Critical Discourse Analysis:
The case of Denmark, Dansk Folkeparti, and a nationalist hegemonic discourse
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Risk Society and globalisation</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Denmark</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context: Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA: Power</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA: Ideology</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA: Critique</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of sources</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis - Discourse of Dansk Folkeparti</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual speeches: Multiculturalism and Xenophobia</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Capital and Nationalism</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital and Xenophobia</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study: Venstre</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Venstre</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirical Analysis</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Across Europe we are seeing a shift in power from status quo political parties towards radical and formerly fringe political parties, on both the right and the left of the political spectrum (Rydgren, 2004:474). On the right side, this trend is directly tied to nationalism. This nationalist trend is being expressed in many different ways, in each respective country, but represents a general move away from global democracy throughout Europe (ibid.). This has dire effects for the ideals of the European Union and could potentially render the EU unequipped to handle global problems. Afterall, “(...) it is intellectually obvious that global problems only have global solutions, and demand global cooperation” (Beck, 2002:42). It is this dichotomy between the globalised world and nationalist ideologies that we wish to focus on. It is this reason we have chosen to investigate the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, who have lead the way for nationalist discourse in Denmark. In many ways these global risks have created the perfect environment for this type of discourse to grow. Stability threatens the European Union on at least three major fronts: economic crisis, ecological crisis, and security crisis (Beck, 2002:41). To borrow a term from Ulrich Beck, our current society can be described as a “world risk society” where global risks are acknowledged and dealt with, according to priority and severity (ibid.). These risks set the scene for our current problem area and will undoubtedly help us to understand some of the reasons, this situation in Denmark has arisen.

In the last parliamentary election in June 2015 Dansk Folkeparti, captured just about 21% of the votes, securing a victory for the party and in turn; their discourse. Becoming the second biggest political party in Denmark brings with it a new legitimization of the party and their discourse. This increase in political power means that the influence of the party on the overall discursive hegemony in Denmark has also increased. Although the Dansk Folkeparti are the bigger party, their allies Venstre are in control of the government. This is due to a tradition of minority governments in Denmark, based on negative parliamentarism where no government can have a majority of mandates against them. This means that a government must have support from
its allied parties on a case to case basis. Because of this the support parties, although not directly in control of government, hold a lot of influence over the governing party (http://www.ft.dk/Demokrati/Regeringen/Den_danske_regeringsform.aspx). Historically parties in Danish parliament have been divided into “blue block” and “red block”; blue, traditionally being conservative liberal, and the red have traditionally represented more social democratic ideals. This helps us understand the power Dansk Folkeparti wield, by showing how critical their alliance to Venstre was, in determining who won control of the government in the last election in 2015 and how they, holding 37 mandates, yield significant influence (http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/valg/folketingsvalg).

In this time of political upheaval, economic and ecological crisis, and war raging in the Middle East, Europe faces challenges that threaten its political and social stability in ways not seen since the last World War. This can be seen as contributing factor in Dansk Folkeparti’s success at the last election and the strengthening of their nationalist discourse and a step backwards for global politics. This is why we have chosen a critical stance, as researchers we are in opposition to power structures that inhibit processes of democracy, especially when global democracy is the only foreseeable path towards properly addressing our current and future dilemmas concerning our world risk society. That leads us to our research question: How can we critically analyze the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti to investigate the influence they have had in contributing towards a hegemonic nationalist discourse in Denmark? To understand this we ask the sub-question: How can we understand this influence by looking at the effect they’ve had on the party currently controlling government, Venstre? To understand this influence we will be paying special attention to their transformation from agency to structure, and the changes that have occurred as seen through the evolution of their discourse.

As we investigate the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, we will be looking into how the discourse of the party is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned; which means that it contributes to transforming the national identity while at the same time being determined by it (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997:258). At the same time the Dansk Folkeparti itself is socially
constitutive as well as socially conditioned; and by that we mean, the effect the party has had on society are just as important to us, as the effects that society in the context of our current times has had on the party. Through these two power relations between the Dansk Folkeparti and their discourse and society, we hope to track the evolution of acceptable Danish discourse surrounding this issue. As we create a timeline to help us to understand the origins and evolution of the party, we will create parallel timelines to help us understand where the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti comes from and what events could have influenced it. To do this we will be looking at the status quo party Venstre, the usually biggest party in ‘blå block’ and a party they have co-operated with, in order to better identify the pervasive power of the Dansk Folkeparti’s discourse; and in turn, the pervasive power of mainstream politics has on the Dansk Folkeparti. To narrow down our research further, we will be focussing on what we will identify as the core discourse behind the Dansk Folkeparti: their narrative around Danish identity and nationalism. We will attempt to unmask their ideologies, and expose the structures of class and power regarding racism and xenophobia (re)constructed by their discourse. All the while we can draw serious connections to our context, the global risk society, and also the Dansk Folkeparti’s approach to acknowledging and confronting these risks.

Methodology

While we construct a methodology around critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a macro strategy, we will also be using the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu to analyze the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti as a micro/meso-strategy, to help unmask their ideologies concerning their contribution to a hegemony around Danish national identity. While we collect data from the Dansk Folkeparti to help us paint a picture of their discourse around this issue, we will also be collecting data concerning the discourse of status quo political parties that have held the majority of power in Denmark for decades, Venstre. Our macro approach will involve setting the context of our globalized society using Beck’s concepts of modernity through the lense of
classic critical theory. Our context then narrows as we show Denmark and the special position it holds in our global society; one which, due to the welfare state ranks high in economic and social stability. We then narrow our context even further as we investigate the journey the Dansk Folkeparti have taken, from birth to now as the second biggest political party, and subsequently their path from agency to structure. This macro, meso, micro approach will help us to chart their discourse as it has developed, while simultaneously charting the general hegemonic discourse in society. To focus on the direct connections the Dansk Folkeparti have to a hegemonic discourse in Denmark, we will also be using the Venstre in our analysis, spending special attention to the relationship and dependency they have on the Dansk Folkeparti.

Context as it is defined in the Oxford Dictionary refers to, “the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood”. In this case, as we research the nationalist discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, the context is crucial to help us to understand the factors that have had an undeniable effect on formulating and sustaining this particular discourse. According to Wodak and Meyer in their book about CDA methodology, “the notion of context is crucial for CDA, since this explicitly includes social–psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:21). This interdisciplinary procedure is an important part of our research, and one of the main reasons we gravitated towards this methodology.

Context: Risk Society and globalisation

The concept of context hints towards the interconnectedness of the world by its very definition. It provides the foundation for our analysis in the sense that we are assuming that everything we can discover in parallel to our case study must have some affect, whether known or unknown, on it. In this way we will not be attempting to make direct causal claims, but instead we will be pointing out the interconnectedness of these factors. No one, and nothing, is an island
and to better understand any one thing, we must take a step back to be able to see the external factors and environment which undoubtedly have affected its development. This is precisely why understanding the context from which this phenomenon has spawned, is the first major method we will be using to guide our research. To begin defining our context we will start from the macro and work towards the micro.

To describe the methodological macro approach we will be taking we must make mention of Karl Marx and the critical approach he brought to analyzing and critiquing society. Although his critique was mainly aimed towards capitalism, his analysis of class, power and ideology will remain at the foundation of our critical analysis. To better understand our modern times, the context in which our research project takes place, we will be borrowing terms and theories from Ulrich Beck, concerning his interpretation of modern times as “late modernity” and our current society built around risk and risk analysis, the “world risk society” (Beck, 1992). According to Beck, “‘Risk’ inherently contains the concept of control” (2002:40). To set the scene around a certain risk and then build a discourse around solving and/or dealing with that risk implies dependency and in consequence control. This will be extremely helpful while attempting to describe the nationalist discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, but what we find equally interesting is what risks Dansk Folkeparti chose to acknowledge, and which ones they chose to ignore. To do this we, with help from Beck have chosen the three major global risks that face the Europe today, economical risk, ecological risk, and security risk (Beck, 2002:41) with special attention paid towards how these risks contribute to Europe’s current migration crisis.

Starting with economic risk we can begin with the analysis of Marx and his contemporaries. Since the times of Marx capitalism has colonized the world, and it has done so quite unevenly. Capitalism has brought, “ruthless economic exploitation and an unjust international division of labor” (Orford, 2014:560). We cannot ignore the effects of this ruthless exploitation and unequal international division of in fueling current and future migrations of people who are fleeing poverty in hopes of creating a better life for themselves and their families. So why and how has capitalism made so much trouble for the world? According to
David Harvey it has something to do with the destructive power of our current economic ideology, neoliberalism (Harvey, 2007:22). Harvey explains that, “Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade” (ibid.). By this definition neoliberalism does not seem so bad, but the consequences of this economic system have started to show its dark side and it comes in the form of “income inequality”. According to The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "The enormous increase of income inequality on a global scale is one of the most significant—and worrying—features of the development of the world economy in the past 200 years," (van Zanden, 2014:202). Economic factors have always played a big role in the decision people make to uproot their families and travel to a country where they don’t speak the language, might not have any friends or family, and have no job. The success of the US in becoming a world superpower has often been linked to the masses of immigrant labor forces moving there to create a better life. Our case example Denmark stands in a very special position regarding economic stability, due to its social welfare programs and low levels of inequality. It is no wonder, with the risk of economic collapse spreading across the world as global inequality reaches levels not seen for 200 years, a discourse has developed which aims to protect Denmark from those who would like to come and take advantage of this economic stability and low income-inequality the welfare state has created. It is worth mentioning that Denmark, although arguably one of the least affected by the economic crisis, is still feeling the effects of an economic system that has put this balance in jeopardy, and many believe the welfare state cannot afford to accommodate any drastic changes. With economic risk challenging the stability of Denmark’s welfare model it becomes obvious what role our current economic crisis plays in creating an environment ripe for this type of discourse to flourish. Keeping this in mind will help us tremendously in understanding the situations that made it possible for a party once regarded as unable to ever be “housebroken” (Rasmussen, 2001) as Poul Nyrup Rasmussen put it during his time as prime
minister, to becoming the second biggest political party in Denmark; all while maintaining their nationalist core values.

