

Chapter 7

Beneficiary and Conscience Constituencies: On Interests and Solidarity

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Introduction

Participants in social movements are not a homogeneous crowd (e.g. Corrigan-Brown 2012). Social movements comprise nominal members next to active members and between those extremes one finds a variety of participants: donors who provide resources, members who provide voluntary labor, less active members who participate in easy activities such as writing letters to elected officials only (Barkan 2004). Previous studies have proposed various characterizations of participants. Knoke (1988), for instance, links types of incentives to levels of participation. He suggests that participants who are motivated by social and recreational incentives are likely to attend meetings, group projects and other internal activities, while those motivated by hopes of influencing policy tend to participate in external activities such as lobbying. In this chapter we will focus on yet another characterization—the classic distinction between *beneficiaries* and *conscience constituents* introduced by McCarthy and Zald almost 40 years ago (1976). Rooted in resource mobilization theory, this distinction received more theoretical than empirical attention. In this chapter we will try to take an empirical turn.

McCarthy and Zald (1976) elaborate the logic of supply and demand of resources in the social movement sector of a society. Resources such as legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor are accumulated in what Klandermans (1997) called mobilization potential. Social movement organizations mobilize and employ these resources to pursue their goals. According to McCarthy and Zald (1976) part of the resources movement organizations acquire, are from people who might benefit directly from the potential successes of the movement. Those participants they name *potential beneficiaries*. But not all participants are potential beneficiaries. Some are what McCarthy and Zald refer to as *conscience constituents*. That is, people who do not stand to benefit from the movement's successes, but nonetheless contribute resources to a social movement out of a feeling of social and/or moral obligation, solidarity, personal convictions, values and the like. They may receive some selective incentives and this may go some way in explaining their

participation, but as the name they gave suggests, McCarthy and Zald conceived of them as acting primarily on the basis of *conscience*.

Not all potential beneficiaries will necessarily become constituents. There will always be free riders (Olson 1965). On the other hand, conscience constituents are apparently sufficiently disposed toward a movement's cause that they are prepared to donate some of their resources although they would not benefit from it personally. Jenkins and Perrow (1977) characterize this group as "liberal middle class." They are elites whose support of a movement is a function of their moral convictions. Conscience constituents play a key role in resource mobilization theory. Because they are not potential beneficiaries, conscience constituents are not contributing to a social movement out of self-interest. This means that their participation is not contingent on cost-benefit reasoning as conceived of by Olson (1965). It implies that it is not only the resources of potential beneficiaries that affect the emergence of a social movement but also the resources made available through conscience constituents. Indeed, many a movement would not bloom had not conscience constituents provide the necessary resources, so McCarthy and Zald argue (but see Jenkins 1985 and Morris 1984). By identifying support of conscience constituents as a precondition for the emergence of social movements, McCarthy and Zald make the possibility of collective action contingent—not only on the choices of self-interested potential beneficiaries—but also on the choices of altruistic conscience constituents.

Conscience constituents are according to McCarthy and Zald (1976) likely to support more than one SMO and to be involved in more than one social movement industry (SMI). Due to the fact that they are relatively well off they are able to engage in any matter they care for. Whether they engage in a cause is not directly tied to their own well-being. This means that they are an important but, at the same time, not always reliable source of resources as they may decide to withdraw their support without damaging their own well-being. They are weathered activists who support causes they sympathize with.

Crossley (2002, 89) comments that conscience constituents deviate from the rational actor model. He does not question that conscience constituents exist nor that they do what resource mobilization theorists suppose they do. There is sufficient empirical evidence suggesting that indeed they do just this. But it is not at all clear how this observation corroborates the basic theoretical assumption that people act in a self-interested manner. In a way, conscience constituents are spanners in the works of resource mobilization theorists. Acting out of conscience is not what the rational actor model would predict. Rational actors are supposed to maximize their own material benefits; conscience constituents, by contrast, act because their conscience "tells them to" (Crossley 2002). A convinced "rational actor model" advocate may respond to this by arguing that people pursue their own interest in salving their conscience, since a nagging conscience is unpleasant to experience. Or they may argue that altruistic acts are an attempt to procure group approval and status drawing the "rational actor model" close to a circular definition of "self-interest."

