# INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

CIL ISSUES
RESOLUTION REPORT
VOLUME 1 OF 3

16 SEPTEMBER 1988

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY
ENGINEERING SERVICES

SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT

WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA88003-48

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
CIL ISSUES RESOLUTION REPORT

16 SEPTEMBER 1988

This Working Paper is Submitted to NASA under
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Independent Orbiter Assessment
CIL Issues Resolution Report

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June, 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was provided by the Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis and assessment using the instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL.

Subsystem FMEA/CIL assessments were completed as revised NASA and prime contractor FMEA/CIL documentation became available. The MDAC IOA task was brought to an interim conclusion in March, 1988. This resulted in several subsystem assessment reports being published with open issues. Subsequent task authority was received that allowed for the resolution of all remaining open issues involving the critical items list.

This report contains IOA assessment worksheets showing resolution of outstanding IOA CIL issues that were summarized in the IOA FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report, dated 9 March 1988 (reference 70). Each assessment worksheet has been updated with CIL issue resolution and rationale.

2.0 INTRODUCTION

The 51-L Challenger accident prompted NASA to readdress safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space Transportation System (NSTS). MDAC is providing an independent assessment of the proposed post 51-L Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.

The MDAC was initially tasked in June 1986 to conduct an independent analysis and assessment on twenty subsystems. Subsequently, in April 1987, eight additional subsystems were added which provided complete coverage of all standard Orbiter equipment. Table 2-1 provides a listing of the Orbiter and GFE subsystems identified by NASA to the National Research Council, Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit Committee.

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Table 2-1

ORBITER AND GFE SUBSYSTEMS

ORIGINAL TWENTY SUBSYSTEMS (JUNE 1986)

- Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C)
- Data Processing System (DPS)
- Backup Flight System (BFS)
- Nose Wheel Steering (NWS)
- Instrumentation (INST)
- Electrical Power, Distribution & Control (EPD&C)
- Main Propulsion System (MPS)
- Fuel Cell Powerplant (FCP)
- Power Reactant Supply & Distribution System (PRS&D)
- Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS)
- Reaction Control System (RCS)
- Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)
- Hydraulics & Water Spray Boiler (HYD & WSB)
- Atmospheric Revitalization System (ARS)
- Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System (ARPCS)
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU)
- Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU)
- Landing & Deceleration (L&D)
- Hydraulic Actuators (HA)
- Remote Manipulator System (RMS)

ADDITIONAL EIGHT SUBSYSTEMS (APRIL 1987)

- Communications and Tracking (C&T)
- Displays and Controls (D&C)
- Orbiter Experiments (OEX)
- Pyrotechnics (PYRO)
- Purge, Vent and Drain (PV&D)
- Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
- Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Life Support System (LSS), and Airlock Support System (ALSS)
- Crew Equipment (CE)

The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL.

Step 1.0   Subsystem Familiarization
            1.1 Define subsystem functions
            1.2 Define subsystem components
            1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
                 assumptions

Step 2.0   Define Subsystem Analysis Diagram
            2.1 Define subsystem
            2.2 Define major assemblies
            2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations

Step 3.0   Failure Events Definition
            3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
            3.2 Document IOA analysis results

Step 4.0   Compare IOA Analysis Data to NASA FMEA/CIL
            4.1 Resolve differences
            4.2 Review in-house
            4.3 Document assessment issues
            4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager

As a result of the preceding steps, general project assumptions and ground rules (Appendix B) were developed to amplify and clarify instructions in NSTS 22206. Also, subsystem specific assumptions and ground rules were defined.

3.0 CIL ISSUES RESOLUTION WORKSHEETS SUMMARY

The IOA analysis process produced an initial total of 10,735 independently derived failure modes and 4,513 potential critical items. As of 9 March 1988, when the Interim Report was published (reference 70), a total of 3,193 FMEA issues and 1,637 CIL assessment issues remained open due to a lack of revised subsystem FMEA/CIL documentation to be assessed. Several subsystems were still in the Rockwell FMEA/CIL revision process during the first quarter of 1988. The IOA assessment results were fully documented in separate subsystem reports (references 36 through 69) and summarized in the Interim Report. Subsequently, MDAC received revised CIL documentation and was able to resolve all CIL issues. Out of 1,693 CIL issues, NASA accepted 304 recommendations and IOA withdrew 1,369 issues. As a result, all issues with safety and mission implications were resolved.

Appendix C includes the revised IOA assessment worksheets reflecting the resolution of the open CIL issues. Resolution rationale is presented in the "Remarks" section at the bottom of each assessment worksheet.

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The number of assessment worksheets differs in many cases from the number of CIL issues shown in the FMEA/CIL Assessment Interim Report. This difference stems from the fact that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence of IOA failure modes to NASA failure modes.

The following subsystems have been excluded from this report since they had no outstanding CIL issues remaining at the time of publication of the interim report.

- o Fuel Cell Powerplant
- o Hydraulic Actuators
- o Displays and Controls
- o Guidance, Navigation and Control
- o Orbiter Experiments
- o Auxiliary Power Unit
- o Backup Flight System
- o Electrical Power Distribution and Control

In addition, the Manned Maneuvering Unit was omitted. This was due to NASA indefinitely deferring its review of the Manned Maneuvering Unit FMEA/CIL.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

This report, as a companion volume to the Independent Orbiter Assessment Final Report, MDAC Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA88003-47, dated 16 September 1988, is intended to provide resolution and rationale closing all open CIL assessment issues. In summary, the NASA and Prime Contractor post 51-L FMEA/CIL documentation assessed is believed to be technically accurate and complete. No assessment issues remain that have safety implications.

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APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

ACRONYMS

ABS	–	Ammonia Boiler System
ACA	–	Annunciator Control Assembly
ACIP	–	Aerodynamic Coefficient Instrumentation Package
ADI	–	Attitude Direction Indicator
ADP	–	Air Data Probe
ADS	–	Audio Distribution System
ADTA	–	Air Data Transducer Assembly
ALCA	–	Aft Load Control Assembly
AMCA	–	Aft Motor Control Assembly
AOA	–	Abort-Once-Around
AOS	–	Acquisition of Signal
APC	–	Aft Power Controller
APU	–	Auxiliary Power Unit
ARCS	–	Aft Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
ARPCS	–	Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
ARS	–	Atmospheric Revitalization System
ASA	–	Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
ATCS	–	Active Thermal Control Subsystem
ATO	–	Abort-To-Orbit
ATVC	–	Ascent Thrust Vector Control
B&AS	–	Brakes and Antiskid
BF	–	Body Flap
BFC	–	Backup Flight Control
BFS	–	Backup Flight System
BITE	–	Built-In Test Equipment
C&W	–	Caution and Warning
CCB	–	Change Control Board
CCC	–	Contaminant Control Cartridge
CCTV	–	Closed-Circuit Television
CCU	–	Crew Communications Umbilical
CIL	–	Critical Items List
CIU	–	Communications Interface Unit
CNTLR	–	Controller
COAS	–	Crew Optical Alignment Sight
COMM	–	Communication
CPU	–	Central Processing Unit
CRIT	–	Criticality
CWS	–	Caution and Warning System
D&C	–	Displays and Controls
DAP	–	Digital Autopilot
DCM	–	Display and Control Module
DCN	–	Document Change Notice
DDU	–	Display Driver Unit
DEU	–	Display Electronic Unit
DFI	–	Development Flight Instrumentation
DHE	–	Data-Handling Electronics
DMA	–	Deployed Mechanical Assembly
DOD	–	Department of Defense
DPS	–	Data Processing System (Subsystem)
DSC	–	Dedicated Signal Conditioner

ACRONYMS

ECLSS	-	Environmental Control and Life Support System (Subsystem)
EI	-	Entry Interface
EIU	-	Engine Interface Unit
EMU	-	Extravehicular Mobility Unit
EPA	-	Environmental Protection Agency
EPDC	-	Electrical Power, Distribution and Control
EPG	-	Electrical Power Generator
EPS	-	Electrical Power System
ET	-	External Tank
EVA	-	Extravehicular Activity
EVCS	-	Extravehicular Communications System
FC	-	Fuel Cell
FCA	-	Flow Control Assembly
FCL	-	Freon Coolant Loop
FCOS	-	Flight Control Operating System
FCP	-	Fuel Cell Power (Plant)
FCS	-	Flight Control System
FDA	-	Fault Detection and Annunciation
FDM	-	Frequency Division Multiplexing
FES	-	Flash Evaporator System
FFSSO	-	Forward Fuselage Support System for OEX
FLCA	-	Forward Load Control Assembly
FM	-	Failure Mode
FMCA	-	Forward Motor Control Assembly
FMD	-	Frequency Division Multiplexer
FMEA	-	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FPC	-	Forward Power Controller
FRCS	-	Forward Reaction Control System (Subsystem)
FSM	-	Fault Summary Message
FSS	-	Flight Support Structure
FSSR	-	Flight Systems Software Requirements
FSW	-	Flight Software
GAS	-	Get-Away Special
GFE	-	Government Furnished Equipment
GMT	-	Greenwich Mean Time
GNC	-	Guidance, Navigation, and Control
GPC	-	General Purpose Computer
GSE	-	Ground Support Equipment
GSTDN	-	Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
HDC	-	Hybrid Driver Controller
HEX	-	Heat Exchanger
HIRAP	-	High-Resolution Accelerometer Package
HIU	-	Headset Interface Unit
HPFTP	-	High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
HPOT	-	High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
HUT	-	Hard Upper Torso
HW	-	Hardware
HX	-	Heat Exchanger
HYD	-	Hydraulics

ACRONYMS

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ICM          - Interface Control Module
ICMS         - Intercom Master Station
ICOM         - Intercommunications
ICRS         - Intercom Remote Station
IFM          - In-Flight Maintenance
IMU          - Inertial Measurement Unit
IOA          - Independent Orbiter Assessment
IOM          - Input/Output Module
IUS          - Inertial Upper Stage
IVA          - Intravehicular Activity
JSC          - Johnson Space Center
KBD          - Ku-Band Deploy
LCA          - Load Controller Assembly
LCC          - Launch Control Center
LCVG         - Liquid Cooling and Ventilation Garment
LEH          - Launch/Entry Helmet
LNDG/DECEL   - Landing and Deceleration
LPS          - Launch Processing System
LRU          - Line Replaceable Unit
LSS          - Life Support Subsystem
LTA          - Lower Torso Assembly
MADS         - Modular Auxiliary Data System
MAS          - Mechanical Actuation System
MCA          - Motor Control Assembly
MCC          - Mission Control Center (JSC)
MCDS         - Multifunction CRT Display System
MDAC         - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDM          - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MEC          - Main Engine Controller
MECO         - Main Engine Cutoff
MET          - Mission Elapsed Time
MGSSA        - Main Gear Shock Strut Assembly
MIA          - Multiplexer Interface Adapter
MLG          - Main Landing Gear
MM           - Major Mode
MMU          - Manned Maneuvering Unit
MMU          - Mass Memory Unit
MPL          - Minimum Power Level (65%)
MPM          - Manipulator Positioning Mechanism
MPS          - Main Propulsion System (Subsystem)
MS           - Mission Specialist
MSBLS        - Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
MSK          - Manual Select Keyboard
MTU          - Master Timing Unit
MUX          - Multiplex
NASA         - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NGSSA        - Nose Landing Gear Shock Strut Assembly
NGTD         - Nose Gear Touch Down
NLG          - Nose Landing Gear
NSI          - NASA Standard Initiator
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ACRONYMS

NSP	-	Network Signal Processor
NSTS	-	National Space Transportation System
NWS	-	Nose-Wheel Steering
OBS	-	Operational Bioinstrumentation System
OEX	-	Orbiter Experiments
OI	-	Operational Instrumentation
OMRSD	-	Operational Maintenance Requirements & Specifications Document
OMS	-	Orbital Maneuvering System
OTB	-	Orbiter Timing Buffer
OWDA	-	Operational Water Dispenser Assembly
P/L	-	Payload
PASS	-	Primary Avionics Software System
PBI	-	Push-Button Indicator
PBM	-	Payload Bay Mechanical
PCA	-	Power Control Assembly
PCI	-	Potential Critical Item
PCM	-	Pulse Code Modulation
PCMMU	-	Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
PCN	-	Page Change Notice
PCS	-	Pressure Control System
PDU	-	Power Drive Unit
PFR	-	Portable Foot Restraint
PHS	-	Personal Hygiene Station
PI	-	Payload Interrogater
PIC	-	Pyro Initiator Controller
PLB	-	Payload Bay
PLBD	-	Payload Bay Door
PLS	-	Primary Landing Site
PLSS	-	Portable Life Support Subsystem
PMS	-	Propellant Management Subsystem
PRCB	-	Program Requirements Control Board
PRCBD	-	Program Requirements Control Board Directive
PRCS	-	Primary Reaction Control System (jet)
PRD	-	Payload Retention Device
PROM	-	Programmable Read-Only Memory
PRSD	-	Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
PRSDS	-	Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System
PSA	-	Power Section Assembly
PSA	-	Provision Stowage Assembly
PSP	-	Payload Signal Processor
PTT	-	Push-to-talk
PV&D	-	Purge, Vent & Drain
QD	-	Quick Disconnect
R/BPA	-	Rudder/Pedal Brake Assembly
RAM	-	Random Access Memory
RCS	-	Reaction Control System
RFCA	-	Radiator and Flow Control Assembly
RFI	-	Radio Frequency Interference
RGA	-	Rate Gyro Assembly

ACRONYMS

RHC	- Rotation Hand Controller
RHS	- Rehydration Station
RI	- Rockwell International
RJD	- Reaction Jet Driver
RM	- Redundancy Management
RMS	- Remote Manipulator System
RPA	- Rudder Pedal Assembly
RPC	- Remote Power Controller
RPTA	- Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly
RSB	- Rudder Speed Brake
RTD	- Resistance Temperature Device
RTLS	- Return-to-Launch-Site
RTS	- Remote Tracking Station
RVDT	- Rotary Variable Differential Transformer
SBTC	- Speed Brake Translation Controller
SCB	- Steering Control Box
SCM	- System Control Module
SCU	- Sequence Control Unit
SCU	- Service and Cooling Umbilical
SDM	- Startracker Door Mechanism
SEADS	- Shuttle Entry Air Data System
SFOM	- Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
SFP	- Single Failure Point
SGLS	- Space Ground Link System
SILTS	- Shuttle Infrared Leeside Temperature Sensor
SM	- Systems Management
SMM	- Solar Maximum Mission
SOP	- Secondary Oxygen Pack
SOS	- Space Operations Simulator
SPA	- Steering Position Amplifier
SPFA	- Single Point Failure Analysis
SPI	- Surface Position Indicator
SRB	- Solid Rocket Booster
SSA	- Space Suit Assembly
SSME	- Space Shuttle Main Engine
SSMEC	- SSME Controller
SSO	- Space Shuttle Orbiter
SSSH	- Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
ST	- Star Tracker
STDN	- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
STS	- Space Transportation System
TACAN	- Tactical Air Navigation
TAL	- Transatlantic Abort Landing
TCS	- Thermal Control System (Subsystem)
TD	- Touch Down
TDRS	- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
THC	- Thruster Hand Controller
THC	- Translation Hand Controller
TPS	- Thermal Protection System
TVC	- Thrust Vector Control

ACRONYMS

UCD	- Urine Collection Device
UEA	- Unitized Electrode Assembly
UHF	- Ultra High Frequency
VDM	- Vent Door Mechanism
VRCS	- Vernier Reaction Control System (jet)
WBSC	- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner
WCCS	- Window Cavity Conditioning System
WCCU	- Wireless Crew Communications Umbilical
WMS	- Waste Management System
WP	- Working Paper
WRS	- Water Removal Subsystem
WSB	- Water Spray Boiler

APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.1 Definitions
B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.1 Definitions

Definitions contained in <u>NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation of FMEA/CIL</u>, were used with the following amplifications and additions.

<u>INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:</u>

    <u>RTLS</u> - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

    <u>TAL</u> - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

    <u>AOA</u> - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

    <u>ATO</u> - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

<u>CREDIBLE (CAUSE)</u> - an event that can be predicted or expected in anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an event where multiple failures must first occur to result in environmental extremes

<u>CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES</u> - procedures that are utilized beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue cards

<u>EARLY MISSION TERMINATION</u> - termination of onorbit phase prior to planned end of mission

<u>EFFECTS/RATIONALE</u> - description of the case which generated the highest criticality

<u>HIGHEST CRITICALITY</u> - the highest functional criticality determined in the phase-by-phase analysis

<u>MAJOR MODE (MM)</u> - major sub-mode of software operational sequence (OPS)

<u>MC</u> - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System (PASS)

<u>MISSION</u> - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans, middeck P/L, etc.)

MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical) function

OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue cards

OPS - software operational sequence

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objectives are equal to mission objectives

PHASE DEFINITIONS:

PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)

LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)

ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8

DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown

LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing safing operations

APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.2   IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

The philosophy embodied in <u>NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA/CIL</u>, was employed with the following amplifications and additions.

1.   The operational flight software is an accurate implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements (FSSRs).

> RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of this task.

2.   After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.

> RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability and/or the actual monitoring by the crew is beyond the scope of this task.

3.   Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission being flown.

> RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of this task.

4.   All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and assembled to the design specifications/drawings.

> RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is designed to detect and identify problems before the item is approved for use.

5.   All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed performed as written, and will not include human error in their performance.

> RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error are out-of-scope of this task.

6. All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater hardware detail levels but not lesser.

    RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with other analyses requires that both analyses be performed to a comparable level of detail.

7. Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not required.

    RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry availability and/or the actual monitoring of applicable data by ground-based personnel is beyond the scope of this task.

8. The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case effects for the phase of interest.

    RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a thorough and complete analysis.

9. Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

    RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

10. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

    RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

11. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.

    RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to ensure consistency throughout IOA project.

SECTION C-1

LANDING AND DECELERATION SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10205
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-079-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10205
ITEM: DOWNLOCK BUNGEE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
ALSO SEE 10206
THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS A MECHANICAL DEVICE THAT IF BENT OR
JAMMED IN THE EXTENDED POSITION COULD CAUSE A FORCE THAT WOULD
UNLOCK THE LOCK BRACE.
HYDRAULICS - THE EXTEND/RETRACT HYD ACTUATOR IS THE ONLY
REDUNDANT ITEM. WHEN THE VEHICLE IS SHUT DOWN POST LANDING THERE
IS NO REDUNDANCY. THE NASA FMEA/CIL DOES NOT CONSIDER APU
SHUTDOWN OCCURRING BEFORE CREW EGRESS.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/1R TO 2/1R. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING (A RESULT
OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE) IS NOT A SINGLE FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE,
THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM 1/1 TO 2/1R.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10206   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-079-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10206
ITEM: DOWNLOCK BUNGEE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
     SEE 10205.   THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
LANDING UNTIL AFTER THE VEHICLE IS SHUTDOWN. ONCE THE HYDRAULICS
SYSTEM IS DEACTIVATED THERE IS NO SYSTEM TO HOLD THE LOCK BRACE
IN POSITION, AND A GUST OF WIND, AN IMPACT FROM APPROACHING
VEHICLES OR MOVEMENT INSIDE THE VEHICLE COULD CAUSE NLG COLLAPSE.
A COLLAPSE OF THE NLG WOULD CAUSE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE. THIS SITUATION CAN BE BYPASSED BY
INSTALLING THE LANDING GEAR SAFETY PINS IN THE LOCK BRACE PRIOR
TO HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1 SHUTDOWN.
     NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF NLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/1R TO 2/1R. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM 1/1 TO 2/1R.

