Ties and Tiers

Decentralisation and Ethno-Communal Mobilisation in Post-Suharto Indonesia

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Declaration

This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.

The word count for this thesis is 19,978, within the guidelines of the Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney.

Gerard McCarthy

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Abstract

Decentralisation of governance responsibilities to sub-national authorities has been one of the most significant trends in state-reform since the 1980s. Debate continues, however, regarding the consequences of the expansion of local/district government for ethno-communal relations. This study develops a strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and ethno-communal voter mobilisation, testing it in relation to electoral processes in two ethno-religiously diverse districts in Indonesia. It finds that in the context of city or district politics, outcomes of voter mobilisation can only be accounted for via the interaction between institutional incentives and candidates’ mobilisation of diverse personal, group and associational ties. This study has implications for analysing and theorising the impacts of decentralisation- especially the expansion of local and district government- upon patterns of ethno-communal mobilisation in other ethnically and religiously diverse societies undergoing transitions to democratic rule.
Acknowledgement

For my parents. I hope one day I can begin to give back.
Introduction

The collapse of authoritarian regimes and the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Huntington 1991) has drawn increasing attention to ethnicity and identity as “forces shaping human affairs, phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled” (Horowitz 1985: xi). With the liberalisation of political space through democratisation, representatives of ethnic groups, sub-clans and minority communities have sought to enhance their place within the democratic arena. Ethnic and regionalist parties have grown in political strength in established Western and ‘Third Wave’ democracies alike- rekindling age-old debates about the reconciliation of territorial or traditional notions of ethno-communal identity with democracy (Dahl 1956). Especially in ‘deeply divided’ societies recovering from civil conflict or ethnically-based genocide, there has been increasing scepticism about the viability and stability of democratic regimes in multiethnic societies (Mann 2005). Whilst the absence of ethnic conflict has generally been the norm in most plural societies (Fearon 1996), the seemingly intractable nature of many conflicts about ethnic and communal identity has generated increased attention on the influence of institutional design in constructing democratic political frameworks oriented to the peaceful management of ethno-cultural diversity.

Approaches to ‘political engineering’ (Reilly 2007) have focused mainly on four key areas of democratic practice: electoral regulations (proportional or majoritarian); the party system (ethnic/regional parties or national parties); the composition of cabinets (all inclusive coalition governments or electoral coalitions); and the allocation of administrative, fiscal or political to various levels of government- what is referred to throughout this study as ‘decentralisation’. Both cross-national and case-study
analysis suggests that the effective design of electoral regulations, party systems and cabinet contributes to the stability and inclusivity of multi-ethnic democracy-regardless of the theoretical or ontological approach adopted to the accommodation or integration of group interests into national democratic processes (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977; Reilly 2001; Norris 2004).

Clear trends about political arrangements at national level have emerged concerning the impact of parties, electoral regulations and cabinet inclusivity on minority representation and inter-group relations. However, debate continues regarding the impacts of decentralisation on inter-group relations at the state level. Much theory and analysis about decentralisation in multiethnic societies has focused on the effects of providing ‘segmental autonomy’ to ‘politically relevant’ ethnic groups as proposed by prominent advocates of consociational democracy such as Arend Lijphart (1969, 1977). By contrast, studies on this ‘ethno-federal’ form of decentralisation- often implemented ‘asymmetrically’ by provision of autonomy to a single regional movement as part of broader strategies of power-sharing- report that decentralisation may institutionalise cultural cleavages grounded in territorially-based ethnic identities (Hale 2004; Bakke 2006; Roeder 2007; Deiwiks 2010).

The intense scholarly interest in asymmetric ethno-federalism and ethno-communal relations stands in sharp relief to the limited attention paid to state reform in which decentralisation has occurred ‘symmetrically’ across all regions within a country. This is despite this form of decentralisation being by far the most common form since the ‘global wave’ of administrative and fiscal decentralisation that commenced in the
1980s (Schneider 2003). Often justified by neoclassical theories of ‘competitive federalism’, the role of non-central political jurisdictions in the fiscal, political and administrative operations of the state has expanded significantly in developed and developing, federal and unitary states alike over the past three decades (Norris 2008: 157). This process of state reform has generated econometric and qualitative studies assessing the impact of various forms of decentralisation on outcomes ranging from economic growth, service delivery, popular political participation and the mitigation of corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Treisman 2007). Seemingly as a consequence of limitations in cross-national data on local government, most of this analysis has not distinguished between the differential effects of devolving governance responsibilities to provincial- or 1st tier -jurisdictions and 2nd tier administrations such as district or municipal governments (Rodden 2004). The few studies that have acknowledged this distinction have not explicitly examined the impact of decentralisation upon the political mobilisation of ethno-communal groups (Cole 2006; Falleti 2010). Consequentially, whilst empirical evidence is extensive on the conflict mitigating or inducing effects of ‘asymmetrical’ decentralisation, the impact of ‘symmetrical’ decentralisation on patterns of ethno-communal cooperation and competition in ethnically diverse states remains a subject of continuing debate (Basedau 2011).

It is this lacuna that this study seeks to partially fill by develops a strategic-relational theory of decentralisation that emphasises the interaction between classical *strategic* as well as *relational* incentives provided by political institutions for ethno-communal mobilisation. This study then analyses processes of elite mobilisation in the recent electoral campaigns of two districts of Indonesia- Poso, Central Sulawesi (2005) and
Medan, North Sumatra (2010) to assess the plausibility of the adapted centripetalist theory (George and Bennett 2005: 75). Whilst Indonesia’s particular institutional arrangements are unique in several respects, this study has significant theoretical implications for the impact of decentralisation—especially at the local district level. These implications include ethnic competition and the processes whereby decentralisation effects inter-group tensions, prevents regional separatism and limits group identity politics in the national political arenas of other ethno-culturally diverse democracies. In the context of ethnically and religiously divided societies undergoing transitions to democratic rule, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation proposed in this thesis may be useful in explaining the impacts of decentralisation—especially the expansion of local government—upon patterns of ethno-communal mobilisation.

This study proceeds in six parts. The first section introduces the dominant theories of political engineering and institutional design and their limitations. The section then proposes the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation, building on the logic of classical centripetalism. Section two justifies case-selection and outlines the methodology utilised and variables assessed in process-tracing elite strategies of identity-based voter mobilisation in all stages of the electoral process. The third section sets the national context for the case-studies, outlining the evolution of macro-frameworks aimed at management of Indonesia’s ethno-cultural diversity in the post-Suharto era. The fourth and fifth sections then conduct case-studies of recent district elections in Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra. The six concludes, summarising key findings, outlining implications and suggesting avenues for further research.
Ch 2 Political Engineering: Assumptions and Limitations

Strategies of political engineering in ethnically diverse societies primarily stem from two divergent theoretical approaches to democratic state-building: consociationalism, advocating inter-ethnic accommodation and centripetalism which emphasises political integration and inter-group cooperation¹. Each theory offers a range of distinct prescriptions to ensure that differences of ethnic identity can either be accommodated or integrated into larger political processes. After outlining the two dominant paradigms, this section will highlight the uni-dimensional conceptualisation of identity underpinning notions of incentives. A broader notion of strategic-relational incentives is proposed and a constructivist theory of decentralisation and identity mobilisation outlined that more fully explains the mobilisation strategies employed by elites.

Consociationalism

Consociationalism is most closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, who identified four structural features shared by consociational systems—a grand coalition government (between parties from different segments of society), segmental autonomy (in the cultural sector), proportionality (in the voting system and

¹ A third paradigm- power dividing- emphasises the sub-division of government powers and jurisdictions with the objective of creating multiple overlapping majorities and minorities that cut across ethnic groups. Based primarily on Madisionian federalism this approach follows a similar integrationist logic to centripetalism and will not be explored in this study. For a full theoretical exposition see Roeder, P. (2011). Power Dividing. Conflict Management in Divided Societies: Theories and Practice. S. Wolff and C. Yakinthou. London, Routledge.
in public sector employment) and minority veto (Lijphart, 1977: 25-52). However, following initial development in the 1960s the theoretical literature now acknowledges a distinction between corporate and liberal consociationalism. The latter is now the more common policy prescription among consociationalists (Wolff 2011: 7). The main theoretical difference lies in the approach to group identity. Corporate consociation “accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, and rests on the assumption that group identities are fixed, and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded” (McGarry 2007: 172). In contrast, “liberal … consociation … rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group or trans-group identities” (Lijphart 1995; McGarry 2007: 172).

In relation to power sharing, as the primary element of institutional design, liberal consociational theory promotes cooperation and consensus among democratically legitimised elites- regardless of whether they emerge on the basis of group identities, ideology or other common interest (Wolff 2011: 8). Liberal consociationalists thus privilege parliamentary systems, proportional (PR list) or proportional preferential electoral systems, decision-making procedures that require qualified and/or concurrent majorities. As Wolff (2011) observes in addition to emphasising power-sharing, liberal consociationalism also increasingly advocates self-governance- with special emphasis being placed on territorial self-governance for relevant ethnic groups. In this regard arrangements in which there are more than two, and ideally even more than three, self-governing entities within a given state, are seen as enhancing to the prospects of state survival. Consociationalism therefore strongly supports the principle of asymmetric decentralisation of powers, ie. some self-
governing entities are vested with more (or fewer) competences than others in order to better reflect the preferences of their populations (McGarry 2007).

**Centripetalism**

In contrast to the ‘accommodationist’ approach of consociationalism, centripetalism sees intergroup cooperation as best achieved by “electoral systems that provide incentives for parties to form coalitions across group lines or in other ways moderate their ethnocentric political behaviour” (Horowitz 2004: 507-508). Thus, Reilly, in his systematic exposition of centripetalist theory advocates ‘(i) *electoral incentives* for campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from a range of ethnic groups other than their own…; (ii) *arenas of bargaining*, under which political actors from different groups have an incentive to come together to negotiate and bargain in the search for cross-partisan and cross-ethnic vote-pooling deals…; and (iii) *centrist, aggregative political parties* or coalitions which seek multi-ethnic support…’ (Reilly 2001: 11; emphasis in original).

Critical to the success of institutional design in centripetalist theory is a balance of self-rule (territorial or other forms of self-governance) and shared rule (power sharing) achieved through integrationist “electoral incentives, that accord an advantage to ethnically based parties that are willing to appeal, at the margin and usually through coalition partners of other ethnic groups, to voters other than their own” (Horowitz 2008: 1217). In addition to “policies that give regionally concentrated groups a strong stake in the center” (Horowitz, 1993: 36), Horowitz has proposes territorial self-governance or decentralisation of power to ethnically *heterogeneous* jurisdictions.
Citing the experience of Nigeria, Horowitz argues for dividing large ethnic groups into several provinces to encourage the proliferation of political parties within one ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985: 602-4; 2007: 960-1; 2008: 1218). In later studies focused on federation as a mechanism for conflict reduction Horowitz also posits that homogeneous provinces can also assist in fostering intra-group competition (Horowitz 2007: 960-961; Horowitz 2008: 1218). In essence, however, the centripetalist approach to the impact of decentralisation on identity mobilisation constitutes the inverse of the consociational emphasis of management of ethnic diversity through territorial autonomy and national power-sharing.

Limit of Both Approaches: Identity and Incentives

Both consociational and centripetal approaches to political engineering share the assumption- derived from rational choice theory (Riker 1964; Filippov 2004)- that inter-group conflict can be abated through the design of political institutions which provide micro-level incentives to elites and their supporters to accommodate each other or cooperate across group identity boundaries. A conceptual distinction must therefore be made in considering the design of political institutions between i) macro-level frameworks that facilitate the dispersion of incentives in a predictable and continuing manner, and ii) the incentives themselves. Whilst normatively distinct in their objectives, both approaches posit that stable institutions emerge when the actors involved in them have strong and enduring incentives to ‘reproduce’ them: “if the incentives provided are desirable and cannot be gained otherwise, existing arrangements would appear to be acceptable and… would thus be likely to be stable” (Wolff 2011: 2). Embedded within this theory of stable political institutions transmitted through micro-incentives is a deeply contested notion of ethnic and group identity.
Consociationalists take the view that, once formed through socialisation- and potentially conflict- group identities are “relatively hardened and difficult, if not impossible, to change” (Wolff 2011: 16). Ethnic identities are “so deeply rooted in historical experience that [they] should properly be treated as a given” in the design of structures and regulations which motivate ethnic elites to share power and manage conflict amongst their respective communities (Esman 1994: 10-11). Consociational political frameworks therefore structure incentives on the basis of elites managing the violent mobilisation those who share a single identity- that of their ethnicity.

The uni-dimensional consociational approach to ethnicity and incentives is challenged by constructivist theories that perceive individuals as possessing a ‘repertoire’ of multiple personal and group identities- the relative importance of which are subject to change and evolution over time (Esman, 1994: 10-1). In this conceptualisation, ethnicity is seen as being multi-dimensional, rarely associated with conflict and often endogenous- rather than exogenous- to the political process (Fearon 2000; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Fearon 2006; Roeder 2007; Deiwiks 2010).

Whilst there is significant disagreement regarding specific definitions of ‘ethnicity’ (Green 2004), there is an assumption that individuals can choose to ‘activate’ or accentuate their particular ethnic and group identities from a variety of ‘nominal’ categories traced to ancestry- for instance language, race, religion or association with a homeland (Fearon 2006). Recent empirical research in constructivism
emphasises that the identity/identities that individuals choose to activate or politically mobilise will vary over time contingent upon institutional and political incentives such as affirmative action policies or ethnically-based distribution of patronage (Sardan 1999; Chandra 2008: 92). These ‘identity-options’ (Waters 1990) are not open ended, but are limited by a particular person’s ‘attribute-repertoire’- though the ‘boundaries’ of ethnic identities can be subject to redefinition for political purposes (Chandra 2006: 419; Ferree 2010).

