

## Targeted opportunities to address the climate-trade dilemma in China

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The authors declare no competing financial interests. Readers are welcome to comment on the online version of the paper.

1 **[Introductory Paragraph]**

2 **International trade has become the fastest growing driver of global carbon emissions, with**  
3 **emerging countries are the major producer of the trade embodied emissions an.**

4 **International trade with emerging countries poses a dilemma for climate and trade policy:**

5 **To the extent emerging markets have comparative advantages in manufacturing, such trade**  
6 **is economically efficient and desirable. However, if carbon intensive manufacturing in**

7 **emerging countries such as China entails drastically more CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than making the**  
8 **same product elsewhere, then trade increases global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Here we show that the**

9 **emissions embodied in Chinese exports, which are larger than the annual emissions of**

10 **Japan or Germany, are primarily contributed by China's coal-based energy mix and very**  
11 **high emissions intensity (emission per unit of economic value) in a few provinces and**

12 **industry sectors. Exports from these province-sectors therefore represent targeted**

13 **opportunities to address the climate-trade dilemma by improving production technologies**

14 **and decarbonizing the underlying energy systems or reducing trade volumes. [157 words].**

15 Despite international efforts to reduce CO<sub>2</sub> emissions<sup>1,2</sup>, global emissions have increased by an  
16 average of 3.1% per year since 2000<sup>3,4</sup>. Economic growth has been identified as the main driver  
17 of the sharp increase of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the 2000s, and in particular the rapid industrialization  
18 of China<sup>5</sup>, which is the world's largest carbon emitter since 2006<sup>6</sup>. However, China is also the  
19 world's largest net exporter of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions embodied in goods and services: In 2007,  
20 emissions in China were 7.3 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>, (production-based emissions), of which 1.7 Gt (23%) were  
21 related to goods exported and ultimately consumed in other countries<sup>7,8</sup>. In contrast, only 0.2 Gt  
22 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were embodied in products imported to China from other countries. As of 2008,  
23 Chinese trade accounts for a third of all emissions embodied in global trade, and these traded  
24 emissions have been growing faster than global emissions<sup>9</sup>. The magnitude and growth of  
25 emissions embodied in Chinese trade pose a dilemma for trade and climate policy: To the extent  
26 China and other emerging markets have comparative advantages in manufacturing, international  
27 trade is economically efficient and desirable<sup>10</sup>. However, if carbon intensive manufacturing in  
28 China entails drastically more carbon emissions than making the same production elsewhere, then  
29 trade increases global carbon emissions. Yet, although previous studies have quantified  
30 emissions embodied in China's trade<sup>7,11-13</sup>, none have quantified the underlying factors driving  
31 these emissions, leaving open the question of how to mitigate such embodied emissions.

32 Here, we decompose the key factors contributing to the prodigious imbalance of emissions  
33 embodied in China's international trade (See Methods for details): (1) the large trade surplus  
34 between China and its trading partners, (2) the structure of the Chinese economy (i.e.  
35 specialization in energy-intensive production), (3) the energy mix of China's production (i.e.  
36 energy mainly supplied by fossil fuels) and (4) the emissions intensity of Chinese production (i.e.  
37 the emissions produced per unit of economic output)<sup>10,11</sup>. China is a country with substantial  
38 regional differences in technology, energy mix and economic development, as well as large  
39 volumes of interprovincial trade<sup>8,14,15-17</sup>, our analysis assessed the magnitude and intensity of  
40 emissions from 46 industry sectors (Extended Data Table 1) traded among 30 Chinese  
41 provinces/cities and 129 other countries/regions .

42 Details of analytic approach are presented in *Methods*. We track emissions embodied in trade  
43 among 159 regions using a global multiregional input–output (MRIO) model of emissions and  
44 trade as of the year 2007. The trade and emissions data supporting the model are a combination  
45 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAPv8) and province-level input-output tables of China  
46 that we constructed<sup>8,15,18</sup>. We analyze the driving factors of emissions embodied in international  
47 trade using an improved index decomposition approach (IDA)<sup>15,19</sup>. The results presented below

48 and in the figures reflect only international trade. Our model links physical production of  
49 emissions with the consumption of final goods without regard for the location of intermediate  
50 consumption. For example, emissions related to components manufactured in Inner Mongolia  
51 that become part of a product assembled in Beijing and exported to another country are assigned  
52 to Inner Mongolia. If the same final product were exported to another Chinese province, the  
53 embodied emissions are consumed domestically and are therefore excluded from our analyses.

