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Implications of a Local Case Study for Crime Prevention Practice and Policy, and Criminology’s ‘Grand Narratives’

Garner Clancey

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Faculty of Law
The University of Sydney
2014
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Abbreviations

AIC — Australian Institute of Criminology
ASB — Antisocial behaviour
ATM — Automatic teller machine
BOCSAR — New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research
CBD — Central business district
CCTV — Closed-circuit television
CMU — Crime Management Unit
COGG — Coalition of Glebe Groups
CPO — Crime Prevention Officer (New South Wales Police Force)
CPTED — Crime prevention through environmental design
CRC — Criminology Research Council
CSO — Community Safety Officer (Local Government)
CSPC — Community Safety Precinct Committee
DA — Development Application
DCP — Development Control Plan
DNA — Deoxyribonucleic acid
DoCS — Department of Community Services
DURD — Department of Urban and Regional Development
DV — Domestic violence
DVLO — Domestic Violence Liaison Officer (New South Wales Police Force)
FLAG — Forest Lodge and Glebe Coordination Group
GCDP — Glebe Community Development Project
GIS — Geographic Information System
GPS — Global Positioning System
HREC — Human Research Ethics Committee
HSLO — Home School Liaison Officer
LAC — Local Area Command
LGA — Local Government Area
LGSA — Local Government and Shires Association
LPO — Loss Prevention Officer
NGO — Non-government organisation
PCYC — Police Citizens Youth Clubs
POP — Problem-oriented policing
OLGR — Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing
RNR — Risk–Needs–Responsivity Model
SARA — Scanning–Analysis–Response–Assessment
SSCP — Street Safety Camera Program
UK — United Kingdom
US — United States
ZTP — Zero tolerance policing


Declaration of Originality

I hereby certify that this thesis is entirely my own work and that any material written by others has been acknowledged in the text.

The thesis has not been presented for a degree or for any other purposes at The University of Sydney or at any other university or institution.

The empirical work undertaken for this thesis (interviews, questionnaires and observations) was approved by the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC).

Signed:

Date:
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I want to acknowledge and thank all of the people in Glebe who provided assistance with this research. So many people were very generous with their time, their insights and their observations. The research for this thesis would not have been possible without that assistance, nor would it have been nearly as enjoyable. Given how little this research is likely to directly benefit any of the many people who were willing to be interviewed or who aided other aspects of the fieldwork, how the research project was embraced was a true sign of the generosity of spirit and cooperation in the Glebe area. I hope that some of the connections formed through this work endure for many years to come.

Second, great thanks to my supervisors — Associate Professor Murray Lee, Professor Pat O’Malley (for a brief period prior to his retirement), and Adjunct Professor Duncan Chappell. Murray’s belief in the project from the very outset and his gentle guidance throughout ensured that the work continued at a steady pace, often despite numerous competing priorities. His mixture of good humour, support and advice made supervision sessions enjoyable — quite the feat. Duncan’s willingness to step in as an auxiliary supervisor was a great blessing. His vast knowledge, great patience (even when confronted with rambling responses to basic courtesies in the corridor) and encouragement have greatly aided my work on this project. Duncan’s body of work has also been an inspiration over many years.

A number of people have provided tutelage and mentoring throughout my career (which has suddenly stretched over 22 years), and they deserve great thanks. Dr John Howard, Dr Don Robertson, Jenny Bargen, Sally Doran, and Professor Peter Homel each receive special thanks for their intellectual stimulation, and for the example they’ve provided of how to work toward making people’s lives less violent, more just and more fulfilling. Emeritus Professor Terry Carney also deserves special mention. Among his many great achievements, Terry managed to squeeze in time to supervise my research project for the Masters of Criminology degree over a decade ago. His supervision taught me a great deal about organisation and project management. Thanks also to Dr Rohan Lulham, (soon-to-be Dr) Leanne Monchuk-Kelly, and (soon-to-be Dr) Daren Fisher — fantastic colleagues with whom I hope to collaborate (and be friends with) far into the future.

Finally, considerable thanks and significantly greater apologies are extended to my family for the long absences — Bev, Ken, Lisa, Lauren, Aidan, Kay and Barry, and extended family —
Robert, Jane, Lincoln, Kate, Jake, Grace, Shalie, and Millie. I have always cherished your encouragement of my unending education and have appreciated your patience in recent years. Thanks also to friends who showed what appeared to have been a real interest in my research — Scott, Flano, Gav. While my family and friends have tended to live without me in recent years, the one person who has had to live with me deserves the greatest acknowledgement. Nichole — you have endured prolonged and frequent monologues about what book I’d just read or new direction I was taking with great interest and encouragement; your love, support, and enthusiasm have sustained me throughout. With this done, better times await.

This thesis was reviewed for structure, grammar, syntax and tone, and proofread, by Melanie Eslick.
Abstract

There has been a growing focus on crime prevention in the criminological literature in recent decades. Despite this growing interest, much remains unknown. This is true at both the practical, applied level and the conceptual, theoretical level. This thesis extends our understanding of crime prevention on both levels.

This thesis comprehensively describes diverse methods of crime prevention operating in the Glebe postcode area (Sydney, Australia). This case study of the Glebe postcode area was developed to provide a looking glass into crime prevention practices. By having a narrow geographical focus for the research, it was possible to develop a deep understanding of the intricate networks and activities that directly and indirectly contribute to the prevention of crime in the area. Rarely has such close attention been paid to these dimensions of, and conditions and contexts for, crime prevention in Australia.

Description and analysis of wider policies and programs provide important context for this case study. Trends in local forms of crime prevention and state-wide (that is, New South Wales) developments place the case study in a historical and policy context. Analysis of these wider trends and forces reveals the similarities of the findings from the Glebe case study with these longer-term trends.

A number of findings emerged from this Glebe case study relevant to crime prevention policy and practice. Significantly, a plethora of activities and programs was identified that seek to prevent crime or contribute to the prevention of crime. By adopting a place-based analysis, it was possible to observe the layers of prevention operating in the area that other forms or scope of analysis risk missing. The limited previous capture of these crime prevention activities raises questions about what is known about prevention, the efficacy of a crime prevention evidence base, and subsequent theorising.

One reason that these activities might not be generally visible is the absence of evaluation. There was little evidence of rigorous evaluation of the diverse initiatives and programs operating in the area. This might be explained by the generally low commitment to evaluation in Australia (English et al 2002; Homel 2007) and by the nature of some of the crime prevention initiatives. Many of the crime prevention measures adopted are the responsibility of individual home owners, car manufacturers, businesses and institutions. Evaluation, in the traditional social science sense, is not likely to be a priority for these individuals and entities.
Moreover, many of the programs were embedded in human service systems. Isolating the impact of particular programs becomes difficult in this context (Hope 2005a). Calls for increased investment in evaluation, and especially approaches that are sensitive to ‘collective impacts’ (Kania & Kramer 2011, 2013), are supported by this research.

The observation that many of the local crime prevention activities are guided by, and aspire to, socially inclusive outcomes is significant. Rather than being exclusionary and constituting an extension of the ‘net of social control’ (Cohen 1985), much crime prevention activity is animated by social-welfare traditions. For a small number of Glebe residents, the ‘surveillance society’ (Lyon 2007) is a daily reality, with frequent bail checks, reporting regimes to criminal justice agencies and intrusions by state housing representatives. However, for the vast majority, crime prevention is a partial or the primary reason why day care, parenting support programs, alternative education classes, mentoring schemes, exercise programs and breakfast clubs exist. People are more likely to experience the caring face of crime prevention, rather than an impersonal ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000).

Analysis of crime data for the Glebe area over an 18-year period (1995–2012) revealed a dramatic decline in key volume (property) offences in the area from the late 1990s, and especially since 2007–08. This decline, generally consistent with trends in Sydney, New South Wales (NSW), Australia (Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b) and other jurisdictions (Zimring 2007; Farrell et al 2011; van Dijk et al 2012), provided a critical backdrop to the fieldwork. While difficult to prove, especially given the limited evaluation of local programs, it is highly likely that, based on research from elsewhere (see Skogan 2006; Farrell et al 2008; van Dijk et al 2012; Farrell 2013), these crime prevention measures have at least contributed to such declines at the local level.

Irrespective of whether a causal link can be established between particular initiatives and falls in crime, there was evidence that this local crime decline in Glebe has had direct impact on responses to crime. Some inter-agency crime prevention structures have been dismantled in recent years and it was decided by local actors during the research period that a new or revised local crime prevention plan was not necessary due to the significant falls in some crime categories. These developments generally appear contrary to some previous suggestions of the expansionary tendencies of crime prevention actors (Gilling 1997). Local actors also mentioned their fears of experiencing the ‘prevention paradox’ — program
funding being withdrawn as a consequence of falling crime. In this way, crime rates and crime prevention activities seemingly share a loose but important relationship.

The sharp and sustained decline in many crime types in the last 10 to 12 years and the findings emerging from this research suggest the need for the rethinking and reworking of some previous criminological propositions. In particular, this research cautions against easy adoption of the ‘grand narratives’ that suggest we are being ‘governed through crime’/‘fear of crime’/‘uncertainty’/‘antisocial behaviour’ (Simon 2007; Lee 2007; Ericson 2007; Crawford 2009a) in the ‘pursuit of security’ (Zedner 2009). The quiet dismantling of some crime prevention structures, the reduced focus on crime in inter-agency meetings, the anecdotal suggestion that people are less fearful following falls in crime, and the decision not to develop a new local crime prevention plan, all revealed by the Glebe case study, point to (admittedly early and partial) signs that crime is not the organising principle that it once was. The public housing ‘crisis’, child protection reforms, mental health initiatives, and new funding models for human services, amongst other issues, attracted considerably greater attention than crime during this research.

Claims about being ‘governed through crime’/‘fear of crime’/‘uncertainty’/‘antisocial behaviour’ (Simon 2007; Lee 2007; Ericson 2007; Crawford 2009a) and the role assumed by crime prevention in these governance processes look increasingly unstable during a time when other policy domains have taken centre stage and crime has fallen. Such developments should be a cause for optimism, if not celebration, and a salve for the dire predictions and commentaries commonly found in ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ (O’Malley 2000).
Chapter 1: Introduction

The Thesis

In recent decades, crime prevention has captured the imagination of policy makers, politicians and publics alike. Hughes (2007) refers to this as the 'preventive turn', while for Zedner (2007) it is consistent with a wider shift away from post-crime investigation, adjudication and punishment to a ‘pre-crime’ logic.

Despite this ‘preventive turn’ and the growth in the associated literature, O’Malley and Sutton (1997) note that crime prevention is ill-defined and Sherman et al suggest that ‘crime prevention is widely misunderstood’ (2002, p. 3). Definitional ambiguity continues to bedevil crime prevention. Numerous commentators (Jones 1956; Brantingham & Faust 1976; O’Malley & Sutton 1997; Gilling 1997; White 1997; Watts et al 2008) have highlighted the difficulties of settling on an agreed definition and establishing what the term ‘crime prevention’ does and does not entail. Few crime prevention programs or interventions are ever thoroughly evaluated (English et al 2002; Homel 2007; Morgan & Homel 2013), which limits what is known (and can be known) about crime prevention. Moreover, in the Australian context, it has been suggested that academic engagement with crime prevention has tended to be patchy and generally critical (Cameron & Laycock 2002). As important as it is to critically analyse crime prevention policies and programs, this focus has done little to illuminate the diverse nature of crime prevention activities and programs.

The Australian crime prevention literature that does exist can broadly be categorised as focusing on specific forms of crime prevention or on evaluations of government policies (often covering large regions or whole jurisdictions). Ross Homel (1997)¹ and Graham and Ross Homel (2008) provide an understanding of different approaches to preventing alcohol-related crime; Wells et al (2006) undertook a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of closed-circuit television (‘CCTV’); the National Crime Prevention (1999) publication Pathways to Prevention and the work of Ross Homel have been influential in the area of developmental crime prevention; and Wortley (2002) demonstrated examples of situational crime prevention measures used in prisons. These, and other important Australian studies,

¹ Given the significant individual contribution of Ross and Peter Homel to Australian crime prevention, and the potential confusion caused by referencing their individual work, full names are used at the outset. Surname and year of publication will then be used, unless there is a year in which publications for them both are referenced, in which case first name or initial will be included.
focus on single forms or techniques of crime prevention. Despite the utility of these studies and this work, they do not engage with various dimensions of crime prevention practice.

The second broad category is associated with evaluation of government crime prevention policies and programs. The Australian Institute of Criminology (‘AIC’) has evaluated existing state-based policies and the subsequent response of local government in implementing these policies (see Anderson & Peter Homel 2005; Anderson & Tresider 2008; Morgan & Peter Homel 2011). The AIC studies have been augmented by legislative reviews (see Masters et al 2001); analysis of the local governance arrangements associated with a state-based policy (see Cherney 2004a, 2004b); and a recent Parliamentary Inquiry into local crime prevention and the role of local government (Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee 2012), among others.

Invaluable as these studies and research are, they have generally failed to illuminate the density and diversity of crime prevention activities operating in a single area. They also fail to explore or explain the context in which these programs are developed or implemented, or the connections between interventions. Nor has there been much research into the contribution of diverse actors directly and indirectly engaged in crime prevention work. Illuminating these practices and arrangements, it is argued, will provide a deeper understanding of crime prevention practice, which has implications for policy and theory.

A significant motivation for undertaking this research is to contribute to the limited but growing Australian crime prevention literature and to fill some of these identified gaps. In attempting to address some of the existing gaps, this research operates on two levels. The first relates to practical and applied dimensions of crime prevention. Deep or ‘thick’ descriptions of local crime prevention activities in a case study site are provided and supporting structures considered. The second level is more conceptual and involves folding back these findings onto criminological ‘grand narratives’. In this way, the treatment of crime prevention by broader criminological theories is interrogated.

**Case Study**

A comprehensive case study of crime prevention in a postcode area in Sydney (Glebe) was developed. Local Government Area (‘LGA’) is the geographical marker that is often used for crime prevention planning (and other service delivery) purposes. In NSW, LGAs vary in size, but can range from 10 square kilometres to tens of thousands of square kilometres in rural areas. It is argued that the often vast areas covered by LGAs are too large for useful analysis
of crime and understanding of crime prevention activities, hence the smaller geographical reference adopted here. This case study site provides a looking glass into local crime prevention activities and programs, and a geographical reference for description and analysis of wider policies and programs that intersect with or contribute to local crime prevention efforts.

The Glebe postcode area, the case study site, covers 240 hectares (Solling 2007) or just over two square kilometres and sits about three kilometres west of the Sydney Central Business District. The area was selected because of the significant disparity in income and housing types in the area (see Bottrell 2009, Vinson & Rawsthorne 2013, and Chapter 5 for a discussion of these disparities), the presence of key crime generators and attractors (that is, shopping centre, large public housing estates, licensed premises), and the combination of significant transience (student, backpacker, and short-term accommodation) and residential stability. These characteristics provide important tensions and dynamics relevant to crime and its prevention in the area.

The close proximity of the case study site to the researcher’s workplace ensured maximum time was spent in the field. This was in part motivated by an attempt to counteract and overcome the litany of troubling ‘tales from the field’ (Bartels & Richards 2011) and barriers to conducting research identified in criminology research methods texts (Noaks & Wincup 2004; Westmarland 2011).

**Research Methods**

Grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss 1967), case study (Yin 1994; Flyvbjerg 2001 and ethnographic (Snow et al 2003) research traditions and methods informed the fieldwork conducted for this thesis. These research traditions and methods provided the opportunity for immersion in the crime prevention activities of the area; to become familiar with and to the relevant stakeholders; and to become sensitive to the narratives and discourses emanating from the local actors and actor networks. This resulted in developing ‘thick descriptions’ and understandings of crime prevention.

The fieldwork was guided by three key research questions: (1) what programs, interventions and technologies exist and operate in Glebe that conceivably contribute to crime prevention?; (2) what structures and policies support and enable these activities?; and (3) what processes operate to support crime prevention in the area? As is apparent from these questions, the research did not seek to evaluate the effectiveness of local crime prevention programs.
Moreover, the research questions and traditions informing this work were sufficiently broad to allow themes to emerge during the fieldwork period (mid-2013 to December 2013).

Specifically, the research methods adopted included:

- Physical familiarisation — in the spirit of Connell’s (2007, p. 206) arguments for ‘linking theory to the ground on which the theorist’s boots are planted’, considerable time was spent walking the streets of the case study area. This allowed routine activities, pedestrian traffic, and the adoption of security and crime prevention practices to be observed.
- Desktop reviews were conducted to gain an understanding of the history, social dynamics and service delivery systems operating in the case study area.
- Crime data analysis — crime data for the Glebe postcode area for an 18-year period (1995–2012) were analysed to identify key crime trends.
- Inter-agency observation — in excess of 30 inter-agency meetings, informal interviews, and community events in the case study area were observed and notes recorded. The notes from these meetings and events were subjected to basic discourse analysis to identify themes.
- Focus groups — two focus groups were conducted in mid-2013 with local stakeholders to discuss the need for a new local crime prevention plan.
- Interviews — 15 formal, semi-structured interviews with workers from various agencies in the area were conducted and digitally recorded. Analysis of the interview transcripts helped further build a picture of local crime prevention practices in the case study area.

Research Findings

A number of findings emerged from these research methods relevant to crime prevention policy and practice. These will be briefly summarised here, before considering some of the wider implications for criminological theorising.

Mapping and drawing together all of the programs, initiatives and technologies operating in the Glebe area with the direct intention or potential to indirectly prevent crime revealed a welter of crime prevention activities. The ubiquity and small-scale nature of many of these programs and interventions ensure a general invisibility. Without digging into very localised activities, it is likely that many of these programs and interventions would not be captured in
crime prevention and criminological literature. This is further exacerbated by the absence of formal evaluations of many of these programs.

The crime prevention programs and interventions operating in the area cover the gamut of crime prevention methods. Bars and grilles on residential premises were observed during periods spent physically traversing the area; CCTV operates in the local shopping centre; a breakfast club is provided before school to help children prepare for the day ahead; an alternative education program operates to help young people who have been ‘de-schooled’; police run an exercise program with local ‘at-risk’ young people three mornings per week. Many, many more programs, activities and technologies operate in the area to prevent crime.

One feature of the volume of crime prevention efforts not well addressed in previous research is the legacy of existing investments and interventions. What became obvious through the fieldwork was the layering of crime prevention methods over time. While some crime prevention programs are dynamic and require ongoing investment, others continue to contribute to local crime prevention years after being established. This is especially true of the security-related technologies and situational crime prevention measures. Residential security measures, the fence enclosing the local primary school, the significant investment made to upgrade street lighting and beautifying the main retail area, are examples of previous investments that have the potential to deliver ongoing crime prevention dividends over time.

Another infrequently observed phenomenon relates to the interaction between some of these seemingly disparate approaches. Attempts to establish crime prevention typologies contribute to a sense of competition between approaches (Sarre 1994). Money invested in security technologies limit funding available for measures to support ‘at-risk’ young people, or so the argument goes. While this is invariably at least partially true given that finite resources will only ever be available for crime prevention, this misses the integration of different crime prevention approaches. For example, the domestic violence refuge in the case study area uses an array of security technologies to reduce access to the premises and to monitor perimeter fences, while also delivering services to women and their children that seek to prevent future domestic violence. Countless examples abound that suggest a greater harmony between different approaches to crime prevention than might appear likely given the demarcation between approaches arising from crime prevention typologies.

Shaftoe (2004) discusses the ‘mainstreaming’ of crime prevention, whereby responsibility goes from more traditional criminal justice agencies to other agencies in which crime
prevention becomes embedded in their routine activities. There was evidence of this in the case study area and from the analysis of crime prevention initiatives in NSW. Various dimensions of crime prevention are routinely part of work by diverse government agencies, businesses, and community groups. This has important implications for the sustainability of crime prevention.

Interviews with local actors revealed the significant social-welfare explanations for crime and service delivery ethos. This is consistent with Brown’s (2012) observations from talking with frontline workers in Australian criminal justice agencies. Brown argues that ‘there are signs within criminology that life is being breathed back into social democratic and penal welfare concerns, habitus, and practices’ (2012, p. 78).

This orientation to socially progressive programs and services is consistent with the original forces that influenced the emergence of local crime prevention in NSW (and across Australia more broadly) and with other observations regarding crime prevention in Australia. For example, Sutton and Wilson (2004) observed that local government crime prevention practitioners are committed to community-based crime prevention, while Morgan et al noted that ‘the emphasis on a community-based approach has influenced the range of crime prevention strategies implemented in Australia over the past two decades’ (2011, p. 20). The current research suggests that community-based approaches continue to be dominant forms of crime prevention.

While focus is inevitably drawn to individual crime prevention programs and technologies, this misses the considerable good work that happens in the spaces between the programs and which supports and enables programs to operate. Staff longevity in the area, referral pathways, joint delivery of programs, and frequent inter-agency meetings mean that strong bonds have been forged between local service providers. Given the often intricate relationships between workers involved in local programs and the potentially complementary nature of various programs, there is considerable need to better understand the interrelationships and interdependencies of programs and services. It is in these webs of interaction and information exchange that possibilities exist for a range of services to be provided and results to be achieved. Failure to recognise the merits and contribution of these informal practices renders local service delivery merely the sum of its individual parts.

As has been suggested, there was evidence of strong inter-agency connections. These connections provide the foundations for much of the local work, whether it is focused on
crime prevention or other local issues. What was less evident was a heavily audit-driven, procedural approach to local crime prevention efforts. It appears that a more structured approach was previously found in the area in previous years. This, perhaps due to falls in crime in the area in recent years, no longer seems as necessary or pressing. In particular, there appeared to be limited access or use of crime data specific to the local area; few opportunities for problem-solving methodologies to be utilised and few specific inter-agency structures with a crime focus.

Perhaps unsurprisingly given previous findings in Australia (English et al 2002), there was little evidence of evaluations of local crime prevention efforts. This might be the result of limited funding, the way that many programs are embedded in a wider human service delivery framework, and limited capacities to undertake complex evaluations (Weatherburn 2004). The lack of evaluations has implications for the development of a crime prevention evidence base (Morgan & Homel 2013). In the absence of local evaluations, the growing evidence will be dominated by studies from elsewhere, with the likelihood that imported perspectives will influence policy decisions.

Thus, calls for more, and more sophisticated, evaluations are supported by this research. Data (often output data) is routinely captured by numerous agencies, but little in the way of outcome data appears to be routinely captured. Beyond the collation of this data, there is considerable need to better understand the inter-relationships and interdependencies of programs and services. Given the often intricate relationships between workers involved in local programs and the potentially complementary nature of various programs, any evaluations need to be sensitive to understanding and exploring these dimensions of practice. Evaluation of individual programs will add to the evidence base, but it will do little to reveal these relationships, referral pathways and cooperative arrangements that operate locally. It is in these webs of interaction and information exchange that possibilities exist for a range of services to be provided and results to be achieved. Failure to recognise the merits and contribution of these informal practices renders local service delivery merely the sum of its individual parts, rather than capturing the ‘collective impacts’ (see Kania & Kramer 2011, 2013) of these interventions.

A significant theme that emerged from analysis of local crime data was the fall in numerous (predominantly) property offence categories in the area in recent years. Despite the many limitations of crime statistics, the significant falls in key volume offences in the area has had
particular impacts on crime prevention efforts. There has been a dwindling of crime prevention inter-agency structures in recent years. Glebe really only has one operational crime-focused inter-agency group — the Community Safety Precinct Committee. The Community Drug Action Team is in hiatus, and previous calls for a local liquor accord did not result in the formation of a group due to the perceived lack of problems with alcohol-related crime in the area. Neighbourhood Watch is generally inoperable. Focus groups with local workers in 2013 to discuss the need for a new local crime prevention concluded that it was unnecessary due to falls in crime and the continued programs operating in the area. While these falls in crime were welcomed and anecdotal evidence provided about the impact that these falls have had on perceptions of the area, some concern was expressed by interviewees that funding would be cut in response to the lower crime. Concerns about this ‘prevention paradox’ not only related to reduced agency and program funding, but also the potential impact that it might have on future crime rates — cutting programs, it was feared, would result in increasing crime. Relatedly, crime as an organising principle has declined in recent years. Other policy domains, such as the public housing ‘crisis’, mental health, child protection, and changes to funding models for human service organisations in NSW garnered greater attention in inter-agency deliberations than crime. Crime is no longer the organising principle that it once was.

These key findings have implications for crime prevention practice and policy development. There is an obvious requirement for greater investment in evaluation of local crime prevention programs. Any such evaluations should seek to better understand the collective impacts and the supporting processes and structures that enable these programs to operate. Far too little attention is given to the factors outside of the formal programs that are crucial to area-wide responses to crime.

The lack of familiarity with existing crime data and some of the challenges posed in getting area-specific data should be addressed. While Jones and Weatherburn (2011) have documented some of the improvements made to crime data access in NSW in recent years, problems remain. As stated elsewhere (Clancy 2011) and supported by this research, meaningful area-specific data remains critical and hard to access. Crime data presented at this level will help agencies better understand localised crime trends and the impact, if any, of particular trends.
Implications for Criminology of Research Findings

Beyond findings pertaining to crime prevention policy and practice, the research findings have implications for the criminological literature and theorising. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive overview of the contemporary criminological literature, there are some themes that will be highlighted and compared against the findings from this research. In essence, the nub of the argument is that key ‘grand narratives’ cast crime prevention as being part of, or complicit in, being ‘governed through crime’/‘fear of crime’/‘uncertainty’/‘antisocial behaviour’ (Simon 2007; Lee 2007; Ericson 2007; Crawford 2009a) in the ‘pursuit of security’ (Zedner 2009). ‘Dismal’ depictions of crime prevention are integrated into dystopian discourses of ‘mass incarceration’, the ‘surveillance society’, and the fear and insecurity of late modern times. In this way, crime prevention becomes yet another exemplar of these broad trends to govern through crime/uncertainty/fear/antisocial behaviour. It is argued that these depictions over-state the punitive and controlling dimensions of crime prevention as it is mostly experienced and practised, and is consistent with what O’Malley (2000) has termed ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ or a ‘dismal criminology’, as suggested by Braithwaite (1992, 1998). Failure to grapple with the incidental, small-scale examples of crime prevention that are rarely visible in crime prevention or criminological literature skews the analysis of what crime prevention is. Moreover, some of these depictions were buttressed against inexorable increases in crime and the associated ‘law and order’ politics (Hogg & Brown 1998) of the latter part of last century.

In light of the widespread crime drop (van Dijk et al 2012), the findings from this research (that is, dismantling of some crime prevention infrastructure, decision not to develop a new crime prevention plan, crime being replaced by other social policy domains as the key themes for inter-agency discussions), the reliance on non-Australian developments, and Brown’s (2012) observation that life is being breathed back into penal-welfarism, there is mounting evidence that those elements of the ‘grand narratives’ that sweep crime prevention into their analyses require revision.

To get a flavour of the key features of this argument, a brief summary will be provided of dismal depictions of crime prevention, the ‘grand narratives’ and the tendencies of criminology to err toward dystopian depictions.

It has been suggested by Watts et al (2008) that crime prevention has dark origins. They suggest that the ‘eugenic impulse’ ‘played an important role in shaping approaches to crime prevention until the 1930s’ (2008, p. 153) and that ‘one of the first efforts to mobilise citizens
to engage in crime prevention was the exercise undertaken by the German Gestapo in the 1930s’ (2008, p. 157). These sinister origins are not just historical. Borch (2005) levels similarly provocative claims at contemporary crime prevention:

[I]n the name of prevention, ever-new social and material technologies are invented to regulate the life of ordinary citizens ... the rationality of crime prevention amounts to an almost totalitarian biopolitical strategy, as it focuses on virtually all dimensions of life: our health, the way we live, our identities, how we play, the way we move, our relations to neighbours, etc (2005, p. 91).

These views chime with elements of ‘grand narratives’ emerging in recent years that suggest we are ‘governed through crime’/‘fear of crime’/‘uncertainty’/‘antisocial behaviour’ (Simon 2007; Lee 2007; Ericson 2007; Crawford 2009a) in the ‘pursuit of security’ (Zedner 2009). While these ‘grand narratives’ draw on diverse examples and impulses to construct their arguments, it is noteworthy that crime prevention features as a strand of the overall movement to being governed through crime/uncertainty/fear and antisocial behaviour (among others). While each of these narratives is premised on different empirical data, and conceptual and theoretical analyses, each casts crime prevention in a particular light. For example, Simon (2007) states that:

As other institutions, from preschools through colleges, ratchet up the significance of behaviour they deem criminal or crimelike, governing the crime risk of one’s children has become a major concern for parents in all social classes. For those with sufficient economic means, the new initiatives to police the family are simply the other side of the new social contract they have consented to by living in gated communities, sending their children to high-security schools, and shopping in high-security malls. For these parents, the policing of the family is likely to be delegated to the same kind of professional security-oriented services that already manage so much of the lived environment (Simon, 2007, p. 200).

Simon, predominantly speaking about the situation in the United States (‘US’), argues that crime has become an organising principle shaping diverse features of contemporary life. Private security, gated communities, ‘mass private space’ (Shearing & Stenning 1983), and

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2 Chapter 12 will cover critical perspectives more thoroughly.
surveillance of children and young people are symptoms of a society inherently shaped by crime and efforts to control, prevent and manage it.

Ericson (2007), drawing on examples as diverse as the treatment of the unemployed to responses to terrorism, contends that ‘the family, community associations, schools, healthcare, welfare, business enterprise, and insurance — has a distinctive approach to criminalisation based on its own private justice system and mobilisation of the surveillant assemblage’ (2007, p. 2). Multiple organisations are complicit in, and contribute to, ‘surveillant assemblages’ that have grown up in the ‘age of uncertainty’.

Lee (2007) argues, among other things, that fear of crime (a theme of both Simon and Ericson’s work) is a catalyst for the proliferation of various industries (that is, private security) and products (that is, residential security) in recent decades. Specifically linking fear of crime to crime prevention, Lee argues that ‘fear of crime is a major concern of contemporary crime prevention strategies and programmes’ (2007, p. 141).

Crawford (2009a) charts recent developments in antisocial behaviour policies in the United Kingdom (‘UK’). He argues that ‘as a policy domain through which low-level crime, incivility and disorder are governed, the focus on ASB [antisocial behaviour] fulfils a number of wider strategic governmental objectives. It serves as a precursor to crime promoting pre-emption and prevention’ (2009, p. 816). In this way, crime prevention becomes equated with the proliferation of regimes and structures focused on addressing ‘antisocial behaviour’.

While these ‘grand narratives’ have separately, and together, made important contributions to the criminological canon, it is argued that their treatment of crime prevention is partially flawed. Some of the examples used to buttress these arguments are based on outdated initiatives (such as Neighbourhood Watch); some examples are more particular to jurisdictions that have little relevance to Australia (see, for example, Sutton & Wilson’s (2004) comments about Australia being slow to adopt public space CCTV systems or Martin’s (2011) views about Australia not having enthusiastically embraced the antisocial behaviour ‘movement’); and the strong social-welfare traditions of Australian crime prevention are rarely acknowledged.

This should not be read as an outright rejection of critical perspectives. Commentary and analyses of this kind provide a crucial reminder of the negative consequences of benign intentions. These insights and commentaries are critical for reflexive and ethical crime
prevention practices and policies. Rather, it is a question of emphasis. Partial engagement with crime prevention through isolating and highlighting particular approaches without engaging with crime prevention in its broad messiness renders any such analysis partial.

In this context, understanding ‘criminology’s dirty little secret’ (Farrell et al 2008) — the recent crime decline — and better understanding the contribution of crime prevention (if any) to this decline might best fit with a ‘utopian realist criminology’ (Loader 1998) that seeks to be both ‘in’ and ‘against’ criminology (Loader 1998, p. 205). Such an approach might integrate aspects of a ‘positive criminology’ (Ronel & Elisha 2011), which would focus more on desistance and prevention, than deviance and recidivism. Adoption of strength and asset-based approaches more common in other disciplines (Green & Haines 2008) should also be integrated into this ‘utopian realist criminology’ that celebrates positive developments, grapples with pragmatic, normative and applied considerations, and adopts a critical, reflexivity grounded in a deep familiarity with diverse practices and theories.

In this way, understanding what crime prevention is has the potential to not only impact on crime prevention policies and practices, but to also contribute to a revision of aspects of the discipline of criminology.

**Thesis Structure**

Before providing an overview of the content of each of the chapters in this thesis, a brief comment on style will be made. Christie observed that:

> [s]o little of the sociology I am fond of needs technical terms and ornate sentences. I write with my ‘favourite aunts’ in mind, fantasy figures of ordinary people, sufficiently fond of me to give the text a try, but not to the extent of using terms and sentences made complicated to look scientific (1994, p. 18).

I too have written with my ‘favourite aunts’ in mind.

Quotes from interviewees and focus group participants are used frequently in various chapters. Giving voice to the views of local actors was an objective of this research. Consequently, a number of chapters (5, 7 and 8 in particular) liberally use quotes from local actors gathered during fieldwork.

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3 In this context, ‘positive criminology’ refers to a more optimistic criminology, rather than a positivist criminology as might be traditionally inferred.
Chapter 2: Definitions and Typologies of Crime Prevention

The second chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of definitions and models of crime prevention. Given the plethora of definitions and the inexact nature of what is encapsulated by the term ‘crime prevention’, there continues to be considerable debate about the efficacy of it and related terms, such as ‘community safety’ or ‘security’. Some limitations of existing definitions are highlighted, demonstrating the challenges of defining ‘crime prevention’.

Different crime prevention typologies have been put forward by numerous theorists. Brantingham and Faust (1976), drawing on the public health model, differentiate crime prevention programs into three categories: primary, secondary and tertiary. Tonry and Farrington (1995) suggest four key models: law enforcement, developmental, community, and situational prevention. These models are briefly described, before a more detailed overview is provided of a slightly modified version of the Tonry and Farrington model. This helps to demonstrate the breadth of programs and activities operating at the micro, meso and macro levels of crime prevention.

Despite the utility of these models, it is argued that they contribute to the establishment of a false competition between particular approaches (Sarre 1994). The tendency to slice crime prevention into particular approaches also suggests a rigidity that, it will be shown, is not reflected in practice. Individual programs can (and do) routinely integrate different approaches and pursue multiple outcomes.

Chapter 3: The (Re-)Emergence of Crime Prevention

There is some debate about when crime prevention, as a science, commenced. Broadly, some draw links to pre-modern developments, whereas others are of the view that crime prevention is a thoroughly modern pursuit. A brief review of the arguments from both perspectives will be presented before turning to the substantive objective of this chapter — to chart the re-emergence of crime prevention in the latter part of last century. The debates associated with the re-emergence of crime prevention from the 1980s are considered in some detail. The context of rising crime rates, the acknowledged limits of the sovereign state (and the criminal justice agencies) to stop these increases, the emergence of victimology, the rise of neoliberalism and managerialism, the success of the public health model, and the trends embracing local service delivery are some of the themes reviewed that are relevant to the prominence of crime prevention in this period.
Charting the re-emergence of crime prevention in the latter part of the 20th century helps contextualise crime prevention practices and approaches. It also begins to introduce the basis for some of the criticisms that have been levelled at the crime prevention ‘movement’. Some of these criticisms are more fully explored in Chapter 12.

**Chapter 4: Methodology**

A number of research methods were employed to respond to the research questions, and to build a picture of crime prevention in Glebe and NSW more broadly. Desktop reviews, documentation analysis, crime data analysis, physical familiarisation with the area, attendance at inter-agency meetings, informal meetings, semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted to gather diverse perspectives and understandings of crime prevention in Glebe and NSW. The capture, analysis and synthesis of information from these different sources provided a form of triangulation and allowed the building, slowly of a grounded, deep understanding of contemporary crime prevention practices, in the context of local Glebe and broader NSW structures.

Despite the merits of these approaches to probe the various research questions, there are limitations to the methods adopted. Some important prospective interviewees declined invitations to participate in the research, resulting in some gaps in data. Although attendance by representatives from some of the agencies at inter-agency meetings partially addressed these gaps in knowledge caused by the non-participation of these agencies/actors, this remains a limitation of the research. Moreover, accessing all desirable information was not possible. Invariably some documentation was not accessible, limiting the opportunity to review all necessary material. Finally, case studies have been criticised for their limited relevance to other geographical areas. While agreeing with Flyvbjerg’s (2001) rejection of these arguments, the information in Chapters 9 and 10 position the case study material in sufficient context to at least partially, if not completely, overcome the perceived limitations of case studies.

**Chapter 5: An Overview of Glebe**

A brief socio-historical depiction of Glebe is provided in Chapter 5. An understanding of some of the historical, topographical and socio-economic characteristics of the area provides important context for the subsequent chapters. By demonstrating the strong historical Indigenous links to the area, the significant role of the church, the divided class history, and particular topographical features that influenced the settlement of Glebe, it is possible to
reinforce the importance of local context to an understanding of crime and its prevention. A small number of strengths of the area are also highlighted, some of which demonstrate its unique qualities. This stresses the importance of understanding local conditions — as each area has its own history, topography, service system, strengths and gaps that will shape local crime patterns and crime prevention responses — which are often overlooked or minimised by some (Weatherburn 2004).

Chapter 6: Crime Trends in Glebe
Crime data for key volume offences in Glebe for an 18-year period are presented in Chapter 6. These data provide an important context for understanding current crime prevention practices and highlight the significant decline in key volume offences (predominantly property offences) since the year 2000. The crime data also reveal an upward spike in 2007–08, followed by a sustained drop in key crime types since 2008. These falls have resulted in unprecedented low levels of crime, which have had some impact on local practices. The first was the decision not to renew the *Glebe Community Safety Plan*, because a new plan was considered unnecessary given the current low levels of crime. A second impact was the cessation of various inter-agency groups previously focused on crime or related issues. A third impact relates to the prevention paradox — the removal of prevention resources following falls in crime. There is a general concern that low crime rates will result in the withdrawal of some local resources. The development of the *Community Safety Plan* when crime increased and the agreed lack of need for renewal of the plan now that crime is at historical lows suggest that crime (and its prevention) might not be receiving the same political attention as it once did.

Chapter 7: Crime Prevention Programs and Activities in Glebe
This chapter adopts a 24-hour clock to showcase the plethora of crime prevention programs and activities in the Glebe postcode area. This device confirms the wide array of programs and activities that have direct and indirect crime prevention objectives. Drawing them together in this fashion highlights how many programs operate in a complementary, not competitive, manner. It also demonstrates that the orientation of many of these programs and activities could be described as socially inclusive and more consistent with a social-welfare or community development approach than a controlling or exclusionary orientation, as is depicted in some crime prevention and criminological literature.
Chapter 8: Crime Prevention Practices in Glebe

Chapter 8 explores some of the dimensions of how crime prevention is practised in Glebe. Having listed the many programs and services with direct and indirect crime prevention intentions and outcomes in Chapter 7, this chapter looks at the inter-agency structures, coordinated planning measures, and philosophy of the different adopted approaches. Heavily influenced by the findings emerging from the semi-structured interviews and attendance at inter-agency meetings, this chapter suggests that crime prevention is not a particularly strong focus for much of the work in the area. In fact, there are very few inter-agency structures established to focus on crime and its prevention, crime data are not routinely accessed by local community agencies, and a number of crucial inter-agency partners (including those from the criminal justice system and key government agencies — not including police) were generally absent from inter-agency meetings and discussions. This less coordinated, data- and audit-driven approach is in stark contrast to much of the evidence as reported in the literature coming out of the UK, for example, where there has been a significant investment in crime prevention in recent decades (see Crawford 1997; Gilling 1997; Tilley 2002; Hughes 2002, 2007; Homel et al 2004). Rather, the lack of a clear crime prevention industry depicted in Glebe raises questions about efficiency of practices, as well as the merits of not having a narrowly defined understanding of crime. Given the influence of community-based programs and actors that position crime causation within wider socio-economic causes, it is possible that the more narrowly defined and controlling tendencies often linked with crime prevention practice in other jurisdictions are not as prevalent in Glebe (or other parts of NSW and Australia). While some residents of Glebe are closely governed and routinely experience the ‘surveillance society’ (Lyon 2007), or ‘liquid surveillance’ as Bauman and Lyon (2013) describe it, the majority of crime prevention activities seek to address social welfare needs.

Chapter 9: A Partial History of Localised Crime Prevention

Chapter 9 discusses some of the critical actors and policy developments leading to the adoption of localised forms of crime prevention in NSW. Local developments, including the mounting pressure to adopt a crime prevention framework achieved through a series of reports and inquiries, such as the Kids in Justice Report in 1990, the Inquiry into the NSW Juvenile Justice System in 1991 and the subsequent Green and White Papers on juvenile justice in 1993 and 1994, are some of the forces, it is argued, that have shaped local prevention arrangements in NSW. Specifically, this chapter shows how competing forces of
subsidiarity and centralisation have, at different times, influenced local crime prevention practices in NSW.

This chapter provides important context for the Glebe case study. Clearly, the programs and practices operating in Glebe have been shaped and are positioned within wider contexts. The important role assumed by local government in the emergence of localised forms of crime prevention in NSW is especially pertinent to contemporary practices in Glebe. Moreover, the strong community development tendencies running through the emergence of localised crime prevention practices in NSW very much resonate with current Glebe programs. This linking of crime prevention with a community development ethos, it will be argued, is a distinctive characteristic of the programs and activities both in Glebe and, more broadly, in NSW. Despite the potential limitations of such an orientation (including the generally poor evaluation outcomes of community crime prevention programs, as noted by Homel 2007), there are various benefits that appear to accrue from this approach, including the ability of this ethos to challenge more narrowly defined, criminal justice methods of preventing crime and to challenge the ‘law and order’ hegemony.

Chapter 10: NSW Government Programs and Policies

This chapter seeks to broaden the analysis, ensuring that what was observed in Glebe is positioned within a wider context. In this way, Glebe begins to slip away from view, while the key findings emerging from the area are connected with wider experiences and patterns in NSW. This is achieved by unearthing crime prevention programs and practices that are now routinely embedded in the work of various (predominantly) NSW government agencies. While crime prevention is most often associated with the work of police, crime prevention bureaus and even local government, there is a profusion of programs and policies that sit with education, health, housing, child protection, urban planning, and other NSW government agencies. These policies and programs often have considerably greater potential for significant impact, given their large budgets and wide reach. Consequently, any consideration of crime prevention must include consideration of these programs and policies.

By listing and describing these programs and policies operating in NSW in recent years that are directly and indirectly relevant to crime prevention, it will be demonstrated that crime prevention has been ‘mainstreamed’ (Shaftoe 2004). They are now somewhat routinely delivered by government agencies, which has implications for minimising stigmatisation and
labelling that might arise if these programs were the responsibility of specific crime prevention or law enforcement agencies.

Chapter 11: Findings and Implications for Crime Prevention Practice and Policy

This chapter completes the first overall task of this thesis by pulling together the findings from the detailed case study and the desktop analysis of the policies and programs operating in NSW more broadly. In so doing, this chapter takes stock of the material covered in the preceding chapters. In addition to this summary, a number of recommendations are made in relation to crime prevention practice and policy.

Chapter 12: Criminology — Critical Perspectives and ‘Grand Narratives’

The (re-)emergence of crime prevention has not been welcomed by all. There have been numerous and sustained criticisms of crime prevention. Some criticisms closely relate to particular models and methods, while others reflect wider concerns about the impact of crime prevention on the discipline of criminology. A number of key criticisms are reviewed in Chapter 12. Given the ethical, moral and political dimensions of crime prevention, it is important to consider the potential negative unintended consequences and the wider implications of the move to embrace prevention. In the context of the thesis, it is also beneficial to understand these critical perspectives and to compare them with the programs and practices that are documented in Chapters 8 to 11. While critical narratives are necessary and important, it will be argued and shown that they are often overstated.

The broad findings of this research suggest that although they are important, ‘grand theories’ should be held to account for nuanced, particular local practices. Similarly, the tendency to treat the experiences of the northern metropoles as universal should be challenged (Connell 2007), as should the ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ (O’Malley 2000) and the dismal tendencies of criminology (Braithwaite 1992, 1998; Zedner 2012). The ‘socialisation of crime policy’, ‘crime prevention through reassurance’ and ‘cultures of care’ might well be more apt descriptions than dismal monikers. Being open to more positive realities and practices is especially important given the dramatic and sustained crime decline across many countries (van Dijk et al 2012). Accepting that something has positively impacted on crime rates and that crime might be losing some of its potency as an organising principle should be welcomed, even if the criminological gaze continues to find new abuses of power and frontiers to rail against. Given the limitations of ‘dismal’ criminology’s attempts to explain the crime decline and the significance of other disciplinary perspectives in understanding
crime prevention, it might be necessary to look beyond criminology to better understand crime prevention within wider human service, public policy and strengths-based models. A ‘utopian realist criminology’ (Loader 1998) provides an appropriately balanced approach to theorising and grappling with both applied and critical concepts. It is argued that this provides a more appropriate approach to integrating crime prevention practice and policies into the wider criminological enterprise than the narrow ‘dismal’ depictions of some ‘grand narratives’.

Through this commentary, the research findings from the case study and wider analysis are used to interrogate critical perspectives, hence achieving the second main task of this thesis.

**Chapter 13: Conclusion**

The final chapter briefly summarises the rationale for the research, the research questions and methods, and the major research findings. This short chapter ties together all of the findings and insights generated from this research and analysis.
Chapter 2: Definitions and Typologies of Crime Prevention

At the outset, it is important to canvass some of the many definitions of crime prevention that have been proposed. This task is frustrated somewhat by the high level of disagreement in the literature on what might be usefully categorised as crime prevention. After reviewing the challenges of defining crime prevention and some of the more widely used definitions, discussion of crime prevention typologies will be provided. This will indicate the diversity of activities captured under the banner of crime prevention. Such diversity of crime prevention activities problematises simple pronouncements about the nature and state of crime prevention.

Defining Crime Prevention

A consistent challenge when discussing ‘crime prevention’ is quarantining what is actually captured by the term and concept. As has been noted by numerous authors, defining crime prevention is beset with numerous issues because, ‘[i]n practice, the term “prevention” seems to be applied confusingly to a wide array of contradictory activities’ (Brantingham & Faust 1976, p. 284). Jones stated that the ‘prevention of crime … remains an enormous topic. Possible preventive measures are as numerous as possible causal factors’ (1956, p. 272). Homel observed that:

When one examines what could be described as ‘crime prevention’ in most developed countries one finds a bewildering array of activities and programs. Exactly how bewildering the analysis depends on where one draws the line in terms of what counts as ‘crime prevention’ and what does not (2007, p. 267).

O’Malley and Sutton observed that ‘crime prevention ... is ill-defined’ (1997, p. 3), a view shared by White (1997a, p. 169), who suggested that ‘crime prevention is one of those ubiquitous terms that increasingly is being used in criminology and within the various criminal justice systems to mean just about everything and anything’. Crawford has argued that ‘[c]rime prevention is … ill-defined. Its boundaries, terms of reference and defining characteristics are all the subject of debate and contention … crime prevention has produced a profusion of terms, concepts and approaches with their own lexicon’ (1998, p. 3). Gilling (1997, p. xi) suggested that ‘crime prevention is a difficult beast to tame’. Perhaps more provocatively, Watts et al liken crime prevention to lush undergrowth of competing definitions and ideas:
Traversing the landscape of crime prevention can seem rather like hacking through the dense undergrowth of an Amazonian rainforest. This is not simply because the history of crime control seems to be so murky. It also has much to do with the proliferation of competing definitions, typologies and political meanings associated with the idea of crime prevention which has the kind of lushness associated with tropical plant growth ... There is a plethora of ideas about crime prevention (2008, p. 150).

This is compounded further by the use of synonyms: ‘The concepts of “crime prevention” and “community safety” are seldom defined very clearly.⁴ Definitions are either tautological or they just describe the kind of measures they relate to’ (van Swaaningen 2002, p. 261). Stenson (2002, p. 112) agrees: ‘This term [community safety] is notoriously slippery and resists precise definition since it is used and applied at local levels in a variety of ways’.

It is little wonder then, that Sherman et al suggest that ‘crime prevention is widely misunderstood’ (2002, p. 3).

To demonstrate the difficulty of defining the term, it is useful to consider a frequently cited definition: ‘[C]rime prevention is defined as the total of all private initiatives and state policies, other than the enforcement of criminal law, aimed at the reduction of damage caused by acts defined as criminal by the state’ (van Dijk & de Waard 1991, p. 483). This definition is not without its critics. O’Malley and Sutton (1997, p. 3) note that it is ‘more a statement of intention ... than delineation of a specific philosophy’. By excluding the enforcement of the criminal law, van Dijk and de Waard dismiss the preventive capacity of criminal justice agencies, institutions and programs. Given the proliferation in recent times of policing models (for example, problem-oriented policing, zero tolerance policing, third party policing, intelligence-led policing) and criminal justice interventions (for example, actuarial risk assessment, Risk-Needs-Responsivity model, therapeutic jurisprudence, drug courts, diversionary interventions) that have clear preventive goals, this would seem unwise.

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⁴ Other terms like ‘security’, ‘policing’, and ‘urban safety’ are also utilised in discussions about or relevant to crime prevention. For example, Johnston and Shearing (2003) discuss Neighbourhood Watch in the context of security, while others (such as Bennett 1989 and Lab 2010) include Neighbourhood Watch as a form of crime prevention. This further problematises definitions of crime prevention and raises tensions throughout this thesis in relation to what activities, technologies, programs and techniques can rightfully be included under the banner of crime prevention.
The definition also suffers by only including initiatives and policies ‘aimed at the reduction’ of crime. Challinger (1992) points to ‘serendipitous’ crime prevention, while Knepper (2007) describes various social interventions and policies that had positive unintended consequences of preventing crime. Programs designed to mobilise young people in nation-building activities after World Wars I and II, for example, had the desirable effect of providing employment and engagement in meaningful activities. A positive unintended consequence was the prevention of crime. Given that this could be true for many policies and programs, it becomes even harder to define ‘crime prevention’ merely by intentions.

**Why Definition Matters**

It might be self-evident, but it is worth reviewing why definition matters. As has been illustrated, there is little consensus about what crime prevention actually is and what activities might actually be labelled as crime prevention. At a practical level, this might be relatively unimportant. The volume of programs and activities claiming to prevent crime operate irrespective of the definitional ambiguities. The success or otherwise of these programs and activities will not be adversely affected by academic debates about definitions.

Conversely, there are significant potential repercussions associated with the absence of an agreed definition, especially at the conceptual and political levels. Without an agreed understanding of what might be crime prevention, there are possibilities for perspectives to be developed based on radically different understandings of what is and is not included. By way of example, it would be generally accepted that an accommodation service designed to enable victims of domestic violence to leave a violent situation would be considered a crime prevention activity. However, there would probably be less agreement as to whether a remedial reading class in a primary school was considered to be such. The physical redesign of an airport to restrict access to secure areas might not be considered when crime prevention is being debated.

Given the diversity of policies, programs and activities that aim to prevent crime, there is ample opportunity for particular examples to be used to justify certain views of crime prevention. It could be argued that crime prevention is an exclusionary pursuit that seeks to identify, classify and exclude those with ‘criminal tendencies’. The electronic monitoring of offenders, use of public space CCTV with visual facial recognition, programs for ‘at-risk’ young people, and stringent tenancy management regimes of public housing authorities could all be selected to inform or justify this particular analysis.
Alternatively, a sympathetic analysis might highlight harm minimisation policies operating to assist people using alcohol and other drugs or civil society involvement in resettlement programs post-release from prison. Universal visitation programs with all new parents, and greater availability of mental health services might also be justified by the potential for crime prevention outcomes. By focusing on these more benign interventions or programs, it is possible to arrive at a different perspective about crime prevention (these arguments will be revisited in detail in Chapter 12).

This definitional ambiguity can, therefore, make it difficult to know what is being considered when crime prevention is being discussed or invoked. This can have consequences regarding the perception of crime prevention, the likelihood of it being adopted, and its political purchase. Being cast in an unduly negative or positive light misses the inherent complexities, diversities and possibilities.

**Crime Prevention Typologies**

Perhaps reflecting the aforementioned challenges of defining crime prevention, various attempts have been made to develop crime prevention typologies. These typologies seek to corral the multitude of potential programs, initiatives and techniques into like groups.

One of the first, and most influential, typologies was developed by Brantingham and Faust (1976). Borrowing from the public health paradigm, their approach advocated three tiers: primary, secondary and tertiary prevention:

*Primary* crime prevention identifies conditions of the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts. Here the objective of intervention is to alter those conditions so that crimes cannot occur. *Secondary* crime prevention engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene in their lives in such a way that they never commit criminal violation. *Tertiary* crime prevention deals with actual offenders and involves intervention in their lives in such a fashion that they will not commit further offenses (1976, p. 290).

Tonry and Farrington offer an alternative typology, which differentiates between four models of crime prevention: ‘law enforcement, and developmental, community, and situational prevention’ (1995, pp. 1–2). A slightly modified version of the Tonry and Farrington typology will be used here to more deeply explore what crime prevention encompasses. The minor modifications include provision of an overview of crime prevention through
environmental design (‘CPTED’). Rather than merely seeing it as a sub-set of situational crime prevention, the increasingly widespread adoption of CPTED justifies specific attention. A further minor modification includes the expansion of community crime prevention to include social crime prevention.

**Criminal Justice Crime Prevention**

Criminal justice crime prevention:

> deals with offending after it has happened, and involves intervention in the lives of known offenders in such a fashion that they will not commit further offences. In so far as it is preventative, it operates through incapacitation and individual deterrence, and perhaps offers the opportunity of treatment in prisons or through other sentencing options (Cameron & Laycock 2002, p. 314).

This definition highlights the importance of courts and corrections (including prisons and community corrections) in forestalling or preventing future offending. It speaks to staple criminological and criminal law concepts, such as incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restoration.

Summarising the contours and developments of all features of criminal justice crime prevention is beyond the scope of this thesis. With an extensive history and a rash of recent developments, it is not possible to do justice to the breadth of the institutions and programs that may be linked to criminal justice crime prevention. Only broad (generally recent) trends within and across these criminal justice institutions and policies will be considered here.

**Policing for Prevention**

There is some debate about the effectiveness of police\(^5\) in preventing crime; some are doubtful about the ability of police to prevent crime, while others are more sanguine. A little of both sides of the argument will be presented here.

It was generally argued in the 1990s that police had little ability to prevent crime:

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\(^5\) In this instance, ‘police’ refers to state policing practices. Consideration will be given to private police later in this thesis. While it is acknowledged that such a clear demarcation between public and private police does not accurately reflect the ‘mixed economy of policing’ (Johnston 1992), this distinction aids the following discussion.
The police do not prevent crime … the police pretend that they are society’s best defense against crime and continually argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be able to protect communities against crime. This is a myth (Bayley 1994, p. 3).

Crime is, for the most part, outside of the control of the police … Crime trends across all societies appear to move up and down regardless of the financial commitment of governments to support police demands and to supply the hardware and personnel resources they say they need. Experts have long acknowledged that simply injecting more resources into law enforcement has a negligible effect upon crime rates (Sarre 1997, pp. 65–6).

Climbing crime rates, despite increasing police numbers and mounting police budgets, did little to inspire any faith that police could prevent crime.6

However, this position has been increasingly challenged in recent years: ‘It is now becoming clear that Bayley’s (1994) view that the ‘police do not prevent crime’ and that ‘the primary strategies adopted by modern police have been shown to have little or no effect on crime is no longer entirely accurate’ (Mazerolle et al 2011, p. 128).

Specifically, Sherman and Eck have suggested that particular focused policing activities can be effective in preventing crime: ‘[T]here appear to be substantial results from focusing scarce arrest resources on high-risk people … Overall, proactive arrests may be effective at preventing crime when they are directed at repeat offenders and when used to reduce drunk driving fatalities’ (Sherman & Eck 2002, pp. 312–5).

While, for some, doubt lingers, there has been a proliferation of policing models that reflect a renewed faith in police capabilities to prevent crime. These emergent models of policing move away from random patrolling to targeted analysis of crime data, engagement of external stakeholders with prevention capacity and reach, and targeted deployment of policing

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6 Chapter 3 will deal specifically with the significant increases in crime in the latter half of last century and the associated increases in police numbers in major jurisdictions.
resources. Some of the policing models adopting these principles include problem-oriented policing, zero tolerance policing, third party policing, and intelligence-led policing.7

**Problem-Oriented Policing**

Herman Goldstein is generally regarded as the architect of problem-oriented policing (‘POP’). In a seminal article in 1979, Goldstein outlined his concerns regarding the ‘means over ends’ syndrome, which he thought was a feature of contemporary policing. He suggested that there was an undue focus on organisational issues, rather than on the outcomes of policing. Police, in his opinion, had to deal with ‘the residual problems of society’.

To ensure a more responsive policing, Goldstein suggested that problems should be defined with much greater specificity; that effort needed to be invested in researching the problem (rather than simply repeatedly responding to calls for service); that alternative solutions should be considered (including physical technical changes, changes in the provision of government services, developing new community resources, increased use of city ordinances, and improved use of zoning); and that implementation should be carefully managed (Goldstein 1979, pp. 244–58). Ultimately, this led to the development of the SARA model (scanning–analysis–response–assessment) (Eck & Spelman 1987), which is now widely adopted by many policing agencies. This model, and Goldstein’s focus on understanding recurring problems confronting police, the analysis of data, engagement with key stakeholders, and evaluation of the impact of POP interventions, reflects the transition away from community-based policing, with its emphasis on community engagement and building legitimacy with local policing communities, toward more targeted forms of policing.

This approach to policing has been influential. Various police forces have adopted features of POP (see Bullock et al 2006 for some examples), and the establishment of the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing and the Goldstein Awards reflect some of the interest and influence in this approach.8

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7 What follows is a very brief uncritical review of some contemporary policing approaches that re-establish police as preventers of crime. There has been much criticism of crime prevention and the police role within it that is not included here. Chapter 12 will canvass some of the broader criticisms of crime prevention.

8 Information about the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing and the Goldstein Awards can be found at http://www.popcenter.org/goldstein/. Note that, due to a lack of funding, there are no awards in 2014.
Zero Tolerance Policing

Zero tolerance policing (‘ZTP’) rests heavily on the ‘broken windows thesis’. This thesis suggests that ‘serious crime flourishes in areas in which disorderly behaviour goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window’ (Wilson & Kelling 1982, p. 34) and requires police to ‘reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control’ (Wilson & Kelling 1982, p. 35). Police are required to negotiate the rules of the street, which will differ depending on the neighbourhood. Because problems emerge from large numbers of disorderly persons congregating, and disorder perpetuates fear, police are to crack down on ‘lifestyle and quality of life misdemeanours’. Compared to the previous ‘tolerance’ of low-level offending, zero tolerance policing requires sanction for fare evasion, loitering, urinating in public, begging, and homelessness. By adopting a strict enforcement regime, it is argued, local informal control measures will be allowed to re-emerge and flourish, and order will be maintained. More serious crimes will then be averted as minor crime left unchecked will escalate.

A significant feature of the adoption of ZTP (in New York), was the development of COMPSTAT. COMPSTAT is a management strategy designed to reduce, prevent and control crime, originated in New York City in 1994 under then Police Commissioner William Bratton. At the core of the approach are four crime reduction principles:

(1) accurate and timely intelligence about crime made available at all levels in the organization, (2) selection of the most effective tactics for specific problems, (3) rapid deployment of people and resources to implement those tactics, and (4) ‘relentless’ follow-up and assessment to learn what happened and make subsequent tactical adjustments as necessary (Mazerolle et al 2011, p. 129).

Thus, COMPSTAT placed a heavy emphasis on crime data analysis and responding swiftly to emerging issues. The management of crime problems was also delegated to relevant police personnel, ensuring that local dimensions of crime were well understood by police working particular geographical areas.

Zero tolerance policing has significantly influenced not only policing and crime control, but also other forms of governmental activity. Newburn and Jones (2007) have charted the rise in the use of the term ‘zero tolerance’ in a variety of policy domains, analysed why ZTP become popular, and revealed the influence of aspects of ZTP on various jurisdictions.
**Third Party Policing**

Third party policing is defined as ‘police efforts to persuade or coerce organisations or non-offending persons … to take some responsibility for preventing crime or reducing problems’ (Mazerolle & Ransley 2005, p. 2). These agencies might include public housing agencies, property owners, parents, health and building inspectors, and business owners (among others). In working with these agencies, police employ civil, criminal and regulatory powers to encourage, engage or cajole third parties into taking some control and responsibility (Mazerolle & Ransley 2005).

Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) suggest that third party policing initiatives have gained pace in recent years. This is because of the ‘blurring’ of civil and criminal laws as a consequence of the move from centralised state control to a system of decentred networks of governance and crime control. A host of agencies are invited, co-opted or cajoled to assume some responsibility for managing crime, many of which might be considered distant bedfellows from policing practices. Consistent with this approach, police seek to regulate practices of premises and institutions that contribute to crime. Business inspections, enforcement of building codes, and joint operations with other regulatory bodies are common third party policing strategies.

**Intelligence-Led Policing**

Intelligence-led policing has features in common with third party, zero tolerance and other models of policing. According to Ratcliffe (2008), intelligence-led policing is a ‘business model for policing’ that ‘works in an information management framework that allows analysts to influence decision-makers, and where a range of enforcement and longer-term, problem-solving prevention solutions are drawn from an evidence base that suggests there effectiveness’ (2008, p. 89). Data and intelligence gathering and analysis, and the deployment of police according to trends highlighted through these processes, are at the heart of intelligence-led policing methods. With the growing sophistication of police databases, increased geocoding of offences (Burgess 2011), the utilisation of spatial software such as the Geographic Information System (‘GIS’) (Chainey & Ratcliffe 2005), and appreciation of insights generated by environmental criminology (Brantingham & Brantingham 1981), including an awareness of ‘hot spots’, ‘hot times’ and ‘hot offenders’, intelligence-led policing seeks to predict and prevent crime. Like third-party policing, it also aims to engage other agencies in this preventive activity.
These are just some of the new models or approaches to policing that have sought to reinstate police as key preventers of crime.

**Courts and Corrections**

Similar to policing, there was a period when courts and corrections were considered to be ineffective in preventing crime. The height of this penal pessimism was marked by Martinson’s ‘nothing works’ treatise in 1974. In 1981, Gendreau declared that ‘Martinson was wrong!’ and by the mid-1990s this mood was giving way to the rise of the ‘what works’ movement. Maguire and Priestley (1995) revealed programmatic ingredients that increased the likelihood of effective interventions with offenders, while Sherman et al (1997) highlighted not just ‘what works’, but ‘what doesn’t’ and ‘what’s promising’ across a broad array of crime prevention measures, including those associated with courts and corrections. This and the subsequent evidence-based crime prevention movement sought to focus resources in a manner that have the greatest chance of success. Criminogenic risk assessment, matching of interventions with identified criminogenic risks and needs, and an application of evidence-based interventions are some of the key themes impacting on attempts by courts and corrections to prevent crime in recent years.

**Criminogenic Risk Assessment**

It is well established that risk has permeated the criminal justice system (and wider institutions) in a variety of forms (see Beck 1992; Simon 2007; O’Malley 2010). Criminogenic risk-assessment tools are now routinely used in adult and juvenile justice settings across numerous jurisdictions (Maurutto & Hannah-Moffat 2006; Schwalbe 2007). While there are dissenting voices challenging underlying tenets and the application of criminogenic risk-assessment tools within court and correctional practices (Pate 2002; Gottfredson & Moriarty 2006; Fitzgibbon et al 2010; Henderson & Miller 2013), the widespread adoption has had a marked impact on criminal justice practices. In particular, the identification of criminogenic risks and needs is being used as to influence court decisions and treatment interventions. The Risk–Needs–Responsivity (‘RNR’) model provides a vehicle to connect criminogenic risks and needs with treatment modalities.

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10 There is some dispute about the nature of these findings and subsequent recanting: see Sarre (2001) for a discussion of Martinson’s ‘nothing works’ publication.
**Risk–Needs–Responsivity Model**

The RNR model grew out of the work of Andrews, Bonta and Hoge (1990). They identified key principles — namely risk, needs and responsivity — for effective rehabilitation programs. Reviewing psychological and offending treatment literature, Andrews et al isolated these principles as the basis for effective interventions, claiming that ‘interventions that adhere to the RNR principles are associated with significant reductions in recidivism, whereas treatments that fail to follow the principles yield minimal reductions in recidivism and, in some cases, even increase recidivism’ (Andrews et al 2011, p. 736). Through careful assessment of criminogenic risk (perhaps by using actuarial risk assessment technologies, some of which have been developed by Andrews and Bonta), it is possible to identify both the level of risk posed by an offender and his or her associated criminogenic needs. By responding to these needs and providing sufficient treatment to match the level of risk posed, criminal justice resources can be successfully and efficiently deployed to prevent re-offending.

The RNR model has been challenged by some, due to its overriding focus on deficits. Ward and Stewart (2003) proposed the Good Lives Model to capture better the strengths of offenders and to embed offending behaviour in wider contexts. They suggested that this approach draws on positive psychology and humanistic traditions, with the primary goal being ‘to help offenders live better lives’. By being concerned with the ‘enhancement of offenders’ capabilities in order to improve the quality of their life’ and by ‘attending to their human needs and levels of well-being’ (2003, p. 353), the chances of further offending will be reduced. While Andrews et al (2011) rebuke Ward and Stewart by suggesting that their ‘fear is that crime prevention is easily overlooked if the primary pursuit of therapy is a life fulfilled as completely as possible’ (2011, p. 750), it is important to recognise this tension between risk-based, criminogenic-focused interventions, and those more aligned to a strengths-based approach. This tension runs through other forms and models of crime prevention, and remains unresolved, largely because of the politics and values inherent in determining the ‘best’ methods of preventing crime.

**‘What Works’ and Evidence-Based Prevention**

Flowing from this focus on the assessment and appropriate response to criminogenic risks and needs is a similar zeal to ensure that rehabilitation programs not only reflect principles of effective practice, but are closely and rigorously evaluated to ensure that an evidence base is established of programs that have a demonstrably positive impact on offending behaviour.
This pursuit of ‘what works’ is increasingly recognised as an evidence-based approach to prevention. By identifying the programs that are effective, and those that have little or no impact on crime (or potentially increase offending), limited criminal justice resources can be purposefully deployed.

Through meta-analytic techniques, findings from high-quality evaluations are aggregated and programs assessed according to their combined impacts. Utilising such processes, MacKenzie (2002, p. 385) asserted that the following types of programs work in reducing re-offending: prison-based therapeutic community treatment of drug-involved offenders; cognitive behavioural therapy (including Moral Reckoning Therapy and Reasoning and Rehabilitation); non-prison-based sex offender treatment programs; vocational educational programs; multi-component correctional industry programs; community employment programs; and incapacitating offenders who continue to commit crimes at high rates. Similar lists have been drafted isolating those programs for which there is evidence of no positive impact on re-offending or for those where there is insufficient evidence to support, but which have had some positive outcomes and appear promising.

Together, these developments highlight some currents running through attempts to ensure that court and correctional processes prevent crime, largely through preventing recidivism. Risk assessment, and the matching of programs and intervention to identified risks and needs, ensures a more focused and efficient criminal justice system, in contrast to the previous efforts that were considered to be somewhat undirected. The building and use of an evidence base also ensures that program evaluation is carefully considered and support for ineffective programs is withdrawn.

**Situational Crime Prevention**

One of the most significant proponents of situational crime prevention, Clarke, offers the following description of situational crime prevention:

Situational crime prevention comprises opportunity-reducing measures that are (1) directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) that involve the management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment in as specific and permanent way as possible, (3) so as to increase the effort and risk of crime and reduce the rewards as perceived by a wide range of offenders (Clarke 1997, p. 4).
Tilley has observed that, although the theory is quite recent, situational crime prevention measures have, in practice, a very long history (Tilley 2009, p. 109). Downes and Rock are credited with coining the phrase ‘situational control theory’ (Clarke 1997, p. 7), which was emerging from different disciplines, empirical analysis and scholarship. In the UK Home Office, research into the effectiveness of rehabilitation and treatment programs for offenders in the mid-1970s demonstrated the generally poor outcomes from such measures. Perhaps more importantly, it also highlighted the differential performance of particular treatment facilities. Analysis suggested that particular physical and program design features impacted upon the retention rates and performance of the different facilities. This contributed to the general pessimism of the period regarding the efficacy of treatment (as noted previously) and also stimulated interest in the situational variables that influenced retention and outcomes of treatment programs.

A development also credited as influencing the emergence of situational crime prevention relates to suicide methods and rates in the UK. Reductions in suicides in the UK were attributed to changes to the type of gas used in and methods of delivery to homes. It was contended that if the gravest decision in life (that is, to commit suicide) could be positively affected by situational changes (that is, the modification of the type of gas provided to homes), then perhaps decisions to commit crime could also be equally affected by changing situational variables (Clarke 2005).

Relevant historical research also proved influential. In particular, Clarke references research by Burt (1925) into delinquency in London, which revealed higher rates of burglary in winter due to longer hours of darkness; Hartshorne and May’s (1928) studies of deceit, which showed that the likelihood of dishonest behaviour by children was dependent upon the level of supervision; research showing that locations such as business premises, hotels and parking lots have targets that attract crime (Engstad 1975); and studies revealing that fluctuations in motor vehicle theft reflect the number of opportunities as measured by the numbers of registered vehicles (for example, Wilkins 1964) (Clarke 1997, pp. 6–7) were particularly influential in shaping situational crime prevention developments.11

11 While this does not necessarily contribute to the emergence and growth of situational crime prevention, criminologists and criminal justice academics highlighted the contribution of situational variables to the growth in crime in Australia in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, Ward and Woods (1972) noted: ‘With greater affluence, more money in transit, and more places such as garages, betting shops, clubs and banks
This historical research was augmented by research into the behaviour of offenders. Insights generated by this research demonstrated how offenders make decisions about which targets to offend against, what plans were required and what deterred selection of particular targets (see Cornish 1994; Ekblom & Tilley 2000; Gill 2000; Michael et al 2001; Bernasco & Kooistra 2010; and Chiu et al 2011; Carmel-Gilfilen 2011, among others). This body of work demonstrated the importance of situational variables on offending, and was seen as an important departure from the general focus on dispositions of offenders. For Clarke, the problem of explaining crime had become confused with the problem of explaining the criminal (2008, p. 178). Offending, he argued, is an act, not merely a propensity. Thus, much greater attention to opportunities for offending was required, rather than endless research of the biographical characteristics of offenders.

