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MILITARY TERROR AND SILENCE IN BRAZIL, 1910–1945

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Abstract. Throughout the twentieth century, the Brazilian military has gone to great lengths to conceal its use of terror. The armed forces have kidnapped journalists, censored newspapers, and threatened authors. Such censorship and silencing have not only limited criticism from powerful social groups, but have also enabled the military to defend political myths that are in its interest. To date, however, few scholars have carefully examined military terror in Brazil, although testimonials abound. In order to better understand this phenomenon, consequently, this study examines two specific cases of military terror in Brazil, and the armed forces' efforts to silence or shape the memory of these events.

Resume. Au cours du XX^e siècle, l'armée brésilienne s'est efforcée de voiler sa politique de terreur par l'enlèvement de journalistes, la censure de la presse et l'intimidation des écrivains. Cette politique de baillonnement n'a pas seulement porté atteinte à la liberté de critique des groupes sociaux puissants, elle a aussi permis à l'armée de poser en défenseur de mythes politiques qui servent ses intérêts. Jusqu'ici, bien que les témoignages de cette terreur abondent, peu de spécialistes se sont penchés sur le problème. Pour l'éclairer, l'analyse portera sur deux cas spécifiques illustrant l'emploi de terreur militaire et les efforts entrepris par l'armée pour faire taire ou pour forger le souvenir de ces événements.

"I don't know ... the heat ... the weather was hot."

— Frigate Captain Francisco José Marques da Rocha explaining to a reporter why 16 prisoners in his care had died on Christmas Eve 1910.
Correio da Manhã, 17 January 1911, p. 1.

“If we were the only ones who knew this monstrous fact, we would certainly not divulge it, judging the terror and revulsion it would cause.”

— The pro-government paper *O Paiz* lamenting that the public had learned about the massacre of sailors. *O Paiz*, 19 January 1911, p. 1.

Introduction

Military terror is the use of intense fear and violence by armed forces to achieve institutional or political goals.¹ Terror, it should be pointed out, differs from repression, which can and does often take place within a legal framework. Moreover, the instruments of terror (murder, kidnapping, disappearance and torture) tend to be illegal according to the state's own laws.

In the case of Brazil many authors, such as Alfred Stepan, Daniel Zirker and Lawrence Weschler, have thoughtfully considered the military's use of torture after the 1964 coup.² However, research on the origins of military terror during the period between 1910 and 1945 has been hampered by the military. This was a time when the armed forces increasingly used terror to uphold the nation's racial hierarchy, to maintain military discipline and to defend the state.³ To conceal this violence, the Brazilian armed forces kidnapped journalists, stripped scholars of their political rights, censored newspapers and banned books.⁴ At one point, the navy interned one victim of its violence in a mental hospital in order to prevent the public from learning about military repression.⁵ Even so, too much evidence of military terror existed for such efforts to succeed fully, and evidence of military torture in the end became well known. Yet, the military's efforts to conceal terror did help it to preserve and promote political myths.

Censorship and silencing have always accompanied military terror in Brazil, for obvious reasons. Censorship made it difficult to hold specific individuals or groups accountable. It limited criticism from powerful social groups and international actors. The Brazilian military maintained a sense of legitimacy, which public knowledge of its violence could have undermined. Indeed, the military justified its intervention in civilian affairs by claiming that its moral superiority over civilian leaders made it a tool of national salvation.⁶ At the same time, silencing accomplished more subtle goals. In an atmosphere in which unauthored stories and rumours abounded, the political impact of terror was magnified. The military demonstrated its power by erasing or shaping the public memory

of key events. Censorship also enabled the military to define its victims in terms of particular identities, which justified their repression. Terror and silencing helped the military, in co-operation with civilian elites, to defend political beliefs that legitimated its involvement in civilian affairs.

Two cases of military terror in Brazil are examined here in an effort to establish this thesis. As will be shown, in each case the armed forces went to great lengths to silence or shape the memory of its violence.

The Revolt of the Whip, 1910

There are continuities in military terror that extend as far back as the colonial period. Nonetheless, the Revolt of the Whip provides a useful starting place for this investigation, as the first moment in twentieth century Brazil when the armed forces used a major program of terror to crush internal dissent.⁷ When the Brazilian Republic was established in 1889, military violence and torture tended to be directed towards members of the armed forces itself, especially to Afro-Brazilians in the lower ranks. By means of terror, army leaders upheld not only their authority but also the racial hierarchy within the country. Although Brazilians have taken pride since the 1940s in what Gilberto Freyre has called their nation's "racial democracy," race has historically influenced all aspects of Brazilian society.⁸ Although discrimination was not institutionalized and legal as it was in the United States, over the years it has certainly defined Brazil's class system.

Like Brazilian society, the armed forces had long been divided along racial lines.⁹ The officer corps was largely white, while the enlisted men were either black or mixed-race. Indeed, as late as the 1940s army regulations prevented people of colour and Jews from entering the military schools that trained officers.¹⁰ This racial division has especially shaped the navy, long perceived as an elite bastion. Most sailors were ex-slaves or the sons of slaves who entered the navy against their will. They could not leave the service until they completed 15 years in the ranks, where they endured racial abuse and physical violence.¹¹ Commanders flogged sailors for minor infractions, using leather whips tipped with metal balls.¹² As officers tried to control their men by terror on isolated ships, racial tensions became extreme.

The Revolt of the Whip began in 1910 when black sailors, unhappy with their treatment, carefully planned an uprising within the navy.¹³ They chose as their leader First Class Helmsman João Candido Felisberto, an

experienced sailor on the dreadnought *Minas Gerais*, who became known as the "Black Admiral." A sailor (Marcelino Rodrigues Meneses) was whipped into unconsciousness with more than 200 blows in front of his fellow sailors. The whipping continued after he fainted. A wave of anger caused conspirators to advance their plans. On 22 November 1910, sailors seized a number of navy ships, killed white officers who resisted, imprisoned the rest and trained their guns on Rio de Janeiro. The city's populace panicked. In the initial confusion, rebels on the *Minas Gerais* fired rounds into the *Castello favela* (shantytown), killing two small children.¹⁴ Yet overall the rebels showed remarkable discipline, unity and restraint. After the sailors' initial struggle to seize the ships, no equipment was damaged, and no officers were killed. The rebels' immediate demand was for an end to corporal punishment and a general amnesty.¹⁵

The government quickly moved army troops to the presidential palace and the coastline, but they could do little to overpower the fleet. Both the president, Marshal Hermes Rodriguez da Fonseca (a military officer), and Congress had to accede to the rebels' demands to save the capital from bombardment. The government issued official statements of regret and amnestied all sailors involved. This decision provoked outrage and protest by both the army and the navy.¹⁶ But the announcement satisfied the sailors, who returned control of the ships to their commanders on Saturday, 26 November 1910.

