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44 p.

NASA
Technical
Paper
3413

September 1993

Results of an Electrical Power System Fault Study (CDDF Final Report No. N06)

N.R. Dugal-Whitehead
and Y.B. Johnson

(NASA-TP-3413) RESULTS OF AN
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM FAULT STUDY
(CDDF) Final Report No. N06 (NASA)
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N94-15007

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H1/18 0189622



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N.R. Dugal-Whitehead and Y.B. Johnson
*George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of Management
Scientific and Technical
Information Program

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A	amperes
Ah	ampere hour
AMPS	autonomously managed power system
Bat.	battery
CATV	cable access television
CHG	charge controller
CMD	command
CRRES	Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite
Cur	current
dc	direct current
div	division
DOD	depth of discharge
DMSP 4	undefined in source document
EMI	electromagnetic interference
EPS	electrical power system
EPSC	electrical power system controller
FELES	front end load enable scheduler
FET	field effect transistor
FRAMES	fault recovery and management expert system
FT	fast trip (I at limit >15 ms)
GC	generic card
HST	Hubble space telescope
I	current

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Continued)

Inc.	Incorporated
INTELSAT	International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
JPL	Jet Propulsion Laboratory
KANT	knowledge and negotiation tool
kHz	kilohertz
KNOMAD	knowledge management and design
kW	kilowatt
LASEPS	large autonomous spacecraft electrical power system
LC	load center
LCC	load center controller
LEO	low Earth orbit
LLP	lowest level processor
LPLMS	load prioritization list management
mA	milliamp
MAESTRO	master of automated expert scheduling through resource orchestration
mHz	megahertz
min	minute(s)
ms	millisecond
MSFC	Marshall Space Flight Center
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Ni-Cd	nickel cadmium
Ni-H	nickel hydrogen
NJ	New Jersey

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Continued)

OS	operating system
P ³	programmable power processor
PC	personal computer
PDCU	power distribution control unit
PEP	power expansion package
PI	principal investigator
PMS	power management system
PPG	power processing group
PSC	power source controller
RBI	remote bus isolator
REG	regulator
RPC	remote power controller
SA	solar array
SAS	solar array simulator
SASU	solar array switching unit
SCATHA	undefined in source documentation
SIC	switchgear interface controller
SPA	solar panel assembly
SMES	Solar Mesosphere Explorer Satellite
SSM/PMAD	space station module power management and distribution
t	time
T	temperature
TV	television

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (Continued)

V	voltage
Vdc	voltage direct current
386	80386 based computers
μ s	microsecond



TECHNICAL PAPER

RESULTS OF AN ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM FAULT STUDY

I. INTRODUCTION

For some time, research into electrical power system faults has taken place at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). This research included a study into the most common of the electrical power system (EPS) faults. Some of the faults which were revealed by the study were then injected into an MSFC EPS breadboard to observe the effects of these faults on the rest of the EPS. The effects which were being watched included the ability of the power system to save itself and the effects of the faults on the programs which control the power system.

II. ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM FAULT STUDY

The research into the most common faults in EPS's falls into four categories for an orbital spacecraft:

- Solar array (SA)
- Battery
- Distribution system
- Loads.

The data being presented were collected from both the aerospace industry and the terrestrial utilities. Although space power systems are NASA's primary concern, there are enough similarities between terrestrial utilities and high voltage dc (direct current) power distribution in space to make the terrestrial utility information very interesting and useful.

In the following subsections, the results of the power system study will be presented.

A. Solar Array

The consideration of factors such as solar intensity, solar array pointing, charged particle degradation, ultraviolet induced degradation, load growth, battery charging, EPS losses, and cell breakage have long been considered in solar array sizing. In addition to these factors, high voltage solar arrays in low Earth orbits may experience degradation due to space plasma interaction.

In the presence of space plasma, high voltage solar arrays are particularly vulnerable to electromagnetic interference, parasitic plasma current power loss, and corona discharge leading to insulation breakdown and arcing. Material damage can result from carbon tracking and shorting between insulation punctures. Such problems occurred

on DMSP 4 and SCATHA and are suspected as the source of anomalies on other vehicles.¹

Some of the possible faults in the solar array subsystem are :

- SA parasitic plasma current power loss
- SA corona discharge
- SA electromagnetic interference
- SA degradation
- SA panel short
- SA panel open
- Isolation diode open
- Isolation diode short.

These faults will be discussed below:

1. Solar Array Parasitic Plasma Current Power Loss and Solar Array Corona Discharge. The topics entitled SA parasitic plasma current power loss and SA corona discharge are similar in content, therefore, they will be discussed jointly.

Discharges of SA's were found to be primarily caused by electric field concentrations in the gap regions between the cells. "Ground testing of solar array segments in simulated low Earth orbit (LEO) plasma environment has shown that discharges occur when the array is at a negative potential with respect to the plasma potential."²

Discharge faults can occur in different areas of the array. Two places where they can occur are between sectors and at the end of a block. Sectors and blocks are illustrated in the simplified SA power system schematic (fig. 1).³ A sector is composed of an individual solar cell with a diode in parallel, and a block is a series connection of several sectors. A single discharge between sectors could effectively shut down that particular array block, or could reduce the power generated for a short duration of time (depending on the number of blocks in the array). A multiple discharge between sectors could possibly cause several blocks to simultaneously go down. Neither of these scenarios would cause serious damage to the array, unless the discharge rates were high. High discharge rates for large arrays have not yet been determined.




Figure 1. Simplified space station SA power system schematic.³

Effects on arrays for discharges at the end of a block can be far more serious. Other blocks can add their current to the discharge because there is nothing to hinder current flow. "If discharges are frequent, then they could prevent or reduce battery charging capability."³

2. Solar Array Electromagnetic Interference. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) can be caused by high current switching or any switching of power. EMI switching problems can be eliminated by utilizing soft start circuits on loads supplied by the the SA's and batteries. Another space related EMI would be space radiation. "The space environment can induce discharges in space power systems either by surface charging via geomagnetic substorm environments in geosynchronous orbit or by interactions between biased surfaces and the space plasma environment in low Earth orbits."³ Other EMI problems include arcing and transient currents. If the negative poles of the SA, primary, and secondary grounds are referenced to the truss, high transient currents and/or arcing could occur, causing possible damage to the arc site. This undesirable scenario can be EMI manageable, according to sources at MSFC. According to these same sources, the best option to manage EMI would be in addition to referencing the array, primary, and secondary grounds to the truss or primary structure, having an electron emitter and a shunt resistor across the plasma potential and the truss. The electron emitter would emit electrons to reduce the plasma potential, and the resistor would work to provide a current path for excess electrons, reducing arcing.⁴

3. Solar Array Degradation. SA degradation can be caused by several factors. These factors include contamination, substandard solar cells, and physical damage to the cells. It is "... well known that photochemical reactions induced by solar vacuum ultraviolet radiation play an important role in contamination of optical surfaces on spacecraft."⁵ This implies that less light could reach the solar cells themselves, causing a degradation in the amount of electricity which is produced and, thus, causing an off nominal condition.

4. Solar Array Panel Short. SA panel shorts can result from a single solar cell being reverse biased. A solar cell in shadow can become reverse biased. With the occurrence of one reverse biased cell, cells in parallel with the reverse biased cell will become reverse biased as well. "Reverse biased cells can sustain permanent short circuit failure, permanent power output loss, and excessive localized heating. . . . The design of the power system has a direct bearing on the degree to which a cell can become reverse biased."⁶

5. Solar Array Panel Open. Reasons for experiencing SA panel opens include:

- a. The detachment of cell to cell interconnect
- b. The detachment of cells from their substrate
- c. The results of poor manufacturing.⁷

SA panel open conditions can cause a significant reduction in power output.

6. Isolation Diode Open. If an isolation diode open occurs, its effect is to open circuit the SA.

7. Isolation Diode Short. An isolation diode short may allow the battery to discharge into the SA. This causes heating of the SA which causes a loss of efficiency in the SA.

B. Battery

Batteries, as everyone knows, are very safe, simple devices that are inexpensive and highly dependable. After all, whenever a flashlight cell fails, we have the simple recourse to go down to the local drug store, procure a new unit, and insert it into the flashlight.

That assumed perception of high reliability causes a certain dimming of our judgments regarding detail, but the perception is easily refuted by our own experiences of disappointment as we place the battery out of its normal 70 operational environment to the cold, where success converts to failure.⁸

Unlike most of the faults in other parts of the EPS, battery faults are dependent on what is happening in the rest of the system. The major battery faults according to *The Battery Safety Handbook* include:

- Overtemperature (from battery self heat or environmental heat)
- Short circuit (external or internal to the battery)
- Reverse current (inadvertent overcharging)
- Cell reversal (overdischarge)
- Cell/battery leakage (gases and/or electrolyte)
- Cell grounds (moisture, potting outgassing, electrolyte leakage)
- Cell internal shorts (foreign material, separator degradation)
- Overpressure.⁹

There is also another condition which can be added to this list as an operational failure:

- Capacity degradation sufficient to prevent normal system operation.

