‘We the Peoples of Asia and Africa’


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‘We, the Peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority which lives on other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on the side of peace.’

- Sukarno, 6 June 1901 – 21 June 1970
Thesis Abstract
In 1945, fifty-one nations came together for the first time and declared, ‘we the peoples of the United Nations.’ Ten years later, in a very similar gathering, a further twenty-nine nations came together and declared, ‘we the peoples of Asia and Africa.’ This was the Bandung Conference, an unprecedented event in international relations that heralded the end of colonialism. It also signalled the beginning of the transformation of the United Nations into an organisation of the Global South.

This thesis seeks to reaffirm the place of the Bandung Conference in the history of the United Nations, arguing that the UN of today is as much a legacy of what happened at Bandung as the San Francisco Conference.
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Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents for supporting during my honours year, and for believing in me all the way.
A Note on the Use of Capitals and the Use of Other Terms

This thesis employs the convention of capitalising 'International Relations' when referring to the academic discipline that is concerned with the study of 'international relations.' When used with lower case letters, the term refers to the interactions between states and other actors in the real world, and all other associated phenomena. When written with capitals, it refers to the academic discipline.

Throughout this thesis, the term 'Third World' may appear to be used interchangeably with a variety of other terms, such as Afro–Asian, Southern and developing. Different terms have been used at different times to describe what this thesis treats as one overarching identity. The term Southern is more pertinent to understanding the identity as it relates to the present day. Hence, it is used in the title and in the broader arguments of this thesis. However, the word Southern not come into use until the late 1960s. Third World was used quite commonly and was a politically correct term for the period in question, and is used to refer to the South in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
A Note on the Use of Sources

This thesis uses standard UN notation when referring to UN resolutions and other UN documents. Standard historical referencing is used in conjunction with this to identify the published source of the document.

A Note on the Spelling of Indonesian Names

This thesis may appear to have some inconsistencies in the spelling of certain Indonesian names. Since 1972, there have been two systems in place for the transliteration of Indonesian names into the Latin alphabet. These are the Perfected Spelling System (EYD) and the Soewandi Spelling System. This thesis uses the Soewandi Spelling System, where Sastroamijoyo (EYD) is spelt Sastroamidjojo. In regards to references and direct quotations, all names are spelt as they appeared in the original source.
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Introduction

In April 1955 in the Indonesian City of Bandung, there occurred an extraordinary gathering. For the first time in history, the peoples of the nations of Asia and Africa came together in a free international setting to determine their own future. At this meeting, they made a declaration of solidarity to aid each other in development and stand together against the continuing bane of imperialism. They eschewed militarism and declared that their success lay in the way of peaceful negotiation. Most importantly, they affirmed the role of the United Nations as a force for good. This was despite the fact that a great number of these states were either not yet members of the UN, or only had a marginal role in the organisation.

The event was a watershed in international and diplomatic history. For centuries, the majority of the world’s diplomacy had been conducted in the ‘Concert of Europe.’\(^1\) Decisions that would have some of the most global implications were determined by small and unrepresentative gatherings. The scramble for Africa was a prime example, where amongst themselves the European powers achieved a ‘compromise’ that would affect the lives of millions for the next century.\(^2\) Even as far forward as 1944, it was a small gathering of largely Western states that created the Bretton Woods system.\(^3\) The state of

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\(^3\) There were 44 countries in attendance at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. Those were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, French Delegation, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
international relations before WWII is best articulated by the Indian historian Singh. He argues that outside of Europe and the Americas, ‘horizontal relationships’ in the international sphere were restricted. Colonies rarely interacted with each other, and were often communicatively closer to their far-flung imperial centres than their immediate neighbours. Post-war decolonisation changed this by allowing for new spaces of interaction between hitherto internationally isolated peoples. The new nations of Asia and Africa could now interact and find common ground on their own terms, often playing the game of their old masters.

The Asian African Conference (Bandung Conference), held between 29 recently decolonised states was one such opportunity. Appraisals of the conference have often focused on this aspect. Richard Wright, an attendant and observer of the conference, noted it as an opportunity for the many oppressed peoples of the world to build trust and build new diplomatic networks. For the world at large, especially observers in the developed states, the conference was a rather novel event that heralded the coming end of the colonial age. Journalists in the Washington Post portrayed it as the final shedding of European

Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, USSR, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. For a good critical analysis of the Bretton Woods system and how it affected the global financial system, see Barry Eichengreen, Global Imbalances and Lessons of Bretton Woods (Cambridge, MA.: National Bureau of Economics Research, 2004).

5 Singh, Emerging International Order, p. 5.
colonialism. For diplomats in Washington, it was regarded with suspicion as a forum liable to communist infiltration.

The Bandung Conference was instrumental in the creation of two key organisations in the following years. The first was the Non–Aligned Movement (NAM), an organisation of largely ‘Southern’ states who sought to stay neutral in the Cold War. The NAM was officially created in 1961, and by 1970 had a membership of 70. Today, it has a membership of 120, with 18 observer countries. The second organisation was the Group of 77 (G77), a caucus made up of less developed countries that operated in most international economic fora, most prominently in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The existence of the above two organisation however were dependent on the creation of a more abstract concept that was more immediately tied to the Bandung Conference. This was the ‘Third World’ or ‘Global South,’ a transnational identity that had post–racial and post–colonial dimensions. With some variations, there were some key markers that

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9 See for example an article in the Washington Post commenting on the problem of the attendance of China and other communist countries, and praising India’s ostensibly pro–Western stance: Peter Jackson, ‘Nehru to Work Hard at Bandung Against Forming Anti–Western Bloc’, The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 15 1955, p. 4.
12 The Group of 77 was established on the 15th of June 1964 at the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development upon the signage of the ‘Joint Declaration of the Seventy–Seven Countries.’ Despite still being called the G-77, the group now has 132 members. For more information, see Group of 77, ‘About the Group of 77’, accessed 01 May 2012 on http://www.g77.org/doc/index.html#establish.
13 Alfred Sauvy coined the term ‘Third World’ in 1952 in an article of L’Observateur in relation to an analysis of the state of the Cold War. By the late 1950s, it was used in a more expansive fashion to refer to an identity. A series of other terms are often used to substitute the identity
determined whether a country was ‘Third World,’ other than their geographical location or their position in the international political landscape. These were: being non – white or non – European; an experience of colonialism or quasi – colonialism; and underdevelopment. It almost always followed that ‘Third World’ also meant being Asian, African or Latin American; i.e. Southern.14

Understandably, the Bandung Conference and its ensuing movements have generated substantial attention among international and transnational historians with post – colonial inclinations.15 Some of these histories have focused on the conference’s cultural impact in the non – white and non – Western world. Others have examined its role in Asian regionalism and the development of organisation like ASEAN.16 However, in regard to histories of the birth and growth of the United Nations, the Bandung Conference occupies a marginal place. Such histories tend to focus on the San Francisco Conference and on the immediate post – war period. This is taken as part of a longer story that started with the League of Nations and ended with World War II. San Francisco, for most, was the first time the entirety of the globe had come together, forming a global charter and later the Universal Declaration of Rights. It was the beginning of the age of internationalism.

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14 The latter of these three occupies a more complex position in the North / South divide, with Latin American states being buttressed between the Southern World and the New World.
The United Nations that emerged in the late 1940s however was hardly the organisation we know today. In 1955, the General Assembly represented only 60% of the world’s countries, and had staff composed largely of Americans and Western Europeans.\textsuperscript{17} The budget of the organisation was, by today’s standards, quite small, which meant that the organisation didn’t conduct many initiatives independently.\textsuperscript{18} In terms of its real costs and functions, the UN in its early years can better be described as a rubber stamp organisation for the actions and spending of its members. It was also the case, especially with the executive power of the Security Council, that the United Nations was a way for larger powers to legitimately keep smaller powers in check.\textsuperscript{19}

The transformation of the United Nations (save the Security Council) from a small, Western – based political forum to a global and proactive agent of change occurred as a result of the initiative and the very UN positive outlook of the Southern or Third World countries. With the power of numbers and the strategy of bloc voting, these countries commanded the floor of the General Assembly, taking it in directions never intended by the victors of World War II. This direction was three fold. Firstly, the United Nations increasingly became a forum for economic and developmental issues. This was not the intention at its founding in the 1940s, with a preference among the big players to rely on the

\textsuperscript{18} The budget of the United Nations for the year 1954 – 1956 was $50,665,670 ($432,050,000 CPI to 2012). The budget for the year 1976 – 1977 was $745,813,800 ($3,006,813,000 CPI to 2012). Factoring CPI, this was a little over a six-fold increase in the UN’s budget from the years 1954 – 1976. Budgets for every year are available on the public website of the United Nations under GA resolution, viewed 14 March 2012, http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm.
\textsuperscript{19} Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, p. 18.
Bretton Woods system to ensure the stability of the global economy.\textsuperscript{20} Secondly, the bureaucracy of the United Nations started to become more reflective of its representation. In the 1940s and 50s, the staff of the United Nations were primarily of Western backgrounds. This was not the case by 1970, when the majority of the staff and the leadership came from the developing world.\textsuperscript{21} Thirdly, and most importantly, the organisation in its central aims remained intact. Holding the majority of the floor, the very existence of the Non–Aligned Movement ensured that the United Nations fell neither to the Western bloc nor the Eastern bloc, at least in the case of the General Assembly. While the sanctioning of force would always be at the discretion of the P5, the normative, political, directional, legal and most importantly budgetary aspects of the United Nations stayed in the hands of the South.

This thesis argues that the Bandung Conference was an essential moment in the evolution of the United Nations into a global organisation. This was because it created the Third World, a transnational identity that allowed for the development of the Non–Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The result of this was a ‘southernisation’ of the United Nations, whereby it became a site of tension between the developed North and the decolonising South. Furthermore, the thesis argues the Bandung Conference had roots in the Afro–Asian Solidarity Movement, which was an internationalist movement with a


completely separate history to the various forms of internationalism at play in the Western world that led to the UN Charter.

The first chapter will look at the growth of Afro – Asian Solidarity as a transnational and multinational movement, comparing it with the ideology of liberal internationalism in Europe and North America. It will begin by analysing some the historical literature regarding the creation and success of the United Nations. It will look at the growth and the origins of cosmopolitanism, and how this formed the basis for liberal internationalism. It will then argue that the creation of the United Nations Charter was a synthesis of these ideals and the common experience of WWII between the Western and Eastern blocs. The chapter will then contrast this to the development of Afro – Asian Solidarity, arguing that it had roots in Pan – Asianism, Pan – Nationalism and Anti - Imperialism. The chapter will conclude by arguing that these movements ultimately coalesced into a common perception of the world and common approach to international relations among many newly decolonising states in Africa and Asia. The common perception was that the old imperial powers of Europe continued to reap the benefits of their history while the countries of Africa and Asia were dealt a poor lot in the post – war world.

The second chapter will look at the Bandung Conference itself and how it was the place by which the norms that constituted the Third World identity were created. Using memoirs from the leaders of the 5 sponsoring countries, the chapter will present an overview of the immediate politics behind the conference. It will argue that the actions of these countries on the international sphere were coloured by the history of Afro – Asian solidarity and the preceding movements of Pan – Asianism, Pan - Nationalism and Anti – Imperialism.
Following this, the chapter will present a description and analysis of the conference using various accounts by observers and attendees. It will argue that the conference resolved many tension between the many African and Asian states and created a common understanding of international relations in the final communiqué. It will then argue that this communiqué became a series of norms that were increasingly taken up by many newly independent states in Asia and Africa. The norms were: non-alignment; commitment to the United Nations; commitment to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation; hostility towards imperialism; mutual support for struggles of national liberation; and a commitment to mutual economic assistance. The chapter will conclude by examining how these various norms translated into the two dominant institutions of the Global South: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.

The final chapter will look at the impact of the Bandung Conference on the UN by way of creating the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. It will begin by examining the immediate responses in the United Nations towards the conference, in the context of increasing tensions over UN membership. It will argue the Bandung Conference was an important factor in the general push to make UN membership universal. The chapter will then look at the lasting impact of both the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, and how this changed the United Nations from a characteristically Western Organisation to a Global organisation, one where the South was dominant in all spheres except the Security Council. It will thus conclude that the Bandung conference forms a central part of the History of the United Nations in its current form.
The conclusion will look at how the actions of the Southern countries were part of a transnational identity, and cannot be explained by the conventional theories of International Relations. It will conclude that the Bandung Conference held an essential place in the transformation of the United Nations into the organisation that it is today, and should be regarded with the same importance as the San Francisco Conference. The thesis will finish by offering a question, namely why the Bandung Conference has been so forgotten in popular histories of the UN.
Chapter One

Two Visions of International Order: Liberal Internationalism and Afro–Asian Solidarity

The post war period saw the rise of institutionalised international law and a proliferation of international organisations. The United Nations especially is a defining feature of the last 60 years and is a key separator for most International Relations theorists and international historians between the age of global anarchy, and the relative peace following 1945. With a continuous structure stretching 65 years, it is older than the majority of the world’s states, and certainly older than all but a small handful of the world’s constitutions. Furthermore, it stands hand in hand with the domination of the Westphalian state system. The latter statement is based on the fact that every bit of land (except for Antarctica) now falls under a sovereign state. Furthermore, all states are members of the United Nations, with membership now being one of the primary delineations between de facto and de jure states.