The emergence of situational crime prevention marked a move away from focusing on the ‘root causes’ of crime and instead shifted attention to the opportunities for crime; a radical departure from most previous criminological thought (Clarke 1997), which had particular political implications. Garland (2001) suggested that:

Unike earlier efforts to build social prevention programmes, job creation schemes, and community regeneration, the new situational methods do not appear to benefit the undeserving poor, to imply a social critique, or to disturb market freedoms. Their implementation can proceed outside of a politics of solidarity and collective sacrifice, and in the absence of redistributive welfare programmes. Their growing appeal rests on the fact that they can be distributed through the market as customised commodities, rather than delivered by state agencies (2001, p. 200).

In this way, situational crime prevention becomes attractive to governments that can ‘responsibilise’ or shift responsibility for managing and preventing crime to non-state with sums of money to attract the would-be robber, we can only expect a greater rate of robbery unless measures are taken to make the robber’s job more difficult’ (1972, pp. 98–100). Grabosky (1977) observed the influence of increasing opportunity: ‘There were, quite simply, more objects to steal in the Sydney of the 1960s than at any other time in the past. Automobiles, television sets, and other such attractive items existed in unprecedented quantity, while retailers continued to display their merchandise as openly as ever before. Evidence that the majority of burglaries in Sydney occurred in the affluent eastern and northern suburbs while the majority of apprehended burglars lived elsewhere further support this contention’ (1977, p. 140). Parallel observations were being made in relation to crime opportunities in Australia as situational crime prevention was emerging (predominantly) from the UK.
agencies, reducing both the costs and the political fallout of being responsible for addressing the ‘crime problem’.

Underpinning the emergence of situational crime prevention were a small number of key theories.

**Rational Choice Offender Approach**

Much of the work by Clarke and his colleagues at the UK Home Office resulted in the development of the ‘rational choice offender approach’. This approach, which has come to form the basis of situational crime prevention, ‘views the desires, preferences and motives of offenders and potential offenders as similar to those of the rest of us, and as in continual interaction with contemporary opportunities and constraints to produce, reinforce and sometimes reduce criminal behaviours’ (Cornish & Clarke 2008, p. 21). Offending is not pathological; nor are offenders deprived of agency. If opportunities to offend arise, many people will capitalise on these opportunities. An offender will weigh up the costs and the benefits of offending. If the rewards are high and the risks low, then there is greater likelihood that an offence will be committed. Offending is purposive and rational.

While some have criticised this approach for being simplistic or neglecting the ‘irrational, demented, intoxicated or desperate’ offender (Shaftoe 2004, p. 82), Tilley argues that ‘it is emphatically not assumed that individuals weigh all options carefully in advance of each act before deciding what would be best for them. Equally it is not assumed that individuals value the maximisation of material utilities above all else in deciding what to do’ (2009, p. 110). Moreover, Cornish and Clarke (2008, p. 24) argue that ‘the rational choice perspective is a heuristic device or conceptual tool rather than a conventional criminological theory. Its purpose has always been to offer a way of looking at offending that is both present-centred and recognises the influence of the environment on behaviour’. Thus, the rational choice offender approach is more akin to a ‘bounded rationality’ and was devised to turn attention to the influence of decisions and motives, rather than seeing offenders as empty vessels playing out behaviours determined by their histories.

While this work was gaining pace in the UK, related but separate developments in North America were to impact upon the emergence of situational crime prevention. The routine activities approach, developed ostensibly by Marcus Felson, and the crime pattern theory, developed by Paul and Patricia Brantingham, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Together with the rational choice offender approach, these ‘theories’\textsuperscript{12} have become the theoretical basis for situational crime prevention.

**Routine Activities Approach**

The routine activities approach developed by Felson and Cohen\textsuperscript{13} borrows heavily from human ecological theory of community developed by Amos Hawley (1950). In particular, Hawley identified and discussed three important temporal components of community structure:

1. *Rhythm* — the regular periodicity with which events occur, as with the rhythm of work activity

2. *Tempo* — the number of events per unit of time, such as the number of criminal violations per day in a given street

3. *Timing* — the coordination among different activities which are more or less interdependent, such as coordination of one worker’s rhythms with that of another worker (as cited in Felson & Cohen 1980, p. 391).

These concepts draw attention to the dynamics in an area: the movement of people, spatial and temporal trends, and the relation of these dynamics with crime.

By looking broadly at dynamics in American cities and neighbourhoods, changing patterns of consumption, and labour market forces, Felson and Cohen concluded that their:

central empirical argument is that the changing structure of modern American society may have contributed to declines in the tempo of primary group activity within households by removing people from home and from their relatives in the context of performing their daily tasks. This in turn appears to have contributed to more frequent convergence of criminogenic circumstances within communities (Felson & Cohen 1980, p. 397).

In particular, they suggested that three macro social indicators may have affected crime rates as a whole in the US: the proportion of young people, the proportion of people living alone and the weight of consumer goods (Felson & Cohen 1980, p. 400). Given, they argue, that

\textsuperscript{12} Note that Felson does not see routine activities as a theory.

\textsuperscript{13} Felson (2008) has since argued that Cohen played only a minor role in the development of routine activities theory.
young people are the most crime-prone, then the age structure of a nation or a neighbourhood will have an effect on crime rates. A post-war population boom meant that a greater percentage of the overall population would be young, influencing crime statistics. Premises with single occupants provide increased opportunities for crime, because of the low level of supervision (that is, capable guardianship) provided when the sole occupant vacates the property. And as the weight of consumer goods decreased, the opportunities for theft increased.

Felson argues that, from its inception, the routine activities approach has provided both macro and micro explanations of how crime rates change. On a macro level, trends like those outlined above can influence opportunities for crime. At a micro level, a crime requires the convergence of a motivated offender, with a suitable target or victim, in the absence of a capable guardian in time and space (2008, p. 70). So, greater opportunities for crime will be found in neighbourhoods where there is a high level of workforce participation requiring homes to be vacated for long periods of the day.

There has been recent further exploration of the influence and the dynamics of capable guardianship. Reynald, for example, has sought to better understand ‘guardianship in action’. She argues that residents can be capable guardians of property crime through ‘their visible presence at home, monitoring over their residential surroundings and intervention when they observe something suspicious or untoward’ (2011, p. 135). This implies a dynamic of active participation in preventing crime, as opposed to passivity in the face of criminal activity. However, ‘guardianship in action’ often requires incentives. For home owners, this incentive is usually the protection of their own property. However, acknowledging that there are diverse guardians, including handlers and managers (Clarke & Eck 2003) that influence targets, offenders and places, other agents might be required to boost incentives for active guardianship. Sampson et al (2010) suggest that this is the function served by ‘super controllers’. Legislative amendment, media, insurance companies, courts, and political institutions can impact on controllers and encourage, coerce and cajole them to be active guardians.

**Crime Pattern Theory**

During the same period (that is, the late 1970s/early 1980s), in Canada, the Brantinghams were analysing spatial and temporal crime trends (see Brantingham & Brantingham 1978, 1981, 1982). They concluded that:
Crimes do not occur randomly or uniformly in time or space or society. Crimes do not occur randomly or uniformly across neighbourhoods, or social groups, or during an individual’s daily activities or during an individual’s lifetime ... There are hot spots and cold spots; there are high repeat offenders and high repeat victims. In fact the two groups are frequently linked. While the numbers will continue to be debated depending on the definition and population being tested, a very small proportion of people commit most of the known crimes and also account for a large proportion of victimisations (2008, p. 79).

Reflecting similar interests as Felson and Cohen, the Brantinghams drew attention to routine activities. They suggested that individuals have a range of daily activities, which usually occur in different nodes, such as home, work, school, shopping, entertainment or time with friends. Activity nodes are connected by paths and people tend to routinely travel along the same paths. In so doing, they observe and learn about potential opportunities for crime. When a potential offender intersects with a potential target or victim, the latter will become an actual target when the potential offender’s willingness to commit a crime has been triggered. These patterns of daily activities and routines help to explain why particular locations experience elevated rates of crime, and they became known as ‘crime pattern theory’.

The Brantinghams suggest that hot spots can be predicted. By analysing specific locations and taking into account the convergence of the key elements of crime pattern theory, it is possible to predict where crime will be concentrated.

These three approaches (rational choice offender, routine activities, and crime pattern theory) highlight how opportunities for crime emerge in particular locations and at particular times. They demonstrate the importance of understanding the dynamics of offending, including spatial and temporal trends. They take offending as a rational, purposive act that occurs when a sufficiently motivated person comes into contact with a suitable target or victim in the absence of capable guardianship. These approaches also encourage deeper analysis of the decisions associated with offending, the impact of offending peers, the consequences of previously successful episodes of offending, and the controls and cues embedded in the immediate urban environment that increase or decrease the opportunities for crime.
Opportunity-Reducing Techniques

Following from these insights, Clarke and various colleagues (including Cornish and Ross Homel) have progressively developed a list of 25 opportunity-reducing crime prevention measures: see Table 1.

Table 1: 25 Opportunity-Reducing Techniques

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase Effort</th>
<th>Increase Risks</th>
<th>Reduce Rewards</th>
<th>Reduce Provocations</th>
<th>Remove Excuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target harden</td>
<td>Extend guardianship</td>
<td>Conceal targets</td>
<td>Reduce frustration</td>
<td>Set rules</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and stress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control access to</td>
<td>Assist natural</td>
<td>Remove targets</td>
<td>Avoid disputes</td>
<td>Post instructions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>facilitators</td>
<td>surveillance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen exits</td>
<td>Reduce anonymity</td>
<td>Identify property</td>
<td>Reduce emotional</td>
<td>Alert conscience</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>arousal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deflect offenders</td>
<td>Utilise place</td>
<td>Disrupt markets</td>
<td>Reduce peer pressure</td>
<td>Assist</td>
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<td></td>
<td>managers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>compliance</td>
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<td>Control tools/</td>
<td>Strengthen formal</td>
<td>Deny benefits</td>
<td>Discourage imitation</td>
<td>Control drugs</td>
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<tr>
<td>weapons</td>
<td>surveillance</td>
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<td>and alcohol</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cornish & Clarke 2003, p. 90.

As is apparent from Table 1, these opportunity-reducing techniques are clustered under five major themes: increase effort, increase risks, reduce rewards, reduce provocations and remove excuses. 14 This reflects the lessons learned from applying situational crime prevention to an increasingly vast array of offences, which, as Clarke notes, have expanded to include robbery (of taxi drivers, bus drivers, convenient store staff), violence, fraud, speeding, drunk driving, shoplifting and employee theft, crime on the Internet and even ways to prevent deaths of illegal immigrants on the US/Mexican border (Clarke 2005, p. 57). More recently, situational crime prevention is being applied to poaching and smuggling of wildlife (Pires & Clarke 2012).

The list of opportunity-reducing techniques and the offences tackled by situational crime prevention hint at some of the characteristics that have made this approach attractive in

14 The latter two have been added in the past decade, extending the number of opportunity-reducing techniques from 12 to 16 and to 25 in its latest incarnation.
certain quarters. There is a simplicity to seeing offenders as rational. It allows for prevention practitioners to ‘Think Thief’ (Ekblom 1997) or to think about the choices, decisions, motives, required tools and possible rewards of particular offending. Unlike other forms of prevention, there is an immediacy to the responses and to determining the potential outcomes. As Tilley notes, we all take routine situational precautions by locking cars and houses, protecting valuables, depositing money into banks, and purchasing relevant security devices (2009, p. 104). Consequently, there can be an ease in developing and implementing some aspects of situational crime prevention.

**Crime Prevention through Environmental Design**

As has been shown, crime is not evenly distributed through space. Environmental criminology and its crime-mapping technologies consistently demonstrate that crime clusters in particular ‘hot spot’ locations. In NSW, for example, Weatherburn noted that the top one per cent of LGAs account for more than two-thirds of the robberies, and that 30 per cent of the burglaries in the suburb of Waverley occurred in just 13 streets (2004, p. 94).

This spatial clustering of crime prompted some to explore the dynamics of crime hot spots to determine the causes of the elevated crime levels. It has been suggested that specific physical design features contribute to crime in these areas, prompting the development of CPTED. Crowe states that the conceptual thrust of the CPTED program is that the:

> physical environment can be manipulated to produce behavioural effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime, thereby improving the quality of life. These behavioural effects can be accomplished by reducing the propensity of the physical environment to support criminal behaviour (Crowe 2000, pp. 34–5).

The physical environment can prevent crime by blocking opportunities through creating obstacles or barriers to targets; eliminate places for concealment; restrict escape routes; and increase the surveillance of would-be offenders (Rosenbaum et al 1998, pp. 125–6).

CPTED and situational prevention belong to a ‘family’ of similar preventive approaches. Situational prevention seeks to eliminate existing problems, whereas CPTED seeks to ‘eliminate anticipated problems in new designs on the basis of past experience with similar designs’ (Clarke 2008, p. 182). Thus, Clarke suggests that CPTED is more future looking than situational prevention.
While the term ‘CPTED’ was coined by Jeffrey in the early 1970s, CPTED has been practised for much longer. Cozens suggests that:

> From early prehistoric cave-dwellers to medieval and modern cities, human settlements have always attempted to provide for the safety, security and well-being of the citizens in terms of design ... As technology evolved, settlements adapted to reflect new and emerging threats. Initially, topography (e.g. higher ground) and landscaping (e.g. ditches and mounds) were used in early hill forts and a variety of fortification designs for castles (e.g. walls and moats) (Cozens 2008, p. 153).

CPTED has gained traction over the last few decades (Minnery & Lim 2005; Atlas 2008; Cozens 2008; Sutton et al 2008; Paulsen 2013; Armitage 2013). Many police and local authority staff now receive CPTED training (Kelpczarek 2003; McCauley & Opie n.d.; McDonald & Kitteringham 2004; Cozens et al 2005; Book & Schneider 2010; Clancey et al 2014); rating systems for some forms of built environment operate in some jurisdictions to quantify safety and security (for example, the Secured by Design accreditation process in the UK — see Brooke 2013 for a detailed discussion of the Secure by Design approach); CPTED practitioner professional associations have emerged (for example, the International CPTED Association); many planning regimes incorporate CPTED design principles (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 2004; Scottish Executive Planning Department 2006; New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2005; Australian Capital Territory Government 2000; Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment 2005; South Australian Department of Transport and Urban 2004; Western Australian Planning Commission 2006; Queensland Government 2007) and some, such as NSW, have a system for reviewing crime risk assessments of some new developments (see Clancey et al 2011; Clancey et al 2012 for discussion of these processes in NSW). Armitage (2013) and recent special editions of the *Built Environment* (Armitage & Monchuk 2013) and *Safer Communities* (Monchuk & Clancey 2013) journals highlight approaches to CPTED in jurisdictions as diverse as the United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands, Japan, New Zealand, England and Wales and various Australian jurisdictions.

CPTED now commonly includes a series of design techniques, which Cozens et al (2005) list as: surveillance, access control, territoriality, activity support, image/maintenance, and target hardening. Each will be briefly considered here, although little attention will be given to target hardening, as it is akin to aspects of situational crime prevention previously discussed.
**Surveillance**

Providing ‘eyes on the street’ or surveillance is a major element of CPTED. Jacobs (1961, pp. 32–3) suggested that ‘the sidewalk and street peace of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves, and enforced by the people themselves’. Moreover, Jacobs stated that ‘a well used city street is apt to be a safe street’. This, she argued, can be achieved by having a clear demarcation between what is public space and what is private space; having users fairly continuously; and having eyes on the street belonging to the ‘natural proprietors’ of the street (Jacobs 1961, pp. 35–7).

Through watching the ‘theatre’ and performance of sidewalks and neighbourhood activities, Jacobs identified the importance of natural surveillance in preventing crime and fear of crime. In her seminal text, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, she used stories and vignettes from her neighbourhood (Greenwich Village, New York), to demonstrate how control is maintained by the ‘natural proprietors’ of the street. For example, an incident between a man and a young girl prompts numerous local people to monitor the situation, preparing to intervene if necessary. As Jacobs watches and notes the number of people observing the incident and their readiness to respond if the situation escalates, she stresses the value of having people on the street with some sense of responsibility for the area. Through this episode, Jacobs demonstrates that shopkeepers and local residents not only provide a level of natural surveillance, but they also exercise informal social control through their preparedness to intervene.

Jacobs notes that other areas often lack this natural surveillance. The creation of large shopping complexes replaced smaller, neighbourhood shops (and shopkeepers); single-use zoning controls have resulted in narrow temporal patterns of activity; large city blocks reduce incidental pedestrian traffic between city blocks; the reliance on the car reduces pedestrian traffic; substantial, impersonal housing developments and the creation of dead areas that do not permit through traffic (car or pedestrian), due to the installation of arterial roads and highways, are some of the reasons for the reduction in natural surveillance. Gehl (2010) also highlights that vertical (high-rise) development, the limited attention given to activating street level, and car-centric developments mitigate natural surveillance opportunities.

These observations have given rise to design practices that seek to increase the ability for people to see and be seen. Landscaping that promotes visibility, porous fences, the use of
glass and clear plastic in bus shelters and apartment entrances, activation at street level through alfresco dining, increased foot and bicycle paths, and mixed-use developments that result in greater pedestrian traffic throughout the day and night are just some of the methods adopted to promote natural surveillance. Moreover, many cities have made a concerted effort to repopulate downtown or inner-city areas. This increased density supplies more natural proprietors, and given Jacobs’ observation that ‘the sight of people attracts still other people’ (1961, p. 37), the greater the activation of an area, the greater the likelihood that even more ‘eyes on the street’ will be generated in a virtuous cycle.

While Jacobs was concerned with stimulating diversity, street life and activity as the means for achieving natural surveillance, technological and other developments have subsequently resulted in mechanical and organised forms of surveillance (Crowe 2000). Mechanical surveillance includes lighting and CCTV, while organised surveillance is generally provided by security guards or police patrols. Street lighting has proven to be an especially successful form of crime prevention (see Welsh & Farrington 2008a), whereas CCTV appears to be less successful in preventing crime in public places (see Gill & Spriggs 2005; Wells et al 2006; Welsh & Farrington 2008b).

It will be further borne out by review of the other elements of CPTED, but it is already apparent that CPTED is a multi-disciplinary pursuit (Cozens 2008). This brief overview of surveillance demonstrates the different dimensions and disciplines that potentially contribute to forms of surveillance. Jacobs’ interest in natural surveillance highlights the important role of planning controls and land-use policies, public housing authorities, architects, traffic engineers, retailers, and property developers. The mechanical and organised forms of surveillance introduce lighting engineers, CCTV consultants (covering technical issues such as cabling, camera placement, monitoring room technologies), and private security personnel. The diversity of ‘actors’ engaged in the built environment means that work of this nature invariably requires coordination, cooperation and negotiation (Carmona et al 2003).

**Access Control**

Access control is a ‘design concept directed primarily at decreasing crime opportunity ... The primary thrust of an access control strategy is to deny access to a crime target and to create a perception of risk in offenders’ (Crowe 2000, p. 36) and to reduce the rewards of offending (Cornish & Clarke 2003).
Access control has been practised since the beginning of the built form (Cozens 2008). Moats, fences, gated doors, and isolated buildings have been some of the methods for preventing entry. Modern forms of access control build on these historical concepts and include boom gates, bollards, alarms, swipe cards, biometric access, electronic surveillance of entrances, demarcated uses within buildings and other strategies designed to restrict access. Less technologically advanced measures can also restrict or channel movement, for example, the use of landscaping, public art, and water features. It is argued that by reducing the opportunities to offend and the rewards of offending, access control measures can prevent crime.

Crowe (2000) suggests that access control and surveillance are not mutually exclusive concepts; rather, they are ‘mutually supportive’. As with natural surveillance, Crowe differentiates between organised, mechanical and natural forms of access control. Organised access control involves guards; mechanical access control is achieved through locks, alarms and gates; natural access control is achieved through spatial definition. In this context, water features, hedges, mounds, flowerbeds and other natural features might be used to prevent access to a particular location. Defensive planting, or the use of foliage and plants that are prickly and repellent, is also an approach adopted to prevent access.

**Territoriality (or Defensible Space)**

Newman (1972) developed the concept of ‘defensible space’. Newman and colleagues spent three years (in the late 1960s/early 1970s) analysing large housing estates in the US. Many of these estates, developed and built in the 1950s, had become areas of high crime and multiple social disadvantage. The problems experienced on these estates were regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant the detailed and comprehensive research undertaken by Newman and his team.

Among all of the locations visited, Newman was struck by the vastly different experiences of residents in two estates that were physically close in proximity, but substantially different in design. The following excerpt from Newman’s book, *Defensible Space: Crime Prevention through Urban Design*, goes to the heart of many of his observations and subsequent recommendations:

The 150 New York families trapped in apartments that open onto double-loaded corridors of a seventeen-storey high-rise building — whose elevators, fire stairs, hallways, and roofs are freely roamed and ruled by criminals — find it hard to believe
that the project across the street, composed of three- to six-storey buildings in which two to three families share a hallway and six to twelve an entrance, actually accommodate people at the same densities and could be built at the same cost. The families in the seventeen-storey building are continually aware of the fact that they are the constant prey of criminals and are equally aware that things are a lot better across the street. They find it incomprehensible that both projects house families at equal densities, and that the design differences between the two projects are predominantly the result of the whims of each designer (Newman 1972, pp. 11–12).

A key observation arising from interviews with residents of these buildings and analysis of the different design was the inability of residents in the 17–storey building described above to exercise any ‘territoriality’. Long, open corridors, a small number of entry and exit points, and the large tracts of (often) green land surrounding the tower blocks contribute to low levels of territoriality. Coupled with tenancy management regimes that can result in high turnover of residents (especially common in public housing), these design characteristics reduce any sense of ownership of an area. This erodes informal social control opportunities or proprietorship, as Jacobs might have described it. As a consequence, hallways and other shared areas become ‘ruled by criminals’.

Through this work, Newman differentiated four kinds of space: private, semi-private, semi-public, and public (1975, p. 59). He identified locations within and external to buildings that reflected these different dimensions and advocated clear distinctions between the transitions from public to private space. By having legible transitions and clear indicators marking the different forms of spatial ownership, Newman argued that residents would be in a better position to assume responsibility for particular locations and visitors would better understand what was expected of them in particular areas. This he termed ‘defensible space’, and this is how it can be achieved:

Architectural design can make evident by the physical layout that an area is the shared extension of the private realms of a group of individuals. For one group to be able to set the norms of behaviour and the nature of activity possible within a particular place, it is necessary that it have clear, unquestionable control over what can occur there. Design can make it possible for both inhabitant and stranger to perceive that an area is under the undisputed influence of a particular group, that they dictate the activity taking place within it, and who its users are likely to be (1972, p. 2).
Thus, legibility and demarcation of land ownership signals transition from public to private space. Greater management of and vigilance over an area arises from clear ownership. Fences and signs can mark out privately owned property, which sends cues about appropriate behaviours in particular locations. Where there is uncertainty regarding ownership, purpose of use and responsibility for management, there is less capacity for capable guardianship and greater potential for criminal activity to occur.

These observations and the associated design recommendations have been especially influential on housing design (see Stollard 1991; Poyner 2006; Armitage 2013). Australian social and public housing has suffered from many of these same design flaws and much effort has been invested in rectifying problems arising from low levels of territoriality or defensible space, as will be considered in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

**Activity Support**

Cozens et al state that ‘activity support involves the use of design and signage to encourage intended patterns of usage of public space’ (2005, p. 337). The design of public places can serve to support activity and, subsequently, promote natural surveillance. For example, playgrounds can attract children and families into an area; sporting or exercise facilities can encourage cycling and jogging; facilities to support music and performance can attract audiences; and busking and street performance influence the mood of a crowd.

Sorensen et al (2008) suggest that ‘activity support fills the area with legitimate users so that any abusers will leave’ (2008, p. 67). Similarly, Crowe (2000) advocates (where appropriate) placing inherently ‘unsafe’ activities in ‘safe’ locations. This can ensure that surveillance is provided for activities and areas that might ordinarily pose crime risks. For example, the placement of a skate ramp on the edge of a park will ensure increased natural surveillance opportunities. A skate ramp might also be placed in an area that historically receives little pedestrian traffic. The activity generated by the skating area will enliven the location, drawing others into the area and making crime less likely.

Avoiding user conflict is an important feature of activity support (Crowe 2000). The co-location of particular facilities will potentially stimulate conflict between the users. Religious institutions and licensed venues will obviously attract different audiences with different expectations. Co-locating these facilities increases the potential for user conflict because of the divergent expectations of the two user groups.
Wayfinding is another concept linked to activity support. Gibson (2009, p. 13) suggests that the ‘wayfinding designer is responsible for enhancing how a space — whether public, commercial or private — is experienced by finding order in chaos without destroying character’. He further suggests that ‘great wayfinding systems employ explicit signs and information as well as implicit symbols and landmarks that together communicate with accuracy and immediacy’ (2009, p. 13). Thus, wayfinding helps a visitor to an area understand and navigate the space successfully. By getting lost or appearing disorientated, a person is potentially more vulnerable to being victimised (Atlas 2008, p. 487).

Linked with the situational crime prevention approach, activity support also involves ‘removing the excuses’ (Cornish & Clarke 2003) for offending through the use of signage. Signs routinely communicate transitions from public to private space; alert users to the rules and conditions of entry; and explain possible consequences for inappropriate behaviour. In this way, signage is not just used in wayfinding, but also seeks to influence behaviour in particular areas. Signs to deter trespassing or consumption of alcohol, and explaining the conditions of entry, now routinely adorn entrances to shopping centres, train stations, schools, parks, licensed venues, sporting facilities, libraries, residential estates and many other private, public and semi-public areas, all, potentially, in the name of crime prevention.

**Image/Maintenance**

The image of an area can influence how it will be used (Crowe 2000). Given that the sight of people attracts other people (Jacobs 1961), a vibrant, well-maintained area that has a reputation for being enjoyable and safe will draw in people. This activation will promote passive surveillance, as people come and go, stay and watch, and move around an area. This increases the risks involved for potential offenders (Cornish and Clarke 2003).

The image of an area will be adversely affected by signs of damage and low capable guardianship. As Flynn suggests, ‘physical characteristics of communities related to high crime risk and to the perception of vulnerability are signs of vandalism — broken windows, destruction of public facilities — littering, and abandonment of housing or property’ (1983, p. 23). Disused needles, broken bottles, rubbish, graffiti and damage will send cues that an area is not well maintained. Consistent with the ‘broken windows’ thesis (Wilson & Kelling 1982), rapid removal of graffiti, regular maintenance and cleaning, and proactive management of public spaces help to establish an image of an area that is conducive to greater use. Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that the sight of a broken window is likely to
lead to further broken windows because the damage will imply low levels of capable guardianship. By promptly responding to signs of destruction, it is possible to prevent this vicious cycle.

The maintenance of an area and the prevention of ‘broken windows’ require action by a host of agencies. There are similar implications for the management of footpaths, public spaces and entertainment venues in the form of ordinances and by-laws. Many local authorities and local governments have adopted more proactive cleaning, repair and maintenance programs to keep public spaces well maintained.15

Second-Generation CPTED
Cleveland and Saville (1998) and Saville and Cleveland (2008) have proposed a ‘second-generation CPTED’, which employs four new strategies: social cohesion (participation in local events, self-directed community problem-solving, friendship networks); connectivity (transport facilities, networks with outside agencies); community culture (gender and minority equality strategies, special places, festivals); and threshold capacity (human scale, land-use density, maximum diversity).

This approach attempts to marry various advances in community development, new urbanism, ecology, environmental sustainability, transit-oriented developments and other socio-political movements. In many respects, it seeks to combine the more design-centric ‘first-generation CPTED’ principles and practices with social and community crime prevention approaches.

Despite the more human orientation of second-generation CPTED, situational and CPTED methods of crime prevention have been criticised, often for their failure to consider the ‘root causes’ of crime and the impact they have on particular parts of the population. Some of the key criticisms will be briefly discussed here.

Limitations of Opportunity-Reduction (and Associated ‘Theories’)
Various criticisms have been levelled at the opportunity-reduction perspectives — situational crime prevention, CPTED, and associated theories. Perhaps one of the most frequently mounted criticisms relates to displacement. Often described as the ‘Archilles heel of crime

15 This will be explored in greater detail with specific examples in later chapters. Regular rubbish collections, rapid repair to damaged council property, and rapid graffiti removal are just some of the regular activities adopted by local government to maintain the physical environment.
prevention’ (Welsh & Farrington 1999), displacement occurs when crime simply moves to another location after the implementation of a particular situational intervention (known as ‘geographical displacement’). If CCTV was installed in a town centre, then crime might be displaced to surrounding locations not captured by the CCTV system. Other forms of displacement can include temporal, tactical, target, and crime type (Repetto 1976; Clarke & Eck 2003, 2005).

The mere displacement of crime, rather than its prevention or reduction, does little good and might even result in the escalation of offending severity. Ekblom (1997) has referred to this phenomenon as an ‘arms race’, whereby offenders use more violent and more sophisticated means of committing offences as a consequence of opportunity-reducing techniques that have made offending more difficult, less rewarding, and riskier.16

The concern about displacement can be considered somewhat technical. More spirited and significant criticisms have been mounted against opportunity-reducing approaches and the associated ‘theories’ (see von Hirsch et al 2000 for a collection of critical perspectives). Garland, for example, is scathing in his assessment of the rational choice offender approach and the consequences of the perceived narrow explanation of criminality offered by its proponents:

After more than a century of social scientific research that complicated and refined the understanding of criminal offending; after a mass of evidence has been accumulated to show that criminal acts are typically embedded in, and produced by, definite social and psychological relations; rational choice analyses have, abruptly and without ceremony, swept aside all such complexity and empirical findings. With the certainty of armchair philosophers and economic modellers they insist that crime is,

16 Empirical evidence of displacement is not very strong. The much-cited study by Hesseling (1994) (cited in Clarke 2008) found no evidence of displacement in 22 of the 55 studies examined. Of the remaining 33 studies, there was some evidence of displacement, but the overall reduction in crime was greater than was displaced (Clarke 2008). Clarke (1997) suggests that this is because if ‘alternatives are not viable, the offender may well settle for smaller criminal rewards or for a lower rate of crime. Few offenders are so driven by need or desire that they have to maintain a certain level of offending whatever the cost. For many, the elimination of easy opportunities for crime may actually encourage them to explore non-criminal alternatives’ (1997, p. 28). Not only has there been little evidence that displacement occurs, it has also been discovered that the effects of some situational measures extend beyond the intervention site or period — ‘diffusion of benefits’ (Clarke & Weisburd 1994).
after all, simply a matter of individual choice — or anyway can be treated as if it were. It would be wrong to say that rational choice criminology had caused the shift towards harsher sentencing laws and a greater use of deterrent threats. But it is certainly plausible to argue that this kind of reasoning has functioned to legitimate these tougher policies and give them a gloss of respectability. Penal policy, like welfare assistance to the poor, has rediscovered market discipline and purity of coercive disincentives (Garland 2001, p. 130).

Garland’s claim that situational crime prevention and the associated rational choice offender and routine activities approaches have legitimated tougher policies is supported by others. O’Malley suggested that the rational choice offender theory ‘fosters the combination of a variety of disciplinary, punitive, and risk-based techniques in order to achieve effects consistent with neo-conservative programs’ (1992, p. 373). Further, Shaftoe (2004, p. 80) argues that ‘in the late 1970s and early 1980s government resources were directed away from social intervention and towards situational crime prevention’. With its focus on rational offenders, it is argued that situational crime prevention has not only legitimated more punitive policies, it has also resulted in the (partial) demise of social and community-based crime prevention initiatives.

Katz and others highlight limitations with the rational choice offender model. Katz (1988) argues that there are a host of motivations for and ‘seductions’ of offending, other than material gain. From a different theoretical perspective, Wright et al highlight how recent evidence from neuroscience might also challenge notions of ‘rationality’:

[T]he available evidence ... indicates that the adolescent brain is under relatively constant change. In the frontal cortex, grey matter increases with the onset of puberty. It will decline throughout the rest of adolescence and into adulthood ... Adolescents, moreover, may not fully realise the social consequences of their behaviours, nor may they understand completely how their negative or unpredictable attitudes and emotional outbursts affect those around them ... Unlike rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of any action, adolescents may, under certain circumstances, simply act without regard to the costs (Wright et al 2008, pp. 245–9).

Perhaps even more stridently, Crawford raises the following criticisms of situational crime prevention: it over-emphasises property crimes in public places; it addresses symptoms, not causes; it is only ever temporary; it may encourage a (blind) faith in technology, which may
be unwarranted; surveillance can be highly intrusive; it is socially divisive; it may increase
the social concentration of crime through displacement; and it has adverse cultural

Similarly, Hogg and Brown argue that situational crime prevention suggests a fatalism about
dealing with more fundamental social and individual factors affecting crime levels and it is a
defensive strategy with little relevance to certain crimes or to high-crime communities (1998,
pp. 189–90).

Added to these numerous criticisms of situational crime prevention are related concerns
regarding CPTED. While Newman’s concept of ‘defensible space’ has become a key plank of
CPTED practice, it has not been without criticism. Sutton et al (2008, p. 65) suggest that
‘attempts to enhance territoriality ... may only be effective in neighbourhoods that are
characterised by high levels of home ownership’. Shaftoe wonders whether the territorial
cues are necessarily understood by all:

Defensible space and natural surveillance concepts rely on psychological signals
being transmitted to potential miscreants that they are not supposed to be in defined
spaces and will be spotted if they try to offend. Outlaws, macho risk-takers and the
heavily intoxicated are unlikely to read, or take heed of, these signals (2004, p. 78–9).

The focus on delineating public and private space also runs the risk of conspiring with wider
capitalist, consumerist forces, resulting in increasing ‘mass private property’ (Shearing &
Stenning 1983) and a reduction of the public realm. Newman’s work has been ‘attacked for
ignoring the social characteristics of residents in housing developments’ and the failure ‘to
account for larger neighbourhood context’ and to ‘define key concepts’ (Rosenbaum et al

It has also been argued that, because of the fear associated with some public spaces and the
importance of economic development to the revitalisation of inner city areas, there has been
greater regulation of public spaces. Loukaitou-Sideris and Ehrenfeucht suggest that:

Municipalities respond to urbanites’ fears of disorder by regulating, controlling, and
eliminating feared elements and activities from public streets and sidewalks. They
privilege the complaints of residents and business owners, often at the expense of
other street users. Some wealthy citizens have ensured local security by gating
neighbourhoods, privatising streets, and employing security guards (2009, pp. 234–5).
This form of regulation and control has been criticised by many for privileging the interests of those who can consume and conform, while excluding the homeless, the young and those who do not readily behave in ways conducive to commerce (see White 1990; White 1997b; Polzot 1997; Grant 2000; Lloyd & Auld 2003; NSW Parliamentary Committee on Children and Young People 2006; Miles 2010).

Irrespective of the merits of the arguments in favour of or against situational crime prevention, it is clear that it has divided criminological commentary. Whether it is because, as Cornish and Clarke argue, the ‘ideallogues of right and left are so set on imposing their utopian visions on the pragmatic middle’ (2008, p. 44) or because of the damage reputedly wrought on welfarism, the merits and effects of situational crime prevention will continue to be debated.17

**Community and Social Crime Prevention**

This section will focus on the nature, differences and issues associated with community and social forms of crime prevention.18 These are many and varied.

Hope (1995, p. 21) suggests that ‘community crime prevention refers to actions intended to change the social conditions that are believed to sustain crime in residential communities. It concentrates usually on the ability of local social institutions to reduce crime in residential neighbourhoods’. In this context, ‘the structure and organisation of a community affects the crime it experiences over and above the individual characteristics of its residents’ (Hope & Shaw 1988 as cited in Hogg & Brown 1998, p. 190). The community (however defined) is greater than just the sum of its constituent residents — there are effects that germinate from the way residents interact, the opportunities that they have available to them, the services provided for them, and relationships between them collectively and relevant service providers and agencies. These issues will be considered in greater detail.

Social crime prevention is a somewhat broader concept. Despite Crawford’s observations that ‘social crime prevention remains particularly ill-defined ... (and) as a term it is essentially

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17 Perhaps ironically, the proponents of situational prevention have suggested that the approach remains marginal to crime prevention, criminological and political discourse, while opponents have opined its significant influence.

18 Different theorists use ‘community’ or ‘social’ to describe diverse strategies and practices directed towards communities and/or the social causes of crime.
Rosenbaum et al have attempted to provide a definition. They suggest that:

the social crime prevention model gives much needed attention to the ‘root causes’ of crime, especially the forces that contribute to delinquency, drug abuse, and a host of related adolescent problems. Based on the premise that crime is caused by the social ills of society, the social crime prevention model focuses on developing programs and policies to improve the health, family life, education, housing, work opportunities and neighbourhood activities of potential offenders (1998, p. 201).

Thus, the focus of social crime prevention is on strengthening communities through the provision of necessary services that ameliorate circumstances that foster crime. What these circumstances are and how they contribute to crime continues to be debated.

**Causes and Explanation of Crime**

Like all crime prevention measures, community and social crime prevention techniques and interventions seek to address particular causes of crime. However, in the case of community and social crime prevention, the causes of crime are often mediated through a set of structures. For example, one of the most enduring explanations for crime relevant to this approach is the social disorganisation theory. Shaw and McKay mapped rates of delinquency and income. This mapping suggested that ‘the areas of highest delinquency ... [are] those adjacent to industry and commerce, those areas of lowest income status, and those areas with the highest concentration of European immigrants and Black Americans. Delinquency rates were highest in the zones of transition’ (Knepper 2007, p. 20). These observations begin to equate zoning, urban planning, neighbourhood developments, and demographic changes with elevated levels of crime. But what specifically was it about these circumstances that resulted in crime?

Sampson and Groves suggest that social disorganisation refers to:

the inability of a community structure to realise the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls. Empirically, the structural dimensions of community social disorganisation can be measured in terms of the prevalence and interdependence of social networks in a community — both informal (e.g. friendship ties) and formal (e.g. organisational participation) — and in the span of collective supervision that the community directs toward local problems ... structural barriers
impede development of the formal and informal ties that promote the ability to solve common problems. Social organisation and disorganisation are thus seen as different ends of the same continuum with respect to systematic networks of community social control (1989, p. 777).

This more precisely reveals the ‘mechanisms’ (Pawson & Tilley 1997) through which particular conditions contribute to crime. It is not so much low income or a function of urban planning that contributes to greater crime; it is the impact that these (and other) characteristics have on how communities function and how much control they exert over their community or neighbourhoods.

This work on social disorganisation has produced and contributed to the identification of some important concepts. Informal social control, for example, arises out of this body of work. The formal agents of social control (such as the police) generally have very little interaction with communities and particular neighbourhoods. The control of the streets and neighbourhoods is much more a function of residents and community members, rather than police, security guards and other formal agents of social control.19

The related concept of ‘collective efficacy’ has also emerged from this interest in community dynamics, circumstances and crime. According to Sampson, neighbourhood collective efficacy ‘captures the link between cohesion — especially working trust — and shared expectations for action’ (2004, p. 108). More specifically, ‘a neighbourhood’s efficacy exists relative to specific tasks such as maintaining public order. The key causal mechanism in collective efficacy theory is social control enacted under conditions of social trust’ (2004, p. 108). Thus, collective efficacy is the neighbourhood’s ability to maintain order in public spaces such as streets, sidewalks, and parks (Vold et al 2002, pp. 131–2), which raises issues associated with shared expectation and mutual engagement by local residents.

A further related concept is that of ‘social capital’ (Putnam 2000; Halpern 2005). Social capital is the raw material of civil society. It is created from the myriad of everyday

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19 This resonates with Jacobs’ observations in relation to natural surveillance. On closer inspection, there are some similarities that begin to emerge across the different models of crime prevention. For example, the ‘broken windows thesis’ had significant impact on zero tolerance policing, while also influencing Skogan’s (1990) views on community-based crime prevention and accord with image/maintenance principles of CPTED and Innes’ ‘signal crimes’ (2004). This is one example of why hard boundaries of different crime prevention models do not really exist.
interactions between people and is considered a ‘bottom-up’ phenomenon. It originates with people forming social connections and networks and is based on the principles of trust, mutual aid and support, norms of action and a concept of ‘the common good’. There are different forms of social capital. Bonding capital related to the intra-community networks or, in Hope’s terms, the horizontal dimensions of power (Hope 1995). Bridging capital relates to the extra-community network and the relationships between residents of a community and service providers, government and policy elites. Hope refers to these relationships as the vertical dimensions of power, and argued that, without these links, it is very difficult (if not impossible) for a disadvantaged community to resolve problems it is experiencing.

Putnam famously attempted to isolate and measure the factors that have contributed to the decline in civic engagement and social capital. He suggested that, between 1965 and 2000, the following characteristics eroded the bonds between people or the social capital: pressures of time and money; suburbanisation, commuting and sprawl; electronic entertainment (mainly television) in privatising leisure time; generational change (less involved children and grandchildren); and joint impact of generation and television (Putnam 2000, pp. 283–4).

More recently, others have sought to understand factors impacting upon communities. Bauman identified the following characteristics as contributing to the passage from the ‘solid’ to a ‘liquid’ phase of modernity:

- Separation and pending divorce of power and politics (consequences of globalisation).
- Withdrawal of communal, state-endorsed insurance against individual failure and ill fortune — saps the social foundations of social solidarity.
- Collapse of long-term thinking, planning and acting.
- The responsibility of resolving quandaries generated by vexingly volatile and constantly changing circumstances is shifted onto the shoulders of individuals (Bauman 2007, pp. 1–4).

Young suggests that we suffer from the ‘vertigo of late modernity’ because of:

- mass migration and tourism, the ‘flexibility’ of labour, the breakdown of community, the instability of family, the rise of virtual realities and reference points within the media as part of the process of cultural globalisation, the impact of mass consumerism, and the idealisation of individualism (Young 2007, p. 1).
It is clear that analysis of local community structures and relationships requires consideration of these global forces that have significantly altered employment opportunities, residential mobility, spatial relationships, leisure time, hobbies and pursuits, and the overall quality of relationships. Some have even suggested that terms like ‘community’ and ‘neighbourhood’ are no longer (if they ever were) appropriate (Greer 2004; Hughes 2007; Young 2007; Cheshire et al 2010). These global forces, it is argued, have transformed relationships and local connections.

**Programs and Policies**

Despite, or perhaps because of, the ravages of consumerism, neoliberalism and globalisation wrought on communities and locations of disadvantage, there has been renewed interest in the policy responses required to tackle high rates of crime and associated social problems found in these ‘communities’. Sampson’s policy suggestions, well summarised by Knepper, have to do with changing communities, emphasising the need for ‘changing places, not people’. Specifically, policy suggestions include targeting specific neighbourhood sites known for criminal activity; abating the ‘spiral of decay’ by removing rubbish and removing graffiti from buildings; supporting youth activities to increase interactions between young people and adults; reducing residential mobility through programs enabling people to buy their own homes; mixing public housing across various neighbourhoods, rather than concentrating it in poor neighbourhoods; increasing delivery of urban services, including police, fire and public health services; and promoting volunteerism and community organisations (Knepper 2007, pp. 22–3). As outlined by Samuels et al (2004), many of these policies have been adopted in NSW and Australia by government and non-government agencies alike.

**Implementation Challenges**

What has been clear from these programs and interventions is that there has generally been limited success in fully implementing these initiatives (as originally intended) and limited success in preventing crime (Homel 2007). As noted by Crawford (1998), ‘despite the energy and effort put into community crime prevention there has been little sustainable success’ (1998, p. 155). Some of the factors contributing to these problems will be briefly considered here.

One of the recurring challenges with community-based interventions is participation. It has been generally shown, for example, that ‘members of community crime prevention and those
who take preventive measures more often are males, middle-to-upper income, home owners, more highly educated, white, and live in single family dwellings’ (Lab 2010, p. 97) — the exact people that often have least to gain from such initiatives. Part of the difficulty is that, although ‘residents of high-crime communities still retain close contact with neighbours, their communities are fragmented and riven with mistrust, which implosive offending and disorder does nothing to diminish’ (Hope 2001, p. 423). Being fearful of your neighbours; being threatened with physical violence if you report crime or intervene; having little or no trust in agencies such as the police; having previous negative experience with government agencies; and having language or communication barriers, are just some of the reasons why people are unlikely to participate in community crime prevention activities and programs (Skogan 1990, 2006).

In addition, Hope (1995) highlights the ‘free-rider effect’. This occurs when people derive benefit from a program or intervention, irrespective of whether they participate or contribute to it. For example, Neighbourhood Watch20 operates on the basis that community members keep an eye out for each other, routinely attending meetings to discuss latest crime trends and security measures and adopting basic home security practices. The benefits of an active Neighbourhood Watch group might be derived by all residents in an area, regardless of whether every resident actively participates. This free-rider effect can be a disincentive for some to participate in relevant programs or activities.

A further dimension of participation that can lead to undesirable outcomes is the imposition of solutions by external agents in the absence of local community involvement or participation (Hope 1995). There is often a tension with community-based interventions because they are infrequently the result of some local agitation and mobilisation. More often, governmental agencies will identify an area as being ‘in need’ of some form of crime prevention activity. Whether this is due to crime statistics, a particular incendiary incident that receives widespread attention (such as a ‘riot’) or wider public policy reforms (for example, public housing reforms), the imposition of some form of action and intervention might be resisted or undermined by residents. Thus, the manner in which community crime

20 It should be noted that Neighbourhood Watch is now largely defunct in NSW. ‘Eyewatch’, a Facebook version of Neighbourhood Watch, has largely superseded the older version: see <http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/structure/operations_command/major_events_and_incidents_group/project_eyewatch/about_project_eyewatch>.
prevention programs originate and are fostered can have significant consequences for longevity and success (however defined).

A related challenge is how a program will be framed. In the context of community crime prevention, the mere identification of an area as a candidate to receive a particular intervention creates the risk of that location being stigmatised (these concerns are addressed in greater detail later in this chapter). Once branded as a ‘difficult’, ‘dangerous’, or ‘poor’ community, the harder it will be for local residents to enjoy full civic participation and to attract business and stimulate economic activity that might be required to enable progress to be made. This area-wide stigmatisation is an obvious impediment to people participating in crime prevention programs. Perceptions of failure and individual responsibility for local conditions will be barriers to ownership of and participation in community crime prevention.

Moreover, much community and social crime prevention is delivered through partnerships. There is now a mature literature on crime prevention partnerships (see Gilling 2005), which highlights the inherent challenges of this work. There are a host of problems associated with delivering ‘whole-of-community’ or ‘whole-of-government’ interventions, including: lack of data sharing or inability to deal with incompatible data sets; an inability to develop clear targets; reliance on past experience, rather than following a problem-oriented solution logic; an over-reliance on single agencies; the reluctance of certain agencies (notably health, corrections, education, welfare) to come ‘on board’; the dominance of statutory agency concerns to the exclusion of NGOs and the tendency to repackag{}e pre-existing commitments or responsibilities into plans (Gilling 2005, pp. 735–6). Crawford has noted the problem of diffuse responsibility: ‘The crux of the problem is that in this new-found era of “crime is everybody’s problem”, responsibility has become so diffused as to no longer reside anywhere in particular, with all the problems for funding to which that gives rise’ (1998, p. 122). Partnerships might be critical to delivery of community and social crime prevention, but they are not without their challenges.

These problems of partnerships point to the many implementation challenges associated with these types of intervention. Tilley has identified a series of problems with multi-agency, multi-programmatic interventions, including: the number of interventions; the number of independent agencies/parts of agencies involved; the number of separate lines of accountability; the space for unfettered practitioner discretion; the number of changes to the personnel, especially leaders; the indifference of leaders at all levels, and the changeability of
the context for the initiative (Tilley 2009, p. 158). These observations provide some insight into the challenges of devising and implementing community and social crime prevention programs that often involve multiple components, engage numerous agencies, require coordination and implementation over extended periods (often years), and rely on input and participation of local community members, who, for a variety of reasons (including fears of other residents, suspicion of government agencies, perceptions about labelling), might not be interested in participating.

**Evaluation Challenges**

These implementation problems eventually lead to evaluation problems. Leaving aside the difficulty of demonstrating the non-occurrence of a crime due to some intervention (Crawford 1998), which is a challenge common to all crime prevention activities, it can be difficult to determine what active ingredients brought about a particular change. It can also be difficult to measure some of the concepts associated with informal social control, collective efficacy and social capital. For example, some of the work by Sampson and colleagues has focused on measuring connectedness and willingness to intervene in local problems. The validity of some of the measures used to get at these constructs is open to question, especially when administered to large populations. Take, for example, the indicator used for local friendship networks:

\[\text{T}he\text{ indicator or local friendship networks is derived from a question in which respondents were asked how many of their friends (on a five-point scale ranging from none to all) resided in the local community, which was defined as the area within a 15-minute walk of the respondent’s home (Sampson & Groves 1989, pp. 783–4).}\]

While the complexity of the task of measuring such a construct on a large scale is not questioned, the validity of such a survey question is. If program outcomes are to be measured according to these constructs, then there is some likelihood that program evaluation will strike similar difficulties.

An issue that poses challenges to both implementation and evaluation is the length of time that a program or series of interventions will need to be supported to be effective. There are few ‘quick wins’ in community and social crime prevention. Vinson argued that:

\[\text{tough decisions are required about staying the distance with a manageable number of highly disadvantaged communities in order to ‘turn around’ the life prospects of those}\]
who reside in them. No absolute time limit can be set for the endeavour but it will need to be nearer seven or eight years than the standard two or three characteristic of state initiatives (Vinson 2007, p. 100).

While investment of this duration may make programmatic sense, public servants in a workshop held by the Australia Social Inclusion Board noted that ‘the budget cycle discouraged longer-term funding and that difficulties in measuring progress, the nature of portfolio reporting requirements, and the election cycle militate against long term funding’ (Australian Social Inclusion Board 2011, p. 45). To achieve this level of commitment to funding and program implementation, political and budgetary challenges must be overcome.

Given the recommended duration of programs and the nature of the interventions associated with regeneration of public housing estates or long-term community development programs, for example, it will invariably be a long time before a sound evaluation can be conducted or concluded. Further, the complexity of evaluating multi-agency, multi-component initiatives should not be underestimated. Given this challenge and those of measuring progress and sustaining funding in longitudinal analysis, it is unsurprising that only a small number of community and social crime prevention programs are evaluated. English at el found that while ‘a variety of community crime prevention programs are in use in Australia ... fewer than 10% of 170 state and territory crime prevention programs and projects identified had been evaluated’ (2002, p. 121). Compilation of an evidence base of ‘what works’ in community and social crime prevention will continue to be hampered if such little investment in evaluation is made.

Another challenge to building an evidence base is uncertainty about the crime prevention outcomes of programs that do not have crime prevention as an objective. Hope asks:

[Are the ultimate goals of crime prevention (whether that is seen as safety, well-being, opportunity or solidarity) best served by crime-specific strategies that have the specific intention of removing crime from local communities, or are they attained by strategies that seek to create the general social conditions which would attain these goals and thereby drive out crime and disorder? (Hope 2001, p. 435).]

Hogg and Brown (1998, p. 191) similarly note that ‘many of the institutions, forces and measures that serve to prevent crime do not have a crime-specific focus’. Knepper (2007) demonstrated that programs designed to engage young people in post-war construction efforts
had potential crime prevention benefits, despite this not being an intention of the initiative. Knepper duly questioned whether the identification of crime prevention as an objective of such initiatives would have, perversely, had detrimental consequences to participation and outcomes. Given that social policies may have positive unintended crime prevention benefits, evaluations of specific programs need to be sensitive to such possibilities.

Irrespective of these challenges, community and social crime prevention approaches have been widely embraced in various jurisdictions, and have been and continue to be particularly popular in Australia.

Before providing an overview of developmental crime prevention, two key criticisms of community and social crime prevention methods — the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ and the romantic notions of ‘community’ — will be briefly discussed.

‘Criminalisation of Social Policy’

Numerous commentators (Blagg et al 1988; Crawford 1994, 1998; Gilling 1997; Hughes 2002; Shaftoe 2004; Knepper 2007; Rodger 2008; Evans 2011; Wincup 2013)21 have observed and critiqued how crime has become a central organising principle in such a way as to ensure that social policies and programs become justified on the basis of their crime prevention capabilities, rather than their specific social or community-building credentials.

This ‘criminalisation of social policy’ refers to ‘the situation in which social welfare issues become redefined as crime problems. When goals of providing affordable homes, improving health, and providing incomes through employment become secondary to crime reduction in social policy, criminalisation of social policy has occurred’ (Knepper 2007, p. 139).

Rodger (2008) argues that the focus on anti-social behaviour (especially in the UK) has brought the social and criminal policy together. This can be seen, he argues, in two main ways:

First, it is evident in the *subordination* of social policy objectives designed to address social injustice and tackle the problems of poverty and disadvantage to those of the

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21 Interestingly, all of these commentators have written about the experiences of the UK. While there has been a considerable degree of cross-referencing between these authors, indicating less separate empirical interrogation of the concept of ‘criminalisation of social policy’ than the list of names might otherwise suggest, the overwhelming UK-centric nature of this commentary indicates that the concept may have limited utility in other regions or nation-states.
criminal justice system aimed at controlling and managing deviance … The justification for policy developments in the fields of early childhood development and community regeneration is that they will tackle incivility and criminality rather than that they should be pursued because of their social justice aims. Second, it is evident in the tendency to blur professional boundaries and paradigms between the criminal justice system and the world of welfare in the field of child welfare, youth justice, and community education and development (Rodger 2008, p. xii).

In this context, crime prevention and reduction credentials are used as the basis to determine if particular social welfare programs are funded or continue to be supported. No longer is the program or policy inherently sound; it must also demonstrate its ability to prevent crime. An education program is no longer evaluated only for its educational merits, but must demonstrate how it will prevent crime. A program for local young people cannot be justified based on its capacity to merely provide prosocial recreational activities; it must also show how it is contributing to preventing crime. Failure to demonstrate these crime prevention outcomes jeopardises the program/policy in question.

This process of criminalising social policy raises a number of questions, as identified by Crawford (1998, p. 121): ‘[W]here does, or should, one end and the other begin? Is it appropriate to justify social policy by reference to its (potential) crime prevention qualities?’ Crawford and others (including Knepper 2007; Hughes 2007; Rodger 2008; Evans 2011) have questioned the consequences of such a subversion of the legitimate merits of social welfare programs and their drift toward becoming crime prevention initiatives. The failure to deliver social welfare programs and assistance, irrespective of their demonstrable crime prevention outcomes, runs the risk of further exacerbating poverty, disadvantage and exclusion. This has the potential to cause greater social and economic stress, which has been shown to impact on parenting practices (by causing neglect), resulting in high levels of juvenile crime and delinquency (Weatherburn & Lind 1997). Clearly, this is not a desirable outcome.

In addition, Rodger (2008) argues that the narrow focus on individualistic behaviours distracts policymakers from confronting and tackling the more significant issues associated with constructing a civilised society. The ‘underlying structural forces destroying interdependence in marginal communities’ are avoided in favour of shallow issues associated with ‘anti-social’ and ‘criminal’ behaviour (2008, p. 168). While the ‘underlying structural
forces’ are neglected, superficial remedies will fail to be effective, and substantial policy responses will not be mounted.

This coupling of social and criminal policy has the potential to exacerbate conditions for individuals and families, but it also has the potential to distract policymakers from addressing the structural issues contributing to behavioural problems. In such an atmosphere, social policies wither and crime prevention-focused policies thrive.

**Romantic Notions of ‘Community’**

Much crime prevention (especially community crime prevention) has sought to mobilise the ‘community’. Community members are co-opted to help address problems directly affecting them — quite a seductive proposition for governments. However, there is a range of issues here. Hughes provides a concise account of the dangers of invoking ‘community’ in the context of crime prevention:

> It is hardly novel to note that the assumption of communities being akin to ‘ye olde idea of community’ is both a wrong-headed and dangerous seduction, whether imagined as the bucolic village of a hierarchical but harmonious organic past, or as the homogenous ‘high trust’ working class community of industrial society yore. It is a myth to assume that actually existing communities today are commonly characterized by a ‘relatively homogenous group of people, closely bound, sharing certain values, usually within a defined spatial locality’ (Carson 2004a:13) ... the late modern realities of living together is that of both more open, mobile social arrangements for consumer-citizens and more closed, immobile relations, especially in the most deprived and least mobile ‘communities of fate’, left behind by the neo-liberal times of affluence and consumerism (Hughes 2007, p. 12).

Pronouncements about the ability and willingness of communities, however defined, to accept responsibility to prevent crime fail to recognise the changing nature of communities, the diverse and often pluralistic nature of communities, and the resources required to address particular problems.

**Developmental Crime Prevention**

Developmental crime prevention focuses on early intervention through the amelioration of risk factors associated with later criminality and the strengthening of protective factors (National Crime Prevention 1999; R Homel 2005; Homel et al 2006; France & Homel 2007;
Farrington & Welsh 2007). There is growing evidence across multiple domains of the benefits of developmental crime prevention and early intervention:

> [F]indings of neuroscience, behavioral research, and economics show a ‘striking convergence on a set of common principles that account for the potent effects of early environment on the capacity of human skill development’, which affirms the need for greater investments in disadvantaged children in the early years of the life course (Knudsen et al 2006 as cited in Welsh et al 2010, p. 115).

Much of this research has involved capturing data across many years. Longitudinal research has highlighted pathways into and out of crime. While many studies have now been conducted to better understand what factors increase or decrease the risk of being involved in crime, two will be discussed here: the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development, and the Australian Temperament Study.

The Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development followed the lives of 411 males in South London. They were first contacted in 1961–62 when the boys were aged eight to nine years, and recent interviews were conducted when the boys (now men) were 48 years of age. Multiple data sources were compiled throughout the duration of this research, including personal interviews, criminal records, school tests, social workers interviewing parents on home visits, teachers completing questionnaires, and peer assessment during primary school. Through these data sources it has been possible to chart involvement in crime. Recent findings have revealed different general categories of involvement in crime. Of the ‘123 males who were convicted at ages 10–12, 70 (57%), were reconvicted at ages 12–50; they are termed as the persistent offenders’ (Farrington et al 2009, p. 156). Then a cohort (53 males) was identified as adolescent limited offenders — they were involved and ceased offending between the ages of 10 and 20 years. A smaller cohort (38), who did not have a record of offending between 10 and 20 years of age, but were convicted between 21 and 50 years of age, were labelled as late-onset offenders. The biggest cohort (237) were categorised as non-offenders, because they did not have any convictions during the research conducted to date (Farrington et al 2009, p. 156).

The Australian Temperament Study, conducted in Victoria (Australia), involved 13 waves of data collection over a 20-year period. A total of 2443 infants (aged four to eight months) and their families were engaged in this study. Data was captured from parents, teachers and the children, and reported on the child’s temperament style, behavioural and emotional
adjustment, social skills, health, academic progress, relationships with parents and peers, and the family’s structure and demographic profile. In relation to involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour, the study found that 79.4 per cent of the cohort were identified as low or non-antisocial, 8.3 per cent of the cohort were identified as experimental and 12.3 per cent identified as persistent antisocial between 13–14 and 17–18 years (Vassallo et al 2002).

**Risk and Protective Factors**

Studies like these have provided greater insight into movement in and out of offending behaviour over the life course. By capturing information throughout the life course, these studies were able to identify factors that appeared to increase the propensity or chances of a child/young person (and later as adults) engaging in crime. Farrington and Welsh (2007) have sought to compile findings from various studies on risk factors. They suggest that the risk factors listed in Table 2 are the most significant risk factors for offending behaviour.

**Table 2: Risk Factors for Later Offending**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain</th>
<th>Risk Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual factors</td>
<td>Low intelligence and attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personality and temperament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Empathy and impulsiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family factors</td>
<td>Criminal or antisocial parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large family size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor parental supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parental conflict and disrupted families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental factors</td>
<td>Growing up in a low socio-economic household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associating with delinquent peers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attending high-delinquency-rate schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Living in deprived areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While, ‘disappointingly, less is known about protective factors against offending’ (Farrington & Welsh 2007, p. 3), there have been attempts to define and identify protective factors. Farrington & Welsh suggest that ‘on one definition, a protective factor is merely the opposite end of the scale of a risk factor ... Another possible definition of a protective factor is a
(moderator) variable that interacts with a risk factor to minimise the risk factor’s effects’ (2007, pp. 23–4). Despite some of these challenges to accurately defining and identifying protective factors, the National Crime Prevention *Pathways to Prevention* report sought to list an array of protective factors. Some of these are listed in Table 3.

**Table 3: Protective Factors against Later Offending**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective Factors</th>
<th>Child Factors</th>
<th>Family Factors</th>
<th>School Context</th>
<th>Life Events</th>
<th>Community and Cultural Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social competence</td>
<td>Social skills</td>
<td>Supportive caring parents</td>
<td>Positive school climate</td>
<td>Meeting significant person</td>
<td>Access to support services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social skills</td>
<td>Attachment to family</td>
<td>Family harmony</td>
<td>Prosocial peer group</td>
<td>Moving to a new area</td>
<td>Community networking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>Secure and stable family</td>
<td>Secure and stable family</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
<td>Turning points or major life transitions</td>
<td>Attachment to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving</td>
<td>Small family size</td>
<td>Strong family norms and morality</td>
<td>School norms re violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Participation in church or other community group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Good coping style</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A strong cultural identity and ethnic pride</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While some of the protective factors identified in the *Pathways to Prevention* report might be questioned (and are later in this chapter), it is apparent how diverse and numerous potential protective factors (and risk factors) can be, and the obvious interaction between factors operating across different (individual, family, school and community) domains.
Early Interventions

Attempts to better understand risk and protective factors associated with later offending have had a significant impact on crime prevention and social policy discourse and practice more broadly. Studies reviewing the impact of parenting programs, pre-school enrichment activities and programs designed to enhance social skills at an early age have demonstrated positive outcomes, often across multiple domains, not just crime prevention. Two seminal programs and studies will be mentioned here — the oft-cited (North American) Elmira Home Visiting Study, and the Perry Pre-School Program — to demonstrate the benefits of developmental crime prevention interventions.

The Elmira Home Visiting Study consisted of bi-weekly home visits by nurses who provided prenatal care, baby health care, and assistance with links to other services to 400 poor and/or single first-time mothers who were under 19 years of age. Reporting on the findings of this study, which consisted of a randomised trial, Olds et al (1999) noted that:

Long-term follow-up of families in Elmira indicates that nurse-visited mothers were less likely to abuse or neglect their children or to have rapid successive pregnancies … Their children benefited too. By the time the children were 15 years of age, they had had fewer arrests and convictions, smoked and drank less, and had had fewer sexual partners (1999, p. 44).

Significant cost-savings were attributed to this program, approximated at US$4 for every US$1 spent (Olds et al, p. 56).

The Perry Pre-School Program study was conducted in Ypsilanti, Michigan, with children born between 1958 and 1962. The study’s participants were 123 three- and four-year-old Afro-American children who were selected on the basis of low parental educational attainment, socio-economic status, and the participants’ low IQ test scores (61–88 on the Stanford-Binet). Participants were assigned to an experimental group that received the pre-school program or to a control group that did not (Barnett 1985). The program was implemented between 1962 and 1967 and involved pre-school activities with trained staff, weekly home visits, and other assisted learning. The evaluation, which incorporated a randomised trial design, demonstrated substantially positive outcomes. The impact of the pre-school program on later offending was very impressive: ‘at the age of 15, programme children had lower self-reported offending; at 19, they were less likely to have been arrested; at 27, the control group had twice the number of arrests; and at 40 the programme group had
significantly fewer lifetime arrests than the non-programme group’ (R Homel 2005, p. 75). Moreover, significant non-crime-related benefits also accrued to program participants — by the ages of 27 and 40 years, the program recipients had high incomes and were more likely to be home-owners and, ‘at the age of 40, more programme-group males than controls were employed’ (R Homel 2005, p. 75). Cost-benefit analysis revealed a saving of approximately US$7 for every US$1 spent on the program.

Developmental crime prevention approaches have gained significant momentum in recent decades as longitudinal research has demonstrated the efficacy of early intervention methods. Through the identification of risk factors (and, to a lesser extent, protective factors), it has been possible to develop parenting and early-schooling programs that have positive impact on the life course development of children as they grow and mature. Positive consequences have included not only a reduction in later offending behaviour, but also impacts across other domains, including educational attainment, employment, and relationships.

**Labelling and Stigmatisation**

Despite these benefits, various criticisms arise. The potential for labelling and stigmatisation is especially true for aspects of developmental crime prevention and social crime prevention. Gilling and Barton (1997) suggest that ‘no matter how well intended, community safety can end up stigmatising populations which are, after all, selected for intervention because of their allegedly high crime or criminality, not because of their need for social injustice’ (1997, p. 79). Shapland (2000) (as cited in Knepper et al 2009) points out that early intervention and social measures can be extremely intrusive, including measures that are located in or impact on schools, houses and neighbourhoods, parenting, friendships, and relationships. In so doing, they ‘bring the public into the private lives’ of individuals and their families and because they ‘tend to be forced upon the minority by the majority, they are more like to “confine than empower”’ (2009, p. xxiii). Sutton et al (2008, p. 10) caution ‘that unless carefully managed, even the best intended social programmes are likely to have stigmatising and damaging effects’.

These are not the only criticisms of social and developmental crime prevention approaches. For some, significant political implications arise from the manner in which longitudinal data is gathered and used. Bourgois, having spent the best part of five years in El Barrio, East Harlem, New York, befriending and observing the daily rituals of local Puerto Ricans, makes
the following observations about the inadequacies of the research methods that underpin developmental crime prevention:

Developmental psychologists and psychiatrists are generally considered to be the ‘experts’ on early childhood socialisation and family violence. Most of their large-scale, multimillion-dollar, cross-generational epidemiological surveys of ‘children at risk’ conclude that the bulk of an adult’s character is determined in infancy … an individualistic, psychological-determinist approach misses the larger political economic and cultural context. It ignores historical processes and the effects of unequal power relations around class, ethnic, or gender and sexual categories. Developmental psychologists tend to focus only on the epiphenomenon of individual neuroses. Their data and analytical tools are also limited by the cultural and class biases of their survey methods. White middle-class families are overrepresented in their epidemiological samples because of the very logistics of collecting reliable statistics (Bourgois 1995, pp. 259–60).

The immersed ethnography of Bourgois leaves him sceptical of the validity and reliability of studies that focus on the ‘epiphenomenon of individual neuroses’ at the expense of positioning and understanding particular characteristics within socio-political and historical contexts. The risk, Bourgois might argue, is that potential solutions and forms of prevention inevitably focus on the individual, rather than structural factors impacting on the individual.

Similarly, Hil (2000) raises related concerns, suggesting that developmental crime prevention is:

symptomatic of a particular way of thinking about crime and its management … The ‘framing’ of this problem in the lexicon of current crime prevention discourse means that white collar or corporate crime and/or the injustices meted out via governmental mismanagement are, at best, subsumed under a welter of ‘background’ conditions … [and there is] no effort to theorise their connection [that is, poverty and disadvantage] to ‘extraneous’ considerations like globalisation and economic realignment (2000, pp. 28–32).

For Bourgois and Hil, the failure of developmental crime prevention proponents to sensitively understand and appreciate the impact of socio-historical and political influences on individuals undermines the utility of their approach and raises the possibilities of
individuals being labelled and of areas and ethnicities being stigmatised. Thus, the risk of stigmatising and labelling particular communities, individuals and families as criminogenic is an ever-present danger for social, community and developmental approaches to crime prevention.

**Problems and Limitations of Existing Typologies**

As with all nomenclature, the names of the models of crime prevention outlined in the various typologies mask numerous realities. First, there are many similarities between different models. For example, the concerns of social and developmental crime prevention clearly resonate with each other. The provision of education services can be invoked in the name of social or developmental crime prevention. Second, considering a geographical location, it quickly becomes apparent that multiple forms of crime prevention are delivered simultaneously in that area.²² Situational crime prevention techniques might be adopted by business owners on the high street, while a youth service in the same location delivers social interventions. The police working in that neighbourhood are actively using intelligence to detect would-be offenders and work with local government authorities to enforce civil ordinances regulating the activities of brothels, boarding houses and other businesses. The police also assist the public housing authority to maintain order in the housing estate. Rapid repair of vandalism, removal of graffiti and safety audits also augment the work of the public housing authority in engaging people within the estate. These and so many other crime prevention activities, technologies and techniques co-exist in any geographical location.

Such messy arrangements are rarely rendered meaningful in the crime prevention literature, which tends to focus on specific models and themes of prevention. Publications often showcase interventions from a particular model of prevention. Clarke’s (1997) *Situational Crime Prevention Case Studies* unsurprisingly highlights a number of examples of situational crime prevention from around the world. Similarly publications focus on offender rehabilitation, intelligence-led policing, crime mapping, environmental criminology, and so on. Each tends to concentrate on a single theme, rather than showing how the different models and related interventions and programs operate simultaneously in locations.

A third challenge facing any attempt to categorise crime prevention techniques is the broad array of crimes that can be committed, and therefore prevented. While ‘regular’ crime types

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²² This will become clear in later chapters, which review the volume, diversity and spread of programs and policies operating in and beyond the Glebe area.
such as assault, burglary, robbery and vandalism, for example, provide few conceptual challenges to the existing crime prevention literature, the prevention of state crime, people smuggling, cyber-crime, money laundering, drug importation, identity theft, terrorism, and numerous other emerging and/or complex inter-jurisdictional crime types tests the explanatory powers of definitions of crime prevention its typologies.

A related challenge is ensuring that crime prevention models, definitions and typologies are sufficiently broad to encapsulate the many advances in prevention techniques and to encompass the breadth of prevention techniques. Advances in security technologies, for example, are not always well understood or integrated into crime prevention discourse. Similarly, advances in military hardware (such as drones) are often adopted in security and policing domains. Should technologies such as drones be considered a form of crime prevention? Given that they are operating in areas of armed conflict and provide a means of surveillance, it could be argued that they serve some form of crime prevention. Much crime prevention literature confines itself to a limited array of activities that tend toward ‘traditional’ offences committed within a specific jurisdiction. The ability of the crime prevention literature to keep pace with technological and globalising trends is questioned.