By introducing the possibility of solidary and moral incentives into the equation resource mobilization theory draws the “rational actor model” far from its basic assumptions. It suggests that people feel the moral pressure of the group to which they belong and feel that pressure so profoundly that they are moved to act, even against their own material interest. This conceptualization of participation brings resource mobilization theory close to contemporary social psychological approaches to collective action participation (e.g. Van Zomeren, et al., 2011, Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009). Although the majority of social psychological research focuses on participation in collective action to redress the disadvantages of one’s own group, one line of research examines actions made on behalf of another group. This research shows that the more people feel connected to or solidary with a disadvantaged group, the more likely they are to engage in collective action on behalf of that group (Beaton and Deveau 2005; Subasic, et al. 2008). Solidarity is seen as a form of identification that can be felt by people who are not part of the social group in question (Saab, et al. 2012). Solidarity causes feelings of anger about the disadvantages done to others, which motivates them to engage in collective action to redress the disadvantages (Leach, et al., 2006). An important push for action is generated by violated values which results in feelings of indignation and anger (Van Stekelenburg, et al., 2009; Van Zomeren, et al. 2011). Political efficacy, finally, seems to be related to solidarity; the more solidarity with the social group in question people experience, the angrier they are. Moreover, the more politically efficacious they feel, the more willing they are to engage in collective action on behalf of others (Stewart, et al. forthcoming).

Potential Beneficiaries and Conscience Constituents in Anti-austerity Demonstrations

Most participants in anti-austerity demonstrations will be beneficiary constituents, but some will be conscience constituents. In an attempt to understand the dynamics of their participation we set out to compare potential beneficiaries and conscience constituents. We think we know who the beneficiaries of a specific anti-austerity demonstration are, obviously the people who are directly affected by the austerity measures. But who are the conscience constituents? Are there any and if so who are they and what motivates them? Next to dynamics of motivation we are interested in dynamics of mobilization. Are the dynamics of mobilization and motivation different for beneficiaries and conscience constituents? In the next few pages we will hypothesize how the two types of participants differ in terms of socio-political status, dynamics of motivation, and dynamics of mobilization.

Socio-political status

Jenkins and Perrow (1977) propose that conscience constituents are people from the *liberal middle class*. If that is so, we expect them to have higher levels of education, to be of a higher social class, and to have the resources and political sophistication to support a cause that does not concern them directly. McCarthy

and Zald (1977) suggest that conscience constituents are likely to be *weathered activists* who support causes they sympathize with. If that is the case, we expect them to be more left-oriented, politically active, and less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. We also expect them to be frequent demonstrators who have supported various social movements in the past.

Dynamics of motivation

Social psychologists make a distinction between identification, motivation, and emotions as the driving forces of movement participation (Klandermans 2014; Van Stekelenburg et al. 2011; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Simon et al. 1998). Motives they separate further into, instrumental motives and ideological motives; emotions into anger, fear, worry and frustration (Van Troost et al. 2013). *Identification* refers to movement participation as a manifestation of identification with a group. People take part because it is “their” people who are protesting. They feel an inner social obligation to participate (Simon 2011). *Instrumental motives* refer to movement participation as an attempt to influence the social and political environment. It is based on the assumption that desired change can be achieved at affordable costs. *Ideological motives* refer to movement participation as an expression of one’s values and principles. People feel an inner moral obligation to take part (Van Stekelenburg 2013). *Emotions* amplify and accelerate: the motivation to participate in protest events intensifies and turns into action more rapidly. In a comprehensive discussion of emotions of protest Van Troost et al. (2013) discuss how anger and frustration fosters people’s readiness to protest, while fear and worry, on the other hand, make people’s readiness to protest decline. Anger and frustration are defined as “fight” emotions while fear and worry are defined as “flight” emotions. However, in our latest study of street demonstrations, contrary to the protest literature, we encountered participants in street demonstrations who displayed worry, which suggests that under certain circumstances a flight-emotion like worry might make people fight (Van Troost et al. 2014).

