


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Formal Design and Verification of a Reliable Computing Platform for Real-Time Control (Phase 3 Results)

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1 Introduction

This paper describes the Phase 3 effort on the design and verification of the Reliable Computing Platform (RCP). The paper builds on the Phase 1 and Phase 2 efforts described in [1] and [2].

The goal of the RCP project is to devise a fault-tolerant computer architecture that adheres to a system-design philosophy called “Design For Validation.” The basic tenets of this design philosophy are summarized in the following four statements:

1. A system is designed such that complete and accurate models, which estimate critical properties such as reliability and performance, can be constructed. All parameters of the model that cannot be deduced from the logical design must be measured. All such parameters must be measurable within a feasible amount of time.
2. The design process makes tradeoffs in favor of designs that minimize the number of measurable parameters in order to reduce the validation cost. A design that has exceptional performance properties yet requires the measurement of hundreds of parameters (say, by time-consuming fault-injection experiments) would be rejected over a less capable system that requires minimal experimentation.
3. The system is designed and verified using rigorous mathematical techniques, usually referred to as a formal verification. It is assumed that the formal verification makes the probability of system failure from design faults negligible, so the reliability model does not include transitions representing design errors.
4. The reliability (or performance) model is shown to be accurate with respect to the system implementation. This is accomplished analytically not experimentally.

Thus, a major objective of this approach is to minimize the amount of experimental testing required and maximize the ability to reason mathematically about correctness of the design. Although testing cannot be eliminated from the design/validation process, *the primary basis of belief in the dependability of the system must come from analysis rather than from testing.*

1.1 Recovery From Transient Faults

There is a growing concern over the impact of high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) and electromagnetic interference (EMI) on digital electronics. The electromagnetic environment is becoming increasingly hostile at the same time electronic device dimensions are being reduced—making the devices even more vulnerable to upset phenomena. The use of composite materials in aircraft will further increase susceptibility. Although an electromagnetic event may be of short duration, its effect may be permanent. This could occur as a result of permanent physical damage or merely the corruption of a memory state of an otherwise functional processor. Transient faults are believed to be much more prevalent than permanent faults (i.e., typical failure rate 10 times the permanent rate).

Several approaches can be used to recover the state of memory in a transiently affected digital processor. The simplest technique is to rely on the reading of new inputs to replace corrupted memory. Of course, this does not give 100% coverage over the space of potential memory upsets, but it is much more effective than one might expect at first glance. Since control-law implementations produce outputs as a function of periodic inputs and a relatively small internal state, a large fraction of the memory upsets can be recovered in this manner. This accounts for the fact that although many systems in service are not designed to accommodate transient faults, they do exhibit some ability to tolerate such faults.

Another important technique is the use of a watchdog timer. Since a transient fault can (and frequently does) affect the program counter (PC), a processor can end up executing in an entirely inappropriate place—even in the data space. If this happens, then the previous technique becomes totally inoperative. The only hope in this situation is to recognize that the PC is corrupted. A watchdog timer is a countdown register that sets the PC to a pre-determined “restart” location if the timer ever counts down all the way to 0. In a non-transiently affected processor, the watchdog timer is periodically reset by the operating system.

Once a fault has been detected by a watchdog timer, the entire system may be “rolled-back” to a previous state by use of a checkpoint—a previous dump of the dynamic memory state to a secondary storage device of some kind. This technique has not been used very often in flight control systems because of the unacceptable overhead of this type of operation. A more appropriate technique is the use of majority-voting to replace the internal state of a processor. It is important to note that this is done *continuously* rather than just after a transient fault is detected. Of course, majority-voting can be expensive as well if the dynamic state is not small.

1.2 Validation/Verification of Transient Fault Recovery

No matter what technique is used its effectiveness must be measured and incorporated in the reliability analysis. This is much more important than one might first suspect. Since a transient fault can potentially disable an otherwise good processor, a worst-case analysis must increase the processor failure rate to include the transient fault rate. Because this rate can be 10 times larger than the nominal permanent fault rate, this can be devastating to the reliability analysis, unless a credible estimate of the fraction of transient faults that disable a processor can be obtained. In figure 1 the probability of system failure as a function of the fraction of recoverable transients (R) is plotted for a 4MR system. The Markov model of figure 2 was solved to obtain this plot. The horizontal transitions represent transient fault arrivals. The vertical transitions represent permanent fault arrivals. These arrive at rate λ_T and λ_p , respectively. The backwards arc represents the removal of the effects of a transient fault by the operating system. This is accomplished by voting the internal state. State 1 represents the initial fault free state of the system. There are only two transitions from state 1 due to the arrival of either a transient or permanent fault. These transitions carry the system into states 2 and 4, both of which are not system failure states. All of the transitions except one from these states are a result of second failures, which lead to system failure states. The transition from state 2 back to state 1 models the transient-recovery




Figure 1: Probability of System Failure As a Function of R

process. The transition from state 2 to state 4 models the situation where a processor that is recovering from a transient fault experiences a permanent fault. The effect becomes even more dramatic as the number of processors is increased, as shown in figure 3.

Approaches to the validation of computer systems susceptible to transient faults can be categorized into two broad categories: empirical and analytic. Empirical approaches rely on measuring the probability of successful recovery (R) and the recovery time ($1/\rho$) of the system using fault-injection experiments. Analytic approaches seek to establish the transient-fault immunity property (i.e. $R = 1$) of the system and calculate the value of ρ by mathematical analysis. The empirical approach measures the probability of successful transient recovery (i.e. R) and the distribution of recovery time using fault-injection experiments. The results of the experiment are used to estimate the transient-fault recovery transition in the Markov reliability model. The analytic approach relies on analysis to insure that $R = 1$. In other words one must *prove* that the recovery technique always removes the effects of an arbitrary transient within a bounded amount of time. In this approach, one does not rely on detection, which is always imperfect anyway. Transient recovery is automatic, via continuous voting and rewriting of state with voted values. The analysis must also be able to establish the value of the upper bound on the time for transient recovery. In this way one is able to *calculate* the value of ρ rather than measure it¹.

The analytic approach does not *completely* eliminate the need for measurements. Mea-

¹To simplify the discussion, the reliability analysis process has been described in terms of a pure Markov process. The actual distribution of recovery-time is more likely to be closer to a uniform distribution than an exponential and thus a semi-Markov model would be used. The SURE program [3, 4] can be used to analyze




Figure 2: Markov Model of Imperfect Transient Recovery




Figure 3: Probability of System Failure As a Function of R For a 5MR and 7MR

asuring (or estimating) the λ 's (i.e. failure rates) in the reliability model is still necessary, but time-consuming fault-injection experiments are not. Furthermore, the reliability analysis does not depend on an empirical model of how a transient fault upsets a processor.

1.2.1 Advantages of Analytic Approach

The analytic approach has several clear advantages over the empirical approach. First, confidence in the system does not rely primarily on end-to-end testing, which can never establish the absence of some rare design flaw (yet more frequent than 10^{-9}) that can crash the system. Second, the analytic approach minimizes the need for experimental analysis of the effects of EMI or HIRF on a digital processor. The probability of occurrence of a transient fault must be experimentally determined, but it is not necessary to obtain detailed information about how a transient fault propagates errors in a digital processor. Third, the role of experimentation is determined by the assumptions of the mathematical proof. The testing of the system can be concentrated at the regions where the design proofs interface with the physical implementation.

1.3 The Synergism Between Formal Verification and Reliability Analysis

The analytic approach described above is in reality a synergism between formal verification and reliability analysis. Formal methods prove formulas of the form

$$\text{A-PREDICATE} \supset \text{NICE-PROPERTY}$$

Reliability analysis calculates the probability

$$\text{Prob}[\text{A-PREDICATE}]$$

Also, formal methods offers an approach to overcoming a serious dilemma for the reliability analyst—how can I assure myself that the reliability model itself is a valid representation of the implemented system? Although the present work does not establish a formal connection between the RCP functional specifications and the Markov model, key assumptions of the Markov model are formally verified. In particular, the absence of any direct transition from the fault-free state to a death state depends upon the fault-masking property established in the RS to US proof. Also the simplification of the reliability model under the assumption that $R = 1$, is justified by the formal verification that 100% of the errors produced by a single transient fault are flushed by the system.

this more general class of reliability model. It requires the mean and standard deviation of the recovery time. Under the assumption of a uniform distribution of recovery, these parameters can be derived from the upper bound on the time of recovery.

1.4 Overview of Previous Work

A major goal of the RCP project is to develop an operating system that provides the applications software developer with a reliable mechanism for dispatching periodic tasks on a fault-tolerant computing base, which *appears* to him as a single ultra-reliable processor.

The following design decisions have been made toward that end:

- the system is non-reconfigurable
- the system is frame-synchronous
- the scheduling is nominally static, non-preemptive
- internal voting is used to recover the state of a processor affected by a transient fault

Although scheduling is typically static, RCP would accommodate an implementation that used limited forms of dynamic scheduling, provided all the axioms about task execution are satisfied. A hierarchical decomposition of the reliable computing platform is shown in figure 4.





Figure 4: Hierarchical Specification of the Reliable Computing Platform.

The top level of the hierarchy describes the operating system as a function that sequentially invokes application tasks. This view of the operating system is called the **Uniprocessor System layer (US)**. It is formalized as a state transition system and forms the basis of the specification for the RCP. As in the Phase 1 report [1], this constitutes the top-level specification of the functional system behavior defined in terms of an idealized, fault-free computation mechanism. The specification is the correctness criterion to be met by all lower level designs. The top level of the hierarchy describes the operating system as a function that performs an arbitrary, application-specific computation.

Level 2 is called the **Replicated Synchronous layer (RS)**. In this level an abstract view of the system's fault-tolerance capability is specified. Fault tolerance is achieved by voting results computed by the replicated processors operating on the same inputs. Interactive consistency checks on sensor inputs and voting of actuator outputs require synchronization of the replicated processors. The RS level describes the operating system as a synchronous system, where each replicated processor executes the same application tasks. The existence of a global time base, an interactive consistency mechanism, and a reliable voting mechanism are assumed at this level. Processors are replicated and the state machine makes global transitions as if all processors were perfectly synchronized. Interprocessor communication is hidden and not explicitly modeled at this layer. Suitable mappings are provided to enable proofs that the RS layer satisfies the US layer specification. Fault tolerance is achieved using exact-match voting on the results computed by the replicated processors operating on the same inputs. Exact match voting depends on two additional system activities: (1) single source input data must be sent to the redundant sites in a consistent manner to ensure that each redundant processor uses exactly the same inputs during its computations, and (2) the redundant processing sites must synchronize for the vote. *Interactive consistency* can be achieved on sensor inputs by using Byzantine-resilient algorithms [5], which are probably best implemented in custom hardware. To ensure absence of single-point failures, electrically isolated processors cannot share a single clock. Thus, a fault-tolerant implementation of the uniprocessor model must ultimately be an asynchronous distributed system. However, the introduction of a fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm, at the DA layer of the hierarchy, enables the upper level designs to be performed as if the system were synchronous.

Level 3 of the hierarchy, the **Distributed Synchronous layer (DS)**, breaks a frame into four sequential phases:



Activity on the separate processors is still assumed to occur synchronously. Interprocessor communication is accomplished using a simple mailbox scheme. Each processor has a mailbox with bins to store incoming messages from each of the other processors of the system. It also has an outgoing box that is used to broadcast data to *all* of the other processors in the system. The DS machine must be shown to implement the RS machine.

1. compute

- frame started by clock interrupt
- execute all tasks scheduled in current frame
- multiple frames constitute a cycle

2. broadcast

- broadcast outputs of task execution to other processors
- usually just a subset of the outputs are broadcast

3. vote

- vote broadcast data
- replace memory with voted values

4. sync

- execute sync algorithm
- wait for next clock interrupt

Each processor in the system executes the same set of application tasks every cycle. A cycle consists of the minimum number of frames necessary to define a continuously repeating task schedule. Each frame is `frame_time` units of time long. A frame is further decomposed into 4 phases. These are the `compute`, `broadcast`, `vote` and `sync` phases. During the `compute` phase, all of the applications tasks scheduled for this frame are executed. The results of all tasks that are to be voted this frame are then loaded into the outgoing mailbox. During the next phase, the `broadcast` phase, the system waits a sufficient amount of time to allow all of the messages to be delivered. As mentioned above, this delay must be greater than $\text{maxb} + \delta$, where `maxb` is the maximum communication delay and δ is the maximum clock skew. During the `vote` phase, each processor retrieves all of the replicated data from every other processor and performs a voting operation. Typically, this operation is a majority vote on each of the selected state elements. The processor then replaces its local memory with the voted values. It is crucial that the vote phase is triggered by an interrupt and all of the vote and state-update code be stored in Read-Only Memory (ROM). This will enable the system to recover from a transient even when the program counter has been affected by a transient fault. Furthermore, the use of ROM is necessary to ensure that the code itself is not affected by a transient.² During the final phase, the `sync` phase, the clock synchronization algorithm is executed. Although conceptually this can be performed in either software or hardware, we intend to use a hardware implementation.

At the fourth level, **Distributed Asynchronous layer (DA)**, the assumptions of the synchronous model are discharged. A fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm [6] can serve as a foundation for the implementation of the replicated system as a collection of asynchronously operating processors. Dedicated hardware implementations of the clock synchronization function are being pursued by other members of the NASA Langley staff [7, 8, 9]. Also, this layer relaxes the assumption of synchrony and allows each processor to run on its

²In the design specifications, these implementation details are not specified explicitly. However, it is clear that to successfully implement the models and prove that the implementation performs as specified, such implementation constructs will be needed.

own independent clock. Clock time and real time are introduced into the modeling formalism. The DA machine must be shown to implement the DS machine provided an underlying clock synchronization mechanism is in place.

The basic design strategy is to use a fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm as the foundation of the operating system. The synchronization algorithm provides a global time base for the system. Although the synchronization is not perfect, it is possible to develop a reliable communications scheme where the clocks of the system are skewed relative to each other, albeit within a strict known upper bound. For all working clocks p and q , the synchronization algorithm provides the following key property:

$$|c_p(T) - c_q(T)| < \delta$$

which asserts that the difference in real time for two clocks reading the same logical time is bounded by δ , assuming that there is a sufficient number of nonfaulty clocks. This property enables a simple communications protocol to be established whereby the receiver waits until $\text{maxb} + \delta$ after a pre-determined broadcast time before reading a message, where maxb is the maximum communication delay.

Figure 5 depicts the generic hardware architecture assumed for implementing the replicated system. Single-source sensor inputs are distributed by special purpose hardware executing a Byzantine agreement algorithm. Replicated actuator outputs are all delivered in parallel to the actuators, where force-sum voting occurs. Interprocessor communication links allow replicated processors to exchange and vote on the results of task computations. As previously suggested, clock synchronization hardware may be added to the architecture as well.

The basic concept of task execution is illustrated in figure 6.

Tasks receive inputs from the outputs of other tasks (illustrated by horizontal arrows) or from sensors (shown by vertical arrows). The outputs of a task are not available to other tasks until after termination of the task. There is therefore no use of an intertask communication mechanism such as the Ada rendezvous.

Task results are assigned to different *cells* within the state, as illustrated in figure 7.

The Clock Sync Property layer and Clock Sync Algorithm layer represent the recently revised version of the Interactive Convergence clock synchronization theory developed by SRI [10].

1.5 Availability of Specifications and Proofs

Both the DA_minv model and the LE model are specified formally and have been verified using the EHDM verification system. All specifications and proofs described in this report are available electronically via the Internet using anonymous FTP or World Wide Web (WWW) access. Anonymous FTP access is available through the host `air16.larc.nasa.gov` using the path:




Figure 5: Generic hardware architecture.

`pub/fm/larc/RCP-specs`

The specification files are provided in two formats: 1) a set of plain ASCII source files bundled using the Unix `tar` utility, and 2) a single file in the “dump” format used by EHD. Each version is compressed using both `gzip` and Unix `compress`. The compressed files range in size from 100 to 250 kilobytes.

WWW access to the FTP directory is provided through the NASA Langley Formal Methods Program home page:

`http://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm-top.html`

or the specific page for the Formal Methods FTP directory:

`file://air16.larc.nasa.gov/pub/fm/larc`

2 Formalizing the DA_{minv} and LE Layers

The RS model introduced a very abstract view of the execution of application tasks on a local processor. The DS and DA models concentrated on the distributed processing issues of the design and did not develop the task execution aspects of the system any further. In the LE model, a more detailed specification of the activities on a local processor are presented. In particular, three areas of activity are elaborated in detail:

- task dispatching and execution,
- minimal voting, and
- interprocessor communication via mailboxes.

These are presented in sections 3, 4, and 5, respectively. An intermediate model, DA_minv, that simplified the construction of the LE model is used. Some of the refinements occur in the DA_minv model and some in the LE model. For example, the concept of minimal voting is addressed in considerable detail in the DA_minv model.

2.1 Overview of Task Execution and Voting

To understand the DA_minv and LE formalizations, a detailed presentation of the abstract model of task execution used in the upper levels is necessary. We begin with a review of this model. The abstract model was based upon the following functions:

succ : function[control_state \rightarrow control_state]
 f_k : function[Pstate \rightarrow control_state]
 f_n : function[Pstate \rightarrow Pstate]
 f_t : function[Pstate, cell \rightarrow cell_state]
 f_c : function[inputs \times Pstate \rightarrow Pstate]
 f_s : function[Pstate \rightarrow MB]
 f_v : function[Pstate, MBvec \rightarrow Pstate]
 f_a : function[Pstate \rightarrow outputs]
recv : function[cell, control_state, nat \rightarrow bool]
dep : function[cell, cell, control_state \rightarrow bool]

The meaning of each of these functions is summarized in table 1. These functions define

succ	returns next control state
f_k	extracts control state
f_n	increments the frame counter
f_t	extracts cell (e.g. task) state
f_c	executes tasks and updates Pstate
f_s	selects and copies cells from memory into outgoing mailbox slot
f_v	votes mailbox values and overwrites cell states
f_a	denotes the selection of state variable values to be sent to the actuators
recv	true iff cell c 's state should have been recovered before the specified frame
dep	true iff cell c 's value in the next state depends on cell d 's value in the current state

Table 1: RS abstract functions

task scheduling, mailbox usage and voting on a single processor. To maximize generality, a minimal set of axiomatic properties of these functions was sought that would enable a proof that $RS \supset US$.

succ_ax : AXIOM $f_k(f_n(\mathbf{ps})) = \text{succ}(f_k(\mathbf{ps}))$

control_nc : AXIOM $f_k(f_c(u, \mathbf{ps})) = f_k(\mathbf{ps})$

cells_nc : AXIOM $f_t(f_n(\mathbf{ps}), c) = f_t(\mathbf{ps}, c)$

full_recovery : AXIOM $H \geq \text{recovery_period} \supset \text{recv}(c, K, H)$

initial_recovery : AXIOM $\text{recv}(c, K, H) \supset H > 2$

dep_recovery : AXIOM $\text{recv}(c, \text{succ}(K), H + 1) \wedge \text{dep}(c, d, K) \supset \text{recv}(d, K, H)$

components_equal : AXIOM $f_k(X) = f_k(Y) \wedge (\forall c : f_t(X, c) = f_t(Y, c)) \supset X = Y$

control_recovered : AXIOM

$\text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = f_s(\mathbf{ps}))$
 $\supset f_k(f_v(Y, w)) = f_k(\mathbf{ps})$

cell_recovered : AXIOM

$\text{maj_condition}(A)$
 $\wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = f_s(f_c(u, \mathbf{ps})))$
 $\wedge f_k(X) = K \wedge f_k(\mathbf{ps}) = K \wedge \text{dep_agree}(c, K, X, \mathbf{ps})$
 $\supset f_t(f_v(f_c(u, X), w), c) = f_t(f_c(u, \mathbf{ps}), c)$

vote_maj : AXIOM

$\text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = f_s(\mathbf{ps})) \supset f_v(\mathbf{ps}, w) = \mathbf{ps}$

In the LE model, interpretations are given for each of the functions listed in table 1 and shown to satisfy these axioms.

The development of the LE model proceeded in two steps. The first step (i.e. DA_minv) produced an elaboration of the functions f_v , recv , dep , f_k and f_t . The next step (i.e. LE) produced an elaboration of the functions f_n , f_c and succ . This is illustrated in figure 8. The first set of interpretations (in DA_minv) all deal with the voting processes of RCP. In the RCP Phase 2 paper [2] three types of voting were discussed—continuous, cyclic and minimal. In Appendix B of [2] interpretations of these functions were given for both the continuous and cyclic voting methods of voting. The more efficient minimal-voting method has always been the method-of-choice for RCP, but the mechanical proofs were incomplete and were thus not included in [2]. However, the continuous and cyclic voting proofs were sufficient to establish that the abstract axiomatic definitions of the RS level were consistent.

Details about the completed mechanical verification of the minimal voting approach can be found in section 4. There the functions f_v , recv and dep are defined in terms of other functions that are dependent upon the particular application.




Figure 6: Task Execution

Frame 1	Task 1	$cell[1] := f_1(u, cell[7]);$
	Task 2	$cell[2] := f_2(cell[1])$
Frame 2	Task 3	$cell[3] := f_3(u, cell[2]);$
	Task 4	$cell[4] := f_4(cell[3])$
Frame 3	Task 5	$cell[5] := f_5(u);$
	Task 6	$cell[6] := f_6(u, cell[4])$
Frame 4	Task 7	$cell[7] := f_7(cell[5], cell[6])$

Figure 7: Assignment of Task Results to Cells




Figure 8: Two Step Refinement into LE Model

2.2 Specification Method: EHDM Mappings

Unlike the higher levels of the hierarchy, the DA_minv and LE models were developed using the Ehdm mappings capability.

2.2.1 Example

The basic idea of Ehdm mappings is the substitution of an uninterpreted TYPE or function with an interpreted one. This is best explained by way of example. Consider

```
high : MODULE

THEORY

  f : FUNCTION[nat → nat]
  x : VAR nat
  f_ax : AXIOM f(x) > 0

  T : TYPE
  t : VAR T
  g : FUNCTION[T → nat]
  g_ax : AXIOM g(t) > 0

END high
```

This specification has two uninterpreted functions f and g . Each function is constrained by an axiom. Note that both the domain and the body of g are uninterpreted. This specification may then be refined into the more detailed specification below, named `low`:

```
low : MODULE

THEORY

  x : VAR nat
  F : FUNCTION[nat → nat] = (λ x : 100)

  T_imp : TYPE = nat
  y : VAR T_imp
  G : FUNCTION[T_imp → nat] = (λ y : y + 1)

END low
```

The function f is refined into F and g is refined into G . The uninterpreted type T is replaced with `nat`. The intended connection between module `high` and module `low` must be made formal. This is done by the following Ehdm mapping module:

to_low : MODULE

MAPPING high ONTO low

$f \rightarrow F$
 $T \rightarrow T_imp$
 $g \rightarrow G$

END

A mapping module consists of a list of associations denoted by \rightarrow . On the left side of an \rightarrow , an object from the high-level specification is given. The corresponding object in the lower level specification is given on the right side of an \rightarrow . When the mapping module is typechecked, Ehdm generates a file containing a list of obligations that must be proved:

high_to_low : MODULE

USING low

EXPORTING ALL WITH low

THEORY

x : VAR nat
f_ax : OBLIGATION $F(x) > 0$

t : VAR T_imp
g_ax : OBLIGATION $G(t) > 0$

END high_to_low

In this example, discharging the obligations is simple.

