

Pride and Prejudice:  
Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States,  
1891-1945

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**Canada**

## Abstract

This study compares how English and French Canadian intellectuals viewed American society from 1891 to 1945. During the period under study, the Dominion experienced accelerated industrialization and urbanization, massive immigration, technological change, and the rise of mass culture. To the nation's intellectuals, many of these changes found their source and their very embodiment in the United States. America, it was argued, was the quintessence of modernity, having embraced, among other things, secularism, democracy, mass culture, and industrial capitalism.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Canadian hostility to the United States and continental integration was expressed in two conservative discourses: that of English Canadian imperialism and French Canadian nationalism. Despite their fundamental divergence on the national question, both imperialists and *nationalistes* shared an essentially antimodern outlook, and anti-Americanism was their logical point of convergence.

By contrast, the most passionate Canadian defenders of American society could be found among liberal and socialist intellectuals like F. R. Scott and Jean-Charles Harvey. They saw continental integration and Canadian-American convergence as both inevitable and desirable. Intellectual continentalism reached its summit of influence during the 1930s and 1940s.

The present study is based on the analysis of some 520 texts found essentially in the era's periodical literature. Each, at least in part, explores some aspect of American life or of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Unlike most previous scholarship, which has tended to view anti-American sentiment merely as an expression of Canadian nationalism, this study is more concerned with Canadian intellectuals as thinkers on the left, the right, and the centre.

The comparative, pan-Canadian nature of this study reveals that English and French Canadian intellectuals shared common preoccupations with respect to the United States. However, the tone and emphasis of their commentary often differed. In English Canada, where political institutions and the imperial bond were viewed as the mainstays of Canadian distinctiveness, writing on the United States tended to deal primarily with political and diplomatic issues. In Quebec, where political institutions were not generally viewed as vital elements of national distinctiveness, social and cultural affairs dominated writing on the United States.

## Résumé

Cette étude compare la vision que les intellectuels canadiens-français et canadiens-anglais entretenaient à propos des États-Unis de 1891 à 1945. Durant cette période, la société canadienne a été profondément transformée par l'industrialisation, l'urbanisation, l'immigration massive, les changements technologiques et la montée de la culture de masse. Pour les intellectuels canadiens, plusieurs de ces transformations trouvaient leurs racines et leur incarnation dans la société américaine. Les États-Unis, soutenaient-ils, représentaient la quintessence même de la modernité étant donné leur acceptation, entre autres choses, du laïcisme, de la démocratie, de la culture de masse et du capitalisme industriel.

À la fin du dix-neuvième et au début du vingtième siècle, l'hostilité des Canadiens à l'égard des États-Unis et de l'intégration continentale s'exprimait à travers deux discours conservateurs : l'impérialisme anglo-canadien et le nationalisme canadien-français. En dépit de leurs divergences fondamentales sur la question nationale, les impérialistes et les nationalistes partageaient une sensibilité antimoderne et leur anti-américanisme constituait un point de convergence logique.

Inversement, les défenseurs canadiens les plus enthousiastes de la société américaine se trouvaient parmi les intellectuels libéraux et socialistes comme F. R. Scott ou Jean-Charles Harvey. Ces derniers voyaient l'intégration continentale et la convergence canado-américaine à la fois comme inévitable et souhaitable. Le continentalisme intellectuel a atteint son apogée dans les années 1930 et 1940.

La présente étude repose sur l'analyse d'un corpus de 520 textes provenant, en majorité, des revues intellectuelles de l'époque. Chaque texte du corpus envisage, du moins en partie, un aspect de la société américaine ou des relations canado-américaines. Contrairement à la plupart des études antérieures qui ont examiné le rapport aux États-Unis des intellectuels canadiens et qui ont surtout vu l'anti-américanisme comme l'expression d'un nationalisme canadien, cette étude s'intéresse davantage aux intellectuels en tant que penseurs de droite, de gauche ou du centre.

Le caractère comparatif et pan-canadien de cette étude révèle que les intellectuels canadiens-français et canadiens-anglais partageaient des préoccupations communes vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Toutefois, le ton et l'emphase de leurs écrits différaient. Au Canada anglais, où les institutions politiques et le lien impérial ont joué un rôle de premier plan dans la construction d'une identité distincte, le discours sur les États-Unis s'articulait surtout autour

de questions politiques et diplomatiques. Au Québec, où les institutions politiques n'ont pas joué un rôle aussi important dans la construction de l'identité nationale, les questions sociales et culturelles dominaient le discours sur les États-Unis.

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Damien-Claude Bélanger  
Montreal, Quebec  
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## Introduction

“The average Canadian attitude towards the United States and all things American cannot be permanently based upon pride and prejudice, or, to use one word, ignorance,” warned Douglas Bush (1896-1983) in 1929.<sup>1</sup> Bush, who would spend most of his career teaching English at Harvard University, was part of a new and, some believed, irreverent generation of thinkers who came of age during the Great War and dominated English Canadian discourse during the 1920s and 1930s. Rejecting the imperialism that had largely permeated pre-World War One Canadian thought, intellectuals like Bush, Frank Underhill (1885-1971), and Arthur Lower (1889-1988), sought to affirm the inherently American nature of Canadian society and to draw the nation out of Britain’s orbit. This implied a redefinition of the Canadian experience and a rapprochement between the Dominion and her neighbour to the south.

There was nothing exceptionally novel in the outlook of this continentalist cohort. Many of their arguments had been plainly stated a generation before by the *bête noire* of Canadian imperialism, Goldwin Smith (1823-1910). Indeed, as Allan Smith has noted, “the dialectic between national and continental forces is a principal structuring element” in Canadian history.<sup>2</sup> As a result, Canadian intellectual history has been characterized, writes Louis Balthazar, by “un débat presque ininterrompu entre les tenants de la thèse dite ‘continentaliste’ et les défenseurs d’une identité canadienne (autrefois américano-britannique) distincte des États-Unis.”<sup>3</sup> This tension between continentalist and anti-American sentiment emerged during the crucible of Canadian discourse – the American Revolution – when rebel and loyalist elements struggled for the very soul of the Province of Quebec. In many ways, the dichotomy between continentalism and anti-Americanism has corresponded to the classical division between the left and the right in Canada and serves as a litmus test for Canadian thought. Along with the French Canadian question, argues Ramsay Cook, the “American question” has dominated the whole of Canadian history.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, intellectuals have grappled with this existential question since the birth of Canadian discourse.

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas Bush, “Pride and Prejudice,” *Canadian Mercury* 1 (1929): 136.

<sup>2</sup> Allan Smith, “Introduction,” in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), 6.

<sup>3</sup> Louis Balthazar, “Les relations canado-américaines: nationalisme et continentalisme,” *Études internationales* XIV (1983): 23.

<sup>4</sup> Ramsay Cook, “Loyalism, Technology, and Canada’s Fate,” in his *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1977), 45.

This study explores the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Through an extensive corpus of fiction and non-fiction, it examines how Canadian intellectuals have viewed the United States and Canadian-American relations from 1891 to 1945 and compares English and French Canadian attitudes towards America during this age of transition. It does not focus on specific events like, for instance, the Spanish-American War or the New Deal. Instead, the study offers a thematic examination of Canadian viewpoints on issues ranging from American forms of freedom to cross-border migration. The method corresponds to what French historian Pierre Ronsanvallon calls “l’histoire conceptuelle du politique.” Broadly defined, its goal is to “faire l’histoire de la manière dont une époque, un pays, ou des groupes sociaux cherchent à construire des réponses à ce qu’ils perçoivent plus ou moins confusément comme un *problème*.”<sup>5</sup> By centering the analysis on themes and issues, this method avoids some of the pitfalls of more biographical or event-based methods of intellectual history, which often neglect the internal dynamics of discourse and the continuity of ideas over time.

1891 is a significant year for the Canadian historian. One of the most momentous federal elections in Canadian history – and Sir John A. Macdonald’s last – was held in March of that year. The election pitted an ailing Macdonald and his National Policy against a youthful Laurier and his promises of unrestricted reciprocity with the United States. The old chieftain prevailed. Defeated a second time in four years on a free-trade platform, the Liberal party would move away from unrestricted reciprocity and, for a time, embrace the National Policy.

The campaign revolved around anti-Americanism and, in a pattern that would be repeated time and again in Canadian politics, anti-American rhetoric was used by the Conservatives to attack their Liberal opponents.<sup>6</sup> The Tories had successfully portrayed the election not as a contest between free trade and protectionism, but as a mortal struggle pitting the forces of loyalty against those of treason. The campaign galvanized English Canadian imperialists. In effect, the challenge posed by the advocates of unrestricted reciprocity, commercial union, and annexation in the late 1880s and early 1890s had given Canadian imperialism its *raison d’être*.

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<sup>5</sup> Pierre Ronsanvallon, “Pour une histoire conceptuelle du politique,” *Revue de synthèse* IV (1986): 100.

<sup>6</sup> Patricia K. Wood, “Defining ‘Canadian’: Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald’s Nationalism,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36 (2001): 49-50.

The 1891 election also produced the most important Canadian essay of the nineteenth century: Goldwin Smith's best-selling *Canada and the Canadian Question*. Its publication stands out as one of the key moments in Canadian intellectual history. In a sense, *Canada and the Canadian Question* was English Canada's Durham Report. The irreverent essay argued that the Dominion was a geographic, ethnic, economic, and political absurdity whose ultimate destiny lay in political union with the United States. In short, Smith had rejected almost every principle held by nineteenth-century Canadian imperialists. He had authored, according to Frank Underhill, "the most pessimistic book that has ever been written about Canada, and he advanced the most radical solution for the frustrations of the day – union with the United States."<sup>7</sup>

Much in the way that the indignation generated by Lord Durham's infamous Report sparked an intellectual and literary explosion in French Canada, Smith's essay generated a similar torrent of nation-affirming prose in English Canada. Indeed, some of the best work produced by English Canadian conservatives, most notably the magnum opus of Canadian imperialism, George R. Parkin's (1846-1922) *Imperial Federation* (1892), and Donald Creighton's (1902-1979) seminal study, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (1937), was written in response to *Canada and the Canadian Question*. More than sixty years after its publication, Frank Underhill argued that all modern discussions of the "Canadian question" still revolved around the points that Smith had raised in 1891.<sup>8</sup> Underhill, who stands out as one of the few Canadian intellectuals not to reject Smith's ideas en masse, was correct in his assumptions. According to Carl Berger, Smith's book "is supremely important in Canadian nationalist thought because he asked the question which all Canadian nationalists have since tried to answer: what positive values does the country embody and represent that justifies her existence?"<sup>9</sup>

*Canada and the Canadian Question* had actually been written as a campaign document for the Liberal party, but failed in this purpose since it was not off the press until April 1891.<sup>10</sup> Rabidly anti-Catholic and francophobic, the book was the product of a deeply pessimistic time in Canadian history. Less than twenty-five years after the British North America Act was passed, Canada was suffering from a profound malaise. The enthusiasm generated by Confederation had been battered by economic depression and washed away by

<sup>7</sup> Frank H. Underhill, *The Image of Confederation* (Toronto, 1964), 27.

<sup>8</sup> Idem, "Canada and the Canadian Question, 1954," in his *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto, 1960), 214.

<sup>9</sup> Carl Berger in Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto, 1971), xvi.

<sup>10</sup> Elisabeth Wallace, *Goldwin Smith, Victorian Liberal* (Toronto, 1957), 275.

a torrent of ethnic, religious, and sectional strife. To make matters worse, emigration to the United States was undermining the Dominion's population growth, and annexationism, that unmistakable sign of national despair, reared its ugly head for one final encore. Clearly, some Canadians shared Smith's profound defeatism. As the nation lurched from recession to recession, it became clear that the National Policy had not delivered on its promises of prosperity. Overall, observed Frank Underhill, the late 1880s and the early 1890s "mark the point when our national self-confidence reached its lowest point."<sup>11</sup>

There was, however, light at the end of the tunnel. A few years after Smith's indictment of the Dominion, the nation was enjoying rapid economic expansion and a period of unbridled optimism under the stewardship of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his "sunny ways." The next decades would witness the birth of a new independent, urban, and industrial Canada. By the late 1890s, Canada had shaken off a decade of pessimism and discord and had begun to grow as never before. "The poor relation has come into her fortune," wrote British observer J. A. Hobson at the turn of the century.<sup>12</sup> Between 1901 and 1945, emigration ebbed, immigration soared, and Canada's population nearly tripled. In addition, rapid, though intermittent, industrial growth brought the nation's urbanization rate from 35 to 59 percent. Industrial expansion also fuelled the rise of consumerism which, in turn, helped to homogenize North American lifestyles.

The Dominion emerged from the Great War a nation transformed. Canadian independence had been consecrated at Vimy and Versailles and the nation was taking its first steps on the world stage. Continental integration was proceeding apace: American investments in Canada grew exponentially as Britain's decline in the post-World War One era forced Canada into the arms of the United States, and American mass culture – magazines, radio, clothing styles, sports, and movies – displaced British popular culture in Canada.<sup>13</sup> "Like all the great empires before it," writes Stephen Brooks, "America had begun to export its culture – its values, lifestyles, dreams, and self-image – through what were then the new media of film and mass advertising," and had proven her mastery of the mass age.<sup>14</sup> By the end of World War Two, the United States had finally assumed its role as a superpower and

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<sup>11</sup> Underhill, *The Image of Confederation*, 27

<sup>12</sup> J. A. Hobson quoted in Alan Bowker, "Introduction," in Stephen Leacock, *The Social Criticism of Stephen Leacock* (Toronto, 1973), xii.

<sup>13</sup> Reginald C. Stuart, "Continentalism Revisited: Recent Narratives on the History of Canadian-American Relations," *Diplomatic History* 18 (1994): 411.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen Brooks, *America through Foreign Eyes: Classical Interpretations of American Political Life* (Don Mills, Ontario, 2002), 152.

was poised to enter into a desperate struggle to contain communism. All the pieces were now in place: America had become a military, economic, and cultural powerhouse.

Canada emerged from the Second World War more North American than ever, as industrialization reached a fever pitch and provoked rapid social change.<sup>15</sup> Intensified by wartime anxiety, Canadian continentalism produced its magnum opus in John Bartlet Brebner's (1895-1957) *North Atlantic Triangle* (1945), the final volume in a series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation.

By 1945, Canada had fully entered the mass age. Canadian society had been thoroughly transformed in less than fifty years, and while modernity's march was far from complete, its effects could be felt on every aspect of Canadian life. Not surprisingly, the penetration of modernity and Americanization were synchronized. Indeed, as James W. Ceaser notes, "America, as one of the most modern and the most powerful of nations, has been the effective source of many of the trends of modernity, which therefore inevitably take on an American cast."<sup>16</sup> Canadian intellectuals understood that modernity and America were closely allied. Accordingly, some thinkers embraced continentalism and modernism while others fiercely resisted them.

Anti-Americanism was largely present in the discourse of Canadian intellectuals from the early 1890s to the Great War. And though the emphasis and tone was different in English and French Canada – French Canadian anti-Americanism was both more radical and more focussed on social and cultural issues – the essence of their critique of American life was the same. By the 1920s, however, continentalism became increasingly common in the work of English Canadian intellectuals. Clearly, the era of Andrew Macphail (1864-1938), Stephen Leacock (1869-1944), and the conservative *University Magazine* had come to an end, and the era of Frank Underhill, F. R. Scott (1899-1985), and the left-of-centre *Canadian Forum* had begun. Though several English Canadian thinkers continued to denounce the United States, an emerging generation of progressive intellectuals embraced modernity and continentalism. In French Canada, the process was quite different. The anti-Americanism that had dominated the prewar generation of intellectuals was renewed and reinforced in the 1920s and 1930s as a new cohort of conservative thinkers led by abbé Lionel Groulx (1878-1967) stiffened the resistance to modernity and America that had characterized many of their precursors.

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<sup>15</sup> Stuart, "Continentalism Revisited," 411.

<sup>16</sup> James W. Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest* 152 (2003): 17.

In essence, this study is about the Canadian intellectual's reaction to modernity, a concept whose multiple dimensions are difficult to circumscribe. According to Philip Massolin modernity boils down to

the replacement of Victorian society – agrarian, religious, adhering to a rigid set of philosophical and moral codes – with the modern age: industrial, secular, and anti-philosophical. From an economic standpoint, it pertained to the arrival of an urban and industrial society that replaced a hoary agrarian-merchant system. Closely related to the process of urban-industrialization, modernization also involved the rise of a consumer, scientific-materialist, and technological society.<sup>17</sup>

“Arquée sur le présent tout en visant constamment son propre dépassement, sa propre négation,” writes philosopher Alexis Nouss, “la modernité n’a rien à apprendre du passé.”<sup>18</sup> The modern ethos is thus obsessed with change and newness. As a result, it invariably leads to a penchant for rupture and, in some cases, to unabashed revolutionism. Unlike traditionalism, which impedes “l’affirmation de l’homme, du sujet,” and reduces “à la portion secondaire un espace terrestre, profane, matériel,”<sup>19</sup> modernity is anthropocentric, utilitarian, and in its moderate form, libertarian. Politically, it can lean towards either democracy or totalitarianism, but in both instances it will invariably corrode the power of traditional elites. In Canada, the penetration of modern ideas and practices was a slow and steady process that began in the late eighteenth century and reached its logical conclusion in the postwar era.

During the period under study, the intellectual's reading of American life was not the direct result of United States foreign or commercial policy. Rather, it was primarily conditioned by his attitude towards modernity. In the Dominion, as elsewhere in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, equality, democracy, capitalism, urban and industrial society, mass culture, and secularism – in a word, modernity – became increasingly identified with the United States. Consequently, resistance to modernity became gradually more anti-American. Deep down, the Canadian intellectual's perception of American life was in fact a mirror of his attitude towards the modern ethos. As a result, the dialectic between

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<sup>17</sup> Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Alexis Nouss, *La modernité* (Paris, 1995), 15, 19.

<sup>19</sup> Yvan Lamonde, “La modernité au Québec: pour une histoire des brèches (1895-1950),” in *L’avènement de la modernité culturelle au Québec*, ed. Y. Lamonde and E. Trépanier (Québec, 1986), 307.

anti-American and continental forces was a struggle involving two different understandings of Canada, one of which was fundamentally antimodern.

Modernity is a powerful and revolutionary force. It spawns new social groups and new forms of expression. In doing so, it produces a cultural and status revolution that overwhelms tradition and destroys established social relations and customs. Swept up in this chaotic whirlwind, conservative intellectuals feared that the modern world would marginalize their ideals and their voice. Searching for order amid what they felt was anarchy, they clung to traditional values and lashed out at the very heart of modernity: America.

That being said, modernization renewed the intellectual's function. The expansion of Canadian public and higher education, urbanization, the growth of the press and of journalism, the development of a network of public libraries, and most importantly, the expansion of literacy that occurred in the late nineteenth century, all contributed to the emergence of the modern Canadian intellectual. And this emergence more or less corresponds to the beginning of the era examined in this study.<sup>20</sup>

Intellectuals are not members of a social group corresponding to the Russian concept of an *intelligentsia*. Rather, the intellectual is a more singular figure in history. According to French historian Pascal Ory, "l'intellectuel est un homme du culturel mis en situation d'homme du politique, producteur et consommateur d'idéologie." He has "moins une fonction qu'une mission, il répond à une vocation."<sup>21</sup> Ory's definition has been applied in this

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<sup>20</sup> Yvan Lamonde, "Les 'intellectuels' francophones au Québec au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle: questions préalables," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 48 (1994): 164-167.

<sup>21</sup> Pascal Ory, "Qu'est-ce qu'un intellectuel?" in his *Dernières questions aux intellectuels et quatre essais pour y répondre* (Paris, 1990), 14, 24; Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, *Les intellectuels en France, de l'Affaire Dreyfus à nos jours* (Paris, 1986), 10. There exists a debate among historians, particularly in France, on how to define the 'intellectual.' "On a souvent relevé le caractère polysémique de la notion d'intellectuel, l'aspect polymorphe du milieu des clercs, et le flou qui en découle pour établir des critères de définition du mot, d'autant que cette notion et ce mot ont évolué avec les mutations de la société française," writes Jean-François Sirinelli. "Pour cette dernière raison, il faut, nous semble-t-il, plaider pour une définition à géométrie variable, mais se fondant sur des invariants. Ceux-ci peuvent déboucher sur deux acceptations de l'intellectuel, l'une large et socioculturelle, englobant les créateurs et les 'médiateurs' culturels, l'autre fondée sur la notion d'engagement. Dans le premier cas, sont concernés le journaliste autant que l'écrivain, le professeur de l'enseignement secondaire autant que le savant. Aux marches de ce premier ensemble se tiennent une partie des étudiants, créateurs ou 'médiateurs' en puissance, ainsi que d'autres catégories de 'récepteurs' de culture." [Sirinelli, "Les intellectuels," in *Pour une histoire politique*, ed. René Rémond (Paris, 1988), 210.] In Canadian historical writing, most scholars, including Yvan Lamonde, Pierre Trépanier, Philip Massolin, and S. E. D. Shortt, have chosen to reject the socio-cultural definition of the intellectual in favour of a definition that more or less corresponds to Pascal Ory's *intellectuel engagé*. Nevertheless, some historians, including Michiel Horn, prefer to view intellectuals as a large social group. In his 1980 monograph on the League for Social Reconstruction, Horn adopts Seymour Martin Lipset's definition of the intellectual: "I have considered as intellectuals all those who create, distribute and apply *culture*, that is, the symbolic world of man, including art, science and religion. Within this group there are two main levels: the hard core or creators of culture – scholars, artists, philosophers, authors, some editors, and some journalists; and the distributors – performers in the various arts,

study. On the whole, the thinkers examined in these pages were essentially cultural figures – most intellectuals in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Canada were to be found in the academic community, in journalism, or in the ranks of the clergy – who became involved in socio-political debate without directly entering the world of partisan politics. “Rather than actively participating in politics,” writes S. E. D. Shortt, Canadian intellectuals “preferred to confine themselves to critical observations in academic journals or membership in quasi-clandestine organizations, a tradition beginning with the Canada Firsters, carried on by the Round Table Groups, and culminating in the League for Social Reconstruction.”<sup>22</sup> Many of the radicals involved in the League, in particular Frank Underhill, F. R. Scott, Edgar McInnis (1899-1973), and King Gordon (1900-1989), are good examples of the *intellectuel engagé* whose action lies somewhere between the cultural and political spheres. This grey zone is the realm of the intellectual.

A few exceptions were made to this rule in an effort to diversify and strengthen the study’s corpus. Some work by erudite labour leaders and businessmen, in particular Alfred Charpentier (1888-1982), Erastus Wiman (1834-1904), B. E. Walker (1848-1924), and Beaudry Leman (1878-1951), who might not fit the standard definition of the “intellectual” has been included. And though career politicians were systematically excluded from this study, work by a few independent or sometime politicians, most notably Henri Bourassa (1868-1953) and Vincent Massey (1887-1967), has been analysed. Recent historical writing has tended to confirm their role as intellectuals.<sup>23</sup>

For the purposes of this study, intellectuals were considered Canadian if they were born in Canada and received the greater part of their education there, or if they immigrated and settled permanently in the Dominion. As a result, work by expatriate intellectuals who showed a sustained interest in Canadian affairs throughout their careers was examined. Indeed, exiled authors like John Bartlet Brebner or Edmond de Nevers (1862-1906) were full participants in the development of Canadian discourse and played a key role in disseminating American ideas north of the border.

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most teachers, most reporters. A peripheral third group is composed of those who apply culture as part of their jobs – professionals like physicians and lawyers.” [Lipset quoted in Horn, *The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942* (Toronto, 1980), 6.]

<sup>22</sup> S. E. D. Shortt, *The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals and their Convictions in an Age of Transition, 1890-1930* (Toronto, 1976), 6.

<sup>23</sup> See in particular Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity, 1939-1970* (Toronto, 2001) and Pierre Trépanier, “Notes pour une histoire des droites intellectuelles canadiennes-françaises à travers leurs principaux représentants (1770-1970),” *Cahiers des Dix* 48 (1993): 119-164.



The term ‘English Canadian’ has been used in this study to describe a fairly heterogeneous group of English-speaking individuals drawn from different regions, ethnicities, and religious denominations. I am aware of the difficulties this usage poses. However, the constraints of comparative research make it necessary.

Most of the texts analysed in this study have been examined by previous research on the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. However, my focus on the intellectual discourse of both English and French Canada distinguishes it from earlier work on the subject, in particular from J. L. Granatstein’s *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (1996), which is largely centred on English Canadian thought. Moreover, the study’s Canadian comparativism proposes a perspective on French Canadian thought that the work of Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard on Quebec’s *américanité* does not necessarily offer.<sup>24</sup>

Comparison is a valuable tool for the historian. It helps to reveal the general trends, the differences, the similarities, and the mutual or shared influences that have characterized Canadian discourse.<sup>25</sup> According to Robin Winks, it enables the Canadian historian “to escape the assumption that a particular course of events is natural, almost foreordained.”<sup>26</sup> Moreover, as Gérard Bouchard has noted, comparativism “fait partie des procédés d’objectivation parce qu’elle est un moyen de créer une distance entre le sujet et sa culture, parce qu’elle permet de casser la chaîne de production du savoir là même où naissent les paradigmes, bien en amont de la théorie et des concepts.”<sup>27</sup>

My analysis builds on the work of Yvan Lamonde, but seeks to go beyond his interpretation of Quebec’s continental rapport by unearthing the essential modernism that lies beneath the concept of *américanité*. Previous research on the history of Canadian-American relations has not seen the pre-1945 Canadian intellectual’s vision of the United States as a product of his or her relationship with modernity.

Furthermore, unlike most previous work on Canadian intellectual history, this study is more concerned with Canadian intellectuals as thinkers on the left, the right, and the centre than as nationalists or non-nationalists. As Fernande Roy has observed, nationalism is

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<sup>24</sup> See Yvan Lamonde, *Ni avec eux ni sans eux: le Québec et les États-Unis* (Montreal, 1996); Gérard Bouchard, *Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde. Essai d’histoire comparée* (Montreal, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> For an excellent example of comparativism applied to Canadian intellectual history, see Sylvie Lacombe, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus* (Quebec, 2002).

<sup>26</sup> Robin Winks, *The Relevance of Canadian History: U.S. and Imperial Perspectives* (Toronto, 1979), 2.

<sup>27</sup> Bouchard, *Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde*, 75.

typically “une valeur polymorphe qui épouse des idéologies diverses. Tellement présent qu’il en a masqué le reste, le nationalisme rend plus complexe l’histoire des idéologies québécoises et explique d’étranges alliances.”<sup>28</sup> The same could be said for English Canadian forms of nationalism, which have complicated the study of discourse and have led many writers to neglect the left-right cleavage in Canadian history. More often than not, nationalism is merely the vehicle for a wider ideology. Imperialism, for instance, was the primary means of expression for turn-of-the-century English Canadian conservatism. Accordingly, Andrew Macphail and Stephen Leacock were imperialists because they were conservatives, not the other way around.

My research rests on a corpus of 520 texts written by Canadian intellectuals between 1891 and 1945, and on the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1936 and 1945.<sup>29</sup> Wholly or in part, each text selected for inclusion in the study’s corpus explores some aspect of American life or of the relationship between Canada and the United States, and offers a particular insight into the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Not surprisingly, given that the “American question” has played a key role in Canadian discourse since the late eighteenth century, several of the most influential Canadian books published between 1891 and 1945 can be found in this study’s corpus.<sup>30</sup> Works of fiction account for a little under 6 percent of the corpus.

The study’s corpus was intended to be comprehensive, not exhaustive. It contains work by most of the era’s prominent intellectuals and offers a cross-section of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Canadian discourse. In all, work by over 250 authors was analysed for this study.<sup>31</sup> French-language texts represent a little less than a third of the corpus.

Women authors account for slightly more than 2 percent of the study’s corpus. To a large extent, this is a reflection of women’s relative exclusion from the professions most

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<sup>28</sup> Fernande Roy, *Histoire des idéologies au Québec aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Montreal, 1993), 11.

<sup>29</sup> The Carnegie series is examined in Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1986), 137-159.

<sup>30</sup> These include Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891); George R. Parkin, *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity* (London, 1892); Edmond de Nevers, *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Paris, 1896); Stephen Leacock, *Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town* (New York, 1912); Louis Hémon, *Maria Chapdelaine* (Montreal, 1916); Ringuet, *30 arpents* (Paris, 1938); D. G. Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto and New Haven, 1937); and J. B. Brebner *North Atlantic Triangle* (New Haven and Toronto, 1945).

<sup>31</sup> A complete list of these intellectuals can be found in Appendix A.

closely associated with intellectual discourse in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Canada.

Articles gleaned from journals and collections of essays make up roughly three-quarters of the corpus. The bulk of these texts were located through an examination of the era's periodical literature. Detailed scrutiny of this literature was confined to a selection of over one hundred of Canada's leading English- and French-language political, religious, literary, business, labour, legal, military, student, university, learned, and scholarly journals published no more than once a month between 1891 and 1945.<sup>32</sup> Efforts were made to include journals that were both regionally and ideologically representative of the diversity of the Canadian mind. However, due to the sheer volume of material, articles in daily, weekly, and bi-monthly publications were excluded from the study. A few American and British periodicals were also scrutinized. Previous work on the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations, in particular that of Lamonde, Smith, and Granatstein, played an important role in compiling the list of books and pamphlets that appear in the corpus.<sup>33</sup>

This study is centred on texts and on the internal dynamics of discourse. However, following the innovative work of Dominick LaCapra, it moves beyond simple content analysis in an effort to examine the various contexts that shape discourse. Thought does not evolve in a vacuum; it is the result of a complex bond between the author's intentions and the text and between the author's life and the text. Moreover, to fully grasp the mechanisms that influence discourse, the intellectual historian must examine the relationship between society and the text, between culture and the text, between the text and a given writer's wider corpus, and between modes of discourse and the text.<sup>34</sup>

In an effort to grasp the various contexts that surround a given text, biographical information on the various intellectuals whose work is examined in these pages was collected and analysed.<sup>35</sup> That said, this is not a prosopographical study. Rather, the group approach was primarily employed to uncover intellectual generations, their principal characteristics, and the key events that shaped their evolution. Indeed, as French historian Jean-François Sirinelli has noted, "les effets d'âge dans le milieu intellectuel sont ...

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<sup>32</sup> Roughly a third of the periodicals examined were French Canadian. For a list of the serials examined for this study, see *infra*, 422-426.

<sup>33</sup> Granatstein, *Yankee go Home?*; Lamonde, *Ni avec eux ni sans eux*; Smith, *Canada: An American Nation?*

<sup>34</sup> Dominick LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts," in his *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language* (Ithaca, New York, 1983), 35-56.

<sup>35</sup> Biographical notices for the intellectuals who figure most prominently in this study can be found in Appendix B.

nombreux et significatifs” and can affect discourse as profoundly as the left-right cleavage. The events that shape a generation’s consciousness during its formative years will deeply affect its outlook on the world, and every generation, writes Sirinelli, “tire de sa gestation un *bagage génétique* et de ses premières années d’existence une *mémoire commune*, donc à la fois l’inné et l’acquis qui la marquent pour la vie.”<sup>36</sup> The Great War, for instance, deeply affected the outlook of the generation of English Canadian intellectuals born roughly between 1880 and 1900. As we shall see, their penchant for continentalism was largely an expression of their profound disillusionment with imperialism and Europe.

On the whole, the method employed in this study is qualitative. On occasion, however, quantitative analysis is employed in an effort to better understand the evolution of Canadian attitudes towards the United States. Indeed, the study’s corpus constitutes an excellent sample of Canadian writing on America and occasionally lends itself to quantification.

My work rests on the assumption that ideas have consequences; that they can be powerful and autonomous historical forces, but that they can also serve as pragmatic tools or instruments for socio-economic and political control.<sup>37</sup> To be sure, the attitude of Canadian intellectuals towards the United States has affected the relationship between the two nations. Several key observers, most notably O. D. Skelton (1878-1941) and Hugh L. Keenleyside (1898-1992), would eventually help shape Canadian policy towards the United States from inside the Department of External Affairs, while others would influence the course of Canadian-American relations through their essays, lectures, and sermons. For instance, in the 1880s and 1890s, Erastus Wiman’s tireless promotion of a North American customs union helped convince many Canadians that continental integration was both feasible and desirable. His numerous articles and pamphlets nourished the wider social discourse regarding reciprocity and no doubt encouraged the Liberal party in its late-nineteenth century campaign to liberalize Canadian-American trade. That this campaign was unsuccessful is beside the point. Wiman’s ideas – and those of other Canadian intellectuals – are important to the study of Canadian-American relations because they helped shape larger attitudes towards the United States and continental integration.

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<sup>36</sup> Jean-François Sirinelli, “Effets d’âge et phénomènes de génération dans le milieu intellectuel français,” *Cahiers de l’IHTP* 6 (1987): 7, 11.

<sup>37</sup> Robert A. Skotheim, *American Intellectual Histories and Historians* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1966), 259.

The present study is divided into three sections. The first part, *Canadian-American Relations: An Intellectual History*, amounts to an *entrée en matière*. It defines and dissects Canadian continentalism and anti-Americanism, and traces their general evolution. Previous scholarship on the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations and the foreign sources of Canadian commentary are also discussed. The second part, *America Through Canadian Eyes*, explores how Canada's intellectuals have viewed the various aspects of American society, from its philosophical bases to its practical workings. Chapters focus on the core principles of the American experience, politics and government, religion and culture, race and gender, and various issues related to order and industrial capitalism. Finally, the third section, *Canada and the United States*, examines how Canadian intellectuals have applied their reading of American history and society to the field of Canadian-American relations and to the politics of Canadian identity. The spectres of annexation and Americanization, as well as American foreign policy and Canadian-American trade, unionism, and migration are also discussed.

I

Canadian-American Relations:  
An Intellectual History

## *Chapter One*

### The Intellectual History of Canada-U.S. Relations: A Historiographic Outline

As a field of research, the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations is largely underdeveloped. American attitudes towards Canada have scarcely been examined and few studies dealing with Canadian attitudes towards the United States have sought to extend the scope of their inquiry beyond a particular thinker, sensibility, issue, or linguistic community.

In English Canada, many of the scholars who have examined the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations have done so from a continentalist perspective. As a result, most of the studies dealing with anti-American sentiment in Canada cast a very critical gaze at the phenomenon. More often than not, pervasive anti-Americanism is viewed as a sign of national intellectual immaturity. Continentalism, on the other hand, is generally portrayed as an essentially constructive and patriotic sensibility.

French-language scholarship surrounding the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations is essentially centred on Quebec and has traditionally sought to grapple with the divergence that existed between elite and popular attitudes regarding the United States. Recent work has explored the province's *américanité* and has been the object of a heated debate. Unlike in English-language scholarship, little attention is paid to American policy and actions, and the United States is boiled down to its essential sensibility. Indeed, *américanité* has far more to do with the continent's wider ethos than with Canadian-American relations or Americanization.

#### *English-Language Scholarship*

Our examination of the contemporary scholarship surrounding Canadian intellectual attitudes towards the United States begins with S. F. Wise and Robert Craig Brown's *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes* (1967).<sup>1</sup> Relying for the most part on legislative and journalistic sources, the authors chart Canadian opinion from the war of 1812 to the late nineteenth century. Canadian attitudes towards the United States, Wise and Brown insist, are largely a reflection of Canadian circumstances. They teach us little about America, but offer an interesting insight into the Canadian mind. Despite brief

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<sup>1</sup> Earlier scholarship, in particular the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is discussed throughout the present study.

outbursts of annexationism, nineteenth-century Canadians were largely critical of the American experience. This criticism, Wise and Brown argue, was intrinsic to the emergence of Canadian nationalism, but was also essentially detrimental to the development of the Canadian mind: “The urgent necessity for a small people, in the overwhelming presence of a supremely confident neighbor, to insist not merely upon their separateness and distinctiveness, but even upon their intrinsic political and moral superiority, had a paralytic effect upon the Canadian mind and upon the quality of Canadian thought.”<sup>2</sup>

Wise and Brown’s study is significant not for its conclusions, which are fairly standard, but for its effort to examine both English and French Canadian discourse. Later English-language studies tend to focus solely on English Canada and to examine either continentalist or anti-American sentiment. Generally speaking, anti-Americanism is viewed as a facet of Canadian nationalism and an expression of the nation’s struggle for distinctiveness. Most of the scholars who have examined anti-Americanism have regarded it as fundamentally harmful to both the Canadian mind and to the Canadian-American relationship. The anti-American tradition, indeed, has not led to a great deal of historical debate in Canada. Moreover, notes Reginald C. Stuart, “despite its ubiquity as a concept in Canadian history, little work exists on anti-Americanism in Canada.”<sup>3</sup>

In *The Sense of Power* (1970), Carl Berger insists that imperialism was a form of Canadian nationalism and that a vigorous critique of the American Republic was a key ingredient of that nationalism. Indeed, he writes, “what lay behind this Canadian critique of the United States was not malevolence but nationalism.” Berger’s use of the term ‘critique’ is significant, because he does not regard imperialist hostility to the United States as genuine anti-Americanism:

The term ‘anti-Americanism,’ invented in another age, is too loaded with unsavoury connotations and too ill-defined to faithfully encompass outlooks which ranged from Denison’s conspiratorial fantasies to G. M. Grant’s hopes for Anglo-American understanding. It is suggestive of an unwarranted sense of superiority, an inordinate preoccupation with describing the failures of a good neighbour, and a tendency to attribute to Americans expansionist motives which they did not harbour. Though

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<sup>2</sup> S. F. Wise, “The Annexation Movement and Its Effect on Canadian Opinion, 1837-1867,” in S. F. Wise and R. C. Brown, *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes* (Toronto, 1967), 97.

<sup>3</sup> Reginald Stuart, “Anti-Americanism in Canadian History,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* XXVII (1997): 293.



imperialists were unacquainted with the term anti-Americanism, they frequently disclaimed any hatred of the United States which it implies.

Imperialists, Berger nevertheless argues, “were all convinced that the republic represented an undesirable social order.” “Scarcely less prominent in their image of the republic than the feeling that republican institutions were unstable, was the conviction that the Americans had always been, and generally remained, hostile to the realization of a Canadian nationality,” he writes.<sup>4</sup>

Berger’s assertions regarding the benign nature of the imperialist critique of the American Republic scarcely stand up to serious scrutiny. Anti-Americanism, indeed, was a core element of the imperialist tradition. As we shall see, bland pleasantries on the subject of Anglo-Saxon unity or the occasional disclaimer regarding anti-American hostility hardly outweigh the systematic and fervent anti-Americanism which emanated from Canada’s pre-World War One imperialists. Besides, it is hardly anachronistic to use the term ‘anti-Americanism’ to describe imperialist hostility to the United States, since the adjective *anti-American* and the noun *anti-Americanism* respectively appeared in the English language during the late eighteenth and mid nineteenth centuries, and were used in much the same way as they are today: to express the idea of a general spirit of hostility towards the United States.<sup>5</sup> And though ‘anti-Americanism’ only became widely employed in Canadian English during the interwar years, the idea that there existed a spirit and a body of opinion hostile to the American Republic clearly predates 1900 in Canada. For instance, in 1891, Goldwin Smith employed “anti-American feeling” to express the notion of “Americanophobia,” which he considered “too long a word.”<sup>6</sup>

Few scholars share Berger’s reticence to identify imperialist hostility to the United States as anti-Americanism. For William M. Baker, who published some work on the subject in the 1970s, anti-Americanism is “a reflex of Canadian nationalism” and a “recurring theme in Canadian history.” He defines anti-Americanism as an “opposition to the Americanization of Canada whether in economic, social, cultural or political terms. Canadian anti-Americanism is therefore integrally connected with the Canadian’s concept of his own country ... It is one of the solid legs on which that elusive animal, the Canadian identity,

<sup>4</sup> Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 153, 165, 175.

<sup>5</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., s.v. “Anti-American.”

<sup>6</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered before the Young Men’s Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 77-78.

stands.” Born of the loyalist tradition, its most vocal spokesmen were members of the elite who sought to retain their power and prestige. Nevertheless, “while it is true that anti-Americanism did serve the interests of a social elite, it is clear that this group represented the views of the Canadian populace, though undoubtedly more vociferously than the ordinary Canadian.” Indeed, Canadian anti-Americanism was essentially moderate: “Canada has seldom been very belligerent in her anti-Americanism.”<sup>7</sup>

Canada’s anti-American outburst in the 1960s and 1970s encouraged several other scholars to take a look at Canadian hostility to the United States. Most agreed with Baker’s arguments. John C. Kendall, for instance, argued that “anti-Americanism has been the central ingredient in Canada’s objective to be independent of the United States.” Anti-Americanism, indeed, was integral to Canadian nationalism and to the construction of Canadian identity. It was, moreover, “the product of the intelligentsia, the would-be manufacturers of visible identity, the ‘priests of Canadianism.’”<sup>8</sup> Similarly, in 1979, George Rawlyk argued that “the negative image of the United States was used, it is clear, to try to bolster an extremely fragile and vulnerable Canadian identity. Such an identity was, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, threatened by the twin forces of regionalism and Americanization.”<sup>9</sup> At heart, anti-Americanism was an elitist, loyalist legacy.

The free trade debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s also brought scholars to examine Canada’s enduring anti-American tradition. In a 1988 article published in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Charles F. Doran and James P. Sewell insist that “anti-Americanism involves perceptual distortion such that a caricature of some aspect or behavior or attitude is raised to the level of general belief. In addition, based on that perception, it involves hostility directed toward the government, society, or individuals of that society.”<sup>10</sup> Tied to nationalism and the struggle to assert Canadian distinctiveness, Anti-American rhetoric is assumed to be fundamentally misrepresentative of the American experience. It is also largely instrumental, argue Doran and Sewell. Indeed,

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<sup>7</sup> W. M. Baker, “The Anti-American Ingredient in Canadian History,” *Dalhousie Review* 53 (1973): 58, 65; “A Case Study of Anti-Americanism in English Canada: The Election Campaign of 1911,” *Canadian Historical Review* LI (1970): 426, 438.

<sup>8</sup> John C. Kendall, “A Canadian Construction of Reality: Northern Images of the United States,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* IV (1974): 21.

<sup>9</sup> George Rawlyk, “A Question of Self or no Self: Some Reflexions on the English-Canadian Identity Within the Context of Canadian-U.S. Relations,” *Humanities Association Review* 30 (1979): 287-288.

<sup>10</sup> Charles F. Doran and James P. Sewell. “Anti-Americanism in Canada?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (1988): 106.

anti-Americanism has repeatedly been used by Canadian nationalists to discredit political opponents and to legitimize economic and cultural protectionism.

These arguments are also present in the most important study of Canadian anti-Americanism: J. L. Granatstein's *Yankee Go Home?* (1996). In this lively volume based largely on secondary sources, Granatstein examines the evolution of Canadian hostility to the United States from the late eighteenth century to the 1990s. He defines anti-Americanism as "a distaste for and a fear of American military, political, cultural, and economic activities that, while widespread in the population, is usually benign unless and until it is exploited by business, political, or cultural groups for their own ends. Added to this is a snippet – and perhaps more – of envy at the greatness, wealth, and power of the Republic and its citizens, and a dash of discomfort at the excesses that mar American life." Anti-Americanism, indeed, has traditionally been most intense among Canada's elite and its roots can be found in matters unrelated to the actual attributes of American society or to its foreign policy. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, anti-American rhetoric was "almost always employed as a tool by Canadian political and economic élites bent on preserving or enhancing their power. It was largely the Tory way of keeping pro-British attitudes uppermost in the Canadian psyche." In the end, Granatstein can find little redeeming qualities to such a deplorable national tradition: "With all its hatred, bias, and deliberately contrived fearmongering, anti-Americanism ... never was and never could become the basis of any rational national identity."<sup>11</sup>

More recently, in an article drawn from her master's thesis, Patricia K. Wood further undermines the notion that anti-Americanism is merely an expression of Canadian nationalism. She argues in her study of the 1891 federal election that "while the campaign revolved around anti-Americanism, its language, images and symbols were referential to specific discourses of ethnicity, gender and class. These discourses privileged British-Canadian, middle-class males, who used this election to further entrench their positions of social, cultural, and political power."<sup>12</sup> Indeed, Wood insists that anti-American rhetoric contained powerful cues related to gender, class, ethnicity, and race. It was used by the Conservatives to claim ownership over the power to define what was and was not 'Canadian.'

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<sup>11</sup> J. L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto, 1996), x, 4, 286.

<sup>12</sup> Patricia K. Wood, "Defining 'Canadian': Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36 (2001): 49.

In a 2004 monograph on the Anglo-Saxon ideal, Edward P. Kohn criticises North American historians for not “looking beyond traditional American Anglophobia and Canadian anti-Americanism” and “treating these trends of thought as unquestionable constants of their respective national histories.” Both of these negative faiths, he believes, were undermined during the brief period of Anglo-Saxon fervour fuelled by the Anglo-American rapprochement that occurred between 1895 and 1903: “As many of the events leading to the rapprochement had a North American context, Americans and Canadians often drew upon the common lexicon of Anglo-Saxon rhetoric to undermine the old rivalries and underscore their shared interests. Racial ideology did not cause the rapprochement, but racial rhetoric provided Americans and English Canadians with a device with which to adapt to the changing context of Canadian-American relations.” Pan-Saxon idealism, Kohn argues, was intimately tied to the rise of modernity: “Mainly older, white, upper-class, Protestant Americans and English Canadians used Anglo-Saxonism as a way of reasserting control on a rapidly changing world.”<sup>13</sup> Kohn nevertheless concedes that the Anglo-Saxon ideal proved ephemeral and somewhat superficial. It eroded but could not overcome Canada’s anti-American tradition and America’s tradition of Anglophobia. Ultimately, perceived national interest limited the potential of Anglo-Saxonism.

Kohn is right to issue such a caveat. Anti-American assumptions were scarcely undermined by Anglo-Saxon rhetoric, which generally amounted to little more than a series of bland pleasantries. Moreover, as we shall see in later chapters, English Canadian intellectuals were far more likely to use anti-Americanism than Anglo-Saxonism as a way of reasserting control on a rapidly changing world.

On the whole, anti-Americanism has received scant attention from Canadian historians. Even less, however, has been written about the continentalist impulse. The prevalent attitude within Canada’s intellectual and academic community is to dismiss continentalism as an antinationalist doctrine. Indeed, by the 1960s, writes Reginald C. Stuart, “continentalism acquired a musty, quaint, anachronistic, even sinister quality to those who now asserted that Canada was rather too much like, and too peaceful toward, the American neighbor.”<sup>14</sup> The

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<sup>13</sup> Edward P. Kohn, *This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Idea, 1895-1903* (Montreal and Kingston, 2004), 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> Reginald Stuart, “Continentalism Revisited: Recent Narratives on the History of Canadian-American Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 18 (1994): 406.

handful of the scholars who have seriously studied the continentalist impulse have sought to counter this impression.

Ian Grant is one of these scholars. In his work on commercial unionist Erastus Wiman, Grant criticises Carl Berger for suggesting that continentalism was an antinationalist sensibility. "In spite of a recent study which might lead us to the contrary conclusion, the story of the imperialists is but one side of the coin," he writes in the *Canadian Historical Review*. "Not only were many continentalists equally nationalistic, but they presented arguments which convinced many Canadians that continentalism was indeed more loyal and patriotic than imperialism." Continentalists like Wiman were not primarily motivated by self-interest; they firmly believed that continental integration would strengthen the Canadian nation. Moreover, Grant's defence of continentalism goes beyond the late nineteenth century: "Because Canadians have never been able to agree collectively what their national identity actually is, or is becoming, because continentalists have persisted among us, and because continentalists have often considered themselves loyal Canadian nationalists, we are not permitted to write them off as traitors."<sup>15</sup>

Graham Carr makes similar claims regarding interwar Canadian literary culture and the continentalist ideal. Indeed, he argues that literary critics like F. R. Scott and Douglas Bush believed that "American writing had overtaken British writing at the cutting-edge of English-language literature," and that "this dualistic notion that American literature had suddenly become progressive, while European literature was simultaneously growing stale, provided continentalist critics with a useful rationalization for their assertion that North America was a separate and distinctive cultural entity." Interwar continentalist critics wanted Canada to leave Britain's political, intellectual, and cultural orbit and assert its essentially North American nature. This continentalism, Carr insists, was a legitimate expression of Canadian nationalism:

Inevitably, the spread of continentalist thinking reflected, in some measure, the preponderating material domination of Canada by the United States; nevertheless, continentalism as an intellectual construct should not be confused with the process of Americanization *per se*, nor mistaken for a kind of intellectual submission to the ineluctable influence of American goods and ideals. Continentalist critics did not embrace American influence thoughtlessly, or simply because they were conditioned to it. Instead,

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<sup>15</sup> Ian Grant, "Erastus Wiman: A Continentalist Replies to Canadian Imperialism," *Canadian Historical Review* LIII (1972): 1.

they claimed an affinity with American culture because they sincerely admired it, and found it relevant to their own experiences as North Americans. Far from subverting the national culture, or interfering with the clarity of its vision, the continentalists believed that their ideal afforded Canadians an enlarged and distinctive perspective on the world.<sup>16</sup>

Like Carr, Allan Smith contends that continentalism and Canadian nationalism are historically compatible. In his various studies, Smith has sought to understand Canada's essentially continental nature. To this end, he has examined the intellectual and cultural aspects of continental integration. Continentalist intellectuals, Smith argues, have traditionally sought to harness American wealth and power to strengthen the Canadian nation. Indeed, in the continentalist perspective, closer Canadian-American relations are viewed as "perfectly compatible with – and would indeed serve – Canadian survival." Moreover, in a recent article, Smith insists that

For one group of commentators [the continentalist school], transforming the American challenge into the means of its own modification and removal involved a heavy emphasis on the good that could come to Canada from virtually unlimited access to the republic's economy. Enjoying access to American markets, able to draw on its capital, and in a position to profit from its expertise, Canada would find itself benefiting from American strength in ways that would be altogether at the service of the great nation-building project which had become so central to its life and survival.<sup>17</sup>

Like most English-language scholarship surrounding anti-Americanism in Canada, these studies of pro-American discourse are written from a continentalist perspective. They seek to confront the wider criticism of continentalism and continental integration which has come to dominate English Canadian intellectual commentary since the 1960s.

### *French-Language Scholarship*

In Quebec, the scholarship surrounding late nineteenth and early twentieth century intellectual attitudes towards the United States has often sought to understand the dichotomy between elite and popular attitudes regarding America. It is widely assumed that

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<sup>16</sup> Graham Carr, "All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 146, 149.

<sup>17</sup> Allan Smith, "Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century," *Canadian-American Public Policy* 44 (2000): 5.

anti-Americanism was rampant among the province's elite, while the rest of the population held a more positive view of the United States. As a result, work on Quebec's *rapport aux États-Unis* is often tied to a wider debate regarding the significance and the impact of pre-1960 nationalism.

For Guildo Rousseau, who published a monograph on *L'image des États-Unis dans la littérature québécoise* in 1981, "l'image des États-Unis est avant tout l'expression d'un mirage. Elle reflète un sentiment national obsédé par l'appel de l'Amérique." Anti-American sentiment, he notes, was tied to nationalism: "La résistance au mirage américain aboutit à l'exaltation des valeurs nationales." Moreover, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the struggle to curb emigration was central to the French Canadian critique of the United States. "L'ampleur de l'exode ligue contre l'Amérique opulente la presque totalité des écrivains," Rousseau notes.<sup>18</sup> Yves Roby's work on French Canadian emigration to the United States confirms this. More often than not, he writes, anti-American diatribes "traduisent l'affolement et subliment l'impuissance des élites devant l'exode de leurs compatriotes vers les États-Unis." As a result, these elites depicted America as a moral and spiritual wasteland. "Les images des États-Unis que nous donnent les élites québécoises sont des créations qui ont somme toute assez peu à voir avec la réalité," Roby writes. Indeed, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "les gens ordinaires projettent une image plus juste des États-Unis."<sup>19</sup> Jacques Cotnam agrees. He insists that outside of a few "précurseurs de la Révolution tranquille," which included Jean-Charles Harvey (1891-1967), Alfred Desrochers (1901-1978), and Robert Choquette (1905-1991), Quebec's pre-1960 elite preached in the desert when it came to the United States.<sup>20</sup> For his part, Richard Jones notes that anti-American sentiment, though endemic to French Canadian nationalism, was not its dominant negative faith:

Depuis l'arrivée des loyalistes au Canada à la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, un fort courant d'antiaméricanisme fait partie du nationalisme canadien. Quoique ce thème figure également dans le nationalisme canadien-français, son importance relative est indiscutablement moindre. Après tout, le nationaliste canadien-français dressait le plus souvent une longue liste d'ennemis de la nation parmi lesquels prenaient place, outre

<sup>18</sup> Guildo Rousseau, *L'image des États-Unis dans la littérature québécoise, 1775-1930* (Sherbrooke, Quebec, 1981), 25, 122.

<sup>19</sup> Yves Roby, "Émigrés canadiens-français, Franco-Américains de la Nouvelle-Angleterre et images de la société américaine," in *Québécois et Américains: la culture québécoise aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles*, ed. Gérard Bouchard and Yvan Lamonde (Montreal, 1995), 131-132, 150-151.

<sup>20</sup> Jacques Cotnam, "La prise de conscience d'une identité nord-américaine au Canada français, 1930-1939," in *Les grands voisins*, ed. G. Kurgan (Brussels, 1984), 76.

l'Américain, et suivant la période étudiée, l'Anglais, le protestant, l'immigrant, le Juif, le franc-maçon, le communiste, l'impérialiste britannique, le centralisateur fédéral, etc., etc. Dans cette panoplie d'adversaires, l'Américain n'est généralement pas à l'avant-garde.<sup>21</sup>

More recent work on the intellectual history of Quebec-U.S. relations has been centred on the concept of *américanité*. According to Yvan Lamonde, who initiated the historical profession to the concept in the 1980s, Quebec's history has been marked by a long struggle between those who embraced the province's *américanité* and those who rejected it.<sup>22</sup> *Américanité* refers to Quebec's fundamentally American nature, to its Americanness, and should not, insists Lamonde, be confused with Americanization:

L'américanisation du Québec, concept de résistance ou de refus, est ce processus d'acculturation par lequel la culture étatsunienne influence et domine la culture autant canadienne que québécoise – et mondiale – tandis que l'américanité, qui englobe tout autant l'Amérique latine que l'Amérique saxonne, est un concept d'ouverture et de mouvance qui dit le consentement du Québec à son appartenance continentale. Cette quête d'américanité a connu trois moments forts: 1837 et 1860 alors que ... le phénomène s'avère incomplet et réversible, 1945, après quoi il deviendra inconséquent de ne pas se voir et de ne pas s'accepter comme américain.<sup>23</sup>

From the mid nineteenth century to the postwar years, the bulk of Quebec's intellectuals would reject the province's *américanité*. "Chez ces élites," writes Gérard Bouchard, whose recent work has also explored Quebec's *américanité*, "la fidélité à un passé largement imaginaire servit alors de programme pour les générations futures, la mémoire des origines se substituant à l'exaltation du rêve nord-américain."<sup>24</sup> As a result, the bulk of Quebec's elite was out of step with both the populace and the continent's wider ethos of rupture and renewal. In his work, Bouchard insists on "la distance entre la culture des

<sup>21</sup> Richard Jones, "Le spectre de l'américanisation," in *Les rapports culturels entre le Québec et les États-Unis*, ed. C. Savary (Quebec, 1984), 147.

<sup>22</sup> The concept of *américanité* is central to Lamonde's *Histoire sociale des idées au Québec* (Montreal, 2000-2004), 2 volumes.

<sup>23</sup> Yvan Lamonde, *Ni avec eux ni sans eux: le Québec et les États-Unis* (Montreal, 1996), 11. This study has been republished in Lamonde, *Allégeances et dépendances. Histoire d'une ambivalence identitaire* (Quebec, 2001), 27-135. The distinction between *américanité* and *américanisation* is also discussed in Lamonde, "Américanité et américanisation. Essai de mise au point," *Globe* 7 (2004): 21-29.

<sup>24</sup> Gérard Bouchard, "Le Québec comme collectivité neuve. Le refus de l'américanité dans le discours de la survivance," in Bouchard and Lamonde, *Québécois et Américains: la culture québécoise aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Montreal, 1995), 16.



milieux populaires et celles des élites – sociales et culturelles principalement. Nous avons parlé à ce propos d'une antinomie: la première était entièrement nourrie des expériences du continent, submergée dans l'américanité, tandis que la seconde empruntait largement à la France et à l'Europe ses références et ses repères."<sup>25</sup> The originality of Bouchard's work on Quebec's américanité rests primarily on his methods of analysis. He views the province as a *société neuve* whose historical development can be best understood through comparative studies involving other *sociétés neuves* such as Mexico or Australia.

The defeat of the 1837-1838 rebellions is significant to the *rejet de l'américanité* that both Lamonde and Bouchard have suggested was prevalent in French Canadian thought from the mid nineteenth to the mid twentieth centuries. The defeat dealt a crushing blow to Quebec's liberal intellectual elite, which had sought to follow the American model of rupture and republicanism. And the vacuum left by the collapse of the *patriote* movement was quickly filled by a conservative and clerical elite whose rejection of the Quebec's *américanité* expressed itself through a vigorous anti-Americanism and a desire to create a *Nouvelle-France* on the shores of the St. Lawrence. The province's intellectual culture had gone off the rails. For the next century or so, conservative and Catholic utopianism dominated the French Canadian mind. The masses, however, continued to look upon the United States with sympathy.

The *américanité* paradigm is not without its critics. Chief amongst them is Joseph Yvon Thériault. In his 2002 *Critique de l'américanité*, Thériault argues that the concept impedes the understanding of Quebec's historical singularity. The province's historical development, he insists, cannot be properly understood as a disembodied *société neuve*. Moreover, Thériault contends that Quebec's conservative and clerical elite did not reject the province's essential continentalism and were not completely out of step with its populace. These elites merely refused to accept that the American model – rupture – was endemic to the New World. They sought instead to promote a right-wing version of *américanité*, and dreamed of an *Amérique française*. For these conservatives, the concept of an *Amérique française* was an attempt to appropriate the continent through the explorers of New France, Quebec's diaspora, and French Canada's religious mission. It translated, according to Thériault, the dream of an "américanité nordique."<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Gérard Bouchard, *Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau monde. Essai d'histoire comparée* (Montreal, 2000), 66.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph Yvon Thériault, *Critique de l'américanité. Mémoire et démocratie au Québec* (Montreal, 2002), 70.

Nevertheless, Thériault is most critical of the theory's contemporary intellectual and political implications, which are most evident in the writing of Gérard Bouchard. Indeed, in Bouchard's work, the concept of *américanité* is politically charged. On the one hand, it refers to a truism: Quebec is part of the Americas. As Thériault writes, "cette référence nous étonnait et nous agaçait, en raison, dans un premier temps, de son caractère d'évidence, de banalité, pourrait-on dire. Personne n'aurait idée de mettre en doute l'existence physique du Québec sur le sol nord-américain, son intégration économique et sa participation à la civilisation nord-américaine?" On the other hand, "l'américanité comme pensée forte, c'est encore l'idée de la rupture, c'est-à-dire une hypothèse selon laquelle la culture québécoise contemporaine est une radicale nouveauté en regard de l'histoire du Canada français, groupement historique qui n'aurait jamais assumé son destin continental."<sup>27</sup> And therein lie the political and ideological implications of *américanité*. The concept has provided Gérard Bouchard with a tool to obliquely criticize the conservative nationalism that dominated Quebec's intellectual culture from the 1840s to the Quiet Revolution.

This study builds on the work of several scholars. It draws particularly on Yvan Lamonde's work on Quebec's américanité. The *américanité* paradigm, to be sure, suggests that the United States is treated more as a sensibility than as a nation in Canadian thought and writing. Indeed, as Lamonde notes in a text co-authored with Gérard Bouchard, "l'évolution qui a conduit à l'insertion de la culture savante québécoise dans l'américanité recoupe en plusieurs points une autre trame culturelle qui est l'essor de la modernité."<sup>28</sup> The present study seeks to follow up on this research avenue.

A handful of American scholars have viewed anti-American sentiment as a rejection of modernity. For instance, in a recent article, James W. Ceaser suggests that the interest of anti-American thinkers in Europe "was not always with a real country or people, but more often with general ideas of modernity, for which 'America' became the name or symbol."<sup>29</sup> Paul Hollander, who sees anti-American sentiment as the product of "nationalism (political

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 12, 14.

<sup>28</sup> Bouchard and Lamonde, "Introduction," in their *Québécois et Américains*, 10. Nevertheless, Bouchard and Lamonde do not believe that *américanité* and modernity are synonymous: "Les deux trames ne doivent pas être confondues, comme le montre, notamment, le fait qu'elles aient entretenu des interactions contradictoires. Ainsi, on pourrait montrer que, d'un côté, la modernité a pavé la voie à l'américanité en libérant la culture savante des vieilles normes et traditions qui lui servait d'ancrages et en l'ouvrant au changement. Mais de plusieurs façons aussi, la modernité a relancé l'état de dépendance à l'endroit de modèles culturels européens, repoussant ainsi l'échéance de la rupture." [Ibid.]

<sup>29</sup> James W. Ceaser, "A Genealogy of Anti-Americanism," *The Public Interest* 152 (2003), 5.

or cultural)” and “the rejection of (or ambivalence toward) modernization and anti-capitalism,” goes a step further than Ceaser in his assessment of the phenomenon. “It has become increasingly clear,” he writes, “that to the extent that ‘Americanization’ is a form of modernization, the process can inspire understandable apprehension and anguish among those who seek to preserve a more stable and traditional way of life in various parts of the world.”<sup>30</sup>

The present study also builds on the ideas of J. L. Granatstein and Patricia K. Wood, whose work has revealed that anti-Americanism is far more than a simple expression of Canadian nationalism. Along with the work of Graham Carr and Allan Smith, these studies have undermined the notion that nationalism is the central cleavage in the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Too many studies, indeed, have viewed the ‘American question’ through the prism of nationalism and have correspondingly neglected the left-right cleavage in the formulation of Canadian commentary.

My work also draws some inspiration from Gérard Bouchard’s comparativism, but seeks to pursue a more Canadian path. Indeed, the present study follows in the tracks of Sylvie Lacombe, who recently published a groundbreaking study comparing the imperialism of several prominent late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperialists with the nationalism of Henri Bourassa.<sup>31</sup> There is indeed, as Lacombe notes, a great degree of convergence between these seemingly antithetical ideologies. This is hardly surprising since, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, both groups shared an essentially antimodern outlook.

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<sup>30</sup> Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1990* (New York, 1992), xi, 7. A few contributors to Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toinet, eds. *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception* (New York, 1990) also view anti-Americanism as a form of antimodernism.

<sup>31</sup> Sylvie Lacombe, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus. Comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au Canada entre 1896 et 1920* (Quebec, 2002).

## Chapter Two

### Observing the United States

As a model or as a *bête noire*, America has never ceased to fascinate intellectuals. Along with Great Britain, the United States played a key role in the conceptual universe of the Canadian intellectual. Both nations were generally represented as antithetical archetypes: Britain embodied tradition and conservative values, while the United States came to symbolize modernity and the liberal ethos.<sup>1</sup>

“To think of the U.S. is to think of ourselves – almost,” noted George Grant (1918-1988) in 1968.<sup>2</sup> At heart, Canadian writing on the United States reflected domestic concerns, not American issues. Indeed, as S. F. Wise has pointed out, “one learns little about the American polity from the Canadian idea of it, but much about Canadians. Their picture of the United States was a projection of their own fears and emotions, of their sense of living in a hostile world, of their anxiety for their own survival, and of their uncertainties about their special place in North America.”<sup>3</sup>

Above all, however, in pre-1945 Canadian discourse, America embodied both the promise and the dangers of the mass age. “The United States is dealing with some of those great social and economic problems which, if not altogether peculiar to the great democracy of the West, seem to be more acute there than elsewhere,” wrote James Cappon (1855-1939) in 1912. Born in Scotland, Cappon had immigrated to Canada in 1888 to teach English at Queen’s University. Regarding the United States, he worried, as did most Canadian imperialists, that “the problems which are theirs to-day may be ours to-morrow.”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, America has long presented a vision of the future, albeit a blurred one, to the intellectuals of the world.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity, 1939-1970* (Toronto, 2001), 8.

<sup>2</sup> George Grant quoted in Robin Winks, *The Relevance of Canadian History: U.S. and Imperial Perspectives* (Toronto, 1979), 84.

<sup>3</sup> S. F. Wise, “The Annexation Movement and Its Effect on Canadian Opinion, 1837-1867,” in S. F. Wise and R. C. Brown, *Canada Views the United States: Nineteenth-Century Political Attitudes* (Toronto, 1967), 97.

<sup>4</sup> James Cappon, “Current Events: Government and Trusts in the United States,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XIX (1912): 290.

<sup>5</sup> Theodore Zeldin, “Foreword,” in *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, ed. D. Lacorne et al. (New York, 1990), x. In this sense, foreign writing on America has generally contained more than a simple discourse of otherness. For instance, as Michel Winock has noted regarding French reactions to America, “l’autre, l’Américain, même quand on le déteste, on n’en parle pas comme jadis de l’Angliche’ ou du ‘boche’ car il n’est pas radicalement différent de nous: il est une part de nous-même, un

This chapter offers a series of preliminary observations regarding Canadian observers of American life, the evolution and major themes of Canadian writing on America, and the intellectual core of the two opposing sensibilities that emerge from the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations: anti-Americanism and continentalism.

The “American question” has always held an important place within Canadian thought and writing. Not surprisingly, therefore, most late nineteenth and early twentieth century Canadian intellectuals published some material on the United States and Canadian-American relations. That said, the intellectuals whose contact with American society had been closest, those who had lived, studied, or worked in the United States, did tend to produce more work on the “American question.” Canadian interest in American affairs and in the Canadian-American relationship ebbed and flowed during the period under study – the reciprocity elections of 1891 and 1911, for instance, brought Canadian interest in the “American question” to a fever pitch – but never ceased to occupy a prominent position in Canadian discourse.

The anti-American/continental dialectic has structured Canadian thought since the American Revolution. In many ways, it mirrors the classical dichotomy between the left and the right. For the continentalist left and centre, modernity and social change were not to be feared. Prewar socialists and liberals welcomed the mass age, and they embraced America and continental integration. Theirs was an ethos of change. Canada’s right did not share their enthusiasm, and imperialist and *nationaliste* anxieties regarding modernity and the status revolution found a convenient outlet in anti-American rhetoric.

### *The Canadian Observer*

Though it has been argued that early Canadian views of America “were lacking in both understanding and information,”<sup>6</sup> this was not at all the case at the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, by that time, many intellectuals, particularly in English Canada, had acquired what Allan Smith refers to as “a continental frame of reference” and a marked

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mauvais côté à refouler. Le vieil ennemi héréditaire, il était facile de ne pas le ‘gober,’ parce que sa différence ethnologique sautait aux yeux. Cette extériorité de la menace cuisait des haines sans mélange. Mais l’Amérique, faite de tous les morceaux du monde, ébauche d’une civilisation planétaire, nous la craignons parce qu’elle est en nous, parce qu’elle est une des virtualités à haute probabilité de notre avenir.” [Winock, “U.S. go home’: l’antiaméricanisme français,” *L’Histoire* 50 (1982): 7.]

<sup>6</sup> S. F. Wise cited in Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 154.

tendency “to view American issues as though they were their own.”<sup>7</sup> Many Canadians studied, worked, and traveled in the United States, and American newspapers, magazines, literature, and eventually, radio and film combined to make Canadians keenly aware of events and trends in the United States. Far better informed than their predecessors, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Canadian intellectuals pondered the “American question” as never before.

As a result, commentary on America can be found throughout late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Canadian discourse. As we have seen, several of the most important books published in Canada between 1891 and 1945 dealt in some way with the “American question,” and the roll of English and French Canadian thinkers (Tables 1 and 2) whose writing occurs most frequently in this study’s corpus reads like a who’s who of the Dominion’s early-twentieth-century intellectual culture. Moreover, the list of the ten periodicals (Table 3) whose articles appear most frequently in the corpus contains many of the Dominion’s leading journals of intellectual commentary.

In fact, most Canadian intellectuals showed some interest in the “American question.” Commentary on American affairs and on Canadian-American relations nonetheless remained more prevalent in English Canadian discourse. Simply put, English Canadians were more preoccupied with American affairs, no doubt because of their closer cultural proximity to the United States.

During the period under study, the average intellectual observer of the United States was a middle-class man – the corpus is overwhelmingly male – born sometime between 1860 and 1900. Two generations dominate this study. The first, born between the late 1850s and the late 1870s, was profoundly affected by the wave of imperialism that washed over the British Empire in the second half of Queen Victoria’s reign. It was most active in the early twentieth century. The second generation, born roughly between 1880 and 1900, was deeply scarred by the Great War. It reached its peak of influence during the 1930s and 1940s.

For the Dominion’s intellectuals, interest in American affairs increased in proportion to contact with the United States. Nearly two-thirds of the English and French Canadian intellectuals listed in Tables 1 and 2 either studied or worked in the United States at some point in their lives. Moreover, a few prominent Canadian intellectuals, including Jules-Paul

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<sup>7</sup> Allan Smith, “The Continental Dimension in the Evolution of the English-Canadian Mind,” in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), 42.

Tardivel (1851-1905) and John Castell Hopkins (1864-1923) were in fact born in the United States. Others, like George M. Wrong (1860-1948), R. G. Trotter (1888-1951), Jean-Charles Harvey, and Harry Bernard (1898-1979), spent part of their childhood in the Republic. Not surprisingly, expatriate intellectuals proved to be among the most prolific observers of the United States. Indeed, writers like abbé Henri d'Arles (1870-1930), who was attached to the Roman Catholic diocese of Manchester, New Hampshire, for almost two decades, or John Bartlet Brebner, who spent most of his career teaching history at New York's Columbia University, could offer a unique perspective on American life to Canadians.

Table 1  
English Canadian Intellectuals Whose  
Work Appears Most Frequently in this  
Study's Corpus

Rank	Name	Number of Appearances
1	R. G. Trotter	15
2	Stephen Leacock	12
3	O. D. Skelton	12
4	F. H. Underhill	11
5	J. B. Brebner	9
6	Goldwin Smith	9
7	Andrew Macphail	8
8	James Cappon	7
9	A. R. M. Lower	7
10	B. K. Sandwell	7

Table 2  
French Canadian Intellectuals Whose  
Work Appears Most Frequently in this  
Study's Corpus

Rank	Name	Number of Appearances
1	Harry Bernard	6
2	Antonio Huot	6
3	André Laurendeau	6
4	Henri d'Arles	5
5	Hermas Bastien	5
6	Lionel Groulx	5
7	Esdras Minville	5
8	Henri Bourassa	4
9	J.-L.-K. Laflamme	4
10	E. de Nevers	4

Table 3  
Journals Whose Articles Appear  
Most Frequently in this Study's Corpus

Rank	Journal	Number of Articles
1	<i>Queen's Quarterly</i>	43
2	<i>Canadian Forum</i>	36
3	<i>University Magazine</i>	22
4	<i>Canadian Magazine</i>	14
5	<i>Canadian Historical Review</i>	13
6	<i>Revue canadienne</i>	13
7	<i>Revue dominicaine</i>	13
8	<i>L'Action nationale</i>	12
9	<i>L'Action française</i>	11
10	<i>Dalhousie Review</i>	9

Many key observers experienced American society through its universities. Indeed, though higher education grew rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, graduate studies remained woefully underdeveloped in Canada until well into the 1960s. As a result, a significant number of the corpus' authors completed their studies abroad, often in American universities. Stephen Leacock, O. D. Skelton, and Harold Innis (1894-1952), for instance, all earned doctoral degrees from the University of Chicago, while James T. Shotwell (1874-1965), who edited the interwar series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, received his Ph.D. from Columbia University.

Moreover, as the nation's economic and intellectual development perennially lagged behind that of the United States, a number of Canadian intellectuals left the Dominion to find work in the Republic. American universities proved to be particularly fertile ground for Canadian scholars in search of employment and good wages. Queen's University graduate William Bennett Munro (1875-1957), for instance, headed Harvard's Bureau of Municipal Research in the 1920s, while P. E. Corbett (1892-1983), who served as McGill University's Dean of Law in the 1930s, left Canada and joined the faculty of Yale University in 1942. The world of American journalism also proved particularly enticing to the Canadian intellectual. Sara Jeannette Duncan (1861-1922), one of the most prominent women authors of her generation, got her start at the *Washington Post*, while John MacCormac (1890-1958) made a name for himself at the *New York Times*.

The 'brain drain' was particularly acute among English Canadian thinkers, whose upward mobility in America was not hampered by the 'foreign' label. In his memoirs, Arthur Lower, who had studied and taught history at Harvard University, reflected on this reality: "In that first week [at Harvard], I also went to a reception for foreign students. The gentleman receiving me said, 'You do not seem like a foreigner.' I replied that I did not know whether I was or not, since I was a Canadian. 'Oh, Canadians are not foreigners,' he said. No one ever treated me as one."<sup>1</sup> James T. Shotwell made a similar observation in his memoirs: "Never, during all the years from student to professor, did anyone at Columbia ever raise the question of Canadian origin. There was never a trace of nationalism in the attitude toward my work – not until August, 1914, that is, and then not in criticism. I was astonished,

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<sup>1</sup> A. R. M. Lower, *My First Seventy-Five Years* (Toronto, 1967), 149.



however, when at a luncheon at the Faculty Club in that year some of my colleagues turned to me to get the British point of view, of which they knew as much as I.”<sup>2</sup>

The French Canadian experience in America was different. Emigrants from Quebec had long suffered the stigma of the “Chinese of the Eastern States” epithet that the Chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of Labor, Carroll D. Wright, had heaped on them in 1881. Nonetheless, many French Canadian intellectuals followed the hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who emigrated to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And though latent nativism and linguistic barriers effectively excluded most of them from mainstream American intellectual life, many found work in the lively world of Franco-American journalism. In fact, the emigrant press served as a training ground for several of French Canada’s most prominent journalists, including the *enfant terrible* of French Canadian journalism, Olivar Asselin (1874-1937), who began his career at eighteen writing articles for the *Protecteur canadien* of Fall River, Massachusetts. Others, like Catholic clergymen Édouard Hamon (1841-1904) and Antonio Huot (1877-1929), served God in various American dioceses.

While French Canadian intellectuals showed less sustained interest in the United States than their English Canadian counterparts, they did, however, produce several of the Dominion’s full-length examinations of American life.<sup>3</sup> It is indeed Edmond de Nevers, not Goldwin Smith, who stands out as the most sophisticated Canadian observer of his era. Born Edmond Boisvert in Baie-du-Febvre, Canada East, de Nevers was educated at the Séminaire de Nicolet. Called to the Quebec Bar in 1883, he appears to have taken a job as a provincial inspector of asylums rather than practice law. Shortly thereafter, he adopted the pseudonym Edmond de Nevers. In 1888, he left Canada for Germany. Brilliant and multilingual, he traveled extensively throughout Europe during the next several years and worked at the Agence Havas in Paris as a translator and writer. In 1895, he returned to North America, going first to Rhode Island, where his family had previously emigrated, then to Quebec City, where he had numerous friends and relatives. The following year he was back in Europe, but returned to Quebec in 1900 stricken with locomotor ataxia. He spent the next couple of

<sup>2</sup> James T. Shotwell, *The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), 57.

<sup>3</sup> These include A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896); Sylva Clapin, *Histoire des États-Unis depuis les premiers établissements jusqu’à nos jours* (Montreal, 1900); Edmond de Nevers, *L’âme américaine*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1900); and Jules-Paul Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (Montreal, 1900). The turn of the twentieth century also produced two of English Canada’s most in-depth analyses of American history and society: Goldwin Smith, *The United States: An Outline of Political History, 1492-1871* (New York, 1893); and Beckles Willson, *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (London, 1903).

years working as a publicist for the provincial Department of Colonization and Mines. Debilitated by his illness, he returned to Rhode Island sometime in late 1902 or early 1903 to die among his family.<sup>4</sup> In many ways, de Nevers was Canada's answer to Alexis de Tocqueville. Like the author of *De la démocratie en Amérique*, de Nevers was a liberal with marked conservative tendencies who devoted several years of his life to analyzing American society, which he admired, though not unquestioningly. He published his monumental *L'âme américaine* in 1900 and translated Matthew Arnold's 1888 essays on *Civilization in the United States* into French. In 1900, French literary critic Ferdinand Brunetière published a forty-page review of *L'âme américaine* in the prestigious *Revue des deux mondes*. He believed that the two-volume essay was "un des plus intéressants qu'on ait publiés depuis longtemps sur l'Amérique."<sup>5</sup>

#### *Canadian Interest in America: Evolution and Themes*

The Canadian fascination with the United States grew progressively during the period under study. And though the upward trend in Canadian writing on the Republic and on Canadian-American relations that can be observed in Figure 1 does, to some extent, reflect the general development of the Dominion's periodical literature, it also reveals a genuine growth of interest in American affairs between 1891 and 1945. As continental integration expanded, so too did Canadian commentary on America.


Writing on America responded to a variety of stimuli, both domestic and foreign. To be sure, while Canadian commentary was primarily a reflection of national concerns, American events and policy also affected its intensity. Canadian federal elections centred on reciprocity were largely responsible for the peaks in interest in 1891 and 1911 (see Figure 1), whereas the Alaska boundary dispute and the flurry of treaties and agreements signed with the United States during the decade or so that preceded the outbreak of the Great War engendered a great deal of commentary. Later, the Great Depression, the New Deal, and the King-Roosevelt reciprocity agreement produced a fair amount of discussion in 1929-1931 and in 1935-1936, while American neutrality and the outbreak of World War Two, the fall of France, the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour brought Canadian commentary to a fever pitch in 1939-1942. The fall of France was indirectly responsible for the burst of interest in American affairs and in Canadian-American

<sup>4</sup> Claude Galameau, "Edmond Boisvert," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. XIII.

<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand Brunetière quoted in Claude Galameau, *Edmond de Nevers, essayiste* (Quebec, 1960), 32.

relations that occurred in 1940 and 1941. As the British Empire faced the Axis powers alone, Canada's sense of vulnerability reached its highest levels since the 1860s, and Canadians increasingly turned to the United States for protection and leadership. As a result, Canadian intellectuals produced more commentary on American affairs in 1940-1941 than at any other point during the period under study.

**Figure I**  
Texts Selected for Inclusion in this Study



Canadian independence and the Dominion's entry into the League of Nations produced a great deal of writing on international relations in general, and on Canadian-American relations in particular, during the interwar years. International affairs literally fascinated the English Canadian intellectuals born around the turn of the twentieth century. They had come of age with the Dominion and were anxious to see it assume its rightful place in the concert of nations. The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, which was founded in 1928, helped nurture their interest in international relations by sponsoring a number of conferences and innovative studies that explored Canada's place in the world.<sup>6</sup>

In general, English Canadian intellectuals showed greater interest in American affairs and a more pronounced tendency to view American issues as though they were their own than did their French Canadian counterparts. Nevertheless, Quebec's interest in America grew rapidly after World War One. French Canadian intellectuals authored 31.4 percent of

<sup>6</sup> These studies included R. A. Mackay and E. B. Rogers, *Canada Looks Abroad* (London, 1938); F. R. Scott, *Canada Today* (London, 1938); C. P. Stacey, *The Military Problems of Canada* (Toronto, 1940); and John P. Humphrey, *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1942).

the texts in this study's corpus. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, a quantitative jump in French Canadian commentary occurred after the Great War. From 1891 to 1918, French Canadians produced 26.7 percent of the corpus, while they generated 34.4 percent of the texts from 1919 to 1945. The decline of imperialism, the rise of American cultural and economic power, the temporary return of large scale emigration, and the steady growth of French interest in American life all contributed to this phenomenon. As in English Canada, French Canadian interest in American affairs peaked in 1941, which André Laurendeau (1912-1968) hailed as the year of Quebec's "découverte tardive de l'Amérique."<sup>7</sup>

Though English and French Canadian intellectuals shared common preoccupations with respect to the United States, the tone and emphasis of their commentary often differed. English Canadian discourse on America tended to be centred on political and diplomatic affairs. As Louis Balthazar has pointed out, "les relations canado-américaines, même sous leur jour politique, ont été dans l'ensemble l'apanage quasi exclusif des Canadiens anglais."<sup>8</sup> Not surprisingly therefore, writing on formal diplomatic relations between Canada and the United States was largely the realm of the English Canadian. Conversely, French Canadian intellectuals were inclined to concentrate on social issues – religion, education, and culture – which English Canadian intellectuals were more likely to discount, and showed far less interest in American political affairs and in Canada-U.S. diplomacy. Quebec's intellectuals did, however, devote a great deal of energy to Canadian-American economic, demographic, and cultural relations. Accordingly, while it was little more than an afterthought in English Canadian writing, emigration loomed large in the French Canadian psyche. Economic affairs were of great interest in both English and French Canada, though issues related to trade were not as important in French Canadian discourse. Indeed, while reciprocity served as the flashpoint for the "American question" in English Canada, the issue was far less contentious in Quebec. In fact, even the most militant *nationalistes* were surprisingly ambivalent when it came to the liberalization of Canadian-American trade. Interwar American investment, on the other hand, does not appear to have generated a debate as intense in English Canada as it did in Quebec. English Canadians would only become fully conscious of the perils of

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<sup>7</sup> André Laurendeau, "Connaissance des États-Unis," *L'Enseignement secondaire XXI* (1941): 208.

<sup>8</sup> Louis Balthazar, "Les relations canado-américaines: nationalisme et continentalisme," *Études internationales XIV* (1983): 33.

American investment after Walter Gordon's Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects published its controversial report in 1957.

Not surprisingly, a great deal of Canadian commentary on America can be found in texts on emigration and the loyalist experience. For English Canadian intellectuals, the loyalists often acted as a convenient springboard for discussing the merits of the American Revolution and the foundations of American politics and government. However, interest in the loyalist tradition was tied to the vitality of English Canadian imperialism, and both declined after the Great War.<sup>9</sup>

Quebec frequently viewed the continent through the eyes of its diaspora. As Édouard Montpetit (1881-1954), who taught political economy at the Université de Montréal for almost three decades, observed in 1941, the United States, like English Canada, "intéressent surtout par le sort qu'elles réservent à l'élément francophone de leur population."<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, emigration and Franco-American affairs generated a great deal of commentary, which, in turn, often led to an examination of the merits of American society. Roughly one-fifth of the French Canadian texts (25.9 percent from 1891 to 1918 and 16.4 percent from 1919 to 1945) selected for inclusion in this study deal directly with emigration, Franco-America, or Louisiana. Interest in emigration and Franco-America dropped off rapidly after 1930, when the United States severely curtailed immigration from Canada. French Canadian intellectuals also had a tendency to see America, though to a lesser extent, through the experience of its Catholic citizenry.

By and large, Canadian observers viewed the United States in a monolithic fashion, and rarely was any region or state discussed independently of the whole. Seen from the outside, America was a largely homogeneous nation. However, unlike the European observer, who "as a rule either [saw] America through a trans-Atlantic haze or from the distorted perspective of a few weeks' mad dash between New York, Chicago and Boston,"<sup>11</sup> the Canadian observer merely peered over a fence, glanced at his neighbour, and jotted down his impressions. Canadian commentary rarely took the form of a travel narrative, and it usually appeared in article and pamphlet form. Relatively few Canadian observers, in fact, would publish books on American affairs. This was especially true after the Great War.

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<sup>9</sup> Norman Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists: The Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts* (Toronto, 1997), 113.

<sup>10</sup> Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 124-125.

<sup>11</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "The United States Through Canadian Eyes," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* 1 (1939): 104.

Indeed, the turn of the twentieth century produced virtually all of the full-length analyses of American society written in pre-1945 Canada.

The themes and arguments used to debate the “American question” were more or less constant during the period under study (and beyond). Indeed, as Ramsay Cook has pointed out,

George Grant succeeds Robinson and Principal Grant as the spokesman for ‘British’ Canada, while Professor Underhill is the successor of Goldwin Smith as the spokesman for ‘American’ Canada. (In a curious way, history does repeat itself: the repetition can be seen in comparing Professor Underhill’s review of George Grant’s *Lament for a Nation* in the *Journal of Liberal Thought* with G. M. Grant’s review of Smith’s *Canada and the Canadian Question* which appeared in *The Week* in 1891. The arguments about the future of Canada are largely unchanged).<sup>12</sup>

Canadian commentary was indeed repetitive and, as we shall see, somewhat derivative. Some scholars bemoan this fact. They argue that Canada, as a North American nation, should have produced some of the more perceptive analyses of American civilization; instead, they claim, it generated among the most unoriginal work ever written about the United States. To this effect, Carl Berger notes that

One of the curious features of Canadian views of the United States was that, while geographical proximity afforded countless opportunities to examine the nature of American society, Canadians have never produced significant interpretations of American life that could rank with the travelogues of Charles Dickens or Mrs. Trollope, let alone the monumental study of Alexis de Tocqueville. It may well be that in the later nineteenth century their capacity for understanding was blunted by prejudice, but even the liberal nationalists of the 1920s and 1930s who thought of Canada as an interpreter in the Anglo-American relationship accomplished little in the way of explaining American society to foreigners.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ramsay Cook, “Many Are Called, But None Is Chosen,” in his *The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics in Canada*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1977), 186.

<sup>13</sup> Berger, *The Sense of Power*, 153.

There is some truth to Berger's assertions. But the importance of Canadian interpretations of American life is lost when they are compared to European analyses. Canadian commentary is not significant because it offers any particular insight into the American experience; it is worthy of study because it offers a great deal of insight into the Canadian mind. Besides, the American commentary of Edmond de Nevers, Jules-Paul Tardivel, or Goldwin Smith easily ranks with that of Georges Duhamel or Charles Dickens. Their work has undoubtedly attracted scant attention in the United States and Europe, but this is principally the reflection of a wider ignorance of Canadian thought and writing.

### *The Anti-American Ethos*

In Canada, resistance to American domination has taken a number of forms since the War of 1812: the National Policy, Defence Scheme No. 1, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canadian content regulations, the Foreign Investment Review Agency, and the National Energy Policy, to name **only** a few. And from Confederation to the present day, cultural and economic protectionism **has** found its most vocal supporters among Canada's intellectual elite. Indeed, though the nation's intellectual culture has changed fundamentally since the late nineteenth century, anti-American sentiment continues to play a key role in Canadian thought. This apparent continuity masks a fundamental shift in the underpinnings of anti-American rhetoric in **Canada**: primarily a left-wing idea today, anti-Americanism was essentially a right-wing doctrine until the 1960s.

Though American actions and policy have historically intensified or lessened Canadian hostility, especially among the masses, they have never proved fundamentally causal to elite anti-Americanism. This was particularly true after Confederation. Certainly, American expansionism **did** threaten Canada before the Great War, but it had been a mitigated menace since the 1871 Treaty of Washington. Besides, American forcefulness never upset all Canadian thinkers – there has always been a group of continentalist intellectuals willing to forgive America for even its most serious misdeeds. Instead, pre-1945 anti-Americanism was **primarily** the expression of conservative antimodernism. Accordingly, the first step to understanding the anti-American ethos is to examine its complex relationship with modernity and, **more** immediately, to define its parameters. Where did criticism of the United States end and anti-Americanism begin?

“Il faut distinguer entre l’antiaméricanisme et la critique des États-Unis,” warns Jean-François Revel in a recent essay on *L’obsession anti-américaine*.<sup>14</sup> This distinction is very important, because anti-Americanism has historically implied a *systematic* hostility to American civilization, not merely a *punctual* criticism of American policy or life. By and large, anti-American thinkers were opposed to continental integration and rejected the notion that Canada was first and foremost, as John W. Dafoe (1866-1944) put it in 1935, “an American nation.”<sup>15</sup>

The anti-American invariably suffered from what Freud called the “narcissism of small differences.”<sup>16</sup> It should be noted, however, that the anti-American ethos was neither uniformly unsympathetic nor wholly uninformed; certainly it was not entirely the product of bitterness and traditional animosity.<sup>17</sup> Prominent anti-American thinkers could indeed, on occasion, wax sentimental about Anglo-Saxon unity or the Dominion’s critical role as the linchpin of Anglo-American relations. One such commentator was Beckles Willson (1869-1942), whose *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (1903) was written to celebrate nascent American imperialism and to promote Anglo-American cooperation. Willson, a staunch Canadian imperialist who worked as a freelance writer in Great Britain, looked forward to the emergence of a new imperial America that would erode democratic rights and freedoms, militarize, and take up the white man’s burden. The book was nonetheless anti-American; the liberal foundations of American civilization were denounced, and the advent of an imaginary and largely un-American “imperial republic” was acclaimed. Conversely, Goldwin Smith reacted to American imperialism with disgust. In *Commonwealth or Empire* (1902), he vigorously denounced what Willson had praised. It would be a mistake, however, to view Smith’s pamphlet as an anti-American document. He was merely condemning imperialism, a mortal threat to the liberal republic he so admired.

Anti-American rhetoric frequently involved inaccurate representations and irrational delusions. That said, irrationality was not intrinsic to anti-Americanism. Canadian critics could, at times, prove surprisingly insightful and accurate in their assessment of American

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<sup>14</sup> J.-F. Revel, *L’obsession anti-américaine: son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences* (Paris, 2002), 247. Charles F. Doran and James P. Sewell agree: “Criticism, when specific and objective, is not anti-Americanism.” [Doran and Sewell, “Anti-Americanism in Canada?” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (1988): 106.]

<sup>15</sup> J. W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation* (New York, 1935).

<sup>16</sup> S. Freud quoted in G. A. Rawlyk, “‘A Question of Self or no Self’: Some Reflexions on the English-Canadian Identity Within the Context of Canadian-U.S. Relations,” *Humanities Association Review* 30 (1979): 282.

<sup>17</sup> Berger, *The Sense of Power*, 153.



society. Accordingly, anti-Americanism never fully prevented the rational discussion of American affairs.

Anti-Americanism was fundamentally different from the other major negative faiths, anti-Semitism and anticommunism, because it lacked their unconditional nature.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, as Charles F. Doran and James P. Sewell note, Canadian hostility to the United States tends “to dissolve when brought directly into contact with the individual American.”<sup>19</sup> “No signs reading ‘Americans need not apply’ have ever been seen over the doors of Canadian offices,” observed John MacCormac in 1940.<sup>20</sup> Anti-American sentiment did not ultimately stop many Canadian intellectuals from adopting American practices, from contributing to American periodicals, or from studying, working, lecturing, or vacationing in the United States. Speaking before the Young Men’s Liberal Club of Toronto in 1891, Goldwin Smith offered an amusing anecdote to this effect: “The other day I was myself reviled in the most unmeasured language for my supposed American proclivities. Soon afterwards I heard that my assailant had accepted a call as a minister to the other side of the line.”<sup>21</sup>

Most anti-American intellectuals did not consider themselves to be antagonistic to the United States, and Canadian writing is filled with instances of anti-American authors defending themselves against the charge of anti-Americanism. For example, in 1910, the editor of the *University Magazine*, Andrew Macphail, sought to refute “the charge that Canadian writers in the *University Magazine* are animated by malice and misled by prejudice when they deal with matters concerning the people of the United States.” Indeed, he wrote, “it is not a sign of prejudice but a desire for self-preservation to fly the yellow flag over a plague spot.”<sup>22</sup> Macphail, however, was unquestionably one of the Dominion’s leading anti-American intellectuals; his suggestion that American civilization was akin to an epidemic disease is a classic anti-American statement.

Anti-Americanism is not an ideology per se, but a series of ideas woven into a wider system of beliefs.<sup>23</sup> In pre-1945 Canada, these ideas were integral to the conservative ethos. The

<sup>18</sup> Pascal Ory, “From Baudelaire to Duhamel: An Unlikely Antipathy,” in *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, ed. D. Lacombe et al. (New York, 1990), 42.

<sup>19</sup> Doran and Sewell, “Anti-Americanism in Canada,” 119.

<sup>20</sup> John MacCormac, *Canada: America’s Problem* (New York, 1940), 150.

<sup>21</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered before the Young Men’s Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 21.

<sup>22</sup> [Andrew Macphail], “Canadian Writers and American Politics,” *University Magazine* IX (1910): 3, 5.

<sup>23</sup> Indeed, as Réal Bélanger notes, “l’antiaméricanisme et le proaméricanisme n’ont de signification que dans leur rapport avec un plus grand ensemble idéologique qui leur sert de référent.” [Bélanger, “Le spectre de

premises upon which anti-American discourse rested were also those of conservative nationalism. These were relatively straightforward in English Canada:

- there is an unbroken bond between the Dominion and Britain;
- Canada is a nation primarily characterized by unity, not diversity;
- Canadian society is fundamentally different from American society; and
- Canadian nationhood is intrinsically precarious.

An analogous list has been drawn up for French Canada by Gérard Bouchard. He sees the historical rejection of Quebec's *américanité* as the product of a "paradigme de la survivance" whose basic premises were:

- l'affirmation de la continuité entre le Canada français et la France, l'un étant la reproduction de l'autre, d'où une vocation de fidélité aux racines, de conservation au sein du nouveau continent;
- l'affirmation de l'homogénéité sociale et surtout culturelle des Canadiens français, les manifestations de différenciation ou d'hétérogénéité étant considérées à la fois comme un affaiblissement de la nation et comme une sorte de manquement à la vocation continuiste;
- le postulat de la différence, en vertu duquel la culture canadienne-française (ou québécoise) était tenue a priori pour fondamentalement distincte de ses voisines, surtout la culture étatsunienne; [et]
- le sentiment de l'inconsistance et de la précarité de la culture nationale, toujours à soutenir, à réparer, sinon à construire.<sup>24</sup>

These tenets were fundamentally conservative. And while left-of-centre intellectuals are now the primary exponents of anti-American sentiment, until the 1960s the Canadian critique of America was essentially conservative. In fact, as we shall see, prewar "American civilization presented a far greater affront to traditionalists than it did to Marxists."<sup>25</sup> This is why Canadian anti-Americanism was expressed most fully in the discourse of the nation's

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l'américanisation : commentaire," in *Les rapports culturels entre le Québec et les États-Unis*, ed. C. Savary (Québec, 1984), 168.]

<sup>24</sup> Gérard Bouchard, "Le Québec comme collectivité neuve. Le refus de l'américanité dans le discours de la survivance," in Bouchard and Lamonde, *Québécois et Américains: la culture québécoise aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Montreal, 1995), 23-24.

<sup>25</sup> David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Connecticut, 1978), 67.

dominant conservative families: imperialism<sup>26</sup> and French Canadian nationalism.<sup>27</sup> Certainly, anti-Americanism has historically made for strange bedfellows, but more to the point, as Sylvie Lacombe has shown, French Canadian nationalism and English Canadian imperialism were not antithetical ideologies.<sup>28</sup> Despite their fundamental divergence on the national question, they both possessed an essentially antimodern outlook, and anti-Americanism was their logical point of convergence.

Imperialists and *nationalistes* indeed shared a number of overarching conservative values. These included a firm belief in communitarianism and elitism, an appreciation of organic, evolutionary change, a profound devotion to tradition, continuity, order, and transcendence, and a deep conviction that freedom, order, and private property were closely linked.<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting, however, that Canadian conservatives were rarely satisfied with the status quo. As a result, they produced some of the most sweeping critiques of modern industrial society to be published in the Dominion. Conservatism itself would not have existed without the challenge of modernity; only rupture or the threat thereof can make man reflect on the value of tradition.

That said, the average English Canadian critic of American society was both more fixated and more temperate than his French Canadian counterpart. This apparent paradox was the result of two basic factors: English Canada's more moderate conservative intellectual tradition and the traditional focus of its nationalism.

French Canadian conservatism was, simply put, more conservative than its English Canadian counterpart. English Canadian conservatism was essentially British and Protestant in inspiration; Quebec's right, on the other hand, was fundamentally Catholic and strongly

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<sup>26</sup> Not every imperialist was anti-American. A handful of unconventional thinkers, including journalist John S. Willison (1856-1927), had come to the imperial federation movement from the Liberal party and professed a non-anti-American form of imperialism. Others, like physician William Osler (1849-1919), had spent so much time in the United States that their imperialism had become largely purged of anti-American impulses. "Too often I have heard and seen expressed in the newspapers a carping spirit towards the Americans," Osler told Canadian Club of Toronto in 1904. "You should bear in mind that your fellow countrymen are living over there and are treated in a way which certainly should make you who live at home remember that whatever feelings you may entertain towards the United States as a nation, it ill becomes you to speak in any way at all derogatory of its people among whom we live as brothers and could not be treated any better if we lived at home." [Osler, "Anglo-Canadian and American Relations," *Addresses Delivered Before the Canadian Club of Toronto* (1904-1905): 64.]

<sup>27</sup> Loyalism, a far less prominent form of French Canadian conservatism, was also present in pre-1945 discourse. It combined key elements of both the imperialist and *nationaliste* traditions into a unique conservative synthesis. During the period under study, loyalism's principal exponents were Thomas Chapais (1858-1946), Gustave Lanctot (1883-1975), and Arthur Maheux (1884-1967).

<sup>28</sup> Sylvie Lacombe, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus. Comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au Canada entre 1896 et 1920* (Quebec, 2002), passim.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity*, 5; Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind from Burke to Eliot*, 7<sup>th</sup> revised edition (Chicago, 1986), 9.

influenced by the far less temperate conservative tradition of France.<sup>30</sup> These factors combined to ensure that French Canadian intellectuals would offer a stiffer resistance to modernity and America. Unlike many Protestant denominations, turn-of-the-century Catholicism stood fast against modernism. The English Canadian critique of the Republic also lacked the basic pietism that was the hallmark of conservative French Canadian commentary.

English Canada's ethnocultural proximity to its southern neighbour has historically made the United States the main focus of its nationalism, of its efforts at survival. Altogether less confident in their nation's distinctive nature, English Canadian intellectuals have been particularly prone to lashing out at America. As a result, English Canadian conservatives were more fixated on America than their French Canadian counterparts.

Yet the intellectual's rapport with modernity was hardly alien to the construction of identity and nationalism in pre-1945 Canada.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, conservative English and French Canadian nationalists both sought to build a nation on traditional (and therefore anti-American) precepts.

It has been written that anti-Americanism is "a disease of the intellectuals."<sup>32</sup> In the context of pre-1945 Canadian thought, however, anti-American rhetoric was in fact the symptom of a far deeper affliction: antimodernism. Modernity renewed the intellectual's function, yet most turn-of-the-twentieth-century Canadian thinkers were resolutely antimodern, and a moderate traditionalism born of Canada's essentially temperate political and intellectual culture formed the core of their thought. In the United States, the antimodern impulse expressed itself, among other things, through orientalism, medievalism, and the exaltation of martial virtues.<sup>33</sup> These values could be found in Canadian thought, but Canadian antimodernism found its principal outlet in anti-American rhetoric.

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<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, as Pierre Trépanier notes, "l'ultramontanisme, comme le conservatisme modéré, avait pour tradition de référence non seulement la contre-révolution française, mais surtout une synthèse proprement canadienne-française intégrant partiellement le traditionalisme britannique, avec sa singularité: le parlementarisme. L'ultracisme canadien-français ne coïncidera jamais parfaitement avec son homologue français. Joseph de Maistre, oui, mais aussi Edmund Burke et Louis-Hippolyte La Fontaine, dont la conquête de la responsabilité ministérielle a été saluée comme une victoire nationale, nationaliste même." [Trépanier, "Notes pour une histoire des droites intellectuelles canadiennes-françaises à travers leurs principaux représentants (1770-1970)," *Cahiers des Dix* 48 (1993): 122.]

<sup>31</sup> The relationship between modernity and the politics of Canadian identity is discussed in Chapter 9.

<sup>32</sup> J. Van Houten quoted in J. L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto, 1996), 6.

<sup>33</sup> Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (New York, 1981), passim.

But why lash out at the United States? Because America, like the former Soviet Union, is more than a nation; historically it has embodied both a way of life and an ideological system with pretensions to universality.<sup>34</sup> The American Republic is built on specific conceptions of liberty, equality, individualism, and secularism, and has come to epitomize an explicitly liberal version of modernity.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, as a revolutionary nation built on an ethos of rupture, America was quick to embrace the mass age and its social, cultural, and technological transformations. Revealingly, the pre-1945 critique of the United States was centred on a rejection of republicanism, egalitarianism, individualism, secularism, mass culture, materialism, and industrialism. America was a nation where continuity, order, and deference had vanished; it was, as George Grant asserted in *Lament for a Nation* (1965), “the heart of modernity.”<sup>36</sup> To stab at the United States, therefore, was to stab at modernity.

At the turn of the century, the attitude of many Canadian intellectuals towards American civilization was not unlike the current outlook of countless thinkers in the developing world. In both instances, “the dynamism of U.S. society is viewed as a radical threat by ... elites intent on the preservation of existing values, institutions, practices, and social relationships.”<sup>37</sup> Simply put, conservative intellectuals felt increasingly marginalized by the mass age, which America both embodied and extolled.

In this sense, anti-American rhetoric was tied to a wider denunciation of the status revolution that followed the rise of modernity. The rapid economic transformations that accompanied industrialization had profoundly affected the Dominion’s social structure. And as modernization eroded pre-modern status and deference, new social groups assumed some of the power and prestige that traditional elites had wielded.

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<sup>34</sup> Guy Sorman, “United States: Model or Bête Noire,” in *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism*, 213. According to Stephen Brooks, “America as a ‘city upon a hill’ and America as an ‘evening land’ are two sides of the same coin. The coin involves the utopian expectations associated with America, or what [I call] the mythic meaning of America. Most of the millions of people who have left their native countries for America, to live or visit, have come in search of something far less grand than utopia. But foreign observers of the American scene ... have understood that America represented an important new chapter in human history and that its potential for greatness lay not in economic brawn or military prowess, not in its engineering marvels or its ability to assimilate millions of immigrants from countless nationalities, but in the ideals embodied in its social structures and political institutions.” [Brooks, *America Through Foreign Eyes: Classical Interpretations of American Political Life* (Don Mills, Ontario, 2002), 150.]

<sup>35</sup> Along with socialism, liberalism is modernity’s most important ideological expression. These ideologies share a profoundly modern ethos which is described in *infra*, 50. For its part, fascism is a modern ideology to the extent that it seeks to create a “new man” and embraces atheism and revolutionism.

<sup>36</sup> George Grant, *Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism*, new ed (Toronto, 1970), 54.

<sup>37</sup> A. Z. Rubinstein and D. E. Smith, “Anti-Americanism: Anatomy of a Phenomenon,” in their *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 1985), 17.

Intellectual concerns about the ill-effects of the status revolution were tied to the more general middle-class anxieties that invariably follow rapid social change. These apprehensions were not confined to the Dominion; they could be found throughout Western Europe and the United States. Richard Hofstadter, for instance, argued that American progressivism was largely a reaction to the status revolution that accompanied industrialization. In his brilliant 1955 study of *The Age of Reform*, he contended that most turn-of-the-century reformers

were Progressives not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they were victims of an upheaval in status that took place in the United States during the closing decades of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century. Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable extent led by men who suffered from the events of their time not through a shrinkage in their means but through the changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power.<sup>38</sup>

Hofstadter's ideas are extremely relevant to the study of anti-American discourse in Canada. Indeed, many American progressives were die-hard antimodernists. Their progressivism was essentially conservative and possessed much in common with English Canadian imperialism and French Canadian nationalism.<sup>39</sup> These seemingly divergent ideologies were in fact born out of a common desire to make sense of modernity, and shared an antimodern sensibility that sought "to establish a social hierarchy, not based on class, but rather in which social critics and moral philosophers gained heightened recognition."<sup>40</sup> Like their Canadian counterparts, countless progressive leaders were nostalgic for an era when North American society was characterized by "a rather broad diffusion of wealth, status, and power," and where "the man of moderate means, especially in the many small communities, could command much deference and exert much influence." However, late nineteenth-century industrialization had "transformed the old society and revolutionized the distribution of power and prestige."<sup>41</sup> A new plutocracy of grandiosely and corruptibly wealthy men was emerging and stamping out traditional notions of status and deference.

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<sup>38</sup> Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform from Bryan to F. D. R.* (New York, 1955), 135.

<sup>39</sup> S. E. D. Shortt, *The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals and their Convictions in an Age of Transition, 1890-1930* (Toronto, 1976), 137.

<sup>40</sup> Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity*, 16.

<sup>41</sup> Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, 135, 136

Nevertheless, if Canadian conservatives and many American progressives were “critical of the predatory capitalists and their political allies,” they were “even more contemptuously opposed to the ‘radical’ agrarian movements and the ‘demagogues’ who led them, to the city workers when, led by ‘walking delegates,’ they rebelled against their employers, and to the urban immigrants.”<sup>42</sup> Irresponsible wealth would push the rootless, urban, and cosmopolitan proletariat to revolution. For the progressive, the imperialist, and the *nationaliste*, the twin evils of extravagant wealth and abject poverty threatened to destabilize society.

“In both Europe and America, the antimodern impulse was rooted in what can aptly be called a crisis of cultural authority,” writes Jackson Lears.<sup>43</sup> The intellectual’s power and prestige has always rested on his role as an arbiter of culture. As a result, many Canadian thinkers felt dispossessed by mass, or as they saw it, American culture, which was completely out of their control. To be sure, as Mario Roy notes in his 1993 essay on anti-Americanism in Quebec, “l’intellectuel tend à protéger son droit exclusif de manier les idées comme le plombier s’efforce de monopoliser le droit à la manipulation des tuyaux.”<sup>44</sup> That said, antimodernism and its principal Canadian expression, anti-Americanism, were nonetheless the result of a largely sincere effort to impose moral meaning on a rapidly changing society, and it would be a mistake to reduce this impulse to a simple quest for social control.

Canadian intellectuals were aware that the United States was undergoing – indeed exporting – a status revolution, and conservative critics were appalled by its implications. America fears “the better classes,” wrote the ultraconservative and pseudo-aristocratic Viscount de Fronsac (b. 1856) in 1891.<sup>45</sup> More than a decade later, the editor of the *Queen’s Quarterly*, James Cappon, lamented that “the influence of the American business man has been strong enough to set up success in making money as the popular test of a man’s ability and worth.”<sup>46</sup> One of Quebec’s leading conservative women writers, Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé (d. 1980), worried about the status of refined French Canadian women in the face of Americanization. The status revolution, she feared, would marginalize women of talent and standing and, in turn, would neutralize their influence over society. In America, she warned the readers of the *Revue dominicaine* in 1936, “la femme du monde n’est plus la femme d’un

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 142-143.

<sup>43</sup> Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 5.

<sup>44</sup> Mario Roy, *Pour en finir avec l’antiaméricanisme* (Montreal, 1993), 31.

<sup>45</sup> Viscount de Fronsac [X Frederic Gregory Forsyth], “Origin of the Social Crisis in the United States: A Monarchist’s View,” *Canadian Magazine* I (1893): 664.

<sup>46</sup> James Cappon, “The Great American Democracy,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XI (1904): 310.

rang social élevé, d'une éducation soignée, d'une culture plus poussée. L'intérêt et l'argent ont tout nivelé avec quelques degrés dans l'égalité suivant la capacité de réception et d'adaptation des uns et des autres. On n'est plus bien souvent qu'une femme riche, ou simplement un membre anonyme, falot, sans influence dans la société."<sup>47</sup>

Conservative writers were not only dismayed by the status granted by American society to millionaires, but also to sports stars and entertainers, those adulated heroes of mass culture. Indeed, while industrial capitalism produced a new plutocracy and a growing urban proletariat, mass culture spawned the modern superstar. Like many interwar *nationalistes*, the dean of the Université de Montréal's Faculty of Philosophy, Father Ceslas Forest (1885-1970), was horrified by the rise of the superstar and its implications for the status of the traditional elite. America's scale of values, he reasoned, was upside down:

Quels sont ceux que les jeunes Américains connaissent, admirent et envient? Les littérateurs, les savants, les artistes? Nullement. Ce sont les étoiles de l'écran, pour leur beauté; les étoiles du sport, pour leur force ou leur adresse ... Certains d'entre eux sont de véritables gloires nationales. Ils jouissent d'une célébrité qu'aucun homme public, qu'aucun savant, qu'aucun artiste n'oserait ambitionner. Leurs traits que les journaux ne se lassent pas de reproduire sont souvent plus familiers aux jeunes américains que ceux du Président des États-Unis. Lors du Congrès eucharistique de Chicago, un journal reproduisit une photo où l'on voyait Babe Ruth donnant la main au Cardinal Légat. Il n'est pas douteux que pour un grand nombre d'Américains, tout l'honneur était pour le Légat du Saint-Siège.<sup>48</sup>

Clergymen, in particular Roman Catholic priests and Anglican ministers, were among the most zealous exponents of anti-Americanism. Their antimodernism was often well-honed. Indeed, rising secularism threatened to eradicate their moral and intellectual leadership. Yet antimodern rhetoric was hardly confined to the presbytery. Modernity worried more than a few Canadian intellectuals. In fact, antimodernism dominated both English and French Canadian discourse from the late nineteenth century to the Great War.

