The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Point of View: Towards a Social Psychology of Relativity

Gordon Sammut

A thesis submitted to the Institute of Social Psychology of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2010

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

Abstract

The explanation of social behaviour requires an understanding of individual orientations to social issues as these exist relative to others. This thesis argues that whilst the attitude concept and social representations have illuminated certain aspects of social behaviour, both are handicapped by a restricted focus. The former's focus on the evaluation of attitude objects excludes a reference to wider societal processes. The latter provides an account of societal contingencies, but excludes an explanation of individual orientations towards objects and issues in the social environment. This thesis postulates the point of view concept to bridge this gap, that provides an explanation of social behaviour at the situational level. This complements attitude and social representations in a nested, multilevel explanation of social behaviour. The point of view is defined as an outlook towards a social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. It reflects an individual's orientation towards a social object, relative to others. This thesis has demonstrated, in a series of empirical studies, that the point of view can be typified in three categories. A monological point of view is closed to another's perspective. A dialogical point of view acknowledges another's perspective but dismisses it as wrong. A metalogical point of view acknowledges the relativity of its' perspective, and concedes to an alternative the possibility of being right. These different types were demonstrated to be characterised by differences in positioning and in individuals' capacity to fit a given social reality. Such relational outcomes accrue as a function of the socio-cognitive structure of points of view in relation with another perspective. This thesis demonstrates that points of view, alongside attitudes and social representations, provides a multilevel explanation of social behaviour.

Keywords: Points of view; Perspective taking; Attitudes; Social Representations; Social behaviour; Social judgment; positioning; argumentation; Social psychology; Intercultural relations.

Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1:
Introduction

Numerous scholars have noted and documented the pervasiveness of the 'attitude' construct in social psychology (McGuire, 1985, 1986; Zaller & Feldman, 1992; Farr 1996; Gaskell, 2001; Howarth, 2006). McGuire (1986) has documented how the study of attitudes spans the historical development of the discipline, from its inception at the turn of the twentieth century to the present day. The 'attitude' has largely become social psychology's defining concept (Allport, 1967). In spite of its popularity, its meaning in the discipline has a chequered history. Attitude has gone from a social concept in its origin, to an individual, asocial and apolitical concept more recently (Howarth, 2006). The general influence of individualism on the social sciences (Graumann, 1986), and the influence of cognitivism on social psychology in particular (Farr, 1996), have redefined attitudes as an individual's valuation of an attitude object (see Fishbein, 1967). The purpose it serves in the social sciences is that of an independent variable that can be measured efficiently and concisely towards predicting behaviour. As an empirical concept, its popularity is largely unparalleled.

Nevertheless, this conception of attitudes has attracted much critique over the years (see Asch, 1952; Sherif & Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Farr, 1990; Billig, 1996; Gaskell, 2001; Howarth, 2006) and various theorists have sought to address its primary shortcoming of overlooking the 'social' in its conceptualisation. As some scholars have pointed out (Farr, 1990, 1996; Fraser & Gaskell, 1990; Fraser, 1994; Gaskell, 2001), the theory of social representations has come to serve as a countervailing force to individualistic theories like 'attitude', by foregrounding the social rather than the individual. However, most theorists retain that the two concepts are incommensurable due to their differing underlying epistemologies (Farr, 1994; Howarth, 2006). Whilst attitude is clearly a cognitive attribute of the individual even in its aggregate form, that is public opinion, social representations are held to be intrinsically social. They are conceptualised as existing across minds rather than inside individual minds (Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Wagner, Mecha & do Rosário Carvalho, 2008). According to such conception, the individual extends into the social as a relational unit in a systemic network of social

meaning. In this tradition, rather than being two sides of the same coin, the individual/social dichotomy is a false dichotomy to begin with, as the individual is ontologically part of the social firmament.

The theoretical usage of the concepts, however, cannot escape reification and for this reason problems persist in reconciling the dual focus of the social and the individual contemporarily. Gaskell (2001) has outlined this as the challenge that can reinvigorate the discipline. At present, one either studies the social field as a collective by looking at things such as social representations and discourses but failing to locate the individual within these wider polemics, or one studies the individual's orientation, possibly even in aggregate, but failing to account for the wider social meaning that legitimates individuals' evaluations[1]. More worryingly, the move from one focus to the other is intransitive[2], which is why social psychologists are often required to take sides on the debate. Seemingly, what is required at this point is not a reformulation of one construct in terms of the other. In actuality, both concepts have withstood rigorous critique and both have demonstrated empirical utility. Consequently, the heuristic value of both concepts cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless, the gap between the two remains a ubiquitous challenge. To use the common adage, my proposal in this thesis is to 'mind the gap'. In looking more closely at the gap between the individual and the social, one inevitably comes to realise that between the cognitive evaluations of attitude objects and the larger framework of social knowledge, stands nothing other than the individual herself. It is by looking at the individual–not inside the individual, nor outside in the social field, but *at* the individual–that we can potentially further our understanding of how human beings, on the basis of their cognitive evaluations legitimated by the wider social structures, act socially in the world they inhabit.

This thesis proposes that by developing the concept of point of view, social psychology can successfully bridge the persistent gap between the social and the

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[1] see Harré, 1984
[2] see Wagner & Hayes, 2005

individual; i.e. between social representations and attitudes. Point of view, along with the overarching social representation and the underlying attitude (Fig. 1), provides a transitive explanation for how human beings are located within a social environment, on the basis of which they orientate themselves cognitively and affectively to objects they encounter in their environment and in relation to which they act in prescriptive ways.

Fig. 1: Hierarchical model of point of view construct across different levels of explanation (see Wagner & Hayes, 2005).

Our everyday understanding of relating individuals serves as a useful guide in this conception. In everyday language we use attitude to mean opinion (how one thinks) or orientation (one's mental posture). What we commonly mean by an attitude is one's mental outlook, rather than the narrower meaning of a cognitive evaluation of

an attitude object that reflects that mental outlook. Furthermore, etymologically, what we want to capture is not common sense either, i.e. a social representation, but a *perspective* that is rooted in common sense. This makes the postulation of an intervening construct immediately plausible. The point of view provides a transitive explanation of the social as the context in which a particular opinion is located, which opinion is itself socio-cognitive, and which relates to other opinions on the basis of its own inherent cognitive and affective structure–attitude being one such structural component.

This chapter introduces the conceptualisation of the point of view construct, which represents the fundamental project of this thesis. The overarching contribution of this, to the social sciences in general and the discipline of social psychology in particular, is the formulation of a construct that effectively bridges the gap between the social and the psychological. It does this by retaining a dual focus on overarching social structures and underlying psychological processes, without being prejudicial against either, and by adopting a situational level of explanation. Such a construct enables social psychology to gain a fuller understanding of the individual in terms of the individual's social-psychological characteristics, and of human relations in their social-psychological complexity. I proceed by looking at the state of diversity of beliefs in contemporary societies that position individuals within relational encounters marked by difference, to then outline the point of view concept and its particular significance for social psychology. I conclude by reviewing the central precepts of this inquiry.

The Diversity of Beliefs

Numerous scholars have pointed to potential problems that are inherent to clashes of beliefs, and urged social scientists to investigate these matters more seriously towards identifying ways to reconcile divergences and promote cooperative relations between human beings (see Giddens, 1991; Huntington 1996; Benhabib, 2002; Moghaddam, 2008). This concern is not new within social psychology. Authors like

Asch (1952) and Sherif and Sherif (1968) were acutely aware of these issues even before the advent of modern forms of ICT and the progressive rise of globalisation, that are held to lie behind the immediacy of these problems (Giddens, 1991). Sherif and Sherif (1968), for example, have argued that these problems "are among the most vital and timely in this world of rapid change" (p. 105). Indeed, in their time, Sherif and Sherif (1956) claim that "at no time has the problem of intergroup relations been more vital than it is today" (p. 280). Their statement applied acutely at their time, but does so still today, over half a century later. It is easy to note that the problems and issues that concerned Sherif and Sherif are still with us. If anything, the rise and management of terrorism today indicates that they have intensified more than ever (Moghaddam, 2008).

The problem of clashing beliefs struggling for recognition has been put firmly on the social psychology agenda by Moscovici (1967, 1985a, 1985b, 2000). The problem, as Moscovici (1985a) articulates it, is to understand how a minority can see things as it does and how it can think as it does. In this context of plurality, which characterises the contemporary public sphere, intergroup relations are embedded within interpersonal relations. In certain parts of the world, human relations more routinely take place with others who are not direct members of one's social group. Individuals encounter each other as individuals, but their relations are framed by their relative group relations (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). In such circumstances, understanding how individuals relate with one another is an imperative concern. How do individuals orientate themselves in what appears to be a plurality of perspectives? How do they adopt one perspective and not another? And in adopting a certain perspective, how do they then treat others who hold a different perspective?

The Contact Hypothesis, proposed by Allport in 1954, stipulates that when individuals from different groups interact under conditions of equal status, cooperation, opportunities for acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms, prejudice and discrimination are reduced and the prognosis for better interpersonal contact outcomes improves. Moscovici (1985a) argues, however, that the more

discrepant our beliefs are from those of another the more we tend to deprecate the views of the other to the extent that they appear crazy and lacking common sense. Other social psychological theories make the same predictions. Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981, 1982) claims that through processes of social categorisation and comparison, group members develop an ingroup identity that accentuates differences with other groups and deprecates the outgroup on the basis of these differences. Social Judgment Theory (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972; Eiser, 1991) claims that the perspectives of others' that differ significantly from our own are rejected automatically due to the fact that, by being different, they fall within our latitude of rejection. The concept that social psychology has put forth in studying the manner by which individuals orientate themselves towards attitude objects, i.e. attitude, along with its collective counterpart–public opinion, are ill-placed to address these issues. The requirement is to understand individual relations in a way that includes a reference to the social framework that validates some perspective over another, and that determines which perspectives are acceptable and which, on the other hand, are objectionable. Neither attitudes nor public opinion includes such reference. It is such a *relational* formulation that is required in extending the analysis of orientations to interpersonal relations.

Points of view

A concept that has been proposed towards such understanding is the 'point of view'. Asch (1952) claimed that individuals act often in terms of their point of view; their outlook towards the problems they face. Asch argues that in developing such a concept, it is pertinent to call for a specification of the individual's frame of reference and to ask questions concerning the centre of gravity of a person's outlook, i.e. how wide or narrow it might be and what is the place of individual assertions in the larger context of an outlook. Asch's proposal seems to be a valid one. Nevertheless, his suggestion has never been taken up in detail. As a construct, the point of view remains undeveloped and undefined. However, Asch's suggestion

seems valuable in that this concept comes with the promise of providing an understanding into individuals' perspectives as they relate to those of others on the basis of a wider background of intelligibility (Daanen, 2009). Unlike attitude, it is not limited to an evaluation of an attitude-object to the exclusion of other matters of significance.

The importance of this development lies in the fact that when individuals interrelate, they do so on the basis of perspectives that refer at once to themselves as well as to those of others (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Sherif's work parallels that of Asch in many ways. Both scholars sought a reformulation of attitudes in a way that includes a reference to an individual's social positioning. Their attempts have by and large failed to gain prominence in social psychology. However, the problems they identified and for which they sought such a conception have not disappeared. Social psychology is still faced with these very same concerns. If anything, as outlined above, these have become even more pressing.

Conceptualisation

The present thesis follows in the footsteps of Asch and Sherif and draws on their distinguished tradition to formulate the concept of the point of view. It does so in the context of the most recent developments in social psychology that transpire in the works of Moscovici. This formulation is presented in Chapter 2, following a detailed review of Asch's proposal along with the theory of social representations. This thesis proposes that the point of view can be conceptualised as the individual's location within a social representation. The social representation serves to provide the individual with meaning; a meaning that legitimates her outlook (i.e. point of view) and on this basis enables her to achieve adequate social functioning. This formulation is undertaken on the basis of other theories, namely Billig's rhetorical analysis (1987, 1991) and Harré's positioning theory (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999), that have adopted a situational level of explanation and have thus yielded a benchmark for the exploration of social behaviour at this level.

Both of these theories are reviewed in detail in Chapter 3. Additionally, the present formulation of the point of view draws on theories of social judgment, in which Sherif's work is situated, that have sought to investigate the socio-cognitive aspects of perspectives as these relate to alternative ones. This cognitive characteristic, along with the interpersonal aspects of points of view by way of positioning, is considered an intrinsic element to points of view in relation. The point of view is a social-cum-psychological construct involving a socio-cognitive process that manifests in discursive practices. The theories of social judgment that have informed this formulation are visited in detail in Chapter 3.

Drawing on these traditions, the point of view in this thesis is formulated as both a relational and a relative construct. The point of view is relational inasmuch as it is an outlook, or view, of something. This involves minimally a percept and a perceiver. It is relative inasmuch as this view is a point amongst other points, other outlooks held by other subjects. This involves relations between interacting subjects. The point of view thus involves a minimal triad of three elements, a perceiving subject in relation to another perceiving subject and an object of perception. For this reason, the term point of view is herein preferred over similar terms that proliferate the literature such as outlooks or perspectives. These latter terms are not afforded, by definition, relational as well as relative properties. The point of view triad is similar to Bauer & Gaskell's (1999) formulation of the social representation, and for this reason provides a transitive link to social representations. The difference between the two is that in the point of view, the other elements are defined from the standpoint of the perceiving subject, as opposed to their systemic co-existence in a representational field. The point of view in this thesis is thus defined as as an outlook towards a social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. This includes a reference to the perceiving subject's outlook and its discursive manifestation that is legitimated by the argumentative context in which it occurs. Chapters 2 and 3 outline in further detail the relevance of these aspects of points of view.

Aims

In the preface to his volume on Social Psychology, Asch (1952/1987) argues that "If there must be principles of scientific method, then surely the first to claim our attention is that one should describe phenomena faithfully and allow them to guide the choice of problems and procedures" (1987, p.xv). Sherif and Sherif (1968), whose works are amongst the most influential in social psychology (Harré, 2006), outline that the first step of scientific inquiry is to learn about the phenomenon in question, which means learning from the actualities of events in which the phenomenon appears.

The first task in this inquiry is thus to describe the nature of the phenomenon that is being postulated, as both Asch (1952) and Sherif and Sherif (1968) have commended. In the present thesis this is undertaken in an effort to determine whether the present conceptualisation of points of view can be supported. The aim of identifying the phenomenon and describing its nature is an objective that is taken up in the first of three empirical investigations undertaken for the purposes of this thesis. These are summarised hereunder. Furthermore, insofar as the point of view is formulated as a social-psychological construct, its social as well as psychological properties have required exploration. Accordingly, the second empirical inquiry adopts the aim of identifying the interpersonal features of points of view, whereas the third inquiry focuses on their intrapersonal properties. Identification of these properties of points of view lends support to the claim that point of view is wedged between attitudes and the social representations, as a construct that bridges the gap between the individual and the social and that alongside attitudes and social representations serves to provide a multilevel explanation of social behaviour (Harré & Secord, 1972). In view of these aims, the overarching objective of the present inquiry is to describe the point of view and document its interpersonal and intrapersonal characteristics, in an effort to describe its psychological structure and social functions. Methodological details of the three studies are presented in Chapter

4. To date, no other scholarly investigation has formulated this construct in such detail. It has been alluded to, such as in the works of Asch (1952), Harré and Secord (1972), Billig (987, 1991) and Clémence (2001). Yet its social-psychological characteristics are yet to be charted. It is this lacuna that this thesis aims to address.

Study 1: Describing the phenomenon

The three empirical studies undertaken in this thesis draw on the major approaches of situational-level analyses of social behaviour. The first inquiry draws on argumentation approaches to investigate a public controversy in an effort to identify points of view as phenomena and to describe their nature. This is undertaken in the context of a cosmopolitan public sphere that admits not only different perspectives but also different worldviews to intermingle in the same public. Encounters between different points of view can be based on a similar or different background of intelligibility. Encounters can be of four types: (1) similar points of view can be articulated that are based on the same background of intelligibility; (2) different points of view can be articulated that are based on the same background of intelligibility; (3) similar points of view can be articulated that are based on different backgrounds of intelligibility; (4) different points of view can be articulated that are based on different backgrounds of intelligibility. Whilst many societies adopt procedures to police their publics and allow only a limited number of backgrounds of intelligibility to co-exist, possibly a single one, other publics are less restricted and admit a plurality of perspectives that legitimate what may be incommensurable worldviews. Such a cosmopolitan setting, chosen for the first inquiry, enables the full range of encounters between points of view to manifest and provides an ideal setting for studying points of view in their diversity. Consequently, this study addresses the following concerns: is such a thing as a point of view identifiable? How can it be described? How does it vary in its manifestations? An answer to these questions enables a conceptual definition of the point of view, one that has so far been lacking in the social psychological literature.

The setting chosen for this study is the Dawkins debate on atheism that took place in Britain during the first half of 2006. This debate saw numerous individuals air their views over the merits of religion, science and atheism, following Prof Dawkins' claims during a documentary aired on British prime-time television that religion is conducive to evil. The findings revealed that the public entertained a plurality of points of view in which science and religion, with their relative merits, could co-exist in the same public sphere. More importantly, individuals not only agreed or disagreed with what was being proposed in the documentary or in the press; there were instances where individuals agreed when they disagreed and disagreed when they agreed. This is to say that individuals at times had the same attitude, however, argumentatively, they did so for wholly different reasons that at times may have been more fundamentally discrepant. On the other hand, individuals who seemingly disagreed may have done so on the basis of a more fundamental agreement.

This polyphonic debate provided an opportunity to discover variances in points of view and to describe the characteristic differences between types. The findings suggest that three different types are discernible, that vary in their appreciation of an alternative perspective. This relative appreciation depends on the legitimacy accorded to the rationale of the worldview on which the other's point of view draws. The first type, termed 'monological' points of view, hold their own perspective to be in the right and refute any other position as faulty and in need of correction. The second type, termed 'dialogical' points of view, admit that others can have different perspectives to their own, but that these need to adhere to some fundamental precepts that are unchallengeable and that validate their own position as a rightful one. The third type, termed 'metalogical' points of view, not only admit that others can have different outlooks, they hold that others may be right and that they may be wrong; they hold that others are right in their own way just like them. This typology of points of view is supported by other findings in the social judgment tradition and suggests that different points of view are marked by socio-cognitive differences that bear on the interpersonal relations in which they engage. This study is detailed further in Chapter 5.

Study 2: Interpersonal characteristics

Insofar as the point of view is a *social*-psychological phenomenon, then different types of point of view ought to be marked by characteristic interpersonal differences. The second empirical inquiry draws on positioning theory to address this issue empirically. Points of view bring people into interpersonal relations, by which positioning in a social system is negotiated. A case study of 'stranger' points of view (Schuetz, 1944) has been adopted for this inquiry. It investigated the positioning individuals originating from one cultural setting undertook in an effort to negotiate their lives in another cultural setting following migration. The points of view towards the host country that legitimated migration on the basis of social representations that circulated in the country of origin, are in themselves alien within the host country in which a new social reality based on different social representations exists. In the case study adopted for this second inquiry, migrants did not have an option of resorting to a native community that might have validated their original perspectives, as no such native community is established in the host country. This meant that the negotiations undertaken by these migrants were characteristically interpersonal rather than intergroup, due to the fact that from the standpoint of the stranger, such negotiation was necessarily undertaken at the individual level given the absence of a native community. This rules out the attribution of identified characteristics to community rather than individual properties, and fulfils the requisite conditions for inquiring into the interpersonal characteristics of points of view in a way that is not confounded by processes of social re-presentation (Chryssides et al, 2009).

The setting chosen for this inquiry is the case of Maltese migrants to Britain. Maltese migrants to Britain are unable to mediate their interaction through a community in negotiating a new life, due to the fact that no such community presently exists. This is due to various socio-historic reasons that are detailed in Chapter 6. The point of view of Maltese migrants to Britain towards life in Britain is originally rooted in Maltese social representations. Once they land on British shores,

however, they necessarily come into contact with a new system of social representations that exists in Britain and that is very different from the Mediterranean, island mentality from which their outlooks originate. In this contact, their points of view are required to negotiate a new system of intelligibility. This negotiation has direct relational consequences on their ability to settle in Britain, as well as on what form their settlement takes. The findings of this inquiry demonstrate that different types of points of view relate differently to others. More specifically, metalogical points of view have a capacity to position themselves without contradiction in two social realities, a characteristic that individuals with dialogical and monological points of view lacked. Whilst dialogical points of view related to both systems, they positioned themselves functionally within a single setting, and could only fit the other with stark reservations. Monological types were exclusive, what positioned them in one setting automatically excluded them from the other. This second empirical study is detailed further in Chapter 6.

Study 3: Intrapersonal properties

The third empirical inquiry draws on theories of social judgment to investigate the intrapersonal properties of points of view. It does so by looking at individuals' judgment of alternative claims that have circulated within a certain public sphere with regards to a number of social issues. This procedure enabled the investigation of the intrapersonal socio-cognitive properties of points of view, controlling for diversity in social representations due to the fact that the study was undertaken with an undisputed dominant group in a relatively homogenous country. Consequently, emergent characteristics could not be attributed to different cultural practices. The study was undertaken with Maltese students at the University of Malta.

A point of view that encounters an alternative point of view, in a condition where such encounter does not challenge its underlying logic, can either accept, or reject, or remain indifferent to the alternative. These outcomes have been investigated widely in Sherif's various studies on social judgement (see Sherif & Hovland, 1961;

Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968). They have led to the claim that individuals' orientations are structured by latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment. The third empirical study thus inquires into whether different points of view are characterised by differing latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment that determine their capacity to relate to an alternative perspective. The findings of this inquiry revealed statistically significant differences in latitudes with regards to given issues. However, the findings also demonstrate that where these differences transpire depends on the argumentative context of the issue as it circulates in public. At times differences emerged in latitudes of rejection, at other times in latitudes of non-commitment. Nevertheless, the findings of this study support the claim that socio-cognitive differences mark differences between point of view types. The findings of this study are detailed further in Chapter 7.

Conclusion

This brief description of the studies undertaken towards a formulation of the point of view, with which this thesis is concerned, is discussed more fully in Chapter 8. Nevertheless, it is immediately clear that an appreciation of points of view requires sensitivity to the nature of public spheres in which the articulation of points of view occurs. Public spheres police the expression of points of view and can support some and censor others. Moreover, not every point of view is legitimated in every public sphere. Some are deemed sensible; others are relegated as nonsense. Public spheres can promote or inhibit the expression or existence of points of view. This inquiry demonstrates that the existence of certain points of view constructs certain versions of reality that a certain public may desire or disdain. Consequently, the study of points of view is necessarily a political concern. Beyond the narrow realm of social psychology and the concepts that are more useful for explanations of social behaviour, the study of points of view is warranted by more general concerns that have to do with the processes of legitimation and recognition of the lives of human beings, in conditions of diversity. The formulation and study of points of view thus has the potential to contribute to the pragmatics of promoting tolerance and positive

relations between different people, by bringing about a certain public sphere and a certain social reality that admits of the possibility that things may be seen differently and understood differently, and that this need not necessarily mean that either is right or wrong, and that different perspectives stand in need of correction by persuasion or by force.

Chapter 2:
Points of View and
Social Representations

Introduction

The nature of contemporary social life is such that social happenings belong to the circle of events that humans can potentially control, and have their roots in how human beings construct social realities (Asch, 1952/1987). The knowledge that communities create in the process of social construction serves to interpret and order data in the natural and social surroundings. This knowledge enables individuals to participate meaningfully in social life, and act meaningfully with and in relation to others. As Asch (1987) succinctly claims, "to act in the social field requires a knowledge of social facts" (p. 139). Community knowledge constitutes common sense (Jovchelovitch, 2007, 2008) that allows individuals to participate in public life, orientate themselves to others and to objects in their environment, adopt outlooks towards social objects and social events, and act meaningfully on the basis of these outlooks in ways that others recognise as legitimate and sensible.

In explicating how individuals orientate themselves to others and to events in their social life, social psychology has proposed and developed the concept of the 'attitude' as an evaluation of some happening of concern to the individual. Social psychology granted this concept social moment through the measurement of public opinion (Bernard, 1930). Yet the formulation of attitude/public opinion fails to appreciate the wider, argumentative, social context (Billig, 1987, 1991) in which individuals encounter alternative points of view, where in adopting a particular perspective they consequently position themselves in relation to others. An alternative way for understanding how individuals orientate themselves in social life has been proposed by Solomon Asch (1952/1987), in the notion of the point of view. Asch postulates the study of the point of view to overcome the limitations he identifies in attitude research. Asch, however, neither defines nor conceptualises this construct, but leaves it merely as a proposal for further inquiry. This thesis takes up Asch's proposal and seeks to formulate a social-psychological conceptualisation of the point of view. This chapter will review Asch's proposal in detail, to identify and legitimate the reasons for this enterprise. It proceeds to model points of view, that in

contrast to attitude, takes into account the epistemic dimension in its formulation. In this thesis, point of view is defined as an outlook towards a social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. It describes how individuals orientate themselves towards the social happenings they face in their everyday lives, in a context of a polyphasia of perspectives that in our contemporary societies may draw on altogether different worldviews. This thesis contends that the study of this concept, alongside attitudes and social representations, helps towards a fuller understanding of human social behaviour in its complexity, across different levels of explanation.

This chapter argues that the formulation of the point of view in terms of social representations provides a social-psychological conceptualisation for social behaviour. The contribution of this formulation lies in its capacity to describe how, by virtue of their membership in groups and communities, individuals position themselves in relation to others and to social events in ways that enable them to participate meaningfully in social life. Moreover, it enables social psychology to explain the consequences of the encounters between similar or divergent positions that are taken towards social phenomena. These, in turn, may be based on similar or divergent worldviews. This chapter firstly outlines how the conditions of modernity have changed the relations between individuals such that no one can today adopt a position without knowing that its sensibility is relative, as modern publics are infused with the awareness that others may be seeing that very same phenomenon in some totally different way. It proceeds to review the efforts made within the discipline of social psychology to explain individuals' orientations to social phenomena by means of attitudes, and how it has explained social action in terms of attitudes through the notion of public opinion. It goes on to argue that this formulation fails to consider the wider social context and fails to describe the processes and consequences of the encounters between divergent perspectives. This shortcoming results from the formulation of attitude as an individual and cognitive construct. In its social form however, as proposed by Solomon Asch, it enables a

formulation of how individuals may develop an outlook towards some social event based on the worldview they hold, by virtue of their membership in some group or community. This chapter claims that reconciling Asch's social attitude with social representations theory enables social psychology to overcome the shortcoming of foregrounding the individual at the expense of the social. This legitimates Asch's proposal for the study of points of view and enables explication of the social behaviour of individuals as it takes place *in situ*, that is, as individuals adopt meaningful points of view that position them in relation to others on some particular issue.

The Changes of Modernity

Modernity and late modernity have had a profound influence on the world we live in and the nature of our everyday life. Modern institutions differ from preceding ones in respect of their dynamism, the degree to which they undercut traditional customs, and their global impact. As Giddens (1991) argues, these changes are not merely extensional transformations, they radically alter the nature of day-to-day social life and affect the most personal aspects of human experience. Not only is the pace of social change faster, so is its scope and profoundness, by which it affects pre-existing social practices and modes of behaviour (Giddens, 1991). One area where modernity has brought about radical changes is in the production of knowledge. Knowledge, in any form, is bound to the social context of its production and tied to a community's public sphere (Jovchelovitch, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2008). The public sphere that a community creates is a place where different perspectives are brought together and debated as arguments of opinion, in an effort to establish legitimacy and validity for one's perspective. In the process, a community constructs common sense–common knowledge that it establishes as the correct version of reality. Modernity has redefined this arena, by changing "the nature of communication between human communities, the pace of change and the introduction of novelty coming from distant remote others. In this context, traditions cannot remain impermeable; they are put under scrutiny, revised or fiercely defended and through

this process precisely lose the unshakeable and unquestioned form that defines them in the first place" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 93).

The process of detraditionalisation "blasts open the public sphere of communities to practices of contestation, argumentation and debate. […] They become one amongst many other forms of knowledge" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 93). As Giddens (1991) claims, "[f]orms of traditional authority become only 'authorities' among others, part of an indefinite pluralism of expertise" (Giddens, 1991, p. 195). Different 'authorities' co-exist in public spheres characterised by a polyphasia of knowledge systems and rationalities. In this context, "which kind of thinking is better depends crucially on the sphere of activity within which it occurs" (Cole, 1996, p. 175). Modernity has demolished the traditional boundaries of the public sphere, casting the public out in the open, exposing community life to a global audience. These developments have led to a heightened awareness of diversity and have facilitated recognition, but they have also complicated and increased tensions between cultures and civilisations. Such tensions take place not only at the borders of nation-states, but also within the boundaries of existing liberal democracies (Benhabib, 2002), within the pluralistic and diversified public spheres of modern communities.

It is this clash of perspectives, in the form of a multiplicity of knowledges, that individuals need to confront and to resolve in participating in social life: "the common knowledge of communities, or the lifeworld, provide the points of reference, the parameters, the resources against which individuals make sense of the world around them, develop the theoretical and practical competencies to deal with the everyday and establish the communicative relations that allow for the development of bonds of solidarity and cooperation and the experience of belonging" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 79). In adopting a position towards some particular social object or event, individuals must orientate themselves amongst this discursive polyphasia (Wagner, 2007) of different types of knowledges and rationalities that coexist side by side in the same public sphere. Social knowledge serves individuals to develop and elaborate their own points of view towards social

events, by which they interact with the world and with others in their everyday lives. Adopting a particular position towards some social happening has consequences not only on the self and the identities that individuals negotiate, but also on the social relations and social practices that are enacted collectively in a particular community. Furthermore, the outcome of contact between different community points of view has obvious implications on the subsequent relations that develop between different communities. At the same time, however, due to the changes brought about by modernity, no one today can adopt a particular point of view towards a social event without knowing at the same time that there are different, alternative, yet equally plausible points of view based on different systems of knowledge that are themselves equally legitimate and perfectly valid in their own context. This fundamental insecurity relates to all orientations, even those based on the most basic belief systems: "[n]o one today can but be conscious that living according to the precepts of a determined faith is one choice among other possibilities" (Giddens, 1991, p. 181). Moreover, the conditions of modernity also mean that these are transformations from which no one can 'opt out' (Giddens, 1991).

The encounter with alternative and competing worldviews requires individuals to adopt the perspective of the other in evaluating others' orientations towards the social facts faced by one and all in a given society. This requirement is not a simple, value-free, and unproblematic transaction. As Benhabib (2002) argues, reactions "can range from total bafflement in the face of another culture's rituals and practices to more mundane and frustrating encounters with others when we simply say, "I just don't get it. What do you really mean?"" (p. 31). The ability to make sense of the perspective of the other stems from the underlying ability to understand the logic and rationality that sustain the other's perspective. Whilst our own perspective appears to us rational, in terms of a worldview we consider simply common-sensical, alternative perspectives may or may not share this bedrock of common-sense. Our ability to thus make sense of an alternative perspective, and thereby our willingness to engage in dialogue over divergent perspectives is underpinned by our evaluation of the underlying alternative worldview and by the extent to which these

divergent worldviews can be reconciled. As Asch (1952/1987) claims, with regards to our own society, "[i]ts practices and beliefs appear to us natural, permanent, and inevitable, whereas the particular conditions that make them possible often remain invisible. To those who live in the United States the social condition of Negroes has a quality of normality, but the caste system of Hindu society appears bizarre" (p. 7). Our evaluation of alternative worldviews can either enable us to adjoin divergent perspectives, or prohibit us from doing so: "there are those with whom we agree, who inhabit other cultures and worlds, but whose evaluations we find plausible and comprehensible, and still others whose ways of life as well as systems of belief will be abhorrent to us" (Benhabib, 2002, p. 42). In these conditions the demarcations between us and them, and the consequences of these demarcations become ever more complex.

As Jovchelovitch (2007) points out, recognising the diversity of knowledge raises some crucial concerns: do all systems of knowledge qualify as knowledge or just some of them? Are all systems of knowledge rational or just some of them? What defines the rationality of a knowledge system? Jovchelovitch (2007) argues that at the heart of knowledge encounters lies the problem of difference in forms of knowing and what constitutes human reason. Defining who can pose claims to rational knowledge is a political act that carries a string of dilemmas and consequences related to the valuation and ranking of different peoples, different knowledges, and different ways of life (Benhabib, 2002; Jovchelovitch, 2007). Defining who can claim rational knowledge defines in turn who is entitled to hold and express an opinion, whose point of view acquires legitimacy, and who emerges victorious in the 'clash of cultures' (Benhabib, 2002). The transformation of the public sphere from a traditional to a detraditional form has led to a transformation of the authority structure of knowledge: "arguments of authority have been replaced by the authority of arguments" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 96). Arguments are the articulation of the points of view held by individuals and groups. A point of view provides a gateway for participation in the public sphere, which participation has identity and political consequences for the holder. It is by means of points of view

that the claims of culture are advanced in a plural and diversified public sphere. Having a point of view means one exercises one's right to an opinion and on the basis of it to participate in the public sphere, wherein legitimacy is granted to some perspectives as opposed to others.

The study of how individuals and groups develop and hold points of view ought therefore to be an imperative concern in contemporary multicultural societies. This requirement is highlighted by the need to legitimate the life and practices of each and every cultural group in modern societies. Fascination with, and tolerance of, ethnic practices falls far short from granting equality of worldviews. Dialogical encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2007) require that on any given issue we need to be able to understand the point of view of the other fully, in terms of the knowledge system by which it is informed. The ability to understand how different individuals may adopt divergent perspectives, and how these perspectives in turn may be sustained rationally, is requisite for promoting dialogical encounters.

Divergent perspectives may be articulated at the level of interpersonal relations, whereby contrasting opinions may be held by different subjects who share a system of knowledge that provides them with a common frame of reference. However, divergent perspectives may at times be more appropriately located at the intergroup level, whereby different points of view may be drawing in turn on divergent systems of knowledge. Furthermore, apparent consensus may also be underlined by divergent rationalities, whereby apparently similar outlooks may be sustained by different knowledge systems. These contrasting knowledges determine the limits and boundaries of agreement. Overlooking the processes of legitimation served by systems of knowledge handicaps an adequate explanation of social behaviour, in a way that results in failure to recognise differences across different levels of explanation. This handicap is characteristic of attitude scaling and has long been identified in this tradition, as Thurstone (1967a) notes:

"It is quite conceivable that two men may have the same degree or intensity of affect favourable toward a psychological object and that their attitudes would be described in this sense as identical but that they have arrived at their similar attitudes by entirely different routes. It is even possible that their factual associations about the psychological object might be entirely different and that their overt actions would take quite different forms which have one thing in common, namely, that they are about equality favourable toward the object" (p.21).

Thurstone goes on to provide the example of an atheist and a pious believer both expressing similar attitudes to a statement such as 'Going to church will not do anyone any harm'. According to Likert (1967), whose simple attitude scale has arguably enabled the discipline to better measure than define attitudes (Allport, 1967), and whose widespread use across the social sciences is perpetuous, this state of conceptualisation is unsatisfactory as the measure should be in such way that "persons with different points of view, so far as the particular attitude is concerned, will respond to it differentially" (p. 90). For this reason, Likert (1967) claims that attitude scales, like intelligence tests, should be standardised for cultural groups, and one devised for one group should not be applicable for another. Likert's suggestions have, however, gone largely unheeded in the measurement of public opinion, as noted hereunder.

This thesis postulates the point of view construct as a remedy to this handicap. According to Sherif and Sherif (1967), to the extent that the object of an attitude is socially relevant, individuals of the same cultural group will share a similar orientation to the object that is not unique to the particular individual. Social norms, according to Sherif and Sherif, define what are acceptable and unacceptable positions in relation to that object. This thesis postulates that the point of view enables an understanding of the outlooks individuals adopt in relation to others in everyday life, on the basis of the meaning they hold for individuals and groups. Its reference to visual perception is more than cursory. The point of view enables an

understanding of how individuals and groups *perceive* social reality. It articulates how human beings *see* things in their everyday life, and comes with the potential to address such issues as: how I see what we see; how you see what we see; as well as how I see what s/he sees, and how you see what s/he sees as a function of how we see what they see.

This articulation requires an appreciation and analysis of interpersonal behaviour as a function of intergroup behaviour. One cannot provide a satisfactory account of one without an appreciation of the other. The reason for this is that apparent disagreement may be underlined by a more fundamental consensus, whilst, on the other hand, apparent agreement may be fragile if underlined by a more fundamental cleavage. In any case, what is at stake in the encounter between points of view is the ability to comprehend the perspective of the other and consequently the ability to appreciate difference, to willingly engage in mutual dialogue, and to ultimately settle divergent perspectives through collaboration or conflict. Understanding how individuals come to take up some position on an issue against another enables a deep understanding into "the motives which unite people and bring them into conflict" (Asch, 1987, p. 8), that in our contemporary world is a crucial and urgent socio-political concern. For these reasons, the requirement to study points of view embedded within different public spheres is an imperative concern and has informed the empirical studies undertaken in this project.

Points of view can draw on a system of knowledge that is legitimated in a public sphere, which public sphere may in itself be marked by a multiplicity of knowledge systems that co-exist within in. In this state of affairs, typical of cosmopolitan publics, encounters between different points of view may represent more fundamental encounters between distinct worldviews. Interpersonal relations in these publics instantiate intercultural relations. This condition was studied in the first empirical inquiry in this project. On the other hand, points of view may draw on systems of knowledge that are not legitimated in a given public sphere. Such alien points of view present a twofold empirical concern: (1) The requirement to study the

alien point of view from the outside, as it seeks to negotiate its version in the context of a discrepant system of social representations; (2) The requirement to study the reception and encounter with the alien point of view from the inside, as it is received by individuals for whom this version is out of the ordinary. These two conditions have informed the second and third empirical studies undertaken in this inquiry respectively. Clearly, understanding social behaviour on these bases requires a deeper appreciation than mere evaluative judgments, as not only dispositions but also perceptions and common-sense bear distinctly on social behaviour.

Attitudes and Attitude Change

'Attitude' has for a long time served as the primary concept by which social psychology has sought an understanding into how individuals orientate themselves towards objects and events in their social life. Social psychology as a discipline has been defined in terms of its concern with the scientific study of attitudes (Allport, 1967). Farr (1996), tracing the historical development of attitude in social psychology, claims that the understanding of this construct has changed through the years, from a sociological understanding found in the origins of the concept in Thomas and Znaniecki's (1918-1920) study of the Polish peasant, through to what Graumann (1986) terms 'the individualisation of the social' in the social sciences, and finally to the cognitive interpretation of the Gestaltists' work in the US. The result of this historical development is a contemporary understanding of attitude as a measurable, cognitive characteristic that represents an individual's evaluation of some attitude object (see Thurstone, 1967a, 1967b; Sherif & Sherif, 1967).

In the early years, attitude presented a dual focus on the individual and the social. Later developments, however, extracted the individual cognitive system from the social context, focusing on cognition as antecedent of action (Gaskell, 2001). The underlying premise in contemporary attitude studies is that the measurement of attitudes in the individual can be utilised as an independent variable, and thus as a predictor of behaviour, i.e. the dependent variable. Farr (1996) goes on to claim that

an epistemological contrast developed between two forms of social psychology, characterised by the way the two conceptualise the social–that is in turn reflected in the way attitude is employed. What separates the two social psychologies, according to Farr, is an epistemological incompatibility between the gestalt 'view of the world' approach, characteristic of sociological forms of social psychology, and the behaviourist 'consistency of response' approach, characteristic of psychological forms of social psychology[3]. Attitude has been developed as an individual cognitive construct predominantly in psychological forms of social psychology, and has established itself as a keystone in these forms of the discipline (Allport, 1967).

Across the discipline of social psychology, however, individuals are not held to be neutral observers of the world. Individuals are held to be agentic; they have differing orientations to things they encounter in social life, and they act in context-rational ways in relation to them. Psychological forms of social psychology focus on the fact that individuals hold attitudes towards things they encounter, including people, objects, and ideas. Simply put, attitudes are evaluations individuals hold towards these elements in their environment (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005). Attitudes are held to be made up of three parts: an affective component consisting of emotions, a cognitive component consisting of thoughts and beliefs, and a behavioural component consisting of actions and behaviours. Their origin has been linked to genes (Tesser, 1993), but most studies have focused on the way by which people's attitudes are created through cognitive, affective, and behavioural experiences. Attitudes are held to be cognitively based if they are based primarily on relevant facts, affectively based if they are based primarily on emotions and values, and behaviourally based if they stem from people's observations of how they behave toward an object. Moreover, people's attitudes may be explicit, in the case of attitudes which are consciously endorsed and easily reported, or implicit, that is, those attitudes held involuntarily, uncontrollably and unconsciously (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005).

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[3] For a more in-depth exploration of the epistemological differences in the underlying philosophies see Marková (1982).

The popularity of the attitude concept in social research has been largely based on the presumed link between attitudes and behaviour. Insofar as attitudes are held to reflect an individual's evaluation of an attitude object, individuals will presumably behave according to their attitudes when in relation with an attitude object. Consequently, knowing someone's attitudes ought to provide an insight into their future behaviour. Moreover, changing someone's attitude is in itself a way to change future behaviour. Given the widespread political and commercial interests in manipulating individual behaviour, the attitude concept has benefitted extensively from such interests. However, the relationship between attitudes and behaviour and the characteristic low correlations between the two, has been a problem attitude research has had to contend with over the years. Ever since LaPiere's (1934) study on Chinese diners, the presupposition that attitudes have something to do with behaviour has been cast in doubt. Attitudes are now held to predict behaviour only in certain circumstances (Fazio, 1990). A distinction is drawn between spontaneous and deliberative behaviour; attitudes predict spontaneous behaviour only when they are highly accessible. On the other hand, according to the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), when people have time to contemplate their behaviour, their attitudes are relevant in conjunction with subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, and in predicting behavioural intent. It is behavioural intent that is, in turn, the best predictor of actual behaviour. The theory of planned behaviour has provided a lifeline to the attitude concept, in retaining, if in a weaker form, the link between attitudes and behaviour. This has meant that attitudes could be retained as a variable that is subject to manipulation, and that is somewhat linked to actual behaviour. Consequently, it remains admissible to hold that manipulating attitudes may still result in behavioural change.

Various theories have been proposed to account for attitude change. Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people experience dissonance whenever their behaviours towards a particular stimulus or event do not match their previously held attitudes towards the same stimulus, particularly if there is no way that the behaviour can be explained as due to external circumstances. In such

instances, individuals are motivated to change either their attitudes or their behaviours to bring the two into alignment. Hovland and the Yale group (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) have pioneered research into persuasive communication and attitude change, which has served to inform marketers on how to advertise products. The Yale attitude change programme suggests that the effectiveness of persuasive communication depends on 'who' says 'what' to 'whom': credible, and attractive speakers are more likely to be persuasive; people are more persuaded by messages that do not seem to be designed to influence them, by two-sided messages which refute the arguments on the other side, and by messages delivered to benefit from primacy or recency effects; audiences are more likely to be persuaded when they are distracted, when the receiver is of low intelligence and moderate or low self-esteem, and when the audience consists of people between the ages of 18 to 25 (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005).

The heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and the elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) have both outlined two routes to persuasion: one characterised by elaborate messages to which people listen attentively and that they process deeply, such as occurs when the message is highly relevant and people are both able and motivated to listen carefully; the other route characterised by persuasive messages other than arguments about the facts peripheral to the message, such as who is delivering the message, or how one feels about it. Inoculation (McGuire, 1964) and forewarning (Cialdini & Petty, 1981) are two variables that have been argued to help in resisting persuasive messages. The political value of the study of attitudes and attitude change is demonstrable in the advocation of soft power as a conflict resolution tactic (Nye, 1990, 2004).

Public Opinion

The popularity of 'attitude' in the social sciences stems from the pragmatic value it has claimed in the measurement of public opinion. The measurement of attitudes using attitude scales, predominantly the Likert scale, administered in the forms of

representative surveys, has become the methodology of public opinion sampling or polling (Fraser, 1994). Allport (1967) argues that the attitude concept has come to mean different things to different people, and that for any further progress to ensue a clarification of terminology is a necessary prerequisite. According to Allport, attitudes are measured more successfully than they are defined. Similarly, Shamir and Shamir (2000) point out that there exists no generally accepted definition of public opinion either, and there have even been calls to abandon the concept altogether. However, with regards to public opinion, "the concept is being invoked as much as ever if not more so" (Shamir & Shamir, 2000, p. 2).

Himmelweit (1990) claims that "[s]ince the late 1930s the systematic measurement of public opinion has become a major industry. Some surveys explore issues in depth so as to learn what has given rise to, or lies behind, the expression of particular views and also how views on different issues relate to one another. Others ask for snap judgments by the public concerning preferences for different products, political parties or leaders, or about the public's behavioural intentions" (p. 81). In spite of the epistemological and ontological difficulties the attitude concept has had to bear, and even if public opinion is taken to be that which public opinion polls measure, the measurement of the 'attitude' in public opinion polls has proven to be a useful exercise for 'those in the know' over the years (Himmelweit, 1990). Examples include the numerous political surveys which anticipate general elections in Western democracies, as well as national surveys measuring social attitudes. The Eurobarometer, a famed example of the study of public opinion, is held by some to have "made a unique and immensely important contribution to social sciences research" (Inglehart & Reif, 1991, p. xv). Hewstone (1986) outlines three reasons for its great value: first, that the questions are posed simultaneously to representative samples in all member countries of the Union; second, that key questions are repeated on several occasions, some in every single survey; and third, that results are broken down by various demographic criteria. Public opinion, so measured, is considered to be the expression of the many (Himmelweit, 1990).

Other theorists have attempted to describe public opinion as more than a distribution of individual attitudes. For Shamir and Shamir (2000), "public opinion lies at the juncture of society, communication, and the individual; of the public and the private domains; of civil society and the state; of citizenry and politics; of masses and elites; of social control and rationality; of norms and events" (p. 2). Shamir and Shamir's approach attempts to accommodate public opinion's diverse manifestations and rests on four premises: first, public opinion is a social system that mediates and accommodates social integration and social change; second, public opinion is a multidimensional phenomenon and cannot be reduced to any single expression; third, public opinion can evolve in different dynamic paths; fourth, the nature of the information environment is a major factor in determining which dynamic process will be set in motion. In many ways, Shamir and Shamir's approach to public opinion attempts to go beyond the limitations of an understanding of public opinion as an aggregate distribution of attitudes. However, as Farr (1990a) outlines, a conceptualisation of public opinion based on attitude measurement per force retains a distributive notion of the social. Whilst this may be useful, it says nothing about how public opinion forms and changes but merely states what it is at the time of measurement. And in spite of the concerns outlined, both in relation to attitudes and, by implication, to public opinion, the bottom-line measure of public opinion change is measured by shifts in the mean or in percentage agreement in attitudes (Himmelweit, 1990). The Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission has adopted the term 'Eurobarometer' deliberately because:

> "Just as a barometer can be used to measure the atmospheric pressure and thus give a short-range weather forecast, this Euro-barometer can be used to observe, and to some extent forecast, public attitudes towards the most important current events" (Eurobarometer, no. 1, 1974, p. 1).

This definition implies an ability to locate attitudes as objective entities, qualities, or characteristics, which may increase or decrease in a collective of individuals in measurable quantities. This characteristic of attitudes has proven highly contestable

and has led to the postulation of 'points of view', that is the object of this thesis, as an alternative to understanding, more pertinently, individuals' orientations to the social facts they encounter in their everyday life.

The Fact of Culture and the Social Attitude

The aim to counterbalance the individualisation of 'attitude' in social psychology is not exclusive to European forms of social psychology. Even before the advent of societal forms of social psychology (Himmelweit & Gaskell, 1990), such as social representations theory (Moscovici, 1961), social constructionism (Berger & Luckman, 1966), and discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), Solomon Asch (1952/1987) took issue with 'attitude' as a purely individual construct and drawing on sociological roots, went on to postulate other concepts with the intent to develop a social psychology that in understanding the complexity of whatever is its object of study, accounts for the social as much as it does the individual. This objective, as well as the social-psychological elaboration of sociological concepts, is characteristic of contemporary societal forms of psychology that foreground social knowledge (Gaskell, 2001) and attempt to provide an understanding of social and cultural conditions in analysing and explicating social behaviour.

Asch (1987) argued that attitude scales "do not provide a knowledge of the way in which an individual thinks about an issue, what he feels about it, or on what grounds he bases his convictions" (p. 537). Information obtained through a public opinion poll provides "the distribution of the number of people who say "yes" or "no"; but the rest is interpretation. For interpretation one must rely upon a knowledge of social conditions and ideas that the data has neither produced nor is capable of checking" (p. 547). According to Asch, measuring attitudes does not provide any insight into societal processes, factors, or conditions. This position has more recently been reiterated in Farr's (1991) critique of the conceptualisation of the social in attitude measurement and public opinion, and in Billig's (1987, 1991) critique of the argumentative context and its absence in attitude measurement (see Chapter 3).

Asch (1952/1987) starts by locating man within a societal framework, rejecting a purely individualistic and behaviouristic account of man which social psychology was pursuing at his time (see Graumann, 1986; Farr, 1996). He strives to take the cultural into account, arguing that social conditions are more than just variables to the individual. For Asch there is no man-in-general, but "[w]e always have before us a person born into a particular society at a particular level of development" (1987, p. 364), and that material and social conditions for the individual are far more than objects of reflection. This has significant consequences on how individuals go about living the life they live in relation to the world they inhabit: "the surroundings do not look quite the same to one who believes in reincarnation and to one who has studied the principles of genetics. It matters whether the society in which we live is predatory or peaceful, cooperative or individualistic, expressive or taciturn" (1987, p. 365). For Asch, societal conditions are highly influential: "Cultural conditions decide whether people will walk the earth humbly or hunt heads, whether they will pray to their dead ancestors or not pray at all, whether they will own their own slaves or fight for freedom" (1987, p. 366). Moreover, this fact has clear implications for how we conceptualise individuals, for "[h]ead-hunting, polygamy, Mohammedanism are not simply traits of individuals like height or color vision. They are properties of individuals in so far as the individuals are members of a given society" (1987, p. 16). According to Asch, the difference between being a spectator in a social scene and being in a group is that the latter means that the individual is directly implicated in the actions of others.

Asch draws on Sumner's notion of the *mores*[4], to go back to a more sociological understanding of the concepts he develops, rejecting an absolutist position in favour of a socially-contingent interpretation of cultural values. In doing this he develops what Farr (1996) terms a sociological form of social psychology. Asch argues that cultural similarities and differences are a matter of investigation for social psychology, as cultural variation is rooted in psychological processes. Additionally,

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[4] Mores are the customs and habitual practices of a community that reflect moral standards that a community accepts and follows.

in studying culture, cataloguing existing similarities and differences is not enough, as cultural variations are facts having historical direction:

> "It is not enough to say that some societies observe rules of cleanliness and others do not. It would be more consequential to ask whether one can as readily teach one group to adopt the habits of cleanliness as another to surrender them; whether one can as readily convert an American community to curing illness by sorcery as persuade a primitive group to adopt modern medical practices" (1987, p. 382).

Asch demonstrably validates and legitimates local practices based on local knowledge, rejecting a hierarchical view of knowledge held by different communities and arguing that the study of localised views is not a matter for sociological investigation alone as these also depend on psychological processes: "changes have a direction and that often the direction is irreversible because of the sensible character of some *psychological* processes" (1987, p. 383, emphasis in original).

Opinion, Sentiments, and Attitudes

In seeking a social-psychological account for how individuals orientate themselves in their everyday life, Asch distinguishes between 'opinions', which are peripheral belief-action systems that may be socially relevant, and 'sentiments', which he defines as deep-seated, cognitively and emotionally crucial concerns that act as centres of reference for complex and extended actions and themes. Asch postulates two types of sentiments: (i) those that have a predominantly personal reference but are sociologically peripheral (e.g. falling in love), and (ii) *attitudes*, sentiments we share with many others, (e.g. education, civil liberties, economic and political organisation). Attitudes, Asch argues, join central processes in the individual with central processes in society. Attitudes orient individuals by ordering the data of social surroundings.

In differentiating between opinions and attitudes, Asch (1987) rejects a purely cognitive notion of attitude as an individual evaluation towards some attitude object. He strives to appreciate the argumentative, dialogical, and social context of attitudes, arguing that "[t]o be in society is to form views of social facts and relatively enduring concerns toward them. By means of these psychological operations we participate in the social process; they make possible the coherent interlocking of action between individuals and between groups; they define our position as members of the social body. Their *stability* and *change* seem closely connected with the stability and change of the social order" (p. 522). Asch attributes personal-social roots to attitudes, claiming that "to be in social relation is to stand on common ground with others and to face daily conditions with shared understanding and purpose" (p. 576).

Attitudes function to orient individuals in society. Their function "is to be found in the effects it exerts upon current experiences and the appraisal of new conditions. Generally an attitude functions as an orientation to and context for current events" (p. 582). Attitudes do this on the basis of cognitive content. According to Asch, attitudes have a cognitive basis and to understand attitudes, one needs to understand this cognitive basis. For Asch however, cognitive implied social knowledge or data, rather than mental information processing that is characteristic of contemporary cognitive psychology. Asch elaborates thus:

"Only if the knowledge exists that there are germs and viruses that produce disease will it be meaningful to have an attitude about the right of the state to compel children to be vaccinated against smallpox regardless of the wishes of their parents. If, instead, the available data contain such entities as spirits and the belief that they produce illness, medical problems will be solved by medicine men and there will be different attitudes towards vaccination and hygiene. In order that the burning of witches make sense it is necessary to have as part of the intellectual climate the propositions that there are devils and that persons can be in league with them. In each of these instances a particular factual definition of the given situation is the necessary condition for conviction and action" (p. 564).

Asch further proposes that data is a function of sociological conditions, that is, historical development controls the content of knowledge whilst existing social relations decide what data will become accessible and the emphasis they will receive. Asch claims that it is not sufficient for facts to be identical to secure agreement amongst social actors, it is equally essential that facts be *perceived* in the same context.

To understand public opinion therefore, it is important to go beyond the mere counting of heads and develop an understanding of societal conditions and the forms of social knowledge these conditions sustain, and furthermore how individuals draw on this knowledge to orient themselves in social life. Asch argues that looking at functional uniformities fails to supply "the functional relations between conditions and consequences. Between these stands nothing less than the individual himself, with his tendencies, capacities, and group relations. Unless we take into account what he understands and feels about his situation, we do not understand the sense of the given relation in a single instance" (p. 533).

Social Attitudes

Attitudes, for Asch, "are social not merely because their objects are social or because others have similar attitudes. They are social principally in that they arise in view of and in response to perceived conditions of mutual dependence" (p. 576). Asch elaborates with an example: that "[t]here cannot be in a society several official opinions of what constitutes a crime or what is an object of private property" (p. 576). Attitudes are thus "not only causally connected with group-conditions, they are also part of the mutually shared field. Therefore the investigation of attitudes brings us to the center of the person's social relations and heart of dynamics of group processes" (p. 577). Asch describes the mutually shared field as a phenomenal field that for subjects in relation constitutes reality. Asch argues that humans experience their surroundings and perceive what goes on within their environment as experientially objective situations. Individuals do not experience their perceptions of the world as cognitive products of their internal physiological processes, they experience objects in terms of properties attributed to objects themselves. Consequently, human subjects go on to assume that the objects that lie in front of them in some way lie in front of others who share the same experiential space in the same way. In this way, the biological basis of human cognition orients human subjects to a phenomenal objectivity. Things in the environment possess this characteristic of objectivity, by means of which they are held to exist in-themselves, independently of human perception. It is this world of objects, taken as a whole, and existing independently of any of us, that constitutes for us our shared phenomenal reality and that makes up our mutually shared phenomenal field. Consequently, the study of human relations is necessarily a study of phenomenal relations, in other words, representations of reality that for human subjects constitute the real world and according to which they interrelate inter-objectively (Latour, 1996; Sammut, Daanen & Sartawi, 2010). It is within this shared phenomenal field that attitudes are located.

One necessary requirement for studying attitudes is therefore that human actions and experiences, being in relations of interdependence, be studied in terms of the units of which they form part. The presence of others effects human subjects by bringing within their psychological sphere the thoughts, emotions and purposes of others. This extends their world vastly beyond their own individual capacities. According to Asch, this fact alters the individual's psychological scene by bringing him into relations of mutual dependence. It is not simply that individual action is mutually oriented and elicits in another a similarly oriented response. Mutuality is a systemic condition that refers to an interpenetration of views that forms the basis of social interaction. It allows individuals to presume that others stand in the same relation to the environment as they do, and it endows human actions with a mutually intelligible character. As Asch explains, humans do not live in their own space, in their own time, and in their own systems of cause and effect. They live in a shared space, in shared time, and in shared systems of causality. When humans interrelate, they do so on the basis of this inter-objective, open field that surrounds them and which stands in similar relation to all of them.

Taking context into account in this way leads Asch to postulate certain questions which social psychology is still grappling with today: "How do social conditions make the most diverse beliefs and convictions part of the individual? To what extent do values vary and what may be the limits to this variation?" (p. 367). In outlining a potential answer to these questions, Asch calls for a theory of attitudes in which techniques grow out of the needs for description and theoretical clarification and, according to Asch, when such a framework has been developed:

> "It would then become pertinent to call for a specification of the individual's frame of reference and to ask questions such as the following: What is the center of gravity of the individual's outlook? How wide or narrow is it? Is he considering a given question from a long-range or short-range view? Is he oriented to the present situation, to the future, or to a past that has already disappeared? Does he have an attitude on a given issue or is the problem

remote and without reality? What is the place of his specific assertions in the larger context of his outlook?" (p. 559).

