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**JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY: A VICTIM RISK AND INTERVENTION  
PERSPECTIVE**

By

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I declare that

**JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY: A VICTIM RISK AND INTERVENTION  
PERSPECTIVE**

is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

.....

SIGNATURE

(MR. E ZANNONI)

.....

DATE

In memory of:

\* my father, Claudio Zannoni

In appreciation of:

\* my loving mother, Bruna Gaio Zannoni

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## **ABSTRACT**

The exploratory study investigated jewellery store robbery from a victim risk and intervention perspective. An explanation of the phenomenon was offered based on the information obtained from a review of the existing literature, case studies, personal observations at jewellery stores, discussions with jewellers, a scientific questionnaire submitted to jewellers, and semi-structured and structured interviews conducted with a group of knowledgeable respondents and victimised jewellers respectively. A predominantly quantitative research method was applied.

The research findings obtained during the study enabled a proposal for a jewellery store robbery intervention model based on the situational crime prevention perspective, which is inclusive of decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, personnel and business-oriented strategies.

### **Key terms**

Jeweller, jewellery store, jewellery store robbery, commercial robbery, robbery victimisation, victim risk, victim vulnerability, victim precipitation, victim facilitation, crime opportunity, situational crime prevention, robbery intervention model.

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## CHAPTER 1

### OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGICAL LAYOUT OF THE STUDY

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Recent incidents of armed robberies committed at jewellery stores in busy shopping centres highlight the fact that jewellery stores are vulnerable to this type of crime. In a robbery at a mall in the northern Johannesburg suburb of Fourways, a gang of up to 12 robbers armed with automatic firearms shot their way out of a gun battle with police and stole in excess of R 1 million in jewellery (Swart 2007:3). In another robbery, jewellery worth over R 1.5 million was stolen by a gang of up to 15 men who conducted a simultaneous attack against two jewellery stores situated in a shopping centre in the eastern Johannesburg suburb of Bedfordview. According to research participant McKinnon (2007), during the attack, robbers did not hesitate to discharge their firearms in order to intimidate staff, customers and security personnel. A robbery was also committed at a jewellery store inside a Kempton Park shopping centre where, after holding security personnel hostage, the gang escaped with approximately R 20 million worth of jewellery (R20m robbery reported finally 2007:3). During a robbery in the Pretoria eastern suburb of Brooklyn, a gang of up to six robbers wearing construction hats and mouth covers, fired shots into the windows and used hammers to smash open the display counters. The robbers managed to steal in excess of R 1 million in valuable items (Flanagan 2006:4). In some instances, within a short period of time, jewellery stores were subjected to repeat victimisation by heavily armed gangs (Thompson 2006:10). More recently, a jewellery store situated at a new shopping centre in Centurion was robbed by three armed men who shot and critically wounded a security guard before escaping with an undisclosed amount of cash and jewellery (Guard shot during mall robbery 2007).

The focus of robbers is not always directed towards cash but also includes valuable assets such as jewellery. As stated at a conference held by Effective Consumer Response (Kalideen 2004:2), crime in South Africa is often moving from one industry to another. As targets get harder, e.g. banks, criminals shift their activities to soft

targets where cash or valuable merchandise is easily available, particularly in the retail sector. Jewellery stores can be regarded as suitable targets for victimisation due to the presence of high value merchandise and a lack of stringent security measures. Jewellers and members of staff not only run the risk of being violently victimised, but also of sustaining significant financial damage, which may seriously compromise their ability to conduct business.

In order to understand the crime phenomenon of armed robbery at jewellery stores, the researcher identified the need to conduct a scientific investigation. In this chapter, an overview and methodological layout of the study will be addressed. The researcher will state the rationale for his initiative and explain the aim of the study, the scientific approach and research goal, unit of analysis, data collection, data analysis and interpretation. The key concepts are defined and the problems encountered during the study elaborated on. The chapter will end with a layout of the study to guide readers through the various stages of the research process.

## **1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH**

When stating the rationale for the study undertaken, the researcher must explain how an interest develops in the proposed topic and, above all, why the research is worth doing (Vithal & Jansen 1997:30). Criminological research into crime specifically committed against jewellery stores in the Republic of South Africa is lacking. The researcher established that neither the Jewellery Council of South Africa, of which jewellers can become voluntary members, nor the South African Police Service (SAPS) maintain a database on crime directed at jewellery stores. Thus there is a distinctive lack of knowledge and insight into jewellery store robbery, as well as of a comprehensive strategy to intervene against such crime. This situation justifies the adoption of an exploratory approach to the topic of research.

Most jewellers can be regarded as high-profile targets for robbers. According to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), jewellery stores were third on the list of the most targeted businesses after supermarkets and clothing stores. Retail jewellers, who encourage the public to enter their premises, are at greatest risk due to the fact that robbers often pose as customers. Persons at risk during a robbery attack include not

only jewellers and members of staff, but also clients who happen to be present at the time of the robbery.

Following on the reasons given above, and as a result of the researcher's professional involvement in a consulting capacity with companies operating in the jewellery retail sector, it was decided to conduct a scientific study on a specific type of crime affecting jewellers, i.e. jewellery store robbery. This topic was selected, amongst others, because of the potentially devastating effects that a robbery event may have on both, the jeweller him/herself as an individual, as well as his/her occupation/business. Furthermore, the researcher is of the opinion that, robbery being a crime of violence where the lives of victims may be in danger deserves attention in terms of research and intervention measures. Through a scientific study of jewellery store robbery, the researcher intended to achieve a better understanding of this phenomenon in order to explore and describe its nature and dynamics, and formulate an effective intervention strategy.

In May and June 2002 the researcher conducted general discussions with jewellery store owners, representatives of the Jewellery Council of South Africa, jewellery retail groups, insurance companies, brokers and loss adjusters specialising in the jewellery industry, in order to become more familiar with the topic and, at the same time, to establish whether robbery was regarded as a worrisome problem affecting the jewellery retail sector. The majority stated that armed robbery was indeed a serious phenomenon that needed to be thoroughly addressed in order to bring about a reduction of this type of crime.

During the said discussions, mention was also made of the fact that the jewellery industry had not stood united in the fight against crime. Offenders had not been effectively dealt with via a common effort between all the interested parties in conjunction with the SAPS. On the contrary, the Banking Council of South Africa, which may serve as an example, had initiated a number of crime reduction projects and started the South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC), a centre aimed at an understanding of the types of crime committed against banks, with the intention to develop and implement effective crime intervention strategies (SABRIC 2004).

### 1.3 AIM OF THE STUDY AND ACTUATING QUESTIONS

Research cannot proceed without a clear articulation of a goal. It demands a clear and unambiguous statement of the goal, in other words what the research intends to accomplish (Leedy 2005:5). The multiplicity of this study's aims underlines the complex nature of the topic under investigation. The researcher drew a distinction between immediate aims and an ultimate aim.

The **immediate aim** of this study is to scientifically explore the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery with a view to gain new knowledge and insight. The study aims at achieving the following main objectives:

- Determining how serious the phenomenon of robbery victimisation is among the study's participants.
- Understanding the dynamics and outcomes of the robbery event and the *modus operandi* of the robbers from the victim's point of view.
- Identifying areas of risk and vulnerability affecting the owner and employees of a jewellery store.
- Offering a theoretical explanation based on the data obtained from the literature on the crime, the offender and the victim.
- Determining the type and effectiveness of the security measures implemented by the jewellers for the protection of their stores against robbery.
- Identifying possible deficiencies in the above security measures.
- Establishing the jewellers' procedures with regard to the security screening and crime prevention training of their staff.
- Develop some understanding regarding the level of fear of robbery victimisation among the respondents as well as how robbery may ultimately affect their work motivation.
- Verify the respondents' attitude towards the implementation of specific crime intervention strategies.

The study's **ultimate aim** is the development of an effective robbery intervention strategy, which should take into account not only identified security deficiencies (procedural, physical and technological), but also the respondents' views on the subject of crime prevention. In order to reach the set aims, the researcher formulated **actuating questions** that were raised on fundamental issues concerning jewellery store robbery. The following questions were used as guiding points throughout the research:

- Is armed robbery a serious phenomenon affecting jewellers?
- Do jewellery stores experience a high level of risk of robbery because of the nature of their activities and the type and value of the merchandise being stored?
- Can a theoretical explanation be offered for armed robberies at jewellery stores?
- Do factors such as, amongst others, geographical location, presence of escape routes, situation of the store, store visibility, lighting conditions and number of staff visible on the floor, affect the likelihood that a jewellery store be robbed?
- Can anything be done to reduce a jewellery store's vulnerability to robbery?
- Do jewellers and their staff perceive their work as being risky?
- Do jewellers and their staff have the right mentality of security in order to counteract the threat of robbery?
- Are jewellery stores equipped with adequate security measures to minimise the risk of robbery?
- What is the jeweller's attitude in respect of crime prevention in general and robbery prevention in particular?
- Are jewellers willing to make a difference and invest in new systems and procedures to minimise the risk of robbery and injury to themselves, their staff and customers?

#### **1.4 SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURE OF THE STUDY**

In an effort to understand any phenomenon, researchers can follow several methods of inquiry. Scientific research requires a specific plan of procedure, in other words, a carefully thought explicitly planned and logically designed plan of action (Leedy 2005:6). This presumes that the researcher works from a specific scientific approach,

adopts a specific type of study, focuses his/her attention on a specific unit of analysis and makes use of given scientific methods and techniques to direct the investigation.

#### **1.4.1 Scientific approach**

Two approaches can be identified in social science research, i.e. quantitative and qualitative. A quantitative approach may be described as that approach to research that is more formalised, controlled and defined, through which phenomena can be observed and measured, and causatively related and expressed in mathematical formulae or statistical analysis (Neuman 2000:33; Rubin & Babbie 1997:372). In contradistinction, a qualitative approach is not strictly formalised and its scope is more likely to be undefined and more narrative in nature with emphasis on individuals' perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, feelings and behaviour (Davis & Klopper 2003:72-76; Neuman 2000:33; Mouton & Marais 1996:155-156).

This project undertaken by the researcher is primarily quantitative in nature in that, on the one side, the areas being investigated by means of a questionnaire are all defined and statistically measurable and, on the other, relevant issues on the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery are discussed in a controlled manner during semi-structured and structured interviews. The focus of the interviews is on a person's specialised knowledge and not on their feelings, experiences and subjective views as direct role players, such as offenders or victims.

#### **1.4.2 Unit of analysis and sampling techniques**

The unit of analysis identifies the object(s) under scientific investigation. The main categories of units of analysis are individuals, groups, organisations and social artefacts (Neuman 2000:132-133). Individuals are probably the most typical object of research in the social sciences. Even when groups or populations are studied, it is customary to study individuals and then to aggregate the data collected in this manner for the group concerned (Mouton & Marais 1996:38). In order to avoid running the risk of making assertions about one unit of analysis based on the examination of another, it is necessary to be clear as to what the unit of analysis represents (Babbie & Mouton 2001:88).

The unit of analysis used by the researcher involved a relatively small group of individuals knowledgeable on the topic under investigation. The researcher applied non-probability sampling (without randomisation) by focusing primarily on a selection of suitable respondents by means of purposive sampling. This type of sample is based entirely on the judgement of the researcher, in that a sample is composed of elements that contain the most characteristics, representative or typical attributes of the population (Strydom & Venter 2002:206-207).

The selection process involved, on the one side, convenient sampling of jewellery store owners and members of staff willing to respond to a mailed questionnaire and, on the other, of persons with known and demonstrable experience and expertise in the area under investigation. These persons took part in semi-structured and structured interviews designed to obtain further insight into jewellery store robbery.

### **1.4.3 Research goals**

It is possible to distinguish between three typical studies that are most useful in criminological science: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory depending on whether their principal goal is to explore, describe or explain a certain phenomenon (Mouton & Marais 1996:42). The study undertaken by the researcher is **exploratory** in that the main goal is to explore a relatively unknown phenomenon, i.e. jewellery store robbery.

The distinguishing feature of exploratory studies is that relatively little is known about the subject of study (Champion 2000:138). By scientifically exploring the topic of jewellery store robbery, it is possible for the researcher to primarily acquaint himself with certain characteristics of the subject under investigation. While the chief shortcomings of exploratory studies are that they seldom provide definitive answers to research questions and the direction of inquiry changes frequently, they are most typically done for three purposes: i) to satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding, ii) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, and iii) to develop the methods to be employed in any subsequent study (Babbie 2001:92-93; Neuman 2000:21).

#### **1.4.4 Delimitation of the study**

According to Leedy (2005:58), in every research endeavour the researcher should eliminate any possibility of misunderstandings by providing clear delimitations in respect of the topic being investigated, the place where the research is conducted and the timeframe allocated to the research. With reference to this study, the following delimitations are relevant:

- **Topic delimitation** - The researcher decided to limit the investigation to the crime of robbery committed inside jewellery stores, from a victim's perspective.
- **Geographic delimitation** - While the questionnaire targeted jewellers who subscribed to the Jewellery Council's magazine, semi-structured and structured interviews were conducted in Johannesburg as this location was not only convenient to the researcher who lives and works in the city, but also the place where a number of jewellery store robberies in shopping centres had occurred.
- **Time delimitation** - Data collection by means of questionnaires took place over the time period from July to August 2002. Semi-structured interviews with experts were conducted between October and November 2005. Structured interviews with victims of jewellery store robbery took place between July and September 2007. Respondents were encouraged to talk about their most recent experience of jewellery store robbery.

#### **1.4.5 Data collection techniques**

Designing the research instrument(s) is an essential step in the research process in order to collect the data needed for the successful outcome of the project (Vithal & Jansen 2002:26). The researcher consulted literature on robbery, examined case studies and collected data by means of a three-phase approach involving the initial distribution of a questionnaire among members of the Jewellery Council of South Africa, followed by semi-structured interviews with a group of knowledgeable people in the jewellery industry and additional structured interviews, based on the questionnaire model, with a group of victimised jewellers.



#### **1.4.5.1 Literature and case studies**

Literature and case studies are aimed at contributing towards a clearer understanding of the nature and meaning of the problem that has been identified (Neuman 2000:32-33). The selection of sources used for this study includes text books, published and unpublished reports, internal investigation reports as well as journals and newspapers. In this context, the specialised literature on jewellery retail crime obtained from Jewelry Security Alliance, Jewelry Vigilance Canada proved to be a valuable instrument to gain some knowledge on jewellery store robbery, the *modus operandi* of the offenders and the applicable intervention strategies.

The study benefited from this literature review as it provided the researcher with an understanding of the issues and debates in the area of study, current theoretical thinking and definitions, as well as previous studies and their results. Available statistics in the form of previously collected information (by the SAPS and the above-mentioned sources) was analysed to obtain an indication of the extent of the phenomenon. Recent incidents of armed robbery at jewellery stores, based on confidential investigative reports (2005/2006), were analysed and case studies were compiled (see section 2.3.5). The specialised knowledge obtained from the available literature was also used to compile the questionnaire and the semi-structured interview schedule.

#### **1.4.5.2 Questionnaire and structured interview**

The questionnaire was developed with due consideration to specific guidelines explained in the existing literature (Neuman 2000:251-255), such as careful planning, unmistakable clarity, relevance, objectivity, consistency, impartiality, confidentiality and probability of favourable reception and return. Examples of different questionnaires used in other criminological research projects were studied, e.g. the International Crime Victims Survey (Van Kesteren, Mayhew & Nieuwbeerta 2000:152-156) and the Retail Violence Survey (2000) in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, to better understand the dynamics associated to jewellery stores and to be as accurate as possible in the formulation of the questions, the researcher, with the

owners' permission, conducted physical observations of jewellery stores situated in shopping centres and along urban / suburban streets. Various aspects such as the position of the store, the store layout, number of staff present, flow of customers, trade activities and security measures were observed in relation to the surrounding environment, e.g. type of businesses in the immediate vicinity, type of roads, traffic conditions, parking facilities and availability of escape routes.

The questionnaire contained 51 closed-ended (fixed response) questions and it was divided into seven sections as follows (see appendix A):

- Section A - General information (on the respondent's biographical data, position at work and geographical location)
- Section B - Robbery event (covering a five year period from 1997 to 2001)
- Section C - Location of premises
- Section D - Mechanical, physical and electronic security measures
- Section E - Personnel
- Section F - Fear of crime
- Section G - Crime prevention initiative

Each of the above sections contained a number of questions relevant to the topic being investigated. Some questions implied that only one response category had to be selected, whereas others contained multiple response categories.

The above instrument was also adopted for the structured interviews with victimised jewellers during the third and last phase of the research. Structured interviews are based on a strict procedure and utilise an interview schedule, which is no different from a questionnaire (Champion 2000:259).

#### **1.4.5.3 Semi-structured interview**

One of the best ways to identify one's knowledge about a topic is to talk to informed people who have access to exclusive and unique information (Sarantakos 1998:255). By using a semi-structured interview, while focus on a specific topic is maintained,

interesting points can be discussed further, thus allowing the researcher to obtain detailed information from the respondent (Stewart & Davis 2003:51).

As this study is of an exploratory nature, insiders of the jewellery retail store trade can provide valuable information to underline and elaborate on data collected from the questionnaires. Toward this end, the researcher developed a semi-structured interview schedule containing a set of predetermined and appropriately sequenced questions divided into different themes. Even though most of the questions are similar to those contained in the questionnaire, they are not close-ended and allow for discussion on the topic being investigated.

The semi-structured interview schedule was divided into eight themes as follows (see “Appendix B”):

- Theme A – Interviewee’s professional experience
- Theme B – Perception on jewellery store robbery
- Theme C – The jewellery store robber
- Theme D – Particulars of jewellery store robbery
- Theme E – The victim of jewellery store robbery
- Theme F – The aftermath of jewellery store robbery
- Theme G – Security risk reduction
- Theme E – Jewellery store robbery prevention initiatives

Each theme contained a number of open-ended (free response) questions, which are especially valuable in exploratory stages of research (Neuman 2000:261).

The interview was aimed at collecting further information pertaining to this crime phenomenon from different sources within the jewellery retail industry, in particular insurance specialists, loss adjusters and police sources. Most of the questionnaire’s basic principles such as the need to remain neutral, unbiased, and unambiguous when formulating questions, also apply to the interview schedule (De Vos, Fouché & Venter 2002:303).

#### **1.4.6 Data collection procedure and response to the questionnaire and interviews**

Without data, scientific reasoning and method are bound to collapse (Vithal & Jansen 2002:26). At times, more than one research instrument is needed to collect information. With regard to this research, the process of data collection comprised three different phases as follows.

##### **1.4.6.1 Phase one – Questionnaire addressed to Jewellery Council’s members**

Phase one involved the distribution of the questionnaire described in section 1.4.5.2 above as an insert in the Jewellery Council’s monthly magazine “SA Jewellery News”. During this phase the investigation was therefore confined to members of the Jewellery Council of South Africa who received the magazine. According to the Jewellery Council, at the time of the distribution, “SA Jewellery News” reached approximately 200 jewellery retail store owners / companies, bearing in mind that the magazine was also addressed to jewellery manufacturers and wholesalers who were not the target of this investigation.

Therefore, the Jewellery Council’s database was regarded as the main population to target jewellery store owners. The criteria adopted was that, due to the method of distribution of the questionnaire (via SA Jewellery News) and the target of the research instrument (members of the Jewellery Council receiving the magazine), it was probable that jewellery store owners subscribing to SA Jewellery News would have been included. However, it is important to stress the fact that the researcher did not have any control as to who would receive the questionnaire.

The July 2002 issue of SA Jewellery News was chosen in view of the concomitant Jewellery International 2002 trade show. A self-addressed and stamped envelope was included with the questionnaire in order to facilitate the highest possible response rate. Prior to the questionnaire being distributed, the researcher succeeded in addressing the population by means of an insertion in the above-mentioned magazine in which the importance of the project for the jewellery retail industry was stressed. A reminder was also inserted in the August 2002 issue of SA Jewellery News, with a view to encourage the respondents to take part in the project by returning the

completed questionnaire. In addition, in order to encourage their participation, mention was made that the results of the study would be made available in a future SA Jewellery News' issue.

Notwithstanding the fact that, as explained in the available literature (De Vos et al 2002:177; Neuman 2000:270), important questionnaire-related criteria were adhered to, over a period of approximately two months, a total of only 45 questionnaires were returned to the researcher. When compared to the actual number of jewellery store owners / companies receiving the magazine (approximately 200 as indicated by the Jewellery Council), the collective response constituted approximately 22,5 percent. It was clear that, as findings could not be based on such a small return, additional steps were needed to obtain a consistent picture of the phenomenon under investigation. Therefore, it was decided that the exploration of jewellery store robbery should continue by addressing people with special knowledge and insight into this type of crime.

#### **1.4.6.2 Phase two – Semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable respondents**

The semi-structured interviews referred to in section 1.4.5.3 above were conducted with the following informed respondents (names of persons and businesses are withheld for reasons of confidentiality):

- Respondent 1, jewellery store owner based in Fourways, northern Johannesburg suburb (twenty years in the jewellery retail sector).
- Respondent 2, jewellery insurance company director based in Randburg, northern Johannesburg suburb (33 years in the insurance sector, of which six in the jewellery field).
- Respondent 3, jewellery insurance brokerage director based in Sandton, northern Johannesburg suburb (30 years in the jewellery insurance sector).
- Respondent 4, chartered insurance practitioner and loss adjuster based in Rivonia, northern Johannesburg suburb (40 years in this field).
- Respondent 5, SAPS superintendent based at the Johannesburg central police station (32 years in the police service).

The interviews were conducted at the above respondents' workplace inside their private office. The average time spent on an interview was approximately one and a half hours. The respondents co-operated patiently with the researcher and stated that, if needed, they would be available to provide additional information.

#### **1.4.6.3 Phase three – Structured interviews with victimised jewellers**

To further substantiate the information obtained during phase one and two, in order to generate the most objective and comprehensive picture of jewellery store robbery, it was decided to proceed to the third and final phase in the data collection process. This phase involved structured interviews (based on the questionnaire model) with victimised jewellers. A list of potential respondents was obtained from a leading jewellery insurance company. Respondents were contacted telephonically and asked whether they were willing to take part in a structured interview with the researcher. A small number of respondents participated as follows (names of persons and businesses are withheld for reasons of confidentiality).

- Respondent 6, jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern Johannesburg suburb)
- Respondent 7, jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern Johannesburg suburb).
- Respondent 8, jewellery store owner operating in Fourways (northern Johannesburg suburb).
- Respondent 9, jewellery store owner operating in Randburg (northern Johannesburg suburb).
- Respondent 10, jewellery store owner operating in Cresta (northwestern Johannesburg suburb).

All interviews were conducted at the respondents' jewellery stores in private offices. The average time spent on an interview was approximately forty minutes. Although, it was not an easy task for the researcher to set-up interviews (see section 1.6.3), all of the above respondents were very cooperative and did not object to any of the questions posed during the interview. It must be noted that, as opposed to the

questionnaire, the interaction between the respondents and the researcher allowed for the recording of additional comments arising from the close-ended questions.

#### **1.4.7 Data analysis and interpretation**

Quantitative data analysis is used to interpret the results and obtain meaningful answers to research questions (De Vos et al 2002:223). With regard to this study, questionnaire data was analysed by means of computer programming. Interview data instead was analysed manually as it involved a small group of respondents.

Where applicable, percentages were illustrated in the form of graphic presentations, i.e. bar graphs and pie charts. These are used as a descriptive statistical technique to summarise and display data (De Vos et al 2002:230). Cross tabulation was, at times, used to try and reveal a relationship between two different variables.

Information obtained from the semi-structured and structured interviews was used to substantiate the initial interpretations stemming from the questionnaire results. It needs to be stressed that the study was contextual in nature and the findings cannot be generalised beyond the research group.

#### **1.4.8 Validity and reliability**

Validity and reliability imply information on the ways in which objectivity of the data/information, as presented in the research project, is being sought and maintained. Whilst validity is concerned with the effectiveness of the measuring instrument and seeks to establish whether the researcher is measuring what he/she in fact intended to measure, reliability deals with its dependability and consistency (Mouton & Marais 1996:193-194).

In order to add scientific value to the questionnaire and semi-structured interview schedule, a study of the existing literature and an analysis of case studies on the subject were conducted. Furthermore, the researcher held various discussions with jewellers, representatives of jewellery insurance companies, loss adjusters, security experts and people related to the researcher, during which the research instruments

were tested for clarity and relevance and for questions that could have been misleading to the respondents. These subjects were asked to complete the questionnaire and study the semi-structured interview schedule to determine whether the research design and methodology were relevant and effective. They all agreed that the questions were relevant, simple and easy to understand. With regard to the questionnaire, it was stated that, as the questions were all close-ended, this would facilitate and speed-up its completion. Furthermore, in order to scientifically test the measuring instrument, the researcher consulted with statisticians and academics at the University of South Africa. Consequently, it can be stated that the data collection instruments used by the researcher contributed to an accurate and true measure of the phenomenon under study.

## **1.5 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS**

Prior to commencing the study, an explicit definition of the key (central) concepts is necessary in order to clarify and delimit important research issues. By giving an accurate definition of the most important concepts, it will be possible to avoid creating confusion and conflict during the research process (Mouton & Marais 1996:161).

### **1.5.1 Jewellery**

Jewellery includes all the merchandise displayed for sale in a store such as neck chains, arm bracelets, rings, earrings, watches, pendants, loose stones (precious and semi-precious) and various giftware and silverware. Gem and Jewel Acceptances' policy cover (2005:2) defines stock as "jewellery, gold, diamonds, precious or semi-precious metals or stones, watches, other merchandise or materials usual to the insured business". For the purposes of this study, jewellery can also be defined as the main target of robbery.

### **1.5.2 Jewellery store**

For the purposes of this study, a jewellery store is defined as the place, intended as a permanent and independent structure, wherefrom jewellers conduct their trading



activities. Only individual stores (private and chain) situated within building structures were the subject of this study. Mobile structures such as stands and counters mounted in specific areas, e.g. a flea market or an exhibition venue, as well as jewellery stands within large departmental stores, were not included. A jewellery store can also be defined as the scene of the robbery event. These definitions provide both a spatial and crime delimitation as the study focuses on the robbery event committed inside a jewellery store.

### 1.5.3 Robbery

Robbery is a traditional form of interpersonal violence. The act of robbery requires the physical taking of property from another either by threat or by use of force. Even though it is done for economic motives, it is the use or threat of force that places robbery in the violent crime category (Hunter & Dantzker 2002:12). According to Criminal Law (Snyman 2002:506-510), robbery is the unlawful, intentional, violent removal and appropriation of a movable corporeal thing belonging to another. In short, the crime may also be defined as theft by means of violence. The element of violence needs to be further explained. It must not be intended as a physical aggression of the victim only, but also as intimidation and verbal violence. A threat of violence is indeed sufficient to constitute robbery. Both violence and threat of violence must be committed in the process of acquiring the thing, e.g. jewellery. If, for instance, violence is employed to retain a thing which has already been stolen, or to escape once the theft has been committed, one in this case is dealing with the crimes of theft and assault and not robbery. Further to this definition, it must also be stated that the South African Police Service distinguishes between **common robbery** (involving mainly muggings) and **robbery with aggravating circumstances** (involving the use of dangerous weapons). Armed robberies do in fact constitute an aggravating factor for the criminals who committed them because the victim's life is put in jeopardy (Schönteich 2002:3). From a broader criminological perspective, robbery can be defined as a predatory crime, a typically urban phenomenon, committed violently or accompanied by threat of violence against persons and businesses. It is also a method to obtain a quick economic reward.

Based on the researcher's own operational definition, **jewellery store robbery** is the unlawful and wilful use of force or the threat of force, committed inside a jewellery store and directed against the owner(s), members of staff and customers (when the latter happen to be present) in order to compel them to hand over to the robber(s) jewellery and other personal belongings such as cash, bags and wallets.

#### **1.5.4 Robber**

Robber is the person who perpetrates the material act of robbery. This person may be armed or unarmed. The crime is committed at the time when a threat is made or violence is used to obtain a specific thing belonging to another person, e.g. jewellery in the case of a jewellery store robber (Snyman 2002:506-510). Statistically, both abroad and in South Africa it is mainly men involved in the crime, particularly robbery (Flowers 2003:187; Masuku 2002:9) and therefore most references to the robber, in this study, will be male, e.g. he/his.

#### **1.5.5 Robbery victimisation**

Any person or business is potentially a victim of crime (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:55). Victimised individuals and organisations suffer injury, pain, prejudice, damage, loss, and inconvenience of one sort or another (Fattah 1991:4). This study is about robbery victimisation, which can be defined as victimisation caused by, or resulting from a specific criminal offence, i.e. jewellery store robbery.

The process of victimisation resulting from a jewellery store robbery has both long and short term consequences and involves a number of direct victims, i.e. the jeweller, members of staff and customers (if present during the robbery) who may be traumatised, injured or killed; the store which may be damaged during the robbery; the business itself which may be compromised as a result of the loss sustained.

#### **1.5.6 Victim risk**

In Criminology, risk refers to the probability of harm, the role of its calculation on assessment in making decisions about whether to perform criminal actions, and its

role in criminal justice decision making (O'Malley 2001:250-251). According to Van der Hoven and Maree (2005:56), victim risk is the amount of exposure to the possibility of suffering harm or loss perceived for a given individual. In the context of this study, based on the researcher's own operational definition, victim risk refers to a situation where a jeweller and a jewellery store, because of the presence of high value merchandise, are most at risk of being confronted by armed criminals.

### **1.5.7 Victim vulnerability**

Victim vulnerability refers to the likelihood of a person or organisation becoming a crime victim, thus incurring potential physical and psychological damage or economic losses (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). Whilst every individual, dwelling, business and organisation can be vulnerable to crime, some are more vulnerable than others because of specific characteristics such as, amongst others, age, sex, race, location, extended working hours, presence of cash or easily accessible high value merchandise (as in the case of jewellery stores).

### **1.5.8 Victim precipitation**

Victim precipitation can be defined as a form of overt, aggressive and provocative behaviour by the victim that triggers the action of the criminal (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). In the context of this study, victim precipitation is relevant to the robbery event in that, at times, the criminals' violent reaction may be triggered not only by the aggressive verbal and physical behaviour of the jeweller or the employees, but also by their inaction as a result of shock or hysteria. To establish victim precipitation, then, is to demonstrate that had it not been for the precipitating action of the victim, the victimisation would not have occurred against that particular victim in that particular situation.

### **1.5.9 Victim facilitation**

Facilitation can be defined as some kind of negligent or careless behaviour on the part of the victim, which gives rise to crime temptation and / or opportunities, thus making it easier for an individual to commit a criminal act (Karmen 2007:110-111).

Facilitation leads to the creation of risks and, unlike precipitation, it does not necessarily involve interaction with the criminals (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). Jewellers and members of staff may, as a result of their negligence or careless behaviour, be instrumental in the facilitation of a robbery at their stores.

#### **1.5.10 Criminal opportunity**

Criminal opportunity can be defined as a necessary condition for a crime to occur or an immediate cause for the commission of criminal behaviour (Felson & Clarke 1998:2-3; Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:57). Opportunity also represents the situational ability for crime to occur (Wilcox, Land & Hunt 2003:60). In the context of this study, opportunity is not only concerned with a jeweller's (or members of staff) action or inaction which may lead a person to seize the opportunity to commit a robbery, but also with specific environmental and situational conditions that may be conducive to robbery such as, amongst others, the location of the store or a lack of security measures at the store, e.g. physical and electronic barriers.

#### **1.5.11 Crime prevention and intervention**

Crime prevention has been described by criminologists as probably the most overworked and least understood concept in contemporary criminology (Pelser & Louw 2003:1). It involves a wide range of activities directed, in the long and short term, towards the crime situation, the victim and the offender. All activities are aimed at eliminating or reducing opportunities for crime in a multiplicity of environments and situations, e.g. familial, social, physical and situational.

The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security defines Crime prevention as "all those methods and strategies which reduce, deter, or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes, firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly, by changing the conditions that are thought to cause them, and thirdly, by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective criminal justice system" (Leggett 2004c:12). Crime prevention also entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime. These actions are not restricted to the efforts of the criminal justice system and include activities by individuals and

groups, both public and private. Crime prevention clearly denotes an attempt to eliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before further activity (Lab 2000:19). In practice, preventing crime involves actions taken before (prevention of criminal behaviour or victimisation), during (prevention of further victimisation) and after crime commission (preventing a repetition of a crime or recidivist behaviour).

Due to the fact that the prevention of crime is, in actual fact, difficult to achieve, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer to **intervention strategies** against robbery where, based on the researcher's own operational definition, intervention may be defined as all those actions aimed at reducing the likelihood for this type of crime to occur. In the context of this study, emphasis is given to robbery intervention in a situational (the context in which jewellery activities take place), environmental (the place where the said activities are conducted, i.e. the jewellery store) and behavioural context (the actions or behaviour of a jeweller and his/her members of staff). It is within this context, i.e. the elimination of opportunities in the physical environment (also known as physical and environmental crime prevention), that a robbery intervention strategy needs to be formulated and implemented in order to manage the risk of jewellery store robbery successfully. Crime prevention strategies directed towards the offender as an individual (also known as individual-directed approaches), do not fall within the scope of this study.

## **1.6 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED**

Generally speaking, the project undertaken was met with positive comments and willingness to co-operate from most parties approached by the researcher. However, the study did not proceed without problems. On the contrary, various obstacles of a different nature were encountered along the way.

### **1.6.1 Finding support for the study**

The researcher realised that, in order for the study to be successful, the support of key organisations in the jewellery industry was needed. In this regard, various meetings were held with companies and organisations involved in the jewellery industry. Managing members of the Jewellery Council of South Africa, a non-profit

organisation representing the jewellery industry, reassured the researcher that there was a real need for constructive initiatives against crime. They also stated that they were most willing to co-operate by offering their support for the initiative and by making relevant information and data, which were at their disposal, available to the researcher.

### **1.6.2 Finding sponsorship**

The researcher realised that the success of the project depended not only on its endorsement by relevant jewellery organisations, but also on a professional presentation. The jewellery sector is, in fact, known to be very attentive to image and presentation. After several meetings with organisations involved in various fields, such as insurance, trade and security, sponsorship was offered by Gem & Jewel Acceptances (Pty) Ltd, a company specialising in jewellery insurance. This company acknowledged the validity of the project as a new and interesting initiative, which would ultimately prove beneficial to the jewellery industry as a whole. It was then agreed that Gem & Jewel Acceptances would sponsor the costs related to the printing and distribution of the questionnaire as an insert in SA Jewellery News.

### **1.6.3 Gaining the trust of respondents**

The Jewellery Council, jewellers and representatives of insurance companies warned the researcher that the jewellery industry was highly protective of their information systems and wary of discussing security issues with other parties, particularly if the latter did not belong to the industry. In order to overcome this problem, following on the researcher's request, the Department of Criminology of the University of South Africa issued a letter which certified the academic nature of the project and facilitated the task of the researcher (see "Appendix C"). The Jewellery Council also issued an official letter of endorsement of the project, which subsequently proved to be of valuable assistance to the researcher in gaining the trust of the respondents (see "Appendix D").

Notwithstanding the above, the researcher still found it difficult to obtain cooperation from jewellers particularly during the final phase of the data collection process, which

involved structured interviews with victims of jewellery store robbery. The majority of the jewellers did not wish to take part stating that they were too busy or reluctant to share the information. Moreover, it must be stressed that, due to the sensitive nature of the topic being investigated, this type of interview could not be done by simply walking into a jewellery store and requesting an interview with either the store owner or manager. Prior formal arrangements were necessary.

#### **1.6.4 Obtaining specialised literature and statistics**

Due to the general lack of local and international data on retail store robbery and specifically jewellery crime, as well as the general unwillingness on the part of the jewellery retail groups to disclose sensitive information, the researcher decided to utilise all valuable sources linked to this crime phenomenon, even though such sources were prior to the year 2000. In addition, the researcher conducted an extensive internet search in order to identify organisations involved in the specialised field of jewellery crime prevention. Jewelers' Security Alliance (JSA) emerged as the leader in this field. JSA is a non-profit organisation dedicated to the security needs of the jewellery industry in the United States of America since 1883. JSA has, over the years, collected an extensive database on crime committed against the North American jewellery industry, probably the largest and most accurate in existence counting 15 500 members. Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (JVC) was also identified as an important organisation which was, however, much dependant on JSA's assistance with regard to information and statistics. Through these organisations, the researcher was able to obtain specific information, statistics as well as annual reports, which would otherwise have been difficult to obtain locally. This information provided the background in formulating research questions.

#### **1.6.5 Distributing the questionnaire**

Various meetings with representatives of the Jewellery Council and the Editor of SA Jewellery News, a specialised magazine distributed to members of the Jewellery Council were held. It was decided, with the consent of the Jewellery Council, that the best way to distribute the questionnaire in order to reach as many jewellery store

owners as possible (in the most professional way) would be as an insert in the said magazine.

### **1.6.6 Preparing the respondents**

The researcher offered to write an article for SA Jewellery News on a topic relevant to jewellery crime prevention. This would give the researcher an opportunity to introduce himself to the jewellery industry, prior to the actual distribution of the questionnaire. This initiative was welcomed by both the editor of the magazine and the Jewellery Council. The editor suggested that the article be published in the December (2001) issue and asked the researcher to focus on the topic concerning the forthcoming Christmas Season and the crime risk factors associated with it. The article was then submitted for publication with the title: "Preventing open store crime" (Zannoni 2001:9). A brief note about the researcher's profile and project involving the distribution of a research questionnaire on jewellery store robbery was included. The note stressed the importance of the project and asked for the jewellers' co-operation in returning the questionnaire. In spite of all the efforts to obtain a good response rate, only a small number of questionnaires were returned to the researcher.

## **1.7 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION**

The dissertation comprises seven chapters. In Chapter 1 both the objective and importance of this study have been discussed, the research problem has been clearly formulated and the key concepts have been unambiguously defined. In Chapter 2 a literature review and an analysis of case studies are conducted on robbery and robbers. Chapter 3 focuses on the victim of robbery in general and the jeweller (and members of staff) as victims of robbery in particular. An attempt is also made to describe a typology of the jeweller as a robbery victim. Chapter 4 is concerned with the theoretical explanation of robbery based on a literature review. Chapter 5 summarises the research findings based on the responses to the questionnaire and to the semi-structured and structured interviews. Chapter 6 includes the formulation of a victim based robbery prevention strategy based on the research findings and a review of the existing literature, as well as the researcher's professional experience in the



field of crime and security risk reduction. Chapter 7 concludes the study with important recommendations on the best way forward for jewellers to succeed in their efforts to reduce the risk of robbery victimisation.

## **1.8 CONCLUSION**

In this chapter the need for research on jewellery store robbery as a contemporary crime issue has been stated. The lack of a database on armed robberies directed at jewellery stores was discussed under the rationale in order to justify this investigation. The chapter further focused on the aim of the study, actuating research questions, unit of analysis, data collections by means of a literature study, questionnaire and interviews, data analysis, the definition of key concepts and the problems encountered during the study, as well as a layout of the following chapters. The next chapter focuses on jewellery stores as targets of armed robbery and explains the dynamics and characteristics associated with the jewellers' occupation and the criminal event. Case studies on jewellery store robbery are also presented.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **JEWELLERY STORES AS TARGETS OF ROBBERY AND ASSOCIATED DYNAMICS**

#### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides a basic explanation of the different types of jewellery stores, their products, personnel and clientele, as well as the various activities or tasks performed by jewellers and members of staff from opening until closing time. In addition, standard security measures, which currently seem to be accepted as best practice amongst jewellers, are identified.

A good understanding of the various components and activities typical of a jewellery retail store helps create a security risk profile as each of them bears a direct influence on a specific crime situation. As an example, the concomitant presence of high value items and a low volume of customers entering a jewellery store may create a favourable condition for a robbery attack.

The chapter also deals with the general characteristics of business robbery and robbers in order to provide an understanding of the dynamics of the criminal event. Aspects such as risk factors for robbery, typology of robbery and robbers and a description of the robbery event as it unfolds in a commercial environment are discussed. References to the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery both in South Africa and abroad, when available, are included.

#### **2.2 THE JEWELLERY STORE, ITS MAIN COMPONENTS AND ACTIVITIES**

Prior to dealing with the crime of retail store robbery as a criminal event, it is necessary to describe both the main target of the robbers' action (jewellery) and the characteristics of the environment where the crime is committed (jewellery store).

### **2.2.1 Types of jewellery stores**

Based on the researcher's observations, different types of premises wherefrom jewellers conduct their activities can be identified:

- Street front stores situated along urban or suburban streets.
- Shopping complex stores situated inside a commercial centre as an independent business unit amongst other types of commercial activities.
- Departmental counters situated within larger stores where different types of products are offered.
- Flea market stores or stands operating from fixed or mobile structures situated in different places such as a parking lot, a shopping complex or a public square.

Each type of store experiences different crime-related risks depending on factors such as, amongst others, location, volume of traffic and the level of security measures adopted. As stated in the definition of jewellery store provided in chapter one, section 1.5.2, this study focused on shopping complex stores and included both chain and private stores.

### **2.2.2 Type of merchandise**

The products of the mid and high-upmarket jewellery stores differ significantly from those of the chain stores, whose quality of stock is generally lower to cater for a larger section of the population. Chain stores usually keep a low volume of high value jewellery on site, but this is only located on request (Security Industry Best Practice for South Africa 2002:18).

While the value of jewellery displayed may vary significantly from one item and jewellery store to another, the typical range of jewellery available to customers includes neck chains, arm bracelets, rings, earrings, watches and watch straps, pendants, loose stones (precious and semi-precious), various giftware and silverware and high quality pens. During a discussion with the researcher (2005), Mr. B. Friedland, a jewellery store owner, stated that the start-off capital required to open an

average jewellery store may exceed two million Rand including shop fittings, working capital and stock.

### **2.2.3 Clientele**

In the past the tendency has been to associate jewellery with wealthy people. Nowadays, jewellery has been made more affordable to the lower income groups of the population, mainly due to the credit facilities available at many stores. However, while some jewellery stores cater for all type of clientele, others remain exclusive, only within the reach of the higher income groups (Friedland 2005).

In general chain stores whose products are usually more affordable than the mid or high-upmarket stores, have a larger number of customers. On the other hand, high-upmarket stores in shopping complexes or street front stores in suburban areas, usually experience a lesser flow of customers. This situation influences the element of risk to which a store may be exposed. In fact, the higher the volume of customer traffic, the higher the risk for jewellers to experience opportunistic theft or theft by distraction. Robbers instead seem to prefer targets that are less busy and offer easy access to high-value items.

