Sigmund Freud’s Philosophy of Mind

A Self in Hiding

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1. Introduction

‘Normally, there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our own self, our own ego.’ (Freud, 2010: 26)

This quote expresses a shared yet individual feeling, which human individuals assign to themselves and others. The quotation represents the presupposition that this project shall use as a foundation into the philosophy of mind expressed by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). Therefore it should already be mentioned that Freud himself continues this quotation with determining that the term ‘self’ is not so easily defined (Freud, 2010: 26). In fact, Freud’s notion of the ‘self’ seems counterintuitive and provocative to the common-sense feeling of a ‘self’, expressed in the quotation above, when he states that the subject hides from itself, implying that no ‘self’ is fully rational (Lübcke, 1996: 142). The difficulty of describing the ‘self’ and the provocation which follows the notion of a ‘self’ in hiding, is an intriguing foundation for investigation into Freud’s philosophy of mind. Because of the notion of a subject in hiding, Freud’s use of the notion of an unconscious realm of the mind is presupposed knowledge.

This foundation expressed in Fred’s notion of a counterintuitive ‘self’ will lead to two classic, yet contemporary issues within philosophy of mind. Firstly, the ‘self’ seems to be represented outwards by a body but also have an innate component, the mind. It becomes clear that the mind-body issue is the first point of interest which becomes relevant to this examination. Secondly, the onset of the mind-body issue will invoke the need for an investigation into the concept of consciousness. Finally, the two first subjects will lead to an examination into the notion of a individual experience which we might call a ‘self’. Though this latter subject of ‘self’ is the foundation of the investigation into Freud’s philosophy of mind, it will not receive preferential treatment over the two other issues.

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1 It is not the emphasis of this investigation to discuss whether other human minds exists, as this is a discussion which could belong to the mad man (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/; 1.)
2 The unconscious can be described as ‘that which one is not aware of’, and is a concept strongly associated with Freud (Lübcke, 1996: 438). More on this subject throughout the project.
3 It should be mentioned that the issue of consciousness can be divided into the so called easy and hard problems. The easy problems constitutes the study of conscious functions, such as perception and volition, whereas the hard problem involves consciousness in the sense of a ‘self’ (http://consc.net/papers/montreal.html; 1). The hard problem is the primary focus of this project.
These three issues will initially be investigated from the opposing positions of dualism\(^4\) and monism\(^5\), in order to discuss Freud’s philosophy of mind in a relevant context. The two contemporary professors of philosophy David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett, which have been chosen to represent each of these perspectives, will be presented and analysed in relation to three points of interest, prior to the examination of Freud’s theory. Chalmers’ and Dennett’s theories are only the focus inasmuch as they represent two classic opposing views in the modern philosophy of mind, to which Freud’s theory might be able to contribute. Therefore their theories has been presented in relation to dualism and monism, in terms of their basic principles, as otherwise each of these theories could dominate the project. The first chapter in this project has been constructed by the use of literature produced by both Chalmers and Dennett, as well as supporting material from *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*.

Thereafter, Freud’s *Metapsychology\(^6\)* will be presented and analysed in order to create a conceptual foundation for the main analysis of his philosophical retrospection upon his *Psychoanalysis*, expressed in *Abriss der Psychoanalyse\(^7\)*, which will follow the section on Metapsychology. Freud’s *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur\(^8\)*, will be included, when it can lend supporting information to the analysis. So far this literary work has lent its support to the project, as the quotation above has been abstracted from here, however *Abriss der Psychoanalyse* has been chosen as primary source, as its main concern is a formulation of the *Psychoanalysis* in terms of dogmas (Freud, 1959: ix). The analysis aims to determine on which points Freud’s theory might still be relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind. The form of this analysis of *Abriss der Psychoanalyse* will follow the structure similar to the section on Chalmers’ and Dennett but will prove to need a new form. More on this new form in the analysis. The project shall refrain from original psychoanalytical issues, such as pathological diagnosis, childhood sexuality and dream analysis, as well as any discussions relating to Chalmers and Dennett’s theories, which might stray from the focus of the mind-body issue, consciousness and the ‘self’.

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4 Metaphysical theory which claims reality is divided in two diametric substances, and therefore they need to be described by two completely different principles (Lübcke, 1996: 95)

5 Monism is the opposition to dualism and therefore claim that everything in existence can be reduced to only one substance (Lübcke, 1996: 95).

6 *Metapsychology* is the part of Freud writings in which he presents and analyse the basic concepts of the psychoanalytic framework (Olsen, Kjær, Køppe,1974: 7). The psychoanalysis is Freud life’s work, one which he considered an analytical and therapeutic method, as well as a theoretical discipline, *Metapsychology* denoting the latter.

7 *Abriss der Psychoanalyse* will be used in its English form *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*. Please refer to Bibliography for further details.

8 *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* will be used in its English translation *Civilization and its discontents*. Please refer to Bibliography.
1.1. Problem Formulation

The introduction had the purpose of easing the way to the points of interest which will constitute the elements of the problem definition, mentioned in point form below:

- What is Freud’s philosophical position on the mind-body issue and on the subject of consciousness, and how does this view relate to that of Chalmers and Dennett?
- How can Freud’s position on the above mentioned issues, and the notion of the ‘self’ in hiding, contribute to the discussion between the two opposing views of dualism and monism, within contemporary philosophy of mind?

2. Philosophy of Mind

This section of the project will be comprised of the problems of mind-body relation, consciousness and finally, the conscious experience of a ‘self’, which, in this context, is assumed to be an experience common to all individuals. Throughout this section, David Chalmers’ and Daniel Dennett’s positions on these issues will be introduced and analysed in order to progress to the main focus of the project, namely Freud’s philosophy of mind.

2.1. The Mind-Body Issue

Here many issues arise, of which the following will be of interest in this section; the ontological\(^9\) question of what body and mental states are, the causal question of whether body effects the mind, or the other way around. Finally, if there is a causal link then, how does this happen?

The individual ‘self’ seems to be the result of a combination of physical and mental properties, body and mind. The physical properties, which constitutes the spatial apparatus, can be measured and weighed. Thus, the ontological question of the body is easily answered by our natural sciences, and are not of further interest to this examination. The mental properties however, are different and less easily defined, though with the body they make up the ‘self’ (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/:1.1). What are, then, the mental properties? This questions are still up for debate and initially dualism will present its case.

\(^9\)Ontology is the teaching or ‘logos’ of that which is existent and is a study of the features specific to a given existence (Lübecke, 1996: 323).
A modern adherent to René Descartes *substance dualism*\(^{10}\) is David Chalmers, whom is a *fundamental property dualist*. Firstly, it should be mentioned that *property dualism* states that although the mind is not a property which can be reduced to physical matter, it may be signified by that which characterise the physical, for instance the brain. Nonetheless according to this view the mind presupposes the body (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/: 4.2 - 4.3). *Fundamental property dualism* claims that mind cannot be said to be reliant on or constituted by other properties, it is a fundamental element of reality comparable to the fundamental elements already defined in physics, such as the dimensions of space and time. (http://consc.net/papers/montreal.html: Project 4). On this view there is no reality, no existence, without consciousness.

On the opposite side of this discussion we find the monist, Daniel Dennett, whom, as an advocate of *physicalism*, states that the consciousness is dependent on, and derived from, the brain, or more precisely neural activity. In opposition to Chalmers view, the physical presupposes the mind, because the underlying idea behind physicalism is that the universe is conditionally physical in nature and should be studied by its function (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/cohen.pdf: 361). The physical would still exist without the presence of a consciousness.

This means that the conscious mind is best understood as a produce of the body, and consciousness is considered nothing more than complicated networks of neurons transmitting and receiving signals to and from one another (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/:7). Hence both mind and body are to be considered realities in the eyes of the advocate of physicalism. However, mind is not granted the fundamental status, as it did within dualism. This makes Dennett a reductionist when it comes to his view on the mind, whereas Chalmers belongs to a non-reductionist perspective. What is Freud’s perspective on this traditional discussion? It becomes clear that the foundation of this project, that of a common-sense feeling of a ‘self’, provoked by Freuds notion of a subject, which to some degree is unknown to itself, will require an investigation of the conscious mind as presented by the two theoretical perspectives.

