### **PRESENTATION 4.2.15**

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# "TEST VS. SIMULATION"

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## INTRODUCTION

Rockwell International

**OVERVIEW: SPACE VEHICLES REQUIRE** SIMULATION CAPABILITIES PROPULSION STRUCTURES LOADS AERODYNAMICS CONTROL OTHER

#### PRESENTATION SCOPE: PROPULSION SIMULATION AND PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING

**PRESENTATION OBJECTIVE** 

APPROACH: THROUGH ASSESSMENT OF SIMULATION CAPABILITIES AND REVIEW OF CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST PROGRAMS ILLUSTRATE THAT BOTH SIMULATION AND PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING EACH HAVE **IMPORTANT ROLES IN SPACE VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT.** 

# SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

(NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

EVALUATION CRITERIA	VEHICLE FLIGHT CATASTROPHE RISK	MISSION LOSS RISK	LAUNCH DELAY RISK	LAUNCH CONPLEX RISK	SYSTEN TEST PROVIDES DATA	REMAINING RISK AFTER 20 SECOND FRF
"Wrong" Component Verification	Very High	Very High	High	High	Yes	Low
Instrumentation Failure	Moderate	Moderate	Very High	Very High	Yes	Minor
Hazardous Fluid Leakage	High	High	Very High	Very High	Yes	Moderate
POGO Failure	Moderate	High	Ninor	Minor	Can	Moderate
Thrust Vector Control Failure	Low	Low	Low	Minor	No	Hinor
Propellant Loading Procedures/Opera- tions	No	No	Very High	High	Yes	No benefit
Clustered Engine Performance	Ninor	Ninor	Minor	Minor	Yes	Minor
Performance Margin Uncertainty	Minor	High	No	No	Yes	Hoderate
Stored Gas Mass, Loading, Operations	Ninor	Minor	Ninor	Moderate	Yes	Ninor

### SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT (NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

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Pressurization System Performance	Noderate	High	Ninor	Ninor	*Yes	Noderate
Propellant Mass Uncertainty	Ninor	Noderate	Very High	Ninor	Yes	Low
Low Level Cutoff Sensor	Ninor	Ninor	Noderate	No	Yes	No benefit
Engine/Feed Systems Chill	Minor	Ninor	High	Minor	*Yes	Minor
Tank Insulation	Minor	Minor	High	Minor	*Yes	Minor
Hardware Thermal Control	Minor	Minor	High	Moderate	*Yes	Minor
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\* Mission Dependent

### ADVANCED VEHICLE SIMULATION CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

	SHUTTLE	ADVANCED VEHICLE WITH SMALLER VOLUME, COMMON BULKHEAD			
EVALUATION CRITERIA	FLIGHT CATASTROPHIC/ LAUNCH DELAY	ALTITUDE START	ORBITAL START		
	RISK	RISK	RISK		
Pressurization Systems Performance	Moderate/ Minor	Much Higher/ Same	Significantly Higher/Higher		
Propellant Mass Uncertainty	Ninor/ Extr <b>emely</b> High	Higher/Same	Much Higher/Same		
Engine/Feed System Chill	Ninor/H1gh	Higher/Same	Significantly Higher/Higher		
Tank Insulation	Ninor/High	Higher/Same	Much Higher/Same		
Hardware Thermal Control	Minor/High	Higher/Same	Significantly Higher/Higher		
			1		

(NO PROPULSION SYSTEM TEST)

Note: Risk relative to shuttle.

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## SYSTEMS TESTS IDENTIFIED EVENTS

					**	
	CATA	CATASTROPHE		UNWORKABLE		
STAGE	FLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	FLIGHT	PREFLIGHT	PER STAGE	
SHUTTLE	3	3	5	17	40	
S-1C	4	0	3	3	13	
S-11	2	O	8	8	21	
S-1VB	8	0	6	3	20	
S-1/18	5	1	4	2	15	
\$-IV*	2	o	3	1	6	

\* Incomplete

\*\* Includes Categories not included

#### EXAMPLE

SHUTTLE SSME NOZZLE STERN HORN RUPTURE - H2 DUMPED. MARGINAL STABILITY CHARACTERISTICS - ET/ORBITER 17" 02 DISCONNECT.