**Conclusion**

Downes and Rock (2007, p. 9) note: ‘There is an ever-increasing body of arguments, criticisms, and studies, and no sociologist [or criminologist] is capable of mastering, reading, or remembering all that is produced.’ A complete overview of all crime prevention measures is complex and time-consuming. An understanding of the complete field covered by the term ‘crime prevention’ is not possible, and neatly categorising previous crime prevention research is fraught with difficulties. Nonetheless, this lengthy (but limited) exegesis of the different models of crime prevention serves numerous purposes. First, it highlights some of the challenges of effectively defining crime prevention, delineating the boundaries of what can rightfully be regarded as crime prevention, and points to the problems associated with attempts to develop clean crime prevention typologies. These challenges are not merely semantic. The diverse interpretations and definitions of crime prevention enable wildly different techniques to be labelled as crime prevention. Second, it provides a platform for analysing local crime prevention arrangements and activities. A basic understanding of the different forms of crime prevention is necessary to engage critically with the empirical work that forms the basis of this thesis. Further, this far-from-comprehensive description of crime
prevention models also serves to demonstrate the inter-disciplinary nature of crime prevention activities and initiatives.

Without having touched on all of the possible disciplines, agencies, institutions and actors engaged in crime prevention, it is clear that a vast array of actors contribute to the prevention of crime. This diversity of actors not only illustrates the potential complexity of inter-agency crime prevention interventions, but also alludes to the difficulties of inferring any singular organising principle or historical explanation of crime prevention. The many histories, disciplinary influences and trajectories ensure that multiple explanations must be provided in order to understand the field of crime prevention (which might be better referred to as the ‘fields’ of crime prevention).

This description of crime prevention models highlights the divergent causations of crime advanced by the different models (and within the different models). The focus of early childhood experiences expounded by developmental crime prevention advocates prevention approaches in contrast to opportunity-reducing situational and environmental design techniques. It is argued that the different crime prevention models are often pitted against each other, indeed often contradict each other, with advocates and opponents exchanging perspectives about the relative merits of each approach. While the wider political implications of embracing one approach over another must be considered, there is little to be gained from such competition (Sarre 1994). The diversity of criminal activities, from insider trading to shoplifting, from domestic violence to state-endorsed genocide, cannot be explained by a single theory and therefore cannot be prevented by a single model. As will be shown, a sterile and academic competition between approaches is not reflected in actual practice. Rather, crime prevention practitioners and other actors engaged in crime prevention shop around for appropriate responses to particular crime issues and/or deliver interventions that relevant to their organisation or program.

The next chapter considers the growth in crime prevention in recent decades.
Chapter 3: The (Re-)Emergence of Crime Prevention

The previous chapter described some of the definitional challenges associated with crime prevention, outlined common typologies, and introduced particular models of crime prevention. This chapter turns to the reasons behind the (re-)emergence of crime prevention as a discipline. Much of the material utilised in this chapter is drawn from the latter part of last century. It has been suggested that there had been a re-emergence of crime prevention, known as the ‘preventive turn’ (Hughes 2007). Zedner captures this rise in prevention in the term ‘pre-crime’ (2007).

This chapter will describe some of the conditions and socio-political circumstances that enabled crime prevention to re-emerge significantly in the latter part of last century (especially during the 1980s and 1990s). In particular, consideration will be given to the impact of high crime; the growth and subsequent recognition of the limits of the criminal justice system; the rise of neo-liberalism and the attack on the state; the emergence of victimology; the development of crime prevention as an antidote to ‘law and order’ politics; and the success of the public health model. The importance of local responses will also be canvassed here. These neatly presented categories break down quickly when unpacked and should not be considered as separate historical determinants, but rather as parts of a complicated story with local, temporal and geo-political continuities and discontinuities.

Before reviewing these contributing factors, brief mention will be made of the accuracy of calling this ‘preventive turn’ an emergence or re-emergence.

Emergence or Re-emergence?

In essence, there are two dominant strands of thought about the emergence or re-emergence of crime prevention. One suggests that the roots of modern crime prevention can be found deep in the history of civilisation or, as Cherney and Sutton (2003, p. 332) suggest, ‘crime prevention is as old as crime itself’. Crowe (2000) and Cozens (2008) point to early forms of town planning and architecture to demonstrate early forms of CPTED. Gilling (1997) suggests that:

Unfocused crime prevention, which is of a primary sort, targeted at the general population, has been traced back into the mists of time. Laycock and Heal (1989), for example, note that Palaeolithic man used property-marking, albeit not with a UV pen,
while the constructors of the Egyptian pyramids clearly pursued something akin to a strategy of design against crime (1997, p. 70).

Lab (2010) highlights practices of the Roman Empire and the Norman conquest of England in 1066 as precursors to the establishment of modern policing agencies as linked to the eventual emergence of crime prevention. Lab also points to the private security industry and merchant policing forces in the US and England and the juvenile court as early examples of crime prevention (2010, pp. 22–6). Additon describes the establishment of an Advisory Committee on Crime Prevention by the New York Police Department in 1929 (1936, p. 215), and the Gluecks highlighted diverse crime prevention programs operating in the US in the early decades of the 20th century (Glueck & Glueck 1936).

O’Malley has argued that:

[C]rime prevention has a longer history than these claims [of situational crime prevention advocates] suggest. Situational crime prevention, for example, dates back at least to the great adventures in urban planning that were features of the European cities of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The creation of broad boulevards, slum clearances and the levelling of the old criminal ‘rookeries’ were conscious exercises in what is now termed ‘designing out crime’. More focused architecture models for reducing criminal opportunities have been under development since the 1960s … The involvement of ‘the community’ in increasing local security and providing ‘pre-delinquents’ with alternative lifestyle avenues, likewise goes back many years. The interventions of the Chicago ‘ecological’ criminologists in the 1930s, for example, were based on the mobilisation and training of community members in the creation of less criminogenic neighbourhoods … In other words, the currently favoured models are not that new (1997, p. 255).

There is clearly much to suggest that contemporary crime prevention has roots in various historical practices and developments. As outlined here, various commentators have connected numerous historical developments with contemporary crime prevention practices. Early forms of policing, urban planning and slum clearance, community-based interventions and other historical governmental practices pre-date the more recent rise of prevention.
The alternative perspective suggests that crime prevention really only started to take hold formally in the 1960s. O’Malley (and Hutchinson), perhaps in contrast to his early arguments, more recently observed that:

With respect to crime prevention ... the insurance industry was not oriented toward crime prevention until into the 1960s, at which point, it began an involvement that was to become increasingly active both as a pressure group and as an ‘agent of prevention’, helping to effect and generalise a new approach to crime prevention (O’Malley & Hutchinson 2007, p. 385).

This seems to relegate previous arguments in favour of an insurance-led rise of prevention in the latter decades of last century. While the insurance industry and prudentialism has no doubt had a significant influence on shaping police involvement in crime prevention and ‘responsibilising’ individuals and businesses to take greater precautions, the influence of the insurance industry can only be confined to the prevention of property-related crimes. A spectrum of other crimes and prevention approaches obviously pre-date the interest shown by insurance companies in crime prevention.

Irrespective of the definition of crime prevention (or related terms) or when it ultimately emerged as a feature of modern government policy, it is widely accepted that crime prevention significantly re-emerged in the latter part of last century, most notably in the 1980s and 1990s, the period of the greatest growth of crime prevention activity. Main explanations for this ‘preventive turn’ will be considered in some detail in this chapter.

**Rising Crime Rates — Latter Part of Last Century**

Crawford (2009b, p. 2) argued that ‘concerns over increased crime and the fear of crime, prompted by greater ownership of commodities vulnerable to theft and property-derived incentives to security’ contributed to the rise of crime prevention. While measuring the actual level of crime and perceptions of crime are beset with problems (Black 1970; Graycar & Grabosky 2002), including that the reporting of property offences has been shown to be higher than the reporting of personal offences (ABS 2007a; O’Brien et al 2008), many western democratic nations experienced rising crime rates through the latter part of the 20th century. Garland suggests that the growth in crime between 1950 and 1990 is incontestable.

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23 Though, as Lacey (2008) highlights, these broad generalisations mask jurisdictional (and inter-jurisdictional) differences.
He states that between ‘1955 and 1964 the number of crimes recorded by the police in England and Wales doubled … It doubled again by 1975 and yet again by 1990’ (Garland 2001, p. 90). These increases led Radzinowicz and King (1977, p. 4) to state: ‘The recent speed of growth [in crime rates] … has been unprecedented’ (1977, p. 4). And Tilley (2002) to suggest that in the 1980s, ‘crime rates were continuing to rise at a rate of 5–7 per cent per annum’ (2002: 15) (emphasis added).

Similarly, Grabosky and others have highlighted rises in crime in NSW and across Australia. Grabosky (1977, p. 143) observed that: ‘Beginning in 1963, rates of burglary, larceny, armed robbery, and robbery with assault showed sharp annual increases. The years from 1963 to 1970 saw rates of larceny and break-and-enter increase well over 100 per cent, while that of assault and robbery increased 300 per cent’. Moreover, ‘[t]he rate of reported armed robberies increased sixteenfold from 1963 to 1969, before dropping off slightly in 1970. Continuing an upward trend which began in the late 1950s, the rate of ‘rape and attempts’ known to the police rose by 100 per cent during the 1960s’ (1977, p. 143).

Weatherburn, too, noted Australian-wide trends in reported crime. Between:

1973/74 and 1988/89, the recorded rate of household break-and-enter rose 144 per cent, while the recorded rate of motor vehicle theft rose by 105 per cent. Over the same period, the recorded rate of robbery rose 126 per cent and the recorded rate of serious assault increased by 376 per cent (2004, p. 12).

These are dramatic increases in crime.

While many of these offences have witnessed falls in recent years (especially since 2001) (see Zimring 2007; Farrell et al 2008, 2011; Weatherburn 2011; Moffatt & Goh 2011; van Dijk et al 2012; Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b), the earlier increases in crime, seen in many countries, placed pressure on governments to ‘do something about the crime problem’. One aspect of this response has been the rise of crime prevention infrastructure, programs and policies, in the shadow of dramatic expansion of the criminal justice ‘system’.

**Growth in and Limitations of the Criminal Justice ‘System’**

The criminal justice ‘system’ is a term ‘covering all those institutions which respond officially to the commission of offences, notably the police, prosecution authorities and courts’ (Cavadino & Dignan 2002, p. 1). The criminal justice system has historically been the key vehicle for preventing crime. Despite the problems of suggesting that criminal justice
agencies function as a cohesive system (Cavadino & Dignan 2002), police, courts and corrections (including prison administration) have been the traditional agencies for preventing crime. Rising crime rates generally resulted in significant expansion of criminal justice powers, budgets and activities.

One approach to stall rising crime rates was to deploy greater numbers of police, and numerous jurisdictions witnessed a rise in police numbers in the last decades of the last century. Newburn illustrates the growth of public police in England and Wales from approximately 50 000 police in 1955 to 142 000 in 2007 (2008, p. 2). Linked to the increasing numbers of police have been substantial increases in policing budgets. Newburn reveals the rise in policing costs from £1.6 billion in 1979 to £3.4 billion in 1984, to £7.7 billion by 2000, and rising again to £13 billion in the 2007–08 financial year (2008, p. 2).

While perhaps less dramatic than the increases experienced in England and Wales, the NSW Police Force also increased in size during the last part of last century. Chappell and Wilson state that the strength (that is, number of police) of the NSW Police Force was 6517 in 1967 (1969, p. 140). Swanton et al reveal that this had increased to 9357 in 1981, with an annual budget of approximately A$250 million (1983, pp. 15–20). Prenzler and Sarre indicate that the NSW Police Force had 13 614 sworn police in 2001 (2002, p. 53), increasing to 15 977 in 2011–12, with a budget of just greater than A$3 billion (NSW Police Force 2012, p. 4).

As was flagged in Chapter 2, despite these increases in personnel and funding, there was little evidence and confidence that more police necessarily translated to lower crime rates. Sarre suggests that ‘[e]ven highly professional police find that increased knowledge about specialised policing methods, quicker response-times and reliance upon crime-control expertise do not bring the rewards (lower crime rates and less fear of crime) they may have envisaged’ (1997, p. 65). Reiner (2010, p. 256) observed that ‘[t]he overall crime reduction that has been occurred [sic] in recent years is largely due to factors other than policing’. Thus,

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24 Due to ‘austerity measures’ in the UK in recent years, the number of police across the UK has fallen. The Independent Police Commission has suggested that austerity measures have resulted in the loss of 6800 police officers, with a further 15 000 to be lost from UK police forces by 2014–15 (Independent Police Commission 2013, p. 25).
the increased number and cost of police appears to have had little impact on crime rates.\textsuperscript{25} Perhaps other areas of the criminal justice system delivered better results.

In the US, the imprisonment rate has increased fivefold since 1975, and US state expenditure on corrections has risen from US$12 billion to US$52 billion over a 20-year (1998–2008) period (Brown 2010, pp. 137–8). In the UK, the prison population approximately trebled between 1946 and 1986 (Cavadino & Dignan 2002, p. 187) and grew by 66 per cent between 1995 and 2009 (Prison Reform Trust 2011, p. 4). In just five years (between 2003–04 and 2008–09), prison expenditure increased nearly 40 per cent in real terms to £3.96 billion per annum (Prison Reform Trust 2011). Lulham and Fitzgerald (2008) report that ‘[t]here has been a 50.3 percent increase in the yearly prison population [in NSW], with 6,181 people imprisoned in the 1992/1993 financial year and 9,288 imprisoned in the 2006/2007 financial year’ (2008, p. 5). Further, Hall (drawing on data from Hogg 2002) notes that, in NSW, the imprisonment rate in 2000 was 172 per 100,000 adult population, an increase of 78.6 per cent since 1982. In ‘2006/7 the rate of imprisonment in NSW was 187.6 per 100,000 adult population (Department of Corrective Services NSW 2008)’ (Hall 2010, p. 20).

A raft of related figures can be assembled to demonstrate the ‘mass imprisonment’ experienced (unevenly) across numerous jurisdictions in recent decades and their associated rising costs. Despite this greater use of imprisonment, there is substantial evidence questioning the effectiveness of prison to prevent crime. A performance review conducted by the Auditor-General of NSW into the NSW Department of Corrective Services in 2006 found that:

> Currently one in two prisoners returns to corrective services within two years of release, which is similar to other states. Most of these return to prison. The return to prison rate has risen by nine percentage points over the last ten years. It is now about 44 per cent, having fallen from a peak of 46 per cent in 1999–2000 (2006, p. 4).

These data are not especially glowing in relation to the effectiveness of imprisonment in preventing crime and re-offending.

\textsuperscript{25} As outlined in Chapter 2, the view that police have little or no capacity to prevent crime has been challenged in recent years. There is now some evidence that targeted policing activities can have prevent some forms of crime (see Sherman et al 2002; Mazerolle et al 2011).
There has been similar increasing use of and investment in courts. With more police, rising crime and greater numbers of people being imprisoned (by the courts), it is unsurprising that there has been considerable growth in cases before the courts. Callinan observed in 2002 that ‘[a] significant growth in the demand for court hearings was noted in 1989 and this trend has generally continued’ (2002, p. 21). Moreover, ‘demand on the criminal jurisdiction has increased by 22% during the last 5 years. In 2000 there were 266,769 new matters’ (2002, p. 13).

A recent study undertaken by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (‘BOCSAR’) sought to determine levels of re-offending by people who appeared in NSW (adults’ and children’s) criminal courts in 1994. The study concluded that ‘it is clear that the majority of those who are convicted in the NSW criminal courts are eventually reconvicted of a further offence, and this is especially so for juveniles’ (Holmes 2011, p. 5). Specifically, almost 60 per cent of offenders convicted in 1994 were reconvicted within 15 years with most re-offending occurring within a few years of the initial offence (Holmes 2011, p. 1), suggesting little preventive benefits of court.

Expansion of the criminal justice ‘system’ and associated individual agencies through the latter part of the 20th century is well documented (as outlined above). Not only was the number of people coming into contact with the criminal justice system growing, but more resources were being invested in various criminal justice agencies. Despite this increasing investment, considerable evidence has amassed of the limitations of the criminal justice system to prevent crime. High levels of re-offending, repeat contact with the criminal justice system and rising crime rates suggest that criminal justice responses to preventing crime were ineffective. To compound this situation, self-report studies showed that, despite the expansion of the criminal justice system, a fraction of people offending were apprehended or processed (Baker 1998), and clear-up rates for various offences revealed that only a small percentage of offences reported to police resulted in a conviction (Weatherburn 2004).

Taken together, these findings in part assisted the pursuit of alternative means to prevent crime — as clearly the criminal justice system on its own was unable to successfully prevent crime and to reverse the substantial increases in crime experienced in many western democratic countries between (approximately) the 1950s and the start of this century.
Neo-Liberalism and Small Government

Providing a simple overview of socio-political changes in the last 40 or 50 years and the link between these changes and the ‘preventive turn’ is not an easy task. There are many contradictory examples, competing perspectives and complex socio-political trajectories. As such, the following can only be considered a limited synopsis, sufficient for current purposes.

Despite the ballooning criminal justice system, the last decades of last century were generally characterised by rhetorical and actual attacks (often by conservative governments) on the role of and the size of the state. Labelled as ‘neo-liberalism’, a shift in governmental activity resulted in the erosion of the welfare state.

O’Malley suggests that ‘beginning in the early 1990s, criminologists began to interpret many changes across the domain of crime control as reflecting the ascendency of neo-liberalism. Broadly speaking neo-liberalism is said to be distinguished by a series of central concerns’ (2008b, p. 57). O’Malley summarises some of the key features of neoliberalism as:

- an attack on state-centred governance, expounding views that the interventionist state crippled economic dynamism by over-regulation, and by diverting potentially profitable activities into non-profit state agencies;
- an assault on the welfare state and on welfare expertise that is seen as generating a culture of dependency rather than activity and independence, and as destroying individual freedom and responsibility by inserting technocratic governance into all walks of private life;
- the advocacy of the market as a model for most social order (including most surviving ‘state’ operations), advocacy of the business enterprise as a model for organisational and individual activity, and idealisation of the entrepreneur as the model for preferred individual self-governance;
- promotion of business-like relations, especially the formation of contractual and quasi-contractual relationships such as ‘partnerships’ between state and non-state agencies;
- an emphasis on cost-effective, pragmatic, results-based government, coupled with accountability at all levels, and especially a desire to make government accountable for expenditure and productivity;
- the reaffirmation of individual responsibility and of the responsibility of families and communities for the government of their own affairs; and
• an affirmation of ‘freedom of choice’, including choice in relation to consumption as a market-provided reward for success (O’Malley 2008a, p. 57).

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) famously characterised these changes to the role of government as moving from ‘rowing to steering’. No longer does the state assume responsibility for the delivery of all services. The ‘enterprising’ state regulates through its legislative powers, but leaves delivery to the market, enabling the rise of a mixed economy where private organisations, government departments, NGOs, volunteer groups and others can compete, cooperate or co-deliver services (Considine 2001). The monopoly of the state in providing correctional, policing, rehabilitation, education, employment assistance, health care, electricity and a host of other services was eroded during the latter part of last century. The state is no longer central to the provision of services, as privatisation valorises the role of private organisations and the market (Clarke & Newman 1997).

Hybridised forms of service delivery gained greater ascendency during this period. Welfare services that continue to be provided are increasingly the domain of NGOs, not-for-profit organisations and private companies (Saunders 2002). These changes in the role of the state also enabled the rise of private security companies and strengthened the role of insurance providers. A potentially symbiotic relationship thus grew, whereby individuals were ‘responsibilised’, requiring, for example, the purchasing of security technologies and services to protect against theft (O’Malley & Hutchinson 2007). Insurance policies in many instances require such ‘pro-activity’ or else the policies are void. Consequently, a ‘mixed economy’ emerged, whereby service delivery configurations are many and varied. Agencies are funded and audited on the delivery of ‘outcomes’, rather than for merely providing services (Heinrich 2002). In this climate, consortia, coalitions and public private partnerships become the norm, with ‘public’ and ‘private’ distinctions blurring and the shift from government to governance accelerated (Geddes 2005).

Neoliberalism has impacted on how government agencies operate. The transformation of government agencies and public administration brought on by neoliberalism has been referred to as ‘managerialism’ or ‘New Public Management’ (Considine & Painter 1997). In essence, business principles increasingly crossed into public administration as part of the ‘modernisation’ of the public service (Newman 2002). Senior bureaucrats moved from fixed tenure to contracts; efficiency savings were made through outsourcing ‘non-essential’ activities; productivity savings were achieved through investments in information technology,
resulting in the need for fewer staff; government agency activities were rationalised and key performance indicators identified; corporate plans and business planning were de rigueur; cost-effectiveness and cost-savings were driven by central treasury agencies; and business cases were needed to secure extra funding. These and other trends in public administration and governance permeated criminal justice agencies and government thinking more broadly, including in the area of crime prevention (see Gilling & Barton 2005; Hughes 2007; Evans 2011 for a discussion of the audit and managerial culture within the crime prevention field in the UK).

Coinciding with and linked to managerialism and the ‘creep’ of business processes into public administration was a sustained attack on government spending. The ‘bloating of the welfare state’ resulted in unsustainable substantial increases in government spending, or so the argument goes. Fiscal responsibility necessitated the ‘hollowing out of the state’ through staff reductions, privatisation, the sale of state assets, a withering attack on welfare recipients (Cohen 2002), and efforts to rein in allegedly profligate government spending. In this context, the ‘promise of crime prevention’ is alluring. The growing burden of administering the criminal justice system without any political gains (due to rising crime rates) made preventive alternatives economically and politically desirable. ‘Cost-benefit’, ‘cost-effectiveness’ and ‘cost-savings’ became terms frequently invoked to advocate forms of prevention and to gain political support for various initiatives. Welsh and Farrington note:

Arguments such as ‘for every dollar spent, seven dollars are saved in the long run’ (Scheinhart, Barnes, and Weikart 1993) have proved very powerful. Indeed, cost-benefit studies over the last twenty years demonstrate that many different crime prevention strategies, such as early childhood intervention, situational prevention, and offender treatment, hold much promise in reducing the monetary costs associated with crime and paying back public and private investments in prevention programs (2001, p. 3).

Hence, the cost-saving potential of crime prevention became a significant further attraction in a time of rising criminal justice costs, sustained attacks on the size and spending of government and recognition of the limits of the criminal justice system.

It is not difficult to see the relationship between these broad developments and the rise of crime prevention. Individual responsibility, advocacy of the market (and the rise of private providers), the assault on the welfare state and the attendant rise in situational crime
prevention, and an emphasis on cost-effective, pragmatic and results-based government are all conditions that enabled and facilitated the rise of crime prevention as a goal of the state. Security services and devices flourish in such conditions; governments divest responsibility for delivering ‘safer communities’ by responsibilising voluntary groups (such as Neighbourhood Watch); crime is ‘designed out’ via greater consideration of crime risks by architects and planners; business owners are incentivised to take precautionary measures by insurance companies that seek to reduce risk exposure; police develop partnerships with motor vehicle manufacturers to modify car designs to make them more inherently secure. A plethora of examples abounds, showing the movement from state-centric crime prevention through criminal justice agencies to hybridised, networked, ‘joined up’ models of prevention.

**Victimology and Protection of Victims**

The victim, it has been claimed, was absent from much criminological discourse in the first two-thirds of the 20th century (Schafer 1977; Mawby & Gill 1987). Understanding crime required only an understanding of the offender. Criminal justice agencies, by and large, attended to the needs of offenders and sought to find more sophisticated ways of processing, punishing and rehabilitating them. Criminological discourse highlighted, among other things, the origins of punishment, the work of criminal justice agencies, the abuses of power by criminal justice personnel, and levels of crime in particular jurisdictions. Numerous other and related issues garnered attention, but rarely were the needs and experiences of victims captured or considered (with some notable exceptions).

This began to change, particularly in the 1970s. Mawby and Gill (1987) provide three key explanations for this interest and focus on victims: (1) different sentences had different impacts on offenders and were not shown to be especially effective (demonstrated by Martinson’s (1974) ‘nothing works’ pessimism), leading to interest in the opportunities for crime and the promotion of situational crime prevention; (2) feminist sociology resulted in focus on the experiences of women as victims of crime; and (3) the adoption of victim surveys provided a more accurate picture of victimisation than police records. Perhaps more provocatively, Elias adopts a party-political view by suggesting that the victims’ movement was associated ‘with liberal politics whose crime control policies failed, thus ceding the field to conservatives who, in their law and order crusade, championed the victim’s cause’ (1993, p. 48).

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26 As discussed in Chapter 2.
Regardless of the exact explanation, there is considerable evidence of the increasing attention given to victims. Spalek (2006, p. 92) noted that over ‘the last forty years, victim services, aimed at addressing victims’ emotional, practical, financial, psychological and social needs, have rapidly expanded’. Victim statements, victim’s compensation, victim-offender mediation, victim policies, victim bureaus, victim support services, state-sponsored counselling for victims and numerous other policy and programmatic developments grew up around the victims’ movement and the greater recognition of the needs of victims in the latter part of the last century.

While many of these victim-oriented developments were welcomed, Elias cautioned against celebration of these developments:

Most victim policy has fallen far short … The revolution in crime control, which has built around restoring the victim’s role has not succeeded … Behind the flurry of new policy and the very few victims’ initiatives of any real substance, the real political agenda was to enhance conservative crime policies and social policies … The real meaning of this experience is that victims have been politically manipulated (1993, p. vii).

The victim becomes the symbol of the need for increased crime-control measures. In the name of the victim (at times literally, as in the case of legislation introduced in some jurisdictions, such as Megan’s Law\(^{27}\) in the US), greater powers were given to policing agencies and courts, and greater penalties were introduced.

It could be argued that the rising political influence of the victims’ movement not only (directly or indirectly) contributed to ‘punitive populism’, but was also harnessed to support crime prevention activities. Schafer cites the 1967 US President’s Commission on Law and Enforcement and Administration of Justice: ‘If it could be determined with sufficient specificity that people or businesses with certain characteristics are more likely than others to be crime victims … efforts to control and prevent crime would be more productive’ (1977, p. 42). Thus, not only do victims assume greater political clout, they also become important units of study to help shape crime prevention activities. Victim surveys at the local level

\(^{27}\) ‘Megan’s Law’ is an informal name for laws in the US that require law enforcement authorities to make information available to the public regarding registered sex offenders, and it was created in response to the murder of Megan Kanka.
(Mawby & Gill 1987), routine activities theory (Cohen & Felson 1979), crime pattern theory (Brantingham & Brantingham 2008), and the emergence of environmental criminology (Brantingham & Brantingham 1981) contribute to victim experience becoming vital intelligence about the commission of crime and potential prevention options.

Crime mapping is an extension of elements of these developments, in that data are now routinely captured and mapped on offence type, offence location, offence time, modus operandi of offender and instruments used in the commission of the offence (Weisburd & McEwan 1998; Chainey & Ratcliffe 2005; Burgess 2011). By gathering this information, often from victims, crime prevention measures can be mounted in the hope of preventing further victimisation. And with the ‘discovery’ of repeat and near-repeat victimisation (Farrell & Pease 1993), the focus on the victim as a target and rationale for crime prevention gained further momentum.

Consequently, the ‘rise of the victim’ in criminological discourse and criminal justice policy has not only manifested in policies and programs to support victims, but has also been employed by political parties of various hues to legitimise crime control policies. Moreover, victims’ needs have been linked with and used to justify crime prevention activities. The prevention of crime equates to a prevention of victimisation.

Antidote to ‘Law and Order’ Politics

Much of this chapter has been dedicated to reflecting on some of the developments found in many democratic nations during the 1980s and 1990s. Rising crime, fear of crime, general anxieties fuelled by ‘liquid modernity’, globalisation, risk-based thinking, and adherence to the precautionary principle, identification of the limits of the sovereign state to arrest rising crime, and growing insecurity are but some of the themes to emerge from diverse commentary of this period. These and other factors contributed to what has been variously described as ‘the culture of control’ (Garland 2001), ‘popular punitiveness’ (Bottoms 1995 as cited in Pratt 2002) or the ‘uncivil politics of law and order’ (Hogg & Brown 1998). Each of these monikers denotes growing intolerance from the public and politicians leading to increasingly repressive criminal justice powers and practices.

Pratt reminds us that:

There seems little doubt that the public mood became more sharply punitive from around 1980 onwards than had been the case in the previous twenty years … These
Concerns might then be typically connected to broader undercurrents of worry, insecurity, fear of the future, lack of concern for others and a heightened concern for one’s own security, amidst a general sense of powerlessness and foreboding (2002, p. 182).

Coupled with a state declaring its own limits in controlling crime (Garland 1996), but not wanting to appear ‘aloof’ (Pratt 2002) or emasculated, the conditions are created for the ‘law and order auctions’ that came to dominate electoral cycles in many jurisdictions (Lee 1996; Weatherburn 2004; Ricketts 2004; Loughnan 2009; Cowdery 2012). Greater police powers, more police, greater number of people appearing before court, harsher penalties, more people imprisoned, fewer opportunities for early release from prison, and the like reflect these law and order ‘auctions’ and politics.

Crime prevention presents an alternative or even an antidote to these ‘uncivil politics of law and order’ (Hogg & Brown 1998). Rather than continue to bow to popular punitiveness, crime prevention provides a palatable political alternative. Prevention programs provide opportunities to be seen to be ‘doing something about the crime problem’, but they also increasingly can be shown to be effective and even cost-effective, with a growing evidence base developing. Hogg and Brown argue that crime prevention can ‘redistribute responsibility for managing crime. It also seeks to reorder the core objectives and priorities of crime control practice away from a sole or dominant emphasis on the apprehension and punishment of offenders, to prevention of crime and management of risk’ (1998, p. 184). O’Malley suggests that ‘despite defeats and changes in criminological fashion, ideas about crime prevention continue to be resurrected, perhaps in no small measure because they represent one alternative to punitiveness and retributivism’ (1997, pp. 255–6).

Thus, this feature of the ‘preventive turn’ has been in direct response to the ‘uncivil law and order politics’ common in the 1980s and 1990s. In some respects, the language and nature of crime prevention interventions had political appeal. Not only did prevention provide an alternative or perhaps more appropriately an adjunct to criminal justice interventions (Sutton et al 2008), it also, in some instances, promised quick results (as with many situational crime prevention techniques), adopted language more familiar with progressive or liberal political regimes (such as ‘community crime prevention’), and could be shown to augment the ‘tough-on-crime’ policies (as with developmental crime prevention, which could be characterised as focusing on preventing the next generation of offenders). In this way, crime prevention could
be promoted as: cheaper than traditional crime control responses; quick in delivering results; everyone’s responsibility; effective; and still ‘tough on crime’. Aspects of these messages no doubt appealed to diverse political sensitivities, resulting in support from the Left and the Right (Gilling 1997).

Local Approaches
A significant feature of the rise of crime prevention has been the devolution of responsibility to local actors to assume responsibility for coordination and delivery of crime prevention programs. Following is a brief overview of some of the international developments that have propelled local responses to crime prevention, which have contributed to the rise of crime prevention more generally.

Support for local crime prevention planning has been premised on the hope that the involvement and participation of local community members temper the excesses of law and order political rhetoric and ‘punitive populism’ (Sutton 1997; Cherney & Sutton 2007; Sutton et al 2008; Crawford 2009b). While not specifically referring to local crime prevention planning, Sutton suggests that crime prevention ‘can become a vehicle for contesting established political and media discourses about the nature of crime and society’s responses’ (Sutton 1997, pp. 32–3). By the very nature of engagement of local stakeholders, community members and businesses, local crime prevention planning offers the hope of challenging the pervasive popular punitive rhetoric driving crime control policy.

There is now a well-established body of research and practice highlighting local governments as critical agents in the delivery of crime prevention (Hogg 1990; Crawford 1997; Queensland Criminal Justice Commission 1999; Shaw 2001; Sutton & Cherney 2002; UNODC 2004; Cherney 2004a; Cherney 2004b; Homel 2005; Anderson & Homel 2005; Cherney 2006; Cherney & Sutton 2007; Sutton et al 2008; Homel 2009; Shaw 2009; Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee 2012). There have been a number of reports and guidelines from key international agencies promoting the role of local government in crime prevention. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (‘ICPC’), the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (‘UNODC’) and UN-HABITAT are some of the most influential organisations promoting the role of local government in the prevention of crime. Margaret Shaw (formerly of the ICPC) suggests that ‘cities, municipalities, and their leaders are in a unique position to mobilize local agencies in the development of safe, secure and lively communities’. This is because:
[t]hey are strategically placed to bring together all the actors. They have traditionally been responsible for urban or rural planning, they have intimate ties with all the local services, hospitals, schools, transport, youth and social services, police and judiciary, and the business community, to say nothing of their constituents (Shaw 2001, p. 2).

The *United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime* (UNODC 2002) and the *Guidelines for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in the Field of Urban Crime Prevention* (ECOSOC RES 1995/9) developed by the UNODC echo these sentiments. And the UN-HABITAT (n.d.) Safer Cities Programme states that cities have a primary role in coordinating the activities aimed at reducing crime. Local governments are seen as the key actors in coalitions and in the development of community-wide planning strategies for crime prevention. These are just some of the relevant international developments, reports and guidelines that have consolidated support for local government assuming a key role in the prevention of crime.

While there can be no single explanation for this movement, there are a number of potential factors that have led to this increased recognition of the role of local government. The localised nature of much crime, an ability to mobilise local services and resources, to build partnerships, to understand local problems, and connection with the citizenry are some of the reasons frequently cited. Further, the growing acceptance of subsidiarity principles within public administration circles has resulted in the devolution of greater responsibilities to local governments (Homel 2009). It has been suggested that public administration and governance should be managed as close to the citizenry as is possible. This means that local government has the opportunity to better manage and coordinate various services and address ‘wicked social policy issues’, rather than relying on (in the case of Australia) state/territory or Commonwealth government agencies, which are frequently further removed from local communities and local issues. This move to devolve responsibility to the lowest competent authority is also consistent with ‘responsible’ trends that have been discussed by numerous commentators in recent years (see Crawford 1997; Garland 2001; Rodger 2008). Making local government (and community members, local businesses, voluntary groups, non-government organisations, and so on) responsible for crime prevention reduces the accountability of higher levels of government for crime rates (Hope 2005b) and can shift the costs of these activities to local government (and associated entities).
Consistent with these ‘responsibilisation’ and subsidiarity trends, there has been growing recognition of non-state actors in the delivery of local services. No longer are local councils considered to be solely responsible for the provision of particular goods and services. Terms like ‘joined-up’, ‘whole-of-government’, ‘whole-of-community’, ‘networked government’, ‘associational governance’, and the ‘third way’ are commonly associated with these developments (Crawford 1997; Gilling 1997; P Homel 2005; Geddes 2005). This suggests that local government has a critical ‘steering role’, while other local groups, companies, individuals and entities have greater responsibility for ‘rowing’ local crime prevention initiatives (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Crawford 1997). Partnerships coordinated by local government become the vehicle through which local crime prevention occurs.

While there are numerous reasons for this trend toward local government assuming a key role in crime prevention, this approach is not without its own problems (or discontents). For example, Hughes suggests that there is potential for local crime prevention initiatives to become ‘co-opted on to the broader right-wing law-and-order agenda in an attempt to regain public confidence’ (Hughes 2002, p. 127). Rather than bringing about a reduction in punitive populism, there is the potential for local crime prevention initiatives to be exclusionary and an extension of ‘law and order’ politics found in many jurisdictions in recent decades. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, Weatherburn highlights the limits of the capacity of local government for crime prevention, suggesting that ‘most of the risk and protection factors associated with involvement in crime are under the control of state and federal governments rather than local government’ (Weatherburn 2004, p. 209). Irrespective of the crime prevention strategies mobilised at a local level, Weatherburn raises doubts about the effectiveness of local government to actually impact on key risk and protective factors affecting crime. Further, Cherney raises concerns about the capacity of local government to assume these responsibilities without resources. Devolution of responsibility of crime prevention from state to local governments without resources, autonomy and decision-making powers undermines efforts of local government to implement frequently centrally determined government crime prevention policies (Cherney 2004a).

Despite these potential limitations and concerns, there has been a significant movement toward local government assuming a crucial role for crime prevention in recent years. Some of the support for local crime prevention in Australia was directly influenced by international developments (Sutton 1997; Cameron & Laycock 2002), with developments in two international jurisdictions being particularly important: the Bonnemaison approach in France,
and local government crime prevention (or ‘community safety’ as it is often labelled) in the UK.

The Bonnemaison Approach

The French approach to crime prevention evolved out of three key developments in the early 1980s: riots in Lyon and Marseille in 1981; the election of a socialist government in 1982; and a review of the causes of crime and the development of a charter for a national response. This review, chaired by Gilbert Bonnemaison, the mayor of Epinay sur Seine, shaped what became known as the ‘Bonnemaison approach’. This approach was ‘rooted in the observation that many of the major public housing programs developed in the 1960s and 1970s ignored the social needs of the residents and led to their exclusion from the most productive and valued elements of society’ (Cameron & Laycock 2002, p. 314). It focused on the coordination of key agencies and actors and gave primacy to local responses. The three essential ingredients for the successful delivery of crime prevention associated with the Bonnemaison approach included a defined territory (which in France is the municipality); partnership at the local level; and a strategy based on a local crime analysis (Cameron & Laycock 2002, p. 314).

Sutton (1997, p. 23) notes that this approach gave birth to a host of programs and activities, including: youth recreational initiatives; victim assistance; special intensive classes for educationally disadvantaged young people; schemes to improve physical security for older people on public housing estates; and video-making for young people. These programs and activities demonstrate why this approach has been defined as a social crime prevention approach (Shaftoe 2004; Wyvekens 2009).

The process of enabling these programs to be developed and funded involved considerable cooperation between the levels of government. Shaftoe described this as ‘a new political conduit that ran from central government through the regional administrations down to the towns and cities’ (2004, p. 136). Integral to these new structures was substantial devolution of resources and administrative decision-making from the national government to the local municipal governments (Sutton 1990).

Additionally, this approach required the development of biennial regional crime prevention plans. These plans, implemented with the assistance of the national government and focused on making better use of local resources, involved efforts to better engage marginalised and ethnic minority young people. Participation of these young people in mainstream educational,
employment, cultural and recreational programs was a key focus of this overall approach (Sutton 1997, p. 23). Consequently, this approach sought to embed crime prevention practices in the delivery of wider social and community-based services.

Despite the limited positive evaluations of the Bonnemaison approach (Knepper 2009), it had a significant impact on localised crime prevention in Australia and elsewhere.

**The Localised Approach in the United Kingdom**

The localised approach to crime prevention planning in the UK has a lengthy and somewhat complex history. Crawford (1997), Gilling (1997), and Tilley (2002), among others, have plotted some of this history. Some of this early history of crime prevention in the UK is summarised below:

[Crime prevention] had been part of the task of police as provided for in the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829; there had been police crime prevention officers since the 1950s. The Cornish Report (Home Officer 1965) had examined crime prevention, and made recommendations for it. Local Crime Prevention Panels have been in operation since 1966. Outside the areas of responsibility of the Home Office, community crime prevention had figured in the original aims of the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NACRO) when it was formed in 1966. A Home Office Standing Committee on Crime Prevention was set up in 1975; crime prevention was part of the aim of the Department of the Environment Priority Estates Project in 1979; NACRO established its own Crime Prevention Unit in 1979 (Tilley 2002, p. 15).

Following these developments, there was a series of key policy and institutional moments:

- The establishment of the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit in 1983
- The 8/84 Home Office Circular encouraging local authorities and other agencies to work together to develop crime prevention strategies
- The ‘Five Towns’ demonstration project from 1986, which provided an opportunity for inter-agency responses to be trialled
- The establishment of the Ministerial Group on Crime Prevention and two subsequent crime prevention seminars chaired by the Prime Minister and Home Secretary in 1986
• A series of Crime Prevention Unit Papers (20 papers were published between 1985 and 1989, a further 36 were published between 1990 and 1994 and 57 were published between 1995 and 1999)

• Home Office Circular 44/90 encouraging local bodies to develop partnership approaches to crime prevention

• The Morgan Report in 1991, which advocated a leadership role by local authorities

• The introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which (amongst other things) legislated for a partnership approach to crime prevention (local government and police as lead agencies), provided guidance on access to appropriate crime (and other) data and instituted a cyclical planning process (Tilley 2002, pp. 18–22).

What this list demonstrates is the emergence of localised crime prevention (and community safety) planning. The list also highlights how tentative initial steps were taken to encourage local government involvement, culminating in the mandated responsibilities set out in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK). It also shows that pilot programs and initiatives were originally introduced, before much larger rollouts of particular crime prevention and community safety initiatives.

This limited overview demonstrates that growing research attention, the establishment of specific units and structures, a significant inquiry (and subsequent report) and legislative recognition have been some of the key factors in the rise of localised approaches to crime prevention in the UK. Notwithstanding these developments, it is important to recognise also the long history of local authorities assuming responsibility for critical social services and the significance of rising crime rates in the 1980s in producing a greater focus on prevention, and one with a heavy emphasis on partnerships at the local level. Further to these developments, a £250 million, three-year Crime Reduction Programme was launched in 1999, which provided significant resources that further embed local crime prevention activities in England and Wales. A significant proportion of these funds were, however, directed to the establishment of public space CCTV systems (Tilley 2009) and there was a series of challenges associated with the implementation of this Programme (see Homel et al 2004 for discussion of some of these challenges).
This brief overview necessarily omits considerable developments, debates and nuances. The politics of localised crime prevention — discussed in detail by Crawford (1997, 1998), Gilling (1997), Gilling and Barton (1997), Hope (2001, 2005a), Tilley (2002), Phillips (2002), Hughes (2002, 2007) and an array of others — reveal conflicts between central and local government, tensions between perspectives on crime causation and associated prevention measures, the rise of a crime prevention ‘industry’, the challenges of evaluating multi-component programs, tensions between evaluators and policy makers, and the politicisation of local crime prevention. Despite the importance of these issues in shaping localised crime prevention practices in the UK, for current purposes it will suffice to reveal the development of localised approaches to crime prevention, with heavy involvement of local government and the police. It is also important to note that many UK visitors came to Australia during recent decades to share stories of these experiences, and numerous Australian policy makers and criminologists undertook study tours to England (and other parts of Europe) to learn more about these approaches to crime prevention.

**Public Health Model**

The adoption and impact of the public health model, focusing on preventive medicine, had implications for various social policy areas, including crime prevention. Adopting strategies to encourage healthy lifestyles, rather than waiting for illness and subsequent treatment, provided positive health and medical outcomes. This model soon began to be applied in other social policy settings, particularly given the potential economic benefits of investing funds now to save spiralling costs later. The attraction of this logic in the context of crime is apparent.

Brantingham and Faust (1976) leant on the public health model in the development of their crime prevention typology. They advocated a distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary crime prevention activities. They drew heavily on public health approaches (as noted in Chapter 2), as outlined here in this extended quote:

*Primary* prevention identifies disease-creating general conditions of the environment and seeks to abate those conditions (e.g., sewage treatment, mosquito extermination, small-pox vaccination, job-safety engineering, personal hygiene education). *Secondary* prevention identifies groups or individuals who have a high risk of developing disease or who have incipient cases of disease and intervenes in their lives with special treatment designed to prevent the risk for materializing or the incipient
case from growing worse (e.g., chest x-rays in poor neighbourhoods, special diets for overweight executives, rubella vaccinations for prospective but not-yet-expectant mothers, dental examinations). Tertiary prevention identifies individuals with advanced cases of disease and intervenes with treatment to prevent death or permanent disability (e.g., stomach pumping for poisoning, open-heart surgery for defective heart valves, radiation therapy for some forms of cancer), provides rehabilitation services for those persons who must live under the constraints of permanent disability (e.g., Braille training for the blind, prosthetic limbs for amputees), and provides a measure of relief from pain and suffering for individuals with incurable diseases (e.g., opiate therapy for terminal cancer patients, leper colonies) (1976, p. 288).

While Brantingham and Faust do not specifically mention the efficacy of the various health/medical treatments listed, it is accepted that there is an evidence base to support these interventions, programs, procedures and policies. The success of these forms of public health and medical practices has been established over lengthy periods and in different contexts, leaving us with clear policy implications: sewage treatment will prevent an array of ailments; mosquito eradication will prevent malaria; chest x-rays in poor neighbourhoods will identify tuberculosis; and radiation for some forms of cancer will reduce or stall the growth of cancer cells and so forth.

Not everyone shares enthusiasm for drawing parallels between crime prevention and public health approaches. O’Malley and Sutton (1997) note that ‘[a]lthough efforts have been made to import the public health vocabulary into criminology (for example, Brantingham and Faust 1976; van Dijk and de Waard 1991), no widely shared understanding has emerged of what they might mean when applied to crime’ (1997, p. 2). Sutton et al suggest that ‘[w]hile the public health analogy can help raise awareness of the diversity of practices that can fall under the ambit of crime prevention (Crawford 1998) … it says little about the key theoretical assumptions informing these practices’ (2008, p. 23). Drawing on public health language and concepts might provide a useful heuristic device, but it says little about the way in which crime prevention operates.

Despite these concerns and criticisms, recent examples exist in which developments in the public health and medical sciences are put to work in shaping crime prevention practice and research. The rise of experimental criminology and its attendant interest in building an
evidence base has drawn on public health and medical science developments. For example, the use of randomised control experiments in criminological research or the ‘gold standard’ (see Farrington et al 2002; Weisburd & Hinkle 2012 for discussion of randomised experiments) is advocated by some experimental criminologists such as Sherman and Farrington (see Sherman et al 1997). Through the use of the randomised control experiment, it is argued, more robust evaluation data will be produced, promising greater confidence in the efficacy of forms of treatment and intervention. The studies utilising such robust methods are then analysed and collated in the form of systematic reviews. Published systematic reviews can be found on the Campbell Collaboration website, which was inspired by the Cochrane Collaboration and its work to collate research findings on the efficacy of medical treatments and public health interventions (Farrington & Petrosino 2001).

There have been some recent attempts to unite health promotion and crime prevention (see O’Donnell 2005; Young & Sarre 2013). It has been suggested that these approaches share similar objectives and techniques and that shared effort might produce outcomes across health and crime domains — a point that will be examined further in Chapter 12.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has charted broad, inconsistent, shifting and disputed terrain. It has attempted to document the ‘preventive turn’, which gained prominence in many jurisdictions in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the challenges of accurately charting the ‘preventive turn’, Crawford (2009b) provides a useful summary of what he sees as the key forces that drove the emergence of crime prevention in recent decades. These forces have been covered in some detail in this chapter and include:

1. Public concerns over increased crime and the fear of crime, prompted by greater ownership of commodities vulnerable to theft and property-derived incentives to security.

2. Growing acknowledgement of the limited capacity of formal institutions of criminal justice adequately to reduce crime and effect change in criminal behaviour, spurred by a recognition that the levers of crime lie beyond the reach of formal institutions of control.
3. Concern that many of the traditional bonds of informal social control — that operate through families, kinship ties, communities, voluntary associations and other social networks — may be fragmenting and weakening.

4. A decline in the attachments by liberal elites to social welfare-based responses to offending as captured in the ‘rehabilitative ideal’ and the concomitant rise in importance attributed to the role of victims of crime within public policy.

5. A political desire to explore alternative means of managing crime that avoid the economic, social and human costs associated with over-reliance on traditional punitive — ‘law and order’— responses (Crawford 2009b, p. 2).

Having provided this background and context, it is now appropriate to introduce the fieldwork component of the thesis. The next chapter outlines the research traditions shaping and methods adopted during the fieldwork. This is then followed by an overview of the case study site before the major findings are presented.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Crime prevention research, like much of the social sciences, has tended to fall within two broad categories, consistent with the overstated quantitative/qualitative divide. The first might be referred to as the ‘what works’, or evidence-based, literature. This tradition is interested in instrumental outcomes and normative questions. Did an intervention have the desired effect? Was crime reduced or prevented in a particular location? How can the intervention be replicated in other locations? The approach often draws heavily on quantitative data analysis and research methods. Pre- and post- analysis of crime data and time-series data analysis is conducted to determine the fidelity of the program and its relationship with measurable changes in reported crime; complex regression techniques are employed to control for extraneous variables; meta-analysis of existing studies is undertaken to arrive at (it is argued) clear statements about the efficacy of particular interventions (see Sherman et al 2002, 2006). This approach is consistent with positivist traditions.

Some have argued that the primacy of positivist approaches associated with this first broad category of research has been to the detriment of more grounded, experiential and contingent research (Pawson & Tilley 1997; Pawson 2006). The realist evaluation framework of Pawson and Tilley (1997) encourages consideration of ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’. More radical approaches jettison interest in normative questions, favouring more contested, complicated portrayals found in the second approach.

The second broad approach is more interested in how interventions are implemented and the lived experience of practitioners and program participants, the unintended consequences of particular programs, and the socio-political context of implementation. It is less interested in outcomes, and more focused on processes, experiences and politics. The scientific objectivity associated with the former approach is challenged and subjective insights are elevated. Research from afar is replaced by immersed observation and reflexivity. Universal truths demonstrated with reference to large data sets are replaced by equivocal descriptive and constructivist accounts.

The second approach has inspired and informed this research.

Methodological Influences and Inspirations

This research is directly informed by particular research traditions, including grounded theory, case study and ethnography. In general, the research approach adopted involves a case
study of the Glebe area, utilising ethnographic research traditions and methods. The objectives were to be immersed in the crime prevention activities of the area; to become familiar with and to the relevant stakeholders; and to become sensitive to the narratives and discourses emanating from the local actors and actor networks. The voices of practitioners are elevated above (or at least equal to) quantitative data. Findings and theories are built from these insights, from the ground up.

**Grounded Theory**

Maxfield and Babbie (2008, p. 31) suggest that a ‘theory is a systematic explanation for the observed facts and laws that relate to a particular aspect of life’. Snow et al (2003) propose three main paths to theoretical development: (1) discovery; (2) theoretical extension; and (3) theoretical refinement. Grounded theory fits with the first of these approaches. As Glaser and Strauss have observed: ‘Our basic position is that generating grounded theory is a way of arriving at theory suited to its supposed uses … we suggest as the best approach an initial, systematic discovery of the theory from the data of social research’ (1967, p. 3). This approach attempts to:

- build up inductively a systematic theory that is ‘grounded’ in, or based on, the observations. The observations are summarised into conceptual categories, which are tested directly in the research setting with more observations. Over time, as the conceptual categories are refined and linked, a theory evolves (Bachman & Schutt 2011, p. 293).

Data derived from fieldwork drives the generation of theory. Theories are postulated to explain observations, experiences and practices. Theories, in this tradition, are not developed without reference to lived experience or from remote relationships with social phenomena, making it a particularly relevant approach for this thesis. These research methods and traditions (grounded theory, case study and ethnography) were chosen to shed some light on crime prevention practices and programs, to give voice to local actors involved in this and related work, and to describe the discourses informing crime prevention approaches. Other research methods would not have been nearly as effective in building this picture and allowing appropriate analysis to be conducted.

Thus, a mixed methods approach with a heavy emphasis on qualitative approaches has been adopted to interrogate crime prevention practices as it was felt that these methods would more fully expose the intricate agency networks and programs operating in the selected site.
Quantitative methods would not sufficiently excavate local practices and gain insights into relationships, influences, approaches and methods brought to bear on crime prevention. The processes adopted for this research fit with the grounded theory approach.

**Case Study**

Simons (2009, p. 3) defines a case study as the ‘study of the singular, the particular, the unique’ and as an ‘in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a “real life” context’. She further states that the ‘primary purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy, institution or system to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community action’ (2009, p. 21).

Perhaps more comprehensively, Yin (1994, p. 13) suggests that a ‘case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’. Moreover, a case study relies on multiple sources of evidence.

Maxfield and Babbie (2008) outline the variety of potential cases. They suggest that case studies can include individual people, neighbourhoods, correctional facilities, courtrooms, or ‘other aggregations’ (2008, p. 202). Further, they suggest that, in ‘the most general sense, case studies attempt to isolate causal mechanisms from possible confounding influences by studying very precisely defined subjects’ (2008, p. 203).

In his book, *Making Social Science Matter*, Flyvbjerg (2001) mounts a sustained argument for case study research. He suggests that not only should case studies be considered as important approaches to research, but that they are the only way to truly gain an understanding of complex social phenomena necessary to inform policy, practice and theory. The failure to understand and to grapple with context renders large-scale quantitative analysis impotent. Flyvbjerg rejects arguments that the social sciences should seek to emulate the natural sciences with respect to methodologies. He highlights how numerous critical scientific breakthroughs were achieved through individual cases, rather than large quantitative analyses involving replication of experimental methods. Flyvbjerg also draws on Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis*, which ‘goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know-how (techne) and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso social and political actor’ (2001, p. 2). In this
manner, research becomes more than just scientific or technical knowledge; it is a context-dependent, close reading of complex phenomena capable of illuminating practices, resistance, subversion, corruption, and complicity.

The case study approach is also advocated because it can engage participants in the research process, it can be responsive to research conditions, it can reflect changes and developments, and it can give voice to multiple perspectives. It conveys complexity, diversity and, through the use of narrative, can persuasively describe phenomena allowing audiences to ‘vicariously experience’ what has been witnessed (Simons 2009, p. 23). Case studies provide ‘thick descriptions’. According to Flyvbjerg, ‘the focus on minutiae, which directly opposes much conventional wisdom about the need to focus on ‘important problems’, has its background in a fundamental phenomenological experience, the small questions often lead to big answers’ (2001, p. 133).

Again, this approach presents challenges for the researcher. The dialectic between the ‘research’ and the ‘researched’ requires high levels of self-awareness and reflexivity. Cosgrove and Francis highlight that the:

observer is required to be sensitive to assumptions, to consider observations within their wider context and to be reflexive in relation to their own participation, observing interactions and action introspectively in an attempt to overcome the effects of misinformation and to be accepted by the group ... It is this close interaction and engagement between the observer and observed that enables mutually understood expectations and meanings to be observed and interpreted (2011, p. 203).

This opens up opportunities for advanced learning, as this process enables the researcher to move beyond rule-based or formulaic understandings of a situation or location (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 84).

**Ethnography**

Snow et al suggest that ‘ethnography grounds theory in the richness of social life’ and that this is done by discerning, grasping, and understanding the ‘world at hand from the standpoint of its members or practitioners; to acquire an insider’s view’ (2003, p. 182). Semmens suggests that ethnography ‘is an approach to research that involves the immersion of the researcher into the social setting for a long period of time. The emphasis is on
describing and understanding the social processes that are observed and experienced’ (2011, p. 70).

Cosgrove and Francis (2011) suggest that this approach to research has been heavily influenced by the work of the Chicago School sociologists and symbolic interactionism, phenomenological and hermeneutic perspectives. They further propose that, given that ‘actions are based on meanings and are constructed and reconstructed as people interpret and reinterpret the situations in which they find themselves, ethnography has developed as a means through which access to and an understanding of meanings, actions, decisions and situations is achieved’ (2011, p. 201).

This places particular demands on the researcher, who must ‘learn the codes, language and practices of the group he or she is observing’. This, therefore, means that ethnography ‘combines cultural interpretation — that is eliciting an understanding of the shared meanings of a group so as to develop understanding of their action — with prolonged participant engagement in the natural settings within which the group operate’ (Cosgrove and Francis 2011, p. 201). Such engagement and immersion enable detailed description of and insights into specific populations that cannot be achieved by quantitative methodologies (2011, p. 201).

Westmarland (2011, p. 46) also highlights how qualitative studies frequently (if not always) entail a personal, and potentially emotional, attachment between the researcher and the researched. This might take the shape of friendship (2011, p. 162). Such relationships are critical to gaining an understanding of the dynamics of an area or situation, but can make it difficult to report observations accurately. As with other qualitative methods, this approach raises the spectre of the researcher ‘going native’. Jupp suggests that this is a problem of over-involvement in the group being studied. It might have the consequence that the researcher becomes more of a ‘participant and less of an observer’. In such a situation, he or she might begin to take ‘statements and actions for granted rather than as data to be examined, questions and treated as “anthropologically strange”’ (1989, p. 60). Another potential problem is exploitation where ‘superficial friendships’ are created for the purpose of data collection (Noaks & Wincup 2004, p. 97). Westmarland notes that, as with other types of qualitative study, there are problems regarding ‘researcher effect’. This occurs when the researcher becomes part of a group, raising the possibility of influencing the behaviour or dynamics being observed. Known as the
‘Hawthorne effect’, the presence of a researcher can shape or influence the behaviour of actors under observation (2011, p. 121).

Ethnography, as with other qualitative research methods, has been criticised for being ‘unscientific’. Observations can be considered to be ‘overly subjective’ (Semmens 2011, p. 70). Small-scale qualitative research has been:

accused of naivety in failing to give sufficient weight to the constraints placed on action by structural conflicts and … macro-theorizing being criticised for taking too many steps backwards along the chain of explanation and thereby failing to explain differential response at the level of the individual and at the level of meaning (Jupp 1989, p. 123).

Despite these criticisms, there are numerous examples of critical criminological insights being developed through ethnographical research methods (Shearing & Marks 2012). The contribution to knowledge and impact on criminological theorising (as well as public policy) can be illustrated with reference to the following (somewhat arbitrary list of) ethnographic studies, which have greatly influenced the author over the years.

Sutherland’s *The Professional Thief, By a Professional Thief*, published in 1937, provided a detailed account from a professional thief. Sutherland recorded approximately 84 hours of interviews with a professional thief (Chic Cowell) and analysed written information from Chic. This detailed account of Chic’s activities and ‘occupation’ highlight the importance of tutelage from other professional thieves (that is, differential association), the intricate codes and communication styles amongst thieves, and the corruptibility of the ‘justice system’ and its associated limitations. By giving voice to the established ‘practitioner’, Sutherland values grounded observations over remote analysis.

Whyte’s *Street Corner Society* charts the dynamics of Italian immigrants in ‘Cornerville’ and is based on his three-and-a-half years living in the area in the late 1930s. Through this complete immersion in local life, he intimately describes the group affiliations, the interpersonal dynamics, the interactions between the ‘corner boys’ and police, and the formal and informal economies of the area. It is through this immersion that meaning is derived. In describing his fieldwork, Whyte observes that the ‘ideas grow up in part out of our immersion in the data and out of the whole process of living. Since so much of this process of analysis
proceeds on the unconscious level, I am sure that we can never present a full account of it’ (1955, p. 280).

Ditton’s *Part-time Crime: An Ethnography of Fiddling and Pilferage*, published in 1977, is based on an extraordinary amount of observation of and participation in the workings of a commercial bakery in the north of England. These observations revealed the widespread practices of fiddling and pilfering across staff divisions. The practices were so widespread and ‘justified’ by the staff that sanctions effectively did not exist. Via observation of these behaviours and associated discussions, Ditton challenges assumptions about offender/non-offender categories.

Foster’s *Villains: Crime and Community in the Inner City*, published in 1990, described how a small network of families experienced conditions in South East London, resulting in similar patterns of behaviour across generations. Through participant observation and interviews with key family members over an 18-month period, Foster was able to better understand the pressures and dynamics that resulted in members of different generations engaging in criminal activity. She suggested that ‘people learn from an early age to exploit their environment using legitimate or illegitimate methods’ (1990, p. 34), thus highlighting the importance of social dynamics on shaping behaviour over time.

Closer to home, Maher’s work with drug-using young people of Asian background in Cabramatta (a suburb in south-western Sydney) in the 1990s, at the height of the heroin ‘epidemic’, provided important checks on the official discourse at that time. Given the longitudinal nature of Maher’s research, it also demonstrated the impact of particular law enforcement policies on drug-use practices. Highlighting the increased health risks associated with more chaotic drug use, Maher and her colleagues were able to illustrate the immediate negative consequences of police saturation of the main commercial zone of Cabramatta (Maher et al 1997; Maher & Dixon 1999; Dixon & Maher 2002).

For Maher, this work in Australia followed detailed ethnographic work in Brooklyn, New York. Maher befriended and observed female crack smokers and street-level sex workers in the late 1980s — a time when crack use was fuelling a fervent ‘war on drugs’ and when it was suggested that women’s offending was becoming more violent. Maher and Curtis (1992) challenged simple pre-conceptions by suggesting that their ‘reading of these women’s lives suggests that they are becoming neither more violent nor more ‘criminal’. What they are
becoming — within the contexts which their live their daily lives and their drug use are situated — is both more vulnerable and more victimised’ (1992, p. 251).

Various other seminal works from these traditions have contributed deep and rich insights into the experiences of particular communities, gangs, criminal networks, and criminal justice personnel. While these studies have influenced the approach adopted here, the current research only provides a passing nod to these studies. The deep connections and lengthy fieldwork have not been completely replicated and this research has sought to understand crime prevention largely through the eyes of practitioners, rather than community members or ‘offenders’.

Now that aspects of the epistemological traditions for this research have been explored, more specific commentary is provided about the actual research methods adopted. Explanation will be provided for the selection of the Glebe area, before the specific research methods are described.

Site Selection
The Glebe postcode area has been selected for analysis as the basis for this research. Local government area is the geographical marker that is often used for crime prevention planning purposes. In NSW, LGAs in NSW vary in size, but can range from 10 square kilometres to tens of thousands of square kilometres in rural areas. It is argued that the often vast areas covered by LGAs are too large for useful analysis of crime and understanding of crime prevention activities. The Glebe postcode area provides a contained geographical area, making it possible to generate the depth of analysis required for a comprehensive case study.

The area was also selected because of the significant disparity in income and housing types (as revealed in Table 6, in which the top two income brackets for the area as revealed by the 2011 Census were $2000+ and $200–$299 per week), the presence of key crime generators and attractors (that is, shopping centre, large public housing estates, licensed premises), and the combination of significant transience (student, backpacker, and short-term accommodation) and residential stability. These characteristics provide important tensions and dynamics relevant to crime and its prevention in the area.

Another key reason for choosing this area was its accessibility and proximity to the researcher’s workplace (and residence). The close proximity ensured that maximum time was spent in the field. This was in part motivated by an attempt to counteract and overcome the
litany of troubling ‘tales from the field’ and the barriers to conducting research. Noaks and Wincup (2004), Westmarland (2011), and Bartels and Richards (2011), among others, highlight the numerous barriers facing criminological research. By reducing the travel time to, and physical impediments to accessing, the study area, considerable time was spent in the area. This also included ‘incidental’ time, during periods of recreation, consumption and the like.

Moreover, familiarity with some of the agencies and services delivered in Glebe provided easier access and allowed for greatest data capture. As MacDonald notes, “insider research” is often seen to be advantageous; the researcher is already part of the scene or group under study and his or her cultural identity eases access and trust’ (2011, p. 187). Previous work experiences and professional networks in the area provided this researcher with some limited connection to local agencies and personnel. Having some familiarity with the area was helpful in recruiting interviewees and gaining access to inter-agency groups. It particularly helped to reduce the impact of ‘gatekeepers’ (Westmarland 2011). Having also worked in government and non-government organisations meant that the researcher had some personal connections in various agencies/organisations outside of the area that were of benefit in terms of familiarity with names, positions and policies operating in Glebe. This also helped with access.

It is not claimed that this area is representative of wider patterns or of other areas. Rather, it is argued that each area has its own structures, agencies, histories and arrangements that contribute to crime and its prevention. While this might have negative implications for considerations of external validity (Davies & Francis 2011, p. 12), it is arguable how similar two areas necessarily are in relation to specific criminogenic variables and preventive capacities and configurations. While the research design and methodology has not specifically focused on achieving external validity, embedding the case study in wider historical and policy frameworks (Chapters 9 and 10) partially addresses any questions of external validity.

**Research Questions**

Based on the generally accepted definitions and typologies of crime prevention (as outlined in Chapter 2), it is obvious that many programs, initiatives and policies directly and indirectly have an impact on the prevention of crime in a local area. A network of agencies and actors will contribute to crime prevention in any given area. Rarely has previous research explored
these structures and issues in sufficient depth to illuminate what drives, informs and inhibits local crime prevention activities.

In an attempt to address this particular gap in the crime prevention literature, this research adopted a case study approach and sought to quantify the nature of crime prevention activities in one geographical area, probing the following research questions:

- What programs, interventions and technologies exist in Glebe that conceivably contribute to crime prevention?
- What structures and policies support and enable these activities?
- What processes operate to support crime prevention in the area?

While these research questions informed the overall research project, consistent with a case study approach, room was also provided for further issues to emerge and to shape the fieldwork component of the research.

Research Methods

A number of processes were adopted to interrogate and explore the research questions. A mixed methods approach was used, enabling quantitative data to be coupled with richer qualitative data. The key research methods adopted included the following:

- Physical familiarisation with the area was undertaken by walking the area and observing daily routines of residents and visitors, and through night-time visits (often in a car).
- Desktop reviews were conducted to gain an understanding of the history, social dynamics and service delivery systems operating in Glebe and in NSW.
- Crime data for an 18-year period were analysed.
- In excess of 30 inter-agency meetings, informal interviews, and community events were observed over a 12-month period and notes recorded.
- Two focus groups were conducted, with the express purpose of understanding falls in crime in Glebe in recent years.
- Fifteen formal, semi-structured interviews were conducted with workers from various agencies operating in Glebe over an 18-month period.

These research methods were conducted with approval of the University of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee (‘HREC’) requirements. Consistent with standard ethical procedures for research involving human studies, a number of processes had to be followed...
and undertakings made to gain approval from University of Sydney HREC. Key undertakings included gaining consent from research participants (interviewees and inter-agency meeting participants), the protection of anonymity of research participants, safe storage of research data, and provision of key findings to research subjects upon completion. The University of Sydney HREC granted approval on 5 April 2012 for the fieldwork component of the research (protocol 14654). Relevant documentation can be found in Appendices 1 to 3.

Site Familiarisation and Audits

In the spirit of Connell’s (2007, p. 206) ‘new meaning for the term “grounded theory”: linking theory to the ground on which the theorist’s boots are planted’, considerable time was spent wearing out ‘shoe leather’ by walking the streets of Glebe and conducting ‘audits’ at different times to observe routine activities, pedestrian traffic, and the adoption of security and crime prevention practices. Walking streets in Glebe provided a rich context for other features of this research. Seeing how the topography of the area creates natural physical barriers not well represented on standard aerials maps and images; observing the presence of private security personnel at particular times; noting the general cleanliness of the area; seeing the different types of street lighting used; registering the presence of laneways once used by the ‘night soil men’; and reflecting on the location of large public housing estates and their proximity to the gentrified parts of Glebe, helped to ground the research and to give it a strong sense of place. In particular, the relationship with the physical features of Glebe helped the researcher to understand geographical reference points frequently made in inter-agency meetings and interviews, as well as tying programs and services to place. This understanding was especially important in developing subsequent chapters, in particular the 24-hour crime prevention clock (see Chapter 7).

Documentation Review

Key policies, plans, legislation and organisational documentation were reviewed. This included City of Sydney planning instruments, crime prevention and community safety plans, NSW government policies (related to homelessness, domestic violence, policing, alcohol-related crime, housing, land use, and planning) and local agency reports and plans. Many of the documents accessed were publicly available on websites. Other documents were secured

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28 ‘Night soil men’ were the workers who collected sewage from outside toilets common in the area prior to the advent of underground sewerage systems. Streets were designed so that small lanes were at the rear of residential streets to provide access to outside toilets of each house.
through discussion with local actors and workers. Unpublished evaluation reports, papers prepared by university students, newsletters and related publications were made available in this fashion.

The purpose of reviewing these documents was to show the volume of existing instruments and to analyse the harmony (or otherwise) between these documents. Consideration was also given to the responsiveness of existing arrangements to fluctuations and changes in local crime patterns. Further, documentation review provides an opportunity to gain a sense of history of the area. As Katz suggests, this is important because ‘history impinges on the present in ways we cannot grasp unless we study the past ... as we become historians, we must also seek to develop a generalisable knowledge from our case studies’ (2010, p. 27).

**Crime Data**

Crime data were accessed from BOCSAR for the Glebe postcode area. Data for an 18-year period\(^\text{29}\) and covering in excess of 70 offence categories was obtained from BOCSAR. Basic analysis were undertaken to establish trends in reported crime for key offences in the Glebe area. Given that key crime problem-solving models (see Goldstein 1979; Ekblom 2011) require data analysis as the first step to any prevention activity, these data helped to illuminate whether existing crime prevention programs were sensitive to crime trends and whether key actors understand local crime patterns. The data were also used to inform interviews with key informants and to provide a context for understanding local responses to crime.

**Focus Groups**

During the course of the fieldwork, an opportunity arose to facilitate two focus groups. The City of Sydney Council (responsible for the Glebe area) was reviewing the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012*. As part of this review, the researcher accepted an invitation to facilitate two focus groups in June 2013.\(^\text{30}\) Focus groups were chosen to provide opportunities for stakeholders in Glebe to share their insights and to build on answers provided by their

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\(^\text{29}\) Preliminary discussions with BOCSAR suggested that crime data prior to 1995 is not especially reliable and is rarely released; hence data was accessed and analysed for the 1995–2012 period.

\(^\text{30}\) This facilitation was unpaid. It was considered to be a mutually beneficial opportunity. The researcher was able to organise a student to assist the Council with the process and the preparation of a mini-evaluation report, and the focus groups (and associated transcripts) provided an opportunity to explore issues relevant to this research.
colleagues during the focus group discussion. As noted by Hall (2008, p. 203), focus groups provide ‘rich textual data containing information from interaction among participants … Often such interaction produces new ideas or novel ways of thinking about the issue that would not have arisen from the conduct of interviews’. A student took notes during the focus groups and all discussions were digitally recorded. The digital recordings were sent to a professional transcription service and verbatim transcripts were produced. These transcripts were analysed for key themes, consistent with the treatment of the semi-structured interview transcripts (which will be discussed in greater detail below).

Focus group participants included representatives from the City of Sydney Council, Housing NSW, NSW Police Force, Glebe Community Development Project (‘GCDP’), The Glebe Society, the Glebe Youth Service, the University of Sydney, and the Chamber of Commerce. Some of the focus group participants were previously or subsequently interviewed. The focus groups specifically focused on exploring the reasons for the decline in crime in recent years, the benefits of the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012*, and potential future issues that might exert an upward pressure on crime rates in the area.

**Observation of Inter-Agency Meetings**

A key platform for the coordination and delivery of local crime prevention is inter-agency committees and groups (see Crawford 1994; 1997; Gilling 1997; Cherney 2004a; Cherney 2004b; Morgan et al 2011, among others, for a discussion of inter-agency responses to crime prevention). There has been limited Australian commentary of local crime prevention inter-agency partnerships generated from observation of these inter-agency structures or reflecting the views of participants of these inter-agency groups (see Cherney (2004); Clancey et al (2012); Shepherdson et al (2014) for analysis of localised crime prevention practices).

