

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MILITARY RULE
IN GHANA, 1966 - 1982

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Arts
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
for the Degree of Master of Arts

Johannesburg 1985

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is my own, unsided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Master of Arts in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

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22 day of September 1985

ABSTRACT

This study examines the performance of the three military regimes that ruled Ghana during the period, 1966 - 1982.

The analysis would seem to suggest that, contrary to *post-coup rhetoric and expectations*, military regimes are, in general, poor economic and political performers. In the field of foreign policy, a rational foreign policy based on an even balance between Ghana's national interest and its actual and potential power eluded the country under the three regimes.

The study is exploratory, designed to contribute a better empirical base to the field of study and to formulate a preliminary theoretical proposition, namely that, in Ghana, the foreign policy formulation and conduct of military officers tends to vary according to differences in their reference group identifications and these in turn, vary according to differences in the *professional socialisation process* undergone by the country's officer corps. To the degree that the professional socialisation of officers differs, or to the degree that it changes over time, differences can be expected in the nature of Ghana's foreign policy under military rule.

It would therefore be expected that as the colonial

experience becomes remote, so will the reference group identifications of the military officers be affected, and with it, their attitudes and behaviour.

In time, Ghana may come to rely on its own training institutions and/or its army may undergo combat experience (such as the one in Congo-Zaire) from which it develops an indigenous military tradition as a result of which non-indigenous reference groups can be expected to be of much less salience for the officer corps.

Finally, it may be noted that in Ghana, junior officers who do not receive "elite" training in foreign academies, or those who were not professionally socialised in the pre-independence colonial army, can be expected to possess less intense psychological commitments to non-indigenous reference groups than those of their superiors who have received such training. But whether foreign or locally trained, the analysis would suggest that military officers are hardly the right people to pursue successful foreign policies. The main reason for this is the military's lack of political legitimacy, with all its international economic, political and diplomatic implications.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to several people who supported my work on this study. I have had discussions with some officials of the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Accra, and with friends of former military officers, many of whom have gone into exile for fear of their lives under the present military regime, (Provisional National Defence Council, PNDC). My discussions with Mr. Alex Quaison-Sackey (a former President of the United Nations General Assembly and later Ghana's Foreign Minister in the Nkrumah Government) disabused my mind of many naive misconceptions about the inner workings of Ghana's international diplomacy.

I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. J. Amponsah-Koomson of the Principal Secretary's Office in the Ghana Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Koomson's candour in answering my questions was of great help in the crystallization of my ideas.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Dirk Kunert, Head of the International Relations Department at the University of the Witwatersrand. Professor Kunert, a fine scholar, made effective contributions to my efforts in respect of this study.

Mr. Colin Vale, my dissertation supervisor, was always willing to assist with much-valued advice and suggestions. His guidance helped me intensify the focus of this study. But for him, work on this dissertation would have taken years to complete.

Finally, I wish to thank Mrs. Travis for her thoughtfulness in typing this dissertation with promptitude.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

RWAF	:	Royal West African Frontier Force
CPP	:	Convention People's Party
CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
UNO	:	United Nations Organisation
OAU	:	Organisation of African Unity
UK	:	Uni. d Kingdom
NLC	:	National Liberation Council
UP	:	United Party
UAS	:	Union of African States
US	:	Unites States (of America)
GATT	:	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
OBE	:	Order of the British Empire
NRC	:	National Redemption Council
SMC	:	Supreme Military Council
TUC	:	Trades Union Congress
ILO	:	International Labour Organisation
AFRC	:	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
PNDC	:	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	:	People's National Party
PDC	:	People's Defence Committee
WDC	:	Workers' Defence Committee
NUGS	:	National Union of Ghana Students
GIHOC	:	Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation
GBA	:	Ghana Bar Association
ARPB	:	Association of Recognised Professional Bodies
UGFC	:	United Ghana Farmers' Council

CPC : Cocoa Purchasing Company
GCP : Ghana Congress Party
TC : Togoland Congress
MAP : Muslim Association Party
NPP : Northern People's Party

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Military rule in Ghana can be said to be part of a wider phenomenon of military intervention in the politics of developing countries generally and of African states in particular (1). Much of the extensive literature tends to deal almost exclusively with motives and rationalisations of military rule in the states concerned. These taxonomies of "factors" regarded as to the coup-prone states of Africa seem to ignore the fact that the kinds of features said to give rise to coup-proneness are often just as characteristic of states where coups have not occurred. Dependency, economic malaise, ethnic competition, corruption, inadequately professionalised armies, widespread public discontent and shortages of essential commodities are some of the factors often cited as precipitating coups d'etat in Africa.

In short, traditional thought on the nature of military intervention in developing countries and the location of the impetus for such action in a state has, in a sense, typically polarised along the theoretical biases of the investigators:

those whose primary professional interests were military have sought the causes of military intervention in the social background of the officer corps or with reference to the internal structure of a military organisation (2), while those whose interests were primarily political, in the political and institutional structure of the society.

The argument of the latter group of scholars has been that officers of every social class have led coups, that there is no discernible relationship between such factors as internal military cohesion and political intervention. Samuel Huntington sums up the latter position in defining the nature of praetorian society:

"Military explanations do not explain military intervention ... military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions ... In underdeveloped societies the military are concerned not only with pay and promotion, although they are concerned with that, but also with the distribution of power and status throughout the political system." (3)

In the class of ideologically motivated coups,

Huntington discerns three separate and distinct patterns: the attempts by radically oriented soldiers to destroy a conservative oligarchy (such as the 1952 Free Officers Coup in Egypt or the Thai Revolution of 1889); responses to the escalation of social conflicts by groups such as unions and students (the recurring political instability in the Dominican Republic is an excellent example of this type of intervention); and finally "veto coups" which prevent "the accession to power of popular lower class or reform movements", or deter a party in power wishing to "promote radical policies or to develop an appeal to groups the military wishes to esclude from power." (4) (The Brazilian coup is a good example of the last type of ideological intervention).

One can accept both Huntington's criticism of theorists who neglect the importance of political variables in the study of military intervention, as well as his own analysis of the positive relationship between the absence of political institutionalisation and the frequency of military intervention. However, this does not necessitate either accepting entirely his statement that "military explanations do not explain military interventions", or the unstated presumption that in all cases, military intervention is based on social or ideological variables. (5)

Other scholars, such as S.E. Finer, have noted at least two other potential motives for military intervention in societies that can be classified as praetorian: intervention to preserve or extend military corporate interests and intervention to gain or preserve the personal benefits and perquisites of the military. (6)

The first type of non-ideological intervention, the corporate coup, is well illustrated by the Algerian coup of 1965. Here the representatives of the professional military, led by Boumedienne, overthrew Ben Bella as a response to the latter's attempts to interfere in the operation of the military, particularly through increasing the importance of the ruling party within the military. (7) The lack of ideological antipathy to the Ben Bella regime exhibited by conspirators is apparent in the similarity of the policies pursued by the Ben Bella and Boumedienne governments. In fact, after the coup, Algerians began speaking of "Ben Bellism without Ben Bella". (8)

Although the actions of the Algerian government in attempting to control the military was obviously a political act, the response of the military was based not on the politicization of the military, but, rather, upon their specific corporate interests.

In praetorian societies, where political power is centralised in a single-party state bureaucracy, there is no prescribed institutional recourse for a military exposed to corporate insecurity other than the overthrow of the government: appeals to legislative bodies, courts, political parties or public opinion are not viable options.

The second type of non-ideological intervention is due to the lack of recourse for military leaders who are experiencing loss of status, income, allowances and perquisites. In this sense, military intervention based on self-interest has at least a partial military explanation. In the case of Ghana, it is admitted that the country is a polity with a low level of institutionalisation and that actions of the Nkrumah, Busia and Limann governments were such as to weaken their respective support among many important interest groups within society.

It still remains to examine the tortuous relationship between the military and the government in order to explain the immediate factors leading to military intervention. As one of these factors, Huntington has suggested the existence of a condition he refers to as "political decay". However, in his seminal essay, he never defines the term. A careful reading indicates that Huntington sees a positive correlation

between political decay and civilian violence. He notes that in praetorian systems, "claims on government are advanced by the mechanism of civilian violence and military intervention". Resort to direct action by all social forces is not a deviation from the system's norm, rather "the persistent use of violence is the system, or at least a very large part of it." (9)

Other observers of African politics have noted aspects of what may be broadly classed as political decay. Claude Welch has concluded that governments may be weakened by the "declining prestige of the major political party, as exemplified by increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance; a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces; and a consequent denial of effective political choice." (10) According to Welch, the decline of the major political party may lead to a schism among prominent politicians, further weakening the government. A. Zolberg would add to this list, the politicization of primordial ties such as was evident in Nigeria in 1965-66 or in Northern Ireland in 1971-72. (11)

Clearly, a polity experiencing ethnic or religious warfare, urban chaos or the disintegration of the ruling political party may be said to be suffering political decay.

The Relationship Between Political Decay and the Three Types of Intervention

Despite Huntington's demonstration of the relationship between political decay and ideological military intervention, the linkages between political decay and the other two types of coups are not so straightforward.

The events leading to corporate coups do not necessarily involve political decay. A government may, for example, choose to change the nature of civil - military relations for reasons external to the domestic political system. The boundaries between the civil and military spheres may be changed for ideological reasons, such as the desire to adopt the strict party control typical of civil - military relations in communist countries. (12) As in the Algerian case, there is no clear relationship between military intervention and growing social or political disorder, international humiliation, or economic depression. Corporate interventions have corporate explanations.

Broadly speaking, there are two types of self-interest coups: those which result from loss of status and income by the officer corps and those carried out by officers who feel their professional career

has been retarded by actions of the government in power. The instigation of coups by officers who have been passed over for promotion clearly is not related to political decay; while coups motivated by the officers' financial status have only an indirect relationship with political decay; these are more likely to be associated with economic decay. There is a high correlation between the incidence of economic and political decay. Economic decay that does not affect the army will eventually lead to political decay and ideological intervention in a praetorian polity.

These views are valuable as they throw considerable light on some of the critical factors that make for military intervention. ⁽¹³⁾ They do not, however, address themselves specifically to the question of what foreign policy outputs could conceivably be expected from a military-backed government once it has consolidated its rule.

To this end, this study addresses itself to the almost neglected field of the military's performance in office in the specific field of international relations. A primary objective of this study is to describe and analyse the actual foreign policy goals pursued by the various military-backed governments of Ghana in the period 1966-1982. Additionally,

the study will seek to discover whether domestic military rule in Ghana is compatible with a successful Foreign Policy.

Foreign Policy under military rule is a politically relevant area of study in view of the fact that military intervention has become a fact of political life in Ghana. Indeed, for the sixteen year period covered by this study, the country saw an average of one military-backed government every four years. (14) The period starts (1966) and ends (1982) with a military government. But for two brief periods of six years (1969-1972; 1979-1981) during which the country was run by Western-educated elites, it was the men of the armed forces and the police who controlled the foreign policy of the country. The pendulum of decision-making swung from being a patently pro-West in 1966 to violently anti-West in 1982. Rumours of coups and attempted coups were common throughout the period. All this, in spite of the late President Kwame Nkrumah's admonition that "It is not the duty of the army to rule or govern because it has no political mandate and its duty is not to seek political mandate." (15)

This fact, that military intervention in the politics of Ghana has become a dynamic and persistent occurrence since 1966, poses the problem of what could rea-

sonably be expected in the area of Foreign Policy, from a military-backed government. Once in power, what is likely to be the nature of Foreign Policy that a Ghanaian military government will pursue? The focus of this study is not on the causes of coups but the Foreign Policy outputs of coups. A case study of Ghana has implications for other Black African states with similar problems.

The concept of Reference Groups is used as an ancillary conceptual framework in this study in order to provide a theoretical basis for the understanding of the influence of professional socialisation on Ghana's military leadership. In this I am deeply indebted to Robert M. Price from whose article entitled "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case,"⁽¹⁶⁾ this model has been largely derived.

Although the original article is limited to a consideration of the National Liberation Council (NLC) government (1966-1969), the assumptions and hypotheses which underlie it as a whole, are implicitly relevant to the period under study.

The influence of a group on the attitudes of an individual or individuals is often treated in terms of the concept, Reference Groups. ⁽¹⁷⁾ A Reference Group is a social unit which the individual sees

as holding interest, attitudes and values in common with his own and which he takes as a basis for self-evaluation and attitude formation. A person need not even be a member of a group in order for it to influence him. If he merely aspires to become a member, the attitudes held by the group may serve as a guide to his opinions and behaviour. Usually however, groups to which a person belongs are Reference Groups for him.

Although a Reference Group is usually a group whose acceptance and approval is desired, in some instances an individual may be influenced by a group that he dislikes or is rebelling against. In this case, he is motivated to adopt attitudes contrary to those of the group and is termed a Negative Reference Group.

A Reference Group may have one or both of two functions:

1. the normative function, setting and enforcing standards of conduct and belief;
2. the comparison function, serving as a standard for comparison point against which persons measure themselves and others.

The effects of a Reference Group depend on its salience to a particular issue or problem.

The implications of the above-mentioned characteristics of the concept could be summarised thus: The "colonial experience" and the training process undergone by the officer corps of the Ghana armed forces and the police is such as to produce Reference Group identifications with the officer corps and socio-cultural variables of the ex-colonial power resulting in commitments to their set of traditions, symbols and values. Such identifications and commitments are seen to affect the behaviour of these Ghanaian officers both in their relations with domestic civilian political authorities and in the formulation and execution of Ghana's foreign policy once these officers assume political office.

The Ghana armed forces lack political skills (and are in fact, anti-political) for reordering Ghanaian society. They therefore fall back on civilian bureaucrats who are themselves foreign oriented in the sense that they share the body of interests and values common in the Western world (an example of such values would be the belief in the virtues of parliamentary democracy in contrast to one-party state).

It should be said that the explanatory power of the Reference Group theory is limited and must be viewed as a beginning rather than as an end in the

effort to understand foreign policy under military rule in Ghana. Its major thrust is in the direction of description and exploration rather than in rigorous explanation and unflinching prediction.

In carrying out this project, two difficulties have been experienced. One major problem has concerned access. A military regime hardly fosters the kind of research climate in which an investigator can operate. For one thing, many of the decisions made by military authorities are made behind closed doors and in some cases the principal decision-makers are unknown. For another, many of the key military participants who could be interviewed tend to feel greatly inhibited and apprehensive about saying things which could be used as evidence against them with dire consequences. Dealing with such a sensitive topic, it has not been possible to have a representative sample of top decision-makers dutifully answering the most obtrusive yet very important and relevant questions. Moreover, the active and knowledgeable actors in the field of Foreign Policy in Ghana have either died, left the country on voluntary or forced exile or could not be traced. Primary information contained herein has been gleaned from civilians and friends of military rulers.

Names have been mentioned where such disclosures

would not cause trouble to the persons involved.

A second major problem has been the dearth of published works dealing specifically with Foreign Policy under the various military regimes. Hence, the exploratory analytical study has been adopted as the main tool of the investigation. The intention is to help develop a body of knowledge in the area of this subject.

The purpose of exploratory studies has been defined as formulating a problem for more precise investigation, increasing familiarity with the phenomenon to be investigated later in a more highly structured study, clarifying concepts and establishing links and priorities for further research and developing hypotheses. (18)

Exploratory studies seem to be the most appropriate format in the case of problems about which little knowledge is available. It has been the intention in this presentation to review publicly available printed data with sensitivity to hypotheses that could be derived from them rather than by making an inventory of existing hypotheses and testing them explicitly. Exploratory studies lead to insights and hypotheses, but do not test or demonstrate them. (19)

The study has been historical, descriptive, comparative and analytical. Materials for the study have been both primary (interviews, government publications, etc.) and secondary. Details of these sources have been noted in the footnotes as well as in the bibliography.

Chapter Two covers in considerable detail the socio-economic and political background of Ghana before 1966 when the first of a series of coups took place. This chapter, though separate from the remaining chapters, is complementary to the individual chapter backgrounds. The latter constitute the introductory sections of the chapters and are specific to each military coup and rule.

Chapter Three describes and reviews Ghana's Foreign Policy under the CPP government led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The next four chapters deal, respectively, with the Foreign Policies of the National Liberation Council, the intervening year, the National Redemption Council, Supreme Military Council, and the Foreign Policy of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council - Provisional National Defence Council.

The concluding Chapter reviews and evaluates the study.

The comparative section of the chapter is based on five criteria, namely, the Foreign Policy Actors, the causations of their policies as well as the alignment and the effect of their respective policies. Tentative conclusions are then drawn about probable foreign policy outputs of military regimes in Ghana.

1. Refer to map of successful coups d'etat in Appendix A.
2. See Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the Development of New Nations, Chicago University Press, Chicago 1964; and Be'eri, E. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Praeger, New York, 1970 .
3. Huntington, Samuel P. "Praetorianism and Political Decay" in Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven 1968. Also see, Perlmuter, Amos "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army" in Comparative Politics, April 1969, pp 382-404.
4. Huntington S.P., Ibid, p 224.
5. Robert Dowse has pointed out that one of the shortcomings of theories of military intervention is due to the "totally overwhelming variety of events the theorists attempt to embrace". See "The Military and Political Development" in Colin Leys (ed.) Political Change in Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, p. 217.
6. See Finer S.E. The Man on Horseback: The Role

of the Military in Politics, Pall Mall London, 1962.

7. On the Algerian Coup see, David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution, University of California Press, Berkeley 1970.
8. Ottaway, op. cit., p. 200.
9. Huntington, op. cit., p. 212.
10. Welch, Claude E., (ed.) Soldier and State in Africa, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1970, p. 17.
11. Zolberg, Aristide, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa" in American Political Science Review, 62, 1968, p. 73.
12. For a discussion of the nature of the boundaries between the civil and military spheres, see A.R. Luckham "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations" in Government and Opposition 6, 1971, p.1.

13. For criticisms of these and other views, refer to Uma O. Eleazu, "The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of existing Theories and Practices." JDA Vol 7 No. 2, 1973.
14. 1966-1969 NLC Government; 1972-1978 NRC & SMC; 1979-1982 AFRC & PNDC.
15. Statement to National Assembly on February 1, 1966 Ghanaian Times February 2, 1966.
16. Price, Robert M., "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States - Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case" World Politics Vol 23 (3), 1971, pp 401-432. I have drawn liberally from this article.
17. For a detailed treatment of the concept, refer to: Maccoby, E.E. and others (eds.) Readings in Social Psychology, New York, 1947, pp 265-275.
18. Selltitz, C. et al: Research Methods in Social Relations, Praeger, New York, 1961, p 51. See also W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, PUP, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969.
19. Ibid, pp. 60, 61, 64.

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The present day West African state of Ghana was called Gold Coast before it attained political independence on 6th March, 1957. (1)

Within the Gold Coast there was a large number of distinct traditional states which, partly helped by the British policy of indirect rule, maintained a sense of their separate identities throughout the colonial period. Although the Akan-speaking states of the Colony and Ashanti shared a common cultural heritage, there were 62 separate traditional states in the Colony area (the first colonized, southern region) in 1931, varying greatly in size and importance. There were several dozen states in Ashanti, many of which were constantly engaged in a struggle to assert their autonomy from the Ashanti Confederacy. And in the Northern Territories the colonial government recognised some two dozen political units when the "protectorate" was established, which, Page notes, "fails to take into account the autonomous tendencies of many of the sub-units." (2) Although social, economic and political change helped to erode certain aspects of the traditional social and political systems as inter-

related sets of norms, values and structures, these systems survived colonial rule. Territorially, the four parts of the Gold Coast were administered separately during the colonial period; no inter-regional political links developed.

There were important advances in the Gold Coast between 1900 and 1945, particularly in terms of the significant percentage of farmers who had been drawn conclusively within a cash economy (most notably but not exclusively the many peasant cocoa farmers), a growing wage labour force and large increases in education, urbanization, communications, governmental revenue and external trade. However, this social and economic growth was sharply skewed regionally and ethnically within the country, with the southern Colony area being most favoured in all aspects (including cocoa production almost until World War II), the south-central Ashanti region second and the British Togoland trusteeship territory to the east (a strip running the length of the country) and the vast Northern Territories coming last in almost all aspects. Modern distinctions in terms of education, wealth and secularization all providing access to wage employment, material benefits and high modern status-helped to compound and exacerbate older distinctions based on language, customs, social and political structures and histo-

rical enmities.

The social and economic modernization and the subordination of the traditional African states to colonial authority brought about some radical changes in social values, the structures and norms of authority and patterns of participation. The colonial structure rested in significant measure, on the traditional authorities, whom it utilized as local agents. It sought to protect both the office of chieftaincy and its occupants from challenge. By removing ultimate power from the hands of the traditional authorities and then sustaining them in the face of community disfavour, the colonial administration helped to bring both traditional leaders and chieftaincy itself in many areas into disrepute. Among the Akan-speaking traditional states in south and central Ghana, chieftaincy was an elective (from royal lineages) and limited majesty, hedged by the councils of lineage elders or other, higher chiefs in council and, to a lesser extent, by the traditional prerogatives of the commoners (non-royal lineage and non-slave) with regard to the enstoolment (election) or destoolment of their chiefs. With modernization and access to new social roles and values, the essentially religious norms which regulated and sanctified social roles, behaviour and structures were signi-

ficantly undermined. Thus, the chiefly office, its occupants and the traditional and colonial prerogatives and abuses associated with both, attracted a high level of antagonism from those modernized and transitional men who saw both the colonial and traditional authorities as restricting their drive for social mobility and political power.

An anticolonial nationalism erupted at the end of World War II. Prior to that, a small, bourgeois, merchant-professional class with aristocratic proclivities (partly comprising old coastal trading families) had emerged and promoted African advancement by constitutional reform, in political competition with the chiefs. The post-World War II nationalism was precipitated by imminent expectations of change and the felt grievances of many groups: the merchant-professional class, denied commercial opportunity, social status and political power (by the chiefs); the anguished cocoa farmers, whose trees, stricken by a contagious disease, were being cut; rural youth (commoner) associations, constrained by colonially supported traditional power; ex-servicemen, petty traders and frustrated, alienated primary- and middle-school leavers (both graduates and dropouts), educated to the opportunity but bereft of the possibility of social mobility

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and modern status within the confines of a colonially and traditionally structured society. The diffuse grievances of many groups were animated by expectations and events and were aggregated in the sentiment that things could only be put right under African rule. Throughout much of the Colony and Ashanti the legitimacy of colonial authority and its agents, the chiefs, was discredited and soured and legitimacy passed to those who recognised, demanded and incarnated the right of African rule.

POLITICAL DEMANDS, PARTICIPATION, AND STRUCTURES

As the anticolonial nationalism moved to militancy (1948-52), as well as during an interim period of internal self-government (1951-57), certain social cleavages became highly politicized and were manifested in different political structures. During both these periods of significant social stress, there was a widely manifested class-community conflict in the Colony and Ashanti (3), which was initially a conflict between modern secular and traditional authority, the latter represented by chiefs and councils. With the great expansion of political participation in the 1950's through the extension of the franchise, there was a wide-scale politicization of primordial ties, resulting in the rise of religious, ethnic and regional parties. Participation

in these political groups was animated not only by primordial ties but by socio-economic grievances, since, as noted, the extension of modernization was skewed regionally and ethnically and thus did not result in cross-cutting but in reinforcing ties and identities among traditional groups. Salient during the early period (1948-52) was a class conflict. This ranged the older, reformist merchant-professional class, mostly in the Colony, against a post-World War II generation whose leadership was predominantly petty-bourgeois teachers, small traders, a few larger businessmen and journalists and whose support included the relatively small but growing number of semi-industrial workers, an urban and rural lower-middle, transitional class of the partially educated, and a large number of peasant farmers attached to the capitalist-export economy.

These class-community and class conflicts of the 1940's and 1950's which were to re-occur in the late 1960's and 1970's, reflected some fundamental social and political cleavages which shaped the structure of political conflict in Ghana during the 1950's and 1960's. Politics occurred in the context of an unintegrated society, in which the host of traditional societies - with their values, norms and structures (not just political) - over-

lapped with the emergent, modernizing society. Traditional structures competed with the new weak political structures for political authority, and an increase in the authority of the latter did not necessarily mean a decrease in that of the former. (4) Traditional structures and norms helped to animate the politicization of primordial loyalties and, with the anti-colonial movement itself and then the imminent prospects of self-government, nurtured the vast inflation of political demands to which the new government was subjected. The nature of the society, along with the relative scarcity of economic resources, severely limited the range of political choices.

The political structures which arose in the post-war period to aggregate and represent the diffuse interests articulated, were proto-parties and, more importantly, party-movements. The latter combined characteristics of a broad social and political (national or sub-national) movement with those of a party and maintained elements of each at all times. As movements, they functioned (or believed they were functioning) in an extra-constitutional environment, tended to subordinate specific interest to an overriding interest (often rendering those specific interests illegitimate), attempted to integrate or align intimately with their cause all associat-

ional groups and worked towards a moral community (whether village, traditional state, ethnic group, or country) above the divisiveness of partisan politics, united in common abhorrence of a "stranger" (e.g., colonialist or other ethnic groups). As parties, they recognized (from time to time) and worked within a constitutional framework; competed in elections, recognized the legitimacy or at least the necessity of satisfying specific interests for electoral support and more or less tolerated opposing political groups.

The first important post-war political party was the United Coast Convention (UGCC) led by the intelligentsia of the small merchant-professional class, which began as a proto-party or faction to aggregate both its class grievances (vis-à-vis the chiefs and colonial structure) and nation list sentiment. Its leadership was almost wholly composed of lawyers; it was basically elitist and reformist in nature. Animated by events (chiefly, and anti-inflation campaign, the February, 1948 riot and the cocoa crisis) and a young secretary-general, (Nkrumah) brought home from England to organize it, the UGCC quickly became a very loosely structured social and political movement, to which a large number of smaller associational, youth and political groups attached themselves. Outstanding and influen-

tial among these were farmers' groups, the Ex-Servicemen's Union, trade unions and youth groups in the Colony and Ashanti. Aware that colonial authority had been gravely undermined, the British government (as distinct from the parochial colonial administration) prepared to give way to constitutional change and give the UGCC leadership a power position. With their leadership and tactics challenged from within by younger, better organized and more militant elements, some of them close to Nkrumah, the UGCC elite, cautioning patience, refused to submit its leadership to popular, "uneducated" opinion. A final schism occurred in mid-1949, bringing the birth of the CPP and leaving the UGCC with many disputatious leaders and few followers.

There has been a contentious debate over the nature of the CPP. (5) It has been referred to as a party, a movement and a political machine, the latter designation being used quite differently by various observers. It had characteristics of all three and changed in both structure and function over time.

In the pre-independence period it was a relatively loosely structured party-movement (as characterized above), a fragile national coalition which the leadership persisted in trying to integrate and render coherent and responsive to its aims, an attempt

which was hardly altogether successful. It began as populist, in ideology, and chiliastic in vocabulary. It derived its legitimacy from its militant nationalism (which grew tactical during 1951-57), from its identification as the party of the commoners, on whose behalf it facilitated and legitimated a social and political revolution which was already occurring at the grassroots in the Colony and Ashanti, and from Nkrumah's charismatic appeal, which was sharply limited in range over time but initially crucial to securing the CPP as a reasonably coherent political structure. Explicit in all three sources of legitimacy was the CPP's decidedly secular dedication to rapid and economic change.

As the first organized national movement, it had an initially powerful impetus, drawing to its nationalist aspirations, many specific interest groups, the educated and semi-educated commoners seeking rapid social mobility and all those who sought to gain advantage from a winner. Its organizing impetus was strong, but membership itself was often a casual thing. Sweeping to power in the 1951 elections, the CPP utilized its powers and resources to organize and attempt to win the support of the farmers (in the United Ghana Farmers' Company through the para-statal Cocoa Purchasing Company), the trade unions, the ex-servicemen, youth associations (which

it tried with difficulty to absorb, even when its leaders were CPP), Muslims, chiefs and various ethnic groups. Basically, the party was organized around the local councils established in 1951 (providing local control and patronage) and the parliamentary constituencies.

The CPP leadership sought to maintain a national focus, a predominantly secular appeal and a fairly broad ethnic/regional representation in government.⁽⁶⁾ Its local partisans recruited politically on the basis of ethnic and other parochial ties but sought to orient and integrate parochial solidarities and interests into the larger, nationalist organization.

There was a small national leadership with an undivided national orientation, and strong, demanding and parochial constituency party leaders, whose interests frequently differed from those of the national leadership. The national leadership, in which Nkrumah was pre-eminent, and the constituency leadership both lent to and derived strength from each other.⁽⁷⁾ To the extent that the CPP can be likened to a "political machine", organizationally and in terms of the dispensation of resources and favours to party faithful as a means of control, it comprised one primary machine directed from the

national level and a large number of lesser machines. The local machines were attached, but not always responsive, to the top leadership, having their own interest, pressures and constituencies to take into account. (8) The national leadership often made accommodations to the local leadership in order not to create disturbances and impair party unity as the local leadership made accommodations within its own fief.

In the CPP Nkrumah was the leader from the beginning, the charismatic, popular nationalist hero, Osagyefo (9), and he successfully turned back challenges to his tactics (vis-a-vis the British) and authority in the early 1950's. His increasingly secure grasp of leadership prerogatives was enhanced by his position of formal authority within the government. In the early 1950's CPP propagandists started to turn the spontaneous, often evangelically phrased, glorification of Nkrumah's qualities into a cult. None of this, however, secured Nkrumah and the CPP from local political demands nor reduced the fragility of the CPP structure.