The government's amnesty did not end the crisis. On 28 November 1910, President Hermes passed a decree that allowed the Minister of the Navy to expel without trial any sailors who undermined discipline.¹⁷ Sailors viewed this law as an effort to reverse the amnesty. The attitude of naval commanders also angered sailors. White officers believed that their men were racially inferior and could be controlled only by force. Their attitudes were captured in a book published the following year by an anonymous white officer. The book, *Política versus marinha*, described Afro-Brazilians as a primitive race, incapable of advancement. Its author argued that Brazilian sailors needed to be controlled by the whip, as had slaves.¹⁸ Naval commanders deliberately provoked a second uprising by brutal treatment that included whippings.¹⁹

On 9 December 1910, the naval battalion on Ilha das Cobras (Snake Island) rose up. João Candido and sailors on the dreadnoughts *Minas Gerais*, *São Paulo* and *Bahia* remained loyal to the government. Only the destroyer *Rio Grande do Sul* joined the rebellion. This fact allowed the armed forces to suffocate the uprising. The naval hierarchy then used

the rebellion as a pretext to expel amnestied sailors from the institution. Hours after Congress declared a state of siege, the navy began to remove sailors from the fleet.²⁰ The events that followed illustrate the conditions under which the military used terror, and the lengths to which the armed forces would go to conceal this violence.

The navy arrested sailors who had remained loyal to the government throughout the second uprising, including João Candido. It imprisoned many of these men on the naval base on Ilha das Cobras. On 24 December 1910, 18 prisoners were placed in an underground cell on the orders of the island's commander, Frigate Captain Francisco José Marques da Rocha. The men had been beaten and were suffering from both hunger and thirst.²¹ Later that evening naval officers poured buckets of quicklime (a powerful corrosive, which forms whitewash when mixed with water) into their cell to "disinfect" it, perhaps a symbolic reply to a racial challenge.²² When the jailer opened the cell on Christmas morning 16 men were dead. Only João Candido and naval soldier João Avelino Lira had survived.²³

A crucial aspect of military terror is the institution's effort to silence all discussion of its use of violence. The navy hierarchy did its best to hide these events from the public. The base commander, Frigate Captain Francisco José Marques da Rocha, forced doctor Ferreira de Abreu to list the cause of the men's death as *insolação* (sunstroke) on the death certificate. The men were all buried at night.

The graphic details of the case, however, soon became public in January 1911, as letters from witnesses poured into the newspaper *Correio da Manhã*.²⁴ Of course, many elites were discomfited by the publicity. Even some papers, such as the pro-government newspaper *O Paiz*, wished to silence discussion of the massacre: "If we were the only ones who knew this monstrous fact, we would certainly not divulge it, judging the terror and revulsion it would cause."²⁵ Still, the press as a whole criticized Marques da Rocha, who in turn accused his enemies of spreading falsehoods about him. When asked why so many men had died he said, "I don't know ... the heat ... the weather was hot."²⁶ But the horror of Christmas Eve 1910 was not caused by isolated officers but rather formed part of naval policy, as shown by the future careers of the officers involved. For example, Marques da Rocha was charged in the men's death, but he was absolved in June 1911. Brazilian President Hermes subsequently invited him to a private dinner, and a few days later he was promoted.²⁷

The military violence at Ilha das Cobras can best be understood as part of a larger pattern of terror. Over a thousand sailors were expelled from the navy, and an unknown number were sent into interior exile in the Amazon. Brazil had long used its remote and unhealthy interior (which Hélio Leôncio Martins called an "Equatorial Siberia") to punish rebel soldiers and political dissidents.²⁸ After a rebellion in 1904, the government rounded up hundreds of its opponents and sent them to the Amazon. Continuing this pattern, on 24 December 1910 the ship *Satélite* set sail for the Brazilian state of Acre with 97 former sailors aboard.²⁹ Without any legal proceeding, one half of these men were condemned to string telegraph lines for Brazil's famous General Rondon and the other half to work for the Companhia da Estrada de Ferro Madeira-Marmoré (Madeira-Marmoré Railway Company).³⁰

Congressman Rui Barbosa, commenting on the location to which the sailors were sent, offered that "Santo Antônio do Madeira is a place where one only dies; one does not live, one is not born: one dies. This is the reputation that Santo Antônio do Madeira enjoys."³¹ The rumours surrounding this location, in fact, marked it as a place of fear, like all the places Brazil sent its exiles. Although the figures are for a later period and location, in the 1920s over half of the prisoners sent into internal exile died. In the case of the *Satélite*, officers also chose seven prisoners for brutal treatment. Red crosses marked their names on the list of prisoners when the ship sailed on Christmas Day 1910.³² The ship's commander (Second Lieutenant Francisco de Melo) later claimed that he feared a possible rebellion, based on an informant's warning. Although 79 armed soldiers were on board (and the unarmed prisoners were locked below decks) he ordered seven men to be first whipped, then shot in "self-defence."³³

The navy tried to conceal these events, but by early May 1911 the press had learned of this case. President Hermes publicly supported Second Lieutenant Francisco de Melo's decision to shoot the men. Incredibly, Hermes argued that the soldiers were too seasick to control the sailors, which left no other option but "measures of supreme energy."³⁴ The massacre's leader, Francisco de Melo, was never punished. Indeed, the Minister of War commended him in a military bulletin for his service on the *Satélite*. He was also promoted.³⁵

Despite a brief period of public outrage, discussion of this violence faded not only from the press but also from public memory, in part because the navy went to extraordinary lengths to keep this history concealed. On 11 April 1911, a team of naval doctors examined João Candido

and declared that he was mentally ill. Expelled from the navy, he was interned for a year and a half in a mental hospital, even though he was so lucid that his nurses let him go home every night, provided he returned in the morning. By this means the navy ensured that a government inquiry would not hear his account of events.³⁶ For more than 50 years the navy and the government used terror against journalists and scholars to suppress all memory of the revolt, with amazing success. In 1934, the journalist Aparício Torelly announced plans to publish 10 articles on the rebellion in the paper *Folha do Povo*. He published two articles before naval officers kidnapped and beat him. The paper halted the series.³⁷ The secret police censored all mention of the rebellion during Getúlio Vargas' authoritarian Estado Novo (New State, 1937–1945). Authors such as Adão Manuel Pereira Nunes were forced to use pseudonyms to write on the topic.³⁸ Incredibly, even after Brazil's 1964 military coup, two civilian authors and authorities on the revolt, Edmar Morel and Adão Pereira Nunes, both had their political rights suspended.