To address this gap in Australian research and to provide an understanding of the activities of key relevant inter-agency groups operating in the Glebe area, the researcher attended the inter-agency meetings listed in Table 4.

**Table 4: Inter-Agency Meetings Attended**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Inter-agency Meeting</th>
<th>Approximate Duration (mins)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 November 2012</td>
<td>Glebe Youth Service Annual General Meeting</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Inter-agency Meeting</td>
<td>Approximate Duration (mins)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 March 2013</td>
<td>Forest Lodge and Glebe Coordination Group (‘FLAG’)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March 2013</td>
<td>CSPC</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April 2013</td>
<td>GCDP Planning Meeting</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 2013</td>
<td>FLAG — Networking Event</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 2013</td>
<td>Mayor’s Housing Forum</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 2013</td>
<td>CSPC</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 September 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 October 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 October 2013</td>
<td>Evening audit</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 November 2013</td>
<td>FLAG Networking Meeting</td>
<td>180 (including networking lunch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 November 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 November 2013</td>
<td>Glebe Youth Service Annual General Meeting</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Community Restorative Centre Annual General Meeting</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December 2013</td>
<td>Glebe Youth Service Closure Meeting</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December 2013</td>
<td>FLAG</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FLAG is coordinated by the GCDP, which is funded by the University of Sydney and Housing NSW. The CSCP is facilitated by the Leichhardt Local Area Command (‘LAC’) (NSW Police Force). ‘Focus Group’ refers to two separate focus groups conducted to discuss the impact of the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012* (developed by the City of Sydney Council). The Mayor’s Housing Forum is a bi-annual event hosted by the Mayor of the City of Sydney to engage directly with the tenants of the Glebe Housing Estate.
Beyond these formal inter-agency meetings, the researcher also attended informal meetings and events, including the Mitchell Street Fete (an event specifically for public housing tenants), two community safety barbecues (coordinated by the City of Sydney Council), a get-to-know-the-candidates event prior to the Australian federal election (hosted by the Glebe Society in September 2013), meetings associated with the temporary closure of the Glebe Youth Service and numerous other events/activities. In addition, a series of informal meetings was held on site at various agencies to obtain an understanding of their programs and activities and the physical layout of the facilities.

The inter-agency meetings selected for observation had the greatest obvious relationship to issues of crime prevention. Numerous other inter-agency groups operate in the area, including those that focus on the running of particular events (NAIDOC week, Mitchell Street Fete), those linked with the Glebe Society and the Coalition of Glebe Groups (‘COGG’), and those involving residents of the Glebe Housing Estate. Inter-agency activities with high resident involvement were avoided due to the ethical considerations of engaging with residents as opposed to workers.

The Chairperson of the relevant inter-agency group was contacted and asked to sign a letter of consent prior to commencement of this aspect of the research. Once permission had been granted to attend, arrangements were made to be present at each of the relevant meetings. An outline of the research was provided at the commencement of the first meeting of the particular inter-agency group attended. Thereafter, a basic introduction was provided and the affiliation to the University of Sydney stated at each subsequent meeting.

It was difficult merely to remain an observer of the inter-agency meetings. Over time, the researcher became familiar with many (if not all) of the participants in the various inter-agency fora. This often resulted in being directly invited to address a meeting. Despite best efforts to remain in the role of observer, the researcher was periodically invited to comment or contribute to particular inter-agency meetings. This might have been because of perceived expertise relevant to particular discussions or deliberations, or due to their discomfort associated with having a largely impassive participant in the meeting.

During attendance at each inter-agency meeting, rough notes were made as discreetly as possible to ensure that meeting participants were not made aware of key observations (Emerson et al 1995). As Maxfield and Babbie suggest: ‘If you are taking notes during the observation, do it unobtrusively because people are likely to behave differently if they see
you writing down everything they say or do’ (2008, p. 299). Handwritten notes were then retyped by the researcher some hours or days after the meeting. These notes taken during and directly after inter-agency meetings ‘are subject to memory work and selectivity’ (Cosgrove 2011, p. 213). Consequently, the accuracy of the observation notes cannot be assured.

Through observation of these key inter-agency structures, it was possible to gain an understanding of the manner in which agencies cooperate, how information is shared, and how issues are prioritised. The notes taken were augmented by minutes and other documentation provided for many of the meetings. These documents helped overcome aspects of the ‘memory work and selectivity’, but cannot be considered a complete record of discussions and deliberations. Meetings that lasted an hour or more were frequently summarised in minutes of less than two pages. Critical discussion and decisions were frequently not included in meeting minutes.

The treatment of the records (including minutes) was similar to that of the interview transcripts (as described in detail in the next section). While less detailed than the transcripts, content analysis sought to detect themes. Beyond these themes, these notes and minutes were also interrogated to identify who attended or did not attend the meetings, the nature of the interactions, how the meeting was managed and whether outcomes were generated. Ultimately, analysis was limited to these methods due to the volume of overall data collected and the specific relevance of the information garnered from attending these meetings. Observation in these meetings assisted in the development of an understanding of local dynamics, such as the relationships between local actors, the role of particular actors and organisations, and the key discourses used to describe and understand crime and its prevention.

Snow et al suggest that since:

all ethnographers inevitably bring both conscious and unconscious assumptions and interests with them to their research, the development of taxonomies and concepts does not occur in vacuo, but analytic understandings are discovered in the sense that they emerge in large part from detailed examination of observational fieldnotes, and are then tested and revised in a constant comparative process (2003, p. 186).
This process of recording, reviewing and revising notes inevitably draws on wider experiences of the area, the key actors, and information gathered through the interviews and observations.

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 workers in the Glebe area. Broadly categorised, these interviewees were drawn from non-government organisations providing diverse social services (n=8), local government (n=3), law enforcement (n=3), and voluntary organisation (n=1). These interviews provided a practitioner voice that is generally lacking in the extant crime prevention literature. By interviewing a diversity of personnel from different disciplinary backgrounds and from different agencies, it was possible to explore if there are common narratives driving the diverse crime prevention programs.

Each interviewee was given a Participant Information Sheet and required to sign a Consent Form before the interview was conducted (see Appendices 1 to 3 for copies of these forms). It was explained that interviews could be stopped at any time. Twelve of the interviews were conducted in the researcher’s office on the University of Sydney campus, and a further three were conducted in the interviewee’s workplace. The close location of the study area to the researcher’s office ensured that this did not pose any unnecessary barriers to participation and it reduced interruptions, potential problems with interviewees being overheard during interviews, or the observation of interviewees participating in the research. The interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed by a professional transcription company. All interviews were conducted throughout 2012 and 2013, as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5: Dates Semi-Structured Interviews were Conducted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Code</th>
<th>Date Interviewed</th>
<th>Broad Agency Categorisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#01</td>
<td>11 July 2012</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#02</td>
<td>27 July 2012</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#03</td>
<td>28 February 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#04</td>
<td>20 March 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#05</td>
<td>17 April 2013</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#06</td>
<td>14 August 2013</td>
<td>Voluntary organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#07</td>
<td>14 August 2013</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#08</td>
<td>30 August 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee Code</td>
<td>Date Interviewed</td>
<td>Broad Agency Categorisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#09</td>
<td>9 September 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>13 September 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11</td>
<td>15 October 2013</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12</td>
<td>17 October 2013</td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13</td>
<td>1 November 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14</td>
<td>20 November 2013</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15</td>
<td>2 December 2013</td>
<td>Community services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has been suggested that it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain anonymity with small-scale studies (Simons 2009, p. 106). Nonetheless, every attempt has been made to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees is maintained — a common practice in qualitative research methods. It was decided that access and participation might have been adversely affected had anonymity not been maintained. While this does mean that a certain amount of detail is lost in the attribution of comments to anonymised individuals, the overall benefits of generating such a large volume of data was the predominant reason for erring on the side of caution.

While it was important to maintain anonymity, it was also important to provide broad descriptions of the type of work interviewees were engaged in or organisation they were affiliated with. Broad categories (community services, local government, law enforcement, and voluntary organisation) have been used to describe the work and affiliations of the interviewees. These descriptions demonstrate some of the diversity of the interviewees. What is masked is the much greater diversity in the work undertaken by each interviewee. Some had very close involvement in crime prevention programs and activities, while others were less focused on and involved in crime prevention. Some worked for government agencies, while others worked for non-government or voluntary agencies. Some had responsibilities beyond the Glebe area, while others had relatively limited geographical responsibilities.

The codes (#01, #02) are used throughout this thesis to refer to interviewees. Comments from interviewees are used liberally in the following chapters, giving voice to their valuable insights and perspectives. Given the general absence of these voices in crime prevention discourse, it was considered important to draw on these comments.
Interviewees were recruited by direct contact, constituting a purposive sample (Maxfield and Babbie 2005, p. 238). Snowballing techniques were used to locate further organisations and personnel in the area (Maxfield and Babbie 2005, p. 241). A purposive sample was required because key participants were sought for their particular insights and knowledge of the Glebe area and crime prevention practices operating in the area. Other sampling techniques were not considered to be valid for this research.

Three prospective interviewees declined to be interviewed or failed to respond to correspondence inviting participation. These staff were from NSW government agencies that have a footprint in the Glebe area but service much larger geographical regions. Given the requirements of the Sydney University HREC to gain organisational approval as well as individual consent, two organisations required completion of separate ethics procedures. The non-participation of these three agencies is a limitation of the research. However, given the other data sources, information was still able to be generated regarding the impact of these agencies on crime prevention in Glebe.

Some interviewees were known to the researcher for many years. One was an ex-student, another was a colleague on behalf of whom the researcher had completed work on previous occasions, and another was someone who had been trained by the researcher. These pre-existing relationships no doubt shaped their responses in subtle ways. There might have been a desire to ‘perform well’ in the interviews. Conversely, there might have been an inclination to connect responses to the previous professional relationships, discussions and debates. There might also have been some unintentional reluctance to fully explain responses due to assumptions of presumed knowledge on the part of the researcher. Ultimately, the exact impact of the researcher-interviewee relationship is unknown (and unknowable). It is also likely that impacts might have varied according to the interviewee and any pre-established relationship.

The semi-structured interviews ranged in duration from 31 to 99 minutes; the average interview lasted approximately 52 minutes. In total, 772 minutes of semi-structured interviews were recorded. Semi-structured interviews were employed because they offer

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31 In one case these onerous administrative requirements were not actively pursued by the researcher due to the significant time that would have been invested in preparing a further ethics application for a single interview. Beyond these requirements and the impediments imposed, two NSW government personnel did not respond to correspondence inviting them to participate in the research.
‘more opportunity to probe, typically with the use of follow-up questions’ and ‘more opportunity for dialogue and exchange between the interviewer and interviewee’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004, p. 79). This more conversational approach allowed for interviewees to in part determine how the interview proceeded. Hearing the stories and experiences of interviewees was important. It is within these stories that the richness of the interviews came to life.

While semi-structured interviews provide opportunities to explore issues in depth, there are limitations associated with this research method. Semmens (2011) suggests that difficulties can arise in building a trusting rapport with the interviewee and that there is a chance that the interviewee will not answer honestly, giving a response that is socially desirable or that will satisfy the interviewer in some way. Also, there is a danger of the interviewer misinterpreting the things people say. Consequently, Semmens suggests that it is important to assign the right meaning to the rights contexts (2011, p. 64).

The professionally produced interview transcripts amounted to 224 pages in total. There are numerous benefits of digitally recording the interviews. Simons (2009, pp. 51–2) highlights three main benefits: (1) it ensures accuracy; (2) it reduces the need for close note-taking; and (3) it reduces the reliance on memory. Getting the recordings professionally transcribed saved considerable time, given that estimates suggest that four to five hours are spent transcribing every hour of recording (Simons 2009, p. 52).

Content analysis (also referred to as ‘thematic qualitative analysis’ by Cosgrove and Francis (2011)) was conducted manually. Given the relatively small number of interviews and focus groups, manual analysis was considered the most time-efficient method. All transcripts were closely read to ‘support familiarisation with material’ and ‘a wide range of categories or themes were identified’ (or coded) (Cosgrove & Francis 2011, p. 214). This process enabled the ‘researcher to understand the character of the data and to control for original assumptions’ (Cosgrove & Francis 2011, p. 214).

Coding of the data ‘entailed bringing a measure of organisation to the data and identifying conceptual categories’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004, p. 130). This process was iterative. The transcripts were read on a number of occasions, allowing for reflection on the themes that emerged. The production of themes and sub-themes through this process is consistent with the whittling down of data, common in various forms of qualitative research (Cosgrove & Francis 2011). This process allowed for ordering and re-ordering of emerging themes, which maintained a closeness to the data.
While this process of content analysis was undertaken, it is not without its limitations and challenges. Managing large amounts of data presents challenges, as does the temptation of ‘simply confirming what we know already’ (Simons 2009, p. 57). Given that the information from these interviews only formed a small part of the overall research, these limitations are not considered to have had a significant adverse impact.

**Methodological Reflections**

Hughes notes that:

> All too often research publications fail to tell us about the hidden difficulties, constraints and limitations — not least the play of power relations and politics in the broadest sense of the word — underneath the apparently smooth and detached surface appearance of the criminological research process (2011, p. 307).

The following is an attempt to reflect on some of the experiences of the fieldwork to excavate the research practices and processes.

Fieldwork of the kind undertaken for this research involves being in a ‘liminal status’ and occupying a participant role that was ‘betwixt and between’ the status of ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ (Van Maanen 1979 cited in Cosgrove & Francis 2011, p. 215). As has been highlighted in anthropology, ethnography and related disciplines, there is a risk of ‘going native’ or developing ‘over-rapport’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004, p. 97). Having known some workers in the area prior to the commencement of the research and having been accepted and assisted by a number of workers in the area during the period of fieldwork, it was very difficult for the researcher not to become ‘captured’ to some extent. The ability to be connected and engaged with the wide group of local actors and yet sufficiently detached to be able to effectively interpret and critically appraise local practices was a significant challenge. Gaining access was at least in part premised on building trust and rapport. Not allowing the relationships, that were important for gaining access to interviewees, cloud faculties for critical appraisal was an ongoing difficulty.

The nature of the researcher-actor relationships also had implications for how these relationships impacted on the research. At times, previous work experiences were utilised to demonstrate a familiarity with organisational issues. For example, due to previous work, the researcher was able to converse with senior police about internal organisational issues during initial introductions. Previous relationships with senior police within the NSW Police Force
were introduced as methods of building rapport and traversing the ‘insider/outsider’ (Westmarland 2011, p. 123) dichotomy common in fieldwork. While these experiences and relationships might have helped to win trust with key ‘gatekeepers’, there was also the risk that previous work experience would be interpreted by different actors in different ways. Similarly, using these experiences as the basis for forming relationships and gaining access also raises questions about assumed knowledge, which can be a barrier to the free exchange of information. If it is presumed that the researcher is familiar with particular practices or policies, there is a risk that an interviewee will provide clipped or abbreviated responses.

Another dimension to having pre-established relationships with local actors relates to how these relationships might influence responses during interviews. As mentioned, some of the interviewees were former students, participants in training delivered by the researcher or long-standing colleagues. This heightened requirements to be aware of what Wahidin and Moore have described as the inter-subjectivity of the research process: ‘Inherent in the research process, then, is the subjectivity of the “researched”, the subjectivity of the researcher and the intersubjectivity of the research process, which cannot be eliminated or ignored but has to be accounted for and reflected upon’ (2011, p. 296).

Dynamics of these relationships cannot be neatly captured or predicted. As with concerns about ‘social desirability’ or surveys and the Hawthorne Effect more generally, there is the potential that these pre-existing relationships resulted in particular responses to interview questions being provided.

The generally warm reception that the researcher received by the ‘researched’ raised some ethical dilemmas about how best to present key findings. As Westmarland notes, ‘[e]thnographers and other researchers often form friendships or emotional bonds with their research participants, and may then go through tortuous decision-making processes in deciding what to do in certain situations’ (2011, p. 162). There was a strong desire not to disappoint, disparage or denounce observed practices. Having had contact with a significant number of people throughout the course of the fieldwork, it was always difficult to discern exactly how the research project was understood and therefore what repercussions there would be if the final output included perceived negative commentary.

Being attached to a university that is situated so close to the Glebe area invariably had consequences for the research. The university holds a strong physical and symbolic relationship with the area. Historically, the architect responsible for the design of the
university lived in Glebe; many staff and students live in Glebe or visit the area regularly; and staff from various faculties are engaged in research in the area. The impact of these relationships and ties is not easily estimated, but there was a strong sense during the research that access was aided by the close connections between Sydney University and the Glebe area/communities.

The researcher’s role at the university was at times a catalyst to be invited to contribute to discussions in inter-agency meetings. Discussions about how community organisations might approach senior university personnel for support or funding or on possible funding for local initiatives were two such examples of where any neat dichotomy between observer and participant was blurred. While the researcher was comfortable providing assistance, internal tensions arose in relation to what was the appropriate response in these and other situations. An inclination to remain distant and detached was clouded by a desire to provide constructive assistance.

A challenge of fieldwork commonly discussed in relevant research literature is the management of what quickly becomes a vast amount of information (Semmens 2011; Cosgrove & Francis 2011). Notes, minutes, annual reports, interview transcripts, historical and contemporary documentation, and an array of other forms of data were produced or secured during this research. Synthesising this material and drawing key themes was a challenge. Beyond the issues of simply distilling this material, there was the parallel challenge of not falling into the trap of generating novel insights or ground-breaking observations where none existed. Downes and Rock (2007, p. 10) warn that ‘[s]ociologists frequently strain after the identifiably new, the special emphasis that will set him or her apart as an original thinker who deserves honour and reward’. This fuels the search for the pithy summary or the catchy slogan, which is compelling in an age when succinctness is favoured over complexity. However, the risk of conflating findings for the sake of neatness or grandness was resisted.

Noaks and Wincup suggest that ‘[a]ll experienced researchers can relate to the sense of research fatigue, which includes becoming bored by the data collection process, and physically and emotionally drained’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004, pp. 70–1). This was acutely experienced in the typing up of notes after observing inter-agency meetings. The menial task of recording impressions for later analysis was not relished. However, the overall involvement with workers in the area proved to be generally invigorating.
Conclusion

To explore the state of crime prevention and more deeply understand local crime prevention programs, policies and practices, a series of research methods were adopted. These included:

- physical familiarisation with the area by walking the area and observing daily routines of residents and visitors, and through night-time visits (often in a car);
- desktop reviews to gain an understanding of the history, social dynamics and service delivery systems operating in Glebe;
- analysis of crime data for an 18-year period;
- observing and notating 30 inter-agency meetings, informal interviews, and community events over a 12-month period;
- conducting two focus groups, with the express purpose of understanding falls in crime in Glebe in recent years; and
- conducting 15 formal, semi-structured interviews with workers from various agencies operating in Glebe over an 18-month period.

These research methods and the overall research philosophy were heavily influenced by ethnography, grounded theory and case study traditions. It was determined that through a deep understanding of crime prevention practices in Glebe, insights about crime prevention more broadly would arise. It is argued that a failure to understand local, often opaque crime prevention programs and practices makes particular grand theories vulnerable. Without deep understanding of these practices, there is a risk that sweeping theories have unstable foundations.

Before exploring the findings emerging from these research methods, Chapter 5 provides an overview of Glebe. This information will help provide a geographical, historical, and social context for exploration of the key research findings.
Chapter 5: An Overview of Glebe

As has been stated, the focus for the fieldwork and thesis is the Glebe postcode area (which includes two suburbs: Glebe and Forest Lodge). A general description of this 2.1 square kilometre postcode area will be provided to ground some of the later discussion and analysis. Sufficient rather than exhaustive detail has been compiled. Some of the local characteristics are critical to understanding crime prevention activities in the area. However, for the purposes of the more conceptual analysis, the local characteristics of Glebe will move out of focus.

The more factual data derived from spatial, Census, and historical data, is augmented by numerous comments from interviewees and focus group participants. While later chapters will deal with the key findings emerging from these interviews and other aspects of the fieldwork in detail, relevant quotes are provided throughout this chapter to animate some of the historical material and to provide a contemporary context that sets the scene for the more crime prevention-centric analyses that follow. Maps, photos and images are also used, where appropriate, to illustrate the area.

General Description of Glebe Area

The Glebe 2037 postcode area covers 240 hectares (Solling 2007). Glebe sits about two kilometres west of the Sydney central business district (‘CBD’). The area is geographically defined by Rozelle and Blackwattle Bays in the north, Parramatta Road (a major arterial road that connects Sydney with western Sydney) in the south, Wattle Street to the east and The Crescent and Ross Street to the west (partially illustrated in Figure 1).

The area of Glebe now falls within the City of Sydney LGA, within NSW, which is one of eight states and territories that make up Australia. It has changed council areas numerous times, most recently in 2003 when the area was transferred from Leichhardt Council to the City of Sydney LGA. This has particular implications for service delivery, which will become apparent in later chapters.

Figure 1 reveals the predominantly residential nature of the Glebe postcode area (referred to as Glebe for ease throughout the remainder of this thesis). It also demonstrates the sizeable

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32 Familiarity with these locations and landmarks is not critical to understand the following chapters. Specific geographic reference points are used at times to ground observations, but familiarity with these places is not necessary to follow the key findings and points of discussion.
parks, including Wentworth Park on the eastern edge, Bicentennial and Jubilee Park in the north, Harold Park\textsuperscript{33} in the west and smaller pocket parks scattered throughout the area. The aerial map reveals areas of industrial/commercial land use, predominantly along Parramatta Road (the arterial road along the southern border), which also shows some of the sporting fields that are part of the University of Sydney’s grounds. Broadway shopping centre is just visible in the right hand corner of Figure 1; it now stands on approximately 50 000 square metres (or total Gross Leasable Area) and is home to 142 speciality shops.\textsuperscript{34} Adjacent to the shopping centre is Glebe Point Road, which retains strip shopping and numerous restaurants and eateries. The area enjoys significant pedestrian traffic due to these activity generators and attractors.

The area does not have a train station, but light rail does dissect the northern edge of the area, and there are good bus connections along Parramatta and Glebe Point Roads.

\textsuperscript{33} Harold Park is currently being redeveloped. The former harness racing venue will become a significant residential development. Some aspects of this redevelopment will be considered in Chapter 7.

The topography of the area is not well represented in Figure 1. Solling describes the topography in the following manner:

In Glebe the Hawkesbury sandstone ridge runs from south-east to north-west. The soft Winnamatta shale capping the sandstone has weathered to produce gently rolling slopes and rounded summits with contours ranging from 20 to 30 metres. On Glebe’s eastern, northern and western limits, where the underlying Hawkesbury sandstone outcrops, steep cliff faces appear (2007, p. 40).

This topography has particular implications. The northern water border creates somewhat of a peninsula, while the rise and fall of the land across the area creates natural boundaries and points of elevation with commanding views (with the associated impact on property prices).
Social Profile

Table 6 provides a breakdown of some of the socio-demographic characteristics of the area.

Table 6: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Glebe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total persons</td>
<td>11 431</td>
<td>11 061</td>
<td>11 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous (% of total population)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian birthplace (% of total population)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English only language spoken at home</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>33 years</td>
<td>35 years</td>
<td>35 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median total family income</td>
<td>$1200–$1499 per week</td>
<td>$1631 per week</td>
<td>$2193 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median mortgage repayment</td>
<td>$1600–$1799 per month</td>
<td>$2178 per month</td>
<td>$2817 per month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average household size</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top personal income categories</td>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>$2000+</td>
<td>$2000+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$150–$249</td>
<td>$200–$299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage in state housing authority</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage own home outright</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage owned with mortgage</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage renting (real estate agent)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of themes emerge from Table 6. The residential population of the area has been stable over the last decade, sitting just over 11,000 people. Of these, a little greater than two per cent are Indigenous, the majority of the population was born in Australia and only speaks English at home, and the median age is 35 years. The unemployment rate has fluctuated and, at the most recent Census, 6.7 per cent of the Glebe residential population was unemployed. There is also evidence of socially polarised populations, with the two most common personal income categories being greater than A$2000 per week and between A$200 and A$299 per week. It is also apparent that a significant proportion of the Glebe population (19 per cent in 2011, down slightly from 22 per cent in the 2006 and 2001 Censuses) resides in public or social housing, which equates to approximately 2000 residents residing in properties managed by state, social housing or Aboriginal housing providers. An almost equal number of Glebe residents live in properties that are owned outright. Issues associated with the polarisation of wealth and the significant reliance on public housing will be considered in detail later in this chapter.

**Indigenous History**

Macintyre suggests that Indigenous Australian history started ‘40,000 to 60,000 or more years before the present’ (1999, p. 4). The area encompassing Glebe was (and continues to be) home to the Cadigal people of the Eora nation. The swamps of what are now Rozelle and Blackwattle Bays were rich in food. Fishing was a significant pastime and source of food for the Cadigal people, who fashioned sophisticated fishing and hunting devices (Solling 2007, p. 32).

The peaceful existence of the Eora clans was irrevocably altered with the arrival of the First Fleet in 1788. Attacks on the Indigenous population were frequent, and barbaric practices pitting Indigenous men against one another were organised by early colonial settlers (Grabosky 1977). Mass atrocities were also carried out on Indigenous communities as the colony spread across parts of NSW and Australia (Cunneen, 2001). Further, disease and destruction of local habitats had crushing consequences for the local Indigenous communities: ‘Deprived of their traditional lands, and with a consequent reduction in availability of indigenous foods, Aboriginal lives were bedevilled by disease, destitution and disenfranchisement’ (Solling 2007, p. 35).
Despite these practices, which threatened the survival of local Indigenous communities, Glebe continues to play an important role for the small but significant local Indigenous population, especially through organisations like the local Tranby Aboriginal College.35

**Early Colonial History**

The Glebe area was part of the early Australian colony, having been surveyed in 1790, but largely remaining unoccupied until 1812. The area was heavily timbered before it was handed to the church. Stillwell notes that ‘[a]s it names implies, Glebe has the distinguished feature that its land has been owned by the church — in this case the Church of England — which was the recipient of the original grant of land’ (1987, p. 73). Solling further identifies the links between the area and the church. He observes that ‘a glebe under ecclesiastical law is defined as “land devoted to the maintenance of the incumbent of the church”’ (2007, p. 42). Governor Phillip, the first Governor and founder of the Sydney settlement, on instruction from the British authorities, reserved the land for the Church of England. Large lots were allocated and major estates developed (including St Phillip’s and Bishopthorpe Estates), which remain features of the area today.

By 1841, 203 people were living in Glebe. Thirteen major villas dominated the area, with a number of huts for labouring families (Solling 2007). Economic difficulties in the 1840s saw the further sale and subdivision of land in Glebe. More rapid population growth occurred in the 1850s, with the population growing to over 1500 people. With an absence of planning controls, numerous ‘deadends and backwaters’ became a feature of the area during this 1840–50s period (Solling 2007, pp. 63–4). However, with Glebe being granted municipal status in 1859, greater town planning principles began to be adopted, which reinforced class divisions.

**Early Class Divisions**

The terrain and the original subdivision boundaries influenced the manner in which the area developed. Solling noted that ‘[t]opography was an important social consideration in early suburban development … the middle class in 1858 tended to live in the more elevated parts of new suburbs encircling the city proper, and the poor congregated in the least desirable localities’ (2007, p. 12). From its earliest post-settlement beginnings, the area was dominated by significant class divisions related to topographical features of the area. Higher land with

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35 Tranby is a not-for-profit educational college for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Established in 1958, Tranby has delivered and continues to deliver a range of vocational education courses to Indigenous Australians and organisations. Further information about Tranby can be found at http://www.tranby.edu.au/.
views of the water were the sites for large estates, while those areas closer to what would become an industrial precinct along the waterways were where the poor and the workers settled. Solling puts it thus:

> On the heights of Glebe Point, the merchant princes, the captains of industry and the men of the liberal professions looked down on the migration of this new breed into their domain. The blandishments of suburban living were no longer solely reserved for the wealthy, but their citadel at Glebe Point would not be stormed by the working classes (2007, p. 63).

Consistent with observations by Solling (2007), one interviewee linked this divide to the topography of Glebe:

> [H]istorically more affluent areas are also in the higher parts of suburbs in terms of the topography, and that relates mainly to issues relating to sewerage, waste disposal. Of course, where we didn’t have ways of disposing of our waste, it just flowed down the street, so historically people built their houses on the hill, not just because they got the view but because the cesspool existed at the bottom of the hill, and also away from creeks and rivers and the waterways that came off the bay itself, which were the original water supplies which themselves became very highly polluted areas as people did their toileting in the creek. So those areas became polluted very quickly, and of course they were always low-lying areas (Interviewee #2).

**Persistent Class Divisions**

From its earliest settlement, the area has been home to the working classes and the wealthy. Throughout economic periods of boom and bust, working-class families have resided in the area to service the local industries and because of its close proximity to the CBD. In times of economic downturn, the area became a site of numerous boarding rooms and some of the earliest charities were established in the area (for example, the Glebe Ragged School was established in 1862, the City Mission operated a soup kitchen in Bay Street in 1893, and the Benevolent Society encouraged philanthropy throughout the area).

These class divisions were noted by an interviewee:

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36 These observations are perhaps informed by Solling’s book, *Grandeur and Grit*. During fieldwork visits to various organisations in the area, there was evidence that a number owned a copy of this book. It does provide a definitive history of the area.
There’s been a history from what I understand in Glebe of entrenched social disadvantage and across many social indicators Glebe has scored consistently poorly around the Glebe estate for a long, long time (Interviewee #4).

Those from disadvantaged backgrounds often face numerous social and economic challenges, highlighted by numerous interviewees:

Growing up in families where there are drug and alcohol issues, histories of violence, child protection intervention, ongoing issues with police. Overcrowding … (Interviewee #3).

[P]overty, disadvantage, family, complex families. I think the community with drug and alcohol and mental health is a significant problem and there not being consistent care for children and not I guess an expected level of care (Interviewee #8).

These are the low income families ... It’s not even categorising, it’s just what they are. They are in the government housing, they are living with their mother whose partner is in and out of prison. You’ve got other families that have family members that have their addictions and struggle in that sort of sense. So these families have four to eight kids and they’re just running around. And there’s more, you’ve got grandparents taking care of the grandchildren along with their own children and then there’s DoCS [child protection agency Department of Community Services] involvement because they’re either not doing the right thing, just trying to get some money and just not using the money the way it should be (Interviewee #10).

Beyond these characteristics of disadvantage, it was also suggested that some residents of the area were quite transient, raising challenges for service delivery.

[Y]ou’ve got these families that are in and out but you’ve also got families that come in from the bush and then disappear just as quickly (Interviewee #10).

[W]e do have blow-ins, people who come in from the country and they’re just here to stay with family for a few months and then go back, but while they’re here they really unleash hell on us (Focus Group Participant).

It seems to be quite a transient area as well … So I'm thinking it is probably the Housing Commission we could safely say is the more transient side of Glebe, but then again you’ve got a lot of like backpackers and students as well … if you have a
transient population nobody takes ownership of the area … People don’t care. People don’t care about getting to know their neighbours, they don’t care about throwing a brick through the school window because they don’t know anybody who’s ever gone there and they don’t... I guess it’s just a lack of care — generalising again because not everybody is like that (Interviewee #7).

[W]e have high concentrations of public housing we do get higher concentrations of transient populations, too, so people living on the margins who live in very temporary accommodation and situations, often moving from place to place, from night to night (Interviewee #2).

Some transience in the area is the result of universities and a major hospital complex in adjacent areas, and the close proximity to the Sydney CBD.

Many of these divisions and challenges persist. As Bottrell noted in her study of young people in the area, it is perceived that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ends of Glebe (2002, p. 6). Specific geographical referents were provided by interviewees that demonstrate this divide:

    St Johns Road almost is a good divider where you’ve got Housing Commission on one side and almost mansions on the other side (Interviewee #7).

    It’s quite amazing. We draw the line — first at St John’s Road as a cutting point … So yeah, the wrong side of the tracks or the wrong side of St John’s Road (Interviewee #4).

Part of this division is the result of institutionalised differences in housing tenure. Many interviewees and focus group participants made mention of this divide:

    It’s an interesting place because it’s kind of yin and yang, 50/50 with Housing Commission and then like million dollar terraces and big houses down at the other end (Interviewee #7).

**A Brief History of Public Housing**

Given the critical importance of public housing to Glebe, the following provides a short history of key developments in public housing in NSW. A more detailed commentary will then be provided about public housing in Glebe, with historical and contemporary observations being canvassed.
Changes in public housing across NSW and Australia have impacted the Glebe area. Hayward (1996) identifies four key phases in the history of public housing in Australia. The first phase, ‘anything but public housing’, ran between 1900 and 1937 and was characterised by the absence of public housing, despite the social and economic conditions of the Great Depression.

The second phase, ‘the foundations of a national public housing system’, ran between 1937 and 1956 and was the ‘golden era’ of public housing. The post-war period of nation building saw massive investment and construction of public housing. The building and construction industries were unable to source suitable materials and erect homes quickly enough. Demand outstripped supply, despite some 96,000 dwellings being added to Australia’s housing stock in this period.

The third phase, ‘public housing for home ownership’, was evident in the period between 1956 and 1973. Building continued, especially in inner-city areas, where towers rose up and on the periphery of capital cities and large tracts of newly developed land saw sprawling estates emerge. Regimes to enable public housing to be purchased meant that the overall number of public housing dwellings did not dramatically increase in this period. This final phase, termed ‘the last throes of public housing’ by Hayward, involved a significant shift in the demography of public housing tenants. The original intention was to provide housing for returned soldiers and for blue-collar workers. Large estates were often, though not always, located near to key manufacturing and industrial sites (Arthurson 2012). Over time, the population changed. Waiting lists grew following economic troubles in the early 1970s and then again in the early-to-mid-1980s; tenants were no longer necessarily employed; demand for smaller properties rose as family sizes fell and divorce rates soared; and tenants with ‘complex social and emotional needs’ increased, as public housing was increasingly used to resettle domestic violence victims, ex-offenders and people suffering from mental illness (Foard et al 1994; Arthurson 2012). As Hayward notes, ‘in the space of only two decades, public housing had for the first time genuinely become welfare housing’ (1996, pp. 27–8).

The trends observed by Hayward have continued in recent decades. A recent report from the NSW Auditor General stresses the significant challenges facing the public housing system in NSW. The report concludes that social housing meets only 44 per cent of estimated need in NSW; the public housing stock is ageing and ‘increasingly not fit for purpose’; increasing investment is required to maintain the current properties despite constraints on the capacity to
generate income and funding; and, without significant investment, ‘the housing portfolio will
decline in terms of dwelling numbers and standard’ (2013a, p. 2). Hayward’s suggestion that
‘successive Governments have at best been reluctant landlords’ (1996, p. 5) continues to resonate.

Hayward’s history of public housing also highlights an important characteristic that has had
ongoing repercussions in the Glebe area. The rapid erection of public housing dwellings at
different times in the last century has had implications for the design quality and ongoing
maintenance. The ‘frenetic pace of housing production in a context of a shortage of building
materials inevitably meant sacrificing quality standards’ (Hayward 1996, p. 16) in the post-
war public housing boom. In the 1960s and 1970s, ‘[d]wellings were always at best modest.
They also tended to be under-maintained and poorly served by community facilities’
(Hayward 1996, p. 19). This lack of quality design and construction coupled with decreasing
investment in repair and maintenance and changing demographics requiring differently
configured designs has meant generally declining standards of public housing stock in recent
decades.

Public Housing in Glebe

The church, as a significant landlord in Glebe, originally provided a significant amount of
housing in the area. However, managing this housing stock became an increasing problem for
the church and it was eventually sold off. By the 1960’s, the local population was
predominantly elderly, ‘a residual from the dominant trends towards suburban living for the
more affluent and/or mobile sections of the community. The church found itself in a position
of seeking to maintain a steadily deteriorating housing stock with diminishing return from its
ageing population’ (Stillwell 1987, p. 73).

After selling off some of the properties, the church proposed a more comprehensive plan of
management in its submission to the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty in 1972. This
suggested that ‘the area “would be an ideal place for the federal and state governments,
perhaps in co-operation with local councils, to experiment with the provision of low-cost
housing along planned lines”’ (Stillwell 1987, pp. 73–4). This proposal was supported by the
recently established Glebe Society (a local activist group formed in 1969) and the local
council (at that time Leichhardt Council), and it received support from the newly elected (in
late 1972) Labor Federal Government. The Federal Government was interested in urban
development, unlike its predecessors and, through the establishment of the Department of
Urban and Regional Development (‘DURD’), it was able to bring attention to efforts to save and maintain inner-city public housing.

DURD undertook a feasibility study for assuming responsibility for the land and properties. In 1975, the Glebe Estate was established, ‘under the responsibility of the Glebe Estate Project Board which comprised representatives from DURD, the Cities Commission and the Department of Housing and Construction’ (Stillwell 1987, p. 74). A protracted process then saw the eventual ownership and management move from the Federal Government to the NSW Government — the intention being to maintain public housing in the inner city and tenure diversity close to the city. The Glebe Estate and other pockets of public housing continue to be a central and contentious part of the fabric of Glebe, with Housing NSW responsible for allocating and maintaining these public housing estate properties. Bottrell (2009) highlights some of the social issues linked with the Glebe Estate: ‘Since its establishment in the 1980s, the estate has been a focus of identified social problems, including child protection notifications, youth truancy, drug use and involvement in street crime, disturbance complaints, vandalism, and car break-ins’ (2009, p. 482). Recent attention has focused on the state of repair (or disrepair).

There has been much commentary in recent years of the poor state of some of the public, social and Aboriginal housing in Glebe. The Local Member, Mr Jamie Parker, raised the following issues in the Legislative Assembly of the NSW Parliament on 29 March 2012:

My electorate office has received a dossier of public housing tenants who have contacted my office in exasperation after waiting months and often years for repairs to be carried out to their homes. The issues include rat infestations, flooding, mould and even holes in ceilings … The huge maintenance backlog means miserable conditions are being endured by some of the most vulnerable people in our community — those who live in appalling conditions while the assets owned by the people of New South Wales are facing demolition by neglect. It is a disgrace that people are forced to live in such conditions without adequate support from the Government. Underfunding basic maintenance leads only to greater future costs as smaller problems grow into significant structural faults (Parker 2012, p. 10256).

The poor physical state of some of the public housing was frequently highlighted during fieldwork. The comments below are from interviewees:
I get to hear a lot of complaints and issues of people who are in public housing ... I think they have got a lot to answer for for the living conditions for a lot of the people who are in Housing complexes ... I’ve heard stories of [water] in their bedroom, like where their bedhead is, of like having a water feature almost running down the wall because the guttering has exploded upstairs and the roof leaks and the water just runs down the architraves and just kind of trickles past their heads. I’ve seen photos of mould on walls ... I’ve spoken to people who say they are not only physically ill because of the mould or because of the drafts and the damp and whatever else it might be, they’re physically ill because they’ve sent 100 letters and they’ve sent a 1000 emails and nothing is happening, and I think when you get into that headspace, I’ve actually had one woman admit to me that she’s literally gone mad because of it (Interviewee #7).

[M]assive termite colony; rotting verandas, just huge ... Glebe’s a bit of a damp suburb, you know, in parts ... some of those families I’ve seen where there’s ... they just have to have doors, areas locked off in the house ... workmen had come and sort of tacked up a bit of wood to cover one of the broken things and that was that. Yeah, water damage, flooding, yeah (Interviewee #9).

For some, these poor physical conditions directly impact on any behavioural or conduct issues of public housing tenants:

You put people in substandard housing they’re going to behave like substandard humans (Interviewee #6).

If you’re living in an awful house and the landlord won’t fix your veranda it just creates that sense of dejection and rejection and no hope (Interviewee #4).

These physical conditions are compounded by housing allocation policies:

I might be being less optimistic than I should be, but I am concerned about what’s happening in housing, and the allocation policy. Getting too much of a mass of dysfunctional groups or families or individuals. I’m concerned about that (Focus Group Participant).

I frankly don’t think Housing does enough to separate people out so you don’t have a ghetto of psychotic people all living next door to each other or ex-crims. I mean
criminals have to be given a chance to get a new start in life but ... they’re going back
to their old patch with all their old playmates (Interviewee #6).

Another interviewee reflected not only on the allocation policy, but also some of the changes
that are now impacting on the overall public and social housing system:

New South Wales housing allocation policy and the shortage of housing, public
housing compared to the demand, assessment criteria to be housed, it’s no longer
about income. That got shifted years ago and it needs to be that you’re a survivor of
domestic violence fleeing with a child with a disability with a mother with significant
mental health difficulties. It’s quite hideous what you have to do to get housing
(Interviewee #8).

There was also concern that cessation of tenure for life, and attempts to extract greater returns
from public housing tenants able to pay higher rents and to maximise use of properties that
are under-tenanted, have provided a level of instability in the system which creates anxiety
for tenants:

There are a lot of one and two person people in Housing and a lot of those properties
are four and five bedrooms (Interviewee #6).

[T]he Department of Housing were looking at relocating the families to a different
community, so then that throws things out again because you’re trying to design some
social community support and intervention around not knowing if they’re going to be
in that community and if they’re not in that community you can’t technically work
with them (Interviewee #1).

Despite, or because of, these problems, there continues to be significant demand on public
and social housing. Waiting times to access public and social housing have become
excessively long.\textsuperscript{37} The Housing NSW website lists the waiting times for particular areas in
Sydney for particular housing types (that is, the number of bedrooms per dwelling). The
waiting list for the Inner City Region (which includes Glebe), accessed in September 2013,
revealed that the waiting times for studio, one-bedroom, three-bedroom and four-plus

\textsuperscript{37} Murphy et al (2011) show how excessively long waiting lists deter some from even applying for public
housing. They also show the tensions faced by many public housing tenants: poorly maintained buildings,
frightening behaviour of neighbours, and significant intrusion by government agencies.
bedrooms was between five and 10 years. The waiting time increases to greater than 10 years for two-bedroom dwellings (Housing NSW 2013). The impact of the situation on those wanting to access public housing is obviously significant.

Given the nature of Glebe and the significant proportion of the population residing in public or social housing, these issues continue to be central to any contemporary discussions about, and analysis of, the area. Interestingly, given the stigma often associated with public housing, there is strong interest in retaining public housing:

Most people choose to live in Glebe because of the diversity of the demographics and if you made the Glebe Estate like Paddington the whole tenor of Glebe would change, I think, and it would bring a different sort of social problem (Interviewee #6).

There’s a real passion to maintain the public housing estate and so there are people from the wealthy side who value the diversity and I don’t know, I suppose the historical social cultural character of Glebe. I know this isn’t so related to crime but part of Glebe’s uniqueness and its history is because of that estate and there are people who are wealthy who value that but they want that area to be socially healthy as well (Interviewee #4).

Unique Strengths of Glebe

Much of the foregoing discussion paints a somewhat fractured picture, which is a partial image. There are many who would rightly challenge this account. In contrast, they would point to a number of unique strengths of the area, some of which are discussed here.

Glebe has a number of strengths that other areas would welcome. Under the headings of social capital, celebration, and inter-agency relationships, some of these strengths will be considered.

Social Capital

Glebe demonstrates the hallmarks of strong bridging and bonding social capital of the kind Putnam (2000) has previously discussed (and which has been covered earlier in Chapter 2). There are vertical and horizontal connections and relationships that serve the area well. Organisations like the Glebe Society and COGG advocate strongly for the retention of public/social housing and for the provision of appropriate services to public/social housing tenants. This genuinely seems to be more than a desire to retain some urban tapestry; it reflects a strong social justice commitment, which is one of the hallmarks of the Glebe
Society. Solling (2007) and Stillwell (1987) both highlight the important contribution of the Glebe Society in preserving the area from planned development in the 1960s and its role in the development of the Glebe Estate and the subsequent retention of public housing. This lobbying by the Glebe Society to retain public housing continues today.

The proximity to the University of Sydney (and other tertiary education facilities, such as the University of Technology and Sydney TAFE) is also a considerable strength. In particular, the Glebe Community Development Project, a partnership between Housing NSW and Sydney University, provides a layer of inter-agency coordination not common to other areas. The resources and knowledge associated with this project provide greater impetus and rigour to community development work in the area. The Pathways Project (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7) owes much to Sydney University staff (Hayes 2011a), as do a number of local programs. The strength of inter-agency bonds and relationships also owes much to this project.

A recent initiative involving the Glebe Society and the Community Development Project perhaps demonstrates the value of these two groups. The ambassador program involves ambassadors identified through the Glebe Society working with local organisations to pursue funding. This has the potential of garnering further resources for the area through the expertise of people with strong political connections, systems knowledge and capacities to distil ideas into funding proposals.

The transfer of Glebe from Leichhardt Council to the City of Sydney Council has also been beneficial to the area. Without passing judgment on the relative merits of particular councils or LGAs, it is widely recognised that the City of Sydney Council has greater economic resources than that of Leichhardt Council. A cursory review of the most recent financial reports for both councils reveals the significant disparity in income and assets. According to the 2012–13 financial statements, the City of Sydney Council generated approximately A$600 million in income in 2012–13 and had infrastructure assets worth approximately A$6 billion (City of Sydney 2013a). Leichhardt Council generated approximately A$80 million in income and had approximately $702 million in infrastructure assets (Leichhardt Council 2013). While the areas service different geographies and populations, the significant difference in economic capacity is illustrated by these crude comparisons. One of the interviewees mentioned the perception of improvements following the transfer: ‘Some of
them [community members] remark on how much better it is since they came over from Leichhardt’ (Interviewee #13).

Glebe is also home to a large number of religious organisations. Per some of the history of the area described earlier in this chapter, there has been a strong connection between religious organisations and Glebe. These organisations not only provide opportunities for local community members to observe their religious beliefs, but they also provide a welter of community development programs, including provision of food, community gardens, counselling, support services, and drop-in programs.

Together, these dimensions ensure that the people of Glebe have a strong community voice; are connected to key political forces (at local, state and federal levels of government); have connections that cut across the socio-economic divide; and have the ability to mobilise resources, in part due to the improved economic investment in the area following the transfer of the area from Leichhardt Council to the City of Sydney Council in 2003.

Local Services and Inter-agency Relationships
No area is likely to regard itself as being well serviced or completely happy with the inter-agency configurations operating. Glebe does, however, have a multitude of actors that directly and indirectly contribute various aspects of community life. Many of the programs and services operating in the area that have any relationship to the prevention of crime will be considered in Chapter 7. The nature of the relationships between these agencies was generally described in glowing terms during fieldwork. Interviewees and focus group participants lauded the quality of inter-agency partnerships in the area:

[E]everyone is able to collaborate and see this is actually good for our whole community (Interviewee #9).

The Glebe community is amazing, so it’s very, very easy to work alongside one another (Interviewee #10).

We link up with other services which is one of the biggest strengths I think we have (Interviewee #10).

Glebe is lucky in the sense … well, I think it’s fortunate in the sense that there are some really proactive groups that are not specific to public housing, so the Chamber [of Commerce] and the Glebe Society and so on where there’s some great individuals
who are willing to raise issues and partner with others around doing stuff (Interviewee #5).

I really think from 2008 everybody started talking to each other a lot more. I don’t know what happened before I was around, but it certainly seems like the collaborative stuff between everybody grew leaps and bounds (Focus Group Participant).

The quality of these relationships and inter-agency collaboration is not just a function of the services in the area. Two actors were specifically nominated for mention in interviews and focus groups — Ally who runs the Glebe Community Development Project and John who is the Senior Safer City Coordinator at the Council for the City of Sydney:38

I think a really important thing from my perspective was having people like Ally and John who weren’t necessarily involved in direct service delivery but who played a role as coordinators and brokers and bringing people together. That was pretty cool, because otherwise there was no way to bring us together. So I can’t emphasise that particular role enough (Focus Group Participant).

[A] role that City played, John in particular, in terms of really cementing the coordination and facilitation of those and communication between those groups. That was the key thing that I would note. I think that’s persisted too ... So that’s positive, capacity-building type of an outcome (Focus Group Participant).

The coordination responsibilities of these roles were highlighted for particular mention, as many other workers have few opportunities to take on such coordination roles. These roles and the work over many years have helped foster a culture of collaboration:

I think there is — a culture of collaboration has been built over time … There’s a culture that’s been developed. I think there’s a general kind of shared vision or principles of social justice that organisations share. I think that comes from the political history as much as the NGOs that are there and that stuff around quality and equity (Interviewee #8).

This is not to suggest that inter-agency work is simple or without difficulties. There were suggestions that the limited number of services in the area, the absence of some key agencies

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38 Attempts have been made to avoid naming individual workers. However, in this instance it was considered necessary to retain the intent of what was suggested by the focus group participants.
at inter-agency events and uncertainty of funding undermined such collaboration. Moreover, barriers to effective collaboration were flagged as being relevant to Glebe:

[T]here’s not a lot of services in Glebe with the capacity … I also think that for a suburb that’s such a concentrated Housing community with really sort of complex needs there could be a lot more going on (Interviewee #9).

**Celebrations**

Another somewhat distinctive feature of Glebe is the number of celebrations and events hosted throughout the year. These celebrations help to bring different community and external actors together and provide an opportunity for workers to interact and collaborate in different ways, as identified by one interviewee:

[E]vents are really important and all the research shows that they’re really important. They’re a really nice way of working with other agencies because they’re not problem focussed and they’re fun and you get to do new things. The meetings tend to be pretty light hearted so it’s a whole different way of working together and connecting with others as well (Interviewee #8).

While there is a host of small-scale community events, there are also central celebrations throughout the year. For example, the Mitchell Street Fete, held in March, provides an opportunity for public and social housing tenants to enjoy the activities provided by numerous community groups and local workers; NAIDOC activities in July have been steadily building in Glebe and now consistently include events over a week to celebrate Indigenous culture and customs; and November is when the Glebe Street Fair is held, bringing many thousands of people to enjoy the stalls, music, dancing and other activities, as shown in Figure 2.
These events take considerable effort to organise and involve a diversity of actors. They provide opportunities for local community members to showcase their cultures, customs and talents, and bring workers together to plan and administer these events.

**Conclusion**

Glebe has a lengthy Indigenous history and a more recent colonial history. The area was earmarked for settlement soon after colonisation. With large parts of the area being granted to the church and divided into large estates, three enduring trends were established: the importance of churches; the attraction of wealthy residents; and the arrival of the working classes to service the large estates. The social divisions reflected in the early settlement of the area resonate today, with the suburb home to public housing tenants and corporate leaders alike. Between these two populations is a more fluid and transient group who are drawn to the area because of the proximity to the Sydney CBD and the nearby tertiary institutions and hospital.

This socio-historical and spatial overview provides an important backdrop to understanding crime and crime prevention dynamics in the area. Remote or distant analyses miss important local dimensions, characteristics and topography. Natural barriers, local traditions, established working arrangements, and political dimensions are just some of the characteristics of an area that have repercussions on local crime and the ability of local groups and people to respond to crime.
With this partial picture painted, attention will now turn to crime prevention in Glebe. Chapter 6 will review recent crime statistics for Glebe and consider some potential consequences of what can be generally described as a crime decline. Chapter 7 will provide a detailed account of some of the crime prevention activities operating in the area. Chapter 8 will consider some of the crime prevention planning practices and inter-agency connections in the area.
Chapter 6: Crime Trends in Glebe

Crime data for the Glebe postcode area were accessed and analysed. The major crime trends in Glebe between 1995 and 2012 include a substantial decline in major property offence categories; an increase in fraud; generally stable trends for offences against the person; and a spike in some of these categories in the 2007–08 period. These trends provide important context for analysis of local crime prevention programs and policies, as will be shown in this chapter.

This chapter will commence with some discussion of the trends for key offence categories, exploration of the responses to the crime spike, and analysis of the property crime decline.

Crime Trends

Data is provided here for key volume offences (those with greater than 50-plus incidents per annum) including break and enter dwelling, motor vehicle theft, steal from motor vehicle, malicious damage to property, robbery offences (without a weapon, with a firearm, and with a weapon not a firearm), assaults (domestic violence-related and non-domestic violence-related), and fraud, as reported to police. Appendix 4 contains data for in excess of 70 crime categories for the Glebe postcode area for the 1995–2012 period.

Break and Enter Dwelling

Break and enter dwelling (more commonly known as burglary) has shown a marked decline between 1995 and 2012. Break and enter dwelling offences in Glebe peaked at 449 in 2000, as shown in Figure 3, falling to 90 reported and recorded offences in 2011. This downward trend (approximately an 80 per cent reduction between 2000 and 2011) is consistent with patterns across Sydney, New South Wales, Australia, and internationally (Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b; van Dijk et al 2012).

39 BOCSAR access and collate NSW Police Force data, which is the basis of the published crime statistics in NSW. Crime data in NSW is generally not provided for years prior to 1995 due to the quality of the data. The introduction of the electronic database in the early 1990s improved the accuracy of the data captured on reported crimes. Only volume offences will be discussed. In such a small area as Glebe, many offences have fewer than 50 incidents per annum. Appendix 4 contains a full list of offences and incidents.

40 The low level of serious violence offences in Glebe deserves mention. Due to the very small numbers of offences resulting in loss of life, they will not be analysed or discussed in this thesis. Nonetheless, it is worth highlighting that there were fewer than 25 incidents of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, driving causing death, and accessory to murder in the Glebe area between 1995 and 2012.
Figure 3: Incidents of Break and Enter Dwelling in Glebe between 1995 and 2012

![Break and enter dwelling graph](image)


**Motor Vehicle Theft**

The number of incidents of motor vehicle theft reported and recorded by the police in Glebe has fallen dramatically in recent years (see Figure 4). The peak for this offence (328 incidents) was recorded in 1998, dropping to 52 in 2012. This is an 84 per cent reduction in motor vehicle theft in this period, which is slightly above Sydney and NSW averages (Weatherburn & Holmes 2013b).

Figure 4: Incidents of Motor Vehicle Theft in Glebe between 1995 and 2012

![Motor vehicle theft graph](image)

**Steal from Motor Vehicle**

Incidents of steal from motor vehicle in Glebe more than doubled toward the end of the 1990s, rising from 437 in 1995 to 1081 in 2000. There was a general decline then for the following five years, falling to 341 incidents in 2005 and 477 incidents in 2006, before rising sharply to 879 in 2007 and 705 in 2008. A dramatic decline then again occurred, with incidents of steal from motor vehicle falling to 121 in 2011 and 107 in 2012. This represents a quite remarkable decline of 90 per cent from the peak in 2000 to the low in 2012.

It is apparent that the incidence of these offences has risen and fallen over the 18-year period, with a high of 1079 in 2000 and a low of 107 in 2012. The high represents nearly three of these offences per day, while the low is approximately two incidents per week. The changing levels suggest some volatility, with the 495 incidents of steal from motor vehicle in 2006 doubling in 2007, before falling by approximately 77 per cent in the following three years.

**Figure 5: Incidents of Steal from Motor Vehicle in Glebe between 1995 and 2012**

The fall in this offence is particularly pertinent to perceptions of crime in Glebe: ‘[A] few years ago it was about car break-ins and they talked about Glebe. They used to call it Glebe Glass or Glebe Ice and it was the shattered glass on the footpath from where cars had been broken into’ (Interviewee #8).
Malicious Damage to Property

The number of incidents of malicious damage to property peaked in 1999 at 542, falling to 233 incidents in 2012. This was after a rise in 2007 and 2008 (as shown in Figure 6).

Figure 6: Incidents of Malicious Damage to Property in Glebe between 1995 and 2012

![Chart showing the number of malicious damage incidents]


Robbery Offences

Given the small overall number of the key categories of robbery, they have been collapsed into a single graph (see Figure 7). Similar to trends for other property offences, there has been a significant decline in robberies in Glebe from 1998 and 1999, when a total of 111 robberies were committed in each year. This has fallen to a total of 32 robberies in both 2011 and 2012. This represents an approximate 71 per cent decline.
Figure 7: Incidents of Robbery in Glebe between 1995 and 2012


Assaults

They two major categories of assault — domestic violence-related and non-domestic violence-related — show slightly different trends across the 18-year period covered by the crime data. Non-domestic violence-related assaults increased between 1995 and 2002, rising from 102 to 217 per annum, before falling to 102 incidents in 2012. There were consistently between 145 and 155 incidents between 2003 and 2009, before falling to 102 incidents in 2012.

In contrast, domestic violence-related assaults tended to rise through the late 1990s, peaking at 80 incidents in 2004. With slight fluctuations since, the number of domestic-violence related assaults in Glebe was at a similar level in 2012 (68 incidents).

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41 The reporting levels for these offences are especially low, so care should be taken in interpreting these figures. It is estimated that only approximately 30 per cent of assaults are reported to the NSW Police Force in NSW (ABS 2007a).
Fraud

While there have been some dramatic falls in various property offences in Glebe over the past 12 or so years, one offence which has consistently increased is fraud (see Figure 9). Twenty incidents in 1995 have risen to 200 incidents in 2012. This is a tenfold increase (which is loosely similar to NSW trends more broadly).

Crime Spike

Brief commentary will be made about the crime spike in 2007–08 before the overall decline in key (property) offences are discussed in detail. As is apparent from the data presented here,
there were increases in ‘steal from motor vehicle’, ‘malicious damage to property’, and ‘robbery’ offences in the 2007–08 period. These increases in crime received considerable media and community attention (see, for example, Danielle 2008), and were recognised by local workers:

Lots of steal from motor vehicle in Cowper Street, especially, so a lot of that was going on on the Friday and Saturday nights as people were coming to the community to access the restaurants. Lots of people coming back from their dinners and having smashed windows awaiting them. Some were actually robbed in the back streets. There were some violent incidents (Interviewee #2).

[Name of resident] down on Catherine Street would talk about glass being distributed all along the street there on Saturday mornings after Glebe Street Markets where kids would just go along and brick every car as they walked and stuff like that (Focus Group Participant).

Kids from about seven to 14 bracket were engaging in drinking and drugs and basically keeping people up at night and that sort of thing … kids missiling stuff off — actually gathering stuff, storing it there during the day and then using them as missiles off the roof (Focus Group Participant).

These particular crime problems were associated with elevated levels of fear of crime:

The fear factor was very high (Focus Group Participant).

[P]eople were worried about the car thefts and about having their house damaged (Focus Group Participant).

People were afraid of gangs, I remember that. When we did the safety audit [in 2008], walking around Bellevue Street and around that area. People were really scared of kids who were doing those sorts of things. People in the housing estate and in private residences. Do you remember, there was a real concern (Focus Group Participant).

[C]olleagues of mine that work as case workers in other areas made the comment from me [sic], kids from Glebe they’re a tough bunch. I wouldn’t walk around Glebe and not be frightened. So even from that professional outlook, Glebe kids were known as pretty savvy and to be feared (Focus Group Participant).
These fears were echoed in local and wider media coverage:

   And I remember all those terrible stories that used to turn up in the press, too, lots of anxiety (Focus Group Participant).

Fears and perceptions seemed to concentrate on local young people and resulted in particular meetings being held in the local area:

   I remember a number of meetings because we were peaking in terms of crime, as the data shows. People were very concerned. There were various reasons given for the peak … that they can just be odd individuals moved into the area … I remember there were the TGG and the TGB — The Glebe Girls and The Glebe Boys, and there were gangs, a lot of strength in the gangs at that time, with young kids … We all were on the streets for a while and identifying hot spots (Focus Group Participant).

   [A]t that time they were expressing concerns about young people who weren’t in school, who were walking the streets and who had either been expelled or were just long-term truants. So there was a lot of concern around that (Focus Group Participant).

In response to these growing concerns, media reports and community meetings, the City of Sydney developed a specific *Glebe Community Safety Plan* to fit under its *Safe City Strategy*. An overview of both plans is provided in Appendix 5. These local crime prevention plans are consistent with the trends to be outlined in Chapter 9, in which local governments in NSW increasingly took on responsibility for coordinating crime prevention and community safety measures. However, unlike other councils in NSW, the City of Sydney has greater capacity to implement plans of this kind due to its stronger financial position.

**Understanding and Explaining the Crime Decline**

Focusing on the general property crime decline in Glebe, this section will highlight on some of the themes emerging from the relevant literature, insights provided by interviewees, discussed during the focus groups and raised during inter-agency meetings, that reflect an understanding that crime has fallen and some of the possible reasons for this decline.

**The Crime Decline — An International Phenomenon**

As has been outlined, data for the Glebe postcode area over an 18-year period (1995–2012), reveal substantial declines for many offences: 80 per cent reduction in break, enter and steal
(dwelling); 84 per cent reduction in motor vehicle theft; 90 per cent decline in steal from motor vehicle; 57 per cent decline in malicious damage to property; and 71 per cent decline in robbery offences. Contrary to these trends, violence offences have generally been stable and fraud has increased by 90 per cent. The declines in property offences are consistent with or better than state, national and international trends, as will be shown below.

In NSW in ‘the 10 years between 2001 and 2010 the rate of household burglary recorded by NSW Police fell by half and the current rate of household burglary is considerably lower than it was 20 years ago’ (Fitzgerald & Poynton 2011, p. 1). Weatherburn and Holmes reveal that between:

2000 and 2012, New South Wales (NSW), along with most other Australian States and Territories, experienced a remarkable fall in theft and robbery offences … Over this period the robbery rate fell 66.5 per cent while the theft rate fell 54.8 per cent. Rates of these two categories of recorded crime in NSW are now the lowest they have been since 1995 (2013b, p. 1).

Using AIC costs of crime data (Rollings 2008), Clancey and Lulham (2014) estimated that the cost savings associated with this property crime decline in NSW could be as great as A$5 billion.

In her analysis of crime trends in Australia and New Zealand, Mayhew (2012) concluded that Australian burglary rates in 2009 were at about the level they were in 1977–78, ‘the national rate [of homicide] was nearly 40 per cent lower than in 1993’ and ‘the robbery rate was at the same level in 2009 as in 1993’ (2012, pp. 83–4). Motor vehicle theft in Australia plummeted and had fallen 55 per cent between 2001 and 2007 (Farrell et al 2011, pp. 151–2).

A small number of commentators have considered crime trends in other jurisdictions. The magnitude of these declines has been significant. Zimring, in his book, *The Great American Crime Decline*, revealed significant falls in major crime types in the US. Using Federal Bureau of Investigation uniform crime reports for seven ‘index offences’ in the US from 1990–2000, Zimring highlighted the following falls: 39 per cent reduction in homicide; 41 per cent reduction in rape; 44 per cent reduction in robbery; 24 per cent reduction in

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42 These declines have been calculated on highest to lowest numbers of incidents over the period. Given the generally small number of incidents and the limited way that these data will be used, more sophisticated trend analysis was not considered necessary.
aggravated assault; 41 per cent reduction in burglary; 37 per cent reduction in auto theft; and 23 per cent reduction in larceny. Starting in 1991, these substantial falls amounted to ‘the longest decline ever recorded’ in crime in the US. Similar declines have been experienced in England and Wales, where burglary fell 59 per cent, and vehicle theft fell 65 per cent between 1995 and 2007 (Farrell et al 2011, p. 148). Britton et al (2012) suggest that ‘all property crimes are at significantly lower levels compared with the high point in 1995’, with burglary down 57 per cent, vehicle-related theft down 72 per cent; other household theft down 44 per cent; and bicycle theft down 20 per cent (2012, p. 164).

van Dijk et al (2012) have considered crime trends in various European (including Western and Eastern European) countries and discovered generally similar trends. These international falls in crime raise interesting questions about possible explanations. Consideration is given here to discussions in Glebe about the property crime decline, revealing both local and wider factors that are suggested to have contributed to these declines.

Widespread Acknowledgement of the Glebe Property Crime Decline
Local anecdotal information and perceptions of crime generally chimed with the recorded crime data. Interviewees and focus group participants frequently mentioned these declines:

We’ve seen dramatic reductions in particularly steal from motor vehicle, robbery and assault statistics (Interviewee #2).

What I am hearing is that the youth crime is down (Interviewee #3).

[F]rom where I sit today the crime stuff seems to be greatly reduced (Interviewee #5).

I think the general perception is that there’s not a lot of crime in Glebe. The police certainly say that. Community talk about the crime having dropped off since ‘09, ‘08 when we had a lot of petty break and enters and thefts and a few muggings and stuff like that (Interviewee #13).

I think there has been a big drop in crime in Glebe over the last few years (Interviewee #14).

I know that the statistics have varied and come down of late (Interviewee #15).

[W]e all go to the community policing meetings and their stats certainly indicate that crime is down in Glebe (Focus Group Participant).
Interestingly, there seemed to be different levels of understanding of the recorded crime statistics for the area. For example, Interviewee #4 said: ‘I don’t have any data on it but we know that youth crime’s gone right down’. In general, there seemed to be little direct access to the recorded crime statistics, which raises questions about the nature of local crime prevention practices (which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8).

One interviewee thought that the crime decline also included violent crime, which is less obviously supported by the crime statistics (depending on exactly how violent crime is defined/what offences are included, as robbery is down but assaults are generally stable):

> We've got crime levels at their lowest ever … I think probably where Glebe has really improved greatly in the last two to three years has been a real reduction in violent crime (Interviewee #2).

In general then, there was widespread recognition that many offence categories had fallen in Glebe in recent years, despite limited access to recorded crime statistics for the area. This suggests that information about crime circulates between local service providers. While not all observations corresponded with recorded crime statistics, the generally high level of understanding of recent crime trends suggests that the tight networks operating in the area provide mechanisms for information about crime to be easily disseminated.

**Possible Explanations for the Glebe Property Crime Decline**

Zimring (2007) discusses the challenges of explaining the crime decline retrospectively, especially without acknowledging changes in crime in other countries or regions that have not necessarily adopted similar policies or experienced similar socio-demographic changes. One interviewee echoed Zimring’s concerns about retrospectively explaining the crime decline:

> I’ve been in meetings with police where they’ve said it’s a state decline in crime. This has got to do with police initiatives or there’s a global trend or a recent Labor [political party] policy about the youth New Start [welfare payment] or I don’t know. So there’s always something else that’s being tied to a decrease in crime. When it’s an increase that’s quite different … I think people fall back into a mode of making it the individual’s problem rather than a community problem or rather than a societal problem … People become protectionists about their organisations (Interviewee #8).

Moreover, there were those who felt that no single solution could be offered:
Like all of these things, it’s a number of factors. It’s never one simple silver bullet or magic formula … Part of the solution to that problem has been definitely a culmination of stick and carrot (Interviewee #2).

My sense is it never comes down to one particular strategy, because the issue itself is so complex that you need multiple ways of addressing it (Focus Group Participant).

While acknowledging the dangers of isolating explanatory factors that have contributed to the crime decline in Glebe, it is nonetheless interesting to reflect on how local actors explained the decline in particular offences or crime more generally. Following are some of the insights provided during two focus groups and 15 interviews with Glebe workers from diverse backgrounds, which include youth work, local government, law enforcement, community groups, early childhood services, and community development programs (among others).

Of the explanations offered, many neatly fall into the Tonry and Farrington (1995) typology of crime prevention — developmental; social and community; situational and CPTED; and policing and criminal justice. Some of what was suggested by interviewees and focus group participants will be recited here (and expanded in the following chapter), starting with early intervention and community-based programs:

There’s a breakfast program, again coming back to that factor of neglect happening in some of these families which are susceptible to falling to the cycle of crime (Interviewee #2).

[T]he kids get a meal before school. Now, people say, ‘Oh, well, you’re taking the responsibility away from the parents.’ But if you get the kids fed then they’ve got a chance of being educated and then they do Head Start [school program] for kids coming into school and then they do a follow-up again in high school’ (Focus Group Participant).

[C]rime prevention in its broadness, I guess, happens with all those agencies working together in different ways at different levels. I suppose the Schools Community Centre plays a part too, not so much with the young people that go to that but I guess with their families as well (Interviewee #5).

I’m not sure when [local chaplain] came about, but I know he’s had a pretty instrumental effect on supporting kids in that high-risk bracket. Various youth service
initiatives, I think probably that early intervention with families probably sits a little bit outside this, but might be taking its effect in the next few years (Focus Group Participant).

The Pathways Program [alternative education program] has revealed that that transition from primary school to high school is a component of that and people dropping out, people not going to high school. So I know there’s been some good stuff done with Glebe Primary, for example … (Interviewee #5).

PCYC [Police Citizens Youth Club], and then there’s the Youth Service as well. They’re probably the two biggest players in terms of crime prevention for young people and they both do sort of similar things but in a sense I think they’re both very different as well (Interviewee #1).

The PCYC runs a range of recreational and educational programs. They run, for example, an after-school program … that program is more aimed at 15–16-year-olds, people who are getting behind in their education, missing school, finding mainstream school irrelevant, I think are intimidated by constant assessment in conventional learning environments (Interviewee #2).

Short Black films but combined with the annual film clips which were part of the After Dark Crime Diversion Program which operated during peak periods of crime on a Friday and Saturday night (Focus Group Participant).

These diverse community and youth programs (explained in greater detail in Chapter 7) are seen as potentially contributing to the falls in crime. This is despite some of the programs having little or no focus on crime prevention. As has been shown and will be highlighted further, these approaches to crime prevention resonate with local crime prevention approaches common in NSW and Australia.

Some specific situational and CPTED measures were also nominated as having reduced opportunities for crime — some relate to broad developments impacting on Glebe, while others are specific to Glebe. The reduction in steal from motor vehicle offences was partially attributed to car security and the reduction in the second-hand stolen goods market:

[S]teal from cars, I don’t think that happens nearly as much now because the nature of the way cars are locked and alarmed. There’s a reduction in GPS [Global Positioning
System], portable GPS, now or people are more aware about putting them away. I don’t think there’s the market for fencers in pubs like there used to be (Focus Group Participant).

This is consistent with aspects of Farrell et al.’s (2008, 2011) ‘security hypothesis’, which suggests that improved security has had a direct impact on offences such as steal from motor vehicle. Street lighting, which has been positively evaluated for its impact on crime (Painter & Tilley 2010), was also highlighted as a successful local measure that has contributed to the reduction in crime:

We actively try and work on adequate lighting in lanes and streets so that people are safe. I think if you’ve got an active nightlife you certainly reduce the possibility of on the street type crimes (Interviewee #6).

A further, very specific, design modification was mentioned by a number of interviewees and focus groups participants as having a particularly beneficial impact:

[A] gate [was installed] into one aspect of the [public housing] complex and that reduced the crime in that area by 90 per cent almost overnight. So that was quite fascinating and Housing were really reluctant to do that but that proved a real winner (Interviewee #5).