Anti-Americanism's fortunes were tied to the conservative ethos. In English Canada, anti-American rhetoric sagged after the Great War, while in Quebec it intensified. Yet despite its many ups and downs, anti-Americanism has remained present in Canadian discourse

<sup>47</sup> Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé, "Notre américanisation par la femme," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 146.

<sup>48</sup> Ceslas Forest, "Notre américanisation par les sports," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 350-351.



since the late eighteenth century. With continentalism, it has formed a dialectic that will forever structure Canadian discourse.

### *The Continentalist Perspective*

At its core, pre-1945 continentalism was a modern ethos. Not surprisingly therefore, the intellectuals who embraced America also welcomed the rise of modernity. The status revolution did not strike fear in their hearts. Instead, they looked forward to the disintegration of deference and elitism. In Canada, the continentalist impulse was tied to two seemingly antithetical ideologies: liberalism and socialism. In fact, continentalism was their point of convergence.

To simply describe the continentalist ethos as pro-American – sympathetic to the interests of the United States and favourable to American society – is overly simplistic. Rather, continentalism was a complex and specifically Canadian version of pro-Americanism. “Le continentalisme est avant tout une mentalité, un état d’esprit et il embrasse aussi bien les valeurs culturelles que les denrées économiques,” argues Louis Balthazar.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, turn-of-the-century continentalism was a *sensibility* that implied far more than a general sympathy to American society. Continentalists embraced the essentially North American nature of Canadian society and were favourably inclined towards some form of continental integration.<sup>50</sup> They were more likely to view the Canadian-American relationship in terms of similarities and concord, rather than in terms of differences and conflict. Most of all, as Allan Smith notes, they shared the deep conviction “that nation-building had to involve working with, rather than against, the grain of American strength.”<sup>51</sup>

That said, continentalists did not accept North American integration unquestioningly. And they did not systematically gloss over or ignore America’s shortcomings either; they relativized them. The Dominion, continentalists believed, suffered from many of the ills that affected her neighbour. Above all, Canada and the United States shared a common North Americanism; they were nations of the New World. Continentalists

<sup>49</sup> Balthazar, “Les relations canado-américaines,” 25.

<sup>50</sup> According to Graham Carr, “fundamental to the continentalist perspective was a feeling of oneness with American culture that was nicely expressed in E. K. Brown’s ingenuous phrase, “all we North Americans.” This sense of collective North American identity was predicated on two key assumptions: that the similarities between Canada and the United States far outweigh their differences; and that the potential benefits to Canadian identity of those cross-border connections far outweigh the costs.” [Carr, ““All We North Americans’: Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 146.]

<sup>51</sup> Allan Smith, “Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century,” *Canadian-American Public Policy* 44 (2000): 5.

rarely suggested that American society was in any way superior to Canadian society. However, they regularly underlined the superiority of the New World over the Old World.

By and large, continentalist differentialism was aimed at Europe, not America. It was largely an ethos of rupture, of *américanité*, and its basic premises were relatively straightforward:

- Canada is an American nation;
- the Dominion is a nation primarily characterized by diversity, not unity;<sup>52</sup>
- Canadian society is fundamentally different from European society; and
- Canada is sufficiently resilient to survive – and would in fact benefit from – some form of continental integration.<sup>53</sup>

Continentalism was endemic to the centre and the left in pre-1945 Canada. And though liberalism and socialism are antithetical ideologies in the sense that they are respectively founded on individualism and collectivism, both also share a profoundly modern ethos. Liberals and socialists indeed possess a common passion for change. As a result, they are contemptuous of tradition, which they reject as a guide to social welfare in favour of reason or materialistic determinism. Moreover, they regard man as the central fact of the universe (anthropocentrism), and have a profound faith in his perfectibility and in the illimitable progress of society (meliorism). Privilege is condemned, and democracy, as direct as practicable, is the professed ideal (egalitarianism).<sup>54</sup>

To the Canadian continentalist, the United States more or less embodied these core modern values. America was a liberal republic that embraced a certain conception of progress, equality, and secularism. Moreover, the United States had detached itself from the Old World; it had made a genuine attempt to build a new society and, by extension, a new man. Unhindered by the burden of tradition, America was a nation on the move. To defend America was to defend the promise of the New World, which continentalists wanted the Dominion to enter unreservedly. During the interwar years, the rise of continentalism was also tied to a more general shift in Canadian society: “as their initial fears about the

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<sup>52</sup> This premise was shared by nearly all French Canadian intellectuals.

<sup>53</sup> Obviously, annexationists did not share this premise. They believed instead that the Dominion was a geographic, ethnic, economic, and political absurdity whose ultimate destiny lay in political union with the United States. Annexationism is discussed in Chapter 10.

<sup>54</sup> Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*, 9-10.

consequences of industrialization and urbanization were mollified, members of the middle class turned away from the past and embraced a faith in progress and materialism.”<sup>55</sup>

During the nineteenth century, continentalism was an overwhelmingly liberal doctrine, and it found its political expression in the policies of the Liberal party. However, in the 1930s, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) came to challenge the Liberal party as the political rallying point for Canadian continentalism. The continentalist ethos had taken a left turn. After the Great War, socialists were among the nation’s leading promoters of continentalism; they abhorred British imperialism and denounced economic nationalism – the CCF’s landmark *Regina Manifesto* called for an end to “the strangling of our export trade by insane protectionist policies.” Later, when the left would, in the words of James Laxer, “take up the burden of being the prime defenders of Canadian independence,”<sup>56</sup> socialists would be increasingly drawn to the anti-American nationalism of Donald Creighton and George Grant, which they converted into radicalism.

Left-wing discourse and pro-American sentiment may seem irreconcilable today, but they were closely allied in prewar Canada. America projected a different image before 1945. It had embarked on a number of progressive experiments, including the New Deal, and was often perceived as a nation that eschewed militarism. For the prewar left, European imperialism and militarism were seen as the world’s principal obstacles to progressivism, and America had not yet come to fully embody the rampant abuses of industrial capitalism. But all this would change with the Cold War. For the left, America became a quintessentially reactionary nation whose military-industrial complex conspired to stifle radicalism on an international scale. “For Canadians who wish to pursue the elusive goal of an egalitarian socialist society,” wrote James Laxer in 1970, “American imperialism is the major enemy.”<sup>57</sup> And so the die was cast.

Socialism aside, annexationism was continentalism’s most radical expression. Articulated by liberal intellectuals who had lost all faith in Confederation, it was an idea born of nineteenth-century despair and depression – its fortunes were invariably tied to some form of economic or political malaise. And though continentalists as a group were frequently accused of favouring the union of Canada and the United States – the stigma attached to annexation stuck to continentalism – most were firmly opposed to the idea of political

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<sup>55</sup> Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists*, 168.

<sup>56</sup> Gerald L. Caplan and James R. Laxer, “Perspectives on Un-American Traditions in Canada,” in *Close the 49<sup>th</sup> Parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada*, ed. Ian Lumsden (Toronto, 1970), 309.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 310.

union.<sup>58</sup> No longer able to rally more than a handful of malcontents, annexationism basically disappeared from Canadian discourse around 1900.

Continentalism and nationalism were not necessarily opposing doctrines, and contrary to what many scholars appear to believe, Canadian nationalism has never been intrinsically anti-American. Certainly, some continentalists, most notably Goldwin Smith, James T. Shotwell, John Bartlet Brebner, and Jean-Charles Harvey were antinationalists, but the majority, in fact, were not. Indeed, as Graham Carr notes, “far from subverting the national culture, or interfering with the clarity of its vision, the continentalists believed that their ideal afforded Canadians an enlarged and distinctive perspective on the world.”<sup>59</sup> Continentalism was a key ingredient in the anti-imperialist Canadian nationalism professed by intellectuals like John S. Ewart (1849-1933), Arthur Lower, and F. R. Scott. The Dominion, they believed, would only become truly independent from Britain if it embraced its *américanité*. Moreover, in Quebec, several turn-of-the-century liberal nationalists, including Errol Bouchette (1863-1912) and Edmond de Nevers, were keen proponents of continentalism.

As a doctrine, continentalism was hardly univocal. As we have seen, continentalism was ideologically divided. Unlike the anti-American ethos, which was essentially conservative, the continentalist impulse could be either liberal or socialist in inspiration. But the divisions did not end there: continentalism was also tied to four other geopolitical sensibilities. All shared the wider continentalist ethos described earlier in this chapter, but could also diverge on a number of issues.

In its purest form, continentalism could be described as North American isolationism. Indeed, many diehard continentalists argued that the Old and the New World were thoroughly antithetical entities and that America’s vitality was the product of its separation from Europe. Isolationism was the most intrinsically nationalistic form of continentalism. This radical doctrine was popular during the turbulent 1930s and found its most articulate spokesman in Frank Underhill, a prophetic scholar who taught history at the

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<sup>58</sup> According to Donald F. Warner, “public support of annexationism in Canada then, like support of the Communist Party in the United States now, was regarded as treason, or tantamount to it. It was a bold Canadian who proclaimed this sentiment, one willing to face ostracism and economic boycott. Silent supporters of political union probably outnumbered the assertive ones; on the other hand, many persons were falsely accused of being annexationists. The stigmatic quality of the term made it a handy weapon to use against an enemy, particularly in the sensitive area of public life.” [Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1897* (n.p., 1960), vi.]

<sup>59</sup> Carr, “All We North Americans,” 146.

University of Toronto from 1927 to 1955. Deeply scarred by his service in the Great War, Underhill's contempt for Europe knew virtually no bounds.

On the other hand, moderate continentalists such as John Bartlet Brebner saw the United States as a key component in an enduring axis – the “North Atlantic triangle” – that no revolution could sunder. In essence, their continentalism was tied to a wider Atlanticism. Atlanticists argued that history, geography, and culture made Canada, the United States, and Northern Europe (usually Britain) members of a wider Atlantic community. As a result, the nations of the North Atlantic, not simply Canada and the United States, needed to draw together for the purposes of trade and defence. Atlanticism was most popular during the Second World War and in the immediate postwar years. It found its most concrete expression in the 1949 creation of NATO.

Pan-Americanism was occasionally tied to the wider continentalist ethos. Though most continentalists gave little thought to hemispheric integration and the Pan-American Union, some, including John P. Humphrey (1905-1995), hoped to see the Dominion draw closer to the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean Basin. In Canada, pan-Americanism reached its apex in the late 1930s and early 1940s. With wartime Europe essentially closed to Canadian goods, several continentalists argued that the time had come for the Dominion to seek out new markets in Latin America and join the Pan-American Union.

An internationalist seam also ran through Canadian continentalism. It postulated that all the nations of the world, not merely Canada and the United States, shared a broad community of interests. Internationalism's most prominent Canadian advocate was James T. Shotwell, an idealistic intellectual born in Strathroy, Ontario, who dedicated his life to the promotion of multilateralism and disarmament. Strangely, in Canadian discourse, internationalism was not necessarily an antinationalist doctrine. Unlike Americans, who have repeatedly seen international organizations and multilateralism as possible threats to their sovereignty, Canadians have tended to view their participation in multilateral bodies as the fulfillment of their national sovereignty.

These four sensibilities were not all mutually exclusive. For instance, the Dominion's keenest advocate of hemispheric integration, John P. Humphrey, was also a proponent of internationalism. In his 1942 essay on *The Inter-American System*, he argued that regional organizations, including the Pan-American Union, could form the building blocks for a

“universal World Order.”<sup>60</sup> In fact, Humphrey’s pan-Americanism was a facet of his wider internationalism. Born in Hampton, New Brunswick, Humphrey practiced law in Montreal before joining McGill’s Faculty of Law in 1936. He briefly served as the Faculty’s dean before being appointed director of the UN Secretariat’s Human Rights Division in 1946, where he helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Humphrey would remain with the United Nations for the next twenty years. In 1966, he returned to teaching at McGill and lectured well into his eighties. He was awarded the UN’s Human Rights Award in 1988.

During the period under study, Canada experienced rapid social change and the erosion of premodern status and deference. American society came to embody these changes to the Canadian intellectual. As a result, Canadian writing on America contained an encrypted commentary on the mass age. Conservatives expressed many of their misgivings regarding modernity through anti-American rhetoric while liberals and socialists signalled their acceptance of the modern ethos by adopting the continental perspective. In effect, the essential dichotomy between modern and antimodern thought was partially masked by a debate centred on the nation’s *américanité*.

The “American question” loomed large in Canadian discourse. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that most of the Dominion’s intellectuals published some work on the question. Nevertheless, writers whose contact with the United States was most sustained were generally among the Dominion’s most intense observers of American life. And while Canadian interest in American society and in Canadian-American relations was constant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various events, including the federal elections of 1891 and 1911, did affect its intensity.

The respective intellectual cores of anti-Americanism and continentalism remained basically constant during the period under study. Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next chapter, the fortunes of anti-American and continentalist sentiment varied over time. The Great War emerges as a watershed moment in the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Indeed, after the conflict, anti-American sentiment waned in English Canada but intensified in Quebec.

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<sup>60</sup> John P. Humphrey, *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1942), 253.

## *Chapter Three*

### The Evolution and Sources of Canadian Commentary

The previous chapter dealt with anti-Americanism and continentalism as expressions of the intellectual's wider outlook on modernity. Their evolution, however, were affected both by social change and by the historical events that shaped the consciousness of the intellectual generations who observed America between 1891 and 1945. The following pages examine these generations. They broadly outline the development of Canadian intellectual attitudes towards the United States and analyse the foreign sources of Canadian commentary.

The Great War marks a turning point in the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. In essence, it acts as a dividing line between the two generations whose writing dominates this study. In English Canada the conflict dealt a blow to intellectual antimodernism. By and large, the generation of English Canadian intellectuals who came of age around 1918 were deeply sceptical of conservatism, imperialism, and Europe. The continentalism of the interwar generation reflected this scepticism. North American peace and progress stood in stark contrast to European conflict and reaction. Tradition (Europe) had brought war and misery; modernity (North America) would bring peace and prosperity.

In contrast, the Great War strengthened antimodernism in Quebec. Great Britain and imperialism were seriously weakened by the conflict and America, many believed, was emerging as the leading external threat to the French Canadian nation. Moreover, the war dislocated the international economy and, along with the abuses of American capitalism, triggered the Great Depression. As embodied by the United States, modernity had become a savage beast. And most French Canadian intellectuals reacted to the onslaught of modernity with a torrent of anti-American rhetoric.

Despite their fundamental difference of opinion regarding the United States, continentalists and anti-Americans were often inspired by the same writers. Indeed, as we shall see, the foreign sources that nourished both anti-American and continentalist rhetoric were often the same. Bryce and Tocqueville, for instance, inspired both gloomy and cheerful judgements on the United States. Canadian intellectuals read classical interpretations of the American experience very selectively and chose their arguments carefully. Their reliance on a few key sources strengthened the repetitive nature of Canadian commentary, but did not

significantly alter its originality. The inspiration may often have been American or European, but the concerns remained Canadian.

### *The Evolution of English Canadian Commentary*

English Canadian imperialism experienced its golden age during the years that separated the 1891 and 1911 reciprocity elections. The exaltation of the Loyalist tradition, which reached a fever pitch in the late nineteenth century, was intimately linked to this movement.<sup>1</sup> It was an era dominated by two influential journals of conservative commentary: the *Queen's Quarterly* (founded in 1893) and the *University Magazine* (founded in 1907). Not surprisingly, this was also a period characterized by intense anti-Americanism among Canada's intellectuals. It was a contested dominance, however, as potent continentalist voices challenged imperialism head on. Imperialist anti-Americanism reached its zenith in 1911, when inflammatory rhetoric was successfully used by the Conservative party to scuttle a reciprocity agreement that promised to revolutionize the Dominion's economy.

An aging generation of imperialists, among them George Monro Grant (1835-1902), John G. Bourinot (1836-1902), Colonel George T. Denison (1839-1925), and George R. Parkin, faced the continentalist challenge in the 1890s. Born in the 1830s and 1840s, they came of age around the time of Confederation and were mesmerized by the new nation's potential. They were also deeply affected by the American Civil War, which seemed to confirm the folly of the American experiment. Moreover, the American menace loomed large in the 1860s as the long-standing quarrel between Britain and the United States worsened, and Fenianism, which embodied the twin evils of annexationism and Irish nationalism, gave Canadians a real scare. The Fenian raids indeed nourished both anti-Irish and anti-American – the two were often related – sentiment in the young dominion.<sup>2</sup>

Principal Grant's generation was most active during the Dominion's first twenty-five years, when sectionalism, economic marasmus, sectarianism, and ethnic conflict threatened to tear apart what the Fathers of Confederation had built. Yet their faith in the Dominion remained unshaken and their desire to preserve its survival found its expression in a longing

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, as Carl Berger notes, "the most extreme and caustic portrayal of American life emanated from the descendants of the United Empire Loyalists and their chief spokesman, Colonel Denison." [Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 154.]

<sup>2</sup> Several anti-American thinkers, including Colonel Denison, Charles-E. Rouleau (1841-1926), William Chapman (1850-1917), and George Sterling Ryerson (1854-1925), saw militia service during the Fenian raids. The link between anti-Irish and anti-American sentiment is discussed in *infra*, 174-177.



for imperial federation and a forceful anti-Americanism. They were convinced that Canada was seriously threatened by Americanization and manifest destiny, and that only British power could guarantee the nation's sovereignty.

Continentalism predates Confederation – its earliest proponents were to be found among the Quebecers and Nova Scotians who supported the American Revolution. In the late nineteenth century Goldwin Smith and Erastus Wiman were its elder statesmen. Their writing was tinged with despair; the Dominion, they believed, was on its last leg. And a number of Canadians shared their pessimism. Indeed, when Goldwin Smith published *Canada and the Canadian Question* in 1891 “the communal confidence of Canadians in their experiment of building up a new nation in the northern half of North America was at about the lowest point which it has ever reached.”<sup>3</sup> Born in Reading, England, Smith taught modern history at Oxford University from 1858 to 1866. In 1868, he accepted the professorship of English and constitutional history at the newly formed Cornell University of Ithaca, New York. He left Cornell after a few years and settled in Toronto, eventually marrying William Henry Boulton's widow, Harriet Elizabeth Mann (née Dixon), in 1875. Harriet possessed a sizable fortune, which gave Smith a degree of financial independence that few Canadian intellectuals have enjoyed. Shortly after settling in the Dominion, Smith became active in the Canada First movement, but soon lost all faith in the new nation. Ever the prophet of gloom and despair, he saw Canada's only possible salvation in annexation, and he played an important role in annexationism's last gasp in the late 1880s and early 1890s. By contrast, the less pessimistic Wiman merely prescribed commercial union as a cure for the nation's ills. Unlike Smith, who had studied at Eaton and Oxford, Wiman had little formal education. Nevertheless, Wiman's success as a businessman – he was known as the ‘Duke of Staten Island’ for his attempts to develop the New York island – lent a great deal of credibility to his ideas regarding a North American customs union. Both Smith and Wiman had a relatively large following in the late 1880s and early 1890s, but their ideas were repellent to the imperialists who dominated English Canadian discourse in the late nineteenth century.

Born roughly between the late 1850s and the late 1870s, the generation of imperialists who rose to fame in the early twentieth century was brought up in the midst of the status revolution. Its leading lights, which included George M. Wrong, Andrew Macphail, Robert

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<sup>3</sup> F. H. Underhill, “Canada and the Canadian Question, 1954,” in his *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto, 1960), 214.

Falconer (1867-1943), and Stephen Leacock, were born in the 1860s and came of age during the late 1880s and early 1890s. The rancorous debate over unrestricted reciprocity and commercial union helped shape their anti-Americanism. Macphail and his associates followed their imperialist predecessors in arguing that Canadian sovereignty would be best preserved and enhanced with some form of imperial federation. And their anti-Americanism deepened in the whirlwind of change that struck Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was this generation of imperialist intellectuals that helped bring popular anti-American sentiment to a fever pitch during the 1911 federal election. Stephen Leacock, for instance, actively campaigned in favour of the Conservative party in 1911, and wrote anti-reciprocity articles for various newspapers, for which he was paid, indirectly, by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association.

By 1900, the storm clouds that had hung over the Dominion in the early 1890s had cleared and continentalism began to shed its gloomy aura. Free trade was now cheerfully advertised as a tool for economic development and prosperity rather than as a desperate measure to preserve Canada from economic collapse. And though aging continentalists like John S. Ewart remained active well into the new century, it was the younger generation of pro-American thinkers – Sara Jeannette Duncan, John W. Dafoe, James T. Shotwell, William Bennett Munro, and O. D. Skelton – that took centre stage in the crusade for continental integration. Born in the 1860s and 1870s, these intellectuals bucked the trend and supported reciprocity in 1911. Like their predecessors, they had come to realize, writes Allan Smith, that “American might could in fact be interpreted not as a threat to, but as a source of assistance for, Canada’s growth and development.”<sup>4</sup> And though theirs was a rearguard action, they helped lay the framework for the passionate continentalism of interwar years. Ever the *rassembleur*, Shotwell planned and edited the Carnegie Endowment’s landmark series on Canadian-American relations, which stands as a lasting monument to North American idealism. After decades of retreat, continentalism had gone on the offensive again.

Born roughly between 1880 and 1900, the interwar continentalists were English Canada’s first – and hitherto only – largely continentalist intellectual cohort. They came of age during the Great War, and their wartime experience profoundly shaped their continentalism. Idealistic and naïve, they rushed to answer their nation’s call in 1914.<sup>5</sup> Many

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<sup>4</sup> Allan Smith, “Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century,” *Canadian-American Public Policy* 44 (2000): 4.

<sup>5</sup> A surprising number of interwar thinkers, including Frank Underhill, Arthur Lower, and John Bartlet Brebner, actually served in the British forces. In the autobiographical introduction to *In Search of Canadian Liberalism*

of those lucky enough to survive the carnage would return profoundly disillusioned with imperialism and, more generally, with Europe. Canada may indeed have been born at Vimy Ridge, but nineteenth-century Canadian imperialism died at the Somme. Traumatized by the horror of gas and trench warfare, the *génération massacrée* no longer saw Europe as a genteel land of universities, libraries, museums, and cafés, but as a seething cauldron of hatred and militarism. Europe's seamy side had been exposed.

In the years that followed the tragic conflict, national self-confidence swelled and anti-Americanism receded as Canada entered the concert of nations. The Dominion could stand on its own, and the United States, many argued, was no longer a threat to Canadian nationhood. Indeed, unlike their imperialistic predecessors, the interwar continentalists saw Britain as the principal obstacle to national sovereignty. European imperialism had claimed over sixty thousand Canadian lives and had torn the Dominion apart, and intellectuals like Frank Underhill vowed that Canada would not be sucked into the swirling vortex of European militarism again. Besides, Europe was incorrigible: a few years after the Treaty of Versailles, rearmament was proceeding apace and the rhetoric of war was omnipresent. By comparison, North America was an oasis of peace, and the much vaunted undefended border stood in stark contrast to the endless cycle of European conflict. Accordingly, the Dominion had to realign itself and embrace its North American destiny. Tradition and imperialism had brought war and devastation; modernity and continental integration promised peace and prosperity.

Antimodernism did not appeal to many English Canadian intellectuals born in the late nineteenth century. Unlike their imperialist elders, they did not portray America as a cultural backwater. Indeed, the interwar generation was struck by the vitality of American intellectual life. The United States might not offer the same status to their intellectuals as Britain or France, but at least American writers could find work. As Graham Carr has noted, "the lack of support for cultural and intellectual endeavours in Canada, and the resulting brain drain to the United States, was a source of anxiety for many commentators."<sup>6</sup> Perhaps

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(1960), Underhill described how his war service helped shape his perception of Britain: "Then came the war of 1914. I did my military service in France as a subaltern officer in an English infantry battalion. I discovered that this Edwardian-Georgian generation of Englishmen made the best regimental officers in the world and the worst staff officers. The stupidity of G.H.Q. and the terrible sacrifice of so many of the best men among my contemporaries sickened me for good of a society, national or international, run by the British governing classes." [F. H. Underhill, "Introduction," in his *In Search of Canadian Liberalism*, x.]

<sup>6</sup> Graham Carr, "'All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 146.

Canada, not America, was the cultural backwater.<sup>7</sup> By contrast, the United States, with her countless colleges, graduate schools, solvent journals, and vast market for erudite publications seemed like an eldorado to intellectuals reared in a society with a limited cultural capacity.

A number of the interwar generation's leading lights, including Frank Underhill and F. R. Scott, embraced socialism, while others, in particular P. E. Corbett, Arthur Lower, and John Bartlet Brebner, were drawn to liberalism. However, in spite of important ideological divisions, a shared continentalism and a common rejection of conservatism and imperialism gave a definite cohesion to the discourse of the *génération massacrée*.

Interwar continentalism burst onto the scene with the founding of the left-of-centre *Canadian Forum* in 1920,<sup>8</sup> and reached its high-water mark with the publication of John Bartlet Brebner's *North Atlantic Triangle* (1945), the final volume of the landmark series on Canadian American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Edited by James T. Shotwell, the twenty-five-volume series played a key role in the development of North American sentiment among Canadian intellectuals. Shotwell, one of the continent's leading proponents of liberal internationalism, "immediately grasped the significance of Canadian-American history for the lesson it would convey as a model of peaceful international relations."<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the healthy state Canadian-American relations confirmed that arbitration and trade could foster international peace and goodwill. "The whole project," writes Carl Berger, "was initiated, largely supervised, and partly written by Canadian-born scholars in the United States, aided by scholars who were American trained and living in Canada."<sup>10</sup> And though some of its volumes, in particular Donald Creighton's

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<sup>7</sup> Reviewing the third volume of Vernon Louis Parrington's *Main Currents of American Thought* (1930), Frank Underhill was particularly critical of Canadian intellectual life: "The reading of a book such as this is a depressing experience for a Canadian. It makes him realize the awful intellectual and emotional poverty of our Canadian civilization. For we also have seen the same social and political struggles between agrarian democracy and centralizing capitalism; we have sat at the same kind of a Great Barbecue under Macdonald and Laurier. A country's literature should make it conscious of the social forces which determine its destiny. But our literature since 1867 displays only a Boeotian placidity. We shall never produce a Parrington because we have not produced the literature for him to interpret. What is the reason for this mysterious sterility in Canadian life?" [Underhill, "American Political Thought," *Canadian Forum* XI (1931): 384.]

<sup>8</sup> As Jean-François Sirinelli has noted, "une revue est parfois le vecteur d'une nouvelle classe d'âge intellectuelle ... et peut servir, en effet, à une nouvelle strate d'intellectuels pour s'introduire dans les 'réseaux' de clercs." [Sirinelli, "Effets d'âge et phénomènes de génération dans le milieu intellectuel français," *Cahiers de l'IHTP* 6 (1987): 6.]

<sup>9</sup> Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1986), 145.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 145-146.

*Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (1937), did not reflect Shotwell's continentalism, the Carnegie series nonetheless represented the pinnacle of North American idealism in Canada.

Expatriates like Shotwell and Brebner played a key role in the development of Canadian continentalism. For the most part, notes Graham Carr, they "approached the border eagerly, and many of those who eventually returned to Canada were candid about their fondness for the United States."<sup>11</sup> American-educated intellectuals were particularly drawn to continentalism. In most cases, however, expatriation merely heightened pre-existing continentalist tendencies; it confirmed that the United States was not a cultural wasteland. American schooling or residency, moreover, hardly guaranteed a continentalist outlook. For instance, the years Stephen Leacock spent studying under Thorstein Veblen at the University of Chicago appear to have strengthened rather than lessened his anti-Americanism.<sup>12</sup>

Continentalism had a profound impact of the writing of Canadian history. During the interwar years, writes Carl Berger, "a systematic and determined effort was made to explore in detail the interconnections between Canada and its southern neighbour."<sup>13</sup> Led by Lower, Underhill, and Brebner, the continentalist school tended to emphasize the *américanité* of the Canadian experience. Above all, it was an environmental creed that focussed on the ways in which the continent and the frontier had transformed Canada's European settlers into North Americans.

During the 1920s and 1930s, the imperial federation movement withered away as the Empire gave way to the Commonwealth, the *University Magazine* ceased publication (1920), and interest in Canada's Loyalist heritage waned. But imperialism lived on: its Tory core was preserved by intellectuals like R. G. Trotter who refused to follow the leading lights of their generation into continentalism. Besides, several of the Dominion's most prominent pre-World War One imperialists, including Stephen Leacock, George M. Wrong, Andrew Macphail, and Robert Falconer, remained active until the late 1930s.<sup>14</sup> Their time, however, had passed, and their anti-Americanism had considerably mellowed since 1911. That said, though elite anti-American sentiment waned in the 1920s, it nevertheless became more

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<sup>11</sup> Graham Carr, "All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 153.

<sup>12</sup> Veblen's influence over Leacock's thought and writing is discussed in *infra*, 72.

<sup>13</sup> Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History*, 137.

<sup>14</sup> During the Great War, Macphail served as a medical officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France. After witnessing the horrors of gas and trench warfare, however, his work became increasingly brooding and morbid. In 1916, he published *The Book of Sorrow*, an anthology of poetry related to death and mourning that he had initially compiled after the untimely loss of his wife in 1902.

organized with the creation of a number of lobby groups such as the Canadian Authors' Association, the Magazine Publisher's Association of Canada, and the Canadian Radio League, which were set up to defend the Dominion against Americanization and promote Canadian cultural autonomy. Indeed, though anti-American rhetoric was tied to a wider denunciation of modernity and the status revolution, it could also have a more overtly instrumental side. Many Canadian writers stood to gain financially from the cultural protectionism that anti-American rhetoric inevitably promoted. In certain cases, economic interest was even more transparent. For a wealthy intellectual like Vincent Massey, whose family fortune rested on the National Policy, rhetoric that legitimized protectionism could only be profitable.

The Great Depression taught many Canadians to be suspicious of protectionism and, quite uncharacteristically, the nation applauded when Mackenzie King negotiated a major trade agreement with the United States in 1935.<sup>15</sup> By the late 1930s, the continental debate in English Canadian intellectual circles had partially shifted from Americanism to pan-Americanism. But the discussion surrounding the possible entry of the Dominion into the Pan-American Union – Canada would only become a member in 1989 – was in fact a renewal of one of the oldest debates in Canadian intellectual history. Tories like R. G. Trotter refuted pan-Americanism with essentially the same arguments that their predecessors had used to reject reciprocity twenty-five years before. In essence, they feared that pan-Americanism would corrode Canada's British connection.

By the early 1940s, however, even the staunchest imperialists readily accepted the necessity of wartime continental integration. In a world gone mad, the United States seemed increasingly familiar and sane. The anonymous Canadian correspondent of the *Round Table*, Britain's leading imperialist journal, echoed this sentiment:

The Ogdensburg Agreement causes Canadians to reflect on all angles of their day-to-day relationships with the United States, and with some justifiable measure of assurance. There is, for example, an entire absence in Canada of fear of the United States. There is nothing between the two even remotely comparable to the atmosphere of a European frontier. Few Canadians consider themselves foreigners in the United States. They feel free to express themselves on every subject there, as free as they would in England. Both these countries

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<sup>15</sup> Indeed, as Frank Underhill noted in the *Canadian Forum*, "nothing is more interesting to the sociologist studying Canada than the thumping success of the anti-reciprocity elections of 1891 and 1911; and nothing can be more significant of some change that was coming about in our communal consciousness than the failure of an anti-reciprocity election to take place in the 1930s." [Underhill, "North American Front," *Canadian Forum* XX (1940): 166.]

represent to them a kind of paternal dwelling. It must not be forgotten that the United States is almost as much the motherland of Canada as is Great Britain. Consequently even the long-remembered United Empire Loyalists feel in their condescending way that the United States is not a strange land to them.<sup>16</sup>

Ogdensburg indeed marked the nadir of English Canadian anti-Americanism. As the nation held its breath after the fall of France, anti-Americanism seemed totally out of place. German U-boats prowled the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Japanese destroyed the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, and the very survival of Britain and, indeed, of the free world, seemed to rest in the hands of the United States. But anti-American sentiment had not disappeared.<sup>17</sup> It would re-emerge in the writing of a new generation of conservatives born between 1900 and 1920. Led by Donald Creighton and George Grant, this generation of Tory intellectuals was too young to have fought in the Great War and, in many cases, too old to have fought in the Second World War. It turned up on the Dominion's cultural radar in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and came to dominate the nation's discourse in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the context of the Cold War and the atomic age, their anti-Americanism reflected new concerns regarding modernity and American power.

Several scholars maintain, without offering a great deal of evidence, that Ontario has historically been the epicentre of anti-American sentiment in Canada.<sup>18</sup> Certainly, fragmentary evidence would suggest that anti-Americanism has generally been stronger in Ontario than in the rest of Canada. The results of the 1911 federal election, for instance, do reveal that support for reciprocity – the litmus test of anti-American sentiment – was weaker in Ontario than in most of the rest of Canada. Things become far less clear, however, when it

<sup>16</sup> Anonymous, "The Canadian-American Defence Agreement and its Significance," *The Round Table* XXXI (1941): 352.

<sup>17</sup> Even at its height, intellectual continentalism was not always favourably viewed by the general population. Indeed, in August 1940, Frank Underhill came close to being dismissed from his teaching position at the University of Toronto after the following statement caused a public outcry: "We now have two loyalties – one to Britain and the other to North America. I venture to say it is the second, North America, that is going to be supreme now. The relative significance of Britain is going to sink, no matter what happens." [Underhill quoted in Robert Bothwell et al., *Canada since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism* (Toronto, 1981), 57.] Popular anti-Americanism may have reached its low-water mark during the war, but many ordinary English Canadians, especially in Ontario, undoubtedly continued to equate continentalism with treason. In the end, the enthusiasm with which the Canadian population greeted the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements was largely the result of fear. With Britain teetering on the edge of collapse and Nazi legions streaking across Europe, most Canadians had more important things than Americanization to worry about.

<sup>18</sup> Charles F. Doran and James P. Sewell, "Anti-Americanism in Canada?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 497 (1988): 110; J. L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto, 1996), x.

comes to gauging the regional distribution of anti-American sentiment among intellectuals. Undoubtedly, several of Canada's most prominent anti-American thinkers were Ontarians. This is hardly surprising since Ontario's industrial structure relied heavily on the National Policy for its survival, and the province possessed a dynamic United Empire Loyalist movement that was more militantly anti-American than its Maritime counterpart.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, the Dominion's most populous province did not have anything approaching a monopoly when it came to anti-Americanism. A number of imperialist intellectuals born in the Maritimes, most notably John G. Bourinot, Andrew Macphail, and George R. Parkin, made major contributions to Canada's anti-American canon. Moreover, during the period under study, Quebec's intellectual culture was notoriously anti-American. In fact, if anything, Quebec was the epicentre of elite anti-Americanism.

Continentalist sentiment appears to have been stronger in the Dominion's more peripheral regions. The Prairie Provinces, with their large American-born population and wheat economy, were especially receptive to continentalist ideas. Indeed, a number of the Dominion's leading continentalist intellectuals, in particular John W. Dafoe, were Westerners. Others, like Frank Underhill and John S. Ewart, lived for a time on the Prairies. That said, though the Western experience of several Canadian intellectuals appears to have contributed to their continentalism, its impact on their thought should not be overestimated. In the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations, region has proved a much less significant variable than generation. Underhill's continentalism, to be sure, was far more a product of his war service than of his years at the University of Saskatchewan. Besides, during the period under study, many of the West's leading continentalists were born and raised in Ontario. Dafoe, Western Canada's most fervent champion, did not settle permanently in Manitoba until the age of thirty-five. Above all, he was a product of Ontario's intellectual culture, which also possessed a strong continentalist tradition.

### *The Evolution of French Canadian Commentary*

English and French Canadian attitudes towards the United States evolved quite differently. Indeed, anti-American sentiment grew among Quebec's intellectual elite just as it was declining in English Canada. On the whole, insist Yvan Lamonde and Gérard Bouchard, French Canadian discourse was characterized by "un retour aux traditions et aux référentiels

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<sup>19</sup> Murray Barkley, "The Loyalist Tradition in New Brunswick: The Growth and Evolution of an Historical Myth, 1825-1914," *Acadiensis* 4 (1975): 44.



européens (français surtout) à partir de 1840-50 et durant le siècle qui a suivi.”<sup>20</sup> Conservative nationalism dominated intellectual discourse during this century and, notes Guildo Rousseau, “le combat contre le mirage américain rallie la plus grande majorité des écrivains.”<sup>21</sup> Anti-Americanism, however, only became hegemonic after the Great War, and continentalism, which had been in a steady decline since the 1840s, virtually disappeared from Quebec’s intellectual culture during the interwar years. By the 1930s, only a handful of *frondeurs* could accurately be described as continentalists.

The failure of the 1837-1838 rebellions seriously disrupted the development of continentalism in Quebec. Traumatized by military and political defeat, a generation of young *Canadiens* turned their backs on radical republicanism – continentalism’s core constituency in nineteenth-century Quebec – and embraced more moderate theses. Pro-American and annexationist sentiment, however, lived on in the impious Institut canadien and in the writing of prominent *rouges* like Louis-Joseph Papineau’s nephew, Louis-Antoine Dessaulles (1819-1895), and the anticonfederate poet Louis-Honoré Fréchette (1839-1908). Still, republicanism declined further after Confederation: the Roman Catholic Church condemned the Institut Canadien and Laurier repudiated *rougisme* in favour *le libéralisme politique* – British-style (i.e. moderate) liberalism. Denounced by Quebec’s civil and religious leaders, radicalism was on the ropes.

As a result, by 1900, continentalism was fairly uncommon among Quebec’s intellectual elite. Its most radical seam was preserved in the writing of aging annexationists like Fréchette and Jean-Baptiste Rouillard (1842-1908). However, after experiencing a brief period of popularity in the late 1880s and early 1890s, militant annexationism basically disappeared from the province’s intellectual culture – prosperity had been as lethal to annexationist sentiment in Quebec as it had been in English Canada. By the turn of the twentieth century, French Canadian continentalism’s leading lights – A. D. DeCelles (1843-1925), Sylva Clapin (1853-1928), Edmond de Nevers, and Errol Bouchette – embraced the moderate liberalism of the age of Laurier. They held American civilization in high regard, but were not shy about pointing out its shortcomings. Still, in an era dominated by Jules-Paul Tardivel and Henri Bourassa, their ideas – though appealing to the population at large – had a limited impact on the evolution of French Canadian commentary.

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<sup>20</sup> Gérard Bouchard and Yvan Lamonde, “Introduction,” in their *Québécois et Américains: la culture québécoise aux XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Montreal, 1995), 8.

<sup>21</sup> Guildo Rousseau, *L’image des États-Unis dans la littérature québécoise (1775-1930)* (Sherbrooke, 1981), 279.

Expatriates were responsible for a good deal of the pro-American prose published in Quebec. Indeed, a number of the province's prominent continentalist thinkers resided for a time in the United States. Edmond de Nevers, for instance, spent the last years of his all-too-short life in Rhode Island, while Sylva Clapin, who authored a popular *Histoire des États-Unis* in 1900, lived in Massachusetts for nearly a decade and served in the American navy in the early 1870s and again during the Spanish-American War. Expatriates often acted as vectors of intellectual and cultural transmission. Immersed in a different political culture, they were sometimes drawn to the radical republican theories that were becoming increasingly taboo in late-nineteenth-century Quebec. Annexationism, to be sure, was reasonably popular in the Franco-American communities of New England and the Midwest, and prominent French Canadian annexationists like Louis-Honoré Fréchette and Jean-Baptiste Rouillard found a receptive audience for their corrosive ideas in Franco-America. Fréchette lived in Chicago from 1866 to 1871. It was during these formative years that he published *La voix d'un exilé*, a popular poem denouncing Confederation. For his part, Rouillard spent the last years of his life, from 1893 to 1908, in New England. Shortly after leaving Quebec, he founded *L'Union continentale*, a monthly review advocating annexation. Both men had left Quebec under a cloud of suspicion; Fréchette is believed to have disclosed sensitive information to a Fenian spy, while Rouillard was tarnished by the scandal that toppled the provincial government of Honoré Mercier.<sup>22</sup>

During the decades that preceded the Great War, French Canadian anti-Americanism never attained the level of intensity that it would reach in the 1920s and 1930s. For nationalists born before the 1880s, writes Richard Jones, "le spectre qui menace le Québec – eux parlent plutôt du Canada – est sans doute le spectre de l'impérialisme britannique."<sup>23</sup> Indeed, the combined impact of the imperial federation movement, the South African War, Ontario's infamous Regulation XVII, Laurier's Naval Service Act, and the conscription crisis left nationalist intellectuals like Henri Bourassa and Olivar Asselin thoroughly convinced that imperialism – both British and English Canadian – was the *primary* threat to the French Canadian nation. Accordingly, their Ligue nationaliste, though concerned by Quebec's progressive Americanization and deeply troubled by emigration, found its raison d'être in the anti-imperialist struggle. In the wake of the 1911 election, Bourassa went as far as to

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<sup>22</sup> Alexandre Bélisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine* (Worcester, Massachusetts, 1911) 54, 289.

<sup>23</sup> Richard A Jones, "Le spectre de l'américanisation," in *Les rapports culturels entre le Québec et les États-Unis*, ed. C. Savary (Quebec, 1984), 148.

denounce the manipulation of anti-American rhetoric by imperialists.<sup>24</sup> Though he acknowledged that Americanization threatened French Canada, he skilfully argued that annexation was in fact less of a threat to *la survivance* than imperial federation. English Canadian opinion was mortified, but Bourassa had made his point.

After the Great War, the waning of imperialism in English Canada, the concretization of Canadian independence, the decline of British power, and the meteoric rise of America's commercial and cultural influence all combined to make the United States appear far more threatening to French Canadian conservatives. And emigration, which had been steadily declining since the late 1890s, suddenly kicked back into high gear – almost 150 000 Quebecers left for the United States between 1919 and 1929. *Nationaliste* intellectuals answered this new *saignée* with a torrent of anti-American prose. Moreover, the French intelligentsia was growing increasingly hostile to the United States, and French Canadian conservatives, who took many of their cues from the French right, were inclined to follow suit.

In effect, America had replaced Britain as the leading outside menace to French Canadian traditionalism. The shift was evident. "Partisans of nationalism have possibly a greater fear of American influence than of English influence," wrote Édouard Montpetit in 1938, "because the French-Canadians have proved their ability to cope on their own ground with the latter, whereas they often feel defenceless against the former."<sup>25</sup> André Laurendeau agreed. "L'influence anglaise peut nous paraître redoutable," he noted in 1937, "mais elle s'exerce à distance et, considérée comme civilisation, nous est moins hostile [que] la civilisation américaine."<sup>26</sup> Shortly after the Great War, as Bourassa's influence began to fade and abbé Lionel Groulx came to dominate Quebec's nationalist movement, interest in imperial affairs waned, and anxiety over French Canada's progressive Americanization grew apace. The abbé had shared Bourassa's concerns in the prewar years, but in the 1920s the centre of his attention shifted from imperialism and constitutional issues to Americanization and economic affairs. Bourassa's unruly collaborator, Olivar Asselin, followed suit. Groulx exerted a great deal of influence on the generation of nationalist intellectuals who, like Anatole Vanier (1887-1985) and Esdras Minville (1896-1975), would come of age during the

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<sup>24</sup> Henri Bourassa, *The Spectre of Annexation and the Real Danger of National Disintegration* (Montreal, 1912), passim.

<sup>25</sup> Édouard Montpetit, "French Canada," in *Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States*, ed. H. F. Angus (Toronto and New Haven, 1938), 37.

<sup>26</sup> André Laurendeau, "Commentaires: Menaces de l'américanisme," *L'Action nationale* X (1937): 312.

Great War, and galvanized the Jeune-Canada movement, whose most prominent figures, Dostaler O'Leary (1908-1965), Gérard Filion (1909-2005), André Laurendeau, and Roger Duhamel (1916-1985), would burst onto the scene in the 1930s and 1940s.

By 1920, the era of the moderately conservative *Revue canadienne* had passed. The French Canadian right would now take its cues from the militant *L'Action française* and its heir apparent, *L'Action nationale*. As the pull of American mass culture intensified, resistance stiffened, and anti-Americanism intensified among Quebec's intellectuals. The Great Depression, the *nationalistes* claimed, was the logical consequence of materialism and capitalism, and seemed to confirm the failure of American civilization. As in France, "le *Krach* de Wall Street et la crise mondiale vont porter au paroxysme la critique des États-Unis."<sup>27</sup> In 1936, the *Revue dominicaine* published a series of exceptionally virulent articles devoted to investigating "notre américanisation."<sup>28</sup> The review's staunchly conservative editor, Father M.-A. Lamarche (1876-1950), was particularly harsh in his assessment of the United States: "ce résidu de civilisation anglo-saxonne jeté dans une immense éprouvette a donc produit une civilisation à part, éblouissante par certains côtés. Mais *le déchet est immense et nous cueillons le déchet.*" He concluded the 1936 inquiry by calling for a "campagne d'éducation anti-Américanisante, à la fois scolaire et populaire."<sup>29</sup> French Canadian anti-Americanism had reached its zenith.

Pro-American thought, on the other hand, was at its nadir.<sup>30</sup> Yet continentalism did not disappear from the Quebec's intellectual culture. Its leading light was the irreverent novelist and journalist Jean-Charles Harvey. The anticlerical Harvey was Quebec's *enfant terrible* in the 1930s, but he showed less interest in American affairs than many previous continentalists. The interwar years also witnessed the appearance of a new modernist and continentalist current in French Canadian literature led by Alfred Desrochers and Robert Choquette. Like Harvey, Desrochers and Choquette had spent part of their childhood in New England, and though they also showed relatively little interest in American affairs, their work nonetheless explored Quebec's *américanité*.

<sup>27</sup> Michel Winock, "US go Home': l'antiaméricanisme français," *L'Histoire* 50 (1982): 10.

<sup>28</sup> For a complete list of the series' articles, see *infra*, 419-421.

<sup>29</sup> M.-A. Lamarche, "Notre américanisation: Aperçus complémentaires et mot de la fin," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 253, 258.

<sup>30</sup> Interwar English Canadian continentalism had little or no influence in Quebec. Even the Carnegie series' volume on Quebec, *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (1943), was basically anti-American in its conclusions.

There was no noteworthy socialist voice among the French Canadian elite during the period under study. And by the 1930s, even radical liberalism had been whittled down to a mere shadow of its former self.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, according to Gérard Bouchard, “la pensée canadienne-française de cette époque bouleversée sur les plans économique et social fut remarquablement exempte de grandes utopies sociales radicales mettant en valeur un idéal d’égalitarisme, appelant à la solidarité et à l’action du peuple, à la lutte ouverte contre le capitalisme sauvage (en regard, le corporatisme des années 1930 fut une idéologie de droite, antidémocratique).” The ethno-religious nature of French Canadian nationalism did not lend itself to radicalism because it hindered the discussion of political institutions. This, in turn, could have but one consequence: “l’absence (sinon le caractère très marginal) d’une pensée sociale radicale” in Quebec.<sup>32</sup> And it was this dearth of radicalism that prevented the emergence of a vigorous continentalism in the prewar intellectual circles of French Canada.

Nevertheless, as Jean-François Revel notes, anti-Americanism “est, le plus souvent, un parti pris des élites politiques, culturelles et religieuses beaucoup plus qu’il n’est un sentiment populaire.”<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the United States has traditionally exerted a powerful attraction on Quebec’s masses, and several historians insist that there existed a major disparity between elite and popular attitudes on the question of *américanité*.<sup>34</sup> Put simply, ordinary French Canadians do not appear to have embraced the negative image of America propagated by most of their intellectuals.

By the 1940s, however, a noticeable shift had occurred in French Canadian commentary: elite anti-Americanism had begun to recede. Indeed, wartime anxiety also worked its magic on French Canada, and intellectuals like Édouard Montpetit, Gustave Lanctot, Léopold Richer (1902-1961), and André Laurendeau began to explore Quebec’s relationship with the United States in a new way.<sup>35</sup> The tone remained largely critical, but a

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<sup>31</sup> In this respect, a fundamental divergence existed between English and French Canadian thought during the 1930s. This dichotomy is dramatically reflected in the ideological gulf that separated the two documents that respectively embody the intellectual climate of the era: the socialist *Regina Manifesto* (1933) and the very conservative *Programme de restauration sociale* (1934).

<sup>32</sup> Gérard Bouchard, *Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde. Essai d’histoire comparée* (Montreal, 2000), 143-144.

<sup>33</sup> J.-F. Revel, *L’obsession anti-américaine: son fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences* (Paris, 2002), 248.

<sup>34</sup> The evident disparity between elite and popular attitudes on the question of *américanité* is discussed in Bouchard, *Genèse des nations et cultures du Nouveau Monde*; Bouchard and Lamonde, eds. *Québécois et Américains*; Yvan Lamonde, *Ni avec eux ni sans eux: le Québec et les États-Unis* (Montreal, 1996); and Lamonde, “Le regard sur les États-Unis: le révélateur d’un clivage social dans la culture nationale québécoise.” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 30 (1995): 69-74.

<sup>35</sup> See Gustave Lanctot, ed., *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (Montreal, 1941); André Laurendeau, “Connaissance des États-Unis,” *L’Enseignement secondaire* XXI (1941): 203-208; Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets*

genuine interest in American affairs was emerging. French Canada, it was argued, needed to learn more about its southern neighbour. André Laurendeau, who was poised to assume the leadership of Quebec's nationalist movement, played a particularly important role in this wartime development. In a 1941 article published in the normally sedate *L'Enseignement secondaire*, he scathingly criticized the lack of attention paid to American affairs by the province's classical colleges:

Si donc Edmond de Nevers a usé dix ans de sa vie à scruter des documents, s'il a tourné son regard original et perspicace vers nos voisins du sud, c'est qu'à son avis *les destinées des États-Unis sont d'une importance suprême pour nous, Canadiens-Français [sic]*. On ne saurait exiger un effort aussi soutenu de la part de tous les esprits cultivés, à plus forte raison de tous les futurs bacheliers. Mais l'avenir étatsunien devant peser d'un tel poids sur notre avenir national, n'est-il pas légitime de s'attendre à ce qu'on ait fourni aux collégiens des notions simples, justes et vraies sur le passé et le présent de la grande République, à ce qu'on ait éveillé à son endroit une curiosité intense? ... Questionnons autour de nous, et dans l'ensemble, nous découvrirons les mêmes pauvretés, le même néant. Certains amis, dont la sympathie avait été éveillée de ce côté, se sont donné une demi-culture personnelle. Leur spécialité en a forcé d'autres à chercher plus avant. Plusieurs ont voyagé outre quarante-cinquième, noué des relations d'affaires, etc. Mais tous tombent d'accord: le collège les avait mis en garde contre l'américanisme, c'est-à-dire contre une très réelle maladie de l'âme et de l'esprit, c'est-à-dire encore contre un péril national, moral et religieux, mais leur avait révélé fort peu de chose sur le fait américain.<sup>36</sup>

This was hardly a ringing endorsement of American society, but the shift was palpable. Liberal intellectuals like Edmond de Nevers, A. D. DeCelles, and Sylva Clapin had urged Quebecers to show more interest in American affairs at the turn of the twentieth century, but this was the first time that a major intellectual identified with the province's conservative nationalist movement – Laurendeau was the editor of the influential *L'Action nationale* – had called for the same thing. The 1940s indeed witnessed a fundamental shift in French Canadian intellectual history. After dominating French Canadian discourse for the best part of a century, conservatism had begun to decline. Laurendeau and his acolytes were undoubtedly conservative, but their rapport with tradition – and America – was different.

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*d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941); and Léopold Richer, *Vers l'accomplissement de notre destin américain* (Quebec, 1941).

<sup>36</sup> Laurendeau, "Connaissance des États-Unis," 205. Note the early use of *étatsunien* as a synonym for *américain*.

Once again, shifts in the “American question” announced wider changes in Canadian thought. Twenty years after André Laurendeau recommended that classical colleges show more interest in American affairs, Quebec was undergoing its Quiet Revolution. Laurendeau was a transitional figure in French Canadian intellectual history. Not quite a Quiet Revolutionary, his work would nonetheless herald change for Quebec.

### *The Foreign Sources of Canadian Commentary*

In some senses, Canadian commentary was derivative. Indeed, though analysis of Canadian-American relations and the Dominion’s *américanité* was overwhelmingly Canadian in inspiration, writing centred on domestic American issues, which is examined in Part II, tended to rest on foreign sources. For the most part, Canadian observers sought inspiration from American, British, and French sources. Not surprisingly, French sources were especially important in Quebec, while American and British sources were particularly influential in the elaboration of English Canadian commentary. By and large, continentalists and anti-Americans were drawing on the same sources. Their deductions, however, could be vastly different. And foreign interpretations were not being bought wholesale. Canadian observers were both critical and selective when it came to their foreign sources. André Laurendeau, for instance, was impressed by Georges Duhamel’s sweeping indictment of American society in *Scènes de la vie future* (1930), but nevertheless warned the readers of *L’Action nationale* to take the French writer’s “antiétatsunianisme caricatural” with a grain of salt.<sup>37</sup>

### *American Sources*

American writing played a key role in the formulation of Canadian commentary. And even the most hostile Canadian intellectuals drew a great deal of inspiration from American sources. Historically, American writers and intellectuals have not shied away from critical introspection. Indeed, from Alexander Hamilton to Michael Moore, America has consistently shown itself to be a “puissance autocritique.”<sup>38</sup> Most Canadian critics have been inspired by this rich tradition.

Alexander Hamilton and the American Federalist tradition cast a long shadow across several strains of Canadian thought. Indeed, Hamiltonian ideas can be found in the work of

<sup>37</sup> André Laurendeau, “Commentaires,” *L’Action nationale* X (1937): 316.

<sup>38</sup> Bruno Roy, *Pour en finir avec l’anti-américanisme* (Montreal, 1993), 160.

thinkers as seemingly antithetical as Goldwin Smith and Bishop John Strachan. As both George Rawlyk and Jane Errington note, “even the Loyalist elite’s anti-American critique was copied directly from the writings of American Federalists, who were similarly alarmed with what they saw as the democratic excesses of the Jeffersonian Republicans.”<sup>39</sup>

Likewise, the idealized, anti-American narratives produced by Loyalist historians were also inspired by American sources. Arthur Johnston’s (1841-1919) *Myths and Facts of the American Revolution* (1908) was one of these. Dedicated “to the memory of the Loyalists,” the book was largely based on the work of American historians James Hosmer and Moses Tyler.<sup>40</sup> In a similar vein, George M. Wrong drew heavily on the work of George Louis Beer and, more widely, on the so-called “imperial school” of American history, to produce his 1935 monograph on *Canada and the American Revolution*. Like Beer, Wrong was critical of the American Revolution and mourned the great rift of 1776.

However, it was the American progressive tradition and its scathing critique of political corruption and plutocracy that most inspired anti-American commentary in turn-of-the-century English Canada. As we have seen, many American progressives shared a fundamentally antimodern sensibility with Canadian imperialists. Andrew Macphail, for instance, was a keen observer of the progressive movement, and considered his critique of the Republic to be tied to “that undertone of doubt, suspicion and fear, which a fresh perception detects in growing volume in the minds of the best Americans who meditate upon their own problems.”<sup>41</sup>

Thorstein Veblen, progressive America’s most articulate critic of plutocracy and consumption – he coined the phrase “conspicuous consumption” – was particularly influential in the Dominion. Stephen Leacock, who studied under the Norwegian-American economist at the University of Chicago, helped to popularize his ideas in Canada. Inspired by Veblen’s seminal critique of American wealth, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899), Leacock’s celebrated cycle of humorous sketches, *Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town* (1912) and *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* (1914), are a witty commentary on the ill-effects of the status revolution.

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<sup>39</sup> Rawlyk and Errington cited in J. H. Thompson and S. J. Randall, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Montreal and Kingston, 2002), 17.

<sup>40</sup> Arthur Johnston, *Myths and Facts of the American Revolution: A Commentary on United States History as it is Written* (Toronto, 1908), iii; Norman Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists: The Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts* (Toronto, 1997), 110.

<sup>41</sup> [Andrew Macphail], “Canadian Writers and American Politics,” *University Magazine* IX (1910): 3; Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 174.



Woodrow Wilson, the “careful critic of institutions,” wrote John G. Bourinot,<sup>42</sup> was also popular among Canadian intellectuals. Before entering the political arena, the twenty-eighth president of the United States published several critical studies of American politics and government. Moreover, Wilson held certain aspects of the British parliamentary tradition in high regard. As a result, a number of turn-of-the-century imperialists eagerly drew anti-American arguments from his work.

Because their work addressed American concerns and was partially inspired by progressivism, some early-twentieth-century English Canadian critics of the Republic, most notably Stephen Leacock, enjoyed a wide audience in the United States. Antimodernism was also a staple of turn-of-the-century American intellectual discourse, and the progressive mind was receptive to critical assessments of American life. As a result, America was more than ready for the critique of American wealth in Leacock’s *Arcadian Adventures With the Idle Rich* or Robert Barr’s (1850-1912) turn-of-the-century tale of political corruption in New York City, *The Victors* (1901), which had the added attraction of an anti-Irish subtext.<sup>43</sup>

American progressivism also had a profound effect on the work of many English Canadian continentalists, in particular James T. Shotwell, O. D. Skelton, and Frank Underhill. However, unlike their conservative rivals, continentalists did not draw a series of anti-American arguments from progressive writing. Underhill’s historical materialism was particularly influenced by the work of Charles Beard, whose economic interpretation of American history revolutionized historical thought in the United States.<sup>44</sup>

Obviously, American writing had a greater impact on English Canadian commentary than it would in Quebec. However, directly or indirectly, French Canadian intellectuals were absorbing a fair amount of American ideas. American authors were read in Quebec. Francis Parkman’s work on colonial North America, for instance, was widely read. Besides, French

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<sup>42</sup> John G. Bourinot, “Canadian Studies in Comparative Politics: Parliamentary Compared with Congressional Government,” *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 1<sup>st</sup> Series, XI, Section II: 80.

<sup>43</sup> “It seems highly plausible that hostility toward the United States abroad and hostility at home are interdependent and nurture one another,” writes Paul Hollander. “This is not to say that critiques abroad are predicated on domestic confirmation or vice versa, but only that each group of critics finds welcome supporting evidence in the reproaches of the other group.” [Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965-1990* (New York, 1992), vii-viii.] Canadian anti-Americanism and American critical introspection could indeed, at times, nurture one another. For instance, Canadian detractors of America’s Indian policy frequently echoed the work of American critics such as Helen Hunt Jackson, whose 1884 *Century of Dishonor*, in turn, praised the Dominion for its treatment of Native People. [Thompson and Randall, *Canada and the United States*, 50.]

<sup>44</sup> Frederick Jackson Turner also exerted a great deal of influence on continentalist thought. As a result, the significance of the frontier in Canadian history was diligently explored in the work of sociologist S. D. Clark (1910-2003) and historians Frank Underhill and Arthur Lower.

commentary on the United States, which played an important role in nourishing French Canadian thought, was often inspired by American writing.<sup>45</sup> And furthermore, American Catholic sources were important in the formulation of French Canadian commentary. Indeed, the pastoral letters of many American bishops, especially Cardinal Gibbons, the primate of the American Church, were widely circulated within Quebec's Catholic clergy. And a variety of Catholic periodicals, principally *America*, New York's Catholic weekly, but also the *American Catholic Quarterly Review* and the *Catholic World*, were an important source of information for many French Canadian intellectuals. These periodicals were particularly inspiring for writers seeking to pass judgment on American morality and public education. However, taken individually, few American Catholic writers appear to have had a significant impact on French Canadian commentary. Jules-Paul Tardivel, who stands out as the French Canadian intellectual who drew most heavily on American Catholic sources, was particularly fond of the writing of outspoken Catholic convert and journalist James A. McMaster. In his influential essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* (1900), which denounced theological modernism in the American Church, the ultramontane Tardivel referred to McMaster, "ce grand polémiste catholique," as "une des plus belles figures de l'Église des États-Unis, et tout à fait comparable à Louis Veuillot."<sup>46</sup> This was the ultimate compliment that Tardivel, who consciously modeled himself on Veuillot's example, could pay to another journalist.

### *British Sources*

Canadian observers drew heavily on British sources for inspiration. The American commentary of Charles Dickens, Walter Bagehot, Frances Trollope, or Matthew Arnold, for instance, was widely read and commented in the Dominion. However, no British – or indeed foreign – observer could rival the impact of James Bryce on Canadian commentary, especially in English Canada. *The American Commonwealth* (1888), Bryce's positive, though not uncritical assessment of American society offered a great quantity of arguments to both continentalist and anti-American thinkers. As a result, Bryce's ideas permeated Canadian commentary and helped heighten some of its repetitive tendencies. Intellectuals from across the political spectrum were inspired by his work and used it in a variety of ways: Edmond de

<sup>45</sup> David Strauss, *Menace in the West: The Rise of French Anti-Americanism in Modern Times* (Westport, Connecticut, 1978), 187-188; Ezra N. Suleiman, in *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, ed. D. Lacome et al. (New York, 1990), 110.

<sup>46</sup> Jules-Paul Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (Montreal, 1900), 167.

Nevers quoted Bryce a number of times in his two-volume essay on *L'âme américaine* (1900); George R. Parkin's critique of American politics and government was influenced by *The American Commonwealth*; and Sara Jeannette Duncan even evoked Bryce in one of her novels.<sup>47</sup> As a young man, James T. Shotwell was in absolute awe of Bryce. In his autobiography, he fondly recounted meeting the author of *The American Commonwealth* while on an 1899 trip to England:

London, of course, was overpowering. I thought, and still think, that the much abused Gothic architecture of the nineteenth century rose to imperial majesty in the houses of Parliament, and that Big Ben chimes the hours with all the pomp and circumstance of empire. But it was an incident in the lobby of the House of Commons which outshone all other memories. The House was in session, and gathering together all the courage I could muster I sent in my card, inscribed as "a student of history," to the Right Honorable James Bryce, former ambassador to the United States, whose brilliant essay *The Holy Roman Empire* had been published ten years before I was born, and whose *American Commonwealth*, with its penetrating analysis of United States politics, we were using in my class. He came out to see me, and instead of dismissing me with formal courtesy sat down to ask me all about history at Columbia – a half hour worth to me all the cycles of Cathay.<sup>48</sup>

*The American Commonwealth* was an important source of anti-American arguments for turn-of-the-century imperialists. With chapters entitled "Why great men are not chosen presidents," "Why the best men do not go into politics," and "The True Faults of American Democracy," the two-volume essay was bound to please many anti-Americans. To be sure, Bryce was a liberal, but his strong conservative tendencies endeared him to many conservatives who were inspired by his forceful critique of American political corruption and his distrust of the separation of powers.

### *French Sources*

France produced the first truly classic interpretation of American society in Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1835-1840). The two-volume essay was widely read in

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<sup>47</sup> George R. Parkin, *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity* (London, 1892), passim; Sara Jeannette Duncan, *Those Delightful Americans* (New York, 1902), 236.

<sup>48</sup> James T. Shotwell, *The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell* (New York, 1961), 35.

the Dominion, but as in France, “on ne prit dans Tocqueville que ce qu’on y cherchait: sa volonté d’interprétation objective – surmontant ses préjugés d’aristocrate – ne fit gère école.”<sup>49</sup> Like Bryce, Tocqueville was read very selectively. His overall assessment of American society was too positive to be accepted by Canadian conservatives. That said, the right did appreciate his rejection of American individualism and materialism and his critique of the Republic’s cultural anaemia. Not surprisingly, Tocqueville also inspired a number of continentalist intellectuals. For instance, the work of Goldwin Smith, Edmond de Nevers, A. D. DeCelles, and Sylva Clapin echoed several of Tocqueville’s ideas, including the value of social mobility in the United States and the overall stability of American democracy.

For most English Canadian observers, French commentary began and ended with *Democracy in America*. But Tocqueville’s opus was only the beginning of a very rich tradition. Indeed, over the years, French intellectuals have shown a great deal of interest in American society. This was particularly the case during the 1920s and 1930s, when the rise of American power and the steady decline of the French Republic led many thinkers to wonder who would dominate the new world order: Europe or America? As a result, several influential books on America were published in France during the interwar years. This sudden increase in French interest in the United States contributed to the rise of American commentary and anti-Americanism in post-World War One Quebec.

French political scientist André Siegfried stands out as the most important foreign source for interwar anti-American rhetoric in Quebec. As a Protestant who had authored a highly controversial study on the French Canadian question, *Le Canada: les deux races* (1906), his work was generally regarded with suspicion. “André Siegfried essaye d’être objectif mais, malgré lui, ses jugements, ses appréciations laissent trop voir qu’il est protestant. Son credo l’empêche d’avoir de la question une vue totale,” warned Hermas Bastien (1897-1977), who taught Latin at Montreal’s Mont-Saint-Louis, in 1928.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless, Siegfried’s *Les États-Unis d’aujourd’hui* (1927) was very well received in Quebec. His interest in Canadian affairs – Frank Underhill regarded Siegfried as the “Tocqueville of Canada”<sup>51</sup> – gave him a degree of prominence that other French authors did not necessarily enjoy. Consequently, his 1927 study of American society appears to have had a greater impact on French Canadian interwar commentary than those of Georges Duhamel or Lucien Romier, whose work on

<sup>49</sup> Michel Winock, “‘U.S. go home’: l’antiaméricanisme français,” *L’Histoire* 50 (1982): 8.

<sup>50</sup> Hermas Bastien, “Sur les États-Unis,” *L’Action canadienne-française* XX (1928): 115.

<sup>51</sup> F. H. Underhill quoted in Gérard Bergeron, *Quand Tocqueville et Siegfried nous observaient...* (Sillery, 1990), 109.

America is generally regarded as more significant. Siegfried, like Tocqueville and Bryce, was a liberal with strong conservative tendencies, and many *nationalistes* shared his aversion to American cosmopolitanism and industrialism. In spite some reservations, Édouard Montpetit was impressed by Siegfried's opus. "On peut ne pas s'accorder avec lui – et encore! – ne pas le suivre ou vouloir le retenir sur une pente dangereuse, on ne laisse pas d'être surpris, subjugué, par la vivacité si juste de la pensée," Montpetit wrote in 1941.<sup>52</sup>

French Canadian intellectuals were also influenced by the work of Lucien Romier and Georges Duhamel. In his *Scènes de la vie future*, Duhamel warned that America offered a glimpse of Europe's future degeneracy: "Notre avenir! Tous les stigmates de cette civilisation dévorante, nous pourrions, avant vingt ans, les découvrir sur les membres de l'Europe."<sup>53</sup> Duhamel's monograph exerted a good deal of influence over the various authors who contributed to the *Revue dominicaine's* 1936 inquiry into "Notre américanisation."

Lucien Romier, a conservative republican who would eventually serve as a minister in Marshall Pétain's ill-fated *État français*, went even further than Duhamel in his rejection of the mass age and America. In *Qui sera le maître, Europe ou Amérique?* (1927), Romier warned that "le cycle présent de l'évolution humaine aboutit peu à peu à une 'dépersonnalisation' de l'individu, devenu machine lui-même."<sup>54</sup> America, as he saw it, was the embodiment of this post-human era. Romier's 1927 monograph was widely read in Quebec's intellectual circles and appears to have exerted a particular influence over the anti-American commentary of Lionel Groulx and Hermas Bastien.<sup>55</sup>

#### *Canadian Awareness of American Affairs*

Generally speaking, English Canadian intellectuals were better informed of American affairs than their French Canadian counterparts. Indeed, by the late nineteenth century, English Canadian society was awash in American ideas and culture. English Canadians read American books and magazines, studied with American readers, and enjoyed American mass entertainment. Their exposure to American news, writes Allan Smith, "played a particularly important role in the creation of a continental frame of reference. The fact that they were so

<sup>52</sup> Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 10-11.

<sup>53</sup> Georges Duhamel, *Scènes de la vie future* (Paris, 1930), 220.

<sup>54</sup> Lucien Romier, *Qui sera le maître, Europe ou Amérique?* (Paris, 1927), 238.

<sup>55</sup> See in particular Lionel Groulx, *Nos responsabilités intellectuelles* (Montreal, 1928); Hermas Bastien, "La philosophie américaine," in his *La défense de l'intelligence*, 169-174 (Montreal, 1932); and Bastien, "La critique américaine," in his *Témoignages. Études et profils littéraires*, 33-51 (Montreal, 1933).

fully provided with knowledge of public controversies in the United States transformed those controversies into matters which seemed less newsworthy items from a foreign country and more vital matters which penetrated into the heart of Canada.” The pervasiveness of American ideas and culture in English Canada was not fully reproduced in Quebec. The United States certainly loomed large in Quebec, but the province was partially insulated from American ideas by its distinct language and culture.<sup>56</sup>

Several observers bemoaned – to little avail – the general lack of awareness of American affairs that prevailed in Quebec. Indeed, in spite of the province’s geographic contiguity with the United States and its large Franco-American diaspora, much of the readily available information on the Republic was the work of French authors. What’s more, very little American history was taught in Quebec’s classical colleges and universities. Eurocentric and obsessed with antiquity, the whole structure of classical education did not lend itself to the study of American affairs. This situation troubled A. D. DeCelles:

N’est-il pas singulier de voir les Canadiens instruits, au courant des faits et gestes des Grecs et des Egyptiens, des causes de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains, des annales de l’Europe, ou très peu ou nullement renseignés sur les Etats-Unis? C’est là, convenons-en, une anomalie qui ne devrait pas exister, car aucun pays au monde n’influe autant que la Confédération américaine, sur nos intérêts et sur notre situation économique.<sup>57</sup>

An admirer of American institutions, DeCelles sought to remedy this situation by publishing *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (1896), French Canada’s first full-length study of American history and government. His book was widely read and received a prize from the French Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Re-edited in 1913 and 1925, its success inspired Sylva Clapin to write a similar but more generally accessible *Histoire des États-Unis* (1900) for use in French Canadian and Franco-American schools.

However, despite the best efforts of DeCelles and Clapin, Quebec’s intellectuals remained woefully misinformed when it came to American affairs. And the situation did not improve with time. A generation after DeCelles criticized Quebec’s classical colleges for

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<sup>56</sup> Allan Smith, “The Continental Dimension in the Evolution of the English-Canadian Mind,” in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), 42.

<sup>57</sup> A. D. Decelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), vi.

neglecting American studies, André Laurendeau published a similar indictment of classical education in *L'enseignement secondaire*.<sup>58</sup>

In the 1940s, American studies remained underdeveloped in Quebec and the province's intellectuals continued look to France for analysis of American affairs. Still, as Pierre Trépanier notes, prewar Quebec was not an intellectual province of France.<sup>59</sup> French texts were read very selectively and other sources were consulted. English Canadian commentary was no different in that regard. Britain and America loomed large in the English Canadian mind, but never overwhelmed Canadian concerns.

These concerns evolved over time. Indeed, though Canadian commentary reflected wider attitudes towards modernity, various events helped shape its evolution. The Great War, for instance, was a watershed event in the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. It announced both the decline of anti-American sentiment in English Canada and its intensification in Quebec. It also marked the decline of the generation of intellectuals born from the late 1850s to the late 1870s and the rise of those born in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. This changing of the guard, so to speak, occurred in both English and French Canadian thought, but would produce vastly different results. In Quebec it signalled a *virage à droite*, while in the rest of Canada it would mark the decline of the imperialist right.

By examining the core ideas and the evolution of Canadian intellectual commentary on America, Part I laid the groundwork for this study. The next section explores Canadian attitudes towards the various philosophical, political, cultural, social, racial, and economic elements that were believed to define the American experience. What emerges is the image of a society that embodied both the hopes and the fears that Canadian intellectuals associated with the mass age.

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<sup>58</sup> See *supra*, 70.

<sup>59</sup> Pierre Trépanier, "Le maurrassisme au Canada français," *Cahiers des Dix* 53 (1999): 167.

## II

# America Through Canadian Eyes



## *Chapter Four*

### The Core Principles of the American Experience

Since its founding, America has embodied a variety of principles to the intellectuals of the world. These principles reflect, by and large, the intellectual's era and perspective. In the 1830s, for instance, Tocqueville saw equality as one of the essential features of American society. On the other hand, more than a century later, Simone de Beauvoir, who also spent several months travelling across the nation, saw inequality as one of the hallmarks of the American experience. This chapter focuses on what Canadian writers perceived as the core principles that underpinned the American experience. These essentially modern values included revolutionism, materialism, freedom, equality, and individualism.

As Allan Smith has noted, English Canadians have always had a "tendency to understand their community through use of the sort of classless, egalitarian, liberal, and New World language which was prevalent in the United States."<sup>1</sup> Even Canadian Toryism did not significantly deviate from this trend, and most conservative intellectuals had little patience for overly rigid class structures or constraint. Individual freedom and meritocracy were valued by the Canadian right, which ensured that its critique of America's conception of freedom, individualism, and equality would be relatively mild. And though revolutionism was anathema to the Dominion's Tories, the American Revolution was not viewed as entirely unprovoked and unwarranted. The conservative rejection of American society, to be sure, was not unconditional.

Continentalists recognized that the American Revolution had been inevitable, but nevertheless bemoaned its violence and the long-term antagonism it had spawned. Continentalism was a pluralistic sensibility, and socialists and liberals did not always see eye to eye on questions regarding freedom, equality, and individualism. They were more or less united, however, in refusing to see materialism as a specifically American problem. In the end, their assessment of American society was positive but critical.

The basic trends of Canadian commentary emerge in this chapter. To be sure, while imperialists and *nationalistes* shared a basically antimodern sensibility, their critique of American society was different. American materialism was more often denounced in Quebec. This is hardly surprising, given that an ultramontane seam ran through French

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<sup>1</sup> Allan Smith, "Introduction," in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), 7.

Canadian conservatism, and also because religious issues played a more significant role the province's intellectual culture.

### *Revolution and Rupture*

For the Canadian intellectual, America was a quintessentially youthful nation. "Le peuple américain est encore à l'époque de l'énergie créatrice, de la vigueur et de l'exubérance juvénile," remarked Edmond de Nevers in 1900, "il a les allures fantasques, l'humeur capricieuse, les aspirations pleines de contrastes bizarres d'un jeune homme ardent et libre."<sup>2</sup> With youth came vitality – "l'énergie américaine coule comme un fleuve," wrote Claude-Henri Grignon (1894-1976) in *Le secret de Lindbergh* (1928), a fictionalized account of Charles A. Lindbergh's solo flight across the Atlantic<sup>3</sup> – but also immaturity. And Canadian conservatives never failed to note that America, as Gustave Lanctot put it in 1941, was a nation "qui a grandi trop vite sans avoir eu le temps de se mûrir."<sup>4</sup>

The Republic's youthful exuberance was sometimes credited to its frontier experience – which the Dominion also underwent – but was more often attributed to her early separation from Europe. America was a nation born out of rupture, out of revolution. Americans, claimed R. G. Trotter, who taught Canadian and colonial history at Queen's University, in a 1940 pamphlet criticising isolationism, "denied the dependence of America upon Europe, the interdependence of the two continents throughout American history." This was hardly surprising, he continued, since

The national experiment of the American people had its inception in a violent political disruption from the old world. Their Revolutionary War meant forswearing an old connection and ancient traditions as the basis of political stability and the focus of national self-respect. These had to be found in the Revolution itself. Americans soon came to think of their liberties and their national experience as inseparable from and even identified with the completeness of their independence from any old-world connection.<sup>5</sup>

Rupture and the rejection of tradition and historical precedent are central to the modern ethos. Accordingly, conservative intellectuals like Trotter could hardly approve of a

<sup>2</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, vol. II (Paris, 1900), 129.

<sup>3</sup> Claude-Henri Grignon, *Le secret de Lindbergh* (Montreal, 1928), 3.

<sup>4</sup> Gustave Lanctot, "Le Québec et les États-Unis, 1867-1937," in his *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (Montreal, 1941), 310.

<sup>5</sup> R. G. Trotter, *North America and the War: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1940), 5-6.

national experiment based on discontinuity. "A nation must grow from the roots," argued Andrew Macphail in 1909, "and in this process of growth a thousand years are as one day. A nation crawls on its belly, slow as a glacier. The optimists who demand only ten years for the fulfilment of political prophecy and the pessimists who require as many as twenty years are both wrong. The whole matter is summed up in the philosophy of Mr. Dooley; 'I have seen great changes in three years, but very few in fifty.'" To Macphail, the American nation was an ill-conceived *tabula rasa* founded on abstract principles. Indeed, while Canadians "are following a course which the English have travelled ever since they landed in Britain at least. The people of the United States broke into a new direction, chiefly under the persuasion of certain guides who lived in France, and in accordance with the genius of that race had drawn up as rules for guidance certain theoretical propositions based upon hypothetical considerations. It has come to be a question between experience and theory."<sup>6</sup> Abstract principles, he believed, could not serve as a nation's bedrock. Born in Orwell, Prince Edward Island, Macphail was a graduate of McGill University and a licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians. After practicing medicine and teaching at Bishop's University from 1893 to 1905, he was appointed McGill's first professor of the history of medicine in 1907, a position he would hold for thirty years. That same year he became the editor of the prestigious and influential *University Magazine*. Deeply depressed by modernity, Macphail saw the United States as the antithesis of his conservative political, religious, and social values.

Central to the conservative ethos, writes Allan Smith, was the idea that "the New World could not be seen as a place apart. People there were not different from other people. They were not above the laws of nature, remade by their sojourn in the New World, and able to set aside the constraints which had made their compatriots on the other side of the Atlantic selfish and sinful. Their lives, accordingly, must be regulated by the same truths which had regulated them in the Old World."<sup>7</sup> The New World may have forged a French or British Canadian nation, but human nature and racial traits were seen as immutable. "Je n'ai jamais pu comprendre ceux qui prétendent qu'il existe un je ne sais quoi de nouveau en Amérique," argued Quebec's leading ultramontane intellectual, Jules-Paul Tardivel, in 1900. Instead, he insisted that

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<sup>6</sup> Andrew Macphail, "New Lamps for Old," *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 31; "Canadian Writers and American Politics," *University Magazine* IX (1910): 6-7. Mr. Dooley was a fictional character created by at the turn of the century by journalist Finley Peter Dunne.

<sup>7</sup> Allan Smith, "American Culture and the Concept of Mission in Nineteenth-Century English Canada," in his *Canada: An American Nation*, 28-29.

Le bien et le mal qui s’y coudoient sont vieux comme le monde, et les *exemples* et les *leçons* qu’on y trouve se produisent dans tous les pays. Encore une fois, c’est une simple question de *proportion* entre le bien et le mal; tout au plus une question de degré, non point de *nature*. Un bien et un mal propres à l’Amérique, des idées vraies et des idées fausses vraiment américaines, cela n’existe pas en réalité. C’est un rêve des américanisants tant d’Amérique que d’Europe.<sup>8</sup>

In spite of their dread of rupture, many conservative intellectuals were not as dismissive of the American Revolution as might be expected – Burke, after all, had shown some sympathy for the Patriot cause. They tended to blame Georgian absolutism for the conflict, and even the most radical Tories who, like Colonel George T. Denison, Arthur Johnston, or George Sterling Ryerson, were steeped in the Loyalist tradition, showed little sympathy for George III. Indeed, though Denison attributed the revolution to “lawless elements” led by “impecunious lawyers and unsuccessful merchants, by ship owners who lived by smuggling, and by men on the verge of bankruptcy,” he did not hesitate to write in 1895 that “misunderstandings, negligence, ignorance, what Lord Beresford describes as the ‘savage stupidity of the British Government of 1774-1776,’ led to the loss by the Empire of the thirteen colonies.”<sup>9</sup> Although he was perhaps the pre-eminent Loyalist mythmaker of his time, Denison’s loyalty to Britain was not blind: he did not hesitate to criticize Britain if he felt that its actions were endangering the cause of imperial unity.

Like most nineteenth-century Tories, the Colonel saw the Revolution as a cataclysm that would forever destabilize the American nation. Born out of an act of rebellion, the Republic would be permanently beset by lawlessness and violence. Yet some later conservative writers were also willing to acknowledge, as R. G. Trotter did in 1932, that “George Washington is one of the best examples history affords of the Englishman carrying his English principles into execution far from England.”<sup>10</sup> Rejecting Andrew Macphail’s earlier reading of the Revolution, which had insisted on its Jacobin character, an aging George M. Wrong contended in the mid-1930s that “the Americans radicals, indeed, shaped

<sup>8</sup> J.-P. Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalité* (Montreal, 1900), 70, 74.

<sup>9</sup> G. T. Denison, “The United Empire Loyalists and their Influence upon the History of this Continent,” *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, X (1904): xxvii; “Canada and her Relations to the Empire,” *Westminster Review* CXLIV (1895): 249..

<sup>10</sup> R. G. Trotter, “George Washington and the English-Speaking Heritage,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XXXIX (1932): 301.

themselves on the English model.”<sup>11</sup> The American Revolution, at heart, had been less a revolution than an unhappy civil war that had pitted the two branches of the English race against each other.

This view was shared by many continentalist writers. “In one sense the American Revolution was not a revolution at all,” argued William Bennett Munro on the first page of his popular 1919 textbook on American government. “It was not a cataclysm like the French Revolution of the eighteenth century; it did not sweep away the fundamental institutions, or transform political ideals, or shift the weight of political power from one class among the people to another.”<sup>12</sup> A. D. DeCelles agreed. “C’étaient des hommes absolument modérés que Washington, Hamilton et les principaux constituants de Philadelphie,” Parliament’s head librarian wrote in his *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (1896). “On aurait tort de voir en eux des révolutionnaires; ils ne l’avaient été qu’un instant, et à leur corps défendant. Profondément imbus des traditions anglaises, ils restèrent, sous la république, prisonniers de leur passé et de leurs traditions.”<sup>13</sup>

DeCelles’s work was at odds, however, with the conservative reading of the American Revolution that prevailed among Quebec’s *nationaliste* intellectuals. Most French Canadian nationalists, to be sure, were not willing to attach a temperate label to the revolution. “L’esprit de la Révolution américaine ne diffère guère, quoi qu’on en ait dit, de l’esprit de la Révolution française,” wrote Jules-Paul Tardivel in 1900.<sup>14</sup> There was nothing moderate about 1776 – it was radical revolution in the French mould. Indeed, noted Father Louis Chaussegros de Léry (b. 1895) several decades later in *Relations*, the organ of Quebec’s Jesuits, many of the leading Patriots were heavily influenced by French freemasonry and by Voltairean ideas. Worse still, “plusieurs chefs de la Révolution américaine inclinaient vers le déisme.”<sup>15</sup>

A deep sense of loss emerges from most English Canadian writing on the American Revolution. Had “tact prevailed in England,” Robert Falconer told a British audience 1925, “a compromise might have resulted and the radical thinkers would not have been able to go to the extreme.”<sup>16</sup> George M. Wrong, who ran the University of Toronto’s Department of History from 1894 to 1927, was equally mournful. “It would have been a great day not merely

<sup>11</sup> G. M. Wrong, *Canada and the American Revolution: The Disruption of the First British Empire* (New York, 1935), 192.

<sup>12</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Government of the United States: National, State and Local* (New York, 1919), 1.

<sup>13</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), 408.

<sup>14</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 127.

<sup>15</sup> Louis Chaussegros de Léry, “Écoles publiques étatsuniennes,” *Relations* III (1943): 320.

<sup>16</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 106.

for their two nations but for humanity if [the political opinions of Guy Carleton and George Washington] and those of their countrymen could have been reconciled in a common citizenship based on freedom and unity," he wrote in *Canada and the American Revolution: The Disruption of the First British Empire* (1935).<sup>17</sup> For imperialists like Falconer and Wrong, the revolution has forever weakened both the British Empire and the cause of Anglo-Saxon unity.

Continentalist writing could be just as sorrowful. "Looking back," wrote John W. Dafoe of his Loyalists ancestors, "one can only ponder on how different the history of the world might have been if their suggestions had been followed. If there had been a little more statesmanship in England and a little more patient application of constitutional methods in the colonies, how different history would have been. But men are not wise enough. The appeal was to the sword, and the English race was tragically divided." Nonetheless, he acknowledged in a 1935 conference that "the Revolution could not be avoided because the Americans could not accept subordination and Great Britain would not permit them to stay on any other condition; nor was it then possible for the idea of peaceful separation to rise in the minds of men."<sup>18</sup> Many intellectuals also lamented the century of Anglo-American conflict and mistrust that followed the Revolution. Goldwin Smith, for his part, hoped and steadfastly believed "that some day the schism will be healed, that there will be a moral reunion, which alone is possible, of the American colonies of Great Britain with their mother country, and a complete reunion, with the hearty sanction of the mother country, of the whole race upon this continent."<sup>19</sup> Annexation, Smith believed, would be an important step in that direction.

Still, in spite of some residual nostalgia for Anglo-Saxon unity, English Canadian continentalists believed that American independence had been both necessary and inevitable. "The Fathers of Independence conceived their Republic untrammelled by the handicaps of Europe and untangled in its life," remarked the managing editor of the *Toronto Globe*, Reverend James A. Macdonald (1862-1923), in 1915.<sup>20</sup> America had indeed avoided several of the problems that plagued European civilization, which included, according to Edmond de Nevers, militarism and hatred. In Europe, he wrote in 1900, "le passé pèse sur le

<sup>17</sup> Wrong, *Canada and the American Revolution*, 397-398.

<sup>18</sup> J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the United States," *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* IX (1930): 723; *Canada: An American Nation* (New York, 1935), 23.

<sup>19</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered Before the Young Men's Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 19-20.

<sup>20</sup> James A. Macdonald, *Democracy and the Nations: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1915), 71.

présent, sur l'avenir, de tout le poids des lourds armements, des millions de soldats, des cuirassés, des citadelles, des siècles de haine; de toute la force des habitudes acquises." De Nevers, who had travelled extensively in Europe during the late nineteenth century and been appalled by the militarism and anti-Semitism that he had encountered in the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, looked forward to the day when America's "conscience nationale va se ressaisir pleinement et rompre les liens qui la retiennent encore dans le vasselage de la conscience faussée du Vieux-Monde [*sic*]." <sup>21</sup>

However, as a number of continentalists pointed out, a singular kinship had survived the great rift of 1776. For instance, in 1942, John MacCormac argued metaphorically that "a man may cast his mother off and grow up to hate her, and she may have given him cause for it, but he cannot banish her from the deeps of his mind or legislate her out of his blood."<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Ray Palmer Baker (1883-1979), whose *History of English-Canadian Literature to the Confederation* (1920) was written, in part, to illustrate the intellectual kinship that united the English-speaking peoples, contended that the North American continent had remained English in both speech and thought after 1776.<sup>23</sup> There was more than a touch of Atlanticism in Baker's work. Like many moderate continentalists, he was eager to show that a wider continuity had survived the American Revolution. Likewise, some imperialists were willing to acknowledge that the revolution had not sundered the racial bond that united all Anglo-Saxons. Though the American Republic had been born of an act of rebellion, the Declaration of Independence had not altered the racial makeup of the average American. However, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, imperialists were divided on whether America was an Anglo-Saxon nation.

As a people of rupture and revolution, Americans were thought to be instantly drawn to change and progress. Consequently, conservatives argued, all things experimental appealed to their collective psyche. In 1917, the dean of Queen's University's Faculty of Arts, James Cappon, argued that "the susceptibility of the average American to the claims of what is new half disarms him before innovations which are often crude and experimental. He has a private conviction that everything which is old must be obsolete and the principle he uses

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<sup>21</sup> E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, vol. II, 295, 349.

<sup>22</sup> John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery: The Future of the United States, Canada, and the British Empire* (New York, 1942), 5.

<sup>23</sup> R. P. Baker, *A History of English-Canadian Literature to the Confederation: Its Relation to the Literature of Great Britain and the United States* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1920), viii, 69.

to justify change is generally some lower form of utility.”<sup>24</sup> This predilection for the untried threatened the United States because it exposed Americans to social and political revolutionism. Continentalists viewed things very differently. Indeed, where conservatives saw instability, liberals and socialists saw progressivism and movement. In a talk broadcast by the CBC in 1940, Arthur Phelps (1887-1970), who began his academic career teaching English at Cornell College, Iowa, contrasted the Dominion’s lack of imagination and innovation with America’s progressivism:

A lot of us up here – too many of us, but I think a decreasing number – are tempted to call Americans unstable and mercurial when further analysis might often suggest instead resilience and open mindedness. Too many of us talk carelessly about American incalculability when we might better admire American energy and imagination. Too many of us, taking our cue, I must say, as we take so many things, from American self criticism, too many of us are content to call their multiple magnificent accomplishments merely a kind of frightening materialism. I think we should be particularly careful when we are tempted to do the latter. Not being ourselves a creative people, we Canadians haven’t been caught up into the spirit of inventive and material progress as they have; into the *spirit* of that progress.<sup>25</sup>

### *Materialism*

“It does not seem quite intelligent to denounce the American pursuit of wealth when we calculate our own progress mainly in material terms,” reasoned Douglas Bush in a 1929 diatribe against anti-Americanism.<sup>26</sup> A literary critic and frequent contributor to the *Canadian Forum*, Bush had little patience, writes Brandon Conron, “for the introspective and moral seriousness of both Canadian literature and the Canadian character.”<sup>27</sup> Arthur Lower, who had taught history at Tufts College, Massachusetts, and at Harvard before accepting a position at United College, Winnipeg, was equally sceptical when it came to Canadian criticism of American materialism. “We worship [the great god Dollar] just as faithfully but

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<sup>24</sup> James Cappon, “Current Events: The Conflict over the Classics in the United States,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XXV (1917): 92.

<sup>25</sup> Arthur Phelps, *These United States: A Series of Broadcasts* (Toronto, 1941), 12.

<sup>26</sup> Douglas Bush, “Pride and Prejudice,” *Canadian Mercury* I (1929): 136.

<sup>27</sup> Brandon Conron, “Essays, 1920-1960,” in *Literary History of Canada: Canadian Literature in English*, vol. 2, ed. C. F. Klinck (Toronto, 1976), 119.



with less success," he wrote in 1939.<sup>28</sup> Materialism – the tendency to treat material possessions, wealth, and physical comfort as more important or desirable than spiritual values – was no more specific to the United States, English Canadian continentalists argued, than the setting of the sun.

Nonetheless, Tories saw materialism as central to the American experience. As a nation, the United States had abandoned the bedrock of tradition and embraced the mass age. And the mass age, in turn, corroded religious values and undermined intellectual endeavours. As a result, America only attached importance to the tangible, the quantifiable, and the material. Worse still, materialism marginalized the intellectual's moral authority. It was, many believed, the Trojan horse of a status revolution.

America possessed, as James Cappon put it in 1904, "only one measure for greatness or possible greatness, and that is magnitude in some material form."<sup>29</sup> Beckles Willson was equally blunt. "If a neighbour critic may say so frankly," he wrote in *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (1903), "there is no people which has greater need to hold up to itself constantly high ideals of conduct and morals – because there is no people who struggle passionately for material advantages, and are, therefore, most exposed to temptation in the methods by which they may gain it. They may be said to have, at present, chiefly executive energy without depth of idea or spiritual direction."<sup>30</sup> Willson, the neighbourly anti-American, hoped that imperialism and Anglo-Saxon unity would give the United States the spiritual and intellectual direction it lacked.

Along with American secularism, which is discussed in the next chapter, materialism was denounced far more frequently by French Canadian conservatives, principally because Catholicism played such a major role in the formulation of French Canadian discourse. "Le matériel accapare la portion la plus considérable de l'énergie américaine," warned the Université de Montréal's professor of American literature, Hermas Bastien, in 1936. America, he continued, was a "civilisation d'essence économique" that embodied "le libéralisme à l'état pur, oublieux des personnes et des distinctions ethniques."<sup>31</sup> Others went further still. Drawing on the work of French intellectuals Jacques Maritain and Lucien Romier, Lionel Groulx, who had studied theology and philosophy in Rome and philosophy and literature at

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<sup>28</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "The United States Through Canadian Eyes," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* 1 (1939): 110.

<sup>29</sup> James Cappon, "The Great American Democracy," *Queen's Quarterly* XI (1904): 304.

<sup>30</sup> Beckles Willson, *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (London, 1903), 248.

<sup>31</sup> Hermas Bastien, "L'américanisation par la philosophie," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 201.

the University of Friburg, in Switzerland, offered a searing indictment of American materialism to a Catholic student association in 1928:

Bref, il semble que ce peuple vise plus bas que Dieu, ce qui, pour une civilisation chrétienne, est le commencement de tout désordre. "Toutes nos valeurs dépendent de la nature de notre Dieu." On aura beau faire, "civiliser c'est spiritualiser." Le progrès matériel peut y concourir dans la mesure où il permet à l'homme le loisir de l'âme. Mais s'il n'est employé qu'à servir la volonté de puissance et à combler une cupidité qui ouvre une gueule infinie, *concupiscentia est infinita*, il ramène le monde au chaos avec une vitesse accélérée. Lucien Romier peut écrire, s'il le veut, que ces conceptions de la vie ont cours chez le peuple "le plus moralisant de la terre." Il ne saurait se cacher néanmoins que les États-Unis sont déjà "le pays où le principe de la famille semble le plus atteint." Et quel fragile spiritualisme que celui qui n'a d'autre loi, d'autre inspiration que le *make money*, moralisme pragmatiste plutôt que religion, ne visant au surplus qu'à procurer la plus haute efficience du travailleur, les conditions les plus favorables à la grande production!<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, insisted André Laurendeau, American materialism, with its emphasis on comfort and luxury, did not even possess the stoicism of communistic materialism. "Il existe, du moins dans l'état actuel des choses, un communisme héroïque; ces prophètes de la terre donnent leur vie, en somme, pour une idée. L'américanisme préfère un cigare, un radio [*sic*] et un chesterfield," he wrote in 1937.<sup>33</sup> Henri Bourassa, for his part, saw materialism as an overarching attribute of Anglo-Saxon civilization. Writing in the shadow of the 1919 Winnipeg general strike, *Le Devoir's* founding editor was blunt:

Cette dangereuse et lamentable équivoque entre le capital et le travail est plus frappante que partout ailleurs en Amérique du Nord, – États-Unis et Canada – où l'absence quasi totale de sens social s'ajoute au matérialisme abject, au culte intense de l'or et du confort matériel, qui caractérise les civilisations anglo-saxonnes. C'est par là peut-être que la conquête anglaise et la pénétration américaine menacent d'entamer le plus profondément, sinon d'engloutir, la civilisation supérieure dont le petit peuple canadien-français est le dépositaire.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Lionel Groulx, *Nos responsabilités intellectuelles* (Montreal, 1928), 28.

<sup>33</sup> André Laurendeau, "Commentaires: Menaces de l'américanisme," *L'Action nationale* X (1937): 314.

<sup>34</sup> Henri Bourassa, *Syndicats nationaux ou internationaux?* (Montreal, 1919), 16.

Conservative French Canadian thinkers were not alone in denouncing American materialism. Like Tocqueville, Edmond de Nevers had a great deal of contempt for materialism, “cet esprit terre-à-terre et mercantile dont l’Américain en général est pénétré jusqu’aux moelles et qui éteint chez lui tout instinct artistique.” In *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français* (1896), he nevertheless conceded that “cette conception de la vie, dans laquelle le bonheur s’identifie avec la richesse, n’est pas nouvelle en vérité, ni particulière à l’Amérique et aux peuples de race anglo-saxonne.”<sup>35</sup>

Many French Canadian continentalists refused to buy in to the Manichean logic that opposed materialism to intellectualism. Quebec’s leading turn-of-the-twentieth-century economist, Errol Bouchette, warned his compatriots not to snub material progress under the pretext that it was incompatible with spiritual and intellectual pursuits. Of America, he wrote in 1905 that “sa qualité saillante est l’énergie, et on l’accuse de trop d’âpreté dans sa poursuite de la richesse matérielle. Mais il est aussi faux de dire que l’Américain adore uniquement le dollar que de prétendre que les Anglais sont une nation de boutiquiers.” The Republic, Bouchette continued, “ne manque pas de vie intellectuelle,” and had produced, among other things, “une littérature plus brillante et plus variée que la nôtre.”<sup>36</sup> Jean-Charles Harvey, whose economic thought drew heavily on Bouchette’s liberal nationalism, was also reluctant to denounce American materialism. In fact, Harvey was convinced that the conservative rejection of materialism was entrenching, indeed celebrating, *l’infériorité économique des Canadiens français*. Harvey’s first novel, *Marcel Faure* (1922), grappled with these issues. The story’s hero, young industrialist Marcel Faure, and monsieur Brégent, an aging Tory, crossed swords on the question of American materialism:

– Ah! Les Américains! Parlons-en, dit le vieux Brégent, rouge de colère. Un tas d’abrutis! Une nation de païens où le mariage est un jeu et le divorce un sport. Les Américains! Des chercheurs de plaisir et d’excitations sensuelles, qui ne trouvent pas d’autre but à la vie que fabriquer des bretelles et jeter leur gourme! Et pas intelligents, pas artistes, bourrés de littérature de foot-ball et ahuris de jazz band. Ah! Ah!

<sup>35</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Paris, 1896), 72, 179.

<sup>36</sup> Errol Bouchette, “Le Canada parmi les peuples américains,” *La Revue canadienne* XLVIII (1905): 14-15. Bouchette’s most influential follower, the moderately conservative Édouard Montpetit, was inclined to agree. America, he noted in 1941, was “un pays d’action, livré à la production et au négoce, agité de réclame et de spéculation, rude sinon brutal dans ses gestes et attitudes, remuant de vie avec ce que cela comporte d’égoïsmes et de violences; mais épris aussi de progrès social, intellectuel ou artistique. La fortune édifiée par l’Amérique a produit, au delà de la vie économique, des œuvres remarquables dans tous les domaines.” [Montpetit, *Reflets d’Amérique* (Montreal, 1940), 59.]

– Calmez-vous, je vous prie. Je connais leurs défauts. Peuple très jeune, il est trop fort pour son âge. Il a l'exubérance de l'adolescent qui, trop tôt, a pris conscience de sa puissance: il dépense sa surabondance de vie. Mais restons dans le sujet: la prospérité matérielle, dis-je, donne le confort au foyer et à l'État, la fierté aux citoyens qui s'éprennent d'une terre où l'on vit mieux et plus qu'ailleurs. Avec la richesse, la science, les lettres et les arts deviennent nécessairement l'apanage du grand nombre; les grandes institutions se multiplient, bref, on achète la civilisation.<sup>37</sup>

Born in La Malbaie, Quebec, Harvey studied at the Séminaire de Chicoutimi for three years before entering Society of Jesus in 1908. He left the order in 1913 and briefly studied law at the Montreal campus of Université Laval. In 1914, he began his career as a journalist with *Le Canada*. Harvey moved to Montreal's *La Patrie* in 1915 and worked at *La Presse* from 1916 to 1918. In 1918, he took a job as a publicist with the Machine agricole nationale of Montmagny, Quebec. The firm went bankrupt in 1922 and Harvey soon returned to journalism, this time at Quebec City's *Le Soleil*. He would serve as the Liberal organ's editor-in-chief from 1927 to 1934. In April 1934, Harvey's second novel, *Les demi-civilisés*, which was harshly critical of Quebec's Roman Catholic clergy, was placed on the Index by Cardinal Villeneuve. Shortly thereafter, he was dismissed as *Le Soleil's* editor-in-chief. Harvey was appointed the head of Quebec's Bureau of Statistics a few months later by Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, but was dismissed from this position after the 1936 victory Maurice Duplessis' Union nationale. In September 1937, Harvey founded *Le Jour*, a weekly newspaper devoted to political and cultural commentary. The paper ceased publication in 1946 and Harvey would spend the rest of his career working as a radio journalist and tabloid editor in Montreal.

### *Freedom*

Whether taken to mean an exemption from arbitrary or despotic control or the capacity to act without hindrance or restraint, freedom remains a largely abstract concept. Yet from its inception, America has been understood to be a land of freedom – a nation built on the very idea of liberty. As a result, the concept of liberty loomed large in Canadian commentary on the United States. And not surprisingly, freedom of speech – the right to freely express one's opinions without fear of sanction – was of particular interest to intellectuals.

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<sup>37</sup> J.-C. Harvey, *Marcel Faure* (Montmagny, Quebec, 1922), 138-139.

After living in New England for a few years, Henri d'Arles, whose Francophilia was well known, grudgingly acknowledged in 1910 that "la liberté d'opinion, sur les hommes ou sur les choses, est beaucoup plus grande ici qu'en Europe."<sup>38</sup> Abbé d'Arles' experience with European political culture – he had resided in France and Italy on three occasions – made him value American freedom of speech. Most Canadian conservatives, however, were reasonably critical of American liberty. They valued liberty as a traditional right, but saw American freedom as a modern deviation from British tradition. Some argued that the United States suffered from a deficit of liberty, while others contended that the Republic was handicapped by an excess of freedom. In either case, it was assumed that freedom and order were out of balance in America. True liberty, conservatives believed, could only thrive in an ordered society.

"It is difficult, often amusingly difficult," wrote Beckles Willson at the turn of the twentieth century, "to make the mass of Americans understand that Britain is also a republic and a democracy; that there is far more justice and freedom there than in their own country."<sup>39</sup> Robert Falconer was more elaborate in his critique of America's dearth of liberty. An astute observer of American life, the Presbyterian minister and president of the University of Toronto saw the Republic's pervasive conformism as a powerful obstacle to freedom of expression. Speaking before an English audience in 1925, he noted that "there is less freedom of speech in America, east or west, than in Britain; in the East this may be due to the innate timidity of the propertied classes, in the West to the fear lest the principles of society are not so strongly rooted as to be able to resist the convulsive shock of new ideas should they gather volume."<sup>40</sup> Falconer, like many other Burkean conservatives, had an English liberal's tolerance for dissent. As a result, he had a deep aversion for the republican conformism that he believed was stifling freedom in America.

Most conservatives, however, argued instead that the United States suffered from an excess of freedom. Born of the Age of Reason, American liberty was abstract, selfish, and unbalanced; more than anything, it was an irresponsible and licentious form of freedom. The American, remarked George Grant in a 1945 pamphlet on the Dominion's place in the North Atlantic triangle, emphasizes "the inalienable right to be free to do as he chooses, whatever the effect it might have on society as a whole." "We in Canada," he continued, "have put the

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<sup>38</sup> Henri d'Arles, "Le journalisme américain," in his *Essais et conférences* (Quebec, 1910), 25.

<sup>39</sup> Willson, *The New America*, 244.

<sup>40</sup> Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour*, 174.

balance far more on the side of order or the good of society. The individual has certain rights, but these rights must be strictly prevented from causing any disruption to society as a whole." Grant argued that "the great question of the modern world is going to be to what extent, within the complicated pattern of industrialized civilization, freedom and authority can be truly integrated." American society, however, had proven itself incapable of reconciling "liberty and order."<sup>41</sup> Educated at Upper Canada College, Queen's, and Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar, Grant's conservative pedigree was impeccable; he was the son of Upper Canada College headmaster William Lawson Grant (1872-1935) and the grandson of two of Canada's most influential late nineteenth century imperialists: George Monro Grant and George Parkin. He joined Dalhousie's Department of Philosophy in 1947. By the late 1950s, he had emerged as the Dominion's leading critic of the mass age. Along with Donald Creighton, George Grant was a transitional figure in the history of Canadian anti-Americanism. Though his critique of American society was solidly rooted in the conservative tradition, his influence on the development of left-wing anti-Americanism was significant. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, Grant was an icon of the New Left in Canada.

Not surprisingly, Quebec's critique of American liberty was more moral and religious in tone. Licentiousness, claimed some French Canadian conservatives, was the major consequence of American freedom. While serving as a chaplain in turn-of-the-twentieth-century Mississippi, Antonio Huot warned the readers of *La Revue canadienne* that "le plus grand problème moral dont la solution s'impose, aujourd'hui, au peuple américain est celui-ci: où mettre les bornes entre la liberté et la licence?"<sup>42</sup> American society, he argued, was too permissive, relativistic, and secular. Jules-Paul Tardivel also approached freedom from a religious standpoint:

En Angleterre on a quelques notions de liberté. Aux États-Unis on parle beaucoup de liberté. La langue anglaise a même deux mots pour exprimer la chose: *liberty* et *freedom*; deux beaux mots, certes, qui arrondissent admirablement une phrase et qui font toujours éclater des applaudissements pourvu qu'on les prononce avec un peu d'emphase. Mais la

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<sup>41</sup> George Grant, *The Empire, Yes or No?* (Toronto, 1945), 30-31. Grant hoped that Canada's ability to harmonize freedom and order could serve as an example to the United States: "It is particularly important that there should exist on this continent a nation such as Canada with the tradition of the middle course between individual liberty and social order. For by extending and working out these differing forms of social structure we can strongly affect the tendencies that the U.S.A. will follow. In this way, because we share this contact with the U.S.A., we can influence that country to move in the direction of greater social order by the power of our example. But we can do this best by preserving our own individuality as a nation and by remaining part of the stream of social thought that flows through the British Commonwealth." [Ibid., 32.]

<sup>42</sup> Antonio Huot, "Aux États-Unis: Les universités," *La Revue canadienne* New Series, II (1908): 554.

*Land of freedom* n'a réellement pas la moindre idée de ce que c'est que la vraie liberté ... Nous avons l'expérience de bien des siècles et de bien des pays pour nous prouver que la vraie liberté n'a rien à craindre de l'Église, et que le catholicisme n'a rien à redouter des libertés civiles légitimes ... Mais la liberté qui existe aux États-Unis, est la liberté libérale ou maçonnique. Et cette liberté là – une fausse liberté – est très nuisible à l'Église, en ce sens qu'elle lui enlève de nombreux enfants et affaibli l'esprit de foi chez beaucoup de ceux qu'elle ne lui arrache pas entièrement.<sup>43</sup>

Like Huot, Tardivel drew a great deal of inspiration from France's counterrevolutionary tradition, and was correspondingly obsessed with the *fléau maçonnique*. In his influential turn-of-the-twentieth-century monograph on American Catholicism Tardivel contended that American-style liberty threatened society's moral order because it inevitably lead to secularism and to religious free thought.

Continentalists hardly shared these concerns. Order did not loom as large in their thought, and they considered American freedom to be an offshoot, rather than a perversion, of British liberty. As a result, they saw the Dominion and the United States as two nations possessing similar conceptions of freedom. And though prewar Canadian socialists wrote precious little on the subject of American freedom, most liberal continentalists argued that the New World had in fact revitalized British liberty. Freedom was central to the "community of dominant ideas" that formed the basis for "our North American civilization," contended one of Laurier's most trusted advisors, Reverend James A. Macdonald. "More than that," he wrote in the *North American Idea* (1917), "it is by the ties of their great ideas ... that the peoples of the United States and Canada are bound up in the great bundle of life with all the free peoples of the English-speaking fraternity over all the world. The idea of freedom is the badge of their North American brotherhood."<sup>44</sup> James T. Shotwell, whose doctoral dissertation had focussed on the French Revolution, regarded American freedom as an *heureux mélange* of English and French liberty: "as Washington embodied the spirit of English freedom, Jefferson embodied the universality of that French outlook which France itself was later to register in the 'Rights of Man and the Citizen.'" Nevertheless, he noted in

<sup>43</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 38, 195-196.

<sup>44</sup> J. A. Macdonald, *The North American Idea* (New York, 1917), 73-74.

