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Party System Fragmentation and Democratic Representation in Peru, 1980-2011

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Chapter 1. Introduction

The political transformations that took place in Latin America from the mid-1970s onwards, were described by Samuel P. Huntington as the ‘third wave of democratization’. The global shift towards democracy, specifically a “group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur[ed] within a specific period of time” became known as the waves of democratization (Huntington, 1991, p.15). As a result of this democratization trend and process, scholars and observers became increasingly optimistic about the consolidation of institutions and democracy in Latin America.

The party system, characterized by a minimum of two political parties interacting in structured forms (Melendez, 2012, p.5), is considered to be one of the most important institutions of democracy, followed by strong and representative political parties. According to Alexis de Tocqueville (1962) this is because political associations and parties are the key institutions of civil society. Thus, party system consolidation came to represent a significant indicator of a democratic form of governance. The political party however, regarded as one of the central pillars of democracy, has been met with increasing public dissatisfaction in Latin America (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.1).

During the 1970s, when global attention focused on the consolidation of democracy in the southern region of the American continent, Latin American politics experienced the unprecedented. On the one hand, countries such as Colombia and Venezuela, that possessed a long tradition of strong and institutionalized party systems, aspired to further consolidate democracy. On the other hand, the Peruvian, Ecuadorian and Bolivian party systems regarded as inchoate and possessing extreme low levels of institutionalization, aspired to institutionalize the party system as a result of the democratization trend. Overall however, these five countries countries experienced a trend of severe party system decay during the late 1980s and 1990s that gave rise to the collapse of the party systems across the region.

Literature centering on democratic governance in Latin America is abundant and for many decades Latin America has become the focus of a number of studies that look at its forms of governability, which either challenge or try to follow the democratic standards prominent in Northern Europe and North America. In the last decades, party system fragmentation has been an ongoing phenomenon specifically challenging governability in the Andean Region. Similarly, a crisis in democratic representation remains a critical
factor that shapes the political system in the region today (Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.13). Party system fragmentation, concerned with the breakdown of one of the central political institutions or democratic representation, embodying the political relationship between the citizen and the representative, are not new phenomena in the discipline of political science. Despite this, analyzing these phenomena within, as well as across the diverse, complex and unique political environments in Latin America is particularly important. Firstly, however, these phenomena need to be more specifically defined.

Party system fragmentation occurs when the party system decomposes and the levels of competition and rootedness are weak. The concept of party system institutionalization that measures different dimensions of the party system, are useful to determine fragmentation. Low levels of institutionalization reveal high electoral volatility, low political party legitimacy, lack of political identification and political party organizational deficit. Fragmentation thus, considering the indicators mentioned, represents the decomposition of the party system.

In turn, as examined by Scott Mainwaring (2006), the patterns that presuppose changes in representation are foremost affected by instability. The quality of democratic representation is troubled when the electorate, the citizens, feel omitted from the political process, a lack of popular democracy is present, and the formal mechanisms of representation are no longer adequate (2006, p.19). Particularly in Peru, both phenomena are salient and a crisis of democratic representation that challenges the country’s political system has been prominent (Mainwaring, 2006 and Tanaka, 1998, 2003). A crisis of democratic representation reveals that the “… traditionally strong political parties have eroded or disappeared throughout Latin America allowing for the rise of political outsiders and a surge of political mobilization against the political establishment” (Mainwaring, 2006, p.13). Considering the variety of elements and interconnected indicators that both phenomena involve, it is rather evident they are not unrelated since party system fragmentation can influence on the quality of democratic representation greatly.

Certainly, the interest of the current study lies in further exploring and examining the relationship between party system change, specifically fragmentation, and democratic representation, regarding its quality. This research thus, will focus primarily on analyzing this relationship by paying particular attention to key indicators that establish, on the one hand, party system fragmentation and, on the other, that represent the quality of democratic representation. Specifically, the inquiry to be answered in this research is
framed as follows: how does party system fragmentation influence the quality of democratic representation? Furthermore, this study aims to examine if party system fragmentation contributes to a crisis of democratic representation.

An ongoing party system fragmentation, the rise of political outsiders and anti-establishment figures together with the increasing dissatisfaction and rejection towards institutions, have shaped different forms of citizen-representative linkages in the Andean Region. Trust in institutions, an important factor that has an effect on democratic stability and that further reflects the electorate’s behavior (Tanaka and Vera, 2010, p.104), has been remarkably low in the last decades. In Peru, all these conditions are salient and shape a complex political reality. In fact, according to the Latinobarometro\(^1\) figures of 2008, a public opinion poll in Latin America, which measures different conditions and elements that shape democratic stability, Peru ranks lowest in the levels of trust towards two core institutions, the congress and the political parties.

The prevailing argument shaping this research thus, maintains that party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation are interconnected phenomena influencing each other. Moreover, due to the fact that the so-called programmatic linkages between voters and agents are weakened, these allow for the rise of other forms of citizen-representative linkages, for example those characterized by personalist and clientelist traits. As it will be shown, both phenomena are characteristic elements of an unstable political system, which challenges and hinders democratic consolidation.

It is ultimately maintained that if not assessed together, the understanding of the weakened institutional landscape that occurs in Latin America and in Peru in particular, would be remarkably limited. These two phenomena have to be considered jointly to allow for a comprehensive understanding of the political scenario and the key aspects of the puzzling political system prevailing in Peru and the region. Peru is the focus of this study due to the fact that the Peruvian party system decomposed abruptly in the late 1980s onwards and all conditions regarding the quality of democratic representation mentioned previously have been particularly salient in the country. The relationship between these phenomena thus, seems to be present in Peru, making the country a valuable case to examine.

\(^1\) *Latinobarómetro* is “an annual public opinion survey that involves some 20,000 interviews in 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 600 million inhabitants”. See: [www.latinobarometro.org](http://www.latinobarometro.org) for more information.
This study firstly delivers a literature review on the most relevant academic work concerning the party system fragmentation and democratic representation. This allows for the formulation of a framework that establishes the theoretical and conceptual direction taken. In order to empirically study these subjects, key indicators and conditions are established. Concerning party system fragmentation, the indicators of the levels of institutionalization are inter-party competition, party rootedness in society and party organization. In turn, regarding democratic representation, the conditions selected to best establish its quality, are the levels of trust towards the party system, clientelist linkages and the emergence of outsiders. These indicators and conditions will be examined from 1980 up to 2011 in the Peruvian context hoping to deliver results that are in line with the arguments previously mentioned.

This study aims to contribute to the academic discussion on the relationship between the party system and democratic representation. It will be determined if in the Peruvian case, whether the study of party system change, expressed specifically in fragmentation, greatly influences the quality of democratic representation. If party system stability is crucial for the quality of democratic representation and by extension, for democratic stability, the role of the party system and the political parties that comprise it needs to be emphasized. Due to the fact that weak political parties "... shape the political system in a variety of ways" (Mainwaring, 1995, p. 3), this research aims to establish that one way is directly affecting the quality of democratic representation.

Research focusing on these subjects does not only hold value for theory building, as it provides a framework for analysis in an adverse political system such as the Peruvian one, but also possesses pertinent arguments of high societal relevance. Much of the literature claims that political parties and democratic representation play an important role in democratic stability. If the results of this study show that these phenomena are actually more interconnected than it has been thus far considered, such findings could have significant implications for the study of these concepts, the functions they perform and their relationship within democratic systems post 1970s.
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The interest of the current study is firmly rooted in the relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic representation, and specifically, how the former may influence the latter’s quality. It is thus important to review the literature concerned with the fundamental concepts that frame this study in its wider context as well as set the premise for subsequent analysis. Accordingly, this chapter will look firstly at the relevant studies concerning party systems in wide-ranging terms and their functionality in a democracy.

Moreover, party system fragmentation and the consequences thereof within the Latin American context will be assessed. Subsequently, democratic representation literature will be explored and evaluated focusing specifically on political representation and the mechanisms that presuppose it. This will be followed by the theory that frames party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation, which will allow the establishment of the conceptual ground of the so-called crisis of representation as it transpires in the Andean Region of Latin America.

Political Parties and Democracy

Political parties are widely perceived to be a fundamental element of modern democracy. In his now famous paper on Party Government (1942), E.E. Schattschneider claims that "political parties created democracy", a fundamental belief which for many would still hold true today. Schattschneider further claims that the very thought of democracy without political parties was inconceivable (1942, p.1). Far from being alone in his view, Schattschneider’s emphasis on the role of political parties within democracy has been echoed numerous in the academic work in the field.

For instance, Seymour Martin Lipset (2000) claims that political parties are essential to the definition of democracy. This author sustains that democracy is a political system that, "supplied regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials" (2000, p.48). Lipset also proposes that it signifies a “social mechanism [allowing] the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among
contenders for political office, that, through political parties” (Ibid). Lipset’s definition of democracy serves to further establish the important role and functions of political parties. Conceiving political parties as a significant mechanism employed to represent the interests of the population, through elections, further makes the role of political parties important for a representative democracy.

Political parties are essential for democratic governance because of the functions they carry out. Political parties provide power to their leaders (Weber, 1922) and, they allow for electoral competition (Weber, 1922; Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976,1992 in Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001, p.18). They also allow for the recruitment of political elites to operationalize the political system (Sartori, 1976,199; Von Beyme, 1982,1986 in Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001, p.18) and they make political socialization possible by providing basic information and explanations to the population about how to understand reality (Alcantara, 1997). Finally political parties represent and articulate the interests of social groups (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Cotarelo, 1985 in Alcantara and Freidenberg, 2001, p.18). Contemplating such characteristics makes the options to refute the significance of political parties minimal.

However, the developments that political parties and the party system have undergone since the 70s, particularly in Latin America, have made scholars question the indispensability of parties for democracy and point out a paradoxical relationship between them (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.27). Levitsky and Cameron (2003) explain that this paradox lies in the fact that, “although parties are considered essential to the effective functioning of modern democracies, they are not [necessarily] created for that purpose” (2003, p.27). In fact, parties might as well be “created by politicians in order to resolve coordination problems and further their own careers” (Aldrich, 1995 in Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p. 27). Despite the fact that parties may in fact be created for politicians to advance their political interests, this does not necessarily imply that their role and functions are less significant for a stable democracy. Indeed, as mentioned previously, political parties allow for the mechanisms of representation to be present, and only this consideration, makes them indispensable for democratic regimes.

Party System: Change, Institutionalization and Fragmentation

By party system, this study follows the description provided by Martin Tanaka (1995) and Carlos Melendez (2012), which firstly, conceives it as the set of rules and interactions that
link together the political parties in a political system (1995, p.213). Secondly, a party system is composed of "at least two political parties that interact in structured forms" (Melendez, 2012, p.5). A political system consequently, is the set of rules, actors and interactions - formal and informal, shaping the political dynamics in a regime (Ibid). In the literature, party systems can be classified based not only on the number of relevant political parties or the ideological polarization (Sartori, 1969, p.134), but also, according to its degrees of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

Particularly in young democracies, institutionalization is a political dimension that requires prime attention (Melendez 2012, p.5). Understanding what this process entails is thus relevant. In *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), Huntington refers to this concept as a process by which "formal institutions and democratic procedures acquire value and stability" (1968, p.12). When associating thus, the party system and institutionalization, Peter Mair (2006) explains that party system change is an area of study that needs to be explored in detail. Moreover, Mair further determines that "... systemness implies institutionalization" (2006, p.66), which suggests that institutionalization is key for a system to 'be' a system. Based on this premise, it appears that the lack of institutionalization of the party system does not only affect, evidently, the systemness of the party system, but also already de-categorize it as a system.

Scholars interested in party system change and institutionalization, identify characteristics that are part of a continuum in which the party system can be found. On one extreme, institutionalized systems possess low levels of volatility, deep partisan loyalties, high political legitimacy and well-developed partisan organizations (Melendez, 2012, p.6). On the other extreme of the continuum, the characteristics are the opposite. There are different conditions identified for the party system and the change it may undertake in order to reach institutionalization, fragmentation or even, collapse. Importantly, Huntington accentuates that adaptability of an institution is a requirement for institutionalization. Nonetheless, he recognizes that an institution, which is too adaptable, is unfavorable (Huntington, 1965, p.369).