These faults affect all batteries to some degree, but for this research more emphasis was placed on nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) and nickel-hydrogen (Ni-H) cells since these batteries are the types which are used for most secondary batteries (rechargeable batteries) in spacecraft.

The results of the JPL survey showed that the batteries have generally yielded satisfactory performance in flight. . . . Battery failures have caused several spacecraft to limp along with curtailed operations to achieve the required mission durations, as a consequence of the ingenuity and watchful eyes of the NASA battery engineers.⁸

The above conditions have contributed to most of the battery failures, but the three major failure modes are:

- Short circuit
- Capacity degradation
- Energy storage failure.

1. Short Circuit. The most common battery fault encountered in this fault study was a shorted cell.

Short-circuited cells are not rare, however, but their effect is simply to reduce the battery voltage level by approximately one cell. The affected battery is still usable and it is common practice for long missions to anticipate one or more short-circuit failures and to design the electric power system to accommodate them.¹¹

Some of the in-flight shorted cells were end-of-life failures such as the INTELSAT IV F-3 and F-4 battery cell failures.¹² There is a temperature factor in the short circuits that have been observed in the Viking Landers. The batteries on the hotter side had degraded and had shorted cells faster than the colder side of the spacecraft.¹³ Most of the shorted cells in tests had cadmium migration as contributing factors in the shorts.

In the Hubble space telescope (HST) Ni-Cd EPS breadboard, a test was run with one of the six batteries having a shorted cell. In the Ni-Cd version of the HST power system, there was a provision that in the case of a shorted cell in one of the batteries a diode could be placed in series with each of the "healthy" batteries. This test showed:

The tradeoff is to either remove the battery with a shorted cell from the bus and place its SPAs (solar panel assembly) directly to the diode buses providing better SA (solar array) utilization and longer trickle charge to the healthy batteries, or to use it to reduce the DOD (depth of discharge) of the healthy batteries,¹²

by adding the diode in series with the healthy batteries.¹²

2. Capacity Degradation. During the course of this study, various descriptions of battery conditions have been used to describe a battery which is losing its capacity: capacity degradation, high impedance, and undervoltage are the main ones. Before the Viking Lander showed signs of any cells shorting, the following observation was made: "At approximately 5.5 years after landing, two batteries exhibited an apparent acceleration in the rate of loss of energy storage capacity."¹³ These two batteries work at temperatures 5° to 15° hotter than the other two batteries in the vehicle.

The combination of higher temperatures and depressed voltage disables the charge control logic capability to sense the necessity to terminate charging an already fully charged battery, causing the excess energy to be dissipated as heat in that battery, and further depresses the terminal voltage.¹³

This statement is true for all batteries in this condition and leads to thermal runaway. This is a good example of how many of the battery faults mentioned in the beginning of this section can combine to form a fault.

Another description of battery cell failures in battery life testing which falls into this category is:

Six cells failed because of high impedance so that cell charging could not be accomplished within the charge control parameters of the test . . . we concluded that the increase in impedance is indicative of a permanent nonreversible deterioration in cell performance, possibly associated with component dryout.¹⁴

In several of the sources of this study, unequal separator dryout was mentioned as a cause for battery faults.

3. **Energy Storage Failure.** Energy storage failure has occurred at least twice in flight, on the Solar Mesosphere Explorer Satellite (SMES) and on the Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES). In both spacecraft, the temperature of the battery increased well above the ambient temperature of the spacecraft before the battery was taken off-line.^{10 15} Energy storage failure can be described as follows: the battery is “. . . no longer able to hold a charge, and when taken off-charge, discharged through the voltage monitor at a rate of between 0.2 and 0.3 volts per hour and continued discharging to essentially zero voltage”¹⁵ as in the SMES.

C. Distribution

Three-phase terrestrial power systems consist of three lines, a neutral, and a ground. In spacecraft power systems, there are normally multiple buses, a return bus, and a single point chassis ground. For the consideration of power system faults, the neutral in the terrestrial system can be compared to the return in the spacecraft system. The Earth ground of the terrestrial systems and the chassis ground in the spacecraft system are also comparable.

As a result of this EPS fault research, the following faults have been found to be common in electrical power distribution systems :

- Short of bus to neutral or return
- Short of bus to Earth or chassis ground
- Short of one bus or line to another
- Soft shorts of bus or line to return or ground
- Loss of ground to neutral bonding
- Multiple neutral to ground connections
- Bus switch short
- Bus switch open.

Each of these faults will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

1. **Short of Bus to Neutral or Return, Short of Bus to Earth or Chassis Ground, Loss of Ground to Neutral Bonding, and Multiple Neutral to Ground Connections.** Strict adherence to the National Electrical Code should prevent distribution faults from occurring without outside interference; sadly, terrestrial power systems contain many flaws. Here are two of “. . . the most common mistakes that can be found in almost every factory in the United States. One mistake is a failure to bond the ground and neutral in the main panel. Another is a separate ground electrode at the control panel instead of a separate conductor back to the subpanel.”¹⁶ Thus, we have examples of not only the short to ground or neutral, but also of how multiple grounds or loss of ground to neutral continuity are formed. Spacecraft are not immune to distribution errors either, as shown by this episode in the Mariner-Venus-Mercury spacecraft.

Schedule pressure on the Mariner-Venus-Mercury program forced power distribution wiring to be accomplished under stressful conditions. During mission operations,

television cameras did not respond to “on” commands from the ground. After careful investigation, it was ascertained that the cameras did respond to an “on” command meant for another unit. The wiring error was thus discovered and the mission was allowed to continue.¹

2. Short of One Bus or Line to Another. The shorting of one bus or line to another is a problem for both terrestrial and space-based power systems. According to Dr. Gross of Auburn University, the “line-to-line” fault is the second most common power distribution fault following the “line-to-ground” fault.¹⁷ This must also be addressed in spacecraft development; perhaps in greater depth than in terrestrial utilities, since it is critical that certain loads not lose power even momentarily, such as lighting and certain material experiments during critical periods of the experiment process.

3. Bus Switch Short and Bus Switch Open. The switch short and the switch open faults represent serious problems in more than just loss of power. They represent the loss of function of a portion of the distribution system or the possibility of having to stop a runaway load by disabling a larger portion of the bus than should be necessary. This means that the lowest level switch was unable to function, so the next level switch would have to be turned off to isolate the bad switch, also turning off other loads.

4. Soft Shorts of Bus or Line to Return or Ground. “A soft-fault condition is one where there is a small leakage current loss in the system that is not sufficiently major to cause hardware circuit breakers to trip.”¹⁸ This definition holds true for both terrestrial and aerospace systems.

All too frequently, the faults involve arcing or do not establish a firm ground resulting in very little current flow. The result is a fault which can persist for hours or even days while delivering considerable energy to the fault point. The results are obvious: fire hazard, danger to personnel, melting of switch gear, equipment damage, etc.¹⁹

To date, more research has been performed in the detection and isolation of terrestrial soft faults than into space-based soft faults. An example of a soft fault is a small current flow from the bus to ground through a faulty insulator.^{20 21}

D. Loads

According to this research, the most common of all power system faults originates in the terminal-end user load. Many of the above distribution faults are the same types of faults encountered in the loads, but on a smaller scale. As a result of this, the following faults are similar to the distribution faults :

- Short of load to neutral or return
- Short of load to chassis or Earth ground
- Open circuit failure of load
- Soft short of load.

1. Short of Load to Neutral or Return and Short of Load to Chassis or Earth Ground. These faults are similar to the line to neutral or return short and the line to chassis or Earth ground faults. The major difference between line faults and load faults is the results to the equipment or load which is being

powered. With a hard line fault, the input to the load would be shorted, resulting in transients and then no power, due to some higher level switch tripping off. With a load short there will probably be damage to the load due to the component which shorts and then the switch will turn off. One example of poor grounding techniques causing load damage involves a woman who has had three televisions damaged by lightning storms. This woman has had her television replaced by her insurance each time a storm came through. Finally, after the third television was damaged, her insurance company canceled her policy. An analysis of the situation revealed that it is:

. . . not unusual for lightning to cause damage but here the real problem was multiple grounds caused by the cable installer. The CATV cable entrance was on the opposite side of the house from the power cable entrance, making it difficult to bond the grounds properly. Therefore, the installer used a separate ground rod near the point of the cable entry to the building. . . . by not bonding CATV cables to the power ground, lightning can produce thousands of volts across TV tuners and cause catastrophic failure.¹⁶

Shorts of components in space hardware have sometimes caused temporary and sometimes permanent damage to an experiment on the space shuttle or a satellite. One example occurred during the checkout phase of the HST mission when a stray particle shorted a component in an HST experiment. The particle was burned free, causing little or no damage to that experiment on the HST.