The parochial, heterogeneous nature of the societies in the Gold Coast and conflicts in values and interests rendered the CPP subject to fragmentation as, with the expansion of political participation and

the imminence of full African self-government, many stepped forward to claim their communities' share in the status, material and power benefits of self-rule. With independence near, the nationalist orientation which the CPP had given particularistic demands, was weakened. Specific interests and parochial and ethnic susceptibilities, perspectives and jealousies reasserted themselves. The CPP found that its local roots were not only its strength but its weakness. There were many specific (e.g. economic) local or ethnic interests which were dissatisfied with the distribution of amenities, power and status. Equally important, there were significant social groups which disputed the legitimacy of CPP leadership, the secular state, the criteria of political participation and authority and the limits of state and nation. Neither the political demands which were made nor the political conflicts which arose were clear-cut. Value and interest demands were interwoven and compounded by parochial channels of articulation and aggregation. Such was the diffuseness, quantity and intensity of demands based on interest, ethnicity and values that it was difficult, if not impossible, for the national CPP to represent all satisfactorily. The CPP quickly came to regard demands based upon ethnicity as being both illegitimate and as destructive to itself as assertive traditional authority. Although the CPP leadership engaged

in considerable political bargaining with interest and ethnic claims, it was prone to regard this process as anathema to the party as a national movement and inconvenient in reducing its own options. Virtually unopposed by any organized political groups from 1951 to 1954, CPP leaders regarded the CPP as the incarnation of the nation, a view that rendered them inhospitable to the claims of new groups.

A number of political groups arose in the early and mid-1950's to oppose the CPP. Available as an ally to all these political groups were many of the traditional authorities. Their power and status were reduced in 1951 by a local government act which replaced the chiefs and their councils as organs of local government with two-thirds-elected local councils; the elections were all but swept by the CPP in 1952. The opposition of some chiefs was intense and grounded in values as well as interest, for they regarded the CPP as destructive of the moral universe which sustained their society and their office.

It is important to note that, with a single exception, all the significant political groups which arose to oppose the CPP did so not as parties but specifically as movements, opposed to the social divisiveness allegedly introduced by party politics.

Both the CPP and opposition political leaders, for diverse reasons, entertained beliefs concerning the sanctity of social solidarity and the evil of social and political conflict, which inspired each to view the other in particularly abhorrent terms.

After their electoral defeat in 1951, the UGCC leaders continued to oppose the CPP and amalgamated with several small urban factions in 1952 to form the Ghana Congress Party (GCP). It constantly sought, but could not find, a constituency outside of the several chieftaincies whose rulers were directly related to its two primary leaders, Dr. Kofi Busia, a university professor, and J.B. Danquah, a lawyer. They demanded government by the "best men" available, not the CPP riffraff and malcontents.

The Togoland Congress (TC), established in 1951 by the Ewe in southern British Togoland, battled for the separation of British Togoland from the Gold Coast and a union with French Togoland. Insistent upon polarizing sentiments between the CPP and TC among the Ewe, the TC was sustained by an acute feeling of social and economic neglect under the British, a strong Ewe subnationalism (whose form and direction were greatly disputed among the Ewe themselves), and a fear that the Ewe would forfeit both a distinctive historical identity and

their prerogatives if British Togoland was "swallowed up" by Ghana. The Muslim Association Party (MAP) was formed in 1953, drawing off CPP Muslim support, to rectify the social and economic neglect of the Muslims (about 12 percent of the population). It drew most of its support from the Muslim Lumpenproletariat in southern towns, where Muslims, many of them immigrants from surrounding territories, lived in the zongo ("stranger") wards and held low economic positions. It recruited militantly on the basis of common religious ties and neglect.

The Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA's) from the Northern Territories established the Northern People's Party (NPP) in early 1954 in order to represent distinctly and for electoral purposes the social and economic demands of their seriously underdeveloped region. It was primarily organized around the still powerful traditional state council of important northern chiefs. It was extremely loosely structured and ethnically diverse, though in each area it recruited on a parochial (often sub-ethnic) basis. Its leaders included teachers, educated sub-chiefs and important state council employees and were often of a royal lineage. Politically inexperienced in national politics and fearful of manipulation by the south, NPP leaders demanded a distinct status for the North in the government

and a huge socio-economic development programme.

In the 1954 general election the GCP, MAP and NPP together won 20 out of 104 seats and almost 21 percent of the total vote, though most of this was due to the NPP's 15 seats and 9,7 percent. In contrast, the CPP won 72 seats, with 56,4 percent of the vote, and was strong in all regions. A large "Independent" vote was primarily a CPP "rebel" vote; it was indicative of the CPP's inability to maintain the loyalty of the communities of those men who had been denied a CPP candidacy. (10)

The rise of the National Liberation Movement (NLM) in Ashanti posed the most serious threat to the CPP because it undermined a strong area of CPP strength, raised divisive issues and polarized political action. The emergence of the NLM was occasioned by two specific grievances: cocoa farmers furiously demanded that the government cocoa price be raised (11); and the many unsuccessful CPP "rebels" and their supporters in Ashanti (25 percent of the Ashanti vote in 1954) angrily charged that the national CPP had dictated the nominations to the Ashanti constituencies and that the southern CPP leaders - "strangers" - were dominating Ashanti. These two groups provided an incendiary spark, igniting a range of diffuse interest and value demands which

many among the Ashanti had articulated but which had until then found no group to adequately aggregate. The Ashanti harboured a strong sense of historical significance as a people. (12) There was a pervasive suspicion that the Ashanti, with a powerful military heritage of dominance over the states to the south and north, were now being dominated by southern peoples. The CPP "rebels" and Ashanti Youth Association leaders turned to the chiefs for support, and the threat to Ashanti helped to heal commoner-chieftaincy antagonisms in many areas. As a rich region, producing 50 percent of the cocoa, it felt it was being short-changed to subsidize poorer regions.

Ashanti identified itself as a nation and the NLM as a national movement (explicitly not a party), dedicated to restoring a responsive indigenous leadership in Ashanti. It quickly became in many respects a mass party/movement, captained by many ex-CPP commoners, strongly supported by many chiefs and organized broadly; if often from the chief's state councils, which were the only available political structures not controlled by the CPP. It recruited less in terms of secular demands than of Ashanti nationhood and drew under its wing many associational groups which severed their ties to the CPP. It proposed a federal rather than a centralized state,

in which federal powers were weak and residual powers went to the regions, a new constitution and a new election. All of these demands it supported with a furious, patriotic fervor. Intimidation and violence became rife in Ashanti as the NLM and CPP battled for support.

One may, with good reason, hypothesize that the CPP leadership looked askance at the proliferation of political demands and competing groups and was basically intent upon preserving political prerogatives for itself. Nonetheless, the meaning of some of these demands and the intent of some opposing political parties were such as to reduce Ghana's viability as a state, impair its capacity for development and appear to the CPP leadership to represent challenges to its authority as government by illegitimate means for illegitimate ends. This does not mean that the CPP regarded all these groups as illegitimate or their expressions of interest unjustified or beyond its capacities or convenience to honour.

The CPP was intolerant in ideological or value terms to political participation and recruitment primarily on the basis of ethnicity (the NLM and TC) and communal ties (the MAP and Islam). It regarded this as basically divisive to the nation-state. It could

readily be seen how political recruitment by parochial appeals impaired the tenuous sentiment of loyalty to national institutions and perspectives; the CPP recognized this both in terms of NLM, TC and MAP utter defiance of the government, and in the large defections from CPP ranks to the NLM, TC and MAP. The TC advocated territorial fragmentation and the NLM's demand for federation could have been equally destructive of the sinews of the state.

The 1956 general election did not settle matters, from which CPP leaders undoubtedly drew lessons. The CPP again won 72 of 104 seats in the National Assembly, with 57 percent of the vote. However, the opposition parties had won popular pluralities in Ashanti and the Northern Territories and refused to accept a constitution which failed to meet their demands. Amidst threats of secession and defiance from the TC and NLM, the CPP was compelled to accept British mediation, in order to attain independence and, consequently, a constitution with which it was far from satisfied and prepared to alter after independence. (13)

The difficulties in finding acceptable limits to conflict between the CPP and the opposition derived from: the high level of distrust with which each

political leadership perceived the intentions and behaviour of the other; the nature of the politicized social cleavages, featuring commoner-chief-taincy, national-parochial and class-community conflicts; Nkrumah's and his lieutenants' desire to maintain themselves in power and to pursue in an unfettered manner their own valued political, social and economic designs, which were personal, local, national and international; and the often needlessly provocative behaviour of many opposition leaders, predicated on a profound distaste for CPP leadership, CPP power and the consequences of a social revolution they were incapable of reversing. This animated among some a willingness to sustain almost any cause and course which would embarrass, disrupt or bring down the government.

It is conceivable that a level of political tolerance adequate to the maintenance of relatively democratic procedures might have developed if the political crises had eased off; there was certainly wide distress at the level of social and political conflict. However, a range of demands arose simultaneously on the morrow of independence, which again gave Nkrumah and his lieutenants a sharp sense of unease. The more significant included: a minor but alarming Ewe rebellion in former British Togoland; the rapid rise of an angry, aggressive political movement

among the Ga in Accra; a long, economically troublesome strike by Motor Drives' Union, as well as defiance and threats of strikes from large public service employees' unions; economic demands forcefully thrown up to the government by the irate, pro-CPP Ex-Servicemen's Union, which threatened to march on Nkrumah's residence; and, capping this, an incipient revolt by angry, backbench CPP parliament members, who threatened to go over the opposition side if they were not accorded more influence. (14) The nature, extent and intensity of these demands and conflicts as well as the CPP leadership's perception of them set the stage for the post-independence order.

THE POST-INDEPENDENCE ORDER

The behaviour of Nkrumah, the government and party in the post-independence period must be viewed from a number of perspectives intertwined in the thoughts and behaviour of the political actors. Nkrumah and those who were and who became his lieutenants sought to establish a national society and political system, which would surmount all political cleavages and sustain CPP power, the latter both a personal concern and a belief in the rightness and necessity of a strong national and secular leadership. They also sought to fashion a new institutional framework,

though this was undertaken gradually on an ad hoc basis. And they sought to develop the Ghanaian economy as rapidly and dramatically as possible. Nkrumah, in particular, entertained as a fundamental aim a large role for Ghana and himself in Africa's liberation, unification and international presence. Through these goals Nkrumah and his lieutenants sought to legitimize their power and roles.

At independence, Nkrumah, the CPP and the government cannot be said to have enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy in many areas of the country. (15) The unwillingness to accord legitimate authority to the government and Nkrumah was a function not only of political opposition and distrust but also of the primacy of attachment to traditional and local structures and values.

The central problem of the political system was that there was no legitimized authority structure or institution, one which was, or was perceived to be, broadly acceptable to the Ghanaian people. Whatever the contribution of Nkrumah's charismatic authority to legitimizing the CPP had been, many Ghanaians in Ashanti, British Togoland and Northern Territories clearly refused to recognize it. The legitimacy of the new secular structure of authority, the National Assembly, was, like Nkrumah's charisma,

a victim of the 1954-56 political conflict when the opposition deemed it wholly unrepresentative and spurned it; in the post-1956 period it was regarded as too manipulable an instrument of the CPP regime, which was regarded as fundamentally dictatorial even before it became so.

The responses of Nkrumah, the party (with varying responses at national and local levels) and government to problems of power legitimacy, state-building and national integration were heavily influenced by the bitterness and distrust in the 1954-56 conflict and by the wealth of ethnic (Ga, Ewe and Ashanti), interest (labour, ex-servicemen, business) and power (opposition, internal CPP) demands forced upon them in the months following independence. The immediate post-independence measures were designed not only to assert and sustain CPP and government power but also central government strength and legitimacy, national integration and the secularity of modern structures (e.g. banning parties based on ethnicity, religion and region, which forced the opposition to amalgamate into the United Party).

In the years following independence in 1957, the CPP, party and government, moved to employ measures to control the demand side of the political system: to control, restrict or suppress groups or insti-tu-

tions concerned with the articulation, aggregation and communication of interests. This did not occur at once, but was the consequence of a series of political and economic crises, in each of which the CPP felt threatened and applied restrictive measures. These regulative efforts featured the use of both the carrot and the stick: the politically and/or administratively accomplished destoolment of important opposition chiefs (except the Asantehene, who in 1958 pledged to uphold the government) and the attempted depoliticization of and limiting of their authority and functions; the centralization of constitutional authority, through the legal removal of the Constitution's "entrenched" clauses, which was hardly evil in itself; (16) abolition of regional assemblies and the appointment of CPP leaders to the political/administrative positions of Regional Commissioner (1957), filled by members of Parliament and District Commissioner, beginning in 1985, filled by local leaders, who were in theory directly responsible to the head of government, Nkrumah; suppressive political tactics and election fraud against the opposition, often on local initiative (17), which went hand in hand with party and government inducements to opposition leaders and areas to partake in government largess; a host of increasingly repressive statutes, some with unduly severe sanctions, which served to delimit personal

and civil liberties, the best known of which was the earliest, the Preventive Detention Act.

New problems involved in state- and nation-building required a ritualization and rationalization of authority. Ritualization involved non-partisan measures like establishing and making familiar a national flag and anthem, replacing British with African regalia in Parliament in 1960 and more partisan measures like Nkrumah's face on new coins and stamps, Nkrumah's move to Christianburg Castle (the residence of British governors) to symbolize the transfer of authority and the building-up of Nkrumah as the father of the nation, beyond reproach and criticism (which received legal sanction). At a later stage, an adulatory, effusive cult of Nkrumah's personality was diffused through press, radio, party and government and government channels and schools. (18) In the 1960's there were some ambitious plans to undertake the socialization of youth; for example through the Young Pioneers (whose appeal varied with the availability of uniforms), to inculcate deference to Nkrumah, the party and the state.

The extension of government authority was closely linked with the expansion of CPP authority, though in a manner which tied it inextricably to the government and state. The result in structure was what

Zolberg has aptly called "party-state", in practice and increasing monopolization of "legitimate" political prerogative by the CPP government leadership, and Nkrumah above all. State and party were linked, providing ample demonstration of party power, through the replacement of colonial servants by CPP Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners. In its efforts to control groups making demands, the government "recognized" (a colonial precedent) the CPP-controlled United Ghana Farmers' Council (UGFC) as the official farmers' organization in 1957. The ambitious head of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), John Tettegah, drew upon government power (the 1958 Industrial Relations Act and amendments) to centralize the TUC in CPP hands, in exchange for bringing organized labour under government sanction. In 1959 the government created the Central Cooperative Council in order to replace the non-partisan Cooperative Alliance and the Ghana Cooperative Marketing Association (cocoa) and to develop industrial and commercial cooperatives (which never got off the ground).

The CPP leadership of these and other associational groups meant in practice that they were not accountable to their own constituencies but to Nkrumah and the government. Although some of these leaders, such as the UGFC's Appiah-Danquah, represented the

interest of their followers to the government more forcefully than others, they were often interested in bringing their organizations to support government policies, with little or no consultation with their groups: for example, the UGFC in contributions of 16 percent of earnings for development and in price reductions in cocoa; the TUC in the 5 percent forced savings in 1961, against which rank-and-file unionists revolted in the politicized Sekondi-Takoradi strike of 1961. (19) Unable to articulate discontent with specific policies and leaders, the discontent of workers and farmers was increasingly aimed at the system as a whole. Although the party-state enveloped these groups, it frequently could not control them beyond the national leadership level (and often not even there) due to their size, the responsiveness of subordinate leaders to membership pressures and their bargaining power as strategic (and therefore politically worrisome) economic and solidarity groups; they could and did readily frustrate government policies.

Opposition strength declined steadily from 1957 to 1960, due to a swing back to the CPP, a desire for an end to social conflict, government repression and the attraction of greater power. Opposition chiefs were destooled, the UP lost local elections and the number of UP members in the assembly dwindled

from 32 in 1957 to 13 in mid-1960, when Ghana became a Republic (6 were detained, many more "crossed the carpet" to the CPP). At a relatively early point, some opposition leaders considered violence. The arrest of two UP MP's in December 1958 for involvement in a plot to kill Nkrumah and others worsened the position of the UP and was a major source of CPP apprehensions and the readiness of the government to increasingly resort to preventive detention. (20) In the 1960 presidential election, the UP received only 11 percent of the votes. Violence increased in 1962 with the attempted assassination of Nkrumah in August and random bombing of crowds later in the year, which brought the government to a heavier reliance on repressive measures and on instruments of force, the military and police.

The CPP leadership's attempts to control interest articulation and aggregation and to ignore political demands when communicated not unnaturally resulted in a decline in political participation. Success in reducing opposition strength left the CPP without the stimulus of political conflict. The tendency of the CPP leadership to identify the CPP with the nation, as in its early years, became again explicit as Nkrumah's 1959 assertion that "the CPP is Ghana and Ghana is the CPP" was voiced on all occasions. This claim to represent the nation was practised

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locally by inducing people, even former opposition members, to join the CPP. Membership became more widespread, more nominal; relaxation in local political conflicts and ever-present pressures and demands of local societies rendered the CPP an increasingly diffuse, socially conservative and parochial organization. Since its inception its roots had been indigenous, not alien. With a decline in social stress, these roots - kinship and clan ties, local and ethnic solidarity, local interest both traditional and modern - exerted themselves. (21) The CPP remained a distinct organization but one with only a limited responsiveness to national direction. (22) This was not much altered by the reorganization of institutions, when in the 1960's the district became the major local unit of government (councils), administration (district commissioners), party and parliamentary representation (1965). One reason for the lack of discipline in the local-national link was that District Commissioners were assigned to their own home areas.

The radicalization of the CPP party-state starting in 1959-60 derived from a number of interrelated sources: realization of the atrophy of the CPP and of the sloth, corruption and pursuit of self-interest by many local and national leaders; the drive of new CPP elites for status and power; the search

for a coherent ideology, as a guide and as an instrument of socialization and CPP legitimation; the emergence of vast economic ambitions and problems; and challenges to Nkrumah's pan-African leadership with the appearance of many new states in 1960 and an anti-Western animus fuelled in part by the Congo crisis and African dependency.

Nkrumah's realization of the need to revitalize the CPP in order to mobilize certain strata for economic development and to recapture the CPP's early drive demanded new orientations, functions and power for some party structures - the TUC, UGFC and party press - and the creation of new structures - the Central Cooperative Council, Young Pioneers, Young Farmers League and ideological cadres. (23) The "old guard" petty-bourgeois CPP leadership included among others some capitalist entrepreneurs, large and petty traders and others who had acquired economic interests and enriched themselves during their years in power. They represented the drive for social mobility and status of a new, acquisitive, lower-middle and middle class of educated commoners: they were not the socialists Nkrumah sought for Ghana's development. Both TUC and UGFC leaders and the few militants in the press were seeking new roles and power, and Nkrumah gave them status, money and power to challenge the "old guard",

who were readily attacked as corrupt "self-seekers". The CPP was reorganized for the umpteenth time (on paper), and a Ga CP militant, Tawia Adamafio, a latecomer to the CPP (1953), was made secretary-general. Tettegah and Adamafio, in close partnership and with the support of the press militants, sought to re-energize the party through party organs, new but short-lived TUC units and through Party Study Groups which vigorously attacked the incompetence and conservatism of the CPP government leadership. While Adamafio (with Nkrumah's support) proclaimed as the official slogan "The Party Is Supreme", his quick acquisition of a governmental post, as minister of presidential affairs, was recognition of the overwhelming preponderance of government as distinct from CPP power.

Major political alterations were started between 1960 and 1962 which were continued after Adamafio fell from power in August, 1962. Nkrumah and the militants began to intervene more directly in the bureaucracy, stimulating change by bringing some departments directly under the president's office. (24) The UGFC became enormously powerful, acquiring in 1961 a monopoly on cocoa buying (eliminating independent marketing cooperative and later important roles in developing producer cooperatives and agricultural mechanization. The CPP MP's under siege

of the militants, suffered somewhat, but became a more critical and institutional group. Nkrumah, urged on by militants, determined that the state should play the central role in economic development, established institutions for serious planning, whose plans he and his ministers generally disregarded, launched many new state industries, received the US-UK-IBRD loan for the vast Volta dam-alumina complex and then turned to the Communist countries for aid and export markets for cocoa during his summer, 1961, three-month tour. Bitter factional, power struggles broke out within the CPP, chiefly between the old and new elites, sometimes over programmes. Ideology was used as a weapon by the new socialist militants against the insufficiently socialist "old guard"; Nkrumah's top lieutenants and most senior ministers, Finance Minister Komla Gbedemah and Minister of State and Agriculture Kojo Botsio, were driven from the party and government - Gbedemah into exile and opposition to return after the coup, Botsio and the old guard to be recalled within a year when Nkrumah found the militants incompetent. The militants were aggressive, subject to ideological corruption and divided among themselves by ambition, ethnicity and ideology.

There also began the search for a usable ideology, a tortuous journey, in part serious, grievously

marred by indecisiveness over its use and thus its shape - whether it should be an integrative myth (Nkrumahism, African socialism, "Consciencism" - a chronological progression marked by increasing popular incomprehension and withdrawal) or a vanguard ideology ("scientific socialism"). (25) The vanguardists, who were wholly dependent on Nkrumah for support, were ahead when the coup occurred, but only within the confines of an increasing Nkrumah cult and at the expense to the regime of the increasing alienation of the rest of the party - local, regional and national - whose leadership ignored or merely mouthed the revolutionary rhetoric.

The advent of ideology as a weapon brought new repressive measures, arbitrarily rather than massively applied and new attacks against social and political institutions - the civil service, universities and judiciary. These measures in turn spawned plotting and violence, such as the attempted assassination of Nkrumah by a policeman in January, 1964.

The January, 1964, constitutional referendum, marked by massive intimidation and fraud and making Ghana by law a one-party state, brought home to many their loss of political participation, as did the 1965 parliamentary election, a non-event, in which the candidates were selected by Nkrumah and his lieute-

nants and returned unopposed (though almost all former MP's kept their seats, itself a recognition of their local ties). (26)

Nearly successful assassination attempts induced Nkrumah to withdraw from public view and eye all suspiciously. A network of informers was established, anti-rumour-mongering laws passed. (27) Nkrumah governed by manipulating among contending factions and interests (party and non-party), playing one group off against another in order to maintain his leverage and autonomy, thrusting for change but obsessed with the need for order. Decision-making was unstructured, a function of Nkrumah's inattention, his varying advisors, his desire for haste in implementation of an idea before it was closely examined (e.g. economic projects), his vacillation and his failure to discipline his ministers. Much of Nkrumah's time was devoted to pursuing his pan-African and international politics; his responsiveness to political demands, internal and external, was conditioned by his perception of himself as a national and international revolutionary leader, for example, his failure to appreciate the articulate opposition to the financial costs of his pan-African ambitions and the dislike and distrust of Ghana's increasingly intimate ties with the Communist countries. (28)

The restriction of claims on the political system did not lessen the demands but assured the rise of sub-terranean politics - pursuit of interests through kinship; personal and bureaucratic links - and anomic dissidence, few instances of which were reported by the controlled press. The choking-off of channels of interest articulation and communication lessened the flow of information to party and government leaders; thus, they were uninformed about popular demands and grievances or doubted their credibility, and when expressions of discontent broke out they were surprised and occasionally panicked, often responding initially with repression and by suspecting malign if not subversive intentions.

CONCLUSION

A political system had developed in Ghana under conditions noted earlier as being generic to politics, in particular, the inflation of demands, the politicization of traditional cleavages and, thus, the limited legitimation of national political authority. The national system which developed over time in Ghana, and elsewhere in much of Africa with variations in emphasis, had the following characteristics: an increasing centralization of decision-making power in the hands of the leader and a strong tendency to personal rule; an increasing reliance in this rule upon personal loyalties (whence, return of

the "old guard", increase in the number of Nzimas - Nkrumah's ethnic group - in the cabinet and security service), partly secured by material rewards, including the allocation (appropriation) of offices and direct benefits (money, housing); in response to the rapid increase in participation and demands, the creation of oligarchic controls and manipulation of interests and groups; despite attempted centralization and curtailment of sub-system autonomy, relative degrees of autonomy for sub-ordinate political leaders outside the national centre and in certain structurally differentiated groups.

Some observers have noted how closely these new political systems resemble the patrimonial system described by Weber, stressing the above features as well as increasingly salient traditional sources of ideological legitimation, with a shift from a future to a past-orientation and reliance upon a personally controlled coercive apparatus. (29) However, as Zolberg points out, authority in these states tends to rest upon a clustering of charismatic, traditional and bureaucratic traits. It is important to note that in Ghana the bureaucracy, even though manipulated, was more differentiated, specialized and institutionalized (particularly in terms of behavioural norms) than elsewhere in Africa and, therefore, with the exception of certain

presidential secretaries, operated much less as personal instruments of rule than on a legal-rational basis. Also, even allowing for the large element of mystification in Ghana's political cultures (including Nkrumah's cult), there was increasing secularization, and the main thrust of ideological legitimation and of leadership goals was oriented to the future, not the past.

The regime entertained a certain range of permissiveness, the limits of which were frequently probed. The acceptance of CPP goals provided a basis for criticism between the ideal and the practice, which left a lot of room for complaint, such as in the National Assembly, which spent much time in the regime's last years criticizing the government's economic performance. R.O. Amuako-Atta, after having been dismissed as minister for opposing the UGFC cocoa-buying monopoly in 1961, had pursued his opposition in the Assembly and sounded an early warning: "What I am saying is in the interest of us all, politically. Because if there are irregularities and they are not pointed out now and are brooded upon, the next thing we shall see is some sort of revolution." (30)

Basic to the regime's loss of critical support groups were its economic policies and the disastrous econo-

mic conditions in the last several years. The development potential of the economy was fundamentally limited by its basic colonial character and by the structure of the world market demand for its most important export, cocoa, which provided 65 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. (31) Nkrumah and his ministers felt that the most rapid possible economic development was imperative, and development for them was synonymous with industrialization and increasing expenditures and jobs. Up to 1959, the development emphasis had been on infrastructure and social services (especially education). By 1951-62 the government had decided on a structural change in the economy by means of a preponderant role for the state sector and a push for industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture through producer cooperatives and the state farms. (32) In 1961 the government also tardily imposed economic controls in response to a sharp decline in the cocoa price and a balance of payments deficit.

In the next five years the government encountered steadily worsening economic conditions due to factors both within and beyond its control. An increased cocoa crop brought a rise in local demand and inflation but not more foreign exchange because of the decline in the world price (from \$ 603 per long ton in 1958 to \$ 241 in 1965). Severe balance of

payments deficits, only sporadically reduced by import controls, depleted foreign currency reserves. This regime, and Nkrumah directly, refused in the face of increasing inflation to curtail its huge budget deficits (expenditures exceeded revenue by 60 percent in 1962-63, 27 percent in 1965), which the government financed by dramatic increases in internal and external borrowing. (33) This heavy external borrowing, much of it for hastily and ill-considered agricultural and industrial development projects and extravaganzas, quickly resulted in an intolerable debt burden, since 82 percent of this external debt consisted of medium-term foreign credits. The malfunctioning of import controls, due to administrative incompetence and corruption, political corruption and hoarding (34), resulted in frequent scarcities of consumer goods and drastic shortages of spare parts, which caused a decline in productivity in the private sector and the laying off of workers. The GNP increased between 1955 and 1962 at an average annual rate of 4,8 percent, but by 1964 it dropped to 2,8 percent and in 1965 to 0,2 percent, practically nil; Ghana's estimated rate of population growth was 2,6 percent. (35)

Government inattention to problems, lack of discipline and self-indulgence exacerbate development

problems unduly. Commitments were made for development projects without serious study, outside existing plans, with medium-term financing for long-term projects; there was little attempt until the last year to compel the proliferating state industries to be profitable or even accountable. (36)

Economic conditions served to discredit the regime and stood in articulate mockery of the party-state's boasts of progress. The vast increases in revenue required to finance rising government expenditures were extracted from wage and salary earners, cocoa farmers (by "voluntary" development contributions, special taxes and, finally, hesitantly, reductions in the cocoa price) and foreign businesses. A painfully high rate of inflation reached a high in 1965, when the consumer price index (base: March, 1963 = 100) rose from 128 to 165, with the largest increase in local food costs. (37) Statistically, the standard of living declined, though, in fact, there were vast compensatory increases in social services, in health, water supplies, education and village development. (In fact, basic to Ghana's dilemma was the regime's attempt to provide high levels of social services without the productivity to finance them). Employment stood still or declined in 1965, with more school leavers seeking jobs. (38)

Popular support for the regime eroded with the decline in economic conditions, creating the opportunity for the military to intervene with the anticipation of widespread public approbation. The military and police might well have intervened in any case on behalf of their own institutional interests. But despite the regime's authoritarianism, the probability of a coup would have been reduced if economic life had been more buoyant, discontent less animate, and the military and police thus unarmed with the crucial public issue to legitimize their seizure of power.

1. See Boahen, J.D. Topics in West African History State Publishing Corporation, Accra, 1959, p.1.
2. See Fage, J.D. Ghana: A Historical Interpretation University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1959, p.26. Also refer to Gold Coast, 1931 Census: Appendices, Table XX p. 21.
3. The non-Akan states of the Northern Territories and the Ewe states in British Togoland did not experience this class-community conflict, in the case of the Northern Territories largely because there was insufficient modernization to sponsor an emergent class.
4. On the unintegrated or syncretic nature of African society and on a conceptualization of diverse political systems attempting to authoritatively allocate values within a single state, see Zolberg, A. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1966, pp. 128-134.
5. See Apter, David, "Ghana" in Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa eds. Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, C.G., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1964, pp. 259-315
Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960,

OUP London 1964; Bretton Henry, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah, Praeger, New York, 1966; Zolberg, A. Creating Political Order op. cit. and Kraus Jon, "On the Politics of Nationalism and Social Change in Ghana" in Journal of Modern African Studies, V 11 No. 1, 1969, pp. 107-130.

6. The following table compares: (1) the regional distribution of all seats in the National Assembly (regardless of Party) to (2) the percentage of Ministers and Ministerial Secretaries (MS) from each region represented in the CPP government after the 1954 and 1956 elections (all CPP). The CPP held a larger percentage of the total number of seats in the Colony than it did in the other regions.

