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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK: A CRUCIAL TOOL IN
SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT**

by

Scott D. Leuthner
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December 2015

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**JOINT COMBINED EXCHANGE TRAINING EVALUATION FRAMEWORK: A
CRUCIAL TOOL IN SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT**

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ABSTRACT

A focal point of American security readiness is proactive security interaction with cooperative states and allies abroad to deter threats, protect the homeland, and advance national interests. As a component in this effort, the militaries of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines (PH) have been conducting recurring bilateral engagements since 1991. Among these Security Cooperation programs, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) produces a high return on training investment through the enhancement of US Special Operations Forces (SOF) in mentor, instructor and advisor roles, as well as increasing cultural understanding and trust between American and Filipino counterparts, US-PH interoperability, and both militaries' tactical skills.

Despite several decades of conducting JCETs, no objective assessment of these events has been done. Thus, this study develops the JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF)—a tool based on the Eight-Step and ADDIE training models to examine the effectiveness of JCETs. Uniquely, this study compares the post-training reports from both the PH and US SOF units to validate the evaluation design, and provides recommendations for the improvement of future JCETs: improving after-action report formats, developing an overall engagement strategy, improving resource sustainment and the human rights vetting processes, and conducting and bilaterally sharing post-engagement surveys.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PRESENTING THE STUDY.....	1
B.	DESCRIPTION, IMPORTANCE, AND PURPOSE OF JCETS.....	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
D.	APPROACH AND DESIGN.....	9
E.	THESIS ORGANIZATION/STRUCTURE	12
II.	PH-US ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND LEGALITIES	15
A.	BACKGROUND	15
B.	PH-US MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY.....	15
C.	PH-US MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS	19
D.	PH-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT.....	20
E.	PH-US MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGREEMENT	21
F.	PH-US ENHANCED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT	22
G.	LEAHY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING.....	23
H.	SUMMARY/CONCLUSION.....	25
III.	CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR EVALUATION OF JCETS.....	27
A.	BACKGROUND	27
B.	JCETS IN THE PHILIPPINES.....	27
C.	THE EIGHT-STEP TRAINING MODEL AND THE CONDUCT OF JCETS	28
D.	THE ADDIE MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE TO JCETS.....	31
E.	CORE TRAINING TASKS AND CONCEPTS	33
F.	SUMMARY/CONCLUSION.....	37
IV.	APPLICATION OF THE JEF AND OUTCOMES	39
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	39
B.	ANALYSIS/PROOF OF EVALUATION DESIGN FOR JCETS	40
1.	Agreed Training Events	40
2.	Flexibility in Execution.....	44
3.	Shared Bilateral Training/Logistical Support.....	45
4.	Shared Legal Frameworks.....	48
5.	Institutionalization of JCET	50
C.	SUMMARY/CONCLUSION	53

V.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	55
A.	SUMMARY AND FINDINGS	55
B.	IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	58
	1. Post-Training Report Standardized Format and Exchange.....	59
	2. Develop a JCET Strategy	60
	3. Improve Sustainment Operations	60
	4. Include Alternate Participants for HR Vetting.....	60
	5. Conduct Effective Survey	61
C.	FUTURE RESEARCH AND WAY AHEAD	62
	APPENDIX A. JCETS REGULARLY CONDUCTED IN THE PHILIPPINES.....	63
	APPENDIX B. CONSOLIDATED JCET DATA	67
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	67
B.	JCET QUALITATIVE INFORMATION	68
	1. JCET Event 1	68
	2. JCET Event 2	70
	3. JCET Event 3	71
	4. JCET Event 4	72
	5. JCET Event 5	73
	6. JCET Event 6	75
	7. JCET Event 7	76
	8. JCET Event 8	77
	9. JCET Event 9	77
C.	VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF JCET DATA	78
	LIST OF REFERENCES	81
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	89

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Diagram of Nested Security Cooperation Activities	5
Figure 2.	JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF).....	11
Figure 3.	The PH MDB-SEB Engagement Process with US PACOM.....	17
Figure 4.	The PA MDB-SEB Engagement Process with USARPAC.....	18
Figure 5.	The Non-Linear ADDIE Model.....	32
Figure 6.	Core Concepts for JCET Evaluation.....	35
Figure 7.	Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Agreed Training Events).....	41
Figure 8.	Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Flexibility in Execution).....	45
Figure 9.	Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Shared Bilateral Training/Logistical Support).....	46
Figure 10.	Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Shared Legal Frameworks)	49
Figure 11.	Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Institutionalization of JCET)	51

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	JCET Post-Training Data Sources	39
Table 2.	JCET Quantifiable Data and Notation of Combined AARs Conducted vs. Not Conducted by Event	79
Table 3.	Data Depicting Types of AFP Units Trained During Studied JCETs	79
Table 4.	Data Depicting Variation in Planned vs. Executed Events During Studied JCETs.....	80
Table 5.	Data Depicting Discrepancies between US and PH Views of Success Per JCET	80

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR – After Action Review
ADDIE – Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement, and Evaluate
AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines
APA – Administrative Procedures Agreement
ATR – After Training Report
BP – Balance Piston (Joint Combined Exchange Training Event Name)
BN – Battalion
COIN – Counterinsurgency
CONOPS – Concept of Operations
CQB – Close Quarter Battle
CT – Counterterrorism
CULEX – Culminating Exercise
DOD – Department of Defense
DOS – Department of State
EDCA – Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
ESG – Executive Staff Group
FID – Foreign Internal Defense
FLE – Forward Liaison Elements
FPC – Final Planning Conference
FSF – Foreign Security Forces
FTX – Field Training Exercise
GAO – Government Accountability Office
HRV – Human Rights Vetting
IDAD – Internal Defense and Development
IPC – Initial Planning Conference
JCET – Joint Combined Exchange Training
JCISFA – Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
JSOTF-P – Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
JUSMAGPHIL – Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Philippines
LCE – Liaising and Coordinating Elements

