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IDEOLOGY IN ORGANIZED INDIAN POLITICS, 1880 - 1948.

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This paper is an attempt to place in perspective the ideologies which have helped shape South African Indian politics.

The history of organized Indian politics from the 1880s to the 1940s is mainly the history of trader politics - an almost unbroken line of accommodation to the demands of the ruling white minority; or, at most, selective reformism. This line has twice been breached though. Between 1907 and 1913, and again in the 1940s, a radical leadership emerged in the Transvaal and Natal which attempted to transform Indian politics. The process of transformation began at the level of ideology. Thus the two periods of radicalism are useful focal points: they demand an examination of not only the new ideologies, but also the old.

No attempt is made here to discuss the course of the passive resistance movements which were the end result of Indian radicalism, except insofar as is necessary to explore some of the issues which this paper has sought to address: the articulation of trader and radical ideologies; the potential of radical ideologies to forge cross-class or, indeed cross-race alliances; the extent to which that potential was realized, and the role of the Indian lower middle classes in that realization.

The paper begins, however, with a discussion of Indian social stratification at the turn of the century, and in the 1940s. This is meant, first of all, to provide the background to an understanding of the nature of the essentially conservative, entrenched political parties which the radicals attempted to transform. The discussion also illuminates the conditions under which radicalism emerged. Finally it sketches the social and economic conditions of the mass of the Indian people in order to identify their specific interests. The varying extent to which, and the way in which, those interests were represented by Indian politics at different times is in itself a significant commentary on changes in the content of their ideological underpinning.

INDIAN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

By the turn of the century three broad strata were discernible within the Indian population. Dominating the social and economic hierarchy was a trader elite. Some 1800 in total, they were based mainly in Natal - home of the vast majority of South African Indians - but there were several hundreds in the Transvaal. Most of them had migrated on their own initiative in the decades between the 1870s and 1890s; most of them were from western India (mainly Gujerat), and many of them were members of

heterodox Muslim sects.¹

The elite created and nurtured many social and religious organizations which celebrated narrow cultural distinctions imported from India. In Natal these included the Anjuman Islam, the Memon Committee, the Brahman Mandal and the Kathiawar Arya Mandal. In the Transvaal, identifiable sub-groupings, though some were perhaps less formally constituted, included the Gujerati Kunbis, the Konkanis, the Gujerat Hindu Society, the Sanatan Veda Dharma Sabha, the Hamidia Islamic Society and the Hamdarde Islamic Society. But these narrow loyalties were in part counterbalanced by the fact that Muslims in both areas supported the international Red Crescent Society and, for a time between 1905 and 1908, committees which were established in Johannesburg and Durban to collect funds for a 'Holy Railway' from Damascus to Medina. Even the far more fundamental distinction between Hindus and Muslims was counterbalanced by an elite consciousness - however ill-defined - of themselves as an Indian elite. There is an abundance of evidence to suggest that their most extravagant secular social activities were attended by all of the group; and though they may occasionally have included guests of honour of other races, these were essentially Indian celebrations.²

But although these ascriptive similarities/differences were important in moulding the social life of the traders, it was above all their common and, indeed, shared economic interests which as early as the 1880s bound them together as a self-conscious elite. Their interests in Natal and the Transvaal were closely intertwined through a network of partnerships (often involving family members), through credit networks which linked the petty traders to big traders, and through the fact that in Natal the more affluent often owned the property where smaller traders rented shops. This economic relationship, which defined the elite both objectively and subjectively, shaped the ideology and the political parties which the radicals sought to transform. These will be discussed in the second part of the paper.³

By the turn of the century, a new Indian elite was beginning to emerge as an objectively definable group in Natal. By 1910 the perimeters of the group were clearly distinguishable, though the group itself still showed signs of groping towards a self-conscious sense of identity. In the main they were 'colonials' - the more materially successful of the young, Natal-born offspring of indentured or ex-indentured labourers. They numbered around 300 in 1904.

Part of what prevented this group from coalescing earlier was the fact that in terms of ethnicity and religious affiliation they were somewhat less homogeneous than the established commercial elite. Although the overwhelming majority were Tamil-speaking Hindus, important members of the group were Tamil Christians (whose mother tongue was English), and others among them were Telegu Hindus or Christians, or Hindi speakers from northern India. Like the commercial elite, their early social organizations reflected these ascriptive attributes: the most important were the Hindu Young Men's Association (whose language of business was Tamil), and the Young Men's Catholic Society. Unlike the traders, however, the emerging elite lacked any overarching association before 1909.

But more importantly, perhaps, it was the lack of a clearcut community of economic interests which hampered the development of a unifying ideology by the emerging elite. What the group had in common was little more than a western education, and a relatively superior position in the occupational structure: relative, that is, to the mass of the Indian population from which they had risen. The most successful members of the group were a few highly trained professionals: lawyers, civil servants, accountants and a lone newspaper publisher. Lower down the occupational ladder were teachers, book-

keepers, clerks interpreters, petty entrepreneurs and small farmers. Most of the emerging elite, though, were salaried white-collar workers, dependent for a livelihood on the colonial administration. Their salaries obviously varied, but it seems accurate to suggest that until around 1909, most were economically comfortable, if not wealthy.

It is not surprising, then, to find that the new elite began to cohere as a distinct, self-conscious group during the postwar depression in Natal when it became increasingly difficult for western educated white-collar workers to maintain existing standards, far less aspire realistically to anything higher. The ideological form which they found to express their sense of common identity - South Africanism - linked them downwards to the mass of the people and produced the crucial challenge to both trader ideology, and radical ideology, which changed the shape of the first passive resistance movement. This too will be discussed in the second part of the paper.⁴

The final broad stratum in the Indian population, referred to thus far - rather unhelpfully - as the mass of the people, needs to be disaggregated even for a brief sketch of their social and economic conditions. The most crucial distinction within this stratum was that between indentured workers and others.

The base of the South African Indian population was built on the flow of indentured labour which began in 1860. Between 1860 and 1911, when the importation of Indian labourers ceased at the request of the Union government, 152,184 workers were shipped to Natal - approximately one third out of Calcutta, and the rest out of Madras. The sugar industry in Natal was built on this cheap labour: indentured Indians formed the backbone of the coastal sugar plantations during the industry's infancy. Indian contract labour was the mainstay of up-country farms and wattle plantations. Increasingly after the 1890s indentured Indians were also used in the industrial sector, principally on the Natal Government Railway (NGR) and the northern coalfields. They were also valued as domestic servants in private residences, hotels, restaurants, boarding schools and hospitals. However, indentured Indians in Natal were primarily agricultural labourers. The agricultural sector rarely absorbed less than 75% of the total indentured workforce, which numbered around 30,000 towards the end of the first decade of the century.⁵