REPORT DATE   19 JUNE 1988   C.1-3

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10210
NASA FMEA #:   NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10210
ITEM: STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
     NOT CONSIDERED BY THE NASA FMEA/CIL
     NASA FMEA 02-1A-076-1 ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR TORQUE ARMS. THE IOA CONSIDERS THE STRUCTURAL
FAILURE OF THE STEERING DISCONNECT LOCK TO BE COVERED BY THE NASA
FMEA. THE IOA AND NASA/RI AGREE ON A 1/1 CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10211   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-076-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10211
ITEM: TORQUE ARM ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE   [ ]
                          INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
    A NOSE WHEEL SLAPDOWN WHERE THE NOSE WHEEL ROTATES BEYOND A
SAFE ANGLE OF ATTACK WILL CAUSE AN IMMEDIATE COLLAPSE OF THE NLG.
    NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF FMEA 02-1A-076-1 FROM
2/1R TO 1/1; THEREFORE, THE IOA AND NASA/RI ASSESSMENTS ARE IN
COMPLETE AGREEMENT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10212   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10212
ITEM: NOSE WHEEL RETAINING BOLT

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
        ADDITIONAL DATA UNCOVERED AFTER STUDY COMPLETION ELIMINATES
THIS IOA EVALUATION REPORT

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10213
NASA FMEA #:   NONE

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10213
ITEM: AXLE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
     NOT EVALUATED BY NASA
     NASA FMEA 02-1A-075-1 ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE
NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRYING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE NOSE LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS 1/1 AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10220   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #: NONE   BASELINE [   ]
                                                      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10220
ITEM: TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     THE WORST CASE SCENARIO FOR A BROKEN TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
WOULD BE A FAILURE THAT WOULD PREVENT THE NLG FROM LOCKING IN THE
EXTENDED POSITION. SIMILAR TO MLG TORQUE TUBE ASSY REF 02-1-010-
1.
     NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-1A-111-1) FOR THE NOSE
LANDING GEAR TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY FAILURE MODE. THE IOA AND
NASA/RI ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE CRITICALITY IS 1/1.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10221   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-077-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10221
ITEM: DRAG BRACE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
      ALSO SEE 10202, 10203

      FMEA 02-1-077-1 COVERS THE NLG DRAG BRACE ASSEMBLY BUT IT
DOES NOT COVER THE CRITICAL PARTS INDIVIDUALLY. IOA AGREES WITH
CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10402   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-H01-A02   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10402
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1. IF THE SYSTEM FAILS,
THEN THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR
VEHICLE. THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT
FAILS, THE GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
INTO-A01 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY. AN EXTERNAL LEAK IS
STILL A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-10416
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-H01-A04

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 10416
ITEM: NLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS THE FAILURE IS NOT DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL INTO-A01, WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY-1/1.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-11003   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-H03-2   BASELINE [X]
                                                    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 11003
ITEM: NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
     WITHDRAW. THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED INTO-H03-1. A LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-11004
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 11004
ITEM: NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]				
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN "EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN "EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 11005. WITHDRAW.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-11005
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-H03-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 11005
ITEM: NLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
    REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-11102   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-097-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 11102
ITEM: NLG B/U PYRO UPLOCK RELEASE MECH

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A        B        C


      NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ NA]    [ NA]    [ NA]      [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 1 /1  ]     [ NA]    [ NA]    [ NA]      [ X ]

   COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```


RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [ /  ]       [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [    ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```


* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
      SYSTEM IS NOT USED UNLESS HYDRAULIC UPLOCK RELEASE SYSTEM
FAILS. IF THIS SYSTEM FAILS WHEN CALLED ON TO FUNCTION, THERE IS
NO OTHER BACKUP.

      ACCORDING TO THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN 22206, THIS SYSTEM IS A
2/1R CRITICALITY BUT, A FAILED HYDRAULICS SYSTEM ACTIVATES THIS
SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEMS FAILURE WILL NOT ACTIVATE THE HYDRAULICS.
THERE IS A LINEAR OPERATION HERE THAT WILL NOT ALLOW
REVERSAL OF THE ROLES.
      THE CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE IS ATRIBUTED TO DIFFERENT
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE REDUNDANCY RULES IN NSTS 22206. FROM
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI ASSIGNMENT OF
CRITICALITY 2/1R AND THE RETENTION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-11302   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 11302
ITEM: NLG DOOR BUNGEE ASSIST ASSY

LEAD ANALYST: W.WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
               FLIGHT                                     ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

    NASA    [   /   ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ] *
    IOA     [ 1 /1  ]    [ NA]     [ NA]     [ NA]      [ X ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]        [    ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     BUNGEE COULD POSSIBLY INADVERTENTLY RELEASE CAUSING THE NLG
DOOR TO CRACK OPEN.
     NASA/RI CREATED A NEW FMEA (02-1A-102-2) WHICH ADDRESSES
PREMATURE RELEASE OF THE NOSE LANDING GEAR BOOSTER BUNGEE-DOOR
EXTENSION ASSIST. THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITY IS 1/1 WHICH IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA ASSESSMENT.

REPORT DATE   19 JUNE 1988   C.1-16

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20202   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-001-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20202
ITEM: SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
    THE NASA FMEA COVERS ONLY THE LOSS OF NITROGEN.
    NASA/RI PREPARED A NEW FMEA, 02-1A-001-3, TO ADDRESS THE
LOSS OF MLG SHOCK STRUT HYDRAULIC FLUID. THE 1/1 CRITICALITY IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20203
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-001-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20203
ITEM: SHOCK STRUT PISTON ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
    NASA FMEA ASSUMES LOSS OF NITROGEN ELASTIC MEDIUM ONLY.

    HYD FLUID IS CONSIDERED AS CAPABLE OF ABSORBING A LANDING
SHOCK PER MC621-0011.
    IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI 3/3 CRITICAILTY FOR LOSS OF
NITROGEN PRESSURE IN THE MLG SHOCK STRUT. LOSS OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID IS A DIFFERENT FAILURE MODE AND IS COVERED BY SEPARATE
FMEA.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20205
NASA FMEA #:   NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20205
ITEM: AXLE KIT - MLG

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 02-1A-001-1 ADDRESSES STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE MAIN
LANDING GEAR SHOCK STRUT INNER AND OUTER CYLINDER AND LOAD
CARRING MEMBERS. FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT
THE MAIN LANDING GEAR AXLE IS PART OF THE MAIN LANDING GEAR SHOCK
STRUT ASSEMBLY AND THEREFORE CAN BE CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY
THE FMEA. THERE IS AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IOA AND NASA/RI THAT
THE CRITICALITY IS 1/1 AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE IS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20209
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20209
ITEM: DOWN LOCK BUNGEE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
UNTIL THE SAFETY PIN IS INSTALLED IN THE LOCK BRACE THERE IS
A MAJOR PROBLEM. FROM THE TIME THE HYD SYS 1 IS SHUTDOWN UNTIL
THE SAFETY IS INSTALLED THERE IS AN IMINENT THREAT OF COLLAPSE.
NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/1R TO 2/1R. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA, CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM 1/1 TO 2/1R.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20210   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-008-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20210
ITEM: DOWN LOCK BUNGEE

LEAD ANALYST: W. WEISSINGER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE [ ]
                             INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
    SEE IOA EFFECTS/RATIONALE.
    NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF MLG OVERCENTER DOWNLOCK
BUNGEE STRUCTURAL FAILURE FROM 3/1R TO 2/1R. UPON FURTHER
ANALYSIS THE IOA AGREES THAT THE DOWNLOCK BUNGEE IS NOT A SINGLE
FAILURE POINT; THEREFORE, THE IOA CRITICALITY SHOULD BE
DOWNGRADED FROM 1/1 TO 2/1R.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20402   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G09-A02   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20402
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
THE GEAR HAS A PYRO BACKUP TO UNLOCK THE GEAR. IF IT FAILS, THE
GEAR WILL NOT DEPLOY. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FMEA/CIL
WITH-A01 WHICH IS A HIGHER CRITICALITY (1/1). AN EXTERNAL LEAK
IS A LEAK REGARDLESS OF THE FAILURE MODE. ISSUE RESOLVED; IOA
ACCEPTS HIGHER CRITICALITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-20416
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G09-A04

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 20416
ITEM: MLG EXTEND / RETRACT HYD STRUT ACT

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
     REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD SYS 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS, THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTED. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN. NASA INCORPORATED THIS FAILURE INTO-A01
WHICH IS A 1/1.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21003
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G08-A02

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 21003
ITEM: MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
    POSSIBLE LOSS OF HYDRAULICS SYSTEM 1. IF SYSTEM FAILS, THEN
THE ORBITER IS ONE FAILURE AWAY FROM LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE.
PYRO BACKUP. HYDRAULIC FLUID IS NOT CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR
ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE CANNOT BE DETECTED - FAILS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B. HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED,
THUS PASSING SCREEN.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21004   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 21004
ITEM: MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     GEAR WILL NOT RELEASE HYDRAULICALLY. THE PYRO BACKUP WILL
RELEASE THE GEAR ONE SECOND AFTER THE COMMAND TO DEPLOY IF THE
LANDING GEAR HOOK IS NOT OPEN. THIS FAILURE IS THE SAME AS AN
"EXTERNAL HYDRAULIC LEAK" FOR CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, IT CAN
BE COMBINED WITH MDAC 21003. WITHDRAW.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-21005   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G08-A01   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 21005
ITEM: MLG UPLOCK ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     REDUNDANCY SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE HYD. SYS. 1 FLUID IS NOT
CIRCULATED TO THIS ACTUATOR ONORBIT, THUS FAILURE NOT DETECTED.
HOWEVER, FAILURE IS DETECTED WHEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED, THUS PASSING
SCREEN.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30104   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30104
ITEM: BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
     CLOSED LVDT WILL RESULT IN HALF-WHEEL LOCKUP ON LANDING WITH
ANTISKID OFF, CAUSING POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE. ANTISKID WILL
PROVIDE PROTECTION IF ON.
     FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS THE IOA WITHDRAWS THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ISSUE. A SHORT CIRCUIT WILL ONLY CAUSE LOSS OF BRAKING
CAPABILITY FROM ONE OF FOUR CHANNELS TO ONE WHEEL. AFTER THE
FIRST FAILURE, TWO SUCCESS PATHS REMAIN. THE ANTISKID CIRCUIT
IS A NON LIKE SYSTEM THAT OFFERS PROTECTION AGAINST BRAKE SYSTEM
CONTROL FAILURES. A FAILURE OF THE ANTISKID SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A BRAKE PEDAL TRANSDUCER FAILURE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30105   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-025-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30105
ITEM: BRAKE CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     WITH BRAKE PRESSURE BEING APPLIED AT TOUCHDOWN, TIRE ON THAT
WHEEL WILL PROBABLY BLOW RIGHT AFTER TOUCHDOWN CAUSING POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE.
     NASA/RI UPGRADED THE CRITICALITY OF THE BRAKE CIRCUIT
FAILURE FROM 2/1R TO 1/1. THIS RESULTS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE IOA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30111   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-033-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30111
ITEM: HYD PRESS REG (SYS 2 & 3)

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
    SEE 30129. SHOULD BE A 2 BECAUSE IF STANDBY SYSTEM HAD SOME
FAILURE VERY LITTLE BRAKING WOULD BE AVAILABLE - ONLY FROM LAST
REMAINING SYSTEM.
    FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/1R AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA
02-1B-033-2.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30112
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-030-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30112
ITEM: INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
     NO CIL AVAILABLE. SHOULD BE 2/1R BECAUSE IF STANDBY FILTER
GETS CLOGGED, HALF BRAKING CAPABILITY TO BRAKES IN THAT WHEEL
WELL WILL BE LOST. SEE 30130.
ISSUE RESOLUTION:
     FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/1R AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-1B-030-1.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30116   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-029-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30116
ITEM: BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
        THIS VALVE HAS VERY LITTLE VALUE SINCE HYD. SYS. 1 IS
SHUTDOWN AND LINE CLOSED OFF DURING FLIGHT. FLUID NOT AVAILABLE
TO VALVE UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO LANDING. IF BOTH PRIMARY AND
STANDBY SYSTEMS FAIL TO OPEN BOTH SYSTEMS MUST BE SO SLUGGISH
THAT
        THE BRAKES ON THIS CONTROL MODULE WON'T FUNCTION. ALSO SEE
30131.
        FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30124   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-066-2   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30124
ITEM: STATORS, ROTORS, CLIPS

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     IF LOCKUP OCCURS AT HIGH SPEED, TIRE WILL BLOW CAUSING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
     FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE DOWNGRADED FROM 1/1 TO
2/1R. LOSS OF BRAKING CAPABILITY ON ONE WHEEL (25% OF TOTAL) IS
PROBABLE EFFECT RATHER THAN A BLOWN TIRE WHICH COULD CAUSE
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL PROBLEMS. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE
REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-1E-066-2.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30129   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-033-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30129
ITEM: HYD PRESS REG (SYS 1)

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE [ ]
                           INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
    SEE 30111 - DIFFERENT BECAUSE THIS DOESN'T PASS REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B.
    FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/1R AND THAT THERE IS
NO METHOD TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN);
THEREFORE, THE HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS
IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-1B-
033-2.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30130   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-1-030-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30130
ITEM: INLET FILTER, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS 1)

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
     SEE 30112 - SYS 1 DOES NOT PASS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
     FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE CRITICALITY
OF THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE 3/1R AND THAT THERE IS NO METHOD
TO READILY DETECT THE FAILURE (FAILS B SCREEN); THEREFORE, THE
HARDWARE FAILURE REMAINS AS A CIL ITEM. THIS IS IN AGREEMENT
WITH THE REVISED NASA/RI EVALUATION OF FMEA 02-1B-030-2.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/15/86
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-30131
NASA FMEA #: 02-1-029-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LANDING/DECELERATION SYSTEMS
MDAC ID: 30131
ITEM: BY - PASS VALVE, HYD MODULE ASSY (SYS 2&3)

LEAD ANALYST: J. COMPTON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
      SEE 30116. SINCE CIRC PUMPS ARE ON FOR THESE SYSTEMS
ONORBIT, THIS FAILURE COULD BE DETECTED INFLIGHT.
      FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE
CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE SHOULD BE 3/3 WHICH AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION. THERE ARE TWO BYPASS VALVES IN EACH MODULE
ASSEMBLY. THEY ALLOW FLUID TO CIRCULATE AND WARMUP THE RETURN
LINE. EVEN IF BOTH VALVES FAIL TO OPEN, THERE WILL STILL BE
ADEQUATE BRAKING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31105A   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2205-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31105
ITEM: TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODE (4), 3 AMPS

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [3 /1R]   [F]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
         IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS
DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY AND REMOVING THIS ITEM FROM CIL.
LOSS OF TWO DIODES IS LOSS OF A HYDRAULIC SYSTEM WHICH THEN
RESULTS IN 3/1R CRITICALITY.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

REPORT DATE   19 JUNE 1988   C.1-36

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31114
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2115-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31114
ITEM: PUSHBUTTON SWITCH (2), LANDING GEAR DOWN

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR DOWN CIRCUIT.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31115B
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2116-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31115
ITEM: LANDING GEAR TOGGLE SWITCH, S13

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION, FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT
ON SUBSYSTEM. CB60 REMAINS "OFF" UNTIL NEEDED. HOWEVER, IOA
ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31117   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2117-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31117
ITEM: PUSHBUTTON SWITCH, LDG GR ARM, 4PDT, ILLUMINATED

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT MANUAL "ON" CONTROL FROM CONTROL BUS TO
LATCHING RELAYS FOR LANDING GEAR ARM CIRCUIT. IOA DOES NOT
CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA RECOMMENDS: (1)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS, IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B,
AND LOWERING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE
MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31125   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2302-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31125
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (5 AMP)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                 ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

    NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ X ] *
    IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /    ]    [    ]   [ N ]    [    ]    [    ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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           [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]         [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND IOA
RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS SINCE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/1R.

TRANSFERRED OUT OF LANDING/DECEL. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE
NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31137
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2303-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31137
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (2), 5 AMP

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE [ ]
                                    INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF FMEA 2303-1
AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREEN B TO CONFORM TO
NSTS 22206.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING FUSE IS
FUNCTIONING

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31145
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BA-2406-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31145
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 1)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 1
HDC, IOA RECOMMENDS: DOWNGRADING CRITICALITY TO 3/3 AND COMBINING
FMEA'S 2406-1 AN 2406-2 TOGETHER TO CONFORM TO NSTS 22206.

IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY WHICH IS DUE TO A
MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31154
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2409-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31154
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 3)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE TYPE 3 HDC'S.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE FMEA TO THE CIL BECAUSE IT FAILS
REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS FUNCTION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31161   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31161
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE 1)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE UNCOVERED TYPE 1 HDC TO NASA'S
FMEA/CIL. THE HDC CONNECTS MAIN BUS DC POWER TO THE "WOW2"
CIRCUITS WITHIN BRAKE/SKID CONTROL BOX A.
MOVED TO NOSE WHEEL STEERING EPD&C.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31166
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-200200-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
  NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31166
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER (TYPE III)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA INCORPORATED FMEA INTO OTHER FMEAS. SEE ASSESSMENT LDGDEC-31164.
NASA HAS NOW GENERATED SEPARATE FMEAS AND THIS IS NOW COVERED BY
05-6BA-2410-2. NASA CONCURS WITH SCREEN B FAILING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31168A   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2501-2   BASELINE [X]
                                                    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31168
ITEM: LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'ARM' CONTROL
CIRCUITS

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
       IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [X]
REMARKS:
FMEA 2501-2 HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) AND
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FMEA AND ITS CIL BE DELETED. NASA
INCORPORATED 2501-2 INTO 2501-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.

REPORT DATE   19 JUNE 1988   C.1-46

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31170A   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2502-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31170
ITEM: LATCHING RELAY (6), LDG GR 'DOWN' CONTROL
CIRCUITS

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [X]

REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2502-2 AND ITS CIL BE DELETED, BECAUSE
IT HAS A NONCREDIBLE FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND. NASA
INCORPORATED 2502-2 INTO 2502-1.
NASA HAS DELETED FMEA.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31183   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BA-2578-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31183
ITEM: DIODE, 12 AMP

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING THE ISOLATION DIODE TO NASA'S CIL. THE
DIODE ISOLATES THE K6 & K7 ARM RELAYS FROM THE K8 DOWN RELAYS;
DIODE IS ALSO IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING POWER TO THE LDG GEAR
CONTROL VALVE AND THE LDG GEAR DUMP CONTROL VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF LOSS OF POWER TO OPERATE THESE VALVES
IF THE DIODE FAILS OPEN.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLINK PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF THIS STRING, THUS INDICATING IF DIODE FAILS
OPEN, PASSING THE SCREEN. NASA UPGRADED THIS FAILURE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31205
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BB-2241-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31205
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE FUSE (8), 2 AMP

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE GENERAL
PURPOSE FUSES. IOA RECOMMENDS: CHANGING THE REDUNANCY SCREENS
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B, AND DOWNGRADING FMEA TO A
3/1R. HOWEVER, IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY
WHICH IS DUE TO A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF REDUNDANCY
GROUNRULES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31210
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BB-2249-1

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [X]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31210
ITEM: CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR (4), 1.21K, 2W

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR FULLY WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE RPC
CONTROL CIRCUIT CURRENT LIMITING RESISTORS. IOA RECOMMENDS (1)
CHANGING THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS (2) ADDING FMEA 2249-1 TO THE CIL
SINCE IT FAILS REDUNDANCY SCREEN B.
FURTHER ANALYSIS INDICATES DOWNLIST PARAMETERS ARE AVAILABLE TO
DETERMINE STATUS OF STRING, THUS INDICATING THAT RESISTOR MUST BE
FUNCTIONING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31213A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6BB-2096-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31213
ITEM: GENERAL PURPOSE RELAY, NONLATCHING (2)

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT FMEA 2096-2 BE DELETED, BECAUSE IT IS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE (SHORTS TO GROUND) FOR THE NONLATCHING RELAYS. NASA INCORPORATED FMEA 2096-2 INTO 2096-3.
THIS FMEA DELETED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31221
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BB-2107-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [X]
  NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31221
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM	
		A	B	C		
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]	*
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDS DOWN-
GRADING FMEA 2107-3 TO CRITICALITY 3/3.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/23/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LDGDEC-31225
NASA FMEA #:   05-6BB-2106-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [X]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C
MDAC ID: 31225
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH, DPST

LEAD ANALYST: G. BEAIRD

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S EVALUATION OF THE "MAIN C" TOGGLE
SWITCH AND IOA RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE CRITICALITY TO 3/3.
NASA CRITICALITY IS NOW 3/3.

SECTION C.2

PURGE, VENT AND DRAIN SUBSYSTEM

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9035A   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   01-5-332404-6   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9035
ITEM: DESICCANT/FILTER OUTER CAVITY

LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.

REPORT   DATE 19 JULY 1988   C.2-2

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9036
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9036
ITEM: TUBING

LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [   ]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A PV&D FMEA/CIL WAS NOT FOUND FOR THE FAILURE MODE, WCCS OUTER
TUBING CLOGS. TUBING CLOGS WOULD DEGRADE WCCS DEPRESSURIZATION
AND REPRESSURIZATION CAPABILITY WITH POSSIBLE THERMAL PANE
RUPTURE.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA THAT THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT CREDIBLE,
EXCLUDING HUMAN ERRORS DURING REFURBISHMENT, AS DISCUSSED WITH
NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88 AND 4/4/88.
PORTS ARE PROTECTED BY DEBRIS SCREENS. LINE IS CHECKED FOR FREE
FLOW DURING VEHICLE TURNAROUND.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87
ASSESSMENT ID: PV&D-9037A
NASA FMEA #:   01-5-332406-5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PV&D
MDAC ID: 9037
ITEM: TUBING

LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY, BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER (J. JANNEY/ES3) ON 3/31/88. FORWARD/MID
WINDOWS DO NOT EXCEED DESIGN MARGINS FOR THIS FAILURE MODE,
ACCORDING TO ROCKWELL INT. ANALYSIS.

SECTION C.3

PYROTECHNICS SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4702
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-R103-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [X]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4702
ITEM: GUILLOTINE ASSY, PYROTECHNIC

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL HAS BEEN DELETED BY NASA. IOA CONCURS WITH
DELETION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4703
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4703
ITEM: PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-R105-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/1R NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4704
NASA FMEA #:   NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4704
ITEM: PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
RECOMMEND THAT CRITICALITY BE UPGRADED.
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-R106-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 3/1R NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4706   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-R104-2   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4706
ITEM: RELEASE NUT

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FMEA/CIL HAS BEEN DELETED BY NASA. IOA CONCURS WITH
DELETION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4707
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4707
ITEM: PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-R105-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 2/1R NNP. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: PYRO-4708
NASA FMEA #: NONE

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: PYROTECHNICS
MDAC ID: 4708
ITEM: PRESSURE CARTRIDGE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: W. W. ROBINSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NEW NASA FMEA # P2-4H-R107-1 HAS BEEN GENERATED FOR THIS
ASSESSMENT, CRITICALITY 1/1 NNN. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS
CRITICALITY.