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\(^{10}\) Renè Descartes’ (1596 - 1650) (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/:1.2). In his heuristic methodology, Descartes dissected what he believed to be knowledge of his existence until he was left with the simplest, and intuitively recognizable truths, such as ‘I think’. This is intuitively true as someone is doing the doubting in the first place. By synthesis he reconstructed his knowledge and realised ‘cogito ergo sum’, which leads him to the conclusion ‘Sum res cogitans’. He realises that he is a being which is entirely different from the body, specifically he is in essence a thinking being. His body, *res extensa*, is one thing, namely substance, and his thinking feeling of an ‘I’, *res cogitans*, is his essence (Lübecke, 1996: 83-85).
2.2. Consciousness

It should be mentioned that the notion of consciousness entails several different yet interrelated definitions, such as; qualitative states, phenomenal states, what-it-is-like states, and narrative consciousness. Of these, to mention a few contenders which have attempted to describe consciousness, this project shall focus on qualitative states and narrative consciousness, as they each represent Chalmers and Dennett (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; 2.2).

Chalmers makes use of the notion of Qualitative states, which entails that a state may be considered conscious if it has properties of the kind called qualia, which is an introspective aspect of our mental existence. This introspection entails a feeling of what the given sensory experience is like (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 3). In other words, when a person has perception of, for instance, the smell of a rose that he or she is sniffing, then this counts as consciousness in the sense that this experience entails sensory qualia. It is like something for one to experience a state, for one to experience the smell of a rose, just as it is like something else for one to touch the thorns of a rose. These raw sensory feels are private, which explains why one person cannot know for sure what it is like for another person to smell a rose. The person can only know what it is like for him- or herself to smell a rose. (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 3).

Chalmers engages in a thought experiment in which he urges conceivability of the existence of beings, which have the same physical circumstances as humans, however lack qualia. These beings are called philosophical zombies and Chalmers, along with other theorists, claim that they will be physically alive but that they would not be conscious due to the lack of qualia, or sentience (http://consc.net/papers/goldman.html). Thus, qualia is an important notion when explaining what consciousness exists in, for the dualist, and simultaneously it seems this description of mind offers an attempt to link the mind and the body via these sensory qualia. The zombie does not link the sensory input from the body to a conscious experience of these, because of the lack of qualia, and therefore does not know what it is like to smell a rose. Qualia organises our experience of the world in such a way that we recognise ourselves as active individuals in a spatial and temporal world (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/; 2.2). The notion of qualitative states seems to suggest that Chalmers is nearing a definition of the ‘self’ that this project also seeks to investigate. Chalmers is nearing the ‘self’ because of the function of the private qualia, which also allows realisation of individuality, however Chalmers himself states that qualia, though vital to consciousness, cannot alone be responsible for consciousness in the sense of a ‘self’ in the zombie
Consciousness in the sense of a ‘self’ requires more than *qualia*. Daniel Dennett, on the other hand, promotes the notion of a *narrative consciousness*, which stresses the interpretative nature of consciousness. In order to understand this, it is essential to introduce Dennett’s *Multiple Draft Model*, also referred to as MDM, while keeping his preference of physicalism in mind. The name of the theory echoes the fact that content fixations of many various experiences are continuously and simultaneously occurring throughout the neural paths of the brain (*http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model*11; 1). The body is constantly being bombarded with impressions, such as sights, sounds, smells and other sensory experiences, however the brain does not allow for all of the input to be conscious all at once. The brain, Dennett states, makes some of these many contents conscious by what Dennett calls ‘*fame in the brain*’. This signifies to which point a content, for example, the perception of the smell of a rose, effects the further progress of other neural transmitted contents in the brain, and in order to explain this concept, it can be useful to mention that Dennett uses the term ‘stream of consciousness’ (*http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model*; 2). For example, when I smell a rose, I simultaneously receive sensory information about the smell, the feel and the colour of the rose, among other sensory inputs. Potentially this simultaneously stirs a representation of content in the brain, of a past emotional experience, which makes the smell of a rose wake an emotional experience in this current experience.

‘*Fame in the brain*’ particularly relates to how the stream of consciousness become apparent in narrative form, for instance, when an individual answers a question. Here the question could be ‘How does a rose make you feel?’ The question is called a probe in MDM and it exists along with other probes, such as, how being in some situations demands or invoke one kind of behaviour, whereas other situations may demand or prompt a change in reaction to the surrounding world (*http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/*: 9.4). When smelling a rose, one’s behaviour may give an indication of the emotional experience which has become conscious. These probes can tell us what is conscious to the individual in that instance and this means that multiple states of consciousness can be narrated, depending on what questions are asked or what situation the person is in. Moreover, it implies that conscious states, according to Dennett, can easily be manipulated. Here

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11 The original link was found under the title of Dennett’s ‘Recent Work’ on Tuft University website, and can be found via the following link: *http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/recent.html#. The curator of the article is Kathleen Akins, whom is also co-author of the Multiple Drafts Model.
it truly becomes clear, that physicalism attributes the consciousness to the physical, not the other way around. It is the brain’s ability to organise the neural activity that controls which content is conscious (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model: 4). Thus to Dennett, it seems at this point in the investigation that the mind consists of other processes besides conscious ones, and so his theory is compatible with that of Freud’s, in the sense that they both grant the mind an unconscious realm.

The ontological question for the advocates of physicalism is answered by their nature of being physical and so now it seems that the relationship between mind and body does not pose an obstacle to this view. In reply to the question of the relationship between body and mind, Dennett and his fellow physicalists can simply argue that we do not have the scientific tools for the explanatory job that is required, but this is very possible to achieve in the future due to scientific progress (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/cohen.pdf: 362). For the dualist, the link between body and mind seems to rely on the notion of qualia. Contrastingly, it is still not clear how the two very different views explain the feeling of a uniform ‘self’, which we humans seem to possess. Again, Chalmers shall open the discussion.

2.3. The Self

Although the definition of qualitative states seems to hint at the uniform consciousness referred to as a ‘self’, due to the private qualia which installs a sense of individuality in the subject, it is far from sufficient to say that it is like something (private) for a person to smell a rose, when explaining what the uniform ‘self’ consists in. Therefore it should be mentioned that this explanatory task involves several of Chalmers’ concepts belonging to his philosophy of mind. These concepts are; subsumptive unity, objectual unity, spatial unity and subject unity. Chalmers’ theory advocates the Experiential Parts Theory (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/: 6.1). This perspective states that when an individual has a conscious experience it is in fact a multitude of separate experiences combining to a complete state of consciousness. The separate experiences are subsumed into one conscious state, and therefore the first concept which will be addressed is the matter of subsumptive unity (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.4). The experience of smelling the flower is a unified experience which can be said to subsume the experiential parts of the complete

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12 This concept will be addressed first, because it appears to be a fundamental principle which can aid the description of the other forms of conscious unity. It should be mentioned that Chalmers divides this concept in two, however here, the concept will be described in its basic principles, as it is not the focus of the project.
experience. This would, for instance, include the experiential parts of feeling moving ones arm up as to direct the rose towards the nose, holding the rose in one’s hand, sensing the rose’s shape, colour and smell, as well as knowing what it is like to do so.

Here, *objectual unity* plays the part of example for describing the function of *subsumption*. *Objectual unity* is a matter of having more than one experience joined in the experience of an object, while being aware of the individual parts of the object for instance, the shape, and colour of the rose (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/: 2.1.2). Other sensory domains can contribute to the unified experience of the rose, for example the kinaesthetic, or ones sense of smell for that matter (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html:2.113). When these qualia together are directed towards one single object, an individual has the unified conscious experience of an object.

As already implied, when the shape of the rose was mentioned, *spatial unity* is closely linked to the objectual kind mentioned above. Chalmers describes it as follows: ‘(…) as a set of experiences are spatially unified if (i) each has spatial representational content, and (ii) the representational content of each is comparable, in the sense that the objects represented are represented as being in spatial relations to each other’ (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.2) This means that our senses allows us to ascribe the space which an object takes up, as well as compare its position to other objects. One could argue that although Chalmers claims to grant the mind some dependence on the body, this description of a conscious experience of an object in space, entirely presupposes the body in the sense that the sensory domains are required for the experience. In fact, the notion of *qualia*, seems to implicitly link the consciousness to the body, which sensory aspect allows consciousness in the first place.

*Subject Unity* denotes conscious states that are unified by the same individual in one instance, this thus includes all of this individuals experiences, whether it be sense-, emotion- or thought related. (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.3) The subject whom is smelling the rose will have a sensory experience of colour, feel and smell, and will have an experience of, for example an emotional nature, which prompts conscious thought. All of these experiences are thus unified within the subject, who is having these separate, yet conjoined, conscious states. Here, Chalmers seems to get near the subject’s experience of a ‘self’, or at least *subject unity* seems to point toward the way in

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13 *What is the Unity of Consciousness?* By Tim Bayne and David J. Chalmers, Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.
which the subject have a unified experience of the world around itself, and moreover, it seems to denote that a subject will recognise the unified state of consciousness as his or her own experience, due to the concept of qualia. Moreover, the individual can compare its own outer shape and position to that of others because of the objectual and spatial unity. Yet, this type of consciousness is not Chalmer’s focus (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.3) Therefore, the focus will now rest on Dennett to explore his notion of a consciousness of a ‘self’.