I mean it was interesting, because from what I remember with the [public housing estate] stuff is the locals in that building just wanted that gate closed off, and there were a whole lot of reasons given why it couldn’t happen. In the end it happened and stuff just cleared up overnight (Focus Group Participant).

They also sealed off a lot of the entrances so like many of the public housing environments there’s probably some real design flaws in terms of the number of access and egress points into that part of the estate, so plenty of escape routes for would-be offenders to find. So they sealed off a lot of those and just spent some money on beautifying. They took some of the elements of the façade, they took those down because they were used as natural ladders to climb up on to the roof (Interviewee #2).

These comments suggest the potential benefits of simple CPTED measures. The installation of these gates, as described above, would have required little funding. While these measures
have not been thoroughly evaluated (a point which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8), there is research evidence from other jurisdictions of the merits of such interventions (Hayward et al 2009).\footnote{While there is some evidence of the effectiveness of ‘alley-gating’, for example, Hayward et al (2009) caution against the ready application of such approaches elsewhere. Local contextual factors, they argue, need to be considered before design measures such as these are implemented.}

Further CPTED treatments in the public housing estates, consistent with the CPTED principles of space management and access control, were also mentioned:

> There was some money spent by Housing NSW on that specific estate, looking at preventing access to the underground car park which was basically a dead space which a few people had vehicles. It was dark and a place of rubbish dumping. I think they used to find stolen goods in there (Interviewee #2).

Considerable positive commentary was also made by interviewees and focus group members regarding the beautification and public works on parts of Glebe Point Road (which is home to many restaurants and retail outlets):

> There was an upgrade of Glebe Point Road so some CCTV footage went in … One [CCTV camera] went in Francis Street (Interviewee #2).

> Of course, we had the upgrade at Glebe Point Road, so that was a big jump in quality improvement of lighting and facilitation of footpaths and all those sorts of things (Focus Group Participant).

Further to the opportunity-reduction and design measures, police practices were also identified as contributing to the falls in crime:

> I think probably the police proactiveness has played a part as well (Interviewee #5).

> I’ve got to say I think the commander at the time, [name of former Commander] was fantastic. I think he drove — he shifted some of the ways that police did stuff, which was really helpful (Focus Group Participant).

> 2008 is also when our Friend in Hand youth program [run by the police] started up which we're still running and hugely successful (Focus Group Participant).
On the streets there is a heightened police presence and I believe that community people are feeling that. I think that’s coming from I guess police really wanting to put a halt on that crime and by increasing that presence they’re increasing the community’s sense of safety, and in the hopes also to reduce the crime … Yeah. My understanding is that there is quite a mistrust between the community and police, despite the good work police do and are looking at building those relationships (Interviewee #3).

These comments highlight the potential merits of different styles of policing. Interviewee #5 suggests that proactive policing is considered to have contributed to the reduction in crime, while two focus group participants suggest that the more community-oriented aspects of policing have been successful (especially the Friend in Hand youth program).

While there has been considerable commentary in NSW (and beyond) in recent years about the impact of alcohol-related crime (Graham & Homel 2008; NSW Auditor General 2006, 2013b), it is notable that this was not seen to be a problem in Glebe:

There’s very little crime associated with pubs, whether that’s antisocial behaviour or noise or anything … But we don’t seem to have a lot of problem in that respect (Interviewee #6).

Glebe doesn’t have a big problem with alcohol-related violence in the public domain relating to licensed venues (Interviewee #2).

These explanations for the Glebe crime decline suggest the importance of adopting different approaches simultaneously. Early intervention, community development, situational and CPTED interventions operate in conjunction with policing practices. This does not mean that the interventions are necessarily complementary or systematically coordinated, but it does tend to show the merits of a variety of strategies operating simultaneously. That said, there remains a difficulty in establishing the actual contribution of each to the falls in particular crime categories. As Zimring has stated: ‘The new theories of crime prevention … vary substantially in the mechanisms they say reduce crime, but they share one common characteristic that requires special caution: they use the … crime decline as evidence to prove that these newly discovered mechanisms prevent crime’ (2007, p. 75). While a number of programs and policies mentioned directly responded to specific crime problems (or perceived
causes of these problems), a significant number pre-dated the decline. The wider crime decline makes it difficult to separate important local versus more global influences.

**Impact of the Glebe Property Crime Decline**

The significant decline in some offences in Glebe in recent years appears to have had particular impacts, including a reduced fear of crime, and a reduced need for renewal of the local crime prevention and community safety plan, and is seen by some as having the unwelcome consequence of reduced funding for the area.

This crime decline, it was suggested by some, has had an impact on the perceptions of crime and the feeling of the area:

[C]ause I’ve been up and down Glebe Point Road. I mean I go up and down it every day and talking to shopkeepers and just popping in and saying hi, how’s it going. I’m told that everything is fantastic. Yeah, they used to have to step over unconscious people to lift up their roller doors at the beginning of the day, somebody had a needle hanging out of their arm and, yeah, it used to be pretty bad (Interviewee #7).

These (limited) comments suggest that the falls in crime have had a positive impact on perceptions of crime (in contrast to the rising fear of crime associated with the crime spike in 2007–08). This relationship between crime rates and perceptions of crime is similar to recent findings focusing on local characteristics and crime rates and perceptions of crime (Brunton-Smith & Sturgis 2011). While there is considerable complexity and debate surrounding efforts to measure fear of crime (Lee 2007), these limited insights do suggest a level of relationship between local crime rates and reported perceptions of crime.

While it is difficult to say with absolute confidence, there does seem to have been a direct impact of the crime decline on perceptions of crime (as previously outlined) and on local policies. The *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012* was developed after a spike in some crime categories (especially steal from motor vehicle) in 2007–08. In two focus groups in July 2013, it was decided that a further community safety plan was not required, largely due to the crime decline (Ocias 2013).

Interestingly, this decision not to develop a further crime prevention and community safety plan contrasts with Gilling’s (1997) discussion of expansionary tendencies of community safety and crime prevention practitioners. He suggests that there is vested interest in identifying ‘areas of intervention over which they can attain both occupational control and
social closure, thereby maximising their own rewards and status’ (1997, p. 11). This can be achieved by promising to be more preventive (via earlier intervention) and operating across a ‘broader canvass’ through partnership work (1997, pp. 12–13). While Gilling acknowledges that there are limits to how much professionals can expand their reach, the decision not to develop another crime prevention and community safety plan suggests a choice not to seek greater or continued influence through policy recognition.

With generally lower crime rates in the area in recent times, there was a concern about the ‘prevention paradox’ — if crime falls, services are withdrawn as the perceived need is presumed to have dissipated. The perceived success of some of the local initiatives was felt to be at risk because of the falling crime rates in the area. Agencies frequently commented on the need to secure consistently ongoing funding for particular programs and positions. This made potential continuity of activities limited:

I’m concerned … that the City [of Sydney] will pull resources out of Glebe … And I think those preventative strategies are preventative because they’re there and to remove them because the crime rate is down is probably ill advised … we may well again face issues around community safety. And if you pull all the resources then all the capital that’s built up, we could sort of lose that as well (Focus Group Participant).

Conclusion

A significant theme to emerge during the fieldwork period was the local crime drop in recent years. At the outset, analysis of these trends was not originally intended to consume considerable time. However, during fieldwork, it soon became apparent that these local trends were shaping discussions in the area and influencing crime prevention activities. As a consequence, greater energy was spent attempting to understand these trends and to explore their impact.

Despite a spike in some offences in 2007–08, many crime categories have fallen in Glebe in recent years. The spike in crime prompted the development of the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012*. This plan sat under the *Safe City Strategy 2007–2012*, developed by the City of Sydney. The *Glebe Community Safety Plan* catalogued some of the policing and other crime prevention initiatives operating in the area, as well as committing to some new initiatives. In particular, this plan helped leverage council resources for upgrades to Glebe Point Road and the funding of local youth initiatives, including supporting the Pathways Project and After Dark programs. The general falls in crime in Glebe are for the most part
consistent with the crime decline in other jurisdictions, and the falls in crime since 2007–08 resulted in a recommendation by local workers in 2013 not to develop a new community safety plan. This recommendation contrasts with suggestions of the expansionary and protectionist tendencies of workers engaged in crime prevention and other community-based work (see Gilling 1997). Nonetheless, there is concern that falling crime in the area will result in resources being withdrawn.

The next chapter will explore, in greater detail, the array of crime prevention activities operating in Glebe.
Chapter 7: Crime Prevention Programs and Activities in Glebe

The following account of a day in Glebe draws together information gathered about different programs, practices, technologies and designs that contribute to the prevention of crime in the area. By collapsing the various activities into a 24-hour period, it is possible to understand the volume and diversity of actions that contribute to the prevention of crime.

The 24-hour period commences at 5:00am on Friday and concludes in the early hours of Saturday morning. All of the activities mentioned operate in Glebe. While in reality they might not all fall on the same day, they have been grouped into a 24-hour period to demonstrate the unnoticed nature of much crime prevention in the Glebe area. Footnotes are liberally used to support the observations and to maintain the flow of the narrative.

Drawing together the diversity of crime prevention practices clearly demonstrates how diverse programs and interventions operate simultaneously. Delivered by and through a diversity of actors and technologies, these crime prevention measures reflect features of the different models of crime prevention. Rather than being pitted against each other, as might be assumed from the manner in which the crime prevention typologies depict different practices (as outlined in Chapter 2), the diverse crime prevention measures operating in a single location simultaneously are complementary. What is also demonstrated is the social-welfare orientation of many of these programs and activities. This is somewhat in contrast to the dystopian depictions that frequently equate crime prevention with surveillance, control, and exclusion.

5:00am

The work day has already commenced for the City of Sydney Council staff responsible for collecting rubbish from Glebe streets. The fleet of specially designed trucks leaves the Glebe Bay Street depot to wind its way through the tight inner-city streets collecting household rubbish. Today, like many others, it is not only the standard household rubbish collection that is being undertaken. Illegal dumping is a problem largely contained to just a few streets in Glebe. Today, just over two tonnes of illegal rubbish is removed.44 Beyond the usual garbage

44 This estimate reflects data provided by the City of Sydney Council. It is estimated that between 2 and 2.5 tonnes of illegally dumped rubbish are collected from the Glebe area on a daily basis. This is largely from six streets and laneways in Glebe.
collection, Glebe Point Road receives particular treatment, including steam cleaning of the busy retail quarter on Glebe Point Road.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{6:00am}

Police drag local young people out of their beds. This is not for misdemeanours committed the night before or for any allegiance to an organised criminal network; it is to participate in the Friend in Hand program. Police and local young people considered to be at risk of involvement in crime train together three mornings per week. Training this morning consists of boxing and cardio activity at the Glebe-Leichhardt Police Citizens Youth Club (‘PCYC’), which is located at Minogue Crescent, Glebe. After training, a healthy breakfast is served around 7:30am at the PCYC and the 12 young participants are escorted to school or TAFE.\textsuperscript{46}

The Glebe-Leichhardt PCYC operates a number of programs, including the Indigenous Talented Athlete Program, the Through the Gap education program for Indigenous students, the Club Café which provides employment preparation and training in hospitality, as well as individual case management of young offenders and youth-at-risk who are identified by local police. The Youth Case Manager (a police officer) is responsible for this case management.\textsuperscript{47} This form of intervention is part of the Targeted Programming model adopted by PCYC. The ‘young offender case management’ component of Targeted Programming involves ‘personalised and group programs designed to stop and prevent offending behavior [sic] by those involved, usually involving 6 young persons at any one time’ (PCYC 2012). Other elements of the Targeted Programming approach include hot spot interventions and community policing work.

\textbf{7:30am}

While the young people involved in the Friend in Hand program are enjoying their breakfast, another group are sitting down to their morning meal together. Centipede,\textsuperscript{48} an out-of-school-hours child-care program, and the Australian Red Cross, provide a breakfast club. This is to

\textsuperscript{45} This information was provided by Cleansing and Waste Services staff of the City of Sydney Council.

\textsuperscript{46} Information about the Friend in Hand Program is available from various sources including past editions of the Glebe Community News, the CPSC Meeting Minutes for December 2012 and from the Glebe-Leichhardt PCYC. The program operates on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday mornings.

\textsuperscript{47} This information is from the Glebe-Leichhardt PCYC website http://www.pcycnsw.org/club_glebe_police, viewed 25 April 2014.

\textsuperscript{48} Information about Centipede is from http://www.centipede.org.au/, viewed 25 April 2014.
help the children (generally aged between five and 12 years) prepare for the school day, focusing on children from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Centipede operates from the Glebe Primary School and is licensed for up to 50 children (National Childcare Accreditation Council 2011). Apart from the provision of the breakfast club, this program provides care, recreation and play opportunities for primary school-aged children (five to 12 years), before and after school and vacation care. A variety of programs is provided and includes recreational activities, creative activities, free play, opportunities for completion of homework and reading, and excursions during school holidays.

**8am**

While some of the children and young people in the area have been engaged in the Friend in Hand Program or playing structured activities at the Centipede child-care program, others having been waking in the different ‘ends’ of Glebe. The different groups awake and begin their day with vastly different opportunities, expectations, provisions and aspirations. For some, today will bring further fights with Housing NSW and struggles to provide sufficient food for the entire family group; others will leave their expensive housing for a day of challenging, but fulfilling, work in a professional job that affords a comfortable lifestyle. For others, the day will start and end late, with a little time spent walking to and from the university, followed by an evening in one (or more) of the pubs and licensed small bars. Irrespective of the nature of the day ahead, many will traverse areas of Glebe during their daily routines. Recently refurbished Glebe Point Road, the hub of commercial and retail activity, is where people from the different ‘ends’ of Glebe circulate and potentially interact. At 8am, many of the cafes are already open, with diners (residents and non-residents) spilling onto the pavement tasting their morning coffee and reading their newspapers (hard-copy and digital versions).

Largely unrecognised by the patrons, the cafes, restaurants and retail outlets on Glebe Point Road each adopt various crime prevention strategies. Many shops operate CCTV, have

As outlined in Chapter 5, there are distinct socio-economic profiles for Glebe residents. A cursory review of the most recent (2011) Census data demonstrates the socially divided nature of Glebe. Of the 13,841 residents of Glebe, 6.4% are unemployed, 19% earn less than $300 per week (including those stating that they receive no income), and 18% reside in state or cooperative housing. At the other end of the social scale, 13% have postgraduate qualifications, 18% live in private housing that is owned outright, 23% identify as being professionals, and 12% earn $2000 or more per week.
alarms, pay for after-hour security patrols, and have internal procedures to manage money to reduce the risks of theft.

8:30am
The residents of Rainbow Lodge, which is located on Wigram Road, are slowly waking and getting ready for the day ahead. Funded by the NSW Departments of Community Services and Corrective Services, Rainbow Lodge provides ex-prisoners with supported accommodation (Judge Rainbow Lodge Fund 2013).

A small group of three residents gather in the courtyard area before setting off to the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in the neighbouring suburb of Camperdown. They take the bus, a trip of about 15 minutes. When they arrive at the hospital, they proceed to the methadone clinic. They have ample time to collect and consume their methadone dose, as the clinic is open between 8:30am and 12:30pm every day of the year. Being ex-prisoners, the group are easily able to get into the methadone program. While the daily dose of methadone curbs any physical cravings for opiates, the daily ritual does potentially impede their attempts to secure employment. This is one of the reasons why other Rainbow Lodge residents elect not to join the methadone program, despite their former drug-using histories.50

On returning to Rainbow Lodge, they will participate in the daily programs, which include morning groups, creative writing, art and personal programs (Judge Rainbow Memorial Fund 2013). Meals will be taken together with staff and residents often enjoying the company of successful graduates of the Rainbow Lodge program.51

9am
The school and working day commences. Those not old enough to yet attend school enjoy the benefits of the Schools as Communities Centre (‘SACC’) based at Glebe Public School, located on Glebe Point Road. The Glebe SACC provides parenting programs and supported playgroups, and assists with the transition to school. The Glebe SACC has operated for 12 years.

51 Personal communication with the Manager of Rainbow Lodge helped build a picture of the daily routines of the seven male clients housed at the Lodge at any one time. A visit to Rainbow Lodge on 28 November 2013 and a meeting with the Manager augmented information gathered from desktop searches.
Primary school children (aged five to 12 years) race into the school through the brightly coloured school fence to attend classes. The perimeter school fence was given a splash of colour in 2008 as part of the 150-year anniversary of the Glebe Public School. Older children (12–16 years) leave Glebe to attend Leichhardt or Balmain High Schools; while those studying for their Higher School Certificate attend the Blackwattle Bay campus.

9:30am

The Family Referral Service, which is located on Glebe Point Road, has been open since 8am but there has been little activity this morning. The Family Referral Service in Glebe is delivered by Barnados Australia and it ‘brings together families, support services and community resources so that our children and young people are safe and well’.

One local mother has come into the service this morning. She is seeking advice and support with a domestic violence situation. She is particularly worried about the impact of witnessing the verbal and physical violence on their three children. A caseworker with the service spends some time discussing the situation, the current service support structure that is available, and the role of Domestic Violence Liaison Officers (‘DVLOs’) based at the Glebe police station.

10am

A small cohort of six students file into the Glebe Youth Service building at 84 Glebe Point Road to attend the Glebe Pathways Project. The Glebe Pathways Project started operating from the Glebe Youth Service in October 2009. The program operates five days per week from 10am to 1pm for up to 14 young people aged 13–16 years. Young people residing in or having strong connections to the Glebe area in years 8 and 9 of secondary school who are having difficulties at school are the main target population. Initial data highlights the high percentage of Indigenous young people participating in the program (approximately 90 per cent of the students enrolled in 2011 were Indigenous) (Hayes 2011b, p. 13).


53 The NSW Government amalgamated high schools in the region in 2005, resulting in children and young people needing to leave the area to attend the first four years of high school. They then return to the area if they continue to study through completion of the Higher School Certificate.

54 Information taken from a Family Referral Service brochure collected from the service.
This program succeeded the Glebe Re-engage Education Project, which was held at the Glebe Youth Service between 2004 and 2008 (Hayes 2011b, p. 9). This program was established for young people not attending school. Funding was withdrawn from this program in 2008 (Hayes 2011b, p. 13). Following an increase in youth crime in 2007–08, numerous stakeholders came together and funding was eventually dedicated to re-establish an alternative education program in Glebe. The Glebe Pathways Project adopts an individual learning focus, consistent with the Big Picture Education Australia approach. ‘The Big Picture philosophy is grounded in educating one student at a time … It inverts the traditional education models by placing students, their passions and their interests, at the centre of the learning process’ (Hayes 2011b, p. 11). The curriculum includes internships, excursions, and a yearly camp, and is ‘an intensive form of student-centred learning’ (2011b, p. 12).

The Project is staffed by qualified teaching personnel and supported by numerous agencies. Key partners in the project include: Glebe Youth Service, the NSW Department of Education and Training (as it was previously known), Sydney Secondary College, Faculty of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney, Big Picture Education Australia, Save the Children, and the City of Sydney.

11am

The Crime Management Unit (‘CMU’) of the Leichhardt LAC of the NSW Police Force meets to discuss latest trends in crime in the area. CMUs were:

introduced on 1 July 1999. They were designed to provide local level crime management by collecting and adding value to data and providing timely local intelligence. CMU staff … coordinate operations, evaluate strategies, allocate cases, review briefs and manage all local proactive crime reduction measures (Ryan 2000, p. 10).

The CMU consists of a number of specialist officers, including the Crime Manager, an Inspector responsible for coordinating the CMU; the Crime Coordinator, a Sergeant who has direct supervision and tactical responsibilities for members of the CMU; the Intelligence Officer, who is responsible for data analysis; the DVLO, who manages the Command’s response to domestic violence; the Youth Liaison Officer, responsible for youth issues; and the crime prevention officer (‘CPO’), who manages a broad portfolio of responsibilities that range from reviewing development applications for potential crime risks to working with Council Community Safety Officers (‘CSOs’) to tackle particular local issues.
Today, the CMU is focused on incidents of ‘steal from motor vehicle’. Security at the Broadway shopping centre has reported a spike in these incidents over recent weeks. The CMU considers the location of the incidents (including the Broadway shopping centre car park) and known offenders. Analysis of intelligence received from Corrective Services NSW and Juvenile Justice NSW suggests that known repeat offenders have returned to the area from prison/juvenile justice centres. Three known offenders are isolated for particular attention and placed on a Suspect Target Management Plan (‘STMP’). The STMP is a ‘coordinated state-wide strategy where repeat offenders are identified as high risk offenders or medium risk offenders’ (NSW Government 2004, p. 269). This will ensure that they receive frequent visits from the local police as part of their regular patrolling.

During the CMU meeting, it is also recommended that signs be erected warning drivers that the area is high risk for theft from motor vehicles. The CPO agrees to contact the City of Sydney Council to discuss the potential for such a measure to be adopted. Other similar signs have previously been erected in the area, so there is some prospect of increasing the number of existing signs.\(^{55}\)

The CMU meeting concludes with a discussion of the Community Safety Precinct Meeting to be held at the police station later today.

**12pm**

Six security staff\(^{56}\) assemble at Broadway shopping centre for the afternoon shift. They are briefed on key issues for the forthcoming shift, provided with radios and deployed to different parts of the centre. One member of the security team spends time in the CCTV control room before joining others on the floor of the shopping centre. Police have requested that footage be copied following the apprehension of a young person yesterday for retail theft. Footage from one of the many centre cameras is reviewed; footage is copied and a

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\(^{55}\) The Glebe Community Safety Audit 2005 report recommended that ‘Council place “Stop Thief” signs at strategic sections on Glebe Point Road’ (2005, p. 11). Signs were erected following this recommendation.

\(^{56}\) A private security company (Grand Services Group) is contracted by the Shopping Centre Management Company (Mirvac, in the case of Broadway) to patrol the centre. Different rostering arrangements mean varying numbers of security personnel work particular shifts.
document outlining the continuity of evidence is signed and left ready for collection by the police.\footnote{The total number of cameras was provided in personal communication with relevant shopping centre personnel but has not been specified here in the interests of protecting potentially sensitive information. The procedures outlined for copying and providing the footage are broadly similar to what was described in the personal communication. Given that is consistent with general procedures for accessing and using CCTV footage, a brief description has been provided here.}

Soon after the start of the shift, all security personnel are informed that two undercover Loss Prevention Officers (‘LPOs’) will be deployed in a major retailer and two undercover police will be patrolling the centre. This is part of an operation to catch an organised group committing significant shop stealing.\footnote{This type of criminal activity has been a concern as shown in the minutes of Community Safety Precinct Committee meetings, last viewed 25 April 2014, http://www.police.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/192190/cspc_20110310_leichhardt.pdf.} The LPOs, employed by the particular chain store, rotate between stores in various parts of the Sydney area. The undercover police are frequently deployed in the shopping centre and work closely with the security team.

The efforts of security personnel, LPOs and undercover police are augmented by numerous security and design features dotted throughout the shopping centre. The majority of retailers utilise Electronic Article Surveillance to protect their more vulnerable items from being stolen. Automatic teller machines (‘ATMs’) are located in areas away from entrances or are securely installed to prevent easy theft, having learned from the spate of ATMs removed from shopping centres and other locations in recent years (see Prenzler 2009 for a discussion of the responses to these previous attacks and offences). Banning notices are issued to people who break the centre rules to exclude them formally from entering the centre for specified periods.

Beyond these security-related activities, Broadway shopping centre management (Mirvac) supports a number of youth initiatives in the area. This was negotiated when the original development application (‘DA’) was submitted in the 1990s to develop the site into a shopping centre. The DA was submitted to Leichhardt Council, but, with the change of local government boundaries in 2003, the commitment is now with the City of Sydney Council. These commitments included: a single donation of A$100 000 to support youth facilities in the immediate area and an annual donation of A$10 000 (linked to the Consumer Price Index) provided to support youth facilities and services; creation of a Youth Advisory Committee;
employment of a full-time Youth Services Coordinator, funded by the centre’s management; development of a youth policy by the Youth Advisory Committee in consultation with Centre’s Management prior to the centre’s opening, so that its recommendations could be implemented from the start; available complementary and concessional passes for low-income young people from the local area; and the Centre’s Management exploring and developing employment training opportunities and traineeships for young people in the complex (White et al 1996, pp. 32–3).59

1pm
Glebe contains a number of treatment and care facilities. Glebe House, located on Mount Vernon Street, is a residential therapeutic community designed to help residents make the ‘transition from addiction into life and the community as a whole’. The program is a drug- and alcohol-free approach, assisting residents to acquire ‘the skills necessary to regain your independence from addiction’. The program runs for three months, with an additional 12 months of support and assistance with housing. At 1pm on a Friday, residents of Glebe House join the daily meeting.60 The meeting runs for four hours and tackles issues associated with alcohol and other drug use.

1:30pm
An art therapy class is just starting at Elsie’s Refuge, a refuge for victims (and their children) of domestic violence.61 Today, three residents join the art therapy session. The session provides an opportunity to gently explore the impact of violence through art. Heavily influenced by a feminist model of self-empowerment, the residents are provided with opportunities to understand the cycle of violence and to develop healthy relationship practices. The art therapy session proves confronting but beneficial for the residents.

Elsie’s Refuge for Women and Children was started in 1974 when a group of feminists squatted in a vacant Glebe property. It has been suggested that this was the first women’s

59 It is unclear if all of these commitments have historically or have recently been met. There does not appear to be any assessment of the impact of these conditions of the original DA.


61 Information about Elsie’s Refuge was gleaned from a visit to the facility on 9 December 2013. Given the nature of the service, little published information is available. Protection of the location of the service is maintained to prevent estranged partners of residents being able to locate the service.
refuge in Australia to be run according to feminist principles (Laing 2000). Funding was then provided in 1975 to run the refuge on a permanent basis, and other similar programs were established across Australia. The refuge can accommodate six women and their children who are escaping domestic violence. They provide crisis accommodation for a period of approximately 12 weeks.

2pm
The Community Safety Precinct Committee (‘CSPC’) meeting is held in the police station. According to the Community Safety Precinct Committee Guidelines — Community Resource (NSW Police Force 2006), the purpose of CSPCs is to ‘facilitate a multi-faceted approach to the development of community safety and crime prevention strategies to address diverse community safety issues of the Local Government Area, promoting cooperation between Council, the community, government and non-government agencies’ (2006, p. 2). The CSPC ‘involves local communities in reducing crime and fear in their neighbourhoods’ and has the following aims:

- increase community awareness of crime risk and prevention strategies;
- encourage community involvement in promoting local community safety;
- identify actual and potential community safety problems;
- develop local community safety plans;
- coordinate crime prevention efforts; and
- utilise local police services regarding early intervention programs for young children (D’Amore 2008, p. 11860).

Meetings should be held quarterly and the committees should ‘reflect the demographics of individual communities. Typically, membership includes representatives from police, local government and members (elders, youth and representatives from ethnic, Aborigine and other local groups)’ (2006, p. 2).

Representatives from local councils (City of Sydney and Leichhardt), key state government agencies (Housing NSW), Chambers of Commerce, and other local service providers (Glebe Youth Services) attend. The meeting follows a similar format to previous meetings: the Commander makes brief introductory remarks; a short verbal presentation is given on local crime trends; comments are made by the various police in attendance on initiatives and activities designed to tackle issues highlighted in the presentation of crime trends; and general discussions ensue.

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2:30pm
One of the two Magistrates at Bidura Children’s Court is presiding over a complex care hearing. Bidura is a specialist Children’s Court, dealing with criminal and care matters. Friday is reserved for care hearings.62 The matter involves an application to remove an infant from his mother who has a history of mental illness resulting in neglect of the infant. The lawyer representing the NSW Department of Community Services is outlining the case against the mother and the need to grant an order enabling the child to be temporarily placed in out of home care.

While the court focuses on care hearings on Fridays, it also processes fresh custody matters each morning. This morning there were three matters that needed to be addressed. Two young people were arrested overnight for stealing and driving a motor vehicle, which led to a police chase. When they were apprehended, they were refused bail and escorted to Cobham Juvenile Justice Centre. They appeared via audio-visual link and were denied bail and remanded in custody. The third young person was apprehended the previous evening for breaching bail. He contacted the Chaplain employed to work with the Sydney Secondary College (local high school) and asked him to be present in Court when his matter was to be dealt with. The Chaplain provides an informal court support program, helping young people from the area who attend the Sydney Secondary College to navigate the criminal justice system. On this occasion, the Chaplain informs the court about the current circumstances of the young person and his family. Bail is granted with further conditions imposed on the young person.

3:30pm
Two workers from the GCDP conclude a consultation session with local public, social and Aboriginal housing tenants on community stress and conflict. This theme was identified during a FLAG meeting earlier in the year.63 Community stress leading to conflict was identified as an issue in the local area. Part of the response to this perceived issue was to liaise with local community members to identify possible sources of tension, existing strategies to manage such issues, and existing gaps in service delivery. Today’s consultation has reinforced the problems facing public housing tenants in getting repairs completed and

62 This information is taken from Children’s Court, Bidura Children’s Court (21 August 2012), viewed 25 April 2014, http://www.childrenscourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/childrenscourt/bidura.html, and was confirmed during a visit to the Court on 1 November 2013.

63 A Community Stress Working Group was established following the Networking Meeting held on 8 May 2013.
fears associated with recent policy announcements to generate greater rental returns from public housing, especially where rooms are empty or tenants have a capacity to pay greater amounts of rent.  

4pm

Police direct a small group gathered in Franklyn Street park to tip out their alcohol. The group reacts to this direction and swearing and raised voices can be heard along Franklyn Street. The two police officers explain that Franklyn Street has been designated as an Alcohol Free Zone.

Eventually the police prevail and the group begrudgingly tips out their alcohol and leaves the area, complaining as they go of being unfairly targeted. No infringement notices are issued on this occasion as the group eventually complies with the directions of the police.

Figure 10: Alcohol Free Zone Sign on Franklyn Street, Glebe

Source: Photograph taken by author.

According to the Ministerial Guidelines on Alcohol-Free Zones, produced by the NSW Department of Local Government in 2009:

64 For an explanation of some of the arrangements and changes impacting on rents paid by public housing tenants, see Family and Community Services Housing NSW, Charging Rent Policy (9 September 2013), viewed 25 April 2014, http://www.housing.nsw.gov.au/Forms+Policies+and+Fact+Sheets/Policies/Charging+Rent+Policy.htm.

The object of alcohol-free zones is an early intervention measure to prevent the escalation of irresponsible street drinking to incidents involving serious crime. The drinking of alcohol is prohibited in an alcohol-free zone that has been established by a council. Public places that are public roads, footpaths or public carparks may be included in a zone (2009, p. 5).

Various procedures accompany the establishment of alcohol-free zones, including consultation by the relevant council with local police, notification of relevant parties (including police and licensees) of an intention to establish an alcohol-free zone and erection of signage to indicate the boundaries of and period for which an area if designated an alcohol-free zone.

The Ministerial Guidelines state that:

Councils with authorized council enforcement officers need to establish a system to record the number of occasions that these officers enforce the Alcohol-Free Zone legislation in the area. This should include monitoring the number of authorized council enforcement officers and how often alcohol is tipped out or otherwise disposed of (2009, p. 14).

6pm

Security staff arrive at the licensed venues in the area and begin their shifts. Most experience a quiet shift, with few incidents over the course of the evening. Glebe is not renowned for significant alcohol-related crime issues, which is the reason why it does not have a Liquor Accord (an ‘agreement by licensees and other stakeholders to take certain actions in local communities which aim to improve safety in entertainment areas and reduce alcohol-related anti-social behaviour, offences and violence’). Some licensees attend Liquor Accord meetings in other areas.

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6:30pm
The After Dark program commences in the Peter Forsyth Auditorium\textsuperscript{67} adjacent to Broadway shopping centre. Groups of young people slowly drift in from the surroundings area. The barbecue and activities provide an incentive to gather here rather than elsewhere in Glebe.

A large number of young people attend the program this evening. All up, over 100 young people pass through. Not all stay for the entire duration, with many drifting off throughout the night.

The After Dark program is run by the Glebe Youth Service and is funded by the City of Sydney Council. Glebe Youth Service runs recreational activities from 6:30 to 10:30pm on Friday nights and between 7:30 and 11:30pm on Saturday nights. ‘After Dark is a space for young people to enjoy a healthy meal and participate in a variety of sports and activities. This program is both a diversion from youth anti-social behaviour, but also a refuge from hardships’. The activities are ‘designed to divert young people from drinking, crime and other unhealthy or antisocial behaviours’ (Glebe Youth Services 2012, p. 14).

6:45pm
Just off Glebe Point Road, about 500 metres from where the After Dark program is commencing, a group of women have gathered in the Old Fire Station. They have completed the general preamble to the meeting and begin the Serenity Prayer. This Glebe Women’s Steps Meeting is one of a number of Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous and Al-Anon meetings that happen in Glebe each week. These self-help meetings provide support to many people in the area who suffer from alcohol and other drug dependence issues or have family members with alcohol and other drug problems.

7pm
Two constables are allocated responsibility for conducting bail checks on local people granted bail to appear in court at a later date. In some cases, especially for young people, bail conditions might include restrictions on times that they can be away from the home or approved residence. Tonight, there are eight people in the area who will receive visits from the police to ensure that they are complying with their bail conditions, especially those that restrict movement between certain hours.

\textsuperscript{67} This auditorium is named after a police officer who was stabbed and killed while on duty in the local area in 1998.
7:30pm

Glebe Point Road contains a number of restaurants, cafes and bars, making the area a popular destination for a meal. The cinema complex in Broadway shopping centre also attracts visitors to the area.

Diners and visitors to the cinema arrive. Those who drive seek parking either in the shopping centre or in streets adjacent to Glebe Point Road. The limited parking options mean that some will require a short walk to the active areas. Given the proximity of residential streets, many visitors park in residential streets, leaving their cars unsupervised for extended periods. Increasingly sophisticated locking and security features largely protect attacks on the vehicles from theft, but provide limited protection against steal from motor vehicle. Expensive cars parked for long hours in darkened side streets have previously been a problem for Glebe and continue to present crime opportunities. Street lighting in these areas has been upgraded in recent years to increase the risks of detection for would-be offenders.

10pm

The Licensing Sergeant from Leichhardt LAC and an inspector from the Office of Liquor, Gaming and Racing (‘OLGR’) conduct a short operation in the area to check that licensed venues are complying with their licensing conditions. One venue is especially vigilant throughout the evening to ensure that it does not breach the sale of alcohol provisions of the Liquor Act 2007 (NSW). Having being identified and placed on the ‘three strikes disciplinary scheme’ on 9 June 2013 by the OLGR, the Sage on Glebe68 keeps strictly to its licensing conditions this evening. The Licensing Sergeant and OLGR inspector visit key licensed venues and check that the number of patrons does not exceed licensed limits, that staff are complying with responsible service of alcohol provisions, and that there are no under-age people consuming alcohol on the premises. These measures ensure that the well-documented problems with alcohol-related crime across NSW (and Australia) are not being exacerbated by local practices.69

68 The Sage on Glebe closed during the period that the fieldwork was carried out. It is not possible to determine if this was linked to liquor licensing issues.

69 For a discussion of alcohol-related crime issues is NSW, see Auditor General (2008 and 2013b) and findings arising from the 2003 and 2013 NSW Alcohol Summits (among others).
1am
A group of four young people is the final drop-off for the Streetbeat Bus this evening. They alight on Glebe Point Road, having enjoyed an evening with some friends in the neighbouring suburb of Waterloo. The Streetbeat Bus, run by Weave Youth Services, provides transport to young people to reduce the likelihood that they will need to resort to crime to fund or enable their transport home. The bus has been operating since 1998 and transported many thousands, a significant proportion of whom are Indigenous young people.

2am
While most of the residents in Glebe are safely locked in their homes enjoying slumber, a small group works through the night. In somewhat disparate professions, police general duty car crews continue to patrol the area. They stop and talk with a small number of people moving through the area; some are returning to the backpacker and student accommodation dotted around the suburb, while others return from the busy night-time economy areas of Kings Cross, Darlinghurst and other popular Sydney entertainment precincts.

A small number of brothels and massage parlours are busy with Friday-night patrons. Staff at these venues are at particular risk from violent patrons. Staff working from the local venues are partially protected by local planning guidelines. The Adult Entertainment and Sex Industry Premises Development Control Plan 2006, developed by the City of Sydney Council, ‘seeks to recognise and appropriately regulate the location, design and operation of adult entertainment and sex industry premises through the provision of clear and comprehensive planning controls’ (City of Sydney 2006b, p. 1). The Development Control Plan (‘DCP’) provides definitions of particular activities and the associated planning restrictions. The DCP also provides a number of planning controls designed to ensure safety and security to patrons and clients and to minimise negative impacts on the amenity of surrounding areas.

Specific planning controls relevant to the prevention of crime include the following:

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- Active uses are encouraged to be presented to the street to promote surveillance and safety.
- All entrances and exits to adult entertainment and sex industry premises are encouraged to be designed to facilitate the privacy of staff and visitors without compromising personal safety (through avoiding the use of isolated back lanes and poorly lit areas).
- Adequate lighting should be provided to all entrances and exits of adult entertainment and sex industry premises, to ensure safety of all staff and visitors as they arrive, use and leave the premises.
- Any landscaping that is proposed must not obstruct the visibility from public areas of entrance and exits so as to ensure the safety of all staff and visitors to the premises.
- Design that minimises alcoves and entrapment spaces.
- Adequate safety and surveillance systems, including a secure entry and controlled internal and external access, preferably with remote door-release mechanisms.
- The design of private performance areas/rooms should include a duress alarm system linked to a central base and monitored at all times (City of Sydney 2006b, pp. 8–10).

3am
There is very little activity in the area now. There are a few people moving through the area on foot and a few vehicles, including police cars, traversing the suburb. Security systems and procedures are in place for many venues and properties. Retail and commercial venues operate a mixture of security regimes. Alarm and locking systems are ubiquitous; some engage security patrols to monitor their premises throughout the night; others have CCTV systems constantly operating; some have secure shopfronts and others use security film to cover vulnerable glass. The schools in the area are protected by security fencing and the NSW Department of Education and Communities engages security patrols to randomly patrol school sites. CCTV and alarms installed in council premises are linked to a staffed control room and other key facilities also receive visits throughout the night from single-unit private security providers. Concierge security personnel are located at entry and egress points in exclusive residential developments, and security devices are routinely deployed across the more than 5900 residential properties in the area.
4am

The 7/11 Convenience Store on Glebe Point Road is brightly illuminated, in stark contrast to the disposition of the solitary figure behind the counter. It has been a long shift and very few customers have been through the store in the last two hours. Historically, the store has been a magnet for trouble. The CRAVED\textsuperscript{72} (Clarke 1999) items in the store and the lower levels of capable guardianship (Cohen & Felson 1979) produced by the limited staff on shift at any one time caught the attention of local (predominantly) young people. In part prompted by relevant WorkCover policies,\textsuperscript{73} the sole staff member and the floor stock is partially protected by various security devices. A drop box for high-currency denominations and time-delay safe mean that any would-be offenders cannot access significant sums of cash; cash-in-transit procedures ensure that only relatively small sums of money are retained on site at any one time; jump wire prevents easy scaling of the front counter; six CCTV cameras record customer and staff movements; bright LED lights shine inside and outside the store; the most CRAVED items are stowed behind the counter; the store layout allows for easy surveillance from the staff and till enclosure; an alarm activated on entry to the store ensures that staff are aware when people enter the store; a mirror placed in the rear of the store allows for a single staff member to actively monitor the entire store; and the placement of the till and staff enclosure close to the entrance means that entry and exit from the store is closely monitored.\textsuperscript{74}

Day and Night

While many of the programs, services and activities operating in Glebe are delivered during the day and early evening, many physical features are constantly put to work or are in place to deter and prevent crime. These measures, reflective of situational crime prevention and CPTED approaches, once installed, operate continuously, often over many years. The

\textsuperscript{72} Clarke (1999) coined this acronym to demonstrate those items that are most likely to be stolen. The acronym stands for ‘Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable and Disposable’.

\textsuperscript{73} WorkCover NSW has produced a number of guides relevant to protecting staff and stock from attack and theft. These include: \textit{Armed Hold-Ups and Cash Handling: A Guide to Protecting People and Profits from Armed Hold-Ups} (2003); \textit{Workplace Violence in the Finance Sector: Guidelines, Checklists and Forms for Small to Medium Workplaces} (2001); \textit{Robbery and Violence in the Retail Industry} (2002); and \textit{Cash in Transit} (2002).

\textsuperscript{74} These features are common to many convenience stores. Some were casually observed in the Glebe 7/11 convenience store during fieldwork.
following are just some of the physical upgrades and interventions relevant to the prevention of crime in Glebe.

Glebe Point Road is the central spine of Glebe, running from busy Parramatta Road in the south to Jubilee Park in the north. Glebe Point Road is the busiest road in the area, acting as a major bus route, walking path and anchor for commercial activity in the area. Throughout the day, Glebe Point Road is a hive of activity and a picture of pedestrian and vehicular amenity. It has not always been so. In 2003, a report from the Macquarie Graduate School of Management described it as ‘run down, empty and wrought with petty crime’ (2003, p. 5). In 2005, the City of Sydney Council established local action planning arrangements to address localised issues of the various villages within the overall City of Sydney LGA. The North West Local Action Plan area, which includes Glebe, and was developed in 2007, highlighted 50 priorities, including:

- Revitalising Glebe Point Road (including improving lighting, paving, street trees and landscaping, underground cables, reviewing parking, reducing signage and clutter).
- Providing better lighting of footpaths and pedestrian crossings throughout the whole area to encourage safe pedestrian activity.
- Expanding lighting around schools and in Department of Housing areas.
- Improving the footpaths in the Forest Lodge area to increase safety.
- Improving street cleaning and graffiti removal beyond main streets.
- Making footpath licensing free to encourage more street life.
- Improving safety — advocating increased police presence at known ‘hot spots’, safety by design, and revitalisation and lighting projects (City of Sydney 2007).

Safety audits in 2005 and 2008 also highlighted particular problems with Glebe Point Road and adjacent areas. The Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012 referenced the findings of the 2008 Community Safety Audit and listed the following actions: extensive lighting upgrades throughout the Glebe area, installation of two CCTV cameras in Glebe, and an upgrade of Glebe Point Road (including the installation of smart poles, undergrounding of overhead cables and public art).
Subsequent to the development of the *Local Action Plan North West*, the City of Sydney Council states that it has completed a Glebe Safety Audit and Glebe Point Road upgrades. Consequently, people using Glebe Point Road today benefit from the approximately A$15 million invested in the street beautification and upgrade. Not only did this upgrade ensure that the quality of lighting along Glebe Point Road and pedestrian surfaces has improved, but installation of a Street Safety Camera (that is, public space CCTV camera) was installed. This, and a camera on Bay Street, is part of the Street Safety Camera Program (‘SSCP’) managed and monitored by the City of Sydney Council. These cameras are monitored 24 hours per day, seven days per week, consistent with the SSCP Protocols and Code of Practice (City of Sydney 2010a, 2010b).

Vibrant murals are dotted around the suburb. Glebe Youth Services secured funding from an insurance provider (NRMA) for the ‘creation of five Community Safety Murals to be placed around the Glebe area. We are targeting young people who may have participated in some of the crime and other unsafe behaviours taking place in Glebe’.

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76 Different documents suggest different sums of money were allocated or spent on the upgrade. For example, a media release from the Council of the City of Sydney on 28 June 2007 (http://www.sydneymedia.com.au/3296-glebe-point-road-upgrade-set-to-commence/, viewed 5 October 2013) stated that the upgrade would cost A$15 million, while a Glebe Society publication from 2006 suggested that a little over A$12 million would be spent on the project (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:gNv_8B1idsEJ:bulletin.glebesociety.org.au/2006_06.pdf&cd=7&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au, viewed 5 October 2013).


78 Information obtained from www.glebeyouth.org.au, viewed 9 July 2012. The site is currently under redevelopment.
Further to these and other murals, efforts to prevent illegal graffiti in the area are also undertaken by the Council of the City of Sydney. Their Graffiti Management Policy (City of Sydney 2013b, p. 2) states that:

The City’s intensive Graffiti Maintenance Program involves routine inspections and removal by City contractors and site specific removal in response to requests. This program aims to prevent recurrence of illegal Graffiti through rapid removal, thus removing recognition sought by the vandal (City of Sydney 2013b, p. 2).

The City of Sydney Council has also embedded CPTED principles into a number of planning instruments. For example, the following CPTED principles are highlighted in the Sydney Development Control Plan 2012.

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Provisions (quoted at length to show the exact nature of the concerns and issues covered) include:

1. Active spaces and windows of habitable rooms within buildings are to be located to maximise causal surveillance of streets, laneways, parking areas, public spaces and communal courtyard space.

2. In commercial, retail or public buildings, facilities such as toilets and parents rooms are to be conveniently located and designed to maximise casual surveillance to facility entries.

3. Blind-corners, recesses and other external areas that have the potential for concealment or entrapment are to be minimised.

4. Building entries are to be clearly visible, unobstructed and easily identifiable from the street, other public areas and other development. Where practicable lift lobbies, stairwells, hallways and corridors should be visible from the public domain.

5. Ground floors of non-residential buildings, the non-residential component of mixed use developments, and the foyers of residential buildings, are to be designed to enable surveillance from the public domain to the inside of the building at night.

6. Pedestrian routes from car parking spaces to lift lobbies are to be as direct as possible with clear lines of sight along the route.

7. Where dwelling units have individual main entries directly from a public space, entrances are to have a clearly defined transitional space between public and private areas.

8. Building details such as fencing, drainpipes and landscaping are to be designed so that illegitimate access is not facilities by the opportunity for foot or hand-holds, concealment and the like (City of Sydney 2012, p. 3.13-1).

CPTED principles are also integrated, at least in part, into various other local planning instruments and policies. For example, the City of Sydney Convenience Stores Development Control Plan 2004 outlines the need for a Plan of Management to be submitted with a DA.
that includes ‘a security plan specifying measures taken to address security threats to staff and customers including closed circuit television, internal and external view lines, specifying heights of shelving greater than 1.2m above floor level, internal mirrors, security lighting and staff’ (City of Sydney 2004, p. 9). The current draft Public Toilet Policy also includes references to CPTED.

To demonstrate how these planning controls come together, it is useful to consider the Harold Park development. At the north-western edge of the Glebe postcode area, this development is transforming the previous Harold Park Paceway (horse-trotting track) into a large residential site with approximately 1250 new residences, a retail precinct and parks.\textsuperscript{80} Given the size of the development, a specific development control plan was created. The \textit{Sydney Development Control Plan (Harold Park) 2011} lists 16 provisions pertaining to safety and design, many of which echo those outlined above from the \textit{Sydney Development Control Plan}. Due to the similarities, they will not be repeated here.

Mirvac, the developer of the Harold Park site, submitted a DA on 22 August 2011 for part of the overall site. It was considered in an Extraordinary Central Sydney Planning Committee meeting held on 18 September 2012. At this meeting a number of issues were highlighted. Those pertaining to CPTED included the following:

- The design of the building must be modified as follows:
  
  - The area of open space between 1D and 1C [parts of the development] and access to this space requires significant design resolution. A concept landscaped plan must be provided addressing CPTED principles, access arrangements, landscaping and fencing details and the potential for the provision of public art (Central Sydney Planning Committee 2012: no page number).

Moreover, the following was highlighted in relation to landscaping and safety and security:

- Some of the access areas considered poorly resolved in terms of activation … Conditions are recommended to improve safety and security.

- The letter box location in the entry structure is not approved via a condition of consent. Conditions require the Applicant to submit a letter box strategy detailing

alternate options for letter box locations, the primary objective being to secure letter box locations that assist in crime prevention.

- The southern entry lobby from Building 1A to the communal courtyard is indirect to the communal courtyard with ‘dog leg’ corners that comprise the safety and security of the resident.

- Overall, sight lines and privacy are maintained through the proposed fence arrangement. Proposed fencing across the subject site will allow for passive surveillance and contribute positively to the character of local streets and public domain (Central Sydney Planning Committee 2012: no page number).

In response to the issues raised, Mirvac submitted a CPTED Statement in relation to submission of a DA covering further parts of the redevelopment, specifically a residential tower of 347 apartments. The 10-page report addresses design of basement car park, communal private open space, residential buildings, and street frontages. While the details in this report will not be reproduced, this example demonstrates how local planning controls operate to ensure that crime risks in the built environment are identified and, ideally, designed out before construction. Other key current and future developments across the Glebe area are subject to similar processes, ensuring that consideration is given to the key crime risks of significant developments. Given the somewhat opaque nature of these processes, they are generally not routinely recorded as crime prevention measures. Despite the absence of evidence of the effectiveness of these measures in NSW (see Armitage 2013 for discussion of the benefits of designing out crime in residential developments), there is potentially much to be gained if relatively simple design techniques are integrated into a site like Harold Park, which will accommodate 2500 people when completed.

These planning provisions, murals, graffiti-removal procedures, urban upgrades, street lighting, and the numerous security features common in residential houses, businesses, government properties, and other properties provide continuous or near continuous prevention. They, over time, build up a security legacy, in which investments in these technologies and structures continue to contribute to the reduction of opportunities for crime.

**Evaluation**

An obvious limitation of simply listing and describing programs and interventions is the lack of consideration of whether crime has been prevented as a consequence. As was mentioned in
Chapter 2, there has generally been a limited investment in evaluation of crime prevention programs in Australia (English et al 2002). Of the programs and interventions described in this chapter, there was some evidence that a small number had been evaluated, although rarely were evaluations conducted independently. Even where thorough evaluations of individual programs have been conducted, there is limited evidence that they acknowledge and incorporate the impact of related activities. These issues will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 8.

Conclusion

This lengthy and necessarily descriptive portrayal of active, intentional, incidental, serendipitous and permanent crime prevention (and security) measures operating in the Glebe area seeks to demonstrate the volume of devices, programs and interventions designed to make crime more difficult, riskier and less rewarding. It also highlights just some of the preventive programs directed at tackling the causes of crime, building a socially cohesive community, and providing alternative leisure activities to occupy local young people, to aid transitions of children and young people between key institutions.

This crime prevention overview highlights the diversity of actors directly and indirectly engaged in crime prevention and the provision of security. By mapping and describing some of the crime prevention and security measures routinely operating in the area, it is possible to see how the different approaches to prevention co-exist. The web of relevant activities highlights the potentially complementary nature of various approaches, as well as some possible tensions. For example, efforts to prevent and reduce youth crime range from the delivery of programs by Glebe Youth Services, to the provision of the After Dark program on Friday and Saturday evenings, to the strict policing of bail conditions, to the inclusion of young people on the Leichhardt LAC’s Suspect Target Management Plan. The philosophical tensions across these approaches are evident. However, there is general acceptance of these assorted approaches from different stakeholders.

This summary also provides insight into the layering and building up of prevention capacities over time. The total capital and recurrent funding dedicated to some of these initiatives and structures is significant. However, once the hardware and physical structures are installed, there is little or no ongoing cost. For example, some of the capital expenditure on Glebe Point Road requires minor ongoing maintenance. Similarly, once the murals were created, they require little ongoing investment to maintain them over long periods. This layering and
building up of prevention measures is not often well canvassed in the existing crime prevention (and related) literature. Nor is there a good understanding of the potentially diminishing costs as multiple initiatives take shape and become embedded.

This descriptive mapping exercise also highlights the importance and potential contribution of micro interventions and practices. Some, such as Weatherburn (2004), have suggested that there is little to be gained by small-scale, localised interventions. The opposite is argued here — the dynamics and causes of offending will assume local dimensions and reflect local conditions, meaning that localised responses have merit. Broader policies and interventions are also crucial, but consideration should be given to local circumstances. A gate installed to stop people passing through a public housing estate; a program designed and delivered to provide young people with meaningful activities on Friday and Saturday nights; the delivery of an alternative education program to address problems of de-schooling created by a policy to close the local high school: these and similar initiatives directly reflect local conditions. However, this does not mean that they will necessarily prevent crime — just because they are locally devised and delivered does not guarantee success. As Homel et al (2006, p. 2) suggest, program design should be scientific (that is, ‘do good science’), understand community needs, and engage in community development. These principles are likely to ensure that locally developed programs have the greatest chance of success.

This already lengthy list of potential contributors to the prevention of crime and the ‘pursuit of security’ (Zedner 2009) is only a partial illustration of the preventive regimes operating in the area. There are numerous policies and programs delivered across wider geographical areas that have direct and indirect impacts on local crime. Some of these wider policies will be considered in Chapter 10. Before turning to these, the following chapter will examine some of the processes adopted to plan, organise and implement crime prevention in Glebe.
Chapter 8: Crime Prevention Practices in Glebe

The previous chapter listed and described a number of crime prevention programs, policies and activities operating in Glebe. This highlighted the volume and diversity of programs and the legacy of some investment in security and crime prevention in the area over time. However, the presentation of the information potentially implies a level of isolation or separateness of individual programs and practices of particular agencies/actors, which is not strictly accurate. This chapter will focus on the practical features of crime prevention in Glebe, including inter-agency partnerships, access to data, and coordination of crime prevention efforts. Analysis of the overall ethos of crime prevention practices in Glebe will then be discussed, before considering the experiences of those who are closely governed — a small group who might be said to be ‘governed through crime’.

Coordination of Crime Prevention Activities

There are numerous approaches to organising, coordinating and operationalising crime prevention activities and programs. One model, Ekblom’s 5Is (Ekblom 2011), helps to differentiate key steps and procedures to preventing crime. This model highlights the importance of: (1) intelligence (or crime data); (2) intervention; (3) implementation; (4) involvement of key stakeholders; and (5) impact (or evaluation). A number of Ekblom’s 5Is will be used here as a means of interrogating crime prevention practices in Glebe.

Intelligence

Numerous authors highlight the importance of understanding the nature of crime problems in order to effectively seek to prevent crime (Goldstein 1979; Ekblom 2011; Weatherburn 2004; NSW Crime Prevention Division (n.d.); Ratcliffe 2009; Wortley & Mazerolle 2008; Chainey & Ratcliffe 2005; Tilley 2009; Cherney 2006). Crime problems tend to arise in very specific areas, and preventive efforts will consequently need to target particular areas (Brantingham & Brantingham 1981; Chainey & Ratcliffe 2005; Wortley & Mazerolle 2008; Groff et al 2010).

Ekblom lists a series of dimensions that might assist in developing a detailed understanding of the nature of a particular crime problem (or problems):

- types of offenders involved;
- modus operandi, tools, weapons, skills, ‘script’ and other resources used by the offenders;
• target goods typically stolen or damaged;

• target homes or business premises that were burgled;

• owners or managers of the homes or goods;

• target persons who were assaulted;

• immediate physical and social context of the criminal events (type of street, shop, station, etc.);

• wider physical and social context of the criminal events (town centre, residential area, etc.; demographic features, for example, social deprivation);

• wider crime and disorder context in which the specific problem is addressed;

• timing of criminal events during the day, week or year;

• whether crime problem is recent or long-standing and

• whether repeat victimisation is significant, and if so, any specific pattern of victims (Ekblom 2011, p. 177–8).

This list infers access to considerable sources of data, likely to be held by different agencies.

Access to meaningful crime (and other) data was repeatedly identified as an impediment to effective crime prevention planning for the Glebe area. Minutes of the CSPC meetings and observations from the two CSPC meetings attended in 2013 suggest that crime data are generally presented at the beginning of a meeting. Based on what can be gleaned from the minutes and what was observed, data for various crime categories is provided generally for a single month or a short period. The data are in aggregate form, describing increases or decreases in particular offence categories. Little or no geographical, temporal or other descriptive data are provided.

The relevance of this data was challenged at different meetings:

The Commander was asked if the CSPC could be provided with statistics over a longer term. Supt [name] replied that, for that information, police would need to know the nature of the concern and the particular crime category (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 10 March 2011).
A similar issue was raised at the 25 July 2013 meeting. While no minutes could be accessed for this meeting, notes taken during it recorded that a request was made for more detailed information to be provided:

[Name of attendee] asked about what level of crime data is available? He asked the police to explain what level of detail they break down their data. The [title of officer] answered … The [title of officer] stated that they had not shown crime maps because the group didn’t understand maps. [Name of attendee] suggested that the provision of more detailed information would help the group to contribute to crime prevention. [Name of another attendee] suggested that the group could track how it was performing if they received more data (Observation Notes from CSPC Meeting, 25 July 2013).

As outlined above, a fuller picture of crime in the area, it was suggested, could help agencies assist in efforts to prevent and reduce crime. The two remaining scheduled CSPC meetings for 2013 were cancelled, so there is no record of any response to this request.

One interviewee suggested that the somewhat limited coverage of crime statistics in the CSPC meeting was in contrast to prior experience:

I would attend meetings where that was a regular feature of the meeting, that the local policeman would come along and talk about crime stats for that month. It was regular whereas now I think that’s something that’s requested when specific things arise or when there’s an interest in something particular (Interviewee #8).

The level of detail of information this interviewee suggests was formerly provided is unclear.

By controlling the nature of the data released, the methods that it is presented and the forms of analysis applied (or not applied, as the case might be), the police very much shape and drive how the CSPC operates, what it focuses on, and how crime in the area is understood. This management reflects Sarre’s (and Roger’s) observations that police were not especially cooperative crime prevention partners because they misunderstood crime prevention, they found it difficult to consult, and they were disinclined to share their work (and data) (Sarre 1997, pp. 71–8; Rogers 2004, p. 7).
In addition to limited crime data accessible from the NSW Police Force, crime data can be accessed from BOCSAR. A number of interviewees reported accessing information from BOCSAR:

I generally just use the online databases through BOCSAR (interviewee #1).

However, the utility of these arrangements and the data that can be accessed was questioned by interviewees:

[T]he crime data itself is very general and hard to break down. The more specific information I’ve gotten on Glebe from the BOCSAR from Glebe is the crime maps, where it looks down the areas and streets. So it’s very hard to pinpoint what’s really going on … and so there’s no sort of distinction of youth crime versus other types of crime (Interviewee #3).

There’s the BOCSAR stuff but the problem with it is the currency of the information and also the specificity, geographic specificity of the information … So to have really targeted crime strategies for certain areas and to really understand when, where and who in your very local area is difficult … yeah it could be more precise … Crime by specific areas or suburbs. I think that would probably be of some use to us in a way but not necessarily (Interviewee #4).

I have previously argued that limited accessibility to relevant local crime data is a barrier to efforts to prevent crime (Clancey 2011). While Jones and Weatherburn (2011) refuted these concerns and suggested that existing data access arrangements were suitable for local crime prevention purposes,81 the above comments appear to suggest that there are still perceived barriers to the access of adequate and appropriate crime data.

**Involvement**

Another of Ekblom’s 5Is relates to inter-agency responses. As has been stated, there has been significant attention given to inter-agency and partnership approaches to crime prevention in recent decades. Terms like ‘joined-up’, ‘whole of government’, ‘whole of community’, ‘networked government’, ‘joined-up government’, ‘associational governance’ and the ‘third way’ are commonly associated with these partnership approaches (Crawford 1997; Gilling 1997; P Homel 2005; Geddes 2005).

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81 Jones and Weatherburn, at the time of this retort, were employees of BOCSAR.
As demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7, a number of organisations and actors operate in the Glebe area, many of which directly or indirectly contribute to the prevention of crime. Many of these come together for particular inter-agency meetings. The only current inter-agency structure with a crime/law enforcement focus in Glebe is the CSPC. Two CSPC meetings were held and observed in 2013. Minutes were reviewed for CSPC meetings held in the three years prior.

Other inter-agency groups meet in Glebe. FLAG meetings are held monthly and attract diverse stakeholders. In total, 10 FLAG meetings, networking events and a planning session were observed in 2013. These monthly meetings focused on diverse issues, ranging from coordinating events, and sharing information, to joint planning. Apart from FLAG meetings, the COGG, the Glebe Society, youth inter-agencies, and other specialist inter-agency meetings are regularly held in Glebe or adjacent regions. Crime is generally a low priority for these groups.

While the CSPC remains the central inter-agency structure with a crime/law enforcement orientation, various other crime-oriented committees once operated in Glebe and largely still operate elsewhere. As noted by Shepherdson et al (2014), numerous crime-focused inter-agency committees were established in NSW in the last 10 or so years. These included Community Drug Actions Teams (‘CDATs’), Liquor Licensing Accords (and Precinct Liquor Accords), Violence against Women Regional Reference Groups, Police Accountability Community Teams (‘PACTs’), and Community Solution, and Crime Prevention Partnerships. Perhaps due, in part, to the crime decline, none of these committees continues to operate in Glebe.

The following information relates to the CSPC meetings and experiences of other local inter-agency groups. As Chapter 5 revealed, the general perception of these inter-agency relationships is glowing:

The Glebe community is amazing, so it’s very, very easy to work alongside one another (Interviewee #10).

Nonetheless, interviewees were asked if particular agencies were less likely to contribute than might be desirable. A number of government (state and federal) agencies were identified as being frequently absent:
Glaringly obvious absenteeism from all of this stuff, for me, my personal huge frustration is getting some collaboration with the big agencies … I think all the big five don’t make it to the table — so DoCS [child protection agency Department of Community Services], Centrelink, Health, Housing and Education (Interviewee #9) [police were also mentioned, but not in such an emphatic manner].

We never see Health … There’s always so many changes within health but I think they bring something different to the table (Interviewee #8).

[I]n terms of community health it seems to be really hard to identify the right people and a willingness for those right people to be part of those sort of gatherings (Interviewee #5).

[B]ut is Health there? Probably not really. That’s another big issue in terms of mental health and in terms of an ageing population and some of the issues around that. Housing is certainly struggling to be there I think (Focus Group Participant).

I’ve never met a DoCS [child protection agency Department of Community Services] person in all the time I’ve been on community groups (Interviewee #6).

I think Housing is quite often just missing but I don’t think Housing actually have the capacity anymore to be effective in those broader settings compared to working with Housing 15 years ago. I think it’s changed. Their focus has changed. I mean it changes all the time and they’re back into landlord mode at the moment so I just don’t think they have the capacity and they’re not always that helpful to be there (Interviewee #8).

These findings echo concerns raised by focus group participants in previous research by Clancey et al (2012) into the work of NSW local government CSOs:

I’d like to see more support from the human services agency and perhaps Education or DoCS [child protection agency Department of Community Services] or someone like that. I think we also need a partnership model that we all develop ourselves and are accountable to so that we actually at a project inception agree on how we can be accountable to each other up front. These models exist overseas and we ourselves have to get better at documenting it and publishing our own experience (Focus Group Participant cited in Clancey et al 2012, p. 251).
One interviewee mentioned the agency responsible for adult community corrections:

Interviewer: Probation and Parole — it’s the first time you’ve mentioned them. Are they generally at the table?

Respondent: No, they’re often an absentee partner. You know, perhaps arguably 10 years ago they didn’t need to be. I think they need to be now. And that’s part of the bigger picture thing, in terms of those different state government bodies working a little bit more together (Interviewee #5).82

While these major (generally NSW government agencies) were listed as being absent from inter-agency structures, similar criticisms were levelled at large NGOs:

[B]ut what I’ve seen in the last 10 years is an increase in that sort of problem stretching over to organisations that used to really be charities that are now operating more like big government departments. So yeah, they’re not located in the community; they cover huge areas. So how can a worker that covers four LGAs make it to all of these little interagency, local interagency meetings? (Interviewee #9).

[A]nd then the big charities — Barnardo’s, Ben Soc [Benevolent Society], particularly for me, because these are the charities working with families and we just sort of seem to come across them incidentally (Interviewee #9).

There’s no large NGO in Glebe either. There’s no BenSoc [Benevolent Society] or Smith Family and they bring in resources. They often also bring in authority to negotiate with the state government, depending on what it’s about but they can tend to foot big projects which is not often helpful but if that possibility is there then we can take up on that (Interviewee #8).

Thus, despite the generally positive views held regarding inter-agency relationships in the Glebe area, concerns were raised regarding the presence and contribution of particular (predominantly government) agencies. The much larger geographic remits of these agencies means that there is less capacity to build local relationships. This poses challenges in coordinating diverse services across different geographical boundaries. Relatedly, the geographical boundaries used by different NSW government agencies differ. With 152

82 Based on these comments, it would seem that the significant role of probation services in crime prevention suggested by Laycock and Pease (1985) has not been realised in Glebe (and perhaps NSW more broadly).
LGAs, 80 NSW Police Force LACs, 15 Health Districts, and numerous other regional structures for other government services, there is considerable opportunity for duplication. These inconsistent boundaries also provide excuse-making opportunities for non-attendance.

These comments suggest strong connections between local actors, but less strong connections with agencies operating across wider geographical areas. Government agencies (apart from police), but also large NGOs (as they increasingly take on functions and responsibilities that were formerly provided by the state (Housego & O’Brien 2012)), were identified as not being present or contributing to inter-agency networks. This raises fundamental challenges to notions of inter-agency work. The contribution of education, health, housing, child protection and other state government agencies to crime prevention activities was a key part of the development of local approaches to crime prevention in NSW (as will be outlined in Chapter 9). The decreasing involvement of these key agencies has consequences for funding and the delivery of programs, given that these agencies have access to greater resources than local services.

While the non-participation of large state government agencies in local inter-agency activities raises concerns about their involvement and investment in local crime prevention activities, it will be clearly shown in Chapter 10 that this does not mean that these agencies have no involvement in crime prevention. Quite the opposite will be demonstrated with reference to a broad array of initiatives and programs managed by these agencies. Nonetheless, the comments from interviewees suggests that many of these programs are not especially well known by local actors.

A final factor to be considered that directly impacts on inter-agency responses is funding and its uncertainty into the future. The uncertainty of ongoing funding means that some services and activities perpetually operate under some threat of closure:

[A]ll of the different jobs I’ve had in the welfare sector. And that to me is very strange seeing as every single job I’ve been in there was always a question around well if we get funded next year, if we’re funded again (Interviewee #9).

One of our main funders, we have been funded by them for many years. We now ask for less in the hope that we’ll get the money because there’s the overhanging threat that they will not continue to fund us (Interviewee #10).
The ‘paradox of prevention’ issues raised in Chapter 6 makes this a particularly uncertain future for many services in Glebe — with crime falling, services are at considerable risk of being de-funded, especially in an era of tighter funding regimes.

Impact

A theme of the fieldwork was the apparent absence of evaluation of the impact of crime prevention programs and interventions. As noted in Chapter 2, English at el found that while ‘a variety of community crime prevention programs are in use in Australia ... fewer than 10 per cent of 170 state and territory crime prevention programs and projects identified had been evaluated’ (English et al 2002, p. 121). Moreover, Homel has argued that ‘[c]ommunity programs attract funding because they “feel good” and help keep a range of community organisations operating. This is good politics but it may or may not be good crime prevention, especially since rigorous evaluation is seldom supported’ (2007, p. 277). It could therefore be concluded that evaluation of crime prevention programs has never been particularly strong in Australia.

The listing of programs and activities in the previous chapters has not engaged with questions of efficacy and impact. In some respects, the crime decline has been taken as evidence that some programs are working. This is obviously a dangerous line of reasoning, given that a number of programs predated the crime decline and operated during the crime spike in 2007–08. A closer analysis of the impact of particular programs and interventions would be desirable, as would some analysis of the capacity of programs to have some synergistic effect, whereby it is the combination of programs and services that contributes to particular outcomes, as opposed to single, isolated interventions.

Two interviewees specifically raised concerns about the lack of evaluation of local programs:

Yeah, if they were to be evaluated on terms of crime prevention I think they’d be very limited (Interviewee #1).

There’s a swag of programs happening. I don’t know, like so many of the programs that we all run, how they’re evaluated and has it been running long enough to be evaluated for us to know the real effectiveness that they’re having? (Interviewee #8).

While there appears to be limited focus on evaluation, there was evidence that some individual programs or initiatives had been evaluated. For example, the Glebe Pathways Project has attracted some positive attention. The local Member of NSW State Parliament,
Jamie Parker, made the following private members’ statement in the Legislative Assembly in 26 August 2011:

The initiative is not simply about good intentions; it is about genuine outcomes and success in re-engaging young people with education and the many opportunities that follow … The project has created many success stories — re-engaging and inspiring young people and creating new and positive connections throughout the community. The review undertaken by the University of Sydney confirmed its effectiveness, not only qualitatively but also from the point of view of quantitative indicators. Experienced educators and academics have worked to design the project and to ensure it is embedded within an Indigenous cultural framework. The program has changed the lives of these young people (Parker 2011, p. 4895).

The review referred to above states:

The Project was initiated at a time when there were regular reports from the Police and community members (and subsequent lobbying to Government) in relation to the spate of juvenile crime in Glebe. Police reported that the alleged offending profile at the time was young people who were not attending school. The main offences being committed were robbery and steal from motor vehicle. Since the Pathways Project commenced rates for robbery and steal from motor vehicle have dropped by 60% and 70% respectively (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics [sic], 2010) (Hayes 2011b, pp. 10–11).83

The Evaluation Report also states that the:

Pathways Project has supported 18 young people to re-engage with a learning pathway; and this is equivalent to 95% of total enrolments. As well as those who continue to be enrolled in the Project:

- Four completed their School Certificate in 2010
- Three achieved Life Skills Outcomes
- Two transferred to other NSW schools
- Five pursued TAFE options

83 The veracity of these claims seems open to debate for a number of reasons. The web link provided in the bibliography of the Evaluation Report is for crime data for the entire City of Sydney LGA.
• One was successful in getting work (2011b, p. 7).

Moreover:

Prior to enrolment in the Project, all students attended school less than 35% of the time and some had not attended school for extended periods of time. During Term 1 in 2011:

• 78% improved their attendance rates to over 50%
• 50% improved their attendance rates to over 65%
• 28% improved their attendance rates to over 70% (2011b, p. 7).

While there was limited evidence of evaluations routinely being conducted of other local programs, the nature of funding and the associated reporting requirements ensure that data are captured on program outputs. For example, a Quarterly Report from Glebe Youth Services includes data on the After Dark program for the 2012–13 financial year. It stated that 3779 meals were served with a monthly average of 315 young people participating in the program. The number of participants increased in the last six months of this reporting period, with attendance figures increasing to 959 between January and March 2013 and increasing again to 1136 between April and June 2013. The overwhelming majority (95 per cent) of these participants are reputedly residents of the Glebe public housing estate.84

While important in determining participation rates, this type of data does not illuminate the impact or outcomes of programs of this nature. Ask Eck has argued: ‘We need to … make better use of information from evaluations with weak designs’. He further suggests that:

Evaluation designs that are weak by social science standards may be acceptable to decision makers who fund such efforts and even weak evaluations can contain valuable information. Local governments and businesses produce untold numbers of weak evaluations. Those who want to build knowledge in this area must discover ways of learning from the many attempts to address very specific crime problems … This requires ways of finding, cataloging and synthesising weak evaluations (Eck 2002, pp. 285–6).

