

Armstrong Flight Research Center

X-Plane Structures Challenges/Lessons Learned Briefing to the 2016 NESC Structures TDT F2F Meeting Randy Thompson, Chief, Aerostructures Branch May 2016



Outline



- X-planes introduction
- Recent (30 years) of structures related X-planes and research aircraft
- ARMD New Aviation Horizons Plan
- Structures lessons learned (four of many)
- Summary

X-Plane Designation



- 70 years of X-planes (Bell X-1 First flight 19 Jan 1946)
- Original designation "XS" for eXperimental Supersonic
- "X" identifies research craft designed for experimental and developmental research programs which are not intended for production beyond a limited number built solely for flight research

"Recent" Research Aircraft





- Flight research just not with X-planes
- Research aircraft include purpose-built aircraft without an "X" designation and aircraft (significantly) modified for specific research

NEW AVIATION HORIZONS

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JIL JIM

ARMD New Aviation Horizons Plan



- $2014 \rightarrow 2034$ (est) Global Aviation Industry
 - − 3.3B → 7B Passenger Trips; 58M → 105M Jobs; $2.4T \rightarrow 6T$ GDP
- ARMD 10 Year X-Plane Plan
 - Research/Demonstrate new airframe and propulsion technologies
 - Distributed ~\$4.25B budget increase over next 10 years
- Ultra-Efficient Subsonic Transports (UEST)

D-8: Prop/AF integration enables reduced drag

9. 2.

HWB: Aerodynamically efficient

shape enables reduced drag

TBW: Very high AR substantially increases wing efficiency

Supersonic Low Boom Flight Demonstration

- Demonstrate boom noise reduction
- Support international regulation changes
- Hybrid Electric Propulsion
 - Integration and demonstration

New Aviation Horizons Flight Demo Plan



Structures Lessons Learned



- Executing fwd \rightarrow Remembering the past to succeed in the future
- Lessons learned from programmatic to technical



Flight-Research vs. Developmental T&E



	Flight Research	DT&E
Purpose	Discover something new or validate a theoretical principle	Verify and validate proper operation in flight environment to show works as designed
Predicted outcomes	Typically high uncertainty	Typically high confidence
Measure of Success	Quality of data produced	Match predictions and validate operation

- Changes perspective on technical risk \rightarrow Take it! (more on that later)
- Changes perspective on "failure" \rightarrow "Fail early, fail often."
- Changes perspective on scope \rightarrow Limited vs. Complete
- Changes perspective on expected results \rightarrow Data is key
- "Learn by doing" \rightarrow Build, fly, learn...

"We will ask big questions, seek multi-disciplinary solutions, and demonstrate their feasibility in 18-36 months" – ARMD AA

Take the Right Kind of Risk



Programmatic Risk

– Unacceptable to fail due to inadequate planning, management, etc.

Technical Risk

- Technical failure is OK
- Can learn as much from technical failure as technical success
- Lean forward and accept risk of failing to meet the technical objectives
- Take the right technical risk
- Example: First X-56 flex-wing flight takeoff mishap → Accepted risk of mishap due to flutter, but not takeoff mishap

Safety Risk

- Edwards AFB, street names, conference room names, etc.
- Hazards must be identified, mitigation implemented, and risk assessed and accepted
- Misconception of taking risk in Convergent Aeronautics Solutions (CAS)





Capt Glenn Edwards Sat, 5 June 1948, AM YB-49

Judson Brohmer Tues, 17 July 2001, 0700 F-16

Understand Airworthiness



- NASA granted authority to conduct airworthiness and safety review processes for "Public Use" aircraft outside of FAA regulations
- NPR7900.3C (Aircraft Operations Management Manual)
 - 2.3.2 Center Directors shall establish airworthiness, flight safety, mission readiness, and configuration control review processes and procedures to identify any hazards, to manage the risks associated with flight programs, to ensure safe flight operations, to manage and thoroughly document aircraft configurations, and to ensure that flight objectives satisfy programmatic requirements.
- Airworthiness = Capability of an aircraft to be operated within a prescribed flight envelope in accord with the project's safety risk posture



- Big picture: Understand loads / Understand strength
- To support the airworthiness process, Structures Engineers gather airworthiness evidence through analysis and ground/flight-test to increase airworthiness confidence in accord with a project's safety risk posture
- X-planes and research aircraft are not normally "certified" operational systems (either FAA or DoD)
 - Airworthiness guidelines are tailored to meet mission requirements
 - Multiple paths to airworthiness
 - Can accept higher risk (in many cases the higher risk is mitigated through shorter life, more inspections, instrumentation, ground test, etc.)
 - Can trade envelope for margin
 - Can trade real-time monitoring for margin
 - Can disregard (in many cases) fatigue concerns
 - Example:

Quiet SuperSonic		Convergent Electric Propulsion
Technology (QueSST)	VS	Scalable Technology and
Aircraft (LBFD)		Operations Research (SCEPTOR)

