is Israeli? ...

'... Thou doth not know that if someday a voice is raised and the page is turned, all those who have encircled thee shall be no friends to thee. ...

'There is much to say. Much more than what you think it can be. Facts should be revealed. Our country, our Islam are in danger. All that is brewing up has caused us much grief. We are very worried about the affairs of Iran on account of the conditions of this worn out country, on account of this government and its senior officials and authorities. We pray to the Almighty Allah to improve the affairs' (IPO 1991, 101-104. Original italics.).

Appendix IX:

The general outlook of the Islamic Revolution 1978-79:

The arrangement of the two struggling aspects, the people and the state, became more severe after the harsh oppression of the people's movement in 15th of Khordad. The Shah being proud of trampling the Moslem community continued his White Revolution programme by adding to it other new principles in the direction of secular modernism afterwards. In the line of dependency even the American personnel granted the immunity of prosecution if they committed any kind of crime in the country. On the other hand, Ay Khomeini addressed people in a speech against the capitulation and asked the ulama to become united against the Shah's regime. It caused him to be arrested, for the third time after the 15th of Khordad 1342 AHS, and banished to Turkey on 13 *Aban* 1343 AHS (4 November 1964) and then to Najaf, where he continued his antagonism against the Shah until the outburst of the Islamic Revolution (Algar 1991, 754).

Due to the pressure of Carter's Human Rights Committee, and according to modernisation theory, the political development of Iran started in the second half of the year 1356 AHS (autumn 1977). Thereby some of the political prisoners were released and ten evenings of poetry readings were arranged at the Goethe Institute in Tehran, in October 1977 (Rahnema 1990, 8), and 'The Human Rights Association in Iran' was established on 19 *Azar* 1356 AHS (10 December 1977) by modern educated political activists like Bazargan, Sahabi (from Liberation Movement of Iran), Nazih (from Solicitors Centre), Lahiji (from Lawyers society), Hajseidjavadi (from Writers Centre) and others (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 238).

On 17 *Day* 1356 AHS (7 January 1978) an article abusing Ay Khomeini was published in Ettelaat, a semi-state newspaper (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 243-245). The religious community of Qom responded to that by a demonstration on 18 *Day* 1356 AHS (8 January 1978). This demonstration was oppressed by the police. On the very day after more demonstrators marched in the streets of Qom. To show their anger, some of them rushed to a few banks and the troops opened fire on them. About 80 to 90 were killed and many were arrested (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 245-247).

Forty days later on 27 *Esfand* (18 March) there was a demonstration in Tabriz mourning those who were killed in Qom. There was a confrontation and bloodshed too. Forty days later the same ritual with the same results occurred in Yazd. And the same story followed each forty days with the same slogans in different big cities of the country (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 247-249). Besides the *Chelle* of each event, the demonstrations were held on the religious days of the year 1357 AHS. Ay Khomeini's proclamations and tapes of speeches urging the people to arise against the Shah's regime were distributed, and marches were continued. Amoozgar's cabinet announced martial law in Isfahan,

Najafabad, Shahreza, and Homayoon-Shahr in Isfahan province on 25 Mordad 1357 AHS (15 August 1978) (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 256).

One of the important events in agitation of the Iranian population against the Shah's regime was the firing of Cinema Rex on 19 August 1978. In that incident about 400-700 members of the audience were burned in to ashes. The regime blamed the revolutionaries for this catastrophe, but the people became convinced that it was the regime's conspiracy to show that Ay Khomeini's rule is the state of 'great terror', using the Shah's words in his speech on just one day before the happening (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 256). It caused Khozestan, that was one of the most modernised provinces of the country, due to the oil industry and several other international agro-industrial projects, to join the revolution. On 21 Ramadan the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Ali, the first Imam of Shiites, there were some massive protests in the big cities of the country and almost all cities of Khozestan province (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 256).

Sharif Imami established his reconciliation government on 5 *Shahrivar* 1357 (27 August 1978) after resignation of *Jamshid-e Amuzegar*. It proved to have no results after about three months. Meanwhile, freedom of political prisoners could not cure the rage of the people. The first huge rally took place on 13 *Shahrivar* 1357 (4 September 1978) on the occasion of Eid-e Fetr. The number of participants in Tehran was over one million according to the French Press published next day in newspapers (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 257-262).

Three days latter, on 16 *Shahrivar* (7 September) there were some other great marches with more radical slogans specially in Tehran: "death to the Pahlavis," "the shah is a bastard," "throw out America," "Hussein is our guide, Khomeini is our leader," "independence, freedom, and Islam," and, for the first time in the Tehran streets, "we want an Islamic republic" (Abrahamian 1982, 515). On the next day, 17 *Shahrivar*, there was supposed to be another demonstration but the martial law was announced by the government at 6 am in Tehran and eleven other cities: Karaj, Qom, Tabriz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Shiraz, Abadan, Ahwaz, Qazvin, Jahrom, and Kazerun. 'This was the first time since 1963 that martial law had been imposed on Tehran.' Abrahamian continued the description of the situation as follows: 'To add bite to the decree, the shah gave the military governorship of the capital to General Oveissi, who as governor during the riots of 1963, had earned the nickname, "butcher of Iran"' (Abrahamian 1982, 515).