Overall, Brazilians have preferred to blame the uprising on foreign influences rather than internal factors such as racism. Gilberto Freyre, for example, has discussed the naval rebellion in his *Order and Progress*. In this work he quoted the racist comments of the naval officer who authored *Política versus marinha*. Yet he did not stress the importance of race as a cause of the rebellion, or criticize the officer's statements; instead, Gilberto Freyre emphasized that the sailors "developed their revolutionary sentiments under European influences." Freyre ignored the repression that followed the uprising. His work ended with the government granting the sailors amnesty. As the man who coined the term "racial democracy," and someone who sympathized with the military during the early years of authoritarian rule, Freyre failed to challenge the military's historical hegemony.³⁹ Other authors such as Edmar Morel and Adão Manuel Pereira Nunes did undermine the official story but, as we have seen, at a heavy personal price. More recent works on this subject have tended to toe the military line. In his 1988 work, Hélio Leôncio Martins (a naval officer) argues that the death of sailors whom officers suffocated with quicklime represented an unfortunate accident. Moreover, his work ignores the racial aspect of terror.⁴⁰

Yet, in their totality, it is clear that the armed forces' efforts at silencing can be understood only when placed in the context of race in Brazilian society and politics. Brazilian elites have taken pride in their nation's "racial democracy." Nonetheless, race has long shaped all aspects of Brazil-

ian society.⁴¹ While there has been no formal system of segregation in Brazil, race has served as a marker for political power in this culture. In this context, the Revolt of the Whip acquired racial overtones, unlike a mere military rebellion.⁴² Certainly, Brazilian elites viewed the rebellion as a challenge to Brazil's racial order. A political cartoon on the cover of the Brazilian magazine *Careta* on 10 December 1910 shows two thin white officers saluting an obese black sailor. The caption reads "The Discipline of the Future," implying what would happen if white officers ceased to use the whip. The cartoon reflected the views of naval officers, who believed in the racial inferiority of their men. But the cartoon also captured elites' fears that without violence they would lose their privileged social position.⁴³ It was no coincidence that while João Candido became known as "the Black Admiral," President Hermes da Fonseca acquired the nickname "President Very White."⁴⁴

In this racial context, the armed forces used mass violence during a moment of crisis not only to re-establish lines of authority within the navy but also to uphold racial norms.⁴⁵ At the same time, acknowledging this violence and the reasons for its use would have undermined key legitimating myths in Brazilian society. In this context, it was not only that the Brazilian navy wished to protect itself by hiding its crimes, or that the government wished to conceal evidence of scandal. The question of military terror was explosive because it was tied to the question of race. Of course, many Brazilian elites were horrified when they learned what the navy had done, and segments of the Brazilian public were scandalized. Because the use of military terror undermined Brazil's political mythology, it had to be accompanied by censorship.

Communism and Terror: 1935

It was the unusual character of the Revolt of the Whip (challenging Brazil's racial hierarchy) that led to the employment of such extreme military violence. Because subsequent military rebellions did not radically challenge Brazil's social structure, they did not meet with such an extreme reaction. For example, when junior army officers rebelled against the government during the 1920s, the military's use of terror was less extensive.⁴⁶ The rebels (called *tenentes* because most of them held the rank of lieutenant) lacked a clear program and mainly called for a series of technocratic reforms. They also failed to rally support among the masses that might have challenged the elite politics of the Old Republic.⁴⁷ The government did send rebel soldiers into internal exile, but only the en-

listed men, not the officers.⁴⁸ The government certainly did not target the tenentes' leaders for murder, as it had the leadership of the 1910 rebellion.

In 1935, however, military army and navy officers created a massive program of state terror in response to what they perceived as a terrifying effort at social revolution. In 1930 Getúlio Vargas overthrew the Old Republic, after he claimed to have been cheated out of an electoral victory. Vargas's ascension to power marked the onset of mass politics in Brazil. His inauguration also created a new (and ostensibly democratic) political system, which was no longer under the strict control of traditional elites. This system entailed new challenges for the armed forces, which were captured by social turmoil as contending political forces sought to dominate Brazilian society. Officers were frightened by the efforts of populist politicians to appease their men, at a time when non-commissioned officers frequently rebelled.⁴⁹ Officers had good reason to fear the growing influence held by mass political parties and charismatic civilian leaders. When a conspiracy began within the armed forces to overthrow the government, the Communist party seized upon the plot as a means to create a social revolution.⁵⁰

In 1934, army and navy officers began to plot against the government.⁵¹ Their plan to overthrow the federal government was driven as much by humiliation as by ideology. Some officers had left the armed forces after 1930; others had lost the prestige they had enjoyed before the Revolution. These officers allied with civilian politicians who desired a revolution, under the nominal leadership of former President Artur Bernardes. The nation was divided into zones, each of which had a military commander. Army and naval officers infiltrated police forces and collected military weapons. The conspirators successfully targeted the sergeants and the lower ranks to create their combat force. They created ties with almost every garrison in the country and worked with state police forces.

Their conspiracy, however, was quickly infiltrated by the chief of police in the federal district, led by an army officer named Filinto Muller. By the end of the year Muller had a clear picture of the conspirators' entire plan. Perhaps even worse for the conspirators, between October 1934 and January 1935 the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) began to take part in the plot. As General Pedro Aurelio de Góes Monteiro described, military conspirators had divided among three currents. One faction (linked to São Paulo) involved both officers and civilians; a second was purely military, composed of generals and admirals who shared authoritarian ideals; and a third was made up of officers and enlisted men to whom Communism seemed an attractive ideology. The latter faction attracted the attention of

the Soviet Union. In particular, Communist agents noted the profound division between officers, who were loyal to former president Artur da Silva Bernardes, and the sergeants, who wished to make a social revolution.⁵² These ideological divisions affected the conspiracy and made the movement susceptible to an external takeover.