The constructivist conceptualisation of identity activation has significant implications for the rational choice notion of ‘incentives’ created by political institutions. If ethnic identities are multi-dimensional then political elites have options with regard to mobilisation of ethnic and group identities as numerous dimensions “might serve as a basis for coalition formation” (Posner 2005: 4). Regarding group identities as more ‘malleable’ and contextually contingent, centripetalism provides strategic incentives for cooperation between ethnic groups- for example through preferential or alternative vote (AV) ballot systems that enable ethnic groups to support their ‘own’ candidates whilst also exchanging preferences with parties and candidates from other ethnic groups (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 2004). In addition to electoral incentives, centripetalism also sees federalism- or the decentralisation of power to sub-national governments- as a strategy to territorially divide groups. In this approach, decentralisation is seen to alter elite strategies of ethnic group mobilisation by engendering increased intra-ethnic competition for the same political office. As an example, if numerous candidates from the same ethnic group- for example Tamil-compete against each other in a provincial election, these candidates will be presented with two incentives.
The first incentive is to mobilise more specific categories of their ethnic identity - for example their membership of a particular Tamil sub-clan or group. This has the effect of dividing the Tamil ethnic base, limiting the likelihood of unified ethnic mobilisation (Horowitz 2007: 960-961). Where mobilisation of Tamil sub-clan identity provides insufficient support to obtain election, candidates have a second incentive - to cooperate with candidates from other ethnic groups - for instance as a Tamil-Sinhalese pairing. The centripetalist understanding of individuals possessing a single, politically salient ethnic identity leads to the hypothesis that *(H1)* \textit{decentralisation increases political competition, leading candidates to mobilise sub-ethnic identities and/or cooperate with candidates from other ethnic groups}. For centripetalists, the incentives for mobilisation provided by macro-frameworks - for example in the context of federalism or decentralisation of powers - are therefore \textit{strategic incentives} for inter-group cooperation or the mobilisation of sub-ethnic identities.

The differences between consociationalism and centripetalism in macro-framework design and the varying notion of incentives for ethnic identity mobilisation and inter-group cooperation are outlined in Table 1.

**Table 1 Consociational and centripetal frameworks. Source: Reilly 2006: 95**

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<th>Consociationalism</th>
<th>Centripetalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>List PR; large districts to maximize proportional outcomes</td>
<td>Vote-pooling to ensure elected politicians have support across communities (preferential; AV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Ethnic parties each representing their</td>
<td>Non-ethnic or multi-ethnic parties or</td>
</tr>
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As with consociationalism, the notion of identity implicit within classical centripetalist theory is constrained does not include the logical extension of the hypothesised ‘fragmentation effect’: that individuals and political elites possess a ‘repertoire’ of identities, networks and associational ties, each of which may be ‘activated’ in order to mobilise supporters (Esman 1994: 10-11). The notion of incentives in both consociationalism and centripetalism restricts the agency of political elites and candidates to a single ethnic identity and it's sub-components. This notion of incentives created by macro-political frameworks fails to provide an adequate account of identity mobilisation in the context of decentralisation.

**A Strategic-Relational Theory of Identity and Decentralisation**

This study builds on the classical centripetalist theory by proposing that the political strategies adopted by elites in the context of decentralisation can only be accounted for by how incentives imparted by macro-frameworks are reinterpreted by political elites in light of their respective “identities, interests and capabilities” (Jessop 2001: 1224). In so doing it accepts the supposition in classical centripetal theory that decentralisation of powers to provincial or local governments lowers the barriers to meaningful political participation. However, it builds on this theory by positing that the outcome of ethno-communal mobilisation in the context of decentralisation will be
determined by the *interaction* between political competition and the specific identities, social networks and capabilities that candidates possess.

In placing emphasis upon the interaction of structural incentives, political competition and the mobilisation strategies of political elites, this theory is informed by Jessop’s (2001) strategic-relational approach to analysis of institutions and individual agency. Jessop emphasises “the possibility of *reflection* on the part of the individual and collective actors about the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures” when determining their own political strategies and tactics (2001: 1224- emphasis added). Actors are taken to possess a capacity for *reflexivity* in the context of structural incentives- enabling the theoretical space for a constructivist notion of incentives operating across a range of identity and political categories.

At the centre of the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation is a primary intervening mechanism: that after having weighed the various relational ties of other candidates, political elites will- “in the light of their understanding of the current conjecture and their ‘feel for the game’” (Jessop 2001: 1224)- mobilise those dimensions of their identity repertoire that may enable them to form a winning coalition of voters vis a vis other candidates (Riker 1962; Posner 2005).

Rather than macro-frameworks being the sole explanation of elite and mass mobilisation, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and identity posits: *(H2)*

*strategic incentives of political competition associated with decentralisation interact with the identities, social networks and capabilities of candidates in*
determining the mobilisation strategies adopted by political elites. In the prior classical centripetalist example of a Tamil ethnic group from which numerous candidates compete, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation predicts that in candidates will assess the various sub-ethnic, religious and other group identities in their repertoire- in addition to various network and associational ties- to form strategies of ethno-communal mobilisation. Only by considering the interaction between the relational options of candidates and the strategic incentives created by macro-frameworks of institutional design may the outcome of ethno-communal mobilisation be accounted for.

The hypothesised process of candidate reflexivity logically has application to the formulation of mobilisation strategies at any tier of government. However, in the context of decentralisation, social and relational ties between voters and political processes have an important impact on mobilisation of voters (Niven 2004)- especially in the context of ‘mediated’ or patronage democracies where voter ties to political elites may be an important factor determining whether and how they access state benefits (Chandra 2007). In these contexts, the process whereby elites formulate strategies of voter mobilisation (outlined in Figure 1) and the extent to which these align with particular ethnic or personal identities will have significant consequences for the politicisation of group identity and ethno-communal relations.
Figure 1 Classical Centripetal and Strategic-Relational Theories of Decentralisation and Ethno-Communal Mobilisation

The strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and elite strategy does not predict whether or how decentralisation effects ethnic ties developed through long histories of socialisation and inter-group bonding (Esman 1994; Putnam 2000: 10). Rather, it simply posits that outcomes of ethno-communal mobilisation will only be accounted for by considering the interaction between strategic factors of increased competition and the various relational ties (ethnic and group identities, associational ties etc) possessed by candidates. The typological theory proposed in this study therefore seeks to fill a lacuna in the present literature vital to fully understanding the
processes whereby macro-frameworks of political institutions impact local elite strategies of identity mobilisation and politicisation of group identity.
Ch 3: Methods/Research Design

To assess whether the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and ethno-communal mobilisation provides a fuller account of the mechanisms whereby incentives created by macro-frameworks influence elite strategies of identity-based voter mobilisation, this study undertakes a plausibility probe of recent election campaigns in two districts of The Republic of Indonesia.

Case-Country Selection: Indonesia

Indonesia has been selected as the case-country for this study as the country’s macro-political frameworks and complex profile of more than fifty ethnic groups, 450 languages and 10,000 islands provides several local political entities with a situation ideal to test this theory through a plausibility probe.

Moreover, Indonesia is a useful national context to test the strategic-relational theory in this study due to the strongly centripetalist electoral and party regulations at both national and district level. In 2004, Indonesia introduced direct elections for executives at all tiers of government and crafted new electoral and party regulations that require all candidates to be endorsed by parties with offices in at least 60 percent of provinces (Aspinall 2005; Reilly 2006). Nationally, these regulations resulted in the first direct elections for Indonesia’s President since the 1950s (Aspinall 2005). At the regional level, democratisation resulted in the introduction of direct local election of district heads (bupati) and their deputies by local constituents, shifting this power from the party-dominated district legislature (Buehler 2010). Indonesia’s introduction of direct elections and promulgation of new electoral and
party regulations in the context of significant decentralisation to the district level provides a useful country setting in which to conduct a plausibility probe of the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and identity-based voter mobilisation.

In 1999, following the end of the 32 years rule of Suharto’s New Order regime, Indonesia underwent a period of fundamental political reconstruction in which transitional democratic frameworks were coupled with the introduction of an ambitious decentralisation program- devolving substantial fiscal and political power from the central government to the district (kabupaten) level, largely bypassing the provincial level of administration (Hofman and Kaiser 2006).

Upwards of 30 percent of total national expenditures are now made by district administrations in areas as ranging from health care, education to infrastructure (Suhendra 2006). Administrative and fiscal powers were provided to all districts and provinces across the country on a ‘symmetrical’ basis. The equal treatment of districts in the decentralisation of political and administrative responsibilities eliminates any selection bias that may present in other countries that have decentralised responsibilities for governance (at least initially) on an asymmetric basis as a concession to a mobilised regional autonomy movement.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Special arrangements were made in Papua and Aceh, though these are not considered in this study.

\(^3\) This has occurred in numerous ethno-linguistically heterogeneous federations, where decentralisation to sub-national entities has commenced through asymmetric processes in which a single region or province within a state is granted greater political and fiscal autonomy in order to sate the demands of regional separatists. Examples include: the Basque region in Spain, Crimea in Ukraine, Corsica in France and Quebec in Canada.
For definitional purposes it is important to clarify that Indonesia’s second-level administrative regions, below the level of the province, are termed kabupaten. This term refers both to administrations located in rural areas (usually translated as districts), and kota, which are urban (usually translated as municipalities) (Aspinall 2011). They are headed by, respectively, bupati (district heads or regents) and walikota (mayors). It is convenient in this study to refer to both rural districts and kota as ‘districts’.

**Level of Analysis: Districts**

Districts were selected as the principle level of analysis as they were provided with the primary role of service delivery in Indonesia’s 1999 legislation on fiscal decentralisation and since 2002 have been responsible for over 30 percent of national expenditures (Suhendra 2006). As posited by the classical centripetalist theory of decentralisation, the increased powers provided to district government should result in increased competition for control of the local executive, with ethno-communal identity possibly emerging as a significant base for voter mobilisation.

This study therefore seeks to assess the extent to which district-level patterns of ethno-communal mobilisation at both elite and mass level are influenced by the interaction of strategic incentives and the relational options possessed by candidates.
Case District Selection

This study assesses the plausibility of the strategic-relational mechanism in determining outcomes of elite strategy and mass mobilisation by selecting two cases for analysis: Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra. By selecting case-districts that are socio-structurally different, this study assesses whether the mechanisms hypothesised to be causal in the proposed theory are limited by a variety of scope conditions such as population size, past experience of ethno-communal conflict and vibrancy of associational life (George and Bennett 2005: 25).

Poso, Central Sulawesi

The first case in this study is the 2005 pilkada (election) in Poso, Central Sulawesi Province. Poso is a predominantly rural district with an ethnically and religiously mixed population of around 190,000\(^4\) that includes a large population of Muslim migrant workers (30 percent) from South Sulawesi and Sumatra (BPS 2004b). Between 1998 and 2002 Poso was the scene of a protracted Christian-Muslim conflict in which at least 1,000 were killed and at the height of violence saw the majority of the district (147,000 people) to flee their homes to outlying areas (van Klinken, 2007, Aragon 2008, Varshney 2010). Poso was re-districted in 1999 and again in 2003 on the basis of ethnic and religious demography. It now has a population which is 30 percent Muslim and 65 percent Christian (Tirtosudarmo 2006: 15). Given the severity of recent Christian-Muslim violence, assessing strategies of voter mobilisation in post-conflict Poso will provide a useful test of whether and how

\(^4\) Exact population figures are unavailable as a census has not been conducted since redistricting in 2003.
incentives created by macro-frameworks of party and electoral regulations impacted incentives to activate other relational ties to mobilise voters also.

**Medan, North Sumatra**

The second case is the 2010 district election in Indonesia’s fourth largest city-Medan in North Sumatra Province. In contrast to the predominantly rural profile of Poso, Medan is a major Indonesian city with a large commercial economy and ethnically and religiously diverse population of 1.9 million people (BPS 2004a; Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 30). The city has a rich associational life with numerous ethnic organisations, religious groups, trade unions and a number of gangster (*preman*) networks (Hadiz 2004; Agustono 2008). In contrast to Poso, Medan has experienced little large-scale ethno-communal conflict.5

Apart from Medan’s socio-economic differences from Poso, the recent 2010 elections- which occurred in two rounds- also enables assessment to which variance in the extent of competition accounts for the mobilisation strategies of elites in an urbanised district that is not ‘deeply divided’. Medan therefore provides a useful context in which to assess the scope conditions of the strategic-relational theory.

Within-Case Methods & Variables

To establish the relevance of candidate’s social ties and their interaction with strategic incentives in the 2005 Poso and 2010 Medan election campaigns, within-case analysis is conducted of the intervening processes and mechanisms leading to outcomes of voter mobilisation using ethno-communal identities.

By tracing the processes within each case that leads to mobilisation, this study seeks to identify the influence of the hypothesised strategic-relational mechanism as a causal process between the independent variables (electoral rules, party regulations and decentralisation) and the dependent variable (voter mobilisation) (George and Bennett 2005: 206). In order to assess the role of this strategic-relational mechanism for voter mobilisation, this study divides the election process into four stages:

- **Candidate pairing**: who do candidates choose to pair with and for what reasons?

- **Party nomination process**: how important are parties nominations in mobilisation strategies?

- **Campaign appeals (actions and words)**: to what groups and on what basis do candidates seek to mobilise voters?

- **Voting results (voter mobilisation)**: to what extent did ethno-religious identities and party ties influence voting results?
By process-tracing of the strategies adopted by candidates during the four stages leading to voter mobilisation, this study establishes the limitation of the centripetalist hypothesis (H1) regarding decentralisation and voter mobilisation. By exploring this hypothesis, scope conditions can subsequently be placed on the plausibility of the strategic-relational theory, its hypothesised intervening mechanism and the role of ethno-communal identity in voter mobilisation.