#### 54 **Magnitude and intensity of emissions embodied in Chinese exports**

55 Figure 1 shows the top 5 countries and the top 5 Chinese provinces whose exports (first row),  
56 imports (second row) and net trade (third row) embody the greatest CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (first column),  
57 including the greatest emissions per unit of economic output (second column) and per capita  
58 (third column). China is the largest net exporter of embodied emissions, by a large margin (Fig.  
59 1g) with 8 times more emissions embodied in its exports than its imports (Figs. 1a and 1d). In  
60 contrast, this ratio of emissions embodied in exports to imports is much less in other major  
61 exporting nations (e.g., 0.5 in the U.S., 0.5 in Japan, 1.3 in India, 1.2 in Canada, 0.5 in Germany  
62 and 1.5 in Australia).

63 All of the 30 Chinese provinces assessed are net exporters of embodied emissions, meaning that  
64 in all cases the emissions embodied in exports exceed the emissions embodied in imports. Figure  
65 1 also highlights the significance of particular Chinese provinces; 7 of the top 10 net exporting  
66 regions are Chinese provinces—larger than many large nations (Fig. 1g). Furthermore, the ratio  
67 of emissions embodied in exports to imports in these Chinese provinces is immense: 11 of  
68 China's 30 provinces export more than 10 times as much emissions as they import, including  
69 Xinjiang, Shanxi, and Hebei, whose export-import ratios are the largest of any region in our  
70 model: 25, 19 and 16, respectively. Five provinces account for 46% of the 1,671 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>  
71 embodied in China's exports in 2007: Shandong (178 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>), Jiangsu (173 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>),  
72 Guangdong (161 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>), Hebei (139 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>) and Zhejiang (111 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>) (Fig. 1a).

73 China's provinces are also the most carbon-intensive exporters in the world. The average  
74 emissions embodied per dollar of Chinese exports is 1,357 g CO<sub>2</sub>/\$, which is about 6 times the  
75 average emissions embodied per dollar of China's international imports (230 g CO<sub>2</sub>/\$). This is  
76 reflected in the very high emissions embodied per dollar of exports from individual provinces,  
77 which comprise all of the top 10 regions in this category (Fig. 1b). The provinces with the  
78 greatest emissions intensity of exports also tend to be less economically developed; provinces  
79 where GDP is less than \$4,000 per capita show the largest difference in the emission intensity of  
80 exports and imports (Extended Data Fig. 1). About 80% of China's export-related emissions are

81 produced by these poorer regions where the emissions intensity of exports is more than 5 times  
82 the emissions intensity of imports. For example, in Guizhou, where per capita GDP was \$900 in  
83 2007, the emissions intensity of international exports was almost 31 times of the emissions  
84 intensity of imports (Extended Data Fig. 1). Similarly high ratios exist in the also poor provinces  
85 of Inner Mongolia, Yunnan and Gansu. In the more affluent coastal provinces, ratios of  
86 emissions intensity of exports to imports are much smaller: ratios in Beijing, Zhejiang and  
87 Shanghai are 2.8, 3.0 and 4.1, respectively. But even these ratios are still much higher than those  
88 of other large trading nations such as U.S. (0.8), Germany (0.4), Japan (0.2), Canada (1.1), the  
89 UK (0.3), and India (1.7).

90 Although it is the most populous country in the world, since 2013 China's per capita emissions  
91 are approaching the average level in Europe when one ignores the fact that a large fraction of  
92 emissions are destined to exports<sup>20,21</sup>. However, the per capita net export of embodied emissions  
93 from some Chinese provinces is also much larger than most developed countries, three Chinese  
94 provinces among the top 10 in the category of global 159 regions (Fig. 1i), and 15 of China's 30  
95 provinces could listed as the world top 30 regions with the highest net trade emissions per-capita.

96 Figure 2 shows the destination of exports from the five provinces whose exports embody the  
97 greatest emissions (see also Fig. 1g). Just five provinces, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guangdong, Hebei  
98 and Zhejiang, represent 10.7%, 10.4%, 9.7%, 8.3% and 6.7% of all emissions embodied in  
99 China's exports, respectively (Fig. 2). As previous studies have shown<sup>22,23</sup>, developed countries  
100 are the primary importers of Chinese embodied emissions, foremost among them the U.S. (395  
101 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>, 24% of China's exported emissions and 44% of the U.S.'s imported emissions,  
102 respectively), the EU (422 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>, 25% and 42%, respectively) and Japan (149 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>, 9% and  
103 48%).