Asch's proposal for addressing these issues is the postulation of the notion of the 'point of view', as a function of the social attitudes on which it draws. 'Point of view' constitutes an individual's perspective towards a social object or event, an outlook which individuals adopt and in terms of which they act meaningfully in their everyday social relations. It is by means of this operation, Asch argues, that alignments and oppositions arise in the social order.

Points of view, according to Asch, allow individuals to engage in psychological processes of far-reaching importance. It enables individuals to engage in social checks, to verify the nature of their surroundings. It also enables individuals to make use of the mutually shared psychological field, drawing the actions of subjects into relations of mutual relevance, whereby the surroundings come to include a reference to others and happenings cease to have a relation only to oneself: "I am induced to take up a particular standpoint, to view my own action as another views it or as the action of another person, and, conversely, to view another's action as my own" (p. 132). According to Asch:

> "[i]t blunts thinking to speak of the participants in the social scene as "individuals". Human interaction takes place between persons, each of whom has the property of being an "I" to himself and each of whom sees the other as a "you". The meaning of these terms goes far beyond the identification of separate individuals. Their content is relational and mutually dependent. To be an "I" means that one experiences oneself as a "you" for others and that one experiences others as "I's" to themselves. Often the two protagonists, "I" and "you", speak and refer to themselves as "we". "We" represents a new group formation, different from "you" and "I" taken singly. Further, the newly constituted "we" may jointly refer to another character, to a "he" or

"she". Similarly, "we" may discuss, plan, or plot about "them", another important part of the social firmament" (p. 180).

In this systemic and relational context that is the shared phenomenal field, each subject's point of view is mutually intelligible. A subject is able to adopt a perspective and interrelate with others on the basis of it, because others can comprehend one's point of view even if they can disagree with it. As Asch argues, social action requires a unique organisation between participants who stand on common ground, oriented towards one another and to the same environment, and that their acts *interpenetrate* and regulate each other. In social action each subject refers his action within a shared environment to the other, and the other's actions to himself. According to Asch, this requires: (a) the subject to perceive the surroundings which include another as well as herself; (b) the subject to perceive that the other is also oriented to the surroundings, and similarly perceives herself and the subject in the surroundings; (c) the subject to act and note that the other responds; (d) the subject to note that the other's response sets up the expectation that the subject will understand the response as an action of the other directed towards the subject; and, (e) that the same ordering must exist in the other as well, as a subject. On the basis of this social interaction we are able to derive the reasonable grounds for divergences, based on differences in perspectives. We realise that certain points of view and certain experiences are our own, but we do not maintain that we are in singular relation with the environment. We turn to the thought of others for confirmation of our relations, because we understand that they can illuminate us with some perspective that is inaccessible from our point of view. Social relations are enabled by means of the critical capacity of human subjects to take the perspective of the other. As Asch argues, I am able to understand my own action as it appears to another, and to view the action of another as if it were my own. Furthermore, divergences in perspectives are considered as more than brute differences. We are able to understand that one perspective may be capable of correcting another distorted view by appeal to a deeper-lying unity of shared action, feeling, and thought.

To sum up Asch's postulation, the mutual relations in which human subjects engage extend and deepen their individual psychological field and form a systemic, psychosocial, phenomenal field that enables the interpenetration of views. In a clash between divergent views, individuals are induced to take a stand and view their actions as others view them, and conversely to view the actions of others as their own. In this way, limitations of individual thinking are transcended by including the thoughts of others. Individuals become open to more alternatives than their own unaided individual cognition makes possible. This knowledge, that our understanding can be in disagreement with that of others, is of high significance. According to Asch, it makes evident to us the possibility of error as an intellectual fact, and prepares the way for entertaining errors in our own view. In consequence, individuals become able to deliberately approve one view and dismiss another on the basis of a process of social validation, by appeal to a common frame of reference that serves to provide 'logical' proof for one's own thinking. And, to go back to the previous argument concerning the public sphere, different publics admit different logics to co-exist to different degrees, meaning that not all points of view are equally valid in a given public.

The notion of the point-of-view remains today, as Asch (1952/1987) already pointed out decades ago, ill-defined. The reason for this is that the major specification within social psychology for how individuals orient themselves to different aspects of their environment has been served by the notion of 'attitude' rather than 'point of view'. As noted, 'attitude' has been individualised and cognitivised to provide a specification of the individual's cognitive and emotional orientation towards social objects, excluding a reference to the thinking of another. In this definition, attitude has replaced the notion of point of view, as outlined by Asch. However, the contemporary conceptualisation of attitudes fails to provide an account of how individual orientations are adopted and sustained in a social context characterised by argumentative practices, divergent and competing knowledge systems, and discrepant rationalities. Attitudes and public opinion provide a static snapshot of

individual evaluations towards an attitude object, but fail to provide an appreciation of the cultural aspects by which that orientation is validated. Attitudes and public opinion fail to account for how attitudes serve individuals to participate in social life, have their own perspectives recognised and legitimated by others, and gain respectability on account of their views. Attitudes and public opinion also fail to account for how and why public attitudes may change as a function of societal conditions, how some public attitudes may be common-sensical in some context but non-sensical in another, and for how cultural conditions may shape perspectives and allow individuals to make sense of social reality accordingly. The modern conceptualisation of attitudes fails to include a specification of the social context that Asch intended for it in his theory of social attitudes.

Asch's calling for a theory of social attitudes has, however, been a core concern for societal forms of social psychology (Himmelweit and Gaskell, 1990), and an understanding of worldviews in their social form has become the cornerstone of this alternative form of the discipline. This is most notably found in the theory of social representations. If the theory of social representations adequately meets Asch's calling for a theory of social attitudes, then the conceptualisation of points of view in terms of social representations will provide a theoretically plausible specification for an individual's outlook based on a social frame of reference. In this way, the notion of point of view can overcome the limitations of the cognitivised attitude and take into account the argumentative context of an individual's orientation that is based on a collective, rather than an aggregate, understanding of the social (see Harré, 1984). As attitude is to public opinion, so point of view is to social representations. The present thesis elaborates a social psychological conceptualisation of 'point of view', systemically embedded within social representations. This formulation is aimed at resolving Gaskell's (2001) predicament of pushing social psychology to bring both the individual and the social into focus contemporarily, and meet the challenge that could reinvigorate the discipline.

Social Representations

In many Western societies individualism has had a marked influence, not least in the formulation of the social sciences as behavioural disciplines and in the conceptualisation of the social as a measurable influence on the individual (Farr, 1996). A primary consequence of the individualisation of the social is the individualisation of attitudes, in which the social element has been removed in favour of individual, cognitive processes. For historical and geographic reasons, the social psychology of social representations has escaped this individualisation. It developed into a social psychology that foregrounds social knowledge as it emerges in communicative practices, in which the social and the individual are not opposed universes but part of the same system of mediation (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Gaskell, 2001). As a result, the social representations approach has provided a counterbalance to the predominant forms of social psychology in which the individual is abstracted from the social and constitutes, in itself, a universal unit of analysis.

Since Moscovici's (1961) pioneering study on the social representations of psychoanalysis in France, the study of social representations has proceeded along a number of different lines. This has been permitted as a result of an eclectic definition of social representations. Social Representations have been variously described as a concept, a conceptual framework, a theory, and an approach (Allansdottir, Jovchelovitch, & Stathopoulou, 1993; Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Carugati, Selleri, & Scappini, 1994; deRosa, 1993). Moreover, a further distinction is applicable to the term social representation. Used as a verb, 'social representation' refers to a *process* of representing 'socially', whilst as a noun, it refers to some *product*, a representation, whose content it is possible to study. Social representations are the outcomes of processes of communication that represent reality for a given people, and once in existence they constitute social reality *sui generis* (Moscovici, 2000). This is similar to Asch's (1987) social psychology, where one great consequence of psychological interaction is the creation of a realm of social facts: "Interaction produces a host of objects, roles, and relations of great permanence that are

understandable only in terms of their social setting and function" (p. 178). Asch argues that "representations and the actions that they initiate bring group facts into existence and produce the phenomenal solidity of group processes" (Asch, 1987, p. 251-252). For Asch, the form that "interrelated actions take […] is a datum of precisely the same kind as any other fact" (1987, p. 252).

The philosophy of studying 'phenomena' through 'representations' can be traced back to Kant, who claimed that a phenomenon is an appearance amenable to sensory perception, that is, an observable event. The word 'phenomenon' comes from the Greek noun 'phainomenon', which means 'appearance', and is related to the Greek verb 'phanein', meaning 'to show'. In Kant's philosophy, phenomena constitute the world as experienced, as opposed to 'noumena', that is things-in-themselves, or the world as it exists independently of how it is experienced. In Kantian philosophy, we cannot ever know things-in-themselves; we can only know the world through our experience of it, through the representations we have of the phenomena in our world. Kant thus laid the foundations for the distinction between reality and the real. Reality consists of the world of things, whilst the real is the particular horizon constructed by a particular community or individual, which is lived and acted through in the experience of everyday life. According to Jovchelovitch (2007) "Representations construct the real but never fully capture the wholeness of reality" (p. 37). These 'representations' of the world as experienced, our representations of phenomena, according to Kant, serve as the basis for inferring reality.

In his introduction to *Being and Nothingness* (1943/2003), Sartre resolves the Kantian dualism of reality and the real through the very notion of point of view. Sartre claims that although an object may manifest itself through a single appearance, "the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of multiplying the points of view on that *Abschattung*", such that, according to Sartre, "our theory of the phenomenon has replaced the *reality* of the thing by the *objectivity* of the phenomenon and that it has based this on an appeal to infinity" (2003, p. 3). This conception in terms of objectivity is similar to Moscovici's claim

that social representations constitute social reality *sui generis*, noted above. The opposition of finite and infinite in Sartre replaces that of being and appearance in Kant, in that what of the object appears is in fact only an aspect of it. It is this *relative aspect* that is captured in the notion of a point of view. To use Sartre's own example, "The genius of Proust […] is no less equivalent to the infinity of possible points of view which one can take on that work and which we will call the "inexhaustibility" of Proust's work" (2003, p. 3). That is to say, the reality of a phenomenon exists always and forever relative to the point of view that describes it. According to the present thesis, by analogy, the reality of a *social* phenomenon exists always and forever relative to the individual multitude of points of view that describe it and that constitute it in the public sphere.

Kant's account of representations and phenomena has been highly influential in psychological theories concerning the brain, the mind, the external world, and the ways by which these interact. In psychology, mental representations are held to be reproductions in the mind, of the world, as experienced by the individual through sensory information. The scientific study of these representations has become the task of cognitive psychology in particular. Representations have also been studied and formulated in other social science disciplines, such as sociology and anthropology, with the aim of investigating cultural representations, or those representations which exist across individual minds rather than inside individual minds (Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner, Mecha, & do Rosário Carvalho, 2008).   The very foundations of sociology as a discipline rest fundamentally on Durkheim's (1924) distinction between individual representations and collective representations. Whatever the discipline, the study of representations has always proven controversial. Jovchelovitch (2007) captures very well the nature of the controversy:

> "[m]uch of the dispute over representation can be explained by an underlying tendency to focus solely on its epistemic function, that is, the ability of representation to produce knowledge about the world. Indeed there is a very strong tendency both in psychology and the social sciences to equate the

epistemic function of representation with cognition and to erase from the representational process its connection with persons and contexts. Representation is studied as an accurate depiction of a given state of affairs in the world and disconnected from the human and social processes that make it possible in the first place. Conceived as the sole basis of cognition and knowledge, representation is reduced to a mental epistemic phenomenon, ruled by information-processing mechanisms and a modular computational system that some psychologists call mind" (p. 11).

Cultural representations are, however, held to be different from mental representations in a fundamental way: "[r]epresentations are not a mirror of the world outside and are not purely the mental constructions of individual subjects. They involve a symbolic labour that springs out of the interrelations between self, other and the object-world, and as such have the power to signify, to construct meaning, to create reality" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 11). The difference between the two stems from the relevance of the social: "[i]gnoring the social dimension of representation has allowed for the recurrent view of representational processes as purely mental cognitive phenomena, detached from the larger societal constrains that are integral to their processes of constitution" (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 12). This difference locates them at different levels of explanation[5].

The nature of the social

Himmelweit (1990) claims that the analysis of social representations requires a molar, in contrast to a molecular, approach. The molecular view considers behaviour as consisting of discrete units, or responses, which are measurable and which, if enough data is available, is assumed to be predictable. The molar view, on the other hand, sees behaviour as a temporally extended activity in both space and time (Baum, 2004). This distinction, according to Baum (2004), is not merely theoretical but paradigmatic. The difference, according to Farr (1996) reflects an

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[5] For a detailed explanation of different levels of analysis see Wagner & Hayes (2005).

epistemological incompatibility between behaviouristic and gestaltist approaches. The key to understanding this paradigmatic difference lies in the conceptualisation of the social.

Harré (1984) argues that one of the root ideas of the 'social' is that of a plurality, which can be a distributive plurality or a collective plurality. A distributive plurality is one where each member of the group has some similar attribute to every other. In a collective plurality however, "the group, as a supraindividual, has an attribute which is not an attribute of any of the members" (p. 930). Certain representations are not held in any sense by a single individual but they only emerge and take shape in a collectivity, as a gestalt, in the coming together of a group where no individual holds the entire representation on their own. According to Breakwell (2001) no one individual has access to all social representations in operation, nor to a single social representation in its entirety. Asch (1987) similarly claims that there are instances of "extended cooperation in which the situation of the group is not perceived or understood by all and in which many or most attend to a restricted job that contributes to a larger aim, often unknown" (p. 177).

According to Harré (1984), an account of social representations needs to account for the social as a structured group not an aggregate of similar individuals: "representations, as "something" cognitive, could be located in true social collectives rather than multiplied and distributed through an aggregate of people" (p. 933). Farr (1990b) has utilised these terms to critique public opinion and its reliance on the distribution of attitudes. And according to Jovchelovitch: "just as the social is more than an aggregation of individuals, social representations are more than an aggregation of individual representations" (1995, p. 93). Moreover, according to Harré (1984), representations can effectively be understood independently of individual cognition. Conversely, definitions of social representations in terms of consensus are inadequate: "More than consensual beliefs, social representations are therefore organizing principles varied in nature, which do not necessarily consist of shared beliefs, as they may result in different or even opposed positions taken by

individuals in relation to common reference points" (Doise, Clémence, and Lorenzo-Cioldi, 1993, p. 4).

In a similar vein Asch (1987) distinguishes between macroscopic and microscopic properties. The social in social representations may be accorded macroscopic properties and ascribed a sense of a collective system that "does not reside in the individuals taken separately, though each individual contributes to it; nor does it reside outside them; it is present in the interrelations between the activities of individuals" (p. 252). The social representation, according to Wagner, Mecha, & do Rosário Carvalho (2008), far from a more traditional understanding of a cognitive unit that exists in individual minds, is conceived of as a collective phenomenon pertaining to a community. Instead of locating representations within minds, the authors argue that it is more adequate to conceptualise them as existing *across* minds. Social representations as phenomena pertain to "a world that, although belonging to each of us, transcends all of us. They are a "potential space" of common fabrication, where each person goes beyond the realm of individuality to enter another-yet fundamentally related-realm: the realm of public life" (Jovchelovitch, 1995, p. 94).

In public life, each individual is uniquely positioned in relation to others in the process of social representation, on the basis of some point of view that they adopt. Whilst individuals within a social group share a holomorphic frame of reference, they will not hold the same positioning within the social representation (Clémence, 2001; Doise, 2001; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Clémence defines social positioning as "the process by which people take up position about a network of significations" (2001, p. 83). This is corollary to Asch's notion of adopting a point of view. Divergent positions are expressed by individuals who attempt to define the phenomenon from their points of view, as noted by Sartre, using a framework of normative rules based on ideas, values, and beliefs characteristic of their group for the elaboration of meaning. The frame of reference must be shared by individuals if they are to interrelate at all. Whilst positioning may be idiosyncratic (an individual's

point of view may be unique), it cannot be idiomorphic, as others would be unable to relate meaningfully to the frame of reference that legitimises the actor's point of view (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Diversity within the social field means that individuals position themselves differently, engaging with the phenomenon from a particular point of view relative to other agents, who are similarly engaged in the process of social representation (Clémence, 2001; Liu & László, 2007). Social positioning in terms of adopting a point of view in social relations is not only the expression of an opinion (Thurstone, 1967b), it is a way of processing information in order to align our thinking with what society thinks (Clémence, 2001).

Modeling the point of view

Social representations are social insofar as they retain a sense of the collective existing across individual minds, and they are representations insofar as they are phenomena representing reality[6] and constituting the real[7]. This conception of the social representation is found in Bauer and Gaskell's (1999) toblerone model that postulates social representations as elaborated by a collective in an inter-objective space. This is similar to Asch's (1952/1987) conception of the shared phenomenal field. For Bauer and Gaskell, representations can be formally characterised as the relation between three elements: subjects, or carriers of the representation (S); an object that is represented, which may be a concrete entity or an abstract idea (O); and a project, or pragmatic context in which the representation is meaningful (P). Subjects, object, and project form a system of mutual constitution. This enables an understanding of how "in the object, the project of the subjects is represented; or how in the subjects the object appears in relation to a project; or how the project links the subjects and object" (p. 168). Similarly, Asch claims that "the paramount fact about social interaction is that the participants stand on common ground, that they turn *toward one another*, that their acts interpenetrate and therefore regulate each other […] It is individuals with this particular capacity to turn toward one

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[6] The noumenon, or object-in-itself.
[7] The phenomenon for a given community.

another who in concrete action validate and consolidate in each a *mutually shared field*, one that includes both the surroundings and one another's psychological properties as the objective sphere of action" (1987, p. 161-3, italics in original).

Bauer and Gaskell argue that the functions of representation are not mere epiphenomena of human activity, but that they constitute the internal environment that in conjunction with the external environment of brute facts[8], empower and constrain individual and collective activity. Social representations, unlike mental representations that require a single individual, involve a minimal triad of two persons (subject 1 and subject 2) concerned with an object (O), constituting a triangle of mediation [S_1-O-S_2] that is the basic unit for the elaboration of meaning across time. This formulation is similar to Heider's (1946) account of the balance of reciprocity in the cognitive organisation of attitudes between three entities. The links between any two entities in this formulation represent attitudes, which are balanced systemically in their reciprocal relations, or within what may be held to be a social representation. In this formulation, the angle that is the subject's perspective, oriented towards another subject and an object, represents an aspect of the phenomenon, in Sartre's terms, that is subject's point of view. This point of view is constitutive of the subject's attitudes towards the object and the other (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2: Point of view

Bauer and Gaskell argue that a final extension to their model concerns the differentiation of social groups. Over time, they argue, various triangles of mediation

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[8] 'Reality', or noumena, in contrast to phenomena, as proposed by Kant.

emerge and coexist to form a larger social system. This leads to the 'toblerone pack' model, where O is the linking pin of different representations, their common referent being the brute fact. More recently, they have proposed the 'wind-rose' model of social representations that denotes different representations in different communities at different points in time (Bauer & Gaskell, 2008). The surface of each triangle, which is a section through the toblerone pack, denotes the different common senses that prevail in different social groups at the same time, whilst the elongation of the triangles denotes the evolution of common sense in the different groups. The toblerone pack model and the wind rose model provide a conceptualisation of a structural approach to the coming together of a multitude of social representations in relation to a particular social object or event. They also present a formulation of the elaboration of points of view based on group membership and shared group knowledge, that can model 'how I and you see what we see; and how we see what they see' (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3: Inter-relating points of view and social representations

The extension of the toblerone model to a toblerone pack model or wind rose model is required to model divergent points of view pertaining to different social representations (i.e. when the object is the linking pin between two different social representations [S_1-S_2-O, O-S_3-S_4][9], as in Fig. 3) that come into contact in some public sphere. In relations between points of view based on different social representations[10] individuals engage in processes of social re-presentation (Chryssides et al., 2009) on the basis of which they seek to comprehend alien perspectives and make the unfamiliar familiar. Until a new social representation is forged to provide a frame of reference that enables alternative perspectives to be understood in their own legitimacy, they will be incomprehensible from any point of view of another social representation. In such cases, an individual's perspective would impede one to see the potentiality of another perspective in its legitimacy, or, to put it in other words, as a result of the way I see it, I cannot see how it can be seen differently. In the event of an encounter with an alternative perspective that draws on a different rationality, the alternative point of view may appear bizarre or abhorrent, as argued above.

This conceptualisation of social representations is similar to gestalt forms of social psychology and draws on the same epistemological roots. Drawing on Durkheim's notion of collective representations, wherein the collective representation as a social fact is a collective phenomenon that is not directly reducible to its substrate elements, social representations theory adopts a gestalt formulation of reality that is conceptualised as existing across individual minds. This conceptualisation is similar to Asch's social psychology and his formulation of sentiments and attitudes, which similarly draws on sociological roots to account for reality as part of a mutually shared field. It is this collectively enacted reality that individuals draw on to orientate and position themselves in social life. The reconciliation of the social representations programme with Asch's social psychology, as an account of social

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[9] Angles of view in different triangles, such as S_1 & S_3, not only characterise divergent perspectives, they represent perspectives which draw on different meanings of the same object. In this case, the object is not the same to the two subjects in question, the object is a wholly different phenomenon for the two groups S_1-S_2 & S_3-S_4.

[10] such as represented by dashed lines in Figure 3 between S_1 and S_3, or S_2 and S_4

attitudes, opens space for the formulation of how individuals as members of groups may develop points of view in terms of social representations that are available to them by virtue of their membership of that particular group. Such a conception allows for the analysis of the encounters between different points of view based on similar or divergent backgrounds of social representations, and the consequences that may emerge forthwith. As detailed above, this can occur in a public sphere that legitimates different perspectives as well as different systems of knowledge, or in a public sphere in which an established system of knowledge encounters a perspective from outside.

The point-of-view/social representations formulation allows both individual cognitive processes and the social context to play a part in the explanation of human social behaviour. It constitutes a figure/ground gestalt of social psychological theorising that allows a change in perspectives but which retains the totality of understanding without the need to foreground one element at the exclusion of another (Gaskell, 2001). It also provides a societal alternative to the contemporary attitude/public opinion formulation that retains a collective, gestalt, understanding of the social that is: (a) transitive[11] in explaining the individual point of view, (b) not reducible to its elements, and (c) that retains taxonomic priority[12]. Consequently, inquiry into points of view requires sensitivity to both interpersonal characteristics that ensue in interpersonal relations, as well as intrapersonal properties that may characterise mental operations involved in adopting a point of view. The studies undertaken in this inquiry concern both of these social-psychological processes.

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[11] Transitive explanations are those whereby the conceptual components of the explanation of a phenomenon, the theory governing the research, and the hypotheses derived are all located within the same explanation space (Wagner & Hayes, 2005).
[12] Taxonomic priority means that states, processes, products and structures of lower aggregation levels can only be acknowledged and classified from the superordinate level but not the other way around, and that a particular state of the higher level must conform with one particular state of the lower level but not vice-versa. Several states of the super-ordinate level can conform with the same state of the subordinate level (Wagner & Hayes, 2005).

Consequences and Conclusion

So what are the consequences of conceptualising social attitudes in this manner? Asch suggests that it is necessary to describe their main lines of organisation and their degree of structurisation; insofar as attitudes are part of wider systems, they cannot be understood on their own terms alone. It is also necessary, according to Asch, to understand the directions of individuals' outlooks, and the cleavages that may exist between different outlooks. In this way, we can understand an attitude's place and function in the general scheme of social behaviour, how it takes shape and changes in a medium of already functioning views, and how a change in part leads to a change in whole.

The assimilation of Asch's conception of attitude within the social psychology of attitudes as it stands today is largely impossible due to the individualisation and cognitivisation of the concept. This stems largely from discrepant epistemological assumptions between the two. Yet, Asch's approach and the social representations paradigm share an underlying epistemological base, and their assumptions derive largely from common roots (Marková, 1982; Farr, 1996). Reconciling the two, as proposed above, in a formulation of points of view based on a background of social representations, presents social psychology with new challenges and requires of it new explanations, such as: How can we come to understand individuals' outlooks towards the social phenomena they face? How do different individuals adopt different points of view when they orientate themselves towards the same social phenomenon? How is it that certain different points of view may appear sensible whilst others may appear non-sensical? What happens in encounters between divergent points of view, when these draw on the same worldview, and when they do not? What happens in encounters between similar points of view when these draw on similar worldviews, and when they do not? These questions present themselves as new and worthy challenges for the social representations programme on the one hand, and for social cognition on the other hand, as well as for the discipline of social psychology in general. The linking pin between the two concerns

is the concept of point of view, which provides a specification for the location of the individual within a social representation.

The empirical studies undertaken in this thesis have been carried out with the aim of addressing some of these issues. The first study undertaken looks at different points of view towards the role of religion in society, in the wake of a documentary proposing religion as the source of all evil and the subsequent debate that took place around the issue in the British public sphere in 2006. This study characterises different points of view and elucidates the process of social positioning involved in adopting a point of view in a cosmopolitan public marked by a plurality of perspectives legitimated by diverse worldviews. The element of social positioning attached to point of view, as outlined by Clémence (2001), is what demarcates the notion of point of view from attitude, and the empirical analysis of the data in this study makes a contribution towards the discussion of attitudes and their role in social psychological theory.

The second study looks at social positioning in further depth, by means of an analysis of the points of view of Maltese migrants to Britain. Maltese migrants to Britain do not have recourse to a Maltese community in which their perspectives or frames of reference are shared. As a result, they are required to negotiate their outlooks towards social events with others whose perspectives are legitimated by different frames of reference–as their own frames of reference have no currency in the absence of a native community. The extent to which they succeed in doing this determines the degree to which they are able to position themselves as members of the host community, establish ties of solidarity with others in a new social reality, and benefit from the resources available in their host society. The analysis of the data in this study sheds light on the interpersonal aspects of adopting certain points of view.

The third study looks at the intrapersonal properties of points of view, in terms of their latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment, as they relate to different issue domains. It contributes to an understanding of the extent to which different types of point of view are characteristically more or less favourable to other perspectives. The findings of this study contribute towards discussions of social cognition in intercultural encounters. Taken together, the three empirical studies enable a formulation of 'point of view' and an understanding of its social-psychological characteristics. This is considered relevant for one principal reason, that is, it helps in elucidating the dynamics involved in intercultural contact and, insofar as it helps in understanding the processes that foster successful perspective-taking across divergent social representations, it promises to further our knowledge of how to turn intercultural diversity into added value.

Whilst a detailed conceptualisation of 'point of view' has so far eluded social psychological theory, certain scholars have elaborated aspects of the concept in formulating theories of social behaviour. Most of these have employed the term to offer explanations for other phenomena, due to the relational and relative properties that points of view signify. Such scholarship is critical in understanding the nature, as well as the relevance, of points of view in theories of social behaviour. It is also relevant in establishing a blueprint for inquiry into this construct. The following chapter reviews the major contributions that have made recourse to this concept in their examination of human social behaviour.

Chapter 3:
The Point of View
in the
Social Sciences

Introduction

Social psychology, in its various forms, has concerned itself with the explanation of social behaviour. Historically however, the discipline has divided itself along epistemological lines (see Stephan & Stephan, 1990; Farr, 1996; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003), with the result that social psychological explanations of behaviour have been proffered according to different levels of explanation (Farr, 1996; Gaskell, 2001; Wagner & Hayes, 2005). Sociological forms of social psychology have provided top-down descriptions of social behaviour through macro-reductive descriptions of societal phenomena (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), such as discourse and social representations. Such descriptions provide content-rational accounts of social behaviour. They do not, however, provide an explanation that fits deterministic person-level conceptual models of behaviour. Psychological forms of social psychology, on the other hand, have focused on personal-level phenomena, predominantly attitudes, with the aim of studying isolated variables in an effort to gain an understanding of micro-processes that underpin social behaviour. Such explanations are held to provide predictable explanatory accounts of individual social behaviour, but exclude a reference to the situational and societal contingencies in which behaviour occurs. The meso-level situational study of opinions and views has, however, been largely absent from social psychological enquiry. With the exception of Billig's rhetorical analysis and Harré's positioning theory, it has received scant attention and when it did, this was only as a corollary to the development of other concepts and theories, predominantly in the study of attitudes and public opinion.

Interest in attitudes emerged in the 1920s, and throughout the twentieth century became so central that it defined social psychology as the study of attitudes (Allport, 1967). Whilst interest has waxed and waned over the years (McGuire, 1986), the attitude concept has become one of the pillars of the discipline and arguably represents the field's major contribution to society and the social sciences in general. Despite its predominance, the attitude as a concept has proven problematic in

relation to the way it considered the 'social'. Farr (1996) traces the historical understanding of 'attitude', from a sociological one found in Thomas and Znaniecki's (1918-1920) study of the polish peasant, through to what Graumann (1986) terms as 'the individualisation of the social' in the social sciences, and finally to the cognitive interpretation of the Gestaltists' work in the US. What separates them is an epistemological incompatibility between the gestalt 'view of the world' approach and the behaviourist 'consistency of response' approach (Farr, 1994).

As argued in the previous chapter, Asch's conception of attitudes is closer to social representations than it is to what attitude has in our times come to convey. The formulation of attitudes today still presents an elaborate way of understanding individuals' orientations towards other elements in their social environment. Its function in the explanation of *social* behaviour has, however, proven contentious. There are evident difficulties in locating attitudes outside of the wider social and argumentative context. The measurement of public opinion by means of attitude scales presents complications which have been long identified within the attitude literature, as Asch (1952/1987) aptly notes. Similar critiques have been leveled at 'attitude' by Billig (1987, 1991) and by Harré (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999).

This chapter follows on from the previous in presenting an alternative approach to the study of social behaviour than the prevalent attitude framework. This proposal takes the form of inquiring into points of view. This chapter traces the philosophical roots of this construct before reviewing Billig's and Harré's approaches, that have employed the notion of views in their theories. In both, a concern with attitudes is dispelled in favour of a more dynamic, situational explanation of social behaviour that considers not merely individuals' cognitive orientations towards some object, but also the social implications of such inclinations. Inasmuch as individuals' perspectives are idiosyncratic, they are also inherently relational. Alongside these two theories, the study of points of view has also featured extensively in the social judgment literature, which this chapter proceeds to review. Social judgment studies

have looked at perspectives, a concept analogous to points of view, in studying the socio-cognitive processes involved in individuals' judgment decisions of psychophysical and social-psychological stimuli. Whilst the prevailing concern of this research has been largely cognitive, this literature advances the intra-personal understanding of points of view, in contrast to Billig's and Harré's inter-personal concerns. The study of points of view is thus argued to provide a way to overcome some of the challenges that the discipline faces in providing an account of social behaviour across different levels of explanation (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). This is spelled out in more detail towards the end of this chapter.

Philosophical conceptions of the point of view

Whilst social psychology and the social sciences in general, have given points of view scant attention over the years, numerous philosophers have been preoccupied with what it means to hold a view. Mischel (1969) provides a historical overview of this preoccupation in outlining the scientific and philosophical bases of psychology. He argues that the behaviors of concept-using beings, i.e. humans, can be affected by the conceptual distinctions they are able to make. Consequently, given that the objects of psychology are discursive subjects, such concept-relevant behaviours are the phenomena that concern psychologists insofar as they are concerned with distinctively human behaviour. Drawing on Tolman's (1932) distinction between 'molar'–purposive and cognitive–acts, and 'molecular'–physiological acts, a distinction that has underlined a paradigmatic distinction between sociological or societal forms of social psychology and psychological ones, as noted in the previous chapter, Mischel goes on to argue that a clearer understanding of the way our ordinary psychological concepts work is essential.

In explicating what it means to have a view, Mischel traces this understanding to Descartes' conception of the *cogito*, arguing that Cartesian introspection establishes not only the existence of one's mind, but also the fact that minds must also be attributed to others to explain their behaviours. Whilst Descartes himself put in place

the foundations for mechanistic neurological explanations of human behaviour, human behaviours that involve subjects conjuring up discursive statements or acting from their knowledge, Mischel points out, are, according to Descartes, not amenable to physiological explanation. On the other hand, instead of being tied to a particular stimulus, such behaviour varies in ways that are appropriate given the circumstances. Intelligent speech is not elicited by a stimulus but by "the requirements of the situation as understood by the speaker" (Mischel, 1969, p.9). In Mischel's account we thus have a rudimentary formulation of situational points of view.

Mischel goes on to explicate how if an individual were always to reply with the same phrase to a certain stimulus, his behaviour would appear non-intelligible to the extent that one would then focus on a mechanical explanation of that behaviour, as one would a parrot's speech. When human beings converse however, as when individuals act from knowledge, behaviour varies intelligently with changing circumstances in a way appropriate for achieving intentions. Furthermore, according to Descartes, an individual is able to correct mistakes, respond to advice, and guide others into how to go about doing this. Such behaviour, which Asch (1952/1987) later termed the interpenetration of views, as noted in the previous chapter, is incorporeal and can be explained as initiated and directed by the *cogito*. Descartes thus distinguished between physiological and phenomenological aspects of psychological behaviour.

Kant's reaction to Descartes elaborated the notions of phenomena and representations, as argued in Chapter 2. Mischel (1969) notes how, to Kant, thought itself was something that human beings do, not something that occurred to them. Kant moved away from Descartes' psychology of volitions to a constructivist account of experience based on how things appear to us, and the *a priori* rules we have for understanding events. Kant (1798) also distinguished between different standpoints from which actors and observers view behaviour, since the psychological environment is the situation as it appears to the actor. Human

behaviour must therefore be described in terms of consciousness and intention, or "what he takes himself to be doing in this situation" (Mischel, 1969, p. 18). Such a view of behaviour is closely linked to the Kantian view of will. For Kant, human beings have interests that can be stated in rules. Humans act from the conception of these rules and from the considerations of the connections and consequences that acts have with each other in social life. Human action is therefore mediated by meanings. Reason is practical, according to Kant, when it helps the actor decide what should be done in a situation given the nature of the agent. This very same understanding was famously captured by Lewin (1936) in his formula for human behaviour: $B = f(P, E)$, where behaviour is a function of the person and the environment. Willing, Kant explains, is acting on a rule of reason. In Mischel's words "an action is willed when it is done intentionally, with some end in view and some knowledge of what one is doing and why. Since such actions are guided by the agent's conception of rules, they can be explained in terms of those rules and the agent's construal of the situation" (1969, p.18). In other words, in terms of one's point of view. And as Mischel further argues, by looking at points of view of actors we connect human behaviour with a network of concepts and meanings relating to actors who have interests and who follow rules in their dealings with other agents.

Kant's philosophy therefore provides ""pragmatic" explanations of conduct from the "standpoint" of agents" (Mischel, 1969, p. 19). This understanding is keenly captured by Harré and Secord's (1972) reformulation of Lewin's formula in terms of conditions:

If $C_1, C_2, C_3 \ldots C_n$, then B by virtue of PxE

Applying the formula to the experimental situation, Harré and Secord claim that if certain conditions, or social rules, are fulfilled, then behaviour follows by virtue of the parameters of the person and the experimenter, which may be considered as extraneous, or environmental, to the person. This is highly consequential for social psychology as,

"in line with Kant's suggestion that agents and spectators see behavior from different standpoints, one can suggest that there may be different points of view from which events can be legitimately viewed, depending on the interest we bring to them. A Kantian approach would thus suggest that there is no need to insist that only one point of view can reveal what we "really" see, that only one class of descriptions can constitute the basic bricks from which all knowledge is built. It would suggest that our world contains actions as well as movements, and that seeing actions involves no more, and no less, interpretation than seeing movements. What we see, whether actions or movements, will then depend on the standpoint from which we view the behavior, the context that is relevant in light of our interest" (Mischel, 1969, p. 31).

This explicit appraisal of what it means to have a point of view in social behaviour is highly consequential. It means to say that behaviour takes place in response to certain conditions by virtue of how we see things, that is, our individual point of view (PoV), which is itself a function of characteristics that are intrinsic to the person as well environment contingencies. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to reformulate Lewin's and Harré and Secord's equation taking into account the implications of having a point of view on human behaviour, given certain conditions. The equation can be reformulated thus:

If C_1, C_2, C_3 … C_n, then B by virtue of PoV, where PoV $= f(P, E)$

This characterisation of points of view is supported in physiological research, such as demonstrated by Murphy (1947), who provides evidence that we do not really see with our eyes but also with our midbrain, with our visual and associative centres, and with our systems of incipient behaviour. Segall, Campbell and Herskovits (1966), provide further evidence that people originating from different environments and having different life histories *see* differently. It is clear that, as Mischel notes,

the behaviour of higher organisms is not a response to stimuli, but to the meaning that situations have for perceivers. Human beings "act, for the most part, not under the compulsion of forces or even threats, but because they *see* compelling reasons for doing something in a certain social or political situation" (Mischel, 1969, p. 264).

The point of view as explanans

The philosophical conception of point of view outlined by Mischel, as a relational term describing the meaningful outlook of an individual towards some social object, has been employed in a number of scientific theories and has served in describing other physical, social, and psychological processes and phenomena. In the sciences, point of view has served as *explanans* for what is arguably the cornerstone of modern science, that is, Einstein's (1916) theory of relativity. Specifically, Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (STR) rests fully on the conception of different positions that exist in physical space, and that the physical reality of that space can only ever be described relative to a point of view. Einstein's STR rests on the relational and relative characteristics of points of view, as outlined by Mischel. In his opening example, Einstein discusses whether a stone that is dropped by a passenger on a train carriage falls in a straight line, as appears to the passenger, or in a parabolic curve, as appears to a stationary observer. Einstein's theory shuns space and replaces it with "motion relative to a practically rigid body of reference" (1916/2001, p. 11), which practically rigid body of reference occupies a position and on the basis of which holds a point of view relative to the object in motion. Einstein goes on to extend these positions to 'systems of co-ordinates', concluding that:

> The stone traverses a straight line relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the carriage, but relative to a system of co-ordinates rigidly attached to the ground (embankment) it describes a parabola. With the aid of this example it is clearly seen that there is no such thing as an independently existing trajectory (li. "path-curve"), but only a trajectory relative to a particular body of reference (p. 11).

In other words, a description of physical reality is always relative to whose point of view is being adopted. In his STR, Einstein goes on to establish that simultaneity and distance are equally relative to some body of reference or system of coordinates. Whilst the theoretical details of Einstein's STR are clearly beyond the scope of the present thesis, it is worth noting that Einstein's great contribution to science lay in conceptualising how divergent points of view determine physical reality. The present thesis retains the relative and relational philosophical characterisation of points of view and purports that, in like fashion to Einstein's STR, the nature of social reality also depends on whose point of view is being considered. 'Point of view' characterises how an object is perceived relative to another's position and the object. Furthermore, the regulation of legitimacy of another's reality is inherent in one's own perspective, as the first empirical study will demonstrate. That is, to use Einstein's example as an analogy, whether it is acceptable to claim that a stone falls in a parabola depends on the nature of the system of coordinates that exists relative to the passenger on the carriage. If social representations theory, as Bauer and Gaskell (2008) argue, is equivalent to a general theory of relativity for social psychology, then this thesis purports that the present social psychological conception of point of view is it's ancillary special theory of relativity.

Other than Einstein's STR, point of view has been utilised in other studies of spatial coordination that have concerned themselves with psychological processes. Piaget and Inhelder (1948) studied children's conceptions of space and their coordination of spatial perspectives. In their Three Mountain Task experiment, children faced a display model of three mountains. A researcher then placed a doll at different viewpoints in relation to the display. The child was then required to select a picture from a set that represented the mountain display from the doll's point of view. Piaget and Inhelder showed that children around age four did not distinguish between their own point of view and that of the doll, but gave as a response their own point of view for that of the doll. This was interpreted as evidence of egocentrism, indicative of the pre-operational stage, that limited children's perspective-taking capacities.

Perspective-taking and the emergence of self as distinct from others, a theory developed by George Herbert Mead, were a product of maturation and a characteristic of logical thinking.

In Mead's social psychology, the self emerges by virtue of the human capacity to adopt the perspective of the other, that is, as a function of the human ability to hold a point of view towards some object and simultaneously comprehend that different points of view are held by others that bear on the very same object. At the point of this realisation, according to Mead, the self is able to emerge as an object. Adopting the perspective of the other comes with the realisation that, as other is an object to the self, so the self is an object to other. At the point of adopting the perspective of the other towards self, the self becomes an object unto itself. This explanation is the cornerstone of Mead's theory of the self. In Arendt's (1958) work, individuals learn by engaging in this process of taking the perspective of the other and extending themselves beyond the personal sphere. Again, Arendt associates such processes with a spatial dimension, what she refers to as 'the spatial quality of politics'. One cannot be a political agent without participating in a public sphere. And this participation involves nothing other than relating to others on the basis of one's own point of view with regards to that of others. The public sphere, in Arendt's conception, is a plurality of agents who, from their perspective, judge the quality of what is enacted. Furthermore, this plurality involves the fact that human beings are both equal and distinct. Agents are sufficiently alike as humans to be able to understand one another, but they are also distinct due to the fact that every one of them occupies a distinct position in public space based on the uniqueness of their biography and their idiosyncratic point of view.

More recently, evolutionary psychology has also inquired into individuals' understandings of others' perspectives. Theory of Mind (ToM) describes the maturational human capacity for inferring the mental states of others that may be different from one's own (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Call & Tomasello, 1998). On the basis of the reciprocal nature of social interaction, such as in joint attention tasks, human beings are able to assume that other human beings have minds like themselves, and are able to attribute mental states, including intentions, to others. ToM is a theory for human beings inasmuch as the mind or mental states of others are not amenable to observation and can only be assumed by analogy with one's own mental activity. ToM enables human beings to infer that others may have intentions consonant with their own, personal point of view, and they are thus able to regulate their own behaviour with these inferred intentions. Tomasello (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005) argues that shared intentionality, that is fundamentally based on understanding the point of view of another and incorporating it into one's own mental schema, is what underlies differences between human cognition from that of other primates. Such social-psychological processes enable communication and cooperation between humans and have maximized fitness and survival in the human species.

In all of the above theories, that have greatly advanced scholarship in various domains of scientific and human inquiry, the point of view concept is employed as *explanans* of some other concern–physics in Einstein's STR, logical reasoning in Piaget's theory of cognitive maturation, the self in Mead's social psychology, the public sphere in Arendt's sociology, and survival of the species and maximization of fitness in evolutionary theory. In all these theories, the utility of 'point of view' stems from its philosophical characterisation as relational and relative. Social psychology has been handicapped in its mainstream focus on attitudes, due to overlooking both of these characteristics. The social psychologies of Billig and Harré reject attitude as a satisfactory account of social behaviour. Both employ 'point of view' in their effort to account for the social character of human behaviour as it occurs in real life, amidst debate and controversy over whose point of view

presents the rightful version of reality in the public sphere. What marks these theories from the preceding ones, along with theories of social judgment, is that in these theories point of view is treated not as *explanans*, but as *explanandum*, i.e. it is treated as an object of inquiry in its own right (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Whilst the explicit focus in all three theories resides in other aspects of social behaviour– discursive products or articulations in Billig's and Harré's theories, and judgment decisions in social judgment studies–these can, to some extent, be considered as manifestations or products of having a point of view. The social psychologies of Billig and Harré warrant a focus on points of view towards an understanding of interpersonal relations. Social judgment theories warrant the study of points of view towards an understanding of social cognition. These three approaches thus open up inquiry into points of view. They have, in this way, informed the three empirical studies undertaken in this project, as detailed hereunder.

Argumentation and rhetoric

Billig (1987, 1991) takes issue with the contemporary understanding of attitudes, arguing that an attitude is both something personal that belongs to an individual, as well as a position in a wider controversy. Billig argues that: "In indicating our attitudes, we do more than express our personal beliefs. We also locate ourselves within a public controversy" (1991, p. 43). When people hold attitudes on topics such as political, moral, religious, commercial, or other such issues, attitudes held "refers to a stance on a matter of public debate and disagreement" (1987, p. 177). The social context of attitudes is thus a context of controversy. Billig further argues that in this light, attitudes need to be understood as more than mere responses for or against a stimulus; attitudes are stances on matters of debate, the possession of which indicates agreement or disagreement with some issue, as well as an implicit willingness to enter into controversy. As a result, we can expect the holders of attitudes "to be able to justify their stances, to criticize competing views, and generally to argue about the issues" (1987, p. 177). These criticisms and justifications should not be considered as extraneous matters to attitudes. Billig calls

for their consideration as an integral part of attitude research, "for, without the argumentative context, there would be no attitudes" (1987, p. 178). This treatment of the argumentative context is relevant to the understanding of the gap between attitudes and behaviour. Rather than being treated as a methodological artifact, the inconsistency between attitudes and behaviour should, according to Billig, be problematised argumentatively–those facing criticism of inconsistency can be expected to be able to give a good account of it. Additionally, people cannot be expected to hold a single attitude towards a particular stimulus; people will more likely draw on "complex, and frequently contradictory patterns of talk; they will use different 'interpretative repertoires' to accomplish different functions" (1987, p. 15).

Billig (1987) argues that the persuasion paradigm in attitude research distinguishes between the content and form of communication and focuses exclusively on form to find ways of delivering poor arguments persuasively. Billig, however, cautions against such an approach. Looking at content as a characteristic which arouses emotions does not suffice. According to Billig, the novelty of each moment and each situation produce uncertainty in general rules: "we can never capture the infinite variety of human affairs in a finite system of psychological laws. At any moment the finite laws are likely to be embarrassed by unforeseen and unforeseeable events" (p. 62). For Billig, "[t]he one constant factor to emerge from the research into persuasion is that there is little constancy and that laws like "Sx produces Ry" stand in need of qualification" (p. 75). That qualification stems from specific content. Content cannot be ignored because "it affects form in unpredictable ways, so that a particular message may produce unforeseen effects" (p. 74). When the content of messages varies, different responses are produced. Billig thus argues that the study of persuasion and attitude change cannot disregard content that is rooted in the wider context of controversy. The way by which this can be studied is through what Billig terms rhetorical analysis.

Billig claims that modern democracies are places of opinion, where citizens are expected to hold views on all manners of issues. He argues that in modern

democracies there is a culturally shared expectancy of multisubjectivity, that is, that everyone will have views of some sort or other. Ordinary life is "filled with the sound of chatter, as people philosophize and argue, comparing critically 'opinion' with 'opinion'" (1991, p. 11). The holding of views, Billig argues, is a form of thinking as well as being a product of thinking. According to Billig, "in holding views people are thinking" (1991, p.191). In arguing, members are jointly engaged in a process of thinking about the topic in question. Billig (1987, 1991) argues that psychologists studying cognitive processes have a tendency to view thinking in terms of logic, rather than as a form of rhetorical argumentation, focusing on problems to which only one solution exists. Everyday thinking, according to Billig, does not always admit a single, successful, problem-solving, logical solution.

Billig's social psychology thus shares the goal of studying the thinking society with social representations theory. For Billig, the link between an orator and an audience is some form of a common content:

> "If orators are identifying with their audiences, then they are emphasising communal links, foremost amongst which are shared values or beliefs. The concept of common-sense (*sensus communis*) might be a helpful one for discussing this communal content. The orator, in identifying with the beliefs of the audience, will be treating the audience as a community bound together by shared opinions…The audience, therefore, will be presumed to possess a common-sense, agreeing that certain positions are commonly sensible" (1987, p. 196).

Billig (1987, 1991) notes, however, that there is a paradox in common-sense, which arises when "we have disputes in which both parties are appealing to the same audience, and therefore are identifying with the same common-sense […] The paradox is that the two oratorical sides, although appealing to the same common-sense, will be arguing in diametrically opposed ways. In this way, the same common-sense will be the location of arguments which contradict each other" (1987,

p. 203). Billig goes on to resolve the paradox by accepting what in social representations literature has been termed as the 'cognitive polyphasia' of knowledge (Moscovici, 1976; Jovchelovitch 2007). Billig argues that "The paradox is resolved if we assume that the common-sense of an audience is not unitary, but is composed of contrary aspects…Both logoi and anti-logoi are presumed to co-exist within the common-sense" (1987, p. 203). In this way "rhetorical disagreements are often between two points of view, which are both, to a certain extent, reasonable" (Billig, 1987, p. 204). This is similar to Asch's (1952) arguments regarding divergent perspectives. Asch argues that whilst individuals may realise that the points of view they hold may be idiosyncratic, they are nevertheless able to draw on the perspectives of others to check for confirmation of their relations. The shared representational field permits different perspectives to exist and remain intelligible to each other to the extent that, according to Asch, these are able to interpenetrate and guide human conduct by virtue of the capacity to take the perspective of the other, a virtue that has been traced back to Mead.

According to Billig, "As one articulates a point of view, one can be said to be developing an argument" (p. 44). The study of argumentation is therefore crucial in developing a social psychology of points of view, as "opinions, or individual chains of reasoning, clash in the context of social argument" (p. 44). The argument is an instance where the individual is directly implicated in the social, and vice-versa. According to Billig, there are two ways in which the context of argumentation is social. Firstly, "the topics of argumentation can be seen as social issues, whereby arguments possess a social context"; secondly, the argumentative context "might include the opinions which the speaker is attempting to justify to the audience, but it also comprises the counter-opinions which are implicitly or explicitly being criticized" (1987, p. 87). Both of these senses by which the argument is social are pertinent to a conceptualisation of 'point of view'. A *point*-of-view can only be a 'point of view' if another '*point*-of-view' is possible; a point of view can exist only relative to another *point*. Without an alternative position, a particular point of view cannot acquire location; it cannot make manifest its particular *angle* of view.

Therefore, a study of a point of view is always essentially social. It requires locating the particular point of view amongst other points. Moreover, points of view may change, either by adopting new points, that is, by looking at the same issue from a different angle, or as a function of a change in the underlying structure of knowledge. As Billig (1987) argues, the rhetorical context of arguments is not fixed; should the context change, the expression itself may be altered. Likewise, should the wider controversy change, arguments might be expected to change to cope with argumentative developments.

Positioning Theory

Harré & Secord's (1972) commanding volume on the explanation of social behaviour provides the rudimentary framework for the development of positioning theory. Harré and Secord's concern is the scientific study of psychological states, conditions, and powers that are attributed to individuals in the course of social behaviour. From the outset, the authors distinguish their programme from positivist methodology that is concerned with the study of variables, characteristic of attitude research. Harré and Secord go on to explicitly critique attitude studies in social psychology, arguing that such studies adopt a limited focus of human operations as represented by attitude scales, without due consideration of the logical properties underpinning such operations. The authors argue that evaluation, the operation of study in attitude research, plays a role in human life other than ranking objects in an ordered fashion. It is rather used for commending things and courses of action to other people. For this reason, Harré and Secord claim that the attitude concept in itself "is almost useless" (1972, p. 309) in the study of social behaviour as in attempts for attitude change. Rather, it is in the structural "meshing and failing to mesh of background beliefs" (1972, p. 308) that the conceptual tools for understanding social behaviour lie. These evaluative structures, according to the authors, only show up when challenged and when justifications have to be provided for them. On the basis of this premise the authors put forth their proposal for studying accounts.

Harré and Secord (1972) claim that through the study of the feelings, plans, intentions, and beliefs that transpire in accounts, the meanings of social behaviour and the rules underlying it can be discovered. The authors subscribe to a self-directed model of social behaviour that conforms to the meaning ascribed to the situation by social actors. At the heart of the explanation of social behaviour, the authors contend, is the structure of meanings underlying it that allows "for explanation of behaviour in terms of the actor's point of view" (p. 10). Such study has both a descriptive and an explanatory function. According to Harré and Secord "The former is related to the way in which the episode is described from the social point of view, and the latter as to how participation in it is accounted for from an individual point of view" (p. 14). Social behaviour is thus to be conceived of as "actions mediated by meanings, not responses caused by stimuli" (p. 29).

In outlining their theory of social behaviour, Harré and Secord (1972) posit what they term the 'Anthropomorphic Model of Man' that for scientific purposes aims to treat people as if they were human beings. They argue that people alone have the meta-cognitive powers of self-monitoring and self-commentary. These powers depend upon the commentator having a standpoint outside the field of commentary, and, one may add, a realisation of such a standpoint relative to other standpoints. The authors refer to the metaphor of the eye and the eye's visual field to explain such perspective. No other theory in the social sciences comes closer to articulating 'point of view'.

Harré and Secord go on to argue that human beings adopt a point of view in social space that enables them to act upon things that are perceived as different from themselves but nevertheless as part of the same system of reference. According to the authors, human beings' meta-cognitive powers enable them not only to monitor their own performances but also to become aware of their own monitoring and to be able to provide accounts of their performances as well. In other words, human beings are able to have a point of view and describe it in a way that justifies their

position. Drawing on Hampshire, Harré and Secord claim that a necessary condition for considering an entity as typically human is that "it has a point of view, that is occupies a place and knows that it does so, so that it understands itself as viewing the world from that place and acting upon things from there" (1972, p. 96).

Harré and Secord (1972) go on to explain that occupancy of place is a necessary condition for agency due to the fact that agency requires an ability to act upon things and things have a place. The actions of an agent thus take place at certain places. Furthermore, having a place is also a necessary condition for perception, as this requires the agent to note that the object is different from oneself, such that it occupies a place different from that occupied by the perceiver. Finally, to refer to something also means to identify the place where it is positioned relative to the speaker. This requires the speaker to occupy a position within the same system of space as the referent. It is this positioning that grants an actor a point of view in social space. This conception does for social reality what Einstein's STR does for physical reality.

Harré and Secord's description of social positioning is synonymous with Asch's (1952) description of the representational field (see Chapter 2). According to Asch, the understanding that we are positioned with others in a common representational field enables us to navigate the world with others. It also enables humans to engage in the social check and correct errors in their own thinking. Similarly, Harré and Secord (1972) argue that we are able to change the meanings of situations for others, as happens when we try to persuade others to attend to different aspects of the situation. We try to change their point of view, to persuade them to see things differently. By implication, this also means that it is possible for others to counter-persuade us and change our own point of view. This is also similar to Billig's claims on the content of persuasive communications, as well as on the dilemmatic nature of common-sense. Harré and Secord go on to argue that in order to discover meaning relations that exist between social agents, accounts must be collected and studied. These accounts provide an insight into conventions and rules that serve to determine

which actions are required in the performance of an act. The identification of rules in episodes in the form of act-action structures becomes Harré and Secord's primary focus. Whilst their concern is with the identification of role-rule models, as they themselves argue, the crucial aspect of the study of social behaviour is the explanation of it "from the point of view of the actors themselves" (1972, p. 152).

Harré's further developments of his theory of social behaviour have culminated in the postulation of positioning theory (Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003; Moghaddam, Harré & Lee, 2007). Positioning theory retains a concern with declarations in which the social actor provides an account of things as they appear from his or her own point of view. Points of view refer both to the speaker's locus in time and space as well as his or her character. In positioning theory, the social realm is held to consist of three processes: conversations, institutional practices, and societal rhetorics. Positioning is a discursive practice undertaken by several individuals at a time. In the social realm, a position is a reference to the person's moral and personal attributes as a speaker. An individual can undertake several varieties of positioning. Furthermore, there exist variations in positioning across individuals. Individuals differ in their capacity to use positioning techniques in positioning themselves and others. They also differ in their willingness to position and to be positioned, and in their power to achieve positioning acts. Consequently, the matter of individual differences emerges as a primary concern, as the matter of variations in the extent to which different ways of positioning are related for, or in, an individual (Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999). Once an individual takes up a particular position, he or she "inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, storylines and concepts which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned" (Davies & Harré, 1999). Positioning analysis is the analysis of such discursive practices.

In Harré's theories, an account may be considered as the discursive product of an individual's articulation of his or her own point of view. This discursive product is

the object of study in positioning theory. However, one could further argue that an individual has a point of view even when this has not been expressed in an account, just like individuals are held to have attitudes even when these have not been expressed in responding to an attitude scale. For this reason, it is worth noting that the phenomenon under consideration in Harré's theories is none other than the point of view of subjects. Harré and Secord's (1972), as well as positioning theory's, proposal to inquire into accounts is a, more or less, indirect proposal to study points of view. This thesis aims at conceptualising this phenomenon more explicitly in terms of its social-psychological characteristics.

If we are to understand variation and individual differences in positioning, it is necessary to understand variation and individual differences in points of view themselves. This requires the study of both interpersonal characteristics as well as intrapersonal properties of points of view alongside the study of discursive products. It is with this undertaking that this thesis is concerned. Conceptualising the point of view proper may open up new lines of inquiry that extend Harré's proposal beyond the product of the individual's psychological operations in the social realm, into the psychological constitution of the social individual. As Billig argues, "As ordinary people claim to 'hold views' […] so social psychologists should study what is going on when such claims are made in ordinary life. There is thus a need to investigate what it means to 'hold a view'" (1991, p. 169). One could argue that this extends beyond what holding a view achieves in the social realm by way of positioning. Theories of social judgment have extended such inquiry in a different line to that adopted by both Billig and Harré. Social judgment theories have inquired into the intrapersonal properties of points of view, to which this chapter turns next.

Social Judgment

A number of theories in the social judgment research programme have grappled with the nature of individuals' orientations to stimuli and have gone a step further to not only conceptualise, but also operationalise points of view. The large part of this research has concentrated on the judgment of psychophysical stimuli. Even so, an individual's perspective has been demonstrated to play an explanatory role in social judgment. As Upshaw (1965) argues, the *width* of a judge's perspective, that is, whether one's perspective is broad or narrow, has significant implications on the consequent social judgment of stimuli. Upshaw's variable series model contends that judges with a broad view make less fine distinctions among elements than judges with a narrow view. The issue of the breadth of perspectives was noted by Asch (1952) in his postulation of point of view. Asch argued that a formulation of points of view would legitimate inquiry into how wide or narrow these may be and what their centre of gravity might be. Pettigrew (1959) sought to measure the category width of subjects' judgments through his C-W (category-width) scale. He revealed that subjects tended to be consistently broad, medium, or narrow in their category widths.