2. Open Circuit Failure of Load. Open circuit load failures are fairly common in loads that are fused. "The fused fault quickly converts to an open circuit and is treated in the same manner—the evaluation of a reduction in current demand. The change is typically detected as a reduction in load bus current."²² The disadvantage to a fused load in space is that if the load is on an unmanned flight and the fuse blows there is no recourse to salvage that load in the short term. Of course, if the satellite is in LEO perhaps a shuttle rescue mission can be planned as in the Solar Max satellite, but this is an extreme action.

3. Soft Short of a Load. Just like in the soft short in the line or to the chassis, "A soft-fault condition is one where there is a small leakage current loss in the system that is not sufficiently major to cause hardware circuit breakers to trip."¹⁸ The major source of such faults in the distribution system would have to come from the line protection devices failing or insulation breakdown, but in a load there are many more paths for a soft fault to occur than in the distribution system. Something as mundane as a resistor changing value could be the source of a soft fault in a load, or as extreme as the shorting of the load with enough resistance in series that the load does not quite reach the trip point of the protection device. Most protection devices must be set to 150 percent of the maximum expected load current if the device is, as is typically done, selected so that the protection device does not trip due to inrush currents when the device is turned on.

III. LARGE AUTONOMOUS SPACECRAFT ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM

The fault study was conducted primarily to provide a list of the most common power system faults so that these faults could be implemented in a large spacecraft power system breadboard to enable MSFC to have a facility to test the effects of power system faults on a large spacecraft power system. The power system which was chosen is called the large autonomous spacecraft electrical power system (LASEPS) breadboard.

LASEPS is the combination of two EPS breadboards which have existed at MSFC for some time. These two breadboards are the autonomously managed power system (AMPS) breadboard and the space station module power management and distribution (SSM/PMAD) breadboard. Figure 2 shows the configuration of the two breadboards when they are hooked together. The two systems have been interfaced with the use of two programmable power processors (P³'s).




Figure 2. Present configuration of LASEPS.

A. Autonomously Managed Power System

In 1978, TRW received a study contract from NASA/MSFC to study the best power system for a large orbital satellite, platform, or space station, projecting 1985–1986 technology use and a start of mission in 1988. “This task focuses upon developing the methodology for achieving minimum life cycle costs for a 250 kilowatt (kW) electrical power system in low Earth orbit including the interactions with other subsystems, for example, thermal control, orbital altitude maintenance, and shuttle transportation.”²³ As part of this study, a reference design was to be provided for the proposed EPS, as well as, for a testbed to be used for testing the conceptual designs.

The 250 kW power system design called for seventeen 16.7 kW channels to support 250 kW of payload and 25 kW of housekeeping power for a total of 275 kW.

Each channel consists of one primary power bus and is electrically isolated from the other channels (no tie connections), but all channels utilize a common power return path. These isolated power channels are integrated into a cohesive operating utility by the electrical power management subsystem (PMS).²³

The PMS which is referred to here is a set of control computers for the EPS. The PMS would then communicate with an overall spacecraft computer to determine what interactions are needed between the PMS and the other subsystems.

Out of this power system study, a proof of concept breadboard was built; this breadboard was called AMPS. The original concept for AMPS was to have three complete power channels (solar array and battery) and two full 16.7 kW load centers. Because of budget constraints, only one power channel and one 24 kW load center were delivered to MSFC. A diagram of AMPS is given in figure 3.




Figure 3. Autonomously managed power system.

AMPS is a 250 V system. The power channel consists of a 75 kW solar array simulator (SAS) and a 168 cell, 189 Ah Ni-Cd battery. The solar array current and the battery charging and discharging tasks are handled by an embedded computer called the power source controller (PSC), which is part of the PMS. From this power channel, three buses are presently being simulated by dividing the outputs of the battery and the SAS through three circuit breakers, one for each channel.

There is one 24 kW load center which has 10 remote power controller (RPC) simulators. An RPC simulator, in this case, is a remote controllable switch which can protect against an overcurrent condition in the load. Nine out of the ten RPC simulators can place its load on to one of two buses, the tenth RPC simulator can place its load on any one of the three buses. There are three 1 kW RPC's, three 2 kW RPC's, three 4 kW RPC's, and one 3 kW RPC. The loads are controlled by a computer called the load center controller (LCC), the second part of the PMS.

Above the LCC and PSC is the subsystem controller called the electrical power system controller (EPSC). The EPSC's job is to oversee the whole electrical power subsystem and to communicate with the overall spacecraft controller. In AMPS, as it is presently configured, the EPSC takes the information from the LCC and runs a load balancing program on these data to try to balance the loads on the three buses, and sends down these data to the LCC. The EPSC looks at the system data from the PSC and handles the alarm conditions which occur.

A Sun 4/330 is the host or overall system computer. Displays have been created on the Sun 4/330 to display all the system data using Precision Visuals' DI-3000 graphics display package.

B. Programmable Power Processor (P³)

The P³ project was started in the late 70's for the 25 kW power module program. The 25 kW power module program was also known as the power expansion package (PEP). This program was to provide the orbiter with 25 kW of power for experiments and 2 kW of power for housekeeping power. The power was to be generated by using high voltage batteries and solar arrays. P³'s were to act as the battery charger and output regulator for the system.²⁴

The task of two identical regulators performing different functions is satisfied by microprocessor control. Experience with large space power systems, such as Skylab, indicates a need for greater flexibility in EPS management. Microprocessor-controlled regulators and chargers provide this capability.²⁴

The power system configuration is modularized from the power source to the output busses (fig. 4). A specific portion of the solar array is dedicated to one charger/battery/regulator system or Power Processing Group (PPG). The charger in each PPG will process all of the power from its solar array section, using all power not required by the bus regulator to charge the battery. When the bus power requirement exceeds available solar array power, the charger will deliver the maximum available solar array power and the battery will make up the balance. The power voltage levels and regulator design were chosen in anticipation of future large space power systems using higher voltage distribution networks. Evaluation of requirements led to the decision to specify operation over an input voltage range of 30 to 400 Vdc and an output voltage of 24 to 180 Vdc programmable. The output current is specified as 100 A maximum programmable. The power stage of the P³ uses three 100 A, 500 V transistors in parallel stages to meet these requirements.²⁴




Figure 4. EPS configuration.²⁴

C. Space Station Module Power Management and Distribution

When MSFC first contracted for the SSM/PMAD breadboard—at the beginning of the space station program—the breadboard was to be built in the space station configuration. Of course at the beginning of the space station program, the station and the SSM/PMAD breadboard were to run off of 250 V, at 20 kHz. Provisions were placed in the contract for the breadboard to be switched to dc if the space station was switched to dc, so when the modules were switched to dc so was the SSM/PMAD breadboard.

NASA's plans at the beginning of the space station program were to have the EPS automated. The SSM/PMAD breadboard was built to test the space station module EPS hardware characteristics, as well as to develop and test the automation software, using space station project money and advanced development money.²⁶ As a result of all the changes in the space station program, eventually it became counter productive for the SSM/PMAD breadboard to keep up with all the changes in the space station program. The costs of continually changing the hardware and the constant interruptions to the power system automation work which was being done on the breadboard became prohibitive. The removal of most of the sensors and data processing equipment from the space station baseline configuration has placed the SSM/PMAD breadboard farther into the advanced development arena.

Since the SSM/PMAD breadboard has become an automation testbed, the implementation of its product is, at the present, aimed at ground-based operations in the mission operations center. The mission operations people, who have been contacted about the use of expert systems type automation in the space station, have expressed the opinion that it would be 10 to 15 years after launch and proven use of the systems on the ground before any expert systems automation would be placed in flight on the space station.²⁶ Figure 5 is a diagram of the SSM/PMAD breadboard. This diagram shows both the power system hardware, the computers which control the power system hardware, and the higher level computer and its software.

The power system architecture of the SSM/PMAD breadboard consists of two power buses. Each power bus is controlled by a 15 kW remote bus isolator (RBI). The RBI's are zero current switching devices, meaning that they are not built to be turned off or on under load. The use of an RBI is strictly to isolate the breadboard bus from the power source and not to trip under fault conditions.

Below each RBI, there are a number of 3 kW RPC's. The RBI, some voltage and current sensors, and the 3 kW RPC's combine to make up the power distribution control unit (PDCU). The maximum number of RPC's in each PDCU is five. There are two PDCU's, one for the port bus and one for the starboard bus. Each PDCU RPC controls the power to the port or starboard portion of each load center. In the present configuration, there are only three load centers (LC's), so only three of the possible five 3 kW RPC's in each PDCU are being used.

The control system within each PDCU consists of a lowest level processor (LLP) and the switchgear interface cards (SIC) which are shown in figure 5. The LLP commands the switches in the PDCU on or off as the schedule demands, monitors the voltage and current sensors in the PDCU, monitors the condition of each RPC, and sends information back to the higher level computer when requested or when a contingency occurs.




Figure 5. Space station module power management and distribution breadboard.

Each load center consists of RPC's powered from the port bus and RPC's powered from the starboard bus, with a voltage sensor and a current sensor located at the input to the load center of the port and the starboard buses. The RPC's in the load centers are each rated at 1 kW. In each load center there are five possible 1 kW switches.