The importance of assessing party system institutionalization is primarily concerned with acknowledging that it represents a positive trait for the functioning of a stable political system and particularly, a democratic one (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998, 1999). Mainwaring (1998) makes clear however, that if the levels of party system institutionalization are too high, they can increment its rigidity and result in tension within the party system (1998, p.69).
Considering that extreme circumstances may in fact hamper the process of value and stability acquisition an institution requires, it is necessary to first determine how to measure change to achieve institutionalization. Mainwaring (1998) differentiated key dimensions that indicate the levels of party system institutionalization. In fact, it seems that the key to a stable institution is when there is an existent balance between the following four dimensions: competition, rootedness, legitimacy and organization (Mainwaring, 1998, p.70).

Firstly, the patterns in intern-party competition need to be stable; this is to say that electoral volatility should remain low, election after election. Jones (2005) explains that in institutionalized party systems, the relevant political parties tend to remain the same and also tend to “gather relatively similar shares of the vote” over time (2005, p.5).

Secondly, when the party system is strong, political parties have solid roots in society (Mainwaring 1998, 1999). The electorate tends to support the same political party election after election, therefore, creating strong loyalties (Jones, 2005, p.7). In decomposing party systems, election results are based on personal characteristics of the political candidates (Ibid). Thus, showing that existent lack of the electorate’s political identification. Thirdly, the legitimacy of parties and elections is considered to be an important aspect of a strong party system. Scott Mainwaring (1998, 1999) established that a basic prerequisite for party system institutionalization is that both political parties and elections are to be considered legitimate by the population (Mainwaring, 1998, Jones, 2005, p.9). As Jones (2005) further states, for parties to be legitimate, it is imperative that they are viewed as institutions that are vital for the functioning of the democratic system (2005, p.9). Lastly, the organization of the political party remains significant due to the fact that the structure of the party itself shows its capabilities in the political system. In poorly institutionalized party systems, political parties have limited resources, the internal processes are unpredictable, and individual party leaders dominate the parties (Jones, 2005, p.12).

These four dimensions, which are distinguishable when assessing the party system, have allowed scholars to draw conclusions not only on the levels of institutionalization, but also, and relevantly to this research, how fragmentation may be identifiable. That is, when these dimensions are unstable, are weak or even non-existent. Accordingly and complemented by other indicators, such as the number of parties, party system fragmentation occurs when patterns of competition become highly unstable (Sanchez, 2008, p.316), when there is a lack of partisan loyalty, and when improvised political parties shape the political arena.
Democratic Representation

On a joint work, Mark E. Warren and Dario Castiglione (2006) reconsider democratic representation by conceptualizing what representation, political representation and democratic representation establish. Their work is useful for this research as it establishes the theoretical ground for determining democratic representation what conditions presupposes its quality.

In her work *The Concept of Representation* (1967), Hanna Pitkin established what is now considered as the formal view of 'representation'. Pitkin identified that political representation involves; *inter alia*, authorization, accountability, and the looking out for another's interests (Rehfeld, 2006, p.3). Moreover, it became noticeable that the practice of political representation emerged through two different processes: firstly through the establishment of the representative nature of the state and of its institutions, concerned with the act of authorization, and secondly through the emergence of a 'representative government', concerned with the extent to which representatives can be made accountable to the represented (Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.3).

The understanding of political representation was the baseline that allowed for the conception of democratic representation since it was “…built on an early modern, state-centric conception of representative government” (Ibid, p.3). Though there is a wealth of studies that analyze the concept of political representation, either addressing the importance of accountability, or explaining how representation can be legitimate, it is essential to determine that representation needs to be considered as crucial in creating democratic practices (Plotke, 1997, p.19).

Due to its important functions in shaping democratic governance, democratic representation has three key, yet general, characteristics that, when examined can help determining its quality. Firstly, it invokes a principal-agent relationship, in which the “the governments [are] responsive to the interests and opinions of the people” (Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.1). Secondly, representation identifies a place for political power “…to be exercised responsively and with a degree of accountability”, which in turn, allows citizens on having some “influence upon and exercise some control over it” (Ibid, p.1). Thirdly, having the “right to vote for representatives, provides simple means and measures of political equality” (Ibid). Arguably however, democratic representation with
such characteristics entails a somewhat ideal relationship between quality of representation between the *principals* and *agents*. Nowadays, the relationship between these actors can be seen as mediated and enabled by many kinds of groups, organizations and institutions (Ibid), which makes the relationship between principals and agents more complex and distorted when analyzing contemporary socio-political relations.

Ongoing contemporary developments keep on challenging the notions of the quality of democratic representation and can be best illustrated by explaining that the various forms of representation are shaped by the specific “ways people relate to their political communities” (Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.2). Moreover, a predominant trend of the diffusion of informal structures and opportunities for democratic representation is occurring. The development of informal structures does not only reveal a “diminished role of formal political structures in social decision-making, but also the increasing diversification of the forms of association in modern societies” (Beck, 1997; Warren, 2001 in Warren and Castiglione, 2006, p.2). To a large extent, such changes are valuable in showing that there have been significant shifts on how democratic representation has to be understood and what it entails nowadays. Additionally and most importantly, these variations make possible to conceive a weak formal democratic representation since other forms and structures become more prominent.

As seen previously, and according to Scott Mainwaring (2006), the relationship between the *principal*, the voters, and the *agent*, the politician and the political parties (2006, p.15) requires examination. Considering that political parties are the agents, whose role is to represent the voter's interest, it is important to reassess this consideration because “the core of democratic representation lies in the relationship between citizens, on the one hand, and elected politicians, parties, and assemblies on the other” (Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.14). Realizing that there exists an *institutional linkage* between voters and their chosen representatives, traditionally established by the political parties, which continuously changes over time, serves to emphasize the role of these linkages in the literature.

Moreover, it is widely argued that democracies need to create the appropriate vehicles that represent issues of collective action and those concerning social change, and the party system is considered to be a channel capable of addressing such challenges. Once fragmented however, the party system’s capacity is intensely reduced and as a result, democratic representation is affected. Furthermore, when the quality of democratic representation is comprised, new forms of representation, either formal or informal, and
varying linkages, are manifested. Moreover, the emergence of personalities that shape the political system is regarded as a clear indication of a crisis of democratic representation.

In *The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980-2010: An Institutionalist Perspective* (2012), Miguel Carreras points out that studying the rise of outsiders in political systems is important due to the fact that it is connected to ongoing debates in the Political Science field (2012, p.1453). In fact, the rise of political outsiders signifies a liability of a presidentialist system since it makes possible for individuals without previous experience to create new parties and participate in elections (Linz, 1994, Mainwaring, 1993 in Carreras 2012, p. 1453).

Suarez (1982) outlines two "pernicious consequences" of the election of political outsiders in presidential regimes (Suarez, 1982, p.109). Firstly, this phenomenon reduces the efficiency of the executive power and secondly, the rise of political outsiders allows for a personalist style of politics and governing (Suarez, 1982 in Carreras, 2012, p. 1453). Furthermore, electing outsiders will seek to develop personal bonds with the electorate, which according to Guillermo O’Donell (1994) involves "... bypassing intermediary institutions and engaging in delegative forms of democracy" (1994, p.55-59). Contemplating the significant effects of outsiders on governability and representative-electorate linkage, this phenomenon of anti-establishment or anti-political personalities, can be considered as an important dimension that can illustrate the quality of democratic representation.

**Society-Elite Linkages**

Due to the fact that democratic governance is about “establishing linkages of accountability and responsiveness between citizens and the competing political elites” (Diamond and Gunther, 2001, p.300), an unstable political system weakens these dynamics. In fact, in his work *Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities*, Herbert Kitschelt (2000) sustains that from the 1980s onwards empirical variance of linkage mechanisms has become interesting to study and has accompanied the third wave of democratization (2000, p. 846). What Kitschelt calls a ‘diversity of democratic linkage mechanisms’ is centered around a crisis of clientelist citizen-elite linkages, which he claims, have given rise to a crisis in European party systems, like in Italy or Austria (Ibid).
Clientelist linkages can be best illustrated by those dynamics of accountability and responsiveness that presuppose "delivering specific material advantages to a politician's electoral supporters" (Ibid). This rather material exchange has demanded a reconsideration of the competing studies that have mainly focused on the prominent programmatic linkages. Programmatic linkages have been characterized by a somewhat ideal perception of politician's responsiveness, and are those concerned with politicians pursuing policy programs that distribute benefits and costs to all citizens, irrespective of their vote intention and preference (Kitschelt, 2000, p.845).

On a similar line of thought, Kenneth M. Roberts (2002) argues that nowadays the main party-society linkages have been degenerating, and linkages described as marketing and personalist, become more prominent in shaping the political system at the time of electoral campaigns and elections (2002, p.22). As expected, these linkages trends have several important implications for democratic representation in Latin America, since they establish a scenario in which the quality of democratic representation and its structure is challenged. Based on marketing and personalist considerations to exercise the right to choose representatives, the ties between society and those who represent them, may be weak or unstable, resulting in hindering the quality of representation.

Conceptualization

Party system fragmentation implies instability, decay and weakness of the party system. Two dimensions employed to examine party system fragmentation are derived from the party institutionalization literature, competition and rootedness. It should be clear that institutionalization and fragmentation are not regarded as concepts signifying the same phenomenon, but mainly that the former and the indicators that determine it, are employed as a reference to determine how fragmentation is determined.

Democratic representation in this study follows the definition by Mainwaring, it is the relationship between voters and their elected representatives in a democratic regime (2006, p.12). Whilst there exists a wealth of considerations that can influence democratic representation, three specific indicators are selected from the literature to determine the quality of democratic representation: Political outsiders, trust in institutions and clientelist linkages.

Outsiders are defined in this study based on two conceptual approaches developed by Robert R. Barr (2009, p.33) and Miguel Carreras (2012, p.1456). Thus, in a context of
presidential elections, an *outsider* is (1) a candidate who does not have any previous political experience at the time of the electoral campaign and (2) someone who gains political support not in association with a competitive or traditional political party. *Trust in institutions* is a rather straightforward concept as it refers to the electorate's trust towards core institutions and relevant to this research, to political parties. *Clientelist linkages* are defined in this study as having a nature of direct exchange of goods and "material advantages" (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 853) between the representatives and the electorate.

Central to this study is to examine the relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic representation. Departing from the observations made by Kitschelt and Roberts, this study argues that party system fragmentation further affects the quality of democratic representation by weakening the party-society linkages that shape the relationship between society and the political elites. Moreover, this relationship can be identified examining the dimensions of party system fragmentation and of the quality of democratic representation.

It is expected that high electoral volatility and low, or non-existent, party competition, contribute into making more feasible for a political outsider to gain support and be elected. Moreover, if parties are not rooted in society, there is unstable competition, parties emerge and disappear, the capacity of political parties as vehicles for representation will be questioned and distrusted by the electorate. Therefore, this study argues that when political parties do not act as mechanisms of representation, the electorate and the elites may engage in developing other forms of linkages that shape the relationship with their representatives.

Overall, the literature identifies that party system change has significant consequences for democracy (Tanaka, 2003, 2008; Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 1998; Levitsky and Cameron, 2002). The current study aims to show that in fact, the relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic representation can be examined along the dimensions listed previously, and results in affecting the quality of democratic representation. Moreover, it is expected that this study's empirical results will not only show how democratic representation is affected by party system fragmentation, but also, how it has contributed to what Mainwaring and Tanaka have called, a "crisis of democratic representation". Mainwaring (2006) explains that a crisis of democratic representation reveals the extinction of strong political parties, which in turn, allows for the rise of
political outsiders and the rejection of the political establishment (2006, p.13). Addressing the interaction between these phenomena, the following hypotheses are thus formulated.

Null Hypothesis (H0): There is no identifiable influence between party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation in Peru.

Alternative Hypothesis (Ha): There is an identifiable influence between party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation in Peru.

In order to address the relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic representation theoretically, and establish how a crisis of democratic representation occurs, the Neo-Institutional theoretical approach serves as a starting point. The significance of this approach lies in the fact that it stresses that the actual “organization of political life makes a difference” (March and Olsen, 2006, p.1). Neo-Institutionalism is best defined as the “set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and change” (Ibid). This approach is therefore relevant to the analysis intended to be employed in this research. Neo-Institutionalists not only emphasize that institutions have an impact upon individuals, but also acknowledge that there is an interaction between institutions and individuals (Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p.61). This interaction is that which is of most interest for subsequent analysis in this study.

Though particularly useful in framing the vital role of institutions and their interactions with the individual, Neo-Institutionalism is limited when addressing the linkages that presuppose accountability and responsiveness. As Kitschelt (2000) suggests, “parties in the institutional sense are not always parties in the functional sense”, this is to say, “they are not necessarily the collective vehicles that solve problems of collective action and of collective choice” (2000, p.848). For this reason, it is pertinent to examine the theoretical debate accounting for the linkage mechanisms between society and politicians.

In Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities (2000), Herbert Kitschelt developed a theoretical outline highly applicable to the focus of this study. Kitschelt begins by establishing that democracy is the only regime in which “institutional rules of competition between candidates, who aspire to become political representatives and exercise authority”, “make rules accountable and responsive to the political preference distribution among all competent citizens” (2000, p. 845). This assessment when viewed from normative political theory represents a favorable argument supporting
democracy (Ibid). Furthermore, the accountability and responsiveness performed by political parties and characteristic of democratic representation, is the focus of this study. Kitschelt's contribution therefore, is applicable to this research because it challenges the assumption that “above all, programmatic linkages matter for democratic accountability and responsiveness” (Ibid, p.847), since this study argues that these linkages are no longer prominent in Latin America.

Moreover, Kitschelt emphasizes the need to focus on a “more systemic, comparative account of diversity in the models of democratic accountability and responsiveness” (Ibid, p.847), these being as described previously, the linkages that are strongly influenced by personalistic or clientelistic traits. This study therefore aims to contribute to theory-building on linkage mechanisms between the citizens and representatives, through examining how party system fragmentation influences the quality of democratic representation. Thus, a theory-confirming approach in line with Kitschelt analysis and Mainwaring’s conceptualization of a crisis of democratic representation is employed.
Chapter 3. Research Design

Defining the research question driving social science research is the logical starting point for subsequent analysis, wherein the current study is no exception. As introduced initially, the focus of this study lies in describing how party system fragmentation influences the quality of democratic representation in Peru, in order to explain the crisis of democratic representation argues to be taking place in this country. In this chapter, the research design developed in order to answer this question is established. The method of analysis that is employed together with the case selection and temporality considerations, are subsequently explained.

Method of Analysis

Due to the fact that it is hardly possible to “... construct meaningful causal explanations without good description, and in turn, description loses most of its interest unless linked to some causal relationships” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p.34), exercising both remains essential when carrying out social science research. In the current research, the causality observed is the influence of party system fragmentation on the quality of democratic representation. It must be noted however, that this causality is not one-sided and, as it will be shown, these phenomena, due to their temporal development, hold a mutual inter-relation. This is because, despite the implied causal relationship being the main focus of this study, it will also be argued that a crisis of democratic representation inhibits party system reconstruction. Acknowledging this interdependence between the issues of interest, allows political science research to have a holistic perspective and avoid reducing the analysis to a few separated variables (Pierce, 2008, p.43).

In order to examine the complex yet appealing relationship between party system and democratic representation, examined through the fragmentation of the former and the quality of the latter, this study employs a qualitative method of analysis focused on a single case study, the case of Peru. This method allows for inductive analysis that “is
premised on discovering categories and being exploratory with open questions” (Vromen in Marsh and Stoker 2010, p. 257). Moreover, employing a qualitative method serves to demonstrate “sensitivity to context” (Pierce, 2008, p. 43) since the analysis will consider social, historical and temporal context from which the data has been gathered (Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p. 257). Schmitter (2008) emphasizes that “carefully constructed narratives remain key in understanding processes”, in this case these are party system fragmentation and a crisis of democratic representation, “that have a strong temporal dimension” (Hancké in Marsh and Stoker, 2010, p. 242). This study therefore, primarily addresses the observed causality considering the following temporal dimensions: sequence, context and change.

Accordingly, addressing sequence, the fragmentation of the party system in Peru has been concurred to take place in the beginning of the late 1980s (Tanaka, 2002, p.6; Levistky and Cameron, p.6; Cotler, 1994; Lynch, 1999; Planas, 2000), and, the quality of democratic representation became evidently in peril from the early 1990s onwards. Throughout the 1990s and continuing during the 2000s, the mutual inter-relation between these phenomena has been evident.

Regarding the context, the qualitative method involves taking into account other factors that may have affected the quality of democratic representation and contributed to a crisis of democratic representation. On of these factors can be the structural changes in Peru, e.g., growth of the informal sector and development and spread of mass media technologies (Levistky and Cameron, 2003, p.1). Moreover, the profound effect of the armed conflict between the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the Peruvian state (late 70s-early 90s) on the political system, must not be overlooked.

Lastly, significant changes can have important effects on the outcome observed. It is not an easy task to determine which changes are significant and which are not. However, in the Peruvian case and taken into account in this analysis, the economic crisis that hit the Latin American region in the 1970s, is arguably a factor to consider since it demanded urgent responses from the political actors in these countries (Tanaka, 2002, p.1), shaping thus the forms of governability employed these years.

Having determined the value of the qualitative method, this study employs the “process tracing” approach in order to analyze extensively the relationship implied. The process-tracing approach is useful for this analysis because it involves identifying and examining other mechanisms or “different paths” that lead to the outcome observed (George and Bennett, 2005, p.215). In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the
phenomena of interest therefore, employing this approach within the current qualitative analysis is applicable. It allows establishment of the paths that lead to a crisis of democratic representation by determining party system fragmentation and examining the quality of democratic representation.

The process-tracing approach is a subunit analysis that is useful in elaborating causal mechanisms that increase the number of theoretical relevant observations (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p. 227), and this is a significant goal this research aims to achieve. It is again worth mentioning, that the focus of this study is theory-confirming, since it is expected to conclude that the quality of democratic representation has been influenced by party system fragmentation thus contributing to a crisis of democratic representation.

As introduced in the first chapter, dimensions and conditions have been observed to indicate party system fragmentation and the quality of democratic representation respectively. Regarding the party system, the indicators of fragmentation will be analyzed and are listed as follows; inter-party competition, rootedness in society and the number of parties. The quality of democratic representation in turn, is approached by analyzing the following indicators; emergence of outsiders, clientelist linkages and trust in institutions.

Process-tracing involves looking closely at "the decision processes by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes" (George and McKeown, 1985: 35), and this feature is highly relevant for analysis in this study. Due to the fact that decision-making actions and intentions are observable conditions that reconstruct the expected outcome (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p. 227), in this case a crisis of democratic representation, process-tracing highlights the importance of reaching the level of the individual actor. Considering that this study argues that the citizen-representative linkages, constituting the quality of democratic representation have been affected by party system fragmentation and have resulted in giving rise to different relationships, analysis reaching the individual actor level is necessary to explain how a crisis of democratic representation exists.

It has been argued that the qualitative method runs the risk of using sources of bias and inefficiency (King, Keohane and Verba, 1995, p.229), and thus delivering an unreflective research design. Taking this weakness into serious consideration, this research employs a variety of data sources in order to avoid inefficiency. The data this study relies on therefore, comes primarily from the academic literature with the intention to provide a comprehensive story of the Peruvian case. Moreover, by employing the
process-tracing approach, the number of observations has been expanded and this allows for greater, yet relevant, information delivery. In order to measure the indicators of the phenomena central to this study, secondary data and quantitative data from academic journals, electoral results, public opinion polls and surveys, is used for analysis in this study.

Case Selection and Time Frame

The literature suggests that the levels of dissatisfaction with the political system have been most severe in the Andean Region (Mainwaring et al, 2006 and Tanaka, 2003), which is comprised by Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru. Accordingly, a divergence between the state and the citizens in terms of the linkages that presuppose their socio-political relationship has been more acute in these countries (Burt and Mauceri, 2004; Drake and Hershber, 2006).

In the Andean Region, only Colombia and Venezuela were regarded as holding a stable, firm and valued party system. In Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, the party systems were described as inchoate. Overall however, in all five Andean countries, during the 70s and 80s, the party systems became fragmented and collapsed. Particularly interesting is the Peruvian case, which illustrates how party system fragmentation from the late 80s onwards, represented an opening for political instability and democratic uncertainty (Tanaka and Vera, 2010, p.35).

Peruvian politics contain contradictory and complex trends that characterize the political system (Aldrich, 1995, Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, Tanaka 1998, Tanaka 2002) and these are considered to have challenged, and even endangered, the democratization process (Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton, 1990, p.21). Electoral volatility has been the highest in Peru since the restoration of democracy in 1980. Moreover, the frequent shift in party support and loyalties has characterized Peruvian politics since the 1990s onwards. Political outsiders such as Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala, and their rather new political parties at the time (1990, 1999, 2003 respectively), have all won presidential elections in Peru in 1990, 2001 and 2011 respectively. High volatility in Peru does not only reflect a shift in electoral preferences but also how quickly new parties emerge and old ones collapse.

In addition, the majority of the elected presidents of the last two decades have reaffirmed their consistent rejection of the establishment. These candidates have
employed and identified their electoral campaigns as highly clientelist. These conditions come to represent a rather puzzling political system and indicate the urgency to examine the indicators shaping this reality. In line with the focus of this study, determining what presupposes a crisis in democratic representation in Peru holds several implications.

The implications of studying the Peruvian case hold both academic and social value. By gaining in-depth understanding of a crisis of democratic representation, a multi-dimensional observation can help explain what mechanisms interact in shaping it and which are in particular more salient and need to be re-examined. The Peruvian case can contribute to the academic literature by offering insights of the democratization process in Latin America. Furthermore, examining Peruvian politics help distinguishing the actual limitations and weaknesses of the democratization process. Considering these implications, it seems rather fitting to have selected a case study that can contribute to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms shaping the political system academically and socially.

Having discussed and established the value of the temporal dimension that involves studying party system fragmentation and democratic representation in Peru, the time frame selected for analysis ranges from 1980-2011. This period of thirty-one years is useful in illustrating a temporal development of all the indicators of party system fragmentation and the mechanisms of democratic representation that determine its quality. As it has been explained previously, party system fragmentation occurred in the late 1980s and variations of the quality of democratic representation followed this phenomenon from 1990 onwards.

Examining the results of the presidential elections that took place since 1980 to 2011, is significant to establish the temporal development of these phenomena. Furthermore, thirty-one years will allow observing a, claimed party system fragmentation that may in fact contribute to a crisis of democratic representation present in the Peruvian political system. This period of time may in fact represent both the weakness and strength of this study. Regarding the former, even if observation is conducted thoroughly, the relationship observed may in fact not be as salient or possess a trend overall. Regarding the strength of this study, a long time frame will allow for a multi-dimensional observation to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomena in Peru. These considerations are further explained in the implications and limitations chapters, after employing the research design outlined throughout this section.
Chapter 4. Latin American and Peruvian Politics

In Latin America, and specifically concerning Peruvian politics, understanding the context in which the party system fragmented and how the quality of democratic representation has been affected, is highly necessary. According to Julio Cotler, a prominent Peruvian scholar who's famous work *Clases, Estado y Nación* (1978) examines and describes the development of the Peruvian state and the political system in this country, a reading of Peruvian history is indispensable to an understanding of the present (Crabtree, 2011, p.1). Before fully diving into the contextual development of Peruvian politics, it is relevant to describe and examine Omar Sanchez’ grouping of ‘underlying causes’ of party system fragmentation and democratic representation in Latin America. By acknowledging the existence of environmental conditions in Latin America, the first part of this section stresses the important influence these have had on the political institutions’ organization and stability throughout the southern region of the continent.

Firstly, once characterized by a strong ideological fervor, ideology in Latin America is no longer conceived as the main factor for voters to elect their representatives and for parties to win electoral campaigns. Therefore, the region seems to have entered and to be experiencing a post-ideological era (Castaneda, 1994; Colburn, 2002). One could argue however, that the *left-turn*, as seen in different levels in the cases of Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina in the last 10 years, challenge this idea. The previous and current political leaders in these countries however, i.e., Chavez, Correa and Morales, did not rely on political ideology as the heart of their electoral campaign and governance, but they focused rather on anti-system rhetoric. These leftists leaders have arisen from a mixed past that includes populism, nationalism and as a consequence, with few ideological underpinnings (Castaneda, 2006).

Secondly, during the 1980s Latin America was hit by a heavy economic crisis that resulted in affecting governability in the region, most notably and gravely in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Though economic debt was more paralyzing in these countries, the whole region experienced it and decisive economic reforms took place. A large scale, Neoliberal reorganization resulted in limiting the functions and reducing the size of the state (Vellinga, 1998 in Sanchez, 2008, p.316). These reforms are important to consider because they influence the functioning of not only the state, but also the political parties. From the 1990s onwards, political parties have been unable to deliver policy privileges or material benefits like they used to (Ibid, p.317). The central role in the political system played by
political parties thus, was further weakened by instituting economic reforms resulting in restricting political agency.