The success of the United Nations has come to form a kind of folklore in the history of international relations, at least for those who argue for the ideals of the United Nations Charter. For those supportive, the trend is to place focus on the San Francisco Conference, the moment at which the peoples of the world first came together. The international historian Ian Hurd, a supporter of international

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23 It is difficult to give a definitive number here given varying definition of what is meant by continuously independent. Just prior the creation of the United Nations, there were sixty widely recognised independent states, many of which had just been freed from German occupation. Many states however lost their independence over WWII, Serbia being one example.

24 See Mikulas Fabry, *Recognising States: International Society and the Establishment of New States Since 1776* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 8. Three widely recognised independents states remain non – members of the UN. These are: Vatican City; Kosovo; Taiwan.
governance, describes a ‘politics of legitimacy’ that was at play in San Francisco. Whereby international anarchy had been the norm in regards to international security before 1945, the inaugural conferences of the United Nations created new ‘imagined institutions.’ This was, according to Hurd, expressed by a growing belief among states that they ‘ought to resolve their conflicts, coordinate their relations, and facilitate coexistence.’ While Hurd’s argument is primarily an institutional one, outlining the development of norms in the international sphere, Karn and Mingst argue that the UN was based in the common memory of the founding states. They assert that ‘the establishment of the United Nations in the closing days of World War II was an affirmation of the desire of war weary nations for an organisation that could help them avoid future conflicts and foster international economic and social cooperation.’

Mark Mazower, another historian of the United Nations has referred to ‘the hopes of 1945,’ arguing that the project of the UN was ultimately guided by utopianism. This gave it ‘energy, support, and in certain circumstances, valuable political capital.’ A discernable theme across the literature is that San Francisco was a moment of triumph for the whole of humanity. Indeed, for collective memory in the Anglosphere, San Francisco would be one of the main separators between the period of general strife characterised by the two world wars.

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26 Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p. 91.
27 Hurd, *After Anarchy*, p. 91.
wars and the Great Depression, and the relative peace and prosperity of the Baby Boom.

There is another story that acts as a source of collective security and global triumph for the majority of the world's nations. This story is not related to the victory of WWII, but to the decline of colonialism and the newfound unity of many former colonies in the 1950s. This was the Afro – Asian Solidarity Movement, an unprecedented transnational movement that spurred a series of opportunities for peoples that had for centuries been cut off from international channels of diplomacy. The Afro – Asian Solidarity movement would develop into the Non Aligned movement and the Group of 77, which effectively controlled the floor of the General Assembly and thus the United Nations.

This chapter argues that the Afro – Asian Solidarity Movement was an internationalist ideology with its own transnational roots, entirely separate from the internationalism that was at play in the Western World. It will begin by presenting a brief history of Liberal Internationalism, the driving ideology for the project of the United Nations. It will then go on to present a brief history of internationalism in Africa and Asia. It will argue that the main international movements with which people in these regions had engaged in the early twentieth century were Pan – Nationalism, Pan – Asianism and Anti – Imperialism. These movements weighed on the minds of the diplomatic elite in many of the states in South and South East Asia. This ultimately led to the development of Afro – Asian Solidarity as a post – war movement.
Internationalism and the Second World War: The Ideological Roots of the United Nations

The creation of the United Nations was a product of internationalism, an ideological current that had gained increasing popularity and legitimacy in Europe and North America throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to Carlsten Holbraad, internationalism is ‘the ideology of international bonding,’ and is marked by ‘a preference for utilizing international bodies in the conduct of world affairs and, more typically, by a degree of enthusiasm for the strengthening [of] such instrumentalities.’\textsuperscript{32} Holbraad’s describes three main forms of internationalism: Liberal; Conservative and Marxist.\textsuperscript{33}

Liberal internationalism had its roots in the related concept of cosmopolitanism, which was the belief in and commitment to a ‘common humanity,’ whose interests transcend that of the nation – state.\textsuperscript{34} While most of the basic tenets of cosmopolitanism are quite ancient, its application to the modern state system can be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s \textit{Perpetual Peace}.\textsuperscript{35} In this seminal work, Kant argued that world peace was both achievable and was the highest state of human achievement. Furthermore, he set out the conditions under which world peace could occur. The conditions were: that all states are constitutional republics; that the sovereignty of all states are respected; that there shall exist a ‘law of nations’ which governs conduct between states; and

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\textsuperscript{33} Holbraad, \textit{International and Nationalism}, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{34} Holbraad, \textit{Internationalism and Nationalism}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{35} See Gary K. Browning, \textit{Global Theory from Kant to Hardt to Negri} (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 23 – 24.
\end{flushright}
that ‘the law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.’ The value of the ideology is the whole of humanity, and its synthesis is a particular model of international organisation, namely a world of independent republics that cooperate voluntarily. As the international historian Browning argues, Kant’s arguments formed the foundation stone of liberal internationalism, a normative theory that sought to achieve a world of prosperous and mutually cooperative sovereign states. The liberal IR scholar Rasmussen argues that liberalism ‘formulates as a universal law that has been guiding Western peacemaking in the twentieth century.’

Liberal Internationalism featured quite heavily in the League of Nations, and is argued by some historians to have been a driving factor. It was certainly a strong influence for Woodrow Wilson, the person assumed by many historians of international relations to be the original international advocate for a liberal world order. In his speech on the fourteen points, Wilson referred to a ‘universal human sympathy’ later saying that ‘our [America’s] program is one of world peace.’ This was much in line with Kant’s vision of an international system based on ‘universal hospitality.’ The link between the League and the United Nations is a matter of ongoing debate, with some arguing it was a complete failure, and others positing otherwise. A proponent of the former is

37 Browning, *Global Theory from Kant to Hardt to Negri*, p. 25.
George Scott, who begins with this premise in his book, *Rise and Fall of the League.* The main question in Scott’s book is why the League failed. The contemporary historian Ruth Hening, on the other hand, argues that the League created the intellectual foundations for many of the constituent institutions of the UN, most notably the International Court of Justice. Whether the League was formally tied to the League of Nations, it is certain that the intellectual currents that formed it were still present at the founding of the UN. Liberal Internationalist rhetoric abounds quite strongly in the Preamble to the Charter. The use of the phrase ‘good neighbours,’ stemming from Kant’s concept of ‘universal hospitality’ is one example. Reference to ‘social progress’ achieved by ‘international machinery’ would be another.

Any argument that considers Liberal Internationalism as a driving factor in the UN would be based on two key assumption of the liberal tradition. The first is that the actions of states are rational, meaning that the intentions of all the relevant actors correspond with their actions. The second is that the liberal world order was indeed the intention of the main founders UN. Liberal Internationalism certainly wasn’t guiding the Soviet Union at San Francisco nor, many would argue, the United States. From a realist perspective, the UN exists only at the behest of the most powerful states, and is the sum total of a particular configuration of state interests. As summed up by Holbraad, realists conceive the

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46 For a good introduction to critiques of rationalist approaches from an International Relations perspective, see Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).  
47 Such is the realist critique of liberal internationalism that emerged from the 1950s. For a good introduction to the theory from an International Relations perspective, see Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
international system as a ‘multiplicity of sovereign states engaged in continual interaction.’\[^{48}\] Paul Kennedy, author of the *Parliament of Man*, takes this view. Kennedy focuses on the United Nations as a negotiated outcome between the five victors of WWII, later the P5.\[^{49}\] As the primary site of international relations in the 19\(^{th}\) century, Europe had been protected from conflict by a balance of power between the British and Russian Empires.\[^{50}\] These two countries were what Kennedy calls ‘flank powers.’\[^{51}\] In the early Twentieth Century, the flank powers became the United States and the USSR. However, both of these countries had retreated from the international system and resorted to isolationism.\[^{52}\] It was this lack of balance, Kennedy states, which led to the aggression of the Axis Powers.\[^{53}\] In Kennedy’s view, the United Nations ultimately emerged because the great powers agreed it was the only way to prevent the rise of another Germany or Japan.\[^{54}\] Furthermore, its purpose is to entrench the power of those states, as demonstrated by the structure of the Security Council. As Kennedy states, ‘if a powerful state should decide to defy the world body and go it alone, then there was little that could be done to prevent it . . . If lesser states broke the rules, they might well get spanked.’\[^{55}\]

What both liberal and realist theories fail to consider is that the United Nations was a product of a particular shared understanding of the world. The Constructivist theory sheds more light on the United Nations from a historical perspective, as an institution based on the common experience of the

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\[^{52}\] Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man*, p. 15.
participating countries and on a set of ideologies. On one level, this was a shared intellectual tradition and shared commitment to a world government. As argued above, cosmopolitanism and liberalism shaped the way the world leaders, particularly those from Western Europe and North America, approached the League of Nations and the United Nations. On the other hand, the structure of the United Nations as a peacekeeper was based on the common experience in war between the P5 countries, and the common enemy of fascism. The reason the United Nations came to be was thus a result of a common narrative between the founding states.

Both narratives, whether they’re based in realism or liberalism, see the United Nations as either a product of Western liberal internationalism, or a negotiated outcome between the Soviet Union and the United States. This focus completely ignores the modes of internationalism that were at play in what was the vast majority of the global population. As was described above, internationalism is a ‘preference for utilising international bodies.’ For most of the states joining in the UN 50s and 60s, this preference was not based heavily on the experiences described above. The internationalism of the African and Asian states in the immediate post–war period was based on Afro–Asian Solidarity, which had a history rooted in experiences of anti–imperialism and national liberation.

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Pan – Asianism, Anti Imperialism and the Afro – Asian Solidarity

For the majority of the world’s states, the experience of their diplomatic elite in international relations was more strongly tied to their experience of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles. When 29 states gathered in the city of Bandung, they did so despite having many cultural and political differences. However, they produced a rather united stance and came out with a strong commitment to the United Nations. The existence of the Bandung Conference, much like the San Francisco Conference, was based on a shared experience and a shared narrative. The immediate politics behind the Bandung Conference will be analysed in the next chapter. In this section, I will argue that three key transnational movement movements shaped the approach of the Bandung states towards international relations, which ultimately manifested itself as Afro-Asian solidarity. These were Pan-Asianism, Pan-Nationalism and Anti-Imperialism.

Pan – Nationalism and Pan – Asianism

Pan – Asianism was one very important transnational movement that formed an identity above the state for many countries outside of Europe and the Americas. In short, Pan – Asianism was a belief in and commitment to a united ‘Asia’ as a counter to the West. As it played out in world affairs, the ideology has often been linked to Japanese nationalism and imperialism.\textsuperscript{57} Sven Saaler, an

\textsuperscript{57} See for example, Sven Saaler & J. Victor Koschmann, \textit{Pan - Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders} (Oxan: Routledge, 2007); M. Jansen, ‘Pan – Asianism’, in Marlene J. Mayo, ed., \textit{The Emergence of Imperial Japan: Self Defense or Calculated Aggression}}
historian of modern Japan, locates the origin of Pan – Asianism in the Meiji Restoration with thinkers such as Okakura Tenshin and Tarui Tokichi, who grappled with the question of how Japan should deal with its Asian neighbours.\textsuperscript{58} Using the Japanese intellectual Kodera, Saaler argues that it was the underlying ideology for Japanese expansion, with the notion of a ‘glorious new civilisation under Japanese leadership and guidance.’\textsuperscript{59} This was obviously accompanied by the view that Japan was more advanced and civilised than her Asian neighbours and thus had a right and responsibility to lead the region.\textsuperscript{60} For Eric Hotta, Pan – Asianism was a driving factor in Japan’s expansion from 1931 – 1945.\textsuperscript{61} He associates the central tenets of the ideology with the Amo Statement of 1934 made by Japan’s Foreign Ministry Information Division Chief, something he states has widely been dubbed the ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine.’\textsuperscript{62}

The notion of an Asian alliance standing up against the West however was invoked in many national resistance movements across Asia. Such movements often characterised their struggle as one of ‘East against West.’\textsuperscript{63} Cemil Aydin, another Asian historian, argues that the Japanese Government merely ‘appropriated an already existing Pan – Asianist alternative to the Eurocentric world order.’\textsuperscript{64} Much like it’s counterpart in the Arabian world, Pan – Asianism

\begin{footnotes}
\item[58] Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1261.
\item[59] Kodera, quoted in Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1271.
\item[60] Saaler, ‘Regionalism in Modern Japan’, p. 1271.
\item[62] Hotta, Pan Asianism and Japan’s War, p. 79.
\end{footnotes}
was simply taken as political currency by all aspiring nations. It was thus simultaneously a transnational and multinational movement, with different countries taking and appropriating its tenets. It is therefore rather difficult to identify any one root of Pan – Asianism. In the 19th century, Pan – Asianism as a coherent ideology was predominately based in China and Japan. In the Chinese case, a prominent example would be the scholar Gu Hongming, who dichotomised the ‘spiritual East,’ based in Confucianism, with the ‘materialistic West.’ According to Aydin, the birth of Pan – Asianism as a coherent regional ideology was the Russo – Japanese War. The war, Aydin argues, ‘established a consciousness of the era as the awakening of the East.’ Immediately following the war, national liberation movements around Asia started making serious cases for an Asian alliance. A prominent example would be Phan Boi Chau, a Vietnamese intellectual and nationalist. It was briefly after the 1904 war that Chau wrote his seminal work, Modest Proposal for an Asian Alliance, which called for a united Asia. Chau was indeed motivated by his own nationalism, but believed that a united Asia was in everyone’s interest.

