

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE EXISTENCE: MAN AND CITIZEN IN ROUSSEAU

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I

RESUMEN:

En este artículo se examinan algunos aspectos del contraste que según Rousseau se da entre ser hombre —una unidad numérica, un todo absoluto (E. 1, 39; IV 249¹), y ser un ciudadano —una unidad fraccionaria, cuyo «valor es determinado por su relación con el todo» (E. 1, 40; IV, 249).

SUMMARY:

The objective of this paper is to consider one or two aspects of the contrast Rousseau claims there to be between being a man—a numerical unity, an absolute whole (E. 1, 39; IV, 249¹), and being a citizen—a fractional unity, whose «value is determined by his relation to the whole» (E. 1, 40; IV, 249).

1. Editions, abbreviations, are as follows: *Emile* (E) tr. Allan Bloom, Basic Books, New York, 1979. *The Social Contract* (S.C.) tr. G.D.H. Cole, revised J. H. Brumfitt and J. C. Hall, Dent, London, 1973.

A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (D.I.) — same —

A Discourse on Political Economy (D.P.E.) — same —

The roman numbers, followed by arabic page numbers, refer to the volume and page of J.-J. Rousseau: *Oeuvres Complètes*, edd. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Gallimard, III, 1964; IV, 1969.

Rousseau is commonly read as maintaining that no-one can be both man and citizen. One must choose between these exclusive possibilities; whichever choice one makes, one incurs unavoidable losses; if someone fails to choose, he will remain:

Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, ...never... either man or citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing. (*ibid.*)

I shall maintain that this is a misreading of one of Rousseau's central thoughts, a misreading which arises largely because of a misunderstanding of the character and significance that Rousseau ascribes to *amour-propre*. If this misunderstanding is corrected, it can be seen that Rousseau held that being a man and being a citizen could, and should, not only be compatible but be mutually implicated, in that «completion» as a man requires assumption of the place of citizen, and appropriate characterisation of the station of a citizen depends upon incorporating essential attributes of man in it. (For the idea of «completion», see for instance E.3, 203; IV, 481; and E.5, 455; IV, 833.) Rousseau holds, I shall claim, that the «double object», of raising man both for himself and for others, could be accomplished, although only with great difficulty and in the face of many obstacles, both inherent and circumstantial (see E.1, 41; IV, 251). The form of human community outlined in S.C. is a depiction of the manner of human life and union in which this «double object» is realised.

For reasons of space, the defence of my position will not be as full as it should be. But I hope to establish a presumptive case.²

I begin with a brief statement of what I have referred to as a «common reading» of Rousseau's ideas in this matter. I shall draw on Judith Shklar's account³ for this, not because I think her account particularly faulty, but rather because it is instructive to find even so sensitive and careful a critic as Shklar persisting in certain very general presumptions about Rousseau's meaning and intent, presumptions which shape the overall character of her treatment.

2. I have considered these issues at greater length in my *Rousseau* (Blakwell, 1988), Ch. 1, 2, and 4.

3. Judith N. Shklar (S.): *Men and Citizens*, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

II

According to Shklar, Rousseau offers two models of Utopia. «One model was a Spartan city, the other a tranquil household, and the two were meant to stand in polar opposition to each other» (S. 3). In the former model, we are offered «an image of the perfectly socialized man, the citizen whose entire life is absorbed by his social role» (S. 13). In this case, the individual:

... loses his personal identity and becomes a part of a purposive social unit. Here... the group absorbs all his resources, emotional as well as physical... the *moi humain* is crushed by the *moi commun*. And this is the very essence of the psychological transformation of man into a citizen (S. 15).

In the latter model, that of «the quiet village», the happiness of men springs from «unspoiled family love» (S. 21).

Shklar goes on:

Although the Golden Age is one of villages, the only social life that matters is within each household. This... shelters... a primary family, parents and their children. Self-sufficient and self-contained, they need no one but each other... only within the family is perfect uncompetitive affection possible. (S. 23).