What about beneficiaries and conscience constituents? Will they diverge in terms of identification, motives and emotions? Social psychological literature on participation in collective action on behalf of less fortunate out-groups reveals the key-significance of identification processes (Beaton and Deveau 2005; Leach et al. 2006; Saab et al. 2012; Subasic et al. 2008). The more people identify and feel solidary with a disadvantaged out-group, the more they are prepared to take part in collective action on behalf of that group. As conscience constituents are not benefitting personally from a possible success of the protest event they are participating in, we expect them to be less instrumentally motivated both compared to beneficiaries and in terms of their own motivational profile. On the other hand, as we assume that their principles rather than their interests are violated, we expect them to display more feelings of moral obligation and to be more ideologically motivated to participate both in comparison with beneficiaries and in terms of their own motivational profile. Would the two types of participants differ in terms of emotions? As conscience constituents are not personally affected by the measures

they are fighting side by side with the beneficiaries one would expect them to be less fearful and less worried than angry and frustrated, but also less fearful and worried than the beneficiaries in the demonstration. Both types of participants could, however, be equally angry and frustrated.

Dynamics of mobilization

Are beneficiaries and conscience constituents mobilized in a different way? We are not aware of any research answering this question, but we imagine that much depends on whether the two types of participants are differentially embedded in the social networks of their society. If beneficiaries are more embedded in networks of the organizers than conscience constituents they are presumably also more often mobilized through those networks. If, on the other hand, conscience constituents are more socially embedded we expect *them* to be mobilized via such networks. If people are socially embedded but not so much in networks of the organizers they still might be mobilized more often via the networks they *are* embedded in. Assuming that formal and informal social networks play an important role in the dynamics of mobilization, one might wonder whether the role of such networks differ for potential beneficiaries and conscience constituents. Our research can provide an answer to that question.

The most frequently given answer to the question why people did not participate in some collective action is “because nobody asked me.” Interpersonal interaction, that is asking somebody to join a protest event or being asked by somebody, is among the frequently employed and most effective mobilization techniques (Walgrave and Wouters 2014). Are beneficiaries more often mobilized via formal organizational networks and conscience constituents via informal personal networks? Have beneficiaries more often asked others to join than conscience constituents? Who did mobilize whom? We will explore how the two types of demonstrators were mobilized in the following pages.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to testing the assumptions formulated in the previous sections regarding the socio-political status of the two types of participants and the dynamics of their motivation and mobilization. We will draw on four demonstrations taken from a large comparative study of over 90 street demonstrations on a diversity of issues in nine different countries. In the pages to come we will first describe those aspects of the study that are relevant for us here; next we will discuss results regarding the questions we formulated in the previous section. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of the results.

Methods

Our empirical evidence stems from a comparative study of street demonstrations: The CCC-project¹. This chapter is based on findings on four demonstrations where

1 See the introduction by Giugni and Grasso for a detailed account of the sampling and data collection procedures. Further description of the project and its tools can be found

we could make a clear distinction between beneficiary and conscience constituents. Two student demonstrations in the U.K. and two student demonstrations in the Netherlands all four protesting against measures that directly affected students (e.g. the rise of registration fees, penalties for slow students, etc.). In all four demonstrations participants who were not students (conscience constituents) took part next to students (beneficiaries). The student demonstrations in the UK took place in London on the 10th of November and 9th of December 2010, those in the Netherlands in Amsterdam on the 21st of May 2010 and in The Hague on 21th of January 2011. Respectively, 30,000 and 15,000 demonstrators took part in the two British demonstrations and 2,000 and 15,000 in the two Dutch demonstrations.