	COLONY	TVT*	ASHANTI	NORTHERN TERRITORY
PERCENTAGE OF ASSEMBLY SEATS	42,5	12,5	20,0	25,0
1954 PERCENTAGE OF MINISTERS	54,5	9,1	18,2	18,2
PERCENTAGE OF MS	45,5	18,2	18,2	18,2
1956 PERCENTAGE OF MINISTERS	61,6	7,7	15,4	15,4
PERCENTAGE OF MS	54,9	15,4	15,4	15,4

* Trans-Volta Togoland, later Volta Region, Ghana

7. In 1954 David Apter noted that "observers often remark at the accessibility of Nkrumah in the party. Rather than control, and direct and constant need by the member to receive his mandate from Nkrumah for role activity and support. Support, instead of stemming primarily from local units, come from above; it is endowed as grace." See Apter, David in Ghana in Transition, Athenaeum 1963, New York, p. 208. This overstates Nkrumah's authority, charismatic and/or legal-rational (as Prime Minister and dispenser of patronage); the support relationship was more mutual and when some of the local leadership shifted into opposition in Ashanti in 1954-55, it drew away much of the CPP's local support.

8. David Apter referred to the CPP in the mid-1950's as "the most effective mass political organization in Africa ... a Tammy-type machine with a nationalist ideology ... a militant elect who dominate and spearhead the nationalist movement". Ghana in Transition op. cit., p. 202.

A. Zolberg supports this analysis in terms of organization but he also regards the CPP as a political machine in terms of its maintenance

in power through the allocations of resources and favours to the party faithful: patronage
Creating Political Order op. cit., pp. 23, 160.

Henry Bretton, regarding only the late 1950's and 1960's, conceives the CPP as Nkrumah's "personal political machine", see The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah.

9. The most acute analysis of Nkrumah as a political leader is by David Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma and the Coup", Daedalus XCVII, pp. 773-75.
10. Derived from Gold Coast, The 1954 General Elections. Eight out of eleven elected independents were CPP rebels, six of whom quickly returned to the CPP.
11. The government controlled Cocoa Marketing Board Price was set at the same price in 1954 as it had been in 1953, far below a rapidly rising world market price, in order to prevent inflation and to create funds available for development investments; it accomplished both goals.
Cf. Killick, Tony; "The Economics of Cocoa" in A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol. 1; The Economy of Ghana, eds. Birmingham, W. et al

Northern University, University Press, Evanston
1966, pp. 365-69.

12. One refers here to the core states of the old Ashanti Confederacy immediately surrounding Kumasi, the Ashanti capital. Many of the outer states, especially the Brong states, who were former members of the Confederacy, were CPP stalwarts. The party conflict was in some areas a re-staging of historic conflicts between Kumasi-centred Confederacy and states desiring autonomy. There was anything but unanimity among the Ashanti in the NLM-CPP conflict, even in the core states. It split families, villages and chieftaincies.

13. Cf. Bing, Geoffrey, Reap the Whirlwind: An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966, Macgibbon & Kee, London 1968, pp. 185-95. Bing was an advisor to the CPP government during the frustrating constitutional negotiations with the British. The 1957 Constitution represented a compromise settlement, with the NLM and its allies attempting to limit as far as possible the prerogatives of the central government. Under "entrenched" clauses, however, there were to be popularly elected regional assemb-

lies with a variety of secondary functions which violated the CPP's commitment to the Brong and other dissident states in Ashanti who wanted to escape Ashanti control and measures to protect the "traditional functions or privileges of a chief".

14. Dennis Austin in Politics in Ghana op. cit., pp. 373-76, notes these immediate post-independence crises, except for the important incipient backbench revolt, which in the person of two MP's was linked up with the threatening rallies and protests of the Ex-Servicemen's Union.
15. Dennis Austin disagrees, arguing in a post-coup article "Opposition in Ghana: 1947-67" Government and Opposition II 1967, p. 541, that only among the Ewe in the British Togoland trusteeship, later part of the Volta region, was there a refusal to accept governmental authority as legitimate.
16. Dennis Austin tends to see this centralization of authority solely as repressive, see Politics in Ghana o. cit., pp. 377-80. This is not the view of G. Bing, then attorney general, who had a hand in the constitutional changes. See Reap the Whirlwind op.cit., pp. 191-98.

17. Although Bing's apologetics with regard to government behaviour in the 1964 referendum was strange, it is clear that some the suppressive electoral tactics were initiated locally in the period 1957-60, as in the parliamentary by-election in Anlo South, where the central government voided the local CPP efforts and the opposition won. Ibid, pp. 296-97.

18. The Nkrumah cult was nothing compared to the Mao cult in China but was an undeniable stifling presence nonetheless. The cult was also manipulated within the CPP by the new militants of 1960-62, e.g. Tawia Adamafio, against the "old guard" and in 1964-65 by the "old guard" against the "scientific socialists".

19. See the study by Drake, St. Clair and Lacy, Leslie A., "Government Versus the Unions: The Sekondi Takaradi Strike, 1961" in Politics in Africa: Seven cases, ed. 1966, pp. 67-118, on the breakdown in communications between CPP associational group leadership and the rank and file; and Ghana, Statement by the Government on the Recent Conspiracy, December 1961.

20. For varying accounts of this case, involving

the UP and an army officer, see Austin, Dennis Politics in Ghana op. cit., pp. 381-82, 424-29 and Bing, G. Reap the Whirlwind op. cit., pp. 239-77.

21. Cf. Brokensha, D.W. Social Change at Larteh Ghana Clarendon Press, Oxford 1966. Who, though discussing an area where political and normative conflict were not intense, stresses the strength of local institutions and concludes that "even the powerful CPP has to contend with the strong localism, emerging as almost a Larteh institution", p. 266.
22. Zolberg, A. observed in 1965 that the CPP "has almost ceased to be a tangible separate organization", however, it had long reflected "all the cleavages, components, norms and structures that prevail in an underdeveloped country". Creating Political Order op. cit., p. 98.
23. While many observers agree that the CPP leadership tactically defused its radical elements in the 1950's in order to attain independence, Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer in Ghana: End of an Illusion monthly Review Press, New York 1966, argue that the CPP failed to organize

the revolutionary potential of the oppressed classes, (i.e. urban and rural proletariat), temporised revolutionary impulses in 1961-66. Their assessment of the possibility of revolutionary change is "petty bourgeois romanticism" as a segment of the British left agrees. See Murray, Roger "Second Thoughts on Ghana". New Left Review XLII 1967, pp. 37-39.

24. The reasons for bringing departments under the president's office varied: The Budget Department was there for a year to facilitate the establishment of a slush fund for Dr. Nkrumah, for internal and pan-African purposes; The labour Department for less than a year at Tetegah's behest, the Chieftaincy Secretariat to reduce conflicts and corruption, some departments to facilitate co-ordination and reduce political interference (e.g. Planning, Volta River Secretariat), while others were there due to Nkrumah's particular interest (e.g. African Affairs Secretariat, a body charged with handling relations with all African States) or Nkrumah's concern with security (e.g. intelligence, taken from the police after the assassination attempts).
- 25 See Legum, Colin, "Socialism in Ghana: A Political

Interpretation", African Socialism ed. Friedland W.M. and Rosberg, Carl, Stanford University Press, Standford 1964, pp. 131-59.

26. See Kraus, Jon, "Ghana's New 'Corporate' Parliament" in Africa Report, August 1965, pp. 6-11.
27. A Senior Civil Servant who asked his superior about the rumour that Nkrumah had shot a soldier at the castle after the January 1964 assassination attempt was arrested and convicted under a "publication of false news" law, which made the civil service extremely apprehensive, even though the conviction was later quashed.
28. On the context of the development of these ties, see Kraus, Jon, "A Marxist in Ghana" in Problems of Communism XVI No. 3, 1967, pp. 42-49.
29. See Zolberg, A. Creating Political Order op. cit. pp. 134-35. Also see Ruth, Guenther "Personal Rule, Patrimonialism and Empire-Building in the New States" in World Politics XX, 1968, pp. 194-206 and Bretton's The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah op. cit.
30. Ghana Parliamentary Debates official report

XXii, May 17, 1961, p. 682.

31. Killick, Tony, "The Possibilities of Economic Control" in Economy of Ghana ed. Birmingham, A. et. al., op. cit., pp. 411-38 and Rimmer, Douglas, "The Crisis in the Ghana Economy" in Journal of Modern African Studies, IV, 1966, pp. 17-32.
32. Attempts to increase agricultural productivity were not accompanied by any alteration in land tenure except for some acquisitions of land by the state. Ghanaian political leaders, including Nkrumah, were economic innocents.
33. The precise size of Ghana's external debt at the time of the coup was simply not known; initially estimated as high as \$ 800 million, provisional government figures indicated \$ 600 million. See Ghana, Economic Survey, Government Printer Accra, 1965, pp. 28-29.
34. See Ghana, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Alleged Irregularities in Connection with the Issue of Import Licenses 1964, Akainyah Commission. Also see Abraham Commission, 1966 and Oilenu Commission, 1967.

35. Economic Survey, Government Printer Accra,
1965, pp. 13-14.

CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. KWAME NKRUMAH'S GOVERNMENT

In order to investigate how the various military governments pursued their respective foreign policies whilst in office, it is necessary to describe at the onset the "traditional" (civilian) setting in which Ghana's foreign policy operated prior to military rule. This will place the military's approach and performance in perspective.

The nature, style and motivation of Ghana's foreign policy prior to military rule can partly be traced back to the country's colonial history. (1) The colonial Administration bequeathed the English language to the country as the official language of government, education, commerce and industry and law. The country's systems of education, law and administration were largely patterned after those of the United Kingdom. Ghana's economic, financial and commercial links after independence remain with the West. Indeed, the country's army was originally part of the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF).

Until September 1961, British Officers occupied senior posts in the army and the army itself was equipped with either British weapons or weapons

from some other Western nations. (2) Even now Britain remains Ghana's major source of arms, ammunition and military aid. At independence in 1957, the majority of the country's leaders in Government, the civil service, the University and the army were trained either in the UK or in the United States. Furthermore, tangible ties (such as those between professional bodies had been established between Ghana and the UK and intangible ties (such as the commitment to liberal and Parliamentary democracy, freedom of expression and parliamentary government) had gained some important adherents. The external trade and finances of the country were closely tied to the West during the colonial era.

All these factors, and also because Britain granted Ghana's independence under conditions untainted by bitterness, have continued to make Ghana's political, economic and commercial and educational links with the Western powers - especially Britain - very important. Even at the peak of the anti-Western campaign in Ghana, from 1961 to February 1966, (3) Ghana did not show great hostility towards Britain and the Commonwealth. Indeed, it was the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah who suggested the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat during the Prime Ministers' Conference of July 1964. And despite his opposition to the position taken by Mr. Harold Wilson

on Rhodesia, Dr. Nkrumah agreed to serve on the abortive Commonwealth Peace Mission to Vietnam which was established in June 1965 at the summit meeting of Commonwealth leaders.

As Kwame Nkrumah himself said in 1958, history had brought Ghana and the West together ⁽⁴⁾ and this could not be erased overnight. This was echoed in October 1969 by the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Kofi Busia, in his address to the UN General Assembly: " ... (Ghana's) own historical contacts and experiences have brought it about that we share more common interests with some (Western) countries at this point of time than with others." ⁽⁵⁾

Such "historical contacts and experiences" have produced significant opinions which favour a pro-West foreign policy. These opinions are to be found among the Western educated elite in the civil service and the Universities. Indeed, among the armed forces that have ruled the country during the period 1966-1982, such pro-West sentiments have not been wanting.

Foreign policy may be looked at as a nation's maximization of its value synthesis. Such maximization of Ghana's interests have traditionally operated around:

- (a) Non-Alignment,
- (b) Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism, and
- (c) Pan-Africanism.

Non-Alignment:

Ghana entered the world stage on 6 March 1957, determined to remain non-aligned, that is to enter into no formal military or ideological commitment to either of the power-blocs. Already in 1955, Ghana, as an advanced colony (Gold Coast, the country was called before independence), had sent observers to the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States. (6)

On June 26, 1959, the Governor General, in a Sessional address to the National Assembly described Ghana's foreign policy as "non-alignment and positive neutralism". (7) The term "non-alignment" seemed to indicate her desire to remain outside the periphery of the cold war. The "positive neutralism" on the other hand emphasised the participationist elements in her foreign policy. These included, among others, a policy of friendship with all nations and malice toward none. (8)

Non-alignment was only a template of Ghana's external relations. Provision for the security of Ghana, protection of her national interests ⁽⁹⁾, loyalty to the Charter of the United Nations ⁽¹⁰⁾, liquidation of colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination, settlement of international disputes by peaceful means ⁽¹¹⁾, advocacy of disarmament as an approach to peace, avoidance of excessive economic reliance on a state or an ideological group of states and respect for the territorial integrity of all states, were all presented as norms of Ghana's foreign policy. It was conceived as a "policy of balancing equilibrium in the troubled seas of international relations". ⁽¹²⁾ President Kwame Nkrumah thought that Ghana could help to "bridge the gulf that separates the two ideological blocs" ⁽¹³⁾, Ghana aimed to emphasise co-operation, not conflict.

Nkrumah once articulated Ghanaian goals as follows: "It is our belief that international blocs and rivalries acerbate and do not solve disputes and we must be free to judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are just and peaceful, irrespective of the powers involved. We do not wish to be in the position of condoning imperialism or aggression from any quarter. Powers which pursue policies of goodwill, co-operation and constructive international action will always find us on their si-

de." (14)

Ghana did not seem to subscribe to the theory of "demonology" - the division of nations and peoples into good and bad - in international politics. Kofi Basko, a member of the cabinet said in Parliament on September 4, 1958: "If you say that the world is divided into two camps - right and wrong - and at the same time you align with the West, then you are saying that the West is always right and the East is always wrong. And we do not agree with that."

(15)

Dr. Nkrumah wrote that "as to issues between them, neither bloc can claim to be permanently right or permanently wrong." (16)

Ghana therefore, generally stressed the need to hold on, with other non-aligned nations, to the middle ground. It sometimes displayed a determination to "intercede and to mediate in the interests of world peace. " (17) Nkrumah once suggested that non-aligned powers, including Ghana, could "interpose" between the existing blocs. (18)

In implementing the policy of non-alignment and positive neutralism, Ghana appeared to rely on world opinion.

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In implementing the policy of non-alignment and positive neutralism, Ghana appeared to rely on world opinion.

On December 16, 1959, Kofi Baako said in Parliament:
" ... there is something called world public opinion, in which the government very well believes. It is this international opinion that the government wants to boost ... " (19) Nkrumah argued that world opinion was an important ingredient of Ghana's policy: "We (the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations) represent a large segment of world opinion and herein lies our strength. Ours is a force which cannot be employed coercively. It can only be employed persuasively; but it is nevertheless an effective force." (20) At a private meeting of the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations, Nkrumah asserted that the group could "exert moral pressure on the two main blocs and prevent them from plunging all of us into the holocaust of a disastrous war." (21) He further claimed that non-alignment was a "moral force in international affairs." (22)

Military non-alignment was the kernel of Ghana's policy. For it did not seem to believe peace could be ensured by preparing for war. P.K.K. Quaidoo, then a cabinet member, made this clear in a statement in the Ghanaian Parliament on September 4, 1958. "This policy is in direct conflict with the ancient rule: si vis pacem para bellum, that means, if you want peace, prepare for war. In spite of what anybody says, we do not accept that as a basis

for our foreign policy because we never achieve peace by war." (23)

Military entanglement, Ghana seemed to fear, could place her in the tutelage of a foreign power which would become the arbiter of her fate, for the foreign power would gain an intimate knowledge of the defence structure of Ghana. (24) Besides, she believed that military alliances tend to promote, not resolve conflict. For they "revive old rivalries and create new dangers" (25). In fact, small nations in the past were, Ghana pointed out, sucked into the quarrels of great powers. (26) The entangling alliances of small countries with great powers were believed to be one of the causes of World War I. (27) Further, in practical terms, Ghana felt that small nations would lose everything and gain little by a world conflict. (28) Ghana, therefore, aspired to reduce international tension. For she feared that "when the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled down." (29)

Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism:

The Charter of the United Nations, under Chapter XI, provides for self-determination in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. Ghana utilised those provisions to help the struggle for freedom of colonial

peoples. But it often concentrated its attention on the territories of Africa, believing that its own freedom would be meaningless until all of Africa was free.

Nkrumah maintained that colonialism was the outgrowth of capitalism. "The origin of colonisation", he wrote, "is nothing else than the enterprise of individual interests, a one-sided egotistical imposition of the strong upon the weak." (30)

Colonialism, according to him, was a policy by which a foreign power bound "territories to herself by political ties with the primary object of promoting her own economic advantage." (31) In Consciencism, Nkrumah wrote that he had always believed that the basis of colonialism was economic. (32) He insisted that colonialism was a source of conflict and only complete decolonisation would truly liberate man from "the moral, political and cultural restraints which hamper his full progress and development in many parts of the world." (33) It was also held that "life in Africa would have been happier, progress would have been greater, in Ghana as well as in the rest of Africa, had there been neither colonialism nor imperialism." (34) Anti-colonialism accordingly became one of the tenets of Ghanaian foreign policy.

Colonialism was opposed in every form. Nkrumah considered colonialism a devil (35), though he rejected ideological demonology. Nkrumah argued that colonialism changed its tactics and assumed subtler forms. He called it Neo-Colonialism, the worst form of imperialism.

The essence of neo-colonialism, according to Nkrumah, was that a state affected by it possessed a facade of sovereignty with all its visible trappings. In reality, however, its economic system and its political policy were directed from outside. (36) Economically, such a state was said to be compelled to buy manufactured products from the colonial power. Neo-colonialism, according to this theory, protected imports into the country from the colonial power, clamped down local development and sometimes even the fiscal policy was controlled by the dominating state. (37) Bilateral economic aid was also cited as one of the tools of neo-colonialism. (38)

Nkrumah held that the mechanics of imperialism were responsible for widening the disparity between the rich and the poor nations. This, he said, was also a consequence of the fall in the world price of raw materials, the backbone of emerging nations. For example, Ghana's 210 000 tons of cocoa in 1954-55 earned her 239,4 million United States Dollars as

against an estimated \$ 215,6 million in 1964-65 on a projected crop of 590 000 tons. (39) This fall in cocoa prices had apparently serious repercussions on policy makers in Ghana. They felt that the buyers were denying Ghana the benefits of its increased production. Ghana, therefore, sought to rectify the imbalance in its economy as a producer of raw materials and escape the traps of one-crop economy.

Pan-Africanism:

African Unity was considered by Ghana as an important facet of its foreign policy. Nkrumah believed that only a strong political union could bring about a full and effective development of Africa's resources for the benefit of Africa's peoples. (40) He wrote: "Divided we are weak; a United Africa could become one of the greatest forces for the good of the world." (41)

Nkrumah argued that differences in culture and language in various parts of Africa need not be an obstacle to African unity. (42) Ghana placed Pan-Africanism on the commanding heights it occupied during the period 1957-66. It believed that, despite historical differences, the sense of brotherhood engendered by African culture would enable African states to make enlightened self-immolation in the cause

of African unity possible and acceptable. But Nkrumah did not demand such a sacrifice immediately. He sought to protect the diversity of Africa: "The individual character of population groups might properly be expressed in special kinds of development within the universal plan; particularly in the fields of specialised production, whether in agriculture or in industry, or handicraft and culture." (43)

Ghana felt that a united continent would benefit immensely on an economic plan. Nkrumah argued thus: "The unity of the countries of Africa is an indispensable precondition for the speediest and fullest development, not only of the totality of the continent, but also of the individual countries linked together in the Union." (44)

Nkrumah insisted that the Union would also assist Africans in breaking the melancholy circle of poverty. (45) He denied that he was advocating a coming together of poor states. Africa's resources could be better exploited under political unity and this could help a wider capital development, he said.

Nkrumah constantly preached unity to convert passive sympathy of the masses into active participation: " ... there are three alternatives open to African

states; firstly, to unite and save the continent; secondly, to disunite and disintegrate; or thirdly, to sell out. In other words, either unite or to stand separately and disintegrate or to sell ourselves to foreign powers." (46) He insisted that Africa's needs must be the paramount concern of every African leader. (47) For his part, Nkrumah had apparently conjured up in his mind a vast edifice of continental dimensions, with all its majesty and glory. But he refused to agree with the view that his concepts were utopian: "I have often been accused of pursuing a policy of the impossible. But I cannot believe in the impossibility of achieving African union any more than I could ever have thought of the impossibility of attaining African freedom." (48)

Again and again, he insisted that a single representation at international councils, resting on the strength of the whole continent, would be more positive in its influence than all the separate representations of the African states put together. (49) Pan-Africanism, it was believed, would not only assist Africa in the United Nations, but will also help the cause of world peace. The permanent machinery of the African states at the UN was a partial fulfillment of this hope. Ghana utilised the forums provided by the UN, the Commonwealth and later, the OAU to promote these principles.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has not directly confronted the question as to whether Ghana's foreign policy as formulated and executed under Dr. Nkrumah's government succeeded in enlarging the country's influence and in augmenting its power.

Professor W. Scott Thompson's definitive case study of Ghana before the military regimes constitute an excellent source of information on this period.

In Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966, Professor Thompson closely examines the role of the charismatic leader in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the function of the competing elites - professional diplomats and party ideologues in their efforts to fashion policy according to their perceived interests.

The enquiry is conducted at several levels, corresponding to the concern of Ghana's foreign policy in its actual operation. Ghana's relations with the great powers and specifically its developing ties with Moscow and Peking, are one concern, as, more theoretically, are the examination of the limits of the influence of a small state trying to sway the actions of the great powers in international crises.

At another level, Ghana's foreign policy had as its primary aim the uniting of Africa and this historical movement is studied in its several stages. The utility of the methods used - ideology, diplomacy and subversion - are weighed. The results in policy of irridentism combined with ideology, are explored as they relate to Ghana's tangled relations with its neighbours.

Throughout the study the author considers the effects of the domestic forces set free by Dr. Nkrumah's attempt to import a new "ideology" tied to both domestic and foreign policy goals. The State's role in the Congo (Zaire) crisis, the non-aligned and Afro-Asian movement, Nkrumah's dilemma in trying to change Ghana's trade and economic structures to reflect her new links with the Soviet Union are all given comprehensive and thorough analysis.

The author draws a number of conclusions from the study. Some of these are first, that Ghana's foreign policy of the period was Nkrumah's and a reflection of his moods and ambitions. This is a valid assessment of the situation but Nkrumah's domination of the foreign policy processes was understandable. Given the general yearning for the "African Revolution" (which involved

a difficult struggle to attain the "political kingdom", to decolonise, that is,) and the strong opposition to it by certain significant sectors of the Ghanaian educated population, Nkrumah had little choice but to exercise and be seen to exercise firm leadership. It needs to be remembered also that Nkrumah used Ghana's foreign policy as an adjunct to his effort to build a united nation that could easily be torn apart by ethnicity. Dr. Nkrumah's single minded commitment to Ghana's foreign policy is moreover vindicated when it is remembered that all Ghanaian governments (including the military) subsequent to Nkrumah's have had to make public professions of adherence to Nkrumah's foreign policies. Dr. Hilla Liman's PNP government in fact, won the last elections principally because they assured the electorate that they would, if elected, strive to implement Dr. Nkrumah's uncompleted domestic and foreign policies.

As for the view that Nkrumah's foreign policy failed partly because his intellectual capacity would bear further examination, all that can be said is that Nkrumah was not a social scientist, a theoretical scholar in the traditional academic sense. He was, in a sense, the initiator and leader of a difficult revolution that sought

to decolonise almost a whole continent and its peoples. He knew what he wanted, namely "a political kingdom" - a transfer of political power from alien rulers to indigenous peoples. It is therefore as a charismatic and inspiring leader that Nkrumah should be judged and not as an abstract thinker. Practice without theory may be blind but theory without practice is definitely empty!

Yet another view about Ghana's foreign policy of the period is that, the country's foreign policy failed because Nkrumah was unrealistic about the limits of Ghana's resources (natural and human) and of its geopolitical significance especially after 1962. The result, it said, was that he expended Ghana's resources to achieve unrealistic ambitions and objectives.

There is much to be said for this view. Ghana is a small country with a small population and limited resources. Undoubtedly some and perhaps much of the country's resources of the period in question could have been more profitably used in domestic development. Had that happened Nkrumah could probably have had a happy domestic support base for his foreign policies. After all, charity, it is said, begins at home.

However, as Nkrumah saw it, African revolutionary

history had thrust a role upon Ghana which made it impossible (and indeed immoral) for the country to choose between moderate development at home and piecemeal and limited policies abroad. To him, Ghana's independence was meaningless unless it led to African continental independence and unity. Ghana's resources were to be used to attain the twin objectives so that greater African resources would be available to all African countries. The timing was, to him, the best as any further delay would result in individual, almost non-viable countries becoming embroiled in their individual problems with the possibility of foreign interference and re-colonisation (neo-colonialism). Someone had to start the movement or else it might not get off the ground. Nkrumah chose to take the initiative. That he did so was not solely because he did not understand how the international system worked or that he was egoistical as was claimed by Sir Tafawa Belewa, the Nigerian Prime Minister at the time.

Kwame Nkrumah's commitment to African Unity could be said to have had its origins in several sources. Professor K.A.B. Jones-Quartey, in a letter to W. Scott Thompson, had this to say: "At Lincoln, he always brooded about Africa's lack of a 'national' symbol or myth. Britain had its Monarchy, America

had its flag and the Constitution, etc. But what had Africa? No Crown, no constitution, no flag, no rallying cry, no focal point - nothing! It was imperative, Nkrumah insisted, to develop a myth - some national symbol, somewhere ... Eventually, this symbol turned out to be Kwame Nkrumah himself and the whole African case, then assumed the form of a pyramid in his own mind. Africa was its base, Ghana was somewhere in the middle and at the top, Kwame Nkrumah ... " (50)

Second, Nkrumah had been brought up as a child and was operating as a politician in a society where a high value is placed on human relations. Children in Ghana are taught to greet all whom they meet; even the stranger whom they may never meet again. It is more than courtesy. The greeting is considered to be an acknowledgement, a recognition of the other person as a fellow human being. If you passed him by without greeting him, you would be treating him as a thing - you would be implying that he did not share your humanity.

Therefore, to recognise one whom you passed as a fellow human being, is an obligation and a Ghanaian is deeply hurt when he is ignored without cause.

This explains, in part at least, why Dr. Nkrumah

felt able to declare on the eve of Ghana's independence that: "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation and unity of the African continent." (51)

Indeed, the Ghana constitution provided for the surrender of Ghana's political sovereignty in order to further Nkrumah's objective of African political union, thus: "In the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a Union of African States and territories, the people now confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana." (52)

Therefore, when, after his overthrow, foreign observers commented that Dr. Nkrumah had fallen from power because his foreign policies had made him a good African but a bad Ghanaian, they had missed an important point in that, certainly to the Akan-speaking Ghanaian foreign policy decision-makers, who dominated the foreign office during the period, being a good African is the obligation of a good Ghanaian! It was such a domestic environment which encouraged Dr. Nkrumah in his grand pan-African designs.

Dr. Nkrumah saw Ghana only as part of a United Sta-

tes of Africa. Nkrumah's government had some notable achievements, which A.L. Adu, one of Ghana's most distinguished civil servants, has summarised thus: "Ghana succeeded in making the impact of African diplomacy felt in international forums and international organizations. Ghana succeeded in mobilising Africa's efforts towards the emancipation of the dependent territories. Ghana succeeded against formidable obstacles of inertia and opposition, in making the idea and ideals of African unity accepted all over Africa as the ultimate objective for all African States, whatever disagreements there might be on the ways and means of achieving this objective. Ghana succeeded in making Africans everywhere proud of their Africanness and in a real sense in galvanising the spirit of 'African Personality' in international organizations. Most of these successes are due to the sense of dedication, of purpose, of single-mindedness and the inspired leadership of Dr. Nkrumah." (53)

1. See Aluko, Olajide, The Foreign Policies of African States, Longmans, London 1984, pp. 72-97.
2. Dr. Olajide Aluko discusses these and other points in the article. "After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana's Foreign Policy" Issue, Vol. V No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 55-62.
3. Between 1962 and February 1966, there was in Accra great hostility towards the US mainly because the CPP believed that the CIA was out to unseat the government. See Thompson, W.S., Ghana's Foreign Policy op. cit., pp. 300-301.
4. Nkrumah, Kwame, "African Prospect" in Foreign Affairs, October 1968.
5. Refer to Ghana Press Release No. 527/68 Time, London, 22 October 1969.
6. Post, Ken, The New States of West Africa, Penguin London 1964, Chapter 7.

7. See Ghana Parliamentary Debates, First Series Vol. 16, Col. 4, Accra Government Printer 1959, hereinafter referred to as "Debates".
8. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, London, Heinemann, 1961.
9. Ibid, p. 98.
10. Debates, Vol. II Col. 2.
11. Ibid.
12. Debates, Vol. 25 Col. 127.
13. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom op. cit. p. 144.
14. Nkrumah, Kwame, "African Prospect" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, October 1958, p. 49.
15. Debates, Vol. II Col. 2176.
16. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. 199.
17. Debates, Vol. 24 Col. 41.

18. The Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961. The Documents of the Belgrade Conference Beograd, Yugoslavia, Publicističko Izdavački Zavod, 1961, p. 98.
19. Debates, Vol. 17 Col. 670.
20. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. 149.
21. The Evening News, Accra, September 28, 1960, p. 1
22. Debates, Vol. 32 Col 82.
23. Debates, Vol. II Col. 2150.
24. Statement of Kwame Nkrumah in Parliament on June 21, 1963, Debates, Vol. 32 Col. 82.
25. The Ghanaian Times, Accra, May 16, 1960, p.16.
26. Debates. Vol. 24 Col. 2.
27. Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite, Praeger, New York 1963, p. 173.

28. Debates, Vol. 23 Col. 4.
29. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. 143.
30. Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite, op. cit. n.21.
31. Nkrumah, Kwame, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, T. Nelson & Sons Ltd., London 1957, p. vii.
32. Nkrumah, Kwame, Consciencism, Monthly Review Press, 1964, p. 98.
33. The Spark, Accra, December 4, 1964, p. 2.
34. Quaison-Sackey, A., Ghana Unbound, F. Praeger, New York 1963, p. 14.
35. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. 180.
36. Nkrumah, Kwame, Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism, T. Nelson & Sons Ltd., London 1965, p. ix.
37. Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite, op. cit. p. 180.