There is an LLP and two SIC's per load center. The LLP has the same functionality as in the PDCU, except in the load center the level of requested current is monitored, and, if this level is exceeded the load is removed or as the schedule terms it, the load is "shed." The LLP also has the capability to turn on a redundant load when the primary fails, as long as the redundant load is within the same load center. The SIC is a switch interface controller which interfaces the RPC's to the LLP. There is one SIC per bus in each load center and PDCU.

The 3 kW RPC's and the 1 kW RPC's have common features. These features are given in figure 6. The RPC will trip under five conditions :

1. "Under voltage" (approximately 60 V)
2. "Fast Trip" (current limit is reached and maintained for 15 ms)




Figure 6. 120 Vdc current limiting RPC.

3. "Over current" Trip (current exceeds the set trigger point the RPC will trip after the I^2t relationship is met)
4. "Over temperature" (RPC will trip if a FET temperature exceeds the reference temperature)
5. Current limit failure (the RPC will trip at 400 percent of its rated current if the current limit fails).

The RPC reports the reason for its trip to the LLP which forwards the information to the upper level computer for fault diagnosis and reconfiguration of the power system.

The tall white box in the center of figure 5 represents the power system computer or the "higher level computer." The computer which is fulfilling this function at the present time is a Solbourne 5/500. This computer is a multitasking machine running the Sun operating system (OS). The knowledge management and design (KNOMAD) environment enables various software systems to cooperate. The functions running within KNOMAD include the front end scheduler that takes the main schedule and breaks that down into 15 min segments to control the power hardware (front end load enable scheduler (FELES)), a load priority manager (load prioritization list management system (LPLMS)), the collection of planning and negotiating tools inside KNOMAD (knowledge and negotiation tool (KANT)), the fault recovery and management expert system (FRAMES), and the user's interface. MAESTRO is an expert system scheduler which is a product of Martin Marietta, Corp., so it runs as its own process—not being supervised by KNOMAD, but interfacing to KNOMAD.

D. Fault Device

1. Proposed Fault Injection Device. The original concept for the fault injection device was to use a computer to inject the faults into the power system. There are several advantages and disadvantages to computer fault injection.

Some of the advantages of using a computer to do the fault injection included :

- a. Improved safety
- b. Computer timed fault injection.

Safety would be improved by not having exposed power terminals available for a person to come in contact with. The faults would be injected using relays. The timing of two simultaneous faults could be computer-controlled to be within milliseconds of each other. Faults could be timed to occur in a cascade from the lowest level upward with precision.

However, computer-controlled fault injection also has its disadvantages. Some of the disadvantages include :

- a. The appearance of one computer telling the other control computers what the fault is and where it is
- b. The price and size of the relays needed to induce even the smallest faults into a 120 to 250 Vdc system
- c. The time involved in programming the computer to control the devices.

The Electrical Power Division's management was concerned that there would be an appearance of just "playing computer games" with one computer telling the control computer where the fault was and then the control computer coming up with the correct diagnosis. With immerging technologies in power systems control involved in this testing, the appearance of this type of "game playing" needs to be avoided.

Another concern of the principal investigators' (PI's) was the expense and limiting factors of the number of relays which were needed to create the type faults which were discussed above and the amount of time which was needed to install them and then program the computer to inject the faults. Also, the amount of work and time needed to move the faults from one location to another was a big concern. In the end, a more flexible and simple method was used to inject the faults.

2. Existing Fault Device. In order to be able to install the faults into the LASEPS breadboard, wires were run from the breadboard into the fault device. This fault device contains fourteen 60 A knife switches and twenty 20 A switches for a total of 34 switches on the fault panel. Below the assembly which holds the switches are terminal strips where the possible fault locations are wired. There is also an annunciator panel, shown in figure 7, which indicates where power is in the breadboard and also where there are faults which have been injected into the system. The annunciator panel represents the final configuration of LASEPS with two independent source channels. Figure 8 shows an example of how the wires are run into the fault device from the SSM/PMAD portion of the LASEPS breadboard. Of course, any of the wires which are shown going into the fault device can be faulted.




Figure 7. LASEPS annunciator panel.




Figure 8. Example of how the faults are wired into the fault device.

IV. FAULTS

Since this fault study has been ongoing for over 3 years, the hardware fault results will be presented chronologically by years. There are two reasons for presenting the data in this fashion. First the data is related to the phase of LASEPS's construction. Second, these data have been organized in this fashion for the year-end reports and the papers which have been written about this research.

A. First Year

The faults which occurred in the first year, are actual faults discovered in the AMPS breadboard while reactivating it. These faults included:

- Communication faults
- Battery faults
- Load faults.

1. Communication Faults. The communication faults were not included in the power system fault research. It is hoped that any problems with the communications between subsystem computers will be discovered before the spacecraft leaves the ground. To date, communication problems have not been mentioned as a problem with the electrical power systems flown. But with the complexity of power systems and the increasing need to monitor them, this may be a problem in the future.

In fact, the fault in the communications system in the AMPS breadboard was one of the first problems encountered. The fault had two causes, neither of which the systems in the breadboard could correct without intervention. These problems were the physical disconnect of the Ethernet at one end of an Ethernet cable. The other was an increase in traffic on the network so that the AMPS messages were not getting to their destinations. The cable problem was fixed by reconnecting the pieces of the Ethernet cable. The network traffic problem was fixed by creating a separate network for the AMPS breadboard.

The separate network was needed because the embedded computers in AMPS broadcast all packets without checking to see if the packets are received. Also, it is considered bad form to send all broadcast messages on an open network. The Ethernet in our test facility used to be isolated so that "broadcast" messages were not a problem. But, since the systems in this room are now connected to the Internet, it became a problem for the embedded computers in AMPS to broadcast all their messages and data.

2. Battery Faults. The battery system consists of 168 battery cells which are monitored by the PSC through a battery cell scanner. There are 14 cell scanner boards that each read 16 measurements: 12 cell voltages, the voltage of the first 6 cells, the voltage of the second 6 cells, a ground measurement, and the board's voltage reference. The battery is wired so that each set of 12 cells is wired to 1 scanner board. There is only one wire coming from each cell. The voltages are read using the wire off the previous cell, and the wire off the cell being read to get a differential reading. If one wire is broken, that wire affects that cell reading, as well as, the next cell reading. The six cell readings are taken using an extra wire between the sixth and seventh cells which is used as a reference for each six cell measurement.

No actual physical battery faults were encountered in the first year. What battery faults were encountered were sensor faults and broken wires. A bad board in the battery cell scanner resulted in unusually high readings of its 12 cells, and the broken wires produced anomalous readings too high or too low. Both problems made the initial charging routine of the PSC trip to trickle charge almost immediately. This means that with the present program the battery, if faulted in this manner, could be undercharged, thus producing other battery fault symptoms as discussed in the battery section of this paper. These faults were also faults that the system could not correct on its own.

These faults were corrected, and the battery cycling was started cycling (cycling only during working hours, ending each working day with a full charge). One other adjustment that had to be made for the system to cycle at LEO was to adjust the battery charging current to $1/2 I_{\text{discharge}} + 5$ to fully recharge the battery in 60 min.

Some time after the system started cycling, it was noticed that the voltage of the battery was still being read even when the battery safety switches had been disabled. The battery voltage should not have been readable with the battery safety switch disabled since the battery safety switch removes the return path connection of the battery to the breadboard and the battery voltage sensor. A battery voltage discrepancy of 7.5 V was noted between the voltage across the battery terminals and the voltage that the computer system was reading. One of the power supply voltages which feeds the battery cell scanner is 7.5 V, so the battery cell scanner boards were removed one by one to see which one of them was causing the false ground path. Apparently one of the board's isolation components failed, and this caused a ground loop or multiple paths to ground. Once the board was removed, there was no damage to AMPS. The danger was to the personnel working around the battery, assuming the battery was isolated from the return path to the breadboard, and there was the danger to the equipment if another fault had occurred. Of course there is always danger working around any battery, but especially one of this physical and electrochemical size.

3. Load Faults. Load faults, according to the fault research, are the most common EPS faults encountered. In AMPS, there are three sizes of RPC's: 4 kW, 2 kW, and 1 kW. The loads that can be attached to each of these RPC's represent one-third (low), two-thirds (medium), and full (high) load. Full load is created by paralleling the low and medium loads. The first fault encountered in the load center was a hard short of RPC 1 (4 kW). The EPS was isolated from the fault by RPC 1 tripping immediately. The AMPS computers continued to function normally since the fault had been isolated.