Pan – Asianism was part of a broader trend in the colonised and semi colonised world, mirroring other so-called pan – nationalist movements. This included Pan – Arabism, Pan – Islamism and, to a lesser extent, Pan –

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65 Chunmei Du, ‘Gu Hongming as a Cultural Amphibian: A Confucian Universalist Critique of Modern Western Civilisation’, Journal of World History, 22, No. 4 (December 2011), p. 754. Chunmei Du argues that Hongming employed an internationalist interpretation of Confucianism, seeing it as a way of uniting Asia. Hongming believed this to be a superior form of internationalism to that which permeated Europe, as a united Asia would be more powerful than a constantly warring Europe.
68 Christie, Ideology and Revolution, p. 22.
Africanism. Aydin argues that these movements were predominately progressive, modernist and optimistic. According to Riklefs, such was characterised by a perception of the West as superior and a resultant desire ‘to borrow Western science and technology while maintaining an indigenous cultural and religious base.’ All these movement were a primary way be which nationalist intellectual outside of Europe and North America advocated for a unit and a goal above the state.

An examination of Pan – Asianism and more broadly Pan – Nationalism as it played out in every national case would be far too expansive for this work. Nonetheless, a brief explanation of the role of Pan – Asianism in Indonesia and India, two of the key players at Bandung, is necessary.

India’s engagement with the Pan – Asianism largely stemmed from the Indian National Congress’s 1924 Foreign Policy Conference. The conference produced two very important doctrines that formed much of the theoretical basis for India’s engagement in the East Asia, and thus most of the decolonising world after WWII. The first of these was that India’s destiny was linked with her Asian neighbours. Malik, a key intellectual figure in Indian nationalism in the 1920s, stated that it was ‘an urge, devoid of any desire for the leadership of Asia, for friendship, co-operation and partnership with Asian people for freedom,

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69 Pan – Africanism in Africa emerged later in the twentieth century than Pan Asian, Pan Islamism and Pan Arabism. In the early 20th Century, it was based heavily in the African Diaspora through intellectuals like Dubois. There is some debate as to whether Pan – Africanism was a colonial product in itself. Pan Africanism in the diaspora had often been linked to ‘returning to Africa.’ The return to Africa was advocated for in the Northern United States, and often meant going back to the continent to be a missionary. For information on Pan African in the early 20th century, see Alexandre Mboukou, ‘The Pan African Movement, 1900 – 1945: A Study in Leadership Conflict Among Disciples of Pan Africanism’, Journal of Black Studies, 13, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 275 – 278.


prosperity and world peace on a democratic and secular basis.' The second was the maintenance of friendly relations from the West. This was largely based on Ghandi’s views, and his desire to have 'honourable and voluntary cooperation based on mutual respect and trust.'

Indian nationalism was furthermore linked to the prospect of a united Asian continent. Sorojini Naidu, a prominent intellectual of the period, presented a rather grand vision for India to ‘play a part in the great international development of the world.’ Pan – Asianism was thus used much in India as political currency for nationalism.

Indonesia’s engagement with pan – Asianism was much more closely tied to the development of its own brand of nationalism. Like most countries of the region, Indonesia experienced a national awakening in the early 20th century. This was, according to Nagazumi, inspired by numerous colonial struggles around the world, most notably the Boer uprising and the Russo – Japanese War. Indonesia’s nationalism however interacted much more with Pan – Islamism. Ricklefs states that it was part of 'Unmat Islam,' the emerging view among Muslims in the early 20th century that they were part of a global community. Indonesia’s brand of nationalism however was in itself regional, given that Indonesia was a region with extreme linguistic and political diversity. A united Asia, or rather a united South East Asia was often applied to make the case for the one Indonesian nation.

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75 Ricklefs, 'The Dragon's Stir', p. 2.
Overall, Pan – Asianism and pan nationalism in general portray a history of internationalism that was entirely separate from both the liberal cosmopolitanism of the West or even the Marxist internationalism of the Soviet bloc. It was a common ideology or approach to international relations that coloured the way newly decolonising states approached international relations in the immediate post war period.

**Anti Imperialism**

In concurrence to the development of Pan – Asianism and other forms of pan - nationalism, the years between the 1920s and 1930s saw the growth of global anti – imperialism. As argued above, Pan – Asianism, Pan – Islamism and Pan – Arabism were some of the most prominent transnational movements outside Europe. Pan – Africanism was also emerging in a significantly weaker capacity. Eventually by the 1920s, the notion of a global alliance against imperialism, stretching across all regions, was starting to take shape. This occurred at the Conference of Brussels in 1927, which aimed to create an international ‘League Against Imperialism.’ Among some of the most important norms emerging form this conference were colonial solidarity and a disavowal of imperialism in the general and universal sense.

The conference began with intentions that were quite far removed from what it ultimately produced. Brussels was largely a communist endeavour spearheaded by two communists living in Berlin named Willi Muzenberg and

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Virendranath Chattopadhyaya.\textsuperscript{77} Furthermore, it was covertly financed by the Comintern in the hopes of instigating revolution throughout the world's colonies.\textsuperscript{78} Even the name of the conference stemmed from Soviet perceptions of the world order at the time. The League Against Imperialism was a play on the League of Nations, which the Soviet Union still accused of being a Western Capitalist Plot.\textsuperscript{79} Furthermore, the desire to build solidarity among colonial resistance movements was in keeping with the Soviet Union's policy of supporting communist revolutions across the world.\textsuperscript{80}

The conference however could hardly be termed very communist in nature. The majority of attendees and key voices were non–communist nationalists, including people such as Nehru from the INC and Chiang Kai Check from the Kuomintang. Prashad argues that this was largely the reason for the ultimate demise of the League as an institution, given that it was ultimately superseded by a variety of nationalist struggles in all the home countries.\textsuperscript{81}

While dying soon afterwards, the League Against Imperialism translated into many nationalist movements and was retained in national memories. Such was the case in India, and can by seen by some of the changes in Nehru's rhetoric following the conference. He said in his 1929 address that 'India's movement must link with a series of movements, not necessarily in line with the INC's vision, including the labour movement in the West and nationalist movements in

\textsuperscript{77} Prashad, \textit{The Darker Nations}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{78} Prashad, \textit{The Darker Nations}, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{80} This faded in the years following as Stalin's 'socialism in one country' started to become the dominant orthodoxy.
\textsuperscript{81} Prashad, \textit{The Darker Nations}, pp. 26 – 27.
the Middle East. The period after Brussels thus saw some synchronisation in the previously disparate and insular nationalist movements in Asia. As Nehru's language shows, there was an emerging trend from the late 1920s to present a global struggle against imperialism, with the nations of Africa and Asia on one side, and the Nations of Europe and America on the other..

**The Post – War Order and the Move towards Afro – Asian Solidarity**

The legacies of Pan-Asianism and anti-imperialism were beginning to be felt in the early years of the United Nations. Arab and East Asians would form a bloc in regards to gaining representation in various leadership roles in the United Nations. According to Alden et. al, the first electoral behaviour was seen in the elections of the President of the General Assembly, the 7 Vice Presidents and the chairmen of the 6 GA committees. Alden et. al states that this was incredibly important for the interests of various Africa and Asian countries. This was because the Vice Presidents and Chairmen formed the General Committee, which was responsible for setting the agenda of the General Assembly. Already in 1946, many common issues were beginning to appear for these two regions. The right to national self-determination was one, as well as the nature of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mechanisms for decolonisation were also a clear issue, as the UN Charter was never meant to address the question of

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82 Quoted in Bandyopadhyaya, 'The Non – Aligned Movement', p. 140.
85 Alden et. al, *The South in World Politics*, pp. 34 – 36.
territories that had existed as colonies before WWI. According to Alden et. al, what the European powers did in their won colonies fell under their domestic jurisdiction.

The immediate post-war period also saw the appearance of a few regional organisations, largely stemming from the history of Pan-Nationalism. The Arab League was one, forming in May of 1945 to 'coordinate collaboration between them [Arab states], to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.' In East Asia, calls towards regional alliances were largely restricted to Indian diplomatic circles. Indian foreign policy had for a while been linked to the notion of leadership over a united Asia. United by common ties in the League Against Imperialism, individuals such as Nehru and Nasser began making the move to create a third Cold War bloc, mainly through the creation of the Arab Asian Group in 1950. Such events were ultimately affected by the common diplomatic history of these elites, which tended to form a clear consensus on their vision of a post war order. This order was based on a united Africa and Asia that could bring about a final end to all forms of colonialism, and which saw their own countries taking ownership of internationalism and the ideals of the UN.

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86 The trusteeship system of the UN dealt with territories that had previously been under the control of the Axis powers, and also states that had been under League of Nations mandates.  
89 Alden et. al, The South in World Politics, p. 27.
Conclusion

The first half of the twentieth century saw the growth of two major internationalist trends. One was the internationalism between the states of Europe and the Americas that led to the San Francisco conference and the birth of the United Nation. The other was Afro – Asian solidarity, which would not emerge in a coherent form until the first instances of decolonisation. The roots of Afro – Asian solidarity lay in a completely different tradition of internationalism to those that operated in the West. This was not based in Kant’s theories nor on a common experience of WWII. Cooperation among the African and Asian states was based on a common experience of, and struggle against imperialism. Combined with Pan – Asianism and other forms of pan – nationalism, this shared experience provided the political and cultural premise for holding the Bandung Conference. In the next chapter, I will argue how the Bandung conference finally solidified these many ideologies into a series of norms that formed the basis for cooperation in the African and Asian world.
Chapter Two
The Bandung Conference and its Aftermath: From Afro – Asian Solidarity to Non - Alignment

The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a wave of decolonisation that rapidly grew the number of the world’s states. These states were very much outside the diplomatic networks that permeated the Western and Eastern (Soviet) worlds, as their diplomatic elite lacked the same institutional history. Furthermore, many were not yet members of the United Nations, and would not be so for at least another year. Those that were members played a generally marginal role in a time when the UN’s bureaucracy was much smaller and the Security Council was considerably more active.90 Lacking diplomatic alternatives, the newly independent state of Africa and Asia were led into bilateral relationships with old powers. Such was the dynamic at play, Mackie argues, in the development of collective defence agreements such as SEATO and CENTO.91 Without their own diplomatic networks, one would have assumed that the African and Asian states would have been subsumed into either side of the Cold War. However, the 50s and 60s saw the emergence of a vibrant third bloc that tended to act independently. The foreign policies of this bloc’s constituent states were determined by the outcome of the Bandung Conference, which created the identity of the Third World from the preceding Afro Asian Solidarity Movement.

90 See Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 2: The Age of Decolonization [sic], 1955 – 1965 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire & London, 1989), p. 4. From 1945 to 1955, the Security Council met much more frequently that it did any time in the United Nations History. In the 1940s, it met on average about 130 times a year. In the late 1950s, this had dropped to roughly 30 times per year.
This chapter argues that the Bandung Conference solidified a set of norms that guided the actions of most newly decolonised or decolonising African and Asian states following 1955. These norms were: a commitment to Non-Alignment; belief in and optimism for the United Nations; a proclivity towards caucausing and collective voting; and a commitment to mutual assistance. This chapter will begin by presenting the immediate background to the Bandung Conference, and the emergence of Afro-Asian Solidarity, focusing on Indonesian, Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) and Indian diplomatic circles. It will then present an overview of the conference, arguing that it negotiated a series of norms that were embodied in the final communiqué. The chapter will then look briefly at the emerging Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, which were two of the many products of the conference.