The people of Tehran did not pay attention to the announcement of the martial governor of Tehran and poured to the streets. A massive amount of shooting took place and among 4 to 5 thousands were killed (Rahnema 1990, 44). The proclamation of Ay Khomeini in this occasion, like the previous ones, encouraged the people to continue their opposition. This event called 'Bloody Friday' or 'Black Friday' had a significant role in the irreconcilable opposition of the people against the Shah's regime.

From then on the strikes started. 'On September 9, some 700 workers in the Tehran oil refinery went on strike to demand higher wages and protest the imposition of martial law' (Abrahamian 1982, 517). Abrahamian explains the wave of strikes as follows:

'The wave of strikes gathered force in the latter half of September. By early October, blue-and white-collar workers demanding political as well as economic concessions had closed down not only many of the oil refineries, but also most of the oil fields, ... The strikes wave grew more powerful during the course of the next month, especially after October 6, when Khomeini was forced out of Iraq to Paris, and October 16 - the fortieth day after Black Friday - when more blood was shed in the major cities. By the third week of October, a rapid succession of strikes crippled almost all the bazaar, universities, high schools, oil industries, banks, government ministries, post offices, railways, newspapers, customs and port facilities, internal air flights, radio and televisions, state-run hospitals, paper and tobacco plants, textile mills, and other large factories' (Abrahamian 1982, 517-518).

Sharif Imami was replaced by *General Azhari* with a martial government on 15 *Aban* 1357 (6 November 1978). The opposition took to the roofs, with shouts of religious slogans: Allah-o Akbar (God is the Greatest) and La Elah-a Ella Lah (There is no god except God), instead of the streets and demonstrated at nights rather than by days; and great strikes took place. Nearly all the civil organisations were closed by that time. Only SAVAK and the military establishments were operating

as usual (Abrahamian 1982, 515). The huge rallies of Tasua and Ashoora, by about one to three million participants only in Tehran, occurred with emphasis on the leadership of Ay Khomeini and demand for Islamic government at this time. Meanwhile it was announced by the Central Bank officials that about \$13 billion had been evacuated from the country. Most of the people withdrew their money from the banking system (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 305-307).

After Azhari, *Shahpoor-e Bakhtiar* one of the moderate opposition leaders was appointed as the prime minister by the Shah, on 13 Day 1357 (3 January 1979). The Shah assigned the royal council as well on 26 Day 1357 (16 January 1979) and went to Egypt. At the same time the Revolutionary Council was assigned by Ay Khomeini to manage the nation. The last hope of the Shah vanished when Ay Khomeini went to the country on 12 *Bahman* 1357 AHS (1 February 1979). Among 4 to 8 million people received him and soon after he announced a new government and appointed Bazargan as the prime minister. Bakhtiar arranged a march for the Constitution of Iran on 20 *Bahman* 1357 AHS (9 January 1979) in Amjadiye Sport Stadium, but he and the Shah's regime fell on 22 *Bahman* 1357 AHS (11 January 1979). On this day military organisations gave up after two days of sporadic fighting between a few of them, who remained loyal to the Shah, and the radicals (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 350-353).

Very soon after by a referendum the Islamic Republic was established by the agreement of the vast majority of Iranians, on 12 *Farvardin* 1358 AHS (1 April 1979).

Appendix X:

The chronology of the National Movement of Iran: the Allies in the second world war occupied Iran in August 1941, in order to backup the Russian front against Germany. The southern part of Iran was under the surveillance of Great Britain and the northern part under the influence of Russia. Great Britain had the monopoly of the oil industry of the southern part of Iran which was the major resource of the Iranian economy. Seventeen days later Reza Shah, the king of Iran, resigned. He was banished to Saint Morris Island, and his son - Mohammad Reza - mounted the throne. The expulsion of Reza Shah's dictatorship brought a short period of freedom to the country. The active features of the National Movement emerged in this environment (Algar 1991, 744-745) (Madani 1361 AHS, 136-188).

Ayatollah Kashani, one of the opponents of the British policies in the Middle East and one of the leading figures of the Iraq revolution in 1920, was arrested by the British troops on May 1943 (Madani 1361 AHS, 142). In the same month the election for the 14th rotation of Iran's parliament was taking place. Kashani was elected by the people, but his name was removed from this list of Mps because of his being in jail. Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq, a political personality and descended from Qajar, won that election in Tehran (Madani 1361 AHS, 139). Iran's parliament, in its 14th to 17th rotation, was the main scene of efforts to nationalise the oil industry of Iran. Dr Mosaddeq and Ayatollah Kashani, who was released after 28 months, were two distinguished activists of this, mostly, parliamentary movement (Ayat 1362 AHS, 27-31) (Madani 1361 AHS, 142).