Data and Constraints

In this study a mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach is adopted. This approach draws on a variety of primary and secondary sources to answer the two main research questions of this study. First, do macro-frameworks of electoral laws and party regulations significantly impact the mobilisation strategies of local political elites in the context of decentralisation? Second, under what conditions will candidates seek to mobilise various dimensions of their ethnic and social identities to appeal to a broader political base? The focal point for analysis is the case-studies of pilkada in Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra in Indonesia.

The major source of evidence this case-study analysis consists of first-hand accounts of electoral processes by field researchers published in peer-reviewed journals or university-published texts. Sub-district electoral data sourced from Indonesian electoral authorities as well as census data on the ethnic and religious demography of sub-districts form the basis of statistical analysis.
Wherever possible, these sources have been supplemented with secondary accounts—either through reports from Indonesian news websites such as The Jakarta Post and local media sites, or through direct personal correspondence with field-researchers who witnessed the electoral processes. These sources have been critically analysed for bias, especially where quotes from candidates have been included. Limited first-hand data was available on particular aspects of electoral processes such as party nominations—especially when those processes involved candidates who were peripheral to the overall result of the elections. Subsequently, the ability to make generalisations about candidate behaviour during each stage of the electoral process is in many instances restricted to the mobilisation strategies of the top two candidate pairings.

Language was a challenge in this study as many of the primary sources regarding candidate campaign platforms were in Bahasa Indonesian. As a consequence, only when an English translation could be obtained was this material used. Similar challenges existed with regard to secondary accounts of the identity appeals made by candidates as covered by various blogs and local Indonesian news-sites.

As such, in studying the mobilisation strategies employed by various candidates, this study draws inferences about candidate profiles (ethno-religious identities, profession and associational connections) and the discourse and actions of candidates during each stage of the electoral process. Where possible, this information has been triangulated through multiple secondary sources.
Ch 4 Integration and Accommodation - Towards a Political Architecture of Centripetalist Decentralisation in Indonesia

In the Reform Era after the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia’s interregnum President Habibie and law-makers in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and House of Representatives (DPR) were confronted with the potential disintegration of the Indonesian Republic. After decades of centralised, military-supported rule, the demands of the reformasi movement that culminated with the fall of the Suharto regime prompted a period of rapid and radical revision of Indonesia’s political architecture. The subsequent reforms to electoral laws, party regulations and the territorial organisation of powers established Indonesia as a strongly centripetalist democracy that is also one of the most fiscally decentralized countries - unitary or federal - in the world (Hofman 2004: 18). This chapter outlines the evolution of Indonesia’s macro-frameworks from Independence to current centripetal electoral and party regulations of district elections.

The chapter has four parts. Section one and two provide an outline of the political architecture prior to the fall of Suharto’s New Order in 1998. Section three describes the major elements of political engineering undertaken between 1999 and 2004. Section four assessing the implications of these macro-frameworks on the political strategy of elites in district level politics with reference to Poso District, Central Sulawesi and Medan District, North Sumatra.
Political Architecture 1945-1961

The design of political institutions and territorial organisation of the state were central to nationalist debates after the Indonesia proclamation of independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945. At issue was the way to construct national institutions and devolve power to the regions in the manner most conducive to creating a “unified, single Indonesian identity” (Diprose 2008: 3). Proposals to ensure a share of power for the immense diversity of ethnic groups spread across Indonesia’s 10,000 islands primarily focused on whether the newly independent Indonesian state should be federal- a structure that the Dutch had used to manage centre-regional tensions- or unitary as preferred by many regional leaders who saw the Federation of Indonesia as mechanism of continuing colonial strategies of ‘divide and rule’ (Booth 2001).

The Constitution of 1945 created a unitary state that “embodied the concept of a single nation” by providing no explicit recognition for ethnic groups (Bertrand 2008: 206). However, it set the framework for the emergence of a strong, multiparty system that sought to integrate the concerns of periphery regions into national politics in Java. The cooptation of ethnic elites into the multi-party system ensured, however, that ethnicity was rarely mobilised as a national political cleavage- unless competing groups had pre-existing histories of hostility towards one another (Feith 1962: 28). Whilst the party system may have played a role in mediating ethno-communal and national loyalties during the early period after independence, the failure to adequately integrate the interests of outlying regions into central policy prompted the emergence of regionalist discontent.

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6 Article 18 refers to ‘regions’- though the boundaries of these jurisdictions do not necessarily coincide with the territorial homeland of ethnic groups.
Claims of ‘Javanese Imperialism’ escalated into anti-regime rebellions in Sulawesi and Sumatra (the regional settings for the forthcoming case-studies) during the 1950s (Diprose 2008: 5). As Feith and Chauvel observe, the leaders of these rebellions synthesised an ideology of marginalisation by Java and Sumatra with ‘local patriotisms’ built upon (but not limited to) ethnic and regional identities (Feith 1962: 487; Chauvel 1996: 62). Demands for greater self-management were accommodated through the ratification of regional autonomy laws in the 1950s which were revoked in 1959 when Soekarno implemented ‘Guided Democracy’ (Legge 1961: 209). The framework of the 1945 Constitution was retained during this period of attempted consociation between Soekarno, Islamic groups and the Indonesian Communist Party. It was adopted again after the military takeover of 1965 that launched the so-called ‘New Order’ regime of Suharto (Bertrand 2008: 206).

Political Architecture under Suharto

Following the instability that plagued the final years of the Soekarno regime, the New Order administration of Suharto from 1966 to 1998 utilised the integrationist framework of the 1945 Constitution to justify policies emphasising ‘stability’, centralisation and the development of a national consciousness. The ideological centrepiece of Suharto’s quest for harmony was Pancasila (the five principles)\(^7\) - a strongly integrationist social philosophy which did not include any notion of kemajemukan (plurality) (Foulcher 2000: 400). Any sentiments related to SARA

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\(^7\) The five principles of the Republic of Indonesia acknowledge commitment to belief in one God, a just and civilised humanity, national unity, and people’s rule through consultation and representation, to achieve social justice for all Indonesians. See Guinness, Patrick (1994) ‘Local Society and Culture’, in Hal Hill (ed) Indonesia’s New Order, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, p271.
(suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan - ethnic, religious, racial or intergroup relations) were suppressed by officials in order to “prevent regional, linguistic, and religious differences from taking on a political force” (Hooker and Dick 1995: 2). The New Order’s SARA policy and ideology of Pancasila influenced the design of electoral regulations, party rules and the territorial division of authority aimed at comprehensively mediate and control the expression of ethno-cultural and religious diversity.

**Electoral Regulations**

The New Order retained the structures of two houses of parliament established by the 1945 Constitution. However, only 40 percent of parliament was openly elected, and multi-party politics were virtually banned by merging all opposition parties into two larger parties. Electoral laws provided for proportional representation election to the DPR- though these body acted primarily as ‘rubber-stamp’ institutions for Suharto’s Presidential decrees until 1998, when both the MPR and DPR grow increasingly assertive (Ziegenhain 2008: 5).

At national level, President Suharto was ‘re-elected’ every three years through appointment by a vote of the two houses of parliament: the DPR and MPR, both of which were controlled by the state-run Golkar Party and representatives of the military who held 20 percent of seats up until 2004 (Ziegenhain 2008: 8).

District and provincial assemblies, largely controlled by members of the ruling party Golkar and members of the de-concentrated military apparatus, were entitled to
nominate candidates for governors and *bupati* under the 1974 law. However, the ultimate power of appointment remained with the President and Home Minister until the 1999 reforms (Malley 2003).

Provincial and district governments were appointed by Ministerial Officials in Jakarta, often at the direction of Suharto. Some input in this process was allowed by the relevant legislature (provincial, district) and the governor, though their proposals and nominations were never binding. Armed forces representatives were appointed to positions of Governor and *bupati* (district head) across the archipelago (Malley 1999). At provincial and district level, elections were held every four years but the central steering of regions was supported by the placement of military officers in all district and provincial assemblies (Guinness 1994: 269; Malley 1999: 76; Mietzner 2009).

**Parties Regulations**

The Suharto regime used Golkar (Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups) as its primary electoral vehicle. All public officials at both national and sub-national level were required to join Golkar, effectively turning every government office into a Golkar branch and providing the regime party with a highly efficient machine for voter mobilization (Liddle, 1999: 43).

Technically, Golkar was not considered a political party but rather a branch of the state. As such it was not subject to party regulations that tightly constrained political opposition. The party regulations of the New Order period forced secular nationalist parties to unite under the banner of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian
Democratic Party, PDI), while numerous Muslim parties were fused into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP).

No alternative avenues of political expression existed at a local level as the ‘opposition’ parties during the New Order, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP were not permitted to establish branches at lower administrative levels (Ufen 2011: 14). Subsequently, by the time of the fall of Suharto in 1998, Golkar was the only party with a local party apparatus, severely disadvantaging the local organisational development of major parties to this day (Hellmann 2011: 123).

Territorial Organisation of Power

Administratively, the New Order increasingly centralised national administration in Jakarta, promoting ‘development’ as the cornerstone of national stability, economic progress and prosperity. The era was characterised by top-down decision-making and administrative deconcentration to Ministerial Field Offices where local interests were rarely embraced. Economic policy was implemented through centrally driven Five-Year Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita) (Hooker and Dick 1995: 3). A large proportion of the ‘spoils’ of development flowed into the hands of the military or ‘cronies’ with ties to Jakarta (Guinness 1994: 64).

A legal foundation for central political control of regional governments was established through the enactment of Law No. 5, 1974 on “Government in the
Regions” which enabled the Suharto regime to ‘drop’ its preferred candidates from the centre into regional positions (Fittrani, Hofman et al. 2005). The primary link between regional governments and the central administration in Jakarta was the diffusion of Golkar as an outgrowth of President Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Rather than develop organically, Golkar’s expansion to the outlying regions was linked closely to the state. As a consequence the ‘party on the ground’ was essentially “identical with parts of the highly centralist New Order administration” (Ufen 2011: 14). The strongly centripetal nature of the party system and limited autonomy for regional governments fuelled the development of regionalist sentiment in the final years of the Suharto regime. Demands for regional autonomy subsequently became one of the central elements of the reformasi movement that helped to bring down the Suharto regime in 1998.

Political Engineering after Suharto

With the fall of Suharto and subsequent transition to democratic rule, reforms to Indonesia’s political architecture have sought to balance the ethnic and regional diversity of the regions through strongly centripetalist electoral and party laws, as well as the substantive decentralisation of a wide-range of fiscal and political powers to district governments.

Electoral Regulations

Executive
Since the fall of Suharto, electoral regulations for Presidential, Governor and District Head (bupati) elections have generally followed the same reform process and centripetalist tendencies.

The initial 1999 electoral regulations only marginally shifted the responsibility for election of national, provincial and district executive (Reilly 2006: 10). According to the 1999 legislation, the President, Provincial Governors and District Heads were all respectively appointed by democratically elected parliaments/assemblies at national, provincial and local level- a practice that existed at the national during the New Order period. Due to regulations requiring all candidates to be nominated by parties, the appointment of the executive was strongly party-based. Reports of party branches selling nominations were rife during this early period (Hadiz 2004).

The subsequent reforms created for the 2004 Presidential election facilitated the ‘normalisation’ of Indonesian politics (Aspinall 2005) whilst maintaining the strongly centripetalist tendencies of Suharto era political arrangements.

The new 2004 electoral regulations had two key elements, paralleled in the Law on Local Governance (Law 32/2004):

- All candidates were required to be nominated by parties that had received 15% of the votes in past elections or occupied 15% of the seats in the relevant parliament (national, provincial, district) (Ufen 2011). Electoral regulations have therefore retained a strong centripetalist role for parties and
party organization in the selection of candidates, their running-mates and the campaign for popular election.

- Candidates were required to be nominated in pairs (President and Vice-President, Governor and Deputy Governor, District Head and Deputy Head). This centripetalist trend was apparently instituted in the hope of major parties nominating pairs combining a Javanese with outer Island candidates (Reilly 2006: 10).

One difference between national and kabupaten (regional) regulations was the size of voter threshold required to take office. In Presidential elections, in order to avoid a second-round run-off, a first-round winner was required to win an absolute majority across the country/province, with at least 20 percent of those votes in half of all provinces (Reilly 2006: 10). At the regional (provincial and district) level, a plurality of 40 percent is required to win election, with a second ‘run-off’ election occurring between the two highest polling candidates within two months if no candidate achieves more than 40 percent of the vote. The 2004 electoral regulations therefore introduced direct popular rather than proxy elections, institutionalising similar party dependency and candidate pairing requirements at both national and regional level. A subsequent 2009 Constitutional Court ruling permitted candidates to participate in local elections independent of parties in district elections, though few candidates have participated in pilkada without party nomination (Buehler 2010).

**Legislature**

Elections for parliamentary bodies have similarly democratised but have not changed significantly in the regulations around election. In an unusual hybrid system of party list proportional representation, the initial electoral regulations created in 1999 for the
election of the DPR and MPR provided for a ‘personal vote’ option in which locally-popular candidates would increase their chances of gaining a list seat (Reilly 2006: 9). After complications, the model and the automatic allocation of seats to the military implicit within it, was revised to a more conventional ‘open list’ proportional representation for the 2004 elections, with a proportion of seats elected through multi-member constituencies. A similar system is used for the election of members to provincial and district assemblies (Aspinall 2005: 138).

**Party Regulations**

With the transition to multi-party democracy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia’s political reformers have sought to cultivate a broad-based party system through a range of incentives for the development of aggregative parties. For instance, in order to qualify for registration, parties must have offices in 60 percent of provinces and 50 percent of districts within those provinces - a strongly centripetalist attempt to prevent regional or ethnic parties from developing. The same provision applies at the district and provincial level, where regional parties are banned from competing in elections for either assemblies (Reilly 2006: 14).