Pettigrew's scale, which was devised for psychophysical judgments, was adapted to social stimuli by Detweiler (1980) and applied to intercultural situations. According to Detweiler, intercultural interaction is a situation in which others' behaviour may be categorised in an inaccurate or inappropriate way due to unfamiliar cues, where expected things may not happen and unexpected things might. This leads to obvious difficulties in intercultural relations. Since individuals vary in their category width, their categorisation (which comes as a function of the category width of their perspectives) has direct implications on the nature of their social behaviour. According to Detweiler, narrow categorisers categorise others' behaviour more narrowly by using their own cultural values as a standard for judging that behaviour. Such individuals are unaccepting of the idea that behaviour can have different meanings and consequently serve to make negative inferences about the other. In

contrast, broad categorisers categorise behaviour in a more general way and are more accepting that behaviour may have multiple meanings. As a result, negative inferences are less common amongst these individuals.

The application of social judgment to social psychological stimuli has its origin in Rokeach's (1951a, 1951b) studies of narrow-mindedness. Rokeach's starting point is also a critique of 'attitude'. He observes that both liberals and left-wingers can be equally militant and dogmatic in their ideological outlook, and that there is no reason to believe that it is easier to change the attitudes of one than it is to change the attitudes of the other. Rokeach (1951a) argues that the intensity and resistance of attitude change is a function of the underlying cognitive structure that he describes as narrow-mindedness. Rokeach's approach is fashioned on the cognitive maps proposed by Tolman (1948) that like Pettigrew's findings vary from narrow to broad. Rokeach draws further on Krech's (1949) dynamic systems model that proposes that dynamic systems differ from each other with respect to the degree and kind of interaction they demonstrate with other dynamic systems. This characteristic, according to Krech, describes their manner of 'Isolation'. And as Pettigrew subsequently claimed, Rokeach (1951b) argues that three degrees of cognitive organisation are discernible in perspectives, ranging from comprehensive, to isolated, to narrow. A subject's organisation was comprehensive if it was broad and integrated in relating a series of concepts. If a subject's cognitive map was broken down into substructures, this was deemed as isolated. On the other hand, narrow organisers were unable to relate the entire series of concepts. Whilst, according to Rokeach, these cognitive organisations seemed to order themselves along a continuum, he argues that differences between cognitive organisations were in themselves qualitative ones.

A more recent development in social psychological theory that provides a framework for the study of closed mindedness is that developed by Kruglanski (1989; 2004). Kruglanski's approach is based on a lay epistemic framework of knowledge, where different cultures are held to subscribe to different belief systems

that validate different perspectives. This, at face value, is not dissimilar to Billig's claims as well as the present conception of points of view. According to Kruglanski (1989), the plurality of knowledge means that what different persons 'know for a fact' can be widely diverse. Knowledge is considered to consist of propositions in which individuals have confidence. Knowledge is developed through the generation of hypotheses about some new event, and through the testing of these hypotheses against some logical framework. The logical element of knowledge determines whether beliefs are proven or disproven on the basis of *relevant* evidence.

What is relevant for a particular social milieu is a matter of social construction. Nevertheless, according to Kruglanski, the plurality of systems of knowledge also means that the capacity for mental disjunction and cognitive inconsistency are high and potentially overwhelming for the individual, who faced with such diversity, is required to process an infinite amount of alternative perspectives. This is where the issue of open and closed mindedness becomes relevant. According to Kruglanski (2004), individuals are motivated by a need for closure that enables them to truncate information processing and fix their perspectives. This process, which is held to be at the interface between cognitive and social processes, may prompt individuals to seize on some notion that provides closure, or freeze upon an extant closure. The social, in Kruglanski's theory[13], is relevant in two-ways, that is, either in view of the fact that others are often targets of the individual's beliefs, or in view of the fact that they may be sources of information. Kruglanski thus operationalises closed mindedness in terms of the cognitive, individual need for closure. Kruglanski himself admits that this operationalisation may not be entirely satisfactory, claiming that "the road leading from need for closure to close mindedness isn't a straightforward one" (2004, p. 17). Moreover, as Kruglanski notes, the crux of the matter in closed mindedness "is the failure to consider rival alternatives to one's initial conception" (2004, p. 164). Whilst this principle is intrinsic to Rokeach's formulation of closed mindedness, in Kruglanski's need for closure this mutuality

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[13] The conceptualisation of the social here is typical of the cognitivisation of the social in social psychology and is the same conception that has cognitivised and individualised the attitude, making it unsuitable for the study of societal phenomena (see Farr, 1996).

has been relegated. Further studies on empathic concern have demonstrated that the effects of need for closure are themselves mediated by perspective-taking (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Crucially, the social judgment studies demonstrate that perspectives are not merely individual orientations, like attitudes, but that they vary in their relations with another perspective. Points of view can, to different degrees, accommodate an alternative perspective in their own judgment. Moreover, such degree of accommodation is a function of the underlying cognitive structure that results, moreover, in manifest outcomes in social behaviour. Sherif's theory of social judgment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968) postulates that this is a function of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment inherent in individuals' points of view. And whilst the former theories of argumentation and positioning outlined by Billig and Harré and the social judgment theories are seemingly at odds in various respects, these approaches are reconcilable in their treatment of points of view as *explanandum*.

The missing link

It should be clear by now that the points of view individuals demonstrate have pragmatic consequences on social behaviour. Whilst the social is necessarily implicated in human behaviour, the explanation of individual behaviour is necessarily located at the level of the person. This is also saying that, as Moscovici (1984) and Wagner (1993) have noted, knowledge of the social realm in itself does not suffice for an explanation of social behaviour. Moscovici (1984) explicates how social representations are not causal stimuli for individual behaviour. He reformulates the behavioural conceit as one in which social representations determine the character of the stimulus and the response it elicits, as well as determining which is which in a particular situation. Wagner (1993) explicates this further by arguing that social representations provide illustrative or descriptive accounts of individual behaviour, in contrast to explanatory ones. According to

Wagner, knowing that an individual shares a specific representation simply means that he or she is inclined to act in a particular way when in a given situation, as implied by the representation. A knowledge of social representations tells us about what behaviour may be expected as rational behaviour for a particular group of people in a given situation. This is captured in Wagner's equation: $\{P(R: S{\rightarrow}B)\}$, where P is a group of people holding representation R that commends behaviour B as epi-rational in situation S. However, this also means that social representations cannot be considered as independent variables causing particular behaviours as dependent variables.

The above account also means that social representations theory is unable to displace micro-level theories of social behaviour that aim at direct causal explanation, such as 'attitude'. This reason lies behind the chequered explanations that have been advanced for the relations between attitudes and social representations. Attitudes, unlike social representations, have been utilised extensively, and more or less successfully, as independent variables in an effort to determine and predict behaviour as dependent variable. The problem with this approach, as Billig (1987, 1991) and Harré and Secord (1972) have noted, is that at this level of explanation, there is no consideration of the particular situation. Attitudes provide the individual with an evaluation that may predispose action, but the concept fails to explain when and why individuals act according to their attitudes and, conversely, when they do not. LaPiere's (1934) epic study has made this all too clear and time has not detracted the significance of his findings. The reasons for such decisions to act are, as has been noted, situational.

The cause of behaviour, therefore, as Moscovici (1984) argues, lies with the individual's interpretation of things in a particular situation, in which individual perception is mediated by a social representation that describes how things are and prescribes what behaviours ought to follow. Whether the individual follows through, or otherwise, is a function of the individual as well as extraneous influences in his or her environment. The two come together in an individual's point of view: his or her

actual perception of the event in a given situation and given the individual's own inclinations and environmental factors, as per the reformulation of Lewin's behavioural equation above. Behaviour follows by virtue of the point of view, in response to certain conditions or events that occur to the individual. Causality, as outlined in Moscovici's model, is still located in the interplay between a stimulus and a response, but resides at the situational level of explanation.

At this point, we are therefore in a position to outline a nested model of social behaviour that includes attitudes, points of view, and social representations in the explanation of social behaviour (Figure 4). The model is nested due to the fact that underlying concepts are necessarily implicated in overarching ones, that is, attitudes are necessarily implicated in points of view–in terms of the person's characteristics; and points of view are necessarily implicated in social representations–in terms of social positioning. Neither social representations theory nor attitudes on their own provide a situational explanation of social behaviour. Social representations theory provides a societal-level explanation. It describes societal prescriptions that bear on the way people interpret events and what they will hold to be legitimate courses of action. Attitudes, on the other hand, provide a personal-level explanation of social behaviour, outlining the individual's evaluation of an attitude object that bears on their inclination to act in a particular way. Whether, in a given situation, individuals do act in a given way depends on their point of view at the time and in the situation, given the conditions that they find themselves in, as per the behavioural equation.

Fig. 4: A nested model of social behaviour: social representations, points of view, and attitudes (adapted from Bauer & Gaskell, 1999 and based on Heider's (1946) balance of reciprocity in the cognitive organization of attitudes).

To illustrate, the culture of honour prevailing in certain societies provides a suitable hypothetical example. Whether two individuals to whom the same dishonourable event happens, for example a daughter falling pregnant out of wedlock, behave in the same way may be due to different attitudes they may hold towards the attitude object. For example, one might evaluate the event more harshly than another. Such would be a characteristic explanation of behaviour as a function of attitudes. Yet two individuals may hold the same evaluation of the attitude object that is dishonourable but still act differently. They may be equally appalled by the event, and equally inclined to punish whom they regard as the perpetrator. In such a situation therefore, the attitude variable is constant. Their actual behaviours may differ due to the fact that different societal prescriptions bear on the interpretation of the event and the legitimacy of the ensuing behaviour. In one group, for instance, it might be reasonable to attack the perpetrator whereas in another it may only be reasonable to request maintenance payments. Such would be a characteristic social representations explanation. However, behaviour differs even more widely than this. Two individuals, with similar attitudes and in the same social setting, may nevertheless opt to do very different things when faced with the same event. One might opt to

save face and lose the offspring, whereas another may opt to lose face and save the offspring. This is because whilst the experience and interpretation of the event may be similar to both, the way the two *see* the event may differ. One might adopt a certain point of view in relation to the event and the community, whereas another might take a different standpoint. If we are to truly understand social behaviour, then aside from knowing what social representations prescribe and what evaluations people may hold, we also need a situational-level explanation that accounts for the individual's situational reality given certain events. The concept of point of view, as formulated in this thesis, provides such an explanation.

Given such myriad explanations of social behaviour, it seems wise to heed Durkheim's advice that "Our first task then must be to determine the order of facts to be studied" (Durkheim, 1952/1987, p. xl). With reference to Wagner & Hayes' (2005) levels of explanation in social psychology, it is clear that the present conceptualisation of points of view provides the missing link at the situational level of explanation (see Figure 1). Attitudes are useful in understanding social behaviour at the intra-personal level; an attitude is a personal characteristic that predisposes an individual to relate in a certain way. Social representations are useful in understanding social behaviour at the societal level; a social representation is a description, or knowledge-content, that prescribes social behaviour according to the precepts of the representation. Yet between the two is a gap, and point of view fills this gap by linking the intra-personal to the societal. By also considering points of view in explanations of social behaviour, we are able to explain how an individual with a particular predisposition relates in a certain way in given social circumstances.

'Point of view' thus provides the missing link at the situational level of explanation (see Fig. 1). At each level, however, one needs to pay due consideration to characteristics particular to that level as well as adopt an epistemology suitable to that same level. The manner by which we can come to understand attitudes may be different from the manner by which we can come to understand points of view,

which might be different in turn from the manner by which we can come to understand social representations. The analogy with water is apt in this case. Water may be understood at the molecular level: H_2O. That understanding however is different from the way we understand masses of water, such as seas and oceans. Neither however is sufficient for the understanding of tides and currents. Whilst the latter are implicated in the existence of oceans, and whilst physically the molecular structure is none other than H_2O, at each level a different understanding of water is required despite the fact that the phenomenon in its materiality remains the same.

Consequences and conclusion

This chapter, along with the previous one, has articulated a social psychological formulation of point of view as a situational-level concept that can provide an account of social behaviour that neither attitudes as a personal-level attribute nor the social representation as a societal-level structure can. This conceptualisation is based on the social psychological theories of positioning and argumentation analysis. These two have described the products and processes of points of view, as accounts and argumentation respectively. Neither has, however, identified and conceptualised the social-psychological phenomenon implicated in the production of accounts and argumentation. This thesis proclaims that this phenomenon is the point of view. 'Point of view' provides an explanation of social behaviour in which the individual's own inclinations are necessarily implicated, and which is also influenced by prevailing societal prescriptions. It is in conceptualising and studying points of view, alongside both attitudes and social representations, that a holistic account of human behaviour can be developed and that can describe social behaviour in its manifold complexity as it takes place *in situ*. In this way, 'point of view' provides a social-psychological account of human behaviour that alongside attitudes and social representations provides a true 'cognition and culture' perspective on human behaviour.

The present inquiry follows in the footsteps of the theories outlined above that have theorised and studied points of view as *explanandum* (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Whilst none of these three theories may have provided an explicit formulation of the point of view as a social psychological phenomenon, the social psychologies of Billig and Harré have looked at the discursive manifestation of points of view in argumentation and positioning, and have thus opened inquiry into the interpersonal characteristics of holding some perspective and relating to others on the basis of it. Social judgment theories have looked at the manifestation of points of view in judgment decisions, and have further opened inquiry into the socio-cognitive structure of perspectives as these bear on judgment decisions in the face of new alternatives. The present inquiry explicitly concerns itself with the point of view phenomenon, rather than the products and processes that may accrue from having a point of view. It considers the various aspects of points of view that have been studied in the social psychological literature and that have been drawn together in this chapter. This present thesis thus undertakes a series of empirical studies to inquire into points of view's (a) variable differences, (b) their interpersonal characteristics, and (c) their intrapersonal properties.

The first empirical study in this series adopts a method of argumentation in an effort to identify instances of variance in points of view to investigate whether these could be identified as characteristically different types, as the social judgment literature suggests. Insofar as the point of view is itself a phenomenon, then individual differences in its characterisation should transpire under investigation. The second empirical study inquires into the interpersonal characteristics of points of view by studying the social positioning of immigrants with regards to their host country and their country of origin. The third empirical inquiry looks at the intrapersonal properties of points of view, by studying the variable socio-cognitive latitude structure inherent to points of view. Taken together, these three studies make a first attempt at conceptualising points of view as a social-cum-psychological construct (Harré & Secord, 1972), in terms of its inter- and intra-personal variable properties.

Chapter 4: Methodology

Introduction

The critiques of attitudes reviewed in the previous chapters reacted primarily to the measurement of attitudes in terms of responses on a psychological scale, rather than to attitudes as a concept *per se*. It is the operationalisation of attitudes in terms of a range of points on a scale that has proven problematic for the attitude concept, rather than its social psychological conception. Asch's (1952/1987) objections to such an operationalisation of attitudes led him to propose that social researchers should take the bull by the horns and replace the superficial measurement of attitudes by methods that approximate genuine conversations. His views are echoed in Harré and Secord's (1972) advocation of accounts, in Billig's (1987, 1991) call for the study of argumentation, as well as in Farr's (1984) proposal of the 'inter-view'. Both Harré and Secord, and Billig have devised their approaches on different epistemological grounds than that of attitudes. Both sought a situational conception rather than a personal one, as outlined in the previous chapter. This chapter will review the epistemological basis of Harré and Secord's approach that is considered to be foundational for a situational-level methodology that aims to study the concept of point of view, and that is based on one key principle: that of social behaviour as agentic and volitional. It will go on to review Billig's and Farr's contributions that serve to outline an appropriate methodological approach to the study of points of view as an argumentative and relational concept. Finally, it will detail the methods adopted for each of the three empirical studies that have been undertaken to investigate this concept in the present inquiry.

A situational epistemology

Harré and Secord's (1972) central tenet is that social psychology has been studied without reference to what are its major phenomena, that is, social meanings, and without considering fully its main behaviour generating features, namely individual agency. Billig (1987, 1991) similarly notes that psychologists studying attitudes mostly view thinking in terms of logic rather than as a form of rhetorical

argumentation. They thus tend to focus on problems to which only one solution exists. Everyday thinking, according to Billig, does not always admit a single, successful, problem-solving, logical solution. Social behaviour thus needs to be conceived of in terms of actions mediated by meanings, carried out by agentic people, rather than mechanistic responses caused by stimuli (Harré and Secord, 1972).

Within the attitude paradigm, Harré and Secord argue, phenomena are analysed in terms of the relations between dependent and independent variables. Investigation consists in the manipulation of independent variables and the observation of subsequent changes in the dependent variable. Attitudes are characteristically considered an independent variable to the dependent variable of individual behaviour. Accordingly, social psychology has been prone to conceive of individuals as complex information-processing machines, whose behaviour can be fully explained in terms of the causal influence of a series of variables. This has led to a social psychology that looks for influence either from within the individual, as in emotional states or neurological processes, or from without, as in cultural conditions or social representations. Such reductionism has characterised research on perspectives and narrow-mindedness, as noted in Chapter 3, and has reduced these to a cognitive need for closure that, after all is said and done, is itself demonstrated to depend on the very variable it was originally meant to be studying, i.e. perspective-taking (see Kruglanski, 2004; Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the process, social psychology has overlooked what takes place at the level of *inter-acting* individuals. Harré and Secord argue that individuals are not merely information-processors, but also information-seekers and information-generators. And yet, social psychology, in the attitude programme, has sought to eliminate individual justifications as well as consensual outlooks (Fraser, 1994), with the result that studies of attitudes have changed the very character of the phenomena that are being observed into ones that fit neatly into an artifactual operationalisation of the concept.

Harré and Secord's critique has arguably aged. The present state of the discipline suggests that some of these limitations have been rectified with the rise of qualitative methodologies. On the other hand, if one considers the impact of these techniques on the entire breadth of the discipline, it is clear that Harré and Secord's critique remains pertinent today, as the concern for predicting behaviour, or the calculation of Y′ in regression methods, remains mainstream. According to Harré and Secord, whilst such an approach may be appropriate in those circumstances that investigate things that happen to a person, much of social behaviour does not have such a character. Instead, it consists of actions that people have made happen for a reason. Consequently, it is important to realise that the individual herself is the cause of her own actions. Action of this kind, according to Harré and Secord, has both significance and meaning and it occurs in a social context. This means that if social psychology considers people as agents, it must connect their behaviour to concepts that describe "self-controlled actions in a world of agents who have interests and who follow rules and plans in their dealings with other agents" (1972, p. 38). This is a foundational epistemology for the conceptualisation of points of view.

According to Harré and Secord, in many contexts an individual's actions are adequately *explained* by reference to the individual's reasons for acting so. The present conceptualisation of point of view agrees with Harré and Secord's position that "Rules of behaviour do not have the status of laws of nature since they can be ignored, defied, or changed, and because adherence to them is not necessarily a reflection of the presence of identical or even very similar physiological states and mechanisms in the entities involved" (1972, p. 243). Lay explanations of behaviour thus provide the best model for psychological theory. They provide an explanation of action that is volitional and purposive. Social psychology as a discipline is called upon to extend what can be known by common observation, and to critically check the authenticity of what is thought to be known by application of the scientific methods of exploration and experimentation. Exploration aims at discerning non-random patterns concerning the phenomena investigated. Experimentation aims at formulating and generating relevant theories that describe their nature. What is

wanted beyond critical description, according to Harré and Secord, is an explanation for why patterns occur, that is, why and by what mechanism in those circumstances something has produced something else.

The empirical inquiries into points of view undertaken in the present investigation follow such a methodological procedure. The first study aims at establishing the former postulate for points of view, that is, of an exploration of the phenomenon that aims at discerning patterns of variability. The second and third studies, as outlined hereunder, aim to describe its nature in terms of interpersonal and intrapersonal characteristics respectively.

The Inter-view

Harré and Secord (1972) argue that the mechanisms responsible for social behaviour involve inter-relations of meanings perceived by interactors. The structure of meaning relations, as has been documented in the previous chapter, can be discovered in the study of justificatory accounts. The first and second empirical enquiries in this investigation adopt such a method. According to Harré and Secord, a social researcher becomes an engaged spectator in the process of research, rather than a detached observer. Consequently, she becomes herself able to provide a meaningful account for that episode. The procedure by which this occurs is that of a negotiation of viewpoints between researcher and respondent.

In similar vein, Billig (1987) suggests that an enquiry into points of view requires an argumentative methodological procedure. According to Billig, "Instead of asking someone whether they agree or disagree with a particular position, the researcher might probe in depth the occasions when a respondent might consider disagreeing with a chosen position" (1987, p. 253). Billig thus argues for further probing, or cross-examination, in contrast to attitude measurement, suggesting that the in-depth interview is more suitable to this sort of enquiry. In such a method, the interviewer does not need to feel constrained by establishing a complete common-ground

between themselves and the respondents, "In consequence, the interview would take the form of an argument, or discussion, rather than a one-sided succession of formal questions followed by brief responses" (1987, p. 253).

Billig's proposal is keenly formulated in Farr's (1984) notion of the inter-view, a methodological concept that is highly pertinent to the present inquiry. Farr's claims are made in light of the interview as a method, but his approach can be described as a methodology that seeks the study of relative perspectives, the principles of which apply equally to quantitative and qualitative techniques. Farr describes the interview as "a technique or method for establishing or discovering that there are perspectives or viewpoints on events other than those of the person initiating the interview" (p. 182). An interview is, according to Farr, a peculiar conversation that is a co-operative venture between interviewer and interviewee and that elicits self-reports of divergences in perspective: "When O speaks, a perspective other than that of P is revealed. P and O engage in conversation while the unique perspective of each is retained. This difference in perspective between them helps to produce an inter-view in the literal sense of the term" (p. 184).

During an interview, each of the interactants becomes able to adopt the position of actor as well as observer, and positions shift during the course of the procedure. Farr basis his method on Mead's (1934) notion of taking the perspective of the other. For Mead, Farr notes, these perspectives are relative in that they represent points in space/time from which one could view events. According to Mead, it was entirely possible to change one's position in space/time. During the course of an interview, the asking of questions by interactants helps to establish the existence of perspectives other than that of the investigator who has initiated the study. It is this that enables the undertaking of an inter-view.

Farr (1984) further argues that if Harré & Secord's plea were heeded by the social sciences, then the interview would become the privileged mode of research. As a method, the inter-view is more defensible from a scientific point of view, according

to Farr, as it highlights the fact that the perspectives of researcher and interviewee are different. This sensitises researchers to the possible consequences that might ensue from this divergence in perspectives. Harré & Secord (1972) themselves note that the perspective of the interviewer is always different from that of the interviewee, and that this divergence in perspectives is an adequate basis on which to negotiate accounts. Farr further notes that Harré & Secord's proposal is in line with the influence of Gestalt psychology, from which Asch's social psychology derives, wherein a reliance on self-reports was customary given the Gestaltists' interest in how people perceived the world. The best way to discover this is undoubtedly to elicit an account of the perception directly from the perceiver.

It is thus reasonable to adopt Harré & Secord's epistemology for the study of points of view. Moreover, it is also reasonable to adopt the principles of argumentation and the procedures of the inter-view as methods for inquiring into points of view. These procedures put an emphasis on the negotiation of divergences in perspectives, which is an essential requirement considering that points of view are necessarily relative. For this reason, the methodology adopted herein puts a value on the argumentative and justificatory context that marks the understanding of situational-level manifestations of social behaviour. Argumentation and inter-viewing are deemed suitable methods for the study of points of view, as these provide interactants with the conditions to establish a common ground that retains divergences in perspectives.

Research Design

This thesis, in light of the aims outlined in Chapter 1 that involve the conceptualisation of point of view as a social-psychological phenomenon, adopts a three-pronged inquiry for empirical investigation. Insofar as the point of view is a phenomenon worthy of explanation in itself (i.e. *explanandum*), then its manifestation and instances of its variation should be observable under investigation. Furthermore, insofar as the point of view is a social-cum-psychological construct, as

argued in Chapter 3, then certain features of it should transpire under investigation that pertain to its *social* nature. Points of view should thus be marked by certain interpersonal characteristics. And, again, insofar as the point of view is a social-cum-psychological construct, then certain other features of it should transpire under investigation that pertain to its *psychological* nature. It ought thus to be also marked by certain other intrapersonal, or socio-cognitive, features. Consequently, the research design adopted for the purposes of this exploration involves an effort to investigate: (a) the manifestation of the phenomenon and document instances of its variance, (b) the phenomenon in terms of its interpersonal characteristics, and (c) the phenomenon in terms of its intrapersonal properties.

Three separate studies were thus undertaken to deal with these aims respectively, sensitive to certain conditions of public spheres. As argued in Chapter 2, the ontology of points of view is intrinsically bound to the public sphere in which they occur. Public spheres can legitimate certain points of view, as opposed to others. Not all points of view are recognised in all publics. Furthermore, public spheres constrain not only individual perspectives, they also legitimate certain worldviews, possibly a single one, as opposed to others. Consequently, the manifestation of different types of points of view can be of four types, determined by two orthogonal axes, that is, either similar or different perspectives in relation to some other point of view, where both perspectives are legitimated by the same worldview (X-axis), and similar or different perspectives in relation to some other point of view, where the two perspectives are legitimated by different worldviews (Y-axis). Not all publics admit the four different conditions. Moreover, focusing on either interpersonal features or intrapersonal features of points of view necessitates control of certain conditions, as detailed hereunder. The three empirical studies undertaken for the purposes of this thesis have been designed according to these characteristic conditions of points of view embedded within public spheres.

The first study undertaken is a qualitative inquiry that maps instantiations of points of view based on methods of argumentation. The second is another qualitative

inquiry that explores and describes the interpersonal characteristics that emanate from points of view as these relate to another with regard to a different background of intelligibility. The third is a quantitative inquiry that looks at differences in the socio-cognitive structure of points of view across a number of respondents that share a common frame of reference. The methodological features of these studies are detailed hereunder. Findings and their discussion are presented in subsequent chapters. Taken together, these three studies document instantiations of the point of view in its various manifestations (i.e. from within and from without a similar background of intelligibility) and explore its manifold social-psychological properties.

The sensitivity of points of view to the character of public spheres, as argued in Chapter 2, prohibited an integrated study of the three aims of this thesis in a single public with regards to a single issue. The description of the nature of points of view was best undertaken in a cosmopolitan public sphere that brought together perspectives originating in different worldviews. This same condition, however, precluded an effective study of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view, due to the fact that in the event of the co-existence of different legitimating communities, observed behaviour could have been interpretable at both the intergroup level as well as the interpersonal. A case study of interpersonal relations controlling for community relations was thus a requirement for such an investigation, something that could not be served by a cosmopolitan public where different community worldviews co-exist. Similarly, inquiring into the intrapersonal properties of points of view required first and foremost controlling for heterogeneity. In heterogeneous conditions, as in cosmopolitan publics, characteristic differences in the treatment of alternative claims may be attributable to different cultural practices prescribed by different social representations pertaining to the different cultural groups. Once again, this condition could not have been served by either a cosmopolitan public, as applied to the first inquiry, nor an unlegitimated one, as applied to the second. It required, on the other hand, an investigation of a relatively hegemonic public that is made to entertain alternative views.

The fulfilment of these research aims validates the claim that the point of view is a social-cum-psychological phenomenon, rather than a singularly discursive epiphenomenon or a mere cognitive process. Insofar as these research aims are supported, then the postulation of points of view at the situational level of explanation–that links psychological processes that take place in cognition at the level of the individual with social processes that manifest in the collective–will prove to be a demonstrably legitimate enterprise. It establishes points of view as a construct in need of inquiry in its own right that serves towards providing a fuller explanation of social behaviour, one that overcomes the limitations of the malleability and temporality of attitudes according to the situation on the one hand, and the incapacity for understanding circumspect social behaviour through social representations on the other. The point of view, insofar as its interpersonal and intrapersonal properties are understood, could help provide an explanation of social behaviour at the interpersonal level as it takes place *in situ*. The research design adopted for this inquiry thus investigates these three concerns in detail in an effort to piece together the bigger picture of describing the point of view's nature in its manifold social-psychological manifestations.

Study 1: The Root of all Evil?

The first study adopted a qualitative approach in studying a public controversy that took place in Britain early in 2006 over beliefs in a supernatural faith and the role of science in society. This controversy brought together in debate numerous believers of a multitude of faiths as well as representatives from the media, scientists, atheists, and agnostics, all of whom sought to proclaim their own point of view regarding the nature of these widespread beliefs and their consequences. For the purposes of this first study, that sought to document the various manifestations of points of view, qualitative interviews were undertaken with a total of ten respondents, residents of London, with five respondents selected to represent each side of the dichotomy of belief/non-belief in a supernatural faith. The inclusion/exclusion criterion along

which respondents were classified along each side of the dichotomy was an expressed belief in the dictates of an organised faith. Those who professed a faith in a religious code and institution and participated in the rituals of that faith were classed as religious. Those who expressed no particular faith in an organised religion and did not participate in any organised religious rituals were classed as non-religious. Table 1 outlines select demographic data of the respondents.

Participant	Sex	Nationality	Y.O.B.	Ethnicity	Education	Non/Religious
1	Female	British	1956	Black	Tertiary	Non-Religious
2	Female	South African	1978	Black	Tertiary	Religious
3	Female	Ghanaian	1970	Black	Tertiary	Religious
4	Female	British	1958	Black	Tertiary	Religious
5	Female	Jamaican	1961	Black	Secondary	Religious
6	Male	British	1979	White	Secondary	Non-Religious
7	Male	Finnish	1977	White	Tertiary	Non-Religious
8	Male	British	1981	White	Tertiary	Non-Religious
9	Female	British	1966	Black	Tertiary	Non-Religious
10	Male	Maltese	1976	White	Secondary	Religious

Table 1: Demographic data of interview respondents

The interviews were conducted during the month of July 2006, at various locations in London. An interview guide was drawn up (Appendix I), consisting of a short introduction intended to provide respondents with background information about the study and to create a setting for conversation. A few preliminary questions were asked initially, that were intended to guide the conversation into the core of the topic. Subsequently, selected quotations from some arguments that circulated in the public sphere on the controversy over whether religion is a source of evil–an idea propagated by Prof. Richard Dawkins during a two-part documentary during prime-time British television–and which captured the flavour of the controversy that ensued, were presented to the respondents. This was done in an effort to undertake an argumentative interview, rather than a mere recital of opinions, guided by Farr's (1984) notion of the inter-view outlined above. The topic guide further outlined a number of questions intended to explore interviewees' reactions to divergent

opinions about the claims proposed during the controversy concerning 'The Root of all Evil?'[14] in the British public.

The interviews explored participants' perspectives towards religion, science, and moral behaviour. They also explored opinions around the claims proposed in Dawkins' documentary. The duration of the interviews ranged from thirty minutes to one hour thirty-five minutes. The interviews were audio-recorded and fully transcribed by the researcher. The transcribed interviews constituted text data for subsequent analysis. The data was content analysed using Atlas.ti qualitative analysis software, to categorise respondents' points of view and to identify respondents' social positioning, that is in relation to whom respondents' arguments were being formulated. For the purpose of this present investigation, selective coding of the Type Family of Coding Families (Glaser, 1978) was undertaken on the coded data. Type Family codes that were deemed to describe the nature of the perspective being studied were categorised, compared and described for the purpose of this investigation. The findings of this analysis are presented in Chapter 5.

Study 2: The Maltese in Britain

The second study was undertaken during the latter quarter of 2008 and early 2009. For the purposes of this study, qualitative interviews were undertaken with a number of Maltese people who moved to London and other areas in Britain. A number of interviews were also undertaken with Maltese migrants who moved back to Malta after a stay in Britain. The Maltese in Britain are represented by the Maltese High Commission. The Commission, however, does not hold records of the number or location of Maltese migrants. Similarly, a small number of cultural organisations have been set up in Britain, namely the Maltese Culture Movement and the Maltesers in London group. These have been able to attract the participation of fellow Maltese migrants at their organised events. However, attendance at these events is neither limited to Maltese migrants alone nor to Maltese people in general,

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[14] The title of Prof. Richard Dawkins' documentary

in that both Maltese tourists to Britain as well as foreigners are known to attend these events. Furthermore, numerous Maltese living in Britain do not participate in these events and have never sought membership. For this reason, respondents for this study were selected through snowballing.

A total of thirty interviews involving forty respondents were undertaken. Respondents were interviewed either alone or jointly with their partners in case of family migration. The latter group consisted of a total of ten couples, one of which returned to Malta. Respondents' stay in Britain ranged from less than a year to fifty years, and their ages ranged from twenty-five to seventy. A number of respondents were actively working, others were studying, others were homemakers and one was retired. Their purpose for moving to Britain was equally varied. Some were in Britain to study, some moved to study and stayed, others moved to work, and others moved or stayed following a tourist visit. Selected demographic data are presented in table 2 hereunder, ordered by the chronological undertaking of the interviews.

Respondents were interviewed at a convenient location suitable for purpose. An interview guide was drawn up for the purposes of the interview. This provided a description of the study and outlined a number of relevant questions to guide the interviewer (Appendix II). Interviews followed a semi-structured, conversational format, guided by the researcher's own understandings of Maltese and British mentalities, as well as the settling down process in Britain. This was undertaken in Farr's (1984) spirit of the inter-view, requiring respondents to justify their decisions to move to one country or another in view of the circumstances in both countries, with which the researcher was himself familiar. Kuhn and McPartland's (1954) Twenty Statements Test was also administered to respondents prior to the interview, to check whether responses provided during the interview were characterised by differences in social identities (Deschamps, 1982). The interviews lasted between forty-five and a hundred and ten minutes. All interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and translated for analyses.

Participant No.	Place of residence	Years in UK	Single/ Family	Age	Gender	Marital Status	Work Status
1	London	1	S	25	F	Single	Education
2	London	3	S	31	F	Married	Working
3	Essex	21	F	61	M	Married	Working
4	Essex	21	F	61	F	Married	Working
5	Surrey	3	S	30	F	Single	Education
6	Surrey	6	F	37	M	Married	Working
7	Surrey	6	F	33	F	Married	Homemaker
8	London	2	S	28	M	Single	Working
9	London	2	F	29	M	Married	Working
10	London	2	F	28	F	Married	Education
11	London	4	S	32	M	Single	Working
12	London	3	F	31	M	Married	Working
13	London	3	F	28	F	Married	Working
14	London	2	F	30	M	Single	Working
15	London	2	F	27	F	Single	Working
16	Essex	36	F	58	M	Married	Working
17	Essex	25	F	49	F	Married	Working
18	London	3	S	29	M	Single	Working
19	London	3	S	26	M	Single	Working
20	London	5	S	34	F	Single	Working
21	Middlesex	2	F	28	M	Married	Working
22	Middlesex	2	F	28	F	Married	Working
23	Essex	5	F	35	M	Married	Working
24	Essex	5	F	32	F	Married	Working
25	Surrey	1	F	42	M	Married	Working
26	Surrey	1	F	39	F	Married	Education
27	Berkshire	50	S	70	M	Divorced	Retired
28	London	2	S	32	F	Single	Working
29	Surrey	12	S	40	M	Married	Working
30	Oxfordshire	7	S	32	M	Single	Working
31	Middlesex	2	S	33	F	Married	Working
32	London	8	S	31	M	Married	Working
33	Malta	< 1	S	32	M	Single	Working
34	Malta	< 1	S	26	F	Married	Homemaker
35	Malta	2	S	31	F	Single	Working
36	Malta	6	S	28	F	Married	Homemaker
37	Malta	6	S	37	F	Married	Working
38	Malta	4	S	28	M	Married	Working
39	Malta	< 1	F	30	F	Married	Working
40	Malta	< 1	F	32	M	Married	Working

Table 2: Demographic data of interview respondents

Data analysis for the interviews followed Flick's (2006) Thematic Coding protocol for comparative studies, based on Strauss's (1987) grounded theory procedure. In this method, groups under study are defined *a priori*. For the purposes of this study, the groups consisted of those respondents who demonstrated either a monological point of view, or a dialogical point of view, or a metalogical point of view. These were the point of view types unearthed in the first study (see Chapter 5). Data analysis, according to Flick's protocol, involves a comparative exploration of case studies that enables comparisons across groups to be undertaken on respondents' perspectives with regard to certain relevant issues. The first step in Flick's protocol is to draw up a short description of each case. This is followed by a deepening analysis of single cases. Such a procedure enables the researcher to develop a system of categories through open coding and selective coding that is put together in a thematic structure reflecting a coding structure across all cases. The overarching thematic structure serves the purposes of comparability. The final output is a demonstration of coding themes that are found to differ across groups with regards to relevant issues.

The case descriptions drawn up for each respondent were used to classify respondents as monological, dialogical, or metalogical. For the purposes of this classification, the following operational definitions of points of view were utilised, guided by the findings of the first study and complimenting Rokeach's (1951b) description of different types of cognitive organisation:

Monological   *A point of view that is closed to relations with an alternative social reality.*

Dialogical   *A point of view that considers the legitimacy of more than one social reality, but where functional relations with the other social reality are bounded.*

Metalogical   *A point of view that is open to relations with different social realities.*

The operationalisation of points of view in terms of functional relations within different contexts stems from the prior conceptualisation of points of view in terms of their propensity to engage with alternative realities, in line with the findings of the first study. Consequently, in practical terms, subjects with different points of view were expected to relate in different ways to the encounter with some alternative reality on the basis of their comprehension of the *logos*, or sensibility, of that different social reality. An encounter with an alternative reality is given in the migration experience. This rationale served to operationalise points of view in terms of functional relations.

The categorisation was undertaken by two independent raters. The inter-rater reliability measured by Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (2-tailed) for the final classification demonstrated high convergence between raters ($r_s = 0.905$, p = <0.01). Due to the high likelihood of identifiability of respondents, real case descriptions are not presented. These are replaced by a description of the typical characteristics of the accounts given by respondents in each category:

Monological   *Settlement into British culture is seamless. They claim that they felt they never fit into Maltese culture even though they originated from there. They describe their situation in Malta as that of a 'fish out of the water', whereas no such feelings accompany their settlement in Britain. They claim not to have lost anything and not to feel homesick, and the adjustment they required was to a better life. Their experience did not change them; they were always closer to the British in character than they were to their compatriots. They do not entertain the idea of going back because they do not fit there.*

Dialogical	*They left Malta to seek out new experiences and to get away from the limitations. They required some adjustment to fit into British society, but they persevered and managed, and have now come out the other end much stronger. They define themselves as Maltese living in Britain; Maltese adapted to British life. They function well and are proud of their achievements. They look favourably at Malta, but from a distance. They claim that there are certain things in Malta that prevent them from going back, and that it will take a while for Malta to catch up with the mentality in Britain that they now share. They can see how certain people can have a good life in Malta, and they would entertain going back were situations to change, but they do not see this as a possibility and they do not mind this because they are nevertheless happy. In spite of their favourable attitudes to Malta, they do not envy the Maltese as they feel that migrating to Britain has opened their minds and made them grow. As a result, they cannot now fit back into the more restricted island-mentality of Malta. Malta for them is a good holiday destination where they go to have some fun and visit family.*
Metalogical	*They demonstrate a dual appreciation of both Malta and the UK. They cite situational reasons for being in the UK. They are proud of who they are and where they come from. They also appreciate Britain and the fact that they were able to fit in to British culture and that British society actually made this possible. They feel for Britain and for what they have gained from moving there, but they still feel they fit in Malta and were situational conditions to lead them there again they wouldn't mind moving back, although they wouldn't mind staying in Britain either. They feel that the two systems are different, but each system has its advantages and disadvantages. Where they take up residence depends on what circumstances matters at a given point in their lives. They feel as much at home in Malta as they do in Britain, and will stand up for both countries if others were making disparaging comments.*

Out of the 40 respondents interviewed in this study, 11 were classified as monological, 17 as dialogical, and 12 as metalogical (Table 3).

Frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Monological	11	27.5	27.5	27.5
	Dialogical	17	42.5	42.5	70.0
	Metalogical	12	30.0	30.0	100.0
	Total	40	100.0	100.0	

Table 3: Classification of cases into point of view types

Data analysis of single cases was undertaken on the transcribed texts of each respondent using Nvivo8. Coding was structured in Tree Codes that yielded a Thematic Structure of case analyses as per Flick's (2006) protocol. The Thematic Structure served for running queries in Nvivo8 regarding relevant themes categorised by point of view types. A systematic comparative procedure on the output of queries was undertaken in an effort to identify instances of variance between types. Findings are presented in detail and discussed in Chapter 6. The findings of the thematic coding comparison are summarised hereunder in Table 4.

1. Expectations and Impressions	5. Settling down
2. Migration/Repatriation	a. Difficulties
3. Life in Malta	b. Fitting in
a. Quality of Life	c. Adaptation
b. Lifestyle	d. Networking
c. Mentality	e. Support
d. Living & Working conditions	f. Staying in touch
e. Social Network	g. What do they miss?
f. Feeling for Malta	6. Identity
g. Visiting	a. Britishness
4. Life in Britain	b. European
a. Country	c. Mediterranean
b. Lifestyle	d. Perspective
c. Mentality	7. Settlement
d. Living and Working conditions	a. Home
e. Social Network	b. Going back
f. Being a Foreigner	c. Fitting in
g. Feeling for Britain	d. Settling down
h. Malta	
i. Maltese community	
j. Multiculturalism	
k. Personal consequences	

Table 4: Thematic Structure of case analysis

The classification of respondents according to point of view types served for the analysis of the interview data as well as data from the Twenty Statements Test (TST). Responses given for the TST were first coded into categories that described the definition respondents used to characterise themselves. Out of the total number of respondents, personality/character descriptions featured most highly, followed by relationships and interests, profession, nationality, age, migration, life circumstances, gender, faith, physical features, name, others' descriptions, aspirations, sexual orientation and residence, as detailed in Table 5.

Descriptor	n appearances in data	$\overline{X}$ per respondent*
Personality/Character	37	7.08
Relationships	36	2.08
Interests	36	4.61
Profession	30	1.97
Nationality	23	1.52
Age	20	1.1
Migration	17	1
Life circumstances	15	1.73
Gender	13	1
Faith	12	1.08
Physical features	10	1.5
Name	9	1
Others' descriptions	3	1.67
Aspirations	2	1
Sexual orientation	1	1
Residence	1	1

* excluding respondents where descriptor was not mentioned

Table 5: Categorisation of TST data

One-way ANOVAs were conducted for each of these categories as dependent variable with point of view type as independent variable, to test whether the null hypothesis of no statistically significant differences between means of each category across point of view types could be rejected. There were no statistically significant differences between mean scores across point of view types, meaning that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. No evidence was therefore found that any differences between point of view types identified during the analysis of the interview data is a function of differences in the structure of social identity.

Study 3: Social Issues in a hegemonic public

The third study aimed to discover whether intrapersonal socio-cognitive differences marked different point of view types, according to the conceptualisation of points of view postulated in this thesis. The study aimed at comparing subjects' latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment across point of view types. Three issues were presented to subjects for this purpose. The first concerned a range of statements made in public with regard to the revision of the student stipend system at the University of Malta. The second presented a similar number of statements made with regard to the rights of Muslims to pray in public in Malta. The third concerned the issue of voting rights of Maltese citizens who leave the country temporarily or permanently.

The study was undertaken in Malta with Maltese students at the University of Malta. This was done with the aim of fulfilling the condition of a relatively hegemonic public required for this study, as argued above. Given that Malta has only recently opened its borders to European nations, that is, upon joining the EU in 2004, and that only at around that time it experienced any notable immigration from North Africa and Europe, Maltese mentality is deemed to be sufficiently insular to permit the undertaking of this study. Whilst, arguably, Maltese mentality has forever been under Western influence due to tourism, colonial heritage and the mass media, nevertheless, a characteristic Maltese culture prevails on the island by which the Maltese regulate their daily affairs in line with the views of the dominant majority of Maltese living on the island. The demographics of the country are by far disproportionately Maltese and Roman Catholic. Moreover, due to the small size of the island and the size of the population, no perspective from within is justifiably alien, and whilst certain sub-groups in the population could be discerned, no social group is sufficiently impermeable to warrant classification as a sub-culture. This means that the views debated by this population and any differences that may transpire between them are not attributable to different community representations,

considering that these are all based within a general Maltese culture that permeates the island.

The survey undertaken for the purposes of this third inquiry was administered between December 2009 and February 2010. A questionnaire was drawn up by the researcher and administered to students at the University of Malta. The survey was piloted twice prior to administration with a convenience sample of university students using techniques of cognitive interviewing to ensure that the right meaning was being conveyed and that the right responses were being elicited for the various questions. A noteworthy outcome of piloting was the rating of latitude statements on a five-point scale ranging from -2 to +2, in favour of options to accept, reject, or non-commit to the statement. The survey was administered online through the Office of the Registrar of the University of Malta to a representative random sample of 1000 students, stratified by faculty. The study was sent to undisclosed recipients to maintain anonymity and protection of personal data. Details of the sample to whom the questionnaire was addressed are presented in Table 6.

Faculty/Institute/Centre	Count	Percentage
Centre for Communication Technology	25	2.50%
Centre for Labour Studies	18	1.80%
Conservation and Management of Cultural Heritage	2	0.20%
European Documentation and Research Centre	28	2.80%
Faculty for the Built Environment	37	3.70%
Faculty of Arts	149	14.90%
Faculty of Dental Surgery	19	1.90%
Faculty of Economics, Management and Accountancy	122	12.20%
Faculty of Education	110	11.00%
Faculty of Engineering	70	7.00%
Faculty of Information & Communication Technology	101	10.10%
Faculty of Laws	62	6.20%
Faculty of Medicine and Surgery	48	4.80%
Faculty of Science	34	3.40%
Faculty of Theology	20	2.00%
Institute of Agriculture	20	2.00%
Institute of Criminology	33	3.30%
Institute of Health Care	99	9.90%
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies	3	0.30%
Total	1000	100.00%

Table 6: Sample characteristics

The survey was initially emailed on the 9th of December 2009. Email reminders were subsequently sent by the Office of the Registrar to the same sample on the 17th of December, the 5th of January 2010, the 18th of January 2010, and the 5th of February 2010. The survey was closed on the 21st February 2010. A hundred euro voucher draw from a leading retail outlet was used as an incentive. At the time of closure of the survey, a total of 272 responses had been received. These were reduced to 247 after data filtering, excluding all cases that returned responses in the form of long strings of similar responses, even to contradictory statements. The survey thus attracted an effective response rate of 25%, which is deemed adequate for an online survey. Moreover, the faculty demographic of respondents largely mirrored that of the entire sample, as outlined in Table 7.

Faculty	Count	Percentage
Agriculture	2	.8
Arts	49	19.8
Built Environment	10	4.0
CCT	4	1.6
Criminology	2	.8
Dental Surgery	1	.4
EDRC	7	2.8
Education	35	14.2
Engineering	17	6.9
FEMA	30	12.1
I & C T	23	9.3
IHC	13	5.3
Labour Studies	2	.8
Laws	18	7.3
Medicine & Surgery	10	4.0
Other (unspecified)	2	.8
Science	17	6.9
Theology	5	2.0
Total	247	100.0

Table 7: Faculty demographic of respondents

The questionnaire (Appendix IV) was presented to respondents online over a series of five pages. The first page presented respondents with a series of arguments concerning three issues, namely the right of university students to receive stipends from the state, the right of Muslims to pray publicly in Malta, and the right of Maltese migrants to vote in national general elections. These three issues were debated and contested in the Maltese public at various times throughout the year preceding the study. Arguments were selected by the researcher to represent the various views that circulated in the media, following an analysis of articles published in the Times of Malta concerning these issues. Arguments were selected according to their underlying point of view type characteristic. Respondents were thus presented with five arguments per issue on the first page, that is a total of fifteen arguments. A monological statement in favour of the issue, a monological statement against the issue, a dialogical statement in favour of the issue, a dialogical statement against the issue, and a metalogical statement on the issue, were presented to respondents about each issue. As per the conceptual definitions of point of view types following the first study of this inquiry, the monological statements presented an exclusive and unilinear argument, the dialogical statements presented two perspectives but selected one over the other, whereas the metalogical statements presented both arguments without favouring one over the other.

Respondents were asked to identify the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with each statement in the first instance, and subsequently to select the one they identified as coming closest to their own view. This method has been well utilised in other studies that dealt with similar intercultural issues (see Georgas & Papastylianou, 1996). In this study therefore, respondents self-classified their points of view according to pre-defined point of view types. For every issue, respondents who selected either the first or second statements were thus automatically classified as monological, respondents who selected the third or fourth statements were classified as dialogical, whilst respondents who selected the fifth statement as coming closer to their own views were classified as metalogical. The second page of the questionnaire proceeded to request respondents to provide a rating for how

strongly they felt the issue applied to them. This measure of ego-relatedness has been associated with variances in latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment in the works of Sherif (see Chapter 7).

The third page of the questionnaire presented respondents with short statements that had been made in the press concerning each issue. A list of nine statements per issue was presented, requesting respondents to indicate the extent to which they found each statement acceptable or unacceptable on a scale of -2 to +2, with 0 indicating the middle point. These lists of nine statements served for the measurement of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment. Acceptance was measured by a positive response to a statement, rejection by a negative response, whereas a neutral response indicated non-commitment. In this way, the extent to which each respondent found varying arguments acceptable, objectionable, or neutral was measured in a way that enabled a computation of latitudes. The number of acceptances, rejections, and non-commitment responses was computed for each respondent, providing a direct measure of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment for every issue.

The fifth page proceeded to present respondents with Berry's (1984) multicultural ideology scale. This scale measures the extent to which individuals are open to the encounter and co-habitation with different cultures. Given the similarity of definition between point of view types and multicultural ideology, as well as the fact that one issue selected for investigation concerned the worship rights of a culturally different non-dominant group in Malta, multicultural ideology was included in the questionnaire as a measure of construct validity. The scale was originally devised by Berry for the purposes of studying multicultural relations in Canada, and has been employed in acculturation studies since. The version of the scale adopted for this study is the one adopted in Berry's Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies (MIRIPS) international survey that measures, amongst other things, multicultural ideology, acculturation expectations, and cultural identity. The scale was expected to correlate with respondents' points of view with regards to multicultural relations,

and thus provide a measure of construct validity. The scale was demonstrated to have good reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.81$). The fifth and last page of the questionnaire gathered demographic data about participants, namely gender, age, year of study, faculty of study, religious beliefs, place of residence and marital status. Thereafter respondents could proceed to enter the incentive lottery.

Following closure of the survey, data was transferred into the PASW 18 software programme for quantitative statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics and frequencies were generated and analysed for patterns in the data. A total of twenty-five questionnaires were eliminated during the filtering process for returning responses in the form of long strings of similar answers, even to contradictory statements. These were deemed to have replied to the questionnaire for the purposes of entering the draw. Following the filtering procedure, various statistical analyses were undertaken on the data to check for a number of relationships and associations between the variables under study.

The distributions of points of view were analysed visually and using descriptive statistics to determine whether responses for the point of view statements were normally distributed. The relationships between points of view on different issues was analysed using Kendall's tau-b correlation coefficient, testing the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between individuals' points of view on one issue and their point of view on another issue. The ego-relatedness relationships were analysed using the Pearson correlation coefficient, testing the null hypothesis that there are no significant relationships between individuals' levels of ego-relatedness on an issue and their level of ego-relatedness on other issues. Subsequently, the relationship between point of view types and ego-relatedness was tested, using the Pearson correlation coefficient, testing the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between individuals' point of view type and their ego-relatedness measure for the same issue. The relationship between point of view type regarding Muslims' rights of worship and the computed Multicultural Ideology score was tested using the Pearson correlation coefficient testing the null hypothesis that

there is no relationship between the two. Subsequently, a one-way ANOVA was undertaken to determine whether there were differences between point of view types and their respective measure for Multicultural Ideology, testing the null hypothesis that there are no differences between the means of the various point of view types on this measure.

Further one-way ANOVAs were undertaken to test for differences between point of view types and the computed measures for latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment. These analyses tested null hypotheses stating that there were no differences between the means of the various point of view types in their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment respectively. Further analysis was undertaken for the voting rights issue, to identify whether there were differences between the various types of points of view in their expression for or against the issue, and the latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment. Five groups were thus utilised for this analysis (monological-for; monological-against; dialogical-for; dialogical-against; metalogical) in contrast to the usual three (monological; dialogical; metalogical). For this purpose, a number of t-tests were undertaken to determine whether there were any differences between the means of some particular type of point of view and its latitude of rejection compared to another type, testing the null hypothesis that there were no differences between the means of the various point of view type groups, with for-the-issue and against-the-issue treated as separate groups, and their respective latitudes of rejection.

Further statistical analysis was undertaken to determine whether point of view types varied with demographic criteria. The null hypotheses that there are no differences in the mean point of view types between different gender, age, faculty, year of study, father's employment background (as an indicator of social class), religious belief, and place of residence criteria were tested. The difference in mean scores for multicultural ideology was also tested between males and females, testing the null hypothesis that there are no significant differences in the means of males and females in their measure of multicultural ideology. Finally, a series of logistic

regressions were carried out for the three point of view types as dependent variables, testing the main effects of demographic data as predictor variables. This tested the null hypotheses that demographic variables have no predictive effect on the dependent variable. The logistic regression was adopted in *lieu* of the fact that the type of point of view demonstrated by respondents could be treated as a categorical independent variable with three categories for monological, dialogical, and metalogical respectively. The findings of these statistical analyses are presented and discussed in chapter 7.

Conclusion

The theorists reviewed in this chapter concur in advocating the investigation of points of view in terms of argumentative inquiry rather than a passive recital of beliefs or the ticking of responses on questionnaires. Points of view are elaborated in the course of argumentation and a social-psychological inquiry into points of view needs to take this into consideration. Moreover, it is only through argumentation that the intricacies of a point of view are made manifest. Argumentation offers the possibility of insight into how and why a point of view is held to be legitimate and valid in the first instance, as well as superior to alternative points of view in the second. Argumentative enquiry also allows the elaboration of a point of view with reference to the lay background knowledge, or common sense, that provides points of view with justification. It is this process which opens the gateway into inquiry, not only of personal beliefs, but equally into the social representations at play in and across individual minds (Wagner et al., 1999). The present formulation of point of view in view of its epistemological underpinnings, and the methodological procedure that it warrants, are in line with Habermas' claim that "any account of communicative action needs to include an adequate theory of argumentation" (1991, p. 206). The present formulation of point of view, based on the three empirical studies undertaken in this thesis that document its variable manifestation in terms of its interpersonal and intrapersonal properties, provides such a theory for understanding social behaviour as it takes place *in situ*.

Chapter 5
Identifying the phenomenon

Introduction

Tyler (2008) claims that at the root of the contemporary challenge that multiculturalism is posing to modern societies is the capacity for humans "to tolerate views and lifestyles inconsistent with their own" (p. x). The problem of discrepant views underlines the dark side of intercultural contact. Understanding the other requires an ability to view the world from the other's perspective (Marková, 2003a). How can we empathise with another whose perspective we do not understand? Numerous theorists have pointed to this potential impasse. Herder argued that to appreciate other cultures one needs to adopt the other culture's own perspective, and he acknowledged the enormity of the task to empathise with other nations (Marková, 2003b). Asch (1952/1987) claimed that whilst our own society's practices and beliefs appear to us natural, permanent and inevitable, those of other societies appear bizarre. Bateson (1972) agrees that the patterns of thought of individuals in a given society "are so standardised that their behaviour appears to them *logical*" (p. 66, italics in original). And Benhabib (2002) similarly claims that: "there are those with whom we agree, who inhabit other cultures and worlds, but whose evaluations we find plausible and comprehensible, and still others whose ways of life as well as systems of belief will be abhorrent to us" (p. 42).

Clearly, the ability to take the perspective of the other fully, and understand it on its own terms is a necessary condition in successful contact outcomes. The problem in intercultural relations is the clash of cultures, which takes the form of encounters between different knowledge systems and ways of making sense of the world, whereby having a particular worldview may preclude understanding of another's perspective. Successful contact outcomes are desirable, but all too often, intergroup contact degenerates into outright hostility and intolerance. Seemingly, even when conflict is avoided, outcomes may still take the form of segregation, integration, assimilation, or marginalisation. Contact in itself does not resolve the political problem of acculturation (Berry, 1980; Berry & Sam, 1997).

The theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1961/1976; 2000) may well provide the potential for a way forward into furthering our understanding of diversity. Social representations theory allows a conceptualisation of individual perspectives within a social system of knowledge that constitutes a social reality *sui generis* (Moscovici, 2000; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Moghaddam, 2008). Social representations provide a frame of reference that is common to social actors, who interact meaningfully and legitimately in everyday social life by adopting points of view that are intelligible to others by virtue of being located within a social representation. The point of view constitutes a social actor's outlook towards some object or event relative to others within the social field. It provides a theory of social positioning that accounts for diversity encounters between social actors, and the prospective potential for positive relations between them. This potential, as the findings of this study demonstrate, is based on the extent to which one's perspective is able to appreciate and accommodate the relative logic of one's own point of view as well as that of another.

A point of view is herein defined as an outlook towards a social event, group, or issue, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. A point of view articulates how a social actor sees things in the social field, relative to others. Figuratively, it describes how I see what you see, how I see what s/he sees, and how we see what they see. This chapter presents findings from a study undertaken in 2006 concerning the nature of religion and its relation with science. The study was undertaken in the wake of a public controversy that took place in the British press following a televised documentary that proposed religion as a source of evil. The findings demonstrate how a particular point of view may be closed to dialogue with another position. Alternatively, points of view may acknowledge the legitimate existence of another position but retain its logic as of a superior form. Finally, a point of view may be open in considering the other point of view on the terms of the other's logicality, rather than one's own. In this way, point of view is isomorphic to social representations in the extent to which it is open or otherwise, with regards to another system of understanding.

