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# CORRUPTION: AN UMBRELLA CONCEPT

AIYSHA VARRAICH

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Department of Political Science  
University of Gothenburg  
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## **Corruption: An umbrella concept**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Research surrounding corruption has grown exponentially in the past decade, during which various concepts have been drawn into the corruption realm; whereby independent concepts now share space with corruption. This paper attempts to recast the concept of corruption as an umbrella concept in order to highlight the family resemblance that exists between corruption and respective concepts such as clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism and state capture. This effectively shows the connections between the related concepts and corruption within academic research. It enhances corruption to a category that can fit many cases reasonably well, but as Wittgenstein points out “on close examination it can become clear that for most cases the fit is not perfect.” This particular approach results in expounding each of the side-lying concepts as concepts in their own right, simultaneously elaborating on the space shared by the related concept and corruption – this not only clarifies a set of commonalities, that are analytically important (Collier and Mahon 1993), but effectively explains the survival of the implicit understanding of these concepts as corruption thus far.

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### **Aiysha Varraich**

The Quality of Government Institute

Department of Political Science

University of Gothenburg

aiysha.varraich@pol.gu.se

## Introduction

Corruption research has mushroomed into a world of its own in the last decade, during which there has been no agreed upon conceptualisation. However one thing is clear, corruption is a multidimensional as well as universal concept (Kurer 2005, Genaux 2004), reflected by the abundance of conceptualisations from the various academic disciplines. During this process various concepts have been tucked in the “corruption” realm through an implicit understanding within the research community; whereby independent concepts now share space with corruption.

This paper intends to utilise corruption as an umbrella concept in order to show the relationship shared by family resemblance categories such as clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism, particularism and state capture –effectively bringing them onto one spatial field. Therefore the paper will first separately define each concept, followed by a comparison to corruption, in order to fully flesh out the nuances where the overlap between corruption and each respective concept occurs.

Holistically this provides a bird’s-eye view over the literature, enabling the reader to see the connections between the related concepts and the far stretching reach of corruption within academic research, as well as understanding the versatile character of corruption and the fact that it takes different forms in different locations. Particularly, it results in expounding that each of the side-lying concepts are concepts in their own right, simultaneously elaborating on the space shared by the related concept and corruption –clarifying a set of commonalities that are analytically important (Collier and Mahon 1993) effectively explaining the survival of the implicit understanding of these as corruption thus far.

The demonstration of corruption as an umbrella concept is best carried out with a parsimonious Venn-diagram, in order to expand on the family resemblance shared by these concepts. The idea of family resemblance was first developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who defined it as “a category, defined in a particular way that, may fit a number of cases reasonably well, but on close examination it can become clear that or most cases the fit is not perfect.” (Collier and Mahon, 847)




Figure 1

These concepts all share a “core”/ family resemblance with corruption, which is why they constantly are examined hand in hand (Kotkin and Sajo 2002, Kawata 2006, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), .

Corruption can be viewed as an umbrella concept that links together concepts of clientelism, patronage, state capture, particularism and patrimonialism. When surveying the literature surrounding these concepts, rough patterns as to the application of these concepts geographically appear. Clientelism ostensibly is the main form of corruption found in transition countries of South/east Asia and Latin America as well as in post-communist states. Patrimonialism appears to be the form of corruption that dominates the African continent and patronage the form of corruption that is found in both developing and developed countries. However, in relation to developed countries, patronage is a form of legal corruption that appears to go hand in hand with “machine politics” and the mass party. All these concepts stand for different types of corruption that are not explicitly labelled as such. However, within the literature they are treated within the same theoretical space, creating confusion as to what distinguishes them. As Hilgers points out,

A concept should be catchy, intuitively clear and hold to the established characteristics with which it is associated. It should be expressed according to a core characteristic, on which secondary characteristics depend (interde-

pendence) and be easily identifiable with its empirical manifestations (Hilgers 2011, 569)

All of these secondary concepts can be argued to be the causes of “real” or “true” corruption. They are, however, established concepts in their own right, that have a certain degree of overlap with corruption which is not fully explored or explicitly stated within the literature. Therefore, the attempt of this section is to fill this gap by first delineating the different conceptualisations of these forms of corruption (clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism, state capture) as concepts in their own right (describing the “core” elements of each), followed by an analysis of the evolution of each respective concept parallel to corruption. Finally, we will analyse the overlap that exists between each of them and corruption.

## **Clientelism**

Clientelism, like corruption, has a very negative image. Similar to corruption, clientelism was first viewed as a phenomenon mainly present in developing countries such as in Latin America, and Southeast Asia as well as countries in transition (Landé 1983). Clientelism was developed as a conceptual tool for understanding traditional societies (as is evidenced by the initial anthropological and sociological case studies) where patron-client relationships were observed as social structures. Seen from the lens of modernisation theory it was assumed that it was a phenomena that would eventually dissipate once a society began to modernise (Hilgers 2011, 570, Kaufman 1972). This, however, has not been the case. Instead, as research on the subject has increased, it has become apparent that clientelism is not confined to a certain evolutionary continuum of states’ development but is a phenomenon found in both developing and developed countries and at different levels within societies and in various forms. The forms vary from the basic understanding of how political systems work with secondary concepts such as pork-barrelling and special interest politics in a Western country such as the United States (Hopkin 2006, 3). As van de Walle aptly summarises “*clientelism exists in all polities. The form it takes, its extent and its political functions vary enormously, however, across time and place*” (van de Walle 2000, 50).