Thirdly, as a result of continuous socio-economic reforms taking place in the region, the growth of the informal labor sector is a relevant factor to consider. According to Sabatini and Farnsworth (2006), an expanding informal labor sector results in composing an electoral group that is not attached to organized channels of political participation any longer (2006, p.55-62). Moreover, as claimed by Sanchez, the growing informal labor sector surely demands capabilities that traditional political parties are not able to exercise (Sanchez, 2008, p.317). These conditions result in disenchantment and distrust, with and towards the political system. Nonetheless, Levitsky and Cameron (2003) argue that different forms of informal party organization have eroded in the region and adaptability to external circumstances has taken place (2003, p.2).

Finally, the access to, and development of mass media technologies has further hampered the main role of political parties in structuring their party-organization building (Skidmore, 1993 in Sanchez, 2008, p.317). Television has specially weakened the incentives of politicians to engage in the organization of the political parties. Sanchez argues that in a mass media era, “telegenic political outsiders can potentially challenge well established, well organized party machines” (Ibid, p.317). Moreover, the increasing popularity of social networks and the access to a wealth of available information on the internet, clearly posits challenges to the conventional electoral campaign strategies held by political parties. Political presence is not judged only on television and radio slogans and appearances, but also on the extent to which political leaders are involved and represented in social media networks.

The factors outlined here are considered to be underlying multifaceted causes that have the power to shape the nature of the political sphere in a manner that is out of the control of the political parties themselves (Sanchez, 2008, p.317). According to Steven Levitsky and Maxwell Cameron however, some of these indicators do not directly cause party systems to collapse, but rather, they may in fact “inhibit its reconstruction” (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.25). Whether these conditions cause party system fragmentation or impede its reconstruction is not a task this research is directly concerned in debating. What is more relevant to argue is that these factors clearly influence political parties by limiting their agency and also, result in affecting the electorate’s behavior. Thus, these factors shape an even more complex political scenario, in which ‘the rules of the game’ are

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in constantly changing and the quality of democratic representation is thus affected. The Peruvian case is particularly appealing in this regard, as Julio Cotler (1995) claims politics in Peru have consistently been unpredictable (Cotler, 1995 in Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p.323). The following section thus, focuses in detail on the puzzling Peruvian considering the economic, political and social context between 1960 and 1990.

The deepening of democracy, claims John Crabtree (2011), has been absent in Peru despite the fact that constitutional governments have been upheld (2011, p.xviii). From the 1960s onwards, attempts to get rid of the old Peruvian regime aiming to modernize the country, were made (Crabtree, 2011, p.56). In fact, “social change and the emergence of both new political actors and political parties, brought attempts to outdated social structures” (Ibid). The creation of Acción Popular (AP) in 1956, founded by Fernando Belaunde, and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano founded in 1966 by Luis Bedoya are examples of the previously mentioned new political parties and actors. However, due to a successful and strong old regime, political movements and parties were forced to plea support from the mobilized sectors of the population by employing “… assistentialist policies that reaffirmed old populist ties” (Ibid). Such policies and resistance to reform, exacerbated institutional weakness and contributed to a political breakdown whereby “no political regime endured for a long as two decades” (Kenney, 2004, p. 6).

While Peru has experienced semi-democratic and democratic governance from the 1900s until the 1960s, when democracy was interrupted by military and authoritarian regimes. Most notably, the military intervention of 1968 led by General Velasco Alvarado, lasted no less than 12 years. Velasco, though a representative of the military forces, employed reforms that had popular support, remarkably the so-called "agrarian revolution", which concentrated on agrarian reforms that re-distributed rural land ownership (Cotler, 1994). Crabtree emphasizes that despite Velasco’s reforms on land-ownership and popular economic policies, patterns of political patrimonialism, heritage of the post-colonial era, persisted in Peru (Kenney, 2004, p.6). Velasco’s military rule and reforms led the country to a deep economic crisis, which had to be faced when the country transitioned back to democracy in 1980 and Fernando Belaunde was reelected as president, since his electoral win in 1963, ended abruptly with Velasco's military coup in October of 1968.

In 1978, the New Constitution, part of the Peruvian Presidentialist system, was approved with the objective to “return to democracy after military rule”, and determined significant reformation to the electoral system from1980 onwards (Peruvian Congress
The most important reformation was: Firstly, the general elections would elect collectively the president, the congress members, and the vice-president for a period of 5 years. Secondly, it established a two run-off system, in which a president would be elected if obtaining a minimum of 50 percent of total vote support. If less than 50 percent, the two parties with the highest vote share, would compete in a second round. Thirdly, it provided the president as entitled to have more power capacity to employ social reforms (Peruvian Congress Report, 1980).

Belaunde returned to power in 1980 when the AP won the presidential elections, marking thus an end to the military rule (Kenney, 2004, p. 18). The economic crisis was the main challenge Belaunde’s administration faced. In fact, by 1982, the GDP fell by 2.2 percent and by an unforeseen 14.6 percent a year later (Kenney, 2004, p.11-21). In addition, inflation figures were unprecedented as they went from 75 to 125 percent during these years (Ibid). The deepening of the ongoing economic crisis in the country has been correlated with Belaunde’s “IMF-style austerity program” (Burgees and Levitsky, 2003, p.898). Belaunde’s term ended in 1985, when Alan García, leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), was elected as president.

Originally a labor-based party, The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), founded in 1930, is considered the oldest political party in Peru. Founded by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, APRA is commonly regarded as the only party that has maintained, though at times remarkably low, electoral support since the 1980s. During the 1960s, APRA was often involved in corruption and though formed in 1930, only gained formal recognition in 1962 (Kenney, 2004, p.6). Because APRA’s involvement in frustrating Belaunde’s “legislative program” in the 1960s, which lead to the military coup of 1968, the political party was still seen as a threat and was somewhat excluded from the political scene until 1985 (Ibid). when it won the presidential elections.

During the 1980s, besides the deep economic crisis in the Andean country, social turmoil unfolded in Peru with the presence of Sendero Luminoso, a “Marxist, Maoist and Leninist” radical revolutionary movement (CVR, 2003, p.14). Sendero Luminoso or The Shining Path declared war to the Peruvian state in 1980, when the country witness the beginning of an armed struggle that was deepened from 1985 onwards (Ibid). The radical movement exposed the inequality and social exclusion prevalent in the country and condemned the failure of the state in confronting these issues. The struggle between Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian state, resulted in an armed conflict that lasted until the early 1990s. During the 1980s, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)
was formed. MRTA was another radical revolutionary movement that increased the social turmoil that shaped the state of emergency in the country (Ibid, p.254). States of emergency were established in ten of the twenty-four departments, restricting the civil and political liberties of one half of the Peruvian population in 1990 (Woy-Hazleton and Hazleton, 1990, p. 21). The political and armed violence between the state and the radical movements between 1980 and 1992, is responsible for over 70 thousand lives, according to the Comisión de la Verdad y la Reconciliación³ (CVR, 2003, p.115).

By 1985, the Peruvian political system was challenged by an uncontrollable economic crisis characterized by hyperinflation and the armed conflict that paralyzed the country for longer than a decade. So when Alan Garcia (APRA) was elected in 1985, his term was associated with widespread corruption, which Crabtree (2011) claims, resulted from "rampant patrimonialism and contributed all in all to a failed government of heterodox policies" (2011, p.57).

Despite the fact that the political forces in Peru resembled more social movements than parties (Cotler, 1995 in Cabtree, 2011, p.10), between 1980-1990, the APRA, AP, PPC and Izquierda Unida (IU), were considered the four-sustaining parties of the party system (Tanaka, 2002, p.2). IU was founded in 1980 and it was the only political force that represented a leftist vote. By 1990, "none of the four system-sustaining parties could demonstrate that it had the capacity to confront a multifaceted crisis: economic collapse, organizational weakness, and Sendero Luminoso" (Dietz and Myers, 2007, p.75). These conditions can help explaining why in 1990, an anti-establishment candidate such as Alberto Fujimori was elected.

In 1992, Fujimori "made every effort to ensure that no opposition parties received any help from the state” (Tuesta, 1996; Conaghan, 2001 in Dietz and Myers, 2007, p.77). Furthermore, Fujimori “seized power in an autogolpe" or ‘self-coup’, when he dissolved the congress in 1992 and claimed to start the “national reconstruction” of the Peruvian political system (Tanaka, 1998, p.220-221). His move, though criticized internationally, was accepted and supported by the population as he “jumped from a 53 percent of support in March of 1992, to a 81 percent after the autogolpe” (Tanaka, 1998, in Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.8). In 1993, a New Constitution was approved via a national referendum and it established the consecutive presidential re-election (Tanaka, 1998, p.221). In 1995 thus, with an imposing 62,4 percent Fujimori is re-elected. Fujimori’s

regime, which turned a democratic election into an "authoritarian success" (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.8), greatly affected the stability political system in Peru between 1990-2001.
Chapter 5. Party System Fragmentation in Peru

As introduced in the previous chapters, the literature has been concerned with identifying several dimensions that comprise the party system and that are useful in understanding party system change, and relevant to this study, fragmentation. Accordingly, these dimensions can be measured separately by focusing on specific indicators.

In this study, Party System Fragmentation is operationalized by examining three dimensions selected from the literature: Inter-Party Competition, Party Roots in Society and the Number of Parties.

Competition and rootedness are determined by the most commonly used indicators of the party system, electoral volatility in the case of competition, and party support and/or identification accounting for rootedness. Additionally, analyzing specifically the number of parties, is determining the Effective Number of Parties (ENP). The ENP is an indicator predominantly used to determine the levels of party system fragmentation. Collectively, these indicators will provide a clear image of the Peruvian party system. Moreover, the results will permit the drawing of inferences on party system fragmentation in Peru.
Inter-Party Competition

Stability in the tendencies of Inter-Party Competition is determined by electoral volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the “net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers” (W. Ascher and S. Tarrow, 1976, p.48). Thus, measuring volatility allows determining the percentage of the electorate that modifies their political preferences from one election to another. Volatility in this study is examined by relying on the measure developed by Pedersen in 1979, with high levels indicating higher volatility (Jhones, 2005, p.5), implying instability and weak inter-party competition.

In Party Systems in the Third Wave, Mainwaring (1998) provides the scores for electoral volatility post-1980 for the established advanced industrial democracies, the old European and the new Latin American democracies. When comparing the mean results of electoral volatility between Europe and Latin America, the differences are remarkable. In the former, the mean volatility reaches a 9.7 percent, whereas if focusing ten Latin American democracies, the mean is approximately 30 percent. In the Andean Region, the mean volatility is even higher, at 37 percent between 1970-1990.

In Peru, the electoral volatility score had a mean of 54 percent between 1980 and 1990, the highest in the Andean Region during these years. As Table 1 shows, electoral volatility was prominently high in Peru during the 1980s. In order to assess how significant the high volatility figures are, the following table compares Peru's volatility results to the rest of the Andean Countries. Moreover, it shows an overview of the electoral volatility in the region.

Table 1. Electoral Volatility in the Andean Region between 1979-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Electoral Period(s)</th>
<th>Time Spam (1979-1990)</th>
<th>Mean Volatility: Presidential Vote %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1980-1990</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1979-1993</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1979-1992</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1970-1990</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Table 1, Peru scores 54 percent, the highest electoral volatility in the Andean Region. This value is higher than Bolivia and Ecuador by almost 17 percent and more than 40 percent higher than Colombia’s mean volatility. As such, party competition during the 1980s in Peru is reflected by high volatility figures that not only illustrate constant vote variation but also, as the following observations will show, party system fragmentation since the patterns of competition are unstable in Peru.

Electoral volatility serves not only to examine party competition, it also makes it possible to observe varying patterns in the party system, e.g., in the distribution of electoral support among the relevant political forces. Thus, looking at the voting percentage shared by the competing Peruvian parties during the 1980s, allows assessing the shifts in vote preference. In fact, the 1980 and 1985 Peruvian general election results, show how four political parties, PPC, AP, APRA and IU together gathered an average of almost 85 percent of the electoral support. Such high figures expressed in vote percentages, allow the establishment of these parties as the principal, relevant political forces of the 1980s in Peru.

By 1990 however, there was a considerable decline in electoral support for these four principal parties. Actually, it is possible to observe a clear tendency of declining support towards the relevant parties of the 1980s up to the 2000s. In order to visually observe such tendencies, Graph 1 shows this declining trend in Peru from 1980 to the year 2000.