Background

In January 2006, Prof. Richard Dawkins presented a two-part documentary on British prime-time television (Channel 4) entitled 'The Root of all Evil?'. In his documentary, Prof. Dawkins argued that the world would be better off without religion. In the first episode, entitled 'The God Delusion', Dawkins argued that science is opposed to the "process of non-thinking called faith", and that it should replace faith in society because the latter is divisive and dangerous. In the second episode, entitled 'The Virus of Faith', Dawkins likened faith to a virus which is transmitted inter-generationally to children, and which may lead to a warped morality. Ultimately, Dawkins claimed, religious education can be considered abusive.

Dawkins' documentary generated considerable controversy and debate in the British public sphere. A lot of arguments circulated in the media from various domains, such as religion, the media itself, and science. Some agreed with Dawkins, some only partly agreed, and some radically opposed his claims. Voluminous reactions were posted on Channel 4's website and various others were printed in national newspapers. The debate on science and religion raged on in the public sphere long after the documentary was aired, as individuals sought to present their ideas as rightful and consequential to British society.

The suggestion that scientific thinking ought to displace religious belief is centuries old. Yet Dawkins' documentary stirred public interest in this debate anew. One reason for this renewed interest was the political context in Britain at the time, in which context this study was undertaken. At the time, religion and its consequences were high on the public agenda. Dawkins' documentary aired a mere six months following the 7th July bombings in London by British Islamic fundamentalist terrorists. Only two weeks later, on the 21st July 2005, another four failed bomb attacks were carried out by another terrorist cell. During the aftermath of the bombings, London police were involved in two shootings related to terror raids, both

of which turned out to be unfounded and one of which resulted in a fatality. de Menezes was killed by police on the 22nd July 2005 after being mistaken for a terrorist. Less than a year later, on the 2nd June 2006, Mohammed Abdul Kahar was shot by police during a raid at his home in London. The Terrorism Act, drafted in the aftermath of the bombings, was introduced on the 12th October 2005 and made law on 30th March 2006. Moreover, the Israel-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, which commenced on the 12th of July, provided a backdrop for the interviews undertaken in this study, and was referred to by participants in almost all interviews. Furthermore, on the 10th August 2006, flights at British airports were disrupted by a large-scale police operation acting to prevent terrorist attacks, allegedly planned by Islamic fundamentalists in Britain, that subsequently led to a worldwide ban on liquids brought into the cabin by airline passengers. These events provided the political context in which this study was undertaken and around which the points of view analysed in this study were developed.

The political context was the central context for this study but the religious context of British society is equally pertinent to the findings of this research. The religious context in Britain has been contradictory long before these events took place. Davie (1994) argues that the majority of British people persists in believing in God, but expresses their religious sentiments by staying away from their places of worship rather than attending churches and conglomerating to collectively express their faith. On the other hand, relatively few have opted out of religion altogether. Atheists in Britain remain in the minority. On the other hand, the Churches remain disproportionately elderly, female, and Conservative. Whilst people seem to retain some form of personal religious belief, religious orthodoxy displays an undeniable degree of secularisation. Nevertheless, despite the supposedly declining church membership, the Churches in Britain have retained a persistently high public profile (Davie, 1994).

The backdrop of this study is thus one of a highly contested and cosmopolitan public sphere, in which different perspectives and different systems of understandings co-

exist and are brought to bear on any given issue. In this context, points of view and social representations intermingle as individuals seek to make sense of social events and position themselves meaningfully in relation to both similar and different others, with regard to politically charged public issues.

Findings

It is important to note that some respondents, whilst claiming a belief, or lack thereof, in religion at the start of the interview, failed to position themselves consistently throughout the interview and articulate a consolidated point of view. Two respondents in the study (Respondent 5, Respondent 8) alternated between different positions, and in both cases categorised themselves variably as believers and non-believers during the course of the interview, failing to articulate a firm opinion on the matters explored. One of the respondents claimed a belief in a religious faith (Respondent 5) at the start of the interview, whereas the other respondent (Respondent 8) denied such belief, however, both shifted their positions back and forth during the interview. This suggests that whilst people who engage in public debate do so on the basis of some position, the articulation of a point of view for some may be a work in progress. This in itself is quite a significant finding as it implies that in studying public opinion, one needs primarily to discover who holds any opinion at all. It cannot be assumed that all individuals have an opinion on all matters at any time. Clearly, the contemporary expectation of multisubjectivity (Billig, 1991; see Chapter 3) is not warranted by the findings of this study.

Respondent 5 positioned herself as a non-practicing believer originally, but her positioning changed as different topics were discussed during the course of the interview. Initially, when asked about the importance of religious beliefs in today's world, she replied in the affirmative with regards to faith:

"I'm not practicing although I believe, […], but that's not saying that I don't believe in something, I suppose that thing I got from a child is still there, spiritual thing, and I can call on it at times, especially when in trouble, yeah"

(Respondent 5, believer)

Later however, she claimed she can understand how people become atheists, and whilst she proclaims herself a believer, she questions her faith to the extent that in the conflict she perceives between science and religion, she is more inclined towards the former:

"I know there's always been conflict between the 2, if you are a believer you say that God created the Earth, the scientists say no, they can prove the Big Bang or whatever, so there's conflict, I'm more to go with the scientist, but deep down, I also go back to when I was, when I was in Church talking about the Earth created in 5 days, so there's conflict for me […], I believe & not believe, sometimes there's conflict when I think about the evidence, […], I think, I wouldn't say I believe […] I'd rather go on what science finds, yeah, there's areas of conflict there, but also, conflict between I suppose my upbringing, what I was taught, & now as an adult thinking and questioning"

(Respondent 5, believer)

Nevertheless, she claimed that there is place for both science and religion in society, that science can not ever displace religion, and she herself draws on her spiritual faith at times:

"I think, there's a place for both of them, […], you can't live with one without the other, ehm, as I said you'll never get rid of religion, there's always people who believe & there's always who'll be challenging & looking to discredit […] Religion is something that is there in a spiritual form, all I know, is that it's there, in a form, if I'm in trouble I'll say 'God help me!', I call on something, you know, it's always there"

(Respondent 5, believer)

Respondent 5's positioning shifts between believer and non-believer throughout the interview. Similarly, her views on the value and merits of religion alternate between appreciating religious faith and opposing it during the same interview. Whilst she claimed that religion may be damaging to children as it can result in children missing out on their childhood, and whilst she further claimed that religion can be damaging to children as they are growing up, by pulling them to the faith when they encounter other people, she also claimed that religious education has a place in the transmission of values and that evil is attributable to the use of religion when it is used to justify wrongdoing.

Similarly, Respondent 8, who claimed to be non-religious at the start of the interview, argued for religious diversity and religious education. He expressed a fascination with religions and an appreciation of religious faiths and what these can do for human beings. Respondent 8 claimed morality exists independently from religion or science, and that religion is often wrongfully invoked in assigning blame:

> "religion is often looked at as a means of scapegoating, and blame can be, sort of, put upon religion, […] religion is blown out of proportion, really"
> (Respondent 8, non-believer)

However, people are quick to jump to conclusions and faith is:

> "massively more complex than most people think"
> (Respondent 8, non-believer)

Respondent 8 claimed that evil is at times seemingly related to religion, but that to understand the meanings of certain acts, a cultural appreciation is required as people's ideas of religion are very different. However, when asked about the value of religious education, he claimed that religion can lead to a pseudo-morality and that religious education is useful insofar as it is a way to teach cultural heritage. In terms of beliefs themselves, Respondent 8 claimed that religious belief should be a matter of personal choice:

"Religion should be something that, you should be, it's like a convenience stores, a corner shop, you can have everything on a shelf and you should be able to read the back of the packet and go ok, ooh, oh, I like the idea, oh this is the ingredients that goes into this religion, ok, put it back and have a look at another one, oh ok, ehm, the taste, yeah it smells quite good, or this one is quite right, I don't know, you can have that choice. You should, but why not, why can't you"
(Respondent 8, non-believer)

Respondent 8's position was that he was himself atheist, fascinated by religion, who was in no position to have a specific point of view on the topic:

"I would say I'm an atheist but I like the idea of this tradition of meeting and greeting, ehm, generally, it's quite a beautiful thing isn't it, if you see a wedding, in Japan, or something like that, it's, it's nice […] I've never read the Bible all the way through, how could I possibly have a correct, not necessarily a correct but, a different point of view, an opinion, or something, that I hardly understand"
(Respondent 8, non-believer)

Other respondents however, presented their convictions in well-articulated points of view, as detailed hereunder. Some of these points of view were held as clear convictions and were relatively closed to alternative points of view that others may hold. Other points of view appreciated the right to have a different opinion, but this appreciation was restricted. Other perspectives could be recognised as long as certain fundamental precepts were adhered to. Finally, another point of view was open to a different way of seeing things. This point of view expressed an appreciation of alternative perspectives according to their own system of rationality.

Monological points of view

Three respondents presented a point of view that was closed to alternative perspectives. These points of view are termed *monological*, as they held their

rationality as the only logical and rightful version. These respondents failed to grant any legitimacy to alternative points of view, and dismissed alternative perspectives as wrong or bad.

Respondent 3 claimed a belief in God and that children should be taught religious education because it helps them become good people. She claimed that she accepts a diversity of beliefs and that she thought everyone should believe in something. In discussing good and bad and the role of religious faith, she positioned herself as a believer of the right faith, that betters people. Others however, may be led to evil by wrong faiths:

> "I think depending on the religious beliefs that you hold it could make you evil, let me put it that way"
> (Respondent 3, believer)

According to Respondent 3, religion can lead to a warped morality "only if it hasn't been explained properly" (Respondent 3), and that those who use religion but commit evil acts do so on the basis of "wrong explanations or interpretations" (Respondent 3). When asked her views on people who believe different things from her, she held that if people were doing evil acts [by her standards], then they adhered to a wrong faith. If they believed the right things, they wouldn't be doing evil:

> "I: What are your views on other people who believe different things from you?
> R: Ehm, I think maybe they've been taught wrongly, they have been taught the wrong things. Some of the ideas are evil. I don't think it's everything that is in religion is evil, but I think some of the beliefs are evil. If they are evil how can they have faith in God?
> I: So you don't think that some people who believe in God are still evil?
> R: I think so yeah, I mean, people who are evil do not believe the same thing as the people who are good, it's not the same faith they have, they believe in something else, they may believe in it & think they are doing the right thing but they are not doing the right thing in society

I: So in other words, if you have a good faith, that makes you a better person

R: Of course

(Respondent 3, believer)

Respondent 3's perspective on science was similarly closed to the consideration of an alternative perspective. She claimed that science and religion are two different things entirely, and that one cannot replace the other because science cannot give what religion can give. Moreover, science has no jurisdiction over religious affairs:

"I: What do you think is the relationship between science and religion?

R: Scientists try to have explanations for everything and they try to create human beings, they don't believe in God, they don't believe in religion, and they try to create but they haven't succeeded, but with technology these days, but no, I don't think so, they cannot create the human being

I: Do you think that science should replace religion?

R: No, they are two separate things, everything a religion gives me science cannot give, I don't think, it's two different things, to me

I: So how are they different?

R: Well, I mean, scientists they do the aeroplanes, do things, but that's not God, protecting me, looking after me while I'm sleeping, looking after my children. Religion gives me someone to look over my shoulder, I mean, that's my religion, to me they're two different things, and it's God who gave scientists their brains anyway, so it can't replace it, but that's my view

I: Do you think that science should investigate religion?

R: What part of religion can science investigate? No, I don't think so, apart from creating the world and all that, then maybe scientists can work out how it's done but apart from that, I don't think, they can't do any spiritual healing and all those things that come with religion that we believe in

I: Do you think they should try to look at things like spiritual healing?

R: No, I don't think so

(Respondent 3, believer)

Respondent 9 denied belief in a religious faith and positioned herself as an agnostic in relation to people who believe in an organised faith. According to her, agnosticism was the rational position:

> "Ehm, because of the uncertainties, I don't know if I describe myself as an atheist, but I'm an agnostic, that's what I'd see myself as, because I, I know that there's got to be a greater being to have created all of this, I know that much, but I can't say exactly, whether that is Allah, or whether that is, you see, I don't know, that's were I'm at. That's what I believe is a rational alternative."
> (Respondent 9, non-believer)

She thought that science should replace religion:

> "I do think that science should replace religion, we need to be going on what's actually there, what's to be able to make sense or what's actually happening"
> (Respondent 9, non-believer)

With regards to issues of morality, whilst science cannot answer what's right or wrong, people should look more critically at what's being affirmed by religious believers. Moreover, science needs to investigate religious matters to shed some light on certain beliefs, as there is a lot of contradictory information around. Whilst she claimed that religion has something to do with morality and learning right from wrong, growing up in a religious faith is no prerequisite for good morals. On the other hand, faith can lead to intolerance and violence, as the example of the Middle East makes clear. According to Respondent 9, this was an example of two sides warring in the name of good and for this reason teaching religion fosters a "distorted attitude of people before you actually know people" (Respondent 9). According to Respondent 9, religion:

> "can affect the way that you, that people perceive you, or how they view other people if you're not like them"
> (Respondent 9, non-believer)

Respondent 7 similarly claimed to be a non-believer, and positioned himself as an atheist during the interview, against religious believers. When asked what beliefs are important to foster in children today he replied:

> "well Santa Claus maybe, I mean there's always, I mean children are thinking till when they are 7 or 8, they are thinking magical still so I think some beliefs are nice like Santa Claus, or little monsters, I guess it's part of their upbringing I guess, but personally I don't think religious things should be taught to children anymore" (Respondent 7, non-believer)

According to Respondent 7, the more we study the world, the more humanity can rid itself of religious belief, to the extent that in our age religious faiths are entertainment rather than something to be taken seriously. Religious beliefs are important to people, but this is because these people are weak and they need some precious comfort from an imaginary world. Also, for some people it has become a cultural habit, something that they do because of who they are rather than because of what they sincerely believe. In any case, religion is something else than facts. Facts are the province of science, and whilst science is in no battle with religion, as, according to Respondent 7, scientists would lower themselves if they devoted their studies to religious matters, nevertheless, facts are replacing religious beliefs with time. The only reason science will not replace religious belief is that it is too hard for humankind to deal with our harsh reality, so we still entertain supernatural beliefs. For this reason, "there has to be a little Peter Pan in everybody" (Respondent 7).

In all these instances, whilst the positions adopted by the three respondents are different (believer, agnostic, atheist), their points of view similarly denigrate those against whom they have positioned themselves. All three points of view present a stereotypical view of the other's perspectives that is wrong and against whom they stand in opposition.

Dialogical points of view

Four respondents held a different type of point of view. These respondents acknowledged diversity and found it enriching. They held that it is fair to hold different perspectives and that these do not have to conflict as people can live together harmoniously. However, this can only happen insofar as some fundamental precepts (the ones they themselves espoused) are adhered to. These points of view are termed *dialogical*. They are open to dialogue with another point of view, but this dialogue is bounded by the logic of their own perspective.

Respondent 1 positioned herself as a non-believer, as someone who had lost her faith, in relation to people who believe in a supernatural faith. Moreover, she thought that religion has been a cause for a lot of conflicts, and that as far as she's concerned it should be banned from schools and replaced by a scientific atheism as religion has done nothing but mess with people's heads. Insofar as morality is concerned, Respondent 1 held that good and evil transcend religion, and they are utilised by religions to advance their own agendas. This in itself makes organised religious movements bad. However, for the individual, their faith might be important:

> "it's their god, so how do you describe that my god is not a good god. My god could be a fairy, […] the Buddhists, they, you know, a god, they call it a different name, but it's a god. The Muslims worship Allah, and it's their god. So that is how they feel comfort, you know, in paying respect to him. As anybody, perhaps in, the USA, worshipping what they see as god, you know, so who are they to judge me, that my god is not a good god or a lesser being, because my god is not the same as their god, […] even if it is a stone, and, you know, that's my god, I get comfort, peace, and it's a big stone, or a rock, or whatever, you know, who is the other person to say to me that I'm crazy, I'm foolish, because I'm worshipping a stone"
> (Respondent 1, non-believer)

What is important, according to Respondent 1, is that people are treated as with respect. According to her:

"religion is like politics, you know, not because I belong to the Conservative party
that I am evil, foolish person"
(Respondent 1, non-believer)

Everyone should be treated as equals, with justice and with respect, whatever their colour, political orientation, or creed. Similarly, Respondent 4 claimed that respect is the core value that must be fostered in children today. Whilst she claimed a conviction in the Catholic faith, she argued that:

"now for you in your religion your God might be Allah, but it's just, that's the name my God has, your God might have a different name, ehm, but because a different culture believes in a different God, I'm not going to say I'm better or worse than you, that is your belief, as long as your belief isn't injuring, isn't harmful, ehm, I'm not going to say I'm better or worse than you, that's your belief and as long you are a good person, and do your best, you know, you can only ever do, the best that you can, I'm not gonna denigrate, anybody for believing in Thor and Odin, and Valhalla, that's their belief or Ra or Aphrodite, that's their strong belief has been made for centuries and millennia, I'm, you know, who am I, I don't, again its about respect, I respect the fact that that's my religion, I respect the fact you have a different religion, and once people have respect, you know"
(Respondent 4, believer)

She explained how respect is at the apex of every religion that seeks to better the human spirit, and for this reason diverse beliefs are not problematic:

"I'm not gonna say that believing in Thor or Odin or Loki, is wrong, no, I don't believe that, I think they are reconcilable, because at the apex of any religion there is always an omnipotent being, and coming down from that omnipotent being there are, what we call helpers, just use that word helpers, God had Jesus, you know, to sort of, make us feel a bit closer to him, then you have your angels, and you have the hierarchy of angels, they're all helpers, the same with Odin, then you have his sons Thor, then you have Loki, so it's all about how the human spirit gets to better

itself, and if you can better yourself and you can be respectful and share that respect, I don't believe it matters really which religion you're doing that in, it just happens, I was born into a Catholic family therefore the religion I was given was Catholic, and I, if it had been another one may be the same thing, but I was thought respect, so I will always respect, other people who have other faiths and yes they are reconcilable and I think it's when men start to look at material things, that's when the religious part takes on a very dark spin, ehm, because people then start to use their religion, no religion says it's right to kill anybody"
(Respondent 4, believer)

Nevertheless, Respondent 4 subtly disapproved of other faiths where equal respect was not forthcoming from her perspective:

"I don't like using religions I don't believe in, but I could pick bits out and say, that's not very, that's not gonna help the women in your society, or that's not gonna help the children, that's gonna keep some people down"
(Respondent 4, believer)

According to Respondent 4, such faults do not pertain to her own creed:

"I know there are some faiths that don't believe that, but I know in the Catholic faith, nobody was, ehm, looked on any worse if they didn't believe"
(Respondent 4, believer)

Respondent 10 positioned himself similar to Respondent 4, that is, as a believer in relation to believers of different faiths, and he claimed a similar conviction:

"I think the Christian religion is the most thought through religion in the world"
(Respondent 10, believer)

However, like Respondent 1 and Respondent 4, Respondent 10 similarly claimed that religious pluralism in itself is not a problem, and that religious faith should be a matter of personal choice:

> "Yeah, if you say to someone this is the religion that you have to learn eh, and this is going to be your religion till the end of your life, it's not correct yeah, as we were taught when we were young yeah, we were taught that Christianity is the right religion for us, but then when you start growing up you start to realise that there are other religions, like the Buddhas, the Muslims and everything, everyone thinks that his religion is the right one, everyone says yeah, well, there is nothing that is written that says Christian is number 1, Muslim is number 2, bla bla bla, so, in a way, if religion is taught in a certain way to say well, this is the religion that we know about, you have to have faith in God, you have to believe in such things, but then, it's up to you if you want to do such things"
>
> (Respondent 10, believer)

Respondent 10 further argued that whilst he would like his children to learn about his own convictions, he will leave their faith up to them and he will respect their choice:

> "I was taught religion and as I said before, I want my children to learn about religion, to know everything about religion, but I'm not gonna say to my children this is the right religion, and you have to do this, and this and this, you know, if they don't believe you know, I'll let them know about religion, and what I used to believe in, then it's up to them, to make their choice, to have their choice, to say well, you know, I believe in this, this, and this God"
>
> (Respondent 10, believer)

Respondent 10 claimed that it is dogmatic religious teaching that is wrong because it can affect us the wrong way:

"R: […] you know sometimes, just, we put so much pressure about religion onto kids, that sometimes they start realising, do I have to do this, if I do this what happens then, and if I do this instead of this, what does that mean yeah, because, you know, when you have children and you're teaching them, you cannot swear, you cannot do this, you cannot do this, they do it, so, when we are teaching our religion, especially the Christian religion, Christianity.

I: So you think when religion is taught in a dogmatic way?

R: It can be, it can affect us in the wrong way

(Respondent 10, believer)

Similarly, Respondent 2, who positioned herself as a believer, disapproved of dogmatic religious convictions in relation to practicing believers:

"in some ways I suppose faith would make you better, in some instances, but not in others, because sometimes with people who can be so much into faith, going to Church everyday and they like pray every day, they have a tendency to stereotype other people, they see them as, if you don't go to Church that means you're not a good person, you know […] I'm not gonna sit here and preach to you about God and you should be doing that or God will be upset with you because you didn't do that, but people will see it as, […], that means you're not a Christian, because you don't spend time talking about God, so, that tendency for people who have too much faith, to stereotype other people that don't have faith, so in a way, it could make those other people that don't go to Church, they're being blamed for not doing something, which, they shouldn't be blamed for it, because you can never know what's inside a person's heart until you actually, only God can know, whether that person believes in Him or not, you can preach it and say, I believe, I believe, but your heart might say something completely different"

(Respondent 2, believer)

In positioning herself as a believer in relation to scientists, whom she regarded as atheists, Respondent 2 argued that it is very well for science to concern itself with investigating religious claims. She granted that religious belief raises certain questions, and for this reason she is sympathetic with those who question religion and put religious doctrine under scientific scrutiny. She held that if people believe in science, then they have equal rights to further their individual conviction. Moreover, that might mean that in future we might be living according to facts not to faith:

> "It should, it should, I don't see why not, because we can't all be the same, we can't all believe in God, and there will always be people who are different from us, it should, ehm, because who knows maybe in the future we'll be living according to facts not according to faith, so if that's what science views as the best way forward for themselves, they need to do that, I don't see why not, it's just about, it's an individual choice"
> (Respondent 2, believer)

Respondent 2 claimed that she thought science should not replace religious belief, although it probably would the way things are going. She personally held that believing in science is believing in something that can break, but that believing in science is easier than believing in religion as science provides tangible evidence. She could therefore understand how atheism could seem as the rational alternative to certain people. Nevertheless, she held that:

> "if you believe in God you will continue to believe in God whether or not what has been proven by scientists is right or wrong"
> (Respondent 2, believer)

She claimed that science cannot ever grasp the personal meaning of religion:

> "it's that feeling you have inside of you, you can't go out there and say, I've seen that and that's God. And how do you prove that, if you can't see it […] you can't go inside somebody's heart and pop inside thinking that you will understand how they're feeling, you can't, you know, you can do as much research as you want to do about it but you can never see it, or touch it […] how do I believe in religion when I don't know where it started, is it, you have to believe something that you can see and touch and sometimes you just think, if I believe in this thing, I don't know what it is about, chances are, well, I'm never gonna meet God, you're not gonna meet angels or whatever, but you continue to believe in it, if that's something to believe in"
> (Respondent 2, believer)

The points of view articulated by these four respondents are similar in as much as they all accept the fact that other people who hold different points of view have an equal right to their views as much as they. Whether their own points of view are of believers in relation to non-believers, or believers in relation to atheists or scientists, or non-believers in relation to believers, they all grant others a personal right to individual choice and equal recognition in society. These points of view are dialogical inasmuch as they are open to interrelation with other perspectives. However, their openness is bounded. They are restricted by the requirement that points of view must adhere to criteria for reciprocal recognition. The fundamental criteria for equal recognition must be adhered by all. Everyone has a right to their opinion as long as they respect everyone else's. Respect and recognition for the right of alternative perspectives to exist overrules any claims to verity. Other points of view can only be legitimated insofar as they conform to the principle of equal recognition. What these points of view do, in granting other perspectives a right to exist, is they apportion for themselves that very same right and as a result retain their relative verity in the face of counter-perspectives. Consequently, the possibility of the other's points of view being right and of one's point of view being wrong need not be entertained. Believers will continue to believe, but they will let others not

believe if they so desire. Non-believers will not believe, but they will allow others to believe in whatever it is they want to believe, for whatever reason. In both cases, the freedom for others to be wrong holds insofar as it does not restrict one's right to be right.

Metalogical Points of View

In marked contrast to the two points of view above, one respondent, who declared himself a non-believer, articulated a point of view that was manifestly different from any other in the study. This point of view doubted the certainty of its own position relative to other perspectives, and granted that others may actually be right, although the respondent believed it not to be so. Nevertheless, this basic doubt in relation to his own position enabled him to question his own belief system and entertain the possibility of error in his own beliefs that required examination of 'eco-logical' proof (Gigerenzer, 2002). This third category of points of view can be described as *metalogical*. Bateson (1972/2000) defines a metalogue as a conversation that not only discusses the problem, but also attends to the structure of the conversation as a whole. In mathematical and computational logic, metalogical frameworks are those that represent other logics and are able to reason about their metalogical properties (Basin et al., 2004). A point of view that questions its own veracity, considers the possibility of error of one's own belief system, and entertains the logicality of another belief system, can thus be deemed to demonstrate metalogical properties. This respondent positioned himself as a non-believer, but considered religious beliefs important. Furthermore, he considered that it is important to learn not just *what* other people believe, that is the *contents* of faith, but more importantly *why* they believe what they believe, that is the *rationale* that justifies the content of the belief:

> "They're important because a lot of people have religious beliefs and therefore it's important to understand them, ehm, and it's important for individuals and therefore it should be important to some extent, for everybody to understand what everyone

else is thinking, or, not what they're thinking but, you know, some comprehensions of what they believe and why they believe it, it's very important to help you understand other people around you, ehm, yeah"

(respondent 6, non-believer)

He maintained that what is good to one person may be bad to another, depending on underlying belief systems, and crucially, the meaning of good and bad depends on what point of view an individual adopts:

"if somebody, thought what they're doing is right then they're gonna believe it's right whatever its in the eyes of the majority or other people that think it's wrong and evil as it says, ehm and therefore yeah religion can certainly play a good big part in that bit, but things which aren't religion as well. As far as I am concerned, killing people is wrong but people join the army in this country or any other army, and will go out and they will do things that are incredibly wrong, and they think they're doing good and they might never think otherwise, and it might never get questioned but in actual facts, if a soldier from this country is blowing up a house with children in it, well I think that's evil, that's pretty evil, […], I think evil is incredibly difficult to define that or what's bad and what's good cause it is always in the eyes of the perception, ehm"

(respondent 6, non-believer)

Asked whether he thinks there is such a thing as objective good and bad, he replied that there is a clear pattern for him but that this might not translate to other people's situations:

"There is in my head but that does not cross over to other people, so I have to accept that, though I think that my way, my belief system works, what's right and wrong, there's a clear pattern. I don't necessarily follow it, but there is a clear pattern of what's right and wrong, without being involved too much, I think, but, not for other people, obviously cause they have different views as what's right and wrong"

(respondent 6, non-believer)

This relative rationality applied to himself as much as it did to others. According to Respondent 6, his own anti-religious stance was sensible only from his own point of view:

> "I see religion as causing completely wrong priorities from my point of view"
> (respondent 6, non-believer)

He also acknowledges that whilst he is not a believer and has never been a Christian, his own morality is very similar to Christianity as a result of his socialisation and the influence Christianity has had on his own society. He maintains that a religious upbringing might have a negative impact on children, but crucially, he goes on to make the following claim:

> "R: But, I could be wrong, one of these religions could be right and therefore if I brought up children without religion, or without the true one, then I would be doing them a disservice, it's not what I believe but it could be the case"
> (respondent 6, non-believer)

This point of view presents an opinion that whilst claiming a veridical subjective reality, is permeated by self-doubt, and excludes neither the legitimacy of alternative opinions, nor, more crucially, their underlying logicality. The certainty of knowledge is doubted, and the point of view is open to alternative truths. It extends others, not simply the right to be wrong, but also the right to be right. As Marková (2003b) argues, knowledge, certainty and truth all go together as knowledge must have a degree of certainty otherwise it would not be knowledge. The metalogical point of view embodies the idea of relative certainty, in contrast to absolute certainty (Latour, 1999). Latour demonstrated how this same principle of doubt is at work in Pasteur's yeast studies. Pasteur's point of view is also a metalogical point of view in that it considers the possibility of being wrong, and leaves itself open to the possibility of refutation according to some other reasoning. This method of Cartesian doubt has become the hallmark of the knowledge 'fabricated[15]' by modern science

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[15] In the Latourian sense refers to the cumulative production of knowledge. See Latour (1999).

(Jovchelovitch, 2007). Transposed to a point of view, this method of self-doubt is what characterises a metalogical position.

The metalogical point of view is an agnostic point of view (Latour, 1999). It doubts not the content of belief, but as Latour postulates, it doubts the doubting of beliefs. A metalogical point of view considers any point of view to be a product of the situation and circumstances, and as such, considers that itself has no power to correct any belief if that belief is reasonable given the conditions of its production. This is the position assumed by Respondent 6 in relation to others who espouse a belief. It does not question the veracity of a belief, but questions the belief that others simply *believe* (i.e. naïve content). The metalogical point of view considers knowledge as a matter of *fact*, which contexts make a matter of course[16]. Knowledge that acquires the status of 'of course knowledge' is what a community holds as common-sense. At that point, the veracity of the original fact need no longer be questioned, it can be taken for granted. What is crucial about this process is that the metalogical point of view comes with an awareness that one's point of view is as fabricated as any other, and conversely. In this way, it is therefore in a position to consider alternative viewpoints at par, even those based on a different frame of reference. A metalogical point of view, in its agnosticism, is the only perspective that has the potential to bridge the chasm between divergent points of view based on differently fabricated social realities.

Discussion

The degree of openness to alternatives is an underlying factor in the point of view typology identified in this study. This is similar to Krech's (1949) findings that systems vary in their propensity to relate to other systems, as well as to Rokeach's three-fold distinction in the cognitive organisation of narrow-mindedness (see Chapter 3). This basis for categorisation is, moreover, isomorphic to the

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[16] Given a particular context, one is able to see how a particular fabricated version of reality is established as a fact, and how in relation to this fabrication it is wholly reasonable that this point of view is able to arise in due course.

categorisation of social representations, communication patterns, and behavioural orientations (Table 8). Moscovici (1988) distinguishes between three types of representations: *hegemonic* representations, those shared by all members of a highly structured group; *emancipated* representations, characteristic of subgroups who in close contact with others create their own version of reality; and *polemical* representations, those created in circumstances of controversy and not shared by all. These are in themselves isomorphic to the distinctions made by Moscovici (1961/1976) with regard to communication styles for different social groups, namely propaganda, propagation, and diffusion (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).

The degree of openness is by definition low in hegemonic representations, and similarly in monological points of view. Propaganda promotes one strict version of reality, perpetuated by stereotypes. On the other hand, emancipated representations consider divergent positions to an extent. Engagement with divergent positions is limited in propagation, and aimed at shaping attitudes. Similarly, the dialogical point of view engages with another perspective only insofar as some basic premises are met. Metalogical points of view, however, are open not only to other perspectives but also to their methods of validation. Alternatives are considered as legitimate opinions. Communication aims at providing information. The representational field is polemical as divergent perspectives are allowed to take a standpoint.

	Representations	Communication	Point of view
Closed	Hegemonic	Propaganda	Monological
Bounded	Emancipated	Propagation	Dialogical
Open	Polemical	Diffusion	Metalogical

Table 8: Isomorphic categorisations

Since the mid-20th century, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) has provided the primary strategy for analysing intergroup contact (Dovidio et al., 2005). The contact hypothesis, in its simplest form, proposes that bringing together individuals from different groups under optimal conditions reduces prejudice and improves intergroup relations (Hewstone et al., 2005). Allport (1954) outlines four prerequisite

conditions for positive contact: equal status between groups, cooperative interaction, opportunities for intergroup acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms (Dovidio et al. 2005). Under these conditions, intergroup contact improves tolerance, and reduces prejudice and conflict. The contact hypothesis has gathered meta-analytic support (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). More significantly, Hewstone and his colleagues (Hewstone et al., 2005) found evidence for perspective taking as a mediator of contact. Their findings suggest that contact is associated with a greater willingness to take the other community's perspective on the conflict and that this makes a unique contribution in the prediction of prejudice, trust, and forgiveness. Differences in perspective are significant in shaping perceptions of contact and reactions to it (Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Dovidio, et al., 2005). On a practical level, these may mitigate interventions and lead to failure in bringing about long-lasting societal changes (Hewstone, 1996).

The preconditions set out in the contact hypothesis appeal to the open system. According to the hypothesis, positive contact outcomes are achieved in conditions of equal status, cooperation, acquaintance, and supportive institutional norms. These conditions are an instance of intercultural relations characterised by open dynamics. Where open systems allow perspective taking and thereby positive intergroup outcomes, bounded systems limit perspective taking and lead to instances of problematic relations. Closed systems prohibit perspective taking and are characterised by conflictual relations. For contact to produce positive outcomes, systems need to move from closed or bounded to open.

One could further extend the above table to include different forms of intercultural relations, arguing that isomorphic processes underlie intercultural relations. Whilst the contact hypothesis specifies but one instance of intercultural relations, in this meta-perspective it can be applied to the problem of acculturation. A closed system will lead to *coercive* relations, where a particular worldview is imposed on others. This is typified in a monological point of view that does not grant alternative points of view the right to exist. The political movements of nazism, fascism, and

communism have borne all the characteristics of a closed system. A bounded system leads to efforts at *influence*. Small concessions may be made in the realisation that something may also be gained from dialogue, but the substance of one's perspective is retained and efforts to influence the other to adopt it characterise relations. This is typified in a dialogical point of view where the right to hold a different point of view is granted, but the possibility of the other point of view to be right is not entertained. The other point of view is extended the right to be wrong. One could argue that the export of democracy by Western powers worldwide is such an instance. It assumes unquestioningly that democracy is the best form of government for one and all, and justifies efforts to influence other nations, implicitly and explicitly, to adopt such a political system. Lastly, an open system leads to symmetrical *discussion* and genuine perspective taking. It is the social system that leads to positive contact outcomes by fulfilling the preconditions of the contact hypothesis. The various parties involved in intercultural relations are open to each other's perspectives and each other's reality. Interaction is not guided by any effort to prevail, but simply by an effort to understand the other and by striving to find a pragmatic solution for some common problem. This is typified in a metalogical point of view that not only legitimates another point of view's right to exist and to be wrong, it also grants it the right to be right.

The extension of the categorisation model to intercultural relations suggests that the reason why dialogue in intercultural relations often fails is that parties retain the right to attempt to influence each other, either in an effort to achieve recognition in the case of a minority, or in an effort to achieve solidarity in the case of a majority. This violates the condition of equal status between groups prescribed by the contact hypothesis. Attempts at influence may preclude the possibility to engage in mutually open discussion. If dialogue is to be truly open, influence must be cast aside and replaced by a reflexivity of the fabrication of perspectives that characterises a metalogical point of view. Mutual and reciprocal agnosticism, grounded in relative certainty, is the hallmark of true dialogue.

Conclusion

Understanding the relation between the individual and the social requires the understanding of points of view (Liu & László, 2007). In this concept, social psychology can move to an analysis of the openness, and thereby compatibility and reconciliatory potential, of different points of view based on different backgrounds of intelligibility. In different cultural contexts, different worldviews are fabricated that serve individuals with knowledge that provides certainty, assumed as objective reality (Moghaddam, 2003).

This study has demonstrated that individuals can express similar attitudes that are however based on different points of view. Individuals with different points of view were similarly inclined towards religion or science in the present study. Moreover, similar points of view towards religion or science were at times based on different social representations of religion or science. Individuals could, for example, agree that religion ought to be replaced by science, but they could provide different rationales for this. On the other hand, this study also demonstrated how similar social representations could nevertheless lead to individuals holding different points of view in relation to the same object. Individuals originating from similar social groups and espousing the same worldview could nevertheless themselves be either atheists or believers. These findings legitimate the claim that the point of view is in itself a distinct analytical construct than either attitudes or social representations.

This study further revealed that points of view can be typified according to the extent to which they concede another perspective the possibility of being right in terms of their own system of logicality. Kruglanski (1989) draws attention to the characteristic of logicality in his theory of lay epistemics. In this vein, a point of view can be monological, where it is closed to another point of view altogether. Points of view can be dialogical, where they are open to the existence of another point of view but where they do not entertain the possibility of the other point of view being right. Finally, a point of view can be metalogical, where it is open not

only to the possibility of other people having a different point of view, but additionally the point of view is open to the other point of view's rationale. A metalogical point of view therefore entertains the possibility for one's own point of view to be wrong, and for it to stand to be corrected by an alternative point of view. It is in this case that the requirements for the interpenetration of views, outlined by Asch (1952/1987), can be fulfilled, even in conditions where this interpenetration of views is required to bridge the chasm between distinct worldviews. In this condition, another's point of view can still serve as auxiliary to one's own, even though it might be legitimated by an incommensurable logic. In such circumstances, humans can face their objective reality with joint purpose.

The chasm which intercultural contact is required to bridge is that between different objective realities. Understanding the other requires an ability to comprehend objectifications of the world that are different from one's own (Moghaddam, 2003). Adopting an open point of view of reciprocal agnosticism and relative certainty is a requirement for bridging this divide. On the face of it, to the parties concerned in dialogue, this position may appear as illogical cross-fertilisation. The other's position, based on a different frame of reference, appears objectively false, unreasonable, and blatantly illogical. If this position is maintained however, the only reasonable outcomes possible remain influence, or in a worst-case scenario, conflict, as Benhabib (2002) rightly claims. The only way forward is to relinquish absolute certainty and adopt a metalogical position that is open to understand the other on the other's terms, in the context of the other's own objective reality. The great significance of a metalogical position is that it opens the path to interobjectivity (Moghaddam, 2003).

The negotiation of points of view with a different frame of reference is the topic of the second empirical study in this inquiry. The case study of Maltese migrants to the United Kingdom provides an opportunity for analysing how individuals negotiate points of view acquired in their country of origin in a different society where a different frame of reference operates. Such dynamics of the public sphere are

different in their nature from the cosmopolitan one that characterised this study, in which different perspectives encountered each other based on different worldviews. In the conditions adopted for the next study, however, an alien point of view remains illegitimate inasmuch as the social representations that legitimate it originally have no currency in a foreign public sphere in which there is no native community representing one's native worldview. Different perspectives, in this case, are not instances of disagreements based on a similar frame of reference.

The following case thus presents a singular opportunity to study points of view as they encounter other points of view based on a different background of intelligibility. Such characteristics of the public sphere are requisite for the study of interpersonal characteristics of points of view that are not present in either cosmopolitan publics (as in Study 1) or hegemonic ones (as in Study 3), in both of which the underlying worldview has legitimacy. In such cases, the study of points of view in relation is confounded by that of social representations in relation. The following study, however, aims to shed light on the interpersonal outcomes of holding certain points of view. The negotiation of points of view is a requirement for these immigrants if their perspectives are to be sensible and meaningful in their new conditions, in the absence of a community that validates their original common-sense. The interpersonal effects and outcomes of such negotiation are the topic of the next study.

Chapter 6
Interpersonal Characteristics

Introduction

The Maltese community in Britain, particularly in London, has been the subject of a detailed investigation by Dench (1975). Dench has documented the erosion of ethnic consciousness in the Maltese community and its eventual demise in Britain. His motive for studying the Maltese community in Britain was that, in his words: "The Maltese community in Britain has a number of peculiarities which make its problems rather different from those of most minorities. Because of these odd features it may seem that their case holds little of general interest. But in fact just because it is unusual, this case-study is able to show up certain aspects of the minority situation in a particularly conspicuous form, and helps to highlight the existence of forces […] whose operation is in ordinary circumstances overlooked. Hence it is in fact a most instructive case, and by virtue of its very singularity raises important questions […] which might otherwise be more difficult to formulate" (1975, p. 7-8).

The same conditions that made the study of the Maltese community in Britain pertinent to Dench's investigation remain today, and for similar reasons are considered also pertinent to the present study. The Maltese community remains fragmented, to the extent that it is difficult to talk about its very existence. In these conditions, Maltese migrants to Britain are required to negotiate their migration and settlement on their own account. Upon migration, they are unable to draw on community resources and their lifestyle of origin to negotiate the challenges of a new social reality. The resources they are required to draw on are their own individual resources; they do not have access to community social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995). In these conditions, any conflicting perspectives that they may hold in relation to their settlement communities require negotiation on the basis of a different background of intelligibility than the one that informs their own. Maltese social representations do not have currency in Britain in the absence of a Maltese community, and any points of view that are informed by these social representations are more or less discrepant with British mentality. The resolution of this discrepancy

requires the negotiation of points of view according to an alternative form of understanding, that is, British mentality.

Different types of point of view are more or less open to different mentalities, as the previous study has documented (see Chapter 5). An encounter with a different mentality puts a strain on the individual whose now alien point of view is not conversant with, or open to, that new mentality. An encounter with a new mentality does not only question a point of view. The challenge it poses goes down to its very roots; a new mentality can challenge the veracity of a point of view as well as its sensibility and legitimacy. For the individual, what would have previously been the order of the day is questioned, challenged, and potentially derogated by the new mentality. An individual, whose perspectives and ways of living served to navigate social life comfortably, suddenly finds herself and her ways of living at odds with the new framework. What was previously held as natural becomes odd and inappropriate (Schuetz, 1944; Asch, 1952; Benhabib, 2002; Chryssochoou, 2004).

In his essay on the social psychology of the 'cultural' stranger, Schuetz (1944) claims that the approaching stranger does not have the recipe for standardised social reality prevalent in the host community and consequently, the stranger must place into question what seems unquestionable to the community. This dislocates the stranger's point of view, based as it is on a different but habitual system of reference, and requires its modification to a new framework of social practices. In the absence of a diasporic community that can provide shelter from this epistemic challenge, posed by the encounter with a new social reality, the individual is required to negotiate discrepancies in perspective or fail to integrate (Berry, 1970, 1974, 1980). The case of the Maltese in Britain presents a fortuitous occasion to study the interpersonal aspects of points of view when these relate with others. Points of view in relation can be based on a similar or different bedrock of common-sense. An empirical inquiry into points of view requires sensitivity to this condition, and the case of the Maltese in Britain affords a singular opportunity to study this negotiation from the point of view of the stranger.

The interviews conducted in this study constituted an interaction between two strangers' points of view, to use Schuetz's term, that between them shared a common framework of understanding, i.e. the Maltese framework shared between the respondent and the researcher, with regard to a different system of social representations, i.e. that of life in Britain. This allowed a focused study of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view, due to the fact that the relations under study (i.e. that of the respondent in relation to a different social framework) could be directly attributed to points of view rather than to processes that pertain to the encounter of social representations. This is because the relations of a stranger's point of view with an alien system of social representations are characteristically interpersonal and not intergroup in the condition of an absence of a legitimating native community. Had the study been undertaken in the presence of a legitimating native community, the observed characteristics could have been attributable to intergroup rather than interpersonal relations. For example, in the case of difficulty in achieving integration, the failure may have been on the part of the community itself rather than any particular point of view within it. In fact, even if certain points of view in such a situation may have been conducive to successful integration, the mediation of a community as a collective may have prevented it. In the absence of a legitimating community, no such mediation takes place such that the success or failure of certain individuals to relate is directly attributable to them rather than any intercession on the part of the communities in which they are embedded. This critical condition, unlike the first inquiry that sought to discover the myriad instantiations of points of view that transpire under different relational conditions (i.e. both within and outside a system of social representations), required exclusion for a focused study of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view that is not confounded by intergroup processes of social re-presentation (Chryssides et al., 2009). The characteristics observable in this second empirical inquiry are thus attributable to points of view, and document the interpersonal characteristics of the various point of view types identified in the first study.

On the other hand, this study could have equally been undertaken in a condition where the point of view does not traverse the chasm between different social realities. Interpersonal relations between different points of view that are both rooted in the same framework of understanding would have fulfilled the same conditions, but would have not extended as far. The discrepancy between the various positions is essentially less than that in positions that bridge different social representations. The former is nested within the latter. This is due to the fact that the interpersonal relations between points of view can be of four types: a. between similar points of view that are based in similar social representations; b. between different points of view that are based in similar social representations; c. between similar points of view that are based in different social representations; d. between different points of view that are based in different social representations.

Whilst it is obvious that these different conditions are hardly amenable to experimental manipulation, the study of the points of view of Maltese migrants to London presents an opportunity to inquire into the relational aspects of points of view when they succeed in negotiating a different frame of reference and adopt some position within it, as well as when they do not and remain firmly rooted in an alien frame of reference. This means that the instance of points of view relating to others on the basis of a common frame of reference is still present in this inquiry for those that have successfully negotiated a position within the new framework. These may then have retained or relinquished their positions in the other frame of reference. Which means to say that the plethora of interpersonal relations that may characterise points of view are presumed to be represented in this case, and the four types of interpersonal relations between points of view present within the relations that take place with regard to a different frame of reference. This accrues from the two-dimensional nature of inquiry undertaken in this study, i.e. looking at interpersonal relations of points of view as they relate to a new social reality as well as their original frame of reference.

Background

On the 1st of May 2004 Malta, along with nine other countries, joined the European Union in the bloc's largest enlargement to date. With their accession, new member states were extended the Four Freedoms, a set of treaty provisions between member states that allow for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people within the internal market of the European Union. Due to concerns over mass migration, however, the free movement of people from the new states to the old EU15 was transitionally restricted until 2011. Malta was exempted such restrictions. Consequently, a number of Maltese citizens moved to other European countries to enjoy the newly acquired home status benefits for work and study. Due to the long-standing affinity between Malta and Britain, a number of Maltese headed to the United Kingdom.

Malta's relations with Great Britain are long-standing. In the late 18th century the British backed a military uprising by the Maltese against the ruling French. Following surrender by the French in 1800 the island was presented by Maltese leaders to British Admiral Sir Alexander Ball for dominion. In 1814 Malta officially became a part of the British Empire. British rule remained throughout the two world wars until independence in 1964. In 1974 Malta became a republic within the British Commonwealth. Five years later, in 1979, British forces pulled out fully and terminated their longstanding stay in Malta.

At the end of WWII, Maltese were among the first colonial citizens to embark on large-scale migration to Britain, and they are assumed to have set up a sizeable community there (Dench, 1975). Until the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, the Maltese could travel freely to Britain. For those who did, Britain provided a convenient exile from religious sanctions. Dench reports that "As the stronghold of personal liberties and the free society, Britain has been a particularly attractive destination for Maltese seeking refuge from religious oppression" (1975, p. 25). London became the natural hub of Maltese communal life in Britain. However, the

Maltese community in London displayed little organisation or cohesion at the time of Dench's study and this fact became the central problem of his enquiry.

Dench noted how the Maltese that were attracted to Britain displayed strong individualistic tendencies and had minimal interest in cultivating a local Maltese community. Most of them were single, young men whose motives consisted of a mixture of religious escapism, economic pursuit, and adventure. The casual, disorganised nature of migration to Britain, compared to other Maltese settlement countries, offered these individuals greater liberation to the extent that, rather than being prepared to go a little out of their way to meet their fellow countrymen, Dench noted that most of them went to some trouble not to. The majority of them had sufficient knowledge of English to enable them to gain employment with non-Maltese and this enabled their quick adaptation to British society. Additionally, most of them did not aspire to settle permanently in Britain, but saw their stay away from Malta as temporary and had plans to go back once their objectives had been met.

Nevertheless, an extension of the British heritage in Malta took shape by migrants in London. One of the main services provided by the Maltese to the British garrison in Malta was culinary, in the form of numerous cafés and eating houses catering for sailors and servicemen in the dock area. This servicing role was exported to London, not surprisingly concentrated in the Docklands area in East London, particularly Stepney. These small Maltese cafés grow also out of indigenous Maltese life. In small villages in Malta, local cafés served as the only real social centres not run or dominated by the Catholic Church. Consequently, as Dench noted, they served as a natural alternative of community life for migrants who rejected the church and the family-centred culture of straight Maltese life. A café society sprung up amongst Maltese in London that provided a niche for recent migrants, and that retained the same secular characteristics of café life in Malta.

Other than culinary services, the cafés around the Grand Harbour in Malta provided yet other services to the British garrison, namely those of a sexual nature. The

replacement of the Knights by the British garrison created demand for sexual services and increased possibilities for honourable marriages between servicemen and well-born mistresses. A number of families' livelihood in the Grand Harbour area thus came to depend exclusively on the sexual economy. However, young Maltese men in Malta were not spared the Catholic moral sanctioning. Their sexual desires were inflamed by the restraints imposed on them by religious and public opinion. According to Dench, this frustration may have been a veritable cause for emigration for Maltese individuals who did not share the moral righteousness of Maltese society at large.

Upon emigration, Maltese migrants lapsed from their country's religious code. The café society of Maltese in Britain became an expression of a secular counter-culture, a promised land where sexual behaviour was uncluttered by moral prohibitions. In London, their rebellious sentiments exploded in rampant selfishness and individualism, and found gainful expression in the organisation of the provision of sex services in the Docklands. Seasoned criminals were selectively drawn to London to serve in the pimping trade. Maltese café society became an organised vice network run by Maltese criminals. Dench estimated that at the time of his study a quarter of Maltese settlers had served or were serving prison sentences, and possibly up to one half had been sentenced on some criminal charge in London. The completed criminality rate, that is, the chance of being convicted at some time during settlement, would have been higher yet. The net effect of this activity was that "Among a community with a generally bad reputation, the Maltese had a specifically bad name" (p. 71).

Public opinion in Britain considered these activities as particularly loathsome and despicable, and consequently the Maltese were subjected to a lot of hostile press and negative stereotypes. This further compounded the lack of cohesion within the Maltese community in London and led to further erosion of ethnic consciousness, as Maltese migrants sought to disassociate themselves from the stereotype of the Maltese ponce. The outcome of these historical events was the breakdown of the

entire community of Maltese in Britain (Dench, 1975). Following Malta's independence from Great Britain, immigration was significantly curbed, which meant that the renewal of a Maltese community was no longer sustainable.

More than three decades later, these events have been largely forgotten by Londoners as well as the British population at large. However, traces of collective remembering (Bartlett, 1932) remain for the Maltese in Malta that may impede or deter the formation of a new community in Britain following renewed migration due to Malta's accession into the EU. Due to the community breakdown of the sixties, Maltese migrants to the UK are no longer able to initiate their settlement through the mediation of a native community in their host country. With the exception of individuals who have Maltese relatives who settled in Britain at the time of the above-mentioned events, recent Maltese migrants to Britain have had to negotiate their migration on their own.

Aside from all other implications, the central problem of this investigation is how these recent migrants have negotiated their perspectives towards their new life once they arrived in Britain. Their points of view towards this new life have necessarily been forged in the context of a Maltese mentality that legitimated their move to Britain. In Britain, however, their perspectives need adjustment to a different frame of reference. In spite of their long-standing affinity, Britain and Malta are very different countries. Maltese mentality is imbued in traditions of religiosity, family solidarity, Eurocentrism, and a Mediterranean lifestyle. In Britain these socio-political values have little currency. The reasons for which the migrants' move to the UK may have been sensible given a Maltese mentality, may be totally discrepant with British mentality. Consequently, their outlooks require adjustment to a new, unmediated reality. There is for them no option of resorting to a local community that can provide a safe intercultural haven. There is no possibility to do things right according to a Maltese mentality, in the UK. Their outlooks are required to fit and make sense within a different frame of reference. These historical circumstances provided the socio-political context for the present study.

Findings

The present inquiry involved a series of interviews undertaken with Maltese migrants to Britain that sought to study respondents' points of view towards Britain and Malta. Data analysis revealed some characteristic differences in the interpersonal relations enacted between different types of points of view. Individuals with monological points of view were found to fit in a single culture that they called home. Their social networks consisted of fellow members of that culture with whom they fit, and this fit marked their social identities–what made them belong to one group also excluded them from another group. Individuals with dialogical points of view were able to relate to both cultures, although they overvalued one and undervalued another. They fit better in one culture that to them was more homely than the other, into which they fit much less naturally. They were open to relations with both communities, although one of them came with reservations. Their identities were dual, but stood in opposition to others with a single identity. Individuals with metalogical points of view, on the other hand, fit as well in one culture as they did in the other, identified equally with both cultures, felt at home in both, and were open to equal relations with both.

Whilst individuals with monological points of view were therefore able to position themselves within a single culture, which positioning prevented their ability to position themselves in relation with another simultaneously, for individuals with dialogical points of view this positioning was curtailed but not prevented, whilst for those with metalogical points of view this was unrestricted. Individuals with metalogical points of view were able to position themselves in both settings without contradiction. Consequently, by virtue of their encounter with an alternative mentality, individuals holding metalogical points of view claimed that they had broadened their perspectives but that this did not preclude their ability to relate back to their former mentality, whereas for those with dialogical points of view, this broadening hindered their ability to relate back to their original framework. For

individuals with monological points of view, there was no difference in perspective as these were fully preserved through the sacrifice of fitting. The main differences between types that emerged from this inquiry are presented in Table 9 and detailed hereunder.

	Monological	**Dialogical**	**Metalogical**
Fitting In	Fit in 1 culture	Fit well in culture 1; not well in culture 2	Fit in both
Social network	Exclusively 1 type	2 types (Preferential/Conditional/ Restricted)	2 types
Identity	Exclusive	Dual (Oppositional)	Dual (Non-oppositional)
Home	One home	One is more home than the other	Two homes
Perspective	No change	Change, with consequences on fitting	Change, with no consequences on fitting

Table 9: Comparative thematic coding results

This study also demonstrated that there were no differences between individuals who held characteristic types of point of view in their preference for intercultural relations. All respondents expressed a preference for the assimilation acculturation strategy over other forms of relations (Berry, 2001). However, whilst they expressed preferences for assimilation, the fact that individuals with certain points of view retained relations with the two cultures simultaneously to varying degrees also meant that there were differences between types in the social capital they fostered (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995). Not everyone was equally capable of investing in bonding as well as bridging social capital (Gittel & Vidal, 1998). Consequently, the outcome in acculturation was markedly different between types. Only individuals displaying metalogical points of view demonstrated a capacity for integration. Finally, this study also demonstrated that when points of view enter relations with other points of view that may not comprehend their logic, they stand to make an

attribution of ignorance to the other to preserve their original position. These findings, along with the characteristic differences in interpersonal relations between types, are detailed further hereunder.

Fitting In

A central difference between point of view types was in their holders' ability to fit in to British culture. Respondents with a monological point of view claimed that they fit seamlessly in one culture and not very well at all in the other, even though they may have spent the large portion of their life in their country of origin:

> I feel more at home here than I used to there; I fit so much better here; I am definitely more home here than I ever was in Maltese culture; I feel I never fitted with that culture, and I used to feel I was a misfit
> (Respondent 26, Monological)

They claimed that if there was any adjustment required, it was to good things in British culture because they were so unused to things working out well. By contrast, in Malta they would feel out of place given who they are, as if they were "a fish out of the water" (Respondent 34, Monological). A clue as to the underlying causes is provided by Respondent 12, who claims:

> The difficulties I had in Malta were matters of principle rather than practicalities that could be sorted; I couldn't get used to the fact that my boss was unqualified and he was there because he had the right links; these things define me as a person so there can be no compromise over them, whilst going to the pub is not a principle, it's a practicality
> (Respondent 12, Monological)

Even in practical matters, respondents claimed that these presented no difficulty and that they were able to take to British culture with ease, to the extent that matters that might have been an issue for them in Malta were no longer such in Britain: "here I mind the rain but there I didn't" (Respondent 34, Monological [returned to Malta temporarily]). The same pattern of fit is also noticeable in respondents with a monological perspective that favours Malta. They claimed they faced difficulties in settling in Britain because they weren't cut out for that kind of life:

> I couldn't settle and I didn't want to settle; I came, but not happily; I hated Britain, I hated the British; everything here was silly, I didn't like the course, I didn't like my place; I didn't make an effort because I wasn't cut out for here and I'd decided that on the last day of the course I'd head back
> (Respondent 1, Monological)

> you survive there if you're into pub culture, but we didn't adopt the British way of life
> (Respondent 37, Monological)

And even after an extended stay in Britain these respondents find no problem in fitting back in Malta. They claim that no adjustment was required on their part to fit back into Maltese culture:

> didn't need adjustment; you need to get used to a few things […] we didn't have problems […] the kids did not need any adjustment at all
> (Respondent 37, Monological)

By contrast, respondents with dialogical points of view claimed that their move from one country to the other required some adjustment due to a new social reality they encountered:

I personally just wasn't ready for it initially, I needed adjustment

(Respondent 7, Dialogical)

at the end of the day I'm still Maltese, so these are not things I look forward to

(Respondent 19, Dialogical)

However, these respondents were able to adapt their character to the new environment:

here there's a culture of going to the pub, you make the effort

(Respondent 3, Dialogical)

those who do not persevere fail; it's a test for character

(Respondent 20, Dialogical)

In talking about their ability to fit in British culture, respondents with a dialogical point of view demonstrate, however, that their adaptation may also have had repercussions on their perspective towards Malta and their capacity to function there:

it's nice to go back but if you live there - there are people watching over you, not because they want but because that's what things are like

(Respondent 31, Dialogical)

Respondents with metalogical points of view claimed that whilst they faced the same conditions as their fellow compatriots, they were able to adjust and fit in to British culture just like dialogical types:

it took me a while to get used to going to the pub but once you get to know your friends it's ok, I used to avoid it but now I look forward to it; I wouldn't do it in Malta, but here it's fine

(Respondent 10, Metalogical)

at the end of the day I never had a problem with integration; I managed my goals; I was a foreigner doing assessments on British wealthy families, but I was accepted and clients trusted me and my boss drilled into me that I was an agent of the state

(Respondent 33, Metalogical)

Their adaptation however did not come at the cost of their ability to function in Malta. Respondent 33 returned to Malta after a brief stay in Britain. Whilst he recognises that his experience changed him and that he became more liberal as a result of his move to Britain, he also claims that:

I don't say those around me are idiots and I'm the only sensible one around; I can still voice my perspectives; there's liberal and conservative ideas, and I can't say I couldn't adjust

(Respondent 33, Metalogical)

Respondents with metalogical points of view incur no cost to their functioning in Malta from acquiring an ability to function in Britain. Respondent 27, who has resided in Britain for fifty years, remains an avid supporter of a local Maltese football club to the extent that he occasionally flies over to watch his club play even though in the grand scheme of major league football, and unlike the team he supports in Britain, his local Maltese team is very much insignificant. Nevertheless, respondents with a metalogical point of view, in spite of their functional adaptation to British life do not, in the words of Respondent 8: "do a clean break from Malta".