In order to understand how and why clientelism is so closely associated with corruption it is important to first define what clientelism actually is. According to Hopkin “*political clientelism describes the distribution of selective benefits to individuals or clearly defined groups in exchange for political support*” (Hopkin 2006, 2). Muno defines clientelism as a type of informal institution “*clientelism is a social relationship based on informal rules*” (Muno 2010, 3). The term has served varied uses – serving as

shorthand for systems, institutions, or individuals that are somehow less than ideal (such as clientelistic party system, clientelistic political party or a clientelistic politician, Hicken 2011, 290). The wide and diverse application of the term has resulted not only in confusion and controversy (Hopkins, 2006) but also in blurring the concept to an extent that, in Tina Halters (1999) words “clientelism is no longer clearly differentiated from neighbouring terms, making it a poor concept difficult to operationalize and to use for theory building”.

Effectively, there is no single agreed upon definition for what exactly constitutes clientelism (much like corruption). However, there is a set of “core” elements/characteristics that forms the core concept of clientelism on which these definitions build upon; dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy and iteration.

### **The Dyadic relationships**

With its roots in sociological and anthropological studies of traditional societies, the initial focus of clientelism was on the dyadic social relationship between the patron and client at the micro level (Landé 1983). A patron is someone who uses resources (both material and immaterial) he owns or controls and which are available to the client under certain circumstances. These can include assistance, protection, opportunities for career advancement and of course money. The client typically gains access to these resources by showing political support – many a times in exchange for ones’ vote or otherwise such as helping improve the patron’s reputation. The emphasis, as Hicken elaborates (2011), was on the face-to-face interactions between the patron and client, reinforcing a “personal” and yet “instrumental friendship” (Scott 1972) between both parties. This dyadic relationship was expanded by many scholars to include brokers, which makes clientelism into a triadic relationship.

Weingrod (1968) conceptualised the difference between traditional dyadic relations and modern party-directed clientelism being one of the first to allude to explicit variables and forms of clientelism. This new model changed the patron-client relationship to be viewed as patron-broker-client relationship (Weingrod 1968, Munro 2010, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). In this relationship the broker acts as the go-between to patron and client; a middleman that arranges exchange of resources between the two parties that may be separated by geographical distance or perhaps in situations where one patron has multiple clients. As Kettering (2006) explains, brokers use resources that he does not directly control himself. More importantly, brokers play a multifaceted role when playing client to the patron (patron-broker) and patron to the client. The core of this triadic rela-

tionship, it is argued, is still the dyadic relationship, where, instead of the direct patron-client, the dyadic relationship between patron-broker and client-broker is paramount (Kettering 1988, 426).

The brokerage model evolved in response to the “levels of analysis problem” which had earlier been one of the main shortcomings identified in the literature (Kaufman 1974). This resulted in a model that could extrapolate the dyadic relationship from the micro to the macro levels of analysis; where the brokerage model is utilised in analyses of macro scale (with the political party as the patron and the voters as clients), while the dyadic is best suited for the micro-sociological levels. A parallel pattern that can be observed within the literature is the utilisation of the dyadic model for analyses of developing countries whereas the triadic model is utilised to analyse the presence of clientelism in the more established democracies such as Italy (Caciagli 2002).

## **Contingency**

The second core aspect shared by most definitions of clientelism is that of reciprocity – i.e. the quid pro quo nature (tit for tat) of the relationship (Roniger 2006, Hicken 2011, Kettering 2006). The delivery of a good/service by either patron or client is contingent upon the delivery of such from the other, whether in the present or in the future. One of the many descriptions of this reciprocal feature of the relationship is that offered by Kaufman,

It is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to the other... (Kaufman 1972, 285)

The patron supplies goods/services/jobs in exchange for political support (most often in the form of the client’s vote). The politician delivers benefits to the clients that support the politician and the client supports the politician that delivers on his/her promises. In the clientelistic relationship there are always strings attached.

The type of good or service exchanged can vary from material (ranging from cash to something as random as cutlery) to nonmaterial benefits such as protection, education, healthcare, or admission to a school (Muno 2010). The exchange however does not have to occur simultaneously, there can be a time lag where the exchange may be completed in the near future. A client may have voted in favour of his patron upon the promise of receiving certain benefits once the patron is voted into office. This results in two imperative aspects of the clientistic relationship. Firstly, the need for each

party to monitor and sanction the other, as well as an implicit trust between the two, which is strengthened by the on-going nature of the relationship (iteration).

### **Iteration**

Iteration is the one aspect that sets clientelism apart from other exchange relationships that relates to corruption. The relationship between the client and patron is an on-going one. This is shown by the fact that the exchange does not have to take place simultaneously. This “future” aspect has important implications. It creates a situation where the “future” is considered in the relationship which is different from a one-time payment of a bribe. Effectively each party has the opportunity to establish its reliability. This repeated interaction not only reinforces social norms of reciprocity but also results in an element of trust between both parties. Furthermore, the iteration aspect provides opportunities for predictability and monitoring for both parties (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 48-9, also Piattoni 2004). After an election a client can monitor if the patron fulfilled their election promises (upon which the client had voted for the politician/patron). If the politician has delivered on the promise then the client will vote for the politician again. The same goes for patrons, however due to the nature of voting, if the ballot is secret, the politicians will only be able to tell whether specific local groups of voters kept their promise to vote for them or not. In the same way, “repeated interactions over time allow politicians to observe which voters keep their promises and which voters can be swayed, and calibrate the size of offer needed to sway the voters” (Hicken page 293).

### **Hierarchy**

Hierarchy has been a central feature in defining clientelism. Roniger (2006:353), for example, defines clientelism as “involve[ing] asymmetric but mutually beneficial relationships of power and exchange, a non-universalistic quid pro quo between individuals or groups of unequal standing.” Caciagli (2002) further elaborates the asymmetry of the relationship between patron and client defining clientelism as “informal power relations between individuals or groups in unequal positions, based on exchange of benefits (cf. Kawata 2006, 157). Somebody with higher status (the patron) takes advantage of his authority and resources to protect and benefit somebody with an inferior status (the client) who reciprocates with support and services. The relationship can be both voluntary and coercive and based upon particular interests such as a common ethnicity (Habyarimana et al. 2007). This asymmetry is reinforced by the patron-client relationship being described as “exploitative” and one of “domination” as well as diction that emphasises “obligation” and “loyalty” when



describing the role of the client (Stokes 2007; Kitschelt 2000). Other scholars, such as Kettering, are more direct, describing the asymmetry “a patron is the superior and a client the inferior in an unequal, vertical, and reciprocal relationship” (Kettering (1988: 425).