As Moscow followed the conspiracy, it became convinced that this uprising could succeed. The Communist International (Comintern) sent its best leaders to Brazil from Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, the Comintern was able to build upon the earlier work of rebel officers (tenentes) during the 1920s. Luís Carlos Prestes, the former head of the tenente movement, had converted to Communism while in exile in Bolivia. He left Moscow that winter and arrived in Brazil in April 1935 to take over the conspiracy. Olga Benario accompanied him. A member of the Soviet military's secret service, she took responsibility for his safety.⁵³

The rebel organization was vulnerable to a takeover. The Communists' success came very quickly. The first organized leftist elements began to penetrate the conspiracy only in January 1935. By March 1935 the Communists dominated the movement. This horrified many commanders, who had been uncertain whether to take advantage of the strength of the Communist party for their own ends. The date for the revolution may have been set originally for Carnival week in February 1935, but by that point senior commanders feared the Communists' power within their own movement.⁵⁴ After July 1935 most officers who remained in the conspiracy either chose to leave or were forced out by Prestes. A revolutionary political party had seized the conspiracy the officers had created.

In July 1935 Vargas outlawed the National Liberation Alliance, the front organization for the conspirators. In the face of government repression, Prestes found that he was unable to rally widespread support for his uprising from civilians. This suited Prestes because he had considerable experience plotting a military rebellion. His agents continued to fan out throughout the army, where they won over soldiers to their cause. By November 1935, the Communists' plans were fully laid. From the northern city of Natal to the nation's capital of Rio de Janeiro, soldiers rose up to seize control of the army from their commanders.

In the end, however, the rebellion ended in disaster because of the poor co-ordination of the Communists, the apathy of workers, the efficiency of the police and the warnings of the British. In the aftermath of the uprising, generals and admirals were in no mood for mercy. The Minister of the Navy, Henrique Aristides Guilhem, and the Minister of War, João

Gomes Ribeiro Filho, were terrified by the revolt and recognized their colleagues' desire to purge the armed forces and society. As naval officer Ernâni do Amaral Peixoto noted, the memory of the 1910 rebellion remained fresh within the navy, where it created a special horror of rebellion.⁵⁵ With naval officers' worst fears realized, commanders were willing to repress dissent with terror. Admiral Guilhem expressed his institution's outlook: "Cleansing and punishment are needed...."

Similar sentiments existed within the army. During the fighting, Minister of War João Gomes Ribeiro Filho told General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, "Let's bomb everything, because I don't want any of that rabble to come out of there alive." After the rebels laid down their arms, Gomes wanted to have them summarily shot. President Vargas had to give him a direct order that this was not to take place.⁵⁶

Given this climate within the armed forces, it is not surprising that Minister of War Gomes denounced the "liberalism" of legislation that restricted the "kind of repression required."⁵⁷ In fact, Brazilian laws did little to curb the military's use of terror, because neither the president nor Congress had the will to see them enforced. The army and navy as institutions played a crucial role in this repression, which went far beyond arresting officers, transporting them to their torture, legitimating their suffering and influencing the officers commanding civilian police. Because the uprising had taken the form of an attack on the armed forces, officers believed that they had to take an active role in the movement's repression. Many of the torturers were army and naval officers, as in the cases of Victor Allen Barron and Elise Saborowski, two members of Comintern. Soldiers were also victimized by violence. Muller arrested 1,300 soldiers, who were taken to an isolated island for "safe-keeping."⁵⁸ These men did not find safety in their seclusion.

It is difficult to overstate the savagery of the state terror that ensued. The special police and military officers tortured not only their prisoners but also their victims' wives and children.⁵⁹ Prisoners had sharp objects forced under their fingernails until their hands were maimed, as happened with José Romero, the head of the Brazilian Communist party, who was beaten and tortured for a week. Some prisoners simply disappeared.⁶⁰

No one was exempt. The armed forces insisted that the government arrest specific individuals, and even Vargas feared to resist their demands. Many people unconnected to the conspiracy suffered. The state and the military seized upon this opportunity to repress not only Communists but also anarchists, union leaders, "socialists, progressives, and reformers of

all stripes....”⁶¹ But the military reserved its worst ferocity for actual conspirators.

The German Arthur Ernst Ewert (alias Harry Berger) was tortured with electric shocks. Brazilian officer Nelson Werneck Sodré alleges that Ewert also watched soldiers repeatedly rape his wife, Elise Saborowski (Elise Ewert), until he lost his reason.⁶² Minna Ewert wrote a heartbreaking description of her brother and sister-in-law’s torture:

In my brother’s presence they beat my sister-in-law’s naked body till she fainted. They burned my brother with lighted cigarettes till he had two hundred burns. He was hit on the head till he lost consciousness and then was given an injection in the arm which revived him and the torturers began again. Another torture consisted in [sic] choking him, six times in the course of the night. Furthermore, both of them were tortured with electric shocks, and one of his wife’s ears was badly burnt.⁶³

Minna Ewert’s efforts to save her family proved futile. Vargas ultimately sent Saborowski to Germany, where she met her death in a concentration camp.⁶⁴

Victor Allan Barron, an American who had formerly been a member of the Communist Youth, underwent horrible tortures after his arrest. Although most of these tortures took place at the police station, there was no question about who controlled this process. A naval captain (and doctor) supervised Barron’s torture, as he was beaten, shocked and had his testicles squeezed until he fainted. US Ambassador Hugh Gibson visited him and protested his torture to Filinto Muller, but there was no saving him. Indeed, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull ordered Gibson not to involve himself any further in the case. According to Brazilian authorities, Barron committed suicide by jumping from the second floor of the central police station. It is unclear if he was dead before he went through the window, or if he died in the hospital after the fall.⁶⁵ In the US, Congressman Vito Marcantonio denounced Barron’s torture and murder before the House of Representatives. He read a statement from Joseph R. Brodsky, Barron’s lawyer, who claimed personal knowledge of his client’s torture: “They stabbed him with belts and rubber hose; they burned and shocked him with live electric wires; they punched and kicked him around constantly and did not let him sleep for days.”⁶⁶ Neither this publicity nor mass protests in the United States did much to end the terror in Brazil, because the armed forces perceived that its survival was at stake.⁶⁷