**Graph 1. Vote Percentage to Principal Parties in General Elections between 1980-2000**

![Graph 1](image)

*Sources: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE*.4

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4 ONPE is the National Office of Electoral Processes.
Graph 1 provides significant evidence of the strong decline trend of the total vote percentage gathered by the four main political parties between 1980 and 2000. Between 1980 and 1985, electoral support rose from 84 percent to a grand 96.9 percent. From 1990 onwards however, an imposing and continuous decline occurred with the percentages shared by these four political parties. Accordingly, in 1990, the vote percentage shared between the four parties declined to a 63.3 and strikingly, to a 9.7 and 1.8 in the 1995 and 2000 general elections respectively.

The 1990 results, Tanaka explains, illustrate how the principal political parties of the 1980s, followed a path to their "political extinction" (Tanaka, 2002, p.2). The following four graphs show the decline of support to the principal parties of the 1980s during the general elections between 1980-2000 based on the vote percentage they obtained individually.

**Graph 1a. Electoral Support for Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)**

![Graph 1a](image1)

*Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE.*

**Graph 1b. Electoral Support for Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)**

![Graph 1b](image2)

*Source: Personal elaboration based on data from ONPE.*
Collectively, Graph 1a to 1d provide a detailed account of how each relevant political party of the 1980s lost the popular support in the presidential elections in two decades. A couple of considerations can be made regarding what support decline meant for each political party. APRA, considered the oldest political party in Peru, experienced remarkable vote shift during the 1980s. Such variations in electoral support, allowed the party to win elections in 1985, though the party quickly lost support in the following three general elections. Only APRA can be regarded as the party system that barely survived party extinction, as Alan Garcia is reelected in 2001.

Regarding PPC and AP, both experienced a strong drop in electoral support over twenty years. Though the former experienced more variation in electoral support, it only managed to obtain a maximum of 12 percent during twenty years. AP in turn, was considered to have a strong party tradition as it was elected in the 60s and in 1980, but was also affected by decaying electoral support. Remarkably, AP obtained only almost 8 percent in vote support during the 1985 elections and less than 2 percent in the following
general elections. Such adverse results experienced by AP and PPC, forced both parties to make major decisions in order to survive extinction. This was manifested in the coalition AP and PPC formed in 1988, FREDEMO, that included a political movement called Movimiento Libertad, lead by novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Thus, in the elections of 1990, FREDEMO was able to obtain 32.6 percent. AP and PPC are shown to have 0 support in the general elections of 1990 since neither party gathered votes independently.

Lastly, Graph 1c shows how IU managed to obtain almost 25 percent of electoral support in the 1985 elections, a striking figure when compared to that of almost 3 percent in 1980. From 1990 onwards however, IU’s electoral support was subjected to the predominant declining trend taking place in Peru. By the 2000 general elections, the political party did not even appeared in the voting ballot.

The observed variability in voting preference during the mid 1980s onwards and the high electoral volatility in the country during this decade, offers a clear image of the party competition in the country. The information provided illustrates that a volatile party competition began in Peru in 1985 and became prominent in the 1990 general elections. In fact, in 1990, the political scene witnessed a new political party, Cambio 90, winning the general elections by gathering 29.2 percent in the first election and 62.4 percent in the runoff.

Considering that the time frame of this study aims to examine inter-party competition up to the year 2011, it is necessary to provide the scores of electoral volatility in Peru from 1990 onwards. As shown initially in this chapter, between 1980-1990, the electoral volatility mean scored 54 percent in Peru. In the general elections that followed in 1990 and up to 2011, the scores vary considerably. Graph 2 provides the trend and fluctuations of aggregated electoral volatility scores in Peru up to 2011.

**Graph 2. Aggregated Electoral Volatility in Peru, 1990-2011**

![Graph showing aggregated electoral volatility in Peru from 1990 to 2011. The graph indicates a decline in volatility scores over time.](image)

*Source: Margarita Batlle (2012) based on data from ONPE.*
Overall, this section shows that electoral volatility scores and voting preference in Peru are high, but not continuously so throughout during the 2000s. During the 1980s, though volatility was high in Peru, the four main political parties obtained no less than 85 percent of electoral support. Such figures represented a positive trait regarding party competition in the country, especially because Peru was returning to democracy after a military rule that lasted 12 years. From 1990 onwards however, as Graph 2 shows, electoral volatility rises from 63 to 97 percent in only 10 years. Between 2001 and 2006, a significant decline can be observed since electoral volatility decreases from 62 to 51 percent. Several factors can be considered to affect the increase of electoral volatility between 1995 and 2000 and the decrease between 2001 and 2006. The electoral scene during the 1990s and 2000s allows a general image to be formed that can help understand the unstable party competition in Peru.

The 1990s have been regarded as the 'Fujimori regime' years, since he was elected in 1990, reelected in 1995 and, though accused of corruption and human rights violations, (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003, p.21), also in 2000. As a result, Fujimori resigned the same year and general elections were held a year after. In the 2001 general elections, another new political party formed only in 1998, Peru Posible, obtained the majority of votes in a contented second run-off with the APRA leader Alan Garcia. In 2006, Alan Garcia was re-elected after having been president of Peru from 1985 to 1990, running against Ollanta Humala. In 2011, a new coalition of new parties, Gana Peru, obtained the majority of the votes in the first and second run-off that took place in that year. Remarkable is the fact that 11 parties participated in the 2011 elections, out of which, only two, had participated independently in the previous elections. The phenomenon of number of parties is explored in detail when addressing the remaining indicators of party system fragmentation.

Overall, the information provided in this section shows that high volatility scores have characterized Peruvian politics. Though lower volatility scores were observed in the 1990s and between 2001 and 2006, high volatility has been prominent in Peru. In fact, it has remained at 50 percent between 1980 and 2011. The results of 2000 and 2011 are remarkably high, with scores of 97 and 100 percent respectively. Such scores suggest a very unstable competition characterizing Peruvian politics for more than 30 years. Though there is not a clear increasing trend overall, political competition in Peru is characterized by volatile competition that shows remarkable trends in electoral support to the numerous political parties in the country. Furthermore, the results show that parties are unable to hold onto stable constituencies since their electoral support changes
dramatically from one election to the next. Inter-party competition does not really explain why this occurs, but it is an indicator which helps illustrate how electoral volatility and vote preference variability are high in Peru.

So far, it can be concurred that such high results in volatility affected the stability of the party system when looking at inter-party competition in Peru over 31 years. It is thus not surprising that fragmentation of the party system was characterized, among other factors, by unstable and volatile competition. However, in order to have a better understanding of party system fragmentation, it is necessary to examine and determine the results of the remaining indicators. Rootedness is the next dimension that will be examined.
Party Roots in Society

The second dimension employed to examine party system fragmentation in this study is party rootedness in society. The literature identifies that a high degree of party rootedness is beneficial for party system stability (Mainwaring 1998, 1999). When the extent of party rootedness is high, voters tend to vote for the same party, election after election, demonstrating their political identification with the chosen party. Moreover, as expected, high party rootedness shows that political parties possess a high level of linkage with society (Johnes, 2005, p.7). In fact, the electorate has more possibilities of feeling connected to the party based on ideological or programmatic considerations (Melendez, 2011, p.11), where parties have strong roots.

Prior to an explanation of how rootedness is measured in this section, some considerations are needed. Since this study focuses on democratic representation and how the party system influences its quality, examining different linkages between the electorate and the agents is important. In this section therefore, when addressing party rootedness, the first evidence of how linkages vary, is expected to be present. This is because perhaps the most important aspect of party rootedness is that it indicates how parties fulfill their role as representative mechanisms.

The electorate, observes Kitschelt (2000), chooses to vote for political parties that represent their programmatic preferences, those based on an ideal perception of the politician's responsiveness (2000, p.845). Moreover, regarding ideological considerations, programmatic linkages are significant because they help stabilize the electoral competition (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006, p.204). Electoral volatility and party rootedness are therefore, closely interacting dimensions that moderate competition stability and by extension, stability of the party system as a whole. The opposite occurs however, when the degrees of party rootedness are low or inexistent. Accordingly, elections reflect voters casting their ballots “more based on the traits and characteristics” of the party leaders or their electoral campaign message (Johnes, 2005, p.7).

Though the 1980 and 1985 presidential elections show that the prominent parties gathered a high percentage of voting support during these years (70 - 90 percent), such high electoral support does not necessarily imply party rootedness based on ideological identification. Measuring rootedness thus, implies attempting to understand both the electorates’ feeling of party identification and, the influence of ideology in determining a vote choice.
Based on the considerations presented thus far, rootedness is operationalized in this study by examining two indicators: Party Identification and Ideological or Programmatic Voting. Firstly, party identification is derived from surveys carried out during the 1980s and 2000s from three different polling companies that measured party support, identification and closeness. Secondly, ideological or programmatic voting during the 1990s is determined by evaluating the correlation between the electorate’s shift in preference and change in their self-consideration on an ideological right and left scale developed by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006). For 2011 specifically, a programmatic vote is examined considering survey data on the electorate’s ability to position presidential candidates in a left-right ideology scale.

It is important to mention that due to data limitations concerned with the time frame this study envisaged (1980-2011), survey data on party identification or support in Peru, is only available from the late 1980s and from 2006 onwards. Taking this aspect into consideration, programmatic voting is determined based on data from 1990-2001 and of 2011. Both indicators thus, allow having a somewhat general overview of party rootedness in Peru during the proposed time frame.

Party Identification

Scott Mainwaring (1998) claimed that overall in Latin America, the scores for identification with political parties were particularly low during the 1980s. When comparing the Latin American results to those found in advanced industrial democracies such as the European or North American, the differences were outstanding. Party identification in Western Europe was particularly high with levels of 60 percent or higher (Mainwaring, 1998, p.73). In Peru however, only around 20 percent of the surveyed respondents admitted to feel some form of identification with a political party (Ibid,73).

The following table shows the results from surveys carried out on party support from 1986 to 1991. Two qualitative methods were employed in these surveys. The first (Table 2) asked a single question: “which of the following political group do you support more?” The question would be then followed by a list of the representative political parties of the 1980s, and also including “independent” as an option. Positioning oneself as an independent would represent either, rejecting the current parties because of no support, or actual support for new political figures that were not part of the ‘traditional’ parties of the 1980s.
The second method relied on two questions, the first was: “do you support a political party or are you an independent?” and the second, in case the answer would imply agreement for party support, would be: “which political party do you support”? Continued Table 2 shows the results for these surveys from 1986 to 1991. This table illustrates the development of party support during these years in Peru.

**Table 2.** Development of Support for Political Parties in Peru, 1986-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage support for</th>
<th>May 1986</th>
<th>Aug 1986</th>
<th>Jan 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FREDEMO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertad*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREDEMO*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/No response</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- As mentioned previously, Libertad was founded in 1988 and FREDEMO, a coalition that included Libertad, AP and PPC, was also founded this year.
Table 2 continued Development of Support for Political Parties in Peru, 1986-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent support for</th>
<th>Nov '86</th>
<th>Oct '87</th>
<th>June '88</th>
<th>Dec '88</th>
<th>Apr '89</th>
<th>Nov '89</th>
<th>Dec '89</th>
<th>June '90</th>
<th>Oct '90</th>
<th>Oct '91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FREDEMO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libertad</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FREDEMO</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/No response</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2 provides valuable information regarding the decline in support towards APRA and IU from the mid 1980s onwards. Considering the option of “I am an independent” provided in these surveys, it is possible to see that it increases throughout the mid 1980s in the years that follow, reaching 60 in Dec 1988, 65 in Dec 1989 and even 80 percent in Oct 1990. By October 1991 however, one year after the general elections that elected Fujimori with Cambio 90, the results for “independents”, decreased to a 74 percent. The independent choice can be understood in 1990 as an indication of support for a new party or “an independent” like Fujimori.

The results for the independent option show that a significant group of the electorate did not identify with any political party during these years. Accordingly, during the late 1980s FREDEMO, had relatively stable support. However, in 1990 and 1991, the coalition experienced a severe decline in support, going from 29 to 10 percent in only a year. Overall, data from the polling company APOYO suggests that the Peruvian electorate had a moderate at times, but generally, a low degree of support for political parties during the 1980s.
From 2006 until 2010, the data available to assess party rootedness relies in a different survey method. Graph 3 shows the results from surveys that focused on party identification based on a yes or no answer to the question: “do you currently identify with a political party?”