Some 48% of these migrant labourers stayed on in Natal after their term of indenture had expired. From there, several thousands drifted north to the Transvaal before the Anglo-Boer war; but most of them remained in Natal.⁶ Initially they and their descendants enjoyed modest material success: there were numerous opportunities for involvement in petty enterprises in the agricultural sector which required little or no capital investment.⁷ During the postwar depression in Natal, however, they began to experience severe economic pressure. In addition to the depressed economy they bore the burden of an annual £3 tax to which those who had entered indenture after 1895, and their offspring, were subject. Widespread unemployment and destitution, and heavy indebtedness, are reported in a variety of sources between 1905 and 1908. The NGR and the sugar plantations lowered their wage levels for free Indian labour, so that even those who were employed experienced unusual pressures.⁸ One possible avenue of escape, the Rand gold mines, which had attracted Indian wage workers before the Anglo-Boer war, was blocked off after the British administration in the Transvaal started clamping down on Indian immigration in 1903 and 1904. The pre-war opportunities for Indian hawkers in the Transvaal were, of course, similarly restricted. Increasingly, then, the ex-indentured were driven back into contract work, where payment of the tax was suspended as long as the worker remained under contract. A measure of how hard this community was hit by the cumulative pressures of the £3 tax and the depressed economy is the fact that in 1913, some four years after the beginning of economic

recovery, 65.25% of the entire indentured workforce was under second, or subsequent, terms of indenture. Most of these were on the sugar plantations.⁹

Conditions for the indentured workforce into which these ex-indentured workers were thrown back obviously varied from employer to employer.¹⁰ But a close reading of the Protector of Indian Immigrants' files suggests a number of valid generalizations. In theory the labourer's conditions of existence were dictated by the terms of his five year contract, which conformed to Government of India regulations, and which offered an adequate, if very meagre, level of subsistence. The terms of contract were, however, all too often abused - particularly in the agricultural sector where some 75% of Indian contract workers were employed. Indeed, there is a solid weight of evidence in the Protector's files to suggest that overwork (as much as a 17 or 18 hour day in the overlapping crushing and planting seasons), malnourishment, and squalid, degrading living conditions formed the pattern of daily life throughout much of the agricultural sector. According to medical officials of the time, these conditions were significant contributing factors in the abnormally high disease and death rates of the indentured workforce.

Although the material conditions of industrial indentured labourers were slightly less oppressive, it is clear that the vast majority of indentured workers led a harsh, if not sub-minimal existence. Elaborate layers of formal and informal controls were used to keep workers on the job under these conditions. The degree of control varied with the harshness of conditions, ranging from employer/official encouragement or sanctioning of palliatives (drug and alcohol abuse, gambling and money-lending, for instance), to sjambok-wielding gang bosses, and a legal system that was heavily stacked in favour of employers. 'Leaving the estate in a body' was illegal, and punishable by fines or jail sentences even if the labourers had left to complain about breach of contract, and even if that complaint were upheld by the magistrate or Protector. Indeed, no indentured Indian could move more than 2 miles beyond his place of work without a written ticket of leave. Thus the workforce was atomized by law. If, despite all this, a worker did show signs of political awareness, such as trying to organize others in his compound, or even his work gang, he was immediately transferred elsewhere - the final divisive mechanism.

Given these constraints on worker action, it is difficult to assess the degree of worker consciousness shared by indentured labourers. Obviously they protested their conditions; but, not surprisingly, these protests were usually individualistic, and often of a type which did not require premeditation - malingering, absenteeism, destruction of employer property, and desertion, for instance. But, taking the period from 1860 to about 1909 as a whole, the incidence of collective action is - again, not surprisingly - low. There were no more than a handful of strikes, and these were short-lived, rarely transcended the accommodation units or work gangs into which plantation, mine or railway workforces were further subdivided, and were generally concerned with specific gross abuses of the contract. But as the percentage of re-indentured labourers in the workforce began to rise sharply after 1906, collective action and, even more, individual acts of protest, began to increase. Thus it is abundantly clear that, at least as individuals, indentured workers had a profound sense of grievance about their living and working conditions. Indeed, the growing air of militancy, as more and more ex-indentured workers joined the ranks of the indentured, suggests - among some at least - a broader consciousness: if nothing else, a sense of a wider range of options than would usually have been perceived by new recruits from India.

What is particularly important for present purposes then, is to underscore both the more pressing grievances of indentured and ex-indentured workers, and their inability to effectively represent these grievances. No cohesive formal political protest was generat-

ed by the mass of the people themselves, fragmented as they were into free rural and urban wage labourers, petty cultivators, hawkers, pedlars, and an atomized indentured workforce. But nor, contrary to the rhetoric of trader politics, were their grievances represented by the commercial elite, unless representing them could be seen to serve elite interests in some way. Indeed, the only real linkages between the commercial elite and the mass of the people were the essentially exploitative patron-client relationships formed by money lenders, shopkeepers, and the owner-operators of the Durban produce market. Thus, as the emerging new elite in Natal began to develop a unifying ideology, and to create a separate political identity, the field was clear for them to claim this vast potential constituency.

Whatever attempts were made to mobilize the mass of the Indian people for political action in the early years of the century proved to be short-lived. By the 1940s they were still poorly served by organized Indian politics, and they still suffered oppressive social and economic conditions. Recruitment for indentured labour in India had stopped in 1911: the last contracts were being worked out by 1916. The £3 annual tax on ex-indentured workers had been abolished in 1914. But opportunities for ex-indentured and their descendants to earn an independent livelihood in the agricultural sector had steadily declined between the wars, particularly during the 1929 - 1932 depression. Evictions by landowners, extending their own operations in the rural areas, and by the Durban City Council as industrialization advanced through the peri-urban areas, pushed others off the land. The 1936 Sugar Agreement, meant to protect small white cane farmers from the growing monopoly of large estates, eliminated numbers of petty Indian cultivators who could not meet the quotas set by the Agreement. By the census year 1946, only 15.4% (12,008) of the total male Indian working population remained on the land - virtually all of these, as at the turn of the century, in Natal. Nearly half of this number were wage workers, mainly in the sugar industry which was noted by contemporary observers as one of the lowest paying employers of Indian labour. Of the rest, only a small proportion owned their land, most of them holding monthly or yearly leases with no security of tenure. Contemporary studies describe their lifestyle as hand to mouth at best. Families were large, and largely illiterate; they lived in shanties which lacked sanitation, lighting and adequate water supplies. Intestinal diseases were rife.¹¹

Part cause,¹² and part effect of the shrinking rural Indian community was the rapid growth of the Indian urban wage labour force. Between 1936 and 1946 it soared from approximately 30% to 53% of the total male Indian working population. Some 88% of these (around 36,000) were in Natal, mainly Durban.¹³ It is difficult to assess to what extent these newly urbanised workers developed some sense of worker consciousness, and to what extent they might have maintained their links with, and continued to identify with, the rural areas which they had so recently left. More than one source suggests that the move to the towns consisted less of complete families than of young males whom family smallholdings could no longer support and for whom, clearly, financial constraints made the acquisition of their own land impossible. In earlier decades, the strength of the Indian joint family system would have ensured close links between town and countryside under these circumstances. But, at least within the urban areas, the joint family was rapidly disintegrating during the war. The disintegrative force seems to have been generated inside the families, by the young, and particularly by young women. It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that though a residual sense of obligation might have kept the newly urbanized in touch with the rural areas, the linkages would not have been sufficiently strong for them to continue to identify closely with them.¹⁴