As mentioned earlier, Dennett is an advocate of physicalism, and therefore attributes the consciousness to biological processes and laws of physics. The key to Dennett’s view on experience of a ‘self’ lies in his description of the brain, which for him is merely neurons sending and receiving signals. The consciousness cannot, in this view be more than a chaos of rivalling bits of neural content (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model: 3). For Dennett, the feeling of a ‘self’ is simply a temporary feeling produced by the dominance of a small group of neural content. This group of neural content is in competition for the dominance with other groups of neural content, which as mentioned earlier can be easily manipulated. The dominance of the conscious content controls cognitive activities, such as self-awareness and according to Dennett, the subjects misinterpret this momentary state of consciousness to be more than it really is. This is because each of such groups of dominant neural content is the ‘self’ of the subject in the given moment. But a feeling of a ‘self’ requires more than a brief feeling of such and so Dennett argues that a state, like mentioned above, is linked to earlier momentary feelings of ‘self’ by form of autobiographical memory, explained in terms of a ‘stream of consciousness’ (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/originss.htm). Unsurprisingly, this view leads him to determine that the unity of mind has been vastly exaggerated and in fact the workings of the mind are not obvious for the subject, and very often function in ways that are out of the control of consciousness. So Dennett does not deny the existence of what one might refer to as ‘self’, however he does not think that this ‘self’ is all that represents the mind, nor is it in control of the mind. His argument depends on the matter of fact that our conscious acts also sometimes seem incoherent (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity:3). He reminds us that it is highly conceivable to imagine a subject which very often acts in a way which contradicts what the subject knows to be beneficial. An example of this can be observed in humans whom seem self-destructive. Dennett’s view of the ‘self’ is just as provocative to the common-sense feeling of ‘self’, as Freud’s notion, and similarly Dennett points to the existence of brain activity, which is not conscious. However, this unconscious realm is not Dennett’s focus.
2.4. Sub-conclusion

For the dualists, mind cannot be said to depend on the body, as it presupposes the physical. This leaves the dualist with the trouble of explaining the connection between body and mind. As mentioned in the section on consciousness, the dualist seems to find a connecting feature between mind and body in the principle of *qualia*, which allows the individual to know what it is *like* to be conscious of a sensory input. The dualist views the mind as a fundamental to reality, however the *qualia* seems entirely dependent on the sensory domains. Therefore this view is short of an explanation as to how the mind, though dependent on the body, is a presupposition of the physical. Although Chalmers does not focus on the concept of ‘self’, his theory describes how different states of consciousness can be subsumed to make an individual conscious of a spatial world in which objects exists. The subject unifies these experiences, and as such is the subject, which knows what a given experience is *like* for him- or her.

Dennett, on the other hand, will not accept this dualist account of the ‘self’ that is constituted by the mind and body, as he denies that the consciousness should be anything other than the result of the physical reality. The brain will determine which content is conscious at a given time, and this mind can easily be manipulated in such a manner, which will make alternative content consciousness. On this view the feeling of a ‘self’ is merely a temporary organisation of the brain which focusses on monitoring the individual. The problem for physicalism is that science is yet to determine how the consciousness, or even the feeling of a ‘self’ is dependent on the physical laws. Moreover, this physicalism will meet opposition from individuals, whom are unwilling to let go of their intuitive common-sense feeling of ‘self’.

The interest of the analysis will be to determine how Freud’s philosophy of mind can still be of relevant contribution to this contemporary discussion of the mind-body issue, consciousness and the feeling of a ‘self’. Initially, Freud’s *Metapsychology* should be presented in preparation of the analysis. How can Freud’s theory contribute to the discussion between these two theories?

3. Freud’s Metapsychology

In this section Freud’s metapsychology will be addressed before commencing the analysis of Freud’s *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, which will follow in the chapter succeeding this particular introduction. It has been noted that Freud’s theory developed throughout his lifetime, and so this introduction presents
Freud’s theory as it can be found in its completest form, which has been achieved through reconstruction and synthesis of accepted textbooks\textsuperscript{14}. It is essential for the understanding of Freud’s complex theory that both the Topographical Model and the Structural Model will be included, because together these two provide a great foundation for the understanding of Freud’s overall theoretical standpoint on the nature of the mind, and the unconscious realm it entails. These two have been favoured over Freud’s third and earliest model, the Economic Model, which shall only briefly be mentioned here, but only inasmuch as it presents the fact that Freud understood the mind is a system of energies (Ankjaer Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 17). Moreover, Freud’s theory of instinctual drives\textsuperscript{15} and his development theory should be included as this, together with his model of the mind, creates the basis for his theoretical work (Gammelgaard, 2007: 119).

To begin with, Freud’s theory of instinctual drives will be introduced, as it will provide better understanding of his view on the relationship between mind and body. Furthermore, it is elemental to the understanding of Freud’s models of the mind, which are both to be understood under the submission of the two principle forces described in this theory. The instinctual drives originate within the individual and is categorised as primary motivation for human activity. Freud’s notion of the life instinct, Eros, can be observed in the suction reflex of the infant child on the mother’s breast (Gammelgaard, 2007: 123). When the child on the other hand sucks on its own thumb, it is because it has realised that it can experience a similar pleasure, though not quite as satisfactory, by this means. This would be an expression of the sexual instinctual drive called Libido, which belongs to that of Eros. In the above written example of Eros and Libido, a clear connection between the instinctual drives and the body become apparent in Freud’s theory, as the example describes a physical act.

On the other hand Freud placed the death instinct, Thanatos, which has at least two functions; it is destructive and aggressive in both an extrovert and introvert sense. The introvert destruction, the Nirvāna principle, seeks the absolute dissolution of the organism. It is this driving force that explain human traits, which includes hurting oneself on purpose (Olsen and Køppe, 1997: 344). However, the instinctual drive for destruction should be understood in relation with the drive for survival and not necessarily always in opposition to it (Freud, 2010: 19). An example of these working together, can be observed every time we humans eat. Here we secure our survival and enjoy pleasurable food by destroying, first an animal by slaughter, and then a steak by chewing. These instinctual drives,

\textsuperscript{14} Several books have been used to provide a full view of Freud’s theory, which can all be found in the Bibliography.

\textsuperscript{15} Freud uses a biological concept of drives Freuds states that drives are existent in all organic life and that these drives are our inner source of motivation, which makes humans seek satisfaction of physical needs (Colman, 2006: 227).
Freud also refers to as organic drives (Freud, 1959: 67). This indicates a referral to the human physicality and so the subject of drives will be discussed further in the analysis.

With this description of the *instinctual drives* aside, yet continuously kept in mind, the *Topographical Model* can be presented. This model represents the mind as a system of three separate yet interrelated levels, which each signifies a degree of consciousness within the mind. These levels are the unconscious, the preconscious and the conscious (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 17). The unconscious only consists of the *primary processes*, which is ruled by the *pleasure principle* and result in the inclination to uphold a state of pleasure and avoidance of pain, or other unpleasant situations (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 130). This pleasure governed unconscious has impulses, which need instant satisfaction and constitute the main motivation for the mind. The unconscious realm of the mind is described by Freud in terms of its incapability of becoming verbal, without an interpretation that will translate the content (Freud, 1959: 20-21). Further description of a verbalisation of the unconscious will follow below and in the section of the analysis devoted to the subject of consciousness.

The conscious mind, on the other hand, is consistent in secondary processes which are governed by the *reality principle*. This principle, unlike the *pleasure principle* has to examine the world around to estimate whether satisfaction of the bodily needs and other pleasurable, or at least discomfort avoiding, actions are allowed at a given moment. (Olsen and Køppe, 1997: 62) This means that this part of the mind represents rational thinking, and the ability to refrain from instant gratification, in order to find more appropriate ways of satisfying ones needs or simply finding out whether it is a good time and place to do so. The importance of the physical aspect of human existence in Freud’s theory seems inescapable, even when focus rests on the matter of consciousness.