### **2.2.4 Personnel**

The number of staff members employed at a jewellery store and their professional qualifications differ depending on the type of store. The average store employs at least four people in various positions, including one senior manager, two sales persons and one junior member of staff. The owners or directors may also be present but not at all stores (Friedland 2005).

Private jewellers usually select experienced personnel by sourcing them from within the industry. Some retail chain stores instead may also select inexperienced candidates and train them internally. Training for members of staff involved in the jewellery retail sector is also available through organisations such as, amongst others, the Jewellery Council of South Africa and the Diamond Training School.

### **2.2.5 Jewellery store-related activities**

According to research participants McKinnon (2007) and Friedland (2005), various activities characterise the work of jewellers and members of staff from opening until closing time:

#### **At opening time**

Before opening the store to customers, the stock must be removed from the safes or strong rooms and placed on the display cases. The store, windows and cases are cleaned and repaired and ordered items of jewellery are prepared for collection by customers. Only when the stock is laid out and secured in the display cases, and the members of staff are ready to receive customers, the store is opened for business (usually at 9 a.m.).

#### **During business hours**

Besides looking after customers, typical activities conducted by staff during business hours include preparing and maintaining the stock, e.g. polishing and re-marking; changing the lay-out of the jewellery and re-positioning items in different display cases; entering newly purchased stock and designing new jewellery (only at those stores which specialise in jewellery design). It is common practice amongst jewellers to receive sales representatives only by appointment.

#### **At closing time**

At closing time (usually between 5 and 7 p.m. depending on factors such as the location of the store and management's directives), after having locked the doors, members of staff proceed to remove items of jewellery from windows and show cases, pack jewellery onto trays, place trays in the safes or strong rooms, count the amount of money received from the daily sales, reconcile the stock list against the store master list, and prepare for the following day (e.g. stock to be repaired or collected and list of clients to be contacted). All these activities are time consuming

and for a zealous jeweller it may take up to two hours, after the official closing time, to leave the store.

### **2.2.6 Standard security measures**

Due to the constant element of risk and as a result of insurance-related requirements, most jewellers have adopted a best practice with regard to security at their stores. A Jewellery Council of South Africa's sponsored survey conducted between 2001 and 2002 across three retail jewellery stores in Gauteng, showed how chain, mid and up-market private stores reviewed their security arrangements (Security Industry Best Practice for South Africa 2002:17-18). The following were some of the most important findings:

- Standard security measures adopted by all stores included intruder detection and panic systems comprising of door and window contacts, motion detectors, vault protection, hard wired panic buttons and wireless panic transmitters, and radio / telephone link up to a security control centre. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems were utilised by chain stores and high up-market private stores but not by the mid up-market private stores. All stores relied heavily on their own security response companies.
- The high up-market private stores, which cater for a very affluent clientele and have the most expensive range of products, held concern for a more organised heist and therefore implemented more intensive security measures.
- None of the jewellers interviewed employed their own security personnel. Shopping complex stores relied on the visible security presence within the centre, whereas the individual jewellery stores sub-contracted a security response service.
- In the case of the chain store, general staff were strictly pre-screened, i.e. their references and criminal records were checked, whereas in the case of the private jewellers, credibility within the industry provided suitable reference with no systematic pre-screening process.
- Due to aesthetic reasons, chain stores did not implement barriers for access control, but this was in the process of being reviewed. In the case of private

jewellers, access control was strictly handled by the door buzzer system, after which the staff took control.

- Only jewellers in high up-market stores made use of a private viewing area when showing customers goods in excess of a specified amount. Only senior managers attended the private room with customers, and a dedicated CCTV camera viewed and recorded all transactions.

### **2.3 ARMED ROBBERY AS THE CRIMINAL EVENT**

While different personal, social and psychological risk factors may play a role in the causation of robbery, an immediate cause for an individual to commit this crime seems to be his desire for material gain, i.e. obtain quick and easy money (Siegel 2005:255). This might also be the most important factor which motivates offenders to commit jewellery store robbery. Furthermore, the presence of specific robbery facilitating factors such as the presence of opportunities and the availability of firearms may also be easily exploited by criminally predisposed individuals.

While SAPS statistics serve as a good indicator of the extent of aggravated and business robbery both at a national and provincial level, it is difficult, on the other hand, to determine the extent of jewellery store robbery as this is not recorded as a separate crime category. Therefore, the researcher had to rely on available literature and statistics.

In the context of this study, a careful analysis of the robbery event has important theoretical and practical implications. Business robbery is usually characterised by various phases, i.e. planning, selecting a suitable target, casing the store, establishing co-presence, entering into a conflict situation, transferring of valuables, leaving the crime scene and disposing of stolen valuables (Maree 1999:55-58). A careful analysis of all these phases is essential in order to understand the different dynamics of jewellery store robbery. In this chapter, two phases have been given special attention: the selection of a suitable target and the disposal of stolen merchandise. The first phase is important because it helps establish which factors attract the robbers' attention to a specific store and which opportunity-reduction measures need to be adopted by jewellers to minimise the risk of robbery. The second phase, which

involves an understanding of the role of the fence (receivers), is also important for, without the presence of the fence, robbers would find it extremely difficult to dispose of the stolen jewellery and obtain the much needed cash.

### **2.3.1 Contributory factors to robbery**

It would be too simplistic to attribute this crime to a single factor, for it is generally agreed that, for this crime to be committed, there must also necessarily be an individual's predisposition to carry it out. In addition, the various factors should not be seen in isolation but rather as an integral part of the problem. Some researchers seem to agree that factors such as breakdown of family processes, poor socio-economic conditions, inequality of the poor, lack of opportunities, unemployment, urbanisation and modernisation and a violent culture and sub-culture within society may all play a role in predisposing an individual to commit crime (Leggett 2004b:19; Thomson 2004:13; Masuku 2003:24; Stewart & Davis 2003:50; Van Niekerk 2003:13; Van der Hoven 2001:84). However, due to the fact that this study does not focus on the robber's perspective, it would not be possible to establish which of the mentioned factors in particular contribute to an individual becoming a jewellery store robber, and therefore the researcher is unable to substantiate them. As indicated in section 7.3.6, this should be treated as an area for future research. Nevertheless, some factors appear to be the primary motive for robbery, in particular the need to obtain a quick reward in the form of cash and the opportunities present in a specific environment.

#### **2.3.1.1 Immediate cause: material gain**

Wright and Decker (Siegel 2004:349) found that robbery is caused primarily by the individual's pressing need for material gain. Robbers typically see their decision to offend as emanating from a financial need that cannot easily be met through more conventional means. For some, it is a way to maintain a high standard of living to which they become accustomed. Stewart & Davis (2003:60) confirmed that the economic advantage that an individual can obtain from a retail robbery is the primary motive for this crime. Robbery of cash is a preferred method of making money



because it is quicker, safer and easier and does not generally entail having to dispose of “hot” merchandise as in the case of jewellery.

Another factor which, according to Wright and Decker (Siegel 2004:349), plays a role in armed robbery is that it provides a psychic thrill, or a chance to hurt or humiliate victims through a show of power and force. It is also a way to avenge adverse personal factors experienced by an individual by seizing what belongs to the better privileged and wealthier classes.

Besides the factors explained above, there are other personal, social, environmental situations and circumstances which, individually or collectively, may facilitate the commission of a crime on the part of individuals who already have a predisposition to criminal behaviour.

#### **2.3.1.2 Opportunity**

Opportunity may be considered as one of the important facilitating factors in criminal activities (Felson 2002:35). In fact, it can be stated that no crime can be committed without the physical opportunity to carry it out. Crime opportunities present in the environment or created by people themselves are constantly exploited by criminals. In this regard, criminal behaviour may be considered as the product of the interaction between the individual with his / her criminal predisposition and the surrounding environment (setting) which offers many opportunities for crime commission (Felson & Clarke 1998:1-3).

#### **2.3.1.3 Mood altering substances**

Besides opportunities, some forms of addictions in the form of mood altering substances such as cocaine, amphetamines and alcohol may lead individuals into committing serious crimes, including robbery, as they are forced to raise considerable amounts of money in order to support their costly addiction. Furthermore, people who are actively involved in a life of crime may rely on drugs and alcohol to reduce their anxiety or build up their courage for crimes they plan to commit (Siegel 2004:454).

As reported in Conklin (2001:317), a study of robbery found that alcohol was present in 71 percent of the crimes committed on the spur of the moment, but in only 44 percent of the planned crimes. The major role played by drugs and alcohol in criminal behaviour was confirmed by a South African study conducted by the Medical Research Council and the Institute for Security Studies, which found that 60 percent of offenders were under the influence of various mood altering substances (Philp 2005:4). Urine samples taken (within 48 hours of the crime) from more than 3000 arrested suspects in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg revealed that 42 percent of robbers, 46 percent of murderers, 66 percent of burglars and 50 percent of rapists were high on drugs at the time of their crimes. Based on these findings, it is evident that strong police and community action on drugs and alcohol is needed to reduce high crime levels.

#### **2.3.1.4 Availability of illegal firearms and crime syndicates**

While the availability and abundance of illegal firearms, which may become an essential tool during an armed robbery, is not a cause of violence per se, it is nevertheless a facilitating factor to be recognised. In South Africa, for instance, the easy availability and abundance of weapons of all kinds, is a significant factor in the commission of robberies with aggravating circumstances. Access to a gun can have extremely serious consequences. According to the SAPS (Masuku 2002:10), 80 percent of 110590 serious robberies recorded in 2000 were committed with a firearm. The Crime Information Management Centre also linked the number of crime syndicates operating in the country to the climate of lawlessness and crime of violence such as retail robberies (Stewart & Davis 2003:50).

According to Conklin (2001:321-322), the presence of a weapon during a criminal confrontation can escalate the level of violence, producing a murder when an assault would have occurred if no firearm had been present. Furthermore, firearms give some robbers a sense of power and self-confidence and their actions become more lethal. Assaults with firearms are more likely to produce death than are attacks with other weapons and so the presence of a firearm makes murder a more likely outcome of an altercation (Conklin 2001:329).

### **2.3.1.5 Ineffective criminal justice system**

An ineffective criminal justice system does not act as a deterrent against robbery; poor detective work, easy granting of bail and relatively mild sentences may also give robbers the impression that it may be worthwhile pursuing their criminal careers and face the risk associated to it (Govender 2007:5; Van der Hoven 2001:85). The financial gain associated with criminal behaviour outweighs the deterrent effect of a possible prison sentence. This reasoning is applicable in South Africa where the high level of property and violent crime appear to correlate with a faltering criminal justice system and an overburdened and under-resourced police service (Stewart & Davis 2003:50).

### **2.3.2 The extent of business robbery**

Jewellery store robbery is recorded by the SAPS for statistical purposes as a business robbery which is a sub-category of aggravated robbery. Due to the fact that no distinction is made between different types of businesses, it is difficult to determine the extent of jewellery store robbery in South Africa. Therefore, the focus of this section will firstly be on a statistical analysis of the phenomenon of business robbery and, secondly, on jewellery store robbery based on available information.

#### **2.3.2.1 General statistics on business robbery**

Amongst violent crimes, which make up a substantial proportion of the total crime experienced in South Africa, robbery has traditionally been one of the crimes with the highest annual increase (Schönteich 2002:1-3). Based on an analysis of the latest SAPS crime statistics (SAPS 2007b) for the period from 2001 to 2007 available on line ([http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/crime\\_stats.htm](http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/crime_stats.htm)), it is evident that, while serious crimes such as murder, attempted murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm showed a downward trend, aggravated robbery instead showed a systematic increase from 116 736 incidents in 2001/02 to 133 658 incidents in 2003/04, with a decrease in 2004/05 and 2005/06 (down to 119 726 reported incidents) and again a sudden increase of 5.7 percent in 2006/07 (126 558). In 2006/07 the provinces with the highest ratio of aggravated robbery per 100 000 of

the population are Gauteng (552.1) followed by Western Cape (278.7). The least affected province with a ratio of 53.8 is Limpopo

With regard to the extent of business robbery in South Africa, to which category jewellery store robbery belongs, an analysis of the above SAPS statistics for the past five financial years from 2002/03 to 2006/07 shows that while this type of crime declined from 5498 incidents (12.1 per 100 000 of the population) in 2002/03 to 3320 incidents (7.1 per 100 000 of the population) in 2004/05, it increased significantly by 52.5 percent in the last year and by 21.6 percent between 2002/03 and 2006/07 (see table 2.1). It needs to be remembered that the SAPS only started recording business robbery as a separate crime category in 2002/03.

**Table 2.1: Business robbery (South Africa) - Past five financial years (SAPS)**

<b>CASES REPORTED</b>				
2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
5498	3677	3320	4387	6689
<b>RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION</b>				
12.1	7.9	7.1	9.4	14.1
<b>PERCENTAGE INCREASE / DECREASE</b>				
2002/03 2003/04	2003/04 2004/05	2004/05 2005/06	2005/06 2006/07	2002/03 2006/07
-33.1%	-9.7%	32.1%	52.5%	21.6%

According to the same SAPS business robbery statistics, the three provinces with the highest ratio per 100 000 of the population in 2006/07 are Gauteng (46.9), followed by North West (15.0) and KwaZulu Natal (10.2). The provinces with the lowest ratio per 100 000 of the population are Northern Cape (1.4) and Limpopo (1.9), possibly due to conditions of lower business development (see table 2.2). The highest ratio in Gauteng is in all probability linked to the much higher level of commercial activities in the province, as compared to other parts of South Africa. Most alarming is the significant percentage change in the past year in Gauteng, North West and Kwa-Zulu

Natal. This increase may cause business owners to become more fearful and invest more in security measures to protect staff and property.

**Table 2.2: Business robbery (Provinces) - Ratio per 100 000 of the population - Past five financial years (SAPS)**

<b>RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION</b>					
	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
EASTERN CAPE	9.3	5.4	4.6	3.3	3.4
FREE STATE	3.4	0.5	1.5	0.8	2.1
GAUTENG	29.0	24.5	23.4	34.0	46.9
KWA-ZULU NATAL	11.1	4.4	3.9	5.4	10.2
MPUMALANGA	11.8	3.7	2.7	2.1	5.3
NORTH WEST	5.8	4.0	5.2	7.2	15.0
LIMPOPO	7.4	3.6	2.3	1.5	1.9
NORTHERN CAPE	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.9	1.4
WESTERN CAPE	2.7	2.3	1.8	2.4	4.2
<b>RSA TOTAL</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>9.4</b>	<b>14.1</b>

In its annual report (SAPS 2007a), the SAPS also explain that business robbery is a scourge at a localised level especially in central business districts (CBD) and in the periphery of CBD's. In fact, this type of crime is one of the most concentrated violent crimes recorded in South Africa with 40 percent of all cases occurring in only 22 of the 1105 police precincts (2 percent), six of these (27.3 percent) being CBD stations ([http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/\\_pdf/crime\\_situation1.pdf](http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2007/_pdf/crime_situation1.pdf).)

When analysing the above statistics, it is important to remember that recorded crime levels undercount the real levels of crime, as unrecorded crimes are not reflected. This is because crime rates rely on members of the public reporting crime, and the police recording it. The use of recorded crime statistics in the current South African context is especially problematic, as research has shown that upwards of 50 percent of crime in many important categories goes unreported. In particular, according to national victims of crime surveys conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (Burton, Du Plessis, Leggett, Louw, Mistry & Van Vuuren 2004:133-134; Leggett 2002:8), the reporting rates for robbery in South Africa were down from 41 percent in 1998 to 29

percent in 2003. Despite these problems, South African crime figures are generally regarded as comprehensive and largely reliable.

### **2.3.2.2 Specific statistics on jewellery store robbery**

At an international level there is a generalised lack of statistical data on the extent of jewellery store robbery. However, reliable statistics from the United States of America are published online by Jewelers' Security Alliance ([www.jewelerssecurity.org/statistics.html](http://www.jewelerssecurity.org/statistics.html)). According to their 2006 statistics in the category of "On-Premises Crimes" (criminal activities taking place at the victims' business base of operations) robbery had the third highest incidence (18.7 percent) after theft (61.1 percent) and burglary (20.2 percent). However, the number of robberies in 2006 increased by 7.7 percent when compared to 2005.

The Jewelers' Security Alliance database is the largest and most accurate in existence, notwithstanding the fact that it is not always possible to obtain information on every jewellery industry crime as many go unreported. Their database counts approximately 15,500 members in the United States, thereby giving a reliable picture of the dimension of the crime problem affecting the American industry. Statistics are based solely on credible and verifiable information obtained by the Jewelers' Security Alliance and have purposefully been divided into two categories, on-premises and off-premises crime.

Statistical data regarding the extent of robbery against the jewellery retail sector in South Africa is not available. Neither the South African Police Service nor the Jewellery Council of South Africa maintains a database on jewellery crime. The SAPS does not differentiate between type of business when recording robbery statistics, other than distinguishing between robbery committed against businesses or against individuals. Some statistics on jewellery crime are available through companies involved in the jewellery industry such as head offices of retail stores, insurance companies and loss adjusters who gather information via their own client database. These statistics give only an indication of the crime situation against the

jewellery industry. However, there are obvious problems for the above companies in disclosing such data, which is usually kept very confidential in order to protect their image and clients' business interests. Research participants Esmé McKinnon and Alan Brown from Gem & Jewel Acceptances (2001), Joel Bergman from A.I. Brokers (2001) and John Pearson from Crawford International Loss Adjusters (2001), expressed concern at the frequency of the robbery attacks against the South African jewellery retail sector. It was said that some stores had sustained repeated attacks in a short period of time, an indication that criminals were shifting their activities to softer and more manageable targets. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.2, data released by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), confirmed that jewellery stores were third on the list of most targeted retail businesses.

### **2.3.3 Typologies and characteristics of the crime and the offender**

Through a study of the available literature, it is possible to draw a general typology of robbery and robbers, with particular reference to the phenomenon being investigated, i.e. jewellery store robbery.

#### **2.3.3.1 Typology of robbery**

Robbery can be classified on the basis of the type of target or victim selected by the criminals. Various patterns have been identified that can be applied to jewellery store robbery (Siegel 2004:347).

**i) Robbery of persons who, as part of their employment, are in charge of money or goods.**

Examples are cash in transit officers or owners / managers of commercial activities. Jewellery store robbery can be included in this category as jewellers' and members of staff happen to be in charge of both money (from the sale of jewellery) and valuable merchandise.

**ii) Robbery on commercial targets.**

The commercial activities more often targeted by robbers include petrol stations, convenience stores, supermarkets, restaurants, hotels, jewellery stores and general retail stores. This type of robbery involves some degree of planning. In the majority of cases robbers are armed with firearms and violence is often used, although the latter seems to be correlated to a physical reaction of the victims during the robbery (Engelbrecht 2005).

**iii) Robbery in an open area.**

Although not relevant to jewellery store robbery as such, this type of robbery must be mentioned in that it may affect jewellers' or jewellery representatives carrying a valuable line in an open area. This robbery is committed directly against individuals who are seen, known or thought to carry money or valuables. It can happen in different places, the most common being the streets and parking areas and involves street attacks such as muggings and purse snatching during which bags, wallets and cellphones are most often targeted. It is the most common form of robbery in urban areas. This type of robbery is often characterised by episodes of violence because, on the one side, the item(s) which the robbers want to seize is/are on the victim or in his/her immediate possession and, on the other, the victim often decides to resist the criminal attack, causing the robbers to react. Senior citizens and women are the preferred victims because of what the criminal perceives to be their limited physical capacity to react. It must be said, however, that any person who appears to be weak, unaware of his/her surrounding, distracted and vulnerable is more at risk.

**iv) Robbery on private premises.**

As mentioned in point iii above, this category is also not relevant to jewellery store robbery as such but needs to be mentioned due to the fact that a jeweller may be victimised at home, taken hostage together with family members and forcibly accompanied back to the store (Williams 1999:2). This type of robbery is committed inside private dwellings, apartments or homes. Two different scenarios can be identified: a) robbery which follows a housebreaking as when the victims suddenly arrive home and meet up with the



criminals; b) robbery per se as when the criminals enter the dwelling with the intent to rob the owners / occupants, or when the robbers wait for the latter to arrive forcing them to hand over money or valuable items.

v) **Robbery after preliminary association of short duration.**

This type of offence comes in the aftermath of a chance meeting, e.g. in a bar or store. Jewellery store robbery can also be part of this category as in most cases criminals enter the store posing as customers, and after a short association with the jeweller, suddenly show their real intention.

vi) **Robbery after previous association of some duration between the victim and offender.**

In this type of robbery the criminal, after having befriended the victim and gained knowledge of his/her possessions, seizes the opportunity to commit the crime. This may also apply to jewellery store robbery as when criminals befriend a member of staff with the intention of obtaining information on a jeweller's activities in order to better plan a robbery attack.

Incidents in items v) and vi) above are substantially less common than stranger-to-stranger robberies which account for the majority of robbery events.

### **2.3.3.2 Characteristics of robbery**

The following findings on business robbery and jewellery store robbery in particular, are relevant to the study:

i) **Hourly / Daily / Monthly distribution**

According to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), there is a clear indication that most commercial robberies in South Africa occur between 7:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. This is especially true in the case of clothing, jewellery and furniture stores. A possible explanation for this is that there is less human traffic in the store, other than the staff. Employees are also distracted as they are usually preparing for the day ahead. Robberies at supermarkets and other fast moving consumer goods outlets instead tend to happen early in the

morning, just before opening time, and between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. (Consumer Goods Council of South Africa: 2005; Engelbrecht 2005). A possible explanation for this is that there is more cash present and members of staff are usually tired and less on their guard. Commercial robbery in establishments that are not open 24 hours, e.g. jewellery stores, occurs mostly during working hours. Because of the restricted business hours, jewellery stores are held up almost exclusively during the daytime period. However, numerous incidents of robberies at night have also been recorded, as when a jeweller is kidnapped from his / her home and forced to open the store; or when guards are held up at a gun point and the store broken into (Jewelers' Security Alliance 1999:4).

According to Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:3), jewellery store robbery is most likely to occur at opening time. This has been a consistent pattern which finds explanation in the fact that usually there are less people (customers) present in the store. The second most vulnerable time period for the occurrence of robbery has traditionally been between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. However, in 2000, the second most likely time for a robbery event was between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. A possible explanation is that robbers may be adjusting their hours of operation to overcome more stringent security procedures implemented by retail jewellers at closing time.

According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), most commercial robberies in South Africa occur on a Monday or over the week-end (Saturdays and Sundays). This finding was confirmed by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005). A possible explanation is related to the robbers' perception of large amount of money being available due to restricted banking hours. This reasoning does not apply to jewellery retail stores where jewellery (not cash) is the primary target of robbery. Mc Kinnon (2001) reported that most robberies at jewellery stores seemed to occur during the week (between Tuesdays and Thursdays), and that December and February usually experienced an increase in criminal activities against

jewellers due to crime opportunities created by the Christmas rush and the restocking of jewellery after the festive season.

**ii) Number of robbers involved**

In the United States, jewellery store robbery is almost in the totality of cases carried out by two or more robbers in possession of firearms (Jewelers' Security Alliance 2000:5). This seems to be the trend in South Africa where in the majority of cases, as explained by research participant McKinnon (2001) and Engelbrecht (2005), groups of criminals are usually involved. Furthermore, attacks by groups of heavily armed robbers carrying automatic weapons, holding staff and customers up and executing a robbery (or more than one robbery at different stores in the same complex) in just a few minutes, have been reported (Smillie 2007:2).

**iii) Modus operandi during the execution of the robbery**

According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), during commercial robberies in South Africa, the robbers usually gain access to the premises posing as customers. At office complexes instead, the perpetrators usually hold up security guards and proceed to break into the building. Staff and customers (when present), are held at gunpoint and are usually tied up and locked inside a storeroom. A member of staff (usually owners, managers or key holders) is then forced to open the till(s), safes or vaults and hand over cash and other valuable merchandise. Often members of staff and customers are robbed of their personal belongings, e.g. wallets, cellular phones, watches and jewellery. The robbers usually touch very little and even make cashiers open money bags in order to avoid being linked to the crime scene by fingerprint identification (Engelbrecht 2005)

According to research participants Pearson and Bergman (2001), most jewellery store robberies appear to be well planned and executed. In the majority of the cases, robbers seem to gain access to the stores simply posing as customers. Since jewellery store robberies are usually committed in a few

minutes and within a confined space, robbers can easily control, by means of threat of violence, staff and customers without any need to tie them up or lock them inside a store room. Often they are simply pushed to the rear of the store. However, in recent incidents in Gauteng robbers acted differently in that they approached the targeted store with automatic weapons, threatening bystanders, shooting rounds into the windows and causing them to shatter. Once the glass was broken, the robbers did not walk into the store; instead they grabbed valuable watches from the shattered windows and fled the scene without being confronted (Green 2005:2).

**iv) Escaping from the crime scene**

According to studies conducted by the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), in South Africa the most common ways used by commercial robbers in escaping from the crime scene are either on foot or hi-jacked / stolen motor vehicles. When working in groups, motor vehicles are usually utilised to flee from the robbery scene. Motor vehicles are usually fitted with false number plates. Maree (1999:54) found that most of the bank robbers involved in her study drove along the getaway route a number of times, constantly looking for alternative routes should that become necessary.

**v) Type of weapons**

As reported by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005), firearms are the number one weapon of choice of many offenders involved in retail store robberies, probably because of a perception that victims find them more threatening. It also appears as if firearms are better for controlling groups of people during a robbery. The type of firearm may vary depending on the type of target and include 9 mm pistols, sawn-off shotguns, revolvers and AK-47 assault rifles (Maree 1999:56).

Research conducted in the United States of America by Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:5), also found that firearms were by far the jewellery store robbers' preferred weapon. Robbery committed with a gun constituted 72

percent of the total robbery events in 2000. The carrying and actual use of automatic weapons in major jewellery heists in South Africa has also been documented. In one instance, an entertainment venue in Johannesburg came under siege when more than 20 robbers armed with automatic weapons fired their way into the complex before making off with cash and jewellery in what could be considered a “military-style” heist (Gang of jewel robbers rake Montecasino 2001:1). In a recent jewellery store robbery in Fourways (north of Johannesburg), bystanders dived for cover as the gunmen carrying AK 47 assault rifles fired several shots during the robbery (Swart 2007:3).

**vi) Duration of robbery**

The duration of an attack may vary depending on the type of robbery and commercial establishment against which it is committed. According to research participants Bergman and Mckinnon (2001), in South Africa jewellery store robberies involving large losses have been carried out in approximately three to five minutes.

**vii) Place of occurrence**

Patterns in jewellery store crime have, over years of social and political transformation in South Africa, also changed significantly. Jewellery stores located along urban roads and city centres were often in the past (before the decaying of the urban areas from the early 90's) attacked by robbers. However, most jewellery stores have since moved to the relatively safer environment offered by suburban shopping malls. This move does not seem to discourage determined criminals from committing daring attacks against jewellery stores situated in shopping complexes. According to research participants McKinnon and Brown (2001), in South Africa jewellery store robbery also appears to be a typical urban / suburban phenomenon, more predominant in the larger metropolitan areas. It is committed indoors, i.e. inside a jewellery store, although it may also be initiated outdoors as when, for instance, a jeweller is attacked whilst walking or driving and forced back to the store. Stores near entry / exit points, busy roads and highway ramps are reported to be the most vulnerable to robbery.

**viii) Use of disguises**

Robbers are known to use all kinds of disguises to prevent recognition. Maree (1999:57) found that most of the bank robbers wore balaclavas or pulled a stocking over the head where cameras were operative. A suit is also a popular outfit because this formal type of dress is associated with successful business people. Surgical gloves are also favoured, with translucent nail polish on the fingers and palms to avoid leaving identifiable fingerprints. At times, robbers may wait until they are ready to commit the robbery before wearing masks or balaclavas.

However, because too much disguise such as balaclavas attracts attention, particularly when robbing a store in a busy shopping complex, robbers may prefer to use simple, yet effective means to prevent recognition both by witnesses and video cameras such as, for instance, caps, sunglasses, false beards and moustaches. This also seems to be the case in jewellery store robberies which are for the most part committed by robbers posing as customers (Four arrested after attempted jewel heist 2001:2). In a robbery at a jewellery store in a shopping centre in Sandton (north of Johannesburg), two robbers were seen wearing a religious dress much like a burqas (Ndaba 2005:1). In a more recent armed robbery attack at a jewellery store situated in a shopping centre on the East of Johannesburg, the offenders had disguised their faces with headbands over their eyes (Green 2005:2).

**ix) A crime between strangers**

As opposed to other violent crimes such as murder and assault, robbery is, in almost all cases, an event between people, i.e. the robber and the victim, who are strangers to each other, strangers are less likely to be able to identify robbers to the police (Conklin 2001:67).

In the case of jewellery store robbery, it may have happened that the criminals posed as potential buyers or credit applicants in order to assess the situation at the store. In this case, as reported by research participants McKinnon and

Brown (2001), robbers may not be total strangers in the eye of the jewellers and members of staff who may, in fact, be able to recognise them.

**x) Presence of witnesses / bystanders**

While Barlow (1996:159) reports that armed robberies appear to be carefully timed to minimise the risk of intervention from third parties, research participant Bergman (2001) believes that, once the target is identified, jewellery store robbers seem to be unperturbed by the presence of by-standers or customers inside or near the store. This lack of concern has been shown during a number of daring robberies committed inside busy shopping complexes.

**2.3.3.3 Typology of robbers**

There are currently no important data upon which to base the classification of jewellery store robbers, for instance, age, gender, racial group and level of professionalism. However, criminological findings on robbers have led to a specific typology as described below (Siegel 2004:347):

**i) Professional robber**

Professional robbers usually manifest a long-term commitment to crime as a source of livelihood, carefully study each situation and plan every detail prior to committing a robbery. Some professionals are exclusively robbers, while others may engage in other types of crimes. It can be stated that planning and skills are the trademarks of the professional robber. They usually operate in organised groups in which assigned roles are the rule, and are interested in stealing large amounts of cash or valuable merchandise from commercial establishments. In the majority of cases, they are armed with firearms.

**ii) Opportunist robber**

They randomly select the most vulnerable targets and commit robbery at the most favourable opportunity. They are not committed to robbery as a source of livelihood. They are also not organised and usually do not plan the robberies. Opportunists often operate in the context of juvenile gangs. Amongst all types,

they are the ones that tend to be more aggressive and ready to assault and harm their victims.

**iii) Substance addicted robber**

This category comprises both drug addicts and alcoholic robbers. They act in order to satisfy their urge for more drugs or alcohol and because their aggravated condition makes them unemployable. Some drug addicts do not hesitate to physically attack and harm their victims, also because they may be acting under the influence of certain drugs which are known to cause aggressive behaviour, e.g. cocaine and crack. They both have a low commitment to robbery because of its dangers, but a high commitment to theft because they can raise money to fund their addictions. When committing a robbery, they do not usually plan it and are satisfied with enough money to get their next fix.

**2.3.3.4 Characteristics of robbers**

Literature findings point to a classification of the typical jewellery store robber as a professional criminal. It would appear as if this crime is seldom the work of occasional robbers. According to industry sources in Italy (Armando 1998:104-105), jewellery robbers have become increasingly professional, “exclusive and international”, in the sense that they concentrate their unlawful activities in the jewellery sector only and do not associate with other categories of criminals. This seems to be the case also in the United States where law enforcement agencies have developed strong evidence supporting the existence of organised criminals identified as “South American Theft / Robbery Gangs”, which are actively engaged in criminal activities against the jewellery industry (Jewelers’ Security Alliance 1999:14).

In South Africa, research participants McKinnon, Brown, Pearson and Bergman (2001) also indicated that jewellery store robberies are a phenomenon involving professional criminals. Jewellery store robbery usually involves a considerable degree of planning, because of the presence of security systems, which protect a jewellery store. Also, the stolen merchandise does not really have value unless it can be



immediately disposed of and transformed into cash, which is what robbers want most. This presumes that the robbers involved maintain a reliable network of contacts (fences) in the criminal underworld. Attempts to identify the criminals through the stolen jewellery are often thwarted by the increasing availability of recycling operations. Furthermore, according to industry sources (e.g. insurance companies and loss adjusters), police investigations into jewellery store robberies found that this crime is at times commissioned by crime syndicates, which make use of trained and professional robbers. All of these factors point to various degrees of professionalism among jewellery store robbers.

With regard to a profile on the jewellery store robber, the researcher established that there is a clear lack of local and international data on the offender's perspective. This study is also not focused on the jewellery store robber as the offender. Therefore it is recommended that this specific area be considered for future research. However, based on a study of the available literature, it is possible to draw a general profile on robbers as follows:

**i) Age**

According to Schönreich (2000:17), Statistics SA found that 109,3 out of every 100 000 males aged 18 to 20 were convicted of robbery. Less than a third, or 30,4 out of every 100 000 males aged over 20 were convicted of robbery. On average, less than one out of every 100 000 females (across all age groups) was convicted of robbery. Maree (1999:53) in her study of bank robbery in South Africa, a type of crime which, as in the case of jewellery store robbery, involves a more professional type of criminal, found that the majority of robbers taking part in the sample were in their 30's. Based on the same study, the majority of the subjects had a criminal record before they reached the age of 21. This shows that offenders start with criminal behaviour at an early stage of their life and usually progress to more professional types of crime as they get older.

**ii) Gender**

Criminological research confirmed that male offenders are in the vast majority of cases responsible for robbery (Flowers 2003:187; Siegel 2004:346), although females may also play a part by, for instance, providing information on a potential target, being on the look-out during a robbery and offering a hide-out place for the robbers. They can therefore be considered as accomplices or accessories after the fact. Often young women become associated with a criminal subculture and provide various levels of assistance to the male counterpart.

Statistics SA (Schönteich 2000:17) found that, on average, in South Africa less than one in every 100 000 females (across all age groups) was convicted of robbery. However, at present there is a tendency for women to become more involved in violent crime, including robbery, as the role of women in society continues to change and they become involved in the same type of activities as their male counterparts. The presence of women during armed robberies has been reported (Ajam, Russow & Schmidt 2005:1).

**iii) Racial group**

As in the case of the United States, where young black perpetrators account for a substantially high portion of robbery (Flowers 2003:187), in an heterogeneous society such as that of South Africa, a disproportionately high number of perpetrators of crime come from marginalised and economically deprived black and coloured communities (Leggett 2004a:22). The possible causes for the frequent involvement in crime of marginalised and discriminated against groups can be found in their resentment, frustration, despair, anger and violence, all forms of rebellion against the authorities and the richest sections of the population, including owners of businesses. For a resentful, violence-prone person, robbery may afford, besides an immediate financial reward, a sense of power over their victims (Siegel 2004:349).

**iv) Social status**

It appears as if the majority of robbers are more likely to come from the lower, more marginalised and undereducated groups in society. Maree (1999:53)

found that the majority of the bank robbers in her research were poorly educated (left school after standard eight) at the time the robberies took place. However, while the criminals executing the robbery may fit the above profile, this does not seem to be the case for the fences or the leaders of the robbery syndicates who may well be wealthy and educated people living a good life out of the illicit profits.

### **2.3.4 The unfolding of a robbery**

In general, business robberies committed by professional criminals tend to exhibit high levels of planning, organization and victim-management skills (Barlow 1996:161). These robberies are characterised by different phases, the most important ones being planning, selecting a suitable target, casing the store, establishing co-presence, entering into a conflict situation, transferring of valuables, leaving the crime scene and disposing of stolen valuables. Each phase is further characterised by specific actions which, during the course of the robbers' career, may become so repetitive and distinctive as to constitute their trademark or *modus operandi*.

#### **2.3.4.1 Planning**

Planning is undertaken to minimise the risk of being caught, identified or injured (or having to cause injury to the victims). The time spent on the planning phase varies from robber to robber and is influenced by factors such as, amongst others, previous crime experience, personal circumstances, use of drugs and alcohol, the number of criminals involved in the robbery, cognitive abilities and personality characteristics (Maree 1999:54). During the planning stage, the offender makes the necessary arrangements, such as seeking the assistance of accomplices, assigning specific roles, finding suitable weapons and vehicles, short-listing suitable targets and devising feasible getaway routes (Barlow 1996:159). Jewellery store robbers are probably also in close contact with potential buyers (fences), who may place an order for a specific type of merchandise. Being considered as professional implies that, in most cases, the jewellery store robbers will carefully plan the event and assess all possible obstacles which could be found on their way.

#### **2.3.4.2 Selecting a suitable target**

Robbers' criteria in selecting victims and targets vary depending on the type of robbery they are about to commit. Based on rational choice explanations, robbers try to assess each situation and weigh both rewards and risks (apprehension and sanctions) prior to going into action (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1.1).

Important factors that professional criminals usually consider during the selection of the most suitable target are the individual robber's perception of the security countermeasures such as barriers, systems and the presence of security / police personnel, the location, parking opportunities, entrances and exits, movements of people inside and outside, size and design of the target (Barlow 1996:158; Maree 1999:54).

##### **i) Profitability**

To make robbery worth the risk, robbers must have some indications that the victim (or target) carries (or keeps on premises) a reasonable amount of money (or valuable merchandise). Cash (or valuable items which can be exchanged for cash such as jewellery) is a primary motive and the amount or value available a crucial determinant of the target chosen.

Commercial robbers prefer retail establishments such as supermarkets, restaurants and bars, the reason being they are among the kinds of businesses that have been least affected by the credit revolution and the accounting system. Robbers can usually count on the ready availability of a reasonable amount of cash, something that could not be taken for granted with most street robberies (Stewart & Davis 2003:50).

Jewellery stores may be considered suitable targets for robberies due to the fact that they contain valuable merchandise, which can be relatively easily carried away (a small bag can contain a considerable amount of stolen

jewellery), and transformed into cash because of the presence of available channels (fences). In reality, robbers only manage to obtain a fraction of the value of the jewellery.

**ii) Location**

The location of the target and its immediate environmental conditions are important elements influencing the offenders' decision on whether or not to commit the crime. Robbers usually give priority to the following:

- **Familiarity with the area**

Non-professional robbers generally prefer to act in areas with which they feel familiar. They usually do not travel far in search of targets, as being mobile and venturing into new areas can be risky. Professional robbers, on the other hand, seem to be willing to travel considerable distances in order to reach lucrative targets and avoid possible recognition. In one instance, a group of criminals in the United States travelled long distances to rob jewellery stores in small towns because, in their eyes, small town jewellery stores were a perfect target; they typically contained an abundance of high value merchandise but lacked the sophisticated security systems associated with big city jewellers. The Police in small towns were also perceived as being less efficient than their metropolitan counterparts (Wright & Decker 1997:92-93). These findings are in line with those of Maree (1999:55) who indicated that professional robbers preferred to attack targets away from their residential area.

- **Presence of police and security personnel**

Robbers try to avoid confrontation with the police and security, the risk of being apprehended, injured or killed being the obvious reasons (Siegel 2004:113). When selecting a target, the robber usually assesses the probability of police or security intervention by considering factors such as the distance of the target from the nearest police station / security company, the estimated response time and the frequency of police / security patrols in the area.

- **Availability of escape routes**

Because the finding of suitable escape routes is of the utmost importance, robbers usually need to be familiar with the area; this is referred to as their “awareness space” (Siegel 2004:113). The following factors are usually taken into consideration: the vicinity and the geographical location of the target; the traffic flow in the immediate area; available parking (depending on the escape mode); the whereabouts of the nearest police station (to estimate the reaction time) and the design of the target. Commercial targets situated near a freeway are usually preferred as this offers easy and immediate access to a major escape route. Busy streets also allow robbers to blend with the traffic, thus reducing the risk of being identified and caught (Felson 2002:136).

iii) **Manageability of target**

Some targets can be more manageable than others depending on factors such as temporal and physical accessibility, the victim’s capability or willingness to resist the robbery, and the physical layout and visibility of the store.

- **Temporal and physical accessibility**

Certain targets are more appealing than others due to their extended working hours or their easy physical accessibility, e.g. cafes, supermarkets and restaurants. Such free access enables the robbers to be fast and efficient, thus minimising the risk of apprehension. Jewellery stores are also generally not difficult to attack because of their “open door approach” and lack of effective security barriers during business hours. As a result these businesses are soft targets for robberies. This is especially true for those which are unable to afford costly security measures (Stewart & Davis 2003:50). The presence of physical and electronic systems such as gates, alarms and CCTV may, at times, act as a deterrent. However, as reported by Bergman (2001), these measures do not seem to deter a determined effort by

professional criminals who will either neutralise the security features or simply choose to ignore them.

- **Victims' capability/ willingness to resist the robbery**

Retail establishments are also often targeted because their employees are merely ordinary citizens who are usually not equipped to defend themselves against robbers (Stewart & Davis 2003:50). Robbers seem to be aware that employees of retail stores are usually not armed. Furthermore, they are not likely to resist armed criminals, not only because the money and merchandise are not theirs but also because they are thought to be insured.

Robbers are unwilling to act when they perceive the chances of meeting strong opposition from the victim, getting caught, injured or killed are too high. Robbers may see the prospect of having to deal with large number of people, e.g. staff and customers, as a risk factor. In addition to such a situation being unpredictable and difficult to control, there is also a greater chance of being identified later. The logic behind this is the fact that robbers want to exercise maximum control over victims and events, thus avoiding the possibility of encountering strong resistance and being overwhelmed (Pearson 2001). Also, the position of the staff in the store may affect the robbers' decision to attack as they may lose control when members of staff are positioned in different places.

- **Physical layout and visibility**

Due to the limited business hours, jewellery store criminals are usually forced to commit robbery during broad daylight. In this case, criminals seem to feel more comfortable in robbing those establishments that have a view to the inside obstructed by obstacles such as posters and furniture as this minimises their risk of being seen by security, police or passers-by (Felson 2002:137).

Stores with multiple entry and exit points present an advantage to the robbers who are not restricted to coming and going through a single opening. They also provide more than one escape route. Close proximity of the till / safe to the front door also allows for swift access to the money and reduces the risk of apprehension. As discussed, the position of the counters is also important as robbers do not seem to like having to keep control over members of staff positioned in different areas of the store.