#### 104 **Driving factors of China's carbon intensive trade**

105 Several factors can contribute to the observed differences in the magnitude and intensity of  
106 emissions embodied in exports and imports. First, in recent years China has become a "factory for  
107 the world," with high concentrations of global heavy industry and manufacturing. For example,  
108 China produces 60%, 51% and 65% (by mass) of the world's cement, steel and coke ,  
109 respectively<sup>24</sup>. Such large imbalances in the volume of traded products may correspond to  
110 similarly large imbalances in the emissions embodied in traded products. Figure 3 compares the  
111 percentage of emissions related to consumed goods that are imported (y-axis) and the percentage  
112 of produced emissions that are embodied in exports for a number of industry sectors in China (Fig.  
113 3a) and Europe (Fig. 3b). For example, 34% (26 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>) of emissions produced by the

114 European metal production industry are embodied in products exported from Europe in 2007, but  
115 emissions embodied in all metal products consumed in Europe were 140 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>, 64% of which  
116 (90 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>) were imported from outside Europe (Fig. 3a; red circle labeled “Metal”) . In  
117 comparison, the share of emissions produced by China’s metal production sector that is exported  
118 is similar to Europe’s (33%; Fig. 3b), but the share of emissions related to Chinese consumption  
119 of metals that is imported is much lower: 11% .

120 Overall, Figure 3 highlights that, across many industry sectors, the share of European  
121 consumption (import from other countries) is consistently greater than the share of produced  
122 emissions that are exported, and the opposite is true for China. These trade imbalances are  
123 evident for both industries (yellow circles) and secondary industries (red and purple circles).

124 A second factor influencing emissions embodied in trade is the trade structure. Figure 4 shows  
125 the industry categories that make up Chinese imports, exports and domestic consumption.  
126 Emissions embodied in heavy, energy-intensive products such as metal and non-metal products  
127 and equipment make up much larger shares of China’s exports (37% and 22%, respectively) than  
128 its imports (19% and 16%, respectively; light green and dark blue bars in Fig. 4). Meanwhile,  
129 mining products is the category with the greatest proportion of emissions embodied in Chinese  
130 imports (23%). The dominance of these industries in Chinese trade implies that China is not just  
131 the world’s workshop, but is engaged in the most emission-intensive stages of manufacturing: the  
132 smelting and processing of raw materials. This pattern is visible at the province level, as well; in  
133 Shandong, where emissions embodied in trade are largest, 8 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> are embodied in imports of  
134 mining products from other countries (42% of all emissions embodied in imports) and 60 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>  
135 are embodied in exported metal and non-metal products (34% of emissions embodied in the  
136 province’s exports).

137 The third major factor is emissions intensity, or CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per dollar of output in each  
138 particular industry. Such emissions intensity reflects both energy intensity (energy consumed per  
139 dollar of output) and carbon intensity of energy (CO<sub>2</sub> per unit of energy consumed). The  
140 combination of a carbon-intensive power industry, relying primarily on coal, and of a relatively  
141 low value-added of industry thus translate into a high emissions intensity of Chinese production  
142 (Figs. 1b, 1h, and 2). In 2007, 75% of China’s primary energy was supplied by coal, the highest  
143 level among major energy-consuming nations. As a result, the carbon intensity of energy  
144 consumption in general (for internal consumption and exports combined) in China is extremely  
145 high: Chinese exports entail 61 tCO<sub>2</sub>/PJ on average, which is almost triple the carbon intensity of  
146 imports to China, 24 tCO<sub>2</sub>/PJ. The energy intensity of China’s exports is similarly high; in 2007,

147 China consumed 22 MJ per dollar of output, on average, or more than twice the energy intensity  
148 of products imported to China (9 MJ/\$). This high energy intensity is underpinned by low value-  
149 added and less advanced technology of China's production, as previously suggested by other  
150 studies<sup>22,25</sup> covering the 2002-2010 time period.

151 Extended Data Figure 2 further indicated that the industry sectors with the greatest emissions  
152 intensity in each of the six Chinese top carbon export provinces (see also Fig. 1b). Although  
153 there is some variation among the emissions intensity of sectors in these six provinces, the  
154 manufacture of heavy industrial materials for export (e.g., mining products, chemical products,  
155 metal/non-metal products, and energy) is many times higher than the emissions intensity of  
156 similar products that are imported and consumed in China (Extended Data Figure 1, 2 and 3).

157 Figure 5 shows the contribution of the different factors to the net emissions embodied in trade  
158 of each Chinese province. Four factors are decomposed: (1) differences in the total economic  
159 value of exports and imports (trade volume, black bars), where greater trade volumes correspond  
160 to greater embodied emissions; (2) differences in sectors responsible for exports and imports  
161 (economic structure, orange bars), where greater shares of energy and emission intensive heavy  
162 industry and manufacturing, for example, correspond to greater embodied emissions; (3)  
163 differences in the carbon-intensity of energy used to produce exports and imports, where a greater  
164 share of low-carbon energy sources such as renewables and nuclear correspond to less embodied  
165 emissions; and (4) differences in the sectoral energy intensity of exports and imports, where  
166 greater shares of low-energy, high value-added products correspond to less embodied emissions  
167 (shown combined with (3) as emissions intensity, purple bars).