F.S. = 1.8

F.S. = 1.5

Limit Load

Ultimate Load

Considerations

- Design FS
- Confidence in external, internal, and thermal loads analysis
- Instrumentation?
- Ground/flight testing
- Structural inspections^{F.S. = 1.2} (type & intervals) Limit
- Flight envelope limitations
- Flight environment limitations
- Control law tailoring
- Fatigue considerations (usually of little concern)



Operation on case by

Operated to 100% DLL

case basis

* Flight Strain Survey Validated FEM Monitor + Expand to 100% DLL

Ref: G-7123.1-001B2 (Aircraft Structural Safety of Flight Guidelines)



M.S. = Allowable/Ultimate-1

F.S. = Factor of Safety























AFTI/F-11 Mission Adaptive Wing (MAW) Variable camber LE & TE



F-106/C-141 Tow Launch Demonstration



AFTI/F-16XL2 Supersonic Laminar Flow Control Glove and Attachments







F-8 Supercritical Wing Research Aircraft





D-8 UEST

Scalable Convergent Electric Propulsion Technology and Operations Research (SCEPTOR)

Quiet SuperSonic Technology (QueSST) Low Boom Flight Demonstrator (LBFD)

TX TX









Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA)









- A Word About Composites...
- Difficulty of Composites
 - Mechanical performance VERY dependent upon Materials and Processes (M&P)
 - Variance of material properties
 - Requires characterization of material properties and structural features

AFRC Aerostructures Philosophy

- Airworthiness requires a close link between design, analysis, and manufacturing (including material perf) to understand "as built" performance
- Relationship easier to establish when working with high pedigree OEMs
 - $_{\odot}$ $\,$ Proven processes and ability to leverage design databases
- Employ a "building block approach" appropriately scoped for prototype flight
- Many paths to airworthiness \rightarrow Tailorable based on risk posture, M&P, etc.

Understand the Requirements



- X-planes/Research aircraft have unique requirements
 - Unique research
 - Unique mission
 - Unique flight envelope
 - Unique airframe and systems
- Design and airworthiness methodology should be tailored to meet unique research/mission requirements
 - Not held to Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), Joint Service Specification Guides (JSSG), etc.
- Structures design and airworthiness methodology needs to be technically adequate (not technically meticulous) to meet the experiment's intent in accord with the project's safety risk posture
- Example
 - SCEPTOR An electric-aero-propulsion integration experiment; Expected flight time of 30 min within EDW restricted area with EDW lakebed as landing mitigation
 - QueSST Expected flight time of 90-120 min over multiple CONUS metro areas including ferry to those locations (ferry OCONUS???)

Have the Ability to Learn the Right Info



- "Everyone" thinks Developmental Flight Instrumentation (DFI) is important
- "Everyone" wants DFI (Eng/Res always want more data)
- Projects need DFI (Eng/Res need some data)
- However ...
 - Instrumentation development is often a project's afterthought and/or the last thing identified in the budget
 - Projects often want the minimum amount of DFI thus limiting understanding of <u>nominal</u> and <u>off-nominal</u> events
 - Projects want other projects to pay for their DFI development \rightarrow Bad assumption that someone else is developing what you need
 - Projects often only want COTS DFI, but right DFI for the project's application does not exist (because no one paid for it to be on the shelf & ready to use)
- Early involvement integral to experiment success
 - DFI can be long-lead procurement item
 - Design in structurally imbedded DFI
 - DFI development time/effort needed (sensors and packaging)
 - Example: Hypersonics High temp sensors for flight → New sensor, minimum form factor, minimum weight, severe environment

Learn the Right Info (Cont)



F-111 MAW

X-53 AAV

Lucky or Good?

- Structural DFI needed to understand performance impacting experiment
 - Example: QueSST/LBFD Primary experiment boom reduction/characterization
 → Need to understand airframe deflection to understand impact on boom →
 FOSS deflection and twist determination → Roadmap developed to meet project
 requirement while leveraging other efforts
- Structural DFI needed to understand performance in event of mishap
 - Example: Hypersonics experiments where additional info would have been helpful in understanding event
- Purposed and opportune → Need big picture view to develop meas and test technology/techniques as a priority for future NASA efforts

Strain gage loads measurement techniques on composites proven on HiMAT then utilized on X-29



Highly Maneuverable Aircraft Technology (HiMAT)

Electro-optical Flight Deflection Measurement System (FDMS) developed for HiMAT then utilized on AFTI/F-111 MAW, X-29, and X-53 AAW

X-29

Summary



- Proposed budgets and research acknowledges need for USA to lead in aeronautics research – for nation and world
- If proposed budgets become reality → Very exciting time for NASA to significantly impact our nation's economy for years to come
- Lessons Learned

#1 – Understand the uniqueness of flight research vs. DT&E

#2 – Understand risk; Take technical risk; Do not compromise on safety risk

#3 – Understand tailorable/adequate airworthiness processes applicable to aeronautics research

#4 – Make sure you have the ability to learn the right information from the research; Work DFI development early