#### **2.3.4.3 Casing the store**

Most robberies against jewellers are preceded by some form of “casing” which can be defined as “to inspect or study the store with the intent to rob” (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:24). The criminals will want to find out as much information as possible about the conditions in the vicinity of the store which they intend to target, in particular parking opportunities, police / security patrols and general movement of people. Sometimes casing takes place immediately before a loss, not giving the jeweller time to react. However, in other situations, the process of casing is conducted over a period of hours, days, weeks and even longer. The robbers may pose as customers and spend some time looking at the merchandise in order to assess certain conditions inside the store such as, amongst others, the position of the CCTV cameras, the alarm system, the position of the till or safe, the location of the most expensive merchandise, the layout of the store, the number of entries / exits, the number of employees and the presence of store guards (Barlow 1996:159). In other cases, in order to obtain information on the store, some jewellery store robbers may pose as credit applicants, obviously providing false information on the application form. Research participants Bergman and Pearson (2001) reported that robbers often repeatedly visited the store which they intended to attack.

#### **2.3.4.4 Establishing co-presence**

The offenders move into striking range of the target or victim. Since they are usually careful not to cause unnecessary suspicion or opposition from the victim, the



criminals rely on the elements of speed and stealth or deceit to surprise an unsuspecting victim (Wright & Decker 1997:95-96). As reported by research participants Bergman and Pearson (2001), both deceit and speed are employed by jewellery store robbers who may pose as customers suddenly showing their real intention to unsuspecting victims, or storm into the store brandishing weapons.

#### **2.3.4.5 Entering into a conflict situation**

At this stage, the criminals announce their real intention which is to dominate the events at all costs. They assume the assigned roles to which they must adhere if the robbery is to be successful, e.g. watching the entrance, paying attention to time, keeping staff and customers at bay, seizing cash and valuables (Barlow 1996:160). Robbers also threaten the victim with violence should he / she fail to comply with their orders and demands, often through the creation of a convincing illusion of impending death (Wright & Decker 1997:128). After the surprise factor, fear of losing one's life or being injured sets in and this usually prevents any reaction by jewellers, staff and customers, especially if confronted by robbers armed with firearms. The danger exists that a victim because of his/her shocked condition, may be unable to react to the commands put to him/her. Robbers who fail to secure co-operation may, at this stage, resort to force in order to subdue, incapacitate or further intimidate the victim(s). Should the victim react, the offenders usually respond with severe but non-lethal violence in order to bring the victim(s) into line with their expectations. In general, robbers do not intend to kill the victim(s), but some are prepared to resort to deadly force if need be (SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 2002). Maree (1999:55) also found that bank robbers who acted as a group were more inclined to be violent but, when possible, without causing serious bodily harm to the victims.

#### **2.3.4.6 Transferring of valuables**

After having obtained the victim's co-operation through threat of violence, intimidation or actual physical force, the robbers then proceed to seize valuables, unless this action is suddenly interrupted by events such as the arrival of a third party,

security or police, or the stubborn resistance by the victim(s). As reported by research participant Bergman and Pearson (2001), in a jewellery store robbery, fine jewellery and watches are amongst the robbers' preferred items. However, robbers (especially if not immediately threatened), will seize as much jewellery as possible and may also turn their attention to cash (from the till) and the victims' personal belongings, e.g. cash, wallets, bags, and cellular phones or firearms. While seizing jewellery, much damage can be done to counters and display cases, which are usually smashed by robbers using hammers or handheld pickaxes.

#### **2.3.4.7 Leaving the crime scene**

The getaway is the most important phase of any robbery for the criminals must escape to avoid apprehension. The robbers will usually attempt to terminate the interaction with the victim at a time and under conditions of their choosing. It is during this stage that violence is most likely to erupt, especially if the robbers are hindered at the time of their escape (Barlow 1996:161). This is in fact a very critical moment in the robbery event, which requires the victim(s) to remain calm in order to avoid the possibility of further victimisation, which may include shooting, stabbing or taking hostages (Consumers Goods Council of South Africa 2005). The criminals have to rely on the skills of their driver who is usually positioned nearby with the engine running in order to clear the scene quickly.

#### **2.3.4.8 Disposing of stolen valuables**

According to research participants Bergman and Pearson (2001), robbers are known to dispose of the stolen jewellery via a network of professional fences who maintain close contacts with crime syndicates. The fence can be defined as someone who purchases stolen goods on a regular basis for resale; he is a middleman, a layer between the thief and the buyer, the latter generally being a merchant, a businessman, a wholesaler or a criminal group (Siegel 2004:376-377). According to Snyman (1995:479-485), fences' activities are clearly unlawful. In fact, they can be charged

with the crime of “receiving stolen property, well knowing it to have been stolen”, which is committed when a person intentionally and unlawfully receives possession of property knowing at the time of receipt that it has been stolen.

Two types of fences can be identified, i.e. the occasional and professional receiver (Felson 2002:70). They are different in that while the occasional receivers do not exclusively devote themselves to fencing, the professional receivers dedicate themselves to fencing, regularly buying stolen property directly from criminals and profitably working it back into legitimate trade through a network of contacts with legitimate buyers. To be successful, a professional fence must meet certain conditions such as i) available cash to pay the criminals; ii) thorough knowledge of the trade; iii) connections with suppliers of stolen goods who are relatively free of police interference (e.g. warehouse workers); iv) continued access to buyers; v) complicity with law enforcers, which usually involves either bribing corrupted officials or acting as an informer in important cases (Siegel 2004:377).

Having to rely on fences makes jewellery store robbery particularly risky in that, if the fence is arrested he / she may reveal the names of the robbers and vice versa. Furthermore, if a fence is not immediately available, this also adds to the risk. However, without a fence, jewellery robbers would find it extremely difficult to dispose of the stolen goods and, in so doing, generate the cash they need, which remains the main objective of their criminal action.

According to police sources, a sudden increase in the robbery of jewellery stores in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg could be due to the known presence of fences operating in the area, willing to buy stolen jewellery from criminals (Jewellery theft on the rise 2001:2). In some cases, in fact, robbers do not even choose their own targets. Instead, they rely on the services of a professional fence who tells them where and when to commit robberies and specifies exactly what type of jewellery is to be taken on the basis of current demands (Wright & Decker 1997:93). However, thieves and robbers also depend on members of the public which often supply the demand for stolen goods (Felson 2002:71).

Fences dealing in stolen jewellery need to have a certain level of expertise, in order to be able to evaluate the merchandise received from the criminals. For this reason it may be inferred that some of them are somehow associated with the trade. When selling jewellery to fences, criminals are usually paid out a fraction of the price of the merchandise. Professional criminals who steal high-priced items are given the highest amounts. Jewellery, especially when made of exclusive design or belonging to private individuals, could be easily identified by the legitimate owners. According to Bergman (2001), a common method employed by criminals in order to thwart identification of stolen jewellery is by removing identifiable characteristics. Gold, silver and other metals can be melted down and jewels (precious stones) can be removed from their settings. However, fences also rely on a very rapid turnover of the stolen goods and often prefer sending “hot” merchandise a considerable distance away, through buyers situated in other cities and even in foreign countries. Once received from the criminals and paid for, the fence will then either directly or indirectly resell the stolen goods. Directly, as when the jewellery is resold to customers in the fence’s own store (making out false or vague receipts and keeping a supply of purchase receipts of legitimate goods that can cover the purchase of similar stolen goods at a later stage, may help in legitimising the possession of particular items of jewellery); indirectly, as when the jewellery is channeled to business buyers or to other dealers who then sell the goods directly to consumers or perhaps direct them along other distribution channels, e.g. other dealers in stolen goods, second-hand stores, pawn shops, auctions, retail merchants, wholesalers, and special customers such as private collectors.

The police use a number of methods in order to arrest offenders and bring about a conviction for fencing stolen property, such as frequent inspections of pawnshops and second hand stores, “sting operations” (posing as fences), or keeping suspects under surveillance by means of legal investigative techniques such as telephone tapping, photographic evidence, tailing and use of informers (Felson 2002:73). Whatever the method, it is of paramount importance for the police to arrest the fences if there is to be a reduction in jewellery store robbery. Proving in a court of law that the fence knows that the goods are stolen can be a difficult task. This is particularly true if one takes into account the relative impersonality of property items and the lack of

adequate property identification. Furthermore, owners often fail to maintain an adequate record of their jewellery, with relevant photographs of each item.

### **2.3.5 Case studies on jewellery store robbery**

The researcher was able to analyse different types of jewellery store robbery following information (in the form of confidential investigative reports) received from the loss control manager of a national jewellery retail company (confidentiality was agreed on). Three case studies were compiled as follows:

- Robbery committed by a lone criminal.
- Robbery committed by a small group of criminals.
- Robbery committed by a large group of criminals.

#### **2.3.5.1 Case study A: armed robbery committed during business hours by an offender acting alone and by surprise.**

**i) Type of premises**

Jeweller retailers

**ii) Location**

Multi storey shopping centre in suburban area (corner store facing mall walkway)

**iii) Time, day and date of loss**

Approximately 11:50 a.m. – Wednesday - 19 April 2006

**iv) Cause of loss**

Armed robbery by a criminal acting alone

**v) Number of staff employed**

Two permanent and one casual (two were present at the time of the robbery)

**vi) Security arrangements**

- Alarm system comprising of one panic button and one magnetic door contact (no passive infrared detectors).

- SABS category 2 ADM safes.
- Security guards provided by centre management.
- CCTV system provided by centre management (no cameras installed at or near the store).
- No roller shutters on doors / windows.

**vii) Description of incident**

One member of staff was in the back office and the other busy on the phone when a man approached the latter and asked her: “Do you know that security guards are on strike”? As she did not answer him immediately, the man repeated the question and then told her to move away as he “wanted to work”. He then showed her his firearm and told her to move into the back office. Before she could react, the robber jumped over the counter behind her. Both members of staff were made to sit on the floor in the back office. The robber opened the safe and took one pad of rings, which he placed into a bag that he had brought with him. He then asked for the keys to the front display units and made one member of staff assist him in opening them. During this time, customers approached the staff member and each time the robber politely told them that they were busy. A customer entered the store to change the account details and was told by the robber to return later as they were busy with a survey.

Every time the robber took a tray of jewellery, he went to the back office to put the jewellery into his bag. When the bag was full, he ordered both staff members to remain seated and, before walking out, took their cellular phones and cash from the till. During the robbery the offender constantly made reference to the fact that he was not alone and that his accomplices were just outside the store. When the staff realized the robber had left, they immediately raised the alarm and the centre management security responded shortly thereafter.

**viii) Loss**

The loss amounted to approximately R 250 000 in stock retail value (assorted jewellery), R 5000 in cash and R 2000 for the cellphones.

**ix) Investigation**

The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was opened for investigation. No arrest and / or recoveries were made.

**x) Comments**

The alarm system was substandard as it did not include passive infrared detectors and glass sensors (for the volumetric and perimeter protection of the store). A jewellery store cannot rely only on a magnetic door contact at the front door. Furthermore, for an emergency panic system to be effective, staff should not rely only on a fixed panic button installed at the main counter but should instead also be provided with panic buttons at strategic positions including the back office where they are usually confined by robbers. Portable panic transmitters should also be carried by each member of staff.

In the above incident, the existing centre management CCTV system proved to be totally ineffective for the identification of the robber as no cameras had been installed near the store entrance. Again, this stresses the fact that jewellery store owners should not rely exclusively on centre management's security arrangements but should instead adapt security to the unique needs of their stores.

**2.3.5.2 Case study B: armed robbery committed during business hours by a small group of offenders acting by force.**

**i) Type of premises**

Jeweller retailers

**ii) Location**

Shopping centre in the central business district of a small town

**iii) Time, day and date of loss**

Approximately 10:45 a.m. - Saturday - 13 August 2005

**iv) Cause of loss**

Armed robbery by four criminals

**v) Number of staff employed**

Two permanent and one casual (all were present at the time of the robbery)

**vi) Security arrangements**

- Standard alarm system comprising of a magnetic contact at front door, passive infrared detectors and glass break sensors.
- Fixed panic button located beneath desk in the office.
- Portable panic transmitters placed beneath a counter and at the point of sale.
- SABS category 2 ADM safe.
- Security guards provided by centre management.
- CCTV system provided by centre management (no cameras installed at or near the store).
- No roller shutters on doors / windows.

**vii) Description of incident**

An armed man entered the store, jumped over the counter and placed a firearm at one of the store employees' side. Simultaneously two more men entered the store, jumped over the counter and held another staff member up at gun point, manhandling her in the process as they thought she intended to trigger the alarm. At the time of the attack, ten customers were in the store. The offenders forced staff to open the till and display cabinets and to remove and place jewellery in bags. At times, when the robbers considered the staff were not acting quickly enough, display cabinets were forced open. During this time, a fourth offender kept watch at the entrance. After threatening and warning staff and customers not to move, the robbers escaped on foot. The robbery lasted for approximately five minutes.

**viii) Loss**

The loss amounted to approximately R 500 000 in stock retail value (assorted jewellery and watches), R 500 in cash (stolen from the till).

**ix) Investigation**

The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was opened for investigation. No arrest and / or recoveries were made.

**x) Comments**

The presence of thirteen people in the store did not deter a determined group of robbers. Staff members were unable to activate the panic system as they did not carry the panic transmitters on their person. Furthermore, a major shortcoming in the store security arrangements was that no video footage of



the robbery was available to assist the police with their investigation (given that no CCTV camera had been installed inside or near the store).

Immediately after the robbery, an alerted employee locked the doors and requested the witnesses to remain inside the store until the police arrived. However, one customer who suffered from severe shock left without being asked for his/her name and address. In this type of situation, it is of the utmost importance for staff to know how to handle the crime scene as the presence of a large group of people in a small area may cause the destruction of valuable evidence (see Chapter 6, section 6.3.4.2.3).

### **2.3.5.3 Case study C: armed robbery committed after business hours by a large group of offenders evading security.**

**i) Type of premises**

Jeweller retailers

**ii) Location**

Major shopping centre in suburban area

**iii) Time, day and date of loss**

Approximately 06:50 a.m. - Wednesday – 1 February 2006

**iv) Cause of loss**

Armed robbery at two jewellery stores (committed by twelve armed criminals).

**v) Number of staff employed**

Store A: six permanent and one casual (none present at the time of the robbery). Store B: seven permanent and one casual (none present at the time of the robbery).

**vi) Security arrangements**

- Standard alarm system comprising of a magnetic contact at front door, passive infrared detectors and glass break sensors.
- No panic buttons linked to alarm system.
- SABS category 2 ADM safes.
- Security guards provided by centre management (fourteen guards, some of them armed, were on duty at the time of the robbery; all

guards are in two way radio communication with their control centre located on the top parking level of the mall).

- CCTV system provided by centre management (164 cameras strategically placed throughout the shopping centre).
- All twelve entrances to the shopping centre are locked at about 01h00 a.m. (after the last movie) and reopened between 06h00 and 06h30 a.m. One entrance remains open to allow cleaners entry / exit (always under guard).
- No roller shutters on doors / windows.

**vii) Description of incident**

Twelve heavily armed men entered the mall via the entrance (found open) closest to the targeted jewellery stores (situated in an area called “The Jewellery Court”). The criminals were armed with a variety of weapons including handguns, semi-automatic rifles, shotguns and pick axes. Most of them wore headgear to prevent recognition of facial features. CCTV footage showed some of the robbers stopping at a jewellery store and firing shots into the windows smashing the glass panes. The robbers then split with one group targeting the above store and another targeting the display windows of a store in the immediate vicinity. The criminals left two minutes after entering the shopping centre carrying the jewellery out in small bags, in their hands or in their pockets.

**viii) Loss**

The loss amounted to approximately R 337 000 in stock retail value (assorted jewellery and watches). Damage to the store amounted to approximately R 60 000.

**ix) Investigation**

The robbery was reported to the local police station and a case docket was opened for investigation. Investigating police officers confirmed that a spate of robberies had been committed at shopping malls following a similar *modus operandi*.

**x) Comments**

The presence of fourteen guards and 164 CCTV cameras in the mall did not deter a determined group of robbers who managed to gain access via an unattended entrance without being spotted by security. The possibility of

complicity on the part of some of the guards needs to be investigated, e.g. by means of a polygraph test. Particular attention should be paid to the actions of the guard who, based on CCTV footage, walked away casually from the entrance just a couple of minutes before the robbery. Furthermore, it appears as if the security service provider and shopping centre management concentrated most security resources on the inside of the complex, thus leaving the external areas without adequate security surveillance. The deployment of guards trained as “crime spotters” in the external areas of a shopping centre, particularly near entrances leading to high value stores, can help prevent armed robberies. These guards should be trained in surveillance techniques and in the identification of potential criminal behaviour. Their role is to act as the first line of defense against criminals planning to commit a robbery at a shopping centre.

According to the loss adjusters who investigated the incident, other jewellery stores in the immediate vicinity of the robbery scene were not attacked as they had taken adequate precautions by not leaving high-value stock items out on display over night. In addition, the robbers did not manage to penetrate a third jewellery store as the owners had recently strengthened the display glass windows. Therefore, these measures proved successful in preventing after hour robberies.

## **2.4 CONCLUSION**

In this chapter, the researcher explained how the different types of jewellery stores, their main components (merchandise, clientele, personnel and adopted security measures), and the activities performed by jewellers and members of staff (from opening until closing time) can influence the element of risk, in particular through specific situations conducive to robbery. It is evident that, while the intrinsic value of jewellery, which can be easily converted into cash, remains the main factor attracting criminals to a jewellery store, other conditions typical of a jewellery store, also play an important role in the unfolding of the robbery event.

As discussed, the lack of specific information and statistics on jewellery store robbery in South Africa stressed the importance of the researcher's investigation into this crime phenomenon. Based on available literature and information obtained by the researcher via reliable sources within the jewellery industry, a picture emerged of the typical jewellery store robber as a professional criminal motivated by his quest for immediate financial rewards and experienced in the commission of robbery, which is generally well-planned and executed (in different phases). Jewellery store robberies seem to be a predominantly urban and sub-urban phenomenon of the larger metropolitan areas. The criminals' *modus operandi* usually involves an attack by a group of robbers mainly at opening time, with some gaining "legitimate" access to the targeted store by posing as customers, and others getting involved in various supportive roles. In the majority of cases, victims seem to be confronted by criminals armed with firearms and wearing minimal or no disguises. The robbers also seem to be unperturbed as to the presence of bystanders and security measures (especially if a store has been identified as a profitable target) and, although violence is not common, they are usually ready to use force if provoked by the victims. Some of the robbers have also been recognised by jewellers and staff as having visited the store on previous occasions (as part of the "casing" phase). In the following chapter, emphasis will shift from the crime and the offender to the victim of jewellery store robbery.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **AN ANALYSIS OF VICTIMS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

Until von Hentig's time (1948), the explanation of crime largely ignored the role of the victim in the causation of crime. The criminals with their behaviour and personality were the main subjects of study. With von Hentig's work on "The criminal and his victim" and Mendelsohn at a later stage (1965), more attention was paid to the problems concerning crime victimisation, in particular to the criminal-victim interaction and victim's involvement in the criminal event (Garkawe 2001:92; Fattah 2002:32-33).

Victims can play a significant role in the genesis of criminal behaviour by either actively or passively contributing to their victimisation (Siegel 2004:91). Everyone in society is a latent victim of robbery; but while the threat of robbery is always present, some individuals or businesses are more exposed to it due to certain factors that make them more attractive to criminals. This can be said of jewellers and members of staff whose occupation exposes them to a high crime risk, with theft and armed robbery the most likely occurrences (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:2).

Due to the violent nature of the robbery event and the possible serious consequences on the victim, an understanding of the interaction process between the victim and the offender in a specific setting, in this case the jewellery store, is fundamental. The victim's behaviour during the criminal attack is dependent on specific individual factors and ultimately determines the criminal's reaction. In this regard, it can be stated that the way in which jewellers and staff react during a robbery often means the difference between getting injured or successfully managing the event without being hurt.

## **3.2 VICTIMISATION RISKS FOR JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

Vulnerability to victimisation describes the likelihood of a person or business becoming a crime victim (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). This is related to various factors such as bio-socio-demographic properties (e.g. age, gender, race and location), the characteristics of potential targets (e.g. attractiveness, suitability, vulnerability, exposure to motivated offenders and high-risk situations) and the behaviour or lifestyle of those targets (Walklate 2003:40). It is important to stress the fact that it is the combined presence of specific risk factors in time and space that contribute to a jeweller's likelihood of victimisation. For instance, the presence of motivated offenders (e.g. robbers) in a specific area (e.g. suburban shopping centre) where a suitable (vulnerable) target (e.g. jewellery store) is situated may result in the latter being chosen by criminals and later victimised. In this regard, as explained below, Fattah's integrated model of criminal victimisation can be used to show how various victimisation risk factors affect jewellers and their businesses (Fattah 1991:341-346).

### **3.2.1 Occupation as risk exposure**

The type of work that one does is a factor in either increasing or diminishing the level of fear and the actual exposure to risk. Certain occupations carry with them a higher than average potential for criminal victimisation and can therefore be considered as high-risk activities (Fattah 1991:344-345). Robbery rates vary substantially according to the victim's occupation (Karmen, 2007:66). Business owners and members of staff working late hours and dealing with large amounts of cash, such as for instance convenience store and restaurant or bar owners, are subjected to high levels of fear and risk.

In the context of this study, occupational vulnerability is very important in that it is the type of work that jewellers and staff do which exposes them to the risk of victimisation. In fact, because they are dealing with extremely valuable merchandise which attracts criminals, they are subjected to an above average risk of victimisation.

### **3.2.2 Level of responsibility**

The degree of fear and exposure to risk is affected by specific conditions such as the level of responsibility at work or the position and interest that one holds in a particular business (Fattah 1991:345). Jewellery store owners are obviously very concerned about all types of crime affecting their business. Incidents of theft and robbery may cause serious losses and even put them out of business. The store manager, because of his/her level of responsibility, e.g. being responsible for opening and closing or being in possession of the store keys, may also experience a higher level of risk.

### **3.2.3 Location of business premises**

As opposed to Europe, jewellery stores in South Africa have moved out of the urban areas because of serious crime problems, and have concentrated in suburban areas, for the most part inside shopping complexes (see section 2.3.3.2 vii). However, there are still stores located along urban and suburban streets which, due to easier access and availability of escape routes, may be considered as an attractive robbery target.

Whilst stores situated inside shopping complexes are usually less at risk than those which are street front, this is not always the case, as there have been instances of heavy losses suffered as a result of robberies committed during business hours and burglaries (after hours). Although the presence of risk reduction measures at these complexes such as armed guards, security patrols and response, as well as CCTV systems with video recording facilities are undoubtedly a deterrent for most criminals, they do not seem to be able to stop a determined effort by a group of professional jewellery criminals (research participant Pearson 2001).

Victimisation shows a close relationship to specific areas (Fattah 1991:344). There are certain crime hot spots close to high-crime areas, in which there is a greater risk of victimisation than in other areas located close to low-crime areas. The rate of victimisation is usually higher in urban areas, particularly central city areas. A possible explanation is that large urban and commercial areas offer a greater degree of anonymity and have a higher concentration of available targets and opportunities for crime victimisation. In addition, they are often characterised by insufficient security

measures and poor environmental and architectural planning (Karmen 2007:64-65; Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:57-58). The proximity of a jewellery store to crime risk areas, entry / exit points, main roads and freeway ramps may increase the risk of robbery, especially if the nearest police station is situated a considerable distance away.

### **3.2.4 Dangerous times and days of the week**

As indicated in section 2.3.3.2.i, the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002) found that most commercial robberies against targets such as clothing, furniture and jewellery stores occurred between 07:00 to 09:30, possibly because, during these times, there is less human traffic in the store other than the staff. Furthermore, this is when stores are getting ready for the day ahead. 17:00 up until closing time is also a critical period for robbery, with the majority of incidents occurring during the evening (Engelbrecht 2005). Jewellers are most often robbed while at work inside their stores, during business hours. Opening and closing times are particularly vulnerable. However, jewellers have also been attacked by robbers while on foot, driving or at home after business hours. According to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), it is also clear that in South Africa most commercial robberies involving cash occur over weekends or on a Monday. This finding was also confirmed by a research conducted by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2005). This is most probably due to perceptions among robbers that large amounts of money are available during this specific period because of restricted banking hours over weekends.

### **3.2.5 Attractiveness of target**

An attractive target is one that the criminal perceives as being easier to attack and escape from and as having more rewards. But what in particular makes a jewellery store attractive to robbers? This is a subjective decision since, what is attractive to one robber, may not be necessarily so to another. Important factors, amongst others, can be the reward versus the risks, number of staff present at any given time, visibility from outside, the lack of visible security measures and the availability of easy escape routes (Fattah 1991:237-239). Lack of guardianship will also increase the attractiveness of the target for the offender. Guardianship is measured by the extent to



which people in the course of their daily activities do or do not protect property and individuals from crime. A capable guardian is a person or object that provides control over criminal behaviour (Van der Hoven and Maree 2005:57; Wilcox *et al* 2003:60).

### **3.2.6 Crime opportunities**

Criminal victimisation does not happen by chance: in fact, the likelihood of victimisation is a function of the available opportunity to victimise. Variations in opportunities can thus explain, at least partially, the uneven distribution of victimisation and the differences in victimisation risks and rates. There are days, times, areas and places that provide more or better opportunities for criminal victimisation (Fattah 1991:341).

Opportunities for criminal victimisation are closely related to the characteristics of potential targets (persons, households and businesses) as well as the activities and behaviour of those targets. The absence of capable guardians in particular is an important opportunity factor (Wilcox *et al* 2003:61-62). Therefore, providing criminals with opportunities for crime commission increases the possibility of victimisation. Through their behaviour, jewellers often create opportunities for crime which are then exploited by the criminal element.

### **3.2.7 Patterns of individual behaviour**

Certain behavioural patterns place individuals in risky situations in that they create specific opportunities for crime to occur (Fattah 1991:344). The risk of being victimised is greater when jewellers or staff behave negligently or aggressively, e.g. during a robbery event. Furthermore, behaviour that tempts or attracts potential offenders may facilitate the commission of certain crimes such as theft and robbery. This reasoning implies that creating opportunities and behaving in a specific way may facilitate or precipitate the commission of robbery against jewellers.

### **3.2.8 Victim facilitation**

Negligent or careless behaviour on the part of the victim can give rise to crime temptation opportunities, thus making it easier for an individual to commit a criminal act (Karmen 2007:110-111). Imprudent, careless, reckless or negligent attitudes and behaviour have been empirically demonstrated to be conducive to victimisation (Fattah 1991:105). Robbery facilitation occurs whenever victims fail to take reasonable precautions to protect themselves or their property, or reasonable measures to prevent victimisation from taking place.

Facilitating victims unwittingly assist their offenders and therefore share a minor amount of blame (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). Practical examples related to this study can be the jeweller's failure to notify police or security about the presence of suspicious individuals in the immediate proximity of the store; or the failure to adopt the security rule on "serve one customer at a time" or "show one item at a time", in order to avoid falling victim to distraction theft (Jewellers Vigilance Canada 2000:29). The jeweller's failure to remove high value items from the windows after hours can also result in a burglary or smash and grab attacks.

### **3.2.9 Victim precipitation**

Victim precipitation occurs when the opportunity for the commission of a crime is generated by some actions on the part of the victim that encourage or precipitate the offender's behaviour (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:56). According to victim precipitation, some people may actively or passively contribute to their own victimisation (Siegel 2004:91). Active precipitation occurs when victims act in a provocative manner, use verbal or physical threats or even attack first. Victims may resist in a way that turns a robbery into a murder. A practical example of this is when a jeweller, during a robbery, reacts by verbally or physically attacking the robber who then decides to use deadly force. Passive precipitation, on the other hand, may occur in different ways. The victim may be unaware of being targeted or may belong to a group being discriminated against. At times also negligent or careless behaviour can precipitate a crime. A practical example is when a jeweller opens the door of the store at closing time, to robbers posing as delivery personnel or late customers. Whether

active or passive, victim precipitation implies that at times the victim plays a significant role in causing his / her own victimisation, by giving the offender an opportunity to commit a crime.

### **3.2.10 Repeat and multiple victimisation**

One measure of vulnerability is the frequency with which people or businesses are victimised repeatedly. Repeat victimisation can be described as a person, object or place being victimised more than once during a limited period of time (Felson 2002:106). This implies that, in certain cases, there is a victim's proneness because of specific personal characteristics, social situation, physical location, and relationship to offenders (Conklin 2001:310). Research has shown that repeatedly victimised people and places account for a significant proportion of all crime (Walklate 1989:126).

The risk for a jewellery store to be attacked and robbed more than once in a short period of time is real. This was confirmed by research participants Mckinnon, Pearson and Bergman (2001) who stated that some criminals have been linked to the same crime scene through either circumstantial or direct evidence. According to these sources, some clients experienced two armed robberies within a few weeks of each other. It may happen that the same group of criminals commits another robbery at the same store once the stolen merchandise is replaced.

Previous victimisation appears to be a good predictor of possible later victimisation, mainly for the following reasons (Conklin 2001:311):

- Jewellers have risky occupations which keeps them vulnerable all the time.
- It seems reasonable that a jewellery store which has proven to be attractive to burglars or robbers will remain attractive for the same and/or other burglars / robbers, unless the jeweller decides to increase the level of security.
- There is a heightened risk period. After the first incident a new victimisation tends to follow within a short period. This will vary, however, by type of area. It would appear that the heightened risk period is shorter in an area with a high crime rate, although this will depend on the circumstances and the types of crimes.

According to a retail violence survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, 34 percent of the retailers surveyed stated that they had been victims of a violent attack in their store between two and five times. Police services are becoming increasingly concerned about how often crimes are committed against the same places or individuals. The data in the British Retail Consortium (BRC) survey from single outlets shows that many shops suffer repeat crimes. As an example, over three-quarters of all burglaries committed against retailers are second, third, or even more frequent attacks against the same premises in the course of the year (Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3).

Besides the problem of repeat victimisation, jewellers also face the risk of multiple victimisation, that is, being a victim of more than one kind of offence (Walklate 1989:123). As an example, a jeweller's home can be broken into; he/she and the family can be held hostage; then, the jeweller can be kidnapped, assaulted, forced to open the store and robbed of valuable merchandise.

### **3.3 THE VICTIMS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

The process of robbery victimisation at jewellery stores involves different types of victims and extends well beyond the boundaries of the store, e.g. inside the shopping complex or outside in the streets near the store. A jewellery store robbery, as in the case of many other commercial robberies, has implications for both persons and property.

#### **3.3.1 Property versus individuals**

Robbery of a business is similar to robbery of an individual: the victim must be present at the time of the crime and force or threat of force must be used. The robbery attack is carried out against the store with the intention to remove the valuable merchandise contained therein. During a criminal attack, the store may sustain considerable damage due to the robbers using force to gain access to the areas where the jewellery is stored; display cabinets may be forced open, glass may be shattered and windows damaged. At some stages during the attack, robbers may turn their

attention to the victims' personal belongings, e.g. cash, watches, jewellery and cellular phones. Cash in the till or safe is also an attractive target.

In order to get to the merchandise, the robbers must use violence or threat of violence against the custodians of such merchandise, i.e. the jewellers and members of staff. The process of victimisation may continue with the possible involvement of other victims, i.e. customers who happen to be present inside the store at the time of the robbery. Bystanders who happen to be in the robbers' path during their escape may also be threatened, shot at, or taken hostage. Bystanders in many events are more than passive spectators; they may, by their very presence, prevent the commission of a robbery. What bystanders do depends on several factors such as, for instance, their relationship to the victim, their perception on the personal risks associated with intervention and the level of confidence in their ability to intervene (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:128). If bystanders react during a robbery event, they may cause the robbers to react violently and risk serious injuries and even death. Bystanders may also be valuable witnesses in a criminal investigation. They observe and/or hear what is happening at or near the crime scene, usually without taking part in the criminal act. However, research (cited in Sacco & Kennedy 2002:129) suggests that bystanders' accounts are usually inaccurate, as they often fail to remember even key characteristics of the offenders. Members of a security company or police responding to a panic button alert or a report of a robbery in progress, may become involved in a shootout with the robbers and, at times, be injured or killed. During the shootout, general members of the public may be victimised as when, for instance, a stray bullet injures a passer-by near the scene of the robbery (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:16). Police or security involvement may happen by chance when they come across a robbery during their routine patrol activities. The jeweller's family members may also be victimised, e.g. kidnapped or held hostage in exchange for access to the store or valuable merchandise (Williams 1999:2). In fact, it can be stated that jewellers and their families remain a tempting target for criminals 24 hours a day (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada, 2000:27).

### **3.3.2 Typologies of victims**

Victims' involvement in the criminal event varies according to personal, psychological and situational variables. Different typologies of victims can therefore be identified on the basis of their involvement or contribution or lack of both to the crime situation.

#### **3.3.2.1 General typology of victims**

Over the years, research into the victim's role and position in his or her victimisation generated different typologies as explained below (Walklate 1989:2; Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:59-60). Von Hentig's approach focused on the role of the victim in the perpetration of a criminal event or on how the victim could contribute to create the opportunities for the commission of a crime. In so doing, he identified thirteen different classes of victims, which referred mainly to psychological and sociological variables. The emphasis was on "victim proneness" or on the circumstances or behaviour which were more likely to cause victimisation. Mendelsohn's typology, on the other hand, classified victims with respect to their culpability for a crime. His typology comprised six categories ranging from the completely innocent to the most guilty. Whilst open to severe criticism because of negative implications such as "victim's blaming", Mendelsohn's notion of culpability turned out to be very useful not only in the application of the Criminal Procedure, e.g. in imposing suitable sentences, but also in the explanation of victim precipitated incidents of violent crime such as murder, assault and robbery. Mannheim (1965:672-673) suggested a general typology for victims of crime which is still of practical value in robbery victimisation:

##### **i) Direct victims**

This category includes all individuals or businesses that have been personally involved in the crime or directly affected by the actions of the criminal(s). The jeweller who lost valuable merchandise in a robbery event, the jewellery store which was badly damaged, e.g. display windows and cabinets shattered, as well as the customers who had their wallets and cellular phones stolen during the robbery, are all examples of "direct victims". The robber himself may be injured or killed during the attack, thus becoming a direct victim of his crime.

**ii) Indirect victims**

This category includes all individuals or businesses affected by the commission of a crime, for instance through their relationship to either the criminal or the victim, or simply by being members of society. The jewellery store robber himself becomes a victim, as he personally has to bear both the penal and the non-penal consequences of his unlawful actions. Also, the families of both the victim and the criminal may be affected by the crime. They may, for instance, suffer because the jeweller or robber has been killed or incarcerated. Furthermore, it can be stated that, since every person in society is directly or indirectly dependent on his fellow man for his/her orderly survival and security, society as a whole is ultimately victimised.

**iii) Latent victims**

All people or businesses are latent victims of crime because of specific characteristics or actions that make them a potential target of a criminal attack. The jeweller's profession, for instance, constantly exposes him/her to various crime risk factors, and jewellery stores, because of the availability of valuable merchandise, are always a potential target for criminals.

**3.3.2.2 Specific typology of victims**

Based on both Mendelsohn and Mannheim's principles as well as on studies of robbery victimisation such as those conducted by Fattah (1991:103-106), the researcher attempted to describe a specific typology applicable to jewellers as victims of robbery. The following types were identified:

**i) Attentive jeweller**

This refers to jewellers who have done everything possible to protect themselves, their staff, customers and stores against robbery. They have implemented various risk reduction strategies, but still fall victim to a robbery by a group of determined criminals who have identified a specific store as a lucrative target.

**ii) Inattentive or distracted jeweller**

This refers to jewellers who do not pay attention to potential dangers and allow criminal elements to deceive or distract them during the course of their business activities. A practical example is when a jeweller allows some customers, who entered the store as a group, to distract him/her with requests to see different items of jewellery at the same time. In so doing, the jeweller provides the criminal with opportunities not only for theft but also for robbery.

**iii) Negligent or careless jeweller**

This refers to jewellers who through their negligent behaviour, lack of care, habits and lifestyle, make it easier for criminals to rob or steal from them. A relevant example is the jeweller who decides not to invest in adequate security measures both at the stores and at home. In so doing, the jeweller facilitates a robbery attack.

**iv) Over-reactive jeweller**

This refers to jewellers who, during a robbery attack, instead of remaining calm, decide to react aggressively against the robbers, thus provoking their reaction and endangering in the process not only their own life but also those of their staff and customers.

### **3.4 VICTIM'S INTERACTION AND RESPONSE DURING THE ROBBERY**

Violent crimes such as robbery, involve an interaction between the offender and the victim, albeit short, within a specific setting. The victim's response during this short interaction varies significantly from case to case, depending on a number of individual and situational variables such as, amongst others, age, sex, physical and mental condition, presence of bystanders, intervention by third parties, and the criminal's change of heart or plans. The victim's reaction to the robbery event will in turn determine the nature of the offender's response (Fattah 1991:206). Thus, an understanding of offender-victim interaction dynamics in crime situations is fundamental to this study. Interaction research implies that, besides criminals with



their motivation and the opportunities for crime afforded to them, potential and actual victims are also important elements in the genesis of crime (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:61). In the context of this study, the concept of victim resistance is particularly significant as it involves important elements such as the ways of resistance and the outcome of resistance.

### **3.4.1 Victim's reaction**

In general, the decision to resist a robbery attack is related to the victim's perception and assessment of the potential danger inherent in the situation. This usually depends on factors such as the number of robbers, the level of force actually employed or threatened, the presence or absence of a weapon and the type of weapon used. Research findings indicated that the presence of a weapon, particularly a firearm, is a strong intimidating factor, capable of reducing the probability of resistance and forcing the victim into compliance, thus enhancing the likelihood that the crime will be completed without the armed offender resorting to physical force (Fattah 1991:200).

Most victims resist their assailants in one way or another, the most common strategies being trying to escape, reasoning with or threatening the offender, shouting for help to scare off the attacker, and fighting back physically (Karmen 2007:83). Research findings also showed that victim's resistance is a primary determinant of both the success or failure of the crime and the probability of death or injury to the victim (Fattah 1991:206-210). Resistance has both positive and negative implications in that, on the one side, it was found to decrease the criminal's probability of success but, on the other, it significantly increased the risk of physical injuries to the victim (Conklin 2001:67; Hansmann 2000:24-28). According to Engelbrecht (2005), commercial armed robbers in South Africa will not usually become physically violent unless confronted or met with resistance, in which case they will not hesitate to shoot.

### **3.4.2 Outcome of resistance**

Evidence shows that victims who are injured during a robbery are more likely to have taken some self-protective measures. However, it must be stated that the conjunction

between injury and resistance also depends on a number of other factors, especially the presence of weapons, of other robbers, and of other victims. According to Karmen (2007:83), certain types of victims were more likely to be injured than other types, depending in part on the type of robbers they faced (armed or unarmed, alone or in groups). Victims were more likely to be physically harmed and need medical attention if they were attacked by three or more robbers and happened to be alone. Furthermore, the type of weapon wielded by the robber was found to be the most significant factor determining whether or not a victim will be wounded or killed. Armed robberies that began with the brandishing of a gun or knife were less likely to lead to injuries or death because the threat of the deadly weapon induced the victim to comply with the robbers' demand without offering resistance. On the other hand, victims who believed they could overpower an unarmed robber were more likely to be injured while resisting (Conklin 2001:67).

According to Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:4-5), in the United States there is evidence that jewellery store robbery is becoming more dangerous. Robbery with violence made up 45 percent of the total robbery events. Case analysis indicated that violence, i.e. physical contact or actual injuries inflicted by the robbers, almost always occurred as a response to some level of resistance on the part of the victim. According to the same source, between 1984 and 1994, 241 people were killed in crime against jewellers. However, murders involved with jewellery crime continued to decline sharply. In 2000 there were nine murders, down from fifteen in 1999 and 37 in 1991. Among the nine homicide victims, there were four criminals, two owners, one travelling sales person and two police officers. Survivors of non-fatal violent incidents were a total of 44 of which six were seriously assaulted, eleven pistol whipped, fifteen shot at but missed and twelve received non-fatal shots (Jewelers' Security Alliance 2000:2). In South Africa robbery at jewellery stores resulting in fatal injuries to the victims are not a common event but various types of injuries are often reported. However, the potential for a lethal outcome is always present. For example, the owners of a Boksburg jewellery store in Gauteng were found dead inside the store (Crime count & crime busters 2001:2). Recently, a policeman was killed during a robbery at a jewellery store in Durban (Cop caught in gunfight 2007).

### **3.5 CONSEQUENCES OF ROBBERY FOR THE VICTIMS**

Robbery is a sudden, unanticipated event in which the perpetrators attempt to establish control of the situation as rapidly as possible and by violent means. Its consequences for the victims are varied and far-reaching and can lead to financial and material loss, serious injuries or even death, as well as short or long-term psychological and physical effects depending on an individual personality and personal circumstances. Furthermore, robbery can also have a negative impact on someone's family and social life.

#### **3.5.1 Financial and material losses**

A robbery is an event that causes an immediate financial loss. Cash, personal belongings or valuable items are suddenly removed from the victim's possession. Very often losses are not limited to the above objects but also involve structural damage caused by robbers during the attack, which can lead to very expensive repairs. As opposed to the average commercial robbery, jewellery store robberies can be financially very damaging. In fact, a lifetime work can be taken away in just a few minutes, especially if jewellers are not adequately insured (see Chapter 6, section 6.3.1.2). For this reason, it can be stated that if one cannot afford to have insurance, one cannot afford to be a jeweller (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:6-7). Even with adequate insurance, there are still huge costs associated with crime, e.g. lost selling time, adjusting the loss, spending on crime prevention measures, low morale of employees and motivation at work, customers' doubts as to their safety (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:8).

According to Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:2), in the United States robbery was by far the category of crime against the jewellery industry, which accounted for the highest Dollar losses with USD 30.8 million (up 10.4 percent from 1999), followed by theft (USD 21.2 million) and burglary (USD 12.8 million). The average on-premises robbery loss increased from USD 131.423 in 1999 to USD 152.613 in 2000. Losses in excess of one million Rand in stolen jewellery have also been recorded in South Africa (Flanagan 2006:4).

### **3.5.2 Occupational impact**

Violent crime against jewellers may have a considerable impact on the jewellers or staff members' work situation. According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:31) conducted in England, the following results are significant to evaluate the economic impact of crime on retailers:

- 29 percent took time off work to handle the stress.
- 29 percent had a member of staff leaving employment as a result of retail crime.
- 18 percent lost one or two days man-hours.
- 18 percent lost three to seven days and twenty percent lost seven to ten days.
- A staggering 83 percent indicated that they considered giving up independent retailing because of the level of retail crime.