On the day Barron died, 5 March 1936, the police found Prestes and Olga Benario in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. Prestes survived, although he endured long imprisonment. Olga (pregnant with Prestes' child) was not so fortunate. A German Jew, she was deported to her home country in August 1936, where the Gestapo received her. She died in a gas chamber in 1942.⁶⁸

What is remarkable about this list of horrors is not only its brutality but also who was exempt. The military ignored the officers and civilians who had initiated this plot. This was not because the government remained ignorant of their role. By the end of 1934 Filinto Muller had known everything about the conspirators' plans: the names of the participants, their motivation for rebellion, the names of their messengers and the sites where they stored arms.⁶⁹ But these individuals remained concealed not only immediately after the rebellion but also in the military's "official" account of the uprising. The armed forces have collectively remembered the rebellion every year, by having senior officers visit a cemetery (São João Batista) where the remains of loyalist soldiers were buried. This ceremony served a political purpose: to remind the armed forces and the nation of the need for permanent vigilance against the Communists.⁷⁰

In this context, censorship was an important tool. In a climate in which accurate information was impossible to obtain, silence permitted the armed forces to rewrite history in their interest. Senior commanders such as General Eurico Gaspar Dutra reduced the complex history of the uprising into a useful myth that illustrated the dangers "foreign" ideologies posed to Brazil. Official accounts described how Communist soldiers had murdered sleeping officers in their beds, although this atrocity never occurred.⁷¹ These accounts served to dehumanize the rebels and to justify the terror that followed. Censorship also enabled the armed forces to manipulate the rebels' identities in other respects. For example, after the rebellion General Pedro Aurelio de Góes Monteiro demanded the creation of a fascist state on the nationalist-socialist model to purge Brazil of "Semitic internationalism."⁷² By linking dissent with ethnic identity, the armed forces defined the victims of terror as "others" who were not true Brazilians. It became common to refer to the uprising as the "Jewish-Communist conspiracy."⁷³ In using rhetoric that defined its victims as "aliens," the Brazilian military adopted a discourse (frequently anti-Semitic) often used by Latin American militaries to justify repression.⁷⁴ While in 1910 the rebels had been defined as "other" because of their race, in 1935 the military described the rebels as being "foreign" because of their ethnicity.

In this context, the military could not have admitted that a former president led the initial movement, that conspirators met at his house and that his son (Artur Bernardes Filho, a federal congressman) was involved. It would have been too disturbing to acknowledge that Arthur Bernardes stored munitions and other supplies at his property in Viçosa. The list of officers involved included many highly respected men. Important civilians participated in the initial plotting, such as João Neves da Fontoura and Christiano Machado.⁷⁵ These revelations would not only have made military terror unacceptable, but also have prevented the armed forces from using the uprising as a political tool. Instead, the rebellion served to rally frightened Brazilian elites behind the state and the military. It also justified a radical purge of the political left.⁷⁶ For this reason, the military concealed the roots of the uprising among its commanders and instead argued that the rebellion had come from outside the institution, from a still-dangerous enemy.⁷⁷

As key commanders, such as General Góes Monteiro and General Dutra, sought to reshape the military's relationship with the Brazilian state, they used the threat of Communism as a political tool. The Brazilian government had worked since the 1920s to define Communism as the nation's enemy. It proved more attractive for elites to explain dissent in terms of a foreign ideology than by referring to the internal causes of discontent. As the army sought to expand its political power, it turned to this legacy. In 1937 the Brazilian army "found" a Communist plan to take over the nation. In reality, a member of Góes Monteiro's staff (Captain Olímpio Mourão Filho, a member of the Brazilian fascist party the *Integralistas*) probably wrote this document based on an article in a French military magazine.⁷⁸ This forgery helped to rally civilian and military support for a coup that made Vargas a dictator and the military the basis for the regime. State censorship, torture and silencing continued throughout the Estado Novo.⁷⁹

There could be no challenge to the military's official history, because this would have challenged the government's legitimacy. Not only civilians but also many officers had to be convinced of one version of the past. Accordingly, the armed forces shaped the state institution responsible for censorship during the Estado Novo. When the head of the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (Department of Press and Propaganda, or DIP) resigned, Vargas replaced him with an army major who had served as the head of the army's secret service.⁸⁰ The military did not directly take part in political torture; it left this work to the police. But the armed forces also shaped state violence to conceal their use of terror.

During the Estado Novo repression generally took place either under the aegis of the Division of Social and Political Police (DOPS), which was led by an army captain named Afonso Miranda Correia or by civilian police under the authority of Filinto Muller (who, as the chief of police in the federal district at this time, controlled civilian police throughout Brazil).⁸¹ When Muller resigned his position in July 1942, Vargas replaced him with army colonel Alcides Etchegoyen. Muller promptly returned to the army to serve as a cabinet official on Minister of War Dutra's staff.⁸² When Etchegoyen resigned as police chief in August 1943, Vargas replaced him with another army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson de Mello. These appointments reflected the extent to which the military had acquired influence within the state apparatus dedicated to intelligence, propaganda and repression. Although Brazil was ruled by a civilian dictator, Vargas relied on the armed forces as the basis of his regime. In this context, the lines between civilian agencies and the armed forces became blurred.

This situation permitted the military to enforce silence. The state censored all discussion of the 1910 rebellion. When Gustavo Barroso wrote about the naval rebellion for the newspaper *A Manhã* during the Estado Novo he was called to the DIP, the agency responsible for censorship. Major Amilcar Dutra de Menezes told him that he was not to write any further on this topic, on the orders of the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Aristides Guilhem.⁸³ The military also sought to conceal the true history of the 1935 uprising. This suppression of the past created a strange disjunction between public perception and military policy. For example, during a later military government the armed forces appointed Filinto Muller to be head of the Conselho de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana (Human Rights Defence Council) of the Ministry of Justice.⁸⁴ This action symbolized not only military hypocrisy but also the extent to which the armed forces believed they could manipulate the memory of the past. The military could not be satisfied only with eliminating dissent through the use of terror; it also had to use censorship and silencing to maintain its legitimacy and to shape Brazil's political culture in its interests.