**Graph 3. Political Identification in Peru, 2006-2010**

![Graph](image)


The 2006 survey was conducted a couple weeks before the runoff date of the general elections. The contenders were Ollanta Humala, leader of the *Partido Nacionalista Peruano* (PNP), and Alan Garcia, leading APRA. According to Zárate and Carrión (2010), the runoff took place within a context of profound polarization around the candidacy of Ollanta Humala’s (Zárate and Carrión, 2010, p.191), a military official regarded as anti-establishment. Considering such a context, only 30 percent of respondents identified as to sympathize with a political party in 2006. Partisan identification in the following surveys of 2008 and 2010 shows a decline of approximately 10 percent.

**Graph 4. Party Closeness in Peru, 2011**

![Graph](image)

Source: Latinobarometro survey, 2011.
Graph 4 shows that in 2011, when confronted about the feeling of *closeness* to a political party, 32.7 percent responded affirmatively. A second related question was asked: “how partisan are you to this party?” to the respondents that said to be close to a political party. As seen in Graph 5, only 5 percent claimed to be “very partisan” and 17 percent said to have some degree of partisanship.

**Graph 5.** Degree of Party Partisanship, 2011

Overall, party rootedness in Peruvian society during the 1980s and 2000s varied considerably. Such variations, as previously mentioned, somewhat explain the inability of political parties to maintain the electorate’s support. Why this occurs is an important question. Thus, examining rootedness allows observation of several trends exercised by the Peruvian electorate. From the 1988 onwards, figures show that the electorate identified in greater levels with being ‘independent’ or supporting ‘independents’. Such findings demonstrate a trend, which slowly grew during the end of 1989 up to Oct 1990, which can be that of rejecting the traditional parties of this decade. The results from the 1980s shed doubt that the traditional parties of the 1980s actually had constituencies. From 2006 up to 2010, it was observed that the around 75 percent of Peruvian electorate, did not feel identified with a political party. Such a figure, barely decreased by 2 percent between 2008 and 2010, indicates that the Peruvian electorate felt little representation of their interests and inclinations by existing political parties.

Considering the latest survey of 2011, though based on a different question about how *close* Peruvians felt to a political party, the results show that 32 percent actually felt close to a political party. Such results are interesting and favorable for greater rootedness. It is important however to consider that such closeness does not translate to partisanship. As seen in Graph 5, the results highlight a clear limitation of assuming that an increase in
perception of closeness to a political party, could represent actually being partisan of this party. Graph 5 shows that only 5 percent of the respondents that felt close to a party, claimed to be partisan of this political party.

Overall, party support during the 1980s, party identification from 2006 to 2010 and, party closeness in 2011, reveal that the Peruvian electorate did not support, felt identified with or close to political parties during these years. This trend might not be increasing, but approximately 65 percent, do not feel any sense of strong linkage with the existing political parties. Such results, especially during the 1980s and with increasing support (approximately 75 percent) for an independent option up to 2010, show that in twenty of the thirty years examined, a significant percentage of the Peruvian electorate does not have any sense of linkage with political parties.

Programmatic or Ideological Voting

Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) found a high correlation between electoral volatility and ideological linkages. A high correlation between these phenomena allows them to claim that in countries where electoral volatility is low, empirical observation of ideological voting, in terms of ideological positioning, has higher probability. As expected, the contrary, i.e., high volatility figures, make it more difficult to predict an ideological vote. In order to measure a vote based on indicated ideological positioning, these authors measured the probability of the electorate “voting for a different party than before” and “shifting their position on the ideological left-right scale” (Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006). This measurement focused on the three largest parties, determined by surveys, of party support in 33 countries. In Peru, the Peruvian political parties identified as the largest were APRA, Union Por el Cambio (UPP) and Cambio 90.

The results from measuring the correlation between the electorate’s shift in party preference and the change in their self-positioning in Peru, was measured at 0.06. This figure indicates that party preference is not related to “self-placement”. When compared to the correlation findings in other countries, Peru’s results are remarkable. Peru ranks in the 31st out of 33 positions, and is the lowest ranking country in Latin America. It can be argued thus, that Peru’s ideological voting score showed no party roots in society during the 1990s.

Melendez (2011) argues that other indicators can show a renewal, of ideological voting in 2011 in Peru. Data surveys by IOP-PUCP from May 2011 shows that Peruvians

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5 Surveys focused on identifying a candidate in a left-right scale (0-10), positioned Javier Perez de Cuellar, a left wing candidate with UPP, at 6.9, and Fujimori at 7 in 1995.
seem to be able to identify presidential candidates based on ideological considerations (Melendez, 2011, p.12). In fact, the mean average results show the following left to right identification: Ollanta Humala (3.4), Alejandro Toledo (6.1), Luis Castañeda (6.5), Keiko Fujimori (6.7) and Petro Kuczynsky (7.2). Such results are somewhat concordant with the actual ideological positioning of these candidates. Moreover, due to the fact that the 2011 elections had a second round, the electorate was able to notice “programmatic moderations” in both candidates. Humala was positioned at 4 from 3.4, and Keiko Fujimori, daughter of Alberto Fujimori, at 6.3 from 6.7 (Ibid). These results can be considered to actually reflect electoral ideological understanding and ability to position a candidate along a left-right scale in 2011.

The data presented thus far permits the making of some important inferences regarding party rootedness in Peru. Firstly, the probability of voting based on programmatic or ideology considerations during the 1990s is remarkably low. This result characterizes the inability of Peruvian parties to have strong roots. However, the ability of Peruvians to position candidates in a left-right scale in 2011, supposes that ideology could be linked to a programmatic vote in the 2011 elections (Melendez, 2011). Such results, though positive for an ideological linkage to be considered, should be carefully observed. Despite being able to identify political leaders in an ideological scale, this does not translate into voting being actually based on ideological or programmatic considerations. Therefore, observation of this indicator's development should follow in the coming 2016 general elections in order to actually be able to make the argument that programmatic voting may influence the electorate's vote. It may be too soon to regard these figures as a renewal of an ideological vote because 62 percent in the 2011 closeness survey identified no linkage with the existing political parties.

The regression run by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006) shows evidence of almost a non-existent ideological or programmatic voting taking place during the 1990s and early 2000s in Peru. This result characterizes the lack of the prominent Peruvian parties' to have strong roots during these years. Overall, during thirty years of rootedness examination in Peru of a variety of indicators, show that during the 1990s up to 2010, a clear lack of strong party identification, support or even, sense of closeness in 2011, was present.

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6 IOP-PUC is a survey company from the Catholic University of Peru.
Number of Parties

A consistent phenomenon that seems to transpire in the Peruvian party system is that of new parties emerging. Contrary to belief, an increasing number of parties does not entail better competition. In fact, a system is considered as fragmented if it is composed of many elected parties (Caulier, 2011, p.2). But for meaningful competition, there should be enough parties in the system. However it should not be so many that it becomes difficult to form governments and exercise decision-making (Gooppelge, 2011 in Diamond and Gunther (2001), p.235). Thus, a minimum of two parties is the requisite.

The Peruvian party system, from 1980s has witnessed political parties either disappearing in less than a decade, or emerging one or two years before elections. In fact, during the general elections held in 2006, there were 22 parties competing for support. This figure is remarkably high, but evidently, only a smaller number of parties gather a significant vote share. Proper understanding of the party system is limited therefore if one only relies on the overall number of parties. In order to determine what the actual number of parties represents, specific indicators have been developed in the political science discipline.

In order to measure the number of parties, this study firstly accounts for the total number of parties that have participated in the general elections from 1980 to 2011 in Peru. Subsequently, to determine the significance of these numbers, the Laakso-Taagepera index of Effective Number of Parties (ENP) is employed. ENP allows having a figure that represents the level of fragmentation in a party system. The level of fragmentation thus indicates the number of parties that obtain a significant proportion of the vote share or seats (Alcantara, 2004, p.32).

Number of Parties

The number of political parties in a context of elections, either nationally or locally, allows understanding of the structure of a partidist competition in greater detail (Alcantara, 2004, p32). Accordingly, the total number of political parties participating in the general elections in Peru since 1980 is provided in the following table.
Table 3. Number of Political Parties Participating in the General Elections, 1980-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Parties</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal Elaboration based on data from ONPE.

As seen in Table 3, the number of parties during the 1980 elections was very high. 15 parties competed in the general elections in that year, after the military regime of the 60s and 70s had ended. Not surprisingly, a return to democracy, as it has been reported in the literature, showed many political parties, or political movements, participating in the general elections of 1980. Between 1980 and 1985, the number of parties, decreases almost by half. During these years, as described previously, four political forces became prominent in the Peruvian political system (APRA, AP, PPC and IU). In 1995, the number of parties increased and 14 parties competed in elections this year, again quite a high figure compared to the two preceding elections. In the subsequent two elections however, the number of parties decreases to 9 and 8 respectively. It has to be noted that during the 10-year period from 1990 until 2000, Fujimori’s regime, during his second term in office was considered authoritarian.

Considering Fujimori’s term between 1990 and 2000 as authoritarian, one would expect to see, fewer political parties running for office due to political repression. Moreover, after Fujimori was elected president for the third time and renounced office the same year, an increase of the number of parties would be expected. However, in 2001, 8 political parties ran for office, the lowest number since democratic elections took place in Peru after the 1980s. The unprecedented was thus expected in 2006, when no less than 22 parties competed in the general elections. In the last general elections undertaken in Peru, that of 2011, the amount of parties, decreased by half to 11. Overall, a trend regarding the number of parties in Peru only, is difficult to support. However, the predominant change from one election to another, and remarkably in the last three general elections held, is rather evident.

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7 As mentioned previously, Fujimori’s third election in 2000 was considered fraudulent and evidence of corruption became available for the population, making him renounce as president of Peru the same year.
Effective Number of Parties

Having considered the precise number of parties during the last 8 general elections taking place in Peru, it is necessary to determine what has been defined as the actual ‘effective number of parties’, in order to make comprehensive inferences about the fragmentation of the Peruvian party system. This section employs the Effective Number of Parties developed by Laakso-Taagepera (1979). ENP® ranges from 1.0 to infinity and “counts parties after weighting them by their share of the votes or seats, producing an "effective" number of parties that can be expressed in fractional terms” (Cooppelge, 2011 in Diamond and Richard, 2011, p.222).

The level of fragmentation determined by the ENP, has become the most commonly used and effective, indicator of party system fragmentation in political science. When scoring higher than 4, the system is to have high levels of fragmentation (Cooppelge, 2011). The ENP of the Peruvian general elections since 1980 are presented based on Margarita’s Battle (2012) calculation of the ENP. The following graph provides the ENP for all presidential elections undertaken in Peru.

Graph 6. Level of Fragmentation (ENP) in General Elections in Peru, 1980-2011

As Graph 6 depicts, the ENP for 1980 and 1985 scores 3.45 and 2.76 respectively, which, when considering the number of parties presented previously, accounts for more parties participating during the presidential elections in 1980 (15) and less in 1985 (9). Importantly, only 3 and 2 parties dominated the party system during this decade. Interestingly, as seen in Table 4, the number of parties during the 1990 election was 9 in

8 ENP is calculated based on the formula proposed and developed by Laakso-Taagepera (1979): NEP= 1/∑pi2, where pi is the proportion of votes or seats obtained by the party.
total, same as in 1985. However, when measuring the ENP this year, four parties are identified, showing an increase of two parties to the party system. As seen when measuring electoral volatility in the previous dimensions, a great vote share was attained by FREDEMO and Cambio 90 in the general elections taking place in 1990, which would explain the increase of NEP by 2 from 1985 to 1990.

In 1995, though 15 parties participated in the elections held this year, only two parties gathered the greatest share of the vote. Moreover, in accordance with the literature, an ENP of 2 for in 1995 and 2000 can be explained by the authoritarian regime of Fujimori. Though increasing by one party between 2000 and 2001, it is possible to observe that by 2006, four parties shape the political system. Though the 2006 figure is determined with fractions and the actual result is 4,5, it is evident that the level of fragmentation during 2006 and 2011 (4,46) in Peru is high.

Overall, as seen when examining the number of parties and determining the effective number of parties, the Peruvian party system can be regarded as fragmented. Firstly, there have been numerous political parties (8-22) participating in the general elections since the 1980s in Peru. Such figures do not per se determine if the party system is fragmented, but do serve to illustrate continuous and, as seen in the 2006 elections, critical trends. The importance of observing the number of parties lies in understanding that a high number of parties, especially in a presidentialist system, represents a combination that makes governability difficult (Mainwaring, 1993, 200).