The two influential foreign powers in Iranian politics of the time were Great Britain and the Soviet Union, joined by the United States after the second world war. The United States through the government of Iran tried to gain the concession of the oil industry of the northern part of Iran. The Soviet Union was also one of the concession-seekers. Dr. Mosaddeq argued against the contract, and the parliament deprived the government of the right to grant any kind of concession in December 1944. One of the members of the parliament asked for cancellation of the contract of the oil of the southern part of Iran with Great Britain, but was not supported by the other MPs (Madani 1361 AHS, 143-145).

In late 1945, *Qavam* was appointed as the prime minister; his position lasted for about three years (Madani 1361 AHS, 156). Before him nine cabinets had been changed within four years (Madani 1361 AHS, 127). He signed a secret military contract with the United States and granted the monopoly of the supervision of the Iranian army to them (Madani 1361 AHS, 164). He caused the Soviet Union's troops to leave the country (Madani 1361 AHS, 164). The Soviets had remained in the country after the second world war, supporting two local communist governors in the north of Iran (Hassanpour 1994, 78-105). The *Qavam's* cabinet fell in December of 1947 (Madani 1361 AHS, 166). After him six cabinets came and fell within three years, mostly due to Ay Kashani's opposition (Madani 1361 AHS, 167). Kashani supported an Islamic guerrilla group called '*Fadaeian-e-Islam*' (Algar 1991, 745).

In February 1949, there was an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Shah and, thereby, Ay Kashani was jailed and then banished to Lebanon (Algar 1991, 745). Meanwhile, there was an effort to re-new the oil contract of 1933 with Great Britain for 32 more years (Madani 1361 AHS, 139). Minority members of the parliament, led by Dr. Mosaddeq, opposed it. They caused the parliament to be closed at the end of its 15th rotation by filibustering and procrastination, without any decision about the contract (Madani 1361 AHS, 177-178).

Nineteen ex-members of the parliament sought sanctuary in the Court because of government's meddling in the election for the 16th rotation of the parliament. They formed a political group on 23 October 1949, '*Jebhei-e-Melli*' (National Front), with the aims of national reforms and opposition to colonialism and imperialism (Madani 1361 AHS, 178-179). Ay Kashani returned to the country on 10 June 1950, by permission of *Mansoor*, the prime minister (Algar 1991, 745) (Madani 1361 AHS, 180). The new parliament opened on 9 February 1950. The new oil contract was presented to the parliament by the prime minister (Madani 1361 AHS, 181).

A new cabinet was formed by *Razmara* on 26 June 1950 (Madani 1361 AHS, 182). On 24 December 1950, a member of parliament, *Dr. Baghaee*, prepared a bill for nationalisation of the oil industry, but he could not gain the support of fifteen other members in order to present it to the parliament (Madani 1361 AHS, 184). On 29 December 1950 there was a big demonstration, arranged by Ay Kashani, in Tehran, asking for nationalisation of the oil industry in its declaration (Madani 1361 AHS, 182). On 7 March 1951, *Razmara* was killed by a member of '*Fadaaian-e Islam*' (Madani 1361 AHS, 185). On the following day the commission of oil in parliament, headed by Dr. Mosaddeq, approved the bill for the nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran (Madani 1361 AHS, 186). The parliament and the senate ratified it on 15 and 20 March 1951, respectively (Madani 1361 AHS, 199).

On 2 May 1951 Dr. Mosaddeq was appointed as the prime minister of Iran (Madani 1361 AHS, 204). The British government arranged a ban on Iranian oil, and complained to Lahe supreme court for nationalisation of her company (Madani 1361 AHS, 208). Dr. Mosaddeq, himself, defended the act of nationalisation of the oil industry in the international organisations (Madani 1361 AHS, 220).

On 5 February 1952 the 16th rotation of parliament ended, and on 27 April 1952 its 17th turn begun (Madani 1361 AHS, 225-226). Dr. Mosaddeq resigned, in order to be re-elected by the new parliament. He was elected as the prime minister, and received direct legislative powers for 6 months, as he requested as a matter of urgency, on 13 July 1952 (Madani 1361 AHS, 231-232).

On 16 July 1952 Dr. Mosaddeq resigned after three hours of argument about the minister of war with the Shah. Mosaddeq wanted to hold this position himself, regardless of the Shah who appointed this ministerial post by long tradition, although it was not in accord with the constitution of Iran (Madani 1361 AHS, 232-233). The Shah assigned *Qavam* as the new prime minister and the parliament voted for him. Ay Kashani opposed the new government. He wrote a proclamation to the military troops and warned them of confrontation with the people. He, also, wrote a letter to the Shah in support of returning Dr. Mosaddeq to his position, otherwise he threatened to lead a revolution against the king (Madani 1361 AHS, 233-237).