SECTION C.4

ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
AND LIFE SUPPORT SUBSYSTEM

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1100   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1101-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1100
ITEM: H2 SEPARATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H2O MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
WITHDREW ISSUE.
H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2 IN SUPPLY H2O)
WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE MISSIONS WERE NOT
TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) H2O FLOODING THE FUEL
CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.

REPORT DATE   29 JUNE 1988   C.4-2

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1100A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1132-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1100
ITEM: H2 SEPARATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER IS LOST, AND THERE IS
NO OTHER WAY TO PROVIDE FOR THIS LOSS. THE PRESENCE OF H2 IN THE
WATER MAY CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH FES AND DUMP OPERATIONS, AND CREATE
CREW ILLNESS. THIS MAY HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT
SPECIALLY FOR THE EMU/EVA MISSION - RECHARGING THE EMU WATER
TANKS WITH THE H2/H2O MIXTURE IS HAZARDOUS AND SHOULD NOT BE
DONE. ALTERNATE WATER LINE PLUS FCP RELIEF LINE ARE AVAILABLE TO
EXPEL WATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCIES WITH THIS FAILURE WILL
DEAD-HEAD FUEL CELLS, THUS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE.
THIS FMEA WAS CONSIDERED SAME AS 06-2-1101-1 FOR THE FAILURE MODE
STUDIED, AND MAY THEREFOR BE COMBINED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. H2 SEPARATOR PROBLEMS ON PREVIOUS MISSIONS (H2
IN SUPPLY H2O) WERE CONCERNS BUT BY PROCEDURAL MANAGEMENT THE
MISSIONS WERE NOT TERMINATED. MAJOR PROBLEM (WORST CASE) IS H2O
FLOODING CELL LIST CRIT REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF 3.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1101
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1101-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1101
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT SEE HOW THE FAILURE OF THIS ITEM WILL HAVE ANY
EFFECT ON THE OPERATION OF THE RADIATORS OR AMMONIA BOILER IN
ORDER TO LOOSE TOTAL COOLING CAPABILITY.   LOSS OF WATER TO
REPLENISH THE TANKS, WILL FORCE MISSION TO BE SHORTED
(FLIGHT RULE 9-24). SINCE ADDITIONAL WATER WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE
FOR ON-ORBIT FES USE AND CREW REQUIREMENT. FUEL CELLS WILL NOT
BE DEAD-HEADED SINCE THIS FAILURE WILL ALWAYS RELIEVE THE WATER
OUT.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE
CRITICALITY IS DERIVED UPON A SCENERIO WHERE H2O LEAKAGE TO THE
VACUUM VENT DUCT CAN CAUSE UNCONTROLABLE BUILDUP OF ICE AT THE
OUTLET PORT WHICH CAN SEVERLY DAMAGE VEHICLE STRUCTURE DURING
ENTRY. EVEN IF THE FORMATION WERE FREED FROM THE VEHICLE VIA RMS
OR EVA THE BUILDUP COULD NOT BE CONTROLLED WHILE PREPARING FOR
ENTRY SINCE THE FUEL CELLS MUST CONTINUE TO OPERATE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1102
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1101-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: H2 SEPARATORS (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT: - WATER WILL FLOW
THROUGH TO THE TANKS; - LOSS OF ONE SEPARATOR IS SIGNIFICANT.
THE BACKUP SEPARATOR IS NOT ADEQUATE TO REMOVE ALL OF THE
HYDROGEN (WORST CASE). THE INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 (WITH WATER
FLOWING) WILL HAVE POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT AS EXPLAINED IN MDAC-
1100.
WITHDRAW ISSUES. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H2O. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1105
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1132-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1105
ITEM: MICROBIAL FILTER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION TERMINATION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1106
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1132-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1106
ITEM: MICROBIAL FILTER QUICK DISCONNECT (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1110   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-1132-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1110
ITEM: TANKS INLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.

C 2

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1113
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1165-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1113
ITEM: TANKS OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE (4)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235. THIS FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS LINES AND
FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. 1R IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1123-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1135
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1141 (LS-1135A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H2O FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1141-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1135
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH RELIEF VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE
FMEA 06-2-1123-1 (LS-1135).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H2O FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1135B
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1156-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1135
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCIES (FCP WATER LINES) WITH THIS
FAILURE WILL STILL PROVIDE TANK A ULLAGE TO MANAGE THE WATER.
MISSION TERMINATION IS EMMINENT, RETURN ON TANKS C AND D, OR JUST
TANK A. ALTERNATE FCP LINE WILL NOT PROVIDE HYDROGEN
REMOVAL. THE FMEA COVERS SEVERAL ITEMS AS ONE LINES & FITTINGS
ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING DANGER TO
CREW/VEHCILE.
THE NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERS THE FAILURE OF THE CAPABILITY TO
REMOVE H2O FROM THE FUEL CELLS WHICH REQUIRES FOUR FAILURES
BEFORE THE FUEL CELLS FLOOD. THIS FAILURE SHOULD HAVE MISSION
EFFECTS BEFORE THE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS EFFECTS CAN OCCUR. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE, THE FAILURE SHOULD BE A 2R, BUT THE NASA
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH IS UNDERSTOOD.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1136
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1123-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1136
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT THE FUEL CELLS WILL BE
DEAD HEADED AFTER R. VALVE FAILURE. CHECK VALVES IN THE FCP
WATER LINE WILL PREVENT BACK FLOW TO THE CELLS. FES OPERATION
WILL BE MAINTAINED BY COMBINED WATER IN TANKS A AND B DRAWING
APPROXIMATELY 80 LB/HR OF WATER. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF VALVES IN
THE FCP LINE ARE CONSIDERED UNASSOCIATED WITH THE FAILURE OF 1.5
PSID VALVE. NO PROBLEM IS ANTICIPATED POST MECO. FUNCTIONAL
LOSS (NO C.V.) WILL RESULT IN FLOW OF WATER THRU THE FCP VENT
LINE FOR 8-10 MINUTES DURING PRE-MECO. IOA CONSIDERED BOTH
VALVES IN ONE ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1141-2 (LS-1136A).
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING HARDWARE CRITICALITY
OF 2. EVEN THOUGH THE CHECK VALVES WILL KEEP BACKFLOW FROM
ENTERING THE FUEL CELLS THE HEAD PRESSURE CREATED FROM THE ASCENT
ACCELERATIONS CAN KEEP H2O FROM EXITING THE FUEL CELL BY
THE NORMAL H2O LINES. IF THIS OCCURS AND THE FUEL CELL RELIEF IS
PLUGGED THE 2/1R SITUATION EXISTS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1137   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1132-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1137
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSID (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [X]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1233. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN ONE LINES
AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1140
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1130-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1140
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1140A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1131-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1140
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1142
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1130-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1142
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1142A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1131-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1142
ITEM: QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1144
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1130-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1144
ITEM: CAP, GSE QD (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1144A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1131-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1144
ITEM: CAP, GSE QD (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED LOSS OF REDUNDANCIES TO BE LOSS OF FIRST O-RING
(QD) AND SECOND O-RING (CAP) WITH NO OTHER REDUNDANCIES. THE
MOST SEVERE EFFECT IS TO LOSE CAPABILITY TO REPLENISH SUPPLY
TANKS FOR CONTINUOUS FES USAGE. OPERATIONALLY, TANKS C AND D ARE
ISOLATED FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES OR UNTIL NOMINAL DEORBIT.
THEREFORE, FES IS ONLY PARTIALLY LOST DURING ON-ORBIT WHICH MAY
IMPACT MISSION (P/L REQUIREMENT, MISSION REQUIREMENT). FAILURE
OF RADIATOR OR ABS ARE NON-REDUNDANT ITEMS AND UNASSOCIATED WITH
THE QD/CAP. IOA CONSIDERED QD & CAP SEPARATELY, BUT AGREES TO
STUDY THEM AS ONE UNIT.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. THE ABOVE ASSESSMENT IS RIGHT. FURTHER
RECONFIGURATIONS AND PROPER MANAGEMENT WILL PRECLUDE FES
PROBLEMS; BUT FORMATION OF ICE EXTERIOR TO THE PORTS IS A MAJOR
THREAT DURING THE ENTRY PHASE. CRITICALITY SHOULD REFLECT
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BUT ONLY AFTER 3 FAILURES IS THE
DANGER OF ICE DAMAGE TO VEHICLE POSSIBLE. QD & CAP MUST LEAK &
ICE MUST EXIT THE AREA WHERE THE QD IS LOCATED. MOST LIKELY
RESULT IS THAT BUILD UP WILL STOP LEAK WITH NO ILL EFFECTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1154
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1165-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1154
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA CONSIDERED SEVERAL ITEMS IN
ONE LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.
THE VALVE CONSTRUCTION IS SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO
TAKE PLACE TO GIVE A LEAK THAT AFFECTS BOTH SIDES OF OUTLET
SYSTEM AND THUS CAUSE A FES LOSS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1167
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1165-2

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1167
ITEM: ISOL VALVE, FES B LINE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE MDAC-1235 FOR REMARKS. THE FMEA COVERED SEVERAL ITEMS INTO
ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1183A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VD-2033-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1183
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H2O SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H2O IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1184
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VD-2033-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1184
ITEM: SWITCH, GALLEY VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H2O SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H2O IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1189
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VD-2005-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1189
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, GALLEY VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
UPDATE TO NEW CRITICALITY.
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER A NEW CRITICALITY WAS AGREED UPON. THE CRITICALITY IS
DERIVED FROM THE INLET SIDE H2O SYSTEMS LEAKS RESULTING IN FREE
H2O IN THE CABIN WHICH IS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE
GALLY THE LINE IF LEAKING CAN BE ISOLATED VIA A QUICK DISCONNECT
WHICH IS CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN ISOLATING THE LEAK.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1193
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1165-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1193
ITEM: DUMP ISOL VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[F]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE CREW MODULE OR OUTSIDE TO THE
MIDBODY UNLESS THE LEAK IS STOPPED BY SHUTTING OFF THE TANKS A
AND B OUTLET VALVES AND X-OVER VALVE.   IN THIS CASE, THE USE OF
A/L SUPPORT (EVA MISSION) AND TWO TANKS ARE LOST FROM THE
WATER MANAGEMENT - MISSION IMPACT. NO REDUNDANCY EXISTS TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS. ALSO, LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCIES (FESB, FCP RELIEF) WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN
CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO CABIN - FCP OPERATING. THIS FMEA
INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO ONE ANALYSIS FOR LINES AND FITTINGS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE. LEAKS IN THE
OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES INLET) CAN WITH A
SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY
FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND RADIATORS ARE THEN
AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO
FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1210   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VD-2028-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1210
ITEM: SWITCH, DUMP VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
BASED ON VERY LIMITED FMEA-EPD&C DATA (ONLY A CRIT SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
DUMP MAY BE CONTROLLED VIA DUMP ISOLATION VALVE AND THE
CONTINGENCY COLLECTION DEVICE IS AVAILABLE FOR SUBSEQUENT WASTE
WATER MANAGEMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1228   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1135-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1228
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-
2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO
THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW
INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER
(TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN
STILL BE ACHIEVED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOOSE THE FES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1228A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1162-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1228
ITEM: QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DID NOT KNOW OF THE CAP. BASED ON THE SAME RATIONING AS 06-2-1124-2, HYDROPHOBIC FILTER, FOR WHICH THE WATER WILL LEAK INTO THE CABIN, THIS SHOULD BE 3/2R. LOSS OF FUNCTION WITH NO CREW INTERVENTION WILL RESULT IN CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER (TANK B ONLY) INTO THE CABIN. ALSO, THE DUMP WITH X-TIE CAN STILL BE ACHIEVED. THIS FMEA INCLUDES SEVERAL ITEMS INTO LINES AND FITTINGS ANALYSIS-SEE FMEA 06-2-1135-2 (LS-1228).
WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS ASSESSMENT WAS MISTAKENLY MADE BETWEEN THE CONTINGENCY CROSSTIE BETWEEN THE SUPPLY & WASTE H2O SYSTEMS AND THE FOUR-WAY CROSS-FITTING ON THE SUPPLY WATER INLET LINES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1233
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1132-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1233
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1233A
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1162-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1233
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE FMEA, ABOUT THE FAILURES OF THE
RADIATOR AND ABS. THESE ITEMS ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH THE ITEM
BEING STUDIED. CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER INTO THE MID-BODY OR
CREW MODULE - LEAK CANNOT BE ISOLATED WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE
FCP.
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY
BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IOA PERSONNEL AND THE NASA
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS DETERMINED TO BE
CORRECT. A LEAK IN THE INLET SIDE IF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM
RESULTS IN FREE H2O IN THE CABIN. THE DEPLETION OF FES WATER
WOULD NOT BE A RESULT OF THE DESIGN BUT POOR WATER MANAGEMENT
DECISIONS. FREE WATER IN THE CABIN SHOULD DICTATE MISSION
TERMINATION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1234
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1156-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1234
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[P]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]

FOR LEAKAGE BETWEEN THE A/B AND B/C RELIEF VALVES: 1) CONTINUOUS
FLOW OF FCP (PRIME/ALTER) TO CREW CABIN - NO WAY TO ISOLATE LEAK
WITHOUT SHUTTING DOWN THE FUEL CELLS, 2) TANKS C/D AVAILABLE FOR
RETURN WITH EXISTING LEAK.
FOR LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE B/C RELIEF VALVE: - TANKS C AND D
COULD BE ISOLATED, AND TANK B KEPT LOW IN ORDER TO ISOLATE THE
LEAKAGE - LESS SEVERE THAN PREVIOUS CASE.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1235   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1165-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1235
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1235A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1164-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1235
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LEAKAGE UPSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS C/D TO BE SHUT
DOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE B, AND TWO
TANKS RESERVE; - TANKS A AND B AND FES FEEDLINE A AVAILABLE.
LEAKAGE DOWNSTREAM OF THE X-OVER VALVE: - TANKS A AND B TO BE
SHUTDOWN IN ORDER TO STOP THE LEAK; - LOSS OF FES FEEDLINE A,
PRIMARY DUMP, X-TIE FUNCTION, AND A/L SUPPORT; - ONLY TWO TANKS
AVAILABLE PLUS FES FEEDLINE B.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IR IS THE MOST CRITICAL FAILURE.
LEAKS IN THE OUTLET SIDE OF THE SUPPLY H2O SYSTEM (i.e. FES
INLET) CAN WITH A SECOND FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF THE FES WHICH
LEAVES NO REDUNDANCY FOR ENTRY COOLING, SINCE ONLY THE ABS AND
RADIATORS ARE THEN AVAILABLE. THE CROSSOVER VALVE PROVIDES
ISOLATION SUCH THAT TWO FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO LOSE THE FES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/28/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-1255X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-1103-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 1255
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, H2 VENT

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE LOSS OF FUNCTION PLUS THIS FAILURE WILL ONLY RESULT IN
INABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM WATER - WATER FROM FCP STILL FLOWS TO
THE TANKS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST CRITICALITY REFLECTING POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
THE GREATEST CONCERN IS H2 IN EMU H2O. FIRST FAILURE MEANS THE
H2 CONCENTRATION WILL INCREASE. SECOND FAILURE (2ND SEPARATOR)
MEANS FURTHER PROBLEMS. IF WATER MANAGEMENT PROCEDURALLY ALLOWS
H2 INTO THE EMU SOURCE TANK C, PROBLEMS CAN BE EXPECTED AND
LOSS OF CREWMAN IS POSSIBLE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0435-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2040
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[　]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[　/ 　] [　] [　] [　] [　]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW BUT ALSO INCLUDES ARS LINES.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2040A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0443-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2040
ITEM: WCS TO WWS QD (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE QD BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2044   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0435-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2044
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2044A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0443-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2044
ITEM: WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE DYNATUBE BY RESTRICTED FLOW ONLY
RESTRICTS THE USE OF THE WCS, IN WHICH CASE THE FCB AND UCD
SUPPLIES MUST BE USED. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES MAY BE
INSUFFICIENT FOR MISSION DURATION, THUS CREATING A MISSION LOSS
CRITICALITY 3/2R PNP. THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION
OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA
ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.
THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA
ANALYSIS. WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB
AND UCD ARE ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS
REDUNDANCY IN THE STRICKEST SENSE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2048   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0401-4   BASELINE [   ]
                                                  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2048
ITEM: MANUAL VENT VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

          NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
          IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE VALVE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE DEVELOPS SUCH THAT
THE AIR FLOW IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE VALVE CONTROLLER (PAST 2 SEALS)
THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE WOULD BE POSSIBLE DUE TO
UNCONTROLLED CABIN PRESSURE LOSS IF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE DID NOT FUNCTION TO RESTRICT THE AIR FLOW. THE RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/1R PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. IF THE
VALVE LEAKS THE ONLY REDUNDANCY LEFT IS THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION
VALVE. THUS CRITICALITY IS 2/1R.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2126
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0314-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2126
ITEM: WASTE TANK N2 HYDROPHOBIC FILTER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE FAILURE OF THE FILTER IS NO CRITICALITY CHANGE,
HOWEVER IF THE LOSS OF THE BELLOWS OCCURS THEN THE FCB AND UCD
MUST BE USED AS REDUNDANT SUPPLIES WHICH MAY REQUIRE TERMINATION
OF THE MISSION BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT UCD SUPPLIES PAST
3-DAYS USAGE. THE NEW CRITICALITY SHOULD BE 3/2R FNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT, AS STATED IN
PREVIOUS IOA REMARKS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2131   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0420-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2131
ITEM: GSE FILL AND PLUG (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO CLOSE
IOA COMMENT: IF THE LEAKAGE DEVELOPS AFTER GROUND SERVICING AND
THE CAP, AS SECONDARY SEAL, ALSO FAILS, THEN A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS
OF LIFE OCCURS DUE TO CABIN PRESSURE LOSS FOR A CRITICALITY OF
3/1R FFP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE CONDITION OF A POTENTIAL CABIN
ATMOSPHERE LEAK, IF A SECOND FAILURE OCCURED IN THE REDUNDANCY
STREAM, TO BE A LIFE CRITICAL CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY CORRECT. IF THE IOA FAILURE
OCCURS THE LEAK RATE WOULD BE SUCH THAT THE CABIN PRESSURE COULD
BE MAINTAINED EASILY, BASED UPON LINE SIZE AND CONSTRUCTION OF
THE QD AND CAP SEALING CAPABILITIES. THUS MISSION LOSS SHOULD
BE WORST CASE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2136   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0438-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2136
ITEM: DUMP LINES, FITTINGS, JOINTS AND UNIONS

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A
LOSS OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/1R PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2137
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0438-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2137
ITEM: DUMP LINES, FITTINGS AND CONNECTIONS

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW.
IOA COMMENT: THE RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE DUMP LINE PRODUCES A LOSS
OF MISSION WITH NO CHANGE IN CRITICAL EVENTS.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/1R PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2141   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0438-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2141
ITEM: QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. FILTER (2)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
              HDW/FUNC        A      B      C

      NASA  [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]  [ P ]  [ P ]     [ X ] *
       IOA  [ 2 /2  ]      [   ]  [   ]  [   ]     [ X ]