These centripetalist party regulations have pushed some parties to develop a local party apparatus. The PDI-P, for instance, apparently has branches in 63,000 of Indonesia’s 77,000 villages (Ufen 2011: 17). However, despite the clear incentives to develop local branches, most Indonesian parties remain “heavily top-down… with charismatic leaders in Jakarta deciding on policies and the next strategic steps” (Ufen 2011: 9). Faced with financing constraints and the emergence of an industry
“of pollsters, consultants and of candidates with weak links to political parties”, the role of parties in candidate vetting has been increasingly undermined within local political processes (Hellmann 2011: 136).

**Territorial Organisation: Decentralisation**

The final element of political engineering in the years following the fall of the New Order regime has been the territorial reorganisation of the Indonesian state. Two major reforms form the pillar of these reforms: Law 22 of 1999 on regional governance and Law No. 25, 1999 concerning ‘The Fiscal Balance Between the Central Government and the Regions’.

Combined, these two laws provided for a significant shift in management of state resources across a broad range of areas to Indonesia’s 400-plus districts and cities (*kabupaten*). Administratively, Law 22 of 1999 on regional governance devolved all government functions to sub-provincial governments with the exception of national defence, international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, development planning, religion and finance. Key functions included the provision of health, education, environmental and infrastructure services, as well as “any function not explicitly reserved for the center or the provinces” (Hofman and Kaiser 2006: 93).⁸

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⁸ In some instances, lack of clarity regarding specific administrative functions of regional governments created confusion and tension with central officials. As Turner and Hofman observe, the assignment of centre-local responsibilities in the initial decentralisation laws were often ambiguous or conflicting. Later laws such as the forestry law and civil service law entirely ignored the concept of regional autonomy, whilst there were explicit efforts later to re-centralize some responsibilities such as hiring and firing of local bureaucrats. For a fuller discussion of the regulatory confusion embedded within Law 22 and 25 see Turner, M. O. P. (2003). Decentralisation in Indonesia:
The district or region (kabupaten) was therefore provided the primary role in service delivery, bypassing the provinces out of fear that strong provincial government would encourage the resurgence of regional autonomy movements—especially in Sulawesi and Sumatra—quashed in the 1950s and 1960s (Nordholt 2005).

The fiscal arrangements of decentralisation were set out in Law 25 of 1999, which revised the entirety of Indonesia’s intergovernmental fiscal framework. The law replaced the system of earmarked or specific purpose grants that characterized the Suharto era with a series of other revenue sources, the two major elements of which are general allocation grants and shared taxes. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the size of fiscal transfers through these mechanisms almost doubled the regional share of government spending from 14.9 percent of national spending in 2000 to 27.50 percent in 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Sub-National Spending (Rp trillion)</th>
<th>GDP (Rp trillion) % of GDP</th>
<th>National Revenues (Rp trillion)</th>
<th>% of National Revenues</th>
<th>National Spending (Rp trillion)</th>
<th>% of National Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>997.0</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>205.6</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>220.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>1615.7</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>305.2</td>
<td>27.00</td>
<td>335.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>1688.0</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>302.0</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>343.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>1948.0</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>336.2</td>
<td>34.77</td>
<td>377.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>2017.6</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>349.9</td>
<td>34.02</td>
<td>373.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>129.9</td>
<td>2201.7</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>378.2</td>
<td>34.35</td>
<td>392.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DJAPK, Ministry of Finance

Figure 2 Sub-National Spending in the State Budget FY 2000 to 2005. Source Suhendra 2006: 6.

Imperative to the centripetalist design of the fiscal decentralisation initiative was the institutionalization of regional dependency upon transfers from the government in Jakarta. Though district governments enjoy new spending powers, central authorities retained control over the rate and base of most substantive taxes. Some autonomy was provided for expenditures of locally-collected revenues, though these sources typically only constitute around 5 percent of the average local budget (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). As demonstrated in Figure 3, the laws therefore institutionalized heavy transfer dependence of district governments on central government transfers- a deliberate strategy of fiscal vertical accountability aimed at militating localised rebellion that emerged during the transition period of 1998-2001.

![Figure 3](source.png)

**Figure 3** The Contribution of Intergovernmental Transfers to Sub-National Revenues. Source Suhendra 2006: 6

As part of the shift towards localised expenditures, the fiscal decentralisation laws reassigned two-thirds of central civil servants who had previously worked in central government field offices to the regional government- integrating them into the newly
reconstituted district governments (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). District governments are now responsible for employing three-quarters of Indonesia’s civil servants, with Law 22 providing district establishment and especially bupati with broad autonomy to determine the size and specific projects of the local civil-service (Hofman and Kaiser 2006).

With the Presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2004, further reforms to the decentralisation framework were made. Law no. 32/2004 on Regional Government and Law no. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regional Government entirely revised the 1999 laws on regional autonomy, cultivating intergovernmental relations and increasing the mandate of the local executive vis a vis the district assembly (Malley 2004). Law 33 revised the framework of regional collaboration by removing lacunae in the 2001 legislation that permitted erection of barriers by district executives to trade across district and provincial boundaries. The legislation therefore sought to facilitate ‘harmonious relations’ between regions and with the national government by strengthening the role of provincial governors in ‘guidance and supervision’ of district governments and creating new mechanisms of national government oversight (Article 1 in Bunte 2009: 111). A new mechanism of vertical intervention was also provided to the national government to unilaterally suspend district bupati for corruption or if they threatened public order (Bunte 2009: 112).

Law 32 strengthened the fiscal authority of district heads to control financial management within their respective territories, to authorise expenditure and to set
priorities within the budget (Article 156 and 192 in Buehler 2010: 278). These changes were achieved by substantially reducing the autonomy of local assemblies (DPRD), weakening their role in oversight of the local executive (district heads and their deputies) (Buehler 2010: 279).

The final change in the 2004 legislation, reflecting the stabilisation of the national civilian polity that occurred with the first direct Presidential elections in 2004 (Aspinall 2005; Nordholt and van Klinken 2007: 15), was to democratis the election of heads of kabupaten (governors as well as district heads). Law 32 subsequently removed the district assembly from the process of election and dismissal of the local executive, with the objective of shifting power away from party bosses who were exploiting party nomination roles for personal and political benefit (Nordholt and van Klinken 2007: 17; Bunte 2009: 112). Combined, the 1999 and 2004 reform processes significantly altered both the territorial organisation of power within the Indonesian state as well as the frameworks of electoral and party laws.

**Conclusion**

Since the fall of the Suharto New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has undergone a significant reformation of electoral laws, party regulations and the territorial organisation of the state. The design of each of these institutions have generally continued the strong centripetalist orientation of the Suharto era, with incentives embedded within electoral and party regulations aimed at integrating regional and ethnic constituencies into national parties and cultivating cross-communal pairing. Of particular significance is the territorial reorganisation of the state that occurred with
the 2001 decentralisation of all major government functions to district administrations with the exception of national defence, justice, police, monetary policy, development planning, religion and finance (Hofman and Kaiser 2006: 93).

Given Indonesia’s strongly centripetalist macro-frameworks of electoral and party regulations, it is evident that the country provides a useful context through which to assess the processes whereby strategic incentives of macro-political frameworks impact processes and outcomes of ethno-communal mobilisation at the district level. To explore these propositions, a plausibility probe of the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and ethno-communal mobilisation will now be conducted through case-studies of candidate strategies and voter mobilisation in recent electoral campaigns in Poso Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra.
Ch 5: Poso, Central Sulawesi- Elite Strategy in a Deeply Divided District

District Background 1998-2004

The district of Poso located in the eastern Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi is a small, predominantly rural region. Poso became renowned during the colonial era when the indigenous Pamona people converted on mass to Protestantism, making it one of the most successful Christian missionary areas in the Dutch East Indies (Aragon 2000). The completion of the Trans-Sulawesi Highway in the 1980s made Poso district a major migrant destination (van Klinken 2007a: 78). The district subsequently experienced the highest proportion of population change of any region in Central Sulawesi, with a migrant share in 1998 of around 18 percent compared with 10 percent nationally (Braithwaite, Braithwaite et al. 2010: 245). These migrant in-flows saw the percentage of Christians in the district decline from 38 percent in 1980 to 32 percent in 1998 at the end of the New Order. Changes in Poso’s religious composition raised concerns amongst local Christian political elites of “demographic threats to the historically Christian domination of the highlands” (Brown and Diprose 2009: 7).

Poso’s changing religious demographics led to the practice of religious identity alternation in the control of the district executive from the 1980s, ostensibly as a mechanism of sharing power and mediating conflict between communal elites (Braithwaite, Braithwaite et al. 2010: 245). In the mid-1980s the position of district head was held by a Christian, followed by an ethnic Tojo Muslim in the 1990s (Aragon 2007: 51). However, this practice ceased after the fall of Suharto in 1998.
when the Muslim incumbent supported the appointment of a local Muslim bureaucrat to his soon-to-vacated position as district head (bupati) (van Klinken 2007a: 80). With the announcement in December 1998 that the new electoral laws for the 1999 Presidential election would also empower district assemblies to appoint district bupati, minor scuffles between youths escalated into a series of religious clashes forcing intervention by Central Sulawesi provincial military (HRW 2002: 4).

Between 1998 and early 2002 this pattern of bureaucratic competition and religiously-based mobilisation by local political elites recurred repeatedly, escalating into a protracted communal conflict involving South-East Asian terrorist networks Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Laskar Jihad (LJ) (ICG 2004; ICG 2005; ICG 2010). This period of large-scale communal mobilisation ceased with the Malino Declaration of December 2001 which brokered a peace agreement between the primary militias and political elites involved in the conflict (HRW 2002: 28-29). At least 1,000 people died during the conflict and more than 147,000 were displaced (van Klinken 2007a; Aragon 2008; McRae 2008; Varshney 2010).

Of the locals involved, Christians were primarily from Poso’s main indigenous group-the Protestant Pamona people- as well as smaller ethnic groups from the rural highlands outside Poso township (Diprose 2008: 23). The Muslim groups engaged in the conflict were largely ethnic Bugis and Gorantalese originating from South Sulawesi, predominantly resident in Poso’s coastal urban sub-districts.
Seemingly in an attempt to alleviate the communal tensions and elite competition at the centre of the Poso conflict, the district underwent two re-divisions (evident in Figure 4) by Jakarta authorities after the initial outbreak of violence in 1998: the first in 1999 to create Tojo Una Una district (Aragon 2007: 51) and the second in 2003 to create Morowali district (Tirtosudarmo 2006: 15). Poso is now comprised of an ethnically and religiously mixed population of around 200,000 people, of which according to the most recent census figures around 65 percent are Christian and 30 percent Muslim (BPS 2004b)\(^9\).

\textbf{Figure 4} Poso after excluding Tojo Una Una and Morowali districts

It is within this context of a district recovering from recent religious communal conflict- yet retaining a large proportion of (predominantly urban) Muslims- that this study is framed.

\(^9\) Exact population is unknown as a census has not been conducted since re-districting in 2003.
Following the introduction of direct local elections (*pilkada*) for the district executive in 2004, the first Poso *pilkada* in 2005 was seen as a potential spark for further ethno-communal violence (ICG 2004)- a scenario which did not, and has not, eventuated despite provocative bombings and kidnappings linked to terrorist networks JI and LJ (ICG 2005; ICG 2010). The Poso 2005 *pilkada* therefore provides a useful case-study in which to test how macro-frameworks of electoral laws, party regulations and decentralisation shape strategies of voter mobilisation adopted by candidates and local political elites and their relationship to voting patterns in a religiously polarised district (Diprose 2009: 102).

It proceeds in three parts. It first analyses the election process (candidate pairing, party nominations, campaigning) and then assesses the role of parties, religious identities and ethnic identities in influencing voting outcomes. It then concludes, emphasising that the classical centripetalist theory is insufficient to explain the strategic choices about relational ties made by candidates, political elites and voters in Poso’s 2005 post-conflict election.

**Poso Pilkada: 2005**

Five candidate pairs (10 candidates) were nominated for election in the 2005 *pilkada*. Each candidate pair brought a diverse range of affiliations across major religious and ethnic groups within Poso. As forecast by the classical centripetalist theory, the intense level of intra-group competition in the 2005 Poso *pilkada* motivated candidates to develop strategies aimed at mobilising voters across various ethnic and religious constituencies within the district.
Candidate Pairing


This pairing strategy was identified by many observers as vital to mitigating persistent tensions about future communal exclusion, with the head of the Poso Electoral Commission noting that “all of society wanted such combinations” (Interview in Brown and Diprose 2009: 13). However, underwriting the ‘rainbow’ pairing strategy was a clear recognition amongst all candidates that with multiple candidate-pairs nominated from each of the major religious communities “even a Christian candidate would find it hard to win… without any Muslim backing” (Brown and Diprose 2009: 13). The centripetalist pairing regulation intended to motivate cross-communal pairing was therefore successful in engendering a certain level of inter-communal cooperation. However, a variety of other strategic factors beyond
Religious affiliation also entered into *bupati* candidates’ specific choice of running-mates.