On 20 July 1952, *Qavam* cancelled the parliament and ordered the arrest of Ay Kashani (Madani 1361 AHS, 239-240). On 21 July 1952 there was a great demonstration in Tehran and several other big cities of the country. Clashes took place and the military troops withdrew (Madani 1361 AHS,

242-245). Qavam resigned and the Shah agreed with Mosaddeq's conditions and appointed him as the prime minister. "To be the enemy of Quran, if I do any thing against the Constitution, or I would accept the presidency of the country, if others would like me to", Mosaddeq wrote on the Quran and sent it to the Shah (Madani 1361 AHS, 248).

On 22 October 1952, political relations with Great Britain were broken off (Madani 1361 AHS, 254), and on 21 November 1952 the Iranian National Oil Company was established (Madani 1361 AHS, 259). The economic ban was still in place (Madani 1361 AHS, 258). Mosaddeq asked for one year more direct legislative rights. Ay Kashani, the head of parliament, disagreed. He made a proclamation that his disagreement was not with Dr. Mosaddeq but with this right which was not in accord with the Iranian constitution (Madani 1361 AHS, 270-271). There was much propaganda against Ay Kashani by the Communist Party of Iran (*Hezb-e-Tudeh*), which was the most powerful party of the time and a supporter of Mosaddeq, in the contemporaneous years (Ayat 1362 AHS, 54-64). Mosaddeq dissolved the parliament by a referendum on 3 August 1953. Ay Kashani had forbidden the participation of the people in this plebiscite. The parliament was dismissed, and, thereby, Mosaddeq had lost his most powerful and organised supporter (Madani 1361 AHS, 278, 283-284).

On 15 August 1953, the Shah deposed Mosaddeq and appointed *Zahedi* as the prime minister. Mosaddeq did not accept, and ordered the arrest of Zahedi. The Shah went to Iraq, and then, onto Rome on 16 August 1953 (Madani 1361 AHS, 288-289). Zahedi, through a CIA planned coup, arrested Mosaddeq and other leading personalities of the national movement (Madani 1361 AHS, 290). On 19 August 1953 Zahedi announced himself as the prime minister via a radio broadcast, and the Shah came back to the country (Madani 1361 AHS, 291).

Notes:

¹ For more about this movement look at: Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh, eds., 1982: *In the Shadow of Islam: The Women's Movement in Iran* (London, Zed); Guity Nashat, ed., 1983: *Women and Revolution in Iran* (Boulder Colombia, Westview); Haleh Afshar: 'Women, State and Ideology in Iran, April 1985: *Third World Quarterly* 7: 256-78; Valentine Moghadam, 'Women, Work and Ideology in the Islamic Republic', May 1988: *Middle East Studies* 20: 221-43; Afsaneh Najmabadi, 'Power, Mortality and the New Muslim Womanhood', Ali Banuazizi and Myron Wiener ed., 1993: *State and Culture in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan* (Albany, State University of New York); Nayereh Tohidi, 'Modernity, Islamization, and the Women Question in Iran', Valentine M. Moghadam ed., 1995: *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies* (London, Zed); J. S. Hawley ed., 1994: *Fundamentalism and Gender* (Oxford, oxford University Press).

² More than ninety percent of the population of the country are Shiite Moslem now.

³ Abdol Azim is a town near Tehran where the shrine of Hazrat-e Abdol Azim is located and which was a common place for pursuing asylum.

⁴ See page 148 for more information.

⁵ To remind the readers, by the state I mean the ruling body of the country.

⁶ All of them were opposed by Ay Khomeini in form of issuing proclamations and messages (Algar 1991, 754-755).

⁷ Cyrus The Great was the King of Persia from 550 to 529 BC.

⁸ See: Mongol Bayat, 1991: *Iran's First Revolution, Shiism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909* (Oxford, Oxford University Press) for more on this type of interpretation of the Constitutional Revolution.

⁹ See, for example, Farideh Farhi, 1990: *States and Urban-based Revolutions* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press).

¹⁰ One of the most distinguished and senior Maraje of the time who was seeking the Constitution of Iran rather than an Islamic government.

¹¹ See page 148 for more information.

¹² Dr. Mosaddeq appointed as the Prime Minister of Iran after the nationalisation of oil industry. (See Appendix X for more detail).

¹³ In her previous book under the title of: *Religion and Politics in Iran, Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, written in 1983, she presents a functionalist interpretation of Iranian social movement.

¹⁴ His book under the title of *The Pre-industrial City: Past and Present*, written in 1960, is the last intensive word in the sociology of the pre-industrial cities.

¹⁵ See Appendix II for the full story.

¹⁶ 'Khoms (one-fifth levy) is an annual tax that is levied on seven forms of wealth. It consists of 1/5 the value of the following wealth[s]: 1- Surplus income from one's business or from an employee's salary. 2- Precious minerals. 3- Treasure. 4- Lawful property combined with unlawful property. 5- Gems taken from the sea bed. 6- War booty. 7- Property bought by a non-Muslim (living in an Islamic community) from a Muslim (Khomeini 1985, 77).