These are the two models with reference to which Rousseau stands in judgment «to reveal the failures of actuality and to condemn the unpardonable» (S. 30). But neither of them comprises a complete good and meeting of need for men — even were a decisive choice for one or the other made. The «man of the Golden Age is brutish and stupid»; the impact of civilisation cannot be shaken off «by mere physical escape» (S. 31). Shklar continues:

The wish to play a public role, to develop one's civic capacities, to belong to a purposeful order, to take part in an organized drama, is a much part of a morally adult life... (S. 31-2).

But the completion of this wish lies in the exclusion of «all private affections and associations, not only the family... all inclinations are bent before xenophobia, communal isolation and pride, and a virtue that is sustained by the pressure of public opinion rather than by benevolence or love» (S. 31). We cannot, finally, try to secure the best of both worlds. These models do not contain elements in common which could be withdrawn from their setting and synthesised into a life accommodating to humans. Civil society — even in its rectified form envisaged in S.C.

— is «only the cure for social disease. It is... not permanent abode for men» (S. 212).

Why is it that we appear to be confronted by this impossible choice: *either* the extinction of individual identity, the transformation of man into «denatured» citizen; *or* the retention of individual identity, but only with a defensive withdrawal from society into an idealised family life? Shklar's answer, which she gives as Rousseau's, is that it is because if persons retain their individual identity and enter a wider social milieu, this not being accompanied by a transformation of the self, then their *amour-propre*, with its concerns and destructive energies, is immediately and fatefully brought into play. But why does this matter? How does this impose the choice? «*Amour-propre*», Shklar says, «arises out of association as such» (S. 185). It is «that anxious awareness of oneself as a social object» that begins to «dominate our psychic economy» once we begin to associate with others on any other footing than that of membership of an idealised family (S. ix; see 10, 23, on the family). Once this «anxiety» begins to work, it breeds competition for personal precedence, for invidious distinction. Inequality, just in having the better of others, in doing them down, are its satisfactions, for these appear to yield assurance of one's eminence and potency as a social presence. But with this comes division, envy, dependence, vanity and the dominant characteristics of our present unendurable condition. And so we confront (or avoid, to our cost) the choice.

Amour-propre is not, it is true, absent from the members of a «Spartan city». But, in this case, these members have become entirely socialized, and any desire for prestigious precedence will automatically become directed towards civilly estimable objectives, towards bringing credit to the city or nation, not towards individual distinction won in another's despite. We, however, are not spartans, nor, given the points made earlier, should we want to be. But then there remains nowhere to find rest.

It would, of course, be absurd to say that nothing in Rousseau's work encourages this account of his ideas. To take only the points about *amour-propre* just referred to, we find, for example, this:

Since my Emile has until now looked only at himself, the first glance he casts on his fellows leads him to compare himself with them. And the first sentiment aroused in him by this comparison is the desire to be in the first position. This is the point where love of self [*amour de soi*] turns into *amour-propre* and where begin to arise all the passions which depend on this one. (E.4 235; IV, 523; see also E.4, 243; IV, 534.)

The talk of «comparison», of the desire to be first, powerfully suggest Shklar's reading. And there is much else to apparently similar effect in virtually all of Rousseau's mature writings.

Despite this, I now propose to argue that this account of what Rousseau understands *amour-propre* to be and to imply is mistaken. Further, I suggest that it is mistaken in just such a way as to lead to an erroneous assessment of Rousseau's views about the prospects for men to be able to live in a just and humane way with others, of the kind Shklar presents. I would say, too, that putting this matter straight is not an idle exercise, in that what results may be an assessment more faithful to Rousseau, but one which consists in ideas which are incredible or useless. I think that the picture which results is certainly as compelling and interesting as that which is more familiarly painted of the escene Rousseau is offering us here.

III

We can note, straight away, that the passage quoted just above continues in what must appear a surprising way if the familiar interpretation of Rousseau's meaning is accepted. It goes on:

But to decide whether among these passions the dominant ones in his character will be humane and gentle or cruel and malignant, whether they will be passions of beneficence and commiseration or of envy and covetousness, we must know what position he will feel he has among men, and what kinds of obstacles he may believe he has to overcome to reach the position he wants to occupy. (*ibid.*⁴)

Rousseau here plainly says that humane, gentle, beneficent passions can depend on *amour-propre* quite as much as cruel, malignant ones may. Which of these will come to dominate a person's character is conditional — conditional upon the «position» he feels he has among men, and upon the obstacles he believes stand in his way to occupying that position.

