

Multiculturalism and its discontents in SFR Yugoslavia and Bosnia: A Critique of the Multiculturalist Rights Model

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Culture and personality in post-conflict societies

I asked someone in the US team if he would like to live in a country with a constitution of the kind which was beginning to emerge. He just laughed. Clearly not!¹

Frustration among international officials at the continuing ethnic divisions in Bosnia is profound as international supervision looks likely to continue over the next decade. International High Representatives have come and gone with their aspirations to reconstruct an integrated multicultural Bosnian society becoming more forced as the years roll by. Each successive High Representative has proved to be incrementally more involved in Bosnian affairs than the last in the attempt to shore up the ethnic arrangements created under the 1995 Dayton Agreement. Instead of the one-year international supervision initially envisaged under Dayton, the international presence has become indefinite as officials have found it difficult to overcome the cleavages in society and create self-sustaining institutions.

International policy-makers deplore the lack of an exit strategy and speak of the need for local ownership of peace. Yet, it will be argued here that ethnic divisions and external supervision are inherent to the international multiculturalist approach and its politics of recognising difference. Bitter criticisms of international officials making concessions to ethnic nationalists miss the point. Concessions are contained within the logic of the multiculturalist's valorisation of difference. So although the multiculturalist road is paved with good intentions for ethnic coexistence, multiculturalist policies have helped

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¹ Carl Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson), 1998

institutionalise difference and inhibit the overcoming of ethnic divisions. The imperative to contain ethnic divisions and promote non-nationalist politics has led international officials to resort to decree and encroach upon the exercise of civil and democratic rights.

In its examination of the multiculturalist rights model, this chapter will analyse both theoretical and empirical aspects of multiculturalism and their implications for international conflict management policy. The importance of ethnic rights in international policy is informed by multiculturalist ideas. There is a burgeoning literature on multiculturalism as a political philosophy and policy approach. However, the literature on multiculturalism has only made superficial reference to the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Moreover reference to former Yugoslavia in the existing multiculturalism literature frequently *mis-recognises* the sources of ethnic conflict as relating to the denial of ethnic recognition. However SFR Yugoslavia actually gave extensive recognition to ethnicity. Meanwhile the literature dealing with international ethnic rights policies in Bosnia is generally unaware of the debates over multiculturalism. The literature in this field is dominated by issues of policy implementation. Critiques of multiculturalism have not been applied in the literature on multiculturalist policies in post-conflict situations. That multiculturalist political arrangements are prone to breakdown tends to be put down to local intransigence. For evaluations of international policy do not take into account wider debates over multiculturalist politics of recognising difference ('the politics of recognition'). Consequently, the international multiculturalist rights model is not fundamentally interrogated in spite of the fact that senior international officials at the Dayton negotiations expressed serious reservations about the viability of the model.²

In this chapter I seek to contribute to debates over multiculturalism and highlight problems with ethnic rights strategies. I hope to facilitate understanding of the failures to overcome ethnic divisions in Bosnia, as well as to suggest how critiques of multiculturalism could be enriched by analysing the failures of ethnic rights policies in SFR Yugoslavia and Bosnia. I further wish to highlight the implications of the multiculturalist rights model for civil rights and freedoms. The imperative to secure peace in Bosnia has led to the international community overriding certain civil and political freedoms. These developments tend to be overlooked as exigencies of the immediate situation. Little unexplored is how multiculturalism involves very different expectations of the relationship between the State and the individual citizen in which rights come to be re-conceptualised as external rights of intervention and regulation. In this regard, the so-called third generation of rights is representative of the conformist, disciplinary side of the rights tradition as opposed to its emancipatory aspects, analysed by Hughes in this volume.

In essence, the politics of recognition entails a shift away from the social contract model of the relationship between the State and the individual towards one of *therapeutic governance*.³ The earlier liberal ideal of the citizen as an autonomous rational capable subject whose self-identity is taken for granted is displaced under multiculturalist thinking. In the post-liberal multiculturalist model, the citizen is conceptualised as a psychologically and socially vulnerable being prone to dysfunctionality who requires external affirmation to actualise the

² Bildt, *Peace Journey*, 145.

³ Vanessa Pupavac, 'Therapeutic Governance: Psycho-social Intervention and Trauma Risk Management.' *Disasters*, 25: 4 (2001), pp. 358-372; Vanessa Pupavac, 'The Emotionology of the New International Security Paradigm.' *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7:4 (2004, forthcoming).

self and promote psychosocial well-being. Multiculturalism therefore seeks to move beyond non-discrimination in interethnic relations, which it considers inadequate for interethnic well-being, and require positive public measures to recognise ethnic identities and cultural distinctiveness.

The emphasis on cultural, ethnic, minority or identity-based rights has been greeted as a corrective to the dominance of Western perspectives in international human rights provisions. However, this is to misunderstand the recognition accorded to cultural rights in the international system over the last decade. Multiculturalism's ethnic rights framework and its recognition of difference involve implicit assumptions about the location of social problems. The ethnic rights approach, like the contemporary human rights approach more generally, locates social problems in human behaviour and psychology, as Tony Evans and Caroline Hughes explore elsewhere in this volume. Thus while multiculturalism validates ethnic recognition, it also problematises cultural norms and identity. Of relevance to post-conflict societies, multiculturalism regards ethnic conflict as ultimately deriving from the culture and psyche of communities. Oppression is psychologised as being reproduced through dysfunctional self-identities. 'Their own self-depreciation', argues the prominent theorist of multiculturalism Charles Taylor, 'becomes one of the most potent instruments of their oppression'.⁴ Consequently acting upon self-identity becomes a priority in multiculturalist strategies. According to Taylor, '[t]heir first task ought to be to purge themselves of their own oppression'.⁵ This multiculturalist model is informed by Anglo-American social psychology. Here we see the influence of the Culture and Personality School of anthropologists around Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead at Columbia University. The Culture and Personality School turned to Anglo-American social psychology for solutions to combat war and racism. Anglo-American social psychology traces social pathology ultimately to the formulation of personality in primary relations and regards identity as crucial to the functional personality and community. Under its influence, anthropologists became concerned with the 'homeless' or 'rootless' individual of modernity. Their research sought to address dysfunctional national and individual personalities and develop policies to foster appropriate socialisation. These themes are evident in international conflict management in Bosnia. International policy-makers give importance to recognising local ethnic identities and have elaborated an extensive framework of ethnic rights. At the same time, they seek to change the culture and personality of the Bosnian population and prevent aggression through numerous cultural and psychosocial programmes. In this elevation of identity and problematising of a population's psychology, there are implications for both national and individual rights.

First I outline the main criticisms of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Second I examine the influence of multiculturalism on international minority rights conventions. Third I analyse the failures of SFR Yugoslavia's elaborate ethnic rights framework. Finally I examine the international politics of recognition in Bosnia.