Assimilation

Whilst there are differences between point of view types in their functional capacity to fit in to British life upon migration, there is no evidence of differences across point of view types with regards to what form fitting in should take. This is rather surprising given the differences in the way monological, dialogical and metalogical points of view relate to their country of origin and their host country. Given these differences, one would have reasonably expected individuals with metalogical points

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of view to strive for integration and those with monological points of view to opt for assimilation, with dialogical views somewhere in between[17]. However, all seem to equally favour assimilation with the dominant culture once they are in Britain. Respondent 18 claims that:

> I don't impose Maltese culture on others, insofar as I'm here I try to integrate here
> (Respondent 18, Monological)

Even for those who faced hardships in adapting and who favour Maltese ways, the acculturation strategy they favoured was that of assimilation:

> what it took was adaptation, doing different things to ameliorate your condition
> (Respondent 23, Monological)

The goal of respondents, irrespective of their point of view type, was that of assimilation through adaptation. Respondent 5 articulates what this process involves, describing it as 'moulding':

> moulding is when I adapt to fit; not I'm a circle fitting into a square; I change
> slightly but not totally, I remain distinct and different and not fully amalgamated;
> but not totally alien
> (Respondent 5, Metalogical)

With regards to making links with a Maltese community respondents similarly replied that they were not after associating with other Maltese, irrespective of what point of view they held. They claimed that had they wanted the fellowship of other Maltese, they would have stayed in Malta. For this reason they did not actively seek out other Maltese people during their stay in Britain. Whereas for a lot of immigrants, native communities are a source of support in a foreign land,

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[17] Respondents' use of terms does not correspond to the scholarly terms used in referring to acculturation strategies. What respondents refer to as integration commonly refers to the assimilation acculturation strategy in Berry's terms.

respondents chose to do away with such support and relied only on their own resources:

it was just us, no one really helped
(Respondent 7, Dialogical)

we didn't search for support, no one ever saw me in the worst of times
(Respondent 7, Dialogical)

Respondent 12 provides a clue as to why this might be the case:

the primary source of support is mostly ourselves; we're not the type to seek support outside of our nucleus; we're an independent type; no one helped us to settle, we knew people but we wanted to do it ourselves; the only help we got were services that we paid for, we didn't seek support […] it wasn't easy but I'd rather do it like that; otherwise you get obliged and I don't like to be in that situation
(Respondent 12, Monological)

The desire to make it on their own and to avoid community relations seems to have underlined respondents' desire for assimilation irrespective of their point of view. Both of these findings are in line with those outlined by Dench (1975) and may be particular to the Maltese community in Britain. Respondent 27, who has direct experience in view of the length of his stay in Britain, claimed that he'd often meet other Maltese people and find out they were up to no good so he'd steer clear of them. He further argued that:

I didn't like the Maltese here, it seemed like they didn't change, they lived like they did in Malta and I didn't like that, I wanted to integrate; for example they'd speak Maltese when there were English people present, I don't know, it's me, I'm not saying it's wrong, but I didn't like it; I made some Maltese friends after a couple of years, I joined the Maltese club; we used to go dancing, used to organise things and get together, but now I'm cut off; everyone went their separate ways; most went

back to Malta; it's a shame we don't have community here; but the ones I described they stayed Maltese, whereas I talk to everybody

(Respondent 27, Metalogical)

This goal of assimilation, which respondent 27 has articulated as a desire for integration, as well as the scepticism directed towards fellow countrymen, was reiterated across points of view:

there are Maltese people here but I don't seek them out; maybe because I know they're not my type

(Respondent 32, Dialogical)

Whilst the conditions for this may be due to stereotypes that the Maltese hold of the Maltese in Britain and the communities that existed in Britain at the time of Dench's investigation that are lodged in collective remembering of the Maltese, it seems that the scepticism respondents had for a Maltese community ran deeper than that. Respondents claimed that in spite of the support a community can confer newly arrived migrants, having no community was effectively an advantage as it forced migrants to assimilate:

the fact that there is no community is an advantage because it forces us to integrate much quicker; others who have these big communities tend to cluster together and do not integrate as readily

(Respondent 34, Monological)

I'd like to make contact with people who've been through the same experience; but then it depends on what they're like; I know Maltese who have been here but didn't integrate; we want to integrate now that we're here, we want to be part of this community now, that's why we came here

(Respondent 25, Dialogical)

These findings are rather surprising given the different ways different types of point of view acquire the ability to fit in. For example, respondent 1 stated that her life in Britain has improved markedly ever since a few other Maltese acquaintances of hers also moved to Britain, as these have now come to constitute her social network. Respondent 37 claimed that for her family, fellow Maltese in Britain were her 'extended family'. And respondent 35 argued that whilst she does not fit in with the Maltese in Malta, the Maltese in Britain are different from the Maltese in Malta. One would therefore expect similar differences in the acculturation objectives of point of view types, but no evidence for this has emerged in the course of this inquiry.

On the other hand, and equally surprisingly, there is also no evidence for significant culture loss amongst the respondents, irrespective of their point of view type and their common desire to assimilate. Respondents retained their ability to converse in the Maltese language, identified themselves as Maltese, displayed Maltese artifacts in their homes, and stayed in touch with Maltese affairs and Maltese networks, particularly their families, irrespective of their point of view type. Even the staunchest monological point of view respondents made it a point to keep contact with their families and to remember events such as the birthdays of friends and relatives. Furthermore, respondents maintained that they retained a preference for a Mediterranean way of life. This characteristic of Mediterranean ways was highly significant in that it seemed to bridge some of the cultural distance between the two countries, and marked other differences between different types of point of view.

Social Network

Whereas all respondents claimed to still be in touch with their social networks in Malta, there were differences in the way respondents with different points of view built up a social network. Respondents with a monological point of view had mostly exclusive networks, that is, their friends were either almost exclusively foreign or almost exclusively Maltese. Respondent 18 claims that: "admittedly I like to make

foreign friends" (Respondent 18, Monological). Respondent 26 claimed that in just over a year, she had:

> a network of friends like I had in Malta […] I do have close friends, not Maltese, British, our social network is predominantly British
> (Respondent 26, Monological)

Asked about associating with fellow Maltese, Respondent 26 stated that she is: "comfortable with a Maltese community over the net" (Respondent 26, Monological).

Respondents with a monological point of view favouring Malta replied similarly, although the constitution of their network was diametrically opposed:

> The only friends we made were foreigners; it's not that easy to integrate […] but you make Maltese friends who are there […] Our social network was mostly Maltese in England
> (Respondent 37, Monological)

Respondent 37 claimed that:

> it was very important for us to connect with fellow Maltese, they were our extended family, we felt the lack of community there so we went of our way and worked hard to network
> (Respondent 37, Monological)

For these respondents, a social network of fellow Maltese went some way in filling the void of cultural distance between the two countries. Respondent 1 stated that:

> my social network is made up of Maltese who live here; […] I was happy when other Maltese I knew were coming here, as I could fill that void somewhat that couldn't be filled with a pub; but at least there's a certain bond, they're not coming

from pub culture; even the language, I don't have to make an effort; with other Maltese around, that void can be filled somewhat; but before it wasn't and I didn't want to fill it this way; now it's a support network that I didn't have

(Respondent 1, Monological)

Recounting her experiences before the arrival of other Maltese acquaintances, she underlines how hard it was for her to be in Britain without a support network:

before it was boring, lonely, and depressing; I sat with my computer all the time, awaiting contact from Malta; I felt I'd got out of their life and that they'll move on and leave me behind; rather than I moved on by coming here; so I strived to keep in touch, send cards in birthdays and all that

(Respondent 1, Monological)

For this reason, Respondent 1 kept her social network in Malta as her primary network for social capital. She'd make the effort to stay in touch as well as visit regularly to keep her network alive:

I've been to Malta very often, I'd need to go hook up with my network; I made surprises to make them remember me

(Respondent 1, Monological)

Respondents with a dialogical point of view described their networks in more open terms. They were open to foreigners as well as fellow Maltese within their networks. However, their networks were fragmented, in contrast to their social networks in Malta, and were organised around what they described as different cliques:

different from Malta were friends are always the same since ever; here you have different friends in different networks, some Maltese, some of one work, some friends of friends

(Respondent 15, Dialogical)

Respondent 19 claims that most Maltese in his network in Britain were people he was acquainted with in Malta but who weren't in his network there to the extent they are in Britain. Some respondents made friends online then hooked up with their virtual friends in real life and extended their social networks this way. These do not exclude Maltese associations, but unlike Malta, these are typically kept separate. Respondent 35 outlines the benefits of such a network:

> my network was made up of different cliques; so if I felt like doing one thing I'd hook up with one clique, if another, another clique
> (Respondent 35, Dialogical)

These respondents also expended different effort in the different cliques they had, due to their vested interests in such cliques. With the exception of respondent 28, those who intended to return to Malta worked at keeping their Maltese networks alive, knowing they would eventually be calling on them. They knew that their foreign networks would eventually wither once they headed back. On the other hand, those who intended to stay vested much more effort into building good networks in Britain, knowing that these will be serving socialising purposes for the long-term. The ties they established with fellow Maltese were conditional–they would need to be their type, that is, Maltese-British as opposed to just Maltese. Respondent 28, in typical dialogical fashion, simply accepted the fact that the vibrant and mostly foreign network she developed in Britain would have to be sacrificed for a higher ideal that was taking her back to Malta–she dismissed the possibility of developing an intimate relationship in Britain.

Respondents with metalogical points of view expressed similar openness to native and foreign association, but they were far less preferential or conditional in their networks, such that they would call on either in times of need. Respondent 27 describes his early years in Britain and how he was able to draw on the network he got going when he moved to Britain:

I got friends, not many many, mostly British; I make friends straight away; I can walk in anywhere and make friends […] English people helped me in the first few years, they used to take me places, I was given space, I found them very nice people, they respect you
(Respondent 27, Metalogical)

Similarly, respondent 36 stated that she got support from a foreign family with whom she shared a house, and their friendship has remained in spite of her moving back to Malta. She also described, however, how she'd also made an effort during her stay in Britain to associate with fellow Maltese in Britain:

the family we shared with made life easy, they helped us out, they became part of our network […] we're still friends […] I didn't actually look out for Maltese friends; I made a couple of friends but they were my friends only because they were Maltese, they weren't the type who'd be my friends here; we made an effort to meet up with them
(Respondent 36, Metalogical)

Respondent 33 outlines how both Maltese and foreigners in one's network may be able to provide support:

in case of need I'd call my mates at the hostel, in other big matters I'd call the Maltese mates
(Respondent 33, Metalogical)

And respondent 8, who claims to have many more foreigners in his social network in Britain due to the fact that his partner is also British, still retains an affinity for Maltese association:

I feel the Maltese community bond, I spent 25 years there, if I meet a Maltese person I strike a bond very quickly, I talk to the Maltese I meet; there's something in common between us
(Respondent 8, Metalogical)

For respondents with metalogical points of view however, this affinity is not restrictive and does not limit the potential for trans-cultural association:

> but these friendships are more interesting in a way because these people are different from us so we're curious about each other; it takes a while to get used to each other, but then it becomes an interesting relationship
> (Respondent 10, Metalogical)

Identity

Different types of point of view also marked differences in identity dynamics. Like their social networks, respondents with monological points of view expressed similarly exclusive identities. They either defined themselves exclusively by their newly established status, or fully in terms of their place of origin. Respondent 18 argues, for example, how he has no inferiority complex for being Maltese, however, he does not define himself as Maltese:

> I am Maltese and I don't hide it; I have no inferiority complex for being Maltese, but I don't define myself as Maltese […] I am grouped with British by some at work, maybe because I am more fluent in English
> (Respondent 18, Monological)

Respondent 18 is proud of the success of his adaptation to British ways. He prides himself in his Sunday morning paper and British radio preferences. Respondent 18 claims that he feels he is a Londoner now that he knows how to use buses. Similarly, respondent 32 claims that he is a Londoner as, according to the dictum he cites, if you have an Oystercard you are a Londoner. He goes on saying that he is a foreigner but not an outsider and that he always felt at ease as a foreigner. Respondent 12 argues that even though he lacks a native identity in Britain, he does not feel out of his element: "I don't feel British but I don't feel a fish out of the water" (Respondent 12, Monological). Similarly, respondent 32 maintains that: "I feel foreigner only

because I have a foreign passport; I feel a Londoner" (Respondent 32, Monological). For respondent 26, her identity is now simply that of a resident of the United Kingdom.

In contrast, whilst most respondents claimed that in Britain, and in London in particular, being a foreigner does not equate with being an outsider, respondent 23 asserted that:

> I'm reminded every day that I'm a foreigner; I was accepted, I'm not disadvantaged because I'm a foreigner; I don't feel more or less than them, but I do feel different […] I feel Maltese, a bit Londoner, I'm a Maltese living in London; I think like a Maltese I see things like a Maltese, not like a Londoner
> (Respondent 23, Monological)

Respondents with a dialogical perspective did not express such an exclusive identity. They replied that they felt they were Maltese-Londoners or Maltese living in Britain, that they felt part of Britain even though they were not British, and that the fact they were of foreign origin did not exclude them socially: "feeling a foreigner wasn't foreign because everyone's foreign" (Respondent 30, Dialogical). They also claimed that they identify themselves as Maltese even more strongly since they moved here, and they've become more patriotic. Respondent 30 explains what it's like for him to be Maltese and different from the locals: "I feel Maltese because I approach life differently, for example the boundary of what's acceptable or not in humour, of having a laugh at others" (Respondent 30, Dialogical).

However, for respondents with a dialogical perspective, their identities are still oppositional and defined relative to each country. Respondent 30, who favours settling in Malta, elaborates further:

> I always tell my partner that my people are there; there's certain things like the language, things like, to understand how a Maltese would write 'Have you seen enough?' on the back of their car, if you're British you don't understand that, there's

something Maltese about that; I understand that, I feel I belong there, but to live there, some things bug me

(Respondent 30, Dialogical)

For other respondents with a dialogical point of view, their identity as a Maltese in Britain is defined in opposition to a strictly and solely Maltese identity. They retain that their experience has changed them and has led them to grow and mature:

I feel a Maltese adapted to British culture; I have absorbed a different culture, of people I meet; and I've become a better person, more mature; it would be a mistake to change completely though

(Respondent 19, Dialogical)

However, these respondents retain that their experience has had irrevocable consequences on their identity and that Maltese who lack an awareness and influence like theirs are unlike them, to the extent that they now have trouble fitting back.

Respondents with a metalogical point of view lack such an oppositional identity. They are able to define themselves as 'half and half'. Respondent 17, who has been in Britain for over 25 years, elaborates thus:

I still consider myself Maltese because people remind me due to my accent, which I still have; in the beginning it was an issue because I was the only foreigner at work, but now there's such a proliferation that I'm no longer different because of this […] but not an outsider; I consider myself a local, until they comment about foreigner then I'd stand up for foreigners; but I don't consider myself a foreigner

(Respondent 17, Metalogical)

Respondents with a metalogical point of view do not feel that their identities stand in opposition. As respondent 27 argued:

I've been here 50 years, I speak the language, I meet British people, I like British things, football, but only because I'm here; if I were in Malta I'd be into Maltese things

(Respondent 27, Metalogical)

Other respondents with a metalogical point of view elaborated a different identity that transcends cultural differences. Respondent 11 stated that he feels part of London because London is individualistic, so that you don't have to belong to any specific group to belong, so, he claims, you end up feeling you belong. He then goes on to claim that:

I don't feel I belong anywhere; I'm an island, I'm an individual, I drift; I feel I belong to Malta, I feel close to my culture, but it's not a sense of pride; I belong to myself

(Respondent 11, Metalogical)

Respondent 29 expressed a similarly transcendental identity. He claims he feels at home both in Malta and in Britain as well as in a number of other countries. He claims that:

ultimately I feel Maltese; when I'm in Malta I don't feel Maltese; the way I approach things is not Maltese, I'm more Anglo-Saxon

(Respondent 29, Metalogical)

And then, at the same time, he claimed that:

when it comes to family I think Britain lacks community, so in those respects I'm more Maltese; but I don't feel Maltese professionally, my head is business

(Respondent 29, Metalogical)

The identities elaborated by respondents differ in terms of the manner by which the dual element of Maltese-British is incorporated into their own identity. Respondents with a monological point of view adopt one element exclusively. Respondents with a dialogical point of view seemingly reconcile the two, but by virtue of this reconciliation they identify themselves differently from others. Respondents with metalogical perspectives have what seems to be a dual-boot identity, or a master-identity, that enables them to be Maltese in Malta and British in Britain. These differences translate into differences as to where they feel at home and where they fit. Respondents with a monological perspective argue that it is either in Malta or in Britain where they feel at home. Respondents with a dialogical perspective argue that whereas they feel somewhat at home in both places, either one place is: "a bit like home but not quite home" (Respondent 15, Dialogical), or one is more home than the other: "both are home, but Malta is home sweet home" (Respondent 28, Dialogical). On the other hand, respondents with a metalogical open point of view feel at home in both countries:

> two countries - two homes; so I stayed here because I had a good living […] I feel at home in both countries; don't know how to answer the question of where I belong (Respondent 27, Metalogical)

> at this point, both countries are somewhat home […] my character is more England, but my family home is Malta; in England I have an alternative home but still a home; it's an alternative because even my character is different in Malta (Respondent 5, Metalogical)

The last comment articulated by Respondent 5 is highly significant as it provides a clue as to what masks the differences between points of view that enable some respondents to keep an open perspective that enables them to function adequately in both cultures, whereas others seem to lose this capacity or indeed, never to have had it. Respondent 5 claims to have a different character in Malta than the one she has in Britain. It is this capacity to change perspectives between the two countries that

underlies the functional implications of adopting one type of point of view against another.

Perspectives

In contrast to metalogical and dialogical points of view, monological points of view are held to be unable to accommodate an alternative perspective in their own constitution. And in contrast to metalogical perspectives, dialogical perspectives will retain their own logic as the right and truthful version. Metalogical points of view are marked by their ability to accommodate the possibility of alternative perspectives other than their own, and the possibility of them also being in the right as much as one's own. Maltese migrants to Britain necessarily faced a new social reality in which they were required to immerse themselves. Respondents claimed that this experience led to them opening their minds, and that they became able to see things from a different perspective. They decried their experience abroad as an eye-opener; an experience that led to personal growth and that has come to define them. Not all respondents, however, were equally open to relate their newfound perspectives to their preceding ones. Respondents with monological points of view became unable to relate back to a Maltese mentality. They shed one system of social representations to fit into another. Their new perspective has broadened to the extent that it prevents their positioning themselves within the former mentality:

> I don't think I'd fit going back; my mentality changed too much; after I've lived in an open multicultural place, everything else is going to be more closed; not just Malta but anywhere else; the difference between here and Malta is too big
> (Respondent 32, Monological)

Respondents with a dialogical perspective acknowledge their ties with one framework whilst expressing a preference for another in a way that binds them more firmly to the latter than the former. They argue that the experience of migration has helped them open their minds, but, for those who now favor British ways, this has come at a cost:

you think everything by a Maltese mind; here you get a different perspective; if Maltese were to come here they'd change their perspectives but the fact that they're there they think like Maltese

(Respondent 31, Dialogical)

my life here is different from the culture in Malta; the mentality is different, it's more open-minded; I adapt a lot, I adapted here and made lots of friends; I don't belong in Malta

(Respondent 19, Dialogical)

I feel I'm coming home when I come here; I wouldn't go back to Malta, I don't belong; I might stay here, or I might go somewhere else but not to Malta; you have adapted and you have a different mentality now

(Respondent 19, Dialogical)

Respondents with a dialogical perspective that favors Malta also hold their perspectives are now different and broadened as compared to other Maltese, even though they are intent on settling permanently in Malta, as do respondents with metalogical perspectives, who also retained their experience has broadened their perspectives and led them to open their minds:

I became much more independent, an adult; even in relation to my parents; I've got my own experiences now; even the way I think about myself is different, even my perspective towards my values; the values haven't changed but I see things differently; even in religion, I try to make a Sunday mass, and I still go daily in Malta, but I see things differently

(Respondent 5, Metalogical)

The consequences that accrue from broadening their perspectives bear directly on respondents' ability to fit into the two systems. Respondents with a monological point of view are unable to fit in one context due to their perspective that conforms

to another context. Respondent 34, who returned to Malta prematurely after a brief stay in Britain and is intent on going back, states that:

> here I feel as if I'm still struggling to adapt, as if I lived somewhere, came here and struggling to adapt […] even though I've been here double the time I was there as I can't fit in here, I was comfortable there
> (Respondent 34, Monological)

Respondent 26, who has moved to Britain for just over a year, was also adamant that she wouldn't be able to fit back, and faced similar problems even whilst holidaying there:

> I wouldn't fit in Malta; when I went there for a weekend I was scared I would talk with an English accent
> (Respondent 26, Monological)

By contrast, respondent 37, who also returned to Malta after a much longer stay in Britain, faced no such hardships and presents a diametrically opposed view:

> after a couple of days I got back into the Maltese life as if I had never had left; I fit right back; I got involved into the kids' school; no adaptation; the transition was from class to class not country to country
> (Respondent 37, Monological)

Respondents with a dialogical point of view that want to settle in Britain held an appreciation for certain Maltese things. Whilst claiming that they were settled in Britain and that they've made it their home, they also claimed that they miss their own kind and longed for certain things. However, they expressed stark reservations as to their ability to fit back:

> I belong but I don't want to go there; I don't want to make a compromise
> (Respondent 31, Dialogical)

we'd fit but we'd only survive

(Respondent 25, Dialogical)

Respondent 24 could fall back on her own experience in providing an answer:

I tried it, I found it very hard; I didn't show it, because I didn't want my parents to think they'd done something wrong but I found it very difficult

(Respondent 24, Dialogical)

On the other hand, respondents with a dialogical point of view favoring Malta claimed that in spite of all that Britain had to offer, they knew they couldn't stay long-term:

I don't want to stay here for a long time because I miss family, friends, the easy life we had, even if here I earn more money; I don't think it's a good place to bring up your kids

(Respondent 9, Dialogical)

we always said we didn't want to settle here, we were here to do a masters, and now that I'm doing this I'll go back in June. Eventually I'll try to settle in Malta

(Respondent 14, Dialogical)

Respondents who expressed metalogical perspectives, and who also claimed they'd opened their minds as a result of their experience, nevertheless sustained that they were able to fit back into Maltese society and that their perspectives wouldn't deter their functioning:

I would fit, 100%; only thing stopping me is grandchildren; I go there it's like I never left, I still feel at home; Malta is beautiful, I don't know bad people; friends and neighbors, are more respectful, they're good people […] if my daughter goes I'll pack up and go right now

(Respondent 27, Metalogical)

Respondent 36, who has returned to Malta after a stay in Britain, claimed that she fit in Britain to the extent she felt she belonged. She believes she was naïve and ignorant before she went there and that her experience has opened her mind. Nevertheless, she still feels she belongs in Malta:

> now there's a good mismatch that wouldn't have been there before; I still fit in, in spite of the ignorance; we have good friends like us; I would say I feel like a local with the added benefits of having a past
> (Respondent 36, Metalogical)

Respondent 16, who describes himself as half British and half Maltese and who has lived for extended periods in both countries, claims that he appreciates differences between the two systems, and that he functions well in both in spite of their relative inconsistencies:

> I like both systems; I find the system here as very rigid, too controlled, I like to go where it's more relaxed, I need a break from this but I don't want to stay too long because I have a system here that works too, I know everything's in place; the two complement each other; and I'm at ease in both
> (Respondent 16, Metalogical)

An appreciation for the relative logics underlying both systems is the hallmark of a metalogical point of view that has no need to claim one system as superior to another. For this reason, respondents with a metalogical position can attach themselves equally to each cultural system. Respondent 8 demonstrates this well when asked if he's still in touch with Malta, after having voiced his intent to settle in Britain permanently and seek dual citizenship. His response was that for him staying in touch goes beyond reading the news or communicating with friends and relatives. Whilst he enjoys his life in Britain thoroughly, he retained that his attachment to Malta means that he still has a 'presence' there even though he is away, and that this attachment runs very deep:

not only in touch but I have a presence there; I'm here to stay here, but I'll still stay in touch with Malta

(Respondent 8, Metalogical)

Malta I'm passionate and I take it personal; Malta is beautiful and can't be replaced

(Respondent 8, Metalogical)

In spite of this commitment towards his country of origin, respondent 8 asserted that he would be seeking dual citizenship in the near future due to his intent to settle in Britain on a permanent basis. He would like to feel a part of the nation to the extent that he can claim he is also British, and the passport can grant him this symbolic capital. On the other hand, he is adamant not to give up his Maltese citizenship; he claims he couldn't ever do that.

Ignorance

Respondents holding different types of point of view related in very different ways to Maltese mentality as a function of their point of view. Whereas monological points of view either fully embraced or fully rejected Maltese mentality, dialogical points of view favoring Britain were able to show some appreciation from a distance, whilst metalogical points of view were not deterred by differences between the two systems. However, respondents across point of view types retained that Maltese mentality was ignorant and backwards and that there was a lot of room for it to improve and catch up with more open-minded mentalities like the British one. This finding was surprising, in that one would have expected such claims to not originate across types, but to be confined within the range of monological points of view favoring Britain. It seems however, that the social representation of Maltese mentality characterised by ignorance is pervasive amongst respondents. Maltese mentality is described as backwards and ignorant in the way it overly-concerns itself with petty issues. Respondent 38 for example claims that:

you also see how Maltese mentality is limited and wastes too much effort on petty issues; it is more closed; due to people who do not get out other than holiday, never have experience of living abroad; they see that things start here and finish here

(Respondent 38, Metalogical)

Respondent 40, who is in Malta, elaborates thus:

when I have a bad day at work, with ignorant people, I say how backwards this place is […] here it's a small place so you come across it; for example people smoke when no smoking is allowed; park in the middle of the road and expect to be served earlier, queues do not exist; there it's more organised, more civilized

(Respondent 40, Dialogical)

Respondent 9 argues that this has to do with the habits of seeking information and knowledge that the Maltese generally lack:

there's a lot of ignorance I'm afraid to say […] if you compare newspapers here and Malta, you realise why there's much more ignorance in Malta; the Maltese need to read more, become more cultured […] in general there is more ignorance in Malta, not in terms of IQ or textbook knowledge; but here the man in the street […] they read papers and stay in touch […] in Malta when people read people look at them strangely

(Respondent 9, Dialogical)

This finding is worthy of further study into the social representation of ignorance in Malta. It is curious how this seems to be shared by one and all, even by those who have very strong ties with Malta and who intend to settle there. Indeed, breaking out of it is an oft-cited reason for migration, as it is for the motive to avoid Maltese community. Yet aside from the social representation of ignorance, and more pertinent to the present inquiry, respondents described another aspect of ignorance that has to do with perspectives in relation. A number of respondents attributed ignorance to the Maltese not at the sociogenetic level of a social representation, but at the microgenetic level of communicative interaction (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990).

More specifically, the attribution of ignorance was made by individuals, who considered themselves to have broadened their perspective as a result of their stay in Britain and who in some way act according to this open perspective, to others (i.e. Maltese) who disapprove of their acts on the basis of a more limited perspective. Respondent 36 for example, who claimed that before going to the UK she herself was ignorant but that she opened her mind, was asked whether the Maltese in Malta are still ignorant. Her response illustrates well the attribution of ignorance:

> I: do you think Maltese people are still ignorant?
> R: completely, completely [...] the older generation, the older really piss me off cause they're really ignorant; they're ignorant because they're not exposed, they don't know any better; they don't know that a Muslim girl is as sweet and nice as their daughter is; they don't know she's not extremist and that she only believes in God like they do; they don't know, all they see is Muslim equals suicide bomber, Jew equals child rapist; it bothers me because I'm married to a non-catholic, a non-practicing Muslim, sometimes it embarrasses you, the way people talk, absolute bullshit
> (Respondent 36, Metalogical)

She goes on to argue how she shed her ignorance as a result of her experience abroad, and that this broadened her mind, but that those who have not acquired the capacity to see things in a different way, like she has, remain ignorant:

> what it made me do is accept everyone, rather than not giving them a chance because they're black; my family are like that, this is why they're ignorant, because they don't know and they don't want to know; all I tell them is that you can't judge because you haven't done it
> (Respondent 36, Metalogical)

Respondent 31 articulates very succinctly how: "people there don't appreciate how things are here, because they don't know it" (Respondent 31, Dialogical). And Respondent 11 claims that for the Maltese in Malta:

ignorance is bliss; if you haven't experienced anything outside the box it's fine but once you've experienced it it becomes difficult to adapt back to that

(Respondent 11, Metalogical)

Aside from a general social representation of the Maltese nation, ignorance is thus seemingly an attribution made by one point of view to another when the former perceives that the latter is failing to grasp its logic. Kruglanski (1989) has noted the role of logicality in attribution, claiming that attribution is itself an 'if-then' logical clause. Axial coding undertaken on the coded text models the attribution of ignorance as a product of a perspective that identifies the subject in a cultural context relative to another, and that has implications on the individual's ability to fit (Figure 5). Whereas all points of view, irrespective of type, may attribute ignorance to another point of view, not all points of view are able to relate equally well with others in *lieu* of such attribution.

Causes: Repatriation; Going Back

Strategies: Identity

Context & Intervening Conditions: Life In Malta: Mentality; Life in Britain: Multiculturalism

Phenomenon: Perspective

Consequences: Fitting In

Figure 5: The attribution of ignorance

Acculturation

The ability of points of view to relate to alternative points of view characterises their type and determines their acculturation outcome. Not all points of view are able to relate to alternative points of view to the same degree. Faced by a context that presents them with a new reality, all points of view experience acculturative stress except for monological points of view who claim that they never fit in the previous context and that they found they were at home in the new one. For other points of view, acculturative stress pushes them to adopt coping strategies that bring about adaptation, or 'moulding'. An effect of this adaptation is that it broadens one's perspective. As a result one acquires the capacity to see things differently, in line with the requirements of the new social reality, as noted by Schuetz (1944). Achieving this outcome is tantamount to successful moulding. This adaptation however, leads to structural changes in one's point of view that in all but metalogical types prevent one from fitting back into the culture of origin. Axial coding undertaken on the coded text provides a model for this acculturation process (Figure 6).

Causes: Migration

Strategies: Identity

Context & Intervening Conditions: Life in Malta: Lifestyle, Mentality; Life in Britain: Lifestyle, Mentality, Multiculturalism

Phenomenon: Settling down: Difficulties, Fitting in, Adaptation

Consequences: Perspective; Settlement

Figure 6: Acculturation

Discussion

Duveen & Lloyd (1986) claim that social identities are themselves a function of social representations. Duveen (2001) argues that identities are positions within the symbolic field of culture that provide a way of organising meanings to sustain a sense of stability. Insofar as social identities are themselves a function of social representations, and insofar as respondents in this study originate from a reasonably homogenous population (i.e. Malta prior to EU accession) in which social representations are understood to be shared by all, the findings of the TST that respondents elaborated their social identities in the same way irrespective of what point of view type they held was a significant finding (see chapter 4). Its significance lies in the non-significance of the statistical tests undertaken on the data that provide no reason to believe that the differences discovered to exist between points of view in the course of this study pertain rather to structural differences in social identities or the social representations that respondents were drawing on. Such hypotheses can be excluded, as were the differences discovered existing in either

social identities or social representations, this would have transpired in statistically significant differences in the analysis of the TST data (see Deschamps, 1986). This finding is an important one and in line with the aims of the study and the choice of the Maltese in Britain as a case. Consequently, the differences unearthed in this study are attributable to the interpersonal aspects of points of view as opposed to social identities or social representations.

The case study of the Maltese in Britain enabled the exploratory study of interpersonal differences between points of view to be undertaken with respondents for whom social representations were constant and amongst whom homogeneity, or more accurately a holomorphic frame of reference (Wagner & Hayes, 2005), can therefore be reasonably assumed. No doubt, due to the socio-political changes the country is undergoing, the system of social representations that collectively makes up Maltese mentality is undergoing considerable change as Malta moves towards becoming a culturally plural society, due to the country opening up its borders to Europe and due to the influx of North African immigrants. This study could not have been undertaken with this population at some other point in the future, as differences between points of view will need to be considered in light of heterogeneity in social representations. And if Duveen & Lloyd's (1986) propositions are correct, in light also of heterogeneity in the structure of social identities. Moreover, due to the present conditions of global trade, migration and global influence, homogeneity in representations and identities is sparse and few countries present an opportunity for studying points of view under the conditions that the case study of Maltese migrants to Britain afforded. The study of Maltese migrants to Britain is thus deemed to be a valid case for the study of points of view, controlling for the context in which these arise.

This study has demonstrated how different types of point of view are marked by varying interpersonal characteristics in seeing and understanding things differently in different contexts. Monological points of view seem to be unidimensional, and vary only in which extreme position they hold in relation to their own kind and

towards another social group. For a monological type, preference for one's culture and for another culture varies along a single axis; preference for one type automatically excludes the other type. Dialogical and metalogical points of view differ in their positioning when locating themselves in a two-dimensional system involving preferences for one's own group and another group. Whereas it seems therefore that dialogical and metalogical points of view are distinguishable from monological points of view on the basis that the latter are unable to negotiate a pluralistic social reality in which alternatives exist, metalogical points of view are nevertheless functionally distinguishable from dialogical types. Metalogical points of view are able to retain a preference for both cultures, whereas for dialogical points of view a preference for one comes at a cost for the other (Figure 7). This finding contradicts the measurement of perspectives in social judgment studies along a single axis (Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Pettigrew, 1959; Detweiler, 1980), and supports rather Rokeach's (1951b) claim that the differences between perspectives are qualitative rather than merely quantitative.

Figure 7: Cultural preference & engagement

Acculturation strategies

In Berry's (2001) intercultural relations model, these two dimensions, based on orientations towards one's group and towards other groups, define acculturation strategies in ethnocultural groups. The first dimension, what Berry et al. (2002) label as 'Issue 1', refers to the relative preference for maintaining one's culture. The second, 'Issue 2', refers to one's relative preference for contact with the wider society.

According to Berry (2001) orientations can vary along dimensions to define four strategies of intercultural relations. Assimilation is defined by a desire to adopt the host culture, whilst shedding one's own cultural identity. When individuals value their own culture and avoid interaction with the host culture, the acculturation strategy adopted is that of separation. When there is an interest in maintaining both one's culture as well as adopting that of the host country, the strategy is integration. In contrast, marginalisation refers to instances where individuals lose their own native culture, but make no effort to interact with the host culture (Berry, 1970; Sommerlad & Berry, 1970). Berry et al. (2002) argue that integration has been shown to lead to the most positive outcomes and is thus the preferred acculturation strategy.

Whilst the respondents in this study expressed a desire for assimilation, that is, merging with the host community, it is clear that the resultant acculturation strategy that ensued contact in the case of the respondents had much to do with the point of view they held. Whilst there was no instance of marginalisation, respondents with monological points of view opted either for separation or assimilation exclusively. This was also the case for dialogical types, albeit to a lesser degree depending on whether their preference was for the ways of life of the culture they came from or that in which they were now embedded. In contrast, respondents with metalogical points of view were able to successfully achieve integration, as they were the only to be able to amalgamate with the host country without losing the bonds of solidarity

that tied them to fellow compatriots. The adaptation of dialogical types came at this cost.

Social Capital

The understanding of interpersonal differences between metalogical points of view and dialogical and monological points of view is best located within the social capital literature, to which the present case study lends itself. Three major theories of social capital have been proposed in the literature (see Baum, 1999; Morrow, 1999; Schuller, Baron, & Field, 2000). According to Bourdieu (1986), capital can present itself in four ways: economic (money and property), cultural (cultural goods and services, such as educational credentials), social (acquaintances and networks), and symbolic (legitimation). Social capital is the aggregate of actual or potential resources linked to the possession of a durable network of institutionalised relationships characterised by mutual acquaintance and recognition. These networks provide members with the backing of collectively owned capital. Social capital is not reducible to, nor independent of, the other forms of capital, but may serve members to gain access to other forms. And just like economic capital, social capital is not evenly distributed within a society. According to Coleman (1988) social capital exists in the relations among persons, and describes the way in which families and communities are able to support each other. Social capital takes the form of obligations, expectations, the trustworthiness of social structures, norms and sanctions, and the potential for acquisition of information. Putnam (1995) adopts a succinct definition of social capital. For Putnam, social capital refers to those features of social life, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. Putnam's approach has become associated with the definition and measurement of social capital as the norms and networks of civic engagement.

Woolcock & Narayan argue that the definition of social capital is captured in the common aphorism of "It's not what you know, it's *who* you know" (2000, p. 225).

Social capital is underlined by an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between members of a community (Fukuyama, 1999). At a societal level, social capital translates into an expectation of health and well-being because members of these communities "are able to find and keep good jobs, initiate projects serving public interest, costlessly monitor one another's behavior, enforce contractual agreements, use existing resources more efficiently, resolve disputes amicably, and respond to citizens' concerns more promptly" (Woolcock, 1998, p. 155). However, social capital also has a downside, termed negative social capital or anti-social capital (Portes & Landolt, 1996), where the bonds of trust, obligations and commitment making up a civic community are stifling and by nature exclusive rather than inclusive. In the present study, a number of respondents expressed a desire to negotiate migration on their own lest they incur obligations with their own kin–an instance of avoiding anti-social capital. More importantly however, this leads to a distinction between intra-community ties and extra-community networks (Woolcock, 1998), what Gittell and Vidal (1998) have termed 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital. Bonding social capital refers to ties amongst like-minded people. It has the potential of building strong ties but it can also serve to erect higher walls excluding those who do not qualify for membership. Bridging social capital, in contrast, refers to connections between heterogeneous groups (Foley & Edwards, 1999). This is likely to be more fragile but essentially is what enables or prevents social cohesion at the level of the nation-state.

Different types of point of view seem to foster different types of social capital. It is this, in turn, that leads to the acculturation strategy adopted by individuals in their inter-, and intra-, cultural relations. Respondents with monological points of view seem to forge exclusive ties with those of their own kind, not necessarily where they originate from but where they claim they fit. They will avoid association with others who are not of their type because they do not feel at home amongst them. They will therefore create either bonding social capital or bridging, exclusively. Respondents with dialogical points of view, although open to an alternative perspective, retain a clear preference for one kind and whilst somewhat open to alternatives, will

nevertheless put their own efforts towards building up either bonding or bridging social capital. If they are sojourners (Berry et al., 2002), they will not waste too much effort on bridging social capital as they will not have much chance to redeem it. If they intend to naturalise, they will not waste too much effort on bonding social capital for fear it would mount up to antisocial capital. For both monological and dialogical types, a bias towards one or the other of bonding or bridging social capital translates into pursuing either assimilation or segregation acculturation strategies. In contrast, respondents with metalogical perspectives, being open to both systems, do not renounce capital be it bonding or bridging. They are able to appreciate both forms of capital for what they are, and they have the capacity to value both types of capital as such. Even if they choose not to make recourse to either one or the other forms of social capital, unlike dialogical and monological types, they are nevertheless capable of appreciating its value. Dialogical types undervalue one form of social capital, whereas monological types devalue it. The metalogical type's openness to bonding and bridging social capital *at the same time* enables them to achieve integration, without sacrificing one form of solidarity at the cost of the other. This formulation is represented in figure 8, which tentatively models the inter-relational functions of types of points of view in terms of acculturation strategies and social capital. Berry et al. (2002) argue that the course of change resulting from acculturation is highly variable and depends on many characteristics of the dominant and non-dominant groups. This study suggests that one such characteristic may be the type of point of view individuals hold at the time of intercultural relations.

Figure 8: Inter-relational functions of points of view (adapted from Berry, 2001)

Identities

Deschamps (1982) argues that social identities can vary fundamentally as a function of the material and symbolic capital that is owned by the individual. Presumably, identities can also vary as a function of social capital, particularly considering that through social capital individuals develop ties of solidarity with others and consequently come to belong with some and not with others. Duveen (2001) argues that identities are as much a system of exclusion as of inclusion. The findings of this study support such a claim. Duveen identifies variations in social identities, namely that characterised by a bipolar opposition that offers a degree of clarity and simplicity, and that of a union of bipolar opposites masking an implied hierarchy in which one group is overvalued and another undervalued. Both of these variations were also discovered in this study.

In spite of the fact that the structure by which respondents elaborated their identities did not differ between point of view types, substantive differences were discovered with regards to the content by which those identities were elaborated. The former of Duveen's variations was characteristic of the identity elaborated by monological types, who developed an exclusive identity that by virtue of positioning them within one group excluded them entirely from another. If one is Maltese, then one is not British, and vice-versa. The latter of Duveen's variations was characteristic of the identities elaborated by dialogical types that elaborated a value-added to their identities by virtue of reconciling bipolar opposites. One could therefore be a Maltese in London, as opposed to just Maltese. Moreover, due to this value-added, the former is superior to the latter because it comes with an open mind.

This study, however, also suggests a third variation, that is one where the bipolar opposites are not in opposition, and they can be reconciled in a non-conflictual and non-hierarchical manner. One can therefore be both Maltese and British at the same time, and be equally Maltese and British–being a Maltese-British makes one no less of a Maltese and no more of a British than a Maltese or a British alone. In this variation, characteristic of respondents with metalogical points of view, the dual identity is not summative–two does not add up to more than one. Rather, this identity positions oneself at par with Maltese and British at the same time, and within Maltese and British systems at the same time. In doing this, it becomes the hallmark of true integration. Metalogical types are able to contract a social identity to join a social group (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990), without having to pay the price of giving up their former social identity. Individuals with this characteristic 'dual-boot' identity are able to draw on either, depending on what circumstances warrant.

Perspectives

Whilst the above identity differences were discovered to exist between different types of points of view in this study, these differences were not rooted in structural differences in social identities, as the TST data made clear. Structural differences

between points of view are seemingly located elsewhere. This study suggests that these may be inherent to perspectives themselves, rather than in some other phenomenon. The respondents' claims that the experience of encountering alternative perspectives opened their minds, broadened their perspectives, and led to them seeing things differently, are more than cursory and are indicative of intrapersonal structural differences. This, however, requires further investigation that is taken up in the third empirical inquiry. The attribution of ignorance to other points of view provides further indication. The idea is that the experience of encountering alternative perspectives leads to socio-cognitive structural differences in one's perspective that enable one to fit with the alternative. In an encounter between two points of view that are structurally different, one point of view will come to the realisation that the other point of view is unable to see things from its own perspective and will, henceforth, make an attribution of ignorance to the other perspective, dismissing it on grounds of a lack of understanding. The same attribution patterns have been discovered in development studies, where the scientific community has often attributed ignorance to indigenous populations whose practices differed from those propagated by experts (see Hobart, 1993).

These types of attribution have, however, largely escaped the attention of social psychologists. Whilst social psychology has developed a voluminous body of knowledge on attribution theory (see Jaspars, Fincham, & Hewstone, 1983; Harvey & Weary, 1984; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Hewstone, 1989; Försterling, 2001), this has by and large concerned itself with causal attributions. Yet the meaning of the term attribution is not limited to causal mechanisms. It can also refer to the attribution of characteristics or features, as when we say: "ancient societies attributed magical properties to stones", or "flexibility is a key attribute of this army". When a point of view attributes ignorance to another point of view, it is not making a causal claim but one that refers to a characteristic or feature of another point of view. Buss's (1978) conceptual critique of attribution theory has criticised the idea that attributions are solely causal. Buss argues for the need to distinguish between reason explanations and causal explanations. Harré and Secord (1972) also

make this same distinction. The finding of the attribution of ignorance in the present investigation clearly fits the former explanation more than it does the latter, as the interlocutor would suggest that the reason why a point of view is in disagreement with one's own is because the other is ignorant. It therefore provides a reason explanation for the point of view rather than a causal one. This finding in the present study thus provides fortuitous support for Buss's distinction that may be worthy of further social psychological exploration.

Conclusion

This study has provided evidence that points of view bear on interrelational processes and contact outcomes. The findings are in line with the aim of this study to explore the interpersonal characteristics of different types of points of view. The type of point of view one holds has implications on one's capacity to negotiate a position that fits social reality and that locates the holder functionally within the social system. Not all points of view are capable of fitting in to the same extent. Monological points of view, by virtue of their exclusive nature, may stubbornly close down any opportunity for positive interrelations that enable them to fit in. This holds both with regards to an individual's place of origin as well as with regards to a new social system following migration. Points of view bear on one's ability to fit in a new social system as to one's ability to fit back into a previous one, on the basis of the extent to which one's point of view is open or closed in relation to both systems.

Metalogical points of view are marked by an ability to negotiate differences functionally, in a way that enables individuals to position themselves without conflict in both systems. They can function according to different backgrounds of intelligibility (see Daanen, 2009). Dialogical points of view are marked by conflict when negotiating an alternative system to the one they retain they fit. They privately subscribe to a background of intelligibility whilst knowing that a different one may be at work in another setting. Monological points of view are marked by their

inability to negotiate an alternative. They admit a sole background of intelligibility to which they conform.

Consequently, this study suggests that different types of points of view can be more or less open to social relations, both with regards to social networks with individuals from other communities as well as those with individuals from one's own community. Furthermore, whilst the structural organisation of an individual's social identity may remain unchanged when transported into a new social setting, different points of view enable individuals to construct different identities that vary in the extent of exclusion or inclusion of difference. Whilst three individuals may all claim the same identity (e.g. Maltese in London), the one with a monological perspective will hold this in an exclusive way, the one with a dialogical perspective will hold it in a hierarchical way, and the one with a metalogical perspective will hold it in an inclusive way. All these functional differences between types are underlined by the extent to which one's point of view is open or closed to an alternative. The reference to the degree of openness and closure in points of view, as noted above, is more than mere cursory. Respondents maintained that their experience has 'opened' their mind, and enabled them to 'see' things differently.

This inquiry has thus far established a typology of points of view characterised by a degree of openness to alternative perspectives. This study has further suggested that the interpersonal functions served by different types of points of view have to do with individuals' capacities for positive interrelations with different others. It has shown that metalogical points of view are able to transcend differences in interpersonal relations to an extent that neither dialogical nor monological types can. The structural foundations of these differences are yet to be established. This study suggests that these may be inherent to perspectives themselves, as social judgment theorists have argued (see Chapter 3). Respondents have claimed that the experience of migration has broadened their perspectives such that they are now able to see things differently. This suggests that different types of points of view are not only characteristically, but also structurally, dissimilar. This question has guided the third

empirical investigation in this inquiry. The third study looks at the intrapersonal properties of points of view in an effort to determine whether socio-cognitive structural differences mark different types of point of view, in a way that transpires in interpersonal relational differences. More specifically, considering that what seemingly varies between different types of point of view is their judgment of an alternative and whether this can be accommodated in one's own perspective, or otherwise, the third study seeks to investigate whether structural differences can be identified in terms of the points of view's latitude structure, as suggested by Sherif's theory of social judgment (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968).

Chapter 7:
Intrapersonal Characteristics

Introduction

A central issue that has emerged in the study of Maltese migrants to Britain (Chapter 5) has been that of the broadening of perspectives when these encounter an alternative. Respondents claimed that in coming to understand another mentality, they broadened their perspectives to accommodate new ways of seeing things. The issue of the broadening or narrowing of perspectives has been the focus of Upshaw's (1965, 1969) variable perspective theory of social judgment. According to Upshaw, experimental subjects judging statement categorisation do so on the basis of the range of their own perspectives. Upshaw argues that in a judging task, subjects will anchor the end-points of their rating scale to the end-points of their own perspective. Consequently, subjects with a wider perspective use a wider scale for judging statements. Upshaw argues that subjects with a wider perspective show less polarised ratings than subjects with a narrower perspective. This focus is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, yet Upshaw also claimed that subjects' perspectives are widened whenever experimental stimuli were presented amongst which the judge's own opinion was out-of-range. If the judge's own position was amongst the range of statements presented in the experimental condition, then the condition would be described as in-range. In an out-of-range condition, that is, when the subject's own position lay outside the range of statements presented to her for judgment during the experimental condition, the subject would adopt a wider perspective in which the end-point of their rating scale would not be anchored to the extremes of the presented stimulus range, but one of which would be anchored to the individual's own subjective position.

The idea that a particular position may be in-range or out-of-range of a particular perspective, and that the assimilation of such positions leads to the broadening of perspectives, certainly corresponds with the findings of the second inquiry. Respondents who came across an alternative perspective and opened themselves up to it claimed they developed a broader perspective. In real-life social issues, in contrast to the social judgment of statements according to an experimentally

superimposed classification, an in-range position is one that would fall within the individual's range of acceptable propositions based on familiarity by virtue of a shared background of intelligibility, whereas an out-of-range position falls outside of that range. An individual who accepts and assimilates the alternative encountered broadens, or widens, their point of view, unlike someone who rejects it. One who rejects the encountered alternative sticks with a restricted range in which the alternative is out-of-range, and remains with a narrower point of view compared to the one who accepts it and broadens their range. The respondents in the second study who migrated to Britain and accepted and assimilated British ways claim to have broadened their perspectives and that they have become able to see things differently. Framed in this way, it would therefore be feasible to claim that the degree of openness and closure of a perspective depends on how wide or narrow the range of acceptable alternatives is.

In another theory of social judgment, put forth by Sherif and Hovland (1961), this range is termed the latitude of acceptance. According to Sherif and Hovland, whether a given statement is assimilated or contrasted depends on whether it falls within the judge's latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. These terms refer to the respective ranges which the judges find acceptable, unacceptable, or about which they do not have a position for or against. Presented alternatives that fall within an individual's latitude of acceptance will be assimilated, those falling within the latitude of rejection will be contrasted. Others that fall within the latitude of noncommitment receive a neutral response.

Considering that any encounter with an alternative point of view can only ever be accepted, rejected, or treated with indifference, it becomes feasible to operationalise the openness or closure of perspectives in terms of their latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommitment, and how wide or narrow these latitudes may be. Even though Sherif's theory and Upshaw's theory are contrasting theories in the narrow domain of the social judgment of experimentally superimposed classifications in a laboratory, the concepts they draw on can still be profitably employed, especially

taking into account that social judgment is essentially a process of judging encountered alternatives according to subjective standards (Eiser, 1990). Social judgment is a comparative process that is at work every time individuals encounter an alternative position and bring their own points of view to bear on it.

In social judgment, individuals engage in a process of categorical classification of items they are presented with as a function of class membership. The accentuation theory of social judgment (Eiser & Stroebe, 1972, Eiser, 1990) extends Sherif & Hovland's assimilation-contrast theory by replacing their hypothesised role of anchoring with that of interclass accentuation (Eiser, 1990). Accentuation theory incorporates the principles of interclass accentuation described by Tajfel, whilst emphasising the individual's use of subjective categories. Both of these are in line with the formulation of points of view being undertaken in this inquiry. Points of view have been found to play a role in the social identification of the Maltese in Britain. Moreover, the judging of alternatives relative to the social subject's own position is implicated in the classification of point of view types by definition (see Figure 6, Chapter 5). As Eiser (1990) notes, awareness of the relativity of one's own system of values in social judgment is difficult to achieve. Eiser's example is telling and pertinent to the present inquiry:

> "Armed resistance movements are seen as *really* 'terrorists', 'freedom-fighters' or whatever, not merely as 'resistance movements of whom I personally happen to disapprove or approve'. Supporters of nuclear power are seen as *really* 'complacent' or 'pragmatic', and opponents are *really* 'alarmist' or 'concerned', not merely as 'making calculations of risk with which I happen to agree or disagree'" (Eiser, 1990, p. 98).

Whilst social judgment research has been primarily driven by psychophysical experiments and the understanding of how people judge attitudinal statements, following Thurstone's scaling methods (Eiser, 1990), social judgment in itself is clearly a socio-cognitive process that is involved in the interrelations of points of

view and that underlies many of the interpersonal characteristics of points of view observed in the previous study. Evidently, the references to perspectives, how wide or narrow categories of judgment are, and categorical classification in social judgment theories, are not merely coincidental and are considered pertinent to the present inquiry. One wonders whether differences in the latitude architecture exist for different types of points of view, such that a person who identifies herself exclusively with one group ends up with a narrow perspective and narrower latitude of acceptance of alternative, out-of-range positions. Presumably, and according to the typology of points of view observed in the first study, she would. This investigation, the third in this inquiry into the social psychological nature of points of view, aims to address this question empirically. It aims to discover whether different point of view types are marked by differences in their socio-cognitive latitude architecture and their proclivity towards alternative perspectives.

For the purposes of this study, a survey was undertaken with students at the University of Malta that operationalised and measured points of view by way of vignettes, as well as latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment regarding statements made in public in relation to three social issues that circulated in the Maltese public at the time of the investigation. The first of these concerned students directly and related to the stipends issue that was raised towards the end of the previous academic year. The second and third issues concerned citizen rights. The second issue was concerned with the worship rights of foreigners, to study an alternative from without. The third issue was concerned with Maltese migrants voting rights, to study an issue emerging from within.

Background

Issue 1: The Stipends Issue

The stipends issue re-emerged in the Maltese public following a recommendation by the University Rector to revisit the stipend system. The University of Malta, which is the only university in Malta and a state university, pays undergraduate students stipends throughout the duration of their studies. The stipend was introduced in the wake of independence, in an effort to provide an incentive for promising individuals to pursue tertiary education and help build a knowledge-society. Tertiary education became a goal for many, and student numbers at the University of Malta have increased considerably over the years. Consequently, so has the welfare burden to provide a stipend. The issue was put on the agenda by the Labour administration of 1996 and attracted stiff opposition from students and the public alike.

The matter was put to rest by a premature change in government in 1998. It was resurrected in 2009 by the Rector of the University who, in the context of a reform in tertiary education, proposed that the stipend system be revised and for the funds to be utilised towards further investment in the sector. Rector's suggestions were this time endorsed by other high-ranking public officials, but once again attracted stiff opposition. This time, however, the debate was less one-sided, with a poll conducted by the students' council suggesting that certain students were also wanting the removal of stipends. The proposal received further endorsement from a portion of the general public who expressed frustration at their imposed taxation burden for financing others' studies. On the other hand, others suggested that stipends remained an investment towards achieving a knowledge-society and useful in helping those who lack financial means to pursue tertiary education.

Issue 2: Muslims' right of public worship

The Roman Catholic religion in Malta is by far the dominant religion in the country. It is inscribed in the constitution as the official religion of Malta, although equal rights and recognition are granted to other non-denominated religions. Numerous Roman Catholic churches are to be found in every village in the country, and the church's calendar is intertwined with the national calendar with respect to feasts and public holidays. Several saintly feasts are observed as national holidays. During the summer months, villages vividly celebrate feasts dedicated to their patron saints by way of street processions, band marches, fireworks, and other festive celebrations. Other religions, being in a very small minority, enjoy no such exposure. Muslims in Malta claim a single mosque in Paola.

During the spring of 2009, a group of Muslim worshippers became the subject of a public controversy. They had been gathering in an apartment on a prominent promenade that they rented for the purposes of meeting and praying together. After several complaints the authorities evicted the tenants, citing as reason for the eviction the fact that the apartment was not licensed as a public place of worship. The worshippers who used to gather in this apartment took their protest to the streets, and after getting all necessary permits from the authorities for a public protest, gathered and started worshipping in public on the promenade. Their protest concerned the fact that, unlike other fellow Maltese citizens, they were unable to practice their religion in their locality. This attracted opposition as well as hostile reactions from the public, some of whom felt that their rights of access to the promenade had been violated, that Muslim worship was against the norms of the country and detrimental to the tourist industry, that foreigners were making Malta their own and hijacking its culture, and that Muslim worship in Malta, being a minority conviction, should be restricted to the private sphere. Such was the reaction that after the second public gathering, the police authorities rejected subsequent applications for peaceful protests citing the fact that this was inciting and could threaten public order. Others, on the other hand, were sympathetic to the protesters.

They distinguished between believers and citizens and claimed that Malta did not belong to the Catholics, and whilst the Catholic traditions are part of Maltese culture these should not be imposed on everyone else regardless.

Issue 3: Expatriate voting rights

The Maltese general election of 2008, the first since Malta's accession into the European Union, was narrowly won by the Nationalist Party. Malta was one of fifteen new member states that joined the European Union in 2004. In the general election of 2008, the Nationalist Party, who championed the European agenda in Malta, claimed 49.33% of the votes cast against 48.9% that went to the Labour Party, a margin of 1580 votes. Various reports claimed that over 3000 Maltese persons living abroad were eligible to vote, and special flights were commissioned by the government to fly in these voters for the election. Maltese electoral law states that for Maltese people to be eligible to vote in a general election, they would have had to be resident in Malta for a continuous period of six months in the eighteen months prior to the election. Such restrictions, however, often go unpoliced, particularly in view of the newly acquired freedom of the Maltese to work and study in other European countries that many exploited.