I should grant that it is not impossible that these comments of Rousseau's should be brought into line with customary interpretations. It could be argued, for example, that the position Rousseau has in mind is that occupied by a person who — as Shklar puts it — is wholly «absorbed by his social role» so that he becomes only «part of a purposive social unit». So, then, we should have the «spartan» model referred to above; someone could be fired by *amour-propre*, but in this his objectives would be civil, public distinctions for his «unit». He would then be benevolent, humane, towards his own kind at least. But there is nothing at all in the text at this point to suggest this was in Rousseau's mind.

4. For a fuller discussion of this passage, see N.J.H. Dent: *Rousseau*, pp. 52-56 and Ch. 4.

Rousseau might, of course, be being inconsistent; he is notorious for such a fault. I would suggest, though, that he is offering here an entirely clear and fundamental point about *amour-propre* as he understands that, and it is our business to make sense of it. To do so, I want to examine the idea (or: an idea) of «standing», of what it is for a person to have or hold standing in his relations to and transactions with other people; and I want to consider how and why the possession of standing is valuable and important for us.

I do not suggest that what I am about to present is an analysis of the «ordinary meaning of the word «standing»». I am more interested in the phenomena concerned, and although I think these are by and large the phenomena the term «standing» comprehends, I shall not mind if my use is somewhat stipulative.

The possession of standing can consist in the possession by someone of many very different powers, titles, roles, opportunities in different contexts, dealings and relations. It is impossible to give an exhaustive treatment, so I shall outline my point through a couple of briefly given examples. Consider, for instance, the standing of a child in relation to the making of the decision where and when the annual family holiday shall be taken. One possibility could be this. A child may have strong preferences, to which powerful expression is given. It may be that these preferences are heard and heeded by the other members of the family; the decision process includes an attempt to meet the child's wishes, and an equal weight is given to these wishes alongside everyone else's. But it could be that whether these preferences are heeded, and whether they are given much or little weight, depends entirely on the adults, upon their discretion and grace, since the adults reserve to themselves the exclusive management and determination of the decision process. Or again, the attempt to meet the child's preferences is made, but because the declared preferences are incompatible, little meeting of them, is actually achieved. The child, then, may not be given scope to question the decision, to ask for a reworking of it; but neither may he be able to withdraw from the proposed trip that will determine what his holiday is. Perhaps with (late) teenage children it is unnecessary or impossible to carry through this last point. If no actually mutually agreeable proposal can be found, then maybe it is better all round (— and *this* may have to be a mutually agreeable proposal) that people go their different ways. And so on — with many variations.

One more example. Course and examination structure alterations are brought to a departmental board. Each staff member whose working practices will be governed by the new proposals may be unrestrictedly at liberty to comment on them; no-one is disqualified, or has to meet conditions, in order to be able to do so. If just one member of the board is deeply unhappy about the proposals, then it could be thought improper

to introduce them. Or, perhaps, unless that person is ready to make it a «resignation» issue, he will be expected, and will expect, to comply with the will of the majority. And so on — with many variations.

What I want to take from these sketchy instances are one or two points of generalisable significance. Our lives are affected, our behaviour and desires are touched, almost all the time by the actions (and inactions) of others — near and remote others. On many occasions when this happens or is going to happen, we very much want to «have a say in» the change in our life that is coming about. If we cannot, we often enough feel presumed upon, taken for granted, taken advantage of, imposed upon, treated as if we are invisible, don't count etc. etc. We feel, in short, that we are treated as non-persons in relation to what is being done. In my first example, the child's preferences do feature in the attempt to determine what is going to happen to him. But that they do is at the discretion and favour of the adults; the child and the child's preferences are involved in the deliberations not «as of right» but by revocable gift, the withdrawal of which is unchallengeable.