2.2.2 RCP Specifics

In figure 9, the main modules associated with the DA_minv and LE models are given.

The horizontal arrows represent USINGs and the down arrows represent MAPPING modules. The modules where the RS-level task-execution functions are mapped into are given in table 2.

The list of all of the *non-identical* name associations in the mapping modules follows:

null_memory \rightarrow mem0
cells \rightarrow cell_mem
MB \rightarrow MBbuf
null_memory \rightarrow mem0
pred \rightarrow pred_cs
=[cell_state] \rightarrow CS_eq
=[control_state] \rightarrow cnst_eq




Figure 9: DA to DA_minv to LE Mapping Structure

function	DA_minv module	LE module
succ	:	gc_hw
f_k	: gen_com	
f_n	: gen_com	
f_t	: gen_com	
f_c	:	minimal_hw
f_s	:	gc_hw
f_v	: minimal_v	
f_a	: minimal_v	
recv	: minimal_v	
dep	: minimal_v	

Table 2: The modules where the abstract task-execution functions are interpreted.

2.3 The Model of Processor State

In RS, DS and DA, Pstate was uninterpreted. The details about how the execution of tasks changed the state of a processor were left unspecified. The function “ f_c ”, which represents the change that occurs as a result of executing all of the tasks, was left uninterpreted also. The only changes to Pstate that were elaborated in some detail were those associated with replacing the local state with voted values. This was accomplished by the function “ f_v ”. The next step in refining the RCP into a detailed design involved the elaboration of the uninterpreted functions. This required a more detailed description of Pstate. In this section we will describe the elaboration of the processor state Pstate first in the DA_minv level then in the LE level.

At the DA_minv level, Pstate is interpreted as follows:

```

Pstate : TYPE = RECORD
    control : control_state,
    memry : memory
  
```

END

The state of a processor is partitioned into two components: the control state and the memory. The first component represents the state of the machine associated with the operating system; the second component represents the rest of the state. However, both fields of this record are still uninterpreted types:

```
control_state : TYPE
memory : TYPE
```

At this level, it is assumed that the frame counter can be retrieved from the `control_state` field via a function `frame`, and that the contents of cells can be retrieved from the `memory` field via a function `cells` and replaced in memory via a function `write_cell`:

```
frame : FUNCTION[control_state → frame_cntr]
cells : FUNCTION[memory, cell → cell_state]
write_cell : FUNCTION[memory, cell, cell_state → memory]
```

The semantics associated with the functions that operate on `Pstate` are captured in two axioms:

```
cells_ax : AXIOM cs.length(cells(mem, cc)) = c.length(cc)
write_cell_ax : AXIOM cs.length(cs) = c.length(xx) ⊃
  cells(write_cell(mem, xx, cs), cc)
  = IF cc = xx
  THEN cs
  ELSE cells(mem, cc) END
```

Note that the `write_cell_ax` only applies when `cs.length(cs) = c.length(xx)`. The reason for this is that the contents of different cells can be different sizes. This prevents the rewriting of a cell with a `cell_state` that has an inappropriate size.

At the `DA_minv` level of specification, the memory of the system is modeled as a collection of cells. Thus, equality of memories is defined by the following axiom:

```
memory_equal : AXIOM (∀ c : cells(C, c) = cells(D, c)) ⊃ C = D
```

Note that there is other memory in the system that is not modeled here. Examples of such memory include temporary storage and the program code, which is stored in ROM. The specifications described in this section are located in module `rcp_defs_imp`. These details are abstracted away in the upper levels through use of the `Ehdm` equality-mapping capability. Equality over `cell_states` is mapped onto the following function at the `LE` level:

```
cs1, cs2, cs3 : VAR cell_state
CS_eq : FUNCTION[cell_state, cell_state → bool] =
  (λ cs1, cs2 :
    cs1.len = cs2.len ∧ (∀ x : x < cs1.len ⊃ cs1.blk(x) = cs2.blk(x)))
```

EHDM requires that one demonstrate that this function is an equality relation. The following obligations are generated by the Ehdm system:

```

cell_state_var1 : VAR cell_state
cell_state_var2 : VAR cell_state
cell_state_var3 : VAR cell_state
control_state_var1 : VAR control_state
control_state_var2 : VAR control_state
control_state_var3 : VAR control_state
cell_state_reflexive : OBLIGATION
  CS_eq(cell_state_var1, cell_state_var1)

```

```

cell_state_symmetric : OBLIGATION
  CS_eq(cell_state_var1, cell_state_var2)
  ⊃ CS_eq(cell_state_var2, cell_state_var1)

```

```

cell_state_transitive : OBLIGATION
  CS_eq(cell_state_var1, cell_state_var2)
  ∧ CS_eq(cell_state_var2, cell_state_var3)
  ⊃ CS_eq(cell_state_var1, cell_state_var3)

```

```

control_state_reflexive : OBLIGATION
  cnst_eq(control_state_var1, control_state_var1)

```

```

control_state_symmetric : OBLIGATION
  cnst_eq(control_state_var1, control_state_var2)
  ⊃ cnst_eq(control_state_var2, control_state_var1)

```

```

control_state_transitive : OBLIGATION
  cnst_eq(control_state_var1, control_state_var2)
  ∧ cnst_eq(control_state_var2, control_state_var3)
  ⊃ cnst_eq(control_state_var1, control_state_var3)

```

as well as some congruence properties not shown here.

In the LE model, both components of Pstate (i.e., control and memry) are given detailed interpretations. These interpretations are described in the next two subsections.

2.3.1 LE Model of Memory

In the LE model, the concept of memory is extended significantly beyond that of the upper levels of the hierarchy. The type memory is defined as follows:

```

address : TYPE FROM nat WITH (λ n : n < mem_size)
memory : TYPE IS FUNCTION[address → wordn]

```

Thus, in the LE model, memory is represented as a bounded array of words. The value of `mem_size` is application or machine dependent. The type of `wordn` is still uninterpreted at this level (cf. leaving the number of bits in the word unspecified.)

The type `cell` is the index for components of computation state and the type `cell_state` is the information content of computation state components. At the LE level a `cell_state` becomes a fixed-length block of memory as illustrated in figure 10.




Figure 10: Memory Cells: blocks of words

Formally, a block of memory is represented as

```
mem_block_ty : TYPE =
  RECORD
    len : addr_len_ty,
    blk : memory_ty
  END
```

The `len` field indicates the maximum address in the block. All the values of the `blk` field above `len` are irrelevant. The `cell_state` type is interpreted as a `mem_block_ty`:

```
cell_state : TYPE IS mem_block_ty
```

The uninterpreted function `cell_map` assigns memory locations to all cells in the system:

```
cell_map : FUNCTION[cell → address_range]
```

The following three axioms constrain this function.

```
cell_map_length_ax : AXIOM length(cell_map(cc)) ≤ MBmem_size
```

```
cells_for_all_ax : AXIOM (∃ cc : address_within(adr, cell_map(cc)))
```

```
cell_separation : AXIOM (c1 ≠ c2) ⊃ address_disjoint(cell_map(c1), cell_map(c2))
```

The first axiom requires that the size of every cell is no larger than the size of the mailbox. The second axiom states that every memory location is covered by some cell. The third axiom says that cells do not overlap in memory; `address_disjoint` is defined as

```
address_disjoint : FUNCTION[address_range_ty, address_range_ty → bool] ≡
(λ ar, ar2 : ar.low > ar2.high ∨ ar2.low > ar.high)
```

In the upper level models, the function `cells` was used to extract a cell from memory. This function is implemented in the LE model by a function named `cell_mem` as follows:

```
cell_mem : FUNCTION[memory, cell → cell_state] =
(λ mem, cc :
  cs0(cc) WITH
  [len := length(cell_map(cc)), blk := mshift(mem, cell_map(cc).low)])

mshift : FUNCTION[memory, address → memory] =
(λ mem, low :
  (λ n : IF n + low < mem.size THEN mem(n + low) ELSE word0 END IF))
```

The mapping produces the following obligation:

```
cells_ax : OBLIGATION cs.length(cell_mem(mem, cc)) = c.length(cc)
```

The functions `c.length` and `cs.length` are defined as follows:

```
c.length : FUNCTION[cell → nat] ≡ (λ cc : length(cell_map(cc)))
cs : VAR cell_state
cs.length : FUNCTION[cell_state → nat] ≡ (λ cs : cs.len)
```

The function `write_cell` is used to replace the contents of a cell in memory with a `cell_state`.

```
write_cell : FUNCTION[memory, cell, cell_state → memory] =
(λ mem, cc, CS :
  (λ adr :
    IF address_within(adr, cell_map(cc)) ∧ adr - cell_map(cc).low < CS.len
    THEN CS.blk(adr - cell_map(cc).low)
    ELSE mem(adr) END IF))
```

The function `write_cell` is slightly more general than the axiom at the `DA_minv` level requires. It allows one to update a cell using a `cell_state` of a different size than the cell being updated. Nevertheless, the constraining axiom at the upper level,

```
write_cell_ax : OBLIGATION
  cs.length(cs) = c.length(xx)
  ⊃ cell_mem(write_cell(mem, xx, cs), cc)
  = IF cc = xx
  THEN cs
  ELSE cell_mem(mem, cc) END
```

```
null_memory_ax : OBLIGATION cell_mem(mem0, cc) = cs0(cc)
```

is shown to be satisfied by this implementation.

The specifications in this subsection are located in the `rcp_defs_hw.spec` module.

2.3.2 LE Model of control_state

The control state of the processor is defined as follows:

```
control_state : TYPE =
  RECORD
    frame : frame_cntr,
    mmu : mmu_state,
    superflag : boolean,
    errorflag : boolean
  END
```

The `frame` field indicates the current frame number, which is incremented by the operating system modulo the number of frames per cycle. The `mmu` field contains the memory management registers. The `superflag` is a boolean flag that indicates whether the processor is in supervisor mode. Certain instructions such as loading the memory management registers can only be performed while in supervisor mode. Finally the `errorflag` field indicates whether a malfunction has occurred.

In the upper-levels of RCP, the only component of `control_state` that is used is `frame`. The other fields of `control_state` are abstracted away by mapping equality on `control_states` (i.e. `=[control_state]`) onto a function `cnst_eq`, defined as follows:

```
cnst_eq : FUNCTION[control_state, control_state → bool] =
  (λ cn1, cn2 : cn1.frame = cn2.frame)
```

Thus, equality of control states in the upper levels of the model only constrains the `frame` fields to be equal.

3 Task Dispatching and Execution

Tasks are executed during the compute phase of a frame. Different sequences of tasks can be executed during different frames. A schedule that consists of a 2-frame cycle (i.e. `schedule.length = 2`) is illustrated in figure 11. The particular cell that stores the results of




Figure 11: Structure of frames and subframes

the execution of a task during a particular frame and subframe is determined by the function `sched_cell`:

sched_cell : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, sub_frame → cell]

This function is uninterpreted in DA_minv and remains so in LE. The number of subframes can vary from one frame to another; therefore, an additional function is specified that returns the number of subframes in a given frame:

num_subframes : FUNCTION[frame_cntr → nat]

For convenience, the inverse functions are also defined. Given a cell, two functions indicate the frame and subframe that a particular cell (i.e. task) executes.

cell_frame : FUNCTION[cell → frame_cntr]
cell_subframe : FUNCTION[cell → sub_frame]

The relationship between these functions is given by an axiom:

sched_cell_ax : AXIOM
 $mm = \text{cell_frame}(c) \wedge k = \text{cell_subframe}(c)$
 $\Leftrightarrow \text{sched_cell}(mm, k) = c \wedge k < \text{num_subframes}(mm)$

3.1 DA_minv Refinements

In the upper four levels, the dispatching and execution of tasks were completely abstract. The function f_c :

f_c : FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate → Pstate]

defined the state change on non-faulty processors but was uninterpreted. At the DA_minv level, we specify in more detail the steps involved in task execution. The function f_c is interpreted as follows:

f_c : FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate → Pstate] =
 (λ u, ps :
 ps WITH
 [(memry) := exec($u, ps, \text{num_subframes}(\text{frame}(ps.\text{control}))$)).memry])

where

exec : RECURSIVE FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate, sub_frame → Pstate] =
 (λ u, ps, k :
 IF $k = 0$ THEN ps
 ELSE **exec_task**($u, \text{exec}(u, ps, k - 1), k - 1$)
 END)BY **exec_meas**

Each call to the uninterpreted function `exec_task`

`exec_task` : FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate, sub_frame → Pstate]

corresponds to the dispatching and execution of a single task. It is constrained by three axioms:

`exec_task_ax` : AXIOM

`sched_cell(frame(ps.control), q) ≠ c`
 \supset `cells(exec_task(u, ps, q).memry, c) = cells(ps.memry, c)`

`exec_task_ax_2` : AXIOM

`frame(exec_task(u, ps, q).control) = frame(ps.control)`

`cell_input_constraint` : AXIOM

`X.control = Y.control`
 \wedge `sched_cell(frame(X.control), q) = c`
 \wedge ($\forall d$: `cell_input(d, c) ⊃ cells_match(X, Y, d)`)
 \supset `cells_match(exec_task(u, X, q), exec_task(u, Y, q), c)`

The first axiom requires that all of the cells other than the one assigned to the executing task remain unchanged.³ The second axiom states that the execution of a task cannot change the current frame number. The third axiom states that the execution of the same task on two different Pstates, X and Y, that have equivalent control_states and where all of the inputs to the tasks are the same, will produce the same outputs.

Note that the specification says nothing about the values that are written into the cell associated with the task, because it is dependent on the particular workload executing on the RCP. Note also that nothing is said about the execution time of the individual tasks. The DA specification merely requires that all of the tasks complete within the time allocated for the compute phase of the system.

Figure 12 shows the implementation tree for f_c . The arrows represent the “calls” relation. The module that a function is defined in is listed in square brackets. Functions that are still uninterpreted in the LE module are underlined. The specifications in this subsection are located in the `gen_com` module.

3.2 LE Refinements

At the DA_minv level the f_c function is defined in terms of a recursive function `exec`. The function `exec` invokes an uninterpreted function `exec_task` to execute a task. In the LE model `exec_task` is defined as follows:

³In general this would not be the case for a task running on a faulty processor; however, this function is only used in the state-transition relations where the condition `healthy(p) > 0` is satisfied.




Figure 12: Function f_c implementation tree

```

exec.task : FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate, sub_frame → Pstate] =
  (λ u, PS, csf : LET tws := t_write_set(u, PS, csf) IN
   LET c := sched_cell((PS.control).frame, csf) IN
   LET loaded_PS := load_mmu(set_super(PS), c) IN
   write_em(tws, unset_super(loaded_PS), tws.num)
   WITH [control := PS.control])
  
```

This function delineates the change to Pstate that accrues as a result of executing a task. A task running on a working processor will write its outputs into the appropriate cell locations in main memory. The set of memory locations that are altered by an executing task is assumed to be finite and is modeled as a bounded list of records of TYPE `mup`, where

```

mup : TYPE = RECORD addr : address,
          val : wordn
END
  
```

The field `addr` contains the address and `val` contains the new value to be written into that address. The list is of TYPE `muplist`, where

```

mupseq : TYPE = FUNCTION[nat → mup]
muplist : TYPE = RECORD num : nat, mups : mupseq END
  
```

The function `t_write_set` returns such a list (i.e. of type `muplist`) corresponding to the current task's outputs.

```

t_write_set : FUNCTION[inputs, Pstate, sub_frame → muplist]
load_mmu : FUNCTION[Pstate, cell → Pstate] =
  (λ PS, c : MMU(PS, word0, cell_map(c).low, cell_map(c).high, true, false))

```

It is expected that the muplist produced by redundant tasks executing on non-faulty processors would be identical and would only alter appropriate locations in memory. A recovering task *may* attempt to write into an erroneous location. Consequently, **t_write_set** is a function of the full Pstate and the current inputs and not merely the task name and its inputs. The MMU prevents an attempt to write in an inappropriate location from actually occurring. The function **write_em** is called by **exec_task** to update Pstate in accordance with the values in muplist. This takes place after the memory management unit registers have been loaded by the function **load_mmu**. Implicit in this definition is the requirement that the registers are loaded correctly even on a recovering processor (i.e. non-faulty but not necessarily containing a recovered memory). Clearly this operating system code must not rely on any dynamic memory—the cell locations must be hard-coded into ROM.

The recursive function **write_em** is called by **exec_task** to write to memory using the MMU. The function **write_em** updates Pstate with all of the values in the muplist produced by **t_write_set**.

```

write_em : RECURSIVE FUNCTION[muplist, Pstate, nat → Pstate] =
  (λ ml, PS, i :
    IF i = 0 THEN PS ELSE
      write_em(ml, MMU(PS, ml.mups(i - 1).val, ml.mups(i - 1).addr, 0, false, true), pred(i))
    END IF)
  BY we_meas

```

The mapping module from DA_minv to LE is of the form:

cebuf → **cebuf**

cnbuf → **cnbuf**

cell_frame → **cell_frame**

exec_task → **exec_task**

3.3 Specification of the MMU

In the LE model a set of outputs associated with a task's execution is written into specific memory locations. The values produced by the task are not specified: only the locations of the addresses that are written by a task are considered. As mentioned in the earlier RCP papers, a major consideration is the prevention of a working, but not fully recovered, processor from writing into a memory region not assigned to it. Thus, in the LE model a memory-management unit (MMU) is specified that sits between the processor and the memory.

In this section, the abstract specification of a MMU is presented. The MMU unit contains registers that control which portions of memory can be written into. The registers are of type `mmu_state`.

```
address_range : TYPE FROM addr WITH ( $\lambda aa : aa.high \geq aa.low$ )
mmu_state : TYPE IS address_range
```

The MMU is defined as follows:

```
MMU : FUNCTION[Pstate, wordn, address, address, bool, bool  $\rightarrow$  Pstate] =
( $\lambda PS, w, a, b, setflag, RWflag :$ 
  IF setflag THEN MMU_set(PS, a, b) ELSE
  IF RWflag THEN MMU_write(PS, w, a) ELSE PS END IF)
```

This function calls `MMU_set` to load the MMU registers and `MMU_write` to write memory:

```
MMU_set : FUNCTION[Pstate, address, address  $\rightarrow$  Pstate] :=
( $\lambda PS, a, b :$ 
  IF (PS.control).superflag THEN
  IF  $a \leq b$  THEN
  PS WITH
  [control := PS.control WITH
  [mmu := mmu_st_0 WITH [low := a, high := b]]]
  ELSE
  PS WITH [control := PS.control WITH [errorflag := true]]
  END IF
  ELSE PS WITH [control := PS.control WITH [errorflag := true]]
  END IF)

MMU_write : FUNCTION[Pstate, wordn, address  $\rightarrow$  Pstate] =
( $\lambda PS, w, a :$ 
  IF address_within(a, (PS.control).mmu)
  THEN PS WITH [memry := PS.memry WITH [a := w]]
  ELSE PS END IF)
```

The processor can only load the MMU registers while in supervisor mode.

3.4 Verifications Associated With f_c -Related Refinements

Since the function `exec_task` was constrained by three axioms at the `DA_minv` level, the mappings to the LE implementation generated three obligations:

exec_task_ax : OBLIGATION

$\text{sched_cell}(\text{Frame}(\text{ps.control}), q) \neq c$
 $\supset \text{CS_eq}(\text{cell_mem}(\text{exec_task}(u, \text{ps}, q).\text{memry}, c), \text{cell_mem}(\text{ps.memry}, c))$

exec_task_ax_2 : OBLIGATION

$\text{Frame}(\text{exec_task}(u, \text{ps}, q).\text{control}) = \text{Frame}(\text{ps.control})$

cell_input_constraint : OBLIGATION

$\text{cnst_eq}(X.\text{control}, Y.\text{control})$
 $\wedge \text{sched_cell}(\text{frame}(X.\text{control}), q) = c$
 $\wedge (\forall d : \text{cell_input}(d, c) \supset \text{cells_match}(X, Y, d))$
 $\supset \text{cells_match}(\text{exec_task}(u, X, q), \text{exec_task}(u, Y, q), c)$

Note that the obligations differ from the axioms in the upper level by the replacement of the equalities between `cell_states` and `control_states` with their mapped equivalence relations, `CS_eq` and `cnst_eq`, respectively.

3.4.1 Proof of `exec_task_ax`

The proof of this obligation establishes that any cell `c` that is not the one associated with the currently executing task (i.e. `sched_cell(Frame(ps.control), q)`), will not be altered by the execution of the task. This is verified by proving the following lemma using induction on `nn`.