A human cannot be conscious of everything at once, and Freud had an inkling that there are thoughts an individual might not want to be conscious of if it causes the mind discomfort. Hence he claimed that the unconscious level is also where we find content which has been forgotten or repressed\(^\text{16}\). Repression is a defence mechanism\(^\text{17}\) which resides between unconscious and the preconscious and has two functions; 1) It strips the *secondary processes* of their content and as a result, this content is

\(^{16}\) Defense mechanisms are unconscious function of the Ego, which protects this part of the mind against the demands of the *Id*. The defense mechanisms constitutes a pattern of behavior, thoughts and feelings which arises in the individual when met with threatening situations. This enables the individual to avoid anxiety provoking thoughts, and even sometimes it prevents the individual from being conscious of the conflict in the first place (Colman, 2006: 194). Repression has due to its principal feature served as example in this presentation.
repressed into the unconscious realm of the mind, and 2) it prevents already repressed content from resurfacing. This is an unconscious process, which degrades experiences of their preconscious state, and abolishes them into the unconscious domain of the mind (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 145). These repressed thoughts are of a certain non-verbal form as they cannot be expressed in their unconscious state. They need to be verbalised on the preconscious level of the mind before entering the consciousness, and so it requires the pleasure principle to take appropriate forms (Olsen and Køppe, 1997: 321). This preconscious level of the mind, which makes use of a verbalising function is thus a link between the unconscious and the conscious, which are otherwise diametrically incompatible dimensions.

By the formulation of the functions of the defence mechanisms, represented here by repression, and as a result of his emphasis on the instinctual drives, it became clear to Freud that the mind is much more unconscious in its function than he had initially hypothesised. He claimed that some activities of the mind, for example repression, which belong to the part of the mind governed by the reality principle, in result of their non-verbal content could not be conscious (Gammelgaard, 2007: 142). This led him to reformulate his theory in the Structural Model. As in the first model, the Structural Model, Freud emphasises a model of three levels but now they are referred to as Id, Ego and Super-Ego. The Id, which is made up by unconscious content and function in the way as the primary processes mentioned above, represents the only content of the mind of the infant as it is born (Miller, 1997: 114). Because of the same necessity for the development of the secondary processed in the first model, the Ego is developed as the reality oriented part of the mind. The Ego has the job of perceiving, interpreting sensory impulses, and establishing appropriate reactions for the pleasure seeking function of the Id, while simultaneously facing the demands of the surrounding world. It confirms the foundation of the project, namely that of a ‘self in hiding,’ that the Id, which exists by itself at birth and is largely unconscious. The fact that the unconscious is unaccompanied at the onset of life, indicates that Freud does not think we can speak of a uniform mind, or a ‘self’ (Gammelgaard, 2007: 141).

The final aspect of the mind, Freud calls the Super-Ego, which is the consequence of the norm of the society which one’s parents reproduce in the form of their prohibitions and directing encouragements. This is why Freud divides this part of the mind in a further two subdivisions; a realm which governs our moral consciousness or feeling of guilt, and the other, which Freud names the Ego Ideal. (Miller, 1997:119). To the Ego Ideal belongs the function of sublimation, which enables the Ego to convert the content of the Id to socially accepted activities, such as the pursuit of art or science (Olsen and
At this point, Freud’s description of the mind widely differs from the focal point of Chalmers and Dennett, whom does not focus on the possibility that other individuals might have an influence on the structure of a given mind.

The mind develops through the interrelated and overlapping *psychosexual* phase; infantile, latent and genital sexuality. The *instinctual drives* will, throughout the development of these stages, move the mind’s focus and the need for satisfaction from their starting point in the mouth, as seen in the example of the sucking reflex, to the anus during potty-training and finally to the genitals. The child experiences pleasure from these zones, but if the surrounding world does not allow the child the satisfaction of the need for this erogenous pleasure then it can have consequences for the development of the mind (Miller, 1997: 129). At least two results are possible for the further development of the mind in each stage when the instinctual drive is not satisfied. Either, the negative development requires the function of the defense mechanism or an expression of *Thanatos*, or contrastingly the content can instead be sublimated. Again, Freud emphasis on other individuals, as a co-constituting element of the mind, becomes apparent.

### 3.1. Sub-conclusion

Some preliminary remarks can be made before the analysis. It has already been noted that the mind comes across as being explicitly connected to the body, according to Freud, but how and why this occurs is yet to be established. It has also become apparent that, in opposition to Chalmers, Freud emphasises a mind of three levels of consciousness, rather than focusing on only that which is strictly speaking consciousness. Dennett also stresses that there is more to mind than consciousness, yet does not make the unconscious realm his focus. Despite this knowledge of Freud’s theory it is not yet clear what his notion of consciousness encompasses, and the unconscious realm, which the mind entails will also need further analysis. Additionally, it has become obvious that other individuals play a part in the development of a given mind, according to Freud. This is an emphasis which stands in complete contrast to the focus of Chalmers and Dennett. More on these subjects in the analysis below.

### 4. Analysis

This section of the project will endeavour to answer the questions posed in the problem formulation, and will do so through Freud’s literary works *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*. This work represents Freud’s era of philosophical retrospection on his theoretical work, presented in the preceding section. The
analysis of the issues raised will adopt a similar structure to that of the chapter on modern philosophy of mind, while adapting to the concepts of Freudian Metapsychology. Hence the initial issue which will be addressed is that of mind and body and this issue will include Freud’s theory of the *instinctual drives*. Thereafter, the analysis will include a part on consciousness, which will contain the notion of the preconscious and the unconscious. Finally, the analysis will include a section on Freud’s perspective on the concept of a conscious experience of a ‘self’, in which the findings of the preceding subjects will be recapitulated in order to elaborate on the Freudian perspective of this concept. The analysis has been structured as such in order to determine how Freud’s theory can best contribute to each of these three discussions belonging to philosophy of mind.

4.1. The Mind-Body Issue

Freud starts his *Abriss der Psychoanalyse* with addressing the explanatory gap in the issue of mind and body, which still spurs contemporary debate between the traditional opponents of dualism and physicalism.

‘*We know two things concerning what we call our psyche or mental life: firstly, it’s bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (our nervous system), and secondly, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data, and cannot be fully explained by any kind of description. Everything that lies between these two terminal points is unknown to us and, so far as we are aware there is no direct link between them. ’* (Freud, 1959: 1)

Initially it should be mentioned that, to the ontological question of ‘what is the body?’, the answer will once again lay with our natural sciences, such as biology and chemistry. Granted Freud’s medical education and experience within the field of neurology\(^\text{18}\), it is safe to say that this project should not concern itself with the sceptical doubt of whether the body in fact exists, as that question is not relevant in this context. The nature of this analysis presupposes the body as a fact of reality.

Contrastingly, it is the causal question of how the two are related, that has been of particular interest in the section on dualism and physicalism, which will now take a new form. It should be mentioned that Freud points to the brain, when defining the relation between body and mind. He names the brain the *scene of action*, inferring that this is the relation which converts conscious thought into bodily action. This is a notion which Chalmers and Dennett can also subscribe to. The quotation above could, despite of the emphasis on the brain and body, indicate a dualistic view on the issue, as Freud does

\(^{18}\) Freud specialised in neurology during his medical study in Vienna (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 13).
describe the body and mind as two ‘terminal points’, and adds that a complete description of consciousness is not possible. Yet, an ontological pursuit of the link between mind and body is to Freud a mere discussion of localisation of the conscious processes, and he claims that it will not aid the understanding of the physical, consciousness, nor what lies between these two, except for the location of the latter of course (Freud, 1959: 1). Instead what interests him is why humans seem to have involuntary acts and not only conscious ones. Can an understanding of these involuntary acts contribute to closing the explanatory gap between mind and body?

In order, to compare and potentially align Freud with one of the two modern philosophers, Chalmers and Dennett, it will be beneficial to entertain the more traditional form of this discussion, if only briefly. Freud states that the mind is a function of the body, which he describes in terms of its spatial quality and as being made up from several parts (Freud, 1959: 1). This would indicate that Freud does not have a perspective of the mind as being fundamental, instead it depends on the physical reality, inasmuch as it is described as a function of the somatic. Thus, in this early point of the investigation, Freud’s notion of the body-mind relation resembles that of Dennett, whom also attributes the mind to the physical realm. Yet, as mentioned earlier the quotation expressed a dualistic view on the issue, and therefore it is premature to make claims of Freud’s perspective. As mentioned, Chalmers himself does agree that the consciousness has some dependence on the physical, and so he should not be seen as being in complete opposition to this view.

Returning to the new form of the causal question within the mind-body issue, and therefore to Freud’s disinterest in localising the seat of consciousness in the body, it will be necessary to refer to his Metapsychology. Particularly his notion of the unconscious Id will be beneficial for the endeavour to answer the questions posed in the problem definition.