### **3.5.3 Physical impact**

Although in the majority of cases evidence suggests the contrary, robbery can at times involve a physical attack against one's person which may lead to serious injuries (assault with grievous bodily harm) or even death (murder). In fact, due to the violent nature of robbery, the risk of being further victimised, i.e. seriously assaulted or murdered, is present. Victims can sustain both short and long-term physical injuries, and, at times, be physically impaired for the rest of their lives. This again bears serious financial implications (Siegel 2004:83).

According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, the following findings related to physical trauma emerged:

- 16 percent received emergency hospital treatment.
- 11 percent required a visit to a doctor.
- 15 percent required time off work.

Violent incidents against jewellers include, amongst others, serious assault, fatal injuries, pistol whipping, stabbing, sexual violence (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:16).

### **3.5.4 Psycho-somatic impact**

The immediate and short-term effects of crime are usually extremely traumatic for the victim. Victimization poses an enormous mental strain on victims. A common element is a feeling of loss after victimisation (Siegel 2004:84). However, the effect of a violent crime such as robbery on the victim, both in the short and the long-term, depends on various factors such as the victim's personality, the nature of the crime, the circumstances in which it is committed, the violence to which the victim is exposed and the duration of the crime.

A robbery event can lead to psycho-somatic reactions both on a long and short-term basis. Research showed that common reactions during the robbery event were surprise, fear of death or injury, anger and paralysis. After the robbery, fear of repeat victimisation, depression, distrust, aggression and desire to quit one's profession, were also found to be common psychological disorders (Gabor 1987:107-119).

According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, the long-term effects of violent crime on retailers are very worrying. The following findings related to physical trauma emerged:

- 75 percent of store owners surveyed stated that they or their staff suffered stress as a result of retail crime.
- 5 percent indicated that their personal stress level at the time of the survey was unbearable, fairly severe (28 percent) and very severe (seventeen percent).
- 28 percent suffered stress-related illness.

### **3.5.5 Familial and social impact**

Some problems related to the personality of the victim may occur for extended periods of time. For instance a sudden and violent robbery attack may lead to fear of another attack and this may in turn cause victims to become socially withdrawn, to go out less often, and to become hyper-protective towards family members and friends whose safety they value (Siegel 2004:85). Also, feelings of distrust and anger can be very destructive in interpersonal relationships. They may find expression as racial hatred especially when directed against members of a racial group or minority, which the robber happens to belong to, and therefore racial hatred may affect one's relationship with other members of the community (Gabor 1987:115-116). The social costs of crime are indirect and take the form of a chronic fear of crime, distrust of the police and authorities in general, isolation and distrust of fellow human beings. Furthermore it can be stated that each crime that is committed is an attack against the very fabric of society, and goes against its democratic values, freedom and civilised customs.

### **3.5.6 Impact on criminal justice system**

Immediately after the commission of the robbery, victims are left traumatised and with a decision to be made on whom to contact for assistance and on whether to report the incident to the police or not. In the case of personal robberies, it is believed that many go unreported. On the contrary, commercial robberies are usually reported in view of, amongst others, insurance considerations. According to a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30-31) conducted in England, on the issue of help following a violent attack, retailers stated that they would turn for assistance to family and friends (43 percent), police (36 percent), victim support (8 percent) and personal doctors (5 percent).

After a robbery, because of the severity of the crime and the need to report it in order to be paid out by their insurance, jewellers in most cases report the event to the police, even though they seem to have a negative attitude towards the capability of the police in solving the crime and recovering the merchandise. The following reasons (listed

according to importance) for reporting crimes to the police were offered during a crime victimisation survey in Southern Africa (Naudé & Prinsloo 2002:91):

- The recovery of property.
- Wanted the offender to be caught and punished.
- Insurance purposes.

According to a study conducted in South Africa (Naudé, Prinsloo & Martins 1999:18-19), companies offered the following reasons for not reporting cases to the police:

- Many companies are reluctant to report crimes because of a perception of a heavy police workload and police inability (and the criminal justice system in general) to deal with crime, previous experience, and the inconvenience and legal costs involved.
- The seemingly negative attitude towards the police is supported by the fact that the police play a limited role in community education and, more specifically, in advising businesses on security matters.
- The poor police image is primarily due to the historical dissatisfaction of 39 percent of the research group with the way the police dealt with their previous reporting of crime.
- A significant 30 percent of respondents who appear neutral and still not negatively predisposed towards the police indicate a latent opportunity for the police to regain public confidence and cooperation.

The low arrest and property recovery rates following a robbery also contribute to a high level of dissatisfaction with the police. According to Karmen (2007:81), robbery victimisation studies indicated that recovery rates are usually low. Only about one third of the value of stolen property was ever recovered by the police, or by the victims themselves.

### **3.5.7 Fear of crime versus perceived and actual risk**

A serious consequence of robbery can be identified in a generalised fear of this crime. Because of the element of violence associated to an act of robbery, people are most

afraid of it (together with murder and rape), even though in actual fact it occurs least often as compared to other categories of crime (Conklin 2001:69). According to the 2003 National Victims of Crime Survey conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (Burton *et al* 2004:18-19), South Africans are very concerned about robbery, which is the second “most commonly discussed crime”, believed to be the second “most common crime” in respondents’ areas, and the fourth most feared crime (the first in Gauteng). However, according to both the survey and official crime statistics, the chances of any South African being robbed in any given year are about two out of a hundred. Fear of robbery is also linked to fear of strangers, particularly the thought of being attacked by strangers as in the majority of the robbery attacks.

Fear of crime is a state of mind which leads people into thinking that they are more vulnerable to crime. It has a negative psychological impact on the individual and may lead to a change in personal behaviour and lifestyle, as in the case of the intense reaction of fear provoked by the threat of violent crime against the person (Conklin 2001:69). Fear of crime can prevent people from living fulfilling and productive lives. It causes people to stay home, avoid certain neighbourhoods and move to safer communities. Furthermore, a person’s trust in his/her fellow human beings is destroyed by the fear of crime as strangers may be viewed as potential criminals. People who have been violently victimised may develop altruistic fear or fear for other, e.g. family members and close friends. Fear of crime has also an economic impact on individuals, families and businesses, which may lead to resorting to expensive measures to protect themselves against crime (Siegel 2004:85). On the positive side, fear of crime may help reduce the risk of victimisation by inducing those who are fearful to adopt specific precautions and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to crime. On the other hand, however, fear of crime may also contribute to one’s victimisation as when, for instance, a victim is chosen by robbers as a possible target because of his/her weak and fearful appearance (Shadel 1995:22). The central concept is vulnerability. When certain people believe they are vulnerable, they may have a high level of fear which does not necessarily correspond to the objective realities of threat and risk (Fattah 1991:264). In fact, many people are victimised more by fear of crime than by an actual crime. As an example, a victim survey (Mistry 2004:19), highlighted the fact that, despite the decline in crime rates, South Africans



felt less safe in 2003 than they did in 1998. More than half of South Africans felt that crime had increased in the areas where they lived.

Armed robbery is typically what business owners fear most. Although armed robbery is not the biggest threat to a business, because the media continuously portray this type of violence, business owners often indicate that they are afraid they will be held at gunpoint. Fear of crime is very common among retailers, particularly in city areas with higher level of crime. This emerged from a survey (Retail Violence Survey 2000:30) conducted in England, which found that as many as 85 percent of respondents (retailers) felt at some risk of becoming victims of crime while at work (of which 28 percent feared victimisation all the time). Furthermore, 52 percent of the retailers also believed that their performance at work had been to a certain degree adversely affected. According to a 1998 national commercial crime survey (Naudé, Prinsloo & Martins 1999:11) conducted for the first time in South Africa, crime was regarded as a serious or fairly serious problem by 58,7 percent of the respondents, which corresponds with the general concern of all South Africans on this vital issue. A considerable percentage of companies (53,8) also reported an increase in crime problems. In a survey (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:4) conducted among jewellers in Canada, it was found that, in response to the question "What are jewellers most concerned about?", "making a profit" rated third below "break and enter" and "security". Crime and security related issues are therefore a jeweller's top concern in order to decrease feelings of fear.

The fear of robbery experienced by many jewellers and members of staff is the result of a perceived risk of victimisation. The higher the perceived risk, the stronger the fear of crime will be. Perception of risk, on the other hand, does not necessarily correspond to the reality of the crime situation. As an example, research found that women were more fearful than men, despite women's lower rates of victimisation (except for rape). This was attributed to the fact that fear of rape amongst women also had a negative effect on other types of crime. In addition, when gender is taken into consideration, older people were no more fearful of crime than younger ones. The reality is that older adults comprise the lowest category of victims of all crimes (Conklin 2001:394). The possible explanation for this is that they tend not to be in

areas that are hotspots like downtown where younger people would be going to work, and they tend to stay indoors, especially at night (Shadel 1995:17).

### **3.6 CONCLUSION**

No crime can be analysed without a proper understanding of the victim's role in the unfolding of a criminal event. The victim's personal, psychological and situational involvement, as well as the criminal-victim interaction are essential elements of a crime. Not all individuals or businesses are vulnerable to crime to the same extent. Some are, in fact, more vulnerable than others because of specific factors such as socio-demographic properties (e.g. age, gender, race and location), specific characteristics (e.g. attractiveness, suitability, vulnerability, exposure to motivated offenders and high risk situations), behaviour and lifestyle.

The same can be said of jewellers who, because of their occupation, are exposed to high levels of fear and victimisation risks. While for other categories of victims variables such as sex, age and race are relevant (particularly in the case of crimes against the person), jewellers are more exposed to what can be defined as "occupational crime risk" or the crime risks inherent in the very nature of their profession, the most important of which being theft, fraud and robbery. Armed robbery in particular, because of its violent nature and negative consequences, must be considered as a very serious threat to any individual or business in that it can lead to financial loss, serious injuries or even death, as well as short and long-term psychological effects. For a jewellery store owner in particular, a single robbery event can, apart from the possible violence associated to it, be financially very damaging to such an extent that he/she may be forced out of business. In the following chapter, a theoretical explanation will be offered in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery within a specific framework.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **APPLICABLE THEORIES FOR THE EXPLANATION OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

#### **4.1 INTRODUCTION**

The previous two chapters contribute to a better understanding of the literature on the nature of jewellery store robbery offering the opportunity of a theoretical explanation. As it is not possible to deal with all the explanatory factors in detail, it becomes necessary to fix boundaries and act within a specific theoretical framework. This is necessary in order to focus on what is relevant in the explanation of jewellery store robbery. In this context, the most relevant theoretical points of departure are the rational choice, the victim and the integrated approaches to the explanation of crime. Within these approaches, various theories can then be applied in the attempt to explain the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery from different perspectives, i.e. the offender, the victim or target and the crime situation.

Rational choice has dominated past criminological thinking and today is still of great value in explaining criminal behaviour. Modern opportunity and victimisation theories also play an important role not only in the explanation of robbery but also in the formulation of appropriate strategies for its prevention (opportunity reduction model). However, as it may be difficult to explain by means of a single theory why jewellery stores are being targeted by robbers, an integrated approach combining different theoretical schools of thought can possibly provide the best answers to an otherwise complex phenomenon. In this regard, an explanation of the criminal event model becomes important as it integrates various theoretical concepts into a cohesive unit.

The focus of this chapter will firstly be on the theoretical framework for the explanation of crime where after a specific theoretical framework for the explanation of jewellery store robbery will be addressed. It is also important to stress that the emphasis of this study is on those theories that are mostly applicable to the victim and the crime situation, in this case the jewellers, members of staff and the jewellery store,

rather than the offender or jewellery store robber. The latter, as indicated in Chapter 7, section 7.3.6 should become the focus of further research activities.

## **4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Specific criminological schools or directions can be identified which have different approaches or points of departure with respect to the explanation of crime. In the context of this study, important theoretical starting points in the explanation of robbery are the rational choice, the victim and the integrated approaches. Their relevance is due to the fact that they can be successfully applied in specific circumstances and environments which provide rational offenders with opportunities for crime commission. These approaches do not exclude the importance of other factors in the explanation of crime, i.e. the biophysical, the psychological and the sociological, which stress predisposing factors in criminal behaviour. However, factors focusing on the offender as an individual are considered as not being easily subject to treatment or change and, in actual fact, necessitate long-term and often complicated intervention measures. On the other hand, rational choice based approaches are more immediate as they focus mainly on the crime situation and victims' behaviour (Felson & Clarke 1998:1-3).

### **4.2.1 Rational choice approach**

The rational choice approach is derived from the classical school of criminology which can be traced to about 1764 to the work of Beccaria and Bentham. This is where the classical theory evolved. After a period of decline, during which the principles of the positivist approach (e.g. poverty, education, family life and individual's personal traits) became the main focus, the classical approach began to enjoy resurging popularity in the form of rational choice (Brown, Esbensen & Geis 2001:219). According to the rational choice perspective, offending is purposive behaviour in that the criminal takes into account the benefits and the costs of committing the offence. This decision is reached after due consideration to personal rewards, e.g. obtaining cash from the sale of the stolen jewellery, as opposed to the difficulties in the execution of the crime, e.g. the degree of protection of the target, and the actual risk of being caught and dealt with by the criminal justice system.

Therefore, the decision to commit a specific type of crime is a matter of personal choice based on weighing up of risks and available opportunities in a specific environment (Lab 2000:79; Siegel 2004:109).

According to Walklate (2003:38-39), the value of this perspective has been argued within the context of its crime prevention potential, usually referred to as situational crime prevention. The harder the target of criminal behaviour, the more likely the offender will choose another target. Hence, the actual protection of the environment and the victim's behaviour play a major role in minimising crime opportunities (see Chapter 6, section 6.2).

#### **4.2.2 Victim approach**

With the victim approach, which was generated by the thinking of von Hentig (1948) and Mendelsohn at a later stage (1965), more attention was paid to the problems concerning crime victimisation, in particular to the criminal-victim interaction and victim's involvement in the criminal event. This entailed a change of focus from the criminal to the victim's perspective (Garkawe 2001:92-93). This approach stressed the individual's (the victim) behaviour, lifestyle and activities in the genesis of opportunities for criminal behaviour, the main underlying assumption being that specific characteristics or behavioural patterns of the victim may generate crime (Walklate 2003:39). For instance, careless behaviour on the part of victims not only creates an opportunity for crime commission, but is also considered as an important factor in crime causation.

#### **4.2.3 Integrated approach**

The integrated approach moves away from the static theoretical models used to explain criminal behaviour and considers all the different dynamics of the criminal-victim interaction within a specific setting, including the physical and social environment, the victim, the criminal, the bystander and the criminal justice process (Van der Hoven 2001:82). This approach emphasises the study of crime as an event (process) with its preceding factors (precursors), the event itself and the aftermath of the event (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:137).

### **4.3 EXPLANATORY THEORIES**

Based on the literature study (Chapters 2 and 3), the opportunities generated by both the physical environment (the jewellery store and its immediate surroundings) as well as individual behaviour and activities (the jewellers and members of staff), are fundamental in the explanation of the robbery event. The robber, after having assessed the opportunities, risks and benefits involved (rational choice), will decide on the feasibility of the execution of the robbery against the selected target. Following on the approaches discussed above, modern theories which can be considered as most relevant to this study are the opportunity theory (rational choice and crime patterns), the victimisation theory (routine activities and lifestyle) and the integrated theory (the criminal event).

#### **4.3.1 Opportunity theory**

The value of opportunities in the explanation of criminal behaviour has in the past been neglected, since most criminological thinking focused only on individual, psychological and social factors, all concepts which are often difficult to explain in the immediacy of a crime situation. On the contrary, opportunities, along with personal and social factors, make the case for being considered as a principal element in the explanation of crime (Felson & Clarke 1998:III). According to the opportunity theory, criminal behaviour is seen as the result of an interaction between the person (criminal) with his/her predispositions, and the setting (environment) with its precipitating conditions (crime opportunities). The simultaneous existence of the criminal's desire to commit a crime and the belief that an opportunity exists to commit it, is fundamental for the actual execution of the offence. Opportunity theory is concentrated on the environment, and not on the individual bio-psycho-social make-up. It is the opinion of the researcher that opportunity is undoubtedly a very important concept in the explanation of crime in that no crime can occur without the physical opportunities to carry it out. Furthermore, even if one has a predisposition to commit a crime, one cannot do so unless specific opportunities are available.

With the opportunity theory emphasis is on the opportunities that criminals have to commit jewellery store robbery. The crime opportunities present in a specific physical environment (setting), in this case the jewellery store, as well as the opportunities generated by the action or inaction of the jewellers and their staff, are seen as an important factor in the commission of robbery. In this context, opportunities are given by factors such as the following (Felson 2002:21-22):

- the presence of motivated offenders (jewellery store robbers);
- the availability of suitable targets (there is an abundance of jewellery stores in every city, suburb and shopping complex);
- the availability of highly expensive merchandise (jewellery, watches, precious stones, amongst others);
- the absence of capable guardians (such as the presence of only one member of staff);
- the weakness of the security measures protecting the store;
- suitable environmental conditions (e.g. the position of the store near the exit and easy escape routes leading to a freeway or major thoroughfare).

After assessing the above factors, criminals will decide whether robbing a jewellery store is worth the risk or not.

Opportunity theories such as routine activity, rational choice and crime pattern should not be seen in isolation but rather as overlapping. They have in fact many of the same principles, the core ones being as explained below (Felson & Clarke 1998:V-VI):

- **Opportunities play a role in causing all crime;** they are not restricted to property offences only, but involve all classes of crime, including violent crimes such as robbery.
- **Crime opportunities are highly specific;** they differ considerably depending on the type of criminal and crime involved. Robbery of banks, post offices and jewellery stores are all different in terms of crime opportunity. It follows logically that crime opportunity reduction is also highly specific.

- **Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space.** Crime shifts significantly from area to area, even within the same geographical area. The opportunities to carry it out also fluctuate with hours of day and days of week.
- **Crime opportunities depend on people's daily activities.** Offenders and their targets / victims shift according to the trips to work, school and leisure settings. As an example, jewellery store burglars move to commercial districts when these are closed for business.
- **One crime produces opportunities for another.** During the commission of one crime, offenders can unwittingly be drawn into others. For example during the robbery of a jewellery store, the jeweller's physical reaction may in turn provoke an even more violent reaction from the robbers, causing serious injuries or death. This is an example of how a robbery can turn into an assault or a murder. The stolen jewellery also generates opportunities for other type of crimes, e.g. selling and receiving stolen goods.
- **Some items offer more tempting crime opportunities.** Obviously cash is what robbers target most. Jewellery is also high on the list of the most targeted items in that it complies in particular with the concepts of value and inertia (jewellery items are high in value and easy to carry away from the scene of the crime).
- **Social and technological changes produce (or reduce) new crime opportunities.** An example of this has been the advent of cellular technology which brought along not only thefts and robberies targeting this specific item, but also facilitated the commission of many crimes, including jewellery store robbery.
- **Crime can be prevented by reducing opportunities,** a fundamental concept of this study. This important crime prevention strategy is thoroughly discussed in conjunction with other concepts relevant to situational crime prevention, i.e. crime displacement and diffusion of benefits.

#### **4.3.1.1 Rational choice**

Expanding on the principles of the classical approach, rational choice focuses on the offenders and their decision-making, driven by a particular motive within a specific setting (environment or social structure) which offers opportunities for criminal behaviour. In this sense, crime is seen as a subjective choice within a given objective



situation. The choice to commit an offence is taken after due consideration of the expected rewards, costs and risks of alternative actions. After this initial assessment, criminals will then select the action which will best serve their purposes (Felson & Clarke 1998:7-8). Therefore, according to rational choice, most offenders do not select their victims or targets arbitrarily. On the contrary, in the case of property offences or other profit-oriented offences such as robbery, criminals usually select their targets carefully and cautiously.

Rational choice views crime as both offence and offender specific. This implies that both crimes and criminals are different from one another, have different purposes, needs and fears and require different skills. The decision to become a criminal rather than a law abiding citizen, or withdrawing from a criminal career, is influenced by different factors such as personality, age, status, risk and opportunity. Furthermore, evidence of rational choice may be found in the way criminals structure their crimes with regard to choosing the type of crime, the time and place, the target and the technique to commit the offence, as explained below (Siegel 2004:109-113):

- **Choosing the type of crime**

Some offenders are generalist who can commit different types of crime depending on what their immediate needs are. Others are specialists such as professional robbers who focus on attacking lucrative targets.

- **Choosing the time and place of crime**

As emerged from a study of the literature (Chapter 2, section 2.3.4.2, I-II-III-X), commercial robbers tend to pick the time and day of crimes carefully, and to commit crime at the edges, away from their own neighbourhood. Robbers are also willing to travel considerable distances to rob a lucrative target.

- **Choosing the target**

The level of risk is a significant factor in the rational criminals' decision to commit a robbery. In fact, risk is an important criterion for target selection (Fattah 1991:342). Because robbery involves a direct confrontation with the victim, it is accompanied by far greater risk for the offender than offences in which there is no confrontation, e.g. fraud or burglary. Rational offenders usually plan their crime

and select their targets paying special attention to the likelihood of success or failure and risks or dangers of the crime situation.

- **Learning criminal techniques**

Through their association with the crime underworld and the experience acquired in the field, criminals learn techniques which help them avoid detection, a sure sign of rational thinking and planning. Eventually over a period of time, the criminal's technique may develop into a set pattern of behaviour which becomes his trademark or *modus operandi*. Ultimately, this set pattern of behaviour may cause the criminal's downfall, leading to his identification and apprehension.

Based on the study of the existing literature as shown in Chapter 2, the average jewellery store robber can therefore be described as a rational choice offender. The jewellery store robber carefully selects his target prior to the execution of the robbery, taking into consideration the rewards, i.e. the cash obtained through the sale of the stolen jewellery, and the risks associated with his action, e.g. the possibility of encountering resistance, being seen by by-standers, security or police and being arrested or injured / killed in the process.

#### **4.3.1.2 Crime patterns**

Local areas play an important role in generating opportunities for crime commission. Crime patterns theory, a central component of environmental criminology, considers how criminals, potential victims and actual victims move about in space and time. Based on the rational choice perspective, crime patterns seek an explanation as to the reasons why criminals choose to concentrate their actions at specific locations and times. Crime patterns theory is based on three main concepts: nodes, paths and edges, which can be explained as follows (Felson & Clarke 1998:6-7):

- **Nodes** refer to the way people travel to and from a specific area. Each offender searches for crime targets around personal activity nodes and the paths around them.
- **Paths** are specific routes followed by people when they go about their daily activities. They are closely related to where they fall victim to crime. As an

example, a jeweller may follow a specific route on his/her way to work which exposes him/her to the risk of victimisation.

- **Edges** refer to the boundaries of areas where people live, work, shop or seek entertainment. They are important because it is where people who do not know each other come into contact. Some crimes such as shoplifting and robbery are committed mostly at the edges.

Specific geographical areas may act as crime generators, crime attractors (or both), or crime detractors (Felson & Clarke 1998:15):

- **Crime generators** refer to a specific area where there is a concentration of opportunities for crime, giving rise to a phenomenon called “hot spots”, namely specific geographical locations which draw many more calls for police service than others. A hot spot can be also defined as a specific geographical area where crime or certain types of crime repeatedly occur. People living or working and businesses operating in a crime hot spot elevate their chance of victimisation (Siegel 2004:93). With regard to hot-spots in South Africa, Gauteng is considered the hot spot province for violent crimes such as armed robbery, and Johannesburg has been identified as the city with the highest number of violent and property crime followed by Pretoria and Cape Town (Van der Hoven & Maree 2005:66).
- **Crime attractors** involve an area which, for some reason, acts as a magnet for offenders coming from other areas.
- **Crime detractors** instead refer to a location where crime is discouraged from happening as in the case of an area where a large presence of security and police acts as a deterrent against would be criminals.

Crime opportunities are not equally distributed; on the contrary, they are highly uneven for many reasons, e.g. lack of suitable targets and victims; lack of motivated offenders and capable guardians; unsuitable locations for crime commission. As an example, robbers wanting to attack a jewellery store can do so only at particular times and places. Because of the concentration of up-market jewellery stores in suburban areas and inside shopping centres, these are usually the most likely places for a robbery to occur. Whilst jewellery burglars strike after hours when stores are closed,

robbers usually strike during business hours, although there have been recorded instances of after-hours robberies (Jewelers' Security Alliance 2000:3). Following on this explanation, it can be stated that crime patterns theory is important because it helps, on the one side, to understand crime patterns (geographic profiling) and, on the other, to focus crime prevention efforts where needed most.

#### **4.3.2 Victimisation theory**

Very often individuals play a significant role in generating conditions for criminal behaviour. Individuals' lifestyle, social and occupational activities, for instance, can actively contribute to their victimisation. Some individuals are exposed to the risk of criminal victimisation simply because of the dangerous nature of the work they perform. Lifestyle and routine activities theory are suitable to explain this type of exposure. In other instances instead, it is the victims' behaviour that may expose them to victimisation. For instance, specific individual actions (or inactions) may generate opportunities for the perpetration of a crime (Siegel 2004:91-92). In fact, according to opportunity theory, criminals take advantage of situational opportunities, many of which are created by victims' negligent, careless, or facilitating behaviour. Besides the crime risk inherent in their work activities, jewellers' attitude and behaviour towards security, and the precautions or protective measures they take (or do not take) can increase or diminish the risk of victimisation. Furthermore, if victimisation does occur, the manner in which they react can either reduce or increase the risk of further victimisation, which could lead to serious injuries and even death.

According to victimisation and interaction theory, more than motivation and opportunity are needed to understand why and how crime occurs. The victim should not be considered as merely a passive target in crime but rather as someone who, in one way or the other, contributes to his / her own victimisation. Victims often provoke or encourage, through specific actions or inactions (negligence), the criminal attack and therefore it can be said that, at times, they share a degree of responsibility in the genesis of crime. In fact, they are considered as key participants whose actions (or inactions) prior to and during a criminal event can have a dramatic impact on the outcome of the crime (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:107).

Violent crimes such as robbery involve an interaction between the offender and the victim, albeit short, within a specific setting. The victim's response during this short interaction varies significantly from case to case, depending on a number of individual and situational variables such as, among others, age, sex, physical and mental condition, presence of bystanders, intervention by third parties, criminals' change of heart or plans. The victim's reaction to the robbery event will in turn determine the nature of the offender's response (Fattah 1991:206). Routine activities and lifestyle exposure are the victimisation theories which are most relevant and applicable to this study.

#### **4.3.2.1 Routine activities**

Routine activities, which was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979), maintains that crime occurs when there is a convergence in time and space of three minimal elements: a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian (Brown *et al* 2001:220). Routine activities can be defined as any recurrent and prevalent activities that are part of people's everyday social interaction, e.g. recreation and formal occupation (Davis 2005:40). According to routine activities, for a crime to occur, a motivated offender must find a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian. It is when these three factors coincide that a crime occurs (Siegel 2004:92).

- **Motivated offenders:** their presence is taken as a given fact in that, in any society, there will always be someone criminally predisposed and willing to seize opportunities to commit crime.
- **Guardians** can be anybody whose presence or proximity to the target would discourage a crime from happening. The mere presence or proximity of a person(s), e.g. a co-worker, public, police or security, can be a powerful deterrent in crime. Guardianship can also involve physical and electronic security measures, which can deter crime and limit access to targets. When these guardians are absent, a target or victim is at risk of criminal attack

- **Suitable target** means that criminal choice is influenced by the perception of target vulnerability. The more suitable and accessible the target, the more likely crime will occur.

According to Felson and Clarke (1998:4-6), four main elements influence a target risk for criminal attack:

- **Value**, meaning that the target or victim's possession must be financially rewarding.
- **Inertia**, meaning that the items, which are the target of the criminal attack, must be easy to carry away.
- **Visibility**, which refers to the exposure of targets to offenders.
- **Access** involves all those environmental and situational features which make it easier for offenders to get to the target.

The above principles can all be seen in the following practical example applicable to this study. A robber (motivated offender) is assessing the possibility of committing a robbery against a jewellery store situated on a street, close to a highway ramp (suitable target). He is attracted by the following factors: a) very valuable items of jewellery and watches are displayed near the exit (suitable target); b) there is only one member of staff inside the store; no customers and security are present (absence of capable guardians). The robber then proceeds to rob the store and easily succeeds in doing so. During his assessment of the situation, as well as of the risks and benefits, the robber paid special attention to the following:

- The targeted items were identified as being high value items, wanted by buyers (value).
- The targeted items were all very easy to carry and hide away (inertia).
- The targeted items were very visible from outside the store (visibility).
- The targeted items were all displayed near the entry/exit and therefore easily reachable (access).

The routine activity, which is of particular interest to this study, is the type of work or occupation that jewellers and members of staff conduct on a daily basis. This activity exposes them to an above average risk of criminal victimisation and makes them vulnerable to specific predatory crimes such as theft and robbery.

#### **4.3.2.2 Lifestyle exposure**

Routine activities are closely linked to lifestyle exposure theory of criminal victimisation, as developed by Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo (1978). The basis of this theory is that crime is not a random occurrence but rather a function of the victim's lifestyle, which refers to routine daily activities or patterned ways, both of a recreational and occupational nature (Siegel 2004:92). As in the case of routine activities, lifestyle theory stresses the fact that certain everyday activities increase the risk of criminal victimisation, which is influenced by variations in lifestyle and key demographic variables such as age, race, income, marital status, education and occupation (Davis 2005:36). Lifestyle differences also reflect the social roles one is required to play and the various types of social restraints to which one is subject. In this sense, it can be stated that lifestyle structures victimisation opportunities (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:96-97).

With regard to this study, the relevance of lifestyle exposure is that, as in the case of routine activities, it shares basic concepts such as proximity to criminals, time of exposure to criminals, target attractiveness and guardianships. The occupational nature of a jeweller's daily routine activities exposes him / her to a significant risk of victimisation, particularly theft and robbery. However, lifestyle theory appears to be better suited to explain predatory crimes such as street robberies and muggings rather than more rational type of crimes such as jewellery store robberies.

#### **4.3.3 An integrated model: the criminal event**

The theories discussed above are all relevant to explain the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery. However, their relevance carries less weight if they are considered in isolation. On the contrary, a model which integrates various elements of the theories

into a unit, is ideal in the explanation of crime as it can be applied in a practical way (Van der Hoven 2001:86).

Based on the different phases of robbery (Chapter 2, section 2.3.4), the criminal event model, which was introduced by Sacco and Kennedy (2002:137), is a new way of explaining and integrating the various dynamics or components present in a crime situation. They argued that, in studying the criminal event, explanations should move beyond the motivation of offenders or the responses of the victims. A more comprehensive view must consider firstly, the precursors of the event (including the locational and situational factors that bring people together in time and space); secondly, the criminal event (how the interactions among participants define the outcome of their actions); thirdly, the aftermath of the event (including the reporting to the police or security, their response, the harm done, the redress required, and the long term consequences of the event in terms of public reactions and changing of laws).

#### **4.3.3.1 Precursors to the robbery event**

In order to understand the precursors of a jewellery store robbery event, attention must be given to different factors such as (Van der Hoven 2001:84-85):

- The jewellery store robbers' motivation and criteria in target selection.
- The physical context or environment.
- The victims or targets (jewellery stores, jewellers, members of staff and customers) and their vulnerability to crime.
- The role played by the victims, i.e. jewellers and members of staff, in creating the opportunities for a robbery.

Motivation is an important element in the precipitation of a criminal event. It refers to an inner condition (in this case the robbers') that stems from a need or desire. It directs the behaviour towards a particular goal, namely the fulfillment of the aroused need (Van der Hoven 2001:84). Jewellery store robbers, as in the case of the majority of robbers, appear to be motivated by a desire to obtain an immediate financial reward



(through the sale of the stolen jewellery). However, their motivation may also be the result of the need to maintain a high standard of living.

The physical context refers to the presence of certain factors in the physical environment which may be conducive to crime such as, amongst others, poor visibility, lighting conditions, absence of security and availability of easy escape routes. These factors may create an attractive target for robbers. The physical context also creates the opportunity to commit a particular crime, e.g. the location of a jewellery store near a major road and freeway ramp is ideal for a robbery attack. The workplace (jewellery store) becomes the setting where the criminal event (robbery) takes place. The various activities being performed inside the jewellery store influence not only the type of criminal event that may occur but also the different reaction to such event.

#### **4.3.3.2 The robbery event**

The criminal event is regarded as having a dynamic nature. Important elements to be considered as part of the criminal event are (Van der Hoven 2001:86-87):

- The interaction between the offender and the victim.
- The type and seriousness of the crime.
- The *modus operandi* of the offender.

The way victims react during a robbery attack is an important element of the criminal event in that it may lead to extremely serious consequences. The way the crime is executed may show similarities with other incidents, place the same criminals at different crime scenes, reveal the offender's intent as well as specific characteristics such as cruelty and capacity to act violently and unscrupulously. The use of intimidation and violence, the display of firearms to exercise total control over the victims, the seizing of valuable merchandise and personal belongings, the methods of attack and escape are, amongst others, important elements of the jewellery store robbery event.

#### **4.3.3.3 The aftermath of the robbery event**

An understanding of the aftermath of a crime is essential as every crime provokes specific reactions and has consequences of a human and material nature (Van der Hoven 2001:87). In the case of a jewellery store robbery, important elements characterising the aftermath of the event are:

- The reaction of the security or police and the victims' level of satisfaction with their work.
- The consequences of robbery on the victims (e.g. jewellers, members of staff and bystanders).

The victims of jewellery store robbery require the assistance of the police to investigate the crime with a view to apprehend the suspect and attempt to recover the stolen merchandise. Victims may be seriously injured or killed, not to mention the material loss they may sustain during the robbery attack. Psychologically, the victims may also be seriously affected in the short or long-term. The degree of harm suffered by the victim and the resources required to help the victim recover are also important components of the integrated model.

The robbery event must also be understood from the criminals' perspective. For instance, the offenders' behaviour during and after the commission of a crime has a bearing on their degree of guilt. It must be stressed that criminals are ultimately also victims of their own actions in that, if apprehended, they (and their families too) have to endure the criminal justice process, which may result in stiff punishment.

The final phase in the analysis of the criminal event is the influence that the crime may have on the community. Factors to be taken into account should include the offender's degree of danger to the community, the possibility of recidivism as well as the community's sentiment with regard to the crime committed.

## **4.4 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE APPLICABLE THEORIES**

### **4.4.1 Robbers, opportunity and rationality**

Accepting that opportunity is the primary cause of crime, equal in importance to personal and social factors, results in a criminological approach that is not only more complete in its theorizing but also more practical and effective in the short-term (Felson & Clarke 1998:33). Positive considerations involving opportunity-based theories are as follows (Newman 1997:2-4):

- They are effective and practical and pave the way for immediate actions against a potential or actual criminal threat as soon as specific opportunity factors are identified.
- Distant bio-psycho-social conditions are much harder to alter than proximal ones (opportunities) and provide solutions in the short (or even immediate) term, as opposed to distant causes of crime, such as personal and social factors, which require long-term involvement.
- Opportunities are at least as important as individual and social factors and are in fact far more tangible and relevant to an impending crime problem or situation.
- Accepting opportunity as a principal cause of crime also opens up a new vista of crime prevention strategies focused on opportunity reduction.

However, situational or opportunity theory has also received much criticism, mainly in relation to the following factors (Newman 1997:4; Felson & Clarke, 1998:25-28):

- It does not address the root causes of crime and relegates personal and social factors to the background.
- A major limitation is that it pays little attention to the nature of the offender motivation or to the relationship (interaction) between the offender and the victim.
- More research is still needed to strengthen the theoretical status.

The fact remains that opportunity theory plays a significant role not only in the explanation of crime but also in the formulation of “opportunity reduction” strategies which may be applied as a short-term solution to specific crime problems.

The applicability of the rational choice perspective is that, on the one side, it makes it possible to better understand the decision-making process of offenders and, on the other, it offers a framework within which criminological and victimological theories may be integrated. However, can it be safely assumed that potential offenders are always rational in their decision to commit robbery? Often, criminals do not make decisions that would appear to be in their own best interest, for a variety of reasons such as, amongst others (Brown *et al.* 2001:223):

- They do not always have all the information they need to make informed decisions.
- Even if information is available, they may not have the capacity to optimally process the information.
- Choices may differ from individual to individual depending on one’s cognitive abilities / deficiencies and learning experiences.

It can be stated that many crimes including crimes of violence are often committed on the spur of the moment, based more on an individual’s instincts than rationality. Certain offences such as vandalism can, in many instances, be classified as irrational. In the case of robberies instead, the presence of elements linked to rational choice such as, for instance, careful selection of the target, evaluation of the scene (prior to the actual robbery), escape routes and time of attack, are evident (Siegel 2004:113).

#### **4.4.2 Victims, behaviour and lifestyle**

With regard to victimisation theories, it cannot be denied that some individual action or inaction can either facilitate or precipitate the commission of a robbery. By acting in a certain manner or failing to act when necessary, individuals create opportunities for criminal behaviour. Important considerations on victim theories are as follows (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:104-105):

- Victimisation theory shifted from the traditional criminological theory which focused only on the action of the criminal offender whilst ignoring the role of the victim.
- Victimisation theory becomes essential in providing an understanding of the different criminal-victim interaction dynamics, which can lead to the precipitation or facilitation of a robbery event in a situational context.

However, much criticism has also been leveled at victimisation theory, the main points being the following (Fattah 1991:293-294; Sacco & Kennedy 2002:104-105):

- As in the case of opportunity, victimisation theory is for the most part applicable in the immediate environment, thus neglecting other root causes of crime within an individual bio-psycho-social make-up.
- Radical criminologists argued that the concept of victim precipitation led to “victim blaming” and also diverted attention from the structural causes of crime. This viewpoint has both ideological and gender biases and fails to see the real value of victimisation theory, i.e. the explanation of the dynamics of victim-offender interaction. Victimisation theory does not seek to explain why some people become criminals, but rather why some individuals or targets become victims and this cannot be done without a thorough understanding of the characteristics, behaviour and lifestyle of the victims.
- To be successful, some victimisation models imply a collective participation in the prevention of victimisation. However, not all individuals will co-operate collectively on all levels of deterrence. This factor may lead to instances where certain individuals are actually isolated by the majority of the group, thus becoming more crime vulnerable.
- Furthermore, there is a need to move beyond the interaction between victims and offenders and include other participants in the crime situation, e.g. bystanders, security and police.
- Research on victim response to face-to-face victimisation has yet to solve a number of conceptual and methodological problems. It needs, among others, to develop a typology of responses and adequate measures of the resistance level.

The effectiveness of the victim response needs to be measured on important aspects such as completion or non-completion of the criminal attack, avoidance or sustainment of injuries, duration of the attack and psychological impact (Fattah 1991:215).

Notwithstanding the above limitations, the fact remains that the role of the victim and his/her interaction with the criminal is fundamental, not only in the explanation of robbery, but also in the formulation of robbery prevention strategies, especially those relevant to the behaviour of individuals (before, during and after the commission of the crime).

With reference to the routine activity of victims various aspects can be addressed in the evaluation (Davis 2005:41). Critics of routine activity point out that empirical tests of this theory are often based on false and ambiguous assumptions. For example, according to routine activity, the affluent should have a lower victimisation risk than the poor because they have better access to security. Yet affluence allows people to increase activities outside the home and their wealth makes them tempting targets. Furthermore, it has been suggested that routine activity, by placing too much emphasis on the victim, neglects to account for the individual (the criminal) factors that shape criminal choice. While the scrutiny of victims' lifestyles is a practical way of assessing the risks of victimisation and possible preventative strategies, it may also be considered as an intrusion in an individual's lifestyle or an instrument judgmental of the victim's behaviour (Brown *et al.* 2001:221). Despite such criticism, routine activity continues to offer an important explanation of the phenomenon of victimisation, in particular that resulting from predatory crimes.

#### **4.4.3 Robbery as a criminal event**

The criminal event can be successfully applied in the explanation of jewellery store robbery as it helps to integrate the various dynamics or components present in a crime situation, i.e. the precursors, the event and the aftermath. However, the criminal event cannot be separated from the physical and social settings in which it occurs. It is also intricately linked to the routine activities in which both victims and offenders engage (Van der Hoven 2001:83). The criminal event also has shortcomings, especially in

view of the fact that the information provided by the various parties taking part in a specific crime, e.g. criminals, victims and bystanders, is often inaccurate and unreliable.

#### **4.5 CONCLUSION**

From the literature study on the nature of robbery at jewellery stores three components, namely the crime, the criminal and the victim are prominent. Therefore, the limitation of this study within a specific theoretical framework is essential for the positive outcome of the study itself. Without a solid theoretical foundation, the study would lose purpose and direction. In the context of this research endeavour, the applicable theoretical framework included opportunity-based approaches and theories focusing on the victim and the crime situation.

The principles of opportunity theories as applicable to a specific setting, i.e. the jewellery store, are relevant throughout the study, where it is in fact argued that opportunity should be considered as one of the primary factors in the explanation of robbery. Furthermore, the role played by potential or actual victims, i.e. jewellers and members of staff, in causing the facilitation or precipitation of a robbery event, in other words, in generating opportunities for its commission, is also important for the understanding of its different dynamics and outcomes.

Separate theories should not be treated as isolated sections; on the contrary, as shown in the criminal event analysis, various theoretical elements can be incorporated into a cohesive unit and applied in a practical way. Likewise, the explanation of an event such as jewellery store robbery cannot be considered in a fragmented way. In fact, various elements play an important role in creating the opportunity for this crime to occur, be it the robber(s), the victim(s) or environmental situations. In the following chapter, an analysis and interpretation of the research findings will be conducted with a view to continue with the exploration of the crime phenomenon under investigation.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS**

#### **5.1 INTRODUCTION**

This chapter includes a presentation of the research findings as emerged from the data collected from the respondents' questionnaires, structured and semi-structured interviews. The findings will be addressed following the headings reflected in the questionnaire (see "Appendix A") and in the interview schedule's themes (see "Appendix B"). Some of the findings will be presented by means of pie charts and bar graphs, which are effective and easy to interpret illustrations, often used instead of tables for frequency distributions (De Vos et al 2002:230). In the discussion, because the total number of questionnaire respondents was small (45), the percentage (%) and directly after the total number (N) will be stated for better understanding, for example (15.38 percent / 2).

#### **5.2 FINDINGS BASED ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

Statistical computer processing of the information collected from the respondents' questionnaires was based on the *FREQ* procedure, which showed frequency, percentage, cumulative frequency and cumulative percentage.

##### **5.2.1 Respondents' biographical and geographical information**

The information provided in this section deals with the respondents' gender, age and position at work as well as the jewellery stores' geographical location. The purpose of this section is to obtain an accurate profile of the respondents taking part in the study.



### **5.2.1.1 Gender**

More male (57.78 percent / 26) than female (42.22 percent / 19) respondents returned the questionnaire. This is probably due to the fact that, following on the general work trend, males seem to be prevalent in the jewellery industry.

### **5.2.1.2 Age**

Most respondents (28.89 percent / 13) belonged to the age group 40-49, followed closely by the age groups 30-39 (24.44 percent / 11) and 50-59 (22.22 percent / 10). Since most respondents were jewellery store owners or managers (as indicated in section 5.2.1.3 below) it is usually senior people with regard to age who hold these positions.

### **5.2.1.3 Position at work**

Most respondents were store owners (64.45 percent / 29), followed by managers (31.11 percent / 14). Only 4.44 percent of respondents (2) were sales personnel who took the initiative to complete and return the questionnaire. Due to the sensitive nature of the project, it follows that owners in most instances had to be directly involved in answering security-related questions.

### **5.2.1.4 Area location**

Most responses came from jewellers in Gauteng (53.33 percent / 24), this being the province with the highest number of subscribers to SA Jewellery News, through which magazine the questionnaire was distributed. Gauteng was followed by Western Cape (20.00 percent / 9), KwaZulu Natal (13.33 percent / 6), Mpumalanga and Northern Province (4.44 percent / 2 each), and Free State and Northern Cape (2.22 percent / 1 each). Respondents were evenly distributed among urban (48.89 percent / 22) and suburban (51.11 percent / 23) areas.

## 5.2.2 The robbery event

The findings related to the robbery event deal with particulars such as the frequency of the robbery event, period of occurrence, criminals' *modus operandi*, victim's resistance and criminal violence. The purpose of this section is to obtain a better understanding of the nature and extent of robbery at jewellery stores as a criminal event.


### 5.2.2.1 Incidence and place of occurrence

Robbery can indeed be considered as a very serious problem affecting jewellers. 64.44 percent of respondents (29) experienced a robbery attack during a five-year period. It was also found that more urban (68.97 percent / 20) than suburban (31.03 percent / 9) stores were robbed. This is in line with other findings which indicate that this type of robbery is typically an urban and suburban (in metropolitan areas) phenomenon (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:5).

### 5.2.2.2 Frequency of robbery

Figure 5.1 shows that jewellery store robbery is a phenomenon involving repeat victimisation. In fact, in as much as 48.27 percent of the cases (14), jewellery stores experienced two or more robberies over a five year period.


FIGURE 5.1: FREQUENCY OF ROBBERY



These findings are similar to those of the British Retail Consortium (BRC), which stressed the reality of repeat criminal victimisation among retailers (Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3). A possible explanation for repeat attacks may be that, once a jewellery store has been identified as a relatively easy target, robbers may be encouraged to return to the scene of the crime or may pass information on the same target to other criminals who then decide to rob the store.

### 5.2.2.3 Monthly distribution

According to Figure 5.2, the month of June experienced the highest percentage of robbery (18.53 percent / 5), followed by February, March, July and December (all at 14.81 percent / 4). The months with the lowest robbery activity were April, May, August and October (all at 3.70 percent / 1).




It is unclear as to why June in particular experienced the highest percentage of jewellery store robberies. The months of December and February, which also figured prominently, usually experience higher levels of crime. A possible explanation is that numerous opportunities are offered to criminals during the Christmas Season and the purchasing of new stock, immediately after.

#### 5.2.2.4 Weekly distribution

According to Figure 5.3, the days which experienced the highest percentage of robbery included Tuesday and Thursday (both at 22.22 percent / 6), followed by Wednesday and Friday (both at 14.81 percent / 4). Sunday instead had the lowest percentage (3.70 percent / 1), possibly due to the limited number of stores opened for business. These findings are similar to those of Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:3) which showed that in 2000, in the United States, most robberies against jewellery stores were committed on Wednesday (23 percent), Thursday (20 percent) and Tuesday (18 percent).


FIGURE 5.3: DAY OF THE WEEK



#### 5.2.2.5 Time of the day

Figure 5.4 shows that robbery was committed mostly during early morning (46.43 percent / 13) followed by opening time (25.00 percent / 7). This is in line with the findings of the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), which found that most commercial robbery in South Africa occurred between 07:00 a.m. and 09:30 a.m. A possible explanation for these findings is that in the early hours of the day there is usually less human traffic in a store other than the staff. During early hours, members of staff also tend to be more distracted as they are usually preparing for the day ahead. Furthermore, robbers may decide that it is better to act at a time when some members of staff are out on lunch (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.2, i).

FIGURE 5.4: TIME OF OCCURRENCE




As opposed to findings by the Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:3) which showed that, in the United States, late afternoon closing time had traditionally been the second most vulnerable time, closing time did not appear to be a critical period for the respondents. In fact, only 7.14 percent of robberies (2) were committed during this period. Lunch and afternoon were instead the second most vulnerable time (equally at 10.71 percent / 3). A possible explanation is that robbers are adjusting their hours of operation to overcome more stringent security measures implemented by jewellers at closing time.

#### 5.2.2.6 Offenders involved in the robbery

The serious nature of jewellery store robbery is evident in the finding that in 53.85 percent of cases (14), five or more criminals were involved as reflected in Figure 5.5. The involvement of a number of criminals serves to corroborate the fact that robberies at jewellery stores are for the most part an organised event and not the work of occasional robbers.

FIGURE 5.5: CRIMINALS INVOLVED IN THE ROBBERY




These findings are in line with those of the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk (2002), according to which up to eight criminals are involved in commercial robberies.

#### 5.2.2.7 Offenders seen at the store before the robbery

In 55.00 percent of cases (11) criminals were seen at the store (posing as customers) prior to the commission of the robbery (Figure 5.6). Therefore, it can be stated that, as opposed to other findings (Conklin 2001:7) which indicated that in almost the totality of cases robbers are unknown to the victims, not all robbers were total strangers to jewellers and staff.


FIGURE 5.6: CRIMINALS SEEN AT THE STORE PRIOR TO THE ROBBERY ATTACK



The finding is in line with that of Maree (1999:54), which showed that bank robbers visited the chosen target a number of times prior to committing the robbery. Again, the fact that criminals carefully assessed the target points to jewellery store robbery as an organised (not casual) event.

### 5.2.2.8 Methods of execution of the robbery


As indicated in Figure 5.7, in the majority of cases (55.17 percent / 16), robbers managed to gain access to the store simply by posing as customers. This was followed closely by the method involving immediate threat of violence i.e. brandishing a weapon (51.72 percent / 15). The least used method involved forcing a person who is the key holder back to the store (6.80 percent / 2).



As opposed to findings by Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:19), which indicated that robbers often gained "legitimate" access by posing as delivery personnel, no such instance was reported by the respondents. It must also be noted that only in 10.34 percent of cases (3), robbers wore masks during the execution of the robbery. This is in line with Maree's findings (1999:57) which showed that, in general, robbers preferred to use simple, yet effective, means to prevent recognition such as caps, sunglasses, false beard and moustaches.

### 5.2.2.9 Weapons used

According to Figure 5.8, in the majority of cases (79.31 percent / 23) robbers made use of firearms followed a great distance away by knives and hammers / iron bars / pickaxes (each at 3.44 percent / 1). The presence of clubs and batons was not reported.



In as much as 21 percent of cases, respondents did not know what type of weapons were carried by robbers, possibly an indication that, in certain instances, the panic caused by the criminal attack had the effect of temporarily blinding the victim(s). The findings are similar to those of the Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:5), which showed that firearms were by far the preferred weapons in robberies against jewellery stores (used in 72 percent of the total robbery events in 2000).


Firearms give robbers a sense of power and dominance over their victims. In fact, the researcher found that in 89.65 percent of cases (26), after having gained access to the store, robbers displayed their weapons to force owners, members of staff and customers (if present) into submission. Therefore, it can be stated that the availability and abundance of illegal firearms play a significant role in jewellery store robbery, which is another indication that professional criminals are usually involved.



### 5.2.2.10 Violence and injuries inflicted during the robberies

As shown in Figure 5.9, be it physical in the form of actual violence inflicted on the victim (19.23 percent / 5) or psychological as when a threat of violence is made (80.77 percent / 21), the element of violence is always present during a robbery attack. In the majority of cases threat of violence proved to be sufficient to force the victim(s) into submission.


FIGURE 5.9: TYPES OF VIOLENCE INFLICTED BY ROBBERS



Findings by the Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:5) showed that the element of physical violence appeared in more cases in the United States, where robbery with violence in 2000 made up for 45 percent of the total robbery events.

Notwithstanding the element of violence, as shown in Figure 5.10, in the majority of cases (68.96 percent / 20), robbery attacks against jewellers did not lead to injuries. A possible explanation is that the robbers immediately threatened them with their life and forced them into submission. However, even though no fatal injuries were reported, 13.79 percent of cases (4) involved light injuries and 6.89 percent (2) serious injuries. Therefore in 20.68 percent of cases (6), respondents were involved in violent physical victimisation.


FIGURE 5.10: CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE INFLECTED DURING THE ROBBERY ATTACK



However, notwithstanding the above findings, it should be remembered that, even though no fatalities were reported by the respondents, incidents of violent robberies at jewellery stores in South Africa (causing the death of the victim), have been recorded (Crime count 2001:2).

With regard to the element of victim resistance during the robberies, Figure 5.11 indicates that, in the majority of cases (92.00 percent / 23), victims did not offer any resistance during the robbery attack. Only 8.00 percent of victims (2), on the other hand, reacted either verbally or physically.

FIGURE 5.11: RESISTANCE BY VICTIMS DURING THE ROBBERY ATTACK




Research on victim's resistance (Hansmann 2000:24-28), clearly showed that physical or verbal resistance to a robbery substantially increased the risk of injury to the victim.

Findings as a result of cross tabulation indicated that among the victims who resisted, 50 percent (1) were subjected to physical assault. On the other hand, in those instances where the victims had not reacted, 17.39 percent (4) were physically assaulted and 82.61 (19) were not. The threat of immediate danger to the victims' life for the most part appears to discourage them from reacting and, in most cases where the victim does not react, there appears to be no physical assault.

### 5.2.2.11 Duration of the robbery

As shown in Figure 5.12, 44.44 percent of robberies (12) were executed in a time frame of between one and five minutes (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.2, vi).

FIGURE 5.12: DURATION OF THE ROBBERY ATTACK (IN MINUTES)




The fact that a large percentage of robberies are committed in less than five minutes serves as another example of the robbers' organisation and efficiency. In 55.56 percent of cases (15), instead, robbers took longer than five minutes. A possible explanation is that the duration of a robbery attack is dependant on factors such as, amongst others, victims' reaction, sudden response by police or security, presence of bystanders, degree of visibility from outside the store, and the robbers' degree of professionalism. In cases where the criminals took longer than five minutes to execute

the crime, it does not necessarily mean that they lacked professionalism. The reason might be that, because they were not disturbed during the robbery, they spent more time at the store in order to increase their “reward”.

### 5.2.2.12 Type of merchandise stolen, value and insurance coverage

Figure 5.13 indicates that jewellery was the most targeted merchandise (86.2 percent / 25), followed by watches (48.22 percent / 14), personal belongings, e.g. wallets and cellphones (44.82 percent / 13) and cash from the till (37.93 percent / 11).


FIGURE 5.13: TYPE OF MERCHANDISE / ITEMS SEIZED BY ROBBERS



Therefore, as emerged from the above findings, it happens often that, in the time-frame of just a few minutes, jewellery store robbers also turn their attention to the persons present in the store, may it be employees or clients, and proceed to seize their personal belongings.

With regard to the value of the stolen merchandise, Figure 5.14 shows that in 69.23 percent of cases (18), the total amount (cost price) was between R 50 000 and R 250 000. In 15.38 percent of cases (4) the stolen merchandise exceeded R 500 000, a massive loss which, if not adequately insured, could end a jeweller’s career.


FIGURE 5.14: TOTAL AMOUNT (COST PRICE) OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE



It can be stated that, as opposed to other types of commercial robberies where the average amount stolen is generally much lower, jewellery store robberies instead involve a considerable financial loss. This finding was confirmed by Jewelers' Security Alliance (2000:5), which found that, in the United States, jewellery store robberies accounted for the highest dollar losses.

When considering the findings on the value lost by jewellers in a single robbery attack, it is obvious that their survival in business depends on adequate insurance cover. In this regard, findings in Figure 5.15 indicate that in 50.00 percent of cases (14), respondents were fully insured in respect of the loss sustained. However, in 17.86 percent of cases (5) jewellers were under-insured and, in as much as 32.14 percent of cases (9), they did not have any insurance coverage.

FIGURE 5.15: INSURANCE COVERAGE IN RESPECT OF STOLEN MERCHANDISE




Due to the potential for serious losses as indicated in Figure 5.14 above, the fact that many jewellers did not have insurance cover or were inadequately insured constituted a serious risk factor.

### 5.2.2.13 The role of the police in jewellery store robberies

As shown in Figure 5.16, 92.86 percent of respondents (26) indicated that they had reported the robbery to the police. This is a high reporting rate compared to the findings of Naudé and Prinsloo (2002:90) on the lower reporting rate for robberies in most Southern African countries. Swaziland reported a 50.4 percent; South Africa a 38.5 percent and other countries about 26 percent.

FIGURE 5.16: ROBBERY REPORTED TO POLICE




The high reporting rate of jewellery store robbery among the respondents is possibly due to factors such as the fact that reporting is required by the insurance companies and in the hope that the stolen jewellery may be recovered by the police. This explanation confirms the reasons offered by Naudé and Prinsloo (2002:91) as to why cases are reported to the police by victims in Southern African countries.

The unreported cases of robbery (7.14 percent / 2) may instead be related to factors such as lack of insurance, distrust in the criminal justice system, particularly in the ability of the police to solve the robbery and recover the stolen merchandise, and a jeweller's possible involvement in unlawful activities (receiving stolen property).


The high reporting rate by the victims does not result in a high number of arrestees. Figure 5.17 shows that in a large percentage of cases (67.86 percent / 19), robbers were not apprehended by the police. Only in 25 percent of cases (7) arrests were carried out.

**FIGURE 5.17: ROBBERS APPREHENDED BY POLICE**




As an aggravating factor, Figure 5.18 indicates that, in the majority of cases (81.48 percent / 22), the stolen merchandise was never recovered by the police. This finding again stresses the importance for jewellers to be adequately covered by insurance.

**FIGURE 5.18: MERCHANDISE RECOVERED BY POLICE**



Satisfaction with police work is closely linked to the success of the police investigation into the robbery event and the recovery of stolen merchandise. Given the negative results in these areas, as shown in Figure 5.19, it follows that in the majority of cases (60.72 percent / 17) jewellers were dissatisfied with the way the police managed the robbery investigation.

FIGURE 5.19: SATISFACTION WITH POLICE WORK



Further results based on cross tabulations showed that when arrests were carried out, 71.43 percent of respondents (5) were satisfied with police work, as opposed to 28.57 percent (2) who were not. On the other hand, when no arrests were carried out, 78.95 of respondents (15) were dissatisfied with police work. Likewise, when police did not manage to recover the stolen jewellery, 72.73 percent of respondents (16) showed their dissatisfaction with police work

### 5.2.3 The jewellery stores and surrounding environment

The findings on the location of the jewellery stores provide a clear picture of the stores (victims) in relation to the immediate environment. The results help identify possible risk factors conducive to robbery (the crime).


#### 5.2.3.1 Location of the jewellery stores

As shown in Figure 5.20, in the majority of cases (55.56 percent / 25) jewellery stores were situated inside shopping complexes as opposed to 31.11 percent (14) which were



trading along urban or suburban streets. A small percentage at 11.11 (5) instead were located in other areas such as private premises. Only 2.22 percent of respondents (1) were conducting business from a hotel.

FIGURE 5.20: LOCATION OF STORES



The findings are consistent with the past ten years' trend, which saw jewellery stores being relocated from the dangerous streets (especially in urban areas) to the "safety" of shopping complexes. Further results by cross tabulation showed that among shopping complex stores, 56.00 percent (14) were robbed and 44.00 percent (11) were not victimised. Instead, among street front stores, 78.57 percent (11) were robbed and 21.43 percent (3) were not victimised. It would appear as if street front stores were more frequently victimised.

### 5.2.3.2 Description of the surrounding environment

Most jewellery stores in shopping complexes were situated near entry / exit points (52 percent / 13), followed by centre of complex (36.00 percent / 9) and stairs / lifts (32.00 percent / 8). Among these stores, 28.00 percent (7) of those near entry / exit points experienced robbery attacks, followed by 20.00 percent (5) of those near the centre of complex and sixteen percent (4) of those near stairs / lifts. This may be attributed to the fact that jewellery stores near entry / exit points offer robbers a better chance of a quick getaway.

Further results indicated that most jewellery stores were situated in the proximity of general small businesses (77.77 percent / 35), followed by restaurant / coffee bars (40.00 percent / 18) and departmental stores / supermarkets (35.55 percent / 16). Certain environments provide criminals with an opportunity to observe a target without being noticed or becoming suspicious. For example, coffee bars or restaurants situated in the immediate vicinity of a jewellery store may be an ideal place for potential robbers to closely observe routine activities and plan the most suitable method and time of attack. In this regard, findings indicated that 79.31 percent (23) of jewellery stores targeted by robbers were situated near general small business, followed by 44.82 percent (13) near restaurants and coffee bars and 31.03 percent (9) near departmental stores and supermarkets.

With regard to main transport routes that are used by motorists to reach and leave the stores, findings showed that 64.44 percent (9) of jewellery stores were situated along main roads and within a five kilometre radius from a freeway ramp (51.11 percent / 23). This, as found in other studies (Maree 1999:55), constitutes a risk factor as robbers usually prefer to target stores that are ideally placed to provide a quick getaway. In this regard, findings indicated that 65.52 percent (19) of stores situated along main roads had experienced a robbery, followed by 51.72 percent (15) of those within a five kilometre radius from the freeway, 34.48 percent (10) of those near secondary roads and 3.4 percent (1) within five to ten kilometres from the freeway.

Most respondents (77.27 percent / 34) stated that their stores were situated at a distance of between one and 50 metres from the nearest parking, 15.91 percent (7) from 50 to 100 metres and 6.82 percent (3) over 100 metres. The distance from the jewellery store to the nearest parking lot is also an important risk factor. The shorter the distance from the store to the robbers' getaway vehicles, the better is their chance of a successful escape. In this regard, findings by cross tabulation indicated that among the stores situated between one and 50 metres from the nearest parking, 55.88 percent (19) experienced a robbery attack and 44.12 percent (15) were not victimised. All seven stores situated between 50 and 100 metres from the nearest parking experienced robberies. Only three stores were located at a distance of over 100 metres of which two were robbed.

The nearest parking facilities were found to be street parking (35.56 percent / 16), followed by external parking with the presence of security, e.g. guards (33.33 percent / 15), internal parking with the presence of security (22.22 percent / 10) and external parking without security (8.89 percent / 4). Robbers generally prefer targets which allow for easy parking a short distance away from the scene of the crime (SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk 2002). In this regard, findings by cross tabulation indicated that, among the stores situated close to internal parking with security, 30.00 percent (3) were victimised by robbers and 70.00 percent (7) were not. On the other hand, among fifteen stores situated close to external parking with security, 73.33 percent (11) experienced robbery victimisation and 26.67 percent (4) did not. Important is the finding that all four stores close to external parking (without security) were robbed, a possible indication that robbers preferred those stores that were out of security view. In addition, among the stores situated close to street parking, 68.75 percent (11) were attacked by robbers and 31.25 percent (five) were not. Based on these findings, it would appear as if the stores in the proximity of external and street parking were more exposed to robbery victimisation.

#### **5.2.4 Mechanical, physical, electronic and other security measures.**

Findings on mechanical, physical and electronic security measures show the preferred security systems adopted by jewellery store owners. Visibility and lighting, which are usually considered as important factors in robbery deterrence, are also considered.


##### **5.2.4.1 Available security measures**

According to Figure 5.21, the security measures mostly implemented by the respondents, ranked from the highest to the lowest, include the following:

- Intruder detection and panic system (86.66 percent / 39)
- Safes (80 percent / 36)
- Insurance cover (64.44 percent / 28)
- Alarm monitoring / armed reaction and reinforced glass (each at 55.55 percent / 24)

- Security gate with strike lock (31.11 percent / 15)
- Electronic security doors (20 percent / 9)
- Vaults and fixed grilles / shutters (each at 17.77 percent / 8)
- CCTV system with video recording (15.55 percent / 7)
- Store guard (13.33 percent / 6)

FIGURE 5.21: STORE SECURITY MEASURES



A possible explanation for the least implemented measure, i.e. store guard, is that it has high and on-going cost implications for jewellers. CCTV systems with video recording facilities were also not commonly considered by jewellers, possibly due to high cost implications for the installation of such systems. Of particular interest is the finding that not all jewellers who had intruder detection and panic systems installed were in fact linked to a dedicated control room monitoring and crime reaction service. It appeared as if some jewellers trading from shopping complexes relied on the response of the security guards who would be alerted by the sound of the siren. However, it must be said that this situation poses a serious risk due to the possibility of shopping centre guards being taken hostage by a group of robbers. For an alarm system to be effective, it must always be linked to a professional security company with a visible presence in the area and capable of offering dedicated alarm monitoring and response services.

After a robbery, it might happen that additional security measures are implemented at the affected stores. In this regard, 58.62 percent (17) replied that, after an incident of robbery, they had not implemented any additional security measures as opposed to 41.38 percent (12) who decided that it was in their interest to do so. Even though jewellers often suffer repeat victimisation, only just over half reviewed and upgraded their security. Preferred security measures implemented after a robbery attack included the following (listed from highest to lowest):

- Security gate with strike lock (17.24 percent / 5)
- CCTV system, guards and reinforced glass (each at 10.34 percent / 3)
- Electronic security doors and alarm monitoring with security response (each at 6.89 percent / 2).
- Intruder detection / panic systems and insurance cover (each at 3.44 percent / 1).

Findings indicated that among twelve stores which implemented additional security measures after a robbery, 91.67 percent (11) had not experienced another robbery attack. The implementation of additional security measures may have played a role in deterring further attacks.

#### **5.2.4.2 Visibility of the jewellery store**

A total of 65.91 percent of respondents (29) indicated that the inside of their store was “clearly visible” from the outside both during day and night, with the remaining 34.09 percent (15) stating that it was not “clearly visible”. Good store visibility is considered as an important element in a jewellery store robbery reduction strategy (Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:7). Findings by cross tabulation indicated that 75 percent of the stores (21) that enjoyed good visibility had been robbed as opposed to 25 percent (7) that did not experience a robbery attack. Therefore, good store visibility does not seem to have a deterrent effect. However, this finding should not detract from the value of good store visibility, as it is not possible in the scope of this study, which did not focus on the offender, to establish how many robbers were in fact deterred by this element.

Most (72.73 percent / 32) jewellery stores enjoyed good lighting conditions during day and night. As explained above, effective lighting (together with good visibility) can have a deterrent effect against criminals. However, as in the case of good visibility, 68.75 percent of the stores (22) that enjoyed good lighting conditions had also been robbed as opposed to 31.25 percent (10) that were not victimised. Again, based on the same considerations as above, this should not detract from the value of effective lighting in crime prevention which, as explained by Geason and Wilson (1992:75), increases the chances of identifying the offender and is an important element in CCTV surveillance.

### **5.2.5 Personnel**

The section on personnel includes findings on the number of staff members visible inside the store (as an element of deterrence), the screening procedures (prior to employment) and specialised crime prevention training within a jewellery store environment.


#### **5.2.5.1 Presence of staff members**

In the majority of cases three or more employees were visible inside the store (40.00 percent / 18), followed by two members of staff (26.67 percent / 12), one member (24.44 percent / 11) and none (8.89 percent / 4). Evidence suggests that the more staff one can afford to have in the store the greater the deterrent against robbers (Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:11). It follows that the number of staff visible in a jewellery store should influence the criminals' decision to commit a robbery. However, findings by cross tabulation indicated that, among the stores with three or more members of staff, 72.22 percent (13) were robbed and 27.78 (5) did not experience victimisation. Therefore, it would seem as if the number of staff on the floor did not deter a robbery attack. It must be noted that, as in section 5.2.4.2 above, it is not possible in the scope of this study to understand whether robbers had in fact been deterred by the presence of more employees inside the store.

### 5.2.5.2 Pre-employment screening of personnel

The findings shown in Figure 5.22 are cause for serious concern. In as much as 48.78 percent of cases (20), jewellers did not proceed to screen their staff (prior to employment). This constitutes a serious risk factor in view of the potential for internal criminal activities on the part of dishonest members of staff. Furthermore, lack of screening can also result in criminals being given important “inside information” for the planning of a robbery attack.

FIGURE 5.22: STAFF SECURITY SCREENING (PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT))




Further findings as a result of cross tabulation, indicated that among the stores that decided to screen their staff, 57.14 percent (12) were robbed and 42.86 percent (9) were not victimised. On the other hand, among the stores that did not proceed with the screening, 70 percent (14) were robbed and 30 percent (6) were not victimised. Based on these results, it would seem as if those stores that did not screen staff members were more exposed to robbery victimisation.

### 5.2.5.3 Security awareness training of staff members

Figure 5.23 indicates that in 56.82 percent of cases (25), jewellers had implemented some robbery prevention training for members of staff and in 43.18 percent of cases (19) no training programmes were introduced. This constitutes another serious risk factor in that untrained members of staff could, through their negligent or provocative

behaviour, either facilitate a robbery or aggravate the course of the event. In fact, during a robbery attack, unconsidered actions on the part of an untrained member of staff can lead to a tragic outcome, i.e. serious injuries or even death.

FIGURE 5.23: ROBBERY PREVENTION TRAINING FOR MEMBERS OF STAFF




Findings by cross tabulation indicated that among the stores that implemented crime prevention training for members of staff, 68 percent (17) were robbed and 32 percent (8) were not victimised. On the other hand, among the stores that did not introduce crime prevention training, 63.16 percent (12) were robbed and 36.84 percent (7) were not victimised. Based on these findings, it would seem as if crime prevention training did not have a significant impact on the prevention of robbery. However, as stated earlier, these findings should not detract from the real value of robbery prevention training, i.e. creating awareness on how to reduce risks and behave during a confrontation with the offenders.

If training was conducted, it is important to determine what it entailed. As shown in Figure 5.24, in most cases (88.00 percent / 22), the type of robbery prevention training implemented by jewellers involved only basic security procedures, e.g. activation of alarm and panic systems and general security awareness. This was followed by a more comprehensive “in house” security induction programme conducted by security / loss control managers (52.00 percent / 13). Only 8.00 percent of respondents (2) indicated that they had contracted external consultants to conduct specialised crime prevention training.



FIGURE 5.24: TYPE OF ROBBERY PREVENTION TRAINING



A possible explanation for jewellers not resorting to external consultants is the cost factor linked to this type of service. However, it must be stated that specialised training by experts can be a valuable tool in a robbery risk reduction programme, especially useful in raising the employees' level of awareness and their knowledge on how to respond to a criminal threat.


### 5.2.6 Fear of crime

Findings on the fear of crime among jewellers and members of staff throw light on their perception of risk of victimisation and their psychological reaction to the element of risk.

#### 5.2.6.1 Perception on the trend of jewellery store robbery

According to Figure 5.25, in 80.95 percent of cases (34) the general perception amongst jewellers and members of staff was that the trend of robbery against jewellery stores was on the increase compared to 16.67 percent of respondents (7) who believed that there was no increase. Only 2.38 percent of respondents (1) indicated that the trend was decreasing.

FIGURE 5.25: PERCEPTION ON FREQUENCY OF ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST JEWELLERY STORES




Further results as a result of cross tabulation, showed that among 23 male respondents, 73.91 percent (17) believed that robbery was increasing, 21.74 percent (5) staying the same and 4.35 percent (1) decreasing. On the other hand, among nineteen female respondents, 89.47 percent (17) believed that robbery was on the increase and 10.53 percent (2) stationary. The fact that more female than male respondents believed that robbery was on the increase may be attributable to them being more sensitive to crimes of a violent nature.

When considering the age factor in the perception of the trend of armed robbery among the respondents who believed that robbery was on the increase, the age groups 30-39, 40-49 and 50-59 were equally represented (each at 23.53 percent / 8), followed by the group 20-29 (20.59 percent / 7) and the group 60 plus (8.82 percent / 3).

### 5.2.6.2 Types of crime affecting jewellery stores

According to the respondents, as shown in Figure 5.26, theft by customers is at the top of the list of crimes affecting jewellery stores (44.44 percent). This is followed by robbery (33.33 percent), fraud (31.11 percent) burglary (8.89 percent) and theft by employees (4.44 percent).

FIGURE 5.26: TYPES OF CRIME OCCURING MOSTLY AT THE STORE




The findings are in line with those by Jewellers' Security Alliance (2000:2) in the United States which indicated that the most common crimes were theft (60 percent), followed by robbery at 22 percent.

### 5.2.6.3 Perceptions on victimisation risk

As reflected in Figure 5.27, most respondents (68.89 percent / 31) felt either frequently (35.56 percent / 16) or always (33.33 percent / 15) at risk of robbery victimisation, while 28.89 percent (13) indicated that they felt at risk occasionally. Only 2.22 percent of respondents (1) never felt at risk of becoming a victim. It is important to keep in mind that, as stressed by Fattah (1991:264), in certain situations many people are victimised more by fear of crime than by an actual crime. When certain people believe they are vulnerable, they may have a high level of fear which does not correspond to the objective realities of threat and risk.

FIGURE 5.27: FEELING AT RISK OF ROBBERY VICTIMISATION




Additional findings by cross tabulation indicated that among 26 male respondents, 34.62 percent (9) felt at risk of robbery victimisation occasionally, 23.08 percent (6) frequently, 38.46 percent (10) always and 3.85 percent (1) never. On the other hand, among nineteen female respondents, 21.05 percent (4) felt at risk occasionally, 52.63 percent (10) frequently and 26.32 percent (5) always.

When considering the age factor, among sixteen respondents who frequently felt at risk of victimisation, most belonged to the age groups 20-29, 40-49 and 50-59 (equally at 25 percent / 4), followed by the groups 30-39 (18.75 percent / 3) and the group 60 plus (6.25 percent / 1). Further results indicated that, among fifteen respondents who always felt at risk of victimisation, most belonged to the age group 30-39 (40.00 percent / 6), followed by the group 40-49 (33.33 percent / 5), the group 20-29 (13.33 percent / 2) and the groups 50-59 and 60 + (equally at 6.67 percent / 1).

It is important to note that the respondents' perception on victimisation risk may contribute to stress. In fact, as shown in Figure 5.28, findings indicate that, in 51.11 percent of cases (23), respondents felt either frequently (28.89 percent / 13) or always (22.22 percent / 10) stressed due to the risk of robbery victimisation. A total of 42.22 percent (19) experienced stress occasionally. Only 6.67 percent (3) indicated that they never experienced stress. Therefore, feeling at risk of robbery victimisation and experiencing stress as a result of it, seem to be constant elements of being in a jewellery profession / occupation.

FIGURE 5.28: FEELING STRESSED DUE TO RISK OF ROBBERY VICTIMISATION




Findings by cross tabulation showed that among 26 male respondents, 46.15 percent (12) occasionally experienced stress, 23.08 (6) frequently, 23.08 percent (6) always and 7.69 percent (2) never. On the other hand, among nineteen female respondents, 36.84 percent (7) occasionally experienced stress, 36.84 percent (7) frequently, 21.05 percent (4) always and 5.26 percent (1) never.

When considering the age factor, among thirteen respondents who frequently felt under stress due to the risk of robbery victimisation, most belonged to the age groups 20-29 and 30-39 (equally at 30.77 percent / 4), followed by the groups 40-49 and 50-59 (equally at 15.38 percent / 2). The group 60 plus was last (7.69 percent / 1). Further results indicated that among ten respondents who always felt under stress due to the risk of robbery victimisation, most (40.00 percent / 4) belonged to the age group 40-49, followed by the groups 30-39 and 50-59 (equally at 20 percent / 2), and the groups 20-29 and 60 plus (equally at 10.00 percent / 1).

#### 5.2.6.4 Psychological impact of the perception of victimisation risk

The findings shown in Figure 5.29 are significant. In as much as 46.67 percent of cases (21), jewellers and members of staff considered giving up their business / occupation. Therefore, feeling at risk of robbery victimisation and experiencing high levels of stress resulted in jewellers or members of staff considering giving up their business / occupation.

FIGURE 5.29: CONSIDERING GIVING UP BUSINESS / OCCUPATION



Findings by cross tabulation also indicated that among 26 male respondents, 46.15 percent (12) considered giving up their business / occupation as a result of the risk of robbery victimisation as opposed to 53.85 percent (14) who did not. On the other hand, out of nineteen female respondents, 47.37 percent (9) thought about giving up as opposed to 52.63 percent (10) who did not. These results showed a similar attitude between female and male respondents.

When considering the age factor, among 21 respondents who thought about giving up their profession or occupation, most belonged to the age groups 30-39 and 50-59 (equally at 28.57 percent / 6), followed by group 40-49 (19.05 percent / 4), the group 20-29 (14.29 percent / 3) and the group 60 plus (9.52 percent / 2).


### **5.2.7 Crime prevention initiatives**

The findings on crime prevention give an indication of the respondents' attitude in respect of specific initiatives such as conducting specialised training, forming a jewellery industry crime prevention structure and introducing a crime intelligence and dismissed employee database.

### 5.2.7.1 Crime prevention training of jewellers and members of staff

According to Figure 5.30, 93.33 percent of respondents (42) either agreed (60.00 percent / 27) or highly agreed (33.33 percent / 15) on crime prevention training by experts as an integral part of staff general training. Only 6.67 percent of respondents (3) disagreed. This is an important finding which underlines the fact that jewellers and members of staff viewed crime prevention initiatives in a positive light.


FIGURE 5.30: INTRODUCTION OF CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING BY EXPERTS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF STAFF GENERAL TRAINING



Findings by cross tabulation also indicated that, among 26 male respondents, 23.08 percent (6) highly agreed on the need for crime prevention training, 69.23 (18) agreed and only 7.69 percent (2) disagreed. On the other hand, among nineteen female respondents, 47.37 percent (9) highly agreed, 47.37 percent (9) agreed and only 5.26 percent (1) disagreed. Therefore, both male and female respondents gave significant value to crime prevention.

Figure 5.31 shows that, as a further indication that the majority of respondents agreed to various crime prevention initiatives to help curb jewellery related crime, 71.79 percent (28) favoured the introduction of a crime prevention study programme at the schools or institutions training jewellers.


FIGURE 5.31: CRIME PREVENTION AS PART OF STUDY PROGRAMME AT JEWELLERS' SCHOOLS



### 5.2.7.2 Formation of a jewellery security structure

Figure 5.32 shows that most respondents (91.11 percent / 41) believed that the formation of a jewellery security body aimed at creating and maintaining a crime intelligence and dismissed employees database was a useful instrument for the prevention of jewellery store crime. This again emphasised the respondent's willingness towards crime prevention initiatives.

FIGURE 5.32: FORMATION OF A JEWELLERY SECURITY BODY TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A CRIME INTELLIGENCE AND DISMISSED EMPLOYEE DATABASE




Further results by cross tabulation showed that, among 26 male respondents, 88.46 percent (23) found the introduction of a jewellery crime prevention structure useful



for the industry. On the other hand, among a group of nineteen female respondents, 94.74 percent (18) also found the initiative useful.

Figure 5.33 shows how, in respect of the introduction of a crime intelligence and dismissed employee database, 57.78 percent of respondents (26) indicated that they would consider contributing with an annual subscription fee towards its running costs.

FIGURE 5.33: ANNUAL CONTRIBUTION TO DATABASE



Regarding the financial implications and the perceptions of male and female respondents, 63.16 percent of female respondents (12) and 53.85 percent of males (14) indicated that they were willing to pay a subscription fee.

### **5.3 FINDINGS BASED ON THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE RESPONDENTS**

The analysis of the information collected from the semi-structured interview with five knowledgeable people referred to as respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.6.2) led to the following findings.

#### **5.3.1 Respondents' professional experience**

All respondents were males in the age groups 40-49 and 50-59 working from different Johannesburg's suburbs. They gained vast experience in their respective fields, which rendered them knowledgeable on the topic being investigated.

### **5.3.2 Perception on jewellery store robbery**

This theme dealt with the interviewees' perception on the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery, particularly with regard to aspects such as the seriousness of the crime, its frequency and severity. Respondents were also asked to explain the reasons for the recent spate of robberies at jewellery stores.

#### **5.3.2.1 Seriousness of the crime**

All respondents, with the exception of respondent 5 (SAPS spokesman), believed that jewellery store robbery was a serious crime problem causing significant losses and a blow to jewellers and staff's morale. Respondent 5's viewpoint is that robbery at jewellery stores does not constitute a serious crime problem compared to other types of robbery, such as those committed at supermarkets and petrol stations. These premises were targeted much more frequently by robbers. A problem crime, however, appears to be robbery against women wearing expensive jewellery. Often, this robbery is committed on the driveway when a woman returns home.

#### **5.3.2.2 Frequency versus severity**

All respondents agreed that while robbery at jewellery stores had stabilised in the past few years, it had shown a sharp increase since 2003, with major heists being committed against jewellers. Robbery had increased in terms of severity with a higher value of jewellery being stolen (respondent 3). It was not possible for the SAPS (respondent 5) to state whether robbery at jewellery stores was increasing or decreasing due to the fact that this specific crime was not classified separately for statistical purposes but appeared under the general category of "business robbery". Respondent 5 also stated that one of the reasons why robbery at jewellery stores appeared to be on the increase was attributable to the wide publicity received in the newspapers.

### **5.3.2.3 Upsurge in robbery attacks**

All respondents stated that jewellery stores were being targeted due to them being perceived by robbers as soft targets with a high concentration (in a small area) of valuable jewellery, which can be easily seized and carried away. The reasons for the recent upsurge in jewellery store robbery, particularly in the Gauteng Province, received various responses such as:

- The high rate of unemployment is causing people to try and make quick money by robbing easy targets (respondent 1).
- Rolex watches agents are being increasingly targeted (respondents 1 and 3).
- Organised crime syndicates led by foreign criminals from countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Nigeria are exploiting the many opportunities for crime in South Africa and the weaknesses of its criminal justice system (respondent 3).
- Jewellery is easy to carry away and to dispose of. Low volumes of stolen jewellery offer high value returns (respondent 4).
- While other targets such as banks and Cash in Transit vehicles have been considerably hardened, jewellery stores remain easy to attack and rob of valuable merchandise (respondent 2 and 5).

### **5.3.3 The jewellery store robber**

With this theme the researcher focused on obtaining information on the jewellery store robbers and the criminals standing behind them (giving them instructions to commit the robbery).

#### **5.3.3.1 Local or international?**

According to respondent 5, it would appear as if jewellery store robberies were the work of both local and foreign crime syndicates with the executors of the robbery being mostly South Africans. Two respondents (2 and 4) indicated that there seemed

to be no hard evidence implicating international syndicates in jewellery store robberies, which were carried out in the majority of cases by local crime networks.

Other respondents were of the opinion that the presence of foreigners appeared to be increasing, particularly in the theft of expensive watches (respondent 1). Criminals from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana and Nigeria were known to be behind some incidents of robbery (respondent 3).

### **5.3.3.2 Random or selective?**

All respondents agreed that there appears to be selective targeting of high value items such as watches, e.g. Tag, Rolex and Breitling, but also precious stones. Watches, especially Rolex, are being increasingly targeted due to market demands both in South Africa and other African countries (respondent 4). The value of a display tray of 67 Rolex watches is approximately R 1.5 million (respondent 1). Robbers also appear to be following orders by criminal syndicates for specific items of jewellery (respondents 3 and 5). It should, however, be born in mind that some robbers act randomly by seizing as many items as possible (respondents 1 and 4).

### **5.3.3.3 Professional or opportunist?**

All respondents agreed that most jewellery store robberies were the work of professional criminals. This type of robbery was seldom committed by casual criminals. Respondent 3 believed that as many as 99 percent of jewellery store robberies involved professional criminals. The main reasons pointing to a professional type are the following:

- Evidence points to a carefully planned attack (respondents 3 and 4).
- In the majority of cases, the criminals had been seen at the store (prior to the robbery) posing as customers (respondents 3 and 4).
- Robbers seem to be acting on orders placed by crime syndicates (respondents 3 and 5).

- Robbers act in groups of armed individuals and have support / back-up systems in place (respondent 5).

#### **5.3.4 Particulars of the robbery**

All respondents had the same viewpoint in respect of the following:

**i) Number of robbers**

Jewellery store robberies are committed by groups of individuals, at times up to twenty (respondent 3) but usually between four and six (respondent 5).

**ii) Method of entry**

Most robbers gain access to a store by posing as customers. They are usually neatly dressed (respondent 5). However, at times, they may act violently, particularly when a large number is involved (respondent 3), or no security gates have been installed (respondent 2).

**iii) Use of disguises**

The use of disguises is not common and the majority appear to act as they are. When worn, disguises are usually not highly visible (to avoid drawing unnecessary attention), e.g. caps (respondents 3, 4 and 5). However, in certain instances, the use of heavy disguises such as dressing as clowns (respondent 3) or wearing balaclavas or masks (respondents 2, 4 and 5) was reported. Robbers also appear to disregard the presence of CCTV systems and the possibility of identification and arrest (respondents 2 and 5).

**iv) Use of weapons**

In all incidents of robbery, a weapon (mostly firearms) is produced to subdue the victims. Due to the presence of firearms, this type of robbery is investigated by the Serious and Violent Crime Unit of the SAPS (respondent 5). The most commonly used firearms are small handguns, which are easy to conceal and carry, but automatic rifles are at times also carried, especially by the robbers' external support team (respondents 3, 4 and 5).

v) **Stolen items**

Robbers appear to increasingly target jewellers, members of staff and customers' personal belongings during the attack, including cellphones, wallets and firearms.

vi) **Time of execution of the robbery**

Robberies at jewellery stores are usually carried out in a short period of time, usually within five minutes.

### **5.3.5 The victim of jewellery store robbery**

In this section the researcher aimed at obtaining information on the victims of jewellery store robbery, particularly with regard to the potential for physical violence inflicted upon them and the psychological impact resulting from the threat of robbery.

#### **5.3.5.1 Violence inflicted**

All respondents indicated that physical violence leading to injuries or death was not common. However, threat of violence was always present as robbers needed to take immediate control of the situation. Robbers will not hesitate to shoot if provoked by a victim's reaction (respondent 5). In one incident that happened twelve years ago a young member of staff was shot dead (respondent 3). Another respondent stated that only one fatality (2002) had occurred among his clients (respondent 2). Respondent 1, instead, mentioned that he knew of two people who had been killed in 1996 after they reacted by screaming and confronting the robbers.

#### **5.3.5.2 Psychological impact**

All respondents believed that the threat of robbery had an impact on the jewellers and staff's mental state, in particular by causing stress. Respondent 2 stated that the threat of robbery and the resultant stress caused jewellers and staff to become more observant of potential risks. Respondent 4 was aware of some members of staff having left their workplace for fear of a repetition; others instead, due to the trauma, were in need of psychological counselling.

### **5.3.6 The aftermath of jewellery store robbery**

In this section the researcher dealt with the aftermath of the robbery to understand what happened to the stolen jewellery, which must be disposed of through the available channels in order for the robbers to obtain cash. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in respect of arrests and recoveries of stolen jewellery was investigated.

#### **5.3.6.1 Disposal of stolen jewellery**

The stolen jewellery may be sold via fences such as pawn shops whose owners are involved in receiving stolen property (respondents 2 and 5). Once stolen, the jewellery is handed over to the crime syndicate which commissioned the robbery. These syndicates pay the robbers only a fraction of the retail value and, in fact, they are paid an agreed upon amount to execute the crime. However, they inevitably keep some items of jewellery for themselves in order to increase their reward (respondent 3). The crime syndicates then dispose of the jewellery to obtain cash via a network of available fences (respondent 4). At times, the stolen goods are sold to corrupted jewellers (respondent 1). In order to avoid possible identification, the crime syndicate may decide to export the jewellery to foreign contacts, melt down the gold and reshape precious stones (respondents 3, 4 and 5).

#### **5.3.6.2 Arrests and recoveries**

All respondents agreed that the rate of arrest and recovery of the stolen jewellery was very low. The SAPS success is indeed limited (respondent 5). The conviction rate is also extremely low (respondent 3 and 4). Respondents 3 also stated that a serious problem was that, once arrested, criminals were easily released on bail, thus continuing to offend. Since 1977, he had only witnessed one case of conviction. Jewellery store robbery appears to be a type of crime where the risk of apprehension and conviction is extremely low. Therefore, because of the reward received from the sale of the stolen jewellery, this criminal activity may be well worth the risk (respondent 3).

### **5.3.7 Security risk reduction**

In this section, respondents were asked whether they could suggest security measures that could prove effective in reducing the risk of robbery.

#### **5.3.7.1 Suggested security measures**

According to respondent 4, while radio frequency identification (RFI) systems are useful in the prevention of theft or shoplifting, there is no special device to prevent robbery. Some measures that may prove useful are:

- Limiting high value stock in the display windows.
- Making access to high value stock more difficult, e.g. by keeping excess stock in a safe with a time lock mechanism.
- Making access to the store more difficult to criminals by means of a double door interlocking system. However, in one instance, in order to gain access, a group of robbers shot their way through this barrier.

Respondent 5 stressed the fact that risk reduction at a specific store or shopping complex should be regarded as the responsibility of the store owner and landlord, and not as a police function. It is simply not possible, in terms of the existing resources, for the police to maintain a visible presence at all shopping complexes in the country and patrol each and every store. Security at shopping complexes should be improved by means of more effective security technologies, e.g. professionally installed digital CCTV systems, and better trained and vetted security personnel. The latter should not be armed but instead furnished with the necessary equipment (e.g. two-way radios and panic transmitters) to immediately alert their control centre and in turn police and security response vehicles.

A combination of various risk reduction measures offers the most suitable response to the threat of robbery. These measures should include employees' security awareness, as well as physical and electronic security. The installation of an access control system such as a double security door would be well received by an insurance



company. However, this system is seldom accepted by jewellers due to the fact that it may discourage customers from entering the store. In addition, it may not be allowed by shopping centre management (respondent 2).

Not only stores but also shopping centres' security should be improved. CCTV cameras should be installed outside the store in order to also keep video records of suspects or suspicious activities in the vicinity of the store. At present, the tendency is to install cameras only on the inside of the store. In addition a double alarm / panic response system should be implemented by contracting two different security companies. This will minimise the risk of theft by corrupted members of one company (from the scene of an after hours robbery or burglary). Security gates are not recommended as they add to the risk of violence if the robbers happen to be trapped inside the store (respondent 1).

Most measures will not stop an attack by a professional, well organised group of robbers. Most jewellers dislike security gates due to aesthetics and the fear of being trapped inside the store with dangerous criminals. However, a double door interlocking system may have a deterrent effect on robbers in that they may decide to move to a softer target. Although the effectiveness of CCTV surveillance is questionable due to poor follow-up investigations by the SAPS, a digital camera should be utilised at the entrance to capture an image of all people entering the store (respondent 3).

### **5.3.7.2 Employees' security screening and training**

All respondents indicated that there was no systematic screening of candidates prior to employment. Many jewellers appeared to be relying only on trade references. Some jewellers also appeared to be very superficial with regard to the need to train their staff in security risk awareness and reduction.

### **5.3.7.3 Insurance coverage**

All respondents agreed on the need for jewellers to have an adequate insurance coverage due to the potential for crippling losses resulting from a robbery attack. A

major loss from a single robbery attack could put a jeweller out of business (respondents 2 and 3). Some jewellers experienced losses of up to R 5 million (respondent 4). Factors that may discourage jewellers from purchasing insurance coverage include the following:

- Insurance is perceived to be expensive (respondents 1, 2 and 3). Coverage of approximately R 3 million for stock and R 1.2 million for armed hold-up may cost up to R 6000.00 per month (respondent 2).
- The business is too small to insure (respondent 2).
- Bad experiences with insurance companies (respondent 2).
- Fraudulent activities on the part of jewellers who prefer not to keep records (respondent 3).
- Insurance policies contain too many clauses making jewellers fully accountable (respondent 1).

### **5.3.8 Security initiatives**

All respondents agreed on the measures proposed by the researcher, i.e.:

- Improved security awareness training for jewellers and members of staff, and introduction of a crime prevention module as part of the study programme at schools or institutions training jewellers. In this regard, it was stated that emphasis should be on creating more security awareness amongst staff (respondents 4 and 5). The Jewellery Council should introduce and subsidise training programmes (respondent 1). The cost factor may be a problem, especially if independent consultants are involved (respondent 2).
- The formation of a jewellery security body and dismissed employee database. In this regard, it was stated that strict requirements on legal and employees' rights should be taken into consideration (respondents 1 and 2)

All respondents also agreed that the best way forward is to bring all sector players together in a joint effort to tackle the problem of armed robbery and crime in general. In this regard, it was stated that the Jewellery Council could play an important role in

achieving a common, unified response to the threat of crime (respondent 2). Moreover, there should be a more effective police response against the robbers who far too often manage to escape punishment. Consideration should be given to the creation of a special jewellery crime squad to increase the arrest and conviction rate (respondent 4). The SAPS should be involved in all industry security initiatives (respondent 5).

#### **5.4 FINDINGS BASED ON THE STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMISED JEWELLERS**

In the case of the semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable people reference was made to respondents 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. For the purposes of the structured interviews with five victims of jewellery store robbery, reference is made to respondents 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 (see Chapter 1, section 1.4.6.3).

##### **5.4.1 General information**

All respondents, with the exception of respondent 9, were males. They all were in the age group 40-49 and operated their businesses from a suburban store situated in the Johannesburg metropolitan area.

##### **5.4.2 Description of the robbery event**

In the past five years, respondents 6 and 7 had each experienced an armed robbery in September 2006; respondents 8, 9 and 10 were victimised once in 2007. Respondent 7 was also robbed once in 2004 and 2005 (only information on the most recent robbery was captured for the purposes of the interview).

The results that emerged from the structured interviews with victims of jewellery store robbery were, for the most part, similar to those obtained from the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. This helped to further substantiate the research findings as follows:

- While the day of the week in which the robberies occurred varied from one respondent to another, in the case of respondent 7 two robberies took place in December, which has already been described in sections 2.3.3.2 (i) and 5.2.2.3 as a critical month for robberies.
- Two robberies took place at opening time (respondents 9 and 10); one during late morning (respondent 8); and two at closing time (respondents 6 and 7). This stresses the fact that opening and closing appears to be critical times for the risk of armed robbery. However, robbers may also strike during busy hours. In one instance (respondent 8), the store was attacked in a busy shopping centre at approximately 11:00 on Thursday.
- All respondents were robbed by a large group of offenders (five or more). This is in line with the questionnaire and semi-structured interview results which indicated that the majority of stores were robbed by a group of five or more offenders (sections 5.2.2.6 and 5.3.4 i). During three incidents (respondents 6, 7 and 8) gangs of up to fifteen robbers were involved. In one case, two stores (respondents 6 and 7) were robbed simultaneously by a large group of criminals who, once inside the shopping centre, split into two different groups and proceeded to attack the selected targets.
- Respondents 7, 8, 9 and 10 pointed out that suspicious looking individuals were seen at the store prior to the commission of the robbery. According to the respondents, these individuals posed as customers with the purpose of casing the store. Respondent 8 explained that store CCTV footage confirmed the presence of individuals behaving in a very suspicious manner a few days before the robbery. This is also in line with questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.2.7).
- In four cases (respondents 6, 7, 8 and 10), robbers forced entry and, once inside the store, some of them wore balaclavas during the execution of the crime while others did not bother to disguise their identity. Some robbers instead wore a cap and kept it as close as possible to their eyes in order to make identification difficult (respondent 7). In one case (respondent 9), robbers entered the store posing as customers and, once inside, pulled out a firearm threatening members of staff. They were immediately joined by other members of the gang who took control of the store while others kept a watchful eye.

- In all cases, robbers were armed with firearms including handguns and automatic rifles. Respondent 8 stated that some of the robbers wore bullet proof vests for their protection. Some robbers carried hammers in order to smash the reinforced glass surface of the display counters (respondents 6 and 7). In other instances (respondents 8, 9 and 10), the butt of the rifles was used to smash the glass. Automatic rifles were carried under overcoats and inside large bags but were also openly displayed in an act of total defiance when the gang arrived at the store (respondent 8). Questionnaire and semi-structured interview findings also indicated that firearms were the robbers' preferred weapon (sections 5.2.2.9 and 5.3.4 iv).
- Firearms were used to threaten and intimidate staff and customers. Although no injuries or death were reported among staff or customers, during three attacks (respondents 6, 7 and 8), robbers did not hesitate to open fire in order to destroy the display windows, generate panic among members of staff, customers and bystanders, and engage civilians and SAPS members who stood in their way. Some of the robbers were injured but helped away by other gang members (respondent 8); a robber was also found dead in an abandoned vehicle not far from the crime scene (respondent 6). During one incident (respondent 8), robbers made use of plastic explosive to blow a locked door open. This shows their level of preparation and determination in the execution of the robbery.
- No resistance on the part of staff or customers was reported and this helps explain why no serious injuries had occurred. It is clear that any resistance would have been met with a swift and severe retaliation on the part of the robbers. This is in line with the questionnaire-based findings, which showed that the majority of the victims did not react or sustain injuries during the attacks (section 5.2.2.10). However, respondent 6 stated that a policeman had received serious injuries when confronting the robbers. Although no physical injuries were reported among staff or customers, all respondents indicated that they had experienced severe psychological trauma in the immediacy of the robbery event.
- In four cases the offenders executed the robbery in three to five minutes. One attack (respondent 6) was completed in over five minutes, which is more in line with the majority of the responses obtained from the questionnaires (section

5.2.2.11). The fact that these gangs are prepared to spend five minutes or longer at a crime scene is an indication of their confidence, preparation and strength.

- In three cases (respondents 6, 7 and 8), the robbers escaped with over R 500 000 worth of jewellery and high-value watches, the latter being the most targeted item. In the remaining cases (respondents 9 and 10), the stolen jewellery caused a loss of just under R 250 000. Respondents 8 and 10 reported that, because they were not fully insured, their losses were substantial. Respondents 6 and 8 stated that shots fired inside the stores had caused extensive damage to shop fittings, thus adding to the financial burden. As indicated by the experts during the semi-structured interviews (section 5.3.3.2) and as emerged from the questionnaire-based findings (5.2.2.12), high-value watches appear to be a much sought after item due to the fact that they are easy to dispose of.
- In all cases, even though the robbery was reported to the SAPS, no arrests or recoveries of stolen jewellery were reported. As in the case of the majority of questionnaire respondents, this explains why all interview respondents were dissatisfied with the way the SAPS conducted the investigation (section 5.2.2.13). Respondents 6, 7 and 8 also stated that their dissatisfaction was aggravated by the lack of feedback on the part of the appointed investigators.

### **5.4.3 Location of premises**

All respondents' stores are situated inside shopping centres. In the case of respondents 6 and 7, the stores are trading at a distance of approximately 50 metres from each other. As indicated earlier, these stores were attacked simultaneously by a very large group of robbers. Four stores were located near entry / exit points in the proximity of a parking area (less than 50 metres); one store (respondent 8) was closer to the centre of the complex (over 50 metres from the nearest parking). Results indicate that all stores are in the proximity of general small business. However, two stores (respondents 6 and 7) also happen to be next to coffee bars. As pointed out in the questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.3.2), a store's proximity to an entry / exit point leading to a parking area and to certain premises such as coffee bars and restaurants is viewed as a risk factor in that the first provides an easier and quicker escape route, and the second offers an ideal place from which to observe a store.

#### **5.4.4 Adopted security measures**

Standard security measures adopted by all respondents at their stores include intruder detection systems connected to a security control centre and armed response, reinforced glass and insurance approved safes. Only two respondents (7 and 8) made use of CCTV surveillance, which as in the case of questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.4.1), indicates that the installation of digital CCTV systems is not a standard practice among jewellers, probably because of the high cost involved. One respondent (9) opted for a security gate with a strike lock system and another (7) went a step further in access control by installing an electronic security door system. All other respondents believed that they were better off, both in terms of trade and security, by maintaining free access / egress. In this regard, respondent 8 pointed out that, in the event of a robbery, he preferred seeing the offenders out of his store quickly rather than having to face a hostage situation by hindering their escape. It must be noted that the electronic security doors referred to above, did not deter the robbers who managed to shoot their way into the store by shattering the glass with automatic rifles. After the robbery, the jeweller decided to install 30 mm bullet proof glass, covering all glass surface of the store, in order to repel similar attacks. In addition, the landlord increased the level of security at the shopping centre by adding security manpower at strategic places, particularly in the jewellery retail area, and by improving the existing CCTV system and parking security. Other respondents did not implement any additional measures after the robbery event, with the exception of respondent 10 who decided to install a CCTV system in order to increase the level of deterrence and obtain video evidence in the event of criminal activities at the store.

#### **5.4.5 Personnel-related findings**

In the majority of cases (respondents 7, 8 and 9), the robbers were not deterred by the presence of three or more members of staff who were highly visible from the outside (respondent 8 pointed out that as many as ten members of staff were present at the time of the robbery). This is probably due to the fact that, as indicated earlier, the majority of jewellery store robberies appear to be committed by large groups of

heavily armed and professional criminals who can easily take control of a store and are fully prepared to deal with any reaction on the part of staff, security and police.

All respondents indicated that their members of staff had neither undergone security screening prior to employment nor received robbery awareness and prevention training. This is also a reflection of the questionnaire-based findings (sections 5.2.5.2 and 5.2.5.3), which showed that over 40 percent of respondents chose not to take any preventative action with regard to staff screening and training. Therefore, it appears as if a simple reference check is common practice among jewellers.

#### **5.4.6 Psychological impact**

Four respondents believed that the frequency of armed robbery at jewellery stores was increasing; respondent 7 instead believed it was decreasing (after reaching a peak in 2005-2006). This is in line with the questionnaire-based findings, which showed that the majority of respondents believed that armed robbery was on the increase (section 5.2.6.1).

All respondents felt at risk of robbery victimisation and this caused them to experience stress. Due to the constant threat of robbery and to the stress resulting from it, all respondents considered giving-up their businesses, particularly after the robbery event. Questionnaire results also showed that a high percentage of respondents (46 percent) had contemplated changing their type of work because of the risk of violent victimisation (section 5.2.6.4).

#### **5.4.7 Strategy against robbery**

All respondents agreed that crime prevention should become an integral part of staff general training. They also expressed in favour of the formation of a jewellery security body taking care of all security issues pertaining to the jewellery industry, and indicated that they would be willing to pay a subscription fee in order to fund this initiative. This is in line with the questionnaire-based findings (section 5.2.7.1). With regard to the question on whether crime prevention should form part of the study programme at schools or colleges training jewellers, respondent 8 indicated that he



was not in favour as he believed it should be the direct responsibility of the Jewellery Council to prepare and manage training programmes for jewellers.

## **5.5 CONCLUSION**

This chapter has presented the main findings of the empirical research on jewellery store robbery. Topics like the respondents' profile, geographical location of the stores in relation to its surrounding environment, robbery event (precursors, crime, criminal, victim and aftermath), available security measures, personnel-related security issues, perception of victimisation risk and crime prevention initiatives, were discussed. Based on the study, it is evident that robbery at jewellery stores is a cumbersome phenomenon, which needs to be addressed not only by the individual jewellers but also by the jewellery industry as a whole. With regard to this study, encouraging is the fact that the findings that emerged from the questionnaire and interview responses were similar in many respects. The main results can be summarised as follows:

- Findings on the robbery event indicated that most respondents experienced a robbery attack in a five year period. The stores situated in urban /suburban areas reported the highest percentage of robbery victimisation.
- Both questionnaire and interview results furnished a clear picture of robbery at jewellery stores as an organised criminal event involving large groups of professional robbers, for the most part armed with firearms (linked to local and foreign crime syndicates). It was also found to be a phenomenon involving repeat victimisation (more robbery attacks against the same target). In many instances, robbers or suspicious individuals were reported by jewellers and members of staff as having visited the store prior to the commission of the robbery. While fatal injuries were not reported, and in general death seemed to be a rare occurrence, due to the violent nature of this event, physical injuries did, in some instances, occur. The average reported loss, coupled with the very low arrest and jewellery recovery rates, stressed the importance for jewellers to be adequately insured in order to avoid losing a significant amount of money or even risk the success of their businesses.

- Questionnaire and interview findings on the location of the stores and on their immediate environment showed that the jewellery stores situated near entry / exit points, in close proximity to external parking, main routes and freeway ramps appeared to be vulnerable to robbery victimisation. However, interview respondents seemed to agree on the fact that a group of professional robbers would seldom be deterred by environmental factors.
- Findings on the available security measures at jewellery stores indicated that, while a variety of measures were implemented by jewellers as part of their risk reduction programme, there were specific areas of deficiency. Particularly evident was the lack of physical security barriers at the main entrance to the store and of CCTV systems.
- Questionnaire and interview findings on personnel pointed to a lack of security screening procedures prior to employment and also of crime awareness training for members of staff. These areas of deficiency contribute to a higher risk profile for jewellers.
- With regard to the fear of robbery victimisation, questionnaire and interview findings showed that the majority of respondents believed that robbery was on the increase. Semi-structured interview respondents instead seemed to agree that the increase was more on the severity than on the frequency of the attacks. However, they agreed that there had been a sudden upsurge in robberies, particularly in the Gauteng Province. Robbery was found to be second on the list of the crimes that questionnaire respondents perceived as occurring mostly at their stores (after theft). Feeling at risk and under stress as a result of the possibility of robbery victimisation was found to be a common element among jewellers and members of staff, and had such a negative impact that almost half of the questionnaire respondents and all interviewees (victims of robbery) considered giving up their business or occupation.
- Findings on crime prevention indicated that the majority of questionnaire respondents and all the interviewees were in favour of the introduction of a jewellery security structure with the task of forming a crime intelligence and dismissed employee database. Stricter employee screening procedures and improved crime prevention training for all staff were also viewed in a favourable light.

While the above findings are important to describe the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery, additional research is recommended particularly from the robbers' perspective. This will undoubtedly add value to new crime reduction initiatives in this specialised field. In the following chapter, a jewellery store robbery intervention strategy, which is based on the situational crime prevention model, will be formulated.

## CHAPTER 6

### INTERVENTION MODEL FOR THE REDUCTION OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

The realisation of a comprehensive robbery intervention strategy, which serves as a guide to jewellers and members of staff in reducing the risk for robbery victimisation, is the ultimate aim of this study (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). In order for this strategy to be effective, it is necessary for it to be developed within an appropriate theoretical framework which makes use of tested principles and techniques and the research findings from Chapter 5. Since the emphasis of this study is on the opportunities generated by the physical environment (the jewellery store and its immediate surroundings) and the behaviour and activities of individuals (the jewellers and members of staff), **situational crime prevention** was chosen as a model to reduce opportunities for robbery. This model focuses on the reduction of crime opportunities as a practical and short-term answer to specific crime situations, in this case jewellery store robbery.

Firstly the basic principles of the model will briefly be discussed and evaluated, followed by specific robbery intervention strategies focusing on the crime situation, or the context in which the crime occurs, and the individual behaviour, or the behaviour of potential or actual victims. The researcher was not concerned with an approach based on the robbers' perspective, except when discussing situational, environmental and victim's behavioural strategies which could bear an influence on the criminals' behaviour and their decision to commit robbery.

In order to be as comprehensive and as effective as possible, the suggested robbery intervention strategies are explained in terms of specific categories as reflected in the empirical findings of Chapter 5, i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, personnel and business-oriented strategies. For these categories of prevention to be effective they should not be considered in isolation but rather as a cohesive unit which

aims at achieving a specific objective, i.e. the reduction of the opportunities for robbery.

## **6.2 THE SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION MODEL**

Having stressed opportunity theories in the explanation of jewellery store robbery (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.1), it follows that, with regard to the prevention of this crime, emphasis will be on a model derived from the said perspective. Accepting opportunity as a cause of crime also opens up a new vista of crime prevention policies focused upon opportunity-reduction. The reduction of crime opportunities through situational crime prevention is considered as a successful strategy in that it is focused on immediate and concrete crime generating conditions (Felson & Clarke 1998:1-3).

After having been conceptualised in the United States through Newman's defensible space, situational crime prevention developed from 1976 with Mayhew, Sturman, Hough and Clarke, and reached its peak with Clarke's work (1990) at the British Home Office (Felson 2002:144). Situational crime prevention has to do with the reduction of opportunities people have to commit particular crimes and, as Clarke puts it (Conklin 2001:529), "is directed at highly specific forms of crime; involves the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in a systematic and permanent a way as possible; is aimed at increasing the efforts and risks of crime and reduce the rewards as perceived by a wide range of offenders".

From a practical point of view, situational crime prevention incorporates two main categories of prevention (Geason & Wilson 1992:9-10):

- **Environment centred prevention** including physical, mechanical and electronic prevention as well as environmental design.
- **Individual centred prevention** including procedural (behavioural) security, self protective measures and business / employee oriented programmes.

### **6.2.1 Environment-centred prevention**

Environmental crime prevention, as a specialised field of research in modern criminology, is relevant to this study because of its specific applicability in the prevention of jewellery store robbery. The origin of environmental crime prevention can be traced to the United States in the early 1970s with Newman's model of defensible space and Jeffery's concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, which involved making use of or manipulating environmental features with a view to eliminating or reducing opportunities for delinquency and crime (Siegel 2004:117). Their view was that crime could be prevented through the introduction of specific measures such as, among others, physical security, electronic security, high visibility and neighbourhood watch patrols. This reasoning, which initially involved large urban and residential areas as well as housing projects can, in modern criminology, also find an important application in the design and layout of business premises, e.g. shopping complexes and retail stores.

The concept of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design also known today as **CPTED** evolved from the idea of creating a defensive environment both from a physical and psychological perspective. The principal goal of CPTED is the reduction of opportunities for a crime to occur. This reduction is achieved by employing physical and psychological features to a specific environment, aimed at discouraging the commission of unlawful activities. The uniqueness and success of CPTED stems from the manner in which its main individual elements, i.e. target hardening, territoriality, surveillance / visibility, access / escape routes, and image and aesthetics, are integrated in the protection of a specific environment (Du Plessis & Holtmann 2005:155-158).

### **6.2.2 Individual-centred prevention**

The success of situational crime prevention may also rest on the behaviour of people whose actions directly influence crime prevention. In situational prevention these people are also known as crime discouragers (Siegel 2004:118). Discouragers have different levels of responsibility and can be grouped into three categories, namely **guardians** who monitor specific targets, such as jewellery store security guards;

**managers** who are in charge of a specific place such as the jewellery store owners and managers; and **handlers** who monitor potential offenders, e.g. parents and parole officers. This study is concerned with the first two categories of discouragers.

The principles of situational crime prevention, i.e. increasing the efforts, increasing the risks and reducing the rewards for the criminal, can also be achieved through the application of specific behavioural procedures on the part of potential victims. According to Karmen (2007:25), two main strategies contribute to the prevention of victimisation. The first involves educating likely victims; the second calls for likely victims to enhance their safety through security hardware and protective measures. These strategies aim at guiding the individual's behaviour in the reduction of victimisation risk and changing the criminal's perception towards a specific target or victim. Clearly, victimisation cannot be prevented solely through educational campaigns that simply stress behavioural procedures. A more comprehensive approach advocates a reliance on security hardware and protective services as well (Conklin 2001:530).

Victimisation reduction strategies can be adopted by single individuals (e.g. jewellery store owners), a group of individuals (e.g. jewellers and members of staff) as well as organisations or communities (e.g. the jewellery retail sector). The crucial point is that by taking responsibility for their personal security and property, and by not taking unnecessary risks or creating opportunities for crime, jewellers may be able to largely avoid victimisation.

### **6.2.3 Critical evaluation of situational crime prevention**

It is necessary to state that situational crime prevention is not just a collection of "*ad hoc*" methods, but is firmly grounded in opportunity theory. In the context of this study, this model is considered very important as a strategy to reduce the opportunity for the commission of jewellery store robberies. Accepting that opportunity is a primary cause of crime, equal in importance to personal and social factors, results in a criminological approach that is not only more complete in its theorising but also more practical and effective in the short term (Felson & Clarke 1998:33). In fact, it is increasingly evident that situational crime prevention offers society the best chance

for a quick and inexpensive way to reduce crime slice by slice in three general ways: i) designing safe settings, ii) organising effective procedures and iii) developing secure products (Felson 2002:145).

Situational crime prevention has been mainly criticised for addressing only symptoms and not causes and thus for never being a permanent solution. Moreover, it has been argued that it leads to a displacement rather than prevention of crime, in that offenders may decide to shift their activities to another area (geographical displacement), or to another time (temporal displacement), target (target displacement), method (tactical displacement) or to another type of crime (crime type displacement) (Lab 2000:154; Newman 1997:4). In this regard, it can be stated that displacement is always a threat to prevention, but there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that it can be avoided or limited in scope (Felson & Clarke 1998:25-28). There is also the problem of extinction which implies that opportunity reduction programmes may produce a short-term positive effect, but benefits dissipate as criminals adjust to new conditions (Siegel 2004:120). For example, if security measures and systems increase, motivated offenders may resort to armed robbery against soft targets. It has also been said that the situational prevention model may enhance the fear of crime, in that specific forms of opportunity reduction (e.g. target hardening measures such as locks, grilles and shutters) are considered as part of a “fortress mentality” (Sacco & Kennedy 2002:303).

Apart from the above criticism, it can be safely stated that the advantages of opportunity reduction outweigh the disadvantages. In fact, besides being practical and effective, the situational model may lead to a reduction of crime with a “diffusion of benefits”. In so doing, preventative measures adopted in one location may lead to a diffusion of benefits in nearby places, because offenders seem to overestimate their reach (Newman 1997:2-4). As an example, general crime preventative measures inside a shopping complex, e.g. CCTV systems and guarding services, are beneficial to the security of a jewellery store situated inside the same complex.

With regard to individual-centred prevention, much criticism has also been levelled at the concept of victim response strategies (Fattah 1991:293-294). In fact, it is sometimes difficult to ask a potential victim to behave in a certain way in order to



avoid victimisation. Victims of robbery and the actual situation in which they find themselves, vary far too widely to be controlled by policy prescriptions. It has also been argued that limiting the range of responses open to a victim may be harmful to both the victim him/herself and the interest of society in controlling crime (Fattah 1991:211). Furthermore, self-help actions by potential victims may, in certain cases, lead to infringements of the law, e.g. excessive use of force or vigilantism. However, on a positive note, it cannot be denied that victim empowerment strategies are essential in providing individuals with knowledge on how to prevent crime and avoid further victimisation. Furthermore, empowering individuals means providing them with a positive attitude against crime and, by implication, reducing their fear.

### **6.3 INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

Based on the research findings, crime opportunity can be regarded as a primary risk factor in jewellery store robbery. It follows that opportunity reduction as emphasised by the situational crime prevention model will be the main factor for its prevention. In a jewellery store context, usually crime opportunities are generated by the actions (or inaction) of the jewellers and their members of staff as well as by the environment where they operate, i.e. the jewellery store and the surrounding areas (due to factors such as lack of security barriers and systems or a high crime rate). Following on these considerations, effective robbery intervention strategies must necessarily focus on the environment, i.e. the jewellery store and its immediate environment, and on individual behaviour, i.e. the jewellers and members of staff's. It is in this specific context that opportunities for robbery can be minimised.

#### **6.3.1 Decisional strategies**

Prior to implementing any strategy, it is of the utmost importance for jewellers to consider factors such as the security and cost effectiveness of the proposed measures as well as risk transfer possibilities.

### **6.3.1.1 Security and cost effectiveness**

Jewellers are faced with the task of deciding what level of security protection they need, given their type of business, location, inventory and other situational / environmental factors (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:7). An essential requirement prior to the implementation of any crime prevention strategies is that they must effectively reduce the risk of victimisation. In order for any strategy to be effective, they have to be selected and implemented after a thorough evaluation conducted by experts on all crime risk factors related to a business activity (risk assessment). Each strategy whether situational, environmental or procedural, should specifically target the identified risk and help minimise the possibility for it to occur.

A further consideration is that effective security does not necessarily have to be costly. In fact, it is fundamental to determine the cost-effectiveness of all preventive measures before their implementation. This can be done by weighing up the costs of possible crime related losses against the cost of preventive measures. In general it can be stated that if the cost of a possible crime exceeds the cost of the preventive measures being considered, then such preventive measures will be cost-effective (Stevens 1988:209).

One of the consequences of crime against jewellers is an increase in crime prevention spending. According to the British Retail Consortium (2000:12), while the value of retail losses in 2000 decreased by 3 percent, actual spending on crime prevention rose by 13 percent (from 1999). The spending was spread as follows: security staff (57 percent); cash collection (17 percent); theft protection (11 percent); security systems leasing and maintenance (8 percent); burglary protection (7 percent). The total cost of crime should, therefore, be measured on the value of losses from crime added to the cost of crime prevention measures in a given year. To this figure one should still add the various cost factors linked to absence from work, low productivity, loss of clientele, and so forth. According to a Retail Costs Survey, published by the British Retail Consortium Crime Initiative in the United Kingdom, while retailers in general spent low amounts on crime prevention measures as a proportion of losses by crime, jewellers instead were spending a staggering 247 percent of the figure they lost from crime (Cost of crime 1995:22).

While the implementation of certain robbery intervention strategies, e.g. procedural and behavioural, are inexpensive, other recommended strategies may require considerable expenditures, especially electronic security measures such as CCTV surveillance systems. Due to the fact that, as stated earlier, the selected intervention measures need to be both security and cost-effective, it is advisable for jewellers to resort to expert advice at an early stage, ideally prior to setting up a store. The implementation of late measures without professional advice, e.g. after having sustained a serious loss, may result in inappropriate and costly decisions.

The cost-effectiveness of the implemented risk reduction measures is also reflected in the likely reduction of insurance rates. In fact, insurance savings may more than offset the cost of installing insurance-approved security systems. In addition, improvements in management practices stemming from security concerns may increase the profitability of the enterprise as a whole, again resulting in savings (Gem & Jewel Acceptances 2002).

Given the nature of the jewellery business, it is impossible to create a crime-proof environment. Some security measures, which could be extremely effective against robbery, are simply not practical in a jewellery retail context. Nevertheless, jewellers must continuously strive to keep crime risks to a minimum. In other words, sales and marketing must be balanced with intelligent security solutions (Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:9).

#### **6.3.1.2 Risk transfer**

Because of the high risk factors inherent in their activity, it is of the utmost importance for jewellers to adopt risk transfer strategies, bearing in mind that this should not detract from the value of an effective security programme, but rather be an integral part of it. Risk transfer is simply a structured approach to dealing with the many risks to which a specific business is exposed in order to minimise the financial effect following loss or damage (Gem & Jewel Acceptances marketing material 2004). The consequences of risks can be measured by considering two factors: **frequency** (how often a particular type of risk will occur) and **severity** (how serious, in financial terms, will a particular risk be if it happens).

Insurance is the most economic method of providing for the more serious forms of loss or damage. It can be stated that no jeweller can afford to be without an adequate insurance cover as, even a single robbery attack against a jewellery store may force the uninsured jeweller out of business. The manner in which such insurance is arranged and the quality of the protection provided for the property insured will have a significant effect on the cost of such insurance. In general terms, a low severity risk could be self-funded within the business and those risks with severe financial consequences should be covered through insurance.

It is important for jewellers to select an insurance company that can provide a specialised policy that is designed to meet the needs of the jewellery industry, and who can offer competent advice regarding risk control. When arranging insurance, it is most important to ensure that the company selected carries out a detailed survey of the premises in order to significantly reduce the potentially onerous duty of disclosure, i.e. providing accurate information regarding the implementation of security or risk reduction measures. Therefore, it is evident that by adequately insuring their businesses, jewellers will be able to limit financial losses and in such a way remain in business. In addition, members of staff will be able to retain their jobs which could otherwise have been lost as a result of an uninsured event.

Jewellers should also make sure that they disclose accurate values as being under-insured could lead to considerable losses. Under-insurance refers to a situation when the value for which a jeweller is insured is less than the actual replacement value of the insured items (Van Alphenstahl 2004:13). In today's economic climate this could have a serious impact on a jeweller's day-to-day finances. If funds are not available to replace the stolen items, jewellers may be forced to take out a loan; or worse still, take a step backward and simply not replace many of the lost items. To avoid a situation of under-insurance it is necessary for jewellers to go back to and update their inventory. If this is done regularly jewellers will always know the true value of their stock and will avoid being under-insured on the day of a claim, a mistake that could result in significant losses.

## **6.3.2 Environmental strategies**

Environmental strategies involve acting on the physical environment with a view to deter a criminal attack or render access to the target as difficult as possible through the application of target hardening measures. These intervention strategies focus on physical and psychological prevention and deterrence.

### **6.3.2.1 Selection and manipulation of the environment**

Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2, indicate that a jewellery store's location and environment may be a factor in creating opportunities for robbery. Therefore, specific robbery reduction measures need to focus on store location, store design and layout.

#### **6.3.2.1.1 Store location**

The location of a jewellery store and the nature of the surrounding area play a significant role in the vulnerability and risk of the business with regard to crime. For this reason, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis of the area where a jeweller is considering setting up a store. If this aspect is overlooked, it may have negative implications for a jeweller and his/her business. In fact, once the store has been set up, it is usually very difficult and costly to move to another location. Consideration should be given to the following important aspects (Gardner 2001:14; Maree 1999:59; Maree & Naudé 1991:68-69):

- **Choice of surroundings and site.** This is fundamental for both the success of the business and the security of the store. In making their choices, jewellers must bear in mind aspects such as vulnerability, risk and cost-effectiveness.
- **Assessment of the general crime statistics in the area.** This is an important element in the overall security strategy. The higher the armed robbery figures, the more serious the risk for the store to be attacked by criminals.
- **Typology of crimes.** An analysis of the type of crimes affecting other businesses in the area may assist jewellers in their decision on whether it will be safe to

invest in the area. All the precautionary measures taken by business owners should be noted. The more security measures are in place, the higher the crime risk is likely to have been and continue to be in future.

- **Nature of the socio-economic and demographic environment.** This usually indicates an enterprise's likelihood of success or failure and the risks that jewellers may face. The presence of a poor socio-economic environment with a high population density may signify a high burglary and robbery rate in the area. Also the presence of a high concentration of juveniles in the streets of a neighbourhood may have implications on the levels of crime in the area.
- **Access to escape routes.** Easy access to freeways or major thoroughfares in the vicinity of the store must be considered as a risk factor in that, after a robbery has been committed, freeway or major thoroughfares offer criminals an easy escape route.

#### **6.3.2.1.2 Store design and layout**

The architectural design of the store should be adequately arranged giving priority to the elements of security. The following measures are suggested (Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3-5):

- **Ideal location.** The store should be located within a business complex that has all three separating brick walls extended from concrete floor level to concrete ceiling height without any openings or apertures to any other adjoining retail store by way of false ceilings.
- **Display cases** need to be positioned in such a way that better control can be exercised, especially at the most vulnerable areas, e.g. at entrances and exits, and where expensive merchandise is displayed, bearing in mind that high value merchandise should not be kept inside display cabinets near exit points.
- **Counters** need also to be positioned in a way that criminals are unable to keep all the staff in their line of sight, also making their movements more difficult. The width of the counters is also important since the installation of narrow counters would lend itself to criminals leaning over them, giving access to locking mechanisms and tampering with them.

- **Visibility** inside the store is an important element. Counters and display cases should not hinder visibility in the store. A jewellery store in which, on the one side, staff can exercise a high degree of visual control and, on the other, members of the public or security can see the store's activities from outside, increases the likelihood of a criminal act being observed and reported. This has a deterrent effect on would-be robbers. However, jewellers cannot rely only on natural methods of surveillance; they also need to implement formal methods of surveillance such as CCTV systems, guarding services and business watch initiatives.
- **Cash registers** need to be adequately positioned. They should not be too close to the main entrance / exit, otherwise robbers would have the advantage of being able to act quickly and escape easily with cash.
- **Store security systems**, e.g. video surveillance, intruder detection and panic systems, need to be carefully considered at the design stage in order to maximise security and minimise the costs related to the installation of such systems. The introduction of security measures at a later stage may be a very costly exercise.
- **Surveillance** needs special attention in order to increase robbery deterrence. The internal area of the store should be clearly visible from outside. It is therefore advisable for jewellers to remove or rearrange anything that may obstruct good visibility inside the store and to create adequate light conditions.
- **Zone division** also plays a role in robbery risk reduction. High-risk areas need to be divided from the general area where customers can move freely, by means of physical and electronic barriers.

### **6.3.2.2 Barriers to protect the store and merchandise**

The protection of store and merchandise involves symbolic, physical, living and electronic barriers which, in combination, considerably increase the element of robbery deterrence. The following risk reduction measures are suggested:

### 6.3.2.2.1 Symbolic and psychological barriers

As indicated in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.2, the effectiveness of symbolic and psychological barriers in jewellery store robbery deterrence needs to be researched from a robber's perspective. The purpose of symbolic barriers is to act on the psychology of the criminals and, in such a way, discourage them from committing a crime. Examples of symbolic or psychological barriers in a jewellery store environment are (Zannoni 2002a:11-12):

- **Visibility.** This element may act as a psychological deterrent. In fact, criminals may refrain from committing a robbery if they believe that they may be seen in the process. Therefore, high priority should be given to creating an environment with good visibility and lighting.
- **One-way mirrors.** These need to be installed inside the stores in a highly visible position, thus giving potential robbers the impression that someone is watching them from the other side.
- **Notices and signage.** In order to deter potential criminals it is necessary to use notices or signage to advertise the fact that specific security measures and systems, e.g. cash control, CCTV, intruder detection and time locks, are in place.

### 6.3.2.2.2 Physical barriers

In a jewellery store, the purpose of physical barriers is the protection of the staff and merchandise. Some of these physical security measures will undoubtedly make access to the store and the jewellery more difficult for robbers but may, at the same time, put jewellers and staff more at risk if they cannot immediately comply with the criminals' demands. Therefore, as a result of this risk, it is necessary to assess each situation carefully and consult with qualified security specialists.

Findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1 indicated that the most common physical barriers adopted by jewellers include safes and shutter proof glass on windows. The following physical barriers are suggested by the experts (Zannoni 2002b:14-15; Thames Valley Business Crime Centre 2001:20):



- **Security gates.** Jewellers are sensitive to aesthetics and usually prefer to avoid the installation of barriers which may discourage customers from entering their store. According to a 2002 security survey sponsored by the Jewellery Council of South Africa (Security industry best practice for S.A. 2002:18), in the case of private jewellers, access control is usually handled by a door buzzer system, after which further access is controlled by human intervention, usually receptionists. However, there are some stores, in particular chain stores that do not have any form of access control. This implies that customers have free and unannounced access into the stores. This situation can be reviewed with the introduction of some form of access control such as a security gate or door linked to a buzzer system. Some jewellers are installing a low height door which serves as a more friendly barrier than the traditional security gate. This allows jewellers and members of staff to check who is at the gate or door and use their discretion prior to authorising access. However, these gates/doors do not constitute an effective barrier as they can be easily jumped over, but this action should draw the attention of members of the public or security, thus providing some degree of deterrence. Another advantage of this barrier is that, should a robber panic during the attack, he would still be able to jump over the door without being trapped inside the store, a situation which could cause a violent reaction with serious consequences for the jewellers, staff and customers (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1).
- **Safe and vaults.** A safe within which to store high value jewellery, precious stones and cash is a necessary long-term investment for the jeweller. Insurance requirements need to be considered when choosing the type of safe, which should be South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) approved and have a minimum category 2 ADM (Anti-Disc Material) grading. However, since its purpose is to provide maximum security, a safe of the highest rating is well worth the investment, particularly in instances where jewellers have high value items in stock. The following serves as a guideline (safe category and insured value) :

SABS Category 2 ADM Grading	R 50 000
SABS Category 2 ADM Grading D3	R 75 000
SABS Category 3 Grading	R 100 000
SABS Category 4 Grading	R 200 000

Furthermore, jewellers with large inventories should, at the design stage, make provision for a vault which can also contain the safe(s). In this case, even if burglars manage to enter a jewellery store, they are far less likely to attack the safe(s). Hidden safes can prove useful in the event of robbers successfully managing to have access to the main safe. A smaller safe can be hidden, for instance, under the floor and only the jeweller or trusted person should be aware of its existence.

- **Time locks.** By using time locks on safes which allow opening only at pre-set times, staff cannot hand high value jewellery over to robbers (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). Furthermore, if robbers were to kidnap the jeweller, he / she would not be able to open the safe outside the pre-set times. This measure has both advantages and disadvantages. While valuable jewellery is secured, robbers may resort to violence if they cannot have immediate access to it. For this reason, it is necessary to have prominently displayed notices indicating that time locks have been installed as an added source of protection. An alternative method is that of making use of a hidden safe.
- **Secure jewellery and cash handling areas.** These areas need to be adequately secured against a robbery attack. The installation of security measures such as video surveillance cameras, reinforced doors, walls, ceilings and glass areas, and access control systems (e.g. fingerprint identification), needs to be considered.
- **Display cases.** Jewellers need to use display cases that have break and enter resistant or shatterproof glass on the sides as well as the top (for all the showcases containing high-end merchandise). This will help prevent quick smash and grab attacks by slowing down the robbers. Sturdy locking mechanisms are also vital in order to resist tampering effects.
- **Security glass.** All glass surfaces need to be strengthened with insurance approved high-impact glazing material (security films). If properly installed, this film bonds with the glass to form an invisible barrier that defends against the most

violent of blows and is particularly effective in deterring smash and grab attacks. This is, however, not effective if the windows or door frames are not sufficiently strong to sustain repeated blows. High-impact security glass is available in the following thicknesses (no plate glass of any kind should exceed the measurement of 4 square metres or 2m x 2m):

7mm	Made up of two part 3mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl Transparent Lamination between the respective 3mm each Glass Floats.
9mm	Made up of two part 4mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl Transparent Lamination between the respective 4mm each Glass Floats.
11mm	Made up of two part 5mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl Transparent Lamination between the respective 5mm each Glass Floats.
13mm	Made up of two part 6mm Glass Floats with a 1.5mm thick Vinyl Transparent Lamination between the respective 6mm each Glass Floats.

Bullet resistant glass is also suitable for jewellers risk but very expensive to install. Limits of values should be calculated on the thickness of the glass in respect of values of stock displayed during and after business hours. The glass floats and returns should be protected by an approved alarm radio linked system that provides audio impact sensors in addition to inside metal grilles with small apertures or, preferably solid roller shutters. On account of the mounting of the glass floats and glass returns, which for impact purposes are installed in cushioned gaskets surrounds and then in metal or wood frames, alarm impact sensors or alarm metallic strips are not recommended as this type of glass is not subject to vibration or complete breakage unless violently struck by an extremely heavy object (manhole cover or vehicle collision). Glass of this nature, when attacked, is shattered and adheres together and does not fall apart.

Inherent glass limitations should also be borne in mind, in particular that i) it is vulnerable to icy conditions below freezing point because under such conditions the glass becomes very fragile; ii) any vinyl laminated glass is easily glazed and broken under extreme heat; iii) security film on existing glass is ineffective unless the entire glass floats are removed from their respective frames and completely laminated and refitted (because the inner frame surrounds is not protected, it becomes vulnerable to breakage).

### 6.3.2.2.3 Living barriers

As in the case of psychological barriers, findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.5.1, stressed the need to conduct a further study based on the robbers' perspective, in order to understand the real value of living barriers in deterring a robbery attack against a jewellery store. However, based on literature findings (Wright & Decker 1997:91; Maree 1999:55), these barriers help reduce the risk of a robbery attack. The following are examples of living barriers:

- **Members of staff.** The presence of more members of staff may act as a deterrent against robbers who, in order to have better control over the situation, usually prefer to target stores where staff can be easily overpowered.
- **Security and police.** The presence of security guards or patrol vehicles near the store may help prevent an incident of robbery. Dedicated security guards may also act as a deterrent, particularly during times of special risk such as during events calling for unusually high value at the store, e.g. seasonal increases during the Festive Season (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). According to Wright and Decker (1997:91), commercial armed robbers disagreed on the deterrence value of security guards. Some said that they would not attempt to rob an establishment while a security guard was on duty. Others, instead, reported that guards were not much of a threat, especially when committing robbery as part of a team.
- **Bystanders.** High volumes of pedestrian traffic in the vicinity of the store may act as a barrier against criminals in that the latter are worried of being observed and reported to security or police.

Based on the findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1, jewellers do not usually employ the services of a dedicated store guard, possibly because of the high on-going cost factor. Frequent police patrols or the presence of a police station or security company in the area may also be a deterrent against robbers, who, for obvious reasons, prefer to avoid being confronted by law enforcement or security officials.

#### 6.3.2.2.4 Electronic barriers

Findings in chapter five, 5.2.4.1, indicated that intruder detection and panic systems linked to an emergency armed response are the jewellers' preferred electronic barriers. These barriers are important whenever the behavioural procedures adopted by jewellers and members of staff are not on their own sufficient to prevent robbery. Their main functions are the deterrence and prevention of crime as well as the detection of a crime in progress and the possible identification of the offenders. An important consideration is that electronic barriers need to be installed by insurance-approved contractors, adequately maintained and regularly tested in order to maximise their effectiveness, especially in times of need. The following considerations on electronic barriers are relevant (Thames Valley Business Crime Centre 2001:14-19; Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:20-24; Criteri di sicurezza 1998:74-76):

- **Intruder detection and panic systems.** An effective alarm system includes three types of detection devices: i) perimeter protection on doors and windows; ii) area protection, also called volumetric protection and; iii) object protection, for example, to the safe or vault from being interfered with. The protection against entry from various spots, such as side walls, a false ceiling, or from the walls facing other stores, needs to be addressed. Showcases should also be protected against smash and grab attacks or distraction theft by means of glass break detectors and magnetic contacts linked to a buzzer and flashing light system.

A panic system by means of fixed switches and portable remote transmitters needs to be incorporated into the main alarm and installed at strategic positions, which should be easily accessible not only by the action of the hand but also by foot or knee. A strategic place for a panic switch can also be within till drawers or under a tray, with the alarm being activated when the last banknote is removed from a clip. On activating the panic alarm, jewellers or members of staff should not try to reach for a panic button unless they are absolutely certain that the robbers cannot see them in the process. A silent panic alarm is also suggested as the activation of a siren might cause the robbers to react violently. Furthermore, jewellers need to be aware that pressing a panic button during a robbery may

result in a hostage situation, if a security or police response unit arrives while the suspects are still in the store.

Insurance companies usually require that the above systems comply with the following specifications:

- South African Intruder Detection Services Association (SAIDSA) approved installer
  - Certificate of installation and maintenance contract with quarterly inspection by installer
  - Hard-wired system (no wireless systems)
  - Radio transmitter signals (no tele-dialer)
  - Internal passive detectors for space protection, including roof void
  - Magnetic contacts on external doors
  - Audio glass breakage sensors for windows
  - Dedicated alarm circuit for each detection device
  - 24-hour tamper circuit protection for the alarm devices and control unit
  - End of Line Resistance (EOL) for all space protection units
  - Control box and transmitter in alarm protected area
  - Entry/exit delay at main entry/exit point
  - Panic buttons (preferable portable as it is easier to activate and at the critical opening and closing times allows a staff member to observe from a distance)
  - Duress signaling facility in the event of an armed hold-up
  - Immediate siren on alarm; delayed or silent mode on panic
  - Stand-by battery (minimum 8 hours)
  - Alarm monitoring by SAIDSA approved control centre
  - Security response via a Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) registered company
- **Security response.** The effectiveness of an alarm depends upon the reaction that follows. For this reason, the alarm and panic systems need to be linked to a reputable security company, with a visible operational presence in the area where the jewellery store is situated. It is also important for this company to maintain

high standards of training for their response officers, be registered with PSIRA, as required by law, and have its own control centre in compliance with SAIDSA's regulations.

Due to the vulnerability and unreliability of telephone lines, a radio transmitter link to the security response is necessary. Linking the alarm and panic system to on-site security, i.e. the complex security team, is also an important step, but jewellers should not rely on this protection only as it has its limitations and risks. In fact, it may happen that the entire guard force is held up at gunpoint by a group of robbers who then proceed to break into jewellery stores.

Depending on budget and degree of risk, jewellers should also consider two different alarm companies protecting their premises (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). One alarm system would protect the perimeter, which is all doors, windows and points of entry to the store, while the other system would protect the interior of the store and the safe. This double alarm monitoring gives added protection if one alarm is defeated, response in some manner is rendered ineffective, or if there is collusion with criminals by dishonest employees of one alarm company.

Today's technology makes it possible to link the alarm system to a CCTV camera system which is activated when the alarm or panic is triggered. With this system in place, the alarm monitoring company is able to listen in and see the actual events inside the store. This will initiate the most appropriate response to an emergency situation. The cameras provide images over telephone lines which can produce photographs of the criminals or help determine if the signal was a false alarm.

- **Closed circuit television (CCTV).** The installation of closed circuit television cameras to record crime vulnerable areas and all who enter the store is a valuable tool in a jeweller's security programme. To increase the chances of video evidence being used to get a conviction, it is necessary to use good quality digital equipment and recordings need to be date and time stamped. Cameras should be installed at a suitable position in order to get a clear picture of persons and events.

There are some conflicting statements with regard to the deterrence value of CCTV. While, on the one side, Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:20-23), agrees on CCTV as an effective deterrent against crime, on the other hand, some criminals have different opinions in that, according to them, the system can be defeated by the wearing of disguises such as a pair of dark glasses or a sport cap. In addition, it would appear as if CCTV has become so much a part of the urban commercial landscape that robbers have begun to take their presence for granted and plan accordingly (Wright & Decker 1997:90-91). It is advisable, in order to increase the element of deterrence, to have highly visible notices advising customers that a video surveillance system is in place.

CCTV has undoubtedly a valuable role to play in a jewellery store security strategy, mainly for the following reasons (Home Office Crime Prevention Agency 2000:3-4): criminals can be identified and arrested; many incidents of "mysterious disappearances" or shoplifting, which would not have been covered by insurance, can be turned into identifiable theft losses through the availability of video evidence; the actions of distraction thieves or dishonest members of staff can be uncovered; and an important database of visual information can be developed.

However, the effectiveness of CCTV can be hampered by various factors such as, amongst others, the following: faulty installation and inadequate positioning of the cameras; lack of proper maintenance; improper use by employees; inadequate lighting; no connection to video recorder, obstacles in front of cameras; and destruction of video system or removal of recording devices by criminals.

Some of the problems stated above can be eliminated through the utilisation of digital CCTV technology instead of the conventional analogue systems. The benefit of using a digital system is that it allows the user to replace the switching unit, monitor and time lapse recorder with one centralised system, which can be accessed and controlled from several locations. Digital CCTV systems offer many advantages over the analogue systems, such as the following (Eagle Technology 2004:89): higher image quality; faster retrieval times; less storage space required; better archiving capabilities; no routine maintenance required, software can be



upgraded; and transmit and retrieve stored data remotely across towns or across the world.

Risk areas that need to be covered by a video surveillance system are the following: a store's entry and exit points; point of sale / till area; high value jewellery and precious stone displays; safe and vault; secure room (where digital photographs of potential buyers can be taken either openly or secretly); external areas (particularly useful for street front stores where pictures of suspicious individuals or vehicles can be obtained) (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1).

Notwithstanding the value of video surveillance in a jewellery store environment, findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4.1 have clearly shown that only a small number of jewellers are willing to invest in this type of technology, mainly due to the fact that its application requires a considerable financial investment.

- **Smoke screen system.** Once activated, this system, within seconds, fills a small area with a dense but non-toxic smoke, thus preventing criminals from seeing and forcing them to flee. It can be incorporated into an existing alarm or used as a stand alone unit. In one instance (Flanagan 2006:4), a smoke screen system installed in the window area helped reduce the extent of the loss during an armed robbery at jewellery store in a busy shopping centre. In the opinion of the researcher, the smoke screen finds a better security application in the prevention of after-hours burglaries. Its activation during a robbery by a jeweller or staff member could cause a robber to react violently by shooting at random.
- **Smart water sprinkler system.** This consists of a liquid specially encoded with a DNA code unique to the store and visible under an ultraviolet light. Once activated, because the liquid sticks to everything over a long period of time, it may assist the police in linking a suspect to a specific crime scene (Smart water not a blessing for robbers 2005:2).
- **Electronic security doors.** These doors are used for the protection of high-risk areas such as, for example, banks, post offices and jewellery laboratories. In these types of environment, they may be useful in preventing a robbery attack as they generally restrict entry / exit to one person at a time, and may be used in conjunction with a metal detector. In addition, robbers can be effectively trapped

in the air lock between the doors in the event of an emergency. Their application in the case of a jewellery store, instead, is more problematic as their presence may discourage customer traffic. In this regard, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4.1 and 5.4.4 indicated that electronic security doors are not on the top list of jewellers' preferred security measures. Furthermore, according to Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:14), such system might actually bring about violence if the robbers set off an alarm or if they are caught between the doors. In some cases, depending on the degree of risk involved, it may be sufficient to have a security gate installed which can be opened by means of an electric strike lock. This is, in fact, the preferred option of many jewellers. These considerations underline the dilemma that most jewellers are facing, i.e. attaining a balance between the need for security and the need to make their businesses attractive to customers, without discouraging them from entering the store.

- **Anti-robbery device.** This is an electronic tracking device placed in jewellery trays which enables the police or security to follow the stolen tray by means of satellite tracking. Another system has a time triggering mechanism, which is set off shortly after robbers take trays from a store. This device explodes and releases smoke and dye. According to Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:15), in the United States there have been successful recoveries of stolen jewellery using both devices, which seem to have scarce application in South Africa.
- **Entrance alarms.** Simple door alarms warning staff that someone has entered the store may help reduce the chances of jewellers or members of staff being caught by surprise in a robbery or theft attempt.
- **Access control for secure areas.** Access control by means of biometric identification, e.g. fingerprint or face identification, has an important role to play in securing high risk areas in a jewellery store. The fingerprint scan is the most widely used biometric and is based on the unique patterns of ridges and valleys visible on the fingertips (The benefit of biometrics 2003:44)
- **Exterior and interior lighting.** Effective lighting may help reduce the risk of burglary, theft and armed robbery. When used properly, lighting not only discourages criminal activity but also enhances natural surveillance opportunities and reduces fear. Lights should be positioned at strategic points and exterior lights should be protected against deliberate damage.

### 6.3.3 Situational strategies

Situational strategies involve acting on a specific situation which creates the opportunity for crime commission. These strategies focus on the immediacy of a situation and aim at bringing about the necessary changes, within a specific environment, in order to reduce the risk of victimisation. Since jewellery store robbers are primarily interested in high value items of jewellery and cash, it is necessary to adopt target removal measures. This can be achieved in different ways (Zannoni 2002a:11; Home Office National Board for Crime Prevention 2000:3-5; Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:13-14):

- **Lock away expensive items.** High value jewellery items such as top-end diamonds and watches need to be locked away (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). Only selected samples should be displayed. When closing for business high value merchandise should always be removed from show windows or display cases and locked in the safe or strongroom. No high value items should be left out to attract the attention of robbers and thieves.
- **Keep a supply of decoy precious stones.** Some jewellers follow the practice of not keeping their valuable diamond inventory in the safe during the day, but rather conceal it elsewhere in the store so that criminals will not have access to it in the event of a robbery. These jewellers keep a supply of decoy stones in the safe to use if there is an armed robbery. A word of caution: the stock inventory should be kept in a secure place, e.g. a hidden safe installed under the floor or off premises.
- **Split higher value merchandise.** This merchandise needs to be split among different display cases. Since time is of the essence for the robbers, making the criminals' action slower and more difficult may reduce the quantity of jewellery the robbers can easily remove.
- **If jewellers own multiple stores, they should not keep the same merchandise in identical showcase locations in each store.** Keeping the same locations allows robbers to learn the position of valuable merchandise in each store by learning the layout of only one.

- **Keep cash in the till to a minimum.** It is suggested that jewellers keep as little cash as possible in the till at all times by regularly transferring it to somewhere more secure, e.g. a hidden safe.
- **Prepare decoy money.** Bags filled with low denomination bank notes and coins, purposefully prepared to face such an emergency, can be kept inside the main safe, ready to be handed over to determined and potentially violent robbers. In such a way the loss of cash will be reduced to a minimum.
- **Encourage non-cash transaction.** In order to make a business a less attractive target, non-cash transactions, e.g. by means of credit or debit cards, need to be encouraged.
- **Separate key holders.** Different members of staff need to be responsible for holding different keys; in particular, the store and safe keys should be kept separately. This procedure can help prevent a member of staff who holds both keys from being taken hostage.
- **Control all keys.** Keys to the premises, safes and alarm need to be removed after close of business (keys to display cabinets and windows may be left in a locked safe).

#### **6.3.4 Procedural strategies**

Procedural strategies involve acting on the mentality and behaviour of individuals, in this case jewellers and members of staff, with a view to reduce their risk of crime victimisation. The focus of these strategies is on the human element in crime prevention.

##### **6.3.4.1 Developing a mentality of security**

Effective crime prevention begins with a **mentality of security**. To think in terms of security means having the necessary mental attitude towards crime while remaining fully aware that it may affect anyone, at any time or place. If jewellers and members of staff are unprepared and do not have a mentality of security, it may lead to serious consequences. On the contrary, through a mentality of security, they will be empowered with a positive and confident attitude against crime, in the belief that it

can be prevented and, in the event of an occurrence, its effects minimised. This confidence derives from knowledge and insight into crime (Zannoni 1998:88-89; Shadel 1995:24).

A company programme is fundamental for the development of an awareness of crime among employees and to arm them with the knowledge they need to minimise the risk for its occurrence (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1). To be effective this programme necessitates the following (Van Kaam 2003:16):

- A conscious programme of awareness on the implications of criminal activities on both employees and businesses. Employees need to be made aware that criminality can harm them directly in terms of, for instance, possibility of physical injuries, lost opportunities, lowered salaries and even retrenchment.
- Suitable response mechanisms through which employees can react to criminality, e.g. through security measures, procedures and systems.
- Design and implementation of a professional security plan which assigns specific responsibilities to employees.
- The propagation of a culture of integrity, values and ethics throughout the company.

Through the development of a mentality of security, employees will be actively encouraged to assume responsibility and take steps to enhance the security of the company. However, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.5.3 and 5.4.5, indicated that often jewellers do not seem to do enough towards the development of a mentality of security and this leads to a lack in crime prevention training.

#### **6.3.4.2 Adopting behavioural security procedures**

Having acquired a mentality of security, jewellers and members of staff need to have a specific plan to respond to a potential or real crime situation such as armed robbery. In this context, the adoption of specific procedural intervention strategies is important. Security procedures can be defined as an individual's rational, behavioural responses

which can be adopted **before, during and after** the commission of a robbery. This implies that there is a need for **planned actions** on what to do to prevent and counteract a robbery attack.

At times, in spite of the adoption of robbery preventative measures, individuals may still be victimised. In fact, criminals often rely on the advantage of the “surprise factor”, in other words the possibility of choosing place, time and methods of attack most suitable to them. But even when this happens, one should not think that all is lost. In fact, when a robbery is committed, it is still possible to adopt specific behavioural responses that can help minimise the risk of further victimisation, e.g. being seriously assaulted or murdered. Since, as indicated in Chapter 3, sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, the victims’ verbal or physical reactions are directly linked to a robber(s)’ violent response, it is essential to avoid verbal or physical confrontation. Furthermore, it needs to be stated that, the way one behaves during and after the commission of a crime has an influence on the possible apprehension and conviction of the offender(s). The behavioural security procedures discussed below, are not only relevant to the jewellery industry but can, in fact, be successfully applied by any individual, business or organisation.

#### **6.3.4.2.1 Before the robbery**

Effective robbery prevention encompasses a person’s day to day activities on a 24 hour basis, e.g. while at home or leaving home to go to work by car, public transport or on foot, while working, on the way back home and also during social times. Jewellers may adopt different behavioural strategies to reduce the risk of robbery victimisation (Zannoni 2003b:10; Zannoni 2002b: 14-15; Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:12-15):

- **While travelling to the store**, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff:
  - **Be aware and alert.** Awareness of the surrounding environment and alertness as to the presence of possible dangers are powerful instruments in crime prevention.

- **Be suspicious.** They need to be on the look out for suspicious activities, such as the same persons or vehicles following them.
  - **Change direction.** If Jewellers and staff realise that they are being followed, they need to remember the particulars of the vehicle and immediately change direction. If the following continues, they should proceed to the nearest police station or stop at the nearest safe place and ask for assistance.
  - **Avoid routine.** Travelling at the same times and via the same routes to and from the workplace increases the risk factor.
  - **Park in a secure area.** Parking in a security protected and well-lit area will help minimise the risk of criminal attacks.
- **While opening for business,** it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff:
    - **Be on the lookout for suspicious persons or activities in the vicinity of the store.** Who or what can be considered as suspicious looking? Persons or cars, for instance, that have been repeatedly seen at the same place; individuals standing at street corners pretending to be waiting for someone, especially if wearing disguises which render personal identification difficult such as sunglasses, hats, scarves or overcoats (under which various weapons may be hidden). If something makes them suspicious, jewellers and staff should leave the area and notify their security company or the police without delay.
    - **Be extremely careful when opening.** Opening time is always critical; jewellers and staff may be surprised by someone approaching rapidly from behind or arriving coincidentally at opening time.
    - **Activate the panic system in the event of a suspicious situation.** Jewellers and staff need to be ready to activate the emergency panic system (via a portable transmitter which they should carry on their person at all times) to obtain assistance from the security service provider.
    - **Avoid opening the store alone.** Whenever possible, there should be two members of staff present during opening time. One needs to remain vigilant outside the store while the other proceeds to open.

- **Immediately re-lock the door and turn off the alarm.** The jeweller or a member of staff will inspect the premises and, if satisfied that all is in order, will give a signal to the staff member outside to also enter the store.
  - **Avoid unlocking the door.** Until the merchandise has been removed from the safe and placed in locked showcases and staff are ready to open for trade, the door should be kept locked and nobody allowed to access the store.
- **During business hours,** it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff:
    - **Be careful about unexpected deliveries.** Robbers may successfully enter a store by posing as delivery personnel, particularly outside business hours or when a jeweller or staff member is alone. According to Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:19), robbers have impersonated letter carriers, package delivery drivers, delivery personnel of overnight courier services and telephone workers, among others.
    - **Have an alert system in place.** If a suspicious person is in the store, jewellers and staff need to have a coded signal to alert other employees that they believe a crime is about to be committed. A phrase containing the word "ruby", for instance, may signify a state of alertness for all members of staff without disturbing genuine customers.
    - **Always apply the "serve one customer at the time" rule.** This will help jewellers and staff keep control over customers and avoid being distracted by a group of criminals.
    - **Be vigilant for individuals casing the store.** Many robberies are preceded by some kind of casing as when criminals, pretending to be customers, obtain as much information as possible about the store and business operations prior to committing a robbery. Some casing takes place immediately before an attack; in other situations, the process of casing is conducted over a period of hours, days, weeks and even longer. It is during the casing that alert jewellers and members of staff have an opportunity to spot the criminals and take appropriate steps to deter a robbery. In this regard, findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.7 and 5.4.2, indicated that



robbers often visit the store on different occasions prior to committing the crime. To detect casing, jewellers and members of staff need to:

- **Be suspicious of anyone acting in a manner not consistent with a regular customer's profile.** Is there something that does not look right? Are customers asking unusual questions? Are there odd groupings of people at unlikely hours? Are they just looking around without being interested in merchandise or prices? Are they dressed in a manner possibly designed to disguise their true appearance? Potential robbers casing the store will be interested in information such as opening and closing times, security systems, exits and entrances, location of valuable items, location of safe and vault and when the fewest employees are present.
  - **Trust their instincts.** As a rule, jewellers and staff should not neglect the instincts given by their first impressions.
  - **Mind unusual behaviour.** Jewellers and staff need to be suspicious of those "clients" who show visible signs of nervousness, avoid making eye contact, speak with an altered voice and appear to be constantly looking towards the entrance / exit, walls or ceiling. In this case, without being noticed, the emergency panic system needs to be activated.
  - **Look for suspicious individuals or vehicles in the vicinity of the store,** particularly when positioned for an unusual length of time with a direct line of sight to the store. In this case, jewellers and staff need to write down number plates and descriptions of individuals and vehicles, as well as the time and date of their observations.
- 
- **Avoid actions that put them at risk,** such as displaying or removing products from windows or showcases when the door is open or customers are in the store. Also, jewellers and staff should never balance their float or prepare a bank deposit when the same situation exists.
  - **Have at least two employees on the floor at all times.** The risk of armed robbery increases if there is only one member of staff, as this makes the target less threatening and more appealing to occasional criminals.

- **When closing the store**, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff:
  - **Watch out for suspicious “customers”**, particularly those who arrive coincidentally at closing time.
  - **Check the external environment.** At the time of closing, jewellers and staff need to be on the look-out for suspicious persons or vehicles that can be seen in the immediate vicinity of the store.
  - **Call security if a suspicious situation is observed.** In such a case, jewellers and staff should lock up in the presence of security officials. It may also be advisable, depending on the degree of risk perceived, to ask security to provide an escort service.
  - **Inspect the store before leaving** to ensure that no one is seeking to conceal him/herself on the premises with the purpose of being locked inside.
  - **Keep the door locked.** Jewellers and staff should never allow non-employees into the store after closing.
  
- **On the way back home**, it is suggested that jewellers and members of staff:
  - **Follow procedures.** When returning home, the same behavioural strategies that have been suggested on the way to work need to be followed.
  - **Be aware of possible threats when approaching home.** If they arrive home to find suspicious persons or activities, they should not go inside but instead call the police or security from a cellular phone or a neighbour’s home.
  
- **When at home**, it is important to remember that the threat of robbery continues outside the store. In South Africa, jewellers have been attacked by robbers at home and forced back to their store (Williams 1999:2). Hence the importance to think with a mentality of security (Zannoni 1998:88-89; Jewellers’ Vigilance Canada 2000:27-28). It is suggested that, while at home, jewellers and members of staff (particularly those who have keys to access the store and safe):

- **Maintain a high level of alertness.** If they notice any suspicious person or vehicles near their home, they should immediately alert the police or security. They also need to beware of repairmen, delivery personnel or general workers in the proximity of their home. When inside their home, jewellers need to remain vigilant, e.g. arm the perimeter alarm, check doors and windows and listen to unusual noises.
- **Strengthen all their security arrangements.** They need to ensure that intruder detection and panic systems remain in good working order. A perimeter protection system should be installed in order to alert the occupants as to a potential threat. Strong locks, security gates, burglar proofing, effective outdoor lighting, CCTV surveillance system and dogs should also be an integral part of a jeweller's security programme.
- **Beware of calls after hours,** from individuals identifying themselves as "police or security personnel" and asking the store owner or key holder to come to the store for an emergency. They could be taken hostage, forced to open the store and robbed of high value merchandise. Therefore, it is necessary to always ask for identification and double check with a caller's station or office for the authenticity of the call. Jewellers and staff should maintain an unlisted home telephone number and install a caller's identification device.
- **Educate domestic staff and children** to look out for suspicious people loitering in the neighbourhood and report them to the police. The telephone numbers of the police and security should be in a visible place. Domestic staff and children need to be told not to release information on their employers / parents and not to allow strangers on the property without permission.
- **Always check domestic staff's references,** as the threat of robbery may also come from within the household.
- **Always lock doors, gates and skylights and activate the alarm system** even if they have to go just around the corner.

#### 6.3.4.2.2 During the robbery

If, in spite of the suggested risk reduction measures, jewellers or members of staff become victims of robbery, it is important for them to avoid irrational forms of behaviour which may seriously compromise their safety and the safety of others. Giving advice to a potential victim on how to react when confronted by robbers is an extremely sensitive issue, which cannot have easy answers. The decision to resist is, in general, related to the victim's perception and assessment of the potential danger inherent in the situation. This usually depends on factors such as the number of attackers, the level of force employed or threatened, the presence or absence of a weapon, and the type of weapons used by the robbers. Although as indicated in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.10 and 5.3.5.1, only a small percentage of victims are physically assaulted, to minimise the risk for a violent reaction on the part of the criminals, it is suggested that, during a robbery, jewellers and members of staff (Zannoni 2003a: 30-31; Jewellers' Vigilance Canada 2000:16-17):

- **Safeguard lives.** The priority at this very moment is to safeguard one's life and the lives of others, i.e. staff, customers or bystanders.
- **Avoid offering resistance and stay calm.** In the event of a robbery, jewellers and staff need to immediately co-operate with the robbers in order to avoid serious or fatal injuries.
- **Refrain from disarming the robber or reaching for a concealed weapon.** It must be assumed that the robber will shoot without hesitation.
- **Expect to be threatened.** One of the robbers' weapons is the fear they create by repeatedly threatening their victim(s).
- **Obey orders.** Robbers want to complete their crime in the shortest possible time in order to avoid apprehension, that is why it is necessary to comply with their demands. They may turn violent if their actions are delayed.
- **Avoid abrupt movements,** by holding their hands well in sight without making any sudden moves which may cause the robber(s) to react with violence, e.g. by trying to reach for a panic button or a firearm.
- **Avoid provocative actions.** A defiant attitude or the passing of provocative remarks may cause a reprisal by the robbers. This behaviour

will only draw the criminal's attention and seriously increase the risk of further victimisation

- **Activate panic system only if it is safe to do so**, when the robber(s) cannot see them.
- **Concentrate their attention on the physical features of the robber(s).** Features such as gender, race, age, height, weight, hair colour and style, eye colour and facial hair are all important. In the event of a confrontation by more than one robber, jewellers and staff should try and memorise the features of only one in particular. By doing so, they will be able to furnish the police with sufficient details which will help reconstruct a reliable identikit of the criminal(s).
- **Avoid staring at the robber(s)**, as this action may cause him/them to react violently.
- **Memorise as many particulars as possible** such as, for instance, the presence of scars and tattoos which may, however, be part of the criminal's disguising tactics. The type of clothing and items such as jewellery worn by the robber(s), as well as the type of weapons are also important.
- **Pay attention to the criminal's behaviour.** Bodily movements, language used, slang, accent and tone of voice are also important aspects which can help the police obtain a behavioural typology or *modus operandi* of the criminal(s), thanks to which the police may link different robberies to a single robber or group of robbers with a similar *modus operandi*.
- **Refrain from hindering the robbers' escape**, as this is a critical time where the possibility of injuries increases.
- **Seek cover in the event of a shoot-out.** A quick police or security reaction may cause a shoot out with the criminals; in such a case, jewellers and staff need to immediately look for cover behind a counter or any object which may be utilised for their protection. In any event, they should throw themselves to the ground in order to reduce the size of their body and wrap their arms around the head to protect it from stray or ricocheting bullets or any fragment caused by them.
- **Rehearse the above procedures with all members of staff.** Being prepared may help prevent an employee from panicking and provoking violence.

In a study which involved interviewing robbers in a dangerous, life threatening field research, Wright and Decker (1997:136) suggested that victims of robbery:

- **Immediately co-operate with the criminal(s) in order to avoid serious or fatal injuries.** Most of the robbers said that they typically responded to any indication of victim's resistance with severe violence.
- **Avoid staring at the criminal(s) during the robbery.** The majority of robbers stated that they did not want victims to look directly at them for fear of being identified.

#### **6.3.4.2.3 After the robbery**

The period immediately after the robbery may mean the difference between a successful or unsuccessful investigation into the criminal event. It is suggested that jewellers and members of staff (Zannoni 2003a:30-31):

- **Avoid rushing after the robbers.** There have been cases where marksmen have been used to kill any pursuers.
- **Approach store exit with caution.** Once the robbers have left, jewellers and staff need to approach the exit with extreme caution in order to try and identify their getaway vehicle(s), escape route, the make of the vehicle(s), the colour, the number plate and the number of criminals on board.
- **Call the police and security** and alert them with a description of the criminals and their getaway vehicle(s).
- **Lock the store** to avoid outside interference with the crime scene.
- **Protect the crime scene** to assist the police with the investigation. Jewellers or a designated member of staff should secure the crime scene according to the following SAPS guidelines (ECR South Africa 2005):
  - Alert police and medical emergency personnel (where necessary) without delay.
  - Close off the premises (all doors leading to the crime scene).
  - Inform police of access routes which will not interfere with the crime scene.

- Move all unauthorised people away from the crime scene.
  - Set-up inner cordon and prevent all unauthorised access.
  - Use red and white chevron tape on traffic cones, white chalk to mark evidence and surgical gloves for handling evidence.
  - Set-up temporary facility (outside the crime scene) to receive emergency and police services, take care of injured or traumatised people, as well as interview witnesses, etc.
  - Identify all potential witnesses and encourage them to furnish information, personal details and contact numbers.
  - Handle the evidence with extreme care by always protecting the evidence matter and, when unavoidable, by removing the evidence with the minimum of handling (after marking / noting the location). This includes injured or deceased persons. The control of videotapes and films is of paramount importance. Also, memorise all the locations touched by the robbers, so that police can trace fingerprint evidence.
  - Hand over the scene to the SAPS first member arriving on the crime scene; also, meet with the crime scene investigation and processing senior officers and explain what has been done to protect the scene.
  - Be available to assist them during this period and also to accept the scene back.
  - Refrain from discussing details concerning the robbery, as this can create confusion and lead to a misrepresentation of the events (jewellers and staff should only speak to the police or the head of security).
  - Continue to liaise with the SAPS crime scene and investigation officers in order to keep informed on the development of the case.
- **Compile a crime incident information form.** After the robbery, when the memory of the events is still fresh, jewellers and staff need to jot down information pertaining to the criminal event, preferably in a specifically designed “Crime Incident Information Form” (see below example). They should always keep a copy of this form for future reference.

**Example: Crime Incident Information Form**

<b>PARTICULARS OF CASE</b>				
<b>Date:</b>				
<b>Time:</b>				
<b>Place:</b>				
<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT</b>				
Specify (e.g. theft, fraud, robbery, suspicious activities, etc.)				
<b>REPORTING MEMBER OF STAFF</b>				
<b>Full name:</b>				
<b>Store / Branch:</b>				
<b>Contact number(s):</b>				
<b>SENIOR POLICE OFFICER ATTENDING THE INCIDENT / SCENE</b>				
<b>Full name:</b>				
<b>Police station:</b>				
<b>Contact number(s):</b>				
<b>Case number (when available):</b>				
<b>WITNESSES</b>				
<b>1) Full name:</b>				
<b>Contact number(s):</b>				
<b>2) Full name:</b>				
<b>Contact number(s):</b>				
<b>SUSPECTS' DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Age</b>				
<b>Race</b>				
<b>Sex</b>				
<b>Height</b>				
<b>Build</b>				
<b>Hair Colour</b>				
<b>Hair Length</b>				
<b>Facial Hair</b>				
<b>Complexion</b>				
<b>Scars / Marks</b>				
<b>Clothing</b>				
<b>Language/s</b>				
<b>Type of weapon</b>				
<b>Other details</b>				
<b>VEHICLE (S)'</b>				



<b>DESCRIPTION</b>		
<b>Make</b>		
<b>Model</b>		
<b>Colour</b>		
<b>Registration number</b>		
<b>BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT / MODUS OPERANDI</b>		
<b>INCIDENT CONTROL</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>NO</b>
<b>Notified manager(s)</b>		
<b>Notified Head Office</b>		
<b>Notified SAPS</b>		
<b>Preserved crime scene, e.g. fingerprints or objects</b>		
<b>Refrained from discussing incident (except with manager)</b>		
<b>Other actions taken (explain)</b>		
<b>Signature (reporting staff member)</b>		
<b>Signature (manager)</b>		

#### 6.3.4.3 Utilising self-protective measures

Jewellers and members of staff may utilise various devices in the defence of their person and property during a robbery attack. It must be stressed that it is important to inquire regarding the legitimacy of a device prior to its purchase and utilisation (laws may vary from country to country). Furthermore, it needs to be remembered that the device used by jewellers for their own protection may, in fact, be turned against them, especially if they are not adequately trained on how to use it or they are overpowered by the criminal(s). It is therefore necessary to assess each situation carefully and decide on the best course of action. The following are among the most common self protection measures:

- **Firearms** can be used to stop a criminal attack in extreme cases when one's life or the lives of others are in immediate danger. In this case there are important aspects to be considered. First of all it is necessary to strictly act in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act and Criminal Law, with particular reference to section 49 regulating justifiable homicide for 1<sup>st</sup> Schedule Offences and the law of self-defence (Maepa 2002:11-12). Jewellers need to remember that, while the case law remains unclear, the guiding principles today suggest that killing another person in order to

retain property is unlikely to be deemed lawful by the courts (Du Plessis 2004:1). In fact, courts are no longer lenient on the use of firearms and one may well end up on the wrong side of the law for having acted outside the permitted scope. Various requirements must be met before the defensive act will be considered lawful; the criminal attack must be (Du Plessis 2004:1):

- commenced or imminent;
- against a legally recognised interest;
- unlawful.

The action made in defence must be:

- necessary to avert the attack;
- reasonable in terms of the amount of force used;
- directed against the attacker.

Based on the above, it is clear that the law specifically rules out any action being taken, on the one hand, pre-emptively or, on the other, in revenge. Furthermore, the new Firearm Control Act which came into effect in July 2004 introduced stricter regulations including, amongst others, background checks, one gun per person for self defence, compulsory competency training, renewal of licenses, and 21 as a minimum age to own a firearm (Ellis 2004:2) Research conducted in South Africa by the Institute for Security Studies on the impact of firearms on the outcome of a robbery found as follows (Hansmann 2000:24-28):

- The possession of a firearm by a victim does not always favourably influence the outcome of a robbery for the victim and it is not necessarily a deterrent to a crime.
- There are circumstances under which a firearm may assist the victims in not having their possession stolen, although this may be at the expense of an injury.

- In fact, an unarmed victim has a greater chance of having his/her possession stolen during a robbery, while an armed victim has a greater chance of being injured when confronted by one or more offenders.
- The deterrence value of a firearm during a robbery cannot be determined against the utilisation of other types of personal protection system, as further research efforts are needed in this regard.

According to Jewellers' Vigilance Canada (2000:15), an analysis of the actions in 241 cases of homicide in the United States demonstrated that the risk of death or serious physical injuries to jewellers increased significantly if the latter tried to resist or did not co-operate fully with the robbers. Furthermore, any shot fired by a jeweller can end up hitting an innocent person inside the store, outside the front window, or even a considerable distance away, causing not only injury or death, but raising serious issues of legal liability for the jeweller.

- **Anti-robbery briefcases** may be useful when transporting cash or valuables items such as jewellery. A siren, smoke, dye and, if required, a low amperage electrical shock, can be remotely set off in the event of a robber seizing the case. This device implies a quick action on the part of the victim as the criminal may be able to run out of the required range or throw the case into an awaiting vehicle.
- **Personal alarms** can be carried on one's belt or pocket and when activated will set off a loud siren which aims, on the one side, at drawing the public's attention to the robbery attack and summoning help and, on the other, at scaring the robber off. This may be useful in public places but in isolated areas may in fact achieve the opposite effect, i.e. provoke the robber(s) into a physical attack.
- **Stun and spray guns** can be used to disorient and stop an aggressor by either delivering a strong, high voltage but low amperage shock to his body or by spraying oleum capsicum (derived from peppers) directly into his eyes and respiratory system. To be effective, both these actions imply that there be either bodily contact or that the attack be carried out at a very close range, and this can lead to a violent reprisal on the part of the robber

### **6.3.5 Personnel-oriented strategies**

In some instances, in a robbery event, there may be collusion between criminals and dishonest members of staff. Robbers may receive information on factors such as the location of the safe and high value jewellery, the most suitable time for a robbery attack, jewellers' habits, activities and home addresses. Information about a jeweller or jewellery representative exiting the store with a very valuable package containing precious stones or other jewellery may also be passed on. Findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.5.2, 5.2.5.3 and 5.4.5, indicated that jewellers often lack adequate risk reduction strategies, particularly with regard to staff selection and training. Specific intervention strategies focusing on personnel selection, training and morale are therefore important.

#### **6.3.5.1 Personnel selection**

In order to minimise the risk for a potentially dangerous or criminally-minded person to be employed, the screening of all prospective (and existing) employees is crucial to the well being of a company (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.2). This is particularly true for certain types of businesses where the potential for theft, fraud and collusion with the criminal element is high as in the case of jewellery-related activities. Due to these risk factors, integrity assessments are important during the selection process, their main purpose being the following:

- Keeping unwanted people out of one's company.
- Assessing compatibility with job requirements by verifying all information provided in a curriculum vitae including qualifications, personal documents, work history, credit history, criminal records history, experience and skills. It is also wise to check for existence of any expensive habits.
- Identifying high-risk existing employees.

Polygraph examination (a test used in the detection of deception, based on the natural involuntary response of the human body to stressful situations, e.g. lying), has a useful application in pre-employment integrity screening, i.e. prior to employment of

staff in specific posts in order to verify critical information, e.g. qualification and experience. Polygraph testing should also be considered as an instrument for periodic honesty screening among existing members of staff.

When applying the test, the following considerations are relevant (Cilliers & Martin 2003:94-105):

- The examinees must submit voluntarily and they are at liberty to terminate the examination at any stage, if they so choose.
- If a candidate refuses to submit to a polygraph examination, he / she should not then automatically be presumed to be guilty.
- The examinee must be mentally and physically suitable to undergo an examination; as an example, a person suffering from physical or mental pain or effects of alcohol, drugs or stress disorder are not suitable to be tested.
- The accuracy of the test varies from 85 to 95 percent, depending on the question technique used, the clarity of the case facts and the competence of the polygraphist.
- Polygraph examinations are not intended to provide irrefutable probative evidence but they can be used to assist investigators to collect probative evidence and to corroborate other evidence.
- Proper polygraph procedures comply with the Constitution and Labour legislation. They actively promote fair labour practices and also afford innocent suspects an opportunity to be heard and to prove their innocence.
- South African Trade Unions now recognise that the polygraph is a legitimate, accurate and positive investigative tool that can be used to eradicate crime and criminals from the workplace and exonerate innocent staff.

According to a 2002 security survey commissioned by the Jewellery Council of South Africa (Security industry best practice for SA 2002:17-18), in the case of chain stores, general staff are strictly pre-screened, whereas in the case of independent upmarket jewellers, credibility built-up within the industry provide suitable reference (with no systematic pre-screening process). As the area of integrity assessments is particularly sensitive in that constitutional rights and privacy issues come to the fore, it is

advisable for jewellers to request the assistance of professional companies specialising in this field.

### **6.3.5.2 Personnel training**

Employees' involvement in security is important for a successful risk reduction strategy. In fact, it can be stated that well-trained and alert staff form the basis for good crime prevention (Home Office Crime Prevention Agency 2000; Geason & Wilson 1992:75-76). While findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.1 and 5.3.7.2, indicated that the majority of respondents agreed to the introduction of crime prevention training for jewellers and members of staff, the reality is that this is not implemented as a standard procedure. Personnel need to be trained in reducing opportunities for crime in a business enterprise. Such training needs to take place as part of the initial employee induction and, as indicated by findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.1, 5.3.7.2 and 5.4.7, should also be introduced at institutions training jewellers. The following important aspects need to be considered for the training programme:

- Crime awareness in order to help staff develop a mentality of security.
- Identification of specific crime risk areas.
- Description of the criminals' *modus operandi* based on the jewellery industry's experience.
- Crime intervention / reduction strategies applicable to specific types of crime affecting the jewellery industry.
- Behavioural procedures to be adopted during specific crimes when prevention fails and members of staff are confronted with the reality of the criminal act.

Furthermore, it is important for jewellers to bring their security policy to the attention of employees also with regard to aspects related to employee theft / fraud and the consequences of such actions. It is important to stress that in the field of crime awareness and prevention education, professionalism is of the utmost importance as the wellbeing of people is at stake. It is therefore essential that such training be conducted by accredited crime reduction specialists.

### **6.3.5.3 Creating a positive working environment**

Due to the danger of dissatisfied employees becoming a security risk to their employers, jewellers need to always strive to ensure job satisfaction among their staff. Factors that could lead to job dissatisfaction include, amongst others, unfair salaries, unfair treatment causing absence of loyalty to the company, absence of rewards for good performance as well as impersonal and negative attitudes towards employees causing hostility (Stevens 1988:216).

When the above negative factors are present, employees may resort to criminal actions against the company, e.g. by stealing valuable items or by passing sensitive information to would-be robbers. Therefore, it is vital for jewellers to instill a sense of pride and ownership among members of staff by treating them fairly, assigning specific responsibilities and educating them in all aspects of security. By doing so, employees will develop a strong attachment to their work environment and will be encouraged to defend it against possible threats. At the end, the preventive value of loyal employees will be greater than any formal sanctions or physical preventive strategies imposed by management.

### **6.3.6 Business security initiatives**

Businesses, police and security personnel need to closely work together towards the implementation of specific crime prevention / reduction initiatives. As shown in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.2, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7, most respondents were in favour of new initiatives contributing to the reduction of crime.

The creation of a common strategy in the prevention of crime against the jewellery trade and industry is of the utmost importance. A successful business strategy should include the following:

- **Membership** to organisations involved in initiatives such as the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa's crime prevention project, which offers an excellent

platform for companies in the retail sector to share ideas and initiatives as well as join forces in the reduction of crime.

- **Close liaison** between jewellery store owners, representatives of the jewellery trade and industry, the Jewellery Council of South Africa, insurance companies / brokers, and representatives of the South African Police Service and private security industry.
- **Regular meetings** on security and crime related issues. Important for jewellers is the attendance of police / community forums where they can become aware of the crime problems affecting their area and, at the same time, meet with high-ranking officers or detectives from the local police station.
- **The creation of business watch systems** involving a high level of co-operation between jewellers in a specific area, and between them, other businesses, police authorities and security agencies. Jewellers need to develop a neighbourhood alert system, passing along warnings by phone, fax or email to other retailers in the area.

Examples of crime reduction initiatives can be offered.

#### **6.3.6.1 Database on crime and dismissed employees**

To aid in the selection and screening process, it is suggested that the jewellery industry introduce a database on jewellery related crime and dismissed employees. As indicated in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7.2, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7, most respondents viewed this initiative in a very positive light. The database should be used to advise the jewellery industry on various issues such as criminal trends within the industry, statistical analysis, criminals' *modus operandi*, as well as identification of known criminals or suspected individuals or vehicles by means of digitally stored photographs. Jewellers should be issued with a form where all relevant security incidents can be recorded and forwarded either by fax or on-line to the crime prevention structure for centralised record-keeping purposes.

It is common cause that staff, once found by their company to be engaging in dishonest activities, more often than not move employment to another company



within the industry. The result is that the criminal element is not being rooted out, and the risk of perpetrating a crime is not that great, as employment is easily obtainable in the same field, where the same criminal opportunities usually exists. The proposed dismissed employees' database aims at solving this problem, by providing a means whereby companies can discover whether the candidate they are considering has proven dishonest in the past. The potential benefit of not employing people who are known to be dishonest cannot be quantified in Rand. However, common sense dictates that if dishonest people are removed from the industry, crime will decrease. The database will have the following benefits:

- **To facilitate more informed employment decisions.** A prospective employer will be able to look up a candidate's name on the list, and the details of any dismissal due to dishonesty within the industry will be recorded.
- **To increase the risk of crime to the individual,** by making it considerably more difficult to obtain employment subsequent to his/her dismissal. This should also act as a strong deterrent.

There are a number of legal issues that need to be considered in order to ensure that the correct procedures/rules are in place for the database (ECR South Africa 2001):

- **Employee communication.** The first issue is that employees need to be informed that they will be registered on a database should they be found guilty of a criminal activity, which leads to their dismissal. This should also become part of their contract of employment. It will be up to the individual companies to clear this through their particular unions.
- **Limited access.** The right to access information must be restricted to participating members. A corollary to this limitation is that the database may not contain any details of the incident for which the employee has been dismissed, apart from a "type of incident" indicator.
- **Objective listing.** Only names of employees who have been (or are going) through the disciplinary process may be listed. This is intended to prevent names being posted without there being foundation for that listing. Should an employee

challenge the listing, the company must be able to refer to the minutes of the hearing(s).

- **Not a blacklist.** Blacklists, which prevent members from employing individuals listed, have been found to be against the Constitution. The registration of an individual must therefore be seen as a part of the employment process, and the candidate employee must be provided with an opportunity to explain his or her listing.

### **6.3.6.2 Retail security schemes**

Various crime reduction initiatives have been introduced, both locally and internationally, in the retail sector which is constantly targeted by criminals. The “Safer on Radio” retail scheme introduced in Luton (United Kingdom), for instance, serves as an example of a business initiative aimed at discouraging criminal activities in a specific area (Luton retail radio link 2000:26). The scheme involves participating retailers purchasing two-way radio systems which they use to warn each other about shoplifters or any other criminal acts occurring in the shopping area. Meetings with police officers and business security departments are held monthly, so that the companies involved can be updated on events and get to know new techniques on crime prevention. Photographs of known criminals operating in the area and suspects are also circulated among retailers.

Another example of business security initiative in South Africa introduced by Gem & Jewel Acceptances involved the implementation of a jewellery crime database (on-line). Jewellers are encouraged to contact [crime@gemjewel.co.za](mailto:crime@gemjewel.co.za) and provide a brief description of crimes or attempted crimes that have been committed against them, as well as a profile on the criminal(s) or suspect(s). This information is then forwarded to the SAPS Robbery Intelligence Desk and analysed by police experts with a view to initiate preventative and investigative actions, as well as recovery of stolen merchandise.

Another initiative was introduced by the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa Crime Prevention Office which has installed a capacity of sending SMS instant alerts to cellular phones of members in an area where a serious security incident has

occurred. This will alert members of the criminals' *modus operandi* and provide a brief description of individuals and vehicles (Consumer Goods Council of South Africa: Crime Prevention Programme 2005).

It is necessary to state that the success of any business security initiative ultimately depends on the commitment of all the parties involved, i.e. business owners, staff, police, security and industry bodies. Without a collective effort initiatives will fail to achieve the desired goal, i.e. the creation of a safer and more profitable working environment.

#### **6.4 CONCLUSION**

Chapter 6 has clearly shown that, while the risk of robbery prevails no matter the type or robustness of the security measures adopted, jewellers and staff can go a long way in minimising the likelihood of this type of crime to occur. Furthermore, they can also considerably reduce the chances of serious injuries and financial loss in the event of a robbery being committed. However, it is necessary to stress that the success of the suggested robbery intervention strategies is dependant on their level of integration and the jewellers and staff's ability to act as a cohesive unit. Only a holistic approach to the problem will deliver a sustainable solution. Without a professional plan involving all levels of intervention, i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, employee and business-oriented strategies, jewellers will find it difficult to significantly reduce the risk of robbery victimisation. In the final chapter, further suggestions are presented in an attempt to provide the most effective response to the threat of robbery.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS**

#### **7.1 INTRODUCTION**

In this chapter the project is reviewed in terms of its main goal and objectives and an explanation is provided as to how, through the applied research methods and techniques, the goals have been achieved. Answers will be provided to the actuating questions, which were originally formulated in Chapter 1, section 1.3, to reach the set objectives.

To add value to the robbery intervention strategy discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3, attention is also focused on specific elements of the strategy which, in the researcher's opinion, represent the most appropriate solution to reduce the risk of robbery victimisation at jewellery stores.

#### **7.2 PROJECT REVIEW**

This section includes an evaluation of the work done and an assessment on whether the principal goal and aims of the investigation into jewellery store robbery have been achieved. The suitability of the methodology used to reach the immediate and ultimate aim of the study is also addressed.

##### **7.2.1 Research methodology**

The scientific methods used in this exploratory study involved a study of the existing literature, observations at jewellery stores, discussions with jewellers and knowledgeable people as well as a process of data collection by means of a questionnaire (directed to jewellery store owners and members of staff drawn from the Jewellery Council of South Africa's database), a semi-structure interview held with a group of knowledgeable respondents, and a structured interview with victimised jewellers. Specific case studies were also compiled based on information obtained by the researcher.

While important information was gathered through the research instruments, the lack of existing South African literature and statistics on the subject constituted a considerable obstacle in the research process. Notwithstanding this deficiency, the methodology adopted by the researcher, together with the availability of a few specialised international sources such as Jewelers' Security Alliance (USA) and Jewellers' Vigilance Canada, proved sufficient in achieving the study's main objectives, i.e. the exploration of jewellery store robbery as a crime phenomenon and the development of a comprehensive robbery intervention strategy.

### **7.2.2 Research goal**

The principal goal of the study, which is the exploration of jewellery store robbery from a victim and intervention perspective, has been achieved. The results from the data collected during the investigation together with specialised literature and case studies, helped create a picture of this crime phenomenon. However, as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.4.7, it is important to stress the fact that, due to the small number of respondents taking part in the project, results cannot be generalised beyond the research group.

### **7.2.3 Immediate objectives of the study**

In this section the actuating questions, which were formulated to reach the stated objectives, are answered. These answers demonstrate that the immediate aims of the study identified in Chapter 1, section 1.3 have been achieved.

- **Is armed robbery a serious phenomenon affecting jewellers?**

The fact that armed robbery is considered as a serious crime affecting jewellers is evident in Chapter 1, section 1.2 "Rationale for the research" and in the findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.3.2.1 and 5.4.6. Jewellery store robbery is, for the most part, the work of organised criminals and not of occasional robbers. This is evident from the following findings (Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4 and 5.4.2):

- Both local and foreign crime syndicates appear to be behind most robberies.
  - Robbers are selective and usually target high value items of jewellery such as watches and precious stones.
  - Five or more offenders are usually involved in the robbery.
  - The crime shows evidence of careful planning.
  - Robbers often visit the stores on different occasions, posing as customers, before committing the crime.
  - In the majority of cases, robbers are armed with firearms, including automatic rifles.
  - Some jewellery store robberies have been executed by group of criminals acting with military precision.
  - The average loss caused to a jeweller in a very short period of time is considerable.
  - Generally, there is a low rate of physical violence, which is usually more prevalent with occasional and inexperienced robbers.
  - Jewellery store robbers need a network of fences to dispose of the stolen jewellery.
- **Do jewellery stores experience a high level of risk of robbery because of the nature of their activities and the type and value of the merchandise being stored?**

Due to the presence of high value merchandise, as indicated in the literature findings in Chapter 3, section 3.5.1, jewellery stores are considered as attractive targets by criminals, thus putting them at constant risk of robbery victimisation. In this regard, research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.2.11, 5.2.2.12 and 5.4.2 show how, on average, the merchandise stolen in a jewellery store robbery (in just a few minutes) may bring a considerable financial reward to the criminals. Retail jewellers are also relatively easy to rob due to their open door approach and, often, to the weakness of the implemented security measures. The merchandise displayed in the stores is valuable, small and easy to carry away from the scene of the crime inside bags or pockets (see Chapter 5, sections 5.3.2.2, 5.3.2.3 and 5.4.4).

- **Can a theoretical explanation be offered on the phenomenon of jewellery store robbery?**

The theoretical explanation offered in Chapter 4, focused mainly on the victim and the crime and not on the offender as such. Particular attention was paid to the opportunities generated by the physical environment (the jewellery store and its immediate surroundings) and individual behaviour / activities (the jewellers and members of staff), as well as to the criminal event, including the interaction between the victim and the offender. For this reason, it is suggested that further research activities on jewellery store robbery, directed specifically to the jewellery store robber, be undertaken. This will foster understanding of what motivates criminals into committing jewellery store robbery and their criteria for target selection.

- **Do factors such as, amongst others, geographical location, presence of escape routes, positioning of store, store visibility, lighting conditions and number of staff visible on the floor, affect the likelihood that a jewellery store will be robbed?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.3 and 5.4.3 seem to indicate that jewellery stores located in urban and suburban areas, in close proximity to main routes and freeway ramps are more at risk of robbery victimisation. There is instead no clear answer on whether factors such as good store visibility, lighting conditions and presence of more staff on the floor affect the likelihood of a jewellery store being robbed. While these factors may indeed play a role in deterring a robbery attack, additional research involving structured interviews with arrested jewellery store robbers is needed in order to understand their real value in robbery deterrence. This was confirmed by the interview respondents (section 5.3.7.1) who indicated that, once a store has been identified as a lucrative target, professional criminals will proceed to attack it in spite of specific environmental or situational conditions.

- **Do jewellers and their staff perceive their work as being risky?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.6, 5.3.5.2 and 5.4.6 show that jewellers and members of staff do feel at risk of robbery victimisation, to such an extent that most of them work under stress and often think of quitting their profession / occupation.

- **Can anything be done to reduce a jewellery store's vulnerability to robbery?**

Chapter 5, section 5.3.7.1 offers various suggestions on the part of experts on how to reduce security risks in a jewellery store. In Chapters 6 and 7, the researcher places more emphasis on what can be done by jewellers, members of staff and relevant organisations regarding robbery risk reduction. Environmental, situational, behavioural and business-related strategies based on the research findings can be adopted, through an integrated approach, to reduce the risk of robbery victimisation.

- **Do jewellers and the staff employed by them have the right mentality of security in order to counteract the threat of robbery?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.5, 5.3.8 and 5.4.5 show that there is an evident lack of robbery risk reduction programmes and pre-employment screening of staff on the part of jewellers. This deficiency indicates that more should be done by jewellers in developing a better mentality of security among all their staff. In a jewellery store environment, not thinking in terms of security can lead to a significant increase in the risk of crime victimisation.

- **Are their stores equipped with adequate security measures to minimise the risk of robbery?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4, 5.3.7 and 5.4.4 indicate that jewellers adopted a wide range of security measures in their effort to reduce the risk of a robbery attack. It is evident that, due to the risk factors inherent in their



business activity, security is a major concern for most jewellers. Being without adequate security measures often means the difference between succeeding or failing in business. However, the above findings also indicated that there were certain deficiencies with regard to the implementation of security systems that needed to be urgently addressed, e.g. the lack of physical barriers, CCTV systems and dedicated security response in the event of alarm activations.

- **What is the jewellers' attitude in respect of crime prevention in general and robbery prevention in particular?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.7, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7 indicate that the majority of questionnaire respondents and all interviewees have a positive attitude towards crime prevention and welcome specific initiatives aimed at improving the security situation in the jewellery retail sector. In particular, respondents favoured the introduction of crime prevention training at an early stage, the formation of a jewellery security structure and the creation of a dismissed employee database.

- **Are jewellers willing to make a difference and invest in new systems and procedures to minimise the risk of robbery and injury to themselves, their staff and customers?**

Research findings in Chapter 5, section 5.2.7, 5.3.8 and 5.4.7 proved that most questionnaire and all interview respondents, by giving their approval to specific initiatives proposed in the questionnaire by the researcher (e.g. the formation of a jewellery crime prevention structure and the implementation of a jewellery crime and dismissed employees' database), are indeed willing to make a difference in their efforts to reduce the serious risk of robbery victimisation.

#### **7.2.4 Ultimate objective of the study**

While the real threat of robbery against jewellers requires the introduction of comprehensive security measures, some of these are, in practical terms, of difficult implementation in a retail store context. In fact, as opposed to jewellery

manufacturers and wholesalers who can adopt strict security measures to protect their businesses, retail jewellers always need to maintain a friendly environment in order not to discourage customers from entering their stores. Therefore, a jeweller's approach to security is more complex in that it must necessarily take into account this need. This reasoning does not imply that jewellers should be left exposed to criminal threats; on the contrary, the need to balance security with the environment requires intelligent solutions. Without a well-planned risk reduction programme, jewellers would certainly run the risk of incurring heavy financial losses of such gravity that they might be forced out of business.

The ultimate aim of the study as indicated in Chapter 1, section 1.3, has been achieved through the formulation of an exhaustive robbery intervention strategy based on the situational crime prevention model and involving six different levels of intervention, i.e. decisional, environmental, situational, procedural, personnel and business-oriented levels. In addition, section 7.3 below elaborates further on the said robbery intervention strategy focusing on specific risk reduction elements.

### **7.3 THE WAY FORWARD: SUGGESTIONS**

In addition to all robbery intervention strategies that have been thoroughly explained in Chapter 6, section 6.3, the researcher believes that the suggestions given below represent an appropriate response to the threat of robbery against the jewellery retail sector.

#### **7.3.1 Jewellery industry summit**

An industry-wide summit should be hosted seeking to address the crime and security related problems affecting the industry. The summit should also prioritise the formation of a jewellery industry crime prevention structure as suggested by the researcher in section 7.3.2 below. Role players within the jewellery industry, the Jewellery Council of South Africa, insurance companies, security specialists and SAPS experts, should get together to initiate the process leading to the summit.

### 7.3.2 Jewellery industry security structure

The creation of a high-level jewellery crime prevention structure is required. The principal purpose of the structure, which needs to feature senior representation from the jewellery industry, retailers and employees, will be to unify the sector's crime prevention strategy and facilitate improved communication on crime and security-related issues affecting the industry, with all parties concerned, i.e. Jewellery Council, industry sectors, police and security. In fact, one of the structure's key tasks should be the improvement of relations with the SAPS, the National Prosecuting Authority and the Department of Justice.

The structure needs to establish an industry-wide code of practice, setting out minimum standards for jewellery manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Important work already done by crime reduction specialists and insurance advisors can be used as a basis to implement the suggested standards. The structure also needs to seek common interest and experience from other industries' crime prevention initiatives such as the one initiated within the Efficient Consumer Response (ECR South Africa 2001). The Jewelers' Security Alliance in the United States and Jewellers' Vigilance Canada can also be approached for advice.

The proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention Structure could be funded in different ways such as:

- **Annual subscriptions** allowing participating jewellers to have access to the services and products offered by the structure, e.g. access to the database on jewellery-related crime and dismissed employees, crime risk reduction manual and videos.
- **Fees charged for “ad hoc” services** for non-subscribers belonging to the industry.
- **Sponsorship** received by companies in the jewellery industry, and other interested organisations.

The proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention Structure will be responsible to set up a database on jewellery crime and dismissed employees as discussed in Chapter 6, sections 6.3.6.1 and 6.3.6.2.

### **7.3.3 Employee screening**

The lack of pre-employment screening on the part of jewellers is clearly an area of security vulnerability which needs to be addressed. It is suggested that employee screening be adopted as an on- going procedure involving not only candidates (pre-employment screening) but also existing employees (post-employment screening). Screening procedures should include a thorough reference check on employment and qualification historical information, criminal and civil records and credit vetting in order to determine if the candidate's profile may pose a threat to the employers. A post-employment screening carried out by Griffith and Associates (Employee screening 2004:51) for a major retail group showed that 7 percent of all employees who had started work with a clean record had, since commencement of employment, acquired criminal records for serious offences, ranging from robbery to drugs (all without the employer's knowledge). Therefore, while pre-employment screening will help companies identify problem areas before a person starts working, post-employment screening will assist companies in minimising the risk to which they are exposed over the long term.

As stressed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.5.1, jewellers should utilise the services of reputable companies to screen employees. Consideration should be given to offering this type of service as an integral part of the proposed Jewellery Crime Prevention Structure as explained in section 7.3.2 above.

### **7.3.4 Integrating environment, human behaviour and security**

Section 6.1 in Chapter 6 stressed that, in order for a robbery intervention strategy to be effective, jewellers should direct their efforts towards integrating environmental, behavioural and technological elements within their stores. In fact, manipulating the environment, acting on the behaviour of staff and jewellers and introducing specific

security systems and barriers, have the potential of going a long way in reducing the risk of victimisation.

#### **7.3.4.1 Environmental security**

In the area of environmental security, good visibility, lighting and adequate store lay out are important factors which, if applied correctly, can act as a deterrent against various crimes such as jewellery store robbery and theft. In fact, environmental security, which is often neglected, should be prioritised in a jeweller's risk reduction programme at an early stage, i.e. preferably during the design stage prior to the opening of a jewellery store.

#### **7.3.4.2 Crime awareness and prevention training**

In the area of human behaviour emphasis needs to be given to the creation of more awareness among jewellers and staff, particularly on how to reduce the risks of victimisation, and also by giving them guidance on how to react when threatened by dangerous criminals. Besides the jewellers themselves who have an obvious responsibility in creating a safer working environment for their employees and customers, other parties need to contribute to raising the level of security awareness. For instance, it is suggested that the Jewellery Council of South Africa and jewellery insurance companies introduce manuals and workshops to new and existing customers on crime risk reduction and security-related issues. Specialised jewellery magazines should encourage regular article contributions from crime reduction and industry specialists. Furthermore, institutions training jewellers will take a step in the right direction by introducing crime prevention as part of their study programme. In this regard, attention must be drawn to the Risk Control Manual for Jewellers recently completed by the researcher. The manual identifies security-risk factors affecting jewellers and provides suggestions on how such risks can be effectively reduced from a practical point of view (Zannoni 2007).

### **7.3.4.3 Physical and electronic security**

The findings on physical and electronic security in chapter 5, section 5.2.4 and 5.4.4 also indicated that certain improvements are needed if jewellers were to further reduce the risk of robbery victimisation and other criminal activities. Of particular concern, for instance, is the scarce utilisation of video surveillance systems linked to recording facilities of a digital type. Remote CCTV surveillance technology linked to a security control centre providing visual verification of events in a jewellery store should also be considered. In the event of a criminal incident, the control centre operators will be able to assess the situation prior to dispatching emergency reaction.

The lack of physical barriers at the main entrance to a jewellery store is also cause for concern. At present, the implementation of specific barriers such as security gates or electronic security doors seems to be a reactive (after the robbery) rather than proactive (before the robbery) measure. Although physical barriers are usually not a preferred method to secure a jewellery store, the threat of robbery is such that jewellers need to make access into their stores more difficult to criminals.

### **7.3.5 Retail crime intervention initiatives**

Because retail stores are vulnerable to various types of crime, jewellers and other business owners should be working closely together in order to reduce their risk of victimisation. While effective security measures at the store level are indispensable in order to increase their level of security, jewellers should not remain isolated from the rest of the business community. In fact, by actively co-operating in crime prevention schemes as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.3.6.2, retailers stand a better chance of keeping criminals away from their stores, as they can:

- Immediately alert each other as to suspicious activities and individuals spotted within a protected area.
- Provide each other with descriptions or photographs of known or suspected retail criminals.

- Be proactive in calling out security or police at an early stage to investigate the above activities.

To set up a retail crime prevention scheme within a specific business area, a committee of motivated business owners should get together and plan for the most suitable strategy for the area where they operate (with the assistance of a crime reduction specialist and the local SAPS). To be successful, the scheme needs to be actively advertised throughout the protected area by means of signboards placed at strategic positions, stickers on store windows and other conspicuous measures. By doing so, retailers will send a strong message to criminals that the business community within a specific area is standing united against crime. All localised incidents relevant to the jewellers' security should then be transmitted to the centralised jewellery crime prevention structure as explained in section 7.3.2 above.

### **7.3.6 Protection for shopping centres**

The frequency of armed robbery at jewellery stores in busy shopping centres necessitates that landlords and management implement target hardening measures aimed at deflecting this crime. In this regard, the Consumer Goods Council of South Africa (2007) conducted surveys at 50 shopping centres and, in consultation with various stakeholders, published the following best practice guidelines:

- **Perimeter fencing** (minimum height of two metres) to be installed around the entire centre; clear of vegetation on both sides; illuminated by outward facing lighting.
- **Vehicle access / egress control** to include ticket operated booms manned or unmanned, preferably linked to automated road teeth barriers; speed humps on both sides of the booms.
- **Car park lighting** to provide adequate visibility to entire parking area; lights (preferably mercury vapour 125 watt type) to not shine towards CCTV cameras as they overexposed the picture.

- **CCTV** to be installed by a reputable company with sound references; digital technology preferable with remote off site recording or secure on site control room; adequate coverage of all public and high risk areas to be included.
- **Observation towers** to be positioned for maximum viewing of car park.
- **Cash-in-transit (CIT)** movement during peak trading hours to be avoided and, where possible, restricted to centre service areas isolated from public areas.
- **Shopping centre security service providers** including car guards to be: PSIRA registered; vetted for criminal records; in an identifiable and suitable uniform; in direct contact with their company; issued with adequate equipment such as portable two way radios, panic alarms linked to armed response, torches, handcuffs and self defence equipment; issued with Standing Operational Procedures and all applicable documentation; supervised during day and night shift duties.
- **Customer reporting facilities** to be included in order to encourage customers and tenants to report all incidents to shopping centre security; all security incidents to be recorded.
- **Emergency planning** to be formulated through tenants meetings.

In the researcher's opinion, there seems to be a tendency on the part of management to deploy most security resources on the inside of a shopping centre, thus neglecting the external areas. It is of the utmost importance for security personnel to spot suspicious activities at an early stage, when the offenders are still outside. For this reason, trained security officers need to be deployed at strategic external positions.

### **7.3.7 Further research activities**

As indicated in various findings in Chapter 5, sections 5.2.4.2 and 5.2.5.1, the researcher recommends that further studies into jewellery-related crime be conducted. In particular, jewellery store robbery should also be approached from a robber's perspective. This is necessary to understand what triggers criminals into committing



jewellery store robbery, and most importantly what acts as a deterrent in their decision not to carry out a robbery against a store. Furthermore, robbery against travelling jewellery representatives and other criminal activities against jewellers such as theft, burglary and fraud should be investigated for a comprehensive risk reduction strategy to be developed.

#### **7.4 CONCLUSION**

Based on the findings of this study, it is clear that armed robbery is a real threat to jewellers, not only because of its potential for violence, but also due to the fact that a single criminal event may cause significant financial losses, and even force a business to close. While it is of the utmost importance for all jewellers to implement a well planned robbery intervention strategy at store level, the reality is that, as suggested in Chapter 5, section 5.3.8, only a collective effort on a much larger scale involving the jewellery industry as a whole, can bring about the necessary conditions to effectively reduce the risk of robbery victimisation.

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Respondent 3. Jewellery Insurance Brokerage Director. Semi-structured interview held in November 2005

Respondent 4. Chartered Insurance Practitioner. Semi-structured interview held in November 2005

Respondent 5. SAPS Superintendent, Head of Communication Services. Semi-structured interview held in November 2005

Respondent 6. Jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern Johannesburg suburb)

Respondent 7. Jewellery store owner operating in Bedfordview (eastern Johannesburg suburb)

Respondent 8. Jewellery store owner operating in Fourways (northern Johannesburg suburb)

Respondent 9. Jewellery store owner operating in Randburg (northern Johannesburg suburb)

Respondent 10. Jewellery store owner operating in Cresta (northwestern Johannesburg suburb)

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APPENDIX "A"

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A CUT ABOVE THE REST

QUESTIONNAIRE: JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY

We appreciate your cooperation in this research project, an initiative by Elio Zannoni, a crime prevention specialist and master student at the Department of Criminology of the University of South Africa, endorsed by the Jewellery Council of South Africa and in collaboration with the University Research Institute for Criminology (Rome – Italy). Your anonymity is assured and data will be carefully analysed and used to further the security needs of the jewellery industry. The results of the study will be released by the Jewellery Council, together with a robbery prevention strategy. For any information, please contact the researcher on 0834605990 or [e.zannoni@mweb.co.za](mailto:e.zannoni@mweb.co.za)

Please complete this questionnaire and forward it to us in the attached self addressed envelope.

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

- Q. 1 What is your gender?  
1. Male  2. Female
- Q. 2 What is your age?  
1. Younger than 20  2. 20 - 29  3. 30 - 39  4. 40 - 49  5. 50 - 59  6. 60+
- Q. 3 What is your position at work?  
1. Owner  2. Manager  3. Salesperson
- Q. 4 In which province is the store situated?  
1. Gauteng  2. Mpumalanga  3. Northern P.  4. North West P.  5. Free State   
6. KwaZulu Natal  7. Eastern Cape  8. Western Cape  9. Northern Cape
- Q. 5 In which area?  
1. Urban  2. Suburban  3. Rural

SECTION B: ROBBERY EVENT

*Definition of robbery: "Robbery is the unlawful, intentional, violent removal and appropriation of a movable corporeal thing belonging to another" or "Theft by means of violence".*

- Q. 6 Over the past five years (1997/2001) has anyone committed a robbery at your store(s)?  
<<If your answer is no or do not know, please proceed to section C, question 27>>  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know
- Q. 7 How often did it happen during the past five years (1997/2001)?  
1. Once  2. Twice  3. Three times  4. Four times or more  5. Do not know
- Q. 8 During which month did the last robbery happen?  
1. Jan  2. Feb  3. Mar  4. Apr  5. May  6. Jun   
7. Jul  8. Aug  9. Sep  10. Oct  11. Nov  12. Dec  13. Do not know
- Q. 9 Which day of the week?  
1. Mon  2. Tue  3. Wed  4. Thu  5. Fri  6. Sat  7. Sun  8. Do not Know
- Q. 10 At what time?  
1. Opening  2. Morning  3. Lunch  4. Afternoon  5. Closing  6. Do not know
- Q. 11 How many criminals were involved during the last incident of robbery?  
1. One  2. Two  3. Three  4. Four  5. Five or more  6. Do not know
- Q. 12 Was (were) the criminal(s) seen at the store before the actual commission of the robbery?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

OFFICIAL USE

Questionnaire no.:

1-3

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11-12

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OFFICIAL USE

- Q. 13 How did the criminals execute the last robbery?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Armed  2. Masked  3. Forcing entry  4. Posing as customers   
5. Faking delivery  6. Forcing key-holder back to store  7. Do not know
- Q. 14 If armed, what type of weapon(s) did the robber(s) carry?  
<< More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Firearms  2. Knives  3. Hammers / Iron bars / Pickaxes   
4. Clubs / Batons  5. Do not know  6. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- Q. 15 Were any of the above weapons actually used?(e. g. to threaten or hit staff or customers)  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know
- Q. 16 If any weapon was used, what did the violence against owner(s), staff or customers involve?  
1. Physical assault, e.g. by shooting or stabbing   
2. Threats of violence and intimidation   
3. Do not know
- Q. 17 How serious were the consequences of such violence?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Fatal injuries  2. Serious injuries  3. Light injuries  4. No injuries   
5. Do not know  6. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- Q. 18 Was any resistance put up on the part of any of the victims in an effort to foil the robbery?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know
- Q. 19 How long did the criminal(s) take to execute the last robbery (in minutes)?  
1. 1 to 3  2. 3 to 5  3. Over 5  4. Do not know
- Q. 20 What type of merchandise / items did the criminal(s) seize during the last robbery?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Jewellery  2. Precious gemstones  3. Watches  4. Metal alloys   
5. Customers' goods  6. Jeweller's private collection  7. Cash from the till / safe   
8. Personal belongings, e.g. cellphones or wallets  9. Do not know
- Q. 21 State the total amount (cost price) of merchandise stolen during the last robbery:  
1. Under R50 000  2. R50 001-R150 000  3. R150 001-R250 000   
4. R. 250 001-R. 500 000  5. Over 500 000  6. Do not know
- Q. 22 Were you insured in respect of the merchandise stolen during the last robbery?  
1. Yes, in full  2. Yes, but not in full  3. No  4. Do not know
- Q. 23 Was the last incident of robbery reported to the police?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know
- Q. 24 Did the police apprehend the offender(s)?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable  4. Do not know
- Q. 25 Did the police recover any of the stolen merchandise?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable  4. Do not know
- Q. 26 On the whole, were you satisfied with the way the police dealt with the last robbery?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable  4. Do not know

- 17  18  19  20  
 21  22  23  
 24  25  26  
 27  28  29  
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 32  33  34  35  
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SECTION C: LOCATION OF PREMISES

Q. 27 Where is the store situated?  
1. Shopping centre  2. Street front  3. Hotel  4. Other (state) \_\_\_\_\_

55

Q. 28 If the store is situated inside a shopping complex, is it near:  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Stairs / Lifts  2. Centre of complex  3. Entry / Exit

56  57  58

Q. 29 What types of businesses are situated in the immediate vicinity of the store?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Restaurants / Coffee bars  2. Departmental stores / Supermarkets   
3. General small businesses  4. Banks  5. Other (state) \_\_\_\_\_

59  60  
 61  62  63

Q. 30 Describe the main transport routes that are used by motorists to reach and leave the store:  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Main road  2. Secondary road  3. Access to a freeway ramp (between 0 and 5 Km)   
4. Access to a freeway ramp (between 5 and 10 Km)  5. Other (state) \_\_\_\_\_

64  65  66  
 67  68

Q. 31 How close is the nearest parking facility?  
1. 1 to 50 metres  2. 50 to 100 metres  3. Over 100 metres

69

Q. 32 Describe the nearest parking facilities:  
1. Internal parking with security, e.g. guards/booms/gates  2. External parking with security   
3. External parking without security  4. Street parking

70

SECTION D: MECHANICAL, PHYSICAL AND ELECTRONIC SECURITY MEASURES

Q. 33 Is the store equipped with any of the following security measures?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Fixed grille / Shutters  2. Reinforced glass  3. Security gate with strike lock   
4. Electronic security doors  5. Safes  6. Vaults  7. Alarm / Panic systems   
8. Alarm monitoring / Armed reaction services  9. CCTV system / Video recording   
10. Store guard  11. Insurance

71  72  73  
 74  75  76  77  
 78  79  
 80-81  82-83

Q. 34 After a robbery were any additional security measures implemented at the store?  
<<If your answer is no, do not know or not applicable, please proceed to question 37>>  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Not applicable  4. Do not know

84

Q. 35 If so, which additional security measures were implemented (after the robbery)?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>  
1. Fixed grille / Shutters  2. Reinforced glass  3. Security gate with strike lock   
4. Electronic security doors  5. Safes  6. Vaults  7. Alarm / Panic systems   
8. Alarm monitoring / Armed reaction services  9. CCTV system / Video recording   
10. Store guard  11. Insurance  12. Do not know

85  86  87  
 88  89  90  91  
 92  93  
 94-95  96-97  98-99

Q. 36 Was the store robbed again after the implementation of additional security measures?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

100

Q. 37 Is the inside of the store clearly visible from outside both during day and night?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

101

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Q. 38 Are the internal and external areas of the store well lit (day and night)?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

102

SECTION E: PERSONNEL

Q. 39 How many staff members are visible from outside the store?  
1. None  2. One  3. Two  4. Three or more  5. Do not know

103

Q. 40 Do staff members undergo security screening prior to being employed?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

104

Q. 41 Do staff members receive robbery prevention training?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

105

Q. 42 If so, what does the training entail?  
<<More than one response is allowed>>

- 1. Basic security procedures, e.g. activation of panic alarm and crime awareness
- 2. Internal training (by loss control manager)  3. Crime prevention training (by experts)
- 4. Not applicable  5. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

106

107  108

109  110

SECTION F: FEAR OF CRIME

Q. 43 What do you think is the trend or frequency of armed robbery against jewellery stores?  
1. Increasing  2. Staying the same  3. Decreasing  4. Do not know

111

Q. 44 Being in the jewellery business, do you feel at risk of becoming a victim of robbery?  
1. Occasionally  2. Frequently  3. Always  4. Never

112

Q. 45 Does the risk of being robbed cause stress to you?  
1. Occasionally  2. Frequently  3. Always  4. Never

113

Q. 46 What type of crime occurs mostly at your store?  
1. Robbery  2. Theft by employees  3. Theft by "customers"  4. Burglary   
5. Fraud, e.g. by cheques or credit cards  6. Extortion  7. Do not know

114

Q. 47 Have you ever considered giving up your business/occupation because of crime?  
1. Yes  2. No

115

SECTION G: CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVE

Q. 48 Do you agree that jewellery crime prevention training by experts should be an integral part of staff general training?  
1. Highly agree  2. Agree  3. Disagree  4. Highly disagree

116

Q. 49 Do you feel that the formation of a jewellery security body, which will create and maintain a crime intelligence and dismissed employee database, would be useful in the fight against jewellery crime?  
1. Yes, useful  2. No, not useful

117

Q. 50 Would you consider making an annual contribution for such a service through a subscription fee?  
1. Yes  2. No

118

Q. 51 Do you think that jewellery crime prevention should be part of the study programme at schools or institutions training jewellers?  
1. Yes  2. No  3. Do not know

119

Thank you for your cooperation

**APPENDIX “B”**

**SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE ON JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

**Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Company:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**Time:** from \_\_\_\_\_ to \_\_\_\_\_

**Venue:** \_\_\_\_\_

**A) INTERVIEWEES’ PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

A1) What is your position at work?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

A2) Kindly tell us about your professional experience in your field of work.

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**B) PERCEPTION ON JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

B1) Do you consider armed robberies at jewellery retail stores as a serious crime problem affecting jewellers?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

B2) Do you perceive jewellery store robbery as being stable, on an upward or downward trend?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

B3) Can you explain the recent upsurge in jewellery store robberies?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**C) THE JEWELLERY STORE ROBBER**

C1) Are robberies conducted by local criminal groups or is there an involvement of international organised crime?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

C2) Do the robbers target specific items of jewellery or do they steal jewellery at random?

\_\_\_\_\_

---

C3) Are jewellery store robbers professional or opportunists?

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---

C4) Are they planning the robbery over a period of time or acting on an available opportunity?

---

---

**D) PARTICULARS OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

D1) Are robbers acting individually, in small or large groups?

---

---

D2) How do they gain access to the store to commit the robbery?

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D3) Do they use any disguise?

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---

D4) What type of weapons do they carry?

---

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D5) What valuables are mostly targeted?

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D6) How long do the criminals usually take to complete the robbery?

---

---

**E) THE VICTIM OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

E1) Do robbers usually inflict violence on the victims?

---

---

E2) Does the threat of robbery affect the psychological well-being of jewellers and members of staff?

---

---

E3 If so, in what way is their psychological condition affected?

---

---

**F) THE AFTERMATH OF JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY**

F1) How do robbers dispose of the stolen jewellery?

---

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F2) Are the police successful in apprehending jewellery store robbers?

---

---

F3) Is the stolen jewellery recovered during an investigation?

---

---

**G) SECURITY RISK REDUCTION**

G1) Beside the standard security measures, which are commonly adopted by jewellers to reduce the risk of robbery, is there any new system /measure that jewellers have recently adopted?

---

---

G2) What do you consider as the most effective measure(s) to deter a robbery?

---

---

G3) Do you think that there should be a strict access control at jewellery stores on the same basis as, for instance, the systems in place at financial institutions?

---

---

G4) Do jewellers, as part of their internal security policy, regularly employ risk reduction measures such as:

i) employee screening prior to employment?

---

---

ii) staff crime prevention training?

---

---

G5) Is adequate insurance coverage a must for all jewellers to survive in business?

---

---



**F) JEWELLERY STORE ROBBERY PREVENTION INITIATIVES**

F1) Should crime prevention training by experts be an integral part of staff general training?

---

---

F2) Do you think that crime prevention training should be introduced as part of the study programme at jewellery schools?

---

---

F3) Would you agree to the formation of a jewellery security body and a dismissed employees database?

---

---

F4) What should, in your opinion be the way forward to get all relevant parties involved in tackling the problem of robbery at jewellery stores and, in general, all forms of crime affecting the jewellery retail sector?

---

---



## JEWELLERY COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA

---

13 November 2001

Mr Elio Zannoni  
Crime Prevention Specialist  
P O Box 2560  
HOUGHTON  
2041

Dear Mr Zannoni

I refer to the research that you are conducting in conjunction with the Department of Criminology at UNISA on jewellery store robbery in the South African jewellery industry.

We have been made aware by yourself that the University Research Institute for Criminology in Rome, Italy, will conduct a parallel research.

We will assist in any way possible with the research to reach as many jewellers as possible. The Jewellery Council endorses such a well-needed project and will encourage its members to co-operate.

We wish you luck in the project and look forward to the results on the South African, as well as the Italian research.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Ernie Blom', written in a cursive style.

**ERNIE BLOM**  
**CHAIRMAN**

S:\JCSA\JCSA\Corres\ZannoniE.let.doc

APPENDIX "D"



UNISA

Faculty of Arts

Fakulteit Lettere en Wysbegeerte

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINOLOGY  
(Criminology/Penology/Police Science)  
PO Box 392 UNISA 0003  
Fax: (012) 429-3221

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Hloegile ka 1960

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(Kriminologie/Penologie/Polisiekunde)  
Posbus 392 UNISA 0003  
Tel: (012) 429-6003

Gestig in 1960

25 May 20001

429-6003

429-6682

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to confirm that

Name: Mr E Zannoni

Address: PO Box 2560  
HOUGHTON  
2041

Student number: 479 545 8

is enrolled for the masters degree in Criminology. The title for his dissertation is: **An exploratory study of robbery of jewellery stores in South Africa.**

To conduct research Mr Zannoni requires vital information from you. Your cooperation in this research endeavour will be appreciated.

Yours sincerely

Dr Alice Maree  
Supervisor