168 On average, the high energy intensity of sectors and the coal-dominated energy mix accounted  
169 for 43.3% and 43.0% of the net emissions embodied in exports, respectively (Fig. 5). In  
170 comparison, the structural preference for manufacturing and heavy industry accounted for only 8%  
171 of the net emissions embodied in exports, and less than 6% of the net exports are related to the  
172 larger volume of exports than imports. Emissions intensity (contributed by both energy intensity  
173 and carbon intensity of sectoral energy use) is the most important factor underlying the large net  
174 exports of embodied emissions, accounting 86% of the emissions embodied in exports, or 1,438  
175 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> of emissions. All 30 regions are net exporters of emissions, but only 11 of the 30 would  
176 remain net exporters of emissions if differences in emissions intensity were eliminated. The  
177 emission intensive manufacturing reflects China's current development status with features  
178 discussed above.

179

180 **Discussion**

181 We show that the very large quantities of emissions embodied exported from China on net are  
182 likely due primarily to Chinese reliance on coal energy and the very high energy intensity of the  
183 exporting industries, which are in turn geographically concentrated in a small number of less-  
184 developed provinces.

185 Our analysis is based on aggregated sectors (e.g., “electronic equipment and machinery”) rather  
186 than the specific products (e.g., iPhones), such that we may underestimate the effect of economic  
187 structure on net trade of emissions if differences in production are too specialized to be reflected  
188 by the 46 sectors in our model (Extended Data Table 1). The comprehensive data necessary to  
189 support product-level analysis are not yet available. However, we also used up-to-date and  
190 independent life cycle analysis datasets (PRé SimaPro LCA 7.3 dataset<sup>26</sup> for Europe and RCEES  
191 2012 database<sup>27</sup> for China) to investigate the carbon emission per unit product of the production  
192 process for a sample of 15 industrial products made in Europe and China (Table 1). Doing so  
193 revealed that the emissions per unit mass of each product (kg CO<sub>2</sub>/kg) for Chinese products was  
194 on average 4.4 times higher than the same products made in Europe, ranging from 1.4 times as  
195 high for copper production to 18.4 times as high for propylene production (Table 1).

196 Product-level data are therefore entirely consistent with our more aggregate sector-level analysis  
197 showing that production in China is several times as carbon intensive as the same production in  
198 other countries, supporting our conclusion that the emissions intensity of Chinese production is  
199 the main factor driving the country’s large net exports of embodied emissions. This suggests that,  
200 although international trade with China may be economically optimal given comparative  
201 advantages in labor costs, for instance, such trade is on average causing increase global CO<sub>2</sub>  
202 emissions relative to production taking place in the countries which now import from China.

203 However, because Chinese emissions intensity is highest in a small number of provinces and  
204 sectors, targeted changes in primary energy generation and improvements in the technology used  
205 by these industrial sectors and provinces could drastically reduce the emissions embodied in  
206 Chinese exports and thereby global emissions. For example, if the emissions intensity of China’s  
207 international exports were equal to the intensity of its imports, total emissions embodied in  
208 exports as of 2007 would be reduced by 86%, from 1,671 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> to 233 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>. In this  
209 hypothetical, the avoided emissions are roughly equivalent to the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of Japan.  
210 Even without improving the energy intensity of its economy, decarbonizing China’s energy  
211 supply to the global average of emissions per \$GDP would reduce the emissions embodied in  
212 Chinese exports by 43% (619 MtCO<sub>2</sub>). Similarly, Chinese targets to increase the share of energy



213 produced from renewable sources to 20% of the total by 2020 could reduce exported emissions  
214 by 5%.

215 National economic policy underlines China's carbon-intensive exports. China has for many  
216 years prioritized economic growth over environmental management, maintaining 10% economic  
217 growth over the past decade, even as the world experienced a global economic crisis that slowed  
218 consumption in the major developed countries that consume most of China's exports. The  
219 Chinese government has sustained such a high level of economic growth in part by large capital  
220 investments in energy-intensive infrastructure and by favoring industry sectors with high  
221 emissions intensity<sup>28</sup>, which has caused China's national carbon intensity to increase by 3%  
222 during 2002-2009<sup>5,29</sup>.