LLO – Lessons Learned Office
LRB – Light Reaction Battalion
LRR – Light Reaction Regiment
MAA – Military Assistance Agreement
MAROPS – Maritime Operations
MDB – Mutual Defense Board
MDMP – Military Decision-Making Process
MDT – Mutual Defense Treaty
MLSA – Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
OEF-P – Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines
OG8 – Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training (Philippine Army)
PA – Philippine Army
PACOM – Pacific Command
PDEA – Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
PDSS – Pre-Deployment Site Survey
PH – Philippines
PN – Partner Nation
PNP-SAF – Philippine National Police-Special Action Force
POL – Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POI – Program of Instruction
SA – Security Assistance
SC – Security Cooperation
SEB – Security Engagement Board
SF – Special Forces
SFA – Security Force Assistance
SFG – Special Forces Group
SOCOM – Special Operations Command
SOCPAC – Special Operations Command Pacific
SOF – Special Operation Forces
SOP – Standing Operation Procedure
SSR – Security Sector Reform

SR – Scout Ranger (PA)
STX – Situational Training Exercise
SUT – Small Unit Tactics
TCCC – Tactical Combat Casualty Care
TLP – Troop Leading Procedure
TRADOC – Training and Doctrine Command
TTPs – Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
USARPAC – United States Army Pacific
USC – United States Code
USG – United States Government
VBP – Vector Balance Piston (JCET Event Name)
VFA – Visiting Forces Agreement

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PRESENTING THE STUDY

Our military is postured globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges. US forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement.¹

– *National Security Strategy*, 2015

Security cooperation and security assistance have been around for as long as wars have been fought. Researchers may look back at the time during the Peloponnesian War when Athens decided to launch its ambitious Sicilian expedition with an end view of projecting power dominance over its long-time adversary, Sparta. From 414–413 BCE, a Spartan Commander named Gylippus provided effective military advising and assistance to the beleaguered Syracusans. The timely intervention of Gylippus resulted in the total defeat of the entire Athenian armada.²

Today, the global security landscape changes with respect to diverse factors including, but not limited to, adaptive adversaries, culture, ideology, information revolution, power diffusion, religion, and technology.³ Therefore, civilized and democratic nation states must strengthen their bonds and security cooperation by conducting collaborative training exchanges to address current and future security challenges. The training activities then become a “conductor” or a quill pen to “connect

¹ *National Security Strategy*, February 2015, 7–8, accessed March 6, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

² Martin Hammod, *Thucydides: Peloponnesian War* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 365–414.

³ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 1; Adrian R Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).

the dots”⁴ between training events and achieve the broader objectives and goals of security cooperation.

The United States Government (USG) conducts security cooperation engagements globally with its Partner Nations (PN). Security cooperation engagements serve as parallel efforts to collectively and jointly address the global and transnational security challenges and problems posed by the enemies of peace. Among security cooperation programs, the Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET)⁵ is an excellent tool to achieve US security cooperation objectives. This study asserts that security cooperation engagements such as JCETs between the United States and its Partner Nations with shared goals and objectives, communicated throughout the training process, leads to the achievement of tactical and strategic goals for all nations involved.

B. DESCRIPTION, IMPORTANCE, AND PURPOSE OF JCETS

Under the umbrella of US security cooperation policy, JCETs fall specifically under the “other security cooperation education and training program,”⁶ which allows US Special Operations Force (SOF) elements to train with the Foreign Security Force (FSF)⁷ elements in the PN’s home country. Although JCETs are primarily designed to support the training of US SOF teams abroad, PN security forces gain incidental training

⁴ Steve Jobs, in his speech to Stanford University graduate students, spoke about connecting the dots, which could be done by looking backwards but was impossible looking forward. According to Jobs, one must trust that the dots will connect to his or her future and trust on something like destiny, gut, life, and karma, among others. See video clip accessed on September 11, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sr07uR75Qk0>.

⁵ Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, commonly known as JCETs, are activities specifically designed to support the sustainment training of U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) outside the continental United States of America. JCETs focus on developing the professional skills of SOF teams in order to build trust and relationship with the Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and at the same time enhance U.S. individual and team’s instructor competencies, advisory roles, language, and cultural awareness. Moreover, the FSF usually receives incidental training benefits, especially on individual and collective combat skills and capacity development. As stipulated in the Army Regulation 12–15, JCETs fall under the other training programs of security cooperation education and training program.

⁶ Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Army Regulation 12–15 SECNAVINST 4950.4B AFI 16–105, Security Assistance for International Logistics: Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (Washington, DC: January 3, 2011), 1.

⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3–22: Army Support to Security Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 2013)1–9.

benefits.⁸ This incidental training, compounded through continuous engagements, can have a substantial positive impact on PN security forces' capacity to address both internal and external security demands.

The fulfillment of strategic bilateral security cooperation engagements is consummated by the actual face-to-face interactions of both parties' security force elements. Numerous security cooperation and Security Assistance (SA) programs are tailored to build partner nations' capacity to overcome its internal and external security challenges in furtherance of achieving US strategic objectives.⁹ Considering the wide range of USG's security cooperation activities and programs that are intended to support security and capacity building frameworks, JCETs are important bilateral training activities, which are expected to be continuously employed as a tool in developing the PN's capacity to address traditional and nontraditional security concerns.