Collecting data and sampling participants

The protest surveys employ printed questionnaires handed out at the demonstration to be returned to the university using prepaid envelopes. Overall 692 (23.0 percent) participants in the student demonstrations returned their questionnaire. The response rate for the four demonstrations fluctuated between 14.8 and 31.7 percent. The analyses we conducted to assess whether the non-response could have resulted in biased findings and conclusions did not reveal any deviating outcomes (Walgrave et al. 2012).

Measures

Socio-political status

We assessed someone's age, sex, and education; political ideology (left-right self-placement on a scale from 0=left to 10=right; and satisfaction with the way democracy functioned in their country on a scale from 0=extremely dissatisfied to 10=extremely satisfied). As for political participation we asked whether respondents performed one or more political activities from a list of nine and whether they had taken part in demonstrations in the past 1 months.

Identification

We made a distinction between identification "with any organization staging the demonstration" and identification "with the other people present at the demonstration" (not at all, not very much, somewhat, quite, very much). The two forms of identification correlate (.42), but the pattern of correlations of the two with other variables are significantly different to treat them separately.

Motivation and emotions

In order to assess what motivated the participants to take part, we asked them to agree or disagree with reasons to participate. We offered them two reasons related to instrumentality: "defend my interest" and "pressure politicians," two reasons

in the project-manual (Klandermans et al. 2010). The manual is available on request; see the project website (www.protestsurvey.eu). See also Van Stekelenburg et al. (2012).

reflecting ideology: “express my view,” and “raise public awareness,” and two reasons related to solidarity “express solidarity” and “moral obligation” (strongly disagree, disagree, neither, agree, strongly agree). The two instrumental reasons correlate .24; the two ideological .44; and solidarity and moral obligation .43. We collapsed the six into measures of “instrumentality,” “ideology,” and “solidarity and moral obligation” (each ranging from 2 “not at all motivated” to 10 “very much motivated.” Finally, we asked participants whether they felt angry, fearful, worried or frustrated when they thought about the issue of the demonstration (not at all, not very much, somewhat, quite, very much).

Social embeddedness

We distinguished affiliation to the organizers and embeddedness in society’s multi-organizational fields. As for affiliation to the organizers we first asked respondents to name organizations that are staging the demonstration they were taking part in. Respondents who could mention one or more organizations were then asked whether they are a member of any of those organizations. As for embeddedness in society’s multi-organizational fields we asked our respondents in how many organizations they have been actively involved during the past 12 months.

Communication channels

We asked our respondents via which communication channels they found out about the demonstration. They could tick as many as applied of the following list: radio or television, newspapers, alternative online media, advertisements, flyers, and/or posters, partner and/or family, friends and/or acquaintances, people at one’s school or workplace, (fellow)members of an organization or association, an organization’s (magazine, meeting, website, mailing list, etc. online social networks (e.g. Facebook, twitter, etc.)). Next we asked them which of these channels was their most important source of information. Finally, we assessed if someone was specifically asked by some other person to take part in the demonstration (no-one, partner or family, relatives, friends, acquaintances, colleagues or fellow students, co-members of an organization they are a member of). They could again tick as many as applied.

Results

The four student demonstrations counted 70 percent participants who were students, that is beneficiaries, while 30 percent were not students, that is conscience constituents. The non-students were full-time or part-time employed, unemployed, self-employed, or retired. In the Netherlands 80 percent of the demonstrators were students and 20 percent other than students. In the UK the proportions were 55 percent versus 45 percent.

Table 7.1 Socio-political status: Means and standard deviations

	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents
Year born	1988 (3.8)	1976 (14.6)
Gender (% female)	54%	51%
Education (1–7)	6.4 (1.0)	6.6 (1.2)
Social embeddedness (1–4)	2.3 (1.0)	2.2 (0.9)
Left-right self-placement (0–10)	3.3 (2.0)	2.6 (1.8)
Satisfaction w democracy (1–10)	5.7 (2.4)	4.8 (2.7)
Political participation (1–5)	3.0 (1.7)	3.7 (2.0)
Demonstrations participated (0–3)	0.8 (.64)	1.2 (.75)
N	491	201

Note. Figures printed bold in italics display significant differences between beneficiaries and conscience constituents

Who are the Beneficiary and the Conscience Constituents?