‘The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism’s life’ (Freud, 1959: 5)

Again, Freud’s writing reveals a view deeply rooted in the presupposition of the primary feature of the physical world, as the Id, a part of mind, is said to express the purpose of the physical entity, not the other way around. However, the above written quotation holds more information than implying what would be a misunderstood classification of Freud as a physicalist, as the attributes and properties of the mind have not yet been considered. Instead, it provides the basis for an investigation of the why and how the relation between body and mind occurs, rather than where it occurs and how that link can be described. This interest in why and how the relation of the mind and body occurs is vital to Freud because, as he states, the body alone has, due to its organic nature, restricted aptitude for the
adaptation required to uphold its existence (Freud, 2010: 57). Although the power of the Id is emphasised and indeed expresses the prime purpose of the organism, the Id is feeble in the body on its own and both would perish if the Id remains the only content of the mind.

Thus it is apparent, that, at the onset of life, the body is inhabited only by what Freud refers to as the primary feeling of Ego. This primary feeling of ego is the Id, which denotes the original, the innate and inherited component of the human. This mental component is the fixed and unchangeable part of the mind. The undeveloped and primary mind has only the instinctual drives as its mental content, and these drives are demands on the mind from the physical property of the individual, namely the body (Freud, 1959: 2). In other words, the mind is at this point of development only represented by the urge to satisfy physical needs, which will ensure the Id a state of pleasure. A need, such as thirst or hunger, is to be understood as a source of energy from the body, which motivates the Id, in an expression of Eros (Freud, 1959: 5). The need for the organism’s survival consequently seems to link the body and mind. However a body alone cannot survive, as there is no conscious acts to secure this survival, and so final judgement about Freud’s position on the status of mind shall be reserved for later in the project. Yet it can already be argued that even though the physical provides energy, which motivates the Id, this latter quotation does not state that the Id is created by the physical, nor does the section on Freud’s Metapsychology seem to express this.

The libido, or sexual instinct, mimics the survival instinct, and so the infant can create its own pleasure by sucking on his or her thumb. When mother’s breast is not available for the satisfaction of hunger, at least the infant will have some form of oral pleasure. This action would suggest the presence of something more sophisticated than that of the primal Id. Yet, the mention of a conscious agent allows the following link between the mind and body to arise; the instincts are related to organs or systems of organs (Freud, 1959: 67), in this example, the mouth. It is important to consider the claim made by Freud, that: ‘(...) strictly speaking the whole body is an erotogenic zone.’ (Freud, 1959: 9) This denotes that the entire body, due to the senses, can be of pleasure or pain to the primal mind, the Id. Therefore, not merely are certain zones of our body, like the mouth, anus and genitals, responsible for impressions on the mind, but in fact the entire body can be thought of as a source of sensory experience, either pleasurable or painful. The body, with its different organs and limbs, functions as a spring of excitation of various kinds, depending on which limb or organ is involved in the given sensory experience (Freud, 2010: 27). The mind, at this early stage, can therefore be understood to be a function, or at least an expression of the bodily needs. Thus for Freud, the instinctual drives, as well as the sensory function of the body, understood as a source of excitation for the mind, serves as
a link which connects the mind and body. The instincts of the unconscious mind and the sensitive body explains the need for a conscious mind, however the discussion of Freud’s view of the mind-body issue is not resigned for conclusion as of yet.

The *Id*, which resides in the body, does not distinguish itself from the outside world. For instance in the case of the breastfeeding child, the breast has simply become an extension of the infant’s mouth in this pleasurable experience. (Freud, 2010: 27) The body and the primal mind, which is unconscious and only seeks pleasure, is not sufficiently equipped to react to the external world perceived only in terms of pleasure or pain. The *Id*, Freud claims, encompasses the entire external world, or as he puts it, the *Id* ‘*includes everything*’ (Freud, 2010: 29). It becomes evident that we cannot speak of a ‘self’ in terms of this combination of a pleasure driven, unconscious mind and the sensitive body. At this early stage of the project it has become apparent that Freud places great importance on the body in its relation to the mind, however the mind in the body, though an unconscious mind, cannot be said to derive from the body. The mind is innate (Freud, 1959: 2). This would suggest that the reservation for a premature alignment with physicalism was justified, and further judgement on Freud’s position on the mind body issue will be reserved for the section concerning the conscious mind. It has therefore become time to contemplate that which we call consciousness.

4.2. Consciousness

As Freud focusses his attention on the issue of the qualities of the mind in his *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, he addresses the philosophical community with his critique that many thinkers ‘declare that the notion of a mental thing being unconscious is self-contradictory.’ (Freud, 1959: 16)

As already demonstrated in the chapter on Freud’s *Metapsychology*, he does indeed consider large parts of the mind unconscious, in fact this notion is the foundation of the project, as it represents the subject in hiding, mentioned in the introduction. This section on consciousness will, similarly to the section on the mind-body issue, take a new form in which it will be necessary to include the concepts of the preconscious and unconscious. Freud states that the difference in the notion of mind, which can be observed between philosophy and his own psychoanalysis, is dependent upon which aspects of the human condition these two disciplines contribute to the mind (Freud, 1959: 16). However, for the sake of clarity, it shall be beneficial to analyse some of Freud’s notions on consciousness alone, in which he does not include the preconscious and unconscious elements of the mind, before moving towards this alternative description of the mind.
Ironically, when addressing such a description of Freud’s perspective of consciousness, one comes across Freud’s disinterest as he unfolds his view in *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*. He describes consciousness in terms of the non-necessity of such a description in the first place. By consciousness he claims we can take the general perspective which is understood by common sense and by philosophy in general. Here, he describes consciousness as an elusive and flighty state, and he includes several features on the description of the states which he contributes to consciousness, such as; ‘(...) perception, feelings, intellective processes and volitions.’ (Freud, 1959: 19) However, we know that Chalmers and Dennett differ widely in their perspective on the conscious mind, and so far Freud seems aligned with Dennett on the minds dependence on the body, though he is not in complete disagreement with Chalmers. Indeed some of Freud’s quotations seems to express a dualistic view. Moreover, the notion of a flighty consciousness can be interpreted as analogues with what Dennett calls a ‘virtual captain’, however this ‘virtual captain’ was a description of the ‘self’, not of consciousness, strictly speaking. What, then are we supposed to understand by consciousness from the Freudian perspective? Freud is of the opinion that human individuals intuitively know what consciousness is when the word is uttered, and this intuitive knowledge he bases on our experiences (Freud, 1959: 16) Keeping Freud’s *Metapsychology* in mind, as well as his view on the somatic essence of the *Id*, it cannot be *Id* which holds this intuitive knowledge, as this primal part of the mind was a part of everything, the entire external world, and moreover it is completely unconscious.

So far it has not been possible to fully determine Freud’s perspective on the status of the mind, yet now a quotation springs to attention with a clue to his ontology of consciousness, which prompts for urgent reconsideration of the alignment with Dennett;

*‘The starting point for this investigation is provided by a fact without parallel, which defies all explanation or description – the fact of consciousness.*’ (Freud, 1959, 16)

In these two lines, together with his notion that consciousness is known intuitively, Freud manages to express a view of consciousness, which cannot be explained in terms of simpler elements, and it is unique due to its unparalleled status. This implies an irreducible status and suddenly the Freudian notion of consciousness seems to converge with that of dualism. Indeed, Freud does view the mind and the bodies as two separate, yet interrelated phenomena, Hence, though consciousness is dependent on the physical, it is not reducible hereto (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 16).

However, this notion of the irreducible nature of consciousness, which cannot be dependent on any explanation, is apparently one of intuition for Freud. However, it will become clear further below,
that this irreducibility which is assigned to consciousness here, will once again be muddled. Until a further understanding of Freud’s position has been made, it can be stated that he appears to think of consciousness as an irreducible element, which exists in brief moments, and has some dependence on the physical as source of sensory stimuli, that motivates the mind as a whole. This would indicate that it is not inconceivable that there is indeed a middle way between the arguments of Chalmers and Dennett. Freud’s notion of the body-mind relation, as well as this preliminary analysis of his concept of consciousness, displays features familiar to both dualism and physicalism. For example, the brain is emphasised to be the seat of the connecting feature between mind and body, in all of the three perspectives. Moreover, Freud emphasizes the importance of the physical reality, while implying that mind may hold an irreducible status. The analysis of Freud’s notion of consciousness is not yet complete, and shall also aim to determine where Freud’s concept of consciousness might be able to contribute, besides suggesting a compromise in the middle of the traditional debate. On this note, the analysis shall turn to the alternative discussion of consciousness, namely that which includes the preconscious and the unconscious part of the mind.