I do not want to say that the child has *no* standing at all in the decision process, in its progress or outcome. But he has at best a fragile and marginal standing. Contrast a situation where one adult treated the preferences of another adult in this fashion. This would, I imagine, be felt as an outrage, to treat the other person as if beholden to the favour and grace of the first before his preferences are admitted to the debate (even if it were that the preferences *are* admitted). One might rather suppose that adult's preferences hold, as such, level claim and demand for consideration as comprising the constitutive material for the deliberative process in itself, without there being any imaginable question of permission, grace or indulgence coming into the case. The adults possess an absolute, categorical, footing in constituting the deciding body and the decision process; and that process goes forward without any issue of the authority or right of each to speak and determine being raisable. No-one has the place to vet qualifications, to rule someone in or out of order: each holds undisputable position as making up the deliberative body as such.

This is more like what I want to call «holding standing». It signifies, roughly, holding a categorical, unchallengeable, right and title of inclusion and participation, in such a fashion that no-one stands in any super-ordinate place to preclude or to permit inclusion and participation. If you hold standing — in the sort of instance I am interested in — you comprise one of those who does any permitting or precluding there may be done, and not because you are *allowed* to do so, for that would imply a yet further person or body who grants your title. Your possession of standing is indebted to no-one, by no-one's grace, subject to no-one's allowance. So it is, now referring to my second example, in the relations

of colleagues in a departmental discussion (we might suppose...).

To hold standing, after this fashion, in relation to decisions about holidays naturally involves different powers, opportunities from those relevant to making departmental decisions, of course; and so it will go in relation to each different sort of activity that involves a multiplicity of persons. But, relative to each case, there will be something, or a cluster of things, recognisable as the denial or refusal of standing to a person, making them a «non-person» as far as that matter is concerned. Palpably, we are apt to mind very much that this does not happen to us. Not because — or nor necessarily because — of some shrill and strident demand that we should be the one deferred to. That would be to require others to accept just that subordinate place we so much object to. They have no more cause to find that tolerable than we do. Nor do we necessarily fear that if we do not hold standing, we are bound to be ignored, our preferences dismissed, our interests violated. The people around us may be kind, benevolent, concerned for us. But, even so, our needs only find admittance on their good favour, by their say-so. We remain only conditionally included and reckoned with, and we may — we often should — see no reason at all why that should be *our* place when, apparently, *they* see themselves as unconditionally involved, as the granters and givers. Why is not our inclusion undeniable and irrevocable? Why are we subordinated, even if our lives are gently and well looked after?

Such-like points are very well expressed by Wasserstrom, discussing racial discrimination. I quote, selectively:⁵

A different reaction of White Southerners in respect to recent events in the South is bewilderment... the White Southerner will say that he simply cannot understand the Negro's dissatisfaction with his lot. This is so because he, the White Southerner, has always treated his Negroes very well. With appreciable sincerity, he will assert that he has real affection for many Negroes. He would never needlessly inflict pain or suffering on them. Indeed, he has often assumed special obligations to make certain that their lives were free from hunger, pain, and disease...

What is wholly missing from this description of the situation is the ability and inclination to conceptualize the Negro... as the possible possessor or rights of any kind... what this way of conceiving most denies to any Negro is the opportunity to assert claims as a matter of right. It denies him the standing to protest against the way he is treated. If the White Southerner fails to do his duty, that is simply a matter between him and his conscience... it requires of any Negro that *he* makes out his case for the enjoyment of any goods. It reduces all of *his* claims to the level of requests, privileges,

5. Richard Wasserstrom: «Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination», *Journal of Philosophy*, 61, 1964, pp. 639-641. For some related points, see also, T.E. Hill: «Servility and Self-Respect», *Monist*, 1973.

and favors. But there are simply certain things, certain goods, that nobody ought to have to request of another. There are certain things that no one else ought to have the power to decide to refuse or to grant... a society based on such a denial [of human rights] is especially offensive because it implicitly, if not explicitly, ...read[s] certain persons, all of whom are most certainly human beings, out of the human race...