COMPARE     [   /N  ]      [ N ]  [ N ]  [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 2 /2 ]       [   ]  [   ]  [   ]       [ A ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF
CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO
LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/1R PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2142A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0438-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2142
ITEM: HIGH CAPACITY FILTER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
NOTE TO NASA: WHY ARE 06-2-0423-1 AND 06-2-0438-1 NOT CONSISTENT
FOR CRITICALITY?
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT
PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY FOR THE WASTE WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/1R PPP CRTICALITY FOR SUPPLY WATER DUMP
CONSIDERATIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2144
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0431-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2144
ITEM: CONTINGENCY H2O CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: INABILITY TO MATE/DE-MATE, FAILS TO OPEN, RESTRICTED FLOW
NASA FM: FAILS CLOSED, RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF DUMP LINE AND WCS FUNCTION REQUIRES USE OF CONTINGENCY WASTE COLLECTION METHODS AND A LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF ARS CONDENSATE STORAGE CAPABILITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS TEAM COULD NOT DETERMINE ANY APPARENT REDUNDANT PATHS FOR THIS HARDWARE OR FUNCTION
WITHDRAW ISSUE. IN THE STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H2O AND 3/1R FOR SUPPLY H2O. THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER HAS FOREGONE WASTE CRITICALITY SAYING ONLY SUPPLY TO WASTE FLOW WILL BE ALLOWED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2189
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VF-2001-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2189
ITEM: DUMP VALVE/NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [ ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE WASTE WATER DUMP REQUIRES USE OF
THE CWC FOR FLUID STORAGE THUS 3/2R CRITICALITY, NOT LOSS OF
LIFE.
THE NASA VIEWED ANY LOSS OF WATER DUMP CAPABILITY, EITHER SUPPLY
OR WASTE WATER, AS A LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE CONDITION. HOWEVER
THE IOA ANALYSIS DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS LIMITATION AND VIEWED THE
LOSS OF WASTE WATER DUMP CAPABILITY TO
BE ONLY A LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H2O
AND 3/1R FOR SUPPLY H2O, THUS THE 3/1R APPLIES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2191   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2191
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H2O AND 3/1R FOR SUPPLY H2O, THUS THE 3/1R APPLIES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2192   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VE-2024-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2192
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU THE NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT DUMP CAN STILL BE DONE
THRU THE SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE OPEN PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF THE
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS - THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED
THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE
THREATENING CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE
STRICTEST SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR
WASTE H2O AND 3/1R FOR SUPPLY H2O, THUS THE 3/1R APPLIES.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2193
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2024-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2193
ITEM: DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[P] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
NASA FM: OPEN, SHORT TO GROUND WHILE VALVE CLOSED.
IOA COMMENT: LOSS OF SWITCH ELIMINATES WASTE WATER DUMP
CAPABILITY THRU NORMAL CHANNELS. IF THE FAILURE OCCURS DURING A
VALVE CLOSED PHASE, THEN A POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE CAN OCCUR IF
THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE ALSO FAILS-THUS A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R
PNP.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION. INCORPORATE MDAC IOA CRITICALITY. IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE THIS SHOULD HAVE A DUAL CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR WASTE H2O
AND 3/1R FOR SUPPLY H2O, THUS THE 3/1R APPLIES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2211
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0418-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2211
ITEM: VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[P]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DETERMINED TO BE A "NON-CREDIBLE"
CONDITION OF BLOCKED FLOW IN THE VACUUM VENT LINE, HOWEVER IF
PLAUSIBLE A POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT DUE TO HYDROGEN GAS
CONCENTRATIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE, HENCE THE 1/1 CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. A SECOND FAILURE
WHICH INDUCES O2 INTO THE ENVIRONMENT IS REQUIRED TO PRODUCE AN
EXPLOSIVE ENVIRONMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2213
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2213
ITEM: VACUUM VENT LINE HEATER THERMOSTAT (2)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
REVISE CRITICALITY TO 3/3. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ASSESSED
AGAINST 06-2E-0424 & 0425. THE FAILURE OF THE THERMOSTAT EITHER
CLOSED OR OPEN DOES NOT CREATE A PROBLEM. WHEN CLOSED THE
WATTAGE IS NOT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH TO OVER TEMP THE LINE AND IF
OPEN THE
REDUNDANT HEATER IS AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH THE GAS FLOWING THROUGH
THIS 2 INCH LINE ACTUALLY DOES NOT REQUIRE HEATING. IF H2O IS
INDUCED IN THE LINE (i.e. H2 SEPARATOR FAILURE) THE HEATER IS TO
SMALL TO STOP FREEZING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2218   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2006-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2218
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS              CIL
                 FLIGHT                                        ITEM
                HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

      NASA    [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]        [   ] *
       IOA    [ 1 /1 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]        [ X ] *

   COMPARE    [ N /N ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]        [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]        [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2219
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2219
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[_ / _]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 / 1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N / N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 / 3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN
THERE WAS NO NASA WMS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2220
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VE-2411-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2220
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2220A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2025-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2220
ITEM: NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA FM: SHORTED. NASA FM: OPEN, SHORTED TO GROUND.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2222   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0425-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2222
ITEM: VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HEATER (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[A]
				(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA FM: ELECTRICAL OPEN, SHORT. NASA FM: OPEN. NOTE: THE
NASA CRITICALITY WERE 2R/3 DURING A PREVIOUS ANALYSIS.
IOA COMMENT: IF THE POSSIBILITY FOR LINE FREEZING IS ACCEPTED,
DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE VACUUM VENT HEATERS, THEN LOSS OF THE
HEATERS COULD CAUSE LINE FREEZING AND A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS GAS
ENVIRONMENT.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT DUMP LINE BY
BLOCKAGE OR LOSS OF THE HEATERS AS A POTENTIAL LOSS OF
LIFE/VEHICLE CONDITION. A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS ATMOSPHERE OF
HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN COULD OCCUR IF THE LINE WERE BLOCKED.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE HEATER IS
SIZED TO KEEP ANY FROST FROM BUILDING UP IN THE DUCT. THE
MOISTURE (VERY LOW LEVEL) IS VENTED OVERBOARD FROM THE COMMODE OR
THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. ANY FREEZING IN THIS CASE WOULD NOT
COMPLETELY BLOCK FLOW NOR WOULD THE ICE BUILD UP BE SIGNIFICANT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2233X
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0443-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2233
ITEM: WCS CHECK VALVE LINES TO WWS QD

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
THOSE NASA FMEA WHICH INCLUDE A COLLECTION OF HARDWARE ITEMS MAY
NOT MATCH THE IOA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ANALYSES PROVIDED SEPARATE
ANALYSES FOR EACH PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE
NASA FMEA DID AGREE WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2236X   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0445-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2236
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2237X
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-0445-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2237
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (1)

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW
IOA COMMENT: NOT VIEWED AS IMMEDIATE MISSION CRITICAL BECAUSE OF
FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES. THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLY USAGE MAY CREATE A
LOSS OF MISSION DEPENDING ON MISSION DURATION DUE TO LACK OF
SUPPLIES.
THE IOA ANALYSIS VIEWED THE FIRST FAILURE TO BE A NON-MISSION
ESSENTIAL CRITICALITY, HOWEVER SECONDARY FAILURES COULD CREATE
MAJOR PROBLEMS. THE NASA FMEA CRITICALITY VIEWED THE FIRST
FAILURE TO BE AT LEAST A MISSION LOSS, IF NOT A LIFE THREATENING
CONDITION.
WITHDRAW ISSUE. LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE FCB AND UCD ARE
ONLY A ONE DAY SUPPLY AND ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS REDUNDANCY IN THE
STRICKEST SENSE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2252X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2037-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 2252
ITEM: WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND
IOA COMMENT: THE FIRST FAILURE IS POTENTIAL PROBLEM IF VALVE
OPEN AT FAILURE BECAUSE OF LOST CONTINGENCY DUMP CAPABILITY.
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE IF
DUMP VALVE IS OPEN AT FAILURE, THUS CRITICALITY 2/1R PNP.
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE
REDUNDANT PATHS.
INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY AS RECOMMENDED FOR THE WASTE
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS AND ADD 3/1R PPP CRITICALITY FOR SUPPLY
WATER DUMP CONSIDERATIONS. CONSISTENT WITH ALL OTHER WASTE WATER
DUMP COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE DUMP ISOLATION VALVE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3001
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, 1B/3A, 1A/2B (CB8, 7, 7)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
PER NSTS-222006 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE
THE SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF
CIRCUIT BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE
ADDITION TO THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER
FDA IF THE OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE
SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3003
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3003
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3005
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2000-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3005
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE SENSOR.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION.
SINCE DETECTABILITY IS AVAILABLE WITH STATION COVERAGE AND THE
ITEM IS ALREADY A CIL IT APPEARS THE ITEM HAS BEEN GIVEN
SUFFICIENT VISABILITY WITHIN THE CCB AND PRCB.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3027
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2075-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3027
ITEM: RESISTOR A1R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, R10, R11
(1.2K)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [D]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ALARM STILL WILL BE ISSUED VIA THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA
PARAMETER AND THE APPROPRIATE FIRE LIGHT WILL ILLUMINATE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3030
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3030
ITEM: DIODE A1CR1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [D]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FAILURE IS DETECTED BY THE SMOKE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION FDA
ALERT AND SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3033
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2075-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3033
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R11, R12 (1.2K)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P }   [D]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THESE RESISTORS ONLY EFFECT THE PAYLOAD SMOKE DETECTION ALL OTHER
ALARMS WORK TO INDIACTE THE FIRE. BUT THE LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY (ALL ALARM OUTPUTS) COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN
LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHCILE.
NASA CRITCALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3036   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2251-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3036
ITEM: DIODE A6CR1, CR2

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [D]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
ALL OTHER ALARMS WORK TO INDICATE THE FIRE AND THE SOURCE CAN BE
IDENTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION, WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALITY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3042   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2311-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3042
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTION LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [D]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED INFLIGHT WHEN ALARMS ANNUNCIATE THE FIRE
BUT LIGHT DOES NOT. SOFTWARE FDA PROVIDES SOURCE OF FIRE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (B SCREEN,
P). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/09/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3054   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2253-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3054
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[N]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [N]   [P]   [   ]
                                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
POST LAUNCH, OPEN ACTUALLY ISOLATES THE GROUND CIRCUIT BETTER
THAN ANY OTHER CONDITION AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT
PRE-LAUNCH THE CIRCUIT PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A FIRE
THROUGH GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITIES. THIS DIODE, THE ON BOARD
CIRCUIT, AND THE PORTABLE BOTTLES MUST FAILS TO RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. CONSIDERATIONS OF PREMATURE FIRING ARE ACTUALLY A
FAIL SAFE CONDITION.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3055
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2073-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3055
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (5.11K)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[N]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [N]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3057
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2302-2

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3057
ITEM: PYRO CONTROLLER NO. 1, 2, 3

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[N]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A PREMATURE OPERATION OF THIS CIRCUIT (SHORT INTERNAL) CAN
INHIBIT THE ACTUAL FIRE VOLTAGE BY NOT ALLOWING THE CAPACITOR
VOLTAGE TO BUILD UP. THUS THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY IS 1/1. IF
THE NSI CAN FIRE AT A LOWER VOLTAGE OR IF THE FAILURE FIRES THE
NSI PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL FIRE COMMAND THE FAILURE WOULD BE A
CRITICALITY 3/3 SINCE THE DESIRE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA RECOMMENDED
CRITICALITY. IOA REMARKS WERE SUBSTANTIATED BY NASA SUBSYTEM
MANAGER FOR THE BASIC EPD&C COMPONENTS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3059   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-330001-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3059
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT THAN ONE FMEA/CIL: 1) THE
FAILURE BY ITSELF SHOULD BE INDICATED BY ILLUMINATION OF THE
AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. UPON DISCHARGE (ASSUMING A HIGH LEAD
RATE) THE AV BAY WOULD BE PROTECTED FOR UP TO 50 HRS. THUS THE
FAILURE ONLY HAS MISSION TERMINATION EFFECTS AND LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE ARE NOT THE CONCERN; 2) THE FAILURE ASSUMING A SLOW
LEAK WOULD REDUCE THIS AV BAY PROTECTION TIME BUT DETECTION WOULD
STILL BE INDICATED VIA THE AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. IF THE RATE
IS SLOW ENOUGH IT WILL BE DETECTED BY GROUND CHECKOUT BETWEEN
MISSION; 3) THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS IF FOLLOWING GROUND CHECKOUT THE
RESISTOR THAT PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING FOR THE CIRCUIT FAILS
OPEN OR THE PRESSURE SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED, OR THE
CIRCUIT IS SHORTED TO GROUND NO AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT
ILLUMINATION CAN TAKE PLACE AND THEN THIS FAILURE CAN BE
CATASTROPHIC IF THE LEAK IS UNDETECTED AND COMPLETE PRIOR TO
LIFT-OFF. THUS THE FAILURE WOULD APPEAR AS A 1R/2.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE LEAK OF THE BOTTLE COULD
RESULT IN NO SUPPRESSANT TO FIGHT A SUBSEQUENT FIRE AND
CREW/VEHICLE ARE AT RISK. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY
BASED ON GREATER VISABILITY.

REPORT DATE 29 JUNE 1988   C.4-74

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3062   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-371000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3062
ITEM: PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
A JAMMED ACTUATOR WILL BE KNOW IMMEDIATELY UPON USAGE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE. SINCE THE DIFFERENCE IN SCREEN B HAS NO
EFFECT ON THE ANALYSIS OUTCOME THE NASA ANALYSIS IS CONSIDERED
GOOD.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3063
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2204-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3063
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE III) (3)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3064
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2203-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3064
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [N]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE
SYSTEMS.
WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3148X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2028-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3148
ITEM: SW-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [A]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FAILURE COUPLED WITH A FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY
CAN INHIBIT THE DISCHANGE OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER.
WORST CASE IS DURING ASCENT AND DEORBIT.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY IS NOT CONSIDERED A
CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THAT DEVICE. THUS THE CIRCUIT IS SUCH THAT
THE CAPACITOR BANK WILL CHARGE UP AND DISCHARGE EVEN WITH THIS
FAILURE. THE DIFFERENCE IN OPERATION IS THAT THE AGENT DISCH SW
DOES NOT NEED TO BE DEPRESSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/09/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3154X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2253-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3154
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [X] *
         IOA   [2 /1R]   [F]   [P]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [N]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [2 /1R]   [F]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE AS RUN GROUND TURNAROUND TEST UNDER MOST CONDITIONS WILL NOT
DETECT THE FAILURE.
NASA CRITICALITY CHANGED TO AGREE WITH IOA CRITICALITY (A SCREEN,
F). THE ACCUMULATED RESULTS TABLE (SMOKE) DATED 3/14/88
INDICATES THE LATEST NASA ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE IOA ANALYSIS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3164X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3164
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[1 /1] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
PRELAUNCH PORTABLE BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE TO DISCHARGE SUPPRESSANT
INTO THE BAY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR ONORBIT AND LANDING/SAFING.
DURING LIFT OFF AND DEORBIT, A FAILURE OF THE PRE-FLIGHT BUS
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE THE COMMAND VIA THIS FAILURE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE IOA ASSESSMENT RATIONALE THAT CONSIDERED USE OF THE PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER AS ANOTHER BACKUP IS SUSPECT. IN THE VERTICAL
POSITION THE REACH FROM THE AFT AREA TO THE AV BAY FIRE PORTS IS
RATHER DIFFICULT.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3166X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6V-2201-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3166
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKE DETECTOR GROUND
RESET

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FAILURE IS DETECTABLE THROUGH THE REDUNDANT SENSING
CAPABILITY.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE DETERMINATION OF ON-ORBIT DETECTABILITY IS AT QUESTION. THE
IOA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE FAILURE DETECTABLE AND ISOLATABLE
UPON SENSOR ACTIVATION; WHERE-AS NASA CONSIDERED IT NON-
DETECTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD BE IN EXISTANCE A LONG TIME BEFORE
THE SENSOR IS ACTIVATED. THIS IS ANOTHER CASE OF THE APPLICATION
OF DETECTABILITY AS DEFINED IN NSTS-22206. IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA
ANALYSIS BASED UPON THE HIGHER CRITICALTY WHICH PROVIDES EVEN
GREATER VISABILITY INTO THE FAILURE AND ITS EFFECTS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3258X
NASA FMEA #:   06-2-311000-03

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 3258
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTOR (9)

LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TEST THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF THE
CONCENTRATION PARAMETER WOULD BE TO VERIFY A KNOWN CONCENTRATION
LEVEL WHICH THE PROCEDURES DO NOT ATTEMPT. SIMILAR LOGIC APPLIES
TO THE INFLIGHT CASE.
WITHDRAW THE IOA ISSUE.
THE ISSUE AS DEFINED IS BASED ON A MIS-MATCH OF FAILURES. THE
NASA FAILURE IS AN ABSOLUTE FAILURE OF THE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT
(i.e. THE SIGNAL THAT IS THE CONCENTRATION LEVEL SENSED INTERNAL
TO THE SENSOR). THE IOA FAILURE CONSIDERED THE SENSOR COULD
NOT DETECT CHANGES IN CONSENTRATION LEVEL AND ONLY OUTPUT A
CONSTANT VALUE WHICH INDICATION WOULD BE GIVEN. BASED UPON THE
CONFUSION AND HIGHER CRITICALITY THE NASA CRITICALITY IS
ACCEPTED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5003
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5003
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE LIST NASA CRITICALTIY. THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS HARDWARE DEPENDS ON HOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN NSTS 22206 ARE INTERPRETED AND WHETHER THE
FAILURE EFFECT IS LOSS OF PLANNED OR LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA
CAPABILITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THAT THE TWO EMU
WATER SUPPLY VALVES PROVIDE SOME DEGREE IF REDUNDANCY WHICH
SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY. ALSO, THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO WOULD BE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW BECAUSE OF
LOSS OF EVA CONTINGENCY CAPABILTIY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS
WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5005
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1206-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5005
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5005. LOSS OF THE FUNCTION TO SEAL THE WATER
ON THE LINE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOSS OF FES. A REVALVING OF THE
SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THE FAILURE; HOWEVER EVA
MISSIONS ARE STILL LOST.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST THE NASA CRITICALITY.
BOTH NASA/RI AND IOA ANALYSIS AGREE THAT THE HARDWARE FAILURE
MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI IF THE FAILURE
EFFECT IS CONSIDERED TO BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2008-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5006
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS OF DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE
THE LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2008-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5006
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[N]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5009
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5003).
NASA DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT IOA & NASA'A CRITICALITIES ARE
CONSISTENT WITH #5003 & 06-1A-1206-1 THUS, THE ISSUE FOLLOWS THE
LOGIC OF ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT
#5003, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE
OF SCREENS A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5011
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1212-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5011
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5011. PRE 51-L ANALYSIS SAYS LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. HOWEVER, WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN, THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO WMU WASTE
WATER VALVES DO PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. THIS SHOULD BE REFLECTED BY
ASSIGNING EITHER A 3/1R OR 3/2R CRITICALITY DEPENDING ON WHETHER
THE FAILURE EFFECT IS CONSIDERED LOSS OF CONTINGENCY OR LOSS
OF PLANNED EVA CAPABILITY. SINCE ALL SCREENS PASS, THE FAILURE
MODE WILL BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM. THEREFORE, THE IOA
ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5014   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2009-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5014
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5014A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2009-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5014
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

     NASA  [ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]     [ NA]     [ P ]     [   ] *
     IOA   [ 2 /2  ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [  /  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]          [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011),
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY, THUS MISSION LOSS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5017
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2001-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5017
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5017. ASSUMING TWO CREWMEN THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMEN. THUS LOSS OF CB FORCES THE VALVE TO
REMAIN CLOSED AND LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FUTHER REVIEW, AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #50011,
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE
AND THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5020
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1208-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5020
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5020. FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO
SERVICE THE EMU'S. HOWEVER, AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM.
FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH ASSESSMENT #5003,
THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL
SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5022   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5022
ITEM: O2 SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NO EXISTING EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA WAS FOUND FOR THIS FAILURE (SEE
IOA ANALYSIS #5022).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
THIS SHOULD HAVE REFERENCED NASA FMEA # 06-1C-1510-1 WHICH SHOWS
A CRITICALTIY OF 1/1. SINCE IT COMBINES ALL LINES & FITTINGS
THAT IS THE WORST CASE CRITICALTIY. WHEN THE AIRLOCK IS
CONSIDERED BY ITSELF THE CRITICALITY IS 2/1R DUE TO ISOLATION
CAPABILITIES. THUS THE IOA ANALYSIS WAS TO A FINER LEVEL AND
BOTH THE NASA AND IOA CRITICALITIES ARE CORRECT.

REPORT DATE   29 JUNE 1988   C.4-93

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5025   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1201-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5025
ITEM: EMU O2 SUPPLY VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5025. ASSUMING A BASELINE OF TWO SUITED
CREWMEMBERS AND NO CREW ACTION (RULE 2.3.3.f OF NSTS 22206). TWO
CREWMEMBERS SHARING ONE SCU IS NOT A "NOMINAL CREW ACTION", THUS
LOSS OF MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THIS FAILURE IS ANALOGOUS
TO THE EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE FAILURE ADDRESSED IN ASSESSMENT #
5003. IT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED A 3/2R CRITICALITY AND EXCLUDED AS A
CIL ITEM SINCE ALL REDUDNANCY SCREENS ARE PASSED. THIS
FAILURE IS SIMILIAR TO THAT LISTED IN LS-5017.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5026   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1201-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5026
ITEM: EMU O2 SUPPLY VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5026. LOSS OF O2 ISOLATION FUNCTION LEADS TO
LOSS OF EVA AND SHUTTLE MISSION. THIS IS BECAUSE LV3 AND LV4
WOULD BE CLOSED, AND THIS ACTION ISOLATES THE LEH'S. THUS, UPON
FUNCTION LOSS, THE MISSION IS TERMINATED AND DEORBIT PLANNED
FOR THE NEXT PLS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE NASA/RI ANALYSIS OF THIS FAILURE
MODE REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206. THEREFORE,
THE NASA EVALUATION IS ACCEPTABLE AND THE INCLUSION OF THE EMU O2
SUPPLY VALVE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM IS
APPROPRIATE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5029   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1128-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5029
ITEM: DEPRESS CAP VENT (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5030
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1127-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5030
ITEM: CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5031   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1127-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5031
ITEM: CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5032A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1126-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5032
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE MORE CONSERVATIVE EVALUATION OF THIS
FAILURE MODE BY NASA/RI AND THE INCLUSION OF THE FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.