A Grand Asian African Alliance: The Road to Bandung

The Bandung Conference was set in motion by the efforts of Sir John Kotewalala, the prime minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), when he called for an ‘informal meeting’ involving the heads of government of Pakistan, India, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon.92 Jamie Mackie, who has written one of the most comprehensive secondary accounts of the Bandung Conference in the English language, notes that the purpose of the conference was somewhat ambiguous.93 This is reflected by the comments of the other participants. Ali Sastroamidjojo reflected in his memoirs that it seemed odd that Kotelawala simply wanted all

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the heads of government to ‘get to know each other.’ He further stated that it was unusual he should call it an ‘informal’ gathering, given that such a meeting of heads of government would ‘by its nature be perceived as formal.’ In his memoirs, Kotelawala noted that it was important for the Asian states to start building trust and come to have a united stance on a variety of matters. This was linked to Kotelawala’s particular brand of nation building, which was linked quite strongly to Pan–Asianism. Kotewala believed that national unity could be achieved by Ceylon being an international leader and acting as a ‘Voice for Asia.’ Becoming such would have probably also strengthened Ceylon’s case for being accepted as a member of the UN, after having it’s application rejected over ten times. It was no accident that Kotelawala had floated the idea for the Colombo meeting at the Annual Dinner of the United Nations Association of Ceylon.

The meeting was also conceived in a time of great uncertainty for the larger South and South–East Asian states. The Indo–Chinese conflict and the principles and approaches of the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were soon to give rise to organisations such as SEATO. The rise of collective defence agreements was significantly restricting the diplomatic manoeuvrability of countries that were aspiring to become economic, cultural and military leaders in the region. The Colombo Conference was possibly an opportunity for those

95 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on my Journey, p. 274.
96 Sir John Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story (George G. Harrap and co, Ltd, 1956), pp. 117 – 118.
97 Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, pp. 117 – 118.
98 Kotelawala, An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, pp. 117 – 118.
99 SEATO was signed on in September 1954, a few months following the conference of Colombo.
100 See for example a letter by Nehru to the foreign minister demonstrating the difficulty of establishing relationships with China: Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Chief Ministers, 15 August
countries pursuing 'free and active' foreign policies and seeking to be leaders in the region to gauge each other's positions, and coordinate their diplomatic efforts.

It was at the Colombo Conference that the proposal for an Asian African Conference first gained a hearing. The idea came not from Kotelawala, but from the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sastromidjojo. The Prime Minister had made it a condition of his attendance that the question of a 'conference of a more comprehensive nature' would be included on the agenda. Much like Kotelawala's move to hold the Colombo conference, the prospect of an Asian African conference was influenced by Pan – Asianism and the desire among every Asian leader to be a 'voice of Asia.' As for Africa, Sastroamidjojo was of the belief that Asia and Africa shared common concerns and aspirations concerning the current states of world affairs. This as possibly due to what was established at Brussels, namely the belief that the struggle against imperialism was a global one. The prime minister had made sure to include input from his diplomats in various African states when creating the proposal. This was mainly done through the Tugu meeting held several months earlier between the Indonesians heads of diplomatic missions in Asian and Africa.

While certainly influenced strongly by Pan – Asianist and Anti – Imperialist ideals, the move to hold the Asian – African conference was also a strategic calculation on Indonesia's part, and a realisation of the foreign policy

101 Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 54.
102 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 275.
103 See Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 276, where he recounts stating in his speech at Colombo, 'where do we nations of Asia stand now.'
104 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 272.
105 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 275.
doctrines that had come to emerge under Sastroamidjojo and Sukarno. The doctrine was Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ policy, conceived in response to the regional security agreements that were emerging under the US Secretary John Foster Dulles in South East Asia.\(^{106}\) The policy was quite strongly linked to Indonesian nationalism, which was aspirational and based on leadership in the region.\(^{107}\) This was related to the fact that Indonesia was so multi ethnic and multination, and was in most ways already being a regional leader purely by existing as one sovereign state. Faced with skyrocketing inflation and frequent government reshuffles, the time for Indonesia to live up to its ‘free and active’ policy was looming with greater urgency.\(^{108}\) With Cold War tensions mounting, Indonesia was presented with an opportunity for regional leadership through Bandung. Sastroamidjojo noted in his autobiography:

‘In my initial statement to the DPRS I had also stressed that the activeness of our foreign policy should mean active participation in the efforts to reduce cold war tensions... world peace was not only something craved for all of mankind; it was also in our national interest and an indispensable condition for rapid and orderly development of our country and people.’\(^{109}\)

Sastroamidjojo’s proposal did not receive a great deal of enthusiasm in Ceylon. Several other concerns dominated the Colombo conference, namely the


\(^{109}\) Sastroamidjojo, *Milestones on My Journey*, p. 273
conflict in Indo – China and the upcoming Geneva conference.\textsuperscript{110} Nehru most notably expressed scepticism regarding the viability of such an endeavour. As Mackie suggests, this was because he was not willing to take on an overly idealistic stance at such a politically delicate moment for the region.\textsuperscript{111} Kotelawala notes the general mood of the attendees in his memoirs, stating that they ‘were anxious to avoid anything which might hinder the negotiations in Geneva, where much recalcitrance was being expressed from certain quarters.’\textsuperscript{112} In a letter to his Chief Ministers after Colombo, Nehru made almost no reference to Sastroamidjojo’s proposal, instead focusing on the utility of the Colombo meeting towards coming to a resolution in Indo – China.\textsuperscript{113} Sir John Kotelawala was only cautiously supportive, careful that such a conference would give an open forum to communist countries like China, North Korea and the newly forming South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{114} U Nu and Mohammed did not have strong feeling either way, being much more heavily concerned with the upcoming Geneva Conference.

As a result, the final communiqué of the Colombo conference produced a rather low-key statement about the prospect of an Asian – African conference. It stated simply that the ‘Indonesian Prime Minister discussed the possibility and desirability of holding a conference of Asian and African Nations.’\textsuperscript{115} It was not for another few months that the idea for the conference gained popularity. This was a result of several international events. One was the unsatisfactory outcome

\textsuperscript{110} Sastroamidjojo, \textit{Milestones on my Journey}, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{111} Mackie, \textit{Bandung 1955}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{112} Kotelawala, \textit{An Asian Prime Minister’s Story}, p. 123.
\textsuperscript{114} Kotelawala, \textit{Asian Prime Minister’s Story}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{115} Communiqué of the Colombo Conference, quoted in Mackie, \textit{Bandung 1955}, p. 56.
of the Geneva Conference and the further strengthening of collective defence agreements.\footnote{116} Another was the continued rejection of several applications for membership in the UN. According to Mackie however, the major catalyst was Nehru’s turnaround. In September of 1954, Sastroamidjojo made a speech in the Indian Parliament.\footnote{117} In this speech, he referred as he had before to Pan-Asianism and to the common struggle against imperialism. He also made reference to the need for Afro-Asian Unity, and about the dangers of new forms of imperialism.\footnote{118} Sastroamidjojo’s lobbying led to a significant turnaround by Nehru, who began to view the conference as another opportunity for expanding India’s emerging programme of non-alignment.\footnote{119} On the other hand Indonesian historian Dewi Fortuna Anwar argues that Nehru’s change in attitude was more heavily influenced by Zhou Enlai’s visit to New Delhi, which was when the two leaders formulated the \textit{Panchsheel}, or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.\footnote{120} Both non-alignment and the Panchsheel would feature heavily in what was debated at Bandung, and what was ultimately produced in the communiqué.

The Bogor Conference came soon after Nehru’s rather public change in attitude. Composed of the Colombo 5, it was chaired by Ruslan Abdulgani, the Indonesian Foreign Minister.\footnote{121} Numerous problems abounded, namely the question of who to invite. Nehru’s position was that the conference should be as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] \textit{Mackie, Bandung 1955}, pp. 58 - 60.
\item[121] Mackie, \textit{Bandung 1955}, p. 68.
\end{footnotes}
representative as possible of the Afro–Asian region, which meant inviting Israel.\textsuperscript{122} Pakistan and Indonesia maintained their opposition to this specific question as would be expected.\textsuperscript{123} In the end, the 5 countries came to an understanding that not inviting Israel was the pragmatic option, as it would mean the non–attendance of all Arab countries.\textsuperscript{124} Another question was whether countries that weren’t yet independent should attend. It was decided that the British trust territory of the Gold Coast (Ghana) would be given observer status.\textsuperscript{125} The question of inviting China and other communist countries was also rather challenging, with Kotelawala maintaining opposition all the way.\textsuperscript{126} Nehru had a strong interest in having China attend, as it could use this to diffuse tensions with other Asian states over its rather controversial alliance.\textsuperscript{127} As a compromise, the two Koreas were not invited but China was.\textsuperscript{128} In the end, 30 countries were invited, of which 29 attended. The countries were: Afghanistan; Burma; Cambodia; Ceylon; People’s Republic of China; Cyprus; Egypt; Ethiopia; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Japan; Jordan; Laos; Lebanon; Liberia; Nepal; Pakistan; The Philippines; Saudi Arabia; Syria; Sudan; Thailand; Turkey; The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam); The State of Vietnam (South Vietnam); Yemen; The Gold Coast (observer status).

The politics at play in each of the 29 countries in the lead up to conference is a subject for another work, but a considerable amount of interactions were made to get many of the Middle Eastern and African states to attend. Once Nehru

\textsuperscript{122} Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{123} Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{124} Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 64 – 68.
\textsuperscript{125} Mackie, Bandung 1955, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{126} Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 64 – 65.
\textsuperscript{127} See Letter by Nerhu to his chief ministers, dated November 15, 1954, recounting a visit to China where he briefed Cho Enlai on the Afro–Asian conference, in G. Parthasarathi, Letters to Chief Ministers, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{128} Mackie, Bandung 1955, pp. 65 – 66.
was invested in the conference, he took the lead in lobbying the key figures of Africa and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{129} As the ‘intellectual father of non–alignment, Nehru appealed primarily to the many antipathies towards the Cold War.\textsuperscript{130} Increasingly, attending the Bandung Conference also became a strong political gesture that showed the cosmopolitan outlook of attending countries. China’s attendance was based on such, as it wanted to use the conference to ‘defeat the Western isolation imposed on it.’\textsuperscript{131} Overall, the strategic imperatives for the conference were coloured by the cultural affinity all the attending countries had towards the movement against imperialism. While emerging from the foreign policy directions of the Colombo Five, the idea and drive for the conference was very much a product of anti-imperialism and the now emergent ideology of Afro–Asian Solidarity.

\textbf{At the Conference}

Effects and concrete actions aside, the conference held incredible cultural resonance across the globe when it was held. At its start, the main theme of the conference was a celebration of the cultural diversity of Africa and Asia. Richard Wright, an attendant of the conference, noted that the opening was dominated by ‘pleasantries’ and opportunities to ‘showcase national identities.’\textsuperscript{132} Wright’s account shows that Afro–Asian Solidarity was very much an explicit theme.

\textsuperscript{130} Adebajo, ‘From Bandung to Durban’, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{132} Richard Wright, \textit{The Color Curtain}, p. 130.
Describing the opening ceremony, he states that there ‘was a forest of banners proclaiming Afro-Asian Solidarity.’ Media report from most Western countries tended to focus on the historic nature of the conference as a ‘coloured conference.’ The Washington Post stated that it was ‘the first time in history that Asian and African nations have attempted to solve their problems without interference or advice from the United States or European powers.

With its clearly raced elements, the conference also featured as a potent symbol for oppressed peoples around the world. Richard White, an African – American author and left wing activist was one such example. His account, the Coloured Curtain, is a good window into how the Bandung Conference was perceived by people who perceived themselves as fighting either against colonialism or racism. He states in his chapter on race at Bandung that:

‘Before Bandung, most of these men had been strangers, and on the first day they were constrained with one another, bristling with charge and countercharge against America and/or Russia. But, as the days passed, they slowly cooled off, and another and different mood set in [sic]. What was happening? As they came to know one another better, their fear and distrust evaporate. Living for centuries under Western rule, they had become filled with a deep sense of how greatly they differed from one another. But now, face-to-face, their ideological defences dropped. Negative unity, bred by a feeling that they had to stand together against a

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rapacious West, turned into something that hinted at the positive. They began to taste their combined strength.'\textsuperscript{136}

The tone of the conference was set by Sukarno’s opening speech. Here, he identified the uniting factor of the countries as a ‘common detestation of colonialism.’\textsuperscript{137} He further linked the geopolitics of those attending, noting that they formed the ‘lifeline of imperialism.’\textsuperscript{138} Much of Sukarno’s rhetoric thus drew upon older Pan–Asianist and Anti-Imperialist sentiments. However, it portrayed some emergent ideas that did not become widespread among the countries of Asia and Africa until some years later. The main one was that the countries of Africa and Asia should be guardians of peace. Noting the dangers posed by nuclear weapons, he stated that the countries of Asia and Africa have a duty to stand up against the military arms race between the USA and the USSR.\textsuperscript{139} While making no mention of the United Nations, Sukarno presented what could quite clearly be conceived as a reference to the first line of the charter. This was when he said ‘we the peoples of Africa and Asia.’ Given that the UN was not universal at the time, Sukarno may have been making a call for the African and Asian states to take a lead in the UN project and the project of world peace. Such seems apparent when considering the remainder of the excerpt:

'We the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called

\textsuperscript{136} Richard Wright, \textit{The Color Curtain}, p. 175.
\textsuperscript{138} Transcript of Sukarno’s opening speech, in Kahin, \textit{The Asian African Conference}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{139} Transcript of Sukarno’s opening speech, in Kahin, \textit{The Asian African Conference}, p. 45.
the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war, and that whatever strength we have will always be thrown on to the side of peace.'