Several hours after RPC 1 tripped, both of the switches in RPC 4 (4 kW) tripped off. Within minutes of RPC 4 tripping off, the current on RPC 7 (4 kW) went from approximately 24 A to approximately 15 A. The response of the breadboard in each overcurrent condition was to trip the appropriate RPC. Upon further investigation, the following values of resistance were measured in the load bank:

	Resistance (ohms)			
	Low		Medium	
	meas.	theor.	meas.	theor.
RPC1	∞	30	2.8	15
RPC2	60.1	60	28.7	30
RPC3	117.9	120	56.9	60
RPC4	∞	30	14.17	15
RPC5	59.59	60	28.49	30
RPC6	115.3	120	56.9	60
RPC7	29.38	30	35.05	15
RPC8	59.3	60	28.47	30
RPC9	118.0	120	56.9	60

As can be seen, the low load resistors for RPC 1 and 4 are opened. RPC 4 will now function on medium load, but RPC 1's medium load is a hard short. It is presumed that before the low load for RPC 4 open-circuited it was shorted and that is why the RPC tripped, safing the system.

Apparently, the medium load setting of RPC 7 has had one of the broken leads from one of the other loads to fall on it and weld the two resistors together, which changed its resistance and created a soft fault. The meter on RPC 7 reads 6.4 A and the LCC reads no current from the medium setting of RPC 7. The meter on the RPC reads the current on the high voltage side of the RPC, and the LCC reads the current on the return leg for the RPC, so the current from the medium load of RPC 7 is probably being seen on another RPC. This is true since RPC 4's meter reads 15.5 A and the LCC reads the current as 22.3 A. The AMPS breadboard handles the loads using what the LCC sees, so it does not know, with its present programming, that there is a soft short.

At the present time, this load bank has not been fixed and may not be since the purpose of this study is to produce realistic faults in the LASEPS breadboard.

B. Second Year

1. Batteries. The battery which is in LASEPS is a flooded cell Ni-Cd aircraft battery of the type used for starting aircraft engines. This battery was 7 years old at this stage of the fault investigation. A 7-year-old Ni-Cd battery is normally at or near the end of its useful life. This battery started showing its age during some LEO cycling. At the end of the second discharge cycle, the battery voltage was approximately 172 V. For a 168 cell battery, 172 V is just barely above 1 V per cell. At that time, everything else was put on hold, and the battery was put into reconditioning. Reconditioning consists of completely discharging a Ni-Cd battery, then charging it up to its name plate capacity or slightly above name plate capacity, and then completely discharging it again. A number of these cycles are performed, then a final discharge is performed to determine the new battery capacity. The battery capacity is determined by computing the number of ampere-hours the battery outputs before the first cell goes to zero. The LASEPS battery was reconditioned, resulting in a new capacity of 120 Ah.

Several months after the battery had been reconditioned, the cell which had been the low cell during the reconditioning was failing to hold its charge. There were two cells left over from the original battery cell order, so one of these cells was activated and the low cell was replaced. The lower cell was replaced in hopes that the battery would recover to its previous battery capacity of 120 Ah from the approximately 90 Ah that the battery was operating at when this cell failed.

While a few cycles were being run for the new cell, the cell which had been the next to the lowest cell prior to replacing the other cell discharged to 0.9 V before any other cell in the battery was below 1.2 V. The battery capacity was up to 100 Ah. It was decided to replace the cell that was so low during this discharge with the second spare cell.

One of the personnel of NASA/MSFC's Energy Sources Branch suggested that the only way to know if this battery would still do the job was to run it and see. Because of this suggestion, the charge and discharge cycles that were run on this battery from this point on changed from a discharge at 30 A until the first cell goes below 1 V, then drop the discharge rate to 15 A until the first cell goes to 0 V, to a straight discharge at 30 A until the first cell goes to 0 V. This discharge rate is comparable to running the SSM/PMAD through the P³'s from AMPS.

Several reconditioning cycles were run on this battery, and the final capacity was back up to 111 Ah. As was mentioned in the results of the study portion of this document, end-of-life failure has been the cause of several satellite failures either prior to their planned end-of-life or possibly far beyond the satellite's planned life, the end-of-life failure of the battery has ultimately been the end of most satellites. In all fairness to this battery, it should be mentioned that this battery was not designed to cycle in LEO type cycles. The manufacturer said to try LEO cycles, but the electrolyte might have to be emptied and the cells reactivated if it did not work. However, a failure analysis of the two failed cells showed the cadmium plates were falling apart, and the nickel electrodes were unwilling to accept charge, so these two cells, at least, could not have benefitted from reactivation.

2. Solar Array Simulator. In the papers written about power system faults,^{27 28} some of the faults were labeled as probably too dangerous to attempt. One of these faults was the shorting of the SAS output diode. As it turns out, this output diode is formed from three 1,000 V, 275 A diodes in parallel. One of them shorted in the course of our battery cycling. There are many safeguards in the AMPS system to isolate the battery or the three power channels in the load center from the SAS or each other, but the only device used to isolate the SAS from the system is the SAS output diode (three in parallel). Therefore, when the diode shorted, the battery had to be disconnected until the SAS could be physically removed from the circuit before two 25 ohm, 100 W resistors inside the SAS were burned out. These diodes are used in the input capacitor's soft start circuit, so they are not normally in the circuit when the SAS is on. Even though these resistors were glowing red hot, they were still good and well within their 5 percent tolerance level. The wires feeding them, on the other hand, were only 18 or 20 gauge wire so they had to be replaced.

There could be several reasons why the output diode could short. The first is obviously age, since it was a commercial part which was put into service in 1985. However, during the process of cycling and reconditioning the battery, the 200 A fuse in the ground leg of the battery has been blown at least six or eight times. The battery fuse blows when the SAS is on, with the SAS voltage above that of the battery voltage, and the battery is attached. There is also a flaw in the battery charging software, which has not been corrected as yet, which causes current spikes on the system. The PSC current control routine, which is a continuously running process, does not take into account that the battery is discharging and tries to adjust the SAS's output current to the charging level. Therefore, when the "spacecraft" goes back into "sunlight," the SAS's output current has been driven to full scale. The current meter on the SAS pegs above 250 A. This implies that the output diodes in the SAS are possibly being stressed by the SAS itself, as well as the battery, when the SAS is turned down or turned off for the battery to be discharged.

The SAS failed a second time. This time the battery was undergoing a slow charge (1 A for 192 hours) when one of the seven control channels of the SAS failed. When a failure of this type occurs, the output voltage of the SAS goes to maximum. The maximum output voltage for the SAS-5 is 450 V. When the voltage went so high, apparently there was a large enough current spike to blow the 200 A fuse on the ground side of the battery, so the battery was protected. The suspected cause of the failure, aside from the age of the SAS, is stress on the control components by using them in so unloaded a condition for so long. Sometimes very light loads can be as stressful as very heavy loads to components. The solution for a too lightly loaded SAS during a slow charging cycle of the battery is to always have more load on the system than just the battery.

3. Programmable Power Processor. The P³'s were designed and built in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Their first use was in a high voltage battery test. Therefore, there were two P³'s which were designed and built for use in this type test. The P³'s had to be checked out and programmed to output 123 V nominally for use in LASEPS, but aside from that, they had the correct input and output

capacitor banks to handle the high voltage. The P³'s were designed to take an input of up to 400 V and regulate it to its set output voltage with a current limit of 100 A.

Since the P³'s can regulate AMPS output voltage of 250 V down to the 120 V that the SSM/PMAD needs, phase I of the LASEPS breadboard can be considered complete and operational. However, until the voltage level of AMPS can be dropped down closer to the SSM/PMAD level, a device to limit the voltage that can get to the SSM/PMAD needs to be considered. Since the P³'s are not isolated, it is possible for the P³ to fail in such a way that the input voltage will be seen at the outputs. If this occurs, then it is probable that every switch in the SSM/PMAD breadboard that is off will break.

The reason that the RPC's that are "off" may break is because there are some current limiting diodes in the output circuit that can not handle this high level of voltage. The field effect transistors (FET's) are 400 V devices, therefore, if the switches are on, the FET's will be able to handle the 250 V. As will be seen later, these diodes can not handle the spike voltages being impressed on them by the fault testing.

The fault mechanism which is described here for the P³ is similar in nature to the fault mechanism which was described for the SAS. The device which would be necessary to limit the voltage out of the P³ would probably be more expensive than replacing the FET's which were off in the SSM/PMAD breadboard, so no further investigation into a device of this kind has been done. This type of failure mode in space probably is not acceptable, but, for ground-based test systems, the risk is acceptable.

4. Space Station Module Power Management And Distribution. The major portion of the faults which were injected in the second year of this study were placed in the SSM/PMAD portion of the LASEPS breadboard. These faults were placed in the SSM/PMAD breadboard either using the LASEPS configuration or the external power supplies which were delivered with the SSM/PMAD breadboard. There is no noticeable difference in the data taken using LASEPS compared to that taken when using the external power supplies. The data taken using LASEPS or the power supplies looked so alike that there was no need to mark the data as to which configuration the data were taken under. There are two reasons that the data appear the same using either configuration. The reasons are similar in nature: first the supply to the SSM/PMAD breadboard either way is through a dc to dc converter, and second, the RPC's are current limiting so the load can only see a maximum current for a specific amount of time.