While economic factors have always played a major role in motivating people to migrate out of their home countries, there is one thing that will motivate them more; war. Although it is difficult to quantify the causes of the current refugee crisis, much research has been done that shows conflict, and in particular civil war, contributes significantly to the creation of refugees and asylum seekers (Hatton and Williamson, 2006:255-256). To move away from your home and start a new life for economic reasons presumes a choice being made, but if staying means potentially dying, the choices become very limited, hence the distinction between migrant, refugee, and asylum seeker. People fleeing war and regional insecurity due to conflict, have arguably much less choice in the matter and are thus categorized as refugees and asylum seekers rather than migrants. “The definition of a refugee is derived from the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees, namely someone who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, is outside his or her country of normal residence and who is unable or unwilling to return to it” (Hatton and Williamson, 2006:250). It is curious none the less that a distinction needs to be made at all.

Neoliberalism has fueled capitalism’s growth and expansion into nearly all territories around the Earth, with an ideology based on the expansion of a free and unregulated market allowing businesses freedom to cross borders where they please to maximize profit even at the expense of individual states. This freedom to exploit the resources of the world without the restrictions of national borders has yet to translate to human kind. Although neoliberalism has opened borders for capitalist expansion it has not opened borders for the people of the world. Even when people are fleeing death and destruction, they are confronted with strict restrictions and limitations in finding a stable home. This is being experienced right now as Europe faces a migration of Syrian refugees due largely to a civil war in Syria and, more broadly, the general regional insecurity of the Middle East. The security risk as well as the economic risk has an undoubtable affect on the current migration crisis Europe faces today, and sequentially plays a major role in setting the context for which the nationalist discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti has developed.
While considering global risks we must of course be aware of the ever present ecological risks, the world faces today and the potential for this risk to contribute to even more migration as people around the world find themselves unable to continue living where they live, due to the effects of global warming. Although politicians argue whether or not climate change is a real thing, scientists around the world have accepted the theory as truth given the overwhelming amounts of data supporting the argument. According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the average temperature of the Earth has risen 1.5 degrees in the last century and will continue to rise due to human activity. This phenomenon means more than just warmer weather, as many regions around the world are suffering due to changes in the climate. “The evidence is clear. Rising global temperatures have been accompanied by changes in weather and climate. Many places have seen changes in rainfall, resulting in more floods, droughts, or intense rain, as well as more frequent and severe heat waves.” (EPA.gov). This newfound global threat, although not often directly considered by politicians as a contributing factor, has already contributed to mass migrations and even the Syrian refugee crisis Europe faces today. According to research done at the University of California Santa Barbara, “Before the Syrian uprising that began in 2011, the greater Fertile Crescent experienced the most severe drought in the instrumental record. For Syria, a country marked by poor governance and unsustainable agricultural and environmental policies, the drought had a catalytic effect, contributing to political unrest.” (Kelley, 2014:1). This contribution to political unrest can now be directly linked to the war and in turn the refugee crisis (ibid.).

To sum up the context of our research we see a world defined by Beck as a world risk society, characterized by three major global risks; economic risk, security risk, and ecological risk. To draw clear lines linking this to our research we look briefly at how these risks contribute to current and future migrations with particular attention paid to the current migration crisis facing Europe today, and maybe more importantly, we have identified a characteristic of our modern society that responds to the threat of risks because of the fear that they might be realized. The general stability of Europe has meant that the neighboring regions of Africa, and especially
the Middle East, have suffered significantly more from these risks. We must consider the effect that these risks have on creating an environment ripe for the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti. These risks cannot be ignored in considering the contribution they have had towards legitimizing the problematization of immigrants in Denmark. Part of our analysis will rely on how the Danish people acknowledge the problems proposed by the Dansk Folkeparti as being true or not. The acceptance of the general Danish public in problematizing this issue gives this discourse a certain level of legitimacy and in turn power derived towards the Dansk Folkeparti. Maybe more interesting is which aspects of our current world risk society the Dansk Folkeparti chose to acknowledge and which ones they chose to ignore, and in turn how that strengthens their discourse. This context should work as the base for our understanding and help us understand, why such a discourse was able to be accepted by such a large part of the Danish society. Furthermore this analysis of our context helps us paint a picture of a globalized society that, although in stark contrast to the nationalism of the Dansk Folkeparti, contributes in some ways to constituting it.
Context: Denmark

To better understand our global context and its relevance to our research topic, we must understand how Denmark holds a special position in the world to the general stability it has created through its welfare system. And although this system has brought extremely low levels of social, cultural, and economic inequality creating formidable social stability, it is being threatened by the risks that currently challenge global society, “Demographic development, financial crises and rising youth unemployment mean that more and more people are becoming concerned about what our welfare model will not be able to afford to support in the future” (Göransson in Vidje it al., 2013:2).

We use this statistic, the Gini Coefficient, used by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to outline the strength of the Nordic welfare model in comparison with the strength of other governments on the world. This use of the Gini Coefficient is examined in combination with other measurements, the Relative Income Poverty and the top 10% vs bottom 10% of the income of the citizens, to give a broader view in comparing the listed up states. The OECD is an international Organisation for international and transnational cooperation to improve global and national policies for a better economic and social environment for human beings all over the world (http://www.oecd.org/about/). This includes various areas: the understanding of a government to recognize where which factors lead to economic, social and environmental change, “the measurement of productivity and global flows of trade and investment”, the prediction of national and global trends with support of an analysis and comparison of data, etc (ibid). The Gini Coefficient measures the general income inequality, “after taxes and transfers”, which is scaled beginning by 0 and going up to 1 (http://
www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm). A Gini of 0 would require the income distributed for every citizen equally and opposing to that a Gini of 1 would mean that one citizen would get 100% of the income (ibid.). To exemplify Denmark has a Gini Coefficient of 0,25. The Relative Income Poverty outlines the percentage in population that has a general income, also measured after taxes and transfers, “less than 50% of the respective national median income” (ibid.). In Denmark this percentage is around 5,4%. The last scale shows “the average income of the top 10% as a multiple of the average income of the bottom 10% of the income scale” (ibid.). According to this statistic the Nordic model of the Scandinavian welfare states have a noticeably high ranking in comparison with other states regarding these scales.

The Danish welfare state follows the Nordic Welfare Model and is mainly based on the concept of solidarity between all citizens (Lu & Olesen, 2009). To make sure of the adherence of this concept the “strong” government is in charge in guaranteeing “the necessary material framework for living a reasonable life” (ibid.). Regardless of their “economic and social backgrounds” the welfare state attempts to preserve “equal opportunities, rights and obligations to participate in society and use its resources” (Vidje it al., 2013:10). These are basic goals of every welfare state. To transfer these goals to social reality the Danish welfare state has included them in the political system for an essential practice (e.g. in educational system, public health etc.) (ibid.). One of the main characteristics of the Danish, and more generally Nordic, welfare state is the core part the government takes over in policy sections (ibid.). This also involves the productive exercise of the social and healthcare to secure basic requirements for the citizens to live without concern of their social and health situation (free medical treatment, social financial help, etc.), which is essential to broaden a variety of opportunities to participate in the labor market and to reduce the average unemployment (ibid.). The relatively equal distribution of income in Denmark is also crucial for the satisfaction of the Danish citizens (ibid.). Financed by the generally high taxes in Denmark these core concepts, coming along with various other key aspects, are achieved in social reality (ibid.).
The effective organization and exercise of the welfare state and the trust in this system by the citizens build the fundament of the high developed state Denmark and is one of the various occasions of the globally high reputation of it (Vidje et al., 2013:13). The Danish population is well aware of their well functioning welfare state and this recognition is used by the national parties. It is exactly this fact that gives justification to nationalist ideals, especially in times of crisis when the very stability this system creates is under stress.

(http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm)

Context: Dansk Folkeparti

The groundwork for Dansk Folkeparti started as an experimental right wing party in the late 70’s with ‘Fremskridt-Partiet’, but their name soon became synonymous with xenophobia
and racism. Throughout the 80’s the party became more and more influenced by the rising politician, Pia Kjærsgaard. With the emergence of Pia Kjærsgaard, and a change of policy focus by a small group of members, Pia Kjærsgaard and the aforementioned members decided to start their own party: Dansk Folkeparti. Dansk Folkeparti adapted to a more socialistic model and dialed down the blatant racist rhetoric, but still maintained the concepts of a Danish hegemonic-discourse (Rydgren, 2004:480).