1934, “of these two sources of American political ideals, the English far predominated over the Continental.”<sup>45</sup>

Later, the erosion of civil liberties in wartime North America, though deplored by many continentalists, was cited as proof that American, British, and Canadian forms of freedom were essentially the same – at least in practice. In *Canada Fights* (1941), a collaborative volume edited by John W. Dafoe, several of the Dominion’s leading liberal intellectuals argued that

Canadian civil liberty is guaranteed in precisely the manner in which the British common law and the British unwritten constitution works. In the United States a different system prevails whereby a Bill of Rights is written formally into the Constitution. Both are adequate methods of reaching the desired end, nor is one better than the other. In times of crisis, even the written safeguards of the American Constitution have not availed the citizen much, for judges and juries interpreting that Constitution are no more immune from any general inflammation of public opinion than the judges and juries of Canada who today have the task of defining the rights of the subject.<sup>46</sup>

### *Individualism*

Criticized on the left and on the right, individualism – self-centred feeling or conduct as a principle – was seen as one of the foundations of American society. Surprisingly, it was not always understood to have been much of a contribution to Western civilization by many Canadian liberals. By the twentieth century, several leading liberals felt that American society was treading a fine line between individualism and ruinous egotism.

“Je suis Américaine, moi. Le premier devoir de tout Américain, c’est de se suffire à lui-même, d’être l’artisan de son propre bonheur,” exclaimed the egotistical Fanny Barry in Father Adélarde Dugré’s (1881-1970) best-selling regionalist novel, *La campagne canadienne* (1925).<sup>47</sup> Conservative intellectuals could hardly condone a form of individualism as blatantly corrosive and antisocial. In 1900, Jules-Paul Tardivel noted that “l’individualisme américain ... s’appelle, en bon français, esprit d’insubordination.” “En effet,” he continued, “l’individualisme américain a horreur de la discipline, de tout ce qui peut gêner ses

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<sup>45</sup> J. T. Shotwell, *The Heritage of Freedom: The United States and Canada in the Community of Nations* (New York, 1934), 6-7.

<sup>46</sup> J. W. Dafoe, ed., *Canada Fights: An American Democracy at War* (New York, 1941), 205.

<sup>47</sup> Adélarde Dugré, *La campagne canadienne. Croquis et leçons* (Montreal, 1925), 215.



mouvements. Il veut bien croire aux dogmes, mais ne cherchez pas à lui imposer une règle de conduite.”<sup>48</sup> And though Tardivel understood that individualism “est une qualité ... lorsqu’il ne dépasse pas les bornes de la modération,” he could not condone a form of individualism which he believed destabilized society. Similarly, but several decades later, George Grant insisted that “the true Britisher is the last person to submit to the overwhelming control of the centralized totalitarian state. We are true individualists to our very core.” However, as a British nation, the Dominion possessed a well-balanced form of individualism. And unlike the United States, Canada was charting a “middle course between individual liberty and social order.”<sup>49</sup> Conservative communitarianism had its limits: neither Grant nor Tardivel were willing to reject individualism en masse.

Many nineteenth-century liberals, including A. D. DeCelles, saw individualism as the root of American success. “Fondée par l’individualisme, arrivée à la plus haute prospérité en s’appuyant sur ses propres forces, la république devra répugner à la loi de la collectivité qui serait la mainmise sur l’énergie de chacun au profit de tous,” DeCelles argued in 1896. Comparing the development of New France with that of New England, he praised American individualism:

Mais pourquoi tant de succès d’un côté, et si peu de l’autre, au point de vue des intérêts matériels? Nous avons essayé de répondre à cette question. On verra entre autres causes que nous ne saurions toutes indiquer ici, l’individualisme dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre, laissé seul, se prendre corps à corps avec les difficultés et les vaincre, tandis que le colon français, protégé par l’autorité, c’est-à-dire contrôlé, gêné dans tous ses mouvements, arrêté par des règlements à tous les tournants de la route, est forcé de languir et de végéter.<sup>50</sup>

However, by the progressive era, a number of Canadian liberals began to view American individualism as too self-centred, too egotistical. Writing in 1913, O. D. Skelton, a professor of political and economic science at Queen’s University, offered the following indictment of American political corruption: “one universal reason for the failure of so many state governments has been apathy of the citizens, the indifference of an individualistic people, intensely on the make, with half a continent to exploit, confident that the glorious constitution of the fathers could run itself, that democracy was automatic, and so assured of

<sup>48</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 19, 28.

<sup>49</sup> Grant, *The Empire*, 31-32.

<sup>50</sup> DeCelles, *Les États-Unis*, xii, 402.

the boundless riches of the country as to be careless of waste and graft." Skelton saw egotism as a significant obstacle to civic virtue. That said, his critique of American graft never lapsed into anti-Americanism. The American progressive movement, he believed, would revive "civic interest" and bring about "a new day" for the Republic.<sup>51</sup>

Invariably described as "rugged," American individualism held little attraction for interwar continentalists. "Having regard to the fact that Americans are presumed to be 'rugged individualists,'" declared H. Carl Goldenberg (1907-1996) in 1935, "one can describe the NIRA [National Industrial Recovery Act] as nothing but a revolutionary measure." As for President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "if he has accomplished nothing else, he has made the American citizen think in terms of social welfare. He has introduced new social concepts in the United States, and to my mind that alone justifies this great experiment."<sup>52</sup> A prominent Montreal lawyer and an advisor to the Liberal party, Goldenberg was frequently called upon to mediate strikes during the 1930s and 1940s. On a more radical register, in 1933, Colin McKay (1876-1939) also applauded the New Deal's "apparent dethronement of the time-honoured fetishes of rugged individualism and *laissez faire*." However, the labour activist warned the readers of the *Canadian Unionist* that this "apparent revolution in sentiment and temperament" might prove ephemeral "since it was effected under the influence of a fear that troubled the plutocracy."<sup>53</sup>

For his part, Frank Underhill refused to consider self-centredness as a specifically American trait. It was, he believed, a wider attribute of North American society. As a result, he argued in a 1930 article published in the *Canadian Forum* that "municipal misgovernment is rooted in our North American civilisation, in the individualism and lack of civic spirit of the North American citizen."<sup>54</sup> Underhill joined the *Forum's* editorial staff in 1927 and authored its irreverent "O Canada" column in the 1930s. In 1932, he played an active role in the founding of both the League for Social Reconstruction, which was intended to be a Canadian version of the British Fabian Society, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. He authored the first draft of the CCF's 1933 Regina Manifesto.

Individualism is tied to the liberal ethos. Yet it could not be embraced wholeheartedly by many continentalist intellectuals. Like their conservative colleagues,

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<sup>51</sup> O. D. Skelton, "The Referendum," *University Magazine* XII (1913): 202.

<sup>52</sup> H. C. Goldenberg, "Economic Recovery in Great Britain and the United States," *Empire Club of Canada Addresses* (1934-1935): 381-382.

<sup>53</sup> Colin McKay, "Roosevelt's Plan - So Far," *Canadian Unionist* 7 (1933): 39.

<sup>54</sup> F. H. Underhill, "O Canada," *Canadian Forum* X (1930): 116.

many Canadian liberals and socialists saw American individualism as too extreme. The United States, many argued, had crossed the thin red line that separated individualism from egotism. As public intellectuals, men like O. D. Skelton or Frank Underhill expected their fellow Canadians to respond to the call of civic duty, and exacerbated individualism, they believed, was hardly conducive to civic virtue.

### *Equality*

Equality is a relatively abstract concept with a number of legal, political, social, or economic implications. And though the Republic was founded on egalitarian principles, equality has meant different things at different times in American history. Generally speaking, American egalitarianism has been political and legal in nature and has corresponded to the liberal concept of equality of opportunity.

The Canadian intellectual's position on American egalitarianism was reasonably ambivalent. Liberal continentalists praised the United States for its attempts to equalize the human lot, but socialists were generally silent on the subject. As for Canadian conservatives, they held a low view of egalitarian doctrines, but they also had little use for hereditary privilege. Their elitism, though commonly tinged with some form of racialism or sexism, was based on merit and talent, not on birth.

True equality of opportunity demands a porous social structure and a belief in social mobility. Canadian conservatives were not opposed to these concepts. In a 1904 article published in the *Queen's Quarterly*, James Cappon praised equality of opportunity in the United States. "We in Canada owe much to that great American democracy," he wrote, "it taught Europe to respect what is good in our standards and in our ways. It broke the mountain barriers of aristocratic prejudice and arrogance for us." Drawing on his European experience, the Glasgow-educated critic then paid a tribute to American egalitarianism:

What that means in the way of a general elevation of instincts and independence of character is easily understood by those who have seen the depressing effect of rigid social superstructure on the lower classes and even the middle classes of Europe. In this respect, even if it rise to no other heights, the American people has achieved something truly great, something which is a worthy end in itself. It has set up manhood, not class, as the standard of life, and it has done so successfully.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Cappon, "The Great American Democracy," 298, 311.

Other turn-of-the century conservatives, in particular Beckles Willson, held a dimmer view of American egalitarianism. Where Cappon saw equality of opportunity, Willson saw radical utopianism. "Had the founders of the republic attempted to apply the doctrines of equality which they proclaimed," he argued in 1903, "the whole social fabric would very quickly have gone to pieces." Happily, however, "they one and all shrank from applying them," and "an aristocracy, not as ungenerously charged, merely of money, but of manners and culture, is growing, and class distinctions are widely and properly recognized."<sup>56</sup> A few years later, Andrew Macphail deplored the insolence and inefficiency generated by American egalitarianism:

A nation in which each man is a king and all men equal in power and glory cannot organize itself even for industrial purposes. A man whose business in life is to sell railway tickets or "locate guests" in a hotel, and who insists upon being considered not as a railway official or a clerk, but as a "free and equal," or even considered at all, will not perform his humble duties efficiently. His cool insolence is merely a protest that his manhood is outraged, if a traveller does not choose to enter into a community of feeling with him in the larger issues of life. If he is asked to sell a ticket which will entitle the purchaser to sleep in a lower berth and has none available, he must not state the fact simply, lest it might be inferred that he was merely the employee of a corporation. When he says: "There aint no lowers left, but I can give you a nice juicy upper," he has vindicated his right to freedom and equality.<sup>57</sup>

Sustained contact with right-wing French discourse made Quebec's conservatives even more likely to see American egalitarianism as a radical attempt at class levelling. They believed that French society had been thoroughly dislocated under the republican triptych of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, and held a correspondingly low view of egalitarian doctrines. Like many Roman Catholic clerics, Antonio Huot saw any attempt at social equality as an aberration: "les Pères Conscrits de la grande république déraisonnèrent, s'ils crurent avoir créée, d'un mot, l'égalité absolue. L'égalité politique, oui; l'égalité sociale, jamais. Ils pensaient avoir banni, pour toujours, de leur pays la lutte des classes par un moyen radical et infaillible: en ne faisant de tous les citoyens qu'une seule classe." "L'utopie égalitaire n'a jamais duré

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<sup>56</sup> Willson, *The New America*, 13, 35.

<sup>57</sup> Macphail, "Canadian Writers and American Politics," 14.

plus que le temps qu'il faut pour l'écrire sur le papier," he continued, "elle est dans tous les discours du tribun; zéro dans la société. C'est le plus stupide contresens qui soit jamais sorti de la bouche d'un homme. Mieux que cela: elle est contre nature." Abbé Huot had formulated a classic conservative statement: no society could flaunt human nature and found itself on abstract principles. "Où sont les Pères de la révolution américaine? Où sont ils?" he asked in 1907. "Ils sont disparus avec leur rêve," came the answer, "ils sont avec les Pères de la révolution française."<sup>58</sup> Once again the American Revolution had been likened to its more radical French counterpart. This was one of the preferred anti-American strategies of Quebec's right, and it was used with brio by the radically anti-egalitarian Jules-Paul Tardivel, whose contempt for liberal doctrines was almost boundless:

Les hommes sont créés égaux dans ce sens que tous sont composés d'une âme et d'un corps, que tous sont mortels, que tous ont la même fin surnaturelle à laquelle ils ne peuvent parvenir que par la même aide d'En-Haut, la pratique des mêmes vertus, l'éloignement des mêmes péchés. Mais ce n'est pas dans ce sens métaphysique que les Révolutionnaires, tant Américains que Français, entendent l'égalité. Ils parlent de l'égalité sociale et politique. Or cette égalité n'a jamais existé, n'existera jamais, ne peut pas exister. Il n'y a peut-être pas deux hommes "créés égaux" dans ce sens; il n'y a pas deux hommes qui possèdent exactement les mêmes qualités intellectuelles, les mêmes aptitudes, les mêmes dons physiques. Tous ne sont pas appelés aux mêmes rôles dans la société. Le fils est-il "créé égal" à son père? L'imbécile, le *minus habens*, est-il l'égal, socialement, et politiquement parlant, de l'homme d'étude et de génie?<sup>59</sup>

The continentalist understanding of American equality was completely different. Equality of opportunity and a porous class structure were among the principal hallmarks of North American civilization – Canadians and Americans, wrote Arthur Lower in a 1939 article for the *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, share "the same comparative absence of class-consciousness"<sup>60</sup> – and liberal continentalists consistently praised American egalitarianism. Three years later, John MacCormac, whose visceral distaste for totalitarianism

<sup>58</sup> Antonio Huot, "La question sociale aux États-Unis en 1907," *La Revue canadienne* LII (1907): 420-421.

<sup>59</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 128. Andrew Macphail held a similar view of equality: "We may admit at once that all men are born equal, inasmuch as all men are conceived in iniquity and born in sin." [Macphail, "Protection and Politics," *University Magazine* VII (1908): 250.]

<sup>60</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "The United States Through Canadian Eyes," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* I (1939): 110.

was strong even by continentalist standards, saw American egalitarianism as a bullwark against communism:

It must be admitted that Britain, if in some political and economic respects far more advanced than the United States, is socially still far less democratic. In the United States, though class exists, it is not accepted as final. Every man still hopes to improve himself and meanwhile feels potentially as good as his neighbor. Class-consciousness implies acceptance of class and it is the lack of a feeling of such inferiority that makes the American-born worker ... inaccessible to communist doctrine, if not to communist influence. It is not that the English worker or farmer is not self-respecting. But his respect for himself is as a member of his own class whereas an American-born worker or farmer measures himself against you quite simply as one man against another.<sup>61</sup>

The value of American equality was a recurring theme in continentalist literature. Sara Jeannette Duncan, who successfully explored the differences between the Old and the New World in several of her novels, was fond of contrasting the egalitarianism of the New World with the rigid social stratification of Europe. In *A Daughter of Today* (1894), her rebellious and Bohemian heroine, Elfrida Bell, depicted American equality thusly: “you see, our duchesses were greengrocers’ wives the day before yesterday, and our greengrocers’ wives subscribe to the magazines. It’s all mixed up, and there are no high lights anywhere.”<sup>62</sup> Immigrant novelist Frederick Philip Grove (1879-1948) dealt with a similar theme, namely the New World’s caustic effect on aristocratic pretence, in *A Search for America* (1927). Shortly after arriving in the Dominion, ruined patrician Phil Branden realizes that breeding counts for little on an egalitarian continent:

No matter how miserable I might – in Europe – have felt in my innermost heart, the mere deference shown by “subordinates” to my appearance, my bearing, and my clothes would have kept up the pretence of a certain superiority. In Europe I should have lapsed into the most comfortable of all deceptions, self-commiseration: “a smile on the lips, and death in my heart.” Here I was simply roused to revolt. Nobody paid the slightest attention to me. If

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<sup>61</sup> John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery: The Future of the United States, Canada, and the British Empire* (New York, 1942), 142-143.

<sup>62</sup> S. J. Duncan, *A Daughter of Today: A Novel* (New York, 1894), 113.

in all this gaiety a girl or a boy had a look for me at all, the girl betrayed no admiration in her eye, the boy felt not subdued by my mere presence. This was truth!<sup>63</sup>

Branden, who personifies Grove in this semi-autobiographical novel, eventually accepts and embraces New World egalitarianism.

Edmond de Nevers, who saw deference as “un reste des époques de servitude,” praised democratic egalitarianism. In *L'âme américaine* (1900) he painted a positive though somewhat condescending picture of small-town familiarity, the quintessence of American egalitarianism:

Rien de typique comme une station dans une boutique de barbier de petite ville. Trois ou quatre clients attendent leur tour en lisant la *Police Gazette*, d'autres entrent. A chaque nouvel arrivant, le patron et les garçons se retournent: Haloo John! Haloo Dick! Haloo Doc! A quoi le nouvel arrivant répond: Haloo Fred! Ou Haloo Bill! John sera peut-être un patron de fabrique, millionnaire, Dick un avocat, *Doc* un dentiste ou un médecin. J'ai vu dans l'Ouest, des servantes appeler les jeunes filles de la maison où elles servaient Minnie, Anna, Kate, sans faire précéder ces prénoms de *miss* et avertir Madame que “Peter a dit qu'il ne rentrerait pas dîner.” Peter c'est monsieur.

De Nevers had been repelled by “la servilité des garçons de café, ouvriers, manœuvres” that he had encountered while travelling in Europe. By contrast, he marvelled at American society, where “chaque homme traite son semblable comme un *homme*.” Indeed, in spite of America's insidious love of titles, “l'égalité règne aux États-Unis, aussi complète que cela peut être compatible avec les lois de la nature qui en feront toujours une chose paradoxale. Le mouvement de la richesse, la constitution de grandes fortunes ne lui ont pas été fatals, comme on aurait pu le croire.”<sup>64</sup>

American equality, however, had no greater enthusiast than Goldwin Smith. Canada's prophet of doom and despair had been a forceful critic of hereditary privilege in England and had carried his democratic crusade with him to the New World. “Aristocracy is a hateful word to the Canadian as well as to the American ear,” he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*. Smith believed that equality was the native condition of the New World, and like de Nevers, he marvelled at the egalitarian decency of small-town America:

<sup>63</sup> F. P. Grove, *A Search for America* (Ottawa, 1927), 30.

<sup>64</sup> E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, vol. II, 237-239, 241.

Nowhere is English life better or more attractive than in a country parish, with a kind and conscious squire, good ladies, an active pastor, a well-to-do tenantry, and a contented peasantry. Yet passing from this to an American village, an observer felt that he had come to something which had more of the true spirit of a community. He felt that by the social equality and general friendliness which prevailed, by the spontaneous obedience to law which had no force to support it but that of a single constable, by the general intelligence and the common interest in public questions, one step at least had been made towards something like the fulfilment of the social ideal.<sup>65</sup>

Yet most Canadian observers, including Smith, saw American egalitarianism as threatened or inoperative. Often, the growth of an irresponsible plutocracy was cited as the main reason for the erosion of the Republic's egalitarian ideals. The practical application and failings of American egalitarianism, however, will be examined in subsequent chapters.

For conservative intellectuals, the core principles of the American experience – revolutionism, materialism, freedom, individualism, and equality – were viewed as the underpinnings of an undesirable social order. They reflected a fundamental imbalance, a lack of order, which affected every aspect of American society. And though *nationaliste* and imperialist perspectives on the United States were different – socio-cultural and religious affairs were of particular interest in French Canada, while political and commercial issues dominated English Canadian writing on America – they both portrayed the United States as the embodiment of the modern ethos. At times, their judgements regarding the United States had little to do with objective reality. They reflected domestic concerns regarding the social changes that accompany modernity.

Continentalist discourse was no different in this regard. Indeed, though continentalist observers often seemed better informed and more objective than their anti-American counterparts – continentalists did not argue that materialism, for instance, was at the core of the American experience – they nevertheless constructed an image of the United States that corresponded to their aspirations regarding continental integration and, in a wider sense, to their appreciation of the modern ethos.

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<sup>65</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 28; *Commonwealth or Empire: A Bystander's View of the Question* (New York, 1902), 4.



## *Chapter Five*

### American Politics and Government

A vigorous critique of American politics and government lay at the heart of imperialist anti-Americanism. By contrast, *nationaliste* intellectuals centred their critique of American civilization on social and cultural issues. These different approaches to a common American threat reflected profound differences in the politics of Canadian identity. English Canadian nationalists have traditionally viewed their nation primarily as a political entity. Ethnicity and religion were important to imperialists, but they were less significant to the construction of Canadian distinctiveness than political institutions and the imperial connection. Indeed, many imperialists were willing to acknowledge that Canada and the United States shared a number of ethnic and religious affinities. The main distinction between Canadian and American society lay therefore in its political institutions and its membership in the British Empire. As a result, anti-American rhetoric in English Canada was largely centred on political themes. French Canadian nationalists, on the other hand, saw their nation primarily as a spiritual, ethnic, and cultural entity and produced relatively little comment on American politics and government. In the end, the nature of political institutions mattered far less to intellectuals whose conception of *la race française en Amérique* was essentially ethno-religious and cultural.

In English Canada, liberal and socialist nationalism repudiated anti-American differentialism. Continentalists argued that Canada and the United States, in spite of their apparently dissimilar political institutions, shared a wider political sensibility. At heart, Canadian constitutional monarchy and American republicanism sprang from the same source – Britain – and sought a common purpose: liberty. Yet, for the most part, the continentalist defence of American politics and government was half-hearted. Many liberals and socialists were fairly critical of the American political system, and only a handful of radicals, annexationists for the most part, considered it entirely superior to the Canadian one.

French Canadian continentalists were slightly more interested in American politics and government than their anti-American opponents. Yet, outside of the dwindling band of *rouges* whose intellectual roots lay in the radical republicanism of the 1830s, few of Quebec's intellectuals truly admired the American system as a whole. Ultimately, however, most

continentalists and *nationalistes* could find certain elements of the American political tradition, in particular state sovereignty, which they approved of.

Beyond questions of nationalism and identity lay the issue of modernity. Rupture and abstraction are integral to the modern ethos. As a result, American political institutions were perceived to be the embodiment of modernity by conservative intellectuals. Democratic republicanism, imperialists believed, was the antithesis of British tradition. Indeed, American political institutions derived their legitimacy from the people, rather than from God and the sovereign. Here was anthropocentrism and egalitarianism at work in the body politic. As a result, American politics and government were often described as unstable, ineffective, and corrupt. Furthermore, for many conservatives, they represented an intolerable break with British tradition. And the preservation of British institutions was integral to the English Canadian sense of tradition.

Canadian intellectuals discussed and debated every possible aspect of the American polity. A comprehensive study of Canadian attitudes towards the American political tradition, therefore, would take up dozens of pages.<sup>1</sup> As a result, to avoid overwhelming the reader with details, this chapter focuses on the main themes of American politics and government: democracy, republicanism, secularism, and the separation of powers; federalism and the constitution; and political culture. The chapter begins, however, with an examination of the American political system's relationship with British tradition.

### *Rupture, Continuity, and the American Political Tradition*

The American Revolution produced a new nation, a new political system and, some believed, a new man. Yet the founding Fathers drew on British political tradition to elaborate their new republic. As a result, there exists a certain continuity between the British and American political traditions. The extent of Anglo-American continuity, however, has preoccupied English-speaking intellectuals since the days of the early republic, and Canadian writers frequently addressed this question. In fact, the Canadian debate surrounding the value of the American system often revolved around its perceived deviation from British tradition.

Most of the Dominion's intellectuals seemed to agree that the British political system, and by extension the Canadian one, were fundamentally sound. Even among the most ardent continentalists, precious few would have agreed with leading annexationist

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<sup>1</sup> Discussion of the American judiciary and the relationship between class, gender, ethnicity, and politics is, for the most part, confined to Chapters 7 and 8.

Samuel R. Clarke (1846-1932) when he wrote in wake of the 1891 federal election that the American system of government, “though possessing some defects, is on the whole, so far as I am able to judge, superior to our own.”<sup>2</sup> In fact, only a handful of radicals hoped to see Canada become an American-style republic or, worse still, a series of American states.

Always quick to minimize Canadian-American divergences, continentalists insisted that the American political tradition was, like its Canadian counterpart, largely British in inspiration, and that both nations had adapted British ideas and institutions to suit the conditions of a new continent. Canada and the United States “received the matrix of their laws and government from England,” wrote John Bartlet Brebner in 1934, “and both have North-Americanized it.”<sup>3</sup> Political differences between the two nations were therefore largely superficial, he argued. In the end, both the Dominion and the Republic were New World democracies.

“In the continuity of American political institutions,” remarked William Bennett Munro in 1919, “the Revolution marks a break of no great violence. It guided political evolution into new channels, and set the political ideals of the New World more clearly before its people.” “American constitutional history,” he continued, “does not begin with the Declaration of independence in 1776 nor yet with the founding of the first seaboard colonies more than half a century previously. Its beginnings go back to the days of the Saxon folk-mote and the Curia Regis of Norman England.”<sup>4</sup> Born in Almonte, Ontario, Munro was one of Canada’s most influential interwar continentalists. The Harvard professor of government showed a sustained interest in Canadian affairs throughout his career and some of his most significant work, including *American Influences on Canadian Government* (1929), was aimed at revealing the common features of North American politics and government. Another scholar, Columbia’s James T. Shotwell, developed a more multifarious theory regarding the convergence of Canadian and American political institutions. An admirer of Republican France, Shotwell believed that both “Canada and the United States are the chief non-European inheritors of the great political traditions of France and Great Britain.”<sup>5</sup>

Writing in 1912, O. D. Skelton put a different spin on the continuity that existed between the British and American political traditions: “When the United States took over the

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<sup>2</sup> S. R. Clarke, *A New Light on Annexation: A Political Brochure* (Toronto, 1891), 19.

<sup>3</sup> J. B. Brebner, “The Interplay of Canada and the United States,” *Columbia University Quarterly* XXVI (1934): 335.

<sup>4</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Government of the United States: National, State and Local* (New York, 1919), 2.

<sup>5</sup> J. T. Shotwell, “Foreword,” in Max Savelle, *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary, 1749-1763* (New Haven and Toronto, 1940), v.

task of governing itself, the Great Britain it knew and imitated in its political institutions was a Great Britain in which the cabinet system had not yet secured a definite and recognized place, and where the official exponents of the constitution declared that the first condition of liberty was to keep the executive and legislative separate.”<sup>6</sup> Skelton, who would later serve as *Queen’s* dean of arts, saw America’s chief political weakness – the separation of powers – as the result of an unfortunate reproduction of Georgian England’s inchoate political system.

Anti-American intellectuals generally insisted on the revolutionary nature of the Republic. Canada was a nation born of tradition and continuity. The United States, inversely, was the product of revolution; it had rejected its British heritage. Aside from a few moderates, notably George M. Wrong and Robert Falconer,<sup>7</sup> most imperialists argued that only residual traces of British tradition could be found in the American polity. The United States was not built on the bedrock of tradition, but on the shifting sands of abstract theory. And modern abstractions, imperialists contended, were no basis for a political system. Indeed, as Andrew Macphail put it 1911, “British institutions work well because they are based upon fictions which we all understand to be so. American institutions work with noise and friction because people think that they are founded upon realities.”<sup>8</sup> The Republic possessed a flawed system based on egalitarian illusions. At heart, American institutions were alien to the Anglo-Saxon race.

America is a democratic republic; Canada is a constitutional monarchy. Therein lies the fundamental political difference between Canada and the United States. In Quebec, where the Westminster system was not generally viewed as an element of national distinctiveness, most *nationaliste* intellectuals were largely indifferent to the whole question of American republicanism versus British monarchy. Even Jules-Paul Tardivel, who held democratic republicanism in very low regard, noted in *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (1900) that “les diverses formes de gouvernement que les peuples se donnent, pourvu qu’elles ne sortent pas du cadre légitime, n’intéressent pas l’Église.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> O. D. Skelton, “Current Events: Choosing a President,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XX (1912): 113-114.

<sup>7</sup> In many ways, Wrong and Falconer’s interwar judgement of American politics and government was not significantly different from that of liberal continentalists like J. W. Dafoe or W. B. Munro. Their moderate anti-Americanism did emerge, however, when they discussed issues pertaining to trade and identity. See G. M. Wrong, *The United States and Canada: A Political Study* (New York, 1921); and Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925).

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Macphail, “Certain Varieties of the Apples of Sodom,” *University Magazine* X (1911): 33.

<sup>9</sup> Jules-Paul Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (Montreal, 1900), 12.

Things were quite different in imperialist circles. For the imperialist, the monarch was the embodiment of British tradition and constitutional monarchy was the wellspring of Canadian distinctiveness. Republicanism was poisonous to tradition. As a result, the superiority of British constitutional monarchy over American republicanism was held to be self-evident by intellectuals like George R. Parkin or Colonel Denison. In a paper read before the Toronto branch of the Imperial Federation League in 1891, A. H. F. Lefroy (1852-1919) dismissed the whole issue in one sentence: "I do not purpose dwelling this evening upon any of the advantages which may be supposed to accrue to us from having at the apex of our political system the representative of our ancient and historic monarchy, rather than a mere passing politician elected for four years, whose very mediocrity often recommends him as a safe candidate to the party tacticians."<sup>10</sup> Born into a prominent Toronto family – his father, John Henry Lefroy, had been one of Canada's most renowned scientists and had served as the governor of Bermuda, while his grandfather, Sir John Beverley Robinson, had been the chief justice of Upper Canada – Lefroy was educated at Oxford University. He practiced law in Toronto during the 1880s and 1890s and was appointed professor of Roman law, jurisprudence, and the history of English law at the University of Toronto in 1900, a position he would hold for the rest of his life. Lefroy was the Dominion's leading expert on the common law. He edited the *Canadian Law Times* from 1915 until his death in 1919. Inspired in part by the work of Sir John George Bourinot, Lefroy's essays frequently emphasized the superiority of British and Canadian forms of government over American ones. An ardent imperialist, he frequently sought to refute English jurist Albert Venn Dicey's assertion that the Canadian Constitution was essentially similar to the American one.<sup>11</sup>

A handful of radicals thoroughly rejected Lefroy's negative assessment of republican government. Indeed, in certain circles, radical republicanism enjoyed a brief moment of popularity in the late 1880s and early 1890s. During those years, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard was at the centre of Quebec's republican movement. He firmly believed that "le système républicain ... possède une supériorité indéniable, indiscutable, car il ne pourrait, comme l'hérédité, donner des chefs ou des pontifs ignorants, vulgaires, criminels mêmes."<sup>12</sup> For Rouillard, the superiority of American republicanism was another argument in favour of annexation. Goldwin Smith concurred: "In the hereditary principle there is not on the

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<sup>10</sup> A. H. F. Lefroy, *The British Versus the American System of National Government* (Toronto, 1891), 9.

<sup>11</sup> R. C. B. Risk, "Augustus Henry Frazer Lefroy," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 14.

<sup>12</sup> J.-B. Rouillard, *Annexion: conférence: l'union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 13.

American Continent a spark of life.” Indeed, he continued, “the structure and spirit of Canadian as well as American society ... are thoroughly democratic.” Monarchy and aristocracy may have been acceptable in the Old World, but they were aberrations in the Americas. “On the soil of the New World hereditary monarchy and aristocracy can never grow,” he wrote in 1891.<sup>13</sup> The very essence of the New World, Smith believed, required American nations to break with both European monarchies and their political systems.

Most continentalists, however, were fairly comfortable with constitutional monarchy. In practice, they argued, the Dominion was as democratic as the United States. As a result, many continentalists deplored what James T. Shotwell regarded as the “inveterate tendency in American opinion to regard monarchy as synonymous with reaction because it has been reminiscent of oppression.” “The answer to this historical barrier to American-Canadian understanding,” he wrote in 1934, “is surely to be found in the principles upon which the British Commonwealth is founded, which makes the Crown itself the conservator of the ordered processes of freedom.”<sup>14</sup>

### *The Separation of Church and State*

During the period under study, the issue of American secularism did not generate a great deal of commentary in English Canada. Mainstream Protestant culture, indeed, had come to accept the formal separation of church and state, and even imperialists like Andrew Macphail, who were inclined to view “the utter divorce of government from piety” with alarm, did not see American secularism as much of an issue.<sup>15</sup> French Canadian conservatives viewed things somewhat differently. Their society was overwhelmingly Catholic, and they believed that its moral and spiritual welfare was intimately linked to the power and influence of the Church. Besides, Roman Catholicism was paramount to the French Canadian identity, and the ultramontane impulse was particularly strong among Quebec’s turn-of-the-twentieth-century nationalists. Not surprisingly therefore, an overwhelming proportion of Canadian commentary on American secularism was written in Quebec.

The province’s most forceful critic of American secularism was none other than Jules-Paul Tardivel. Born in Covington, Kentucky, Tardivel’s parents were recent immigrants to the United States from England and France. He was sent to Canada in 1868 by his maternal

<sup>13</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 252.

<sup>14</sup> J. T. Shotwell, *The Heritage of Freedom: The United States and Canada in the Community of Nations* (New York, 1934), 126-127.

<sup>15</sup> Andrew Macphail, “New Lamps for Old,” *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 35.

uncle, a parish priest in Mount Vernon, Ohio, to study at the Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe. After graduating, Tardivel began his career as a journalist at *Le Courrier* of Saint-Hyacinthe. Shortly thereafter, he briefly worked at Montreal's *La Minerve* before settling down in Quebec City and joining the staff of *Le Canadien* in 1874. In 1881, he founded *La Vérité*, French Canada's most influential ultramontane newspaper, which he would continue to edit until his death in April 1905. In the wake of the 1899 papal condemnation of 'Americanism,'<sup>16</sup> Tardivel published an influential three-hundred page essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* that denounced the separation of church and state in the United States. American secularism, Tardivel warned, was not a model for church-state relations. Indeed,

Depuis que JÉSUS-CHRIST est venu sur la terre, il n'y a que deux esprits qui animent les individus et les gouvernements: l'esprit chrétien et l'esprit antichrétien. L'esprit gouvernemental des États-Unis n'étant manifestement pas l'esprit chrétien doit être, de toute nécessité, l'esprit antichrétien. Si cet esprit antichrétien y paraît moins violent qu'ailleurs, c'est uniquement parce qu'il y trouve moins de résistance. Le fleuve, large et profond, coule silencieux vers la mer, tandis que la petite rivière, dont le cours est obstrué par des digues et des rochers, fait grand bruit. Cependant la puissance du fleuve l'emporte de beaucoup sur celle de la rivière.

In the end, despite a "reconnaissance officielle de l'existence d'un être Suprême" by the American Republic, Tardivel believed that "le vrai Dieu du peuple américain et du gouvernement américain, c'est l'homme."<sup>17</sup>

Many French Canadian conservatives, however, held a more moderate view of the separation of church and state in America. Henri Bourassa, for his part, argued in 1912 that the First Amendment to the American Constitution was hardly a radically secular clause, and noted that "the Catholic Church is not 'established' in Quebec, at least in the sense meant by the framers of the American constitution." Furthermore, Bourassa believed that the First Amendment "touches only on the powers of Congress, and interferes in no way with State jurisdiction." "As to the teaching of any religion or language at school, as to school laws in

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<sup>16</sup> In the late nineteenth century some European Catholics looked to America's non-confrontational secularism as a possible alternative to the radical separation of church and state that had occurred in the French and Italian republics. Moreover, they saw the progress of the American Church as a sign that Catholicism could adapt to modernity. The Roman Catholic Church, however, had little patience for theological modernism during this era. As a result, 'Americanism' – the so-called "phantom heresy" – was promptly condemned by Pope Leo XIII in 1899. [The papal condemnation of 'Americanism' is discussed in Condé B. Pallen, "Testem Benevolentiae," *Catholic Encyclopedia*.]

<sup>17</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 125-126, 135.

general, or the use of languages in legislatures or State courts,” he continued, “there is no reference whatever in the American constitution. Therefore, all those remain, in virtue of the X<sup>th</sup> Additional Article, within the exclusive jurisdiction of States.”<sup>18</sup>

It was the Franco-American centres of New England, however, which produced the most moderate French Canadian judgments on American secularism. In fact, many emigrant intellectuals viewed the separation of church and state in the United States as relatively benign. One such writer was Josaphat Benoit (1900-1976), whose family had settled in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, when he was a child. Benoit returned to Quebec as a teenager to study at the Séminaire de Sainte-Hyacinthe and the Collège Sainte-Marie and eventually became a key figure in Franco-American journalism. In his 1935 essay on *L'âme franco-américaine*, he argued that American secularism should not be confused with French secularism:

La séparation de l'Église et de l'État n'a pas le sens péjoratif qu'elle comporta d'abord en France. Dans une brochure très claire sur le sujet, Monsieur le vicomte de Meaux oppose ainsi la séparation dans les deux pays, aux débuts du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle: “En Amérique, ces mots signifient indépendance de l'Église vis-à-vis de l'État; en France, suppression de l'Église par l'État. En Amérique, la séparation est fondée sur l'incompétence de l'État en matière de culte; en France sur l'indifférence affectée et l'hostilité réelle.”<sup>19</sup>

In the end, most of Quebec's intellectuals recognized that church and state could hardly be linked in a society divided into a number of Christian confessions. Even Jules-Paul Tardivel was willing to acknowledge that “la population hétérogène des États-Unis, la multiplicité des croyances que l'on y trouve, l'absence même de toute foi religieuse chez un grand nombre, ont rendu [le laïcisme] nécessaire. Dans de telles circonstances, c'est incontestablement le moindre mal.”<sup>20</sup> Besides, as the province's observers were usually quick to point out, American theocracy invariably led to the persecution of Roman Catholics. Conservatives were fairly disinclined, therefore, to condemn the wider secularism of American government. Their critique of American secularism was instead centred on

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<sup>18</sup> Henri Bourassa, *The Spectre of Annexation and the Real Danger of National Disintegration* (Montreal, 1912), 17-18. The First Amendment to the American Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The Tenth Amendment states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”

<sup>19</sup> Josaphat Benoit, *L'âme franco-américaine* (Montreal, 1935), 111.

<sup>20</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 88.



education and culture, both of which will be dealt with in the next chapter. Indeed, the practical application of secularism, particularly in public schools, was anathema to the *nationaliste*.

### *Democracy and the Separation of Powers*

American democracy has always provided the intellectuals of the world with a working model to applaud and criticise. In the Dominion, “democracy” was understood to possess two separate yet related meanings. In the writing of some purists it corresponded to the Greek notion of *δημοκρατία* – rule of the people – and referred to a form of government where sovereign power resided with the people. The term was more generally employed, however, to designate any system of representative government involving free elections. Hence, Canada, though a constitutional monarchy in the strict sense, was often referred to as a democracy.

Democratic notions are integral to the modern ethos, which tends to favour political systems founded on some form of popular sovereignty. That said, most conservative intellectuals did not condemn democracy per se, whether American or otherwise, mainly because they understood the term to refer to representative government which, of course, was seen as a key element of the British political tradition.<sup>21</sup> As a result, only the most immoderate conservatives criticised American democracy, because they alone understood it to be a radical political system.

Until the 1960s, ultramontanist lingered in Quebec’s intellectual culture. Imported from continental Europe, this theocratic doctrine rejected the very notion of popular sovereignty as an affront to God. Accordingly, Quebec’s *nationalistes* were most likely both to equate democracy with popular sovereignty and to reject it wholesale. By the turn of the century, both France and the United States provided convenient foils for their antidemocratic rhetoric.

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<sup>21</sup> Indeed, though antidemocratic sentiment was present in pre-1945 conservative thought, the rejection of parliamentarism was virtually nonexistent in both English and French Canada. As historian Pierre Trépanier has pointed out, “sauf chez les fascistes et malgré les dénonciations des méfaits de l’esprit de parti, l’antiparlementarisme de doctrine ne mordra guère sur les intellectuels québécois, dont la pensée restera en retrait par rapport à son inspiration d’outre-mer: preuve supplémentaire de l’acculturation, plus profonde qu’on ne l’a cru, de la société canadienne-française au libéralisme et aux institutions britanniques.” [Trépanier, “Notes pour une histoire des droites intellectuelles canadiennes-françaises à travers leurs principaux représentants (1770-1970),” *Cahiers des Dix* 48 (1993): 162.]

Among the province's *nationalistes*, Jules-Paul Tardivel emerges as one of American democracy's most persistent critics. Indeed, in 1900, Quebec's most theocratic intellectual saw blasphemy at the very root of American politics and government:

La Déclaration d'Indépendance contient un principe essentiellement faux et subversif. "Les gouvernements reçoivent leurs pouvoirs légitimes du consentement des gouvernés. *Deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.*" Les auteurs de la République Américaine [*sic*] attribuèrent donc formellement une origine humaine au pouvoir civil. L'Église, parlant par la bouche de Léon XIII, dans l'encyclique *Diuturnum*, déclare "qu'il faut chercher en DIEU la source du pouvoir dans l'État."<sup>22</sup>

Henri Bourassa was not far behind Tardivel when it came to criticising "government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Indeed, though Bourassa's thought possessed a strong liberal component – he sat as a Liberal in the House of Commons for the riding of Labelle, Quebec, from 1896 to 1899 – the enigmatic *castor rouge* viewed democracy with a certain disdain:

Aux États-Unis, la "démocratie" est une réalité vivante, avec ses avantages et ses inconvénients, ses séductions et ses mensonges. La masse y croit avec ferveur. Elle professe et pratique, ou du moins, croit pratiquer la maxime du "gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple." La multiplicité des fonctions électives, le succès retentissant de certains hommes, partis de rien pour atteindre aux plus hauts sommets de la hiérarchie politique, entretiennent l'instinctive et irréductible illusion que tout Américain possède en puissance un titre à l'élection présidentielle, sénatoriale, etc.<sup>23</sup>

American democracy was contemptible, Bourassa believed, because it entertained a dangerous illusion: egalitarianism. Similarly, Andrew Macphail insisted in 1908 that equality, political or otherwise, was a fallacy that American democracy perpetuated: "To preserve the fiction that all men continue on the same plane of equality is an essential of democratic government."<sup>24</sup> Like many imperialists, Macphail believed that egalitarian democracy was an unworkable charade.

<sup>22</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 129.

<sup>23</sup> Bourassa, *L'intervention américaine*, 18.

<sup>24</sup> Andrew Macphail, "Protection and Politics," *University Magazine* VII (1908): 250.

More generally, however, Canadian conservatives merely criticised the breadth of suffrage in the United States. Commenting on the wave of nativist legislation that followed America's entry into World War One and that threatened Franco-American parochial schools, abbé Henri d'Arles lamented in 1919 that "notre république est vraiment la chose du peuple; elle pratique le suffrage universel, qui est, pour de grands esprits, 'le règne de l'incompétence.'"<sup>25</sup> The self-styled Viscount de Fronsac agreed. Born Frederic Gregory Forsyth in Montreal, the viscount had received most of his education in the United States. The American political system, he wrote in 1893, was "radically wrong." Democracy, Fronsac argued, "renders government into the hands of the worthless and ignoble." Worse still, it shuts out of power "the silent, unrepresented minority of wise and cultured men, who of right are the natural rulers, but in democracies never have a right."<sup>26</sup> Democratization clearly contributed to the reviled status revolution. By granting suffrage to the urban proletariat, many conservatives believed that the United States had destabilized existing social relations and rejected political elitism and deference.

Goldwin Smith, whose liberalism had congealed in the mid nineteenth century, was not far behind Fronsac when it came to condemning universal suffrage. He noted in 1891 that "among the American errors of which even Liberals who took part in founding the Canadian Confederation promised themselves to steer clear, was universal suffrage." Like many of his conservative adversaries, Smith feared the extension of suffrage to the urban proletariat, women, and non-whites. The political empowerment of the propertyless masses would have particularly dangerous consequences for society: "power will be transferred from the freehold farmers to people far less conservative, and at the same time from the country to the city." Smith was not an elitist per se, but like Thomas Jefferson, his ruralism made him fear "the dangerous class."<sup>27</sup>

By the early twentieth century, precious few continentalists shared Smith's aversion to universal suffrage. On the contrary, his intellectual successors saw the expansion of suffrage in the United States as a brilliant experiment in democracy. They insisted that American democracy, like its Canadian counterpart, had been inherited from Britain and nurtured in the New World's soil. Indeed, when it came to democracy, the border, they claimed, was far less important than the frontier. According to Arthur Lower, whose

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<sup>25</sup> Henri d'Arles, "Le français dans le Connecticut," *La Revue nationale* I (1919): 15.

<sup>26</sup> Viscount de Fronsac [X Frederic Gregory Forsyth], "Origin of the Social Crisis in the United States: A Monarchist's View," *Canadian Magazine* I (1893): 663-664.

<sup>27</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 173-174.

historical thought had been influenced by Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, "both in Canada and the United States, democracy has been a condition, not a theory. It has been the spontaneous product of the frontier and the forest."<sup>28</sup> Edgar McInnis, who taught history at the University of Toronto and whose widely-used textbooks helped diffuse continentalist ideas in Canada's colleges and universities, was of the same opinion. "The frontier," he wrote in a 1942 survey of Canadian-American relations, "whether in Canada or the United States, fostered an attachment to the democratic ideal which was the outcome not of abstract speculation, but of practical conditions."<sup>29</sup> Democracy, continentalists argued, was one of the pillars of North American civilization. For Reverend James A. Macdonald, democracy, in spite of its European origins, found its embodiment in "the North American idea":

Democracy! The word goes back through the centuries. It bears the flavour of ancient Greece. There is the tang of Plato about it. But the idea of democracy came to its own and justified itself only in the modern world. America, with its United States and Canada, prides itself against Europe, as embodying the world's idea of democracy. Here on this continent has been asserted and made good the right of a free people to govern themselves. But America is only the heir of Europe's age-long struggle up from servitude to self-government.<sup>30</sup>

Educated at Knox College, Toronto, and at the University of Edinburgh, Macdonald was ordained a minister of the Presbyterian Church in 1891. In 1896, he founded *The Westminster*, a monthly religious journal published in Toronto. Later, he reorganized and edited *The Presbyterian*, a weekly journal devoted to the interests of the Presbyterian Church. From 1896 to 1901 he was the principal of the Presbyterian Ladies College of Toronto. In 1902, he was appointed managing editor of the Toronto *Globe*, where he would remain until his retirement in 1916. Macdonald believed that Canada and the United States possessed a common English-speaking civilization founded on the twin ideals of democracy and liberty. He expressed this idea in two collections of essays, *Democracy and the Nations* (1915) and *The North American Idea* (1917).

There were several aspects of American democracy, however, that few Canadian intellectuals, continentalist or anti-American, approved of. Not surprisingly, pre-World War

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<sup>28</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "Some Neglected Aspects of Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (1929): 69.

<sup>29</sup> Edgar W. McInnis, *The Unguarded Frontier: A History of American-Canadian Relations* (New York, 1942), 12.

<sup>30</sup> James A. Macdonald, *The North American Idea* (New York, 1917), 54.

One imperialists like John Castell Hopkins believed that America suffered from “the cost and turmoil of ... almost continual elections.”<sup>31</sup> John G. Bourinot agreed. A foremost authority on constitutional law and parliamentary procedure – his *Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada* (1884) was the standard work on the subject for several decades – and an ardent imperialist, Bourinot’s writings consistently emphasized the superiority of British and Canadian political institutions over American ones. In Canada, he wrote in an 1895 article which sought to explain “why Canadians do not favor annexation,” “infrequent elections, taken in connection with the system of appointing all public officials, necessarily minimize the evils of party faction compared with the system in operation in the Federal Republic.”<sup>32</sup>

On this question, however, most continentalists saw eye to eye with their anti-American adversaries. Edgar McInnis, for instance, held the idea of frequent fixed-term elections in low regard. In a 1929 article published in the *Canadian Forum*, he argued that excessive democracy had the paradoxical effect of alienating the American voter:

The lot of the conscientious voter in America – if such a being exists – is not in all respects a happy one. Lord Bryce has described the burden laid upon him, and that description is even more true today than when it was first written. It is not merely the choice of a President that faces the voter, or even of Senators and Congressmen. He has his state elections, his county elections, his municipal elections; and the class of elective officials is far more extensive than under our own system. And he has in addition the burden of the primary, which seeks to assure to the people the right of nomination as well as of election. Small wonder if the average voter finds the task of selection beyond his powers, and frequently abandons all intelligent interest, if not all participation, in politics generally.<sup>33</sup>

Democracy clearly had limits, many continentalists insisted, and its application should not act as an impediment to good government. Indeed, their understanding of democracy did not require the election of all public officials.

No single element of American government was rejected more vigorously in the Dominion than the separation of powers. In the United States, constitutional checks and balances have

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<sup>31</sup> J. C. Hopkins, “Canadian Hostility to Annexation,” *Forum* XVI (1893): 332.

<sup>32</sup> John G. Bourinot, “Why Canadians do not Favor Annexation,” *Forum* XIX (1895): 282.

<sup>33</sup> Edgar W. McInnis, “This Insubstantial Pageant: Reflections on the American Political Scene,” *Canadian Forum* IX (1929): 305-306.

historically been viewed as integral to democracy and indispensable to the prevention of tyranny. But most Canadian intellectuals believed that they hindered both democracy and good government.

Canadian imperialists viewed responsible government as a pillar of the British and Canadian political traditions. American government, by contrast, was irresponsible. In the United States, the executive and legislative powers were strictly separate, which was viewed as a recipe for disaster. Drawing on Lord Bryce, who heaped criticism on constitutional checks and balances in his *American Commonwealth*, A. H. F. Lefroy noted 1891 that

The fundamental defect of the American system ... seems to lie in the separation and diffusion of power and responsibility, and on both points it is obviously less favourable than our system to the speedy and safe carrying into effect of the popular will. There is, writes Mr. Bryce, in his work on the American Commonwealth, in the American Government considered as a whole a want of unity. Its branches are unconnected; their efforts are not directed to one aim, do not produce one harmonious result. The sailor, the helmsman, the engineer, do not seem to have one purpose or obey one will, so that instead of making steady way the vessel may pursue a devious or zig-zag course, and sometimes merely turn round and round in the water.<sup>34</sup>

Divided against itself, American government was both weak and disorganised. Moreover, remarked Cephas D. Allin (1874-1927) in 1913, constitutional checks and balances had failed in their original purpose because they did not really protect American civil liberties from the tyranny of the majority:

The framers of the constitution were evidently of the opinion that the elaborate system of checks and balances which they incorporated into the organic law would suffice to prevent not only the legal abuse of powers by the various organs of the State, but also the less obvious but more insidious evils of extreme partisanship. That system has undoubtedly defeated much hasty and ill-considered legislation on the part of an arbitrary and high-handed majority in Congress, but it has failed to protect the rights and liberties of a minority against the excesses of a victorious party which has gained control over the whole governmental organization.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> A. H. F. Lefroy, "Canadian Forms of Freedom," *Annual Transactions of the United Empire Loyalists' Association of Ontario* (1899): 106.

<sup>35</sup> Cephas D. Allin, "The Game of Politics," *University Magazine* XII (1913): 219.

Born in Clinton, Ontario, Allin had studied law at the University of Toronto and political science at Harvard. His faith in imperial federation and in the superiority of the Westminster system remained constant over the course of his career, most of which was spent teaching political science at the University of Minnesota.

Many continentalists also vigorously criticized the American separation of powers. Socialists tended to view constitutional checks and balances primarily as an obstacle to progressive legislation, while liberals, like their conservative adversaries, often suggested that they hampered the whole working of government. In *The Government of the United States*, a successful textbook which went through five editions and two title changes between 1919 and 1946, William Bennett Munro offered a tactful – and essentially liberal – critique of the separation of powers to American college students:

The notion that there can be no liberty without a separation of governmental powers, without a system of checks and balances, is one that might easily be expected to find favor a century ago; to-day it is far from commanding general acceptance by students of political science. The federal governments of Canada and Australia, for example, with no separation of powers, have demonstrated Montesquieu's dread of centralization to have been in large measure imaginary. It is impossible to say, of course, whether the United States would have fared better or worse under a constitution framed by men who knew not Montesquieu; but there are many thoughtful Americans who nowadays believe that the theory of checks and balances is a delusion and a snare, that it has made for confusion in the actual work of government, that it divides responsibility, encourages friction, and has balked constructive legislation on numberless occasions.<sup>36</sup>

Some continentalists offered solutions to political deadlock in the United States. Like many of his conservative opponents, O. D. Skelton believed that “to the Canadian cabinet government seems the logical means of securing the coordination and responsibility lacking in the Republic's system.” However, in a 1907 article for the *Queen's Quarterly*, he acknowledged that “outside of a few academic writers, Wilson, Ford, Bradford and Godnow especially, this solution has not found adherents.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Munro, *The Government of the United States*, 51.

<sup>37</sup> O. D. Skelton, “Current Events: Reform Tendencies in the United States,” *Queen's Quarterly* XV (1907): 76.

Goldwin Smith was somewhat ambivalent on the subject of the American separation of powers. On the whole, he agreed with most Canadian intellectuals regarding checks and balances: “assuming that government is to be by party, the Canadian and British system has clearly the advantage in respect to the conduct of legislation.” Indeed, he recognized that “the American House of Representatives is apt for want of leadership to become a legislative chaos.” “On the other hand,” he remarked in *Canada and the Canadian Question*, “the American system gives the country a stable executive independent of the fluctuating majorities of the legislative chamber and of those shifting combinations, jealousies, and cabals which in France, and not in France alone, have been making it impossible to find a firm foundation for a government.”<sup>38</sup> In the end, the American system, in spite of its imperfections, was basically stable. Responsible government, to be sure, hardly precluded minority governments and instability. At least with a separate executive, some degree of continuity could be maintained in the face of legislative flux.

Only a handful of continentalists truly embraced constitutional checks and balances. Samuel R. Clarke was one such radical. Like the American Republicans he so admired, the Toronto jurist and advocate of continental union saw the separation of powers as an indispensable obstacle to tyranny. By contrast, he argued in early 1891 that the Canadian prime minister was endowed with the powers of a dictator:

A few sickly theorists with the tinsel of royalty dazzling their mental vision are laboring painfully to disseminate the notion that our system of government is superior to the American. According to these gentlemen the initiative in American legislation belongs to nobody in particular. I quite agree this objection will not lie in respect of our system. Sir John Macdonald is a kind of emperor, king, president and British prime minister all combined. He has no trouble in either initiating or enacting measures according to his own sweet will. Theoretically the Senate bars his way. Practically this august body only cloaks his absolute power; they are his own complaisant nominees rewarded for long faithful party services.<sup>39</sup>

The last word on the separation of powers, however, must go to Frank Underhill, whose continentalism was tainted with left-wing cynicism. In a 1930 article published in the *Canadian Forum*, Underhill contended that, in practice, the Canadian and American political

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<sup>38</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 161-162.

<sup>39</sup> Clarke, *A New Light on Annexation*, 19.



systems were basically the same. Capitalism and sectionalism provided both nations with their true system of checks and balances:

The one fundamental subject to be discussed in a comparison of Canadian and American governments is the question of what actual differences have resulted in practice between the American system of separation of powers and our system of cabinet government ... The orthodox belief is that the cabinet system provides unity in control and policy such as is impossible in the United States where the head of the executive has to conduct a constant struggle with the two houses of the legislature. But is that the real result in Canada? Ask anybody in Ottawa. The fact is that Ottawa is the scene of exactly the same sort of warfare between competing economic and sectional interests as goes on constantly in Washington ... Policy at Ottawa as at Washington is the result of a complex process of wire-pulling and bargaining among competitive interests. We have been made more familiar with this process as it goes on at Washington. And here we come upon the one significant difference between the governments of the two capitals. They have better newspaper reporters at Washington.<sup>40</sup>

### *Federalism and the Constitution*

The American Constitution is one of the most enduring instruments of government in the world. Yet many Canadian intellectuals refused to acknowledge its resilience. For imperialists, it was nothing more than a rigid piece of legislation that had stifled American life since the late eighteenth century. And though they acknowledged that the American Constitution contained fragments of the British political tradition, they argued that it was largely built on modern, abstract principles. "A community cannot adopt a constitution any more than a child can adopt a father," wrote Andrew Macphail, quoting Walter Bagehot, in 1911.<sup>41</sup> Constitutions had to evolve over hundreds of years; they could not simply be drafted by a convention of delegates. Moreover, imperialists believed that the United States possessed a decentralized, and therefore inferior, instrument of government.

Macphail was a persistent critic of the American Constitution. "The Constitution of the United States has always broken down when unusual strain was placed upon it," he wrote in a 1909 article published in the *University Magazine*.<sup>42</sup> Imperialists indeed believed

<sup>40</sup> F. H. Underhill, "O Canada," *Canadian Forum* X (1930): 116.

<sup>41</sup> Bagehot in Macphail, "Certain Varieties of the Apples of Sodom," 30.

<sup>42</sup> Macphail, "New Lamps for Old," 22.

that the Constitution of 1787 had failed its ultimate test: the Civil War. Unlike the largely unwritten British and Canadian Constitutions, America's instrument of government had proved too rigid and decentralized. Speaking before the Empire Club of Canada in 1910, Justice William Renwick Riddell (1852-1945) of the King's Bench division of the High Court of Ontario criticised the American Constitution for its rigidity: "The dead and gone generation are, in the United States, saying to the present and living: 'Thus far shalt thou go and no further' – a prohibition to which I do not believe any British people would submit for one minute."<sup>43</sup> A prolific author primarily concerned with legal and historical subjects, Riddell wrote a number of articles and pamphlets on the history of Canadian-American relations and on the comparative constitutional evolution of Canada and the United States. Though his work frequently emphasized the common aspects of North America's constitutional and historical development, he did not hesitate to rate the Canadian experience as superior to the American one.

Canadian conservatives were not apologists for social and political immobility. Instead, they preferred measured change guided by tradition. As a result, they rejected what they saw as the American effort to produce permanence out of nothing. The whole issue was summarized by John G. Bourinot in a paper read before the Royal Society of Canada – of which he was a founding member – in 1893:

The history of responsible government affords another illustration of a truth which stands out clear in the history of nations, that those constitutions which are of a flexible character, and the natural growth of the experiences of centuries, and which have been created by the necessities and conditions of the times, possess the elements of real stability, and best insure the prosperity of a people. The great source of the strength of the institutions of the United States lies in the fact that they have worked out their government in accordance with certain principles, which are essentially English in Origin, and have been naturally developed since their foundation as colonial settlements, and what weaknesses their system shows have chiefly arisen from new methods, and from the rigidity of their constitutional rules of law, which separate too closely the executive and legislative branches of government. Like their neighbours, the Canadian people have based their system on English principles, but they have at the same time been able to keep pace with the progress of the unwritten constitution of England, to adapt it to their own political

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<sup>43</sup> W. R. Riddell, "Some Remarks on the Constitutions of Canada and the United States," *Empire Club Speeches* (1909-1910): 197.

conditions, and bring the executive and legislative authorities so as to assist and harmonize one another.<sup>44</sup>

Continentalists and anti-Americans could agree on a number of America's political shortcomings, but they held diametrically opposed positions when it came to its Constitution. Like most American intellectuals, continentalists praised the Constitution of 1787 for its stability and flexibility. "It is not true that the constitution of the United States has shown itself to be far less flexible than the constitution of England," wrote William Bennett Munro in 1919.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, while Munro acknowledged that the American Constitution was difficult to amend, he also noted that constitutional interpretation had allowed the document to evolve a great deal since 1787. In practice, therefore, the British and American constitutions were quite similar. A. D. DeCelles, who had been called to the Quebec bar in 1873 but had never practiced law, was of the same opinion. In an 1896 study of American history and government, he argued that the Constitution was a pillar of American stability:

Ce nouveau pacte est le chef-d'oeuvre des constitutions écrites. Jamais le monde n'a vu avant ni depuis, un ensemble de règles de gouvernement plus sages, mieux appropriées aux exigences de la multitude et dénotant une intuition plus profonde des besoins d'une démocratie, n'ayant rien de commun avec les petites républiques de l'antiquité, mais évoluant dans une immense sphère d'action. C'était une innovation que l'expérience a justifiée car, malgré ses défauts, la constitution de 1789 [*sic*] a créé des institutions d'une élasticité et d'une puissance de résistance extraordinaires.<sup>46</sup>

Continentalists and anti-Americans also diverged on the level of influence that American constitutional thought had exerted on the drafting of the Canadian Constitution. Conservatives were not keen on admitting that the Fathers of Confederation had drawn heavily on American political ideas and institutions to craft the British North America Act. To do so would compromise the anti-American purity of the Canadian nation. If anything, America had provided an example of what not to do when drafting a constitution. For his part, Donald Creighton vigorously rejected the idea that the BNA Act was an essentially

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<sup>44</sup> John G. Bourinot, "Canadian Studies in Comparative Politics: Parliamentary Compared with Congressional Government," *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 1<sup>st</sup> Series, XI (1893): 81.

<sup>45</sup> Munro, *The Government of the United States*, 58.

<sup>46</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), 219.

American document. In 1942, he published an article in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* to affirm the anti-American integrity and the centralized nature of the Canadian Constitution:

The chief sentiments which the Fathers of Confederation entertained with respect to the United States were a lively desire to escape being annexed and a firm determination to avoid what were popularly regarded in British North America as the mistakes of American federalism. Besides the United States was not the only federal system with which the provinces were acquainted: they had, in fact, been long and intimately related to another organization, which, though much less systematic than the American, was definitely federal in character. This was, of course, the British Empire itself, with its central imperial parliament and its subordinate colonial legislatures. And it would not be difficult to prove that the main ideas and a good deal of the political machinery of Canadian federalism were taken over directly from the Old Colonial System of Great Britain.<sup>47</sup>

Creighton was reacting to the ideas contained in William Bennett Munro's *American Influences on Canadian Government* (1929). In this widely-read essay, Munro had insisted that, in spite of some superficial institutional differences, the political systems of Canada and the United States were very much alike. In fact, he argued that the Fathers of Confederation had borrowed heavily from American constitutional thought and practices while drafting the British North America Act. Consequently, they had produced an essentially Hamiltonian – and therefore American – document. "If Macdonald is entitled to be called the 'Father of the Canadian Constitution,'" Munro remarked, "it would appear that Alexander Hamilton has some claim to be designated as its grandfather."<sup>48</sup>

There was nothing implicitly new in Munro's arguments; Goldwin Smith had used them a generation before in support of continental union. "Passing through the false front into the real edifice," he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*, "we find that [the Dominion] is a federal republic after the American model, though with certain modifications derived partly from the British source." As a result, "were a Canadian Province to be turned at once into a State of the Union the change would be felt by the people only in a certain increase in self-government. The political machinery would act as it does now."<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Donald G. Creighton, "The Course of Canadian Democracy," *University of Toronto Quarterly* XI (1942): 263-264.

<sup>48</sup> W. B. Munro, *American Influences on Canadian Government* (Toronto, 1929), 20.

<sup>49</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 157-158.

By the early twentieth century, one of the few elements of the American political system that aroused genuine interest in Quebec was the constitutional division of powers between the federal government and the states. This is hardly surprising given that the struggle for provincial autonomy rallied an overwhelming majority of French Canadian intellectuals. In their calls for constitutional decentralization, the *nationalistes* sometimes pointed to the American division of powers as a model. Indeed, they believed that the American state possessed a greater degree of sovereignty than the Canadian province. “La décentralisation et le régionalisme,” wrote Harry Bernard of the United States in 1942, “sont à la base de leur histoire et de leur système politique.”<sup>50</sup> The editor of the weekly *Courier de Saint-Hyacinthe* was not the only *nationaliste* to praise the decentralized nature of the American Constitution. In *Reflets d’Amérique*, a 1941 collection of essays which urged French Canadians to resist Americanization, Édouard Montpetit also wrote approvingly of the American Constitution:

La province canadienne correspond à l’état américain. La principale différence – elle a son importance – est que les états américains reçoivent et exercent les pouvoirs que la Constitution ne réserve pas au gouvernement fédéral; quand, au Canada, c’est le gouvernement central qui est revêtu des pouvoirs que la Constitution n’accorde pas aux provinces. Autrement dit, l’état américain possède, en matière de législation, un champ plus étendu, une autorité plus large.<sup>51</sup>

Canadian imperialists saw state sovereignty as one of the great weaknesses of the American political system. Centralism, to be sure, was an imperialist mantra, and English Canadian conservatives regularly condemned the fact that American states retained all residual powers not specifically granted to the federal government by the Constitution. This could only have a centrifugal, and therefore negative, effect on American life. Indeed, for many, including Andrew Macphail, the Civil War was the direct result of constitutional decentralization:

The people of the United States have not yet decided wherein the real sovereignty lies. Calhoun believed that it lay in the individual states. Madison also was of the opinion that

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<sup>50</sup> Harry Bernard, “Nationalisme du roman américain,” *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa* XII (1942): 125.

<sup>51</sup> Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets d’Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 34.

the union was an operation of the states and not of the whole people. The Civil War was an argument to the contrary; but nothing is ever settled by force. For forty years we in Canada have been discussing our own document, but we have had a tribunal to which we might appeal. Right or wrong the questions which arose have been settled, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with all its limitations is probably a saner tribunal than a camp of armed men.<sup>52</sup>

### *Political Culture in the United States*

Beyond the theories and institutions lay the actual practice of politics and government in the United States which, perhaps not surprisingly, generated a great deal of commentary in the Dominion. For the most part, Canadian intellectuals held American political culture in low regard. Indeed, conservatives were not alone in criticising the rampant corruption and incompetence they believed poisoned the American body politic. Yet there were bright spots: America's two-party system stifled radical political dissent, noted some liberal and conservative intellectuals, while many continentalists approved of the growth of American government in the 1930s.

"There can be no doubt that political corruption in the United States has, in particular instances, surpassed anything the world has seen," remarked William S. Milner (1861-1931), the University of Toronto's influential professor of classics, in 1903.<sup>53</sup> This belief was widespread in the Dominion, where many conservatives regarded corruption as the primary characteristic of American political culture, indeed of American politics and government. The issue even crept into Canadian literature. In 1901 alone, two Canadian novels, James Algie's (1857-1928) *Bergen Worth* and Robert Barr's *The Victors*, explored political corruption in American cities. A few years later, Stephen Leacock ridiculed American attempts at political reform in his humorous *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* (1914). In the final instalment of this celebrated cycle of stories, even the Clean Government League becomes an instrument of political corruption and violence:

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<sup>52</sup> Macphail, "New Lamps for Old," 21-22. Goldwin Smith disagreed: "The framers of the Canadian Constitution fancied that American secession was an awful warning against leaving the Federal Government too weak. In this they were mistaken, for slavery and slavery alone was the cause of secession, and had the Federal Government possessed authority to deal with the Southern institution and proceeded to exert it, that would only have precipitated the catastrophe." [Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 158.]

<sup>53</sup> W. S. Milner, "Roman, Greek, English and American Conceptions of Liberty," *Canadian Magazine* XXI (1903): 516.

There is no need to recount here in detail the glorious triumph of the election day itself. It will always be remembered as the purest, cleanest election ever held in the precincts of the city. The citizen's organization turned out in overwhelming force to guarantee that it should be so. Bands of Dr. Boomer's students, armed with baseball bats, surrounded the polls to guarantee fair play. Any man wishing to cast an unclean vote was driven from the booth: all those attempting to introduce any element of brute force or rowdysm into the election were cracked over the head. In the lower part of the town scores of willing workers, recruited often from the humblest classes, kept order with pickaxes. In every part of the city motor cars, supplied by all the leading business men, lawyers, and doctors of the city, acted as patrols to see that no unfair use should be made of other vehicles in carrying voters to the polls.<sup>54</sup>

Canadian conservatives attributed political corruption in the United States to a number of causes, including the nation's revolutionary heritage, the structure of its politics and government, and the impact of immigration and plutocracy on its body politic.<sup>55</sup> The separation of powers was often singled out as the leading cause of American political corruption. Anti-Americans argued that constitutional checks and balances, by diffusing power and responsibility, made it relatively simple for special interests to affect the legislative process in the United States. In this vein, A. H. F. Lefroy singled out the power of congressional committees as a catalyst for political corruption. "The lobbyist, the intriguer, and the wielder of improper influences have every facility afforded them in the American system of small committees, conducting their proceedings with closed doors," he wrote in 1891.<sup>56</sup>

For the most part, continentalists acknowledged that political corruption was a problem in the United States. However, they were usually quick to minimize and relativize the phenomenon. American corruption, they insisted, was not as widespread as many believed. Besides, bossism and bribery were hardly confined to the Republic. According to William Bennett Munro, cronyism and political corruption were very much alive in the Dominion in spite of the creation of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, as he pointed out in his *American Influences on Canadian Government*, "in the government and politics of

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<sup>54</sup> Stephen Leacock, *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* (New York, 1914), 307-308.

<sup>55</sup> The impact of immigration and plutocracy on the American body politic is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

<sup>56</sup> Lefroy, *The British Versus the American System of National Government*, 30.

Canada, most of what is superimposed is British; but most of what works its way in from the bottom is American.”<sup>57</sup>

But corruption was not the only blemish that Canadian Tories detected on America’s body politic. Like Bryce, many anti-Americans were convinced that the United States consistently produced politicians of inferior quality. “The forms of government in America have always been unfavourable to the easy elevation of talent to the station of permanent authority,” noted A. H. F. Lefroy in 1891.<sup>58</sup> A number of continentalists were inclined to agree. Goldwin Smith blamed American localism for the problem. “The ablest and most popular of public men, if he happens to live in a district where the other party has the majority, is excluded from public life,” he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*.<sup>59</sup> Smith noted, however, that localism was also gaining ground in Britain and Canada. For his part, William Bennett Munro lamented the fact that America “has failed to utilize in the presidential office a long line of notable statesmen: Hamilton, Marshall, Gallatin, Webster, Clay, Calhoun, Seward, Sumner, Hay, and others. On the other hand, it has bestowed its highest honor on men like Polk, Filmore, Pierce, and Arthur, of whom no one now knows much except that they are on the roll of the presidents.”<sup>60</sup> American parties, Munro remarked in 1919, generally picked inoffensive, and often untalented, presidential candidates simply because they could garner votes in pivotal states. This, he believed, was hardly a recipe for great statesmanship.

That said, most continentalists refused to see intermittent presidential mediocrity as a sign of American inferiority. Some claimed that Canadian political culture was scarcely more adept at producing great statesmen. Frank Underhill, whose contempt for Canada’s political establishment reached its paroxysm in the 1930s, argued that socio-economic factors common to both Canada and the United States produced inferior politicians:

As for our British form of government we are still brought up to believe that it produces better results than the American form, but the belief will not survive much serious analysis. For forms of government let fools contest. The real test of a government is in the character of the men who are attracted to public life, and in this respect there is no appreciable difference between Canada and the United States. We habitually talk as if the British

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<sup>57</sup> Munro, *American Influences on Canadian Government*, 91.

<sup>58</sup> Lefroy, *The British Versus the American System of National Government*, 36.

<sup>59</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 174.

<sup>60</sup> Munro, *The Government of the United States*, 97.



system in Canada habitually produced Balfours and Asquiths whereas we all know in our hearts that it only produces – well, the reader can fill in the names for himself. A people gets the kind of government it deserves, i.e., the kind which inevitably results from the complex of its social and economic activities. We can no more reproduce the English kind of government in Canada by copying its forms than we can reproduce the English accent here by sending Rhodes scholars to Oxford. The truth is that nothing about us is so distinctly North American as our government.<sup>61</sup>

A handful of Canadian intellectuals also noted that there was something vaguely illiberal about American political culture. They argued that latent political conformism and consensus stifled dissent in the Republic. Writing in 1913, Tory expatriate Cephias D. Allin described the inevitable tyranny of American majorities as particularly oppressive: “The democracy of America is often fretful and intemperate in its political activities. It has not yet acquired the habit of liberality of judgement and strong self-control. It is apt to be intolerant of the opinions of the minority.”<sup>62</sup> Frank Underhill was of the same opinion, but saw political conformism as a problem common to both Canada and the United States. In a rare tribute to Britain, he recognized that “the unique thing which English history has produced in England is not a particular form of parliamentary government but the spirit of political liberalism, the belief in fair play, the conviction that things turn out best when differences are adjusted by free discussion.” This sense of fair play, he noted in the wake of a 1929 crackdown on Toronto communists, was noticeably absent from North America’s political culture:

In nothing are we Canadians so typically North American as in our lack of this political liberalism. Nothing demonstrates the hollowness of our British professions so clearly as the fact that the section of Canada which is always boasting most vociferously about its British character is the section in which the British spirit is most conspicuous by its absence. The recent antics of the Toronto police authorities in dealing with the alleged communist danger are just the sort of thing which one would expect in an American city.<sup>63</sup>

At the turn of the twentieth century, however, many Canadian intellectuals saw the political conformism generated by the Republic’s two-party system as one of its few political assets. The rise of radical doctrines was indeed viewed with great alarm in many circles. In

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<sup>61</sup> F. H. Underhill, “O Canada,” *Canadian Forum* X (1929): 11.

<sup>62</sup> Allin, “The Game of Politics,” 230.

<sup>63</sup> Underhill, “O Canada,” 11.

1904, *Queen's* James Cappon argued that the two-party system checked the spread of radicalism and provided the United States with a great measure of unity and stability:

Consider the practical efficiency of an organization which keeps nearly 80 millions [*sic*] of people, so diverse in their interests, so heterogeneous in blood and instincts and spread over so vast a space, within the political unity of the Republican and Democratic parties, with clearly defined and concerted programmes for each, and think of the confusion that would exist, and the danger for the body politic, if that political unity were split up into the confused conflict and uncertain, changing combinations of half a dozen parties as in the German Empire, an Irish party, a German party, a Socialist party, a Labour party, a Western party, and so forth. They may yet have to face trouble of this kind, especially if a Labour party should detach itself from the two great political camps, but hitherto the skill of their political leaders aided some profound instinct of patriotism in the people has managed to avoid the political chaos which the states would present under such conditions.<sup>64</sup>

A number of liberals were inclined to agree. Indeed, like Cappon, A. D. DeCelles was no fan of radicalism. But DeCelles saw federalism as the principal barrier to subversion in the United States. "Le système fédéral ne constitue-t-il pas une force formidable au profit de l'ordre? En effet, sur la vaste étendue de la république se dressent quarante-cinq gouvernements particuliers, comme autant de citadelles en état d'imposer respect aux ennemis de la société," he wrote in 1896. Still, possibly foreseeing Roosevelt's New Deal, DeCelles worried that political opportunism might force either the Democratic or Republican parties to take a left turn: "la direction des partis est sans scrupule ... elle est capable, à un moment donné, pour arriver au but convoité, de faire une alliance avec le socialisme et lui ouvrir la porte de la forteresse."<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> James Cappon, "The Great American Democracy," *Queen's Quarterly* XI (1904): 297. Many Canadian conservatives, however, were highly critical of party government in the United States. They believed that parties entrenched factionalism and were the scourge of democracy. Andrew Macphail, for instance, argued in 1911 that party government had placed the United States on a dangerous course: "The strong desire of the people to make known their wills was the fundamental assumption of revolutionary politics. It was the fundamental fallacy. It did not occur to any one that a time might come when the electors would not care much whether they voted or not, and that a machine of great power and vast complexity would be necessary for getting them to the polls. That is the genesis of the thing which is called Party. That a man should belong to a party is the first principle of the machine; and loyalty to a party, no matter how despotic it may be, has taken the place of an uncomplaining and unreasoning loyalty to a king." [Macphail, "Certain Varieties of the Apples of Sodom, 37.]

<sup>65</sup> DeCelles, *Les États-Unis*, 405.

By the interwar years, old school liberals like DeCelles no longer held a monopoly on pro-American sentiment and the Republic's dearth of radicalism was often criticised by continentalists. In a 1929 article published in the *Canadian Forum*, Edgar McInnis lamented that "the most arrogantly progressive nation in the world has, of all civilized nations, the most unreasoning terror of any political change whatever." He insisted, moreover, that the Democratic and Republican parties had virtually become political clones. "Such differences as originally existed between Republicans and Democrats – and these differences were once very real – have one by one been obliterated."<sup>66</sup> For Frank Underhill, ideological convergence was a problem common to both Canada and the United States. "A party in North America is nothing but a bundle of sectional factions held together by a common name and a common desire for the spoils of office," he wrote in 1930. Aside from a lack of ideological distinctiveness, many continentalists also believed that both the Democratic and Republican parties suffered from an absence of ideas, which Underhill attributed to the two-party system's deleterious effect on politics. Like many left-of-centre intellectuals, the author of the Regina Manifesto considered third parties to be the primary matrix of political change in North America. But American political culture, Underhill claimed in 1944, impeded serious third-party challenges:

From the liberal point of view the most disheartening thing about American politics has been the persistent failure of all third-party movements. Ever since the days of the Progressives, before the last war, liberals have been promising themselves that at the next presidential election there would be a real farmer-labour party to challenge the two old parties. Third parties in our English-speaking democracies are the channels through which new ideas and interests find expression in politics, and the two-party system only works well when there are more than two parties.<sup>67</sup>

Years later, when Canadian socialism would turn on the United States, this sort of argument would become a staple of anti-American rhetoric.

Yet from the late nineteenth century to the opening of the Cold War, and particularly during Roosevelt's New Deal, Canadian reformers regularly looked south for

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<sup>66</sup> McInnis, "This Insubstantial Pageant," 305-306.

<sup>67</sup> F. H. Underhill, "O Canada," *Canadian Forum* X (1930): 116; "Trends in American Foreign Policy," *University of Toronto Quarterly* XIII (1944): 293.

successful examples of state interventionism.<sup>68</sup> Prewar America was seen as a fairly progressive nation and, in certain respects, its social legislation was assumed to be ahead of the Dominion's. "The Canadian," bemoaned a group of liberal continentalists in 1941, "has a greater reverence for the past than his neighbor; for precedent, position and old custom; and he is correspondingly slower to accept economic and social experiments. Thus Canada watched the New Deal with scepticism. In social legislation it is relatively a backward nation and one which is extraordinarily loyal to economic orthodoxy."<sup>69</sup> By the late 1940s, however, Canada had pulled ahead of United States in terms of social legislation and precious few progressives longed for the Dominion to follow America's lead.

American statism was not universally praised in the interwar Dominion. Antistatist sentiment was strong in Canada, particularly in Quebec where Catholic doctrine made many intellectuals weary of the State. Like most *nationalistes*, Hermas Bastien was particularly concerned by the effects of "la déification de l'État" on society. In a 1936 article published in the *Revue dominicaine*, he argued that American statism produced "une rupture dans la hiérarchie des personnes et une confusion dans leurs rapports avec le politique et le culturel. En ces dernières années, tels symptômes se sont accusés chez nous et nous nous croyons autorisés à les dénoncer comme une influence américaine en morale politique."<sup>70</sup> *Nationaliste* intellectuals believed that excessive state intervention destabilized society because it threatened established social relations.

During the period under study, few Canadian intellectuals wholeheartedly embraced the American political system. Indeed, on several issues, including the American separation of powers, there was little to distinguish the anti-American and continentalist positions. To many observers, the American political tradition seemed in constant disarray. It lacked leadership and was rife with corruption.

For Canadian imperialists, the American political system was the embodiment of modernity. The Founding Fathers had committed the cardinal sin of rejecting the Empire and the British political tradition. Moreover, they had established their nation on the very unsound idea of popular sovereignty. And for this they paid a high price. The United States, imperialists believed, suffered from permanent political instability. Order and stability are of

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<sup>68</sup> Canadian attitudes towards the New Deal are examined in W. J. McAndrew, "Weighing a Wild-Cat on the Kitchen Scales: Canadians Evaluate the New Deal," *American Review of Canadian Studies* IV (1974): 23-45.

<sup>69</sup> John W. Dafoe, ed., *Canada Fights: An American Democracy at War* (New York, 1941), 35.

<sup>70</sup> Hermas Bastien, "L'américanisation par la philosophie," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 211-212.

course integral to the conservative ethos, and while the British political tradition ensured order and good government, the American tradition virtually guaranteed disorder and political corruption. Besides, unlike Quebec's *nationalistes*, imperialists saw political issues as the backbone of Canadian-American differentialism. As a result, their critique of the American political system was tied to their struggle to maintain a separate Canadian identity founded on conservative notions of tradition and continuity.

Continentalists hardly embraced the American political tradition. Like their imperialist adversaries, they had doubts concerning its effectiveness. Yet their critique of certain aspects of American government did not lapse into anti-Americanism. On the contrary, they generally sought to relativize Canadian-American differences. Putting aside what they considered to be superficial differences, continentalists believed that Canada was an "American democracy" that possessed many of the political strengths and weaknesses of its neighbour.

Quebec showed relatively little interest in American politics and government. Indeed, by the turn of the twentieth century, the generation of *rouges* who embraced American republicanism was fading away rapidly, and nationalists shunned American society and paid little attention to the nation's political system. *Nationaliste* differentialism rested on religion, culture, and race. Nationalists hardly needed to denounce American republicanism to assert French Canada's distinctiveness and traditionalism. Besides, with the exception of a handful of loyalists, Quebec's intellectuals held little sentimental attachment to constitutional monarchy. For the imperialist, the defence of British institutions was a knee-jerk reaction. This was simply not the case for the *nationaliste*. Unlike its English Canadian counterpart, Quebec's intellectual right did not necessarily have a powerful attachment to a given political system. They did, however, have a very strong attachment to the Roman Catholic Church which, as we shall see in the next chapter, generated a strong dislike of the moral and religious laxity they believed that America embodied.

## *Chapter Six*

### Religion and Culture in the United States

For the Dominion's conservative intellectuals, American society embodied several of modernity's worst features: the commodification and debasement of culture, religious indifference, and secular, egalitarian, and utilitarian education. In America, conservatives believed, the status revolution had reached its logical consequence: the intellectual elite had lost all cultural influence and culture was designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator.

Culture, religion, and education loomed large in the conservative mind. In Quebec, religious affairs were of particular interest, and the United States came to symbolize the widespread irreligion that the *nationalistes* believed invariably accompanied Protestantism and secular education. Moreover, as America's cultural influence grew after the Great War, its French Canadian detractors became more vocal. They were following a well-beaten path. Imperialists had harshly criticized American mass culture at the turn of the twentieth century, and their assessment of the Republic's spiritual and intellectual well-being was hardly positive. Like their *nationaliste* adversaries, they had some choice words for education in the United States. In fact, their distaste for utilitarian pedagogy found its expression in a rejection of American education.

Continentalists, for their part, offered a rather weak defence of culture in the United States. They were faced with the kind of dilemma that only affects pro-American intellectuals. The Republic's mass culture did not really appeal to these elites – it was, all things considered, rather common – but they could hardly denounce it in the way that their anti-American adversaries did. Instead, continentalists preferred to point out that America's intellectual culture was vibrant, and that the nation's system of education was functioning properly. In religious matters, continentalists were divided. Continentalism was, after all, a dichotomous ideal. Moderates like Edmond de Nevers criticised what they saw as American irreligion, while more radical observers saw faith in the Republic as omnipresent and oppressive. Others merely suggested, in true continentalist form, that there really wasn't much difference between Canada and the United States when it came to spiritual matters.

### *Cultural and Intellectual Life*

The emergence of mass culture is key element in modernity. In the modern world, culture is a commodity to be purchased and consumed like any other good or service. Moreover, it is standardized and relentlessly advertised and promoted by a cultural industry that seeks to generate vast profits and anticipate or create the next trend.

In North America, culture began to experience its first signs of commodification and standardization in the mid-nineteenth century. Later, the spread of mass culture was hastened by the emergence of mass media and advertising, as new technologies like broadcasting became effective instruments of cultural standardization. Mass culture marginalized both folk culture and elite culture. As folk culture receded, the relative cultural autonomy that had characterized most North American communities was slowly ground down. Moreover, the elite's professed role as the arbiter of culture became increasingly tenuous.

From the very start, America emerged as the hub of mass culture. The new nation embraced technology and the mass age like no other, and, for many observers, mass culture and American culture became indissociable. This was certainly the case for Canadian conservatives, who saw the commodification and standardization of culture as an American poison. Mass culture appealed to the lowest common denominator; it was violent and sensual, and it only sought to entertain, not to educate and elevate. Worse still, conservatives argued that it corroded Canadian culture and the Dominion's more traditional way of life.

American intellectual culture did not fare any better. In imperialist and *nationaliste* commentary, Americans were often described as an unintelligent rube. As a result, the Republic's intellectual sterility was a popular theme in anti-American discourse. Most Canadian conservatives maintained that Americans were incapable of producing decent literature and journalism. "Des choses de l'esprit ils méprisent l'étude," wrote William Chapman in an 1898 poem.<sup>1</sup> Even the quality of American English was abysmally low. Materialism had corroded every possible aspect of the Republic's cultural life. And cultural endeavours, it was argued, should never be subordinated to commercial considerations. The United States, moreover, suffered from its premature separation from Europe, a continent which conservatives believed was the source of all proper culture.

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<sup>1</sup> William Chapman, *À propos de la Guerre hispano-américaine* (Quebec, 1898), 6.

In 1922, Victor Barbeau (1896-1994), who would spend most of his career teaching French language and literature at the *École des Hautes Études commerciales*, summed up the conservative stance on American culture in this oft-quoted passage from his irreverent *Cahiers de Turc*: “Regardons vers New York lorsqu’il s’agit de finances et vers Chicago lorsqu’il s’agit de cochons. Mais lorsqu’il y va de littérature, d’art, de science, de culture, rappelons-nous que les Dieux n’ont pas encore traversé l’Atlantique.”<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, anti-Americans were impressed by the Republic’s cultural infrastructure – orchestras, libraries, museums – but not by the content of its culture.<sup>3</sup>

American culture, it was argued, married vulgarity with technology. By the 1920s, it had acquired a new means of propagation: the radio. During the interwar years, conservatives railed against American radio and demanded that the federal government intervene to sanitize the Dominion’s airwaves. Indeed, not only were most Canadians able to pick up American signals over the air, but Canadian stations were eagerly retransmitting American programmes. The *nationalistes* feared that American radio would be an instrument of linguistic assimilation, but all conservatives worried about the moral content of American programmes. American stations, for instance, facilitated the spread of jazz, a form of entertainment that Lucien Desbiens (b. 1907) found utterly repugnant. In a 1936 article published in the *Revue dominicaine*, the junior editor of Montreal’s *Le Devoir*’s argued that jazz was more akin to noise than music:

Le jazz que nous servent le plus fréquemment les postes radiophoniques américains n’a pas été purifié par l’art de compositeurs remarquables, il n’est pas manié non plus par des musiciens mais des faiseurs de bruit quelconques. Ce qu’on nous sert est donc le jazz *original*, c’est-à-dire, selon Paul Whiteman – l’un des rénovateurs de musique syncopée – un bruit épileptique dans lequel s’immisce une musique informe et bête. J’invoque, de nouveau, ici, le témoignage de M. [Frédéric] Pelletier : “Le jazz persiste, sous sa forme primitive, dans la plupart des danses modernes où bêle un saxophone prostitué et où les

<sup>2</sup> Victor Barbeau, “La politique: La méthode américaine,” *Les Cahiers de Turc* V (1922): 34.

<sup>3</sup> There were exceptions to this rule. Moderate conservative Édouard Montpetit, for instance, praised America’s intellectual culture in a 1945 article published in *La Nouvelle Relève*: “L’Amérique s’européanise. Elle applique cet argent dont elle poursuit la conquête, à l’embellissement de la vie, au rayonnement de l’esprit; elle crée des œuvres qu’elle destine à l’enseignement du peuple: universités, écoles, musées. Elle retourne au passé que lui a donné l’Europe; la religion, la philosophie, la science y prennent un regain d’influence, font l’objet de nouvelles inquiétudes. Peut-être même y met-elle quelque excès, comme elle fait souvent, et ne distingue-t-elle pas parmi les tendances qui l’absorbent ce qu’elles offrent de hâtif.” [Montpetit, “Quantité et qualité,” *La Nouvelle Relève* IV (1945): 496-497.]



trompettes bouchées avec un chapeau sur le pavillon, grincent comme une égoïne rouillée, sur un tapage de banjo, le tout accompagné du *crooner* obligatoire.”<sup>4</sup>

In a similar vein, American movies were seen as a major source of low-brow depravity. Conservative intellectuals argued that Hollywood producers would stop at nothing in their race to appeal to the lowest common denominator. In a 1931 tirade against the raciness of American movies, the assistant editor of the Toronto *Star Weekly*, John Herries McCulloch (b. 1892), lamented that

Of all the monstrosities of the cinemas, the kiss is far and away the worst. It is revolting. Deliberately or unconsciously – it doesn’t matter which – Hollywood has made it symbolize sexual contact ... And as we become accustomed to it, our artistic senses are dulled, and we are made ready for the next crudity that will emanate from Hollywood. Who knows what these artistic trucksters may put on the screen? Will it be sexual perverts, invertes, and the like? I should not be surprised if the introduction of these perverted types – so common in the film world of the United States – were the next development of the Hollywood technique.<sup>5</sup>

Observations on the immoral nature of American cinema were also a staple of *nationaliste* anti-Americanism. In 1924, Harry Bernard warned the readers of *L’Action française* that Hollywood hypnotised moviegoers and made them yearn for material possessions. Even by *nationaliste* standards, Bernard’s elitism was particularly well developed. In his eyes, “le peuple” was barely sentient. As a result, it had neither the strength nor the intelligence to resist Hollywood’s mirage. And women were particularly at risk:

Le cinéma développera d’abord chez les adultes comme chez les jeunes, l’imagination la plus exaltée. Il tournera les têtes, excitera aux aventures romanesques ou violentes, contribuera à créer, dans toutes les classes de la société, un besoin de richesses et de luxe. C’est le peuple surtout, et dans le peuple l’élément féminin, qui sera le plus gâté. Pour le peuple, le cinéma, c’est en quelque sorte le rêve éveillé. Concrète, presque palpable, c’est la belle illusion que chacun, sans peut-être y croire beaucoup, conserve dans un recoin de

<sup>4</sup> Lucien Desbiens, “L’infiltration américaine par la radio,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 140.

<sup>5</sup> J. H. McCulloch, “Monstrosities of the Movies,” In *Open House*, ed. William Arthur Deacon and Wilfred Reeves (Ottawa, 1931), 47, 51-52.

l'âme. Le spectacle détachera l'être de la réalité vivante et de ses tristesses, pour le transporter dans un monde factice d'où il ne descendra qu'avec peine. Pour beaucoup, cette transposition dans l'irréel aura pour effet de rendre plus durs la vie et le renoncement qu'elle comporte.

Moreover, American movies misrepresented Canadian life. In a complaint familiar to twenty-first-century Canadians, Bernard lamented that

Non seulement [le cinéma américain] ignore tout de notre histoire, de notre vie nationale et de nos aspirations, mais, quand il affecte de s'intéresser à ce pays de neige qu'est le Canada, il le représente sous des couleurs fausses, ou n'en montre qu'un aspect, comme il arriva lors de l'engouement pour les histoires de la gendarmerie à cheval canadienne, à la suite des romans de James-Oliver Curwood et de Ralph Connor. Il nous rend en quelque sorte, auprès de l'étranger, le même mauvais service que *Maria Chapdelaine*.<sup>6</sup>

The son of a restless French Canadian businessman, Bernard was born in London, England, and attended school in Soissons, Paris, and St. Albans, Vermont. In 1906, his family returned to Canada and settled in Quebec's Eastern Townships before relocating to Saint-Hyacinthe, Quebec. From 1911 to 1919 Bernard studied at the Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe. His family moved to Boston in 1912 and Bernard trained briefly as a cadet officer in the American army during the summer of 1918. A year later, he entered the world of journalism at Ottawa's *Le Droit*. In 1923, he became the editor of the *Courier de Saint-Hyacinthe*, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1970. He was the founding editor of one of Quebec's most influential intellectual journals, *L'Action nationale*, from 1933 to 1934. In the early 1940s, Bernard received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to study literary regionalism in the United States, and his attitude towards American culture softened correspondingly. Indeed, though he continued to disapprove of mass culture in the United States, his eyes had been opened to the nation's literary and cultural accomplishments.

American professional sports, particularly boxing and baseball, were also the target of conservative criticism. Father Ceslas Forest led the charge in the *Revue dominicaine's* 1936 inquiry into "Notre américanisation." The influential Dominican believed that Americans had debased sport by turning it into a popular spectacle. Forest readily acknowledged that "le sport a pu rester longtemps une détente, une distraction; l'inactivité à laquelle nous

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<sup>6</sup> Harry Bernard, "L'ennemi dans la place: Théâtre et cinéma," *L'Action française* XII (1924): 75, 77.

condamne la vie moderne en a fait une véritable nécessité.” But Americans had turned sport into “un spectacle, une entreprise financière,” rather than a physical activity destined to keep the masses healthy. Worse still, “certains joueurs de base-ball s’achètent à prix d’or. Il en est qui reçoivent un salaire dépassant celui de n’importe quel juge et de n’importe quel président d’université. On a vu des boxeurs retirer de quelques minutes de combat plus que le Président des États-Unis ne reçoit durant tout son séjour à la Maison Blanche.” “Tout cela est malsain,” he continued, “c’est, dans l’esprit des jeunes, le renversement de l’échelle de valeurs.”<sup>7</sup> For conservative intellectuals, the incredible salaries paid to professional athletes in the United States was yet another sign of the status revolution that accompanied modernity. The modern world, it seemed, rewarded brawn over brain.

America had also turned the written word into mass entertainment. Indeed, anti-Americans frequently railed against the abject commercialization and the utter degradation of the Republic’s press. They believed that American newspapers and magazines had been reduced to mere forms of entertainment. For Jean Bruchési (1901-1979), the American magazine embodied the worst tendencies of yellow journalism. Born in Montreal, Bruchési was admitted to the Quebec bar in 1924, but never practiced law. Instead, he pursued graduate studies at the Sorbonne and taught history and political science at the Université de Montréal. A vocal supporter of the Union nationale, Bruchési was appointed to a key position within Quebec’s civil service in 1937 by Maurice Duplessis. In 1959, he was named Canadian ambassador to Franco’s Spain by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Like many *nationalistes* of his generation, Bruchési saw American culture as utterly debased. “S’il se rencontre encore, aux États-Unis, plusieurs magazines dont le ton et la forme littéraire rappellent les premières publications du genre,” he wrote in 1936, “la grande majorité des magazines américains est devenue synonyme d’une des formes les plus détestable et dangereuses de la réclame en faveur des manifestations les moins intéressantes des mœurs de nos voisins.” These included “l’apologie du crime, du divorce, de l’amour libre,” and “la glorification des étoiles de cinéma et des as du base-ball.”<sup>8</sup> Of course, the Canadian critique of American magazines was tied to a campaign to protect the Dominion’s periodicals from foreign competition. Moral outrage was good business for Canadian intellectuals. The literary nationalism of the Canadian Authors’ Association was, to be sure, the cultural equivalent of

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<sup>7</sup> Ceslas Forest, “Notre américanisation par les sports,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 350-352.

<sup>8</sup> Jean Bruchési, “Notre américanisation par le magazine,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 6, 9.

the self-serving economic nationalism of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association – both groups intended to protect Canadian producers from their American competitors.

More often, however, conservative intellectuals attacked the American newspaper. For abbé Henri d'Arles, the daily newspaper was an unfortunate victim of the mass age. Born Henri Beudet in Princeville, Quebec, d'Arles was educated at the Séminaire de Québec and entered the Dominican Order in 1889. Over the next several years, he served God in various Quebec and New England dioceses. He adopted the pseudonym Henri d'Arles during a 1906 trip to France. In 1912, he left the Dominican Order and settled in Manchester, New Hampshire, eventually becoming the chaplain of the Association canado-américaine, a Franco-American fraternal organization. He became an American citizen in 1924. A profound conservative, d'Arles' revolt against the mass age was at once moral, philosophical, and æsthetic. He believed that marketing and mass production had destroyed journalism in the United States. They had transformed an intellectual endeavour into a purely commercial enterprise. Quantity, it seemed, had triumphed over quality. In his *Essais et conférences* (1910) he painted a vivid portrait of journalism in New York City:

J'ai eu l'occasion de visiter, à différentes reprises, les plus grands ateliers de journaux de la métropole ... Et chaque fois, j'en ai remporté comme une impression de stupeur. Le mot atelier, pris dans son sens le plus matériel, convient admirablement ici. Quelles boutiques ce sont vraiment! Et qu'il y règne donc une activité prodigieuse, mais d'un ordre tout pratique! Derrière les comptoirs de l'administration se tiennent des Messieurs qui répondent froidement aux clients, prennent des notes, compulsent des registres, voient aux détails de l'expédition avec tout "l'intellectualisme" de commis de banques ou de garçons épiciers. A l'étage des presses, on voit toute une armée d'individus noirs comme des charbonniers, luisant d'huile, qui vont et viennent, suant, soufflant, le regard dur, l'expression concentrée, à travers cet entrecroisement de machines, les plus perfectionnées, les plus modernes, les plus puissantes et compliquées, capables, par exemple, d'imprimer, de plier, de trancher, plus d'un million de copies par jour. Quelle vision dantesque! Et quelle commotion tout cela produit-il! Quel bruit d'enfer! C'est à se croire dans un antre de titans! Je ne dis rien, du reste, des centaines de reporters affairés, des étourdissants appels téléphoniques, du tic-tac des télégraphes, de ces formidables et nauséabonds laboratoires où se préparent les gravures. En vérité, nous sommes en face de

l'une des manifestations les plus sensibles du caractère grandiose, ou mieux gigantesque, presque monstrueux, que revêt toujours, chez les Américains, l'esprit d'entreprise.<sup>9</sup>

An aesthete – some would have considered him a dandy – d'Arles found mass production repugnant. Most of his books were limited editions published with the highest standards of typography and bookbinding.

Like d'Arles, James Cappon also believed that abject commercialism had destroyed journalism in the United States. In a 1911 article denouncing "Hearst journalism," he lamented that the American newspaper's sensationalism was designed to appeal to the lowest common denominator, rather than to uplift and educate the masses:

American journalism is certainly a triumph of modern organisation. Its immense tentacles reach everywhere and ferret out everything that will interest the public legitimately or illegitimately, and its manner of vivifying and exploiting its news by startling headlines, dramatic and somewhat imaginative interviews, etc., is, if not in the best Greek taste, full of a comforting humanity ... Of course, a good deal of American journalism has a strong streak of yellow in it. Its weakness is its tendency to publish any rubbish of a novel or sensational sort, but even this has its attractiveness, its utility as throwing light on obscure and peculiar tendencies in the national mind or character.<sup>10</sup>

Stephen Leacock, for his part, denounced "the literary sterility of America." This was a recurring theme in anti-American thought. Americans, it was argued, simply could not write. Leacock was therefore not alone in believing that "the quantity of American literature – worthy of the name – produced in the last one hundred years is notoriously small." Furthermore, he wrote in 1909, "its quality is disappointingly thin." It was Britain, not America, that had produced "the great bulk of our reputable common literature of the past one hundred years." Above all, Leacock believed that Americans (and Canadians) were not a literary people. Their education system was too utilitarian to foster the growth of literary genius. Worse still, the affluence and materialism of American life was simply not conducive to the development of great literature. In the United States, Leacock remarked, "all less tangible and proveable forms of human merit, and less tangible aspirations of the human mind are rudely shouldered aside by business ability and commercial success." What's more,

<sup>9</sup> Henri d'Arles, "Le journalisme américain," in his *Essais et conférences* (Quebec, 1910), 18-19.

<sup>10</sup> James Cappon, "Current Events: A Glance at the Surface: Hearst Journalism," *Queen's Quarterly* XVIII (1911): 251.

he argued that “literature and progress-happiness-and-equality are antithetical terms.” As a result,

American civilization with its public school and the dead level of its elementary instruction, with its simple code of republicanism and its ignorance of the glamour and mystery of monarchy, with its bread and work for all and its universal hope of the betterment of personal fortune, contains in itself an atmosphere in which the flower of literature cannot live. It is at least conceivable that this flower blossoms most beautifully in the dark places of the world, among that complex of tyranny and heroism, of inexplicable cruelty and sublime suffering that is called history. Perhaps this literary sterility of America is but the mark of the new era that is to come not to America alone, but to the whole of our western civilization; the era in which humanity, fed to satiety and housed and warmed to the point of somnolence, with its wars abolished and its cares removed, may find that it has lost from among it that supreme gift of literary inspiration which was the comforter of its darker ages.<sup>11</sup>

Once again, modernity and intellectual endeavours were seen as incompatible by Canadian intellectuals. But the Canadian critique of American intellectual culture did not end there. Indeed, the quality of American English spawned a great deal of criticism among Canadian Tories. Americans, it was argued, did not speak properly. Their pronunciation was atrocious and their spelling was appalling. In 1942, while still an unknown quantity in the field of literary theory, Northrop Frye (1912-1991) lamented that

Untold millions of Americans tawk through their nowses and hawnk like fahghorns; some whine like flying shells; some sputter and gargle like cement mixers. The average American pronunciation of “yes” or “now” is hardly a human sound at all. Bad speakers, however, are not yet outcasts; they are not yet in the position of the stinking innocents of the soap ads, whose friends can smell them but can’t tell them.<sup>12</sup>

The Canadian critique of American English was generally tied to a desire to attach Canadian English to its British parent. Imperialists were always quick to point out even the minutest

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<sup>11</sup> Stephen Leacock, “Literature and Education in America,” *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 3, 13, 16-17; “The Psychology of American Humour,” *University Magazine* VI (1907): 57-58.

<sup>12</sup> Northrop Frye, “Reflections at a Movie,” *Canadian Forum* XXII (1942): 212.

divergences between American and Canadian English and, unlike their continentalists opponents, they usually made a point of using British spelling in their publications.

The continentalist defence of American culture rarely included a plea for mass culture – continentalists were, after all, also intellectuals. That said, they did defend the instruments of American mass culture, which they inevitably portrayed as possible means of intellectual upliftment. For instance, the most significant Canadian playwright of the interwar years, Merrill Denison (1894-1975), defended the promise of American radio in a 1931 collection of essays:

United States radio programs are claimed to exert a deplorably bad cultural influence. Is this actually a fact? I doubt it. The reverse is true, it seems to me. Consider, for a moment, this much discussed matter of musical taste and appreciation. There can be no question that both are improving, and that thousands of people today can enjoy music that they would neither have tolerated nor understood three years ago.<sup>13</sup>

Born in Detroit of a Canadian mother and an American father, Denison studied architecture at the Universities of Toronto and Pennsylvania before turning to writing. He wrote several plays for Toronto's Hart House Theatre and was a leading figure in the Little Theatre movement. His plays often cast a satirical gaze at Canadian life. Denison also made a significant contribution to the development of North American radio drama.

Continentalists often tried to highlight the intellectual vigour of the Republic's elite. During the interwar years, notes Graham Carr, continentalists believed that "American writing had overtaken British writing at the cutting-edge of English-language literature."<sup>14</sup> Some earlier observers believed that America's cultural takeoff was yet to come. In *L'âme américaine* (1900), Edmond de Nevers acknowledged that "à l'heure qu'il est, quelles que soient les perspectives de l'avenir, il faut admettre que la partie du bilan de 1900 relative aux conquêtes scientifiques, littéraires et artistiques ne sera pas brillante." Nevertheless, he continued, "ce pays est en état de croissance, les idées, les principes qu'on lui inculquera se développeront avec lui, telles les lettres gravées sur l'écorce d'un jeune arbre grandissent

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<sup>13</sup> Merrill Denison, "Thoughts on Radio," In *Open House*, 115.

<sup>14</sup> Graham Carr, "All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 149.

avec cet arbre.”<sup>15</sup> America was a new nation; it still had plenty of time to develop a vibrant intellectual and cultural life.

Unlike their anti-American adversaries, a number of continentalists believed that the Republic’s intellectual emancipation from Europe was the necessary precondition to its cultural development. In the conclusion to *L’âme américaine*, Edmond de Nevers warned that “le grand obstacle qui s’oppose à l’avènement de l’état de liberté absolue auquel doivent aspirer tous les patriotes sincères, c’est le vasselage intellectuel dans lequel l’Amérique se trouve encore vis-à-vis de l’Europe et surtout de l’Angleterre.”<sup>16</sup> Decades later, in 1941, E. G. Faludi, an architect and urban planner whose postwar designs would leave a permanent imprint on Toronto’s urban landscape, anticipated that “the influence of the European culture on the American continent will slowly cease.” American affluence and innovation would then propel the United States to the forefront of the artistic world. “America will become the centre of art,” he confidently predicted in the *Canadian Forum*. Moreover, The Republic’s widespread affluence would contribute to an artistic boom: “In America, there are no limitations. There are free masses which are in considerably better economic conditions than the Europeans and there are now 140 millions all speaking the same language and having the same understanding for many human feelings, expressions and actions. *These masses will be the greatest consumer market for artists ever known in history.*”<sup>17</sup>

Likewise, some continentalists noted that America’s literate masses were an extraordinary market for the written word. In 1896, A. D. DeCelles, who had spent his early career as a journalist in Quebec City, marvelled at the American newspaper’s ability to reach and inform the masses:

Sur le terrain du journalisme la supériorité des Américains sur leurs concurrents s’affirme sans conteste. Sous la poussée de leur génie entreprenant, la feuille éphémère a pris un développement en rapport avec la soif de savoir qui dévore leur société enfiévrée. L’information complète, intense, n’a pas de secret pour le *reporter américain*, inventeur de l’*interview* et pour qui rien n’est sacré, pas même la vie privée, fouillée à fond par cet impitoyable chercheur de potins et nouvelles. Il faut voir le tirage spécial des grands journaux du samedi, avec leurs vingt-cinq pages de petit texte, leurs cent colonnes

<sup>15</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L’âme américaine*, vol. II (Paris, 1900), 279-280.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 387.

<sup>17</sup> E. G. Faludi, “America and Modern Art,” *Canadian Forum* XXI (1941): 75-76.



d'articles, portant sur les sujets les plus variés. Le journal devait, certes, atteindre ce prodigieux développement dans un pays où l'instruction s'est infiltrée partout.<sup>18</sup>

Of course, American mass culture had its continentalist detractors. But unlike their anti-American opponents, they were always quick to point out the essentially continental nature of Canadian cultural and intellectual life. Canadians, after all, possessed the same cultural tastes as Americans, and were correspondingly drawn to American mass culture. Goldwin Smith, for instance, believed that Canadian journalism shared much of the appeal and many of the weaknesses of its American counterpart:

The Canadian Press is, in the main, American not English in character. It aims at the lightness, smartness, and crispness of New York journalism rather than at the solidity of the London *Times*. There is an interchange of writers with New York. Enterprise in the collection of gossip and scandal is now a feature of the press in all countries and everywhere bears the same relation to taste and truth.<sup>19</sup>

Continentalists defended American English with a little more vigour. After all, Canadian English was basically American in its pronunciation and syntax. In a 1926 article published in the *Queen's Quarterly*, lexicographer Henry Alexander (1890-1975) paid tribute to the "free inventive faculty at work in American vocabulary and idiom." "The really valuable and vital contribution of American popular speech to the language," he wrote, "is shown by the coinage of a great number of vivid phrases, many of which are the products of real linguistic genius."<sup>20</sup> Similarly, in the preface to his *New Dictionary of Americanisms* (1902), Sylva Clapin, who worked as a translator at the Canadian House of Commons from 1902 to 1921, praised American English. He believed that the English spoken in Canada and the United States was a distinct improvement on its British parent:

As regards the great bulk of the people of the United States, there can be no question but that they speak purer and more idiomatic English than do the masses in the Old Country. In every State of the Union, the language of the inhabitants can be understood without the slightest difficulty. This is more than can be said of the dialects of the peasantry in various parts of England, these being in many instances perfectly unintelligible to a stranger.

<sup>18</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), 376.

<sup>19</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 50-51.

<sup>20</sup> Henry Alexander, "Is there an American Language?" *Queen's Quarterly* XXXIV (1926): 200-201.

Again, the fluency of expression and command of language possessed by Americans, even in the humbler ranks of life, form a marked contrast to the poverty of speech of the same class in England, where, as an eminent philologist has declared, a very considerable proportion of the agricultural population habitually make use of a vocabulary not exceeding 300 words.<sup>21</sup>

Clapin's argument was a continentalist classic. Indeed, he skilfully turned anti-American rhetoric on its head by arguing that Britain, not America, suffered from poor English. The implication was clear: the New World had improved upon the Old. Continentalists saw great promise in the modern world. Modernity and newness were not to be feared, because both man and society were viewed as inherently perfectible.

### *Religion*

Modernity marginalizes religion, and established religion in particular. In its liberal form, it is quite tolerant of religious devotion, but rejects religious absolutes. As a result, the modern ethos refuses to accept that a particular religion or denomination possesses a monopoly on truth. The religious constellation, liberals believe, is marked by a fair degree of moral equivalency.

These ideas were anathema to Canadian conservatives, particularly in Quebec. Indeed, traditionalism is inherently theocentric, and it cannot embrace a truly secular outlook. Yet the United States, conservatives believed, was the very embodiment of secular modernity. America was a worldly society where faith was marginal; it was a secular nation in every sense of the word. In their writing, conservative intellectuals often contrasted American worldliness with Canadian spiritualism. Once again, anti-Americanism served to affirm the essentially conservative nature of Canadian society.