**Figure 5 Profiles of candidate pairs, 2005 Poso Pilkada. Source Brown 2009: 12**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bupati Candidate</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Deputy Bupati Candidate</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Nominating Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dede K Amrawijaya</td>
<td>Army officer, Muslim, Sundanese</td>
<td>Lia Sigilipu</td>
<td>Reverend, Christian, Pamona</td>
<td>Koalisi Poso Bersatu; PDIP; Partai Demokrat; Pelopor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piet Ingkiriwang</td>
<td>Retired police officer, Christian, Pamona</td>
<td>Muthaliib Rimi</td>
<td>Businessman, Muslim, Bugis</td>
<td>Partai Damai Sejahtera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muin Pusadan</td>
<td>Former Bupati, Muslim, Bungku</td>
<td>Osbert Welanta</td>
<td>Retired civil servant, Christian, Pamona</td>
<td>Koalisi Sintawu Maroso; Partai Keadilan dan Perasatun Indonesia; Partai Amanat Nasional; Partai Bintang Reformasi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frans Sowoiono</td>
<td>Civil Servant, Christian, Pamona</td>
<td>Kahar Laljare</td>
<td>Politician, Muslim, Bugis</td>
<td>Partai Patriot Pancasila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edy Bungkundalu</td>
<td>Bureaucrat, Christian, Pamona</td>
<td>Awad Alemri</td>
<td>Bureaucrat, Muslim, Arab</td>
<td>Partai Golkar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Seputar Rakyat*, 52; interviews with community leaders, Poso, May 2005

Politicking on the basis of ethnicity was closely related to religious self-identity. With the partition of Poso in 1999 and 2004, the mostly Christian Pamona ethnic group now constituted the largest voting block in the district (BPS 2004b; Sukarsono 2011). Consequently, in addition to electoral competition and demographic realities necessitating cross-religious candidate pairing, all tickets also nominated a member of the indigenous Pamona ethnic group—either as *bupati* or *deputy*. The outcomes of this pairing strategy for voter mobilisation in Pamona majority sub-districts will be examined further. However, additionally the professional and public service profile of candidates also seem to have influenced choices about running-mate selection.

Six of the ten district head and deputy candidates were civil servants with strong links to the local bureaucratic, religious and business elites that dominated district politics during the late New Order and beyond. Most candidates had held positions in
the district administration during the earlier period of fiscal decentralisation (2001-2004), including the present *bupati* incumbent, Muin Pusaden.

The ultimately successful candidate-pair comprised a retired local police officer of mixed Chinese, Manado and Pamona ancestry - Piet Ingkiriwang - and a wealthy local businessmen, Muthalib Rimi. Both had close links to the district bureaucracy (Brown and Diprose 2009: 11; Sukarsono 2011). Dede Atmawijaya, a high-ranking army officer in Poso credited with acting impartially in protecting both religious groups during the conflict, was the only major exception to local elite dominance of candidate nominations. Dede was Sundanese Muslim, though he apparently had weak religious affiliations. He paired with Lis Sigilipu, a well-connected member of the Central Sulawesi Christian (GKST) and a former Golkar activist (Brown and Diprose 2009: 11).

Beyond the expectations of classical centripetalism, all candidates therefore made strategic calculations about pairing based on the relational ties, personal and group identities and prior bureaucratic service of their deputy. This feature of candidate pairing was a critical determinant in subsequent strategies of voter mobilisation employed by candidate pairs.

**Party nomination process**

Despite inclusive candidate-pairing, several tickets were nominated by parties with explicit religious affiliations. For instance, two sets of *bupati* candidates - the local
Christian police officer Piet Ingkiriwang and the incumbent Muslim *bupati* Muin Pusadan - sought nominations from national parties with local reputations for being strongly linked to Poso’s Christian and Muslim communities respectively (Brown and Diprose 2009: 11). Ingkiriwang and Rimi were nominated by the Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperity for Peace-PDS), a party dominated by Christians in the Poso branch and which held the majority of seats in the local district assembly. Pusadan and Walenta were nominated by a coalition of four Islamic parties. However, only the Partai Bintang Reformas (The Reform State Party- PBR) had any serious local presence with a number of members in the district assembly (Interview with DPRD chairman in Brown and Diprose 2009: 6).

Dede Atmawijaya’s deputy- Lis Sigilipu- had long-running ties as an activist for the Poso branch of Golkar. However, the current secretary of the district assembly, Edy Bungkundapu and his running-mate Awad Alamri were able to secure the Golkar nomination by leveraging contacts in the local bureaucracy (Brown and Diprose 2009: 11). Sowolino and Latjare were nominated by Partai Patriot Pancasila- an off-shoot of a Golkar youth organisation that had several members in the local district assembly (DPRD). Dede and Lis consequently obtained nomination from national parties Partai Democrat (PD), PDI-P and Partai Pelopor- none of which had a strong presence in the twenty-five member DPRD (Interview with DPRD chairman in Brown and Diprose 2009: 6). Party nominations, whilst necessary to declare candidacy, were therefore mixed in the organisational benefit that they provided to candidates.
Campaign appeals (actions and words)

Despite the varying degrees of religious affiliation, both personal and institutional, amongst the candidates, they all sought to frame their role in the religious conflict and local politics of 1998-2003 as positively as possible. The successful Christian-Pamona candidate, Ingkiriwang, was most effective at distancing himself from the conflict as he entered Poso’s political scene just six months prior to the election (Sukarsono 2011). Ingkiriwang also stressed his ‘newness’ and ‘clean slate’ from the local corruption and mismanagement of the early decentralisation period of 1999-2004 and promised stricter security measures for the district to prevent terrorist attacks (Interview with activist in Brown and Diprose 2009: 13). In addition to emphasising religious inclusivity, candidates also activated non-religious dimensions of their identities to forge connections across other communal groups.

As a consequence of the resurgence of traditional customary institutions (adat) in the years following the collapse of the Suharto regime, newly reconstructed ‘traditional’ systems of law and village governance have played a greater role at the sub-district, district and provincial level throughout Indonesia (van Klinken 2007b; Tyson 2010). In addition to actively facilitating local peacebuilding and resettlement of displaced people from the earlier period of conflict (UNDP 2007: 70), decentralisation had also prompted the political resurgence of ‘traditional’ authorities. Adat and tribal rituals increasingly “operate as tools or even as branches of government”, and local youth activists have come to participate actively in district pilkada campaigns by mobilising members of their communities on behalf of candidates supportive of their communal concerns (Li 2007: 363; Tyson 2010).
In the 2005 district election, candidates therefore sought to build a support-base amongst Poso’s increasingly politically assertive ethnic Pamona community. Piet Ingkiriwang emphasised the Pamona dimension of his mixed Chinese, Manado and Pamona heritage to appeal to *adat* and described himself as a ‘son of the soil’ from the local ‘indigenous’ Poso community (Interview with activist in Brown and Diprose 2009: 366). Sources suggest that similar appeals to ‘indigeneity’ were made by Pusaden’s deputy candidate Osbert Walenta. Frans Sowolino campaign as the “fully Pamona” candidate. However, despite Sowolino’s strong involvement in local Pamona schools and regional university, Pamona chiefs reportedly did not mobilise significantly on behalf of either Walenta or Sowolino (Sukarsono 2011). Instead, it appears *adat* leaders made strategic choices regarding the mobilisation of their tribes-people, rather than simply mobilising sub-clan identities as predicted by classical centripetalist theory.

It is evident from the campaign period that *adat* chiefs strategically assessed the various identities and social ties of candidates and their running-mates prior to mobilising their community- a level of agency not envisaged by classical centripetalist theory. Indeed, a distinction was seemingly made between a ‘fully Pamona’ candidate (Sowolino) with minimal support in other constituencies, and a mixed-heritage Chinese-Manado-Pamona candidate (Ingkiriwang) with strong links to members of the district assembly, local bureaucrats and business interests and the Pamona running-mate of the district incumbent, Muin Pusaden (Sukarsono 2011).
Their judgements about the relational bonds of candidates and their running-mates had important implications for outcomes of voter mobilisation.

**Election Results**

Voting returns in the 2005 Poso *pilkada* are an ambiguous indicator of how the strategic decisions taken by candidate-pairs to mobilise a variety of constituencies, identities and social ties impacted voter choice at the ballot box. The election was won convincingly by a Christian candidate Piet Ingkiriwang and his Muslim deputy, Muthalib Rimi with the pair heading the election results in every sub-district in Poso except two. The pair received 42.6 percent of the vote overall- 20 points higher than the second-place candidate pair of Frans Sowolino and Kahar Latjare. However, below this general result is a much more complex web of relationships between religion, ethnicity and party nominations in determining this election outcome.

![Table of election results](image)

*Figure 6 2005 Poso election results by sub-district. Source Brown 2009: 15*
Religious Identities and Voting

Assessing the impact of individual religious identity upon voting outcomes is speculative in the absence of individual-level data regarding voting intentions. However, it does appear that Christian majority sub-distRICTS were more likely to support candidate pairs that nominated a Christian in the *bupati* position. Ingkiriwang, Sowolino and Bungkundapu all received a larger proportion of votes in Christian majority sub-distRICTS than either of the tickets headed by Muslims- which ranked last (Muin/Osbet) and second last (Dede/Lies) respectively in these sub-distRICTS.

However, the inverse relationship of Christian performance in Muslim majority districts was not as clear. The only two sub-distRICTS where Piet Inkiriwang did not top the poll was in Poso Kota and Poso Pesisir, both of which are majority Muslim neighborhoods. In both of these areas, the Muslim incumbent Muin Pusaden- who by many accounts had been complicit in later waves of anti-Christian violence during Poso’s conflict period- received the largest number of votes.

However, the strength of the pro-Muslim vote in Muslim-majority sub-distRICTS was not pronounced, with the two Christian-led tickets of Edy/Awad and Piet Ingkiriwang also polling strongly in these Muslim majority districts. These tickets received 24.2 percent and 20.2 percent of Poso’s Muslim vote respectively - only a few points behind Pusaden/Osbet who received 29.4 percent.
It is noteworthy to contrast Ingkiriwang & Thalib- who received 49.8 percent of the vote from Christian majority districts with the incumbent pairing of Pusaden & Walenta, who were only able to secure 29.4 percent of votes from Muslim majority districts, notwithstanding their nomination by a number of Islamic parties. Given that most accounts of the conflict suggest Pusaden was complicit in condoning later waves of anti-Christian violence by LK operatives (HRW 2002), his low polling even amongst Poso’s Muslims underlines the extent to which many Muslims saw him as devoid of merit despite his religious affiliation (Brown and Diprose 2009: 15).

**Party Nominations and Voting**

The divisions shown in the voting results amongst Poso’s Muslim community suggest as well that rather than religious identity alone, party nominations also played an important role in influencing the election choice of voters. Whilst Pusaden topped the poll in Poso’s Muslim majority sub-districts, the Golkar nominated ticket comprising a Christian bureaucrat (Edy) and Muslim deputy performed almost as strongly in these districts. The margins of difference in voting results between the Pusaden pairing and Edy in Muslim majority sub-districts was under 7 percent in Poso Kota and an even slimmer at 1.6 percent in Poso Pesisir.

Indeed, the Golkar-nominated ticket of Dede Bungkundapu and Alamri had almost twice the voting support of the alternative Muslim-led pairing of Atmawijaya and Sigilipu in Muslim-majority sub-districts. This result suggests that while Dede may have had a reputation amongst some voters for a balanced approach to policing during the conflict (Brown and Diprose 2009: 12), the weak local presence of his
major nominating party (PDI-P) in Poso resulted in the Golkar Party apparatus more effectively mobilising Poso’s urban Muslims on behalf of Edy Atmawijaya and Lis Sigilipu.

Rather than simply making calculations about religious identity affiliation of candidates as predicted by classical centripetalist theory, sub-district voting data suggests that voters in Poso’s ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim urban areas voted primarily “on individual reasons rather than group loyalty” (Sukarsono 2011). However, the strong performance of the Edy-Lis pairing in Muslim urban sub-districts did not extend to Christian-majority districts where this candidate received only 9.8 percent of the vote. This suggests that just as Poso’s Muslims seem to have supported a Christian bupati candidate on the basis of the Golkar-endorsement, Christian Pamona voters were reluctant to provide Bungkundapu with support, despite his claimed Pamona heritage. This may be a function of the strong organisational apparatus of the Partai Damai Sejahtera in Christian areas, which delivered strong polling outcomes in all Pamona majority sub-districts. Mobilisation on the basis of a candidates’ nominating party and the respective strength of their organisational apparatus may therefore have had a more determinant impact on voting behaviour in Poso’s 2005 election, at least in Muslim sub-districts, than concerns about the religious affiliation of candidate pairings.

**Ethnic Identities and Voting**

Whilst the ascriptive religious identity of candidates was not a strong determinant of voting patterns, broader relational ties and networks were more significant in
determining the support of the indigenous Pamona, Poso’s largest ethnic group. Frans Sowolino’s was inability to secure sufficient campaign finance and build networks across other constituencies, especially within the local bureaucracy and district assembly. This meant that he was unable to secure the majority of his Pamona community (Sukarsono 2011). In the four Pamona majority sub-district (Utara, Selatan, Timur and Barat) Sowolino ranked second to the mixed descent Pamona candidate Ingkiriwang, who received over 50 percent of the vote in all but Pamona Selatan. Even in that sub-district, Sowolino’s own village, Ingkiriwang received 38.2 percent of the vote - 2.9 percent more than Sowolino (35.3 percent). In contrast, the incumbent Muin Pusaden and his Pamona deputy Osbert Walenta polled poorly in all four Pamona sub-districts- receiving less than 10 percent of the vote despite the cross-ethnic pairing. A similarly weak voting result was recorded for Dede and his Pamona deputy, Lis Sigilipu who lacked a significant organisational apparatus in these sub-districts. Consequently, the better networked and financed Ingkiriwang won the majority of the Pamona vote in the 2005 pilkada. Sowolino placed second, a long way behind the winning pair.

As data on individual voter intention and village processes of mobilisation amongst adat (customary) leaders is limited, conclusions about the strategic calculations made by local elites in supporting candidates can only be inferred from the voting results. Indeed, the reservations voiced by a number of Pamona chiefs to International Crisis Group field analysts about the limited appeal of Sowolino is reflected by his lack of support in Pamona-majority sub-districts- a result similarly seen in his 2010 pilkada performance (Sukarsono 2011). This suggests that village-level mobilisation by adat elders and youth activists may have been strongly
influenced not simply by intra-ethnic competition or the strength of ethnic ties. Mobilisation might also have been influenced by broader calculations about the viability and appeal of certain candidates across a variety of constituencies within the district. In other words, in the absence of any threat presented to the comparative political power of their ethnic group through the pairing strategy of all the tickets, adat leaders and youth activists ultimately supported the candidate from their community most likely of winning the election.