The focal point shall therefore return to where the discussion of the body was interrupted by that of consciousness. Here, it was noted the body and the Id were not capable of sustaining the survival of the organism. This is due to the Id’s constant search for pleasure, and more so because the Id needs to conceal itself from the world, in reaction to the intensity of the sensory experiences it is subjected to from the external world, as well as from its delicate little body. The Ego is developed from the Id as a result of the persistence of the sensory bombardment from the outer world. (Freud, 1959: 23). The Id is not capable of responding appropriately to the needs pressing on from the inside or react to the potential sources of satisfaction of this need, which may occur in the surrounding world. This evokes the development of the Ego, which is a slave to the demands of the Id, namely the demand for pleasure (Freud, 1959: 2-3). Still, this newly developed part of the mind is governed by the reality principle and therefore cannot always allow instant gratification of pleasure take place. After all, at times survival requires an avoidance of what might be pleasurable or even tolerance of pain. Hence the Ego represents the conscious mind, which can assure the survival of the ‘self’. It is already here that the notion of the consciousness as a irreducible concept becomes muddled and confused.

This confusion arises because conscious Ego is expressed to derive from the unconscious Id, and is explained as something which is spurred into existence because of a need for an agent, whom can react to inner tension in form of needs, and to outer sensory excitation of the body (Freud 1959: 2). However, all it might require for maintaining the fundamental status of consciousness, in Freud’s
theory, is to not call it exactly this – consciousness. As mentioned earlier, the difference between Freud’s and the traditional philosophical perspective on consciousness is a matter of the fact that for Freud the mind contains much more than the conscious domain. Since the consciousness is created out of the unconscious part of the mind called Id, and Freud does not state that the Id is created by the body, only that it is excited hereby, it is at least fair to say that Freud regard the mind as irreducible, rather than the conscious realm. If Freud for a moment is imagined to hear about Chalmers’ philosophical zombies, it can be argued that he would claim much more to be missing than mere qualia, for consciousness to arise. It is the Id and the resulting Ego, which is vacant. The Id’s contact with the world through the senses, along with its need for pleasure, would spur Ego, or consciousness, to arise in the zombie, as a means for survival. Chalmers does not think that these qualia can instil the feeling of a ‘self’ in the zombie but could be considered enough to give rise to a form of consciousness (http://consc.net/papers/goldman.html) Similarly, Freud would not claim that the zombie would have a ‘self’ without the attached ‘in hiding’. This thought experiment lends validity to claim that mind is irreducible, and even fundamental, in a Freudian perspective, though his description of the body and mind relation suggest a view which has deep roots in the physical aspects of reality. In fact, Freud claims that the laws of the mind can be determined in analogue to the laws of physics (Freud, 1959: 18) This focus on the physical aspect of human condition, when explaining the relation of the mind-body relation, along with the notion that mind cannot be reduced suggests that Freud, can provide a theory which accommodates vital features of both physicalism and dualism.

As mentioned in the section on Freud’s Metapsychology, the Ego is the only seat of the consciousness in the Topographical model. Consciousness, he states, is a process which is closely associated with the sensory inputs we receive from the bodily organs, and due to the mind’s connection to the body the conscious states of these sensory excitations is said to occur in the ‘(…)outmost cortex of the Ego.’ (Freud, 1959: 21) This would imply that consciousness can be interpreted as the individual whom faces the world with voluntary conscious acts. Internally, the rest of the mind is unconscious (Freud, 1959, 19). This unconscious part of the mind also includes areas of the Ego itself, and requires that the concept of the preconscious constituent of the mind is introduced. A good example of the Ego’s unconscious and preconscious functions is found in Freud’s explanation of what happens when an individual forgets. A sensory perception, he states, can persist in its impression on the mind for a while, and because of this persistence, the individual will be able to recreate the experience, however it can also be a momentary experience (Freud, 1959: 19) For instance, when an individual looks at a rose, the sensory perception is conscious content for a while, as this will ensure that the mind can
easily recapitulate the colour and shape of the rose at a later time. This representation of the rose is not present in the conscious mind, but can resurface.

‘Everything unconscious that behaves in this way, that can easily exchange the unconscious condition for the conscious one, is therefore better described as ‘cabable of entering consciousness’, or as preconscious.’ (Italics removed to emphasise the original italicised preconscious - Freud, 1959: 19)

The first thing which should be mentioned, is the fact that Freud’s explanation of the preconscious could provide Dennett’s description of the ‘fame in the brain’ support to explain how some content can become conscious via the use of probes. The probes, focussing particularly on questions in this context, bring forth preconscious material to the conscious realm. However, it is arguable whether Freud would regard Dennett’s notion of a susceptible consciousness as anything more than an example of memory, or other repressed content of which we cannot constantly be conscious, becoming conscious for a moment. Dennett’s concept of consciousness is not what Freud thinks this to be. Instead it is an example of the process which makes preconscious content conscious, and is thus a mere function of the mind, instead of an all-encompassing description of consciousness. Mind, rather than consciousness, entails much more than what is conscious in a flighty moment. Secondly, it is worth remembering, from the section on Freud’s Metapsychology that the process which makes the preconscious conscious, entails a verbalisation of the forgotten or repressed content which allows the individual to express out loud, or at least formulate to him- or herself internally, that which has now become conscious (Freud, 1959: 22).

Again, there seems to be concurrence between the focus of Dennett’s and Freud’s theories, though the differences between the two are still clear. Dennett’s notion of Narrative Consciousness springs to mind, as this notion expresses how the conscious material of an individual becomes apparent in ‘stream of consciousness’, understood as dominating neural content occurring in a continuous series, as a narrative (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/: 2.2). Language is thus, for Dennett, an important element of consciousness, as well as for Freud, whom though once again place emphasis on the claim that the mind is not only to be understood only in terms of the consciousness. The function of language will not form the focal point of this project, but has merely been mentioned as a descriptive feature for the understanding of Freud’s perspective on consciousness. Freud himself does not give language a prerequisite status in explaining the preconscious (Freud, 1959: 23).

Indeed, the preconscious material can also take another route before the verbalising function of this part of the mind transforms the content into conscious thought. For example, a preconscious
experience can result in the excitation of an *instinctual drive*, such as an expression of a destructive tendency, which is not allowed satisfaction because it is not appropriate. This preconscious content, as well as its unconscious source, is denied access to the conscious level and is kept in the unconscious (Freud, 1959: 23). In relation to this preceding description of the non-verbal function of the preconscious part of the mind, it becomes relevant to mention that the part of the mind called *Super-Ego* is involved in this particular example of the preconscious, and the example shows how the *Super-Ego* belongs to both the preconscious realm and the unconscious part of the mind. In this example, it becomes clear that the purpose of the *Super-Ego is* to limit the *Id* (Freud, 1959: 5).

As mentioned in the section of Freud’s *Metapsychology*, the *Super-Ego* constitutes the prohibitions and encouragements, rules and values, which are conveyed by the parents, which reproduce the norm of society. These “do’s” and “don’ts” of society ensure the development of the third part of the mind, which is derived from the *Ego* (Freud, 1959: 77) The *Super-Ego* Freud equates with ‘conscience’, among other characteristics, but the key to understanding the function it plays on the mind is that it monitors and censors the intentions of the *Id*, so as these are not allowed to become conscious in the *Ego*. This part of the mind acts as an internal expression of the parents, yet is much more overbearing (Freud, 2010: 120). Here it becomes clear that Freud includes a component in his explanation of the mind, which the two other theories did not contemplate. To Freud, other people are responsible for the development of the last part of the mind, whereas such a notion is neither considered by Chalmers, or Dennett. With the mention of the final part of what constitutes the mind, according to Freud, it has become time to review the matter of a ‘self in hiding’.

4.3. The Self in Hiding

The project was initiated with a presupposed knowledge that Freud’s notion of a hiding subject and entailed Freud’s notion of the unconscious, but it does not suffice to say that Freud thinks of the ‘self’ as largely unconscious. This section of the analysis has the purpose of recapitulating the clues, which have been found throughout the investigation, and which can elaborate on Freud’s philosophy of mind and the notion of a ‘self in hiding’. This is also done in order to further examine where this notion, along with the other two issues addressed earlier, can contribute to the modern philosophy of mind. Therefore it shall be beneficial to remember the notion of ‘self’ according to the two opposing theories, dualism and physicalism.