Conclusion

Brazilian officers did not suddenly create political terror as a tool during the periods described. They did not have to. Instead, during moments of crisis officers adopted older traditions of violence present in their culture. Brazilian society had long been governed by a series of contradictions. The idealized patriarchy advanced in Freyre's *Casa Grande* bore

little resemblance to the true experience of Brazilian inequality. Vargas represented himself as the "Father of the Poor," but he was also the author of political terror during the Estado Novo.⁸⁵ The contrast between ideology and reality had always made key legitimating myths (such as that of a benevolent patriarchy) vulnerable. Brazilian elites (landowners, slave-holders and regional strongmen) had long used violence to enforce beliefs that supported their power. The military also possessed a tradition of terror and violence that stretched back into Brazil's colonial history. In meeting new challenges to its interests, it drew on this legacy.

It is for the same reason that the military used terror to end all discussion of its violence. Any examination of terror would have undermined the ideological beliefs that the elites used to justify their rule. This effort met with surprising success. Yet, terror represented only one tool at the military's disposal in its efforts to shape historical memory. Although the armed forces frequently clashed with the elites dominating Brazilian politics, the two groups shared an identity of interests that encouraged elites not to challenge certain historical beliefs. For this reason, Freyre did not discuss race as a cause of the 1910 revolt, although he quoted the racist comments of a Brazilian naval officer. Because of this, even the best scholarship on the 1935 rebellion (by William Waack and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro) failed to uncover the roots of the rebellion within the military itself. In writing his study Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro had access to 90,000 documents of former President Artur da Silva Bernardes, then in the possession of his son.⁸⁶ Both father and son had taken part in the conspiracy. Yet the origins of the rebellion among *Bernardista* (followers of Artur Bernardes) officers remained obscure, because the former President's family and the military both shared an interest in concealing the truth.

In the final analysis, then, the military's hegemony has endured because of the complicity of different political actors operating under a largely authoritarian structure. As the current process of democratization proceeds, however, scholars may now be better positioned to reconsider old myths and thus to come to a clearer understanding of the military's role in Brazilian society and politics.

Notes

1. I wish to thank Fred Nunn, Friedrich Schuler, Michelle Gamburd and Hendrik Kraay for their comments. This paper is based on research carried out at the following archives in Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Catálogo de Folhetos Apreendidos pela Delagacia Especial de Segurança Política

- e Social (APERJ, CFADESPS); Arquivo Nacional, Arquivo Góes Monteiro (AN, AGM); Arquivo do Exército, Arquivo Goés Monteiro (AE, AGM); Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC/ FGV).
2. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 16, 26–27, 38, 42; Lawrence Weschler, *A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers* (New York: Pantheon Press, 1990); Daniel Zirker, "Democracy and the Military in Brazil: Elite Accommodation in Cases of Torture," *Armed Forces and Society* 14, 4 (Summer 1988): 587–606.
 3. There are some works that examine this topic: François Maspero, *La Violence militaire au Brésil* (Paris: Cahiers Libres, 1971), pp. 15–43; Márcio Moreira Alves, *Torturas e torturadas* (Rio de Janeiro: Idade Novo, 1966).
 4. For example, in 1934 the journalist Aparício Torelly began a series of articles on the 1910 Revolt of the Whip. Naval officers kidnapped and tortured him. See *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Edmar Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata* (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Graal, 1979), p. 45. Two scholars who studied the 1910 Revolt of the Whip had their political rights suspended after the 1964 coup. See Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 255–256.
 5. *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 185, 190–191.
 6. For the military's perception of itself as the nation's saviour see Robert Hayes, "The Formation of the Brazilian Army and the Military Class Mystique," in Henry H. Keith and Robert Hayes, eds., *Perspectives on Armed Politics in Brazil* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1976), pp. 1–26; Robert Hayes, *The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporate Mystique* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1989).
 7. After the 1904 uprising, the government appears to have been more responsible for the terror than the military. For information on this revolt see Jeffrey D. Needell, "The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904: The Revolt Against 'Modernization' in Belle-Epoque Rio de Janeiro," in Silvia M. Arrom and Servando Ortoll, eds., *Riots in the Cities* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1996), pp. 155–194.
 8. Emilia Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985), pp. 234–246.
 9. For information on race and the army during the empire see Hendrik Kraay, "Soldiers, Officers, and Society: The Army in Bahia, Brazil, 1808–1889" (PhD dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1995).
 10. Nelson Werneck Sodré, *A história militar do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1965), p. 282; Frank McCann, "The Military," in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, eds., *Modern Brazil: Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 64. Surprisingly, in 1904 rebel officers allied with Afro-Brazilian streetfighters to overthrow the government. See Needell, "The Revolta Contra Vacina of 1904," p. 181.
 11. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 16–19. On the popular fear of service in the navy, see Peter Beattie, "Conscription versus Penal Servitude: Army Reform's Influence on the Brazilian State's Management of Social Control, 1870–1930," *Journal of Social History* (Summer 1999): 93.

12. The navy limited whipping to 500 blows. Benedito Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido* (Pelotas, Rio Grande do Sul: Edições Independencia, 1934), p. 6. On how institutional racism caused violence see this same work, pp. 14, 16.
13. For literature on the uprising see Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*; Edgard Carone, *A República Velha*, vol. 2 (São Paulo: Difel, 1971), pp. 256–263; Paul Manor, “Un prolétariat en uniforme et une révolution ‘honnête,’” *Caravelle* 30 (1978): 63–108; João Quartim de Moraes, *A esquerda militar no Brasil: Da conspiração republicana à guerrilha dos tenentes*, vol. 1 (São Paulo: Edições Siciliano, 1991); Hélio Leôncio Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros, 1910* (Rio de Janeiro: Serviço de Documentação Geral da Marinha, 1988); Heitor Xavier Pereira da Cunha, *A revolta na esquadra brasileira em novembro e dezembro de 1910* (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Naval, 1953).
14. For information on the conspiracy see Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 73. On the sailor’s whipping, see *O Estado de São Paulo*, 9 December 1969, p. 8; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 57. Most sailors who remained aboard the ships were Afro-Brazilians. See Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 132. On the children’s death see *Correio da Manhã*, 24 November 1910, p. 1.
15. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 9 December 1969, p. 8; *Correio da Manhã*, 23 November 1910, p. 1; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 84–85, 88–91.
16. *Correio da Manhã*, 23 November 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 25 November 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 26 November 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 27 November 1910, p. 1; Manor, “Un prolétariat en uniforme,” pp. 75–77; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 123. On outrage in the army and navy, see Sundj Djata, “Viva a Liberdade! The Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1910,” *Journal of Caribbean Studies* 11, 1/2 (Winter 1995–Spring 1996): 51; Leôncio Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 65.
17. *Correio da Manhã*, 29 November 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 30 November 1910, p. 1; Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido*, p. 54; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 148.
18. J. Nachimovitch, ed., *Politica versus marinha* (Paris: Publisher unknown, 1911). For quotations from this work, see Moraes, *A esquerda militar no Brasil*, vol. 1, pp. 97–98; Evaristo de Moraes Filho, “Prefácio,” in Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 22–23; Gilberto Freyre, *Order and Progress: Brazil from Monarchy to Republic* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 400–401. On how officers perceived their men and race see Manor, “Un prolétariat en uniforme,” pp. 94–95.
19. Moraes, *A esquerda militar no Brasil*, vol. 1, p. 96; Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido*, pp. 57–58.
20. *Correio da Manhã*, 10 December 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 11 December 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 12 December 1910, p. 1; *Correio da Manhã*, 13 December 1910, p. 1; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 14 January 1911, p. 4; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, pp. 165, 185.
21. Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, pp. 190, 192; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 154; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 14 January 1911, p. 4.
22. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 181–182. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 14 January 1911, p. 4; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 15 January 1911, p. 3; Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido*, p. 63.