The main categories of faults which were injected into the breadboard are:

- Direct shorts to ground
- I²t trips.

These faults will be treated separately, as well as handling several faults which also occurred within the SSM/PMAD portion of the breadboard.

It is important to understand that the responses of the software, which are reported within this paper, will improve with future deliveries of the SSM/PMAD software. Part of the purpose for doing this fault testing is to improve the responses of this automated control system. The other reasons include characterizing the present hardware and characterizing the response of similar power buses for future spacecraft.

In the SSM/PMAD breadboard, the direct shorts to ground and the I²t trips were placed below each PDCU switch, as well as below each load center switch. This was done for completeness and to make sure the software would respond properly throughout the system. These faults were not placed below the RBI's. Since an RBI has no protection capability, to place a fault below the RBI would just be testing the P³'s or the external power supply's ability to current limit.

The configuration of the switches in the fault injection device turned out to be perfect for the testing of the SSM/PMAD breadboard, since there were a total of 34 RPC's in the breadboard to be tested when the testing started.

a. Direct Shorts to Ground. The PDCU and load center switches are both current limiting so that a direct short to ground fault could be applied without having a current limiting resistor in line with it. When the direct short to ground fault was applied, in every case the switch tripped in under 15 ms (fig. 9(B)). The software marked the switch with FT, for "fast trip," and a diagnosis like this was made:

Most Likely:

Low impedance short in the cable below "switch number," switch output "switch number," or switch input of a lower switch.

Less Likely:

Current sensor in switch reading high.

The actual switch designation is placed where the words "switch number" are.


More interesting than the reactions of the hardware and the software is the reaction of the bus as shown in figure 9(A). This picture shows the first 95 μ s of a PDCU switch (3 kW rating). Figure 9(C) is a representation of where the currents and voltages on the graph are measured.

b. Shorted RPC. While testing the direct short to ground faults, it was noticed that one of the 1 kW switches was shorted. The short of this 1 kW RPC implies that whenever voltage was supplied to the switch, current was drawn by the switch. This current was drawn even when the interface showed this switch open. The software did not recognize this fault since the data which were going to the screen were not given to the fault diagnosis program. The data needed to make this diagnosis can be sent to the proper program, and this change was made in the next release of the software.


In the next release of software, FRAMES can diagnose a shorted switch in the 1 kW RPC's, since only there does a shorted switch pull power when it is supposed to be off. Under normal circumstances, a shorted RBI or 3 kW RPC in a PDCU would not have any load below it to pull current so these conditions would be harder to diagnose.

To see how the system would react, a direct short to ground was placed below the shorted 1 kW switch. When the fault was placed below the 1 kW RPC, the 3 kW PDCU switch was placed into current limit and the PDCU tripped. The diagnosis was the same as for the direct short to ground in the release of software this was tested with.


c. I²t Fault. There were several valuable pieces of information about the hardware and software which were gathered by testing the I²t function of the RPCs. One interesting occurrence happened while testing the PDCU's, and the other piece of information was gained while testing the 1 kW RPC's in the load centers.



(A) Initial transient.



(B) Direct short to ground trip.




(C)


Figure 9. 3 kW RPC direct short to ground.

(1) Power Distribution Control Unit. When the PDCU's were tested for the I^2t function of the RPC, they were tested using a 4 ohm short to ground and under various loading conditions. These load conditions included 10 A of load on the PDCU (fig. 10), the lightest load the load center could provide on the PDCU, and no load below the PDCU switch from the load center. The tests were run in manual or maintenance mode, then while the system was in autonomous mode. When in autonomous mode, the load on the load center depends on what part of the schedule is being run and which load center the PDCU switch is controlling.

The fault resistance to be used in forming the I^2t faults below the PDCU's was to be 4 ohms. The actual value of the 4 ohm resistor turned out to be about 4.14 ohms. The 4 ohm resistor was just on the edge of triggering the I^2t timer with a value of exactly 4 ohms. As a result of this slightly too high resistance value, two things happened. First, if none of the loads are on in the load center, the switch



(A) Initial transient.



(B) 4 ohm short to ground trip.




Figure 10. 3 kW RPC 4 ohm short to ground.

does not trip and the system does not shed (turn off switches which are pulling too much power) a switch at the PDCU level. This is a problem since the system will allow a fault of this type to remain on the switch forever or until some load is turned on below it to reach the I^2t trigger point. The other thing which came out of applying this fault shows up in autonomous mode. With a schedule running in autonomous mode, when the 4.14 ohm fault is placed in the system the switch trips, in what is called in the software an "over current" trip, and all the switches below the PDCU switch are tripped on "under voltage." The first thing the software does is turn off all the switches which tripped, then it goes in and turns on the PDCU switch to see if it trips again. Because the switch is now unloaded, it does not trip again. The software then comes back with the following diagnosis:

"PDCU switch name" Over-Current tripped.

The fault has not been repeated (and therefore not found). The following switches cannot be tested:

"load center switch name"

"load center switch name"

"load center switch name"

"load center switch name"

Possible Causes:

Most Likely:

A transient short somewhere below "PDCU switch name." A short below one of the switches that were not testable.

Of course, the "PDCU switch name" and "load center switch name" indicators are replaced by the appropriate switch designations. After this diagnosis is made, the switch is taken "out of service."


Two changes to the software have come out of this testing. The first involves the fact that the switches below the PDCU should be tested. In this case, the switches below the PDCU were not tested. Of course if they were, the software would have come to the conclusion that the fault was below the first switch that was turned on, which would still be a wrong diagnosis. The first switch would then be taken off line, and the PDCU would then be rescheduled to come on. The PDCU switch and the loads below it would be turned back on, and the PDCU switch would again trip. This cycle would continue until all the switches below the PDCU switch were declared "out of service," and then the PDCU would be marked as faulty, as well. Clearly this is not an adequate solution by itself.

The second change made to the software involves checking to see if current is being drawn below a switch where it is known that there should be no current being drawn. If current is being drawn below the switch where no current should be, the first thing that will be checked is to see whether any of the switches below the one pulling current is also pulling current. If there is current being drawn by a switch below the PDCU, the two currents will be compared, and, if they match, the solution is that the switch which is pulling current is shorted closed. If the two currents do not match, the conclusion that there is also a soft short below the PDCU, as well, will also be made. Of course, if no switch is drawing current during the first test, the conclusion will be drawn that there is a soft fault below the tested switch.


Because of the philosophy of operation which was adopted, the problem with the fault below the PDCU switch in maintenance mode remains. The decision was made that the PDCU switches would not be turned off by the software for a soft fault condition. In other words, if the switch does not trip itself the switch will not be turned off, at least in manual mode.

(2) Load Center. The I²t fault which was put into the 1 kW RPC's in the load centers was approximately 14 ohms (fig. 11). This fault, unlike the one injected on the PDCU's, always tripped the load center RPC's on "over current." The main thing which was learned from applying these faults was that there is a race between the hardware and software as to which catches these faults.

When the SSM/PMAD breadboard was first designed, the LLP's were Motorola MVME107, 68010 board level processors, communicating through a VME 10 with the expert systems. Now the LLP's are 80386DX, 20 MHz based PC's which communicate across the Ethernet with the expert systems.



(A) Initial transient.



(B) 14 ohm short to ground trip.




Figure 11. 1 kW RPC 14 ohm short to ground.

The 386 machines monitor the status of the RPC's in the load center fast enough that the slow I^2t fault applied would sometimes be caught by the LLP before the I^2t timer would time out. The old LLP's were so slow that it was assumed that the RPC would always trip first. These races were a result of not taking into account the extra speed of the new LLP's or failing to rewrite this portion of the code when the change was made.

The main problem with the races between the RPC hardware and the LLP's to detect the I^2t faults is that the two situations are not handled the same way by the system software. When the RPC trips for an I^2t or "over current trip," the switch is taken "out of service" and a diagnosis like the following is given:

Most Likely:

High impedance short in the cable, below "load center switch," switch output "load center switch," or switch input of a lower switch.

Less Likely:

Current sensor in switch reading high.

Although there is no switch which is known to be below the load center RPC's, there may be some in the loads. A switch of this type would be part of the load.

The RPC which is shed by the software gets handled differently than the RPC which trips on "over current." As the system performed at the time of this testing, a load which was shed for pulling too much current is scheduled to be turned back on 5 min later for the same power requirements it had just violated. In most cases where this was done for one of the loads which had an I^2t fault applied to it, the I^2t function of the RPC eventually did trip and the cycle of turning on, being shed, and rescheduling did stop. However, when the load on the RPC was around 2 A, the LLP always caught the "over current" before the RPC tripped.