223 There is a now large opportunity to improve the emissions intensity of the Chinese economy by  
224 focusing on a small number of provinces and sectors where more energy-efficiency technologies  
225 can be installed and by shifting the Chinese energy systems away from coal towards lower-carbon  
226 energy sources. Such improvements can be supported by both domestic and international efforts  
227 to deploy best-available technologies into critical and still underdeveloped Chinese provinces.  
228 Until the vast difference between the emissions intensity of Chinese exports and domestic  
229 production in developed countries is reduced, international trade with China conflicts with efforts  
230 to reduce global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

231 (2947 words)

232

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294 **Methods (online only)**

295 **Production-based accounting of emissions.** Emissions resulting from combustion of fossil fuels or  
 296 cement production within a territory, or production-based emissions, are the primary basis for national  
 297 emission inventories<sup>30,31</sup>. For example, the methodology prescribed in IPCC guidelines for greenhouse gas  
 298 (GHG) emission inventories calculates production-based emissions based on activity data in the region (i.e.  
 299 the amount of energy consumption) and the associated emission factors (i.e. GHG emissions per unit  
 300 energy consumption), the emission factors are based on in situ measurements in which the value is lower  
 301 than IPCC suggested<sup>30</sup>.

302 
$$\text{Emission} = \sum \sum \sum (\text{Activity data}_{i,j,k} \times \text{Emission factor}_{i,j,k}) \quad (1)$$

303 Notes: i: fuel types, j: sectors, k: technology type.

304 Emission factors can be further disaggregated into net heating value of certain fuel “V”, carbon content “F”  
 305 and oxidization rate “O”.

306 
$$\text{Emission} = \sum \sum \sum (\text{Activity data}_{i,j,k} \times V_{i,j,k} \times F_{i,j,k} \times O_{i,j,k}) \quad (2)$$

307 Detailed calculation process can be seen in literature<sup>30</sup>.

308

309 **Consumption-based accounting of emissions.** An alternative to production-based accounting of CO<sub>2</sub>  
 310 emissions is to compile inventories according to where related goods and services are ultimately consumed.  
 311 Such a consumption-based method accounts for inter-regional exchange of energy supply, goods and  
 312 materials by adding emissions embodied in imports to the production-based total and subtracting emissions  
 313 embodied in exports.

314 The emissions embodied in a region’s imports and exports can be calculated using environmentally-  
 315 extended input-output analysis (EIO). Environmentally-extended multi-regional input-output (MRIO)  
 316 analysis has been widely developed for calculating the embodied carbon emission<sup>8,11,23</sup>, virtual water<sup>32,33</sup>,  
 317 material use<sup>34</sup>, biodiversity loss<sup>35</sup>, and land use<sup>36,37</sup> associated with international trade.

318 In MRIO framework, different regions are connected through inter-regional trade,  $Z^{rs}$ . The technical  
 319 coefficient sub-matrix  $A^{rs}$  consists of " $[a_{ij}^{rs}]$ " is derived from  $a_{ij}^{rs} = z_{ij}^{rs} / x_j^s$ , where  $z_{ij}^{rs}$  is the inter-sector  
 320 monetary flow from sector  $i$  in region  $r$  to sector  $j$  in region  $s$ ;  $x_j^s$  is the total output of sector  $j$  in region  $s$ .  
 321 The final demand matrix is Y consist of " $[y_i^{rs}]$ ", where  $y_i^{rs}$  is the region’s final demand for goods of sector  
 322  $i$  from region  $r$ . Therefore, MRIO analysis can be shown as:

323 
$$\begin{bmatrix} x^1 \\ x^2 \\ x^3 \\ \vdots \\ x^n \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A^{11} & A^{12} & \dots & A^{1n} \\ A^{21} & A^{22} & \dots & A^{2n} \\ A^{31} & A^{31} & \dots & A^{3n} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ A^{n1} & A^{n2} & \dots & A^{nn} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x^1 \\ x^2 \\ x^3 \\ \vdots \\ x^n \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \sum_s y^{1s} \\ \sum_s y^{2s} \\ \sum_s y^{3s} \\ \vdots \\ \sum_s y^{ns} \end{bmatrix} \quad (3)$$

324 Using familiar matrix notation and dropping the subscripts, Equation 3 can be written as:  $x = Ax + y$  or  $x =$   
 325  $(I - A)^{-1}y$ , where  $(I - A)^{-1}$  is the Leontief inverse matrix that captures both direct and indirect inputs  
 326 required to satisfy one unit of final demand in monetary value;  $I$  is the identity matrix. To calculate the  
 327 consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, we then extend the MRIO table with sector-specific CO<sub>2</sub> emissions:  $E$   
 328  $= k(I - A)^{-1}y$ , where  $E$  is the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions embodied in goods and services used for final demand  
 329 and  $k$  is a vector of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per unit of economic output for all economic sectors in all regions.