By and large, anti-American sentiment was strongest among the followers of the least evangelical forms of Christianity – Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism – whose conservative theology placed a great deal of emphasis on order and hierarchy. More than a few anti-Americans, including Donald Creighton, were also sons of the manse. In contrast, continentalism was most prevalent among intellectuals who were raised in or practiced nonconformist Christianity. The Quaker upbringing of James T. Shotwell, for instance, appears to have played an important role in the development of his principled

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<sup>21</sup> Sylva Clapin, *A New Dictionary of Americanisms* (New York, 1902), vi.

internationalism and pacifism. Religious free thinkers like Goldwin Smith were common in continentalist circles, and continentalism appears to have held a particular appeal for agnostics and spiritual eccentrics – religious syncretism and continentalism went hand in hand for Theosophist literary critic William Arthur Deacon (1890-1977). In Quebec, anticlericalism and continentalism were undoubtedly correlated. Indeed, impious dissidents like Louis-Honoré Fréchette and Jean-Charles Harvey invariably professed a deep admiration for American secularism.

For French Canadian nationalists, the critique of American faith – or lack thereof – and of Protestantism was indissociable. America was a secular nation, but it was also an essentially Protestant nation. And Protestantism, the *nationalistes* believed, was worldly faith. It encouraged individualism, materialism, and secularism, which in turn spawned religious indifference. In 1930, Georges-Marie Bilodeau (1895-1966), a Roman Catholic missionary in the Canadian West, argued that American spiritualism had been thoroughly vitiated by Protestant materialism:

L'Américain relègue l'idéal à l'arrière-plan; son but premier, c'est de faire de l'argent pour vivre, puis s'amuser. Le côté moral ne l'intéresse guère si ce n'est dans la mesure où il peut favoriser l'acquisition des richesses. Ce n'est pas toujours un athée, mais le côté surnaturel de la religion ne le préoccupe pas. D'ailleurs il est issu du protestantisme dont le principe fondamental repose sur la foi seule, sans les œuvres. Le libre examen, autre principe protestant le pousse à se faire une religion à lui, et c'est ainsi que le naturalisme toujours croissant, selon l'attrait de la nature viciée, en fait pratiquement un païen. Ce n'est pas un secret que près de la moitié de la population des États-Unis n'a pas été baptisée.<sup>22</sup>

In a similar vein, Lionel Groulx warned in 1928 that “ce peuple de 120 millions d'hommes” was ravaged by “tous les microbes de son néo-paganisme.” “N'est-il pas en train de s'acheminer vers une civilisation athée,” he asked, “n'admettant d'autres lois que la dure loi des surhommes économiques, d'autres fins que la jouissance sensuelle ou l'élevage des meilleures races de l'animal humain?”<sup>23</sup> The last segment was a jab at the practice of eugenics in the United States, which Groulx found deeply troubling. By the late 1920s, the abbé's influence over Quebec's nationalist movement was nearing its summit. Appointed

<sup>22</sup> Georges-Marie Bilodeau, “L'américanisme,” *La Voix nationale* III (1930): 6.

<sup>23</sup> Lionel Groulx, *Nos responsabilités intellectuelles* (Montreal, 1928), 25-26. Groulx borrowed the expression “néo-paganisme” from Lucien Romier's *Qui sera le maître, Europe ou Amérique?* (Paris, 1927).

professor of Canadian history at the Montreal campus of Université Laval in 1915, his position at the university only became permanent after he resigned as the editor of the combative *L'Action française*, whose positions on a number of issues had upset the Liberal provincial government of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau. Undeterred, Groulx played a key role in the 1933 creation of *L'Action nationale*, a journal whose nationalism was no less combative.

The *nationalistes* were hardly alone in criticising American worldliness. Imperialists also believed that the Republic had lost its moral and spiritual compass. Their critique of religious practice in the United States, however, was far more moderate, and obviously did not include an anti-Protestant component. Stephen Leacock, for instance, poked a good deal of fun at the religious practices of the American elite in his 1914 *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich*. In his humorous sketches, the wealthy socialites of Plutoria Avenue practiced an utterly superficial form of Christianity. They measured faith in dollars and cents, complained that their pastor's sermons were "always so frightfully full of religion," and were enthralled with "Oriental Occultism."<sup>24</sup> Born into an Anglican family in Swanmore, England, Leacock was not a particularly devout Christian. Nevertheless, he was critical of the hollow religion of the 'leisure class.'

During the interwar years, the very state of American Protestantism worried many imperialists. America's various Protestant denominations, they believed, were drifting further and further apart. Some sects had become horribly worldly, while others were embracing an apocalyptic brand of fundamentalism. In the wake of the 1925 Scopes Trial, Reverend Robert Falconer expressed great concern at the rise of Protestant fundamentalism in the United States:

A disconcerting phenomenon of the religious life of the western world is the extraordinary reaction to which the name "Fundamentalism" has been given. The fundamentalist appeals to the authority of post-reformation Confessions and lives theologically in an era of arrested development. Though this attitude of mind is found in all countries, it is relatively much stronger in the United States than elsewhere. Churches are being riven twain and some fear a permanent cleavage in American Protestantism.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Stephen Leacock, *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* (New York, 1914), 154, 239.

<sup>25</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 184-185. Protestant fundamentalism in the United States was almost universally denounced by Canada's intellectuals.

Born in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Falconer spent much of his youth in the West Indian island of Trinidad, where his father, a Presbyterian clergyman, had been posted. He was himself ordained a minister of the Presbyterian Church in 1892. Shortly thereafter, he joined the faculty of Pine Hill College, Halifax, where he taught New Testament Greek and New Testament Exegesis. He was appointed the college's principal in 1904. Like many Canadian imperialists, Falconer was a religious moderate and a proponent of church union. The idea of denominational schism and estrangement pained him.

Lionel Groulx was equally concerned by the rise of Protestant fundamentalism in 1920s America, but for different reasons. He warned that "la secte la plus nombreuse et la plus agissante, celle des calvinistes," was "écartelée par deux tendances adverses, celle des modernistes en train de vider la vie religieuse de tout dogme et de tout rite, et celle des fondamentalistes qui, tout autant qu'une religion, figure une réaction nationaliste anglo-saxonne contre les races et les croyances étrangères."<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the *nationalistes* were very concerned about the rise of anti-Catholic nativism in interwar America. "Au point de vue religieux," Hermas Bastien wrote in 1936, "les Américains se partagent entre l'agnosticisme et les divers sectes protestantes." And the only thing that seemed to unite this hodgepodge of agnostics and Protestants, was "un mépris profond des catholiques, dont la religion est celle des *aliens*."<sup>27</sup> A prolific author whose work has been more or less ignored by French Canadian intellectual historians, Hermas Bastien was the first French Canadian writer to produce a major study of American philosophy. His *Philosophies et philosophes américains* (1959) was the culmination of over thirty years of research on the subject.

The persecution of American Catholics was a recurring theme in French Canadian commentary, and many intellectuals insisted on the limits of religious freedom in the United States. "L'Église d'Amérique est libre," wrote Jules-Paul Tardivel in 1900, "tant qu'elle ne sort pas de chez elle, de ses conciles, de ses temples, de ses écoles. Mais quelque désir qu'elle ait de se faire petite, de s'effacer, de se confondre avec la foule des sectes, il lui faut, nécessairement, prendre contact avec les pouvoirs publics. Et alors commence la véritable persécution." Indeed, he continued, "l'esprit public et les pouvoirs publics sont hostiles à l'Église et aux catholiques." Roman Catholics, Tardivel noted, were effectively barred from such highly symbolic offices as the presidency:

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<sup>26</sup> Groulx, *Nos responsabilités intellectuelles*, 29.

<sup>27</sup> Hermas Bastien, "L'américanisation par la philosophie," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 202.

C'est une loi non écrite, comme on dit en anglais – *an unwritten law* – mais une loi inflexible, que le président des États-Unis ne peut pas être un catholique. Il y aura peut-être un roi catholique en Angleterre avant qu'il y ait un président catholique à Washington. Aucun parti politique ne songerait à proposer un catholique au poste de premier magistrat de la République. Si, par impossible, un des partis faisait une telle proposition, il serait littéralement balayé aux élections comme une vile poussière. On ne peut pas se figurer un *catholique* ou un *nègre* président des États-Unis. C'est une impossibilité morale.<sup>28</sup>

Many *nationalistes* were also convinced that American society bred religious indifference and even apostasy among Roman Catholics. Jules-Paul Tardivel, for instance, believed that America's social and religious environment was noxious to Catholicism:

L'Église des États-Unis a perdu certainement plus de la moitié de ses enfants; peut-être les deux tiers ... Ils sont morts empoisonnés par l'air vicié qu'on respire aux États-Unis. Voilà la vérité. L'atmosphère morale de la grande République, 'l'ambiance,' comme on dit, est chargée de miasmes qui affaiblissent et tuent les âmes, comme les germes morbides qui flottent dans l'air de certaines régions, la malaria, les émanations marécageuses, font périr les corps.<sup>29</sup>

Tardivel also argued that American society bred unorthodox Catholicism. Indeed, his ultramontane essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* (1900) read like a veritable catalogue of heretical transgressions perpetrated by some members of the American clergy. For Tardivel, 'Americanism' was hardly a phantom heresy; it was a very real movement led by a number of American bishops who sought adapt Catholicism to the modern world. This was, of course, completely unacceptable to the editor of *La Vérité*, who was a fervent opponent of religious modernism.

French Canadian nationalists insisted that Roman Catholicism alone could preserve America from complete degeneracy. However, some disagreed with Tardivel's pessimistic assessment of "la situation religieuse aux États-Unis." "Divorce, enseignement neutre et socialisme, voilà bien les trois plaies sociales qui menacent de ruiner complètement, de nos jours, les forces vitales de la république américaine," warned abbé Antonio Huot in 1908. Nevertheless, "l'Église catholique se dresse, dans toute la majesté de son immuable doctrine,

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<sup>28</sup> Jules-Paul Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* (Montreal, 1900), 90-91, 111.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

pour barrer la route à ces trois ennemis de l'ordre social."<sup>30</sup> Despite a number of setbacks, Huot claimed that Catholicism was advancing in America. Ordained in 1899, the abbé taught philosophy at the Séminaire de Québec in 1900 and 1901, but resigned due to ill-health. He spent the next decade in Mississippi and became the editor of the *Semaine religieuse de Québec* sometime after his return to Canada.

The continentalist response to the conservative critique of America's religious atmosphere was relatively muted. By and large, continentalists praised American religious freedom – “religious persecution is not to be feared in any part of the Union,” insisted Louis-Honoré Fréchette in 1893<sup>31</sup> – but did not linger on the issue. The continentalist ethos was indeed too ideologically diverse to present a common position on religious affairs; some continentalists were fervent Christians, while others were downright antireligious.

There was some debate in continentalist circles concerning the state of American faith. For instance, A. D. DeCelles believed, like Tocqueville, that religious conviction was strong in the United States. “Une autre force milite chez nos voisins en faveur de l'ordre,” he remarked in 1896, “c'est le sentiment religieux qui pénètre encore toutes les classes de la société et qui s'affirme dans les circonstances un peu importantes de la vie nationale.” And though he conceded that “la religion protestante, de pratique si facile, est parfois une affaire de mode et de convenance pour un grand nombre,” he nonetheless believed that “le sentiment religieux ... inspire de près et de loin le respect à toute la population.”<sup>32</sup> DeCelles' contemporary, Edmond de Nevers, disagreed. He claimed in 1900 that “aux États-Unis, quoi qu'en disent les optimistes, les religions sont en décadence; dans tous les cultes se sont accumulées des ruines, un vent de scepticisme et d'indifférence souffle sur les consciences.”<sup>33</sup> A conservative liberal, de Nevers was hardly ultramontane. Yet like many traditionalists, he firmly believed that widespread irreligion was a threat to the American Republic. Unlike Louis-Honoré Fréchette, whose anticlericalism was a source of irritation to Québec's Roman Catholic clergy, de Nevers and DeCelles showed a great deal of respect for the Church. By and large, their work did not offend the sensibilities of the province's conservative and clerical elite.

<sup>30</sup> Antonio Huot, “Aux États-Unis: Les échos d'un centenaire.” *La Revue canadienne* New Series, II (1908): 172-173.

<sup>31</sup> L.-H. Fréchette, “The United States for French Canadians,” *Forum* XVI (1893): 344. “On the contrary,” Fréchette continued, “the Roman Catholic form of worship there enjoys the most complete liberty, and its priests are as highly considered and esteemed as in Canada, and that, in short, nothing prevents an American citizen from being as good a Catholic as any English subject.” [Ibid.]

<sup>32</sup> DeCelles, *Les États-Unis*, 402-403.

<sup>33</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, II, 143.

Radical continentalists held a dimmer view of religion's role in American life. In a 1936 article published in the far-left *New Frontier*, William Lawson denounced "the bigoted Protestants of the southern states" and railed against Roman Catholic agitator Father Charles Coughlin. Coughlin, he claimed, was a dangerous fascist who aimed to foment a war between the United States and "two friendly powers, the Soviet Union and Mexico."<sup>34</sup> Yet *New Frontier* was not an anti-American publication; its editorial policy was hostile to religion everywhere.

More often, however, English Canadian continentalists simply noted that Canada and the United States shared a fair amount when it came to religious affairs. Like many scholars of his generation, the president of the Canadian Historical Association, Fred Landon (1880-1969), was eager to show that contemporary Canadian-American convergence was rooted in history. In a 1941 monograph on *Western Ontario and the American Frontier*, he remarked that "American influences upon the religious life and denominational characteristics of Upper Canada were widespread and their effects were often permanent in character." In fact, Landon continued, "the two most distinctively evangelistic sects, the Methodists and the Baptists, first entered the province from the United States, and though each increased its membership at a later date through immigration from the British Isles the American characteristics persisted for a long time."<sup>35</sup> Goldwin Smith also believed that Canada and the United States shared a common religious culture. "The Canadian churches are in full communion with their American sisters, and send delegates to each other's assemblies," he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, in his controversial essay, Smith listed religious affinities among the factors that would facilitate continental union.

### Education

Like religion, American education generated a great deal of commentary in the Dominion. Many Canadian intellectuals were educators, and in their eyes, American schools and colleges embodied a distinctly new form of learning. American education was viewed as secular, egalitarian, and utilitarian. This, of course, could only draw the ire of Canadian conservatives, who held these values in low regard. Education, they believed, was a moral and spiritual endeavour whose main purpose was to separate the wheat from the chaff and,

<sup>34</sup> William Lawson, "Father Coughlin," *New Frontier* I (1936): 26.

<sup>35</sup> Fred Landon, *Western Ontario and the American Frontier* (Toronto and New Haven, 1941), 75.

<sup>36</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 55.



ultimately, to prepare an elite for the challenges of leadership. Education was not a purely utilitarian undertaking, however, and both imperialists and *nationalistes* agreed that a classical education was the most suitable method to forge moral and intellectual leaders.

Anti-American tendencies were often reinforced by a British education. This is not to say that Oxford, Cambridge, or Edinburgh were necessarily hotbeds of anti-American sentiment. Indeed, a number of continentalists, including F. R. Scott and P. E. Corbett, studied in Britain. Rather, a British education tended to reinforce imperialist sentiment among English Canadian intellectuals which, in turn, almost invariably strengthened pre-existing anti-American sentiment. At any rate, Canadian intellectuals hardly needed to study in Britain in order to cultivate anti-American prejudice. Anti-Americanism thrived in the Dominion's schools and universities. Upper Canada College, for instance, was a breeding ground for anti-American sentiment, particularly under the headmastership of George R. Parkin, who ran the college at the turn of the twentieth century. Likewise, Quebec's classical colleges all appear to have been disseminating some form of anti-Americanism.<sup>37</sup>

The secularism embodied in American education was most fiercely resisted in Quebec, where the entire school system rested on a confessional base. And secularism's most forceful French Canadian opponent was none other than Jules-Paul Tardivel. In his turn-of-the-twentieth century essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, Tardivel lashed out at American common schools: "Il y a peut-être une chose que l'Europe a réellement empruntée à l'Amérique: le principe radicalement faux et souverainement funeste qui fait de l'éducation de l'enfance une fonction de l'État, une œuvre politique; doctrine qui, entre les mains de la franc-maçonnerie, nous a conduits à l'école sans DIEU."<sup>38</sup> The state, he believed, had no real role to play in education. The moral and intellectual edification of children was the responsibility of their parents and of the Roman Catholic Church. Education, Tardivel argued, should be founded on a moral and spiritual base. To reject this assumption was to flirt with disaster. Indeed, he firmly believed that modern, American-style secular education produced morally stunted nonbelievers who were drawn to crime and perversion. These ideas were widely held in pre-1945 Quebec's intellectual circles.

Some *nationalistes* believed that American education was not only secular; it was, at times, blasphemous. Darwinian theory, they noted, was taught in many American schools

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<sup>37</sup> The anti-American tendencies of the *cours classique* are discussed in André Laurendeau, "Connaissance des États-Unis," *L'Enseignement secondaire XXI* (1941): 203-208.

<sup>38</sup> Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis*, 153.

and colleges. Father M.-A. Lamarche, for instance, was absolutely scandalized by the scientific curriculum of many American universities. “En biologie prévaut uniquement le système de l’évolution sans Dieu, où disparaît toute idée de création,” he wrote in 1936. “Tout phénomène vital, y compris la pensée, a pour cause une mutation chimique dans l’organisme. Le droit à l’avortement et au suicide en découle naturellement.”<sup>39</sup> *Nationaliste* assumptions about secularism and Darwinism were not necessarily shared by their imperialist contemporaries. By the early twentieth century, most imperialists had embraced common schools and had more or less accepted Darwinian theory as objective truth. Reverend Robert Falconer, for instance, was a delegate to the 1909 centenary celebration of the birth of Charles Darwin held in Cambridge, England.

When it came to criticising the egalitarian and utilitarian aspects of American education, however, there was greater consensus among Canadian conservatives. The American system, they believed, was too concerned with elevating the masses and with the schooling of women. American attempts at coeducation were particularly criticised in Quebec, where higher education for Catholic women did not emerge until the *École d’enseignement supérieur pour jeunes filles* (later renamed the *Collège Marguerite-Bourgeoys*) was founded in 1908. The whole issue upset a number of conservatives. Coeducation, it was argued, destabilized both the education process and society in general. Women were a disruptive presence on campus because they were distraction to male students. Besides, higher education was assumed to be unsuitable for women, and admitting women into colleges and universities was viewed as a step towards gender equality, which most pre-1945 conservatives resisted fiercely. In a 1902 pamphlet on American colleges, abbé Henri d’Arles offered a comprehensive critique of coeducation:

Un grand nombre de ces collèges sont mixtes, c’est-à-dire que jeunes gens et jeunes filles y sont également admis, y sont soumis au même régime, y suivent les mêmes cours. Le “Bates,” de Lewiston, se glorifie d’avoir inauguré ce système, qui n’a pas tardé à se répandre par tous les États-Unis, et le premier réalisé parfaitement cet “idéal” d’éducation qui semble à plus d’un le suprême progrès, le plus magnifique produit de la civilisation moderne ... Si nous nous plaçons au seul point de vue des études d’abord, il ne nous paraît pas que la constitution mentale de la femme soit propre à des matières surtout faites pour l’esprit positif, froid et raisonneur de l’homme et s’adapte à un programme de cours

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<sup>39</sup> M.-A. Lamarche, “Notre américanisation: Aperçus complémentaires et mot de la fin,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 254-255.

classique ... D'ailleurs, quoiqu'en pensent les féministes, ce n'est pas du tout comprendre le rôle social de la femme, tel que voulu par Dieu, sa mission, sa vocation dans le monde, que de la préparer, par ces sortes d'études, à sortir de sa sphère naturelle d'influence et d'action, et, non pas à aider l'homme, plus tard, mais à le supplanter, non pas à en être la compagne accomplie, mais le compagnon, l'égal absolu dans l'exercice de ces professions libérales, autrefois regardées comme son inaliénable domaine. Pareille œuvre nous semble être une déformation du plan divin.<sup>40</sup>

But the democratism of American schools and colleges did not end with coeducation. The American system, conservatives argued, was also excessively focussed on educating and elevating the lowest common denominator. This, of course, could only be done at the expense of the elite. Even moderate conservatives like University of Toronto president Robert Falconer lashed out at what they saw as American attempts at class levelling. Falconer, indeed, was not a fervent critic of American education. His imperialism was essentially moderate and barely anti-American. Yet he rejected American education as altogether too democratic and utilitarian:

Democracy as it exists in America is willing to educate the masses but is careless of the few who must be carried to a high degree of proficiency. The maintenance of the humanities is especially difficult, as also of the abstract disciplines of pure science, the processes of history and speculative thought. A tradition must be established for their transmission and a large society of receptive minds be created for their comprehension.<sup>41</sup>

Falconer was, without a doubt, a conservative educator. Appointed president of the University of Toronto in the wake of a 1906 royal commission recommending the complete reorganization of the university, he thoroughly reformed its structure during his twenty-five year presidency. The fundamental purpose of higher education, Falconer wrote in 1925, was "the cultivation of those who are to become the intellectual leaders of the people." And the "mass production" of college graduates in the United States endangered his elitist conception of education.<sup>42</sup> Andrew Macphail was of the same opinion. In a 1910 collection of essays, he praised the British education system for its elitism and derided American attempts to elevate the masses:

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<sup>40</sup> [Henri d'Arles], *Esquisse des collèges américains* [Lewiston, Maine, 1902], [9-10].

<sup>41</sup> Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour*, 236.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 236-237.

The main result of the English method was that boys with minds which were capable of improvement were educated and became leaders of men. The boys without such minds were relegated to their own place without loss of time to their teachers or waste of their own. The aim of the American method is to bring the whole mass up to the same level, with the result that there are few leaders and many ill-educated. This principle finds its ultimate expression in those schools which are designed for the instruction of the imbecile, and the re-education, as it is called, of those who have lost their reason by accident or disease.<sup>43</sup>

Along with Macphail, Stephen Leacock emerges as one of Canada's most influential critics of American education. A graduate of Upper Canada College and the University of Toronto, Leacock joined UCC's faculty in 1889. He left the college in 1898 to pursue doctoral studies in political economy at the University of Chicago. After receiving his degree, he returned to Canada and was appointed lecturer in economics and political science at McGill University. In 1907, with the active encouragement of Governor-General Lord Grey, Leacock embarked on a triumphant and lucrative lecture tour of the British Empire to promote imperial unity. A year later, he was named professor of political science at McGill and head of the department, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1936. Like Falconer, Leacock rejected American education as too utilitarian and specialized. "The older view of education," he wrote in 1909, "which is rapidly passing away in America, but which is still dominant in the great Universities of England, aimed at a wide and humane culture of the intellect." This was not the goal of modern North American educators. "Our American system," Leacock continued, "pursues a different path. It breaks up the field of knowledge into many departments, subdivides these into special branches and sections, and calls upon the scholar to devote himself to a microscopic activity in some part of a section of a branch of a department of the general field of learning." As a result, "the American student's ignorance of all things except his own part of his own subject has grown colossal ... The unused parts of his intellect have ossified."<sup>44</sup> As far as Leacock was concerned, only a broad curriculum based on the classical humanities could be used to educate young minds.

Leacock also stands out as the Dominion's most humorous critic of American education. In his *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich*, he mocked modern pedagogy in

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<sup>43</sup> Andrew Macphail, "The Fallacy in Education," in his *Essays in Fallacy* (London, 1910), 116.

<sup>44</sup> Leacock, "Literature and Education in America," 8-9.

the United States. His fictional Plutoria University was the quintessence of progressive education. It admitted women and “offered such a vast variety of themes, topics, and subjects to the students, that there was nothing that a student was compelled to learn.” Its president, Dr. Boomer, had done away with classical studies and spent his days chasing endowments. As embodied by Plutoria, the modern university was a spiritual and intellectual wasteland:

But the change both of name and of character from Concordia College to Plutoria University was the work of President Boomer. He had changed it from an old-fashioned college of the by-gone type to a university in the true modern sense. At Plutoria they now taught everything. Concordia College, for example, had no teaching of religion except lectures on the Bible. They now had lectures also on Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, with an optional course on atheism for students in the final year.<sup>45</sup>

The gradual abandonment of the classics in American colleges and universities worried more than a few conservative educators. The classical curriculum, they argued, put students into contact with the foundations of western civilization, while modern, utilitarian education was utterly soulless. The classical system produced intellectuals; the modern system bred automatons. American educators, conservatives believed, valued sport and physical conditioning as much as moral and intellectual advancement. Henri d’Arles was therefore not alone in lamenting the importance given to sport in American colleges:

[Aux États-Unis], autant et plus qu’en Angleterre et dans les autres pays anglo-saxons, les exercices athlétiques de toute nature sont profondément enracinés dans les mœurs. Les programmes de collège et d’universités en sont, j’allais dire, encombrés. Cela fait partie intégrante de l’éducation, au même titre que la littérature, l’histoire et la philosophie, à leur grand détriment, hélas! Ce n’est certainement pas être trop sévère que de dire qu’aux États-Unis on a renversé les vraies notions dans la formation de l’homme entier. L’on attache peut-être plus d’importance au développement de son être physique qu’à celui de sa nature intellectuelle et morale. Or, c’est là une aberration profonde, et qui remet à un avenir indéfini l’affinement de la civilisation américaine.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Id., *Arcadian Adventures*, 81-82.

<sup>46</sup> H. d’Arles, “Le journalisme américain,” 28-29.

In the end, however, the conservative assessment of American education was not entirely negative. Many anti-Americans were thoroughly impressed by certain aspects of the Republic's system of higher education, particularly its facilities and endowments. Even a persistent critic like Henri d'Arles could find things to marvel at. In fact, the abbé was so impressed by Rhode Island's Brown University, that he published a short monograph praising *Le collège sur la colline* in 1908.

In continentalist writing, education in the United States was the object of a fair amount of praise. But this praise extended far beyond the facilities and endowments of America's institutions of higher learning. Many continentalists had received part of their education in the Republic, and some even taught in American colleges and universities. Unlike their anti-American adversaries, continentalists regularly paid tribute to the democratic and utilitarian aspects of education in the United States. Indeed, for liberals and socialists, a widely accessible system of education was vital to the development of a democratic and egalitarian society. In Errol Bouchette's only work of fiction, *Robert Lozé* (1903), which he published the year of his appointment as the assistant librarian of the Library of Parliament, the narrator praises the democratic nature of American education: "Dans ces pays, l'éducation est à la portée de tous et l'entreprise de s'instruire n'offre pas des difficultés insurmontables. Tous ont libre accès à la source des connaissances, mais tous n'y puisent pas."<sup>47</sup> American education, however, was not only accessible, it also actively strove to elevate the masses and prepare them for the challenges of citizenship. The American system, continentalists argued, did not leave behind the weaker student; it strove to improve his chances of success. In a 1931 article, John Bartlet Brebner contrasted the three universities he had attended, Oxford, Toronto, and Columbia, in an effort to evaluate the higher education systems of the three nations. Uncharacteristically – Brebner generally preferred not to dwell on Canadian-American differences – he lauded the American system and heaped criticism on higher education in Britain and Canada:

At Columbia, private benefaction has made the University independent of dictation from the democratic government except for easy satisfaction of the legal standards laid down to maintain the quality of less sturdy institutions elsewhere in the State of New York, and rigid entrance requirements sift the mass of applicants for admission. Yet American social democracy, the idea of every individual's right to education and a preoccupation with

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<sup>47</sup> Errol Bouchette, *Robert Lozé* (Montreal, 1903), 49.

Americanization which unconsciously makes for confidence in indoctrination, press upon, indeed are part of, Columbia in interesting and intangible ways which make it more experimental and less static than Oxford or Toronto, more continuously conscious of the responsibility of its aristocracy to the surrounding democracy, and public and self-assured than Toronto in manifesting its conviction that the gifted and self-reliant student is entitled to the better, more expensive instruction which the tutorial system provides. Oxford ignores the weaker brethren, Toronto segregates them and Columbia gives greatly of her energies to teach them to be strong.<sup>48</sup>

Most continentalists also praised the apparently practical nature of an American education. Indeed, without rejecting the classical humanities outright, they argued that education should be better adapted to the challenges of the industrial age. In Quebec, classicism reigned supreme in higher education. As a result, its detractors were generally restrained in their criticism. In his 1896 outline of American history, A. D. DeCelles, who had studied at the Séminaire de Québec and the Université Laval, chose to obliquely criticise the French Canadian system by praising “l’enseignement américain.” And though he did lament the overly secular and practical nature of American education, DeCelles felt that it nonetheless achieved laudable results:

Nulle part au monde plus qu’aux États-Unis voit-on l’adolescent mieux préparé à la lutte pour l’existence, envisager l’avenir avec plus de confiance ... Le jeune Américain sort de l’école parfaitement équipé pour accomplir sa mission. Son savoir est la résultante d’une instruction toute positive, excluant comme bagage inutile les connaissances d’agrément que l’on regarde comme indispensables en Europe. Il les acquerra plus tard, après fortune faite. En somme, éducation très démocratique, très précise, menant droit à un but déterminé: l’aisance ou la richesse.<sup>49</sup>

Outside of Quebec, most continentalists were usually quick to acknowledge the essentially American nature of Canadian education. “Incidentally,” remarked William Bennett Munro in his 1929 study of *American Influences on Canadian Government*, “it may be mentioned that almost every feature of the Canadian public school system (save in the Province of Quebec) is measurably like that in the United States – not because it has been borrowed therefrom, perhaps, but because similar educational problems have been

<sup>48</sup> J. B. Brebner, “Oxford, Toronto, Columbia,” *Columbia University Quarterly* XXIII (1931): 238-239.

<sup>49</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis*, 369-370.

encountered in the two countries and have been dealt with in much the same way.” Munro went on to list a dozen examples of “close analogy” between the education systems of Canada and the United States, including “the grammar school of eight grades and the high school of four” and the “system of separately-elected Boards of Education with their own independent powers, their own budgets, and with no direct responsibility to the regular municipal legislature.”<sup>50</sup> The Canadian correspondent for the *New York Times*, John MacCormac, was of the same opinion. Among “the reasons why a Canadian is so like an American,” he included education. In Canada and the United States, MacCormac noted in 1940, “educational facilities have been almost interchangeable. Canadians have the same faith as Americans in the advantage of education for all. They cherish the same belief that there is nothing degrading in a boy’s working his way through college, whereas in Britain only in London University has anything of the kind been known.”<sup>51</sup> At heart, Canada and the United States shared an essentially democratic philosophy of education.

Canada was, in the continentalist mind, an American nation. As a result, pro-American writers devoted a great deal of energy to pointing out the cultural and spiritual similarities that existed between the two nations. This pattern was much less pronounced in Quebec, where ethno-religious differences were more evident and the continentalist tradition was weaker. Most Canadian liberals and socialists were open-minded when it came to religion and culture in the United States. Indeed, they were not generally alarmed by the secularism, mass culture, or utilitarian pedagogy that many intellectuals identified as being integral to the American experience. Continentalists believed in the illimitable progress of society, and America, they insisted, was a progressive nation.

The anti-American’s understanding of progress was quite different. Indeed, conservative intellectuals resisted the rise of mass culture, secularism, and progressive education as mortal threats to traditional Canadian society. They believed that their status as leaders of opinion was endangered by these seemingly American innovations. The rejection of American religion and culture was strongest in Quebec, where identity was largely centred on ethnicity and religion. Racialism, however, took on many guises in pre-1945 Canada. Indeed, as we shall observe in the next chapter, racial issues preoccupied most Canadian observers of American life.

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<sup>50</sup> W. B. Munro, *American Influences on Canadian Government* (Toronto, 1929), 114-115.

<sup>51</sup> John MacCormac, *Canada: America’s Problem* (New York, 1940), 149.



## *Chapter Seven*

### Race and Gender in the United States

Around 1900, many conservative intellectuals considered the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of America's cities to be an essentially modern phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> The United States embodied cosmopolitanism; it was a chaotic Tower of Babel. Immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, imperialists argued, was hardly a source of strength for the Republic. These immigrants congregated in cities and sapped the nation's already tenuous racial and ethnic vitality. America's race problems, on the other hand, were the bitter legacy of centuries of slavery and mistreatment. African Americans might not be ready or even, some believed, capable of assuming the burdens of citizenship, but they deserved better than cruelty and segregation. Conservatives also condemned America's Indian policy as immoral and genocidal.

For the anti-American, all these elements spoke to the Republic's basic degeneracy. Yet imperialists and *nationalistes* did not necessarily deal with race and ethnicity in the same way. Indeed, they diverged on the issue of immigration. America's large Franco-American population coloured French Canadian writing on immigration and produced a fair amount of prose that, in theory at least, was favourable to pluralism and denounced nativism. Imperialists, on the other hand, relentlessly chronicled the weakening of America's Anglo-Saxon stock through massive non-British immigration. This divergence, however, was superficial; neither the French Canadian nationalist nor the English Canadian imperialist were exempt from racial and ethnic prejudice. Indeed, racialism was fairly widespread in pre-1945 conservative thought.

Still, the Canadian right has never held a monopoly on racial prejudice. Indeed, at the turn of the century, continentalist and anti-American rhetoric shared a great deal when it came to racial and ethnic issues. In fact, what really distinguished conservative and liberal writing on race and ethnicity in the United States was the conclusions they drew from their assertions. Indeed, unlike their anti-American adversaries, continentalists did not see the

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<sup>1</sup> Ethnic and racial pluralism are not intrinsic to the modern ethos; neither is tolerance, for that matter. For instance, modern science and scientism intensified rather than lessened racial exclusion in the nineteenth century. Modernity is undoubtedly egalitarian, but modern egalitarianism can be quite limited in its scope. The modern ethos can therefore flourish in homogenous societies or within the tight confines of racial exclusivism. As a result, at the turn of the twentieth century, American segregationism was not inherently antimodern, and the nation's rising multiculturalism was not necessarily a sign of modernization.

Republic's racial problems as a mark of inferiority. After the Great War, continentalism would become more open to ethnic and racial pluralism, but prejudice continued to linger in continentalist thought. Both the anti-American and the continentalist ethos were victims of their era. On the whole, widespread tolerance of racial and ethnic pluralism is a fairly recent phenomenon in Western thought.

Unlike ethnic pluralism, the transformation of gender relations is integral to the modern ethos. Modernity is corrosive to patriarchal notions of femininity and masculinity. Indeed, industrialization and urbanization transformed the lives of North American men and women. The industrial revolution brought large numbers of women into the paid labour force and urbanization forever altered the North American family. The early twentieth century, moreover, saw most Canadian and American women receive the vote.

Whether gender relations were marked by a greater degree of equality in the prewar United States is open to debate, but many Canadian intellectuals certainly believed that they were. A number of conservatives, principally in Quebec, condemned what they saw as women's liberation in the United States. American women were challenging traditional gender roles and the American family was being progressively weakened by divorce and birth control. In response, some intellectuals defended American progressivism, but the issue only stirred a limited number of continentalists. And some were inclined to agree with their anti-American adversaries.

#### *Race: A Canadian Dilemma*

Race and ethnicity in the United States generated a great deal of commentary in both English and French Canada. When dealing with racial issues, the line between anti-American and continentalist sentiment often became blurred. And many turn-of-the-twentieth-century Canadian intellectuals suffered from an essential dilemma: how could they criticise America's mistreatment of its racial minorities without actually appealing for racial equality? Most resolved this quandary with a healthy dose of paternalism. Indians and Blacks were, after all, the white man's burden. They deserved protection, but not necessarily equality. By the 1930s, however, opinions had begun to shift. Indeed, writers born around 1900 were less likely to infantilize African Americans.

*The African American*

For many turn-of-the-twentieth-century anti-Americans, both the Republic's treatment of its black population and the African American himself were viewed as blemishes on American society. Indeed, though segregation and racial violence were frequently denounced in conservative writing, Blacks were seldom treated as intellectual and moral equals.<sup>2</sup> For instance, in 1902, abbé Antonio Huot condemned "l'infranchissable *color line*, comme on dit en ce pays, qui empêche les blancs et les noirs de voyager en chemin de fer, dans le même wagon, et de dîner au restaurant à la même table, dans les anciens États esclavagistes." Yet, in the same breath, he noted that "la race noire est une race inférieure, et il serait absolument chimérique de croire qu'il soit possible au nègre, placé dans les mêmes conditions que le blanc, d'atteindre le niveau intellectuel de celui-ci."<sup>3</sup> Imperialists shared Huot's dilemma. "If anything," wrote Beckles Willson in *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (1903), "my sympathies are with the people of the South, but no one can sympathize with intolerance, overbearance, and narrow-mindedness." However, Willson, who had been the New York *Herald's* correspondent in Georgia in 1889 and had

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<sup>2</sup> Racial violence, and lynching especially, was particularly offensive to the conservative sense of justice and order. Jules-Paul Tardivel defined and discussed "l'horrible *loi de lynch*" in an apocalyptic footnote to *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* (1900): "Exécution sommaire par la populace des personnes soupçonnées de crimes ou déclarées coupables par les tribunaux. Chaque année il y a un grand nombre de ces exécutions populaires. On exécute rarement les blancs. Par contre, en certains endroits, un nègre accusé est un nègre perdu. Il est certain qu'on a fait périr bien des innocents. On pend et on fusille les nègres pour des crimes qui n'entraînent pas la peine de mort devant les tribunaux réguliers. Il y a parfois des scènes d'une sauvagerie inouïe. On a brûlé des nègres sur la place publique devant une foule en délire. Ces exécutions populaires, qui tendent à augmenter et que les autorités ne peuvent pas ou n'osent pas réprimer, doivent jeter dans le cœur des nègres une semence de haine qui produira tôt ou tard un formidable cataclysme, une guerre des races sans exemple dans l'histoire. La race noire y périra, sans doute, mais non avant d'avoir fait de terribles blessures à la race blanche." [Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (Montreal, 1900), 202-203, n. 1.] The issue of lynching even crept into Canadian literature. In his best-selling work of fiction, *The Attic Guest* (1909), Reverend Robert Knowles (1868-1946) told the story of a courageous Scottish minister, Gordon Laird, who breaks the colour barrier in the American South. In a poignant scene, Laird tries to save a black man from being lynched and almost loses his life in the process. The reader is left with a strong sense of British moral superiority. Knowles was ordained in the Presbyterian Church in 1891, and served as the pastor of Knox Church, in Galt, Ontario, for most of his career. A proponent of church union, he eventually joined the United Church.

<sup>3</sup> Antonio Huot, "Mœurs américaines. Blancs et noirs," *La Nouvelle-France* I (1902): 370, 376. On occasion, and well before Pierre Vallières published his *Nègres blancs d'Amérique* (1968), some French Canadian intellectuals drew parallels between the African American struggle for equality and the *combat québécois*. On the subject of annexation, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard, who had served in a Vermont regiment during the American Civil war, was emphatic: "Oui, nous espérons voir s'accomplir cette libération de notre race. N'avons-nous pas été témoins de l'émancipation des noirs, ces pauvres esclaves qui n'avaient personne pour les protéger, aucune alliance, aucune force. Pourtant, une femme publia un petit livre, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, et la conscience du grand peuple américain en fut ému; six ans après, l'esclavage était chose du passé. Ce qui est arrivé pour les noirs, peut et doit arriver pour les blancs de bonne volonté." [Rouillard, *Annexion: conférence: l'union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 33.] Regarding Black emancipation in the United States, Harry Bernard noted that "trois facteurs de survivance ressortent chez eux: leur qualité de terriens, une haute natalité, une force peu ordinaire d'inertie. Sous ce triple rapport, ils ne manquent pas de ressemblance avec les Canadiens d'origine française." [Bernard, "Les noirs des États-Unis et le roman régionaliste," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* XII (1942): 409.]

subsequently founded a newspaper in Atlanta, was not in any way implying that Southern Blacks deserved to be placed on an equal footing with their white fellow citizens. To emphasise this point, he concluded his chapter on “the Negro problem” by quoting the Great Emancipator, Abraham Lincoln: “There is a physical difference between the white and the black races which will for ever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior; and I, as much as any other man, am in favour of having the superior position assigned to the white man.”<sup>4</sup> Indeed, though turn-of-the-century conservatives frequently denounced segregation, they rarely condemned the political disenfranchisement of Southern Blacks. For the most part, black suffrage was viewed as an unnecessary and potentially dangerous measure.

The overt racism found in many early anti-American texts would diminish during the interwar years. Yet ingrained prejudices continued to affect conservative assessments of the Republic’s racial problems. Harry Bernard, for instance, praised the advancement of the African American in a 1942 article, but remained condescending towards blacks:

Dans le peuple, les noirs des États-Unis possèdent une tournure d’esprit particulière. Primitifs pour un bon nombre, illettrés ou peu instruits, persécutés par des blancs indignes ou dégénérés, ils acquièrent en certaines régions ce que l’Américain appelle un *inferiority complex*. Ils se montrent alors timides et fuyants, obséquieux, serviles. Religieux par tempérament et superstitieux, ils deviennent facilement dupes de charlatans qui les exploitent, au nom d’une divinité assez vague. Leurs mœurs atteignent souvent un niveau assez bas. Cela de façon générale, et dans les dernières couches du peuple. Depuis environ un demi-siècle, ils tendent cependant à sortir de leur marasme. Ils s’instruisent, manifestent de l’initiative et de l’esprit de travail, pénètrent graduellement dans tous les milieux, même intellectuels.<sup>5</sup>

In the early 1940s, Bernard travelled extensively in the American South while preparing a doctoral dissertation at the Université de Montréal on “Le roman régionaliste aux États-Unis (1913-1940).” Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, his doctoral research brought him into contact with the leading figures of literary regionalism in the United States.

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<sup>4</sup> Beckles Willson, *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (London, 1903), 186-187.

<sup>5</sup> Bernard, “Les noirs des États-Unis et le roman régionaliste,” 409.

Continentalists were divided in their appraisal of America's racial problems. Some, like Goldwin Smith, shared much of the anti-American's assessment of Blacks. In his youth, Smith had been an ardent abolitionist – the appearance of slavery in America, he later wrote, “opened a new chapter of evil” – but as was the case with many of his contemporaries, Smith's abolitionism was not accompanied by any degree of racial tolerance. The African American, indeed, was a blot on American society and the nation's racial problems, Smith conceded in *The United States: An Outline of Political History* (1893), would never be solved:

In the United States the white man has a burden, such perhaps as no other nation has been called upon to bear. It would be hard, at least, to find any instance of a problem so arduous as that of the two races in the South. Where intermarriage is out of the question, social equality cannot exist; without social equality political equality is impossible, and a Republic in the true sense can hardly be. When hatred of race has mounted to such a pitch that the people of one race go out by thousands to see a man of the other race burnt alive, and carry away his charred bones or pieces of his singed garments as souvenirs; when they even photograph and phonograph his dying agonies; how can it be hoped that the two races will ever form one commonwealth? Can it even be hoped that they will ever dwell side by side in peace?<sup>6</sup>

Smith's commentary on race relations translated his contempt for Southern society – its aristocratism, he believed, was contrary to republican values – but did not dampen his zeal for continental union.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Goldwin Smith, *The United States: An Outline of Political History, 1492-1871* (New York, 1893), 43; *Commonwealth or Empire: A Bystander's View of the Question* (New York, 1902), 43. Canadian intellectuals frequently suggested that America's racial problems were a latter-day punishment for the abomination of slavery.

<sup>7</sup> Many continentalists saw America's racial problems as an occasion to criticise or isolate the South. Taken as a whole, American society, they believed, was essentially sound; Southern society, however, was not. Indeed, there was something vaguely un-American about the South. It was a reactionary fragment in an otherwise progressive nation. Anti-Americans saw things differently. Some, like Beckles Willson, argued that racial violence and prejudice were hardly confined to the Southern States: “An Englishman, knowing the prejudices of the South, would suppose that the blacks would fly to the more congenial atmosphere of the Northern States. But the negro knows that, on the whole, he is better off where he is ... Race prejudice is not wholly confined to the South. The recent race riots in New York, the lynchings in Ohio and Indiana, and burnings at the stake in Kansas and Colorado, betray something more than acquiescent apathy ... The black suffers an industrial exclusion north of the Mason and Dixon's line in return for his political suppression in the South.” [Willson, *The New America*, 178.] A few Tories idealized Southern society as a bastion of traditional values. The Viscount de Fronsac, for instance, praised Southern aristocratism and bemoaned that the “family unit system of the South was broken” by the Civil War. [Fronsac, “Origin of the Social Crisis in the United States: A Monarchist's View,” *Canadian Magazine* I (1893): 661.]

Edmond de Nevers had a different outlook on the plight of the African American. At the turn of the twentieth century, he argued that prejudice, not biology, was keeping African Americans down:

On prétend que les Nègres sont immoraux, mais les exemples qui ont été donnés par les blancs, depuis le moment où ceux-ci les ont initiés à une civilisation nouvelle, ont été des exemples d'immoralité et d'injustice. On prétend qu'ils manquent d'intelligence, qu'ils n'ont produit ni philosophes, ni savants, ni penseurs, ni hommes politiques. Mais ils ont produit des champions éloquents de leurs droits méconnus; ils ont écrit ou prononcé de vive voix des plaidoyers vibrants en faveur de la tolérance, de la pitié, de la justice. Tous ceux parmi les Nègres qui ont quelque instruction n'ont pas d'autre pensée que celle de faire cesser l'ostracisme dont ils sont les victimes.

Yet de Nevers also assumed that equality was ultimately impossible for the African American, and he believed that the only solution to "le problème nègre" was repatriation to Africa. He hoped that black colonization would regenerate both Africa and the American South:

Le rapatriement des Nègres serait gros de conséquences pour la République; ce serait le progrès s'affirmant sur toute l'étendue du territoire qu'ils occupent, territoire qui serait racheté par l'État et vendu à des Blancs qui en tirent toujours un meilleur parti. Ce serait l'annihilation graduelle de cette classe des *Petits Blancs*, grossiers, vagabonds et paresseux; car c'est toujours la crainte d'être mis au rang des Noirs qui leur fait fuir le travail ... Au point de vue de l'avenir de l'humanité en général, on peut calculer ce que représenterait cet afflux en Afrique de dix millions d'hommes civilisés qui se relèverait dans l'indépendance, voudraient prendre leur place parmi les nations et, étant donné la vanité dont ils sont tous pénétrés, tiendraient à ne rien laisser perdre de ce qu'ils ont gagné au cours des trois siècles de souffrance et d'oppression.<sup>8</sup>

Like de Nevers, most interwar continentalists assumed that racism alone was preventing African Americans from achieving equality. Some, however, continued to insinuate that blacks were a vaguely primitive people. Among them, William Arthur Deacon had perhaps the most unusual take on America's racial problem. Born in Pembroke, Ontario, and raised in Stanstead, Quebec, Deacon received a law degree from the University of

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<sup>8</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, vol. II (Paris, 1900), 311-312, 317, 319-320.

Manitoba and practiced law in Winnipeg before becoming the literary editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press* and, later, of Toronto's *Saturday Night*. "The black man was brought to the United States to labor gratis for the white," he wrote in *My Vision of Canada* (1933). "But it is a law of life that one may not labor for another without recompense; and that spiritual law's unescapable punishment looms over the United States." According to Deacon, America's punishment would be miscegenation – "the merging of white and black through marriage." Indeed, he predicted, "we are due to see within a few generations at most in the United States a new, hybrid race, distinct in color, and homogeneous in culture." This, of course, could only be detrimental to the Republic. "The Negroes are nice people of considerable ability," Deacon conceded, "but they are undoubtedly primitive compared to Europeans." As a result, "there will exist south of us a people so much more child-like in their attitude towards life that even if we should become as irresponsible as the average white American of today – which we shall not – the national distinctions will still be as wide as, say, that between a contemporary white American and a Mexican." Yet if Canada and the United States were bound to drift apart racially, the two nations would nonetheless conserve a strong bond. America, Deacon believed, was destined to become Canada's white man's burden:

There will be something very picturesque and most likeable in the new race, and international friendship will not be jeopardized but enhanced as the fusion of races leaves us to deal with a government of brownish colored men, who will be instinctively courteous, who will respect us and like us. I think it obvious too, that as the black blood interpenetrates with the white in the Republic, its people will turn increasingly to us, as the one confirmed friendly power, for intellectual and political guidance and leadership.<sup>9</sup>

Intellectuals of all persuasions were often quick to point out that Blacks had always received better treatment in Canada than in the United States. Upper Canada had "outlawed the slave trade years before this was achieved by Great Britain herself," remarked George M. Wrong in *Canada and the American Revolution* (1935),<sup>10</sup> and stories of the Underground Railroad abounded in Canadian commentary. Above all, noted William Arthur Deacon in

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<sup>9</sup> W. A. Deacon, *My Vision of Canada* (Toronto, 1933), 118-122.

<sup>10</sup> G. M. Wrong, *Canada and the American Revolution: The Disruption of the First British Empire* (New York, 1935), 459.

1933, "Canada has always given the Negro rights of citizenship, fair treatment generally, and justice in the courts. We have no Negro problem to face."<sup>11</sup>

### *The American Indian*

Canadian intellectuals took a similarly self-congratulatory tone when dealing with the Republic's Indian policy, which was universally condemned as genocidal in the Dominion. "Canada has managed a large Indian population with little serious difficulty," remarked George R. Parkin in his 1892 study of the British Empire. Meanwhile, "her neighbours during the same years have been engaged in a series of wars of extermination, apparently the outcome for the most part of maladministration in Indian affairs."<sup>12</sup> British and Canadian paternalism had worked where American aggressiveness had failed. And later improvements in American policy following the Great War had little or no effect on Canadian commentary, because both continentalist and anti-American intellectuals tended to approach the problem from a historical standpoint.

In Quebec, it was frequently suggested that Canada's softer approach to native issues was in keeping with the French and Catholic tradition. To this effect, A. D. DeCelles' noted in 1896 that

Malgré la distance qui sépare le blanc du Peau-Rouge, le français en fait son ami, le compagnon de ses courses, et cette confraternité le conduit jusqu'au mariage avec la femme indigène. Même le hautain Frontenac quitte sa morgue pour prendre part à leur danse nationale. Tant de condescendance gagne le cœur de l'aborigène et le prestige du nom français sert de sauf-conduit au coureur des bois, au milieu des peuplades sauvages à travers l'immensité de l'Ouest et du Sud, tandis que le puritain, odieux aux enfants de la forêt, n'ose pas se risquer isolé en dehors de sa demeure.<sup>13</sup>

This viewpoint was shared by some English Canadian writers. John Bartlet Brebner, for instance, told the Canadian Historical Association in 1931 that "the French in North America

<sup>11</sup> Deacon, *My Vision of Canada*, 121.

<sup>12</sup> G. R. Parkin, *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity* (London, 1892), 136.

<sup>13</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), 391.



had on the whole a very different record in their dealings with the Indians from that of the English. Unquestionably in this difference religion played a large part.”<sup>14</sup>

### *Immigration*

From the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, massive European immigration fundamentally altered the American experience. The change was most obvious in Northern cities, where many immigrants found work in the nation’s expanding industries. Canadian intellectuals showed a great deal of interest in the Republic’s rising multiculturalism. From the 1890s to the 1920s, the Dominion also experienced massive immigration and, predictably, Canadian thinkers looked south for a glimpse of what the future might hold for their nation. Reactions were mixed. Some groups were praised, while others were denounced.

In Quebec, multiculturalism was often hailed as a boon for the United States. Many intellectuals welcomed the dilution of nation’s Anglo-Saxon and Protestant stock and eagerly chronicled the rise of American Catholicism. But, more often than not, these writers held a hidden agenda. Indeed, the French Canadian perspective was largely conditioned by the Republic’s important Franco-American population. Quebec had contributed to America’s cultural mosaic in a major way and assimilationist policies threatened Franco-American cultural survival. As a result, even intellectuals who were normally hostile to large-scale immigration in Canada regularly praised American multiculturalism.<sup>15</sup> For abbé Lionel Groulx, whose concern for Franco-American *survivance* was expressed in a number of conferences and articles, immigration and ethnic diversity were a source of wealth and strength for the United States:

Sans doute, faut-il compter, aux États-Unis, avec ces idéologues rigides et bornés, comme nous en avons bien quelques-uns au Canada, pour qui l’uniformité, dans tous les ordres,

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<sup>14</sup> J. B. Brebner, “Canadian and North American History,” Canadian Historical Association *Annual Report* (1931): 44. For his part, Donald Creighton saw structural and material considerations behind Canada’s better record in its dealings with Aborigines: “Official Indian policy, personified in Sir William Johnson and a long line of followers and subordinates, became sympathetic and generous, in the best French tradition; but it is a mistake to assume that the quickly established and long-continued fidelity of the Indians to the northern state was alone or even primarily the achievement of a few officials made wise and cautious by the lessons of the Pontiac conspiracy. The commercial system of the St. Lawrence linked the Indians with the northern commercial state: the merchants and Indians were the eastern and western partners of the fur trade. Indian culture, though altered and debased, could alone survive in a fur-trading colony; and the fur trade could alone continue within Indian society with its sparse population and roving, hunting traits. [Creighton, *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850* (Toronto, 1937), 31-32.]

<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, *nationaliste* praise for American multiculturalism was often accompanied by scorn for selected immigrant groups. See *infra*, 176-177, 178-179.

serait la suprême expression de la beauté. S'il n'en tenait qu'à ceux-là, il y a beau temps que les hommes ne seraient plus produits qu'en série et selon le *standard* de leur prétentieuse médiocrité. Mais il est d'autres Américains qui possèdent une autre idée de l'État et de la nation. L'on a coutume de considérer comme un élément de faiblesse, dans un État politique, la pluralité des races ou des origines. Cependant, l'histoire démontrerait peut-être que les États et les empires les mieux musclés et par conséquent doués de longévité, furent précisément les États et les empires de structure composite, comme si l'équilibre de génies divers leur avait donné plus de souplesse dans la conduite de leur destin, les avait mieux protégés contre les emportements irréfléchis, les aventures catastrophiques. Les plus cultivés des Américains savent fort bien que les exigences de la vie internationale interdisent à tout grand peuple de se passer, à l'heure actuelle, de l'un ou l'autre des grandes cultures humaines, et en particulier de la culture française.<sup>16</sup>

Edmond de Nevers was even more enthusiastic about America's ethnic diversity. His family had settled in New England during the 1880s, and de Nevers was a frequent visitor to the region's Franco-American centres. Immigration, he argued, had greatly enriched the Republic, and its pluralism was a beacon to all of mankind: "Il appartient à l'Amérique," he wrote in 1900, "d'enseigner au reste du monde comment dans la liberté et la tolérance, plusieurs races peuvent contribuer à former un pays puissant et uni, sans rien abdiquer de ce qui fait l'originalité de leur existence particulière, comment plusieurs petites patries peuvent fleurir au cœur d'une grande patrie."<sup>17</sup> Eventually, de Nevers believed, North America would evolve into a pan-ethnic confederation of French Canadians, Anglo-Saxons, and Germans.

American nativism was regularly denounced in Quebec, particularly in the 1920s, when a number of states enacted legislation to curb foreign-language instruction. These measures directly affected the large number of Franco-American children who attended French-language parochial schools. In a 1919 open letter to the Governor of Connecticut, abbé Henri d'Arles denounced nativistic legislation that sought to hasten assimilation by suppressing foreign-language instruction in the state's schools: "L'unification linguistique que vous prônez chez vous serait-elle avantageuse à aucun point de vue? Ce serait amoindrir les races diverses qui pullulent ici, par conséquent amoindrir le capital national, si je puis

<sup>16</sup> Lionel Groulx, "Six semaines après," in *En Louisiane*, ed. Omer Héroux (Montreal, 1931), 98-99.

<sup>17</sup> E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, II, 376. Edmond de Nevers' writing on race and ethnicity can be found in Edmond de Nevers, *La question des races*, ed. Jean-Philippe Warren (Montreal, 2003).

ainsi parler, attaquer les réserves foncières sur lesquelles reposent nos plus grandes destinées.”<sup>18</sup>

Imperialists had a very different take on the immigrant’s impact on the United States. Indeed, cosmopolitanism, as they saw it, was yet another strike against American society. By and large, imperialists argued that large-scale non-British immigration was rapidly weakening the nation’s already diluted Anglo-Saxon stock. And the English-speaking race, they believed, was America’s last remaining pillar of civilization. Nonetheless, warned Beckles Willson in 1903, “America has revelled for nearly half a century in a carnival of miscegenation. Hers is the most mongrel race on earth.”<sup>19</sup> In an era when racial purity – in particular Anglo-Saxon purity – was generally viewed as a virtue, this was a powerful indictment. For his part, George R. Parkin lamented “the elimination of the Anglo-Saxon element which is taking place so rapidly in the United States.” In *Imperial Federation* (1892), he blamed massive immigration for this tragedy:

The amazing flood of immigration with which it has been attended is steadily diluting the Anglo-Saxon element and diminishing the relative influence of the native American. A well-known Mayor of Chicago not long since outlined for me the elements of the population over which his municipal rule extended. The analysis would form a curious study for those who would forecast the American type of the next century. A recent event has revealed the fact that America’s population includes a great mass of Italians, little in sympathy with the institutions under which they live, and reinforced by emigrants who crowd every steamer that leaves the Mediterranean to cross the Atlantic.<sup>20</sup>

But non-British immigrants were not only weakening the United States from a racial standpoint, they were also dangerous agents of political corruption, industrial strife, and revolution. The President of Victoria College, Nathanael Burwash (1839-1918), argued that immigrants were naturally drawn to revolutionism. Born in St. Andrews, Lower Canada, Burwash was a Methodist minister and a moderate imperialist. In a 1901 address to the United Empire Loyalists’ Association of Ontario, he warned that large-scale immigration would intensify the fundamental instability that characterized American society:

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<sup>18</sup> Henri d’Arles, “Le français dans le Connecticut,” *La Revue nationale* 1 (1919): 17.

<sup>19</sup> Willson, *The New America*, 170.

<sup>20</sup> Parkin, *Imperial Federation*, 134-135, 194.

The immigrant element is always the opposite of conservative, except when driven out by persecution, as in the case of the Doukhobors and Mennonites who have recently come to us. The millions who have crowded to the United States have been of the restless, progressive class, the class who are ever forgetting the old and seeking the new. They have intensified rather than moderated the revolutionary spirit of the founders of that nation.<sup>21</sup>

Inassimilable immigrants were destabilizing American society; they were responsible for spiralling criminality and they threatened the livelihood of native-born Americans. They also played a key role in the noxious advance of urban modernity. Immigrants crowded into cities, thereby upsetting America's rural/urban balance, and their labour contributed to industrial gigantism.

The imperialist warning was clear: massive non-British immigration would destroy the Dominion. "Canada is still young in its political development," noted the chief clerk of the Canadian House of Commons, John G. Bourinot, in 1893, "and the fact that her population has been as a rule a steady, fixed population, free from those dangerous elements which have come into the United States with such rapidity of late years, has kept her relatively free from many serious social and political dangers which have afflicted her neighbours."<sup>22</sup>

English Canadian continentalists were not necessarily favourable to large-scale immigration either. Indeed, more than a few turn-of-the-twentieth-century continentalists also saw the phenomenon as a serious threat to American civilization. Speaking before the Canadian Club of Montreal in 1912, Reverend James A. Macdonald insisted that North American ideals "are at this moment endangered by the incoming of great masses of aliens, who are a danger to both our civilization and our ideals of government."<sup>23</sup> Like many of their anti-American rivals, various continentalists considered the immigrant to be a likely source of crime and political corruption. O. D. Skelton, for instance, warned the readers of the *Queen's Quarterly* in 1912 that "indiscriminate immigration" had filled America's cities with "alien ignorance and lawlessness."<sup>24</sup> These xenophobic continentalists, however, were usually quick to relativize the danger posed by non-British immigration to the American

<sup>21</sup> Nathanael Burwash, "The Moral Character of the U.E. Loyalists," *Annual Transactions of the United Empire Loyalists' Association of Ontario* (1901-1902): 63.

<sup>22</sup> J. G. Bourinot, "Canadian Studies in Comparative Politics: Parliamentary Compared with Congressional Government," *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 1<sup>st</sup> Series, XI (1893): 94.

<sup>23</sup> J. A. Macdonald, "Some International Fundamentals," *Addresses Delivered Before the Canadian Club of Montreal* (1912-1913): 58.

<sup>24</sup> O. D. Skelton, "Current Events: The Presidential Campaign," *Queen's Quarterly* XX (1912): 238.

Republic. For his part, Goldwin Smith suggested in 1891 address to the Young Men's Liberal Club of Toronto that America's alien population was, as far as burdens go, no worse than Canada's "French element":

The foreign element in the United States is another bugbear often held up by those who would scare us away from the connection. The foreign element is unquestionably a source of danger and the Americans themselves, by their legislative restrictions which they are imposing on immigration, show that they are alive to the fact. But is the influence of the foreign element on the councils of the American commonwealth more alien in its character or more sinister than the influence of the French element on ours?<sup>25</sup>

Continentalism, however, was a broad perspective, and a number of later continentalists were not at all hostile to large-scale immigration in the United States. William Bennett Munro, for instance, regularly refuted claims that immigrants were corrupting the American political system. Though he acknowledged that they were frequently involved in electoral fraud, Munro did not believe that "the alien element is wholly or even mainly responsible for the fact that the government of great cities is America's 'one conspicuous failure.'" In fact, he argued that immigrants were systematically manipulated by corrupt native-born politicians who preyed on their naivety and inexperience. In *The Government of the United States* (1919), Munro described how the suffering and disillusionment of the immigrant made him an easy target for crooked politicians:

All too soon after an immigrant passes the Statue of Liberty he is likely to be disillusioned. He came to America as to a land of promise, of political liberty, of social equality, and of economic fraternity. What he usually finds is hard labor at two dollars a day, a two-room home in a tenement, a foreman who bullies him at work, a walking-delegate who tells him to strike, and a politician who dictates how he shall vote. It is hard for the new arrival to discern the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity in all this. Thus disillusioned and exploited the immigrant often becomes a malcontent and quite naturally becomes the prey of demagogues who use him solely for their own advantage.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered Before the Young Men's Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 87.

<sup>26</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Government of American Cities* (New York, 1912), 35; *The Government of the United States: National, State and Local* (New York, 1919), 576.

Moreover, being on the wrong side of Anglo-French conformity appears to have predisposed many immigrants from continental Europe to continentalism. This tendency was particularly pronounced in the work of German-born author Frederick Philip Grove, whose semi-autobiographical novel, *A Search for America* (1927), explored the immigrant's plight and the promise of the New World. The novel was a commercial success and propelled the émigré writer to the forefront of Canada's interwar literary scene.

### *Irish-Americans*

In Canadian writing on America, some immigrant groups generated far more commentary than others. German-Americans, for instance, were the targets of a great deal of abuse during the two world wars. But Irish Catholics were undoubtedly the immigrant group that was most consistently scorned in pre-1945 commentary. Anti-Irish sentiment was widespread in the Dominion – more widespread, perhaps, than anti-American sentiment – and it coloured Canadian writing on America. And though hostility to Irish-Americans was strongest among pre-World War One imperialists, it was present in the writing of a variety of intellectuals throughout the period under study.

Time and again, English Canadian intellectuals linked Irish immigration to crime and political corruption in the Republic. Indeed, the corrupt Irish-American politician became a bit of a cliché in Canadian prose. For instance, one of Robert Barr's more successful novels, *The Victors* (1901), followed the rise of an illiterate Irish-American peddler, Patrick Maguire, from the gutter to Tammany Hall. Barr's character was a loose collection of anti-Irish stereotypes; Maguire drank, fought, stole, cursed, and cheated. And he professed complete amorality when it came to political corruption: "But it isn't really wrong; it's against the law, that's all. It's done every day at every election in the country more or less, gen'lly more, I guess."<sup>27</sup> Barr's novel was not anti-American per se. It did imply, however, that Irish Catholics were a corrupting influence in American politics. Similarly, in 1892, George R. Parkin suggested that Irish-American corruption was a serious impediment to American democracy:

I lately heard a representative American writer and thinker in England say that in his judgement the Irish question was becoming a more disturbing factor in American politics and a more difficult one to deal with, than it has been for Great Britain. Of the value of this sincerely held opinion an outsider cannot perhaps form a just estimate, but we know that a

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<sup>27</sup> Robert Barr, *The Victors: A Romance of Yesterday Morning & this Afternoon* (New York, 1901), 87.

split in Tammany may practically decide a Presidential election, and a Canadian may fairly think that any problem of race or creed with which he has to deal is not more perplexing.<sup>28</sup>

Anti-Irish sentiment was, of course, also tied to anti-Catholic prejudice. Roman Catholicism, many Protestants believed, invariably lead to poverty, ignorance, and a disregard for political freedom.<sup>29</sup> At the turn of the century, few Canadian intellectuals were more hostile to the Irish and to the Roman Catholic Church than Goldwin Smith. Though a fervent anti-imperialist, Smith had long opposed home rule for the Irish, whom he considered thoroughly unfit to assume the burden of political autonomy. In his 1893 monograph on American history, Smith heaped scorn on Irish immigration:

These people of a hapless land and a sad history, ignorant, superstitious, priest-ridden, nurtured in squalid poverty, untrained in constitutional government, trained only in conspiracy and insurrection, were a useful addition to the labour of their adopted country; of its politics they could only be the bane. Clannish still in their instincts, herding clannishly together in the great cities and blindly following leaders whom they accepted as chiefs, and in choosing whom they were led more by blatant energy than by merit, they were soon trained to the pursuit of political spoils and filled elections with turbulence, fraud, and corruption.<sup>30</sup>

Imperialists regularly denounced the impact of the Irish-American vote on the course of Anglo-American relations. Irish Catholics, it was argued, were propagating anti-British sentiment in America's body politic; Fenian terrorists had tried to foment an Anglo-American war in the nineteenth century and, later on, Irish-American leaders had opposed America's entry into World War One. Many continentalists also deplored the Irish-American lobby's impact on both Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations. In 1942, John MacCormac, though of Irish Catholic extraction himself, argued that Irish-American chauvinism was impeding wartime cooperation: "The Irish have been in America in numbers since 1845. They were driven in thousands across the Atlantic by the terrible potato famine of that year. They brought with them, in their half-starved bodies, souls burning with hatred of England and thus imported into Anglo-American relations a note of discord that has

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<sup>28</sup> Parkin, *Imperial Federation*, 135.

<sup>29</sup> Canadian anti-Catholicism is discussed in J. R. Miller, "Anti-Catholic Thought in Victorian Canada," *Canadian Historical Review* 66 (1985): 474-494.

<sup>30</sup> Smith, *The United States: An Outline of Political History*, 216.

sounded until this day.”<sup>31</sup> Irish immigrants were also regularly blamed for American isolationism, a policy which upset a number of interwar continentalists.

In Quebec, anti-Irish sentiment was also widespread among intellectuals. Indeed, though many French Canadian writers praised American multiculturalism in the abstract, they often heaped scorn on selected immigrant groups. And the Irish were their principal target. Elite hostility frequently revolved around ethnic tensions in the Roman Catholic Church. Many French Canadian intellectuals accused the Irish-American episcopate of dominating the American Church and of trying to assimilate Franco-Americans. Under the editorial direction of J.-L.-K. Laflamme (1872-1944), *La Revue franco-américaine* regularly disparaged Irish-Americans. “Depuis sa venue aux États-Unis,” Laflamme wrote in 1908, “l’élément irlandais, par exemple, a surtout été un élément d’opposition ... il est aujourd’hui l’âme du parti démocratique qui a donné naissance aux quatre ou cinq partis radicaux qui existent dans la république.” The Irish were, he believed, a violent and disruptive group: “L’abondance de liberté qu’ils trouvent en arrivant en Amérique les porte à tyranniser ceux qui les entourent et n’ont pas l’avantage d’être les plus nombreux.” And this tyranny, Laflamme maintained, was aimed squarely at Franco-Americans and at other Catholic immigrants. He argued that the Irish-American bishops “veulent empêcher les catholiques de différente provenance de former en Amérique des groupes compacts nationaux: allemands, italiens, polonais, tchèques, hongrois, franco-canadiens. Les évêques, à l’exemple de Mgr Ireland, cherchent à les américaniser, si bien que l’Église est devenue un instrument d’américanisation.”<sup>32</sup> Born in Sainte-Marguerite, Quebec, J.-L.-K. Laflamme founded the *Revue franco-américaine* in 1908. Published in Quebec City, where Laflamme also worked as the editor-in-chief of *L’Action sociale catholique*, the review focused on issues related to Franco-American *survivance*. Laflamme had previously worked as the editor of *L’Indépendant* of Fall River, Massachusetts. His father-in-law, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard, was a prominent figure in Franco-American journalism.

Despite a general sympathy for the Irish nation and a tendency to look favourably upon the impact of Irish immigration in America, Edmond de Nevers was scarcely more

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<sup>31</sup> John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery: The Future of the United States, Canada, and the British Empire* (New York, 1942), 276.

<sup>32</sup> J.-L.-K. Laflamme, “La religion et les assimilateurs dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre,” *La Revue franco-américaine* I (1908): 86-87; “Les Canadiens aux États-Unis,” *La Revue canadienne* XXXIX (1901): 486; “La question des langues et l’épiscopat dans la Nouvelle-Angleterre,” *La Revue franco-américaine* II (1909): 329.



charitable than Laflamme when it came to assessing the relationship between Irish Catholics and the Republic's other immigrant groups:

L'Irlandais resté catholique, qui n'a rien abdiqué et qui n'a pas honte de ces deux titres, semble n'avoir rien appris du passé, et il veut, à son tour, dans la nouvelle patrie imposer l'unité de langue. L'oppression, en Irlande, a fait disparaître la langue de ses frères; le mépris, aux États-Unis, a fait faire à sa religion des pertes incalculables, il rêve une Amérique catholique sous l'hégémonie de la langue anglaise; il a la nostalgie de l'oppression. Le clergé irlandais, aux États-Unis, est le plus féroce ennemi des catholiques français, allemands, polonais et italiens. Certaines associations, derniers vestiges d'un passé disparu, comme la "*American protective association*" lui contestent la plénitude de ses droits de citoyen; lui, conteste aux autres nationalités le droit à leur langue maternelle.<sup>33</sup>

### *Jewish-Americans*

In pre-1945 Canada, a definite correlation existed between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism. During this time, various stereotypes relating to Jews were widespread in the Dominion and, like all forms of prejudice, they found their way into the nation's literature. In 1901, for instance, James Algie, who practiced medicine in Toronto, published *Bergen Worth*, an anti-American novel filled with violent Irishmen and unscrupulous Jews. Set during Chicago's great Pullman Strike of 1894, the book plays on two conventional anti-Semitic stereotypes; Jews are accused both of spreading radicalism and of debasing business practices. The story's Jewish character, "the famous miser and money-lender" Isaac Dorenwein, is involved in a plot to extend the strike in order to profit from the purchase of depreciated Pullman stock.<sup>34</sup> Published under the pseudonym of Wallace Lloyd, Algie's novel was serialized in 1905-1906 by *Canada First*, the organ of the ultra-protectionist Canadian Preference League.

For some anti-American observers, Jews were yet another blight upon the United States. The Jew was often portrayed as a subversive element in American industry, and in the twisted logic of the anti-Semite, he could embody fully contradictory stereotypes. For Beckles Willson, American Jews personified both cheap labour and capitalist greed. In the United States, he noted in 1903, "the number of Jew millionaires is ... disproportionately

<sup>33</sup> E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, II, 88.

<sup>34</sup> James Algie, *Bergen Worth* (Toronto, 1901), 5-6.

large.” Yet in a subsequent passage, he also suggested that indigent Jews were exerting a great deal of economic pressure on New York’s riotous Irish rabble:

It is estimated that within a radius of fifteen miles from New York City Hall there are more Jews than in the whole of Germany. Slowly, but surely, the Jew is permeating the whole commercial life of New York, and getting control of many trades within his fingers. Gradually, too, the Gentile element, particularly the Irish and the Irish-Americans, are becoming aware of the pressure which Jewish industrial competition is putting upon them. The constant wholesale influx of poor Jews from Russia, Germany, and Austria has led to a marked lowering of wages, and when this came home to the poor Irish, the persecution of the Hebrew commenced. The antagonism has recently evoked unseemly riots, and as the increased cost of living and the ingenious methods of the “sweater” continue, serious trouble is to be feared. Yet, amidst all the outcry against alien pauperism, it would be hard to match the Irish in that respect.<sup>35</sup>

In Quebec, anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism intersected along similar lines. For instance, Harry Bernard’s 1924 critique of American cinema quickly degenerated into an attack on Jews. In *L’Action française*, he argued that the American movie industry was controlled by Jews – “les pellicules qu’on nous montre sont, à de rares exceptions près, de provenance américaine, ou, pour mieux dire, judéo-américaine” – and that Jewish movie moguls were promoting immorality and subversion:

Les Juifs, outre le but de déchristianisation qu’on leur prête, ont pour principal objet de réaliser de l’argent et de mettre la main sur les finances du monde. En s’emparant du cinéma, ils ne songent pas tant à faire de l’art qu’à s’accaparer la richesse. Pour arriver à leurs fins, rien ne sera négligeable ni trop bas; ils exploiteront les passions sous toutes les formes, flatteront les instincts. Ils n’ont aucun souci de la morale ni de l’ordre, et le merveilleux moyen d’éducation qu’est le cinéma deviendra entre leurs mains, à cause de leur soif d’or et de leur rage de domination, un outil de dépravation, une école de corruption et de révolution. S’ils y voient une raison d’attirer les foules, et d’emplir la caisse, ils propageront les idées anti-sociales, se feront les champions du divorce ou de l’amour libre, à l’occasion des pratiques malthusiennes. Naturellement ennemis de l’ordre,

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<sup>35</sup> Willson, *The New America*, 172-173.

ils accorderont un appui bienveillant au socialisme le plus destructeur. Pour eux, il n'y a d'important que ce qui fait recette.<sup>36</sup>

The continentalist tradition was hardly devoid of anti-Semitic sentiment – Goldwin Smith was a notorious anti-Semite – but Jews usually received a fairer treatment in continentalist writing. One of Smith's staunchest allies in the struggle for continental integration, Erastus Wiman, was at odds with the old professor when it came to the "Jewish race." "The influence and success of the Hebrew in America," Wiman wrote in 1893, "is a tribute not only to the high grade of ability which they manifest, but to the liberality of the institutions of the country, and the equality of opportunity which is here afforded."<sup>37</sup> Continentalist sentiment, furthermore, appears to have been strong among Canadian Jews.

Positive depictions of American Jews could also be found in interwar continentalist literature. Merrill Denison, for instance, authored a radio play denouncing anti-Semitism as un-American. *An American Father Talks to his Son* was broadcast by CBS in mid-1939. Furthermore, one of the first works of fiction to deal with the Holocaust was written by a Canadian. In *Solomon Levi* (1935), Claudius Gregory (1889-1944) chronicled the life of an American Jew and his terrifying internment in a Nazi concentration camp. The novel is a powerful indictment of anti-Semitism and Nazism. Born in England, Gregory arrived in Canada at the age of seventeen. He spent most of his career working in journalism and advertising, first in Toronto, then in Hamilton, Ontario. According to Desmond Pacey, Gregory was one of the few Canadian novelists of his generation to seriously deal with the social problems of the 1930s.<sup>38</sup>

### *Gender*

Issues related to gender arose somewhat less frequently in Canadian writing on America than those tied to race and ethnicity. Nevertheless, Canadian intellectuals had much to say about gender relations in the United States, and the "American woman" produced a fair amount of commentary, particularly in Quebec, where social issues relating to the United States were of greater interest.

<sup>36</sup> Harry Bernard, "L'ennemi dans la place: Théâtre et cinéma," *L'Action française* XII (1924): 70, 71-72.

<sup>37</sup> Erastus Wiman, *Chances of Success: Episodes and Observations in the Life of a Busy Man* (Toronto, 1893), 187.

<sup>38</sup> Desmond Pacey, "Fiction, 1920-1940," in *Literary History of Canada: Canadian Literature in English*, vol. 2, ed. C. F. Klinck (Toronto, 1976), 197.

In pre-1945 Canadian writing, it was often assumed that gender relations were marked by a greater degree of equality in the United States. For better or for worse, modernity was believed to have elevated American women and given them a greater say in public affairs. In retrospect, this may seem like hyperbole, but it rang true to many Canadian intellectuals, and perception is more important than reality in the study of ideas.

Sara Jeannette Duncan was among the most prominent Canadian writers to look upon American gender relations with approval. Indeed, her novels often portrayed the United States as a society where women were freer than in Britain. In Duncan's most popular work of fiction, *An American Girl in London* (1891), the story's American heroine and narrator, Mamie Wick, explains her situation in the novel's first sentence: "I am an American girl. Therefore, perhaps, you will not be surprised at anything further I may have to say for myself. I have observed, since I came to England, that this statement, made by a third person in connection with any question of my conduct, is always broadly explanatory."<sup>39</sup> In Duncan's novels, American women are plucky and uninhibited – Mamie Wick basically goes about scandalizing upper-class Londoners for 300 pages – and are the product of a freer and less conventional society. Born in Brantford, Canada West, Duncan was educated at the Toronto Normal School, but soon abandoned teaching for journalism. She wrote for the *Washington Post*, the *Toronto Globe*, the *Montreal Star*, and the *Week*. In September 1888 she set off on a round-the-world tour and met her future husband, museum curator and journalist Everard Cotes, in Calcutta. She married him in December 1890 and spent most of the next three decades in India. In many ways, Duncan's continentalism was an expression of her aversion to imperialism, which she explored in a number of her novels, including her most brilliant work of fiction, *The Imperialist* (1904).

In continentalist writing, discussion of gender in America was frequently centred on political issues. Indeed, by the outbreak of World War One, a handful of American states had granted women the right to vote, and Canadian intellectuals followed their experimentation closely. William Bennett Munro, for instance, predicted that women's suffrage would not have a detrimental effect on American politics. Contrary to popular wisdom, he noted in 1919, women's voting behaviour was not significantly different from that of men:

The granting of voting rights to women in a dozen states of the Union has not demoralized domestic life in any of them, nor, on the other hand, has it had noticeably effective results

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<sup>39</sup> S. J. Duncan, *An American Girl in London* (Toronto, 1891), 1.

in the way of securing these states a priority over the others in the humanitarianism of their laws. The chief merit of woman suffrage in these communities has been that of rendering content a large group of citizens without in any perceptible measure impairing the economic, social, or political order.<sup>40</sup>

Later, Anne Anderson Perry, a vocal advocate of women's rights who began her career in journalism at the *Western Woman's Weekly*, expressed a great deal of satisfaction at the number of women appointed to key positions by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. "In Canada," she wrote in a 1933 article published in *Canadian Comment*, "where one lone woman has had to carry the banners of her sex in the House of Commons and one in the Senate, where almost none of the high offices of State or even the ordinary political or partisan plums have come to women, save in the most meagre measure, the situation now revealed across the border gives to furious thinking as well as to cool reflection."<sup>41</sup> In Perry's mind, Canadian women clearly had some catching up to do.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the continentalist ethos was united in its support for women's rights. In fact, most continentalists had little to say about gender relations in the United States. Some early pro-American writers, moreover, would undoubtedly have agreed with their anti-American opponents when they asserted that gender relations were out of whack in the Republic.<sup>42</sup>

Anti-American rhetoric contained powerful gendered messages.<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, there was a definite correlation between anti-Americanism and antifeminism in Canada. Both of these negative faiths were usually the expression of a deeper conservative ethos. Indeed, many Canadian conservatives were concerned by what they saw as rising gender equality in the United States, which they believed was as an affront to traditional notions of the complementarity of the sexes. American women were abandoning their established role as wives and mothers; they were invading the public sphere and, worse still, were given to

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<sup>40</sup> Munro, *The Government of the United States*, 82.

<sup>41</sup> A. A. Perry, "New Deal for American Women," *Canadian Comment* 2 (1933): 12-13.

<sup>42</sup> For instance, in 1900, Edmond de Nevers warned that an influential and outspoken group of women was undermining gender roles in America: "Il existe ici un type de vieille fille exagérée, sentimentale, chauvine dont aucun autre pays, pas même l'Angleterre n'offre de spécimen. Ce sont des vieilles filles ou des femmes divorcées qui écrivent les romans populaires appelés *dime novels* dont les foules se nourrissent, qui publient sur les pays étrangers des études de mœurs pleines de révélations bizarres, qui s'engouent pour toutes les causes baroques et proclament avec un enthousiasme fébrile les gloires incomparables de la patrie américaine. Elles réclament entre temps les droits de leur sexe à l'électorat, à la députation et annoncent l'avènement de la *femme nouvelle* et de l'amour libre." [E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, II, 176.]

<sup>43</sup> Patricia K. Wood, "Defining 'Canadian': Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36 (2001): 53.

promiscuity. The implication was clear: modernity was corrosive to traditional gender relations; it was turning women into men.

To Andrew Macphail, whose idealization of traditional gender roles appears to have intensified after the untimely loss of his wife Georgina in 1902, the “American woman” was, above all, a universal and timeless phenomenon. “It would be too large a task to trace the genesis of the ‘American Woman’ beyond the period of her entry into New England,” he wrote in 1910. “The evidence of her existence in remote times and in diverse places is ample. In Ephesus we seem to suspect her presence. Indeed the words of Paul are confirmatory: ‘I suffer not a woman to usurp authority over a man, but to be in silence.’” Macphail’s “American woman” was insubordinate, sterile, vain, and idle; she was, in a word, thoroughly modern. And her rebelliousness was quintessentially American:

The United States began with an act of lawlessness and their conduct ever since has been marked by that spirit. Now this spirit of lawlessness has seized upon the women. It would be too large a matter to demonstrate how it has broken up the family life and disorganized the social relation, how it has instigated rebellion against the marriage tie and defeated the intent of all created beings that they should be fruitful and multiply.<sup>44</sup>

Negative commentary on gender relations in the United States was most common in French Canadian writing. Indeed, Quebec’s conservatives placed a great deal of importance on the role of women in *la survivance*, and perceived American attitudes towards gender equality were viewed as a threat to the nation. On occasion, the issue would surface in French Canadian literature. In *La campagne canadienne* (1925), for instance, Jesuit Adélarde Dugré contrasted gender relations in the United States and Canada and warned his readers against emigration and mixed marriages. During a trip to rural Quebec, the novel’s protagonist, Franco-American physician François Barré, is awakened to the harsh reality of his family’s degeneracy:

Devant ces hommes si simplement maîtres chez eux, qui avaient une idée si nette et si ferme de ce que doit être la famille, le docteur américain se sentait humilié de l’anarchie qui régnait à son foyer. Vraiment sa femme y prenait trop de place. Qu’elle eût une voix prépondérante quand il s’agissait des choses de son ressort, passe. Quelle s’occupât seule de

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<sup>44</sup> Andrew Macphail, “The American Woman,” in his *Essays in Fallacy* (London, 1910), 7; “New Lamps for Old,” *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 29.

meubler la maison, de choisir ou de renvoyer les servantes, qu'elle allât même jusqu'à déterminer l'emploi des soirées libres, le but et l'itinéraire de leurs voyages, passe encore; mais qu'elle se chargeât d'orienter la carrière de son mari, de choisir sa clientèle et de lui indiquer son gagne-pain, c'était trop fort. En cela c'est lui, François, qui devait être juge suprême et maître souverain. Il était temps que Fanny l'apprît et l'acceptât. Il y a des cas majeurs où la femme doit obéir et se taire, si elle ne peut pas approuver et se réjouir.<sup>45</sup>

In Dugré's novel, François Barré's son is out of control and his wife is disobedient, domineering, irreligious, and immodest. The Barrés were, it seemed, a typical American family. Re-edited numerous times, including once in comic book form, *La campagne canadienne* was serialized by several Quebec newspapers.

French Canadian novelists often portrayed American women as alluring temptresses given to *l'amour libre*. Ringuet (1895-1960), for instance, filled his landmark 1938 novel, *30 arpents*, with sensuous and immoral American women. In one passage, Grace Rivers, the attractive American wife of Franco-American labourer Alphée Larivière, makes a profound impression on a young rural lad:

La femme d'Alphée était assise à la table où Lucinda avait improvisé un réveillon et près d'elle s'était glissé Ephrem. Il la regardait de côté, sournoisement, toute audace perdue devant cette femme d'une espèce différente; détaillant à petites œillades furtives le visage aux yeux gris un peu troubles, la bouche mince et équivoque, la poitrine affichée où, lorsqu'elle se penchait pour boire son bol de thé, la blouse décolletée ne cachait plus les choses secrètes. Grace, par moments, levait sur lui des yeux amusés et avertis qui abattaient précipitamment les siens. Tout de suite ces deux-là avaient commencé de s'entendre; elle, attirée par sa force visible de rustre solide qu'elle devinait audacieux sous des dehors de bête domptée; lui, retrouvant en elle tout ce qui, de la femme, lui paraissait le plus désirable au monde: des vêtements qui ne soient pas de travail, une conversation qui ne soit pas de la terre, des soucis qui ne soient ni des bêtes ni des moissons. Il sentait surtout en elle la femme habituée à vivre au contact d'hommes divers, à sentir leur désir peser sur sa poitrine et lui serrer les hanches, et à lutter constamment contre lui. Il la croyait capable d'y céder sans hésitation, par un acte formel de consentement, et non par terreur ou par simplicité, comme celles qu'il avait eues jusqu'ici. Telle était du moins l'idée qu'il se faisait des femmes étrangères.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Adélar Dugré, *La campagne canadienne. Croquis et leçons* (Montreal, 1925), 202.

<sup>46</sup> Ringuet, *30 arpents. Roman* (Paris, 1938), 133.

But the attractiveness of American women masked their inner torment. Indeed, as Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé noted in 1936, American women led an empty, unfulfilling life: “L’Américaine humiliée, ravalée par le divorce, la pratique anti-conceptionnelle et le ‘birth control,’ n’a pas d’enfants. Elle élève des toutous et leur lègue en mourant, fortune, palais et cimetière.”<sup>47</sup> Born in Saint-Denis-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, Pineault-Léveillé was one of Canada’s first women psychiatrists. She specialized in the treatment of children and authored two children’s books, *Dollard. L’épopée de 1660 racontée aux enfants* (1921) and *Comment ils ont grandi* (1922). Both these volumes dealt with nationalist themes and were published by the militant Bibliothèque de l’Action française. Pineault-Léveillé was active in Quebec’s interwar nationalist circles and was a friend and admirer of abbé Lionel Groulx. Her husband, Arthur Léveillé, was the Dean of the Université de Montréal’s Faculty of Science.

### *The Family*

As went the American woman, so too went the American family. Indeed, pre-1945 Canadian conservatives considered that society’s basic unit, the family, was under assault in the United States. Modern notions of equality, sexuality, and matrimony were dissolving the American family. And American society itself, it was predicted, would implode when its basic unit vanished.

The disintegration of the family unit in the United States was attributed to a number of causes. According to abbé Georges-Marie Bilodeau, who taught at the only classical college devoted to adult education, the Séminaire des vocations tardives de Saint-Victor de Beauce, the American family was threatened by birth control, a practice which shocked many *nationalistes* and was usually attributed to religious indifference in the United States. In America, Bilodeau argued in a 1926 monograph denouncing French Canadian emigration, “le malthusianisme, pour ne pas dire l’onanisme, ce qui en pratique est la même chose, est la plaie des mariages, non seulement entre protestants et incroyants, mais aussi entre chrétiens.”<sup>48</sup> For the Roman Catholic clergy, the sorry state of the American family was yet another argument against emigration.

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<sup>47</sup> Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé, “Notre américanisation par la femme,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 145.

<sup>48</sup> Georges-Marie Bilodeau, *Pour rester au pays. Étude sur l’émigration des Canadiens français aux États-Unis. Causes. Remèdes* (Quebec, 1926), 46.



At its core, noted many *nationalistes*, the American family was weakened by irreligion. “Ce qui frappe d’admiration, c’est le progrès matériel de notre voisin,” wrote Hermas Bastien in 1933. “Ce qui épouvante,” he continued, “c’est le néo-paganisme de la grande masse des Américains. Idée religieuse, doctrine spiritualiste, solidité de la famille, ces bases des nations chrétiennes sont en Amérique sapées par le divorce stérilisateur, le pragmatisme utilitaire, le panthéisme mystique.”<sup>49</sup> Bastien, who received a doctorate from the Université de Montréal in 1928 for his “Essai sur la psychologie religieuse de William James,” was deeply concerned by the corrosive effects of philosophical pragmatism on Catholic thought.

Denouncing the Republic’s divorce rate was an anti-American staple. “The United States is pre-eminently the land of divorce,” wrote the lay secretary to the Anglican Synod of Ontario, Robert Vashon Rogers (1843-1911), in 1894, “it leads all civilized communities both in the numbers of divorces granted and in the number of reasons for which they can be obtained.”<sup>50</sup> In 1893, another fervent Anglican, John Castell Hopkins, deplored the “looseness of the marriage-tie in the great Republic.” “Between 1867 and 1886,” he noted in an American magazine, “two hundred thousand divorces were granted in the United States, as compared with one hundred and sixteen given in Canada. The trouble, of course, is caused largely by a difference in the laws of the various States, which permit the anomalous and disgraceful condition of a man or a woman’s being married in one state and single in another.”<sup>51</sup> For Hopkins, who was born of English parents in Dyersville, Iowa, and immigrated to Canada as a child, discussing the state of the American family was an opportunity both to denounce constitutional decentralization and to idealize Canadian society.

Continentalists usually put the whole question of divorce into perspective. The American family was not disintegrating, they argued, and the vast majority of the states had perfectly acceptable divorce legislation. Reacting to endless imperialist criticism of American divorce rates, Goldwin Smith acknowledged in 1891 that some states suffered from lax divorce legislation, but refused to see this as an insurmountable flaw or an impediment to Canadian-American relations:

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<sup>49</sup> Hermas Bastien, “La critique américaine,” in his *Témoignages. Études et profils littéraires* (Montreal, 1933), 35.

<sup>50</sup> R. V. Rogers, “How to Get Divorced,” *Queen’s Quarterly* 1 (1894): 203.

<sup>51</sup> J. C. Hopkins, “Canadian Hostility to Annexation,” *Forum* XVI (1893): 330. Hopkins’ use of divorce statistics was an anti-American classic. Similarly, in 1908, Arthur Johnston rattled off *two pages* of divorce statistics to show that the American Revolution had created a culture of divorce in the United States. [Johnston, *Myths and Facts of the American Revolution: A Commentary on United States History as it is Written* (Toronto, 1908), 212-213.]

There are social as well as political evils and dangers in the United States. The gravest of them perhaps are those which threaten the family through the increasing frequency of divorce. But this disturbance, like the unsettlement of the relations between the sexes generally, is the malady of all countries; though at present in different degrees. Nor is the divorce law of Illinois and Indiana the divorce law of the whole Union. The tendency of American legislatures of late, I believe, has been against increased facility of divorce. At any rate we may maintain friendly relations and trade with our neighbours without adopting their divorce laws, or the theories which some of them may have embraced about the character and the proper functions of woman.<sup>52</sup>

Besides, Smith argued, it was Canada, not the United States, that had a divorce problem. Indeed, he noted in *Canada and the Canadian Question*, “the French Catholics will not allow the Dominion to have a regular Divorce Court.”<sup>53</sup> Once again, the dreaded “French Province” was impeding the nation’s progress.

Most continentalists also refused to see the American family as essentially dysfunctional. In *Those Delightful Americans* (1902), a novel that reversed the popular premise of *An American Girl in London*, Sara Jeannette Duncan again contrasted gender and family relations in America and Britain. After arriving in the United States, the novel’s English narrator and heroine, Carrie Kemball, notes approvingly that the family, as an institution, is more egalitarian and less stifling in America:

There never has been anything feudal in the relations of American young people to their elders – they begin early to breathe, on the contrary, the equal privilege of the republic. No doubt there is some parental inquiry; but a certain calm acceptance is the usual thing. I did once hear great annoyance expressed because the young lady was a Unitarian, but it wasn’t allowed to interfere. As to uncles and aunts and cousins they are quite philosophic, they do

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<sup>52</sup> Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy, Jingoism*, 87-88.

<sup>53</sup> Godwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 167. In a similar vein, Arthur Lower noted in 1939 that Canadians “are still, by and large, a godly people, not as godly as we used to be, but still godly. And as such, we are properly shocked (and secretly a little envious) at the tales we hear of the wickedness of the great American cities. We still stand somewhat aghast at the roaring tide of American divorce and pray that it might be halted at our borders. But we are not very sure that it can be, for it is not altogether uncommon for individuals who cannot get a divorce in Canada to slip over the border and take advantage of the complacency of American courts. Men go south to get a divorce as they used to come north to get a drink. This might be considered a fair exchange but we sometimes feel that evil communications from the south are corrupting our good manners.” [Lower, “The United States Through Canadian Eyes,” *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* I (1939): 109.]

not concern themselves at all. It must be because the yoke of family connection sits more lightly there than in England; the fact that a person who happens to be your second cousin married another person is no reason why you should call upon her, especially you if belong to different denominations. You take no responsibility and she makes no claim; it must be less cramping, certainly.<sup>54</sup>

As far as Duncan was concerned, the family unit in the United States was essentially sound. It was less oppressive than in Britain and, as a result, it produced more autonomous women.<sup>55</sup>

Gender relations and the state of the family as a social unit were hot-button issues for the pre-1945 intellectual. This, of course, meant that they would invariably find their way into Canadian commentary on American life. Was the Republic's domestic situation really that different from the Dominion's? Conservatives certainly thought so. And to prove their point, they recited endless rows of divorce statistics, which invariably served to illustrate Canadian-American differentialism. Modernity, with its caustic effect on marriage and gender relations, was evidently not the Canadian way.

Neither were America's race relations. The Republic's treatment of its Black and Indian population, conservatives believed, was a repudiation of traditional notions of paternalism. Segregation was wrong, but equality was nonetheless frowned upon. Many continentalists were inclined to agree. Racial prejudice, to be sure, was widespread in the Dominion.

As for the millions of immigrants that entered the United States in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, they were often viewed with suspicion in Canadian writing. Immigration was tied to urbanization and industrialization, which, as we shall observe in the next chapter, made many conservative intellectuals uneasy. At times, continentalists shared their discomfort. Indeed, what effect would this mass migration have on the Republic's political culture, on its crime rates? Order and stability, after all, were also liberal preoccupations. They were, however, of secondary importance to the continentalist ethos. Only Tories valued order above all else.

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<sup>54</sup> S. J. Duncan, *Those Delightful Americans* (New York, 1902), 237.

<sup>55</sup> Not all continentalists, of course, praised the American family. In 1900, Edmond de Nevers noted that "l'évolution de la femme et la transformation du foyer domestique ont dû et doivent nécessairement produire leur contre-coup sur la situation des enfants dans la famille." Indeed, American children, he wrote, quoting Charles Eliot Norton, "sont impertinents, autoritaires, manquent de respect à leurs parents et se montrent souvent fort grossiers." [E. de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, II, 177-178.]

## *Chapter Eight*

### The Perils of Prosperity and the Search for Order

Since the late nineteenth century, America has been identified with a specific economic system: industrial capitalism. And though the international left would only deem the United States to be the supreme embodiment of *laissez-faire* after the Second World War, the prewar right was always quick to identify America with the evils of *machinisme* and the unregulated market. Indeed, though Canadian conservatives, like their European counterparts, were very much in favour of free enterprise, they regularly denounced industrial gigantism and monopolistic capitalism. Tories preferred a system where industry was more decentralized, both in terms of its ownership and of its location.

The concentration of wealth, conservatives believed, was destroying traditional notions of deference and status. Industrial modernization was producing a new class of obscenely wealthy millionaires whose influence over society was worrisome to intellectuals whose status was based on premodern ideas of entitlement. Moreover, the industrial age had given birth to both the urban metropolis and the proletariat, a rootless, underprivileged, and restless class whose rising power troubled more than a few Tories. For its part, mass production had levelled traditional craftsmanship and produced shoddy, standardized merchandise. Americans appeared to revel in these changes. Industrial modernity, it seemed, had reached its paroxysm in the United States.

Many continentalists were not far behind when it came to criticising the rise of monopolistic capitalism and industrial strife. Both socialists and liberals feared the concentration of wealth in the hands of an irresponsible plutocracy. Obscene wealth, they believed, could only weaken American democracy. Continentalists did not necessarily assume, however, that *laissez-faire* capitalism was an affliction particular to the United States or that industrialism was a threat to American society. Capitalism, after all, was international in its scope, and the future of Western society, they believed, lay in industrial development. Industrial modernization undoubtedly had its defects, but its instauration was both inevitable and desirable. Besides, the United States had taken concrete steps to correct the most flagrant abuses of *laissez-faire* industrialism. The New Deal made many interwar continentalists yearn for a Canadian FDR. The Dominion, it seemed, lagged behind its neighbour when it came to reigning in capitalism. And though some turn-of-the-century

liberals were ruralists who feared the rise of the American proletariat, the socialists who dominated continentalist discourse in the 1930s and 1940s saw working class affirmation as a crucial vehicle for social change.

Conservatives believed that industrialism bred disorder. It upset premodern social relations, it destroyed the rural/urban balance, and it produced revolutionary dissatisfaction. For the anti-American, these factors blended with more traditional concerns regarding the violent nature of American society and its apparently defective system of justice. The United States, it seemed, suffered from a lack of order. Crime was out of control and American justice was, it seemed, administered either by vigilantes or by an elected and inept judiciary. Yet American criminality was but the tip of the iceberg. As previous chapters have noted, conservatives believed that every aspect of American society was marked by disorder: the American political system was unstable, the nation's approach to education was unbalanced, and its race relations were anarchic.

Continentalism, at least in its liberal form, was also concerned with order. Yet Canadian liberals did not share the conservative fixation with orderliness. Socialists, for their part, were preoccupied with replacing the established order with another system. The liberal and socialist attitude towards order was reflected in continentalist writing on law and order. American criminality and vigilantism were condemned, but also placed into perspective. Despite its higher crime rates, continentalists argued that American society was scarcely in a state of anarchy. Besides, crime was hardly unknown in the Dominion.

### *Industrialization and Urbanization*

American industry generated a great deal of commentary in Quebec, where rurality was perhaps more important to the conservative ethos. Ruralism, to be sure, was widespread in pre-1945 Canadian thought, but it was intrinsic to French Canadian nationalism. For the *nationaliste*, the countryside was not only a reservoir of moral virtue, it was also a bastion of *survivance*. Indeed, with large-scale industry dominated by foreigners, *la terre* appeared to offer a viable alternative to urban exploitation and assimilation. American capital, moreover, was hastening the pace of Quebec's industrialization.<sup>1</sup> As French Canadian nationalists saw it, the Republic was an industrial civilization which possessed the ability to catapult its neighbours into the mass age.

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<sup>1</sup> American investment is discussed in *infra*, 314-321.

This tendency was reinforced by French commentary which, during the interwar years, seemed transfixed by American *machinisme*. For French observers like André Siegfried, the assembly line, standardized production, and even Henry Ford seemed to herald a new age. And America was its embodiment. In both Quebec and France, conservative anxiety regarding mass production peaked during the 1930s. Indeed, the Great Depression confirmed *nationaliste* apprehensions regarding massive industrialization and laissez-faire capitalism. Clearly, industrial America was a colossus with clay feet. Stability, the *nationalistes* believed, was the preserve of societies with a solid rural and agricultural base. Large-scale industry was inherently unsteady; it was driven by speculation and governed by the harsh laws of supply and demand in a way that agriculture was not. Massive industrialization, therefore, produced economic instability.

Like many *nationalistes*, Paul-Henri Guimont (b. 1906) blamed the Great Depression on American industrial gigantism. A rising star at Montreal's hotbed of Catholic economic thought, the École des Hautes Études commerciales, Guimont argued in 1935 that America had broken the natural equilibrium between agriculture and industry. Indeed, an over-reliance on massive and heavily standardized industrial production had been America's undoing: "Dans la formation de son économie, elle avait fondé sur la formule nouvelle et vulgaire de la standardisation industrielle d'extravagantes et insatiabiles ambitions. Elle avait méprisé le génie créateur et conservateur de la vieille Europe. L'originalité dans la conception lui était inconnue. Elle s'était gratifiée d'une superstructure industrielle excessive à laquelle correspondait une population trop peu nombreuse."<sup>2</sup> Industrial America was a top-heavy society. As a result, it collapsed like a house of cards when placed under strain.

But industrial gigantism was not only economically unsound, it was also perilous in its social ramifications. For the dean of the Université de Montréal's Faculty of Social Science, Édouard Montpetit, the effects of mass production and standardisation on American society were a source of concern. "L'Amérique change," he wrote in 1941. "Sa figure, même physique, se transforme." And there was something vaguely dehumanizing about this change:

Cette transformation est la conséquence du progrès mécanisé, étourdi de réclame, qui entraîne la société: la production standardisée dont on exalte le bienfait est tendue comme un ressort de civilisation. La vie s'empare de l'homme, lui impose des satisfactions, assimile

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<sup>2</sup> Paul-Henri Guimont, "Coup d'œil sur l'Amérique contemporaine," *L'Actualité économique* XI (1935): 55.

ses goûts, ses habitudes. La puissance économique s'est mise au service des masses, faisant masse elle-même. C'est une forme de rouleau compresseur que l'existence cette fois, et non la loi, actionne. Les idées initiales que l'on retrouve, qui forment encore la trame de l'être collectif, perdent de leur influence sinon de leur vigueur, submergées sous le flot de l'uniforme marée. Elles cèdent devant le bien-être acquis que d'autres idées enfièvent. L'âme s'en va au moment où elle allait exister: il reste un peuple, composite et mécanisé.<sup>3</sup>

Concern surrounding industrialism was hardly confined to *nationaliste* discourse. Imperialists were also troubled by the scope of American industry. Andrew Macphail, for instance, suggested that industrialization, in particular the mass production of processed food, was disintegrating the American family "by destroying the multifarious occupation of every member of it." "In America," he wrote in 1910, "industrial change has been remarkably rapid, and there are women living in idleness to-day, who in their youth took the sheaf from the field and had the evening meal prepared from it before the night fell." And female idleness, Macphail believed, threatened society's moral stability. Accustomed to indolence, American women were refusing to shoulder the burdens of motherhood; they were making a sham of the institution of marriage. "The country has grown rich," Macphail concluded, "but the family is destroyed."<sup>4</sup>

Similarly, after visiting a New England textile factory in 1938, the *Revue dominicaine's* literary editor, Father Albert Saint-Pierre (1903-1958), concluded that "l'esclavage de la machine" was having a devastating effect on the American family:

La fabrique que j'ai visitée fonctionne vingt-quatre heures par jour et six jours par semaine. Chaque groupe d'ouvriers doit travailler huit heures. Le travail de nuit est interdit aux femmes et aux jeunes filles. Mais il arrive que ces différentes périodes finissent par bouleverser les éléments essentiels à la vie de famille et ruiner celle-ci insensiblement, sans parler des dangers que comportent pour le système nerveux et la santé générale, l'atmosphère des lieux, les repas habituellement pris à des heures irrégulières, le sommeil de jour, etc. Les ouvriers de nuit n'ont guère le temps et la facilité de veiller aux intérêts de leur foyer, de pourvoir convenablement à l'éducation et à la surveillance de leurs enfants. Ajoutez à ceci le travail de la femme incompatible avec la maternité, et celui de la toute jeune fille dont les muscles encore peu raffermis ne peuvent résister bien longtemps.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 248-249.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Macphail, "The American Woman," in his *Essays in Fallacy* (London, 1910), 11, 12-13, 14.

<sup>5</sup> Albert Saint-Pierre, "Le mirage de l'or aux États-Unis," *Revue dominicaine* XLV (1939): 88-89, 90.

Massive industrialization was seen as a ticking time bomb. Indeed, with industry came the proletariat, a dangerous class of propertyless malcontents who, many conservatives feared, would eventually be seduced by revolutionary agitators. These subversive forces were clearly at work in the United States. Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anti-American observers relentlessly chronicled the Republic's industrial disturbances and the rise of radical unionism.<sup>6</sup> Industrial strife clearly struck fear in the conservative heart. James Algie, for instance, began 1901 novel, *Bergen Worth*, with an apocalyptic paragraph: "The great railway strike of 1894 was going on at Chicago; the Pullman car riots were at their height. Apostles of discontent had aroused the masses. Loud-voiced agitators had unchained the tiger of irresponsibility and goaded to madness the wolf of want. The flag of anarchy was unfurled and 'down with everything that's up' became the watchword of the hour."<sup>7</sup>

The founding president of the United Empire Loyalists' Association of Ontario, George Sterling Ryerson, was equally appalled by industrial strife in the United States. Born into a prominent Toronto family – his uncle, Egerton Ryerson, was instrumental in establishing Ontario's school system – G. S. Ryerson was a medical doctor and major-general in the Canadian militia. He saw action in the Fenian raids, the North West Rebellion, and the South African War. Like many Loyalist mythmakers, he linked American labour unrest with the nation's original sin: the Revolution. Class conflict, Ryerson argued in *The After-Math of a Revolution* (1896), was the result of the American Revolution's legacy of violence:

The tenth annual report of the Commissioner of Labor of the United States (1894) throws much light on the relations of capital and labor in that country. It shows that the huge trusts, combines and monopolies are making a mockery of Republican institutions. Men may be born equal in the United States, but they don't stay so. A painful feature of the strikes and lockouts is the resort to force, attended in many instances by serious loss of life and destruction of property. But did not the Revolution teach Americans that if your neighbor does not agree with you, you may shoot him, confiscate his property, and injure him to the utmost of your ability? Why then would Americans complain of the latter-day application of their own theories and practices?<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> American trade unionism is discussed in *infra*, 322-325.

<sup>7</sup> James Algie, *Bergen Worth* (Toronto, 1901), 1.

<sup>8</sup> G. S. Ryerson, *The After-Math of a Revolution* (Toronto, 1896), 11.



The condemnation of American industrial agitation, however, was not confined to conservative writing. A number of turn-of-the-century liberals were equally appalled by labour unrest in the United States. In many ways, intellectuals like Goldwin Smith or A. D. DeCelles shared many conservative concerns regarding the revolutionary threat posed by the proletariat. DeCelles, for instance, blamed European agitators and the extreme concentration of wealth for the wave of industrial strife that washed over America in the 1890s:

Nulle part, les conflits entre patrons et ouvriers n'ont été plus âpres, plus dangereux qu'aux États-Unis; nulle part les grèves n'ont revêtu un caractère plus menaçant pour l'ordre public qu'à Pittsburg [*sic*], Baltimore et Chicago. C'étaient, dans leur cadre restreint, comme les combats d'avant-poste d'une guerre sociale. Plusieurs causes ont provoqué la lutte anti-capitaliste; l'influence de l'Europe dévorée par le socialisme, influence exercée par la propagande de nombreux déclassés que l'immigration traîne avec elle et qui, par leurs discours révolutionnaires, attisent la discorde et enveniment le conflit; la concentration rapide, en quelques mains, d'énormes fortunes plus ou moins avouables et, partant, de nature à exaspérer le travailleur honnête.<sup>9</sup>

For most continentalists, however, resisting industrialization was seen as both pointless and counterproductive. Indeed, prewar liberals and socialists shared a common faith in the illimitable progress of society; they understood the rise of modern industry, in America or elsewhere, to be both inevitable and intrinsically progressive. Conversely, societies which rejected industrialization were courting disaster. To this effect, the general manager of the Banque canadienne nationale, Beaudry Leman, warned Montreal's Cercle universitaire in 1928 that Quebec had little choice but to adapt itself to American *machinisme*.

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<sup>9</sup> A. D. DeCelles, *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (Ottawa, 1896), 399. DeCelles was not the only continentalist to see socialism as an imported, and therefore foreign, ideology. During a 1935 conference on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Robert A. MacKay (b. 1894) noted that "socialism has been late in taking root in Canada, as in the United States, and no doubt for the same reasons - both were expanding countries where until very recently the average man could cherish the illusion that by hard work, initiative, and a little luck, he could win for himself a fortune. Socialism is not indigenous to such a soil. But as this illusion has been shattered, socialism has sprung up on both sides of the border, and on both sides the intellectual origins are European, not American." [R. A. MacKay, "The Nature of Canadian Politics," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*, ed. Albert B. Corey, Walter W. McLaren, and Reginald G. Trotter (Boston, 1935), 199-200.]