REPORT DATE   29 JUNE 1988   C.4-99

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5033   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1126-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5033
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
    IOA   [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE TWO EQUALIZATION
VALVES ON THE AIRLOCK HATCH LEADING TO THE PAYLOAD BAY PROVIDE
REDUNDANCY TO THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CONTINGENCY EVA;
THEREFORE, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1603-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5035
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1603-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5035
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN
EVA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.
THE EQUALIZATION CAPS ARE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE START OF AN EVA,
THEREFORE THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF AN INABILITY TO REMOVE THE
CAPS ON THE AIRLOCK TO CABIN HATCH WOULD BE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THREE PATHS EXIST, THE
DEPRESS VALVE AND TWO EQUALIZATION VALVE/CAPS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5036   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1603-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5036
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE VALVE IS AN UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY TO THE CAP. HOWEVER THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY
PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT
#LS-5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/1R
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5040   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1601-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5040
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES THE WORST SCENARIO WOULD BE
LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (IR FUNCTIONAL CRITICALTIY).
TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK COMPONENT FAILURES,
THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO THE HARDWARE
FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION REPRESENTS A MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GROUNDRULES
CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE 2/1R
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE AS A CIL
ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5041   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1601-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5041
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
WOULD BE LOSS OF CONTINGENCY EVA CAPABILITY (1R FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY). TO BE CONSISTANT WITH OTHER ANALOGOUS AIRLOCK
COMPONENT FAILURES, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A LEVEL 3 CRITICALITY TO
THE HARDWARE FAILURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
REPRESENTS A MORE CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GROUND RULES CONTAINED IN NSTS 22206, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE
1/1 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION OF THE HARDWARE FAILURE AS A CIL
ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1604-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5043
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY 1.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1605-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5043
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION
THAT THIS FAILURE MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA WHICH PER OPERATIONS GROUND RULES IS
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY 1.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5047
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1124-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5047
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5051   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1122-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5051
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA ANALYSIS #5041 ASSUMED THE TUNNEL ADAPTER WAS ATTACHED.
WITHOUT THIS THE AIRLOCK WOULD LEAK TO SPACE FORCING EVALUATION
BY THE AIRLOCK CREW. THE LEAK CANNOT BE GREATER THAN TWO
EQUALIZATION VALVES WIDE OPEN ON THE CABIN SIDE. EACH VALVE ALSO
HAS A THREATED CAP WHICH IS CAPABLE OF A PRESSURE SEAL. WORST
CASE SCENARIO IS LOSS OF FURTHER MISSIONS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND INCORPORATE NASA
CRITICALITY. FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE FAILURE OCCURRING IS INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER
THE TUNNEL ADAPTER IS ATTACHED AND THAT THE EFFECT OF THIS
FAILURE MODE AND ASSOCIATED REDUNDANCY (i.e. LOSS OF AIRLOCK
REPRESS CAPABILITY) IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC. THEREFORE, THE
IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5052   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1122-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5052
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1120-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5054
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/1R
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1121-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5054
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST CORRECT NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE INABILITY TO
PRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK BECAUSE OF EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH THE
EQUALIZATION VALVE IS POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC (IF FAILURE OCCURS
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY). THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION.
NOTE: THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE IS 2/1R
VS. 2/2 ERRONEOUSLY SHOWN ON THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.
(REDUNDANCY SCREENS ARE PPP).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5055   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2008-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5055
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5055A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2008-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5055
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALTIY. THIS ITEM WAS INITIALLY ASSESSED AGAINST THE WRONG
CIL. THE PROPER NASA CIL LISTS A CRITICALITY OF 2R/3.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CRITICALITY IF
THE HARDWARE FAILURE DEPENDS ON THE STATUS OF THE ASSOCIATED EMU
BATTERY AND THAT THE WORST CASE SCENARIO IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE
TO FAIL IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM EVA AFTER THE
BATTERIES ARE DEPLETED. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FLIGHT
CRITICALITY BE 3/2R, WITH PASSAGE OF A AND C SCREEN AND EXCLUSION
OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5056   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5056
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER RPC (4)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
                 FLIGHT                                      ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

      NASA   [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ] *
      IOA    [ 2 /2  ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [ X ]

  COMPARE   [ N /N  ]       [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /2R ]        [ P ]    [ NA]    [ P ]       [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5059
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5059
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R.   THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A.   THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5060   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5060
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION.
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST PROPER NASA
CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IS
DOWNGRADED FROM 2/2 TO 3/2R. THE A AND C SCREENS PASS AND B
SCREEN IS N/A. THEREFORE, THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS
A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5066   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1631-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5066
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE CREW CAN DETECT
THE VALVE FAIL TO CLOSE FROM THE POSITION TALKBACK; THEREFORE,
SCREEN B PASSES WHICH AGREES WITH THE NASA EVALUATION.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5067   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2026-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5067
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE TO CLOSE
WHILE EVA IS UNDERWAY WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. ALSO, THE SCREEN B
PASSES BECAUSE THE POSITION TALKBACK PROVIDES A FAILURE
DETECTION CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5068   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2026-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5068
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

     NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [ X ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /2R ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5068A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2026-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5068
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [   ] [   ] [   ]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE
CONTROL SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5069   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2027-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5069
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT FAILURE OF THE BUS
SELECT SWITCH PLUS FAILURE OF THE AIRLOCK DEPRESS VALVE CAN
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO VENT OR PRESSURIZE THE
AIRLOCK. THIS CAN HAVE CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS DEPENDING ON WHETHER
AN EVA IS UNDERWAY OR WHETHER IT PREVENTS A CONTINGENCY EVA FROM
BEING PERFORMED. THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE AND THE INCLUSION AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5081A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VC-2044-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5081
ITEM: ISOL. VALVE SENSOR POWER RESISTOR (A8R3 & 4)

LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC RESISTOR VALUES ARE IN ERROR. THE VALUE
SHOULD BE 1.2K OHM, INSTEAD OF THE 5.1K OHM SHOWN FOR THE
SCHEMATIC. DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY
SUMMARY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM REVIEW OF THE FMEA, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA/RI
EVALUATION. END-TO-END SHORTS OF BOTH RESISTORS RESULT IN A LOSS
OF CONTROL OVER THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE. REGARDLESS OF
THE POSITION IN WHICH THE VALVE STICKS (OPEN OR CLOSED) A SIMILAR
FAILURE OF THE DEPRESS VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5085X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2012-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5085
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(SHORTS TO GROUND)
WITH LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE BREAKER
WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND AND THE VALVE WILL NOT ACTUATE. EMU
SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. FURTHER
ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK OF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PACKAGE OF SCREEN A AND C, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS
A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5086X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6UA-2013-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5086
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
(SHORTS TO GROUND)
WITH THE LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE
BREAKER WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND, AND THE VALVE WILL NOT
ACTUATE. EMU SUIT CANNOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FURTHER ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK IF NASA FMEA DATA.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: INCORPORATE REVISED CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT # 5011
APPROACH, THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE FAILURE SHOULD BE MISSION
CRITICAL BUT BE EXCLUDED AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5087X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1208-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5087
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW)
FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S.
HOWEVER, THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. ASSUMING AN
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS
22206.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW AND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH IOA ASSESSMENT #
5003 APPROACH, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION,
PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A
CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5088X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1402-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5088
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

                [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK)
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CANNOT BE PERFORMED
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHARING ONE SCU
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC NSTS 22206.
THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION
SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
THE IOA ACKNOWLEDGES THE HIGHER LEVEL FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
ASSIGNED BY NASA/RI. EXTERNAL LEAKAGE COULD DEPLETE THE EMU
WATER SUPPLY, CONTAMINATE THE AIRLOCK WITH FREE WATER, AND CAUSE
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5089X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1402-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5089
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW) LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM
FUNCTION. ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY
CANNOT BE PERFORMED SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY
AND SHARING ONE SCU WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC
NSTS 22206. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER
CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT #5003.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
FOR RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE LCVG LINES & FITTINGS WOULD BE
INADEQUATE COOLING TO A STANDBY CREWMAN CONNECTED TO AN SCU
DURING A SCHEDULED OR UNSCHEDULED EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA
CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM. EVEN THOUGH
MISSION CAPABILITY IS LOST, IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ONE
CREWMAN TO PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5090X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1209-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5090
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER LINE & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW)
ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW, THE FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION SINCE
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMAN.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT LOSS OF MISSION WOULD
BE WORST CASE SCENARIO BUT THAT THE SECOND SCU IN THE AIRLOCK
DOES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE STANDBY CREWMAN DURING AN EVA.
THEREFORE, THE IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA/RI EVALUATION AND THE
EXCLUSION OF THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5091X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1205-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5091
ITEM: O2 QUICK COUPLINGS (NOT USED FOR SCU) AND CAP

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE). THE HARDWARE ITEMS TO
PREVENT LEAKS ARE THE VALVE, COUPLING AND CAP. FUNCTIONALLY THIS
FAILURE IS NOT IMPORTANT SINCE BY DEFINITION THIS LEAK IS
"INTERNAL". THUS THE CREW IS NOT EVEN AWARE OF THIS FAILURE.
THAT IS, BY DEFINITION "INTERNAL LEAK" MEANS NOT ALL THE SEALS
CAN FAIL (THIS WOULD BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). INABILITY TO CLOSE IS
MOOT SINCE THE CAP WOULD NEVER BE TAKEN OFF DURING FLIGHT (CREW
USES THE SCU).
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCURS THAT IF ALL REDUNDANT O2
SHUTOFF VALVES EXPERIENCED INTERNAL LEAKS, AND EITHER THE SCU
COUPLINGS OR CAPS LEAKED, THE O2 CONCENTATION COULD BECOME
EXCESSIVE, AN EXPLOSION OR FIRE COULD CASUE LOSS OF CREW AND
VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES THE NASA/RI EVALUATION IS
VALID AND THE HARDWARE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS A CIL
ITEM.

REPORT DATE   29 JUNE 1988   C.4-130

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5094X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1124-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5094
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT CAP

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK)
THIS FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC SINCE THIS VALVE WOULD NOT BE USED
DURING A NORMAL MISSION.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICLAITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF THE OUTER HATCH
EQUALIZATION VALVES AND CAPS LEAK, IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO
REPRESSURIZE THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN EVA. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW. THE FAILURE COULD ALSO CAUSE THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA. THEREFORE, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5095X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1631-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5095
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
                 FLIGHT                                 ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

      NASA   [ 1 /1 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 2 /2 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /N ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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             [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]         [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAK) THE FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. PER NSTS 22206 THE
LEAK CANNOT BE THROUGH THE PACKING IN THE VALVES PENETRATION.
THE ONLY OTHER PLACES COULD BE THE CASING ITSELF WHICH IS
UNREALISTIC OR THE O-RING WHICH SEALS THE VALVE TO THE BULKHEAD.
THE O-RING (LACK OF) IS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO DRAIN THE CABIN FASTER
THAN CONSUMMABLES FLOW. HOWEVER, ASSUMING CREW INABILITY TO
CORRECT THE FAILURE LEADS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE LOSS
OF MISSION DUE TO AN UNCONTROLLABLE LEAK.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE EVENT. FOR THE VACUUM VENT
ISOLATION VALVE, THE LEAKAGE FLOW PATH WOULD BE FROM THE
PRESSURIZED CABIN INTO THE VALVE. THIS IS A SINGLE FAILURE POINT
PER THE NASA/RI EVALUATION. AN EXCESSIVE LEAK COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION AND THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5096X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1630-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5096
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(EXTERNAL LEAKAGE)
THE LEAK CAN BE CONTROLLED WITH THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE.
LOSS OF FUNCTION CREATES A LEAK IN THE CABIN WITH POTENTIAL LOSS
OF LIFE/VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE HAS A
DRAIN ORIFICE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUILD UP OF H2 IF THE
LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE INTERFACE, WHICH ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF H2 IGNITES. THUS, MISSION IS
TERMINATED ON FIRST FAILURE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THE WORST CASE EFFECT OF
THIS FAILURE MODE COULD BE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THEREFORE, THE
NASA/RI EVALUATION IS APPROPRIATE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5097X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1630-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5097
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION

LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
(RESTRICTED FLOW).   NO CRITICALITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BECAUSE
THIS FAILURE IS NOT CREDIBLE.   THE LINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER
AND WOULD REQUIRE LARGE SIZE DEBRIS FOR EFFECTIVE PLUGGING.   ON
THE OTHER HAND, HYDROGEN IS A VERY LIGHT MOLECULE AND CAN
PERMEATE THROUGH ANY SIZE CRACK.   IF IOA HAD TO ASSIGN A
CRITICALITY, IT WOULD BE A 2/2 (LOSS OF MISSION) SINCE THE
AIRLOCK WOULD BE UNABLE TO DEPRESSURIZE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT IF FLOW THROUGH THE
TWO - INCH DEPRESSURIZATION LINES AND FITTINGS WAS RESTRICTED,
THE OUTER HATCH EQUALIZATION VALVES COULD BE USED TO DEPRESSURIZE
AIRLOCK.   SINCE THIS CAPABILITY EXISTS, THE IOA WOULD ASSIGN A
3/1R CRITICALITY TO THIS FAILURE MODE FOR THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
OF LOSS OF ALL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANY WHICH PREVENTS BEING ABLE TO
PERFORM A CONTINGENCY EVA, BUT THE MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA
APPROACH IS ACCEPTED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5098X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1128-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT
MDAC ID: 5098
ITEM: AIRLOCK DEPRESSURIZATION CAP

LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/NASA FM: INABILITY TO REMOVE.
IOA COMMENT: FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION AND THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE.
ISSUE RESOLUTION: WITHDRAW ISSUE AND LIST NASA CRITICALITY.
FROM FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA DETERMINED THE FAILURE MODE UNDER
REVIEW IS INABILITY TO MATE RATHER THAN INABILITY TO REMOVE. IN
ADDITION TO THE CAP, THE DEPRESS VALVE AND VACUUM VENT VALVE
PROVIDE REDUNDANT LEAKAGE PROTECTION. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA/RI 3/1R EVALUATION, PASSAGE OF ALL SCREENS, AND EXCLUSION OF
THIS FAILURE MODE AS A CIL ITEM.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1004   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0102-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1004
ITEM: INLET FILTER (ACCUMULATOR)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER,
ON 5/5/88. HANK'S DATA INDICATES THAT A RUPTURE OF THIS FILTER
WILL RESULT IN THE FILTER ELEMENTS ACCUMULATING ON THE FILTER OF
THE WORKING PUMP ONLY - LEAVING THE SECOND PUMP CLEAR AND
OPERATIONAL. THIS WILL MAKE THE CRITICALITY 3/1R. IOA AGREES
WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1006
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0112-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1006
ITEM: SELF-SEALING DISCONNECT

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA COMBINES ALL DISCONNECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMP PACKAGE
INTO ONE FMEA EVALUATED AT THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. FOR
BETTER CLARITY, EACH DISCONNECT SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELY.
HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES CARRY THE WORST CASE
CRITICALITY, IOA WILL AGREE WITH THE FMEA AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1025   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0301-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1025
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE [   ]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE FMEA CRITICALITY HAS RESULTED IN
AGREEMENT WITH IOA. ISSUE IS CLOSED.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1027   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1027
ITEM: HYDRAULIC HEAT EXCHANGERS

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
UPON RE-EVALUATION, IOA FEELS THAT THIS FAILURE IS A PART OF NASA
FMEA 06-3-0301-3. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1035   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0304-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1035
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1037   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1037
ITEM: O2 RESTRICTOR

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1). UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1038   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1038
ITEM: O2 RESTRICTOR

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA DEEMED THIS TO BE A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE REQUIRING TWO
SEPARATE FAILURES (06-3-0250-1).   UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF
AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES WITH NASA AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1043   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1043
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS COVERED BY NASA IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE ARS,
NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-1 WITH CRIT 2/1R IS THE EQUIVALENT ITEM.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1045   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1045
ITEM: ARS INTERCHANGER HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS COVERED BY NASA DURING THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE
ARS, NASA FMEA 06-1-0505-2 IS THE EQUIVALENT FAILURE. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-1053   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0223-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 1053
ITEM: PAYLOAD HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN THAT SUFFICIENT FLOW
CAPACITY EXISTS IN THE OTHER PORTION OF THE LOOP TO COMPENSATE
FOR A COMPLETELY BLOCKED PAYLOAD LOOP. THIS WILL LOWER THE
CRITICALITY TO 2/2. IOA AGREES WITH THIS ANALYSIS AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2003
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0502-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2003
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2007A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0504-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2007
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPROPRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2008A
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0504-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2008
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT, IOA ERRONEOUSLY CHANGED THE
CRITICALITY OF THIS ITEM TO A HIGHER THAN REQUIRED VALUE.
ADDITIONAL DATA AND CLOSER EXAMINATION HAVE CONVINCED IOA THAT
THE LOWER CRITICALITY IS MORE APPRORRIATE. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/13/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2010   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0504-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2010
ITEM: MOTOR (BYPASS VALVE)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK ROTTER ON 5/8/88, HAS
REVEALED SUFFICIENT LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY TO LOWER THE CRITICALITY
TO 3/1R. IOA AGREES WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER'S ANALYSIS AND
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2017   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2034-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2017
ITEM: SWITCH 26 (RADIATOR CONTROL LOOP)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
       IOA [3 /2R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE ASSIGNED CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-1002-1 WITH CRIT.
2/2).

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-2028
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2036-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 2028
ITEM: SWITCH 29 (RADIATOR MANUAL SELECT)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA'S RE-EVALUATION OF THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS ITEM HAS
REMOVED IT FROM THE CIL BY GIVING IT A NON-CIL RANKING.
THEREFORE, THE ISSUE NO LONGER EXISTS. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WC-
1005-1 WITH CRIT 3/1R).

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3018   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3018
ITEM: HI LOAD ANTI-CARRYOVER DEVICE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE NASA FMEAs DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN RESTRICTED FREON FLOW
IN THE BODY OF THE EVAPORATOR AND RESTRICTED FREON FLOW IN PLACES
SUCH AS THE ACOD. A RESTRICTED FLOW THROUGH THE ACOD WILL HAVE
NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON EVAPORATOR OPERATIONS AND SHOULD
BE A 3/3 CRITICALITY. HOWEVER, SINCE THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE CRITICALITY OF A WORST CASE RESTRICTED FLOW,
MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3019
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3019
ITEM: HI LOAD EXIT DUCT

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE EXIT DUCT OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS
AND HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3030   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3030
ITEM: HI LOAD NOZZLE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. HANK INDICATES THAT EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
STEAM/WATER FROM THE NOZZLE OCCURS DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS AND
HAS NO EFFECT. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3036   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0323-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3036
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ISOLATION VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3040   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0327-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3040
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR INTEGRAL PULSER/SHUTOFF
VALVE/NOZZLE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFIFITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3046
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3046
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR WATER VALVE/NOZZLE MOUNTING
PLATE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3048   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3048
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES WHICH RESULT IN A LEAKAGE OF FREON INTO
THE FES CORE INTO ONE FMEA. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY
RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE ONE NASA FMEA DOES
CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3049   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0323-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3049
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR CORE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITY AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE BASED ON THIS CONSERVATISM.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3050   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3050
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FMEAs INVOLVING A RESTRICTED FLOW OF FREON INTO
ONE FAILURE. WHEN THE RESTRICTION IS IN THE ACOD, THERE IS NO
AFFECT ON THE EVAPORATOR OR FREON LOOP OPERATION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE
NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA
ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3051   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3051
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. MIXING OF
WATER AND FREON IN THE HIGH LOAD EVAPORATOR WOULD BE A 1/1
CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION
OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST
CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL, THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3052   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0311-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3052
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR ANTI CARRYOVER DEVICE

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA GROUPS ALL FAILURES CAUSED BY A MIXING OF FREON AND WATER
INTO ONE FMEA. WHEN THE MIXING OCCURS IN THE TOPPING EVAPORATOR,
THE RESULT IS A LOSS OF ONE FREON LOOP AND THE TOPPING
EVAPORATOR. THIS IS A SURVIVABLE ENTRY CONDITION. ALTHOUGH IOA
WOULD ORDINARILY RECOMMEND A SEPARATION OF THE FAILURES, THE NASA
FMEA DOES CORRECTLY CARRY THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY. IOA WILL,
THEREFORE, WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3053   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0327-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3053
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR EXIT DUCT

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3055   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0327-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3055
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
AND H HEATERS

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
            FLIGHT                                    ITEM
           HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

   NASA   [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]     [ X ] *
   IOA    [ 3 /2R ]     [ P ]    [ NA]    [ P ]     [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [ N ]    [   ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3057   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0327-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3057
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - EXIT DUCT - ZONE D, E, F,
AND H THERMOSTATS

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/16/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3060   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0313-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3060
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR - RH AND LH SONIC NOZZLES

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS WITH THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3067   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0330-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3067
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE A/B FROM WATER SUPPLY TO
WATER/VALVE NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER, HANK
ROTTER, ON 5/5/88. THE ISSUES RAISED BY MDAC WILL BE USED BY THE
SSM TO PUSH FOR A DESIGN CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, LEVEL II
DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE CRITICALITY REMAIN A 3/1R.
BASED ON THIS DATA, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/30/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3076A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0330-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3076
ITEM: FES FEEDLINE ACCUMULATOR STATUS MONITOR

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS IOA CONCURS WITH THE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3079   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2028-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3079
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/1R.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAW THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-1002-3).