Table 7.1 summarizes the socio-political status of the beneficiary and the conscience constituents in the four demonstrations. The beneficiaries were significantly younger than the conscience constituents, which is not surprising as all beneficiaries were students, unlike the conscience constituents who were a far more heterogeneous group. Male and female were about equal. Other findings corroborate Jenkins and Perrow's as well as McCarthy and Zald's assumptions regarding conscience constituents. They are higher educated than the beneficiaries, but the differences are small, which again is not so surprising as both are highly educated citizens (6.4 and 6.6 on a scale from 1–7). Unlike what McCarthy and Zald assumed conscience constituents are not more embedded in society's multi-organizational field than beneficiaries. Theoretically more interesting and in line with what we expected are the remaining four characteristics in Table 7.1. More than the beneficiaries' conscience constituents are leaning toward the political left. To be sure, both beneficiaries and conscience constituents place themselves clearly left in the space defined by the self-placement scale (3.3 and 2.6 respectively), but the latter are significantly more left-leaning than the former. They are also less satisfied with the way democracy functions in their country than the beneficiaries. Not only do conscience constituents display stronger oppositional sentiments they are more politically active as well—which is reflected in a wider range of political activities they engage in and a larger number of demonstration they participated in during the past 12 months. As one would expect political ideology and behavior are correlated (Pearson correlations range from .30 to .54). The more the participants in student demonstrations are leaning to the left, the less satisfied they are with the way democracy functions in their country and the more they are politically active.

Indeed, conscience constituents appear to be the seasoned activists McCarthy and Zald believed them to be. They are compared to the beneficiaries significantly more oppositional both in terms of opinion and beliefs and of political participation. In terms of social embeddedness two types of demonstrators are the same.

Table 7.2 Dynamics of motivation: Means and standard deviations

	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents
Identification w. organizers (1–5)	3.2 (1.1)	3.5 (1.2)
Identification w. participants (1–5)	3.8 (1.0)	4.0 (1.0)
Ideological motives (2–10)	8.1 (1.8)	8.6 (1.7)
Instrumental motives (2–10)	8.2 (1.7)	8.1 (1.8)
Solidarity and moral obligation (2–10)	7.5 (2.0)	8.2 (1.8)
Angry (1–5)	3.8 (1.2)	4.1 (1.1)
Worried (1–5)	4.1 (1.0)	4.3 (0.9)
Fearful (1–5)	2.8 (1.3)	3.2 (1.3)
Frustrated (1–5)	4.0 (1.2)	4.1 (1.2)
N	491	201

Note. Figures printed bold in italics display significant differences between beneficiaries and conscience constituents

Why are They There?

The motivational dynamics work out differently for the beneficiaries and the conscience constituents, be it not exactly in the way we expected (Table 7.2). The figures in the first two rows regarding identification show that conscience constituents indeed identify more strongly with the organizers and the other participants than the beneficiaries. A finding that corroborates the central role of identification. Table 7.3 reveals that this holds both for participants who are affiliated to the organizers as well as for those who are not. But note that affiliated participants display much higher levels of identification than unaffiliated. For this analysis we broke the sample down into those who were members of one of the organizations (n=199) that staged the demonstration—the affiliated—and those who were not (n=466)—the unaffiliated. Affiliation obviously made a difference in terms of identification.