This research broadly addresses the impact of JCETs on the operational security readiness of the US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and its allied counterparts. Using the US-PH relationship as an illustrative example, this study examines the processes of planning, coordination, execution, monitoring, after-action-reviews, and assessment, of conducting JCETs. This study further examines the relevance of JCETs in developing and sustaining the training requirements of US SOF and increasing the capacity of Philippine security forces elements to address internal and external security threats.¹⁰ Very recently, a US House Armed Services Committee examined the security cooperation programs and activities of the Department of Defense (DOD) focusing on the causes of successful engagement outcomes. It was mentioned during the hearing that even with a small size force, US security cooperation with the Philippine government has been successful particularly in "containing the insurgencies in the Southern Islands of the

⁸ Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Army Regulation 12-15 SECNAVINST 4950.4B AFI 16-105, Security Assistance for International Logistics: Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training (Washington, DC: January 3, 2011), 21.

⁹ United States Joint Doctrine Note 1-13, Security Force Assistance, I-1 and I-2.

¹⁰ Nick Turse, Secret Warfare: U.S. Special Forces Expand to Allies with Histories of Abuse (*The Intercept*) September 9, 2015, <https://theintercept.com/2015/09/09/u-s-special-forces-expand-training-allies-histories-abuse/?comments=1#comments>.

Philippines.”¹¹ In concert with this testimony, this study answers the question, “What are the metrics of successful security cooperation training engagements like JCETs?”

Using the micro-level perspective, this study presents an evaluation design that will substantiate the success of security cooperation and training engagements like JCETs. This study also makes recommendations to improve the successful conduct of JCETs or security cooperation engagements in Philippines, the Pacific Command Theater of Security Operations, and other US military engagements worldwide.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

As a global leader both in security cooperation and security assistance, the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) developed numerous program and activities, including but not limited to Security Force Assistance (SFA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Assistance (SA), Internal Defense and Development (IDAD), and Security Sector Reform (SSR).¹² SFA has the explicit purpose “to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions.”¹³ Under the authority, guidance, and supervision of the DOD, SFA addresses both internal and external threats to stability, specifically tailored to the security aspects of security cooperation.¹⁴ In contrast, the FID encompasses the assistance with all “four elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic” (DIME).¹⁵ The DOS maintains overall responsibility for the FID, which focuses on internal threats of the Partner Nation (PN).

¹¹ U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “Examining DOD Security Cooperation: How it Works and How it Doesn’t,” October 21, 2015, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=4163FB92-713B-41D6-97D4-519F56816475.

¹² Ibid.


¹³ United States Joint Doctrine Note 1–13, Security Force Assistance, I-1.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Derek C. Jenkins, “Distinguishing between Security Force Assistance & Foreign Internal Defense: Determining A Doctrine Road-Ahead,” *Small Wars Journal* (2008).

Since JCETs are explicitly in the Security Cooperation-Other category (due to funding sources and their unique focus on training US forces),¹⁶ they do not fit into any of the more organized and well-understood programs. However, they most closely resemble SFA due to their incidental accomplishments of increasing PN's ability to handle internal and external threats and JCETs are organized and conducted by the DOD with DOS support. Different sources categorize JCETs differently; for instance, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance incorrectly categorizes JCETs as SFA activities.¹⁷ This confusion in doctrine can lead to confusion within the executing forces. Figure 1 is derived from several sources and simplifies US security engagement programs in order to better understand the uniqueness of JCETs.

Figure 1. Diagram of Nested Security Cooperation Activities



¹⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, *AR 12-15: Security Assistance and International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 3, 2011)1.

¹⁷ Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/about/sfa.aspx?ref=mainMenu> (accessed November 16, 20115).

There are a number of studies over the years that have addressed the issue of how to improve SFA, from the broader area of building partner capacity to the narrower focus of conducting effective and efficient training, advisory, and other engagements in shaping the future operating environment.¹⁸ The range of potential solutions differs in approach. One is the organizational approach. Bagiski et al. recommended the creation of a staff within the DOD to focus solely on SFA.¹⁹ As a slight variation, Wuestner recommended the creation of “Security Assistance and Advisory Command” in order to address the demands of the dynamic operating environment.²⁰ Second is a doctrinal approach through the identification of the lessons learned for future efforts in SFA and the selection of potential advisors to adhere to the new SFA doctrine.²¹

Other previously recommended solutions revolve around policy and strategic approaches in conducting SFA, which sought to analyze the effectiveness of SOF regional engagement and provide meaningful security assistance from the backseat standpoint.²² Recently, policy recommendations were sought to ensure the return of investment of US security cooperation and security assistance programs including consolidation, rationalization, and rebalancing of various Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) authorities, undertake regional reviews of SC and SA programs,

¹⁸ Ross Meyer, *SOF Regional Engagement: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Current Attempts to Shape Future Battlefields* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2003), v; Theresa Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 2009), iv; Scott G Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2009), 58–59; Jason A. Johnston and Stephen C. Taylor, *Effective and Efficient Training and Advising in Pakistan* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2010), 69–71; Sean R. Pirone, *Security Force Assistance: Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation Considerations* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2010), 83–85; Terrence Kelly et al., *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts* (Rand, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2011), 116–118.