Without greater evaluation and capture of even those evaluations using poor designs, any claims about evidence-based crime prevention seem hollow.

84 It is unclear how this data is collected. The relevant figures are listed on page 9 of the After Dark Report from Glebe Youth Service.
Taken together, it is argued that much greater consideration of impact and sophisticated evaluations is required. There was little evidence of an audit culture in Glebe. The lack of centralised direction and resources meant that there was limited need to respond to centrally imposed targets or directions. The responses to particular problems were often locally developed rather than centrally imposed. There seemed to be limited concern about regular analysis of crime data or progress reporting.

**Crime Prevention Ethos**

Before commenting on the overall ethos of crime prevention in Glebe, consideration will be given to some of the causes of crime proffered by interviewees. It is through this understanding of how the causes of crime are conceived that some key themes emerge regarding approaches to crime prevention. Many of the observations shown below resonate with popular theories of crime — anomie, strain, Marxist, and social ecology (Vold et al 2002) are some of the theoretical traditions implicitly employed to explain crime in Glebe. These explanations of the causes of crime result in the strong welfare orientation of crime prevention in Glebe.

**The Implied Causes of Crime**

A small number of the implied causes of crime — poverty, disadvantage, need, limited life opportunities, sole offender ‘crime waves’ — will be explored here. These identified causes of crime highlight orientations to prevention, which, in the case of Glebe, are very much welfare-oriented. Structural causes of crime require structural solutions.

For a number of interviewees, poverty and disadvantage were considered to be significant contributing factors of crime in the area:

[T]here’s a correlation between poverty and crime. That sense of hopelessness and desperation. It starts to spiral I guess (Focus Group Participant).

[W]e knew that much of the offending behaviour was motivated by hunger, which again is probably an offending factor which isn’t often considered, I think, by the mainstream (Interviewee #2).

A lot of them were quite desperate and poverty and their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter weren’t necessarily being met. I’m not saying all crimes are committed to fulfil that need but certainly there was a degree of that (Focus Group Participant).
You’ve got lower socioeconomic people, quite often they’ll do what they need to do to make some money and whether it’s feed the kids or feed their own habits or whatever it might be (Interviewee #7).

One is entrenched poverty … And the other really big component I think is if you look at a community like Glebe there’s sort of a cultural identity … for some of these kids going to prison is something that will give them that sense of becoming a man. All of the people they love, a lot of the people they love and admire in their communities have been to prison. It’s a rite of passage of sorts … Glebe’s definitely got a bit of gangster about it and that’s important to people, that’s how they’ve survived (Interviewee #9).

The material conditions experienced by some local community members are clearly considered to be a contributing factor to crime in the area. The inability to meet basic needs, it is argued, propels some into crime. Subsistence offending, for lack of a better term, encourages particular approaches to crime prevention, which will be considered in more detail later in the chapter, but the following demonstrates the link between suggested responses and possible causes of crime:

Broadly speaking the capitalist system, it creates the welfare problems in our society and if we’re not prepared to look at the big system and how that influences pockets of poverty then on we go (Interviewee #9).

The experiences of poverty are also potentially exacerbated by the close proximity of people who are advantaged to those who are disadvantaged:

I haven’t approached this from an academic background but I believe anecdotally that when you sharper relief (sic) between wealth gaps or larger relief there’s often a higher crime rate … I suppose the have nots get to see a lot of the haves right in front of them and there’s that sense of, that marginalisation sense factor can be greater. The fancy phones, the nice cars — I’m not sure but I believe that’s backed up in broader research (Interviewee #4).

These conditions impact on self-esteem and life opportunities:

So what you see in families is really like urban disenfranchisement with society, completely unaspirational, the absence of aspiration, the absence of self-belief,
conflicted or negative self-identity, poorly socialised, social skills. When we get on to what works you’ve got to start early and you’ve got to start with families. Once you get into this loop or almost slowly descending spiral and it’s a multiplicity of factors that create entrenched disadvantaged communities and because of that reason, the solutions I think can be complex and require medium/long time horizons and in terms of funding and programs. For someone to want to aspire to something they have to have a sense of self-esteem. They have to have a sense of wellbeing (Interviewee #4).

[A] lot of outcomes in people’s lives in general are determined in the very early years. So not having a chance at a good start in education is going to have an impact on how you do in your HSC [final year of secondary school in NSW], whether you get to university or not, all of those things and then consequently whether you get a job. All of those things will be influenced by what your life experience is in the first five years (Interviewee #9).

Other factors like employment opportunities and access to drugs were also identified as possible causes of crime:

I would say, and it is a crime in itself, and I believe it’s probably at the heart of all other crimes, would be drugs … And when I say it’s kind of the heart of all problems, when you get people who are addicted to drugs, and drugs are really expensive, that’s when they will start breaking into cars, stealing laptops and mobile phones and leather jackets and whatever they can get their hands on (Interviewee #7).

The greatest thing that will keep the crime rate going down is getting the kids into employment … Already those first two boys that were working down at Harold Park have got everyone’s ears up and excited about — they were watching one of the boys went and bought a motorbike the other day. He didn’t take a loan, he bought a motorbike. He got a licence, and he’s legally riding a motorbike around, and the kids are just going where did you steal it from? And he says no, I bought it. He’s got so much money he doesn’t know what to do with it. The other one’s gambling it away, but that’s a separate issue we’re working on (Focus Group Participant).

Clearly, much stock is placed in socio-economic and structural factors as contributing to crime causation in the Glebe area. The particular socio-economic characteristics of the area are attributed as having particular influence on children and young people in particular,
leading to crime. This, it was suggested, could often take the form of a single individual or a small group who significantly affect the local crime rates:

In a small area like this the stats can get skewed by one individual (Interviewee #4).

I think the young kids that are responsible for that generally make up a small group of the kids that are committing crime and that tends to really spike when those kids get out of lockup, so there’s a few of those kids that are actually in lockup at the moment, so I think that’s probably down for a bit at the moment but you can clearly see when those kids that steal from motor vehicle just jumps (Interviewee #1).

[W]e know now that there were actually two or three people committing probably 75 to 80 per cent of the crime. Well, it was seriously … the amount of people … if you count those smashed windows, one person seriously was doing 110 a night. One person, so that’s not to say we didn’t have a problem with crime culture and antisocial behaviour culture but we had some seriously bad ringleaders that were actually committing the offences (Focus Group Participant).

Ultimately, the views of key local actors on crime causation influence approaches to prevention:

What are the causes of crime or what leads to crime — there are so many factors within that. The approach to preventing crime or crime prevention would be to look at each of those causes and that’s supporting families and support children, young people having diversionary programs. If your view is that the causes are multi-pronged then the solution to it needs to address each of those factors (Interviewee #8).

Taken together, these arguments are consistent with various strands of various criminological theories that highlight inequality, anomie, strain, social disorganisation, and differential association as contributing to crime causation. While there is not sufficient information to further probe these explanations for crime in greater detail or to isolate examples that best reflect particular theoretical perspectives, it is clear that broader ideological commitments of the interviewees align with criminological theories that focus on structural determinants of behaviour.

These views regarding crime causation also infer particular approaches to crime prevention, and are similar to Brown’s (2012) observations about talking with frontline workers in
Australian criminal justice agencies. Brown argues that ‘there are signs within criminology that life is being breathed back into social democratic and penal welfare concerns, habitus, and practices’ (2012, p. 78). Coleman and McCahill (2011) made a similar observation in regards to the UK, when they stated that ‘empirical research has shown that ‘front-line’ practitioners in criminal justice agencies and security networks continue to be guided by the ‘old’ concerns of “welfare” and “reform”’ (2011, p. 87). Rather than presuming that opportunity-reduction techniques have displaced interest and concern about structural causes of crime, these findings suggest that there remains a strong welfare orientation to crime prevention and a (perhaps at times uneasy) co-existence of opportunity-reducing techniques and penal-welfare approaches (similar to arguments advanced by Knepper 2009).

It is therefore unsurprising that many of the local programs and services that have direct or indirect crime prevention objectives are akin to community and social crime prevention.

**Community and Social Approaches to Crime Prevention**

Given the explanations offered for criminal behaviour and some of the approaches detailed in previous chapters, it is unsurprising that the general crime prevention ethos in Glebe perhaps best reflects the community and social approaches to prevention. Specifically, it is argued that these approaches demonstrate a commitment to ‘socialisation of crime prevention’, a ‘culture of care’ and ‘prevention through reassurance’. Together, these approaches mirror the specific origins and tendencies in local crime prevention in NSW (as will be discussed in Chapter 9) and possibly Australia.

**‘Socialisation of Crime Policy’**

The rise of crime and its acceptance as a ‘massive and incontestable social fact’ (Garland 2001, p. 90) in the latter part of last century had numerous repercussions. As noted in Chapter 5, for some, governmental responses to high crime resulted in the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ (Blagg et al 1988; Gilling & Barton 1997; Crawford 1998; Knepper 2007; Rodger 2008; Evans 2011; Wincup 2013). According to Knepper (2007), the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ refers to the ‘situation in which social welfare issues become redefined as crime problems. When goals of providing affordable homes, improving health, and providing incomes through employment become secondary to crime reduction in social policy, criminalisation of social policy has occurred’ (2007, p. 139).

While concern about the emergence of this potential phenomenon is laudable, it is argued that any general suggestion that NSW, and more particularly Glebe, has witnessed the
‘criminalisation of social policy’ is overstated. There are possible signs to suggest such a process has occurred. The policing of bail, the existence of high ‘security bubbles’, and a ‘state governance quilt’ that ensnares a minority of Glebe residents demonstrates this, as do public housing reforms, which target anti-social behaviour, the previous trialling of youth conduct orders, place-based interventions and various other examples that could be singled out as examples of the ‘criminalisation of social policy’.

In contrast, given the experience in Glebe, it could be argued that there is a greater tendency in NSW to ‘socialise criminal policy’ (or the ‘socialisation’ of community safety, as suggested by Crawford 1998; Hope 2001; Edwards 2002). Some of the responses to elevated levels of crime in Glebe in the 2007–08 period saw the advent of programs designed to provide de-schooled young people with an alternative education pathway (the Glebe Pathways Project) and the provision of structured social activities on Friday and Saturday evenings (the After Dark Program). The Friend in Hand Program, run by the local police, provides opportunities for local young people to interact with police through sport and recreational activities three mornings per week. The young people are then provided with a meal and delivered to school. The breakfast club at Glebe Primary School, followed by parenting support initiatives through the Glebe Schools as Community Centre, and the subsidised after-hours care provided by Centipede, are further examples of programs and activities that have specific social-welfare objectives, not criminal justice or crime prevention aspirations. Further, the informal interactions between workers from these agencies and the channelling of clients to different programs ensure a ‘continuum of care’ not visible from merely reviewing the practices of single agencies. An excellent example of this continuum of care is the manner in which children arriving with their mothers, who are escaping domestic violence, at Elsie’s Refuge gain access to the local primary school and become involved in related programs. Much of this happens informally, reducing any sense of stigma that might arise in such a stressful situation.

These examples reflect Shaftoe’s (2004) suggestions regarding the social and criminal policy arrangements that ‘[e]nlightened measures that control crime are generally desirable as part of broader social policy, or, conversely, well-considered social policies may also help to reduce levels of offending’ (2004, p. 5). In this respect, many of the direct, indirect and serendipitous crime prevention activities in Glebe better resemble the ‘socialisation of criminal policy’ than might be generally acknowledged.
'Culture of Care'

Inter-agency meetings and comments from interviewees generally reflected not a ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001), but a ‘culture of care’. Strong concern was registered in many fora for the plight of public housing tenants in the area. This took the form of direct advocacy to Housing NSW representatives, State and Federal Members of Parliament, as well as practical support through the organisation of the Mitchell Street Fete (an event specifically designed for public housing tenants). This level of care is demonstrated by the advocacy of the Glebe Society to retain public housing in the area and to improve existing housing stock. This level of bridging social capital is perhaps not reflective of the experience of public housing tenants in other areas and is why one senior housing figure at a public event suggested that Glebe might be a good example of how integrated private and public housing might work.

One interviewee encapsulates some of this perspective:

[T]o me that’s a much better way of trying to deal with crime. Give people positive opportunities, develop things in the community that are community driven, that empower people, that help them connect with their neighbours and see the police doing positive things and all of that stuff (Interviewee #9).

This ‘culture of care’ reflects strong traditions in Australia and Australian crime prevention. Sutton and Wilson (2004) suggested that:

Most officers charged with coordinating crime prevention and community safety at the local level are drawn from community development and welfare backgrounds. They are generally dedicated to programs that they see as attacking ‘root causes’ — for example, deficits in education, welfare support and housing (2004, pp. 317–18).

In a small study of the work and work practices of CSOs employed by NSW councils, Clancey et al (2012) similarly found strong community development and welfare backgrounds. All 13 CSOs participating in the research had post-secondary school qualifications, with 11 of the 13 have acquired a bachelor or masters degree in public health, police management, social science, social work, psychology, community development, communications studies, and international social development (2012, p. 242). Most of these CSOs were administratively placed in community development units or branches of their
respective councils, which further highlights that community development and welfare approaches might be dominant among local government crime prevention practitioners.

It would seem that it is not just local crime prevention or CSOs that have this orientation. Many workers active in the Glebe area have a similar perspective. Tackling ‘root causes’ is a significant shared priority, especially involving issues associated with housing. Moreover, an ethos of caring for, rather than isolating, excluding or punishing, those involved in crime is predominant among workers in the area.

‘Prevention through Reassurance’

Multiple actors espoused the merits of their work (or that of their agency). Police frequently trumpeted the merits of high-visibility policing; local government representatives pointed to Community Safety Plans, street safety cameras, and street beautification; youth services promoted the role of their service in keeping young people busy. The unrelenting nature of the reassurance was a common theme from inter-agency meetings and reflected what will be described as a ‘prevention through reassurance’ ethos. Informing community members and other inter-agency partners about the high level of existing activity and recent initiatives and promising or positive results soothes fears and concerns and valorises the role of each individual agency. It signals to rate payers that their money is being wisely invested; it demonstrates the efficacy of particular practices and practitioners.

The CSPC meeting minutes over the last three years provide examples of the positive mantra repeated by senior police. Pro-active policing was frequently and repeatedly advanced in CSPC meetings in the last three years as the explanation for falling crime and disrupting potential criminal activity:

Break and enter crimes are going up and down; pro-active strategies in place and are having a positive effect (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 31 March 2013).

Supt [name] pointed out that police pro-activity is getting good results in this command; there is no evidence of any particular criminal element being able to freely

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85 Interestingly, Hogg (1990) noted that the original two local government CSOs engaged during the original pilot program in the late 1980s by Fairfield and Waverly Councils (mentioned in Chapter 9) were also placed in Community Services departments. Perhaps these early decisions regarding placement have had ongoing consequences as more councils adopted CSO roles.

Supt [name] referred again to police pro-activity in the area and mentioned the positive impact it is having in keeping crime under control. There are some really good programmes running in the community (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 31 March 2013).

The above comments are from the same meeting, which reinforces the observation regarding repeated reassurance. In other CSPC meetings, similar comments were made:

Supt [name] commented that while the [presentation] slide appeared to indicate a lot of offences, if police were not doing their job properly, there would be a lot more highlighted areas. When a particular spot is identified as having a concentration of this type of offence, police are out there disrupting the criminals — there is no cause for concern (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 14 June 2012).

Insp [name] gave an overview of the command crime hot spots. Leichhardt LAC is working pro-actively with local children in the community to try to prevent crime. Police are concentrating on high visibility policing with a big focus on beat policing; as a result we have seen a significant decrease in local drug activity since adopting this new strategy in January this year. There are less street robberies and stolen motor vehicles and we are not seeing as many drug user type people wandering the streets. We are working closely with Housing NSW re recidivist offenders and also liaising with DoCS and Dept of Education with youth programs through the PCYC (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 15 March 2012).

Det Insp [name] reiterated his earlier comments that crime is not too bad in this command; police are very pro-active. We have tasking and deployment meetings fortnightly and daily morning meetings to address issues (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 15 December 2011).

Supt [name] advised that we are 33% lower in Break Enter and Steal than this time last year. Stolen motor vehicles are 10–15% down however the crimes can actually be traced to one particular offender who, as advised earlier, has been caught and bailed out of the area. Shop lifting statistics seem high however we are running several operations targeting shop lifting and seeing results. He believes the message is going
out that we are not a soft target anymore and he expects to see these figures drop in the future (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 10 March 2011)

Numerous similar comments can be found in the CSPC meeting minutes of the last three years.

Visible patrolling is a common feature of reassurance policing (Crawford & Lister 2004). Millie and Herrington (2005, p. 41) suggest that reassurance policing places an ‘emphasis on police visibility, familiarity and accessibility’, and is premised on the needs to improve perceptions of the police, and to address the gap between rates of crime and fear of crime. The comments from the Leichhardt LAC CSPC meeting minutes resonate with these notions of reassurance policing. Highly visible, pro-active policing brings swift results, which should in turn make local community members feel safer and build trust in local police.

While these comments are reflective of reassurance policing, the police were not alone in their attempts to reassure. Other government agencies also communicated in a similar fashion. Existing government policies and programs were mentioned and promoted as ways that local crime problems were being addressed. There is not just a strong sense of reassurance within these messages; there was also a strong sense of efficacy. Similar to the consistent connecting of proactive policing to falls in crime, other policies and initiatives were advanced as contributing factors to recent falls in crime.

Perhaps much of this capacity for reassurance is facilitated because of the reduced levels of crime in the area in recent years. It is obviously far easier to reassure when crime is falling.

The Closely Governed
As has been noted, there has been much commentary in recent years suggesting that we are now ‘governed through crime’ (Simon 2007) due to a ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001) and as a consequence of the ‘pursuit of security’ (Zedner 2009). Based on the Glebe case study, these organising principles are largely rejected. Only a small percentage of the population could be considered to be routinely ‘governed through crime’. This is most likely for those on bail, in regular contact with NSW government agencies, and for those in small pockets of ‘security bubbles’.

Policing of Bail
The policing of bail has increased dramatically in NSW in recent years (Booth & Townsley 2009; Youth Justice Coalition 2010). This form of policing is not without criticism. A
number of reports and documents have highlighted the detrimental impact of the strict policing of bail conditions on young people, police-youth relations and the impact of breaches of bail (see Youth Justice Coalition 2010; Brown 2013).86

There was considerable commentary about the policing of bail throughout the fieldwork. This policing of bail conditions attracted some commentary during interviews with local workers:

> With that particular problem we had the police enforcing very stringent bail conditions on the young people in question. They were knocking on doors at all hours of the evening. Some people saw that as harassment; some people said that’s our modus operandi for this particular type of offender … So enforcement of that bail condition obviously had the intention of restricting the movements of that young person to their domestic setting and also to where they were able to go at other times (Interviewee #2).

> As soon as you get out they will be watching your residence, watching where you go, checking you’re attending school if you’re a school-aged … and I think that’s as a punitive strategy effective but it hasn’t necessarily helped young people move forward because it does that marginalising thing where they’re sort of almost pushed into … (Focus Group Participant).

> While at times I think the policing of those curfews was bordering on abusive in that some houses were getting visited seven, eight times a night by patrol cars saying, ‘I need to see your son’ (Focus Group Participant).

> We know that was happening [strict enforcement of bail conditions], so as a strategy, yes. As the way it was enforced, I think, bordered on human rights abuses (Focus Group Participant).

These observations are also reinforced by comments from police and crime statistics. For example, at the March 2011 CSPC meeting, the following statement was made:

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In this Region, commands do 12 000 bail compliance checks a year — our LAC does 6,000 of these (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 10 March 2011).

Recorded crime data also shows the potentially significant impact that these practices have had on breach of bail. Figure 12 shows the number of incidents of breach of bail conditions in the Glebe postcode area between 1995 and 2012, which increased from 2004, and peaked at 398 in 2007.

Figure 12: Incidents of Breach of Bail Conditions in Glebe between 1995 and 2012

This strict policing of bail conditions fits more broadly with policing tactics that seek to target known offenders and to maintain a level of visibility in policing these groups and individuals. ‘Pro-active’ and ‘high visibility policing’ approaches were commonly used terms by the current and previous Local Area Commanders (as revealed by the CSPC meeting minutes). The CSPC meeting minutes over the last four years highlight the repeated use of these terms:

[W]e are targeting recidivist offenders, both juvenile and adult, in the command in an effort to stop them re-offending. We are constantly checking halfway houses and low rent accommodation and believe this type of pro-activity works as a deterrent (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 14 June 2012).

Stealing is below the targeted figures due to activity by beat police and our bike patrol police (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 15 March 2012).

Police are concentrating on high visibility policing with a big focus on beat policing; as a result we have seen a significant decrease in local drug activity since adopting
this new strategy in January this year. There are less street robberies and stolen motor vehicles and we are not seeing as many drug user type people wandering the streets (15 March 2012).

Police are maintaining their focus on person searches, bail compliance checks and this pro-activity has had a positive effect (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 21 March 2013).

These statements are consistent with ‘crime fighting’ policing (Manning 1977) and reassurance policing. If problems arise, police respond and the problems are addressed. Perhaps conveniently, if crime goes up, then it is in response to proactive policing, which results in greater arrests and greater reporting of crime. Conversely, if crime goes down, then it is because of the proactive policing that has driven offenders away or placed them behind bars. This places police activity directly at the centre of any changes in crime (up or down). It also explains away any need for a more complicated narrative about crime causation.

**State Governance Quilt**

Beyond (often frequent) interactions with the police, a greater proportion of Glebe residents will have repeated contact with various NSW government agencies in the course of their weekly and daily activities. With a significant proportion (19 per cent) of the population residing in state or social housing, there is greater interaction with the state. Truancy operations are another form of contact with the state and child protection agencies have considerable contact with some families and children. The comment below from Interviewee # 10 illustrates the state governance quilt:

They are in the government housing, they are living with their mother whose partner is in and out of prison. You’ve got other families that have family members that have their addictions and struggle in that sort of sense. So these families have four to eight kids and they’re just running around. And there’s more, you’ve got grandparents taking care of the grandchildren along with their own children and then there’s DoCS [child protection agency Department of Community Services] involvement because they’re either not doing the right thing, just trying to get some money and just not using the money the way it should be (Interviewee #10).

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87 Although, as Waddington (1999) highlights, the efficacy of police as ‘crime fighters’ is not necessarily well supported by available empirical data.
Osmond (2010) provides an example of specific NSW Government initiative that seeks to formalise case management and data-sharing arrangements for young people ‘at risk’ of offending in the Glebe area:

The most recent Local Area Command to be granted powers of exemption is Glebe, after the Mayor of the City of Sydney politicised the issue of ‘serious concerns about crime and safety in Glebe’, including ‘regular reports of assaults and robberies associated with a small number of residents in Housing NSW properties’ (Moore, 2008: 2973). In response the Premier stated that pre-emptive measures were being undertaken, including high visibility policing, the completion a safety audit [sic], and the establishment of a local inter-agency case co-ordination group (part of the ASBPP, which had already identified fourteen young people for co-ordinated, intensive risk case management). Smoother, faster interventions become possible within an intensely securitised inter-assemblage influenced by attractors and flows concerned with the total control of anti-social behaviour (Osmond 2010, pp. 339–40).

There was little overt discussion or reference to this initiative during the fieldwork period. Interviewee #7 provided a synopsis of the nature of this initiative:

So at the ... meeting which is held monthly you have police there ... you will have a representative from Housing who will be there, we’ll have a representative from Health who’ll be there, you’ll have a representative from education and then there'll be a couple of other kind of like little random ... almost like a refuge or something like a youth refuge or a case worker under some other agency — I can’t really be more specific than that, sorry ... The last one I went to there was probably a dozen people in this room and we’ve got a list of names of young people who we’re concerned about and those list of names will come through, yeah, each agency would ... If somebody comes to their attention they’ll kind of throw their name out there and then we’ll all have a look at it and agree, yes or no, whether it meets the criteria I guess for the group, for the panel to work on it and so to kind of case manage them ... And yeah, you’ve got to be in a pretty bad state of affairs as a young person to kind of get on this group (Interviewee #7).

Perhaps given the nature of this initiative there was limited information available about its operation and limited discussion of it in inter-agency meetings.
Some of the practices and programs outlined in Chapter 10 also highlight the nature of state intervention.

**Security Bubbles**

It would be difficult to portray Glebe as a particular exemplar of heavily fortified ‘mass private property’ (Shearing & Stenning 1983). With only two public space Street Safety Cameras (CCTV cameras) and an abundance of large public parks and public spaces, there are numerous examples that suggest an absence of some total ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000). Nonetheless, there are pockets of ‘security bubbles’ where security is heightened. The Broadway shopping centre is an example of ‘mass private property’ that has an active private security force, CCTV in operation throughout the centre and numerous forms of security designed into the products and shop design. Yet even in this instance, by virtue of the history of the development, there are mechanisms to soften these practices. As has been outlined, the Broadway shopping centre was required to donate money (and it continues to do so) to the local government for investment in local youth programs and to consider engaging local young people in various ways. While this potentially balances some of the more overtly security-conscious activities, there is still evidence that local young people get caught in the public/private policing practices covering the centre:

Steal from retail offences occurring at Broadway shopping centre and Leichhardt Marketplace — the figures are up due to several police operations targeting retail theft; numerous arrests were made recently (CSPC Meeting Minutes, 15 December 2011).

There is a clear delineation between access to security at either ‘end’ of Glebe. Those in public housing suffer conditions that enable crime, while those in expensive apartment complexes enjoy the benefits of well-designed, well-maintained, highly secure residential enclaves. While they are few in number, and the growth of such secured estates not nearly as rapacious in NSW as was predicted (Lawes 2013), some of these complexes have adopted considerable security measures. Concierge security is present throughout the day and numerous access-control measures prevent entrance by non-residents or guests. However, these access-control measures are now increasingly enjoyed by many residents of Glebe, as

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88 This term is borrowed from Body-Gendrot (2012). While used in a different context, it has resonance with the current case study. It is also noted that various authors (Shearing, 1998; Rigakos & Greener 2000 cited in Ericson 2007) have used a similar term: ‘bubbles of governance’.
entry phones and secured entrances are common in newer developments. Even some public housing properties enjoy the benefits of access control.

Beyond the different access to security at the different ‘ends’ of Glebe, there are measures that are more likely to impinge on those recreating in public spaces. As has been mentioned, the presence of Alcohol-Free Zones (‘AFZs’) means that some people receive unwanted police attention because of consumption of alcohol in public places. Interestingly, the AFZs in Glebe are concentrated in the southern end of the area, which coincides with the bulk of the public housing properties and estates. It is similarly speculated that the banning notices issued at Broadway shopping centre disproportionately fall on those residing in public housing. Trespass, offensive language, offensive conduct, and resist arrest charges are also likely to impact disproportionately particular groups within Glebe. The policing of public space by public and private police is rarely experienced evenly (Ericson 2007).

**Conclusion**

Recent crime prevention activity in Glebe suggests a less audit and data-driven approach than is common elsewhere. Similarly, in the absence of clear proscriptive guidance, the contribution of inter-agency partners to local discussions and planning is limited in the most part to local service providers. Numerous key government (predominantly NSW government) agencies were rarely seen during the fieldwork period and were consistently highlighted by interviewees as being absent. The lack of alignment of agency boundaries potentially exacerbates this tension and makes it easy for agencies to provide excuses for not participating in local inter-agency fora or activities.

Perhaps reflective of the dominance of local service providers, a general welfare orientation and strong concerns regarding socio-economic causes of crime, localised approaches to crime prevention tend to reflect social and community crime prevention models. Specifically, the observed crime prevention ethos could be described as being ‘prevention through reassurance’, a ‘culture of care’ and the ‘socialisation of crime policy’. O’Malley (2010) points to the ‘importance of seeing exceptions to any presumed hegemony of a culture of control as worth seizing on; as opportunities for something different’ (2010, p. 98). In this vein, it is argued that the crime prevention ethos operating in Glebe largely operates from a commitment to community development, social justice and social inclusion. The absence of a

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89 A map of the AFZs in the City of Sydney LGA can be found at http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/110325/AFZ_LGA_290612.pdf (viewed 25 April 2014).
crime prevention industry, limited access to crime data and limited centrally imposed agendas make this possible.

This is not to suggest that no one is ‘governed through crime’ in Glebe. There is clearly a small cohort (unknown in size) that does experience significant state (and private) intrusion. From repeated visits and interventions from NSW Police Force officers, to regulation of truancy and state housing policies, and the regulation of ‘mass private space’ by private security personnel, this cohort enjoys less freedom and opportunities than others in the area. While the experiences of these people should not be neglected, they should not be considered as representing the broader experience of residents of, and visitors to, the area.
Chapter 9: A Partial History of Localised Crime Prevention

The previous three chapters have highlighted various dimensions of local crime prevention practice as they relate to Glebe. This chapter steps away from Glebe and considers a recent history of local crime prevention policies and developments. In so doing, this chapter provides a national and NSW context to for the previous analysis. It will be shown that local government has played a significant leadership role in adopting local approaches to crime prevention, and these approaches were very much couched in a community development ethos, rather than a narrow opportunity-reducing approach, when they were initially being advocated. These broad trends were clearly evident in Glebe. The following chapter then continues this movement away from Glebe by focusing on (predominantly) NSW government initiatives, policies and programs that potentially contribute to crime prevention. Many of these initiatives, as will be shown, have a footprint in Glebe or impact on Glebe, thus adding to the very localised activities discussed in previous chapters. Australian Developments

Comprehensively charting Australian developments in relation to localised crime prevention is beyond the scope of this thesis. Two key features impacting on Australian approaches adopting localised responses to crime will be mentioned. The first relates to the research program that started to draw attention to crime prevention, and to localised approaches in particular. The second pertains to the state and territory programs that emerged to support localised crime prevention planning approaches. A detailed history of the processes in NSW will then be reviewed.

**Australian Research**

Two key institutional arrangements that stimulated interest in crime prevention included the Criminology Research Council (‘CRC’) and the establishment of the AIC. Both have had a focus on applied criminological concepts and each played a role in stimulating, supporting, producing and disseminating research into (and, in the case of the AIC, hosting conferences about) crime prevention.

The CRC was established in 1971 to ‘support research that is relevant to current and future public policy issues, foster the undertaking of quality criminological research and ensure that
CRC supported research is disseminated effectively.90 From its inception, the CRC supported research into crime prevention. For example, some of the earliest research produced through CRC funding included:

- Prevention of Delinquency in New Planned Urban Environments by Wilson, Braithwaite, Smith and Hines (October 1974).
- Community Crime Prevention Project (funded 1989 — no report available; project to be discussed later in detail).

These studies reveal a particular interest in CPTED. The last of these projects/studies, which will be discussed in more detail, specifically focused on establishing and analysing localised responses to crime. This project had a significant impact on the development of local crime prevention planning in NSW.

Further to these research activities, the AIC has been active in promoting a focus on crime prevention. It hosted conferences on Designing out Crime (1989), Juvenile Crime Prevention (1989) and a National Overview on Crime Prevention (1991), and released a series of reports.91 Hazelhurst authored two publications in 1990: Crime prevention for migrant communities and Crime prevention for Aboriginal communities. These publications disseminated relevant models, theories and practical examples of crime prevention. Two later publications (1995 and 2000), entitled The Promise of Crime Prevention continued this tradition of the AIC disseminating examples of promising crime prevention practice. Coupled with numerous conferences and seminars, this ensured that the AIC stimulated considerable

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91 These include Geason and Wilson, Crime prevention: theory and practice (1988), and a series of subsequent publications covering such titles as Designing out crime: Crime prevention through environmental design; Preventing car theft and crime in car parks; Preventing graffiti and vandalism.
interest and disseminated research findings and international experiences of crime prevention.\textsuperscript{92}

These and more localised issues and pressures resulted in a growing focus on crime prevention across Australian states and territories. As Cameron and Laycock (2002, p. 314) observed: ‘From the late 1980s, several Australian states began to take an interest in the potential of crime prevention as an official public policy response to the growing crime problem, and began looking for ways to develop such an approach’.

In Victoria, there has been a succession of initiatives: the ‘Good Neighbourhood’ program commenced in 1988, followed by the ‘Safer Communities Pilot Programme’ in 1991, and the ‘Safer Cities and Shires’ program in 1997 (Sutton & Cherney 2002). The Victorian Crime Prevention Unit was established in 2000 and operated until 2007, when it was downgraded from a Division to a business unit within the Victorian Department of Justice (Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee 2012). A Ministry for Crime Prevention was established in 2010 and subsequently there have been two Parliamentary Inquiries into crime prevention (2012 and 2013). A Community Crime Prevention Unit has been established, reflecting the ‘cyclical progress of crime prevention’ in that state (Sutton & Cherney 2002).

In South Australia, the ‘Together against Crime’ strategy was launched in 1989 and a Crime Prevention Unit was established (Sutton 1997; Sutton et al 2008, p. 105). These, in one form or another, lasted until 2007, when the South Australian Crime Prevention Unit was closed (Paterson 2007).

Similar ebbs and flows occurred over time in Queensland and Western Australia. The Queensland Crime Prevention Partnerships in 1998 were superseded in 1999 when the ‘Queensland Crime Prevention Strategy — Building Safer Communities’ was launched (Friedman 2001). Originally managed by the Crime Prevention Unit within the Community Engagement Division of the Department of Premier and Cabinet, the functions of this unit have now been folded into the Queensland Police Service. The same fate awaited the Western Australian Office of Crime Prevention, which originally developed the ‘Western Australian Office of Crime Prevention, which originally developed the ‘Western Australian

\textsuperscript{92} The AIC continues to play a significant role in the dissemination of information on local crime prevention activities. It hosts conferences on crime prevention and operates the Crime Prevention ASSIST program (http://cpassist.aic.gov.au/) to aid knowledge transfer between crime prevention practitioners.
Community Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy’ in 2004 and is now part of the Western Australia Police Service.

These are just some of the wider Australian state-based developments that influenced or developed parallel to local crime prevention in NSW.

**Developments in NSW**  
The recent history of local crime prevention in NSW can be broken into three distinct (but connected) periods: (1) the fight for recognition: a focus on juvenile crime prevention (1988–94); (2) formal recognition: establishment of a central agency (1995–2001); and (3) centralisation (2002–13). While each period and its associated developments will be discussed in some detail to provide an understanding of common approaches to local crime prevention in NSW, a brief summary of the key developments is provided in Table 7.

**Table 7: Key Developments Contributing to Local Crime Prevention in NSW**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/s</th>
<th>Key Development/s</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>NSW LGSA conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>Community crime prevention pilot project — Waverley and Fairfield LGAs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>The NSW Youth Justice Coalition launches the <em>Kids in Justice Report</em>.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The NSW Juvenile Justice Advisory Council is created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister requests NSW Juvenile Justice Advisory Council to prepare a Green Paper on juvenile justice.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 1995   | The NSW Juvenile Crime Prevention Division is established.  
|        | The NSW Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention is established. |

93 Throughout the remainder of this chapter, lengthy quotations from various government reports, Parliamentary Inquiries and government policies will be used. This is to preserve the integrity and intent of the original text, and to demonstrate the similarity of perspectives calling for localised forms of crime prevention.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/s</th>
<th>Key Development/s</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The NSW Juvenile Crime Prevention Division becomes the NSW Crime Prevention Division.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The Children (Protection and Parental Responsibility) Act 1997 (NSW) is introduced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1998   | A NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support is announced.  
| 1999   | The first report of the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support is released. |
| 2000   | The second report of the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support is released. |
| 2005   | The AIC conducts a review of local crime prevention planning in NSW. |
| 2006   | The NSW State Plan is introduced. |
| 2008   | The NSW Crime Prevention Framework is released. |


From the late 1980s, there were growing attempts for local crime prevention to be recognised and instituted in NSW. In 1988, at the NSW Local Government and Shires Association (‘LGSA’) conference, there was a push for local crime prevention activities to be recognised. In the same year, the NSW LGSA organised a Community Conduct Seminar. Michael Hogan suggests that this seminar was well attended by local government representatives from across NSW and that it generated interest among those trying to explore the role local government might assume in addressing ‘common forms of anti-social behaviour in the community’ (Hogan 1990, p. 5). It was from this seminar that the idea developed for a pilot project involving local government. Two councils (Waverley and Fairfield) expressed an interest in conducting pilot programs (Hogan 1990, p. 5).94

Subsequent to this seminar, Michael Hogan (Public Interest Advocacy Centre) and Russell Hogg (Macquarie University) sought funding for a pilot project. Funding was forthcoming

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94 Fairfield is in south-western Sydney and Waverley is in the eastern suburbs of Sydney.
from the Federal Office of Local Government, the Law Foundation of NSW and the CRC, resulting in one staff member being placed at each of Fairfield City Council and Waverley Council for a 12-month period. They were responsible for reviewing local crime statistics and developing local crime prevention responses. A rationale for this project was described as: ‘Growing concern has been expressed at the increasing amounts of money spent on policing and changes in the legal system in an endeavour to control and minimise crime levels’.

During this 12-month pilot period, a conference was held at Fairfield on 3 December 1990. The conference proceedings provide an insight into the nature of the project and concerns and issues at that time. Specifically, the program included the following sessions: Understanding Crime — A Pre-requisite for Prevention (Michael Hogan); The South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy: An Integrated Approach (Sue Millbank); What is Happening in Local Government at Present? Information from Participants; and The Contribution of Physical Design and Planning to Crime Prevention (Wendy Bell).

Given not only his role in the pilot project and the associated conference, but in other capacities that will soon show his early influence on raising the need for localised crime prevention responses, it is worth reviewing some of the observations made by Michael Hogan at this conference. One of the themes of his presentation highlighted the local nature of crime. Hogan stated that ‘crime is highly differentiated according to place. That is, there is a significant local dimension to crime’ (1990, p. 6). Consistent with environmental criminology tenets, he observed that various characteristics (physical, social, economic, and demographic) will influence the nature and extent of crime in an area (1990, p. 6).

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95 This, according to Hogg (1990, p. 286), proved to be a ‘difficult and lengthy process’, given the rudimentary crime data that was available at that time.


97 Both Sue Millbank and Wendy Bell were from South Australia, which demonstrates some of the cross-fertilisation across jurisdictions that was common at that time (as will be shown and has continued since).

98 Michael Hogan (an executive member of the Youth Justice Coalition) played a role in the development of the Kids in Justice Report, and was the Deputy Chair of the NSW Young Offenders Advisory Council. He also gave evidence to a Parliamentary Inquiry that made specific recommendations regarding crime prevention in NSW. It is difficult to underestimate his potential influence on the later developments.
Hogan also provided numerous arguments in favour of local government assuming responsibility for coordinating local crime prevention measures:

Councils themselves are significant victims of crime ... Local councils have statutory responsibility for urban planning and development and in setting urban planning instruments and in making development and some licensing decisions ... We’re beginning to see social impact assessments and statements — along the lines of environmental impact statements. We need to get to the point of having a ‘crime impact’ built into planning in a sophisticated way ... We haven’t really seen, in a developed way the crime prevention role of things such as security, lighting, supervision, fencing and other aspects of developments, routinely incorporated into planning instruments or in local, regional or State plans.

... Another role of Council, is that of providing community services and facilities — particularly for those in the community who are most vulnerable ... one of the points that we’d like to try to get across is that there is considerable benefit to be gained by local Councils trying to harness their own and other resources in the local community with more productive crime prevention effects. This is very important, as Local Government is the level of government closest to the community — it is the most informed about local needs, has the access to the best information about the characteristics of the local community, and it also has strong contacts with other levels of government, both state and federal levels. So it is in a prime position to exercise some co-ordinating role, and some pioneering role in crime prevention (1990, pp. 9–10).

It is clear from these comments that Hogan saw local government assuming an important role in the prevention of crime. He, and no doubt others involved in the subsequent inquiries (including Hogg 1990), advocated that local government assume a role in crime prevention. This sustained advocacy is demonstrated through the various inquiries and preparation of reports, which could be considered as providing the impetus for later developments.

Local crime prevention received attention and support in three key documents in the early 1990s, each with a focus on youth crime. The Kids in Justice Report (1990), the Legislative Council’s Inquiry into the Juvenile Justice System in NSW report, and the Future Directions for Juvenile Justice in New South Wales: Green Paper (1993) each advocated for local crime
prevention regimes to be established. The *Kids in Justice Report* (summary report) stated the following:

Local government bears a considerable cost of juvenile crime. Some local authorities have begun taking a role in stimulating and co-ordinating crime prevention activities in their areas. There is also much scope for local government to play a vital role in juvenile crime prevention through *community development* and town planning (emphasis added) (1990, p. 15, Summary Report).

The Youth Justice Coalition (authors of the *Kids in Justice Report*) recommended the establishment of a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention (Recommendation 2). Further to this Sub-Committee:

there should be established or designated in the Premier’s Department an office with responsibility for Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention to undertake co-ordination, research, monitoring, review, standards developments and funding of local crime prevention projects. The Office would resource the proposed Cabinet Sub-Committee (Recommendation 20).

The Youth Justice Coalition was also mindful of demonstrating the costs that would be incurred from their recommendations. It estimated that it would cost A$400 000 to establish the NSW Office of Juvenile Justice and Crime Prevention, with a further A$5 million allocated to the NSW Community Crime Prevention Program (1990, p. 24, Summary Report).

On 14 August 1991, the then Attorney General, the Hon. Peter Collins, M.P. and Minister for Justice, the Hon. Terry Griffiths M.P referred to the Standing Committee of Social Issues of the Legislative Council an Inquiry into the Juvenile Justice System in NSW. This extensive Inquiry involved: submissions from 91 organisations or individuals; 205 people from across Australia participating in hearings; interviews with 29 juveniles currently or previously in contact with the NSW juvenile justice system; 45 people from other countries meeting with Committee members; and the Committee visiting five NSW juvenile justice facilities and various other organisations and facilities across Australia and internationally. Based on findings emerging from these processes and literature reviewed by the Committee secretariat, a report containing 134 recommendations was tabled in Parliament in May 1992. Three of the recommendations specifically related to crime prevention:
• Recommendation 1: ‘That a Crime Prevention Division be established within the Attorney General’s Department, a priority which is to develop policies and strategies relevant to juvenile crime prevention’ (1992, p. xiii).

• Recommendation 2: ‘That a consultation and liaison process, similar to the French Bonnemaison Scheme, be established under the coordination of the proposed Crime Prevention Division of the Attorney General’s Department, so that State Government Departments and Offices, the Federal Government, local councils and relevant community organisations can assist in the formulation of long term policies and strategies relevant to juvenile crime prevention’ (1992, p. xiii).

• Recommendation 14: ‘That the proposed Crime Prevention Division of the Attorney General’s Department examine the feasibility of implementing a juvenile crime prevention scheme throughout New South Wales that gives greater responsibility and a greater role to local councils’ (1992, p. xvii).

Beyond these recommendations, the report highlighted that ‘some local councils are involved in the area of juvenile justice, through their provision of crime prevention programs in the form of community services’ (1992, p. 14).


While many agencies are involved in juvenile crime prevention, it is easy for responsibility to fall between agencies. There is no single agency in New South Wales with a coordinating, developmental, funding and facilitating role.

At a local level, the picture is a similar one. There is no regular coordinating structure in place. In some localities, various agencies often come together to seek to address juvenile crime issues, for example, through youth inter agency meetings, police/community consultative committees, etc. In a few places, local government has
been involved in such forums and two constructive examples are the roles played by
Waverley Municipal Council and Fairfield City Council in the joint Community
Crime Prevention pilot project run during 1990–91 with a mixture of funds from the
Law Foundation of NSW, the CRC, the Federal Office of Local Government, and the
two local councils.

However, these local efforts have often suffered from lack of resources, lack of
representativeness, lack of access to information and expertise, a vulnerability to
personal or political agendas, and a dependency on the inclination and efforts of
individual people. No State Government body has taken responsibility for making co
ordination happen at a local level (1993, pp. 81–2).

Following these reports and inquiries, the NSW Government released the *White Paper:*
Despite criticisms of the White Paper process (Bargen 1997, p. 4), the White Paper made a
commitment for the establishment of a Juvenile Crime Prevention Division in the Attorney
General’s Department to: co-ordinate and conduct research on juvenile crime prevention
issues; disseminate information on crime prevention initiatives and research; provide advice
on the development of crime prevention strategies; and fund innovative juvenile crime

During 1994, the Juvenile Justice Advisory Council of NSW also released *Preventing
Juvenile Property Crime: A Review of the Literature* (by Janet Chan) and jointly hosted (with
the AIC) the conference *Preventing Youth Crime — The Challenge Beyond Diversion.* Apart
from NSW-based academics and policy makers, this conference also included presentations
from Jon Bright99 (UK Crime Concern) and Carol Lee Pepi (CORE, US). These two
international speakers continued an important theme in the development of crime prevention
in NSW: the importation of international ideas and advocates of crime prevention.

From these developments, a number of observations can be made. First, a key driver for local
crime prevention in NSW was the desire to prevent juvenile crime. The *Kids in Justice
Report,* the *Inquiry into the NSW Juvenile Justice System* and the *Green Paper: Future
Directions for Juvenile Justice in New South Wales* each made specific recommendations

99 Jon Bright would subsequently return to Australia to speak at further crime prevention and public
administration conferences.
relating to the importance of efforts to prevent juvenile crime, including the establishment of a central agency to oversee crime prevention activities. The impact of these three separate, but complementary, processes seems to have been significant. Much of the subsequent reformation of the juvenile justice system in the following decade can be directly traced to these inquiries and subsequent reports, and the wider developments in local crime prevention in NSW seem to owe much to these inquiries and reports. The consistency of recommendations across the three reports for the development of a central crime prevention agency must have been difficult to ignore, especially as they moved from a report by a NGO to government policy (in the shape of the White Paper).

Related to the importance of youth crime prevention and youth crime in stimulating wider interest in crime prevention in NSW is the aspiration through the various inquiries and reports to look outside of the criminal justice system to address youth crime issues, almost as an antidote to ‘law and order’ politics, as described in Chapter 3.

Another key observation is the growing recognition of the role of local government in the prevention of crime through these processes, and specifically through the project involving Fairfield and Waverley Councils. Coupled with the LGSA of NSW Community Conduct Seminar in 1988, the conference held at Fairfield on 3 December 1990, this project served to raise awareness of the potential role that could be assumed by local government. Contrary perhaps to later arguments about cost shifting and cost shedding (House of Representatives 2003), it seems that local government (if there was ever such a united voice) was interested in (perhaps even optimistic about) exploring the role it could assume in crime prevention, per Hogan’s suggestion that local government could take on a ‘pioneering role’.

While it has not been explored in detail, there is merit in discussing the expansive nature of the crime prevention activities considered in the various reports. As has been stated, there was obviously a view that local government through its planning consent responsibilities could help to shape the built environment to prevent crime (Hogg 1990). The delivery of community-based programs was also highlighted as a potential method of preventing (youth) crime. Moreover, it was suggested by Hogan that local government could assume a coordinating role given its relationship with other tiers of government, local agencies and community members.

Beyond these comments that directly relate to local government, there was also much said about the roles of other agencies (especially for the Legislative Council’s Inquiry into the
NSW Juvenile Justice System). In the Inquiry’s report, there is considerable reference to various government agencies. For example, the following recommendations demonstrate the inter-agency, whole-of-government responses considered important to prevent youth crime:

- Recommendation 4: ‘That the Department of Community Services and the Department of Housing increase the provision of services that can provide safe and suitable crisis, medium-term supported and long-term accommodation’ (1992, p. 34).

- Recommendation 7: ‘That the Department of School Education in consultation with the Department of Employment, Education and Training, examine the feasibility of establishing Homework Centres throughout New South Wales that can assist disadvantaged young people’ (1992, p. 41).

- Recommendation 8: ‘The Government initiatives in the area of youth employment and training programs be encouraged and developed’ (1992, p. 46).

- Recommendations 9: ‘That the proposed Crime Prevention Division of the Attorney General’s Department, the Department of Sport, Recreation and Racing, and local councils, in consultation with community organisations and members of local communities, collaboratively develop appropriate strategies for the implementation of constructive leisure, recreation and entertainment programs and facilities for young people throughout New South Wales’ (1992, p. 48).

There are numerous additional recommendations that further expound upon these themes. What these recommendations demonstrate is a clear view that crime prevention is an inter-agency responsibility and that the broad causes of crime must be addressed, not just the opportunities for crime. These recommendations are most closely aligned with Tonry and Farrington’s (1995) community model of crime prevention. It is significant that early visions of local crime prevention in NSW focused on these programs and initiatives.

Perhaps to further reinforce this point and to demonstrate the vision of crime prevention at this time, the Inquiry into the NSW Juvenile Justice System recommended:

- [t]hat a consultation and liaison process similar to the French Bonnemaison Scheme, be established under the co-ordination of the proposed Crime Prevention Division of the Attorney General’s Department, so that State Government Departments and offices, the Federal Government, local councils and relevant community organisations
can assist in the formulation of long term policies and strategies relevant to juvenile crime prevention (1992, p. 30).

This recommendation highlights the perceived importance of consultation and local engagement. It would seem that the vision was for a ‘bottom-up’ method of engagement, rather than imposing targets, approaches and methods on particular communities, and focused on long-term, community-based responses.


Following a period in which there were diverse and sustained calls for the creation of particular structures to oversee and support local crime prevention activities in NSW, in 1995 many of the suggested reforms came to fruition. The Juvenile Crime Prevention Unit was established in the NSW Attorney General’s Department in early 1995. Initially this Unit consisted of two staff. Further recruitment and expansion soon saw the Unit become a Division. Initial activities included establishing the Juvenile Crime Prevention Advisory Committee and providing secretariat support to this advisory group. In 1996, the Juvenile Crime Prevention Division became the Crime Prevention Division.

The NSW Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention, which met for the first time in October 1995, was at the centre of the NSW Government’s goal to achieve crime prevention partnerships among all sectors, and reduce the incidence of crime through the development, promotion and implementation of relevant strategies. The Council was chaired by the Premier and comprised 11 ministers (including Ministers of Police, Community Services, Health, Housing and Education) and eight non-ministerial members drawn from academia and private/community sectors (Judd et al 2002, p. 33) (including an expert on Indigenous education, an academic criminologist, a victims’ rights advocate, and a prominent crime novelist (Bargen 1997, p. 7)).

The Crime Prevention Division released *Juvenile Crime in New South Wales: A Review of the Literature* in 1996. This report sought to provide both a statistical profile and an overview of relevant crime prevention literature to aid the development of a juvenile crime prevention strategic plan.

In 1997, the *Children (Protection and Parental Responsibility) Act 1997* (NSW) (‘CPPR Act’) commenced. This Act legislated, among other things, local crime prevention planning procedures. Part 4 of the CPPR Act outlines processes for developing a local crime
prevention plan and for its endorsement as a safer community compact. The key features of the Act were outlined by the then Attorney General, The Honourable Jeff Shaw, in the second reading speech:

The provisions introduced by part 4 of the bill will provide a legislative framework upon which to formalise and foster the development of proactive local crime prevention measures. Division 2 of part 4 established a process for the formulation of local crime prevention plans by local councils. Guidelines and assistance in the preparation of plans will be made available by the Crime Prevention Division of the Attorney General’s Department.

Division 3 of part 4 of the bill seeks to encourage best practice in the development of local crime prevention plans by making provision for the accreditation of local crime prevention plans which meet specified standards as ‘safer community compacts’. Funds will be made available through the Government’s safer community development program to assist in the implementation of initiatives contained in safer community compacts. Funds from the program will also be available to assist more generally in meeting the costs of developing safer community compacts (Shaw 1997, p. 10 952).

Thus, part 4 of the CPPR Act established procedures for the development of local crime prevention plans by local councils in NSW. These procedures did not force councils to develop a crime prevention plan (unlike, say, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in the UK). Part 4 outlines the potential contents of a crime prevention plan (s 33), the adoption (s 35) and duration (s 36) of a local crime prevention plan, and the procedures associated with having this crime prevention plan endorsed as a safer community compact (s 39).100 The legislation also includes reference to the benefits (that is, opportunity to apply for funding) that flow from having a crime prevention plan endorsed as a safer community compact (s 40). Once a local crime prevention plan is endorsed as a safer community compact, the council is then eligible to apply for funding under the Safer Community Development Fund, which,

100 A crime prevention plan is sent to the NSW Attorney General, who then requests comments from the Minister for Police and the Minister for Community Services, before making a determination to endorse the crime prevention plan as a safer community compact.
according to the second reading speech, was established with recurrent funding of A$1.15 million annually.\(^{101}\)

Despite the reservations of the Opposition regarding the adequacy of the funding for local crime prevention programs, local crime prevention received a further boost in 1998 with the announcement of an Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support by the Standing Committee on Law and Justice. The letter from the NSW Attorney General to the Committee chair requesting that the Standing Committee on Law and Justice undertake the inquiry stated:

I am writing to request that the Standing Committee on law and Justice undertake an inquiry into and report on the relationships between crime and the types and levels of social support afforded to families and communities, with particular reference to:

- The impact of changes in the social services system on criminal participation rates;
- Support programs that can assist in protecting people from developing delinquent or criminal behaviours; and
- The type and level of assistance and support schemes needed to change offending behaviour’ (NSW Standing Committee on Law and Justice 1999, p. 1).

This Inquiry ultimately produced three reports — one on the proceedings of a conference and two detailing the findings and recommendations of the Inquiry. Of note, the first report (December 1999) contained a chapter on local government and crime prevention.

Further to the establishment of this Inquiry, the NSW Crime Prevention Division released a *Crime Prevention Resource Manual*. The then Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention launched the manual for the benefit of local councils, setting out parameters for the

\(^{101}\) The Shadow Attorney General J P Hannaford stated: ‘[I]n real terms, if $1.15 million is allocated it will not even touch the sides, so to speak, in the development of local crime prevention programs’ (Hannaford 1997, p. 10 956). Note that the amount allocated for the Safer Community Development Fund was far less than the A$5 million originally advocated by the Youth Justice Coalition in the *Kids in Justice Report*. Also, the 2012–13 Annual Report for the NSW Department of Attorney General and Justice revealed that a mere A$800,000 was allocated in the 2012–13 financial year to local councils following endorsement of their crime prevention plans as safer community compacts (NSW Department of Attorney General and Justice 2013, p. 18).
development of Crime Prevention Plans. This manual provided guidance in relation to
development of such plans and suggested that a detailed analysis of crime data be undertaken
to develop an area crime profile (p 41); consultation be undertaken with local community
representatives (p 56); that only two or three issues of priority reflecting local needs be
identified and addressed (p 50); that between three and five compatible strategies in relation
to each priority be developed (p 51); and that the necessary skills, resources and potential
obstacles and side effects be considered when developing strategies.

In 2001, Nexus Management Consultants were contracted to review of part 4 of the CPPR.
Among other things, they found that ‘Part 4 of the Act has had an impact on local crime
prevention planning’, reflecting ‘inherent strengths of the legislation and the work of the
Crime Prevention Division’ (Masters et al 2001, p. 17). In particular, it was found that the
legislative basis ensured greater ‘authority’ in the eyes of councils and that the funding
received from the NSW Crime Prevention Division has aided the development of local crime
prevention plans, and had helped to overcome perceptions that the legislation involved the
shifting of state responsibilities to local government. The flexibility of the Act also allowed
councils to adopt a broad range of strategies to addressing crime in their area (Masters et al

The report contained 33 recommendations, including the following:

- It is recommended that councils be retained as the lead agencies for developing
  and implementing local crime prevention plans
- It is recommended that the Crime Prevention Division develop a strategy to
  allocate resources to statewide skills development, networking of crime
  prevention practitioners and promotion of best practice in crime prevention
  strategies and implementation
- It is recommended that the local crime prevention planning guidelines make
  stronger reference to linkages between councils social planning requirements and
  local crime prevention planning
- It is recommended that seed funding be provided to smaller councils to assist with
  the development of local crime prevention plans
- It is recommended that the guidelines under Section 32 reinforce that the local
  crime prevention plans, where appropriate, need to clearly demonstrate how they
add value to established initiatives and do not merely repackage existing commitments

- It is recommended that the Crime Prevention Division centrally produce standard crime profiles for LGAs for those councils proposing to develop a local crime prevention plan

- It is recommended that the Attorney General seek enhancement funding to increase the amount of resources available to councils for local crime prevention planning from the Safer Communities Development Fund (Masters et al 2001, pp. 43–6).

While it is understood that there has never been a formal government response to this report and these recommendations, there have been a number of changes following this period, which will be outlined in the following section. However, it is worth considering the developments during this period. There was clearly much activity with the establishment of the Crime Prevention Division and two committees (Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention, Juvenile Crime prevention Advisory Committee), the introduction of legislation (and subsequent review) and the development and release of the *Crime Prevention Resource Manual*. There was also the Standing Committee on Law and Justice Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support, which reaffirmed the important role of local government in crime prevention and the need for localised responses and the critical role of government and NGOs in providing social support to achieve crime prevention.

However, despite these developments and structures, some of the earlier optimism in the efficacy of local crime prevention seemed to have eroded. The review of part 4 of the CPPR Act, for example, pointed to some positive outcomes, but also highlighted limitations. The repackaging of existing initiatives, the lengthy planning processes, the difficulties of engaging hard-to-reach community groups and the limited demonstrable crime prevention outcomes were just some of the limitations highlighted in the evaluation (Masters et al 2001). There was also some concern raised regarding the proliferation of inter-agency committees focused on crime and related issues (for example, many councils had Community Safety Committees; police operated consultative committees that would be replaced with Police Accountability Community Teams; Liquor Accords operated; Community Drug Action Teams commenced after the NSW Drug Summit in 1999) and the duplication of attendance, membership and activities. It is argued that the muted success of local crime prevention
structures and some of the issues arising between local and central agencies resulted in a shift toward more centralised approaches to crime prevention in NSW in the subsequent period.

Centralisation (2002–13)

Central government (in particular, the then Premier’s Department) started to assume greater responsibility for localised crime prevention activities from the early part of the 2000s. Through Place Management, Community Solutions, and then Crime Prevention Partnerships, the Premier’s Department (and later the Department of Premier and Cabinet) increasingly assumed a central role in key local crime prevention activities. While the arrangements established under part 4 of the CCPR Act continued (and continue to this day), much larger funding and greater central government attention was given to specific locations. Place management projects in Cabramatta and Kings Cross, Community Solutions projects in Mount Druitt, and Crime Prevention Partnerships in the Sydney CBD are just some of the more centrally coordinated crime prevention structures to operate over the last 10 years (NSW Premier’s Department 2002).  

In 2005, the AIC was engaged by the NSW Attorney General’s Crime Prevention Division to ‘undertake a review of the overall quality, appropriateness and effectiveness of local crime prevention planning activities in NSW’ (Anderson & Homel 2005, p. 8). This project commenced in January 2005 and involved in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in three sites (Manly, Queanbeyan, and Taree) and responses from 39 councils to surveys distributed to 49 councils that had had a crime prevention plan endorsed as a safer community compact since the commencement of the CPPR Act. The findings, published in a report completed in August 2005, concluded that the crime prevention plans appeared to have had a positive effect on the communities implementing them, but that the nature of the plans and initiatives chosen made it difficult to measure whether they had any impact on crime. However, since the object of the crime prevention plans in part 4 of the CCPR Act is that the crime prevention plans are to work towards building community involvement in crime prevention activities (s 30), the safer community compacts have assisted in promoting this goal (Anderson & Homel 2005, p. 49). The AIC recommended that consideration be given to the following to enhance further local crime prevention planning efforts in NSW: provision of funding for permanent CPOs; improved guidelines for crime prevention implementation;

102 These locations are suburbs of Sydney. Specific understanding of these areas and other locations mentioned in this section is not required.
greater Crime Prevention Division guidance; and the encouragement of more efficient evaluation techniques (Anderson & Homel 2005, pp. 45–9). The impact of these recommendations is unclear.

The NSW State Plan, an overarching plan for all NSW government agencies, was released in 2006 and included a host of priorities for government across various areas (crime being one) and responsibilities (such as criminal justice agencies). Reductions of crimes were prioritised. Over a 10–year period, incidence of interpersonal crimes and re-offending rates were to be targeted. Targets to be met by 2016 included a reduction of property crimes by 15 per cent and personal crime (particularly violent crime) by 10 per cent, as well as a reduction of alcohol-related crime and a reduction of re-offending within 24 months by 10 per cent.

A series of governmental activities and actions were prompted by this Plan. In 2008, the NSW Government developed a Crime Prevention Framework for NSW. The goal of the framework was to strengthen and coordinate the approach to both state and local level situational crime prevention initiatives, contributing to the crime reduction targets of the NSW State Plan.

The key characteristics of the framework include:

- Oversight by the Crime Prevention Steering Group — on a statewide level, the coordination of crime prevention is situated with the Crime Prevention Steering Group. Executive officers from the Attorney General’s Department, NSW Police Force and Department of Premier and Cabinet comprise the group.
- Crime prevention funding — the steering group is responsible for overseeing program and grant based crime prevention funding. It also works with the Commonwealth Government to ensure Commonwealth and state funding is appropriately distributed.

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103 Again, it is understood that there has never been a formal government response to this report, but recommendations from this review appear to have in part influenced the development of the NSW Crime Prevention Framework.

104 Chapter 2: Rights, Respect and Responsibility and Chapter 8: Delivering Locally of the NSW State Plan 2006 are the most pertinent chapters to this thesis.

105 Note that this Steering Group consisted of just three people, which is in stark contrast to the Premier’s Council on Crime Prevention established in 1995.
• Strengthened local crime prevention — two separate yet related approaches occur at a local level: (1) the development of safer community compacts; and (2) the establishment of crime prevention partnerships. Safer community compacts are in place and have been discussed previously. In areas where greater focus is required, newly devised Crime Prevention Partnerships (‘CPPs’) were to be set up. They are a partnership between local council, local police, relevant state government agencies and other relevant local groups. CPPs are chaired by the NSW Police Force Local Area Commander with the deputy chair being a local council representative. CPPs are responsible for coordinating crime prevention planning in the area and meet on a monthly basis to develop CPP Action Plans.

• Community Safety Precinct Committees (‘CSPCs’) — the NSW Crime Prevention Framework makes mention of Community Safety Precinct Committees, which are hosted by the NSW Police Force. These Committees are promoted as the key forum through which the Police and Government agencies engage with communities and key stakeholders on crime prevention and community safety issues (unless there is a CPP operating in the area, in which case the CSPC provides a consultative role to the CPP).

To assist local government bodies in their preparation of Crime Prevention Plans, the NSW Attorney General’s Department prepared a short document outlining various necessary steps. This document addresses some of the concerns raised by the 2001 and 2005 reviews of the CPPR Act, and places local government crime prevention planning capabilities within a specific scope of power and purpose. Targets outlined in the 2006 NSW State Plan are reiterated, providing guidance as to the priorities appropriate to the program. Further, both the role of local councils in planning and the salience of situational crime prevention measures are highlighted (NSW Attorney General’s Department, n.d., pp. 1–2).

The introduction of this Crime Prevention Framework has had numerous consequences. Of relevance here is the change in procedures and requirements of developing and having a local crime prevention plan endorsed as a safer community compact, the new governance structures for local crime prevention activities (that is, Crime Prevention Partnerships and CSPCs), and the expressed prioritisation of situational crime prevention measures.

Despite the difficulties of attempting to provide a coherent summary of the developments impacting on local crime prevention activities in NSW in the last 10 years, it is argued that
there have been some strong centralising tendencies operating. The language and rhetoric common in the early-to-late 1990s has been replaced. Community involvement and ownership have largely been replaced (within central government) by inter-agency (which has meant inter-governmental agencies) responses. Protracted processes requiring community consultation have been replaced by crime data analysis — intelligence-led, data-driven situational crime prevention has been a central logic of the discourse and practice of local crime prevention. Rather than relying on local government personnel to coordinate crime prevention committees and responses, staff from central agencies coordinate and drive responses to perceived needs and police assume key roles. Data are to be shared across agencies in ways that were not and are not possible for local government-led crime prevention. Significant funding is invested in large-scale projects that might involve renewal or complete redevelopment of public housing estates; establishment of new facilities; creation of new programs and deployment of new staff (some of which will be discussed in Chapter 10) — all beyond what could ever have been managed by local government or the model envisaged by the CPPR Act.

Nonetheless, the Glebe case study suggests that these centralising tendencies have not completely altered local crime prevention approaches in NSW.

**Conclusion**

In some respects, it appears that modern local crime prevention initiatives in NSW evolved from the late 1980s, when ‘law and order’ politics supported penal and punitive responses to crime. Localised crime prevention represented an alternative vision to the ‘get tough on crime’ mantra. Through significant research and lobbying, the international and national developments embracing localised crime prevention gained traction in NSW. The Juvenile Crime Prevention Unit (to become the Crime Prevention Division) was established, and legislation soon followed that spoke very much of local communities identifying their own crime problems and solutions. Local governments were seen as the key drivers of this approach.

However, it soon seemed that the optimism of this approach soured. With significant crime and disorder issues flaring in urban and rural locations, evaluations suggesting that there were few demonstrable positive outcomes and tangible examples of reductions in crime, and with forms of managerialism (or New Public Management) starting to displace the previously more de-centred governance structures, centralisation of localised responses to crime
prevention became the norm. The emergence of Place Management, Community Solutions and (later) Crime Prevention Partnerships approaches, and the development of the NSW State Plan and the NSW Crime Prevention Framework, are examples of this growing centralisation. While local government crime prevention activities continue in NSW, the bigger budgets of state bureaucracies have ultimately brought about a transformation of local crime prevention in NSW. While Chapter 10 will connect these developments in local crime prevention planning with wider human service policies and practices that are largely the responsibility of state government bureaucracies and the increasing welter of NGOs delivering contracted services, it is clear from the historical developments presented here and the findings from the Glebe case study, that there has been a strong social-welfare ethos to crime prevention in NSW.
Chapter 10: NSW Government Programs and Policies

The previous chapters have closely documented programs, activities, process and perspectives on crime prevention in Glebe. Some of these local practices reflect the traditional origins of local crime prevention in NSW — heavy focus on welfare and community development approaches. Comments from interviewees and observation of inter-agency meetings revealed that many of the key NSW government agencies are often absent at local inter-agency meetings. Given the important roles assumed by health, housing, education, and child protection agencies in contributing to the prevention of crime, this absence has significant implications for the nature and success of local crime prevention activities. However, as will be shown in this chapter, these agencies contribute significantly to crime prevention and often in ways that are not especially well understood by local practitioners or captured in the crime prevention literature. Documenting these programs and practices is therefore important not only to provide greater context for crime prevention in Glebe, but also to widen understanding of crime prevention. In cataloguing the contribution made by these NSW Government agencies, it becomes clear that crime prevention has been ‘mainstreamed’ (Shaftoe 2004) and is routinely, at least partially, the business of a great number of government agencies. This further problematises any simple pronouncements about crime prevention, the shape that it takes, the impact it has, or the philosophy that drives it.

Description of predominantly NSW Government policies and programs is the focus of this chapter. In this sense, Glebe further fades from view as these wider policies and programs are described. This does not mean that they do not impact on Glebe, but rather they do not take Glebe as the sole geographical reference. A comprehensive (but not exhaustive) desktop review was undertaken to compile relevant policies and programs relevant to crime prevention in NSW. Policy areas covering domestic and family violence, early intervention, child protection, education (including truancy, suspension and expulsion rates, security of schools), housing and homelessness, health, and criminal justice will be considered.

Crime Prevention Frameworks and Plans

There are four over-arching crime prevention frameworks potentially relevant to activities in Glebe: the National Crime Prevention Framework; the NSW Crime Prevention Framework; the Safe City Strategy 2007–2012; and the Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012. Three of these have been previously introduced — the NSW Crime Prevention Framework in
Chapter 9, and both the *Safe City Strategy 2007–2012* and the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012* in Chapter 8 (and summarised in Appendix 5).

**National Crime Prevention Framework**

The National Crime Prevention Framework (‘the Framework’) was prepared by the AIC on behalf of the Australian and New Zealand Crime Prevention Senior Officers’ Group (‘ANZCP SOG’). The ANZCP SOG provides a national forum for senior crime prevention staff from each state and territory as well as the Australian and New Zealand governments. The ANZCP SOG aims to support strategic thinking and policy development on crime prevention issues; promote inter-jurisdictional collaboration; promote and encourage strategic research in crime prevention; and share information on matters to be discussed at relevant Ministerial and Senior Officer Forums (AIC 2012, p. 2).

While the Federal government has numerous agencies that focus on aspects of the prevention of crime (for example, the Australian Federal Police, Customs, Protective Services, the Australian Crime Commission), there has generally been limited involvement of or leadership from the government in setting crime prevention policy (P Homel 2005). Its periodic involvement has often been limited to funding CCTV and street-lighting initiatives, rather than providing an overarching crime prevention policy framework. The release of the Framework in 2012 went some way to changing this situation and to providing an overarching crime prevention policy agenda.

The Framework outlines, among other things, principles of good practice. The principles of good practice, reflecting dimensions common in much crime prevention planning literature (see Gilling 2005; Ekblom 2011) include reference to leadership, collaboration, use of research and evaluation, a focus on outcomes, capacity, community engagement, long-term commitment, and coordination across sectors and agencies (AIC 2012, pp. 4–5).

Beyond these general principles, the Framework identifies the following key priority areas:

- a commitment to concentrate efforts on addressing crime problems that prevent the greatest threat to the safety, security and cohesiveness of communities (including reducing alcohol-related violence and violence against women; improving the safety of young people and Indigenous people; and preventing child abuse and neglect);
• continuing to monitor local crime problems, identify local priorities and develop strategies to reduce their impact on the community;
• addressing new and emerging crime problems;
• improving the evidence base for crime prevention; and
• maintaining an ongoing program of capacity building and technical assistance to ensure new knowledge and good practice are actively disseminated and adopted in practice (AIC 2012, pp. 11–18).

It is difficult to determine at this time the impact of the Framework. Given that this Framework was introduced after the others that have had more direct impact on Glebe, it is likely that it has limited (at most) impact to date. The human service policies and programs described below have had a more obvious impact on crime prevention in NSW and potentially on Glebe specifically.