Multiculturalism and its discontents

⁴ Charles Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', Amy Gutman (ed.) *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25 at 26.

⁵ *Ibid.*

It tolerates the Other in so far as it is not the real Other, but the aseptic Other of premodern ecological wisdom, fascinating, rite and so on – the moment one is dealing with the *real* Other [...] tolerance stops.⁶

Multiculturalism has been embraced by leading donor countries such as Britain, Canada and the United States in over the last couple of decades. In Britain, for example, it is manifest across the political spectrum how multiculturalism informs the prevailing social norms from Prince Charles' wish to be 'defender of faiths' as the future head of the Church of England down to nursery school's ethos. To argue against multiculturalism has become heretical in policy-making today. Yet much discussion on the merits of multiculturalism tends to conflate multiculturalism as a description and multiculturalism as a prescription.⁷ In my analysis I am concerned with the efficacy of the ideology of multiculturalism, an ideology which elevates culture as an explanation and seeks to institutionalise cultural identities as a basis of social order. Thus in arguing against the ideology of multiculturalism I am not arguing against cultural or ethnic diversity, but the specific ideology of multiculturalism. Indeed multiculturalism actually expresses profound scepticism about the ability of people to live with diversity. Although multiculturalism ostensibly celebrates diversity, its imperative to regulate cultural difference exhibits nervousness over diversity in practice. For at the heart of multiculturalism's elevation of culture is pessimism over the possibility of individuals transcending their differences and forging common interests. So although multiculturalism is the dominant critique of new racism, it actually shares key assumptions with contemporary racism and ethnic nationalism in its culturalist understanding of society and validation of difference.⁸ Multiculturalism and new racism have converged with new racism's abandonment of discredited categories of hierarchy for the more respectable categories of difference.⁹ Both multiculturalism and the new racism identify culture/society in terms of cultural difference and regard maintaining ethnic identification as essential.¹⁰ The core distinction between them lies in their view of violence: multiculturalism sees violence as unnecessary and assumes the potential for a harmony interests under global capitalism, whereas new racism sees violence as inescapable in a pluralistic world made up of different ethnicities.¹¹ In multiculturalism's assumption of the potential for a harmony of interests under global capitalism, responsibility for violent conflict and its eradication lies essentially with the cultural norms and psychology of local actors. Multiculturalism therefore involves a belief in the need for the cultural reform of the ethnic identities, which it seeks to maintain.

The rise of multiculturalism and its emphasis on cultural difference has been linked by critics to disillusion with politics and notions of progress more generally.¹² Multiculturalism's celebration of difference has been criticised as a reification of the international development

⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject* (London and New York: Verso, 1999) 219.

⁷ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 23.

⁸ Mark Duffield, 'Lunching with Killers: Aid, Security and the Balkan Crisis', Carl-Ulrick Schierup (ed.) *Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalisation and the Political Economy of Reconstruction* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 118-146; Kennan Malik, *The Meaning of Race: Race, History and Culture in Western Society* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Duffield, 'Lunching With Killers', 123.

¹² Russell Jacoby, *The End of Utopia: Politics and Culture in an Age of Apathy* (London: Basic Books, 1999); *The Meaning of Race*.

crisis, involving the abandonment of policies to overcome international inequalities and the pursuit of separate development for different societies.¹³ Although multiculturalism treats violent conflict as an unnecessary feature of the global political economy, it tends to deplore the transformative aspects of capitalism and its destruction of traditional ways of life. Whereas the older modernisation strategies sought to address security through economic advancement, multiculturalism is nervous of modernisation strategies as de-stabilising societies and disturbing identities. Instead of economic convergence through modernisation, the post-modern multiculturalist strategies are refocusing on identity as key to security. As such the politics of recognition risks being a policy of reconciling people to their station in life.

Multiculturalism may be regarded as the political flip-side of economic globalisation today. Under globalisation there is concentration of capital globally in core States and international economic dis-investment from periphery States, accompanied by a normative re-engagement in the latter addressing the character of their internal relations.¹⁴ Multiculturalism's treatment of violent conflict as an aberration in the international system leads it in practice to attribute violence to the culture and personalities of societies. In so doing, the multiculturalist framework legitimises an international moral division between responsible peaceful (Western) societies and irresponsible violent (non-Western) societies. Weaker States unable to fulfil international normative standards become excluded from the new international community of responsible States, and become permanent sites of external reform by a global class of professionals.

Historically the defensive turn towards identity politics arose because of political setbacks and a demise of belief in political alternatives. Groups seek recognition of their particular victimised statuses instead of universal progress.¹⁵ Thus special claim-making displaces universal socio-economic transformation to overcome inequalities. Multiculturalism's ascendancy was further facilitated by the crisis of legitimacy in public institutions, which became manifest at the end of the Cold War. Public institutions experienced a loss of direction with the collapse of Cold War ideological divisions following initial euphoria at the fall of the Soviet bloc. New sources of legitimacy were found not in a new bold national vision but through validating these particularised victim statuses. There is a palpable lack of confidence about creating common national identities transcending ethnic or cultural differences. As such multiculturalism embodies a sense of terminus. Attempting to assimilate groups is regarded as not only impossible, but as unethical, oppressive and dangerous, risking fostering animosity. The defensive, precautionary, even parochial, multiculturalist vision contrasts sharply with the ambitious nineteenth century nation-building projects. Multiculturalists argue that ethnic identities have to be taken as given, even as they acknowledge their constructed nature.¹⁶ In contrast earlier liberal, radical or nationalist thinkers spoke confidently about ethnic groups wanting to be part of the nation and not choosing to be left 'to sulk' on their rocks.¹⁷ The aspirations of multiculturalists are much more modest. In the field of welfare, multiculturalists substitute special recognition for universal prosperity. This resignation contrasts with the ambitions of the pioneering

¹³ Duffield, 'Lunching with Killers', 127.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 74; Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 208-209.

¹⁶ Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 184.

¹⁷ John Stuart Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), 314.

welfarists such as T.H. Marshall who envisioned fulfilling the material needs of society to promote social cohesion.

Multiculturalism represents a retreat of politics from ideological contestation into the administration of difference. Taking existing identities as its starting point, multiculturalism sets itself up as arbiter of cultural recognition. Although multiculturalism appears as an ideology empty of content, multiculturalism actually requires substantial cultural conformity from different groups in society.¹⁸ This impulse to regulate cultural norms arises because of multiculturalism's elevation of culture as an explanation for social problems and the need to manage difference without prospects for substantial socio-economic transformation. In short, policy-makers in the hey day of economic development models could be more sanguine about traditional cultural norms and practices they found abhorrent because they were regarded as merely vestiges of the past to be eradicated in the great modernisation drives. Today directly addressing cultural norms and practices deemed harmful has become imperative with material transformation off the international development agenda. Effectively international policy seeks the modernisation of cultural norms and practices without economic development being a prerequisite.¹⁹ Indeed cultural change is the substantive meaning of development today. International development policy increasingly takes the form of 'a cultural-pluralist enterprise: the empowerment of cultural and gender differences in pursuit of behavioural and attitudinal change'.²⁰ Hence even as multiculturalism affirms identity, it problematises the content of identity as a key source of oppression.