Analysis and Conclusion

At all stages of the electoral process, Poso’s 2005 pilkada demonstrates the limitations of the classical centripetalist theory in explaining outcomes of voter mobilisation. The candidate pairing regulation in the 2004 electoral legislation successfully achieved cooperation between elites on the basis of religious identity. However, in addition to religious affiliation, the pairing strategy employed by candidates operated simultaneously across several dimensions of personal and communal association, including experience in the local bureaucracy. Beyond the expectations of the classical centripetalist theory of decentralisation, the successful candidates in Poso’s 2005 pilkada reflexively adapted their strategies, identities and approaches (Jessop 2001: 1224) to enable voter mobilisation. As a result, the focus of these mobilisation strategies were not simply ascriptive group identities (ala classical centripetalist theory) but were tied to various dimensions of social linkage between candidates and voters.
In addition to strategic identity mobilisation by candidates, Poso’s 2005 election results also suggest the potential for voter reflexivity—whether influenced by adat chiefs or the local organisational apparatus of a party. For instance, Muslim voters strongly supported a Christian candidate seemingly on the basis of his linkages to Golkar. Meanwhile, ethnic elites and voters did not support the ‘fully Pamona’ candidate Frans Sowolino as he was perceived as unlikely to win the election and therefore deliver benefits to the community (Sukarsono 2011). Rather, voters in Pamona majority sub-districts strongly supported the mixed-heritage Pamona police officer, Piet Ingkiriwang. The proposed strategic-relational mechanism by which macro-frameworks (electoral/party regulations, decentralisation) impact elite strategy formation is therefore analytically necessary to explain the outcome of voter mobilisation in post-conflict Poso. In the context of strong competition and centripetalist electoral and party regulations, cooperation across religious communities has become a necessary but insufficient condition for electoral success. Rather, additional factors such as the breadth of a candidates’ identity repertoire, their inter-communal support and a candidate pairs record and reputation in the wider community strongly determined the outcome of voter mobilisation. Whether the same interaction between strategic incentives and relational ties is equally determinant in explaining patterns of identity mobilisation in a larger, more ethnically heterogeneous city will be assessed in the next case-study of the 2010 Medan elections.
Ch 6: Medan, North Sumatra- The Limits of Ethno-Communal Cooperation

District Background: 1998-2004

The district of Medan in the province of North Sumatra is the fourth largest city in Indonesia. Initially settled as a colonial plantation town by the Dutch in the 1870s, Medan grew rapidly through the 1950s and 60s as a consequence of state-supported transmigration (Agustono 2008: 3). At the time of the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Medan had grown to be a well-established urban agglomeration of 1.9 million people (BPS 2004a). It has an ethnically and religiously diverse population. The largest group in the city are ethnic Bataks originating from the highlands of North Sumatra- though the 2000 census distinguishes between Batak sub-clans Tapanuli, Mandailing, Toba and Karo. Overall, the Javanese statistically constitute the largest ethnic group in Medan at 31.9 percent of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>607,771</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batak, Tapanuli</td>
<td>280,785</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>213,987</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandailing</td>
<td>178,161</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau</td>
<td>166,739</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>125,094</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batak, Toba</td>
<td>86,169</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Batak, Karo</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acehnese</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>14,682</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,904,273</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 Ethnic Composition of Medan 2000. Source BPS 2004.

Islam is a cross-cutting cleavage amongst the city’s numerous ethnic groups including the Javanese, Batak Tapanuli and Mandailing. The most recent census data suggest that Medan’s population is 68 percent Muslim, 21 percent Christian and 10 percent Buddhist (BPS 2004a).
Medan is notable for the continued political dominance of New Order elites following the implementation of decentralisation in 2001. Rather than assuring resolution of local community concerns, Hadiz claims that decentralisation simply allowed Medan’s political parties and local assembly to become “vehicles for the distribution of the spoils of power among the wealthy” (Hadiz 2004: 628). The election of Mayor by the local district assembly (DPRD) in 2000, in which the ultimately successful candidate apparently bribed 16 PDI-P members of the local assembly to split with their nationally mandated nominee to support him, is one such instance of elite-level ‘money politics’ (Hadiz 2004: 626).

In contrast to the restricted campaigns for Medan mayor that characterised the earlier fiscal decentralisation period (2001-2004), the first direct local elections in 2005 required candidates to mobilise voters rather than elites- with many candidates adopting complex strategies of cross-communal candidate pairing and campaigning (Hadiz 2010). It is against this backdrop of political candidates seeking support from the city’s diverse ethnic and religious communities that Medan’s 2010 pilkada is assessed. This highly competitive election, under the framework regulations of the 2004 party and electoral regulations, had two rounds- the first with ten candidate-pairs and the second with the two most successful candidate pairs. The reduction in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>1,291,751</td>
<td>67.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>345,310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>197,986</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>55,002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>12,888</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,904,273</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8 Religious Composition of Medan 2000. Source BPS 2004
the number of candidate pairs between the first and second round transformed the nature of voter mobilisation - both in candidates mobilising strategies and the outcomes of the election. The two rounds of Medan’s 2010 election therefore demonstrate the variant effects of the intervening relational mechanism in determining strategies of mobilisation and community response.

This chapter has three sections. The first part analyses the mobilisation strategies of deployed by candidates in the first round of election and their impact upon the voting behaviour of Medan’s ethnic and religious groups. The second part analyses these same processes in the subsequent run-off election. The third section assesses the implications of the findings for the strategic-relational theory, and the degree of reflexivity afforded amongst candidates, community leaders and voters.

**Medan: 2010 Election**

**Candidate Pairing**

The continued political dominance of New Order business, ethnic and religious elites in Medan’s local politics was reflected in the candidates and candidate pairing strategies utilised in the 2010 *pilkada*. Almost all of the ten candidate pairs that nominated in the first round of election had strong links to Medan’s political networks of bureaucrats, business people and party operatives (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 35). The pattern of pairing between candidates suggests that the electoral regulations mandating candidate pairing was used strategically to ensure broad voter appeal across the numerous ethnic, religious and associational networks in Medan.
Rahudman Harahap, the ultimately successful candidate, was the incumbent Mayor, a career bureaucrat and former District Secretary of the nearby South Tapanuli District. In controversial circumstances, Rahudman apparently cancelled an agreement to pair with ethnic Chinese candidate Sofyan Tan in the final days of nomination. Instead, he paired with Dzulmi Eldin, an ethnic Malay Muslim with a bureaucratic background (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Eldin had initially planned to run for Mayor himself with the backing of the largest party in the district assembly, Partai Demokrat. However, private polling found Rahudman was likely to win the mayoral election, leading Eldin just days prior to the close of nominations to arrange to pair as deputy to Rahudman (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36).

The runner-up in the mayoral election was Sofyan Tan. Raised in Medan’s ethnic Chinese Buddhist community, Tan grew up humbly in an area of the city “known for its graveyards and poverty” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Tan had become a successful businessman and had established an educational foundation aimed at building ‘mutual respect’ between Medan’s ethno-religious communities (Nagata 2003: 375-376). Tan was also an advisor to Indonesian Chinese Clan Social Organisation (PSMTI), a prominent ethnic Chinese association. Evidently predicting that his non-Muslim (Buddhist) religious identity would become an issue of political contention in a Muslim majority city, Tan had initially sought to run only as deputy Mayor. He courted a number of other candidates and eventually reached an agreement with Rahudman to pair as his deputy (Interview with campaigner in
Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 37). However, in the final days before the close of nominations this agreement was abandoned when Rahudman paired with Eldin.

Tan subsequently nominated as Mayoral candidate, pairing with a Malay Muslim woman, Nelly Armayanti. Armayanti was formerly the head of the Medan Electoral Commission and a lecturer in agriculture at North Sumatra Islamic University (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Despite her strong networks in the Malay Muslim community, Tan claimed that gender equity was the primary motivation for his choice of Armayanti as it “was desirable in terms of gender equality and for the message it would send to women voters” (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Rather than Tan’s pairing strategy simply cultivating inter-ethnic partnership (Chinese-Malay) as predicted by classical centripetalist theory, other factors— for instance Armayanti’s connection to progressive networks of Muslim women and Medan’s NGOs sector—seemingly influenced Tan’s choice of pairing.

Significantly, similar strategies of cross-ethnic pairing were adopted by other candidates too. Sigit Pramono Asri, a prominent member of the ethnic Javanese community and founding member of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) nominated with an ethnic Batak from the Karo sub-clan, Nurlisa Ginting— an engineer, university lecturer and government bureaucrat (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Ajib Shah, an Afghan-Malay with a long history as a Golkar legislator in the provincial assembly and close links to North Sumatra’s preman organisations, nominated with local bureaucrat Binsar Situmorang— seemingly in an attempt to appeal to the Christian Batak community of which Binsar belonged.
Maulana Pohan, a Muslim Batak, chose to run with an ethnic Minang member of the Medan assembly with close links to the modernist Islamic organisations, Muhammadiyah and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 39). Even those candidates who ran without a party endorsement such as leader of the ethnic Javanese group Pujakesuma, Joko Susilo, appealed across ethnic and religious constituencies by pairing with a Muslim Batak, Amir Hamzah, as his running-mate (Kompas 2010a).

As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, the level of political competition between candidates of various ethnic descent, combined with electoral laws requiring paired candidacy, resulted in candidates selecting running-mates that would appeal to other ethnic constituencies. Candidates either reasoned or assumed that this was an electoral necessity. As a local party official commented prior to the poll, mixed-candidate pairs were vital to ensuring appeals to multiple constituencies: “if (the running mates) are both Mandailing, if they’re both Javanese, they aren’t going to win... homogenous pairs can lose. They [the candidates] don’t take that risk” (Interview in Aspinall 2011: 40). However, other dimensions of candidate identity, such as their ties to various ethnic-religious associations, were also considered when evaluating potential running-mates, to facilitate the mobilisation of multiple potential micro-constituencies on their behalf. The centripetal incentive for intra-ethnic competition and inter-ethnic cooperation in candidate pairing was therefore utilised by candidates to select partners with identities and social ties that would supplement their own deficiencies. There was evidently an assessment of the benefit that mobilisation of these micro-constituencies would provide them vis a vis other candidates.
Party Nomination/Involvement

There is mixed evidence with regard to the influence and importance of parties in effecting the electoral strategies of candidates in the 2010 Medan election. Party nominations had a determinant influence on Sofyan Tan’s participation in the election. Tan’s personal background as well as his work in social activism and inter-communal dialogue saw him successfully secure nomination from the secular-nationalist party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesia Democracy Party-Struggle) as well as the smaller Christian party, Partai Damai Sejahtera- despite his limited prior involvement with either of those parties (PDS- Prosperous Peace Party) (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36-37). These nominations were initially secured on the basis of Tan running as deputy to another candidate- though this strategy was foiled when Rahudman paired with Eldin in the final days of nominations (Interview with campaigner in Agustono 2009; Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38).

Despite the failed Rahudman/Tan arrangement, it was concerns about the perception of the Medan ethnic Chinese community as a politically ‘serious’ constituency- particularly amongst the national leadership of the PDI-P including Megawati Sukarnoputri who had approved Tan’s nomination- which led Tan to participate in the election regardless. As one supporter stated, “[If we back down] we thought that the PDI-P and Megawati would view the Chinese community as not serious… We wanted to show we were not like that” (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Demonstrating to PDI-P operatives and presumably local elites such
as Rahudman that the Chinese community was not ‘half-hearted’ about participating in politics was therefore the critical factor in Tan’s nominating in the 2010 election (Interview with campaigner in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38).

However, there was early recognition amongst Tan’s campaign team that his status as a non-Muslim would constrain their ability to broaden Tan’s appeal outside the Chinese community in Muslim-majority Medan (Interview with campaigner in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Tan’s Buddhist religious affiliation resulted in him pairing with a prominent local Muslim, Nelly Armayanti, in order to give him strong connections and networks into Muslim communities.

Islamic parties also endorsed a number of candidates, with Maulana receiving nomination and significant organisational assistance from the Islamic political branch (Partai Patriot) of Medan’s preman (gangster) network Permuda Pancasila. Pohan was also nominated by Islamist parties PAN and PPP as a result of the long association of his deputy, Arif with those organisations (Aspinall 2011: 39). Sigit Asri and Nurlisa Ginting secured the endorsement of the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), one of the few major parties with a significant local party apparatus (Ufen 2011: 16). A number of candidates also ran independently of parties as was authorised by a 2009 ruling of Indonesia’s constitutional court (Buehler 2010). However, as will be discussed later these candidates had a relatively periphery role in the election process.
Golkar played a largely passive role in the Medan pilkada-nominating Rahudman after a poll conducted by a campaign consultancy reported that he was the favourite to win the election (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Golkar party operatives were actively involved in Rahudman’s campaign, attending campaign meetings participating in the decisions of the larger ‘victory team’ (Pos 2010b).

Parties therefore varied in their importance in the nomination process. Concerns about perceptions of the Chinese community within the nominating PDI-P proved pivotal in Tan’s decision to run for election- despite concerns about perceptions of the Buddhist religious identity. Ultimately, however, party nomination generally had little relation to the functional policy platforms or ideological approaches of candidates.

Table 2 Medan 2010 Candidate Profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Deputy</th>
<th>Background</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Bahdin/Siyo</td>
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<td>(Toba); Mayor</td>
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<td>bureaucrat</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dzulmi Supratikno</td>
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<td>8. Pohan/Ahmad</td>
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Round One: Campaign/Appeals (action and words)

The mobilisation strategies of candidates during the first round of elections highlight the potential implicit in centripetalist frameworks not just for intra-ethnic and cross-ethnic appeals to voters, but also utilisation of various personal identities and relational ties in candidate’s campaigns.