Recently, the focus of research has shifted from hierarchy itself, to that of the shifting nature of hierarchy, or what some scholars label “old clientelism” versus “new clientelism” (Hopkin 2006, Kawata 2006). This refers to the shift in power from a vertical dyadic relationship to one which is horizontal; with the client in a much stronger position than before. A fitting case is that of Italy – where clients with higher incomes and living standards, effectively no longer tied by the burden of “loyalty,” are able to shop for patrons; weighing what politician offers better stakes. As a result, Piattoni (2004) argues, patrons are now in a weaker position where clients choose to enter the clientelistic deal in order to get privileged access to public resources. This is what Hopkin (2006) refers to as “vote for exchange.”

Scholars such as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) change the power dynamic when analysing clientelism through the lens of principal-agent, where the client effectively is the principal and the patron the agent, the client holding power over the politicians through their vote. This model could be useful in situations such as the case of Italy, where voters use their vote to shop for what patron can offer them a better deal. However in situations where the relationship is not voluntary and the relationship is entered upon as a coping mechanism by the client who needs access to public resources as basic as water and electricity, (e.g., a villager in a developing country dependent upon the local landlord), then this principal-agent model may be troublesome. In the latter situation the client is in the weaker position and asymmetry is blatantly apparent.

On the other hand, Muno (2010. 5) finds the principal-agent model to be a suitable tool for the patron –client relationship when applied to the brokerage system, “with the patron as the principal instructing the broker as the agent with the management of his affairs”. In these clientelistic pyramids (brokerage system), the hierarchal relationship is retained with the patrons situated at the top and the broker/agent in the middle with clients at the bottom.

## The Overlap between Clientelism and Corruption




Figure 2

Corruption and clientelism are different notions. Clientelism is a form of social organisation, while corruption is an individual social behaviour (where you are your own client, trying to play patron to yourself) that may or may not grow into a mass phenomenon. One can imagine clientelism without corruption, although the two often go hand in hand. In post-communist context, the two phenomena seem fused at the hip (Sajo 2003, 2)

As can be deduced from the above parsimonious Venn diagram, clientelism and corruption are two separate concepts that have an overlap, evidenced by the constant comparison/connection of them as shown by the abundance of research focused on comparing the two concepts (Kawata 2006, Della Porta and Vannucci 1999, Singer 2009, Kotkin and Sajo 2002). It is within the space of this overlap that they are confused. The overlap has different degrees; some scholars define clientelism as a structural form of corruption (Sajo and Karkalins 2004) where the overlap makes separation of the two concepts difficult (Sajo 2003). A lighter degree of overlap focuses on the general comparison between the two, where the focus is on the similarities of the concepts in their own right as well as the overlap they share. Finally, others have tried to verify the link through exploring empirical similarities (Singer 2009).

The most difficult overlap between corruption and clientelism to explore is where clientelism is a type of corruption. This conceptual space is the prevalent one applied in the research to the studies of post-communist states, where clientelism is described as a structural form of corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). Here the concepts are dependent upon each other; with clientelism as a form of social organisation and corruption seen as a form of individual social behaviour. As a structural feature of a society it focuses on the social aspect of corruption. This dependency is further high-

lighted by the catch-22 model presented by Della Porta and Vannuci (1999), i.e. clientelism → increase of exchange votes → increases in the cost of politics → (supply of corruption) → availability of money for politicians' → incentives to buy votes → clientelism (cf. Kawata 2006, 13). The model points out clientelism as conducive to corruption.

As pointed out by Hicken, clientelism can drive corruption through three different paths. First, certain clientelistic exchanges can be outright illegal such as vote-buying (Hicken 2011, 303). Secondly, by “undermining the ability of citizens to hold public officials accountable”, Hicken argues that clientelism may in fact be creating “a culture of impunity” within which it is harder to punish individuals for corrupt behaviour. Thirdly, as is demonstrated in the above model, the demand for resources (needed in order to facilitate an exchange between client and patron) could work as a driver for politicians to utilise corrupt ways to acquire more resources. A suitable example that demonstrates the overlap between clientelism and corruption is the Chinese practice of *guanxi*.

This ancient term refers to the informal institution of personal networks where a system of exchange exists around mutual services and the acceptance of a debt obligation. These networks are normally based on personal relations stemming from factors such as common village or region, having gone to the same school, being in the same association, having served in the same military unit (somewhat reminiscent of the fraternity culture prevalent in many developed countries such as the United States). It is said to be deeply rooted in the Chinese culture, strongly tied in with the concept of honour/ “losing face” where the debt obligation is ensured through ones social reputation, superimposed by the will to maintaining “face” in the group and with peers. If one were to obtain a favour through their *guanxi* network, and choose to not repay this debt, one would not only lose face in *guanxi* network but also risk losing access to this network as a whole; which tends to be part of one’s social networking as well. It is this informal institution that has been the focus of much of corruption studies centred on China, where *guanxi* is understood to be conducive to corruption. As the characteristics of *guanxi* networks share many of clientelist characteristics it is tempting to label *guanxi* as the Chinese form of clientelism (brokerage model). However, an aspect that is debated within the literature is the essential characteristic of hierarchy in a clientelistic relationship which is absent in the case of *guanxi*, the favour/service can be obtained from anyone. Pye (1981) argues that *guanxi* does not have a clear cut vertical relationship between the members of the network, explaining the hierarchy to be very subtle. On the other hand are Landé (1983:441)

does not consider the vertical/horizontal to be such a decisive factor for the relationship to be clientelistic:

In my opinion there is no clear break between vertical and horizontal dyads, and their structural and behavioural similarities are more important than their differences. I use the term "horizontal dyadic alliances" simply because the conventional term "patron-client relationship" connotes a vertical tie. Others may take a different view. (Lande 1983:441)

This strong overlap that presents itself where clientelism is considered conducive to corruption is empirically tested by Singer, whose findings point to this link being very weak (or even non-existent) “...we find no evidence that clientelism may potentially create an atmosphere conducive to corruption via its effect on the rule of law or political accountability” (Singer 2009, 14). Thus, there can be a high degree of clientelism without corruption but probably not high degrees of corruption without clientelism.