The response to an LLP discovered over current was changed. The software will now put the RPC "out of service" with a diagnosis which states that the switch is pulling too much current. This makes the experiment evaluate its current draw and decide if the power allocation asked for is too low or if there is something wrong with the experiment. In either case, the experiment must ask to be rescheduled.

d. Internal Failure of the RPC. An internal failure within an RPC causes an "over current" response in the software. There is a constant current diode in the circuitry which is rated from the manufacturer at 100 V, 1 mA. Before these devices were placed in the circuit, they were test selected for a minimum voltage of 150 V. However, with the faults being placed in the system and the voltage and current spikes which have been inserted into the system, 150 Vdc does not seem to be enough margin. One of the 1 kW RPC's failed with the constant current diode blown while in a steady-state on situation during fault testing of another load center. The RPC tripped on an "over current" fault. Apparently, these diodes have been over-stressed with all the faults which have been inserted into the system.

The solution for this problem is to replace the single diode and resistor, which are in the circuit now, with two of these diodes in parallel and two higher valued resistors. This is being done when the RPC boards are removed from the system for any reason, but the RPC's are not being removed just to add this modification.

e. Transients. The definition of a "transient" fault which is being used is a fault which does not last long enough for the system to detect it. Most of the transients, which were seen in this part of the testing, were the PDCU 4.14 ohm I^2t faults. When the autonomous testing of these faults was done, only one or two of these faults could be done at a time without bringing down the system in between. This was caused by data being mishandled by the fault diagnosis program. A flag, which was set by the "transient" fault, was not being reset after the switch was taken "out of service." This problem was fixed in the next software release.

5. Large Autonomous Spacecraft Electrical Power System. For some time, LASEPS was run only as the SAS and/or battery running the SSM/PMAD breadboard or the AMPS load center, but not together. A test was run to see how the computers in AMPS would react to the P³'s and the SSM/PMAD hanging on its buses as well as its own load center.

The PSC is the only computer in AMPS that sees the current on the buses from the SSM/PMAD. The EPSC and the LCC do not see the current, therefore, AMPS acts as though the current from the SSM/PMAD is not being drawn. The LCC probably does not have to know that the current is there, but the EPSC needs to get the information from the PSC and take that current into account when trying to balance the loads on the three channels (buses) in the AMPS load center.

Until some reprogramming of the AMPS computers can be done, the P³'s and the SSM/PMAD breadboard are effectively "soft faults" in the AMPS breadboard, since AMPS does not react to their presence. This presents one of the limitations of automated control in that the programmed system can only react as programmed. New situations outside of the written software can not be handled with any certainty of correctness. Of course, drastic changes in power system configurations, like the addition of SSM/PMAD onto the AMPS bus structure, is not likely to occur in flight, but this illustrates why the human must remain as one of the variables in the control loop.

C. Third Year

1. Creating Cascading Faults. After a brief review of the SSM/PMAD breadboard which has been used in this fault testing, the background will be set to start the discussion into the lessons which have been learned while testing cascading faults in the SSM/PMAD.

When testing of cascading faults first began by placing two faults in the breadboard simultaneously, one on a 1 kW RPC and one on a 3 kW RPC, it was hard to decide whether FRAMES was handling the fault scenario properly or not. FRAMES handled this situation as though these were two separate faults on most occasions. The timing had to be perfect for FRAMES to see these two faults as anything other than two separate events and therefore two separate faults.

Since, in reality, we did indeed have two separate faults, it became necessary to see if cascading faults could be induced into the SSM/PMAD breadboard. Causing cascading faults in the SSM/PMAD breadboard is more of a challenge than it may, at first, seem.

The RPC's in the SSM/PMAD breadboard have several advanced features, including current limiting at 150 percent of their current rating. The RPC's can be tripped off under two current conditions: "fast trip" and "over current" trip. The RPC "fast trips" when the RPC is placed in current limit for 15 ms. The "over current" trip can also be defined as an I^2t fault. In an I^2t or "over current" fault, the RPC trips off after a progressively longer time the lower the current value on the RPC. The minimum current value, which triggers the "over current" trip, is 120 percent of the RPC's current rating. The RPC's also trip on "under voltage" when the voltage goes below 60 Vdc.

In addition to the hardware limits which have to be met to create cascading faults, when the system is working with a schedule in autonomous mode, the LLP's know the correct value of current draw that each load below the 1 kW RPC's are scheduled to draw. This means that above the scheduled value the LLP will "shed" any load which is above that value for two sweeps of the LLP data collection routine, this translates to between 800 ms to 1.2 s. The software is set up so that a "soft fault" on a 3 kW RPC is not "shed," under the assumption that you want the 3 kW RPC's on unless something trips them off.

A conjunction of all of the variables above means that two faults are necessary to make the 3 kW RPC trip when a 1 kW RPC below it trips. Specifically, a "soft fault" below the 3 kW switch big enough to get the 3 kW switch close enough to its 120 percent "over current" trip trigger point that when an "over current" fault is induced in one of the 1 kW RPC's below it, the 3 kW RPC will trip also.

Since, for critical loads, the power system must be two fault tolerant, the above cascading fault scenario has to be studied for spacecraft power systems. It is also true that not all power systems have protective devices with enough margin in their protective zones to require two faults to cause cascading faults to happen. Effectively, the "soft fault" on the 3 kW RPC is reducing the 3 kW RPC's "cascading fault protection margin." Normally the "cascading fault margin" is used to coordinate fault propagation to try to insure that the lowest level fault device is used to isolate the fault.

2. Faults Propagate. When the two faults were first placed in the breadboard to simulate a cascading fault, FRAMES reacted differently depending on how the faults were placed into the breadboard. Three representative cases were created:

1. Place an "over current" trip on a 3 kW RPC then 2 s later apply a "fast trip" to a 1 kW RPC below the 3 kW RPC.
2. Place an "over current" on a 3 kW RPC at the same time or just after the 1 kW "fast trip" is placed into the breadboard.
3. Place an "over current" trip on a 3 kW RPC and 5 s later place the "fast trip" on a 1 kW switch below the 3 kW RPC.

In each of these cases the 3 kW fault is removed before FRAMES starts its diagnosis to simulate the causal relationship between the 1 kW RPC fault and the 3 kW RPC trip.

a. 3 kW "Over Current" Then 1 kW "Fast Trip." In the first test case, where the 3 kW RPC is placed into an "over current" condition before the 1 kW RPC is "fast tripped," both faults are registered in FRAMES before the diagnosis process is begun. FRAMES first opens the 3 kW RPC and all the 1 kW RPC's below this 3 kW RPC. Since the fault is removed from the 3 kW RPC, when FRAMES recloses the 3 kW RPC to test it, the 3 kW RPC does not trip again. After the 3 kW RPC is tested without tripping, further testing is done by reclosing the "testable" 1 kW RPC's below the 3 kW RPC.

The criteria for a 1 kW RPC to be "testable" is:

1. It must be currently scheduled ON
2. The fault condition must be "under voltage"
3. The switch must be "testable".¹

1. *Testable* is an attribute assigned to a piece of powered equipment's mode of operation. The term "testable" switch refers to the ability to test this switch with the current load attached. This attribute prevents damage to a load that can not be turned off and on.

The criteria for an untestable 1 kW RPC is:

1. Switch is currently commanded ON.
2. The switch is "not testable" or the fault type is not "under voltage."

All switches which are not currently scheduled to be turned ON are ignored.

In the first test case, the "fast tripped" 1 kW RPC is placed into the "not testable" group. FRAMES tests the 3 kW RPC and the "testable" 1 kW RPC's and determines that there was a "transient" condition below the 3 kW RPC. The decision was made that an RPC which trips because of a "transient" will be placed "out of service," since the ability exists to ask for an "out of service" RPC to be placed back "in service." So the 3 kW RPC is placed "out of service," and the 1 kW RPC's are marked as "unreachable," since there is no power path to supply the 1 kW RPC's power.

The intended procedure during the testing phase is to wait for the 1 kW RPC to be turned on, and then fault the 3 kW RPC again to recreate the conditions of the first fault. FRAMES, in being conservative and not turning back on a known faulted RPC below another faulted RPC, does not allow the fault to be repeated and fails to take advantage of known knowledge. This is an example of faults which need more thought and possibly an unrealistic fault scenario.

The 3 kW "over current" fault was placed first in this fault scenario to insure that the 3 kW RPC would trip along with the "fast trip" on the 1 kW RPC. "Fast trips" were the only faults wired in the fault device at the time of this test for the 1 kW RPC's. A more realistic fault would be two over current faults. This test case is not very realistic, but it was used to try to insure that both faults were registered before diagnosis began.

b. 3 kW "Over Current"/1 kW "Fast Trip." In the second test case, the "over current" on the 3 kW RPC and the "fast trip" on the 1 kW RPC are applied virtually simultaneously. In this case, FRAMES starts its diagnosis when the "fast trip" is received from the 1 kW RPC. FRAMES goes out and asks the LLP's if they are in a quiescent state to give their data to FRAMES. Since this process only looks at the RPC status and not at any processing being done by the RPC, a quiescent state is seen by the LLP in the PDCU and data are returned to FRAMES creating the original symptom set. After the command to open the 1 kW RPC is issued, more data are requested. It is at this time that the "over current" of the 3 kW RPC is seen along with the "under voltage" trips of the rest of the 1 kW RPC's below this 3 kW RPC. When FRAMES sees these data, it concludes that the open command caused the "over current" and "under voltage" trips.