Secondly, when assessing the number of parties by determining the Effective Number of Parties index to indicate the level of fragmentation, it is evident that in 1990, 2006 and 2011, the Peruvian party system possessed high levels of fragmentation. But, it is also necessary to examine what high levels of fragmentation imply for the type of party system in Peru. Accordingly, the multi-party system in Peru, with the exception of Fujimori’s regime between 1995-2000, was classified as either moderate or polarized. Particularly significant is to observe that in 2006 and 2011, the party system is highly polarized and with high levels of fragmentation.

Lastly, though it is important to acknowledge that different economic, social and political indicators determine the levels of fragmentation, the constant variation in the indicators examined in this section, shape a Peruvian party system that is vulnerable and in unstable. High levels of fragmentation do not only make the system less governable (Payne et al, 2003, p.155), they clearly allow for other forms of governability to emerge.
However, it is not an exaggeration to regard the Peruvian party system as critically vulnerable and inclined to fragmentation. Moreover, an unexpected tendency shows that from 2006 onwards, the Peruvian party system possesses high levels of fragmentation.
Chapter 6. The Quality of Democratic Representation

The Quality of Democratic Representation is examined in this section based on three different indicators that, according to this study, hold important considerations for democratic representation. So far, indicators that examine Party System Fragmentation have been examined. Competition through electoral volatility, rootedness through programmatic or ideological voting and party identification, as well as levels of fragmentation by the (effective) number of parties, have collectively formed a clear and continuously fluctuating picture of the party system in Peru from 1980 to 2011.

Considering the information provided thusfar, it is important to establish how party system fragmentation, through the dimensions and indicators previously examined, may influence the quality of democratic representation in Peru. This section is thus concerned with determining the indicators that, according to this study, best comprise the quality of democratic representation. Furthermore, these indicators are considered as deeply interconnected with the dimensions examined as comprising a party system fragmentation.

This study proposes that the quality of democratic representation is influenced by party system fragmentation. In order to examine this claim, it is important to determine the indicators that operationalize the quality of democratic representation. These are listed as follows:

1. Outsiders,
2. Trust in institutions, and
3. Clientelist linkages.
Outsiders

Since the third wave of democratization Latin American democracies have seen the rise of political prominence of outsider candidates in presidential elections (Carrera, 2012, p. 1452). Democratic representation involves focusing specifically on the relationship between the voters and those in charge of representing them. The fact that, personalities or, outsiders, with no political background may actually win elections requires examination. The concept of political outsiders is thus, the first indicator examined in this section.

Accordingly, the emergence of political outsiders, also called anti-system figures, is determined by identifying electoral candidates on the basis of their political experience and political discourse in Peru. As mentioned initially in this study, the definition given to outsiders in this study, builds on the categorization by Carreras (2012) and Baar (2009). Thus, an outsider is defined in this study as a political candidate who does not have prior political experience at the time of the electoral campaign, and who gains popular support not in association with a traditional political party (Carreras, 2012, p.1456; Baar, 2009, p.33). In fact, as Carrera claims, outsiders “arrive in power through a new party that is often nothing but an electoral vehicle” to win elections (Ibid, p.1453).

In order to identify an outsider in the Peruvian political system, two conditions have to be met. Firstly, the candidate must not have political experience at the time he or she runs for office. And secondly, he or she must identify as an independent or as part of a new political party.
Peruvian Outsiders

In Peru, based on the definition and conditions established to qualify as an outsider, four personalities can be labeled as such. The following table shows the list of Peruvian outsiders during the time frame of this study (1980-2011).

Table 4. Peruvian Outsiders in Peru

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Outsider</th>
<th>Political Party and Foundation Year</th>
<th>Career and Political Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Mario Vargas Llosa</td>
<td>FREDEMO (1988)</td>
<td>Novelist No experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Cambio 90 (1989)</td>
<td>Agricultural Engineer University lecturer/ Dean No experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala</td>
<td>Unión Por el Perú (UPP) (1994)</td>
<td>Army Officer No experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personal elaboration based on Carreras (2012).

In order to understand the emergence of these outsiders in Peru and their continuous presence is all presidential elections since 1990, a brief description of the electoral and social context shaping the candidacies of the identified outsiders is useful.

9 Ollanta Humala runs for office with UPP as an “invited candidate”.
Mario Vargas Llosa and Alberto Fujimori

In 1989, the political party Cambio 90 was formed and a year later, it achieved the impossible. It won the presidential elections with a candidate that was unknown to the Peruvian population only two years before. Alberto Fujimori, who had no background in politics or technocrats, gathered interest and sympathy in late 1989, and won the presidential elections with a 50 percent support for Cambio 90 in a second run-off against novelist Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori "was a former university professor with no ties to the traditional political system" (Fair, 2010, p.88). His background allowed him to hold a discourse based on the criticism of the current political system (Ibid). Moreover, Fujimori managed to gather rapid electoral support because he identified himself with the poorer social sectors, which proved to be successful.

The 1990 elections did not only show that the emergence of outsiders was occurring, but also that the traditional political forces of the 1980s were undergoing a crisis of support. As seen when measuring the electoral volatility, APRA and IU only gathered 26.2 percent in the first round of elections, 19.2 percent and 7 percent of vote support respectively. Characterized by a run-off system that consisted of going to a second round if not more than 50 percent of the vote was gained in the first round elections, both Cambio 90 and FREDEMO passed to the second round.

FREDEMO, a coalition formed in 1989 and represented by Mario Vargas Llosa, obtained no less than 32 percent in the 1990 election. Vargas Llosa, who appeared primarily as a leading innovator needed by the country, would soon appear before the public as the leader of neoliberalism just watching for the interests of economic elites (Fair, 2010, p.89). Thus, the electoral ‘contest’ was understood "as a choice between the rich and the poor or between whites and cholos (mestizos), in which “Vargas Llosa, a critic of indigenous irrationality, was placed as the representative and embodiment of the interests of the rich, white and upper classes in general” (Ibid). Perhaps this was the polarized scenario that influenced the Peruvian electorate to choose Fujimori, or perhaps it was his “anti-system” rhetoric blaming the establishment, which resulted in his election. Electing Fujimori as president of Peru in 1990, initiated, an anti-party campaign (Tuesta, 1995) during this decade that would shape future electoral elections in Peru.
Alejandro Toledo

Toledo, an economist with an Andean and Indian ethnic ancestry, “brushed past more experienced rivals in 2001” claimed Steven Levisky in an interview to a Peruvian television channel in 2003. In fact, Toledo’s main contender was Alan Garcia, leader of APRA, who had been president in 1985. The role of Toledo’s ethnic roots in helping him gain a presidential seat has been of much debate in the literature. The decay of Fujimori’s regime and his exit in 2000 after been ‘fraudulently elected’, was perhaps also a significant factor in Toledo’s campaign. In fact, Toledo appeared in 2000 leading a massive social mobilization called “los cuatro suyos” against Fujimori’s regime. Toledo, together with other political forces, shamed Fujimori’s third consecutive election, calling it unconstitutional. Toledo gained popular support and in 2001, with no political experience and with no association to a traditional party, he became the president of Peru by gathering 40 percent of vote share in the first round and winning the second round with a total of 53 percent of electoral support.

Ollanta Humala

Ollanta Humala, a military officer with no political experience, is the last outsider identified in Peruvian politics. The elections of 2006, regarded as a highly polarized electoral campaign between Alan Garcia (APRA), who had lost against Alejandro Toledo in 2001, and Ollanta Humala, shaped the electoral arena. Humala was regarded as a “candidate by default” in 2006 according to Carlos Melendez (2006), since he “was not a leader who mobilized the population” and was without the charisma or political approaches (2006, p.15) that a leader should possess. Humala lost in a second round against Alan Garcia. However, although practically unknown in Peru until 2004, Humala managed to gather 30 percent of electoral support in the first round of the 2006 general elections. And in 2011 Ollanta Humala won the presidential elections in Peru.

The emergence of political outsiders is an important phenomenon in Peru, not only because these personalities appear suddenly and can quickly gather popular support, but because they actually can win elections. Several explanations can help understanding the emergence of outsiders. As outlined previously, there are underlying factors that play an

11 Which translates as “all the regions” from Quechua, the second official language in Peru.
important role in shaping the political system in a country. The socio-economic context argues Benton (2005) influences people to be more inclined to vote for an outsider. When the country experiences economic hardship and the traditional parties are in power, these parties are blamed and the electorate is more likely to vote for small parties or outsider candidates to punish all the established political parties” (Benton, 2005 in Carreras, 2012, p.1641). Considering this, the economic crisis of the 1980s may help in explaining the election of Fujimori in 1990. However, such economic memory would be limited in explaining the presidential election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 and the support for Ollanta Humala in 2006, since Peru’s economy has been considered stable during the decade 2000 -2010.

The emergence of outsiders is also an important factor that can help examine the relationship between the voters and those who represent them, thus being relevant for democratic representation. The emergence of four Peruvian outsiders since 1990 and therefore in the last six elections, is a clear indication that the electorate does not feel represented by the existing system. The functions that political parties should perform, specifically those concerned with accountability and responsiveness, do not seem to be present in the party system in Peru. According to this study, the rise of prominent outsiders shaping the political system in Peru is a clear indicator that political parties are not fulfilling their role as agents of representation. The personalities identified as outsiders in this study, competed in elections and/or won elections, through newly formed parties. These new parties are identified by the literature as mere “electoral vehicles” (Carreras, 2012, p.1453) used by these candidates only to win elections.

It is doubtful if the election of these candidates would have occurred in a stable and strong party system. Undoubtedly, these outsiders would not have had the opportunity to quickly gather support and be elected if the Peruvian electorates felt represented by the existing parties and possessed strong partisan identification.

In fact, when examining the 2006 electoral campaign, Carlos Melendez (2006) described the vote for Humala as representing the people that rejected the political establishment (Melendez, 2006, p.15). The fragmentation that characterizes the current Peruvian party system is regarded as a significant explanation for the emergence of outsiders in Peru since 1990 onwards.
Trust in Institutions

Besides the emergence of outsiders being considered an important indicator to examine the quality of democratic representation, the relationship between the principals and agents must also be examined to determine the level of actual trust towards political institutions, which the electorate possesses. Thus, trust is a proxy to measure if citizens feel well represented (Mainwaring et al, 2006, p.17). Trust in institutions is measured on the basis of how the Peruvian electorate views the political party, whether it is considered legitimate, represents their interests and is therefore, trustworthy. This section briefly examines the results from the surveys carried out by the Latinobarometro between 1995 and 2011. Before 1995, data are unfortunately not available for this indicator. However, 16 years should allow the determination of a general trend addressing the feeling of representation of the Peruvian electorate.

Graph 7 makes it possible to distinguish the trend held by the Peruvian electorate when questioned if they trusted political parties. The options provided to answer were: “Great, considerable, minimal-none and does not know or no response”. For the purpose of analysis, the last options, “does not know or no response”, is not included in the following graphs as it does not have much significance in the surveys.

Graph 7. Trust in Political Parties in Peru, 1995-2011

Graph 7, shows that approximately 75 percent of the Peruvian population has minimal to no trust in political parties between 1995 and 2011. Accordingly, great trust in parties is not only extremely low, but decline between 1995 and 2006, by which time it
reaches a striking low of 0.2 percent. Great trust in political parties is thus minimal since 1995 and continues a somewhat steady trend that implies the electorate feeling little representation by the political parties.

When observing the considerable trust option, there is a consistent considerable trend of no less than 17 percent between 1995 and 2006. Compared to great trust, these figures can be regarded as somewhat favorable. Even though Peruvians may not trust political parties greatly, at least between 17 and 21 percent from 1995 and 2006, have had some degree of trust. 2001, the year when Alejandro Toledo is elected and only a year after Fujimori’s regime had ended accounted for the higher considerable trust in political parties, at 21 percent. These results show however, that 2011 is the year in which considerable trust is lowest with a percentage of 14.3.

Since between 1995 and 2011, an average of 77.6 percent of the population in Peru, claims to trust political parties minimally or not at all, it can be argued that a great majority of Peruvians do not feel represented by political parties. In 2011, minimal to no trust reaches the highest percentage since 1995, at almost 83 percent. Such high results signify that an increasing amount of the population feels unrepresented. Moreover, extreme low levels of trust imply dissatisfaction with the political parties, which is one of the main, existing mechanisms of representation.
Clientelist Linkages

According to this study, examining the nature of the diverging linkage patterns in Peru, assesses a central aspect of the quality of democratic representation. As sustained initially, the literature identifies three linkage mechanisms between the voter and the representative: ideological or programmatic, clientelist and personalist (Kitchelt, 2000, p.847). A clientelist linkage is defined in this study as having the nature of a direct exchange of goods and “material advantages” (Ibid, 853). Due to the fact that it is difficult to determine if a vote translates as ideological, clientellar or personalist (Melendez, 2012, p.12), or a mix of these, much of the literature has been only concerned with determining the significance of the ideological or programmatic vote. Furthermore, unfortunately, “the analysis of the extent of clientelism is handicapped by the lack of valid cross-national empirical measures of this concept” (Kitschelt, 2000 in Jones, 2005, p.44).