Intra-Ethnic Appeals

Candidate appeals to ethnic identity were commonplace during the first-round of the election. Various candidates sought support from their own ethnic or clan communities- especially after polling reported that Javanese and Batak voters were divided in their support for the pairings headed by the Asri, Rahudman and Maulana (Pos 2010c). Asri posted messages on his website, urging Javanese voters to be ‘solid’ in their choice, vote as a ‘block’ and determine the outcome of the election in a single round- presumably for himself and his deputy (Pos 2010e). Posters of Asri’s partner Ginting dressed in traditional garb also appeared in Karo neighbourhoods throughout Medan (Fox 2011). Tan also established a sub-committee within his
campaign focused exclusively on mobilising voters in the ethnic Chinese community. Asri and Nurlisa’s campaign sought endorsements from a variety of Muslim youth organisations through their attendance at various local Islamic forums where both candidates promoted “courteous (santun) politics” and urged electors to vote “according to conscience”, ostensibly an appeal to their Muslim identity (Pos 2010a).

**Inter-Ethnic Appeals**

As forecast by classical centripetalist theory, the strong competition of the first round combined with Medan’s ethnically plural demography also prompted candidates to make extensive appeals across ethnic boundaries. Despite Tan’s prominence within the Chinese community, other candidates sought to mobilise Chinese voters on their behalf through posters proclaiming their support for Chinese community groups and attendance at various Chinese Organisation of Indonesia (INTI) public events (Pos 2010e). Ajib Shah and his deputy candidate Binsar seemingly made the most explicit attempt to mobilise voters from the ethnic Chinese community, securing endorsements from a number of prominent Chinese leaders (Terrain 2010). During the last days of the election, they also worked with Chinese organisations to distribute free medicine and health-checks throughout the city as part of their campaign (MedanPunya 2010; Pos 2010b).

Similarly, while Arif and Ginting’s campaign was largely Islamic, they sought to appeal for support amongst non-Muslim voters by visiting local Christian Batak churches (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 39). Rahudman’s own campaign promoted him as a civic nationalist who identified- or at least affiliated- with all ethnic and religious groups (Waspada 2010).
All candidates sought support in Medan’s largest ethnic group, the Javanese migrant community, through various ethnic associations and forums. At the request of candidates, various Javanese organisations hosted public events, rallies and meetings at which “Javanese leaders made statements about how this particular pair was the right choice for the Javanese” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 42).\(^\text{11}\) As expected by classical centripetalism, the strongly competitive nature of the first round of election therefore prompted candidates to mobilise voters from other ethnic groups by participating in a variety of cultural group events and rituals.

**Strategic Identity Activation**

In addition to mobilising voters from other ethnic groups numerous candidates also adopted profiles of ethnic and religious inclusion by accentuating particular aspects of their personal identity. Rahudman for instance, an ethnic Batak of the Toba sub-clan, attended Karo Batak *adat* (customary) ceremonies- at which both he and his running-mate Eldin claimed Karo ancestry and danced for ‘almost an hour’ in full traditional Karo dress (Pos 2010d).

Candidates who could claim Javanese or other ethnic connections did so- even when such identification had previously been peripheral to their public profile.

\(^{11}\) Whilst interviews with leaders of North Sumatra’s Javanese networks suggest they are somewhat sceptical of their ability to deliver voters for candidate- a fact supported in the electoral results- they continue to provide nominations from Javanese groups supporting competing candidates in the *pilkada* and provincial gubernatorial elections. See Aspinall, E. (2011). "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11(2): 289-319.
Candidates discovered distant relatives of various ethnic descent. Candidate websites (Pos 2010d) and posters (Fox and Menchik 2011) promoted images of candidates dressed in “the traditional costume of any ethnic group but their own” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 43). In addition to both Rahudman and Eldin claiming Karo heritage, Maulana Pohan ‘added’ the Semibiring Batak clan to his family tree, and Sofyan Tan deployed his traditional Karo ‘Ginting’ name (Kompas 2010b). Cultural and identity-based appeals by candidates transcended the simple inter-ethnic cooperation envisaged by classical centripetalism. Candidate-pairings strategically mobilised their diverse identity repertoires and ties to ethno-religious associations to mobilise voters on the basis not simply of co-existence but also shared group identity.

In addition to activating multiple dimensions of their personal, public and group identity, all candidate pairs also publicised their various professional achievements. Despite being in office as Mayor less than ten months at the time of the election, Rahudman campaigned on his ‘can-do reputation’ of improving local infrastructure such as drains, traffic flows and formalisation of the city market (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Such progress, he claimed, would be reversed if voters risked ‘experimenting’ with ‘inexperienced’ candidates (Pos 2010b). Similarly, Tan underlined his role in the establishment of local organisations that “promoted inter-communal harmony and addressed the needs of the poor” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 44). All candidates emphasised programs to alleviate poverty, together with their links to various ethno-religious charity groups (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36).
The high level of competition in the first round of Medan’s 2010 election was a strong incentive for candidates to compete within their ethnic group— for instance by appealing to Batak sub-clans (Toba, Karo)—as well as appealing across ethnic constituencies. These campaigns operated at several layers of identity—ethnic, religious and personal— with candidates activating previously obscure dimensions of their personal identity to build relational ties of solidarity with voters.

First Round Election Results

As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, the high level of competition amongst candidates in the first round of election resulted in fragmentation of Medan’s Muslim vote between a number of candidates. The strategies developed by candidates to appeal across a variety of dimensions of identity seem to have had a significant influence on voting results in the first round.

Religious Identities and Voting

Given the large number of candidates participating in the first round and small number of non-Muslim candidates, assessing religious oriented voting in the first round is difficult. No clear relationship emerges from sub-district electoral data on whether Muslim majority-districts were significantly less likely to support non-Muslim candidates. Despite his Buddhist religious affiliation, Sofyan ranked first or second in the majority of Medan sub-districts, whilst the other candidate pairing containing a non-Muslim comprised of Ajib Shah and Christian Batak, Binsar Situmorang, ranked third or fourth.
According to sub-district census data from 2004, Medan contains only two non-Muslim (Christian and Buddhist) majority sub-districts: Medan Tuntungan and Medan Baru. In both of these sub-districts the only pairing with a non-Muslim in a bupati position, Sofyan Tan, topped the poll receiving 22.8 percent and 27.5 percent of the vote. The second-ranking candidate pairs in these districts, however, contained Muslims in both bupati and deputy positions- suggesting that non-Muslim voters did not vote solely on the basis of religious identity of candidates.

This inference is supported by the strong performance in these sub-districts by Shah and Binsar- who ranked third and fourth respectively, consistent with their district-wide performance. Electoral returns from non-Muslim majority districts therefore suggest that while candidate pairings with non-Muslims performed slightly better in these districts than elsewhere in the city, the majority of voters in these sub-districts did not vote exclusively on the basis of the religious affiliation of the candidate pairs alone.

Sofyan Tan did, however, perform very strongly in majority Muslim sub-districts containing more than 25 percent non-Muslims. In both of these districts Sofyan and his deputy- Nelly Armayanti- topped the poll, almost doubling the vote of the second placed candidate pairing- Rahudman and Dzulmi. Ajib and Binsar, the other pair containing a non-Muslim, ranked third in these districts. As will discussed further in analysis of ethnic voting, interpretation of these results as religiously based would be flawed, however, given the large proportion of ethnic Chinese voters in these sub-districts.
Ethnic Identities and Voting

Outcomes of voter mobilisation in the first round appear to have been strongly influenced by the diverse strategies of ethnic and cross-ethnic appeals evident in the pairing, nomination and campaign process.

The largest ethnic group in Medan- Javanese migrants- split their vote between numerous candidates in spite of ethnic appeals by the former leader of the prominent Javanese organisation Pujakesuma, candidate Susilo, to ‘vote as a block’ (Pos 2010e). Susilo and his deputy Amir only received 4.16 percent of total votes across Medan- ranking eighth of ten in most Javanese-majority sub-districts. There was a similar result for all Javanese candidates in the election. Indeed, in every sub-district with a Javanese majority population, a non-Javanese candidate-pairing (Rahudman/Dzulmi) won the largest proportion of the vote.

Whilst Javanese voters do not seem to have followed ethnic cues in supporting candidates from their community, a clear ethnic pattern did emerge in the sub-district distribution of Tan’s support. In all sub-districts in which the Chinese population comprises one of the three largest groups- eight of twenty-one areas within the city- Tan topped the poll receiving more than 25 percent of the vote. In the two sub-districts where ethnic Chinese constitute a plurality- Medan Kota and Medan Petisah- Tan recorded the highest results of any candidate in the first round, receiving 34.8 percent and 35.3 percent respectively. The incumbent pairing of Rahudman and Dzulmi also seem to have benefited from the bupati candidate’s
Batak Tapanuli ethnicity-ranking first or second in all but one district in which Batak Tapanuli were the largest ethnic group.

Despite Tan’s strong support within the Chinese community, Tan also performed consistently across all of Medan’s sub-districts with his worst ranking occurring (5th) in Medan Ambias- where ethnic Chinese make up only 4 percent of the population (BPS 2004a). The Malay ethnicity of his running-mate- Nelly Armayanti- may have influenced Tan’s strong support across the city. In sub-districts where Malay’s comprised one of the largest three groups in the area, Tan on average ranked third of the ten candidates. As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, Tan’s pairing strategy and broader campaign emphasising his status as a “symbol of democratic and social reform” therefore proved effective in mobilising voters of various ethnic and religious groups in the first round (Agustono 2009; Pos 2010f).

**Party Nominations and Voting**

Despite the explicitly Islamic platform of the PKS, the party’s strong organisational apparatus in Medan may have influenced voting results for Sigit and Nurlisa, who performed consistently well across all of Medan’s sub-districts. Ranking third overall, the PKS nominated ticket even performed strongly in non-Muslim majority sub-districts- placing second in Medan Tuntungan and third in Medan Baru, well ahead of the overall winner of the poll Rahudman who polled fifth in these sub-districts. Whilst the ethnic Karo composition of these sub-districts may also have been important in influencing the voting outcomes, the consistent support for the PKS tickets across Medan suggests that the strong local organisational apparatus of the PKS (Ufen
2011) may have played an important role in mobilising voters across ethnic constituencies.

The support of the Golkar Party and its local apparatus of campaigners may have assisted in the mobilisation of voters for the incumbent Rahudman and his running-mate. Though evidence is limited of substantive Golkar campaigning is limited, Rahudman polled first or second in every sub-district where Javanese Muslims are the largest ethnic group.

Candidates who participated in the election without the support of parties performed poorly. Joko Susilo, for instance, instead sought to rely on support from the Javanese ethnic association, Pujakesuma. This variable may explain why Joko and Amir polled so poorly across all Medan sub-districts.

**Second Round Campaign (words and actions)**

With the retirement from the election of the other eight candidate pairs, the contest between Rahudman and Tan required both campaigns to implement a strategy that would at least double their respective returns from the first round. The classical centripetalist expectation that inter-ethnic cooperation was contingent upon the number of candidates competing was fulfilled in this second round. However, as the strategic imperative for inter-ethnic cooperation diminished, candidates also reweighed the personal and group identities and networks that would now be the focus for mobilisation. For Rahudman and his supporters, the second round of voting came to be framed as a contest between a Muslim from the established political elite, and
a non-Muslim political outsider from the ethnic Chinese community. Religious affiliation, rather than ethnic identity, subsequently became the targeted cleavage during the second round.

Religious Appeals

Tan’s strong showing in the first round was interpreted by Rahudman as a consequence of the large number of candidates splitting Medan’s Muslim vote - an outcome that was apparently foreseen by Tan’s campaign team (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 46). The key to the second round was therefore Muslim mobilisation in a Muslim-majority city on the basis of Tan’s Buddhist religious identity - despite his pairing with prominent Malay Muslim, Nelly Armayanti.

Neither Rahudman nor Eldin were especially prominent in Medan’s Muslim community prior to the 2010 election. In the second round, however, they utilised a strategy to “paint themselves in more Islamic colours” and mobilise networks linked to local government and the Golkar Party to urge Medan’s electors to vote according to religious affiliation and identity (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 48). Central to Rahudman’s exclusivist religious affiliation campaign was mobilisation of Muslim organisational networks and ties to disseminate anti-Tan materials and mobilise Muslim voters against him. A meeting was called by local Muslim leaders including representatives from Rahudman’s nominating party Golkar and bureaucrats from the Medan Department of Religion, at which it was warned that Medan’s Muslims were
at the “precipice of a pit” with the possibility of a non-Muslim Mayor (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 47).

Also present as this meeting were local operatives of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia-MUI), a conservative, anti-pluralist Islamic organisation with close ties to local and national government officials (Gillespie 2007; Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 47). With the support of MUI, Rahudman and Eldin secured endorsement from Medan’s Communication Forum of Preachers who directed local clerics to infuse daily Islamic prayers with proclamation of religious duty to support “a leader of the same faith” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 48). Brochures, bulletins and writings were also posted on websites of local clerics citing Quranic verses that “forbid the Islamic ummat [community] to elect/appoint elders from among the non-Muslim kafir” (JabalNoor 2010). As the head of MUI in Medan, Mohammad Hatta stated, “we directed them and they were the ones who then went out to the mosques and the sub-district [to campaign]” (Interview with Hatta in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 47).

In the second round campaign, Rahudman and Eldin therefore both sought to accentuate particular aspects of their personal, public and group identities, using connections in the local bureaucratic and Golkar party mobilise Medan’s various religious associations and networks on the basis of Tan’s identity as a non-Muslim.
Tan attempted to counter Rahudman’s campaign by appealing to voters on the basis of his character as a ‘tokoh yang pluralis’ (pluralist figure)- emphasising especially his background in inter-religious dialogue (Agustono 2009). However, Tan also enlisted the support of candidates from the first round such as Maulana Pohan, whose clerical supporters from Islamic parties PAN and PPP posed for photographs with Tan (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 49). Tan’s campaign in the second round mobilised the networks of his deputy candidate within the Muslim community to counter the exclusivist propaganda disseminated by Rahudman’s allies in the MUI. Leaflets supporting Tan and Armayanti were also distributed by students involved in modernist Islamic organisations of Medan. Citing medieval Islamic jurist, Ibn Tammiyah, these leaflets included the quotation: “an Islamic state run by Muslims who are tyrannical, corrupt and liars, that state will be destroyed” (Waspada 2010).