**Domestic and Family Violence**

Domestic and family violence cause considerable stress, hardship, pain and death in NSW. Attempts to quantify the impact of the 26 808 reported incidents of domestic violence in NSW in 2011 (NSW Standing Committee on Social Issues 2012) suggest that the total cost of domestic and family violence is approximately A$4.5 billion per annum (NSW Auditor General 2011). With rates of domestic violence stable in recent years in NSW, but having generally risen over the last 20–30 years (Weatherburn 2004; People 2005), there has been significant governmental attention dedicated to the issue.

The NSW Auditor General undertook a performance audit of the two lead agencies responsible for preventing and responding to domestic violence in NSW — the Department of Family and Community Services and the NSW Police Force. This performance audit resulted in a report released in December 2011, which contained an overview of some the strategies, policies and programs to tackle domestic violence adopted in NSW since 1974.

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106 It is acknowledged that there is considerable debate about the appropriate terminology to describe ‘domestic’ and/or ‘family violence’ (see Laing (2000) and Mitchell (2011), among others, for a discussion of the preferences for particular terms). Both terms are used here to encapsulate all dimensions of domestic and family violence.
While the complete timeline can be found in the report, Table 8 provides a summary of some of the key developments.

Table 8: Key NSW Domestic and Family Violence Policies and Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy/Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>The first women’s refuge was opened in NSW.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>The NSW Taskforce on Domestic Violence was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Apprehended Domestic Violence Orders were introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Wider definitions of ‘domestic violence’ were added to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>A NSW Domestic Violence Strategy was launched and approximately 75 local domestic violence committees were established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>DVLO positions were created in the NSW Police Force and the Domestic Violence Court Assistance Program was established at 47 courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>The NSW Strategy to Reduce Violence Against Women was launched, which included the creation and deployment of 18 Regional Violence Specialists across NSW and the establishment of the Violence Against Women Unit in the Attorney General’s Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Seven government agencies signed a Memorandum of Understanding for working together to address violence against women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Staying Home Leaving Violence program was piloted at one site (and has subsequently expanded to 23 sites).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>The NSW Legal Aid Commission established the Women’s Domestic Violence Court Advocacy Service (which is now at 108 local courts in NSW).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>The Crimes (Domestic and Personal) Violence Act 2007 (NSW) was introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Specialist domestic and family violence training was developed by the Reduction Centre.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


108 There is some discrepancy between different sources regarding the total number of sites. The NSW Department of Community Services website suggests that there are 18 sites, while the Standing Committee on Social Issues report on Domestic violence trends and issues in NSW (2012, p. xxxi) suggests that there are now 23 locations from which the Staying Home Leaving Violence project operates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy/Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>The Domestic Abuse Program was developed by Corrective Service (and is now available in 32 communities and six prisons), and the NSW Domestic and Family Violence Action Plan was launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>The minimum standards for behaviour change programs for male perpetrators of domestic and family violence were released.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further to this (albeit potted) history, three key developments have occurred since 2011, including the release of the NSW Auditor-General’s performance review, *Responding to domestic and family violence in NSW*; the NSW Legislative Council’s Standing Committee on Social Issues undertook an inquiry, releasing the *Domestic violence trends and issues in NSW* report in 2012; and the NSW Government’s policy, *It Stops Here: Standing together to end domestic and family violence in NSW*, which was launched in 2013. This policy, aligned with the *National Plan to Reduce Violence against Women and Children 2010–2022* introduces a number of key objectives:

- Domestic and family violence is prevented.
- Domestic and family violence is identified early.
- Victims are safe and supported to recover.
- Perpetrators stop using violence.
- A supported professional and effective sector is maintained.

These policy objectives reflect findings from both the Auditor General and Standing Committee on Social Issues reports. A lack of focus on prevention, poor coordination across agencies (including non-government organisations) and limited data exchange between agencies were some of the common themes of these inquiries and subsequent reports.

The above summary of some of the key developments associated with attempts to address domestic and family violence is necessarily limited. An exhaustive review is beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather, the above information serves to demonstrate the significant governmental action directed toward domestic and family violence in NSW (and Australia) in recent decades. The increasingly direct focus on prevention demonstrates the relevance of this summary to considerations of crime prevention. Additionally, while limited commentary
was provided in relation to the efforts to prevent domestic and family violence in Glebe, it is important to understand the regional, state and national frameworks operating to prevent these crimes.

**Early Intervention and Child Protection**

Providing an accurate and concise summary of current early intervention and child protection programs, policies, legislation and practices in NSW is difficult. The sheer volume of potentially relevant programs and policies makes it a somewhat daunting task, especially given the detail needed to provide sufficient context. Given these challenges, a brief, and therefore partial, précis is provided to reveal the breadth of activities relevant to discussions of crime prevention.

One of the most significant initiatives embodying the ethos of developmental crime prevention and early intervention in NSW is the Families First initiative. This initiative was originally implemented between 1999 and 2003 with funding of A$54.2 million (Hudson 1999, p. 84) and a further A$117.5 million over the following four years (NSW Department of Community Services 2004, p. 1). The initiative reflected the growing evidence of the importance of early childhood years, providing support to parents to enhance parenting skills ‘before parenting challenges developed into problems resulting in significant family dysfunction’ (Keatinge et al 2007, p. 29). Families First had a ‘special focus’ on children between birth and three years and an emphasis on ‘early intervention and prevention’ (Fisher et al 2006, p. 11). More specifically, Families First was concerned with the:

- welfare of young children and the implications early childhood experiences can have on long-term outcomes in health, education and social development. The program framework is based on developing regional linkages between specialised health, community welfare, educational and other services to ensure a coordinated approach to initial intervention, follow-up visits and other forms of support (Fisher et al 2006, p. 12).

109 There is some discrepancy between sources regarding the exact funding over particular periods. There is some potential duplication in the figures provided. Despite the potential inaccuracy, the sums listed demonstrate the significant investment in this initiative. Given that these resources are in addition to the existing services and programs designed to assist parents and families, the actual total funding allocated to early intervention programs in NSW over this period is far greater than what has been reported here.
Others have highlighted the long-term potential outcomes of Families First to prevent crime through these interventions with parents, families and infants and children (NSW Department of Community Services 2004; Calvert 1999). Calvert highlights how, as a consequence of Families First providing a framework for service delivery, a multitude of non-traditional actors were more likely to come forward to provide services that would potentially contribute to the prevention of crime and other outcomes (Calvert 1999, p. 6).

In recent years, Families First has been absorbed into Families NSW. This is the ‘NSW Government’s whole-of-government prevention and early intervention strategy that aims to provide children with the best start in life’ (Families NSW 2009, p. 4). The work of Families NSW has a particular focus on prevention and early intervention, through a combination of universal services and targeted prevention initiatives. Home visits, supported playgroups, the Schools as Community Centres program, and local antenatal care programs are just some of the activities that now sit with Families NSW.

While Families First and Families NSW operate in the spirit of primary prevention, the much debated child protection system of NSW provides tertiary (and potentially secondary) interventions. A significant focus of the child protection system is on children at imminent risk of harm. The scrutiny, debate within and reforms of the NSW child protection system have been unrelenting over the last 10–15 years. Major legislative reforms started in 1999 when the provisions of the Children (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) commenced. The reforms introduced at this time were substantial and were preceded by three years of consultation and analysis (Parkinson 2003). The Children (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) introduced or significantly reformed, among other things, principles for the legislation and the child protection system, expansion of the range of personnel identified as mandatory reporters, a clear list of risk of harm factors that should result in a notification, substantial revision of the out-of-home care system, changes to the Children’s Court structure and operating procedures to respond better to the needs of children and families involved in care proceedings, the abolition of the concept of wardship, and the introduction of compulsory assistance orders (Shaw 1998, pp. 10 897–903). Associated governmental reforms also saw the introduction of a centralised Child Protection Helpline, which ensured that all reports of harm were captured centrally before being referred to the relevant local Department of Community Services offices for attention.
One effect of these reforms was considerable growth in the number of notifications of child abuse and neglect in NSW. Table 9 shows the increases in notifications from the year the reforms commenced until 2006–07.

Table 9: Child Protection Notifications in NSW 1999–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of notifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>30 398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–01</td>
<td>40 937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–02</td>
<td>55 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–03</td>
<td>109 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–04</td>
<td>115 541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–05</td>
<td>133 636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–06</td>
<td>152 806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–07</td>
<td>189 928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This significant increase in notifications raised three critical issues. The first pertained to the capacity of the Department of Community Services to respond to the flood of notifications. Significant increases in child protection caseworkers (875 extra caseworkers) were promised by the then NSW Government in 2004 at a reputed cost of A$1.2 billion (Tebbutt 2004, p. 8534). The second related to the causes of this increase, with an expansion of the definition of ‘child abuse’ to include domestic violence, the centralised phone line for reporting, mandatory reporting arrangements, and the introduction of financial penalties for non-reporting as prime explanations suggested by some (Ainsworth & Hansen 2006). The third critical issue related to the ability of the child protection system, despite the extra resources invested in the early years of the beginning of the 21st century, to investigate the notifications it received. Substantiated notifications did not increase comparative to the rise of overall notifications, raising questions about whether greater resources were being expended on taking calls and assessing notifications, rather than responding to the highest priority cases (Wood 2008).
With greatly increased notifications, the associated growth in costs in administering the child protection system and some highly publicised failings to protect children, a Special Commission of Inquiry into the NSW child protection system was conducted in 2007. Conducted by the Honourable James Wood, three reports (running to in excess of 1000 pages) were handed down in November 2008. Wood noted that the:

contemporary challenge facing all child protection systems in Australia, and in particular NSW as the largest, is sufficiently resourcing flexible prevention and early intervention services so as to reduce the numbers of children and young people who require the state to step in to keep them safe (Wood 2008, p. i).

Wood made 111 recommendations with wide-ranging implications for the child protection system. Some of these recommended reforms included strengthening the role of NGOs in the delivery of early intervention programs, limiting the use of the Child Protection Helpline to more serious cases, creating units within key mandatory reporting organisations to receive and assess less serious notifications, and numerous changes pertaining to the workforce and operational procedures of the Department of Community Services (Wood 2008).

In response to these recommendations, the NSW Government developed the *Keep Them Safe: A shared approach to child wellbeing* (‘Keep Them Safe Action Plan’) with an associated action plan containing 186 actions and with extra funding of A$750 million over five years. Specifically, this funding was to ‘provide for services delivered by NGOs, the expansion of prevention and early intervention services, increased support for Aboriginal children, young people and their families, and funding to support children and young people entering out of home care’ (KPMG 2012, p. iii).

While it is too early to assess completely the impact of these reforms, a recent report outlined the findings of a process evaluation of the initial stages of the implementation of the Keep Them Safe Action Plan. It found that many of the objectives and strategies of the Action Plan have been implemented or are being implemented. The *Interim Review Report* (NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet 2013) states that the ‘available evidence suggests that the most successful systemic reforms are those surrounding the new threshold for reporting children and young people to the Child Protection Helpline, and early-stage efforts at cultural change and service system re-alignment’ (2013, p. 2). Perhaps one measure of the impact of these reforms is to revisit the data on child notifications in NSW in recent years. Table 10 reveals the reversal of the previous trends in child notifications.
Table 10: Child Protection Notifications in NSW 2007–12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of notifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>195 599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>213 686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>156 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>98 845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–12</td>
<td>99 283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Whether this decline can be attributed to the reforms introduced by the Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection in NSW is difficult to determine. Irrespective of deliberation about causation, it is clear that there has been a significant reduction in the number of child protection notifications in NSW since 2008–09.

While a significant feature of Wood’s Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection in NSW focused on the child protection system, consideration was also given to the early intervention and prevention measures designed to keep children, young people and their families out of the child protection system. During the Special Commission Inquiry, a number of programs delivered by various state government agencies and NGOs were highlighted as providing levels of prevention and early intervention. These included a Universal Health Home Visit, ante-natal care provided by maternity services, Early Childhood Centres, child care centres and services, Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services, Physical Abuse and Neglect of Children (PANOC) services, Home School Liaison Officers (‘HSLOs’), the Priority Schools Program, and the Priority Housing Policy (which includes those at risk of harm due to domestic violence, sexual assault and child abuse) (Wood 2008, pp. 219–31). Moreover, Wood highlighted the benefits of the Better Futures service model administered by the NSW Department of Community Services. Better Futures, developed in 2003–04 following the merging of two programs for child and families, is a ‘voluntary, targeted program designed for low to medium risk families encountering problems that impact on their ability to care for their children’ (Wood 2008, p. 233). The aims of the program are to:
• Reduce child abuse and neglect by reducing the likelihood of family problems escalating into crisis within the child protection system
• Achieve long-term benefits for children by improving intellectual development, educational outcomes and employment chances
• Improve parent-child relationships and the capacity of parents to build positive relationships and raise stronger, healthier children
• Break inter-generational cycles of disadvantage
• Reduce demand for services that otherwise might be needed down the track such as child protection, corrective or mental health services (Wood 2008, p. 233).

With a then projected capacity of Better Futures to accommodate 2757 families, Wood suggested that ‘Brighter Futures is a significant achievement that should continue and be expanded’ (2008, p. 237) and, perhaps more glowingly, a subsequent evaluation of Better Futures stated it is ‘an innovative program, which has changed the practice of child abuse prevention services in NSW. The program has broken new ground nationally and internationally by developing an evidence-based service model’ (Hilferty et al 2010, p. ix).

This very partial account presents just some of the child protection and early intervention programs and services operating in NSW that have implications for crime prevention in Glebe and more broadly. With significant demand, increasing resources, growing complexity and continued media scrutiny, the NSW child protection system and array of early intervention programs will continue to be an important ingredient in efforts to prevent crime. The general failure to consider these initiatives in discussions of crime prevention highlights just some of the critical blind spots of particular crime prevention commentary. A strong, well-functioning child protection system is obviously crucial to attempts to reduce child abuse and neglect, maladaptive parenting practices and distressed families, which have direct and indirect implications for crime and its prevention (Weatherburn & Lind 1997). The significant investment in child protection should, therefore, be acknowledged in commentary on crime prevention.

**Education**

As highlighted by the Federation of Parents and Citizens Association in the Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection, ‘schools must be recognised as an essential sphere of influence for prevention and early intervention’ (Wood 2008, p. 227). There is a variety of ways that the formal education system can be considered to contribute to the
prevention of crime. Educational attainment, school attendance, socialisation and behavioural programs, and the protection of school property are just some of the preventive arrangements linked to the NSW education system that will be briefly considered here.

School attendance plays an important role in reducing opportunities for involvement in crime (leaving aside the crimes committed within the school during school hours). The NSW Department of Education and Communities captures and publishes data on attendance rates by individual schools. The most recent attendance rates for those schools relevant to this research are listed in Table 11.

Table 11: Attendance Rates for Schools in the Glebe (2037) Postcode Area for 2011 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Attendance Rate 2011</th>
<th>Attendance Rate 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest Lodge Primary School</td>
<td>95.31%</td>
<td>94.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glebe Primary School</td>
<td>93.24%</td>
<td>93.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney Secondary College (Blackwattle Bay Campus)</td>
<td>89.51%</td>
<td>89.63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSW Department of Education and Communities 2013a, pp. 16–39.

To provide some context, the best rates of attendance at government schools was approximately 97 per cent in 2011–12, with the worst being approximately 60 per cent.

A key policy and practice impacting on attendance is suspension and expulsion practices, which can result in children and young people being formally absent from school. The NSW Department of Education and Communities states that ‘suspension procedures mandate principles to take strong action in situations where they believe there is a risk to the health and safety of students and staff, particularly for incidents involving violence or weapons’ (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2013b, p. 2). According to the NSW Department of Education and Community Services, there were a total of 18 186 long suspensions\textsuperscript{110} in 2012, involving 12 922 students. The bulk of these students (74 per cent)

\textsuperscript{110} A long suspension can be for a period of up to and including 20 school days. Long suspensions might be imposed if a student has perpetrated violence, brought a weapon or drugs to school, or committed serious criminal behaviour or repeated serious misconduct (NSW Department of Education and Training 2011, pp. 8–9).
were aged between 12 and 16 years of age and 2974 were Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders. Violence and persistent misbehaviour accounted for 87 per cent of the reasons for the long suspensions (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2013b, p. 1). While it is difficult to interpret these data, it does provide some insight into the size, significance and consideration given to suspension and expulsion issues in NSW.

Children and young people in NSW are now legally required to attend school from six to 17 years of age. A series of measures are now in place to encourage and ensure greater school attendance. The *Education Amendment (School Attendance) Act 2009* (NSW) effectively raised the maximum age of compulsory school age in NSW from 15 to 17 years and clarified legal measures to ensure school attendance.

In concert with amendments to the *Education Act 1990* (NSW) was the expansion of the Home School Liaison Officer (‘HSLO’) scheme. The second reading speech for the *Education Amendment (School Attendance) Act 2009* (NSW) committed the (then) government to introduce 25 additional HSLOs and 15 Aboriginal Student Liaison Officers across NSW (Tsang 2009). According to the NSW Education and Communities, the Home School Liaison Program ‘provides a supportive service to students, parents and schools to encourage the attendance of students at school. There are 110 HSLOs and 26 Aboriginal student liaison officers [this is including the additional staff referred to previously]’ (NSW Education and Communities 2013c, p. 1). HSLOs and Aboriginal Student Liaison Officers undertake some of the following activities:

- Conducting periodic roll checks in schools and recommending improvement, where necessary
- Interviewing students for whom attendance is an issue
- Contacting and interviewing parents to resolve attendance issues

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111 See s 21B of the *Education Act 1990* (NSW) for a detailed explanation of the compulsory school age requirements in NSW. These were amended in 2010, raising the maximum compulsory school age and introducing new measures to encourage greater school attendance. In introducing the increased minimum school leaving age, it was noted that: ‘There is compelling Australian and international research which demonstrates that people with higher levels of schooling are more likely to make a successful transition to further education, training or work. The research also demonstrates that early school leavers are two and a half times more likely to be unemployed, earn lower wages and have poorer quality of life outcomes: see [http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/leavingschool/schoolleaveage/faqs/aims.php](http://www.schools.nsw.edu.au/leavingschool/schoolleaveage/faqs/aims.php), viewed 26 April 2014.'
• Developing attendance improvement plans, in consultation with school personnel, to resolve attendance issues
• Participating in school programs supporting attendance for example, Phone Intervention Programs
• Organising attendance meetings with parents, students and school staff
• Working with other agencies, for example, NSW Police Force on joint anti-truancy operations
• Advising schools on additional strategies as an alternative to Home School Liaison Program support, or
• Compiling support documentation to ensure correct procedures are followed if legal resolution is required (NSW Department of Education and Training 2008, p. 5).

Joint anti-truancy operations with the NSW Police Force involve police and HSLOs and/or Aboriginal Student Liaison Officers walking through areas where young people might gather, such as shopping malls, parks, railway stations, internet cafes, and amusement arcades. Young people without a leave pass are directed to return to school and details are taken for further follow-up (NSW Department of Education and Training 2008, pp. 11–12).

This is just one of the joint measures adopted by the NSW Department of Education and Communities and the NSW Police Force. In May 2002, the NSW Government established the Safety and Security Directorate within the NSW Department of Education and Training. This Directorate, originally headed by a former NSW Police Force Assistant Commissioner Ike Ellis (Watkins 2002) provides schools with a ‘comprehensive range of security related services including security alarms system design, security training and awareness programmes, as well as advice on security related matters (for example, surveillance systems, guard services, emergency evacuations, managing school keys)’ (Ellis & Thorley-Smith 2007, p. 4). A large part of this security-related work pertains to the school fencing program. While schools began to get security fences from 1996, this work accelerated following the establishment of the Safety and Security Directorate. As stated in the NSW Parliament by the then Minister for Education, the Honourable Carmel Tebbutt, ‘[t]he Government’s 2003 Safer School Plan committed to providing security fencing to 200 schools by 2007, at a cost of more than $20 million’ (Tebbutt 2005, p. 1977). The success of this program was demonstrated through a 64 per cent reduction in trespass and a 58 per cent reduction in break and enter following the erection of school fences in 40 schools in 2003–04. Moreover, there
was a 42 per cent reduction in fires in schools when comparing July school holiday periods of 2003 and 2005 (Tebbutt 2005, p. 19177).112

Links between the NSW Department of Education and Communities and the NSW Police Force have also been strengthened through various programs and initiatives. Joint police-school meetings, involving principals and Local Area Commanders, provide opportunities to share concerns and to plan future joint activities. The joint delivery by Youth Liaison Officers (NSW Police Force) and school teachers of the Crime Prevention Workshop Program, which consists of a series of educational modules covering topics such as stealing, driving offences, vandalism and arson, weapons and prohibited articles, crime avoidance and public space (among others), enables young people ‘to understand the consequences of involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour for both perpetrators and victims’ and to ‘develop strategies to avoid involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour’ (Thorley-Smith 2002, p. 2). The creation and deployment of 40 School Liaison Police in 2006, who ‘blend crime prevention with operational policing’ (NSW Police Force, n.d., p. 1), provide a greater police presence in NSW schools. Joint operations to prevent crimes in schools, particularly during school holiday periods, also demonstrate the increased links between police and schools.

Beyond what has been described above, the NSW Department of Education and Communities invests significantly in addressing particular education needs. According to the Department, A$1.7 billion was allocated to special education programs in the 2011–12 NSW Budget (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2012a, p. 1). This funding enables a host of programs to be delivered/maintained, including:

- 47 early intervention are provided classes for children under school age with confirmed disability;
- 549 NSW public schools are participating in the Low Socio Economic Status School Communities National Partnerships and can apply for $669.7 million between 2009 and 2015;
- 280 teaching positions and a total of $21.5 million in direct grants for distribution across 581 Priority Schools have been made available;

112 More recent data could not be found.
Those Priority Schools with the ‘deepest needs’ are provided with further support through the Priority Action Schools Program (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2012a, pp. 1–3).

Another program directed toward public schools in disadvantaged areas, is the Schools as Community Centre (‘SACC’) program, which ‘is a universal prevention and early intervention initiative supporting families with children aged birth to eight years in communities facing marked challenges’ (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2012b, p. 2). SACCs are based in public schools and operate like community centres to support families raising children from birth to eight years in partnership with local human service agencies, the local community and the school. SACCs provide a range of projects, including provision of playgroups for children and parents, parenting workshops, supporting transition to school, bringing other services into the school, and child health screening (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2012b).

SACCs have five key objectives:

- Increasing supportive connections.
- Increasing the use of health and community services, resources and activities.
- Increasing the social, emotional and communication skills for school readiness.
- Increasing parent knowledge on parenting and child development.
- Increasing parenting practices in early literacy of children (NSW Department of Education and Communities 2012b, pp. 10–14).

This overall approach reflects the growing recognition of the importance and benefits of early intervention and prevention, which is consistent with developmental crime prevention literature. The focus on parenting programs, supported playgroups, and assisting with the transition to school resonate with reducing the known risk factors and building protective factors to ultimately reduce negative life outcomes that might contribute to later offending behaviour. While SACCs clearly fit with the developmental approach to crime prevention, there is no overt reference to crime prevention as an objective in SACC publications.

While the above is again a very partial list of programs and resources allocated to disadvantaged schools and students, and some of the policies and programs of the

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113 The Glebe SACC was discussed in Chapter 7.
Department of Education and Communities relevant to crime prevention, it does provide an insight into the resources expended through the education system relevant to efforts to quantifying crime prevention activities in NSW. These programs and the general functions of the education system have real and direct implications for crime prevention. The scale of investment in education dwarfs that in the criminal justice system, which, it is argued, is rarely acknowledged in discussions about crime prevention.

**Housing and Homelessness**

The provision of public and social housing and the prevention of homelessness in NSW are significant policy areas that have undergone considerable reform in recent years. A simple review, required for current purposes, will inevitably be partial. These dynamic and significant policy domains are alive with current developments, reflecting some of the wider forces shaping policy across the human and social services — tussles between the Federal and NSW Governments over resources and policy directions, increasing reliance on NGOs to deliver services and manage properties (Housego & O’Brien 2012), and attempts to channel resources from the back-end (tertiary service provision) to the front-end (primary and early intervention services).

With figures suggesting that approximately 28 000 people are homeless in NSW on any one night (Simon 2009; NSW Department of Family and Community Services 2012), the reduction and prevention of homelessness has long occupied public policy discussions (see Burdekin 1989). In NSW today there are a number of key policy frameworks guiding efforts to prevent homelessness and, given the well-established links between homelessness, victimisation and crime (see Martell et al 1995; Martijn & Sharpe 2006; Knepper 2007), these policies and services assume an important role in efforts to prevent crime. The *NSW Homelessness Action Plan 2009–2014*, released by the NSW Government in 2009, highlighted the prevention of homelessness as one of three ‘strategic directions’. Actions associated with this strategic direction were to receive part of the additional funding that flowed from the A$101.4 million allocated by the Federal Government (and matched by the NSW Government) as part of the National Partnership on Homelessness (NSW Government 2009a, p. 11). The Action Plan included three homelessness reduction targets:

- A reduction of 7 per cent in the overall level of homelessness in NSW.
- A reduction of 25 per cent in the number of people ‘sleeping rough’ in NSW.
A reduction of one-third in the number of Aboriginal people who are homeless (NSW Government 2009a, p. 13).

The Homelessness Action Plan was due to end in 2014. However, there was a change of government in NSW in 2011, resulting in changes to various policy directions, funding arrangements and organisational structures. Despite the generally positive findings from various evaluations of the Homelessness Action Plan (see AHURI 2013), a new plan to tackle homelessness was announced in July 2012: the Going Home Staying Home Reform Plan (NSW Department of Family and Community Services 2012). This Reform Plan ‘will make specialist homelessness services easier to access and deliver a better balance between early intervention, crisis and post-crisis support’ (NSW Department of Family and Community Services 2012, p. 5) through an array of initiatives focusing on improved service delivery design enabling streamlined access for clients, better planning and resource allocation, workforce development, and quality contracting and continuous improvement (NSW Department of Family and Community Services 2012, p. 16). These reforms are to be delivered by June 2014.

These higher-order policy frameworks reveal some of the resources allocated, recent developments and current policy directions in responding to homelessness in NSW. What is not elucidated is the service system that operates across NSW to prevent and respond to homelessness. Homelessness can be caused by a diversity of factors and occurrences, including limited affordable housing, mental illness, domestic and family violence, alcohol and drug use, family breakdown, and financial hardship (MacKenzie & Chamberlain 2003). Consequently, the service sector responsible for implementing the Going Home Staying Home Reform Plan, and associated reforms, is diverse. Supported accommodation, refuges, crisis accommodation, alcohol and other drug treatment, youth centres, Indigenous-specific programs, domestic and family violence, mental health and various other services are actively engaged in responding to homelessness. Further, local government can play a role. The City of Sydney Council, for example, previously had a Homeless Strategy 2007–2012, which documents the history of services like the Homeless Persons Information Centre and the Inner City Homelessness Outreach and Support Service (City of Sydney 2009b). Further to this Strategy, the City of Sydney Council employs two public space liaison officers,
facilitates quarterly homelessness inter-agency meetings, and supports the homelessness brokerage program.\textsuperscript{114}

The true number of services and amount of expenditure invested in these services is difficult to quantify. Nonetheless, it is clear that considerable resources are dedicated to preventing and responding to homelessness in NSW. Whether these arrangements are effective or optimal, while being a critical public policy question, is not important for current purposes. Rather, simply demonstrating the significance of this policy domain to any discussion of crime prevention in NSW is the objective of the above information. Similarly, the following information pertains to public and social housing policies and services in NSW. A sketch of some of the more significant developments will be provided here, as a detailed overview of developments in public housing has been provided in Chapter 5.

The provision of public and social housing\textsuperscript{115} in NSW has a long history. Established in 1942, the NSW Housing Commission’s main task was to ‘rid New South Wales of the squalid housing conditions that had been remarked upon since the turn of the century, but never properly addressed’ (NSW Department of Housing 2003, p. 13). Recent estimates suggest that more than 150,000 dwellings were built and are now managed by state or social housing authorities in NSW, now housing over 214,000 people (O’Flynn 2011; NSW Auditor-General 2013a). Originally designed for working families, public and social housing now tends to be provided to those with complex social needs who have very different housing needs (Arthurson 2012). Waiting lists have grown, old housing stock has become unsuited to demographic changes (including the rise of single occupants and elderly tenants), and significant maintenance requirements mount (NSW Auditor-General 2013a). With NSW in the grips of a ‘housing affordability crisis’ (Begley 2014), the provision of public and social housing remains an important piece of the larger crime prevention jigsaw.

\textsuperscript{114} Information about these services was accessed from City of Sydney, \textit{Homelessness}, viewed 26 April 2014, http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/community/community-support/homelessness.

\textsuperscript{115} Traditionally, housing provided by the state was generally called ‘public housing’. Increasingly, the NSW Government is handing over responsibility for the management of these public housing properties to social or community housing providers. \textit{Planning for the Future: New directions for community housing in NSW 2007/08–2012/13} (http://www.housing.nsw.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/E3616ABA-DCA6-4770-A6BF-7B9FE0B4D7FF/0/PlanningfortheFutureDec2007.pdf, viewed 26 April 2014) outlines further growth of the community housing sector. This policy approach is generally consistent with the growing role of NGOs in the provision of services traditionally delivered by the state.
While the provision of the physical infrastructure of public and social housing has been and continues to be important for the purposes of providing vulnerable people and families with stable accommodation, past building, planning and development practices of state housing authorities may have exacerbated conditions leading to crime. Some have argued that a clear link exists between large, poorly designed and highly concentrated public housing estates and crime (Newman 1972; Foster 1995; Samuels et al 2004). Others have suggested that housing allocation policies are more critical than design elements in explaining crime in areas of high concentration of public housing (Matka 1997; Weatherburn et al 1999). Irrespective of the exact explanations offered, there have been significant attempts to tackle crime problems on public housing estates in NSW in recent decades. This attention partially arose from a series of high-profile incidents on public housing estates,\(^{116}\) the poor reputations of some areas and the generally high levels of crime in some of these areas. Major urban renewal programs were adopted in many public housing areas across NSW.

Community renewal projects in public housing estates have included a wide variety of specific programs and activities including tenancy participation committees, police-community liaison measures, increased social and employment programs, and physical remediation (Samuels et al 2004). Perhaps, however, the greatest investments have been made in the deconcentration of public housing estates in NSW through redevelopment and/or sales. At the time of writing, a number of large public housing estates were in the midst of long-term redevelopment (see Table 12).

### Table 12: Redevelopment of Public Housing Estates in NSW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate/Area</th>
<th>Existing Properties</th>
<th>Proposed Properties</th>
<th>Duration/Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airds/Bradbury</td>
<td>1470</td>
<td>2000+</td>
<td>15–20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonnyrigg</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>2330</td>
<td>15 years/A$733 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Estate</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>A$52 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lilyfield</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{116}\) While there are a number of possible incidents that could be mentioned, the Redfern and Macquarie Fields ‘riots’ in 2004 and 2005 respectively, and an incident on the Gordon Estate at Dubbo on New Year’s Eve 2006 (resulting in a police officer receiving a broken jaw), were catalysts for significant governmental attention in these and other areas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estate/Area</th>
<th>Existing Properties</th>
<th>Proposed Properties</th>
<th>Duration/Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minto</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1210</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redfern/Waterloo</td>
<td>350-hectare site is now the responsibility of UrbanGrowth Development Corp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosemeadow and Ambarvale</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverwood</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telopea</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 12 provides some insight into the number and size of public housing estate redevelopments in NSW. A central outcome of these redevelopments has been and will be to increase the social mix (of public and private housing tenants) of these areas. By deconcentrating populations of public housing tenants, it is expected that improvements will accrue in terms of crime and other social measures. Some research into the impact of redevelopment of the Gordon Estate in Dubbo (central west NSW) suggests that such benefits might accrue:

- 32 per cent of residents had previously nominated drug use as a serious issue before relocation. After the move this dropped to 2 per cent.
- Crime was considered ‘serious’ by 32 per cent of residents before relocation and once relocated, no respondents reported crime as ‘serious’ issues and similar changes were apparent for litter, vandalism, noise, graffiti and racism.
- Less subjective numbers come in the form of crime figures from the NSW Bureau of Crime (BOCSAR).
- In 2004, 2005 and 2006 the Dubbo local government area ranked in or around the top five worst area in NSW for break and enter (non-dwelling), motor vehicle theft and stealing from motor vehicles (Housing NSW 2010, p. 13).
While the success of the redevelopment of the Gordon Estate has been acknowledged by the Australian Violence and Crime Prevention Awards, the views of the efficacy of social-mix strategies, such as these, are contested (Arthurs 2012). However, what is beyond debate is the significant investment to addressing crime ‘problems’ in public housing estates in NSW in recent decades.

**Health**

Knepper has argued that in ‘recent decades, the public health and crime prevention establishments have found each other’ (2007, p. 76). While Schuller (2013) shows the increasing convergence between crime prevention and public health approaches, and Young and Sarre (2013) argue for greater alignment between health promotion and crime prevention, Knepper largely contains his discussion of this relationship to problematising it, which fails to unpack fully the potential crime prevention benefits of the health care system. Most strikingly, he does not comment on the mental health system, which is increasingly significant given the growing incidence and prevalence of mental illness. The following will highlight some of the current and recent policy developments in NSW Health that could reasonably be linked to efforts to prevent crime.

The health system in New South Wales consumes the greatest proportion of government spending, with the NSW Council of Social Services estimating that the health portfolio accounts for 28 per cent of the overall NSW Budget. With an aging population, there is both a considerable likelihood, and growing concern, that the percentage of government spending in health will continue to rise over the coming years (Productivity Commission 2013). With responsibility for general health, alcohol and other drug, mental health, health promotion and specialist services, the NSW health system has significant relevance for any consideration of crime prevention.

There have been numerous empirical and theoretical attempts to link particular health conditions with offending behaviour. Ranging from the plausible to the bizarre, these diverse perspectives reflect long-held beliefs about crime causation and the impact of physiology,

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neurology, diet, genetics and lifestyle. While there is considerable dispute about the relative influence of biological, genetic and physiological characteristics and crime, there is considerable agreement that alcohol and other drug use, mental illness, and acquired brain injury, while not being causally related to crime, increase the likelihood of contact with the criminal justice system (see Baldry et al 2013 for an overview of recent data linking research highlighting the interaction of these variables). As a consequence of this unclear but significant relationship, there have been numerous significant health-based programs in NSW which have sought to contribute (directly and indirectly) to the prevention of crime. Some of these will be highlighted here.

New South Wales (and Australia) has been heralded for early adoption of harm-minimisation techniques associated with drug use (Loxley 2000; Wodak & Maher 2010). Diverse programs such as needle and syringe exchanges, methadone clinics, and peer education programs are just some of the original and continuing interventions designed to reduce the harms (including crime) associated with drug use. There is evidence that methadone maintenance treatment is effective in preventing the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (‘HIV’) and other blood-borne viruses (Ritter et al 2004; Sendzuki 2007) and in preventing crime (Hall 1996; Lind et al 2005).119

While there are diverse modes and techniques for providing treatment for alcohol and other drug use, there are generally positive findings for well-designed and managed residential treatment programs (Darke et al 2012). Given these generally positive findings, significant NSW Government spending continues to be allocated to a spectrum of government, non-government and private services designed to prevent alcohol and other drug use, to prevent the associated harms and to reduce the potential connection between alcohol consumption and other drug use.

At any one time, there are many thousands of people in NSW receiving some form of treatment for alcohol and other drug use. At as 30 June 2012, 18 715 clients received some form of pharmacotherapy (methadone, buprenorphine or buprenorphine and naloxone) in NSW from 593 prescribers across 764 dosing points (AIHW 2013b). The majority of providers (411) were private providers, while 13 were housed in correctional facilities. No

119 Despite the generally positive evidence, there are contrary views about the success of Australian harm-reduction measures. See Hawks and Lenton (1995) and Caldicott and Duff (2005) for more cautious commentary on the efficacy of these measures.
specific data appear to be available on the costs to the NSW health system for providing these pharmacotherapy services, but as these services are generally free or very low cost, they place obvious burdens on the health care system.

Including pharmacotherapies, there were in excess of 38 000 closed treatments for alcohol and other drug issues in NSW in 2011–12 (AIHW 2013c). Counselling, withdrawal management, assessment, support and case management and rehabilitation are some of the forms of treatment included in these data. While it is again difficult to locate an estimate of the costs of these services, a previous study revealed that alcohol and other drug rehabilitation programs in NSW cost approximately A$25 million per annum to operate. While many of these programs will receive donations and deduct money from the welfare benefits of their clients, there is also an inevitable cost to the state to operate these programs.

While alcohol and other drug services are germane to any discussion of crime prevention, it is to the area of mental health services that governmental attention has been increasingly directed in recent years. The Federal Government established a National Mental Health Commission in 2012 and the NSW Government established its own Mental Health Commission in the same year. While both agencies have modest funding, they have been established to bring together services from across various government and non-government agencies to improve the effectiveness of the overall system. In the most recent NSW Budget Estimates, it was reported that, as part of the A$1.4 billion expenditure on mental health services in NSW, key initiatives will include the following spending: $30 million over three years to establish the NSW Mental Health Commission, with $8.3 million provided for its first year of operation in 2012–13; $16 million for additional mental health services at new and expanded mental health facilities; and $14 million under National Partnership Agreements to improve the care and support of people living with severe mental illness. Given the well-established, but complex, connections between untreated mental illness and

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crime (National Mental Health Commission 2013; Maniglio 2009), the significant investment in mental health services in NSW and across Australia has the potential to prevent crime.

Custodial health surveys in recent years have clearly affirmed the significant over-representation of people with mental illness imprisoned in NSW correctional facilities (Indig et al 2010; Indig et al 2011). In the adult population, the 2009 inmate health survey revealed that 16 per cent of inmates reported they had an admission to a psychiatric unit and 49 per cent had been treated for mental health problems (both up on previous survey administrations) (Indig et al 2010). The health survey of young people in custody revealed even more startling and worrying statistics: 87 per cent had a diagnosed psychological disorder; 14 per cent had an extremely low IQ (<70) and 32 per cent had a borderline IQ (70–79); and 65 per cent used drugs weekly prior to custody (Indig et al 2011). Given these stark figures, there have been efforts to provide better psychological and psychiatric services in NSW prisons and juvenile justice centres. While there has been a long history of similar services being provided, the development of Justice Health and, more recently, the Forensic Mental Health Service (amalgamated in 2012 to form Justice and Forensic Mental Health Network) have resulted in a centralisation of relevant staff and programs and the expansion of services into police stations and courts. With an approximate budget of A$173 million per annum (Justice and Forensic Mental Health Network 2012), the Network is an increasingly important player in efforts to reduce the impact of mental illness on offending and victimisation.

The Criminal Justice System

The NSW criminal justice system has been a site of persistent and significant developments in recent decades. The flurry of legislative activity is perhaps best illustrated by the volume of changes in what now appears to be a period of peak (or peaking) crime — 1995 to 1998. Hall (2010) noted that there were approximately 49 pieces of criminal justice-related legislation from 1995–98 and 23 amendments were made to bail legislation between 1992 and 2009 (2010, pp. 23–5).122 Numerous commentators have described this flurry of criminal justice policies, especially promised prior to NSW elections since 1995, as ‘law and order auctions’ (Lee 1996; Weatherburn 2004; Ricketts 2004; Loughnan 2009; Cowdery 2012) and these policies have generally been reflective of an ‘uncivil politics of law and order’ (Hogg &

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122 The greatest changes to bail provisions were made recently with the introduction and commencement of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW).
Garland’s observations that ‘governments have relied upon criminological assumptions that are, taken as a whole, quite schizoid in character … at the level of the state as a whole … the result is a set of policies that are increasingly dualistic, increasingly polarised, and increasingly schizophrenic’ (Garland 2001, p. 137) chime with the NSW experience.

Documenting all of these legislative and policy changes impacting on the NSW criminal justice system is beyond the scope of this thesis and is not required for current purposes. However, it is important to understand the volume of changes/developments, the frequently contradictory nature of these changes/developments and the rhetorical or real relationship with these changes/developments with the goals of preventing crime. The following will provide a snapshot of some of the most significant legislative and policy changes in the last 10–15 years in NSW that have impacted upon the police, the courts and correctional agencies.

The Wood Royal Commission into corruption in the NSW Police Force in the mid-1990s resulted in significant changes to many management and operational features of the organisation (Dixon, 1999). New geographical policing units were established (that is, LACs); greater focus was placed on gathering and the use of intelligence to drive operational activities (through the CMU); supervisory positions were created at the rank of Inspector to be responsible for operational matters throughout the day and across the year; specialist officers were designated to manage youth, crime prevention, domestic violence, Aboriginal, multicultural, intelligence, education and other portfolios; a centralised command system was developed to interrogate performance of Local Area Commanders (that is, Operational Crime Reviews, which are now known as Compass); and various measures were adopted to prevent corruption (see Ryan 2000 for a discussion of some of the changes post the Wood Royal Commission to the NSW Police Force; see Dixon 1999 for a critical commentary of these ‘reform’ processes).

These largely internal changes have been supplemented by a raft of legislative changes that have enabled the NSW Police Force to reclaim its ‘crime-fighting’ capabilities, often because of the lobbying of the NSW Police Association (see Finanne 2002 for a discussion of the influence of police unions on Australian politics). Police powers have been expanded through the introduction of, for example, the Crimes Amendment (Detention After Arrest) Act 1997 (NSW), Children (Protection and Parental Responsibility) Act 1997 (NSW), Crimes
Legislation Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998 (NSW), Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW), Police Powers (Drug Premises) Act 2001 (NSW), Police Powers (Internally Concealed Drugs) Act 2001 (NSW), Police Powers (Drug Detection Dogs) Act 2001 (NSW), and Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW). Many of these (and subsequent) increases in police powers were consolidated through the introduction of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW), which continues to be modified to expand police powers. Together, these and other legislative amendments extending police powers have had a dramatic impact on the ability of police to stop and search individuals, cars and homes, to collect DNA samples, and to direct people to move on from particular areas. Coupled with the NSW Police Force’s focus on ‘high visibility policing’, which sends an ‘unequivocal message to the community that police are focussed on reducing crime and improving safety’ (NSW Police Force 2010, p. 5), and the targeting of repeat offenders and crime hot spots (key objectives of the NSW Police Force Corporate Plan 2012–16 and the previous Corporate Plan 2008–12), there has been a concerted effort to deploy limited police resources to disrupt criminal activity and reduce opportunities for offending.

This overall trend toward a more targeted, interventionist approach in policing has been replicated in other parts of the criminal justice system. Developments in both the courts and corrections have reflected a similar ethos. There has been considerable commentary about the pressure on the judiciary to enforce longer sentences. Anderson (2004) suggests that guideline judgments and the introduction of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Amendment (Standard Minimum Sentencing) Act 2002 (NSW) reflected the contemporary NSW ‘law and order politics’ in seeking to reduce judicial discretion. These and other legislative and policy changes have resulted in an increased use of imprisonment and greater length of prison sentences (Lulham & Fitzgerald 2008). These trends led Lulham and Fitzgerald to conclude that ‘courts in NSW have become harsher rather than more lenient’ between 1993 and 2007 (2008, p. 6). Despite these trends, Jones and Weatherburn (2010) found that 66 per cent of 2002 people in NSW interviewed in 2007 stated that sentences were either ‘a little too lenient’ or ‘much too lenient’ (2010, p. 515). Consequently, pressure continues to be exerted on courts and the criminal justice system, despite dramatic falls in crime across much of NSW in the last 12 or so years (Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b).

123 By, for example, the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Bill 2013 (NSW).
Coupled with these developments has been increasing use of criminogenic risk assessment tools. In NSW, the Youth Level of Service/Case Management Inventory (‘YLS/CMI’) is used by Juvenile Justice NSW under a licensing agreement with Multi-Health Systems (a North American test publisher and distributor) (Thompson & Putnins 2003, p. 329). Corrective Services NSW uses the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (‘LSI-R’), a 54-item assessment broken up into 10 sub-domains that attempt to understand and predict criminal behaviours (Hsu et al 2009, p. 729). These actuarial risk-assessment tools seek to identify future risk of offending. By better understanding the risks posed by an individual, attempts can be made to prevent recidivism.

BOCSAR has developed the Group Risk Assessment Model (‘GRAM’), which is a ‘predictive instrument for calculating expected rates of re-offending in any year. The rate is used to compare with actual rates of re-offending to provide a measure of government performance’ (NSW Department of Corrective Services 2010, p. 29). This is not strictly an actuarial risk-assessment tool, but it augments work in this area.

In the shadow of these developments across the criminal justice system resulting in greater state intrusion, there have also been efforts to divert people from entering and penetrating the criminal justice system. The *Young Offenders Act 1997* (NSW) (which codified police warnings and cautions for young people and introduced youth justice conferences), the establishment of Forum Sentencing (adult restorative justice procedures), the Cannabis Cautioning Scheme, and greater use of penalty notices are just some of the policies deployed to divert people (especially young people) from the criminal justice system in NSW in recent years. Moreover, the NSW criminal courts have witnessed the growth in ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ and treatment programs. The NSW Drug Court, the Magistrates Early Referral into Treatment (‘MERIT’) scheme, Circle Sentencing for Indigenous offenders, the Court Referral for Eligible Defendants into Treatment (‘CREDIT’), and the Youth Drug and Alcohol Court are some of the diversionary and treatment interventions that perhaps better reflect the ‘softer’ side of the bifurcated NSW criminal justice system (see Clancey & Howard 2006 for a discussion of some of these).

Further evidence of bifurcation can be found through analysis of key trends in corrections in NSW. The most noteworthy trend has been the rise of incarceration. The NSW prison population has grown dramatically in recent decades. Fitzgerald and Corben (2012) observed that ‘between January 1998 and its peak in July 2009 the total NSW prison population
increased from 6261 to 10 322 representing a 65 percent increase’ (2012, p. 2). They also noted a decline in the NSW prison population between July 2009 and December 2011, but there is evidence that this decline has since stalled, rising above 10 000 prisoners (Needham 2013). While some of the previously mentioned policing and sentencing practices have contributed to this increased use of imprisonment in NSW, there have also been other factors contributing to this higher rate of imprisonment. Stricter policing of bail conditions has resulted in increased remand populations in both adult and juvenile prison systems (Stubbs 2010; Ringland & Weatherburn 2010); greater increases in the number of women prisoners has partially fuelled the overall increase (Drabsch 2010); and continuing over-representation of Indigenous offenders has put upward pressure on prison numbers (Fitzgerald 2009).

The operation of community correctional agencies has also potentially contributed to greater surveillance and monitoring of people coming into contact with the criminal justice system. The actuarial risk assessment tool, known as the Level Service of Inventory-Revised (‘LSI-R’), is now used in NSW to assess the risk of reoffending (Hsu et al 2009); urinalysis is used to determine if parolees are in breach of their parole conditions (NSW Government 2009b; NSW Department of Corrective Services 2012); numerous sections of Corrective Services NSW have been created over the years to focus on intelligence and security (for example, the ‘Hamburger Report’ lists the Corrections Intelligence Branch, the Security Branch, the Corrections Intelligence Group, and the Drug Detector Dog Unit); and Intensive Correction Orders (‘ICOs’) were introduced in 2010 to provide community-based sanctions to offenders who would otherwise serve prison time, and these orders potentially include urinalysis and electronic monitoring (among other conditions). These more ‘modern’ forms of intervention operate alongside traditional community corrections activities, including preparing background reports for courts, supervising the more than 16 000 offenders on community-based orders (NSW Department of Corrective Services 2012), and delivering group intervention programs.

This synopsis of developments in the last 10–15 years reveals somewhat contradictory tendencies and policy directions. More importantly for current purposes, it demonstrates some of the attempts to enhance the preventive capabilities of the NSW criminal justice

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124 Keith Hamburger conducted a review of management arrangements of Corrective Services NSW. The resulting report has become known as the Hamburger Report.
system and the breadth of policies, programs and practices that have implications for our understanding of crime prevention.

**Crime Prevention through Environmental Design Policies and Practices**

There are different policies frameworks that seek to ensure that crime risks are identified and minimised in the development application (‘DA’) process. Some of the local planning instruments were introduced in Chapter 7. At the state level, there are guidelines that seek to encourage consideration of the principles of CPTED. While at the time of writing there is considerable flux within the planning system, with recent rationalisation of local planning instruments and potentially significant changes to the broader NSW planning legislation, the following provides a summary of the existing NSW Guidelines.

**NSW Guidelines**

In April 2001, the then Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (‘DUAP’), introduced *Crime prevention and the assessment of development applications: Guidelines under section 79c of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979*. These guidelines were intended to ‘help councils [local government authorities] identify crime risk and minimize opportunities for crime through the appropriate assessment of development proposals’ (DUAP 2001, p. 1). The guidelines suggest that ‘Councils have an obligation to ensure that a development provides safety and security to users and the community’ (emphasis in original) (DUAP 2001, p. 2). Where a development presents a crime risk, the guidelines can be used to justify:

- Modification of the development to minimize the risk of crime; or
- Refusal of the development on the grounds that crime risk cannot be appropriately minimized (DUAP 2001, p. 2).

The guidelines contain two parts: Part A describes a crime risk assessment (one page), while Part B outlines key CPTED principles (two pages). Councils should consider the principles outlined in Part B when assessing all developments.

Part A defines a crime risk assessment as being a ‘systematic evaluation of the potential for crime in an area. It provides an indication of both the likely magnitude of crime and likely crime type. The consideration of these dimensions (crime amount and types) will determine the choice and appropriate mix of CPTED strategies’ (DUAP 2001, p. 3). The guidelines then state that there are two key steps when assessing crime risk: (1) ‘obtain an understanding of
the crime risk of the area, and if required (2) apply (CPTED) treatments that correspond with levels of risk present in the area’ (DUAP 2001, p. 3). It is stated that:

These guidelines outline how councils are to assess crime risk in local developments. They are not sufficient in themselves, however, to inform councils how to conduct crime risk assessments. To gain a detailed understanding of how to conduct crime risk assessments and how to apply CPTED, council planners need to attend approved training courses (emphasis in original) (DUAP 2001, p. 3).

Formal crime risk assessments will be required for any development posing crime risks (in the council’s opinion) and would include ‘a new/refurbished shopping centre or transport interchange, a large scale residential development (more than 20 dwellings), or the development/re-development of a mall or other public place, including the installation of new street furniture’ (DUAP 2001, p. 2). The guidelines encourage councils and police to develop a local consultation protocol stipulating which developments would require a formal crime risk assessment and state that ‘typically, crime risk assessments are conducted in cooperation with trained local police’ (DUAP 2001, p. 2).

Beyond this, the guidelines also suggest that ‘when conducting individual crime risk assessments, the consequences and likelihood of crime are identified and measured using recorded crime statistics, hotspot analyses and Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) socio-economic data’ (DUAP 2001, p. 3). This is in effect, the total direction provided in relation to crime risk assessments.

Part B of the guidelines essentially provides definitions and examples of the four CPTED principles that need to be used in the assessment of development applications to minimise the opportunity for crime (DUAP 2001, p. 4). These principles are surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and space management.

The efficacy of these guidelines has been considered elsewhere (see Clancey et al 2011, 2012 for commentary). For current purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the Guidelines exist and operate across NSW, which means that new developments will have crime risks considered and mitigated, where possible.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated the depth, range and nature of practices, programs, activities, policies and technologies operating across NSW government agencies which have potential
implications for crime prevention in Glebe. It also painted a partial picture of the nature of the resources invested in different dimensions of crime prevention in NSW. The investments at a local level are dwarfed by those of the NSW Government. While many of these investments will be spread across the state, they also have potential impact on local practices and outcomes. Reforms to housing, child protection and education systems (amongst others) have direct impact on the delivery of those services in Glebe. By describing these broader policies, it is possible to establish a wider context for the analysis of Glebe activities, and to show that the absence of NSW government agencies in local inter-agency meetings does not mean that they are not contributing to the prevention of crime.

Moreover, this chapter illustrates the considerable ‘mainstreaming’ of crime prevention. Shaftoe (2004) and Sutton et al (2008) have suggested that this is a possible outcome of the rise of crime prevention. In the context of Glebe (and NSW, and Australia more broadly) this appears to have occurred. A diverse array of agencies now routinely contributes, knowingly or indirectly, to the prevention of crime. Physical upgrades, lighting, garbage removal, maintenance, provision of various social programs and services are now the business of local government. Greater care is taken to ensure that large newly developed residential and commercial complexes are assessed for their crime risks. Child care and preschool programs are provided. The upper age of compulsory schooling has been increased and a host of programs and initiatives have been devised and funded to support people experiencing problems with alcohol and other drugs, mental illness, and homelessness. This mainstreaming of crime prevention has implications for how we understand and theorise crime prevention. It necessitates greater engagement with diverse disciplines and policy domains.

Further, cataloguing the diverse policies and programs that directly or indirectly seek to prevent crime demonstrates the complex nature of policy development and public administration, both crucial dimensions for any consideration of crime prevention. The contested, incoherent and at times antagonistic dimensions of crime prevention are well illustrated in this chapter. Early intervention initiatives operate concurrently with criminal justice reforms that are partially or wholly premised on crime prevention objectives, but which ultimately achieve greater levels of incarceration and which have child protection implications through greater numbers of children being without parents during periods of incarceration. Any policy inconsistencies are tolerated within a contested political and complex public administration landscape. This contestation and complexity makes simple pronouncements about crime prevention problematic.
Documenting policies and programs in this chapter also highlights the rise of particular policy areas. The crime decline in Glebe had an influence on the need to develop a new localised crime prevention plan. A similar impact has happened more generally. As property crime has declined, other policy domains have garnered the spotlight (and the resources). Health and education have long been the policy areas attracting the greatest resources. The property crime decline in NSW has allowed crime to be displaced on the overall political priority list. While this is hard to quantify, the general absence of ‘law and order’ policy at the most recent NSW election (in 2011) suggests that there has been a de-politicisation (if ever so small) of crime and criminal justice policy. While further exploration is required to determine the veracity of this claim, it is argued that there has been a general slowing of criminal justice reforms with greater attention being given to child protection, housing, the housing affordability crisis, mental health, disability policies, education, and infrastructure.

This and previous chapters have deliberately provided detailed description of the volume of crime prevention activities operating in Glebe and more broadly in NSW. While running the risk of being excessively descriptive, this strategy was adopted to clearly demonstrate the challenges of drafting statements or providing commentary that neatly summarises or categorises crime prevention. It also lays very deep and firm foundations for interrogating criminological perspectives that seek to do just that: provide some form of summary, often integrated into a ‘grand narrative’. The next chapter will summarise findings to date before folding the findings from this research back onto these ‘grand narratives’ to test the veracity of their claims.
Chapter 11: Findings and Implications for Crime Prevention Practice and Policy

A host of findings emerged throughout the fieldwork and analysis of wider crime prevention structures. They have been detailed at varying levels throughout the previous chapters. The following provides a summary of the key relevant findings, followed by a small number of recommendations that have been made to strengthen local crime prevention practices in NSW.

Findings

Key findings from this research, and summarised here, pertain to the volume and diversity of crime prevention activities in Glebe; the significant social-welfare ethos of many of these programs; the importance of understanding local characteristics and local crime issues; the importance of not just focusing on specific programs, but also understanding the supporting structures; the presence and absence of features of crime problem-solving models (using Ekblom’s 5Is); the impact of the (property) crime decline; and the ‘mainstreaming’ of crime prevention.

Volume and Diversity of Crime Prevention Activities

Analysis of programs, policies and technologies in Glebe suggests that a considerable amount of activity and investment is dedicated to preventing crime, even if that is not the overt purpose. These approaches range across the models of crime prevention and, rather than necessarily operating in some form of competition (Sarre 1994), there is evidence of various approaches being combined. Similarly, a single agency can engage with different models simultaneously in its daily activities (which may or may not be directly related to the prevention of crime).

Some of the local crime prevention measures (predominantly situational and CPTED approaches) are historical in nature. The layers of security devices, physical upgrades, murals, graffiti removal, planning guidelines, street lighting and the like provide a crime prevention base. Walking through the area revealed that many of these devices had been installed in previous years, while other security systems are dynamic, requiring regular maintenance, activation and upgrade. Many of these ubiquitous crime prevention measures have little direct impact on the daily lives of residents and visitors to the area (but might have numerous potential crime prevention benefits).
By focusing on a very small geographical area, it became clear how these multiple programs and technologies have been built up over time, and how previous investments continue to deliver crime prevention benefits. Some measures, such as residential security devices and infrastructure upgrades, continue to deliver benefits long after the initial investments were made in these approaches. In this way, there is a progressive layering of crime prevention that is partly premised on previous investments. Attempts would ideally be made to quantify more rigorously the ‘collective impacts’ (Kania & Kramer, 2011, 2013) of these diverse forms of crime prevention. Understanding the crime prevention mosaic and how it can be enhanced will prove beneficial for future crime prevention policy development.

Social-Welfare Ethos
Importantly, these measures are augmented by an array of welfare services, social programs and community development activities. Based on interviews with local workers and observation of inter-agency and community meetings, it became apparent that much crime prevention activity in Glebe operates through three dimensions: the ‘socialisation of crime policy’; a ‘culture of care’; and ‘prevention through reassurance’. In this way, local crime prevention measures might be helping to breathe life back into social and penal welfarism (Brown 2012).

Local workers very much understand crime causation in light of structural disadvantage and reduced life opportunities. These views, shaped by their disciplinary backgrounds, inform their beliefs about how crime can be prevented. Breakfast clubs, parenting programs, structured recreational activities, alternative education classes, mentoring and employment pathways are provided in Glebe. There is strong lobbying, often by residents from the ‘good end’ of Glebe, of NSW government agencies to improve housing conditions for public, social and Aboriginal housing tenants. This advocacy and commitment to community development, socially just and socially progressive services reflects the long-standing activism found in the area, as well as the commitment of local workers to these ideals. Crime prevention, in this context, is provided through forms of welfare, rather than through punishment or patrolling.

This orientation to community development and socially progressive programs and services, some of which might impact on crime, is also consistent with the original forces that influenced the emergence of local crime prevention in NSW (and across Australia more broadly). During the late 1980s and early 1990s there were numerous inquiries, studies, reports and conferences conducted that supported and called for the development of localised
crime prevention models. When local crime prevention arrangements were enshrined in NSW legislation in 1997, community participation, consultation and social and community crime prevention measures were very much at the forefront. This orientation was further encouraged by the NSW Parliamentary Inquiry into Crime Prevention through Social Support in 1999. While it appears that commitment to these locally developed, locally responsive and socially inclusive forms of crime prevention have waned due to growing centralisation, some limited research into the practices of local government CSOs in NSW (see Clancey et al 2012; Shepherdson et al 2014) suggests that there has been strong resistance to centralisation. The observations of Sutton and Wilson (2004) that local government CSOs are committed to community-based crime prevention continues to resonate, as does the observation by Morgan et al that ‘the emphasis on a community-based approach has influenced the range of crime prevention strategies implemented in Australia over the past two decades’ (2011, p. 20).

While these approaches might serve to contain or minimise more punitive approaches (without discounting the fact that social crime prevention approaches can also be punitive in nature and impact), there is little research evidence supporting the efficacy of these approaches (see Homel 2007). Consequently, there is a need to better evaluate the impact of these programs. The limited focus on evaluation is consistent with previous research in Australia (English et al 2002; Morgan & Homel 2013). Future evaluations should not only focus on attempting to demonstrate what impact (if any) social crime prevention programs have had, but should also avoid the ‘antisocial bias’ of research methods that comply with the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (Hope 2005). Evaluating social and community-based interventions is more complex than determining the impact of the installation of a situational crime prevention technology or using randomised control experiments, which do not lend themselves to social or community-based programs. Consequently, consideration of the ‘collective impacts’ (Kania & Kramer 2011, 2013) of diverse local programs will better determine the success of such programs.

Beyond seeking to evaluate the impacts of the social and community programs, vigilance must be maintained to monitor any negative unintended consequences. McCord’s (2003) findings show that harmful effects can and do accrue from good intentions. Foucault (1977) and Cohen (1985) make clear that benevolent policies do get co-opted, have malevolent impacts and have the capacity to drift from original intentions. In the absence of robust evaluations, there is no way of knowing if some unintended consequences have arisen as a consequence of these social-welfare programs.
The Local Matters

Cherney and Sutton (2003, p. 345) note that ‘most crime prevention “success stories” have arisen out of unique circumstances’ — these frequently relate to local conditions, needs and resources. It has long been known that local characteristics shape crime opportunities and causation (Shaw & McKay 1942; Baldwin & Bottom 1976; Foster 2002; Skogan 2006; Groff et al 2010). Through this research, it has been shown that the history, topography, social profile, and service sector of a local area have significant implications for crime prevention capacities and responses. Understanding these characteristics is important to understanding the strengths and deficits in an area, which, in turn, has implications for responses that might be mounted in response to locally defined crime problems.

This does not diminish the influences of wider socio-political factors on crime causation and prevention. Local conditions and institutions will have limited capacity to correct devastating losses of local industry or global trends in the movement of labour. However, these regional and global forces equally do not erase local characteristics that should be understood in responding to local crime issues, which might well relate to small geographical areas (such as an access route through a public housing estate) or a small number of known offenders.

Not Just Programs

When reviewing crime prevention activity, focus is frequently drawn to discrete programs. This research highlights the importance of the elements operating between and enabling these programs. The longevity of staff working in an area, the nature of relationships between local workers, opportunities for joint program delivery and collaboration and the like are all critical to understanding the service delivery framework operating in a local area. This framework provides an important base for crime prevention work and has implications for the capacity of a local service network to respond to crime problems as they arise. There appears to be little appreciation of the importance of these elements from funding bodies.

The strong inter-agency relationships, especially between a core of service providers and workers, many of whom are very experienced and have worked in the area for many years, provide strong foundations for joint working. Some of this joint working is expressed in the significant celebrations held periodically throughout the year, while some is more opaque. The acceptance of a child who has moved into the area with her mother to escape domestic violence into local programs without payments or lengthy assessment; the co-organisation of programs to provide transition opportunities from one program to another; the sharing of
resources; shared support and participation in clean-ups, repair days and fundraising ventures of local services; and a host of other informal and incidental activities operate routinely in Glebe. These practices are not easily captured in performance management systems required by funding bodies and, in fact, often occur in spite of funding agreements. Nor are they necessarily captured in evaluations. Yet these practices have potentially significant implications for service delivery and for improving the lives of local residents.

It is especially important to better understand the contribution of these more ephemeral local dimensions when funding models are becoming increasingly focused on discrete inputs, outputs and outcomes delivered by individual agencies or funded programs. It is possible that some of the important enabling structures will be dismantled in these circumstances. Time invested in understanding local conditions, meeting with local workers, discussing referral pathways, developing joint programs, and competing against other local services might undermine important characteristics of local capacities.

**Comparison to Crime Problem Solving Models**

According to crime prevention planning approaches, such as Ekblom’s 5Is (Ekblom 2011), it could be argued that there is a general absence of good crime prevention planning in Glebe. Interviews and observation of inter-agency fora revealed limited access to crime data; significant NSW government agencies were frequently missing at inter-agency meetings; and there was limited evidence of formal joint crime prevention planning. To some, this might be regarded critically and condemned. However, such a conclusion would miss the intricate informal relationships between service providers, referral pathways between programs, and important incidental interactions that occur in the area on a daily basis.

Furthermore, this should not be taken to suggest that crime prevention efforts in Glebe are disorganised. There is evidence that when crime rose in 2007–08, coordinated planning took place. The development of the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012* followed data analysis, community meetings, and planning discussions. This Plan resulted in (or coincided with) significant investment in physical upgrades to the area and the development or refunding of programs aimed at supporting local young people (Pathways Program and After Dark). The Plan built on local strengths and existing services, while also prompting further investment in the area. While the central role played by the City of Sydney Council, with its greater resources, perhaps says more about the relative capacities of this council than it does
about the abilities of NSW local governments more broadly, it also demonstrated the level of leadership and coordination that local government can bring.

The (Property) Crime Decline

Analysis of local crime data revealed significant falls in some offence categories (predominantly property) since approximately 2000–01 (although there was a spike in a number of offences in 2007–08). These falls are consistent with NSW, Australian and international trends (Zimring 2007; van Dijk 2012; Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b).

The crime decline has had particular impacts on local programs and services (not to mention the positive impacts for community members). The first is that the redevelopment of a further community safety plan for Glebe was considered unnecessary. Two focus groups held with local workers and NSW government staff in June 2013 explored some of the reasons for the crime decline and considered whether a new community safety plan was needed. It was decided that there was no need for a new plan, which suggests a relationship (imperfect, no doubt) between crime and policy development and an absence of some of the expansionary tendencies of crime prevention and community safety personnel suggested by Gilling (1997).

A second obvious impact of the general crime decline in the area over the last 10 to 12 years is the gradual cessation of inter-agency groups and structures established to tackle crime and related issues. Neighbourhood Watch has been in decline for many years; the Community Drug Action Team is in hiatus; and Glebe does not have a Liquor Licensing Accord, due, it was suggested, to the lack of problems with licensed venues and alcohol-related crime. The sole remaining inter-agency structure with a crime/law enforcement focus is the CSPC. Established in 2006, CSPCs also appear to be on the wane. Only two of the scheduled four CSPC meetings were held in Glebe in 2013, each lasting approximately one hour (despite being scheduled for two hours each). The CSPC meetings that were observed provided opportunities for networks to be maintained and for senior police to provide reassurance that pro-active policing was having continued positive effects. Little of the conduct of these meetings could be described as crime prevention planning.

The decline of the focus on crime not only has reduced the necessity for inter-agency groups to operate and for a specific community safety plan to be developed, but it has also meant that other social policy issues have gained greater focus. The needs of public, social and Aboriginal housing tenants is the most pressing local concern. With nearly 20 per cent of Glebe residents residing in this form of housing and with the current ‘crisis’ in the
maintenance and provision of public housing, this issue absorbs considerable energy and attention of local agencies and services. Child protection reforms, changes in the funding models of NSW community-based services, the growing role of NGOs, and mental health and disability policy reforms are just some of the social policy issues gaining greater attention in recent years. It is argued that the focus on crime has declined as crime rates have fallen, allowing resources to be partially shifted to other areas. This presents challenges for local service providers who are concerned that programs previously funded for crime prevention purposes might be withdrawn.

Some local workers were concerned about the ‘prevention paradox’, where falls in crime potentially threaten funding. While these concerns might contain a modicum of self-interest, it was also suggested that removing existing programs would potentially have an adverse impact on the area through increasing crime.

The ‘Mainstreaming’ of Crime Prevention

Exploration of NSW government programs and policies that have direct or indirect crime prevention credentials suggests that many of these broader social policy issues routinely include some form of focus on crime prevention. Substantial and ongoing reforms to the NSW child protection system have direct implications for the life experiences of children and young people. There is clear evidence of the importance of reducing neglect and abuse of children and young people to prevent crime in the long term (Weatherburn & Lind 1997). The establishment of the NSW Mental Health Commission and increased funding for mental health services in recent years also has implications for crime and its prevention. Raising the school leaving age, as has been shown elsewhere (Machin et al 2012), might have far greater crime prevention outcomes than many of the programs operating in local areas. Re-development of large public housing estates across NSW, partially based on the high levels of crime experienced in some of these locations in recent decades, also has the potential for significant crime prevention outcomes (Samuels et al 2004).

These and numerous other reforms, regardless of views about the veracity or nature of the reforms, demonstrate that crime prevention has been ‘mainstreamed’ (Shaftoe 2004). It is now the case, and has been for some time, that policies and programs operating across the state with large budgets have considerable scope to impact on crime. These policies and programs further challenge any simple definitions or depictions of crime prevention and call
attention to the inadequacies of commentary that focus solely on limited forms of crime prevention.

Despite embedding the case study of Glebe within analyses of local approaches to crime prevention and state-wide policies and programs, there are characteristics of the Glebe area that partially limit the applicability of these findings to other areas. Beyond the local spatio-historical dimensions that impact on local environments differently, there are characteristics of Glebe that are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. The significant role played by the local council (City of Sydney) should not be underestimated. Funding and coordination of local crime prevention activities, coordination of responses to particular issues, and investment in the area more generally at levels unseen in other areas of NSW make the contribution of the local council significant and different. Similarly, local activism has been a strong feature in the area for an extended period. This activism continues and provides a level of capacity not likely to be replicated in other areas.

Recommendations

Based on these findings, a small number of recommendations are provided below that relate to ways that local crime prevention activities in NSW might be enhanced:

- Ethical framework — An ethical framework that outlines underpinning principles should be developed for crime prevention in NSW. Such a framework or set of principles would extend what is captured in the National Crime Prevention Framework and seek to address concerns raised by critics of crime prevention (see Chapter 12) including doing harm (McCord 2003), eroding voluntary capacity (Hope 1995) and opting for punitive responses rather than socially just approaches. Prevention should do no harm; it should balance controlling with enabling techniques; education, poverty reduction, child protection, housing, health and other systems/programs should be strengthened to support the reduction in incentives for and causes of offending. As suggested by Sutton et al (2008) and others (Loader 1998; Knepper 2007), crime prevention should ‘encompass some vision of the “good society”’ (Sutton et al 2008, p. 157).

- Human service and public administration framework — The operation of crime prevention needs to be understood within a human services and public administration framework. Forces shaping these domains will have inevitable consequences for the administration of crime prevention. Currently, outcome-
based measures, cost-effectiveness, localism, the rise of the NGO, what works and evidence-based policy, and New Public Management are some of the forces shaping delivery. There must be greater recognition and understanding of public administration trends. Too little Australian literature has positioned crime prevention efforts within such a discourse and, yet, it is through public administration frameworks that crime prevention is implemented. The rise of the NGO provides opportunities for crime prevention work to be embedded in their practices, as has occurred (to some extent) with government agencies. This necessitates professional development opportunities for NGO staff to better understand crime prevention tenets. Simple crime prevention messages can easily augment existing practice and enable practitioners to identify opportunities to also have crime prevention outcomes, further to the specific programmatic and service goals of their organisation.

- Adopt a strengths-based approach — Following developments in other disciplines that have moved toward strengths and asset-based approaches (Green & Haines 2008), crime prevention approaches should seek to understand existing capacities. As shown through the Glebe case study, there are numerous strengths that can be harnessed and built on. In part, this approach starts from a more sympathetic position than is generally found in risk-based or deficit approaches.