Is_et : FUNCTION[inputs, sub_frame, cell, address, muplist, nat \rightarrow bool]
=
($\lambda u, \text{csf}, c, \text{adr}, \text{tws}, \text{nn} :$
($\forall \text{ps} : \text{LET } \text{cc} := \text{sched_cell}((\text{ps.control}).\text{frame}, \text{csf})$
IN
 $\text{address_within}(\text{adr}, \text{cell_map}(c))$
 $\wedge \text{nn} \leq \text{tws.num} \wedge (\text{ps.control}).\text{mmu} = \text{cell_map}(\text{cc}) \wedge \text{cc} \neq c$
 $\supset \text{write_em}(\text{tws}, \text{ps}, \text{nn}).\text{memry}(\text{adr}) = \text{ps.memry}(\text{adr}))$)

Is_et_lem : LEMMA `Is_et`($u, \text{csf}, c, \text{adr}, \text{tws}, \text{nn}$)

Proof of `Is_et_lem`: We first establish a lemma:

etl1 : LEMMA

$\text{cc} = \text{sched_cell}((\text{ps.control}).\text{frame}, \text{csf}) \wedge (\text{ps.control}).\text{mmu} = \text{cell_map}(\text{cc})$
 $\wedge \text{address_within}(\text{adr}, \text{cell_map}(c)) \wedge \text{nn} \leq \text{tws.num} \wedge \text{cc} \neq c$
 $\supset \text{write_em}(\text{tws}, \text{ps}, \text{nn}).\text{memry}(\text{adr}) =$
(**IF** $\text{nn} \leq 0$ **THEN** `ps` **ELSE**
 $\text{write_em}(\text{tws}, (\text{LET } \text{tmn1} := \text{tws.mups}(\text{pred}(\text{nn})) \text{ IN}$
 $\text{IF } \text{address_within}(\text{tmn1.addr}, (\text{ps.control}).\text{mmu}) \text{ THEN}$
 $\text{ps WITH}[\text{memry} := \text{ps.memry WITH}$
 $\{(\text{tmn1.addr}) := \text{tmn1.val}\}]$)

ELSE ps END IF),
 pred(nn))
END IF).memry(adr)

from the definition of `write_em`, `MMU` and `MMU_write`. The base case of the induction (i.e. $nn = 0$) follows directly from this lemma. The induction step is:

ls_et_lem_s : LEMMA
ls_et(u , csf , c , adr , tws , nn) \supset ls_et(u , csf , c , adr , tws , $nn + 1$)

The first step is to establish:

ets2 : LEMMA
cc = sched_cell((ps.control).frame, csf)
 \wedge (ps.control).mmu = cell_map(cc)
 \wedge $nn + 1 \leq tws.num$
 \wedge $cc \neq c$
 \wedge address_within(adr , cell_map(c))
 \wedge ls_et(u , csf , c , adr , tws , nn)
 \wedge address_within($tws.mups(nn).addr$, (ps.control).mmu)
 \supset ps.memry(adr) =
(ps WITH
[memry := ps.memry WITH
[($tws.mups(nn).addr$)
:= $tws.mups(nn).val$]).memry(adr)

This is a direct result of the fact that cells do not overlap:

cell_separation : AXIOM
($c_1 \neq c_2$) \supset address_disjoint(cell_map(c_1), cell_map(c_2))

where

address_disjoint : FUNCTION[address_range_ty, address_range_ty \rightarrow bool]
 \equiv
(λ ar, ar2 : ar.low > ar2.high \vee ar2.low > ar.high)

We next let `ps2` represent

(ps WITH
[memry := ps.memry WITH
[($tws.mups(nn).addr$)
:= $tws.mups(nn).val$])

in lemma `ets2` and use `ls_et` with `ps` substituted with `ps2`. This yields `ets3`:

ets3 : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned}
& cc = \text{sched_cell}((ps.\text{control}).\text{frame}, csf) \wedge (ps.\text{control}).\text{mmu} = \text{cell_map}(cc) \\
& \wedge nn + 1 \leq \text{tws.num} \wedge cc \neq c \wedge \text{address_within}(\text{adr}, \text{cell_map}(c)) \\
& \wedge \text{ls_et}(u, csf, c, \text{adr}, \text{tws}, nn) \\
& \wedge \text{address_within}(\text{tws.mups}(nn).\text{addr}, (ps.\text{control}).\text{mmu}) \\
& \wedge ps2 = \\
& \quad (ps \text{ WITH} \\
& \quad \quad [\text{memry} := ps.\text{memry} \text{ WITH} \\
& \quad \quad \quad [(\text{tws.mups}(nn).\text{addr}) \\
& \quad \quad \quad \quad := \text{tws.mups}(nn).\text{val}]]) \\
& \supset (\text{write_em}(\text{tws}, ps2, nn)).\text{memry}(\text{adr}) = ps.\text{memry}(\text{adr})
\end{aligned}$$

Then from lemma ets3 and lemma etl1 with $nn + 1$ substituted for nn , we have:

ets6 : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned}
& cc = \text{sched_cell}((ps.\text{control}).\text{frame}, csf) \\
& \wedge (ps.\text{control}).\text{mmu} = \text{cell_map}(cc) \\
& \wedge nn + 1 \leq \text{tws.num} \\
& \wedge cc \neq c \\
& \wedge \text{address_within}(\text{adr}, \text{cell_map}(c)) \\
& \wedge \text{ls_et}(u, csf, c, \text{adr}, \text{tws}, nn) \\
& \supset \text{write_em}(\text{tws}, ps, nn + 1).\text{memry}(\text{adr}) = ps.\text{memry}(\text{adr})
\end{aligned}$$

The induction step follows from ets6 and the definition of `ls_et`.

Q.E.D.

3.4.2 Proof of exec_task_ax.2

The proof of the `exec_task_ax.2` obligation follows directly from the definition of `exec_task`.

3.4.3 Proof of cell_input_constraint

The proof of `cell_input_constraint`:

cell_input_constraint : OBLIGATION

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{cnst_eq}(X.\text{control}, Y.\text{control}) \wedge \text{sched_cell}(\text{frame}(X.\text{control}), q) = c \\
& \wedge (\forall d : \text{cell_input}(d, c) \supset \text{cells_match}(X, Y, d)) \\
& \supset \text{cells_match}(\text{exec_task}(u, X, q), \text{exec_task}(u, Y, q), c)
\end{aligned}$$

involves a significant amount of rewriting and the use of the following lemma about the function `write_em`:

write_em_prop : LEMMA

```

n ≤ tws.num
⊃ write_em(tws, XX, n).memry(addr)
= LET im := smallest_adr_n(tws, addr, nn) IN
  IF match_exists_n(tws, addr, n) ∧ address_within(addr, (XX.control).mmu)
  THEN tws.mups(im).val
  ELSE XX.memry(addr) END IF

```

The proof of `write_em` is accomplished by induction on `n`. This proof is very tedious and will not be discussed here; it is fully elaborated in the specifications.

After rewriting `cell_input_constraint` with the definitions of `cells_match`, `exec_task`, `CS_eq` and `cnst_eq`, it becomes:

```

cic2 : LEMMA cnst_eq(X.control, Y.control)
  ∧ sched_cell(frame(X.control), q) = c
  ∧ (∀ d : cell_input(d, c) ⊃ cells_match(X, Y, d))
⊃ CS_eq(cell_mem(write_em(t_write_set(u, X, q),
  unset_super(load_mmu(set_super(X), sched_cell((X.control).frame, q))),
  t_write_set(u, X, q).num).memry, c),
  cell_mem(write_em(t_write_set(u, Y, q),
  unset_super(load_mmu(set_super(Y), sched_cell((Y.control).frame, q))),
  t_write_set(u, Y, q).num).memry, c))

```

Rewriting this formula with definitions of `cell_mem`, `CS_eq`, `mshift`, `used_cells_eq` and using lemmas `CS_eq_need`:

```

CS_eq_need : LEMMA
  xx < cell_mem(write_em(t_write_set(u, X, q),
    unset_super(load_mmu(set_super(X), sched_cell((X.control).frame, q))),
    t_write_set(u, X, q).num).memry, c).len
⊃ xx < cell_map(c).high - cell_map(c).low + 1
  ∧ xx + cell_map(c).low < mem_size

```

we have:

```

cic4D : LEMMA cnst_eq(X.control, Y.control)
  ∧ sched_cell(frame(X.control), q) = c
  ∧ used_cells_eq(X, Y, c) ∧ n < c.length(c) ∧ n + cell_map(c).low < mem_size
⊃ write_em(t_write_set(u, X, q), unset_super(load_mmu(set_super(X), c)),
  t_write_set(u, X, q).num).memry(n + cell_map(c).low)
= write_em(t_write_set(u, Y, q), unset_super(load_mmu(set_super(Y), c)),
  t_write_set(u, Y, q).num).memry(n + cell_map(c).low)

```

Rewriting with `cnst_eq` and using axiom `t_write_set_ax_1` and lemma `cic4F`:

cic4F : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{XX} = \text{unset_super}(\text{load_mmu}(\text{set_super}(X), c)) \\ & \supset \text{cell_map}(c).\text{high} = ((\mathbf{XX}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{high} \\ & \quad \wedge \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low} = ((\mathbf{XX}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{low} \end{aligned}$$

we have

cic4E : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{cnst_eq}(X.\text{control}, Y.\text{control}) \\ & \wedge \text{sched_cell}(\text{frame}(X.\text{control}), q) = c \\ & \wedge \text{used_cells_eq}(X, Y, c) \\ & \wedge \text{tws} = \text{t_write_set}(u, X, q) \\ & \wedge n < c.\text{length}(c) \\ & \quad \wedge \text{cell_map}(c).\text{high} = ((\mathbf{XX}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{high} \\ & \quad \wedge \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low} = ((\mathbf{XX}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{low} \\ & \quad \wedge \text{cell_map}(c).\text{high} = ((\mathbf{YY}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{high} \\ & \quad \wedge \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low} = ((\mathbf{YY}.\text{control}).\text{mmu}).\text{low} \wedge n + \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low} < \text{mem_size} \\ & \supset \text{write_em}(\text{tws}, \mathbf{XX}, \text{tws}.\text{num}).\text{memry}(n + \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low}) \\ & \quad = \text{write_em}(\text{tws}, \mathbf{YY}, \text{tws}.\text{num}).\text{memry}(n + \text{cell_map}(c).\text{low}) \end{aligned}$$

This lemma is proved using axiom `t_write_set_ax.1` again, the definition of `cnst_eq` and lemma `cic.W1` twice, i.e., `cic.W1` and `cic.W1{XX ← YY, X ← Y}`. Lemma `cic.W1` is proved using the definition of `match_exists.n`, axiom `t_write_set_ax.2` and a key property about `write_em`, `write_em_prop` mentioned above.

Q.E.D.

4 Minimal Voting

The `DA_minv` layer of the RCP architecture is positioned immediately below the `DA` layer in the overall RCP specification hierarchy. `DA_minv` specifications maintain the same basic structure as the `DA` layer. What is new at this level is a formalization of the minimal voting scheme that offers a method of axiomatizing a set of general voting patterns, spanning the full spectrum of possible degrees of voting frequency. Although highly frequent voting patterns, such as the continuous voting and cyclic voting patterns discussed in our Phase 2 report [2], could be expressed as instances of minimal voting, we anticipate that the greatest value from this work will result when it is used to achieve minimal voting literally, with a corresponding reduction in voting overhead.

It is worth noting that the `DA_minv` formalism could have been incorporated into the `RS` layer of RCP. Originally, the voting scheme was intended to be quite arbitrary and needed only to satisfy certain constraints. Later we decided to incorporate the minimal voting concept as a voting scheme instance, still quite general, that could serve as the basis for further refinement. Its appearance at this point in the hierarchy is the result of a choice that could have been made differently. Note also that an informal proof the minimal voting results were presented in our Phase 1 report [1].

Mappings from the DA layer to the DA_minv layer have been constructed to map the module `generic_FT` onto the module `minimal_v`. This section presents the minimal voting formalization and proofs of the mapping's obligations.

4.1 Application Task Requirements

To formalize the conditions under which the minimal voting scheme achieves transient recovery, it is necessary to introduce some preliminary definitions about task graphs and execution schedules. At the base of this formalization is a set of uninterpreted functions and a set of axioms that constrain these functions. Any application to be hosted on an RCP implementation must interpret these functions in such a way as to satisfy the axioms. If the axioms hold, then the transient recovery properties shown about RCP will hold as well.

The uninterpreted functions pertaining to application tasks are the following:

1. `cell_frame`
2. `cell_subframe`
3. `sched_cell`
4. `num_subframes`
5. `cell_input`
6. `v_sched`

Two axioms constrain these functions:

1. `sched_cell_ax`
2. `full_recovery_condition`

These functions and axioms are described below. There are several additional axioms introduced in the formalization whose purpose is to constrain the implementation of task execution in RCP. These additional constraints are shown to hold in the LE layer of RCP.

4.1.1 Scheduling Concepts

Four functions are used to describe the position of task cells within an execution schedule. The frame and subframe for a particular cell are given by `cell_frame` and `cell_subframe`, while `sched_cell` provides the inverse mapping, and `num_subframes` gives the number of subframes contained within a designated frame, because this number may vary from frame to frame.

`cell_frame` : FUNCTION[cell → frame_cnr]

`cell_subframe` : FUNCTION[cell → sub_frame]

`sched_cell` : FUNCTION[frame_cnr, sub_frame → cell]

`num_subframes` : FUNCTION[frame_cnr → nat]

A task schedule can use arbitrary definitions for these functions provided they satisfy a well-formedness condition:

sched_cell_ax : AXIOM
 $mm = \text{cell_frame}(c) \wedge k = \text{cell_subframe}(c)$
 $\Leftrightarrow \text{sched_cell}(mm, k) = c \wedge k < \text{num_subframes}(mm)$

This axiom expresses the functional inverse relationship and imposes the bound on the number of valid subframes for a frame.

Next, we need to characterize the data flow dependencies of tasks embedded within a schedule. The uninterpreted function $\text{cell_input}(c, d)$ holds when the output produced by the task executing at cell c is used as an input by the task executing at cell d .

cell_input : FUNCTION[cell, cell \rightarrow bool]

A cell may have inputs from zero or more other cells within the schedule. A cell may have an input from itself, in which case the value referenced is from the task's prior execution, i.e., the task's output from schedule_length frames ago. Clearly, cell_input can be used to define a data flow graph G that captures input-output relationships of the application tasks. Figure 6 on page 13 shows an example of such a graph.

Recall that the RCP architecture divides a frame into four sequential phases: **compute**, **broadcast**, **vote**, and **sync**. A consequence of this scheme is that *all* of the tasks scheduled for execution during a frame will execute (and produce their output) before the output of *any* task scheduled for voting is used in a vote operation. A further consequence is that if cell c provides its output to cell d , and c is scheduled to execute before d within the same frame, and c is voted in this frame, then the value d uses as input is *not* a recently voted value because c 's output is not voted until the **vote** phase of its frame. This feature of RCP was designed to minimize the need for synchronization and make the implementation of voting more practical. A drawback, however, is the introduction of a few complications in the formalization of the recovery process.

Thus, we find it necessary to derive a new function based on the cell_input concept. While cell_input captures the data flow relation irrespective of frame boundaries within a schedule, we need an additional predicate induced by cell_input that indicates when a more specialized set of conditions holds. The predicate $\text{cell_input_frame}(c, d)$ holds when the value provided by c is generated in a different frame from d 's execution frame, and either c 's value flows directly to d or flows indirectly to d through computation by cells that precede d in its frame. This allows us to express the cell recovery conditions in terms of indirect data flows that cross frame boundaries and hence will have been acted upon by vote operations in previous frames. In effect, cell_input_frame defines a modified task graph in which the data flows are prescribed by this new predicate rather than by cell_input .

To formalize this notion, we first define the predicate $\text{different_frame}(c, d)$, which is true when c 's last value was produced in a frame prior to the one in which d would be executing.




Figure 13: Task graph induced by `cell_input_frame` (G^*).

```
different_frame : FUNCTION[cell, cell → bool] =
  (λ c, d :
    cell_frame(c) ≠ cell_frame(d) ∨ cell_subframe(c) ≥ cell_subframe(d))
```

Note that this concept of “different frame” is not the same as having different *scheduled* frames. RCP uses the convention that if c and d are scheduled to execute in the same frame, with c having a later subframe than d , a data flow from c to d uses the value from c ’s prior execution, i.e., c ’s output from `schedule.length` frames ago in time. It is this latter notion of difference that is captured by `different_frame`.

To express `cell_input_frame` we enlist the help of a recursive function that computes the transitive closure of the `cell_input` relation from the target cell back through the cells of all earlier subframes, retaining only those cells that satisfy `different_frame`. It is this transitive closure that captures the indirect data flows.

```
cell_input_star : RECURSIVE
  FUNCTION[cell, cell, sub_frame → bool] =
  (λ c, d, q :
    (different_frame(c, d) ∧ cell_input(c, d))
    ∨ (∃ e :
      cell_input(e, d)
      ∧ cell_frame(e) = cell_frame(d)
      ∧ cell_subframe(e) < q
      ∧ cell_input_star(c, e, cell_subframe(e))))
  BY (λ c, d, q : q)
```

Evaluating `cell_input_star` with a suitable starting value for the recursion is our means of defining `cell_input_frame`, the data flow relation used to characterize the full recovery condition.

```
cell_input_frame : FUNCTION[cell, cell → bool] =
  (λ c, d : cell_input_star(c, d, cell_subframe(d)))
```

In the following presentation, we refer to the task graph induced by the `cell_input_frame` relation as G^* . As an example, refer back to figure 6, where the data flows in this figure would be given by an instance of `cell_input`. The corresponding graph defined by the derived predicate `cell_input_frame` is shown in figure 13. Notice how the only edges in the graph are ones that cross frame boundaries.

The final uninterpreted function needed to characterize an application concerns the scheduling of voting.

`v_sched` : **FUNCTION**[`frame_cntr`, `cell` \rightarrow `bool`]

The predicate `v_sched(fr, c)` is true when cell *c* is scheduled to have its value voted at the end of frame *fr*. This allows a (different) subset of the cell values to be voted each frame. It is necessary to meet certain conditions in the assignments of a voting schedule to ensure that full recovery of the cell states can be achieved in a bounded number of frames. A precise statement of these recovery conditions requires the introduction of several new definitions, which we choose to express in graph-theoretic terms.

4.1.2 Task Graph Concepts

Cell recovery is expressed as a property of the task data flow graph G^* augmented with schedules for computation and voting. Paths through the graph are the basic unit of expression. A path is simply a sequence of cells, which we represent in EHDM as a mapping from natural numbers to cells.

`path_type` : **TYPE** = **FUNCTION**[`nat` \rightarrow `cell`]

Although this can be used to represent infinite paths, we will be concerned only with finite paths. A path of length *L* can be represented by the restriction of a `path_type` mapping to its first *L* elements, that is, mapping from the values 0 to *L* - 1. Hence, when we need to restrict consideration to finite paths, we use a path value and a separate length value to denote this restriction.

For this formal treatment, only paths over G^* are of interest. Moreover, we only will have occasion to refer to paths that terminate in a particular cell *c*. An arbitrary path from G^* ending in cell *c* is identified by the following predicate.

`input_path` : **FUNCTION**[`path_type`, `nat`, `cell` \rightarrow `bool`] =
 $(\lambda \text{ path, len, } c :$
 $(\text{len} > 0 \supset c = \text{path}(\text{len} - 1))$
 $\wedge (\forall q : 0 < q \wedge q < \text{len} \supset \text{cell_input_frame}(\text{path}(q - 1), \text{path}(q))))$

The definition also admits zero-length paths, but any path of nonzero length must end in *c*.

Several definitions about paths are needed to construct proofs pertaining to cell recovery, although they are not needed in the statement of the full recovery condition itself. One such definition concerns a more specialized kind of path needed to reason about when the terminal

cell c can be assured of having a recovered value under certain conditions. The predicate $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$ holds iff a path of length len ending at cell c contains a progression of cells that must have been recovered in order for c to be recovered in frame fr , assuming the processor has been healthy for H consecutive frames (last transient fault disappeared more than H frames earlier). This function is defined recursively by working backward through G^* , taking into account all cells that contribute directly and indirectly to computing the task output at cell c .

```

cell_rec_path : RECURSIVE
  FUNCTION[ $\text{path\_type}, \text{nat}, \text{cell}, \text{frame\_cntr}, \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{bool}$ ] =
  ( $\lambda \text{ path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H$  :
    IF  $H = 0$  THEN  $\text{len} = 0$  ELSE
      IF  $\text{v\_sched}(\text{prev\_fr}(\text{fr}), c)$ 
        THEN  $\text{len} = 0$ 
      ELSE
        IF  $\text{cell\_frame}(c) = \text{prev\_fr}(\text{fr})$ 
          THEN
             $\text{len} > 0$ 
             $\wedge \text{path}(\text{len} - 1) = c$ 
             $\wedge$ 
            ( $\exists d$  :
               $\text{cell\_input\_frame}(d, c)$ 
               $\wedge \text{cell\_rec\_path}(\text{path}, \text{len} - 1, d, \text{prev\_fr}(\text{fr}), H - 1)$ 
               $\vee ((\forall e : \neg \text{cell\_input\_frame}(e, c)) \wedge \text{len} = 1)$ 
            )
          ELSE  $\text{cell\_rec\_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{prev\_fr}(\text{fr}), H - 1)$  END
        END
      END
    )
  BY ( $\lambda \text{ path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H : H$ )

```

For a given cell c , many paths are possible that satisfy cell_rec_path . None, however, may contain successive cells d and e where d 's output is voted before it is used by e . Only paths that represent chains of data flow through G^* unbroken by vote sites are admitted by cell_rec_path . Whenever a cell takes multiple inputs, branching exists to create the possibility of multiple recovery paths. The cell at the beginning of a recovery path must either have no inputs or take all its inputs from cells with voted outputs. In all cases, there must be enough time to follow the indicated path, i.e., H must be large enough to allow all the nonfaulty frames needed for recovery.

To illustrate the concept of recovery paths, we refer to figure 13 again. Suppose the output of T_2 is voted at the end of frame 1. Then two recovery paths for T_7 are possible: $\langle T_5, T_7 \rangle$ and $\langle T_4, T_6, T_7 \rangle$.

Since multiple recovery paths may emanate backward from a target cell, it is natural to consider sets of recovery paths. In our case, it will suffice to define the set of path lengths corresponding to all recovery paths for a cell c . We use $\text{path_len_set}(c, \text{fr}, H)$ to define the set of lengths for all paths needed to recover cell c in frame fr after H healthy frames have transpired.


```

path_len_set : FUNCTION[cell, frame_cntr, nat → finite_set[nat]] =
  (λ c, fr, H → finite_set[nat] :
    (λ len : (∃ path : cell_rec_path(path, len, c, fr, H))))

```

Finally, we note the definition for a cyclic path, which is simply a path in which a cell appears more than once.

```

cyclic_path : FUNCTION[path_type, nat → bool] =
  (λ path, len : duplicates(path, len))

```

4.1.3 Full Recovery Condition

With the preceding concepts about task graphs in hand, we may now introduce the full recovery condition and its supporting definitions. First we define a pair of simple operations for doing modular arithmetic on frame counter values. Functions `mod_plus` and `mod_minus` perform addition and subtraction modulo the constant `schedule_length`.

```

mod_plus : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, frame_cntr → frame_cntr] =
  (λ mm, ll → frame_cntr :
    IF mm + ll ≥ schedule_length
      THEN mm + ll - schedule_length
      ELSE mm + ll END)

mod_minus : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, frame_cntr → frame_cntr] =
  (λ mm, ll → frame_cntr :
    IF mm ≥ ll THEN mm - ll ELSE schedule_length - ll + mm END)

```

The function `mod_minus` is used, in turn, to define the notion of when one frame is “between” two others. If we envision the frame counter values 0 to `schedule_length - 1` forming a circular progression of values, with 0 following `schedule_length - 1` in “wrap-around” fashion, then the values between two points a and b carve out an arc of the circle. Any point within that arc will be between a and b . The points in the complementary arc lie between b and a . If the distance along the arc from a to a point p is less than the distance from a to b , then p lies between a and b .

```

between_frames : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, frame_cntr, frame_cntr → bool] =
  (λ a, fr, b : mod_minus(fr, a) < mod_minus(b, a))

```

The predicate `between_frames` is actually a half-open test; fr may equal a but not b .