The rapid growth of Indian trade unionism in the 1930s and 1940s is also suggestive of old loyalties and old forms of consciousness being replaced by new, however tentatively the replacements might initially have been formulated. Indian unions which, like African unions in secondary industry, began to flourish in 1928 in the wake of the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) and the Wage Act (1925), claimed 22,000 members by 1948.¹⁵ In the early years of the war, the unions were instrumental in helping to improve wage rates for Indian workers, at least to the extent of securing Wage Board investigations of their conditions, or ensuring that Wage Board Determinations were actually implemented by employers. Indeed, at first sight the success of organized labour appears quite striking: in numbers of industries Indian wage rates doubled or even tripled between 1937 and 1946. But this is a measure mainly of the rate of inflation and of how low Indian wages were in the mid 1930s. In any event, hemmed in by the 'civilized labour' policy, and by grossly inadequate educational facilities, the majority of the Indian workforce remained unskilled labourers, at the lowest levels of the wage spectrum. Real improvements in their conditions of existence - if, indeed, there were any during this decade - were minimal.¹⁶

Numbers of surveys conducted in the 1940s reached the same basic conclusion: 'not only is malnutrition serious among the Indian community in Durban, but also . . . for large numbers the quantity of food is insufficient'. This, despite between 65% and 70% of income spent on food.¹⁷ The corollary of the sudden upsurge in the urban population, relatively low wages, and high expenditure on foods, was housing conditions which were consistently condemned by contemporary reports. One of these is particularly revealing:

A large proportion of the Durban Indian community is housed in shacks and other poorly constructed dwellings which are scattered over the undeveloped agricultural lands along the western boundaries of the City. Some of these are actually cultivators, but by far the larger number have leased a patch of land, usually about half an acre in extent, and have erected on it one of the poorest types of dwelling imaginable. Old tar drums, relics of corrugated iron, and old pieces of wood are pressed into the construction, which with its earth floor and smoke grimed walls offers more suitable accommodation for the cockroaches and other vermin who share the uneasy symbiosis. The water supply for these shacks is drawn from springs and streams which are frequently highly polluted, and commonly nothing but the most primitive methods of stercus disposal are attempted.

This report was written in 1940.¹⁸ By the mid 1940s, these problems were exacerbated by severe overcrowding and escalating rents, which will be discussed more fully shortly.

The extensive surveys conducted by the University of Natal Department of Economics, and by others, are lacking for the Transvaal. But the files of the Johannesburg Indian Social Welfare Association are rich with detail which leaves no doubt that the conditions of existence of the small Transvaal Indian wage labour force were little different than those of the Natal Indians. They suffered the same low wage rates. They lived in urban slums which, like those in Natal, were consistently condemned by contemporary investigators.¹⁹

Wartime inflation and the tightening noose of restrictive legislation had also made its

impact on the Indian elites by the 1940s. The more successful among the commercial elite in both Natal and the Transvaal (still mainly descendants of the Gujarati immigrants of the late 19th century) had continued to flourish, at least in terms of capital accumulation. Much of this they invested in property in Natal and the Transvaal, as they had been doing for decades. Between 1932 and 1946 millions of pounds worth of property was bought by Indians in the Transvaal. Between 1927 and 1940 the rateable value of Indian properties in the Old Borough of Durban increased from £1,441,210 to £3,448,230. In the 'added areas' of Durban - site of the urban slums described above - they increased from £1,736,910 in 1934 to £2,394,300 in 1940. Some of these properties, particularly in the Old Borough, in the more affluent hitherto 'European' suburbs (as they were called at the time), reflected the wealthy Indians' dissatisfaction with the slum or near-slum conditions in the predominantly Indian areas of Durban. At least 70% of the new properties, however, seem to have been acquired strictly for investment purposes: though owned by Indians they were not occupied by them. The 1942 and 1943 Broome Commissions noted that Natal and Transvaal Indian capital had only two investment outlets - commerce and immovable property. But trade expansion was restricted by the licensing laws in both provinces (particularly rigorously in the Transvaal after 1939), and Indian occupation of land or immovable property not previously occupied by Indians was temporarily prohibited in the Transvaal in 1939. In the face of these cumulative threats, the Natal property market was an increasingly important investment outlet for the commercial elite of both provinces after 1939.²⁰

But Natal was not slow to follow the Transvaal. The 1943 'Pegging Act'²¹ closed off the elite's only remaining major avenue of investment by prohibiting the transfer of property from whites to Indians in the the municipality of Durban for the next three years. As a result of these new restrictions, property prices and rents soared in the predominantly Indian areas of Johannesburg and Durban. These already crowded slums and near slums swiftly became severely overcrowded under the combined impact of natural population increase, the impossibility of movement elsewhere and, in the case of Natal, continued migration from the countryside. In Johannesburg, and doubtless also Durban, landlords charged exorbitant 'key money' or 'goodwill' for the right to rent a single dilapidated room. Workers' conditions under these circumstances have already been described. To an extent these conditions were also suffered by petty traders and white collar workers who, though they numbered among the Indian notables for social and political purposes, did not have the economic resources which had enabled the more affluent members of the elites to buy their way into more congenial surroundings. Indeed, Indian white collar workers had been hard hit by the 'civilized labour' policy, while petty traders suffered the insecurity of knowing that their small business would be the first to collapse if segregation were permanently enforced. In the meantime they found themselves trapped with the wage workers in the rapidly deteriorating predominantly Indian areas of Johannesburg or Durban. Though they were not confined to the makeshift shanties of the wage labourers, contemporary observers nevertheless noted the overcrowding and squalor of their surroundings.²²

By the mid 1940s, then, the single most pressing problem for the majority of the Natal and Transvaal Indians was the effect of the new legislation which confined them to specific areas of Durban and Johannesburg. This legislation was temporary, but new laws were being worked out which promised to be at least as restrictive, threatening not only to confine Indians to specific areas, but possibly also to expropriate their holdings in other areas. What is important for present purposes, though, is to re-emphasize the different ways in which these restrictions weighed on different strata of the community. For the wealthier members of the elites the proposed legislation threatened loss of their

major investment outlets - choice urban property, either as an investment in itself, or for commercial expansion; and, more importantly, possible loss of their vast vested interests. For the less affluent members of the elites, urban segregation meant almost certain loss of livelihood for some; or, at best, sharing the increasing squalor of increasingly working class neighbourhoods - a privation which they felt keenly. For the workers themselves, segregation threatened homelessness, either through the inability to stretch their already overstrained incomes to meet escalating rents, or through slum clearance. But at the same time, it held the possibility of being rehoused in new municipal housing schemes which some workers, at least, favoured.