In the beginning of the parties existence, it was considered a radical opponent party, without much influence in the Danish Parliament. Their discourse was much borrowed and influenced by Den Danske Forening, a group which stands to “secure Danish culture, language and mode of life in a world threatened by chaos, overpopulation, violence and fanaticism” (Rydgren, 2004). Dansk Folkeparti quickly posed themselves as a radical right wing party, with strong opinions on welfare, the EU and immigration. Throughout the 00’s they became an established party in the Danish Parliament, and steadily grew in votes and importance securing their transformation from agency to structure, as we can see in our timeline. As a party they have experienced great success in terms of elections, and they have sustained growth in every election, except 2011, when they went back 3 mandates, and the blue block (which they sided with) lost its place as governing party. Another important part of their history concerns the blue block government in place from 2001 until 2011. Dansk Folkeparti was the party, that made this government a reality, being a support party, and backing up a Konservative-Venstre government in this period. This means that, as party, Dansk Folkeparti has been influential from almost the beginning of their existence up until now. As mentioned before they had lost mandates in the 2011 election, but at this point, they already had become a major factor in Danish politics, both policy- and mandate-wise (can be seen as a “normal fluctuation”). From the very beginning until 2012 Dansk Folkepartis chairman has been Pia Kjærsgaard, who was one of the founding figures of the party, and is well-known in Danish politics, but after 2012 the post has been occupied by Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who marked a change in the party and their discourse. Under Pia Kjærsgaard, the party had taken a clear approach as a radical fringe party with strong
opinions and being a party of “the people”. With the change of chairman, the party became “housebroken” and by their size had to take a bigger responsibility in the Parliament.

By the election of 2015 Dansk Folkeparti has now become the second biggest party in Denmark, and have a great impact on the government, putting them into power. This development proves important for our project as it will show their change of discourse in relation to the size of the party and their general frame of the party throughout the last 15 years or so. We will show this aforementioned change through our discourse analysis, and by putting it in a historical perspective, we will be able to show the impact of their discourse in mainstream media (Rydgren, 2007).
Theoretical Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis

We are using critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a framework to organize and understand critically the social practices and influence the Dansk Folkeparti hold within Danish politics, along with the power structures and ideologies that they use to form their discourse. Our basis for our theoretical framework is the book Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis written by Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer (2009). CDA has had appeal to us because of its inherent multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach (ibid.). Because our house theme was “communication and media” we decided to look at discourse to attempt to reveal the structures of power and unmask the ideologies behind the Dansk Folkeparti to better understand how it has affected the totality of Danish society. This then requires that we define what discourse means in reference to our research question.

For our research we are using Lemke’s definition of “text” as the concrete realization of abstract forms of knowledge (‘discourse’)” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:6). By this definition
discourse it not just something which is said, but an assumed knowledge expressed through more than just words. This level of abstraction allows us to draw theoretical analysis of how language, along with other communications such as non-verbal communication, play a role in the organization and structuring of social life. From what we see on the surface of our research, the core values of the party have not changed much hence the reason for our use of discourse analysis, to get a more comprehensive and multidisciplinary method for understanding the evolution of the party. “CDA is therefore not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se, but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi-methodical approach” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:2) It is with this methodology we will investigate ‘language as social practice’ (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) to help us identify the three central constitutive concepts regarding CDA: power, ideology, and critique (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) and build our theoretical framework and analysis. This section will work for us as the basis for our methodology and theoretical framework as well as forming our literature review concerning the theories we chose to use.

CDA: Power

The concept of power is very important for our research and represents what is arguably the most important part of our project. To understand the emergent discourse of Dansk Folkeparti and the relation it has with mainstream Danish politics and society in general, we must attempt to understand the power relations at play. Using the sociological theories of both Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu concerning power and power relations in society, we hope to better understand this phenomena and its effects on society.

Although Foucault has quite a broad and often abstract definition of power that goes beyond the traditional usage, we will be focussing primarily on his classical distinction of power as repression and oppression, referring to the classic critical interpretation of power as described previously by Marx and his contemporaries. Although Foucault traverses well above and beyond
this classical definition, he acknowledges it as a subcategory of power relations (Foucault, 1980:119) and therefore, our study will chose to focus more on the people who hold power, rather than to define power itself as Foucault attempts to do throughout his work (Foucault, 1980:51).

That brings us to a distinction Foucault makes about the definition of power. He separates the “right” and “left” and their respective point of view about power. To Foucault power from the point of view of the right was juridical, meaning that it was only referenced in juridical terms taking the form of law, constitution, sovereignty, etc. On the left, and as Foucault refers to it the Marxist side, power is referred to, “only in terms of the state apparatus” (Foucault, 1980:115). Foucault then makes the argument that, “The way power was exercised-concretely in detail-with its specificity, its techniques and tactics, was something that no one attempted to ascertain; they contented themselves with denouncing it in a polemic and global fashion” (Foucault, 1980:116). This proves to be very useful for our future analysis of the Dansk Folkeparti and how they view their power from within the party, expressed mainly by how they attempt to use their power, and how their power is viewed by what Foucault labelled the the “others” or “adversary camp” (ibid). Our critical approach ties us to Marx and the Marxian perspective which Foucault points out is in opposition to power structures, which are utilized by the party we are studying. Foucault would then put our analysis in direct opposition with the Dansk Folkeparti and the power structures inherent in their discourse, and he would be right to do so. The act of being critical towards these forms of dominance and repression cannot help but put one in opposition to them. We can say that one of our research goals, following the lead of the critical theorists that came before us, is to emancipate ourselves and society from these structures and ideologies of power, repression, and oppression. It is with Foucault’s very specific view of how power is specifically used, its techniques and tactics, that we wish to use to build our CDA of the Dansk Folkeparti (ibid). From here we bring ourselves to one of Foucault’s central concepts “Knowledge is Power” (1980:51).
To build from the idea that knowledge is power and to assume that knowledge forms discourse, Foucault asks the question, “whom does discourse serve?” (Foucault, 1980:115). This will be helpful with our research question when it comes to understanding how mainstream politics has benefitted from this discourse and the Dansk Folkeparti, and their discourse, have in turn benefitted from becoming a part of the mainstream political structure in Denmark. This discourse brings along with it a claim of “knowledge” and the respective power inherent in that knowledge. Knowledge then isn’t necessarily a scientific truth, but often instead represents a claim to truth legitimized in our case by the state and the political power held by Dansk Folkeparti. “Truth is used to pacify others by privileging certain ways of interpreting the world, particular discourses, and disqualifying others” (Foucault, 1979:185). With his research into prisons and the panopticon he expressed that, “dominant discourse filters out alternative realities” and in this way the prisoners he studied started to define themselves as prisoners, or in other words they began to see themselves as others see them (Foucault, 1979:187). This is the effect of hegemony, a power over others so grand that the others impose it to some extent upon themselves. From the perspective of our case we can see this clearly. In place of the “prisoners” Foucault references, we have immigrants and non-nationals who in the presence of a hegemonic discourse centered around nationalism, begin to see themselves as outsiders and aliens in a place for which they might otherwise consider home. It is this hegemonic discourse that is the main focus of our research into the Dansk Folkeparti. According to Foucault, ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘régime’ of truth.” (Foucault, 1980:133). From this perspective we see that the Dansk Folkeparti use their discourse to claim a certain knowledge of how the world works, and with that a certain “truth” is assumed. This regime of truth is strengthened by the emergence of this party into mainstream Danish politics and society and is of much concern to those who find themselves oppressed by this knowledge.

To understand Power in more depth we then gravitate towards Bourdieu and his theories which aim to understand the complex social relations involved. We find it very helpful to adopt
the terms of fields as social spaces, habitus as an accumulation of capital, and doxa which refers to the rules of the “field” (Wacquant, 1996). The field we are studying is mainly in reference to Denmark and Danish politics although we make reference to the global society as a whole to set a context around our current modernity and global risk society.

Bourdieu then makes reference to “official discourse” contributes to the hegemony of an official point of view (Bourdieu, 1990:241). He describes official discourse as having three characteristics, diagnostic, administrative, and authorized accounts. The diagnostic is the act of knowledge or cognition, which tends to assert a universal or divine truth. This can be seen as being legitimized by state power and political position as we see in the Dansk Folkeparti. The second is administrative which we can also see in our case study, as they are now utilizing their power and position in the government to affect legislation, rules, and directives. The third is what Bourdieu refers to as authorized accounts which legitimize official discourse. This is where we use the statistics and timelines charting the emergence of Dansk Folkeparti into Danish politics to strengthen our point, that they are now official position legitimizes their discourse as official (ibid). Bourdieu explains that discourse can be legitimized by state power in the same way that a university degree legitimizes a doctor or lawyer. In this way the state is the referee in the struggle for monopoly, or hegemony, of discourse (Bourdieu 1990). It is this relationship between state authority and the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, and the legitimization that inherently takes place, which interest us the most when studying the concepts of power exercised by the Dansk Folkeparti.