¹⁹ Theresa Baginski et al., *A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

²⁰ Scott G. Wuestner, *Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2009), 58–59.

²¹ Terrence Kelly et al., *Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2011), 116–118; Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg, *Levering Observation of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations* (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2013), 31–32.

²² Ross Meyer, *SOF Regional Engagement: An Analysis of the Effectiveness of Current Attempts to Shape Future Battlefields* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2003), v; Johnston and Taylor, *Effective and Efficient Training and Advising in Pakistan*, 69–71.

increase regionally-focused SC and SA funds, enhance interagency coordination, refocus international military education training program, and develop a “systematic, interagency method of tracking outcomes.”²³

There are some missing ingredients to SFA that could also serve as determinants of its success if explored properly. One is culture, which is part of the social consideration variables. According to US Army Manual FM 3-22, culture is a “lens through which information is transmitted, processed, and understood.”²⁴ Fully comprehending culture takes enormous time, knowledge, and understanding wherein most, if not all, SFA providers are constrained by time during engagements. The time constraint generally applies to both planning (time required to gain knowledge of a counterpart’s culture prior to engagement) and execution (time required to build rapport and gain a deeper understanding of a counterpart’s culture). Thus, longer JCETs are apt to have increased cultural awareness by both sides, leading to an increase in interoperability.

Second is trust or distrust. Sztompka advanced a major work on social theory on trust as a fundamental component of human action.²⁵ Kramer tackled the dynamics of distrust and suspicion quoting Grovier on the definition of distrust as a “lack of confidence in the other, a concern that the other may act so as to harm one, that he does not care about one’s welfare or intends to act harmfully, or is hostile.”²⁶ Trust is a crucial component in building US relationships with a partner nation, while distrust upends the relationship of both parties.

The duration of partnering (time) is a tangible element in terms of providing SFA and in building partnership with allied and cooperative states. The military is accustomed

²³ Dafna H. Rand and Stephen Tankel, *Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment*, Center for New American Society, August 2015.

²⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, January 2013), 3-6.

²⁵ Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Social Theory* (Cambridge, UK: The Cambridge University Press, 1999), x.

²⁶ Roderick M. Kramer, “Trust and Distrust in Organization: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Actions,” *Annu. Rev. Psychol.* 1999, Vol 50, 587.

to making the best of time through “double-time” (speed up) and even to overtime (to cover up time of absence or meet urgent requirement). In so doing, it fails to consider the “ripeness of the moment.”²⁷ Questions arise, however: When is the time to intervene and when is it not, or to provide support or not, or to advance or to withdraw? How and when would security cooperation engagements be laid out to produce favorable results? In light of these questions, it would be helpful to delve into the micro-level view of specific engagements to evaluate and perhaps make inferences and conclusions with respect to the possible outcome and future trends of security cooperation engagements, of which JCETs are worthy to be scrutinized.

The JCET program came into the limelight when the US Congress approved the amendment of United States Code (USC) Title 10, which specifically included Section 2011 authorizing the US “Special Operation Forces (SOF) training with foreign friendly forces.”²⁸ USC Title 10, Section 2011 provided leverage for the US SOF to engage its allied partners and former foes at the end of the “Cold War,” with little or no civilian oversight, and likewise raised issues on human rights.²⁹ The latter concern solidifies the Leahy Amendment that called for no training once a gross violation of human rights is reported against the foreign military forces.³⁰ The call for civilian oversight and scrutiny of the JCET program paved the way for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to release a report concerning the management and oversight of JCET in July 1999.³¹ According to the GAO, there were discrepancies in the reporting of JCET activities, which could be attributed to the ambiguity on the term JCET itself. The report also

²⁷ John Campbell, *Successful Negotiation: Trieste* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1976), 73.

²⁸ United States Code Title 10 Section 2011, Special Operation Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces, accessed September 11, 2015, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2010-title10/pdf/USCODE-2010-title10-subtitleA-partIII-chap101-sec2011.pdf>.

²⁹ William C. Story, Jr., CRS Report for Congress, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS: The Library of Congress, January 26, 1999); Robert Thomasson, U.S. Military Trains Foreign Troops, *The Washington Post*, 1998, accessed September 11, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/overseas/overseas1b.htm#TOP>.

³⁰ Human Rights website, “Leahy Vetting: Law, Policy, Process,” April 15, 2013, accessed September 11, 2015, <http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/leahy-vetting-law-policy-and-process.pdf>.

³¹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training* (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 1999).

pointed out the unclear relationship of JCET to counter-narcotics or counterterrorism lines of effort.

The nature, scope, and definition of the JCET program are unclear in the DOD, joint, or armed service component's manuals, and other publications. Obviously, JCETs fall under the broader spectrum of security cooperation. Can JCETs be categorized under SA, SFA, or the FID? The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) is the only US entity that explicitly categorizes JCETs under the program of SFA.³² Under USC Title 10, JCETs are training opportunities for the US military to train in locations and with resources not typically available in the United States. More specifically, US Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers are able to work on improving their language and cultural skills, while training in varied environments with indigenous resources. As a byproduct, the training succeeds in increasing interoperability between nations, increasing the PN security forces' defense of internal and external threats, and creating enduring relationships that may be useful in the future.³³ Successful training of all parties involved is greatly increased in direct correlation to an increase in the level of cultural awareness, the quality of advisors, planning, flexibility, training venues, and invested time.