38. Ibid, p. 176.
39. Nkrumah, Kwame, Neo-Colonialism, op. cit. p. 10.
40. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. xiii.
41. Ibid, p. xii.
42. Nkrumah, Kwame, I Speak of Freedom, op. cit. p. xiii.
43. Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite, op. cit. p. 171.
44. Nkrumah, Kwame, ibid, pp. 163-164.
45. Nkrumah, Kwame, ibid, p. 167.
46. Debates, Vol. 20 Col. 627.
47. Nkrumah, Kwame, Africa Must Unite, op. cit., p. 185.
48. Nkrumah, Kwame, ibid, p. 170.
49. Nkrumah, Kwame, ibid.

50. Quoted in W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 417. Professor K.A.E. Jones-Quartey attended Lincoln University with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.
51. See Daily Graphic, March 7, 1957.
52. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1960, Part I (2), Accra Government Printer.
53. See W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy, op. cit, p. 414. Also see Appendices B and C for some idea of the extensive nature of Ghana's diplomatic representation in and out of Africa to 1965.

CHAPTER FOUR

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION COUNCIL
(NLC) 1966 - 1969

On 24th February 1966, a coup d'etat overthrew the constitutional government under President Kwame Nkrumah and brought to power an army-police coalition, the National Liberation Council (NLC).

Although there are difficulties involved in trying to determine the sources of the coup d'etat, it may be said that unresolved ethnic tensions, a worsening economic situation and the absence of effective political choice, were among the background factors that undermined the government's position. Yet another factor was that the government had tended to commit the country's limited resources to the pursuit of Pan-African unity. (1)

The point has been made in the introductory chapter that an important factor determining the military's foreign reference group identification has been the exposure to British military professionalism, procedures, organisation and personnel. Many Ghanaian officers appear to have had great respect for and worked readily under their British officers. Their common educational background, econo-

mic status and sense of military professionalism rendered them a rather conservative social ground identifying not only with British military norms and values, but with British beliefs and life-styles as well as with their Ghanaian police, civil service and professional counterparts.

Although such identification can be overstressed (the army and police cannot be characterised as a caste remote from their own social roots) the foreign (British) group identification of the NLC government induced a disdain for the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and a consequent dismantling of the CPP's major policies. In the words of Dr. Nkrumah, " The fact that Harley and others found it fairly easy to get support in the army may also be explained by what has been called 'the Sandhurst mentality' of certain officers. These men trained in various English military establishments prided themselves on being more 'English' than Ghanaian, and tended to frown on everything in our Ghanaian way of life which did not conform with English customs and traditions." (2)

Soon after the coup, the NLC sought and was quickly offered the counsel of Ghana's significant professional and middle class. These included former leading opposition United Party (UP) politicians some of

whom emerged from detention, or, like Professor Kofi Busia, returned from exile. The NLC looked to the professional class, the majority of which had been educated in the West, for support and help and tended to regard its members as representatives of the public good and its political heirs. Jurists, many lawyers, civil servants and other professional class members were appointed to prominent positions: as members of the Commissions of Enquiry, delegations to Arican (to restore normal relations soured under umah's rule); some were appointed to head the boards of fifty state corporations. Yet others were made heads of editorial boards of the government-owned newspapers. The NLC justified the coup in terms of democratic values but lacked many of the skills which were needed to rule a democratic state. The support of adequately trained people was indispensable. Hence the NLC was susceptible to the demands made by the professional classes and the UP politicians.

In the beginning, all NLC members except General Joseph Ankrah, who was NLC Chairman, retained their army and police positions and met, at least, once a week to make decisions. Thus, the senior civil servants were thrust into an enormously powerful position on matters such as economic and educational problems.

The NLC's general performance was circumscribed by Ghana's economic conditions, the priority it gave to the economy and the tools it used to restore economic health. Advised by senior civil servants, the government sought to end Ghana's drastic balance of payments problems through renegotiating its external debts, a continuing task, cutting drastically Ghana's imports and rationalising the import license system. Other measures included securing foreign aid, de-valuing the Cedi by 30 percent in mid-1967 and severely cutting the budget.

In 1966, the investment budget was cut by 17 percent; in 1967 by 20 percent, and in this way budget surpluses were achieved. By the end of 1968 Ghana also had a surplus on visible trade. (3) The basically sound rationale behind this severe retrenchment was that Ghana must and could utilize more productively, the investments it was making, but the foreign policy implications of these and other measures in relation to the East (Moscow), the West and Africa bordered on a reversal of all major foreign policies pursued under President Kwame Nkrumah's government.

THE NLC AND AFRICA

Initial reactions to the coup, throughout Africa, were mixed.

In general, Francophone Africa was either indifferent or clearly happy at the news of the coup. Guinea (under President Sekou Toure) and Mali (under President Modibo Keita) were the only French-speaking African countries that condemned the NLC. (4) Guinea and Mali both offered political asylum to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and broke diplomatic relations with Ghana. The three-nation Union of African States (UAS) was thus dissolved. Dr. Nkrumah later settled in Guinea and was made Co-President of Guinea.

In East Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda launched a campaign to isolate the NLC government in Africa. (5)

The response of the NLC to the flood of resentment and opposition in Africa was initially one of scorn. Speaking to newsmen in Accra after Guinea had received Dr. Nkrumah, Major Afrifa, who later became chairman of the NLC said: "We are not bothered by vain threats from people who could not even mount guards at their Embassy in the Congo." (6) And General Ankrah, the first Chairman of the NLC and Head of State mockingly told a newsmen, "Toure (President of Guinea) might be mad to think of invading Ghana at the head of mothers and drunkards." (7)

For some time, it appeared as though Ghana would remain in isolation in Africa. President Sekou Toure of Guinea sent the following message to President Nkrumah who was in Peking at the time: "The Political Bureau and the Government after a thorough analysis of the African situation following the seizure of power by the instruments of imperialism have decided:

1. To organize a national day of solidarity with the Ghanaian people next Sunday. Throughout the length and breadth of the country, there will take place popular demonstrations on the theme of anti-imperialism;
2. To call on all progressive African countries to hold a special conference and take adequate measures ... " (8)

Had the NLC continued to ignore the hostility, propaganda and threats from Africa, the government would have been effectively isolated. However, tempered by the influence of the late President Tubman of Liberia, the NLC opted for diplomacy by sending delegations to African State capitals to explain the reasons for the coup and the policy of the new government towards Africa.

Mr. Alex Kwabong, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ghana, headed a delegation to a number of African countries including Sierra Leone and Nigeria, both of which countries received his delegation but appeared by their public silence to have adopted an initial policy of wait and see.

In East Africa, Mr. Edward Akuffo Addo's delegation was not even received in Kenya and Tanzania. In Uganda and Malawi, the Heads of State were not themselves available to the delegation but government officials met them.

Meanwhile, Ghana's borders along the frontiers, which had been closed since 1962 when allegations of subversion were made against Upper Volta and Ivory Coast governments, were immediately opened to travel and trade. Togo and Dahomey announced their intention to purchase hydro-electric power from Ghana's Volta Dam.

The NLC's drive to gain acceptance in Africa reached its climax when it opened the floodgates to the secrets of Dr. Nkrumah's diplomacy. According to G.K. Blumey, when Dr. Nkrumah failed in 1963 to get the African Heads of State assembled in Addis Ababa to support his programme for immediate political Union of Africa, he decided upon political assassination and violence as the only other means

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left to him. (9) The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba was expanded to take in more students from all over Africa. The African Affairs Secretariat opened research units on each of the 29 states in the Monrovia group of states. Obosomase Camp, a training centre for freedom fighters, was opened in the heart of the Ashanti Forest.

At the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah's government, the objectives of all these institutions were made public. (10) The Obosomase Camp consisted of some 500 recruits from all parts of Africa. There were about a dozen instructors mainly from China and Cuba. The People's Republic of China provided equipment for the camp.

Many of the participants at the Ideological Institute and the Obosomase Camp made confessions about their training. The Ivory Coast, Liberia, Upper Volta and Gabon were the immediate targets of assault to pave the way for a Union of States in West Africa, which would embrace the rest with little trouble. Dr. Nkrumah had designs on Julius Nyerere's Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda's Zambia and on Mobutu Sese-Seko's Zaire.

These claims (or revelations) resulted in far-reaching diplomatic gains for the NLC government. At

the OAU Heads of State Meeting in 1967, General Joseph Ankrah, the NLC Chairman's contribution and impact resulted, partly at least, in the readiness with which the leaders of the rival factions in Nigeria's Civil War accepted his invitation to the Aburi Conference in Ghana at which the federal government delegation led by General Yakubu Gowon and the Biafran delegation under Colonel Odumegwu Ojuku attempted to reach an amicable solution to the conflict. Ghana continued (under the NLC) to support legitimate nationalist movements in Africa. The NLC continued its financial support for African students from South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa. By October 1969, when the NLC ceded political power to an elected government, Ghana was accepted in mainstream African politics. Ghana ranked among the first twenty member states of the OAU that had paid up their membership contributions. Refugees from all over Africa remained welcome in Ghana, but freedom fighters no longer received postal cheques from the government. Before long, Guinea released the remaining 34 Ghanaians who had been held in Guinea. No diplomatic relations were restored however.

The main thrust of NLC policy in Africa was towards the development of Regional Groups to further economic development. That was a definite shift of policy

from the erstwhile Nkrumah stance. Ghana's policy in the era of NLC rule was therefore geared towards co-operation among the States of West Africa.

Trade between the Ivory Coast, Togo and Upper Volta on one hand, and Ghana on the other, received a boost. Restrictions on the movement of goods and of people between Ghana and its neighbouring countries were removed. Ghana could once again import cattle and poultry from the Ivory Coast and export textiles from its Textile factory at Tema. Ghanaians bought French goods from the Ivory Coast and sold them in Ghana. Ghana's farmers regained access to their farms across the borders and free contact among the various ethnic groups along the frontiers was restored. In the end, Ghana was at peace with all but one State in West Africa, Guinea.

In the light of the Foreign Reference Group theory, this shift in emphasis from Pan-African to Regional (i.e. West African) co-operation and diplomacy is understandable. The shift was not simply a question of a return to rationality as was suggested by commentators on Radio Ghana. During the colonial period, the British authorities had stressed regional rather than continental co-operation in Africa. Thus regional institutions had been established to provide institutional support to their policies. The West

African Cocoa Board, the West African Currency Board, the West African Examinations Council are all examples of such regional institutions. At independence in 1957, such regional institutions were dissolved as a result of Dr. Nkrumah's policies. When the NLC assumed power they returned to regional diplomacy, partly as a matter of national self-interest but mainly to conform to what the NLC leaders, in their identification with British practice, considered the "correct" stance.

THE NLC AND THE EASTERN BLOC OF STATES

For all the homage paid to non-alignment, Ghana's policy immediately before the 1966 coup was one of indifference and hostility to the Western World in word and deed as was reflected in radio and press criticisms. The anti-West stance and pro-communist rhetoric was crowned with the launching of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's book, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism in 1965. Thenceforth, the Ghanaian Times and the Evening News (both owned by the government) carried on their front pages cartoons, that showed the American President, Lyndon Baines Johnson, as a hound devouring skinny Africans. The name of the hound was "John D. Imperialism" and its teeth were filled with rolls of American Dollar bills!

In June 1965, the CPP, the only party, sent delegates to the Conference of Communist States held in Moscow. The CPP was also represented at the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party which was held in Peking in July that year. (11)

All that was to change when the NLC assumed political power. The new government returned the 29 Russian-built fishing trawlers which had been lying idle since the departure of the Soviet technicians. Some 2500 Russian and Chinese experts were expelled from Ghana by the NLC. (12) Ghanaian students in Eastern bloc countries were either recalled or sent to educational institutions in the West. Russian-trained medical doctors were re-trained and re-tested by the medical authorities in Accra. All projects or schemes developed by Soviet or Chinese experts as well as several others undertaken by specialists from other socialist countries were either suspended, abandoned entirely or sold to foreign investors. The British Daily Telegraph newspaper of 10th March 1966, commented thus: "The new regime is pledged to pursue a policy of non-alignment while being friendly with all. But there is no mistaking the fair breeze blowing towards the Western camp at the moment." The identification with West's anti-communist stance was unmistakable.

The character of the NLC's policy toward the East, and Russia in particular, was determined in part by the circumstances in which the 1966 coup was carried out. Revelations by former CIA Colonel (G.S.14) John Stockwell (13) indicate that the NLC coup was coordinated by the American CIA operatives. John Stockwell further alleged that the CIA staff chief in Accra at the time, Howard Banes, was prepared to leave Ghana immediately if the coup against Nkrumah had failed. Stockwell said that the CIA group led by Banes got permission to purchase some Soviet intelligence materials that had been confiscated by the Ghanaian troops during the coup. Banes, though, was said to have been enraged by his superiors' plans to use the coup as an excuse to raid the Chinese Embassy in Accra and then blow it up. On Banes' insistence, this plan was shelved, according to Stockwell.

For his part Dr. Nkrumah had no doubt that he was overthrown by agents of the same CIA. His only regret was that "... it should have been an Afro-American ambassador (Franklin Williams) who sold himself out to the imperialists and allowed himself to be used in this way." (14) In Ghana, according to Nkrumah, Harlley, Kotoka, Afrifa and Deku were just the kind of men they were looking for.

This writer recalls quite clearly, the large numbers

of boxes of what the American Embassy in Accra called "food and essential medical aid" that were delivered to the military authorities during the first two weeks after the NLC coup. Rumours were rife in Accra that the boxes, in fact, contained arms and ammunition.

Western involvement with and, in particular, CIA support for the NLC coup plotters has yet to be formally proved but the fact of the matter is Professor W. Scott Thompson's correct view that the officers and police officials, who joined forces to overthrow Dr. Nkrumah's government, felt threatened by the Soviet Union and China and by their adherents in Ghana. (15) These officers were, therefore, emotional in expressing their gratitude to the Western powers for their prompt offers of support. Relations with the socialist eastern states were not completely severed, thanks to the economic and diplomatic advisors of the regime. These relations were, however, scaled down and remained cool. Suspicions of Soviet intentions in West Africa remained resulting in a crisis in October 1968 when two Soviet fishing trawlers were seized and their crews detained for some four months. Although Ghana's professional diplomats counselled against overreaction, the NLC stuck to its ground thus serving notice that Soviet probes would not be tolerated.

THE NLC, THE WEST AND THE COMMONWEALTH

As was to be expected, the NLC sought, energetically, to re-build Ghana's relations with the West. In this connection, general lines of policy were set by the NLC as a collective unit but the detailed day-to-day operations of the Foreign Ministry were left to the career diplomats. These, as well as other professionals (economists), played a major role in the NLC foreign policy. The Foreign Ministry became more streamlined and better used than was the case under Nkrumah. Ghana's foreign missions were reduced in number to conform to the country's needs. Ghana's diplomats and Embassies became more active and morale was generally high. Both Britain and America re-established their influence under the NLC regime.

Perhaps the most accurate description of the impact which Ghana and other African states made on the Commonwealth is provided by Dr. John Holmes, President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. According to him, "The arrival at the Commonwealth table by Ghana, followed by Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Tanzania (Tanganyika) made the Commonwealth genuinely multi-racial and intercontinental, strengthening thereby its role, more than ever

emphasised, as a bridge between East and West, North and South, a fraternity which links regions and blocs in a continent and in another dimension, a new force within the Commonwealth to help relieve old tensions. The whole structure became grander, more significant of its purpose and at the same time, more flexible." (16)

So deep was the country's attachment to the Commonwealth that when Ghana and other Commonwealth countries broke diplomatic relations with Britain over the Rhodesia issue, the only significant action that followed the action was the closing down of the United Kingdom High Commission in Accra and the lowering of the Union Jack. British High Commission officials were still in Accra and Ghana's officials were still in London when Dr. Nkrumah was overthrown five months afterwards.

Major (later, General) Atrifa expressed the attachment of the new regime to the Commonwealth thus: "One of the reasons for my bitterness against Kwame Nkrumah's rule was that he paid only lip-service to our membership of the Commonwealth of Nations and proceeded to undermine the bonds that bind us in this great union of people ... ; so far as this Commonwealth is concerned, Ghana should not be different from Canada, Australia or New Zealand. For

we have to learn to solve our problems like a family. Nkrumah made a mockery of this organization and, under the mask of African Unity and non-alignment, proceeded to discredit the Commonwealth and to put difficulties in its way." (17)

In order to show its profound attachment to the Commonwealth, the NLC regime sent the most distinguished among Ghanaian diplomats as High Commissioners to Commonwealth countries. Major Seth Anthony, a veteran diplomat and recipient of the Queen's Civil title, OBE, went to London. Mr. Justice William Van Lare, a member of the Supreme Court and also an OBE, went to Canada, while General Nathaniel Aferi, a product of Sandhurst, went to Australia. A paramount chief, Nana Anniesie Bissiaku X was sent to India, while General Samuel Otu was sent to Lagos.

Ghana also showed keen interest in the Conferences of Commonwealth Heads of Government which were held during the period of NLC rule. The Ghana delegation to the Ottawa Conference (1967) was led by J.W.K. Harlley, Vice-Chairman of the Council, NLC, while General Albert Ocran, a ranking member of the Council, led the delegation to the Singapore Conference. Major Afrifa twice represented the Government at

conferences of Commonwealth Finance Ministers held in London and Canberra.

Canada and Britain stepped up technical assistance in various forms to the Ghana Armed Forces. Between 1966 and 1970, over fifty Canadian Air Force engineers spent periods of time training Ghanaian fighters. Canada also donated six jet fighter planes and six "chipmunk" training aircraft to Ghana during the period. The Ghana Navy took delivery of two vessels donated for training and coast-guard duties from the United Kingdom government. A group of fifteen military officers spent time with troops in India. Britain and Ghana also exchanged a battalion each for training in warfare in each other's country. (18) The Judiciary in Ghana played host to several distinguished jurists from Britain. Professor W.B. Harvey, then at Cambridge University, returned for a brief period to the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana. (19)

Trade also received a boost. The world price of cocoa rose by 42 % a day after the coup and Britain, Canada and Australia increased their purchases from Ghana. (20) Ghana's exports to Commonwealth countries rose by 47 % while its imports rose by only 15 %. For the first time in many years, Ghana was thus able to register a trade surplus of \$ 115 million in the fiscal year 1966-67. (21)

Ghana's educational institutions also benefitted greatly from the newly formed Commonwealth Technical Assistance programme. In order to improve the teaching of the English language in Ghanaian schools, Britain agreed to send 200 qualified teachers to Ghana each year for five years. That was to anticipate the production of the required number of language teachers from the University of Cape Coast. Lord Todd, a distinguished British Scientist at Cambridge University, spent a year at the Ghana Atomic Research Centre to organise its programme. Cocoa, the main cash-crop, and the major element in Ghana's foreign exchange earning capability, received a good deal of attention. The Cocoa Research Institute, which had since 1961 ceased to be involved in any research work, was re-activated with the secondment of Dr. J.R. Thompson from Cambridge to the Institute. A grant totalling £ 150 000 came from Britain, Canada and Australia to further research in animal husbandry at the University of Ghana. (22)

At the end of its rule in 1969, the NLC had entrenched Ghana in the mainstream of Commonwealth affairs. Ghana continued to join in efforts aimed at putting pressure on Mr. Ian Smith's illegal government in Rhodesia. However, Ghana, like Nigeria and Sierra Leone, retained diplomatic relations with Britain and the other white nations of the Commonwealth.

When Zambia suggested that Britain be expelled from the Commonwealth, Ghana let it be known that such an action was unreasonable and would not therefore be supported. Throughout the period, the NLC considered the Commonwealth as a great institution from which Ghana could not separate itself.

THE NLC AND THE UNITED NATIONS (UN)

The policy of the NLC towards the UNO was outlined in part, at a news conference held by the Council in Burma Hall in Accra on March 2, 1966. (23) General Joseph Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, announced that the new government would remain in the UN and would scrupulously adhere to the principles of the Charter. Ghana, henceforth, Ankrah said, would respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. Ghana would also subscribe to the United Nations principle of settling all international disputes through negotiations and by other peaceful means. On finance, the General promised that Ghana would pay up its contribution to every agency of the organisation to which it belonged. The General concluded by saying that although the new government believed that a world body with power to enforce its own decisions was desirable, Ghana would not press for an immediate establishment of such a body but would join all other nations

in any meaningful effort towards the attainment of that end.

The last point marks a significant departure from the policy of Dr. Nkrumah's government towards the UN. Dr. Nkrumah sought support at various times to invest the UN with powers to enforce its decisions even against the claims of sovereign member states. During the Congo crisis, Dr. Nkrumah called on the world body to establish a political mandate over the young Republic in order to restore order to the Congo. (24) The implications for member states and their national sovereignties would have been serious in view of the organisation's Charter. Again, when Dr. Nkrumah as President of Ghana, addressed the General Assembly in 1962, he called on the world body to establish a standing armed force which, at the command of the Secretary-General and the Security Council, could move into any conflict area of the world to avert any confrontations. President Nkrumah also advocated the abolition of the veto powers of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In his view, the removal of the veto would enable all issues to get a fair hearing and all decisions to be taken by all parties concerned openly and democratically.

The NLC made it clear that such demands were unrea-

listic. Ghana's team in New York included veteran bureaucrats in Diplomatic Service. Among them were Mr. E.L.A. Mintah and L.C.Y. Senoo, both of whom joined the service in 1958. Contrary to its experience at the OAU meeting at Addis Ababa, the Ghanaian delegation had no difficulty in presenting its credentials. The mission voted consistently with the African and the Afro-Asian group.

General Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka, the real leader of the coup that toppled the Nkrumah government, led the first Ghana delegation to the organisation in August 1966. His speech was an affirmation of General Ankrah's pronouncements at home. Ghana would henceforth remain positively non-aligned and would vote on issues that came before the General Assembly solely on the basis of the facts as seen by its delegation and not on the basis of ideological affinity with any power bloc. That was also a departure from the voting pattern of the previous delegations when Dr. Nkrumah's government showed a lot of sympathy for the Eastern bloc of states. Ghana, between 1966 and 1969, sought no leading place at the United Nations and its delegations remained mild in their pronouncements on major issues.

CONCLUSION

What, then, were the major achievements of the NLC regime? An answer may be found at two levels. First, the regime's performance may be assessed in terms of some generalizable criteria according to which its effectiveness in attaining some intrinsically valuable goals is judged. Second, regime-specific criteria according to which the regime's performance will be evaluated in accordance with the goals and objectives set out by the regime itself.

The two sets of criteria may be mutually exclusive. Generalizable criteria (goals that are intrinsically good) might coincide with regime-specific criteria (goals a regime sets itself). The dichotomy is necessary for discussion only.

As a small developing country, what Ghana needs above all else is steady economic development that would result in increased prosperity for the Ghanaian people as a whole. Government and opposition groups, whether civilian or military, all accept this as being an intrinsically desirable national objective. In this regard, Ghana's economic relations with foreign countries should be such that Ghana works with but not for its neighbours as well as the Western and Eastern groups of economies.

A second national goal is active participation in Pan-African concerns, the belief being that African decolonisation history and national character demand it.

It may now be asked whether the NLC regime, by its foreign policy in the period 1966-1969, was effective in pursuing those national and other goals it set itself.

The point has been made that many of the policies and much of the quality and character of military rule in Ghana, is produced by, and therefore can be understood in terms of the extra-national reference group identifications of the officers in power.

Such foreign reference group identifications tend to produce non-nationalistic policies. During their rule the officers of the NLC pursued economic and other policies that adhered in a number of significant ways to this proposition. Indeed, the absence of economic nationalism displayed by the policies of the NLC was a major source of tension between the military and the civilian intelligentsia. (25) The general policy of the NLC in regard to the economic difficulties it had inherited from the Nkrumah government was to rely extensively on the managerial and financial

capacities of European and North American governments and businesses. Symbolic of the extent of this reliance is the fact that even the job of cleaning the streets of Accra was given to a foreign firm. The Ghanaian Times, under the headline "UK Firm to Clean Accra", noted that "a British company, Shelvoke and Drewry of Letchworth, South East England, has undertaken to clean up the present refuse problem facing Accra and that the firm was confident to clean all the garbage in a number of weeks." (26)

The particular aspect of the general reliance on foreign economic and managerial assistance that was most resented within Ghana was the NLC's handling of the State enterprises situation. The leaders of the coup had inherited from the Nkrumah government fifty-four state-owned enterprises, most of which were running at a loss. There were three ways in which the NLC attempted to deal with this inheritance: by engaging private business organizations to purchase the state enterprise; by entering into joint state-private ownership agreements; or by leasing the enterprise to a private business concern for a period of years. Naturally, in the case of the more substantial state enterprises, the business firms in question were foreign since only they had the requisite

capital. It should also be noted that this policy meant first, the "de-nationalization" of only the more profitable or potentially profitable enterprises, since these were the ones to which private entrepreneurs could be attracted; and second, the granting of import concessions to private firms so as to make up for the lack of financial attractiveness in the enterprises themselves.

One of the agreements signed under this policy, that with Abbott Laboratories of the United States to participate in the State Pharmaceutical corporation, led to widespread criticism that the NLC had failed to protect and foster Ghana's national interests and was part of the general pattern of events that led to disenchantment with military rule on the part of sectors of the population that had at first actively welcomed the military intervention against Dr. Nkrumah's government.

Under the "Abbott Agreement" the State Pharmaceutical Corporation was abolished and a new corporation, jointly owned by the Ghana government and the American Company, was formed in its place. The share capital of the new company was to be NC 1 000 000 (equivalent to one million dollars), with Abbott (Illinois) holding 45 percent of the shares through a contribution of \$ 450 000 and

the Ghana government holding 55 percent of the shares through the contribution of the existing pharmaceutical facility.

This portion of the agreement was the subject of strong criticism, since Ghanaian authorities had put the value of the pharmaceutical facility at not less than \$ 5 000 000. (27) Thus, Ghana could be said to be contributing almost seven times the amount that Abbott was contributing and was receiving only 10 percent more of the shares. Additional cause for complaint was the fact that the agreement gave Abbott-Ghana a ninety-nine-year lease on the property upon which the pharmaceutical plant was located at an annual rent of NC 1 (\$ 1). Further, the agreement stated that "there shall be no increase in the annual rental at any time" and that the lease is "subject to renewal at the option of Abbott for an additional ninety-nine years". (28) Despite the fact that the Ghana government owned 55 percent of the corporation, the Abbott-Ghana agreement stated that the American partner was "assured of complete control of the management", (29) and specified that it would have the power to appoint the company's Managing Director, the Chairman and a majority of the Board of Directors, and have complete responsibility and control in the areas of accounting,

personnel and marketing. In the later area, the agreement granted the American company a virtual monopoly to market in Ghana, products it manufactured in the United States. (30)

With the foregoing as background, it is not difficult to understand why Ghana's generally pro-government and moderate journal, the Legon Observer, stated that " ... it would appear incontestable that the agreement turns the State Pharmaceutical Corporation into a subsidiary of Abbott. This is considered unnecessary, humiliating and dangerous." (31) The announcement of the agreement was met by a torrent of economic nationalism from the mass media. Typical is this passage from an editorial in the Legon Observer: "In post-coup Ghana we are not only relying heavily on foreign investments, but seem to be doing so on the most flesh-creeping economic terms ... The terms of the (Abbott) contract are so inimical to the long term interests of Ghana that, on reading it, one begins to wonder whether the legal and economic advisers of the NLC have the economic interests of the country at heart." (32) The Military rulers met such nationalistic criticism by dismissing the editors of the two government-owned newspapers, intimidating the editor of the Legon Observer and declaring that they would sign the agreement "ten times over". (33) Abbott, for

its part, sensing the existence of a hostile environment, backed out of the agreement.

The absence of a nationalistic orientation in the economic sphere can also be observed in the NLC's handling of Ghana's debts. At the time of the coup Ghana had one of the worst foreign-debt servicing structures of any developing country, with payment of over 51 % of its external debt coming due within five years. (34) The reason for this situation was the reliance of the Nkrumah government on what are termed supplier credits to finance economic development. As his alternative sources of investment capital dried up, Nkrumah turned increasingly to the supplier-credit method of obtaining capital. Under this system, private companies lend capital directly to the recipient government in order to finance a project that the company itself will carry out. Often the loan is guaranteed by the government of the donor company. Such an arrangement lends itself naturally to "hard-sell" efforts by private businesses or capital-exporting countries attempting to increase their own profits or export earnings regardless of the economic implications for the borrower. (35) Under the supplier-credit arrangement, it is to the advantage of businesses to "sell" unneeded and even non-viable projects to the government of a developing country, since

the businesses will benefit not only from receiving the contract to execute the project but also from the interest on the risk-free loan it has given to finance it. Thus Ghana found itself saddled with a huge debt, a good proportion of which was made up of supplier-credit high-interest/short-term loans for numerous economic ventures of dubious viability. (36)

When the NLC assumed power it was faced with essentially two choices in regard to the country's foreign indebtedness. It could default on a good number of the debts, especially those involving supplier credits or it could ask the lending businesses and their national governments to negotiate a rescheduling of the debts to allow Ghana to improve its foreign-reserve position before having to assume the major burden of the debt.

The case for defaulting was a strong one and was favoured by many Ghanaian civilians as well as by some foreign economists advising the NLC at the time. It was argued that many of the supplier-credit loans had been arranged under corrupt and deceitful conditions involving the bribing of Ghana government officials by foreign businesses and the submission of misleading feasibility studies. (37) In addition, the political situation at the time of the coup

appeared to preclude significant adverse reaction on the part of the Western governments who had guaranteed the loans, because they, and particularly the Americans, were hardly likely to turn on the avowedly pro-Western NLC officers who had just overthrown Kwame Nkrumah's government.

The new military rulers, however, did not opt for such a nationalistic alternative, but instead decided to attempt to reschedule the debts. The reasoning behind the decision is not clear although Foreign Ministry sources say that the major reason was the notion that "a gentleman pays his debts". Whether a gentleman (supplier-credit donor) should cheat appears to be a different matter. The long-term consequences of the NLC's decision have been serious on Ghana's economic development.