IV

The point in raising these matters here is now to contend that *amour-propre*, as such, consists in the desire — which Rousseau believes is native to each of us — to secure and to hold standing, as at least a «member of the human race», as a person among persons. (It is well to recall that a «person» in law means any entity capable of possessing rights and duties: it is not a «natural kind» term.)⁶ It is the desire to be established, empowered, entitled in a categorical fashion, in relation to certain basic but absolutely central matters, at least on the same footing as other persons, in the general sort of fashion I have tried to indicate in the preceding section.

Such a desire can «latch» on to inappropriate objectives, and its manifestation can take corrupt forms; I shall say a bit more about this below. But it is far from inappropriate *as such* to desire to hold standing. Possession of that is quite evidently wholly central to human good when the forum for securing that involves regular relation and transaction with others. This is not merely because, if one does not hold standing, one's other desires and projects may be frustrated and marginalised. For that need not be true — as adverted to above. It is principally because to be denied standing, or simply not to hold it, is in many instances to be treated as a signal inferior, a dependent, a nullity, and that is, in itself, an affront one's need and nature: that requires recognition for oneself as a significant counting presence in one's own being. To wish to count for something (compare E.2, 160; IV, 421), to be incorporated on all fours with others, is not an hysterical, competitive wish in itself. It need only be the claim for recognition, acknowledgment of one's humanity.⁷ *Amour-propre* perhaps most literally means: to have care for one's own, what is proper or due to one. To care for that is not automatically to have become vain, to glory in others' ignominy, to relish others' humiliation. It may be no more than to have self-respect and to claim respect for one's proper human dignity.

6. See Barry Nicholas: *An Introduction to Roman Law*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, pp. 60-1.

7. One might think here of Shylock's famous speech: *The Merchant of Venice*, Act 3, Scene 1.

Amour de soi, as Rousseau understands this, directs a person to seek what is enduringly good, enriching and life enlarging for himself (see, for instance, E.4, 212-3; IV, 490-1). If we consider man only as an unconnected, animate organism, then his *amour de soi* will direct him to provide for his physical well-being, and to acquire and enjoy the capabilities necessary to his unimpeded physical self-expression. But if we consider him also as making his way in relation and transaction, of many kinds, with others, then his *amour de soi* will direct him to ensure that he possesses a firm, unconditional, footing in the progress of joint affairs, as part of his good and established life in such a context (see E.4, 214; 219-20; 233; IV, 493; 500-1, 520-1). There is, therefore, no discontinuity here in what a person is concerned for — his own well-being and faring. It is only that the terms and circumstances in which he proceeds to secure his well-being have altered. Thus when Rousseau says that *amour de soi* «turns into» *amour-propre* (as quoted), he does not mean that *amour de soi* is converted into, or displaced by, some quite distinct and necessarily conflicting form of concern for self. What he means is that, in the forum of human inter-relation where humans are in constant contact and negotiation, the concern for the well-being of one's self which is *amour de soi* acquires an additional particular objective — that of securing standing or «rank» for oneself. When it includes also that objective, it is designated «*amour-propre*»; that is the name to be given to *amour de soi* when the possession of human standing has come to be a major objective.⁸

I said above that *amour-propre* can acquire inappropriate objectives and take corrupt forms. It can become associated with «dependence, weakness, vanity, competitiveness, inequality, and an unlimited number of other ills», in Shklar's words (S. 10). Rousseau himself evidently stresses this as well, to such an extent that — as I have indicated — nearly all interpreters take these deformed disclosures of *amour-propre* for the thing itself. It will then appear inevitable that the remedies could only be either withdrawal from society, or a complete socialization, functionalisation, of the self. But we see now that this is not how the case stands at all. It is worth, however, a brief account to consider how *amour-propre* does take on a malign character. For when it is seen how this comes about, we can also see how, when it is true to its own proper character and need (cf. E.4, 212-3; IV, 490-1), it has a benign character, both for its possessor and for those who surround him.