D. APPROACH AND DESIGN

This study asserts that US-PN JCETs, if constructed with shared goals and objectives that are communicated in a timely manner during the entire JCET process, will achieve the tactical and strategic goals of both nations. If this claim is true, then evidence of shared goals should exist in all of the following for each JCET: training concept, administrative procedures agreement (APA), after action reviews (AARs), post-training reports or after training reports (ATRs), and other documented reports. Although many of the previously listed documents are often classified, only relevant unclassified lines of the reports have been referenced in this study.

³² Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, What is Security Force Assistance, assessed September 11, 2015, <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/about/WhatIsSFA.aspx>.

³³ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, *AR 12-15: Security Assistance and International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*, 21.


The core of this study's analysis and evaluation of JCETs emerged as a result of combining the two training models. One is the Eight-Step Training Model. This is a modified training model that provides more emphasis on the last two steps of the training process: those that were sometimes taken for granted or not integrated in the training process (conducting a detailed AAR and retraining based on the AAR comments).³⁴ The other model is the Analyze-Design-Develop-Implement-Evaluate (ADDIE)³⁵ training process. This is a nonlinear training process in which evaluation and management cover a wide range of the process. This study emphasizes the facet of the ADDIE Model that focuses on improving training outcomes.

By incorporating these two models, this study introduces the JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) and proposes using the JEF to examine the effectiveness of the JCET program. The JEF (depicted in Figure 2) may further serve as a guide in the planning, conducting, and evaluating of future JCETs. Given the increasing security demands from US partner nations in conducting these activities to enhance their capability and capacity against domestic and international security threats, a better analytical framework is needed.

³⁴ Matthew R. Little, The Eight-Step Training Model, accessed 21 September 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560296.pdf>.

³⁵ Donald Clark, History of ADDIE Model, created 13 July 1995, updated 6 September 2015, accessed on 28 September 2015, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/history_isd/addie.html.

Figure 2. JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF)



In this study, the main data used to analyze JCETs are AARs and ATRs or post-training reports emanated from both PH and US units involved in the previous JCETs conducted in the Philippines. Additionally, when available, the APA, concept of operation (CONOPS) or training concept, the training calendar, and fund utilization reports complement the post-mission reports.

The added value of testing this research design is that these AARs and ATRs originated from the national perspectives of the PH and US executing agencies. These perspectives are studied first in isolation, then in combination. In other words, our study looks at a sequence of JCETs conducted from 2011 to 2015 from each country's viewpoint, comparing how reporting was done and what lessons might be drawn. These reports will confirm or negate the validity of our core concepts in determining the success of the conducted JCETs. For this particular study, success is defined as the byproduct of bilaterally agreed training objectives based on training needs, flexibility in JCET execution, institutionalization of the JCETs, shared commitment on the planned training support stipulated in the APA, and adherence to shared legal frameworks. On the outset,

it is expected that JCETs strengthens the bonds and cultivates a “culture of trust”³⁶ among the participants of both countries.

This study examined and coded the main data (AARs and ATRs), which provided a descriptive and qualitative analysis of previously conducted JCETs. This study developed the evaluation criteria and JEF based on, but not limited to, unclassified higher US and PH policy documents; US Theater Campaign Plans; US Geographic Combatant Commander’s guidance, journals, articles, written papers related to US security cooperation; and the authors’ personal experiences in conducting JCETs.

Due to constraints in data collection, this study is limited to PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs that have been conducted during the last five years. This research closely examined the similarities and differences of the conducted training events, correct training audiences, training duration, and the degree to which JCETs were laid out to meet the training needs and capability gaps of both sides with deeper emphasis on the Philippine security forces. This study also looked at the extent of participation of the AFP training schools in JCETs and the resulting effects on their programs of instruction to institutionalize and maximize the training benefit from this type of bilateral engagement.

E. THESIS ORGANIZATION/STRUCTURE

The study proceeds with a discussion of the legal framework of which JCETs and other security cooperation and security assistance programs and activities strictly abide. Chapter III reviews the Eight-Step Training Model and the ADDIE training process that laid the foundation for the conceptualization of the core concepts advanced in this study. These core concepts are the central focus of the analysis and evaluation of JCETs. In Chapter IV, the PH-US after action reviews (AARs) and after training reports (ATRs) are utilized as the main evidence to evaluate and analyze the conducted JCETs over the last five years between the United States and the PH. As part of the analysis, the authors examined the similarities and differences of conducted JCET AARs and whether the overall objectives of each country are aligned. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the

³⁶ Anne Holohan, *Networks of Democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 52.

findings, recommends key contributory factors for successful security cooperation programs and activities such as JCETs, and suggests the direction for future research.

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II. PH-US ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK AND LEGALITIES

A. BACKGROUND

Every peaceful, state-to-state or nation-to-nation affair is governed and guided by laws, treaties, agreements, or memoranda of understanding among others. Therefore, it is relevant to know and understand the instrumentalities and legalities as well as the implications of these laws to the day-to-day activities conducted by the agencies and departments of both the Philippines and the United States. In essence, these frameworks of engagement are the baselines or reference points of policies and guidance that directly affect all engagement activities, be it in security or non-security sectors of both governments. JCETs must be understood as existing inside these accords.