As for Pan-Africanism, the NLC was lukewarm in its attitude. The regime's acceptance in Africa was not without difficulty. Indeed, the little African support it enjoyed came only after it had revealed the details of Nkrumah's so-called subversion in Africa. The main thrust of NLC policy in Africa was towards the development of Regional Groups to further economic development. But then, by deporting thousands of African nationals from Ghana, the regime did little to further that objective and indeed did much to provoke retaliation.

Ghana under the NLC foreign policy may have become a more acceptable friend of the West but the country's position in the East and in Africa was diminished.

As noted earlier, Ghana's trade with the West increased and the regime had some measure of success with its retrenchment and rationalisation policy at home. The effect of its foreign policy was, however, not outstanding.

1. Bluwey, G.K., explores this point at some length in his unpublished PhD Dissertation, Continuity and Change in Ghana's Foreign Policy in the Post-Nkrumah Era (1966-1975), Howard University 1976.
2. Nkrumah, Kwame, Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit., p.45.
3. In new Cedis (1 NC = \$ 0,98), Ghana had a deficit on current account (excluding debt servicing) of NC 200 million in 1965, NC 134 million in 1966, less than NC 20 million in 1967 and a surplus of NC 29 million in 1968, when there was an increase in exports from NC 244,9 million in 1967 to NC 341 million. Sources: West Africa, March 1, 1969, p. 249.
4. Ghanaian Times and Daily Graphic, March 3, 4, 6, 1966.
5. Afrifa, A.A., The Challenge of our Times, Government Printer Accra, June 1966.
6. See Ghanaian Times and Daily Graphic, April 6, 7, 8, 1966.
7. Ibid.

8. Nkrumah, Kwame, Dark Days in Ghana, Panaf, London, 1968, pp. 14-15.
9. The following section is based on Bluwey, C.K., Continuity and Change in Ghana's Foreign Policy, op. cit, pp. 128-138. Also see Appendices D and E.
10. See Kwame Nkrumah's Subversion in Africa, Government Printer Accra, 1966, and Legon Observer, Vol. 1 No. 10, pp. 8-16.
11. See The Spark, The Evening News, The Daily Graphic, The Ghanaian Times, June 1965 to January 1966.
12. Refer to Nkrumah, Kwame, Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit, p. 101.
13. Copies of a VHS cassette of a New African magazine interview with John Stockwell are available from Diverse Reports, 6 Gorleston Road, London W14 8XS, England.
14. See Chapter Three of Dark Days in Ghana by Kwame Nkrumah, op. cit. for an illuminating treatment of the CIA's activities in Africa.
15. Professor W. Scott Thompson discusses these

and other aspects of the NLC's foreign policy in an article entitled: "Ghana's Foreign Policy Under Military Rule." See African Report, May-June 1969. I am greatly indebted to him for the following section.

16. John Holmes, "The Impact on the Commonwealth of the Emergence of Africa", in Padelford, M.J. and Emerson, R. (eds.) Africa and World Order, Praeger, New York 1964, p. 28.
17. Afrifa, A.A., The Ghana Coup, op. cit., p. 108.
18. The Armed Forces Review, Public Relations Directorate of the Ghana Armed Forces, Accra 1968.
19. Kwabong, A.A., Vice-Chancellor's Address to Convocation, 1968, Ghana University Press, Accra 1968.
20. Basil Davidson has claimed that Dr. Nkrumah's final downfall was caused by international manipulation of the "world price" for cocoa, Ghana's major export. In 1965 (a year before the coup) the year of the country's greatest cocoa production (494,000 tons), the world price fell to its lowest point in modern times.

The claim may, or may not, be valid. What is known is that the prices of nearly all primary commodities, including cocoa, have continued to fluctuate inspite of Nkruman's overthrow. Refer to pp. 98-170 of Davidson, Basil, Black Star, Panaf, London, 1975.

21. Ghana Economic Survey 1968, Government Printer, Accra.
22. British Council Review 1968, British Council, Accra 1968.
23. Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, March 3, 1966.
24. Refer to Chapter 20 of: Nkrumah, Kwame, Challenge of the Congo, Panaf, London 1974.
25. The development of this tension can be traced in the pages of the Legon Observer published and largely written by the academic staff of the University of Ghana.
26. Ghanaian Times, January 9, 1969, p. 1.
27. Radix, A, "Foreign Participation in State Enterprise: Case of Abbott Laboratories (Ghana) Ltd", Legon Observer II, November 1967, p. 4.

28. Legon Observer II, December 1967, p. 26. Note that Abbott, not Abbott-Ghana, is the party with the lease option.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid 27.
31. Legon Observer II, December 1967, p. 28.
32. "National Self-Reliance or Dependence?" Legon Observer II, November 1967.
33. The "ten times over" statement was made by R.S. Amegashie, the then civilian Commissioner for Industries and the Head of the NLC's contract negotiating committee. Cf. Legon Observer II, December 1967, p. 28.
34. Scott, Douglas A., "External Debt-Management Policy in a Developing Country" in T.J. Farrer, (ed.) Financing African Development, Cambridge, Mass, 1965, pp. 58-59.
35. Scott, Douglas A., op. cit. p. 55.
36. Scott, Douglas A., ibid.

37. Cf. Arhin, Kwame, "Why should we let Sleeping Dogs Lie?" Legon Observer IV, November 1969, pp. 11-12.

CHAPTER FIVE

GHANA BETWEEN THE COUPS, 1969 - 1972

The National Liberation Council (NLC), formed by the officers responsible for the February 24, 1966, coup d'etat in Ghana, handed over the reigns of power to the Progress Party government led by Professor Kofi Busia in October 1969. That this disengagement from politics was the most complete ever undertaken by a ruling military force is evidenced by the retirement of all the military members of the NLC once power was firmly in the hands of the Busia government. The Progress Party leadership was "almost wholly merchant-professional middle class in composition". (1) In ethnic terms, the supporters of the Progress Party (PP) were primarily Akan - particularly those in Brong/Ahafo, Ashanti and Central Regions. The opponents of the PP were mainly Ewe and non-Akans living in areas directly adjacent to the Akans.

The Busia government took office with the support of the civil servants, the students, the cocoa farmers and the top military leaders. The only groups which may have viewed the accession to power of the new government with trepidation were the trade unionists and the urban unemployed, since it was

the avowed aim of the PP to develop the rural areas which the party claimed (with some justification) had been ignored by the CPP under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. At the time of the 1969 election, 25 percent of the wage-labour force was unemployed.

Although Ghana's substantial external debt had not been paid in the intervening years, the time when Ghana would have to begin to make payments on the debt was postponed as a result of the two re-scheduling conferences which had been held in 1966 and again in 1968 and 1970. An addition to the Busia government's financial difficulties was the fact that Ghana had no foreign exchange reserves in 1969. In December of that year, the net foreign exchange holding of the Central Bank was approximately NC 11 million (in 1969, E 1 = NC 2,4). Ghana's major earner of foreign exchange was cocos; the price of that commodity had risen dramatically between 1966 and 1969. (2) Consequently the outlook was more favourable for Ghana to bring its imports and exports into balance and to acquire enough hard currency to make the payments on the debt which would start falling due in 1970. However, none of the economic predictions came to pass, leading to the erosion of support for the government because it was forced to retrench sharply to stem the tide of bankruptcy.

THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC DECAY IN GHANA

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah's government left Ghana a mixed record of economic accomplishment and failure. In terms of domestic savings, Ghana had moved in nine years from the position of holding substantial external assets to a negative position. In 1957, external assets totalled approximately \$ 450 million; by 1966, liabilities amounted to approximately \$ 550 million. (3)

Ghana, under Nkrumah's government, was dependent on external financing. "Gross domestic savings in 1957-59 exceeded gross public investment; by 1963-65 very little of gross investment was being covered by domestic resources. In the public sector, less than 15 % of budgeted investment expenditure in 1963-65 was financed out of government savings." (4)

Export growth had low priority in the 1957-66 period. Diversification of agricultural exports was non-existent. Nevertheless, lacking external reserves or expanding exports, Ghana continued to spend on development and domestic investment. Foreign borrowing, aid, or investment were the means chosen to continue development programmes. After 1962 suppliers' credits became the major form of borrowing.

The quality of economic decision-making in the 1961-66 period was rather low by all accounts. "The economy suffered periodic scarcities of raw material inputs and spare parts, particularly in 1965. According to some observers in Ghana at the time, about 70 % of the total manufacturing capacity of the country was utilized in 1965 because of lack of inputs and spares." (5) The growth of the public sector placed severe strains on the country's administrators who had not been trained to evaluate, select and manage development projects. Added to all these difficulties was the declining price of cocoa on the world market. Cocoa provided approximately 60 % of Ghana's export earnings: although cocoa exports doubled between 1957 and 1965, the average earning at the beginning and at the end of the period was the same.

The NLC retrenched Ghana's economy on several fronts. Rampant borrowing ceased, public investment declined, the national currency, the cedi, was de-valued, and debts were re-scheduled. The NLC did not reduce consumption or budgetary increases (most of which went to salaries). In the opinion of one observer, the NLC period represented "at best a breathing space with a partial consolidation but little positive action and less long-term politico-economic rethinking." (6) The Busia government, for the most

part, continued the economic policies of the NLC.

ECONOMIC DECAY UNDER BUSIA

The PP government under Dr. Busia continued to seek a resolution to the debt problem. The UK sponsored meetings of Ghana's major creditors in 1966, 1968 and again in 1970. At each of these meetings (which were also attended by representatives from the IMF and the World Bank) the creditors were able to agree merely on a delay of payments for a year or two. In exchange for these delays a moratorium interest charge was added to the principal amount. The moratorium interest added about £ 35 million to the original debt. As a result of the re-scheduling, Ghana had been paying only about 10 percent of the amounts falling due on the medium term debts. The 1970 Conference decided that between 1970 and 1972, Ghana would be granted relief on 50 % of the amount due, both on principal and interest. Even with the delays, Ghana still made \$ 23,5 million debt payments in the year 1970-71 and was scheduled to pay \$ 36,3 million in 1971-72. The latter figure did not represent any increased ability to pay on the part of Ghana. It was simply the result of the formula used by the re-financing conferences. The debt repayments were substantial when seen against the background of Ghana's total budget for 1971-72

which budget totalled NC 459 million. (7)

The PP government, realizing the inability of the country to meet the payments, pressed for a composite re-financing loan which would have provided for a fifty-year repayment period, including a ten-year grace period with only a 2 % moratorium interest charge. But the creditors would not accept the proposal.

In November 1971 the IMF again sent a team to Ghana, which recommended another delay in the repayment of the debt, in exchange for a display of action by the Ghanaian government, proving that it intended to deal realistically with its deficit in foreign trade through import restrictions, de-valuation and increased exportation.

It may be observed that the CPP government debts were not the basis for the financial crisis in the last months of the PP government under Dr. Busia. That crisis was, instead, due to the size of Ghana's internal debt and its short-term debt which had increased under PP government. In 1970-71, Ghana's internal indebtedness stood at NC 626,2 million, a figure much greater than the country's total external debt. (8) This figure included National Development Bonds, Treasury Bills, Cocoa Marketing Board

loans and Bank of Ghana loans. Internal debts do not have to be paid in hard currency and at first glance appear to be extraneous to Ghana's economic problems. But the printing of new money to pay domestic debts led to increased inflation. In 1969, the previous year, the servicing on Ghana's internal debt amounted to NC 40 million.

The really pressing debts, however, were short-term ones. Ghana owed NC 200 million in commercial credits (mostly 180 day credits) and NC 60 million in arrears on dividends and profits from foreign investments. ⁽⁹⁾ Many of Ghana's commercial suppliers were insured under the UK Export Credit Guarantees Department. Under such a plan, creditors would be paid by the Department if the debtor failed to repay after 120 days. Ghana had been keeping precisely 120 days behind, not testing the principles. But to have continued to do that would have involved borrowing more money. Ghana's foreign exchange position did not improve under the PP government. Whereas at the end of 1970, Ghana's net foreign exchange holdings stood at NC 26 million, by December 1971 that figure had fallen to NC 8,5 million. ⁽¹⁰⁾ The deficit represented money owed to foreign banks. The only substantial new foreign investment in Ghana since Nkrumah's overthrow had been the building of a brewery.

Although Ghana was getting small amounts of foreign aid, a significant share of that aid went to debt servicing. After the 1972 coup, Dr. Busia admitted that Ghana was "utterly bankrupt" and unable to buy imports from suppliers who obviously cannot be paid from Ghana's own resources." (11) In an attempt to solve the problem of the short-term debt, Dr. Busia, Mr. J.H. Mensah, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, William Ofori-Atta, visited the US, the UK and Mexico. In addition, an IMF team came to Accra. Details of the arrangements worked out at the time were not revealed, but they seem to have included a plan for Ghana to go on a cash basis in its foreign dealings. The plan involved borrowing between \$ 170 and \$ 270 million (two-thirds of it in the UK and the rest in the US). Such a loan would have enabled Ghana to transfer most of the short-term debt to medium-term debt at much more favourable interest rates. In return, Ghana was to de-value the cedi and thus reduce the level of imports. The import deficit for 1970 was only NC 15 million, but the figure was artificially low and could not have been continued without greatly increasing the rate of smuggling across the country's borders. A year later, the deficit had risen to NC 70 million.

THE PP GOVERNMENT AND COCOA

The PP government's inability to pay Ghana's debts was compounded by problems experienced with the country's major export and foreign exchange earner, cocoa. The CPP government under Dr. Nkrumah encouraged increased cocoa production to increase foreign exchange earning. In 1964-65 Ghana experienced a record cocoa crop of 567 000 tons which gave the country almost 40 % of the world cocoa market. Since that date, Ghana's cocoa output has fluctuated between 325 000 and 415 000 tons. The over-supply of cocoa that resulted from the large 1964-65 crop pushed cocoa prices down from \$ 840 per ton in 1958 to an all-time low of \$ 204 in July 1965, (12) Ghana's cocoa production for 1968-71 is presented in the following table. (13)

YEAR	GHANA'S OUTPUT	WORLD OUTPUT	GHANA'S PERCENTAGE OF MARKET
1968	327 000	1 210 000	26 %
1969	414 300	1 410 000	29 %
1970	396 200	1 461 000	28 %
1971	404 000	1 600 000	26 %

At the same time that the PP government was unable to increase cocoa production, the world price of

cocoa had been falling. In 1970, the average price of cocoa was \$ 790 a ton; in 1971 it was \$ 470 a ton and in 1972 market price fell as low as \$ 360, as a result of the large crops in all of the major producing areas. It was the Ghanaian budget, rather than the Ghanaian cocoa farmers who suffered from the declining cocoa prices. The prices paid to the cocoa farmers were stable during the Busia regime. In 1969, Ghanaian cocoa farmers received NC 8 per load for their cocoa (up from NC 7 the previous year). Cocoa prices remained constant for the next two years, rising in 1972 to NC 10. ⁽¹⁴⁾ The drop in cocoa prices was absorbed by the cocoa Marketing Board.

Before the 1971 harvesting season, a new cocoa purchasing scheme was introduced which led to delays in payments to the cocoa farmers. One month after the cocoa buying season opened, the Cabinet approved a sum of NC 10 million to pay for purchases in the Ashanti region which supplied most of the cocoa and the PP's supporters.

Declining cocoa prices exacerbated both Ghana's balance-of-payment difficulties and increased budget deficit. The decision to de-value the cedi by 44 percent in December 1971 (a decision which immediately provoked the 1972 coup) was supposed to be an

answer to these difficulties.

1. Kraus, Jon, "Arms and Politics in Ghana" in Welch, op. cit., p. 218.
2. Cocoa prices in London had fluctuated between a low of £ 98 per ton in September 1965 and a high of £ 376 per ton in March 1969. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review for Ghana, No. 2, 1969 and No. 3, 1970.
3. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah has explained that the external debt resulted from the rapid industrialisation programme of his government. See Dark days in Ghana, op. cit.
4. Berg, Elliot, in Aristide Zolberg and Philip Foster, (eds.), Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1971, p. 193.
5. Berg, Elliot, op. cit., p. 204.
6. Ibid.
7. See United Nations, Economic Commission on Africa, Data No. 41, p. 21.
8. Ibid.

9. Much of the latter figure involved repatriation of assets by British firms. See Nkrumah, Kwame, Dark Days in Ghana, op. cit.
10. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, July 25, 1972, No. 7, p. 153.
11. See Ghanaian Times, January 22, 1972.
12. These figures are derived from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review for Ghana, op. cit.
13. Ibid.
14. See West Africa, January 21, 1972, p. 58.

CHAPTER SIX

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION COUNCIL/
SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL (NRC/SMC), 1972 - 1978

The National Liberation Council government voluntarily surrendered political power to an elected civilian government on October 1, 1969. Speaking at a reception given in his honour by the Ghana Armed Forces during the celebrations to mark the inauguration of the Second Republic, General H.T. Alexander, the last of the succession of British Officers to command the Ghana Armed Forces, welcomed the inauguration as "one more manifestation of Sandhurst discipline in loyalty to constituted authority." (1)

Such "loyalty to constituted authority" by the armed forces was, however, short-lived. The rapid expansion of the army and officer corps after 1961 may well have created a new officer generation, one which had experienced much less British influence in training and so tended to be overtly more nationalistic and self-reliant in its policies.

On 13 February 1972, only twenty six months after the inauguration of the Second Republic, a detachment of the Ghana Army stationed in Accra, took advantage of the visit to Britain by the Prime Minis-

ter, Dr. Kofi Busia, to overthrow the government, suspend the constitution and invest itself with sole authority to administer the country. (2)

Supreme political and legal authority thence rested with the NRC. It was initially composed of nine military officers and one policeman. Lieutenant Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, Commander of the First Infantry Brigade, became its Chairman and Head of State. The heads of the three wings of the Ghana armed forces, the Air Force, the Navy and Army were members. Two officers at the Joint Forces Headquarters were also included. Three other officers, all of the rank of Major who supported Lieutenant Colonel Acheampong in the take-over exercise, were included in the Council. (3) It is significant to note that the new government accused the Busia government before it, of showing no interest in Pan-African affairs.

THE CAUSES OF THE COUP D'ETAT

The salient factor leading to the coup d'etat appears to have been the refusal of the government, in the face of deepening economic crisis, to accede to the financial demands of the military.

THE MILITARY AND THE JULY BUDGET

The July 1971 Budget was meant to be an austerity budget, a signal to both the extravagant Ghanaian elite and international financiers, that the government was going to make an effort to deal realistically with Ghana's economic problems. The budget provided for a ban on all imports of cars, television sets, cigarettes, soda, aluminium sheeting, fruit, poultry and crude rubber. There was also an increase in petrol duty. Vehicle maintenance allowances for civil servants and army officers were to be abolished from the first of August and the National Development Levy reduced further, public officials' take-home pay.

In the July Budget, the PP government further increased military resentment by attempting to cut military costs and to increase the productivity of the forces. The military suffered corporately under the new budget because the expenditures of the Ministry of Defence were reduced from NC 45 million in the 1970 budget (which was a reduction from the 1969 figure of NC 49,1 million), to NC 40,4 million. (NC 31,4 million for recurrent expenditure and NC 9 million for capital expenditure). When the Finance Minister, J.H. Mensah, introduced the new budget, he reminded the Assembly that the government had

been faced "with the problem of what to do about a level of Defence expenditure which was clearly onerous for a small country such as ours." (4)

J.H. M. ...ah's statement was motivated as much by expediency as by budgetary realities. Reductions in defence expenditure would satisfy the demands of Ghana's major international creditors to effect selective cuts in government expenditures consistent with the programme of economic development. The most severe cuts were experienced by the Air Force and the Navy, both bodies clearly superfluous to Ghana's limited defence requirements.

The Navy had not expanded for several years; its ships were in need of refitting but there was no money available for that purpose. The ships were reported to be in such poor shape that they could not be sailed for refitting. The "Achimota", the old Flag Ship of the Naval Chief of Staff, was decommissioned and was being offered for scrap. In addition, part of the Sekondi Naval Base was turned into a fishing harbour. The Air Force was not expanding either, no new planes had been bought for many years and very little flying time was logged on the planes already acquired because of the very high cost of fuel.

The army also had its share of cuts: the parachute battalion at Tamale was disbanded. It was later reformed as the Seventh Battalion at Takoradi to keep some airborne capability but, still too costly, the entire battalion was disbanded and the personnel absorbed into other units. There were also unconfirmed reports that the Seventh Battalion was suspected of plotting against the Busia government.

Under the new budget the military, like all other government importers, was expected to pay taxes on items ordered from overseas, thus making repair and replacement a great deal more expensive than previously.

The net result of cutting back the budget while maintaining the size of the establishment was that there was very little money for activities such as exercises, training and ammunition. Restriction on imports led to real supply and parts problems; as a result, many vehicles were simply not locally repairable. One knowledgeable observer estimated in the Fall of 1971 that "half of the total number of military vehicles were not road-worthy." (5)

Another corporate problem faced by the Ghana military was the question of the role of forces. After almost fifteen years of independence, the role of the mili-

tary was still unclear. The army itself saw its main (and possibly sole) role as one of guarding the nation against its foreign enemies. To the Busia government this role appeared either insufficient or non-existent. They found it difficult to justify enormous expenditure on an institution that contributed so little to the economic and social well-being of the nation. Consequently, they sought new ways to utilize the forces. Since April 1970, the military had been supporting the police in an anti-smuggling campaign on the borders. In addition, in September 1970 joint police-military operations against crime began. The army medical corps was active in the anti-cholera drive and the air force provided flood relief aid in the north. But despite these activities, Ghanaians were still left with the feeling that the military could be more useful. The National Union of Ghana Students suggested, in the Summer of 1970, that the technical branch of the Ghana army should be used in agricultural and constructional work. The Minister of Defence, J. Kwesi Lamptey, said at that time that the Ghana army would only be used for defence purposes. But a year later, after the Ministry of Defence had changed hands, a Northerner, Alhaji B.K. Adama became Defence Minister, and Ghana's financial conditions had worsened, the attitude toward reconstruction work changed. In the July budget, Mensah was able

to announce that "... it is possible to combine ... training with substantial contributions to national development. Therefore during this financial year, it has been arranged that whenever units ... go out on training exercises they will seek to leave behind them some positive development project ... by way of roads or sanitary buildings." (6)

But the corporate indignities of the new budget did not hurt the officers as much as the personal losses they experienced due to deprivation of income and perquisites. The Development Levy and the vehicle maintenance allowance have already been mentioned, but it is worth noting the impact of the vehicle maintenance allowance. A typical major who was taking home NC 215 a month under the old budget would only receive NC 125 under the new budget. (7) The government had also eliminated or curtailed the free water and electricity that had been supplied to the officers. In addition, the telephone allowance was cut and the percentage of their salaries withheld by the government for rent payments was increased from 7,5 to 15 percent, previous to the introduction of the budget in July.

In addition to the cuts in allowances, an acute cut in pay scales was also rumoured. (8) The final blow to the financial well-being of the Ghanaian

elite came at the end of December when the Busia government dramatically announced that the cedi would be devalued by 44 percent. In terms of real income for those living in western style in Ghana, 44 percent devaluation may have represented a loss of as much as 25 percent of an individual's purchasing power. The effect of the devaluation was immediate, due to the danger of profiteering and hoarding.

The military's antagonism to a policy of retrenchment at their expense was so evident that after the coup Busia dismissed the event as "just (an) officers' amenities coup arising from their grievances at my efforts to save money." (9)

The Busia government fully realized that the corporate and financial grievances of the officer corps were making it highly probable that the military would move against the government. In the words of Gamal Nasser, "a shabby army (is) a potentially disloyal army." (10) To forestall the eventuality of a coup, numerous changes were made in top military appointments.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE HIGH COMMAND

After the Busia government had taken over in 1969, the military's internal command and control capabi-

lity had been damaged, according to Jon Kraus, "and ambitions and further plotting nurtured, by the break in the chain of command and the arrest of senior officers at the time of the 1966 coup and during later attempts, and by the gradual elimination of many senior officers." (11) The virtual decimation of the high command came in three stages. First was the retirement of the officers associated with the Nkrumah regime (this group included General Aferi, Colonels Hassan Ashitey, Zanlerigu, Kuti and Assassie, and Majors S. Acquah, Achaab and Asante). Retired at a later date, were officers whose position at the time of the 1967 abortive counter-coup had been unclear: these included General Bruce, Admiral Hansen and several younger officers. The next group of retirements came when the National Liberation Council handed over power to the Busia government, and all the military members of the NLC retired - Generals Afrifa, Ankrah and Ocran. Two top officers were killed in the two coups: General Barwah in the February coup and General Kotoka in that of April. The third group of officers lost to the army were those seconded to run other public bodies: this list included Colonel Ewa who became the director in charge of administration for the Ghana Legion; Major A.J. Cobbina, the chief transport officer of Omnibus Services Authority; Major-General D.C.K. Amenu, director of the National Service Corps;

Colonel C.K. Yarboi, deputy-general manager for administration of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation; Colonel Sanni-Thomas to the State Protocol Section of the President's Office. Colonel Quaye became head of the Navy, and four officers not in special favour with the government became Military Attaches abroad (Bonsu, London; Okai, Washington; Kattah, New Delhi; and Coker-Appiah, Addis Ababa). The result of all these shifts was that one-half of those who held ranks of lieutenant-colonel, or above, at the time of the 1966 coup were not available in 1970. The command structure of the military was weak and inexperienced.

The retirement of the top officers meant rapid promotions for those officers who were in the middle ranks and in the good graces of the NLC or the Busia government. The colonels and brigadiers were typically young and inexperienced and as a result there were serious promotion blockages facing the junior officers, particularly because the military establishment had not been expanding. (By 1970 the Ghana Military Academy which had intakes as large as 120 men in the early 1960s had cut back intakes to only 25 men a year).

Scholars have long noted the fact that officers in developing countries have the administrative

skills needed to promote modernization. (12) The assignment of a sizable portion of the officer corps to bureaucratic functions may have a disintegrative effect on the military institution that has not been previously examined.

Further changes in the top command came in the Fall of 1971. Lieutenant-General Mike Otu had been appointed Chief of Defence Staff in March 1968; he still held that position in the Summer of 1971, at which time he strenuously protested to the cuts in the military budget. There were reports that he objected to the diminished budget to the extent that he was considering resigning in protest. This never came to pass; instead, Otu quietly retired and was rewarded with a new position by the Busia government. Major-General D.K. Addo, the former Army Commander, was appointed acting Chief of Defence Staff; Brigadier J.R.K. Acquah, the former Director of Military Intelligence, became acting Army Commander; and Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Osei-Owusu, acting Commander of the Second Infantry Brigade. In mid-November another reorganization began; Brigadier Acquah was forced to resign after informing the government that he planned to retire early in 1972, to enter the building industry "while he was still young." Due to the earlier retirement date he lost many of his retirement benefits. He was replaced by Bri-

gadier Twun-Barima, who had previously been head of the First Infantry Brigade in Accra. His position at First Infantry Brigade Headquarters was filled by Lieutenant-Colonel Acheampong. This appointment proved to be a fatal mistake for the Busia government.

THE PROCESS OF INTERVENTION

At about 2 a.m. on January 13 troops of the First Brigade began to move on key installations in the capital: these included the radio station, the airport, external communications and the castle. The logistics of the coup were relatively simple; all these installations were guarded by the Fifth Infantry Battalion which had been Acheampong's battalion command in 1970. What has come to light from subsequent interviews is that Acheampong had been thinking of engineering a coup in 1970; but only to the extent that he had begun to plan what he would do if he were ever in control of the First Infantry Brigade. His planning was interrupted when he was sent to Trinidad to serve on the court martial of officers who had mutinied against the government of Eric Williams. Suddenly, however, in November he found himself in control of the First Brigade. The period between November and January was sufficient for the short period of pre-coup conspiratorial

activity characteristic of non-ideological coups. In intervention based on ideological motivation, on the other hand, "the actual coup itself is often preceded by years of discussion and preparation. The Thai Promoters of 1932 grew out of the organized discussions of civilian students and younger military officers in Paris in the 1920s. In Egypt the cadets at the military college organized discussions on "The Social and Political Unrest in 1938" (13).

Up until this point, Acheampong's career had not been unusual. Born in Kumasi in September 1931, he earned the General Certificate of Education "O" level, and later worked as a teacher, secretary and school principal. In 1958, when he was 27, he joined the army. In March 1959 he passed out of the Mons Officer Cadet Training Unit in Great Britain. In 1962-63 he served with the Ghana forces in the Congo. Later he attended Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, although he never held a staff appointment. Acheampong served as a Chairman of the Administrative Commission of the Western Region under NLC. Before taking over the Fifth Battalion he had been commanding officer of the Sixth Battalion at Takoradi.

Acheampong belongs to a class of officers who were shut out of promotions because they were not affilia-

ted with the group that brought off the 1966 coup. As Acheampong so plaintively explained, Afrifa had been a company commander of his, and now Afrifa was a retired Lieutenant-General. (14) Men such as Twum-Barima, who like Acheampong had been Lieutenant-Colonels in 1967, were Brigadiers while the latter remained only a Colonel. Colonel Bernasko, one of the Regional Commissioners under the new military government, assured a group of Ghanaian students after the coup that "escalating promotions", which had characterized the NLC period, "is unlikely to be heard of this time." (15)

Acheampong and the few majors who had served under him in previous postings - the only people he trusted with the plans for the coup - can best be described as the non-politicians of the army. These were the line rather than the staff officers. (16) The small group instrumental in the coup seems to have included Major Baah, the Deputy Commander of the Fifth Infantry Battalion, Accra, and Acheampong's former second in command; Major K.B. Agbo, the Commander of the First Infantry Battalion, Tema; Major A. Selormey, the Commander of the Cavalry Regiment; and Major R. Felli, the Commander of the First Signals Regiment. The group may also have included Lieutenant-Colonel C.D. Benni, the Commander of the Third Battalion at Sunyani. All these men were junior to Acheam-

pong; having served under him in the past. In terms of ethnic affiliations, Acheampong is an Ashanti; Baah a Brong; Selormey and Agbo, Ewes; Benni is a Dagarti; and Felli a Northener. Friendships based on career patterns seem to have been more important than ethnic considerations; however, many Ewe officers had felt that they were badly treated by the Busia government. According to Philippe Decraene, the opposition to the PP government centred among the Ewes: "the Ewes had a big hand in bringing about Kwame Nkrumah's downfall in February 1966, and they considered that they have been inadequately rewarded for their part in spearheading the drive against Osagyefo." (17) Several Ewe officers had either been stripped of their ranks or assigned to less vital functions, according to the same report. In 1967 there were five high-ranking Ewe army officers; Kotoka's death in the 1967 abortive coup and the transfer of Quaye to the Navy left three. Amenu, who had been Deputy Chief of Defence Staff when the Busia government came to power was pushed out and transferred to the National Service Corps against his will. Kattah had been exiled as military attaché in New Delhi, but he was called back to Ghana a few months before the coup to face charges of theft arising out of the 1966 coup. Instead of a court martial, he was given a public trial. As a result of these changes Tevie was the only high-ranking

Ewe officer at the time of the 1972 coup.