Turning to the lower degrees of corruption, scholars have focused their attention on the similarities between the two concepts in order to explain the overlap between them. First of all, both clientelism and corruption concern the crossover between the private and public realm. Corruption is the abuse/misuse of public office for private gain, similarly clientelism stems from the same root *“its intention to generate ‘private’ revenue for patrons and clients and, as a result, obstruct ‘public’ revenue for members of the general community, who are not a part of the patron-client arrangement”*(Kawata 2006, 4). The space of the overlap has been explained by various scholars, one of which focuses on the similarities between the two concepts. One of the main similarities is that the theories followed the same development path. At the outset both carried negative connotations— anthropologists focusing on clientelism, while political scientists were focusing on corruption. Both concepts were viewed as part and parcel of the development stages that states went through, effectively as phenomenon that would dissipate once a certain development stage was reached. Contrary to theory, both phenomena persisted in spite of economic development stages reached, resulting with them once again carrying the negative connotations as before (Kawata 2006).

Kobayashi (2006) forwards a list of similarities between the two; both exist universally (can be found at the international level as well as local levels), can be divided into the same typologies, both merge when measuring the scale of political corruption (clientelism is found at the realms of grand corruption), quantity and form of both changes according to time and region, these changes are due to both cultural reasons as well as socio-political systems, the cultural effect is one that

needs to be focused upon. Another similarity is found in the fact that measures of corruption are often used as proxies for the extent of clientelism (Keefer 2007).

Other scholars have focused on differentiating the two concepts, one example forwarded is by Munoz, who compares corruption and clientelism with the example of a bribe being exchanged (Munoz 2010, 7-8). The lack of personal element and the lack of continuity is an element of corruption which distinguishes it from clientelism. In cases of corruption, you do not have to know the “partner” since this can be an unknown policeman who receives bribe from a conductor in order to forge a ticket. Conductor and policeman may never meet again, whereas patron and client are tight-knit; where the relationship/process is an iterative one.

Apart from the clientelistic/corruption overlap there is a further overlap that clientelism shares with patronage, where patronage and clientelism as terms are used interchangeably in the literature (Hilgers 2011). The strongest degree found where patronage is identified as a type of clientelistic exchange. The following section will first venture to define patronage followed by an exploration of the similarities of clientelism to patronage.

## **Patronage**

A second concept that corruption is often entangled with is that of patronage. Patronage means different things in different disciplines. For the anthropologist it is a social relationship (Weingrod 1968) while for the political scientist, it is a way of governing; an “electoral tool” or an “instrument for managing political relations”. Other descriptions are “organisational or governmental resource” or simply “the ways in which party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support” (Arriola 2009, Kopecky and Scherlis 2008, Weingrod 1968, 379). For the purposes of this report, the political science understanding of patronage is the one that will be utilised as it appears to be the one more suitable to contemporary usage; patronage is a particularistic exchange that takes place between patron and client, where the object of exchange is that of public office, i.e. patron offers public office to the client in exchange for electoral support/political allegiance/etc. More simply understood as, appointments to positions in the state (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008, 356). That which varies are the ends for which patronage is exercised. The diversity of ends most often sought are neatly summarised by Souraf:

...The chief functions of patronage are: maintaining an active party organization... Promoting intra-party cohesion... Attracting voters and support-

ers... Financing the party and its candidates... Procuring favourable government action... Creating party discipline in policy making (Souraf 1961, 309-310)

In the literature patronage is associated as a phenomenon closely interlinked with the development stages of a state. Initially patronage, as a subject-matter, was characterised as a phenomenon pertaining to developing states. However, a closer look at patronage reveals the phenomenon to be present in almost all polities (van der Walle 2000) whether developing or not. The scale and form is what varies, the difference stemming from the purpose for which patronage is utilised, as well as, by who plays the role of patron. Therefore, the following section will elaborate on the different goals for which patronage is utilised; maximisation of votes, as a means to achieve a stable political landscape and finally – as a means to strengthen a state/organisation.

Patronage as an electoral tool/resource

It can be argued that the practice of patronage as an electoral tool (public office in exchange for votes), has remained the overarching goal of the patronage exercise. In the literature patronage as an electoral tool is ostensibly a matter of the development stages of the state, where the below relationship is applicable: (Golden 2000)

party/politician → electoral support → material benefit/office/position in state through state institution.

This is the most basic form of patronage, most often attributed to developing states. The setting tends to be rural where the relationship is centred on the individual patron (landlord/politician) and villagers (citizens), most aptly exemplified by the ‘vote banks’ that form in developing countries. In these vote banks the patrons gain a strong following as individuals, so strong, that if the politician were to change political party, the vote bank would ‘travel’ with the patron. Excellent examples of this type of linkage politics is provided by the vote banks that are formed in the Sub-Continent (Weingrod 1968, 380).