B. PH-US MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

The Philippines (PH) and the United States entered into an agreement called the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) on August 30, 1951, in Washington, DC. This bilateral agreement was entered into force upon the ratification of the Philippine President, Elpidio Quirino, on August 27, 1952. The treaty, composed of eight articles, serves to strengthen the bond and relationship as well as specify the corresponding actions of both parties, particularly during times of external or imperialist aggression.³⁷

As an offshoot of the agreement, the PH-US Mutual Defense Board (MDB) was established on May 15, 1958,³⁸ to oversee the implementation of the MDT. According to the Philippine Embassy in the United States, “The MDB provides continuing inter-governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation on military matters of mutual

³⁷ Department of National Defense-Philippines, *Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, August 30, 1951*, accessed on June 11, 2015, <http://www.gov.ph/1951/08/30/mutual-defense-treaty-between-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-united-states-of-america-august-30-1951/>.

³⁸ Establishment of Mutual Defense Board between the Philippines and the United States, accessed on June 11, 2015, http://www.worldcat.org/title/establishment-of-mutual-defense-board-and-assignment-of-military-liaison-officers-agreement-between-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-the-philippines-effected-by-exchange-of-notes-signed-at-manila-may-15-1958/oclc/80623799&referer=brief_results.

concern to develop and to improve both countries' common defense.”³⁹ Moreover, the Security Engagement Board (SEB) was established on April 11, 2006 and has been described by the US Department of State as a means “to provide a framework and mechanism for direct and continuing liaison and consultation to address nontraditional security concerns such as, but not limited to: terrorism, transnational crimes, maritime security and safety, natural and man-made disasters between the Philippine and United States authorities.”⁴⁰ The SEB establishes priorities for PH-US engagements that deal with these specific concerns and strengthens the value of the MDT. All PH-US security cooperation activities (including JCETs) for the succeeding year are itemized in the MDB-SEB activity list. Respective countries' representatives (U.S. Commander PACOM and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines) validate and sign the document during the yearly MDB-SEB Executive Committee Meeting conducted either in Manila, Philippines or Hawaii, USA.⁴¹


Consider the PH MDB-SEB flow chart in Figure 3. It graphically depicts the processes in which the PH-US bilateral engagements and activities are crafted in collaboration with the respective units that conduct the activities and the functional staffs concerned who are responsible for providing the appropriate funding and support for the planned activities under the joint boards.

³⁹ Philippine Embassy in the United States, *PH-US Bilateral Relations*, accessed on June 11, 2015, <http://www.philippineembassy-usa.org/philippines-dc/embassy-dc/ph-us-bilateral-relations-dc/>.

⁴⁰ Worldwide Web, State Government, PDF Document, accessed on June 11, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83382.pdf>.


⁴¹ Major Emmanuel G Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective,” *CTX Journal* 5, no. 2, May 2015, <https://globalecco.org/352>.

Figure 3. The PH MDB-SEB Engagement Process with US PACOM



The major services replicated the process with their respective counterparts as in the case of the current Philippine Army (PA) MDB-SEB bilateral engagement framework with US Army Pacific (USARPAC). Both the PA and USARPAC established the executive staff group (ESG) meeting where the PA commanding general and USARPAC commanding general approve the list of bilateral activities between the two armies. During the ESG meeting, representatives from Special Operation Command Pacific (SOCPAC), Hawaiian, and Guam Army National Guards are invited to incorporate their proposed activities such as JCETs into the overall list of bilateral activities, as depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4. The PA MDB-SEB Engagement Process with USARPAC



The MDT established the framework that would eventually lead “Balikatan”⁴² 02-1, also known as Operation Freedom Eagle,⁴³ where the United States military began to directly support the Filipino counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Philippines. The Special Operations Command-Pacific (SOCPAC), as part of the larger US planning team, planned and conducted Balikatan 02-1 to train and equip AFP elite forces in preparation of future operations. The US forces were prevented from taking part in actual military operations, but provided training and logistical support to their Filipino counterparts.⁴⁴ America had a vested interest in the capture and/or defeat of the terrorists and insurgents in the southern Philippines; the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a notorious

⁴² Balikatan is the biggest Philippines-United States military-to-military bilateral exercise focusing on enhancing the interoperability and warfighting capability of both security forces in joint/combined ground, air, and sea operations.

⁴³ Operation Freedom Eagle: Balikatan 2002–1 (GlobalSecurity.org: Global Security).

⁴⁴ Timeline: Hostage Crisis in the Philippines (CNN.com/World: Cable News Network LP, August 25, 2002).

terrorist organization, was known to be holding several American citizens hostage on the southern island of Basilan.⁴⁵

Balikatan has continued as an annual US-PH bilateral training exercise, with 2015 as the largest exercise yet, incorporating over 11,000 American and Filipino participants.⁴⁶ The training assistance and logistical support in the southern Philippines' counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) fight continued under the umbrella of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) was organized and conducted by a joint task force of US military special operators known as the Joint Special Operation Task Force-Philippines (JSOTFP). JSOTFP deactivated on February 24, 2015 and was replaced with a smaller element known as a Forward Liaison Element (FLE).⁴⁷ The FLE assumed the responsibilities previously held by the JSOTF. Liaison and Coordinating Elements (LCEs) are embedded in the Philippine Army CT unit to facilitate collaboration and coordination between SOF Teams providing CT trainings under the other US engagement initiatives. The FLE and LCEs are key factors in the successful planning, coordination, and execution of JCET activities in the different parts of the archipelago, with more efforts focused in the southern Philippines.

C. PH-US MILITARY BASES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS

The agreement between the governments of the PH and United States that allowed the latter to maintain military bases in the Philippines was highly contested when both parties originally signed it in 1947.⁴⁸ Manuel Quezon, Philippine Senate President at the time, stated that if the United States had "military reservations everywhere in the Philippines after independence would in effect nullify independence."⁴⁹ In spite of the

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Gina Harkins, *Philippine Military Exercise Balikatan Reaffirms U.S.-Philippine Ties* (*Marine Corps Times*, April 26, 2015).