Table 7.3 Identification by affiliation and constituency: Means and standard deviations

	Affiliated		Unaffiliated	
	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents
Identification w. other participants (1–5)	4.0 (.90)	4.3 (.86)	3.7 (.97)	3.8 (1.0)
Identification w. the organizers (1–5)	4.0 (.92)	4.1 (1.0)	2.9 (1.0)	3.2 (1.2)

Back to Table 7.2, which further reveals that conscience constituents are stronger motivated than beneficiaries. As hypothesized, conscience constituents are more ideologically motivated and more motivated by feelings of solidarity and moral obligation than beneficiaries; theoretically significant instrumental motivation forms the exception; with regard to instrumentality beneficiaries display the opposite pattern, that is slightly *more* instrumentally motivated, although the difference did not reach statistical significance. In fact, among the beneficiaries instrumentality was the strongest of the three motives. Interestingly and again theoretically relevant, the solidarity/morality motive reveals the largest difference between the beneficiaries and conscience constituents.

Motives appear to be stronger among participants who identify with the organizers. Table 7.4 provides a comparison of strong and weak identifiers. For this comparison we took respondents who ticked the two highest points of the identity-scale (“quite” and “very much”) together as “strong identifiers” (n=291) and the remaining 362 respondents who ticked the three lower points of the scale as “weak identifiers.” Levels of motivation were much higher among the strong identifiers than among the weak identifiers. Highly significant main effects of identification were found for all three motives (F-ideology=60.06; F-instrumentality=24.0; F-solidarity/moral obligation=22.34. Among the strong and weak identifiers the global picture was retained. Conscience constituents are more motivated than beneficiaries (F-ideology=6.13, $p < .05$; F-solidarity/moral obligation=11.05, $p < .01$). Interestingly, again instrumental motives were the exception although the main effect of instrumentality did not reach statistical significance either.

A final check of Table 7.2 learns that conscience constituents display stronger emotional reactions regarding the issue of the demonstration than beneficiaries. Unlike our expectations conscience constituents were angrier, more worried and more fearful than beneficiaries. For both beneficiaries and conscience constituents worry was the most reported emotion. In terms of frustration the two types of demonstrators are alike.

On the whole the beneficiaries and the conscience constituents are what one would expect them to be. Conscience constituents identify more with the organizers

Table 7.4 Motives by identification and constituencies: Means and standard deviations

	Strong identifiers		Weak identifiers	
	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents
Ideological motives (2–10)	8.8 (1.3)	9.1 (1.3)	7.6 (2.0)	8.0 (2.0)
Instrumental motives (2–10)	8.6 (1.4)	8.5 (1.6)	7.9 (1.8)	7.7 (1.9)
Solidarity and moral obligation (2–10)	7.9 (1.8)	8.6 (1.6)	7.2 (2.1)	7.7 (2.0)

and the participants. They do so the more if they are affiliated to the organizers. Conscience constituents are more ideologically motivated and especially more motivated by solidarity and moral obligations than the beneficiaries; the more so if they identify with the organizers. As one would expect, the largest difference in terms of motivation between the two types of demonstrators was found with regard to solidarity and moral obligation. Indeed, solidarity and moral obligation seems to be the major drive of the conscience constituency of a movement.

How Did They Get There?

Are beneficiaries and conscience constituents differently embedded in networks of the organizers or society in general? If so, does that make a difference in the way that they are mobilized? How are they mobilized anyway? Table 7.5 provides an overview of the findings regarding embeddedness and the various mobilization techniques we encountered. Neither in terms of being affiliated to the organizers nor in terms of embeddedness in social networks do beneficiaries and conscience constituents differ much. Conscience constituents are somewhat diverging from the beneficiaries, the former appear to be slightly more embedded, especially in networks of the organizers. Does that influence the process of mobilization?