INDIAN POLITICS

From the first formal Indian political campaign in 1891, until the 1940s, Indian politics were dominated by the Natal and Transvaal commercial elite. Their major political organizations - the Durban-based Indian Committee (founded c. 1890), the Natal Indian Congress (1894), the Transvaal British Indian Association (1904 - name changed to Transvaal Indian Congress in 1926) and the South African Indian Congress (1919) - were founded to protect vested commercial interests, and controlled by the wealthiest merchants.^{2 3}

It is unnecessary to give any detail of these politics here. What is needed is only to draw out a few key points. Although these parties claimed to be the representatives of the entire Indian community - and were recognized as such by successive South African, British and Indian governments - membership consisted overwhelmingly of the commercial elite. Despite elaborate organizational structures and procedures in most parties, they in fact functioned only intermittently, and usually without regard to their own rules and regulations. Mobilization of the membership for political action was successfully effected only when new, or proposed legislation was perceived to pose a serious threat to actual or potential trader interests. Indeed, mobilization was attempted only under these circumstances. Political action, except in the periods of radicalism which will be discussed shortly, consisted of constitutional protest: letters, petitions and deputations to key officials in South Africa, Britain or India. These forms of protest were generally extra-parliamentary since South African Indians were not enfranchised.

The ideology which informed trader politics changed little during this half century. Although formal ideological statements from the trader were rare, clearly definable ideological assumptions are implicit as well as explicit in the pattern of their politics and political discourse. Insofar as the traders had an articulate secular ideology, it was fairly typical of that of any merchant class, and certainly typical of the Gujerati trading communities (whether Hindu or Muslim) from which they had migrated. Maximum emphasis was placed on protecting their privileged economic position. Socially and politically they were conservative. They worked within the framework of the existing social order, and although they protested manifestations of the whites' discrimination against Indians, they protested from a class rather than a national or racial position. Indeed, the first few decades of trader political rhetoric is shot through with references to the distinction between themselves and the mass of the South African Indian people. They not only accepted the inequalities between traders and indentured or ex-indentured workers, but legitimized them by offsetting the commercial elite as the 'respectable' members of the community. There is no doubt that this strand in their ideology was brought with them from India: caste/class distinctions were an integral part of 19th century Indian cultural baggage, whether Hindu or Muslim. But these sorts of distinctions were strongly reinforced in South Africa. This was particularly so

in late 19th century Natal, where the traders perceived the major threat to their economic interests to derive from being identified as members of a race which was placed low in the colonial racial hierarchy, and for whose vast majority restrictive legislation already existed. But at the same time as they opposed racial discrimination which affected - or might affect - them, they shared the whites' prejudices against blacks. These prejudices were also, almost certainly, imported from India, where hereditary hierarchical social divisions were largely congruent with skin colour. But, again, they were strongly reinforced in South Africa. In the late 19th century Transvaal in particular, the traders feared that justification for discriminatory legislation would be derived from their being identified simply as non-whites (*kleurling*), for most of whom restrictive legislation already existed. Trader ideology, then, was a complex web of class and race prejudices rooted both in the Indian traditions of their communities, and in the specific circumstances of their existence in late 19th - early 20th century Natal and the Transvaal. But there was nothing irrational or arbitrary about these prejudices or the politics which they helped shape. They were meant to protect - in South Africa, as they did in India - the traders' privileged economic position.²⁴

INDIAN RADICALISM

These political tactics and this ideology were first challenged by Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi had been hired as a legal representative and political organizer by some of the wealthiest Natal-based Indian merchants in 1894. For more than a decade, based first in Durban, then Johannesburg, Gandhi planned and co-ordinated the activities of the Natal Indian Congress and Transvaal British Indian Association, which he had helped found. The political patterns and ideology which had been established by the pre-Gandhian Indian Committee remained virtually unchanged during this time. In September 1906 Gandhi attempted to radicalize trader politics by calling for passive resistance against the Transvaal government. This was the beginning of a crisis-ridden campaign that lasted off and on (more the former than the latter) for over seven years.²⁵

The development in Gandhi's personal philosophy which underpinned this attempt to impose radicalism from above need not be discussed. What is of interest here is the ideology of the movement; its potential; the extent to which that potential was realized, and the subtle changes of ideological flavour which accompanied tactical shifts to accommodate planned and unplanned changes in the the movement's social base.

At its most pure and basic level Gandhian passive resistance, or *satyagraha* as it came to be called, was a set of beliefs which contained within them both a simple existential truth, and a command for both private and public action. *Satyagraha* presupposed moral autonomy. It rested on the assumption that man must be a free and independent moral agent, master of his own destiny rather than the passive object of someone else's will. But at the same time Gandhi accepted the legitimacy of the state and of the broad outlines of the existing pattern of social relations, and the need for an external structure of authority. Indeed, implicit within his writings and activity of this period is the belief that social oppression - or its opposite - derived simply from the will of the government. Thus the revolutionary potential of one strand of his ideology was held in check by a liberal, reformist strand which demanded only that men of conscience should challenge manifest injustices in an otherwise acceptable body of law.

Even with these limitations, and even with the ideology offered only to the Indian community, *satyagraha* clearly held enormous radical potential, implying cross-class solidarity within the community. However, despite the universalist and humanist tone of his philosophy, Gandhi's notion of community had yet to transcend his peers, the

commercial elite. He thus chose initially to work within, and for, existing Indian political structures. The obvious political advantages to be derived from this were outweighed by equally obvious disadvantages: nothing in the history of trader ideology or politics suggested that the elite would respond to a moral call to action. Indeed Gandhi's philosophy had been worked out in the context of his despair at what he saw as the moral degradation of the Indian elite. The radical potential of *satyagraha* was thus further whittled down to fit it to the needs and interests of the traders.

These compromises produced a movement whose initial goal was the repeal of a discriminatory piece of legislation which demanded that all Transvaal Indians submit to registration by the government. This goal was made relevant to the elite by convincing them that it admitted the principle of racist legislation for Indians, which would then be used to enforce urban segregation at the expense of Natal and Transvaal Indian vested interests. Given the Transvaal's history of attempts to confine Indians to designated locations (and Natal's occasional stabs in the same direction), and given the Milner administration's recent survey of proposed urban sites for Indians, the connection between these two propositions was far less tenuous than it might seem at first sight. This logic allowed Gandhi to tap the very core of trader ideology, and the one issue which had mobilized them in the past: protection of their vested interests. The two dominant themes in the movement's ideology were thus the moral one - articulated as a confused conception of national and individual honour - and a simple economic rationale.

Passive resistance began in mid 1907 with refusal, on pain of arrest, to take out registration certificates by the specified date. The initial response was overwhelming. The Transvaal notables used their credit, client, ethnic and religious networks to enforce solidarity. The Natal notables were generous with both moral and financial support. The first arrests caused a flutter of panic in the movement, but more rigorous manipulation of horizontal and vertical linkages within the community steadied it again. In early 1908, however, the movement's fatal weakness was exposed when the government linked registration certificates to renewal of trading licenses. Suddenly the campaign violated the cardinal principle of trader ideology and politics. This immediately broke the back of trader support.