Faut-il nous adapter au milieu américain? Il me semble que nous devons répondre: Oui, dans le domaine économique. Que l'on regrette, voire même que l'on déplore la tendance de plus en plus marquée vers la standardisation et vers la disparition de la petite industrie spécialisée et du travail individuel, à la fois créateur et novateur, je le comprends, mais serait-il permis de suggérer que cette forme de l'activité industrielle n'est pas la mieux adaptée à notre condition et à nos besoins. D'ailleurs, à cet égard, l'Europe s'américanise rapidement et ne vit pas seulement de ses petites industries. Elle en a, comme l'Amérique, de très grandes, et, toutes proportions gardées, elle adopte les méthodes qui assurent le meilleur rendement. Chacun est enclin, suivant ses sympathies, à généraliser la louange ou le blâme. Tout n'est pas condamnable dans la standardisation, qui a donné des résultats vraiment extraordinaires.

Trained as a civil engineer, Leman was a leading figure in Quebec business circles. Mass production, he believed, was not a threat to French Canadian *survivance*. "Je ne puis concevoir que notre culture latine et notre humanisme soient sérieusement menacés du fait que nous aurons à notre disposition moins de formes de bouteilles, moins d'espèces de roues d'automobile et moins de genres de pneus."<sup>10</sup> On the whole, though Leman was hardly a revolutionary figure, his ideas challenged many of the ruralist platitudes that were intrinsic to interwar French Canadian nationalism.

Ruralism, however, was hardly confined to *nationaliste* discourse. It was indeed common in pre-1945 Canadian thought. And this, of course, was reflected in Canadian writing on the United States, though as a minor theme. To many conservatives, America was an essentially urban civilization. As Hermas Bastien noted in 1929, the United States often brought to mind "des étourdissantes cités, des quais souillés, des gratte-ciel provoquants, des usines tentaculaires et des vaudevilles burlesques."<sup>11</sup> American cities, in particular New York and Chicago, offended ruralist sensibilities. They were soulless cosmopolitan agglomerations where crime, corruption, and disease were rampant.

Ruralism was not exclusive to the conservative ethos. Many nineteenth-century liberals, for instance, were ruralists in the Jeffersonian tradition. One of these was Erastus Wiman. "One thing seems quite evident," he wrote in 1893, "that the growth of [American]

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<sup>10</sup> Beaudry Leman, "Les Canadiens français et le milieu américain," *Revue trimestrielle canadienne* XIV (1928): 269.

<sup>11</sup> Hermas Bastien, "William James," in his *Itinéraires philosophiques* (Montreal, 1929), 53

cities, which in the last decade was sixty percent, as compared with the growth of the farms, which was but fifteen percent, will have to be reversed if any permanent prosperity is to exist in this country." Born in Churchville, Upper Canada, Wiman entered the world of journalism at the age of sixteen when his cousin, William McDougall, the managing editor of the *North American*, hired him as a printer's apprentice. When the *North American* amalgamated with the *Toronto Globe* in 1855, Wiman became the paper's commercial editor. In 1860, he joined the staff of R. G. Dunn and Co.'s mercantile agency. He was transferred to the company's head office in New York six years later. Wiman would later become the firm's general manager. Like Thomas Jefferson, Wiman saw the independent farmer as the backbone of American freedom, prosperity, and stability. Massive urbanization, he surmised, threatened American society: "In no country has the 'hope of property' so stimulated the aims of humanity as in America, and that hope, encouraged and rewarded, is powerful element underlying the prosperity of the nation. Diminish that hope, lessen it as in crowded cities, where property to the poor is an impossibility, and citizenship declines, manhood deteriorates and civilization sinks back."<sup>12</sup>

On the whole, however, most continentalists did not share Wiman's misgivings regarding urbanization. They generally viewed the phenomenon as both inevitable and desirable. The American city was a source of great inspiration to poet and novelist Robert Choquette. Born in Manchester, New Hampshire, and educated at Montreal's Loyola College, Choquette saw great promise in New York City's cosmopolitan energy. In fact, his 1931 epic poem *Metropolitan Museum* introduced the theme of urban metropolitanism into French Canadian poetry.<sup>13</sup> For his part, the director of Harvard's Bureau of Municipal Research, William Bennett Munro, consistently defended the American city. Unlike his conservative opponents, he stressed the American city's vitality and its ability to reform:

Into this great melting-pot of American municipal life the baser elements of indifference, ignorance, and greed, together with the finer elements of intelligence, public spirit, and self-sacrifice, must be poured, and out of the mass will come the composite of American citizenship. The modern metropolis, whether in America or elsewhere, is neither an

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<sup>12</sup> Erastus Wiman, *Chances of Success: Episodes and Observations in the Life of a Busy Man* (New York, 1893), 172, 256.

<sup>13</sup> Jean Morency and Joël Boilard, "La filière américaine. La contribution des migrants canadiens-français et de quelques Franco-Américains d'origine au processus de diffusion de la littérature étatsunienne au Québec," in *Les parcours de l'histoire. Hommage à Yves Roby*, ed. Yves Frenette, Martin Pâquet, and Jean Lamarre (Quebec, 2002), 332.

Athens nor a Gomorrah; it is both rolled into one. In the rural community, which has the features of neither one nor the other, the problem of maintaining a reasonable standard of ideals and achievements is easier than in the city, where these things must be determined by the might of the stronger among its modern Helenes and Philistines.<sup>14</sup>

### *Capitalism and Wealth*

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of mammoth corporations and an unprecedented concentration of wealth in America. In the Dominion's intellectual circles, the growth of corporate America was viewed with alarm. Distrust of American capitalism was indeed widespread among Canadian intellectuals and was generally centred on the dangers of concentrated wealth. For conservatives, the rise of the 'robber baron' seemed to signal a new era of unbridled materialism. Liberals, on the other hand, tended to view the concentration of wealth as a threat to American democracy. For their part, socialists rejected the whole capitalist system.

The conservative critique of laissez-faire was essentially antimodern. Indeed, in imperialist and *nationaliste* prose, unbridled capitalism emerged as an agent of modernity. The obscene concentration of wealth was, conservatives believed, engendering a status revolution in America. The public stature of the 'robber baron' was growing and, as a result, spiritual and intellectual endeavours were becoming increasingly discounted. Material success, in turn, was being held up as the paragon of achievement. For many elites whose power and prestige rested on premodern notions of deference and spiritualism – aside from Goldwin Smith and Vincent Massey, few of the intellectuals whose work is examined in this study would have been considered wealthy – the rise of American plutocracy foreshadowed appalling social change for Canada.

The status revolution had no greater critic than Stephen Leacock. He regularly condemned "the distinct bias of our whole American life towards commercialism." Indeed, Leacock saw materialism and conspicuous consumption as maladies common to both Canada and the United States. In North America, he noted in a 1909 article published in the *University Magazine*,

Everything with us is "run" on business lines from a primary election to a prayer meeting. Thus business, and the business code, and business principles become everything.

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<sup>14</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Government of American Cities* (New York, 1912), 50.

Smartness is the quality most desired, pecuniary success the goal to be achieved. Hence all less tangible and proveable forms of human merit, and less tangible aspirations of the human mind are rudely shouldered aside by business ability and commercial success. There follows the apotheosis of the business man. He is elevated to the post of national hero. His most stupid utterances are taken down by the American Reporter, through the prism of whose intellect they are refracted with a double brilliance and inscribed at large in the pages of the one-cent press. The man who organizes a soap-and-glue company is called a nation-builder; a person who can borrow enough money to launch a Distiller's Association is named an empire maker, and a man who remains in business until he is seventy-five without getting into the penitentiary is designated a Grand Old Man.<sup>15</sup>

In a similar vein, James Cappon deplored the undue influence that the capitalist exerted over American society. "The older and better standards of the learned professions, of higher literature and art, and of the church have been quite overwhelmed," he wrote in 1904. The modern American businessman was clearly an intellectual and cultural vacuum. "On the whole," Cappon continued, "the immense influence of the business man, with his principle of 'All that is new is good' and his utilitarian views of education, may have been a considerable factor in producing some of the worst phenomena in the American democracy." Indeed, the American businessman's influence was not in proportion to either his intelligence or his aptitudes:

There is the overgrowth of a type [in America] which has impoverished the rest of the national life. The leading business man of fifty years ago in England or France was generally a well-bred gentleman. He was of weight in the counsels of the nation and he knew it. But unless he happened to be something also of a scholar and was really able to understand the records of the past, he did not pretend to judge it from reading about it in a general history or encyclopaedia. He did not fancy he could be an authority on education, on the progress of the human race and the value of this or that civilization, with a knowledge that did not really extend beyond the life of his own century. He had sense enough to know that to be successful in pig-iron or building ships did not necessarily qualify him for that. But this new type of business man has become a monstrosity in the States and is sucking out the higher intellectual life of the nation. I am not advocating his abolition; that would be useless. But I say, if he is going to govern us, he must learn to educate himself better for that purpose.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Stephen Leacock, "Literature and Education in America," *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 16-17.

<sup>16</sup> James Cappon, "The Great American Democracy," *Queen's Quarterly* XI (1904): 301, 307.

A visceral aversion to plutocracy also made Quebec's conservatives vocal critics of laissez-faire. Jules-Paul Tardivel, for instance, railed against the rise of monopoly capitalism in 1900: "Les compagnies de voies ferrées, les puissants syndicats accapareurs et monopoleurs, les *trusts* de toute sorte, les *combines* – institutions qui n'existaient pas aux premiers jours de la République, – exercent aujourd'hui une influence aussi grande que néfaste sur la législation, sur la direction des affaires publiques, sur les destinées nationales."<sup>17</sup> This critique would only intensify with time. By the 1930s, *nationaliste* criticism of American trusts reached a fever pitch, as intellectuals like Esdras Minville or Lionel Groulx blamed the Depression on laissez-faire liberalism and industrial gigantism, both of which were understood to be American poisons.

American-style capitalism, it was argued, profoundly destabilized society. Haunted by the spectre of revolution, most interwar *nationalistes* saw capitalism's inevitable by-products – abject poverty and financial ruin – as the building blocks of revolutionism. To this effect, in 1936, Damien Jasmin (1893-1968), a professor of natural law at the Université de Montréal, warned the readers of the *Revue dominicaine* against the Americanization of "nos pratiques financières":

Mais notre imitation servile des coutumes américaines ne se borne pas à la constitution et à la propagation d'entreprises foncièrement malhonnêtes. Même lorsqu'il s'agit d'affaires solides et sérieuses, le capitalisme actuel, par l'intermédiaire des opérations de bourse, engendre de profondes iniquités à l'ensemble de la communauté, et menace la tranquillité, la stabilité de l'État, car personne ne souhaite plus volontiers la révolution, le renversement de l'autorité établie, que celui qui a subi une ruine soudaine par un revers de fortune, après avoir joui des avantages de la richesse ou d'une certaine aisance. Les débâcles financières bouleversent les esprits et les cœurs.<sup>18</sup>

Laissez-faire capitalism and the concentration of wealth in the United States also worried a number of continentalists. Their critique, however, was somewhat different from that which emanated from conservative writing. Liberals and socialists, indeed, did not appear overly concerned by the status revolution. They were nonetheless worried by the rise of plutocracy and its impact on American democracy. "Nowhere has plutocracy been so

<sup>17</sup> Jules-Paul Tardivel, *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis. Illusions et réalités* (Montreal, 1900), 12.

<sup>18</sup> Damien Jasmin, "L'américanisation et nos pratiques financières," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 193-194.

unbridled or so ruthless as in the United States," wrote O. D. Skelton in 1912. "The trust millionaire has made the demagogue inevitable, and a spirit has been created in which all wealth, honest or dishonest, is under deep suspicion."<sup>19</sup>

Liberals, of course, were very much in favour of free enterprise. But their faith in laissez-faire had its limits, and they could not countenance plutocracy. At the turn of the twentieth century, Goldwin Smith saw the concentration of wealth was a mortal threat to American society. He was convinced that it would slowly erode democracy and encourage the rise of militarism, imperialism, and aristocratism:

It is vain to rail at a class for following its natural bent. The plutocratic class, after all, is doing no more. But its natural bent is anti-democratic. Its ostentatious prodigality and luxury are a defiance of democratic sentiment and subversive of democratic manners. At heart it sighs for a court and aristocracy. It worships anything royal or aristocratic. It barter the hands of its daughters and its millions for European titles. It imitates, and even outvies in some things, the gilding of European nobility. Its social centre is gradually shifting from America, where its inclinations are still in some measure controlled, to England, where it can get more homage and subserviency for its wealth, take hold on the mantle of society, hope perhaps in the end to win its way to the circle of Royalty, and even, if it becomes naturalized, itself to wear a coronet or a star.<sup>20</sup>

Even the 'Duke of Staten Island,' Erastus Wiman, was concerned by the rise of the American plutocrat. "Great care was taken in laying the foundations of the government to diffuse the distribution of great power," he wrote in *Chances of Success* (1893), a rambling collection of essays advocating commercial union, solid business ethics, and rugged individualism. "But provision was not made to guard against the power of the great aggregations of wealth which in the last few years have been accumulated. Half-a-dozen rich men could get together now and jeopardize the country, if they chose, by buying up currency and gold, and putting it away. There is hardly any limit to the mischief they might do, or to the money they might make." Thankfully, Wiman concluded, "up to this time, no

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<sup>19</sup> O. D. Skelton, "Current Events: Choosing a President," *Queen's Quarterly* XX (1912): 114. Socialists were even more suspicious of American capitalism. Indeed, as Colin McKay noted in 1936, "the harsher features of the capitalist system are more sharply developed in the United States." [McKay, "United States Labour Begins to Learn from Britain," *Canadian Unionist* 10 (1936): 36.]

<sup>20</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Commonwealth or Empire: A Bystander's View of the Question* (New York, 1902), 12-13.

such disposition has been shown in this country.”<sup>21</sup> Much of Wiman’s fortune, however, had evaporated in the financial crisis of early 1893.

Edmond de Nevers also worried about the growth of trusts and the concentration of wealth in America. Yet, like Tocqueville, de Nevers had great faith in America’s inherent stability and resilience. As a result, he believed that the nation would eventually reform its economic system and serve as a model to the rest of the world:

Je crois les États-Unis destinés à résoudre les grands problèmes sociaux; car c’est là que la lutte entre le capital et le travail arrivera tout d’abord, à son point culminant. Or, l’Américain considère plutôt la poursuite de la fortune comme un “sport” que comme une nécessité; l’or acquis est pour lui l’enjeu de la lutte et non l’équivalent du bonheur. D’un autre côté, l’ouvrier n’est pas, dans la république voisine, l’homme asservi, pressuré aigri des grands centres européens; c’est un homme libre, ayant conscience de sa dignité et habitué aux formes constitutionnelles. Quand le régime capitaliste aura donné tout ce qu’il peut donner, il s’entendra avec l’élément ouvrier. Et je pressens que la réforme que l’on inaugurerait alors, sera une œuvre géniale que le reste du monde imitera. C’est par les États-Unis que se réalisera cette prédiction du grand philosophe anglais, Herbert Spencer: “L’humanité tient en réserve des formes de vie sociale supérieures à tout ce que nous pouvons imaginer.”<sup>22</sup>

By the 1930s and 1940s, the tone of continentalist commentary shifted. The New Deal had apparently dethroned laissez-faire and many Canadian intellectuals turned to the United States for economic guidance. In 1941, a group of continentalists led by John W. Dafoe bemoaned that “economically Canada is probably the most orthodox of all important nations. Its business is dominated by large companies and often cursed by monopolies that flourish under its tariff walls.”<sup>23</sup> The United States, they believed, had cleaned up its act during the New Deal. Canada, however, had clung to laissez-faire orthodoxy, and was consequently beset by irresponsible monopolies. F. R. Scott agreed. In a 1941 pamphlet devoted to Canadian-American relations, he noted that the Dominion lagged behind the United States when it came to curbing the power of trusts and combines:

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<sup>21</sup> Wiman, *Chances of Success*, 213-214.

<sup>22</sup> Edmond de Nevers, “L’évolution des peuples anciens et modernes,” *La Revue canadienne* XLVII (1904): 559-560.

<sup>23</sup> J. W. Dafoe, ed., *Canada Fights: An American Democracy at War* (New York, 1941), 40.



In the sphere of economics, both countries are seen to have passed through the same stages of capitalist growth and change. The period of small-scale industry is over and politics are becoming more and more interrelated. Power production, the large industrial unit, concentration of ownership and control are to be found in marked degree on both sides of the border. In some respects the process has proceeded further in Canada, where the smaller size of the economy and a less active public opposition to trusts and combines have resulted in an even more centralized economic grouping.<sup>24</sup>

Born in Quebec City, Scott studied at Bishop's College, in Lennoxville, Quebec, before attending Magdalen College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar. He returned to Canada in 1923 and taught briefly at Montreal's Lower Canada College before enrolling in McGill University's Faculty of Law. Influenced by English-born Professor H. A. Smith, Scott took a keen interest in constitutional law. It was during this time that he founded the *McGill Fortnightly Review* with fellow poet and literary critic A. J. M. Smith and began to introduce his poetry to a wider audience. After graduating from McGill, Scott practiced law in Montreal for a time and helped found the *Canadian Mercury*, the *McGill Fortnightly Review's* ephemeral successor. He joined McGill's law faculty in 1928 and became its dean in 1961. He would remain at McGill until his retirement in 1964. Like Frank Underhill, Scott played an active role in the founding of both the League for Social Reconstruction and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. He was the CCF's national chairman from 1942 to 1950.

By and large, Canadian writing on the American economy was marked by an underlying consensus. Unbridled capitalism, it seems, made most Canadian intellectuals uneasy. Free enterprise was one thing, but plutocracy was another. There were, of course, significant differences between the anti-American and continentalist outlooks. Liberals and socialists were concerned that the concentration of wealth would undermine American egalitarianism and threaten democracy. Conservatives, on the other hand, saw the plutocrat in a different light. Plutocracy, they believed, was a threat to premodern conceptions of deference and order.

### *Justice, Order, and Violence*

In pre-1945 Canada, the issue of order was at the heart of anti-American rhetoric. Indeed, it appeared as a watermark throughout conservative commentary. Tories believed that

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<sup>24</sup> F. R. Scott, *Canada and the United States* (Boston, 1941), 12-13.

modernity bred disorder; it eroded established social and economic relations and destabilized society. And America, unsurprisingly, embodied the disorder of modern society.

To the Canadian conservative, violence and criminality were perhaps the most tangible signs of American disorder. The United States was beset by crime and vigilantism; gang violence and lynchings, it seemed, were widespread in American society. Crime statistics, certainly, did not lie. The Republic, moreover, possessed an ineffective judicial system. This conservative rhetoric served a basic purpose: to affirm the inherent superiority of Canadian (i.e. conservative) society.

The issue of law and order was most preoccupying to imperialists. Indeed, notions of “peace, order, and good government” appear to have played a much stronger role in the English Canadian identity. In Quebec, American criminality was viewed with alarm, but did not generate nearly as much prose. And commentary related to capital punishment and firearms, though an anti-American staple today, was scarcely discussed during the period under study. Neither issue appears to have been the object of Canadian-American differentialism or of any significant moral posturing.

In conservative commentary, violence and criminality were seen as intrinsic to the American experience. Andrew Macphail, for instance, spoke of a “reign of lawlessness” in the United States and argued in 1909 that “life is safer in a Yukon dance hall than in Madison Square Garden.”<sup>25</sup> Americans were a rebellious people; they always seemed to be either breaking the law or taking it into their own hands. And this rebelliousness was often attributed to a generalized lack of respect for authority. “La masse américaine n’a pas notre mentalité, notre courtoisie, notre respect de la famille et de l’autorité, qui est le fond du caractère français,” wrote the head of one of Quebec’s largest construction firms, Alban Janin, in 1936.<sup>26</sup> Deference and orderliness, apparently, were French Canadian traits.

Like many imperialists, James Cappon was appalled by what he believed to be “the particular character of American crime, its callous levity and the apparent inadequacy of its motive.” “The criminal who murders to escape with his booty,” he wrote in 1904, “the Neapolitan or Sicilian who uses his knife in an access of rage or jealousy, the drunken Durham miner who kills a comrade in a quarrel belong to a class from which such things may be expected, but there is something ethnologically new in American crime.” America, Cappon believed, was plagued by white middle- and upper-class criminality. Such a

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<sup>25</sup> Andrew Macphail, “New Lamps for Old,” *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 26.

<sup>26</sup> Alban Janin, “Notre américanisation par le cinéma,” *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 72.

surprising phenomenon – he naturally assumed that respectable whites didn't commit crimes – could only be the result of a “general absence of respect for law in ordinary matters of life.”<sup>27</sup>

American criminality was attributed to a number of causes. Immigrants and African Americans were regularly blamed for crime and violence in the United States.<sup>28</sup> Most Tories, however, saw American disorderliness as a more deep-seated phenomenon. For some, it was a result of the nation's frontier experience. Western lawlessness, they argued, had left a permanent imprint on the American soul; it had taught Americans to rely on vigilantism – lynching, in particular, horrified Canadian observers – and to solve their problems with violence.<sup>29</sup> Robert Falconer, for instance, saw the Ku Klux Klan's interwar reign of terror as a manifestation of pioneer vigilantism:

Another symptom of this conflict of ideals is seen in the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan movement in the middle western states, which thoughtful Americans view with no little concern ... Originating in the southern states after the Civil war, to resist the use of the negro vote by unprincipled politicians, this secret organization has reappeared with its terrorism in the states of the middle west ... Its power is due partly to the people having lost faith in their politicians; the machine is beyond their control, law is broken, they feel themselves isolated and betrayed; so they call up their old pioneering instincts, take the law into their own hands and in a rough and ready way mete out decisions according to the prevailing sentiment of the community in respect to good citizenship.<sup>30</sup>

For others, violence and lawlessness were the sombre legacy of the American Revolution. In his 1904 presidential address to the Royal Society of Canada, of which he was a founding member, Colonel George T. Denison suggested that the Revolution had purged the early Republic of its most law-abiding citizens, the Loyalists, and had taught Americans to solve their problems through violence:

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<sup>27</sup> Cappon, “The Great American Democracy,” 299.

<sup>28</sup> African Americans, however, were also portrayed as the victims of white violence. See *infra*, 163, n. 2.

<sup>29</sup> The lawlessness of America's Western frontier was frequently contrasted with the orderliness of the Canadian West. “The violence and insecurity of life which have marked the settlement of the West, and still prevail over whole States in the South, are unknown in Canada,” insisted George R. Parkin. [Parkin, *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity* (London, 1892), 136.] Canada's inherently British sense of order, it was argued, had triumphed over frontier lawlessness.

<sup>30</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 176-177.

On the other side of the line the lawless elements had got control. They had set law and order and government and constitution at defiance. The rights of property were set at naught. As one of their writers has well said: "The Loyalists had position and property, the Indians had fertile lands; both were coveted, and both were wrenched from their rightful possessors." Many of the Loyalists were put to death, the others exiled, and the property of all confiscated. This spirit has affected the nation ever since. The murders per annum in proportion to the population, being many times more than in other countries of the world. The number of lynchings are about equal to the number of legal executions, and are more often accompanied by the most barbarous scenes. Yet they seem to be accepted by public opinion as an unavoidable evil.<sup>31</sup>

Born into a prominent military family in Toronto, Denison was educated at Upper Canada College and the University of Toronto. As the commanding officer of the Governor General's Body Guard, he saw action during the Fenian raids and the North-West Rebellion. From 1877 to 1923 he was Toronto's senior police magistrate. An ardent imperialist and a rabid anti-American, Denison's conceptual universe was dominated by two fundamental ideals: loyalty and order. As a nation born of revolution, America was the negation of both these ideals.

In Quebec, where cultural issues loomed large in anti-American commentary, it was often suggested that criminality was reinforced by American mass culture, which glorified crime and violence. Indeed, American society was not only violent, it revelled in violence. In his contribution to the *Revue dominicaine's* 1936 inquiry into "Notre américanisation," the editor of Montreal's *Le Devoir*, Georges Pelletier (1882-1947), condemned the American mass media's glorification of crime and immorality:

Voilà ce qui marque la presse populaire américaine la plus étalée chez nous. Le milliardaire ou le fils de milliardaire noceur, fêtard, jouisseur, d'une amoralité complète, les déportements de toute une catégorie de la société américaine, les criminels et les *gangsters* immanquablement victorieux sur la police, les divorces répétés d'acteurs et d'étoiles du cinéma, d'industriels ou de financiers en vedette, d'as du théâtre ou du sport professionnel: tout cela, avec des histoires de *love's nests*, d'exploits de *gunmen*, figure au premier plan de ce type de presse.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> G. T. Denison, "The United Empire Loyalists and their Influence upon the History of this Continent," *Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, X (1904): xxxi-xxxii.

<sup>32</sup> Georges Pelletier, "Notre américanisation par le journal," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 276.

Some Tories deemed the American criminal justice system to be overly lenient.<sup>33</sup> Leniency, however, was hardly viewed as the American justice system's most significant flaw. Like every other branch of American government, it suffered from an excessive faith in democracy. Indeed, the American practice of electing judges was almost universally condemned in Canada. Even A. D. DeCelles, whose assessment of American institutions was fundamentally positive, could not countenance an elected judiciary. "Celle-là est bien la plus dangereuse des innovations de la démocratie, exposant la justice aux pires soupçons," he wrote in 1896. Without a doubt, "l'indépendance de la magistrature, qui est la première sauvegarde de son honnêteté, a reçu un coup fatal le jour où elle est devenue une fonction élective. Il est difficile de comprendre comment les Américains, qui n'osent jamais faire fonds sur la probité humaine, ont pu consentir à accepter un principe qui en est le plus sûr destructeur?"<sup>34</sup>

Continentalists had some difficulty in countering the torrent of anti-American prose centred on crime and violence. Crime rates, after all, were clearly higher in the United States than they were in Canada. As a result, most continentalists merely accepted the fact that America was a more violent society.<sup>35</sup> "The Canadian generally has a deeper sense of law and order than the American," wrote a group of liberal continentalists in 1941. "There is less in his tradition of frontier lawlessness than in the American tradition. The Mounted Police carried the ideal of quick and sure justice to the ends of the country when it was young and

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<sup>33</sup> For instance, the Republic's apparent faith in the rehabilitation of criminals was viewed as somewhat imprudent by James Cappon. "Perhaps, generally speaking, the ethical sentiment of the American is a little lax as regards crimes of fraud, theft, etc., if there is anything at all palliating in the case," he wrote in 1904. "The sense of standard, of principle and the need of maintaining it, is not strong in the American in any form, and to the average American it seems an approved kind of humanitarianism to be easy on many kinds malefactors. "Give the poor devil another chance," he says. I think it sometimes costs a life or two more and swells the list of crime in the nation, but sometimes also, no doubt, the poor devil takes that other chance. It is a characteristic trait of the American, this form of humanity, and is related both to what is best and what is worst in him." [Cappon, "The Great American Democracy," 299-300.]

<sup>34</sup> DeCelles, *Les États-Unis*, 240.

<sup>35</sup> Goldwin Smith, however, spoke of "the respect for law which prevails in all States of the Union on which slavery has not left its taint." Taken as a whole, he believed that America did not suffer from lawlessness. Indeed, most criminal and disorderly activity could be attributed to Southerners, African Americans, or immigrants. As for American vigilantism, Smith was not ready to condemn it outright. "Some of the cases of lynching in the United States," he wrote in 1891, were "proof not so much of lawlessness as of the general respect for law. Where no rural police is needed, and none consequently is maintained, when brigandage does appear there is no way of dealing with it except through the Vigilance Committee." [Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (Toronto, 1891), 40-41.] On the subject of American vigilantism, Quebec's answer to Goldwin Smith, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard, responded to an unnamed Tory newspaper's claims with sarcasm: "Et puis les Américains sont barbares, cruels à faire frémir, ainsi que l'établit cette même feuille en citant l'exécution sommaire d'un pauvre nègre qui n'était coupable que d'avoir violé *jusqu'à mort* une petite fille de quatre ans. Ce n'est pas sous un régime anglo-royaliste que se passeraient des scènes aussi révoltantes, *Oh shocking!*" The British, he continued, were committing far worse atrocities in India. [Rouillard, *Annexion: conférence: l'union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 17.]

the lesson has endured. Mob fury has appeared seldom in Canada, labor troubles have not often produced violence, and lynching is unknown.”<sup>36</sup>

This Canadian-American divergence was blamed on several factors. In *My Vision of Canada* (1933), William Arthur Deacon attributed American violence to the nation’s youthful exuberance: “Their lawlessness, lynchings and instinct for ‘direct action’ in general is really exuberance, uncontrolled high spirits, the same lack of forethought and responsibility as you would find in a ten-year-old boy. Their apparent hypocrisy in matters like prohibition and prostitution is mostly youthful thoughtlessness.”<sup>37</sup> More often, however, American turbulence was viewed as a legacy of the frontier. S. D. Clark, whose pioneering work in Canadian sociology explored the impact of the frontier on the nation’s development, noted that “all frontier situations tended to produce a type of society in which little respect was paid to the institutions of law and order.” Born on a farm near Lloydminster, Alberta, Clark studied history and sociology at the University of Saskatchewan, the London School of Economics, McGill, and the University of Toronto. He joined the University of Toronto’s Department of Political Economy in 1938. “The frontiersman,” Clark wrote in 1944, “tended to take the law into his own hands, and the authority of the policeman and judge was disputed by that of the gang and vigilante committee.” This was particularly the case in “the frontier society in the United States,” where, unlike in “the Canadian frontier community,” “traditional and constituted authority” exerted a lesser degree of control.<sup>38</sup> Over time, this would leave a permanent imprint on American society.

Continentalists, however, rejected the notion that American society was in a state of near anarchy and refused to consider the difference between Canadian and American crime rates to be a major issue. For instance, in a 1931 collection of essays, Toronto *Daily Star* reporter Roy Greenaway (1891-1972) showed irritation with sanctimonious Canadian judgements on American criminality:

In our attitudes towards the crime records of the United States we Canadians are fast developing a pharisaical superiority complex that is irritatingly comic. Just recently a Toronto editor, glowing with pious-self approval, satirized the spectacle of 200 New York

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<sup>36</sup> Dafoe, ed., *Canada Fights*, 35.

<sup>37</sup> W. A. Deacon, *My Vision of Canada* (Toronto, 1933), 115-116. Generally speaking, America’s ‘noble experiment’ was not popular among interwar Canadian intellectuals. Many continentalists blamed prohibition for rising crime rates in Canada and the United States and argued that the unpopular eighteenth amendment had bred a general disrespect for law and order among Americans. Similar arguments were made on the right.

<sup>38</sup> S. D. Clark, “The Social Development of Canada and the American Continental System,” *Culture V* (1944): 134-135.

police firing 1,000 shots into the apartment of 19-year-old “Two-Gun” Crowley. Better judgement would have recollected that, only five months before this, 400 Toronto police with all the furore of warfare finished in suburban fields what was described as an “epic of police vengeance” and “one of the greatest pieces of police work in the world,” by shooting down and capturing 23-year-old John Brokenshire several hours after he had thrown away his gun. Strange! All this difference should be ‘twixt Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee!

Canada was not, as many claimed, a heaven of law and order. Chicago had Al Capone, but Hamilton, Ontario, had Rocco Perri, the “King of the Bootleggers.” Besides, as Greenaway, who had studied at Victoria College and Harvard, went on to point out, the Republic’s crime statistics were inflated because Americans considered “not only minor breaches of the traffic and liquor laws as criminal offences, but also trivial assaults, which in the eyes of the general public are not, and perhaps, never will be so regarded.”<sup>39</sup> America was not rife with lawlessness; it was simply enforcing laws which, like prohibition, did not exist in most Canadian provinces.

Continentalists were aware of America’s shortcomings. Their criticism of the United States, without a doubt, could often rival that of their anti-American adversaries. Indeed, American capitalism, vigilantism, and criminality worried both liberals and socialists. Yet their critique of these phenomena was punctual. They understood that America embodied a new era in human development – the mass age – which, in spite of its faults, contained great promise. Industrialization and urbanization, they believed, were the way of the future; they were inevitable and, in spite of their faults, desirable. In this sense, plutocracy, labour unrest, and crime were merely bumps in the road.

Yet as the quintessence of modernity, America was beset by disorder, conservatives argued. Industrial capitalism and urbanization had turned American society on its head, and threatened to do the same in Canada. Indeed, in the United States, both the concentration of wealth and the rise of the proletariat were engendering a most unfortunate status revolution. American society, it seemed, had lost all sense of direction. To intellectuals whose placed a great deal of importance on order and stability, the Republic offered a chaotic glimpse into the not-so-distant future. What they saw was unsettling: crime, labour unrest, and plutocracy were, it seemed, the hallmarks of American life.

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<sup>39</sup> Roy Greenaway, “Big Shots,” in *Open House*, ed. William Arthur Deacon and Wilfred Reeves (Toronto, 1931), 220, 235-236.

Canadian intellectuals dissected American society because it was pertinent to their national experience. As we shall see in the next section, Canadian assessments of American politics, culture, or business indeed served a higher purpose: they allowed the Dominion's intellectuals to define their national experience and to suggest what its relationship with the wider world should be.



### III

## Canada and the United States

## Chapter Nine

### Canadian Identity and America

Anti-American sentiment, nationalism, and the politics of Canadian identity have generally shared a deep intimacy. During the period under study, these elements, along with a specifically anti-American reading of Canada's physiography known as the Laurentian thesis, were tied to a wider discussion related to the modern ethos. Imperialists and *nationalistes* were indeed eager to present their nation as a fundamentally conservative, anti-American entity.<sup>1</sup> Unlike the United States, Canada was founded on the bedrock of tradition and continuity. And as the self-proclaimed guardians of Canadian tradition, conservatives claimed ownership over the right to define what was and was not 'Canadian.'

Continentalists resented various right-wing attempts to brand Canada a conservative nation. They saw the Dominion as an essentially modern and North American entity. Canadian-American similarities and continental integration were not to be feared or resisted, they were to be embraced. Furthermore, continentalists argued that the Canadian nation was organized along a north-south axis and that each of its regions enjoyed a close relationship with a contiguous American region. The Dominion's very geography, it seemed, made continental integration an imperative. Imperialists resisted this reading of Canada's physiography. As far as intellectuals like Donald Creighton were concerned, the Dominion was a northern nation whose natural faultlines ran east and west. Unity, centralism, and the imperial bond were all inscribed in the nation's basic geography. *Nationalistes*, for their part, balked at the suggestion that Canada's geography mandated centralism and imperialism. They preferred to see the Dominion as a fundamentally regionalized entity organized along a north-south axis. They did not necessarily view this, however, as an argument in favour of continental integration. On the contrary, most French Canadian nationalists argued that the nation's physiography made decentralization an imperative for the Canadian state.

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<sup>1</sup> As Sylvie Lacombe has noted regarding imperialism and French Canadian nationalism, "les États-Unis servent ... de repoussoir en faisant valoir les particularités distinctives de la société canadienne que chacun des deux mouvements se donne pour but de préserver. Dans les représentations collectives canadiennes, la République américaine semble occuper la case vide à partir de laquelle le jeu des relations d'identité à soi permet la construction d'un "nous" par opposition à un autre "autre." En examinant le jugement négatif porté sur les États-Unis tant par les nationalistes canadiens-français que par les impérialistes canadiens-anglais, nous trouverons par défaut ce que le Canada ne sera pas." [Sylvie Lacombe, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus. Comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au Canada entre 1896 et 1920* (Quebec, 2002), 236.]

*Canada: An American Nation?*

Anti-Americanism has historically been the principal negative expression of the English Canadian identity. A defensive reaction generated by a people who are essentially American, it has served as a foil to define what Canada is not, and was used, to a certain extent, as a rallying point for a nation divided along regional, religious, and ethnic lines. Indeed, exacerbated differentialism – an element integral to the anti-American ethos – has long served as a unifying force in the politics of Canadian identity.

Moreover, ideology and utopianism have traditionally played a key role in the construction of identity in the New World. Not surprisingly therefore, anti-Americanism played a similar role in pre-1945 English Canada to anti-British sentiment in nineteenth-century America. Both served to affirm the fundamental ideological distinctions between two largely English-speaking societies.<sup>2</sup>

As Philip Massolin argues, conservative intellectuals viewed American society and the modern ethos as “inimical to Canada’s historical value system and tory character.”<sup>3</sup> For the English Canadian imperialist, the survival and basic identity of the Canadian nation was tied to conservatism, and America was consistently depicted as the antithesis of Canadian society. The Dominion was everything the United States was not: a stable, organic society built on continuity and the rejection of revolutionism. And the Dominion’s political and constitutional system underpinned the nation’s distinctiveness.

Similar, though generally non-political, arguments would also be used to distinguish Quebec from its American neighbour. Indeed, *nationaliste* differentialism was primarily etho-religious in nature; French Canada, it was argued, was a Catholic and Latin society. It was therefore the racial and spiritual antithesis of both the United States and English Canada. In the end, however, anti-Americanism was less important to the construction of French Canadian identity, whose differentialism was much less focussed on the United States.

In part, imperialists and *nationalistes* insisted on the conservative nature of Canadian society to consolidate their power and influence. According to Patricia K. Wood, they “sought sole ownership of the power to define ‘Canadian,’ and paradoxically externalized their Canadian opponents by presenting them as a foreign enemy.”<sup>4</sup> If the Dominion was a

<sup>2</sup> Anti-British sentiment in nineteenth-century America was founded on a rejection of hereditary privilege, deference, and militarism. It affirmed the nation’s faith in republicanism and democracy.

<sup>3</sup> Philip Massolin, *Canadian Intellectuals, the Tory Tradition, and the Challenge of Modernity* (Toronto, 2001), 9.

<sup>4</sup> Patricia K. Wood, “Defining ‘Canadian’: Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald’s Nationalism,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36 (2001): 50.

conservative nation, then only conservatives could speak for Canada. Continentalists, they argued, were unfit for leadership; their core values were un-Canadian (i.e. radical).

Anti-Americanism was a key ingredient in the imperialist creation myth.<sup>5</sup> Canada's birth, indeed, could be traced to an anti-American saga: the Loyalist expulsion. "Canada is one of the oldest colonies," wrote Colonel George T. Denison in 1895, "and yet her history can only be said to fairly commence with the migration of the United Empire Loyalists at the close of the American Revolution in 1783."<sup>6</sup> Imperialists frequently recounted the Loyalist Expulsion in tones that evoked the Book of Exodus. The Loyalists had suffered for their loyalty; they were anti-American and conservative heroes; and their faith in a united empire was unshakable. In their rejection of republicanism they had given birth to a fundamentally ordered, conservative nation. In short, Canada would never have become a British dominion without the Loyalists. For their descendants, this narrative had an added attraction. As Norman Knowles notes, it allowed individuals like Colonel Denison to affirm their "patriotic and genealogical superiority and assert their claims to influence."<sup>7</sup> The search for status, once again, lay beneath anti-American rhetoric.

According to the imperialist narrative, the Loyalists had founded a nation on the bedrock of continuity. Consequently, noted R. G. Trotter in a 1933 article published in the *Queen's Quarterly*, "Canada holds a distinctive place on this continent inasmuch as she has never broken with the old world politically, but instead has been able to develop her autonomy and acquire her nationhood while still retaining an organic association and common loyalties with the mother country and the rest of the Empire."<sup>8</sup> This sort of statement, however, did not merely assert Canada's conservative and non-American nature, it also contained insidious racial and ethnic cues which affirmed the social and political pre-eminence of British Canadians.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, if Canada was a British nation, then Canadians of British ancestry were its natural leaders. Not surprisingly, therefore, outside of French Canada, anti-American sentiment was strongest among intellectuals of British – particularly English – birth or heritage.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The idea of an anti-American creation myth is discussed in Paul Romney, *Getting it Wrong: How Canadians Forgot their Past and Imperilled Confederation* (Toronto, 1999), 13-16.

<sup>6</sup> G. T. Denison, "Canada and her Relations to the Empire," *Westminster Review* CXLIV (1895): 248.

<sup>7</sup> Norman Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists: The Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of Usable Pasts* (Toronto, 1997), 162.

<sup>8</sup> R. G. Trotter, "The Canadian Back-Fence in Anglo-American Relations," *Queen's Quarterly* XL (1933): 391-392.

<sup>9</sup> Wood, "Defining 'Canadian,'" 49.

<sup>10</sup> Henry F. Angus (1891-1991), who served as the head of the University of British Columbia's Department of Economics, Political Science and Sociology from 1930 to 1956, saw this as a general trend in Canadian life. After

Canada's distinctiveness – and superiority – lay in its essentially British and conservative nature. And the Canadian political system lay at the heart of imperialist differentialism. Constitutional monarchy and the imperial bond, it was argued, bred order and deference. Moreover, Canada's political stability underpinned its moral order. For many imperialists, including Andrew Macphail and Colonel Denison, Canadian distinctiveness was also fundamentally racial. The Dominion was not only constitutionally British, it was also far more Anglo-Saxon than the United States, a nation whose racial integrity had been weakened by slavery and massive non-British immigration. A number of imperialists, however, considered the United States to be an essentially Anglo-Saxon nation and did not see race as central to Canadian-American differentialism.<sup>11</sup>

In spite of its anti-American proclivities, imperialist rhetoric did possess a certain *américanité*, which became more pronounced after the Great War, when Tory anti-Americanism noticeably mellowed. Many English Canadian conservatives were willing to acknowledge that the Dominion was, in some ways, an American nation.<sup>12</sup> According to the imperialist *Round Table's* anonymous Canadian correspondent, "Canada is British and American, economically more American than British, spiritually more British than American: and yet the result of the mixture is neither British nor American, but Canadian."<sup>13</sup> Canadian society, it was argued, possessed the right balance between the Old World and the New World. In 1945, George Grant described Canadian society as "a blending of what is best in two worlds":

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interviewing "forty-one prominent teachers in British Columbia," he reported that "there is, indeed, general agreement that children from some English homes, and agreement that children from some Scotch homes, too, show marked prejudice against Americans." [Angus, "The Opinion of Teachers in British Columbia," in his *Canada and Her Great Neighbor* (Toronto and New Haven, 1938), 363.]

<sup>11</sup> Lacombe, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus*, 205.

<sup>12</sup> Many Tories argued that Canadian-American similarities were largely the result of their shared British heritage. For instance, while serving as the first Canadian minister (ambassador) to the United States, Vincent Massey often insisted that Canada and the United States shared a common British heritage. [Massey, *Good Neighbourhood and Other Addresses in the United States* (Toronto, 1930), passim.] R. G. Trotter agreed: "The language of most of our people is English and the bases of most of our legal and political institutions are also English. Both of us have derived much that we share from antecedent history in the British Isles." [Trotter, "Future Canadian-American Relations," *Queen's Quarterly* LII (1945): 216.] The editor of the *Toronto News*, J. S. Willison, was the most enthusiastic supporter of this thesis. Canada and the United States, he wrote in 1906, "are the common heirs of British traditions and the common repository of the splendid achievements of the race, and whatever the flag that flies over our heads, or whatever the form of government to which we subscribe, we are common workers for the social betterment and the moral progress of mankind." [Willison, *Anglo-Saxon Amity* (Toronto, 1906), 7.]

<sup>13</sup> Anonymous, "Canadian Prosperity and the United States," *The Round Table* XV (1925): 572.

British, yes, and North American too; and from the amalgam of these two influences has come the Canada of today. The particular Canadianism, that we feel from the grey streets of Halifax to the foothills near Banff, from the wide horizons of the prairies to the lakes and rivers of Algonquin Park, has been created from these two sources. Yes, Canada as a nation can truly be called British North America.<sup>14</sup>

Some Tories were more specific in discussing Canadian hybridity. For instance, in early 1941, the *Round Table's* Canadian correspondent insisted that Canadian soldiers “represent a nice mean between the semi-feudalism still remaining in England and the somewhat excessive democracy obtaining in the American army.”<sup>15</sup> Canada possessed order without tyranny and democracy without disorder. The Dominion, to be sure, was British and conservative without being reactionary. In the end, Tories hoped that Canadians would tame modernity and preserve the essence of tradition.

Prior to World War One, few imperialists questioned Canadian anti-Americanism. Those who did generally viewed the phenomenon as a consequence of American hostility to Canada and, in particular, as a legacy of the revolutionary republic's mistreatment of the United Empire Loyalists.<sup>16</sup> America, they claimed, had offended Canadian sensibilities with a variety of affronts ranging from invasion to protectionism and deserved to be chastised.<sup>17</sup> Anti-Americanism, indeed, was historically justifiable. Besides, anti-American sentiment was also healthy for the Canadian soul; it inhibited continentalism and helped to preserve Canada's distinct identity. By the interwar years, however, some Tories became increasingly uncomfortable with overt anti-Americanism. R. G. Trotter, who received a doctorate from Harvard University, argued in a 1933 article that “our national life will be elevated by

<sup>14</sup> George Grant, *The Empire, Yes or No?* (Toronto, 1945), 1, 29.

<sup>15</sup> Anonymous, “The Canadian-American Defence Agreement and its Significance,” *The Round Table* XXXI (1941): 354.

<sup>16</sup> The Loyalist origins of anti-American sentiment were viewed as self-evident. In 1891, John G. Bourinot insisted that the Loyalists, whose “influence on the political fortunes of Canada has been necessarily very considerable,” had been “animated by a feeling of bitter animosity against the United States, the effects of which can still be traced in these later times when questions of difference have arisen between England and her former colonies.” [Bourinot, “Canada and the United States: An Historical Retrospect,” *Papers of the American Historical Association* V (1891): 283.] By tracing the roots of anti-Americanism to the birth of English Canada, imperialists like Bourinot were affirming the fundamentally anti-American nature of the Canadian nation.

<sup>17</sup> The editor of the *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, John Castell Hopkins, listed several of these affronts in a 1911 article on the defeat of reciprocity. There existed, he wrote, “a sort of sub-conscious resentment in many Canadian minds as to United States treatment of the Provinces and the Dominion in many and varied matters. Of these the abrogation of the 1854 Treaty was only one; the invasions of 1774 [*sic*] and 1812, the raids of 1837, and the sharp, shrewd treaty negotiations of other dates, were too distant to be more than unpleasant and occasional memories; the Fenian Raids, the Atlantic Fishery and Behring Sea and Alaska boundary disputes were more recent and more irritating matters.” [Hopkins, “Reciprocity with the United States,” *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (1911): 21.]

concentrating attention on positive values rather than by spending our best energy in negations.”<sup>18</sup> Like many Tories born in the 1880s and 1890s, Trotter’s anti-Americanism was relatively subdued.

French Canada was also viewed by many imperialists as an element of national distinctiveness and a bulwark against both annexation and Americanization. It was an antimodern – and somewhat reactionary – fragment. Quebec, wrote Robert Falconer in 1925,

is out of sympathy with American democracy. Even American Catholicism is too liberal for the Quebec ecclesiastic. Nor does the sentimental affinity of the educated American for modern France win over the French Canadian, for he disapproves the very ideals of France which America admires. The American glories in his progressiveness, the French-Canadian lives on the authority of tradition.”<sup>19</sup>

In the end, though imperialists might not have been too well disposed towards French Canadian demands for equality, or inclined to view the Dominion as a bicultural entity, they nevertheless recognized that Quebec was indispensable to Canadian distinctiveness.

Like Falconer, French Canadian nationalists saw Quebec and the United States as fundamentally antithetical entities. For Father Adélard Dugré, who taught theology at Montreal’s Scolasticat de l’Immaculée Conception from 1919 to 1932 and was appointed the Society of Jesus’ assistant general superior for the British Empire and Belgium in 1936, the contrast between Quebec and the United States was evident: French Canadian society was “simple, patriarcale, essentiellement catholique et conservatrice,” while American society was “éblouissante et tapageuse, protestante et matérialiste.” Quebec, as the inheritor of pre-revolutionary France, was the embodiment of Catholic tradition, while America was the quintessence of both Protestantism and modernity. Accordingly, Dugré began *La Campagne canadienne*, a 1925 novel that explored the differences between French Canadian and American society through the tale of a Franco-American family torn between its rural French Canadian roots and its urban Midwestern American home, with the following preface:

Il existe actuellement, dans l’Amérique du Nord, deux civilisations fort différentes: l’une est représentée par cent millions d’Anglo-Saxons, l’autre par trois ou quatre millions de

<sup>18</sup> R. G. Trotter, “The Canadian Back-Fence in Anglo-American Relations,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XL (1933): 395.]

<sup>19</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 7-8.

Canadiens d'origine française. Ce qui distingue ces deux groupes inégaux, ce n'est pas seulement la langue qu'ils parlent et la foi religieuse de la grande majorité de ceux qui les composent, c'est aussi la diversité dans les manières d'agir, la divergence de vues dans la façon d'envisager la vie, ses jouissances et ses devoirs. On a hérité, au Canada français, du tempérament et des traditions de la France catholique du dix-septième siècle; on a hérité, chez les Américains anglo-saxons, du libre examen et de l'esprit utilitaire des Anglais du règne d'Élisabeth ... Cette opposition dans le caractère des deux groupes ethniques se trahit constamment dans la pratique de la vie: l'exercice du culte divin, les coutumes familiales, l'éducation, la littérature, le commerce et la réclame, les procédés électoraux, les fêtes populaires, tout traduit à l'observateur le moins attentif les profondes différences qui distinguent le Canadien resté français de l'Américain-type.<sup>20</sup>

But French Canadian distinctiveness was not only based on Catholicism and French language and culture, it was also racial. Americans, it was argued, were Anglo-Saxons, and that French Canadians, as Latins, were their racial antipodes. The two races, indeed, possessed fundamentally different characteristics.<sup>21</sup> As Father Édouard Hamon noted in one of the first books devoted to emigration and Franco-American affairs, *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre* (1891), "le caractère français est juste aux antipodes du caractère anglo-saxon-américain. Autant l'un est gai, expansif, sans souci, compatissant avec les misères des autres, prêt aux sacrifices les plus généreux, autant l'autre est froid, concentré, calculateur et égoïste."<sup>22</sup> These racial differences would inevitably spawn two fundamentally different societies. The French-born Jesuit was not the only *nationaliste* to adopt some of Gobineau's ideas on *la psychologie des peuples*. William Chapman, for instance, saw the Spanish-American War as a clash between two antithetical races. In the preface to an 1898 poem dedicated to the Queen of Spain, the erstwhile civil servant – Chapman had lost his job with the office of the attorney general of Quebec after the 1897 provincial election removed the Conservative party from power – noted that Quebec and the United States shared little more than geography. Spain and French Canada, by contrast, shared a deep spiritual and racial bond:

<sup>20</sup> Adélar Dugré, *La campagne canadienne. Croquis et leçons* (Montreal, 1925), 5-6, 234.

<sup>21</sup> Like Americans, English Canadians were regarded as Anglo-Saxon Protestants. As a result, French Canadian differentialism was often aimed at both groups. Édouard Montpetit, for instance, saw little difference between English Canadians and Americans: "Nous constatons donc que, par la religion, par la langue, par les origines, par les modes de vie, le Canadien anglais se rapproche de l'Américain jusqu'à se confondre presque avec lui." [Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 230-231.]

<sup>22</sup> Édouard Hamon, *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre* (Quebec, 1891), 120.



Non, l'aigle américain n'a pas aujourd'hui notre sympathie, encore moins notre amour. Notre amour! Nous le donnons à l'Espagne ... Les Espagnols sont, pour ainsi dire, nos frères, ils sentent, comme nous, couler dans leurs veines le sang inaltérable de la race latine, leur langue ressemble à la nôtre comme le paros ressemble au carrare, et leur foi catholique est l'étoile qui guide la barque portant nos destinées religieuses et nationales, et qui fit accomplir à la vieille Gaule et à l'antique Ibérie les faits les plus admirables dont l'humanité s'honore et devra s'honorer à jamais.<sup>23</sup>

There was, however, a certain *américanité* to nationalist prose. French Canadians, wrote abbé Lionel Groulx in 1935, "comptent ... parmi les plus vieux Américains." Indeed, he continued, "nul n'est plus enraciné que nous en cette Amérique, ne s'est plus identifié avec ce continent."<sup>24</sup> But this sort of statement rarely led to an honest assessment of Quebec's essential continentalism.<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, most French Canadian conservatives would only readily acknowledge an *américanité* of negative traits. For instance, in 1937, the head of the Public Archives of Canada, Gustave Lanctot, insisted that "le Québécois moyen, également libéré des inhibitions européennes, s'apparente à l'Américain moyen par son démocratisme politique, son égalitarisme social, son incuriosité intellectuelle, sa bienveillance inlassable et ses goûts aventureux."<sup>26</sup>

In contrast, the continentalist ethos was obsessed with *américanité*. Intellectuals like Goldwin Smith, John Bartlet Brebner, and Frank Underhill insisted on Canada's essentially continental nature – Brebner spoke of the United States and Canada as "the Siamese Twins of North America who cannot separate and live"<sup>27</sup> – because they hoped to identify the nation as a fundamentally modern and North American entity. And Canada's *américanité* was not necessarily the result of Americanization. On the contrary, the Canadian experience was innately 'American.'

<sup>23</sup> William Chapman, *À propos de la Guerre hispano-américaine* (Quebec, 1898), ii, v.

<sup>24</sup> Lionel Groulx, "Notre avenir en Amérique," in his *Orientations* (Montreal, 1935), 278.

<sup>25</sup> By the 1940s, however, several nationalistes were beginning to assess Quebec's *américanité* with more maturity. Édouard Montpetit's *Reflets d'Amérique* (1941), for instance, though still largely anti-American, was an honest attempt to establish both the similarities and the differences between French Canada and the United States.

<sup>26</sup> Gustave Lanctot, "Influences américaines dans le Québec," *Mémoires et comptes rendus de la Société royale du Canada* 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, XXXI (1937): 123.

<sup>27</sup> J. B. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain* (New Haven and Toronto, 1945), xi.

Continentalists insisted that Canada's very genesis was American. John W. Dafoe, for instance, repeatedly argued that Canada had been an American nation from its inception. Speaking before an English audience in 1930, the editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press* insisted that even the Loyalists were fundamentally American in their culture and ideals:

I said that Canada is an American country. It is an American country by virtue of a common ancestry with the people of the United States. When one talks of a common ancestry between Canadians and Americans, people say, "Yes, they had a common ancestry in England." But it is something closer than that. The common ancestry to which I refer occupied the American colonies prior to the Revolution. Setting aside Quebec, which hardly comes into this discussion, the English-speaking provinces in Canada were settled by citizens of the English colonies along the Atlantic sea-board. The generations which laid the cultural foundations of Canada and their forebears had lived in those colonies for a hundred or a hundred and fifty years – four or five generations. They had lived divorced from English influences, thrown very largely upon their own resources, and faced with problems upon which the experience of England threw no light. Along the Atlantic coast, cut off from people with the aristocratic point of view, they developed an indigenous American civilisation, now the common inheritance of Canada and the United States. The difference between the Americans who came into Canada after the War of Independence and the Americans who stayed at home were not profound. The people who were driven into exile were called Tories by the Americans, but that term was true of only a very small element. The great bulk of these people were of precisely the same type as the men in the American armies, but they did not think that the situation which had arisen between the colonies and Great Britain was one which could be profitably settled by an appeal to the sword.<sup>28</sup>

Born in Combermere, Canada West, Dafoe was himself of Loyalist descent. However, unlike Colonel Denison or George Sterling Ryerson, he did not mythologize his Loyalist forbearers. A staunch liberal, Dafoe understood that the memory of the United Empire Loyalists was being used to further a conservative political and social agenda. He regularly sought to undermine this agenda by emphasizing the fundamental *américanité* of the Loyalist experience.

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<sup>28</sup> J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the United States," *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* IX (1930): 723.

Race and ancestry played a key role in continentalist attempts to define Canada's essentially American nature. But equally important, particularly to interwar continentalists, was the homogenizing force exerted by the frontier and the environment on North American society. F. R. Scott saw Canadian-American similarities as the result of both a common ancestry and a shared environment:

It would be wrong to attribute all the American characteristics of Canadian life to the influence of the United States. Men and women, whether north or south of the American boundary, derive from the same racial stocks, live on the same continent, and have to abstract a living from a very similar physical environment; it is not surprising that in the process of time their social and economic institutions have come to have great similarities.<sup>29</sup>

Like Scott, Frank Underhill attributed Canada's *américanité* to a shared environment and a common ancestry. His perspective, however, was more macroeconomic. In a 1929 plea for socio-economic history, he enumerated the factors that had contributed to Canada's fundamentally continental nature:

An honest attempt to enumerate the points in which our Canadian civilization differs from that of the United States is apt to be almost as brief as the famous essay upon snakes in Ireland. The underlying conditions which have determined the character of the two peoples are so similar. Each is a nation made up of the descendants of Europeans who came and settled in an empty continent that possessed almost unlimited natural resources; the history of each has consisted of the process of exploring and exploiting a half-continent. The factors in their history which have made for differences count for little compared with this fundamental economic similarity. That one of them in the course of its growth had a violent quarrel with the mother-country and severed its political connection while the other grew up to independence without any such political breach is relatively unimportant; and it would be recognized as such by everybody were not our minds dominated by too much study of political history and too little study of social and economic history. It was not the Declaration of Independence which made the Americans a separate people, it was the Atlantic Ocean; and Canada is on the same side of the Atlantic.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> F. R. Scott, *Canada Today: A Study of her National Interests and National Policy*, (London, 1938), 104.

<sup>30</sup> F. H. Underhill, "O Canada," *Canadian Forum* X (1929): 79.

Nonetheless, continentalists readily acknowledged that there were significant differences between Canada and the United States. P. E. Corbett, for instance, wrote in a 1931 article published in London's *Contemporary Review* that Canada "has still the upper hand on crime," and that "in spite of New York's dictation of fashions and the more superficial morals, we shall probably continue as a people to attach more sanctity to marriage and the family than do our neighbours."<sup>31</sup> That said, most continentalists would have agreed with S. D. Clark when he argued in 1938 that Canadian distinctiveness was essentially a regional variation of a wider North American culture:

It is largely about the United States as an object that the consciousness of Canadian national unity has grown up. And yet the cultural life of English-speaking Canada is strikingly similar to that of the United States. The sense of identity must find its basis in differences between the two countries and there is therefore a temptation to make the most of such differences as exist. The preponderance of settlers from the British Isles, a large French-Canadian population, and the more rural character of Canadian life combine to give a certain individuality to Canadian culture, but hardly a greater individuality than regional communities within a single nation may possess.<sup>32</sup>

Canadian-American similarities, indeed, far outweighed either nation's distinctiveness. Perhaps Arthur Phelps put it best during a talk broadcast in late 1940 on CBC radio: "Let any English-speaking Canadian sit down in his corner and divest himself of whatever is American in origin and impulse, and culturally and intellectually he'll look like a half-skinned rabbit."<sup>33</sup> A proponent of literary modernism, Phelps taught English at the University of Manitoba and was at the forefront of Canada's interwar literary scene. In 1940, he travelled across the United States and related his experiences on the CBC.

Continentalist differentialism was largely aimed at Europe. Indeed, as Graham Carr notes, the continentalist ethos implied "a separatist mentality that regarded North America as not only geographically segregated from Europe, but socially and culturally distinct as well."<sup>34</sup> Nevertheless, continentalists diverged on just how distinct European and North American society really were. North American isolationists like William Arthur Deacon and

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<sup>31</sup> P. E. Corbett, "The New Canadianism," *Contemporary Review* CXL (1931): 483.

<sup>32</sup> S. D. Clark, "The Importance of Anti-Americanism in Canadian National Feeling," in *Canada and Her Great Neighbor*, 243.

<sup>33</sup> Arthur Phelps, *These United States: A Series of Broadcasts* (Toronto, 1941), 55.

<sup>34</sup> Graham Carr, "'All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 146.

Frank Underhill saw Europe and North America as essentially separate and antithetical entities. Europe was portrayed as hopelessly corrupted by inequality, hatred, and militarism, while North American society was presented as fundamentally tolerant, peaceful, and free. North America was everything that Europe was not: modern, progressive, and stable. Even in the depths of the Great Depression, Deacon enthusiastically contrasted North American peace and stability with the turbulence of European life:

Now that we have nothing to fear from the United States, we can appreciate and rejoice in those similarities which will make us successful partners in many ways. One body we are not, and will not be. Things which are alike do not necessarily dissolve into each other – marbles, for instance. Like ourselves, the United States people are predominantly ex-Europeans who hold an ideal of free institutions, and are determined to live in North America a life of peace, such as European nations evidently cannot have. On the whole, both countries have kept themselves out of European wars. Both are theoretically opposed to war, and in practice generally abstain from it. Religious tolerance is an axiom in both countries, as is free and compulsory education.<sup>35</sup>

Most continentalists were not as passionately anti-European as Underhill and Deacon. Indeed, though intellectuals like John W. Dafoe and Arthur Lower also viewed Europe and North America as fundamentally separate entities, they readily acknowledged that both Canada and the United States shared a wider British heritage. Accordingly, the idea of national hybridity and equilibrium was also present in continentalist writing. This time, however, the scales were tipped on the American side. Canada was, above all, an American nation. Canadians were in many ways British, but so were Americans, though to a lesser extent. “The United States is of the European world but not in it,” wrote Arthur Lower in 1939. Canada, on the other hand, “is in the American world but not exactly of it. She has a foot in both continents and if sentiment and tradition draw her to Britain, her daily bread draws her to the rest of America.”<sup>36</sup> One of Canada’s foremost historians, Lower spent most of his career at United College, Winnipeg, where he chaired the Department of History for eighteen years, and at Queen’s. He was keenly interested in the staples trade and in Canadian-American relations. In 1938, he contributed a volume on *The North American*

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<sup>35</sup> W. A. Deacon, *My Vision of Canada* (Toronto, 1933), 113-114.

<sup>36</sup> A. R. M. Lower, “The United States Through Canadian Eyes,” *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* 1 (1939): 105.

*Assault on the Canadian Forest* to the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In English Canada, continentalist attitudes towards Quebec's *américanité* evolved over time. For many early continentalists, including Goldwin Smith, French Canada was viewed as an un-American backwater. In 1891, the notorious Francophobe asserted that Quebec, like the American South, was a reactionary fragment. "Quebec is a theocracy," he wrote, "its character had been perpetuated by isolation like the form of an antediluvian animal preserved in Siberian ice."<sup>37</sup> Smith believed that only assimilation could bring French Canada up to the North American standard. By the interwar years, however, most continentalists were inclined to view French Canadian society as inherently North American. Attitudes towards Quebec had evolved, and though residual Francophobia persisted in continentalist prose, it was now generally assumed that Catholicism and the French language did not make Quebec any less part of the wider continental ethos. John Bartlet Brebner, for instance, claimed in 1931 that "Canadians are not a Franco-British people, they are two kinds of North Americans."<sup>38</sup>

Continentalist intellectuals were united in their distaste for anti-Americanism. They firmly believed that anti-American sentiment hampered the emergence of both a liberal national identity and a continental frame of reference. Canadians, they hoped, were sufficiently mature to found their national identity on something other than the repudiation of their neighbours. In this spirit, P. E. Corbett concluded his landmark 1930 article on anti-American sentiment with the following warning:

There are those among us who proceed on the theory that our autonomy and our British allegiance can be preserved by fostering anti-Americanism. That is a bad policy for ourselves, and a bad policy for the Commonwealth. In addition to impeding our own social and economic development, it would impair our real usefulness in the somewhat over-vaunted rôle of "interpreters." Worst of all, it is lamentable stuff to weave into the texture of a forming national spirit and make a part of Canadianism.<sup>39</sup>

Like many young men of his generation, Corbett served in the Great War. Severely injured at the Battle of the Somme, he was awarded the Military Cross in 1918. After the war he

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<sup>37</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 5.

<sup>38</sup> J. B. Brebner, "Canadian and North American History," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (1931): 43.

<sup>39</sup> P. E. Corbett, "Anti-Americanism," *Dalhousie Review* X (1930): 300.

resumed his studies at Oxford University and was a Fellow of All Souls College from 1920 to 1927. During that time he also served as an assistant legal advisor to the League of Nation's International Labour Office and obtained a *Licence ès droit* from the Sorbonne. In 1924, he was appointed professor of Roman law at McGill's Faculty of Law. Corbett served as the Faculty's Dean from 1928 to 1936. Under his direction, the Faculty of Law recruited both F. R. Scott and John P. Humphrey and became a hotbed of continentalist sentiment. Serving briefly as McGill's acting principal, Corbett continued to teach Roman and International law until 1942, when he left Canada and joined the faculty of Yale University. He became an American citizen in 1947.

Rather than explaining away anti-Americanism by reciting the endless list of indignities suffered by the Dominion at the hands of the United States, continentalists generally looked inwards for its causes. Their conclusions would startle many Canadians: anti-Americanism was largely the result of domestic factors, and had little to do with American actions or policy. For instance, though P. E. Corbett cited the American Revolution and a succession of diplomatic irritants as contributing to anti-American sentiment, he attributed the phenomenon principally to the Dominion's latent inferiority complex.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, in 1942, John P. Humphrey saw "Canadian suspicion of the United States" primarily as "a function of Canada's colonialism."<sup>41</sup> Both jurists agreed that anti-Americanism was tied to the wider politics of Canadian identity; it had prevented the nation from maturing intellectually and poisoned its relations with the United States. Western Canada's leading intellectual, John W. Dafoe, added another piece to the puzzle; he also acknowledged that American hostility to the Dominion had fostered anti-Americanism, but saw the phenomenon as largely instrumental. Above all, he argued in 1935, anti-American sentiment was a political tool used time and again by the Conservative party to manipulate the Canadian people:

For at least a century, first in Canada and afterwards in the Dominion, no general election was ever fought without at least an attempt being made by the Party of the Right to make political use of this anti-American sentiment. The formula was simple. In its earlier form the Party of the Left was charged with disloyal sentiments and separatist tendencies, its fell purpose being to transfer the country to the United States ... The outstanding instances were the reciprocity campaigns of 1891 and 1911; in both cases what looked like certain

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<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, passim.

<sup>41</sup> J. P. Humphrey, *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1942), 6.

victory for the Liberals was turned into defeat by a resurgence of ultra-Imperialistic and anti-American feeling.<sup>42</sup>

A quarter century after the 1911 election, Dafoe was still deeply embittered by the Liberal party's defeat. In his mind, anti-Americanism was nothing more than a contrivance used by the "Party of the Right" to stifle progress.

The continentalist ethos was quite different in Quebec. There was indeed no talk of "Siamese Twins" in French Canadian prose. Leading continentalist intellectuals like Sylva Clapin, Edmond de Nevers, Errol Bouchette, and Jean-Charles Harvey regularly argued that Quebec society was fundamentally different from American society. Bouchette, for instance, insisted in 1905 that the French Canadian soul and mission were unlike those of the United States:

C'est un grand et noble peuple que celui des États-Unis, un peuple éminemment civilisateur et où la question sociale a déjà sur plusieurs points trouvé des solutions. Nous devons admirer ses vertus et rechercher son amitié. Mais jamais nous ne pourrions nous fondre en lui parce que nous sommes différents, que notre âme n'est pas son âme, et que la Providence nous réserve évidemment une mission autre et non moins noble que la sienne.<sup>43</sup>

In Quebec, on the question of identity, what really distinguished the continentalist ethos from its anti-American foil was the willingness of intellectuals like Errol Bouchette to celebrate the province's *américanité* and to promote closer relations with its southern neighbour. Continentalists understood that a wider ethos of rupture with Europe united the various nations of the New World. "Il n'est pas exact de dire qu'on retrouve l'Espagne au Mexique, une Angleterre rajeunie aux États-Unis, une France nouvelle sur les bords du Saint-Laurent," Bouchette wrote in the *Revue canadienne*. "Que ces peuples parlent l'espagnol,

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<sup>42</sup> J. W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation* (New York, 1935), 92-93. Dafoe saw anti-Americanism as essentially hypocritical. "I have never known these political attitudes to stand in the way of business advantage or of personal advancement," he told an American audience. "I recall the case of a young man of some promise as an educationist, who was extremely active in saving Canada and the British Empire from the traitorous conspiracies, American inspired, which he saw all about him. One day we missed him; and upon inquiry it was found that, having been offered a better post in the United States, he had, practically without a moment's consideration, left Canada and the Empire to their fate. His case was that of tens of thousands of others. Staying at home they would resist with great stoutness and in a mood of unchallengeable sincerity, policies which promised material advantage to Canada as a whole and to themselves individually; but as individuals they followed without hesitation the trail of fortune if it lead south of the boundary." [*Ibid.*, 97.]

<sup>43</sup> Errol Bouchette, "Le Canada parmi les peuples américains," *La Revue canadienne* XLVIII (1905): 15.



l'anglais, le français, qu'ils conservent beaucoup de choses de la mère patrie, cela ne les empêche pas d'être des peuples différents."<sup>44</sup> Called to the Quebec Bar in 1885, Bouchette quickly turned his attention to journalism, moving back and forth between Quebec, Montreal, and Toronto over the next several years, and contributing articles to a number of Liberal newspapers, including *L'Étendard* of Montreal, *L'Électeur* of Quebec, the Montreal *Herald*, and the Toronto *Globe*. In 1890, he became the private secretary of Quebec's Minister of Public Works, Pierre Gameau. Three years later, he returned to his original occupation and practiced law in Montreal. Moving to Ottawa in 1898, he served for two years as the private secretary to the Dominion's Minister of Revenue, Sir Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbinière, and was appointed assistant librarian of the Library of Parliament in 1903. He would hold this position until his untimely death in 1912.

#### *America and the Geography of Canadian Identity*

In many ways, geography lends itself to subjective reasoning. Indeed, talk of disputed territory or 'historical' borders is often tied to issues of identity and memory. Canada has not escaped this type of discussion. The nation's fundamental geographic orientation, to be sure, has been the object of a protracted debate among Canadian academics and intellectuals since the late nineteenth century. And like so many other debates in Canadian history, it has revolved around ideology, identity, and the nation's relationship with the United States.

During the period under study, there was a great deal of discussion regarding whether Canada's natural faultlines ran along a north-south or an east-west axis. For continentalists, North America's basic geography followed a north-south orientation. The Dominion, therefore, was an inherently regionalized nation whose physiography was tied to that of its southern neighbour. Canada was a modern, American entity whose economic – and perhaps political – destiny lay with the United States. For English Canadian conservatives, this was pure heresy. The Dominion's faultlines, they argued, ran along an east-west axis. As a result, centralism, the maintenance of the imperial bond, and the rejection of continentalism were all mandated by the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system. Canada's very geography, it seemed, was anti-American. Continuity and tradition, indeed, were inscribed in the nation's faultlines. This was reinforced by the nation's climate. The Dominion's nordicity, indeed, was an element of national distinctiveness and vigour. In

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<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

Quebec, many prominent *nationalistes* agreed that the rigours of the northern climate had helped forge a new nation. What they did not accept, however, was the Tory contention that Canada's basic geography predicated unity and centralism. Instead, they embraced the continentalist vision of a regionalized nation whose faultlines ran along a north-south axis.

Indeed, despite a tendency to stress "the homogeneity of the North American experience,"<sup>45</sup> the continentalist ethos readily accepted Canada's essential regionalism. "Geographical barriers, racial and cultural differences, conflicting economic interests, and varying degrees of wealth, have actually kept Canada divided into five distinct large divisions and many smaller ones," noted John Bartlet Brebner in 1939.<sup>46</sup> And though most left-of-centre continentalists were favourable to constitutional centralism, they never failed to acknowledge the Dominion's fundamentally regional character. The basic premise of continentalist regionalism was formulated by Goldwin Smith in the introduction to his *Canada and the Canadian Question*:

Whoever wishes to know what Canada is, and to understand the Canadian question, should begin by turning from the political to the natural map. The political map displays a vast and unbroken area of territory, extending from the boundary of the United States up to the North Pole, and equalling or surpassing the United States in magnitude. The physical map displays four separate projections of the cultivable and habitable part of the Continent into arctic waste. The four vary greatly in size, and one of them is very large. They are, beginning from the east, the Maritime Provinces – Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island; Old Canada, comprising the present Provinces of Quebec and Ontario; the newly-opened region of the North-West, comprising the Province of Manitoba and the districts of Alberta, Athabasca, Assiniboia, and Saskatchewan; and British Columbia ... Between the divisions of the Dominion there is hardly any natural trade, and but little even of forced trade has been called into existence under a stringent system of protection ... Each of the blocks, on the other hand, is closely connected by nature, physically and economically, with that portion of the habitable and cultivable continent to the south of which it immediately adjoins, and in which are its natural markets.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Graham Carr, "'All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939," *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 150.

<sup>46</sup> Brebner, "Canada's Choice in Foreign Affairs," 54-55.

<sup>47</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 1-2. Continentalists often suggested that physical maps better reflected the realities of North American geography than political maps. Smith's magnum opus contained a fold-out physical map of the Dominion, and every volume in the series on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace contained a physical map of North America on their endpapers.

For Smith, the Dominion's regionalism was an insurmountable obstacle to unity and would eventually lead to annexation. Canada was a geographic, economic, and ethnic absurdity in which "the advance of commerce and civilisation ... is paralysed by geographical dispersion, commercial isolation, and the separatist nationality of French Quebec."<sup>48</sup> Nearly all subsequent continentalists, however, thoroughly rejected Smith's pessimism. They simply argued that regionalism made nation-building and free trade imperative. John W. Dafoe, for instance, took Smith to task in a 1927 lecture given at the University of Chicago: "Goldwin Smith used to say that Canada was an attempt to defy geography, and he predicted that the laws of nature would override the will of man. There was a time when it looked as though this pessimist was right; but these doubts no longer assail us. Canada is an exhibit against the theory of economic determinism as the arbiter of the fate of nations."<sup>49</sup> Yet Dafoe and others did not challenge Smith's basic contention: that the continent's natural divisions ran along a north-south axis and that each of Canada's regions was the prolongation of a contiguous American region.<sup>50</sup> "Canada is a country which has been made in defiance of geography," wrote Arthur Lower in 1929.<sup>51</sup> Natural forces, he argued, divided Canada into sections and, in turn, united these various sections to adjoining regions in the United States. John Bartlet Brebner agreed. "The settled regions of Canada," he wrote in 1939, "with the great exception of Quebec, appear on the whole to be outward projections of the settled regions of the United States, separated by areas inhospitable to occupation, rather than interlocked units of a separate people which has systematically expanded its occupation from Atlantic to Pacific."<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, argued John MacCormac in 1940,

All these regions find natural prolongations south of the largely artificial border that divides Canada from the United States and are far more closely related to them than to each other. The resemblance is not only geographic. In the Maritime Provinces and the eastern townships of Quebec a New Englander finds himself almost at home. Not only are

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>49</sup> John W. Dafoe, "The Problems of Canada," in Cecil J. B. Hurst et al., *Great Britain and the Dominions* (Chicago, 1929), 137.

<sup>50</sup> The essence of what is now referred to as the borderlands theory, indeed, could be found in pre-1945 continentalist prose. The theory is discussed in Lauren McKinsey and Victor Konrad, *Borderlands Reflections: The United States and Canada* (Orono, Maine, 1989).

<sup>51</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "Some Neglected Aspects of Canadian History," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (1929): 66.

<sup>52</sup> J. B. Brebner, "The Survival of Canada," in *Essays in Canadian History Presented to George MacKinnon Wrong*, ed. R. Flentley (Toronto, 1939), 272.

famous New England names perpetuated there but he finds age, conservatism, a conviction that their fishing, farming, lumbering, and trading interests had been sacrificed fiscally for the benefit of the industrialized Central Canada and a tendency to supply more than a proportionate share of the Dominion's public and professional notables. There is little about Ontario that seems strange to the upstate New Yorker. He finds it wealthy, highly industrialized, progressive, and self-satisfied. A farmer from the Dakotas could blunder across the border into Saskatchewan without noticing the difference. He would find the same broad prairies, the same alternation of growth and drought, the same distrust of the banking and manufacturing East, the same readiness for legislative and monetary experiment. In other words, he would find the Canadian West not only a geographical expression but a state of mind. Still farther west a northward-faring American would discover that the Pacific climate does not lose its charm across the Canadian boundary, nor does the Douglas fir cast less shade than the Oregon pine.<sup>53</sup>

To the Canadian imperialist, the very idea that the Dominion was a fractured nation whose regions had less in common with each other than with adjoining regions in the United States was abhorrent. Imperialists, to be sure, continuously stressed the fundamental unity of the Canadian experience, and centralism was intrinsic to the imperialist ethos. The anti-American rhetoric of Canadian imperialism predicated the Dominion's unity.<sup>54</sup> Canada, imperialists believed, was united by its common adherence to British tradition and its rejection of American values. "Nothing but a powerful common purpose could have enabled Canadians to triumph over geography as they have done," wrote Robert Falconer in 1925. He was indeed confident in the strength of Canadian unity:

In Canada or in Europe the American is known at once, whether he comes from Maine or from California, from Wisconsin or from Georgia. So also the term "Canadian" is employed as expressive of a unified national sentiment among the provinces of the Dominion. That such a sentiment exists is obvious to any one who has lived long enough in the different provinces to understand the life of their several communities. Halifax is more like Victoria than the former is like Portland, Maine, or the latter like Portland, Oregon. Toronto resembles Winnipeg more than the former resembles Buffalo or the latter Minneapolis. And in spite of difference of language and social and religious institutions the province of

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<sup>53</sup> John MacCormac, *Canada: America's Problem* (New York, 1940), 216-217.

<sup>54</sup> John C. Kendall, for his part, insists that anti-Americanism was "a weapon for solidarity." [Kendall, "A Canadian Construction of Reality: Northern Images of the United States," *American Review of Canadian Studies* IV (1974): 22.]

Quebec is closer in spirit to the Maritime provinces or to Ontario than to any of the United States.<sup>55</sup>

That said, Goldwin Smith's contention that Canadian unity was essentially unachievable struck a hard blow to imperialist assumptions, and Canadian Tories would spend the next fifty years responding to his claims. In the wake of Smith's indictment of the Dominion, however, imperialists scrambled to counter the old professor's arguments. Their riposte was indeed swift. In a scathing review of *Canada and the Canadian Question*, the elder statesman of Canadian imperialism, George Monro Grant, acknowledged that geography had hampered Canadian growth, but countered that "geography is not the sole or even the primary factor in the formation of nations." "Man triumphs continually over geography or nature in any form," he asserted. "Every trans-continental railway is such a triumph." In the end, Grant was convinced that the strength of British tradition and the "triumph of science" would easily allow the Dominion to overcome its geographic dispersion.<sup>56</sup> For his part, the associate editor of the Toronto *Daily Empire*, John Castell Hopkins, put forward a more geographical argument to counter Smith's thesis. Hopkins claimed in 1893 that the "brilliant but intensely unpopular Englishman" had misread the orientation of Canada's geography and communications. The Dominion's "commerce, railways, steamship lines, cable projects, and waterways all converge, east and west, toward Britain and British countries, instead of south to the United States," he wrote in an American magazine.<sup>57</sup> Canada was built along an east-west axis, and both the nation's independence and the imperial bond were inscribed in its basic geography.

Hopkins had articulated one of the core tenets of what would later be known as the Laurentian thesis. The thesis was the brainchild of Harold Innis, an economist at the University of Toronto. In a 1930 monograph on *The Fur Trade in Canada*, Innis argued that Canada was not a geographical absurdity; its unity and physiographic coherence were founded on the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system and on the development of a succession of economic staples. "Penetration of the continent by the St. Lawrence," he wrote in 1937, "facilitated development of trade from Europe in staple products beginning with the fur trade and continuing with the timber trade, and, after 1850 and the construction of railways,

<sup>55</sup> Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour*, 1-3.

<sup>56</sup> G. M. Grant, *Canada and the Canadian Question: A Review* (Toronto, 1891), 9, 31; "Canada and the Empire," *National Review* XXVII (1896): 682.

<sup>57</sup> J. C. Hopkins, "Canadian Hostility to Annexation," *Forum* XVI (1893): 327, 335.

with livestock products and wheat.”<sup>58</sup> Contrary to what Smith had asserted, the nation’s geography and economic structure ran primarily along an east-west axis that linked Canada to Europe, not to the United States.

The Laurentian thesis’ logical conclusions were implicitly anti-American and centralist. Indeed, if Canada was a northern nation built along an east-west axis, then continental integration and the sundering of the imperial bond would lead to disaster. Furthermore, the maintenance of the east-west axis required a strong central government. Tory intellectuals instantly seized upon Innis’ ideas. In the Laurentian thesis they found the solid arguments they needed to counter continentalist rhetoric. Donald Creighton was Innis’ most fervent disciple. Born in Toronto, Creighton was perhaps the most prominent English Canadian historian of his generation. He joined the University of Toronto’s Department of history shortly after completing his studies at Balliol College, Oxford, and would remain there until his retirement. In *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850*, an influential 1937 monograph which was part of the Carnegie series on Canadian-American relations, Creighton argued that Canada’s struggle against continentalism was rooted in geography and economics. Canada’s basic essence, it seemed, was anti-American.

The Laurentian thesis was not popular in Quebec. Indeed, its implications regarding the imperial bond and constitutional centralization were not likely to elicit a great deal of sympathy in a province where anti-imperialism and constitutional decentralization rallied an overwhelming proportion of the population. Goldwin Smith’s conception of a fractured, regionalized, and artificial Canada, however, did appeal to many French Canadian thinkers. Indeed, in spite of his Francophobic rantings, Smith’s influence could be felt in Quebec’s intellectual circles. He even attracted a key ally in the province: Henri Bourassa. The unlikely duo found common ground in their fervent opposition to British imperialism, most notably during the South African war.<sup>59</sup>

Bourassa, like Smith, understood that the continent’s natural divisions ran along a north-south axis, and he lambasted imperialists for refusing to acknowledge this basic fact. “It is inconceivable that sensible and practical men should so completely live outside the sphere of reality,” he wrote in 1911. “They seemingly ignore the elements of Northern

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<sup>58</sup> H. A. Innis, “Introduction to the Canadian Economic Studies,” in his *The Dairy Industry in Canada* (Toronto and New Haven, 1937), vi.

<sup>59</sup> In 1903, Bourassa translated and prefaced a brochure denouncing the South African war that Smith had published a year earlier. See Goldwin Smith, *Devant le tribunal de l’histoire. Un plaidoyer en faveur des Canadiens qui ont condamné la Guerre sud-africaine* (Montreal, 1903).

America [*sic*] geography, and forget that the political division of this continent has been made with an entire disregard for the laws of nature.”<sup>60</sup> Bourassa also briefly accepted Smith’s contention that “the extension of the Dominion to the Pacific” had destroyed every last vestige of the nation’s “material unity.”<sup>61</sup> In the wake of the conscription crisis and the divisive federal election of 1921, Bourassa openly mused that Confederation’s days were numbered.<sup>62</sup> Canada, it seemed, was headed towards rupture and possible annexation.

Bourassa quickly recanted this position. In the end, his faith in Canada prevailed. Bourassa’s disciples, however, were not as optimistic. In a 1922 inquiry into “Notre avenir politique,” *L’Action française* suggested that Canada’s disintegration was at hand and that the time had come to prepare for the birth of an “État français.” The review’s editor, abbé Lionel Groulx, fully embraced Goldwin Smith’s vision of the Dominion as a geographic, economic, and ethnic absurdity. Groulx was not a separatist, but he did believe that the Canadian nation contained the seeds of its own dissolution. One of the inquiry’s contributors, Father Rodrigue Villeneuve (1883-1947), an Oblate who taught philosophy at the Scolasticat d’Ottawa from 1907 to 1930, expanded on this theme:

Entre l’Est et l’Ouest, il y a la *distance ennemie*. En vain a-t-on espéré effacer cet éloignement qui donne à notre pays l’étendue d’un empire, par la construction d’interminables et coûteux chemins de fer. Le pays y aurait trouvé la banqueroute, à moins que les provinces qui n’ont point à s’en servir ne paient pour celles qui en ont l’usage; ce qui n’est guère une répartition propre à cimenter l’unité. Du reste, les divisions naturelles, en un territoire qui est, comme on l’a dit, une *absurdité géographique*, partagent nettement les intérêts, imposant le libre-échange là-bas, réclamant la protection tarifaire ici. Je sais bien que la *géographie humaine* ne prend pas fatalement ses mesures sur les fleuves ni sur les montagnes, et que les frontières politiques qui demeurent sont plutôt celles de l’esprit national que les tracés de l’arpentage. Mais c’est par une solidarité étroite d’intérêts et d’esprit commun que les fossés géographiques peuvent être comblés. Dans l’espèce, c’est ce qui fait précisément le plus défaut.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Henri Bourassa, *The Reciprocity Agreement and its Consequences as Viewed from the Nationalist Standpoint* (Montreal, 1911), 28.

<sup>61</sup> Goldwin Smith, “Can Canada Make her Own Treaties?” *Canadian Magazine* XXII (1904): 334.

<sup>62</sup> Lionel Groulx, *Mes mémoires*, vol. 2, 1920-1928 (Montreal, 1971), 303.

<sup>63</sup> Rodrigue Villeneuve, “Notre avenir politique: Et nos frères de la dispersion?” *L’Action française* VIII (1922): 12-13.

Later, after becoming the Archbishop of Quebec and primate of the Canadian Church, Villeneuve would disavow his 1922 contribution to “Notre avenir politique.”

The pessimism of the 1922 inquiry’s conclusions did not stand the test of time. Yet the belief that Canada existed in defiance of geography and that the North American continent was organized along a north-south axis would remain integral to the intellectual geography of French Canadian nationalism. As Lionel Groulx put it in 1941, “la structure du continent, du Golfe du Mexique à la mer glaciale, révèle, entre ces deux points, plus de convergences que de divergences; le continentalisme y est inscrit à l’état de postulat.” New France had developed in accordance with the continent’s physiography; modern Canada had not.<sup>64</sup>

In English Canada, Goldwin Smith’s ideas regarding the north-south pull of North American geography and the essential regionalism of the Canadian nation were generally used as an argument in favour of free trade. They served a very different purpose in Quebec. For leading nationalists like Henri Bourassa, North America’s physical geography legitimized constitutional decentralization. Canada’s basic geography, Bourassa argued, made centralization impractical. Others, like Lionel Groulx, went a step further and suggested that the continent’s physiography likely impaired the Dominion’s long-term survival. In time, this type of argument would be used by Quebec separatists to challenge Canada’s most basic legitimacy.

A general acceptance of the continent’s north-south axis did not prevent many *nationalistes* from viewing geography and climatology as elements of Canadian-American differentialism. Indeed, Canada and the United States, it was argued, were almost in separate hemispheres. Canada was unquestionably a nation of the northern hemisphere, and French Canadians were an inherently northern people. America, on the other hand, was a southerly nation, and its people were accustomed to the comforts of living in a temperate climate. American life was easy; snowfall was sparse and crops grew faster and longer. This, in turn, helped breed a lazy and materialistic society. In contrast, argued Father Adélarde Dugré in

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<sup>64</sup> Lionel Groulx, “L’annexionnisme au Canada français,” *L’Action nationale* XVII (1941): 443. Similarly, in the same year, Édouard Montpetit argued that modern Canada existed in defiance of geography: “En travers des lignes naturelles, dont l’homme ne peut qu’atténuer la vigueur, les deux pays se sont aussi organisés selon des procédés artificiels. Les publications officielles reproduisent par des cartes l’état des territoires que l’histoire a modifiés et montrent un Canada de 1713, de 1774, de 1873, de 1882, de 1898, de 1935. Il y a donc eu un pays qui correspondait à ces figures. On dirait un chantier de construction où les provinces et les districts seraient assemblés comme des blocs à pied d’œuvre. Les premières images consacrent des régions naturelles; les dernières indiquent le triomphe des lignes géométriques tracées dans l’impassable plaine.” [Montpetit, *Reflets d’Amérique*, 19-20.]



1925, the rigours of the northern climate had reinforced French Canadian vigour and spiritualism:

Un climat froid, une nature clame, des conditions économiques difficiles, une foi religieuse robuste ont développé chez les Canadiens français l'endurance dans les travaux pénibles et la facilité de contentement; un climat tempéré, une nature généreuse, l'abondance des richesses, ont développé chez les Américains le goût de vivre et l'attachement aux biens terrestres, tandis que le mysticisme des pionniers puritains faisait place chez eux à une indifférence religieuse de plus en plus accentuée.<sup>65</sup>

At the turn of the century, this type of argument was common in imperialist prose. The North indeed captured the imagination of imperialists and *nationalistes* alike, and climate and nordicity were seen as key elements of Canadian distinctiveness by men of science like Andrew Macphail or William Osler. Moreover, talk of Canadian nordicity was usually tied to racialism. William Osler, who had left Canada in 1884 to teach clinical medicine at the University of Pennsylvania and would later join the faculty of Johns Hopkins University, pondered the racial advantages of a cold climate in a 1904 speech delivered before the Canadian Club of Toronto:

Now, fortunately, we are situated most satisfactorily for the development of a race strong in body. We often hear it spoken of as a disadvantage to this country that it is situated so far north. There has rarely been in the history of the world a very strong nation not situated in the north and it is very much to our advantage that we have a rigorous winter and that the climate is a bit hard at times. It is very much to the advantage of the race, and it is likely to produce in the coming ages a stronger race than on any other part of the continent. Twenty-five years hence, when a second and third generation have come, the probability is that by far the most virile nation on this continent will be to the north of the great lakes. It is a distinct advantage to be to the north and not to the south of the line of 45 degrees.<sup>66</sup>

But the Canadian climate not only virilized Anglo-Saxons, it also repelled darker races. George R. Parkin was among the most vocal proponents of this idea. Born in Salisbury,

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<sup>65</sup> Dugré, *La Campagne canadienne*, 5-6.

<sup>66</sup> William Osler, "Anglo-Canadian and American Relations," *Addresses Delivered Before the Canadian Club of Toronto* (1904-1905): 65.

New Brunswick, and educated at the University of New Brunswick, Parkin was the headmaster of the Bathurst Grammar School from 1868 to 1872 and of Fredericton's Collegiate School from 1874 to 1889. In 1889, at the request of the Imperial Federation League, he embarked on a lecture tour of the British Empire to promote imperial unity. Parkin served as the headmaster of Upper Canada College from 1895 to 1902 when he was appointed the organizing representative of the Rhodes Scholarship Trust in England. In 1908, he informed the Empire Club of Canada that climate was one of the Dominion's greatest assets:

What I want to do to-day is to compare with you for a few minutes the position of the two great countries on this continent, and to draw from that some inferences. First, let me say that without hesitation I claim that we have the most prodigious advantages on this northern side of the line; advantages of various kinds. And first and foremost among these I am inclined to place the thing of which some Canadians have been ashamed, but in which I glory; and that is that we are the "Lady of the Snows" and that we have a 30 to 40 below zero climate. I tell my English friends that I consider it the greatest asset that Canada has to-day. I will tell you why. Look at what it sets us free from! What is the incubus that rests upon the United States to-day, and for which the most thinking men have found it impossible to find a solution? It is the great colour problem. We never can have a problem of that kind in this country; it is impossible. And I do not believe that Canadians will ever consent under the conditions of their growth to have anything to do with the solution of that problem. What was the number of people that flowed into the United States last year from the valley of the Mediterranean, from nations very poorly trained to political wisdom? 1,200,000 people passed through Ellis Island, N. Y., alone last year; and the average rate for some years has been closely upon 1,000,000. We are free from that great problem and the difficulties which it involves.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> G. R. Parkin, "The Relations of Canada and the United States," *Empire Club Speeches* (1907-1908): 160. Parkin argued, moreover, that Canada's climate was not merely repelling undesirable immigrants, it was also keeping indigence in check: "I have read with some interest of the suffering that is going on here in Toronto among a certain limited class. What do I tell my friends in England about that? I tell them that Nature is doing her great work of selection here. I tell them that you never can have in this climate the submerged tenth which afflicts a city like London, where people sleep outside along the embankments. Nature takes them firmly in her hand and says, If you do not have foresight and prudence, and get fuel and food and a roof over your head, you are going to die in that climate. And Nature is going to train the Canadians to foresight and prudence, and saving, and to those economies and that spirit which has always marked the people of the North, and given them the strength and advantage over the people of the South; and while this is a matter of temporary suffering, and there will always be suffering as long as you have two or three thousand people pouring into your city from countries where they have been accustomed to receive charity, still nature is doing the separating work, and the people who are unfit for this country are being separated, not by some stern artificial law, but by the law of Nature, which makes its citizens a strong and vigorous people. That is one of the immense advantages which

The corollary to all this talk of northern virility and natural selection was clear: America was a nation whose racial stock had been degenerated by the interrelated evils of heat, slavery, and immigration. And these problems were not confined to the southern states. Andrew Macphail, for instance, argued that the near-tropical climate of the American South was contaminating the nation's more temperate regions. With regards to the practice of lynching, the founding editor of the *Canadian Medical Association Journal* noted in 1910 that "infection spreads. The peculiar diversion which the inhabitants of Alabama employ to relieve the tedium of life in a sub-tropical climate soon comes to be practised in Illinois."<sup>68</sup>

While not all imperialists were inclined to view the Republic's racial stock as inherently inferior, they did appear to agree that it lacked the higher degree of natural selection associated with a northern climate. This belief, however, was hardly confined to the right. Until well into the twentieth century, it was widely assumed that blacks and southern Europeans were biologically ill-equipped to cope with the rigours of the Canadian climate. As a result, a number of continentalists also saw Canada's weather as a source of racial strength. Reverend James A. Macdonald, for instance, noted in 1915 that the northern climate had prevented runaway American slaves from settling permanently in Canada:

To the slaves Canada was Goshen, not Canaan. Many of them grew to comfort and prospered. But Emancipation Day was the day of their deliverance. From that day on they began to set their faces again to the warm southland. Canada never would have had the negro or a negro problem had it not been for slavery. It is not a matter of law, but of latitude. In the northern zone the thermometer is on the side of the white man.<sup>69</sup>

Racial prejudice, indeed, was common in early continentalist prose. However, it did not deter continentalists from seeking a closer relationship with the United States. Even Goldwin Smith – whose racism was, to say the least, well developed – did not see America's South or her black population as a serious obstacle to continental union.

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we have over the people to the south of us. In the future that means everything for us. It means that we are going to have a people more carefully selected, more fit for the struggle of life, breeding a better race than those who take people from all kinds and conditions and permit a submerged tenth." [Ibid., 160-161.]

<sup>68</sup> Andrew Macphail, "Canadian Writers and American Politics," *University Magazine* IX (1910): 7.

<sup>69</sup> J. A. Macdonald, *Democracy and the Nations: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1915), 80-81.

In the end, talk of geography and climatology was intimately linked to a wider debate concerning Canada's basic identity. For imperialists, the nation's nordicity and its east-west axis merely reinforced its conservative, British, and antimodern essence. The imperial bond, continuity, and tradition were all inscribed in the Dominion's basic physiography. Continental integration, however, was not. For intellectuals like Frank Underhill, all this was little more than an anti-American daydream. The Dominion's very geography made continental integration necessary and inevitable. There was nothing fundamentally antimodern about Canada; the Dominion was an American nation. French Canadian nationalists balked at this suggestion, but embraced the idea of a regionalized Dominion whose natural faultlines ran north and south. Decentralization and, some believed, an "État français," were inscribed in the nation's physiography.

Dismissed as un-Canadian by conservative intellectuals who claimed to be the guardians and unique spokesmen for the nation, continentalists tried to brand Canada as an essentially modern, North American nation. As we shall see in the next chapter, they were continuously hampered in this endeavour by the twin spectres of annexation and Americanization, which imperialists and *nationalistes* cleverly used to denigrate continental integration and Canadian-American cultural convergence.

## *Chapter Ten*

### Twin Perils: Annexation and Americanization

The twin spectres of annexation and Americanization have long cast a shadow over the discussion of Canadian-American relations. In the early twentieth century, many conservative intellectuals believed that even the slightest degree of continental integration and cultural convergence might result in the moral, spiritual, and political extinction of the Canadian nation. In English Canada, the spectre of political absorption haunted more than a few imperialists. Annexation would eliminate the dual pillars of Canadian distinctiveness and tradition: the imperial bond and the nation's political institutions. Annexation also worried Quebec's *nationalistes*, though to a lesser extent. As we have seen, political institutions were not significant to the *nationaliste* sense of identity, which was largely based on religion, ethnicity, and culture. Accordingly, intellectuals like Lionel Groulx were far more preoccupied by cultural Americanization, which they saw as a more immediate threat to French Canada's faith, language, and culture. *Nationaliste* concerns surrounding Americanization intensified after World War One. Among other things, the invention of radio was believed to have inundated Quebec with American popular culture. Many interwar imperialists were also concerned by this cultural *raz-de-marée*. However, the reaction to cultural Americanization was less intense in English Canada, in part because the imperialist movement had lost so much steam after the Great War.

Imperialist anxieties regarding annexation and *nationaliste* fears concerning Americanization proceeded from similar assumptions. In both instances, American values and institutions were viewed as inimical to Canadian tradition. These antimodern flights of fancy thoroughly irritated the Dominion's continentalist intellectuals. Aside from a handful of malcontents, most continentalists emphatically rejected annexation, and they understood that the bogey of political absorption was a reactionary tool used by conservatives to condemn continental integration and vilify continentalists. They were similarly unworried by Americanization. In fact, many continentalists rejected the very idea of Americanization. They wondered how Canada, a nation that was inherently American, could even become 'Americanized.' By and large, continentalists believed, as John MacCormac put it in 1940, that Canadian-American cultural and social convergence merely reflected "the fact that Canadians, like Americans, have lived for almost two centuries on the North American

continent and have reacted similarly to the same continental influences. In dress, manner, and social customs it is natural that they should resemble each other.”<sup>1</sup>

### *The Spectre of Annexation*

Continental union – annexation – has been a recurring theme in Canadian political and intellectual debate for over two centuries.<sup>2</sup> Generally speaking, the spectre of annexation is evoked when Canadians debate the merits of continental integration. However, in the nineteenth century, annexation was seriously discussed and debated on several occasions, particularly during periods of economic despair.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, some Victorian intellectuals believed that the solution to Canada’s problems lay in continental union. They were undoubtedly marginal figures, but their ideas were well received in certain circles. Annexation, to be sure, was virtually a legitimate political option in nineteenth century Canada.

By 1900, however, intellectual annexationism had basically disappeared from Canadian discourse. The return of prosperity had put an end to annexationist self-doubt. Talk of continental union nonetheless persisted. Indeed, Tories continued to use the spectre of annexation to tarnish their continentalist adversaries. Annexation, it was argued, would be the ultimate consequence of continental integration. That nearly all continentalists were viscerally opposed to annexation was irrelevant; annexation was a bogey.

For the annexationist, continental union was the only way to permanently ensure Canadian prosperity and progress. Annexation would bring freedom and democracy to

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<sup>1</sup> John MacCormac, *Canada: America’s Problem* (New York, 1940), 148.

<sup>2</sup> Moreover, as Donald F. Warner notes, “though the actual strength of the [annexation] movement might be uncertain, there is no doubt that it was a significant dynamic in the history of Canada. A few examples illustrate this. The Imperial government granted a responsible ministry to its North American colonies lest they seek it as states in the American Union. The specter of annexation also contributed to the creation of the Dominion, when the separate colonies were federated partly to ward off the danger of their being incorporated one by one into the United States, by military force or by economic pressure. Annexationism has stimulated the growth of Canadian nationalism and helped check the natural tendency of this feeling to erode the sentimental ties with Great Britain. Economically, as well as politically, the pull to the United States affected the course of Canadian development. It was an important cause of two significant events in the economic history of British North America – the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 and the adoption of the National Policy, or protective tariff, in 1879.” [Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893* (n.p., 1960), vii.]

<sup>3</sup> As a political movement, annexationism peaked in 1849. In that year, a group of disgruntled Montreal merchants issued the infamous Annexation Manifesto. Angered by Britain’s repeal of preferential trade, they believed that Canada’s best chance for economic recovery lay with political union with the United States. The annexation movement fizzled in the 1850s, but regained strength after Congress repealed the reciprocity Treaty in 1866. Indeed, economic difficulties helped fuel annexationist sentiment in the 1870s and 1880s. The return of prosperity in the mid 1890s was lethal to the annexation movement.

Canada, argued Goldwin Smith. It was, he believed, the only way to free the Dominion from economic depression, British colonialism, and French and Catholic domination. For their part, French Canadian annexationists like Louis-Honoré Fréchettes hoped to see continental union liberate Quebec from British and Anglo-Canadian domination. Nevertheless, in Quebec, the arguments in favour of annexation were also primarily economic in nature.

Imperialists argued that continental union would mean the immediate extinction of Canadian tradition, nay, of the Canadian nation. The Dominion's antimodern distinctiveness rested primarily on her political system and on the imperial bond, and annexation promised to wipe both out with the stroke of a pen. Quebec's *nationalistes* viewed the prospect of annexation with similar distaste. They did not, however, assume that the French Canadian nation could simply be legislated out of existence. In the end, *l'annexion morale* – Americanization – was a more pressing concern to the *nationalistes*.

Goldwin Smith and annexationism have become synonymous. Indeed, his ideas formed the intellectual core for annexationism's last gasp in the late 1880s and early 1890s, and his most controversial work, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, sent shockwaves through the Dominion's intellectual circles. Yet Smith disliked being labelled an 'annexationist.' "Annexation is an ugly word," he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*. "It seems to convey the idea of force or pressure applied to the smaller state, not of free, equal and honourable union, like that between England and Scotland."<sup>4</sup> Smith dreamed of a "continental union" between consenting partners. Canada was not to be 'annexed' by the United States; its provinces were to enter the union freely as equal partners in the American commonwealth.

Goldwin Smith had not always believed that Canada's destiny lay in continental union with the United States. Shortly after settling in Toronto, in 1871, he became active in the fledgling Canada First movement, which sought to promote the political and cultural development of the nascent Dominion. However, the movement collapsed in the mid 1870s and Smith grew increasingly convinced that the new nation was a complete failure. By 1877, when his first article advocating continental union was published in London's *Fortnightly Review*, Smith had become an ardent annexationist. His arguments are well known: the Canadian nation, he believed, was a profound absurdity. Its indefensible borders ran counter to the continent's physical geography and its economy was based on artificial tariff barriers. Economic arguments indeed dominated annexationist rhetoric in nineteenth-century. For

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<sup>4</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 267.

Smith, Canadian prosperity simply required annexation. To continue to resist continental union was to perpetuate economic marasmus and massive emigration. Only a small minority of Canadians, Smith argued, benefited from economic protectionism:

For the few who profit by the system there may be large fortunes and baronial mansions in England, where they will win titles and social consequence by making Canada move, or pretending to make her move, in conformity with the interests of an aristocratic party in Great Britain. For the people at large there will be the inevitable fate of a country kept by artificial separation and restriction below the level of its continent in commercial prosperity and in the rewards held out to industry.<sup>5</sup>

Goldwin Smith's indictment of the National Policy was compelling. Yet his case for continental union was not limited to economic arguments. The Dominion's problems, to be sure, were not merely economic, they were also ethnic. Simply put, Quebec hindered Canadian progress and prosperity. Smith was indeed haunted by spectre of French and Catholic domination, and he could only envisage one solution to the French Canadian question: assimilation. There was, however, a major obstacle to the assimilation of French Canada: "The forces of Canada alone are not sufficient to assimilate the French element or even to prevent the indefinite consolidation and growth of a French nation. Either the conquest of Quebec was utterly fatuous or it is to be desired that the American Continent should belong to the English tongue and to Anglo-Saxon civilisation." Only annexation could guarantee assimilation. Smith believed that freedom from French domination would perhaps form the most convincing argument in favour of annexation: "Since the passing of the Jesuits' Estates Act and the revelation in connection with it of priestly influence and designs, the saying of Lord Durham's Report that the day might come when English Canadians to remain English would have to cease to be British, or something like it, has been heard on many sides."<sup>6</sup>

But annexation would not only save Canada from economic depression and French domination, it would also bring an end to British colonialism on the North American continent. Without Britain meddling in her affairs, Canada could finally assume her continental destiny. Britain would also benefit from annexation. Indeed, Smith argued that

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<sup>5</sup> Id., *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered Before the Young Men's Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 95-96.

<sup>6</sup> Id., *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 275, 278.



without Canadian affairs breeding disharmony, Anglo-American relations would surely improve. Annexation, in this sense, would accomplish a significant step towards the moral reunion of the Anglo-Saxon people.

Even in his heyday, Smith was an unpopular figure. Yet he was not devoid of followers. As he noted in *Canada and the Canadian Question*, “the English inquirer had better be cautious in receiving the confident reports of official persons, or listening to public professions of any kind. The very anxiety shown to gag opinion by incessant cries of disloyalty and treason shows that there is an opinion which needs to be gagged.” Indeed, he continued, “the notion that a man who at a meeting of ordinary Canadians should avow his belief in an ultimate reunion of the two sections of his race would be ‘stoned’ or even hissed, may be proved from experience to be a mistake.”<sup>7</sup> In 1891, annexationism appeared to have wind in its sails.

Smith’s followers were a diverse lot. They embraced his indictment of the Dominion, but often opted for a more proactive approach to annexation. For instance, in an 1891 pamphlet published shortly after *Canada and the Canadian Question*, Samuel R. Clarke argued that the Liberal party needed to adopt annexation as its platform. “So far as the progressive Reform party is concerned, it must be either annexation or retrogression,” he wrote. “My own idea is the Reform party will advance. They seem clearly to be fighting the annexation battle under cover of the ‘unrestricted reciprocity’ colours for the present.”<sup>8</sup> Goldwin Smith, for his part, was content to see the Liberal party take up free trade as its warhorse. Once it was enacted, the two nations would inevitably coalesce. Continental union more a matter of destiny than of politics.

Continental union also had its supporters in Quebec. In the late nineteenth century, the province’s annexation movement was mainly composed of impenitent *rouges* like Louis-Honoré Fréchette and Jean-Baptiste Rouillard. Fréchette was a prominent figure in late nineteenth century Quebec’s intellectual circles. His poetry was intensely patriotic and liberal, and he frequently crossed swords with the province’s conservative and clerical elite. Fréchette served as the Member of Parliament for Lévis, Quebec, from 1874 to 1878, and was appointed clerk of Quebec’s Legislative Council by Premier Honoré Mercier in 1889. Rouillard, who founded and edited several Quebec newspapers in support of Mercier’s Parti national, also benefited from the Premier’s largesse – he was the inspector general of

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 277.

<sup>8</sup> S. R. Clarke, *A New Light on Annexation: A Political Brochure* (Toronto, 1891), 11, 22.

Quebec's mines in the late 1880s and early 1890s – but was eventually tarnished by the scandal that toppled Mercier's government in December 1891. Shortly thereafter, Rouillard settled permanently in New England. Over the next several years, he would found a number of short-lived Franco-American newspapers, including *L'Aigle* (Salem, Massachusetts), *L'Amérique* (Biddeford, Maine), and *La République* (Lewiston, Maine).

Unlike Wilfrid Laurier, Fréchette and Rouillard never came to accept Confederation.<sup>9</sup> Instead, they believed that the solution to most of French Canada's problems lay in continental union. Annexation would bring an end to such nagging problems as economic marasmus and massive emigration. "L'union continentale, par l'annexion aux États-Unis, assurerait un tarif uniforme, un tarif protecteur élevé, contre les pays transatlantiques, et libre échangiste avec les peuples des Amériques," Jean-Baptiste Rouillard argued before Montreal's Club National in 1893.<sup>10</sup>

Political arguments were also important to French Canadian annexationism. Continental union, it was claimed, would free Quebec from the twin evils of British colonialism and Anglo-Canadian domination, and would herald a democratic and secular millennium for the French Canadian nation.<sup>11</sup> In 1893, Louis-Honoré Fréchette insisted that annexation was a veritable panacea for Quebec's problems:

In fact, alliance with the States of the Union would with one sweep of the pen settle all those thorny questions which now embarrass us. At one stroke we should benefit by all the progress of our neighbors up to this point; we should enter into free commercial relations with a country of seventy millions of inhabitants; the lines uncomfortably strained which hold us in the wake of another people would be thrown off; we should have no more hatred or rivalry of faith or race; no longer conquerors ever looking upon us as the conquered; no longer any joint responsibility with any European nation; no longer any frontiers; no longer any possible wars; a single flag over the whole of North America, which then would be, not the holding of any particular nation, but the home of Humanity itself, the Empire of Peace, the richest and most powerful dominion of the earth, under a democratic government having as its leading principle the recognition of the same rights

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<sup>9</sup> In late nineteenth century Quebec, insists Donald F. Warner, "hostility to confederation evolved by frustration and by the distress of depression into annexation." A similar response occurred in Nova Scotia. [Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union*, 81, 86.]

<sup>10</sup> J.-B. Rouillard, *Annexion: conférence: l'union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 26.