In its post-election report, published in the party's newspaper on the 25th of May 2008, the Labour party claimed that one reason it had lost the election was that the Nationalist government had benefitted unduly from votes cast by Maltese citizens living abroad and who should not have been eligible to vote (Malta Labour Party Electoral Commission, 2008). The issue is contentious in Malta as some have claimed that the ruling party does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of Maltese who effectively reside in Malta. Others argue, on the other hand, that no one can know who anyone voted for, be they Maltese residents or Maltese citizens who flew in from abroad, and that the latter could have voted either party. Moreover, many contend that Maltese who travel abroad for one reason or another are not, and should not, be considered as second-class citizens and should thus retain their full

voting rights considering that an outcome of a general election may have direct implications with regards to their homeland and their wishes and opportunities to reside there or elsewhere.

Findings

The study of the distribution of points of view on the three issues revealed that points of view were normally distributed across types for every issue. Out of the total of 247 respondents, there were 51 monological points of view, 135 dialogical points of view, and 61 metalogical points of view regarding the stipends issue. Regarding the Muslim rights of prayer issue, there were 58 monological points of view, 109 dialogical points of view, and 80 metalogical points of view. Regarding the voting rights issue, there were 41 monological points of view, 117 dialogical points of view, and 89 metalogical points of view. Such approximately normal distributions suggest a relationship between types of point of view across issues, meaning that someone who held, for example, a monological point of view on one issue would also be expected to hold a monological point of view on another issue. In this case, a correlation between point of view types would be expected across issues. This hypothesis was tested using Kendall's tau_b correlation coefficient, with the null hypotheses that there was no relationship between: (a) stipend points of view and Muslim rights points of view, (b) Muslim rights points of view and voting rights points of view, and (c) stipends points of view and voting rights points of view. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10.

Variable 1	Variable 2	Correlation	Significance	N
Stipends POV	Muslim Prayers POV	.075	.192	247
Muslim Prayers POV	Voting Rights POV	.251	<.001	247
Stipends POV	Voting Rights POV	-.028	.624	247

Table 10: Kendall's tau_b correlations between point of view types across issues

The analysis of correlations demonstrates that the null hypothesis of a relationship between points of view on the stipends issue and points of view on both the Muslim public worship issue and the voting rights issue could not be rejected. On the other hand, points of view regarding the Muslim rights issue and the voting rights issue were weakly but significantly correlated at the $p<0.01$ level. This analysis suggested that the stipends issue was substantively different from the other issues for the respondents. In fact, a deeper analysis of frequencies of the responses given to the point of view statements, agreement or disagreement with which was scaled on a five-point Likert scale, revealed that whilst the types of points of view regarding the issue were largely normally distributed, the levels of agreement with the individual statements were highly skewed against the removal of stipends in four out of five statements. Out of 247 respondents, 122 strongly disagreed with the first statement, 113 strongly agreed with the second statement, 172 strongly agreed with the fourth statement, and 114 strongly agreed with the fifth statement. Only responses for the third statement were normally distributed. No such swings were evident for the responses to the Muslim rights individual statements and the voting rights individual statements, which were mostly normally distributed (see Appendix V).

The swing in responses in the stipends issue suggested that respondents, in spite of the fact that their points of view on the issue were normally distributed, felt more strongly on this issue than they did about the other issues, and that this in turn might be associated with their point of view, thus resulting in no correlation between their point of view on this issue and their points of view on other issues. The analysis of descriptive statistics supported this hypothesis, in that it demonstrated that the mean value for ego-relatedness on the stipends issue ($\overline{X} = 8.37$) was higher than the mean value for ego-relatedness on the Muslim worship rights issue ($\overline{X} = 5.85$) and the mean value for the voting rights issue ($\overline{X} = 6.18$). Correlational analyses were undertaken using Pearson's correlation coefficient to test the hypotheses that ego-relatedness was related to point of view type across issues. The null hypotheses tested were that: (a) there was no relationship between the point of view type and ego-relatedness for the stipends issue, (b) there was no relationship between the

point of view type and ego-relatedness for the Muslim worship rights issue, and (c) there was no relationship between the point of view type and ego-relatedness for the voting rights issue. Contrary to expectations, in this study and across all issues, ego-relatedness was not correlated to point of view type, failing to reject null hypotheses in any of the three issues. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 11.

Variable 1	Variable 2	Correlation	Significance	N
Stipends POV	Stipends Issue	-.043	.506	247
Muslims POV	Muslim Prayers Issue	-.070	.274	247
Voting POV	Voting Rights Issue	-.072	.259	2147

Table 11: Pearson's correlational analysis between points of view and ego-relatedness

A measure of construct validity was adopted in this survey by way of the Multicultural Ideology Scale (Berry, 1984; see Chapter 4). Reliability for this scale was measured using Cronbach's α, which demonstrated good reliability at 0.81. The Multicultural Ideology Scale measures the degree of openness towards another culture. This is similar in principle to the conceptual definition of points of view adopted in this thesis. One would therefore expect that points of view regarding other cultures would be related to multicultural ideology. To test this hypothesis, a correlational analysis was undertaken on the points of view regarding Muslim worship rights and multicultural ideology. Out of the three social issues investigated, the right of Muslims to practice their religion in Malta was the only multicultural issue. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to test the null hypothesis that there was no relationship between these two variables. Results are presented in Table 12.

Variable 1	Variable 2	Correlation	Significance	N
Muslims POV	Multicultural Ideology	.238	<.001	247

Table 12: Pearson's correlational analysis between Muslim rights point of view and multicultural ideology

A significant correlation (p<0.01) was found between the two variables by which the null hypothesis of no relationship could be rejected. Further analysis was undertaken to explore the nature of this relationship, particularly in view of the fact that the relationship was not very strong. Descriptive statistics were analysed for point of view types. This indicated that the mean values on multicultural ideology varied between point of view types. The mean multicultural ideology value for monological types ($\overline{X}$ = 31.22) did not differ from that of dialogical types ($\overline{X}$ = 31.11). The mean multicultural ideology value for metalogical types did however differ from the other types ($\overline{X}$ = 35.38).

Further analysis was undertaken by means of a one-way ANOVA to test the null hypothesis that the difference between means was not significant. The test score ($F(2, 233)$=10.14) revealed that the difference between means of point of view types and their respective multicultural ideology value was statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Given, however, the difference in orientation between the two monological types (for and against the issue) and similarly the two dialogical types, and the fact that the multicultural ideology score for both types was averaged between the two for the purposes of classification, further analysis was pursued using the five point of view types rather than three (i.e. monological for, monological against, dialogical for, dialogical against, and metalogical). Statistically significant differences were found in the differences between the means of monological types against and those of monological types for, dialogical types against, dialogical types for, and metalogical types. Moreover, statistically significant differences were also found between the differences in the means of dialogical types against and those of monological types for, dialogical types for, and metalogical types. On the other hand, no statistically significant differences were found between monological types and dialogical types favouring Muslim rights, monological types favouring Muslim rights and metalogical types, and dialogical types favouring Muslim rights and metalogical types (Table 13).

Variables	t	N	p
Monological against*Monological for	6.21	51	<0.01
Monological against*Dialogical against	-2.91	109	<0.01
Monological against*Dialogical for	4.88	41	<0.01
Monological for*Dialogical against	4.56	41	<0.01
Monological for*Dialogical for	0.89	43	0.38
Monological against*Metalogical	-6.94	50	<0.01
Monological for*Metalogical	0.86	42	0.39
Dialogical against*Dialogical for	-3.09	30	<0.01
Dialogical against*Metalogical	-5.35	158	<0.01
Dialogical for*Metalogical	-2.76	31	0.78

Table 13: t-test results for multicultural ideology by point of view types

A central element of this inquiry was the investigation of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment associated with particular types of point of view. The latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment were computed by adding the respective number of statements accepted, rejected, or neutral from a list of nine statements that were presented to respondents per issue. This enabled the analysis of mean number of statements accepted, rejected, and non-committed to be analysed. Subsequent analysis tested whether there were significant differences in these latitudes across points of view for every issue, that is, whether the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment varied significantly depending on what type of point of view was held.

One-way ANOVAs were conducted to test the null hypothesis that there were no differences between point of view types in their mean numbers of statements accepted, rejected, and non-committed. No statistically significant differences were found between means of responses for the three latitudes on the stipends issue, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis.

For the Muslim rights issue, however, differences between point of view types emerged in their latitudes of rejection ($F(2, 239)=6.99$), significant at the $p<0.01$ level. Further analysis was undertaken to explore the precise nature of this difference in means. *t*-tests were conducted pair-wise across the point of view types to determine which point of view types differed significantly from others in their latitude of rejection. This analysis was also undertaken for latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment, given the curiously low probability levels at which the null hypothesis could be rejected for these latitudes (see Appendix V). The difference between the two monological types and the two dialogical types were tested prior to this analysis to determine whether those for or against the issue, be they monological or dialogical, differed significantly from each other. There were no statistically significant differences between the two monological types and the two dialogical types in their latitudes of acceptance, rejection and non-commitment. There were, however, statistically significant differences between monological types and dialogical types in their latitudes of acceptance ($t(104)=-2.02$, $p<0.05$) and rejection ($t(161)=3.79$, $p<0.01$)[18]. There were further differences between monological types and metalogical types in their latitudes of rejection ($t(104)=2.18$, $p<0.05$). No differences were found in their latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment. On the other hand, there were no statistically significant differences at all between dialogical and metalogical types in any of their latitudes.

For the voting rights issue, no statistically significant differences were immediately discernible between point of view types in their latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment (Appendix V), thus failing to reject the null hypothesis of no differences between the latitudes of the various point of view types. However, further analysis using *t*-tests was undertaken in view of the curiously low probability value at which the null hypothesis of no differences in the latitudes of acceptance between point of view types could be rejected ($p<0.8$). Subsequent analysis revealed that there were differences between the two monological types in their latitudes of

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[18] Levene's test for equality of variance was significant at the $p<0.01$ level (see Appendix V)

non-commitment (t(26)=2.057) and rejection (t(27)=-2.4) that were statistically significant at or under the 0.05 level of significance. No such differences were found between the two dialogical types, however, the distinction between the two monological types was retained in further analyses and the means of the two were analysed differently.

The first monological type [1] expressed itself against granting Maltese abroad the right to vote, whereas the second monological type [2] adopted a more liberal approach and expressed itself in favour of granting Maltese abroad equal voting rights. Subsequent analysis using t-tests to test for statistical differences in latitudes between the various point of view types, with a null hypothesis of no differences, revealed a statistically significant difference in the latitudes of acceptance between the first monological type and the first dialogical type (in favour of some restrictions) (t(54)=2.09, p<0.05), and in the latitudes of rejection between the first monological type and metalogical types (t(38)=-2.353, p<0.05). Curiously, no statistically significant differences were evident between first monological types (in favour of restrictions), and second dialogical types (against restrictions). Further differences were discovered in the latitudes of non-commitment between the second monological types and the first dialogical types (t(26)=-2.72, p<0.05) as well as the second dialogical types (t(22)=-2.34, p<0.05). No differences between the second monological types and the metalogical types were discovered. There were no statistically significant differences between either of the dialogical types and the metalogical types.

Subsequent statistical analysis sought to identify differences in points of view along varying demographic data. Chi-Square tests were undertaken to determine whether types of point of view were associated with demographic variables. Analysis revealed that gender was not associated with points of view regarding the stipends issue and the voting rights issue, but was associated with the Muslim rights issue (χ^2(2, N=247)=6.48, p<0.05). Table 14 presents the cross-tabulation of these variables.

Gender * Muslim Rights POV Crosstabulation						
			Muslims POV			
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	Total
Gender	Female	Count	32	67	60	159
		% within Gender	20.1%	42.1%	37.7%	100.0%
	Male	Count	26	42	20	88
		% within Gender	29.5%	47.7%	22.7%	100.0%
Total		Count	58	109	80	247
		% within Gender	23.5%	44.1%	32.4%	100.0%

Table 14: Cross-tabulation gender and Muslim rights point of view

Further to these differences between males and females, additional analysis was undertaken on the associated variable of multicultural ideology, to test the null hypothesis that the means of the two groups on this variable did not differ between the groups. Given that multicultural ideology had previously been found to be correlated with points of view regarding the rights of Muslims to worship, a statistically significant difference was expected. The *t*-test undertaken revealed a statistically significant difference between the means of males and females on their mean multicultural ideology values (*t*(142)=-4.40, p<0.01), rejecting the null hypothesis.

In contrast to gender, neither age, nor religious beliefs, nor place of residence, nor class[19] were associated with any point of view. Other than gender, the variable of faculty was associated with certain points of view. The faculty variable was recoded into two values representing the Arts and the Sciences. Due to low cell frequency, it was not possible to conduct any analysis with the original faculty distinctions. Recoded into Arts/Sciences, the faculty variable was not associated with the Muslim rights of worship point of view, but its association with the stipends issue point of view was only just not significant (χ^2 (2, N=245) =5.93, p=0.051), whilst its association with the voting rights point of view was statistically significant (χ^2 (2, N=245)=9.79, p<0.01). The cross-tabulation of Faculty by point of view type on the voting issue is presented in Table 15.

Faculty * Voting POV Crosstabulation

			Voting POV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Faculty	Sciences	Count	7	53	33	93
		% within Faculty	7.5%	57.0%	35.5%	100.0%
	Arts	Count	33	64	55	152
		% within Faculty	21.7%	42.1%	36.2%	100.0%
Total		Count	40	117	88	245
		% within Faculty	16.3%	47.8%	35.9%	100.0%

Table 15: Cross-tabulation faculty and voting rights point of view

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[19] measured through father's employment

Another demographic associated with certain point of view types was the year of study. The association between year of study and Muslim rights of worship point of view was statistically significant (χ^2 (6, N=246)=17.75, p<0.01), rejecting the null hypothesis of no association between the variables. Table 16 hereunder presents the cross-tabulation between year of study and Muslim rights point of view.

Yr of Study * Muslims POV Crosstabulation

			Muslims POV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Yr of Study	Year 1	Count	23	37	40	100
		% within Yr of Study	23.0%	37.0%	40.0%	100.0%
	Year 2	Count	17	25	19	61
		% within Yr of Study	27.9%	41.0%	31.1%	100.0%
	Year 3	Count	8	28	19	55
		% within Yr of Study	14.5%	50.9%	34.5%	100.0%
	Years 4/5	Count	10	19	1	30
		% within Yr of Study	33.3%	63.3%	3.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	58	109	79	246
		% within Yr of Study	23.6%	44.3%	32.1%	100.0%

Table 16: Cross-tabulation year of study and Muslim rights of worship point of view

The association between year of study and points of view on the stipends issue was not statistically significant. The association between year of study and points of view on the voting rights issue was not statistically significant, but only just (χ^2 (6, 246)=12.16, p=0.058). The same pattern of differences amongst the various years of study in points of view regarding voting rights was discernible as in points of view

regarding Muslim rights of worship. The cross-tabulation of year of study with voting rights point of view is presented in Table 17. Further to the Chi-Square analysis above in relation to Muslim rights of worship, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine whether there were differences in the mean scores on multicultural ideology between the various years of study, given that multicultural ideology had previously been found to be associated with the point of view on Muslim rights of worship, testing the null hypothesis of no differences in mean scores between the groups. Contrary to expectations, the difference in means was not significant ($F(3, 231)=1.33$, p=0.27), failing to reject the null hypothesis.

Yr of Study * Voting POV Crosstabulation

			Voting POV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Yr of Study	Year 1	Count	17	39	44	100
		% within Yr of Study	17.0%	39.0%	44.0%	100.0%
	Year 2	Count	14	31	16	61
		% within Yr of Study	23.0%	50.8%	26.2%	100.0%
	Year 3	Count	4	30	21	55
		% within Yr of Study	7.3%	54.5%	38.2%	100.0%
	Years 4/5	Count	6	17	7	30
		% within Yr of Study	20.0%	56.7%	23.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	41	117	88	246
		% within Yr of Study	16.7%	47.6%	35.8%	100.0%

Table 17: Cross-tabulation year of study and voting rights point of view

Further analysis was undertaken with demographic variables to test whether any of these could serve as predictors for point of view types. To this end, three logistic regressions were undertaken with stipends point of view type, Muslim rights point of view type, and voting rights point of view type as independent variables respectively. The regression analyses tested for main effects of the demographic variables, in an effort to identify which of the demographic variables could predict point of view type. Given that the correlational findings between points of view demonstrated little consistency in point of view types across issues, it was expected that any predictors for one point of view type need not necessarily have any predictive power for a respondent's point of view type for another issue. The monological category was treated as the baseline category for the comparative purposes of regression.

None of the demographic variables proved to be significant predictors for points of view on the stipends issue (see Appendix V). This finding is not surprising given that for this issue, points of view were not associated with any other variables and responses to the various items were heavily skewed. The stipends issue in this study presented itself as a singular issue that was substantively different from the other issues as it applied very strongly to all respondents regardless of any demographic differences between them.

The logistic regression for the points of view regarding the Muslim rights of worship issue included the Multicultural Ideology Scale as an additional predictor variable to the demographic data. This was included in view of the fact that points of view regarding this issue were found to be correlated with multicultural ideology scores. The regression demonstrated that Multicultural Ideology was in fact a significant predictor for point of view type regarding the Muslim rights issue (χ^2 (2, N=245)=20.58, p<0.01). This confirms construct validity for the point of view as conceptualised in the present inquiry. It was, moreover, found to be the only significant predictor of point of view types on this issue. Respondents with higher multicultural ideology scores were found to more likely be dialogical (χ^2 (1,

N=245)=4.438, p<0.05) and even more likely to be metalogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=15.89, p<0.01) than monological (Table 18). None of the other demographic data proved to be significant predictors of point of view type, meaning that demographic differences amongst students were not predictive of their points of view on this issue. This regression model significantly fit the data (χ^2 (38)=71.44, p<0.01).

		B	Std Error	Exp(B)
Dialogical	Constant	-2.38	2.17	
	Multicultural Ideology	0.09*	0.04	1.09
Metalogical	Constant	-7.739	2.67	
	Multicultural Ideology	0.195**	0.049	1.22

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01

Table 18: Parameter estimates for Muslims POV Logistic Regression

The logistic regression for points of view regarding the voting rights issue was undertaken with the demographic variables as predictors. Unlike the other two issues, certain demographic variables proved to be significant predictors for the type of point of view adopted. Both year of study (χ^2 (6, N=245)=15.26, *df*=6, p<0.05) and faculty type (χ^2 (2, N=245)=9.29, p<0.01) proved to be significant predictors. Religious beliefs narrowly failed to reach significance. None of the other variables was found to be a significant predictor of point of view types regarding this issue. This model significantly fit the data (χ^2 (36)=58.33, p<0.05). Respondents in their third years were found to be over nine times more likely to be dialogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=5.45, p<0.05) and twenty-six times more likely to be metalogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=8.41, p<0.01) than monological, compared to fourth/fifth year students. Moreover, first year students were found to be over twelve times more likely to be metalogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=5.83, p<0.05) than monological, compared to fourth/fifth year students. With regards to the programme of study, science students were found to be almost six times more likely to be dialogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=7.91, p<0.01) and four times more likely to be metalogical (χ^2 (1, N=245)=4.63, p<0.05)

than monological, compared to arts students (Table 19). Detailed statistical output for all variables is presented in Appendix V.

		B	Std Error	Exp(B)
Dialogical	Constant	1.59	2.07	
	Year of Study 3	2.25*	0.96	9.49
	Sciences	1.74**	0.62	5.68
Metalogical	Constant	-7.739	2.67	
	Year of Study 1	2.53*	1.05	12.53
	Year of Study 3	3.26**	1.13	26.10
	Sciences	1.40*	0.65	4.06

* $p<0.05$ ** $p<0.01$

Table 19: Parameter estimates for Voting POV Logistic Regression

Finally, as noted, respondents were required to indicate the extent to which they found a statement acceptable on a scale from -2 to +2. Positive values indicated acceptance, negative values rejection, and a neutral value non-commitment. These were used to measure the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment for the various statements. Due to the fact that a 5-point scale was used for these purposes, it was possible to recode responses along the lines of the common Likert-scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. This procedure was undertaken to analyse the relevance of a measure of points of view for better understanding attitudes. The following analysis is illustrative in this regard.

Coding the responses in such fashion for a particular statement that expressed an attitude towards reciprocal intolerance, the range of responses indicates that whilst an absolute majority agrees that intolerance should not be reciprocated, a quarter of the sample disagrees with this premiss. In fact, counting the non-committal ones, almost forty percent are in fact not in outright agreement that the country should not reciprocate intolerance. The attitude distribution is presented in Table 20. This could

be a worrying concern for stakeholders seeking to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in Malta, particularly coming as it does from the tertiary sector.

Issue 2: Muslim Prayers [The fact that certain Muslim countries are intolerant does not mean we should ourselves become intolerant]

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Disagree	32	13.0	13.0	13.0
	Strongly Disagree	27	11.0	11.0	24.0
	Agree	61	24.8	24.8	48.8
	Strongly Agree	87	35.4	35.4	84.1
	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	39	15.9	15.9	100.0
	Total	246	100.0	100.0	

Table 20: Attitude measurement for statement no. 2 of Muslim worship rights issue

The cross-tabulation of this attitude measurement with the point of view (Table 21), however, reveals a critical finding. In fact, out of the quarter of the sample who are inclined towards reciprocal intolerance, 6 respondents (i.e. two and a half percent of the sample) are metalogical and thus demonstrably able to see both sides of the coin in spite of their manifest evaluation of this statement. A substantial thirty respondents, i.e. half of the quarter that express a preference for reciprocal intolerance, are in fact dialogical, that is, they ascribe legitimacy to an alternative perspective that they believe is wrong. This would also mean that these, along with the metalogical ones, stand to be convinced otherwise with regards to this particular statement. Only twenty-two respondents express themselves in a monological way. This translates as less than nine percent of the sample who advocate reciprocal intolerance and who, being monological, are themselves fundamentalist in their own views. The relationship between these two variables in this case is statistically significant (χ^2=39.19, *df*=8, p<0.01).

Crosstab

Count

		MtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Issue 2: Muslim Prayers [The fact that certain Muslim countries are intolerant does not mean we should ourselves become intolerant]	Disagree	7	19	5	31
	Strongly Disagree	15	11	1	27
	Agree	12	28	21	61
	Strongly Agree	17	27	43	87
	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	6	23	10	39
Total		57	108	80	245

Table 21: Cross-tabulation of point of view with attitude statement

Discussion

The starting point of any scientific inquiry is an explanation of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation (Asch, 1952/1987; Sherif & Sherif, 1968). Consequently, an analysis of points of view as social-psychological phenomena, which has been the central preoccupation of this thesis, necessarily faces the question of explicating the precise nature of this phenomenon. The fact that people can hold consistent views in relation to certain issues that have a bearing on their interrelations with others (as demonstrated in the second study, see Chapter 6) does not in itself define the nature of these views. Whilst the debate over whether cognition is a generative mechanism or whether it is a discursive feature (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1998) is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, the socio-cognitive nature of points of view requires determination. Insofar as points of view are rooted in socio-cognitive processes, then differences in the cognitive structure should transpire in a comparison of types. The present inquiry sought an answer to this question through a study of the latitude structure of points of view.

The results demonstrate that the cognitive structure does indeed differ between point of view types. This provides evidence that points of view are not merely a discursive epiphenomenon, but that they are marked by characteristic intrapersonal differences in the socio-cognitive architecture.

Cognitive style

Insofar as points of view are cognitively structured, then an expectation of cognitive consistency, and by extension cognitive style (Sternberg & Zhang, 2001) is reasonable. If points of view serve individuals to orientate themselves amidst a plurality of views, then individuals ought to be inclined to organise their feelings, attitudes, and beliefs into internally consistent structures, and when they encounter incompatible views they ought to be inclined to resolve the apparent contradiction (Eiser & Stroebe, 1972). This inclination describes cognitive consistency. By extension, individuals ought to do so according to their preferred mode of thinking and information processing, that is, their cognitive style. Consequently, it would be reasonable to expect individuals who have a certain type of point of view in relation to one issue to have a similar type of point of view in relation to other issues. The theories of cognitive consistency and cognitive style therefore warrant the expectation of coherence across issues in point of view types, for example, that someone with a monological point of view with regards to worship rights would have a similarly monological point of view with regards to voting rights. The social judgment theories of perspectives and narrow-mindedness assumed the relative stability of perspectives in individuals (Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Kruglanski, 2004). Conversely, individuals may arguably be expected to perceive differences and nuances between different social issues and tailor their point of view accordingly.

The findings of this inquiry support this latter theory of cognitive complexity (Bieri, 1961; Burleson & Caplan, 1998). Whilst the fact that different points of view are similarly rooted in the cognitive structure and demonstrate some degree of correlation, points of view do differ markedly with regards to different issues. In the

present inquiry, the points of view adopted with regard to the stipends issue were totally uncorrelated with other points of view regarding other issues. This demonstrates that individuals will adopt a particular type of point of view depending on the characteristics of the issue rather than some intrinsic cognitive style. On the other hand, whilst the correlation was weak, it was nevertheless significant in the two issues that were more closely related and almost equally distant to the immediate interests of respondents (in terms of ego-relatedness), to the extent that knowing an individual's point of view type on one issue explains over six percent of the variance in the point of view type regarding the other issue. It would thus be reasonable to conclude that whilst individuals may have a preferred cognitive style, they are equally capable of appreciating each issue on its own merits, and to orientate themselves accordingly in adopting a particular type of point of view towards it. Such a conclusion rules out the hypothesis that a cognitive style is hard-wired into an underlying neural module or a stable personality type, as these would not afford the flexibility demonstrated in this study. In contrast, the findings of this study demonstrate that cognitive style is not deterministic, and whilst knowing someone's point of view on one issue does go some way towards knowing their point of view on another issue, this is by no means a determined conclusion.

Latitudes architecture

The central issue investigated in this third inquiry is whether, and to what extent, do latitudes of acceptance, rejection and noncommitment vary with point of view type. A point of view that is relatively more closed than another point of view (i.e. a monological point of view as compared to a dialogical one, or a dialogical one as compared to a metalogical one) would be expected to have a narrower latitude of acceptance with little leeway in terms of entertaining different perspectives. It would also be expected to have a wider latitude of rejection, as alternative perspectives are negated or rejected if they do not match with the one the individual upholds. Conversely, more open perspectives would be expected to reject alternatives less outrightly, and that this would be reflected in narrower latitudes of rejection and

wider latitudes of acceptance. The findings of this inquiry certainly do not support such clear-cut expectations.

In this study, no differences in latitudes were found to exist between point of view types with regards to the stipends issue, whereas differences between point of view types emerged with regards to the other two issues. In a sense, the stipends issue was substantively different from the other issues, in that its implications were directly and materially applicable to the population being studied in a way that neither of the other two issues was. The higher levels of ego-relatedness with regards to this issue as compared to the others, as well as the skewed distributions in response to the individual point of view statements, are testament to this. Given the human ability for cognitive complexity, supported above, it is therefore reasonable to expect a different cognitive structure with regards to this issue than that which characterises the other two.

The nature of the differences in latitudes, however, varied somewhat in relation to the Muslim worship rights issue and the voting rights issue. Differences between point of view types in the Muslim rights issue were clear and straightforward. Monological types differed from both dialogical types and metalogical types in their latitudes of rejection. Monological types also differed from dialogical types in their latitudes of acceptance. With regards to the voting rights issue, differences again emerged between certain monological types and other monological types as well as metalogical types in their latitudes of rejection. Further differences emerged between other monological types and dialogical types in their latitudes of noncommitment. And similar to the Muslim rights issue, there were also some differences in the latitudes of acceptance between certain monological types and certain dialogical types.

The most robust conclusion that accrues from these findings is that the differences that exist in the cognitive structure between point of view types lie not so much with the latitudes of acceptance in themselves, although there do seem to be differences between monological and dialogical types here. However, differences are more clear when it comes to appraising an alternative that is not readily acceptable. More consistent differences have thus emerged in the latitudes of rejection between point of view types, particularly between monological types and metalogical types. And whilst in the voting rights issue, these differences did not transpire into latitudes of rejection, they did however emerge in the latitude of non-commitment. It seems therefore, that the latitude of acceptance may be relatively stable across points of view. This may be given by the holomorphic social representations (Wagner & Hayes, 2005) that a particular society may endorse, and that regulate norms and, as argued in this thesis, serve to inform individuals' points of view. Views in line with these norms are thus accepted, although as noted, there are also some noteworthy differences between monological and dialogical types here. On the other hand, treatment of a new alternative varies across point of view types, more specifically between monological types and the other two. These findings are in line with Upshaw's variable series model and the width of perspectives in the social judgment of in-range and out-of-range stimuli.

This evidence also demonstrates clearly that intrapersonal differences exist between point of view types and that these are rooted in their respective cognitive structure. This finding addresses the core concern of this third empirical inquiry and provides clear evidence that points of view are in their nature psychological phenomena, as well as social (as the second study demonstrated), marked by differences in social cognition across types. This lends support to Sherif's theory of social judgment. The fact that differences in latitudes varied across issues is not entirely surprising, and highlights the fact that these differences are not merely cognitive, but *socio-*cognitive in nature. It is difficult to provide a definitive answer as to whether some perspectives are wider or narrower than others, as Upshaw suggested. However, this is fully understandable when taking into consideration the argumentative context of

the issues investigated. These played no part in Upshaw's studies but are immediately relevant to the present inquiry. In a sense, had this study investigated a single issue, one would have been inclined to conclude, for example, that differences between points of view lay exclusively in their latitudes of rejection, had the Muslim rights issue been chosen for a case study, or that no differences at all existed, had the stipends issue been the selected case. However, as this investigation demonstrates, where the intrapersonal differences between points of view lie depends on the issue being considered and how it is framed argumentatively.

The contextual and argumentative factor plays a determinate role in the socio-cognitive structure of points of view. For example, in contrasting the Muslim worship rights issue with the voting rights issue, being open on the voting rights issue would translate into being more liberal, hence rejecting more of the restrictive statements than 'labour-oriented' monological types. In this way, we are justified in saying that metalogical types are more openly predisposed towards alternatives, in line with Upshaw's theory, but this may not literally translate into having a narrower latitude of rejection compared to a monological type. This would depend on the argumentative and contextual aspects of the issue. This finding lends support to Billig's critique of attitudes and the relevance of the argumentative context (see Chapter 3).

Construct validity

The second study in this inquiry into points of view documented differences in the way different types were able to relate to an alternative culture. In light of this, differences were therefore expected between point of view types in multicultural ideology. This variable additionally afforded a measure of construct validity, in that, insofar as points of view were more or less open to an alternative cultural perspective, this ought also to transpire in the extent to which the same individual is predisposed towards interacting with another culture. A significant correlation was therefore expected between point of view types and multicultural ideology, and this

was indeed borne out in the findings of this study. Furthermore, the fact that the correlation is not high supports the conclusion that a point of view on multiculturalism is not the same as multicultural ideology, but significantly related to it. This correlation therefore supports the construct validity of the point of view as a phenomenon that has relational functions with regards to alternative perspectives.

A further key finding to emerge from the correlational analysis of this variable is in the difference between dialogical types and metalogical types as argued in Chapter 6 and Figure 8. Such differences did not transpire in the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment. Both dialogical and metalogical types differed significantly from monological types in certain latitudes, but these differences did not transpire between dialogical types and metalogical types themselves, leading to the conclusion that there might be no real or substantive differences between the two. This, in fact, is not the case. Whilst, as Figure 8 outlined in the previous chapter, dialogical types and metalogical types are distinguished from monological types in terms of the dimensions taken into account in the appraisal of a perspective, differences between point of view types in their respective measures of multicultural ideology conform to the pattern set out in Figure 8.

Metalogical types score as highly on the multicultural ideology measure as monological types that are all out for multiculturalism, and dialogical types that value this type of relation. In relating with another culture, metalogical types relate as well as monological or dialogical types that favour assimilation. This is represented as 'Issue 2' in Figure 8. And as a prediction based on this model would forecast, the differences between metalogical types, dialogical types and monological types favouring multiculturalism, and other points of view that do not favour multiculturalism, are all statistically significant, whilst the differences amongst them are not. In essence therefore, metalogical types are, on this measure, distinguishable from some dialogical types [type 1 against multiculturalism]. It was not possible in this study to test the converse hypothesis whether metalogical types differed from type 2 dialogical types [that favour another culture] with regard to

their own native culture. This is a predictive hypothesis that emerges from the conceptualisation of intercultural relations described in Figure 8, that is represented in 'Issue 1' and that should transpire between metalogical types and dialogical 2 types, but that could not be tested in the present study. In all other ways, the testable hypotheses emerging from the conceptualization of points of view described in Figures 7 and 8 that emerged from the second empirical inquiry were borne out in the present study. Furthermore, as the regression analysis demonstrated, respondents who scored highly on multicultural ideology were more likely to be dialogical and even more likely to be metalogical, than monological. This finding lends further support to the construct validity of the typology of points of view formulated in this inquiry.

The implications of these findings extend beyond the immediate concerns of conceptualising the point of view, in that this finding demonstrates the value of promoting multiculturalism. If the promotion of multiculturalism as a policy can increase individuals' openness to other cultures as indicated by their multicultural ideology scores, then this is demonstrably valuable inasmuch as such increases are predictive of an increased likelihood of adopting dialogical and metalogical points of view over monological ones. And due to the fact that monological points of view are demonstrably divisive, they remain potentially more conflictual than either dialogical or metalogical points of view even when their preferred acculturation strategy is that of assimilation, as documented in the second study of this thesis. Therefore, insofar as the relation between these two variables can be assumed to be causal and flowing in the direction of multicultural ideology to changes in individuals' point of view types, then promoting multiculturalism is clearly a desirable pursuit. This point of discussion will be revisited hereunder in discussing the potential for changing and promoting certain types of points of view.

Ego-relatedness

The measure of ego-relatedness yielded some surprising findings. Given the swings in agreeing or disagreeing with point of view statements for the stipends issue, and that this consequently resulted in the stipends issue being appraised differently than the other issues, the hypothesis that point of view types vary with ego-relatedness was reasonable. This however proved not to be the case. In essence, how strongly people feel with regards to some issue has no bearing on their ability for cognitive complexity. Feeling strongly with regards to something does not, in and of itself, short-circuit cognition to adopting a monological point of view. Some individuals who felt strongly with regards to some issue were still able to adopt a metalogical perspective, just like other individuals who did not feel strongly about some other issue still adopted monological ones.

Demographics

This study has demonstrated that certain social demographics may indeed be associated with certain types of point of view with regards to certain issues. For example, in this study, both gender and year of study, as well as faculty of study, have been found to be significantly associated with particular points of view with regards to specific issues. Whilst a full explanation of the reasons for these variations in points of view according to demographic characteristics is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, the fact that these have been found to be significantly associated with points of view demonstrates that particular issues may be processed differently by different individuals, to the extent that demographic criteria may at times reflect some underlying reality. What this finding demonstrates is the circumscription of context when it comes to expressing oneself on some particular issue. In certain issues, it matters whether one is male or female, a scientist or a philosopher, an undergraduate or a postgraduate, in the types of point of view one adopts with regards to the issue and, by implication, with regards to how one negotiates a position in the social sphere.

Furthermore, demographic differences have been found to be predictive of types of point of view individuals may hold. Differences in points of view are seemingly not based in gender differences. Gender is associated with particular points of view on particular issues, but in and of itself it does not have predictive power in determining point of view type and its association varies depending on the issue under study. The same can be said for individual differences in personality, further to the discussion on cognitive style above. However, certain correlates of points of view and personality differences, such as intelligence, require further exploration. With regards to specific issues however, differences in demographic characteristics may be indicative of differences in points of view. The regression findings regarding the voting rights issue demonstrate that third year students and science students are more likely to be metalogical and dialogical in turn, than monological, as compared to their fellow arts students. The ramifications of these findings are very important.

Whilst an argument could be made that students with metalogical perspectives on certain issues could be drawn to the sciences whilst their monological counterparts could be drawn to the arts, the same argument cannot be made for year of study. Year of study was found to be significantly associated with points of view for the Muslim rights issue, and was found to be a significant predictor for points of view on the voting rights issue. Since the argument that students with particular points of view are attracted to particular years of study does not hold, as this is a temporal matter in following a programme of studies, this finding suggests that points of view are amenable to education. Moreover, the disciplines coded as sciences and those coded as arts are in themselves widely disparate, and it is hard to justify the argument that similar points of view could have motivated some to agriculture as much as others to dental surgery, which were both coded as sciences. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that as students undergo years of education and indoctrination in particular disciplines, they acquire the capacity to adopt certain types of points of view against others, with regards to certain issues. Broadly speaking, it seems that indoctrination in scientific principles fosters metalogical thinking amongst students at the University of Malta, but that progress through tertiary education leads to

monological thinking. Both of these claims are plausible enough, in that the sciences, based on principles of refutation, teach that alternative explanations that may not be immediately apparent may still play a role in whatever phenomena one is observing. Similarly, obtaining a tertiary qualification seems to come with a self-assurance that one's own perspective, based on institutionalised standards of knowledge, provides the sole and correct interpretation of worldly events.

Whilst identification of the specific conditions of this influence, i.e. between demographic variables and points of view, requires further investigation, this finding suggests that particular points of view are amenable to change through influence. To go back to the earlier discussion of multiculturalism, it seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that certain forms of intervention can foster dialogical or metalogical thinking with regards to certain issues, and that the demographic characteristic of point of view type in a given population is not beyond manipulation. This is a critical finding that demonstrates the heuristic value of the study of points of view. For the study of certain issues, it becomes certainly worth knowing the distribution of points of view and discovering how certain points of view could be fostered over others.

The relevance of studying points of view pertains to the study and measurement of social behaviour that is relational and relative, as argued in this thesis. Unlike other forms of measurement that have been proposed through the years (see Fishbein, 1967), that falter for the reason of overlooking the contingencies of the situation and standardising the argumentative context, the study of points of view is able to provide a similar account of individual orientations towards some social object that is circumscribed by the argumentative and discursive characteristics of the social representations in which it is located. Consequently, the study of points of view not only contributes to knowing how many are for against some issue of interest. Indeed, there is no distinct advantage of studying points of views over using the common Likert-scale for this purpose. What the study of points of view adds, and what is perhaps its critical pragmatic advantage over other measures, is an understanding as

to how many of these are, in themselves, open to discussion and negotiation with an alternative perspective.

In quantifying the relative proportions of monological, dialogical, and metalogical points of view, the use of the point of view concept provides an additional understanding of the nature of the characteristic agreement or disagreement that exists with regards to some issue. It provides a clear understanding of why opinion polls alone do not suffice in making accurate predictions of social behaviour. If a substantial proportion of a given population is open to negotiation, in spite of their manifest agreement or disagreement with regards to the issue, then these same are open to last minute persuasion that may result in violent swings of opinion at some critical moment. This is the classical critique of the unreliability of attitudes over time (see Zaller & Feldman, 1992). It is illustrated in the intolerance attitude example above, which demonstrates that the measurement of points of view greatly illuminates our understanding of the situation. Whilst there may nevertheless be plenty of cause for concern, there is also plenty of scope to promote another agenda, should this be desirable. Rather than passively accepting a dissident minority that is alarmingly numerous, as the Likert-scale measure would suggest, this example shows that the hypothetical policymaker has plenty of scope and should actively engage with the population to promote tolerance and convince skeptics that the 'other' view of cultural tolerance is legitimate, and moreover, reasonable.

Framed in this way, it would appear that the point of view is a concept the relevance of which lies in its quantitative operationalisation. Yet it is worth bearing in mind that the point of view, other than being a socio-cognitive concept, is also manifest in discourse. The discursive study of points of view is a necessary prerequisite to its operationalisation for quantitative purposes. The study of points of view requires sensitivity to the characteristics of a social issue as it exists for a particular people. It is for this reason that differences in its cognitive structure cannot be boiled down to specific latitudes, or why the claim that a point of view is necessarily broader or

more open than another is not justified. Unlike the Likert scale, there seems to be no short-cut to the standardisation of points of view.

Conclusion

This study has presented evidence that demonstrates structural differences between points of view, that are functional in their interrelational aspects and that are socio-cognitive in nature. Points of view can be described as social-psychological phenomena that vary in the extent to which they relate to an alternative perspective. This variance is rooted in a varying socio-cognitive architecture that characterises the extent to which points of view open themselves to the alternative proposal. This study has also demonstrated that these differences do not reside in specific latitudes or in a specific direction, although the latitudes of rejection and noncommitment seem to play a more significant role in appreciating an alternative than the latitude of acceptance. This is perhaps because the latitude of acceptance is normative given the prevailing social representations in which points of view are embedded. However, even the differences identified in the latitudes of rejection and noncommitment do vary with the issue. This demonstrates that, as with social representations, with regards to points of view, content is circumscribed by context. This is an aspect that the attitude programme has overlooked, as is made clear in chapter 3. By contrast, points of view are, by implication, bound to their argumentative context in view of the fact that they are by definition relational and relative. This study demonstrates therefore that the point of view, as a social-psychological construct, may be better suited to capture the relational and relative nature of social behaviour than either attitudes or the social representations can do on their own.

Chapter 8:
Discussion & Conclusion

Introduction

The present thesis has proposed and advanced the social psychological conceptualisation of 'point of view'. The study of points of view was proposed by Asch (1952/1987) as a way for studying the manner by which individuals orientate themselves in social reality, as an extension to his conception of social attitudes. Similarly, Harré and Secord (1972) advocate the study of points of view in providing an explanation of individual positioning in social behaviour. The conceptualisation of points of view in the present thesis rests fundamentally on a conception of social representations that circulate in the public sphere, in which subjects are systemically engaged and on the basis of which they act in context-rational ways. Subjects position themselves in relation to others in their social environment, adopting a particular outlook towards an object or issue in their social life that is meaningful in view of a social representation that renders it legitimate. Through their point of view, individuals relate to others and to the object in question. A point of *view* is necessarily relational, being oriented towards other subjects and objects in the social environment, as Bauer & Gaskell's (1999) model for social representations postulates. Furthermore, a *point* of view is necessarily relative, being one point of view amongst others. Points of view describe social reality as it exists for individuals, relative to others.

This thesis contends that social reality is, like physical reality (Einstein, 1916; see Chapter 3), contingent on the perceiver's point of view. Social reality is phenomenal rather than objective, that is, it appears to the observer depending on a background of intelligibility that serves the function of interpretation (i.e. a social representation). This interpretative nature of social reality is the great paradigm shift precipitated by social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This thesis postulates that, in addition to collective processes of social construction, whether an alternative description of social reality is admitted or bears influence depends not so much on the characterisation of that view and whether it has, effectively, some point

to make. Rather, admitting an alternative description depends on the characteristic features of the appraiser's own point of view.

Points of view are fundamentally rooted in the public sphere and are implicated in its very nature. Public spheres can be more or less conducive to open dialogue and the negotiation of alternative views, and through the exercise of power can legitimate some and censor others. Which views are accepted, rejected, or treated with indifference transpires at the personal level in the social-psychological features of points of view. The point of view is a social phenomenon inasmuch as it is a view that incorporates other entities, and it is psychological inasmuch as it is an individual's point, or position, that relates to others. Both of these features have been empirically explored in the present thesis. The empirical studies undertaken in this inquiry have documented three types of point of view that differ in their treatment of alternative rationales for contrasting points of view. These differences are based on intrapersonal socio-cognitive properties inherent to points of view that serve to structure interpersonal relations. These findings are revisited and elaborated hereunder, along with an appraisal of the contribution the study of this construct makes to social theory and the understanding of social behaviour.

The explanation of social behaviour

Social psychology has for a long time relied on 'attitude' to explain how individuals orientate themselves to objects in their surroundings. 'Attitude' arguably represents social psychology's greatest contribution to the social sciences. At its most basic attitudes represent an individual's evaluation of an attitude object (Thurstone, 1967a, 1967b; Sherif & Sherif, 1967; Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2005). Alongside its aggregate counterpart, public opinion, attitude measurement continues to dominate the social sciences at large, as evidenced by the widespread use of Likert scales. The Likert scale, as an attitude measure, serves to combine variables into statistical scales, factors, or indexes that are routinely held to explain as well as predict behaviour.

Social psychology has itself been defined as the discipline concerned with the study of attitudes (Allport, 1967; McGuire, 1985), and since its inception has been immensely concerned with the measurement of this construct (Fishbein, 1967). Yet, the utility of attitudes has not proven unproblematic. One aspect of the problem lies in its presumed link to behaviour. Attitudes are held to represent predispositions towards stimuli in the individual's environment that serve as inclinations towards behaviour. This presumption has been put into contestation ever since LaPiere's (1934) study on Chinese diners demonstrated that individuals who expressed racist attitudes did not behave in straightforwardly racist ways as expected. The attitude's link to behaviour has been addressed in manifold ways, from outlining intervening variables, such as intentions (Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), to addressing its element of temporality (Zaller & Feldman, 1992), such as in the undertaking of polls of polls.

Other theorists, however, have taken issue with the conceptualisation of attitudes and have questioned what it is that evaluation scales really measure. Allport has famously argued that attitudes in social psychology are better measured than defined (Allport, 1967). Most critiques of attitudes have centred on the way in which attitudes consider the social (Farr, 1996). In its early formulations, attitude was held to be an individual counterpart to wider societal processes, that is, social values (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918-1920). In its later formulations, attitude was individualised and cognitivised such that the social came to represent a measurable variable of influence on the individual's own inclinations (Graumann, 1986). This conception of attitudes has proven problematic due to its overlooking of the argumentative context in which social behaviour takes place (Billig, 1987, 1991), and gave rise to counter-formulations of social psychological constructs that retained concern with these wider societal processes.

The study of social representations, alongside social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985) and discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), has sought to counterbalance the focus on individualised social cognition in favour

of explicating the cultural backgrounds of intelligibility (Daanen, 2009) in which a given stimulus may elicit, amongst other alternatives, a context-rational response (Wagner, 1993). These approaches, however, have precipitated a seemingly irreconcilable divide between the individual on the one hand, and the social on the other. This divide is routinely traced back to Descartes' (1637, 1644) postulation of the *cogito*, that is, the independent thinking mind–that the cognitive sciences, including certain forms of social psychology, have taken up as their object of inquiry. Whilst some have sought a more systemic formulation of social representations that exist across rather than inside individual minds (Harré, 1984; Wagner et al., 1999; Wagner & Hayes, 2005; Wagner, Mecha & do Rosário Carvalho, 2008), the chasm between the two has become a defining challenge for the discipline of social psychology (Gaskell, 2001) and for any explanation of social behaviour (Harré & Secord, 1972).

The divide between the social and the individual is ontological as much as it is epistemological and involves different levels of explanation (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). The social pertains to the collective life of human beings and applies to processes that take shape at this collective level, such as ideologies and discourse. The individual pertains to the human being as a single specimen and applies to processes that take place at this level such as cognition and perception. The gap between the two is well explicated by Harré (1984) in his distinction of aggregates from collectives. Whilst aggregates bring together individual specimens, collectives exist independently of individual cognition. Social behaviour, however, retains elements of both. Insofar as it involves an element of positioning relative to other, equally agentic, beings, then such behaviour can be deemed social. And insofar as such interpersonal relations involve an element of perception and interpretation, then such behaviour can be deemed personal and cognitive.

This characteristic duality of social behaviour has confounded explanations on either side of the dichotomy. Attitude thus serves to understand an individual's inclination towards some social object on the basis of characteristics of that individual,

including affect, behavioural tendencies, cognition, and external influences. It does not, however, provide an explanation for why individuals resort to certain courses of action given a certain stimulus. For instance, two individuals may be equally appalled by some event, but their individual responses may vary as a function of different cultural conditions in which they are embedded. Social representations, on the other hand, describe context-rational behaviour that is deemed reasonable in certain circumstances. They describe how for a certain social group, a particular course of action is reasonable given certain conditions. Social representations do not, however, explain why such context-rational behaviour may be adopted by some individuals but not by similar others facing the same circumstances. Not all individuals react in the same way to similar events. In other words, neither attitudes nor social representations are useful for a situational explanation of social behaviour, that is, for an explanation of why a certain individual acts in a certain way at a certain point in time. This explanation requires a focus on the individual, meaning that the level of explanation required is not outside the individual, on collectives in which the individual is systemically embedded and that legitimate individual behaviour, nor inside the individual, on neuro-cognitive processes that take place in the mind/brain. It requires looking at the individual and keeping into focus the individual's inclinations relative to others contemporarily.

This thesis follows in the footsteps of Solomon Asch (1952) to advance a conceptualisation of the point of view as a construct that bridges this divide and that provides a social-cum-psychological explanation of social behaviour. Asch took issue with attitudes as an individual cognitive construct, arguing that attitude measures could not realistically be regarded as scales, as they provide no information with regard to the frame of reference by which individuals can be held to mean the same thing when they reply to an attitude statement in the same way. Such an exclusion of the contextual character of human action precluded any legitimate explanation of social behaviour. According to Asch, the starting point of any social psychological explanation is to recognise that human beings are embedded in social contexts that serve to order their social surroundings in

meaningful ways and that legitimate their outlooks towards objects in their environment. Moreover, this meaning serves to bring about a communal life in which individuals relate with others to enact a certain social reality that serves them. Consequently, according to Asch, it is more meaningful to enquire into the outlooks individuals adopt towards some aspect of social life, on the basis of which they engage in mutual relations with others.

Asch argues that the ability to adopt an outlook and to relate to others on the basis of it, with the realisation that others also have their own idiosyncratic outlooks that may effectively differ from one's own, serves as a foundational characteristic for the enactment of communal life. According to Asch, this ability enables the interpenetration of views, by which individuals can adopt the perspective of the other and comprehend how some object can appear differently from the other's perspective. This capacity enables individuals to engage in the social check, by which, in taking the perspective of the other, individuals check the accuracy of their own perceptions with others and are thus able to make corrections to their own outlooks to match a socially determined reality. Asch goes on to postulate that social psychology needs to concern itself with social attitudes, first and foremost, and upon acquiring an understanding of these it would then become legitimate to inquire into individuals' points of view, to understand their outlook towards a given topic. This provides a situational explanation of social behaviour based on an individual's outlook, as this exists relative to others.

This characterisation of points of view has a long tradition in philosophical thinking, dating back to Kant. According to Kant (1798), agents and spectators see behaviour from different standpoints. Consequently, different points of view may be equally legitimate, and no single point of view can reveal the reality of a phenomenon. What we see depends on the standpoint we adopt in relation to the phenomenon (Mischel, 1969). This same characteristic of points of view enabled Sartre to resolve the dualism between reality and the real through the notion of infinity. Sartre claimed that what appears of the object is only ever an aspect of it, and that objects are

inexhaustible by virtue of the infinite possibility of points of view that may be taken on them. The point of view, in philosophical terms, is thus a relational as well as a relative construct. It is relational in that it implies a phenomenal perception of an object by a subject, and it is relative in that the appearance of the object is relative to whoever is acting as subject.

This conception of the point of view has enabled its utility in other theories that have used the term as *explanans* for corollary social psychological phenomena (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). It transpires in the works of G.H. Mead (1934), who argues that human beings have the capacity to take the perspective of the other and that by virtue of this capacity, the self emerges in human actors. Mead argues that when a subject adopts the perspective of the other towards herself, the self emerges as an object unto itself. In Piaget's developmental psychology, the capacity to take the perspective of the other emerges as a product of maturation and is a characteristic of logical operations. Prior to this level, human infants' thinking is marked by egocentrism, which prevents the child to take the perspective of the other in relation to some object (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948). In Arendt's (1958) political sociology, perspective taking is accorded a spatial dimension, the spatial quality of politics, by which human subjects participate in the public sphere. The public sphere, according to Arendt, constitutes a multitude of agents who judge what is enacted from their perspective. And similar to Asch's (1952) claims on the interpenetration of views, Arendt contends that human beings are sufficiently alike to be able to understand one another and dispute their outlooks in spite of their idiosyncrasies. More recently, evolutionary psychologists have argued that shared intentionality, that is, the human capacity to understand the intentions of others (Theory of Mind) and on this basis to engage in joint attention tasks, again similar to the interpenetration of views, is the hallmark of human cognition. Finally, the point of view has featured as an explanatory construct in what is arguably the cornerstone of modern science, that is, Einstein's (1916) theory of relativity. In his special theory of relativity, Einstein argues that the nature of physical reality depends on whose point of view is adopted. Einstein's example states that a stone falls in a straight line relative to a moving

carriage from which it drops, but traverses a parabolic curve relative to the embankment.

In all of these theories, 'point of view' has served as an explanatory device. However, in itself, the point of view remains largely under-defined and under-investigated. Three social psychological theories have advanced our understanding of points of view. Billig's (1987, 1991) rhetorical analysis argues that an understanding of social behaviour requires an understanding of the argumentative context in which individuals' points of view are embedded. In adopting a certain point of view, individuals position themselves in favour of some and against some others, and that this behaviour is an argumentative one that is justifiable according to some common-sense. Billig's reference to the point of view is made in *lieu* of his call to attend to this wider context of argumentation in the study of social behaviour. Similarly, Harré calls for a focus on the positions individuals negotiate in the course of social relations. In Harré's positioning theory (Harré & Secord 1972, Harré & van Langenhöve, 1999) a focus on accounts is advocated towards an understanding of how individuals assume certain positions in social relations, relative to others. Both of these theories make a more or less indirect proposal to study points of view as these are articulated in discursive practices. Theories of social judgment, on the other hand, have inquired into the socio-cognitive properties of points of view more directly. Upshaw (1965, 1969) has furthered the study of perspectives and how these can be broadened through the presentation of in-range or out-of-range stimuli. In a similar vein, Rokeach (1951a, 1951b) and Pettigrew (1959) have inquired into the categorisation of alternative perspectives and have documented variances in types according to this dimension of judgment. Finally, Sherif (Sherif & Hovland, 1961; Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Sherif & Sherif, 1968) proposed that social judgment is a function of a perspective's latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment.

This thesis contends that these contributions can be furthered by problematising the point of view more directly as a social-psychological construct, rather than studying it solely in terms of its discursive manifestations or its functions in social judgment. Drawing on the philosophical and social psychological conceptions of the point of view, this thesis postulates a definition of 'point of view' as an outlook towards a social event, expressed as a claim, which can be supported by an argument of opinion based on a system of knowledge from which it derives its logic. And drawing on the three social psychological theories that have advanced the study of points of view to date, i.e. argumentation, positioning, and social judgment, it has undertaken three empirical inquiries that sought to describe the social-psychological nature of 'point of view' in terms of its interpersonal characteristics and its intrapersonal properties.

Empirical studies

In formulating the social psychological conceptualisation of the point of view, three empirical studies were undertaken in this thesis. The first study sought to identify instantiations of points of view in an effort to describe their nature. Insofar as a point of view is a phenomenon in itself then it ought to, by definition, be amenable to observation, and instantiations of it should be discernible under scrutiny. The first study was thus undertaken in a cosmopolitan public, due to the fact that such a public affords the presumed range of instantiations of points of view. Points of view are rooted in systems of knowledge that provide them with an inherent rationale. Points of view on a given issue are thus rooted in social representations of the issue that are particular to certain communities. Cosmopolitan publics bring together a diversity of individuals from a diversity of communities. Consequently, on a given issue, they bring together a diversity of points of view legitimated a diversity of social representations. A restricted public, on the other hand, censors some social representations and by implication some points of view, in an effort to preserve the prevailing common sense. The first study was undertaken in London following a controversy that arose in public over the relative merits of science and religion, and

whether certain belief systems are harmful to humankind. The debate was stirred by a documentary that aired Prof Richard Dawkins' views over atheism, evolution, and religion. The controversy that ensued saw numerous individuals taking sides on the debate for a variety of reasons. Ten individuals were interviewed at length about their views on the issues debated, in an effort to identify instantiations of points of view.

The second empirical inquiry sought to describe the interpersonal characteristics of points of view. Insofar as points of view are characteristically *social*-psychological, they should be marked by certain interpersonal features. The second study thus sought to investigate the encounter of points of view with others, relative to a different framework of understanding. These 'stranger' (Schuetz, 1944) points of view provide an opportunity to study social relations at the interpersonal level rather than at the intergroup level. In a case where a given point of view, rooted in some community-sense, encounters an alternative rooted in a different community-sense, then relations between the two could be characteristically described as intergroup rather than interpersonal. On the other hand, the encounter between two points of view that are both rooted within the same community-sense offers no possibility to study interpersonal relations relative to a different framework of understanding. A case of 'stranger' points of view, however, offers the possibility to investigate interpersonal relations both in relation to one's community of origin as well as an alien community, without the confounding intergroup relations level. The case of Maltese migrants to Britain, who at present are deprived of a native community in Britain that validates their original perspectives, was identified as a case that fulfils these requirements.

The third empirical study sought to describe the intrapersonal properties of points of view. Insofar as points of view are characteristically social-*psychological*, they should also be marked by certain intrapersonal features. The third inquiry investigated the socio-cognitive structure of points of view when they encounter a presented alternative, in terms of latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and

noncommitment. In contrast to the first study therefore, a relatively hegemonic public was required if emergent properties were to be attributable to points of view themselves rather than to the effect of social representations. The Maltese public sphere was selected for the purposes of this inquiry, in view of the fact that Malta has only recently opened up its borders to immigration following EU accession, and the fact that in spite of a history of colonialism and tourism, it remains relatively homogenous both culturally and demographically. In this case, emergent findings are thus directly attributable to points of view, rather than to different practices prescribed by different social representations that co-exist in the same public, given that no such plurality is evident with regards to the latter in Maltese society.