Loss of trader support allowed Gandhi to impose his personal ethnical preoccupations on the movement. They dominated its philosophy from 1908 onwards, replacing 'self-interest' with 'self-sacrifice'. The economic imperative was dropped from the ideology, and it was shifted to a more purely ethical footing. The confused conception of honour which had comprised the initial moral content of the ideology was clarified. The movement now rested mainly on the pursuit of 'Truth' (right action against injustice by a fearless man of conscience); but the nationalist overtones of the first stage of the campaign continued to flavour the ideology. Two new goals were added to the original: preservation of the theoretical right of educated Indians to immigrate to the Transvaal, and protection of the residence rights of all pre-war Indian residents. These goals were in keeping with Gandhi's personal ethics, but since they were of no direct relevance to his notional constituents, they added nothing to the movement's appeal. On the contrary, they obviously made the original goal of the campaign harder to achieve since it was now linked to two others.

Throughout 1908 and 1909 Gandhi and a handful of committed supporters (one or two of them big traders) turned from one stratum to another of the Transvaal Indian community in an effort to keep the movement going. Ideology, goals and tactics remained the same, but the focal point of recruitment efforts changed. Attention was focussed, increasingly unsuccessfully, on hawkers, petty traders, hawkers again, and finally the big traders with whom the movement had been started. Gandhi also visited

Durban in an unsuccessful attempt to open a second front in Natal. But the movement offered no tangible benefits. By the end of 1909 it had completely collapsed, except for Gandhi and his handful of committed supporters, who continued to seek arrest throughout 1910.

From late 1910 to late 1913, the 'movement' existed only at the level of negotiations between Gandhi and the Union government. The fact that it existed at all is in part a testament to Gandhi's commitment to his newly developed ethics: attainment of the movement's goals had become a personal moral war for him. As important was his ability to command the attention of the government. The barrage of carefully planned publicity which the early stages of the campaign had received in India and Britain, and the sensitive political situation in India, ensured continued imperial government interest in a peaceful settlement. Indeed, it had been discussed with Smuts (who dealt with the movement first as Transvaal Colonial Secretary, then as Union Minister of the Interior) during the final round of Union negotiations in London in mid 1909. Smuts' interest in a peaceful settlement, however, far exceeded sensitivity to the political situation in India. The price he exacted from the imperial government for keeping open negotiations with the passive resisters was an end to the flow of indentured Indians to Natal, which he had sought since 1908. Once this price had been set, the goals of the movement were included in the deliberations for the first Union-wide immigration bill which began early in 1911.

Smuts attempted to simplify and minimize the South African Indian question by treating Gandhi as the principal Indian spokesman on immigration, thus formally extending his influence to an all-South African level. But this assumed a degree of control over Indian politics which Gandhi had never had. Paradoxically, it was the compromises which Gandhi was required to make in order to retain his legitimacy as principal Indian spokesman which finally led to a dramatic widening of the social base of the movement, and the realization of the radical potential of *satyagraha*.

In March 1911, as the negotiations for the Immigration Bill began, the Natal new elite formed a political party called the Colonial Born Indian Association (CBIA). Hitherto, in the classic pattern of an upwardly mobile group, the ambitions of the young, western educated Natal-born Indians had been expressed in an alliance with those above them in their social hierarchy, the traders. During the postwar depression, though, when the upward mobility of the western educated received its first serious check, it became clear that trader politics did not adequately represent their interests, and were opposed to them in some instances. The process of differentiation which gave birth to the new elite, and culminated in the creation of the CBIA was largely a response to these pressures. The party marked the creation of a unifying ideology by the new elite. The basis of their perceived unity, expressed in the name which they chose for their organization, was their local origins. They saw themselves as South Africans who, though they happened to be of Indian descent, could legitimately claim the rights and privileges of South African citizens. More importantly, the party confirmed the new elite's realignment of loyalties, away from the traders, and downwards to the mass of the people from whom they had risen. The first meeting of the party made it clear that its leaders included at least the upper levels of the masses in their perception of themselves as South Africans. The chairman's opening speech singled out the iniquity of the £3 annual tax on ex-indentured labourers, noting that their future constituents would increasingly include Natal-born Indians who were subject to the tax.

The possibility that the CBIA might mobilize the mass of the people, radicalizing Indian politics and endangering the uneasy coexistence which the traders had established with the Natal government, was sufficient for the Congress to hastily include the aboli-

tion of the tax in their own political platform. Gandhi, struggling to maintain his role as notional spokesman for the South African Indians, equally swiftly included it in his political platform. More forceful representations against the tax by a new elite pressure group in late 1911 and early 1912, saw the tax question elevated to the top of the Gandhi-Congress list of South African Indian grievances. But the tax was not adopted as a goal of the movement, whose original goals now seemed capable of being met by negotiation. However, when a revered elder member of the Indian National Congress (G.K. Gokhale) toured South Africa at Gandhi's invitation late that year, the tax was among the South African Indian problems that he discussed with Union cabinet ministers. Gokhale carried away the impression that they had promised to repeal the tax. Their refusal to do so was perceived by Gandhi as a morally unacceptable 'breach of faith'. This allowed him to adopt the tax as a goal of the movement in mid 1913, when the long drawn out negotiations for the immigration bill had reached an apparently final impasse.

On 16 October 1913, Gandhi and his committed supporters started a strike of Indian workers on the Natal coalfields, for the repeal of the £3 tax. The immediate success of the strike call was a testament not only to worker awareness of the burden imposed by the tax in a low wage economy, but to the multiplicity of grievances in the daily lives of indentured labourers. But the real success for Gandhi came when the strike - unexpectedly and unintentionally - spread like a cane fire through the vast brutally oppressed work force on the coastal sugar plantations, and from there to coastal Indian workers in general. By the end of November when lack of resources and government suppression had driven most of the strikers back to work, the strike had, at one time or another, paralyzed the Durban and Pietermaritzburg produce market, closed down some of the sugar mills, stripped many coastal hotels, restaurants and private residences of their domestics, resulted in some 150 acres of cane being illegally burned, and inconvenienced the coal industry, the Natal Government Railway, and other smaller industries in coastal Natal. The negotiated settlement for the seven year old campaign came soon after this.

The road to radicalism in the 1940s, though similar in some key respects, was in the main rather different. Although Usuf Dadoo emerged as a commanding figure, likened to Gandhi by some, he was only one among numbers of South African Indians - mainly in Natal - who began to challenge the politics accommodation in the mid or late 1930s. Their backgrounds differed. Some were well qualified professionals, sons of wealthy traders, who had been educated abroad. Others were workers with little formal education. Many of them entered Indian politics via organizations with a wider perspective. They were trade union officials and/or members of the CPSA or the Non European United Front which was established in Cape Town in March 1938. NEUF was the product of growing militancy among the coloured and black lower middle classes, one of several abortive attempts in the 1930s to create a broad based movement capable of mobilizing mass support from the blacks. These initiatives were assisted and encouraged by the CPSA which, with international communism in general, underwent a strategic reorientation towards united front politics during this period. At NEUF's first annual conference in April 1939, Dadoo and H.A. Naidoo - both of them CP members - were elected to the national council, Dadoo representing Johannesburg, and Naidoo Durban.²⁶

The radical ideology which informed these politics was all encompassing, calling for cross-class and cross-racial alliance in the formation of the broadest possible united front against white minority rule in general and racial segregation in particular. The tactics which were agreed on in 1939 were boycotts, active and passive resistance, strikes and

demonstrations. Dadoo, however, entered South African Indian politics with an additional ideological frame of references. As a child in Krugersdorp he had attended discussion groups held by former associations of Gandhi's which focussed both on the South African Indian resistance movement of 1906 to 1913, and on the growing tide of nationalism in India in the 1920s. As a youth at college in northern India, and a young man studying medicine in London and Edinburgh, he had become involved in local and overseas Indian nationalist politics.²⁸ At least in the popular perception, these politics were personified by the increasingly charismatic folk-hero figure of Gandhi in the 1920s and 1930s.