Busia was in London at the time of the coup. As Luttwak has observed, coup makers often wait until the head of government is unavailable. (18) His Cabinet Ministers were easily arrested, along with President Akufo-Addo and Chief of Staff Addo, the Head of the Army, Twum Barima, and the Head of Military Intelligence, Hamidu. The most pressing problem for the conspirators in the first hours after the coup was whether the Second Infantry Brigade Group in Kumasi (the centre of Busia's support) would accept the coup. The Chief Regional Executive in Ashanti, Maxwell Owusu, went on radio to say that the coup had failed, but the third in command, Captain David Weir of the Fourth Battalion, later denounced Mr. Owusu's statement. The same day Lieutenant General Afrifa visited Acheampong to declare that he supported the coup and considered himself a friend. But Afrifa was arrested on the morning of the fifteenth for plotting with Colonel Osei-Owusu, the head of the Second Brigade, to overthrow Acheampong by bringing troops down from Kumasi to challenge the troops in control of Accra. This plan was in some respects similar to Afrifa's 1966 coup.

The remarkable thing about the small group of offi-

cers arrested in the first days of the coup (Generals Afrifa and Aido , Brigadiers Twum-Barima, Hamidu and Osei-Owusu) is that they were all Sandhurst men. Regardless of ethnicity or politics these men appear to have been loyal to the Busia government. For this loyalty they had been rewarded by rapid promotion. Osei-Owusu, for example, was a brigadier while his former peers were still colonels.

Acheampong was faced with the difficulties inherent in naming a ruling council. The first broadcast gave the composition of the newly formed National Redemption Council (NRC) as: Colonel Acheampong, Major Kwame Baah, Commander Boham, Major Selorney, Lieutenant Colonel Banor, Lieutenant Colonel Benni, and Mr E.N. Moore (Attorney-General). New regional commissioners were also named:

N A M E	REGION	ETHNIC ORIGIN	AGE
COLONEL AUJETEY	GREATER ACCRA	GA	7
COLONEL NYANTE	EASTERN	AKWAPI	42
COLONEL ACYRKUN	WESTERN	FANTI	48
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BAIDOO	ASHANTI	FANTI	39
MAJOR HABADAN	VOLTA	EWE	43
COMMANDER KYERENAJI	BRONG/AHAFO	BRONG	30
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IDRISSE	NORTHERN	GONGA	36
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MINYILA	UPPER	?	7
COLONEL BERNASO	CENTRAL	FANTI	41

There is no single career pattern uniting the new

commissioners. Five of the regional commissioners had received their military education in Great Britain; Idrissa and Minyila at Sandhurst, Baidoo at Mons, Kyeremah at Dartmouth Naval College, Nyante at Eaton Hall. Two of the commissioners had held administrative posts under the NLC, two held staff appointments before the coup, one is a university graduate, and two had served in the pre-independence army as enlisted men.

At 6 a.m. on the thirteenth, Acheampong announced the reasons for the coup over the air. He first charged that the corruption, economic mismanagement, and other malpractices that had characterized the Nkrumah government had been equally in evidence in the Busia government. He then cited what were, in fact, the essential motivating factors:

"The first people which Busia put his eyes on were the armed forces and police. Some army and police officers were dismissed under the pretext of retirement. Some officers were put in certain positions to suit the whims of Busia and his colleagues. Then he started taking from us the few amenities and facilities which we in the armed forces and the police enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime. Having lowered morale in the armed forces and the police to the extent that officers could not exert any

meaningful influence over their men, so that by this strategy coming together to overthrow his government was to him impossible, he turned his eyes on the civilians." (19)

It was clear that Acheampong, as the leader of a coup motivated by the self-interest of the military, had no real political objectives; he suggested no new policies or dramatic changes. He merely called for a review of the important decisions taken by the Busia government: the Cocoa Purchasing Scheme; the Development Levy; the Rural Development Programme; the Devaluation of the Cedi; and the expulsion of the aliens. (20) The only positive suggestion made, dealt with the unemployment problem; he called for the re-introduction of the Workers' Brigade and the State Farms. (21)

In a broadcast a few hours later, Acheampong stated that the Progress Party had been banned along with all the opposition parties, Dr. Busia had been removed from office, and the leader of the opposition would also be dismissed. Since Acheampong had shared his secret with few people, new appointments had not been ironed out in secret before the coup; it was now that the jockeying for positions began. The next few days saw incredible activity as army, naval and air force officers all attempted

to gain positions on the NRC, ministerial portfolio, and the remaining military positions that were vacated by the successful claimants. The day after the coup the composition of the NRC was substantially changed; only Acheampong and the three majors remained from the first list. The new NRC was almost half Ewe, although the new list was meant to broaden the base of the NRC by including representatives from each of the services and the police. Two days later Lieutenant-colonel Benni was reinstated. On January 22, a fourth list added Major Falli of the Signals Regiment. On the thirtieth, ministerial portfolios were assigned, only seven of the twelve members of the NRC received portfolios. Five new officers were added to the government. That the new government was a coalition of the neglected elements of the NLC and Busia periods was indicated by the return of Coker-Appiah from Accra, of Aferi from Lagos, along with Menu from the National Service Corps, and Asante from the retirement forced upon him after the 1966 coup. The NRC found many collaborators among those officers whose careers had either languished or been permanently ended because of their association with the Nkrumah government.

Whereas the regional commissioners were drawn from Acheampong's age group (their average age

was about 40; Acheampong was 41), the NRC and the new ministers were composed of two distinct age groups, the most senior officers, Addo, Aferi, Ashley-Lassen, Beausoleil and Quaye who represented corporate power; and the junior officers who were instrumental in the coup, Bash, Selormey, Felli and Agbo representing the conspirators. In terms of ethnic origins the regional commissioners were a well-balanced group, while the NRC members were almost entirely southerners; in the former, Fantis represented the largest group, while in the latter Ewes were the most over-represented.

All these changes were indicative of the small size and hasty organization of the conspiratorial group.

The 1972 coup in Ghana brings into question the validity of some of the current literature on the preconditions and motivation for military intervention in developing countries. Previous scholars have argued that political decay precedes military intervention; and that officers intervene in politics either to change or to preserve the class or status stratification of society at large. Events in Ghana seem to show that economic crisis in and by itself, may be the only precondition necessary for intervention. In addition, changes

in the conditions of service and extent of military influence can cause the military to intervene although the level of politicization of the conspirators may be very low. Particularly, in new nations which suffer from the absence of political institutionalization, the motives for military intervention do not have to be acceptable to the public at large in order for the military to be able to bring down a civilian government. In countries whose governments are of low legitimacy, quarrels between the military and the government can lead to military intervention. In polities whose institutions enjoy wide legitimacy, these clashes would be settled by interest group bargaining processes, not a coup d'etat.

THE NRC AND AFRICA

The point has been made that the National Liberation Council Regime displayed by its policies an intense political allegiance to the Commonwealth besides personal identification with Britain. Four days after assuming the reigns of government in Ghana, Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong, as Chairman of the NRC and Head of State, went over radio and television to declare the new government's policy. The 17th January 1972 speech made it clear that intense Pan-Africanism and neo-Nkrumahism

were to be the cornerstones of the regime's foreign policy. (22) Among other things, Colonel Acheampong said: "Our foreign policy will first of all be based on a vigorous and dynamic African policy. We intend to foster the closest and most cordial relations with all African brothers still not free and who suffer deprivations, degradation and indignity on the continent of their birth. Accordingly, we shall vigorously support the eradication of the last remnants of colonialism and racial discrimination from the African continent ... We subscribe unreservedly to the Charter of the OAU and it is our resolve to lend effective support to all efforts aimed at making it an effective body for the expression and realisation of African aspirations." (23)

The NRC replaced the erstwhile elected Ministers with Commissioners drawn almost exclusively from the Armed Forces. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs was Major Kwame Baah, who like all his colleagues in the Council (except Colonel Acheampong and the Attorney General, Mr. K.N. Moore), received their regular officer training at the Ghana Military Academy, Teshie near Accra. Neither at the personal nor political level did they show an intense identification with Britain, a major characteristic of the erstwhile NLC.

Whereas the NLC was never quite warmly accepted in Africa, and in fact, re-established Ghana in mainstream African politics with difficulty, the NRC was recognised and warmly accepted. A mark of Africa's acceptance was that, at the invitation of the government, the Co-ordinating Committee for African Liberation held its 21st Session in Accra. At the end of the Session, a 26 point "Accra Declaration on African Liberation" was issued. The NRC successfully negotiated the return from Guinea of the remains of ex-President Nkrumah for national burial. At the ideological level, the NRC launched for distribution in Africa, a book of selected speeches by the late President Nkrumah. The regime also launched a 19 page "Charter of Redemption" which denounced all forms of imperialism and exploitation and reaffirmed Ghana's commitment to the African liberation struggle, African Unity and the realisation of a continental union government. The regime quickly paid all of Ghana's outstanding contributions to the finances of the OAU.

Early in January 1973, the Government announced its intention to form an African Youth High Command

and an African Liberation Information Centre in Accra. (24) The African High Command had been the brain-child of ex-President Nkrumah. The idea was to establish a continental fighting force of troops donated by all African States to support and defend the sovereignty of the projected "United States of Africa". The idea never got off the ground because of opposition or indifference from OAU member states who feared that it might, if established, compromise their independence. The Acheampong regime revived the idea with little success however.

In March 1973, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs launched an African Liberation Information Centre in the main lobby of the George Padmore Memorial Library in Accra. Picture exhibitions of liberation armies in training and in combat were on display. Other pictures showed scenes of confrontation between individual Africans and law enforcement officers in South Africa, Rhodesia and South West Africa. Maps and short stories illustrating the histories of the various territories were on display. The main objective of the Centre was to inform Ghanaians about events in those areas of Africa and so build up public support for African liberation activities.

The main thrust of the regime's African policy was with neighbouring states of West Africa. Here, the regime of Acheampong, soon after inauguration, indicated total commitment to the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), which was only a project at the time but has since become a reality. The regime thus demonstrated for West Africans in particular, that through economic and socio-cultural co-operation, continental government of Africa is possible.

The significance of the NRC's Africa policy is perhaps best appreciated if it is contrasted that of the Busia government before it.

The PP government's foreign policy, like that of the NRC before it, had come to be perceived in Ghana elsewhere, as anti-Nkrumah and patently pro-West. In Africa the government of Dr. Kofi Busia openly decided to keep Ghana on the fringes of African issues. The government, though not hostile to African expectations on the issue of de-colonisation, nevertheless thought that confrontation was an ineffective and hostile strategy. In this Dr. Busia felt and shared common views with President Houphouët Boigny of the Ivory Coast. To Busia, Ghana's interests as well as the interests of the people in those territories still under colonial

rule, would not be served by continued armed conflict. The policy of his government was therefore based on negotiation, co-operation and conciliation with all states in Africa including Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal.

Thus, for the first time since the beginning of the militant African nationalism in the post-World War II era, Ghana officially sounded the voice of moderation, dialogue and gradualism in African affairs. (25) The swing to the right represented Dr. Kofi Busia's conviction that the quest for a continental unity of Africa is a historical phenomenon which should be carefully studied and need not be pursued in view of Africa's problems and differences. (26) He told Parliament in his inaugural speech that: "... our first consideration in foreign policy must be our own country, Ghana, whose interest we must put above all others. We will participate fully in the movement for a West African political and economic community; take an active part in the work of the OAU and support genuine freedom fighters who wish to bring the fruits of freedom, justice and human dignity to their own people." (27)

In spite of this declaration Busia's African policies

were never completely accepted. Dr. Nkrumah's government had pursued a policy by which, in practice, no African was considered an alien in Ghana. Dr. Busia's government on the other hand had, by the Aliens Compliance Order of 1970, introduced immigration laws which resulted in the deportation of thousands of West African nationals from Ghana and the exclusion of foreigners from certain sectors of Ghanaian business, thus souring the efforts for the pursuit of the projected West African Economic community.

THE NRC AND THE EAST

When the late President Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966, Ghana's links with Russia, the East European countries and the People's Republic of China were virtually broken. The leadership, trained in the West and negatively oriented to the East, were in no mood to identify with Eastern countries as noted earlier on. The NRC regime reversed all that.

To give effect to the desire for the new policy, a Committee for Economic Co-operation with the Socialist Countries (CESEC) was formed in early 1973. (28) The CESEC was made up of ten members drawn from the ranks of bureaucrats in the public services and was under the Chairmanship of the

Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The Committee was charged with responsibility for "promoting trade, scientific and technical co-operation between Ghana and Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania for the development of wood processing industries in parts of Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo and Western Regions of Ghana. Relations were established with the People's Republic of China and the Embassy of the Soviet Union in Accra regained its considerable influence.

It may be noted that the return of East European government-sponsored trade missions to Ghana, led to a slow down of investment activity by Western entrepreneurs. In 1970, a team of Japanese geologists started prospecting for manganese ore in the Volta basin near Alcin. The new government granted prospecting rights to another team from Hungary in late 1972. The Japanese withdrew so that the Hungarians had to start all over again. Similarly, Shell, British Petroleum and Mobil halted their prospecting for oil and natural gas in protest against the arrival of Eastern European geologists. These did not resume their activities until April, 1975, when the government of Ghana agreed to grant sole rights to prospect for oil to the Western entrepreneurs.

THE NRC AND THE WEST

Some three weeks after the formation of the NRC, the Chairman, Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong announced on 5th February 1972 that the NRC would not follow the economic policies of the NLC regime. Accordingly, the regime quickly repudiated a substantial portion of "tainted" debts owed to Western countries and proclaimed a policy of economic "self-reliance" and economic nationalism. In essence, Ghana was not to repay to certain Western creditors pre-1966 supplier-credits amounting to £ 21 million because, the NRC argued, the credits were fraudulent. Ghana was to re-examine other credits unilaterally and repudiate those that in its judgement, were illegal. Where negotiation was sought, the burden of proof of legality of a credit was to fall on the creditors. Ghana was to make payments on debts accruing after 1966 as conditions allowed. Ghana also renounced decisions taken at previous debt scheduling conferences. (29) Certain German creditors also lost their investments subsequently. Since the creditors who became victims of the policy were of the Western bloc, relations with them remained cool and correct but never warm throughout the NRC's rule.

Although no formal joint action by way of reprisals came from the West, the action appeared to have warned off prospective creditors to be wary of giving credit to Ghana. The result was that Ghana had to buy every item of import strictly on cash-down basis.

Spurned by the West, the NRC regime turned increasingly to the East as indicated and to the Arabs for whose sake the NRC joined other African countries in breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel in 1974.

THE NRC AND THE COMMONWEALTH

The regime of the NRC continued to maintain steady support for the Commonwealth of Nations. Ghana, under the NRC, maintained diplomatic representations in every one of the Commonwealth countries . . . was represented at all meetings of the Commonwealth Heads of State. In spite of the unilateral repudiation of debts owed to British firms, Ghana continued to use London as its base for contact with the outside world. The Ghana Public Service Commission still has a recruiting office in London. London has also remained the centre for recruiting Professors for Ghana's Universities. The Cocoa Marketing Board, the Timber Board and the Bank of Ghana all

retained and continue to retain their London operations.

In short, neither the NRC's unilateral repudiation of debts owed to a few British and Canadian firms, nor its condemnation of colonialists had any adverse effects on its position in the Commonwealth. It is significant to note that the regime never sought to advance any proposals for changing the Commonwealth. It sought to remain in the Commonwealth for as long as other African countries remained in it. In the words of Mr. Quarm, the Chief Foreign Policy Adviser to the NRC, "We have found it advantageous to continue to remain in the Commonwealth. We adhere to its principles and we are very much involved in the affairs of the Commonwealth." (30)

THE NRC AND THE UNITED NATIONS

As with the Commonwealth, so it was with the UN. Ghana under the regime of Colonel Acheampong remained steady in its support of the organisation.

Ghana was represented at the annual formal openings of the General Assembly by ministerial dele-

gations from Accra. The regime of Colonel Acheampong was more conformist than revolutionary in its attitude towards the structure of the World body. Ghana never called for a removal of the veto powers of the permanent members of the Security Council nor did it call for a rewriting of the Charter of the organisation. It is probable, however, that had such a measure been sponsored by an African member state, the Ghanaian delegation would have supported it.

Within Ghana itself, there was considerable, positive sentiment for the UN. The Ghana United Nations Students Association continued to observe the annual United Nations Day with pomp and pageantry. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Day was also observed annually by the Ghana Council for Peace. The Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC) remained affiliated to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) while the Ghana Bench and Bar continued its membership of the International Commission of Jurists. (31)

CONCLUSION

Measured in terms of the two generalizable criteria (i.e. economic development and active Pan-Africanism), the NRC's performance was mixed.

The NRC was clearly pragmatic, Pan-African and pro-Nkrumahist. This assessment is based on several factors. One is an analysis of domestic and foreign policy decisions. Another is the regime's recruitment of ex-CPP ministers and members to the regime's special committees, and the return of many former CPP activists from their self-imposed exile.

There is also the successful negotiation of the return from Guinea of the remains of ex-President Nkrumah for national burial as well as the Nkrumahist substance of the 27 point "Accra Declaration on African Liberation" issued by the Co-ordinating Committee for African Liberation which held its 21st session in Accra at the invitation of the NRC government. Also significant is the launching of a book of selected speeches by the late President Nkrumah with a foreword by Colonel Acheampong, and the 19 page NRC "Charter of Redemption" which denounced all forms of imperialism and racist exploitation and reaffirmed Ghana's commitments to the African liberation struggle, African unity and the realization of a continental union government.

In the economic field however, the NRC did poorly. A reading of the Budget Statement, 1978-79 as printed by the Government Printer, Accra, makes it clear that in terms of such aggregate economic indicators as real GDP, rate of inflation, money supply, budget deficits and so forth, the NRC regime's performance was little short of a disaster, leaving behind a legacy of economic and fiscal disequilibrium for successor regimes.

The regime, however, set itself other tasks such as self reliance, correction of existing imbalances in regional development and equitable distribution of the nation's wealth. By nature these were domestic policies intended to reduce sectionalism, regionalism and other forms of economic self-interest and to bring into being a viable sense of nationalism. Only a small measure of success was achieved with these goals so that by July 1978, when Acheampong was removed as Head of State, Ghana was more divided than ever.

1. See The Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, October 6, 1969.
2. See Owusu, Maxwell, "The Search for Solvency: Background to the Fall of Ghana's Second Republic, 1969-1972". Africa Today, 19:1, Winter 1972, pp. 52-60.
3. Government of Ghana, NRC Decree No. 1 January 13, 1972. Accra, Government Printer.
4. Daily Graphic, Accra, July 29, 1971. Ghana's military expenditures were approximately 10 percent of its budget. This is not a particularly high figure. In Latin America military budgets average about 20 percent of government expenditure.
5. Bennett, V.P., "The Military Under Busia", West Africa, London, February 25, 1972, p. 221.
6. Daily Graphic, Accra, July 29, 1971.
7. Bennett, op. cit.
8. Owusu, Maxwell, "The Search for Solvency: Background to the Fall of Ghana's Second Republic", Africa Today, Vol. 19, I.

9. New York Times, January 22, 1972.
10. Quoted in Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations, Simon and Schuster, New York, p. 101.
11. Kraus, Jon., "Arms and Politics in Ghana" in Welch, op. cit., p. 218.
12. Pye, Lucien, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", in John Johnson (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton University Press 1962.
13. Huntington, op. cit., p. 204.
14. Washington Post, January 26, 1972. Edward Luttwak argues that, other things being equal, officers who have been passed-over for promotion make good recruits for conspiracy, Coup d'etat, London Penguin 1969, p. 75.
15. West Africa, February 4, 1972, p. 138.
16. Bennett, V.P., "The Non-Politicians Take Over", Africa Report, April 1972, p. 21.
17. The Guardian, January 22, 1972.

18. Luttwak, op. cit.
19. West Africa, January 28, 1972, p. 108.
20. See Peil, Margaret, "Expulsion of the West Africans" in Journal of Modern African Indies, Vol. 9 (2), pp. 205-29.
21. The Workers' Brigade had been formed under Nkrumah in 1957. The Brigade survived the dismantling of the NLC and still existed in 1972 under the name of the Food Production Corporation. The para-military attitudes acquired in the mid-sixties (wearing uniforms, marching etc) had been abandoned.
22. Rumours were rife in Accra, that Acheampong had, in fact, staged the coup to reinstate Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.
23. Government of Ghana, Our Task, Accra, Government Printer, January 17, 1972.
24. Government of Ghana, Press Release by Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, January 8, 1973.
25. The change was no' without opposition as witnessed by the removal of a prominent government

newspaper editor and the removal from office of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Victor Owusu.

26. Busia, K.A., The Challenge of Africa, Praeger, New York, 1962.
27. Busia, K.A., Speech at the Inauguration of the Second Republic of Ghana, Accra, Government Printer, October 1, 1969.
28. See Quarm, S.E., "An Appraisal of Ghana's Foreign Policy" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 31-33, July - September 1974.
29. See Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times, February 7, 1972.
30. See S.E. Quarm, op. cit, p. 3.
31. Government of Ghana, Ghana and the UN, Accra, Government Printer, October 1974.

C H A P T E R S E V E N

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ARMED FORCED REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL (AFRC) AND THE PROVISIONAL NATIONAL DEFENCE
COUNCIL (PNDC)

Flight Lieutenant Rawlings has given as his reason for his seizures of political power, the need for a "revolution" within Ghana.

This chapter therefore examines this "revolution" as well as its foreign policy dimensions.

Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings first seized power on June 4, 1979. On the face of it, it seemed that the intervention of Rawlings and his colleagues represented some respite from the unyielding effects of Lieutenant-General F.W.K. Akuffo's Supreme Military Council (SMC) austerity programme. Rawlings, and the AFRC, offended by evidence of widespread corruption on the part of high military officers, sought to lighten burdens by means of a series of "house cleaning" measures.

To widespread acclaim, the AFRC put on a series of trials of senior officers (some of whom were convicted of corrupt acts, and were either executed or jailed), disciplined market traders and hoarders,

destroyed the Markola Number 1 Market in Accra (as an alleged centre for dishonest dealings), seized the assets of foreign firms charged with illegal types of transactions and dissolved the Cocoa Marketing Board and the Ministry of Cocoa Affairs. Its economic "populism" (1) was most evident in a controversial decision to enforce price controls on a variety of consumer goods. The imposition of price controls and the attack on hoarding meant that whatever scarce consumer items existed, would be made available to the public at controlled prices. However, in a situation of high inflation, it also entailed a rapid rundown of existing stocks. Short-term benefits were secured but at a high price for the successor government of President Limann, namely, the depletion of extremely limited goods. (2) Thus, despite the elements of idealism in Rawlings' revolution, his brief administration in fact achieved little in the way of coherent economic policy. And the government's disdain for consequences was disruptive of both legal procedure and economic productivity.

There were several major consequences of Rawlings' rule. First, the military virtually collapsed in the face of rank and file and non-commissioned officer attacks, the "trials" and prison terms and lower ranks and junior officer refusal to acknowledge

senior authority. Second, when AFRC attacked other state institutions - ranging from Ministries to public companies - subordinates there played a similar role. The attack on the managerial elite, and the investigations into the performance of most public institutions, disrupted their already enfeebled performance. Investigations into private business practices generated widespread fear amongst the country's bourgeoisie. Third, while Rawlings became a folk hero, Ghanaians were horrified that the military continued to attack civilians, whipping market women for alleged hoarding or selling above officially controlled prices and for unleashing random violence. Increasingly split by dissensions and by suspicions of tribal-ethnic favouritism, the AFRC surrendered its rule to President Limann and the PNP on 24th September 1979 after three and a half months of rule.

That was not to be the end of Rawlings however. On December 31, 1981, a small group of military and ex-military personnel seized power in Ghana, thus ousting President Limann's civilian government and the People's National Party (PNP) and propelling Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings into power for the second time.

The PNDC Leadership

Rawlings announced the leadership of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in early January, 1982, and it was significant for its stunningly non-representative quality. It was composed of Rawlings as Chairman; Brigadier-General Joseph Nunoo-Mensah; (3) Sergeant Alogba Akata-Pore, an articulate radical who was a military academy instructor; Warrant Officer J.A. Buadi who worked with the AFRC Secretariat in 1979; the Reverend Kwabena Damuah, a defrocked Catholic priest (reinstated in 1980) who has always been politically outspoken; Joshua Amarte Kwei, a former local trade union leader; and Chris Bukari Atim, a former student leader, a radical and secretary to the June 4 Movement that Rawlings had created after his dismissal from the military in 1980.

The PNDC's membership was distinctly different from that of any previous military regime. It lacked any significant active duty officer representation and almost half of it was civilian. Other former officers were closely linked with Rawlings and the PNDC and were later given offices, including Captain

Kojo Tsikata, an established radical as special adviser and Colonel J.M. Ewa (as Chief of Staff, PNDC office). Presumably, the civilians were to be the PNDC's links with potentially sympathetic groups: the Reverend Damuah with the Protestant and Catholic Ministries which had been extremely active in the agitation against the Acheampong military regime; Chris Atim with students and, in particular, with the National Union of Ghana Students (NUGS) which quickly rallied to the support of the PNDC; and Joshua Amarte Kwei with dissident trade unionists whom, in fact, he helped to rally in attacks against the established trade union leadership until it was forcibly displaced in late April.

By mid-December, only two of the original seven members remained, Rawlings and J.A. Buadi, Reverend Damuah resigned or was dismissed in mid-August, following the murder of the High Court Judges, as he became increasingly critical of violence and condemned the self-styled radicals who attacked and damaged various fraternal lodges (Freemasons, Odd Fellows) in Kumasi and Accra, to which bodies Ghanaian professionals belonged. Amarte Kwei resigned or was dismissed at the same time, possibly because of PNDC concern that the public was linking Kwei, a former GIHOC employee, with the murder of Major Sam Acquah, GIHOC Group Personnel Manager, along

with the High Court Judges. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah resigned in late November, in despair at the PNDC's inability to deal with Ghana's problems.

Rawlings and his associates selected from a broader base the government secretaries (the equivalent of Ministers) (4) though there were stiff protests from NUGS and the radical left for four of his appointments. It took five months to win approval for a candidate for Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, reflecting intense conflict over the economic policies to be pursued by the PNDC regime. Of 20 Cabinet posts (excluding Defence, controlled by Rawlings), 7 positions were given to former Party Leaders, 4 from the left wing of the PNP; one to an experienced Ambassador (a trade specialist), at least three to Professors, another four to experienced technocrats and managers and only one post to a military officer (retired). Many of the Secretaries were experienced and highly qualified.

The PNDC and Rawlings' political base rested on several groups or institutions: the military, especially several units of the army and air force, notably the army's Reece Squadron (armoured cars); university students and NUGS; PDC's and WDC's, whose high level of local activism was the PNDC's most important grassroots link with the population, its

most critical potential for mobilising Ghanaians on behalf of the PNDC goals. Of more doubtful support was a renewed trade union movement, many of whose leaders were removed without members' consent. The union spent 1982 re-organizing and selecting new leadership, trying to retain some autonomy from the PNDC, which promised non-interference in elections (and was under pressure from other African Unions to do so). There were also a few professional groups, mainly people with technical skills, who had responded to the PNDC's appeal for skilled people and independent intellectuals. In addition, there were political groups; their resolutions and statements appeared frequently in the government-owned press, but their membership was meager and included largely leftist intellectuals except for Rawlings' own June 4th Movement.

The key group in this coalition is the military, in which Rawlings retains significant support as evidenced by the failure of at least five attempted counter coups. Rawlings lives in Gondor Barracks in Burma Camp, on Accra's outskirts, a centre of PNDC activity.

Despite the absence of active duty officers in the PNDC or as heads of state corporations, sectors

of the military were entrusted with key responsibilities, including the security of the regime. Ironically, the military also remains the PNDC's major threat.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE REVOLUTION

The economic consequences of the military governments during the period 1972 - 1979, were a major contribution to the problems of the Limann government. Economic growth was negative during 1970 - 1979. Gross domestic product per capita declined on average over 3 percent per year. Ghana had a deficit in its balance of payments during most of 1972 - 1979 and managed to maintain a decent overall balance only by systematically choking off badly needed imports. It had persistent arrears in short-term debts (\$ 438,5 million in late 1979), reducing its ability to obtain private credit abroad. (5)

The balance of payments problems, though aggravated by the oil price shocks of the mid-1970's and the subsequent general inflation, can be traced to sharp declines in the production of its major exports - cocoa, gold, diamonds and timber. This drastically reduced its ability to import capital equipment, spare parts and essential consumer goods. Severe shortages sharply reduced Ghana's domestic production

and stimulated a pervasive black market in essential commodities.