Other countries echoed many of the sentiments and internationalist ideals given by Sukarno in the opening session. While not a pervading theme in the meetings of the Colombo Five, the notion of a united Asia and Africa was constantly revisited by the few Sub-Saharan representatives. The Liberian representative stated that the coming age represented 'a new awakening on the part of the peoples of these two great continents.' Race was also a key element in Liberia's speech, saying that the coming age 'should be regarded as the birth of a dynamic concept designed to engender and accelerate positive and lasting interest in the achievement of universal peace, abiding friendship, unfading equality and untrammelled justice regardless of race, creed economic status or clime.' The representative from the Gold Coast (Ghana) made an even stronger reference to the obviously raced element of the conference. Noting various struggles in Africa, the representative for the Gold Coast asserted a racist bias in the internationally recognised right to sovereignty, which was used by colonial powers to stave off criticism about their colonies. He further stated that, 'the struggles and sacrifices of these [African] nations have in our day re-established and fortified the right of all races to govern themselves; they are a shining

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140 Transcript of Sukarno’s Opening Address, in Kahin The Asian African Conference, p. 46.
141 Circulated text of opening speech given by the Liberian delegation, 18th of April, 1955, in Centre for the Study of Asian – African and Developing Countries (CSAADC), Collected Documents of the Asian – African Conference: April 18 – 24, 1955 (Jakarta: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1983), p. 79.
142 Opening speech of the Liberian Delegation, in CSAADC, Collected Documents, p. 79.
example to all those labouring under racial discrimination, political subjection and economic exploitation.”

Of course, a conference of such an expansive nature was also a prime opportunity for many countries to advance their own agendas, many of which were not as widely shared by all the attendees. Nasser emphasised Israel in his speech quite strongly, stating the situation in Palestine was ‘an injustice [that] is unrivalled in the modern world.’ The castigation of Israel in such a forum was not in the interest of East Asian nations such as Japan, who were trying to build up positive relations with the new nation while also remaining part of the Afro-Asian club. Iran, with its close relationship to the US, focused heavily on the merits of trade agreements with major powers, stating that ‘such collaboration carried on alongside with national plans of development and reconstruction is [sic] most efficient for solving the country’s [Iran’s] pressing economic problems.’ Zhou En Lai of China was predictably the last to speak, being one of the most controversial attendants. Zhou’s stance was labelled by most commentators as ‘conciliatory,’ which was to be expected given Zhou’s particular brand of diplomacy. Zhou’s heavy focus on the relatively non-controversial themes of cultural and historical ties in the region was demonstrative of this. He stated, ‘the peoples of Asia and Africa created brilliant ancient civilisations and made tremendous contributions to mankind. But, ever since modern times, most

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143 Circulated text of the opening speech given by the Gold Coast delegation on the 18th of April, 1955, in CSAADC, Collected Documents, p. 59.
146 Circulated text of the opening speech given by the Iranian delegation, in CSAADC, Collected Documents, p. 60.
of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to the plunder and oppression of colonialism, and have been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness. Zhou En-Lai’s speech also foreshadowed some of the more criticised norms that would later form a significant part of relations in the ‘Southern World.’ These were ‘mutual respect for territorial integrity,’ ‘non interference in each others affairs’ and ‘the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.’ Decades later, when many Southern countries were put centre stage for violations of human rights and other international laws, it was the appeal to such norms that quashed criticism and international action.

**Tensions Arise**

The pleasantries did not last long. Once the conference moved to committees, a number of considerable tensions started emerging. The first and probably most salient tension was over the definition of imperialism. This occurred in political committee when Kotelawala dropped what journalists and historians writing about the conference have called the ‘bombshell.’ In a very passionate speech, Kotelawala alleged that communism was not only a form of imperialism, but was also the most pressing form of imperialism in the world at the time. He stated: ‘think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe . . . if we are united in our opposition

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149 The Asian values debate would be one such example, which was often framed in terms of non-interference. See Rajat Rana, ‘Symphony of Decolonisation: Third World and Human Rights Discourse’, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 11, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 373 – 377.
to Colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as Western imperialism?"150

Kotelawala was promptly joined by Mohammed Ali from Pakistan, as well as the delegations for Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya and the Philippines. These countries proposed a resolution that would condemn ‘all types of colonialism, including international doctrines resorting to the methods of force, infiltration and subversion.’151 Implicit in this resolution of course, given the content of Kotelawa’s speech, was an accusation of communism as a form of imperialism.

While being praised in the American and European press as a stalwart against communism, Kotelawala’s move attracted significant anger from some of the big players at the conference.152 Commenting on the situation in his memoirs, Sastroamidjojo called Kotelawala the most ‘undiplomatic and diplomats.’153 Throwing around the word colonialism was no laughing matter, as it still held an immense historical resonance for the countries present. Such an accusation threatened to make the conference degenerate into the very debates that had caused the United Nations to stagnate and become a propaganda tool for the two sides of the Cold War. Furthermore, Kotelawala had made some extremely hostile statements towards China, demanding that it should take part in

153 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on my Journey, p. 281.
dissolving the Cominform as ‘proof of its good intentions.’ As noted by an article in the Mobile Press, the prime minister asserted this action was a prerequisite for taking part in Nehru’s neutralism. The situation was very worrying for Sastroamidjojo, who was chair of the political committee and was thus responsible for ensuring a result. He stated in his memoirs, ‘I was well aware it could end in failure because of this incident, and as a result Indonesia’s name and prestige would be greatly diminished.’ The situation was also worrying for Nehru, whom Sastroamidjojo recalls getting locked into a serious debate with the Ceylonese Prime Minister.

Such a derailment was also of serious concern for China. As argued above, China had been trying to branch out from it’s diplomatic dependence on the Soviet Union, a task that was extremely difficult given its level of isolation from the rest of the world. China’s strategy for achieving this was to build up cultural relations with the more neutral countries of Asia and Africa. This was done mostly through the establishment of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which was responsible for ‘the establishment of cultural relations with foreign countries.’ The job of this association was to engage in what Zhou had called ‘popular diplomacy,’ which involved ‘people to people contact . . . influencing international opinion.’ This constituted much of

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156 Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on My Journey, p. 293.
159 Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, p. 34.
the thinking for example, behind the 5 principles of peaceful coexistence, which were co-authored by Nehru and Chou Enlai.\textsuperscript{161} A shift in the debate from cultural affinity at Bandung threatened much of China’s foreign policy plans.

The tensions between China and Ceylon were eventually resolved, to some degree via Sastroamidjojo’s intervention. Left in a room personally with Chou Enlai and Kotelawala, the Indonesian prime minister attempted to reconcile their difference and find a form of words that was acceptable to both parties.\textsuperscript{162} Kotelawala furthermore stated that he meant no offense by the statement and simply ‘wanted to get it off [his] chest.’\textsuperscript{163} Given the very positive portrayals of the Prime Minister in the US media following the outburst, it’s quite clear that ‘getting off his chest’ without derailing the conference was an exercise of political expediency. The mainstream American press almost universally portrayed Kotelawala as a tireless soldier against communism, often through endearing phrases like ‘strong Sir John.’\textsuperscript{164} The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin declared him a ‘new voice and a new ideal in Asia,’ an image Kotelawala had already been cultivating for himself and for Ceylon since independence.\textsuperscript{165} As for the tension over the definition of imperialism, this was resolved according to Mackie over a very masterful form of words.\textsuperscript{166} After considerable negotiation, the final wording of the communiqué included a condemnation of imperialism in all its ‘manifestation,’ rather than all its ‘types,’ as Kotelawala and his

\textsuperscript{161} The 5 principles were: mutual respect for each others’ sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each others’ internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful co-existence.
\textsuperscript{162} Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on my Journey, pp. 293 – 295.
\textsuperscript{163} Sastroamidjojo, Milestones on my Journey, pp. 293 – 295.
\textsuperscript{166} Mackie, The Bandung Conference, p. 95.
sympathisers had originally proposed.\textsuperscript{167} From the Ceylonese Prime Minister’s perspective, communism was indeed a ‘manifestation’ of colonialism, meaning he was amenable to the wording. Chou however thought otherwise.\textsuperscript{168} Such may have simply been due to the bad connotations the word ‘type’ had acquired.

The second major tension in committees was over world peace and the existence of collective security arrangements. Many of the attending states were members of either SEATO or CENTO, Thailand and Turkey being respective examples.\textsuperscript{169} India and Indonesia on the other hand had a strong policy of neutralism, Indonesia through its ‘free and active’ policy and India through the policy of nonalignment.\textsuperscript{170} In an effort to drive forward his policy of nonalignment, Nehru was quite determined to have something resembling the ‘5 principles of peaceful coexistence’ or Panchsheel in the final declaration.\textsuperscript{171} Neutrality and nonalignment however were quite controversial at the time, and had been met by deep opposition from the United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.\textsuperscript{172} Famous for his remark that ‘neutralism was immoral,’ Dulles was of the belief that any negotiated settlement was a win for communism.\textsuperscript{173} In regards to Bandung, Dulles’ primary concern was that China would appeal to neutrality and nonalignment to ‘ensnare the relatively inexperienced Asian diplomats into supporting resolutions seemingly in favour

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\textsuperscript{167} Mackie, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{168} Sastroamidjojo, \textit{Milestones on my Journey}, p. 293; Mackie, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{169} Turkey for example was a member of the Central Treaty Organisation and Thailand was a member of SEATO.
\textsuperscript{170} James Johnk, ‘Nehru’s Concept of Non – Alignment’, \textit{Towson State Journal of International Affairs}, 7, No. 1 (1972), p. 32.
\textsuperscript{171} Kahin, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{173} Quoted in Mackie, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 48.
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of goodness, beauty and truth.\textsuperscript{174} The US State Department as a result made a very strong effort to ensure that the Western sympathetic countries in attendance would not go down any such path. This was done through establishing the Afro – Asian Working Group and the Bangkok Group. These bodies were responsible for advising diplomats in the ten Western – sympathetic states and ensuring they came out with a united pro – Western stance.\textsuperscript{175}

It was therefore not surprising that non – alignment and neutrality were the issues that almost ended the conference in a deadlock. On the third day of the conference, the Political Committee appointed an \textit{ad hoc} committee chaired by Nasser to study the question of the ‘promotion of world peace and cooperation’ and ‘the problem of dependent nations.’\textsuperscript{176} Sastroamidjojo notes that the committee was composed of just about every controversial or partisan attendee to ensure a form of words amenable to everyone.\textsuperscript{177} Despite this, the conference continued till 4 o’clock on the last day without a resolution. Both Sastroamidjojo and Kotelawala have focused on the 11\textsuperscript{th} hour negotiation that allowed a compromise to be reached, following a speech by the Indonesian prime minister to the committee.\textsuperscript{178} As Mackie states, it was somewhat of wonder that the conference did come out with the ‘10 principles of peace,’ a form of words which all the participants could agree on.\textsuperscript{179} It was equally remarkable that one of the principles was a commitment to non – alignment, albeit in a very diluted form.

\textsuperscript{175} Guan, ‘The Bandung Conference and the Cold War’, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{176} Sastroamidjojo, \textit{Milestones on My Journey}, p. 297.
\textsuperscript{177} Sastroamidjojo, \textit{Milestones on My Journey}, p. 297.
\textsuperscript{178} Sastroamidjojo, \textit{Milestones on My Journey}, p. 298.
\textsuperscript{179} Mackie, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, pp. 104 – 105.
The resolution of the tensions was not significant because they were resolved, but how they were resolved. Kahin notes that the five sponsors had made an explicit effort to avoid formal voting procedures, which meant that the conference operated by consensus. This was of course not the norm in most international fora, where decisions were made primarily by majority voting. While the final communiqué was diluted, its potency lay in the fact that every one of the 29 countries had agreed to it, and had thus declared a willingness to carry forward its principles.