Both of these ideological strands underpinned Dadoo's attempts to radicalize Transvaal Indian politics in 1939. The issue which he chose to address was the Asiatic (Transvaal) Land and Trading Act which prohibited the transfer of property from whites to Indians for the next two years, pending the passage of more permanent legislation. Dadoo called for passive resistance not only against the Act, but against 'any legislative or other measures' whose objective was segregation.²⁹

As Gandhi had done, Dadoo tried to work through the established political parties. Former associates of Gandhi's and others who, like Dadoo, had an active interest in the Indian nationalist movement, responded to the mainly nationalist appeal in the ideology of the proposed campaign. The petty traders whose low profit margins rendered them most vulnerable to segregation also pledged support. However the big traders who controlled the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) remained unresponsive to this mixed appeal to Indian national honour and non European unity. Taking their lead from the Transvaal, the Natal and South African Indian Congresses also refused to support a campaign. Radicalism had run afoul of the central principle of trader ideology and politics once more. Although the traders obviously did not welcome segregation, they were prepared to accept it since they seemed likely to gain, in exchange, security of tenure for the millions of pounds worth of property which they had acquired in recent years. In the event, however, Dadoo called off the proposed campaign in July, on the advice of Gandhi who urged further negotiation with the government. The evidence does not suggest, in any case, that response to the campaign would have been widespread.³⁰

This abortive attempt to impose radicalism from above was followed by a slow moving and more cautious attempt to transform the existing political parties from below. In the Transvaal, Dadoo met big trader opposition by establishing a splinter group of TIC which he named the nationalist bloc. In Natal the initial attempt to erode trader power in organized politics took the form of a handful of Indian CP members encouraging the creation of a new party, the Natal Indian Association. NIA emerged from the amalgamation of the Natal Indian Congress and the Colonial Born and Settlers Indian Association. The CBSIA, like its predecessor the CBIA, had a definite radical potential. The party had been formed in 1933 by the Natal white collar elite during a moment of perceived crisis when it seemed that trader politics were inimical to their interests. Indeed, many of its officials had first challenged trader politics under similar circumstances as officials of the CBIA quarter of a century earlier. In 1933, as in 1911, the party's manifesto claimed the rights and privileges of citizenship for its members on the basis of their being South African. The manifesto also looked to the mass of the people for the party's constituency.³¹ However, the presence of a handful of CP and NEUF members on the executive of the newly created Natal Indian Association in 1939 marked the first concerted attempt to realize this radical potential.³²

The increasing interpenetration of the CP, organized Indian labour, and the Indian political parties during the next six years simultaneously eroded big trader power in the political parties and began to widen their social base. The traders however, struggled to

retain control of organized politics. The cross-class, cross-race orientation of the new Indian radicalism was thrown sharply into relief as Indian CP and NEUF members engaged in anti-war work before the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Dadoo was jailed in September 1940 for publishing an anti-war 'appeal to all non-European people of South Africa', which listed both general and particular instances of their oppression.³³ The traders fought back by accusing the radicals of using 'foreign ideologies' which endangered the 'Indian cause', and by co-opting the Gandhian and Indian nationalist ideology which Dadoo had used in 1939, but which they had then rejected.³⁴ The ideological differences were translated into political reality at the level of complete rejection of segregation by the radicals, and conditional acceptance by the big traders, who were still prepared to negotiate in the hope of securing at least their vested interests.³⁵ At the same time, both sides sought to mobilize worker support (or, at least, deny it to the other side) by representing the full range of workers' grievances.³⁶ This struggle is most clearly demonstrated in the continuous process of amalgamation, dissolution, and reamalgamation, that Natal Indian politics underwent between August 1939 and October 1945. The radicals, and their allies among the petty traders and white collar workers who were already suffering the bite of segregation and other forms of discrimination, formed political splinter groups when they were not able to effectively influence policy making, and moved back into mainstream politics when they were.³⁷

A similar, though less attenuated process, occurred in the Transvaal. By late 1945 the old, established political parties were dominated by radicals.³⁸ In mid 1946 they began a passive resistance campaign which lasted until 1948. The campaign demanded the repeal of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Representation Act - the Ghetto Act as it became known - which made permanent, and extended, the segregationist legislation of the preceding seven years. However, the Act was portrayed simply as an instance of the wider pattern of racial discrimination in South Africa, and it was this that the campaign was directed against. There are thus striking parallels with Gandhi's passive resistance movement. The ideology of the postwar movement was also not dissimilar to Gandhi's, despite continuing trader accusations about the use of dysfunctional, imported ideas. Gandhi's ethical preoccupations were missing in 1946, but the new movement rested, like his, on a basically liberal, reformist ideology, which called for the elimination of unjust laws. Gandhi's watchwords had been 'truth' and 'conscience'; in 1946 these were replaced by 'equality' and 'democracy'.³⁹

But there were also crucial differences between the two campaigns. Although the 1946 - 1948 movement sought only to mobilize Indians, the wider potential of the ideology was never ignored. The *Passive Resister*, published weekly in Johannesburg during the campaign, makes frequent references to 'Herrenvolkism' directed against blacks and coloureds, as well as Indians. Just as frequently, readers were urged to also read *Inkuhuleko*, which was described as a progressive paper which advocated co-operation between all races for a democratic South Africa. In June 1947, on the first anniversary of the campaign, Dadoo noted that 'we have entered into a period of active co-operation between the oppressed peoples for basic human rights'.⁴⁰ The other crucial difference between the two campaigns is that despite the potential for inter-class solidarity implicit in the ideology of both, recruitment efforts were focussed largely on the traders in the earlier movement, and largely on the workers in the 1940s. It is worth noting finally, though, that the 1946 - 1948 campaign never achieved Gandhi's belated, but nevertheless magnificent, level of mass mobilization: an estimated 2,000 people sought arrest, just over half of whom were workers. Although my research on the 1940s is still at an early stage, a tentative explanation for this is offered in the conclusion.