Particularly important was the persistent decline in the volume of cocoa production available for purchase and export, largely because of the decline in real prices offered by the state monopoly buyer, the Cocoa Marketing Board. Average cocoa purchases declined by 31,3 percent during the four crop years, 1976-1980, in comparison with 1969-1973. In 1972, cocoa farmers were paid 78 percent of what they were paid in 1963 per load of 66 pounds. In 1979, they received only 49 percent. Hence cocoa smuggling to neighbouring countries grew, while many farmers shifted out of cocoa production into higher priced local foods.

Ghanaians also suffered a hyperinflation in the late 1970's: 53 percent in 1976, 116 percent in 1977, 74 percent in 1978, 54 percent in 1979, an average annual increase of 46,6 percent during 1972-1979. Inflation shifted incomes massively to traders, black marketeers and food farmers, who benefited from massive local food price increases. Local food production is estimated to have declined 21 percent in the years 1976-1978 from the years 1968-1971.⁽⁶⁾

The causes of Ghana's economic plight compound one another. Some were external or beyond Ghana's control: the oil price increase of the 1970's, severe droughts in northern Ghana in the 1974-1976 years, worldwide inflation (and thus increased costs in imports), and a deteriorating terms of trade after 1977. Ghanaians have tended to blame incompetent and corrupt leadership and economic mismanagement for their problems, but they have been politically incapable of facing the effects of their economic demands. Populist pressures to keep down the costs of living, e.g. through price controls, have been important to Ghanaian leaders, despite the manifest failure of such efforts.

Nor is it simply a question of radical versus conservative economic policies. Policymakers have felt compelled - in Ghana as in many other African countries - to run large budget deficits in order to maintain nominally high levels of economic activity and employment, to retain overvalued exchange rates, when devaluation would increase the local costs of imports (i.e. generate a real wage decline for consumers of imports, who are disproportionately middle and upper class), to subsidise inefficient state corporations, to finance large-scale and mostly unproductive state farms or large private farmers rather than the fairly productive small

and medium-sized peasant farmers. The Acheampong regime undertook all these measures, generating inflation by colossal budget deficits necessitated partly by its failure to collect taxes from the wealthy.

The Limann government did little better. Thus Limann and the PNP government confronted enormous problems and policy dilemmas. The PNP managed for some months to contain the continued military violence against the police and the public. It tried to deal with the AFRC leaders and Rawlings by sending them out of the country or, failing that, (Rawlings refused to leave), by employing high levels of surveillance and repression.

Limann's government was under enormous public pressure to increase economic activity, keep down inflation, increase local food production and provide essential imported commodities. Its initial policies were tolerable, but it declined to acknowledge (as had Acheampong) the perverse impact of the unrealistically high value of the country's currency (the Cedi) and the impact of partially effective price controls on the distribution of resources and production. These contributed to the continuing collapse or underutilisation of existing industries, massive smuggling, shortages and a flourishing black

market. Over-valuation of the Cedi increased the incentive to consume imports (making them relatively cheap) and drastically reduced incentives to produce for export. (7)

The Limann government was moving slowly toward devaluation of the Cedi, which would have helped shift income from traders to producers and might have led to larger foreign government and international loans and aid. Higher levels of production in cocoa, coffee and rice (consumed locally) could have been achieved through increasing producer prices, which the government did not do until November 1981. By 1980, cocoa farmers were being paid, in real terms, 33 percent of the price they received in 1963; by 1981, only 14 percent. Ghana's 1980-1981 cocoa crop of 258 000 metric tons was the lowest since the late 1950's. (8) Many farmers declined to harvest their crop. Combined with sharply lower world cocoa prices, this led to an estimated 40 percent decline in Ghana's 1981 export earnings and a 32 percent decline in imports, which further aggravated shortages, black-marketing and inflation. The greed of PNP Members of Parliament in giving themselves high rates of pay generated renewed demands for large wage increases from workers and salaried employees (all of whom had suffered enormous losses in real

wages). The tripling of the minimum wage and other salaries in the late 1980's, sharply increased the government's budget deficit and hence inflationary tendencies. Inflation was contained at 50.1 percent in 1980, but grew to 116 percent in 1981. (9)

The Limann government's crucial political problem was that it was partially controlled by different factions of the "old guard", CPP leaders whose alleged propensities to corruption were widely known. Their struggle over control of the party exploded into public view in late 1981 in court battles amidst accurate stories of corruption and a \$ 1 million foreign loan to PNP leaders. Limann himself was a weak leader; he had become PNP President only through "old guard" support and was dependent upon them. The public perception of squalid party leaders competing for the spoils of office, combined with rampant inflation and consumer shortages, endowed the government and democratic institutions with scant legitimacy. Many Ghanaians including the most skilled and educated, were voting with their feet and leaving Ghana to work elsewhere, especially in Nigeria. At the same time, some units of the military voted with their guns.

Populist Revolution

Under Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, the PNDC seized power in order to pursue revolutionary change, and it has done so in some areas, most critically in its encouragement of the creation of hundreds of People's Defence Committees (PDC's) and in workplaces, Workers' Defence Committees (WDC's). The members of these committees attacked corruption and economic mismanagement in all public institutions, providing the kind of accountability that Rawlings demanded and mobilising the community in public tasks. By January 1982, the government of Ghana was almost without resources. It was generating an inordinate budget deficit and had negative foreign reserves and debt arrears of some \$ 18 million, making it unable to obtain foreign bank credits. At the same time, it faced an oil boycott from Nigeria (10), and confronted a desperate shortage of the spare parts and inputs needed to revive unused industrial capacity and to repair Ghana's eroded infrastructure. World prices for Ghana's exports (cocoa and gold) continued to fall and Ghana was devoting over 40 percent of its export earnings to oil import alone. Thus no short-term economic improvements were possible, except through better management of resources, more rational domestic economic policies and an expansion of exports.

The PNDC tried to move to the ports the 40 percent of the previous year's cocoa crop that had not yet been shipped. It reasserted price controls over essential commodities and local foods, re-channeling their allocation procedures, reducing hoarding and smuggling to make more goods available and trying to enforce the reduction of other prices and costs. With the help of the PDC's, it established and energetically implemented rent controls, previously untried in any serious way. The PNDC froze large bank accounts, while Citizens Vetting Committees (CVCs) required the owners of the accounts to appear and produce evidence of taxes paid on earnings. The individuals were liable and the taxes had to be paid within 48 hours or their assets were confiscated by the state. Major attacks were launched against many institutions. (11)

The military presence during the period (January 1982 to December 1982), was palpable in the major cities, at roadblocks and during night-long curfews. It was assigned responsibility for the distribution of essential commodities, the enforcement of price controls, the pursuit of hoarders, anti-smuggling exercises and border control. These activities led elements of the military into repeated instances of brutality against civilians throughout 1982, giving rise to continuous criticism. Officers at

the borders (especially at Aflao, on the border with Togo) and at the Accra Airport confiscated, on all sorts of pretexts, the possessions of returning Ghanaians. Those who protested were frequently beaten up. The confiscated goods were then sold at "Kalabule" prices to Ghanaians after curfew.

The military is a fragile support base for revolutionary change. First of all, when the coup leaders sought to overthrow the Limann government, many units in Accra were not interested; others subsequently resisted the coup with arms. Within the military, enthusiasm for Rawlings' coup was far from universal, not least among an officer corps whose declining numbers had just survived the assaults on its members and authority under AFRC. Thus support for the regime became a matter of prolonged negotiations. Second, the coup itself unleashed violence between the officers and other ranks and renewed the potential for violence. In February, three naval officers in Sekondi were shot and killed by their men. The threatened erosion of authority has been increased by the deliberate politicisation of the other ranks and NCO's. This step was undertaken partly because Rawlings argued, perhaps correctly, that the military has tended to be used in Africa as an instrument of coercion against the common man, and he insisted that this must not be repeated in Ghana.

Third, the outbreak of the coup and the fighting on the 31st December 1981, led immediately to some looting and signalled the re-emergence of indiscipline in the ranks whose most frequent target has been civilians. The most outrageous case occurred in Kumasi, the Ashanti regional capital in February 1982. An army Major interrupted a church service and asked the congregation to leave and join a pot-hole-filling exercise. An incensed congregation apparently beat the major to death. A policewoman who was a member of the church was wounded and taken to a hospital. Soldiers removed her for questioning and she was found later badly beaten, returned to the hospital for surgery and later allegedly shot to death by soldiers. Troops later burned some churches, killed the minister of the offending congregation and besieged the Kumasi Police Station. (12)

This is certainly not typical of Ghana, but there were many instances of brutality and some murder. (13) Lack of military discipline and brutality against civilians became major issues of the Catholic and Protestant churches. (14)

Fourth, it became clear that military factions had developed. Sergeant Akata-Pore's apparent base of support among military personnel from the north was the source of his challenge to Rawlings in a

major confrontation on October 28-29, 1982, and in the attempted coup of November 23, 1982, which was suppressed after some fighting. Such conflicts in the military raised the spectres of tribalism and ethnic favouritism, which became so pervasive in the AFRC in 1979. Significant numbers of military personnel apparently regarded the PNDC as Ewe-dominated: Rawlings is half Ewe and Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and Arnold Quainoo, the Army Commander, are both regarded as half Ewe.

NUGS, the university student group, was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the PNDC's radicalism. Universities were closed during January-April, 1982, while students helped in the movement of cocoa and other crops to the country's harbours. However, student support for the PNDC evaporated and students became strong critics of military brutality, as they were under Acheampong and the NRC/SMC regime. Students were eager to return to the universities. The most pro-PNDC presidential candidate for NUGS lost in the mid-1982 election and NUGS openly opposed the extension of the mandatory National Service Scheme from one to two years and the inclusion of six months of military training in the programme of National Service.

The regime's broadest base for revolutionary change emerged through the development of PDC's and WDC's. In many instances they rose against their managers and bosses, alleging corruption or mismanagement and demanding their removal. In some cases, managers and bosses were physically removed and replaced with others.

The PDC's and WDC's monitored activities in public bodies. As the conflicts between PDC's and WDC's and their managers and superiors increased, PNDC leaders mediated the disputes, shifting the PNDC emphasis somewhat from being watchdogs to increasing production. However, this did not greatly deter the PDC's and they asked the regime to give legal backing against some determined counterattacks by confident managers.

The PNDC and Rawlings stated that anyone who challenged the PDC's and WDC's challenged the legitimacy of the revolution, and the regime created a regional and national co-ordinating apparatus to link the PDC's and WDC's to the regime and to one another. A National Defence Committee with representatives of leading sectors of the PDC's and WDC's was charged to supervise the activities of PDC.

Opposition to the regime grew although much of it

tended to be passive or non-overt. The most important public opposition to the regime came from the lawyers and other professionals. Within a month after the PNDC had seized power, the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) recommended that the PNDC create a broadly based government and prepare to restore civilian rule by September 1983. The opposition of the GBA and the Association of Recognised Professional Bodies (ARPB) to the PNDC was re-animated by the kidnapping and brutal murder of three High Court Judges and a retired Major. There was immediate speculation that persons close to the PNDC were motivated by revenge, because the three judges had all been involved either with appeals from APRC sentences or adverse rulings on petitions for reinstating the dismissed GIHOC strikers.

The murders aroused widespread shock and indignation and were condemned by the regime which later launched investigations. The GBA and ARPB denounced the murders, the PNDC-supported "campaign of HATE" against the rich, PNDC failure to improve economic life, the curfew, the loss of press freedom, the collapse of military discipline and military brutality, and the lack of legal accountability. They reiterated the demand that the PNDC hand power to a broadly based government that would hold elections not later than September, 1983 - a call without the resonance

to Ghanaians that it had in 1977-78. The GBA boycotted all courts, commissions of inquiry and tribunals during a two-week mourning period. The statements prompted condemnations of the Bar Association and ARPB by the regime, the press and PNDC political support groups. Subsequently, PNDC activists raided and destroyed paraphernalia in various Masonic, Odd Fellows and other clubs.

The GBA also condemned and decided to boycott a PNDC system of public tribunals, membership in which would be open to Ghanaians by appointment by a board. Ghana's legal system has permitted many of the country's corrupt public officials and businessmen to escape the penalties of the law, a perception widely and strongly held in Ghana. Thus public tribunals were established as a separate legal system, with broad jurisdictions, no rights of appeal, nor any rights to counsel. Cases were to be brought by the public prosecutor and guidance in proceedings and decisions were to be by the rules of "natural justice" not "legal technicalities".

In late 1982, trials were open to the public and tended to be swift, with long sentences for the guilty, divided between work in night-soil collection and communal labour.

Between October and December 1982, coup plot announcements and rumours abounded, and at least, one major coup effort was made against the regime. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah wrote in his letter of resignation from the PNDC: "If we are honest with ourselves, we will be the first to admit that the going has been tough and chaotic and any hope of bringing about an improvement in the standard of living of our people remains doubtful." He observed that it was not clear who was governing Ghana because PNDC decisions were discarded or altered by anyone in the hierarchy. (15)

Nonetheless, the PNDC regime survived and its radical populist impulses were not altogether obscured by Rawlings' preoccupations with security. Its more important programmes for social and economic change could not possibly have borne fruit in 1982; but by late 1982 there were some indications that the regime would deal with the drastically overvalued Cedi. At the end of 1982, however, the future of revolutionary change in Ghana was an open question. (16)

Foreign Policy Dimensions of the AFRC/PNDC Revolution

This section of the dissertation covers one and

a half years, of Rawlings' rule; the three and a half months when he first assumed power under AFRC and the first one year of his second coming under the PNDC.

Clearly, one and a half years under any government (military or civilian) is too brief a period for any significant foreign policy endeavours to make themselves felt. Nevertheless, the foreign policy implications and consequences of Rawlings' regimes may be isolated in the light of the foregoing discussion of the domestic system.

From the vantage point of reference group theory, the behaviour of the AFRC/PNDC leadership is understandable and predictable. Lacking in extensive exposure to foreign (British) values and political sensibilities, the regimes tended to be more nationalistic and domestic orientated. Once in power, Rawlings and his colleagues sought to bring about a revolution, a complete re-arrangement of the Ghanaian socio-political order. They were accordingly reluctant to hand over power to an elected civilian government. When asked to give some indication as to the date for a handing over of power to a civilian government, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah (Chief of Defence Staff, CDS) asked the Nigerian journalist who had posed the question, "hand over to whom?" (17). To the regime, soldiers are civilians in mili-

tery clothes. Therefore they have as much right as any Ghanaians to rule. When this attitude of military involvement in politics is contrasted with that of the NLC whose leadership was Western orientated, the point of foreign reference group identification becomes very pertinent.

A reading of the memoirs of the two leading army members of the NLC, Generals Ocran and Afrifa, clearly reveals their belief in the essential separation of the military from politics as part of a more general reference group identification with the British Officer corps. Afrifa for example, has written: "I have always felt it painful to associate myself with a coup to overthrow a constitutional government, however perverted that constitution may be." (18) Ocran has stated the position even more strongly: "Above all, our British training has taught us to leave politics alone for those who want to play it; that is the civilians." (19)

Thus the military intervention of February 1966 should be seen as involving a violation of reference-group norms on the part of the Ghanaian army officers, a violation of which, their memoirs reveal, Ocran and Afrifa were keenly aware. The PNDC leadership clearly did not share such qualms.

The relinquishing of power to a civilian government could be seen then, as the bringing of behaviour and belief into consonance. Reference group identification with the British officer corps acted as a countervailing force to the prerequisites of political office, pushing or pulling the NLC military officers to give up the power they had earlier seized.

In ideological terms the PNDC (certainly up to December 1982) was patently anti-elite. Since the elite in Ghana tends to be pro-West in its identification as outlined in earlier pages, one would expect the Western powers to be anti-PNDC in their policies. This was indeed the initial response.

Soon after the coup of 31 December 1981, Nigeria stopped its supplies of petroleum products to Ghana. Rawlings felt he had no choice but to turn to Libya for oil and to Cuba for other economic assistance.

Since Libya was facing increasing isolation in Africa as well as in the Western world for its alleged encouragement of international terrorism, Ghana came, by association, to be treated with suspicion by nearly all the neighbouring West African countries especially Liberia, Ivory Coast and Nigeria.

Matters were made worse by the domestic political harassment and military "trials" and imprisonment of opponents of the regime. The executions and persecutions of opponents resulted in condemnations of the regime by foreign governments. Amnesty International, the London-based human rights organization, called on the regime to either release or bring to trial all offenders that had been arrested and imprisoned by the regime. (20)

Scores of Ghanaians took refuge in neighbouring countries and thus sowed the seeds of suspicion and mutual distrust as the PNDC accused and was itself accused by countries that felt threatened by developments across their borders. The PNDC regime, fearing or suspecting invasion of Ghana by Ghanaian exiles in Togo, the Ivory Coast and Nigeria, closed Ghana's national borders. (21) Meanwhile, the regime's preoccupation with internal security had created a tense atmosphere which made the conduct of any fruitful international business almost impossible.

The murder of the officer corps (largely trained in the West) meant that locally-trained officers took over the commanding heights of the armed forces. One result was a distinct movement away from the NLC's foreign reference group identification to

an orientation towards nationalism, self-reliance and a general attitude of indifference towards outsiders.

Understandably, the conduct of Ghana's foreign policy came to be subordinated to the defence of a legitimacy that has never ceased to be challenged since December 31, 1981. The PNDC regime, increasingly, came to have no perceptible foreign policy as it marshalled all its resources for the defence of its security and the pursuit of its "revolution". The search for new allies of a revolutionary sort was, however, proceeding at the close of 1982. Hence the numerous visits to Libya, Cuba, Russia and the Eastern block of Socialist states.

CONCLUSION

Rawlings' one year and three and a half months rule covered by this study was more domestic in orientation and less foreign in focus.

In the three and a half months of AFRC rule, described in the first part of this chapter, the regime succeeded in creating more fear than in directly building the economy of the country. As noted above, there might have been elements of idealism in Rawlings' "revolution", but his brief rule achieved little by way of a coherent economic policy.

As for Pan-African concerns, the other generalizable criteria, there was hardly any time for them. What the brief rule did was to focus unfavourable world and African attention on Ghana. The public executions of leading citizens could not possibly create international confidence in the country. Neighbouring African states in particular felt uneasy lest Rawlings' "revolution" might have a demonstration effect in the region.

The next one year of Rawlings' rule under the PNDC moreover served to confirm the general character of his policies under the AFRC regime. Perhaps the AFRC-PNDC regime should be evaluated according to the goals it set itself at home. These goals included the building of a new Ghana where there would be neither corruption, privilege, nor abuse of public office. In addition, the regime sought to end what it perceived as the exploitation of Ghana's natural resources by external interests and to introduce greater popular participation in the government of the country.

Not many people would quarrel with the validity of such goals. Whether and when they would in fact, be achieved, is a legitimate question. At the end of 1982 (December 30, 1982) the PNDC announced a four-year programme for economic reconstruction and development. The Secretary for Finance and Econo-

mic Planning, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, warned, at that time, of the hard road ahead: "Our recovery effort will demand the strictest discipline in every aspect of our national life", he said on television. It was not unfair to hope that the exercise of such strict discipline would include re-ordering Ghana's foreign relations in a way that would result in the restoration of confidence amongst those countries which have historically shown a willingness and the ability to work with Ghana along the path of development.

1. See Herbstein, Denis, "Broomstick Revolution" in West Africa, August 13, 1979, p. 1462.
2. Correspondent, "The Economic Consequences of Rawlings" in Legon Observer, Vol. XL, No. 12, November 16, 1979, p. 266.
3. Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah was appointed chief of Defence Staff under AFRC, then curtly dismissed by the PNP government under President Limann and re-appointed as Chief of Defence Staff by Rawlings in his initial coup announcement.
4. It is interesting to note that although the majority of the PNDC membership was locally educated with little direct Western influence, the Secretaries of the various government Departments were largely Western educated. The significance of this point is that the two groups had different opposing reference groups identifications. It is not for nothing that many of the Secretaries have since resigned from their
5. See the discussion in Rothschild, Donald, "An African Test Case for Political Democracy: President Limann's Economic Alternatives" in Legum, Colin (ed.) Africa Contemporary Record, 1980-81, London, Rex Collins.

6. Refer to Bank of Ghana, "An Information Paper..."
op. cit.
7. It should be noted that high local costs could not be recovered because the government paid so few Cedis per foreign dollar earned through exports.
8. For these and the following statistics, see Cocoa Marketing Board Newsletter, vol 4, No. 4, December 1981.
9. Refer to Rothschild, Donald, "An African Test Case ...", op. cit.
10. To which Ghana owed \$ 150 million in unpaid oil bills, and which was angered at the overthrow of an elected civilian government.
11. Such as the legal system, the trade union movement, state corporations, the expensive system of secondary boarding schools (whose government subsidies grew as local food prices soared) and businessmen with government and state corporation contracts, in order to re-fashion them and democratise their practices and operations.

positions and left the country to take up jobs elsewhere.

12. See West Africa, March 1, 1982, p. 617.
13. See "Present Discontents" in West Africa, July 19 1982, p. 1855.
14. For a copy of a "Pastoral Letter from Heads of Churches of the Christian Council of Ghana to Believers in God and in the Lord Jesus Christ" refer to Appendix F.
15. See "Ghana Coup Defeated" in West Africa, November 29, 1982, p. 3065.
16. In late January, 1983, Ghana opened its borders to admit almost a million Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria; these unemployed returnees helped increase the feeling of insecurity by the PNDC leadership.
17. Refer to Ghanaian Times of February 3, 1982.
18. Afrifa, A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, 1966, op. cit., p. 37.
19. Ocran, A.K., A Myth is Broken: An account of

the Ghana Coup d'etat, London 1968, op. cit., p. 2.

20. See the report of these and other foreign comments in Daily Graphic of March 18, 1982.

21. Throughout the period June-November 1982, rumours were rife in Accra of a planned invasion of Ghana by Ghanaian exiles backed by a contingent of troops from Britain, Germany, the USA and Nigeria. In a related development, a Black American wife of an alleged Ghanaian conspirator was seen escaping from around the Ghana International Airport in an American Embassy car. The husband, a certain Dr. J. Antwi, a Ghanaian resident in the United States, managed to escape the country.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter has two basic purposes: First, a comparison of the foreign policies of the three military regimes of the period, (NLC; NRC - SMC; AFRC - PNDC); second, answers will be sought to two inter-related questions, namely

- a) what foreign policy outputs could, conceivably, be expected from military governments in Ghana and
- b) whether domestic military rule in Ghana is compatible with the pursuit of a successful foreign policy?

As a corollary, a brief consideration will be given to the applicability and relevance of the Foreign Reference Group theory as an approach to the study of foreign policy.

The domestic and international systemic conditions under which the foreign policies of the three military governments were conducted differed significantly from government to government, although degrees and areas of similarity are discernible.

Dr. Nkrumah's optimism about Ghana's place in African and world affairs has been noted in chapter three of this work. Not only was Ghana considered free to conduct its own kind of foreign policy, but "... How we conduct ourselves will affect not only Ghana but the whole of Africa. If we can make a success of our independence we shall have made an incalculable contribution towards freedom and progress throughout Africa. We must show that it is possible for Africans to rule themselves, to establish a progressive and independent state and to preserve their national unity." (1)

This optimism about Ghana's potential was widely shared, partly because the new country was relatively wealthy.⁽²⁾ At independence, Ghana had substantial external reserves. Moreover, sympathy for African aspirations was on the ascendency everywhere and the Great Powers' distrust of non-alignment was breaking down as the small states learned to use their leverage advantageously in a bi-polar world. Then Ghana's trail-blazing of the route to independence seemed to ensure a leadership role in the Afro-Asian world. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) through which current Pan-African diplomacy is channelled had not yet been formed. At home in Ghana, there was near euphoria about Ghana being the "authentic voice" of resurgent Africa.

To Nkrumah then, foreign policy was a proof of independence, a means for the uniting of Africa and for influencing great power politics.

The foreign policy of the NLC was on the other hand, the reverse of Nkrumah's. Whereas Nkrumah was strategically daring but tactically cautious, the NLC was tactically daring within a generally cautious overall strategy.

The foreign policy decision-makers of all the three military governments were predominantly military men, at least during the initial stages of their respective rules. Not having been constitutionally elected, they had little to worry about regarding civilian elite claims for participation in the processes of foreign policy formulation. The decision-makers of the three regimes, however, displayed an awareness of a different sort of constituency. The NLC, through its leaders, showed a strong identification with Britain and the Commonwealth of Nations. The national interests of Ghana and of Africa received anomalous treatment. Civilian advisers of the regime, such as Dr. Kofi Busia, had been trained in the West and, like the military officers, openly prided himself on his love of Western values and ways of life. Dr. Busia, who later succeeded the NLC as Prime Minister, used the Centre

for Civic Education (CCE) to preach the virtues of western democratic government and the necessity for strong Anglo-Ghana relations.

The decision-makers of the NRC-SMC on the other hand, pursued a policy of national self-reliance and Pan-African unity. Having been locally trained and identifying more and more with national aspirations, the leaders placed greater emphasis on national economic welfare and strong relations with the Eastern bloc of socialist States with which, it was said, Ghana had more in common.

The AFRC-PNDC leadership showed even more concern for the interests of Ghana. Being junior officers of the armed forces and having had their training locally, the decision-makers of the regime placed emphasis on national economic and social reconstruction rather than on foreign issues. It was not for nothing that the regime sought strong relations with developing states like Cuba, Nicaragua and Burkina Faso, all countries struggling with new economic and social systems of organization.

As to the contributory causes of foreign policy, the AFRC-PNDC regime's policies in 1979 and in 1982, were induced mainly by internal factors as was shown by the public executions of leading politicians

and military officers for economic and social crimes. Ghana's borders were closed to neighbouring countries for the same reasons. What the outside world thought of Ghana was of little consequence.

The difference between the policies of the NLC and the NRC-SMC turn on direction and degree of commitment. Both regimes perceived their policies as the fulfilment of previous commitments (i.e. commitment to Western values in the case of the NLC and commitment to national values in the case of the NRC-SMC). In their actualisation of national objectives, the NRC-SMC was prepared and willing to repudiate national debts owed to Western financial bodies and also to appoint Ghanaians to the commanding heights of the national economy; whereas the NLC displayed an allegiance to Western economic interests, an allegiance which competed with Ghana as a reference group.

Accordingly, Ghana's foreign policy under the NLC was aimed largely at meeting the expectations of Western governments and financial interests. To the NRC-SMC however, the African "environment" was of paramount importance. The AFRC-PNDC moreover, pursued its policies in the belief that a good foreign policy, like charity, must begin at home. Hence the emphasis on problems of the immediate

domestic environment and the pursuit of relations with foreign countries with which Ghana shared common concerns.

When Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings made his dramatic return to power during the early hours of New Year's eve in 1981, he promised the people of Ghana a new country: the end of corruption, privilege, abuse of office; a stop to the exploitation of Ghana's natural resources in the interests of external powers; accountability; and greater participation in the affairs of the nation by the majority of the population. In the early days, Rawlings' allies were men of known radical credentials.

At the close of 1982, it was clear that the regime favoured warm relations with Latin America including Nicaragua and Cuba. The belief was that the experiences of those countries were of relevance to the developments underway in Ghana. The regime is reported to have claimed that Nicaragua and Cuba, both Third World countries, have refused to conform to any particular country's pattern of government. They have evolved and are still evolving their unique modes of participatory democracy even under heavy economic and political pressures. And whilst doing this, they have made enormous strides in education,

health care and other basic needs. Their determination gives strength to other countries such as Ghana, seeking to achieve true independence and social justice.

The restrictive and inflexible approaches of the three military regimes resulted in near universal failures and obvious lack of major successes in their foreign policies. Military rulers, contrary to immediate post-coup rhetoric, are neither paragons of virtue nor selfless builders of successful modern nation-states. As Claude Welch was led to ask: "Can a military-based government cope more successfully with the difficulties civilian regimes encountered? Are some of these problems susceptible to solutions by means congenial to the governing military junta in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime?" (3)

In the case of Ghana's foreign policy during the period of the three military regimes, the answer must be no to both of these questions. As a small underdeveloped country, this study would suggest that, what the country needs is an appropriate foreign policy to back up the development effort. Such a policy would define national interests in terms of economic and social well-being but not in grand ideological posturings meant to satisfy

foreign or domestic reference groups. It follows that the military, lacking political legitimacy and subject to chronic instability, cannot promote the set of circumstances needed to attract foreign investment and international political goodwill without which all hope of peace and orderly progress must be forlorn.

The military's particular kind of organization represents more of a barrier than a means to the pursuit of such a foreign policy, for, as Rustow has observed: "Vanguard, feet marching, ranks serried, battlements, charges, the great objective: the imagery is the familiar one of the proving ground and the infantry attack. Command and discipline, direct and momentum count for everything ... Surely, if the ills of the body politic could have been cured so easily, the occasion for a military coup would never have arisen. The political arena is not a defile. Civil servants cannot administer laws by advancing in serried ranks. Economic planners cannot augment production by charging battlements ... Above all, the objectives in politics are always in question. Any junta of field-grade officers that expects to reach a sacred but unspecified goal - and to reach it by storm, in a few hours or even weeks - is in for an awakening."⁽⁴⁾

The foreign reference group model has been used in this study of the foreign policies of three military regimes of the period 1966-1982 because it provides a common framework within which the foreign policies of military regimes can be analysed and compared. However, this approach to the study of foreign policy has its limitations both in terms of its overall power of explanation and specifically in reference to its applicability to possible future military regimes. Essentially, the model serves an exploratory purpose and some of the concepts and assumptions which comprise it are general enough to permit conflicting interpretations of given historical data.

As an initial formulation rather than a final explanation, the model is oriented toward describing and categorising a complex process rather than attempting to explain and predict that process with unflinching accuracy.


However, on a general rather than specific level, the model is predictive in regard to such matters as the functional relationship between the professional socialisation processes through which military leaders have undergone during their training days (with their resultant psychological predispositions) and foreign policy outputs.

Ghana's foreign policy under a military-backed regime, will, according to this theory, tend to be positively or negatively inclined to the East or West depending more upon the "psychological predispositions" of decision-makers than the "operational environment" within which Ghana's value synthesis ought, under a competent administration, to be maximised.