**The Product: Declaration of the Asian and African States**

The conference would appear not to be constructive when compared with many other historical international gatherings. No treaties were signed, and no international laws were set. All that was produced was a declaration containing a broad set of principles and aspirations. However, as would be seen in later years, these principles were expressed in the behaviour of many of the Bandung states when it came to the United Nations. They were also enacted by most newly independent states in the region, often as an expression of being African or Asian. The identity of the Third World was beginning to take shape. While originally used by Sauvy in 1953 to describe the bloc that wasn’t a bloc, the Third World was developing its own set of aspirations regarding the international order, independent of the first and second worlds. The following years saw the emergence of Third World institutions such as the Aligned Movement and the

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Group of 77. These movements frequently employed and expounded many of the principles that were established on the floor of Bandung.

One of the most important aspects of the communiqué would be it’s commitment to non-alignment and its vision of the African and Asian countries as the world’s main advocates for peace. This was summed up quite pertinently by the so-called Ten Principles of Peace, which were:

1. Respect for Fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and small;
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country;
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
6. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. (b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries;
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country;
8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of the parties own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations;
9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation;

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

Non-Alignment was embodied in principle 6, which identified collective security arrangements, seemingly presenting an implicit connection these had to the ‘interests of any big powers.’ While heavily diluted from India’s original proposals, principle 6 was still unprecedented, as it expressed a clear disapproval of the bi-polar world order.

Another key point of the communiqué was the economic recommendation. Most notably, the communiqué called for the establishment of a ‘special United Nations fund for development.’ This was a rather accurate foreshadowing of both the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and the United Nations Development Fund, respectively created nine and ten years later. Also quite notably, it eschewed so-called comparative advantage and recognised that developing countries had a right to develop their domestic industry through protectionism. This was presented in Section A, sub-section 6 of the communiqué, which stated that ‘Asian-African Countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw material, wherever economically feasible, before export.’\textsuperscript{181} As Kahin noted, the economic committee had not been anywhere near as heated as the political committee, possibly due to the fact that the African and Asian countries had more unified interests in this area.\textsuperscript{182} By 1955, the Bretton Woods System had already been getting criticism, the main source of this being Latin America and

\textsuperscript{181} Communiqué of the Asian African Conference, quoted in Kahin, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{182} Kahin, \textit{The Bandung Conference}, p. 18.
the international political economic school of Dependency Theory. The economic clause presented many of the basic principles of the theory, such as the right of underdeveloped states to develop domestic industries. Presence of such principle in the communiqué would have certainly tied it with the Third World identity, and it’s associated goals of World Peace and global economic justice.183

Probably the most significant and surprising aspect of the communiqué was it’s very UN – friendly tone. The United Nations was not mentioned extensively in either Sukarno’s speech, or in much of the politics leading up to the conference. Indeed, as argued earlier, the conference was conceived largely in response to two things: the growth in collective defence agreements in Asia outside the UN; and the continued disenfranchisement of countries such as Ceylon from the General Assembly. The communiqué could well have gone down two paths. It could have noted the failure of the UN in addressing the many African and Asian states’ grievances, and called for alternate means of achieving their interests. Alternatively, it could have encouraged further development of and engagement with the UN, and declared it the only avenue for achieving the goals of the Bandung states. It seemed to go down the latter, expressing an unequivocal optimism for the ‘principles and aims of the United Nations charter.’184 The communiqué also noted that the UN should be a wholly universal organisation, with every state being a member. Such was made at a time when

183 Dependency theory was put forward by the Argentinian economist Raul Prebish in 1949. Until the many waves of neoliberalisation in the 70s and 80s, it served as a dominant political economic theory for many developing states. Dependency theory became institutionalised into the third world through a wide variety of avenues. In this regard, the Bandung Conference would have helped establish global economic self sufficiency as one of the key goals of the Asian and African states. For a comprehensive history of Dependency Theory and its operation in the developing world, see B.N. Gosh, Dependency Theory Revisited (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
only 60% of the world's states were members of this organisation, with a disproportionate number being European and American states.

The Aftermath: The development of Southern Institution, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77

The norms described above soon began coming into play in the international sphere. In the years following 1955, several of the conference’s key players engaged in efforts to create more formal institutions to create a third bloc in the United Nations. The figures in this endeavour were the big players of Bandung, namely India, Indonesia and Egypt. This was not an easy task, with many of the Bandung states becoming racked by division in the following years. Diem’s close alliance with the United States continued to solidify collective defence agreements as the status quo, with the Vietnamese leader claiming in 1956 that ‘neutralism has lost much of its appeal.’ Meanwhile, Indonesia, the conference’s host and conceiver, was on a root to authoritarianism and was itself facing charges of colonialism in regards to the situation in New Guinea. Coupled with the crisis in the Suez and in Hungary, the prospect of an Asian African Alliance was looking very bleak.

However, as Cold War tensions came to a boiling point 1960 (the year in which Khrushchev banged his shoe), the fears expressed in the Bandung declaration were becoming a reality. Increasingly, the image of the Northern countries as responsible international managers was becoming tenuous. At

Bandung, the attendants had floated the very empowering idea that the countries of Asia and Africa were best placed to be protectors of the peace, untainted and uncorrupted by a history of imperialism. By 1960, this seemed like the reality of the situation, with much of the voices for disarmament and easing of tensions coming from the Third World.

In the face of these tensions, the Non Aligned Movement emerged as a formal institution in the year 1961. It was conceive by Tito as part of his general move away from the Soviet Union. The other key players however had almost all been heavily influential in the Bandung Conference. This included Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser. Indeed, the exploration of a more general and specific organisation for the unaligned was a continuation of their desire for an African and Asian Alliance. The phrase Non alignment had already been in use in India since the early 50s. By 1960, non–aligned was used to describe any country that chose to remain neutral in the Cold War. While active neutrality in the early 50s was prominent in India, Egypt and Indonesia, it seemed to gain increasing popularity after Bandung.

Much of the literature on the Non – Aligned Movement has drawn a strong link between it and the Bandung Conference. While not explicitly creating it, the Bandung Conference set much of the norms among the later constituent states of the NAM. When looking at the original declaration of the Non – Aligned Countries, it is easy to see many similarities in the rhetoric. The general theme of peace and non-violence was one. Much like the Bandung Conference earlier, the first Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of Non – Aligned countries had been conceived in a time of great international tension, linking this to colonialism. It stated that ‘to eradicate the source of conflict is to eradicate
colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practice a policy of peaceful co-existence in the world.’ It is worth noting that the world ‘manifestation,’ used in the Bandung communiqué, was used again. The declaration also continued the theme of the Third World countries being the guardians of peace. The declaration also called for a ‘general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament,’ much like had been stated six years earlier.

The Group of 77 was formed in 1964 at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This was done in the form of a declaration, whereby the group expressed much of the ideas that were present in the economic statement of the Bandung communiqué. The Group of 77 acted largely as a caucus that advocated for the mutual interests of its members. To the present day, institutions like the IMF and the World Bank remain exclusive forums of development. However, as it expand to over 110 members by 1970, the G77 effectively meant that the economic and financial discourse of the United Nations were almost completely dominated by the Third World.

Conclusion

Overall, the Bandung Conference created a series of norms between the African and Asian states, and solidified the transnational identity of the Third World. The impetus for the Bandung Conference came from different modes of internationalism based in pan-nationalism and anti-imperialism. There were several strategic considerations at hand between the Colombo five when they held the conference. This included the rise in collective defensive agreements,
which were significantly limiting the diplomatic manoeuvrability of countries such as India and Indonesia. However, the actions of these states were coloured by the history behind Afro–Asian Solidarity.

While representing a diverse range of states, the Bandung conference produced a series of norms that held hitherto unrelated peoples together; among these norms were that of non-aligned and peaceful coexistence, that of mutual economic assistance and engagement with the United Nations. The next chapter will situate these norms in the many changes that occurred in the United Nations from 1955 to 1970.
Chapter Three
Bandung in the United Nations:
Diversity, Decolonisation, Disarmament and Development

The previous chapter argued that the Bandung Conference created a set of norms that were taken up by a variety of countries in Asia and Africa in the international sphere. This led to the creation of the Non Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, the main international organisations of the Third World.\footnote{\textit{The twenty members were: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and the provisional Algerian Government.}} The literature on the connection between Bandung and the UN however is minimal. Most historians see the Bandung Conference and its aftermath as something external to the organisation. Adebajo for example sees it as an expression of an ‘alternate vision of world order’ to that which was established at San Francisco.\footnote{Adeyeke Adebajo, ‘From Bandung to Durban: Whither the Afro – Asian Coalition?’, in Tan & Acharya, eds., \textit{Bandung Revisited}, p. 106.}

The United Nations of today is not just a legacy of the immediate post-war period, but a legacy of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s. This was when the membership of the United Nations almost tripled, and it became a near-universal organisation. With the creation of a myriad of new funds and programmes, the passage of the first international covenants on human rights and the commencement of the UN’s first international peacekeeping mission in the Belgian Congo, it was also the period by which the organisation came to full maturity. In short, it was when the United Nations experienced its southermnisation. Whereby previously it had been an organisation of the
Capitalist West and the Communist East, it was by the late 1960s an organisation of the developed North and the underdeveloped South.

This chapter aims to situation the Bandung Conference within the history of this southernisation and of the UN in general, arguing that the United Nations of today is as much a legacy of the Bandung Conference as meetings of the immediate post-war period. The aim here is not to argue that Bandung was the sole cause of this change, but that there was a connection between the agenda set at Bandung, and the confidence with which that southernisation took place between 1955 and 1970. It will begin by covering some of the immediate changes in UN membership following the conference, namely the admittance of five Bandung states. It will argue that the conference served as a key point in the Secretary-General’s push to resolve the membership deadlock in the Security Council. It will then examine the greater focus on decolonisation that ensued in the following decade, which further expanded UN membership. As result of this, the Non-Alignment Movement and the Group of 77, both legacies of Bandung, became the most powerful bloc in the General Assembly.

After establishing this connection, this chapter will present two of the main changes that occurred during this period. The first of these was a change in the United Nations bureaucracy. In the 1950s, countries contributed staff to the United Nations based on their financial contribution. These provisions were gradually changed to reflect geographical and national distribution. By 1970, a large portion of the UN’s staff and bureaucracy were from Africa, Asia and Latin America, or the Global South.

The second was a change in the role and the work of the United Nations. With the creation of UNCTAD and the UNDP, a greater proportion of the UN’s
work became focused technical assistance and development. The UN also became the primary sphere by which the countries of the South could voice their interests, given their lack of power in the IMF and the World Bank.

The third and final was the changing agenda of the United Nations. Issues that had previously been of marginal concern took centre stage in the 1950s and 1960s. Possibly the most prominent issue was that of nuclear disarmament, championed by the Non-Aligned Movement. Others were Anti-Apartheid and Anti-Racism.

This chapter will conclude that the Bandung Conference should be considered one of the key moments in the history of the United Nations. While not producing any immediate results, it solidified many of the norms that united the Third World countries in the General Assembly during the following years, the same way that two different ideologies had united the Eastern and Western Bloc. This ultimately turned the United Nations into what it is today.

Bandung and the Secretary-General: The end of the membership deadlock

The period between 1955 and 1970 saw a very large increase in the proportion of the world’s independent states that were members of the UN. In 1955, the proportion stood at roughly 60%. By 1959, the percentage of what could be termed de jure independent states that were members of the UN had risen to 83%. By 1970, it had dropped slightly to 82%, but with almost twice the total number of members as 15 years earlier. Since the end of the Cold War,

\[\text{\footnotesize 188 There were 99 internationally recognized independent states in 1959, with 82 of them being members of the United Nations.}\]
almost 100% of the world’s widely recognised states have been members of the UN at any given time.\textsuperscript{189}

The Bandung Conference played a central role in the expansion of UN membership in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{190} It caused this in two ways. Firstly, it provided a case for granting membership to all applicants in Security Council. Secondly, it brought decolonisation on the agenda of the United Nations, adding political fire to many independence movements around the world.