¹⁷ 'Zakat must be levied on the following items: 1- Wheat, barley, dates and resins. ... 2- Gold and silver coins. ... 3- Camel, cows and sheeps. ...' (Khomeini 1985, 81-82. Original italic.). The rate of taxation of each item is specified by Islamic jurisprudence.

¹⁸ The usage of the Khoms is instructed by the Islamic jurisprudence as follows: 'Khoms is divided into two equal parts. A. The share of the Holy Imam (peace be upon him), which is either given to an agent of the leading *mujtahed*, or, with his sanction, is used for the protection of Islamic interests. B. The share of the descendants of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him). This portion is given to agents of the leading *mujtahed* to be used for needy, orphaned or travelling descendants of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him)' (Khomeini 1985, 79. Original italics.).

¹⁹ Zakat must be used in the following occasions: '1- Given to a poor person whose income or cash in hand is not enough to meet his own and his family's expenses for an entire year. 2- Given to an agent of Imam (peace be upon him) or an agent of the deputy of the Imam whose job is the collection of *Zakat* and its distribution to the Imam or to those who deserve receiving it. ... 4- Given to those whose hearts can be influenced to incline to Muslims or Islam, such as non-Muslims who would be attracted to Islam or would help Muslims in a time of war if they are given proceeds from *Zakat*. 5- To free slaves. 6- To repay the debt of one who cannot do so himself. 7- To be used in the way of Allah for works which are beneficial to the people, such as building mosques, schools or bridges. 8- To aid a traveller who is in need of help during his journey' (Khomeini 1985, 82. Original italics.).

²⁰ The follower (moqalled) must choose the most learned expert by him or herself, if he or she knows the principles of the knowledge, or by asking those who are eligible in this recognition. The testimony of two learned people, not conflicting with that of two similarly pious ones, is enough. He or she may follow the judgement of a group of people too (Golpayegani 1). The chosen faqih who is called marja'-e-taqlid, must be alive, and the follower must obey the changes of his fatvas through the life (Golpayegani 1).

²¹ The source of the legitimacy and/or illegitimacy of the shah's position in the political structure of Iran could be a separate subject of study.

²² According to Kasravi, the ulama in Tabriz showed hostility to new primary schools which were founded by *Mirza Hasan Roshdiye* in 1267 AHS (1888). Roshdiye taught the Persian alphabet according to a new method, which he had learned in Beirut. His school (*Madrese*) was like the other *Maktab Khanes* (traditional schools) which were managed by the clergymen, but it had a signboard of '*Madrese-ye Roshdiye*' at the front door. The style of teaching and books were different as well. Roshdiye was pronounced an infidel by some of the ulama. He left the country for the Caucasus and then Egypt, after his school was attacked by some tollab. However, when Amin-od-Dole became the governor of Azarbayjan, Roshdiye was invited to Tabriz and his schools were supported by the new governor (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 21-22).

²³ For example, when the Shah was in his second trip to Europe *Seyed Ali Akbar Tafreshi*, *Seyed Mohammad Tabatabaai*, *Imam Jomoa* and some other mojtaheds allied with several courtiers against Amin-os-Soltan, but by the treachery of *Eghbal-od-Dole*, the Prime Minister, who was also distinguished as *Atabak*, could offset that conspiracy against himself (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 30).

²⁴ Enforcing the state's authority over the ulama and harsh treatment of the governors to them is also reported from Qazvin and Sabzevar (Kasravi 1357 AHS, 58).

²⁵ 'O David! We did indeed
 Make thee a vicegerent
 On earth: so judge thou
 Between men in truth (and justice):
 Nor follow thou the lusts
 (Of thy heart), for they will
 Misdlead thee from the Path
 Of Allah, ... (38:26)

Allah dith command you
 To render back your Trusts
 To those to whom they are due;
 And when ye judge
 Between man and man,
 That ye judge with justice;
 Verily how excellent
 Is the teaching which He giveth you!
 For Allah is He Who heareth
 And seeth all things. (4:58)

O ye who believe!
 Stand out firmly
 For Allah, as witnesses
 To fair dealing, and not
 The hatred of others
 To you make you swerve
 To wrong and depart from
 Justice. Be just; that is
 Next to Piety; and fear Allah.
 for Allah is well-acquainted
 With all that ye do. (5:8)

²⁶ One of their activities at the end of the year 1283 AHS (the beginning of 1905) in Moharram 1323 AHL, involves distribution of a picture of Naus and other Belgian employees in Iran, attending a fancy dress party two years earlier (Kermani 1371 AHS, 139). Naus wore the Iranian clergymen dress in that party. The ulama considered it an offence against Islam and themselves. Seyed Abdollah Behbahani mentioned this event on menbar and asked Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah for Naus's dismissal. Other ulama followed him in their speeches in that particular month: Moharram. Mozaffar-ed-Din Shah and his Prime Minister Ein-od-Dole did not pay any attention to this opposition, but this itself caused more discontent among the people (Kermani 1371 AHS, 139).