Let's start with the communication channels the respondents ticked as the channel that was the most important in informing them about the imminent demonstration. Conscience constituents and beneficiaries were very similar in that respect. More than two-fifths of the participants in the student demonstrations mentioned interpersonal networks—both online and offline—as the most important. Half the respondents mentioned formal organizational networks as the most important channel. On the other hand, mass media such as radio, newspaper or television were virtually irrelevant to most participants in the student demonstrations. The somewhat larger proportion of the conscience constituents who are socially embedded in organizer networks and in the organizational field in

Table 7.5 Dynamics of mobilization

	Beneficiaries	Conscience constituents
Affiliated to organizers	28%	35%
Social embeddedness (0–3) ¹	2.2 (.94)	2.3 (1.0)
Radio, television, newspapers	6.0%	5.2%
Friends, family	20.1%	20.1%
Online, social media	26.6%	22.7%
Colleagues, members organization	46.9%	52.1%
Asked by no-one	14%	21%
Asked by personal network	56.2%	35.3%
Asked by organizational network	60.1%	49.8%
Asked no-one	8%	12%
Asked personal network	71.9%	53.2%
Asked organizational network	62.5%	60.2%
Alone	14.4%	5.3%
Accompanied by personal network	90.2%	80.1%
Accompanied by organizational network	67.0%	60.2%
N	491	201

¹ means and standard deviations

general translates into a somewhat higher proportion of participants who mention formal organizational networks as the most important information channel, while online social media are more often mentioned by beneficiaries.

Asking or being asked are two crucial processes in the dynamics of mobilization. We know that interpersonal interaction is far more effective in mobilizing people than impersonal channels such as newspapers, television, flyers, posters and the like. Interpersonal interaction requires a person who approaches another person or who is approached by another person. We asked our respondents

whether they were approached by some other person encouraging them to participate or approached themselves another person encouraging him/her to participate. If so, we asked in follow-up questions whether that was via their informal personal networks or rather via formal networks of organizations they are involved in. The results are displayed in the lower part of Table 7.5; they are interesting in more than one way. In the first place, it appears that more conscience constituents than beneficiaries were asked by no-one and asked no-

one. Nonetheless more beneficiaries than conscience constituents went to the demonstration alone. Secondly, far more beneficiaries than conscience constituents appeared to have been approached by other persons persuading them to take part in the demonstration. Both informal personal networks and formal organizational networks were employed in that process. The conscience constituents, on the other hand, were more often approached via organizational networks rather than personal networks. In the third place, far more beneficiaries than conscience constituents asked other people to take part in the demonstration. Both personal and organizational networks were used in that context, but personal networks more often than organizational networks.

These differences in mobilization dynamics are further evidenced by the proportions of participants who engaged in mutual interaction, that is to say, who both asked and were asked (Table 7.6). In the researched demonstrations mobilization has very much been an interactive process. As far as formal organizational networks are concerned beneficiaries and conscience constituents are very much alike. However, beneficiaries appear to have employed informal personal networks more frequently.

Table 7.6 Interactive mobilization

	Beneficiary	Conscience constituent
Asked x asked by personal network	44.0%	23.9%
Asked x asked by organizational network	41.8%	39.3%

The result of such recruitment processes often is that people are going together to the demonstration. In fact, quite a few people go with family, friends, and acquaintances to such events. Demonstrations are social events. As it turns out going with friends makes it more likely that people turn up. It is your friends who keep you to your promises (Klandermans and Oegema 1987). In order to test that reasoning we asked our respondents whether they went to the demonstration alone or with some company. Few people went alone to the demonstration. Almost every participant went to the event accompanied by people from their personal network. At the same time, many a participant went to the demonstration accompanied by people they knew from the formal organizational networks they were involved in as well. Finally, beneficiaries were more often with company than conscience constituents while both beneficiaries and conscience constituents were more often accompanied by people from their personal network.

Conclusions

In their now classic paper in the *American Journal of Sociology* McCarthy and Zald introduced the concepts of beneficiaries and conscience constituents (1976). Respectively, “adherents of social movements who benefit directly from the movement’s goal accomplishment” versus “adherents who do not benefit directly from its successes in goal accomplishment” (1987, p. 23). Little is known, however, about these two types of participants, not even what proportion of participants belong to either category. Exploiting a dataset consisting of surveys among participants in street demonstrations we have tried to understand how the two types of demonstrators compare. As the boundaries between beneficiaries and conscience constituents are not always clear, we selected four demonstrations where we could draw clear lines. All four were demonstrations by students protesting austerity measures that were directly affecting them. We defined participants in these demonstrations who were students as beneficiaries. They were the people who were affected by the austerity measures. But 30 percent of the participants were *not* students. These participants we defined as conscience constituents, people who were not directly affected, but who took part in the demonstration in support of the beneficiaries out of solidarity and moral obligation.