Rousseau's deepest explanation for the emergence of perverse manifestations of *amour-propre* lies in his account of the earliest psycho-

8. This paragraph compresses a very complex argument. See Dent, *Rousseau*, Ch. 1, Sections 2.4-2.5.

logical responses of an infant and child. His principal thought in this is that, because of the infant's own aggression and rage, he represents his «life-world» as one in which he is set about by vengeful, spiteful persons bent upon thwarting, maliciously abusing him (see, for instance, E.2, 87-8; IV, 314; and the story of the two young men: E.4, 228 ff; IV, 512-3). In such a supposed setting, it will appear imperative to hold one's own, claim one's place, by adopting a domineering and overbearing posture of attempted control over others, perceived as threatening.⁹ Writ large, this entails that the leading feature of all human encounter will be that each person will feel that he can establish his place and potency in relation to the other only by domineering control, by ascendancy of himself and negation of the other. Such alone would be a secure proof, a secure possession, of assurance in winning recognition from and undeniable presence in the life of another. Others defer to one; one's word and need carry preeminent weight; one's imperiousness makes others fall back in fear and disarray.

But, Rousseau's thought is, standing and rank is not soundly and genuinely held on such terms. The preeminence possessed is not freely and willingly granted to one; it is retained only by force or trickery and fraud. It depends on the gullibility or weakness of those around you. To keep them in subjection their predilections and vulnerabilities must be played upon; but then the leader is controlled by the vagaries of this followers:

Even domination is servile when it is connected with opinion, for you depend on the prejudices of those you govern by prejudices. To lead them as you please, you must conduct yourself as they please. They have only to change their way of thinking, and you must perforce change your way of acting... (E. 2, 83; IV, 308).

Plainly, no categorical standing with others has been achieved in this at all, no recognition of the humanity in one's own person from them. One weakness, one false move, and those who contend also for ascendancy will tear you down and inflict on you the same ignominy it has been your pleasure to inflict on them.¹⁰

It cannot proceed like this if categorical standing is to be sought and possessed. So far from this involving the inferiority and humiliation under one of others, it in fact requires that they also hold standing in the same way. This emerges in at least two ways. First, only those who are

9. I have discussed this aspect of Rousseau's thought also in: «Aggression, Love and Morality: Wollheim on Rousseau», forthcoming.

10. Compare Rousseau's remark («Considerations on the Government of Poland», Ch. 6, III, 974), that «debased peoples» think that «in order to be free, it is enough to be insubordinate».

sure and collected in their own possession of worth and self-respect, whose acknowledgement can reveal an awareness of and proper valuation of human dignity, will create the possibility of there being such a place which is the possession of categorical standing to be occupied. If people are governed by envy and hatred, there can exist no such thing as honour and recognition.¹¹ (In fact, this is to put as a sequence what must take place in the same moment. The appropriate notions of self-respect and personal dignity are, so to say, the individual's perspective on a form of relation of reciprocal categorical acknowledgement between persons: the notions and the mode of common relation rise and fall together).

Secondly, if others find categorical admission in the conduct of certain basic components of your life, as you do in their lives, then the need to contend for mastery is removed — position is securely held already. The supposed permanent threat of annihilation is removed. Thus it follows that the need and will to admit the standing of others is intrinsic to any one person's desire for standing for himself.

It may well appear, of course, to one who is used to thinking of his substance as a weight-carrying person in terms of the subjugation beneath him of others that to afford others a level position would comprise an intolerable presumption on their part and an unendurable abnegation on his. But, if Rousseau is right, it is only on such a condition that the possession of personal standing is conceivable, let alone likely to be achieved. His desire for that, which presently takes a distorted and self-defeating expression, could only then be met.

V

Much more could, and should, be said to amplify and consolidate these claims. But «Hurried on by the rapidity of time...» (D.I. 79; III, 167), I pass to my concluding comments.

For Rousseau, the coming into proper play of *amour-propre* is identical with the rise of the desire and claim to be, and to be regarded as, a «moral being» with the powers and titles appropriate to that:

The study suitable for man is that of his relations. So long as he knows himself only in his physical being, he ought to study himself in his

11. Compare Aristotle's remark that those who seek practical their good, seek to be honoured by «men of practical wisdom... on the ground of their virtue». (*Ethica Nicomachea*, 1095 b 25-30). Adn see also E.4, 339, IV, 671: Emile «will be quite gratified to be approved in everything with good character... He will... say... «I rejoice because they approve of what I have done that is good... so long as they judge so soundly, it will be a fine thing to obtaining their esteem».

relations with things. ...When he begins to sense his moral being, he ought to study himself in his relations with men. This is the job of his whole life. (E.4, 214; IV, 493).