The concluding point then is not that military officers in all newly independent African States will approximate those of Ghana in their attitudes and behaviour in the field of foreign policy. On the contrary, military elites differ and so does foreign policy under military rule. What is needed is an analytic and explanatory instrument that can recognise and account for these differences. The reference group approach provides an introductory contribution to the development of such a sophisticated instrument.

1. Hansard, Vol.1, No.1, Accra: Government Printer, 1957.
2. The following section is based on Professor W. Scott Thompson's assessment of the situation. Refer to the article "Ghana's Foreign Policy Under Military Rule", Africa Report, May-June 1969, op. cit. I am greatly indebted to Professor Thompson.
3. Welch, Claude, "The African Military and Political Developmen" in Henry Bienen (ed.) The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton University Prass, Princeton, 1962, p. 76.
4. Rustow, Dankwart A., A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., p. 187.

APPENDIX A



SOURCE: New African, No. 199, April 1984

APPENDIX B

GHANA'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN AFRICA TO 1965

Algeria:

A Ghana mission was formally established in Algiers in 1962, although while the Algerian struggle was still in progress, Ghana had accorded Algeria de facto recognition in 1959 and de jure recognition in 1961; Ghana also made financial arrangements for an Algerian mission to be opened in Accra, before Algerian independence, with the late Frantz Fanon as Algeria's Ambassador.

Burundi:

An Embassy established in late 1964 after the visit of the Burundi Foreign Minister to Accra. The first Ambassador appointed by Nkrumah was a Bureau of African Affairs activist. For some time he used the communications facilities of the Ghana High Commission in Kampala.

Cameroon:

One of the last missions established by Ghana in December 1965 just before the coup. Although he had assisted Foncha with political advice and funds and encouraged him to seek unification with the French-speaking sector of the Cameroons, Nkrumah

was never happy about the circumstances of Felix Moumie's mysterious death in Geneva. He distrusted Ahidjo as a protégé of the French authorities. Ahidjo on the other hand protested persistently against the presence of a large pro-Moumie faction in Ghana. The National Liberation Council closed the Ghana Embassy in 1966. It thus had a short-lived existence in the Cameroons.

Central African Republic:

No diplomatic relations.

Chad:

No diplomatic relations.

Congo Br .aville:

Owing to Ghana's close association with Congo (Leopoldville) Kinshasa, Brazzaville was neglected. The Abbé Youlou, when President, was too pro-French to attract Nkrumah's attention or interest. Later, when Masemba-Debat became President, relations between the two countries improved.

Congo (Leopoldville) Kinshasa:

A politician, A.Y.K. Djin, was appointed in 1960. He had been Nkrumah's personal representative in the Congo long before the country attained independence. He thus became a very intimate associate

of the Congolese political leaders. Lumumba, Kasavubu, Albert Kalonji, Gizenga, Mobutu, Kiwewa, and others.

Dahomey:

A mission was set up in 1962 at embassy level amid high expectations of close relations as a counter to the slow response of Togo to Ghana's attentions. President Maga was superficially co-operative (cf. his contribution at OAU), but expected financial assistance similar to loans given to Mali and Guinea. Ghana was at this time not so affluent herself. Maga was also subject to domestic and external pressure, particularly from Abidjan; Dahomey was more interested in a 'Benin Federation' involving Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, and Western Nigeria, but regionalism was political anathema to Nkrumah.

Ethiopia:

An embassy was established in 1959. The first Ghanaian Ambassador was M.A. Riberio who later served in the same capacity in Washington and Rome. He held the latter post until his retirement in 1969.

Gabon:

No diplomatic relations.

Gambia:

Before Gambia's independence Nkrumah maintained close personal relations with Garba-Jahumpa, whom he met in Manchester at the 1945 Pan-African Congress.

Guinea:

This post, owing to the Declaration of Union between Ghana and Guinea in November 1958, was opened as a Resident Ministry in January 1959. After the OAU Charter was inaugurated in May 1963, it became a normal embassy having an Ambassador.

Ivory Coast:

The establishment of diplomatic relations was agreed in September 1960. An Ambassador was appointed in March 1961. There was considerable friction in Ghana-Ivory Coast relations owing to the presence of political exiles from both states in each other's capital. The difference between the two states were ideological. Houphouet-Boigny often said that his ancestors hailed from Ashanti in Ghana.

Kenya:

A Ghana High Commission was set up in Nairobi in December, 1963, It is noteworthy that up to the end of 1965, in spite of Ghana's close links with Kenya and Nkrumah's personal association with Presi-

dent Kenyatta, no Kenya mission had been set up in Ghana.

Liberia:

Diplomatic relations between Ghana and Liberia existed from Ghana's independence. For many years, and right up to the time of the coup in Ghana, Liberia's Ambassador was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

Libya:

Ghana's mission in Tripoli from 1960 and for many years afterwards was occupied by a Chargé d' Affaires; Libya did not appoint a representative to Ghana.

Malagasy Republic:

No diplomatic relations.

Malawi:

Although Dr. Banda had received financial aid from Nkrumah for his political campaigns in Nyasaland (the Ghana Times of 8 April 1959, records one grant of £ 10 000) he showed little inclination towards Ghana when his country secured independence.

Mali:

A resident Minister was appointed in December 1960, after the visit of Nkrumah to Bamako in November 1960. Mali was a member of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union.

Mauretania:

Relations existed between 1964 and 1965.

Morocco:

An embassy was established in the autumn of 1961. Between King Mohammed V and President Nkrumah there were very intimate personal relations. I once heard the President say that King Mohammed wished him to regard his son (Prince Hassan) as his younger brother and ward. The King gave Nkrumah a personal gift of a villa in Tabat, although Nkrumah never used it.

Niger:

An embassy was opened in 1962 with a chargé d' Affaires. The Niger government appointed an Ambassador to Ghana in 1961.

Nigeria:

Ghana set up a Commission in 1959 when Nigeria was still a dependent territory. This was elevated to High Commission status on the attainment of Nigeria's independence on 1 October 1960.

Rwanda:

An embassy was established in 1965. Rwanda had no mission in Ghana.

Senegal:

An embassy was set up in 1961, but the mission was maintained by a Chargé d' Affaires until 1962 when an Ambassador, Dr. Foli, A Paris-educated political economist, was appointed.

Sierra Leone:

As in Nigeria, a Ghana Commission was opened here in 1960, prior to Sierra Leone's independence. This was raised to the status of High Commission in April 1961, to accord with Sierra Leone's independence.

Somalia:

An embassy was established headed by a Chargé d' Affaires in 1961 followed by an Ambassador before the end of that year. Somalia did not have a diplomatic mission in Ghana.

Sudan:

Diplomatic relations were established at embassy level in 1959.

Tanzania:

A High Commission was set up by Ghana in Dar-es-Salaem in 1962. Tanzania had no diplomatic mission in Ghana between 1957 and 1965.

Togo:

Diplomatic relations were established in 1963 at embassy level.

Tunisia:

An embassy was set up in Tunis in 1960.

Uganda:

A High Commission was established in Kampala in 1963.

UAR:

A Ghanaian Ambassador presented his credentials to President Nasser in May 1958, a little over a year after Ghana's independence. Israel had set up a consulate in Accra even before the proclamation of independence in March 1957.

Upper Volta:

Diplomatic relations were established in 1961 at embassy level.

Zambia:

Ghana set up a mission in Lusaka in 1963.

Source: Dei-Anang, Michael, The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations, 1957-1965: A Personal Memoir, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, The Athlone Press 1975, pp. 73-77.

APPENDIX C

GHANA'S DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS OUTSIDE AFRICA
TO 1965

Albania:

This mission, established in January 1962, would not have been necessary for political and diplomatic reasons. Having given the "blanket" order for missions in Eastern Europe, Nkrumah would have been embarrassed by failure to establish one at Tirana.

Australia:

A Commonwealth state. Diplomatic relations were arranged soon after Ghana's independence.

Belgium:

Relations with Belgium, established in 1960, were erratic because of the Congo crisis. Initially cordial, although not without a degree of suspicion on both sides, they were broken at the end of that year and not re-established until 1962. Ghana did not assign an Ambassador to Belgium until 1965. Even then, he was resident in The Hague. Belgium was very badly served by her first representative, Mr. Walravens, notorious in diplomatic circles and Accra society as a philanderer.

Brazil:

A mission in Brazil (opened in 1962) was of economic and cultural, rather than political, importance. The country is an effective rival to Ghana as a world cocoa producer. It also had a large African population, with distinct ethnic relations with the Ewe tribe (first-hand evidence of Bensah, former Ewe Minister who led a Ghana delegation to Brazil).

Bulgaria:

A mission was established in 1962 in the aftermath of Nkrumah's Eastern European tour.

Canada:

One of the Commonwealth posts established in 1957 shortly after independence. A High Commissioner was, however, not appointed until 1961.

Ceylon:

A Commonwealth state. The first Ghana High Commissioner was Reverend S.G. Nimako. Ceylon reciprocated by providing the first woman diplomat in Ghana, Mrs. Senaratne.

China:

Established in 1960 with Ohenenana Cobina Kessie as Ghana's envoy. For Ghanaians, because of its austerity and remoteness from Africa, this post

was regarded almost as penal. Those who accepted service there received considerable respect.

Cuba:

An embassy was established in 1960. There was a general feeling of mutual respect between Fidel Castro and Nkrumah in the context of Afro-Asian-Latin American solidarity against imperialism and colonialism. Che Guevara visited Ghana in 1965.

Czechoslovakia:

An embassy was established in 1962 in furtherance of Nkrumah's Eastern European policy. As, apart from Eastern Germany, this is the most prosperous state among the Soviet Eastern allies, it would have been deserving of Ghana's diplomatic attentions anyway.

Denmark:

Ghana had no mission in Denmark until 1966, although the Danish government had appointed its representative in Ghana as far back as 1961. At the time of the Ghana coup the Danish envoy was a woman, the first European female diplomat in Accra. The tardiness in establishment of a mission in Copenhagen was a reflection of Ghana's assessment of its economic and political importance.

France:

An embassy was set up in 1957 soon after independence. Until 1959 the Ghana High Commissioner in London represented Ghana's interests in Paris. Sir Edward O. Asafa-Adjaye fulfilled this dual role with marked competence.

German Democratic Republic:

In compliance with the 'Hallstein Doctrine' Ghana maintained only a Trade Mission in East Germany. This was, of course, a diplomatic camouflage for the trade representatives of both states were to all intents and purposes, except in diplomatic status, national representatives.

German Federal Republic:

An embassy opened in 1969.

Hungary:

One of the Eastern European states which became diplomatically linked to Ghana in 1962 after Nkrumah's tour of Eastern Europe in 1961.

India:

A Commonwealth state. A High Commission was established after Ghana's independence and there had been a long period of pre-independence association.

Israel:

An embassy was set up in 1958 although Israel established a full mission at ambassador level in 1957. Before independence, Israel had a small consulate in the Gold Coast.

Italy:

An embassy was set up in 1961. No effort was made to establish formal links with the Vatican. This would have been achieved by accreditation of the Ghanaian envoy in Rome and would have involved additional expenditure, but might have been a reasonable concession to the religious sentiment of the large Catholic population in Ghana. The present Pope, as Cardinal Montini, visited Ghana before his elevation to the Papacy.

Japan:

An embassy was established mainly for economic reasons in January 1960.

Lebanon:

Lebanon had an envoy in Ghana by 1960. From June 1959 it had maintained a legation. There has long been a large Lebanese and Syrian trading community in Ghana. Ghana did not establish a mission in Beirut. The National Liberation Council appointed an envoy to the Lebanon in 1966.

Mexico:

This mission was opened in 1964 for cultural reasons and within the framework of African-Latin American solidarity.

Netherlands:

An embassy office was set up in 1965. There has been a Royal Netherlands envoy in Ghana since January 1959. The same reason as for Denmark obtains for the late opening of an embassy.

Pakistan:

A Commonwealth country. A Ghana High Commissioner was posted to Karachi in 1962.

Poland:

An embassy was established in 1962.

Romania:

An embassy was established in 1962.

Switzerland:

An embassy was set up in 1965. There was also a permanent UN Mission from 1959.

Turkey:

The National Liberation Council appointed an envoy in 1966. Ambassador resident in Rome.

USSR:

Diplomatic relations were established in 1959; an embassy was set up in 1960.

United Kingdom:

A High Commission was set up on Independence Day, 6 March 1957.

United Nations:

A Permanent Mission was established in September 1957. Major Seth Anthony was the first Ghanaian representative.

North Vietnam:

Diplomatic relations were established in 1965.

Yugoslavia:

An envoy was posted in 1960, but relations were established between the two states in 1959. There was a strong personal link between the two Presidents on the basis of their non-alignment policy.

Ghana had no missions in Indonesia, Iraq, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Sweden, although these states had established diplomatic missions in Accra. The Swedish representative was resident in Monrovia. At no time did diplomatic relations exist with Singa-

pore, Malaysia or New Zealand, all Commonwealth countries.

Source: Dei-Anang, Michael, The Administration of Ghana's Foreign Relations, 1957-1965: A Personal Memoir, The Athlone Press, London, 1975, pp. 78-81.

APPENDIX D

(Transcript)

No./BR/PR/BU/64

GHANA EMBASSY,
B.P. 79,
BUJUMBURA,
BURUNDI.
17th November, 1964.

Sir,

I wish to refer to my telex message No. BR/PR/1/64 on recent developments in Burundi and to enclose a full report on them.

2. As para-military actions against neo-colonialist forces in Africa are the responsibility of the Bureau of African Affairs, I thought it expedient to inform you of the necessity of taking such an action in Burundi, in the interest of the African cause.

3. As a sequel to my report, I wish to inform you that Chief of the Burundi Army (who was in Accra to attend the African High Command Conference) held secret meetings with me and insisted that I recommended to Osagyefo to give material assistance to the Army to overthrow the decadent monarchy. The Army is fully supported by the Workers and the masses in general.

4. As stated in my report, the King is likely to have a secret army of 60 paratroopers—definitely Western mercenaries. Also across the Burundi border in Kamembe and elsewhere are American military planes which may assist the King to put down any revolution. However, assessing the strength of the Army and the progressive forces, I do not think that any outside force can avail against this national avalanche of progress.

5. I cannot specify in detail the sort of arms which are necessary, but I think that it would be expedient to send small arms as diplomatic packages, considering the difficulties involved in transporting heavy packages to as a remote a place as Burundi. I may mention that some sort of financial support to the revolution may also be necessary.

6. The revolutionaries approached the Chinese also, and I had frequent discussions with the Ambassador. The Chinese are highly interested in the success of the revolution but the Ambassador could not tell me to what extent they were prepared to help.

7. At this very moment when I am drawing up this report in Kampala, the Chief of the Army is awaiting my arrival in Burundi to learn from me if there are any possibilities of assistance from Ghana. I hope, Sir, that you will give this matter your urgent but careful attention and let me have your directives as early as possible.

I am, Sir,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sgd.) M. K. AMEKO
Ambassador

Dear Mr. Del-Anang

NB

Two of our experts must accompany our contingent to teach them in the handling of weapons from the E which we shall be sending.

A. K. BARDEN, ESQ.,
DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
ACCRA.

APPENDIX D

OMAH REPORT,
 R.F. 74,
 KANSAS CITY,
 MISSOURI,
 17th November, 1964.

Sir,
 I wish to refer to my radio message No. 82/11/64 on recent developments in Kuwait and to outline a full report on them.

1. As per-military actions against non-Communist forces in Africa are the responsibility of the Bureau of African Affairs, I thought it essential to inform you of the necessity of taking such an action in Kuwait, in the interests of the African cause.

2. As a result of my report, I wish to inform you that Chief of the Kuwaiti Army, Qura, was in a hurry to attend the African High Command Conference and had several meetings with me and confirmed that I recommended to "rush" to give material assistance to the Army to overthrow the despotic monarchs. The Army is fully supported by the Workers and the masses in general.

3. As stated in my report, the King is likely to have a secret army of 40 paratroopers - definitely Russian mercenaries. Also among the Kuwaiti leaders in London and elsewhere are American military planes which may assist the King to put down the revolution. Summary assessing the strength of the King and the Progressive Forces, I do not think that any outside force can still control this national movement of progress.

4. It is noted generally in detail the need of arms when you mentioned, but I think that it would be essential to send small arms and diplomatic packages, notwithstanding the difficulties involved in transporting heavy packages to a remote physical Kuwait. I may mention that some sort of financial support to the revolution may also be necessary.

5. The news intermediaries approached the Chinese side, and I had proposed immediately with the Ambassador. The Chinese are highly interested in the success of the revolution but the Ambassador could not tell us to what extent they were prepared to help.

6. At this early moment when I am drawing up this report in London, the King of the King is writing to several in Kuwait to learn whether there are any possibilities of assistance from them. I am sure that you will give this matter your utmost but realistic attention and let me know your direction as early as possible.

I am, Sir,
 Yours faithfully,
 OMAH

OMAH

APPENDIX E
(Transcript)

IMMEDIATE

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
P.O. BOX M.84
ACCRA
9th February, 1965.

BAA/SCR.101/Vol.2

SECRET

*Del-Anang,
Will you and Barden see me
about this.*

Dear Mr. Del-Anang,

ACTIVISTS

It has been decided that in view of political trends in certain African States, the Bureau's Activists should be sent out immediately to take care of the internal situation there. The states concerned are:—

Ivory Coast
Upper Volta
Niger
Nigeria
Burundi
Togo

2. This decision is based on authentic information about projected manoeuvres and plans that are being hatched and about which Osagyefo The President has been informed.

3. It is proposed that the Activists should be posted to these countries for a year and should cover events before the O.A.U. Conference in September. I have therefore provided below the details of expenditure involved.

(a) Salaries for 52 months (Ref. my letter BAA/SCR.101 of 8th Dec., 1964)	£14,415
(b) Foreign Service Allowance for 6 Activists on posting (Originally not included in my letter BAA/SCR.101 of 3rd June 1964. Ref. your minute to Osagyefo dated 9th June, 1964)	5,800
(c) Outfit Allowance	2,200
(d) Air passages	2,450
(e) Rent and Transport expenses	3,000
(f) Contingencies	500
	<hr/>
	£28,365

4. I should point out again that funds for the Activists have been excluded from our Estimates for this Budget Year through no fault of ours and I should be grateful for funds to be released to enable the Activists to be posted as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

*Osagyefo,
Have you approved these
proposals by Mr. Barden?
We cannot proceed without
Osagyefo's recorded approval please.*

DIRECTOR.

M. P. DEI-ANANG, ESQ.,
AFRICAN AFFAIRS SECRETARIAT,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ACCRA.

APPENDIX F
(Transcript)

PASTORAL LETTER FROM HEADS OF CHURCHES OF THE CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF GHANA TO BELIEVERS IN GOD AND IN THE LORD JESUS CHRIST

Brothers in Christ,

WE, HEADS OF CHURCHES belonging to the Christian Council of Ghana, greet you in Jesus' name. We are writing to encourage you always to pray and not to lose hope in these days when food is scarce and the activities of some organs of the 31st December Revolution cause deep anxiety.

We want to give you full details of the attack on members of the Methodist Church Accra District Synod on Monday, 9 May, because the incident reflects methods which may be employed again in future against some of you, and it also suggests ways to which the people of Ghana may respond to our prophetic utterances.

The Critical Food Situation

We also want you to see the emergency food situation which now exists all over the country not merely as a disaster but also as a call to the Churches

to serve the whole community in a new way. We call on you to care for those in special need, and to share all existing resources equally and wisely.

In particular we ask you to co-operate with the Churches Relief Committee of the Christian Council in distributing commodities in your area. The Churches Relief Committee was set up during the emergency created by the returnees from Nigeria earlier this year, when the Christian Council distributed some 30 tons of food and other aid, and received donations within Ghana totalling over £ 132 000. Out of this fund £ 82 000 has been spent as follows:

FOOD ITEMS	£	59 000
TRAVEL AND TRANSPORT	£	17 000
ADMINISTRATION	£	6 000

We are using the balance of £ 47 000 to launch the next stage of our relief programme.

The major relief operation is in the hands of the government and the Churches' scheme is on a smaller scale, it is intended to supplement the government operation.

However, the Churches do plan to distribute on a cash sale basis some 7 000 tons of food which we

have requested from Churches around the world. We shall send all the food we receive to main centres in each region; from there it will be the task of Local Councils of Churches to contact their regional Councils to collect their allocations and ensure that the food reaches those who really need it.

When supplies arrive, Councils of Churches should consult with other distribution agencies about local needs and methods of distribution. We shall ask you to sell commodities for cash in most cases and to pay the money into a Churches Relief and Development Fund which will be used to finance projects in the most needy areas.

Local Councils of Churches in those areas should therefore prepare projects for farming, water supply, planting of fruit trees, re-afforestation, repair of school buildings, and other similar projects. Please explain to your people that the purposes of selling commodities for cash is to finance such projects and that provided we receive well-planned schemes, up to 50 % of the proceeds of sales can be devoted to local development projects.

It has been said that man's extremity is God's opportunity. Let us not be dismayed by the problems

around us, but offer Him our energy and honest dedication to be used in the tremendous task that lies before us. By His grace we shall succeed.

A Christian Response to Crises

Faced with incidents such as that which occurred in Accra on Monday, 9 May, the Christians' only weapons are love, prayer and truth. Love desires the highest good of every man. We are therefore to love people who seek to harm us, to believe that God offers them a chance to repent and to rejoice if they find Jesus and change their ways.

Prayer is our daily habit, we pray individually in the privacy of our homes, and we pray together whenever we meet, especially in public worship when scripture commands us to pray for those in authority over us. Prayer is our link with our God and the secret of our strength.

Our duty to tell the truth includes exposing and revealing the actions of sinful men, "Take no part in the unfruitful works of darkness, but instead expose them" (Ephesians 4:11). Therefore we should be accurate reporters of evil act - we should record names and personal details, times, numbers, places, vehicle details including colours

and registration numbers, and other information which will later on help in bringing offenders to justice.

We give you the following account as an example:

Activities of Some Organs of the Revolution

On Saturday, 7 May, there was a meeting in Bukom Square at which an influential adviser of the Government encouraged his hearers to stage a demonstration against the students of the University of Ghana, Legon, the following Monday, 9 May.

Those interested were asked to meet at the Accra Community Centre on Monday morning. Women who prepare food, especially rice and maasa, were also asked to come to cook for the demonstrators.

The women who responded to this invitation on Monday morning were marched from the Community Centre to the nearby Baden-Powell Memorial Hall between 8 and 9 a.m. They were given bags of rice and told to cook food in readiness for the demonstrators' return.

In the hall the women met a crowd of men, some already holding weapons, who had been gathered

together by various means.

For instance, one party of fishermen was recruited at the Accra beach. These people were promised that after the demonstration they would be given rice, sugar and ₵ 500 each. Other parties came from Madina, Tema, Nima and the Total Petrol Station at Pig Farm, Kotobabi; in this case the organisers first attracted by-standers by distributing free cigarettes and then brought them together into a waiting bus. Some returned the cigarettes and got down, others were willing to go.

All these people, and many other groups, including soldiers in mufti and armed members of the people's militia, were in the Baden-Powell Memorial Hall.

The party, estimated by the Ghanaian Times (Wednesday, 11 May) to number 500 people, eventually moved in some 10 to 14 government vehicles, including a green Information Services Department Land-Rover carrying public address equipment, and buses bearing the names of State Transport Corporation, Tema Textiles Limited, Tema Food Complex Corporation, Tema Steel Works, Cocoa Marketing Board and National Defence Committee.

After causing a disturbance at the TUC and injuring

Mr. F.D. Ad abeng, National Chairman, Industrial & Commercial Workers Union, Mr. Van-Less, Chief Accountant and Mr. L.Y. Awua of the Agricultural Union, the convoy of vehicles came at about 1.30 p.m. to Calvary Methodist Church where the lay members of Accra District Synod were leaving after refreshment, prior to the ministerial session which was to take place in the afternoon.

The Information Services Land-Rover was in the lead. A man looking out from the roof and holding a microphone led the demonstrators in shouting insults at the members of Synod. Among the remarks they made were,

"You foolish people, you think you can do politics? You will see."

"You Christian Council people - you have been praying for what?"

"You say government should hand over. You are against the government."

"Where is that Essamuah?"

Some used such obscene language in Ga that witnesses do not wish to repeat the words.

As the demonstrators continued to shout, many of them, probably over 100, got out of their vehicles and came on to the Church grounds. Some removed knives from their socks and boots as they came.

Others held a variety of weapons, including iron bars, sticks, cudgels, matchets and pick-axes. One of them shouted, "Charge".

They then passed through the assembled synod delegates threatening and molesting them, so that most of the people scattered. They also threw out leaflets.

Some of the demonstrators shouted, "You have to go to work. This is no work." "We are the hungry workers." Another declared, "There is no God" - then he smashed one of the chapel doors with a hammer.

When the demonstrators came to the Reverend Edmund Ashietey he asked them, "What are you after?" Some six or seven of them seized Reverend Ashietey as he sought refuge in the choir vestry, tore his coat and trousers, and began to beat him up and drag him into the adjoining conference room where refreshments had just been served. Reverend Ashietey protected himself by seizing a metal chair and holding it over his head to ward off the blows. In spite of this he received two knife wounds in the back of his head and bruises on his left hand and right shoulder. Many people assumed he was mortally injured.

While under attack, Reverend Ashietey was repeatedly calling "Thanks be to God! Thanks be to God!"

Mr. J.S. Coleman and Mr. J.K. Essuon, both chapel stewards of Calvary Methodist Church, attempted to come to Reverend Ashietey's aid. Both were injured. Mr. Coleman lost his spectacles and received a deep cut over the right eyebrow; he was bruised and his trousers were torn. Mr. Essuon had bruises on the right side of the body, and a blow from a pick-axe caused a deep wound on his left shoulder which required several stitches.

Refreshments had been served by students of Calvary Girls Vocational Institute, and these students and other ladies were still in the hall at this point. The demonstrators attacked Mrs. Abeasi, knocked her down and caused cuts on her leg. Miss Aryee, one of the students, recognised her own brother among her attackers. She cried "Brother!" He replied, "Sisi! Saa awoa!" (Sisi, it's you!) Immediately he called out, "Stop, stop, stop!" and encouraged his comrades to leave the hall.

However, before leaving they first consumed the remaining food, overturned some tables, and destroyed hundreds of plates, cups, saucers and teapots. some tea-pots and plenty of cutlery were removed

by the demonstrators.

Outside, they were dragging Mr. Coleman towards one of their vehicles. The Conference Secretary, the Reverend Tekyi-Ansah, then shouted to the on-lookers, "Christians! Why are we standing still while they take our brother away?" At this some stepped forward, but one of the demonstrators said, "If you approach, I will shoot you!"

Reverend Abe-Arthur then pleaded with demonstrators to release Mr. Coleman and they did so. Climbing back into their government vehicles they left the scene, chanting war songs.

Throughout the incident no member of the Methodist Church made any attempt to retaliate against their attackers.

The wounded were given first aid by Dr. Joe Riverson of Akosombo Hospital, one of the Synod delegates, before being taken to the Ridge Hospital for further treatment.

Soon after the convoy of buses had left a Police Task Force jeep arrived at Calvary Church and three armed men got out, one wore the uniform of a police sergeant, one was in army overalls, the leader was

in plain clothes and held a pistol. They asked, "What has happened? Where are the students?" Apparently they believed, or wished to make others believe, that the demonstrators were students. They asked Reverend Ashietey to go with them to make a statement but he declined to leave the Church premises. Later the incident was reported to the Adabraka Police Station by the Reverend Entsua-Mensah, Superintendent Minister of North Accra Circuit, the Circuit Steward Mr. E.A. Hayford, and Mr. J.S. Annan.

A similar violent demonstration was held on the campus of the University of Ghana. Some students and lecturers were severely beaten.

Miss Ama Busia, a member of Calvary Methodist Church and a matron at the University, had her house broken into. A lot of her property was taken away, and some destroyed. She was later forced to drive her car at gunpoint to the Regional Administration office where the car was seized. Her crime was that she had fed the students on Friday, 6 May, and was to explain her action to Mr. Akrase Sarpong, PNDC Secretary to WDC's and PDC's.

Our Reaction

We, heads of Churches, belonging to the Christian

Council of Ghana, believe that these incidents were not caused by a few thugs acting on their own initiative, but that they were carefully arranged by certain organs of the 31st December Revolution who were in a position to provide official transport, food supplies, cutlasses and guns, for the purpose. We believe that these attacks were intended to frighten Ghanaians into the silent acceptance of certain actions and policies: they were meant to stifle free speech and prevent criticism which is so necessary for a just and good government. The Christian Council has submitted a memorandum to the PNDC requesting an immediate public enquiry into the Calvary Methodist Church incident in particular so that those responsible for organizing it can be charged and dealt with in accordance with the laws of Ghana.

Finally we appeal to all citizens who have knowledge of any aspect of this and all similar incidents to come forward to the Ghana Armed Forces and Police and to their pastors, church officers, or Local Councils of Churches, and make full reports naming the organizers, describing exactly what they did, and giving all relevant details. With the three weapons of love, prayer and truth, and by the grace of God, we shall overcome the forces of violence and anarchy. God be with you all.

18 MAY 1983

Signed:

1. Rt. Rev. Prof. N.K. Dzobo
Moderator, E.P. Church and Chairman, Christian
Council of Ghana.
2. Mr. David Acquah
The Society of Friends and Vice-Chairman Chris-
tian Council of Ghana.
3. Rt. Rev. I.H. Frempong
Moderator Presbyterian Church of Ghana.
4. Rt. Rev. S.B. Essamuah
President of Conference, Methodist Church, Ghana.
5. Rt. Rev. J.K. Dadson
Bishop of Sunyani and Tamale, on behalf of the
Joint Anglican Diocesan Council.
6. Rev. Paul Kofi Fynn
Evangelical Lutheran Church.
7. Brother Abraham Wetseh
Ghana Mennonite Church
8. Rev. Brother Yeboah-Koree
Feden Church
9. Lt. Col. Agbenorto - Salvation Army.

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
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Name of thesis Foreign Policy Under Military Rule In Ghana, 1966-1982. 1985

PUBLISHER:

University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg

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