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3079A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2030-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3079
ITEM: FES CONTROLLER - SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88
WHO AGREED, IN THEORY WITH THE MDAC CRITICALITIES OF 2/1R.
HOWEVER, LEVEL II DIRECTION HAS DICTATED THAT THE FAILURE REMAIN
AT THE CURRENT CRITICALITY. THEREFORE, MDAC WILL WITHDRAWN THE
ISSUE. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-1002-3, CRIT 3/1R).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-3118   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2052-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 3118
ITEM: TOPPING EVAPORATOR HEATER SELECT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FMEA BY NASA RESULTED IN A MODIFIED
CRITICALITY. ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED. (NEW FMEA NO. 05-6WE-
2001-1, WITH CRIT 2/2).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4006   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0411-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 4006
ITEM: AMMONIA CONTROLLER A

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IN ORDER FOR THE PREMATURE OPERATION OF THE CONTROLLER TO OCCUR,
A SECOND FAILURE MUST HAPPEN. IOA WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE. (NOTES
BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER).

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4007   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0410-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 4007
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

      NASA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ NA]    [ P ]      [   ] *
      IOA   [ 3 /3  ]    [ P ]    [ NA]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE     [   /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4008   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0410-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 4008
ITEM: FLOW CONTROL VALVE (N.O.)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITY. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4012   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0408-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 4012
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (N.C.)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE SSM, HANK ROTTER, ON 5/5/88.
THE DESIGN OF THE VALVE IS SUCH THAT IT CANNOT FAIL OPEN WHEN IT
IS CLOSED TO START, BUT IF OPEN IT CAN FAIL TO CLOSE. THIS
OCCURS ONLY DURING POST LANDING OPERATIONS. THEREFORE, MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ORIGINAL ISSUE AND NASA WILL CHANGE THE FMEA TO A
2/2 CRITICALITY FOR POST LANDING COOLING CONCERNS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-4027   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2201-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 4027
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (POWER-PRI/GPC)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

      NASA  [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ X ] *
      IOA   [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]        [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [ A ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY IOA WILL PERMIT AGREEMENT WITH NASA
CRITICALITIES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11115X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0304-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 11115
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11116X
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0305-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 11116
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE [   ]
                                 INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11118X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0305-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 11118
ITEM: GSE HEAT EXCHANGER, FLUID CONNECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THIS ITEM. IOA AGREES WITH
THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-11121X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2041-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 11121
ITEM: SW10, 11 (FREON SIGNAL CONDITIONER)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

          CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
             FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
     IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA AGREES WITH THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND ACCEPTS THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ATCS-14032X
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0408-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ATCS
MDAC ID: 14032
ITEM: TANK ISOLATION VALVE (NC)

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED HIGHER THAN REQUIRED CRITICALITIES OF
THIS FMEA. RE-EVALUATION WILL PUT IOA IN AGREEMENT WITH NASA
CRITICALITIES.

SECTION C.5

CREW EQUIPMENT SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2201   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   JSC17067B-1A   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 2201
ITEM: EXTENDED RANGE CREWMEMBER SAFETY TETHER-SMALL
HOOK

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA HAS LUMPED THE FAILURE TO CLOSE INTO THE "HOOK BREAKS
OR JAMS OPEN" FAILURE. NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS
THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/18/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-2301   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   JSC17067B-2A   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 2301
ITEM: WAIST TETHER-HOOKS

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
         IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS UNDER NASA FMEA FAILURE "EITHER HOOK LATCH JAMS
OPEN". NASA, THEREFORE, UTILIZES A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION
OF FAILURE AND FUNCTION DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/02/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3301   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 3301
ITEM: 3-POINT LATCH TOOL HOOK

LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/22/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-3413   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 3413
ITEM: EVA WINCH AND MOUNT ASSEMBLY MOUNTING PLATE
ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
UPON RE-EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE DATA, IOA AGREES THAT THIS
FAILURE IS COVERED IMPLICITLY IN THE NASA FMEA PACKAGE. IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/07/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-6408   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   TREADMILL 1A   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 6408
ITEM: TREADMILL EXERCISER ASSEMBLY ATTACHMENT FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: L. GRAHAM, S. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. MDAC CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/19/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-13809X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   SNATCH BLOCK 2B   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 13809
ITEM: SNATCH BLOCK ASSEMBLY HOOK LATCH

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/10/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: CRWEQP-16409X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   TREADMILL 1B   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: CREW EQUIPMENT
MDAC ID: 16409
ITEM: TREADMILL QUICK DISCONNECT

LEAD ANALYST: S.K. SINCLAIR

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
         IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA CONCURS AND WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.5-8

SECTION C.6

INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-305X   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-7-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 305
ITEM: MDM OF4, OA1, OA2, OA3

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /2]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA 111 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 111 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-305X. THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE
CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A
HEATER STUCK ON COULD PROMPT MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU,
REQURING ABORT. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL COULD
NOT BE DETECTED. NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITEUP IS INCONSISTENT WITH
2/2 CRIT AND ASSIGNS SCREENS FOR THAT 2/2 CRIT.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. ACCEPT NASA'S CRITICALITY PER IOA GROUNDRULES. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.6-2

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-306X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: MDM OF3

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA 116 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 116 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-306X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 306X). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS
WOULD REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1,OF2 OR OF3 MDM'S.
NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDM. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-307X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: MDM OF3

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /2]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA 117 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 117 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-307X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 307X). ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE IMPROPER MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL, REQUIRING
UNNECESSARY MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-308X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 308
ITEM: MDM OF1, OF2

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA 118 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 118 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-308X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM
MDM's OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE
MEASUREMENTS (SEE IOA 308). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS WOULD
CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS REVEALED
THAT REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED.
DPS HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-309X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NONE   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 309
ITEM: MDM OF1, OF2

LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

     NASA   [  /    ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
     IOA    [ 2 /2  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ X ]

  COMPARE   [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [  /    ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [ A ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA 119 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 119 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-309X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM MDMs
OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS
(SEE IOA 309). ERRONEOUS MDM OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE
INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION AND COULD PROMPT A MANUAL
FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN THAT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
CIL ISSUE RESOLUTION:
A. MDM'S ASSESSED BY DPS. NO CIL ISSUES ON OF1, OF2, OR OF3
MDMS. NOT CARRIED BECAUSE FUEL CELL SUBSYSTEM FEELS THAT
REDUNDANCY FOR ALL MEASUREMENTS EXIST. MCR PRESENTED TO RE-
CHANNEL EACH FUEL CELL TO DIFFERENT MDMS. MCR NOT APPROVED. DPS
HAS NOT WRITTEN THE FMEA YET. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA. ISSUE
WITHDRAWN.

SECTION C.7

DATA PROCESSING SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-100   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-2-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 100
ITEM: MDM FF1,FF2,FF3,FF4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA,
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)," WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-1 FROM 2/1R TO 3/1R. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-101   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-2-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 101
ITEM: MDM FF1,FF2,FF3,FF4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "LOSS OF OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AND UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-1 FROM 2/1R TO 3/1R. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-108   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-2-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 108
ITEM: MDM FF1,FF2,FF3,FF4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THE NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM". IOA DID NOT CONSIDER DEGRADED STATE VECTORS.
IOA DOES NOT BELIEVE THE LOSS OF TWO STATE VECTORS WILL CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW OR VEHICLE. IN THE WORST CASE ON ENTRY, THE LOSS OF
THE SECOND STATE VECTOR WILL PERMIT THE ORBITER TO FLY WITH ONE
REMAINING STATE VECTOR.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL. NASA/RI DOWNGRADED FMEA 05-5-
B03-2-1 FROM 2/1R TO 3/1R. THIS REVISED CRITICALITY AGREES WITH
IOA CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-120   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-1-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 120
ITEM: MDM FA1,FA2,FA3,FA4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
IOA RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-121   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-1-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 121
ITEM: MDM FA1,FA2,FA3,FA4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE [X]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT TO LRU" IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED
BY THE ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT: FAILED MDM
PORT - SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O CARD/CHANNEL
FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM".
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.IOA
DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE. IOA
RECOMMENDS DOWNGRADING THE HARDWARE CRITICALITY TO 3, THEREBY
REMOVING THE FMEA FROM THE CIL.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 10/06/86   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: DPS-128   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-5-B03-1-1   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: DPS
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: MDM FA1,FA2,FA3,FA4

LEAD ANALYST: W. A. Haufler

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE "FALSELY STUCK ON BUSY MODE" IS CONSIDERED TO
BE COVERED BY THIS ROCKWELL FMEA WITH FAILURE MODE "NO OUTPUT:
FAILED MDM PORT-SCU, MIA, A/D, POWER SUPPLIES, OR I/O
CARD/CHANNEL FAILURE".
SIMULTANEOUS DISSIMILAR FAILURES WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE IOA.
MULTIPLE FAILURES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NSTS 22206.
IOA RECOMMENDS REPLACING THIS PHRASE IN THIS NASA/RI FMEA'S
EFFECTS FIELD, "COUPLED WITH AN UNDETECTED FCS FAILURE (IN THE
NULL POSITION)", WITH "COUPLED WITH A LIKE FAILURE IN ANOTHER
MDM."
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA'S REEVALUATION AND RATIONALE.
THE IOA WITHDRAWS CRITICALITY DIFFERENCE AND DIFFERENT
APPLICATIONS OF NSTS 22206 AS ASSESSMENT ISSUES SINCE THEY RESULT
IN A MORE CONSERVATIVE NASA/RI EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE MODE
THAN THE IOA ANALYSIS.

SECTION C.8

ATMOSPHERE REVITALIZATION PRESSURE
CONTROL SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-128   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0109-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 128
ITEM: PRESSURE REGULATOR/300 PSIG (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE FAILURE MODE MAY BE CLARIFIED TO REFER TO EITHER 1ST OR 2ND
STAGES OF THE REGULATOR. AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE
AUXILIARY O2 TANK, IOA WOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED 3/1R CRITICALITY.
COMPARED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-129   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0110-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 129
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA   [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

  COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER FURTHER REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY O2 TANK, THE
IOA CRITICALITY WAS CHANGED TO 3/1R. NASA UTILIZED A MORE
CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR
ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES
WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-131   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0110-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 1250 PSIG.