The ideologies which have shaped South African Indian politics run the gamut from class and racial exclusivity, to inter-class and inter-race solidarity. Indians have been politically mobilized by perceiving themselves as an elite, as workers, as Indians, as South Africans, or as non-Europeans (to use the terminology of the time). One of the most interesting aspects of this history is the way in which self-perceptions are capable of change, sometimes with breathtaking rapidity. But the more things have changed, the more they have stayed the same. New forms of consciousness, like those they replaced, almost invariably served the perceived interests of those who underwent the change: ideologies were accepted, rejected, or tentatively toyed with, on the basis of their seeming compatibility with those interests.

This history also demonstrates the pivotal role of the Indian lower middle classes - the new elite, or the white collar/petty trader elite, as I have called them - in the process of Indian radicalization. Both at the turn of the century, and in the 1930s and 1940s, their realignment of loyalties away from the big traders, and towards the mass of the people, proved to be the crucial intervention which made possible the at least partial realization of the potential of radical ideology.

One final point is worth addressing, if somewhat tentatively: the limited success of the 1946 - 1948 movement in achieving widespread mobilization. I would like to suggest that this did not derive from any intrinsic limitation in the ideology (nor, indeed, in the organizational infrastructure of the movement)⁴¹ but rather from the programme of action which the radicals chose to adopt. It is already clear from my research that the Transvaal Indian working class welcomed the escape from Johannesburg's over-priced slums to the Indian township which was to be established under the provisions of the Ghetto Act.⁴² Thus their most pressing needs were put before any wider, or longer term considerations of the implications of segregation (as, of course, were the traders'). Whether these calculations were also made by Natal workers, I have yet to explore. The fact that the passive resistance movement, despite strong links with politically aware organized labour, and despite the manifest grievances of Indian workers, mobilized only around 1,000 of the 22,000 Indian trader union members, suggests that they might have been. From this, I would like to suggest that ideologies with a generalized overarching appeal, which are capable of utilization by different social strata and which, indeed, are capable of ideologically linking different strata, are nevertheless capable of effecting widespread, sustained political mobilization only by being addressed to the specific fundamental grievances of those strata. Both the 1906 - 1913, and the 1946 - 1948 passive resistance movements would seem to support this proposition.

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NOTES

The Rheinallt Jones papers which provide some of the documentation for the latter part of this paper are held, with the Ballinger papers, in the Church of the Province Library, University of the Witwatersrand. The South African Institute of Race Relations collection, of which the Rheinallt Jones papers are a part, has yet to be catalogued by the library. Boxes and files are distinguished by sometimes lengthy descriptions which often bear little relationship to their contents. I have followed the usual order of documentation by listing the collection first, followed by the box, file (if there was one), and then the actual document.

1. NA, Gov. 1599/374/1908: TABA, Gov. 823/PS, 15/9; *Indian Opinion*, 4 May 1907, 11 May 1907, 18 January 1908, 3 February 1912.
2. Occasional mention of all these societies is scattered throughout the Natal Indian press. In particular see *Indian Opinion*, 16 November 1912, 18 January 1913; *African Chronicles*, 24 July 1909; *Rand Daily Mail*, 17 February 1914.
3. *Indian Opinion*, 9 February 1906, 4 May 1907, 11 May 1907, 18 January 1908, 22 August 1908, 26 June 1909, 3 July 1909, 3 February 1912.
4. Tayal, M. J., 'Gandhi: the South African Experience', unpublished. D. Phil. (Oxford, 1980), 16 - 30.
5. Tayal, M. J. 'Indian Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890 - 1911', *Indian Economic and Social History Review*, XIV, No. 4, 1978; annual *Natal Departmental Reports*, Report of the Protector of Immigrants.
6. CO 551/27/19319; NA II 1/77/66/95; *ibid.*, 209/95; *ibid.*, 380/95; *ibid.*, 1/79/1147/95; *ibid.*, 1/80/1799/95.
7. *Natal Departmental Reports*, Report of the Protector of Immigrants, 1890, A42; *ibid.*, 1899 - 1900, A16, A42; *Natal Official Handbook*, 1886, 90.
8. *The Natalian*, 6 September 1907; *African Chronicle*, 5 December 1908; *Report of the Indian Immigrants Commission* (Pietermaritzburg, 1909), 7; *Natal Departmental Reports*, 1908, Report of the General Manager of Railways, 20; *ibid.*, 1905, Report of the Protector of Indian Immigrants, 13.
9. CO 551/56/12682.
10. See Tayal 'Indian Indentured Labour' for a fuller discussion of the material summarized on the following two pages.
11. Department of Economics. Natal Univ. College, 'Indian Land and Agriculture in South Africa', (n.d., c. 1946), 6-8, 11, 18; Burrows, R., *Indian Life and Labour in Natal*, (SAIRR, 1952), 12, 13, 15, 63; Union of South Africa, 1946 *Census*, Vol. 5, 152.

12. Contemporary sources, while sensitive to the obvious 'push' factors behind rapid urbanization also suggest that higher urban wages acted in part as a 'pull' factor.
13. Union of South Africa, 1936 *Census*, Vol. 7, XVII; *ibid.*, 1946, Vol. 5, 152 - 162.
14. Department of Economics, Natal Univ. College, 'Indian Land and Agriculture in South Africa', (n.d., c. 1946), 16; SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/B90.6.2., Memo. submitted to Natal Indian Judicial Commission by Soc. Services of South Africa (Durban branch), 15 June 1944, 5; *ibid.*, AD 843/Indian Affairs 1933-1943/b.82, f. 31, Report of Natal Regional Conference Organized by SAIRR, 31 July 1943, 3.
15. Lewis, J., 'The New Unionism: Industrialization and Industrial Unionism in South Africa, 1925 - 1930', *South African Labour Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 5, 25 - 49; Ringrose, H. G., *Trade Unions in Natal*, (OUP, 1951), 47; Simons, H. J., and R. E., *Class and Colour in South Africa*, (Penguin ed., 1969), 371 - 372; Burrows, *op. cit.*, 18.
16. Burrows, *op. cit.*, 18, 22 - 24, 38; SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/Ind. Affairs 1943 - 1944/Ind. Ed. and Ind. Affairs, Memo. on Univ. and Tech. Ed. for Indians in Natal, by Indo-European Council (c. August 1942), 2; *ibid.*, AD 843/B77.1.4, Acting Chair. Coloured and Indian J.A. Board to Div. Inspect. of Labour, Durban, 8 August 1942.
17. Burrows, *op. cit.*, 32 - 37 (which draws on a number of contemporary surveys). See also SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/B.78.5, Memo. on Natal Indian Health Services, with particular ref. to Child Welfare Socs., January 1945, 1; Naidoo, V.S., 'Survey of the Income and Expenditure of Indian Employees of the Durban Corporation, Living at the Magazine Barracks, Durban', *South African Journal of Economics*, XIV - XV, 1946 - 1947, 40 - 62.
18. Naidoo, *op. cit.*; Burrows, *op. cit.*, 52 - 53; SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/Ind. Affairs 1933 - 1943/ 1943 b.82, f.31, Report of Natal Regional Conf. organized by the SAIRR, 31 July 1943, 6; *ibid.*, 1942 b.182, f.76, A Prelim. Report on the Housing of the Indian Community in the City of Durban, Oct 1940, 1.
19. For example, SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/JISW 1939, 1940, 1947/JISWA 1947, Pres. 1939, 1941, 1948, Application for grant from Central School Board: statement by Katz, c. April 1940; and see JISWA minutes, 1940s.
20. SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/Indian Affairs/Indians 1948 - 1950, Memo, on Ownership, Occupation and Trading by Indians in the Transvaal, c. 1949, 4 (in 1949 the estimated value of the property in the Transvaal was between £8 - 10 million); *Report of the Indian Penetration Commission*, (Pretoria, 1942), 65, 69, 71, 74; *Report of the Second Indian Penetration (Durban) Commission*, (Pretoria, 1943), 5; Indians were prevented from significant investment in industry by strict control of manufacturing licences. SAIR, RJ, AD 843/ B77.1.4, Memo. by NIC for Indian Tech. and Univ. Enquiry Commission. 11 August 1942, 14; *Report of the Asiatic Land Laws Commission*, (Pretoria, 1939), 64 - 65.