²⁷ According to Algar: 'The Pahlavi assault on the position of the ulama in Iranian society began with a conscription law in May 1925 that arrogated to the state the right to examine religious students with a view to their exemption from military service. Then came the promulgation of a Civil Code, under the aspics of Ali Akbar Davar, Minister of Justice, rectified in May 1928. The attack on the legal and juridical functions of the ulama that this implied continued, in November 1931, with the restriction of the competence of sharia tribunals to matters of marriage, divorce, and the appointment of trustees and guardians; and in March 1932, with the termination of all notarial functions exercised by the ulama. The latter measure reduced to penury many lesser religious scholars who did not have access to the resources of the *auqaf* (endowments). Similarly, in 1936, legislation was passed that effectively excluded ulama from holding the position of judge (Algar 1991, 741. Original italic.).

²⁸ On 9 January 1963 the Shah announced his White Revolution plan and said:
 '... The doctrine which I, as the King of the country and chief of the three powers, enunciate for public opinion and call for a direct expression of views by the Iranian nation without the interference of any intermediary, is as follows:

-
- (1) Abolition of feudal system or the land reform in Iran on the basis of amendment bill for land reform dated January 9, 1961 and the appendices thereto.
 - (2) Approval of the bill of nationalisation of forests throughout the country.
 - (3) Approval of the bill regarding sale of shares of government factories as a support to land reform.
 - (4) Approval of the bill for the participation of the workers in the profits earned by production and industrial factories.
 - (5) The election reforms bill.
 - (6) The bill for the creation of Literacy Corps with a view to implement program for compulsory public education' (IPO 1991,60).

²⁹ As Ay. Khomeini intended to convert the movement against the Shah's regime most of the other ulama did not follow. At that time he shouted at them: "Woe be to Najaf which has observed dead silence" and "Woe be to Qum for observing silence" (IPO 1991, 89-90).

³⁰ Some part of Ay. Khomeini's proclamation is as follows:

'The ruling regime has transgressed the sacred laws of Islam and proposes to transgress the established laws of the Qur'an. The dignity of the Muslims is in danger. The despotic regime is planning to dishonour resolution contrary to the Constitution.... It wants to forcibly drug eighteen-year old girls into compulsory military service and place them in military barracks. In other words, they propose to drive young chaste Muslim women, by force to centres of corruption. The aliens have made the Qur'an and clergy as their target. The dirty hands of the aliens with the help of such government intend to do away with the Qur'an and to curb the clergy. We have to face dishonour for the benefit of the Jews from America and Palestine. Not only this, we have to go to the prison, be killed and become the sacrificial goat to fulfil the inauspicious wishes of the aliens. They consider Islam and the clergy as a stumbling block in the performance and fulfilment of their goals. They want these restrictions to be removed with the help of autocratic governments. The ruling regime's existence depends on the removal of these restrictions. The Qur'an and the clergy must be crushed. I declare this *'Id* as a mourning for the Muslims. I want to make Muslims beware of dangers which are on the way for Qur'an and the country having faith in Qur'an. I declare that the despotic ruling regime is faced with danger. I am concerned and seek refuge of the Almighty Allah from the 'black revolution' and from the revolution from below. The administration is preparing the ground with their ill-intentioned motives for this revolution. In my opinion this despotic government should be set aside for its crime of deviating from Islamic laws and the Constitution. A government which abides by the Islamic laws and is sympathetic to the Iranian people should come to power. O Allah! I have fulfilled my obligation as at present (You now help in reaching this message to people) and if I remained alive I shall fulfil my next obligation, if Allah wills. O Allah saves the Holy Qur'an and the honour of the Muslims from the mischief of the aliens. Ruhullah al-Musavi al-Khomeini' (IPO 1991,75-76. Original italic.).

³¹ Chapter three explains how we use different historical sources in more details.

³² At the triumph of the revolution at his trial he was denying any particular role for himself and was accusing the system (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 118).

³³ This secret intelligence organisation which was replaced the martial government in 1336 AHS (1957) was supposed not to tolerate any political gathering or any strike (Madani 1361 AHS, Vol. II, 153-154).

³⁴ He divides the Iranian society of the time into four classes: 1. The Upper Class consisted by a. the Pahlavi family; b. aristocratic families, such as Aminis; c. enterprising aristocrats, such as Khodadad Farmanfarmaian; d. elder politicians, senior civil servants, and high-ranking military officers; e. old-time entrepreneurs, such as Mehdi Namazi; f. a half-dozen new entrepreneurs, such as Ahmad Khiami. 2. The Propertied Middle Class divided into 'three closely knit groups': the bazaar community, fairly well-to-do urban entrepreneurs with investments outside the bazaars, and clergymen. 3. The Salaried Middle Class. 4. The Working Class (Abrahamian 1982, 432-435).

³⁵ About the participants of the revolution and their actions see the next part.

