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Tolstoy's dream		The agent-based approach to Economics and the Social Sciences is becoming AQ1 more and more popular among scholars interested in going beyond mainstream analyses [14]. This approach is trying to reconcile methodological individual-ism [13] with the existence of emergent phenomena in social systems [2].

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AQ1 The agent-based approach to Economics and the Social Sciences is becoming more and more popular among scholars interested in going beyond mainstream analyses [14]. This approach is trying to reconcile methodological individualism [13] with the existence of emergent phenomena in social systems [2].	12
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Some of these concepts may appear brand new, but, at least, they can be traced back to the philosophical and scientific discussions taking place in the XIXth Century. The basic idea is that there is an analogy between human societies where many individuals interact and gases where many atoms or molecules interact. Indeed, as discussed by Hacking in <i>The Taming of Chance</i> [8], Boltzmann himself used this analogy in order to justify the atomic hypothesis. This idea was pervasive in XIXth Century thinkers. We like to think of Tolstoy's novel <i>War and Peace</i> [15] as an early agent-based simulation. The author explores the behaviour and interactions of his 580 characters during the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. More specifically, the second epilogue of the novel reveals Tolstoy's theoretical interests and his model of human history. Let Tolstoy directly speak:	16
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Speaking of the interaction of heat and electricity and of atoms, we cannot say why this occurs, and we say that it is so because it is inconceivable otherwise, because it must be so and that it is a law.	28
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The same applies to historical events. Why war and revolution occur we do not know. We only know that to produce the one or the other action, people combine in a certain formation in which they all take part, and we say that this is so because it is unthinkable otherwise, or in other words that it is a law.	31
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Therefore, in the XIXth Century, the analogy on which current agent-based simulations are grounded was so popular that it found its way through literature. Unfortunately for Economics, the mechanical analogy was used in its static version and the concept of statistical equilibrium remained unknown to most economists throughout all the XXth Century and up to now.

## 2 Statistical equilibrium in economics 41

### 2.1 What is the common notion of equilibrium in economics? 42

The concept of equilibrium referred to in General Equilibrium Theory is taken from Physics. It coincides with mechanical equilibrium.

When looking for mechanical equilibrium one minimizes a potential function subject to boundary conditions, in order to find equilibrium positions; when looking for standard (micro)economic equilibrium, one maximizes a utility function subject to budget constraints (this is the consumer side, in other words, demand) and maximizes the profit subject to cost constraints (this is producer side, in other words, supply); then one equates supply and demand, and finds equilibrium quantities and prices. In both cases, the mathematical tool is optimization with constraints using the method of Lagrange multipliers.

Walras and Pareto explicitly inspired their pioneering work on General Equilibrium Theory to Physics and mechanical equilibrium. This was made clear by Ingrao and Israel [9].

### 2.2 What is statistical equilibrium? 57

Statistical equilibrium is another notion of equilibrium in Physics. It was defined by Maxwell and Boltzmann in their early work on the theory of gases, trying to reconcile mechanics and thermodynamics. In order to better understand this notion, it is useful to make use of a Markovianist approach to statistical equilibrium as discussed by Oliver Penrose (the brother of Roger Penrose) in his 1970 book [10]. By the way, a similar approach was promoted by Richard von Mises (the brother of Ludwig von Mises) in a book reprinted in 1945 (actually the book was written by R. von Mises before World War II) [16].

A finite Markov chain is a stochastic process defined as a sequence of random variables  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  on the same probability space that assume values in a finite set  $S$ , known as the state space. For a Markov chain, the predictive probability  $\mathbb{P}(X_n = x_n | X_{n-1} = x_{n-1}, \dots, X_1 = x_1)$  has the following simple form:

$$\mathbb{P}(X_n = x_n | X_{n-1} = x_{n-1}, \dots, X_1 = x_1) = \mathbb{P}(X_n = x_n | X_{n-1} = x_{n-1}). \quad (1)$$

In other words, the predictive probability does not depend on all the past 72 states, but on the last state occupied by the chain. As a consequence of 73 the multiplication theorem, one gets that the finite-dimensional distribution 74  $\mathbb{P}(X_1 = x_1, \dots, X_n = x_n)$  is given by: 75

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{P}(X_0 = x_0, \dots, X_n = x_n) \\ = & \mathbb{P}(X_n = x_n | X_{n-1} = x_{n-1}) \cdots \mathbb{P}(X_1 = x_1 | X_0 = x_0) \mathbb{P}(X_0 = x_0). \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

As a consequence of Kolmogorov's representation theorem, this means that a 76 Markov chain is fully characterized by the knowledge of the functions  $\mathbb{P}(X_m = 77 x_m | X_{m-1} = x_{m-1})$ , also known as *transition probabilities* and  $\mathbb{P}(X_0 = x_0)$ , 78 also known as *initial probability distributions*. If the transition probabilities do 79 not depend on the index  $m$  but only on the initial and on the final state, then 80 the Markov chain is called *homogeneous*. In the following, only homogeneous 81 Markov chains will be considered. For the sake of simplicity, it is useful to 82 introduce the notation 83

$$P(x, y) = \mathbb{P}(X_m = y | X_{m-1} = x) \quad (3)$$

for the transition probability and 84

$$p(x) = \mathbb{P}(X_0 = x) \quad (4)$$

for the initial probability distribution. Note that  $P(x, y)$  is nothing else than 85 a matrix in the finite case under scrutiny, with the property that 86

$$\sum_{y \in S} P(x, y) = 1; \quad (5)$$

in other words the rows of the matrix sum up to 1 as a consequence of the 87 addition axiom. Such matrices are called *stochastic matrices* (to be distin- 88 guished from random matrices which are matrices with random entries). Note 89 that the initial distribution can be written as a row vector, so that one can 90 obtain the marginal distribution of the random variable  $X_n$  as: 91

$$\mathbb{P}(X_n = y) = \sum_{x \in S} p(x) P^{(n)}(x, y), \quad (6)$$

where  $P^{(n)}(x, y)$  represents the  $(x, y)$  entry of the  $n$ -step transition matrix. 92

Now, assume there is a distribution  $\pi(x)$  satisfying the equation: 93

$$\pi(y) = \sum_{x \in S} \pi(x) P(x, y), \quad (7)$$

then  $\pi(x)$  is called a *stationary distribution* or *invariant measure*. If at time 94 step  $t$  the chain is described by  $\mathbb{P}(X_t = x) = \pi(x)$ , then from (7), it follows 95 that  $\mathbb{P}(X_{t+1} = x) = \pi(x) = \mathbb{P}(X_t = x)$ ; in other words, the distribution does 96

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not change as time goes by. Note that the states are jumping from one to 97  
 another one, but the probability of finding the system in a specific state does 98  
 not change. This is exactly the idea of statistical equilibrium put forward by 99  
 Ludwig Boltzmann. 100

However, more can and should be said. First of all, the stationary distri- 101  
 bution may not exist; secondly, the chain usually starts from a specific state, 102  
 so that the initial distribution is a vector full of 0's and with a single 1 in the 103  
 initial state. The latter state of affairs can be represented by a Kronecker delta 104  
 $\pi(x) = \delta(x, x_0)$ , where  $x_0$  is the specific initial state. This is not a stationary 105  
 distribution and the convergence of the chain to the stationary distribution 106  
 is not granted at all. Fortunately, it turns out that under some rather mild 107  
 conditions: 108

- The stationary distribution exists and it is unique; 109
- The chain always converges to the stationary distribution irrespective of 110  
 its initial distribution. 111

It is indeed sufficient to consider a finite chain that is *irreducible* and *aperi-* 112  
*odic*. A chain is irreducible if all the states are persistent; this is equivalent to 113  
 claim that any state can be reached from any other state with finite probabil- 114  
 ity in a finite number of steps. The chain is aperiodic if for any  $x$ , one has that 115  
 $P^{(s)}(x, x) > 0$  for  $s > s_0(x)$ ; in other words, after a possible transitory period, 116  
 the probability of return is positive. All these conditions essentially mean that 117  
 the  $s$ -step matrix  $\mathbf{P}^{(s)}$  no more has any zero entries after a sufficient number 118  
 of steps. 119

If the finite Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, then it has a unique 120  
 invariant distribution  $\pi(x)$  and 121

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P^{(n)}(x, y) = \pi(y) \tag{8}$$

irrespective of the initial state  $x$ . This means that, after a transient period, 122  
 the distribution of chain states reaches a stationary distribution, which can 123  
 then be interpreted as an equilibrium distribution in the statistical sense. 124

**2.3 Why and where statistical equilibrium may be useful** 125  
**in economics?** 126

There are several possible domains of application of the concept of statistical 127  
 equilibrium in Economics. Incidentally, note that many agent-based models 128  
 used in Economic theory are intrinsically Markov chains (or Markovian pro- 129  
 cesses). Therefore, the ideas discussed earlier naturally apply. Up to now, we 130  
 have used these concepts: 131

- To discuss some toy models for the distribution of wealth (not of income!) 132  
 as in Scalas et al. (2006) [11] and in Garibaldi et al. (2007) [6]. 133

- To generalize a sectoral productivity model originally due to Aoki and Yoshikawa [1], in Scalas and Garibaldi (2009) [12]. 134 135

In [6, 11, 12], we promote the use of a finitary approach to combinatorial stochastic processes. This approach is the subject of a forthcoming book [7] and will be illustrated by an example in the next section. 136 137 138

### 3 An example: the taxation-redistribution game 139

#### 3.1 Basic descriptions 140

Consider a system of  $n$  coins to be divided into  $g$  agents. There are three levels of description for the system. 141 142

- (individual descriptions) Let the integers from 1 to  $n$  denote the coins and the integers from 1 to  $g$  denote the agents. Let us introduce the variables  $V_1, \dots, V_n$  whose values are given by the integers between 1 and  $g$ ; by  $V_i = j$ , we mean the the  $i$ th coin belongs to the  $j$ th agent. 143 144 145 146
- (frequency or occupation descriptions) If the names (or labels) of the coins are irrelevant, it is possible to use the variables  $Y_1, \dots, Y_g$  where  $Y_i = n_i$  is the number of coins in the pocket of the  $i$ th agent. In symbols, one can write  $Y_i = \#\{V_j = i, j = 1, \dots, n\}$ . If the vector  $\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{n} = (n_1, \dots, n_g)$  denotes a particular frequency description, one has  $\sum_{i=1}^g n_i = n$ . 147 148 149 150 151
- (frequency of frequencies or partitions) For  $k = 1, \dots, n$ , the variables defined by  $Z_k = \#\{Y_i = k, i = 1, \dots, g\}$  give the number of agents with  $k$  coins. If the vector  $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z} = (z_0, \dots, z_n)$  denotes a particular partition, it must satisfy the two constraints  $\sum_{k=0}^n z_k = g$  and  $\sum_{k=1}^n kz_k = n$ . 152 153 154 155

**Example** ( $n = 3$  objects (coins) into  $g = 2$  categories) 156

- There are eight individual descriptions:  $(1, 1, 1)$ ,  $(1, 1, 2)$ ,  $(1, 2, 1)$ ,  $(2, 1, 1)$ ,  $(2, 2, 1)$ ,  $(2, 1, 2)$ ,  $(1, 2, 2)$ ,  $(2, 2, 2)$ . 157 158
- There are four occupation vectors:  $(3, 0)$  corresponding to  $(1, 1, 1)$ ;  $(2, 1)$  corresponding to  $(1, 1, 2)$ ,  $(1, 2, 1)$  and  $(2, 1, 1)$ ;  $(1, 2)$  corresponding to  $(2, 2, 1)$ ,  $(2, 1, 2)$  and  $(1, 2, 2)$ ;  $(0, 3)$  corresponding to  $(2, 2, 2)$ . 159 160 161
- There are two partition vectors:  $(1, 0, 0, 1)$  corresponding to  $(3, 0)$  and  $(0, 3)$ ;  $(0, 1, 1, 0)$  corresponding to  $(1, 2)$  and  $(2, 1)$ . 162 163

The three basic descriptions define possible constituents of the sample space for the individual descriptions. Note that: 164 165

- For each occupation vector  $\mathbf{n} = (n_1, \dots, n_g)$  there are 166

$$\frac{n!}{\prod_{i=1}^g n_i!} \tag{9}$$

corresponding individual descriptions; 167

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- For each partition vector  $\mathbf{z} = (z_0, \dots, z_n)$  there are 168

$$\frac{g!}{\prod_{i=0}^n z_i!} \tag{10}$$

corresponding occupation vectors; 169

- The total number of individual descriptions is  $g^n$ ; 170
- The total number of occupation vectors is  $(g + n - 1)!/[n!(g - 1)!]$ ; 171
- For the total number of partition vectors, a closed formula is not available. 172

### 3.2 Taxation (destruction) and redistribution (creation) 173

In this section, a stylized probabilistic model for taxation and redistribution will be introduced, based on [6]. A *taxation* is a step in which a coin is randomly taken out of  $n$  coins and a *redistribution* is a step in which the coin is given back to one of the  $g$  agents. A taxation move is equivalent to a destruction/annihilation and a redistribution move to a creation [3–5]. This model is conservative as the numbers of agents  $g$  and of coins  $n$  do not change in time. Moreover, it only includes so-called *unary* moves. If the initial state is given by  $\mathbf{n} = (n_1, \dots, n_i, \dots, n_j, \dots, n_g)$ , the final state is  $\mathbf{n}_i^j = (n_1, \dots, n_i - 1, \dots, n_j + 1, \dots, n_g)$ , after taxation and redistribution. Note that indebtedness is not possible. If a coin is randomly selected out of  $n$  coins, the probability of selecting a coin belonging to agent  $i$  is  $n_i/n$ . Therefore, in this model, agents are taxed proportionally to their wealth measured in terms of the number of coins in their pockets. The redistribution step is crucial as it can favour agents with many coins (a rich gets richer mechanism) or agents with few coins (a taxation scheme leading to equality). This can be done by assuming that the probability of giving the coin taken from agent  $i$  to agent  $j$  is proportional to  $w_j + n_j$ , where  $n_j$  is the number of coins in the pocket of agent  $j$  and  $w_j$  is a suitable weight. Depending on the choice of  $w_j$ , one can obtain different equilibrium situations. Based on the previous considerations, it is assumed that the transition probability is:

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{n}_i^j | \mathbf{n}) = \frac{n_i}{n} \frac{w_j + n_j - \delta_{i,j}}{w + n - 1}, \tag{11}$$

where  $w = \sum_{i=1}^g w_i$  and the Kronecker symbol  $\delta_{i,j}$  takes into account the case  $i = j$ . If the condition  $w_j \neq 0$  is satisfied, then also agents without coins can receive them. If all the agents are equivalent, one has  $w_j = a$ , uniformly and  $w = ga = \theta$ , so that (11) becomes

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{n}_i^j | \mathbf{n}) = \frac{n_i}{n} \frac{a + n_j - \delta_{i,j}}{\theta + n - 1}. \tag{12}$$

### 3.3 Statistical equilibrium 198

From (7), one can see that the invariant distribution is the left eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue 1 for the matrix of transition probabilities. However, the direct diagonalization of (11) is cumbersome. In this case, it is easier

to use detailed balance. If a probability  $p(\mathbf{n})$  can be found satisfying detailed balance, then this is an invariant distribution! In our case, if  $i \neq j$ , the *direct flux* is given by:

$$p(\mathbf{n})\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{n}_i^j|\mathbf{n}) = p(\mathbf{n})\frac{n_i}{n}\frac{a+n_j}{\theta+n-1} \quad (13)$$

whereas the inverse flux is given by:

$$p(\mathbf{n}_i^j)\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{n}|\mathbf{n}_i^j) = p(\mathbf{n}_i^j)\frac{n_j+1}{n}\frac{a+n_i-1}{\theta+n-1}. \quad (14)$$

Equating the two fluxes, we get

$$\frac{p(\mathbf{n})}{p(\mathbf{n}_i^j)} = \frac{n_j+1}{n_i}\frac{a+n_i-1}{a+n_j}. \quad (15)$$

The  $g$ -variate Pólya distribution discussed in the Appendix satisfies (15), so that, eventually, we get the invariant distribution for the taxation-redistribution model (it is the case  $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2 = \dots = \alpha_g = a$ )

$$p(\mathbf{n}) = \frac{n!}{\theta^{[n]}} \prod_{i=1}^g \frac{a^{[n_i]}}{n_i!}. \quad (16)$$

Moreover, a little thought should convince the reader that the Markov chain defined by (12) is irreducible and aperiodic. Therefore, the invariant distribution (16) is unique and it is also the equilibrium distribution. Three important particular cases of (16) are:

- For  $a = 1$

$$p(\mathbf{n}) = \binom{n+g-1}{n}^{-1}; \quad (17)$$

this is the uniform distribution on all occupation vectors  $\mathbf{n}$ ;

- For  $|a| \rightarrow \infty$

$$p(\mathbf{n}) = \frac{n!}{\prod_{i=1}^g n_i! g^n}; \quad (18)$$

this coincides with the multinomial distribution and corresponds to the uniform distribution on the individual descriptions;

- For  $a = -1$

$$p(\mathbf{n}) = \binom{g}{n}^{-1}; \quad (19)$$

this is again the uniform distribution on the restricted support of all occupation vectors  $\mathbf{n}$  with  $n_i = 0, 1$ .

The case  $a = 1$  coincides with the so-called *Bose-Einstein distribution*, the case  $|a| \rightarrow \infty$  with the so-called *Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution*, and the case  $a = -1$  leads to the so-called *Fermi-Dirac distribution*. As discussed in the



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Appendix, these three remarkable cases correspond to three urn models. The Bose-Einstein distribution is related to the Pólya urn, the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution to the Bernoullian urn and the Fermi-Dirac distribution to the hypergeometric urn. However, in this model, the parameter  $a$  needs not be confined to the three values discussed earlier and it can assume any real positive value and any negative integer value. Moreover, in our stylized model, the redistribution policy is characterized by the value of the parameter  $a$ . If  $a$  is small and positive, one has that rich agents become richer, but for  $a \rightarrow \infty$  the redistribution policy becomes random: any agent has the same probability of receiving the coin. Eventually, the case  $a < 0$  favours poor agents, but  $|a|$  is the maximum allowed wealth for each agent.

### 3.4 Wealth (coin) distribution

As discussed in the Appendix, agents' exchangeability lead to a simple relationship between the joint probability distribution of partitions and the probability of a given occupation vector. One has that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{z}) &= \frac{g!}{\prod_{i=0}^n z_i!} \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{n}) = \frac{g!}{\prod_{i=0}^n z_i!} \frac{n!}{\prod_{j=1}^g n_j!} \prod_{j=1}^g \frac{a^{[n_j]}}{\theta^{[n]}} \\ &= \frac{g!n!}{\prod_{i=0}^n z_i!(i!)^{z_i}} \prod_{j=1}^g \frac{a^{[n_j]}}{\theta^{[n]}} \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

where, as discussed in Sect. 3.1,  $z_i$  is the number of agents with  $i$  coins. Now, both (16) and (20) are multivariate distributions. In order to get a univariate distribution, to be compared with empirical data, we consider the marginal distribution that describes a single agent. Given that all the agents are characterized by the same weight  $a$ , we can focus on the behaviour of the random variable  $Y = Y_1$  representing the number of coins of agent 1. Starting from  $Y_t = k$ , one can define the following transition probabilities

$$w(k, k + 1) = \mathbb{P}(Y_{t+1} = k + 1 | Y_t = k) = \frac{n - k}{n} \frac{a + k}{\theta + n - 1}, \quad (21)$$

meaning that a coin is randomly selected among the other  $n - k$  coins belonging to the other  $g - 1$  agents and given to agent 1 according to the weight  $a$  and to the number of coins  $k$ ,

$$w(k, k - 1) = \mathbb{P}(Y_{t+1} = k - 1 | Y_t = k) = \frac{k}{n} \frac{\theta - a + n - k}{\theta + n - 1}, \quad (22)$$

meaning that a coin is randomly removed from agent 1 and redistributed to one of the other agents according to the weight  $\theta - a$  and the number of coins  $n - k$ , and

$$w(k, k) = \mathbb{P}(Y_{t+1} = k | Y_t = k) = 1 - w(k, k + 1) - w(k, k - 1), \quad (23)$$

meaning that agent 1 is not affected by the move taking place at step  $t + 1$ . 253  
 These equations define a birth–death Markov chain corresponding to a random 254  
 walk with semi-reflecting barriers. This chain represents the wealth dynamics 255  
 of a single agent interacting with a *thermal bath* consisting of the other  $g -$  256  
 1 agents. Indeed, the invariant (and equilibrium) distribution of the birth- 257  
 death chain can be directly obtained marginalizing (16). This leads to the 258  
 dichotomous Pólya distribution (see the Appendix): 259

$$\mathbb{P}(Y = k) = p_k = \frac{n!}{k!(n - k)!} \frac{a^{[k]}(\theta - a)^{[n-k]}}{\theta^{[n]}}. \quad (24)$$

Equation (24) can be compared with the behaviour of the agent as time goes 260  
 by. As a consequence of the ergodic theorem for irreducible chains, it follows 261  
 that 262

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\#\{Y_s = k, s = 0, \dots, t\}}{t} = p_k, \quad (25)$$

where  $p_k$  is given by (24). In other words, the marginal equilibrium proba- 263  
 bility is also the large-time limit of the hitting time relative frequency. These 264  
 consideration are important, in order to identify the probabilistic objects to 265  
 be compared to empirical (or to simulated) data. 266

The same procedure can be used for the wealth distribution  $\mathbf{z}$ . The random 267  
 variable  $Z_k$  counts the number of agents with  $k$  coins. Denoting by  $I_{Y_j}^{(k)} =$  268  
 $\mathbb{1}_{Y_j=k}$  the indicator function of the event  $\{Y_j = k\}$ , the random variable  $Z_k$  269  
 can also be written as follows 270

$$Z_k = I_{Y_1}^{(k)} + I_{Y_2}^{(k)} + \dots + I_{Y_g}^{(k)}; \quad (26)$$

Therefore, we find that 271

$$\mathbb{E}(Z_k) = \sum_{j=1}^g \mathbb{E}(I_{Y_j}^{(k)}) = \sum_{j=1}^g \mathbb{P}(Y_j = k), \quad (27)$$

where  $\mathbb{P}(Y_j = k)$  is the marginal distributions for the  $j$ th agent. As a con- 272  
 sequence of the equivalence of all agents, from (24) and (27), one gets that 273  
 274

$$\mathbb{E}(Z_k) = g\mathbb{P}(Y = k) = g \frac{n!}{k!(n - k)!} \frac{a^{[k]}(\theta - a)^{[n-k]}}{\theta^{[n]}}. \quad (28)$$

Equation (28) gives the first moment of the probability function on all possible 275  
 wealth distributions (20) for the taxation-redistribution model. 276

The thermodynamic limit for (24) when  $n \gg 1$ ,  $g \gg 1$  and  $n/g = a\chi$  leads 277  
 to the negative binomial distribution as an approximation of the dichotomous 278  
 Pólya distribution (see the Appendix) 279

$$\mathbb{P}^{\text{TL}}(Y = k) = \text{NegBin}(k|a, \chi) = \frac{a^{[k]}}{k!} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \chi} \right)^a \left( \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi} \right)^k. \quad (29)$$

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On the other side, the continuous limit for the wealth distribution is (see the Appendix) 280  
281

$$f_B(x) = \frac{\Gamma(\theta)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(\theta-a)} x^{a-1}(1-x)^{\theta-a-1}, \quad (30)$$

where  $x = k/n$  is the continuous variable corresponding to the normalized wealth of the first agent ( $0 \leq x \leq 1$ ) and  $f_B(x)$  is its Beta probability density function. The thermodynamic limit of (30) leads to the Gamma( $x|a, u$ ) density 282  
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$$p^{TL}(x) = \frac{u^{-a}}{\Gamma(a)} x^{a-1} \exp\left(-\frac{x}{u}\right). \quad (31)$$

where  $u = w/a$ , and the meaning of  $w$  is the expected value of the wealth of the selected agent, which stays constant when the continuous thermostat becomes infinite. (See the Appendix). 285  
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### 3.5 Block taxation and the convergence to equilibrium 288

Consider the case in which taxation is made in the following way: instead of drawing a single coin from an agent at each step,  $m \leq n$  coins are randomly taken from various agents and then redistributed with the mechanism described earlier, that is with a probability proportional to the actual number of coins and to an *a priori* weight. If  $\mathbf{n} = (n_1, \dots, n_g)$  is the initial occupation vector,  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_g)$  (with  $\sum_{i=1}^g m_i = m$ ) is the taxation vector, and  $\mathbf{m}' = (m'_1, \dots, m'_g)$  (with  $\sum_{i=1}^g m'_i = m$ ) is the redistribution vector, we can also write 289  
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$$\mathbf{n}' = \mathbf{n} - \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{m}'. \quad (32)$$

The block taxation-redistribution model still has (16) as its equilibrium distribution, as the block step is equivalent to  $m$  steps of the original taxation-redistribution model. However, the convergence rate to equilibrium is faster. 297  
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299

The marginal analysis for the block taxation-redistribution model in terms of a birth-death Markov chain is more cumbersome than for the original model because, now, the difference  $|\Delta Y|$  can vary from 0 to  $m$ . In any case, given that (24) always gives the equilibrium distribution, this means that (see the Appendix) 300  
301  
302  
303  
304

$$\mathbb{E}(Y) = n \frac{a}{\theta} = \frac{n}{g}, \quad (33)$$

and 305

$$\text{Var}(Y) = n \frac{a}{\theta} \frac{\theta - a}{\theta} \frac{\theta + n}{\theta + 1} = \frac{n}{g} \frac{g - 1}{g} \frac{\theta + n}{\theta + 1}. \quad (34)$$

We can write 306

$$Y_{t+1} = Y_t - D_{t+1} + C_{t+1}, \quad (35)$$

where  $D_{t+1}$  is the random taxation for the given agent and  $C_{t+1}$  is the random redistribution to the given agent. The expected value of  $D_{t+1}$  under the condition  $Y_t = k$  is 307  
308  
309

$$\mathbb{E}(D_{t+1}|Y_t = k) = m \frac{k}{n}; \quad (36)$$

this result is valid as  $m$  coins are taken at random out of the  $n$  coins and 310  
the probability of removing a coin from the first agent is  $k/n$  under the given 311  
condition. Moreover, if  $Y_t = k$  and  $D_{t+1} = d$ , we get that the probability of 312  
giving a coin back to agent 1 is  $(a+k-d)/(\theta+n-m)$ , so that, after averaging 313  
over  $D_{t+1}|Y_t = k$ , we have 314

$$\mathbb{E}(C_{t+1}|Y_t = k) = m \frac{a+k-m \frac{k}{n}}{\theta+n-m}. \quad (37)$$

The expected value of  $Y_{t+1} - Y_t$  conditioned on  $Y_t = k$  can be found from the 315  
expectation of (35) and using (36) and (37). This yields: 316

$$\mathbb{E}(Y_{t+1} - Y_t|Y_t = k) = -\frac{m\theta}{n(\theta+n-m)} \left(k - n \frac{a}{\theta}\right). \quad (38)$$

The following remarks on (38) are possible: 317

1. Equation (38) is analogous to a mean reverting equation. If, due to random 318  
fluctuations,  $\mathbb{E}(Y_{t+1}|Y_t = k)$  moves away from its equilibrium expected 319  
value  $na/\theta = n/g$ , it will then move back towards that value; 320
2. If  $k = na/\theta$  then the chain is first-order stationary. If one begins with 321  
 $n/g$ , then one always gets  $\mathbb{E}(Y_{t+1} - Y_t|Y_t = k) = 0$ ; 322
3.  $r = m\theta/(n(\theta+n-m))$  is the intensity of the restoring force. The inverse 323  
of  $r$ , gives the order of magnitude for the number of transitions needed to 324  
reach equilibrium. 325
4. If  $m = n$ , meaning that all the coins are taken and then redistributed, the 326  
new state has no memory of the previous one and statistical equilibrium 327  
is reached in a single step ( $r^{-1} = 1$ )! 328

Before concluding this section, it is interesting to discuss the case  $\theta < 0$  in 329  
detail. In this case the marginal equilibrium distribution becomes the hyper- 330  
geometric one: 331

$$\mathbb{P}(Y = k) = \frac{\binom{|a|}{k} \binom{|\theta - a|}{n - k}}{\binom{|\theta|}{n}}, \quad (39)$$

with  $a = \theta/g$  and  $\theta$  negative integers. The range of  $k$  is  $(0, 1, \dots, \min(|a|, n))$ . 332  
The states with  $n_i > |a|$  are transient and they do not appear any more as 333  
times goes by. 334

If, for instance,  $|a| = 10n/g$  (ten times the average wealth), one has that 335  
 $|\theta| = 10n$  and  $r = 10m/(10n - n + m) \simeq (10m)/(9n)$ . If  $m \ll n$ , this is 336  
not so far from the independent redistribution case. On the contrary, in the 337  
extreme case  $|a| = n/g$ , the occupation vector  $\mathbf{n} = (n/g, \dots, n/g)$  is obtained 338  
with probability 1. If an initial state containing individuals richer than  $|a|$  339

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is considered, that is if one considers (38) for  $k > |a|$ , then  $\mathbb{E}(D_{t+1}|Y_t = k)$  340  
 is still  $mk/n$  but  $E(C_{t+1}|Y_t = k, D_{t+1} = d) = 0$  unless  $k - d < |a|$ . More 341  
 precisely, one has 342

$$\mathbb{E}(C_{t+1}|Y_t = k) = \begin{cases} m \frac{|a| - k + m \frac{k}{n}}{|\theta| - n + m} & \text{if } k - m \frac{k}{n} \leq |a| \\ 0 & \text{if } k - m \frac{k}{n} > |a| \end{cases} \quad (40)$$

If the average percent taxation is  $f = m/n$ , then one gets 343

$$= \begin{cases} \mathbb{E}(Y_{t+1} - Y_t|Y_t = k) \\ -\frac{f\theta}{\theta - n(1-f)} \left(k_t - \frac{n}{g}\right) & \text{if } k(1-f) \leq |a| \\ = -k(1-f) & \text{if } k(1-f) > |a| \end{cases} \quad (41)$$

As  $k(1-f)$  is the average value of  $Y$  after taxation, even if the agent is 344  
 initially richer than  $|a|$  he/she can participate to redistribution when the mean 345  
 percentage of taxation is high enough. 346

## Appendix: the Pólya distribution 347

### Finite ( $n$ -step) stochastic processes 348

The sequence of individual random variables  $V_1, \dots, V_n$  is an  $n$ -step stochas- 349  
 tic process. It is completely determined by the knowledge of all the finite 350  
 dimensional distributions of the kind: 351

$$p_{V_1, \dots, V_m}(v_1, \dots, v_m) = \mathbb{P}(V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m), \quad (42)$$

where  $1 \leq m \leq n$ . The finite dimensional distributions are subject to 352  
 Kolmogorov's compatibility conditions 353

$$p_{V_1, \dots, V_m}(v_1, \dots, v_m) = \mathbb{P}(V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m) \\ = \mathbb{P}(V_{i_1} = v_{i_1}, \dots, V_{i_m} = v_{i_m}) = p_{V_{i_1}, \dots, V_{i_m}}(v_{i_1}, \dots, v_{i_m}), \quad (43)$$

where  $i_1, \dots, i_m$  is any of the  $m!$  permutations of the indices, and 354

$$p_{V_1, \dots, V_{m-1}}(v_1, \dots, v_{m-1}) = \sum_{v_m=1}^g p_{V_1, \dots, V_m}(v_1, \dots, v_{m-1}, v_m). \quad (44)$$

Finite dimensional distributions can be conveniently characterized in terms of 355  
*predictive* probabilities. Indeed, as a consequence of the multiplication theo- 356  
 rem (and of Bayes' theorem), one has 357

$$\mathbb{P}(V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m) = \mathbb{P}(V_1 = v_1)\mathbb{P}(V_2 = v_2|V_1 = v_1) \cdots \\ \cdots \mathbb{P}(V_m = v_m|V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_{m-1} = v_{m-1}) \quad (45)$$

and Kolmogorov's compatibility conditions are automatically satisfied. 358

**Exchangeable processes** 359

An exchangeable process is characterized by additional symmetry conditions on the finite dimensional distributions 360 361

$$\begin{aligned}
 p_{V_1, \dots, V_m}(v_1, \dots, v_m) &= \mathbb{P}(V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m) \\
 &= \mathbb{P}(V_{i_1} = v_1, \dots, V_{i_m} = v_m) = p_{V_{i_1}, \dots, V_{i_m}}(v_1, \dots, v_m), \quad (46)
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $i_1, \dots, i_m$  is any of the  $m!$  permutations of the indices, Note that condition (46) differs from condition (43). For an exchangeable process, the probability of an individual sequence  $\mathbf{V}^{(m)} = \mathbf{v}^{(m)} = (V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m)$  only depends on the occupation vector of the sequence  $\mathbf{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_g)$  with  $\sum_{i=1}^g m_i = m$ . This leads to: 362 363 364 365 366

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{V}^{(m)} = \mathbf{v}^{(m)}) = \left( \frac{m!}{\prod_{i=1}^g m_i!} \right)^{-1} \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{Y} = \mathbf{m}) \quad (47)$$

as a consequence of (9). 367

**The Pólya process** 368

The Pólya process is an exchangeable process characterized by the predictive probability 369 370

$$\mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} = j | V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m) = \frac{\alpha_j + m_j}{\alpha + m}, \quad (48)$$

where  $m_j$  is the number of times in which category  $j$  has been observed up to step  $j$ ,  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_g)$  is a vector of parameters and  $\alpha = \sum_{i=1}^g \alpha_i$ . If the new parameters  $p_j = \alpha_j/\alpha$  are introduced, (48) becomes 371 372 373

$$\mathbb{P}(V_m = j | V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m) = \frac{\alpha p_j + m_j}{\alpha + m}. \quad (49)$$

$p_j = \mathbb{P}(V_1 = j)$  is the *a priori* probability of category  $j$  and (49) is nothing else than a linear mixture between initial or *a priori* probabilities and the observed frequencies. As a consequence of (48), and of exchangeability (see (47)), one gets the following finite dimensional distributions 374 375 376 377

$$\mathbb{P}(\mathbf{V}^{(m)} = \mathbf{v}^{(m)}) = \left( \frac{m!}{\prod_{i=1}^g m_i!} \right)^{-1} \text{Polya}(\mathbf{m}|m; \alpha), \quad (50)$$

where the multivariate generalized Pólya sampling distribution is given by: 378

$$\text{Polya}(\mathbf{m}|m; \alpha) = \frac{m!}{\alpha^{[m]}} \prod_{i=1}^g \frac{\alpha_i^{[m_i]}}{m_i!}, \quad (51)$$

where  $x^{[n]} = x(x+1) \cdots (x+n-1)$  is the rising factorial. 379

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The Pólya process encompasses the following remarkable cases: 380

- The multivariate hypergeometric process for integer  $\alpha_j < 0, \forall j \in \{1, \dots, g\}$  381  
with the constraints  $m_j \leq |\alpha_j|$  and  $m \leq \alpha$ . In this case  $|\alpha_j|$  represents 382  
the initial number of marbles of colour  $j$  in an urn from which they are 383  
randomly drawn without replacement; this process is not extendible to 384  
infinity and ends after  $n$  steps; 385
- The multinomial process in the limit  $|\alpha| \rightarrow \infty$  and  $|\alpha_j| \rightarrow \infty$ , with  $p_j =$  386  
 $\alpha_j/\alpha$  constant. In this case  $p_j$  represents the probability of drawing a 387  
marble of colour  $j$  with replacement from an urn; this process can be 388  
extended to infinity; 389
- The Pólya urn process for integer  $\alpha_j > 0, \forall j \in \{1, 2, \dots, g\}$ . In this case  $\alpha_j$  390  
is the initial number of marbles of colour  $j$  in an urn. They are randomly 391  
drawn and replaced with another ball of the same kind. Also this process 392  
is indefinitely extendible. 393

**Marginal distributions** 394

The marginal distributions for the  $g$ -variate generalized Pólya distribution 395  
can be easily derived from the predictive probability given by (48). Consider 396  
the probability  $\mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} \in A | V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m)$ , where the set  $A$  is a set 397  
of categories  $A = \{j_1, \dots, j_r\}$ . This new predictive probability is given by: 398

$$\mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} \in A | \mathbf{V}^{(m)}) = \sum_{i=1}^r \mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} = j_i | \mathbf{V}^{(m)}), \quad (52)$$

where, as usual,  $\mathbf{V}^{(m)} = (V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m)$  summarizes the evidence. 399  
In the Pólya case,  $\mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} = j | \mathbf{V}^{(m)})$  is a linear function of both the weights 400  
and the occupation numbers; therefore, one gets: 401

$$\mathbb{P}(V_{m+1} \in A | \mathbf{V}^{(m)}) = \frac{\sum_{j \in A} \alpha_j + \sum_{j \in A} m_j}{\alpha + m} = \frac{\alpha_A + m_A}{\alpha + m}, \quad (53)$$

where  $\alpha = \sum_j \alpha_j$ ,  $\alpha_A = \sum_{j \in A} \alpha_j$  and  $m_A = \sum_{j \in A} m_j$ . As a direct conse- 402  
quence of (53), the marginal distributions of the  $g$ -variate generalized Pólya 403  
distribution are given by the dichotomous Pólya distribution of weights  $\alpha_i$  404  
and  $\alpha - \alpha_i$ , where  $i$  is the category with respect to which the marginalization 405  
is performed. In other words, one gets that 406

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{m_j, j \neq i} \text{Polya}(\mathbf{m} | m, \boldsymbol{\alpha}) &= \text{Polya}(m_i, m - m_i; \alpha_i, \alpha - \alpha_i) \\ &= \frac{m!}{m_i!(m - m_i)!} \frac{\alpha_i^{[m_i]} (\alpha - \alpha_i)^{[m - m_i]}}{\alpha^{[m]}}. \end{aligned} \quad (54)$$

**Moments of the Pólya distribution**

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Consider the evidence vector  $\mathbf{V}^{(m)} = (V_1 = v_1, \dots, V_m = v_m)$ . In the general case of  $g$  categories, it is natural to introduce the indicator function  $\mathbb{I}_{X_i=j}(\omega) = I_i^{(j)}$ , and define  $S_m^{(j)} = \sum_{i=1}^m I_i^{(j)}$ . Therefore, the random variable  $S_m^{(j)}$  gives the number of successes for the  $j$ th category out of  $m$  observations or trials and  $S_m^{(j)} = m_j$ . One can determine  $\mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)})$  and  $\mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)} I_j^{(k)})$  and derive  $\mathbb{E}(S_m^{(k)})$  as well as  $\text{Var}(S_m^{(k)})$ . As for the expected value, one has that  $\mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)}) = 1 \cdot \mathbb{P}(I_i^{(k)} = 1) + 0 \cdot \mathbb{P}(I_i^{(k)} = 0) = \mathbb{P}(I_i^{(k)} = 1)$  coinciding with the marginal probability of success, that is the probability of observing category  $k$  at the  $i$ th step. From (48), in the absence of any evidence, one has  $\mathbb{P}(I_i^{(k)} = 1) = \mathbb{P}(X_i = k) = \alpha_k / \alpha = p_k$ . Therefore, the random variables  $I_i^{(k)}$  are equidistributed and exchangeable, and  $\mathbb{E}(S_m^{(k)}) = \sum_{i=1}^m \mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)}) = m\mathbb{E}(I_1^{(k)})$ , yielding

$$\mathbb{E}(S_m^{(k)}) = mp_k. \tag{55}$$

As for the variance  $\text{Var}(S_m^{(k)})$ , the covariance matrix of  $I_1^{(k)}, \dots, I_m^{(k)}$  is needed. Because of the exchangeability of  $I_1^{(k)}, \dots, I_m^{(k)}$ , the moment  $\mathbb{E}[(I_i^{(k)})^2]$  is the same for all  $i$ , and  $\mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)} I_j^{(k)})$  is the same for all  $i, j$ , with  $i \neq j$ . Note that  $(I_i^{(k)})^2 = I_i^{(k)}$  and this means that  $\mathbb{E}[(I_i^{(k)})^2] = p_k$ ; it follows that

$$\text{Var}(I_i^{(k)}) = \mathbb{E}[(I_i^{(k)})^2] - \mathbb{E}^2(I_i^{(k)}) = p_k(1 - p_k) \tag{56}$$

one can show that

$$\mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)} I_j^{(k)}) = \mathbb{P}(X_i = k, X_j = k); \tag{57}$$

now, from exchangeability, from (57), and from (48), one gets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}(I_i^{(k)} I_j^{(k)}) &= \mathbb{P}(X_i = k, X_j = k) = \mathbb{P}(X_1 = k, X_2 = k) \\ &= \mathbb{E}(I_1^{(k)} I_2^{(k)}) = \mathbb{P}(X_1 = k)\mathbb{P}(X_2 = k | X_1 = k) = p_k \frac{\alpha_k + 1}{\alpha + 1}. \end{aligned} \tag{58}$$

Therefore, the covariance matrix is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cov}(I_i^{(k)}, I_j^{(k)}) &= \text{Cov}(I_1^{(k)}, I_2^{(k)}) \\ &= \mathbb{E}(I_1^{(k)} I_2^{(k)}) - \mathbb{E}(I_1^{(k)})\mathbb{E}(I_2^{(k)}) = p_k \frac{\alpha - \alpha_k}{\alpha(\alpha + 1)}. \end{aligned} \tag{59}$$

The variance of the sum  $S_m^{(k)}$  follows from (56) and (59)

$$\text{Var}(S_m^{(k)}) = m\text{Var}(I_1^{(k)}) + m(m-1)\text{Cov}(I_1^{(k)}, I_2^{(k)}) = mp_k(1-p_k) \frac{\alpha + m}{\alpha + 1}. \tag{60}$$



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**Thermodynamic limit** 427

Let  $\alpha_1$  denote the weight of the chosen category and let  $\alpha - \alpha_1$  denote the 428  
weight of the thermostat. The thermodynamic limit is  $n, \alpha \gg 1$  with  $\chi = n/\alpha$ . 429  
Consider that 430

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(\alpha - \alpha_1)^{[n-k]}}{\alpha^{[n]}} &= \frac{(\alpha - \alpha_1)(\alpha - \alpha_1 + 1) \cdots \alpha(\alpha + 1) \cdots (\alpha - \alpha_1 + n - k - 1)}{\alpha(\alpha + 1) \cdots (\alpha + n - 1)} \\ &= \frac{(\alpha - \alpha_1)(\alpha - \alpha_1 + 1) \cdots (\alpha - 1)}{(\alpha - \alpha_1 + n - k) \cdots (\alpha + n - 1)}. \end{aligned} \quad (61) \quad 431$$

The numerator contains the product  $\prod_{i=1}^{\alpha_1} (\alpha - i) \simeq \alpha^{\alpha_1}$ , whereas at the 432  
denominator, one has the product  $\prod_{i=1}^{\alpha_1+k} (\alpha + n - i) \simeq (\alpha + n)^{\alpha_1+k}$  and the 433  
ratio is approximated by: 434

$$\frac{\alpha^{\alpha_1}}{(\alpha + n)^{\alpha_1+k}}; \quad (62)$$

therefore, we eventually get 435

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(k|n; \alpha_1, \alpha) &\simeq \text{NegBin}(k|\alpha_1, \chi) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(k|\alpha_1, \chi) = \frac{\alpha_1^{[k]}}{k!} \left( \frac{1}{1 + \chi} \right)^{\alpha_1} \left( \frac{\chi}{1 + \chi} \right)^k, \quad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots; \end{aligned} \quad (63)$$

this distribution is called *negative binomial distribution*; the geometric dis- 436  
tribution is a particular case of (63) in which  $\alpha_1 = 1$  and  $\alpha = g$ . If  $\alpha_1$  is 437  
an integer number, the usual interpretation of the negative binomial random 438  
variable is the description of the (discrete) waiting time of (i.e., the number of 439  
failures before) the first  $\alpha_1$ th success in a Bernoullian process with parameter 440  
 $p = 1/(1 + \chi)$ . The moments of the negative binomial distribution can be ob- 441  
tained from the corresponding moments of the Polya( $m_1, m - m_1; \alpha_1, \alpha - \alpha_1$ ) 442  
in the limit  $n, \alpha \gg 1$ , with  $\chi = n/\alpha$  yielding: 443

$$\mathbb{E}(Y_1 = k) = n \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha} \rightarrow \alpha_1 \chi, \quad (64)$$

$$\text{Var}(Y_1 = k) = n \frac{\alpha_1}{\alpha} \frac{\alpha - \alpha_1}{\alpha} \frac{\alpha + n}{\alpha + 1} \rightarrow \alpha_1 \chi (1 + \chi). \quad (65)$$

Note that if  $\alpha_1$  is an integer,  $k$  can be interpreted as the sum of  $\alpha_1$  independent 444  
geometric variables. 445

**Continuous limit** 446

Consider the multivariate generalized Pólya distribution given by (51). Noting 447  
that 448

$$\alpha^{[m]} = \frac{\Gamma(m + \alpha)}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \quad (66)$$

(51) can be re-written as: 449

$$\text{Polya}(\mathbf{m}|m; \boldsymbol{\alpha}) = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \frac{m!}{\Gamma(m + \alpha)} \prod_{i=1}^g \frac{\Gamma(m_i + \alpha_i)}{m_i!}. \quad (67)$$

The variables  $x_i = m_i/m$  satisfy the following constraint 450

$$\sum_{i=1}^g x_i = \sum_{i=1}^g \frac{m_i}{m} = 1; \quad (68)$$

moreover,  $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, g\}$ , we have that  $0 \leq x_i \leq 1$ . If one considers the *continuous* limit in which  $m \rightarrow \infty$ ,  $m_i \rightarrow \infty$  with constant  $x_i = m_i/m$  for all the categories  $i$ , one finds that 451  
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453

$$\frac{\Gamma(m_i + \alpha_i)}{m_i!} = \frac{\Gamma(m_i + \alpha_i)}{\Gamma(m_i + 1)} \simeq m_i^{\alpha_i - 1} \quad (69)$$

replacing (69) for any  $m_i$  and for  $m$  in (67) leads to 454

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Polya}(\mathbf{m}|m; \boldsymbol{\alpha}) &\simeq \frac{\Gamma(\alpha)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \frac{\prod_{i=1}^g m_i^{\alpha_i - 1}}{m^{\alpha - 1}} \\ &= \frac{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^g \alpha_i)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \prod_{i=1}^g x_i^{\alpha_i - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{m^{g-1}}. \end{aligned} \quad (70)$$

Equation (70) can be interpreted as follows; based on the exchangeability of the variables  $Y_i = m_i$ , the probability of the variables  $X_i = Y_i/m$  of assuming values  $X_1 = x_1, \dots, X_n = x_n$  with  $x_i \equiv m_i/m$  is 455  
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$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(X_1 = x_1, \dots, X_n = x_n) &\simeq \frac{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^g \alpha_i)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \prod_{i=1}^g x_i^{\alpha_i - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{m^{g-1}} \\ &\simeq \frac{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^g \alpha_i)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \prod_{i=1}^g x_i^{\alpha_i - 1} dx_1 \cdots dx_{g-1}, \end{aligned} \quad (71)$$

where the relationship becomes exact in the continuous limit. In fact, the ratio  $1/m$  can be interpreted as  $\Delta x_i$  because  $\Delta m_i = 1$  and  $x_i = m_i/m$ . The function 458  
459  
460

$$p(x_1, \dots, x_g; \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_g) = p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\alpha}) = \frac{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^g \alpha_i)}{\prod_{i=1}^g \Gamma(\alpha_i)} \prod_{i=1}^g x_i^{\alpha_i - 1} \quad (72)$$

defined on the simplex  $\sum_{i=1}^g x_i = 1$  and  $0 \leq x_i \leq 1$  for all the  $i \in \{1, \dots, g\}$  is the probability density function for the so-called *Dirichlet distribution*. Let  $\mathbf{X} \sim \text{Dir}(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\alpha})$  denote the fact that the random vector  $\mathbf{X}$  is distributed according to the Dirichlet distribution. As a consequence of the Pólya marginalization property (53), we obtain the so-called *aggregation* property of the 461  
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Dirichlet distribution: let  $X_1, \dots, X_g$  be a sequence of random variables with 466  
 values on the simplex  $\sum_{i=1}^g x_i$  with  $0 \leq x_i \leq 1, \forall i \in \{1, \dots, g\}$  whose dis- 467  
 tribution is  $\text{Dir}(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_{i+k}, \dots, x_g; \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_i, \dots, \alpha_{i+k}, \dots, \alpha_g)$ , then 468  
 the new sequence  $X_1, \dots, X_A = \sum_{j=i}^{i+k} X_j, \dots, X_g$  is distributed according to 469  
 $\text{Dir}(x_1, \dots, x_A = \sum_{j=i}^{i+k} x_j, \dots, x_g; \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_A = \sum_{j=i}^{i+k} \alpha_j, \dots, \alpha_g)$ . Thanks to 470  
 the aggregation property, we can find the marginal distribution of the Dirich- 471  
 let distribution, whose probability density function is nothing else than the 472  
 Beta distribution. If  $X_1, \dots, X_g \sim \text{Dir}(x_1, \dots, x_g; \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_g)$  then 473

$$X_i \sim \text{Beta}(x_i; \alpha_i, \alpha - \alpha_i). \quad (73)$$

Starting from the probability density function  $\text{Beta}(x; a, b)$ . 474

$$p(x) = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} x^{a-1} (1-x)^{b-1}. \quad (74)$$

and defining  $y = Ax$ , then we get 475

$$f(y) = \frac{\Gamma(a+b)}{\Gamma(a)\Gamma(b)} \frac{1}{A} \left(\frac{y}{A}\right)^{a-1} \left(1 - \frac{y}{A}\right)^{b-1}, \quad (75)$$

with  $y \in [0, A]$ . While  $x$  is the fraction of wealth belonging to the selected 476  
 agent, now  $y$  represents his absolute wealth, being  $A$  the total wealth. In the 477  
 limit  $A \rightarrow \infty, b \rightarrow \infty, A/b = w/a = u$  constant, the Beta density can be 478  
 approximated by the Gamma( $y|a, u$ ) density given by: 479

$$g(y) = \frac{u^{-a}}{\Gamma(a)} y^{a-1} \exp\left(-\frac{y}{u}\right). \quad (76)$$

The meaning of  $w$  is the expected value of the wealth of the selected agent, 480  
 which stays constant when the continuous thermostat becomes infinite. 481

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## AUTHOR QUERIES

- AQ1. Kindly provide “Summary” for this chapter.
- AQ2. Kindly update the Ref. 7.

Uncorrected Proof