However, as Weingrod makes clear, the changing characteristic of the patron goes hand in hand with the development stages of the state, resulting in different applications of patronage. In this case from “traditional” to “mass” society; the new patron at this point is the political party and its clientele the “constituents” (voters). The exercise of patronage as an electoral tool in modern set-

tings, by the political party, can be exemplified by the patronage exercised by political parties in the United States, more popularly known as party machines – where the relationship is shared between a party (or politician) and its party members or group of potential voters, i.e. linkage politics between the party and society (Scott 1972, Johnston 1979). A further example of patronage in modern settings, i.e. developed states, is the case study of Italy, where “...political patronage [...] is typically offered exclusively to known or potential party loyalists, and it explicitly functions as one side of an exchange of public resources for votes” (Golden 2000, 11).

### **Patronage as a stabilising tool**

A different use that patronage is applied for is the use of patronage as a stabilising tool. According to Arriola (2009, 1340) “the use of patronage as an instrument for managing political relations need to be explained” reasoning that “relatively little is known about the extent to which the distribution of patronage systematically affects political stability”. Arriola’s research centres upon the African continent in which context the use of patronage as stabilisation tool is found very much within the developing countries; where the hierarchy of citizen – political elite – top leader (aka “big man”), is very much intact. The literature has remained divided on the use of patronage as a stabilising tool, one school perceiving patronage as a source of instability due to its “distortion of economic policies and political institutions” (Arriola 2009, 1344) whereas the other end of the spectrum views it as a stabilising tool, arguing “the distribution of patronage could be used to pull together a heterogeneous elite and in this way build up institutions over the long term” (2009, 1344). By using state resources to “facilitate intra- elite accommodation” stability can be achieved Arriola, however, focus is on the political instability that occurs from “elite disagreement over the distribution of power and resources” (2009, 1341). The importance of the political elites’ satisfaction is centred upon the ‘gap’ they fill within the political structure –typically as intermediary between the rulers and the public – as part of a patronage pyramid.

*Power is...arrayed through “a system of relations linking rulers not with the ‘public’ or even with the ruled (at least not directly), but with patrons, associates, clients, supporters, and rivals, who constitute the ‘system’ (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 19)*

The purpose of intra-elite accommodation is twofold; firstly, to decrease the risk of being ousted from office through extra constitutional means, but also ensuring less dependency on the loyalty of specific members of the political elite effectively spreading out the risk/eggs into many different baskets. Although Arriola (2009) focuses on the African continent, he points out this model to be

useful in the context of non-African states as well – whether this be Asia, Latin America or the Middle East.

### **Patronage as organisational resource/governance tool**

The form of patronage most related and researched within the context of developed states is that of patronage as a resource tool for governance, wherein the role of patron is played by the political party which uses patronage towards different ends.

One of the earlier studies focusing on this was carried out by Weingrod (1968), where he compares and contrasts how patronage as a governance tool is used in the so called traditional sense (between patron-client), versus the more the modern setting of party patronage. The focus is on how patronage's character has evolved in relation to the transition from traditional to modern settings; in this case the change in patron, where the party now exercises patronage instead of a single patron per se. Within more primitive settings patronage can be utilised as a political tool for centralising a state, applicable to state structures – so called “cellular structures” such as federalist or decentralised ones, where the multiple layers effectively have “gaps” acting as the ‘space’ for patronage to emerge. The mediating function serves a practical function in settings where the physical infrastructure of the state may not be well established – e.g. a primitive transportation system. Weingrod provides a succinct description of the type of state fosters/accommodates different kinds of patronage:

...traditional patron-client ties can be seen to arise within a state structure in which authority is dispersed and state activity limited in scope, and in which considerable separation exists between the levels of village, city and state. Party-directed patronage, on the other hand, is associated with the expanding scope and general proliferation of state activities, and also with the growing integration of village, city and state. (Weingrod 1968, 381)

The more segmented a state structure is the more ‘gaps’ exist, creating a space for patronage to arise, where patronage helps to integrate the state. The patron not only plays the role of mediator between the village level and the state apparatus, but effectively is contributing to the integration of the different levels of the state, whether between village and town or town and cities – ‘cohesive-fying’ the state.

The use of patronage as a governance tool is not merely limited to governing and organising a state since it can be utilised at various levels, for example in political parties or trade unions. In this ca-



capacity it acts as an organisational tool to strengthen the patronage organisation itself. This is exemplified by the early European example of Sardinia

... the Party's monopoly of thousands of jobs, and the special privileges given to loyal Fascists in securing posts and winning promotions' meant that the party had become the major dispenser of political patronage" through which the "party also became an increasingly coordinated structure. (Weingrod 1968, 393).

The access to thousands of state jobs and public resources not only strengthens the political party but effectively also leverages the political party into a position where they can utilise these resources to "serve their own electoral ends" (Weingrod 1968, 384) Another fitting example is that of political machines in the USA, which utilised patronage as a means to strengthen the political machine by using public jobs as both organisation maintenance as well as an electoral tool (Johnston 1979). A similar trend had developed war Spain where the conflict about the control of such patronage jobs seem to have been a major factor behind the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 (Lapuente and Rothstein 2013).

The most recent research investigating the usage of patronage as an organisational resource is chiefly carried out by Kopecky, Mair and Scherlis (2012). This angle focuses on patronage in the modern context, as a mode of governing; where the political party serves as patron, but contrary to linkage politics between party-society, the focus is on party – state linkages. In this case patronage "*represents a form of institutional control or of institutional exploitation that operates to the benefit of the party organisation*" (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012, 7). Patronage thus is "a strategy to build parties' organisational networks in the public and semi-public sphere" in order to ultimately control the policies that the state churns out.

...patronage is for contemporary parties a mode of governing, a process by which the party acquires a voice in, and gains feedback from, the various policy-making forums that characterise the modern multilevel governance systems (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012, 11)

This is the predominant form of patronage found in European and other modern political settings where social and political conditions are not dire enough to utilise patronage as an electoral tool, i.e., as an electoral resource to collect/maximise votes. Instead the ultimate interest is to have control over the policy-making process. The 'permeation' of the aforementioned patronage (in this case the reach of political parties into the state through the allocation of jobs in both the public and semi-public sectors) varies greatly within Europe (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008). In the Scandinavian countries the reach of patronage is limited to small number of positions in the top echelons, where-

as the former communist states such Hungary and Latvia present cases where there is deep permeation of party patronage within the state. By ensuring political control of the policy implementation process, patronage is utilised as a mode of governing. In the former example only the top echelons of the state positions are patronage based whereas the latter cases entail an almost complete change of much of the public positions within the bureaucracy, resulting in a thoroughly politicised civil service.

The above described application of patronage is by no means comprehensive but points in the direction of the multifaceted ends patronage is applied to. As our interest is to investigate how patronage overlaps with the concept of corruption the above manifold usages of patronage should alleviate how and in what way certain forms of patronage can be considered corrupt and for what reasons, helping narrow down in a precise manner where the overlap between corruption and patronage occurs.

A good starting point of exploring the overlap between patronage and corruption – patronage and clientelism, is the following quote from Medard, which incorporates the different forms of corruption: “Corruption takes many forms clientelism, nepotism, ethnic and other favouritism are all variants of corruption, in social terms” (Médard 1998:308).

### Patronage and Corruption




Figure 3

...patronage and corruption may in practice closely follow one another, as for example when patronage appointments are made for the purpose of providing private kickbacks or in return for bribes. In a similar vein, patronage is an important supporting condition for the survival of systemic corruption, in that it is through the appointment of bureaucrats and other state personnel loyal to party politicians that operations designed to pace checks on the activities of politicians are often effectively covered up (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012, 9)

Patronage and corruption overlap, however this overlap is of different types. Patronage can at times “lead” to corruption while at other times it in itself is corruption. As a starting point, the concept of party patronage is not as penetrating as corruption; it is done in the open and not under the table as most corruption deals are. However the overlap into corruption is obvious when these appointments are done “for the purpose of providing private kickbacks” or more so “in return for bribes.” Furthermore, as Kopecky and Scherlis point out, “patronage is the necessary condition for the emergence of the three particularistic exchanges [clientelism, pork barrel and corruption] since it is mainly due to their ability to control state positions that parties are able to manipulate state resources in clientelistic or corrupt ways” (Kopecky and Scherlis 2008, 357). As stated by Golden (2000:17)

Italy's post-war patronage system probably functioned more on the margin of legality than completely beyond it. The outcome was nonetheless that by the 1980s, the bulk of appointments to the public sector was taking place in clear violation of the spirit of civil service regulations even if in nominal conformity to legal requirements (Golden 2000, 17)

This effectively becomes the root to the survival of systemic corruption in these systems. The below table neatly summarises the differences in the concepts highlighting how patronage differs from corruption and where it overlaps, providing an easy overview of the concepts and how these are inter-related.

TABLE 1 Overview of different concepts related to patronage

	<b>Patronage</b>	<b>Clientelism</b>	<b>Corruption</b>
<b>State Resource</b>	Jobs in state institutions	Subsidies, loans, medicines, food, public sector jobs	Public decisions
<b>Party Goal</b>	Control of institutions, reward of (organisational) loyalty	Electoral support	Financial resources
<b>Recipients</b>	Anybody	Party voters	Companies, entrepreneurs
<b>Legal status</b>	Legal or illegal	Legal or illegal	Illegal
<b>Crucial question</b>	Will you work for me?	Will you vote for me?	Will you give me a bribe?

Source adapted from Petr Kopecký and Peter Mair (2012)

This difference in understanding is pointed out as an imperative aspect that must be taken into account when analysing patronage, as “...the perspectives of the two disciplines are...exceedingly different ones. It is therefore important to be clear about these distinctions and explore their implications” (Weingrod 1968, 378). Such a treatment will not be carried out here but it should be pointed out that this comparative approach helps alleviate why the term patronage is so closely associated to the concept of clientelism. The terms (clientelism and patronage) are not only used interchangeably but at times some scholars specify patronage as a type of clientelistic exchange; a client’s vote in exchange for public office. This close relationship, or indeed overlap of concepts, can be traced to the anthropological understanding of patronage as elaborated by Weingrod:

...the study of patronage as phrased by anthropologists is the analysis of how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and friendship, manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends. (Weingrod 1968:378)

In the literature patronage is most often interchangeably used with clientelism. The statement that the two are coterminous – relates to the fact that the distribution of state jobs had in some cases in the past been used on a mass scale for electoral purposes (e.g. post-war Italy or the era of American city machines (Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova 2012, 9).

## **Patrimonialism**

The term patrimonialism was brought back into political science and sociology by Roth in his attempt to “examine an older term for [its] contemporary usefulness.” It is a term for one of Max Weber’s typologies for traditional authority/governance modes, or as Roth puts it “the actual operating modes and administrative arrangements by which rulers ‘govern... (Roth 1968, 156).” Max Weber defined patrimonialism as

...a special case of patriarchal domination – domestic authority decentralised through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house or other dependents. (Weber 1978, 1011)

Weber’s original definition extrapolated patriarchal domination on to a larger canvas, effectively from the scale of the household to investigate social structures and governance systems (state level), where the model was applied to the heterogeneous empires, such as the Roman and Ottoman, in order to analyse the governance systems.

Patrimonialism is a concept that constantly is used as a synonym, as well as interchangeably, with corruption, especially in the context of explaining the embeddedness of corruption in the African continent. In fact, some scholars refer to patrimonialism as a “theory of corruption” that can “explain corruption in relation to the supposed specificity of African political systems” (Bracking 2007). However, utilising such a narrow approach not only does injustice to the concept but also negates the fact that like clientelism and patronage, patrimonialism too, is a concept in its own right.

Over the years the concept has undergone various applications as well as different ways of nuancing; some scholars have applied it as a universal concept; applicable to all countries whether developing or developed states (Roth 1968, Pitcher 2009, Erdman and Engel 2007). In an early seminal study of Nigeria, Joseph (1987) uses the term “prebendalism” to describe the same phenomenon. Others have used partrimonialism as a particularistic concept limited to developing countries (Theobald 1982, Roth 1968), and some have treated it as a region specific concept; specifically as an African phenomenon (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, Erdman and Engel 2007).

The essence of patrimonialism that pervades the scholarship and unites the above described applications and nuances, is succinctly summarised by Theobald 1982, 552):

...the essential feature of patrimonial regimes [is]...the exchange of resources (jobs, promotions, titles, contracts, licenses, immunity from the law, etc.) between key figures in government and strategically located individuals: trade union leaders, businessmen, community leaders, and so forth. In return for these resources, the government or heads of state receive economic and political support. The emphasis is on the personal nature of the exchange: virtually all the analyses that have resorted to the term have been informed, either explicitly or implicitly, by the model of the patron-client relationship.

As this quote clarifies, the concept of patrimonialism is based on the basic patron-client model. It can be viewed as a metamorphosis of clientelism and patronage, or perhaps as encompassing these two characteristics. The difference however lies within *who* is exercising this. As patrimonialism is a mode of governance derived from the concept of patriarchy the focus is upon the “head” of the organisation. Like Aristototele, Weber too viewed governance in opposites and in fact took it a stage higher when investigating the grey zones that perpetuate within society – in this case within the theory of patrimonialism. Scholars today have continued to utilise this comparative outlook by juxtaposing patrimonial against rational-legal structures, in majority of the research surrounding the

concept. The table below neatly summarises the differences between patrimonialism and the rational legal models.

<b><i>Patrimonial</i></b>	<b><i>Rational-legal Bureaucratic</i></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrators are recruited and promoted as reward for personal connections with political leaders</li> <li>• Administrators can be dismissed for no reason</li> <li>• There is an unspoken hierarchy, with little specialization or specification of output and uncertain reporting channels</li> <li>• Important orders may be given orally</li> <li>• The public and private realms are blurred</li> <li>• Administrators supplement their salary with bribes and kickbacks</li> <li>• System is decentralized allowing wide discretion on the job</li> <li>• Administrators' actions are arbitrary, based on subjective reasoning, and follow ad hoc procedures</li> <li>• Rules are applied with partiality and some citizens get preferential treatment</li> <li>• Verbal agreements are used in government procurement and sales</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrators are recruited and promoted in competitive processes that judge their merit and expertise</li> <li>• Administrators can only be dismissed with cause</li> <li>• There is an authorized hierarchy with clear division of labour, specific standards for output and well-defined reporting channels</li> <li>• Important orders are put in writing</li> <li>• The public and private realms are kept separate</li> <li>• Administrators are prohibited from supplementing their salary</li> <li>• System is centralized with little room for discretion on the job</li> <li>• Administrators' actions are predictable, based on objective methods, and follow uniform procedures</li> <li>• Rules are applied with neutrality and all citizens receive equal treatment</li> <li>• Binding legal contracts are used in government procurement and sales</li> </ul>

TABLE 2 (adapted from Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002)

That which differs between the various scholars over and above the above applications, is the difference of degrees pertaining to the degree of focus on the more personalistic character of patrimonialism (Roth 1968, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009) whereas some encouraged an inclusion of a broader perspective by including socio-economic features of states (Theobald 1982). It should be noted that the table above is only limited to exploring the administrative aspect of states, whereas the scholarship surrounding patrimonialism tends to focus on the governance system as a whole.

## Degrees of separation?

The nuances that differentiate the scholars, apart from the above mentioned applications, lie within the different degrees of patrimonial and rational-legal aspects (whether a system is 50-50, or 30-70 etc.) that exist as the structural framework for each case investigated.

If one were to put these different patrimonial systems on a scale the differentiation would be a matter of degrees. On one end of the spectrum there is the traditionalist patrimonialism or “pure patrimonialism” wherein the rational-legal structure is almost entirely absent. As Roth (1968) points out, such states “in terms of traditional political theory... may be private governments of those powerful enough to rule...” (p. 196). These are differentiated from the rational-legal bureaucracies “in that [these have] neither constitutionally regulated legislation nor advancement on the basis of training and efficiency need be predominant in public administration” (p. 196). As for “the corruption scale”, this would be a state that is considered very corrupt. This is the kind that is most prevalent in developing countries (or as Roth points out ‘new states’) which are mostly associated with corruption. As per Roth himself: “Such personal governance easily evokes notions of opportunism and corruption from the perspective of charismatic or legal-rational legitimation.”

On the other end of the spectrum is Erdmann and Engel’s above mentioned model, introducing modern day patrimonialism, which they term neopatrimonialism. This new term is utilised for a multiple of reasons; first of all, to differentiate it from Weber’s original typology of patrimonialism and also to highlight that the neopatrimonialism they refer to is the contemporary form of patrimonialism, which differs from the original position of Weber. Unlike Weber’s “pure” ideal types, neopatrimonialism constitutes a hybrid – a system where there is a fully established structure of the ideal type legal rational bureaucracy, however the governance mode itself has patrimonial features. In other words, there is in place an established system, a so-called rational-legal structure but most of the decision making processes (in issues such as the selection of civil servants, decisions about public policies and their implementation) are exercised with a patrimonial flavour. This model creates uncertainty and a lack of predictability as the external appearance is one of the ideal, impartial rational-legal, whereas power within the system are exercised according to the personal preferences of the leader instead of following the prescribed laws in place.

## The overlap between patrimonialism and corruption




Figure 4

The most complicated overlap within the literature is that of patrimonialism and corruption. The ostensible complication is the apparent similarities that explain the utilisation of the terms as synonyms are: both were concepts that came to the fore during the 60s and 70s, in that case as issues of the “other” wherein they were applied to developing states, or “new states.”