³⁶ Rahnema and Nomani speaking about the anatomy of the Iranian revolution explain three phases: 'the intellectual challenge', 'the tacit anti-Shah popular front', and 'the armed insurrection' (Rahnema 1990, 8-17). According to them, the first and the third phases were short, and in the second phase they discuss the key role of the clergy in the revolution: 'In the second phase of the revolution the clergy played a key role in organising peaceful demonstration by using the mosque as a sanctuary for agitation and mobilisation against the regime' (Rahnema 1990, 10).

³⁷ This organisation was founded in 1965 by six recent graduates of the University of Tehran *Muhammad-e Hanifnezhad, Saaid-e Mohsen, Mohammad-e Asgarizadeh, Rasoul-e Meshkinfam, Aliasqar-e Badizadegan, and Ahmad-e Rezaii*. They all were the former members of 'Islamic Association of Students' and 'The Liberation Movement of Iran'.

³⁸ Miqat is a fixed place for putting on Ihram - the special clothes made of a white not sewed sheet - by pilgrims.

³⁹ In his own words translated by Algar:

'We must end all this plundering and usurpation of wealth. The people as a whole have a responsibility in this respect, but the responsibility of the religious scholars is greater and more critical. We must take the lead over other Muslims in embarking on this sacred *Jihad*, this heavy undertaking; because of our rank and position, we must be in the forefront. If we do not have the power today to prevent these misdeeds from happening and to punish these embezzlers and traitors, these powerful thieves that rule over us, then we must work to gain that power. At the same time, to fulfil our minimum obligation, we must not fail to expound the truth and expose the thievery and mendacity of our rulers. When we come to power, we will not only put the country's political life, economy, and administration in order, we will also whip and chastise the thieves and the liars' (Algar 1985, 115-116. Original italics.).

⁴⁰ The proofs for the establishment of the Islamic government according to Ay Khomeini are as follows:

'Now that we are in the time of the Occultation of the Imam (upon whom be peace), it is still necessary that the ordinances of Islam relating to government be preserved and maintained, and that anarchy be prevented, Therefore, the establishment of government is still a necessity.

'...

'Not to have an Islamic government means leaving our boundaries unguarded. Can we afford to sit nonchalantly on our hand while our enemies do whatever they want? Even if we do not put our signatures to what they do as endorsement, still we are failing to make an effective response. Is that the way it should be? Or is it rather that government is necessary, and that the function of government that existed from the beginning of Islam down to the time of the Twelfth Imam (upon whom be peace) is still enjoined upon us by God after the Occultation even though He has appointed no particular individual to that function?

'The two qualities of knowledge of the law and justice are present in countless *fuqaha* of the present age. If they would come together, they could establish a government of universal justice in the world' (Algar 1985, 61-62. Original italic.).

And in other place:

'The Most Noble Messenger (peace and blessings be upon him) headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to conveying the revelation and expounding and interpreting the articles of faith and the ordinances and institutions of Islam, he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinances of Islam, thereby bringing into being the Islamic state. ... After the Most Noble Messenger, his successor had the same duty and function. When the Prophet appointed a successor, it was not for the purpose of expounding articles of faith and law; it was for the implementation of law and the execution of God's ordinances' (Algar 1985, 40-41).

⁴¹ In order to avoid misinterpretations about the status of the vali faqih in comparison with the Prophet or Imams he argues in the following paragraph:

'When we say that after the Occultation, the just *faqih* has the same authority that the Most Noble Messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that the status of the *faqih* is identical to that of the

Imams and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking of status, but rather of function. By "authority" we mean government, the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the *shari'a*. These constitute a serious, difficult duty but do not earn anyone extraordinary status or raise him above the level of common humanity. In other words, authority here has the meaning of government, administration, and execution of law; contrary to what many people believe, it is not a privilege but a grave responsibility. The governance of the *faqih* is a rational and extrinsic matter; it exists only as a type of appointment, like the appointment of a guardian for a minor. With respect to duty and position, there is indeed no difference between the guardian of a nation and the guardian of a minor. It is as if the Imam were to appoint someone to the guardianship of a minor, to the governorship of a province, or to some other post. In cases like these, it is not reasonable that there would be a difference between the Prophet and the Imams, on one hand, and the just *faqih*, on the other'(Algar 1985, 62-63. Original italics.).

⁴² The attitude of Rezaii and the Mojahedin, translated by Abrahamian could be a good evidence for this claim:

'After years of extensive study into Islamic history and Shi'i ideology, we have reached the firm conclusion that Islam, especially Shi'i Islam, will play a major role in inspiring the masses to join the revolution. It will do so because Shi'ism, particularly Hussein's historic act of martyrdom and resistance, has both a revolutionary message and a special place in our popular culture' (Abrahamian 1982, 491).

⁴³ After establishment of the parliament, one group of revolutionaries, under the leadership of Sheykh Fazl-ol-Lah Noori, asked for domination of religious rules over secular ones. They were called *Mashroae Khah* (religion seekers) in contrast with the others who were named *Mashrote Khah* (constitutionalists). The result of their efforts was establishment of a complement for the constitution, in which the supervision of a group of ulama was granted over all parliamentary approvals. They could veto those legislations that were not in accord with the Islamic laws. Sheykh Fazl-ol-Lah Noori was hanged by his opponents in 1910 (Ansari 1369 AHS, 237-254).

⁴⁴ See: Michael P. Zirinsky: *The Rise of Reza Khan*, John Foran (ed): 1994: *A Century of Revolution, Social Movements in Iran* (London, UCL Press) pp. 44-77, for more details.

⁴⁵ In 1941 allies forces in the second world war occupied Iran. The Red Army from the USSR was in the northern part of the country. They established Kurdish Republic in Mahabad in January 1946. For more details see: Amir Hassanpour, 1994: *The Nationalist Movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, 1941-46*, John Foran (ed): 1994: *A Century of Revolution, Social Movements in Iran* (London, UCL Press) pp. 78-105.

⁴⁶ Red army established Democratic Party of Azarbaijan in December 1945. See: Hassanpour, Amir, 1994: *The Nationalist Movements in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, 1941-46*, John Foran (ed): 1994: *A Century of Revolution, Social Movements in Iran* (London, UCL Press) pp. 78-105, for more details.

⁴⁷ Turkaman People's Political-Cultural Centre was established in Torkaman-Sahra in 1979. See: Larry J. Ray, 1993: *Rethinking Critical Theory* (London, Sage) p. 142.

⁴⁸ In his words translated by IPO: "... Prepare yourselves for being killed, for being imprisoned and for compulsory military service. Prepare yourselves for being beaten, tortured and for being insulted. Be prepared to bear hardship which is on your way to defend Islam and independence. Be strong and steadfast. Those who proclaim that Allah is their Lord and then remain steadfast He descends angels on them; they have nothing to fear and nothing to worry about" (IPO 1991, 71).

Glossary:

Aban: the 8th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Ahkam: Islamic rules.

Akhound: a clergyman.

Ashoora; the tenth day of Moharram.

Azar: the 9th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Bahman: the 11th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Bastinado: beating stick or whip at the sole of the feet.

Bazaar: market.

Beyah: to pay allegiance.

Chador: Iranian traditional veil.

Chelle: the mourning ceremony of the fortieth day after death.

Dabestan: modern primary school.

Darbari: courtiers or those who belong to the court

Dar-osh-Shora: House of consultation.

Day: the 10th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Dowlat: the state.

Dowlati: of the state.

Esfand: the 12th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Faqih: Islamic expert in jurisprudence.

Faramush-khaneh: freemasonry lodges in Iran.

Farvardin: the first month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Feqh: Islamic jurisprudence.

Foqaha: Islamic experts in jurisprudence.

Hadith: religious documents about speech and deeds of the Prophet and Imams.

Hajj: pilgrimage.

Haram: forbidden.

Hejab: veil.

Hosseinie: a place for lamenting, usually in Moharram for Imam Hossein, the third Imam of Shiits, and his companions who were martyred in Karbala.

Howzeh: religious teaching institution.

Hujaj: proofs.

Imam: divine leader.

Imamate: belief in divine leaders.

Imam Jomoa: Friday prayer leader.

Jamadi-ol-Ola or *Jamady ol Aval*: the 5th month of Islamic Lunar calendar.

Jihad: the Holy War

Jomoa': Friday.

Kafer: out of religion, non believer.

Khordad: the third month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Koffar: non believers.

Makaseb: occupations.

Maktab Khane: house of learning, school, madrase.

Marja': religious leader.

Marja'-i taqlid: the top rank among mojtaheds who is followed by a majority of Shiites.

Mehr: the seventh month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Mellat: the people.

Melli: of the people.

Menbar: pulpit.

Mojtahed: the upper rank in the religious studies.

Moharram: the 1st month of the Islamic Lunar calendar.

Mordad: the 5th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Moqalled: the follower in religious duties.

Ordibehesht: the 2nd month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Owqaf: endowments.

Qarbzadegi: Westoxication.

Ramadan: the fasting month of Moslems, the 9th month of Islamic Lunar calendar.

Rawda or *Rowze*: mourning ceremony, especially for Imam Hossein.

Shahrivar: the 6th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Shar'a: religious jurisdiction.

Sheykh-ol-Islam: head of the shar'a (religious jurisdiction) courts.

Talabe: clergy student.

Taqiye: dissimulation, or hiding the opposition to someone or something.

Tassua: the ninth day of Moharram.

Tir: the 4th month of Islamic Solar calendar.

Towhead: monotheism.

Towliat: endowment management.

Ummah: Moslem population.

Urf courts: a type of court under the administration of the state which was responsible for those claims that were related to the state or public security

Vaqf: endowment.

Voaz: clergy speakers.

Wajib: religious obligation.

Zakat and *Khoms*: Islamic taxes in cash or goods.

Zelhejeh: the 12th month of Islamic Lunar calendar.

Zulm: injustice.

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