**Ethnic Appeals**

With the mobilisation of religious (Muslim) networks in the second round, there also emerged issues of ethnic discrimination and prejudice. A number of Muslim leaders supporting Rahudman rationalised the campaign against Tan as a consequence of the Chinese community's propensity to 'discriminate' in favour of their co-ethnics in business. As one Rahudman campaigner stated, ethnic Chinese are ‘outsiders’ who have the “mentality of boarders” and do not meaningful integrate into the Indonesian nation (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 50). Anti-Chinese leaflets with this propaganda message were circulated amongst the same networks of local Muslims utilised for religious based mobilisation. The Islamic website Majlis Ta’lim Jabal Noor claimed Tan aimed to turn Medan into a “Chinatown”, and cited high-profile
corruption cases involving Chinese businessmen to conclude that *kafir* (non-Muslims) would “betray the Indonesian nation” (JabalNoor 2010).

**Strategic Identity Mobilisation**

In addition to mobilising his ethnic Batak tribe and Muslim religious affiliation as expected by classical centripetalist theory, Rahudman’s religious and ethnic mobilisation strategy in the second round also leveraged networks of middle-class Muslim bureaucrats through his incumbency as Mayor and the local relational ties of his nominating party, Golkar.

As a consequence of this campaign, Tan filed a case in the Constitutional Court alleging that Rahudman had directed the government bureaucracy against his candidacy- citing particularly irregularities in voter turn-out in the second round (Pos 2010d; Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 51). As the case is still pending, there is currently insufficient evidence to confirm Tan’s claim of a bureaucratic campaign against him- rather than the mobilisation of various ethnic and religious networks with strong *connections* to the district government. However, it is evident that clear strategic calculations were made about Muslim mobilisation based upon Tan’s identity as a non-Muslim. In order to assess the efficacy of these ethnic, religious and party-based mobilisation strategies in influencing voter choice, we now turn to the election results for the second round.
Second Round Results

The second round of Medan’s 2010 election saw Rahudman receive the vast majority of votes - recording an average of 65.9 percent across all sub-districts within the city. Inversely, Tan received 34.1 percent of the vote. These broad results mask more complex ethno-religious dynamics with close links to party nominations and the various identities and networks of candidate pairs.

Voter turn-out across all sub-districts increased substantially from the first round (678,804) to the second round (736,872). Similar trends of increased turn-out occurred across all sub-districts with the exception of one - Medan Area, which is an area with a sizable number of Chinese voters. In contrast to the district-wide increase in voter turnout, Medan Area experienced lower turnout of 9 percent. Whilst results of this single sub-district would not have altered the overall election outcome, results from Medan Area will be treated separately from the broader analysis of the role of identity in assessing outcomes of voter mobilisation.

Religious Identities and Voting

The successful framing of the second round of Medan’s 2010 campaign on religion was seen by most observers as critical for Rahudman’s land-slide victory. One local news blog quoted a community leader as saying “if Rahudman’s opponent had not been a non-Muslim, I guarantee it is not certain that Rahudman would have been elected by the people” (Waspada 2010). The mobilisation of religious identity was at least partly reflected in sub-district voting results.
Rahudman received a strong result of 68 percent in all Muslim majority sub-districts, with significantly fewer votes in non-Muslim majority sub-districts (41.9 percent). In contrast, Tan received the bulk of his votes from non-Muslim majority sub-districts-winning 58 percent of voters in these areas, compared with a result of 34.12 percent district-wide. All Muslim majority sub-districts were strongly positively correlated with majority vote for Rahudman (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 52). Underpinning these religious voting patterns, however, was a more complex pattern of voting based on a variety of ethnic and social ties linking candidates with voters.

**Ethnic Identities, Party Nominations and Voting**

The mobilisation by Rahudman’s campaign of various networks of middle-class Muslims harvested an extremely strong result for this pair in all sub-districts in which ethnic Javanese comprise the largest group. Rahudman’s religious campaign using the organisational apparatus of Golkar as well as networks largely dominated by Javanese Muslims such as MUI (Agustono 2008) ensured an ethnic as well as religious aspect to voting patterns. Rahudman and his deputy Dzulmi also found strong support from their respective Batak Toba and Malay ethnic groups, receiving the vast majority (65 percent or more) of votes in all sub-districts in which Batak Toba or Malay were the largest three groups.

In contrast to the first round, less definitive trends of ethnic Chinese voting emerged in the second round for Sofyan Tan and deputy Nelly Armayanti. While in the
previous round sub-districts with a large (10 percent or more) Chinese population were highly likely to support Tan and Armayanti, in the second round this pairing placed second behind Rahudman in all but one of these sub-districts (excluding Medan Area- where Tan also ranked second). The sizable proportion of Javanese in these sub-districts cannot alone explain why Tan suffered a loss of 6 percent in Medan Kota- a sub-district with a large plurality of Batak Christians and Chinese Buddhists. Indeed, a clear decline in the ethnic Chinese vote for Tan is detectable in numerous sub-districts with a large proportion of Chinese voters- Medan Timur, Medan Barat and Medan Maimun- between the first and second round.

Some observers attributed the decline in Tan’s vote from the first round in Chinese areas to fear of repeats of the anti-Chinese violence that occurred in Medan and throughout Indonesia in 1998 (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 52). However, as Fox observes, it’s also possible that the Chinese community leaders supporting Ajib Shah and Binsar Situmorang in the first round made a pragmatic choice to mobilise in support of Rahudman out of concern regarding exclusion from district government if they supported their co-ethnic, Sofyan Tan, who was likely to lose (Fox 2011). Evidence for this pattern of community leader and voter reflexivity is limited. However, it is evident that broader strategic calculations were made about the viability of Tan as a candidate in light of his comparatively weak networks and associational ties in Medan’s Muslim community.
Analysis and Conclusion

The two rounds of Medan’s 2010 election highlight the impact of the intervening variable of competition in influencing strategies of identity-based voter mobilisation. As the number of candidate pairs reduced from ten in the first round to two in the second, the nature and tone of candidates’ appeals to ethno-communal identity altered significantly, strongly influencing the outcome of identity-based voting.

However, as emphasised by the strategic-relational theory, the level of competition alone is inadequate to explain outcomes of identity-based mobilisation. Rather, in each round, candidate pairs participated in critical reflection of their identity and capabilities and the variant advantages these might provide for voter mobilisation. In the first round, for instance, candidate pairs mobilised voters not simply across or within ethnic groups (classical centripetalism). Rather candidate pairs accentuated those aspects of their various ethnic, group and associational ties which they thought would be useful in building a rapport with voters - even when these were previously peripheral to their public profile.

In the second round, Rahudman’s strategic exploitation of Tan’s non-Muslim identity enabled the construction of a threat to the majority religious identity group. Coupled with a campaign of mobilisation in which Rahudman leaveraged ties to Medan’s Muslim middle-class, the outcome of this perceived threat was a significantly higher voter turnout and clear patterns of Javanese sub-districts consistently supporting Rahudman and his deputy.
Interestingly, the efficacy of Rahudman’s campaign in mobilising Medan’s Muslims on the basis of a threat to their religious majority community seems also to have resulted in some ethnic Chinese voters abandoning Tan in the second round—possibly on the basis of maintaining links to the Muslim dominated district government in Medan. Such a result can only be explained by accepting that political participants—candidates, community leaders and voters themselves—are at least partly reflexive about the identities they mobilise or respond to as politically salient, a perspective which is absent in classical centripetal theory.
Ch 7 Conclusion
This study examined the proposition that institutional incentives created by decentralisation are open to re-interpretation by political actors in light of their various identities, social ties and capabilities (Jessop 2001). In seeking to probe this research issue through two case-studies of district election processes in Indonesia, two hypotheses formed the basis for examination.

The first hypothesis was the classical centripetalist expectation, derived from the research of Donald Horowitz (1985, 2007, 2008):

**(H1) decentralisation increases political competition, leading candidates to mobilise ethnic and sub-ethnic identities and/or cooperate with candidates from other ethnic groups**

The second hypothesis was the strategic-relational expectation, of which this study was a plausibility-probe:

**H2) strategic incentives of political competition associated with decentralisation interact with the identities, social networks and capabilities of candidates in determining the mobilisation strategies adopted not only by them but also relevant community leaders.**
The findings from the case-studies of Poso and Medan provide cogent evidence that H1 is insufficient in explaining the diverse identities and networks through which voters are mobilised in the context of decentralisation. H2 is found to provide a fuller analytical understanding of the origins and processes associated with ethno-communal mobilisation, though some limitations and revision of the theory is required.

Findings
The strategies of ethno-communal mobilisation employed in Poso’s 2005 election and Medan’s 2010 election demonstrate that whilst nominally important in enabling cross-ethnic pairing, the incentives provided by centripetalist electoral and party regulations are at best a partial explanation of voter mobilisation outcomes in the context of decentralisation.

In Poso four key points emerge.

- In addition to cross-communal cooperation, candidates paired and mobilised on the basis of their professional and personal backgrounds.
- Party organisational apparatus- or lack thereof- was an important determinant of support for candidates.
- Muslim voters were more willing to support Christian candidates in the top *bupati* position than Christian voters- possible related to particular party (Golkar).
- Pamona chiefs/youth activists ignored distinctions between the ‘indigeneity’ of candidates, instead mobilising support for the candidate (Ingiriwang) with the
strongest networks and organisational capacity in Poso’s religious, ethnic and political communities.

In Medan, four points are also pertinent.

- Strong competition in the first round led candidates to promote ethnic and religious inclusivity and also ‘discover’ and mobilise new dimensions of their ethnic and personal identity.
- A proportion of Chinese community leaders and voters seemingly voted for Rahudman in the second round, in spite of the anti-Tan campaign.
- In mobilising Medan’s Muslims on the basis of a threat to the religious dominance of their community, Rahudman relied heavily on ties to Medan’s Muslim middle-class through links to various Islamic associations and networks.
- Tan’s decision to participate in the poll despite his non-Muslim identity was strongly influenced by Chinese community leaders concerns about the potential political damage of Tan’s withdrawal from the election. A broader notion of strategic incentives therefore needs to be understood about how decentralisation provides minorities with avenues for political participation.

In relation to H1, these findings suggest that when provided with an institutional opportunity such as candidate pairing to appeal across ethnic groups, candidates will seek to mobilise voters across the boundaries of ethnic identity.
In explaining the formation of mobilisation strategies, the strategic-relational theory (H2) provides a more complete account of the various personal, group identities and social ties through which voter support may be mobilised by candidates. In both the Poso and Medan cases the utility of this theory is demonstrated as institutional incentives such as candidate pairing and decentralisation were transmitted into voter mobilisation outcomes through a causal process involving recurrent reflection upon the various identities, networks and organisational ties of the candidate pair.

However, it was not only candidates who engaged in reflexivity when determining the identities associated with mobilisation. Examples from both Poso and Medan demonstrate that community leaders may play an important ‘gatekeeper’ role in determining the outcome of voter mobilisation. In both cases, community leaders and voters made reflexive decisions about communal mobilisation: the Pamona chiefs/youth activists in Poso supporting Ingkiriwang; and Chinese voters in the second round of Medan’s election seemingly supporting Rahudman.

In neither of these examples did all voters follow the same pattern. The Pamona vote recorded by Sowolino (the ‘full Pamona’) was in the range of 20 percent across all Pamona-majority sub-districts. Meanwhile, the precise extent of the Chinese vote that shifted to support Rahudman in the second round is difficult assess. However, in both cases the proportion of voters who seemingly engaged in reflexive analysis of candidates based on their broader appeal and likelihood of electoral success is sufficient to form an additional link in the causal process explaining outcomes of identity-based voter mobilisation: that of community leaders.
Theory Revision

The concerns of some community leaders - in both cases seemingly linked to the low probability of their co-ethnic candidate obtaining sufficient support to win the poll in the presence of more competitive candidates - was determinitive in the outcome of large-scale mobilisation in their respective communities. This additional link (community leaders) is factored into the revised strategic relational theory below as a mechanism causally related to the ultimate outcome of voter mobilisation in the context of decentralisation. The possibility of macro-framework (party and electoral regulations) amendment also emerges from the outcome of voter mobilisation.
Implications and Avenues for Further Research

The demonstrated limitations of the classical centripetalist theory, and the utility of the newly revised strategic-relational theory of identity-based voter mobilisation, have important implications for theories and approaches to political engineering.

Rather than viewing macro-frameworks and the incentives they create as determinant of individual action, the constructivist conceptualisation of identity adopted in this study enables a reconceptualisation of the relationship between
structure and agency in which “institutions constrain and refract politics but are never the sole cause of outcomes” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 4). By embracing “the possibility of reflection on the part of the individual and collective actors about the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures” (2001: 1224- emphasis added), the strategic-relational theory tested in these case-studies has important implications for theories of institutional design. Largely grounded in rational choice theories of institutionalism, these approaches generally do not account for the multidimensionality of individual and group identity.

Adopting such an approach to the incentives created by institutional frameworks such as decentralisation opens up further avenues for research eg. how decentralisation impacts the development of party systems and ethno-communal relations in emerging, ethnically diverse democracies. In addition to the experience of Indonesia, other research suggests that national parties find it difficult to form substantive coalitions with regional parties as decentralisation minimises their levers of influence over sub-national elites (Sabatini 2003). Whilst Indonesia’s party regulations outlaw regional parties, the processes revealed in this study also may be salient to any understanding of how decentralisation impacts the politicisation of ethnicity and group identity in these national contexts.
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