Now it is possible to express when the output of a task at a given cell is voted in a way that is useful to the receiving task. Specifically, if the output of cell d is scheduled to be voted after it is computed and before it is consumed by cell c , then we know c will be using a recovered value for d .

```

output_voted : FUNCTION[cell, cell, frame_cntr → bool] =
  (λ d, c, fr :
    v_sched(fr, d)
    ^
    (between_frames(cell_frame(d), fr, cell_frame(c))
     ∨ cell_frame(d) = cell_frame(c)))

```

This predicate allows for the special case where d and c are scheduled for execution in the same frame. Since we are only concerned with paths through G^* , where there are no edges from one cell to a later one within the same frame, we conclude that it suffices to vote d during any frame. This follows because the value for c must come from `schedule.length` frames in the past.

The main criterion needed to ensure full recovery of all cell states is that for each cyclic path in the graph G^* , there must exist at least one valid vote site, that is, a pair of adjacent cells in the path satisfying the `output_voted` predicate. The predicate `cycles_voted` expresses this requirement for all paths and all pairs of path indices k and l delimiting a cyclic subpath. For each such subpath there must exist an interior cell with its output properly voted.

```

cycles_voted : FUNCTION[path_type, nat → bool] =
  (λ path, len :
    (∀ k, l :
      k < l ∧ l < len ∧ path(k) = path(l)
      ⊃ (∃ q, fr :
        k ≤ q ∧ q < l ∧ output_voted(path(q), path(q + 1), fr))))

```

Note that this definition implies that where there are no cyclic paths in G^* , there is no need for any voting whatsoever.

Our final statement of the full recovery condition is the following axiom.

```

full_recovery_condition : AXIOM
  input_path(path, len, c) ⊃ cycles_voted(path, len)

```

For all cells c and every path of G^* ending at cell c , the cycles on that path must be “voted,” that is, contain at least one vote site.

As an illustration of this condition, consider again the example graph G^* depicted in figure 13. There is only one cycle in this graph, consisting of the cells for tasks T_2 , T_4 , T_6 , and T_7 . Voting any one of those cells in the frame in which it is scheduled for computation will suffice to meet the full recovery condition. Since each one has its output consumed in the immediately following frame, it is not possible to vote the cells in any other frames and still satisfy `output_voted`. Notice how it would be useless to vote the output of either T_1 or T_3 since they lie on no cycles in G^* , even though they are part of the cycle from the original graph G in figure 6.

4.1.4 Time to Recovery

To carry out the proofs for the minimal voting scheme it is necessary to characterize the maximum time needed to recover a cell, where time is measured in number of frames. Our basic mechanism for doing this is a recursive function that traverses paths through the graph G^* in reverse order, much the same as was done with the function `cell_rec_path`. Since this function must be well-defined even if the full recovery condition fails to hold, we need a starting value to supply for the recursive argument H that exceeds the maximum number of frames that could possibly be required if full recovery is assured. This allows the recursion to terminate even when the `full_recovery_condition` is not met.

The constant `max_rec_frames` serves this purpose. Its value was chosen to exceed the maximum possible number of frames needed to recover a cell.

$$\text{max_rec_frames} : \text{nat} = \text{schedule_length} * (\text{num_cells} + 1) + 1$$

The rationale for the value chosen is that `num_cells` is the maximum length of an acyclic path through the graph G^* and `schedule_length` is the maximum number of frames that can transpire for any edge of the graph. Therefore, their product is the maximum time, in frames, of an acyclic path. Add to that another `schedule_length` frames to account for the maximum latency between when a cell is scheduled for execution and an arbitrary frame. The result is a conservative upper bound on the time to recover a cell when the `full_recovery_condition` holds.

The recursive function used to count frames to recovery is called `NF_cell_rec`. Its formalization is somewhat unusual due to a need to take the maximum over a set of values collected from recursive calls of the function. An intermediate function called `rec_set` is provided to aid this process. Note that `rec_set` is a higher-order function; it takes a functional argument of the following type.

$$\text{cell_nat_fn} : \text{TYPE} = \text{FUNCTION}[\text{cell} \rightarrow \text{nat}]$$

With f a function of this type, `rec_set(f , c)` returns a set of nats constructed as follows. The value a is a member of the set iff there exists another cell d providing input to c and $a = f(d)$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rec_set} : \text{FUNCTION}[\text{cell_nat_fn}, \text{cell} \rightarrow \text{finite_set}[\text{nat}]] = \\ (\lambda \text{cnfn}, c \rightarrow \text{finite_set}[\text{nat}] : \\ (\lambda a : \\ (\exists d : \text{cell_input_frame}(d, c) \wedge a = \text{cnfn}(d)) \wedge a \leq \text{max_rec_frames})) \end{aligned}$$

The additional conjunct $a \leq \text{max_rec_frames}$ is used to ensure the resulting set is finite. Thus, `rec_set` yields a method of applying f to all cells that send inputs to c and collecting the results of these applications into a set. In practice, the actual argument for f will be a λ -expression based on recursive calls to `NF_cell_rec`.

Now `NF_cell_rec(c , fr , H)` can be defined using the intermediate function `rec_set`. If c was voted in the previous frame, the recovery time is one frame. Otherwise, determine whether c was due to execute in the previous frame. If so, return one plus the maximum recovery time computed for recursive calls over all input-producing cells d . If c did not execute last frame, simply evaluate the function recursively for the same cell c and add one frame.

```

NF_cell_rec : RECURSIVE FUNCTION[cell, frame_cntr, nat → nat] =
  (λ c, fr, H :
    IF H = 0 THEN 0 ELSE
      IF v_sched(prev_fr(fr), c)
        THEN 1
        ELSE
          IF cell_frame(c) = prev_fr(fr)
            THEN
              max(rec_set((λ d : NF_cell_rec(d, prev_fr(fr), H - 1)), c)) + 1
            ELSE NF_cell_rec(c, prev_fr(fr), H - 1) + 1 END
          END
        END)
    BY (λ c, fr, H : H)

```

This definition assumes that fr is the current frame and we wish to be able to use a recovered value for c at the beginning of that frame, hence the use of tests on the previous frame.

Given this function, what remains is to collect all values together and take their maximum. Accordingly, the constant `all_rec_set` is defined to be the set of all nats that correspond to a recovery time for some cell and some frame. Taking the maximum over this set yields the greatest time required to recover any cell from any point in the schedule.

```

all_rec_set : finite_set[nat] =
  (λ a : (∃ c, fr : a = NF_cell_rec(c, fr, max_rec_frames)))

recovery_period : nat = 2 + max(all_rec_set)

```

The recovery period is defined to be two frames larger than `all_rec_set` to account for the one frame needed to vote the control state (frame counter) before any recovery actions can be relied upon and the off-by-one effect caused by counting the current frame.

4.2 DA_minv Definitions

The RS layer of RCP was shown to achieve transient fault recovery by assuming a generic set of functions describing recovery concepts and a set of axioms governing task behavior. These functions and axioms are found in the EHDM module `generic_FT`. In the `DA_minv` layer, these functions have been elaborated, although only partially in some cases, and proofs are provided for the axioms. The functions in question are f_s , f_v , `recv`, and `dep`.

To model the selection of a subset of cell states for broadcast and voting, the uninterpreted function f_s was introduced. Although its full interpretation appears at the LE layer of RCP, it is further axiomatized in the `DA_minv` layer in terms that relate the various state components in use at this level. In essence, f_s relates the values returned by `cebuf`, which extracts elements from a mailbox, to the current values of corresponding cell states. There is also a control state component accessed via `cnbuf`. While f_s remains uninterpreted in `DA_minv`, the following axioms are provided to further its elaboration.

f_s : FUNCTION[Pstate \rightarrow MB]

f_s_ax : AXIOM

IF v_sched(frame(ps.control), cc)
THEN cebuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cells(ps.memry, cc)
ELSE cebuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cs0(cc) END

f_s_control_ax : AXIOM cnbuf(f_s(ps)) = ps.control

Only cells scheduled to be voted in the current frame have their cell states mapped into the mailbox value produced by f_s . Unvoted cells are assigned a default cell state value if accessed using cebuf.

Turning to the voting effects function, f_v is likewise uninterpreted in DA_minv and further constrained by an axiom. To specify precisely the voted cell states, we provide a support function that recursively applies a function to each mailbox slot and cell state, and accumulates the result. The function cell_apply applies its functional argument for each voted cell, in order, to the cumulative memory state it computes.

cell_apply : RECURSIVE

FUNCTION[cell_fn, control_state, memory, nat \rightarrow memory] =
(λ cfn, K, C, k :
IF $k = 0 \vee k > \text{num_cells}$ THEN C ELSE
IF v_sched(frame(K), k - 1)
THEN
write_cell(cell_apply(cfn, K, C, k - 1), k - 1, cfn(k - 1))
ELSE cell_apply(cfn, K, C, k - 1) END
END)
BY (λ cfn, K, C, k : k)

Only when a vote is scheduled for a given cell is the cell function applied and the memory overwritten. Otherwise, the existing value for that cell state is retained.

An axiom for f_v specifies the proper resulting value for a vote operation. The control state portion is voted in every frame. The cell states are selectively voted and overwritten according to the process specified in the cell_apply function.

f_v : FUNCTION[Pstate, MBvec \rightarrow Pstate]

f_v_ax : AXIOM

f_v(ps, w).control = k_maj(w)
 \wedge f_v(ps, w).memry
= cell_apply((λ c : t_maj(w, c)), ps.control, ps.memry, num_cells)

If no cells are scheduled for voting in a certain frame, all the cell states will be unchanged by f_v . However, the control state value will always be voted (and potentially changed).

For every application-specific transient fault recovery scheme to be used with RCP, we must be able to determine when individual state components have been recovered. This

condition is expressed in terms of the current control state and the number of nonfaulty frames since the last transient fault. The uninterpreted function `recv` was introduced in module `generic_FT` for this purpose. A recursive definition is now provided.

The predicate `recv(c, K, H)` is true iff cell c 's state should have been recovered when in control state K with healthy frame count H . We use a healthy count of one to indicate that the current frame is nonfaulty, but the previous frame was faulty. This means that $H - 1$ healthy frames have occurred prior to the current one.

```

recv : RECURSIVE FUNCTION[cell, control_state, nat → bool] =
  (λ c, K, H :
    IF H ≤ 2 THEN false ELSE
      v_sched(frame(pred(K)), c)
      ∨ IF cell.frame(c) = frame(pred(K))
        THEN (∀ d : cell_input.frame(d, c) ⊃ recv(d, pred(K), H - 1))
        ELSE recv(c, pred(K), H - 1) END
    END)
  BY (λ c, K, H : H)

```

Cell c should be considered recovered if one of three conditions holds:

1. c was voted in the previous frame.
2. c was computed in the previous frame and all inputs to c in G^* were recovered in that frame.
3. c was not computed in the previous frame and was considered recovered in that frame.

As before, we test against the previous frame because we would like `recv` to describe the situation at the beginning of the current frame.

The predicate `dep(c, d, K)` indicates that cell c 's value in the next state depends on cell d 's value in the current state, when in control state K . This notion of dependency is different from the notion of computational dependency; it determines which cells need to be recovered in the current frame on the recovering processor for cell c 's value to be considered recovered at the end of the current frame.

```

dep : FUNCTION[cell, cell, control_state → bool] =
  (λ c, d, K :
    ¬ v_sched(frame(K), c)
    ∧ IF cell.frame(c) = frame(K)
      THEN cell_input.frame(d, c)
      ELSE c = d END)

```

If cell c is voted during K , or its computation takes only sensor inputs, there is no dependency. If c is not computed during K , c depends only on its own previous value. Otherwise, c depends on one or more cells for its new value, namely, those cells connected by an edge in G^* .

Two utility functions are used in the subsequent presentation that we describe here. First, `cells_match` states the simple condition that all cell components of the memories of two `Pstate` values are equal. Second, `dep_agree` specifies a similar condition, that the subset of cells that c depends on all match for two `Pstate` values.

cells_match : FUNCTION[Pstate, Pstate, cell → bool] =
 $(\lambda X, Y, c : \text{cells}(X.\text{memry}, c) = \text{cells}(Y.\text{memry}, c))$

dep_agree : FUNCTION[cell, control_state, Pstate, Pstate → bool] =
 $(\lambda c, K, X, Y : (\forall d : \text{dep}(c, d, K) \supset \text{f.t}(X, d) = \text{f.t}(Y, d)))$

One final axiom we need to describe concerns a constraint on the `cell_input` function and its relationship to the task execution function `exec_task`. The axiom `cell_input_constraint` requires that for two `Pstate` values X and Y , and a cell c , the result of executing c against both X and Y produces the same cell state provided all cell states used as input by c likewise match in X and Y .

cell_input_constraint : AXIOM
 $X.\text{control} = Y.\text{control}$
 $\wedge \text{sched_cell}(\text{frame}(X.\text{control}), q) = c$
 $\wedge (\forall d : \text{cell_input}(d, c) \supset \text{cells_match}(X, Y, d))$
 $\supset \text{cells_match}(\text{exec_task}(u, X, q), \text{exec_task}(u, Y, q), c)$

A similar property based on the derived function `cell_input_frame` and applicable to the graph G^* has been asserted as the lemma `cell_input_frame_lem` and proved using the axiom above.

4.3 DA_minv Proof Obligations

The proof obligations generated by mapping the DA layer onto the `DA_minv` layer stem from the axioms of the `generic_FT` module. By proving these obligations we establish that the minimal voting scheme embodied in the EHDM specifications discussed thus far achieves full recovery from transient faults within `recovery_period` frames. We will present an overview of some of these proofs in the following sections.

recovery_period_ax : OBLIGATION $\text{recovery_period} \geq 2$

succ_ax : OBLIGATION $\text{f.k}(\text{f.n}(\text{ps})) = \text{succ}(\text{f.k}(\text{ps}))$

control_nc : OBLIGATION $\text{f.k}(\text{f.c}(u, \text{ps})) = \text{f.k}(\text{ps})$

cells_nc : OBLIGATION $\text{f.t}(\text{f.n}(\text{ps}), c) = \text{f.t}(\text{ps}, c)$

full_recovery : OBLIGATION $H \geq \text{recovery_period} \supset \text{recv}(c, K, H)$

initial_recovery : OBLIGATION $\text{recv}(c, K, H) \supset H > 2$

dep_recovery : OBLIGATION
 $\text{recv}(c, \text{succ}(K), H + 1) \wedge \text{dep}(c, d, K) \supset \text{recv}(d, K, H)$

components_equal : OBLIGATION
 $\text{f.k}(X) = \text{f.k}(Y) \wedge (\forall c : \text{f.t}(X, c) = \text{f.t}(Y, c)) \supset X = Y$

control_recovered : OBLIGATION

maj_condition(A) $\wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = \text{f.s}(\text{ps}))$
 $\supset \text{f.k}(\text{f.v}(Y, w)) = \text{f.k}(\text{ps})$

cell_recovered : OBLIGATION

maj_condition(A)
 $\wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = \text{f.s}(\text{f.c}(u, \text{ps})))$
 $\wedge \text{f.k}(X) = K \wedge \text{f.k}(\text{ps}) = K \wedge \text{dep_agree}(c, K, X, \text{ps})$
 $\supset \text{f.t}(\text{f.v}(\text{f.c}(u, X), w), c) = \text{f.t}(\text{f.c}(u, \text{ps}), c)$

vote_maj : OBLIGATION

maj_condition(A) $\wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset w(p) = \text{f.s}(\text{ps}))$
 $\supset \text{f.v}(\text{ps}, w) = \text{ps}$

4.4 Top-Level EHDM Proof for DA_minv

We show below the EHDM proof statements for the obligations presented in the previous section. Most of the proofs are simple, requiring only the invocation of function definitions and a few minor lemmas. Two of the proofs require more substantial effort. The proof of `cell_recovered` is of moderate complexity and requires several lemmas for support. This proof will be outlined in the next section. The proof of `full_recovery`, encapsulated here via the lemma `full_rec`, is very complex and requires the formulation and proof of a large collection of supporting lemmas. This proof will be outlined in the next section as well.

p_recovery_period_ax : PROVE recovery_period_ax FROM recovery_period_min

p_succ_ax : PROVE succ_ax FROM f_n

p_control_nc : PROVE control_nc FROM f_c

p_cells_nc : PROVE cells_nc FROM f_n

p_components_equal : PROVE components_equal {c ← c@p1}
FROM
memory_equal {C ← X.memry, D ← Y.memry},
Pstate_extensionality {Pstate.r1 ← X, Pstate.r2 ← Y}

p_full_recovery : PROVE full_recovery FROM full_rec

p_initial_recovery : PROVE initial_recovery FROM recv

p_dep_recovery : PROVE dep_recovery
FROM recv {K ← succ(K), H ← H@c + 1}, dep, pred_succ_ax

p_control_recovered : PROVE control_recovered {p ← p@p1}
FROM
k_maj_ax {K ← ps.control}, f_v_ax {ps ← Y, w ← w}, f_s_control_ax


```

p_cell_recovered : PROVE cell_recovered {p ← p@p1}
FROM
  t_maj_ax {cs ← cebuf(f_s(f_c(u, ps)), c)},
  cell_input_frame_lem {Y ← ps},
  cells_match {Y ← ps, c ← d@p2},
  cells_match {X ← f_c(u, X), Y ← f_c(u, ps)},
  f_v_components {ps ← f_c(u, X)},
  dep_agree {Y ← ps, d ← d@p2},
  dep_agree {Y ← ps, d ← c},
  dep {d ← d@p2},
  dep {d ← c},
  f_s_ax {ps ← f_c(u, ps), cc ← c},
  f_c_uncomputed_cells {X ← ps},
  f_c_uncomputed_cells,
  f_c {ps ← X},
  f_c

```

```

p_vote_maj : PROVE vote_maj {p ← p@p4}
FROM
  components_equal {X ← f_v(ps, w), Y ← ps},
  k_maj_ax {K ← ps.control},
  t_maj_ax {cs ← cells(ps.memry, c@p1), c ← c@p1},
  w_condition,
  w_condition {p ← p@p2},
  w_condition {p ← p@p3},
  f_s_ax {cc ← c@p1},
  f_s_control_ax,
  f_v_components {c ← c@p1}

```

4.5 Proof Summaries

We now focus our attention on summaries of two lines of proof. One is a proof of the obligation `cell_recovered` and the other a proof of the obligation `full_recovery`.

4.5.1 Proof of `cell_recovered`

The `cell_recovered` obligation states conditions under which task computation and voting will produce correct values for cell states at the end of the current frame, given that appropriate cells had correct values at the beginning of the frame. In this case, being recovered means that cell states agree with a majority consensus of the processors.

```

cell_recovered : OBLIGATION
maj_condition(A)
  ∧ (∀ p : member(p, A) ⊃ w(p) = f_s(f_c(u, ps)))
  ∧ f_k(X) = K ∧ f_k(ps) = K ∧ dep_agree(c, K, X, ps)
  ⊃ f_t(f_v(f_c(u, X), w), c) = f_t(f_c(u, ps), c)

```

Proving this obligation is a matter of accounting for the effects of the task computation function f_c and the voting function f_v . Applying the definitions of various functions in the formula and invoking the following lemma about f_v produces two cases to consider based on whether c is scheduled for voting in the current frame.

f_v_components : LEMMA
 $f.k(f.v(ps, w)) = k.maj(w)$
 $\wedge f.t(f.v(ps, w), c)$
 $= \text{IF } v.sched(\text{frame}(ps.control), c)$
 $\text{ THEN } t.maj(w, c) \text{ ELSE } cells(ps.memry, c) \text{ END}$

A second case split is involved based on whether c is scheduled for execution in the current frame. If $cell_frame(c) = \text{frame}(X.control)$, we apply the following lemma

cell_input_frame_lem : LEMMA
 $X.control = Y.control$
 $\wedge cell_frame(c) = \text{frame}(X.control)$
 $\wedge (\forall d : cell_input_frame(d, c) \supset cells_match(X, Y, d))$
 $\supset cells_match(f.c(u, X), f.c(u, Y), c)$

to deduce when cells should match after computation. If $cell_frame(c) \neq \text{frame}(X.control)$, we apply a different lemma,

f_c_uncomputed_cells : LEMMA
 $cell_frame(c) \neq \text{frame}(X.control)$
 $\supset cells((f.c(u, X)).memry, c) = cells(X.memry, c)$

to deduce that c 's cell state has not changed.

The proof, including the case splitting mentioned above, is carried out with a single EHDM proof directive. Proving the lemmas themselves is straightforward. Only `cell_input_frame_lem` requires moderate effort. This lemma is proved by complete induction on subframe number, working from c 's subframe back toward the beginning of the frame. Several supporting lemmas are used in the proof of `cell_input_frame_lem`.

4.5.2 Proof of full_recovery

The property called `full_recovery` formalizes the essence of RCP's transient fault recovery mechanism. Its proof is the heart of the minimal voting proof.

full_recovery : OBLIGATION $H \geq \text{recovery_period} \supset \text{recv}(c, K, H)$

This formula states that if given enough time after experiencing a transient fault, eventually a processor should recover all elements of its cell state by voting state information it has exchanged with other processors. This formula is based on properties of the schedule and task graph only; it does not deal with actual state value changes. Other portions of the `generic_FT` obligations, such as `cell_recovered`, are responsible for those effects. "Enough time" in this

case is expressed by the constant `recovery_period`, which is the maximum number of frames required to recover an arbitrary cell from an arbitrary starting point within the schedule. Recovery of a cell is formalized through the function `recv`, which was discussed in section 4.2.

We begin by giving a very brief proof sketch for the `full_recovery` property. First note that it suffices to show `recv(c, K, recovery_period)`, from which `recv(c, K, H)` will follow for larger values of H . The constant `recovery_period` is defined in terms of the maximum value of `NF_cell_rec(c, fr, max_rec_frames)` for any c and fr . `NF_cell_rec` effectively traces paths backwards through G^* until a vote site or a node with no inputs is reached. The `full_recovery_condition` ensures that every cycle of G^* is cut by a vote site, thereby forcing each path traced by `NF_cell_rec` to be acyclic. The maximum number of frames taken by the longest possible acyclic path in G^* can be determined and is used to bound the path length and hence the value returned by `NF_cell_rec`. This, in turn, ensures that `recovery_period` is a bound on the worst case recovery time.

Now we turn to a more detailed presentation of the `full_recovery` proof. A lemma `full_rec` was provided that has the same formula as `full_recovery`, so our goal is to prove `full_rec`.

full_rec : LEMMA $H \geq \text{recovery_period} \supset \text{recv}(c, K, H)$

This lemma is readily proved by induction on H by appealing to the lemma:

full_rec_rp : LEMMA $\text{recv}(c, K, \text{recovery_period})$

Thus, once full recovery has been achieved it remains in effect as long as the processor remains nonfaulty.

The proof of `full_rec_rp` is obtained by invoking the lemma

NF_cell_rec_recv : LEMMA

$\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{frame}(K), k) \leq H \wedge H < k \wedge k \leq \text{max_rec_frames}$
 $\supset \text{recv}(c, K, H + 2)$

with substitutions $H = \max(\text{all_rec_set})$ and $k = \text{max_rec_frames}$. Noting that `recovery_period` = $\max(\text{all_rec_set}) + 2$, we are left to establish:

$\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{frame}(K), \text{max_rec_frames}) \leq \max(\text{all_rec_set}) \wedge$ (1)
 $\max(\text{all_rec_set}) < \text{max_rec_frames}$

The first conjunct of formula 1 follows by the definition of `all_rec_set` given in section 4.1.4. The second conjunct can be obtained by first noting that for some c' and K' ,

$\text{NF_cell_rec}(c', \text{frame}(K'), \text{max_rec_frames}) = \max(\text{all_rec_set})$ (2)

and then invoking the lemma

NF_cell_rec_bound_2 : LEMMA

$\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, fr, \text{max_rec_frames}) < \text{max_rec_frames}$




Figure 14: Proof tree for `NF_cell_rec_bound.2`.

with substitutions $c = c'$ and $fr = \text{frame}(K')$.

At this point, the proof of `full_rec` has been broken into two main branches based on the lemmas `NF_cell_rec_rcv` and `NF_cell_rec_bound.2`. In the first branch, `NF_cell_rec_rcv` is proved by induction on H with the aid of several minor lemmas and the following property of `NF_cell_rec`:

$$\text{bound_NF_cell_rec} : \text{LEMMA } \text{NF_cell_rec}(c, fr, H) \leq H$$

This lemma asserts that the count returned by `NF_cell_rec` may not exceed H because that is the point at which the recursion will “bottom out.” If the count equals H , then recovery has not been achieved in the number of frames allotted. Conversely, when the count is less than H , we know that all the recovery paths have terminated before running out of nonfaulty frames. Induction on H is the technique used to prove `bound_NF_cell_rec`.

The other main branch of the `full_rec` proof focuses on establishing the strict inequality `NF_cell_rec_bound.2`. This process requires many steps. Figure 14 shows the overall proof tree and the principal lemmas needed to carry out the proof. Several minor lemmas used along the way are not shown in the diagram. In addition, some lemmas require proof by induction, which we usually factor into several smaller steps by formulating a few intermediate lemmas that follow a stylized approach to induction proofs.

Since the condition $\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, fr, H) < H$ implies that cell c will be recovered within H frames, the lemma $\text{NF_cell_rec_bound_2}$ states that all cells will be recovered within time max_rec_frames . This is shown by appealing to the lemma $\text{NF_cell_rec_bound_1}$,

NF_cell_rec_bound_1 : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned} H &\leq \text{max_rec_frames} \\ &\supset \text{NF_cell_rec}(c, fr, H) \\ &\leq \text{max}(\text{path_len_set}(c, fr, H)) * \text{schedule_length} + \text{schedule_length} \end{aligned}$$

and the lemma $\text{max_path_len_bound}$,

$$\text{max_path_len_bound : LEMMA } \text{max}(\text{path_len_set}(c, fr, H)) \leq \text{num_cells}$$

with the substitution $H = \text{max_rec_frames}$. Recalling the value of constant max_rec_frames as $\text{schedule_length} * (\text{num_cells} + 1) + 1$, it follows from the two bounds that

$$\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, fr, \text{max_rec_frames}) < \text{max_rec_frames} \quad (3)$$

and this completes the proof of $\text{NF_cell_rec_bound_2}$.

The proof of $\text{NF_cell_rec_bound_1}$ is a straightforward application of induction with the help of several low-level lemmas. Since the proof involves a fair amount of arithmetic reasoning, a few lemmas were formulated to deal with the presence of the multiplication operator. This helped overcome the limitations of the EHDm decision procedures. On the right-hand side of figure 14, the lemma $\text{max_path_len_bound}$ follows directly from the definition of path_len_set and another bounding lemma:

path_len_bound : LEMMA

$$\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, fr, H) \supset \text{len} \leq \text{num_cells}$$

Now we have reduced the overall proof to establishing that a recovery path is no longer than the number of cells in a schedule. This can be deduced easily from the acyclic property of recovery paths,

cell_rec_path_acyclic : LEMMA

$$\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, fr, H) \supset \neg \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len})$$

and the contrapositive of the following sufficient condition for the presence of a cyclic path:

$$\text{long_path_cyclic : LEMMA } \text{len} > \text{num_cells} \supset \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len})$$

Thus, we once again have a two-way branch in our main proof. The acyclic property of recovery paths, $\text{cell_rec_path_acyclic}$, is proved by first applying a lemma about path types,

cell_rec_input_path : LEMMA

$$\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, fr, H) \supset \text{input_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c)$$

to deduce:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \wedge \text{input_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c) \\ & \supset \neg \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Now invoking the `full_recovery_condition` from section 4.1.3 leaves us with:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \wedge \text{cycles_voted}(\text{path}, \text{len}) \\ & \supset \neg \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}) \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

Another forward chaining step using the following absence of voting property for recovery paths,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{path_outputs_not_voted} : \text{LEMMA} \\ & \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \\ & \supset (\forall q, \text{ff} : \\ & \quad 0 < q \wedge q < \text{len} \supset \neg \text{output_voted}(\text{path}(q-1), \text{path}(q), \text{ff})) \end{aligned}$$

results in the formula:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \wedge \text{cycles_voted}(\text{path}, \text{len}) \wedge \\ & (\forall q, \text{ff} : \\ & \quad 0 < q \wedge q < \text{len} \supset \neg \text{output_voted}(\text{path}(q-1), \text{path}(q), \text{ff})) \\ & \supset \neg \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}) \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Formula 6 now follows from the definitions involved because if none of the outputs along the path is voted, and all cyclic paths must have voted outputs, then the path cannot be cyclic. This completes the proof of `cell_rec_path_acyclic`.

Finally, the remaining branch of the main proof is concerned with showing that the sufficient condition for cyclic paths, `long_path_cyclic`, is true. Intuitively, it seems that if a path is longer than the number of distinct cells, duplicates must exist. Nevertheless, the formal proof of such a statement involves a moderate amount of effort to carry out. In our case, the bulk of the work has been encapsulated in the form of a general theory for the Pigeonhole Principle, described in more detail in the next section. This principle states that if we have n objects drawn from a set having k distinct elements, where $n > k$, then there must exist duplicates among the n objects. Proving `long_path_cyclic` is now a simple matter of applying this principle,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{pigeonhole_duplicates} : \text{LEMMA} \\ & \text{len} > q \wedge \text{bounded_elements}(\text{nlist}, \text{len}, q) \supset \text{duplicates}(\text{nlist}, \text{len}) \end{aligned}$$

with substitutions $\text{nlist} = \text{path}$, $\text{len} = \text{len}$, and $q = \text{num_cells}$. Employing the definition of `bounded_elements` (presented in section 4.6) and the definition of `cyclic_path` (presented in section 4.1.2) completes the proof of `long_path_cyclic`.

We have described the overall proof of the `full_recovery` obligation in moderate detail. Complete details are found in the EHDm modules for the `DA_minv` layer.

4.6 Pigeonhole Principle

The proof of `full_recovery` relies on a formal statement of the pigeonhole principle. We present below an excerpt from the EHDM module `nat_pigeonholes` that captures the essential parts of this formalization. This module expresses its properties in terms of a finite list of natural numbers. Arguments to the functions take the form of a `nat_list`, which is a mapping from `nats` to `nats`, and a length.

A function `duplicates` expresses the condition of a `nat_list` having at least one duplicate element. The predicate `bounded_elements` allows one to state that all elements of the list are less than some bounding number.

```
duplicates : FUNCTION[nat_list, nat → bool] =
  (λ nlist, len : (∃ k, l : k < l ∧ l < len ∧ nlist(k) = nlist(l)))
```

```
bounded_elements : FUNCTION[nat_list, nat, nat → bool] =
  (λ nlist, len, lmax : (∀ q : q < len ⊃ nlist(q) < lmax))
```

The number of occurrences of a particular number in a list is counted by the function `occurrences`. The predicate `bounded_occurrences` states the condition that the occurrence count for each possible value in a list is no greater than a specified bound.

```
occurrences : RECURSIVE FUNCTION[nat_list, nat, nat → nat] =
  (λ nlist, len, a :
    IF len = 0
      THEN 0
    ELSIF a = nlist(len - 1) THEN occurrences(nlist, len - 1, a) + 1
    ELSE occurrences(nlist, len - 1, a) END)
  BY (λ nlist, len, a : len)
```

```
bounded_occurrences : FUNCTION[nat_list, nat, nat → bool] =
  (λ nlist, len, b : (∀ a : occurrences(nlist, len, a) ≤ b))
```

Three lemmas involving these functions are shown below. The first version of the pigeonhole principle is expressed in terms of simple duplicates, i.e., the occurrence bound is one. This is the version used in the proof of the `full_recovery` obligation. A generalized version of the principle is provided as well.

```
pigeonhole_duplicates : LEMMA
  len > q ∧ bounded_elements(nlist, len, q) ⊃ duplicates(nlist, len)
```

```
pigeonhole_general : LEMMA
  len > k * q ∧ bounded_elements(nlist, len, q)
  ⊃ ¬ bounded_occurrences(nlist, len, k)
```

```
dup_bnd_occ : LEMMA
  duplicates(nlist, len) ⇔ ¬ bounded_occurrences(nlist, len, 1)
```

4.7 Primary Lemmas

The primary lemmas used to prove the DA_minv obligations are collected and displayed below. There are a number of other lemmas used in the proofs not shown here, but these are lower-level lemmas or formulas introduced merely to break up induction proofs into several manageable cases. All those lemmas cited in the foregoing presentation are included in this section. All lemmas shown have been proved within EHDM.

cell_apply_element : LEMMA

cells(cell_apply(cfn, K, C, num_cells), c)
 = IF v_sched(frame(K), c)
 THEN cfn(c) ELSE cells(C, c) END

f.v.components : LEMMA

f_k(f.v(ps, w)) = k_maj(w)
 ∧ f.t(f.v(ps, w), c)
 = IF v_sched(frame(ps.control), c)
 THEN t_maj(w, c) ELSE cells(ps.memry, c) END

f.c.uncomputed_cells : LEMMA

cell_frame(c) ≠ frame(X.control)
 ⊃ cells((f.c(u, X)).memry, c) = cells(X.memry, c)

**exec_element_2 : LEMMA LET K := ps.control, k := cell_subframe(c)
 IN**

q ≤ num_subframes(frame(K))
 ⊃ cells(exec(u, ps, q).memry, c)
 = IF k < q ∧ cell_frame(c) = frame(K)
 THEN cells(exec_task(u, exec(u, ps, k), k).memry, c)
 ELSE cells(ps.memry, c) END

cell_input_frame_lem : LEMMA

X.control = Y.control
 ∧ cell_frame(c) = frame(X.control)
 ∧ (∀ d : cell_input_frame(d, c) ⊃ cells_match(X, Y, d))
 ⊃ cells_match(f.c(u, X), f.c(u, Y), c)

NF_cell_rec_equiv : LEMMA

¬ v_sched(prev_fr(fr), c) ∧ cell_frame(c) = prev_fr(fr)
 ⊃ NF_cell_rec(c, fr, k + 1)
 = 1 + max(NF_rec_set(NF_cell_rec, c, prev_fr(fr), k))

full_rec : LEMMA H ≥ recovery_period ⊃ recv(c, K, H)

full_rec_rp : LEMMA recv(c, K, recovery_period)

bound_NF_cell_rec : LEMMA $\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{fr}, H) \leq H$

bound_cell_rec_path : LEMMA $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \supset \text{len} \leq H$

NF_cell_rec_nonzero : LEMMA $k > 0 \supset \text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{fr}, k) > 0$

NF_rec_set_nonempty : LEMMA
 $\text{cell_input_frame}(d, c) \wedge k \leq \text{max_rec_frames}$
 $\supset \neg \text{empty}(\text{NF_rec_set}(\text{NF_cell_rec}, c, \text{fr}, k))$

NF_cell_rec_rcv : LEMMA
 $\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{frame}(K), k) \leq H \wedge H < k \wedge k \leq \text{max_rec_frames}$
 $\supset \text{rcv}(c, K, H + 2)$

long_path_cyclic : LEMMA $\text{len} > \text{num_cells} \supset \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len})$

cell_rec_input_path : LEMMA
 $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \supset \text{input_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c)$

cell_rec_path_acyclic : LEMMA
 $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \supset \neg \text{cyclic_path}(\text{path}, \text{len})$

NF_cell_rec_bound_1 : LEMMA
 $H \leq \text{max_rec_frames}$
 $\supset \text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\leq \text{max}(\text{path_len_set}(c, \text{fr}, H)) * \text{schedule_length} + \text{schedule_length}$

NF_cell_rec_bound_2 : LEMMA
 $\text{NF_cell_rec}(c, \text{fr}, \text{max_rec_frames}) < \text{max_rec_frames}$

path_len_bound : LEMMA
 $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H) \supset \text{len} \leq \text{num_cells}$

cell_rec_path_exists : LEMMA
 $(\exists \text{path}, \text{len} : \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H))$

max_path_len_bound : LEMMA $\text{max}(\text{path_len_set}(c, \text{fr}, H)) \leq \text{num_cells}$

path_outputs_not_voted : LEMMA
 $\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\supset (\forall q, \text{ff} :$
 $0 < q \wedge q < \text{len} \supset \neg \text{output_voted}(\text{path}(q - 1), \text{path}(q), \text{ff}))$

path_cells_not_voted : LEMMA
 $\text{len} > 0 \wedge \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\supset (\forall \text{ff} :$
 $(\text{between_frames}(\text{cell_frame}(c), \text{ff}, \text{fr}) \vee \text{fr} = \text{cell_frame}(c))$
 $\supset \neg \text{v_sched}(\text{ff}, c))$

last_cell_not_voted : LEMMA

$\text{len} > 1 \wedge \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\supset (\forall \text{ff} : \neg \text{output_voted}(\text{path}(\text{len} - 2), \text{path}(\text{len} - 1), \text{ff}))$

last_cell_condition : LEMMA

$\text{len} > 0 \wedge \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\supset c = \text{path}(\text{len} - 1) \wedge ((\exists d : \text{cell_input_frame}(d, c)) \vee \text{len} = 1)$

next_cell_condition : LEMMA

$\text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H)$
 $\supset (\forall e : \text{cell_rec_path}(\text{path WITH } [(\text{len}) := e], \text{len}, c, \text{fr}, H))$

input_path_zero : LEMMA $\text{input_path}(\text{path}, 0, c)$

input_path_one : LEMMA $c = \text{path}(0) \supset \text{input_path}(\text{path}, 1, c)$

input_path_ext : LEMMA

$\text{input_path}(\text{path}, \text{len}, d) \wedge \text{cell_input_frame}(d, c) \wedge c = \text{path}(\text{len})$
 $\supset \text{input_path}(\text{path}, \text{len} + 1, c)$

5 Interprocessor Mailbox System

The functionality of the interprocessor mailbox system was first elaborated in the DS level. The basic idea is illustrated in figure 15. In a four processor system, for example, there




Figure 15: Structure of Mailboxes in a four-processor system

are three incoming slots and one outgoing slot each of type MB. The collection is of type MBvec.

```

MB : TYPE
MBvec : TYPE = ARRAY[processors → MB]

```

Each of these slots contain some subset of the cells of memory (i.e. since only a small portion of memory is exchanged and voted during each frame). Two uninterpreted functions, *cebuf*, *cnbuf* are defined at the DA_minv level to return the “control state” and the contents of the mailbox slot (i.e. MB) associated with a specific cell:

```

cebuf : FUNCTION[MB, cell → cell_state]
cnbuf : FUNCTION[MB → control_state]

```

These functions are not implemented at the DA_minv level but are constrained by the following three axioms:

```

cebuf_ax : AXIOM cs_length(cebuf(mb, cc)) = c_length(cc)

```

```

f_s_ax : AXIOM
  IF v_sched(frame(ps.control), cc)
    THEN cobuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cells(ps.memry, cc)
    ELSE cobuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cs0(cc) END

```

```

f_s_control_ax : AXIOM cnbuf(f_s(ps)) = ps.control

```

The function f_s is used by the state-transition relation to transfer data from main memory to the outgoing mailbox slot. This function f_s is defined as

```

f_s : FUNCTION[Pstate → MB]

```

and is uninterpreted at the DA_minv level. It is refined in the LE level in terms of four functions as shown in figure 16. The implementation of f_s is described in the next subsection.




Figure 16: Function f_s Implementation Tree

5.1 LE Mailbox

The two upper-level functions, `cebuf`, `cnbuf` that return the “control state” and the contents of the mailbox slot (i.e. MB of type `MBbuf`) associated with a specific cell are mapped onto functions `cebuf` and `cnbuf` in the LE Model. These functions, and the type `MBbuf` are defined as follows:

```
MBbuf : TYPE = RECORD cntrl : control_state, mem : MBmemory END
```

```
cebuf : FUNCTION[MBbuf, cell → cell_state] ≡  
(λ MB, cc : LET fr := (MB.cntrl).frame IN  
  IF v_sched(fr, cc) THEN MBcell(MB.mem, cc, fr) ELSE cs0(cc) END)
```

```
cnbuf : FUNCTION[MBbuf → control_state] ≡ (λ MB : MB.cntrl)
```

The function `cebuf` simply copies the contents of a particular cell in a mailbox slot to a `cell_state` buffer. This is specified using a higher-order shift function `MBshift`:

```
MBshift : FUNCTION[MBmemory, MAddress → memory] =  
(λ MBmem, Low :  
  (λ nn : IF nn + Low < MBmem_size  
    THEN MBmem(nn + Low)  
    ELSE word0 END IF))
```

```
MBcell : FUNCTION[MBmemory, cell, frame_cntr → cell_state] =  
(λ MBmem, cc, fr :  
  cs0(cc) WITH  
  [len := length(MBmap(cc, fr)),  
   blk := MBshift(MBmem, MBmap(cc, fr).low)])
```

The location of cells in the mailbox is determined by the function `MBmap`:

```
MBmap : FUNCTION[cell, frame_cntr → MAddress_range]
```

The function f_s is used by the state-transition relation to transfer data from main memory to the outgoing mailbox slot. This function f_s is defined as follows:

```
f_s : FUNCTION[Pstate → MBbuf] =  
(λ PS : MBbuf_0 WITH [cntrl := PS.control,  
  mem := f_s_mem(PS)])
```

where

```

f_s_mem : FUNCTION[Pstate → MBmemory] =
  (λ PS : LET fr := (PS.control).frame IN
    (λ adr : IF (cell_of_MB(adr, fr) < no_cell) THEN
      IF v_sched(fr, cell_of_MB(adr, fr)) THEN
        PS.memry(cell_map(cell_of_MB(adr, fr)).low + adr - MBmap(cell_of_MB(adr, fr), fr).low)
      ELSE word0
      END IF
    ELSE word0
    END IF))

```

The function `cell_of_MB` returns the cell in which a given address is contained. This function is defined axiomatically using `address_within`:

```

cell_of_MB_ax : AXIOM
  IF v_sched(fr, cc) ∧ address_within(adr, MBmap(cc, fr))
  THEN cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = cc
  ELSE
    cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = no_cell END

```

```

cell_of_MB_ax.2 : AXIOM
  cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = cc ∧ cc < no_cell
  ⊃ v_sched(fr, cc) ∧ address_within(adr, MBmap(cc, fr))

```

The following lemma is easier to use and understand than the definition of the function f_s :

```

f_s_lem : LEMMA
  offset ≤ length(cell_map(cc)) - 1 ∧ v_sched((PS.control).frame, cc)
  ⊃ f_s(PS).mem(MBmap(cc, (PS.control).frame).low + offset)
  = PS.memry(cell_map(cc).low + offset)

```

This lemma shows the results of copying a cell from main memory to the mailbox with f_s , and is illustrated in figure 17.

5.2 Verifications Associated With f_s -Related Refinements

The key properties of f_s were specified axiomatically in the `DA_minv` level specification by two axioms. These become proof obligations in the `LE` level:

```

f_s_ax : OBLIGATION
  IF v_sched(Frame(ps.control), cc)
  THEN cobuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cell_mem(ps.memry, cc)
  ELSE cobuf(f_s(ps), cc) = cs0(cc)
  END

```

```

f_s_control_ax : OBLIGATION cnbuf(f_s(ps)) = ps.control

```





Figure 17: The result of copying a cell from main memory to the mailbox using f_s

5.2.1 Proof of f_s .control_ax

This result follows trivially from the definition of f_s .

5.2.2 Proof of f_s .ax

The first step is to establish:

LEM1 : LEMMA

$$\begin{aligned} & v_sched(frame(ps.control), cc) \wedge x \leq \text{length}(\text{cell_map}(cc)) - 1 \\ & \supset \text{cebuf}(f_s(ps), cc).blk(x) \\ & = f_s(ps).mem(\text{MBmap}(cc, (ps.control).frame).low + x) \end{aligned}$$

This follows from the definition of cebuf , MBcell , MBshift and four axioms: MB_size_az , map_ax , MBmap_high_ax and f_s .control_ax. The next step is to prove LEM2:

LEM2 : LEMMA

$$x \leq \text{length}(\text{cell_map}(\text{cc})) - 1$$

$$\supset \text{cell_mem}(\text{ps.memry}, \text{cc}).\text{blk}(x) = \text{ps.memry}(x + \text{cell_map}(\text{cc}).\text{low})$$

from the definitions of `cell_mem` and `mshift` and axioms `MB_size_az` and `cell_map_high_ax`. Using a key lemma about `f_s`, `f_s_lem` and `LEM1` and `LEM2` with `x` substituted by `xx`, we have:

LEM3 : LEMMA

$$\text{v_sched}(\text{frame}(\text{ps.control}), \text{cc}) \wedge \text{xx} \leq \text{length}(\text{cell_map}(\text{cc})) - 1$$

$$\supset \text{cebuf}(\text{f_s}(\text{ps}), \text{cc}).\text{blk}(\text{xx}) = \text{cell_mem}(\text{ps.memry}, \text{cc}).\text{blk}(\text{xx})$$

Two more simple lemmas are easily established from the definitions `cebuf` and `MBcell` and axioms `f_s_control_ax` and `map_ax`:

LEM4 : LEMMA

$$\neg \text{v_sched}(\text{frame}(\text{ps.control}), \text{cc}) \supset \text{cebuf}(\text{f_s}(\text{ps}), \text{cc}) = \text{cs0}(\text{cc})$$

LEM5 : LEMMA

$$\text{v_sched}(\text{frame}(\text{ps.control}), \text{cc})$$

$$\supset \text{cebuf}(\text{f_s}(\text{ps}), \text{cc}).\text{len} = \text{length}(\text{cell_map}(\text{cc}))$$

The last required lemma is `LEM6`:

LEM6 : LEMMA

$$\text{IF } \text{v_sched}(\text{frame}(\text{ps.control}), \text{cc})$$

$$\text{THEN } \text{cebuf}(\text{f_s}(\text{ps}), \text{cc}).\text{len} = \text{cell_mem}(\text{ps.memry}, \text{cc}).\text{len}$$

$$\text{ELSE } \text{cebuf}(\text{f_s}(\text{ps}), \text{cc}).\text{len} = \text{cs0}(\text{cc}).\text{len}$$

The obligation `f_s_ax` follows from `LEM3`, `LEM4`, `LEM5` and `LEM6` using the `cell_state` extensionality axiom `CS_extensionality`.

6 Implementation of f_k , f_t and Other Functions

At the `DA_minv` level the f_k , f_t and f_n functions are fully interpreted:

$$f_k : \text{FUNCTION}[\text{Pstate} \rightarrow \text{control_state}] \equiv (\lambda \text{ps} : \text{ps.control})$$

$$f_t : \text{FUNCTION}[\text{Pstate}, \text{cell} \rightarrow \text{cell_state}] \equiv$$

$$(\lambda \text{ps}, c : \text{cells}(\text{ps.memry}, c))$$

$$f_n : \text{FUNCTION}[\text{Pstate} \rightarrow \text{Pstate}] =$$

$$(\lambda \text{ps} : \text{ps} \text{ WITH } [(\text{control}) := \text{succ}(\text{ps.control})])$$

The function f_k extracts the control state from Pstate. The function f_i is implemented via the cells function and the function f_n increments the frame counter.

The succ function is defined axiomatically as follows:

```

succ : FUNCTION[control_state → control_state]
succ_cntr_ax : AXIOM frame(succ(K)) = next_fr(frame(K))

```

The function f_a is still uninterpreted at the LE level:

```

f_a : FUNCTION[Pstate → outputs]

```

In the upper levels of the hierarchy as well as in the LE model details of the I/O interface have not been elaborated. The inputs and outputs of the system are uninterpreted domains:

```

inputs : TYPE
outputs : TYPE

```

7 A Simple Model to Demonstrate Consistency of the Axioms

To demonstrate that the axioms introduced in the LE level are consistent, we created a version of this level in which the important constants and functions left undefined in the original LE model were given values. Figure 18 shows the memory configuration and the task schedule chosen for the simple model.

Table 3 shows the values given to the previously unspecified constants in order to realize the desired configuration and structure. Although the values assigned are not realistic (for example, mem_size = 2), they suffice for demonstrating consistency of the axioms.

Module	Constant	Value
rcp_defs_i	nrep	6
rcp_defs_i2	schedule_length	2
	num_cells	2
memory_defs	mem_size	2
MBmemory_defs	MBmem_size	1

Table 3: Values Assigned to Constants




Figure 18: Memory and Task Schedule Layout

7.1 Function Definitions

In addition to giving values to the above mentioned constants, we also gave definitions to important functions. In module `rcp_defs_hw.spec`, the following definition for `cell_map` was given:

```

cell_map : FUNCTION[cell → address_range] = (λ cc :
  IF (cc = 0)
    THEN (REC low := 0, high := 0) : address_range
    ELSE (REC low := 1, high := 1) : address_range
  END IF)

```

In `mailbox_hw`, `MBmap` was defined as follows:

```

MBmap : FUNCTION[cell, frame_cntr → MAddress_range] = (λ cc, fr :
  (REC low := 0, high := 0) : MAddress_range)

```

The following definitions were given in `cell_funs`:

```

cell_frame : FUNCTION[cell → frame_cntr] = (λ c :
  IF (c = 0) THEN 0 : frame_cntr ELSE 1 : frame_cntr END IF)

```

```
cell_subframe : FUNCTION[cell → sub_frame] = (λ c : 0 : sub_frame)
```

```
sched_cell : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, sub_frame → cell] = (λ fr, sf :  
  IF (fr = 0) THEN 0 : cell ELSE 1 : cell END IF)
```

```
num_subframes : FUNCTION[frame_cntr → nat] ≡ (λ fr : 1)
```

Cell_of_MB was defined as follows in minimal_hw.spec:

```
cell_of_MB : FUNCTION[MBAaddress, frame_cntr → nat] = (λ adr, fr :  
  IF (adr = 0) ∧ (fr = 0)  
  THEN 0  
  ELSIF (adr = 0) ∧ (fr = 1)  
  THEN 1  
  ELSE no_cell  
  END IF)
```

Finally, the following definition for v_sched was given in module path_funs.spec :

```
v_sched : FUNCTION[frame_cntr, cell → bool] = (λ fr, c :  
  IF ((fr = 0) ∧ (c = 0)) ∨ ((fr = 1) ∧ (c = 1))  
  THEN true ELSE false  
  END IF)
```

7.2 Inconsistencies Discovered

This exercise revealed three inconsistencies in the LE axioms. As originally written, neither sched_cell_ax nor cell_of_MB_ax nor MBcell_separation was satisfiable.

The original sched_cell_ax was as follows:

```
sched_cell_ax : AXIOM  
  mm = cell_frame(c) ∧ k = cell_subframe(c) ⇔ sched_cell(mm, k) = c
```

As written, this axiom does not take into account the fact that the returned value of sched_cell(mm, k) is meaningful only when k is a valid subframe of mm. Thus the axiom should be, and now is, written in the following way:

```
sched_cell_ax : AXIOM  
  mm = cell_frame(c) ∧ k = cell_subframe(c) ⇔  
  sched_cell(mm, k) = c ∧ k < num_subframes(mm)
```

The original `cell_of_MB_ax` was as follows:

```
cell_of_MB_ax : AXIOM
  IF v_sched(fr, cc)  $\wedge$  address_within(adr, MBmap(cc, fr))
  THEN cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = cc
  ELSE cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = no_cell
  END
```

The “ELSE” part of this axiom is simply false; for any valid *adr* and *fr*, `cell_of_MB(adr, fr)` will return a valid cell, not `no_cell`. All that we can say about the value that will be returned is that it will not be equal to *cc*. Fortunately, this is all that we need to know, and the axiom can be rewritten in the following way:

```
cell_of_MB_ax : AXIOM
  IF v_sched(fr, cc)  $\wedge$  address_within(adr, MBmap(cc, fr))
  THEN cell_of_MB(adr, fr) = cc
  ELSE cell_of_MB(adr, fr)  $\neq$  cc
  END
```

The original `MBcell_separation` was as follows:

```
MBcell_separation : AXIOM
  ( $c_1 \neq c_2$ )  $\supset$  address_disjoint(MBmap( $c_1$ , fr), MBmap( $c_2$ , fr))
```

This axiom does not take into account the fact that we care about the addresses being disjoint only if both of the cells in question are scheduled in the current frame. Thus, the axiom was changed to be:

```
MBcell_separation : AXIOM
  ( $c_1 \neq c_2$ )  $\wedge$  v_sched(fr,  $c_1$ )  $\wedge$  v_sched(fr,  $c_2$ )  $\supset$ 
  address_disjoint(MBmap( $c_1$ , fr), MBmap( $c_2$ , fr))
```

In addition to these 3 inconsistent axioms, an unneeded axiom was discovered, namely `num_subframes_ax`, which was given as follows:

```
num_subframes_ax : AXIOM
  fr = cell_frame(c)  $\supset$  cell_subframe(c) < num_subframes(fr)
```

8 Conclusion

In this paper we present the third phase of the development of the Reliable Computing Platform (RCP). This effort has resulted in two additional layers in the formal specification hierarchy, bringing the total to six (excluding the clock synchronization hierarchy it is built upon). These specifications introduce a more detailed elaboration of the behavior of the RCP in three main areas:

- task dispatching and execution,
- minimal voting, and
- interprocessor communication via mailboxes.

Each of these refinements was developed using the EHDM mapping facility, which automatically generates the required proof obligations. Each of these proof obligations has been satisfied. In addition, many of the axioms have been shown to be consistent by mapping them onto a concrete (albeit unrealistic) instance. This paper presents an overview of the more interesting and important proofs.

Phase 3 does not represent a complete implementation of the RCP. Much work remains to carry this detailed design down into a fully operational implementation. However, the design is sufficiently mature for the implementation of a meaningful simulator. The simulator is currently under development in the Scheme programming language. One part of the system remains as a high-level design rather than a detailed design: the interactive consistency mechanism. There are many possible algorithms available that could be exploited, but so far, no choice has been made for the RCP.

The RCP represents one of the largest and most complex proofs performed using EHDM. The total collection of EHDM specifications and proof directives is 13559 lines long (excluding blank lines and most comments). Executing the entire set of proofs requires over 4 hours of computation time on a Sparc 10 with 64 Mbytes of memory.

References

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A Obligations Generated by EHDM Mappings

In earlier sections we have discussed the most important obligations and proofs. For completeness we list all of the obligations produced by Ehdm mapping statements:

A.1 Module generic_FT_to_minimal_v

ps, X, Y : VAR Pstate
p, i, j : VAR processors
u : VAR inputs
w : VAR MBvec
A, B : VAR set[processors]
c, d, e : VAR cell
K : VAR control_state
H : VAR nat
recovery_period_ax : OBLIGATION recovery_period \geq 2

succ_ax : OBLIGATION f.k(f.n(ps)) = succ(f.k(ps))

control_nc : OBLIGATION f.k(f.c(u, ps)) = f.k(ps)

cells_nc : OBLIGATION f.t(f.n(ps), c) = f.t(ps, c)

full_recovery : OBLIGATION H \geq recovery_period \supset recv(c, K, H)

initial_recovery : OBLIGATION recv(c, K, H) \supset H > 2

dep_recovery : OBLIGATION
recv(c, succ(K), H + 1) \wedge dep(c, d, K) \supset recv(d, K, H)

components_equal : OBLIGATION
f.k(X) = f.k(Y) \wedge (\forall c : f.t(X, c) = f.t(Y, c)) \supset X = Y

control_recovered : OBLIGATION
maj_condition(A) \wedge (\forall p : member(p, A) \supset w(p) = f.s(ps)) \supset f.k(f.v(Y, w)) = f.k(ps)

cell_recovered : OBLIGATION
maj_condition(A)
 \wedge (\forall p : member(p, A) \supset w(p) = f.s(f.c(u, ps)))
 \wedge f.k(X) = K \wedge f.k(ps) = K \wedge dep_agree(c, K, X, ps)
 \supset f.t(f.v(f.c(u, X), w), c) = f.t(f.c(u, ps), c)

vote_maj : OBLIGATION
maj_condition(A) \wedge (\forall p : member(p, A) \supset w(p) = f.s(ps)) \supset f.v(ps, w) = ps

A.2 Module DA_to_DA_minv

s, t, da : VAR DState
 u : VAR inputs
 i, p, q, qq : VAR processors
 T : VAR number
 X, Y : VAR number
 D : VAR number
broadcast_duration : OBLIGATION
 $(1 - \text{Rho}) * \text{abs}(\text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) - 2 * \nu * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) - \nu * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast})) - \delta$
 $\geq \text{max_comm_delay}$

broadcast_duration2 : OBLIGATION
 $\text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) - 2 * \nu * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) - \nu * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) \geq 0$

all_durations : OBLIGATION
 $(1 + \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) + (1 + \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) \leq \text{frame_time}$

pos_durations : OBLIGATION
 $0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{compute})$
 $\wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast})$
 $\wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{vote}) \wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{sync})$

A.3 Module rcp_defs_imp_to_hw

k : VAR nat
mem : VAR memory
cc, xx : VAR cell
cs : VAR cell.state

cells_ax : OBLIGATION $\text{cs_length}(\text{cell_mem}(\text{mem}, \text{cc})) = \text{c_length}(\text{cc})$

write_cell_ax : OBLIGATION
 $\text{cs_length}(\text{cs}) = \text{c_length}(\text{xx})$
 $\supset \text{CS_eq}(\text{cell_mem}(\text{write_cell}(\text{mem}, \text{xx}, \text{cs}), \text{cc}),$
 $\text{IF } \text{cc} = \text{xx} \text{ THEN } \text{cs} \text{ ELSE } \text{cell_mem}(\text{mem}, \text{cc}) \text{ END})$

null_memory_ax : OBLIGATION $\text{CS_eq}(\text{cell_mem}(\text{mem0}, \text{cc}), \text{cs0}(\text{cc}))$

mb : VAR MBbuf
cebuf_ax : OBLIGATION $\text{cs_length}(\text{cebuf}(\text{mb}, \text{cc})) = \text{c_length}(\text{cc})$

cell_state_var1, cell_state_var2, cell_state_var3 : VAR cell.state
control_state_var1, control_state_var2, control_state_var3 : VAR control.state

cell_state_reflexive : OBLIGATION $\text{CS_eq}(\text{cell_state_var1}, \text{cell_state_var1})$

cell_state_symmetric : OBLIGATION

$CS_eq(\text{cell_state_var1}, \text{cell_state_var2}) \supset CS_eq(\text{cell_state_var2}, \text{cell_state_var1})$

cell_state_transitive : OBLIGATION

$CS_eq(\text{cell_state_var1}, \text{cell_state_var2}) \wedge CS_eq(\text{cell_state_var2}, \text{cell_state_var3})$
 $\supset CS_eq(\text{cell_state_var1}, \text{cell_state_var3})$

control_state_reflexive : OBLIGATION $\text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var1}, \text{control_state_var1})$

control_state_symmetric : OBLIGATION

$\text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var1}, \text{control_state_var2}) \supset \text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var2}, \text{control_state_var1})$

control_state_transitive : OBLIGATION

$\text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var1}, \text{control_state_var2})$
 $\wedge \text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var2}, \text{control_state_var3})$
 $\supset \text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var1}, \text{control_state_var3})$

frame_congruence : OBLIGATION

$\text{cnst_eq}(\text{control_state_var1}, \text{control_state_var2})$
 $\supset \text{frame}(\text{control_state_var1}) = \text{frame}(\text{control_state_var2})$

cs_length_congruence : OBLIGATION

$CS_eq(\text{cs}, \text{cell_state_var1}) \supset \text{cs_length}(\text{cs}) = \text{cs_length}(\text{cell_state_var1})$

write_cell_congruence : OBLIGATION

$CS_eq(\text{cs}, \text{cell_state_var1}) \supset \text{write_cell}(\text{mem}, \text{cc}, \text{cs}) = \text{write_cell}(\text{mem}, \text{cc}, \text{cell_state_var1})$

A.4 Module `gen_com_to_hw`

p, i, j : VAR processors
 k, l, q : VAR sub_frame
 u : VAR inputs
 A : VAR set[processors]
 c, d, e : VAR cell
 C, D : VAR memory
 w : VAR MBvec
 h : VAR MBmatrix
 us, ps, X, Y : VAR Pstate
 cs : VAR cell_state
 fr : VAR frame_cntr
 K, L : VAR control_state

memory_equal : OBLIGATION

$(\forall c : CS_eq(\text{cell_mem}(C, c), \text{cell_mem}(D, c))) \supset C = D$

exec_task_ax : OBLIGATION

$\text{sched_cell}(\text{frame}(ps.\text{control}), q) \neq c$

⊃ CS_eq(cell_mem(exec_task(u, ps, q).memry, c), cell_mem(ps.memry, c))

exec_task_ax_2 : OBLIGATION

cnst_eq(exec_task(u, ps, q).control, ps.control)

A.5 Module frame_funs_to_gc_hw

K : VAR control_state

succ_cntr_ax : OBLIGATION frame(succ_cs(K)) = next_fr(frame(K))

pred_cntr_ax : OBLIGATION frame(pred_cs(K)) = prev_fr(frame(K))

pred_succ_ax : OBLIGATION cnst_eq(pred_cs(succ_cs(K)), K)

succ_congruence : OBLIGATION

cnst_eq(K , control_state_var1)

⊃ cnst_eq(succ_cs(K), succ_cs(control_state_var1))

pred_congruence : OBLIGATION

cnst_eq(K , control_state_var1)

⊃ cnst_eq(pred_cs(K), pred_cs(control_state_var1))

A.6 Module minimal_v_to_minimal_hw

k, l : VAR nat

c, d : VAR cell

H : VAR nat

C, D : VAR memory

ps, X, Y : VAR Pstate

w : VAR MBvec

K, L : VAR control_state

cc : VAR cell

q, sf : VAR sub_frame

cfn : VAR cell_fn

cell_apply_MAP_EQ : OBLIGATION

(IF $k = 0 \vee k > \text{num_cells}$ THEN C

ELSE

IF v_sched(frame(K), $k - 1$)

THEN write_cell(cell_apply(cfn, $K, C, k - 1$), $k - 1$, cfn($k - 1$))

ELSE cell_apply(cfn, $K, C, k - 1$) END

END

= IF $k = 0 \vee k > \text{num_cells}$ THEN C

ELSE

IF v_sched(frame(K), $k - 1$)

THEN write_cell(cell_apply(cfn, $K, C, k - 1$), $k - 1$, cfn($k - 1$))
 ELSE cell_apply(cfn, $K, C, k - 1$) END
 END)

f_s_ax : OBLIGATION

IF v_sched(frame(ps.control), cc)
 THEN CS_eq(cebuf(f_s(ps), cc), cell_mem(ps.memry, cc))
 ELSE CS_eq(cebuf(f_s(ps), cc), cs0(cc)) END

f_s_control_ax : OBLIGATION cnst_eq(cnbuf(f_s(ps)), ps.control)

f_v_ax : OBLIGATION

cnst_eq(f_v(ps, w).control, k_maj(w))
 \wedge f_v(ps, w).memry
 = cell_apply(($\lambda c : t_maj(w, c)$), ps.control, ps.memry, num_cells)

cell_input_constraint : OBLIGATION

cnst_eq(X .control, Y .control)
 \wedge sched_cell(frame(X .control), q) = c
 \wedge ($\forall d : \text{cell_input}(d, c) \supset \text{cells_match}(X, Y, d)$)
 $\supset \text{cells_match}(\text{exec_task}(u, X, q), \text{exec_task}(u, Y, q), c)$

A.7 Module maj_funs_to_minimal_hw

A : VAR set[processors]

c : VAR cell

w : VAR MBvec

cs : VAR cell_state

K : VAR control_state

p : VAR processors

k_maj_ax : OBLIGATION

$(\exists A : \text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset \text{cnst_eq}(\text{cnbuf}(w(p)), K)))$
 $\supset \text{cnst_eq}(k_maj(w), K)$

t_maj_ax : OBLIGATION

$(\exists A :$
 $\text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset \text{CS_eq}(\text{cebuf}(w(p), c), \text{cs}))$
 $\supset \text{CS_eq}(t_maj(w, c), \text{cs})$

t_maj_len_ax : OBLIGATION cs.length(t_maj(w, c)) = c.length(c)

A.8 Module DA_minv_to_LE

s, t, da : VAR DAstate

u : VAR inputs

i, p, q, qq : VAR processors

T : VAR number
 X, Y : VAR number
 D : VAR number
broadcast_duration : OBLIGATION
 $(1 - \text{Rho}) * \text{abs}(\text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) - 2 * \nu * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) - \nu * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast})) - \delta$
 $\geq \text{max_comm_delay}$

broadcast_duration2 : OBLIGATION
 $\text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) - 2 * \nu * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) - \nu * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast})$
 ≥ 0

all_durations : OBLIGATION
 $(1 + \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{compute}) + (1 + \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast}) \leq \text{frame_time}$

pos_durations : OBLIGATION
 $0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{compute})$
 $\wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{broadcast})$
 $\wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{vote}) \wedge 0 \leq (1 - \nu) * \text{duration}(\text{sync})$

A.9 Module maxf_to_maxf_model

S : VAR finite_set[nat]
 a, b : VAR nat
max_ax : OBLIGATION
 $(\text{member}(a, S) \supset \text{max}(S) \geq a)$
 $\wedge \text{IF empty}(S)$
 $\text{THEN max}(S) = 0$
 ELSE
 $(\exists b : \text{member}(b, S) \wedge b = \text{max}(S)) \text{ END}$

A.10 Module maj_hw_to_maj_hw_model

A : VAR set[processors]
 c : VAR cell
 w : VAR MBVEC
 cs : VAR cell_state
 K : VAR control_state
 p : VAR processors
k_maj_ax : OBLIGATION
 $(\exists A : \text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset \text{cnst_eq}(\text{cnbuf}(w(p)), K)))$
 $\supset \text{cnst_eq}(k_maj(w), K)$

t_maj_ax : OBLIGATION
 $(\exists A :$
 $\text{maj_condition}(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset \text{CS_eq}(\text{cebuf}(w(p), c), cs)))$
 $\supset \text{CS_eq}(t_maj(w, c), cs)$

$t_maj_len_ax : \text{OBLIGATION } cs_length(t_maj(w, c)) = c_length(c)$

A.11 Module RS_majority_to_RS_maj_model

$k : \text{VAR nat}$
 $p : \text{VAR processors}$
 $us : \text{VAR Pstate}$
 $rs : \text{VAR RSstate}$
 $A : \text{VAR set}[processors]$
 $maj_exists : \text{FUNCTION}[RSstate \rightarrow \text{boolean}] =$
 $(\lambda rs :$
 $(\exists A, us :$
 $maj_condition(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset (rs(p)).proc_state = us)))$

 $maj_ax : \text{OBLIGATION}$
 $(\exists A : maj_condition(A) \wedge (\forall p : \text{member}(p, A) \supset (rs(p)).proc_state = us))$
 $\supset maj(rs) = us$

A.12 Module algorithm_mapalgorithm

$T, T_0, T_1, X, \Pi : \text{VAR number}$
 $i : \text{VAR period}$
 $p, q, r : \text{VAR proc}$
 $rr, ii, qq, nn : \text{VAR nat}$
 $s : \text{VAR proc_set}$
 $n : \text{proc} \equiv \text{nrep}$

 $A_0 : \text{OBLIGATION } skew(p, q, T_sup(0), 0) < \text{delta0}$

 $A_2 : \text{OBLIGATION}$
 $\text{nonfaulty}(p, i) \wedge \text{nonfaulty}(q, i) \wedge S1C(p, q, i) \wedge S_2(p, i) \wedge S_2(q, i)$
 $\supset \text{abs}(\text{Delta2}(q, p, i)) \leq S$
 $\wedge (\exists T_0 :$
 $\text{in_S_interval}(T_0, i)$
 $\wedge \text{abs}(\text{rt}(p, i, T_0 + \text{Delta2}(q, p, i)) - \text{rt}(q, i, T_0)) < \text{eps})$

 $A2_aux : \text{OBLIGATION } \text{Delta2}(p, p, i) = 0$

 $C_0 : \text{OBLIGATION } \text{ngood}(i) > 0$

 $C_2 : \text{OBLIGATION } S \geq \Sigma$

 $C_3 : \text{OBLIGATION } \Sigma \geq \Delta$

 $C_4 : \text{OBLIGATION } \Delta \geq \delta + \text{eps} + \text{half}(\rho) * S$

C_5 : OBLIGATION $\delta \geq \text{delta0} + \rho * R$

C_6 : OBLIGATION

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \geq & 2 * (\text{eps} + \rho * S) + 2 * \text{nfaulty}(i) * \Delta / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + n * \rho * R / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + \rho * \Delta \\ & + n * \rho * \Sigma / \text{ngood}(i) \end{aligned}$$

$C6_{\text{opt}}$: OBLIGATION

$$\begin{aligned} \delta \geq & 2 * (\text{eps} + \rho * S) * (\text{ngood}(i) - 1) / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + 2 * \text{nfaulty}(i) * \Delta / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + n * \rho * R / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + \rho * \Delta * (\text{ngood}(i) - 1) / \text{ngood}(i) \\ & + n * \rho * \Sigma / \text{ngood}(i) \end{aligned}$$

B EHDM Status Reports: M-x amps, mpcs, amos

The following reports were generated by EHDM after completion of the specification and proof activities. Included are the following reports:

1. Module Proof Chain Status (mpcs)
2. All Module Proof Status (amps)
3. All Module Obligation Status (amos)

Refer to the EHDM user documentation for detailed explanations of the report formats. Note that to conserve space some portions of these reports have been deleted so that only the more useful items of information are presented. The complete status reports can be obtained from the FTP directory cited in section 1.5.

B.1 Module Proof Chain Status (mpcs)

Excerpts of this report have been reproduced below with the “terse proof chains” moved to the end.

SUMMARY

The proof chain is complete

All TCCs and module assumptions have been proved

The axioms and assumptions at the base are:

```
cardinality!card_ax
cardinality!card_empty
cardinality!card_subset
cell_funs!sched_cell_ax
frame_funs!pred_cntr_ax
frame_funs!pred_succ_ax
functions1!extensionality1
LE!all_durations
LE!broadcast_duration2
mailbox_hw!map_ax
mailbox_hw!MBcell_separation
mailbox_hw!MBmap_high_ax
mailbox_hw!MB_size_ax
maxf_model!ubound_ax
memory_generic!addrs_ty_extensionality
naturalnumbers!nat_invariant
noetherian!general_induction
numbers!mult_pos
path_funs!full_recovery_condition
phase_defs!distinct_phases
```

```
phase_defs!member_phases
rcp_defs_hw!cells_for_all_ax
rcp_defs_hw!cell_map_length_ax
rcp_defs_hw!cell_separation
rcp_defs_hw!control_state_extensionality
recursive_maj!card_add
to_minimal_hw_prf_2!t_write_set_ax_1
to_minimal_hw_prf_2!t_write_set_ax_2
Total: 28
```

The definitions and type-constraints are:

```
absolutes!abs
...
US!N_us
Total: 195
```

The formulae used are:

```
absolutes!abs
...
US!N_us
Total: 1059
```

The completed proofs are:

```
absolutes!abs_div2_proof
...
to_minimal_hw_prf_2!p_CS_eq_need
Total: 781
```

Terse proof chains for module everything

```
RS_majority!maj_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_RS_maj_model
```

```
generic_FT!vote_maj
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v
```

```
maxf!max_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_maxf_model
```

```
rcp_defs_imp!cells_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_hw
```

```
maj_funs!t_maj_len_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_hw
```

```
maj_hw!k_maj_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
```

to_maj_hw_model

maj_hw!t_maj_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_maj_hw_model

gen_com!memory_equal
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_gc_hw

rcp_defs_imp!Pstate_extensionality
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_hw

minimal_v!f_v_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_hw

minimal_v!f_s_control_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_hw

minimal_v!cell_input_constraint
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_hw

gen_com!exec_task_ax_2
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_gc_hw

gen_com!exec_task_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_gc_hw

rcp_defs_imp!write_cell_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_hw

minimal_v!f_s_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_hw

generic_FT!components_equal
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!full_recovery
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!recovery_period_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!control_recovered
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!succ_ax
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!cell_recovered
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!dep_recovery
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!initial_recovery
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!control_nc
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

generic_FT!cells_nc
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_minimal_v

algorithm!C0
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
mapalgorithm

algorithm!C3
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
mapalgorithm

time!C1
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
maptime

algorithm!C2
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
mapalgorithm

DA!pos_durations
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_DA_minv

DA_minv!broadcast_duration
is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
to_LE

```

algorithm!A0
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

algorithm!C5
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

algorithm!A2
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

algorithm!C4
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

algorithm!A2_aux
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

algorithm!C6_opt
  is shown to be a consistent axiom by mapping module
  mapalgorithm

```

B.2 All Module Proof Status (amps)

This report is reproduced in its entirety.

Proof status for modules on using chain of module everything

Proof summary for module words

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module defined_types

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module nat_types

p_upto_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_upfrom_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_below_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_above_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 2 seconds.

Proof summary for module interp_rcp

p_processors_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module numeric_types

p_posnum_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_nonnegnum_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_fraction_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 3 proofs, 3 attempted, 3 succeeded, 1 seconds.

Proof summary for module arithmetics

quotient_pos_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
mult_mon_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
div_mon_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
div_mult_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
mult_pos_alt_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
mult_mon2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
div_mon2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 7 proofs, 7 attempted, 7 succeeded, 4 seconds.

Proof summary for module noetherian

mod_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 2 seconds.

Proof summary for module natprops

diff_zero_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
pred_diff_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
diff1_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
diff_diff_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
diff_plus_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
diff_ineq_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 6 proofs, 6 attempted, 6 succeeded, 12 seconds.

Proof summary for module phase_defs

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module sets

p_extensionality.....	PROVED	1 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 1 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_i

processors_TCC1_PROOF.....	PROVED	0 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module memory_generic

p_address_ty_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_address_range_ty_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_addr_len_ty_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_test.....	PROVED	5 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module finite_sets

finite_set_TTC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 2 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_i2

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module nat_inductions

discharge.....	PROVED	0 seconds
nat_induction.....	PROVED	1 seconds

nat_complete.....	PROVED	1 seconds
reachability.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 3 seconds.

Proof summary for module bounded_induction

p_upto_induction.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_well_founded.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_reachability.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 3 proofs, 3 attempted, 3 succeeded, 4 seconds.

Proof summary for module maprcp

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module absolutes

abs_times_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
abs_recip_TCC1_pr.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_recip_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
abs_div_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
abs_proof0.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof2.....	PROVED	4 seconds
abs_proof2b.....	PROVED	1 seconds
abs_proof2c.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof3.....	PROVED	1 seconds
abs_proof4.....	PROVED	2 seconds
abs_proof5.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof6.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof7.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_proof8.....	PROVED	4 seconds
pos_abs_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
abs_div2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rearrange1_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
rearrange2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rearrange_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rearrange_alt_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_abs_leq.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 22 proofs, 22 attempted, 22 succeeded, 27 seconds.

Proof summary for module natinduction

discharge.....	PROVED	0 seconds
ind_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
ind_m_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
mod_m_proof.....	PROVED	8 seconds
mod_induction_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
induction1_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
mod_induction1_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds
induction2_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds

Totals: 8 proofs, 8 attempted, 8 succeeded, 25 seconds.

Proof summary for module cardinality

empty_prop_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
subset_union_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
twice_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds

card_proof.....PROVED 1 seconds
Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 4 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maxf_model
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module MBmemory_defs
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module memory_defs
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module nat_pigeonholes

bbn_ext.....	PROVED	2 seconds
bnd_occ_sum.....	PROVED	9 seconds
no_occ.....	PROVED	87 seconds
no_occ_2.....	PROVED	21 seconds
one_occ.....	PROVED	26 seconds
all_occ_all_base.....	PROVED	9 seconds
all_occ_all_ind_base.....	PROVED	2 seconds
all_occ_all_ind_ind_1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
all_occ_all_ind_ind_2.....	PROVED	4 seconds
all_occ_all_ind.....	PROVED	5 seconds
all_occ_all.....	PROVED	1 seconds
one_occ_exists_1.....	PROVED	48 seconds
one_occ_exists_2.....	PROVED	20 seconds
dup_bnd_occ_1_ind.....	PROVED	16 seconds
dup_bnd_occ_1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
dup_bnd_occ_2_ind.....	PROVED	18 seconds
dup_bnd_occ_2.....	PROVED	9 seconds
dup_bnd_occ.....	PROVED	1 seconds
pigeonhole_general.....	PROVED	1 seconds
pigeonhole_duplicates.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 20 proofs, 20 attempted, 20 succeeded, 285 seconds.

Proof summary for module maxf
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module cell_funs
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_imp
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_i_maprcp
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module interptime
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module sigmaprops

sc_basis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sc_step_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
sc_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
sm_basis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sm_step_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
sm_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
mod_sigma_mult_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
ss_basis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
ss_step_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
ss_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
sib_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sigma1_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
srb_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
srp_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sigma_rev_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
split_basis_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
split_step_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds
split_proof.....	PROVED	13 seconds
sa_basis_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
sa_step_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
sa_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bounded_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
sb_basis_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
alt_sigma_bound_one_step_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sigma_split_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
alt_sb_step_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sb_step_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
sb_proof.....	PROVED	28 seconds
sigma_bound_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 30 proofs, 30 attempted, 30 succeeded, 106 seconds.

Proof summary for module time

posR_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
posS_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
SinR_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
T_next_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
Ti_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
inRS_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
Ti_in_S_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
in_S_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 8 proofs, 8 attempted, 8 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module proc_sets

p_nat_nit.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_card_fullset.....	PROVED	1 seconds
discharge_finite.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 3 proofs, 3 attempted, 3 succeeded, 2 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_maxf_model

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_hw

p_cs0_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_write_cell_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cell_map_high_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_cell_map_length_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cell_map_low_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 5 proofs, 5 attempted, 5 succeeded, 5 seconds.

Proof summary for module cell_inductions

reachability.....	PROVED	0 seconds
cell_nat_induction.....	PROVED	7 seconds
c3_well_founded.....	PROVED	0 seconds
cell_nat_induction_2.....	PROVED	8 seconds
n3_well_founded.....	PROVED	0 seconds
path_cell_nat_induction.....	PROVED	21 seconds
n5_well_founded.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 7 proofs, 7 attempted, 7 succeeded, 36 seconds.

Proof summary for module path_funs

rec_set_TCC1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
NF_rec_set_TCC1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
path_len_set_TCC1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
all_rec_set_TCC1.....	PROVED	4 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 17 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_funs

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_imp

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module interpclocks

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maptime

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module proc_induction

p_processors_induction.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_well_founded.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_reachability.....	PROVED	1 seconds
proc_plus_TCC1_PROOF.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 5 seconds.

Proof summary for module sums

counter_converse0_proof.....	PROVED	5 seconds
counter_converse_i_proof.....	PROVED	35 seconds
counter_converse_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
partsums0_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
partsums_i_proof.....	PROVED	9 seconds
partsum_proof.....	PROVED	12 seconds
part_lem_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
part_partsums_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds

part_count_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
sum_count0_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds
sum_count_ind_proof.....	PROVED	28 seconds
sum_count_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
counter_bound0_proof.....	PROVED	11 seconds
intermediate_proof.....	PROVED	22 seconds
counter_bound_i_proof.....	PROVED	18 seconds
counter_bound_proof.....	PROVED	9 seconds
mean_lemma_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
split_sum_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
split_mean_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sum_bound_mod_proof.....	PROVED	5 seconds
sum_bound0_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sum_bound_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
mean_bound_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
mean_const_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sum_mult_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
mean_mult_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
mean_sum_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
mean_diff_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
abs_sum_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
abs_mean_proof.....	PROVED	11 seconds
rearrange_sub_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rearrange_sum_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_sigma_restrict_0.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_sigma_restrict_s.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_sigma_restrict.....	PROVED	14 seconds
p_sig_restrict.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_sum_restrict.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_sum_restrict_eq.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_mean_restrict_eq.....	PROVED	3 seconds

Totals: 39 proofs, 39 attempted, 39 succeeded, 242 seconds.

Proof summary for module clocks

rho_pos_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
rho_small_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
diminish_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
monoproof.....	PROVED	4 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 5 seconds.

Proof summary for module generic_FT

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maxf_to_maxf_model

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module mmu_def

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module recursive_maj

card_singleton.....	PROVED	5 seconds
nrep_fullset.....	PROVED	2 seconds
union_plus_one.....	PROVED	6 seconds

intersection_plus_one.....	PROVED	5 seconds
cfen_base.....	PROVED	1 seconds
cfen_ind.....	PROVED	7 seconds
card_fullset_eq_nrep.....	PROVED	4 seconds
maj_cond_unique.....	PROVED	18 seconds
rml_base.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rml_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
rec_maj_lemma.....	PROVED	7 seconds
maj_card_lemma.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rec_maj_cond.....	PROVED	6 seconds
rec_maj_cond_2.....	PROVED	10 seconds
rec_maj_cond_3.....	PROVED	4 seconds
zp_base.....	PROVED	1 seconds
zp_ind.....	PROVED	4 seconds
zpred_preserved.....	PROVED	3 seconds

Totals: 18 proofs, 18 attempted, 18 succeeded, 94 seconds.

Proof summary for module mailbox_hw

p_MBcell_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_MBmap_low_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_MBmap_lem.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_MBmap_lem_2.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module frame_funs

p_succ_le_plus.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_mod_minus_zero.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_mod_minus_plus.....	PROVED	18 seconds

Totals: 3 proofs, 3 attempted; 3 succeeded, 22 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_to_imp
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module interpalgorithm
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module time_maptime
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module mapclocks
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module algorithm

p_gbl_0.....	PROVED	21 seconds
p_gbl_s.....	PROVED	58 seconds
p_gbl.....	PROVED	76 seconds
p_gb1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
good_bad_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
S1C_self_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
C6_TCC1_PROOF.....	PROVED	0 seconds
pos_terms.....	PROVED	2 seconds
COa_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
A1_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds

C2and3_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
npos_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
clock_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
D2bar_prop_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
S1C_lemma_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
Theorem_2_proof.....	PROVED	36 seconds

Totals: 16 proofs, 16 attempted, 16 succeeded, 206 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module US

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_hw_model

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maxf_to_maxf_model_prf

below_empty_eq.....	PROVED	5 seconds
below_empty_n1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
below_empty_n2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
rmax_bound.....	PROVED	43 seconds
max_ax_base.....	PROVED	16 seconds
max_ax_ind_1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
max_ax_ind_2_a.....	PROVED	2 seconds
max_ax_ind_2_b.....	PROVED	6 seconds
max_ax_ind_2.....	PROVED	52 seconds
max_ax_ind.....	PROVED	15 seconds
max_ax.....	PROVED	99 seconds

Totals: 11 proofs, 11 attempted, 11 succeeded, 244 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module gc_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_maj_model

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module gen_com

p_exe_base.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_exec_ctrl_base.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_exec_ctrl_ind.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_exec_ctrl.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_LEM2_0.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_LEM2_s.....	PROVED	1 seconds

p_LEM2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_exe_ind_1.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_exe_ind_2.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_exec_element.....	PROVED	10 seconds

Totals: 10 proofs, 10 attempted, 10 succeeded, 32 seconds.

Proof summary for module clocks_mapclocks
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module mapalgorithm
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module juggle_opt

mult_div_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
step1_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
step2_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
final.....	PROVED	12 seconds
rearrange_delta_opt_TCC1_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 5 proofs, 5 attempted, 5 succeeded, 20 seconds.

Proof summary for module clockprops

i2R_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
upper_bound_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
basis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
small_shift_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
ind_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
adj_pos_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
lower_bound_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
lower_bound2_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
gc_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bounds_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
rmproof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
full_part_sum_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 12 proofs, 12 attempted, 12 succeeded, 26 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_to_RS
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_majority
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_maj_hw_model
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_hw

p_f_s_mem_TCC1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_f_s_lem_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_f_s_lem_TCC2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cell_fn_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 10 seconds.

Proof summary for module gc_hw_prf
p_small_lem.....PROVED 5 seconds

p_hide_sm_lem_0.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_hide_sm_lem_s.....	PROVED	45 seconds
p_hide_sm_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_small_eq_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_me_lem_0.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_me_lem_s1a.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_im_s1b.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_me_lem_s1b.....	PROVED	31 seconds
p_me_lem_s1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_me_lem_s2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_me_lem_s.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_me_lem.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_match_exists_lem.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_match_exists_lem2a.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_match_exists_lem2b.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_match_exists_lem3.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_smallest_adr_lem.....	PROVED	12 seconds
p_me14a.....	PROVED	41 seconds
p_match_exists_lem4.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_write_em_prop_n_0.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_wep1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_wep2b.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_wep2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_wep4_a.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_wep4_b.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_wep4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_wep_s1.....	PROVED	145 seconds
p_wep_s2.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_wep_s3.....	PROVED	31 seconds
p_wepns_lem.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_write_em_prop_n_s.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_write_em_prop_n.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_write_em_prop.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_write_em_lem.....	PROVED	4 seconds

Totals: 35 proofs, 35 attempted, 35 succeeded, 410 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_gc_hw
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_RS_maj_model
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_imp_to_hw
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v		
p_cell_fn_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_f_v_ax_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 1 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_lemmas
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module algorithm_mapalgorithm
 Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma5

rearrange2_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
lemma5proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 3 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma2

lemma2_proof.....	PROVED	5 seconds
lemma2a_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
lemma2b_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
lemma2c_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
lemma2d_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds
lemma2e_proof.....	PROVED	9 seconds

Totals: 6 proofs, 6 attempted, 6 succeeded, 28 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_to_US
 Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_hw_to_maj_hw_model
 Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_hw_prf2

p_Fs1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_Fs1_TCC1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_Fs2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_Fs2_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_Fs3_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_Fs3_TCC2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_Fs3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_f_s_lem.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_f_s_lem_cntrl.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 9 proofs, 9 attempted, 9 succeeded, 20 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_hw_prf

p_fc_lem_a_0.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_fc_lem_a_s.....	PROVED	118 seconds
p_well_founded.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_fc_lem_a.....	PROVED	43 seconds
p_fc_lem_b_0.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_fc_lem_b_s.....	PROVED	64 seconds
p_fc_lem_b.....	PROVED	82 seconds
p_cell_of_MB_lem.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_cell_of_MB_lem_2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cell_of_MB_map_lem.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_p_cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_p_cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC3.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 13 proofs, 13 attempted, 13 succeeded, 325 seconds.

Proof summary for module frame_funs_to_gc_hw
 Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_minimal_hw
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_majority_to_RS_maj_model
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module rcp_defs_imp_to_hw_prf

p_cells_ax.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_case0.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_c0.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_c0b_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_c0b.....	PROVED	12 seconds
p_c1_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_c1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_c2_TCC1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_c2.....	PROVED	62 seconds
p_p_c2_TCC2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_c3_TCC1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_c3.....	PROVED	62 seconds
p_c4.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_case1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_c7_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_c7.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_c8.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_case2.....	PROVED	31 seconds
p_Case1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_Case2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_write_cell_ax.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_nm0.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_nm1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_nm2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_nm3.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_null_memory_ax.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_cebuf_ax.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_cell_state_reflexive.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_cell_state_symmetric.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cell_state_transitive.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cs_length_congruence.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_write_cell_congruence.....	PROVED	37 seconds
p_control_state_reflexive.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_control_state_symmetric.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_control_state_transitive.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_frame_congruence.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 36 proofs, 36 attempted, 36 succeeded, 272 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_lemmas
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_minimal_v
Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_map_proof

p_map_1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_map_2.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_map_3.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_map_4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_map_5.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_map_7.....	PROVED	13 seconds

Totals: 6 proofs, 6 attempted, 6 succeeded, 24 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_support_proof

p_support_1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_support_4.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_support_5.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_6.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_support_7.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_8.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_9.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_support_10.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_support_11.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_12.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_support_14.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_15.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 12 proofs, 12 attempted, 12 succeeded, 22 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_lemmas_prf

p_fr_com_1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_fr_com_2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_fc_A.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_fc_B.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_fc_A_1a.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_fc_A_1b.....	PROVED	10 seconds
p_fc_A_1c.....	PROVED	26 seconds
p_fc_A_1d.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_fc_A_1e.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_fc_A_1f.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_fc_A_2a.....	PROVED	12 seconds
p_fc_A_2b.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_fc_A_2c.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_fc_A_2d.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_fc_A_3a.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_fc_A_3b.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_fc_A_3c.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_fc_A_3d.....	PROVED	12 seconds

Totals: 18 proofs, 18 attempted, 18 succeeded, 145 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_lemmas

p_initial_working.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_initial_maj_cond.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_initial_maj.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_working_set_healthy.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_consensus_prop.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_maj_sent.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_rec_maj_exists.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_rec_maj_f_c.....	PROVED	10 seconds

Totals: 8 proofs, 8 attempted, 8 succeeded, 36 seconds.

Proof summary for module map_proofs

A0.....	PROVED	3 seconds
Corr_zero_basis_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
Corr_zero_ind_proof.....	PROVED	258 seconds
Corr_zero_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rt_is_T_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
goodclocks_prof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
all_nonfaulty_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
count_basis_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
count_ind_proof.....	PROVED	17 seconds
count_proof.....	PROVED	9 seconds
all_good_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
none_faulty_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
A2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
A2_aux.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C0.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C2.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C3.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C4.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C5.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C6.....	PROVED	0 seconds
C6_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
C6_opt.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 23 proofs, 23 attempted, 23 succeeded, 296 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma3

lemma3_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma1

lemma1_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma6

sub1_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
sub_A_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
sub2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
lemma6_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 13 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_hw_to_maj_hw_model_prf

eq_reflexive_k.....	PROVED	0 seconds
eq_symmetric_k.....	PROVED	0 seconds
eq_transitive_k.....	PROVED	1 seconds
eq_reflexive_t.....	PROVED	1 seconds
eq_symmetric_t.....	PROVED	1 seconds
eq_transitive_t.....	PROVED	2 seconds
k_maj_ax.....	PROVED	17 seconds
t_maj_ax.....	PROVED	100 seconds
t_maj_len_ax.....	PROVED	12 seconds

Totals: 9 proofs, 9 attempted, 9 succeeded, 134 seconds.