⁴⁷ Julie S. Alipala, "US-Led Antiterror Unit Deactivated: American Role in PH War on Terrorism to Continue with 'Smaller' Group" (*Philippine Daily Enquirer*, February 26, 2015).

⁴⁸ Stephen R. Shalom, *Securing the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947* BCAS.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

opposition, the military bases agreement was signed by both countries in 1947 and granted USG the right to maintain 23 specified bases in the Philippines for a period of 99 years.⁵⁰ The term of the agreement was later amended to expire in 1991, at which time a renewal of the PH-US Military Bases Agreement was voted on by the Philippine Senate and not passed. By the end of 1992, the United States had turned over all U.S.-controlled military bases in the country to the Philippine government.

Due to the cancellation of the PH-US Military Bases Agreement, US forces have not been able to establish US-owned bases, but have based military operations at AFP bases. This includes more than just training events such as JCETs and Balikatan events, but JSOTFP was also able to establish a base of operations on an AFP base. JSOTFP was able to control a section of the base that had been portioned off for US use.

The PH-US Military Assistance Agreement, also signed by both countries in 1947 and considered the sister agreement to the PH-US Military Bases Agreement, allowed for the creation of a Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) in the Philippines.⁵¹ Although parts of the military assistance agreement have been modified over the years, the JUSMAG is still operating today with essentially the same mission as it was chartered with in 1947, including but not limited to “facilitate the logistical and training requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for counter-insurgency/internal warfare.”⁵² JUSMAGPHIL continues to play a crucial role as the country’s Security Cooperation Office (SCO), a critical link between the Government of the Philippines and the US military’s Pacific Region Geographic Combatant Command (PACOM). JUSMAGPHIL coordinates all US engagements in the Philippines, including JCETs.

D. PH-US VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT

After the PH-US Military Bases Agreement failed to be extended, the PH-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was drafted to protect the rights of US military

⁵⁰ “US Military Bases & Assistance Agreements (1947)—Independence with Strings: From U.S. Colony to U.S. Neocolony.” *The Filipino Mind*, <http://www.thefilipinomind.com/2012/10/us-military-bases-assistance-agreements.html> (accessed June 11, 2015).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

personnel while on temporary assignment to the Philippines. The VFA was ratified by the Philippine Senate in 1999 and allowed US military personnel to remain under the legal jurisdiction of the United States.⁵³ Some Filipinos see this controversial agreement as consenting to US service members operating above the law and being free to commit crimes. This is not true, since most laws in the Philippines are similar to either US laws or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Therefore, if a US service member is accused of a crime, he may not face trial in the Philippine courts, but he will be investigated and possibly prosecuted under US law. The VFA is designed to prevent erroneous allegations of military personnel and punishments that are deemed excessive in the United States.

In the past, including quite recently, US members participating in various joint and combined exercises conducted in the Philippine territory have been accused of criminal infringements such as rape and murder.⁵⁴ The leftist or anti-US groups capitalize on these cases and question the impartiality and constitutionality of the VFA. They recommend revocation of the said agreement because it appeared to be more favorable to the United States and violated the concept of sovereignty.⁵⁵ As a consequence, PH-US bilateral relations are put into the limelight, which subsequently force both defense departments to impose heavy restrictions in the conduct of PH-US bilateral training exercises, including JCETs.

E. PH-US MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT AGREEMENT

In order to further facilitate the previously mentioned agreements, both countries signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) in 2002. The purpose of the MLSA is to, “further the interoperability, readiness, and effectiveness of respective

⁵³ U.S. Department of State and Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America regarding the Treatment of United States Armed Forces Visiting the Philippines*, February 10, 1998).

⁵⁴ Carlos Conde, U.S. Marine Guilty in Philippine Rape Case, *New York Times*, December 4, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/04/world/asia/04cnd-philippines.html?_r=0; BBC News, Murder Trial for U.S. Marine Pemberton in Philippines, 23 March 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32022445>.

⁵⁵ Asia Pacific Daily, Case Against American Serviceman new Irritant to Philippine-US Relations, 16 October 2014, <http://en.apdnews.com/news/aae132ab404140ef8d56b457b040b39e.html>.

military forces through increased logistic cooperation in accordance with the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement or the RP-US Military Assistance Agreement.”⁵⁶ There are exceptions to this agreement, such as nuclear and chemical ammunition, but overall, “each party shall exert its best efforts, consistent with national priorities, to satisfy requests from the other party under this agreement for logistic support, supplies, and services.”⁵⁷ The terms of this agreement have changed over time. Initially, the transfer of guided missiles was expressly forbidden. However, in order to intensify COIN operations in the southern Philippine islands, guided missiles have recently been sold to the government of the Philippines.⁵⁸ This agreement has continued and this year (FY 2015) the Republic of the Philippines is the seventh largest recipient in the US Department of State Foreign Military Financing Program.

The MLSA is a “facilitation agreement for reciprocal provisions of logistics between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and US forces especially for the limited basing of US forces in the Philippines.”⁵⁹ In effect, the MLSA shapes the support and logistical portion of JCETs. The logistical support is stipulated in the Administrative Procedures Agreement (APA). The APA is a nonbinding document that lays out the administrative and logistical support portion of JCETs.⁶⁰

F. PH-US ENHANCED DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT

In 2014, the governments of the United States and the Philippines signed the PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). On the surface, the EDCA

⁵⁶ U.S. Department of Defense and Philippine Department of National Defense, *Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (RP-US-01) between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines*, November 21, 2007).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ *1st Scout Ranger Regiment* (Globalsecurity.org: Global Security, September 7, 2011).