Chalmers provides an intricate description of how different private *qualia* are subsumed so that the given individual may experience the world around him- or herself in an objectual and spatial relation,
while having the experience of being the ‘self’, which has these many combined experiences. (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.3). In this sense one can argue that the ‘self’ can be thought of as a unified conscious experience of a ‘self’. Chalmers, as we recall, does not focus on the matter of our common-sense feeling of a ‘self’, rather his emphasis rests upon the concept of consciousness in its purest irreducible form (http://www.ini.uzh.ch/~kiper/Chalmers_unity.html: 2.3). Nor does the matter of the unconscious seem of interest to this modern dualist, and so maybe Chalmers has not been provoked by Freud’s claim that we do not have full knowledge of our own ‘self’. Neither does the issue of our common feeling of a ‘self’ receive much attention from Dennett, yet he does emphasise on this aspect when describing the functions of consciousness (http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/cohen.pdf: 359). He calls the ‘self’ a flighty phenomenon, a ‘virtual captain’, which is a result of the brain organising itself in such a way that we experience a ‘self’, which is linked via a narrative to previous versions of this ‘self’. The ‘self’ in Dennett’s perspective, also encompass an unconscious realm (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-unity/: 2.2). However consciousness rather than the unconscious, is of interest in Dennett’s philosophy of mind.

In relation to these two views, dualism and physicalism, I will claim that Freud’s philosophy of mind can contribute to their discussion with exactly the emphasis on the ‘self’ and the unconscious domain it encompasses. However, if this is to be the case, a further conceptualisation of the ‘self’ in hiding will be required in order to fully understand what such a notion would entail. Initially, it can prove beneficial to complete Freud’s line of thought, where he was interrupted in the introduction. After having stated that we individuals have a certain feeling of our own ‘self’, which appear autonomous and unique from other individuals, he continues by claiming:

‘That such an appearance is deceptive, and that on the contrary the ego is continued inwards, without any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious mental entity which we designate the id and for which it serves as a kind of facade (...)’ (Freud, 2010: 26)

The Ego is the facade, and as noted earlier, Freud states that the Ego exists in the ‘outmost cortex’ of the individual. From this perspective it can be claimed that the ‘self’, at least is comprised of this outer facade, which represents the body and the Ego’s conscious acts. However, such a description would leave us in exactly the gap between body and mind, which was addressed by Freud in the
which opened the analysis on the mind and body issue. Indeed, more is known of what lies between these two points at this stage of the project and of course the unconscious realm has been presupposed from the very beginning. Hence, so far we know the ‘self’ is at least comprised of body, unconscious *Id* and conscious *Ego*.

In the section on the mind-body relation it became clear that the surrounding world was a part of the original mind, or at least the *Id* did not know how to distinguish itself from the external world, except for hiding behind the *Ego* (Freud, 1959: 56) Furthermore, the section on mind and body demonstrated that Freud finds that the human condition cannot be described without the mention of the two principle forces *Eros*, which includes *Libido*, and *Thanatos*, which entails the *Nirvana principle*. These forces are understood as sources of excitation in the physical which motivates the mind (Freud, 1959: 5). Hence the *instinctual drives* serves as a means for Freud to describe why the body and mind is related and how this occurs. The *instinctual drives* ensures the survival of the individual, and so there can be no ‘self’ without the drives. Furthermore they describe other human traits such as aggression (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe, 1983: 139). These aggressive traits are still an expression of the purpose of the organism. After all it is not completely unthinkable that there might be an act of survival which requires aggression. An example of such an act could be the killing of an animal for food.

It is thus also worth adding the external world to the ‘equation’ that describes the ‘self’ from a Freudian perspective, as well as these two principle forces, which motivates the mind from physical sources in expression of needs. Obviously Dennett does take the external world into consideration, as mind is derived from the physical in his perspective, but neither Chalmers, nor Dennett, give any abstract force, of a kind similar to the *instinctual drives*, attention in their description of a ‘self’. The *instinctual drives* are one of the points on which Freud has received much critique and indeed often the subject of these perplexed even himself (Ankjær Olsen, Kjær and Køppe; 1983: 39). Nonetheless, the *instinctual drives* and the external world is co-constituting elements to the mind and therefore the ‘self’, according to Freud.

In the section on consciousness, it was noted that even the conscious *Ego* only represents consciousness in its ‘*outmost cortex*’, but that the rest which constitutes this part of the mind is

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19 ‘We know two things concerning what we call our psyche or mental life: firstly, it’s bodily organ and scene of action, the brain (our nervous system), and secondly, our acts of consciousness, which are immediate data, and cannot be fully explained by any kind of description. Everything that lies between these two terminal points is unknown to us and, so far as we are aware there is no direct link between them.’ (Freud, 1959: 1)
preconscious or unconscious, as demonstrated in the example of forgetting and thereafter remembering in the preceding section. Thus another of the human conditions, namely memory, is explained by Freud’s model of the mind. Here it was noted that, what Dennett classifies as consciousness, which becomes apparent with the use of probes, to Freud would only describe this particular ability of the mind to make preconscious material conscious. Thus, the preconscious is yet an element which needs to be considered when addressing that which we call a ‘self’, though the ‘self’ does not have immediate knowledge of this level, nor of the unconscious level. Hence, parts of the mind are hidden from the ‘self’, for example the repression of content which the ‘self’ cannot be conscious of (Freud, 1959: 52). Another part of this preconscious level and closely linked to the function of repression, is the Super-Ego, which explains human conscience. This part of the mind which represents an internalised external world, in the form of other minds’ praise and prohibitions, will demand the Ego to find appropriate outlet for the instinctual drives, preferably through sublimation, which is considered the highest aim of the mental content (Freud, 2010: 74). Therefore the pre-conscious Super-Ego and the following function of conscience and sublimation shall thus be included in the ‘formula of the self’.

Thus finally a full description of the ‘self’ in hiding can emerge. The ‘self’ is obviously in hiding because the feeling of a ‘self’ develops with the conscious Ego, out of the unconscious Id, and furthermore, even the part of the mind, which is later developed from the conscious Ego, is not conscious in its function, rather it belongs to the unconscious and preconscious realm, as an expression of guilt absorbed from the external world (Freud, 1959:79). The description of a ‘self’ from a Freudian perspective, will at least have to include the following:

1) A body which functions as a source of sensory excitation.
2) An unconscious, yet irreducible mind, which inhabits the body.
3) Eros and Thanatos which explains the motivation of the organism, and the unconscious mind.
4) An external world, which will leave strong impressions on the unconscious mind, and force consciousness to arise, in order to react to this world.
5) Ego, which denotes consciousness
6) A preconscious realm, which explains memory among other mental phenomena.
7) Super-Ego, which entails that other minds leaves a lasting impression on the ‘self’, and therefore aids the development of this particular mind.
This description of the ‘self’ widely differs from both Chalmers’ and Dennett’s notions of ‘self’, yet seems to offer traits which both theories can subscribe to. The dualist for example, would appreciate the irreducible status of the mind, though here it is expressed in terms of the unconscious realm, instead of consciousness. Physicalists, on the other hand, would agree with the strong focus on the physical aspect of Freud’s theory, and this view would also be able to agree on the presence of an unconscious realm (http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Multiple_drafts_model: introduction). Besides providing points on which both dualism and physicalism can agree upon, Freud’s notion of a ‘self in hiding’ has allowed an investigation into the human mind, which also accommodates other conditions of our reality besides that which we call consciousness. It accommodates for the fact that humans cannot be said to be fully rational and conscious of everything, all at once, as well as the fact that humans as ‘selves’ stand in relation to other ‘selves’.

5. Conclusion

This project set out to answer how Sigmund Freud’s philosophy of mind, expressed through his *Metapsychology*, and in *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, can potentially contribute to the contemporary discussions within philosophy of mind. Here, the two opposing views, dualism and physicalism, were represented by contemporary philosophers, David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett, in order to ensure that the discussion of Freud was one which has relevance for the contemporary debate. The issues of particular interest were concerned with his philosophical position on the mind-body relation, as well as the matter of his notion of consciousness. The foundation of the analysis was our common-sense feeling of a ‘self’, which from the beginning was provoked by Freud’s notion that it was hiding from itself, implying that no individual knows themselves. What then can be said in response to the questions posed in the problem formulation?