The period between 1946 and 1955 was a turbulent one for the United Nations. With Cold War tensions at their height, the organisation was frequently used as a propaganda tool by either the East or the West. This was especially the case in regards to the Security Council, which the international historian Alenius states was ‘an important arena of Great Power politics where the general aims of diplomats was to strengthen the morale of one’s own side, undermine the morale of counterparts, and perhaps above all, have neutral parties support one’s political efforts.’\textsuperscript{191} While the Security Council gave equal floor–space to the USSR and the United States, the Western Bloc countries controlled the floor of the General Assembly. The Soviet Union’s lack of overt support in this sphere often gave the American media the opportunity to portray it as a belligerent.\textsuperscript{192} GA resolutions furthermore were used to legitimise actions of the Western bloc countries when the Security Council failed. Such was the case in the Korean War,

\textsuperscript{189} There are 3 widely recognized states today that are not members of the United Nations. These are: Vatican City; Taiwan and Kosovo.
when the Western Bloc countries used their numbers to produce a series of rather scathing resolutions against China.193

A key feature of this propaganda war was a membership numbers game between the US and the USSR, with frequent uses of both the veto and the General Assembly vote to reject applicants.194 Membership vetos were often justified by twisting interpretations of the charter’s criterion of ‘peace loving nation.’195 The original intention of the clause, according to Luard, was to keep ‘former enemy states’ such as Germany and Japan from joining.196 It was clear in the years following that the spirit of the clause was being abused. Between 1946 and 1955, the Soviet Union vetoed a total of 24 applications for membership.197 Often, the same country was rejected several times, most notably Ceylon.198 The US never vetoed a membership application, instead opting to rely on superior numbers in the General Assembly.199 One example was in 1946, when the General Assembly rejected the Security Council’s recommendation for Mongolia and Albania to become members.200

The static membership of the UN was a consistent source of frustration for the many countries in Asia. It was also a cause of frustration for the Secretary – General. The West’s control of the General Assembly, and by extension its


control over the election of the secretariat, left the Secretary – General open to accusations of partisanship by the Eastern bloc. One example would be a response by Pravda to the Secretary – General’s Third Annual Report in 1948. In this report, Trygve Lie made a brief reference to the dangers of bacteriological warfare, an issue that had gained modest attention in the UN. The Soviet propaganda paper Pravda accused Trygve Lie of using it as a distraction from nuclear energy (the Soviet Union had not yet developed the bomb) and acting ‘with the interests of the Anglo-American bloc.’

‘Trygve Lie twice refers to bacteriological warfare. Is not the definite purpose of this to distract the attention of the General Assembly and of world public opinion from the existing unresolved question of atomic energy? . . . This attitude of Trygve Lie is in accord with the interests of the Anglo – American bloc, but in no way conforms with the interests of peace and security of the peoples of the world. Thus, Trygve Lie is not only unobjective [sic]. In actual fact, he sides with the Anglo – American bloc.’

A more universal membership dominated by neutral countries may have reduced such accusations. This was possibly a reason for Hammarskjöld’s strong push to expand UN membership. Addressing the American Association for the United Nations in 1953, Hammarskjöld called upon membership of the United Nations in 1953, Hammarskjöld called upon membership of the United

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Nations to be universal and available to all countries, stating that ‘the charter does not quite say that membership should be universal, but that is its spirit.’

For all those keeping watch of the United Nations, the Bandung Conference served as a warning of the long-term effects of the membership deadlock. At a press conference in April 1955, journalists asked the Secretary-General whether the conference was being used to ‘bypass to the United Nations.’ When probed further, Hammarskjöld stated that ‘any manifestation of the Asian region would affect the UN in positive terms, just as the manifestation of a great region with a great contribution to make, tends to strengthen the United Nations.’ In the following months, the Bandung Conference would feature quite frequently in the Secretary-General’s arguments for expanding membership. In his tenth annual report, Hammarskjöld stated that ‘the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations reflected an attitude and approach that may bear increasing fruit in the future and affirmed the strong support of all peoples represented there for the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.’ It may’ve been possible that Hammarskjöld was responding to the Soviet Union’s accusations that the applicants were not ‘peace loving.’ The Bandung Conference had shown quite resoundingly that the

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countries of Africa and Asia were heavily committed to the United Nations and to international peace.

The secretariat is not usually the first port of call when considering the political history of the United Nations. As Myint-U and Scott state, it is ‘tempting to think of the secretariat as a simple bureaucracy, with a relationship to the UN’s inter-governmental bodies much like the relationship between a national parliament or government and its civil service.’\textsuperscript{207} However, as Myint – U and Scott go on to argue, viewing the secretariat in this way is misleading. Far from being a ‘parliamentary clerk’ for the general assembly, the secretariat is informally a ‘global trend setter,’ which affects the United Nations role in the world.\textsuperscript{208} Three aspects of the Secretary – General’s role make this so. Firstly, the secretary – general represents, defends and interprets the ideals of the United Nations. Secondly, the secretariat acts as the public face for the organisation and its ‘aims and ideals.’\textsuperscript{209} As Myint – U and Scott argue, in the case of an international event, it is the Secretary – General that speaks on behalf of the organisation.\textsuperscript{210} Of course, the secretariat is not the United Nations, and what Secretary – General says does not necessarily present an accurate view of the international zeitgeist. Since nations are accountable to their public however, they must respond to this particular view. This is how the role of the secretary general becomes that of a ‘global agenda setter, formulating and promoting new ideas, say on human rights or environmental protection.’\textsuperscript{211} Thirdly, the secretariat affects the way the UN relates to its stakeholders, through control.

\textsuperscript{207} Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{208} Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat p. 3.
\textsuperscript{209} Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{210} Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat p. 4.
\textsuperscript{211} Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. 4.
over the bureaucracy. In the areas of peacekeeping and international aid, the nature of on – the – ground staff affects the way the UN is approached as a provider of services. Dag Hammarskjöld certainly spearheaded many organisational changes in the United Nations, including a massive expansion of staff and budget. Changes in the bureaucracy ultimately affect member states’ views towards the ability and viability of inter-governmental initiatives. With this in mind, the Secretary – General’s efforts for expansion and the effect this may have had on the P5 cannot be ignored.

The result of Hammarskjöld’s efforts for expansion was the creation of the ‘Good Offices Committee’ to work towards a resolution on the admission process. The committee had three members, one of which was Egypt, a key player at Bandung. With continuing pushes from both the Committee and the Secretary – General, the US and the Soviet Union reached a compromise at the end of 1955. The compromise was that all applicants for membership would be considered on a case – by – case basis and on their own merits. The resolution would then have to be considered without amendment in the General Assembly. Another part of the compromise was that a number of Western and Soviet sympathetic countries were admitted simultaneously. At the end of 1955, the UN admitted Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos and Spain. The countries at Bandung had made it quite clear that they intended to stay unaligned in regards to questions between the East and West. With the majority

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of newcomers after 1956 being unaligned, the Cold War numbers game was effectively over, and the Security Council could get on with accepting all new members.


Events in 1955 ended the membership deadlock, and opened up membership to almost all independent states. With five Asian states joining the organisation in 1955, including Ceylon, the United Nations was already beginning to look more representative. However, the real revolution in UN membership occurred in 1960. This was the oft – labelled 'Year of Africa,' when 17 African states gained independence and were almost immediately accepted as members of the UN. The Year of Africa was part of an ongoing trend in the preceding 6 years, whereby the UN saw the development of its ‘decolonisation machinery.’ The decolonisation machinery was, according to Luard, largely a political machine that embarrassed and delegitimised colonial powers, effectively blackballing them from friendly relations in the South. It also gave valuable political capital to independence movements across the world.

The question of the future of colonialism was an ambiguous one in the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter expressed a commitment to national self – determination, a legacy of the liberal internationalism behind the League of Nations. The world of states ruled by corresponding nationalities was a central part of Wilson’s 14 points, and in the context of Europe featured as a central part

of peacemaking on either side of WWII. At the same time, the UN charter made it quite clear that the UN could not interfere in matters that were within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. 219 Colonies in Africa and Asia were within the domestic rule of their masters, a fact that was consistently used by the European powers to stave off criticism in the General Assembly. The situation in Indonesia in 1946 was an example, whereby the Dutch used Article 2 to stave off UN criticism of their repression in the colony. 220 Article 73 of the United Nations made some provisions for ‘non self governing territories,’ simply calling upon controlling states to ‘take due account of the political aspirations of the people.’ 221

The only formal institution for decolonisation in place in the 1950s was the Trusteeship Council, which was limited to the question of states that had previously been under axis rule. 222 The only provision for considering other territories was contained in Article 73 (e), which obliged states to ‘regularly transmit information on the political, educational and economic status of their dependent territories.’ 223 This was rarely followed, with colonial states often claiming that the relevant territories already had degree of self – governance. 224

The many tensions between the North and South and the question of Article 7 led to the ‘ad hoc committee to examine the information sent by the colonial

219 The specific clause in question is Article 2 section 7, which states ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’ Colonial powers frequently argued that the situation in their colonies was within their domestic jurisdiction.


222 Luard, A History of the United Nations . . . Volume 2, p. 176. Examples of trust territories were: Palestine; The Gold Coast (Ghana); The Cameroons; West Africa; Somaliland.


powers about their dependent territories.'Eventually, this system provided a way for many of the countries to sneak in discussions about various colonies.226

The years after 1955 saw many resolutions being passed that put various colonial powers in the spotlight. One example would be Resolution 1461 in 1959 on the ‘progress achieved in non-self-governing territories.’227 Such resolutions were often put alongside other issues. Racism was one common topic that was put before resolutions on decolonisation. Briefly after resolution 1461, there was the resolution 1328 on the question of ‘racism in non-self-governing territories.’228 Resolutions concerning colonies were also coupled with social justice issues, often using the various rapporteurs and committees to throw light on various forms of disadvantage. An example would be Resolution 1462, on the question of ‘education standards in non-self-governing territories.’229 The effect of these resolutions was to delegitimise colonialism by linking it with human rights concerns, something that was becoming very central to the work of the UN.230 Luard sums up the position of the African and Asian states by saying, ‘if enough [resolutions] could be passed, surely the walls of Jericho would come tumbling down eventually.’231 Questions on trust territories were also increasingly coupled with questions on all non-self-governing territories.

230 The 1950s had seen the declarations of race and racism by UNESCO. Apartheid also features as possibly the most talked about issue in the general assembly. 1956 saw three resolutions passed concerning apartheid. 1957 saw another two, and 1959 saw yet another two.
territories, allowing for much of the UN’s trusteeship bureaucracy and methods to be transferred into a variety of cases. One example was Resolution 1327, on the question of ‘international collaboration in respect of non self governing and trust territories in Africa.’ This resolution called on the international community to work together on achieving an eventual complete decolonisation of Africa.

The persistent criticism against colonialism did indeed have an effect, with many old colonial powers radically altering their stance in the 1960s in the face of new diplomatic demands. What is of particular significance however is when this decolonisation occurred. The wave of decolonisation following Bandung coincided with one of the hottest periods in the Cold War. In 1960, the 17 new African states were effectively thrown into an organisation that was desperately trying to wind back the Doomsday Clock from its new time of 7 minutes to midnight. The Bandung Communiqué had warned about the dangers of the nuclear arms race, and had proclaimed that the Asian and African states should take a lead in keeping the world safe from global conflict. Bolstered by an immense increase in numbers, Asia and Africa were well poised to fulfil this aspiration. An analysis of one particular letter by Nehru written in 1955 shows the perception one of the Bandung states had of itself in the United Nations. 1955 was the year that the General Assembly first considered the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nehru expressed grave

233 The Doomsday Clock was and still is a symbolic clock that is set by the Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences. See the public website of the Bulletin, viewed 14 May 2012, http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/timeline.
concern over the initial proposal, as it meant the IAEA would be ‘out of the United Nations’ direct jurisdiction.’\textsuperscript{234} In response to this, India called for the IAEA to be more firmly under the control of the UN, and to have members from Asia and Africa guaranteed.’\textsuperscript{235} Nehru’s policies in this regard were exemplary of the typical stance taken by the non-aligned, one of commitment to the integrity of the UN and its basic ideals.

Overall, this wave of decolonisation, coinciding with the norm of non-alignment solidified at Bandung and the tense international climate determined what would be the dominant issues for majority of the UN’s members. These were Non-Alignment, nuclear disarmament, decolonisation and development.

\textbf{The Power of Numbers: The Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77}

The number of sovereign states in the world had increased almost two-fold between 1946 and 1961. The newly decolonised states lacked military and economic power to achieve their ends, but they did have the power of numbers in the world’s biggest international organisation. One nation received one vote in the General Assembly, and the poor and weak states represented the majority of nations. This meant that the United Nations was inevitably drawn in a direction that best served the common interests of the Southern countries. It was not inevitable however that all the countries of the South would bind in the General Assembly.

\textsuperscript{234} Jawaharlal Nehru, Letter to Chief Ministers, 26 October 1955, in Parthasarathi, ed., \textit{Letters to Chief Ministers}, p. 292.
\textsuperscript{235} Nehru, Letter to Chief Ministers, 26 October 1955, in Parthasarathi, ed., \textit{Letters to Chief Ministers}, p. 292.
Assembly. The unity of the South in the United Nations was due to various consensus – building institutions, namely the Non – Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.

At its founding, the NAM had 25 members, with a series of declaration as its founding documents. Key themes were support for independence struggles around the world, and a call for disarmament. The next 10 years saw phenomenal growth in the movement, exploding to a membership of over 70. From its founding to the present day, the NAM has existed as a conference held every 2 – 6 years. In the interim, it is composed of a series of working groups and committees, overseen by a Secretary – General elected at each conference. These groups tended to operate in New York and in close proximity to the UN.236

Tasked with producing declarations and policy position, the institution could best be described as a UN caucus. It sought to find a common and coherent stance for its members when approaching a variety of questions both within the UN and other spheres of international relations.