<sup>11</sup> As Donald F. Warner notes, in the 1880s and 1890s, the anticlerical *rouges* "pronounced for annexation as they had done earlier, hoping that the American government would rein in the wide-ranging Catholic hierarchy if Quebec became part of the United States." [Warner, *The Idea of Continental Union*, 207.]

and the imposition of the same duties among all its subjects, without question of the blood which flows in their veins or of the form in which they may choose to worship God.<sup>12</sup>

Rouillard and Fréchette were convinced that the sovereignty vested in American states would be sufficient to guarantee French Canadian *survivance*. In contrast, the Dominion's constitutional centralism and constant talk of imperial federation did not bode well for the French Canadian nation. By 1893, Fréchette was convinced that annexation enjoyed broad support in Quebec: "The idea of Annexation has, during the last few years, made rapid progress with Canadians of French origin; the fact is that, even to-day, were they consulted on the question under conditions of absolute freedom, without any moral pressure from either side, I am certain that a considerable majority of Annexationists would result from the ballot."<sup>13</sup>

Continental union, of course, did not enjoy broad support in Quebec.<sup>14</sup> Most French-speaking annexationists, in fact, were Franco-Americans, and the *petits Canadas* of New England were breeding grounds for annexationism. Indeed, Fréchette and Rouillard had both lived in the United States, as had Quebec's most brilliant annexationist, Edmond de Nevers. Yet de Nevers professed a very different type of annexationism. Unlike Rouillard and Fréchette, de Nevers was no *rouge*. In the 1890s, he professed a passive and almost conservative form of annexationism that differed in many ways from the militant and republican ideals of Rouillard and Fréchette. Edmond de Nevers' annexationism was born of cold realism. As he saw it, imperial federation was impractical and Canadian independence was impossible.<sup>15</sup> This only left one option for Quebec: annexation. But continental union

<sup>12</sup> L.-H. Fréchette, "The United States for French Canadians," *Forum* XVI (1893): 345.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Rejected by Quebec's turn-of-the-century conservatives, annexation also failed to rally the support of most of the province's liberal intellectuals. Errol Bouchette, for instance, had little use for continental union: "Nous vivons sous le coup d'une alternative qui ne nous plaît guère. L'annexion du Canada par les États-Unis, ce peuple qui se dit Américain par excellence et qui prétend bientôt prendre officiellement ce titre, n'est pas précisément probable, mais elle est possible. Personne, en Canada, ne la croit désirable. Au contraire, on la redoute. Les annexionnistes nous disent bien que les deux peuples réunis formeraient l'organisation politique la plus puissante de la terre. Mais cet argument, d'ailleurs contestable, est le seul dont ils puissent étayer leur projet." [Bouchette, "Le Canada parmi les peuples américains," *La Revue canadienne* XLVIII (1905): 13.]

<sup>15</sup> Quoting Goldwin Smith, de Nevers derided the very idea of imperial federation: "On veut unir vingt ou trente pays dispersés sur toute la surface du globe, n'ayant, pour les relier les uns aux autres, aucune attache d'intérêt commun, ignorants de leurs ressources et de leurs besoins mutuels. La première session d'un tel conclave développerait, nous pouvons en être certains, des forces de désunion bien plus puissantes que le vague sentiment d'union résultant d'une très partielle communauté d'origine et d'une très imparfaite communauté de langue qui serait la seule base de la fédération." However, de Nevers lamented that Canadian independence was equally unrealistic: "Cessant de faire partie du grand empire britannique, [les Canadiens anglais] voudront faire partie d'une grande république où l'immense majorité de la population parle la langue anglaise." [E. de Nevers, *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Paris, 1896), 382-383.]

would open new possibilities for French Canada: “Nous savons, enfin, qu’un jour viendra où la frontière qui sépare le Canada des États-Unis aura disparu, où l’Amérique du nord ne formera plus qu’une vaste république et nous avons l’ambition de constituer dans l’Est, un foyer de civilisation française qui fournira son apport au progrès intellectuel, à la moralité et à la variété de l’Union.”<sup>16</sup> The new America would be a loose confederation of ethnic blocs, and a French Canadian state would ultimately come to dominate the Northeast.<sup>17</sup> Like Fréchette and Rouillard, de Nevers argued that annexation would allow Quebec to finally assume her *américanité*. “Quand l’heure aura sonné de la séparation définitive entre l’ancien monde et le nouveau, la destinée s’accomplira pacifique et solennelle, et rien ne troublera la tranquillité de l’univers,” de Nevers wrote in *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français* (1896).<sup>18</sup>

In the late nineteenth century, annexationism enraged and frightened many Canadians. Imperialists were particularly concerned. Indeed, annexation threatened to eliminate Canada as a British political entity. Besides, the annexation movement, though relatively small, attracted a good deal of attention in Britain and the United States. Goldwin Smith was, to be sure, one of only a handful of Canadian authors known outside the Dominion, and British and American journals frequently asked him to comment on Canadian affairs. As a result, the debate surrounding annexation was largely conducted in foreign publications. Anglo-American opinion, it seemed, was at stake. Imperialists accused Smith of misrepresenting Canadian opinion, of underestimating the nation’s potential, and of overestimating its problems. Smith was undermining Canada’s reputation abroad; his prose encouraged Americans to believe that their nation would someday annex the Dominion and it weakened support for imperial federation in Britain.

The imperialist riposte to annexationism was above all an attack on the person of Goldwin Smith. Smith, it was argued, did not understand Canada, nor did he speak for Canadians. John G. Bourinot, for instance, described Smith in 1895 as “that tall, gloomy figure, isolated from the people of Canada, who admire his abilities but pay no heed to his opinions.”<sup>19</sup> Imperialists continuously externalized their opponent. Smith, they insisted, was not a real Canadian. In an 1893 article published in an American magazine, John Castell

<sup>16</sup> Id., *L’âme américaine*, vol. II (Paris, 1900), 129.

<sup>17</sup> In some ways, de Nevers’ annexationism resembled the ultramontane expansionism of Father Édouard Hamon and Jules-Paul Tardivel. Hamon and Tardivel believed that both Canada and the United States would eventually disintegrate and that a French Canadian republic encompassing Quebec, New England, eastern Ontario, and northern New Brunswick would emerge from the ruins of the two federations. Ultramontane expansionism is discussed in Chapter 12.

<sup>18</sup> E. de Nevers, *L’avenir du peuple canadien-français*, 394.

<sup>19</sup> J. G. Bourinot, “Why Canadians do not Favor Annexation,” *Forum* XIX (1895): 277.

Hopkins portrayed the old man as “a brilliant but intensely unpopular Englishman.”<sup>20</sup> For his part, George Monro Grant, who served as the principal of Queen’s University for twenty-five years, saw Smith as a prime example of the complete ignorance of Canadian affairs that existed at even the highest levels of British society:

Recently, a letter of enquiry, from the Secretary of a Royal Commission, was addressed to me – at the instance of another Oxford authority – “Kingston, Ontario, U.S.A.”! Dr. Goldwin Smith is well acquainted with this crass ignorance, and has himself given some curious instances of it, over which he is wont to make merry, all unconscious that he himself is possessed of the very limitations and the very spirit which makes it possible. For all that he knows of the deeper feelings and convictions of Canadians, he might have lived for the last twenty or thirty years in an English cathedral close; and he is therefore continually rasping the thin-skinned among them by oracular declarations which would be considered insulting were they not ascribed to dyspepsia or disappointment. Yet he is about the only writer on Canadian topics who ever reaches the British politician!<sup>21</sup>

Annexation, imperialists argued, was a fringe solution that only rallied a handful of pessimistic malcontents. In *The Great Dominion*, an 1895 treatise written for a British public, George R. Parkin dispelled the notion that annexationism was all the rage in Canada: “It may be questioned whether there is in Canada to-day, from Atlantic to Pacific, any political passion so strong as opposition to absorption into the United States. It is practically accurate to say that no avowed annexationist could be elected to the Dominion Parliament. If any believer in annexation gets a seat there, it is by concealing his views.”<sup>22</sup> Similarly, in 1898, John G. Bourinot noted that there was little or no support for annexation in Quebec. French

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<sup>20</sup> J. C. Hopkins, “Canadian Hostility to Annexation,” *Forum* XVI (1893): 327. Accusations of outright treason, however, were rare. In this regard, Colonel George T. Denison’s savage attacks on Smith’s character were unusual. A leading figure in Ontario’s United Empire Loyalist movement, Denison was obsessed with the idea of loyalty and, in his mind, annexationism was pure treason. In his autobiographical account of the imperial federation movement, Denison recounted Smith’s fall from grace: “For many years Goldwin Smith and I were close friends, and I formed a very high opinion of him in many ways, and admired him for many estimable qualities. When the Commercial Union movement began, however, I found that I had to take a very decided stand against him, and very soon a keen controversy arose between us and it ended in my becoming one of the leaders in the movement against him and his designs. When he assumed the Honorary Presidency of the Continental Union Association, formed in Canada and the United States, and working in unison to bring about the annexation of the two countries, I looked upon that as rank treason, and ceased all association with him, and since then we have never spoken. I regretted much the rupture of the old ties of friendship, but felt that treason could not be handled with kid gloves.” [G. T. Denison, *The Struggle for Imperial Unity. Recollections & Experiences* (London, 1909), 169.]

<sup>21</sup> G. M. Grant, “Canada and the Empire,” *National Review* XXVII (1896): 676.

<sup>22</sup> G. R. Parkin, *The Great Dominion: Studies of Canada* (London, 1895), 185.

Canadians, he wrote in an American magazine, “comprehend that their true interests lie in a prosperous Canadian federation, and not in union with a country where they would eventually lose their national identity.”<sup>23</sup>

Imperialists repeatedly insisted that the evident superiority of Canadian society forever condemned annexationism to the political fringe. To this effect, John Castell Hopkins claimed in 1893 that “the defects in American national life have long been keenly studied and criticised in Canada, and the most enthusiastic advocate of annexation knows that this belief in the superiority of Canadian institutions, laws, politics and even morals, is ingrained in the heart of the average citizen whom he endeavours to convert.”<sup>24</sup> Even protracted economic marasmus would not convince Canadians to opt for continental union. In a widely-read review of *Canada and the Canadian Question*, George Monro Grant, who was ordained a Presbyterian minister in 1860 and was the pastor of St. Matthew’s Church, Halifax, from 1863 to 1877, argued that the central flaw of Smith’s thesis was its patent materialism:

The present book, in its perpetual insistence on the material prosperity that union would bring, appeals far too much to the baser side of human nature. Surely the lessons that history teaches are that wealth is not the one thing indispensable to a people; that commercial prosperity may be bought at too great a price; that if wealth be gained at the cost of the slightest loss of moral power, it proves not a blessing but a curse that can never be shaken off; and that simplicity of life is not inconsistent with the highest culture any more than with the formation of the noblest character.<sup>25</sup>

Materialism, it was claimed, repelled Canadians. As a result, insisted George R. Parkin in 1892, the Canadian sense of loyalty and patriotism was far stronger than any desire for economic prosperity: “When, therefore, I am told that geography and commercial tendencies are strong, I can only reply that the bias of national life and loyalty to the spiritual forces which give people birth are stronger still.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> J. G. Bourinot, “Canada’s Relations with the United States and her Influence on Imperial Councils,” *Forum* XXV (1898): 336.

<sup>24</sup> Hopkins, “Canadian Hostility to Annexation,” 328-329.

<sup>25</sup> G. M. Grant, *Canada and the Canadian Question: A Review* (Toronto, 1891), 21-22.

<sup>26</sup> G. R. Parkin, *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity* (London, 1892), 141. For his part, John G. Bourinot suggested that Providence had ordained Canadian separateness: “The same mysterious Providence that has already divided the continent of America as far as the Rio Grande between Canada and the United States, and has in the past prevented their political fortunes becoming one, still forces the Canadian communities with an irresistible power to press onward until they realize those high conceptions which their

Smith had even misunderstood the dynamic of Anglo-American relations. Indeed, imperialists repeatedly insisted that annexation would not improve Anglo-American relations or hasten the moral reunion of the Anglo-Saxon race. On the contrary, warned George Monro Grant in 1891, annexation would be akin to trying to “appease a tiger by giving it blood.” American jingoes would exult that they had “driven the British flag from this Continent,” and would be encouraged to continue twisting the lion’s tail. Grant, who emerges as Smith’s most prominent critic in the 1890s, was “convinced that the best way to gain the friendship of the United States – and we all wish to gain it – is by preserving our own self-respect and maintaining our own rights.”<sup>27</sup> In the end, he and others believed that the moral union of the English-speaking peoples would be accomplished through imperial federation, not annexation.

Many late-nineteenth-century continentalists were also fervently opposed to annexation. Chief amongst them was Erastus Wiman, the indefatigable promoter of commercial union between the United States and Canada. Wiman, who became an American citizen in 1897, saw annexation as both undesirable and impossible. “There are only three ways in which a political alliance could be achieved between the two nations of North America,” he told the Union League Club of Brooklyn, New York, in 1891. “These three means are Revolution, Conquest or Purchase.” And all three options, he assured his audience, were unthinkable. Indeed, Wiman could not conceive that revolution would ever come to a nation like Canada, “where there was liberty of the press and a free ballot.” Conquest, for its part, was “not to be thought of,” since he considered the very idea of an Anglo-American war to be absurd. As for purchase, Wiman believed that “Great Britain could not and would not sell a foot of her territory.”<sup>28</sup>

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statesmen and people already imagine for them in a not so distant future.” [J. G. Bourinot, “Canada and the United States: An Historical Retrospect,” *Papers of the American Historical Association* V (1891): 147.]

<sup>27</sup> Grant, *Canada and the Canadian Question: A Review*, 29-30.

<sup>28</sup> Erastus Wiman, *Union Between the United States and Canada: Political or Commercial? Which is Desirable and which is Presently Possible?* (New York, 1891), 29-31. Wiman also repeatedly warned Americans that annexation would upset the Republic’s body politic. The acquisition of Quebec, in particular, would threaten American institutions: “One must always bear in mind the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec – an influence that to-day is greater in its force and influence than prevails in any other country in the world. It is true that the central power of the United States does not interfere with religious matters, and that any State in the Union can have its own church if it chooses. It is equally true that the majority of the people in each State can regulate their religious affairs without let or hindrance, and that, if Quebec were admitted to a Statehood, it would not matter to New York, or any other commonwealth, what religious persuasion prevailed among the majority of a sister State, or what powers were imparted by that State to a religious institution. But it is a fact, nevertheless, that the forces which the Roman Catholic Church exercise in Quebec would have a most powerful influence upon the educational institutions of that commonwealth; and that from it would radiate an influence upon the common school system of the United States, which to many thoughtful minds would seriously

Besides, Wiman insisted that annexation was thoroughly unnecessary since all of its benefits could be acquired through a North American customs union. James Douglas (1837-1918) agreed. Born in Quebec City and educated at Queen's and Edinburgh, Douglas was ordained as a minister of the Presbyterian Church, but soon turned his attention to mining and metallurgy. He emigrated to the United States in 1875 to manage a copper smelter in Pennsylvania, but remained active in Canadian affairs throughout his life and was a supporter of commercial reciprocity. In an 1894 essay examining Canada's national options – independence, annexation, and imperial federation – Douglas scoffed at the idea that annexation was the only path to Canadian prosperity:

If Canada, as a country, is really not to gain much if anything, industrially, by annexation, why should she submit to the shock of the operation which such a radical political change undoubtedly would produce? What she and the United States would gain by annexation, can be secured by reciprocal trade relations which, if not found to be advantageous, can be modified with much less friction than uncongenial political ties can be severed.<sup>29</sup>

Fatally weakened by the return of prosperity in the mid-1890s, the annexation movement died with Goldwin Smith. Still, the old man has haunted Canadian continentalism since the rainy June day when he was laid to rest. Early twentieth-century conservatives, indeed, frequently conjured the spectre of annexation, which has always provided anti-Americans with a bogey to use against their continentalist opponents. Continental integration, it was argued, would ultimately lead to annexation. Moreover, imperialists regularly externalized their opponents by presenting them as un-Canadian. Mainstream continentalists, they argued, were little more than closet annexationists who secretly yearned to be American. During the 1911 federal election, for instance, Canadians were repeatedly warned that reciprocity would put the Dominion on the road to continental union and that continentalists were unfit for national leadership. By the 1930s, however, there was relatively little talk of annexation in imperialist circles. The Depression, and later, the Second World War, made a certain degree of continental integration appear

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threaten its existence. To those who believe the common school is the basis of free institutions, such an anticipation is full of significance. Even at this date, the Roman Catholic desire in Massachusetts for separate schools has acquired a force that is difficult to resist. The feeling of uncertainty in regard to the future in this respect has made many who have hitherto been advocates of a close political union with Canada, hesitate and closely consider the possible consequences." [Ibid., 15-16.]

<sup>29</sup> James Douglas, *Canadian Independence, Annexation and British Imperial Federation* (New York, 1894), 106.



indispensable to Canadian security and economic growth. In 1943, for instance, R. G. Trotter brushed aside any suggestion that the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Agreements or the construction of the Alaska Highway had put Canada on the road to annexation.<sup>30</sup> This attitude would not last. For instance, George Grant, whose *Lament for a Nation* (1965) would galvanize Canadian nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s, was already warning his fellow citizens in late 1945 that “those who want to destroy our membership in the British Commonwealth in the name of a greater Canadian nationhood are fooling themselves. They are really destroying our nation. Because without that membership no power on earth can keep us from being absorbed by the U.S.A. And with that we cease to be a nation.”<sup>31</sup> The bogey of annexation was back to stay.

Twentieth-century continentalists were usually quick to react to any suggestion that their ideas, if applied, would ultimately lead to Canada’s annexation. They understood that the spectre of annexation was being used by imperialists in a desperate attempt to impede both continental integration and the march towards complete Canadian independence. As a result, continentalists strove to argue that independence and reciprocity were in fact the best antidotes to annexation. In the first book-length study devoted to the history of Canadian-American relations, Hugh Keenleyside, who taught at the University of British Columbia’s Department of History before entering Canada’s Department of External Affairs in 1928, insisted that prolonged national infancy was a far greater threat to the Dominion than the sundering of the imperial bond. By 1929, the time had clearly come for Canada to stand on its own two feet:

It has long been argued by imperialistic Canadians that independence from Great Britain would be but the first of two steps to annexation to the United States. This, in the opinion of the author, is a misreading of history. There was a time, undoubtedly, when Canada was so weak and divided internally that annexation *would* probably have followed the severance of the imperial bonds. But that condition no longer exists, and cannot (as far as it is humanly possible to forecast the future) exist again.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> R. G. Trotter, “Relations of Canada and the United States: Reciprocity of Attitudes,” *Canadian Historical Review* XXIV (1943): 134.

<sup>31</sup> George Grant, *The Empire, Yes or No?* (Toronto, 1945), 21-22.

<sup>32</sup> Hugh Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* (New York, 1929), 383, n. 57.

Similar arguments were made in favour of free trade. A strong supporter of the proposed 1911 reciprocal trade agreement with the United States, O. D. Skelton refused to believe that “when a Canadian farmer sells a bag of potatoes to a New Yorker he throws in his country to boot.” Indeed, he asked in the lead up to the 1911 federal election, “if trade intercourse involves political union, how is it that the twenty years in which our imports from the United States have doubled each decade are precisely the twenty years when national and imperial sentiment has been mounting highest?”<sup>33</sup> Reciprocity, as continentalists saw it, was Canada’s best protection against annexation. In fact, Fred Landon, a professor of history at the University of Western Ontario, argued in a 1944 article published in the *Quarterly Review of Commerce* that it was economic marasmus that bred annexationism:

Canadians should long since have disapproved the idea that because they do things in an American way or enter into closer economic relations with their neighbour they are thereby moving in the direction of absorption. It is not only natural but perfectly logical that a North American pattern should be found in Canadian activities and nothing could be more foolish than to attempt a graft of an unsuited pattern drawn from elsewhere. The history of Canada reveals clearly that the only effective influence leading in the direction of absorption has been economic distress. Prosperity has always been an antidote to annexationist notions. But why talk of annexation. It has been a dead issue for fifty years.<sup>34</sup>

Besides, insisted many interwar continentalists, the United States did not even want to annex Canada. Americans, it was claimed, now respected Canadian independence. The terrible sacrifice made by Canadians during the Great War and the Dominion’s entrance onto the world stage had apparently convinced the American people that Canada was a real nation whose sovereignty and national aspirations deserved respect. In a 1941 article dealing with Canada’s place in the inter-American community, P. E. Corbett argued that annexation was a complete dead letter:

We have probably heard the last of another confusion of thought which until recently made a good many Canadians tend to think of any closer association in a general American community as presaging absorption by the United States. The word that comes from south

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<sup>33</sup> O. D. Skelton, “Current Events: The Annexation Bogey,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XVIII (1911): 332.

<sup>34</sup> Fred Landon, “Our Neighbours and Ourselves,” *Quarterly Review of Commerce* XI (1944): 56-57.

of the border these days is not one of manifest destiny stretching out towards the North Pole. Instead there comes an unmistakable hint that certain powerful interests, notably the wheat-growers of the Middle West, would strenuously oppose adding a parcel of Canadian states to the Union. The wholesome impression is growing that, far from having to fear absorption, Canada would experience some difficulty in persuading her neighbor to take her in. The bogey of annexation that stalked so fiercely thirty years ago is dead. Its burial has enabled Canadians to approach more dispassionately the problems of practical adjustment to their American environment.<sup>35</sup>

Annexation was generally viewed as a remote possibility in early twentieth-century Quebec. Nevertheless, a number of *nationalistes* suggested that continental union might be brought about by the Dominion's geographic, ethnic, and economic incongruities. To discuss annexation, therefore, was to grapple with Canada's internal weaknesses. For instance, in the introduction to a 1941 issue of *L'Action nationale* devoted to annexation, André Laurendeau questioned whether the Dominion possessed the internal strength to survive wartime continental integration or a hypothetical British military defeat: "Le Canada, qui n'a pour lui qu'un passé d'à peine quatre-vingts ans, des parties juxtaposées et non liées, une agglomération mécanique de toutes les races de la terre disséminées sur un territoire plus vaste que la Chine; le Canada, qui ne possède aucune culture propre, pas d'unité géographique, pas d'unité nationale authentique, sortirait-il indemne d'un cataclysme militaire, économique ou simplement financier?"<sup>36</sup> Laurendeau was somewhat sceptical. The war, he and others believed, might set the stage for annexation.

French Canadian conservatives were more inclined to discuss the effects of annexation than their English Canadian colleagues. For the imperialist, the rupture of the imperial bond and the destruction of Canada's political system would immediately wipe out two key pillars of Canadian distinctiveness. The Canadian nation, therefore, would cease to exist. Quebec's *nationalistes*, for their part, did not believe that the French Canadian nation

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<sup>35</sup> P. E. Corbett, "Canada in the Western Hemisphere," *Foreign Affairs* XIX (1941): 786. Likewise, John W. Dafoe insisted in 1935 that annexation was a non-issue: "The question of our status is now settled. We are a nation. Our characteristics are our own. There is no overlord. We are in fact a kingdom. We have our own king. I do not think that to-day those instincts of fear or dislike could be aroused by an apprehension that in our future there is any possibility of union with the United States. We are to-day two nations dividing the North American continent. The political division is there, and I think it will always endure." [Dafoe, "Final Luncheon," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1936), 283.]

<sup>36</sup> [André Laurendeau], "There'll always be an England, mais y aura-t-il un Canada?" *L'Action nationale* XVII (1941):439.

could simply disappear overnight. Their sense of national distinctiveness was quite different, and they did not assume that religion, ethnicity, language, and culture would be immediately affected by continental union. Still, it was generally believed that annexation would eventually result in the assimilation of the French Canadian nation. Continental union, indeed, would slowly poison French Canada's traditional social order. For Father Jacques Cousineau (1905-1982), a Jesuit who spent a number of years working with Quebec's Catholic labour unions, annexation would spell disaster for French Canada's religious faith:

L'annexion (pour autant qu'elle déterminerait de brusques changements) tendrait à troubler pour longtemps le métabolisme religieux de l'individu canadien-français. Une partie de la bourgeoisie, retenue dans l'Église par les cadres sociaux plutôt que par adhésion personnelle, se détacherait plus ou moins lentement. Des esprits courts et impatients se réjouiront de voir ainsi secouer une vieille chrétienté, mais Jésus n'éteignait pas la mèche qui fume encore. L'accent rural et la solide continuité de notre vie chrétienne se verront encore atténués par l'attirance accrue vers les villes et par la prépondérance alarmante que prendront les coutumes urbaines de piété.<sup>37</sup>

But annexation would not only devastate Quebec's spiritual order, it would also deepen the economic marginalization of Canada's French-speaking population. In 1941, François-Albert Angers (1909-2003), an economist at Montreal's École des Hautes Études commerciales, warned the readers of *L'Action nationale* that continental union would be an economic disaster for Quebec. With the disappearance of protective tariffs, the province would lose a significant portion of its industrial base and be relegated to the level of a resource hinterland:

Québec deviendrait donc, dans la grande République, un États d'agriculteurs, de bûcherons, de mineurs et de centrales électriques, avec sans doute un minimum d'industrialisation fixée sur place dans les cas où le facteur matières premières l'emporte sur tous les autres pour la localisation. Dans ces conditions, Québec pourrait rester français, mais sans espoir de retenir son accroissement de population: les pays d'agriculture ou d'industrie extractive sont forcément des pays peu densément peuplés.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Jacques Cousineau, "Ne nous induisez pas en tentation..." *L'Action nationale* XVII (1941): 516-517.

<sup>38</sup> F.-A. Angers, "Québec, 57<sup>e</sup> étoile sur le drapeau de l'Oncle Sam," *L'Action nationale* XVII (1941): 495.

Like most of the *nationalistes* of his generation, Angers was a moderate ruralist. He feared that large-scale, rapid, and centralized industrialization would destroy Quebec's economic and social order, but he also believed that an over-reliance on agricultural production and simple resource extraction was a recipe for economic marasmus, underdevelopment, and massive out-migration. Instead, Angers argued for a cautious and decentralized programme of industrial development. Medium-size, regionally-based industry tied to agriculture or resource extraction was the best way to ensure the overall stability and prosperity of French Canadian society.

In *nationaliste* prose, Quebec was frequently portrayed as a bulwark against annexation. Despite Canada's internal weaknesses, the nation's separateness had been maintained by French Canada's repeated refusal to accept continental union. By contrast, argued Lionel Groulx, English Canadians had shown a great degree of inconsistency when it came to annexation. In a 1941 article on the history of annexationism, he presented French Canada's refusal to join the American Revolution as a "bel exemple où l'on voit l'humain échapper au déterminisme géographique. C'est un petit peuple de 100,000 âmes qui fait rater le continentalisme. Et il opère ce coup – l'événement vaut d'être noté – malgré ses concitoyens britanniques devenus, à peu d'exceptions près, les fourriers de la révolution coloniale." Furthermore, the abbé cleverly noted that the 1849 Annexation Manifesto had, for the most part, been the work of so-called loyalists: "Au premier rang des signataires du document, figurent un bon nombre des dirigeants anglais du monde financier et politique de Montréal. Tous les groupes, conservateurs, réformistes, rouges, s'y trouvent représentés, avec cette particularité savoureuse toutefois, que l'élément tory tient la prépondérance."<sup>39</sup> English Canadian loyalism and imperialism were indeed hollow. When push came to shove, remarked François-Albert Angers, paraphrasing André Siegfried, many English Canadians would likely prefer annexation to minority status within the Dominion.<sup>40</sup>

Talk of annexation, to be sure, was usually tied to a wider discussion of Quebec's place within Confederation. In 1912, for instance, Bourassa argued that French Canadian rights had become so eroded in the Dominion, that annexation would make little difference to *la survivance*. French Canadians, he wrote in a pamphlet aimed at an English-speaking audience,

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<sup>39</sup> Lionel Groulx, "L'annexionnisme au Canada français," *L'Action nationale* XVII (1941): 444, 447.

<sup>40</sup> F.-A. Angers, "L'américanisation du Saint-Laurent," *L'Actualité économique* XV (1940): 364.

Have been brought, through a long succession of checks and humiliations, whose end is not yet in sight, to realise that outside their Quebec “reserve,” they possess no more and no fewer privileges than they would enjoy in the United States; and that they are treated, by their English-speaking Canadian brothers, with infinitely less regard than are their compatriots in the United States by the descendants of the *Bostonnais* – the traditional enemy against whom they defended, for a century, the integrity of the Canadian territory, and later on the honour of the British flag.

Indeed, Bourassa insisted that French Canadian linguistic and religious rights would be better protected in the United States. Furthermore, “the Province of Quebec and its legislature would enjoy a much larger measure of autonomy in the American Union than under the constitution of Canada.” Bourassa, of course, was no annexationist. He was merely making a point. *Le Devoir*'s fiery editor was tired of “the bug-bear of Annexation” being used to frighten “the babes of Canada ... into the grip of extreme imperialism.”<sup>41</sup> Imperialism, not annexation, was the real threat to French Canadian society. Imperialist rhetoric and actions, indeed, were eroding French Canadian rights from coast to coast, and they were impeding the Dominion's march towards independence. What is more, they were wearing down Quebec's faith in the Canadian nation. This, in turn, would likely weaken the province's historical opposition to annexation. The best antidote to continental union, therefore, lay in granting rights to the French Canadian minority and in Canadian independence.

For the English Canadian, continental union meant the immediate extinction of the Canadian nation. In stark contrast, many *nationalistes* would have agreed with Lionel Groulx when he argued in 1928 that “les annexions peuvent changer l'allégeance politique et quelques formes administratives; elles ne peuvent atteindre directement l'être de la nation.”<sup>42</sup> Influential nationalist Edmond de Nevers even contended that the French Canadian nation would flourish in the American Republic. In French Canada, it was assumed that assimilation implied far more than the loss of political sovereignty; it supposed the extinction of Roman Catholicism and the French language and culture in Quebec – *l'annexion morale*.

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<sup>41</sup> Henri Bourassa, *The Spectre of Annexation and the Real Danger of National Disintegration* (Montreal, 1912), 3, 16, 18.

<sup>42</sup> Lionel Groulx, *Nos responsabilités intellectuelles* (Montreal, 1928), 13.

*The Americanization of Canada*

Americanization – the process of adopting American values and practices – was seen as a form of annexationism in Quebec.<sup>43</sup> Invariably described as pernicious, Americanization was assimilation writ large, but with a modern twist. For nationalist intellectuals like André Laurendeau, Americanization entailed the gradual suffocation of traditional society. Religious indifference would become generalized, the family would slowly disintegrate, and the French language and culture would progressively disappear; French Canada would cease to exist.

Unlike annexation, Americanization was a major concern in Quebec. This was particularly true during the interwar years, when *nationaliste* intellectuals were alarmed by the rapid spread of American popular culture. During the period under study, the intellectual struggle against *l'annexion morale* reached its zenith in 1936, when the *Revue dominicaine* published a series of articles denouncing “Notre américanisation.” Americanization, it was argued, was a sly form of assimilation precisely because it relied on seemingly benign (i.e. cultural) means of propagation. Indeed, as Victor Barbeau, who had served in the RAF during World War One, noted in 1922, while Britain’s attempts to assimilate French Canada through violence and legislation had failed, American efforts to weaken French Canadian *survivance* with movies, jazz, chewing gum, comics, soft drinks, chorus girls, and baseball were succeeding:

Ce sont eux, en tout cas, que les Américains y emploient. Le pays en est infesté d’une rive à l’autre. Vassal économique des États-Unis, le Canada est en passe de devenir également son vassal spirituel. Canadiens-anglais et Canadiens-français ne pensent, ne vivent, ne jugent que par leurs voisins. Dans tous les étages de la société leur influence pénètre et se développe. On ne va au cinéma que pour voir glorifier leurs prouesses, admirer leur ingéniosité, applaudir leur drapeau. On ne lit leurs journaux, leurs revues que pour apprendre les derniers de leurs exploits, les plus beaux de leurs accomplissements politiques ou sportifs. Ils nous écrasent de leur vie nationale. Nous ne semblons exister que pour nous féliciter de les avoir comme voisins et nous appliquer à leur ressembler le plus possible.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> French Canadian opposition to Americanization is examined in Richard A. Jones, “Le spectre de l’américanisation,” in *Les rapports culturels entre le Québec et les États-Unis*, ed. C. Savary (Quebec, 1984), 145-169.

<sup>44</sup> [Victor Barbeau], “La politique: La méthode américaine,” *Les Cahiers de Turc V* (1922): 31, 34.

But Americanization did not only rely on cultural means to propagate itself. Tourism, international labour unions, and American investment were often cited as vectors of Canadian-American convergence. Even the automobile, insisted the founding president of the Ligue d'action nationale, Esdras Minville, in 1926, was an agent of Americanization:

L'automobile reste un puissant agent de pénétration. Notre époque niveleuse n'aura peut-être pas trouvé d'instrument plus effectif d'uniformisation. L'automobile propage à la campagne les coûteuses habitudes des villes et contribue ainsi pour sa large part au déracinement des classes rurales. Elle transforme la physionomie des champs en la marquant au cachet urbain. Elle efface les frontières; elle est sans doute avec le cinéma; le plus grand canal par lequel les coutumes américaines pénètrent chez nous. Il faudrait voir en ce cas si les incontestables avantages économiques qu'elle nous a assurés ne sont pas en grande partie annulés par des ennuis d'ordre moral et social, à l'origine desquels nous la retrouvons.<sup>45</sup>

Women were occasionally cited as possible vectors of Americanization. "La femme est l'un des grands facteurs responsables de l'américanisme au Canada," wrote Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé in 1936. "L'américanisme," she continued, "a désaxé la femme. En lui proposant toutes les libertés, en la sortant du foyer dont elle est la reine et maîtresse naturelle, en obnubilant sa conscience et troublant sa foi, il brisa du même coup la famille, aggrava le problème économique et disqualifia la société." For Pineault-Léveillé, Americanization was a complete disaster:

Qu'est-ce au juste que s'américaniser? Selon moi, c'est adopter, de forcer aveugle ou consciente, le niveau de vie, les façons de vivre, de penser, de jouir, de se vêtir, de manger, des Américains. C'est accepter sans même les discuter, des théories et une morale, incompatibles à nos cerveaux latins et nos âmes catholiques. C'est importer chez nous les mœurs d'une civilisation vieillie avant l'âge et trahir nos origines françaises. C'est renier un passé plein de gloire et de mérites en s'attachant à la perte de la famille et de la race canadienne-française, héritière de l'une des plus grandes civilisations de la terre. C'est s'unir aux prédicants de la puissance matérielle, pour chasser de notre pays la religion, l'idéal, la spiritualité, l'individualité et y intégrer l'indifférentisme religieuse, le dieu dollar,

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<sup>45</sup> Esdras Minville, "L'industrie américaine de l'automobile," *L'Actualité économique* I (1926): 12.



le matérialisme, la standardisation à tous les degrés. S'américaniser, c'est donc pour les Canadiens français, donner des signes de débilité générale.<sup>46</sup>

However, despite all the doom and gloom surrounding "notre américanisation," most writers insisted that Quebec had yet to succumb to *l'annexion morale*. "Il faut noter que cette infiltration s'exerce surtout dans les grandes villes, mais pénètre infiniment moins et par remous seulement dans les campagnes, de sorte qu'elle n'atteint réellement qu'une moitié de la population," Gustave Lanctot wrote in the only French-language volume in the Carnegie series, *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (1941). As a result, "on peut conclure que l'américanisme n'a pas réussi à modifier d'aucune façon anormale la mentalité du Québécois."<sup>47</sup>

But Quebec could not simply rely on her rurality to counter Americanization. Cultural survival required a plan. Censorship and cultural protectionism were occasionally suggested as means to offset *l'annexion morale*, but most intellectuals saw these measures as wholly inadequate. To survive, Quebec would have to create viable alternatives to American mass culture. As Jean Bruchési noted regarding American magazines, "si nous voulons combattre, autant que la chose est possible, la littérature de rebut qui nous vient des États-Unis, ayons, pour la masse, au moins un magazine bien fait, vivant, présenté avec goût, ou la variété des sujets soit égale à l'excellence de la forme littéraire, où la première place soit donnée aux choses et gens de chez nous."<sup>48</sup>

Cultural resistance, however, would require a strong sense of national pride among French Canadians. And achieving this nationalist renaissance – far too many French Canadians, it seemed, suffered from national apathy – would in turn necessitate both education and agitation. Father M.-A. Lamarche, for instance, concluded the *Revue dominicaine's* 1936 inquiry into "Notre américanisation" by calling for an anti-American campaign to be launched in concert with the Jeune Canada's crusade for "éducation nationale":

Dans l'article-programme paru en janvier dernier, j'insistais sur le caractère social des mesures réactives à suggérer. Ce n'était pas une trouvaille, je l'admets. Au moment de

<sup>46</sup> Ernestine Pineault-Léveillé, "Notre américanisation par la femme," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 128-129, 132.

<sup>47</sup> Gustave Lanctot, "Le Québec et les États-Unis, 1867-1937," in his *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (Montreal, 1941), 306-307.

<sup>48</sup> Jean Bruchési, "Notre américanisation par le magazine," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 20.

conclure, je ne vise pas davantage à l'originalité des conceptions. Ainsi, la campagne d'éducation anti-américanisante, à la fois scolaire et populaire, qui selon moi s'impose d'urgence, peut et doit s'identifier avec la campagne d'éducation nationale que des confrères s'efforcent de propager depuis deux ans. Il est contradictoire et vain de prétendre éveiller chez les jeunes comme chez les anciens le sentiment national (je parle d'un sentiment raisonné, éprouvé au contact de la doctrine catholique), sans les prévenir et prémunir du même coup contre ce qu'on nomme l'annexion morale américaine.<sup>49</sup>

This nationalist reaction would also help preserve English Canada from complete cultural annihilation. Quebec, indeed, was repeatedly presented as a bulwark against both the Dominion's annexation and her Americanization. "Parce qu'il reste fidèle à sa tradition," Gustave Lanctot told the Royal Society of Canada in 1937, "le Québec remplit devant l'américanisme, comme en 1775, en 1849 et en 1887, le rôle de barrière, barrière qui force le pays à s'arrêter et à réfléchir avant de sauter dans l'inconnu de l'assimilation américaine. Il accomplit ainsi une œuvre nationale, tout en poursuivant son but particulier qui est le maintien intégral de la langue, de la religion et des institutions reçues des ancêtres."<sup>50</sup> Born in Saint-Constant, Quebec, Lanctot was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship in 1909 and was appointed to the staff of the Public Archives of Canada in 1912. Soon after the outbreak of World War One, he enrolled as an officer in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and served overseas as the assistant director of war trophies. Demobilized in 1918, he was awarded a doctorate from the Université de Paris in 1919 for his dissertation on "L'administration de la Nouvelle-France." Upon his return to Canada, he became the director of the Public Archive's French Section. An admirer of British institutions, Lanctot was one of the leading figures of twentieth century French Canadian loyalism. He was thus eager to show that Quebec had remained loyal to Britain and the Dominion throughout its history and that this loyalty had ensured Canada's survival as a separate – and British – political entity.

In French Canadian prose, Quebec was regularly portrayed as the backbone of Canadian distinctiveness. Accordingly, a number of *nationaliste* intellectuals cleverly used the province's historical opposition to annexation and Americanization as an argument in favour of French Canadian rights. For instance, in his 1941 *Reflets d'Amérique*, Édouard

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<sup>49</sup> M.-A. Lamarche, "Notre américanisation: Aperçus complémentaires et mot de la fin," *Revue dominicaine* XLII (1936): 258.

<sup>50</sup> Gustave Lanctot, "Influences américaines dans le Québec," *Mémoires et comptes rendus de la Société royale du Canada* 3<sup>rd</sup> Series, XXXI (1937): 125.

Montpetit's condemnation of Americanization quickly turned into an appeal for biculturalism:

La politique à courte vue que l'on pratique encore dans certaines provinces, en réduisant à la portion congrue les libertés scolaires des Canadiens français, comprime leur influence et met en danger leurs disciplines ethniques. Mais, du même coup, elle affaiblit les résistances à l'américanisme; et tout ce qui n'est pas français accentue celui-ci, et même tout ce qui n'est pas anglais. Si l'on ne se résout pas à une attitude nationale qui soit le reflet d'une culture anglo-française, le rayonnement de la civilisation américaine, toute proche et munie de moyens puissants de pénétration, se propagera.<sup>51</sup>

That said, when it came to the issue of Americanization, English Canadians were generally portrayed as lost causes. Their society, argued Father Rodrigue Villeneuve in 1922, was essentially Americanized:

En pays canadien, des provinces entières sont déjà toutes américanisées, non seulement par la langue commune, mais par les idées, les sentiments et les goûts; par les intérêts, les affaires, les amusements; par les sectes, l'école, le théâtre, les magazines et les journaux quotidiens; par une égale licence dans la vie morale, indifférentisme religieux, divorce, malthusianisme, féminisme, démocratie libertaire, égalitarisme social; par un semblable matérialisme dans les idéaux, par un paganisme aussi éhonté dans la jouissance; bref, par une mentalité de même acabit, et une civilisation aussi bornée dans ses horizons.<sup>52</sup>

Imperialists would have balked at Villeneuve's suggestion that English-speaking Canadians were thoroughly Americanized. Still, the Dominion's progressive Americanization was a source of concern to Tory intellectuals. They warned that cultural Americanization would eventually lead to Canada's political and spiritual domination. As Canadians adopted American values and practices, they would gradually lose faith in the Dominion and the Empire. The imperial bond would eventually be broken and Canada would inexorably drift towards continental union. Americanization would dissolve the essence of Canadian distinctiveness: British tradition.

As in Quebec, the bulk of English Canadian commentary regarding Americanization was published during the interwar years. However, while *nationaliste* sentiment intensified

<sup>51</sup> Édouard Montpetit, *Reflets d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1941), 78.

<sup>52</sup> Rodrigue Villeneuve, "Notre avenir politique: Et nos frères de la dispersion?" *L'Action française* VIII (1922): 11.

in interwar Quebec, these years coincided with the decline of imperialism in English Canada. As a result, the imperialist response to Americanization was relatively muted. Some prominent Tories did not even take the issue seriously. For instance, in the 1930s, Stephen Leacock routinely poked fun at British anxieties regarding Canada's progressive Americanization:

Every now and then – and again quite recently – English newspapers break out into a discussion of what is called the “Americanization of Canada.” The basis of the discussion is always a sort of underlying fear that Canada is getting a little too close to the United States. It is the same sort of apprehension as is felt on a respectable farm when the daughter of the family is going out too much with the hired man. The idea is that you can't tell what may happen.

The Dominion, Leacock insisted, was strong enough to resist Americanizing influences. “That this relationship is likely to end in, or even move towards, a political union, is just a forgotten dream,” he wrote in a 1936 article published in the *American Mercury*.<sup>53</sup>

Most imperialists were not so flippant when it came to Americanization. In an oft-quoted 1920 article for the *Canadian Historical Review*, Archibald MacMechan (1862-1933), a professor of English at Dalhousie University, warned that Canada was slowly becoming a “vassal state.” Though outright annexation was no longer a likely scenario, MacMechan insisted that “the danger is far more subtle and far more deeply to be dreaded. It lies in gradual assimilation, in peaceful penetration, in spiritual bondage – the subjection of the Canadian nation's mind and soul to the mind and soul of the United States.” Of all the vectors of Americanization, which included sports, schoolbooks, and movies, MacMechan argued that the press was the most pernicious:

Take the most potent influence at work to-day upon the popular mind, our journalism. Hundreds of thousands of Canadians read nothing but the daily newspaper. Not only is the Canadian newspaper built along American lines, but it is crammed with American “boiler plate” of all kinds, American illustrations, American comic supplements. American magazines, some of them distinctly anti-British in tone and tendency, flood our shops and book-stalls. Every new Canadian magazine is on an American model, some of them

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<sup>53</sup> Stephen Leacock, “Canada Won't Go Yankee,” *American Mercury* XXXVIII (1936): 37.

borrowing an American title and changing only the national adjective. *The Week*, founded on the English model, is dead; and so is the *University Magazine*.<sup>54</sup>

The popularity of various American magazines was of particular concern to imperialist intellectuals. Not only did they contribute to the propagation of American values in the Dominion, but they also competed with Canadian magazines for subscribers and advertisers. Cultural nationalism, indeed, was usually tied to the bottom line. In the first issue of the *Canadian Bookman*, which was founded in 1919 to promote Canadian literature and publishing, John Castell Hopkins warned that the combined action of American magazines and press services would eventually erode Canada's loyalty to Britain:

I do not know of any greater influence in the formation of national lines of thought than the flooding of this country with alien literature, ideas, principles and polity. The combination of a mass of American journals – cheap, popular, and in many cases lacking in morals or high development of thought – with a press which receives practically the whole of its news about Britain as the head of the Empire, about other countries of the Empire, and about foreign nations which are the friends and Allies of Great Britain, through American writing in London for the consumption of Americans in the United States, cannot but train the youth of our country along American lines and in a totally foreign view-point of Great Britain ... Such poisoning of the wells of political thought cannot fail, in due time, to make our people non-British, if not actually anti-British.<sup>55</sup>

American radio and movies were often singled out as vectors of Americanization. Again, imperialists warned that their popularity threatened the Dominion's long-term viability. Robert Falconer, for instance, argued in 1925 that American popular culture would confuse immigrants and prevent their assimilation into Canadian society:

But it is the theatre, the moving-picture show and the radio which are exercising the most penetrating and subtle influence upon the social standards of Canadians. The plays and the films emanate from American sources, the plays that are presented on the Canadian stage having been chosen to suit American audiences, and the films, as well as the cuts in the illustrated papers, having been designed to please the average American constituency. Every night thousands of young Canadians listen to addresses and talks directed to the

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<sup>54</sup> Archibald MacMechan, "Canada as a Vassal State," *Canadian Historical Review* I (1920): 347, 349-350.

<sup>55</sup> J. C. Hopkins, "The Deluge of American Magazines in Canada," *Canadian Bookman* I (1919): 12-13.

people who live in the central cities of the United States. As immigrants from Europe of precisely the same character and outlook as have made their way into the United States pour into Canada, they will, through the constant repetition of similar ideas in picture, play, illustrated paper and radio, soon be moulded into a type that will no longer be Canadian, but a product of European ideas toned to the manner of life that prevails among the people of their own origin in the American cities.<sup>56</sup>

Generally speaking, imperialists contended that Americanization could be curbed with state intervention. Tariffs, censorship, subsidies, and the creation of national cultural institutions such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation were all applauded in imperialist circles. The key to turning the tide of Americanization, however, was to strengthen the Dominion's ties with Britain. To this effect, British immigration and the expansion of Anglo-Canadian trade were often cited as effective barriers to Americanization.

American popular culture was often maligned in interwar continentalist circles. "We draw our cultural importations from the bottom, not the top," lamented Douglas Bush in 1929, "we take our color from the *Saturday Evening Post* rather than the *Yale Review*." Nevertheless, he continued, "it is not quite fair to rail at the vulgarity of such American products as cheap magazines, movies, and chewing-gum when we import such things in enormous quantities; our taste would seem to be the same."<sup>57</sup> Besides, wrote Arthur Phelps in 1919, "nobody ever became an American from reading the *Red Book*, or the *Literary Digest*. Even the *Saturday Evening Post*, though it does know how to create readers, doesn't make Americans."<sup>58</sup>

Americanization did not really alarm English Canadian continentalists. Most liberal and socialist intellectuals saw Canadian-American cultural convergence as proof that both nations shared a wider North American ethos. It was not, as conservatives claimed, a prelude to moral or political assimilation. On the contrary, noted H. Carl Goldenberg in 1936, cultural convergence was a perfectly normal and innocuous phenomenon:

The alleged "Americanization" of Canada is a frequent subject of discussion in the press and on the public platform, and it is usually regarded as a regrettable and undesirable trend. It

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<sup>56</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 201.

<sup>57</sup> Douglas Bush, "Pride and Prejudice," *Canadian Mercury* I (1929): 136.

<sup>58</sup> Arthur Phelps, "The Deluge of American Magazines in Canada," *Canadian Bookman* I (1919): 10-11. Italics added.

is too often forgotten, however, that Canada does not have to be “Americanized,” because Canada *is* a North American nation. We can neither deny nor avoid the facts of geography. The three thousand miles of boundary which separate Canada from the United States are a purely imaginary line. The people on each side of this line, in the main, speak the same language, have the same habits and ways of thought, and dress in similar fashions. They see the same moving picture films, they listen to the same radio programmes, and they read the same periodicals. Every day thousands cross the boundary line each way, as though it did not exist. And proximity makes all this natural and inevitable. Great Britain, after all, is separated from Canada by the width of the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>59</sup>

A graduate of McGill University, Goldenberg was called to the Quebec Bar in 1932. He practiced law in Montreal and frequently acted as an advisor on industrial relations and constitutional matters to various governments in Canada and abroad. From 1968 to 1971, he served as a special counsel on constitutional affairs to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Like many Jewish-Canadian intellectuals, Goldenberg was repelled by the Anglo-conformity and anti-Americanism associated with Canadian imperialism.

Lionel Gelber (1907-1989), a University of Toronto professor of international relations whose family had left Eastern Europe for Canada in the late nineteenth century, was equally sceptical of imperialist rhetoric. In 1939, the former Rhodes scholar argued that ‘Americanization’ was simply a code word for ‘modernization,’ a phenomenon which had taken on an American taint because it had reached its paroxysm in the United States:

Despite the press and the periodicals, the radio and the movies, Americanization is not primarily an article for export. It was and is the cultural and material response of twentieth-century industrialism, urban and rural, when applied to New World conditions; and it is significant that even the most distant of the English-speaking peoples such as the Australians show decided similarities in manner and methods to those which prevail in the United States. As for Canada, if the American technique of contemporary existence were not the most natural one for it, geographical propinquity would never have had so intimate an effect. For it is the paradox of Americanization that it has not really been Americanization in any deliberate propagandist sense. Rather, it is the spread of a social system the name of which happens to be derived from its largest and most famous

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<sup>59</sup> H. C. Goldenberg, “‘Americanization’ of Canada,” *Fortnightly Review* CXLV (1936): 688.

exemplar – one that springs from a common environment and that answers a common need.<sup>60</sup>

Besides, as John Bartlet Brebner noted in 1931, Canadians had played a key role in crafting North America's wider culture. Cultural exchange, he reminded the Canadian Historical Association, was a two-way street:

It is unnecessary to make much comment on how similar ways of living are, wherever one turns in North America. The facts are very obvious, and because of the industrial predominance of the United States and the subjection of Canada to American advertising, they are in Canada usually lumped under the omnibus term of Americanization. But here again it is worth recalling that Canada and Canadians have played probably somewhat more than their proportionate part in designing the continental pattern of life. Scientists and inventors from Quebec to California sell their ideas, whether they be of ginger ale or preventive medicine, in New York or Pittsburgh or Chicago. The same thing can be said of many painters and writers and professional men.<sup>61</sup>

As far as P. E. Corbett was concerned, cultural convergence was not a threat to Canadian sovereignty. "There is little support in history for the doctrine that similarity in language and modes of life must result in political fusion," he wrote in a 1930 article published in the *Dalhousie Review*. What's more, Corbett insisted that "America is advancing towards sane methods of education and finer standards of culture." "Can anyone who moves about the universities, attends the professional conferences and reads the new literature of the country, honestly deny this? Henceforward, Americanization may be anything but deleterious."<sup>62</sup> Measured Americanization, indeed, was inherently progressive.

The measures proposed by conservative Canadians to counter Americanization, however, were not. Indeed, protectionism and imperialism were anathema to continentalist intellectuals. "We cannot escape the fact that for good or for bad we are located in North America," Frank Underhill wrote in 1929. "English culture is a plant which is too delicate to survive for long the process of being transplanted across the Atlantic. Those colonially-

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<sup>60</sup> Lionel Gelber, "Review of H. F. Angus' *Canada and her Great Neighbor*," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* V (1939): 125-126.

<sup>61</sup> J. B. Brebner, "Canadian and North American History," *Canadian Historical Association Annual Report* (1931): 41.

<sup>62</sup> P. E. Corbett, "Anti-Americanism," *Dalhousie Review* X (1930): 297.



minded persons who think to save us from the flood of Americanism by appealing to English traditions may as well start a campaign to bring back the horse and buggy.”<sup>63</sup>

To the continentalist, British values and methods seemed antiquated and foreign. As a result, few pre-1945 continentalists were worried by Americanization, which many dismissed as a sophism, or by continental union, which – annexationists aside – they believed was a conservative bugbear. For their part, imperialists and *nationalistes* believed that Americanization was toxic to Canadian tradition, and they repeatedly warned Canadians that cultural convergence was a serious threat to the Dominion. To this end, imperialists were usually quick to evoke the spectre of annexation and, with it, to vilify their continentalist opponents. In Quebec, the spectre of assimilation, of moral annexation, served a similar purpose. Both groups, to be sure, sought to maintain the antimodern integrity of their nation. And, as we shall see in the next two chapters, their antimodern/anti-American struggle would find its most practical expression in the discussion of Canadian-American relations.

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<sup>63</sup> F. H. Underhill, “O Canada,” *Canadian Forum* X (1929): 11-12.

## *Chapter Eleven*

### Canadian-American Relations and American Foreign Policy

In English Canada, intellectual attitudes regarding American society found their main outlet in the discussion of Canadian-American relations and American foreign policy. For imperialists, discussion of the Canadian-American relationship was an opportunity to emphasize Britain's role as the bulwark of Canadian nationhood and distinctiveness.<sup>1</sup> They tended to view Canadian-American relations in terms of tensions and enmity and saw continental integration as a dangerous proposal. That said, imperialist opposition to continental integration would lessen after the Great War.

Continentalists, for their part, regarded Canada's relationship with the United States as primarily characterized by peace and friendship. They saw any possibility of a Canadian-American rapprochement as an opportunity to distance Canada from Britain and the Empire. As a result, they viewed continental integration as inherently progressive. As Canada drew closer to the United States, it would turn its back on the stifling conservatism that continentalists saw as inherent to British tradition and imperialism.

French Canadian intellectuals, though less preoccupied by Canadian-American diplomacy, were nevertheless interested in issues related to Canadian independence. As such, they embraced a view of Canadian-American relations that was in some ways similar to that of English Canada's continentalists. Indeed, *nationaliste* intellectuals believed that a Canadian-American rapprochement, though risky, would undoubtedly loosen the imperial bond. French Canadian continentalists were also glad to see Canada drift away from Britain. Moreover, like their English Canadian counterparts, they were inclined to view continental integration as a progressive force.

Nevertheless, when it came to American foreign policy, continentalists were hardly as enthusiastic. From the late 1890s to the outbreak of the Great War, America's nascent imperialism was viewed with alarm. Many continentalists saw imperialist expansion in the Caribbean and in the South Pacific as a threat to America's republican values. Later on, when isolationism was seen as the dominant impulse in American foreign policy, most

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<sup>1</sup> Indeed, as historian Donald A. Wright has pointed out, Anglophilia and antimodernism shared a deep intimacy in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Canada. [Wright, "W. D. Lighthall and David Ross McCord: Antimodernism and English-Canadian Imperialism, 1880s-1918," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 32 (1997): 135.]

continentalists chose to criticise the United States for its reluctance to embrace its international responsibilities.

Canada's Tories were also critical of American isolation, but they did not necessarily share the continentalist unease regarding the Republic's turn-of-the-century expansion. Indeed, as long as American expansionism targeted the Spanish Empire, intellectuals like Andrew Macphail and Stephen Leacock were inclined to view it in a positive light. American imperialism, to be sure, was bound to uplift the people of Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

In Quebec's intellectual circles, American imperialism was viewed with alarm. French Canadians have traditionally regarded themselves as the victims of imperialism, and America's entry into the race for colonies was seen by both liberals and conservatives as a repudiation of the Republic's laudable anti-imperialist tradition. Interwar American isolation, on the other hand, did not elicit a great deal of criticism. In theory, nearly all of Quebec's intellectuals favoured multilateralism and the League of Nations. However, in practice, most were quite comfortable with North American isolation. During the 1920s and 1930s, the desire to avoid European entanglements was very strong in Quebec.

#### *Canada in the North Atlantic Triangle*

During most of the period under study, the Canadian-American relationship was not fundamentally bilateral. Indeed, British diplomats were involved in most aspects of Canadian foreign affairs until the 1920s, and even after the 1931 Statute of Westminster, the Dominion's ties to Great Britain continued to affect the course of Canadian-American relations. Canadian commentary regarding the Dominion's relationship with its southern neighbour reflected this. To discuss Canadian-American relations, therefore, was also to discuss the Dominion's connection to Britain.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain and the United States were generally understood to be antithetical entities; to draw closer to one was to drift away from the other. And this opposition was not merely intellectual and spiritual, it was also economic and geopolitical. For instance, many Canadians believed that an increase in the volume of Canadian-American trade would engender a corresponding decrease in the volume of Anglo-Canadian trade. This, in turn, would invariably lead to the loosening of the imperial bond, a possibility that was viewed with alarm in some circles, and with great satisfaction in others.

Pre-World War One imperialists were undoubtedly the nation's most cautious observers when it came to the Canadian-American relationship. They hoped to see the Dominion maintain cordial relations with the United States without sacrificing a shred of Canadian independence or endangering imperial unity. Continental integration, to be sure, was more or less out of the question. To draw to closer to the United States, many believed, was to risk absorption. To this effect, Colonel George T. Denison issued the following warning in the final paragraph of his 1909 autobiography:

We must not forget, that with a powerful neighbour alongside of Canada, speaking the same language, and with the necessarily intimate commercial intercourse, an agitation for closer relations, leading to ultimate absorption, is easy to kindle, and being so plausible, might spread with dangerous rapidity. This is a danger that those both in Canada and Great Britain, who are concerned in the future of the British Empire, would do well to take to heart, and by strengthening the bonds of Empire avert such dangers for the future.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, though turn-of-the-century imperialists generally balked at the mere suggestion of continental integration, they were usually quick to approve of any move towards Anglo-American rapprochement. Anglo-American concord, they believed, would strengthen the Dominion's overall stability and prosperity. Moreover, several imperialists, including George R. Parkin, fancied that Canada could act as an interpreter in the Anglo-American relationship, thereby reinforcing her position within the British Empire and healing the great schism of 1776:

At the point which they have now reached, the business of Canada and the United States is to live on friendly terms with each other, and there is little to prevent them from doing so, given common honesty of dealing and respect for each other's rights. The great boundary questions have been settled, with the exception of Alaska, and here the necessary surveys are now being carried harmoniously forward. Other points of dispute have been cleared away. Mr. Goldwin Smith always assumes that Canada's presence as a part of the British Empire on the American continent is a standing irritation to the United States. Possibly it is to a baser element in the United States, but that is not a thing to which a free people should pander. It is more likely that Canada, in the middle ground that it occupies, will

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<sup>2</sup> G. T. Denison, *The Struggle for Imperial Unity. Recollections & Experiences* (London, 1909), 369.

prove to be the solvent which will unite in sympathy and on honourable terms the two great nations with which she is allied in race and language.<sup>3</sup>

An Anglo-American rapprochement sponsored by Canada was seen as a first step towards an Anglo-Saxon millennium. Anglo-Saxon unity, indeed, was the professed goal of Canadian imperialists. It was integral to the imperialist sense of mission, which Beckles Willson defined as “a belief in the common mission of the English-speaking race to ameliorate human conditions which might otherwise never be ameliorated.”<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, as hazy concepts went, ‘Anglo-Saxon unity’ was even hazier than ‘imperial unity.’<sup>5</sup> For John G. Bourinot, who was awarded a knighthood by Queen Victoria in 1898, this nebulous chimera would be centred on a defence alliance between the United States and the British Empire:

While the Canadian people aim to realize this noble conception of a United Empire, – by no means such a phantasm as some practical politicians deem it to be, – they would fain hope that the statesmen to whom may be intrusted the destinies of the great republic to the south will themselves sympathize with such imperial aspirations, and will labor to bring their own citizens to believe that, although a federation of the world must ever remain a poet’s dream, an alliance of all English-speaking communities for common defence would assuredly be a guarantee not only for the security of this continent, but also for the peace and happiness of all civilized nations.<sup>6</sup>

J. S. Willison, for his part, dreamed of “a union of affection and interest between the United States and the British communities.” The former editor-in-chief of the Toronto *Globe* had come to imperial federation movement from the Liberal party and his imperialism was uncharacteristically friendly to the United States. “We cannot but feel that despite the clamour of faction, and the rhetoric of the stump, and the devious manoeuvres of the political boss,” he told the Canadian Club of Boston in 1905, “there is a deep sense of justice

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<sup>3</sup> G. R. Parkin, *The Great Dominion: Studies of Canada* (London, 1895), 233-234. In both imperialist and continentalist prose, talk of Canada as an Anglo-American interpreter usually reflected notions of Canadian hybridity, which are discussed in Chapter 9.

<sup>4</sup> Beckles Willson, *America’s Ambassadors to England (1785-1929): A Narrative of Anglo-American Diplomatic Relations* (New York, 1929), ix.

<sup>5</sup> The ephemeral quality of Anglo-Saxon rhetoric is discussed in Edward P. Kohn, *This Kindred People: Canadian-American Relations and the Anglo-Saxon Idea, 1895-1903* (Montreal and Kingston, 2004).

<sup>6</sup> J. G. Bourinot, “Canada’s Relations with the United States and her Influence on Imperial Councils,” *Forum* XXV (1898): 340.

at the heart of this people, and a moral force which is omnipotent for fair-dealing. We are, therefore, encouraged to seek the friendship of the United States upon fair considerations of common interest and in order that we may better harvest the gains of civilisation for mankind.”<sup>7</sup>

However, in spite of these lofty goals, friction and disputes seemed to characterize the Canadian-American relationship in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These tensions could not be attributed to Anglo-Canadian policy, imperialists argued, because Canada and Britain had consistently acted in good faith when dealing with the United States. Canadian-American disputes, they reasoned, were invariably the result of American policy and opinion. “Most Canadians believe to-day that the United States has shown a steady, deliberate dislike of their country and has pursued a policy more or less injurious to their interests,” wrote John Castell Hopkins in 1893.<sup>8</sup> The United States, to be sure, had consistently hampered Canadian growth and expansion since the late eighteenth century. It had acquired territory at Canada’s expense in Maine, the Ohio Valley, and the Pacific Northwest, and had conspired to acquire even more. In fact, more than a few pre-World War One imperialists, including Colonel Denison, were convinced that the United States constituted a military threat to the Dominion.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> J. S. Willison, *Anglo-Saxon Amity* [Toronto, 1906], 5, 14.

<sup>8</sup> J. C. Hopkins, “Canadian Hostility to Annexation,” *Forum* XVI (1893): 326. Hopkins went on to list a litany of affronts suffered by Canada at the hands of the United States: “The Oregon boundary dispute; the Maine boundary troubles, settled, it was thought, most unjustly by the Ashburton Treaty; the San Juan question; the abrogation of the fishery clauses of the Washington Treaty; the Atlantic Coast fisheries dispute; the refusal to allow Canadian volunteers to cross American territory during the North-West Rebellion and previously to the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, although dozens of American regiments had passed through Canadian territory during the Civil War; the annexation of Alaska in order, as Secretary Seward once pointed out, to prevent British-Canadian extension on the Pacific Coast and to strengthen American influence in British Columbia; the Behring Sea fisheries dispute and the unfriendly manner in which Canadian sealers have been treated; the McKinley bill and its injurious agricultural schedule; the Alien Labor Law, and its aggressive enforcement against Canadians; the constant threats regarding the Canadian Pacific Railroad; and refusals to entertain any proposition for fair reciprocity – all these things have combined to make Canadians as a rule consider the inhabitants of the Republic what the Liberal Premier of Ontario once termed them, ‘a hostile people.’ And these historical incidents, these evidences of doubtful friendship, are among the most powerful obstacles to future union or closer relations.” [Ibid.]

<sup>9</sup> In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a number of imperialists openly mused about the possibility of an Anglo-American war fought largely on Canadian soil. In such an instance, Canada could be successfully defended with the help of British regulars and the Royal Navy, argued Charles Walker Robinson (1836-1924), a retired major general who had served as the commander of the British garrison in Mauritius from 1892 to 1895. Educated at Upper Canada College and Trinity College, Toronto, Major General Robinson was the youngest son of “the most eminent subject of the Crown in Upper Canada,” Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson. In a 1910 essay on Canadian defence, he warned that only the “methods, not the necessity of defence” had changed since the War of 1812. Colonel Denison agreed that the Dominion could be defended against an American assault. “The odds in 1812 were thirty to one against us, and we were successful,” he wrote in 1895. “To-day they are about twelve to one, not counting Imperial assistance, or practically the same odds that Japan has lately faced against China.” Some imperialists were more realistic. George M. Wrong, for his part,

Imperialists repeatedly pointed out that American opinion was often openly hostile to Britain and the Empire. To this effect, Arthur Johnston reminded the readers of his 1908 monograph on the American Revolution that a “distrust of, and a latent antipathy to, England and Englishmen is the inheritance of every citizen of the great Republic born or educated on its soil. Their minds are so filled and obsessed by the absurd and mendacious American school histories and traditions that they are incapable of dissociating Englishmen of the present generation from those who participated in the scenes enacted in the early history of their country.”<sup>10</sup>

Worse still, the average American was utterly ignorant of Canadian affairs and had little or no respect for Canadian nationhood. Annexationism, in this regard, was often seen as a reflection of American contempt for the Dominion. “The statesmen and people generally of that country have been always remarkably ignorant, not only of the history, but of the political institutions and of the political sentiments of the Canadians,” wrote John G. Bourinot in 1898. “They have never appreciated the tendency of this political development, which is in the direction of a new nationality, not inferior to the United States in many elements of a people’s greatness.”<sup>11</sup> American diplomats, moreover, had no sense of fair play, and the Republic’s political system, with its checks and balances, made diplomatic negotiations particularly arduous.

Imperialists saw Britain as the champion of Canadian nationhood and, furthermore, as the guarantor of the Dominion’s power and prestige. They argued that the Canadian nation would not have survived the nineteenth century without British protection, and believed that continentalist and *nationaliste* calls for complete Canadian independence were largely misguided.<sup>12</sup> Canada needed the imperial connection. “Independent, we could not survive a decade,” wrote Stephen Leacock in “Greater Canada: An Appeal,” a 1907 article

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believed that “it has always been hopeless for [Canada] to think of armed strife with her only neighbour, for this neighbour could put a dozen men into the field to her one.” In fact, Wrong and a handful of other moderate imperialists argued that America’s military power actually protected Canada from outside aggression. [H. J. Morgan, *The Canadian Men and Women of the Time: A Hand-book of Canadian Biography of Living Characters*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1912), 956; C. W. Robinson, *Canada and Canadian Defence: The Defensive Policy of the Dominion in Relation to the Character of her Frontier, the Events of the War of 1812 and her Position Today* (Toronto, 1910), 105; G. T. Denison, “Canada and her Relations to the Empire,” *Westminster Review* CXLIV (1895): 263-264; G. M. Wrong, “The Attitude of Canada,” *The Nineteenth Century* LXVI (1909): 706.]

<sup>10</sup> Arthur Johnston, *Myths and Facts of the American Revolution: A Commentary on United States History as it is Written* (Toronto, 1908), 7.

<sup>11</sup> J. G. Bourinot, “Canada’s Relations with the United States,” 336.

<sup>12</sup> That said, Canadian imperialists did want the Dominion to play a role in international affairs. This would be achieved, however, by federating the British Empire and giving Canadians a formal say in Imperial foreign policy.

published in the *University Magazine*. "Those of us who know our country realize that beneath its surface smoulder still the embers of racial feud and religious bitterness. Twice in our generation has the sudden alarm of conflict broken upon the quiet of our prosperity with the sound of a fire bell in the night. Not thus our path. Let us compose the feud and still the strife of races, not in the artificial partnership of an Independent Canada, but in the greatness of a common destiny."<sup>13</sup> In 1911, Leacock's celebrated article was reprinted and widely distributed by interests opposed to reciprocity.

Most imperialists also took issue with the widely held belief that Great Britain had repeatedly purchased Anglo-American peace by sacrificing Canadian interests.<sup>14</sup> On the contrary, argued Queen's professor of colonial history, William Lawson Grant, in a 1913 article published in London's *Round Table*, British power was the historical key to Canadian survival and expansion:

The first thing to be borne in mind is that British North America exists. Canada is to-day a puissant young nation, extending from Atlantic to Pacific. Her southernmost boundary is south of the latitude of Rome; to the northward she is lost amid eternal snow. She is larger in area than the United States, and exultantly proclaims that the Twentieth Century is hers by right. During the last 130 years her frontiers have marched 3,000 miles with those of a rapidly growing and not over-scrupulous neighbour. For over half of the distance the dividing line is a mere parallel of latitude. During the whole period the greater part of what is now Canada has been sparsely, if at all, inhabited. If British diplomacy has been one long series of surrenders, how is it that so much remains? By purchase, or diplomacy, or conquest, France and Spain have been driven from vast and fertile areas, and Mexico reduced by one-half. Why, if the United States had but to threaten for Great Britain to give, has Canada not shared the fate of Louisiana or of Florida?

Thus, Grant continued, "whether we look at the general results of British diplomacy, or consider individual instances, we find that, whereas France and Spain have been squeezed out of the New World by the United States, Great Britain has always been strong enough to enforce at least a compromise." Britain had sacrificed vast tracts of land to appease the United States, but she had saved the farm. "British diplomacy has other interests to consider

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<sup>13</sup> Stephen Leacock, "Greater Canada: An Appeal," *University Magazine* VI (1907): 139-140.

<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, some imperialists, including Colonel Denison, were genuinely upset by what they saw as repeated British indifference to Canadian interests. Only imperial federation, they believed, would ensure that the Dominion's interests would be protected by British diplomats.



as well as those of Canada," Grant wrote, "but if it be argued that for this very reason Canada would do better to stand alone, the answer is easy. She is in the world, and she cannot get out of it. If, in the world situation at any particular time, she had endeavoured to stand alone, how would she have fared? Granted, that to be part of an Empire, and thus at times to be considered only a part, has its disadvantages. What would have been her fate had she fronted the billows unaided?"<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless, the 1903 settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute, which Canadians generally regarded as a British sell-out, required imperialist damage control. George S. Holmsted (1841-1928) chose to defend the Alaskan boundary settlement in the *Canadian Law Review*. Born in London, England, Holmsted had immigrated to Canada as a teenager and had risen to a position of great prominence within Ontario's legal community. To his mind, Lord Alverstone, the British representative whose decision to side with the American commissioners had settled the Alaskan boundary dispute in America's favour, was clearly "the only person who appears to have approached the matter from a purely judicial standpoint and with a determination to take an impartial and not a partisan attitude in the controversy." Alverstone had not sold Canada out:

Many people seem to think that it was the duty of the British Commissioners to find what construction of the treaty in question would be most beneficial to Canada, and to stick to that, but no one had any right to assume that any British judge of the eminence of Lord Alverstone would so act. On the contrary it might be confidently expected that if he thought the contention of the United States as to the meaning of the treaty was the correct one, he would so find. In declining to apologize for or explain his finding he is merely following the best traditions of the Bench. His judgement speaks for itself; he is content to be judged by it, satisfied that in the end it will commend itself to all fair-minded men.

In the end, Holmsted concluded, "the reason the British contention was not more successful was due to the simple fact that the United States happened to have the better case."<sup>16</sup> Most Canadians, however, were not convinced.

By the interwar years, the imperialist outlook on Canadian-American relations had noticeably softened. Americans, it seemed, had acquired a new respect for their northern neighbours. Indeed, argued Robert Falconer in 1925, Canada's terrible sacrifice in the Great

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<sup>15</sup> [W. L. Grant], "Canada and Anglo-American Relations," *The Round Table* IV (1913): 108-109, 121-122.

<sup>16</sup> G. S. Holmsted, "The Alaskan Boundary," *Canadian Law Review* III (1904): 59, 69.

War had awoken America to the Dominion's strength and promise: "England regards Canada with the pride of a first-born; in the Empire she holds the prestige of age and position. The United States no longer looks upon her as an intruding colony on the continent, but respects her as a nation within the British Commonwealth and as a neighbour who will take her own way to success. The Dominion, therefore, may now play a new part. No longer thought of as factious she may become an interpreter."<sup>17</sup> Present in imperialist rhetoric before the Great War, the idea of Canada as an Anglo-American interpreter intensified during the interwar years,<sup>18</sup> while bland pleasantries regarding the unguarded frontier, which were relatively infrequent in early imperialist writing, became more common. Moreover, by the 1930s, the very idea that the United States might constitute a military threat to the Dominion had become the object of ridicule.

As Tory anti-Americanism eased up, so too did conservative apprehensions regarding continental integration. This was particularly the case during the Second World War, when fear, realism, and indeed loyalty to Britain brought many staunch imperialists to support wartime cooperation and integration with the United States. The Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements, it was argued, aided Britain in her darkest hour. To refuse wartime integration and cooperation, therefore, was to jeopardize British defence. "It will be a poor kind of loyalty to the British if we insist upon being more British than they are, to the extent of being more anti-American," the English-born editor of Toronto's *Saturday Night*, B. K. Sandwell (1876-1954), told Dalhousie's Institute of Public Affairs in 1941.<sup>19</sup> Similar arguments could be found in the *Round Table*, where an anonymous Canadian correspondent conceded that desperate times called for desperate measures:

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<sup>17</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 244.

<sup>18</sup> That said, some conservative intellectuals were sceptical that Canada could fulfill its much vaunted role as interpreter between Britain and the United States. "It has sometimes been suggested," wrote Donald Creighton in 1945, "as often by foreigners who wish to flatter as by Canadians who wanted a place in the sun, that the Dominion is uniquely fitted to take the lead in the maintenance of Anglo-American concord – that she is endowed by nature to play the role of interpreter between the United Kingdom and the United States. There are elements of positive inaccuracy and well-meaning naïveté in this conception, both as regards the past and the future. So far as the past is concerned, it may well be argued that it was Great Britain which in the main performed the role of disinterested broker between the two other members of the triangle. So far as the present and the future is concerned, it may well be expected that Canada will intervene not too frequently and not without good cause. Masters, as the old sea captain put it, should speak only to masters and they are not likely to welcome the gratuitous presence of intermediaries when engaged in conversation." Nevertheless, Creighton firmly believed that "Canada's first requisite is the concord of the English-speaking world. That the Commonwealth and the United States should agree, or at least should avoid the worst forms of economic and political disagreement, is the first condition of Canadian prosperity; and Canada will always be anxiously ready to assist, or to take the initiative, in any arrangement for the preservation of those good relations." [Creighton, "Canada in the English-Speaking World," *Canadian Historical Review* XXVI (1945): 124-125.]

<sup>19</sup> B. K. Sandwell, "Canada and the U.S.A.," *Public Affairs* V (1941): 118.

Perhaps it would be wiser to avoid talk of race. Anglo-Saxons have been known to fight each other. Perhaps the common language is a dangerous trap: possibly we should stick to the grim necessities of politics, and base policy on the penetrating appreciation of realities. They are plain enough: we Westerners must swim or sink, triumph or be vanquished. As things stand now there is no longer any possibility of separating our fates. Even the mighty Republic cannot stand alone. Hence only in a united effort lies salvation.<sup>20</sup>

Nonetheless, Tory intellectuals had a number of reservations regarding wartime continental integration. The *Round Table's* Canadian correspondent, for instance, worried in 1941 that Canadian passivity might turn the Dominion into an American protectorate: "Canada has been content in the past to be the tail of a kite, in other words to accept the results of British policy usually without having sought to determine that policy. She has now entered into a most important military relationship with another great Power. If she does not attempt to influence the policy of that Power, she will become the tail of another kite."<sup>21</sup>

Earlier imperialist ideas, to be sure, had survived the Great War, albeit in a watered-down form. Indeed, though imperial federation's day had passed, the idea of a powerful Commonwealth of freely associated members now galvanized Tories. R. G. Trotter, for instance, insisted in 1938 that the Dominion's ties to the Commonwealth buttressed Canadian nationhood: "Canada needs and will continue to need the prestige and strength of the Commonwealth association if she is to preserve not merely the professed friendship of her neighbour but the latter's respectful recognition and acceptance, in practice, of the realities of the Dominion's national independence."<sup>22</sup> B. K. Sandwell, for his part, warned Canadians in a 1939 pamphlet that continentalist assurances that North American integration would free Canada from residual British domination were missing the mark:

The belief of most of the advocates of North Americanism for Canada has been that it would mean no more than substituting one kind of suzerainty or protectorship for another; that Canada might well be willing to exchange the leading-strings of Great Britain, a country with many special interests to which Canada is entirely a stranger, for the leading-strings of the United States, a country on the same continent and with many

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<sup>20</sup> Anonymous, "The Canadian-American Defence Agreement and its Significance," *The Round Table* XXXI (1941): 348.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 356.

<sup>22</sup> R. G. Trotter, "Which Way Canada?" *Queen's Quarterly* XLV (1938): 295.

interests in common. But this belief has no foundation in fact. There are no leading-strings; and for Canada to accept the leading-strings of the United States would be to reduce herself from the rank of a completely self-governing nation to that of a protectorate. It would be to place in the hands of another nation the control of the most important decisions affecting Canadian national existence, without conferring on Canadians any share in, or any influence upon, the political life of that nation.<sup>23</sup>

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Tory resistance to continental integration often expressed itself through a rejection of pan-Americanism. Indeed, with European markets essentially closed to Canadian goods, many continentalists began to argue that the time had come for the Dominion to join the Pan-American Union and rethink its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean. R. G. Trotter led the conservative charge against the pan-American ideal.<sup>24</sup> To join the Pan-American Union, he warned in 1939, was to subject Canada to American domination:

Canada has some interests in the Western Hemisphere, it is true, which might appropriately be reflected in some formal association with other powers in this hemisphere, but it may be questioned whether those interests are of the kind to make it appropriate for us to be one of the large group of minor powers associated under the leadership of the United States, in a bureau which an American friend of mine, a specialist in international problems and institutions, recently called an appendage of the State Department.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> B. K. Sandwell, *Canada and United States Neutrality* (Toronto, 1939), 31-32.

<sup>24</sup> Pre-World War One imperialists, though far less inclined to discuss pan-Americanism than their interwar disciples, were usually just as fervently opposed to the idea of the Dominion joining the Pan-American Union. "There is a bond," wrote Beckles Willson on the eve of the Great War, "and a very intimate bond, between an Austrian and a German: there is a bond between a Norwegian and a Swede; but what possible nexus – racial, political, lingual, or moral – is there between Peruvians and Canadians?" Besides, he continued, "the Pan-American idea, a strictly American invention, itself formulated to exploit the Monroe Doctrine, which in turn means, if it means anything, the control by the United States of America of the destinies of the countries occupying the continents of North and South America." [Willson, "Must We be Americans," *University Magazine* XIII (1914): 64-65.]

<sup>25</sup> R. G. Trotter, "Defense and External Obligations: Discussion," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 19-22, 1939, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1940), 206. Not every interwar Tory was opposed to Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union. B. K. Sandwell, for instance, saw Canada's repeated refusal to join the Pan-American Union as a sign of national immaturity. "I sometimes suspect," he wrote in 1941, "that that refusal is really nothing more than another form of our colonialism, our unwillingness to accept anything in the way of a responsibility or a commitment, our inability to make up our minds. Canada, with her large Latin element of population, and with her combination of English language, Anglo-Saxon business methods, and distinctiveness from the United States, could exercise a most powerful influence on the nations of South America if we would accept the responsibilities of a North American nation. [Sandwell, "Canada and the U.S.A," 118.]

Joining the Pan-American Union, moreover, would “mean lining ourselves up with a tradition involving a repudiation of our own essential character as a nation. For the framework and the philosophy of Pan-Americanism itself, whatever the use that some American states might now like to make of it, are still essentially defensive and ingrowing.” Pan-Americanism, indeed, was viewed as a dressed-up version of isolationism. “Its unifying spirit,” Trotter continued,

is the tradition of an independence of Europe won through revolutionary conflict that furnishes in each republic the cherished core of national pride. Canada’s national position has not been reached thus, and to do anything that attempts to assimilate Canadian tradition to that aspect of the tradition of the American republics is to nullify the inherent advantages that result for ourselves and for a wider international comity, from Canada’s realization of political nationality without such a core of traditional antagonisms to the non-American world.<sup>26</sup>

In the end, Trotter rejected the Pan-American ethos because he saw it as inimical to Canada’s tradition of British continuity. To enter the Pan-American Union, he believed, was to sunder the bond that linked the Dominion with Britain and the Commonwealth, and furthermore, to imperil the British and conservative essence of Canadian nationhood.

Besides, remarked several prominent Tories, the Dominion had little or nothing in common with the nations of Latin America. By and large, the South American republics were viewed as undemocratic and underdeveloped backwaters; their Catholic inhabitants spoke Spanish and Portuguese and were, for the most part, not of European ancestry. Some conservative intellectuals, including George Grant, also believed that it would be geographically absurd for Canada to join the Pan-American Union. The whole concept of pan-Americanism, Grant argued in 1945, ran counter to the Dominion’s fundamental nordicity: “If it ever comes to a choice between the Commonwealth and the Pan-American Union, the former is of vastly greater importance to us as a nation than the latter. For what the believers in the western hemisphere forget is geography. Canada is even more intimately bound up with the northern hemisphere than with the western hemisphere.”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> R. G. Trotter, “Canada and Pan-Americanism,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XLIX (1942): 256-257.

<sup>27</sup> George Grant, *The Empire, Yes or No?* (Toronto, 1945), 18. By 1945, Grant was beginning to view Canadian-American relations through the emerging prism of the Cold War: “Cut off from the British nations, as an

In the end, Canada did not join the Pan-American Union – renamed the Organization of American States – until 1989. Indeed, though wartime support for continental integration ran high, Prime Minister Mackenzie King knew not to press his luck with further changes to the Dominion's geopolitical position. Significant popular support for continental integration, he surmised, would be fleeting.

Few continentalist intellectuals were quite so pessimistic. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, continental integration appeared to be an idea whose time had finally come. During those years, intellectual continentalism, though basically constant in its ideas, became less defensive and more self-assured in its assumptions.

First among these assumptions was the idea that the Canadian-American relationship had been primarily characterized by peace and friendship. Indeed, unlike their anti-American adversaries, continentalists – annexationists aside – continuously played down elements of friction in Canadian-American relations. For instance, in the introduction to his 1942 study of *The Unguarded Frontier*, Edgar McInnis argued that the Canadian-American relationship, though at times turbulent, was essentially sound. "If the factors which make for antagonism have been real," he wrote, "the factors which dictate a serious effort at harmony and co-operation have been far more powerful and persistent. At the root of the relations between Canada and the United States has been a firm desire to share the North American continent in amity and without strife."<sup>28</sup>

Continentalists did not view American might as a threat to Canadian nationhood. Even in the late nineteenth century, writers like Erastus Wiman considered the very idea of an Anglo-American war fought on Canadian soil to be absurd. American power, Wiman and others insisted, actually protected Canada from outside threats. Indeed, continentalists systematically downplayed annexationist and anti-British sentiment in the United States, and they were inclined to blame Britain for the disputes and tensions that periodically arose between Canada and the United States. On the whole, it was argued that Americans respected Canadian independence. In fact, remarked Frank Underhill in 1929, "the real danger of Canadian-American relations is not, as some of our professional patriots would like

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independent country, we would have little alternative but to join the South American nations in the hemispheric Empire of the U.S.A. And as part of that we would be strengthening the power of the U.S.A. to retire into isolation. We would be abetting its ability to establish an anti-Russian block. We would be increasing the chances for an American-Soviet conflict. On the other hand, as a member of the Commonwealth, we would be doing exactly the opposite. Friendly to the U.S.A., we would still not be her satellite. By our world-wide interests, we would, as her chief neighbour, be pulling her out of continental isolation and towards effective commitments to a world order." [Ibid., 7.]

<sup>28</sup> Edgar W. McInnis, *The Unguarded Frontier: A History of American-Canadian Relations* (New York, 1942), 3.

us to believe, that the Yankees are plotting daily against us, but that they are not thinking about us at all."<sup>29</sup>

Continentalists sought to achieve Canadian-American integration and cooperation without sacrificing the Dominion's separate political identity. Continental integration was seen as an essentially economic endeavour, and would be primarily realized through reciprocity or, some argued, through a North American customs union. Canadian-American cooperation, for its part, would be achieved through the creation of bilateral bodies to deal with issues ranging from trade to defence. The International Joint Commission, which was created in 1909 to regulate Canadian-American boundary waters, was viewed as a model in this regard.

For many continentalists, Canadian-American integration was seen a step towards the creation of a wider North Atlantic, Pan-American, or international community. As a result, relatively few pro-American intellectuals wanted the Dominion to withdraw from the Commonwealth or the League of Nations. Canada's position in the Commonwealth, for instance, was often understood to provide the nation with an opportunity to act as the linchpin of Anglo-American relations. Indeed, though continentalists often made light of Canada's much touted role as an interpreter in the Anglo-American relationship, most also firmly believed that Canada could and should assume such a role.<sup>30</sup> For instance, in July 1939, Arthur Lower, who had served as an officer in the Royal Navy during the Great War, insisted that

Canada's position qualifies her well for what has often been said to be her destined role, that of interpreter between the two great branches of the English-speaking world. She can understand, for example, the Englishman's touchiness on the subject of sea supremacy and can also appreciate America's desire for freedom of the seas, for in wartime her commercial

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<sup>29</sup> F. H. Underhill, "O Canada," *Canadian Forum* X (1929): 10.

<sup>30</sup> That said, some continentalists did express serious doubts regarding Canada's role as an Anglo-American interpreter. In a 1938 study of the Dominion's foreign relations, R. A. Mackay, who would later serve as Canada's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and E. B. Rogers noted that Britain and the United States did not really require an interpreter: "It is frequently urged that Canada has a positive responsibility, or at least an opportunity of performing a positive service to mankind by acting as an 'interpreter' or a 'bridge' between Great Britain and the United States. Flattering as this may be to the national ego, it is difficult to see wherein this mission consists. If it is merely to help American and British peoples to understand each other's opinions and attitudes, there are better means such as each other's press and periodical literature. If it means that the Canadian government should help to explain the other governments to one another, they again have obviously better and more direct means of understanding one another through their respective diplomatic services. If it means that Canada may restrain the policies of either government inimical to the other, we have seen that Canada possesses an effective right and an effective means of intervention only in the case of British policy." [R. A. Mackay and E. B. Rogers, *Canada Looks Abroad* (London, 1938), 134-135.]

interests would be identical with those of America. Canadians feel no menace from the American fleet. Most of them are very glad to know that both it and that of Great Britain are strong. To them dissension in the Anglo-Saxon world is particularly repugnant and they would regard even the remotest prospect of civil war between the English-speaking peoples with unspeakable horror.<sup>31</sup>

However, the continentalist sense of mission was not limited to Anglo-American relations. On the contrary, continentalist intellectuals believed that North American peace and prosperity contained enduring lessons for all of mankind.<sup>32</sup> After all, Canada and the United States shared the world's longest undefended border and had managed to avoid going to war against each other since 1814. For his part, Reverend James A. Macdonald, who played an important role in the establishment of the World Peace Foundation, eulogized the undefended border with evangelical zeal. It was, he exclaimed in 1917, a beacon of Christian internationalism:

There you have it! More than five thousand miles of North America's international boundary between the United States and Canada! More than five thousand miles where free nation meets free nation! Where vital interest touches vital interest! Where imperious flag salutes imperious flag! Where a people's sovereignty answers to a people's sovereignty! More than five thousand miles, with never a fortress! Never a threatening sentinel on guard! More than five thousand miles of civilized and Christianized internationalism! God's shining sun in all his circling round lights up no such track of international peace, and crosses no such line of international power, anywhere else in the world.<sup>33</sup>

Though exceptional, the Canadian-American model was also seen as exportable. Indeed, in 1934, James T. Shotwell convinced the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to sponsor the publication of a series of studies on Canadian-American relations precisely because he believed that "statesmanship and common sense have ultimately built up a technique for the settlement of disputes between Canada and the United States which

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<sup>31</sup> A. R. M. Lower, "The United States Through Canadian Eyes," *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations* 1 (1939): 105.

<sup>32</sup> North American idealism is discussed in D. M. Page, "Canada as the Exponent of North American Idealism," *American Review of Canadian Studies* III (1973): 30-46.

<sup>33</sup> J. A. Macdonald, *The North American Idea* (New York, 1917), 188-189.



can and should furnish a model to all the world.”<sup>34</sup> Profoundly influenced by his father’s Quakerism, Shotwell’s interest in international affairs was an extension of his lifelong commitment to the cause of international peace and disarmament.

Shotwell and others were convinced that Canadian-American harmony proved that the formula for international peace could be found in the arbitration of disputes, trade, and the free exchange of population. “In a war-wracked world,” Hugh Keenleyside wrote in 1929, “Canada and the United States must continue to prove that peace is not an impossible ideal, that states can best maintain their national honor not by resorting to the law of the jungle, but by reasoned and constructive friendship, conditioned by understanding, governed by justice, and founded on peace.”<sup>35</sup> Legalists, including P. E. Corbett, were particularly intent on demonstrating that arbitration and respect for the rule of law were the basis for Canadian-American concord. In *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes* (1937), Corbett insisted that

The remarkable success of arbitration between Canada and the United States is due to the fact that these two countries have sufficient respect for judicial methods and their common legal tradition to endow their joint tribunals with the power of deciding according to “law and equity,” and then to accept, in the main with no more discontent than the losing litigant may be expected to manifest, a liberal interpretation by the arbiters of what constitutes equity in the matter at issue.<sup>36</sup>

There were, of course, some clouds on the horizon. For instance, many continentalist intellectuals were convinced that American ignorance of Canadian affairs hindered Canadian-American harmony. Good relations, they believed, required understanding. However, a number of continentalists also pointed out that Canadians were largely ignorant of American affairs. The average Canadian, they insisted, confused prejudice with knowledge. To counter this shortcoming, Henry F. Angus, who edited a landmark 1938 study of Canadian attitudes towards the United States, argued that Canadian schools needed to include more American studies in their curricula:

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<sup>34</sup> J. T. Shotwell, “Foreword,” in Charles C. Tansill, *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911* (New Haven and Toronto, 1943), viii.

<sup>35</sup> Hugh Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* (New York, 1929), 396.

<sup>36</sup> P. E. Corbett, *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes: A Critical Study of Methods and Results* (New Haven and Toronto, 1937), 128-129.

The Canadian citizens of the future are being brought up in closer contact with the life and culture of a politically foreign country than any other children in the world. It is not within the power of governments to change this fact, but it is within their power to accord intelligent recognition to it. Such recognition, if it were accorded, would take the form of including in the school curriculum instruction designed to correlate and organize the varied impressions which Canadian children pick up about the United States. The practical question is not whether it is desirable for children to learn about the United States or not. An age of innocence in this respect is no longer possible. Nor is the question really connected with that of the desirability of teaching American children about Canada. The plain fact is that the great majority of Canadian school children do learn a great deal about the United States and that knowledge on this subject which is spotty, piecemeal, or mixed up with vague impressions and, too often, with unreasonable prejudices is a poor equipment for citizenship in Canada.<sup>37</sup>

British involvement in Canadian-American relations was frequently viewed with concern. Indeed, most continentalists believed that the main threat to Canada's sovereignty was not American imperialism, but British paternalism. They hoped to draw Canada closer to the United States in part because they wished to affirm the Dominion's independence from Britain – most continentalists were Canadian nationalists. Besides, though the continentalist ethos was not anti-British per se, it could, at times, embrace that negative faith. Indeed, as Graham Carr notes, for some intellectuals, faith in the continentalist ideal provided “a safety-valve for releasing pent-up colonial hostility toward imperial Britain.”<sup>38</sup>

William Arthur Deacon was one such thinker. In a 1933 essay, the outspoken literary editor of the Toronto *Mail and Empire* dismissed the idea that British power and diplomacy had protected Canada from American expansionism: “Consistently, each and every time Canada's interests have been entrusted to Great Britain in connection with a dispute with the United States, Canada has lost through the English arbitrator siding with the advocates of the United States' claim.” The United States, he continued, “have been ready, at all times, to

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<sup>37</sup> H. F. Angus, “The Evidence of the Schools,” in his *Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States* (Toronto and New Haven, 1938), 382. In a review of Angus' collection of essays, Lionel Gelber suggested that Canadian semi-ignorance of American affairs was a threat to the Dominion's foremost international calling: “Clearly on the political plane Canada cannot hope to be a permanently effective intermediary between the greater English-speaking powers unless its people and leaders alike are better acquainted than at present with American institutions.” [Gelber, “Review of H. F. Angus' *Canada and her Great Neighbor*,” *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* V (1939): 127.]

<sup>38</sup> Graham Carr, “All We North Americans': Literary Culture and the Continentalist Ideal, 1919-1939,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* XVII (1987): 149.

take advantage of us. We have resisted, as best we could, hampered during a great part of our career by having our foreign relations largely determined by Britain, with an eye primarily on her own interests." In fact, Deacon argued that American indifference, not the British connection, had saved Canada from annexation: "The United States did not want Canada, partly from ignorance of its value, but chiefly because she was busy filling her own empty spaces and exploiting her own resources. Until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the United States was the most insular of the great powers, sublimely indifferent to the world beyond her borders. Therein lay Canada's early safety – to the credit of neither nation, but to our own lasting advantage."<sup>39</sup>

Even intellectuals like John Bartlet Brebner, whose continentalism was tied to a wider Atlanticism, were reasonably critical of British involvement in Canadian-American relations. Indeed, though Brebner readily acknowledged that British power had prevented the British North American colonies from being absorbed by the antebellum republic, he also insisted in 1943 that Britain had repeatedly sacrificed Canadian interests to achieve Anglo-American concord:

Down to about 1905, in war and peace, Canada's great ally against American Manifest Destiny was Great Britain. From the Civil War onwards, however, Canadians were made increasingly aware that they were less important in British policy than Anglo-American understanding. This circumstance provided a steady undercurrent in the triangular relationship, emerging sharply, for instance, in 1871 at the Washington or in 1903 at the time of the Alaska boundary award. Indeed the manner in which Roosevelt achieved his ends in 1903, together with cleverly-revealed British connivance, made Canadians decide to go it alone.<sup>40</sup>

Continentalist intellectuals were early and enthusiastic supporters of Canadian-American military cooperation and integration. For instance, English Canada's most prominent pre-World War One advocate of Canadian independence, John S. Ewart, had called for a North American defence pact decades before the Ogdensburg Agreement was signed.<sup>41</sup> Canada and the United States shared the same strategic interests, continentalists

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<sup>39</sup> W. A. Deacon, *My Vision of Canada* (Toronto, 1933), 100, 104-105.

<sup>40</sup> J. B. Brebner, "Relations of Canada and the United States: Persistent Problems," *Canadian Historical Review* XXIV (1943): 121.

<sup>41</sup> "There is nothing humiliating in Canada's community of military interest with the United States," Ewart wrote in 1913. "Upon the contrary it is a matter for the highest and most proper gratification. Would anyone

insisted. Besides, by the late interwar years, it had become clear to most continentalist intellectuals – and to most Canadians – that Britain could no longer guarantee the Dominion's security. "A distant country may make a good market in time of peace," F. R. Scott wrote in 1941, "but it may make a poor base for defense in time of war. Strategically, Canada is and must be an integral part of North American, and hence of hemispheric, defense."<sup>42</sup> Continentalist intellectuals accordingly hailed the signing of the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park agreements.<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, they were conscious of the pitfalls of strategic integration. Canada would need to be an active partner in defence integration, many argued. Otherwise, the Dominion would simply become a satellite of the United States.

By the late 1930s, a number of continentalist intellectuals began to argue that hemispheric integration was also integral to Canadian prosperity and security. During this time, the Dominion's leading proponent of pan-Americanism was McGill's John P. Humphrey. A liberal internationalist – he co-drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – Humphrey believed that regional associations like the Pan-American Union could form the building blocks for a new United Nations, and that hemispheric integration was the first step towards drawing the United States out of its isolation. Canada, he insisted, could not afford to continue snubbing the Pan-American Union. Membership in the Union would not require the Dominion to withdraw from the Commonwealth. "As these two great international organizations are presently organized," he wrote in a 1941 article published in

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suggest that a treaty with the United States for mutual guarantee of each other's territory against over-sea invasion would be dishonorable? That is precisely the effect of the treaty between the United Kingdom and Japan, which nobody has deemed disgraceful. And if we might rely upon such a treaty, should we be wrong if, in framing our military policy, we took into account the well known fact of United States policy? In truth, we could not if we would ignore that fact; and we would be fools if we did, for it is in the highest degree, advantageous to us. We might, as sensibly, rail at the geographical protection supplied to us by the three oceans." [Ewart, "The Canning Policy Sometimes Called the Monroe Doctrine," *The Kingdom Papers* 16 (1913): 188.]

<sup>42</sup> F. R. Scott, "Canada and Hemispheric Solidarity," in *Inter-American Solidarity*, ed. Walter H. C. Laves (Chicago, 1941), 148.

<sup>43</sup> For socialist intellectuals like F. R. Scott, wartime economic cooperation had the added attraction of getting Canadians accustomed to statism and economic planning. The war had indeed brought a multitude of Canadian-American and inter-allied production boards into being, and Scott hoped that the practice of economic planning and cooperation would extend into peacetime. Continental integration, in this sense, would act as the Trojan Horse of statism: "Besides security, both present and future, the peoples of the United States and the Commonwealth have certain common economic interests. They both want to avoid a return of unemployment. They both need more health, more housing, more social security, more education, and all the things that go to make up a full and satisfying life. If cooperation can help to achieve these things, and to prevent a return to the world economic depression of the 1930's, then cooperation is a benefit all round. War-time cooperation has shown what can be done when the use of resources is jointly planned to meet common needs. A great body of knowledge and experience has been accumulated through the operation of the lend-lease program and the various joint boards in control of the Allied war effort. This experience could be applied to the handling of post-war economic problems." [Scott, *Cooperation for What? United States and British Commonwealth* (New York, 1944), 35-36.]

the *Canadian Forum*, “there would be no incompatibility, either legal or political, in Canada belonging to them both.” Besides, the Pan-American Union was no longer an instrument of American domination. Indeed, Humphrey claimed that the Good Neighbor Policy, which promised an end to American intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean, had fundamentally altered the dynamic of hemispheric relations. Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union would foster trade between the South American republics and the Dominion and, perhaps most importantly, hemispheric integration was vital to Canadian security and defence:

The chief menace to North American security is not the possibility of a direct attack by a non-European power. It is rather that some non-American power or combination of powers might use a South American base as a jumping-off place for an attack on North America. Dakar is only 1,700 miles from the Brazilian coast. Suppose some Latin American country were to become Nazi, either in an attempt to solve economic or social problems that had become desperate, or because Germany had obtained a stranglehold on its economy. With overseas help it might adopt expansionist policies and become a menace to North American security. There is little present danger of these things happening; but the possibility is serious enough to be a matter of concern in the United States. A radical change in the situation in Europe would have inestimable repercussions in the Western Hemisphere; and Canada must be prepared for all eventualities. Notwithstanding their democratic facades, many of the Latin American countries are ideologically prepared for National Socialism.<sup>44</sup>

Above all, continentalists were convinced that North American, and perhaps hemispheric, integration was a matter of destiny. The Second World War, in this sense, had merely accelerated a natural process. Indeed, regardless of the war’s outcome, F. R. Scott argued in early 1941 that Canada and the United States were fated to draw ever closer:

If the Axis powers should dominate Europe, Asia and Africa, and should seek to dominate the Americas, a common fear would drive the United States and Canada even closer together. The loose understanding of Ogdensburg would need replacing by a formal alliance, and Canada would be obliged to subordinate her foreign policy to that of Washington. This would not necessarily mean the annexation of Canada, any more than of

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<sup>44</sup> J. P. Humphrey, “Pan-America in the World Order,” *Canadian Forum* XXI (1941): 201-202; *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View* (Toronto, 1942), 15.

Mexico, but it would mean integration of policies and much more joint military and economic planning ... On the other hand an Allied victory, on whatever terms it may come, can never exactly restore the former international relationships ... The United States will most probably emerge as the strongest nation in the world after this conflict; a victorious Britain, even if more weakened by the cost of war, will still be a major world factor. Their combined efforts, democratically directed and supported by other freedom-loving states, could place world peace on a new and firmer basis. Out of such Anglo-American cooperation would come more Canadian-American cooperation.<sup>45</sup>

Wartime talk of Anglo-American cooperation or of Anglo-Saxon unity aroused a great deal of suspicion in Quebec. French Canadian intellectuals, to be sure, were more or less united in their opposition to British imperialism, and the very idea that Britain and the United States might combine their power to create a new world order was viewed with alarm. Invited to speak at a 1941 conference on Canadian-American affairs sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, François-Albert Angers criticised the other participants for their readiness to embrace Anglo-Saxon hegemony. Trained at the *École libre des Sciences politiques* in Paris, Angers embraced a multilateral world view:

I would dare to say here, as a Canadian of non-British origin, that a reorganization of the world should be founded not on the basis of a too-exclusive Anglo-Saxon brotherhood and pride – which has been too much, in my opinion, the theme of this conference since its beginning and which might be construed, by other nationalities in the British Empire and the United States, as an unbearable and an unjustifiable rebuff, and by other nations, as a tentative overture for an Anglo-Saxon domination of the world – but on a larger understanding of the general conditions, such as to make possible the organization of collaboration between the peoples of the world on an equal footing, with due respect to the traditions and social state of each, and with a view to giving every nation the possibility of attaining an economic standard acceptable in our times.<sup>46</sup>

The *nationaliste* attitude towards Canadian-American relations was marked by some degree of ambivalence. A number of nationalists, including André Laurendeau, worried that

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<sup>45</sup> F. R. Scott, *Canada and the United States* (Boston, 1941), 74-75.

<sup>46</sup> F.-A. Angers, "Institutional and Economic Bases of the Entente between British Countries and the United States: Discussion," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 23-26, 1941, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1941), 163-164.

continental integration might pave the way for annexation.<sup>47</sup> However, others anticipated that any improvement in the Canadian-American relationship would result in a corresponding loosening of the imperial bond. A rapprochement between Canada and the United States, in this regard, was seen as an important step towards Canadian independence. To this effect, in 1941, *Le Devoir's* parliamentary correspondent, Léopold Richer, argued that French Canadians should actively support Canadian-American cooperation:

Loin de boudier une politique de rapprochement canado-américain, loin de nous arrêter aux dangers qu'une politique d'indépendance représente, nous devons l'appuyer et l'encourager de toutes nos forces, afin qu'elle puisse donner des fruits à la fin du conflit actuel. Pour toutes les nations, la nation canadienne comprise, l'indépendance est un bien désirable en soi. Non pas une indépendance qui méprise les droits des autres nations et qui conduit aux pires catastrophes: la République voisine nous empêcherait bien de tenter la folle aventure. Mais une indépendance réelle, qui s'appuierait sur une collaboration étroite et amicale avec les États-Unis. Une indépendance, enfin, qui nous délivrerait des liens factices actuels, pour accepter ceux que la géographie nous a façonnés, qui correspondent, par conséquent, à des nécessités.

"Il importe," Richer wrote, "de nous habituer à l'idée que le Canada, tout en reconnaissant les obligations que sa situation géographique et économique lui impose, peut vivre libre et prospère, en collaboration avec les États-Unis."<sup>48</sup>

British involvement in Canadian-American relations was viewed with distaste in Quebec's intellectual circles. Henri Bourassa, for instance, regularly accused British diplomats of selling out Canadian interests. In a 1919 pamphlet, he blamed British appeasement of the United States for Canada's geographic incoherence:

Grâce au zèle, à l'intelligence et à la générosité déployés sans relâche par les hommes d'État et les diplomates britanniques pour servir les intérêts américains, pour assouvir les appétits et gagner les bonnes grâces des Américains, le Canada est devenu une incohérence géographique, une enfilade de pays sans contact immédiat, séparés par d'immenses barrières naturelles et attirés, chacun séparément, par l'énorme et croissante force d'attraction qui émane de la république américaine, leur unique voisine.

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<sup>47</sup> See *supra*, 251.

<sup>48</sup> Léopold Richer, *Vers l'accomplissement de notre destin américain* (Quebec, 1941), 3-4, 37.

Bourassa was convinced that British policy had set the stage for annexation, and that only independence from Britain could prevent such a disaster: “Un seul dérivatif – l’indépendance complète du Canada – pourrait retarder ou détourner cette échéance. *Un Canada indépendant serait plus à l’abri des cupidités américaines que le Canada, dépendance britannique.*”<sup>49</sup>

*Nationaliste* intellectuals were more enthusiastic when it came to pan-American relations. “Le centre de gravité du monde se déplace,” wrote Lionel Groulx in 1922. “Il devient clair à tous ... qu’un nouveau classement des régions de la terre se prépare et qu’une rupture d’équilibre s’accomplit au détriment de l’Europe.” The Western Hemisphere would play a central role in the emerging new world order, and Groulx believed that Canadians – in particular French Canadians – needed to get on the pan-American bandwagon. “Seule, il faut bien le dire, notre effroyable insouciance d’État en tutelle, a pu nous permettre d’observer, sans émoi, le vaste mouvement panaméricaniste qui s’est développé dans les deux Amériques depuis 1914,” he lamented. To counter this indifference, Groulx endeavoured to include some discussion of Latin American affairs in the pages of *L’Action française*. Indeed, Quebec shared a great deal of religious and cultural affinities with Latin America and, as the abbé later noted in his memoirs, “j’ai toujours cru qu’il fallait chercher de ce côté-là un contrepoids à l’influence omnipotente de Washington.”<sup>50</sup> Léopold Richer, for his part, saw pan-Americanism as means to distance Canada from the vortex of European affairs. “Plus le Canada s’approchera de l’Union Panaméricaine – ce n’est plus qu’une question de temps pour que le Canada y prenne place – plus il s’éloignera des problèmes exclusivement européens,” he wrote in *Vers l’accomplissement de notre destin américain* (1941).<sup>51</sup>

On the whole, French Canadian anti-Americans and continentalists were on the same page when it came to Canadian independence and pan-Americanism. However, on the issue of continental integration, continentalists like the editor of Montreal’s *Le Jour*, Jean-Charles Harvey, did not suffer from the ambivalence that affected some of their anti-American peers. On the eve of the Second World War, Harvey declared to an assembled group of Canadian and American scholars that “it would be desirable if both Canada and the United States got together more closely to act as the natural arbiters of peace; they should abolish barriers

<sup>49</sup> Henri Bourassa, *Syndicats nationaux ou internationaux?* (Montreal, 1919), 28; *L’intervention américaine, ses motifs, son objet, ses conséquences* (Montreal, 1917), 51.

<sup>50</sup> Lionel Groulx, “Notre avenir politique,” *L’Action française* VII (1922): 5; *Mes mémoires*, vol. 2, 1920-1928 (Montreal, 1971), 335.

<sup>51</sup> Richer, *Vers l’accomplissement de notre destin américain*, 22.



between themselves and set up free trade, free migration, similar social and economic laws, and, on that basis, create a new world of love and justice."<sup>52</sup> Like many continentalists, Harvey believed that Canadian-American integration would hasten the modernization of French Canadian society. America, indeed, was seen as a powerful vector of modernity.

### *American Foreign Policy*

American foreign policy has always held a particular fascination for Canadian intellectuals. Indeed, to scrutinize the Republic's relationship with the wider world is, in many ways, to ponder Canada's foreign policy options. During the period under study, the examination of American foreign policy allowed Canadian intellectuals to grapple with two key geopolitical sensibilities: imperialism and isolationism. Not surprisingly, the issue of American imperialism dominated Canadian discussions of American foreign policy from the late nineteenth century to 1914, while the question of isolationism was at the forefront of Canadian commentary from 1914 to the early 1940s.

On the whole, pre-World-War-One imperialists held a positive, though not uncritical, view of American imperialism. Their penchant for colonial expansion and the upliftment of non-whites made them view the American acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Philippines in a positive light. America, for all its faults, was spreading the virtues of western civilization among the 'ignorant' and 'downtrodden' peoples of the southern hemisphere. The Republic, it seemed, was finally emerging from its isolation and making a positive contribution to the civilizing mission of the Anglo-Saxon race. Andrew Macphail, for instance, praised America for its turn-of-the-century imperialist ventures in Asia and the Caribbean: "The United States has come out into the world and is beginning to do her proper business, helping the helpless to help themselves, as she did in Cuba, and is doing in Porto Rico and the Philippines, warning off marauders from the republics of Central America, and admonishing the people who inhabit them."<sup>53</sup>

When it came to American imperialism, however, no Canadian intellectual was more enthusiastic than Beckles Willson. Indeed, Willson, who had been the Boston *Globe's* correspondent in Cuba in 1888, believed that the Spanish-American conflict would herald a new era of imperialist regeneration for the Republic. "The year 1898 was one of the epoch-

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<sup>52</sup> J.-C. Harvey, "Defense and External Obligations: Discussion," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 19-22, 1939, *Proceedings*, 210.