330

331 **Index decomposition analysis of emissions embodied in trade.** The index decomposition of trade  
 332 embodied CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is presented by equation:

$$333 \quad E = \sum_i E_i = \sum_i Q \frac{Q_i V_i E_i}{Q Q_i V_i} = \sum_i Q S_i I_i F_i \quad (4)$$

334  
 335 where  $E$  describes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions embodied in imports or exports,  $Q$  is the GDP value of imports or exports,  
 336  $S_i$  refers to the share of the GDP value for sector  $i$ ,  $I_i$  to energy intensity of sector  $i$  and  $F_i$  refers to the  
 337 emission per unit of energy consumption of of sector  $i$  ( $i$  for 46 sectors). Thus, the factors contributing to a  
 338 net trade in embodied emissions can be expressed based on the logarithmic mean divisia index (LMDI)  
 339 approach (additive form) <sup>19</sup>as:

340

$$341 \quad \Delta E = E^{export} - E^{import} = \Delta E_{act} + \Delta E_{str} + \Delta E_{int} + \Delta E_{mix} \quad (5)$$

342 Where  $\Delta E$  is the difference between the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions embodied in exports ( $E^{export}$ ) and the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
 343 embodied in imports ( $E^{import}$ );  $\Delta E_{act}$ ,  $\Delta E_{str}$ ,  $\Delta E_{int}$  and  $\Delta E_{str}$  refer to economic scale effect, economic structure  
 344 effect, sector intensity effect and energy mix effect, respectively. Where  $\Delta E_{act}$ ,  $\Delta E_{str}$ ,  $\Delta E_{int}$  and  $\Delta E_{str}$  are  
 345 expressed as:

$$346 \quad \Delta E_{act} = \sum_i w_i \ln \left( \frac{Q_i^t}{Q_i^0} \right) \quad (6)$$

$$347 \quad \Delta E_{str} = \sum_i w_i \ln \left( \frac{S_i^t}{S_i^0} \right) \quad (7)$$

$$348 \quad \Delta E_{int} = \sum_i w_i \ln \left( \frac{I_i^t}{I_i^0} \right) \quad (8)$$

$$349 \quad \Delta E_{mix} = \sum_i w_i \ln \left( \frac{F_i^t}{F_i^0} \right) \quad (9)$$

$$350 \quad w_i = \frac{E_i^t - E_i^0}{\ln E_i^t - \ln E_i^0} \quad (10)$$

351  $Q^i, S^i, I^i$  and  $F^0$  is the GDP, GDP share, energy intensity and the emission coefficient of export,  
 352 respectively.  $Q^0, S^0, I^0$  and  $F^0$  is GDP, GDP share, energy intensity and the emission coefficient of imports,  
 353 respectively.

### 354 **Estimates of sectoral level imported and exported CO<sub>2</sub> emissions**

355 In a region IO model, a regional economy is considered as its system boundary, thus exports are  
 356 treated as final products in a region's economy. Let  $G_i^r$  be the total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in economic sector  
 357  $i$  and region  $r$ , thus  $\sum_i G_i^r$  represents the production-based emissions in region  $r$ . In each region  $r$ , there  
 358 are intermediate consumption, denoted  $Z_{ij}^r$ , which represents the domestic purchases of sector  $i$  by  
 359 sector  $j$  in region  $r$  and final consumption, denoted  $y_i^r$ , represents the domestic purchases of sector  $i$  by  
 360 final consumers in region  $r$  which includes households, government, capital investments. In the single  
 361 region IO model, exports,  $e_i^{rs}$ , from region  $r$  to region  $s$  are also treated as final consumption. By  
 362 summing intermediate and final consumption, we can obtain the total output in each region:

$$363 \quad x^r = Z^{rr} + y^{rr} + \sum_s e^{rs} \quad (S1)$$

364 By assuming fixed production ratios, we obtain the technical coefficients,  $A_{ij}^{rr}$ , the ratio of input to  
 365 output, by dividing  $Z_{ij}^{rr}$  by  $x_j^r$ :

$$366 \quad A_{ij}^{rr} = Z_{ij}^{rr} / x_j^r \quad (S2)$$

367 Thus, Equation (S1) can be re-written as:

$$368 \quad x^r = (I - A^{rr})^{-1} * (y^{rr} + \sum_s e^{rs}) \quad (S3)$$

369 Where  $(I - A^{rr})^{-1}$  is Leontief inverse matrix for region  $r$ .

370 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are estimated based on the direct emission intensity,  $k^r$  in each sector in region  $r$ .