The Group of 77 is a significantly looser organisation that is related to the NAM. The G77 was created in 1964 at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development by a joint declaration. The organisation began formally at the Conference of the Algiers in 1967, and now has 131 members. Unlike the Non – Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 operates almost solely as a voting bloc. It has existed simply as a meeting between all relevant diplomats before each regular session of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it is a consensus – building instrument that addresses the same Third World as the Non – Aligned

Movement. While the NAM sought to unify the broader goals of the Southern countries, the G77 was a more immediate measure to bind votes in the General Assembly.

These two organisations had very little hard power, both in the realms of security and economics. Furthermore they had little control over the international sanctioning of the use of force, given the existence of the veto in the Security Council. What they did have was immense soft power. With internal consensus building mechanisms and the power of numbers, they could direct world opinion and shift the norms of international relations in their favour. Possibly the two norms that were fully institutionalised into the whole of international society were anti – colonialism (in the classical sense), anti – racism and nuclear non – proliferation.

There were some questions on which almost all of the NAM and G77 countries would in fact bind. The creation of bodies such as UNCTAD and the UNDP would be some examples. There were also very united stances on changes or maintenances of the UN structure, given that these already tended to favour the Northern countries. One example would be in regards to Security Council reform, and the many calls to expand its membership. Another would be the resistance to Troika, the proposal from the Soviet Union to have three secretaries – general.237 Another measure would of course be changes to the United Nations staff and bureaucracy. This was in the mutual interest of all countries in the Non – Aligned Bloc, given that the majority of the staff of the United Nations in 1955 was Western. There changes were largely due to the structures of the NAM and the Group of 77, both of which were tasked through

their various committees and working groups with building a consensus among their members before each UN session or any other international forum. No such consensus building measure existed for such a large number of states. Given that colonialism, apartheid, economic assistance and disarmament were the only things the NAM countries could all agree on, these were the issues that tended to dominate debate in the General Assembly.

As can be seen from many third world observers of the time, economic demands formed a considerable portion of the Non-Aligned movement. Clifford Edogun, writing in 1982, calls Non-Alignment a ‘protest-demand’ ideology, based on said countries ‘dwindling economic and technological position vis a vis the capitalist world.’ This was probably why the non aligned movement lead to the establishment of UNCTAD. UNCTAD went on to form a significant proportion of the UN bureaucracy, which increasingly became aimed at international aid and development.

The amazing impact of the Non-Aligned Movement on the UN is even stated by the American ambassador Jackson, who states, ‘this focus [the US’s policy of short term litmus tests towards the NAM] has in both cases overlooked the movement’s impact on the United Nations where its common goals as well as internal divisions have shaped the overall UN agenda, and affected the workings of its principal organs, the General Assembly and the Security Council.’ Jackson further noted that the numbers of the Non-Aligned effectively meant anything

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they could agree on would ‘translated, with little change, and often over Western objections, into resolutions of the General Assembly.’

**Staffing Changes in the United Nations**

One of the greatest changes to the UN structure in the year following 1955 was its staffing practice. Before examining the significance of staffing, it is necessary to consider the existence of what Innis Claude has labelled the ‘two United nations.’ According to Claude, the second United Nations is composed of its member states, acting in union as they so choose under the auspices of the UN Charter. The first UN is ‘constituted by its staff, an international secretariat or bureaucracy located in New York, Geneva and other regional headquarters.’ The first UN is quite important as it appeals to society, because it represents the ‘intentions, hopes and plans of the UN.’ As Claude summarises, this results in a perception of the United Nations as ‘both an arena of governments and a group of secretariats which actually do things.’

It is ultimately the General Assembly that controls the budget of the Secretariat, and thus has primary power over what it does. As Myint – U and Scott state, in the late 1940s ‘the United States and its Latin American Allies enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and thus controlled the Secretariat’s

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budget. This had changed by the 1960s, when the Non–Aligned bloc had a majority. This meant that the Secretary–General ‘came under pressure from new members to make the Secretariat more representative.’ Possibly the most glaring and most obvious occurrence during this period of southernisation was the election of U Thant as Secretary General. The immense significance the appointment had to the view of the UN among the peoples of the African and Asian countries cannot be understated. Sixteen years prior, the face of almost all the major diplomacy in the world was white or European. Now, there was a dark Asian face in the highest office of the highest international organisation, and one from a very recent colony no less.

As for the regular staff of the United Nations, much of the changes happened in the 1960s. At its inception, the majority of the staff was from Western countries. By the 1970s, the majority of all senior staff members in an organisation that was spawned by Western diplomacy were from Africa and Asia. Such was achieved through changes in the staffing formula that were pushed for by many of the Bandung, and later Non–Aligned states. In 1957 for example, Ceylon argued in the GA for quotas that would assign a certain number of positions to under-represented states. This led to a compromise position in 1962 whereby the formula for staffing would be based on a combination of regional population, membership and financial contribution. Furthermore, a base level of 5 positions would be available to all states purely by virtue of their membership in the organisation. The allocation based on membership alone was further increased in 1976 and 1980. By 1983, only 57.2% of the staff in the

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246 Myint – U & Scott, The UN Secretariat, p. 47.
United Nations was determined by financial contribution alone, as opposed to 100% in the 1950s. 35.6% of staff allocations were based on membership alone, and 7.2% were based on regional population.

The effect of the staffing regime was an increase in African and Asian. From 1963 to 1966, there was a 50% increase in African staff, bringing the total number up to 125, with 23 in senior position. An article from the New York Times shows that staffing measures were very active. In the fall of 1966, the article states that there was a mission dispatched to 20 African countries to recruit effective staff, returning with 8 applications. From the article, it is also seen that the unfair geographic distribution of staff was a prominent subject of debate for most African representatives in the United Nations. The primary subject of the article is an accusation of racism against the Secretary General of the UNCTAD by the Tanzanian representative Waldo E. Waldron Ramsay. According to Myint – U, the influx of African staff caused a significant change in the working culture of the UN. As Myint – U states, a majority of the staff in the 1950s were Americans, Canadians, and Western Europeans with predominately liberal value. The new political elites coming from non-Western countries however were predominately either ‘social democratic or statist’ and had ‘Third World Nationalist and anti-colonialist sympathies.’

It is also of note that some of the key bureaucrats and leaders of the UN in the following years had received their first exposure to international diplomacy at Bandung. This was especially the case with U Thant, who was a secretary to

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the Bandung Conference and helped organise it. Considerably more so than the two previous Secretaries – General, U Thant was quite adamant in having complete control over appointments to senior positions in the Secretariat, and was very combatant towards the Soviets demand of *Troika*, which would entail an even division of the top positions. Among the 8 principle advisors put forward by U Thant, an overwhelming majority were from third world countries. Among the 8 countries were: Brazil; Czechoslovakia, France, India, Nigeria and the United Arabic Emirates. Clearly, the vision of both the US and the Soviet Union of having a staff evenly dominated by the two superpowers was coming to nought. The UN’s staff was becoming dominated by the non–aligned.

U Thant’s leadership presented many departures in the work of the UN from the Hammarskjöld and Lie years. Most notable was the new focus on development. It was, as Myint–U and Scott state, under U Thant’s leadership that there took place a ‘huge expansion of the UN’s bureaucracy on development and economic issues.’ This was the time when what is now a main role of the United Nations started coming into effect. According to Myint–U, the primarily goals in the UN in the period following the 1960s were ‘technical assistance’ and ‘the transfer of knowledge and technology to developing countries.’

**Maintenance of the United Nations**

Non – Aligned countries in the 1960s kept the integrity and stability of the United Nations intact, instead of reforming it along many of the suggested lines

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254 Myint – U & Scott, *The UN Secretariat*, p. 46.
255 Myint – U & Scott, *The UN Secretariat*, p. 43.
256 Myint – U & Scott, *The UN Secretariat*, p. 44.
by the Soviet Union and the United States. There were in fact many key moments in the 1960s by which the United Nations faced considerable changes to its structure.

Probably the biggest impasse the UN faced was the Soviet Union’s proposal of Troika. This was put forward in the late 1950s and received increased attention after Hammarskjöld’s death. This new structure would allow for three secretaries – general of equal rank instead of one. One of the secretaries – general would be from the Eastern bloc, one from the Western bloc, and one from the Non–Aligned bloc. The proposal was rigorously opposed by the Non–Aligned at the conference of Belgrade. As soon to be secretary general U Thant observed, the Non–Aligned believed that such a proposal would ‘violate the spirit if not the world of the United Nations charter.’ They also believed that ‘as a simple practical matter, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to administer the United Nations with three chiefs of equal rank who have to agree before anything could be done. And with two of the three representing conflicting sides in the Cold War, such an agreement would seldom be possible.’\(^{257}\) The NAM countries’ clear disavowal for any change in the structure of the secretariat effectively killed any conflict in the General Assembly over this issue, given that they controlled the numbers.

**Changing Role of the United Nations and the Formation of New Bodies**

During the 1950s and 1960s, the United Nations saw an explosion of new funds and new organisations that radically changed the way it operated as an

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The Decade of Development saw the creation of 5 new programmes directed specifically towards economic development. These were: The World Food Programme; the United Nations Population Fund; the United Nations...
Conference on Trade and Development; the United Nations Development Programme, and the International Trading Centre. Possibly the greatest change the United Nations was the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). An explosion in the UN budget, brought about by its increasing membership accompanied the creation of these new funds. From 1955 to 1960, the UN’s yearly budget increased from $50,665,670 ($432,050,000 CPI 2012) per year to $168,420,000 ($998,734,940 CPI 2012) per year, resulting in a two-fold increase.²⁶¹ Today, the United Nation’s budget is almost 10 times what it was in 1955, with a much greater number of assistance programmes.

Conclusion

Overall, decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s greatly changed the composition of the United Nations. While originally an organisation of the East and West, in the 1960s it became an organisation of the North and South. This was accompanied by many radical changes in the organisation, most notably its budgetary expansion and its greater focus on development and economic issues. It also brought a series of issues centre stage, most importantly disarmament and decolonization. The Bandung Conference occupied a central place in these changes. Firstly, it played a role in the push to make membership universal, something that was never intended for the United Nations at its inception. Secondly, it created much of the norms that allowed for the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 to develop. Both these groups had control of the General Assembly and had their own internal consensus building mechanisms.

meaning that the United Nations was effectively taken in any direction on which the Non-Aligned Countries could agree.
Conclusion

The literature around the creation of the United Nations has tended to focus quite extensively on its link to the League of Nations, and as an organisation that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War. This thesis has argued that the Bandung conference played a key part in the creation of the United Nations as it exists today. This is as an organisation that is representative of the entirety of the world’s states, that focuses on development issues, and whose staff is dominated by people from the Southern World. The first chapter examined some of the literature on the institutional and intellectual origins of the UN. It then demonstrated how both the ideologies of cosmopolitanism and the common experience of WW II played a part in creating the organisation. The chapter then went on to argue that other traditions of internationalism based in very different visions of world order were emerging in Asia and Africa. On the one hand, this was based on a commitment to a united Asia. On the other hand, it was the ideal of a world devoid of imperialism. The chapter further argued how these movements affected the approaches of Asian and African diplomats in the post – war period.

The second chapter examined the Bandung Conference itself and how its inception was driven by the participants’ common experiences of colonialism. It argued that the conference created a set of norms among the participating states. Among these norms was a commitment to peace; mutual economic assistance and non – alignment. The most important norm however was that engagement in the UN was the best way for the Asian and African states to achieve their goals. The Bandung Conference turned the UN into the organisation of the third world.
The third chapter examined the key changes in the United Nation from 1955 – 1970. It argued that the Bandung Conference featured quite heavily in the international push to make UN membership universal. Universal membership was a turning point in the UN’s history, leading to many changes in the organisation in the decade following. This change can be best described as a southernisation of the United Nations, whereby the organisation became a forum for the interests of Southern states.

The Bandung Conference has rather unfortunately been forgotten in many popular histories of the United Nations. Instead, the dominant story of the United Nations is one of gradual internationalisation, starting with the development of liberalism in the 18th century, the creation of the League of Nations, and finally the passage of the charter in 1945. Why the Bandung Conference has been forgotten is a subject for another thesis. Perhaps a post-colonial perspective would offer a good critique. From its onset, the Western media marginalised the conference. It was not treated with the same seriousness as many other international gatherings that were based in the Western world. The effort of this thesis has been to present the United Nations as a legacy of Asian African internationalism as much as liberal internationalism, and thus present a more holistic history of an organisation that enjoys the basic support of every country, no matter what their political situation.
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