23. *Correio da Manhã*, 16 January 1911, p. 3. For information on Candido's life see, *O Estado de São Paulo*, 9 December 1969, p. 8; *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13.
24. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 41; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 14 January 1911, p. 4; *Correio da Manhã*, 16 January 1911, p. 3.
25. *O Paiz*, 19 January 1911, p. 1.
26. *Correio da Manhã*, 17 January 1911, p. 1.
27. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 188; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 92.
28. Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido*, p. 64; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, pp. 187, 197–198. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 162; Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão: A revolução mundial e o Brasil, 1922–1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991), pp. 87–104; Beattie, "Conscription versus Penal Servitude," pp. 96–97.
29. Needell, "The Revolta Contra Vacina," p. 184; Rui Barbosa, *Obras completas de Rui Barbosa: Discursos parlamentares*, vol. 38, 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Casa de Rui Barbosa, 1977); Manor, "Un prolétariat en uniforme," pp. 87–89. For the number of sailors aboard, see Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 193; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 163.
30. Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, pp. 193–195; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 161. Candido Rondon accepted the prisoners, but Americans working for Estrada de Ferro Madeira-Mamoré refused them. See Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 198. The government granted the remaining men to rubber tappers. See Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 167. See also Francisco Foot, *Trem fantasma: A modernidade na selva* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1988).
31. Barbosa, *Obras completas de Rui Barbosa*, p. 23. Many former sailors died from malaria. See Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 167, 174–175.
32. For the mortality rate of prisoners during the 1920s see Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, p. 103. For the marked names, see Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 161, 163–164.
33. Martins, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 195–197; Barbosa, *Obras completas de Rui Barbosa*, pp. 11, 13–17.
34. Barbosa, *Obras completas de Rui Barbosa*, pp. 4, 8–9, 39–42, 51–55, 81–89, 113–115.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 123–127; Moraes Filho, "Prefácio."
36. *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 182, 185, 190–191; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 192; Paulo, *A Revolta de João Candido*, p. 64. Candido usually refused to discuss the rebellion in later decades. See *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; *O Estado de São Paulo*, 9 December 1969, p. 8.
37. *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 45. This story has parallels in modern Argentina. See Marguerite Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacy of Torture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 254–255.
38. For censorship during the Estado Novo see *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 45. For Adão Manuel Pereira Nunes's use

- of the pseudonym Benedito Paulo, see Morel, p. 123; Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 127.
39. Freyre, *Order and Progress*, pp. 399–403. On Freyre's sympathy for Brazil's military government see especially his preface, p. xxiii.
 40. Martins, *A revolta dos marinheiros*, p. 192. It can be further argued that because of these long-term military efforts at silencing, English language works on military history have largely discounted the rebellion. Sundj Djata's work is an important exception. See Djata, "Viva a Liberdade!"
 41. Costa, *The Brazilian Empire*, pp. 234–246. For a good study of race in Brazil, see Kim D. Butler, *Freedoms Given, Freedoms Won: Afro-Brazilians in Post-Abolition São Paulo and Salvador* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); see also Hendrik Kraay, ed., *Afro-Brazilian Culture and Politics: Bahia, 1790s to 1990s* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
 42. For race as a cause of the rebellion see Djata, "Viva a Liberdade!" pp. 52–53.
 43. For officers' belief in the racial inferiority of their men see Nachimovitch, *Politica versus marinha*. For this cartoon, see Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 171. For other cartoons see Marcos Antonio da Silva, *Caricata república: Zé Povo e o Brasil* (São Paulo: Editora Marco, 1990); Djata, "Viva a Liberdade!" p. 53.
 44. Manor, "Un prolétariat en uniforme," p. 85.
 45. The Brazilian military had used violence before to defend Brazil's racial hierarchy. For example, the armed forces brutally repressed blacks in the aftermath of the Bahian Sabinada (1837–1838), a regional rebellion with racial overtones. See Hendrik Kraay, "'As Terrifying as Unexpected': the Bahian Sabinada, 1837–1838," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 72, 4 (1992): 501–527.
 46. Still, President Arthur Bernardes exiled rebel soldiers to Clevelândia, where they were virtually enslaved by rubber tappers. See Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, p. 176; Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, pp. 95–104.
 47. Scholars have hotly debated the nature of the tenentes' program. See Maria Cecília Spina Forjaz, *Tenentismo e política* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977); Robert Alexander, "The Brazilian Tenentes after the Revolution of 1930," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 15, 2 (May 1973): 221–248; Vavy Pacheco Borges, *Tenentismo e revolução brasileira* (São Paulo: Editora Brasileira, 1992); Moraes, *A esquerda militar no Brasil*, vol. 1; Neil Macaulay, *The Prestes Column: Revolution in Brazil* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974); José Augusto Drummond, *O movimento tenentista: A intervenção política dos oficiais jovens, 1922–1935* (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1986).
 48. Beattie, "Conscription versus Penal Servitude," p. 97.
 49. Vanda Ribeiro Costa, "Com rancor e com afeto: rebeliões militares na década de 30," *Ciencias Sociais Hoje* (São Paulo: ANPOCS, 1986), pp. 260–291.
 50. William Waack, *Camaradas nos arquivos de Moscou: A história secreta da revolução brasileira de 1935* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993); Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, pp. 287–326. For an annotated biography see Nelson Werneck Sodré, *A Intentona Comunista de 1935* (Porto Alegre, Brazil: Mercado Aberto, 1986), pp. 117–118.