- Programs need to be evidence-informed and locally generated — Cherney and Sutton (2003) note that ‘most crime prevention “success stories” have arisen out of unique circumstances’ (2003, p. 345). Given that many of the programs that have come to be heralded in NSW and Australia have often grown from locally generated ideas, it is important to provide the conditions for these innovative ideas to continue to bubble up, while also embracing large-scale programs that are solidly informed by an evidence base. Such an approach will require some political will to tolerate failure and experimentation. A certain amount of experimentation must be tolerated to foster the development of successful programs. Close monitoring and evaluation will be required to determine what elements of what programs worked well and to identify the prospects of replication. Perhaps more importantly, monitoring and evaluation should boost the ability to share lessons from diverse programs.
• Addressing differential access to security and prevention resources — Given the likelihood that security can be more easily purchased by wealthy tenants, there should be a program of ensuring security is provided to public and social housing tenants. Furthermore, there needs to be much greater collaboration with the private security sector. There are examples where collaboration has been effective (see Prenzler 2009) and there are areas of activity (such as efforts to prevent alcohol-related crime) where the private security industry assumes considerable responsibility and is involved in working with police and other agencies. There is potential for still greater collaboration between private and public (and other) agencies. The atomised nature of private security provision could be better managed through place-based or pooled funding of security contracts. In this way, multiple organisations can benefit from purchasing security services and a wider brief given to security providers. This should all be done within strict limits.

• Expert and lay contribution — Crime prevention must be the domain of both ‘lay people’ and the ‘experts’. As Christie notes, ‘[w]ith the explosion in higher education, a great number of activities are being taken away from ordinary people’ (2009, p. 201). This, in the context of crime prevention, should be challenged. Sutton et al (2008) stress that the “ordinary” people and institutions will always possess the capacity to prevent crime’ (2008, p. 156) and therefore must be consulted and included in the development of local responses. Polyani’s (1966) tacit knowledge suggests that we know more than is ever written down. Communities, volunteers, and NGO and government staff acquire considerable knowledge about local conditions from living and working in an area over many years. This should be harnessed and utilised, and also augmented by external sources of information and knowledge.

• Multi-modal — While the different models of crime prevention should be individually pursued, there should also be greater recognition of the complementary nature of pursuing some forms of crime prevention (Edwards 2002; Knepper 2009). Moreover, there should be a concerted effort to present the merits of each model to enable greater appreciation of the impact that each offers. This can help to ensure that partisan perspectives favouring one model over another are challenged and encourage relevant actors to advocate for broad, rather than narrow, responses. The strength of the Australian approach, if such a thing
exists, is the influence of non-criminal justice disciplines. This should be maintained. Shared training opportunities should be provided, drawing on diverse models of prevention and perspectives on how best to prevent crime.

- Maintain capacity — The recent drop in (predominantly property) crime appears to have resulted in at least the partial dismantling of some forms of crime prevention infrastructure. If this continues, arrangements should be made to ensure that basic crime prevention capacities and focus are retained. The complete dismantling of a crime prevention infrastructure established over recent decades would be counter-productive. Emergency management planning regimes are instructive in this regard. Centralised and local plans are developed, and agencies are trained to respond to particular scenarios. A similar approach might be taken to ensure that spikes in crime are appropriately addressed, based on learning from recent decades.

- Tolerate failure — In some instances, crime prevention efforts have been held to a higher standard than other criminal justice programs. Prisons and offender rehabilitation efforts have been negatively evaluated. Nonetheless, they persist. Crime prevention efforts will experience problems, particularly given the challenges of implementation (Tilley 2009; Homel & Homel 2012). Consequently, there needs to be some toleration of failure, in the interest of further developing an evidence base and a suitably detailed implementation literature.

- Harmonise government boundaries — At present, there is little geographical consistency between boundaries of government (local and state) agencies. In Glebe, for example, the police Local Area Command straddles two LGAs. This means that meetings based on police boundaries require attendance of staff from two councils. However, if a meeting is based on LGA, then numerous police Local Area Commands might be required to attend. This can make coordination of local crime prevention efforts disjointed. To enable local crime prevention structures to operate more effectively, it will be crucial, at a state-wide level, to harmonise boundaries of government (state and local) agencies. The current inconsistent boundaries across local and state government agencies, and across state government agencies, pose considerable barriers to effective local coordination and service delivery. The harmonisation of these catchment areas
and government agency boundaries will ensure greater accountability to local areas and improve inter-agency relationships.

- Lead agencies — Coordination of local activities must fall to two key agencies (that is, local government and police). Local government should be responsible for CPTED, urban design, infrastructure, alcohol-free zones, graffiti management, liaison with local businesses, and community coordination activities. Police should be responsible for repeat victimisation, repeat offenders, sharing of intelligence about crime trends, and liaison with local security providers. By clearly establishing lead agency responsibilities, these two agencies will be in a better position to share data, coordinate local activities and draw on their different skills and knowledge.

- Data sharing protocol — Data sharing continues to be ad hoc. A protocol must be developed that outlines how data can be shared, who is responsible for its provision and how it should be used. However, there should be limits on data sharing and protection of sensitive data. The NSW BOCSAR currently holds considerable data and makes much of it available. Following the Hamburger Report (2012), it appears that BOCSAR will assume responsibility for aspects of data analysis for Corrective Services NSW. With continued efforts directed at reducing duplication across agencies, this trend is likely to continue, making BOCSAR the repository for a host of crime and criminal justice data. This means that there is greater opportunity to have a central agency responsible for the provision of relevant crime data, necessitating the need for a protocol to specify what data can be accessed. As argued elsewhere (Clancy 2011), the UK model provides a potential framework for NSW. Data sharing provisions under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) provide clear guidance about what data can be shared with which agencies and for what purposes. A similar arrangement in NSW would provide local crime prevention inter-agency fora with the necessary data to meaningfully plan and work toward the prevention of crime.

- Repeat victimisation —While it was not a major theme of this research, the complete absence of discussion or consideration of repeat victimisation during fieldwork suggests that it receives little or no attention. There is little evidence that work of this kind is undertaken in NSW, perhaps partially linked to the difficulties (or reluctance) of sharing data between agencies. Given the research findings of Farrell and Pease (1993), there is considerable merit in and potential
benefits of focusing on repeat victims. Therefore, a much greater priority needs to be given to preventing repeat victimisation.

- Funding model — Funding should be made available to local groups based on Weatherburn’s (2004) crime control policy framework — offences attracting public concern, volume offences, offences on the rise, levels of harm and potential harm if left unaddressed. This would be linked to a state-wide framework that highlights key priorities (crime type and hotspots), linked to the latest crime statistics. The state-wide framework would also draw together the crime prevention policies that relate to offences and issues such as domestic violence, alcohol-related crime, CPTED, early intervention, housing and prevention. This funding would be linked to both evidence-informed and locally generated program suggestions.

- Evaluation — There should be a much greater evaluation culture in NSW. While this has been discussed repeatedly over the years, the Glebe case study suggests limited execution of evaluations, especially those that meaningfully grapple with the inter-connected and inter-dependent nature of service delivery. In particular, consideration should be given to measuring the ‘collective impacts’ (Kania & Kramer, 2011, 2013) of crime prevention and related programs and activities. This will require long-term and area-wide evaluation strategies, which will require even greater skills than would ordinarily be required to evaluate discrete programs or activities.

These recommendations have been included as a way of drawing to a close the applied aspects of this analysis.

**Conclusion**

This brief chapter has brought together the key findings associated with the practice and policy aspects of crime prevention and a small number of recommendations have been made to enhance these activities.

Now attention turns to critical commentaries of crime prevention. These perspectives are ‘tested’ against the findings from the fieldwork and analysis of wider trends and policy developments. It will be argued that, all too often, commentary on, and critique of, crime prevention fails to recognise the diversity of practices that are delivered with the direct or
indirect objective of preventing crime. By failing to demonstrate the range of crime prevention activities that routinely impact on an area, there is a risk that only those measures that seek to propel a particular argument will be considered and integrated. Those wanting to suggest that we are ‘governed through crime’ tend to highlight the creep of surveillant technologies and techniques, failing to show the more benign forms of prevention. Thus, this exercise in describing and documenting the vast array of crime prevention practices challenges simple assumptions borne out of narrow constructions of crime prevention. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter 12: Criminology — Critical Perspectives and ‘Grand Narratives’

The bulk of the thesis has discussed practical aspects of crime prevention and their implementation. An abundance of policies, programs, interventions and technologies that directly or indirectly contribute to the prevention of crime have been described in some detail. While the ‘preventive turn’, reflected by this research, has been warmly received by some commentators, others are sceptical (and in some instances scathing) of the nature and impact of crime prevention.

One of the more trenchant criticisms of crime prevention relates to the inability of preventive programs to prevent crime. McDonald (1976, p. 15) suggests that there is ‘now a whole literature showing that rehabilitation programmes do not rehabilitate, and prevention programs do not prevent’ and, ‘[a]s Cohen has noted (1996), the history of crime prevention is replete with good intentions gone wrong and of hope turned to despair’ (Watts et al 2008, p. 166). In particular, it has been argued that social and community forms of prevention have returned limited demonstrable crime prevention outcomes (Homel 2007). The failure of such programs on their own terms is obviously detrimental to any attempts to justify investment in prevention. Even more troubling is evidence that some programs designed to prevent crime in fact increase it (McCord 2003). McCord reviewed evaluations of numerous social programs and identified a number that caused harm. These programs included: the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study; court volunteers; group intervention training; activities programs; and Scared Straight. Not only did evaluations of some of these programs show increases in crime by those in ‘treatment’ groups, some were also associated with other negative outcomes for participants.

In relation to the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, McCord and her research assistants invested considerable time tracing participants (some 40 years after their initial entry to the project). She found that those who had been in the treatment program were more likely to have been convicted for crimes categorised as serious street crimes, were more likely to have received a medical diagnosis as alcoholic, schizophrenic, or manic depressive, and had died an average of five years younger (McCord 2003, pp. 20–1). Obviously, these findings are cause for serious concern and provide a challenge to advocates of crime prevention.

Numerous other concerns have been raised about the rise of crime prevention, including the ability of all citizens to access security goods (public versus ‘private club goods’) (Hope
the potential to blame victims for crime (Stanko 1997), the romantic notions of ‘community’ employed (Hughes 2007), and the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ (Blagg et al 1988). In addition, these critical and cautionary theorists and commentators have argued that crime prevention has not halted the expansion of the prison industrial complex or been an antidote to ‘law and order politics’, as is argued by some proponents.

Perhaps more fundamentally, there has been considerable attention given to the role played by crime prevention in extending forms of punitive governmental intervention. Watts et al (2008) note that a ‘eugenic impulse’ ‘played an important role in shaping approaches to crime prevention until the 1930s’ (2008, p. 153) and that ‘one of the first efforts to mobilise citizens to engage in crime prevention was the exercise undertaken by the German Gestapo in the 1930s’ (2008, p. 157). And since Foucault (1977) documented the spread of the carceral archipelago and Cohen (1985, p. 38) warned that the ‘benevolent-sounding destructuring package [of community corrections] had turned out to be a monster in disguise, a Trojan horse’, great attention has been dedicated to monitoring the expanding reach of the state.

Stenson sums up fears about being swept into the net of state control:

Punitive sovereign technologies aim to regain control over disorderly populations and areas, for example, through the disruption and control of open drugs and prostitution markets, homeless beggars, street robbers and ‘anti-social behaviour’. The goal is to improve the quality of urban life for the majority, and to drive offenders, the homeless, graffiti taggers and psychologically damaged from public spaces, reconquered for mainstream economic and social life (2005, p. 275).

Thus, for some, crime prevention infrastructure has been grafted onto the ‘crime control complex’, resulting in more sophisticated ways of policing, surveilling, managing and controlling particular groups (Watts et al 2008) — a form of ‘biopolitics’ (Borch 2005).

Borch (2005) makes the following claim about contemporary crime prevention:

[I]n the name of prevention, ever-new social and material technologies are invented to regulate the life of ordinary citizens ... the rationality of crime prevention amounts to an almost totalitarian biopolitical strategy, as it focuses on virtually all dimensions of life: our health, the way we live, our identities, how we play, the way we move, our relations to neighbours, etc (2005, p. 91).
Adopting a Foucaultian analysis, Borch charts various dimensions of crime prevention as forms of governing conduct. Borch (2005) variously suggests that virtually no boundaries are set for the crime prevention enterprise; that ‘virtually every aspect of life may now be regulated in the name of crime prevention’ (2005, p. 102); and that the ‘rationality of crime prevention seems to have a very expansive character that knows no natural limits’ (2005, p. 103). He argues that, ‘[i]n short, the idea of crime prevention as it is currently presented amounts to a principally all-encompassing and boundless power, a biopolitical power that contains totalitarian traits’ (2005, p. 102).

These diverse swirling critical commentaries (in part) coalesce in various ‘grand narratives’. ‘Governing through crime’ (Simon 2007), ‘governing fear of crime’ (Lee 2007), ‘governing uncertainty’ (Ericson 2007) and ‘governing through antisocial behaviour’ (Crawford 2009a) are some of the key ‘grand narratives’ emerging in recent years. While each deal with different phenomena, focus on different geographical areas, and employ different epistemological traditions, many shared themes (and concerns) emerge across the different accounts. Together, they represent a major force within criminology.

Each ‘grand narrative’ (and associated concepts) will be briefly introduced in this chapter. Their treatment of crime prevention will also be discussed, which will then be considered in light of the findings from the Glebe case study. This will help to test or interrogate the fit of these theoretical perspectives with the findings from this research. Ultimately, it will be argued that these critical perspectives insufficiently attend to the small-scale, social-welfare oriented forms of crime prevention revealed through the Glebe case study and have a tendency toward pessimistic and catastrophic commentary, which closes off alternative, more optimistic and positive, readings. Rather than descend into a ‘dismal’ criminology, an alternative is recommend — a ‘utopian realist criminology’ (Loader 1998). Such an approach balances critical, normative, and practical considerations, and advocates ways to meaningfully address crime and, in so doing, overcomes the limitations of the treatment of crime prevention by these perspectives.

‘Governing through Crime’
Simon’s (2007) ‘governing through crime’ thesis advances the argument that crime has become an organising principle pervading various policy domains and institutions. He suggests that ‘crime has become so central to the exercise of authority in America, by
everyone from the president of the United States to the classroom teacher, that it will take a concerted effort by Americans themselves to dislodge it’ (2007, p. 4).

Simon’s self-proclaimed intention of his book, Governing through Crime: how the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear, is to draw attention to how governing through crime is ‘making America less democratic and more racially polarised; … exhausting our social capital and repressing our capacity for innovation’ (2007, p. 5).

Simon covers significant terrain in developing his thesis. He considers the rise of mass imprisonment, criminal law ‘reform’, the role of the judiciary, workplace reforms, and the roles of schools and families in ‘governing through crime’. Attempts to prevent crime, while not a core focus of his analysis, are treated as part of the trend toward ‘governing through crime’. For example, he states that:

As other institutions, from preschools through colleges, ratchet up the significance of behaviour they deem criminal or crimelike, governing the crime risk of one’s children has become a major concern for parents in all social classes. For those with sufficient economic means, the new initiatives to police the family are simply the other side of the new social contract they have consented to by living in gated communities, sending their children to high-security schools, and shopping in high-security malls. For these parents, the policing of the family is likely to be delegated to the same kind of professional security-oriented services that already manage so much of the lived environment (Simon 2007, p. 200).

Among other concerns, it is apparent that Simon is concerned with unequal access to security — a theme that has been addressed by other commentators. The unequal distribution of security and the changing urban landscape provide inequitable outcomes. In particular, considerable attention has been paid to the impact of neo-liberalism. As outlined in Chapter 3, neo-liberalism embraces market-based solutions, strives for small government, and promotes individual responsibility. In this context, the distribution of security becomes linked to market and purchasing power, creating winners and losers. Those who have the means to purchase security devices, to live in gated communities or more affluent suburbs, to drive motor vehicles with the latest security features, and to consume in ‘mass private property’ (Shearing & Stenning 1983) enjoy the benefits of privatised security. This
alignment with market conditions means that people are excluded from the ‘club good’ (Zedner 2009) or the ‘clubbing of private security’ (Hope 2000).

One tangible manifestation of this differential access to security relates to different security levels of owned versus rented properties. According to an Australian Bureau of Statistics Crime and Safety Survey, rental homes have a significantly higher break-in victimisation rate (4.7 per cent) than homes that are owned or being purchased (2.9 per cent) (ABS 2006). In part, this could be explained by the differential use of residential security devices. Table 13 shows differences between security devices deployed for owned and rented properties in Australia, with greater employment of security devices in residential properties occupied by the owner, compared with rental properties.

**Table 13: Residential Security Features for Owned and Rented Properties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Features</th>
<th>Owned/Purchased (%)</th>
<th>Rented (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deadlocks</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen doors</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside lighting — sensors</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car in driveway</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ABS 1998.\(^{125}\)

Hope (2000) contends that it is not only the ability to purchase private security that matters, but also the ability to use capital to avoid crime risks (2000, p. 102). Consequently, it is the security ‘club good’ that derives from living in areas with low crime risks, augmented by the high-security practices that result in low residential crime. In this case, it is not just the inability to purchase security devices, but also the forces of the housing market that work against the best interests of the poor.

Certainly, private security services and products thrive in a neoliberal market economy (and especially during periods of high crime). Some estimates suggest significant and unending growth of the private security sector: ‘The growth rate generally for security products and services was from 12 to 15% annually, and there is no sign of slowing. Rapid advances in

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\(^{125}\) More recent Australian data could not be located.
electronic technology create new opportunities almost daily’ (Fischer & Green 1998, p. 25).126

Thus, in contrast with those who have the means to purchase commodified security products and enjoy the benefits derived from housing market conditions and spatial crime trends, there are those ‘half citizens’ (Murphy et al 2011) found on the ‘lowest rung’ (Peel 2003), forced to live in ‘sink estates’, struggling on diminishing ‘mutually-obliged’ welfare ‘benefits’ (Saunders 2002), in dire poverty and socially excluded (Saunders 2011), immersed in ‘delinquent-prone communities’ (Weatherburn & Lind 2001) with few ‘capable guardians’ (Cohen & Felson 1979) who have few opportunities to protect themselves against crime. Therefore, ‘[a]lthough security is held up as a public good, the manner in which it is pursued too often tends to erode trust and other attributes of the good society (Zedner 2009, p. 151) reinforcing (and perhaps accelerating) old lines of structural disadvantage.

So, not only are we ‘governed through crime’, but market conditions ensure unequal access to security and forms of prevention.

**Governing Fear of Crime**

Lee (2007) provides a comprehensive genealogy of fear of crime, tracing the emergence and growing use of the concept and phrase from the mid-1960s. In particular, Lee argues that the convergence of different domains propelled fear of crime to the fore:

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126 Others have been more conservative in their estimates of the growth of the private security industry. Sarre and Prenzler (2005) attempted to quantify the size and growth of the private security industry in Australia. They identified numerous challenges to accurately estimating the size of this sector. For example, are debt collectors, locksmiths, trainers, consultants, alarm installers, and CCTV control room operators all considered to be part of the security industry? There are also difficulties associated with simple comparisons that have been frequently used between the number of security personnel and the number of sworn police officers, as there are greater part-time and casualisation arrangements in private security than in public policing. Despite these (and other limitations) of available data, Sarre and Prenzler note that ‘[a]vailable figures suggest that the Australian security industry does not appear to be as large, nor to be growing as rapidly, as some sensational and alarmist accounts would have us believe’ (2005, p. 21). Recent attempts by Sarre and Prenzler to measure the size of the Australian security industry reveal that the number of security personnel has been growing at a rate greater than the rate of growth of police and the general population, but has slowed since the turn of the century. They estimate that the total income of the Australian security industry was A$4.4 billion in 2005–06 (Prenzler et al 2009, p. 5).
The coming together of anxieties, politics and the social scientific knowledge of disciplines like criminology gave the notion or concept of fear of crime a foothold. Moreover, when fear of crime was named, thus also becoming a quantifiable and observable object, it was transformed into something that began to have strong political purchase (2007, pp. 56–7).

Once identified, fear of crime began to become a focus of governmental action. Local crime and victims’ surveys helped to quantify this emergent ‘fear of crime’ and to encourage attention to the amelioration of this fear. No longer was it sufficient to work toward controlling crime; it also became a goal of government agencies to allay fears of crime. Relevant policy documents began to assume the language of fear of crime, and education programs and reassurance campaigns were established to challenge the ‘irrational’ fear of crime. Advice from insurance companies, policing bodies, local government and national institutions encourages self-policing tactics to minimise opportunities for crime or threats to personal safety. These messages, Lee argues, create a ‘fear of crime feedback loop’, in which measures adopted to enhance security feed fears, requiring even further measures to bolster security (similar to Zedner’s (2009) paradoxes of the ‘pursuit of security’).

In this way, the ‘fearing subject’ becomes ‘responsibilised’:

We do not have to delve too deeply to discover also that fear is often used as a tactic of governance in instructing individuals to take preventative measures, in conducting conduct, in order to reduce the risk of crime and victimisation; a governance-through-
fear. That is to say, we are to be sensitised, through governmental instruction or advice, and constantly expected to evaluate, police, govern and insure our bodies and property against the wrongdoings of others. This is a form of bio-politics aimed at the government of the self (2007, p. 141).

In this sense, fear of crime has been a further catalyst for the proliferation of various industries (for example, private security) and products (for example, residential security) in recent decades. Further, Lee argues that ‘fear of crime is a major concern of contemporary crime prevention strategies and programmes’ (2007, p. 141). He draws attention to numerous policies and plans that include the reduction of the fear of crime alongside the prevention of crime as governmental objectives. Lee uses information from police websites, and brochures from insurance, shopping centre management and real estate companies to demonstrate the ‘safety talk’ engaged in by these organisations. Often targeted directly at women, these forms
of ‘educational’ materials and publicity campaigns have been heavily criticised for ‘victim blaming’ — a concern vigorously picked up by others.

A controversial arena in which these campaigns have been attempted, and perhaps most illustrative of a ‘bio-politics aimed at the government of the self’, involves the prevention of sexual assault (Stanko 1997; Egger 1997; Campbell 2005). Pamphlets warn women (the bulk of this advice is directed toward women) to be vigilant, cautious and wary as they go about their everyday routines. Drawing on the routine activities theory, it is presumed that the coming together of a motivated offender with a suitable target, in the absence of capable guardians, is grounds for a sexual assault to occur. Consequently, women are advised to alter their routine activities, avoid public places, wear ‘non-provocative’ clothing, and to stay in the presence of a (male) guardian who will have the ability to repel any motivated offenders. This form of Garland’s ‘criminologies of the self’ (1996) has particular consequences for women. As Stanko notes, ‘what this means for women, in effect, is that we are asked (and expected) to see the ordinary as risky’, which takes a ‘special toll on all of us’ (1997, pp. 492).

Campbell’s frustrations with these messages are reflective of much feminist criminological commentary and research. The bulk of these ‘safekeeping’ messages are invariably directed to women, not men, and perpetuate assumptions about masculinity, femininity, sexuality, vulnerability, strength, and private versus public dangers. Campbell further notes that:

> what appears as a humanistic endeavour to keep ‘women’ safe is, on closer inspection, a disciplinary force which (unknowingly) colludes with a binary logic which naturalises participated gendered bodies which creates a structure under which rape is made to be inevitable, and hence ultimately unstoppable (2005, p. 131).

Thus, not only do these messages deeply inscribe and prescribe daily experiences and expectations of women, they also perpetuate a logic that enables sexual assault, rather than prevents it. And as Stanko highlights: ‘As the debate turns to discussions of risk avoidance, and especially that avoidance which can be orchestrated by individuals themselves, there is a failure to engage with the wider debate about unsafety arising from structural disadvantages’ (2000, p. 27).

Leaving aside the wider gendered nature of these crime prevention messages, Rosenbaum et al (1998) raise concerns about the efficacy of some of the messages. They suggest that:
the traditional advice dispensed by police departments ... [in the US] might not lead to the best outcome for the victim. For years, women have been told to remain passive and not fight back in sexual assault situations. However, research indicates that resistance is generally an effective means of rape avoidance (1998, p. 88).

So these crime prevention measures run the risk of ‘victim blaming’ and also potentially provide inaccurate information that might have adverse consequences for those following their advice.

Thus, crime prevention educational materials and publicity campaigns may provide inaccurate advice, and risk blaming victims for their behaviour and restrict the routine activities of segments of society (especially women). ‘Crime talk’, ‘safety speech’, ‘safekeeping’ messages and the like have a tendency to reinforce gendered beliefs about acceptable and unacceptable behaviours, and to further promote a fear of crime, which, according to the ‘fear of crime feedback loop’, fuels further attempts of ‘pursuing security’. And as Zedner has argued, this ‘pursuit of security’ presumes the persistence of threat and exacerbates feelings of insecurity (2009, pp. 144–51).

**Governing through Uncertainty**

It has been suggested by some sociologists and social commentators that life became more uncertain and fragmented throughout the latter part of the last century (Bauman 2007; Young 2007; Ericson 2007). Significant changes to family structures, including an increase of numbers of people living alone (Furedi 2002), falling fertility rates in many developed countries (Livi-Bacci 2012), and increased geographical separation of extended family members (Felson 2002; Felson & Boba 2010); reduced employment certainty with unemployment and the transformation of the labour market (increased casualisation, restructuring, international competitiveness) (Pusey 2003); and greater mobility and increasingly pluralistic societies (Bauman 2007) are just some of the issues contributing to feelings of insecurity. Some commentators have suggested that this resulted in increasing levels of mental illness (Eckersley 2004).

The risks of late modernity have become, some would argue, an organising principle (Beck 1992). While the actual dimensions of the rise of risk-based thinking might be disputed, risk as a concept has significantly grown in prominence in recent decades. Risk assessment, risk shedding, risk mitigation, ‘at-risk’ populations and other associated terms have entered common parlance across varied disciplines. Risks of crime are to be managed by
‘responsibilised’ individuals (O’Malley & Hutchinson 2007), as they are no longer the preserve of police or the government (Johnston & Shearing 2003). ‘Gated communities’ are marketed as a way of providing security and reducing risks of victimisation (Lee 2007; Cheshire et al 2010), forming part of a growing ‘socio-spatial archipelago’ in which ‘socio-spatial networks of leisure, schooling and the workplace are linked via paths which provide various forms of privatised sanctuary from unwanted social contact’ (2007, p. 177).

Ericson (2007) picks up many of these themes (and those explored by Simon and Lee). Risk, uncertainty, fear, terrorism, private security, surveillance and neoliberalism are some of the targets of analysis. Ericson extends the focus beyond these concepts by also considering changes in social security and the underlying conceptualisation of risk and uncertainty in this context.

Ericson (2007) contends that ‘the family, community associations, schools, healthcare, welfare, business enterprise, and insurance — has a distinctive approach to criminalisation based on its own private justice system and mobilisation of the surveillant assemblage’ (2007, p. 2). Multiple organisations are complicit in, and contribute to, ‘surveillant assemblages’ that have grown up in the ‘age of uncertainty’. In particular, Ericson suggests that ‘one is no longer just passing through private security “bubbles of governance” (Shearing 1998; Rigakos and Greener 2000), but rather caught up in streams of governance effectively managed by a multinational private security company’ (2007, p. 184). Various forms of crime prevention, many involving technological hardware, have become woven into this analysis as evidence of overall attempts to ‘govern uncertainty’.

Consistent with Ericson’s analysis, surveillance society theorists such as Lyon (2007) point to the rise in techniques to sort, categorise, monitor and surveil, including apparently innocuous store loyalty cards. Numerous commentators (Norris & Armstrong 1999; Coleman et al 2002; Parenti 2003; Coleman 2004, among others) have demonstrated the rise of CCTV systems and their impact on the marginalised, homeless and those least able to conform to the consumerist norms of the aspirational economic zones of town centres. The regulation of the night-time economy found in town centres frequently involves communication between licensees about ‘problem patrons’, including radio networks connecting different public and private policing agencies (Coleman & McCahill 2011), and the sharing of photos (Hadfield et al 2009), and increasingly involves the use of identity scanners to record and retain details of patrons (Palmer et al 2012).
In different and complex ways, crime, fear, uncertainty and insecurity necessitate greater governance, intrusion, and surveillance. This ‘culture of control’ (Garland 2001) becomes all pervasive, with crime prevention playing a supporting role.

**Governing through Antisocial Behaviour**

Crawford (2009a) charts recent developments in antisocial behaviour policies in the UK. He argues that:

> as a policy domain through which low-level crime, incivility and disorder are governed, the focus on ASB [antisocial behaviour] fulfils a number of wider strategic governmental objectives. It serves as a precursor to crime promoting pre-emption and prevention (2009, p. 816).

In this way, crime prevention becomes equated with the proliferation of regimes and structures focused on addressing ‘antisocial behaviour’.

This rise of ‘governance through anti-social behaviour’ (Crawford 2009a) through the expansion and use of police powers to disperse and move on, and to fine, arrest and detain people for non-criminal behaviour, is further example of this overall trend toward greater state (and private) forms of intervention in the name of preventing crime. Ever-increasing minor incivilities or ‘antisocial behaviours’, however defined, become the focus for ever expanding state (and its agents) intervention.

These ‘grand narratives’ and related critical perspectives paint a dark picture of life in late modernity to which methods of crime prevention have contributed.

**Limitations of the Critical Perspectives and ‘Grand Narratives’**

This necessarily limited synopsis of critical perspectives and recent ‘grand narratives’ demonstrates at least some of the ways that crime prevention has been treated by or included in these narratives. Charting the exact nuanced treatment of crime prevention by each of these critical perspectives and ‘grand narratives’ is a task of some complexity. This overview generally demonstrates how crime prevention has been taken by each author to represent one dimension of his or her thesis.

Developing ‘grand narratives’ of this kind requires the integration of numerous developments, trends and concepts, which invariably means that decisions will be made about
which examples (including examples of crime prevention) are integrated and which ones are discarded. As Shaftoe (2004) has noted:

[A]cademics in the social sciences, who rigorously provide evidence and references for every statement and assertion, make subjective choices about emphasis (what they choose to cover and what they leave out), in order to put their own world view and political sympathies in the best possible light (2004, pp. 7–8).

It is argued that this process of subjectively selecting to focus on particular issues or examples that are consistent with an overall thesis is one reason why caution should be exercised in accepting all aspects of these critical perspectives and ‘grand narratives’. As will be shown here, there are a number of reasons to be cautious in adopting these perspectives as they relate to or address crime prevention.

As important as these ‘grand narratives’ and critical commentaries are, it is argued that they are overly pessimistic and dystopian. The suggestions that ‘the rationality of crime prevention amounts to an almost totalitarian biopolitical strategy’ (Borch 2005) paints a dark picture of crime prevention. The prominence given to CCTV, CPTED and situational techniques, and the ease in which they are integrated into commentaries about the ‘fortress society’ or Orwellian images of ‘Big Brother’, create an environment in which senses are highly attuned to potentially punitive, controlling techniques that criminalise and marginalise, and to programs that fail to deliver prevention outcomes. Examples are quickly integrated into the wider corpus of evidence decrying the creep of the criminal justice system, the reach of the state, the privatisation of punishment and the like. Important as these vigilant perspectives are, this ‘theorising of convenience’ ignores examples to the contrary, and fails to grapple with minor and frequently opaque practices revealed in this thesis.

This tendency toward pessimistic or dystopian commentary has been identified as a trend within criminology. Braithwaite has suggested that ‘criminologists are pessimists and cynics’ (1992, p. 1, 1998, p. 49). Matthews (2009, p. 357) concurs, suggesting that criminology ‘has a long history of pessimism and impossibilism’. Zedner goes further, suggesting that criminology is a ‘dismal science’:

[C]riminology, no less than economics, is a dismal science inclined to negativity and critique, and less positively disposed toward normative theorizing. Criminologists are
apart to think that detached, ironic observation of malfunction, failure, or paradox is a worthy substitute for positive critical endeavour (2012, p. 280).

O’Malley (2010) has warned against this pessimism of a ‘critical’ discipline and cautioned against ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ (2000) that fail to recognise countervailing forces. Moreover, he warns that a ‘whole generation of criminologists is being educated and trained in the shadow of such pessimism, whereas it can be argued that the terrain of crime control is a good deal less stable and more optimistic than would be supposed from such interpretations’ (2008b, p. 62). Lacombe (1996) highlights how key theorists have tended to equate criminal justice reforms with ‘widening the net of social control’ (Cohen) and with ‘reform talk’ (Ericson), in which ‘law reform is nothing more than a rhetorical tool used to ensure the reproduction of the necessary oppressive “order of things”’ (1996, pp. 335–6).

Similarly, Loader (1998) highlights that a danger of a critical criminology (or in Loader’s term, ‘anticriminology’) is the reinforcement of the ‘public belief that criminology (radical or otherwise) either has nothing to say about pressing social concerns, or else can only contribute to public discourse a “rubbishing” of the ill-informed claims of others’ (1998, p. 204).

These ‘dismal’ commentaries of crime prevention are contested, especially through the findings of local case studies. For example, detailed local case studies from the UK challenge these perspectives. Hughes has observed:

Driven on by the totalitarian vision of certain readings of Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (1977) and popularised by Stanley Cohen (1985), most radical commentators have explained such developments as community policing and community-based crime prevention as an invidious extension and blurring of the institutional boundaries of social control into the institutional domain of civil society in general and the lives of the poor, vulnerable and criminalised most specifically … Despite the importance of this radical thesis in connecting trends in crime prevention to wider transformations in social control in contemporary capitalist democracies, this dystopian, totalising picture both overplays the significance of such community-based initiatives and underplays the complexity and contradictory tendencies of such developments in specific contexts and locales (Hughes 2002, p. 28).
This very much resonates with the findings from this thesis. As has been shown, the Glebe case study also calls into question the veracity of some totalising tendencies of some commentaries.

The focus on local, and often very local, dynamics and practices in the UK (which served as a partial guide to this thesis and should serve as an ongoing yardstick for Australian analyses) provide further challenges. It is through this work that Hughes (2002) is able to challenge dystopian totalitarian visions as illustrated above; that Edwards is able to explain that ‘advocates of community safety routinely combine situational and social crime prevention measures in the belief that these are complementary rather than mutually exclusive’ (2002, p. 156); that Foster can conclude that ‘bottom-up approaches which involve and work with communities are vital to successful crime prevention but these have to work alongside attempts to tackle structural disadvantage’ (2002, p. 179); and that Hallsworth is able to observe based on his study of crime prevention and community safety in south London that:

Far from conceiving what looks like ‘soft-edge’ developments such as community safety in Cohen’s terms as indicative of an ominous dispersal of disciple, I prefer to interpret them in a more benign way. This would also chime well, I believe, with the benevolent and non-repressive motives of most local crime control practitioners. People like community safety officers, workers in organisations such as Youth Offending Teams and Drug Action Teams as well as outreach workers, youth workers and other support workers do not see themselves as agents of an oppressive state (2002, pp. 212–13).

Detailed local analyses (like the above studies and the findings from the Glebe case study) challenge the generalisations about crime prevention common in some ‘grand narratives’ and critical perspectives. Overly critical perspectives lose the capacity to identify, isolate and celebrate particular approaches that might be productive. As has been shown, much crime prevention activity in Glebe operates through three dimensions — the ‘socialisation of crime policy’; a ‘culture of care’; and ‘prevention through reassurance’ — which might be helping to breathe life back into social and penal welfarism (Brown 2012). Blanket condemnation or integration of ‘crime prevention’ in its broad, messy totality, into critical perspectives risks positive approaches being missed.

Similarly, in these commentaries there is little acknowledgement of the slower speed of Australia to join the ‘surveillance revolution’ than the UK (Sutton & Wilson 2004) and the
sober analysis of the growth of the private security sector in Australia (Prenzler et al 2009). Rather, inflammatory stories or data, often from other jurisdictions, are utilised. The commonly North American commentary about gated communities is assimilated into local commentary, despite suggestions that gated communities have never really flourished in the same way in Australia as they have in North America (Lawes 2013). Furthermore, the antisocial behaviour agenda has not been as readily adopted here as in the UK (Martin 2011), despite what some might claim (see Osmond 2010), which is further reason to be cautious about willingly accepting all features of these ‘grand narratives’.

Another basis for caution about reading too much into commentaries that graft crime prevention onto somewhat pessimistic ‘grand narratives’ is their underlying motivation for developing particular narratives. For example, Simon (2007) admits that his ‘governing through crime’ thesis is, in part, polemical and ‘perhaps overstated’ (2007, p. 4). To make people notice and to challenge the orthodoxy, it may be necessary to carefully select policy areas for analysis. Examples that are contrary to the main thrust of the thesis, in this context, might be given less or little attention. Simon’s analysis and writing seek to be provocative. His intention is to draw attention to how ‘governing through crime’ is making America less democratic, more fearful and will not make people more secure (2007, p. 5). Because of this, it is perhaps inevitable that identification and discussion of molecular activities are forsaken for broader trends. But in so doing, it is argued, important characteristics are lost. The detailed chronicling of crime prevention activities in Glebe and in NSW captured by this thesis deliberately reacts against the dangers of such grand theorising. The spirit of many programs and interventions might well be missed if policy documents are taken to represent the nature of particular activities.

Another reason for caution is the fact that much of criminology in the last century was set against and in response to rising crime rates (Young 2004) and associated developments. Perhaps it is unsurprising that criminology was ‘dismal’ under these circumstances. But the significant crime decline in recent decades places an onus on criminology as a discipline to try to understand and explain this decline. It has been noted by a number of commentators that the crime decline has, to date, received very limited criminological coverage (Zimring 2007; van Dijk et al 2012; Weatherburn & Holmes 2013a, 2013b).

It has been observed that the size and sustained nature of the crime decline suggests that something has gone right in recent decades (Knepper 2012). Given Skogan’s observations
that the crime drop ‘could be attributed to community and prevention factors’, as well as ‘policing and the changing character of crime’ (2006, p. 20), there is significant merit in attempting to better understand the causes of the crime decline. A greater understanding of the causes of the decline offer the possibility of being able to better invest in effective programs or to support promising initiatives. If Felson is correct, then the crime decline is perhaps indicative of modern societies learning how to ‘control their crime extremes’ (2012, p. 283). While this will be considered by some as premature, there is obviously much to be gained by better understanding the causes of crime decline.

The relative recency of the ‘crime decline’ might be a factor in cautioning against adoption of the ‘grand narratives’. There is a long gestation period involved in developing narratives of this kind. Distilling and synthesising such broad trends, developments, policies and programs invariably requires the investment of considerable time over many years. Simon and Lee both refer to the lengthy deliberative periods prior to their publications being released. Given the general recency of the crime decline in NSW and Australia and the likely lag between falls in crime and policy responses, it is unlikely that Lee (using an Australian example) could have adequately integrated these falls in crime and any associated impacts (if there have been any) into his analysis. Examples employed by Lee to support particular observations often date from the early to mid-1990s, which we now know was a time of ‘peak crime’. Perhaps re-analysis today would generate considerably different findings. Nonetheless, the nature of publishing means that there is often a lengthy gap between the research being conducted and the publication being released. The impact of this and other ‘grand narratives’ continues, despite the potentially time-limited nature of some assertions.

In addition, there are real dangers in transposing commentaries and analyses from one jurisdiction to another (remembering that Simon was writing in the context of the US; Crawford in the context of the UK). For example, the utility of Crawford’s ‘governing through antisocial behaviour’ thesis beyond the UK is open to some debate. Despite what some have claimed (see Osmond 2010), it is argued that NSW (and possibly Australia) has not embraced the ‘antisocial behaviour’ program as readily as the UK (Martin 2011). This raises an important point regarding the importation of concepts and theories from elsewhere.

Sutton and Wilson suggest that while ‘Australia achieved formal independence from Britain more than a century ago, legacies from our colonial history … are considerable’ (2004, p. 310). They argue further that:
Australian criminologists continue to rely far more on British journals and key texts … than on theory from North America or continental Europe … The consequence of this lingering influence is a tendency to perceive innovations in Australian crime policy and social control merely as variants of grand narratives being played out in the British context (2004, p. 310).

Braithwaite referred to the 1970s as the ‘British decade in criminology’ (1998, p. 47). The 1990s and early 2000s could equally be described as the British decade(s) of crime prevention and community safety. Given the significant investment in and associated research into crime prevention practices in the UK in recent decades, and the tendency to look to the UK to inform local policy development and criminological discourse (Braithwaite 2012), it is unsurprising that a considerable amount of crime prevention literature and practice in Australia has been heavily influenced by the UK body of work.

While experiences in the UK have some relevance to Australia, there is a risk that any policy transfer127 or application of research findings will fail to recognise the substantial differences in climate, geography, urban planning, culture, demography and the like. The limited relevance of ‘governing through antisocial behaviour’ (Crawford 2009a) and the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ discourses, and the slower speed of Australia to join the ‘surveillance revolution’ than the UK (Sutton & Wilson 2004) are some of the many reasons why literature from the UK (and other northern metropoles) has limited relevance to the Australian experience.

This raises questions about not only the utility of applying imported constructs and commentaries in Australia, but also the practical engagement with the breadth and mess of crime prevention as depicted by the Glebe case study. It is argued that greater grounding of theory as suggested by Connell (2007) is required so that there is greater engagement and recognition of these often inconsistent, small-scale initiatives. This would dampen the tendency of ‘grand narratives’ to conflate particular incidents, policies or movements from various jurisdictions and apply them to the Australian context.

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127 The complexities of policy transfer and the different models offered to describe policy transfer, suggested by Jones and Newburn (2002), will not be canvassed here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to accept that UK legislation, policies and practices have influenced Australian crime prevention.
These observations should not be taken as an outright rejection of critical perspectives or these ‘grand narratives’. On the contrary, commentary and analyses of this kind provide a crucial reminder of the negative consequences of benign intentions. McCord (2003) has importantly shown the negative unintended consequences of various crime prevention programs; Hogg and Brown (1998) caution that some forms of prevention will only ever be available to those with the capacity to afford them; and Norris and Armstrong (1999), Coleman (2002, 2004), Lyon (2007) and others highlight the dangers of seemingly benign surveillance technologies. Moreover, Simon (2007), Lee (2007), Ericson (2007) and Crawford (2009a) have documented, in detail, important and worrying developments. Those who are closely governed in Glebe (as discussed in Chapter 8) share some of the experiences and intrusions captured by these critical perspectives. Those young people banned from the local shopping centre, the individuals directed to tip out the contents of their liquor bottles in alcohol-free zones, and the families who receive numerous bail checks throughout the night no doubt feel that their lives are caught up in expanding state (and private) agency powers and demands.

However, this is only part of the overall picture. As has been noted, there are a very small number of public space CCTV cameras operating in Glebe; many physical upgrades of the area provide amenities to all visitors and residents; the shopping centre contributes financially and in other ways to local youth programs; and social and community-based programs seek to provide opportunities to those experiencing hardship and disadvantage. The ‘grand narratives’ do not tend to reflect these alternative, often small-scale, social-welfare-oriented practices.

Ultimately, it is a question of emphasis. Partial engagement with crime prevention through isolating and highlighting particular approaches without engaging with crime prevention in its broad messiness renders any such analysis unstable. Balancing these different narratives is a task of some complexity, requiring acknowledgement of the dangers of prevention (and related developments), while also being open to its benefits.

Any claims about ‘crime prevention’ as some unitary concept should be treated cautiously. As has been systematically demonstrated, such different rationalities and logics operate and inform diverse types of crime prevention, rendering simple pronouncements — ‘dismal’ or sympathetic — problematic. Much greater attention needs to be given to explaining what crime prevention is taken to include and what examples are included/excluded from analysis.
This might then provide a more nuanced, and therefore more accurate, commentary of crime prevention.

This is not purely a matter of semantics. There are very real repercussions from too readily drawing assumptions and making pronouncements about ‘crime prevention’ writ large based on a small number of models or methods of crime prevention. Effective and promising initiatives will be tarnished equally with those methods that do have unintended consequences, rendering it more likely that support for particular crime prevention approaches will be withdrawn. Given that many of the activities that could be labelled as ‘crime prevention’ in Glebe are more akin to social-welfare traditions championed by various (particularly more radical or critical) strains of criminology, this could ultimately prove counter-productive. Too readily grafting ‘crime prevention’ onto critical perspectives might result in the diminution of programs and initiatives to which these critics might be sympathetic.

A ‘Utopian Realist Criminology’

Given the identified limitations of these critical perspectives, and acknowledging the importance of retaining an appropriately critical form of analysis, there is merit in considering what an alternative criminological approach might embody. While Carlen (1998) has observed and cautioned against the tendency in criminology to establish particular ‘brands’, one approach that enables both relevant critical and applied perspectives to co-exist is a ‘utopian realist criminology’ (Loader 1998; Hughes 2007). Such an approach:

endeavours to connect issues of crime and social regulation with questions of ethics and politics, and enter the public conversation about crime equipped with an articulated, principled and future-oriented set of normative values and political objectives (the utopianism). But is also seeks to engage with the realpolitik of crime and criminal justice, and formulate (for example, crime reduction) proposals that have some immanent purchase on the world (the realism). This approach is one that seeks to be simultaneously ‘in’ and ‘against’ criminology; it aims to be policy-relevant, while setting out to challenge and shift the established boundaries of relevance. It recognises the tensions that exist between the practice of knowledge production, and that of politics, and strives to keep such tensions alive (and fruitful) through a refusal to collapse one of its constituent poles into the other (1998, p. 205).
This neatly captures the balance that emerges from this research. There is evidence that crime prevention can be detrimental (McCord 2003). There is also evidence that less is known about preventive efforts than would be ideal (English et al. 2002) and that there have been broad changes in economic conditions, government regulation, and life opportunities that adversely affect many (Bauman 2007; Young 2007). However, there is now considerable evidence that crime prevention can be and has been effective (Sherman et al. 1997, 2002, 2006; Clarke 1997), and that many countries are experiencing significant falls in crime (van Dijk 2012), partially, it seems, due to particular approaches to preventing crime (Farrell 2013).

A utopian realist criminology seeks, according to Loader (1998), to be systematic, normative in orientation, and prudent. In this way, and through its treatment of crime prevention, based on these tenets, it would seek to do the difficult work of constructing sociological explanation (that is, being systematic); take normative theorising seriously; and have a practical intent (that is, being prudent) (Loader 1998, pp. 206–7). A criminology of this orientation, it is argued, would better grapple with and contribute to crime prevention policy, practice and theorising.

Moreover, it is argued that a utopian realist criminology should seek to ‘re-invent the welfarist theme’ (Knepper 2007, p. viii). Given the findings of this research, there is clearly significant investment in and commitment to social-welfare approaches. While there has undoubtedly been a winding back of the welfare state in Australia in recent decades, there is still much scope for criminology to breathe life into and support social-welfare approaches to crime.

Similarly, a utopian realist criminology should heed Cullen’s call that ‘a “good criminology” pursues the “good society”’ (as cited by Knepper 2007, p. 27). For Sutton et al. (2008), this includes a vision premised on the notion of social inclusion; one which allows and promotes maximum liberty, ‘while simultaneously promising safety and security for all’ (2008, p. 157); and one that involves building positive community relationships. As recommended in Chapter 11, the development of an ethical framework and greater thinking about an ‘ethics of prevention’ is required.

Ideally, a utopian realist criminology interested in crime prevention would incorporate features of a ‘positive criminology’ (Ronel & Elisha 2011). ‘Positive criminology’ refers to a more optimistic criminology, rather than a positivist criminology as might be traditionally
inferred. Related developments of a ‘positive psychology’ are instructive here. Positive psychology is less interested in mental illness and deficit; rather, it is focused on achieving mental health and a fulfilling life. A ‘positive criminology’ in this way might focus more on desistance and prevention than deviance and recidivism, and might celebrate the crime decline (whatever its causes). Adoption of strength and asset-based approaches more common in other disciplines (Green & Haines 2008) would also form part of this utopian realist criminology.

Irrespective of whether such a criminology takes hold, it is hoped that this research will at least be considered as a salve for the dire predictions and commentaries commonly found in ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ (O’Malley 2000).

Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the second aim of this thesis — interrogating key criminological ‘grand narratives’ and critical perspectives with the findings from the Glebe case study. In folding back the findings arising from the analysis of the programs and activities in Glebe that directly or ‘serendipitously’ (Challinger 1992) contribute to the prevention of crime (and from the analysis of the history of local crime prevention in NSW and contemporary policies contributing to the prevention of crime) onto some aspects of the critical criminological commentary, features of the ‘grand narratives’ were found to be overly pessimistic. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the ‘dismal’ orientation of criminology (Braithwaite 1992, 1998; O’Malley 2000; Zedner 2012), narratives have cast crime prevention as a ‘biopolitical power that contains totalitarian traits’ (Borch 2005, p. 102) or a part of the movement toward being ‘governed through crime’ (Simon 2007), ‘governed through fear of crime’ (Lee 2007), ‘governed through uncertainty’ (Ericson 2007) and/or ‘governed through antisocial behaviour’ (Crawford 2009a). Aspects of these perspectives have been shown to be inconsistent with the findings from the case study, rendering features of these ‘grand narratives’ unstable.

It has been argued that caution should be exercised in readily embracing the suggestion that crime prevention necessarily serves such dystopian ends. Significant elements of these narratives are based on analyses from other jurisdictions (especially the UK and US), which have limited relevance to the Australian context. Perhaps due to the length of time it takes to develop and then publish such ‘grand narratives’, aspects of the analysis incorporated perhaps better reflects past practices than contemporary circumstances. This is especially true given
the significant crime decline experienced in many jurisdictions in recent years. As shown by the Glebe case study, this crime decline has had direct impacts on crime prevention infrastructure and programs. As noted by Hughes (2002), analysis of local practices presents quite a different perspective than is generated from broad theorising. Social-welfare-oriented programs are still very much prevalent, as opposed to excessively intrusive interventions suggested by some critical commentaries discussed here.

Brief comment was dedicated to advancing an alternative criminology — one that is more hopeful, optimistic, positive and even celebratory. A utopian realist criminology, it is argued, provides greater possibility of acknowledging the insights generated from the Glebe case study, while simultaneously remaining detached and critical. This balance, it is argued, will more accurately reflect crime prevention as it is practised and experienced in Glebe (and possibly the NSW and Australian contexts).
Chapter 13: Conclusion

The previous chapters have defined, described, probed and analysed various dimensions of crime prevention theory and practice. In the process, a significant amount of information has been gathered. This final chapter briefly draws together the key themes emerging from the various methods adopted and commentary provided.

Research Rationale

Despite the ‘preventive turn’ in recent decades, there has been limited Australian research into crime prevention practices, programs and policies, partially because crime prevention in Australia has generally been ignored by the academy (Cameron & Laycock 2002). Frustration with the limitations of the existing crime prevention literature and the desire to contribute to the Australian body of knowledge were the key driving forces for this research.

In the absence of local research, there is a likelihood that information and perspectives will be imported that share little with the Australian context. Moreover, it is possible that positions taken on and criticisms levelled at crime prevention might not reflect a complete understanding of crime prevention practice. Without detailed descriptions and studies of crime prevention, there is a risk that the term ‘crime prevention’ will be invoked in a variety of ways, some of which might not accurately reflect the breadth of crime prevention activities.

Of the research that has been conducted into crime prevention in Australia, there has been limited involvement of those engaged (directly or indirectly) in crime prevention work. This, it is argued, runs the risk of missing important insights. Similarly, much of the crime prevention corpus tends to focus on silos of activity, reflected in the various crime prevention typologies. While these admittedly heuristic devices seek to demonstrate the different forms of crime prevention, they perhaps also inadvertently create artificial boundaries.

Research Methods

Given the above rationale, this research utilised a case study of the Glebe postcode area to better understand crime prevention practices. Specifically, the fieldwork was guided by three key research questions: (1) what programs, interventions and technologies exist and operate in Glebe that conceivably contribute to crime prevention?; (2) what structures and policies support and enable these activities?; and (3) what processes operate to support crime prevention in the area? The research methods adopted to answer these questions were
physical familiarisation with the area (through wearing out ‘shoe leather’ as Connell (2007) suggests); a review of crime prevention programs and activities; analysis of crime data; attendance at local inter-agency group meetings and community events; interviews with key stakeholders; and facilitation of two focus groups with local practitioners.

This fieldwork, conducted over an 18-month period (July 2012 to December 2013), was heavily influenced by grounded theory, ethnographic and case study traditions. Building up an understanding of the area, its history, its programs and services, the views of key actors, and its recent trends in crime were important methods of triangulating data and cross-referencing findings. The immersion provided an opportunity to read, observe, reflect, discuss, and review throughout the course of the fieldwork, leading to an in-depth understanding of contemporary crime prevention practices.

Despite the time invested in building an understanding of the different dimensions of crime prevention in Glebe, there are limitations to this research. Due to difficulties securing interviews with staff from key state government agencies, interviewees from these agencies were under-represented. The bulk of the interviewees were from local agencies, which introduces a potential bias. However, representatives from some state government agencies were present at various inter-agency meetings, which partially addresses this concern. A further potential limitation of the research is common in qualitative research: over-identification with key stakeholders. Relationships formed during the fieldwork have the potential to influence how material is presented. While this is a very real limitation, it has partially been addressed through use of documentary evidence and limited reliance on interview transcripts.

Another potential limitation relates to the small geographical area selected for study. The Glebe postcode area was selected because it has various characteristics that make it an interesting area of study. The mix of public and private housing, high and low income-earners, and the close proximity to the Sydney CBD and service hubs (universities, hospital) create both a stable and transient population. The proximity of the area to The University of Sydney also ensured maximum time could be spent in the area. While these characteristics made the area attractive for research purposes, they also raised issues about the relevance of the findings to other areas. Particular dynamics appear to be unique to Glebe (for example, its history of social activism, relationship of Indigenous community members to the area over a long period, and the presence of particular services), while others are more generic and are
therefore more likely to be relevant to experiences in other areas. Further, much of the material assembled and reported relates to crime prevention programs and policies operating beyond the borders of Glebe. This work was specifically undertaken to ensure that local findings could not be dismissed as Glebe-only practices. By charting some of the key developments shaping local crime prevention in NSW and documenting the array of programs and policies embedded in the work of various NSW government agencies, key findings speak not only to potentially idiosyncratic Glebe practices, but more broadly to the NSW (and Australian) experience.

**Research Findings**

In summary, this research has shown the diversity, volume and historical layering of crime prevention programs and activities operating in the Glebe case study area augmented by NSW government policies and programs. Many of the programs and activities contributing to the prevention of crime do not directly seek to do so and are delivered by agencies involved in human services, rather than criminal justice, domains. Contrary to any suggestion that different crime prevention models are in competition, there was considerable evidence that approaches to crime prevention often incorporated different models or complemented other approaches. There was also evidence that much of the content of many of the formal programs and interventions delivered in Glebe rests on inter-agency networks, relationships between workers and referral pathways that connect many services and agencies.

A significant feature of discussions with local workers that was also evident in the nature of the programs operating in the area was the focus on social-welfare issues. Causes of crime, as expressed by local workers, very much centred on structural disadvantage experienced by residents of the Glebe (especially those in public housing). Consequently, alternative education programs for young people dropping out of mainstream school; a breakfast club to provide nourishment to children before commencing school; an exercise program run by police for local young people; a program on Friday and Saturday nights to provide safe, alternative activities for young people; and other related interventions demonstrate the commitment to social-welfare approaches. This is consistent with what was found when developing a history of local crime prevention planning in NSW.

The distinct and separate features of crime prevention problem-solving models, such as Ekblom’s 5Is (Ekblom 2011), were not especially evident. There was little evidence of localised crime data being accessed and shared; few inter-agency structures now exist to
support or guide local crime prevention; and there was a lack of rigorously evaluated programs. However, this should not suggest that responses to local crime issues are ad hoc. There is evidence of highly coordinated responses to a crime spike in the area in 2007–08, culminating in the *Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012*, and strong inter-agency connections that enable responses to local issues as they arise.

A significant sub-theme to emerge during the fieldwork was the decrease in many crime categories in recent years. Despite the spike in some offences in the 2007–08 period, there have been substantial falls in burglary, motor vehicle theft, steal from motor vehicle and robbery since 2000–01. Largely consistent with wider trends, these falls have contributed to the dismantling of some structures that previously operated in the area (for example, Neighbourhood Watch, Community Drug Action Team, Liquor Accord not established due to low perceived need). Further, local workers who participated in two focus groups in 2013 recommended against the development of a new *Glebe Community Safety Plan*. This is contrary to the expansionary tendencies suggested by Gilling (1997) and perhaps more stridently by Borch (2005). The limited attention given to crime in numerous local meetings also suggests that crime is no longer an especially strong local issue of interest. Child protection reforms, changes in human service funding arrangements, the public housing ‘crisis’, mental health and other issues received greater attention in community-based meetings than crime. While the falls in crime have generally been positively received, there was some concern that funding for some programs would be threatened by virtue of these falls.

A small number of recommendations were developed based on this fieldwork and associated desktop reviews. In particular, it is argued that there is need to develop an ethical framework to shape crime prevention practices and inform crime prevention policies. There is also a need to better engage with repeat victimisation. Improved data sharing, clear identification and responsibilities for lead agencies (police and local government), more evaluations that focus on understanding the ‘collective impacts’ (Kania & Kramer 2011, 2013) of crime prevention activities and local relationships are needed, and locally developed responses shaped by local knowledge and actors should continue.

The findings were then used to interrogate some recent critical criminological commentaries, which was the second focus of this thesis. ‘Grand narratives’ emerging in recent years have posited that we are now ‘governed through crime’ (Simon 2007), ‘governed through fear of
crime’ (Lee 2007), ‘governed through uncertainty’ (Ericson 2007) and ‘governed through antisocial behaviour’ (Crawford 2009a). In advancing these arguments, various theorists have isolated crime prevention techniques for particular attention. CCTV, CPTED features, private security personnel, ‘mass private space’ (Shearing & Stenning 1983), and other devices or transformations have been cited as contributing to the particular ‘governing through’ thesis. These generally pessimistic and dystopian commentaries, it has been argued, fail to acknowledge the diversity of crime prevention measures routinely operating, as demonstrated by the Glebe case study. In so doing, these narratives fuel an anticriminology (Loader 1998) that potentially undermines all forms of crime prevention, including social-welfare-oriented versions — an outcome that seems at odds with the sympathies of many of these critical commentators.

Rather than a complete rejection of these ‘grand narratives’ and critical perspectives, this thesis serves as a reminder of the challenges of speaking generally about ‘crime prevention’ and the importance of unpacking local practices. Critical perspectives are vital to ensure that unintended negative consequences common to past crime prevention programs (McCord 2003) do not recur. Thus, it is not criticism per se that is the issue. Rather, it is the lack of specificity and detail of the criticism that is contested.

A utopian realist criminology (Loader 1998) is advocated as a means for skirting ‘criminologies of catastrophe’ (O’Malley 2000), while still retaining critical capacities. Such a criminology should seek to engage with the diversity of local practices; it should celebrate and understand the recent crime decline; it should equally focus on strengths as deficits; and it should positively contribute to policy discourse and decisions. In this way, the ‘uncertain promise of prevention’ (to borrow from Pat O’Malley) will continue to be excavated, rather than arbitrarily condemned.
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Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Amendment (Arrest Without Warrant) Bill 2013 (NSW)

Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 (NSW)

Young Offenders Act 1997 (NSW)

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK)
Appendices

Appendix 1 — Interview Participant Information Sheet
Appendix 2 — Participant Consent Form
Appendix 3 — Semi-Structured Interview Questions
Appendix 4 — Incidents of Crime in Glebe Postcode Area between 1995 and 2012
Appendix 1: Interview Participant Information Sheet

Sydney Institute of Criminology
Sydney Law School

ABN 15 211 513 484

Dr Murray Lee
Director, Sydney Institute of Criminology

What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis

INTERVIEW PARTICIPANT INFORMATION STATEMENT

(1) What is the study about?
You are invited to participate in a study that seeks to explore how crime prevention works in practice. We hope to learn more about this by asking people working with different organisations and agencies about their work and their experiences. You were selected as a possible participant in this study because of your work in the Glebe/Forest Lodge area, which is the site of this study. This area has been selected because it has a range of services and organisations that contribute to the prevention of crime.

(2) Who is carrying out the study?
The study is being conducted by Dr Murray Lee and Garner Clancy from the Sydney Institute of Criminology at the University of Sydney.

(3) What does the study involve?
If you decide to participate in this research, we will ask you to take part in an interview of approximately one hour in duration, at the University of Sydney or at your workplace, at a time that is convenient to you. You will also be offered the opportunity to conduct this interview via phone or other electronic medium, should there be any problems in organising a face-to-face interview.

We would like to digitally audio-record your voice during the research so we do not miss any important points. If you feel uncomfortable about that, you can ask at any time for the digital recorder to be turned off.

During the interview, we will discuss your work in the Glebe/Forest Lodge area and consider how your work might contribute to the prevention of crime (if at all). We will also discuss the nature of inter-agency structures and arrangements that support crime prevention activities in the area. We will also ask you a few questions about your background and training so we can describe who participated in the research.

It is unlikely that there will be any risks that may result from your participation in this study, and you are able to cease the interview at any stage.

(4) How much time will the study take?
The interview should take about one hour to complete, and you are invited to provide additional information after the conclusion of the interview should you wish.

What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis
Version 2.2103/2012
(5) Can I withdraw from the study?

Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are not under any obligation to consent and - if you do consent - you can withdraw at any time without affecting your relationship with The University of Sydney and the Sydney Institute of Criminology.

You may stop the interview at any time if you do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study.

(6) Will anyone else know the results?

All aspects of the study, including results, will be strictly confidential and only the researchers will have access to information on participants except as required by law. A report of the study may be submitted for publication and/or the findings presented at an appropriate academic conference, but individual participants will not be identifiable in such a report.

(7) Will the study benefit me?

This study presents an opportunity for participants to present their views on local crime prevention activities. While it is unlikely that there will be any immediate benefits for participating in this study, all participants may benefit from the published findings from this study.

(8) Can I tell other people about the study?

Yes you may pass on the details of this study to your colleagues. As we are interested in gaining the perspectives of a broad range of people involved in local crime prevention work, we invite you pass on the details of this study to anyone else who you feel may be appropriate or willing to participate.

(9) What if I require further information about the study or my involvement in it?

When you have read this information, Garner Clancey will discuss it with you further and answer any questions you may have. If you would like to know more at any stage, please feel free to contact Dr Murray Lee on (02) 9351 0443 or at murray.lee@sydney.edu.au.

(10) What if I have a complaint or any concerns?

Any person with concerns or complaints about the conduct of a research study can contact The Manager, Human Ethics Administration, University of Sydney on +61 2 8627 8176 (Telephone); +61 2 8627 8176 (Facsimile) or humanethics@sydney.edu.au (Email).

This information sheet is for you to keep.
Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form

Sydney Institute of Criminology
Sydney Law School

ABN 15 211 513 464

Dr Murray Lee
Director, Sydney Institute of Criminology

Room 520
Sydney Law School
The University of Sydney
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA
Telephone: +61 2 9351 0443
Facsimile: +61 2 9351 0200
Email: murray.lee@sydney.edu.au
Web: http://www.sydney.edu.au/

PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM

I, .................................................................................. [PRINT NAME], give consent to my participation in the research project.

TITLE: What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis

In giving my consent I acknowledge that:

1. The procedures required for the project and the time involved have been explained to me, and any questions I have about the project have been answered to my satisfaction.

2. I have read the Participant Information Statement and have been given the opportunity to discuss the information and my involvement in the project with the researcher(s).

3. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without affecting my relationship with the researcher(s) or the University of Sydney and the Sydney Institute of Criminology now or in the future.

4. I understand that my involvement is strictly confidential and no information about me will be used in any way that reveals my identity.

5. I understand that being in this study is completely voluntary – I am not under any obligation to consent.

6. I understand that I can stop the interview at any time if I do not wish to continue, the audio recording will be erased and the information provided will not be included in the study.

7. I consent to:
   i) Audio-taping YES ☐ NO ☐

Signed: ________________________________________________

Name: __________________________________________________

Date: ___________________________________________________

What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis
Version 1 19/02/2012
Page 1 of 1
Appendix 3: Semi-Structured Interview Questions

What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis

SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Introductory information provided, including an information sheet. The consent form must be signed before commencing the interview. Reiterate that the interview will be recorded.

Demographic Information
- Male / Female
- Role – please describe your role and provide your job title. How long have you been in this role?
- Organisation – please describe your organisation. How long have you been with this organisation?
- Qualifications – please describe any relevant qualifications that you have for this work/role.

Semi-structured Interview Questions
- What informs your understanding of local crime problems?
- What information do you access that tells you about local crime trends?
- What would you say are the most pressing crime problems in the Glebe/Forest Lodge area?
- In your opinion, what contributes to or causes these problems?
- In your opinion, what attempts are being made to prevent these crime problems?
- Are these efforts satisfactory?
- How does your agency, if at all, contribute to preventing these crime problems?
- What other agencies/programs do you think contribute to the prevention of crime in the area?
- Do these agencies work together in their efforts to prevent crime? If so, how?
- How could cooperation between agencies be improved?
- Are you a member of any inter-agency groups? If so, do any of these groups contribute to crime prevention?
- Are there any particular government policies that guide local crime prevention work?
- Is there anything else that you would like to say?

Thank you for your time.

What is Crime Prevention? A Place-based Analysis
Version 1 19/02/2012
### Appendix 4: Incidents of Crime in Glebe Postcode Area between 1995 and 2012

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| Possession and/or use of other drugs | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 18 | 15 |
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| Dealing, trafficking in narcotics | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
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Safe City Strategy

The City of Sydney Council developed the Safe City Strategy 2007–2012 to provide ‘an overarching strategy to guide the City and its partners in tackling the complex range of crime and safety issues affecting both the Central Business District and our urban villages’ (City of Sydney 2006a, p. 2). It was suggested that this was in recognition that the ‘causes of crime are complex, many and varied and that only working together effectively on a broad range of issues can we continue to create safer, vibrant and more prosperous communities’ (City of Sydney 2006a, p. 2). To achieve these goals, the City of Sydney established the following key objectives:

- Reduce crime and anti-social behaviour
- Tackle complex crime and safety issues in areas of public housing
- Improve the look and feel of our public spaces
- Deliver primary prevention and early intervention initiatives
- Target first time offenders released from prison
- Strengthen communities and increase opportunities for people to engage in legitimate activities
- Advocate to higher levels of government for more resources aimed at crime prevention (City of Sydney 2006a, pp. 2–3).

The Safe City Strategy also identified guiding principles:

The City of Sydney is committed to a crime prevention approach that:

- Delivers a measurable reduction in crime

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128 At the time of writing, a new Safe City Strategy is being developed. The researcher attended two workshops (5 December and 13 December 2013) associated with the development of the new Safe City Strategy and an associated strategy focusing on safety in public housing in the City of Sydney LGA, which should be launched in 2014.
- Improves quality of life for all members of the City community
- Delivers best practice, evidence-based and economically viable solutions that provide the greatest benefit to all members of the City community
- Works in partnership and in meaningful consultation with other levels of government, business and residential communities
- Includes an active advocacy role that promotes comprehensive and coordinated public policy responses to crime
- Recognises that crime and the causes of crime are complex and require multi-faceted strategies which address the needs of specific locations and target groups
- Recognises the need for primary prevention and early intervention and
- Respects the right of all community members to use public spaces (City of Sydney 2006a, p. 14).

With the ‘city of villages’ ethos and recognition that particular areas suffer disproportionately high crime, the Safe City Strategy identified ‘that preventative initiatives should recognise and respond to the localised conditions contributing to increases in crime in these areas’ (City of Sydney 2006a, 9).

Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012

Reflecting this commitment to localised responses to crime, the City of Sydney developed the Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012. This Plan stated that:

Like communities all over the world Glebe is facing its own unique crime and safety problems which are the result of complex changes in economic, social and cultural factors ... The plan aims to take a genuinely preventative approach to Glebe’s distinct crime and safety issues by tackling the underlying causes of crime (City of Sydney 2009a, p. 2).

It claimed that through consultation, crime data analysis and research, the following priorities were identified:

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129 This is the tag line used by the City of Sydney Council to describe itself: ‘the city of villages’.
Reduce crime and anti-social behaviour
Address school retention, and addressing capacity building and diversionary issues or local young people
Develop community capacity building projects with the broader community
Tackle crime and safety issues in public housing
Improve the look and feel of the physical environment
Target supporting ex-offenders released from prison (City of Sydney 2009a, p. 3).

Steal from motor vehicle offences were singled out for particular attention:

in 2007 the southern end of Glebe was one of the hardest hit areas for steal from motor vehicle offences in the City of Sydney Local Government Area. Unlike many suburban areas in the Sydney metropolitan area Glebe has few garages necessitating the bulk of cars being parked on the street (City of Sydney 2009a, p. 27).

The *Glebe Community Safety Plan* outlined the contribution of local police to the prevention of crime:

The Leichhardt Local Area Command conducts the following strategies to reduce these particular offences and reduce the perception of fear of crime within the community:

- **Synergy** — Beat Policing focusing on street offences, antisocial behaviour and theft.
- **Focus** — deployment of various officers from General Duty, Criminal Investigation, CMU, Highway Patrol for high visibility impact and interaction with the Community to gather intelligence from various sources.
- **Curfew/Bail Compliance** checks to ensure that offenders are complying with bail conditions which may require offenders to be at home between the hours of 8pm and 8am (can vary).
- **Local Vikings Operations** targeting specific crime categories and various locations.
- **Review of crime** every 24 hours, targeting recidivist offenders and new releases from goal [sic].
• Use of forensic technologies to identify offenders.

• Daily tasking and deployment of Command staff to hot spot areas.

• Deployment of the Commands [sic] Crime Prevention Team which includes regular overt and covert operations targeting key crime categories.

• Deployment of additional resources including Dog Squad, Mounted Police, Commuter Crime Unit and Region Response Teams.

• Media releases to advise of crime prevention strategies.

• Licensing police have continued to work with licensed premises in establishing a Liquor accord in Glebe, in an attempt to reduce alcohol related crime (City of Sydney 2009, p. 30).130

The Glebe Community Safety Plan 2009–2012 also outlined some of the contributions of the City of Sydney in seeking to prevent crime. These activities included extensive lighting upgrades throughout the Glebe area, installation of two CCTV cameras in Glebe, upgrade of Glebe Point Road (including the installation of smart poles, undergrounding of overhead cables and public art), and the implementation of the community safety audit flagged in the plan. These strategies are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.

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130 No Liquor Accord has been developed in Glebe and there does not appear to be any intentions to do so, given the generally accepted few problems associated with licensed venues in the area.