In response to the first question\(^\text{20}\), it should first be mentioned that Freud’s position on the mind-body relation is one which requires the answer to be sought through his concept of consciousness, and not through his attempt to explain the relation between body and mind, as this could lead to a misclassification of Freud as a physicalist. This is because of Freud’s strong emphasis on the physical aspect of the human life. The body is, as mentioned, a source of excitation for the mind and leaves

\(^{20}\) What is Freud’s philosophical position on the mind-body issue and on the subject of consciousness, and how does this view relate to that of Chalmers and Dennett?
such strong impressions on the mind, that this is driven, or motivated, by the body. The *instinctual drives* function as Freud’s connecting feature between the mind and the body, as they imprint the needs of the organism on the mind (Freud, 1959: 5). This notion of instincts is one which is not considered by neither Chalmers nor Dennett, when they explain the nature of the relation between the body and the mind, though as a common ground all three point to the brain and the sensory perceptions. Freud offers a ground for existence of a sentient being by explaining how these organic drives, in particular *Eros*, requires conscious thoughts in the organism as means for survival.

The quotations which were used in the analysis of the mind-body issue could easily have led to misclassification of Freud, as an advocate of physicalism, which was a problem also addressed throughout this section of the analysis. Clarity on Freud’s perspective on the mind-body issue came with an examination of consciousness, which interestingly was not a concept of great interest to Freud, in contrast to Chalmers and Dennett. However, Freud did describe consciousness, despite of his disinterest in the matter and by means of two quotations, it becomes clear that Freud thinks of consciousness as something unique and which defies explanation. This was expressed in the quote which started the analysis of the mind-body issue, where Freud states that human acts of consciousness ‘cannot be fully explained by any kind of description.’ (Freud, 1959: 1). Moreover, as demonstrated in the analysis of Freud’s notion of consciousness, he considers this part of the mind a ‘fact without parallel’ (Freud, 1959, 16). These two descriptions of consciousness, together with his view that we know our own consciousness intuitively, coupled with the fact that his *Metapsychology* states that the mind is innate, suggests that he gives the consciousness an irreducible status. This irreducible status of mind, as seen by Freud, was further confirmed by applying the principles of *Metapsychology* to Chalmers thought experiment, in which zombies came to have a conscious experience, if only *Id* was innate, and therefore ensured the development of the conscious *Ego*.

Yet, Freud’s notion of the irreducible nature of the consciousness is muddled and confused as consciousness indeed derives from the unconscious *Id*. Nonetheless, the origin of consciousness, the *Id*, is the irreducible and therefore mind cannot be reduced to the physical. Hence, an alignment of Freud with physicalism would have been gravely misunderstood. Instead, it can be argued that he is a dualist, whom, unlike Chalmers, does not give consciousness the full focus, because it is strictly speaking not consciousness which is irreducible. It is the unconscious realm which is innate, and this unconscious is strongly linked with the physical aspect of human reality. The two, mind and body, are entirely and fundamentally co-dependent of each other. The body would not be able to survive without the mind, in particular the conscious part of the mind. Likewise would the mind, in particular
the conscious mind, not arise without the body, as it is the sensitivity of the body which requires the
innate *Id* to split and hide behind the consciousness of *Ego*.

It is due to this notion of an irreducible mind, which shares an interdependent relation with the body
that I argue Freud can provide a middle ground between dualism and physicalism. The one does not
presuppose the other, they are mutually dependent. To those whom might argue that this would imply
that all physical organisms would have a conscious mind in order to secure survival, it has to be said
that this has not been the focus of this project. However, that such an idea has been acknowledged,
and indeed Freud himself would claim that even animals could conceivably have a mind constructed
similarly to that of humans (Freud, 1959: 4). This point has only been mentioned, as it demonstrates
the vast opportunity for application of Freud’s theory in and outside the study of the human condition,
which leads to the concluding thoughts on the second question posed in the problem formulation).

The two first issues, body-mind relation and consciousness, have already shown us how Freud’s
theory might be able to form a compromising position between dualism and the physicalist monism,
inasmuch as it places great importance on aspects which both sides of this debate can subscribe to.
The issue that is yet to be addressed in this final section of the project is that of the ‘self’, which
formed the onset of this project in the first place. This common-sense feeling of a ‘self’ was disturbed
and provoked by Freud’s notion of a ‘self in hiding, and this concept allows Freud the freedom to
theorise about the other aspects of the human mind, rather than merely that which is conscious at a
given moment. This foundation of a ‘self in hiding’ presupposed the knowledge of the emphasis Freud
placed on the unconscious realm of the mind, which as both Freud and Dennett would agree, explains
why human individual’s sometime act in contradiction to what they consciously know to be best.

As mentioned in the final part of the project, which concerned this ‘self’, I will postulate, that the
greatest contribution which Freud’s theory can make to the contemporary discussion between dualism
and physicalism, is the onset of a ‘self in contrast to the onset of consciousness. Consciousness in
the sense of a ‘self’ receives very little attention from Chalmers, whom dubs this phenomena *subject
unity* and Dennett who does agree with Freud’s notion of the unconscious, only grants the ‘self’
existence in brief narratively linked moments of neural self-monitoring. As shown in the list of the
constituting elements of the ‘self in hiding’, in the preceding chapter, this concept allows Freud’s
philosophy of mind to describe and include many aspects of the conditions of the human mind and

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21 How can Freud’s position on the above mentioned issues, and the notion of the ‘self’ in hiding, contribute to the
discussion between two opposing views, dualism and monism, within contemporary philosophy of mind?
experience. Examples of these conditions, which have been addressed throughout the project, includes self-destructive or aggressive tendencies, memory, creativity and intellect, as well as conscience and guilt. Furthermore, this part of the mind, which is represented by conscience, demonstrates the importance of other minds when considering the structure of a given mind. In relation to the two latter examples of human conditions, mentioned above, the foundation of a ‘self in hiding’ opens up for a philosophy of mind which may give grounds for an examination into our common preconceptions about human morals (Freud, 1959; 78). Again, this subject has not been the focus of attention, however it has been mentioned in order to demonstrate the potentials of application of Freud’s theory.

In conclusion, I will argue that Freud’s *Metapsychology* along with *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*, creates the foundation for a philosophy of mind, which can contribute to the contemporary debate between dualism and physicalism, by formulation of a position in the middle of this debate. His theory allows him to express a mutual dependence between the irreducible mind and the body, which is connected due to the *instinctual drives*. It is the notion of a ‘self in hiding’, which enables Freud to formulate a philosophy of mind which encompasses those phenomena or human experiences, that cannot readily be assigned to the conscious mind. Therefore I will conclude this investigation of Freud’s philosophy of mind with his very own words;

‘Now it might appear as though this dispute between psycho-analysis and philosophy was only concerned with a trifling matter of definition – the question of whether the name ‘mental’ should be applied to one or the other series of phenomena.’ (Freud, 1959: 17)
6. Summary

6.1. English Summary

This project will continuously present and analyse Sigmund Freud’s Philosophy of mind expressed in his literary work; *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*. The foundation for this investigation is Freud’s notion of a ‘self in hiding’. In other words, it is his notion of the unconscious which provokes the common-sense feeling of a ‘self’ that shall form the basis of this project. This analysis will be comprised of three issues, which is classic to the tradition of philosophy of mind, and which still are relevant to the contemporary discussion. These issues are that of mind-body relation, consciousness and finally the ‘self’. In order to determine where Freud’s perspective on these issues may still be relevant to the contemporary discussion, David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett, have been chosen to represent two modern positions within the traditional debate of these issues, which Freud’s theory can stand in relation to; namely dualism and monism.

6.2. Dansk Resumé

Dette projekt vil løbende præsentere og analysere Sigmund Freuds filosofi om sindet, udtrykt i hans litterære værk; *Abriss der Psychoanalyse*. Grundlaget for denne undersøgelse er Freuds forestilling om et ‘selv i skjul’. Med andre ord, det er hans opfattelse af det ubevidste, som provokerer den almindelige følelsen af en 'selv', der skal danne grundlag for dette projekt. Denne analyse vil bestå af tre problemer, som er klassiske for den filosofiske tradition, og som stadig er relevante for den moderne diskussion. Disse problemer er krop-sind relationen, bevidsthed og endelig 'selvet'. For at afgøre, hvor Freuds syn på disse problemer stadig kan være relevant for den nutidige diskussion, er David Chalmers og Daniel Dennett, blevet valgt til at repræsentere to moderne stillinger inden for traditionelle debat om disse spørgsmål, som Freud’s teori kan holdes op imod; nemlig dualisme og monisme.

6.3. Search Words

Philosophy of mind, mind-body issue, consciousness, self, Sigmund Freud, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett.
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Consciousness cannot be separated from function
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