As a «moral being», one is entitled to feature in the proposals and conducts of others in certain undeniable and absolute ways, as fitting to one's standing as human, as a person. But in claiming and holding that standing for oneself one is bound to the recognition and acceptance of a like standing for others. There exists, then, at a base level a bond of reciprocal, equal acknowledgement and respect between persons, each holding categorical place with each.¹² This «base level» of mutual, level acknowledgement meets, at once, the needs of *amour-propre* in each person compatibly with each other person, in the same «structure». And it is by reference to this that Rousseau derives the primary criteria for any just and legitimate civil order.

No such order can possibly be legitimate if it flouts this moral position in relation to any one person who is going to be comprehended under the rule and law of that order. If this were done, that person would be denied standing, rendered a nullity, and be in nothing other than servitude having no ground of obligation towards the community in which he is forcibly kept. This is part at least of the meaning of Rousseau's saying that, in the «social compact», each member is received as «an indivisible part of the whole» (S.C. 1, 6; III, 361). There is no civil society where the terms and conditions which govern all are determined only by some. The rest could remain only because of force; as such they are not «in union» with the others, they are «divided» from them.

It becomes imperative, therefore, to state what the titles, powers, capabilities definitive of the possession of moral being, of categorical standing of this kind, are. This I shall not attempt generally to undertake here. But some of the instances central to Rousseau's argument are, of course, defence and protection of the person and goods of each individual, even to the point of relieving anyone who might otherwise perish — and this, in civil society, is to be undertaken «with the whole common force» (S.C. 1, 6; III, 360; see also DPE 131-2; III, 256). The reason why, for each person, the «whole common force» must be involved is that if this were not done, and individual or sectional force only were deployed, then some would at once be being assigned a lesser or inferior status which

12. I have completely omitted from this discussion any reference to Rousseau's detailed and profound treatment of the psychological roots and role of this mutual «human» acknowledgement, founded in the sentiment of compassion. Any full defence of my view would, of course, have to include this. See Dent, *Rousseau*, Ch. 4.

would immediately violate their standing. And this brings out a deeper point, to show how the conversion of man as «moral being» to man as «citizen» is necessary and desirable.

At the start of S.C. 2, 6, (III, 378) Rousseau writes:

Doubtless, there is a universal justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be mutual. Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, the laws of justice are ineffective among men: they merely make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody observes them towards him. Conventions and laws are therefore needed to join rights to duties and refer justice to its object.

The point is plain. «Rational universal justice» alone directs mutual moral recognition. But it does not achieve what it directs. Civil law and the common force must be deployed to ensure that where duty is done right is also enjoyed and justice is actually achieved. But it remains that the primary objective of civil law and the use of common force is to sustain and uphold the «moral order» of right and equal human recognition.

Precisely how these rights, and the liberties and powers, of individuals who hold standing with other individuals are embodied in the structure and functioning of the sovereign body of Rousseau's state, and in its final determinations, is another (massive) issue I simply shall not begin upon. I shall be content to have made some effective case for saying:

1. Rousseau's civil association is not, and is not envisaged by him as, no permanent abode for men. In its principal components, it articulates and ensures the terms and conditions in which each person can effectively hold standing with each other person as a moral being, whose dignity in his own being is respected.

2. Possession of such standing, the need and desire to hold it securely, are all facets of *amour-propre*. This directs a person to seek and secure categorical footing with others. As one person secures this, so do others alike. *Amour-propre* does not require the degradation of others; it requires their recognition.

3. Being a man and being a citizen are not, therefore, exclusive of each other and each impossible. As I stated earlier on, my claim is that to say what «becomes» a citizen we need to know what «becomes» a man, and to possess what «becomes» a man we need to become citizens.

The elements of paradox and tragedy many find so attractive, indeed so perceptive, in Rousseau's views may have largely disappeared on my account. But I do not think he is left looking merely bland.