There are two errors here. First, there is a timing problem between the LLP's. The second error is the assumption that the opening of any RPC could cause other RPC's to "over current" and "under voltage."

The timing problem is amplified in this example beyond the normal timing problems that are seen in the SSM/PMAD breadboard. In this breadboard, the LLP's are not synchronized so that the elaborate methods taken in the first example to make sure the two faults were reported to FRAMES are necessary. The same is true here, but to a different extent. Here the LLP needs to check for more information than just whether the status of the RPC's are in flux, it also needs to check for current level quiescent.

The second problem, that of FRAMES assuming that the "over current" and "under voltage" faults are caused by the open command, is a problem of interpreting data. It has been suggested that all new data which are received during a diagnosis have to be considered unrelated to the fault at hand. In the case with unsynchronized computers, the data may or may not be related to the fault which is being diagnosed. All new data should not be ignored or why should testing be done at all. However, in the case where a higher level switch faults after diagnosis has begun, test should be redirected to the higher level switch before testing can continue on the present diagnosis. A switch cannot be tested when there is no power available. If the higher level switch tests conclude that the higher level switch does not trip, the testing of the present 1 kW RPC can continue.

Without the fault on the first 1 kW RPC causing something else to fail, it is not believed that the 3 kW RPC would continue to be "over current" after the 1 kW RPC tripped off. So this situation is unlikely unless the faults are two "over current" faults which time out at the same time and the data did not get received by FRAMES at the proper time.

c. 3 kW "Over Current" Before 1 kW "Fast Trip." The third test case, the 3 kW RPC is "over current" tripped about 5 s before the 1 kW RPC has a "fast trip" placed below it. The 3 kW RPC "over current" trips and all the RPC's below it "under voltage." The LLP's present their initial data to FRAMES and open the 3 kW RPC and all the 1 kW RPC's below it. When FRAMES tests the 3 kW RPC, the 3 kW RPC does not trip again since the trip on the 3 kW RPC has been removed. With the testing of the 3 kW RPC completed, FRAMES proceeds with the testing of the 1 kW RPC's. During this testing, a 1 kW RPC "fast trips." Although the "fast trip" of the 1 kW RPC occurs during the testing of the 3 kW RPC, FRAMES assumes this fault is an unrelated fault and continues with the 3 kW diagnosis. The diagnosis of the 3 kW RPC is completed and then the 1 kW RPC is diagnosed. This is the way the present system has been configured, but this is a flaw in the diagnostic logic. It has not been proved that the fault of the 1 kW RPC is unrelated to the 3 kW RPC fault under these circumstances. Most engineers would assume that there, at least, might be a relationship.

The 3 kW RPC is diagnosed with a transient fault, since the RPC did not retrip during testing. The 1 kW RPC is then tested after the 3 kW RPC is placed "out of service," and the 1 kW RPC is made unreachable by this fact. The diagnosis which is reached by FRAMES for the 1 kW RPC is that there is a "fast trip" below the 1 kW RPC. This is a correct answer but derived from erroneous data. Since the 3 kW RPC has been placed "out of service" when this 1 kW RPC is reclosed the 1 kW RPC faults on "under voltage," but FRAMES interprets the data to mean that the RPC "fast tripped." It is true that the RPC retripped, but it did not "fast trip" the second time. FRAMES needs to just mark the 1 kW RPC as a possible failure which it is unable to test.

d. Results of Actual Testing. Although the way the third fault test case is created makes it seem unlikely, this test case is closest to the results which have been received in the actual insertion of cascading faults into the breadboard, to date. What is simulated in the third test case and what happens in the actual cascading faults is that the 3 kW RPC trips before the 1 kW RPC can isolate the cause of the problem. This means that the trip coordination fails in this case.

The actual cascading faults which have been injected into the breadboard have all included the placing of two faults into the breadboard: a soft fault below the 3 kW RPC and an "over current" fault below a 1 kW RPC below the same soft faulted, fully subscribed 3 kW RPC. This means that the 3 kW RPC has scheduled loads on it close to its 3 kW rated value. As was stated above, in some systems which do not have the "over current" protection margin SSM/PMAD has, the soft fault may not be needed to cause cascaded faults. An RPC or other switch, which is failed closed and undetected, could

and has caused this kind of cascaded fault in our system by placing too much load on the 3 kW RPC. The operations error of placing too much load on one RPC can also cause this type of fault. As it turns out, the third test case was the most realistic test case in the testing conducted so far.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. Fault Study

From the fault study, several conclusions can be made. The first has to be that there is no repository for the accumulation of power system fault data. Even as this report is being written, the authors have been informed about other historical power system faults which have occurred in space or in the terrestrial utility industry. When power system faults happen, they have a tendency to be fixed and forgotten, not well documented.

The second conclusion that can be reached is that, from a power utility aspect, the most common power system fault is in the terminal end user's load. The load on the power system will tend to be more complex and have more failure modes than the distribution system. For the most part, the power transmission lines of a contained power system do not tend to short or breakdown without external influences, like movement of loads in and out of the system or someone crashing a car into a power pole. The power switching devices are more susceptible to failure than the transmission lines when external influences are not present, because of the power switching devices' complexity. Power generation and storage probably have as much complexity as the switching components or the loads, but are normally monitored more fully than either the loads or the power switching devices, so any problems there are normally anticipated.

B. Power System Testing

Although the power system which was studied was not a very generic one because of the intelligent switches and the intelligent control computers, the power system control knowledge which was embedded into the control computers was tested to see how accurately that knowledge has been captured in the software. For the software limitations and philosophies under which the breadboard software was written, the system functions very well. Some of the things that are being referred to by the previous statement include the assumptions in the software that the sensors and power hardware will not fail, and the philosophy of operation that detailed data about the loads was not to be used. The detailed data were not to be used since the power system overall operation was to be considered to run like a terrestrial power system in which the utility company does not care where something is plugged in, it only cares that the loads do not imbalance the terrestrial three-phase system.

During the time in which the power system was being tested, many bugs in the software code were found and most of them fixed. One or two limitations of the software were found and documented. Several holes in the control logic were found, most of them filled, but several have yet to be solved in a satisfactory manner. These holes are mainly in the areas where more human interaction will be needed with the control systems to diagnose the problems. This interface still needs some defining before these problems can be solved.

C. Cascading Faults

Cascading faults present a more complex fault scenario in automated EPS's than any other kind of fault scenario, since the coordination of the data is key to the recognition of this type of fault. Embedded in this problem of coordinating the data is also the problem of deciding whether witnessed events are related or not. The assumptions which have been and are being used to write the SSM/PMAD control systems are also key to how the data are interpreted.

One of the key problems which the diagnosis of cascading faults has run into is the lack of synchronized data. A time stamp on the data could help some, but, if the data collection devices are not synchronized, the time stamps might actually be detrimental instead of helpful.

The recognition of related events is another key part of diagnosing cascading faults. Some of the key assumptions which have been made or suggested for the SSM/PMAD are contrary to being able to conclude that two faults are related. Under some circumstances, the resulting information caused by the three test cases used in the initial cascading fault simulations could represent possible cascading fault scenarios. Any two faults which occur in a hierarchical line of switches should be investigated for the possibility of being cascading faults. Any fault diagnosis system should not disregard new information which is gathered during testing as unrelated data. If only the expected data are considered during testing, then many diagnoses will be flawed.

Two of the basic assumptions which were incorporated into the FRAMES design were that the sensors and switches would not break, and that they would always supply accurate data. The SSM/PMAD software design has come a long way with its original assumptions, but, to be able to extend its capabilities, the time has come to go beyond some of these initial assumptions and try to expand the ideal assumptions into the world of non-ideal conditions.

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE September 1993	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Technical Paper	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Results of an Electrical Power System Fault Study (CDDF Final Report No. N06)		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) N.R. Dugal-Whitehead and Y.B. Johnson		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER M-731	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) George C. Marshall Space Flight Center Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama 35812		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER NASA TP- 3413	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) National Aeronautics and Space Administration Washington, DC 20546			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Prepared by Information and Electronic Systems Laboratory, Science and Engineering Directorate.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unclassified—Unlimited Subject Category: 18		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This report gives the results of an electrical power system fault study which has been conducted over the last 2 and one-half years. First, the results of the literature search into electrical power system faults in space and terrestrial power system applications are reported. A description of the intended implementations of the power system faults into the Large Autonomous Spacecraft Electrical Power System (LASEPS) breadboard is then presented. Then the actual implementation of the faults into the breadboard is discussed along with a discussion describing the LASEPS breadboard. Finally, the results of the injected faults and breadboard failures are discussed.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS electrical power systems, electrical power system faults, fault detection isolation and recovery (FDIR), spacecraft power systems, power bus interaction, autonomously managed power system, space station module power management and distribution		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 44	
		16. PRICE CODE A04	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited