https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20140005859 2019-08-29T14:08:26+00:00Z



NASA Space Activities presented to the Wells Branch Community Library Science Night

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What's Hot?







NASA







What's Hot 2?





<u>Robonaut</u> - *spring board to evolve new robotic capabilities; operate for extended duration*


tasks, e "Legs" a in 2014-

What's Hot 3?




ChemCam

NASA








The '7 Minutes of Terror'* NASA **Guided Entry** Heatshield Jettison Parachute

Powered Descent Skycrane


Rover

Touchdown



Descent Flyaway

*If you have not seen the video, watch it!







How Did We Do?



Curiosity landed here

International Space Station





What do We Do for NASA?

Materials and Processes (M&P)

Space Environments and its Effects

Basic Function of M&P



Materials Selection, Requirements and Certification

- Verification of Safe Use of Materials
- Materials Selection for Design
- Flammability
- Fracture Control
- Offgassing (Toxicity/Odor)
- Fluid Compatibility (Oxygen, Propellants)
- Corrosion/Stress Corrosion Resistance
- Outgassing (Thermal Vacuum Stability/Contamination)
- Material Analysis/Failure Analysis
- Materials Process Control/Review (Manufacturing Processes)
- Particulate Contamination Control during Ground Build/Processing (FOD)
- Fracture Control and Pressure Vessel Certification

Flammability and Toxicity



24.1% oxygen at 14.7 psia established by life support system throughout ISS.


- 30% oxygen at 10.2 psia conditions in the US Airlock.
- 34% oxygen baseline for the future.
 - Enhanced oxygen testing for all new materials.
- Combustion products or offgassing testing for toxins at WSTF.



M&P ISSUE Ground Contamination

NASA







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M&P Issue Flawed Process





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




M&P ISSUE Process Refinement




Pre-flight Image Photofoil Label







M&P Issue Lubrication Issue








The Space Environment



Materials on the outside of spacecraft are exposed to many environmental threats that can be very harmful to the spacecraft & its operation

These threats include:

- Sun's radiation (ultraviolet (UV), x-rays)
- "Solar wind" particle radiation (electrons, protons)
- Thermal cycling (hot & cold cycles)
- Micrometeoroids & debris impacts (space particles)
- Atomic oxygen (single oxygen atom)



Space Environmental Effects : Contamination





Space Environmental Effects : Inadequate Venting





Space Environmental Effects : Inadvertent Materials Substitution







Battery Box used the 'wrong' grade of beta cloth

Space Environmental Effects : Debris Impact










Space Environmental Effects : Operational Result of a Probable Debris Impact








Ionizing Radiation on ISS




- The on-orbit Space Station must perform when exposed to the radiation dose environment. Class S parts used extensively in the electrical power system (EPS).
- Mil-883B parts used in the vast majority of ISS avionics hardware.
- High quality and reliability of Mil-883B parts in the late 80's and early 90's a direct result of the automotive industry demands on microelectronics producers – not military or aerospace space demands.
- **Metrics for Measuring Performance:**
 - Single Event Effects (SEE)
 - Total Ionizing Dose (TID)












ISS IBM ThinkPad PCS Predictions and Results



12/5



Laptop	Predicted (200 MeV box level proton testing) Reboots/Day (radiation)	Observed Reboots/Day (radiation)
Service Module PCS	0.04	0.02
Lab Robotics Work Station PCS	0.04	0.01
Lab PCS	0.04	0.04
All	0.13	0.08

Predicted Radiation Induced Anomaly^{*} Rate vs. In-Flight Anomaly Rate for Three IBM Thinkpad Laptop 760 XD Computers (PCS) on ISS * Anomalies requiring reboot or power cycling for recovery and not attributable to causes other than

SEE causes

ISS Functional Interrupts



Equipment acronyms

C&DH


APS – attached Payload Switch MDM – Multiplexer-De-Multiplexer C&T Audio AIU – Audio Interface Unit ATU – Audio Interface Unit AUAI – ACS/UCS Audio Interface Unit IAC – Internal Audio Controller RAIU – Russian Audio Interface Unit

S-Band

ACBSP – Assembly and Contingency Baseband Signal Processor Video VSW – Video Switch

Ku-Band

SGTRC – Space-to-Ground Transmitter/Receiver Controller If you want, I can regroup by function (C&DH, Audio, Video, etc



No hard failures on ISS system hardware in 10 years of flight


Unscreened or tested payload systems have occasionally suffered hard failures




What's Next?



Inflatable Space Modules
















Commercial Resupply











Orion











Commercial Crew




















Back-up

NASA

The Video



http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ki Af o9Q9s