From a conceptual approach, the problem is that scholars have assigned patrimonialism as a theory of corruption, without systematically comparing the two. Instead the treatment remains limited to a brief sentence or two where the reader is left to decide how or in what manner the patrimonial feature is corrupt. Within the literature, the undercurrent that appears to be the reason for patrimonialism to be used synonymously with corruption is because it is a mode of governance that conflicts with the ideal-type exercised by liberal democratic rule-of-law states. Instead of following Weber’s legal-rational model, states that follow the traditional mode of authority (that is, patrimonialism) are viewed from an evolutionist aspect, where all ills within these states, whether African or not, stem from the root cause of patrimonialism (Pitcher 2009). The ostensibly understanding that is deduced is that the patrimonial form of governance itself is viewed as a matter of the “other” wherein the mode of governance itself is seen as corrupt, even if the original reading as propounded by Weber confirms this to be a legitimate form of authority. Instead of acknowledging this by looking beyond the dichotomy presented by Weber, majority scholars assert this mode of authority to be corrupt in itself, with the way the term has been constantly utilised alongside corruption, without actually providing evidence to support this claim.

Furthermore, many social scientists add the modifier *neo* to *patrimonialism* to distinguish what they regard as a modern variant of Weber’s ideal type—one in which a veneer of rational-legal authority



has been imposed by colonialism, yet a personalistic or “patrimonial” logic characterized by patronage, clientelism, and corruption is said to prevail—just as it is assumed to have done in the past. (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009)

Under a veneer of rational-legal authority imposed by colonialism, a pervasive “patrimonial” or personalistic logic is said to prevail, encouraging patronage, clientelism, corruption, and economic stagnation. Even with the transition to democracy, forms of patrimonialism are still seen as brakes on Africa’s future political and economic development (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 150).

## **State Capture**

Out of all the above side-lying concepts, state capture is the youngest, and is viewed as a clear type of corruption, wherein the initial definition offered was as follows “shaping the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws rules, decrees and regulations) through illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials.” (Hellman 2000) It is the only area that fully encapsulates one of the largest “grey zones” within corruption research – that is the interaction of the private and public sectors, i.e. a predatory group of individuals (whether this be in the shape of firms or local elites) and the state itself. The state is captured through policy mechanisms being dictated by, and in favour of, the private actors (firms, local elites) at a significant social cost; effectively the private sphere dictates the public sphere. However what remains under contention is where the line is drawn between where it stops being a healthy democratic process to corruption? A much contested example is that of private sector lobbying in the USA.

The term itself was coined by the researchers at the World Bank (Hellman 2000, Hellman, Jones and Kauffmann 2000), and brought about in an attempt to investigate the effect of the private sector upon the state; specifically within the transition states of the former USSR at the recognition that “...powerful firms have been able to capture the state and collude with public officials to extract rents through the manipulation of state power” (Hellman et al. 2000, 1). A second strand of state capture research takes Hellman et al.’s conceptualisation from focusing on economic agents to focusing on agents within a state (e.g. local elites) (Grzymala-Brusse, 2008).

Unlike the other side-lying concepts listed above, i.e. other types of corruption that focus on the output side, such as how power is exercised, state capture directly focuses on the *input* side of the equation, where corruption is affecting “the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws rules, decrees and

regulations)” policies, laws at the stage where they are formed. This difference is essential as it can shift the type of corruption from the illegal sphere to that of being legal, even though in practice it might be considered corrupt by the stakeholders involved. The literature elaborates that the above definition is not limited to only firms, but is applicable to individuals as well as groups in both private and public sectors, in order to influence laws, regulations, as well as other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the “illicit” and “non-transparent” provisions of private benefits (whether this be money, goods, political advantage) to public officials (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000).

One criticism of this fledgling definition is concerned with payments to public officials where it is a prevalent economic focus, the “exchange of private payments to public officials.” This empiric focus, as carried out by Hellman et al. (2000) in “Seize the State, Seize the Day” is based on firm-level data collected through the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 1999, in order to understand the relationship between private and public sectors in transnational societies, similar to the majority of literature on the topic. The heavy initial empiric focus left agape a theoretical space as to the normative aspects of the concept. Furthermore, such a narrow focus leaves out other aspects of state capture, such as that of the local/national/religious elites, or economies of religion or a focus that takes into account of state capture by religious elites wherein the exchange is of the public’s vote in exchange for salvation in the afterlife, a phenomenon prevalent both in Latin America, Africa and much of Asia (Bardhan, P. YEAR and Keefer YEAR). One study that has helped expand the research onto non-economic focus is carried out by Grzymala-Brusse, where the focus is shifted from economic agents to agents within a state (2008).




Figure 5

This form of corruption can be more harmful than the rest listed above, as it “goes beyond excluding the citizens outside the corrupt bargain from a certain political procedure and instead excludes all citizens outside of the group from almost all parts of the political process in general” (Stine

2011). State capture is thus a phenomenon that takes place through the exercise of clientelism or patronage, where a relationship is built up between both parties.

## **Conclusion**

Over the past decade research surrounding corruption has grown exponentially, during which various concepts have been drawn into the corruption realm through within the research community; whereby independent concepts now share space with corruption. This paper attempted to recast the concept of corruption as an umbrella concept utilising Wittgenstein's classification of family concepts, highlighting the family resemblance that exists between corruption and the respective concepts. This approach effectively shows the connections between the related concepts and corruption within academic research, resulting in the enhancement of corruption to a category that can fit many cases reasonably well, but as Wittgenstein points out "on close examination it can become clear that for most cases the fit is not perfect." An imperative result of this approach is that it highlights the side-lying concepts as concepts in their own right, while simultaneously elaborating on the space shared by the related concept and corruption. This not only helps to describe and understand the commonalities that are analytically important between corruption and the side lying concepts, but also sheds light as to why clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism and state capture have so easily entered the shared space with corruption.

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