Accordingly, the author sustains that although the concept of clientelism has no conceptual relation with political corruption, an empirical relationship (200, p.853) exists and can be determined. Corruption involves “the use of private office for private ends, whether personal or promoting one’s political party” (Heywood, 1997; Hutchcraft, 1997 in Kitschelt 2000, p. 853).

Clientelism, though difficult to measure empirically, is thus measured by employing corruption as a proxy measure, as recommended by Kitschelt (2000). As such, clientelist linkages are established by the perception of corruption in the Peru.

The following graph shows the results for identifying the main problems in Peru.

**Graph. 8. Identified Main Problems in Peru, 2002-2010**

![Graph showing the main problems in Peru from 2002 to 2010](image)

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison in Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010.
In Graph 8, the Peruvian population believes corruption is one of the main problems in the country, along with poverty and unemployment. Though the perception of corruption is not as high as poverty or unemployment, the results show that there is a tendency increasing since 2003. In fact, 2010 is the year that corruption, scores the highest, at 51 percent.

Graph 9 shows the results of the perception of corruption in Peru. The majority of the population actually considers the country as corruption or very corrupt. Moreover, though considerably high 2004, the “very corrupt” option, shows decrease up to a much lower 28 percent by 2010.

**Graph 9. Perception of Corruption in Peru, 2004-2010**

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison in Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010.

Graph 10 shows that when asked which institution is most corrupt, Peruvians identify political parties as the second most corrupt, after the congress.

**Graph 10. Peruvian public institutions conceived as corrupt in Peru, 2010.**

Source: Personal elaboration based on data from the National Survey on Perception VI Comparison in Peru. SUPPORT-Transparency International 2010.
Graph 9 shows that when compared to other institutions, Peruvians identify political parties as prominently corrupt. In fact, around a 52 percent of Peruvians think political parties are corrupt. Though it is difficult to determine the extent to which corruption explains clientelist linkages conceptually, it is possible to acknowledge that Peruvians tend to agree largely with a perception of corruption in Peru overall. Thus, since corruption has been employed as a proxy to determine clientelism, it can be argued that clientelist linkages take place in Peru. Moreover, people are able to identify and give their opinion about these linkages.

Lastly, corruption in the country should not necessarily be read as competing against programmatic or personalist linkages. This finding illustrates that corruption is present in Peru and that people identify political parties as corrupt. Thus, establishing that the mechanisms that are supposed to represent and account for the people's interests are seen as medium in which material exchange of goods take place thus making them highly corrupt.
Chapter 7. Implications

This study has examined party system fragmentation and democratic representation in Peru between 1990 and 2011. Considering the outcomes this study has produced, several inferences can be delivered.

Party System Fragmentation in Peru within the time frame of this study, shows significant values. As such, relatively high levels of electoral volatility characterize competition between 1980 and 2011. In the 2011 general elections, volatility scored a grand 100 percent, confirming that competition in the country is in constant variation. Though it is not possible to identify an overall trend, the results illustrate a predominantly shift in vote support, thus an unstable competition.

Regarding rootedness, interestingly since the 1980s, it possible to see significant numbers of people who identify as “independents” in a list composed by other parties. This suggests how disenchantment with the established political parties started partaking in the country. Party affiliation shows significant results in the years after.

Even though the concepts of identification, support, or closeness to political parties are different to each other, these have been employed in the current to determine rootedness. In fact, perhaps is actually beneficial to measure identification along different lines. If a voter has the possibility to associate her understanding of a concept to her feelings towards political parties, maybe results will show different attitudes towards parties. Unfortunately however, these three concepts have all been met with a high percentage of voters (70), who do not associate in any manner with political parties. Only in 2011 it is possible to observe that more than 30 percent feels close to a political party. If compared to those who do not (60 percent) however, such results are not that significant. Overall thus, the Peruvian party system is shaped extremely weak rootedness, as the majority of Peruvians do not possess a sense of party identification.

When examining the number of parties and the Effective Number of Parties (ENP), numerous parties have run for office. The literature identifies that increasing amounts of parties make governability more difficult and fragmentation more likely. For example, a new party might obtain more vote support than expected, such as Cambio 90 in 1990, which resulted in destabilizing the vote shared by other traditional parties. As such, new parties may in fact influence vote shift. Such consideration permits to regard the electorate as very malleable in Peru. Lastly, considering the ENP, there is no evidence to suggest a trend of high levels of fragmentation overall. However, ENP figures are higher
than 4 in 2006 and 2011, which establishes the Peruvian party system as fragmented based on this indicator\textsuperscript{12}.

Based on the previous examination, the Peruvian party system is one characterized by constant variation and instability. Furthermore, regarding the results for the most recent years, the party system in Peru seems to resemble that of the 1980s and early 1990s, when it was first identified as fragmented.

As argued initially, this study is concerned with the linkage mechanisms contained in a principal-agent relationship, thus also within the party system, since political parties are considered as prime mechanisms of representation. Particularly focusing in the linkages established in the Peruvian party system thus, it is important to determine how these vary in a party system that is inclined to fragmentation and characterized by instability. In such context, and considering that democratic governance is “about “establishing linkages of accountability and responsiveness between the voter and her representative” (Diamond and Gunther, 2001, p.300), this study identifies that the party system fragmentation in Peru has serious consequences for democratic representation. Specifically along the dimensions established as representing the quality of democratic representation, a fragmented party system will deteriorate or even diminish, the existing representation linkages. As such, when the voter shifts her vote from one election to the next, when she does not identify with a party and when she observes increasing number of parties and new parties gaining electoral support, the linkages of accountability and responsiveness are weak or non existent.

It can be argued therefore, as seen in Peru, that the voter will rely on other forms of linkages and will seek other mechanisms of representation in order to establish a principal-representative relationship. By measuring the indicators of democratic representation identified as accounting for its quality, it is possible to determine important implications about these linkages in Peru.

Firstly, the emergence of outsiders can be highly influenced by voters who do not identified with, feel close to, or support the existing political parties. In addition, is not only the electorate that may be disenchanted with existing representation mechanisms, i.e., the political parties, but also the rising political outsider. As seen previously, Fujimori and Ollanta most remarkably, characterized themselves as anti-establishment figures. In

\textsuperscript{12} In order to further analyze what the ENP represents. Chasquetti (2000), develops an interesting conceptualization of ENP figures to determine the type of party system. See Appendix.
fact, in a context of party system instability and fragmentation, when the existing mechanisms of representation fail to represent the interest of the principals, is not unexpected that an outsider like Fujimori gathered popular support and won elections in 1990.

Secondly, when linkages of representation are barely ‘representative’, weakened by fragmentation, the principal will seek to establish other forms of linkages, such as those that rely with clientelist characteristics. In order to evaluate clientelist linkages in Peru, corruption is used as a proxy. The Peruvian case shows significant evidence. On the one hand, political parties are regarded as highly corrupt, and on the other, Peruvians identifies the country as highly corrupt. In line with this study's arguments, corruption perception in Peru makes possible to identify the clear disenchantment with political parties and the identification of clientelist linkages.

Moreover, high distrust in political parties further strengthens the evidence of linkages deteriorating in a fragmented party system. Low levels of trust in Peru, illustrate increasing dissatisfaction with the representation mechanisms, and in fact, also represent that Peruvians do not believe they are well represented.

Thus far, based on the clear influence party system fragmentation presupposes for the quality of democratic representation, this study rejects the N0 hypothesis. Moreover, the current study finds evidence that in Peru, when the electorate shows that representation linkages are weakened, manifested in a fragmented party system, other mechanisms of representation are developed. These new forms or varying linkages are established either when supporting an outsider or perceiving an exchange of goods for support. Therefore, when the electorate seeks other representation mechanisms, this has significant consequences for the quality of democratic representation.
Chapter 8. Conclusions

In order to examine the relationship between party system fragmentation and democratic representation, the latter has been operationalized along three indicators this study regards as representing its quality. Moreover, the current shows that if the dimensions measured in order to determine the quality of democratic representation are salient, it is possible to acknowledge that a crisis of representation occurs. In addition, since party system fragmentation affects the quality of democratic representation, this phenomenon is to be found as contributing to such crisis. The Peruvian case shows clear signs that a crisis of democratic representation is visible. Moreover, these signs are greatly influenced, as seen, by the indicators of party system fragmentation in Peru.

Therefore, the findings in this study make possible to agree with the literature and confirm that high levels of fragmentation do not only make the system less governable, “also represent a democratic rupture and an institutional crisis” (Payne et al, 2003, p.155; Linz in Alcantara, 1994, p.32). Such conclusion calls into question the role and importance of political parties to democratic stability and governance. It is evident that if political outsiders emergence, there is a continuous distrust to political parties and corruption is perceived, these collectively can influence the reconstruction and stability of the party system. Such consideration thus, establishes the importance of conceptualizing these phenomena together as they influence each other considerably.

Furthermore, considering that political parties occupy a central role in the literature due to the functions they perform, the Peruvian electorate seems to challenge their importance. In fact, it is possible to observe high levels of rejection to the established parties, manifested in most of the indicators measured thus far. Paradoxically, when asked if a democracy can exist without parties, Peruvians, who portray signs of increasing disenchantment with parties and the system, manifest that democracy cannot exist without parties. Such reality thus, shapes the Peruvian puzzling politics.

Understanding why the Peruvian population seeks for different linkage mechanisms of representation and believe the established system is failing them, as seen in the election of outsiders and increasing distrust, is significant for subsequent analysis.

The Peruvian case helps building understanding and thus, making inferences, about concepts that the literature identifies as significant. Yet, as seen, recurring indicators that actually shape a crisis of representation comprise democratic representation in Peru. For a proper and multi dimensional understanding of the Peruvian puzzling political system however, a more extensive study is required. This study hopes to be helpful in showing how the relationship between the party system and democratic representation unfolded in Peru between 1980 and 2011.
Appendix

Party System Classification and ENP

With the intention to analyze the ENP further and examine what the level of fragmentation may represent, Chasquetti (2000) conceptualization of party system type is highly relevant for the current.

Based on Sartori’s party system categorization (1980), Chasquetti (2000) attempts to adjust these system types according to the level of fragmentation determined by the NEP, as seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Party System Classification by Chasquetti (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Systems</th>
<th>ENP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predominant Party</td>
<td>ENP &lt; 1,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bipartidist</td>
<td>1,8 &gt; ENP &lt; 2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party (Moderate)</td>
<td>2,5 &gt; ENP &lt; 3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Party (Polarized)</td>
<td>ENP &gt; 4,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chasquetti (2000).

Considering Chasquetti’s conceptualization, as seen in Table 4, Peru’s party system can be positioned in the last three categories from 1980 onwards. Although regarded as a bipartidist or two-party system during the two governments post-transition\(^{13}\), (Alcantara, 2004, p.34), the Peruvian party system scoring approximately 3 for the 1980s, should actually be positioned in the categories of a Multi-Party, or moderate system. A moderate multi-party system is characterized by having low ideological polarization and is comprised of less than four relevant parties (Chasquetti, 200, p.33).

In 1990, as seen in Graph*, then ENP is 4, which would categorize the party system as a polarized multi-party system. This type of multi-party system, explains Chasquetti, is characterized by high polarization and comprises more than 4 parties. Although the number of parties was not higher than 4 in 1990, it is possible to explain the polarization experienced when Fujimori and Vargas Llosa ran for office with opposing ideologies and representing two new political parties. In 1995 and 2000, with ENPs of 2,6 and 2,4 respectively, the Peruvian party system would be categorized as a bi-party or two-party system, in line with Fujimori’s regime. By 2001, the ENP is 3, which would categorize the

\(^{13}\) Making reference to Velasco’s military dictatorship between the 60s and late 70s.
party system as a moderate multi-party system and thus, explain the end of Fujimori’s regime and a transition from a two-party system, to a multi-party system characterized by low ideological polarization. Between 2006 and 2011 however, the ENP results are higher than 4, which would thus, still categorize the party system as a multi-party system, but now as polarized.
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