$$371 \quad k_i^r = G_i^r / x_i^r \quad (S4)$$

372 Therefore, the total embodied emissions (direct and indirect) in exports from region  $r$  to region  $s$  can  
 373 be calculated by:

$$374 \quad Exp^r = k^r (I - A^{rr})^{-1} \hat{e}^{rs} \quad (S5)$$

375 where  $Exp^r$  is a vector of embodied CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in sectoral exports of region  $r$  to region  $s$ ;  $k^r$  is a  
 376 row vector of sectoral emissions intensities in region  $r$ ;  $\hat{e}^{rs}$  is a matrix with sectoral export from  
 377 region  $r$  to region  $s$  on diagonal.

378 In turn, the total embodied emissions in imports from region  $s$  to region  $r$  can be estimated by:

$$379 \quad Imp^r = k^s (I - A^{ss})^{-1} \hat{e}^{sr} \quad (S6)$$

380 where  $Imp^r$  is a vector of embodied CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in sectoral imports of region  $s$  to region  $r$ ;  $k^s$  is a  
 381 row vector of sectoral emissions intensities in region  $s$ ;  $\hat{e}^{sr}$  is a matrix with sectoral import from  
 382 region  $s$  to region  $r$  on diagonal.

383

384 **Emissions and trade data.** In this study we estimate emissions from fossil fuel energy combustion and  
 385 cement production, which together account for about 90% of GHG emissions produced in China. Our

386 calculations include 20 different types of fuel and 46 energy consumption sectors. Further details of data  
387 sources and processing methods are available in Liu et al. (2015)<sup>30</sup>, Liu et al. (2012)<sup>15</sup> and Guan et al.  
388 (2012)<sup>38</sup>.

389 Our multi-regional input-output (MRIO) relies on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)<sup>39</sup>,  
390 which includes 129 regions (mostly countries, but some aggregated regions). Although GTAP data covers  
391 57 industry sectors, we aggregate to 30 sectors in order to match input-output tables of interprovincial trade  
392 compiled by Liu *et al.* at the Chinese Academy of Sciences<sup>40</sup>. In turn, we use Liu *et al.*'s tables to  
393 disaggregate the Chinese region in GTAP into 30 sub-regions (26 provinces and 4 cities). Thus, we have a  
394 global MRIO comprised of the latest available economic data that allows us to assess consumption-based  
395 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in each Chinese sub-region as well as emissions embodied in trade among these sub-regions  
396 and all 129 other GTAP regions around the world. Technical details of how the Chinese IO tables are  
397 nested with the GTAP MRIO are available in Feng *et al.* (2013)<sup>8</sup>.

398

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
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426 **Author Contributions:** Z.L., K.F. and S.J.D. designed the research. : Z.L., K.F. and S.J.D.  
427 conceived the paper. K. F. and J. L. provided the data. Z.L., S.J.D., K. F. and K.H. performed the  
428 analysis. S.J.D. drew the figures. All authors contributed to writing the paper.  
429


#### 430 **Acknowledgements**

431 Z.L. acknowledges the Giorgio Ruffolo fellowship and the support from Italy's Ministry for Environment,  
432 Land and Sea. S.J.D acknowledges support from the Institute of Applied Ecology, Chinese Academy of  
433 Sciences Fellowships for Young International Distinguished Scientists. S.L. thanks the support of the Dow  
434 Sustainability Fellows Program.  
435





436 **Figure 1 | Emissions embodied in trade.** Top ten regions (including top five countries and top five  
 437 Chinese cities/provinces) by emissions embodied in exports (a-c), imports (d-f) and net trade (g-i), shown  
 438 in absolute numbers (a, d, g), per dollar of output (b, e, h) and per capita (c, f, i). Data is in year 2007.  
 439




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
443 **Figure 2 | Top exporting provinces.** The emissions embodied in goods exported from  
 444 China to the US, EU and Japan represented 58% of all emissions embodied in trade in  
 445 2007 (a). Five Chinese provinces account for 46% of these exports (b).

446



447  
448

449 **Figure 3 | Differences in share of embodied emissions traded by industry categories.** Circles indicate  
 450 the share of consumed emissions that are imported (y-axis) and the share of produced emissions that are  
 451 exported (x-axis) for a range of industry categories in Europe (a) and China (b). The size of each circle  
 452 denotes the sector's total production emissions, providing an indicator of the relative importance of  
 453 different sectors. The colours of the circles indicate whether the industries are primary (yellow), secondary  
 454 and energy-intensive (red), secondary and non-energy intensive (purple) or tertiary (green). It should be  
 455 noted that while the marker area scale is common across both charts (to aid comparison); the x- and y-axis  
 456 scales differ. A line representing equal import and export share is shown in each chart. Data is in year 2007.




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**Figure 4 | Sectoral share of China's embodied emissions.** Data is in year 2007.



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
461 **Figure 5 | Factors contributing to emissions embodied in provincial trade.** Decomposition of factors  
 462 underlying emissions embodied in trade for each of 30 Chinese cities/provinces. Net emissions embodied in  
 463 trade (red circles) are equal to emissions embodied in exports minus emissions embodied in imports. Black  
 464 bars show the effect of unbalanced trade volume; orange bars show the effect of differences in the industry  
 465 sectors involved in trade (i.e. trade structure, for example, the proportion of heavy industries); and purple  
 466 bars show the effect of differences in the emissions intensity of imported and exported goods. Green  
 467 circles show what net emissions embodied in trade would be if there was no difference in the emissions  
 468 intensity of imported and exported goods—i.e. if trade volume and economic structure were the only  
 469 factors affecting embodied emissions. In reality, all 30 regions are net exporters of emissions, but only 11  
 470 of the 30 would remain net exporters of emissions if differences in emissions intensity were eliminated.  
 471

472 Table 1 Life cycle carbon emission intensity for 15 products from China and EU, unit:  
 473 CO<sub>2</sub> kg/kg production.  
 474

	China-average	EU-average
Flat glass production	2.55	1.05
Crushed limestone	4.53	1.81
Propylene	21.2	1.15
ABS	11.6	3.63
Copper concentrate	0.436	0.357
Steel by electricity stove	5.23	3.62
Steel production	5.68	1.97
Cast iron production	5.45	1.31
Aluminum ingot production	68.4	10.4(USLCI)
Cast iron production	5.45	1.31
Pig iron production	3.23	1.34
Iron sinter production	1.89	0.331
Magnesium alloy production	34.3	11.5
Anode slime copper production	4.82	3.4
Water production	0.00196	0.0003


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**Extended Data Figure 1 | Emissions intensity of trade and GDP per capita of Chinese provinces in 2007.** Kilograms of CO<sub>2</sub> per dollar of output in each of 30 Chinese cities/provinces for international export (red bars) and domestic consumption in China (gray bars), as well as the emissions intensity of goods imported to the city/province from outside China (green bars). The blue curve shows GDP per capita in each city/province according to the top axis.



488 **Extended Data Figure 2, Sector-specific emissions intensity.** In the six provinces with  
 489 the highest emissions intensity, the energy sector dominates in Yunnan and Inner  
 490 Mongolia, metal and non-metal products are intensive in all the provinces, especially  
 491 Guizhou, and chemical products are also notably intensive. Where there are no bars,  
 492 there are no exports from that sector-province.  
 493



494 **Extended Data Table 1** Sector classification

Sector code	Original sectors	Aggregated sectors
1	Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery and Water Conservancy	Agriculture products
2	Coal Mining and Dressing	Mining products
3	Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction	
4	Ferrous Metals Mining and Dressing	
5	Nonferrous Metals Mining and Dressing	
6	Nonmetal Minerals Mining and Dressing	
7	Other Minerals Mining and Dressing	
8	Food Processing	Foods
9	Food Production	
10	Beverage Production	
11	Logging and Transport of Wood and Bamboo	Light industry products
12	Tobacco Processing	
13	Textile Industry	
14	Garments and Other Fiber Products	
15	Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products	
16	Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber & Straw Products	
17	Furniture Manufacturing	
18	Papermaking and Paper Products	
19	Printing and Record Medium Reproduction	
20	Cultural, Educational and Sports Articles	
21	Petroleum Processing and Coking	Chemical products
22	Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products	
23	Medical and Pharmaceutical Products	
24	Chemical Fiber	
25	Rubber Products	
26	Plastic Products	
27	Nonmetal Mineral Products	No metal and Metal products
28	Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals	
29	Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals	
30	Metal Products	
31	Ordinary Machinery	Equipment
32	Equipment for Special Purposes	
33	Transportation Equipment	
34	Electric Equipment and Machinery	
35	Electronic and Telecommunications Equipment	
36	Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Office Machinery	
37	Other Manufacturing Industry	
38	Production and Supply of Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water	Energy
39	Production and Supply of Gas	
40	Production and Supply of Tap Water	
41	Construction	Building
42	Transportation, Storage, Post and Telecommunication Services	Transportation
43	Wholesale, Retail Trade and Catering Services	Services
44	Others	

495

45	Urban Household Consumption	Household Consumption
46	Rural Household Consumption	