21. The formal title of the Acts is the Trading and Occupation of Land (Transvaal and Natal) Restriction Act.
22. For example, Burrows, op. cit., 55 - 56, 64; Dept. of Econ. Natal Univ. College, 'Indian Land and Agriculture in South Africa', (n.d., c. 1946), 21; *Star*, 'Slums in the City. The Plight of Middle Class Indians', 19 March 1940; SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/JISW, 1939, 1940, 1947/JISWA 1947, JISWA to Sec. Nat. Health Services Commission. March 1943; *ibid.*, JISW 1939, 1941, 1948/Rand Aid, statement by Katz (c. April 1940) on Diagonal St. slums; *ibid.*, Indian Affairs 1948 - 1950/Indians 1948 - 1950, Rheinallt Jones to Mgr. Municip. Non Eur. Affairs Dept., Johannesburg, 8 November 1949; *ibid.*, B77.1.4, Memo. submitted by NIC to Indian Tech. & Univ. Enquiry Committee, 11 August 1942; *Daily Express*, 13 January 1939, for similar conditions in Germiston and Boksburg.
23. For trader politics to 1914 see Tayal 'Gandhi'; for the later period see Ginwala, F., 'Class Consciousness and Control', unpubl. D. Phil. (Oxford, 1975), and Pahad, E., 'The Development of Indian Political Movements in South Africa, 1924 - 1946', unpubl. Ph. D. (Sussex, 1972).
24. Tayal, 'Gandhi', 83 - 84, 121 - 122.
25. *ibid.*, chs. 2 - 4, 6, for elaboration of the following summary of passive resistance, and documentation.
26. Simons, op. cit., ch. 21; Roux, E., *Time Longer Than Rope*, (Winsoncin, 1966), 357 - 358.
27. Simons, op.cit., 501, 503 - 504.
28. Ginwala, op. cit., 409 - 410, (extracts from interviews with Dadoo).
29. *Sunday Times*, 14 May 1939.
30. The proposed campaign was widely reported in the press. See, for example, *Rand Daily Mail*, 2 March, 20 April, 15 June, 10 July, 8 August 1939; *Mercury*, 18 April, 24 July 1939; *Sunday Times*, 14 May, 4 June 1939; *Star*, 12 January, 30 March, 4 July 1939; see also Ginwala, op. cit., 408 - 410, abstracting from interviews with Dadoo, for support from petty traders Gandhian nationalists; see SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/ B.77.5.5, TIC to Min. Interior, 15 February 1939; *ibid.*, B.77.5.6, SAIC to Min. Interior, 21 February 1939 for response of big traders.
31. SAIRR, RJ, AD 843/ B.77.6.1, Ag. Gen. to Rheinallt Jones, 22 December 1933, encl. CBSIA Manifesto, Constitution and Rules.
32. *Daily News*, 28 August 1939; *Natal Witness*, 30 December 1939; Pahad, op. cit., 160.
33. *Rand Daily Mail*, 28 August, 7 September 1940.

34. A particularly elaborate statement of this is in M. Ballinger Papers; Correspondence: Indian Affairs (Gen.), A 410/ B.27/1946 - 1947, Chairman's Speech delivered by A.S. Kajee at the Natal Indian Provincial Conference, 4 May 1947. But see also *Leader*, 30 January 1943, 24 February 1945 for earlier examples.
35. Indian representatives, for example, co-operated with the first and second Broome Commissions of Enquiry. The apogee of the politics of accommodation was the short-lived 'Pretoria Agreement' of 18 April 1944. A reconstituted, trader dominated, Natal Congress, claiming to represent the Indian community of Natal, agreed to voluntary segregation, regulated by a 5 man board (2 Indians, 2 whites, and a white advocate or magistrate as chairman) in exchange for repeal of the Pegging Act. M. Ballinger Papers: Correspondence: Indian Affairs (Gen.), A 410/ B.27/1926 - 1945, Memo. submitted by the Natal Indian Congress, as representing the Indian Community of Natal, to the Rt. Hon. Field Marshall J.C. Smuts, Pretoria, 18 April 1944.
36. For example, *Natal Mercury*, 14 November 1944. But see, in particular, election platforms for the 1945 Natal Congress elections, *Guardian*, 15 February, 25 October 1945; Pahad, op. cit., 194 - 199.
37. *Guardian*, 21 June, 19 July 1940; 2 September 1943; 4 May 1944; 18 October 1945; *Call*, June 1940; Pahad, op. cit., 158 - 200.
38. *Guardian*, 21 December 1944, 13 December, 20 December 1945. See also Pahad, op. cit., 158 - 200. His explanations for these processes could be more helpful. He does, however, note the course of events.
39. The weekly issues of the *Passive Resister* are a good source for the ideology of movement. For example, 13 December 1946, 16 May, 12 June, 11 September 1947. On trader accusations, see, in particular, 25 April, 1947. On ideological expositions see also, Cape Passive Resistance Council, *Resist . . . Indian Ghetto Act*, (Cape Town, 1946); Singh, G., *The Asiatic Act*, (Durban, c. 1946); Joint Passive Resistance Council of Natal and Transvaal, *How We Live*, (Durban, c. 1946); Dadoo, Y.M., *Facts About the Ghetto Act*, (Johannesburg, 1946).
40. *Passive Resister*, 12 June 1947.
41. On which, see Carter, D., 'Organized Non - Violent Rejection of the Law for Political Ends: the Experience of Blacks in South Africa', unpubld. Ph. D., (Durham, 1978), 130 - 191.
42. SAIRR, RJ. AD 843/1948 - 1950/Indians 1948 - 1950, Memo. presented to the Hon. Min. of Int. by Johannesburg Tamil Benefit Society, February 1946; *ibid.*, Johannesburg Tamil Benefit Society to Sec. Inst. of Race Relations. Southern Transvaal Branch, 18 July 1949; *ibid.*, same to same, 8 November 1949. See also *Rand Daily Mail* 15 June 1939 for opinion of Rev. B.L.E. Sigamoney, who was in close touch with working class Indians on the Rand, and *Star*, 26 July 1949, for an individual opinion.

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