The limits to multiculturalism's tolerance are dictated by its culturalist understanding of social problems. At issue is not simply the limits to multiculturalism's cultural tolerance or its culturalist understanding of social problems, but its assumption of the rights of conscience.²¹ Crucially the multiculturalist appropriates the right to determine what identities shall be recognised and how they should be realised. In doing so, multiculturalism treats the individual as incapable of appropriate self-actualisation without external affirmation and inverts the right to *self*-determination into a right of external intervention. Thus the ideology of multiculturalism questions the moral capacity of the individual, who is effectively cast as victim/perpetrator and vulnerable to psychosocial dysfunctionality without external support. The expansion of identity-based rights, or the public recognition and mediation of private difference, is driven implicitly by fears over how groups and individuals interact with each other. Politically, the institutionalisation of minority rights is premised on doubts over the majority's unfettered exercise of political rights. Multiculturalists assume opposing interests between the majority of a population and any minorities cannot be resolved through political contestation - or that to leave resolution up to political contestation necessarily entails unfair disadvantage to the minority group.²² This ultimately suggests a mistrust of democracy and the ability of people to transcend their own experience and empathise with others. The idea that one's interests can only be represented by a representative of the same identity problematises representation *per se*, as theorists of multiculturalism have acknowledged. Kymlicka neatly summarises how the logic of identity politics is to challenge any representation, '[i]f men cannot represent women, can white women represent women of

¹⁸ Zizek, *The Ticklish Subject*, 216.

¹⁹ Frank Furedi, *Population and Development* (Cambridge: Polity, 1997).

²⁰ Duffield, 'Lunching with Killers', 127.

²¹ Thomas Paine, *The Rights of Man* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 107.

²² Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 183.

colour? [...] Taken to its conclusion, the principle of mirror representation seems to undermine the very possibility of representation itself'.²³

Kymlicka's answer to the risk of group representation undermining the possibility of representation is for any group representation legislation to be seen 'as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists – a form of political "affirmative action"'.²⁴ This was certainly the hope of the architects of postwar Yugoslavia's ethnic rights approach, which was envisaged as a temporary measure along Yugoslavia's path to socialism. However, any expectation that such measures were temporary and would become irrelevant was not the Yugoslav experience. Once institutionalised ethnic representation took on its own dynamic with divisive consequences, as I will discuss below. It is questionable whether special measures for group representation enhance the position of the group overall and satisfy grievances. Group representation legislation, critics argue, risks creating an elite of professional group representatives who acquire a vested interest in their victimhood, rather than its eradication. Not least group representation legislation is liable to benefit group representatives over their constituencies. Thus temporary expediences for group representation tend to become indefinite measures championed by representatives whose status is dependent on a perpetuation of their condition. At the same time institutionalising group representation risks fostering competing interest groups and reinforces divisions, while becoming an obstacle to the development of alternative political identifications. The politics of recognition is therefore predisposed to slip into the 'politics of recrimination', the theorist Wendy Brown cautions:

Politicized identity [...] enunciates itself, makes claims for itself, only be entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future – for itself or others – that triumphs over this pain.²⁵

Multiculturalists acknowledge the danger of unlimited escalation of demands for political recognition and support.²⁶ The fragmentation of common interests and escalating demands for recognition create the need for an arbitrator to mediate the claims of the competing interest groups. The role of arbitrator standing above political contestation implies further limits on the political sphere. Consequently, the politics of recognition is accompanied by the ascendancy of judicial and administrative power in relation to the political sphere.

There are additional political and social ramifications when arbitration of group representation is external, which are evident in the international administration of Bosnia. It is often contended that the extensive external measures are necessary in a post-conflict situation such as in Bosnia. The need for external supervision is located in the nature of Bosnian society, leaving the contradictions within the international multiculturalist model of administration unexplored. The efficacy of the international multiculturalist approach is not fundamentally challenged. Yet ironically the international multiculturalist policies reproduce key aspects of SFR Yugoslavia's failed ethnic rights policies. Before outlining the experience of Yugoslavia's ethnic key model, I will briefly examine the affirmation of identity in international ethnic rights today. The issue of ethnic rights is being given a prominent role in international security policies. The Preamble to the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe, 1995), for example, declares that 'the upheavals

²³ *Ibid.*, 140.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 141.

²⁵ Brown, *States of Injury*, 74.

²⁶ Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 144.

of European history have shown that the protection of national minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace in this continent'. New international recognition of minority rights as a source for stability reverses the postwar hostility to their endorsement, arising from their invocation by the Nazis to legitimise their attack on Czechoslovakia. For minorities themselves the key issue in law became their statelessness. Their experience was that 'minority treaties did not necessarily offer protection but could also serve as an instrument to single out certain groups for eventual expulsion', that is, facilitate their statelessness.²⁷ The new favourable view of international minority rights is all the more significant for protection is not narrowly conceived as non-discrimination, but influenced by multiculturalist perspectives, actively promotes ethnic identification. Such international protection is counter to the previous 'general distrust of groups which were disposed to perpetuate their minority consciousness' who were regarded as a potential Trojan horse following the Nazi's abuse of minority rights.²⁸

Multiculturalism in international ethnic rights policy

The politics of recognition understands the underlying drive of ethnic movements to be the need for recognition of their ethnic identity and culture. 'Multinational societies', Taylor argues, 'can break up, in large part because of a lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by another'.²⁹ The phenomenon of ethnic nationalism of the last decade is assumed by many policy-makers to be a reaction against the repression of their identity and culture. Recognition of the psychological need for identity has become an integral component of conflict management strategies influenced by psychosocial theories.³⁰ International policy increasingly invokes therapeutic notions of self-esteem and well-being. Specific affirmation of identity is treated as essential for the functionality of individuals and groups. Fears over the consequences of the denial of identity or an identity's low self-esteem are becoming reflected in international human rights debates. In recent years, cultural rights have been flagged up as 'a Neglected and Forgotten Category of Human Rights'.³¹ For many documents such as the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 do not refer to cultural rights, while international human rights deliberations have often ignored cultural issues even where documents do encompass cultural rights such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.³² New prominence, however, is being given to the issue of culture and cultural rights 'as an essential element in the prevention and resolution of conflict'.³³ In this regard, it is the definition of culture as cultural identification that is being operationalised as opposed to culture in its universalist sense of the accumulated achievements of humanity. International human rights documents are now adopting multiculturalist perspectives incorporating pro-active measures to secure the cultural survival and self-esteem of groups.

²⁷ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), 282.

²⁸ Inis Claude, *National Minorities: An International Problem* (Westpoint, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1969) 57.

²⁹ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', 64.

³⁰ John Burton, *Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence and Crime and their Prevention* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 31; Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 123; Tarja Vayrynen, *Culture and International Conflict Resolution: A Critical Analysis of the Work of John Burton* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001).

³¹ Junusz Symonides, 'Cultural Rights', in Janusz Symonides (ed.) *Human Rights: Concept and Standards* (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000), 175.

³² *Ibid.*, 176.

³³ *Ibid.*, 177.

Consequently, in the new international multiculturalist approach, the State is to be judged not only in terms of the protection of the welfare of minorities but its accommodation to their culture.

Under international conventions today, States are required not just to refrain from discriminatory measures, but *actively* to promote the culture of minorities. Protection of minority rights is no longer considered merely part of individual civil rights. In the past minority rights basically signified non-discrimination - not denying the right to enjoy one's own culture or use one's own language as under article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). However, arising from the link being made between of the need for identity and conflict prevention, States are now required positively to advance minority cultures and identities, not merely refrain from discrimination.³⁴ Older human rights documents are being interpreted in the light of the new politics of recognition. Consequently article 27 of the 1966 Covenant has been reinterpreted in the last decade by international policy-makers to mean that, 'the state should act to support minority cultures and not simply take the role of bystander'.³⁵ UNESCO now expects States 'not only to eliminate discrimination but also to undertake affirmative action'.³⁶ Support for minority rights is to entail the provision of measures and resources to promote minority cultures. The Vienna Concluding Document of the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe 1986 sets out that States 'will protect and *create the conditions for the promotion* of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territories'. The Copenhagen Concluding Document 1990 reiterates that states 'will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities, and *create the conditions for the promotion of that identity*' (article 33). Extending the scope of positive action, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992) requires States to 'protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic *identity* of minorities' (article 1), 'take measures *to create favourable conditions* to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs' (article 4). Likewise under the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), states are expected to *facilitate* the position of ethnic minorities (Part II, article 27). In the same vein the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994) sets out further far-reaching measures on the promotion of minorities. Again the UN Convention on the Rights of the child requires that the education of the child should address development of respect for 'his or her own cultural identity, language and values' (article 29). Following these developments, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the European Union, OSCE, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank and other international agencies are requiring states adopt policies actively supporting the cultural survival of their ethnic minorities. The issue of state resources in fulfilling obligations is being interpreted more restrictively. Thus in the

³⁴ Adam Burgess, 'National Minority Rights and the Civilizing of Eastern Europe', *Contention*, 5:2 (1996),18; Rein Mullerson, *International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS* (London: Routledge, 1994), 109.

³⁵ Patrick Thornberry, 'The Principle of Self-Determination', Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick (eds.) *The United Nations and the Principles of International Law* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 15; see United Nations, *Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations adopted by the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comments adopted by the Human Rights Committee*. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.2, 29 March, 1996, 41.

³⁶ UNESCO, *From Social Exclusion to Social Cohesion: Towards a Policy Agenda*, International Symposium, 2-4 March, 1995, Roskilde University Denmark.

opinion of one overview, 'in the majority of cases states are obliged to take immediate steps not conditioned by 'availability of resources' to ensure their full realization'.³⁷

These international developments assume that the promotion of ethnic identity and culture will contain potential demands and frustrations and promote loyalty through the accommodation of different groups. Such policies are being developed without taking on board the critiques of multiculturalism which warn that the politics of recognition may create a vicious circle of ever-escalating demands, rather than satisfy demands. It is confidently stated, for example, that '[t]he experience of the 1990s shows that the recognition of cultural rights of persons belonging to minorities is not a danger and a source of conflict, but rather an important factor for peace and stability'.³⁸ Yet such a confident conclusion does not take into account how the most prominent conflict in Europe of the 1990s precisely took place in a country with a history of extensive ethnic rights recognition, namely SFR Yugoslavia. At the very least the experience of SFR Yugoslavia begs serious questions over the hopes being placed in the politics of recognition. For the case of SFR Yugoslavia suggests how ethnic recognition may foster social and political divisions, rather than the reverse. It is hard to remember, following a decade of conflict, how SFR Yugoslavia, although a one-party State, was looked to as an innovator in promoting good ethnic relations and its constitution held up as a model for multi-ethnic countries to follow. As such, the country actively participated in the drafting of international provisions on group rights in documents such as the CSCE and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Ironically Yugoslavia was the original sponsoring state of the 1992 Declaration, submitting a draft declaration to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1979.³⁹ In spite of Yugoslavia's high profile role in international policy-making on ethnic issues, advocates of multiculturalist models as a solution to ethnic conflict have strikingly neglected to analyse the failures of SFR Yugoslavia's sophisticated system of multiethnic rights. This is the theme of the next section.

Politics of recognition in SFR Yugoslavia

Ethnic identities were forged by stamping, skipping, whirling, twirling, choral singing, pipes, lutes, harmonicas and drums. [...] It was as though the whole fifty-year history of Yugoslav everyday life had passed in folklore displays ...⁴⁰

Multiculturalism is the *sine qua non* of international reconstruction policy in Bosnia. Yet the international multiculturalist model of ethnic recognition and representation in important respects repeats postwar Yugoslavia's own multiethnic rights approach. Far from insensitivity towards ethnic identification, the constitution arrangements of SFR Yugoslavia revolved around the principle of multi-ethnicity or the ethnic key. As Zoran Pajic, formerly professor of law at the University of Sarajevo, has commented:

The constitutional guarantees for the safeguarding of minority identity were substantial and comprehensive. The protection of the native language groups in

³⁷ Symonides, 'Cultural Rights', 206-207.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 219.

³⁹ Hurst Hannum, 'The Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities', Symonides (ed.) *Human Rights*, 283.

⁴⁰ Dubravka Ugresic, 'Balkan Blues' in *Culture of Lies: AntiPolitical Essays* (London: Phoenix House), 128-150.

the former Yugoslavia will remain unrivalled in constitutional practice for a long time.⁴¹

Indeed on the eve of war, the Minority Rights' Group's *World Directory of Minorities* had praised Yugoslavia's minority rights protection. Its report stated, *inter alia*, that its handling of its minorities in the province of Vojvodina was 'highly creditable' and cited its recognition of five official languages in the province.⁴²

The horrific experience of the atrocities in the Second World War made postwar Yugoslavia acutely conscious of the dangers of ethnic nationalism and sensitive towards accommodating its ethnic groups. The regime sought to eliminate controversy over the national question by accommodating the different ethnic identities, following Stalin's policy of institutionalising ethnic national rights to placate and counter potential opposition. Striving to depoliticise ethnic identification, legislation granted extensive cultural rights for ethnic groups, as well as allocating posts to secure a plurality of ethnic representation. From 1945, it became a criminal offence to incite national, racial or religious hatred. According to the area studies expert Paul Shoup, although there was not 'exact proportionality [...] at all levels or in or regions of the country in relation to ethnicity', 'the law on incitement was vigorously enforced'.⁴³ Consequently, while national political movements were suppressed, for example, secessionist demands by Croats in the 1970s and Kosovo Albanians in the 1980s, Albanian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Muslim, Serbian and other national identities were not only permissible, but sponsored in the cultural sphere in an attempt to depoliticise identity. George Schopflin in his analysis of Yugoslav politics observes how the State actively fostered the creation of new nations.⁴⁴ The Macedonians were recognised as a constituent nation by the 1943 Anti-Fascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) declaration, while the Muslims incrementally gained this status. As such the Yugoslav constitution prefigures the multiculturalist concern for the need for specific recognition and affirmation of groups and measures for their cultural survival (Taylor, 1994).⁴⁵

Ethnic cooperation was central to the legitimacy of the Yugoslav State, which was symbolically identified with its diversity. 'Yugoslavia has seven neighbours, six republics, five nations, four languages, three religions, two scripts and one goal: to live in brotherhood and unity' went the popular official refrain often recited to visitors. The State constantly endeavoured to balance the need to create a cohesive society and a collective identity loyal to the state without provoking separatist ethnic backlash. Such was the concern at not offending ethnic identification or creating rivalry between Yugoslav and ethnic identification, that identification with Yugoslav as a *national* identity among citizens was actually discouraged. Instead Yugoslav was to be regarded as a political identity through which ethnic identity was realised. In other words, to be Yugoslav after 1945 was officially about the fulfilment of one's own distinct national identity and the celebration of others.

Under the Constitution, Yugoslavia consisted of various nations, nationalities and ethnic groupings. The term 'nation' designated a national grouping, resident, wholly or mainly in Yugoslavia, and 'nationalities' a group which resided mainly in a neighbouring country or

⁴¹ Zoran Pajic, 'The Former Yugoslavia', Hugh Miall (ed.) *Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transnational Regime* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 62.

⁴² Minority Rights Group, *World Directory of Minorities* (Harlow: Longman, 1990), 124.

⁴³ Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia, 1968), 120, 110.

⁴⁴ George Schopflin, 'Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics', *Survey*, 25:3 (1980), 8.

⁴⁵ Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition'.

other country, for example, Albanian. The term 'ethnic groups', which included Romanies and Vlachs, referred to a people with primarily an oral tradition or in the process of codifying its written language. These distinct categories can be viewed by multiculturalists as 'challenging groups' equal worth. Nevertheless, as Pajic reminds us, the Yugoslav Constitution went far further than any other constitution to date in attempting to accord ethnic recognition.⁴⁶

This sensitivity can be seen in how no single Yugoslav nation was officially identified with the symbols of statehood, so the idea of minority rights became viewed as misnomer. The term 'national minority', implying inferior national rights, was thus replaced by the term 'nationality' in the 1963 Constitution, to promote the idea of equal rights for all citizens irrespective of their national origin. The sensitivity of the Yugoslav Constitution towards ethnic groups and the suspicion of minority rights as a lower status of citizenship were later brushed aside by international mediators. Notably the minority rights position was misunderstood by the Badinter Commission designated by the European Community to consider the minority rights guarantees as a prerequisite for the recognition of the republics as new States. In particular the Badinter Commission failed to understand how minority status was viewed as a demotion from full citizenship rights and therefore regarded as threatening. International insistence on minority rights guarantees actually legitimised the ethnicisation of citizenship, ignoring the lessons of Europe fifty years previously in which minority status failed to provide protection.⁴⁷ For to be categorised a minority in the successor states signified being 'defined out of the body politic', as constitutional expert Robert Hayden has observed.⁴⁸

Postwar Yugoslav multiethnic polices were able to manage ethnic relations in a period of growing prosperity and international stability. However, Yugoslav emphasis on ethnic group rights reinforced ethnic identities and held the potential for nurturing ethnic bureaucracies and undermining shared loyalty. So although ethnic distinctions weakened culturally in the decades after the Second World War,⁴⁹ distinct political loyalties were fostered through the institutionalisation of ethnicity. Indeed the ethnicisation of the bureaucracy and its evolution into ethnic nationalism is illustrated by the biographies of key nationalist leaders, starting with Slobodan Milosevic, who held privileged positions in postwar Yugoslavia and the successor states. A major study by the Wilson Center in the 1980s documented how decision-making had become the outcome of political bargaining between rival ethnic political elites leading to political stasis over both economic and political reform.⁵⁰ In the erosion of shared loyalty consequent upon the loss of legitimacy of Yugoslav socialism, economic recession of the late-1970s and IMF structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s, there was a growing *perceived* lack of group recognition, in despite of the country's 'unrivalled' recognition. The granting of extensive ethnic rights, rather than satisfying demands, had encouraged the politicisation of ethnicity and discontent to be articulated as ethnic differences. In short, the institutionalisation of ethnic rights fostered ethnic nationalists, contrary to the impression given by ethnic nationalists of the suppression of their identity.

⁴⁶ Pajic, 'The Former Yugoslavia', 62.

⁴⁷ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 288.

⁴⁸ Robert Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 15.

⁴⁹ Jaroslav Krejci and Velimsky Vitezslav, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 144.

⁵⁰ Dennison Rusinow (ed.), *Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism* (Washington: Wilson Center Press, 1988).

In its final collapse into war, Yugoslavia all too vividly demonstrates how the politics of recognition may foster ungenerous attitudes towards others and ultimately a politics of mutual recrimination.⁵¹ The growing ungenerosity of identity politics in Yugoslavia was encapsulated by the dissemination of ethnically-based declarations, programmes or historical texts setting out their ethnically-defined grievances. The most infamous expression of ethnic identification was the 1986 Memorandum drafted by members of the Serbian Academy of Arts, with counterparts in *The Wastelands* by Franjo Tujman, the 'Contributions to the Slovene National Programme' in the journal *Nova Revija* and Alija Izetbegovic's *Islamic Declaration*. Nationalist politicians deployed culturalist arguments essentialising ethnic difference and denying commonality.⁵² Nationalist claims to self-determination were asserted on the basis that coexistence was a threat to their cultural identity and each cultural nation required its State. The lived reality of multiethnic communities meant that violence was required to secure the separation of people. Yet the international politics of recognition endorsed these claims to separate identity against coexistence, whose consequences it has been trying to right.

If the multiethnic rights' approach of Yugoslavia failed to prevent ethnic nationalism and actually facilitated the politicisation of ethnicity, the prospects are remote of multiculturalist politics of recognition promoting harmonious ethnic relations in far less auspicious circumstances. Nevertheless, the international conflict management approach has attempted to overcome divisions and recreate coexistence through the institutionalisation of ethnicity, which will be examined in the next section.

International politics of recognition in Bosnia

The loss of international legitimacy of SFR Yugoslavia was related to the rise of politics of recognition and the belief in the importance of cultural survival. This is ironic when Yugoslavia's approach prefigured key multicultural proposals. Nevertheless, the growing ethnic demands of the late 1980s tended to be understood by international policy-makers as arising from denial of ethnic identification rather than a consequence of its institutionalisation. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideological conflict there was wider acceptance of cultural definitions of the nation as referring to a particular ethnically-defined identity as opposed to a fluid political category. For nationalism is increasingly treated by leading academics and policy-makers as 'primarily a psychological phenomenon'.⁵³ The historian Eric Hobsbawm, for example, has suggested that neglect of the importance of identity in State formation may explain contemporary ethnic conflicts.⁵⁴ That Hobsbawm, a historian associated with the modernisation school, not the ethno-symbolic school, which has conceptualised nationalism as arising from the development of modern capitalism and industrialisation, and emphasised the discontinuities with pre-modern ethnic identification, should embrace psychosocial explanations is significant. The new weight given to identity as an explanatory factor by Hobsbawm indicates how recognition of identity

⁵¹ Brown, *States of Injury*; Frank Furedi, 'The Institutionalisation of Recognition - Evading the Moral Statemate', Paper presented to the DMAP Conference, University of Cardiff, 4-6 April, 2002; Todd Gitlin, *The Twilights of Common Dreams: Why America is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Henry Holt, 1995).

⁵² Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided*, 142-144.

⁵³ Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 2, Violence and the Nation State* (Berkeley: University of California, 1985), 116.

⁵⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: programme, myth, and reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 181.

is now treated as an innate human need in many disciplines, moreover a need requiring specific official support.⁵⁵

Coinciding with the perspectives of multiculturalism and its emphasis on the importance of recognising identity),⁵⁶ the right to national self-determination has come to be associated with recognition of an identity and a right to cultural survival.⁵⁷ Yugoslavia, although it had enjoyed considerable international support, came to be seen as embodying what Taylor has characterised as ‘misrecognition’.⁵⁸ On the one hand, the culturalist identification of the nation with a particular ethnic group encouraged the idea that multiethnic States like Yugoslavia were artificial creations and imprisoned nations. On the other hand, the therapeutic understanding of rights requiring intervention to secure psychosocial well-being have led to impatience with principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States or the lives of individuals.

However, with national self-determination interpreted in terms of pre-existing identities, it is not possible to realise demands without impinging on other claims. The recognition of Croatia and Slovenia did not end demands for international recognition but created new demands. Horror at the outbreak of war in Bosnia led quickly to the realisation that the politics of recognition was creating a Russian doll syndrome.⁵⁹ The creation of new States created new minority situations instead of overcoming them.⁶⁰ However, international attempts to recreate a multiethnic Bosnia take place in the context of the international withdrawal of support from the multiethnic Yugoslav State and international recognition of the country’s division into republics based on ethnicised citizenship. Although Bosnia became a symbol of multiculturalism, the dissolution of multiethnic Yugoslavia was accompanied by the disintegration of ethnic relations within the republics, including Bosnia. As the Yugoslav academic Vladimir Gligorov pointedly observed, ‘Why do I have to be a minority in your state, if you can be a minority in mine?’⁶¹ With the politicisation of ethnicity, individuals wanted their ethnicity to be in control of their area and their area to be attached to other territory or republics where their ethnicity dominated. Hence, a unified Bosnian state enjoys the support of Muslims, 43.7 percent of the pre-war population, but lacks the support of the Croatian and Serbian sections of the population, constituting 17.3 and 31.4 percent respectively.⁶² It is clear that the Bosnian Croats would elect to be part of Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs to be part of Serbia and the Bosnian Muslims for a centralised Bosnian state. This lack of popular support is tacitly acknowledged by the international community in its reluctance to allow the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina to vote on the Dayton arrangements, disqualifying from standing electoral candidates expressing opposition to Dayton.

International policy-makers have sought to change the relevance of borders to move beyond the dangers of either State oppression of minorities or perpetual territorial secession. There

⁵⁵ Furedi, ‘The Institutionalisation of Recognition’.

⁵⁶ Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*; Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’.

⁵⁷ Burton, *Violence Explained*, 108; Jabri, *Discourses on Violence*, 123.

⁵⁸ Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, 25.

⁵⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), 6; Mullerson, *International Law*, 74; Thornberry, ‘The Principle of Self-Determination’, 187.

⁶⁰ Mullerson, *International Law*, 53.

⁶¹ Quoted in Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1995), 108.

⁶² Lenard Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 139.

would be greater international supervision of States to ensure ethnic recognition, harmonious ethnic relations and cultural tolerance. This policy is most apparent in Bosnia, which has effectively become an unofficial international protectorate following the General Framework Agreement drawn up at Dayton, Ohio in 1995. Under the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia epitomises the idea of 'the culture state' proposed by E. H. Carr over sixty years ago during the Second World War. In his conception of 'the culture state', Carr was proposing that nations should be allowed to enjoy extensive cultural rights, but that economic, political and military power should be transferred to supra-national institutions.⁶³ In Bosnia today, decision-making over economic, political, military, *and* social policy matters effectively lies with international institutions. In fact it is difficult to think of an area in which the international community has not become involved.

International officials have stated that they will be in Bosnia until they have overcome ethnic divisions and created a sustainable multiethnic State. Yet their approach is fundamentally flawed for their politics of recognition has institutionalised difference in its affirmation of identity as a core element of conflict management. Readiness to accommodate ethnic identifications is not reducible to pragmatic concessions to mollify ethnic nationalist leaders, but relates to how affirmation of identity and parity of esteem are seen as essential for fostering well-adjusted individuals and social harmony.

Understanding the conflict primarily in culturalist terms and attempting to satisfy the needs for recognition, the international community has institutionalised a complex system of ethnic representation under the Dayton agreement and subsequent decrees by the Office of the High Representative. Under Dayton, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The constituent peoples of the Federation are ethnically defined as the Bosniacs and Croats. The Federation Presidency consists of a Muslim and Croat as President and Vice-President. The Federation Parliament consists of two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The House of Peoples consists of 30 Bosniac and 30 Croat delegates and 14 other delegates. The House of Representatives consists of 140 directly elected members. The Federation is sub-divided into ten cantons where ethnicity has further dominated. Like the Federation, the Republika Srpska is ethnically defined, but as the State of the Serbian people. The Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of three directly-elected members: one Croat, one Bosniac from the Federation; one Serb from Republika Srpska (article V). Below the Presidency is the Council of Ministers, no more than two-thirds of whom to be appointed from the Federation. The Council of Ministers is to be headed by two co-chair persons, a Bosniac and Serb rotating weekly; and a Croat vice-chair, each minister having two deputies from the other two ethnic groups. Decisions are to be by consensus in the Council, echoing the previous Yugoslav approach. The Parliamentary Assembly consists of two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives (article IV). The House of Peoples comprises 15 delegates: five Bosniacs and five Croats from House of Peoples of the Federation and five Serbs from the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. The House of Peoples has a rotating chair with two deputy chairs of different ethnicities. The House of Representations comprises 42 directly-elected members: two-thirds from the Federation, one-third from Republika Srpska. There is a rotating chair and two deputy chairs of different ethnicities.

⁶³ E.H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1941), 54-55.

The principle of the ethnic key runs through public institutions at all levels. There have, for example, been various further city agreements on joint administration in which the international community has even decreed the allocation of seats in advance of election results or re-jigged them in order to achieve a particular balance of ethnic representation. Similar measures to ensure multi-ethnicity are being carried over to private institutions and businesses through internationally-drafted employment discrimination legislation. Alongside the requirements for ethnic representation there are complex procedures under which decisions may be declared destructive of vital interests of an ethnic group.

Unsurprisingly, given SFR Yugoslavia's experience, ethnic representation and ethnic vetos have not overcome ethnic divisions. Rather their overall impact has been to institutionalise pork barrel politics and recreate the impasses of the previous Yugoslav multiethnic system. Consequently, international institutions are finding that they are constantly stepping in to overcome impasses and force through decisions. An institutional dynamic has been set in motion unchecked by the weak and fragmented local institutions. In 2000 Richard Holbrooke, former UN Security Council President and architect of Dayton, stated that, '[t]he joint presidency, its central institutions, and many attributes of a single, sovereign, centrally-governed state [...] have not been fulfilled'.⁶⁴ His comments five years after Dayton remain apt. Bosnian institutions are still fragile, shorn up on-going attempts by the international community to create common institutions and stamp out alternative political bodies and symbols.

To encourage more cooperative relations, international administrators have attempted to advance non-adversarial ways of governance, including sponsoring the greater involvement of civil society organisations. International officials have also sponsored a 'so-called mandatory platform in which political parties have to take positions on the most important, vital issues for all people in BiH' to minimise disputes over policy'.⁶⁵ In this way, the case of Bosnia illustrates well warnings on the authoritarian implications of multiculturalism and its transformation of politics into administration.⁶⁶ The wide-ranging strategies have proved to be of limited impact in altering divisions.

Righting Bosnia

The international community has become progressively more involved in Bosnia since the initial one year supervisory role envisaged under the Dayton Agreement 1995. International administration has spiralled beyond inter-ethnic relations into public policy in general, unchecked by the weak and divided local institutions. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), a key international supervisory institution created to supervise the civilian aspects of Dayton, effectively enjoys executive powers, drafting domestic laws, structuring public institutions and directing public policy. Yet the OHR enjoys these extensive powers without any formal accountability to the population, nor any formal suspension of Bosnia's sovereignty. Under the Dayton Agreement (Annexe 10, article II) the High Representative is required to '[r]eport periodically to the UN, EU, United States, Russian Federation and other interested governments, parties and organizations'. There is no specific requirement to report to the Bosnian government. The Bosnian government is irrelevant as an executive body with policy formulated by international officials. Local political participation under international

⁶⁴ Moore, XXXX 2000.

⁶⁵ OSCE, 'Women can change Bosnia.' June, <http://www.oscebih.org/events/events15-7-interview.htm>

⁶⁶ Brown, *States of Injury*, 75.

administration takes on the character of role-playing exercises ever popular in international programmes.

The multiculturalist understanding of rights does not see a contradiction in the formal upholding of Bosnian sovereignty and its effective suspension. This is possible because of the radically different view of the rights-holder that multiculturalism holds from the classical view of the subject as an autonomous rational being. Multicultural critics of the classic model question the classical assumptions over the rights-holder as an exclusionary construct, highlighting how the model fails to recognise groups who are vulnerable and marginalised. Multiculturalism sees rights recognition as necessary for self-actualisation and empowerment. This re-conception of rights as necessary to realise the self fundamentally challenges the classic ideal, which assumes that the rights-holder is a moral agent and emphasises rights as freedoms. In distinction, multiculturalism subtly reconceptualises civil and political rights as rights to third party self-actualisation and empowerment, that is, positive rights supporting the self as opposed to negative freedoms from interference. But third party enablement cannot be relinquished for self-actualisation is a process requiring continual affirmation since the self is ever vulnerable to risk and dysfunctionality. Hence, external intervention in Bosnia is not conceived of as violating the UN Charter on the right to national self-determination, but supporting its realisation. Furthermore, in the multiculturalist understanding of rights, national self-determination is understood psychologically as a right to identity rather than politically as a right to self-government. Thus the new High Representative Paddy Ashdown has stated, 'I will never permit any constitutional change that fundamentally threatens the identity or security of any of Bosnia and Herzegovina's constituent peoples',⁶⁷ but does not mention how his powers of office contradict the right to political self-determination.

Authenticating Bosnian culture and personality

It is the culture and mentality of the population that is increasingly blamed for the continuing inability of the international community to secure a peaceful integrated State. Thus a British official in Sarajevo, Brian Hopkinson has described the international community's attempts to implement Dayton as 'fighting a whole culture'.⁶⁸ Tracing the persistence of divisions to the population's psychosocial dysfunctionality, rather than the dysfunctional political arrangements,⁶⁹ international programmes seek to transform the ethno-psychology of citizens. Policy-makers speak of inspiring 'authentic community' (Common Bond Institute), creating 'a new set of values and traditions'.⁷⁰ Oxymorons abound from 'new traditions' to 'self help through professional intervention'.

Huge attention is being focused on the values and personality of the young in Bosnia as future citizens. Bosnian education, an important site for international efforts, involves substantial international determination, which seeks to affirm ethnic identities while radically modifying their political and cultural content.⁷¹ The education reform process has been controlled by international bodies with secondary participation by locals. Tellingly the

⁶⁷ Paddy Ashdown, 'Bosnia: Reform will bring Justice and Jobs', *Balkan Crisis Report*, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, No. 341, June 7 (2002).

⁶⁸ Interview, *File on Four*, BBC Radio 4, 30 May 1999.

⁶⁹ David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto, 1999); Hayden, *Blueprints for a House Divided*.

⁷⁰ Christopher Hedges, 'Diplomat Rules Bosnia with a Strong Hand.' *New York Times*, 10 April, 1998.

⁷¹ OHR, XXXX 2000d.

education working groups involving locals but chaired by internationals have to report to an international steering group. This steering group, the Education Issue Set Steering Group is 'made up of the heads of international organisations involved in education, including OSCE and OHR, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the World Bank and other stakeholders as appropriate'.⁷² Symbolically the education manifesto entitled *A Message to the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Education Reform*,⁷³ drawn up in this internationally-directed reform process, is first printed in English, followed by three versions of the text printed in the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian-affiliated language identifications. The document emphasises stakeholders at all levels from international organisations down to individual parents and children, but power in determining the outcome lies firmly with international stakeholders and its perspectives. Thus it may be observed that although this multicultural education manifesto requires integrated multicultural schools [...] free from political, cultural, religious and other bias and discrimination and which respects the rights of children', its multicultural education philosophy is not devoid of ideological content. Namely, its education reforms propose a philosophy of education subordinate to the demands of global economy in which the curricula are to be increasingly judged by their market relevance. This occurrence underscores the linkages made by Evans and Hughes in this volume between human rights discourse and global capitalism. At the same time the manifesto illustrates how the international multiculturalism constantly affirms symbolic difference – here the existence of three different languages – while it is constantly trying to deny and rectify the consequences of publicly affirming difference – here its intention to reintegrate Bosnian schools and classes. The contradictions of the ethnicised political sphere and the necessity of external arbitration of difference carry over into the classroom. Again, the international community is repeating the attempts of former Yugoslavia's education policy to promote multi-ethnicity through affirming ethnic diversity. Many of the statements on children learning 'to respect and cherish the precious cultural diversity that makes our country unique'⁷⁴ could have been lifted from a Yugoslav education document of the 1970s or 1980s. The unique cultural diversity of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia was stressed in the school curriculum, rather than repressed, as the writer Dubravka Ugresic discusses.⁷⁵ The extensive efforts of the former state to affirm ethnic diversity tended to reinforce ethnic difference instead of overcoming difference, but international strategies continue in their contradictions.

International multicultural education efforts reveal both the limits of its historical understanding of the causes of the war in former Yugoslavia, and the limits of multiculturalism's tolerance. I will finish by making some general observations on the limits of multiculturalism's tolerance and its implications for self-determination. I have argued that international multicultural politics is informed by an implicit mistrust of the psychosocial functionalism of individuals caught up in conflict situations.⁷⁶ Although the politics of recognition emphasises the need for self-actualisation of individuals and cultures, the process of recognition is one that is informed by a particular view of what the authentic self or authentic community is. As Russell Jacoby has asked, 'How pluralistic is cultural

⁷² OSCE-EISSG (2002) Education Issues Set Steering Group (EISSG)

<http://www.oscebih.org/education/esteering.asp>

⁷³ OSCE-EWG (2002) Education Working Groups

<http://www.oscebih.org/education/eworking.asp>

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁵ Ugresic, 'Balkan Blues', 131-132.

⁷⁶ Pupavac, 'Therapeutic Governance'; Pupavac, 'The Emotionology'.

pluralism?'.⁷⁷ While symbolic aspects of culture, such as language, may receive recognition, international multiculturalism implies a radical transformation of cultural norms in line with Anglo-American cultural sensibilities. The anthropologist Thomas Eriksen has wryly commented, 'in order to save "a culture" one must lose it!'.⁷⁸ The consequence of the external cultural and psychosocial management is not only to challenge particular norms and social relations, but to challenge the very personality of communities. This loss of personality has three aspects. Firstly, external intervention does not contain the element of reciprocity in the conceptualisation of the good and authentic. The extensive cultural intervention proposed destroys the mutuality in social and personal relations, necessary for the self-development of individuals and the building of a sense of community. Secondly, as a consequence of the re-invention of cultural identities by international organisations, culture loses its creative aspect as self-expression of a people or society. People are no longer, active, creative subjects, but subject to cultural identities and norms designated by outside bodies. Effectively, such external determination entails the mummification of culture,⁷⁹ in which cultural features are emptied of their social significance and reduced to symbolic accoutrements, such as, particular food dishes or folk songs. Thirdly, society and the individual citizen are denied their moral capacity for conceptualising the good and thereby denied their own moral subjectivity. Even cultural literary traditions are being subject to external revision to nurture authentic communities conforming to contemporary therapeutic sensibilities, thereby further denying the aesthetic capacity of communities. In the extensive external determination of the authentic self and community, it is not surprising that the population feel little ownership over the reconstruction process. External intervention weakens social cohesion through encouraging identification with and dependence on the intervenor. While the micro-management of relations at the grassroots level may discourage the divided ethnic groups from seeing and moving beyond their mutual enmity.

Consequently, international intervention is sliding into indefinite administration in its attempt to authenticate Bosnia, but the extensive international administration of the region has only heightened people's insecurities and alienation from politics. Bypassing the political process and imposing quotas, policies and organisations has neither created genuine consensus, nor sustainable institutions. The present High Representative Paddy Ashdown has stated he aims to delegate more reform work conducted by the OHR to Bosnians to foster a sense of ownership.⁸⁰ However, significantly this move does not represent any relinquishment of the OHR's authority over Bosnian institutions and OHR recruitment patterns continue to reveal how senior positions are reserved for international staff. Unsurprisingly, analysis of international peacebuilding has found that:

Where individuals felt that their contribution [...] was not valued, that they had no control over the project, that their role had been imposed upon them by an external agency etc., the project became a conflictual experience, and not a source of non-conflictual identification of self and others.⁸¹

The international community has expended considerable effort in Bosnia to create a

⁷⁷ Jacoby, *The End of Utopia*, 34.

⁷⁸ Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), 129.

⁷⁹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1965).

⁸⁰ Ashdown, 'Bosnia'.

⁸¹ Steve Gillard, 'Winning the Peace: Youth, Identity and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *International Peacekeeping*, 8:1 (2001), 94.

sustainable multiethnic State to whose institutions the population feels loyal. However, the international community's presence appears essential to maintain the political arrangements. The failure of the international strategies in Bosnia to create a functional settlement which does not rely on international arbitration urgently needs to be re-examined because these strategies are being deployed elsewhere. Analysis of the failures must look beyond the culture and personality of the population and consider the efficacy of the international politics of recognition and its promotion of identity rights. The history of former Yugoslavia suggests how an ethnic rights approach may foster ethnic divisions. It is therefore ironic that the international human rights framework should be requiring States to promote ethnic rights as part of international security strategies. At the same time the promotion of the third generation of rights represents a retreat from progressive politics nationally and internationally into an ossifying, bureaucratic administration of difference. The contradictions of international multiculturalism are only too apparent for people in the new periphery States. Even as international community demands inclusion within Bosnia, a process of international moral re-division between States goes apace, creating new international exclusions. International multiculturalism is complicit in legitimising this shift away from national self-determination to cultural dependencies.