SAT V F-1 ENGINE TO STAGE BOLTS STRUCTURAL FAILURES S-II ENGINE THRUST CHAMBER CHILL FAULTY - ENGINE STALL POTENTIAL

# MPTA TESTING EVALUATION

ATTEMPTED FIRINGS/ABORTS	INERTING PURGE USAGE	FIRE WATER USAGE (EXTERNAL)	ABORT SOURCE
21/9	5K – 12 System 30K – 3 System	6	Vehicle 2 Engine 8

# SATURN V, IB, I TESTING EVALUATION

	DI	FLIGHT STAGES				
VEHICLE	TEST Number	ABORTS	TEST INADVERTENTLY "CUT"	TEST STAGE DESTROYED	ACCEPTANCE TESTED	DESTROYED IN TEST
SIC "ALL SYSTEMS"	15	5	3		15	1
S-11 BATTLESHIP ALL SYSTEMS	54 9	29 6	1	1	15	
SIV B	21	-	-	1	27	1
SI/IB	23	6			22	

MPTA Haroware Replacement and Repair								
MPTA Test Number	sdmud	Major Valves	EIU/MDMS	Other	LH2 Recirculation System, Pressurization System	Valves	Sensors	LH2 Dilfuser, Feed Line Screens, Other
		ENG				VEHI		
			INE	-			ULE	-
1-002				1	4	5	4	·
2							1	2
3				1		1	1	2
4							1	1
5-A	12	9		1			4	3
5			1		4	2	4	
6-01		9	1	1			2	
6-02/3	1	7		2	3		5	1
6-04			1	5			4	
7-01		1						
7-02		2			2		4	
8		2			5	1		
9-01	1						4	
9-02	4		1		1	1	2	
10		4	10	3	1		2	
11-01	2	7			4	6	2	
11-02				3	5	4		
12				3		1		
Total	20	41	15	20	30	21	40	10

MPTA Hardware Replacement and Repair


Note: Hardware changes made prior to designated test number

## "SPECIAL" VEHICLE SIMULATION ISSUES (PROPULSION RELATED)

#### SPACE ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS ON:

- · PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT
- · PROPELLANT THERMAL CONTROL
- · TANK PRESSURE CONTROL
- · PROPELLANT DYNAMICS
- · PROPELLANT RESUPPLY

## "SPECIAL" VEHICLE SIMULATION ISSUES



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
(PROPULSION RELATED)

#### SIMULATION ASSESSMENT:

FOR SOME ISSUES -

- · NECESSARY TECHNOLOGY DOES NOT EXIST
- · DEMONSTRATION OF TECHNOLOGY NECESSARY
- · ORBITAL EXPERIMENTAL DATA NECESSARY
- · DEVELOPMENT STAGE GROUND TEST POSSIBLE/DESIRABLE
- · SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT GROUND FACILITIES REQUIRED

#### MPTA TEST SCHEDULE



NOTE: R/L . RESONANT/LOADING TESTS

### CONCLUSIONS

- PROPULSION <u>SYSTEM TESTING</u> HAS PREVENTED CATASTROPHE AND MISSION LOSS EVENTS AND LAUNCH DELAYS.
- THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERACTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS SUBSYSTEMS/ DEFIES ACCURATE SIMULATION. <u>SYSTEM TESTING</u> PROVIDES FOR MODEL BASING AND ENHANCES SIMULATION.
- SOME ADVANCED/"SPECIAL" VEHICLES MAY HAVE EQUAL OR GREATER REQUIRE--MENTS FOR PROPULSION SYSTEM TESTING AND UNUSUAL TEST FACILITIES/ METHODS MAY BE REQUIRED.
- A GROUND PROPULSION "SYSTEM TEST" PROGRAM IS THE LOGICAL APPROACH FOR PROVING DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS/METHODS WHERE FLIGHT CATASTROPHIC FAILURES OR OTHER FAILURES CAN BEST BE UNDERSTOOD AND CONTROLLED.
- ADVANCEMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION IN SOME AREAS IS NECESSARY TO SATISFY FUTURE MISSION REQUIREMENTS.