This overview of the three studies undertaken in this thesis, that are further detailed hereunder, highlights the fact that inquiring into points of view requires sensitivity to the characteristics of the public sphere in which they are studied. Public spheres differ in the extent to which they permit different social representations and different points of view to exist and intermingle. They will promote and validate some, and censor and de-legitimate others. The study of points of view is thus a political enterprise, in that certain political conditions require fulfillment for certain points of view to exist in the first place, and to lend themselves to empirical inquiry in the second, as detailed above. The fulfillment of these conditions thus prevented a single overarching inquiry that investigated a single issue-domain within a single public, and that addressed all of the aims outlined above contemporarily.

Study 1: The Root of all Evil?

This first study, detailed in Chapter 5, looked at points of view regarding religious faith amongst a number of residents of London. The issue was polemicised in early 2006 following a two-part documentary aired on British prime-time television entitled 'The Root of all Evil?'. The presenter, Prof. Richard Dawkins, made a case for atheism, for the irrationality of religious beliefs in today's world, and for the displacement of these beliefs with science. The documentary attracted much

criticism and generated much debate in public, as people took sides on the debate and voiced their views online, in newspapers, on air, and in everyday discussion. The study interviewed ten residents of London regarding their views on religion, science, and good and evil, as presented in the documentary and discussed in the media. Respondents reacted to a number of claims that took different positions on the debate and elaborated their views during the course of the interview. Their arguments were studied in depth in an effort to identify instantiations of points of view.

Three types of points of view were identified in the course of this study, similar to Rokeach's (1951a, 1951b) and Pettigrew's (1959) findings, who both studied perspectives in terms of their width and who similarly identified three broad categories. Moreover, the point of view types identified in this study varied in the manner by which they related to an alternative perspective on the issue. This corroborates Rokeach's categories that draw on Krech's (1949) degree of 'Isolation'. Krech claims that systems vary in their propensity to relate to other systems. According to Rokeach, perspectives could be comprehensive, isolated, or narrow. Similarly, Pettigrew claims that perspectives can be broad, medium, or narrow. For the purposes of this inquiry, the first type are termed monological points of view and correspond to narrow perspectives, the second type are termed dialogical and correspond to isolated/medium perspectives, and the third type are termed metalogical and correspond to comprehensive/broad perspectives. This is due to the fact that these three types of point of view seemingly vary in the manner by which they appraise another perspective in terms of its inherent *logos*, or sensibility, and whether they grant that rationale legitimacy. Different types of points of view thus admit different ways of looking at the issue that can be more or less reasonable in their own way.

Respondents with monological points of view, whether they positioned themselves as atheists/agnostics in relation to believers, or believers in relation to sceptics, retained their position as the only right and legitimate position, and held that any

other perspectives that deviated from this were unacceptable. Respondents with dialogical points of view, on the other hand, conceded that others might have different perspectives from their own and that it was right and fair for them to have them. They admitted that everyone could believe or not believe as they pleased, without having to answer to anybody else for that. However, this acceptance of alternative points of view was conditional. Others had the right to believe only if they adhered themselves to some fundamental precepts, such as mutual recognition, that were in themselves unchallengeable. These points of view, whilst recognising other perspectives, never entertained the issue of veracity and the possibility that others may be right. They allowed others to hold whatever, in their opinion erroneous, beliefs they wanted. In so doing, they apportioned for themselves the same right. They thus extended others the right to be wrong, but not the right to be right. Moreover, alternative points of view were wrong because they were not seeing things properly, although they had every right to do so. By contrast, respondents holding the third type of points of view identified, termed metalogical points of view, appreciated that their own point of view was as relative as any other, and its reasonableness as context-dependent as any other. Those taking metalogical points of view argued that whilst they believed their points of view were right, they understood that so did others, and that they therefore could themselves be wrong, as could others.

These characteristic types of point of view were retained for further analysis. A second study was undertaken with the aim of investigating the interpersonal features, and a third with the aim of investigating the intrapersonal features, of these different types of points of view.

Study 2: The Maltese in Britain

The second empirical inquiry was undertaken with a number of Maltese migrants to Britain, in an effort to explore the interpersonal characteristics of holding the particular types of points of view identified in the first inquiry. Maltese migrants to

Britain are deprived of a native community, and must hence negotiate a social reality to which they are strangers, and in which their original perspectives are alien. In such a setting, the 'stranger' points of view (Schuetz, 1944) subjects hold are not legitimated by the social representations from whence they originate, but can only be legitimated by alien social representations in which they need to fit. Following Malta's accession to the EU in 2004, a number of Maltese citizens migrated to other European countries to enjoy their newly gained home-status as European citizens. This home-status entitled them to new work and study opportunities that were not available prior to accession. A number of these migrants headed to Britain, a move legitimated by their perspectives of British life and the social representations of Britain that circulate in Malta. In Britain, however, their perspectives are essentially alien as Malta does not have a sizeable community to which migrants could flock and which could mediate intercultural relations[20]. Maltese migrants are thus required to negotiate their new life on their own, and to fit into British ways of life or fail to establish any functional relations at all. And whilst a degree of familiarity with British ways exists due to colonialism and mutual tourism over the years, both the ways of life as well as institutional practices are sufficiently different in the two countries to be deemed distinct.

For the purposes of this inquiry, qualitative interviews were undertaken with forty migrants, some of whom returned to their native country. Respondents were asked about their views of Britain and their new life, and whether this matched their original expectations. They were also asked about their views of life in Malta and how they relate to it given their immigrant status. This provided a fortuitous occasion to investigate the interpersonal features of points of view as they relate both to other perspectives originating from their country of origin, and with whose framework of understanding they are essentially familiar, as well as with another framework of understanding with which they were required to negotiate their individual views. Consequently, as noted above, this study was able to single out the interpersonal characteristics of points of view without the confounding element of

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[20] The reasons for this lack of community are historical and are reviewed in Chapter 6.

intergroup relations, in such case that a native community mediates the migration experience.

This second investigation, detailed in chapter 6, demonstrated that points of view serve subjects to position themselves in a social system, and to benefit from such positioning accordingly. The findings of this inquiry correspond with those of Detweiler (1980), whose application of Pettigrew's C-W (Category-Width) scale revealed that perspectives are implicated in intercultural relational outcomes on the basis of their classification of alternatives depending on the category width of their own perspectives.

In this study, monological points of view served subjects to position themselves exclusively within one social system, be it Maltese or British, and to forge strong ties with others within that social system. This positioning enabled their social functioning in this system, however, their positioning in one system led to their exclusion from the other. For those with dialogical points of view positioning was not straightforwardly exclusive. Dialogical types were able to retain relations with the two systems and to position themselves somewhat in relation to both, as their needs determined. However, dialogical types still valued one system over another, and their hierarchical positioning in the preferred system came at a cost to their positioning in the other. Social categories, for dialogical types, were not oppositional but were nevertheless hierarchical. Respondents having metalogical points of view, on the other hand, were able to position themselves equally successfully and without contradiction in both systems. Their positioning in one system did not come at a cost of positioning within the other. Metalogical types could be equally Maltese with the Maltese as they could be British with the British, and their positioning in both social systems did not make them any more or less Maltese, or any more or less British, than the Maltese or British alone.

Whilst these findings are similar to Detweiler's (1980), this study suggests that dialogical and metalogical types are different from monological types in their

appraisal of an alternative along distinct dimensions. Whilst monological types may be better conceptualised as linear and unidimensional, dialogical and metalogical types, by comparison, are able to entertain two dimensions. This is similar to Berry et al.'s (2002) model of acculturation along two dimensions that appraises the host country on the one hand and the country of origin on the other, contemporarily. It also corresponds with Rokeach's (1951b) claims that the cognitive differences between different perspectives are qualitative in nature. The present inquiry suggests that this two-dimensional aspect represents such qualitative differences. This contrasts with Rokeach's model, as well as Pettigrew's C-W scale, which, in spite of admitting qualitative differences have relied on a one-dimensional scale for measuring perspectives along a single continuum. The interpersonal characteristics of points of view documented in this study are such that certain points of view, but not all, are able to orient themselves simultaneously to different social systems, and they can value such systems distinctly in turn. Metalogical points of view value both systems, whereas dialogical points of view overvalue one and undervalue the other. Monological points of view are the only unidimensional points of view. Their valuing of social systems ranges on a single continuum, from valuing one to devaluing the other.

An interesting finding that emerged from this inquiry was that regardless of point of view types, Maltese migrants to Britain favoured assimilation as an acculturation strategy, and were wary of association with fellow Maltese. This finding is possibly characteristic of the Maltese community and may be somewhat related to historical circumstances as well as social representations of migration in Malta, which mark successful migration by adaptation to foreign ways and individual adjustment to the practices of the host society. Another non-difference across types was the claim that migration served respondents to broaden their perspectives, 'open their minds', and 'see' things differently. This suggested that the situation of migration might have brought about structural changes to the points of view respondents held originally. This finding was in line with the aim to explore the intrapersonal characteristics of

points of view, inspired by the social judgment literature, in an effort to investigate their socio-cognitive architecture.

Study 3: Stipends, Muslims, and Voting Rights in Malta

Complementing the approaches taken in the first and second studies, the third study looked at the variant socio-cognitive structure of points of view. The third empirical study, detailed in Chapter 7, was undertaken with a sample of students at the University of Malta who responded, in a survey, to a series of questions in which they evaluated different claims made with regard to three issue domains, salient in the Maltese public at the time of inquiry.

The first concerned students at the University of Malta themselves and pertained to the stipends issue. Students at the University of Malta whose parents are taxpayers in Malta are entitled to receive stipends, in addition to free education, for the duration of their undergraduate studies. Calls have been made to revise the system and increase investment in the sector, which received endorsement by some and opposition by others.

The second issue pertained to the rights of Muslims for public worship. Malta is deemed a Roman Catholic country by the Maltese. Numerous churches and chapels are scattered across the island and in every village, over the summer months, parishioners celebrate public feasts in honour of the parish's patron saint. Other religions enjoy no such public exposure. The Islamic faith claims a single mosque in Paola. During the summer of 2009, a group of Muslims mounted a public protest in *lieu* of their incapacity to observe their faith in their own towns like Catholics. An apartment they had rented for this purpose had been closed down by the authorities for lack of a permit, and the affected Muslims gathered on a prominent promenade to worship in public as a sign of protest, after acquiring all necessary permits for a public protest. Their protest attracted sympathy from some and opposition from

others, and further permits for the protest were declined by the authorities for the sake of maintaining public order.

The third issue pertained to the rights of Maltese migrants to vote. Since Malta joined the European Union, a number of Maltese citizens have moved abroad to other European countries for the purposes of work and study. A single general election was held in Malta since accession, which saw the Nationalist Party winning by a margin of just over 1500 votes. Estimates put at double that figure the number of voters who flew in for the purposes of the election from other European countries. The opposition party claimed that these voters were amongst the reasons for its having lost the election. The issue became a matter of debate in view of the rights of expatriates to vote and determine affairs in their country of origin when they no longer reside there.

Whilst these three issues are in themselves unrelated, they all pertain to the Maltese public and the rights enjoyed by the Maltese by virtue of their citizenship. Free education is inscribed in the country's laws and has been provided to the Maltese by the state following establishment of the republic towards building a knowledge-society. Maltese families hold that they have a right to educate their children regardless of class or status, and that student stipends are part of this right. Similarly, the Catholic faith is inscribed in the country's constitutional laws as the official religion of the nation. Consequently, Maltese citizens believe that the rights they have to practice their Catholic faith should not be extended to foreigners, as these are not part of the Maltese way of life. Finally, Maltese citizens eligible to vote in Malta are meant to be resident in Malta for six out of the eighteen months prior to the election. This condition has, on the one hand, been difficult to police given the proximity of the countries to which the Maltese moved following EU accession, and their frequent visitations. It has, on the other hand, been resisted by emigrants who claim that what takes place in Malta has immanent consequences on their migration decisions and that many nevertheless retain some presence on the island. These three issues thus afforded the possibility to investigate the socio-cognitive structure of

points of view, without this being attributable to other practices prescribed by different social representations, in view of the fact that these issues were investigated amongst the Maltese and pertain to the Maltese and their ways of life in Malta.

The study revealed that the socio-cognitive architecture of points of view varies across types, in terms of the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and non-commitment inherent to points of view. This corresponds with Sherif's various findings. Different points of view were found to relate differently to alternative perspectives, most significantly by the rejection of, or non-commitment for, an alternative perspective than other types. The degree of rejection or non-commitment depended on the way in which the issue was framed for respondents. This corresponds with Billig's argumentation approach and contrasts with the individual differences approach that locates such variability within immutable personalities.

Additionally, point of view types were correlated between them on some issues but not on others, and were uncorrelated with ego-relatedness. This contrasts with the cognitive style approach and makes a case for cognitive complexity. This study demonstrated that individuals can reason differently depending on the issues at stake, and that their characteristic point of view with regards to some issue did not translate into a corresponding point of view type with regards to other issues. Moreover, respondents could reason deeply even though the issue might have applied to them quite strongly. Finally, certain demographic characteristics of the sample were found to be significant predictors for point of view types regarding certain issues. This suggests that, on the one hand, one's background does matter when adopting a point of view towards some issue. Additionally, points of view emerged as amenable rather than fixed, in that both faculty of study and duration of education were found to be predictors of point of view types on certain issues. This indicates that points of view are not determined but can change as a function of certain circumstances, and that contextual factors may play a part in what types of point of view are manifest by certain individuals. This finding is all the more

intriguing in view of its crosstabulation with a computed attitude measure representing the standard 5-point Likert scale, that proved to be significantly associated with point of view type. This association demonstrates that attitudes play a part in the points of view that are adopted by certain individuals. It also demonstrated that strongly held attitudes do not preclude the ability of human subjects to relate to an alternative perspective. In the cross-tabulation of points of view with attitudes, individuals who expressed the same attitude nevertheless varied in their point of view types. For every attitude expression, for instance strongly disagree, some respondents were monological, some were dialogical, and some others were metalogical in their point of view. This suggests that regardless of their evaluation of an attitude object, individuals varied in their capacity to appreciate an alternative position. This finding is noteworthy in that it demonstrates that attitudes are not deterministic and that some who hold attitudes strongly may yet be open to dialogue. It thus adds a new dimension to the study of attitudes. Beyond the number of individuals who express themselves for or against a given issue, one could also thus inquire into how malleable their expressed attitude might be in an encounter with an alternative perspective.

The findings of the third inquiry thus provide evidence that the socio-cognitive structure varies across point of view types, and that different types are marked by different intrapersonal features. These differences are cognitive inasmuch as the various latitudes are in themselves of a cognitive nature. Equally, they are social, inasmuch as which latitude is affected depends on the contextual and argumentative features of the content being debated.

Taken together, therefore, the three empirical studies undertaken for the purposes of the present thesis demonstrate that the point of view may be conceptualised as a social-cum-psychological phenomenon that is implicated in the social behaviour of subjects and that varies in its socio-cognitive architecture. The studies provide evidence that points of view vary in type–monological, dialogical, metalogical–in their treatment of an alternative point of view's rationale, and that such variance is

marked (a) by interpersonal characteristics that preclude some points of view, but not others, from positioning themselves functionally in relation to a different background of intelligibility, and (b) by intrapersonal features that lead to the variable treatment of an alternative by some points of view, but not others, with acceptance, rejection, or indifference.

The study of points of view

In our time, the point of view has been popularised. It was conceptually adopted by the leading international bank HSBC in a marketing campaign that sought to promote the bank as a culturally sensitive organisation that has, what in this thesis has been termed to be, a metalogical point of view. In this campaign, the bank sought to promote and market its ability to appreciate diverse points of view in terms of their cultural legitimacy, and that it could thus address its clients' particular needs more fully. The point of view has also been popularised in the new public sphere, i.e. the world wide web, by organisations such as the BBC whose website includes a 'Have Your Say' online public space in which individuals the world over can express themselves with regards to some particular issue that arises in the news. And at the time of submission of this thesis, opposing points of view are being aired by The Economist in its present billboard campaign across London. The point of view construct being postulated in this thesis offers a way to study these encounters, wherein individuals articulate their own perspectives with regards to some substantive issue with the knowledge of the existence of alternative perspectives that are based on different understandings of the issue.

Considering that the point of view has featured in widely influential theories in the social sciences and beyond, as detailed in Chapter 3, in some sense it is little wonder that it has been demonstrated in this thesis to be a social-psychological phenomenon itself worthy of investigation. What this thesis has aspired to, that some other scholars have proposed or hinted at but that has not effectively been undertaken, is the very conceptualisation of point of view. The main contribution of the present

thesis lies in the study of points of view as *explanandum* (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). Consequently, this thesis has been able to describe the social-psychological nature of points of view in terms of their interpersonal and intrapersonal characteristics. The second major contribution of this thesis lies in the postulation of points of view in a nested model, alongside attitudes and social representations, that provides a multilevel theory of social behaviour, as detailed hereunder.

The point of view as a phenomenon of inquiry

This thesis is the first of its kind to cast an inquiring eye into the point of view phenomenon in itself. In so doing, it has revealed that the human capacity to relate to the perspective of the other is subject to individual differences. Whilst, as Theory of Mind proponents may advocate, the potential to relate to another's perspective is an evolved characteristic of human cognition, the degree to which subjects do so in real terms various markedly. This thesis has demonstrated that, whilst there is an inclination towards cognitive consistency, the propensity to relate to another's perspective varies across individuals and across issue domains. It has demonstrated that such variance is a function of the socio-cognitive structure of points of view, which leads to variable reactions to the encounter with an alternative perspective in terms of its acceptance, rejection, or indifference. Which of these cognitive structures is implicated for a given point of view is circumscribed both by content and context pertaining to the issue. Furthermore, this thesis has suggested that such variances in points of view, that have been characterised as three types depending on their openness to alternatives (i.e. monological, dialogical, and metalogical) are fundamentally implicated in social relations and are associated with isomorphic variability in acculturation, the ability to fit into more than one social system, the ability to forge bonding and bridging social capital, and the propensity for achieving integration. This thesis has thus brought to light the heuristic value of studying points of view, inasmuch as this concept can provide an explanation, in part, of manifest social relations.

This thesis has also advanced our understanding of human subjects' outlooks by dispelling some faulty presumptions that circulate in the social psychological literature. Firstly, it has demonstrated that relating to another's perspective is not a linear, unidimensional affair. In measures of narrow-mindedness, the different types of perspectives vary along a single-continuum from narrow, to medium, to broad (Rokeach, 1951a, 1951b; Pettigrew, 1959; Detweiler, 1980). However, human subjects have a variable capacity to understand that their own point of view is relative and that others' perspectives may be equally plausible as their own. Essentially, this means that some human perspectives are two-dimensional, retaining a capacity to judge their own outlook and that of another at the same time. Only monological points of view can be characterised as unidimensional in their appraisal of different points of view along a single continuum. This finding needs to be considered in measures of narrow-mindedness. Secondly, the presumption of an association of closed-mindedness to personality is demonstrably faulty. This presumption goes back to Adorno's studies of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Kruglanski, 2004). This thesis has demonstrated conclusively that individuals' points of view differ depending on the issue being studied, and whilst there is a correlation between point of view types on different issues, this is far from deterministic. Finally, this thesis has provided evidence that points of view towards a given issue are not necessarily stable. The relative stability of perspectives has been assumed in studies of closed-mindedness (Kruglanski, 2004). This thesis has demonstrated that this is a faulty presumption, and that points of view are malleable and change over time, for example as a function of education.

The fundamental relativity inherent to studying points of view clearly stands in the way of a straight and simple solution to explaining human behaviour. The point of view is not a silver bullet in the analysis, measurement, or prediction of social behaviour, as undoubtedly many scholars of human behaviour desire and aspire to. However, in itself, this is not surprising considering that point of view fills the gap between the more quantitative universalistic measurement of attitudes, and the more

qualitative and contingent study of social representations. The point of view, like Heider's (1946) model of the balance of reciprocity in the cognitive organisation of attitudes, retains elements of both and is consequently able to materialise and achieve in part the objectives of both, albeit neither fully on its own.

So what is its practical contribution in the study of social behaviour? As argued throughout this thesis, social behaviour is infinitely complex, which is why any simplification necessarily falls short in providing a full understanding. Traditionally, social psychology has either foregrounded the social or the individual, with the result of overlooking either the one or the other in explanations of social behaviour. Whilst this thesis has sought to address this gap by articulating a situational level explanation of social behaviour through conceptualising the point of view, this is held to supplement, not supplant, the other two foci. In this thesis, social representations have been held to describe, for a certain people, the objectification of certain things that pertain to them in their artifactual and cultural environment. Attitudes, on the other hand, are the individual's personal evaluations of attitude objects. Points of view represent individuals' outlooks with regards to objects and in relation to others' views. Points of view are held to be embedded in social representations and in themselves to incorporate attitudes, as detailed hereunder. They thus serve to provide a conditional explanation of social behaviour (see Chapter 3) that occurs by virtue of an individual having a particular point of view in a certain situation. The point of view is itself a function of the characteristics of the person (e.g. predispositions, or attitudes) and the environment in which it finds itself (e.g. culture, or social representations).

This situational level in the explanation of social behaviour has heretofore been missing in social psychology. Both the characteristics of the person and the environment bear on the point of view that is adopted by a subject at a given point in time. Consequently, inquiry in this thesis has been undertaken into both interpersonal and intrapersonal features of points of view, to provide a social-cum-psychological formulation of the construct that, alongside social representations and

attitudes, is nested in a transitive and taxonomic model of social behaviour. Formulated at the situational level, the point of view is able to provide an explanation of social behaviour as it takes place *in situ*. Empirically, if one wants to understand some particular aspect of social reality, the model helps in recognising what to look for as well as outline where (i.e. at which level) to look for it.

A nested model of social behaviour

Social psychology has been described as a discipline with a long past and a short history (Farr, 1991). This has been borne out in the present thesis. The philosophical roots of the construct have been traced back to the works of Immanuel Kant. Our present understanding of points of view, however, comes from more recent works in the social psychological literature that have grappled with constructs and processes corollary to points of view. This thesis takes this enterprise forward, by taking up inquiry into a new piece of the jigsaw puzzle of an explanation of social behaviour. This explanation, alongside attitudes on the one hand as an intrapersonal construct, and social representations on the other as a societal one, serves towards providing a transitive explanation of social behaviour that retains taxonomic priority in its formulation. This thesis suggests that points of view are located within social representations as the individual outlooks human subjects adopt in positioning themselves in social reality with regards to some issue. Moreover, the attitudes a subject holds towards the object and others with whom the subject stands in relation are in themselves incorporated in the point of view of the subject regarding the issue, that is reasonable given the social representation in which it is itself embedded (see Figure 4, Chapter 3). These varying levels of explanation of social behaviour, and the contribution the inquiry of points of view makes in this regard, are reviewed in turn hereunder. The utility of this model of social behaviour lies in its capacity to orient the inquirer to which aspect of social behaviour is implicated in social reality, and what understanding accrues from inquiry into such aspect.

At a societal level, one studies the processes and contents of social representations as they circulate in a given public. A useful conception at this level is that made by Moscovici (1988) between hegemonic, emancipated, and polemical social representations. However, other than hegemonic representations that are characterised by a single version of reality that does not admit alternative representations (Gillespie, 2008), social representations are mostly characterised by different opinions and interpretations that co-exist within the same framework of understanding that constitutes the representation (Fraser, 1994). These differences translate into different points of view, that in a social representations inquiry need to be mapped out and pieced together systemically despite their differences, if an understanding of the social representation in its collective, as Harré (1984) advocates, is to be achieved.

The relevance of the social and argumentative context has been demonstrated and discussed in the third empirical inquiry (see Chapter 7). As such, studying points of view requires a robust understanding of the social representations of the issue investigated, as this exists for the groups studied. A monological point of view in favour of some issue may be an altogether different discursive phenomenon for one group than it may be for another. Whilst the point of view will be the same in its socio-cognitive architecture, that is, it may similarly accept or reject alternative positions to other points of view, its manifestation in discourse may be wholly different. For example, individuals may be equally monological and fundamentalist in advocating tolerance as they may be in advocating intolerance, as Osgood (1978) noted. For this reason, a study of points of view requires contextualisation to achieve generalisation–relative to an issue and pertaining to a particular group–as pertains to a social representations inquiry.

The discovery of certain points of view might warrant detailed investigation into their characteristics. This clearly overlaps with a social representations study, but such extended inquiry aims to understand how some individuals or groups are positioning themselves in some particular way, given a particular social

representation and given particular other points of view that exist toward the object. This is the study of points of view at the situational level of explanation that looks at orientations, the justifications provided for them, and the cognitive characteristics that typify them. A full understanding at this level requires an understanding of the argumentative structure that legitimates that position as well as an appreciation of the relational aspects of relating to someone else's position, both manifestly in social relations and introspectively in social cognition. At this level, the distinction between metalogical, dialogical, and monological points of view is a useful one. This in itself can be discerned from accounts or assessed through self-categorisation. This becomes the study of the points of view of some regarding some object, as they relate with others. It aims to understand (1) how the object exists for the subjects being studied, (2) who is the other in relation to whom the subject/s position themselves in social affairs, (3) the argumentative content of a point of view, and (4) its socio-cognitive structure.

A concrete example illustrates this point more fully. The only empirical work to claim an inquiry of points of view is Moghaddam's (2006) "*From the terrorists' point of view: What they experience and why they come to destroy*". Moghaddam's work illustrates the fact that a given social representation in a given public does not prescribe any specific behaviour, but legitimates certain action sequences (Wagner, 1993). Some, however, are compelled to take up arms and sacrifice themselves to the cause whilst others are not. A social representations inquiry would investigate the sense-making of matters such as war, foreign policy, the West, Islam, and so on, in a given public. One finding of such inquiry might be the plausibility of martyrdom or suicide-bombing. This, however, in and of itself provides no information as to the reasons why certain people are resorting to certain behaviours amidst a myriad of alternative and equally plausible positions that they are able to take within the same social representation. Why do some individuals advocate diplomacy whereas others advocate armed conflict, given the same struggle? For instance, the divergent perspectives between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian struggle against Israel at present bear testimony to this. What changes between the

two factions is not the struggle itself, nor the representations of the other, but the point of view on how the issue may or may not be resolved.

The point here is that what might be changing across these identified groups is not a representation of the object *per se*, but a preference for particular relations with that object. These preferences are justified by reasons; they are reasonable given the social representation. A point of view study, such as Moghaddam's, inquires into these reasons, and answers the question of *what* points of view people are taking towards the object given the social representation, and *why*. It is in the capacity for answering the what and the why that this thesis makes a critical contribution, that is, in its capacity to direct attention towards the investigation of interpersonal and intrapersonal features of points of view, by which subjects legitimate some alternatives and not others and on the basis of which they position themselves in relation with the object and with others in some ways and not others.

The third level in the model is attitudes. This is useful if one should want to discover more concretely how many are for or against a particular issue, at a given point in time. Even here, however, a point of view inquiry would supplement this aspect of an explanation of social behaviour. As noted in Chapter 7, the same attitude responses may be marked by differences in point of view types. To go back to the finding presented in Chapter 7 in line with the illustration above, certain Maltese respondents strongly agreed that Malta should reciprocate the intolerance supposedly directed towards Catholics by Muslims nations, by being itself intolerant towards Muslims in Malta. However, there were differences between this cluster of respondents in their point of view types, meaning that a number of them were monological, but others were dialogical, and yet others metalogical. Which means to say that some have the capacity to appreciate that different positions towards the issue may be legitimate, whilst others are more fundamentalist in their own judgment and are unable to see the other side of the coin.

This understanding is highly consequential, in that dialogical and metalogical types are amenable to dialogue in a way that monological types are not, because of their inability to see things from a different angle–the hallmark of dialogue. Besides the heuristic interest of knowing how many in a given population may be fundamentalist in this way (i.e. monological and unable to see things differently), this also means to say that, in this case, the battle for hearts and minds over the matter is wide open in the Maltese public. Should a course of events be more desirable than another from a political perspective, then this data would be particularly useful for policymakers (alongside qualitative information on which positions are contestable for whom and why). Whilst attitude measurement provides a suitable aggregate measure of how many are for or against an issue, and at times this may be all that is required, an analysis of points of view, even at this level, adds a relevant and highly consequential dimension to sheer head-counts. It affords a measure of how many stand to be convinced otherwise through dialogue.

A fuller explanation of social behaviour in its manifold complexity requires the study of the phenomenon in its various manifestations across all levels. Attitude studies provide an indication of diversity within the field. Points of view studies look at individual positioning in social behaviour, as individuals adopt a perspective and relate to others on the basis of it, along with the justifications provided that sustain particular positions. Social representations studies piece these together by considering the various points of view as they relate systemically. In practical terms, extending the example further, a Maltese citizen walking on the promenade when a group of Muslims are praying in protest in public may be experience an element of hatred towards them. This describes the individual's attitude (at the time) as a cognitive response to a given stimulus. It does not tell us how this attitude will be translated into some behaviour at this point in time. This would require a situational explanation of social behaviour. So, if asked about it, the individual might make reference to certain conditions that are in place at the time that justify a negative attitude towards the group, for instance, they have chosen a prominent public place, or, there's only men in the protest, or, that old lady cannot walk the dog on this

promenade right now, so I'm hating them. This describes the individual's point of view at the time, that relates to the object in question as well as to others that are part of the individual's present relations, such as bystanders, tourists, and so on. It thus provides an explanation of social behaviour *in situ*, from the point of view of the individual. At this level we can thus comprehend a rationale for action displayed by this individual in interpersonal behaviour, e.g. voicing an objection in public, grunting, cheering, or walking away with indifference. We can also comprehend this behaviour in terms of its socio-cognitive latitude structure, that is, what conditions are objectionable now that might not be in other circumstances, for instance, what if there were women in the protesting groups, what if it wasn't just Muslims, what if it wasn't a prominent public promenade, and what if they did not obstruct, *etc.*?

What such analysis will describe is the reasons why this behaviour is seen in this way by this individual in this situation. What it will not tell us is why is it rational for a Maltese to object to Muslim worship in public in Malta. And what else may be rational in the face of such an event. Answering these questions has to do with the social representations of Islam in Malta that might be very different from the social representations of other religions, or from the social representations of the same object in a different public. The context-rationality of a point of view that in certain circumstances justifies a certain act is given by the social representations that circulate in the public in which it occurs.

This example demonstrates how the model outlined provides transitive explanations of social behaviour that retain taxonomic priority, and that, in spite of its apparent complexity, enables social and psychological inquiry to come closer to a fuller explanation of social behaviour. Moreover, the formulation of the point of view in this model affords an understanding of social behaviour as it takes place in the conditions in which it is manifest, given both environmental influences (e.g. presence of a mob) as well as the individual's own psychological makeup (e.g. high need for closure). The model provides conceptual clarity as well as a blueprint for looking at social behaviour in social reality across different levels of explanation. It

brings some much-needed refinement to the discipline by bringing together the various explanations together in a multilevel social psychological model of human behaviour.

Conclusion: Limitations and scope for further study

In spite of the contributions outlined above, this inquiry is not without shortcomings. A primary shortcoming of this thesis compared to other studies is the opportunistic nature of the three empirical inquiries. Compared to certain commanding works such as Durkheim's *Le Suicide* (1897) or Moscovici's *La Psychanalyse* (1961), the present inquiry lacks a singular empirical focus. One therefore wonders, for example, whether different points of view are similarly identifiable across different issues, or indeed different cultures, compared to what the first study details. One also wonders whether the relational outcomes and structural variations identified in the subsequent two studies are generalisable across settings. Whilst these limitations do not detract from the merits of any of the studies undertaken, further empirical inquiry is required to address these concerns. In addition, the opportunistic selection of case studies was undertaken in consideration of the implications that conditions in the public sphere have on human relations. Public spheres may be more or less open to alternative social realities. Consequently, not every public sphere affords the same opportunities for investigating social relations in the same way. This condition, as outlined in Chapter 1, has prevented an empirical focus on a singular issue. Instead, this thesis has proceeded to identify and study cases wherein public spheres manifest the requisite conditions for inquiry into their multifarious nature.

Two other queries, however, present more serious limitations to the claims that this thesis is able to advance. The first is well articulated by Moscovici (1985a), when he argues whether the phenomenon of social influence found to be operative in a group would apply more for one type of problem and less for another. In essence, does the description of the phenomenon hold without reference to the object being judged? This issue relates to whether a social phenomenon changes as a function of the social

conditions in which it occurs. Can the point of view, as a social psychological construct, be extrapolated from the context in which it occurs? In other words, are there general processes underlying instantiations of points of view that occur across contexts? In an attempt to test whether this critique is a valid one, the third study adopts a three-pronged approach to investigate whether the findings generalise equally to different issue-domains. However, addressing this concern appropriately requires further social psychological study into the interplay between social conditions and individual attributes, a focus that has characterised social psychology since its inception.

Addressing the contextual-contingency concern more fully requires investigation into the function points of view serve in the construction of social representations. If points of view are individual positions in systemic social representations, as postulated in this thesis, then a change in part leads to a change in whole, meaning that the co-construction of social representations takes place as a function of the legitimation of certain points of view. Conversely, further inquiry is required into understanding the role social representations play in human ontogeny, by which individuals come to develop one point of view and not another. As Sherif and Sherif (1968) point out, the groups in which a child is born are not merely external realities but reference groups that serve to anchor the child's own perspective. Duveen (2001) echoes these claims in the social representations literature. In addition, given that group differences may mark differences in points of view, it becomes reasonable to enquire also into linguistic affordances and point of view types, that is, one wonders how and whether language constrains or prescribes particular types of point of view in certain cases.

The latter is particularly pertinent in view of Gillespie's (2008) identification of alternative representations, that are isomorphic to the points of view identified in this thesis. According to Gillespie, hegemonic representations are devoid of alternative representations, polemical representations have alternative representations that are asymmetrical and used as rhetorical-counter points to further one's own agenda,

whilst emancipated representations interact with a description of the alternative representation on its own terms. Similarly, points of view in this thesis have been demonstrated to vary along these very characteristics: monological points of view exclude an alternative perspective; dialogical points of view recognise but denigrate an alternative; whereas metalogical points of view accord rightfulness and legitimacy to alternative perspectives. This line of reasoning seems to suggest that certain knowledge systems may foster particular types of points of view on the basis of the nature of the social representations that are in circulation, i.e. whether these are hegemonic, polemical, or emancipated. It would seem that hegemonic social representations may be synonymous with monological points of view, polemical social representations with dialogical ones, and emancipated social representations with metalogical ones. Whether given certain types of social representations in a given public also equates with a higher incidence of certain points of view is an interesting empirical question. If it does, then there would be a clear case for adopting certain principles in the public sphere to foster a certain kind of thinking amongst individuals who participate in that public. Should this be the case, then the aspects of power and social influence and their association with points of view would emerge as additional areas of inquiry. It would be reasonable to hypothesise that different point of view types exercise different forms of power and are differentially inclined to certain forms of social influence.

Another question that emanates from this conceptual association between points of view and social and alternative representations is what semantic barriers might be at play at the socio-cognitive level of the point of view. Gillespie (2008) identified a list of semantic barriers that prohibited polemical representations from full dialogue with the other. It would be worth inquiring into whether these semantic barriers may also be characteristic of dialogical points of view. Similarly, given that metalogical points of view are capable of entering into full dialogue with one another and are seemingly unimpeded by any barriers, how can metalogical thinking be fostered? Perspective-taking, as Piaget discovered, may well be maturational, but as this thesis demonstrates, metalogical thinking does not necessarily characterise adult thinking.

This is to say that not all adults demonstrate metalogical points of view at all times, just as not all adult cognition takes place at the Piagetian logical operations level of maturation. Indeed, Kruglanski (2004) argues for the evolutionary benefits of closed-mindedness, in terms of a need for closure that serves to cut infinite information processing and that enables subjects to act decisively at certain times. Still, the question of ontogenesis and points of view, particularly metalogical ones, is a pertinent one and one that requires further inquiry. This is particularly relevant considering the fact that points of view are also amenable to influence, as the third empirical study indicates. As argued above, it is worth inquiring into what forms of policy might foster this on a societal level. It is also opportune to study this further at the micro-genetic level of interpersonal relations, such as, for instance, psychotherapeutic intervention.

A further concern emanates from the opposite end of psychological inquiry and relates to intra-psychological functioning. One necessarily wonders what relationship, if any, may exist between types of point of view and the underlying neuro-biological structure that provides the biological basis for cognition. One wonders what the interplay between the biological make-up and the adoption of particular types of point of view might be, and whether this may have served adaptive purposes during the course of human evolution. Addressing this concern requires the analysis of neuro-biological mechanisms by which the co-determination of biology and points of view may be investigated.

Whilst the point of view has been demonstrated to enhance the understanding of public opinion over the mere measurement of attitudes, it is worth noting that the industry standard Likert-scale retains much appeal in terms of both its utility in attitude measurement as well as its amenability to scale construction. These reasons are sufficient for postulating recommendations to this form of behavioural measurement in a cautious way, and, on the basis of the findings of this thesis, there is no reason to suggest that any use of the Likert-scale is ill advised. However, this thesis is in a position to propose that the study of points of view, complementary to

attitude measurement, considerably enhances the social sciences' inquiry into public opinion. As in the Multicultural Ideology scale used in the third empirical inquiry (Chapter 7), scales constructed on the basis of Likert-scale attitude measures can be fruitfully cross-tabulated with points of view for an indication of the openness to alternatives. On the other hand, this necessarily raises the issue of an adequate operationalisation of points of view in different contexts and with regard to different issue-domains, as well as questions of validity and reliability of the measurement of point of view types. The fact that these are not unidimensional and that they are not straightforwardly personality-based, as presumed in the social judgment literature, places some evident obstacles to the construction of psychometric measurement-scales in the fashion of personality research. Yet, given these constraints, one still wonders how points of view can be typified consistently and reliably.

It seems therefore that more questions have been raised in the course of this thesis than answers provided. Nevertheless, as set out in the introductory chapter, enough has been done to warrant further inquiry and extension of scope. In this sense, Durkheim's words in his preface to Suicide provide a salutary remark: "There is nothing necessarily discouraging in the incompleteness of the results thus far obtained. They should arouse new efforts, not surrender […] This makes possible some continuity in scientific labour,–continuity upon which progress depends (1952/2002, p. xxxiv)".

The extension of scope that is brought about by the above concerns is in line with the model for social behaviour presented and may be characterised along two dimensions, both equally pertinent to the findings of the present investigation. On the one hand, the scope of this study needs to be extended to include higher order as well as lower order levels of explanation. According to Wagner & Hayes' (2005) typology, the requirement is to include both the societal and the personal levels. The ontogenetic focus of the development of certain points of view for certain people thus extends on the one hand into sociogeny, that is, in the construction of social realities in which certain people with certain points of view are embedded, and on

the other hand into phylogeny, that is, the evolved cognitive baggage that marks the human species.

In line with this genetic complexity that marks human social cognition (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005), this thesis has demonstrated that the point of view construct has clear overlaps both with social representations and attitudes. Whilst social representations provide explanations of social behaviour at the societal level of explanation, and attitudes at the personal level, it is clearly pertinent for social researchers to mind the gap if they are to achieve an understanding of social behaviour *in situ*. The model propagated in this thesis thus comes to serve as a multilevel theory of social behaviour that is able to furnish explanations of social behaviour across levels. The point of view is the social-cum-psychological construct that bridges this gap, and that provides a situational explanation for action that is conditional and circumstantial.

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Appendix I

Interview Guide – Root of all Evil

Intro:

Thank you for your participation.

Study about belief and its consequences, undertaken as part-fulfilment of an MSc at LSE.

These interviews are part of this study.

No right and wrong answers, aim is to map the diversity of views and perspectives. Some agree, some disagree; it is interesting to know how this happens.

Confidentiality. Identity is not disclosed.

Participation is consensual, as is answering any of the questions which may be put forth by myself. You may refuse to answer any questions, for whatever reasons you may have, which reasons you are under no obligation to provide. You may also terminate interview at any time.

Not a question and answer sequence but a casual conversation around the topic.

Preliminary questions (setting the scene and leading to the core topic):

What beliefs do you think are important to foster in our children today?

What beliefs & principles are important to you in your own life?

Are religious beliefs important in today's world?

Quotations (to be handed to participants following preliminary questions):

-Good people do good things, evil people do evil things, it takes religion for good men to do evil things

-We are atheists when it comes to fairies, unicorns and hobgoblins, and also when it comes to most gods, such as Thor, Ra, Aphrodite. Some of us go one god further

-It is certainty not faith that is the root of evil, and the non-religious can do certainty as well as the religious

-Faith makes good men better, and evil people worse.

What do you make of these readings?

Questions/Topics to be covered:

 - *Science*

Should scientific thought replace religious belief?
Should religious belief be submitted to scientific scrutiny?
Does believing in scientific claims require a leap of faith?

 - *Morality*

Does religion lead to warped morals?
Is morality a genetic product, or is it a product of upbringing?

 - *Children*

Can faith be considered a virus which infects the young across generations?

 - *Evil*

Is religion a source of evil?
Would removing religion from society eradicate evil?

 - *Atheism*

Is atheism the rational alternative?

Participant Number: _____

Sex: Male ☐ Female ☐

Nationality: _____

Year of Birth: _____

Ethnic Origin: White ☐ Black ☐

Asian ☐ Chinese ☐

Mixed ☐ Other _____ (please specify)

Education: No Formal Education ☐ Primary ☐

Secondary ☐ Tertiary ☐

Religious/Spiritual Belief: Religious ☐

Non-Religious ☐

Appendix II

Interview Guide – Maltese in London

Intro

How long have you been in Britain?

What do you do here?

What is life like?

Present

How is life like in the UK?

How is it like for as a Maltese migrant?

What's different here from Malta?

Recent Past

Let me take you a little back. What was life like when you initially got here?

Distant Past

Let me take you a little further back. What was it like before you came here, in Malta?

Present

So do you feel settled here? Belong?

How do you see life in Malta, from here?

What do you make of the Maltese?

Future

How do you see yourself in, say, 10 years' time?

General

Do you go to Malta? How often?

What do you do when you're there?

How do you see life in the UK when there?

What is it like coming back?

Appendix III

Statistical Analyses – Maltese in London TST data

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Personality	Between Groups	6.057	2	3.028	.195	.824
	Within Groups	528.700	34	15.550		
	Total	534.757	36			
Relationships	Between Groups	4.900	2	2.450	1.622	.213
	Within Groups	49.850	33	1.511		
	Total	54.750	35			
Gender	Between Groups	.000	2	.000	.	.
	Within Groups	.000	10	.000		
	Total	.000	12			
Age	Between Groups	.111	2	.056	.559	.582
	Within Groups	1.689	17	.099		
	Total	1.800	19			
Interests	Between Groups	21.606	2	10.803	1.492	.240
	Within Groups	238.950	33	7.241		
	Total	260.556	35			
Life Circumstances	Between Groups	1.600	2	.800	.626	.551
	Within Groups	15.333	12	1.278		
	Total	16.933	14			
Profession	Between Groups	2.169	2	1.084	.576	.569
	Within Groups	50.798	27	1.881		
	Total	52.967	29			
Physical Features	Between Groups	.633	2	.317	.378	.699

	Within Groups	5.867	7	.838		
	Total	6.500	9			
Nationality	Between Groups	.929	2	.464	.859	.439
	Within Groups	10.810	20	.541		
	Total	11.739	22			
Migration	Between Groups	.000	2	.000	.	.
	Within Groups	.000	14	.000		
	Total	.000	16			
Faith	Between Groups	.417	2	.208	3.750	.065
	Within Groups	.500	9	.056		
	Total	.917	11			
Name	Between Groups	.000	2	.000	.	.
	Within Groups	.000	6	.000		
	Total	.000	8			

Others, Sexual orientation, Aspirations, and Residence have fewer than two groups

for dependent variable so no statistics were computed.

Appendix IV

Questionnaire – Social Issues

*** This email is being sent by the Registrar's Office on behalf of Mr Gordon Sammut. Your personal details were not disclosed in order to send this email. The Office of the Registrar does not assume responsibility for the information contained in this message. Please do NOT reply to this email address. In case of any queries, kindly send your email to gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt***

Dear Student,

I would like to invite your participation in this online survey. This survey involves the study of three social issues that have attracted widespread debate earlier this year, namely the student stipends issue, the Muslim prayer protest at Sliema, and the voting rights issue. At the end of the study, which should take no more than 10 minutes to complete, you will be able to sign up for a €100 voucher draw. You are therefore encouraged to answer honestly and truthfully the questions that are presented, as they apply to yourself. Please note that there are no right or wrong answers in this study. The only answer that counts is your own opinion on these issues. Your participation is important as the study seeks an understanding of the opinions that circulate in the Maltese public, including your own. Your participation is therefore highly valued. To proceed to the survey, please click the link hereunder:

Yours truly,

Gordon Sammut
Dept of Psychology
University of Malta

This email has been sent to undisclosed recipients and no personal data has been collected by the sender of this email

Stage 1: Points of view*
*stages not named but progress bar indicates which stage out of 5

Page 1:

Earlier this year a number of politicians and public officials recommended revisions to the University student stipend system. These recommendations were debated by the media and by the general public. Following is a list of arguments that have been proposed during the course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided (where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree"):

"Stipends are a privilege not a right, and one that the country cannot afford. Students in Malta are already lucky to not have to pay tuition fees, so stipends should be removed"

1   2   3   4   5

"Stipends are a necessity. Stipends are for everyone because everyone has a right to education, so stipends must be untouched"

1   2   3   4   5

"It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable and not hinder investment in quality education, whilst also assisting those in need. However, revising the system might mean not all will continue to a stipend "

1   2   3   4   5

"Whilst certain students do not need stipends and they spend their monthly allocation on non-essentials, for others the stipend is the only way they can afford university. It is important that some form of the stipend system be retained"

1   2   3   4   5

"Stipends provide students with spending money. Some students benefit from stipends as they do not have other means of financial support. Other students spend their stipends on luxuries. The stipend system should ensure that the funds allocated for stipends support needy students and are a good investment in higher education"

1   2   3   4   5

And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view:

"Stipends are a privilege not a right, and one that the country cannot afford. Students in Malta are already lucky to not have to pay tuition fees, so stipends should be removed" [Code as Monological -]

[ ]

"Stipends are a necessity. Stipends are for everyone because everyone has a right to education, so stipends must be untouched" [Code as Monological +]

[ ]

"It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable and not hinder investment in quality education, whilst also assisting those in need. However, revising the system might mean not all will continue to get a stipend " [Code as Dialogical -]

[ ]

"Whilst certain students do not need stipends and they spend their monthly allocation on non-essentials, for others the stipend is the only way they can afford university. It is important that some form of the stipend system be retained" [Code as Dialogical +]

[ ]

"Stipends provide students with spending money. Some students benefit from stipends as they do not have other means of financial support. Other students spend their stipends on luxuries. The stipend system should ensure that the funds allocated for stipends support needy students and are a good investment in higher education" [Code as Metalogical]

[ ]

Earlier this year a group of Muslim worshippers gathered on the Sliema promenade to pray in public in protest after MEPA closed a private apartment they were using for their prayers. The protest attracted considerable attention by the media and the general public. Following is a list of arguments that have been proposed during the course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided (where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree"):

"Malta must stand up for Maltese culture and must never allow any change to our way of life, or we will soon be handing our country over to others "

1   2   3   4   5

"Multiculturalism is the way forward whether anyone likes it or not. There is no reason why different cultures should not co-exist"

1   2   3   4   5

"Believers have a right to their own faith, but freedom of religion should be tolerated only insofar as it does not impinge on the rights of others. Extreme tolerance should not be allowed"

1   2   3   4   5

"The real problem is not Muslims but the warped version of Islam that some states and individuals espouse and that most Muslims reject. Muslims in Malta need our support not our hatred"

1   2   3   4   5

"My way is not the only way, and to be free is to allow others to be free too. Everyone has a right to their own beliefs and to worship according to their own faith. Similarly, everyone is free to take a view on the practices of another religion and has the liberty, within reason, to express those thoughts. These rights should be defended whether we agree with the protest or not."

1   2   3   4   5

And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view:

"Malta must stand up for Maltese culture and must never allow any change to our way of life, or we will soon be handing our country over to others " [Code as Monological -]

[ ]

"Multiculturalism is the way forward whether anyone likes it or not. There is no reason why different cultures should not co-exist" [Code as Monological +]

[ ]

"Believers have a right to their own faith, but freedom of religion should be tolerated only insofar as it does not impinge on the rights of others. Extreme tolerance should not be allowed" [Code as Dialogical -]

[ ]

"The real problem is not Muslims but the warped version of Islam that some states and individuals espouse and that most Muslims reject. Muslims in Malta need our support not our hatred" [Code as Dialogical +]

[ ]

"My way is not the only way, and to be free is to allow others to be free too. Everyone has a right to their own beliefs and to worship according to their own faith. Similarly, everyone is free to take a view on the practices of another religion and has the liberty, within reason, to express those thoughts. These rights should be defended whether we agree with the protest or not." [Code as Metalogical]

[ ]

Earlier this year a debate arose in Malta over whether Maltese citizens who live or work overseas should have a say in the issue of governance, and whether they should be allowed to fly in and cast their vote. Following is a list of arguments that have been proposed during the course of the debate. Kindly indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided (where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree"):

The elected government should reflect only the will of the majority of Maltese citizens resident in the country at the time of the election.

1   2   3   4   5

Maltese citizens resident abroad still have a vested interest in Maltese governance, so it is important that they have equal voting rights to any other Maltese citizens.

1   2   3   4   5

At times, some Maltese citizens need to be abroad for a while. Others, however, move abroad on a permanent basis. It is important that elections reflect the will of those who have to bear the consequences of the outcome, so Maltese migrants' rights to vote in Malta should be restricted.

1   2   3   4   5

 Malta's membership in the EU has opened up opportunities for work and study in other countries. Maltese who exploit these opportunities whilst they are available are not necessarily permanent migrants to these countries, so they should be allowed to vote like other Maltese nationals.

1   2   3   4   5

Democratic elections should reflect the will of all eligible citizens. The Maltese should come together at election time and respect equally each other's wills and interests, even if either or both of these differ from their own.

1   2   3   4   5

And which one of these arguments presented comes closest to your own view:

The elected government should only reflect the will of the majority of Maltese citizens resident in the country at the time of the election. [Monological -]

[ ]

Maltese citizens resident abroad still have a vested interest in Maltese governance, so it is important that they have equal voting rights to any other Maltese citizens. [Monological +]

[ ]

At times, some Maltese citizens need to be abroad for a while. Others, however, move abroad on a permanent basis. It is important that elections reflect the will of those who have to bear the consequences of the outcome, so Maltese migrants' rights to vote in Malta should be restricted. [Dialogical -]

[ ]

 Malta's membership in the EU has opened up opportunities for work and study in other countries. Maltese who exploit these opportunities whilst they are available are not necessarily permanent migrants to these countries, so they should be allowed to vote like other Maltese nationals. [Dialogical +]

[ ]

Democratic elections should reflect the will of all eligible citizens. The Maltese should come together at election time and respect equally each other's wills and interests, even if either or both of these differ from their own. [Metalogical].

[ ]

Stage 2: Ego-Involvement

1. For you personally, how important is the issue of student stipends on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest:

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

2. For you personally, how important is the issue of Muslim prayers on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest:

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

3. For you personally, how important is the issue of migrant voting on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest:

1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10

Stage 3: Latitudes

Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in connection with the stipends issue. Could you indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 means "totally disagree" and +2 means "totally agree"):

1.	Students spend their money on leisure and the country cannot afford this luxury.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
2.	Stipends should be revised so the money can be reinvested in providing better higher education, such as by financing the library and IT facilities.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
3.	Students should be given a choice as to whether they receive stipends. Those who do should then pay it back in future and those who do not should be granted tax rebates (i.e. pay less tax when they start working).	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
4.	Students who receive stipends are duty-bound to repay society. They should be obliged to work locally for a certain number of years before they are allowed to leave as they please.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
5.	It is important for the stipend system to be sustainable. Students who feel that they do not need the stipend should have the option of opting out.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
6.	Everyone in Malta has a right to education, and stipends ensure that students who are not wealthy are able to pursue higher education. Stipends are therefore essential for inclusive education.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
7.	Stipends should remain, as they are an incentive for youth to study rather than leave their studies to enter the world of work prematurely.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
8.	If students were forced to work to pay their way through university, they would not have enough time for studying.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
9.	Stipends should remain in full as they provide spending money to students and this stimulates consumption and helps the economy.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2

Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in connection with the Muslim prayers issue. Could you indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 means "totally disagree" and +2 means "totally agree"):

1.	The Maltese find no objection to Catholics praying in private or in public, so Muslims should enjoy the same privileges.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
2.	The fact that certain Muslim countries are intolerant does not mean we should ourselves become intolerant.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
3.	Everyone is entitled to their own beliefs and one of the most important freedoms is the freedom of religion and worship. A temple or mosque in one's locality is part of that freedom.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
4.	There is no harm done. They should not be allowed to do whatever they want but if what they want is harmless then we should let them do it.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
5.	All should have a right to worship, and all have a duty to obey the law.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
6.	If we start being tolerant of these practices then eventually we will be permitting much else. We do not want to jeopardize our Maltese heritage.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
7.	There is a mosque in Paola already, so Muslims should limit their prayers to the confines of that mosque.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
8.	Christians are not allowed to pray publicly in Muslim countries, so Muslims should not expect to be able to pray publicly in Malta.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
9.	Malta is a Catholic country not a Muslim country. If immigrants do not like the way things are, they are free to leave.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2

Following is a list of nine arguments that have been made in the media in connection with the migrant voters issue. Could you indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these arguments using the scale provided (where -2 means "totally disagree" and +2 means "totally agree"):

1.	Only Maltese nationals who live and work in Malta should be allowed to vote in general elections.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
2.	Long-term Maltese migrants to other countries should not be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
3.	Maltese nationals who permanently work abroad should not be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
4.	Maltese nationals who have been away from Malta for more than six months should not be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
5.	Malta is a democratic country and the Maltese have a right to vote in a general election.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
6.	Maltese nationals who are away from Malta for only a short period of time should be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
7.	Maltese nationals who are abroad to work or study but who are still Maltese should be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
8.	Maltese nationals who live or work abroad but who have a Maltese passport should be allowed to vote.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2
9.	All Maltese nationals have a right to their say in matters of governance in their country of origin, whether they live or work in Malta or have a Maltese passport, or otherwise.	-2	-1	0	+1	+2

Stage 4: Multiculturalism

Following is a list of statements about cultural diversity. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements,
using the following 5 point scale where 1 means "totally disagree" and 5 means "totally agree".

1. We should recognize that cultural and racial diversity is a fundamental characteristic of [national] society.   1   2   3   4   5

2. We should help ethnic and racial minorities preserve their cultural heritages in [country].   1   2   3   4   5

3. It is best for [country] if all people forget their different ethnic and cultural backgrounds as soon as possible.   1   2   3   4   5

4. A society that has a variety of ethnic and cultural groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.   1   2   3   4   5

5. The unity of this country is weakened by people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds sticking to their old ways.   1   2   3   4   5

6. If people of different ethnic and cultural origins want to keep their own culture, they should keep it to themselves.   1   2   3   4   5

7. A society that has a variety of ethnic or cultural groups has more problems with national unity than societies with one or two basic cultural groups.   1   2   3   4   5

8. We should do more to learn about the customs and heritage of different ethnic and cultural groups in this country.   1   2   3   4   5

9. Immigrant/ethnic parents must encourage their children to retain the culture and traditions of their homeland.   1   2   3   4   5

10. People who come to [country/region] should change their behaviour to be more like us.   1   2   3   4   5

Stage 5: Demographic Data

1. Gender: Male/Female [Drop-down menu]

2. Age: [Drop-down menu starting 16 to 65+]

3. Marital Status: [Drop-down menu] Married/Single/Divorced-Annulled-Separated/Widowed/Cohabiting

4. Nationality: Preferably country list drop-down menu, if not available as follows:
[Drop-down menu + Other*] Maltese/Other
[*Other – blank space next to "(Please specify)"]

5. Place of Residence: [Drop-down menu + Pop-Up window with definitions using
'?' as a cue for pop-up*] Southern Harbour/Northern Harbour/South Eastern/
Western/Northern/Gozo and Comino
[*Pop-up window] Definitions :
Southern Harbour - Zabbar, Xghajra, Valletta, Tarxien, Santa Lucija, Paola,
Marsa, Luqa, Kalkara, Senglea, Floriana, Fgura, Cospicua, Vittoriosa.
Northern Harbour - Ta' Xbiex, Swieqi, Sliema, Santa Venera, San Gwann, St.
Julians, Qormi, Pieta', Pembroke, Msida, Ħamrun, Gżira, Birkirkara.
South Eastern - Zurrieq, Zejtun, Safi, Qrendi, Mqabba, Marsaxlokk, Marsaskala,
Kirkop, Gudja, Ghaxaq, Birzebbugia.
Western - Zebbug, Siggiewi, Rabat, Mtarfa, Mdina, Lija, Iklin, Dingli, Balzan,
Attard.
Northern - St. Paul's Bay, Naxxar, Mosta, Mgarr, Mellieha, Gharghur.
Gozo and Comino - Rabat, Fontana, Għajnsielem and Comino, Gharb, Ghasri,
Kercem, Munxar, Nadur, Qala, San Lawrenz, Sannat, Xaghra, Xewkija, Zebbuġ.