Although theoretically interesting the distinction between the two types of constituents has generated, so far, few empirical studies that throw light upon the distinguishing features of these two types of demonstrators. To the best of our knowledge ours is the first empirical study systematically comparing beneficiaries and conscience constituents. Our findings corroborate Jenkins and Perrow’s (1977) assertion that conscience constituents are more likely to be from the liberal middle class. They also confirm McCarthy and Zald’s (1976) assumption that they are more likely to be weathered activists. They are more leaning to the political left, they are more negative about democracy in their country, they are more politically active and are frequent demonstrators. This is what we expected them to be. Altogether, conscience constituents seem to be more politicized than beneficiaries. In fact, students and more generally highly educated citizens tend to be more radical and more politically active than their lower educated counterparts anyway. In that sense, our finding that conscience constituents are more radical than beneficiaries is a conservative test. One would expect the differences to be larger had the beneficiaries been of a lower social classes. Future research might test this assumption. McCarthy and Zald’s assumption that conscience constituents are more likely to support various movements at the same time did not find confirmation. To be sure, they did support other movements but did not diverge from beneficiaries in that respect.

Reiterating our findings, conscience constituents appear to be more oppositional both in terms of political ideology and in terms of political participation than beneficiaries. The motivational dynamics of the two types of adherents diverged in ways that one would expect in view of these differences. Conscience constituents were identifying more with the other participants and the organizers. The latter

finding is partly related to the higher level of affiliation to the organizers among the conscience constituents. Moreover, conscience constituents were more ideologically motivated and especially more motivated by solidarity and moral obligation, and they were less instrumentally motivated than the beneficiaries. This is exactly what one would expect. After all, the beneficiaries took it to the streets to redress austerity measures. A comparison of strong and weak identifiers revealed high levels of motivation among the strong identifiers. Among the weak and strong identifiers the differences between beneficiaries and conscience constituents in terms of motivation remained. Hence, this is the pattern we observed: conscience constituents were more affiliated to the organizers and identified more with the organizers. Strong identification came with high motivation. Moreover, conscience constituents are more emotionally touched by the issues of the demonstration. They are angrier, more worried and more fearful. Obviously, the conscience constituents “felt for them.” Solidarity seemed what drove them.

As for the process of mobilization, conscience constituents were more frequently mobilized through formal organizational networks: understandably, as they were more socially embedded. Beneficiaries on the other hand were more frequently mobilized via informal interpersonal networks. Mutual informal interpersonal interaction was the most frequently employed technique among the beneficiaries in the student demonstrations.

What have we learned? We believe that we accomplished the first systematic empirical characterization of two types of participants in political protest that have featured in the literature for several decades but was never assessed empirically. We have made it plausible that indeed next to the potential beneficiaries of a protest event, conscience constituents take part in protest events. On theoretical grounds we drafted portraits of both beneficiaries and conscience constituents and demonstrated that the dynamics of motivation and mobilization diverged for the two constituencies. In the literature it is suggested that many a movement would not survive without the support of conscience constituents. That assumption alone makes it relevant to study the two types of participants. Whether it stands the empirical test remains to be seen. In the end, the vast majority of the participants in the four demonstrations that we covered were beneficiaries. This is also what Morris (1984) argued in his discussion of the Southern Civil Rights movement. Indigenous resources appeared to be as important as external support.

There are, of course, also limitations. An important one relates to the difficulties of drawing a sharp line between beneficiary and conscience constituents. Future research could try some other demonstration from our sample where the boundaries are less clear to see what those analyses would tell.