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY O2 TANK, THE IOA CRITICALITY WAS
CHANGED TO 3/1R. NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF
FUNCTION AND REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER
CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-132A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0114-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 132
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-137   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0111-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 137
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-139   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0111-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 139
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE-LV3 AND LV4 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-140   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-2011-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 140
ITEM: SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

```
             CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
                FLIGHT                                      ITEM
                HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

       NASA  [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]       [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 3 /3  ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]

COMPARE      [ N /N  ]      [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]       [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
             [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF THE FAILURE BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT
FMEA NUMBER (05-6UC-201-02) AND A REVISED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH
NOW AGREES WITH MDAC. ISSUE IS CLOSED.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.8-8

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-141   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-2011-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 141
ITEM: SWITCH-S15 AND S18 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE [   ]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FMEA WAS RE-EVALUATED BY NASA AND ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY
(2/1R) WHICH AGREES WITH IOAs ASSESSMENT. ISSUE IS CLOSED. (NEW
NASA FMEA NO. 05-6UC-201-1).

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-148   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0116-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 148
ITEM: ORIFICE-(ONE 20 LBM/HR IN LOOP1, TWO 10 LBM/HR
IN LOOP2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-151   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0120-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 151
ITEM: LEH O2 SUPPLY VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-158   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0122-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 158
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE-245 PSIG (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-159   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 159
ITEM: FILTER-10 MICRONS   (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEAL THAT THIS FILTER WAS COVERED AS A PART OF THE CHECK VALVE.
(FMEA NO. 06-1C-0123-1, CRITICALITY 2/1R PFP). IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-161   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0123-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 161
ITEM: CHECK VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

          CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
            FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
   IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-163   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1501-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 163
ITEM: LEH O2 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-164   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1501-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 164
ITEM: LEH O2 SHUTOFF VALVE/CREW + PASSENGER (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A 1R/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.8-16

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-166   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1502-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 166
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A 1R/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-167   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1502-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 167
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.8-18

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-168   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1502-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 168
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHELAN, ON 23 MAY 1988,
REVEALED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, A "Y"
CONNECTION FOR THE LEH QUICK DISCONNECTS. THIS MEANS THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE AT LEAST ONE MORE OUTLET THAN CREW MEMBERS AND
THE CRITICALITY CAN BE REDUCED TO A 1R/2. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-169   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1502-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 169
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECTS (8)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-174A
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1512-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 174
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE/DIRECT OXYGEN (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE NASA SSM, JOHN WHALAN, ON 23
MAY 1988. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE LEAK TO GO THROUGH THE VALVE
AND THRU THE DIRECT OXYGEN OUTLET INTO THE CABIN. THERE IS A
FLOW RESTRICTER WHICH LIMITS THE LEAK TO 10LBS/HR. AT THIS
LEVEL, THE LEHS WILL STILL PROVIDE OXYGEN TO THE CREW AND NO
IMMEDIATE LOSS OF LIFE OCCURS. GIVEN THIS KNOWLEDGE, IOA
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-212
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0161-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 212
ITEM: N2 TANKS (4)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[F]	[X] *
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN 23 MAY 1988,
IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-214
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0191-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 214
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS - TP27 & TP28

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ] [ ] [ ]   [ ]
                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION OF SYSTEM AND CONTROLS WILL PERMIT IOA TO AGREE
WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-223A   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0230-3   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 223
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-224   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0230-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 224
ITEM: ISOLATION VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

               CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
      IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.8-25

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-232
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0231-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 232
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
MMU CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE MISSION CRITICAL. THEREFORE, IOA
WILL AGREE WITH NASAs LOWER CRITICALITIES AND WITHDRAW THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-234
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0165-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 234
ITEM: N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-235   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0165-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 235
ITEM: N2 SYSTEM SUPPLY ISOL. VLV-LV3&LV4 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
      IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ] *
                                                          [X]

COMPARE   [N /   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

REPORT   DATE 20 JULY 1988   C.8-28

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-237
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0165-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 237
ITEM: SINGLE PHASE MOTOR/N2-SYSTEM ISOL. VLV (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA STUDIED THE ELECTRICAL MOTOR SEPARATELY FROM THE VALVE, AND
THIS COMPARISON WAS MADE BASED ON THE FMEA ANALYSIS FOR THE
VALVE.
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-241
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-2013-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 241
ITEM: SWITCH, S13&S21/N2-SYSTEM ISOL VLV (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-271
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0152-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 271
ITEM: SHUTOFF VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-276
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0178-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 276
ITEM: CROSSOVER VALVE (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[A] (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE N2 SYSTEM, NASA UTILIZED A
GROUNDRULE WHICH LET THE SECOND N2 SYSTEM AND THE CABIN INTEGRITY
ACT AS BACKUP TO THE FAILED SYSTEM. THE FLIGHT RULES WILL ALWAYS
MAINTAIN A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF 110 LBS OF USABLE NITROGEN, BUT
ABOVE THIS LEVEL, A FAILED N2 SYSTEM DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN
A MISSION TERMINATION. THIS PHILOSOPHY AGREES WITH A 3/1R
CRITICALITY. AFTER THIS DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN ON 23 MAY
1988, IOA AGREES WITH THE APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION REVEALED THAT THE DESIGN OF THIS VALVE IS
SUCH THAT IT IS FLOWN NORMALLY CLOSED. SHOULD A LEAK OCCUR, THE
OPERATING LEG CAN BE CHANGED AND THE LEAK ISOLATED. IT SHOULD
ALSO BE NOTED THAT EVEN WITH A LEAK, N2 IS STILL AVAILABLE TO
THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-312   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0146-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 312
ITEM: PPO2 SENSOR-C (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [ ]
                           INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION ALLOWS IOA TO AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITIES. ISSUE
IS WITHDRAWN.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-322   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0214-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 322
ITEM: CABIN PRESSURE SENSOR (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-324   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0211-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 324
ITEM: CABIN DP/DT SENSOR (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

                [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-327
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-2022-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 327
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB16/DP/DT (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF REDUNDANCY DURING
THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND
CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-344   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 344
ITEM: FILTER (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
DISCUSSION WITH JOHN WHELAN, NASA, SSM, ON 23 MAY 1988, PLUS
EXAMINATION OF PART DRAWINGS REVEALED THAT THIS FILTERS DESIGN
PRECLUDES THE CREDIBILITY OF RESTRICTED FLOW. IOA WITHDRAWS THE
ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-350   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0203-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 350
ITEM: SINGLE PHASE MOTOR (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR FUNCTION AND
REDUNDANCY DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH AND CONCURS WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES.
MDAC WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-358
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VA-200100-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 358
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE [ ]
                                   INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
RE-EVALUATION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-90X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES IOA'S
RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-359   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-200100-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 359
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, CB22 & CB34 (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

    NASA  [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [ X ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]         [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
RE-EVALUTION BY NASA HAS RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT FMEA NUMBER
(05-6UC-100X) AND A MODIFIED CRITICALITY (3/3) WHICH MATCHES
IOA'S RECOMMENDATION. ISSUE CLOSED.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-362   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0207-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 362
ITEM: CAP (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER RE-EVALUATION, IOA HAS DETERMINED THAT THE FAILURE OF
SCREEN B IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-364
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 364
ITEM: DEBRIS SCREEN (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS DEBRIS SCREEN IS COVERED AS A PART OF THE NASA FMEA 06-1C-0206-1 WHICH IS WRITTEN AGAINST THE VALVE. SINCE THE CRITICALITY MATCHES IOAs, THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-367X
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0229-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 367
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-368X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0229-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 368
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-1131X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6VA-2017-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1131
ITEM: SWITCH-S12

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION FOR REDUNDANCY
DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND AGREES WITH THE HIGHER CRITICALITIES. MDAC
WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-1461X
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-0115-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1461
ITEM: FILTER, 10 MICRON (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONSIDERED EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE FILTER UNDER THE LINES AND
FITTINGS ANALYSIS. THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FOR THE FILTER ALONE WAS
NOT CONSIDERED CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, BY DEFINING THIS AS A POSSIBLE
FAILURE MODE, NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE
DEFINITION OF FAILURE MODES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-1501X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1510-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-1761X   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-1511-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 1761
ITEM: ORIFICE, DIRECT BLEED (1)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-2632X
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0193-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 2632
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-3291X
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0191-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3291
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-3431X
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0201-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3431
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE, 16 PSIA

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/NA]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARPCS-3611X
NASA FMEA #:   06-1-0206-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: ARPCS
MDAC ID: 3611
ITEM: RELIEF VALVE (2)

LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/NA]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/NA]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA UTILIZED A MORE CONSERVATIVE DEFINITION OF CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODES DURING THEIR ANALYSIS. IOA ACCEPTS THIS MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH AND WITHDRAWS THE ISSUE.

SECTION C.9

HYDRAULICS AND WATER SPRAY
BOILER SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-110
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 110
ITEM: SPRAY VALVE (WATER SUPPLY)

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS INCORPORATED AS A "CAUSE" IN FMEA 06-3A-0605-2.
ELECTRICAL OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT MUST INVOLVE BOTH REDUNDANT
SOLENOID COILS. INDIVIDUAL ELECTRICAL FAILURES ARE COVERED IN
WSB EPDC FMEA.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-117   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3A-0604-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 117
ITEM: STEAM DUMP NOZZLE

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS BLOCKAGE OF NOZZLE FOR ANY REASON. FREEZING
IMPLIES BOTH HEATERS LOST. SINGLE HEATER FAILURE IS COVERED BY
FMEA 06-3A-0622-1. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-118
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 118
ITEM: HYDRAULIC/LUBE OIL WATER FILTERS

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA RECOMMENDED ADDING "OR RESTRICTED FLOW" TO FAILURE MODE
DESCRIPTION OF FMEA 06-3A-0605-2 TO COVER BLOCKAGE OF WATER VALVE
FILTER. SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ACCEPTED THIS
RECOMMENDATION DURING IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING ON
4/26/88.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-131   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   06-3-0629-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 131
ITEM: LUBE OIL TEMP SENSOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA SHOWS SCREEN A=P IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD
PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA ACCEPTS SCREEN PASSED, RATHER THAN
NA, AS THIS DOES NOT AFFECT CIL STATUS OR WAIVER STATUS.
THIS FMEA IS NO LONGER ON THE CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-143   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 143
ITEM: GN2 TANK

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
             FLIGHT                                       ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

    NASA   [   /    ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
    IOA    [ 2 /1R  ]     [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N   ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /    ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
FMEA 06-3-0609-2 DELETED BY NASA. COMBINED WITH 06-3-0609-1.
NASA APPROACH TAKES RUPTURE OF GN2 TANK AS WORST CASE FAILURE
MODE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. NO SEPARATE FMEA FOR LEAKAGE
IS NECESSARY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-149
NASA FMEA #:   06-3A-0606-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 149
ITEM: GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [X]
                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
GN2 REGULATOR VALVE IN SERIES WOULD REGULATE PRESSURE TO H2O TANK
- REQUIRES SECOND FAILURE TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY: THIRD FAILURE
IN REDUNDANCY CHAIN IS LOSS OF A SECOND HYDRAULIC
SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-164
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 164
ITEM: GN2 FILTER

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 06-3A-0606-1 COVERS FILTER BLOCKAGE AS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE FAILURE MODE-FILTER IN QUESTION IS PART OF GN2
SHUTOFF VALVE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-197
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 197
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CIRCUIT (CONTROLLER)

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE (FMEA 05-6W-2208-1B) IS 3/1R, PPP BY NASA
BASELINE PRESENTED TO NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD ON 3/30/88.
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS CRITICALITY-SWITCHING CONTROLLERS WILL
REGAIN GN2 SHUTOFF VALVE CONTROL. SCREEN B IS ACCEPTABLE AS P,
RATHER THAN NA. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT CIL OR WAIVER
STATUS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-431   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                                    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 431
ITEM: PRESS ACTIVATED RELIEF VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /1R]   [F]   [P]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS VALVE FUNCTION IS NOT REQUIRED UNLESS HYD LINE IS BLOCKED.
IN THAT CASE, LINE BLOCKAGE IS THE CAUSE OF HYDRAULIC LOSS, AND
THE CIRC PUMP IS IRRELEVANT. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA DECISION TO
OMIT THIS FAILURE MODE. CRITICALITY WOULD BE 3/3, IF IT WERE
INCLUDED.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-439   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-E27   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 439
ITEM: FILTER

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE, ACCORDING TO
HYDRAULIC SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES
REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88). IOA CONCURS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-451   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-A02-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 451
ITEM: QUICK DISCONNECT-HYD/SSME (SUPPLY)

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. LOSS OF TWO Q. D.'S ON TWO
HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS STILL ALLOWS RTLS ABORT, IN WORST CASE. FMEA
02-6-A02-1 IS 1/1 BECAUSE ENGINE VALVES DO NOT LOCK UP IN THIS
CASE-UNCONTROLLED FUEL/OXIDIZER MIXTURE CAN LEAD TO SSME
CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. THIS ISSUE WAS WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF
MEETING WITH NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL ON 4/26/88.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-455
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-A07-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 455
ITEM: CHECK VALVE-RETURN LINE FROM ENG'S/ACT'S

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[ ]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS HYD
LINE LEAK UPSTREAM OF VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-465
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-SYSTEM-3

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 465
ITEM: HYDRAULIC LINE (SUPPLY) SYSTEM 1

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
LINE RUPTURE IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88).
IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-466   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-SYSTEM-3   NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 466
ITEM: HYDRAULIC LINE (RETURN) SYSTEM 1

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON WORST CASE CONSEQUENCES OF A
HYDRAULIC LINE RUPTURE. IOA ACCEPTS THIS APPROACH. THERE IS NO
NEED TO CONSIDER SEPARATE FMEA'S FOR LINE SEGMENTS WITH LESS
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-469
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G04-1

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 469
ITEM: REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE IOA ORIGINAL CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS-REDUNDANCY (PRYO
SYSTEM) IS ACTIVATED BY AUTOMATIC DETECTION AND SWITCHOVER, PER
NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.5.a.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-471   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-SYSTEM-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 471
ITEM: REDUNDANT SHUTOFF VALVE (N.O.)

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [X]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-486   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-G13-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 486
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ORIGINAL IOA CRITICALITY WAS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT
THE PYRO UNLOCK MECHANISM CANNOT OVERRIDE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
LOCKUP. IN ACTUALITY, THERE IS NO HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOCKUP.
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA 3/1R CRITICALITY. SCREEN B IS PASSED,
ACCORDING TO NASA BASELINE DOCUMENTED IN NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW
BOARD PRESENTATION, 3/30/88. IOA CONCURS; VALVE FAILURE IS
DETECTIBLE AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN, DUE TO CLOSURE OF SHUTTLE
VALVES (ON TELEMETRY). DETECTION AT L. G. ISOL VALVE OPEN IS
SUFFICIENT TO PASS SCREEN B, ACCORDING TO SSM WALLACE TUTHILL
(IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING, 4/26/88).

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-487

NASA FMEA #:

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 487
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC. SOLENOID VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE [   ]
                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA DELETED FMEA 02-6-G13-3. IOA CONCURS WITH THIS DECISION.
THIS VALVE REMAINS CLOSED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE FLIGHT, SO IT
CANNOT FAIL TO CLOSE.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-489
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-SYSTEM-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 489
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL UP/CIRC SOLENOID VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-494   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-SYSTEM-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 494
ITEM: LANDING GEAR CONTROL VALVE - 2 POS, 3 WAY,
SOLENOID

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
VALVE LEAK IS DETECTIBLE WHEN L. G. ISOL VALVE 1 IS OPENED.
FLIGHT CREW CAN TAKE ACTION TO MANAGE LEAK. THIS IS
JUSTIFICATION FOR PASSING SCREEN B, (ACCORDING TO SUBSYSTEM
MANAGER WALLACE TUTHILL (IOA/NASA CIL ISSUES REVIEW MEETING,
4/26/88). IOA CONCURS WITH THIS REASONING.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-671
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-C10-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 671
ITEM: CHECK VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [X]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY IS BASED ON POSSIBLITY THAT LOSS OF 2 ACTUATORS
COULD CAUSE E. T. UMBILICAL PLATE TO BECOME MISALIGNED AND FAIL
TO RETRACT PROPERLY, RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE. IOA CONCURS.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-672   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-C10-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 672
ITEM: CHECK VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /1R]   [F]   [NA]   [P]   [X] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [N]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY. SECOND FAILURE IS
HYDRAULIC LEAK UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FOR ANY REASON. IOA CONCURS WITH SCREEN
B INAPPLICABILITY, PER NSTS-22206, SECTION 2.3.4.b.2(b).
SYSTEM IS NOT OPERATIVE DURING ANY NORMAL MISSION PHASE.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-724   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 724
ITEM: FREON/OIL HEAT EXCHANGER

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE IS COVERED IN ATCS SUBSYSTEM, FMEA 06-3-0301-3.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-817   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6G-2114-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 817
ITEM: POWER CONTACTOR (K3, K4)

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO CONTROL POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MEANS POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT
APU START OR DURING APU OPERATION. THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WHICH CAN LEAD TO LOSS OF
VEHICLE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-818   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6G-2110-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 818
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (K3), AR TYPE III

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-821   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6G-2110-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 821
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (K4), AR TYPE III

LEAD ANALYST: W. E. PARKMAN

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE FUNCTION OF THIS ITEM IS TO PROVIDE POWER TO ONE CIRC PUMP.
LOSS OF REDUNDANT DRIVERS MEANS LOSS OF ONE CIRC PUMP AT APU
START OR DURING APU OPERATION. NEXT FAILURE IS LOSS OF A SECOND
CIRC PUMP FOR ANY REASON, WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AS A
CONSEQUENCE. IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO CRITICALITY.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/87
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-850
NASA FMEA #: 05-6G-200100-1E

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 850
ITEM: RPC

LEAD ANALYST: J. DUVAL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[NA]	[NA]	[NA]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT. THIS FAILURE MODE IS NOT A CIL
ITEM IN THE NASA BASELINE AS DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II
REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-1771X
NASA FMEA #:   05-6W-2051-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 1771
ITEM: BOILER CONTROL POWER/HEATER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
NASA CRITICALITY FOR THIS FAILURE MODE IS 3/3 AS DOCUMENTED IN
THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF 3/30/88, AND IT
IS NOT LISTED AS A CIL ITEM. IOA CONCURS WITH NASA ASSESSMENT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-5001X   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-6-C06-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 5001
ITEM: VALVE, CHECK, L.G. HYD. CKT. FUSELAGE RETURN
LINE

LEAD ANALYST: W. DAVIDSON

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /1R]   [F]   [NA]   [P]   [X] *
    IOA   [3 /2R]   [F]   [NA]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [X]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA ACCEPTS NASA APPROACH TO REDUNDANCY: THIRD FAILURE IS LOSS OF
ANOTHER HYDRAULIC SYSTEM, FOR ANY REASON.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: HYDWSB-8005X   BASELINE [X]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6G-00100-1B   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: HYD/WSB
MDAC ID: 8005
ITEM: DIODE, HYD MN PUMP DEPRESS VLV SOL CKT.

LEAD ANALYST: P. BYNUM

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MODE IS INCLUDED IN THE NASA FMEA/CIL BASELINE AS
DOCUMENTED IN THE NSTS LEVEL I/II REVIEW BOARD PRESENTATION OF
3/30/88, WITH CRITICALITY 3/1R P F P. IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
ASSESSMENT.

SECTION C.10

MECHANICAL ACTUATION SUBSYSTEM

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1102   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-052000-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1102A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-052000-5   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1102B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-052000-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1102
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1103   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-052000-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1103A
NASA FMEA #: 02-4-052000-5

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[　]	[N]	[　]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1103B   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-052000-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1103
ITEM: GEARBOX

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1104   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4-054000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1104
ITEM: PRESSURE LINE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1105   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1105
ITEM: PROBE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1106
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1106
ITEM: PROBE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1107
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1107
ITEM: SHAFT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1108
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [X]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1108
ITEM: SHAFT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [A]
                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1109
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1109
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1110
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1110
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1111   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1111
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1112   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1112
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

    NASA    [   /   ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /3  ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]        [    ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[_]	[_]	[_]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1500   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-18

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1501
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1502   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
               FLIGHT                                     ITEM
             HDW/FUNC        A         B         C

    NASA   [ 1 /1  ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]  *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]       [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 2 /1R ]       [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]       [ A ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1503
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1504   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                    ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

      NASA   [ 1 /1  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ X ] *
      IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1505
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506A BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [2 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [   ]
                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1506   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1507   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                                 INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

      NASA  [ 1 /1 ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ X ] *
      IOA   [ 3 /3 ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [ X ]

COMPARE     [ N /N ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1508
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1509
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                    ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

     NASA  [ 1 /1 ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [ X ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [ X ]

COMPARE   [ N /N ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1510   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1511
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
       IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1512
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1513   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
                 FLIGHT                                ITEM
                HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

       NASA   [ 1 /1 ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [ X ] *
        IOA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [ X ]

COMPARE       [ N /N ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1514   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1515   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
             HDW/FUNC     A         B         C

    NASA   [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [ X ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]       [ A ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1516   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1518A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1518
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1519A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1519   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1520
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1521   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
     IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1522
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1523   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1532
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1533
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1533A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1534   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
        CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
          FLIGHT                                    ITEM
         HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

 NASA  [ 1 /1  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ X ] *
  IOA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
       [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [ ]
                                 INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1535
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1536
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1537   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1538A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1538
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1539A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS              CIL
                 FLIGHT                                        ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

       NASA  [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]      [   ]      [   ]       [ X ] *
        IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]      [ F ]      [ P ]       [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /N  ]    [ N ]      [ N ]      [ N ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]      [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1539   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1540
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1541   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   BASELINE [   ]
                                                  NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1542   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1543
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
					[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1544A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1544   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1545   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
      IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1546   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [1 /1   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
         IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N   ]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1547   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[F]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1548
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1549
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                               ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1549   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1549
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-101

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1550   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

    NASA   [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [ X ]  *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ A ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1551   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1553   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
              HDW/FUNC     A         B         C

     NASA   [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]    [ X ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1554   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

    NASA   [ 1 /1  ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [ X ]  *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2002-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1555
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2002-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1556   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1556
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1557   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1557
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

             [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1558   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1558
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1559   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1559
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988   C.10-116

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1560   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1560
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1561   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1561
ITEM: CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

         CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
            FLIGHT   ITEM
         HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-118

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1562   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1562
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1563   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1563
ITEM: CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
        CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
          FLIGHT                                     ITEM
         HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

  NASA  [   /   ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ] *
   IOA  [ 3 /3  ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ]

COMPARE [ N /N  ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [   /   ]     [    ]    [    ]    [    ]     [    ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1589
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1589
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2017-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1591
ITEM: TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1593   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2017-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1593
ITEM: SOLID STATE DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-123

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1595   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1595
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/21/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1597   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2016-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1597
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1600   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2015-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1600
ITEM: SWITCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
        IOA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/22/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1602   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2015-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1602
ITEM: LATCH RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R] [P] [P] [P]   [ ]
                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
              ADEQUATE [ ]
            INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1604
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1604
ITEM: EMI FILTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1605   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1605
ITEM: EMI FILTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
					[N]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1606
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1606
ITEM: OP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1607
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [　]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1607
ITEM: OP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE   [ ]
                             INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1608
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1608
ITEM: REGULATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1609   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1609
ITEM: REGULATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1610   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1610
ITEM: GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1611
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1611
ITEM: GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1612
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1612
ITEM: CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1613
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1613
ITEM: CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1614
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1614
ITEM: +Q TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1615   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1615
ITEM: +Q TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1616
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1616
ITEM: -Q TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1617   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1617
ITEM: -Q TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1618   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1618
ITEM: TRANSFORMER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [ ]
                                      INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1619   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1619
ITEM: TRANSFORMER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1620   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1620
ITEM: +10V AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1621   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1621
ITEM: +10V AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1622   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                                      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1622
ITEM: -10V AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

               CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS
                 FLIGHT   CIL
                HDW/FUNC   A   B   C   ITEM

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1623   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1623
ITEM: -10V AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1624   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1624
ITEM: +10V TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
         CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
            FLIGHT                                   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

   NASA  [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA  [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ X ]

COMPARE  [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1625   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1625
ITEM: +10V TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1626
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1626
ITEM: -10V TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/25/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1627
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1627
ITEM: -10V TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1628
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1628
ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1629   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1629
ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1630   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1630
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1631
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1631
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1632   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                 NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1632
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
       IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-156

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1633   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1633
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R] [P] [P] [P]   [ ]
                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
              ADEQUATE [ ]
             INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1634   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1634
ITEM: THERMISTER THERMOMETER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1635   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1635
ITEM: THERMISTER THERMOMETER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1636   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1636
ITEM: FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1637   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1637
ITEM: FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1638
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1638
ITEM: CONTROL CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1639   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1639
ITEM: CONTROL CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-163

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1640   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1640
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1641
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1641
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1642
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1642
ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1643
ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	
COMPARE	[　/　]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　[P]　　[P]　　[P]　　[　]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1644
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1645   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1645
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
             FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1646   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1646
ITEM: TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X] *
    IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [X]

COMPARE   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1647   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1647
ITEM: TRANSISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1648   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1648
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
             FLIGHT                                    ITEM
           HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

   NASA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE   [   /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1649   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1649
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1650   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1650
ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-174

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1651   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1651
ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1652
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1652
ITEM: BINARY COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1653   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1653
ITEM: BINARY COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                  ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

        NASA  [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
         IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE       [   /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]       [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1654   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1654
ITEM: ADDRESSABLE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1655   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1655
ITEM: ADDRESSABLE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1656   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1656
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C


    NASA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [   /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [ N ]


RECOMMENDATIONS:   (If different from NASA)

           [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]      [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1657
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1657
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1658   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1658
ITEM: SWITCHING LADDER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]				
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]
                                                   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1659   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1659
ITEM: SWITCHING LADDER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1660   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1660
ITEM: POLARITY DETECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1661   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1661
ITEM: POLARITY DETECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1662   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1662
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

     NASA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE     [   /N ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]       [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1663   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1663
ITEM: CONTROL LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1664   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1664
ITEM: REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE [ ]
                                  INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1665   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1665
ITEM: REGISTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1666
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1666
ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1667   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1667
ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1668   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1668
ITEM: SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1669   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1669
ITEM: SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

               CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
       IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1670
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1670
ITEM: OSCILLATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1671   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1671
ITEM: OSCILLATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1672
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1672
ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1673
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1673
ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1674   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1674
ITEM: 1 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1675
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1675
ITEM: 1 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1676   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1676
ITEM: 500 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1677
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1677
ITEM: 500 MH2 CLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1678   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1678
ITEM: COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1679
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1679
ITEM: COUNTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1680   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1680
ITEM: OR GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

     NASA  [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [   /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]      [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1681
ITEM: OR GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1682   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1682
ITEM: SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1683   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1683
ITEM: SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1684   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1685   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1685
ITEM: BUFFER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1686   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1686
ITEM: OUTPUT CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-210

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1687   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1687
ITEM: OUTPUT CONTROL

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1688   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1688
ITEM: ENCODER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-212

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1689   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1689
ITEM: ENCODER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
         IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-213

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1690   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1690
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1691   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1691
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                  ITEM
               HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

        NASA  [ 3 /3 ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
        IOA   [ 3 /1R ]   [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE       [   /N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [ N ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]        [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1692   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1692
ITEM: CPU

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1693   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1693
ITEM: CPU

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1694   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1694
ITEM: SELECTOR LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1695   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1695
ITEM: SELECTOR LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1696
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1696
ITEM: READ ONLY MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1697   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1697
ITEM: ROM

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1698
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1698
ITEM: READ/WRITE MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ADP-1699
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EE-2014-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1699
ITEM: READ/WRITE MEMORY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ESP-2106
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2106
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER, BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2500   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS12-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2500
ITEM: ENVIRONMENTAL BARRIER

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-225

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2501
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS1-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2501
ITEM: SEALS, WINDOW PANE ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2502   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS3-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2502
ITEM: SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY SPACER/RETAINER

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2503   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS4-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                          NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2503
ITEM: SEALS, WINDOW ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2504   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS13-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2504
ITEM: SEALS, MANUFACTURING ACCESS PANEL

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2505   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS15-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2505
ITEM: SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATES, BULKHEADS

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2506   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS17-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2506
ITEM: SEAL ELECTRICAL FEEDTHROUGH CONNECTOR

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [X]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2507   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS18-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: 01-4-CS18-1
MDAC ID: 2507
ITEM: SEALS, HARD LINE FEED THROUGH FITTING

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [3 /1R]   [F]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
        IOA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                               ADEQUATE   [X]
                                               INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-232

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2508
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS19-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: 01-4-CS19-1
MDAC ID: 2508
ITEM: SEALS, CREW MODULE, ETS FEEDTHOUGH BLANKING
PLUGS (OV-102 ONLY)

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2509   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS20-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2509
ITEM: SEALS, AIRLOCK HATCH "A" AND "B" WINDOWS

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                      ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2510   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS22-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2510
ITEM: SEALS, INNER PANES, SIDE HATCH WINDOW

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2511
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS24-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: 01-4-CS24-1
MDAC ID: 2511
ITEM: SEAL, SIDE HATCH WINDOW ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206.   THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA.   HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2512   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS25-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2512
ITEM: SEALS, AIRLOCK AND INGRESS/EGRESS HATCHES

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2513
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS28-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2513
ITEM: SEALS, TUNNEL/CREW MODULE STRUCTURAL INTERFACE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2514   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS29-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2514
ITEM: SEALS, SIDE HATCH TUNNEL SEPARATION PLANE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2515   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS30-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2515
ITEM: SEALS, AIRLOCK TO BULKHEAD STRUCTURAL INTERFACE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [X]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206.   THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA.   HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2516   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS31-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2516
ITEM: SEAL, BULKHEAD FEED THROUGH, WCCS LINES

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS32-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2517
ITEM: SEAL, LATCH ACTUATOR TO HATCH STRUCTURE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2518   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS34-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2518
ITEM: SEAL, CREW MODULE, ETS PYRO LINE FITTINGS

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [X]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2519
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS35-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2519
ITEM: SEAL, CREW MODULE, FLIGHT DECK "BEANIE CAP"
OVERHEAD PANEL (OV-102 ONLY)

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2520   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS39-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2520
ITEM: SEALS, STAR TRACKER BOOM COLLAR STRUCTURAL
ATTACH AND COVER PLATE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE [X]
                                  INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2521   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS40-1   NEW   [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2521
ITEM: SEAL, STAR TRACKER BOOM

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2522   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS43-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2522
ITEM: SEAL, STAR TRACKER WELL TO CREW MODULE STRUCTURE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [X]
                                 INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2523
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS44-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2523
ITEM: SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES, BLEED VALVES & LEFT HAND SIDE-NEGATIVE PRESSURE RELIEF
VALVES.

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                  ADEQUATE   [X]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2524   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS46-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2524
ITEM: SEAL, VENT SEVERANCE PANEL

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2525   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS47-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2525
ITEM: SEALS, SIDE HATCH CABIN FILL TEST PORT

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-250

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2526   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS48-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2526
ITEM: SEAL, AIR EQUALIZATION VALVES AND PRESSURE GAUGE
TO HATCH STRUCTURE, AIRLOCK HATCHES

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

                  CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                    FLIGHT   ITEM
                   HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [2 /1R]   [F]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
        IOA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [X]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-251

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2527
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS49-1

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2527
ITEM: SEAL, AFT BULKHEAD-VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                              ADEQUATE [X]
                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2528   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS51-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2528
ITEM: SEAL, TEST PORT CAP, CABIN FILL, SIDE HATCH

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

                  [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [X]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/OS-2529   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   01-4-CS52-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MAS/CMS (CREW MODULE SEALS)
MDAC ID: 2529
ITEM: SEAL, FEED THROUGH PLATE, AIRLOCK

LEAD ANALYST: H. J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES BETWEEN THE
NASA AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS
22206. THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITALLY ANALYZED OR ASSESSED BY
IOA. HOWEVER, IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-254

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2700
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-A2-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2700
ITEM: DEBRIS CONTAINER, AFT ATTACH

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2701
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-U2-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2701
ITEM: DEBRIS CONTAINER, UMBILICAL SEPARATION SYSTEM

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [X]
                                    INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2702
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-F4-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2702
ITEM: SPHERICAL BEARING, ORBITER/ET FORWARD ATTACH

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2703   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-3A-A5-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2703
ITEM: BOLT, AFT ATTACH

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2704
NASA FMEA #:   02-3A-U3-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2704
ITEM: STUD, UMBILICAL ATTACH

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2705
NASA FMEA #:   02-3A-A7-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2705
ITEM: HOLE PLUGGER/COVER ASSY, ORBITER/ET AFT ATTACH

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2706
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-U6-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2706
ITEM: UMBILICAL CLOSEOUT CURTAIN

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [X]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2707   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   02-3A-U8-1   BASELINE [   ]
                                                        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2707
ITEM: ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2708   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-3A-U8-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2708
ITEM: ELECTRICAL DISCONNECT ASSEMBLY, UMBILICAL

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [X]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 6/06/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/MS-2709
NASA FMEA #: 02-3A-U7-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SEPARATION, ORBITER/ET
MDAC ID: 2709
ITEM: SIDE RESTRAINT STRUT, UMBILICAL

LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [X]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE WAS NOT INITIALLY ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE NASA/RI AND IOA FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. ON REVIEW OF THE FMEA/CIL,
IOA/MDAC HAS NO ISSUE WITH THE NASA FMEA/CIL.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3102
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3102
ITEM: CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3110
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3110
ITEM: CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88

ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3112

NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3112
ITEM: DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3118
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3118
ITEM: DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                      ADEQUATE   [ ]
                      INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3125   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3125
ITEM: DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                             ADEQUATE [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3144   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3144
ITEM: READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
             FLIGHT                                   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

    NASA  [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3504
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3504
ITEM: RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3511
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3511
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3512   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3512
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3513
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3513
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3514
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3514
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3515
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
 BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3515
ITEM: CONTROL BUS FUSE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3516   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3516
ITEM: MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3517
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3517
ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3518   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3518
ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3519
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3519
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3520   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3520
ITEM: HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                 INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3521   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3521
ITEM: HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMEMTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3524   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3524
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3525   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3525
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS              CIL
            FLIGHT                                         ITEM
          HDW/FUNC       A          B          C

  NASA    [  /  ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]       [   ] *
   IOA    [ 2 /1R ]    [ F ]      [ F ]      [ P ]       [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N ]     [ N ]      [ N ]      [ N ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [  /  ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]       [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3526
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3526
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3527   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3527
ITEM: FUSE, 1A, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
              FLIGHT                                       ITEM
            HDW/FUNC        A         B         C

   NASA   [  /   ]       [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ] *
   IOA    [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]       [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]      [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [  /  ]       [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3528   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3528
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/ETU-3529   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3529
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
                 FLIGHT                                   ITEM
                HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

       NASA   [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ] *
       IOA    [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [   ]

COMPARE       [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4101   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4101
ITEM: GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4102   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4102
ITEM: GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /2]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4103   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4103
ITEM: NUT/BREECH

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4104   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4104
ITEM: NUT/BREECH

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
            FLIGHT                                  ITEM
          HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

   NASA   [  /   ]    [   ]   [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA   [ 1 /1 ]    [   ]   [   ]    [   ]     [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N ]    [   ]   [   ]    [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [  /   ]    [   ]   [   ]    [   ]     [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4105
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4105
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4106
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4106
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4107   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4107
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (S1 & 2) ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4108   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4108
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (S1 & 2) ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                 ITEM
             HDW/FUNC     A        B        C

    NASA   [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206.   THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4109   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4109
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4110
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4110
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4111   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4111
ITEM: GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4112   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4112
ITEM: GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4113   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4113
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4500   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4500
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
FAILURE OF A SINGLE SWITCH POLE/CONTACT SET OPEN WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION. FAILURE OF REDUNDANT HARDWARE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/MISSION AND NOT CONSIDERED READILY APPARENT
DURING FLIGHT.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4501A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4501
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4502   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4502
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                            ADEQUATE [ ]
                          INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4503A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4503
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4504
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4504
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [　]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[　]	[　]	[　]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[　]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]　　[P]　　[F]　　[P]　　[A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [　]
INADEQUATE [　]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4505A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4505
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4506
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4506
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4507A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4507
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4508
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4508
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4509A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4510
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4510
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4511A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4511
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4512   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-6   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4512
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                               ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                               INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4513A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4513
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
                FLIGHT                                       ITEM
               HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

        NASA  [ 2 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ NA]     [ P ]     [ X ] *
         IOA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [ X ]

COMPARE       [ N /   ]     [   ]     [ N ]     [   ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4514
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-6

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4514
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56060-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE [   ]
                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4515A   BASELINE [ ]
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56060-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R] [P] [F] [P] [A]
                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
               ADEQUATE [ ]
             INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4516
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4516
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4517A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4517
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4518
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4518
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

| | CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC | REDUNDANCY SCREENS | | | CIL ITEM |
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4519A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4519
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4520   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4520
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
             FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [N /   ]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4521A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4521
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4522
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4522
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

  [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4523A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4523
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4524
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4524
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4525A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [ ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4525
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                           ADEQUATE [   ]
                         INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4526
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4526
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4527A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4527
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4528   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4528
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4529
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4529A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4529
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4530   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4530
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4531
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

    NASA    [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]      [ X ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /2R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE    [ N /N ]     [   ]    [ N ]    [   ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ P ]    [ P ]        [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4531A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4531
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
             FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA [2 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [X] *
     IOA [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [N]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4532
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4532
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                               ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4533A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4533
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4534   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4534
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4535A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4535
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4536
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4536
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-357

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4537A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4537
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/03/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4538
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-4

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4538
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4539A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4540
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4540A
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4541
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4541
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4541A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4541
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
                FLIGHT                                    ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

        NASA  [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]    [ X ] *
         IOA  [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]    [ X ]

COMPARE       [ N /N  ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]    [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]      [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-1

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4542A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56000-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
ITEM: TALKBACK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4543
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4543
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4544   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4544
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

         CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
           FLIGHT   ITEM
          HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4545
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [ ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4545
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4546   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4546
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

          CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
            FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4548   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4548
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4550   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4550
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.   THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4551   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4551
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC        A        B        C

     NASA    [ 2 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ] *
      IOA    [ 3 /2R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /N ]       [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4552
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4552
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IS GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4553   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4553
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
      IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4554   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4554
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4556
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4556
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]				[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4558   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4558
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4559   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4559
ITEM: K14

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-380

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4560
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4560
ITEM: K14

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMIANING ISSUES BY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4561
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4561
ITEM: K68

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4562   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4562
ITEM: K68

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

 COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4564   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4564
ITEM: K72

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4566   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4566
ITEM: K70

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4567   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4567
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4568   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4568
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4570
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4570
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4571   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4571
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4572   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4572
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
    IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NO
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINIG ISSUES MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUES IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4573
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

          CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
             FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X] *
     IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4573A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4573
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY     REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                   ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

      NASA   [ 2 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ] *
       IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [ X ]

COMPARE      [ N /    ]    [    ]    [    ]    [    ]      [    ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
         [ 3 /1R ]       [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                             ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4576   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4576
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4578   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4578
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

    NASA   [   /    ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA    [ 3 /2R  ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N   ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /    ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4579
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4579
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4580
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4580
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4581
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4581
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.   THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4582
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4582
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-398

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4584   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4584
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4586   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4586
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4587
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4587
ITEM: K25

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4588   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4588
ITEM: K25

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4589
ITEM: K2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4591   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4591
ITEM: K2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4593
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4593
ITEM: K27

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4595   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4595
ITEM: K37

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /2R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4596
NASA FMEA #:   05-6EH-56021-2

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4596
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/04/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4597   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4597
ITEM: STOW MICROSWITCH #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4599
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4599
ITEM: DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4600   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                         NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4600
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4601
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4601
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4602
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4602
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4603
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4603
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4604
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4604
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                 ADEQUATE [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4605   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4605
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4606   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4606
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4607   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4607
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                    ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

     NASA  [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUE MAY BE ATTRIBUTED
TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4608   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4608
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4609   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4609
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4610   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4610
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4611   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4611
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /3   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                                ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4612   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4612
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4613   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4613
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

     NASA  [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [    ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4614   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4614
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
         CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
           FLIGHT                                    ITEM
          HDW/FUNC      A         B        C

  NASA  [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
   IOA  [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-424

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4615
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4615
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                               ADEQUATE   [   ]
                               INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4616   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4616
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
                FLIGHT                                      ITEM
               HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

     NASA    [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
      IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE      [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
              [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4617   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4617
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
            FLIGHT                                    ITEM
           HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

   NASA   [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                     ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                     INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.   THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4618
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4618
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4619
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4619
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4620
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4620
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4621   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4621
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4622
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4622
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4623
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4623
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                        ADEQUATE [   ]
                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4624   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                                 NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4624
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4625   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4625
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.   THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4626   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4626
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4627   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4627
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N   ]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4628   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4628
ITEM: 40 MS TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-438

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4629   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4629
ITEM: 40 MS TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4630   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4630
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                    ITEM
            HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

    NASA  [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA  [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]     [   ]   [   ]   [   ]        [    ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4631   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4631
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]				[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4632
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4632
ITEM: AND GATE #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4633
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4633
ITEM: AND GATE #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4634   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4634
ITEM: 4 SECOND TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4635   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4635
ITEM: 4 SECOND TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS         CIL
            FLIGHT                                     ITEM
           HDW/FUNC        A        B        C

   NASA   [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]     [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]     [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]      [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4636   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4636
ITEM: AMP #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                             (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4637   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4637
ITEM: AMP #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
                 FLIGHT                                  ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

    NASA    [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4638   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4638
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4639
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4639
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                 ADEQUATE   [   ]
                               INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4640   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                                NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4640
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4641   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4641
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4642
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4642
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4643   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4643
ITEM: AND GATE #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4644   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4644
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

    NASA   [   /    ]    [  ]      [  ]      [  ]      [  ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /1R  ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]     [  ]

COMPARE    [ N /N   ]    [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [  ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]         [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4645   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4645
ITEM: AND GATE #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                       ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4646   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4646
ITEM: 40 MS TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4647
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4647
ITEM: 40 MS TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4648
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4648
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/] [   ] [   ] [   ] [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                             INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4649   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4649
ITEM: AMP #1

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                         (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4650
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4650
ITEM: AND GATE #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4651   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4651
ITEM: AND GATE #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
            FLIGHT                                      ITEM
           HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

  NASA   [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
   IOA   [ 3 /1R ]      [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE  [ N /N  ]      [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /   ]      [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4652   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4652
ITEM: 4 SECOND TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-462

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4653   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4653
ITEM: 4 SECOND TIME DELAY

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4654   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4654
ITEM: AMP #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY       REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

    NASA   [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
    IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

COMPARE    [ N /N  ]     [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4655   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4655
ITEM: AMP #3

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4656
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4656
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4657   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4657
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4658   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4658
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
               FLIGHT                                  ITEM
              HDW/FUNC       A       B       C

     NASA    [   /   ]     [   ]   [   ]   [   ]     [   ] *
      IOA    [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]   [ F ]   [ P ]     [   ]

  COMPARE    [ N /N  ]     [ N ]   [ N ]   [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]   [   ]   [   ]     [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4659   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4659
ITEM: EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N   ]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4660
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4660
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4661   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4661
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4662
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4662
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4663   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4663
ITEM: AMP #2

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4664   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4664
ITEM: CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4665
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4665
ITEM: CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4666   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4666
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE **NOT**
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-476

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4667
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4667
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4668   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4668
ITEM: CAPACITOR BANK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4669   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4669
ITEM: CAPACITOR BANK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4670   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4670
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4671   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4671
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4672   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4672
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4673
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4673
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4674   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4674
ITEM: TEST LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

       NASA [/   ]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ] *
        IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

             [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4675   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4675
ITEM: TEST LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-485

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4676
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
       NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4676
ITEM: CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4677   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4677
ITEM: CONVERTER

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4678   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4678
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES.   THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4679   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4679
ITEM: INVERTED AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N   ]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4680
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4680
ITEM: CAPACITOR BANK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [ ]
                                    INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-490

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4681   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4681
ITEM: CAPACITOR BANK

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4682
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4682
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                         INADEQUAE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4683   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4683
ITEM: AND GATE

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY    REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

     NASA  [   /    ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /1R  ]    [ P ]    [ F ]    [ P ]      [   ]

  COMPARE  [ N /N   ]    [ N ]    [ N ]    [ N ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
          [   /    ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If&a2808Happlicable)
                                        ADEQUATE [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988   C.10-493

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4684   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4684
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

     NASA   [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]          [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4685
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
   BASELINE [   ]
      NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4685
ITEM: AMP

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4686
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
        NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4686
ITEM: TEST LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/05/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/KBD-4687   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4687
ITEM: TEST LOGIC

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

     [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5103   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5103
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5116   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5116
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

              [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5117   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5117
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

           CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-500

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5118   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5118
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-501

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5141   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5141
ITEM: BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5142   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5142
ITEM: BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5143   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5143
ITEM: BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5144   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5144
ITEM: BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                     ITEM
             HDW/FUNC       A         B         C

    NASA   [   /   ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA   [ 3 /3  ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ]

 COMPARE   [ N /N  ]      [   ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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           [   /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]        [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIOALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5148   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5148
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5160   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5160
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5170   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5170
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
              CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS            CIL
                 FLIGHT                                     ITEM
                HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

        NASA   [  /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ] *
         IOA   [ 3 /3 ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ]

COMPARE        [ N /N ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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              [  /   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]       [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION   (If applicable)
                                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                                  INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5171   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5171
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

              CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                 FLIGHT   ITEM
                HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [P]   [P]   [p]   [   ] *
      IOA   [3 /2R]   [P]   [P]   [p]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5172   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                                        NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5172
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5173   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5173
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
         IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5174   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5174
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
            HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

     NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [1 /1]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-512

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5175
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5175
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5177   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                             NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5177
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5178   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5178
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
          CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
             FLIGHT                                   ITEM
           HDW/FUNC      A        B        C

  NASA   [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
   IOA   [ 3 /3  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE  [ N /N  ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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          [   /   ]    [   ]    [   ]    [   ]        [    ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5501
ITEM: CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5503
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5503
ITEM: CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5506
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5506
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5509   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW   [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5509
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
        CRITICALITY        REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
           FLIGHT                                    ITEM
         HDW/FUNC        A        B        C

  NASA  [   /   ]     [    ]   [    ]   [    ]      [    ] *
   IOA  [ 3 /3  ]     [    ]   [    ]   [    ]      [    ]

COMPARE [ N /N  ]     [    ]   [    ]   [    ]      [    ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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        [   /   ]     [    ]   [    ]   [    ]         [    ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5510   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5510
ITEM: DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