6. Religion: [Drop-down menu]
No religion/Jewish/Christian Protestant/ Christian Roman Catholic/Christian
Orthodox/Muslim/Buddhist/Hindu/Animistic/Other* (Please specify option)]

7. Faculty: [Drop-down menu] Built Environment/Arts/Dental Surgery/Economics,
Management & Accountancy/Education/Engineering/Information & Communication
Technology/Laws/Medicine & Surgery/Science/Theology

8. What work does your father usually do? [check one*]

Unskilled: such as farm labour, food service, house cleaner
Skilled work: such as technician, carpenter, hairdresser, seamstress
White collar (office) work: such as clerk, salesperson, secretary, small business
Professional: doctor, lawyer, teacher, business executive
Not currently working: [ ] unemployed   [ ] retired   [ ] homemaker   [ ]
student   [*option to check further]
Other (specify): _____
Don't know

Not Applicable

9. What work does your mother usually do? [check one*]

Unskilled: such as farm labour, food service, house cleaner
Skilled work: such as technician, carpenter, hairdresser, seamstress
White collar (office) work: such as clerk, salesperson, secretary, small business
Professional: doctor, lawyer, teacher, business executive
Not currently working: [ ] unemployed   [ ] retired   [ ] homemaker   [ ]
student   [*option to check further]
Other (specify): _____
Don't know
Not Applicable

If you would like to proceed to the €100 voucher draw click Proceed. If you do not
want to provide your details (email address) for entering the draw, click Submit.
Your personal details will not be saved if you select this option.

[Proceed to voucher draw/Submit]

Stage 6: €100 voucher draw

If you would like to enter the €100 voucher draw please enter your email address in the space provided. Should you be the lucky winner of the draw, you will be contacted on the email address provided. If you do not wish to provide your details to enter the draw please click Submit and leave your email address blank.

Thank you very much for your participation in this study. Should you have any queries about this study or would like further details, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Gordon Sammut
Room 214
Department of Psychology
Tel: 2340 2305
Email: gordon.sammut@um.edu.mt

Appendix V

Statistical Analyses – Social Issues

Statistics

		StypePOV	MtypePOV	VtypePOV
N	Valid	247	247	247
	Missing	0	0	0

StypePOV

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Monological	51	20.6	20.6	20.6
	Dialogical	135	54.7	54.7	75.3
	Metalogical	61	24.7	24.7	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

MtypePOV

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Monological	58	23.5	23.5	23.5
	Dialogical	109	44.1	44.1	67.6
	Metalogical	80	32.4	32.4	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

VtypePOV

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Monological	41	16.6	16.6	16.6
	Dialogical	117	47.4	47.4	64.0
	Metalogical	89	36.0	36.0	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Correlations

			StypePOV	MtypePOV	VtypePOV
Kendall's tau_b	StypePOV	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.075	-.028
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.192	.624
		N	247	247	247
	MtypePOV	Correlation Coefficient	.075	1.000	.251[**]
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.192	.	.000
		N	247	247	247
	VtypePOV	Correlation Coefficient	-.028	.251[**]	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.624	.000	.
		N	247	247	247

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Statistics

		Stipends 1	Stipends 2	Stipends 3	Stipends 4	Stipends 5
N	Valid	247	247	247	247	247
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0

Frequency Table

Stipends 1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	122	49.4	49.4	49.4
	2	56	22.7	22.7	72.1
	3	48	19.4	19.4	91.5
	4	17	6.9	6.9	98.4
	5	4	1.6	1.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Stipends 2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	8	3.2	3.2	3.2
	2	24	9.7	9.7	13.0
	3	40	16.2	16.2	29.1
	4	62	25.1	25.1	54.3
	5	113	45.7	45.7	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Stipends 3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	18	7.3	7.3	7.3
	2	33	13.4	13.4	20.6
	3	77	31.2	31.2	51.8
	4	69	27.9	27.9	79.8
	5	50	20.2	20.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Stipends 4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	3	1.2	1.2	1.2
	2	4	1.6	1.6	2.8
	3	20	8.1	8.1	10.9
	4	48	19.4	19.4	30.4
	5	172	69.6	69.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Stipends 5

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	4	1.6	1.6	1.6
	2	18	7.3	7.3	8.9
	3	33	13.4	13.4	22.3
	4	78	31.6	31.6	53.8
	5	114	46.2	46.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Statistics

		Muslim Prayers 1	Muslim Prayers 2	Muslim Prayers 3	Muslim Prayers 4	Muslim Prayers 5	Voting Rights 1
N	Valid	247	247	247	247	247	247
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0	0

Statistics

		Voting Rights 2	Voting Rights 3	Voting Rights 4	Voting Rights 5
N	Valid	247	247	247	247
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Muslim Prayers 1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	41	16.6	16.6	16.6
	2	44	17.8	17.8	34.4
	3	57	23.1	23.1	57.5
	4	48	19.4	19.4	76.9
	5	57	23.1	23.1	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Muslim Prayers 2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	14	5.7	5.7	5.7
	2	21	8.5	8.5	14.2
	3	73	29.6	29.6	43.7
	4	76	30.8	30.8	74.5
	5	63	25.5	25.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Muslim Prayers 3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	6	2.4	2.4	2.4
	2	12	4.9	4.9	7.3
	3	38	15.4	15.4	22.7
	4	81	32.8	32.8	55.5
	5	110	44.5	44.5	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Muslim Prayers 4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	19	7.7	7.7	7.7
	2	35	14.2	14.2	21.9
	3	97	39.3	39.3	61.1
	4	61	24.7	24.7	85.8
	5	35	14.2	14.2	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Muslim Prayers 5

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	9	3.6	3.6	3.6
	2	18	7.3	7.3	10.9
	3	53	21.5	21.5	32.4
	4	79	32.0	32.0	64.4
	5	88	35.6	35.6	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Voting Rights 1

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	39	15.8	15.8	15.8
	2	42	17.0	17.0	32.8
	3	56	22.7	22.7	55.5
	4	53	21.5	21.5	76.9
	5	57	23.1	23.1	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Voting Rights 2

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	28	11.3	11.3	11.3
	2	55	22.3	22.3	33.6
	3	48	19.4	19.4	53.0
	4	57	23.1	23.1	76.1
	5	59	23.9	23.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Voting Rights 3

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	19	7.7	7.7	7.7
	2	28	11.3	11.3	19.0
	3	53	21.5	21.5	40.5
	4	78	31.6	31.6	72.1
	5	69	27.9	27.9	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Voting Rights 4

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	12	4.9	4.9	4.9
	2	18	7.3	7.3	12.1
	3	42	17.0	17.0	29.1
	4	63	25.5	25.5	54.7
	5	112	45.3	45.3	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Voting Rights 5

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	6	2.4	2.4	2.4
	2	16	6.5	6.5	8.9
	3	55	22.3	22.3	31.2
	4	52	21.1	21.1	52.2
	5	118	47.8	47.8	100.0
	Total	247	100.0	100.0	

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Stipends Issue	247	1	10	8.37	2.085
Muslim Prayers Issue	247	1	10	5.85	2.645
Voting Rights Issue	247	1	10	6.18	2.623
Valid N (listwise)	247				

Correlations

		Stipends Issue	StypePOV
Stipends Issue	Pearson Correlation	1	-.043
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.506
	N	247	247
StypePOV	Pearson Correlation	-.043	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.506	
	N	247	247

Correlations

		Muslim Prayers Issue	MtypePOV
Muslim Prayers Issue	Pearson Correlation	1	-.070
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.274
	N	247	247
MtypePOV	Pearson Correlation	-.070	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.274	
	N	247	247

Correlations

		Voting Rights Issue	VtypePOV
Voting Rights Issue	Pearson Correlation	1	-.072
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.259
	N	247	247
VtypePOV	Pearson Correlation	-.072	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.259	
	N	247	247

Correlations

		MtypePOV	MIdeo
MtypePOV	Pearson Correlation	1	.238[**]
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	247	236
MIdeo	Pearson Correlation	.238[**]	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	236	236

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

```
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 1).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 1 (FILTER)'.
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0).
FILTER BY filter_$.
EXECUTE.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MIdeo	54	13	46	31.22	8.025
Valid N (listwise)	54				

```
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 2).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 2 (FILTER)'.
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0).
FILTER BY filter_$.
EXECUTE.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MIdeo	104	10	46	31.11	6.542
Valid N (listwise)	104				

```
USE ALL.
COMPUTE filter_$=(MtypePOV = 3).
VARIABLE LABEL filter_$ 'MtypePOV = 3 (FILTER)'.
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'.
FORMAT filter_$ (f1.0).
FILTER BY filter_$.
EXECUTE.
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
```

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MIdeo	78	15	50	35.38	6.205
Valid N (listwise)	78				

FILTER OFF.
USE ALL.
EXECUTE.
ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY MtypePOV
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ANOVA

MIdeo

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	938.856	2	469.428	10.141	.000
Within Groups	10785.631	233	46.290		
Total	11724.487	235			

Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
SAccept	32	2	8	4.78	1.453
SNonC	32	0	5	1.16	1.247
SReject	32	1	6	3.03	1.356
Valid N (listwise)	32				

Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
SAccept	71	1	8	4.79	1.603
SNonC	71	0	4	1.46	1.012
SReject	71	0	5	2.73	1.230
Valid N (listwise)	71				

Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
SAccept	32	2	9	5.22	1.539
SNonC	32	0	4	1.28	1.198
SReject	32	0	6	2.53	1.502
Valid N (listwise)	32				

```
FILTER OFF.
USE ALL.
EXECUTE.
ONEWAY SAccept SNoncommit SReject BY StypePOV
  /MISSING ANALYSIS.
```

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
SAccept	Between Groups	4.565	2	2.282	.945	.391
	Within Groups	318.768	132	2.415		
	Total	323.333	134			
SNonC	Between Groups	2.288	2	1.144	.919	.402
	Within Groups	164.349	132	1.245		
	Total	166.637	134			
SReject	Between Groups	4.080	2	2.040	1.157	.318
	Within Groups	232.853	132	1.764		
	Total	236.933	134			

Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MAccept	55	0	9	4.78	1.474
MNonC	55	0	6	1.38	1.340
MReject	55	0	8	2.84	1.761
Valid N (listwise)	55				

Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MAccept	108	2	9	5.27	1.405
MNonC	108	0	6	1.80	1.338
MReject	108	0	5	1.94	1.240
Valid N (listwise)	108				

Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
MAccept	79	2	9	5.27	1.542
MNonC	79	0	5	1.53	1.422
MReject	79	0	4	2.20	1.497
Valid N (listwise)	79				

FILTER OFF.
USE ALL.
EXECUTE.
ONEWAY MAccept MNoncommit MReject BY MtypePOV
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
MAccept	Between Groups	10.021	2	5.010	2.330	.100
	Within Groups	514.013	239	2.151		
	Total	524.033	241			
MNonC	Between Groups	7.089	2	3.545	1.899	.152
	Within Groups	446.171	239	1.867		
	Total	453.260	241			
MReject	Between Groups	29.667	2	14.833	6.995	.001
	Within Groups	506.833	239	2.121		
	Total	536.500	241			

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MAccept	dimension1	1	29	4.76	1.683	.313
		2	26	4.81	1.234	.242
MNonC	dimension1	1	29	1.17	1.197	.222
		2	26	1.62	1.472	.289
MReject	dimension1	1	29	3.07	2.069	.384
		2	26	2.58	1.332	.261

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	.834	.365	-.122	53	.903
	Equal variances not assumed			-.124	51.071	.902
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	.944	.336	-1.230	53	.224
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.216	48.289	.230
MReject	Equal variances assumed	5.591	.022	1.035	53	.305
	Equal variances not assumed			1.059	48.306	.295

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.049	.402	-.855	.757
	Equal variances not assumed	-.049	.395	-.842	.744
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.443	.360	-1.166	.280
	Equal variances not assumed	-.443	.364	-1.175	.289
MReject	Equal variances assumed	.492	.475	-.461	1.446
	Equal variances not assumed	.492	.465	-.442	1.426

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 4)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MAccept	dimension1	3	86	5.35	1.469	.158
		4	22	4.95	1.090	.232
MNonC	dimension1	3	86	1.78	1.250	.135
		4	22	1.86	1.670	.356
MReject	dimension1	3	86	1.87	1.206	.130
		4	22	2.18	1.368	.292

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	4.601	.034	1.177	106	.242
	Equal variances not assumed			1.402	42.777	.168
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	2.825	.096	-.263	106	.793
	Equal variances not assumed			-.222	27.309	.826
MReject	Equal variances assumed	1.937	.167	-1.046	106	.298
	Equal variances not assumed			-.970	29.892	.340

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	.394	.335	-.270	1.059
	Equal variances not assumed	.394	.281	-.173	.962
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.085	.321	-.721	.552
	Equal variances not assumed	-.085	.381	-.865	.696
MReject	Equal variances assumed	-.310	.296	-.897	.277
	Equal variances not assumed	-.310	.319	-.962	.342

T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(1 2)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	MtypePOV	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MAccept	Monological	55	4.78	1.474	.199
	Dialogical	108	5.27	1.405	.135
MNonC	Monological	55	1.38	1.340	.181
	Dialogical	108	1.80	1.338	.129
MReject	Monological	55	2.84	1.761	.238
	Dialogical	108	1.94	1.240	.119

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	.025	.875	-2.057	161	.041
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.024	104.243	.045
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	.093	.760	-1.869	161	.063
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.868	108.605	.064
MReject	Equal variances assumed	11.324	.001	3.788	161	.000
	Equal variances not assumed			3.391	82.065	.001

Independent Samples Test

| | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | |
| | | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
				Lower	Upper
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.487	.237	-.954	-.019
	Equal variances not assumed	-.487	.240	-.963	-.010
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.414	.222	-.852	.023
	Equal variances not assumed	-.414	.222	-.854	.025
MReject	Equal variances assumed	.901	.238	.431	1.371
	Equal variances not assumed	.901	.266	.372	1.430

```
T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(1 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
```

Group Statistics

	MtypePOV	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MAccept	Monological	55	4.78	1.474	.199
	Metalogical	79	5.27	1.542	.173
MNonC	Monological	55	1.38	1.340	.181
	Metalogical	79	1.53	1.422	.160
MReject	Monological	55	2.84	1.761	.238
	Metalogical	79	2.20	1.497	.168

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	.521	.472	-1.820	132	.071
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.834	119.551	.069
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	1.543	.216	-.614	132	.540
	Equal variances not assumed			-.621	120.544	.536
MReject	Equal variances assumed	.659	.418	2.241	132	.027
	Equal variances not assumed			2.177	103.788	.032

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.484	.266	-1.010	.042
	Equal variances not assumed	-.484	.264	-1.006	.038
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.150	.244	-.632	.333
	Equal variances not assumed	-.150	.241	-.628	.328
MReject	Equal variances assumed	.634	.283	.074	1.193
	Equal variances not assumed	.634	.291	.056	1.211

T-TEST GROUPS=MtypePOV(2 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MAccept MNoncommit MReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	MtypePOV	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MAccept	Dialogical	108	5.27	1.405	.135
	Metalogical	79	5.27	1.542	.173
MNonC	Dialogical	108	1.80	1.338	.129
	Metalogical	79	1.53	1.422	.160
MReject	Dialogical	108	1.94	1.240	.119
	Metalogical	79	2.20	1.497	.168

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	1.140	.287	.012	185	.990
	Equal variances not assumed			.012	158.819	.990
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	1.306	.255	1.301	185	.195
	Equal variances not assumed			1.289	162.169	.199
MReject	Equal variances assumed	11.154	.001	-1.333	185	.184
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.295	148.666	.197

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
MAccept	Equal variances assumed	.003	.217	-.425	.430
	Equal variances not assumed	.003	.220	-.432	.437
MNonC	Equal variances assumed	.265	.203	-.137	.666
	Equal variances not assumed	.265	.205	-.141	.670
MReject	Equal variances assumed	-.267	.200	-.663	.128
	Equal variances not assumed	-.267	.206	-.675	.141

Descriptive Statistics - MONOLOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	39	3	8	5.28	1.255
VNonC	39	0	5	1.36	1.347
VReject	39	0	5	2.36	1.460
Valid N (listwise)	39				

Descriptive Statistics - DIALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	114	0	9	4.73	1.391
VNonC	114	0	9	1.79	1.669
VReject	114	0	6	2.47	1.284
Valid N (listwise)	114				

Descriptive Statistics - METALOGICAL

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	86	1	7	4.91	1.261
VNonC	86	0	8	1.35	1.643
VReject	86	0	6	2.74	1.312
Valid N (listwise)	86				

FILTER OFF.
USE ALL.
EXECUTE.
ONEWAY VAccept VNoncommit VReject BY VtypePOV
  /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
VAccept	Between Groups	8.996	2	4.498	2.566	.079
	Within Groups	413.723	236	1.753		
	Total	422.720	238			
VNonC	Between Groups	11.414	2	5.707	2.195	.114
	Within Groups	613.457	236	2.599		
	Total	624.870	238			
VReject	Between Groups	5.329	2	2.664	1.520	.221
	Within Groups	413.768	236	1.753		
	Total	419.096	238			

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	1	26	5.35	1.441	.283
		2	13	5.15	.801	.222
VNonC	dimension1	1	26	1.65	1.325	.260
		2	13	.77	1.235	.343
VReject	dimension1	1	26	2.00	1.442	.283
		2	13	3.08	1.256	.348

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	7.175	.011	.446	37	.658
	Equal variances not assumed			.535	36.449	.596
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.213	.647	2.009	37	.052
	Equal variances not assumed			2.057	25.696	.050
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.349	.558	-2.290	37	.028
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.400	27.340	.023

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.192	.431	-.681	1.066
	Equal variances not assumed	.192	.359	-.536	.921
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.885	.440	-.008	1.777
	Equal variances not assumed	.885	.430	.000	1.769
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-1.077	.470	-2.030	-.124
	Equal variances not assumed	-1.077	.449	-1.997	-.157

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(3 4)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	3	47	4.60	1.527	.223
		4	67	4.82	1.290	.158
VNonC	dimension1	3	47	1.91	1.679	.245
		4	67	1.70	1.670	.204
VReject	dimension1	3	47	2.47	1.177	.172
		4	67	2.48	1.364	.167

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.931	.337	-.850	112	.397
	Equal variances not assumed			-.825	88.171	.412
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.428	.514	.670	112	.504
	Equal variances not assumed			.670	98.825	.505
VReject	Equal variances assumed	4.000	.048	-.039	112	.969
	Equal variances not assumed			-.040	107.186	.968

Independent Samples Test

| | | t-test for Equality of Means | | | |
| | | Mean Difference | Std. Error Difference | 95% Confidence Interval of the Difference | |
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.225	.265	-.750	.300
	Equal variances not assumed	-.225	.273	-.767	.317
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.213	.318	-.418	.844
	Equal variances not assumed	.213	.319	-.419	.846
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.010	.245	-.496	.477
	Equal variances not assumed	-.010	.239	-.484	.465

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

VPOV			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	1	26	5.35	1.441	.283
		3	47	4.60	1.527	.223
VNonC	dimension1	1	26	1.65	1.325	.260
		3	47	1.91	1.679	.245
VReject	dimension1	1	26	2.00	1.442	.283
		3	47	2.47	1.177	.172

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.146	.703	2.050	71	.044
	Equal variances not assumed			2.086	54.340	.042
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.269	.605	-.683	71	.497
	Equal variances not assumed			-.731	62.387	.467
VReject	Equal variances assumed	1.483	.227	-1.500	71	.138
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.415	43.593	.164

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.750	.366	.021	1.480
	Equal variances not assumed	.750	.360	.029	1.472
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.261	.382	-1.023	.501
	Equal variances not assumed	-.261	.357	-.975	.453
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.468	.312	-1.090	.154
	Equal variances not assumed	-.468	.331	-1.135	.199

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 4)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	1	26	5.35	1.441	.283
		4	67	4.82	1.290	.158
VNonC	dimension1	1	26	1.65	1.325	.260
		4	67	1.70	1.670	.204
VReject	dimension1	1	26	2.00	1.442	.283
		4	67	2.48	1.364	.167

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	1.784	.185	1.705	91	.092
	Equal variances not assumed			1.624	41.461	.112
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	1.496	.224	-.130	91	.897
	Equal variances not assumed			-.144	57.101	.886
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.041	.840	-1.492	91	.139
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.455	43.376	.153

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.525	.308	-.087	1.137
	Equal variances not assumed	.525	.324	-.128	1.178
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.048	.366	-.774	.679
	Equal variances not assumed	-.048	.330	-.709	.614
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.478	.320	-1.114	.158
	Equal variances not assumed	-.478	.328	-1.139	.184

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(1 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	1	26	5.35	1.441	.283
		5	86	4.91	1.261	.136
VNonC	dimension1	1	26	1.65	1.325	.260
		5	86	1.35	1.643	.177
VReject	dimension1	1	26	2.00	1.442	.283
		5	86	2.74	1.312	.142

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	2.835	.095	1.504	110	.135
	Equal variances not assumed			1.401	37.343	.170
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.858	.356	.864	110	.389
	Equal variances not assumed			.970	50.452	.337
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.129	.720	-2.476	110	.015
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.353	38.374	.024

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.439	.292	-.139	1.018
	Equal variances not assumed	.439	.314	-.196	1.074
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.305	.353	-.394	1.004
	Equal variances not assumed	.305	.315	-.327	.937
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.744	.301	-1.340	-.149
	Equal variances not assumed	-.744	.316	-1.384	-.104

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	2	13	5.15	.801	.222
		3	47	4.60	1.527	.223
VNonC	dimension1	2	13	.77	1.235	.343
		3	47	1.91	1.679	.245
VReject	dimension1	2	13	3.08	1.256	.348
		3	47	2.47	1.177	.172

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	3.410	.070	1.265	58	.211
	Equal variances not assumed			1.774	38.218	.084
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.536	.467	-2.289	58	.026
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.721	25.651	.012
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.086	.771	1.628	58	.109
	Equal variances not assumed			1.568	18.257	.134

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.558	.441	-.325	1.441
	Equal variances not assumed	.558	.315	-.079	1.195
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	-1.146	.501	-2.148	-.144
	Equal variances not assumed	-1.146	.421	-2.012	-.279
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.609	.374	-.140	1.358
	Equal variances not assumed	.609	.388	-.206	1.424

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 4)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	2	13	5.15	.801	.222
		4	67	4.82	1.290	.158
VNonC	dimension1	2	13	.77	1.235	.343
		4	67	1.70	1.670	.204
VReject	dimension1	2	13	3.08	1.256	.348
		4	67	2.48	1.364	.167

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	2.218	.140	.895	78	.374
	Equal variances not assumed			1.223	25.940	.232
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	1.727	.193	-1.910	78	.060
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.338	21.528	.029
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.918	.341	1.467	78	.146
	Equal variances not assumed			1.552	17.948	.138

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.333	.372	-.408	1.074
	Equal variances not assumed	.333	.272	-.227	.893
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.932	.488	-1.904	.040
	Equal variances not assumed	-.932	.399	-1.760	-.104
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.599	.408	-.214	1.412
	Equal variances not assumed	.599	.386	-.212	1.411

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(2 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	2	13	5.15	.801	.222
		5	86	4.91	1.261	.136
VNonC	dimension1	2	13	.77	1.235	.343
		5	86	1.35	1.643	.177
VReject	dimension1	2	13	3.08	1.256	.348
		5	86	2.74	1.312	.142

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	1.412	.238	.683	97	.496
	Equal variances not assumed			.948	22.253	.353
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	1.157	.285	-1.219	97	.226
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.503	19.088	.149
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.221	.639	.857	97	.394
	Equal variances not assumed			.885	16.226	.389

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.247	.361	-.470	.964
	Equal variances not assumed	.247	.260	-.293	.787
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	-.580	.476	-1.524	.364
	Equal variances not assumed	-.580	.386	-1.387	.227
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.333	.388	-.438	1.104
	Equal variances not assumed	.333	.376	-.463	1.129

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(3 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

	VPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	3	47	4.60	1.527	.223
		5	86	4.91	1.261	.136
VNonC	dimension1	3	47	1.91	1.679	.245
		5	86	1.35	1.643	.177
VReject	dimension1	3	47	2.47	1.177	.172
		5	86	2.74	1.312	.142

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	1.964	.163	-1.261	131	.210
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.192	80.622	.237
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.132	.717	1.885	131	.062
	Equal variances not assumed			1.873	92.985	.064
VReject	Equal variances assumed	1.632	.204	-1.202	131	.232
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.241	103.818	.217

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.311	.247	-.800	.177
	Equal variances not assumed	-.311	.261	-.831	.208
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.566	.300	-.028	1.160
	Equal variances not assumed	.566	.302	-.034	1.166
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.276	.230	-.731	.178
	Equal variances not assumed	-.276	.222	-.717	.165

T-TEST GROUPS=VotingPOV(4 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=VAccept VNoncommit VReject
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

VPOV			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
VAccept	dimension1	4	67	4.82	1.290	.158
		5	86	4.91	1.261	.136
VNonC	dimension1	4	67	1.70	1.670	.204
		5	86	1.35	1.643	.177
VReject	dimension1	4	67	2.48	1.364	.167
		5	86	2.74	1.312	.142

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means		
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	.224	.637	-.415	151	.679
	Equal variances not assumed			-.413	140.437	.680
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.138	.711	1.308	151	.193
	Equal variances not assumed			1.305	140.890	.194
VReject	Equal variances assumed	.682	.410	-1.225	151	.222
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.220	139.295	.225

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
				Lower	Upper
VAccept	Equal variances assumed	-.086	.208	-.496	.324
	Equal variances not assumed	-.086	.208	-.498	.326
VNonC	Equal variances assumed	.353	.270	-.180	.885
	Equal variances not assumed	.353	.270	-.182	.887
VReject	Equal variances assumed	-.267	.218	-.696	.163
	Equal variances not assumed	-.267	.219	-.699	.166

Descriptive Statistics - VRights 1

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	26	3	8	5.35	1.441
VNonC	26	0	5	1.65	1.325
VReject	26	0	5	2.00	1.442
Valid N (listwise)	26				

Descriptive Statistics - VRights 2

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	13	4	7	5.15	.801
VNonC	13	0	4	.77	1.235
VReject	13	0	4	3.08	1.256
Valid N (listwise)	13				

Descriptive Statistics - VRights 3

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	47	0	9	4.60	1.527
VNonC	47	0	9	1.91	1.679
VReject	47	0	6	2.47	1.177
Valid N (listwise)	47				

Descriptive Statistics - VRights 4

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	67	0	7	4.82	1.290
VNonC	67	0	9	1.70	1.670
VReject	67	0	5	2.48	1.364
Valid N (listwise)	67				

Descriptive Statistics - VRights 5

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
VAccept	86	1	7	4.91	1.261
VNonC	86	0	8	1.35	1.643
VReject	86	0	6	2.74	1.312
Valid N (listwise)	86				

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Gender * MtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

Gender * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

			MtypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Gender	Female	Count	32	67	60	159
		% within Gender	20.1%	42.1%	37.7%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	55.2%	61.5%	75.0%	64.4%
		% of Total	13.0%	27.1%	24.3%	64.4%
	Male	Count	26	42	20	88
		% within Gender	29.5%	47.7%	22.7%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	44.8%	38.5%	25.0%	35.6%
		% of Total	10.5%	17.0%	8.1%	35.6%
Total		Count	58	109	80	247
		% within Gender	23.5%	44.1%	32.4%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	23.5%	44.1%	32.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.481[a]	2	.039
Likelihood Ratio	6.637	2	.036
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.66.

T-TEST GROUPS=GenderR(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

GenderR			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1	Male	83	29.75	7.667	.842
		Female	153	34.07	6.231	.504

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	2.408	.122	-4.680	234	.000	-4.318
	Equal variances not assumed			-4.403	141.495	.000	-4.318

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
			95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.923	-6.136	-2.500
	Equal variances not assumed	.981	-6.257	-2.380

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
ArtsSC * StypePOV	245	99.2%	2	.8%	247	100.0%

ArtsSC * StypePOV Crosstabulation

			StypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
ArtsSC	Sciences	Count	12	54	27	93
		% within ArtsSC	12.9%	58.1%	29.0%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	23.5%	40.6%	44.3%	38.0%
		% of Total	4.9%	22.0%	11.0%	38.0%
	Arts	Count	39	79	34	152
		% within ArtsSC	25.7%	52.0%	22.4%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	76.5%	59.4%	55.7%	62.0%
		% of Total	15.9%	32.2%	13.9%	62.0%
Total		Count	51	133	61	245
		% within ArtsSC	20.8%	54.3%	24.9%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.8%	54.3%	24.9%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.933[a]	2	.051
Likelihood Ratio	6.234	2	.044
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.757	1	.029
N of Valid Cases	245		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.36.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
ArtsSC * VtypePOV	245	99.2%	2	.8%	247	100.0%

ArtsSC * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

			VtypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
ArtsSC	Sciences	Count	7	53	33	93
		% within ArtsSC	7.5%	57.0%	35.5%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	17.5%	45.3%	37.5%	38.0%
		% of Total	2.9%	21.6%	13.5%	38.0%
	Arts	Count	33	64	55	152
		% within ArtsSC	21.7%	42.1%	36.2%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	82.5%	54.7%	62.5%	62.0%
		% of Total	13.5%	26.1%	22.4%	62.0%
Total		Count	40	117	88	245
		% within ArtsSC	16.3%	47.8%	35.9%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	16.3%	47.8%	35.9%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.794[a]	2	.007
Likelihood Ratio	10.599	2	.005
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.158	1	.142
N of Valid Cases	245		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.18.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
YrStudyU * VtypePOV	246	99.6%	1	.4%	247	100.0%

YrStudyU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

			VtypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
YrStudyU	Year 1	Count	17	39	44	100
		% within YrStudyU	17.0%	39.0%	44.0%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	41.5%	33.3%	50.0%	40.7%
		% of Total	6.9%	15.9%	17.9%	40.7%
	Year 2	Count	14	31	16	61
		% within YrStudyU	23.0%	50.8%	26.2%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	34.1%	26.5%	18.2%	24.8%
		% of Total	5.7%	12.6%	6.5%	24.8%
	Year 3	Count	4	30	21	55
		% within YrStudyU	7.3%	54.5%	38.2%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	9.8%	25.6%	23.9%	22.4%
		% of Total	1.6%	12.2%	8.5%	22.4%
	Years 4/5	Count	6	17	7	30
		% within YrStudyU	20.0%	56.7%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	14.6%	14.5%	8.0%	12.2%
		% of Total	2.4%	6.9%	2.8%	12.2%
Total		Count	41	117	88	246
		% within YrStudyU	16.7%	47.6%	35.8%	100.0%
		% within VtypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	16.7%	47.6%	35.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.161[a]	6	.058
Likelihood Ratio	13.036	6	.042
Linear-by-Linear Association	.879	1	.348
N of Valid Cases	246		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
YrStudyU * StypePOV	246	99.6%	1	.4%	247	100.0%

YrStudyU * StypePOV Crosstabulation

			StypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
YrStudyU	Year 1	Count	19	53	28	100
		% within YrStudyU	19.0%	53.0%	28.0%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	37.3%	39.6%	45.9%	40.7%
		% of Total	7.7%	21.5%	11.4%	40.7%
	Year 2	Count	14	33	14	61
		% within YrStudyU	23.0%	54.1%	23.0%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	27.5%	24.6%	23.0%	24.8%
		% of Total	5.7%	13.4%	5.7%	24.8%
	Year 3	Count	14	29	12	55
		% within YrStudyU	25.5%	52.7%	21.8%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	27.5%	21.6%	19.7%	22.4%
		% of Total	5.7%	11.8%	4.9%	22.4%
	Years 4/5	Count	4	19	7	30
		% within YrStudyU	13.3%	63.3%	23.3%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	7.8%	14.2%	11.5%	12.2%
		% of Total	1.6%	7.7%	2.8%	12.2%
Total		Count	51	134	61	246
		% within YrStudyU	20.7%	54.5%	24.8%	100.0%
		% within StypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	20.7%	54.5%	24.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.898[a]	6	.822
Likelihood Ratio	2.946	6	.816
Linear-by-Linear Association	.252	1	.616
N of Valid Cases	246		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.22.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
YrStudyU * MtypePOV	246	99.6%	1	.4%	247	100.0%

YrStudyU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

			MtypePOV			Total
			Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
YrStudyU	Year 1	Count	23	37	40	100
		% within YrStudyU	23.0%	37.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	39.7%	33.9%	50.6%	40.7%
		% of Total	9.3%	15.0%	16.3%	40.7%
	Year 2	Count	17	25	19	61
		% within YrStudyU	27.9%	41.0%	31.1%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	29.3%	22.9%	24.1%	24.8%
		% of Total	6.9%	10.2%	7.7%	24.8%
	Year 3	Count	8	28	19	55
		% within YrStudyU	14.5%	50.9%	34.5%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	13.8%	25.7%	24.1%	22.4%
		% of Total	3.3%	11.4%	7.7%	22.4%
	Years 4/5	Count	10	19	1	30
		% within YrStudyU	33.3%	63.3%	3.3%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	17.2%	17.4%	1.3%	12.2%
		% of Total	4.1%	7.7%	.4%	12.2%
Total		Count	58	109	79	246
		% within YrStudyU	23.6%	44.3%	32.1%	100.0%
		% within MtypePOV	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	23.6%	44.3%	32.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.747[a]	6	.007
Likelihood Ratio	22.502	6	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.225	1	.040
N of Valid Cases	246		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.07.

ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY YrStudyU
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ANOVA

MIdeo

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	198.208	3	66.069	1.325	.267
Within Groups	11520.235	231	49.871		
Total	11718.443	234			

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
FWork * StypePOV	177	71.7%	70	28.3%	247	100.0%

FWork * StypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		StypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
FWork	Unskilled	1	9	4	14
	Skilled	14	34	10	58
	White collar	10	24	13	47
	Professional	7	32	19	58
Total		32	99	46	177

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.800[a]	6	.340
Likelihood Ratio	7.255	6	.298
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.038	1	.153
N of Valid Cases	177		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.53.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
FWork * MtypePOV	177	71.7%	70	28.3%	247	100.0%

FWork * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		MtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
FWork	Unskilled	3	7	4	14
	Skilled	8	29	21	58
	White collar	11	24	12	47
	Professional	12	24	22	58
Total		34	84	59	177

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.562[a]	6	.736
Likelihood Ratio	3.705	6	.717
Linear-by-Linear Association	.013	1	.910
N of Valid Cases	177		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.69.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
FWork * VtypePOV	177	71.7%	70	28.3%	247	100.0%

FWork * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		VtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
FWork	Unskilled	4	5	5	14
	Skilled	11	29	18	58
	White collar	7	22	18	47
	Professional	7	30	21	58
Total		29	86	62	177

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.310[a]	6	.769
Likelihood Ratio	3.187	6	.785
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.293	1	.255
N of Valid Cases	177		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.29.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Place of Residence * StypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

Place of Residence * StypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		StypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	7	6	5	18
	Northern	7	26	12	45
	Northern Harbour	11	44	14	69
	Souther Eastern	7	13	9	29
	Southern Harbour	9	22	12	43
	Western	10	24	9	43
Total		51	135	61	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.346[a]	10	.500
Likelihood Ratio	9.071	10	.525
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 2 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.72.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Place of Residence * MtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

Place of Residence * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		MtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	5	10	3	18
	Northern	15	15	15	45
	Northern Harbour	11	30	28	69
	Souther Eastern	8	14	7	29
	Southern Harbour	12	18	13	43
	Western	7	22	14	43
Total		58	109	80	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.048[a]	10	.354
Likelihood Ratio	11.420	10	.326
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 1 cells (5.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.23.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Place of Residence * VtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

Place of Residence * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		VtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	5	6	7	18
	Northern	9	22	14	45
	Northern Harbour	6	36	27	69
	Souther Eastern	7	13	9	29
	Southern Harbour	5	15	23	43
	Western	9	25	9	43
Total		41	117	89	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17.085[a]	10	.073
Likelihood Ratio	17.481	10	.064
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 2 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.99.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
RelYNU * StypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

RelYNU * StypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		StypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
RelYNU	Religious	45	113	50	208
	Not Religious	6	22	11	39
Total		51	135	61	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.878[a]	2	.645
Likelihood Ratio	.919	2	.631
Linear-by-Linear Association	.786	1	.375
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.05.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
RelYNU * MtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

RelYNU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		MtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
RelYNU	Religious	51	95	62	208
	Not Religious	7	14	18	39
Total		58	109	80	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.024[a]	2	.134
Likelihood Ratio	3.852	2	.146
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.119	1	.077
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.16.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
RelYNU * VtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

RelYNU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		VtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
RelYNU	Religious	37	96	75	208
	Not Religious	4	21	14	39
Total		41	117	89	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.533[a]	2	.465
Likelihood Ratio	1.665	2	.435
Linear-by-Linear Association	.364	1	.546
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.47.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeRU * StypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

AgeRU * StypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		StypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
AgeRU	<20	35	84	42	161
	21-30	15	37	10	62
	>31	1	14	9	24
Total		51	135	61	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.716[a]	4	.103
Likelihood Ratio	9.278	4	.055
Linear-by-Linear Association	.867	1	.352
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.96.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeRU * MtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

AgeRU * MtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		MtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
AgeRU	<20	36	65	60	161
	21-30	15	34	13	62
	>31	7	10	7	24
Total		58	109	80	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.346[a]	4	.175
Likelihood Ratio	6.530	4	.163
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.309	1	.129
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.64.

Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Valid		Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
AgeRU * VtypePOV	247	100.0%	0	.0%	247	100.0%

AgeRU * VtypePOV Crosstabulation

Count

		VtypePOV			Total
		Monological	Dialogical	Metalogical	
AgeRU	<20	25	73	63	161
	21-30	11	35	16	62
	>31	5	9	10	24
Total		41	117	89	247

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.572[a]	4	.334
Likelihood Ratio	4.708	4	.319
Linear-by-Linear Association	.760	1	.383
N of Valid Cases	247		

a. 1 cells (11.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum
expected count is 3.98.

GET
  FILE='/Users/Home/Documents/Gordon/PhD/3rd/POVs.sav'.
DATASET NAME DataSet1 WINDOW=FRONT.
ONEWAY MulticulturalIdeology BY MuslimPOV
 /MISSING ANALYSIS.

ANOVA

MIdeo

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2786.663	4	696.666	18.005	.000
Within Groups	8937.824	231	38.692		
Total	11724.487	235			

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo dimension1	3	83	30.13	6.245	.685
	5	78	35.38	6.205	.703

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.159	.691	-5.350	159	.000	-5.252
	Equal variances not assumed			-5.351	158.500	.000	-5.252

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.982	-7.191	-3.313
	Equal variances not assumed	.982	-7.191	-3.314

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(3 4)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo dimension1	3	83	30.13	6.245	.685
	4	21	34.95	6.407	1.398

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.175	.677	-3.144	102	.002	-4.820
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.095	30.342	.004	-4.820

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.533	-7.861	-1.779
	Equal variances not assumed	1.557	-7.998	-1.641

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T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1 2	26	36.62	6.350	1.245
	3	83	30.13	6.245	.685

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.144	.705	4.601	107	.000	6.483
	Equal variances not assumed			4.560	41.284	.000	6.483

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.409	3.690	9.276
	Equal variances not assumed	1.422	3.613	9.353

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1 1	28	26.21	5.921	1.119
	2	26	36.62	6.350	1.245

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.088	.768	-6.229	52	.000	-10.401
	Equal variances not assumed			-6.212	50.927	.000	-10.401

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.670	-13.752	-7.050
	Equal variances not assumed	1.674	-13.763	-7.040

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 4)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo dimension1	1	28	26.21	5.921	1.119
	4	21	34.95	6.407	1.398

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.122	.729	-4.936	47	.000	-8.738
	Equal variances not assumed			-4.879	41.284	.000	-8.738

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.770	-12.300	-5.177
	Equal variances not assumed	1.791	-12.354	-5.122

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1 1	28	26.21	5.921	1.119
	5	78	35.38	6.205	.703

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.058	.811	-6.788	104	.000	-9.170
	Equal variances not assumed			-6.940	49.768	.000	-9.170

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.351	-11.849	-6.491
	Equal variances not assumed	1.321	-11.825	-6.516

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(1 3)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo dimension1	1	28	26.21	5.921	1.119
	3	83	30.13	6.245	.685

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.004	.951	-2.908	109	.004	-3.918
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.986	48.798	.004	-3.918

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.348	-6.589	-1.247
	Equal variances not assumed	1.312	-6.556	-1.281

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(4 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV			N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1	4	21	34.95	6.407	1.398
		5	78	35.38	6.205	.703

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.032	.858	-.281	97	.779	-.432
	Equal variances not assumed			-.276	30.865	.784	-.432

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.536	-3.480	2.616
	Equal variances not assumed	1.565	-3.624	2.760

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 5)
 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
 /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1 2	26	36.62	6.350	1.245
	5	78	35.38	6.205	.703

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.013	.909	.871	102	.386	1.231
	Equal variances not assumed			.861	42.061	.394	1.231

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.413	-1.572	4.034
	Equal variances not assumed	1.430	-1.655	4.116

T-TEST GROUPS=MuslimPOV(2 4)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=MulticulturalIdeology
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).

Group Statistics

MPOV		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
MIdeo	dimension1 2	26	36.62	6.350	1.245
	4	21	34.95	6.407	1.398

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means			
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	.004	.951	.889	45	.379	1.663
	Equal variances not assumed			.888	42.783	.379	1.663

Independent Samples Test

		t-test for Equality of Means		
		Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
			Lower	Upper
MIdeo	Equal variances assumed	1.871	-2.104	5.430
	Equal variances not assumed	1.872	-2.113	5.439

Case Processing Summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
StypePOV	Monological	32	18.2%
	Dialogical	98	55.7%
	Metalogical	46	26.1%
FWork	Unskilled	13	7.4%
	Skilled	58	33.0%
	White collar	47	26.7%
	Professional	58	33.0%
YrStudyU	Year 1	66	37.5%
	Year 2	44	25.0%
	Year 3	42	23.9%
	Years 4/5	24	13.6%
ArtsSC	Sciences	70	39.8%
	Arts	106	60.2%
RelYNU	Religious	147	83.5%
	Not Religious	29	16.5%
MaritalRU	Other	6	3.4%
	Single	161	91.5%
	Married	9	5.1%
AgeRU	<20	126	71.6%
	21-30	40	22.7%
	>31	10	5.7%
GenderR	Male	63	35.8%
	Female	113	64.2%
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	14	8.0%
	Northern	34	19.3%
	Northern Harbour	45	25.6%
	Souther Eastern	20	11.4%
	Southern Harbour	28	15.9%
	Western	35	19.9%
Valid		176	100.0%
Missing		69	
Total		245	
Subpopulation		150[a]	

a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 142 (94.7%) subpopulations.

Model Fitting Information

Model	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	328.822			
Final	296.097	32.725	36	.625

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.170
Nagelkerke	.197
McFadden	.094

Likelihood Ratio Tests

Effect	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	296.097[a]	.000	0	.
FWork	305.328	9.231	6	.161
YrStudyU	302.482	6.385	6	.381
ArtsSc	300.154	4.057	2	.132
RelYNU	296.803	.706	2	.702
MaritalRU	297.056	.960	4	.916
AgeRU	299.043	2.946	4	.567
GenderR	296.104	.008	2	.996
PlaceofResidence	309.502	13.406	10	.202

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.

Parameter Estimates

StypePOV[a]		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Dia-logical	Intercept	3.172	1.762	3.241	1	.072			
	[FWork=1.00]	1.263	1.221	1.070	1	.301	3.537	.323	38.736
	[FWork=2.00]	-.674	.602	1.253	1	.263	.510	.157	1.659
	[FWork=3.00]	-.714	.640	1.244	1	.265	.490	.140	1.717
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	-1.819	1.019	3.185	1	.074	.162	.022	1.196
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	-1.033	.976	1.120	1	.290	.356	.053	2.411
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	-1.879	.975	3.718	1	.054	.153	.023	1.031
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	.751	.519	2.092	1	.148	2.119	.766	5.859
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	-.496	.684	.526	1	.468	.609	.159	2.327
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	.354	1.789	.039	1	.843	1.424	.043	47.453
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	-.767	1.579	.236	1	.627	.464	.021	10.255
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	.020	1.591	.000	1	.990	1.021	.045	23.089
	[AgeRU=2.00]	-.682	1.592	.184	1	.668	.506	.022	11.447
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	.004	.501	.000	1	.993	1.004	.376	2.684
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence =Gozo and Comino]	-.332	.812	.168	1	.682	.717	.146	3.520
	[PlaceofResidence =Northern]	1.564	.757	4.268	1	.039	4.778	1.084	21.066
	[PlaceofResidence =Northern Harbour]	1.826	.720	6.430	1	.011	6.208	1.514	25.457

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
	[PlaceofResidence =Souther Eastern]	.847	.781	1.175	1	.278	2.332	.504	10.785
	[PlaceofResidence =Southern Harbour]	.751	.704	1.138	1	.286	2.119	.533	8.418
	[PlaceofResidence =Western]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
Metalogical	Intercept	2.354	1.974	1.422	1	.233			
	[FWork=1.00]	1.010	1.290	.613	1	.434	2.745	.219	34.433
	[FWork=2.00]	-1.443	.682	4.475	1	.034	.236	.062	.899
	[FWork=3.00]	-.803	.685	1.374	1	.241	.448	.117	1.716
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	-1.903	1.111	2.936	1	.087	.149	.017	1.315
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	-1.492	1.095	1.856	1	.173	.225	.026	1.924
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	-2.015	1.082	3.468	1	.063	.133	.016	1.112
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	1.118	.568	3.868	1	.049	3.059	1.004	9.321
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	-.595	.749	.632	1	.427	.551	.127	2.392
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	-.377	2.181	.030	1	.863	.686	.010	49.262
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	-1.009	1.837	.302	1	.583	.365	.010	13.361
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	.745	1.863	.160	1	.689	2.106	.055	81.049
	[AgeRU=2.00]	-.457	1.880	.059	1	.808	.633	.016	25.227
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	.037	.554	.005	1	.946	1.038	.350	3.074
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence =Gozo and Comino]	-.214	.969	.049	1	.825	.807	.121	5.397
	[PlaceofResidence =Northern]	1.626	.850	3.657	1	.056	5.082	.960	26.893
	[PlaceofResidence =Northern Harbour]	1.524	.831	3.362	1	.067	4.590	.900	23.399

	1.299	.899	2.086	1	.149	3.664	.629	21.341
[PlaceofResidence =Souther Eastern]								
[PlaceofResidence =Southern Harbour]	1.173	.799	2.158	1	.142	3.233	.676	15.469
[PlaceofResidence =Western]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.

a. The reference category is: Monological.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Warnings

Unexpected singularities in the Hessian matrix are encountered. This indicates that either some predictor variables should be excluded or some categories should be merged. The NOMREG procedure continues despite the above warning(s). Subsequent results shown are based on the last iteration. Validity of the model fit is uncertain.

Case Processing Summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
MtypePOV	Monological	30	18.0%
	Dialogical	80	47.9%
	Metalogical	57	34.1%
FWork	Unskilled	12	7.2%
	Skilled	55	32.9%
	White collar	45	26.9%
	Professional	55	32.9%
YrStudyU	Year 1	60	35.9%
	Year 2	41	24.6%
	Year 3	42	25.1%
	Years 4/5	24	14.4%
ArtsSC	Sciences	66	39.5%
	Arts	101	60.5%
RelYNU	Religious	139	83.2%
	Not Religious	28	16.8%
MaritalRU	Other	6	3.6%

	Single	152	91.0%
	Married	9	5.4%
AgeRU	<20	117	70.1%
	21-30	40	24.0%
	>31	10	6.0%
GenderR	Male	59	35.3%
	Female	108	64.7%
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	12	7.2%
	Northern	33	19.8%
	Northern Harbour	44	26.3%
	Souther Eastern	19	11.4%
	Southern Harbour	27	16.2%
	Western	32	19.2%
Valid		167	100.0%
Missing		78	
Total		245	
Subpopulation		165[a]	

a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 165 (100.0%) subpopulations.

Model Fitting Information

Model	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	343.306			
Final	271.862	71.444	38	.001

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.348
Nagelkerke	.399
McFadden	.208

Likelihood Ratio Tests

Effect	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	271.862[a]	.000	0	.
MulticulturalIdeology	292.442	20.580	2	.000
FWork	276.861	4.999	6	.544
YrStudyU	281.839	9.977	6	.126
ArtsSc	274.430	2.568	2	.277
RelYNU	274.511	2.649	2	.266
MaritalRU	278.726	6.864	4	.143
AgeRU	277.133	5.271	4	.261
GenderR	272.848	.986	2	.611
PlaceofResidence	288.348	16.486	10	.087

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.

Parameter Estimates

MtypePOV[a]		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Dia-logical	Intercept	-2.383	2.170	1.205	1	.272			
	MulticulturalIdeology	.088	.042	4.438	1	.035	1.092	1.006	1.185
	[FWork=1.00]	-.077	1.024	.006	1	.940	.926	.124	6.894
	[FWork=2.00]	.403	.642	.395	1	.530	1.497	.425	5.268
	[FWork=3.00]	.118	.626	.036	1	.850	1.125	.330	3.835
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	.782	.824	.901	1	.343	2.186	.435	11.001
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	.250	.785	.101	1	.751	1.283	.275	5.980
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	.260	.796	.107	1	.744	1.298	.273	6.177
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	.821	.525	2.444	1	.118	2.273	.812	6.366
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	.833	.693	1.445	1	.229	2.301	.591	8.952
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	22.160	1.738	162.646	1	.000	4.207E9	1.396E8	1.268E11
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	2.518	2.042	1.520	1	.218	12.401	.226	679.160
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	-2.745	1.958	1.965	1	.161	.064	.001	2.983
	[AgeRU=2.00]	-1.601	1.981	.654	1	.419	.202	.004	9.785
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	.413	.544	.577	1	.448	1.511	.521	4.387
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence=Gozo and Comino]	.569	1.292	.194	1	.659	1.767	.140	22.247
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern]	-1.995	.859	5.392	1	.020	.136	.025	.733
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern Harbour]	-1.103	.875	1.588	1	.208	.332	.060	1.845

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
	[PlaceofResidence=Souther Eastern]	-1.427	.968	2.171	1	.141	.240	.036	1.602
	[PlaceofResidence=Southern Harbour]	-1.997	.912	4.798	1	.028	.136	.023	.810
	[PlaceofResidence=Western]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
Metal ogical	Intercept	-7.739	2.673	8.382	1	.004			
	MulticulturalIdeology	.195	.049	15.893	1	.000	1.215	1.104	1.338
	[FWork=1.00]	-.322	1.102	.085	1	.770	.725	.084	6.285
	[FWork=2.00]	.681	.688	.982	1	.322	1.977	.514	7.608
	[FWork=3.00]	-.604	.689	.769	1	.381	.547	.142	2.108
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	3.214	1.386	5.380	1	.020	24.890	1.646	376.387
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	2.812	1.369	4.222	1	.040	16.649	1.139	243.446
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	3.037	1.337	5.163	1	.023	20.848	1.518	286.293
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	.492	.586	.704	1	.402	1.635	.518	5.156
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	-.012	.712	.000	1	.987	.988	.245	3.989
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	19.071	.000	.	1	.	1.916E8	1.916E8	1.916E8
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	.372	1.819	.042	1	.838	1.451	.041	51.273
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	-.617	1.935	.102	1	.750	.540	.012	23.921
	[AgeRU=2.00]	.012	1.951	.000	1	.995	1.012	.022	46.300
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	.583	.603	.935	1	.334	1.791	.550	5.832
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence=Gozo and Comino]	-.863	1.528	.319	1	.572	.422	.021	8.436
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern]	-1.421	.905	2.464	1	.116	.241	.041	1.424
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern Harbour]	-.822	.933	.776	1	.378	.439	.071	2.737
	[PlaceofResidence=Souther Eastern]	-2.242	1.130	3.934	1	.047	.106	.012	.974

[PlaceofResidence=Southern Harbour]	-1.521	.982	2.400	1	.121	.219	.032	1.496
[PlaceofResidence=Western]	0^b	.	.	0	.	.	.	.

a. The reference category is: Monological.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Case Processing Summary

		N	Marginal Percentage
VtypePOV	Monological	29	16.5%
	Dialogical	86	48.9%
	Metalogical	61	34.7%
FWork	Unskilled	13	7.4%
	Skilled	58	33.0%
	White collar	47	26.7%
	Professional	58	33.0%
YrStudyU	Year 1	66	37.5%
	Year 2	44	25.0%
	Year 3	42	23.9%
	Years 4/5	24	13.6%
ArtsSC	Sciences	70	39.8%
	Arts	106	60.2%
RelYNU	Religious	147	83.5%
	Not Religious	29	16.5%
MaritalRU	Other	6	3.4%
	Single	161	91.5%
	Married	9	5.1%
AgeRU	<20	126	71.6%
	21-30	40	22.7%
	>31	10	5.7%
GenderR	Male	63	35.8%
	Female	113	64.2%
Place of Residence	Gozo and Comino	14	8.0%
	Northern	34	19.3%
	Northern Harbour	45	25.6%
	Souther Eastern	20	11.4%
	Southern Harbour	28	15.9%
	Western	35	19.9%

Valid		176	100.0%
Missing		69	
Total		245	
Subpopulation		150[a]	

a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 140 (93.3%) subpopulations.

Model Fitting Information

Model	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept Only	333.570			
Final	275.236	58.334	36	.011

Pseudo R-Square

Cox and Snell	.282
Nagelkerke	.325
McFadden	.163

Likelihood Ratio Tests

Effect	Model Fitting Criteria	Likelihood Ratio Tests		
	-2 Log Likelihood of Reduced Model	Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Intercept	275.236[a]	.000	0	.
FWork	277.083	1.847	6	.933
YrStudyU	290.492	15.256	6	.018
ArtsSc	284.522	9.286	2	.010
RelYNU	280.452	5.216	2	.074
MaritalRU	277.974	2.738	4	.603
AgeRU	277.568	2.332	4	.675
GenderR	277.008	1.772	2	.412
PlaceofResidence	289.272	14.037	10	.171

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0.

a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the degrees of freedom.

Parameter Estimates

VtypePOV[a]		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Dia-logical	Intercept	1.594	2.073	.591	1	.442			
	[FWork=1.00]	-1.010	.915	1.218	1	.270	.364	.061	2.190
	[FWork=2.00]	-.186	.634	.086	1	.769	.830	.240	2.877
	[FWork=3.00]	-.259	.684	.143	1	.705	.772	.202	2.951
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	.880	.867	1.032	1	.310	2.412	.441	13.184
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	1.090	.844	1.666	1	.197	2.974	.568	15.563
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	2.250	.964	5.450	1	.020	9.492	1.435	62.802
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	1.738	.618	7.905	1	.005	5.683	1.693	19.081
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	-2.004	1.112	3.250	1	.071	.135	.015	1.191
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	-1.436	1.751	.673	1	.412	.238	.008	7.358
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	.423	1.669	.064	1	.800	1.526	.058	40.182
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	-1.044	1.750	.356	1	.551	.352	.011	10.860
	[AgeRU=2.00]	-.133	1.818	.005	1	.942	.876	.025	30.913
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	.165	.547	.090	1	.764	1.179	.403	3.447
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence=Gozo and Comino]	.413	.939	.193	1	.660	1.511	.240	9.525
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern]	.066	.717	.008	1	.927	1.068	.262	4.356
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern Harbour]	1.016	.821	1.533	1	.216	2.763	.553	13.801
	[PlaceofResidence=Souther Eastern]	.510	.787	.421	1	.517	1.666	.356	7.791

		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
	[PlaceofResidence=Southern Harbour]	.423	.884	.229	1	.632	1.527	.270	8.637
	[PlaceofResidence=Western]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
Metalogical	Intercept	-.604	2.178	.077	1	.781			
	[FWork=1.00]	-.632	.992	.406	1	.524	.532	.076	3.714
	[FWork=2.00]	-.164	.677	.058	1	.809	.849	.225	3.199
	[FWork=3.00]	.104	.711	.021	1	.884	1.110	.275	4.471
	[FWork=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[YrStudyU=1.00]	2.527	1.047	5.831	1	.016	12.522	1.610	97.409
	[YrStudyU=2.00]	1.718	1.048	2.688	1	.101	5.573	.715	43.453
	[YrStudyU=3.00]	3.262	1.125	8.408	1	.004	26.101	2.878	236.707
	[YrStudyU=4.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[ArtsSc=1.00]	1.402	.652	4.626	1	.031	4.063	1.132	14.575
	[ArtsSc=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[RelYNU=1.00]	-1.990	1.141	3.042	1	.081	.137	.015	1.279
	[RelYNU=2.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[MaritalRU=1.00]	-.984	1.809	.296	1	.586	.374	.011	12.954
	[MaritalRU=2.00]	1.000	1.785	.314	1	.575	2.719	.082	90.000
	[MaritalRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[AgeRU=1.00]	-1.248	1.804	.479	1	.489	.287	.008	9.851
	[AgeRU=2.00]	-.775	1.881	.170	1	.680	.461	.012	18.391
	[AgeRU=3.00]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[GenderR=1]	-.372	.590	.399	1	.528	.689	.217	2.189
	[GenderR=2]	0[b]	.	.	0	.	.	.	.
	[PlaceofResidence=Gozo and Comino]	1.095	1.013	1.169	1	.280	2.988	.411	21.745
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern]	.612	.806	.576	1	.448	1.844	.380	8.946
	[PlaceofResidence=Northern Harbour]	1.920	.889	4.665	1	.031	6.823	1.195	38.972
	[PlaceofResidence=Souther Eastern]	.446	.955	.217	1	.641	1.561	.240	10.158
	[PlaceofResidence=Southern Harbour]	2.124	.925	5.266	1	.022	8.361	1.363	51.281

| | [PlaceofResidence=W estern] | 0[b] | . | . | 0 | . | . | . | . |

a. The reference category is: Monological.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.