<sup>53</sup> [Andrew Macphail,] "Canadian Writers and American Politics," *University Magazine* IX (1910): 4.

marking years in the history of America," he wrote in *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (1903). "In that *annus mirabilis* was decided the momentous question whether the United States were to continue their policy of political isolation, or were, as a united State, to take up a position amongst the world-powers, and, in the language of one native writer, 'assume the unselfish obligations and responsibilities demanded by the enlightened civilization of the age.'"<sup>54</sup>

Imperialism, Willson believed, was the answer to many of America's woes. Indeed, like most Canadian imperialists, he was convinced that colonial ventures uplifted both the colonizer and the colonized. As a result, American imperial expansion would not only benefit "alien and distant races," but would also help purify American politics and society. It would, for instance, unite the Republic's various sections behind the banner of imperialist expansion. Moreover, Willson argued that the denial of suffrage "to the horde of dark-skinned Sandwich or Philippine islanders, or to the fanatical blacks of the Antilles" would "operate as a powerful argument in favour of the restriction of the suffrage of negroes and illiterates at home." Perhaps most importantly, however, imperialist expansion would fuel the growth of executive and federal power which, in turn, would strike a powerful blow against localism and political corruption:

A new spirit has lately informed [American] politics. Since 1898 we observe a marked tendency to raise the whole tone of public life. Public interest has become centred on Imperial matters, in the upbuilding of international commerce, in the work of establishing peace and orderly government in the outlying portions of the Empire. It has less to spare for the local political crank with his petty programme, or the local boss in his wire pulling. With the decrease of State power, this was inevitable; with the growing establishment of a Civil Service on European lines, the professional politician class must ultimately languish.<sup>55</sup>

Nevertheless, Willson saw turn-of-the-twentieth-century America's reluctance to create a large standing army as a serious obstacle to imperial greatness. Like many Canadian imperialists, he believed that America lacked a truly martial spirit. "For a bellicose and jingoistic folk, ready at all times to take and give offence, the Americans are still surprisingly unmilitary," he noted in 1903. "Perhaps I should say that there is an absence of a scientific military spirit in the country. They do not take the profession of arms seriously; and our

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<sup>54</sup> Beckles Willson, *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic* (London, 1903), 28.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, vii, 34-35, 189.

recent experience in South Africa has rather disposed them to believe that a regular army has very little advantage, if any, over the untrained volunteer."<sup>56</sup> This absence of martialism, Willson and others insisted, was tied to the Republic's more general lack of order.<sup>57</sup> Martialism, it was argued, required manly, conservative virtues which America did not possess in spades. For instance, Willson maintained that Americans lacked the discipline to produce good soldiers. "Subordination is never easy to the average American, in whatever capacity," he wrote. The American everyman could scarcely be turned into a true soldier "because he lacks the leading essential, discipline; because he has never been made to learn that hard lesson, implicit obedience."<sup>58</sup>

At the end of the day, however, Canadian imperialists only approved of American expansionism when it was directed at Spanish colonies or at remote islands in the South Pacific. They quickly changed their tune when expansion appeared to threaten Canada or the British Empire. Indeed, imperialists were more or less united in their opposition to the Monroe Doctrine, which they saw as both regressive and aggressive. Beckles Willson, for instance, firmly believed that the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade the European powers from establishing new colonies in the Americas, was an obstacle to the progress of western civilization:

The Monroe doctrine has indeed been called the one example now surviving of a first-class Power setting its strength against progress. It is opposing the principle of the "constantly increasing responsibility of the superior and competent nations and the constantly lessening sway, influence, and territory of the inferior and the incompetent," which is today one of the mightiest forces in the world. It is telling Peru, Venezuela, Paraguay, Columbia, and the rest, that they shall be protected in their degraded policy and incompetence, and it is telling the great trustees of Africa and Asia, and the islands of the

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

<sup>57</sup> Martialism is often tied to the antimodern ethos. "The martial ideal is virtually timeless," Jackson Lears writes in his 1981 study of American antimodernism. "From Odysseus to Lancelot, from samurai to citizen-soldier, the figure of the warrior has preoccupied human imagination. It is a risky business to link such a universal image to particular historical circumstances. Yet for cultivated Americans during the late nineteenth century, concern with martial virtue did help to focus many of the particular dilemmas generated by the crisis of cultural authority. To bourgeois moralists preoccupied by the decadence and disorder of their society, the warrior's willingness to suffer or die for duty's sake pointed the way to national purification; to those who craved authentic selfhood, the warrior's life personified wholeness of purpose and intensity of experience. War promised both social and personal regeneration." [Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the transformation of American culture, 1880-1920* (New York, 1981), 98.]

<sup>58</sup> Willson, *The New America*, 126.

sea that they must cease their work of morality and civilization in the Western Hemisphere, because in 1823 Mr. Monroe dreaded the Holy Alliance!

European colonization, Willson argued at the turn of the twentieth century, would uplift the “semi-civilized” peoples of Latin America: “Assuming that Germany, highly civilized, efficient, capable, and honest, desires to plant a German colony in the Southern Continent. Does any but a prating dunce or a parish bigot suppose that this would not redound to the advantage of the whole district where German institutions rose, German thrift spread, or German laws ran?” Besides, Willson did not believe that European, in particular German, ventures in Latin America constituted a threat to the United States: “If Germany were to invade and conquer Argentina, America would not be menaced any more than if Germany were to conquer Greece or Portugal. Argentina is 5000 miles from Washington.” Indeed, though he would later serve as a senior officer in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, in 1903 Willson was not above preaching racial solidarity with Germany: “The truth is, America herself would greatly benefit from Germany’s colonizing labours in the Southern Continent. She has far more bond with a great cultured Protestant Germany than with the horde of semi-Spanish, semi-civilized Peruvians and Argentinians.”<sup>59</sup>

Most pre-World War One imperialists were inclined to view the Monroe Doctrine – and American might in general – as a threat to the Dominion. Stephen Leacock, for his part, argued in 1909 that the Doctrine had mutated during the 1890s and had become an instrument of American domination. Indeed, American posturing during the 1895 Venezuelan boundary dispute had convinced Leacock that Washington believed that the Monroe Doctrine gave it the right to sever Canada’s ties to Britain and turn the Dominion into an American protectorate:

But in so far as international law is of any account, the Cleveland-Olney version of the Monroe doctrine would certainly reduce the Dominion of Canada to the most impotent simulacrum of nationality that it is possible to conceive. Here we have three propositions: first, the Monroe doctrine is international law; second, the Monroe doctrine declares that the United States is sovereign in America; third, it also declares that a permanent political connexion between Great Britain and Canada is unnatural and inexpedient. The propositions followed to their logical conclusion mean that Canada is a vassal state of the

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 88-89, 90, n. 1, 91-92.

American republic, whose present connexion with the British Empire cannot be permanently tolerated.<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, Leacock scoffed at the idea that the Monroe Doctrine protected Canada against an attack by a European power. Britain, not America, was Canada's protector. Indeed, Leacock insisted that the United States would not risk being dragged into a European war simply to defend a British dominion:

Consider now a moment what would be the consequences, under present conditions of international politics, of the supposed axiom that Canada is protected by the United States. It could only mean that no matter what European power or combination of powers might be at war with Great Britain, no matter how the United States might otherwise be disposed towards that power, no matter what part Canada might be taking in the contest, as an active ally, as a field of recruitment, as a granary of food supply – that the United States would declare to the European power that Canadian territory, Canadian ships, and Canadian commerce were outside of the legitimate field of belligerent attack. The thing is absolute nonsense ... The only person who fails to grasp the situation is the Canadian patriot-politician sitting upon a snow pile and meandering about the protection afforded him by President Monroe.<sup>61</sup>

Continentalists firmly rejected the idea that the Monroe Doctrine was threatening, regressive, or imperialistic. John S. Ewart, who had acted as the chief counsel for Canada during the 1910 North Atlantic fisheries arbitration at The Hague, insisted in 1913 that the Monroe Doctrine's "operation has been extremely beneficial" to both Canada and the wider pan-American community. The doctrine did not threaten Canada, quite the contrary, and it had "never either led to war, or to participation in war by the United States. Its original enunciation for example, in 1823, *prevented* war. The mere knowledge of its existence

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<sup>60</sup> Stephen Leacock, "Canada and the Monroe Doctrine," *University Magazine* VIII (1909): 365.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 370-371. During the interwar years, most imperialists would cease to regard the Monroe Doctrine as a direct threat to Canadian security. Nevertheless, few Tories were willing to acknowledge that the Monroe Doctrine, and American might in general, were the mainstays of Canadian security. "In the past some Canadians as well as Americans have been in the habit of saying that Canada's main source of security was the American policy embodied in the Monroe Doctrine," wrote R. G. Trotter in 1940. "Actually the strength of Canada's position has always mainly consisted ... in the prestige and power afforded her by the British connection." [Trotter, *North America and the War* (Toronto, 1940), 35-36.]

turned aside the purpose of the Alliance. Prevention of war has been its effect from 1824 to 1913."<sup>62</sup>

Nevertheless, during the period under study, continentalist intellectuals were often more critical of American foreign policy than their anti-American counterparts. This pattern emerged in the late 1890s, when Washington acquired what essentially amounted to colonies in the Caribbean and the South Pacific. Many Canadian continentalists were indeed unimpressed by America's nascent imperialism. A strong anti-imperialist current ran through the continentalist ethos, and its principal spokesman at the turn of the twentieth century was Goldwin Smith. In 1902, he published *Commonwealth or Empire: A Bystander's View of the Question*, a short essay denouncing American imperialism. The United States, he insisted, had reached a fork in the road:

Shall the American Republic be what it has hitherto been, follow its own destiny, and do what it can to fulfil the special hopes which humanity has founded on it; or shall it slide into an imitation of European Imperialism, and be drawn, with the military powers of Europe, into a career of conquest and domination over subject races, with the political liabilities which such a career entails? This was and is the main issue for humanity. Seldom has a nation been brought so distinctly as the American nation now is to the parting of the ways. Never has a nation's choice been more important to mankind.<sup>63</sup>

Imperialism, Smith argued, was a serious threat to America's republican institutions. He believed that the subjugation of "half-civilized races" would destroy the very principles of liberty and equality upon which the American Republic was founded. Imperial expansionism was also a menace to America's "moral foundations." It bred barbarity in both the conquered and the conqueror. Indeed, regarding American attempts to suppress a revolt in the Philippines, Smith questioned whether "the character of the conquerors" would "remain untainted by this competition in cruelty with a half-civilized race."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Ewart, "The Canning Policy Sometimes Called the Monroe Doctrine," 171, 185.

<sup>63</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Commonwealth or Empire: A Bystander's View of the Question* (New York, 1902), 2. Though an ardent supporter of the "moral reunion" of Britain and the United States, Smith viewed the possibility of an Anglo-American alliance with distaste: "A league between two States in different parts of the globe, bound together merely by origin or language, yet sworn to fight in each other's quarrels, whatever the cause was, would be a conspiracy against international morality and the independence of all nations such as would soon compel the world to take arms for its overthrow," he wrote in *Commonwealth or Empire*. "Nobody would be cajoled by such phrases as 'spreading civilization' or 'imposing universal peace.' The world does not want to have anything imposed on it by an Anglo-Saxon league or by a combination of any kind." [Ibid., 49-50.]

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 34, 74.

Smith was equally worried by the growth of militarism that he believed had accompanied America's turn-of-the-century imperial ventures. Like many nineteenth-century republicans, he had a profound aversion to large standing armies, which he viewed as a threat to both freedom and democracy. "It is needless to say what is the relation of Militarism to political liberty. It has been the same ever since the military power enslaved Rome," he wrote in 1902.<sup>65</sup> Smith's repeated references to ancient Rome in *Commonwealth or Empire* were significant. Indeed, his reading of history had convinced him that empires were essentially ephemeral. As a result, he believed that America's transition from republic to empire, like that of ancient Rome, would eventually lead to disintegration.

Two years earlier, another admirer of the American Constitution, Edmond de Nevers, had argued that imperialist expansion and militarism represented a significant – and largely negative – break with America's political and moral traditions:

Ce qui est gros de conséquences, c'est le fait que les États-Unis ont rompu avec leurs traditions et sont entrés dans la voie de l'impérialisme. Pendant la période coloniale avant d'entreprendre une guerre, on cherchait à s'autoriser des textes de la Bible que l'on discutait longuement et que l'on savait toujours, à la vérité, concilier avec ses intérêts. A partir de la fondation de la République, la Constitution, la Déclaration de l'Indépendance, les enseignements de Washington, de Jefferson et de Monroe ont été l'évangile religieusement suivi. Il semble maintenant que chez une partie importante de la population, on ne veuille plus prendre conseil que de son bon plaisir et ne consulter que sa force.<sup>66</sup>

Despite being a decorated veteran of the Spanish-American conflict, Sylva Clapin was also opposed to American imperialism and militarism. America's phenomenal growth in the nineteenth century, he believed, could be found in the nation's repudiation of militarism: "Contrairement à ce qui se passe en Europe, où la politique des armements à outrance immobilise chaque année trois millions de ses habitants les plus robustes, toutes les forces vives de la nation contribuent, aux États-Unis, au développement du pays, et concourent à la création de la richesse publique." Nevertheless, in the conclusion to his 1900 survey of American history, Clapin noted the recent emergence of "un esprit guerrier pouvant pousser

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>66</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L'âme américaine*, vol. I (Paris, 1900), 311.

aux pires aventures.” This martial spirit troubled the erstwhile editor of the *Courier de Saint-Hyacinthe*.

Autre indice inquiétant pour l’avenir. Le militarisme, qu’on croyait impossible aux États-Unis, commence à s’implanter chez nos voisins, depuis l’écrasement de l’Espagne, qui a démontré à l’univers que la république américaine était maintenant une puissance avec laquelle il fallait compter. L’armée régulière a aujourd’hui atteint un chiffre considérable, et des armements formidables se poursuivent dans tous les chantiers de la marine. Bien plus, l’annexion de Porto-Rico et des îles Philippines a fait naître, surtout chez les républicains, toute une politique d’agrandissement qu’on a résumée d’un mot: l’impérialisme. C’est sur cette question que se font les élections présidentielles de cette année (1900), qui auront leur dénouement au mois de novembre prochain, et c’est là encore le courant qui a déterminé l’intervention toute récente des États-Unis en Chine, où les soldats américains ont marché à l’assaut de Pékin, côte à côte avec les armées des grandes puissances de l’Europe.<sup>67</sup>

Martialism and imperialism were not well viewed in French Canada. Indeed, liberals and conservatives alike regarded imperialist expansion and militarism with deep suspicion. The moral upliftment of Africa and Asia, it was argued, could not be achieved at the point of a bayonet.<sup>68</sup> To this effect, *nationaliste* poet William Chapman derided claims that an American victory in the Spanish-American War would serve the higher interests of humanity. America, he asserted in 1898, was ill-placed to give the world lessons in humanitarian upliftment:

Cette guerre est ignominieuse, et ce qui nous la fait trouver plus criminelle encore, c’est la déclaration hypocrite des Américains qui prétendent ne vouloir répandre le sang que pour servir l’humanité. Ah! nous connaissons l’amour des enfants de l’oncle Sam pour l’humanité; nous savons comment ils ont traité et comment ils traitent encore la race noire sous le drapeau semé d’étoiles; nous avons encore devant les yeux l’exemple abominable

<sup>67</sup> Sylva Clapin, *Histoire des États-Unis depuis les premiers établissements jusqu’à nos jours* (Montreal, 1900), 210-212.

<sup>68</sup> French Canadian notions of racial upliftment generally revolved around missionary activity. “Nous sommes un petit peuple, et, tenant à garder l’état de grâce, nous ne voulons aucune part à aucun impérialisme de chair, britannique ou étatsunien,” wrote Father Jacques Cousineau in 1941. “Notre rayonnement comme notre impérialisme est d’Évangile. Par nos missionnaires d’Amérique, d’Afrique, de Chine, des Indes et de partout, qui veulent la paix du Christ dans le règne du Christ.” [Cousineau, “Ne nous induisez pas en tentation...” *L’Action nationale* XVII (1941): 521.]



qu'ils ont donné au monde civilisé en souffrant dans l'Utah la polygamie, en laissant Brigham Young abaisser des milliers de chrétiens policés au niveau de véritables bêtes humaines perdues dans les ténèbres de l'ignorance et de la perversité.<sup>69</sup>

Later on, America's belated entry into the two world wars and her refusal to join the League of Nations caused significant shifts in the tone and focus of Canadian commentary. Indeed, from 1914 until the early 1940s, Canadian discussion of American foreign policy generally revolved around the issue of isolationism.<sup>70</sup> As a strategic doctrine, isolation generated a great deal of criticism in the Dominion, far more, in fact, than American imperialism ever had.

Quebec was an exception to this trend. Indeed, French Canadian criticism of American foreign policy diminished during the interwar years. Unlike their English Canadian peers, most French Canadian intellectuals were relatively ambivalent when it came American isolation. On the one hand, French Canadian intellectuals approved of the League of Nations and, more generally, of multilateralism. American isolation, in this sense, was seen as detrimental to the new world order that had emerged from the Great War. To this effect, in 1935, Paul-Henri Guimont, who had recently received an M.A. in economics from Harvard University, urged President Roosevelt to embrace a more interventionist vision of foreign affairs:

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<sup>69</sup> William Chapman, *À propos de la Guerre hispano-américaine* (Quebec, 1898), ii-iii. Chapman would tone down the anti-American rhetoric in a subsequent edition of this poem. [Jean Ménard, "À propos de la Guerre hispano-américaine, poème de William Chapman," in *Dictionnaire des œuvres littéraires du Québec*, vol. 2.]

<sup>70</sup> The theme of American imperialism received little attention in interwar English Canada. Indeed, many intellectuals believed that the United States had abandoned imperialism after the Great War. P. E. Corbett, for instance, saw Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy as a repudiation of imperialism: "The policy of the good neighbour' is a phrase first used by President Roosevelt, though the policy itself was inaugurated by his predecessor. It means the end of American imperialism. To some it means the end of the Monroe Doctrine; and if that is not the case, it at least involves the transformation of the doctrine from a proud declaration of unilateral intent into an agreed common directive of Pan-American policy." Others were not convinced that the imperialist impulse had disappeared from America's political culture. For instance, in 1945, George Grant predicted a postwar *retour de force* of American imperialism: "When speakers proclaim that this war will mean the end of imperialism, I presume they mean the end of that ruthless form of rapine that is the extreme form of imperialism. If they mean that large nations are not going to influence other countries, they are denying the whole nature of human life. If they mean that powerful nations like the United States are not going to maintain security in the Pacific, they cannot be reading their newspapers. In this hemisphere, the U.S.A. is inevitably going to influence South America. In eastern Europe the U.S.S.R. will naturally dominate the satellites around it. As the strong member of a family inevitably influences that family, so also inevitably in human affairs there will be imperialism." In Quebec, the interwar discussion of American imperialism generally revolved around cultural and economic issues. These are discussed in Chapters 6, 8, 10, and 12. [Corbett, "American Foreign Policy," *University of Toronto Quarterly* VII (1938): 221; Grant, *The Empire*, 10.]

À l'extérieur, il devra endosser la politique wilsonienne et collaborer d'une manière plus étroite et moins sentimentale sur le plan international, ce qu'il n'a encore guère recherché et ce que l'esprit américain ne semble guère disposé à admettre. Le salut économique de la nation américaine ne doit pas être laissé à la merci d'un peuple en désarroi, d'un peuple encore borné par la hantise de ses propres frontières. La participation aux affaires mondiales est un attribut de la virilité d'un peuple. Pour avoir cru à la pérennité de leur propre puissance que d'empires anciens se sont écroulés!<sup>71</sup>

Nevertheless, most interwar French Canadian intellectuals dreaded foreign entanglements. As a result, they were generally hostile to the idea of multilateral interventionism sponsored by the League of Nations. Indeed, in many ways, Quebec and the United States shared a similar worldview during the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently, criticism of American isolationism was rare in Quebec's intellectual circles, and most thinkers would have agreed with Lionel Roy (b. 1905), a lawyer and contributor to *Le Canada français*, when he noted in 1933 that the American "participation à la vie internationale n'est ni plus brillante, ni plus onéreuse que celle des autres nations. Leur politique est avant tout nationale."<sup>72</sup>

In interwar English Canada, the intellectual atmosphere was not particularly congenial to American isolationism. Many continentalists embraced liberal internationalism and were accordingly appalled by America's refusal to join the League of Nations, which James T. Shotwell considered to be "one of the greatest political mistakes the United States has made."<sup>73</sup> A former foreign policy advisor to President Woodrow Wilson, Shotwell worked ceaselessly during the interwar years to counter American isolationism and to promote America's entry into the League of Nations, eventually becoming the president of the American League of Nations Association in 1935. John W. Dafoe, who played a key role in the founding of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, was equally disappointed by America's refusal to accept her international responsibilities. Drawing on his experience at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which he had attended as a member of the Canadian delegation, Dafoe scolded the Americans attending a 1935 conference on Canadian-American relations for their nation's rejection of Wilsonian idealism:

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<sup>71</sup> P.-H. Guimont, "Coup d'œil sur l'Amérique contemporaine," *L'Actualité économique* XI (1935): 39.

<sup>72</sup> Lionel Roy, "Roosevelt travaille," *Le Canada français* XXI (1933): 311.

<sup>73</sup> J. T. Shotwell, *The Heritage of Freedom: The United States and Canada in the Community of Nations* (New York, 1934), 88.

I was present at the Peace Conference in Paris with Dr. Shotwell. There was something to be seen at Paris that never happened in the world before. One country, at a great international conference, had the moral leadership of the world by universal consent; not by military leadership or leadership by the threat of force, but by the strength of a moral ideal. I want to say to you Americans that that was the hour of your power and your glory, – and you threw it away, with very serious consequences to yourselves and with consequences to the world far beyond calculation.<sup>74</sup>

A majority of continentalists saw isolationism as a dangerous policy both for the United States and the wider world. With the benefit of hindsight, John MacCormac condemned isolation in *America and World Mastery: The Future of the United States, Canada, and the British Empire* (1942). America's refusal to accept her international responsibilities, he argued, had created the international power vacuum that had permitted the rise of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan:

Nothing could more conclusively have demonstrated the dangers of isolationist thinking than the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor by an army and navy whose leaders had also been infected with the general belief that 'it can't happen here.' For Pearl Harbor was as inevitably the product of Maginot Line mentality as Dunkerque ... The United States has distrusted others and been unsure of herself. Her sin has been the sin of omission. Her lack of faith in her ability to lead has created a vacuum in the world which finally sucked from the depths the dark dictatorship of Hitler.<sup>75</sup>

In the final months of the Second World War, few Canadian intellectuals feared America's status as an emerging superpower. On the contrary, most worried that the United States would again retreat from the world stage once the conflict ended. Continentalists were particularly anxious to see the United States assume the mantle of postwar international leadership. Many, including Edgar McInnis, were concerned that postwar America would chart "a middle course between the old isolation and an outright acceptance of full commitments under a world organization." Unfortunately, argued the future director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, "such an attitude might fall short of the full

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<sup>74</sup> J. W. Dafoe, "Final Luncheon," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1936), 285.

<sup>75</sup> John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery: The Future of the United States, Canada, and the British Empire* (New York, 1942), 4, 39.

demands of the post-war situation." McInnis believed that America's political system and her political culture were serious impediments to the nation assuming its role as an international leader. "The real question, however, is not whether the majority will favour positive and constructive action, but whether the will of the majority can be made to prevail over the stubborn opposition of a handful of irreconcilable isolationists," he wrote in a 1944 article published in the *Canadian Historical Review*. More worrisome, perhaps, was America's fundamental mistrust of supranationalism:

Quite apart from the jealousy of national sovereignty and the distrust of anything resembling a super-state, there is a lively apprehension about any external obligations which may in any way trench upon the American constitution. There are certain matters such as the declaration of war, the approval of treaties, the determination of fiscal policy, which are vested in Congress. Any long-range promises of action that appear to tie the hands of future Congresses are certain to be refused. If it comes to a choice between limiting the American contribution to world stability and even the appearance of a restriction of the American constitution, the United States will rally to the constitution every time.<sup>76</sup>

Nevertheless, American isolationism had its apologists. Indeed, though most continentalists were critical of isolation many were also, true to form, inclined to minimize and relativize its effects. For instance, Toronto *Globe* journalist Peter McArthur (1866-1924), whose weekly column on rural life was widely read, insisted that American isolation should not be confused with indifference. In *The Affable Stranger* (1920), a series of sketches of American life gathered while on a trip through the United States, he argued that the United States would eventually assume its international responsibilities:

While I would not pretend to defend the United States for its present isolation and apparent indifference when so many of my compatriots – and those the ones supposed to speak with authority – are pointing the finger of scorn, I have a feeling that under this apparent indifference there is a blind, instinctive groping for the true solution of humanity's problem. I found the best people perplexed rather than defiant. They were raging at their own futility – futile because they could not yet see through the battle-

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<sup>76</sup> Edgar W. McInnis, "The United States and World Settlement," *Canadian Historical Review* XXV (1944): 152, 162-163.

smoke that still envelops the world. And I am hopeful that before long they will fulfil Kipling's estimate:

"While reproof around him rings  
He turns a keen untroubled face  
Home, to the instant need of things."<sup>77</sup>

Moreover, many continentalists argued that isolationist sentiment was hardly confined to the United States. "The American world-outlook frequently appears to Canadians insular and selfish, although in many respects there is a striking similarity between it and their own," wrote the University of British Columbia's future dean of graduate studies, Henry F. Angus, in 1938.<sup>78</sup> H. Carl Goldenberg agreed. "In so far as Canada shares in the sentiment of the United States towards foreign entanglements, that feeling is not confined to those of the French minority," he wrote in 1936. "Rightly or wrongly, the Canadian outlook on foreign policy is definitely becoming North American."<sup>79</sup>

Attempts to explain or excuse American isolation were rarer during the two world wars. Even so, a certain defence of American neutrality could be found in wartime continentalist circles. For instance, in July 1915, O. D. Skelton argued that the United States was more useful to the Allied cause as a neutral nation:

Looked at from the Allies' standpoint, it is probably to our advantage that the United States should keep out, if possible. True, it has a strong and efficient navy, practically equally to Germany's, but the Allies' naval preponderance is already tremendous, while its army is small and in spite of big expenditure, not too well equipped. If it were to enter the war, it would simply mean that the stream of munitions now beginning to go to the Allies would be turned to the use of the United States forces, who would not be able to use them for many months later. The progress of the war has shown, as never before realized, that the man in the factory is as essential as the man in the trench, and by devoting a great part of its manufacturing equipment to turning out supplies for the Allies, the United States is setting free so many more Englishmen and Frenchmen for the field.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Peter McArthur, *The Affable Stranger* (New York, 1920), 58-59.

<sup>78</sup> H. F. Angus, "General Analysis of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada," in his *Canada and Her Great Neighbor*, 21.

<sup>79</sup> H. C. Goldenberg, "'Americanization' of Canada," *Fortnightly Review* CXLV (1936): 694.

<sup>80</sup> O. D. Skelton, "Current Events: The Position of the United States," *Queen's Quarterly* XXIII (1915): 107.

A quarter century later, and after a year spent as a Guggenheim Fellow at Harvard University, F. R. Scott insisted that American neutrality was little more than a facade. The United States, he noted in July 1941, had become a quasi-belligerent whose support was vital to the Allied war effort:

Now the principal fact about the United States is that its policy is one of all aid to Britain. This is the predominant current of opinion. The qualification "short of war," which used to go along with the statement of policy, was quietly dropped after the lend-lease bill was signed in March. And this policy has an overwhelming majority behind it. Moreover, as the pressure in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean increases, opinion in favor of increasing the amount of aid solidifies. The logic of the policy carries opinion along. If you have decided to help someone because their existence is necessary for your defense, when they need more help it seems natural to provide it.<sup>81</sup>

F. R. Scott's defence of American neutrality was more than knee-jerk continentalism. Along with Frank Underhill, Scott was one of the Dominion's leading proponents of North American isolationism in the 1930s. In fact, most of the intellectuals involved in the League for Social Reconstruction rejected the liberal internationalism of Shotwell and Dafoe. In a stinging review of Dafoe's influential *Canada: an American Nation* (1935), Underhill lashed out at the old man's "vague expressions of faith in League ideals":

But what if the outside world persists in going mad, as it has persisted since Mr. Dafoe delivered these lectures? Isn't it about time that we began to consider seriously this possibility of North American isolation? American journals have been full in recent months of discussion of this theme. But in Canada there is a persistent silence; and in our circumstances, with entanglements both in the League of Nations and in the British Empire, silence really means casting your vote for Canadian participation in the next European war. If we don't discuss possible alternatives before the fever of war is sweeping over us, we shall have no alternative at the critical moment but to succumb to the fever.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> F. R. Scott, "Currents of American Opinion," *Canadian Forum* XXI (1941): 104.

<sup>82</sup> F. H. Underhill, "Review of J.W. Dafoe's *Canada, An American Nation*," *Canadian Forum* XV (1935): 301.

The Great War had deeply embittered Underhill and, unlike fellow CCFer F. R. Scott, the University of Toronto's most controversial professor did not shy away from the isolationist label.<sup>83</sup>

During the interwar years, the most sweeping critique of American isolation did not come from liberals like Dafoe or Shotwell, but rather from the intellectuals associated with Canada's Tory tradition. For Dafoe and Shotwell, isolation squandered a good deal of America's promise. Imperialists, for their part, saw isolationism as the logical consequence of America's fundamental flaws. And as was so often the case, the Republic's shortcomings could be traced back to 1776, when Americans foolishly chose to forsake the imperial bond and found their nation on rupture and abstraction. In the United States, wrote R. G. Trotter in 1924, "violent severance of the imperial tie produced a natural pride in independence that became a paramount trait, which, however fine in itself, bred inevitably a special sense of isolation from the world in general." Conversely, in Canada, "attachment to the imperial link involved the handicap of a long-continuing attitude of colonial dependence, but it also afforded a unique opportunity for realizing national aspirations without losing the sense, or the reality, of being part of a larger whole."<sup>84</sup> In imperialist prose, the parochialism of the American mind was repeatedly contrasted with Canadian outward-lookingness. It was argued that respect for tradition and continuity – the very essence of conservatism – lead Canadians to repudiate isolationism. To this effect, in 1945, Donald Creighton insisted that Canada's Commonwealth connection was a bulwark against isolation:

Unquestionably Canada has been able to indulge a sense of detachment and irresponsibility; but, at the same time, this not untypical North American feeling of separateness has been modified in part by the British Commonwealth experience of community. The modern Commonwealth, which is neither centralized nor exclusive, has accustomed its member states to think naturally in terms of a wider and more political

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<sup>83</sup> "I am not an isolationist," insisted F. R. Scott in June 1939. "I do not believe that Canada can live by herself. I think she should join the Pan-American Union immediately. But I would insist that Canadians themselves must determine when and where we intervene in any part of the world. Our choice should always be determined by the real interests of Canada. I do not happen to see those interests demanding our intervention in the expected European war. This, however, is far from a policy of isolation." [Scott, "Defense and External Obligations: Discussion," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 19-22, 1939, *Proceedings*, 215.]

<sup>84</sup> R. G. Trotter, "Some American Influences Upon the Canadian Federation Movement," *Canadian Historical Review* V (1924): 226-227.

organization. And, in the present realities of world politics, this disposition towards an international organization has gradually become a conviction in its necessity.<sup>85</sup>

Imperialists were particularly harsh on American isolationism and neutrality during the first years of the two world wars. In the 1917 edition of the *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, John Castell Hopkins lashed out at isolationist sentiment in the United States, which he attributed to the numerous defects of American society: "The result of educational looseness of thought, public ignorance of the complexities of international life or the living lessons of history, contempt for precedent and the products of past thinking or experience – many of the difficulties innate in democracy – were embodied in United States Pacifism during these War years."<sup>86</sup> For Hopkins and many others, the American rejection of tradition and Europe would forever poison American society.

Traditionalism, indeed, was at the core of the conservative critique of America. However, though imperialist and *nationaliste* anti-Americanism possessed similar foundations, they diverged on a number of key issues, notably those surrounding Canadian-American relations and American foreign policy. Indeed, French Canadian hostility to imperialism made Quebec's *nationalistes* far more open to a Canadian-American rapprochement and far less inclined to support American expansionism. In many ways, their attitude towards America's relationship with the wider world was similar to that of English Canadian continentalists. French Canadian nationalists were persistent critics of American society, but their attitude towards Canada's relationship with the United States was, in many ways, ambivalent.

Intellectuals are not always perfectly coherent in their rhetoric. Consequently, a certain degree of ambivalence and contradiction is present throughout Canadian writing on "the American question." Indeed, as we shall observe in the next chapter, precious few pre-1945 imperialists were opposed either to American immigration or to the establishment of American branch plants. Likewise, most *nationalistes* were not passionately opposed to reciprocity.

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<sup>85</sup> D. G. Creighton, "Canada in the English-Speaking World," *Canadian Historical Review* XXVI (1945): 127.

<sup>86</sup> J. C. Hopkins, "The United States and the War," *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (1917): 270. Not all imperialists were as harshly critical of American neutrality, at least not during the initial stages of the Great War. For instance, in December 1914, Stephen Leacock applauded "the tremendous moral support that our empire gains, in this life and death struggle, from the good-will of the United States." "It is a pity that this friendly attitude of the United States is not more widely understood and appreciated in Canada," he wrote in the *University Magazine*. [Leacock, "The American Attitude," *University Magazine* XIII (1914): 595, 597.]



## *Chapter Twelve*

### Canadian-American Trade, Unionism, and Migration

America was regarded as a transformative agency by Canadian intellectuals. Indeed, as we have seen in previous chapters, American mass culture was viewed as an agent of socio-cultural change, of Americanization. Moreover, Canadian-American trade, American investment, international labour unionism, and cross-border migration were also believed to possess the power to fundamentally alter the Canadian experience.

For conservative intellectuals, this continental interplay was a source of concern. In certain instances, concern even verged on obsession. Pre-World-War-One imperialists, for instance, resisted the liberalization of Canadian-American trade tooth and nail because they believed that it would sunder the bonds of empire which, in turn, would inexorably lead to annexation. Imperial trade – many imperialists even dreamed of establishing an imperial zollverein – nourished Canadian distinctiveness and tradition; free trade with the United States would slowly poison both. Imperialism found its *raison d'être* in the struggle against reciprocity. Nevertheless, pre-1945 imperialists were relatively untroubled by international unionism, by the growth of American investment, and by cross-border migration, which were generally viewed as minor issues.

By contrast, in Quebec, these matters generated a torrent of prose, most of which was anti-American. For instance, anti-American rhetoric played an important, though largely unsuccessful role in the *nationaliste* strategy to put an end to French Canadian emigration to the United States. Indeed, the *fièvre des États* that struck Quebec in the late nineteenth century compelled the clergy and its conservative allies to declare all-out war on America. Emigration was viewed as a significant threat to the French Canadian nation. It sapped Quebec's demographic vitality and exposed hundreds of thousands of French Canadian Catholics to assimilation and apostasy. Along with international unionism and American investment, *nationaliste* intellectuals argued that emigration destabilized French Canadian society and threatened its traditional values. Quebec's handful of continentalist intellectuals also worried about emigration and American investment, but refused to resort to anti-American rhetoric to make their point. The province's problems lay not in an American erosion of French Canadian tradition, but in tradition itself.

For English Canada's continentalist thinkers, socio-economic interaction with the United States was vitally important to the Dominion's development and prosperity. The growth of a modern, North American society required a closer economic relationship with the United States. Indeed, free trade and American investment were regarded not as forerunners of annexation, but as necessary alternatives to the Tory chimeras of imperial federation and British tradition. Protectionism and anti-American nationalism were inherently unnatural and unprogressive; they stifled Canada's intrinsic *américanité* and drove a wedge between "the Siamese Twins of North America."

### *Tariffs, Trade, and Investment*

Issues related to tariffs, trade, and investment have long been integral to the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. In English Canada, for instance, the debate surrounding reciprocity has traditionally aroused a great deal of passion and has acted as a litmus test for anti-American sentiment. More often than not, the Dominion's commercial relationship with the United States was viewed as the paramount issue in Canadian-American relations. Cross-border trade had the power to fundamentally transform the Canadian experience. Indeed, to trade freely with the United States was, many argued, to drift away from Britain and, in turn, to append the Dominion to its powerful neighbour.

During the period under study, the free trade debate reached a fever pitch during the federal election of 1911, which was called by Wilfrid Laurier's Liberals to decide the fate of a reciprocity agreement negotiated with the Taft administration. By contrast, the 'free trade' election of 1891 had not aroused the same intensity of passion because it was centred on the abstract issue of 'unrestricted reciprocity' with the United States rather than on a concrete agreement.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Canadian imperialists were overwhelmingly hostile to the liberalization of Canadian-American trade.<sup>1</sup> Arguments

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<sup>1</sup> In this regard, Andrew Macphail stands out as one of the few imperialists of his generation to support reciprocity. Indeed, Macphail appears to have had a greater aversion to trusts and combines, which he believed were nourished by tariffs, than to the United States. "The world is not governed by argument when moral issues are involved," he wrote in 1908. "They see what is happening in certain communities which enjoy the ineffable blessings of protection – legislators bought as one would buy a drove of swine, men who have grown rich under Protection divorcing the wives of their poorer days and publicly consorting with harlots, their sons committing murder in public places with impunity. Corruption of public life and the degradation of society to a condition of savagery is – so runs the feeling – too high a price for the people to pay for the enrichment of an interested class." Later, as Macphail dissected the results of the 1911 federal election, he heaped scorn on his fellow citizens for their rejection of reciprocity: "These terrified Canadians distrusted not the Americans but

generally revolved around the political implications of reciprocity, but imperialists also questioned its economic advantages. The American and Canadian economies, it was argued, were not complementary, since both nations' exports were similar and competed with each other on international markets. The continent's basic geography had created distinct two economic spaces and the thrust of Canada's east-west axis commanded that the bulk of the Dominion's exports be directed towards Europe and, in particular, towards Britain. In *The Great Dominion: Studies of Canada* (1895), George R. Parkin summarized the imperialist school's economic arguments against free trade. His line of reasoning constitutes an early articulation of what would later become known as the Laurentian thesis:

What is the natural market for Canadian products? This is a question much debated in Canadian party politics; it is a question which should be studied closely in England, where it is often carelessly assumed that the contiguity of the United States creates for Canada an overwhelming interest in the market nearest at hand. Without detailed examination of the facts, this conclusion is a natural one. That 65,000,000 of people on its immediate borders should make a far greater demand on the products of the Dominion than 40,000,000 of people 3,000 miles away, seems, on first thought, a reasonable inference. It does not seem so reasonable when we reflect on the one simple fact that the staple products of Canada are, with one or two exceptions, staple products of the United States as well, and that, therefore, over a large range of industry, the two countries are natural rivals in markets where their surplus products are required. There is a physical fact, too, which must be once more specially noted in considering the question. Almost to the heart of the continent Canada enjoys the advantage of water carriage – a circumstance which beyond everything else minimizes for commercial purposes the effect of distance ... Keeping these considerations in view, it seems to me capable of demonstration that the great and dominant trading interests of Canada lie with Britain rather than with the United States – with the far market rather than with the near.<sup>2</sup>

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themselves, and they disclosed to the world that they had no faith in their own citizenship ... In no other country in the world but China could the like be seen, a nationality declaring that its existence depended upon the limitation of trade with a neighbour." Besides, he insisted, reciprocity would not have sundered the British connection, since true loyalty was "an inner experience like religion, a reverence for that which appeared to our ancestors to be good and true, an inner bond which binds men together." [Macphail, "Protection and Politics," *University Magazine* VII (1908): 252-253; "Why the Liberals Failed," *University Magazine* X (1911): 572, 575, 580.]

<sup>2</sup> G. R. Parkin, *The Great Dominion: Studies of Canada* (London, 1895), 186-187.

Imperialists consistently argued that the potential of the American market paled before the vast possibilities of imperial trade. As a result, an imperial customs union was viewed as the key to Canadian prosperity.

More often than not, however, imperialists relied on political arguments to attack reciprocity.<sup>3</sup> Political allegiance and sentiment, they insisted, invariably followed trade. As a result, a significant diversion of Canada's international trade towards the United States would inexorably lead to the sundering of the imperial bond and, eventually, to annexation. This line of argument was used most fully during the 1911 election, when the issue of reciprocity was often presented as a clear-cut choice between the British connection and annexation to the United States, or in the binary logic of imperialism, between tradition and modernity.<sup>4</sup>

The founding editor of *The British News of Canada*, Arthur Hawkes (1871-1933), was particularly adept at exploiting this line of reasoning. Born in Kent, England, Hawkes had worked as a reporter for several British newspapers, including the *Manchester Guardian*, before emigrating to Canada in 1905. As the general secretary of the Canadian National League, an anti-reciprocity front group, he contributed to the barrage of propaganda that played a key role in the defeat of the 1911 reciprocity agreement. "The agreement proves that the time has come for Canada to choose, perhaps finally, between remaining in the orbit of the Empire and achieving first renown in the constellation of kindred British nations, and gravitating to the lesser glories of the Republic," Hawkes wrote in *An Appeal to the British-Born* (1911), a widely distributed pamphlet aimed at convincing British-born Canadians to reject reciprocity. Indeed, he continued, President William Howard Taft "has clearly indicated the strength of the desire in the United States that the Reciprocity Agreement shall destroy all possibility of a commercial unity within the British Empire. In the United States

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<sup>3</sup> History and the contested memory of the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty were also used by imperialists to shore up opposition to reciprocal trade. Many, including Colonel George T. Denison, argued that the Reciprocity Treaty had not brought prosperity to Canada. The president of the British Empire League in Canada attributed the economic growth of the 1850s and 1860s to wartime demand and railway construction. If anything, reciprocity had brought economic dislocation and dependency to the fledgling nation. Imperialists were not alone in using history to promote their cause. "During 1911," noted John Castell Hopkins in the *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs*, "history was freely and variously quoted by the two Parties in Canada." Continentalists were particularly adept at exploiting the enduring – and largely positive – memory of the 1854 treaty to promote reciprocity with the United States. The 1911 agreement, they insisted, would herald a new golden age for Canada. [Denison, *The Struggle for Imperial Unity. Recollections & Experiences* (London, 1909), 5; J. C. Hopkins, "Reciprocity with the United States," *Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (1911): 19.]

<sup>4</sup> The imperialist strategy was successful. By shifting the debate away from economic issues, the anti-reciprocity forces were able to convince a majority of Canadians to reject reciprocity. Imperialists counted the defeat of the 1911 reciprocity agreement among their greatest achievements.

there is no illusion as to the extent to which commercial and political control may be interchangeable terms." The agreement, to be sure, "would destroy the artery through which East and West live a common, national life."<sup>5</sup> Only protective tariffs, Hawkes reasoned, could protect national unity and the imperial bond upon which rested Canadian nationhood.

Nevertheless, while most imperialist intellectuals fiercely opposed the liberalization of Canadian-American trade, many were also critical of American protectionism, which was viewed as an essentially hostile act. This apparent contradiction scarcely bothered most imperialists, whose resistance to the idea of reciprocity would, at any rate, steadily decline in the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>6</sup> This evolution was most apparent in Stephen Leacock, whose opposition to reciprocity had been a great asset to the Conservative party in 1911. By the 1930s, however, Leacock was regularly poking fun at his earlier antagonism to free trade with the United States. Indeed, as imperialism waned in the interwar years, so too did the movement's hostility to continental integration.

An unswerving faith in the benefits of Canadian-American free trade united continentalists of all stripes. It was indeed one of continentalism's core tenets. Free trade with the United States would bring prosperity to the Dominion, insisted intellectuals as ideologically distant as O. D. Skelton and F. R. Scott. The Canadian and American economies were complementary, and if allowed to interact freely, they would generate both wealth and employment.<sup>7</sup> North America, to be sure, was a natural economic space. As a result, even robust protectionism would not ultimately halt the progress of Canadian-American economic integration. "A reciprocity treaty, providing for free trade in raw commodities, was in effect from 1854 to 1866," wrote H. Carl Goldenberg in 1936. "Even after its abrogation, and, notwithstanding the protectionist policies of both countries, their trade continued to grow. Since 1883 the United States has steadily maintained its position as the principal source

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<sup>5</sup> Arthur Hawkes, *An Appeal to the British-Born: To Promote the Sense of Canadian Nationality, as an Increasing Power Within the British Empire, and to Preserve Unimpaired the Canadian and British Channels of Commerce on which the Prosperity of the Dominion has been Founded* (Toronto, 1911), 1, 7.

<sup>6</sup> The Canadian-American reciprocity agreements of 1935 and 1938 provoked little criticism among the Dominion's imperialist intellectuals.

<sup>7</sup> "We should try to plan our tariff adjustments with the future goal of a rationalized economy on the North American continent," O. D. Skelton told a group of Canadian and American scholars in 1935. "The number of resources in the two countries that are complementary rather than competitive is amazing." [Skelton, "Tariffs: Discussion," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1936), 49.]

of Canada's imports, and from 1921 to 1932 it was also the principal market for Canada's exports."<sup>8</sup>

Unlike their imperialist opponents, continentalists centred their arguments on economic issues. The National Policy, they insisted, was an abject failure. By discouraging trade with Canada's natural trading partner, it had slowed the nation's economic growth and fostered underdevelopment. Continentalists viewed various schemes to achieve economic self-sufficiency or to create an imperial free-trade zone as little more than conservative chimeras. In *Canada and the Canadian Question*, Goldwin Smith, who supported reciprocity with the United States in part because he believed that it would hasten continental union, heaped ridicule on the whole idea of an imperial zollverein:

It has been proposed that rather than succumb to the force of nature, and allow Canada to secure her destined measure of prosperity by trading with her own continent, England should put back the shadow on the dial of economical history, institute an Imperial Zollverein, and restore to the Colonies their former protection against the foreigner in her market. It is hardly necessary to discuss a policy in which Great Britain would have to take the initiative, and which no British statesman has shown the slightest disposition to embrace. The trade, both of imports and exports, of England with the Colonies was, in 1889, £187,000,000; her total trade in the same year with foreign countries was £554,000,000. Is it likely that she will sacrifice a trade of £554,000,000 sterling to a trade of £187,000,000 sterling? The framers of an Imperial Zollverein, moreover, would have some lively work in reconciling the tendencies of strong Protectionist Colonies, such as Victoria and Canada, with the free trade tendencies of Great Britain and New South Wales. The Conservative Prime Minister of England, if he has been correctly reported, holds that the adoption of Protection, on which the Imperialists of Canada insist as a condition of any arrangement, would in England kindle a civil war.<sup>9</sup>

Continentalists also scorned the idea that Canadian and imperial unity rested on economic non-intercourse with the Republic. Canadian nationhood, they insisted, was not fundamentally precarious and would undoubtedly benefit from free trade with the United States. "Given permanence," wrote O. D. Skelton in 1910, "the closest of trade relations with the United States cannot but be beneficial; the Canadian national spirit, however weak it

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<sup>8</sup> H. C. Goldenberg, "'Americanization' of Canada," *Fortnightly Review* CXLV (1936): 690.

<sup>9</sup> Goldwin Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question* (New York, 1891), 291-292.

may have been a quarter century ago, is in these days of prosperity and expansion too strong and self-reliant to be endangered by close commercial intercourse with the republic.”<sup>10</sup> In fact, argued John W. Dafoe, it was the National Policy that threatened Canadian unity and nationhood. By fostering the concentration of industry in Quebec and Ontario, the Policy had turned the rest of Canada into an underdeveloped resource hinterland. “I am deeply concerned at the strains upon Confederation which arise from the fact that we have a large vested interest in secondary industries which today are essentially uneconomic and which, because they have to be maintained, are destroying the basis of prosperity in two-thirds of the provinces of Canada,” the West’s most eloquent champion told a group of North American scholars in 1935.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, as far as Dafoe was concerned, it was economic marasmus and regional disparity, not free trade that threatened the unity of the Canadian nation.

American protectionism irritated the Dominion’s continentalist intellectuals, but it was Canadian scepticism regarding the benefits of free trade that really exasperated thinkers like Skelton and Dafoe.<sup>12</sup> The defeat of reciprocity in 1911 was lamented for decades in continentalist circles. It was seen as a foolish decision that would have long-term negative consequences on the Canadian economy. Speaking at a Liberal party policy conference in 1933, P. E. Corbett argued that the defeat of reciprocity was yet another example of the deleterious impact of anti-Americanism on Canadian society:

There is, it seems to me, a totally unnecessary amount of suspicion in our approach to problems connected with the joint Canadian-American exploitation of our North-American patrimony. Played upon by selfish interests in 1911, that suspicion rejected a reciprocity in trade which we had long coveted and have often coveted since. Played upon by similar forces in the last few years, it serves to justify the attitude of Quebec in regard to the St. Lawrence Waterways project. When anyone talks of annexation now-a-days we laugh; but we treat the United States like the wolf who puts on sheep’s clothing in order to enter this

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<sup>10</sup> O. D. Skelton, “Current Events: The Canadian Movement,” *Queen’s Quarterly* XVIII (1910): 173.

<sup>11</sup> J. W. Dafoe, “Tariffs: Discussion,” in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1936), 52.

<sup>12</sup> Continentalists were also upset by the imperialist strategy to equate free trade with disloyalty. “If there is any disloyalty in this matter,” Goldwin Smith told the Young Men’s Liberal Club of Toronto in 1891, “it would appear to be in maintaining a fiscal policy which is constantly driving the flower of our population over the line, and saves Canada from annexation by annexing Canadians.” [Smith, *Loyalty, Aristocracy and Jingoism: Three Lectures Delivered before the Young Men’s Liberal Club, Toronto* (Toronto, 1891), 14.]

fold of ours and devour us at leisure. The metaphor is unflattering; but we have been not a little sheep-like in the way we have allowed ourselves to be led by anti-American interests.<sup>13</sup>

Continentalists were inclined to blame the Depression and the growth of trusts and combines on protectionism. Tariffs, they argued, served special business interests and were a constant source of irritation in the Canadian-American relationship. By contrast, continentalists held that trade, in particular free trade, fostered international peace and understanding. "Blood is no sure guaranty against bloodshed," wrote P. E. Corbett in 1937, "but when community of race is re-enforced by a mercantile spirit acutely conscious of mutual economic usefulness, there is bound to be a powerful prejudice against the dislocation of war."<sup>14</sup> Similarly, in 1891, Erastus Wiman informed the readers of the *North American Review* that "intimate trade relations" could help "heal the great schism of the Anglo-Saxon race."<sup>15</sup> Wiman was one of the few continentalists who actually stood to benefit personally from continental integration. He had made substantial investments in Canadian resources, and the North American customs union he tirelessly promoted would undoubtedly have benefited his investment portfolio. "Yet in spite of these legitimate personal advantages," writes Ian Grant, "Wiman was more than just a self-interested businessman. Certainly one of his prime objectives in promoting commercial union was to attempt to extend to his fellow Canadians some of the immense prosperity which he had acquired. He firmly believed that the National Policy was unnecessarily forfeiting to Canadians a standard of living which was rightly theirs. It was estimated that he personally spent \$30,000 to promote this grandiose scheme." Above all, Grant insists that Wiman "was a philanthropist in his own right and the promotion of the welfare of Canadians was part and parcel of a liberal ideology which he argued continuously between 1887 and 1893."<sup>16</sup>

The issue of reciprocity with the United States did not generate a great deal of passion in Quebec. To be sure, few intellectuals viewed the liberalization of cross-border trade as a threat to the French Canadian nation. Continentalists supported the measure, as did most nationalists. They could see the economic benefits of free trade and, more

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<sup>13</sup> P. E. Corbett, "A Foreign Policy for Canada," in *The Liberal Way: A Record of Opinion on Canadian Problems as Expressed and Discussed at the First Liberal Summer Conference, Port Hope, September, 1933*, ed. Liberal Party of Canada (Toronto, 1933), 134.

<sup>14</sup> Id., *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes: A Critical Study of Methods and Results* (New Haven and Toronto, 1937), 3.

<sup>15</sup> Erastus Wiman, "The Struggle in Canada," *North American Review* CLII (1891): 348.

<sup>16</sup> Ian Grant, "Erastus Wiman: A Continentalist Replies to Canadian Imperialism," *Canadian Historical Review* LIII (1972): 4.



significantly, they believed that it would help weaken the imperial bond. Unlike imperialists, who feared that free trade would destroy the mainstay of Canadian distinctiveness – the imperial bond – and lead the Dominion down the road to annexation, most French Canadian intellectuals assumed that reciprocity would not affect either Canada’s sovereignty or Quebec’s distinct society.

Henri Bourassa was fairly representative of Quebec’s dispassionate support for the liberalization of Canadian-American trade. Though he fervently opposed Laurier’s 1910 Naval Service Act and campaigned against the Liberal party during the subsequent federal election, the *nationaliste* leader saw little danger in the 1911 draft reciprocity agreement: “A measure of reciprocity, both broad and prudent, between Canada and the United States, is natural; it is in conformity with the political traditions and the economical needs of Canada. Kept within proper limits, it affords great advantages to our agriculture and to all the industries derived from the exploitation of natural resources, without threatening our commercial independence, our political autonomy and our attachment to the Empire.” But reciprocity’s main advantage did not lie in the economic sphere. “It is certainly the most treacherous and effective blow which Sir Wilfrid Laurier has ever given to the cause of Imperialism, which he has heretofore so well served,” Bourassa wrote in a English-language pamphlet derived from a series of articles that had previously appeared in *Le Devoir*. Reciprocity would place “an insuperable obstacle in the way of an Imperial customs union,” he concluded, “and this is, in our eyes, the main reason for its adoption.”<sup>17</sup>

Nonetheless, though the issue never generated much debate in Quebec’s intellectual circles, some nationalists were hostile to free trade. For instance, thirty years after Bourassa’s lukewarm endorsement of reciprocity, the emerging leader of Quebec’s nationalist movement, André Laurendeau, warned that free trade might lead Canada down the road to annexation. “L’homme d’affaires songe à part lui que les États-Unis sont un bien autre marché que le Canada et rêve à une expansion de son commerce ou de son industrie. Tel songe-creux demande l’abolition des tarifs protecteurs, mesure qui nous acheminerait vers l’annexion, les douanes étant pour nous ce que les Pyrénées sont à la France,” Laurendeau wrote in a special issue of *L’Action nationale* devoted to “l’annexionnisme.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Henri Bourassa, *The Reciprocity Agreement and its Consequences as Viewed from the Nationalist Standpoint* (Montreal, 1911), 12, 23, 40.

<sup>18</sup> [André Laurendeau], “There’ll always be an England, mais y aura-t-il un Canada?” *L’Action nationale* XVII (1941): 339-340.

Tariffs were not a hot-button issue for Quebec's intellectuals. On the other hand, the massive influx of American investment capital into Canadian industry was viewed with alarm in the province's intellectual circles, particularly during the interwar years.<sup>19</sup> The post-World War One surge in American investment coincided with the rise of a more militant and conservative form of French Canadian nationalism. In the 1920s, as the volume of British capital invested in Canadian industry sagged and the United States became the Dominion's chief source of foreign investment capital, a number of French Canadian thinkers feared that a hostile takeover of Canadian industry was in the works. Indeed, unlike the British, who favoured indirect, portfolio investment, American capitalists preferred to invest directly in Canadian industry. As a result, many intellectuals worried that Canada was quickly becoming a branch plant economy and that French Canadians would be permanently relegated to its lower echelons. American investment was deepening *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français*.

Esdras Minville led the charge against interwar American investment. Born in Quebec's Gaspé Peninsula, he was educated at the Brothers of the Christian Schools' Pensionnat Saint-Laurent and at Montreal's École des Hautes Études commerciales. After obtaining his *license en sciences commerciales* in 1922, Minville worked for a few years in the private sector, first at an insurance firm, then at a brokerage house. In 1927, he joined the faculty of the École des Hautes Études commerciales. He served as the school's principal from 1938 to 1962 and as the Université de Montréal's dean of social science from 1950 to 1957. In an era when concerns regarding *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français* were at the forefront of nationalist discourse, Minville quickly rose to a position of prominence within Quebec's intelligentsia. His economic nationalism was intensely Catholic and conservative, and sought to empower French Canadians, in part, through co-operatism and corporatism.<sup>20</sup>

Minville understood the importance of foreign investment in the development of Canadian resources. "Il est certain d'une part, qu'un pays comme le nôtre, jeune, peu peuplé, possédant un vaste territoire et des ressources abondantes à mettre en valeur, a besoin du secours financier de l'étranger pour assurer son essor, parfaire son outillage, compléter son organisation économique," he wrote in 1924. However, he was also convinced that the post-

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<sup>19</sup> French Canadian attitudes towards American investment are discussed in Yves Roby, *Les Québécois et les investissements américains, 1918-1929* (Quebec, 1976).

<sup>20</sup> Minville's economic nationalism is skilfully examined in Dominique Foisy-Geoffroy, *Esdras Minville. Nationalisme économique et catholicisme social au Québec durant l'entre-deux-guerres* (Sillery, Quebec, 2004).

World War One influx of American capital was too much, too fast. A moderate ruralist, Minville worried that massive American investment was fuelling industrial gigantism. “L’industrialisation du Canada s’est effectuée sans méthode, et, eu égard au chiffre de notre population, trop rapidement. Des troubles d’ordre social et politique en sont la conséquence,” he warned the readers of *L’Action française*. Indeed, rapid industrialization was eroding the nation’s rural base, which in turn, was destabilizing Canadian society:

La grande industrie est centralisatrice par nature; elle recherche pour s’implanter, vivre et se développer, la proximité des ports de mer, des voies directes de communication. Sous l’impulsion du mouvement industriel du début du siècle, nous avons vu surgir sur notre territoire des grands centres, des villes immenses dont le peuplement s’est effectué au détriment des campagnes. Aujourd’hui l’équilibre est brisé, ou bien près de l’être, entre l’élément urbain et l’élément rural de notre population. C’est un mal. Pour peu qu’elle continue à sa vitesse présente, l’industrialisation du Canada menace de lui faire perdre, d’ici quelques années, son caractère de pays agricole que, dans son meilleur intérêt, il devrait conserver longtemps encore. Cette transformation soudaine met en péril la stabilité économique du pays, l’expose aux conséquences les plus désastreuses des crises et périodiquement le fait passer par de profondes dépressions dont il ne se relève que difficilement.

But American investment was not merely destabilizing the Dominion’s economic structure, it was also deepening *l’infériorité économique des Canadiens français*. The French Canadian bourgeoisie, Minville argued, simply lacked the capital necessary to compete with American corporations. As such, the American control of Quebec’s resources was yet another obstacle to French Canada’s economic emancipation. “Chaque arrivage de capital étranger dans notre province signifie le recul du jour où notre nationalité pourra enfin secouer le joug économique qui lui pèse aujourd’hui si lourdement,” he insisted.<sup>21</sup>

American investment was yet another agent of modernity. It not only accelerated Canada’s urbanization and industrialization, but also brought moral decrepitude in its wake. Minville noted, for instance, that American capitalists often insisted that their French Canadian workers transgress the Lord’s Day. “La tendance est au nivellement entre les peuples dont l’un habite au nord et l’autre au sud de la ligne 45<sup>e</sup>,” he warned, “nivellement

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<sup>21</sup> Esdras Minville, “L’ennemi dans la place: Le capital étranger,” *L’Action française* XI (1924): 329, 330-331, 338-339.

économique qui entraîne malheureusement le nivellement moral, l'un et l'autre nous acheminant, si nous n'y prenons garde, vers l'unité politique." Investment capital, indeed, had become an instrument of American imperialism. "La plus grande république démocratique du monde n'est pas sans prétentions impérialistes," Minville wrote in 1924, "elle obéit aux tendances de notre époque et imite l'exemple des grandes puissances européennes ... Le dollar est leur arme, et le peuple qui monopolise à l'heure actuelle 48% des réserves d'or du monde, entend bien s'en servir pour propager ses idées et étendre son influence."<sup>22</sup>

Like most French Canadian nationalists, Minville was reluctant to employ large-scale nationalization to solve the problem of foreign ownership. He argued instead that the development of French Canadian enterprise and a more intelligent strategy regarding the concession of Quebec's natural resources were the best methods to prevent an American takeover of the province's industry and resources. "Il serait temps d'éclairer sur ce point l'opinion populaire," he wrote in *L'Action française*, "d'user d'un peu plus de prévoyance dans le trafic de nos richesses naturelles, d'amender notre politique de concessions sans recours, de canaliser le flot montant de l'or étranger, en particulier de l'or américain, si nous ne voulons pas être réduits bientôt au rôle de serviteurs dans notre propre maison."<sup>23</sup>

A number of French Canadian continentalists were also deeply concerned about the impact of American investment on Quebec's economic structure. In fact, it was Errol Bouchette, a liberal nationalist, who first sounded the alarm at the turn of the twentieth century. Bouchette's calls to "Emparons-nous de l'industrie!" deeply influenced the economic thought of both Esdras Minville and his anticlerical adversary, Jean-Charles Harvey. Like Minville, Harvey wanted French Canadians to harness their capital and develop Quebec's resources before it was too late. However, unlike the work of his conservative contemporary, Harvey's writing on American investment did not contain anti-American or anti-industrial undertones. "L'industrialisation de la province de Québec se poursuivra inévitablement, soit par des Canadiens-français, soit par des étrangers," he wrote in 1920. "Il se peut qu'elle comporte parfois des inconvénients; mais dans ce cas nous appliquerons le proverbe: 'Entre deux maux, il faut choisir le moindre.' Or, mieux vaut que nos richesses deviennent la propriété des nôtres que la chose de nos voisins."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 333.

<sup>23</sup> Id., "Les Américains et nous," *L'Action française* X (1923): 105.

<sup>24</sup> J.-C. Harvey, *La chasse aux millions: l'avenir industriel du Canada-français* (Quebec, 1920), 5-6, 12.

Harvey's interwar preoccupation with the American takeover of Quebec's industry produced a mildly risqué novel, *Marcel Faure* (1922), which was inspired by the years he spent working as a publicist for the Machine agricole nationale, a failed French Canadian business venture. In the story, the hero, Marcel Faure, a young French Canadian entrepreneur, struggles against Anglo-American competitors to transform the fictional village of Valmont into a near-utopian industrial centre. The novel, which was not well received in conservative circles, placed most of the blame for *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français* on Quebec's Catholic clergy and on the province's system of classical education. In one passage, the anticlerical Faure pondered the ill-effects of Catholic idealism: "Convaincus, par auto-suggestion, que notre idéalisme atavique devait nous tenir au-dessus des biens de ce monde, induits par notre éducation même à mépriser les nations commerciales, nous avons vécu en marge des réalités de la matière, laissant nos voisins, concrets et pratiques, entrer dans notre maison et s'y installer en maîtres." In the long term, Harvey warned in a 1920 pamphlet, the American takeover of Quebec's industry would lead to national decrepitude:

Cette dépendance martèle rudement le front des nôtres menacés dans leur orgueil national, cet orgueil nécessaire qui fait vivre les races par la confiance qu'elles ont en elles-mêmes et en leurs chefs. Par milliers, nos ouvriers font métier de serfs sous une férule étrangère. Un jour viendra, s'il n'est pas venu, où notre prolétariat, conscient de son servage, n'obéissant qu'à des hommes qui ne parlent pas sa langue et ne connaissant rien de ses traditions, croira appartenir à une race inférieure. De cet apparente infériorité naîtra le mépris des siens, et de ce mépris, l'apostasie nationale.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, in 1928, Beaudry Leman warned Montreal's Cercle universitaire that "l'asservissement économique entraîne généralement et à brève échéance la domination politique; si nous tardons davantage à nous qualifier pleinement pour répondre à notre vocation de Français d'Amérique, nous cesserons d'être de bons Canadiens et nous nous préparerons à devenir des Américains quelconques." Like many French Canadian liberals, Leman was inclined to look inwards for the causes of *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français*. "La menace la plus sérieuse n'est pas celle qui pénètre sous forme de capital-argent mais celle qui est représentée par le capital moral et intellectuel d'hommes mieux préparés

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<sup>25</sup> Id., *Marcel Faure* (Montmagny, Quebec, 1922), 16; *La chasse aux millions*, 15-16.

que nous à tirer parti de richesses naturelles que la Providence avait mises à notre disposition et que nous aurons laissées glisser entre nos mains inhabiles ou paresseuses en nous contentant de recevoir en échange un plat de lentilles," Leman wrote in the *Revue trimestrielle canadienne*.<sup>26</sup> In true continentalist form, he did not blame the takeover of Quebec's resources on American greed or imperialism. American capitalists, Leman surmised, were simply investing where there were profits to be made. If French Canadian entrepreneurs could not compete, then the problem obviously lay with French Canadian business practices and, more generally, with French Canadian *mentalités*.

To correct *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français*, French-speaking continentalists sought to modernize Quebec's education system – Harvey's critique of the province's education system was exceptionally virulent – and harness the largely untapped potential of French Canadian capital. The latter solution was particularly attractive to Leman, who ran the province's leading French bank. Indeed, Leman and Harvey were even less inclined than their conservative adversaries to consider nationalization as an acceptable solution to the American takeover of Quebec's industry.

American investment did not generate a great deal of apprehension in English Canada until Walter Gordon issued his Royal Commission report on Canada's Economic Prospects in 1957.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, during the period under study, precious few imperialists viewed American investment as a threat to Canadian sovereignty or nationhood.<sup>28</sup> British portfolio investment accounted for over two-thirds of all foreign investment in Canada until World War One, and the postwar surge in American investment coincided with the decline of Canadian imperialism. Interwar Tories like Robert Falconer saw little danger in massive American investment in Canadian industry. Indeed, the establishment of American branch plants, Falconer argued in 1925, was hardly a prelude to annexation:

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<sup>26</sup> Beaudry Leman, "Les Canadiens français et le milieu américain," *Revue trimestrielle canadienne* XIV (1928): 273, 275.

<sup>27</sup> Early to mid-twentieth century English Canadian attitudes towards the rise of American investment are discussed in Peter Kresl, "Before the Deluge: Canadians on Foreign Ownership, 1920-1955," *American Review of Canadian Studies* VI (1976): 86-125.

<sup>28</sup> This state of affairs infuriated many French Canadian nationalists. Henri Bourassa, for instance, could not understand how imperialists who "writhe with anguish at the sole thought of the danger to be incurred by Canada in case we sold a few bales of hay to the Americans" could so readily accept that "American capital is invading our industries, and grasping our forests, water powers and public lands." Surely, he argued in 1912, this illustrated the hollowness of Canadian imperialism: "On several instances, nationalist 'demagogues' have called attention of public powers to that menace. Statesmen laughed and shrugged their shoulders. Some of the stoutest patriots of today even struck very nice bargains with the invaders. Countless are those staunch loyalists, who dream of nothing but war and slaughter on behalf of Britain, but who are always ready to sell any part of the national patrimony, provided they get their commission." [Bourassa, *The Spectre of Annexation and the Real Danger of National Disintegration* (Montreal, 1912), 24-25.]

Mutterings of alarm have quite recently been heard in some eastern manufacturing centres lest the American is getting such a grip upon the Dominion that in a few decades by means of peaceful penetration Canada will be Americanized. This is merely another form of the old cry of Goldwin Smith as to manifest destiny. Even those Americans who under protection have established branch institutions in Canada have nothing to gain by annexation.<sup>29</sup>

Harold Innis agreed. In the introduction to a 1937 collection of essays on Canada's dairy industry, he insisted that American investment was reinforcing both the Dominion's east-west axis and its imperial bond: "American branch factories established under the protection of the Canadian tariff and the advantages of Imperial preference have strong vested interests in Canadian nationalism and Imperial connection. Nationalism and Imperialism have become valuable American assets."<sup>30</sup>

Outside of Quebec, liberal intellectuals were enthusiastic supporters of American investment in Canadian industry. During the interwar years, the most compelling case for American investment was made by two Canadian economists, Herbert Marshall (b. 1887) and Kenneth W. Taylor (b. 1899). In 1936, they teamed up with an American colleague, Frank A. Southard, to co-author *Canadian-American Industry: A Study in International Investment*, the first volume in the Carnegie series. This influential monograph would serve as the standard text on American investment for the next twenty years.

Herbert Marshall graduated from the University of Toronto in 1915 and served in the Canadian Expeditionary Force from 1916 to 1918. He joined the University of Toronto's Department of Political Economy in 1919. Two years later, he entered the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and was appointed Dominion Statistician in 1945. Kenneth W. Taylor also served in the Great War. After the conflict, he studied at McMaster University and the University of Chicago, and was a Fellow of the Brookings Institute in 1924-1925. He joined the faculty of McMaster University in 1925. At the outbreak of World War Two, he was appointed to Canada's Wartime Prices and Trade Board. He served as the Dominion's Deputy Minister of Finance from 1953 to 1963. Staunch Liberals, Marshall and Taylor advised Mackenzie King on economic affairs and were enthusiastic supporters of continental integration. "Geography

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<sup>29</sup> Robert Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour from a Canadian Point of View* (Cambridge, England, 1925), 164.

<sup>30</sup> H. A. Innis, "Introduction to the Canadian Economic Studies," in his *The Dairy Industry in Canada* (Toronto and New Haven, 1937), xxvi, n. 32.

and history have made it inevitable that the economic structures of Canada and the United States should become closely intertwined," went the first sentence of their 1936 monograph. This basic assumption underpinned much of their work. They argued that even the most radically protectionist measures could not reverse the course of continental integration, since high tariffs merely fostered the creation of American branch plants. "The very attempts on Canada's part to preserve an independent economy, through tariffs, through Imperial preference, through appeals to local patriotism, have not infrequently promoted the 'American penetration' which they were designed to repel," they noted in the introduction to their landmark study.<sup>31</sup>

Marshall and Taylor insisted that Canadians had little reason to fear American investment. "There is little evidence of political interference by foreign-controlled companies," they wrote. "Doubtless American-controlled companies, like most other companies, use such political pressure as they may be able to muster to further their economic interests. Doubtless, too, like other companies, they contribute to campaign funds of one or of all political parties. But their interest is almost invariably the interest of a particular company or industry and not in a large sense a pushing of 'American' interests." Besides, as the influential economists were quick to note, British investment, which was widely viewed as essentially benign, hardly came without strings attached: "Pressure from foreign investment banking interests is more likely to be open and political than that from branch plants. But Canada has, hitherto at least, had more difficulties in this respect with London than with New York. Bitter pressure has been brought to bear by London financial groups on a number of occasions, notably in the long and still unsettled Grand Trunk securities issue."<sup>32</sup>

American investment was essential to Canadian prosperity and development; it facilitated the transfer of technology and fostered better relations between Canada and the United States. Besides, as Marshall and Taylor quickly pointed out, after World War One, only the United States was in a position to provide the large-scale investment capital needed to develop the Dominion's resources. And the promise of long-term capital self-sufficiency rested in the development of Canadian resources. Moreover, as interwar continentalists were usually quick to point out, Canadian investment in American industry was not insignificant:

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<sup>31</sup> Herbert Marshall, Frank A. Southard, and Kenneth W. Taylor, *Canadian-American Industry: A Study in International Investment* (New Haven and Toronto, 1936), 1.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 290-291.



“Every Canadian and every American who has any knowledge of the Canadian economy is aware of those hundreds of American-owned factories, mines, public utilities, or what not in the Dominion of Canada. But few Canadians and even fewer Americans realize that in proportion to Canada’s wealth and population her direct investment in the United States is even larger,” wrote Marshall and Taylor. Indeed, they noted in 1936, “on a *per caput* basis, only two countries (Great Britain and the Netherlands) exceed Canada in importance of foreign investments.”<sup>33</sup>

Marshall and Taylor acknowledged, however, that Canada’s dependency on American investment reduced the Dominion’s policy options. For instance, radical economic reform, which neither Marshall or Taylor approved of anyway, would be exceedingly difficult and potentially disastrous in an economy heavily dependent on foreign investment:

If Canada, unaccompanied by the United States, were to move along novel economic paths which involved some reinterpretation of property rights, there is little doubt that international difficulties would arise. The “expropriation of the expropriators” could not be successfully carried out in Canada much in advance of a similar event in the United States. Or to put it in much more immediate and practical terms, a country that is dependent to a considerable extent on foreign borrowing must, if it is to borrow economically, follow social, economic, and political policies that commend themselves reasonably well to the relatively small group that controls the money market in which it borrows.<sup>34</sup>

Left-wing continentalists shared these concerns and were accordingly reluctant to praise American investment.<sup>35</sup> However, their infrequent criticism of American investment was in fact directed at capitalism, rather than at the United States. As Frank Underhill put it in 1929: “There is no real difference, except in names, between being controlled by a Holt and being controlled by a Morgan. And nothing is more certain than that the Morgan of the next generation will gobble up the Holt of the next generation. The best defence of a distinct Canadian nationality is to make sure that these great strategic public services shall be owned and controlled by the people themselves.”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 175, 294.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 291.

<sup>35</sup> It is nevertheless worth noting that one of the earliest English Canadian validations of American investment was published in the *Canadian Forum*. See J. Marjorie Van der Hoek, “The Penetration of American Capital in Canada,” *Canadian Forum* VI (1926): 333-335.

<sup>36</sup> F. H. Underhill, “O Canada,” *Canadian Forum* X (1929): 80.

### *Labour Unions*

In Canada, the history of trade unionism has been intimately linked to the American labour movement. Throughout the period under study, a majority of the Dominion's unionized workers were members of so-called international (i.e. American) unions. Indeed, as American capital flowed north, so too did organizations like the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and, later, the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).

The growth of international unionism angered many on the anti-American right. International unions, it was claimed, fostered both Americanization and radicalism. Nevertheless, the penetration of American unions produced little more than sporadic criticism among the Dominion's imperialist intellectuals. This was perhaps because the alternatives to international unionism were viewed as even less attractive. Indeed, the British labour tradition was clearly more radical than its American counterpart, as were many of the Canadian unions that drew their inspiration from Britain.

During the period under study, resistance to international unionism was strongest in Quebec. The province's Roman Catholic clergy viewed American unions as dangerous agents of secularism and assimilation, and saw itself as engaged in a life and death struggle with international unionism for the soul of Quebec's proletariat. Indeed, as far as the Catholic Church was concerned, issues related to labour and industry were indissociable from religion. As a result, theological arguments dominated *nationaliste* criticism of international unionism. Henri Bourassa summed up the *nationaliste* position in a 1919 pamphlet:

Le syndicalisme international et neutre est pernicieux en soi et dans tous les pays, parce qu'il ne tient aucun compte, dans la recherche des avantages qu'il propose à ses adhérents, de Dieu, de la famille et de la patrie, ces trois assises fondamentales de l'ordre social chrétien. Le péril est incomparablement plus grand ici que partout ailleurs, à cause de l'unique voisinage des États-Unis. Le syndicalisme international veut dire, au Canada, le complet assujettissement des travailleurs canadiens aux caprices et à la domination du travail américain syndiqué. C'est l'une des manifestations les plus complètes et les plus prenantes de la conquête morale et économique du Canada par les États-Unis.<sup>37</sup>

*Nationaliste* intellectuals refused to accept the notion that class solidarity could transcend borders and religious denominations, and they were fervently opposed to the

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<sup>37</sup> Henri Bourassa, *Syndicats nationaux ou internationaux?* (Montreal, 1919), 3.

establishment of a secular, American space within Quebec's proletariat. Secularism, indeed, was a veritable Pandora's Box. "La neutralité a fait du syndicalisme américain un champ propice à la contagion des erreurs (révolutionnaires, socialistes)," wrote Catholic labour leader Alfred Charpentier in 1920, "il n'aspire sans cesse qu'à des réformes de plus en plus égalitaires; il se fait de la sorte, plus ou moins à son insu, le précurseur du socialisme."<sup>38</sup> International unions, it was argued, had a penchant for strikes, violence, and ultimately, for subversion. Indeed, in *nationaliste* prose, America itself was often viewed as a *terreau fertile* for radicalism.

For French Canadian nationalists, the answer to international unionism could be found in the establishment of Catholic labour unions. Alfred Charpentier, a bricklayer who played a key role in the 1921 founding of the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada, argued that "le syndicat ouvrier n'a pas seulement une fonction économique ... il a aussi une fonction sociale et, par conséquent, morale à remplir." Catholic unionism, therefore, "était nécessaire pour vulgariser et diffuser les principes supérieurs de la morale sociale catholique, sans laquelle il n'y a point de solution véritable possible aux problèmes économiques."<sup>39</sup> Charpentier hoped to bring about a new industrial order based on Catholic principles. As a result, he and others shunned the idea of class struggle and sought instead to foster collaboration between labour and capital.

Opposition to international unionism, however, was not confined to the right. Indeed, during the interwar years an embryo of left-wing anti-Americanism could be found among the leaders of Canada's national unions. Their opposition to international unionism – they were particularly contemptuous of the American Federation of Labor's philosophy – was tied to a wider struggle for industrial unionism and political activism. Nationalism, indeed, was a very secondary consideration to men like William Thomas Burford (b. 1892), who served as the secretary-treasurer of the All-Canadian Congress of Labour and, later, of the Canadian Federation of Labour. Born in England, Burford was a World War One veteran and an electrician by trade. In a 1930 article for the *Canadian Forum*, he scoffed at the idea that since "capital recognizes no boundaries, labour should organize on a continental rather than on a national scale, to resist a common exploitation." In fact, as he pointed out, "in the chief Canadian industrial undertakings which United States capital controls, the United States unions are barely represented. In the manufacture of autocars, rubber, electrical

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<sup>38</sup> Alfred Charpentier, *De l'internationalisme au nationalisme* (Montreal, 1920), 13.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 11, 14.

equipment, agricultural machinery, and textiles, and in power generation, union membership reaches a minimum close to zero." American unions, Burford continued, "organize by craft and not by the shop, though nowhere has there been a greater consolidation of industrial units under the control of small groups of capitalists. Their structure is primitive, and it is their aim to improve standards for an exclusive membership of craftsmen rather than to unite the working class for its general advancement." International unions were not sufficiently radical: "The 'international labour movement,' as it is called, is but remotely comparable with any labour movement elsewhere. What labour principles it professes are offset by its conservative policies and its anti-labour practices. It is something less than a movement." As far as Burford was concerned, the AFL's determination to shun partisan politics had hindered the growth of an influential worker's party in Canada. Indeed, in his repeated denunciations of international unionism, the spectre of annexation always took a back seat to the spectre of political impotence for organized labour:

To construct a labour movement without regard to the boundaries of the political state is to build a house without walls. National labour unions, supporting and in turn supported by a national labour political organization, have always and everywhere been the basis of labour governments. Foreign-controlled unions cannot be expected to be politically minded, unless in a subversive sense. The outposts of labour imperialism, deriving their inspiration and submitting to decrees from a distant headquarters, tend to become annexationist agencies. Men and events connected with the particular craft in the country whence the propaganda is directed are so magnified, in the eyes of the stalwarts, as to dwarf the affairs of other craft groups in their own neighbourhood. Solidarity, impossible in the economic organization, is doubly so in politics. It can be no concern of a foreign-controlled labour group, as such, to participate actively in a movement designed to uphold the national constitution and to take charge of a national administration. Thus labour's political impotence in Canada is the logical consequence of an economic organization framed regardless of industrial and national circumstances.<sup>40</sup>

Many liberal continentalists, including Alexander Brady (b. 1896), a political scientist at the University of Toronto, questioned the nationalism of Canadian national unions. "The word 'national' does not imply that these unions are the product of a vigorous nationalism,

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<sup>40</sup> W. T. Burford, "Labour is National," *Canadian Forum* X (1930): 236-238. Burford hoped to see Canadian labour take its cues from the more radical and politically influential British labour movement.

nurtured in antagonism to things American solely on the ground that they are foreign; and yet national sentiment and a certain distrust of Americans are to some extent exploited by the leaders," Brady wrote in 1938. In fact, he went on to suggest that "national unions are generally the work of disgruntled officials who, after failing to get their own way, attempt to exalt themselves by establishing national units."<sup>41</sup>

For the most part, continentalists approved of international unionism. The formation of international unions, argued the Canadian vice-chairman of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Ernest Ingles (b. 1897), was a logical and necessary response to continental integration:

Capital flows across the imaginary boundary line in both directions with a mobility and fluidity truly remarkable. A great number of our industrial establishments are financed from across that line, and with such a great number of our industrial establishments mere branch houses of United States concerns, it is a natural development that there should be an international labour movement. In a great many cases our employers are international concerns. The international trades unions, combining members from both countries with different political view points working together for fundamental principles – the sanctity and uplifting of the home – are without doubt, in a very large measure, responsible for the splendid spirit of amity which prevails between these two peoples. Actually we are one people, springing from the same ancestry, with the same traditions, the same background, animated by the same hopes and the same aspirations. There is no reason why there should not be an association of kinship.<sup>42</sup>

Left-wing continentalists, including F. R. Scott, would not have rejected this analysis. Nevertheless, in 1938, Scott lamented "the inability of most international trades unions to take part in politics." This state of affairs, he insisted, was hampering the growth of the CCF.<sup>43</sup> Scott's criticism was largely directed at the unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Another international union, the more radical Congress of Industrial Organizations, received his full support.

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<sup>41</sup> Alexander Brady, "Institutions of Organized Labor," in *Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States*, ed. H. F. Angus (Toronto and New Haven, 1938), 100.

<sup>42</sup> Ernest Ingles, "Labour Organization," in Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 14-18, 1937, *Proceedings*, ed. A. B. Corey, W. W. McLaren, and R. G. Trotter (Boston, 1937), 177.

<sup>43</sup> F. R. Scott, *Canada Today: A Study of her National Interests and National Policy* (London, 1938), 67.

### *Cross-Border Migration*

The period under study witnessed massive population movement within North America. Principally attracted by better employment opportunities and higher wages, close to 1.5 million Canadians settled in the United States between 1891 and 1930. By 1930, when America essentially shut its doors to Canadian immigration, slightly over 9 percent of the nation's immigrants were born in the Dominion. Most Canadian immigrants settled in the northeastern and midwestern states, though California and the Pacific northwest also attracted a number of Canadians in search of opportunity. Roughly a third of all Canadian immigrants were French-speaking. This exodus slowed the Dominion's demographic growth, but did not prevent the Canadian population from more than doubling between 1890 and 1930.<sup>44</sup>

Indeed, the Dominion received large numbers of immigrants during these years, and though its balance of migration with the United States was negative, roughly 400 000 Americans settled in Canada between 1891 and 1930. By 1931, Americans were Canada's second largest immigrant group after the British. American immigrants were often drawn to agriculture and white-collar occupations and were most heavily concentrated in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.<sup>45</sup>

In Quebec, emigration to the United States was widely viewed as a national disaster and was the object of a broad consensus among the intellectual elite – even the most continentalist thinkers were anxious to put an end to the exodus.<sup>46</sup> Unlike English Canada, which could count on immigration to maintain and expand its position within Confederation, French Canada could only rely on natural increase. And emigration was seriously undermining the province's demographic growth, which in turn, was threatening its place in Canada. Emigrants imperilled their soul, many conservatives argued, because American society was fundamentally corrosive to French and Catholic *survivance*. Accordingly, countering the favourable impression of the United States that permeated Quebec's popular culture became imperative to the nation's survival, and anti-American

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<sup>44</sup> Yolande Lavoie, *L'émigration des Québécois aux États-Unis de 1840 à 1930* (Quebec, 1979), 45; Leon E. Truesdell, *The Canadian-Born in the United States: An Analysis of the Statistics of the Canadian Element in the Population of the United States, 1850 to 1930* (New Haven and Toronto, 1943), 9-10, 26-27, 47.

<sup>45</sup> Statistics Canada, *Statistiques historiques du Canada*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Ottawa, 1983), A297-326; R. H. Coats and M. C. MacLean, *The American-Born in Canada: A Statistical Interpretation* (Toronto and New Haven, 1943), 3, 56.

<sup>46</sup> French Canadian attitudes towards emigration are examined in Yves Roby, *Les Franco-Américains de la Nouvelle-Angleterre. Rêves et réalités* (Sillery, Quebec, 2000).

rhetoric became central to the *nationaliste* campaign to halt the exodus. Continentalists, for their part, condemned emigration without resorting to anti-American diatribes.

By the turn of the twentieth century, most French Canadian intellectuals had come to see the emigrant as a hapless victim of macroeconomic forces. Nevertheless, a few conservative thinkers continued the mid-nineteenth century tradition of blaming emigration on laziness and improvidence.<sup>47</sup> Jean-Charles Harvey, whose family had lived for a time in Massachusetts, refuted these outmoded arguments in a 1920 pamphlet. Like most liberals, he saw economic problems as the root cause of emigration:

Deux millions des nôtres peuplent aujourd'hui le Massachusetts, le New-Hampshire, le Vermont, le Maine, le Connecticut et le Rhode-Island. Deux millions! Presque la moitié de notre population perdue, irrévocablement perdue pour nous avec ses admirables qualités d'endurance physique et morale! Qu'allaient-ils faire là-bas? Cédéraient-ils à un caprice, à un goût d'aventures? Non. Trop de liens puissants les rattachaient au pays d'origine pour qu'ils s'exilassent de cœur-joie. S'ils sont partis, c'est qu'un vice d'organisation sociale les chassait de chez nous; c'est que, pour mieux vivre, ils sont allés vers une prospérité que nous n'avions pas, comme des êtres qui ont froid cherchent la flamme qui les réchauffera.<sup>48</sup>

The crusade against emigration fit well into the wider conservative struggle against modernity. French Canadian migrants, it was argued, were exposed to the twin dangers of assimilation and apostasy. Moreover, they generally lived in abject poverty and were subjected to harsh industrial labour and urban squalor. American life, indeed, was morally and physically corrosive to French Canadian Catholics. Emigration also threatened Quebec's place in Confederation. In *L'Action française*, Father Alexandre Dugré (1887-1958), whose brother Adélarde, also a Jesuit, had published a novel, *La campagne canadienne* (1925), to denounce emigration, went so far as to argue that the exodus had prevented a French Canadian *reconquista*.

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<sup>47</sup> For instance, in 1926, abbé Georges-Marie Bilodeau attributed emigration primarily to self-indulgence: "Quelles sont les causes de l'exode? Les opinions sont nombreuses et toutes contiennent une part de vérité. Les uns ont cru la voir dans l'esprit aventurier dont nos compatriotes auraient hérité des ancêtres; d'autres en ont rejeté la faute sur l'imprévoyance ou l'inhabileté des gouvernants; d'autres, sur les conditions économiques propres à telle ou telle époque; d'autres ont pensé que toutes ces causes pouvaient avoir concouru dans une certaine mesure à déterminer l'émigration, mais que la cause réelle était plus profonde. Ils l'ont placée dans le défaut d'économie, dans l'imprévoyance, dans la folie du luxe et de la jouissance. Ce mal s'est propagé avec une rapidité d'autant plus grande, que le frein de l'autorité chez les parents s'était amolli, que l'éducation n'a pas réagi d'une manière assez vigoureuse. ¶ Voilà, pour nous, la cause principale de l'exode." [Bilodeau, *Pour rester au pays. Étude sur l'émigration des Canadiens français aux États-Unis. Causes. Remèdes* (Quebec, 1926), 14.]

<sup>48</sup> Harvey, *La chasse aux millions*, 13-14.

Ce ne sont pas les deux millions qui surnagent encore vaille que vaille aux États-Unis qui constituent notre coulage national; non, ce sont encore les millions de descendants des assimilés de longue date, ces millions de familles possibles, de familles dues, ces générations vigoureuses, qui seraient nées pour nous et qui auraient fait du Canada une Nouvelle-France catholique. Nous ne faisons pas ordinairement ce calcul des possibilités gâchées. Dieu la fait, Lui, ainsi qu'on le remarque dans le commentaire des mots de la Genèse lancés contre Caïn coupable d'avoir tué Abel et sa postérité normale: *Vox sanguinum fratris tui clamantium ad me*, Pourquoi la voix *des sangs*? La paraphrase chaldaïque dévoile ce mystère: *Vox sanguinum generationum quae futurae erant de fratre tuo clamat ad me*. C'est la voix des *générations qui devaient naître* de ton frère qui crie vers moi.<sup>49</sup>

The emigrant, however, was not only a potential apostate, he was also a dangerous and unwitting agent of Americanization. "Même dans les paroisses les moins affectées," wrote abbé Georges-Marie Bilodeau in a 1926 monograph on emigration, "il faut voir les automobiles qui campent pompeusement devant les portes, avec numéro de licence américaine. Ce sont le plus souvent des fils, des frères, des gendres qui viennent avec toute leur richesse, mais aussi avec arrogance, enseigner le luxe, montrer le chemin des États-Unis, scandaliser les humbles habitants de nos hameaux."<sup>50</sup>

To put an end to emigration, *nationaliste* intellectuals favoured solutions involving agriculture and rural development. The provincial and federal governments needed to promote colonization more vigorously. And access to rural credit – many *nationalistes* were active promoters of Alphonse Desjardin's *Caisses populaires* – was seen as important to stemming the flow of migrants to the United States. It was also argued that the development of decentralized, medium-size industry would help Quebec retain its surplus population. Massive, centralized industrialization, however, was regarded as an essentially counter-productive solution. The industrial metropolis, indeed, was viewed as a threat to French Canadian *survival*.<sup>51</sup> Most continentalists did not share these ruralist biases. Jean-Charles Harvey, for instance, believed that large-scale industrial development was the best way to put an end to the exodus. "C'est à l'époque où nous avons le moins d'industries que la

<sup>49</sup> Alexandre Dugré, "Comment orienter l'émigration," *L'Action canadienne-française* XX (1928): 77-78.

<sup>50</sup> Bilodeau, *Pour rester au pays*, 9.

<sup>51</sup> *Nationaliste* attitudes towards industry and urban life are discussed in Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, *Action Française: French Canadian Nationalism in the Twenties* (Toronto, 1975), 58-83.



désertion du sol a été la plus fréquente: témoins les millions des nôtres qui sont aujourd'hui aux États-Unis," he wrote in 1920. "Le réveil industriel, n'eut-il pour résultat que d'arrêter en deçà des lignes le flot des émigrants, nous aurait rendu déjà un fier service."<sup>52</sup>

By the late nineteenth century, however, emigration was no longer seen as a cultural and moral death sentence. Emigrants could resist assimilation, conservatives and liberals argued, but they would have to struggle to retain their language and their faith. And those Franco-Americans who remained Catholic and French were not denied membership in the French Canadian nation, whose essence was viewed as fundamentally ethno-religious. Abbé Lionel Groulx, for instance, saw Franco-Americans as part of a wider *Amérique française*. "Si la nationalité repose sur la parenté du sang, de l'âme et de la langue, ou – pour parler comme les ethnologues et les philosophes – sur l'identité physiologique, psychologique et morale, vous ne pouvez faire que, tout en étant de nationalité américaine, vous ne soyez aussi de nationalité canadienne-française," he told a group of Franco-Americans in 1922.<sup>53</sup> Edmond de Nevers would have agreed. "Les émigrés n'ont pas quitté la patrie," he wrote in *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (1896), "ils l'ont agrandie."<sup>54</sup>

For some intellectuals, the relative strength of the Franco-American diaspora appeared to confirm theories regarding French Canadian providentialism. French Canada, indeed, possessed a divine mission, insisted Québec's leading theologian, Msgr. Louis-Adolphe Pâquet (1859-1942), in his oft-quoted 1902 "Sermon sur la vocation de la race française en Amérique." God had planted a French seed in the New World to convert North America to Roman Catholicism: "Oui, faire connaître Dieu, publier son nom, propager et défendre tout ce qui constitue le précieux patrimoine des traditions chrétiennes, telle est bien notre vocation. Nous en avons vu les marques certaines, indiscutables. Ce que la France d'Europe a été pour l'ancien monde, la France d'Amérique doit l'être pour ce monde nouveau."<sup>55</sup> A number of turn-of-the-century intellectuals, conservatives for the most part, argued that the Franco-American diaspora was part of this divine movement.<sup>56</sup> For instance, providentialism loomed large in Father Édouard Hamon's analysis of emigration. Born in

<sup>52</sup> Harvey, *La chasse aux millions*, 16-17.

<sup>53</sup> Lionel Groulx, *L'amitié française d'Amérique* (Montreal, 1922), 14. Groulx's relationship with Franco-America is discussed in D.-C. Bélanger, "Lionel Groulx and Franco-America," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 33 (2003): 373-389.

<sup>54</sup> Edmond de Nevers, *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (Paris, 1896), 435.

<sup>55</sup> L.-A. Pâquet, "Sermon sur la vocation de la race française en Amérique," in his *Discours et allocutions* (Québec, 1915), 193.

<sup>56</sup> The providential interpretation of French Canadian emigration is examined in André Sénécal, "La thèse messianique et les Franco-Américains," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 34 (1981): 557-567.

Vitré, Brittany, France, Hamon entered the Society of Jesus in 1861 and taught history and grammar at the Collège de Vaugirard and at the École libre de Metz from 1865 to 1868. He immigrated to North America in 1868 and lectured briefly at Fordham College, New York's Jesuit University, before coming to teach at Montreal's Collège Sainte-Marie, where he would remain until 1879. He was ordained a Roman Catholic priest at Woodstock, Maryland, in 1872 and took his final Jesuit vow in 1878. Though nominally attached to the Montreal parish of l'Immaculée-Conception, Hamon would dedicate the next several years to preaching retreats throughout Canada and the United States. He was instrumental in the creation of the popular Ligue du Sacré-Cœur and served as the superior of the Jesuit Order's Quebec City residence from 1897 to 1900. He returned to itinerant predication at the turn of the century and died while preaching a retreat at Leeds, Quebec, in 1904. Like most of Quebec's clergymen, Father Hamon was deeply concerned by the emigration of French Canadians to New England. A popular preacher, he had spent a great deal of time in New England's *petits Canadas* and was familiar with the emigrant's plight. In 1882, he published *Exil et patrie*, a play that condemned emigration and promoted the colonization of the Ottawa Valley. However, he is best remembered for *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre* (1891), an essay that denounced emigration, but that nevertheless portrayed the emigrant as an instrument of God's will. "Cette dépopulation en masse est sans doute une calamité pour le Canada. Il eût été bien préférable de garder ces hommes au pays, où ils auraient fondé des familles de colons attachés au sol," Hamon wrote in his 1891 study. Nevertheless,

Il faut, je crois, regarder plus haut pour comprendre cette migration étrange. La rapidité avec laquelle elle s'est accomplie, la facilité avec laquelle les Canadiens, transplantés sur une terre étrangère, ont immédiatement reformé le moule catholique de la paroisse qui les fit si forts au Canada; l'énergie qu'ils ont déployée pour bâtir des églises, élever des couvents, se grouper ensemble et s'organiser en congrégations florissantes, soutenus au dedans par tout ce qui peut alimenter la piété chrétienne, défendues contre les influences pernicieuses du dehors par la force de l'association et d'une presse généralement bien dirigée: tous ces éléments de vie catholique organisés en un quart de siècle, au sein même de la citadelle du vieux puritanisme, semblent indiquer, comme je l'ai déjà dit, une action aussi bien qu'une mission providentielle dont l'avenir seul nous révélera toute l'importance.

For Father Hamon, there could be no doubt that “les Canadiens-Français [*sic*] accomplissent une mission providentielle; ils concourent pour leur part à la conquête pacifique, au nom de la religion, du sol de la Nouvelle-Angleterre.” Indeed, his providentialism was tinged with expansionism. Like Jules-Paul Tardivel, Hamon believed that both Canada and the United States would eventually disintegrate and that a French Canadian republic encompassing Quebec, New England, eastern Ontario, and northern New Brunswick would emerge from the ruins of the two federations. “Me plaçant exclusivement au point de vue religieux et national,” Hamon wrote in 1891, “je pense qu’avant longtemps, les deux fractions du peuple Canadien, celle qui habite la terre des ancêtres et celle qui a déjà franchi la frontière américaine se rejoindront et pourront alors se donner la main pour ne plus former qu’un seul peuple.”<sup>57</sup>

Yet, in many ways, ultramontane predictions regarding the divine nature of emigration were hollow. Intellectuals like Father Hamon had sought to make sense of a phenomenon which, by their own admission, was a disaster. And by the interwar years an increasing number of thinkers dismissed the whole idea of a providential exodus as wishful thinking. In the 1920s, Father Alexandre Dugré, who taught at Montreal’s Collège Sainte-Marie, saw assimilation and moral laxity as the more likely results of emigration:

Naguère, pour excuser nos exils inexcusables, on poétisait, on surnaturalisait ces départs en voyants un dessein providentiel: Dieu voulait disséminer aux États-Unis nos bâtisseurs d’églises. N’y insistons pas trop: les défections y furent trop nombreuses, l’adaptation aux mœurs américaines y fut trop fatal, la perte de l’esprit de famille y fut trop choquant et la limitation des naissances, mêmes catholiques, y est trop bien reçue. L’on cite l’exemple d’une famille rurale du bas du fleuve où onze enfants sur treize sont aux États-Unis. Le fils resté sur le vieux bien a onze enfants vivants, un autre établi à Québec en a quatre, et les onze frères et sœurs devenus très américains en ont à eux tous – UN.<sup>58</sup>

A generation earlier, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard had been equally dismissive of providentialism: “Il est évident que ce n’est pas pour jouer le rôle de missionnaire aux États-Unis que le cultivateur abandonne sa terre, que l’ouvrier, s’éloigne avec lui, en se séparant de

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<sup>57</sup> Édouard Hamon, *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre* (Quebec, 1891), 5, 11, 145, 155. Hamon’s providential expansionism is examined in Robert G. LeBlanc, “The Francophone Conquest of New England: Geopolitical Conceptions and Imperial Ambition of French-Canadian Nationalists in the Nineteenth Century,” *American Review of Canadian Studies* XV (1985): 288-310.

<sup>58</sup> Dugré, “Comment orienter l’émigration,” 78-79.

ce qu'il a de plus cher au monde, sa famille, ses amis, sa patrie." In an 1893 conference on the virtues of annexation, Rouillard blamed Conservative governments in Ottawa and Quebec City for the exodus and mocked the very notion of a providential migration: "Nous pouvons nous vanter d'avoir un gouvernement unique au monde. En effet, existe-t-il un autre semblable, qui ait entrepris la conversion de ces païens d'Américains, en envoyant un million et quart de missionnaires pour les convertir?" French Canadian migrants were not in danger of assimilation, he argued. On the contrary, they had flourished in the congenial atmosphere of the American Republic:

"Les canadiens-français [*sic*] qui vont aux États-Unis perdent la foi," c'est l'argument suprême des torys officiels contre l'union continentale. Si tel était le cas, se serait en effet un puissant argument contre l'annexion, mais il faudrait que le niveau moral de nos concitoyens aux États-Unis soit tombé bien bas. Or nous sommes en état de dire qu'il n'en est rien, que nos concitoyens vivant aux États-Unis ont au contraire progressé, au triple point de vue de la fortune, de l'éducation et de la morale.<sup>59</sup>

English Canadian intellectuals regarded emigration with less alarm than their French Canadian colleagues. At the turn of the twentieth century, tens of thousands of English-speaking Canadians were leaving the Dominion every year to settle permanently in the United States, but this loss was offset by immigration, particularly from Britain and the United States. As a result, English Canada's overall preponderance was never really threatened by large-scale emigration to the United States. Emigration, in turn, was scarcely seen as a life or death issue in English Canadian intellectual circles. Moreover, unlike in Quebec, where religious and moral considerations loomed large over the discussion of emigration, the moral fate of emigrants was of no particular concern to English Canadian observers, including those associated with the Tory tradition.

Imperialists, indeed, were far more concerned by the brain drain and its potential impact on Canadian development. As a university administrator, Robert Falconer was particularly troubled by the exodus of Canadian graduates to the United States. "The rolls of Canadian colleges contain the names of nearly six hundred former students who hold academic appointments across the line," he told an English audience in 1925. "In addition to this there are possibly four thousand five hundred graduates of Canadian institutions, or

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<sup>59</sup> J.-B. Rouillard, *Annexion: conférence: l'union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 7-8, 9, 19.

about ten percent of the total number, who are making their living in the United States. This is not a high percentage relative to other walks of life, but in terms of quality the actual loss to Canada has been serious." To help staunch the brain drain, Falconer suggested that Canadian universities develop post-graduate programmes:

The national idea will be furthered also by the establishment of post-graduate departments in the larger universities. At present there is an annual exodus from almost every college of the Dominion chiefly to the United States. It is well known that these students are among our best, and that many of them settle permanently there, because at present so many more opportunities in the teaching profession are open to them there than in our country. But this will gradually change, and, moreover, post-graduate work is not confined to preparation for a purely academic career. If we can divert some of this stream of college graduates to our own universities we shall save many of them for the Dominion, and at the same time bring together from widely separated provinces those who will be leaders in the life of the nation.<sup>60</sup>

Emigration, though unfortunate, was hardly considered a disaster. Indeed, many imperialists showed a great deal of pride in the accomplishments of prominent Canadian emigrants. William Osler, for instance, was widely hailed for his rise to the top of the American medical profession. The emigrant, moreover, was often viewed as a sort of Canadian ambassador at large whose day-to-day actions might help improve American attitudes towards the Dominion and the British Empire.

On the whole, continentalist attitudes towards emigration did not significantly differ from those held by Canadian imperialists. Like their Tory adversaries, most continentalists registered some sense of loss when examining the exodus, which is to say that they were also concerned by emigration's qualitative cost to the Dominion. In certain instances, talk of a brain drain revealed regional and ethnic stereotypes. "Apart from the French-Canadian laborers and the fishermen and mechanics from the Maritime provinces," Hugh Keenleyside noted in 1929, "Canada lost many of those who, by their exceptional qualifications for business or professional life, would have done much to speed the development of the Dominion."<sup>61</sup> Keenleyside, who received his Ph.D. from Clark University in Worcester,

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<sup>60</sup> Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour*, 206; "The Unification of Canada," *University Magazine* VII (1908): 8-9.

<sup>61</sup> Hugh Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* (New York, 1929), 345.

Massachusetts, authored the first book-length study devoted to the history of Canadian-American relations. First published in 1929, *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* was re-edited in 1952, while Keenleyside was serving as the director general of the United Nations' Technical Assistance Administration.

For his part, Goldwin Smith saw the exodus as further evidence that the National Policy was an abject failure. "It is a strong comment on the Protection system that since its inauguration there has not only been no abatement, but apparently an increase of the exodus from Canada to the United States," he wrote in *Canada and the Canadian Question*. "The Americans may say with truth that if they do not annex Canada, they are annexing the Canadians," Smith continued. "They are annexing the very flower of the Canadian population, and in the way most costly to the country from which it is drawn, since the men whom that country has been at the expense of breeding leave it just as they arrive at manhood and begin to produce." Nevertheless, the National Policy was not entirely to blame for the large-scale migration of Canadians to the United States: "It would be wrong to ascribe either the exodus or the decline in the value of land directly and wholly to the fiscal system. There is a natural flow of population to the great centres of employment in the United States, and there is no real barrier of a national or sentimental kind to check the current, the two communities being, in all save political arrangements, one."<sup>62</sup>

A handful of continentalists, usually exiles themselves, regarded Canadian emigration as essentially positive. John Bartlet Brebner, who became an American citizen in 1943, saw the exodus as a factor contributing to the improvement of Canadian-American relations and, perhaps more importantly, to the Dominion's economic stability. In his *North Atlantic Triangle* (1945), he worried that the shutting down of cross-border migration would have serious long-term economic consequences for Canada:

Canadians customarily speak of this situation as a "national deficit" or a "cruel loss," yet these terms invite criticism. Indeed it can be argued that the Canadians who stayed at home may literally have gained because one-quarter of their stock went to live in the United States. The explanation is to be found in the maintenance and improvement of the North American standard of living. Largely because of their immense financial obligations for the systems of transportation which alone can bind the Dominion together, Canadians have normally enjoyed a slightly lower standard of living than Americans. Yet as long as the

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<sup>62</sup> Smith, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, 232-233.

Republic lay open to them, the discrepancy could be kept small because those who found opportunity lacking at home could move to the United States and by their departure release some of the pressure upon opportunity and remuneration in Canada. The middle and older generations of Canadians today, in almost any occupation, can recall the kind of relief that was felt when one of their co-workers created a vacancy by leaving for the United States; and the officers of many a Canadian university, when they have reckoned up the destinations of their graduates, have felt less anxiety about their overproduction of professionally trained persons, because so many of them have been able to find employment south of the border. Now that the Republic is no longer a safety valve for "surplus" Canadian population, time may reveal some unexpected consequences of the novel ban on interchange of population which was laid down in 1930.<sup>63</sup>

In continentalist prose, American immigration to Canada – provided it was made up of Americans of European ancestry – was invariably viewed as positive. Along with Canadian emigration, it contributed to North American unity and friendship, argued John W. Dafoe. "The strains of common blood between the United States and Canada, the result of some five generations of a free movement of population which took little note of national boundaries or political friction, are deep and strong; and their effect on the personal, social and business relationships between the peoples of the two countries has been wide-reaching," Dafoe told an American audience in 1935. The American immigrant, moreover, was not a threat to the Dominion:

We look forward to a renewed volume of immigration from the United States, ultimately to reach large proportions as our natural resources are developed and the pressure of population forces up the price of agricultural land in the United States. There are those in Canada who fear a large American immigration because of its possible bearing on Canada's political future; but Canadians generally welcome Americans. They will take a chance on their turning into good Canadians when they take up residence with us. It has been our experience to date that this is what happens.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> J. B. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain* (New Haven and Toronto, 1945), 302. Brebner was instrumental in the publication of the first in-depth study of cross-border migration, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (1940), which he completed and prepared for publication after the death of the book's author, American historian Marcus Lee Hansen.

<sup>64</sup> J. W. Dafoe, *Canada: An American Nation* (New York, 1935), 100; "The Problems of Canada," in Cecil J. B. Hurst et al., *Great Britain and the Dominions* (Chicago, 1928), 222.

William Arthur Deacon was of the same opinion. American immigrants, he argued in 1926, were easily integrated into the Dominion's body politic: "Americans settled in Canada are seldom annexationists. Many of them are successful farmers in the West, and many have risen to prominence in business in the central provinces; but having become used to Canadian laws and customs, they are usually well satisfied with their adopted country and seldom express a desire for the merging of the two countries."<sup>65</sup>

Many imperialists would have agreed with this assessment. Indeed, in an unsigned 1910 editorial intended to refute "the charge that Canadian writers in the *University Magazine* are animated by malice and misled by prejudice when they deal with matters concerning the people of the United States," Andrew Macphail heaped praise on white, English-speaking American immigrants:

They are everywhere, in offices, factories, universities, churches and clubs. They are crowding our western lands. Their children go to school with our children. They make our best citizens. We like them because they are simple people like ourselves, and they like us and our institutions so well that they quickly become Canadians, which is only a step backward to the race from which we both are sprung; and this without the least prejudice to our growing affection which pertains to England.<sup>66</sup>

That said, some Tories expressed concern regarding the influx of American immigrants. "These people have made remarkably good citizens," noted Robert Falconer in 1925. "In so far as these people have made permanent homes for themselves they have not exploited the land for their advantage, but have become excellent Canadians, accepting the new order of things and the new institutions and endeavouring to take their share in working them." Falconer was nevertheless concerned that the presence of tens of thousands of Americans settlers in the Canadian Prairies might help fuel Western protest and alienation. "As might have been expected, the American new-comer into the prairie provinces has not yet grasped fully the meaning of responsible government," he warned. "Being something of a radical he proposes more direct methods than he finds in the Dominion of Canada. Consequently on occasion, with his pioneering energy, he may suggest

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<sup>65</sup> W. A. Deacon, "The Bogey of Annexation," in his *Poteen: A Pot-Pourri of Canadian Essays* (Ottawa, 1926), 20.

<sup>66</sup> [Andrew Macphail], "Canadian Writers and American Politics," *University Magazine* IX (1910): 3.



the Initiative, the Referendum and the Recall, though so far without much success.”<sup>67</sup> Western populism, to be sure, was not well regarded in imperialist circles.