51. For information on the rebellion's leadership, plans and motivation see an undated and unsigned study titled "Exposição," probably written by Filinto Muller in late 1934, AN, AGM, AP 51, 14 (10); Filinto Muller's report of December 1935, "O Golpe de Vista Retrospectivo," Arquivo Getúlio Vargas, 35.12.03/3, CPDOC/FGV. On Bernardes's participation, see "Exposição," p. 15.
52. Góes Monteiro's testimony in "Conselho de Justificação do Coronel Octavio de Alencastro," AN, AGM, AP 51, 12 (9), p. 10; "Exposição," pp. 24–25.
53. For information on Olga Benario, see Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 92–108; Fernando de Moraes, *Olga* (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1985).
54. Filinto Muller, "O golpe de vista retrospectivo," p. 3; "Conselho de Justificação," pp. 10–11.
55. For why the rebellion failed see Stanley Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917–1947* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 53. On the navy's support for repression see Hilton, p. 75; Ernâni do Amaral Peixoto's interview (CPDOC/FGV–Historia Oral, 1985), pp. 322–323.
56. For the above quotations and Vargas's order see Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, pp. 71–72, 75.
57. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 75; Aspásia Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso: As origens da república corporativa* (Rio de Janeiro: Rio Fundo Edições, 1989), pp. 55–56.
58. *The New York Times*, 29 November 1935, p. 13; see also Sodré, *Intentona*, pp. 9–102; Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 146, 300; Camargo, et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 63.
59. Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 258, 280. For more information on torture see Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, pp. 81–84. The "special police" were founded in 1933. See Elizabeth Cancelli, *O mundo da violência: A policia da era Vargas* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1993), p. 65. On the climate of fear, see Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 64.
60. Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 252, 280, 284, 300, 334. See also *The Times* (London), 10 July 1936, p. 12.
61. Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 52. On Vargas's inability to resist the military's demands, see Camargo et al., pp. 70–71.
62. Sodré, *Intentona*, pp. 100–101; Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 261, 343; Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, pp. 102–103, 152–153. For biographical information on Ewert, see Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 23.
63. Minna Ewert's letter, *The Times*, 18 July 1936, p. 8.
64. Sodré, *Intentona*, p. 102; Waack, *Camaradas*, p. 341. The Brazilian police had an accord with the Gestapo. See Cancelli, *O mundo da violência*, pp. 87–92.
65. Waack, *Camaradas*, p. 300; Sodré, *Intentona*, p. 95; Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, pp. 81–83, 104.
66. *The New York Times*, 3 April 1936, p. 19.
67. *Ibid.*, 26 March 1936, p. 24.
68. Waack, *Camaradas*, pp. 92–93, 341. The Gestapo worked closely with Brazilian police. See Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, pp. 116–120.
69. "Exposição," pp. 7–8, 10.

70. Maria Celina D'Aurujó et al., *Visões do golpe: A memória militar sobre 1964* (Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará, 1994), p. 77; Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 52.
71. Sodré, *Intentona*, p. 107; Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, pp. 303–305. On the military's rhetoric about the uprising, see Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 168.
72. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 78. Goés Monteiro's papers contain an undated and unsigned copy of a speech to the society titled "Amigos Alberto Torres," presumably by Goés Monteiro. The speech described how the "Jewish peace" of the Weimar Republic had led to German suffering "until the day when the nation recovers by the victory of national socialism." The speech continued to say that the calculated impoverishment of the German people could also happen in Brazil because of the "Satanic Policy of corrupt internationalism." See speech to society "Amigos Alberto Torres," AE, AGM, Box 1.
73. Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 54.
74. For example, during the Argentine Dirty War, General Jorge Rafael Videla said that the "repression is directed against a minority we do not consider Argentine." Feitlowitz, *A Lexicon of Terror*, pp. 24, 106. See also Feitlowitz, pp. 44, 90, 98. On anti-Semitism as a justification for military terror, see J. Patrice McSherry, *Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 92. For information on anti-Semitism in Brazil's military, see Jeff Lesser, *Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 11, 135–136, 138.
75. "Exposição," pp. 7, 8, 15, 22, 24.
76. Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, p. 41.
77. The officers who began the rebellion wished to conceal their involvement. General Valdomiro Castilho de Lima was an original conspirator, yet he pushed for harsh laws to punish soldiers in the uprising's aftermath. See Israel Beloch and Alzira Alves de Abreu, *Dicionário histórico-biográfico brasileiro, 1930–1983*, vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Forense-Universitária, CPDOC/FGV, 1984), p. 1869.
78. See the interview with Augusto do Amaral Peixoto, (CPDOC/RGV–Historia Oral, 1982), p. 287; Camargo et al., *O golpe silencioso*, pp. 214–216. On the origins of Brazilian anti-Communism, see Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, pp. 117–131.
79. For information on political torture during the Estado Novo, see Maspero, *La Violence militaire au Brésil*, pp. 18–20.
80. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 181; Cancelli, *O mundo da violência*, p. 36.
81. For information on the police, see Cancelli, *O mundo da violência*. Regarding the fact that Miranda Correia was an army officer, see Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 118. The armed forces controlled the military police, which the states had previously governed. See the interview with Ernâni do Amaral Peixoto, p. 150.
82. Hilton, *Brazil and the Soviet Challenge*, p. 181.

83. Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 45–46. On censorship during the Estado Novo, see *Jornal do Brasil*, 9 December 1969, p. 13; Morel, *A Revolta da Chibata*, pp. 231, 237.
84. Maspero, *La Violence militaire au Brésil*, p. 10.
85. Gilberto Freyre, *Casa grande e senzala: Formação da família brasileira sob o regime de economia patriarcal* (Rio de Janeiro: Schmidt, 1938); Robert Levine, *Father of the Poor? Vargas and His Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
86. Waack, *Camaradas*; Sérgio Pinheiro, *Estratégias da ilusão*, p. 18.