```
           CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
              FLIGHT                                    ITEM
            HDW/FUNC       A        B        C

   NASA   [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ] *
    IOA   [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE   [ N /N  ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
           [   /   ]     [   ]    [   ]    [   ]      [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5511
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5511
ITEM: SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5512
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
  NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5512
ITEM: SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETAION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5513   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5513
ITEM: SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5514   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5514
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5515   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5515
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5516
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5516
ITEM: MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5517   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5517
ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-5518   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5518
ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-528

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-6101   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5519
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER

LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
              HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
      IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

  COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-6102   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                           NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6101
ITEM: MOTOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS          CIL
               FLIGHT                                    ITEM
              HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

     NASA    [  /    ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ] *
     IOA     [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ P ]     [ P ]     [   ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [ N ]     [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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            [  /    ]    [   ]     [   ]     [   ]     [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBD-6103   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6102
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                         ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                       INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6105   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-183-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6105
ITEM: TORQUE LIMITER

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [X]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-532

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6106
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6106
ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                  ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                  INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6109   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6109
ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (S1), (S3), (S4)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                               (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6110   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6110
ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH (S2), (S3), (S4)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6112   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-181-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6112
ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

            CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
              FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

    NASA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ] *
     IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-536

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6112A   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4G-182-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6112
ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [D]
                                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6202   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6202
ITEM: MOTOR BRAKE

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6206   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6206
ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6209   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6209
ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (S1, S2, S4)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS           CIL
              FLIGHT                                      ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A          B          C

    NASA    [   /   ]     [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ] *
     IOA    [ 3 /3  ]     [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]

COMPARE     [ N /N  ]     [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
            [   /   ]     [   ]      [   ]      [   ]      [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PBR-6210   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6210
ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW (S1, S2, S3)

LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

```
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88               NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:   MECH/PBR-6213           BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:     02-4G-152-3                  NEW [ X ]

SUBSYSTEM:       MECH/PBR
MDAC ID:         6213
ITEM:            DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK

LEAD ANALYST:    W.T. SLAUGHTER

ASSESSMENT:
```

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

```
RECOMMENDATIONS:  (If different from NASA)

         [ 3 /3 ]      [   ]   [   ]   [   ]        [ D ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                           ADEQUATE    [   ]
                                           INADEQUATE  [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA.  THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.
```

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-542

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7100   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593309-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7100
ITEM: PRESSURE PORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7101   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593309-1   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7101
ITEM: PRESSURE PORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[1 /1]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[X]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7102   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593302-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7102
ITEM: O RING

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[F]	[F]	[P]	[X] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

      [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7103   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593302-2   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7103
ITEM: O RING

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

```
            CRITICALITY      REDUNDANCY SCREENS        CIL
              FLIGHT                                   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC      A         B         C

     NASA  [ 3 /2R ]    [ F ]     [ F ]     [ P ]    [ X ] *
      IOA  [ 3 /1R ]    [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]    [ X ]

COMPARE  [   /N  ]    [ N ]     [   ]     [   ]      [   ]
```

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

```
        [ 3 /1R ]     [ P ]     [ F ]     [ P ]        [ A ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)
```

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7104   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7104
ITEM: VIEWPORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
        IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

                [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7105
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7105
ITEM: VIEWPORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7112   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593202-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7112
ITEM: O RING

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA [3 /2R]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
         IOA [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [X]

   COMPARE [/N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

          [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                                      (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7113   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   02-4A-593202-3   NEW [X]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7113
ITEM: O RING

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[3 /2R]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[F]	[P]	[X]
COMPARE	[/N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[N]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [A]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
IOA/MDAC AGREES WITH THE FMEA. THE ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY
IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7114   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7114
ITEM: VIEWPORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

             CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
               FLIGHT   ITEM
             HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

      NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
       IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [F]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE   [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

             [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7115   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7115
ITEM: VIEWPORT

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

            [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7116
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7116
ITEM: VIEWPORT LATCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/12/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/PH-7117   NASA DATA:
NASA FMEA #:   BASELINE [   ]
                                              NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7117
ITEM: VIEWPORT LATCH

LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    [   ]
                                                 (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [   ]
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8109
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
     NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8109
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

    [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                            (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                   INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8501
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8501
ITEM: ACTUATOR MOTOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8504
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
    BASELINE [   ]
         NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8504
ITEM: MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8505
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8505
ITEM: MCA DC POWER BUS

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

       [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8506
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
    NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8506
ITEM: MCA AC POWER BUS

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8509   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8509
ITEM: ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS/PINS

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                          (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                      INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8510
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
  BASELINE [   ]
      NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8510
ITEM: CABLES/WIRING

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]				[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUND RULES. THE ISSUE IS
WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8514
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8514
ITEM: FUSE

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			CIL ITEM
		A	B	C	
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]				[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8515   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8515
ITEM: RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

                CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                  FLIGHT   ITEM
                 HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

        NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
         IOA   [2 /1R]   [P]   [NA]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                      ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/19/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/VDM-8516   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8516
ITEM: RESISTOR

LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[2 /1R]	[P]	[NA]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                  (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                        ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                        INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9102   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9102
ITEM: OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (S1 & 3) ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

                 CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
                   FLIGHT   ITEM
                  HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

         NASA   [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
          IOA   [3 /1R]   [P]   [P]   [P]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [N]   [N]   [N]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

               [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                       (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)   ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9103
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9103
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (S1 & 3) ACTUATOR

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                           (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE 22 JULY 1988   C.10-566

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9104   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9104
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4)

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]   [ ]
                                   (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                           INADEQUATE   [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9105   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9105
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4)

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

         CRITICALITY   REDUNDANCY SCREENS   CIL
           FLIGHT   ITEM
         HDW/FUNC   A   B   C

   NASA [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ] *
   IOA   [3 /3]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

COMPARE [N /N]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

         [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                          ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                          INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9106   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9106
ITEM: GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

           [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                    (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                            ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                            INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9107
NASA FMEA #:

NASA DATA:
BASELINE [   ]
NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9107
ITEM: GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[N]	[N]	[N]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                        (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE   [   ]
INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
AFTER COMPARISON, THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES FOUND THAT WERE NOT
ALREADY IDENTIFIED BY NASA, THE REMAINING ISSUES MAY BE
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WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

REPORT DATE   22 JULY 1988   C.10-570

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9108   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9108
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                              (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                    ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                    INADEQUATE [   ]

REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/17/88   NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID: MECH/SDM-9501   BASELINE [   ]
NASA FMEA #:   NEW [   ]

SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 9501
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500

LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT HDW/FUNC	REDUNDANCY SCREENS A	B	C	CIL ITEM
NASA	[/]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ] *
IOA	[3 /3]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]
COMPARE	[N /N]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]	[ ]

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

        [/]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]   [   ]
                                                     (ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
                                              ADEQUATE   [   ]
                                              INADEQUATE [   ]
REMARKS:
THE ISSUE AROSE DUE TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NASA AND IOA
FMEA/CIL INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NSTS 22206. THE
ISSUE IS WITHDRAWN BY IOA/MDAC.