In Quebec, American immigration did not generate a great deal of commentary. Nevertheless, like most foreign immigration, it was viewed with some suspicion in *nationaliste* circles. In 1922, for instance, abbé Lionel Groulx warned the readers of *L’Action française* that the influx of American settlers was loosening bonds of Confederation: “Une politique d’immigration imprévoyante a laissé se parquer dans la partie occidentale du pays, l’élément américain, celui-là même qui pouvait miner le plus activement l’unité canadienne.”<sup>68</sup> Canadian immigration policy, indeed, was reinforcing the Dominion’s inherent geographic disunity. American immigrants were vectors of Americanization; they would invariably turn the Canadian West into a Yankee outpost.

Issues related to cross-border migration loomed large in French Canada. The massive exodus of young French Canadians to the United States, in particular, was viewed as a serious threat to *survivance*. Concerns surrounding Quebec’s weight within Confederation and the moral and physical welfare of migrants combined to make emigration one of the key issues of late nineteenth and early twentieth century French Canadian intellectual commentary. Similar anxieties regarding *l’infériorité économique des Canadiens français* and the American domination of Quebec industry triggered a great deal of hostility to American investment and international labour unions during the interwar years. And, in many ways, anti-American and continentalist opinion converged on these key issues.

By contrast, though free trade with the United States was a highly contentious issue in English Canada, concerns surrounding the liberalization of Canadian-American trade scarcely arose in pre-1945 French Canadian intellectual commentary. Unlike the trans-border movement of capital and labour, the flow of trade was not seen as significant to *survivance*. Indeed, an overwhelming proportion of Quebec’s intellectuals scoffed at the idea that the imperial bond was the mainstay of Canadian independence and distinctiveness. If free trade loosened the bonds of empire, so much the better.

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<sup>67</sup> Falconer, *The United States as a Neighbour*, 33-34, 180. For his part, Arthur Johnston worried that American immigration was affecting the Dominion’s moral stability. “It is not unreasonable to attribute the slight increase in the number of divorces granted in Canada to the great influx of Americans into British Columbia and the North-West Territories during the past decade,” he wrote in 1908. [Johnston, *Myths and Facts of the American Revolution: A Commentary on United States History as it is Written* (Toronto, 1908), 214.]

<sup>68</sup> [Lionel Groulx], “Notre avenir politique,” *L’Action française* VII (1922): 11.

In the rest of Canada, however, the issue of reciprocity spawned a great deal of passion. More often than not, it served as the flashpoint between continentalist and anti-American opinion; by contrast, American investment, international unionism, and cross-border migration did not generate much debate in English Canada. Free trade, argued imperialists, would erode Canadian tradition and the imperial bond. In the long run, this would lead to annexation. Continentalists rejected this line of reasoning. They insisted that free trade would strengthen the Canadian nation. It would bring prosperity to Canadians and allow the Dominion to assume its North American trajectory. For continentalists, free trade was a welcome agent of modernity.

## Conclusion

“Les États-Unis quoique jeunes ont tous les signes de la décadence,” wrote the secretary-general of the Ligue d’action française, Anatole Vanier, in 1922. An influential *nationaliste* who practiced law in Montreal, Vanier believed that “l’irréligion, la corruption des mœurs, la ruine des familles par le divorce, le lynch, les divisions intestines entre blancs et noirs, entre capitalistes et ouvriers, l’absolutisme de la ploutocratie, le réveil des races non-anglo-saxonnes [et] la trop grande étendue de territoire,” would ultimately destroy the American Republic.<sup>1</sup> America’s degeneracy and eventual collapse was a recurring theme in conservative commentary. At heart, like all prewar Canadian writing on the United States, this argument reflected wider attitudes towards the mass age. Specific American actions and policy, to be sure, had little effect on underlying intellectual attitudes towards the United States. Indeed, to claim that elite hostility was the result of American expansionism or protectionism is to misunderstand the symbolic significance of the American Republic.

Previous scholarship, which has tended to view anti-American sentiment merely as an expression of Canadian nationalism, has failed to understand that the United States embodied the mass age to pre-1945 Canadian intellectuals. Carl Berger, for instance, sees the intellectual debate surrounding reciprocity as a dispute centred on the issue of Canadian independence.<sup>2</sup> The imperialist rejection of reciprocity, however, had far more to do with promoting traditional values and branding Canada a conservative, British nation than with protecting Canadian industry or sovereignty. Like many historians, Berger does not fully grasp America’s symbolic significance.

The present study, by contrast, has focussed on this symbolic significance. Indeed, in Canadian intellectual discourse, America has always been the embodiment of both a way of life and an ideological system with pretensions to universality.<sup>3</sup> As such, examining Canadian writing on America offers a fresh insight into the Canadian mind. The study of Canadian commentary casts a new light on the intellectual underpinnings of nationalism in Canada, on the evolution of Canadian antimodernism, and on the intellectual parallels between imperialism and French Canadian nationalism. It offers little or no insight, however, into the American experience.

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<sup>1</sup> Anatole Vanier, “Notre avenir politique: L’État français et les États-Unis,” *L’Action française* VII (1922): 334.

<sup>2</sup> Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 4.

<sup>3</sup> Guy Sorman, “United States: Model or Bête Noire,” in *The Rise and Fall of French Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception*, ed. D. Lacorne et al. (New York, 1990), 213.

Canadian intellectuals, to be sure, rarely produced very sophisticated analyses of American society. For the most part, they portrayed America as a homogeneous bloc. The nation's regional, racial, or social diversity was poorly assessed in Canadian commentary. Yet Canadian intellectuals were well acquainted with American life. As Allan Smith notes, by the late nineteenth century, American ideas and culture permeated the Dominion's intellectual and cultural environment.<sup>4</sup> What's more, many Canadian intellectuals worked or studied in the United States. Their tendency to portray America as a bloc, therefore, was not largely the result of ignorance. Rather, it was a sign that America was more than simply a nation and neighbour in Canadian prose. America was the embodiment of something more universal: modernity.

America's standing as the quintessence of modernity rested on a number of factors. The nation, it was claimed, had rejected European continuity and wholeheartedly embraced, among other things, secularism, democracy, and industrial capitalism. That these assertions often rested on weak reasoning was of little importance; they shaped the attitudes of generations of Canadian thinkers.

Modernity generates deep social and economic change which, in turn, corrodes traditional values, institutions, and social relations. Traditional elites, whose influence rested on premodern ideas of entitlement, feared the erosion of status and deference that accompanied the mass age. These transformations engendered a conservative reaction which, in Canada, expressed itself through both imperialism and French Canadian nationalism.

The period under study roughly corresponds to the heyday of Canadian antimodernism. In English Canada, antimodern sentiment peaked around 1900; in Quebec, it reached its summit in the mid 1930s. The South African War, indeed, brought imperialist sentiment to a fever pitch at the turn of the twentieth century while the Great Depression saw conservative French Canadian nationalism reach its zenith. Protestant intellectual culture was more easily infiltrated by modernity, which accounts for the early decline of conservative antimodernism in English Canada. Moreover, the Great War dealt a crushing blow to the imperial federation movement, which had been the political rallying point of Canadian imperialism.

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<sup>4</sup> Allan Smith, "The Continental Dimension in the Evolution of the English-Canadian Mind," in his *Canada: An American Nation? Essays on Continentalism, Identity, and the Canadian Frame of Mind* (Montreal and Kingston, 1994), 41.

The intellectual reaction to modernity, however, was not uniformly negative. On the contrary, many Canadian intellectuals embraced the mass age. Liberals and socialists alike rejected tradition as a guide to social welfare and were correspondingly enthused with the idea of progress, whether material, social, or cultural. During the interwar years, these ideas came to dominate English Canadian intellectual discourse. As imperialism faded away, the nation's most vibrant intellectual commentary could be found in the left-of-centre *Canadian Forum* and in radical organizations like the League for Social Reconstruction. These institutions had no French Canadian counterparts. Indeed, in Quebec, radical discourse actually declined during the period under study. From the late nineteenth century to the 1940s, the vital centre of French Canadian thought could be found on the right. Nevertheless, the antimodernism that characterized *nationaliste* discourse did not go unchallenged. Interwar liberals like Jean-Charles Harvey confronted traditionalism, but were unable to loosen its hold on French Canadian intellectual discourse.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, accelerated industrialization and urbanization, massive immigration, technological change, and the rise of mass culture produced deep social and economic transformations. During this period, Canadian intellectuals devoted a great deal of energy to debating the merits of modernity. However, given that the Dominion shares a 5,000-mile border with a nation that was seen as the embodiment of modernity, part of the wider discussion surrounding the mass age was masked by a debate on the merits of American society and on the course of Canadian-American relations.

Indeed, in pre-1945 Canada, antimodernism was often expressed through a vigorous anti-Americanism. Virtually every aspect of Canadian intellectual debate, including issues related to gender, identity, and the Dominion's relationship with Britain, could be discussed through the prism of the United States. American society offered an unsettling glimpse into the not-so-distant future. The Republic, as viewed through conservative prose, was a dark and foreboding place: the American Revolution had forever destabilized the nation's political and social order; crime was rampant and a racial or social conflict always seemed to be on the horizon; secularism and materialism were corroding the Republic's moral integrity and its culture; and massive industrialization was creating both a disaffected and unstable proletariat and a dangerous plutocracy of obscenely wealthy capitalists. To draw closer to such a society, conservatives argued, was sheer folly. The Dominion, though a fundamentally

conservative nation, was permanently threatened by annexation and Americanization. Canada and the United States, to be sure, were presented as antithetical entities.

These ideas were expressed most fully in the writing of imperialists born before 1880 and in French Canadian nationalists born roughly between 1860 and 1900. These intellectuals were deeply affected by the whirlwind of change that swept across North America in the late nineteenth century. Subsequent generations of conservatives held less radical opinions of the United States and continental integration. Their assessment of American society, however, remained largely negative. Generations are important to the history of ideas. As intellectual variables, they are more significant to the present study than either region or religion. Nevertheless, neither region nor religion should be discounted in the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Anti-American sentiment, to be sure, was strongest among Roman Catholics and Anglicans. It was also more prevalent among the British-born and, to a lesser extent, among central Canadians.

Imperialism and French Canadian nationalism shared a wider conservative ethos. Elitism, a belief in transcendence, and a reverence of tradition were important themes in both imperialist and *nationaliste* prose. A shared respect for tradition, however, did not prevent imperialism and French Canadian nationalism from coming into conflict. On the contrary, the quarrel that opposed the two ideologies arose because they professed loyalty to two different traditions. That said, imperialist and *nationaliste* sentiment generally converged on issues related to the United States. This, of course, did not mean that their outlooks were identical. They diverged in their level of intensity, in their focus, and in their evolution.

*Nationaliste* anti-Americanism was at once more radical and less fixated than its imperialist counterpart. The most uncompromising critiques of the United States – for instance, Jules-Paul Tardivel's 1900 essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* – were usually the work of French Canadian nationalists. The intellectual core of French Canadian nationalism was fundamentally Catholic and drew a good deal of inspiration from the French right. Consequently, the *nationaliste* rejection of the mass age, and therefore of America, was more rigid and dogmatic than its imperialist counterpart, whose inspiration was essentially British and Protestant. Yet French Canadian nationalists, though fervent in their anti-Americanism, were hardly obsessed with the United States. The bulk of the anti-American prose published in Canada, to be sure, was the work of imperialist intellectuals. Anti-American differentialism was essential to the imperialist sense of nationhood. It was far less

significant to the French Canadian identity, whose distinctiveness rested on ethno-religious and cultural elements.

As we have seen, antimodernism peaked at different times in English and French Canada. This naturally affected the evolution of the Dominion's anti-Americanism. Imperialist anti-Americanism reached its summit of intensity during the 1911 federal election, which was presented as a watershed moment in Canadian history. Canadians, it was argued, had to choose between British tradition and American absorption. In Quebec, anti-American sentiment peaked during the Great Depression, which many *nationalistes* blamed on the United States.

Imperialist and *nationaliste* attitudes towards the United States also diverged in their focus. In English Canada, writing on the United States tended to deal primarily with political and diplomatic issues. Political institutions and the imperial bond were important to the imperialist sense of distinctiveness, and intellectuals like John G. Bourinot devoted a great deal of energy to criticising the American political system and to pointing how its institutions differed from those of the Dominion. In Quebec, where political institutions were not generally viewed as vital elements of national distinctiveness, social and cultural affairs dominated writing on the United States. Economic affairs were of great interest in both English and French Canada, though issues related to cross-border trade were not as important in French Canadian discourse. Reciprocity, to be sure, did not generate a passionate debate among Quebec's intellectuals.

This study has contributed to our understanding of the Canadian right in ways that non-comparative intellectual history could not. Indeed, studies like J. L. Granatstein's *Yankee Go Home?* offer a somewhat one-dimensional approach to the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. The comparative approach, on the other hand, helps put intellectual discourse in perspective. In the present study, comparativism has revealed that French Canadian nationalists, while not fundamentally apolitical in their outlook, were nevertheless disinterested in the nature of political institutions. It has also brought to light the more moderate nature of Canadian imperialism. Above all, however, the comparative approach has revealed that imperialists and *nationalistes* shared a wider anti-American sensibility.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> In this regard, the present study builds on the work of Sylvie Lacombe, whose 2002 monograph, *La rencontre de deux peuples élus. Comparaison des ambitions nationale et impériale au Canada entre 1896 et 1920*, revealed the wider similarities between *nationaliste* and imperialist discourse.

Anti-American rhetoric served a variety of functions. In imperialist writing, its most evident purpose was to legitimize and grant a moral caution to economic protectionism. For instance, the torrent of anti-American prose that accompanied the federal elections of 1891 and 1911 ensured that many Canadians would view the National Policy not only as an instrument of economic development, but also, and perhaps most importantly, as a political, cultural, and moral prophylactic. Anti-Americanism, to be sure, played a key role in the struggle against reciprocity and, in a larger sense, against continental integration. In Quebec, it was a central feature of the campaign to discourage French Canadians from emigrating to the United States. Americans revelled in the worst excesses of the mass age, argued the province's leading *nationaliste* intellectuals. As a result, the French Canadian emigrant would be exposed to moral decadence, violence, and debilitating industrial labour in the cities of the Northeast and the Midwest. To emigrate, indeed, was to imperil one's body and soul.

Anti-Americanism also served more elusive purposes. It was a key element in the right-wing campaign to brand Canada a fundamentally conservative nation. Imperialists and French Canadian nationalists insisted on the conservative and anti-American nature of Canadian society, in part, to consolidate their power and influence. As Patricia K. Wood notes, the Dominion's conservatives sought to monopolize the power to define what was and was not 'Canadian,' and externalized their political and intellectual adversaries by presenting them as foreign enemies.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, if the Dominion was a conservative nation, then only conservatives could speak for Canada.

Anti-American rhetoric also provided traditional elites with a means to legitimize their moral and cultural authority. The conservative assault on American culture, for instance, was essentially an attack on mass culture. By externalizing and disparaging mass culture, intellectuals like abbé Henri d'Arles sought to affirm both the pre-eminence of highbrow culture and their role as the arbiters of culture. Likewise, many clergymen sought to shore up their moral influence by externalizing secularism. To embrace a secular or materialistic worldview, they argued, was not only to turn one's back on God, but also to turn one's back on Canada.

Nevertheless, the conservative rejection of America was seldom absolute. The anti-American ethos, indeed, suffered from some degree of ambiguity. For instance, French

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<sup>6</sup> Patricia K. Wood, "Defining 'Canadian': Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36 (2001): 50.



Canadian nationalists, though worried by most aspects of Canadian-American convergence, held a relatively favourable view of reciprocity. The protectionist impulse was present in *nationaliste* thought, but was generally expressed through calls for cultural protectionism and censorship. In imperialist prose, reciprocity was presented as a major threat to the Dominion's nationhood. American investment, on the other hand, scarcely raised an eyebrow. Moreover, though imperialists believed, as Carl Berger writes, "that the republic represented an undesirable social order,"<sup>7</sup> few appear to have given much thought to the fate that awaited the hundreds of thousands of Canadians who chose to settle in such a dreadful place.

More significantly, few of the Dominion's leading anti-American intellectuals appear to have shunned the United States in their private lives. In spite of their hostility towards American society, many imperialists and *nationalistes* worked, studied, and travelled in the United States. They interacted with American colleagues and published in American periodicals. In many cases, their critique of American society drew its inspiration from American sources.

In Canada, anti-Americanism was very different from most other negative faiths. For instance, the anti-American's relationship with the United States tended to be very different from the anti-Semite's relationship with Jews. Most anti-Americans, indeed, harboured little or no resentment towards *individual* Americans. This is hardly surprising, since anti-American sentiment was in fact the expression of a larger hostility towards the mass age. Nevertheless, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century antimodernism was itself ambivalent. In the writing of many British and American intellectuals, notes Jackson Lears, a rejection of the mass age often coexisted with "enthusiasm for material progress."<sup>8</sup>

A degree of ambiguity was present in most Canadian writing on the United States. Perfectly coherent and unambiguous ideas only exist in the abstract. In practice, both anti-Americanism and continentalism were imperfect sensibilities. For instance, in the work of a number of liberal and socialist intellectuals, continentalism coexisted with a vigorous critique of American society. Nevertheless, throughout the period under study, an obvious dividing line existed between anti-Americanism and continentalism. It was most apparent when intellectuals discussed issues related to continental integration or Canadian-American

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<sup>7</sup> Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto, 1970), 153.

<sup>8</sup> Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (New York, 1981), xiii.

distinctiveness. The issue of reciprocity, for example, tended to rapidly differentiate anti-Americans and continentalists in English Canada. Even during the Great Depression and the Second World War, when conservative intellectuals like R. G. Trotter or B. K. Sandwell were willing to accept some degree of reciprocity, their half-hearted approval of the measure stood in stark contrast to the enthusiastic support for free trade that emanated from the Dominion's leading continentalists. Issues related to *américanité* offered a similar dividing line. Imperialists and *nationalistes* alike balked at the continentalist contention that Canada and the United States shared a wider ethos of rupture and renewal. They argued that the Canadian-American border was far more than an administrative boundary; it marked a fundamental divide.

On a deeper level, however, anti-Americans and continentalists differed in their appreciation of tradition. This dichotomy faithfully mirrored the dividing line between conservative and non-conservative thought. In the conservative hierarchy of values, tradition stood paramount. It offered a guide to social welfare and a haven from the turmoil of the mass age. America's apparent contempt for the very idea of tradition was undoubtedly enough, in the eyes of many imperialists and French Canadian nationalists, to justify slander and abuse. By contrast, liberals and socialists, who shared a common passion for change and progress, viewed America's disregard for tradition as the foundation of its greatness. Even conservative liberals like Edmond de Nevers, who held tradition in some esteem, were inclined to look upon American indifference towards convention and custom with favour.

Continentalism was indeed a dichotomous ideal. In the nineteenth century, it was an essentially liberal doctrine espoused more often than not by religious nonconformists. By the interwar years, however, its vital centre had shifted to the left. During that era, many of the Dominion's leading continentalists were active supporters of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. In English Canada, continentalism reached its summit of influence during the 1930s and 1940s. The generation that had come of age during the Great War was exceptionally receptive to continentalist ideas. Born roughly between 1880 and 1900, this generation largely turned its back on imperialism (and anti-Americanism) after the Great War.

In Quebec, intellectual continentalism had been steadily declining since the failed rebellions of 1837-1838. By the interwar years, its exponents were largely confined to the margins of the province's intellectual culture. The vital centre of French Canadian continentalism remained solidly liberal during the period under study. That said, it was not a

homogenous sensibility. Some of Quebec's leading continentalists were the intellectual successors of the radical Institut canadien, while others professed a more moderate form of liberalism.

In the late nineteenth century, many of continentalism's most radical exponents embraced annexationism. The idea of continental union was particularly appealing to intellectuals like Goldwin Smith and Louis-Honoré Fréchette, whose liberalism was essentially republican in nature. Annexationism's fortunes were tied to a wider pessimism regarding the Dominion's future. During the late 1880s and early 1890s, economic depression and ethnic, religious, and sectional strife helped fuel annexationist sentiment. By 1900, however, economic prosperity had returned to the Dominion and annexationism had more or less disappeared from the nation's intellectual culture.

The intellectual unity of the continental ethos was based on two fundamental premises: first, that Canada was an American nation, and second, that the Dominion would benefit from some form of continental integration. On a deeper level, however, continentalists were united in their assessment of modernity. They regarded man as the central fact of the universe and held a profound faith in his perfectibility and in the illimitable progress of society. Moreover, continentalists condemned privilege and sought to democratize Canadian society. The United States, as they saw it, was the embodiment of these ideas. America was a liberal republic that embraced a certain conception of progress, equality, and secularism. Continental integration, for its part, was expected to further the progressive agenda by altering the Dominion's political, economic, cultural, and intellectual relationship with Europe. This, in turn, would weaken Canada's 'reactionary' impulses – which included anti-Americanism, imperialism, conservatism, and clericalism – and allow Canadians to finally embrace their *américanité*.

Continentalists in both English and French Canada were inclined to view the Canadian-American relationship in terms of similarities and concord, rather than in terms of differences and conflict. They believed, moreover, that American wealth and power could contribute to Canadian development. Most continentalists, indeed, were Canadian nationalists. They saw Britain, not the United States, as the main threat to Canada's sovereignty and hoped to draw Canada closer to the United States in order to affirm the Dominion's independence from Britain. There were, of course, differences between English and French Canadian continentalism. As we have seen, they evolved differently and tended to focus on different issues. Their most significant difference, however, lay in their

assessment of their nation's *américanité*. For the English Canadian continentalist, the similarities between Canada and the United States far outweighed the differences. In Quebec, on the other hand, continentalists did not argue that French Canadian and American society were essentially similar. Instead, intellectuals like Errol Bouchette insisted that a wider ethos of rupture with Europe united the various nations of the New World.

Continentalist rhetoric served similar purposes in both English and French Canada. On its most basic level it granted legitimacy to continental integration, in particular to the liberalization of Canadian-American trade. On a deeper level, however, continentalism sought to brand Canada a modern, North American nation. Reaction, intellectuals like Frank Underhill argued, was not a Canadian value. Indeed, continentalists were eager to defend their legitimacy as intellectual observers. They were fed up with conservative attempts to stifle domestic intellectual debate by portraying their principles as un-Canadian. Canada was an American nation and continentalism, in turn, was not a seditious doctrine.

Ideas matter to the study of Canadian-American relations. Indeed, though intellectual discourse is undoubtedly less significant in its impact on historical development than socio-economic forces, it has nevertheless proved important to the evolution of the Canadian-American relationship. In certain instances, intellectual commentary helped strengthen prevailing attitudes towards a neighbour. For example, in the late nineteenth century, Goldwin Smith's work was one of the few sources of information on Canada readily available in the United States. Smith's writing, in particular *Canada and the Canadian Question*, helped reinforce the persistent American belief that the Dominion was an unnatural entity whose ultimate destiny lay in annexation to the United States. This attitude undoubtedly impaired the course of Canadian-American relations until the interwar years, when most Americans eventually came to see Canada as a legitimate – and permanent – entity.

Intellectual commentary sometimes played a more direct role in shaping Canada's relationship with the United States. For instance, in 1911, the torrent of anti-American prose generated by the Dominion's imperialist intellectuals played a crucial role in turning English Canadian opinion against reciprocity. Most voters probably supported the trade agreement at the outset. However, after an intense barrage of propaganda generated by Canada's imperialist movement and distributed by the nation's leading manufacturing interests, scores of voters turned against an agreement that successive Canadian governments, both Liberal and Conservative, had hoped to secure since Confederation. Stephen Leacock, for his

part, went on a speaking tour in Quebec and Ontario during the election campaign and played a key role in several local contests, including in Brome County, Quebec, where, writes Alan Bowker, “he helped a political unknown defeat a cabinet minister.”<sup>9</sup>

In some cases, intellectuals were directly involved in Canadian-American diplomacy. Reverend James A. Macdonald, for instance, played a significant – and largely secret – role in negotiating the 1911 reciprocity agreement. During the early negotiations, he acted as an unofficial go-between for President William Howard Taft and Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier. Other intellectuals, including O. D. Skelton and Hugh Keenleyside, rose to key positions within Canada’s civil service. Skelton was appointed under-secretary of state for external affairs by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1925. He remained in place during the Conservative government of R. B. Bennett and died of a heart attack on his way to work on January 28, 1941. According to Norman Hillmer, Skelton was the leading Canadian civil servant of his time and an architect of the modern Department of External Affairs.<sup>10</sup> Hugh Keenleyside entered the Department of External Affairs in 1928. He served in Tokyo from 1929 to 1936 and was the Canadian secretary of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence from 1940 to 1944. In 1944, he was appointed Canada’s first ambassador to Mexico. He left the Department of External Affairs in 1947 to serve as Canada’s deputy minister of mines and resources and as the federal commissioner of the Northwest Territories. Both Skelton and Keenleyside were enthusiastic promoters of continental integration.

From 1891 to 1945, the average Canadian’s receptivity to intellectual discourse on the United States and Canadian-American relations varied a great deal. For instance, while anti-American diatribes may have convinced many voters to reject the 1911 reciprocity agreement, it is unlikely that the harsh criticism of the United States that emanated from the Dominion’s turn-of-the-twentieth-century imperialists was shared by the population at large. Likewise, though pro-American sentiment reached its high-water mark after the 1940 fall of France, many ordinary Canadians continued to view intellectual continentalism with suspicion. Indeed, in August 1940, Frank Underhill was nearly dismissed from his teaching position at the University of Toronto for suggesting that Canada’s imperial bond would soon be eclipsed in importance by its relationship with the United States. This incident clearly illustrates the pervasive ambivalence regarding *américanité* that characterized Canadian public opinion during the period under study.

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<sup>9</sup> Alan Bowker, “Introduction,” in Stephen Leacock, *The Social Criticism of Stephen Leacock* (Toronto, 1973), xv.

<sup>10</sup> Norman Hillmer, “Skelton, Oscar Douglas,” *Canadian Encyclopedia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.

In French Canada, where several historians have noted a significant *décalage élite-peuple* on matters related to the United States, this ambivalence was less pronounced. Popular perceptions of the United States, to be sure, were largely positive. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to view the clerical and conservative campaign against emigration and American culture as an abject failure. Clerical censure did not prevent hundreds of thousands of French Canadians from emigrating to the United States, but it undoubtedly helped direct a large number of people towards various zones of agricultural colonization in Quebec, eastern Ontario, and the West. A similar argument can be made regarding American popular culture. Indeed, though widely viewed as ineffective, the *nationaliste* campaign against Americanization did have an impact on cultural consumption in Quebec. At the very least, it encouraged various governments to enact legislation aimed at reducing the influence of American culture. For instance, under intense clerical pressure, the government of Quebec passed a law in 1928 to prohibit children under sixteen from attending movies.

After 1945, the Republic's image as a modern, progressive nation dissipated. Indeed, the Cold War fundamentally altered America's symbolic significance. This, in turn, triggered a shift in Canadian attitudes towards the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, conservative anti-Americanism withered away and left-of-centre continentalism became a veritable contradiction in terms. During these years, the Canadian left took up the struggle against continentalism. Nevertheless, though the intellectual underpinnings of both continentalism and anti-Americanism have fundamentally changed, many of their basic arguments have remained the same. Calls for economic and cultural protectionism did not disappear with the imperial federation movement. Neither did exacerbated Canadian-American differentialism. These staples of Canadian anti-Americanism have lived on in the writing of left-wing luminaries like James Laxer and Maude Barlow. Likewise, Goldwin Smith's contention that the continent's natural divisions ran along a north-south axis and that each of Canada's regions was the prolongation of a contiguous American region has found its contemporary expression in the borderlands theory. The debate surrounding Canada's *américanité*, to be sure, has proven to be both an enduring and an essential feature of our nation's intellectual culture.

## *Appendix A*

### Corpus Authors

This appendix provides a complete list of the authors found in the study's corpus, of their years of birth and death and, within square brackets, of the number times they appear in the corpus.

ALEXANDER, Henry (1890-1975) [4]  
ALEXANDER, William H. (1878-1962) [1]  
ALGIE, James (1857-1928) [1]  
ALLIN, Cephas D. (1874-1927) [1]  
ANGERS, François-Albert (1909-2003) [2]  
ANONYMOUS [4]  
ARLES, Henri d' (1870-1930) [5]  
ASSELIN, Olivar (1874-1937) [1]  
AUDET, Francis J. (1867-1943) [1]  
AYRE, Robert (b. 1900) [1]  
BAKER, Ray Palmer (1883-1979) [1]  
BARBEAU, Victor (1896-1994) [1]  
BARR, Robert (1850-1912) [1]  
BASTIEN, Hermas (1897-1977) [5]  
BELISLE, Alexandre (1856-1923) [1]  
BENOIT, Josaphat (1900-1976) [1]  
BERNARD, Antoine (1890-1967) [1]  
BERNARD, Harry (1898-1979) [6]  
BERNIER, T. A. (1844-1908) [1]  
BILODEAU, Charles (b. 1907) [1]  
BILODEAU, Georges-Marie (1895-1966) [2]  
BONPART, Adrien de (1820-1892) [1]  
BOUCHETTE, Errol (1863-1912) [2]  
BOURASSA, Henri (1868-1953) [4]  
BOURINOT, John George (1836-1902) [4]  
BREBNER, John Bartlet (1895-1957) [9]  
BRISAY, Richard de [2]  
BROSSEAU, Vincent [1]  
BROWN, E. K. (1905-1951) [1]  
BROWN, George W. (1894-1963) [4]  
BROWN, Vere C. (b. 1868) [1]  
BRUCHESI, Jean (1901-1979) [2]  
BUIES, Arthur (1840-1901) [1]  
BURFORD, W. T. (b. 1892) [1]  
BURPEE, Lawrence J. (1873-1946) [4]  
BURT, A. L. (1888-1971) [1]  
BURWASH, Nathanael (1839-1918) [1]  
BUSH, Douglas (1896-1983) [1]  
CAPPON, James (1855-1939) [7]  
CHAPMAN, William (1850-1917) [2]  
CHARBONNEAU, Jean (1875-1960) [1]  
CHARPENTIER, Alfred (1888-1982) [2]  
CHARTIER, Émile (1876-1963) [1]  
CHOQUETTE, Robert (1905-1991) [1]  
CLAPIN, Sylva (1853-1928) [2]  
CLARK, S. D. (1910-2003) [1]  
CLARKE, S. R. (1846-1932) [1]  
CLUTE, Arthur R. [1]  
COLQUHOUN, A. H. U. (1861-1936) [4]  
COOPER, John A. (1868-1956) [2]  
CORBETT, P. E. (1892-1983) [6]  
COURCHESNE, Georges (1880-1950) [1]

- COUSINEAU, Jacques (1905-1982) [1]  
 CREIGHTON, D. G. (1902-1979) [3]  
 DAFOE, John W. (1866-1944) [5]  
 DALE, E. A. (b. 1888) [1]  
 DAVIS, Allan Ross (1858-1933) [1]  
 DAoust, Charles R. (1865-1924) [1]  
 DEACON, William Arthur (1890-1977) [2]  
 DECELLES, A. D. (1843-1925) [1]  
 DENISON, George T. (1839-1925) [3]  
 DENISON, Merrill (1894-1975) [4]  
 DESAUTELS, Adrien (b. 1894) [1]  
 DESBIENS, Lucien (b. 1907) [1]  
 DESROSNIERS, Léo-Paul (1896-1967) [1]  
 DESY, Jean (1893-1960) [1]  
 DOONER, W. A. [1]  
 DOUGLAS, James (1837-1918) [1]  
 DUGRE, Adélarde (1881-1970) [1]  
 DUGRE, Alexandre (1887-1958) [1]  
 DUHAMEL, Roger (1916-1985) [2]  
 DUMONT, Armand [1]  
 DUNCAN, Sara Jeannette (1861-1922) [3]  
 DURAND, Louis-D. (1888-1965) [2]  
 EBY, Frederick (1874-1968) [1]  
 ECKHARDT, H. M. P. (1869-1918) [1]  
 ELLS, Margaret [1]  
 EWART, John S. (1849-1933) [3]  
 FALCONER, Robert A. (1867-1943) [6]  
 FALUDI, E. G. [1]  
 FARRER, Edward (1850-1916) [2]  
 FERGUSON, George V. (1897-1977) [1]  
 FOREST, M.-Ceslas (1885-1970) [1]  
 FRECHETTE, Louis-Honoré (1839-1908) [1]  
 FRONSAC, Viscount de (b. 1856) [1]  
 FRYE, Northrop (1912-1991) [1]  
 GASCON, Wilfrid (b. 1870) [1]  
 GELBER, Lionel M. (1907-1989) [2]  
 GERIN-LAJOIE, Marie (1867-1945) [1]  
 GIRARD, René (b. 1909) [2]  
 GOLDENBERG, H. Carl (1907-1996) [2]  
 GORDON, Charles W. (1860-1937) [1]  
 GORDON, J. King (1900-1989) [2]  
 GOSSELIN, Paul-Émile (b. 1909) [1]  
 GRANT, George (1918-1988) [1]  
 GRANT, George Monro (1835-1902) [3]  
 GRANT, William Lawson (1872-1935) [1]  
 GRATTON, Valmore (b. 1897) [1]  
 GREENAWAY, C. Roy (1891-1972) [1]  
 GREGORY, Claudius (1889-1944) [1]  
 GRIGNON, Claude-Henri (1894-1976) [1]  
 GROVE, Frederick Philip (1879-1948) [1]  
 GROULX, Lionel (1878-1967) [5]  
 GUIMONT, Paul-Henri (b. 1906) [3]  
 HALL, Frank [1]  
 HAMEL, Philippe (1884-1954) [1]  
 HAMMOND, M. O. (1876-1934) [1]  
 HAMON, Édouard (1841-1904) [1]  
 HARRISON, Susie Frances (1859-1935) [1]  
 HARVEY, Jean-Charles (1891-1967) [2]  
 HAWKES, Arthur (1871-1933) [1]  
 HEMON, Louis (1880-1913) [1]  
 HEROUX, Omer (1876-1963) [2]  
 HERTEL, François (1905-1985) [1]  
 HOLMESTED, George S. (1841-1928) [1]  
 HOPKINS, J. Castell (1864-1923) [5]  
 HUMPHREY, John P. (1905-1995) [4]  
 HUOT, Antonio (1877-1929) [6]



- JACKSON, G. E. (1890-1959) [2]  
 JANIN, Alban [1]  
 JASMIN, Damien (1893-1968) [1]  
 JOHNSTON, Arthur (1841-1919) [1]  
 JORDAN, William George (1852-1939) [1]  
 KEENLEYSIDE, Hugh L. (1898-1992) [2]  
 KERR, W. B. (1896-1950) [1]  
 KING, Basil (1859-1928) [2]  
 KING, Tom [2]  
 KNOWLES, Robert E. (1868-1946) [1]  
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 LAFLAMME, J.-L.-K. (1872-1944) [4]  
 LAMARCHE, M.-A. (1876-1950) [3]  
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 LANDON, Fred (1880-1969) [1]  
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 LAUT, Agnes C. (1871-1936) [1]  
 LAWSON, William [1]  
 LEACOCK, Stephen (1869-1944) [12]  
 LE BEL, Paul [1]  
 LEBOUTHILLIER, Jean-G. (1859-1952) [1]  
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 LEDIT, Joseph-H. (b. 1898) [1]  
 LEFROY, A. H. F. (1852-1919) [3]  
 LEMAN, Beaudry (1878-1951) [1]  
 LEMAY, Henri (1885-1947) [1]  
 LERY, Louis C. de (b. 1895) [1]  
 LESSARD, Camille (1883-1970) [1]  
 LLOYD, Cecil Francis (1884-1938) [1]  
 LOGAN, Annie MacFarlane (d. 1933) [1]  
 LOWER, A. R. M. (1889-1988) [7]  
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 MCARTHUR, Peter (1866-1924) [1]  
 MACCORMAC, John P. (1890-1958) [3]  
 MCCULLOCH, John H. (b. 1892) [1]  
 MACDERMOT, T. W. L. (b. 1896) [1]  
 MACDONALD, James A. (1862-1923) [3]  
 MADONALD, W. L. (1879-1966) [1]  
 MCEVOY, John M. (1864-1935) [1]  
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 MCINNIS, Edgar W. (1899-1973) [6]  
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 MACKAY, R. A. (b. 1894) [2]  
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 MACLAREN, J. J. (1842-1926) [1]  
 MACLELLAN, W. E. (b. 1855) [1]  
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 MAVOR, James (1854-1925) [1]  
 MEEK, Edward (1845-1925) [1]  
 MILNER, William S. (1861-1931) [1]  
 MINVILLE, Esdras (1896-1975) [5]  
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 MUNRO, William Bennett (1875-1957) [5]  
 NEVERS, Edmond de (1862-1906) [4]  
 NORMANDIN, Rodrigue (1906-1977) [1]  
 O'HIGGINS, Harvey J. (1876-1929) [1]  
 O'KEEFE, J. C. [1]

- OLLIVIER, Maurice (1896-1978) [1]  
 OSLER, William (1849-1919) [1]  
 PAQUET, Louis-Adolphe (1859-1942) [1]  
 PARIZEAU, Gérard (1899-1994) [1]  
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 PATTON, H. S. (1889-1945) [2]  
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 PERRAULT, Jacques (1912-1957) [1]  
 PERRIER, Philippe (1870-1947) [1]  
 PERRY, Anne Anderson [1]  
 PHELPS, Arthur L. (1887-1970) [2]  
 PINEAULT-LEVEILLE, Ernestine (d. 1980) [1]  
 POTTER, Lloyd [1]  
 RAÏCHE, Joseph (1886-1943) [1]  
 RAND, William [1]  
 RICHER, Léopold (1902-1961) [2]  
 RIDDELL, William R. (1852-1945) [4]  
 RINGUET (1895-1960) [1]  
 ROBERTS, Charles G. D. (1860-1943) [1]  
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 ROULLAUD, Henri (1856-1910) [1]  
 ROY, Lionel (b. 1905) [1]  
 ROYAL, Joseph (1837-1902) [2]  
 RYAN, J. Arthur [1]  
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 SAINT-PIERRE, Albert (1903-1958) [1]  
 SAINT-PIERRE, Arthur (1885-1959) [1]  
 ST-PIERRE, Téléphore (1869-1912) [1]  
 SANDWELL, B. K. (1876-1954) [7]  
 SAURIOL, Jacques [1]  
 SAURIOL, Paul (b. 1905) [1]  
 SCOTT, F. R. (1899-1985) [5]  
 SHORTT, Adam (1859-1931) [1]  
 SHOTWELL, James T. (1874-1965) [2]  
 SIBLEY, E. L. [1]  
 SIMPSON, J. H. [3]  
 SKELTON, O. D. (1878-1941) [12]  
 SMITH, Goldwin (1823-1910) [9]  
 STACEY, C. P. (b. 1906) [1]  
 STEVENSON, J. A. (1883-1970) [5]  
 STEVENSON, Lionel (1902-1973) [1]  
 STEWART, J. F. M. (b. 1879) [1]  
 STRINGER, Arthur (1874-1950) [1]  
 SURVEYER, Arthur (1879-1961) [1]  
 SUTHERLAND, John C. (1860-1936) [2]  
 TARDIVEL, Jules-Paul (1851-1905) [1]  
 TROTTER, Reginald G. (1888-1951) [15]  
 UNDERHILL, Frank H. (1885-1971) [11]  
 VAN DER HOEK, J. Marjorie [1]  
 VANIER, Anatole (1887-1985) [1]  
 VAUGHAN, Walter (1865-1922) [1]  
 VÉZINA, François [1]  
 VILLENEUVE, J.-M.-R. (1883-1947) [1]  
 VOYER, Raymond-M. (b. 1895) [1]  
 WALKER, B. E. (1848-1924) [2]  
 WATSON, J. W. (1915-1990) [1]  
 WATT, C. D. [1]  
 WICKETT, S. Morley (1872-1915) [2]  
 WILLISON, J. S. (1856-1927) [5]  
 WILLSON, Beckles (1869-1942) [4]

WILSON, J. [1]

WIMAN, Erastus (1834-1904) [6]

WRONG, George M. (1860-1948) [5]

## *Appendix B*

### Key Observers of American Life and Canadian-American Relations (1891-1945)

The present appendix offers basic biographical information on the writers whose work had the greatest impact on the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. Particular emphasis is placed on the intellectual's reading of the American experience and the Canadian-American relationship.

ARLES, Henri d' (1870-1930), clergyman, literary critic, and historian, was born Henri Beudet in Princeville, Québec. He was educated at the Séminaire de Québec. Beudet entered the Dominican Order in 1889 and was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1895. Over the next several years, he served God in various Québec and New England dioceses. He adopted the pseudonym Henri d'Arles during a 1906 trip to France. In 1912, he left the Dominican Order and settled in Manchester, New Hampshire, eventually becoming the chaplain of the Association canado-américaine, a Franco-American fraternal organization. He became an American citizen in 1924 and died in Rome in July 1930. A conservative intellectual, abbé Henri d'Arles wrote extensively on Franco-American affairs and was one of Québec's leading literary critics.

BASTIEN, Hermas (1897-1977), philosopher, educator, and soldier, was born in Montreal. He was educated at the Collège de Montréal and the Collège Sainte-Marie before entering the Université de Montréal, where he received a doctorate in 1928 for his "Essai sur la psychologie religieuse de William James." He taught Latin at Montreal's Mont-Saint-Louis from 1928 to 1939 and gave courses on American literature at the Université de Montréal between 1931 and 1941. Bastien served as a major in the Canadian army during the Second World War. After the war he taught pedagogy at New Brunswick's Université Saint-Joseph before returning to teach at his alma mater, the Université de Montréal, in 1954. A prolific author whose work has been more or less ignored by French Canadian intellectual historians, Hermas Bastien was the first French Canadian writer to produce a major study of American philosophy. His *Philosophies et philosophes américains* (1959) was the culmination of over thirty years of research on the subject. However, as a conservative French Canadian nationalist, he was deeply concerned by the corrosive effects of pragmatism on Catholic

thought. Bastien contributed an article on “L’américanisation par la philosophie” to the *Revue dominicaine’s* 1936 inquiry into “Notre américanisation.”

BERNARD, Harry (1898-1979), journalist, novelist, and literary critic, was born in London, England. The son of a restless French Canadian businessman, he attended school in Soissons, Paris, and St. Albans, Vermont. In 1906, his family returned to Canada and settled in Quebec’s Eastern Townships before relocating to Saint-Hyacinthe, Quebec. From 1911 to 1919 Bernard studied at the Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe. His family moved to Boston in 1912 and Bernard trained briefly as a cadet officer in the American army during the summer of 1918. A year later, he entered the world of journalism at Ottawa’s *Le Droit*. In 1923, he became the editor of the weekly *Courier de Saint-Hyacinthe*, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1970. Bernard’s earliest novel, *L’homme tombé* (1924), was the first a series of regionalist works of fiction published in the 1920s and early 1930s. He was the founding editor of one of Quebec’s most influential intellectual journals, *L’Action nationale*, from 1933 to 1934. Bernard was also active in the founding of the Association des hebdomadaires de langue française in 1932. He received a *licence ès lettres* from the Université de Montréal in 1942 and obtained a doctorate from the same institution in 1948 for a dissertation on “Le roman régionaliste aux États-Unis (1913-1940).” Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, his doctoral research brought him into contact with many of the leading figures of literary regionalism in the United States. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1943. Harry Bernard was the first French Canadian writer to produce a major study of American literature. His doctoral dissertation was published in 1949, though early versions of several chapters had previously appeared in the *Revue de l’Université d’Ottawa*. A conservative intellectual generally critical of America, Bernard was nonetheless attracted by the genuine vitality of its regionalist literature.

BOUCHETTE, Robert-Errol (1863-1912), lawyer, journalist, librarian, and novelist, was born in Quebec City. He was educated at the Séminaire de Québec and the Université Laval. Called to the Quebec Bar in 1885, Bouchette quickly turned his attention to journalism, moving back and forth between Quebec, Montreal, and Toronto over the next several years, and contributed articles to a number of Liberal newspapers, including *L’Étendard* of Montreal, *L’Électeur* of Quebec, the *Montreal Herald*, and the *Toronto Globe*. In 1890, he became the private secretary of Quebec’s Minister of Public Works, Pierre Garneau. Three years later, he

returned to his original occupation and practiced law in Montreal. Moving to Ottawa in 1898, he served for two years as the private secretary to the Dominion's Minister of Revenue, Sir Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbinière, and was appointed assistant librarian of the Library of Parliament in 1903. He would hold this position until his untimely death in 1912. Elected a member of the Royal Society of Canada in 1905, he was appointed secretary of its Section I the following year. A liberal intellectual, Errol Bouchette showed a keen interest in economics. Many of his numerous articles and essays, and his sole novel, *Robert Lozé* (1903), deal with the economic advancement of French Canada. Concerned that American monopolies were gaining control of Quebec's economy, he urged the provincial government to legislate in order to protect the Province's natural resources. Bouchette was exceptionally influential among the thinkers of his generation. The Quebec government implemented some of his ideas under the premiership of Sir Lomer Gouin and his work greatly influenced prominent French Canadian economist Édouard Montpetit<sup>qv</sup>.

BOURASSA, Henri (1868-1953), journalist and politician, was born in Montreal. The son of artist and poet Napoleon Bourassa and the grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, he received most of his education from private tutors. In the mid-1880s, he studied briefly at Montreal's École polytechnique and at Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts. The young Henri quickly turned to politics and journalism, becoming the mayor of Montebello, Quebec, in 1890, and founding *L'Interprète* of Clarence Creek, Ontario, in 1895. He sat as a Liberal in the House of Commons for the riding of Labelle, Quebec, from 1896 to 1899, and was the secretary of the Anglo-American Commissions of Quebec (1898) and Washington (1899). Unwilling to accept any Canadian participation in the South African War, Bourassa broke with Sir Wilfrid Laurier and resigned his seat in 1899. He was re-elected shortly thereafter as an independent Member of Parliament. He entered provincial politics in 1907, and sat as a nationalist in Quebec's Legislative Assembly from 1908 to 1912. In 1910, he founded *Le Devoir*, French Canada's most prestigious newspaper, which he would edit until 1932. Bourassa returned to federal politics in 1925, serving for the next ten years as the independent Member of Parliament for Labelle. Defeated in the 1935 general election, he retired from active politics and lived out the rest of his days in relative silence. During the first two decades of the twentieth century Bourassa was French Canada's most influential intellectual. However, his brand of Canadian nationalism lost favour after the Great War as a new generation of intellectuals led by Lionel Groulx<sup>qv</sup> chose to centre their nationalism on

French Canada. Though, like most French Canadians, Henri Bourassa was primarily concerned with the threat posed to Canada by British and English Canadian imperialism, he was also troubled by our nation's progressive Americanization. He articulated his rejection of American society in dozens of articles in *Le Devoir*, many of which were later published in pamphlet form. Bourassa actively campaigned against the Liberal party during the 1911 federal election campaign, and played a key role in eroding support for the governing Liberals in their Quebec stronghold.

BOURINOT, John George (1836-1902), journalist, historian, and civil servant, was born in Sydney, Nova Scotia. He was educated at Trinity College, Toronto. The son of a prominent Cape Breton politician, Bourinot founded the Halifax *Herald* in 1860. In 1873, he was appointed assistant clerk of the Canadian House of Commons, and became its chief clerk in 1880. A foremost authority on constitutional law and parliamentary procedure, his *Parliamentary Procedure and Practice in the Dominion of Canada* (1884) was the standard work on the subject for several decades. A founding member of the Royal Society of Canada, Bourinot became its president in 1892, and supervised the publication of nineteen volumes of the Society's *Proceedings and Transactions*. He was awarded a CMG in 1890 and a KCMG in 1898. A fervent imperialist and a prolific author, Sir John George Bourinot's writings emphasized the superiority of British and Canadian political institutions over American ones. His interest in comparative government and political institutions has led some scholars to view him as "the first political scientist in Canada."

BREBNER, John Bartlet (1895-1957), historian and soldier, was born in Toronto. He was educated at the University of Toronto and served as a second lieutenant in the Royal Artillery during the Great War. After the war he resumed his studies at St. John's College, Oxford, and was appointed a lecturer in the University of Toronto's Department of History in 1921. Brebner left Toronto in 1925 to lecture and pursue doctoral studies at Columbia University's Department of History. He was awarded a Ph.D. in 1927 and became a full professor in 1942 and an American citizen in 1943. Brebner spent the rest of his life teaching at Columbia University and died at New York in 1957. He was the president of the Canadian Historical Association in 1939-1940. John Bartlet Brebner was one of the most prominent continentalist scholars of his generation. Keenly interested in Canadian-American relations and in the North Atlantic triangle, he assisted James T. Shotwell<sup>9v</sup> in editing the series of twenty-five

studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Brebner authored two of the series' most important volumes: *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (1940), which he completed and prepared for publication after the death of the study's original author, American historian Marcus Lee Hansen, and the classic *North American Triangle* (1945). He also participated in all five of the conferences on Canadian-American affairs organized by the Endowment between 1935 and 1941. The publication of his *North Atlantic Triangle* marked the high-water mark of continentalist scholarship. In this study Brebner's "primary aim was to get at, and to set forth, the interplay between the United States and Canada – the Siamese Twins of North America who cannot separate and live."

CAPPON, James (1855-1939), literary critic and historian, was born in Dundee, Scotland. He was educated at the University of Glasgow. After receiving his degree, Cappon spent several years as a lecturer and tutor at Glasgow and, in 1885, he left Scotland to teach at an English school in Italy. Three years later, he joined the faculty of Queen's University as a professor of English language and literature, a position he would occupy until his retirement in 1919. He was appointed the university's Dean of Arts in 1906. Cappon was instrumental in the struggle to separate Queen's from the Presbyterian Church and was the founding editor of the influential *Queen's Quarterly*. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1917. His studies of poets Charles G. D. Roberts and Bliss Carman were significant in the development of Canadian literary criticism. An ardent imperialist, Cappon devoted a number of columns and articles in the *Queen's Quarterly* to criticising aspects of American society.

CLAPIN, Sylva (1853-1928), lexicographer, historian, journalist, short-story writer, sailor, and civil servant, was born in Saint-Hyacinthe, Canada East. He was educated at the Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe. As a young man, Clapin served for two years in the American navy. In 1875, he returned to Canada and became the editor the *Courier de Saint-Hyacinthe* (1875-1879) and of Montreal's *Le Monde* (1880-1885). He left Montreal in 1885 to become a bookseller and publisher in Paris, but returned four years later and opened his own bookstore and publishing firm – the two occupations generally being linked in the nineteenth century. In 1892, he emigrated to Boston and continued to labour in the book trade until he became the editor of *L'Opinion publique* of Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1896. During the Spanish-American War Clapin re-enlisted in the American navy as a gunner and was decorated for



bravery. He returned to Canada in 1900 and became a bookseller and publisher in Ottawa. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed translator at the Canadian House of Commons, a position he would occupy until his retirement in 1921. Sylva Clapin is best remembered as a short-story writer and lexicographer – his 1902 *Dictionary of Americanism* is of particular interest in this regard. However, his most widely read book was undoubtedly his *Histoire des États-Unis* (1900). Inspired by the success of A. D. DeCelles'<sup>qv</sup> similar but more erudite *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (1896), Clapin – an admirer of American institutions – produced a positive, though not uncritical assessment of the American experience that served for many years as the standard American history textbook in French Canadian schools and colleges. Re-edited in 1913 and 1925, the book was widely used in Franco-American parochial schools.

CORBETT, Percy Ellwood (1892-1983), jurist and soldier, was born in Tyne Valley, Prince Edward Island. He was educated at Quebec's Huntingdon Academy and at McGill University. After receiving his M.A. in 1915, Corbett was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship, but postponed it to serve with great distinction as an officer in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France. Severely injured at the Battle of the Somme, he was awarded the Military Cross in 1918. After the Great War he resumed his studies at Oxford University and was a Fellow of All Souls College from 1920 to 1927. During that time he also served as an assistant legal advisor to the League of Nation's International Labour Office and obtained a *Licence ès droit* from the Sorbonne. In 1924, he was appointed professor of Roman law at McGill University's Faculty of Law. One of the Faculty's rising stars, Corbett served as its Dean from 1928 to 1936. Under his direction, the Faculty of Law recruited both F. R. Scott'<sup>qv</sup> and John P. Humphrey'<sup>qv</sup> and became a hotbed of continentalist sentiment. Serving briefly as McGill's acting principal, Corbett continued to teach Roman and International law until 1942, when he left Canada and joined the faculty of Yale University. He became an American citizen in 1947. From 1951 to 1958 Corbett taught at Princeton University's Center for International Studies. He spent the rest of his career teaching at the University of Virginia and at Lehigh University. An international jurist who frequently argued for a Canadian-American rapprochement, P. E. Corbett authored a volume on *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes* (1937) in the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and attended three of the conferences on Canadian-American affairs organized by the Endowment between 1935 and 1941. In the October 1930

issue of the *Dalhousie Review* he published Canada's first in-depth scholarly examination of anti-Americanism.

CREIGHTON, Donald Grant (1902-1979), historian, was born in Toronto. He was educated at Victoria College, the University of Toronto, and Balliol College, Oxford. In 1927, Creighton was appointed lecturer at the University of Toronto's Department of history. He became a full professor in 1945 and was the Department's chairman from 1954 to 1959. In 1946, he was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and was awarded its Tyrrell Medal for history in 1951. He became a Companion of the Order of Canada in 1967. The most prominent English Canadian historian of his generation, he contributed a volume on *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (1937) to the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In this study – reprinted in 1956 as *The Empire of the St. Lawrence* – Creighton argued that Canada, far from being the geographic absurdity denounced by Goldwin Smith<sup>qv</sup>, had developed along the continent's natural east-west axis. Known as the Laurentian Thesis, this theory had been previously developed by economic historian H. A. Innis in his 1930 study on *The Fur Trade in Canada*, and formed the basis for Creighton's sweeping critique of continentalism. A conservative intellectual whose attachment to tradition and to the British connection was indefectible, his anti-Americanism found its expression in most of his writing, including in his only work of fiction, *Takeover* (1978), a novel that explored the Americanization of Canadian society. Creighton was a regular participant in the biennial conferences on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1935 and 1941.

DAFOE, John Wesley (1866-1944), journalist, was born in Combermere, Canada West. Educated locally, he joined the staff of the Montreal *Daily Herald* in 1883 and was appointed the paper's parliamentary reporter a year later. In 1885, he became the founding editor of the *Ottawa Evening Journal*. He left the *Evening Journal* the following year to join the staff of the *Manitoba* (later *Winnipeg*) *Free Press*. In 1892, he would return east and spend the next several years at the Montreal *Herald* and at the Montreal *Star*. He returned to the *Free Press* in 1901 and would remain its editor until his death in 1944. He attended the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as a representative of the Canadian press and participated in the founding of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1928. Elected to the Royal Society of Canada in

1926, Dafoe had previously declined a knighthood. He was a chancellor of the University of Manitoba from 1934 to 1944 and served as a member of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations in 1939-1940. John W. Dafoe was perhaps the most influential English Canadian journalist of his time. A staunch liberal, he was a strong supporter of reciprocity and Canadian independence. The essence of his thought can be found in the series of lectures he gave at New York's Columbia University in 1934. Later published under the provocative title of *Canada: An American Nation* (1935), they constitute a syllabus of Canadian continentalism. Dafoe was a regular participant in the biennial conferences on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1935 and 1941.

DeCELLES, Alfred Duclos (1843-1925), historian, journalist, and librarian, was born in Saint-Laurent, Canada East. He was educated at the Séminaire de Québec and the Université Laval. Called to the Québec bar in 1873, DeCelles never practiced law. He turned instead to journalism and was successively editor of the *Journal de Québec*, *La Minerve*, and *L'Opinion publique*. DeCelles was appointed assistant librarian of the Library of Parliament in 1880, and became its head librarian in 1885, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1920. In 1885, he was elected a member of the Royal Society of Canada. Though a prolific writer – he authored numerous books on the history of early and mid-nineteenth century Québec – A. D. DeCelles' influence on the evolution of French Canadian historiography was fairly limited. However, his *Les États-Unis. Origine, institutions, développement* (1896) was widely read and received a prize from the French Académie des sciences morales et politiques. Re-edited in 1913 and 1925, its success inspired Sylva Clapin<sup>qv</sup> to write a similar but more generally accessible *Histoire des États-Unis* for use in French Canadian and Franco-American schools.

DUGRÉ, Adélard (1881-1970), clergyman and novelist, was born in Pointe-du-Lac, Québec. He was educated at the Séminaire de Trois-Rivières. He entered the Society of Jesus in 1901 and taught at the Collège de Saint-Boniface in Manitoba from 1906 to 1915. Dugré was ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1915. That same year he went to England to study theology at a Jesuit college. He returned to Canada in 1919 and taught theology at Montreal's Scolasticat de l'Immaculée Conception until 1932. Dugré became the school's chancellor in 1927. From 1932 to 1936 he was the Superior of the Jesuit province of Lower Canada. In 1936, he became the Society of Jesus' assistant general superior for the British Empire and Belgium. Ten years

later, he was appointed superior of Montreal's Maison Bellarmin. He retired in 1950. In 1925, Father Dugré authored *La campagne canadienne*, a best-selling work of fiction that explored the differences between French Canadian and American society through the tale of a Franco-American family torn between its rural French Canadian roots and its urban Midwestern American home. The novel vigorously denounced the chaotic materialism of American society, which the author contrasted with the stable, ordered, and spiritual nature of French Canadian society. Re-edited numerous times, including once in comic book form, *La campagne canadienne* was serialized by several Quebec newspapers.

DUNCAN, Sara Jeannette (1861-1922), novelist and journalist, was born in Brantford, Canada West. She was educated at the Toronto Normal School. Duncan soon abandoned teaching for journalism and worked as an editorial writer and book reviewer for the *Washington Post* (1885-1886), as a columnist for the *Toronto Globe* (1886-1887), and finally as a columnist for the *Montreal Star* (1887-1888). She also contributed numerous articles to the *Week*. In September 1888 she set off on a round-the-world tour and met her future husband, museum curator and journalist Everard Cotes, in Calcutta. She married him in December 1890 and spent most of the next three decades in India. She died at Ashted, England, in 1922. Sara Jeannette Duncan wrote nearly twenty novels in the years that followed her marriage. Though only two of her novels drew directly on her Canadian experience – including her most brilliant work of fiction, *The Imperialist* (1904) – she frequently explored the differences between the Old and the New World in her work. This popular theme can be found in two of her more commercially successful novels, *An American Girl in London* (1891) and *Those Delightful Americans* (1902).

FALCONER, Robert Alexander (1867-1943), clergyman, biblical scholar, and educator, was born in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. He was educated at Queen's Royal College, Trinidad, and at the universities of London, Edinburgh, and Marburg. Falconer spent much of his youth in the West Indian island of Trinidad, where his father, a Presbyterian clergyman, had been posted. After completing postgraduate work in Germany, he was ordained a minister of the Presbyterian Church in 1892. Shortly thereafter, he joined the faculty of Pine Hill College, Halifax, where he taught New Testament Greek and New Testament Exegesis. He became the college's principal in 1904. Three years later, Falconer was appointed president of the University of Toronto, a position he would hold until his

retirement in 1932. Selected in the wake of a royal commission recommending the complete reorganization of the university, he thoroughly reformed its structure during his twenty-five year presidency. He was awarded a CMG in 1911 and a KCMG in 1917. A popular public speaker, Falconer received a number of honorary degrees over his long and distinguished career. Elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1916, he became its president in 1932. He was active in the movement to unite the Presbyterian Church of Canada with Canada's Methodists and Congregationalists. Troubled by Canada's progressive Americanization, much of Sir Robert Falconer's work stressed the importance of maintaining Canada's distinct identity and her connection to Britain. He delivered a series of lectures in Great Britain on Canadian-American relations in 1925, and was a regular participant in the biennial conferences on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A moderate imperialist, Falconer was active in the Round Table movement.

GROULX, Lionel-Adolphe (1878-1967), clergyman, historian, and novelist, was born in Vaudreuil, Quebec. He was educated at the Séminaire de Sainte-Thérèse and the Grand Séminaire de Montréal. Groulx was ordained a Roman Catholic priest at Valleyfield, Quebec, in 1903. He taught for three years at the Collège de Valleyfield before pursuing his studies in Europe, first in Rome, where he obtained doctorates in theology and philosophy, then at the University of Friburg, in Switzerland, where he studied philosophy and literature. In 1909, he returned to teaching at the Collège de Valleyfield. During this time, Groulx became increasingly interested in Canadian history. In 1915, he left Valleyfield to teach Canadian history at the Montreal campus of Université Laval, which was reorganized as the Université de Montréal in 1920. The abbé would remain at the university until his retirement in 1949. In 1917, he participated in the founding of *L'Action française*, a nationalist journal he would edit from 1920 to 1928. He went on a lecture tour of France in 1931. In 1947, Groulx founded the Institut d'histoire de l'Amérique française and its organ, the *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1918, and received its Tyrrell Medal in 1948, but resigned in 1952. His two novels, *L'appel de la race* (1922) and *Au Cap Blomidon* (1932), were centred respectively on the struggles of Franco-Ontarians and Acadians. Groulx played a key role in the development of French Canadian historiography. He was also the leader of Quebec's *nationaliste* movement during the interwar years. The

abbé frequently urged French Canadians to resist Americanization and encouraged Franco-Americans to maintain their French and Catholic traditions.

HAMON, Édouard (1841-1904), clergyman and playwright, was born in Vitré, Brittany, France. He was educated at Angers and at Saint-Acheul. In 1861, he entered the Society of Jesus and taught history and grammar at the Collège de Vaugirard and at the École libre de Metz from 1865 to 1868. He immigrated to North America in 1868 and lectured briefly at Fordham College, New York's Jesuit University, before coming to teach at Montreal's Collège Sainte-Marie, where he would remain until 1879. He was ordained a Roman Catholic priest at Woodstock, Maryland, in 1872 and took his final Jesuit vow in 1878. Though nominally attached to the Montreal parish of l'Immaculée-Conception, Hamon would dedicate the next several years to preaching retreats throughout Canada and the United States. He was instrumental in the creation of the popular Ligue du Sacré-Cœur and served as the superior of the Jesuit Order's Quebec City residence from 1897 to 1900. He returned to itinerant predication at the turn of the century and died while preaching a retreat at Leeds, Quebec, in 1904. Like most of Quebec's clergymen, Father Hamon was deeply concerned by the emigration of French Canadians to New England. A popular preacher, he had spent a great deal of time in New England's *petits Canadas* and was familiar with the emigrant's plight. In 1882, he published *Exil et patrie*, a play that condemned emigration and promoted the colonization of the Ottawa Valley. However, he is best remembered for his seminal *Les Canadiens-Français de la Nouvelle-Angleterre* (1891), an essay that denounced emigration, but that nevertheless portrayed the emigrant as an instrument of God's will. Father Hamon believed that the United States would eventually break up, and that several new republics would emerge from its ashes. This disintegration, coupled with the rapid expansion of Franco-America, lead him to prophesize that "qu'avant longtemps, les deux fractions du peuple Canadien (*sic*), celle qui habite la terre des ancêtres et celle qui a déjà franchi la frontière américaine, se rejoindront et pourront alors se donner la main pour ne plus former qu'un seul peuple."

HARVEY, Jean-Charles (1891-1967), journalist and novelist, was born in La Malbaie, Quebec. He studied at the Séminaire de Chicoutimi for three years before entering Society of Jesus in 1908. Harvey left the order in 1913 and briefly studied law at the Montreal campus of Université Laval. In 1914, he began his career as a journalist with *Le Canada*. He moved to

Montreal's *La Patrie* in 1915 and worked at *La Presse* from 1916 to 1918. In 1918, he took a job as a publicist with the Machine agricole nationale of Montmagny, Quebec. The firm went bankrupt in 1922 and Harvey soon returned to journalism, this time at Quebec City's *Le Soleil*. He would serve as the Liberal organ's editor-in-chief from 1927 to 1934. In April 1934, Harvey's second novel, *Les demi-civilisés*, which was harshly critical of Quebec's Roman Catholic clergy, was placed on the Index by Cardinal Villeneuve. Shortly thereafter, he was dismissed as *Le Soleil's* editor-in-chief. Harvey was appointed the head of Quebec's Bureau of Statistics a few months later by Premier Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, but was dismissed from this position after the 1936 victory Maurice Duplessis' Union nationale. In September 1937, Harvey founded *Le Jour*, a weekly newspaper devoted to political and cultural commentary. The paper ceased publication in 1946 and Harvey spent the next several years working in radio journalism, first at the French CBC and then at Montreal's CKAC. He edited two Montreal tabloids, the *Petit Journal* and the *Photo-Journal*, from 1953 to 1966. An outspoken liberal, Harvey was the *bête noire* of Quebec's clergy during the interwar years. In the end, however, even the measure of protection afforded by his association with Premier Taschereau's Liberal regime could not shield him from clerical censure. Though he was generally an admirer of American society, Harvey was troubled by what he saw as the American takeover of Quebec industry. He explored this theme in his first novel, *Marcel Faure* (1922), which was inspired by the years he spent working for the Machine agricole nationale.

HUMPHREY, John Peters (1905-1995), jurist and diplomat, was born in Hampton, New Brunswick. He was educated at Mount Allison University and McGill University. Called to the Quebec Bar in 1929, Humphrey practiced law in Montreal before joining McGill's Faculty of Law in 1936. He briefly served as the Faculty's dean before being appointed director of the UN Secretariat's Human Rights Division in 1946, where he helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Humphrey would remain with the United Nations for the next twenty years. In 1966, he returned to teaching at McGill and lectured well into his eighties. He was awarded the Order of Canada in 1974 and the UN's Human Rights Award in 1988. An ardent internationalist, John P. Humphrey was also a proponent of pan-Americanism. In 1942, he authored *The Inter-American System: A Canadian View*, in which he argued that Canada should join the Pan-American Union. He attended the 1941 Carnegie Endowment conference on Canadian-American relations.

HUOT, Antonio (1877-1929), clergyman, was born in Québec City. He was educated at the Séminaire de Québec and in Rome, where he received doctorates in both theology and philosophy. Ordained a Roman Catholic priest in 1899, Huot taught philosophy at the Séminaire de Québec in 1900 and 1901, but resigned due to ill-health. He served as a chaplain to a wealthy family in Pass Christian, Mississippi, for the next decade, and became the editor of the *Semaine religieuse de Québec* sometime after his return to Canada. A fierce anti-Semite and anti-Freemason – he authored a number of books and pamphlets denouncing Jews and Masons – Huot was also highly critical of American society.

KEENLEYSIDE, Hugh Llewellyn (1898-1992), historian, diplomat, civil servant, and soldier, was born in Toronto. His family moved to British Columbia while he was still a boy. After completing high school, he served with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Tank Battalion, and then enrolled at the University of British Columbia, graduating with a B.A. in 1920. Three years later, he received a doctorate from Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts. In 1925, he became an instructor at the University of British Columbia's Department of History. His interest in international affairs brought him into the service of Canada's Department of External Affairs in 1928. Keenleyside served in Tokyo from 1929 to 1936 and was the Canadian secretary of the Permanent Joint Board of Defence from 1940 to 1944. He opposed the internment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War. In 1944, he was appointed Canada's first ambassador to Mexico. He left the Department of External Affairs in 1947 to serve as Canada's deputy minister of mines and resources and as the federal commissioner of the Northwest Territories. Keenleyside was the director general of the United Nations' Technical Assistance Administration from 1950 to 1958. As the chairman of the British Columbia Power Commission from 1959 to 1962 and of the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority from 1962 to 1969, he played a key role in the development of hydroelectric power in that province. Keenleyside received a number of awards and distinctions during his long and distinguished career, including the Order of Canada and the Pearson Peace Medal. He published his memoirs in 1981-1982. Keenleyside's *Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion* (1929) was the first book-length study devoted to the history of Canadian-American relations. He attended the 1937 and 1941 conferences on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.



LANCTOT, Gustave (1883-1975), historian, archivist, journalist, and soldier, was born in Saint-Constant, Quebec. He was educated at the Collège de Montréal and the Université de Montréal. Called to the Quebec Bar in 1907, Lanctot soon abandoned law for journalism and worked for *Le Canada* and *La Patrie* before being awarded a Rhodes Scholarship. He spent the next several years studying history and political science at Oxford University and literature at the Sorbonne. Returning home in 1912, he found work at the Public Archives of Canada. Soon after the outbreak of war, Lanctot enrolled as an officer in the Canadian Expeditionary Force and served overseas as the assistant director of war trophies. Demobilized in 1918, he was awarded a doctorate from the Université de Paris in 1919 for his dissertation on "L'administration de la Nouvelle-France." Upon his return to Canada, he became the director of the Public Archive's French Section and taught at the University of Ottawa. In 1937, he was appointed deputy minister and Dominion Archivist, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1948. A prolific author and historian, Lanctot was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1926 and served as its president in 1948-1949. He also served as the president of the Canadian Historical Association in 1941. An admirer of British institutions, Major Lanctot stands alongside Sir Thomas Chapais and abbé Arthur Maheux as one of the main expositors of French Canadian loyalism. He edited *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (1941), the only French-language volume the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and participated in three of the conferences on Canadian-American affairs organized by the Endowment. In 1965, he published *Le Canada et la Révolution américaine*. Lanctot was awarded a number of distinctions over the course of his career, including the French Légion d'honneur and the Royal Society of Canada's J. B. Tyrrel Medal for outstanding work in the history of Canada. His *Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* was awarded the Prix David.

LAURENDEAU, André (1912-1968), journalist, novelist, and playwright, was born in Montreal. He was educated at Montreal's Collège Sainte-Marie and at the Université de Montréal. In 1933, he helped found the Jeune-Canada, a nationalist youth movement which sought to regenerate French Canadian society through a Catholic and conservative programme. Two years later, Laurendeau went to Paris to study philosophy and literature. From 1937 to 1943, and again from 1949 to 1953, he edited *L'Action nationale*. In 1942, Laurendeau helped found

the Bloc populaire, a political party opposed to conscription. He became the leader of the party's provincial wing in 1943 and served as the Member of the Legislative Assembly for Montréal-Laurier from 1944 to 1948. In 1947, he became the assistant editor of Montreal's *Le Devoir*. Ten years later, he became the paper's editor-in-chief. During the 1950s, Laurendeau hosted a popular television show on the French CBC. In 1962, he was appointed the co-chair of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson. He published a novel, *Une vie d'enfer*, and wrote three successful plays in the 1960s. Laurendeau was the leading figure of Quebec's *nationaliste* movement in the 1940s and 1950s. Though he accepted most of the anti-American platitudes that were intrinsic to French Canadian nationalism, he nevertheless urged his compatriots to become more familiar with American society in a 1941 article published in *L'Enseignement secondaire*.

LEACOCK, Stephen Butler (1869-1944), political economist, humorist, short-story writer, and historian, was born in Swanmore, England. He was educated at Upper Canada College, the University of Toronto, and the University of Chicago. Leacock arrived in Canada at an early age and settled with his family in the Lake Simcoe district of Ontario. In 1889, he became a master at Upper Canada College. He left this position in 1898 to pursue doctoral studies in political economy at the University of Chicago. After receiving his degree, he returned to Canada and was appointed lecturer in economics and political science at McGill University. In 1907, with the active encouragement of Canadian Governor-General Lord Grey, he embarked on a triumphant and lucrative lecture tour of the British Empire to promote imperial unity. A year later, he was named professor of political science at McGill and head of the department, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1936. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1910 and received a number of honorary degrees over his long and distinguished career. A world-renowned humorist, Leacock's numerous satirical sketches were widely read in the Anglo-American world. However, his literary success in the United States did not prevent him from being a forceful critic of American society. His *Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich* (1914) presented a sharply satirical portrait of urban American wealth. A fervent imperialist, Leacock actively supported the Conservative party during the 1911 federal election campaign. A versatile and prolific author and an influential thinker, Stephen Leacock was perhaps the best-known English Canadian intellectual of his generation.

LEFROY, Augustus Henry Frazer (1852-1919), jurist, was born in Toronto. He was educated at Rugby and New College, Oxford. Born into a prominent Toronto family, Lefroy was called to the English Bar in 1877 and to the Ontario Bar the following year (K.C., 1908). He practiced law in Toronto during the 1880s and 1890s and was appointed professor of Roman law, jurisprudence, and the history of English law at the University of Toronto in 1900, a position he would hold for the rest of his life. Canada's leading late nineteenth and early twentieth century expert on the common law, he was the editor of the *Canadian Law Times* from 1915 until his death in 1919. Inspired in part by the work of Sir John George Bourinot<sup>qv</sup>, A. H. F. Lefroy's essays frequently emphasized the superiority of British and Canadian forms of government over American ones. An ardent imperialist, he sought to refute English jurist Albert Venn Dicey's assertion that the Canadian Constitution was essentially similar to the American one.

LOWER, Arthur Reginald Marsden (1889-1988), historian and sailor, was born in Barrie, Ontario. He was educated at the University of Toronto and Harvard University. During the Great War he served as an officer in the Royal Navy. After completing his doctoral studies, Lower taught history at Tufts College, Massachusetts, at Harvard, and at United College, Winnipeg, where he chaired the Department of History for eighteen years. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1941 and served as its president from 1962 to 1963. In 1944, he became professor of History at Queen's University, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1959. One of Canada's foremost historians, A. R. M. Lower was keenly interested in the staples trade and in Canadian-American relations. He contributed a volume on *The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest* (1938) to the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and participated in two of the conferences on Canadian-American affairs organized by the Endowment. A liberal nationalist, Lower outlined his vision of Canadian unity in his widely read *Colony to Nation* (1946). He was made a Companion of the Order of Canada in 1968.

MacCORMAC, John Patrick (1890-1958), journalist and soldier, was born in Ottawa. During the Great War, MacCormac served as an artillery officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force and was awarded the Military Cross. In 1924, he joined the staff of the *New York Times* and was their Canadian correspondent from 1933 to 1939. He died while on holiday in

Norway. MacCormac authored the widely read and controversial *Canada: America's Problem* in 1940. The wartime essay argued that Canada's participation in the war made "isolation impossible for the United States." He attended the 1939 Carnegie Endowment conference on Canadian-American relations.

MACDONALD, James Alexander (1862-1923), clergyman and journalist, was born in the Township of East Williams, Middlesex County, Canada West. He was educated at Knox College, Toronto, and the University of Edinburgh. In 1891, he was ordained a minister of the Presbyterian Church in Canada and served as the pastor of Knox Church, St. Thomas, Ontario, for the next five years. In 1896, he founded *The Westminster*, a monthly religious journal published in Toronto. Later, he reorganized and edited *The Presbyterian*, a weekly journal devoted to the interests of the Presbyterian Church. From 1896 to 1901 he was the principal of the Presbyterian Ladies College of Toronto. In 1902, he was appointed managing editor of the Toronto *Globe*, Canada's leading Liberal newspaper, where he would remain until his retirement in 1916. Macdonald's interest in international relations and arbitration lead him to play an important role in the establishment of the World Peace Foundation. He was particularly interested in fostering closer relations between Canada and the United States, in part because he felt that both nations possessed a common English-speaking civilization founded on the twin ideals of democracy and liberty. He expressed this idea in two collections of essays, *Democracy and the Nations* (1915) and *The North American Idea* (1917). An influential member of the Canadian Liberal party and a close advisor to Sir Wilfrid Laurier, James A. Macdonald played a key role in initiating the negotiations that would lead to the failed 1911 reciprocal trade agreement with the United States.

McINNIS, Edgar Wardell (1899-1973), historian, poet, and soldier, was born in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. During the Great War, McInnis served as an artilleryman with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France. He recounted his wartime experiences in two collections of poetry, *Poems Written at the Front* (1918) and *The Road to Arras* (1920). He taught at the University of Toronto's Department of History for a number of years before becoming the executive director of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1951. A member of the original staff of York University in 1960, he became York's dean of graduate studies in 1964. An historian keenly interested in international relations, Edgar W. McInnis published *The Unguarded Frontier: A History of American-Canadian Relations* in 1942. His

*Canada: A Political and Social History* (1947) went through four editions and was widely used in Canada's colleges and universities.

MACPHAIL, John Andrew (1864-1938), physician, soldier, and literary critic, was born in Orwell, Prince Edward Island. He was educated at Prince of Wales College, Charlottetown, and McGill University. During his studies at McGill Macphail wrote reviews and articles for various newspapers, including the *Montreal Gazette* and the *Chicago Times*, and saved enough money to finance a trip around the world. In 1891, he arrived in London, England, and resumed his medical studies. Within a year, he had become a member of the Royal College of Surgeons and a licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians. He returned to Canada in 1892. After practicing medicine and teaching at Bishop's University from 1893 to 1905, Macphail was appointed McGill's first professor of the history of medicine in 1907, a position he would hold for thirty years. That same year he became the editor of the prestigious and influential *University Magazine*. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1910. A year later, he became the founding editor of the *Canadian Medical Association Journal*. During the Great War he served as a medical officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in France. In recognition for his military and literary work, he was created a knight bachelor in 1918. After witnessing the horrors of gas and trench warfare, however, Macphail's work became increasingly brooding and morbid. In 1916, he published *The Book of Sorrow*, an anthology of poetry related to death and mourning that he had initially compiled after the untimely loss of his wife in 1902. Later, he authored *The Medical Services* (1925), the first volume of the *Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War*. A fervent ruralist, Macphail translated Louis Hémon's famous novel, *María Chapdelaine*, into English. His 1921 translation was nonetheless overshadowed by W. H. Blake's version of the same year. Despite having achieved little success as a writer of fiction – Macphail authored a novel, *The Vine of Sibmah: A Relation of the Puritans* (1906), and a play, *The Land: A Play of Character, in One Act with Five Scenes* (1914) – his contribution to the development of English Canadian literature was important. Under his supervision, the *University Magazine* devoted a great deal of space to literary criticism. He also played a key role in drawing public attention to the work of Canadian poets Marjorie Pickthall and John McCrae – he published a posthumous anthology of McCrae's poems in 1919. Though by no means a socialist – his work consistently stressed the fundamental importance of racial determinism – Macphail visited the USSR in 1935. He returned to Canada thoroughly

unimpressed by most aspects of Soviet life, but did approve of Soviet public transportation and worker housing. Deeply depressed by modernity, his attachment to the British connection was tied to his deep reverence for tradition. Materialistic, egalitarian, and cosmopolitan, American society embodied the antithesis of his conservative political, religious, and social values. His oft quoted 1909 article in the *University Magazine*, "New Lamps for Old," remains one of the most eloquent and sweeping critiques of American society ever published in Canada. A prolific and versatile writer, Sir Andrew Macphail was among the most influential Canadian intellectuals of his time.

MINVILLE, Esdras (1896-1975), economist, was born in Grande-Vallée, Québec. He was educated at the Brothers of the Christian Schools' Pensionnat Saint-Laurent and at Montreal's École des Hautes Études commerciales. After obtaining his *licence en sciences commerciales* in 1922, Minville worked for a few years in the private sector, first at an insurance firm, then at a brokerage house. In 1927, he joined the faculty of the École des Hautes Études commerciales. He served as the school's principal from 1938 to 1962 and as the Université de Montréal's dean of social science from 1950 to 1957. Minville was the founding co-editor of *L'Actualité économique*, the École des Hautes Études commerciales' monthly review of economic affairs, and the founding president of both the Ligue d'action nationale and the Office de recherche scientifique du Québec. Elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1944, he received its Innis-Gérin Medal in 1967. An influential *nationaliste*, Minville was particularly concerned by *l'infériorité économique des Canadiens français* and by the American takeover of Québec industry.

MONTPETIT, Édouard (1881-1954), economist, was born in Montmagny, Québec. He was educated at the Collège de Montréal and at the Montreal campus of Université Laval. Called to the Québec Bar in 1904, he quickly turned his attention to journalism and the lecture circuit. In 1907, Montpetit received a provincial scholarship that enabled him to pursue post-graduate studies in political science at the École libre des sciences politiques in Paris. On his return to Canada, he was appointed professor of political economy at the Montreal campus of Université Laval and at the newly opened École des Hautes Études commerciales. In 1918, Montpetit was the founding editor of the *Revue trimestrielle canadienne*. Two years later, he was appointed secretary-general of the new Université de Montréal. He became the university's head of external affairs in 1931 and served as the dean of its Faculty of Social

Science. In 1941, the government of Quebec named him director of technical education for the province. Montpetit was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1914. A prolific author and an influential nationalist deeply concerned by French Canada's economic inferiority, Édouard Montpetit played a key role in the development of economic science in Quebec. His 1941 collection of essays, *Reflets d'Amérique*, urged French Canadians to resist Americanization.

MUNRO, William Bennett (1875-1957), political scientist and historian, was born in Almonte, Ontario. He was educated at Queen's University, the University of Edinburgh, Harvard University, and the University of Berlin. From 1901 to 1904 he taught history at Williams College, Massachusetts, and was professor of government at Harvard University until 1929, when he went to the California Institute of Technology as professor of history and government. In 1927, he was elected president of the American Political Science Association, and in 1929 president of the American Association of University Professors. He retired from teaching in 1945 and died at Pasadena, California, in 1957. William B. Munro was an influential North American scholar who showed a sustained interest in Canadian affairs throughout his career and wrote a number of books on the history of New France. He also authored two highly successful textbooks on American politics and government: *The Government of American Cities* (1912) and *The Government of the United States* (1919). The latter went through five editions and two title changes between 1919 and 1946. In charge of Harvard's Bureau of Municipal Research, Munro was a keen observer of United States municipal government and sought to share the lessons of American municipal reform with Canadians. Some of his most significant work was aimed at revealing the common features of North American politics and government. His *American Influences on Canadian Government* (1929) was one of the most important pieces of continentalist scholarship published in the interwar period. In this influential study, Munro argued that "of all the branches of government in Canada, the government of cities has proved the most susceptible to American influence," and that the Canadian party system was organized and operated on an American model.

NEVERS, Edmond de (1862-1906), journalist, lawyer, civil servant, and translator, was born Edmond Boisvert in Baie-du-Febvre, Canada East. He was educated at the Séminaire de Nicolet and the University of Berlin. Called to the Quebec Bar in 1883, Boisvert appears to

have taken a job as a provincial inspector of asylums rather than practice law. Shortly thereafter, he adopted the pseudonym Edmond de Nevers. In 1888, he left Canada for Germany. Brilliant and multilingual, he traveled extensively throughout Europe during the next several years and worked at the Agence Havas in Paris as a translator and writer. In 1895, he returned to North America, going first to Rhode Island, where his family had previously emigrated, then to Quebec City, where he had numerous friends and relatives. The following year he was back in Europe, but returned to Quebec in 1900 stricken with locomotor ataxia. He spent the next couple of years working as a publicist for the provincial Department of Colonization and Mines. Debilitated by his illness, he returned to Rhode Island sometime in late 1902 or early 1903 to die among his family. Deeply concerned by the destiny of his people, de Nevers' writing sought to grapple with French Canada's place on the North American continent and to awaken the pride and nationalism of his compatriots. His influential essay on *L'avenir du peuple canadien-français* (1896) ended with the prediction that Canada's annexation was inevitable. In many ways, he was Canada's answer to Alexis de Tocqueville. Like the author of *Democracy in America*, de Nevers was a liberal with marked conservative tendencies who devoted several years to analyzing American society, which he admired, though not unquestioningly. He published his monumental *L'âme américaine* in 1900 and translated Matthew Arnold's 1888 essays on *Civilization in the United States* into French. In late 1900 French literary critic Ferdinand Brunetière published a forty-page review of *L'âme américaine* in the prestigious *Revue des deux mondes*. He believed that the two volume essay was "un des plus intéressants qu'on ait publiés depuis longtemps sur l'Amérique." Despite his untimely death at the age of forty-four, Edmond de Nevers was exceptionally influential among the thinkers of his generation.

PARKIN, George Robert (1846-1922), educator, was born in Salisbury, New Brunswick. He was educated at the University of New Brunswick. Parkin was the headmaster of the Bathurst Grammar School from 1868 to 1872 and of Fredericton's Collegiate School from 1874 to 1889. In 1889, at the request of the Imperial Federation League, he embarked on a lecture tour of the British Empire to promote imperial unity. Parkin served as the headmaster of Upper Canada College from 1895 to 1902 when he was appointed organizing representative of the Rhodes Scholarship Trust in England. He was awarded a CMG in 1898 and a KCMG in 1920. Sir George R. Parkin died in London, England, in 1922. One of the leading imperialists of his generation, he devoted whole sections of his influential 1892 monograph, *Imperial*



*Federation: The Problem of National Unity*, to refuting Goldwin Smith's<sup>9v</sup> *Canada and the Canadian Question*.

ROUILLARD, Jean-Baptiste (1842-1908), journalist, civil servant, and soldier, was born in Quebec City. At twenty, Rouillard enlisted in a Vermont regiment and fought in the American Civil War. He was wounded in action in 1864. After the conflict, he worked for a number of years as a photographer, mining engineer, and assayer in both Canada and the United States. Angered by the 1885 execution of Louis Riel, Rouillard founded and edited several Quebec newspapers in support of Honoré Mercier's Parti national between 1885 and 1892. These included *L'Hochelega* (Montreal), *Le Courrier des Laurentides* (Saint-Lin), *L'Impartial* (Longueuil), *Le Courrier de l'Outaouais* (Hull), *The Gladiator* (Hull), *Le Patriote* (Sorel), *The Richelieu Press* (Sorel), and *Le Sud* (Sorel). Rouillard was named inspector general of Quebec's mines in the late 1880s by Premier Mercier, but was tarnished by the scandal that toppled Mercier's government in December 1891. He emigrated to Massachusetts in 1893. Shortly after leaving Quebec, he founded *L'Union continentale*, a monthly review advocating annexation. Over the next several years, Rouillard would found a number of short-lived Franco-American newspapers, including *L'Aigle* (Salem, Massachusetts), *L'Amérique* (Biddeford, Maine), and *La République* (Lewiston, Maine). He died in Fall River, Massachusetts, in 1908. A proponent of Canada's annexation to the United States, Rouillard gave a lengthy conference on continental union before Montreal's Club national in March 1893.

SCOTT, Francis Reginald (1899-1985), jurist and poet, was born in Quebec City. After graduating from Quebec High School and Bishop's College, Lennoxville, Quebec, he studied at Magdalen College, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar. He returned to Canada in 1923 and taught briefly at Montreal's Lower Canada College before enrolling in McGill University's Faculty of Law. Influenced by English-born Professor H. A. Smith, Scott took a keen interest in constitutional law. It was during this time that Scott founded the *McGill Fortnightly Review* with fellow poet and literary critic A. J. M. Smith and began to introduce his poetry to a wider audience. After graduating from McGill, he practiced law in Montreal for a time and helped found the *Canadian Mercury*, the *McGill Fortnightly Review's* ephemeral successor. Scott joined McGill's law faculty in 1928 and became its dean in 1961. He would remain at McGill until his retirement in 1964. In 1932, Scott played an active role in the founding of

both the League for Social Reconstruction, which was intended to be a Canadian version of the British Fabian Society, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. With Frank Underhill<sup>qv</sup>, Scott helped draft the CCF's Regina Manifesto and was one of the editors of the left-of-centre *Canadian Forum* in the 1930s. Scott was the CCF's national chairman from 1942 to 1950 and participated in the creation of the New Democratic Party in the early 1960s. In the 1940s, he participated in the founding of two literary journals: *Preview* and *Northern Review*. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1947 and went to Burma in 1952 as a UN technical assistant. Hoping to foster mutual understanding between English and French Canada, Scott translated a great deal of French Canadian poetry into English, co-edited *Quebec States her Case* in 1964, and was a member of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. He was awarded the Governor General's Award for non-fiction for his *Essays on the Constitution* (1977). A progressive intellectual who sought to draw Canada away from Britain's orbit, Scott's continentalism found its clearest expression in *Canada and the United States*, a 1941 pamphlet written after a year spent as a Guggenheim Fellow at Harvard University.

SHOTWELL, James Thomson (1874-1965), historian, was born in Strathroy, Ontario. He was educated at the University of Toronto and Columbia University. After receiving his doctorate in 1900, Shotwell was appointed assistant professor of world history at Columbia's Department of History. He spent the next several years teaching in New York, pausing in 1904-1905 to undertake a study tour of Europe and to serve on the *Encyclopaedia Britannica's* editorial staff. Shortly after America's entry into the Great War, he was appointed chairman of the National Board for Historical Service, a semi-official branch of the Committee on Public Information, which served as the American government's wartime propaganda organ. In late 1917, Shotwell was enlisted by Colonel House to serve as an advisor on foreign affairs to President Woodrow Wilson. It was in this capacity that he attended the Paris Peace Conference as a member of "The Inquiry," Wilson's foreign policy brain trust. After participating in the founding of the International Labour Office in 1919, Shotwell became the general editor of a series of 150 volumes, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the economic and social history of the Great War. He would spend the rest of his career working under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment, eventually serving as its president from 1948 to 1950. Profoundly influenced by his father's Quakerism, Shotwell's interest in international affairs was an extension of his lifelong commitment to

the cause of international peace and disarmament. During the 1920s and 1930s, he worked ceaselessly to counter American isolationism and to promote America's entry into the League of Nations, eventually becoming the president of the American League of Nations Association in 1935. He attended the 1945 San Francisco Conference that drafted the Charter of the United Nations as a consultant to the U.S. State Department. A liberal internationalist who showed a sustained interest in Canadian affairs throughout his life, James T. Shotwell believed that the relatively peaceful evolution of Canadian-American relations held a lesson for mankind. The undefended border, he argued, was a tangible example that world peace could be achieved through the arbitration of disputes, trade, and the free exchange of population. A pioneer in the field of Canadian-American relations, he edited the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and participated in all of the conferences on Canadian-American affairs organized by the Endowment. Shotwell's efforts greatly stimulated interwar continentalist scholarship and the study of Canadian-American relations on both sides of the border.

SKELTON, Oskar Douglas (1878-1941), economist and civil servant, was born in Orangeville, Ontario. He was educated at Queen's University and the University of Chicago. From 1902 to 1905 Skelton was the assistant editor of Philadelphia's *Booklovers Magazine*. Shortly after receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago – his doctoral dissertation outlined "The Case against Socialism" – he was appointed lecturer, and in 1909 professor, of political and economic science at Kingston's Queen's University. He became the dean of Queen's Faculty of Arts in 1919. In 1925, he was named under-secretary of state for foreign affairs at Ottawa, a position he would hold until his death. He was the general secretary of the Ottawa Imperial Conference of 1932. O. D. Skelton was the leading Canadian civil servant of his time and an architect of the modern Department of External Affairs. A liberal intellectual keenly interested in Canadian-American relations, he was a strong supporter of the proposed 1911 reciprocal trade agreement with the United States.

SMITH, Goldwin (1823-1910), historian and journalist, was born at Reading, England. He was educated at Eaton and Magdalen College, Oxford. From 1858 to 1866 he was regius professor of modern history at Oxford University. In 1868, he accepted the professorship of English and constitutional history at the newly formed Cornell University of Ithaca, New York. Three

years later, Smith settled in Toronto and became active in the fledgling Canada First movement. However, he would later become convinced that the new nation was a political, economic, and cultural failure and drift towards annexationism. In the decades that followed his arrival in Canada he played a key role in the development of several Canadian journals, including the *Canadian Monthly*, the *Nation* and the *Week*, and wrote and published the *Bystander*, a small but influential journal of political and social commentary. Though Goldwin Smith had not been a major figure in British liberal circles, he was considered the most prominent Canadian thinker of his time. Indeed, he was one of only a handful of nineteenth century Canadian authors whose work was read abroad and whose influence could be felt in Anglo-American intellectual circles. Written while Canada was undergoing deep political and economic difficulties, his brilliant but highly controversial *Canada and the Canadian Question* (1891) argued that the Canadian nation was a geographic, ethnic, economic, and political absurdity whose ultimate destiny lay in political union with the United States. Widely read and criticized, it was perhaps the most important and influential essay written in nineteenth-century Canada.

TARDIVEL, Jules-Paul (1851-1905), journalist and novelist, was born in Covington, Kentucky. The son of recent immigrants to the United States from England and France, Julius Tardeville (his Americanized name) was sent to Canada in 1868 by his maternal uncle, Father Julius Brent, a parish priest in Mount Vernon, Ohio, to study at the Séminaire de Saint-Hyacinthe. After graduating, he began his career as a journalist at *Le Courrier* of Saint-Hyacinthe. Shortly thereafter, he briefly worked at Montreal's *La Minerve* before settling down in Quebec City and joining the staff of *Le Canadien* in 1874. In 1881, he founded *La Vérité*, French Canada's most influential ultramontane newspaper, which he would continue to edit until his death in April 1905. Jules-Paul Tardivel was French Canada's leading ultramontane and nationalist thinker of the late nineteenth century. First published in France, his influential essay on *La situation religieuse aux États-Unis* (1900) provided conservative Catholic clergymen and thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic with an arsenal of arguments to counter theological modernism.

TROTTER, Reginald George (1888-1951), historian, was born in Woodstock, Ontario, but was raised in Nova Scotia and in the United States. He was educated at Acadia, McMaster, Yale, and Harvard universities. Trotter taught briefly at Stanford University before being

appointed Douglas professor of Canadian and colonial history at Queen's University in 1924. He would hold this chair for the rest of his life. Trotter was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1940. One of Canada's most prominent interwar academics, Reginald G. Trotter was a strong believer in the preservation of Canada's British connection and a fierce opponent of Canada's entry into the Pan-American Union. He helped organize the four biennial conferences on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-edited their proceedings.

UNDERHILL, Frank Hawkins (1885-1971), historian, political scientist, and soldier, was born in Stouffville, Ontario. He was educated at the University of Toronto and Oxford University. He taught history at the University of Saskatchewan from 1914 to 1915 and from 1919 to 1927. During the Great War he served in France as a subaltern officer in an English infantry battalion. From 1927 to 1955, he taught history at the University of Toronto. A frequent contributor to the *Canadian Forum*, he joined the journal's editorial staff in 1927 and authored its irreverent "O Canada" column in the 1930s. In 1932, Underhill participated in the founding of the League for Social Reconstruction, an organization of radical intellectuals intended to be a Canadian version of the British Fabian Society. With F. R. Scott<sup>qv</sup>, he was active in the founding of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, and authored the first draft of the party's 1933 Regina Manifesto. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1949 and was appointed curator of Laurier House, Ottawa, in 1955. Though Underhill had been an associate member of the Fabian Society while at Oxford and was at the forefront of Canada's progressive intellectual movement in the 1930s, he drifted away from socialism after the Second World War and embraced liberalism. Underhill's anti-establishmentarianism and his anti-imperialism caused him to push the limits of contemporary Canadian academic freedom while he taught at the University of Toronto. During the Second World War he was nearly dismissed after he enthusiastically predicted that Canada would slowly drift away from the British orbit and draw closer to the United States. An arch continentalist – he was one of the few Canadian intellectuals not to reject Goldwin Smith's<sup>qv</sup> ideas en masse – Frank H. Underhill was an admirer of American society and an ardent cold warrior. He attended the 1935 conference on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

WILLISON, John Stephen (1856-1927), journalist, was born in Hills Green, Huron County, Canada West. He was educated locally. He began his career in journalism in 1881 at the London *Advertiser* and joined the staff of the Toronto *Globe* in 1883. From 1890 to 1901 he was editor-in-chief of the *Globe*. Though Willison had been drifting away from the Liberal party for some time, he published a masterful biography of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1903. He broke with the party in 1904 when he learned that Laurier planned to make provisions for separate schools in the Alberta and Saskatchewan Acts. Besides, Willison's growing support for imperial federation could not be reconciled with Laurier's disapproval of the scheme. In 1901, he left the Liberal *Globe* to become the editor of the Toronto *News*, and became the Canadian correspondent for the London *Times* in 1910. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1900. On the recommendation of the Borden government, he was made a knight bachelor in 1913. A liberal imperialist – he was a founding member of the Round Table movement in Canada – Sir J. S. Willison was keenly interested in Canada's external relations and in imperial affairs. In 1925, he founded *Willison's Monthly: A National Magazine Devoted to the Discussion of Public Affairs Affecting Canada and the Empire*. The journal was absorbed by the *Canadian Forum* in 1929. Willison's interest in Canadian-American relations found its expression in several pamphlets and articles. In 1911, he strongly opposed reciprocity with the United States.

WILLSON, Henry Beckles (1869-1942), journalist, historian, and soldier, was born in Montreal. He was educated at Kingston, Ontario. Willson joined the staff of the Boston *Globe* in 1887 and was its correspondent in Cuba during the following year. He became the correspondent in Georgia for the New York *Herald* in 1889. After founding a newspaper in Atlanta, Georgia, and engaging in journalism in New York, he went to England in 1892, and joined the staff of the London *Daily Mail*. Later on he became a freelance writer. A prolific author, several of Willson's books explored Canadian history and issues. He served as a senior officer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the Great War and recounted his experiences in the Battle of Ypres in two books, *In the Ypres Salient* (1916) and *Ypres* (1920). Beckles Willson died at Beaulieu-sur-Mer, unoccupied France, in 1942. He authored several books on Anglo-American relations and, in 1903, published *The New America: A Study of the Imperial Republic*, an in-depth essay exploring the emergence of the United States as a world power from "the standpoint of a Canadian (and therefore British) observer, who has passed several years across the southern boundary of his country." A fervent imperialist, Willson viewed

America's acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines with approval and favoured the prospect of an Anglo-American alliance.

WIMAN, Erastus (1834-1904), businessman and journalist, was born in Churchville, Upper Canada. With little formal education, he entered the world of journalism at the age of sixteen when his cousin, William McDougall, the managing editor of the *North American*, hired him as a printer's apprentice. When the *North American* amalgamated with the *Toronto Globe* in 1855, Wiman became the paper's commercial editor. In 1860, he joined the staff of R. G. Dunn and Co.'s mercantile agency. He was transferred to the company's head office in New York six years later. Wiman would later become the firm's general manager. He became the president of the Great North Western Telegraph Company of Canada in 1881. Known as the 'Duke of Staten Island' for his attempts to develop the New York island, much of his fortune evaporated during the financial crisis of 1893. He became an American citizen in 1897 and died at New York in 1904. Convinced that Canadian prosperity could only be secured through "commercial union" with the United States, Wiman was one the most energetic and prominent promoters of a North American customs union. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, he gave dozens of speeches throughout Canada and the United States and published several pamphlets advocating the scheme. Erastus Wiman authored one book, *Chances of Success* (1893), a rambling collection of essays advocating commercial union, solid business ethics, and rugged individualism.

WRONG, George MacKinnon (1860-1948), historian and clergyman, was born in Grovesend, Canada West. He was educated at the universities of Toronto, Oxford, and Berlin. The son of a failed Elgin County farmer, Wrong lived for a time with relatives in Toledo, Ohio. He returned to Canada as a teenager and found employment in a Toronto bookstore. Shortly thereafter, he converted to evangelical Anglicanism. In 1879, he enrolled in theology in the University of Toronto's low-church Wycliffe College and was ordained in the Anglican ministry in 1883. For the next nine years he was a lecturer in history and apologetics at Wycliffe College. His 1886 marriage to Sophia, the daughter of Edward Blake, leader of the Canadian Liberal party and Chancellor of the University of Toronto, signalled his entry into high society. In 1894, he was appointed professor and head of the University of Toronto's Department of History, a position he would hold until his retirement in 1927. He was one of the founders of the Champlain Society. He also founded, in 1897, the *Review of Historical*

*Publications Relating to Canada*, and was the founding editor of its successor publication, the *Canadian Historical Review*, from 1920 to 1927. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada in 1908. From 1914 to 1916 he co-edited the thirty-two-volume *Chronicles of Canada Series*. An anglophile and an imperialist – he was a founding member of the Round Table movement in Canada – George M. Wrong played key role in the development of the historical profession in English Canada. His interest in Canadian-American relations found its expression in two books: *The United States and Canada: A Political Study* (1921) and *Canada and the American Revolution: The Disruption of the First British Empire* (1935). He attended the 1935 conference on Canadian-American relations organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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### Corpus<sup>1</sup>

The present study rests primarily on the analysis of the 520 texts listed below. Wholly or in part, each text selected for inclusion in this corpus explores some aspect of American life or of the relationship between Canada and the United States, and offers a particular insight into the intellectual history of Canadian-American relations. To better illustrate the evolution of Canadian writing on the United States, the texts have been arranged in chronological order.

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<sup>1</sup> This corpus does not include titles found in the series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American relations sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and published between 1936 and 1945. For a complete listing of these works, see the bibliography's second section. The corpus' contents are discussed on *supra*, 10-11.

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## The Carnegie Endowment's Relations of Canada and the United States Series<sup>1</sup>

From 1936 to 1945, the New York-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Division of Economics and History sponsored a series of twenty-five studies on Canadian-American Relations. More than two-thirds of the volumes were written or edited by Canadians. Though some of the studies were written from a decidedly non-continentalist point of view – including Donald Creighton's influential *Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence* (1937) – the series nonetheless embodied the height of continentalist scholarship in Canada. Prepared under the general editorship of Canadian-born historian and leading defender of liberal internationalism James T. Shotwell, the series was published by Yale University Press of New Haven, Connecticut, and the Ryerson Press of Toronto. The only French-language volume in the series, *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud* (1941), was edited by Gustave Lanctot and published in association with the Éditions Bernard Valiquette of Montreal. The writing of the series was paralleled by four biennial conferences held alternately at the St. Lawrence University of Canton, New York, and at Queen's University of Kingston, Ontario, between 1935 and 1941. Edited by Albert B. Corey, Reginald G. Trotter, and Walter W. McLaren, the conference proceedings were published in Boston by Ginn and Company. In addition, the Carnegie Endowment sponsored a 1938 conference on educational problems in Canadian-American relations held at the University of Maine. The University of Maine Press published its proceedings in 1939.

1936

Corey, Albert B., Walter W. McLaren, and Reginald G. Trotter, eds. Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at the St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, June 17-22, 1935, *Proceedings*. xi-301 p.

Marshall, Herbert, Frank A. Southard, Jr. and Kenneth W. Taylor. *Canadian-American Industry: A Study in International Investment*. xiii-360 p.

1937

Corbett, P. E. *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes: A Critical Study of Methods and Results*. viii-134 p.

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<sup>1</sup> For an excellent summary of the series' history, see Carl Berger, *The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto, 1986), 137-159.

Corey, Albert B., Walter W. McLaren, and Reginald G. Trotter, eds. Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 14-18, 1937, *Proceedings*. xii-274 p.

Creighton, D. G. *The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850*. vii-441 p.

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Wilgus, William J. *The Railway Interrelations of the United States and Canada*. xvi-304 p.

1938

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Glazebrook, G. P. de T. *A History of Transportation in Canada*. xxv-475 p.

Laing, Lionel H. and Norman MacKenzie, eds. *Canada and the Law of Nations: A Selection of Cases in International Law, Affecting Canada or Canadians, Decided by Canadian Courts, by Certain of the Higher Courts in the United States and Great Britain and by International Tribunals*. xxvii-567 p.

Lower, A. R. M. and W. A. Carrothers. *The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest: A History of the Lumber Trade Between Canada and the United States*. xxvii-377 p.

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Shippee, L. B. *Canadian-American Relations, 1849-1874*. xi-514 p.

1940

Burt, A. L. *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America from the Revolution to the Establishment of Peace After the War of 1812*. vii-448 p.

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Hansen, Marcus Lee. *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples*, Volume I: *Historical*, completed and prepared for publication by John Bartlet Brebner. xviii-274 p.

Innis, Harold A. *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy*. xviii-520 p.

Savelle, Max. *The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary, 1749-1763*. xiv-172 p.

1941

Corey, Albert B. *The Crisis of 1830-1842 in Canadian-American Relations*. xi-203 p.

Corey, Albert B. and Reginald G. Trotter, eds. Conference on Canadian-American Affairs held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 23-26, 1941, *Proceedings*. xiii-287 p.

Lanctot, Gustave, ed. *Les Canadiens français et leurs voisins du sud*. ix- 322 p.

Landon, Fred. *Western Ontario and the American Frontier*. xvi-305 p.

1942

Angus, H. F., ed. *British Columbia and the United States: The North Pacific Slope from Fur Trade to Aviation*. xv-408 p.

Pritchett, John P. *The Red River Valley, 1811-1849: A Regional Study*. xvii-295 p.

1943

Coates, R. H. and M. C. MacLean. *The American-Born in Canada: A Statistical Interpretation*. xviii-176 p.

Tansill, Charles Callan. *Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911*. xviii-507 p.

Truesdell, Leon E. *The Canadian-Born in the United States: An Analysis of the Statistics of the Canadian Element in the Population of the United States, 1850 to 1930*. xvi-263 p.

1945

Brebner, John Bartlet. *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*. xxii-385 p.

## Serials Examined

The essence of the intellectual debate surrounding the prewar Canadian reading of the American experience and of the Dominion's relationship with the United States can be found in the era's periodical literature. For the purposes of this study, detailed examination of this literature was confined to a selection of Canada's leading English- and French-language political, religious, literary, business, labour, legal, military, student, university, learned, and scholarly journals published no more than once a month between 1891 and 1945. Efforts were made to include journals that were both regionally<sup>1</sup> and ideologically representative of the diversity of the Canadian mind. However, due to the sheer volume of material, daily, weekly, and bi-monthly publications were excluded from the study. In all, over one hundred Canadian serials were examined for relevant articles. The articles gleaned from their pages offer an excellent cross section of Canadian thought. Although a number of articles in this study's corpus were drawn from British, French, and American publications, only five foreign reviews were systematically scrutinized for relevant material: the *North American Review*, the *Quarterly Journal of Inter-American Relations*, the *Inter-American Quarterly*, the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, and the *Round Table*. These journals actively sought the contribution of Canadian authors and devoted sufficient space to Canadian affairs to justify a detailed examination. The dates following a journal's title indicate the period examined and are preceded by its place of publication. In many instances, these dates correspond to the time when the journal appeared and when publication ceased.

*Acadiensis* (St. John, New Brunswick, 1901-1908)

*L'Action canadienne-française* (Montreal, 1928)

*L'Action française* (Montreal, 1917-1927)

*L'Action nationale* (Montreal, 1933-1945)

*L'Action universitaire* (Montreal, 1934-1945)

*L'Actualité économique* (Montreal, 1925-1945)

*Addresses Delivered Before the Canadian Club of Montreal* (Montreal, 1912-1919)

*Addresses Read Before the Canadian Club of Ottawa* (Ottawa, 1903-1918)

*Addresses Delivered Before the Canadian Club of Toronto* (Toronto, 1903-1939)

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<sup>1</sup> Journals and texts from Newfoundland were not included in this study.

- Amérique française* (Montreal, 1941-1945)
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia, 1891-1945)
- Annual Transactions of the United Empire Loyalists' Association of Canada* (Toronto, 1914-1945)
- Annual Transactions of the United Empire Loyalists' Association of Ontario* (Toronto, 1898-1913)
- The Anvil* (Vancouver, 1931)
- Behind the Headlines (Toronto, 1940-1945)
- La Bonne parole* (Montreal, 1913-1945)
- The British Columbia Argonaut* (Victoria, British Columbia, 1931)
- British Columbia Historical Quarterly* (Victoria, British Columbia, 1937-1945)
- The British Pacific* (Cumberland, British Columbia, 1902)
- Les Cahiers de Turc* (Montreal, 1921-1922, 1926-1927)
- Canada First* (Toronto, 1905-1907)
- Le Canada-Français* (Quebec, 1891)
- Le Canada français* (Quebec, 1918-1945)
- Canada Law Journal* (Toronto, 1891-1922)
- Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (Toronto, 1902-1938)
- Canadian Banker* (Toronto, 1936-1945)
- Canadian Bar Review* (Ottawa, 1923-1945)
- Canadian Bookman* (Toronto, 1919-1939)
- Canadian Comment* (Toronto, 1932-1938)
- Canadian Congress Journal* (Ottawa, 1924-1944)
- Canadian Defence* (Welland, Ontario, 1912-1917)
- Canadian Defence Quarterly* (Ottawa, 1923-1939)
- Canadian Field* (Welland, Ontario, 1909-1911)
- Canadian Forum* (Toronto, 1920-1945)
- Canadian Historical Association *Annual Report* (Ottawa, 1922-1945)
- Canadian Historical Review* (Toronto, 1920-1945)
- Canadian Independence Magazine* (Montreal, 1930)
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