Proof summary for module frame_funs_to_gc_hw_prf

p_succ_cntr_ax.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_pred_cntr_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_psl.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_pred_succ_ax.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_succ_congruence.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_pred_congruence.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 6 proofs, 6 attempted, 6 succeeded, 9 seconds.

Proof summary for module gen_com_to_gc_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_majority_to_RS_maj_model_prf

eq_reflexive.....	PROVED	0 seconds
eq_symmetric.....	PROVED	0 seconds
eq_transitive.....	PROVED	0 seconds
maj_ax.....	PROVED	16 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 16 seconds.

Proof summary for module generic_FT_to_minimal_v

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DS_to_RS_prf

p_frame_commutates.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_initial_maps.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 3 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_invariants

p_base_state_ind.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_ind_state_ind.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_state_induction.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_maj_working_inv_l1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_maj_working_inv_l2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_maj_working_inv.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_state_rec_inv_l1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_state_rec_inv_l2.....	PROVED	10 seconds
p_state_rec_inv_l3.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_state_rec_inv_l4.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_state_rec_inv_l5.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_state_rec_inv.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 12 proofs, 12 attempted, 12 succeeded, 44 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma4

rearrange2_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
rearrange3_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
sublemma1_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
lemma2x_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
lemma4_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds

Totals: 5 proofs, 5 attempted, 5 succeeded, 12 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_to_minimal_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module gen_com_to_gc_hw_prf

p_mem_eq_LEM1_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_mem_eq_LEM1_TCC2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_mem_eq_LEM1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_p_mem_eq_LEM1_TCC3.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_mem_eq_LEM3.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_mem_eq_LEM4.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_memory_equal.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_etl1.....	PROVED	17 seconds
p_etl2.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_Is_et_lem_0.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_ets1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_ets2.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_ets3.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_ets4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_ets5.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_ets6.....	PROVED	23 seconds
p_Is_et_lem_s.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_Is_et_lem.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_et0.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_et1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_et2.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_et3.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_exec_task_ax.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_exec_task_ax_2.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 24 proofs, 24 attempted, 24 succeeded, 131 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_funs_to_minimal_hw

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_prf_4

ponv_base.....	PROVED	10 seconds
ponv_ind_1.....	PROVED	7 seconds
ponv_ind_2.....	PROVED	54 seconds
ponv_ind_3.....	PROVED	6 seconds
ponv_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
path_outputs_not_voted.....	PROVED	7 seconds
pcnv_base.....	PROVED	10 seconds
pcnv_ind_1.....	PROVED	6 seconds
pcnv_ind_2.....	PROVED	36 seconds
pcnv_ind_3.....	PROVED	10 seconds
pcnv_ind.....	PROVED	8 seconds
path_cells_not_voted.....	PROVED	11 seconds
lcnv_base.....	PROVED	10 seconds
lcnv_ind_1.....	PROVED	6 seconds
lcnv_ind_2.....	PROVED	46 seconds
lcnv_ind_3.....	PROVED	5 seconds
lcnv_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
last_cell_not_voted.....	PROVED	6 seconds
lcc_base.....	PROVED	10 seconds
lcc_ind_1.....	PROVED	6 seconds

lcc_ind_2.....	PROVED	40 seconds
lcc_ind_3.....	PROVED	7 seconds
lcc_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
last_cell_condition.....	PROVED	12 seconds
ncc_base.....	PROVED	8 seconds
ncc_ind_1.....	PROVED	10 seconds
ncc_ind_2.....	PROVED	35 seconds
ncc_ind_3.....	PROVED	11 seconds
ncc_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
next_cell_condition.....	PROVED	7 seconds
between_frames_self.....	PROVED	3 seconds
between_frames_prev.....	PROVED	58 seconds
between_frames_prev_2.....	PROVED	46 seconds
between_frames_prev_3.....	PROVED	17 seconds
between_frames_prev_4.....	PROVED	15 seconds
prev_between_frames.....	PROVED	61 seconds
input_path_one.....	PROVED	1 seconds
input_path_zero.....	PROVED	1 seconds
input_path_ext.....	PROVED	6 seconds
mod_minus_prev.....	PROVED	12 seconds
mod_minus_prev_max.....	PROVED	4 seconds
mod_minus_nonzero.....	PROVED	1 seconds
prev_fr_distinct.....	PROVED	3 seconds

Totals: 43 proofs, 43 attempted, 43 succeeded, 648 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_prf_3

long_path_cyclic.....	PROVED	2 seconds
cell_rec_path_acyclic.....	PROVED	6 seconds
path_len_bound.....	PROVED	1 seconds
NF_cell_rec_bound_2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
max_path_len_bound.....	PROVED	3 seconds
crpe_ind_1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
crpe_ind_2_1.....	PROVED	60 seconds
crpe_ind_2_2.....	PROVED	15 seconds
crpe_ind_2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
crpe_ind_3.....	PROVED	5 seconds
crpe_ind.....	PROVED	5 seconds
cell_rec_path_exists.....	PROVED	7 seconds
crip_base.....	PROVED	35 seconds
crip_ind_1.....	PROVED	41 seconds
crip_ind_2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
crip_ind.....	PROVED	4 seconds
cell_rec_input_path.....	PROVED	6 seconds
crb1_base.....	PROVED	7 seconds
crb1_lem_2.....	PROVED	18 seconds
crb1_ind_1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
crb1_lem_8.....	PROVED	54 seconds
crb1_lem_4.....	PROVED	6 seconds
crb1_lem_5.....	PROVED	3 seconds
crb1_lem_7.....	PROVED	3 seconds
crb1_lem_6.....	PROVED	2 seconds
crb1_ind_2_1.....	PROVED	23 seconds
crb1_ind_2_2.....	PROVED	8 seconds

crbi_ind_2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
crbi_lem_3.....	PROVED	2 seconds
crbi_ind_3.....	PROVED	5 seconds
crbi_ind.....	PROVED	9 seconds
crbi_lem_1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
NF_cell_rec_bound_1.....	PROVED	8 seconds

Totals: 33 proofs, 33 attempted, 33 succeeded, 361 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_prf_2

bncr_base.....	PROVED	4 seconds
bncr_ind_1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bncr_ind_2.....	PROVED	11 seconds
bncr_ind_3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bncr_ind.....	PROVED	6 seconds
bound_NF_cell_rec.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bcrp_base.....	PROVED	9 seconds
bcrp_ind_1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
bcrp_ind_2.....	PROVED	25 seconds
bcrp_ind_3.....	PROVED	4 seconds
bcrp_ind.....	PROVED	8 seconds
bound_cell_rec_path.....	PROVED	6 seconds
full_rec_base.....	PROVED	0 seconds
full_rec_ind.....	PROVED	5 seconds
full_rec.....	PROVED	3 seconds
full_rec_rp.....	PROVED	12 seconds
nf_crn_base.....	PROVED	5 seconds
nf_crn_ind.....	PROVED	15 seconds
NF_cell_rec_nonzero.....	PROVED	3 seconds
nf_v_sched.....	PROVED	20 seconds
NF_rec_set_nonempty.....	PROVED	2 seconds
NF_cell_rec_exists.....	PROVED	1 seconds
nf_crr_base.....	PROVED	1 seconds
nf_crr_ind_1.....	PROVED	107 seconds
nf_crr_ind_2.....	PROVED	42 seconds
nf_crr_ind_3.....	PROVED	10 seconds
nf_crr_ind.....	PROVED	3 seconds
NF_cell_rec_rcv.....	PROVED	3 seconds
mrf_nat_hack.....	PROVED	1 seconds
max_rec_frames_nonzero.....	PROVED	1 seconds
max_all_rec_set_nonzero.....	PROVED	5 seconds
recovery_period_min.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 32 proofs, 32 attempted, 32 succeeded, 327 seconds.

Proof summary for module RS_to_US_prf

p_frame_commutates.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_initial_maps.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 3 seconds.

Proof summary for module lemma4_opt

lemma4_self_proof.....	PROVED	22 seconds
lemma4_others_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 28 seconds.

Proof summary for module summations_alt

p_l1a0.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_l1a1.....	PROVED	34 seconds
p_l1a.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_l1b0.....	PROVED	29 seconds
p_l1b1.....	PROVED	69 seconds
p_l1b.....	PROVED	4 seconds
l1_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_l2p1.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_l2p4.....	PROVED	81 seconds
p_l2p3.....	PROVED	87 seconds
p_l2p.....	PROVED	10 seconds
l2_proof.....	PROVED	17 seconds
bound_faulty_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
l3posproof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
l3_proof.....	PROVED	267 seconds
S2_pqr_proof.....	PROVED	1 seconds
bound_nonfaulty_proof.....	PROVED	7 seconds
l4_proof.....	PROVED	393 seconds
l4aproof.....	PROVED	12 seconds
l5_proof.....	PROVED	26 seconds
culm_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds

Totals: 21 proofs, 21 attempted, 21 succeeded, 1068 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_minimal_hw_prf_2

p_cic_W1.....	PROVED	10 seconds
p_cic4E.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_cic4F.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_cic4D.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_cic4C.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_cic4B_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cic4B.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_CS_eq_need.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cic2.....	PROVED	14 seconds

Totals: 9 proofs, 9 attempted, 9 succeeded, 52 seconds.

Proof summary for module maj_funs_to_minimal_hw_prf

p_k_maj_ax.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_t_maj_ax.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_t_maj_len_ax.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 3 proofs, 3 attempted, 3 succeeded, 7 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_prf

p_recovery_period_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_succ_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_control_nc.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cells_nc.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_components_equal.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_full_recovery.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_initial_recovery.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_dep_recovery.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_control_recovered.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cell_recovered.....	PROVED	24 seconds

p_vote_maj.....	PROVED	17 seconds
p_cae_base.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cae_ind_1.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_cae_ind_2.....	PROVED	14 seconds
p_cell_apply_element.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_f_v_components.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_p_f_v_components_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_f_c_uncomputed_cells.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_exec_element_2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_exec_cells_match.....	PROVED	50 seconds
p_cil_ind_l1.....	PROVED	15 seconds
p_cil_ind_l2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_cil_ind_l3.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cil_ind.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_f_c_cells_match.....	PROVED	11 seconds
p_cell_input_frame_lem.....	PROVED	14 seconds
rec_set_equal_1.....	PROVED	6 seconds
rec_set_equal_2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
rec_set_equal.....	PROVED	7 seconds
NF_cell_rec_equiv.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 30 proofs, 30 attempted, 30 succeeded, 211 seconds.

Proof summary for module summations_opt

only_2_basis_proof.....	PROVED	13 seconds
proc_index_prop_proof.....	PROVED	4 seconds
only_2_ind_proof.....	PROVED	84 seconds
only_2_gen_proof.....	PROVED	115 seconds
only_2_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
bound_nonfaulty_self_proof.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_l4se2.....	PROVED	225 seconds
l4self_proof.....	PROVED	16 seconds
except_2_proof.....	PROVED	8 seconds
bound_nonfaulty_others_proof.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_l4ot1.....	PROVED	147 seconds
l4others_proof.....	PROVED	23 seconds
helper_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds
l4all_proof.....	PROVED	24 seconds
l4a_opt_proof.....	PROVED	9 seconds
l5_opt_proof.....	PROVED	18 seconds
culmination_opt_proof.....	PROVED	5 seconds

Totals: 17 proofs, 17 attempted, 17 succeeded, 705 seconds.

Proof summary for module minimal_v_to_minimal_hw_prf

p_cell_input_constraint.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_f_s_control_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_LEM1_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_LEM1_TCC2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_LEM1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_LEM2_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_LEM2_TCC2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_LEM2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_LEM3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_LEM3_TCC1.....	PROVED	2 seconds

p_LEM4.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_LEM5.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_LEM6.....	PROVED	12 seconds
p_f_s_ax.....	PROVED	30 seconds
p_cell_fn_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_f_v_TCC1.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cell_apply_MAP_EQ.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_f_v_ax.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_f_v_ax_TCC1.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 19 proofs, 19 attempted, 19 succeeded, 83 seconds.

Proof summary for module main_opt

basis_proof.....	PROVED	3 seconds
skew_S1C_proof.....	PROVED	2 seconds
ind_proof.....	PROVED	12 seconds
Theorem_1_opt_proof.....	PROVED	0 seconds

Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 17 seconds.

Proof summary for module clk_interface

p_sync_thm.....	PROVED	2 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 2 seconds.

Proof summary for module LE

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_minv

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module clkprop

p_nfc_a.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_nfc_lem.....	PROVED	10 seconds
p_ft2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_ft3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_ft4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_ft5.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_ft6.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_ft7.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_ft8.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_ft8a.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_ft9.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_ft10.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_ft11.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_ft12.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_GOAL.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 15 proofs, 15 attempted, 15 succeeded, 38 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_LE

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module to_DA_minv

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_to_DS

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_minv_to_LE

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_to_DA_minv

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_support

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_lemmas

Totals: 0 proofs, 0 attempted, 0 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_minv_to_LE_prf

p_broadcast_duration.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_broadcast_duration2.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_all_durations.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_pos_durations.....	PROVED	0 seconds
Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 2 seconds.		

Proof summary for module DA_to_DA_minv_prf

p_broadcast_duration.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_broadcast_duration2.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_all_durations.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_pos_durations.....	PROVED	1 seconds
Totals: 4 proofs, 4 attempted, 4 succeeded, 3 seconds.		

Proof summary for module DA_broadcast_prf

p_br1.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_br1a.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_br2.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_br3_aa.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_br3.....	PROVED	14 seconds
p_br4.....	PROVED	15 seconds
p_br5.....	PROVED	13 seconds
p_br6.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_br7.....	PROVED	14 seconds
p_br8.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_br9.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_rtp0a.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_rtp0.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_rtp1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_rtp2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_rtp3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_rtp4a.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_rtp4b.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_rtp4.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_rtp5.....	PROVED	7 seconds
p_rtp6.....	PROVED	2 seconds

p_rtp7.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_com_broadcast_5.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_br_int.....	PROVED	10 seconds
p_int0.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_int1a.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_int1.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_int2a.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_int2.....	PROVED	9 seconds
p_int3.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_int4.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_int5.....	PROVED	1 seconds

Totals: 32 proofs, 32 attempted, 32 succeeded, 157 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_support_prf

p_support_1.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_support_4.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_support_5.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_support_14.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_sl15_base.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_sl15_ind.....	PROVED	13 seconds
p_support_15.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_support_16.....	PROVED	30 seconds
p_map_1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_map_2.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_map_3.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_map_4.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_map_7.....	PROVED	13 seconds
p_base_state_ind.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_ind_state_ind.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_state_induction.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_enough_inv_l1.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_enough_inv_l2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_enough_inv.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_nfclk_inv_l1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_nfclk_inv_l2.....	PROVED	16 seconds
p_nfclk_inv.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l2b.....	PROVED	14 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l2c.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l1.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l2.....	PROVED	15 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l3.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_lclock_inv_l4.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_lclock_inv.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_clkval_inv_l1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_clkval_inv_l2.....	PROVED	22 seconds
p_clkval_inv.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_rtl1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_da_rt_lem.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cum_delta_inv_l1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_cdi_l2a.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_cum_delta_inv_l2.....	PROVED	12 seconds
p_cum_delta_inv_l4.....	PROVED	8 seconds
p_cum_delta_inv.....	PROVED	4 seconds

Totals: 39 proofs, 39 attempted, 39 succeeded, 205 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_lemmas_prf

p_phase_com_compute.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_phase_com_lx1.....	PROVED	5 seconds
p_phase_com_lx2.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_phase_com_lx4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_phase_com_lx7.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_phase_com_broadcast.....	PROVED	3 seconds
p_com_broadcast_1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_broadcast_2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_broadcast_3.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_broadcast_4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_earliest_later_time.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_elt_a.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_EL.T.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_phase_com_vote.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_vote_1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_vote_2.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_vote_3.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_vote_4.....	PROVED	4 seconds
p_phase_com_sync.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_com_sync_1.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_sync_2.....	PROVED	6 seconds
p_com_sync_3.....	PROVED	2 seconds
p_com_sync_4.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 23 proofs, 23 attempted, 23 succeeded, 61 seconds.

Proof summary for module le_top

p_dummy.....	PROVED	17 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 17 seconds.

Proof summary for module DA_to_DS_prf

p_phase_commutates.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_initial_maps.....	PROVED	2 seconds

Totals: 2 proofs, 2 attempted, 2 succeeded, 3 seconds.

Proof summary for module top

p_RS_frame_commutates.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_RS_initial_maps.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_DS_frame_commutates.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_DS_initial_maps.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_DA_phase_commutates.....	PROVED	1 seconds
p_DA_initial_maps.....	PROVED	0 seconds
p_dummy.....	PROVED	4 seconds

Totals: 7 proofs, 7 attempted, 7 succeeded, 6 seconds.

Proof summary for module everything

p_dumb.....	PROVED	0 seconds
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Totals: 1 proofs, 1 attempted, 1 succeeded, 0 seconds.

Grand Totals: 859 proofs, 859 attempted, 859 succeeded, 7422 seconds.

B.3 All Module Obligation Status (amos)

This report was reproduced by deleting entries for modules having no obligations.

Obligation proof status for modules on using chain of module everything

...

Obligation proof summary for module nat_types

upto_TCC1.....proved
upfrom_TCC1.....proved
below_TCC1.....proved
above_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 4 obligations, 4 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module interp_rcp

processors_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module numeric_types

posnum_TCC1.....proved
nonnegnum_TCC1.....proved
fraction_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module rcp_defs_i

processors_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module memory_generic

address_ty_TCC1.....proved
address_range_ty_TCC1.....proved
addr_len_ty_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module finite_sets

finite_set_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module absolutes

abs_recip_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module rcp_defs_hw

cs0_TCC1.....proved
write_cell_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 2 obligations, 2 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module path_funs

rec_set_TCC1.....proved
NF_rec_set_TCC1.....proved
path_len_set_TCC1.....proved
all_rec_set_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 4 obligations, 4 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module proc_induction

proc_plus_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module maxf_to_maxf_model

max_ax.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module recursive_maj

eq_reflexive.....proved
eq_symmetric.....proved
eq_transitive.....proved

Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module mailbox_hw

MBcell_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module time_maptime

C1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module algorithm

C6_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module juggle_opt

rearrange_delta_opt_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_hw

cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC1.....proved
f_s_mem_TCC1.....proved
f_s_lem_TCC1.....proved
f_s_lem_TCC2.....proved
cell_fn_TCC1.....proved
f_v_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 6 obligations, 6 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module rcp_defs_imp_to_hw

cells_ax.....proved
write_cell_ax.....proved
null_memory_ax.....proved
cebuf_ax.....proved
cell_state_reflexive.....proved
cell_state_symmetric.....proved
cell_state_transitive.....proved
control_state_reflexive.....proved
control_state_symmetric.....proved
control_state_transitive.....proved
frame_congruence.....proved
cs_length_congruence.....proved
write_cell_congruence.....proved

Totals: 13 obligations, 13 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_v

cell_fn_TCC1.....proved
f_v_ax_TCC1.....proved

Totals: 2 obligations, 2 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module algorithm_mapalgorithm

A0.....proved
A2.....proved
A2_aux.....proved
C0.....proved
C2.....proved
C3.....proved
C4.....proved
C5.....proved
C6.....proved
C6_TCC1.....proved
C6_opt.....proved

Totals: 11 obligations, 11 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module maj_hw_to_maj_hw_model

k_maj_ax.....proved
t_maj_ax.....proved
t_maj_len_ax.....proved
Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_hw_prf2
Fs1_TCC1.....proved
Fs2_TCC1.....proved
Fs3_TCC1.....proved
Fs3_TCC2.....proved
Totals: 4 obligations, 4 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_hw_prf
p_cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC2.....proved
p_cell_of_MB_map_lem_TCC3.....proved
Totals: 2 obligations, 2 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module frame_funs_to_gc_hw
succ_cntr_ax.....proved
pred_cntr_ax.....proved
pred_succ_ax.....proved
succ_congruence.....proved
pred_congruence.....proved
Totals: 5 obligations, 5 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module RS_majority_to_RS_maj_model
maj_ax.....proved
Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module rcp_defs_imp_to_hw_prf
c0b_TCC1.....proved
c1_TCC1.....proved
c2_TCC1.....proved
p_c2_TCC2.....proved
c3_TCC1.....proved
c7_TCC1.....proved
Totals: 6 obligations, 6 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module gen_com_to_gc_hw
memory_equal.....proved
exec_task_ax.....proved
exec_task_ax_2.....proved
Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module generic_FT_to_minimal_v
recovery_period_ax.....proved
succ_ax.....proved

```

control_nc.....proved
cells_nc.....proved
full_recovery.....proved
initial_recovery.....proved
dep_recovery.....proved
components_equal.....proved
control_recovered.....proved
cell_recovered.....proved
vote_maj.....proved
Totals: 11 obligations, 11 proved, 0 unproved.

```

...

```

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_v_to_minimal_hw
  cell_apply_MAP_EQ.....proved
  f_s_ax.....proved
  f_s_control_ax.....proved
  f_v_ax.....proved
  f_v_ax_TCC1.....proved
  cell_input_constraint.....proved
Totals: 6 obligations, 6 proved, 0 unproved.

```

```

Obligation proof summary for module gen_com_to_gc_hw_prf
  mem_eq_LEM1_TCC1.....proved
  mem_eq_LEM1_TCC2.....proved
  p_mem_eq_LEM1_TCC3.....proved
Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

```

```

Obligation proof summary for module maj_funs_to_minimal_hw
  k_maj_ax.....proved
  t_maj_ax.....proved
  t_maj_len_ax.....proved
Totals: 3 obligations, 3 proved, 0 unproved.

```

...

```

Obligation proof summary for module to_minimal_hw_prf_2
  cic4B_TCC1.....proved
Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

```

...

```

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_v_prf
  p_f_v_components_TCC1.....proved
Totals: 1 obligations, 1 proved, 0 unproved.

```

...

```

Obligation proof summary for module minimal_v_to_minimal_hw_prf
  LEM1_TCC1.....proved
  LEM1_TCC2.....proved
  LEM2_TCC1.....proved
  LEM2_TCC2.....proved

```

LEM3_TCC1.....proved
Totals: 5 obligations, 5 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Obligation proof summary for module DA_minv_to_LE
broadcast_duration.....proved
broadcast_duration2.....proved
all_durations.....proved
pos_durations.....proved
Totals: 4 obligations, 4 proved, 0 unproved.

Obligation proof summary for module DA_to_DA_minv
broadcast_duration.....proved
broadcast_duration2.....proved
all_durations.....proved
pos_durations.....proved
Totals: 4 obligations, 4 proved, 0 unproved.

...

Grand Totals: 123 obligations, 123 proved, 0 unproved.

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