CDA: Ideology

Following the methodology laid out by Wodack and Meyer we find ourselves with the second constitutive concept of discourse analysis, the study of ideology. “Organizations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology of a society to become closer to what they want it to be.” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:8). This strikes at the heart of our investigation and
brings us to one of the main assumptions behind our study of Dansk Folkeparti, their strive for power and their influence on the ideology of Danish society due to the discourse they perpetrate. One of the main concerns for us as researchers, especially being actors from within the very social field we are studying, is the effect their discourse has on hegemony. As Bourdieu states, "Holders of bureaucratic authority never achieve total monopoly" (1990:241). This does not mean that their discourse doesn’t have a very real affect on the hegemony from within Denmark, and potentially throughout Europe. “When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of hegemony. With regard to this key concept of ideology, van Dijk sees ideologies as the ‘worldviews’ that constitute ‘social cognition’: ‘schematically organized complexes of representations and attitudes with regard to certain aspects of the social world, e.g. the schema […] whites have about blacks’” (van Dijk in Wodak and Meyer, 2009:8). This is arguably the most important concepts for our research. Our analysis follows the example given by van Dijk of whites and blacks, but modified to fit the context that Western Europe and more specifically Denmark faces. Danes (whites) and the social cognition behind how they view immigrants (blacks) with special attention to islamic immigrants. It should be quite simple to analyse the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti, but to show the effects on the what we could define as hegemony, requires that we also identify a hegemony within the discourse of Danish society as a whole. This will inevitably prove more difficult but by investigating changes from within status quo political parties we hope to get a rough idea of what is acceptable and common speech within mainstream politics and therefore represents to some extent a political hegemony.

This leads us to a general “western ideology” centered around the idea that the west is more advanced than the east. This comes with an economic ideology of capitalism and neoliberalism which paints the picture with the west being the center of capitalist success across the globe, a cultural ideology that paints west as “good” and east as “evil” in the fight for global security which ties well into the religious ideology of Christian vs Islam which has been a defining division between East and West for over a thousand years. This is where we can look at
the traditional nation-state model and its contribution to determining the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti by providing the structures for which we make these ideological distinctions.

To better identify the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti, we ask: what does the party provide for its followers, Danish citizens. To help do this we will be using the concepts of capital described by Bourdieu. We will investigate how the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti differentiates between Danish values and Islamic values to measure between them the difference in social capital, which is described as, “resources accrued by virtue of membership in a group” (Wacquant, 2008). By this definition, we can see how the Dansk Folkeparti offer Danish people a form of social capital for being Danish, that becomes by definition something an immigrant, especially an Islamic one, will never be able to attain. Part of their nationalist discourse is the fact that Denmark is a Christian nation. Although often considered to be of little significance to a largely secular society (Dencik, 2007), the Dansk Folkeparti use Denmark’s official religion to widen the social gap between Danes and Islamic immigrants, even when these immigrants have lived in Denmark for generations. Cultural capital is more difficult for their discourse to monopolize because, “scarce symbolic goods, skills and titles” (Wacquant, 2008:268) can be earned to help non-nationals assimilate into Danish culture. This is where we approach the borders of racism. When people who grow up in Denmark and earn themselves significant cultural capital by learning the language, culture, and workplace in Denmark are still alienated due to their cultural heritage one can easily assume the prejudice due to race. To build this nationalist discourse around the ideology that Denmark is a superior place compared to other places around the world, and consequently Danish people are superior by association, especially compared to immigrants fleeing crisis and notable worse conditions than that which exist in Denmark, contains within it a capital that Danes have simply by being Danish. The Danish habitus containing this cultural superiority complex becomes something that even well integrated non nationals adopt as part of life in Denmark. This form of Danish capital is essentially a nationalist capital, one attained simply by being Danish. This has a potential ego boosting effect for Danes who find themselves with low economic, cultural and symbolic capital compared to
other Danes. It is possible that the demographic in rural Denmark who have noticeably much less capital than Danes located in more urban areas have experienced this ego boost, they are the demographic that voted overwhelmingly for Dansk Folkeparti in the last election, 2015 (http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/valg2015/resultat). It is through this interpretation of capital within Denmark, we hope to uncover the nationalist identity that (re)creates the structures of dominance inherent within this division of classes.

CDA: Critique

We are left with the final “constitutive concept” of CDA in reference to the “C” in our acronym, critique. Our critique develops through the diagnosis of this discourse, the power structures it supports, and the ideologies of nationalism, xenophobia, and racism that are inherent within it. Our opposition towards it can then be seen as an opposition to the power structures that dominate us and the ideologies of nationalism, xenophobia, and racism that we live with in consequence. For that reason our bias should only be seen as a hinderance to our work if we fail to support the claims stated above. Proving academically that the Dansk Folkeparti creates a discourse around nationalism, xenophobia, and racism while constituting the (re)creation of the power structures that keep them in positions of power, and with that maintain a certain influence over the overall discourse within Danish society, should keep us with a methodological approach to the study of their discourse that remains as scientifically objective as possible given our position as actors from within the field of study. Our critique will rely on classical critical theory to generate a “socially informed construction of society” (Krings in Wodak and Meyer, 2009:7). By first describing and explaining the discourse we hope with our critique to be able to root out the delusions behind the xenophobic and racist nationalist discourse.

Choice of sources
To illustrate the discourse of Dansk Folkeparti, we have chosen to base our CDA on speeches from DFs annual meetings. The annual meeting speeches we use are from 2007 until now. These are relevant by not only showing the discourse, but also showing how they want their political opinions to be perceived by the members of the party. Therefore we believe it gives us the best example of what they want to achieve as a party, and show the purest form of their discourse. It must be noted that these speeches are not only given only to party members, but also to journalists, which means that they are not only speeches to rally their members, but that Dansk Folkeparti wants to perceived this way in a political vacuum, without having to back down on statements in fear/need of political opponents or co-working parties. It is this choice of these annual speeches post 2007 that we hope will legitimize our analysis of their discourse. We have not cherry picked the pieces of their discourse that would best suit our preconceived opinions, but rather kept as objective as possible by choosing the sources that seem to be the most legitimate representations of their discourse.

Analysis - Discourse of Dansk Folkeparti

As we begin to show Dansk Folkeparti's general political standings, we have used their programme of principles from their webpage. We have chosen to start with this because it shows their discourse as they wish it to be seen. This creates the background we need to analyse their discourse and a starting point to build our critique on. We will use this base analysis to define their discourse as one of a nationalist ideology. Dansk Folkeparti are a party that on the surface, and especially according to their self defined identity, are hard to categorize in the traditional manner. Their nationalist discourse has put them in direct opposition to the left parties in Denmark, and yet, they openly are in favor of the tradition of the Danish welfare system. Below we have taken examples from their declared “principal program” (www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Principprogram), that best define the party’s beliefs in terms of their nationalist discourse. Their
“principal program” mentions many different aspects of their ideology but we have chosen only the parts of that which make reference to their nationalist ideals. From what we have discovered, as seen below, it is not hard to define this part of their discourse as nationalist and even xenophobic.

We start with, “Landets selvstændighed og frihed er dansk udenrigspolitiks vigtigste målsætning” which translates to, “The sovereignty and freedom of the country is the most important goal of Danish foreign policy” (ibid.). This is the beginning of their nationalist discourse especially as we see through the linking of freedom and sovereignty. Their ideology has put them in direct opposition to the EU and with it the globalized world as they also state this in their principles of programmes.

From here their discourse becomes noticeably more nationalist and xenophobic. “Denmark isn’t a state of immigration, and it’s never been. We will therefore not accept a multiethnic transformation of the country” (ibid.). This shows a direct concern for Denmark resisting globalization and keeping a strict nationalist stance on defining the nation. As stated above Dansk Folkeparti has no interest in Denmark becoming a multiethnic country, and as current chairman Kristian Thulesen Dahl stated in his annual meeting speech from 2014, “Because Sweden has decided to not only become a multiethnic country, but also to become a multicultural country. And this is not a development that creates communities. It does not create social cohesion. But on the other hand it creates social splitting and unsafeness” (Dahl, 2014:2 our translation).

This creates a direct link between a multi-ethnical society and multicultural society. This multiethnic and multicultural society goes against their core value of keeping Denmark “Danish” (as we show further on) with their nationalistic view on Danish cultural traditions and heritage, and creating fear of losing these core values to multi-culturalism. As we have established in the context of our research, we now live in a world characterized by globalism in our “world risk society” or “late modernity” (Beck, 2002). Everything is interconnected in this web of global capitalism, global security coalitions like NATO, and our global ecology which threatens the
habitability of the planet. This “global risk society” poses problems that transcend the nation state model and in many ways adopting this form of nationalist discourse shows a disregard for the severity of the state of the world. To pretend Denmark is an island and can tackle these issues, and all issues to come, by themselves is to ignore that fact that Denmark, and more generally the western world, owe a lot of their success to the multiethnic and multicultural characteristics of our globalized society.

That brings us then to “Folkekirken er det danske folks kirke” (ibid) which roughly translates to, “The church of Denmark/The Danish National Church is the church for the people of Denmark”. Another part of their nationalistic and traditional political standpoint, is their support of the Danish church. Although Danish people are largely secular, it is true that Denmark is officially a Christian country. “There rests a strange paradox in this: from one point of view Denmark is clearly a Christian country (...). Looked at from another point of view, however, Denmark, (...), is a highly secular country” (Dencik, 2007:128-129). This shows that the Dansk Folkeparti have chosen the aspects of traditional Danish society that best fit their ideology of nationalism, making quick and direct mention of Denmark as a Christian state and ignoring the rational and secular society Denmark has become. This helps them to further the divide between Danish nationals and non nationals of immigrants. Even further alienating the people in Denmark who practice religions other than Christianity, for example the percentage of Danish citizens who are Muslim, which was roughly 12.8% in 2011 (http://www.religion.dk/viden/medlemmer-af-muslimske-menigheder-anno-2011), and of course all of the Muslim refugees currently fleeing Syria and the Middle East. Although this is a problem that the Danish people care less about than ever before due to the social processes of rationalization and secularization that have been occurring throughout Denmark (Dencik, 2007:126), Dansk Folkeparti use this rhetoric to define “Danes” in terms that excludes the minority, Muslim Danes.

This rehash of Danish Christianity is a return to a sentiment that further reinforces the class division between natural Danes and their immigrant or non national counterparts. What it is even more harmful is the subtle messages of the unwelcomeness towards anyone who doesn’t fit
these relatively narrow social parameters. The Dansk Folkeparti go even further when they describe in the speech we use that there are good foreigners, ones from western countries who can assimilate to Danish culture, and there are bad foreigners, which consist of people from cultures and societies from outside the western world. They go so far as to outright say only immigrants from western countries contribute to Danish society “We have always had immigrants in Denmark. Immigrants who have both contributed and has been integrated. Immigrants that by time became Danish. What was in common for these immigrants was: They came from Western countries.” (Kjærsgaard, 2013:5 our translation) In her annual speech in 2013 Kjærsgaard makes a direct connection to the relationship between nationalism and globalism or what she calls multiculturalism, “The leading ideology is called multiculturalism - which fights the national [the nation state]. (...) by having the standpoint that all cultures and religions are ‘equally good’.”(ibid.). This is how the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti refers to our globalized society by narrowly defining it as multiculturalism. This definition fits into their problematization of the issue, reinforcing their position of power and claim to knowledge while applying the discursive strategy that filters out competing discourses (Foucault, 1979).

Annual speeches: Multiculturalism and Xenophobia

A general overview of their political beliefs shows a conservative approach and frightening tendencies towards xenophobia. Throughout all the annual speeches from 2007 until 2015 they have displayed a great affection towards the cultural traditions of Denmark, and they have whole segments of their discourse aimed at preserving these cultural beliefs and ideas. This will prove important to our analysis, since they use this nationalism to not only display a power difference of immigrants and ethnic danes through Bourdieu's notion of social capital, and the immigrants lack of so (Wacquant, 2008:268). It is also their framework in which they display xenophobia, shown in their programme under their notions of immigrant policy, and cultural preservation, and in speeches.
An example we have chosen is from Pia Kjærgaards annual meeting speech from 2011: “It has to stop with big groups of people coming from the 3rd world and avoids participating in the maintenance of the welfare, and even avoids to participate actively in providing for themselves” (ibid., p.14), A statement she connects with unsourced numbers afterwards, lacking credibility in the trueness of said numbers. While this does not support our argument of Dansk Folkeparti using xenophobia, the comments made by Pia Kjærsgaard a few lines up on the page of the same speech, uses their nationalistic view of the Danish welfare state and the preservation of it, to partly blame budget cuts on immigrants (ibid.).

In her speech from 2013, Pia Kjærsgaard says “The idea about the multicultural reached a crushing victory with the foreigner-law of 1983. It opened the borders of Denmark wide open, and we still live with the consequences of this fatal law” (Kjærsgaard, 2013:5) here she displays the xenophobia by calling the law change and the multiculturalism “fatal”. In the same speech, on page 6 and 7, Pia Kjærsgaard explains how immigrants shows up everyday in the media as problems for the Danish society, serving halal-slaughtered meat in public institutions is an issue, the “grand mosques” in the major Danish cities are founded by Qatar, and it being a problem because Al-Aqsa-TV will be making television shows from here. This is a problem, because Al-Aqsa-TV are owned by Hamas, a Palestinian terrorist group, which is not known for doing terrorism in Western countries. She then makes connections between Hamas and the Islamic Brotherhood, claiming that these mosques will be founded by “Islamic crazies, who wants to go to war against democracy and the Western world” (Kjærsgaard, 2013:7). After this she then says the immigrants truly integrated to the Danish society was only from Western countries. (all paraphrased from Pia Kjærsgaards annual meeting speech from 2013:6-7). According to Oxford dictionary xenophobia is defined as, “intense or irrational dislike or fear of people from other countries.” and is curious the example they give is, “racism and xenophobia are steadily growing in Europe.”
Cultural Capital and Nationalism

As the paper aims to give clear definitions of the discourse from Dansk Folkeparti, it will first explore what their overall discourse consists of. In order to do so, we have decided to boil down our material and look for general tendencies in their way of expressing themselves. As such, we have found that Dansk Folkeparti repetitively use certain rhetorical tools and associations in order to further their arguments. These tendencies are key in understanding Dansk Folkepartis discourse and is a necessity in order to begin applying various methods of analysis.

In order to best describe these tendencies, the paper will look at the statements made by Dansk Folkeparti, through three different parameters (as mentioned in the section ‘3 Constitutive Concepts’) - first of all, an attempt will be made to uncover the underlying power-structures within Dansk Folkepartis discourse. In coherence with the ‘critical discourse analysis’, we will look at the power relations Dansk Folkeparti as a party create and how these power relations reinforce themselves.

In order to make mention of how Dansk Folkeparti exercise their power, it is needed to first of all important to get an impression of the language they use as a party. This includes not only looking at what type of language they use when making political statements, but also means taking a look at who is the intended recipients of their statements.

Dansk Folkeparti use a variety of specific rhetorical tools, depending on which subject they touch upon. As explained in ‘History of Dansk Folkeparti’, the core principles of the party are based on a conservative-nationalism school of thought, that focus on preserving ‘Denmark’ and the danish core values as they perceive them. It’s through these ideals of Denmark and the danish people, we start to be able to look at who’s their intended recipients. At a speech, done at the Dansk Folkeparti’s annual party of 2011, the previous chairman of Dansk Folkeparti (Pia Kjærgaard), in a way encapsulated what she sees as the ‘true Denmark’:

(...) Our song (Dansk Folkepartis) is the danish song, the song of the young blond girls, the song of men and frisky lads. It’s the song of where our world is and where we belong.
It’s a song about Denmark, the danish people and the danish values. It’s a song about hope and love, about the beautiful coasts, about the oak that reflects itself in calm waters, about Jutland, about Furesøens waters, about poetry, about zest for life, about craving and optimism” (Kjærsgaard, 2011:7 our translation).

The language used in this small phrase, refers to an utopian Denmark - Pia K. gives an example of how Dansk Folkeparti plays on this ideal of ‘a Denmark that once was’. We chose this source, as it not only provides an example of Bourdieu's notions of capital, but as it provides an excellent example of the ‘hegemonic discourse’ Foucault mentions. Through emotionally loaded statements, such as ‘It's a song about Denmark, the danish people and the danish values’, Pia K. illustrates Dansk Folkepartis perception of Denmark - they paint for us the picture of a country that is made beautiful by not only the country itself, but also by the danish people and their values. The language used in this phrase, consist of ‘pathos’, which refers to an appeal of the emotions. This way of praising the ‘true Denmark’ and the ‘true danish people and values’, allows for people to identify with something that is bigger themselves - this reflects back on Bourdieu's notion of capital. As Dansk Folkeparti asserts a certain value to being danish, they within that assertion create a social-construction. This social construct links a ‘superiority’ to the danish nationality, and for some individuals allows for self-realisation, simply by being danish and conforming with the danish culture. As such, Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital comes into play.

“To be Danish is not about being “better than others”. No, it’s about “us being us”. To be Danish isn’t to say that people can’t come from other countries and become Danish - because they can, if they wish to participate in the community, and it’s not enough to only have a job and know the language. “ (Kjærsgaard, 2014:8)
This small paragraph form Pia K. illustrates how Dansk Folkeparti utilize culture, in order to divide immigrants. Like previously stated, we can see this through the lense of Bourdieu and his concepts of cultural capital. Cultural capital is something that you can gain, through scarce symbolic goods, skills and titles; such as acquiring education, job-titles, or just by contributing to the society.” (Wacquant, 2008:268). As we mentioned earlier, Dansk Folkeparti don’t as such have an exclusive right on the Danish cultural capital, as immigrants can acquire these different aspects of capital through hard work, but there still is the concept of social capital which is conveniently out of reach for immigrants to obtain.

But with statements such as this one, Pia K. says that “it’s not enough to only have a job and know the language.“. She implies that in order to actually be Danish, you have to conform with Danish norms - ie. the danish-norms Dansk Folkeparti portraits. They intentionally try to widen the gap between being a national Dane and being a Danish immigrant. For an instance, as mentioned in their principal program, Dansk Folkeparti perceive Denmark as a country that has roots within christianity - by implying that you are not Danish until you assimilate all these cultural aspects, they make it much harder for newcomers to acquire enough cultural-capital, to be truly perceived as a Danish, as this would mean giving up on their pre-existing cultural values.

Through these two examples, Foucault’s notions of knowledge and power can be used. Dansk Folkeparti claim to have a special position in society, that makes them able to define ‘what’s Danish’ and ‘what’s danish values’. These claims are especially legitimized through their position in the Danish government - with their expanding political influence, Dansk Folkeparti is more and more in a position where their claims of danish-nationality is less disputed. This creates a social construct, where danish values are increasingly monopolized by norms created by Dansk Folkeparti. As Dansk Folkeparti speaks about what it means to be Danish, what they see as the Danish utopia and what it takes to become a Danish citizen, we see an exclusion of people from different cultural backgrounds, that is not Danish. They create a certain
‘knowledge’, or in other words, they create a perception of the world they believe to be true, built around the Danish-hegemonic discourse (Foucault, 1979:185).

Social Capital and Xenophobia

As we display and investigate Dansk Folkepartis ideology, we have to look at what and where they started. As stated by Foucault: “We have to know the historical conditions which motivate our conceptualization. We need a historical awareness of our present circumstance.” (Foucault, 1982:778). As we showed in our historical timeline, the creation of Dansk Folkeparti happened in 1995 after two decades of economic struggles and crisis. The 80’s political outlook was tainted by the “four leafed clover government”, a government consisting of Venstre, Det Konservative parti, Centrum-demokraterne, and Kristeligt Folkeparti. They had adapted a more liberal politic as a response to the 80’s being a period of low growth and stagnant economy (Andersen, 2008). The party from which Dansk Folkeparti emerged from, Fremskridtspartiet, was a right wing, neo-liberal party in which several prominent members of Dansk Folkeparti started their political career. But while both Dansk Folkeparti and Fremskridtspartiet could be categorized as right wing parties, Fremskridtspartiet did not build their discourse upon ethno-nationalism and anti-immigration (Rydgren, 2004, p 480). Dansk Folkeparti on the other hand was created with this as one of their main focuses and as we will display in this analysis, they used a xenophobic and nationalistic ideology as a foundation for their growth.

In this following segment we will use our interpretation of their data to help show the nationalistic and xenophobic discourse of Dansk Folkeparti and to display it being an important part of their ideology. In her annual meeting speech from 2007, Pia Kjærgaard starts off with an anecdotal story about Al-Qaeda terrorists in Denmark. The story starts with, “En morgen i sidste uge,” which translates into, 
“One morning last week, when I woke up I was told that PET, The police intelligence of Denmark, had once again stroke against a group of presumed terrorists, this time in Copenhagen, where 8 had been arrested in night time action (…) It didn't help, when I, in the middle of the day, learned that 6 of the arrested was young, residing, citizens of muslim ancestry - with education, work, beetroot-colored Danish passport and all. And it made me shiver coldly down my back to hear PET-boss Jacob Scarf directly connect the arrested to the terror network Al-Qaeda (…) But three times, that's a pattern, a threat - something that looks like bad habit that's here to stay. A new state in our safe country (…) Even if I don’t want to, I probably have to acknowledge that Denmark is not the same, safe, cozy small country it was when I got married … put children into this world … became a politician .. had grandchildren (…) This is, as Mads Andersen Skjern puts in in the tv-series Matador, ‘No one should come in my home and create conflict with their beliefs’ I think you know what I mean, and I’ll get back to the subject later ” (Kjærsgaard, 2007, pp 1-2)

This excerpt is a great example of Dansk Folkepartis discourse. We chose to use this anecdotal story in our analysis because it represents the recurring trend of this type of rhetorical strategy used throughout their annual speeches since 2007 and gives us a great place to start concerning their ideology. Pia Kjærsgaard opens her speech by speaking about problematic immigrants, and the threat of terrorism. She links this risk of terrorism to the idealistic, conservative, and nationalistic view of Denmark. The nationalist approach to creating fear of immigrants and erosion of Danish culture fits perfectly to the idea of tradition vs modernity. This is the clear use of pathos in her argument which, due partially it being formulated not as an argument but as a story, stirs up emotion. It is a subtle way of allowing the listener to fill in the gaps emotionally, letting the story mean a little something different depending on who is listening. It is quite easy to agree on the simple and broad emotions they play towards, for example, “Denmark is not the same safe, cozy, small country (...)” but the connotations that
follow are not as subtle. When she quotes the classic Danish television series *Matador*, she ties the “terrorist” plots and the security risk previously mentioned in her speech with a statement generalizing “their beliefs” as the creation of the “conflict” (ibid). This is quite the accusatory claim and it is well disguised by being broad enough for the listener to fill in the gaps with their own preconceived definition of who “they” represent. This is further exemplified when she finishes with, “I think you know what I mean.” Whether you “know what she means” or not you are asked to fill in the gaps with your own judgments. In this way she appeals to a broad demographic with her discourse by offering her listeners solidarity through a nationalist sentiment formed around the idea of a formerly better Denmark among other sentiments. This type of rhetorical mentioning of the past points towards an older demographic, because they are the demographic that can relate the most to having “grandchildren”, but we could never claim that it is the only demographic targeted.

With the use of Bourdieu's theory of capital, we see a sign of symbolic violence as well. Throughout their speeches they imply ethnic Danes have a certain capital leverage over immigrants; “Den førende ideologi hedder multikulturalismen – som bekæmper det nationale. (...) Gennem den holdning, at alle kulturer og religioner er ‘lige gode’.” (Kjærsgaard, 2013, p 5) translates into “The leading ideology is called multiculturalism - which fights the national [the nation state]. (...) by having the standpoint that all cultures and religions are ‘equally good’..” As seen in the full speech, they disregard unnamed cultures and religions, which proves the point; the culture of immigrants does not align with their image of Danish culture. The culture of immigrants, if it does not fit with Danish, is a danger for the Danish society. As seen in the quote before and throughout, Dansk Folkeparti believes that multiculturalism is eroding the picture of traditional Danish society which they paint once again throughout the speeches. This means that immigrants coming in are lacking social capital by not being born Danish, and thereby they create social violence against immigrants, by automatically giving them a disadvantage for having a different cultural background. Dansk Folkeparti states in their programme of principles that they believe in and wants to protect the freedom of religion. This appears to be a hypocritical
statement considering their opposition of the builds of grand mosques in the major Danish cities ((Kjærsgaard, 2009), (Kjærsgaard, 2011), Appendix 1.1), claiming that the mosques will be run by The Muslim Brotherhood. They display a disregard towards muslim traditions throughout their speeches; Kjærsgaard, 2007, p 7, Kjærsgaard, 2014 p. 5 to give a few examples. They condemn the use of scarves in public positions, and the use of halal-slaughtered meat. It could be argued that this goes against their core value of the freedom of religion. As they see Christianity as a vital part of the Danish culture (www.danskfolkeparti.dk/Principprogram), the restrictions they place upon muslims devalue their religion, and with religion being an important part of Danish culture, they devalue religious muslims. This leads back to social capital and symbolic violence, as they mark other cultures and religions as being unfit for Danish culture and society.

In a quote in which Jacob A. Riis, a Dane immigrating to USA and making a name for himself, is explained as being the immigrants we want, as Kjærsgaard says herself, “These days, fewer [immigrants] comes from muslim countries and way fewer asylum seekers” (Kjærsgaard, 2010:11). By stating the muslim immigrants do not contribute and help build the society, Dansk Folkeparti shows clear xenophobia, and as our examples show, this is not a singular happening. In general they problematize immigration in many ways, and they frame it with nationalism and ‘the risk society’. The change of society is unappealing to them, and they frame it as being a danger to the society, with new risks coming from the muslim immigrants in the form of terrorism (Kjærsgaard, 2007:1-2). Dansk Folkeparti not only sees them as a security threat, but as we have shown, they also show the immigrants as a danger to the utopian society Dansk Folkeparti creates through their nationalism. Not only as a cultural threat, but also as an economic threat to the welfare system of Denmark (Kjærsgaard, 2010:10-11). This problematization of immigrants shows clear xenophobia, and a discourse based upon it, with a big part of their policy based upon the problems they believe the immigrants are bringing along. As they say part of the solution to get through the economic crisis (Kjærsgaard, 2010:10-11), is tightening the immigration system, and not having had a liberal approach to immigration beforehand, they are partly blaming the immigrants for the necessary downgrading of said
welfare system. They paint the picture of fear by repeatedly going back to nationalism and the utopian idea of Denmark. By doing so, they create an ‘us-versus-them’ tone towards muslims by implying a lack of a necessary social capital, as we mentioned above. Dansk Folkeparti make this approach work, by being part of the nationalism, and by being the guardians of it.

The nationalistic and xenophobic arguments Dansk Folkeparti makes, are pathos driven. They use little to no data to back up their arguments, with a clear focus towards speaking to the emotion of the listeners/readers. This is backed up with their lack of data and sources for their statements, and by their wide use of xenophobia. As we showed earlier in our analysis, this xenophobia is based upon the Danish culture and how it creates a social capital for the ethnic Danes unobtainable for muslim immigrants. By doing so, they speak to the emotions of the target group. The Denmark they describe is nationalistic and monocultural, and by doing so they problematize the immigrants and create fear by making them the scapegoats of national problems, which could be argued could be part of the development of the world (heightened terrorist risks, multiculturalism, free movement). As they partly blame international crises (like the international economic crisis of 2008) to the immigrants, by saying they ‘stealing’ valuable economic resources, which could have gone to the welfare instead (Kjærsgaard, 2011:1) and (Kjærsgaard, 2009:19-21), they are making claims which speak to a broad audience through the use of pathos. Dansk Folkeparti make the crisis understandable for the common person, by reverting back to a core argument of their own while remaining vague and obscure. By blaming the immigrants, they can capture the attention of people by using their core arguments based in pathos, by speaking about nationalism, xenophobia and the fear of change.

As we showed in our history section, Dansk Folkeparti went through a major change in 2012. The chairman post of the party got a new face, and one could argue Dansk Folkeparti, as a party got a new one too. Pia Kjærsgaard and Kristian Thulesen Dahl differentiates in their approach to ‘agency vs structure’. As we displayed above in the analysis, Dansk Folkepartis discourse is based upon nationalism, xenophobia and the fear of change. A discourse set by former chairman Pia Kjærsgaard, whom most of our speeches used so far are from. They have
had a change of chairman in 2012, and with it came a new discourse. Kristian Thulesen Dahl was one of the founding members of Dansk Folkeparti, but as a chairman we see a clear difference in their discourse displayed in the speeches. As a chairman and therefore ‘leader’ of the party, we look at the speeches they make as a tone-setter overall for the party, and a change in discourse from the chairman marks a change of discourse for the party itself. So how can we see this change our sources? As Kristian Thulesen Dahl says himself: “Some might have felt best believing that I didn’t go around interfering with policy questions, or had opinions on ghettos, parallel-societies, islamics and integration. That I sat alone with my reading lamp in the dark hours of the day and crunched numbers” (Dahl, 2012:3 our translation). His focus in his speeches are influenced by this. His rhetorics are less xenophobic than Pia Kjærgaard, as seen throughout his speeches. A clear example of this is their difference is shown in the approach to the grand mosques: “Partly because these mosques - which has been several times abroad - is often financed by Islamic crazies with a wish to go war against democracy and the Western world. The money comes from Saudi-Arabia, whom are world champions in the export of two things: Oil and terrorists.” (Kjærgaard, 2013:7 our translation) where Pia connects the mosques to islamic crazies and terrorists who wants to go to war against democracy and the Western world. Once again it is a xenophobic statement, that implies mosques (and therefore partly islam) are backed by terrorists. In Kristian Thulesen Dahl’s speech from the year before, he mentions the mosques as well: “Should we for example be able to decide ourselves, in Denmark, if there should be grand mosques? With minarets taller than Rundetårn. With grand mosques calling in for praying? With the obvious worshipping of submission, distanciation and hostility, that unfortunately comes along in many places?” (Dahl, 2012:3 our translation) As stated before, these examples show the differences well. While the content does not change much, keeping the same opposition towards the grand mosques, Kristian Thulesen Dahl’s wording is less aggressive and claiming. He does not connect the mosques with terrorists, but instead takes a more humane approach by calling the religion submissive and hostile. His speeches are still riddled with nationalism and a more reserved form of xenophobia: “When suddenly humans arrive in droves, who refuses to be
registered and yell they don’t want to be here. And we know some of them are picked up by gangs run by immigrants…” (Dahl, 2015:3 our translation) and “A Denmark safe for all Danes. A Denmark for the foreigners, we, ourselves, chooses to allow entrance, and that can be a part of positively develop Denmark. A Denmark where we will continue to have resources for care and help, where we have resources to develop the core welfare for the ill, elderly and vulnerable. Where there is safeness” (Dahl 2015:5 our translation). The way he lists the nationalism and states that Dansk Folkeparti only want immigrants contribute is reminiscent of the way Pia Kjærsgaard argues (see Kjærsgaard, 2013:5 as an example), but with a much lesser aggressive tone towards both the nationalism and xenophobia. This change of discourse could be seen as a response to their recent rise in popularity and mandates in the parliament. But as as seen throughout the speeches only the discourse and rhetorics has changed. Their nationalistic and conservative ideology has been consistent affirmed by their programme of principles, as it was written in 2002, and it has not been changed since. A potential reason for this change of discourse could be the rise from agency to structure. As we can see in our timeline, Dansk Folkeparti have had a rise in votes in all but one parliamentary election, and because of this, they cannot be looked upon as an agency anymore. They are the major reason for the Venstre government in place, and with their number of mandates they can almost singlehandedly determine parliamentary votings.

As Poul Nyrup Rasmussen said in 2001 during his time as prime minister “(...) You will never be housebroken” (Rasmussen, 2001). Poul Nyrup Rasmussen believed Dansk Folkeparti to be xenophobic and found their discourse to be over the line. Many things has happened in the Danish political system since 2001, and one of them is Dansk Folkeparti becoming a respected and housebroken. We can see this in the legitimization of them through their rise in power. As we mentioned in our theory segment, Foucault's theory of ‘truth’ applies here once again. As Dansk Folkeparti has been on an almost constant rise, so has the legitimacy of their discourse. As voters believe in the discourse, they gain power, which has lead them to be a housebroken party.
Housebroken enough to become the second biggest party in Denmark with the size to uphold a Venstre government, which could not exist without them.

Through our analysis of Dansk Folkepartis discourse we have uncovered a quite xenophobic approach. This helps us prove our point in Dansk Folkeparti contributing to sustain hegemony in Denmark. They devalue muslim immigrants, and displays a wide use of social and cultural capital almost only Danes are capable of having because of the Danish traditions, culture, beliefs and such. Dansk Folkeparti make Denmark seem like this utopian place, that is being transformed and destroyed by the influx of immigrants. They undermine the immigrants in their speeches through the use of fear and nationalism, and it makes a clear-cut case for symbolic violence against said immigrants, and by that contribute to hegemonic society.

Case Study: Venstre

To truly understand the discourse we aim to do a brief history of the foundation and traditional core values of the greater party’s throughout almost two centuries in Denmark to build the foundation for further analysis. In a sense we wish to understand, to some extent, the discourse of the mainstream, or status quo, political parties that have traditionally held power in Denmark. The party we denote as “status quo party”, is Venstre, which is the respective leader of the “blue block” in Danish politics and currently in control of government (www.dr.dk/Ultra/ultranyt/TEMAER/Folketingsvalg_2015/HVAD-ER-roed-og-blaa-blok.htm).

History of Venstre

Venstre was founded in 1870, and has been hugely influential in forming the current political system in Denmark. For instance Venstre was responsible for establishing parliamentarism in 1901 and has been part of a Danish Government 43 percent of the years it has existed as a party (www.ft.dk/demokrati/partier/partioversigt/venstre/historie_og_politik.aspx).
Due to its long history and position of power as well as the fact that it is currently forming a minority government backed by Dansk Folkeparti as a supportive party, makes us categorize Venstre as a “status quo” party.

Venstre has branded themselves as Denmark’s liberal party (www.venstre.dk) and their liberal values include viewing human beings as individuals with personal responsibilities evolving in the absence of compulsion and a concept of freedom where human beings freely take responsibility for their own lives as well other human being in society (www.venstre.dk/politik/principiprogram/det-liberale-menneskesyn). Freedom is an essential liberal value; freedom for individuals, privacy laws, private real estate law, freedom of speech and belief, freedom to form associations as well as to gather in organizations and freedom for professionals to expand businesses. Importantly, freedom is for every individuals no matter their gender, religion, political point of view, ethnicity and sexual orientation. Venstre believe that every human should have the freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle, thoughts and beliefs as well as speak one’s mind freely. However, privately humans have a moral obligation to assist those who can not cope. The role of the state is limited and focused on enforcing the right to individuality and protect the individual from any sort of suppression in society. The right to freedom is the most important and prominent (ibid.).

Empirical Analysis: Venstre

To investigate if Dansk Folkeparti’s increased influence has had an effect on Venstre as a status quo party in Danish politics, we have chosen to analyze the annual speeches from 2014 and 2015 held by the chairman of the party and current Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen. These speeches may provide us with information on changes that have occurred during the two years before and after Venstre became a minority government supported by Dansk Folkeparti.
Furthermore we draw on Venstres current principal programme from 2006 (www.venstre.dk/politik/principprogram), and the liberal core values that the party was founded upon. The aim is to determine and point out what has changed, if anything, regarding Venstres view on Danish national identity. This should help us to reveal a hegemony within Danish political discourse concerning nationalism and national identity.

Comparatively, Venstres rhetoric concerning nationalism, national identity and immigrants is not as explicitly discriminating as we have shown is the case with Dansk Folkeparti. However, we can still find indicators that Venstre has changed their position and have become more nationalistic.

Firstly and interestingly, Venstres “principal program” adopted in 2006 does not include any section about asylum, refugees, or immigrants specifically (www.venstre.dk/politik/principprogram). However, we can find 17 presentations on their website that link to concerns immigration policy (http://www.venstre.dk/politik/politiske-oplaeg) dating from 2013-2015.

The topic of immigration and refugees, however, is very present in Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s annual speech from 2015, given 5 month after Venstre formed the current government this year. The speech determines the annual political aim and concerns of the party and helps us get a clear view of their discourse as it exists today (http://www.ft.dk/demokrati/partier/partioversigt/venstre/historie_og_politik.aspx). In the speech he repeatedly mentions the importance of “taking care of Denmark” (Løkke Rasmussen, 2015) on the one hand and the current European immigrant/refugee crisis on the other. Lars Løkke Rasmussen makes a connection between Denmark, Europe, the international economic crisis and the refugee-/immigrant situation within the first part of his speech:

“The responsibility to look out for Denmark during this difficult time in which Denmark and Europe haven’t yet recovered from the international economic crisis. And in which Denmark and Europe now, socially, culturally, and in regards to security and economics, is challenged by a large number of migrants and refugees, which is equally caused by
wars, religious fanaticism and poverty. In a time when the benighted and barbarous
struggle for the caliphate has definitely moved onto European soil” (ibid. our translation).

Lars Løkke Rasmussen ties the crisis to the world risk society and the three global threats
we described in the context, as he claims that it is caused by both security risk as well as
economic risk. The refugees and migrants are challenging Denmark and Europe socially,
culturally, economically and security-wise and it need to be dealt with because “there is a limit to
how many asylum seekers and family reunifications Denmark can receive” (Løkke Rasmussen,
2015). This represents the classic principles of Venstre with the added nationalism where we can
see the influence of Dansk Folkeparti, which can be exemplified in this statement;

“Of course Denmark is obligated to help. And we do. But it is naive to think that Danish
businesses demand for highly qualified labor can be met by the refugees and immigrants,
who come here by a long trip that includes crossing the Mediterranean sea and Europe. It
is unfortunately not feasible to that a particularly high number can be hired directly into
production- or laboratory work in a company, when figures show that 9 of 10 Syrians
have a short or no education” and “Some immigrants are easier to integrate than
others” (Løkke Rasmussen, 2015 our translation)

In dealing with the crisis, Venstre has drawn on their traditional liberal value of self-
reliance in that it “should be less attractive for one to stay on welfare benefit and more attractive
for one to choose working” (Løkke Rasmussen, 2015) and they emphasise the fact that Denmark
has an international responsibility and “must be an open society” (ibid. our translation). But they
also clearly have the nationalist connotations we see so often with Dansk Folkeparti and their
discourse concerning immigrants in stating that there are limits as to how many immigrants the
Danish society can handle both economically, socially and culturally; “But we must also openly
say that uncontrolled migration leads to social problems, challenges concerning integration,
parallel societies and a heavy burden for the social services to lift. This we cannot manage in the long run. It will weaken our cohesiveness - humanly, socially and economically” (ibid., our translation).

Since coming into power Venstre has proposed a range of policies, for instance reducing the integration benefits, that is supposed to reduce the incentive for foreigners to come to Denmark:

“We have implemented an integration benefit, so that foreigners in the future will receive a benefit, at the same level as the State Educational Grant and Loan Scheme and an option for language-bonus that can we receive if one learns Danish. This is to encourage work and self-reliance” (ibid.).

On Venstre’s webpage a list of these political result can be found, which exemplifies the new political line concerning immigrants which is more in line with Dansk Folkeparti’s policies on foreigners. Policies include helping in the local areas that refugees flee from, making it more difficult to gain citizenship and a so-called “immediate intervention” regarding the immigration (www.venstre.dk/politik/venstres-resultater). The government has aimed to include different parts of the civil society to gain a faster integration, which include companies, communes and volunteer organizations. Venstre mentions it as “civil society involved in the integration process” (ibid.), which is still linking to the liberal core value of community. Again they balance the liberal core values and newer policies more in line with Dansk Folkeparti’s nationalism.

The influence of Dansk Folkepartis nationalist and xenophobic discourse can be seen by comparing the annual speech at Venstre’s annual congress from 2014 and 2015. In their 2014 speech immigrant policies are only mentioned as one of five points of interest for Venstre, whereas Lars Løkke Rasmussen makes it the major focus of the annual speech in 2015. It should be noted that the current relevance and urgency of the European refugee crisis justifies that Lars Løkke Rasmussen makes it a topic of interest, but the way it is dealt with and the policies it has inspired somewhat confirms a hegemonic nationalist and xenophobic discourse which Venstre
participates in, in 2015. The point about selecting which foreigners/refugees/immigrants to grant asylum or permanent residence permit is repeated in both speeches which provide an enhancement of Venstres liberal core values. The quote “…Denmark must be opened to a greater extent for immigrants, who are able and want to contribute - but closed for the ones, who don’t” (Løkke Rasmussen, 2014, our translation). The values of nationality are not necessarily amplified, as the argument for not letting in foreigners are built upon reasons as: “A reluctance of our values, such as democracy, freedom of expression and freedom of religion and equality toward equality” (ibid., our translation), seems to be built on the liberal foundation too. However, Lars Løkke Rasmussen still stresses that Denmark shouldn’t be open to all as he states that: “Denmark must no longer attract asylum seekers, because they gain especially good conditions here” (ibid., our translation).

It is through this analysis that we see quite clearly that Venstre has been influenced by the Dansk Folkeparti and their discourse. The nationalist and xenophobic tendencies of the Dansk Folkeparti can be seen reflected through the discourse of Venstre who although do not admit to it completely, have shifted towards this discourse to strengthen their own political position. This case example of Venstre represent the status quo and mainstream in Danish politics and therefore has become a tool for quantifying the overall hegemonic discourse in Danish Politics. We have seen that the liberal ideology can fit quite easily with the nationalist one, and where the Dansk Folkeparti use fear of cultural degradation to frame their discourse, Venstre use economic terms and the fear of economic degradation to frame theirs. The reason these discourses can coexist so easily is due partly to their relationship to the overall hegemonic discourse in Danish society, one built on a framework of nation states and top down power structures. The nationalist messages of Venstre are subtle and are not so directly linked to cultural capital, but instead they use economic capital to frame their problematization of this issue in order to accommodate the Dansk Folkeparti as a supporting party and in turn secure their position at the top of Danish politics.
Conclusion

The discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti has undoubtedly had an influence in preserving the cultural and class divides that exist in Danish society. There is a discursive hegemony in Denmark around national identity which is not dominated by the Dansk Folkeparti but is certainly strengthened by it. This is a hegemonic discourse based around nationalism, even though this discourse differs from the nationalist one the Dansk Folkeparti perpetrate. The nationalism for which the Danish population accept, and therefore constitute a hegemonic discourse, and the nationalism of the Dansk Folkeparti are two different things. This is not to say that there is not an opposition to this hegemonic discourse, but while the issues are being debated in terms of the nation state and us versus them, this discourse will remain hegemonic. The hegemonic characteristics of the discourse in Denmark around nationalism is still based on concepts of the nation state, class structures, dominance, and oppression. In this way the hegemonic discourse has been strengthened by the legitimization by this once fringe, and often referred to as radical, nationalist party, Dansk Folkeparti. We have seen that our modernity is one defined by change, so much so that we must constantly calculate risks (Beck, 2002). We are now aware of global risks that pose threats that go beyond the borders of the nation state and require global cooperation to properly address. This “world risk society” has made the fear of risk into a valuable tool for constructing a political discourse and which risks the party chooses to focus on give us the ability to categorize their discourse. It is through this perspective that we have done our best to understand the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti, and the strong ties to nationalism and xenophobia that come with it.

The nationalist discourse the Dansk Folkeparti perpetrate is all about preserving the Danish way of life. We have seen that this seemingly innocent and broad ideal can appeal to many, and for good reason. The risks we face today are threatening the stability of society; and for Denmark, which maintains a special position of wealth and prosperity in our global society, it
is justifiably concerning. From economic crisis to war in the Middle East and on to climate change threatening the very habitability of the Earth, society has its fair share to be concerned about. This concern has been exploited by the Dansk Folkeparti and turned into outright fear. We have shown that this fear has been carefully and strategically focused on the risks the Dansk Folkeparti claim to be most threatening, immigrants and a multicultural society. Venstre have also used this fear but in a way that benefits their liberal discourse. It is because of this that we conclude without a doubt that the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti is nationalist and xenophobic. More importantly their discourse is heavily constructed from the ideologies of nationalism. This nationalist ideology disregards globalization when it has brought positive benefits to society and targets globalism as the cause for all the negative aspects in society, all the while ignoring the global efforts we must take to properly address our modern society. This is where we can see the discourse of the Dansk Folkeparti as supporting the hegemonic discourse around nationalism in Denmark. We continued to strengthen this point by showing the influence the Dansk Folkeparti have had over the mainstream political party Venstre and how they have found a harmony between their relative discourses.
Bibliography