⁵⁹ Paterno Reynato C. Padua, Republic of the Philippines-United States Defense Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges, A Filipino Perspective (US Army War College Strategy Research Project: 12 March 2010), <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CDkQFjAEahUKEwigibLI7cnIAhVG3GMKHTTqA-s&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fget-tr-doc%2Fpdf%3FAD%3DADA520039&usq=AFQjCNGX15YV88MILuqemzdMZqZjp5eT8w&sig2=OO28tA7ut6jQuB54uwuXnQ&bvm=bv.105454873.d.cGc>.

⁶⁰ Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training From a Host Nation’s Perspective.”

appears to be a modern version of the original PH-US Military Bases Agreement. The difference, which allowed approval by the PH government, is that the EDCA is “an executive agreement and not a formal treaty.”⁶¹ This allowed the executive branch of each country to agree to the terms without the approval of either nations’ senates. The agreement allows the US military to control and operate bases in the Philippines in “agreed locations” on a “rotational basis,” and the United States will not be able to store any nuclear weapons on the bases.⁶² The government of the Philippines will maintain ownership of the land that the bases reside on, and the agreement is valid for the next 10 years.⁶³ Recently, the media reported that the United States has expressed interest in at least eight locations in the Philippines, including former US bases Clark Air Base and the Naval Base at Subic Bay, two bases on Palawan, and two bases on Cebu.⁶⁴

Due to issues concerning the constitutionality of the EDCA, leftist and anti-US groups pushed for the abolition of this agreement. The matter is raised and currently under the judicial review of the Philippine Supreme Court.⁶⁵ Although this agreement does not directly affect the conduct of JCETs today, its positive resolution will have a meaningful effect on the prepositioning and pre-deployment of US SOF in other areas where JCETs will be conducted in the future.

G. LEAHY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING

The United States views the advancement of human rights as a necessity that complements promoting national self-determination in nation-states around the world. As a result of the US commitment to humane treatment of all people, the Leahy Law was

⁶¹ Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,” *The Diplomat* (May 2, 2014), June 10, 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/>.

⁶² U.S. Department of State and Philippine Department of National Defense, *Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation*, April 28, 2014.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Manuel Mogato, “United States Seeks Access to Philippine Bases as Part of Asia Pivot,” *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/25/us-philippines-usa-idUSKBN0NG05R20150425> (accessed June 11, 2015).

⁶⁵ Ina Reformina, PH Supreme Court to Decide the Constitutionality of EDCA, 18 November 2014, <http://www.balitangamerica.tv/ph-supreme-court-to-decide-constitutionality-of-edca/>.

introduced in 1997 and has since been applied to all forms of security assistance and security cooperation activities. The Leahy Law restricts US assistance to individuals and organizations that have committed egregious violations of human rights.⁶⁶ As a result, prior to committing funds, personnel, or equipment to enhance the capabilities of PNs, the US government must first conduct human rights vetting of the personnel or unit that are to receive training, money, or equipment. If individuals or units appear to have committed human rights violations in the past, they may still receive assistance if the Philippine military can show that “all necessary corrective steps have been taken”⁶⁷ to prevent future heinous acts.

Once accused of human rights violations, PNs may take a long time to prove that the necessary corrective steps have been taken to mitigate or resolve accusations pertaining to human rights. For example, Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus), an Indonesian SOF, was accused of human rights violations. Several years passed before US SOF could reengage with them⁶⁸ and US-Kopassus interactions are still a subject of debate.⁶⁹ In the case of the Philippines, the AFP Scout Rangers were accused of human rights violations in 2006.⁷⁰ This accusation temporarily hindered US bilateral trainings with their units who typically participated regularly in the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs dubbed as Balance Pistons. As a result, the training pause created a considerable gap in building the capability and capacity of these known Philippine ground combat units.

⁶⁶ United States Government Accountability Office, *Human Rights: Additional Guidance, Monitoring, and Training could Improve Implementation of the Leahy Laws* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, September, 2013).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Charles “Ken” Comer, “Leahy in Indonesia: Damned if You do (and Even if You Don’t),” *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, no. 37 (November 26, 2010), 53–70.

⁶⁹ John M. Glionna, “U.S. Plan to Train Indonesian Elite Army Unit Raises Alarm,” *Los Angeles Times*, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/06/world/la-fg-indonesia-military6-2010apr06/2> (accessed November 12, 2015).

⁷⁰ Global Security. *1st Scout Ranger Regiment*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/philippines/1srr.htm> (accessed September 24, 2015).

Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combined Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”

H. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

With the increase in Chinese activity in Southeast Asia (SEA), the United States will heighten its engagements with regional PNs, especially the Republic of the Philippines. This increase in activity coincides with the US National Security Strategy's planned "rebalance to Asia."⁷¹ The newly signed PH-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is indicative that the United States greatly wants to increase its presence in the region. As a result of the semi-permanent US presence that will ensue, the number of military to military engagements between the PH and the United States will likely continue to rise. With the increased numbers of engagements, and increased spending by both the United States and the Philippines, it is even more important to identify the factors of success that can be adapted to security cooperation engagements and ensure a high return on investment for both nations. In summary, JCETs will certainly continue to be a relevant SOF security cooperation engagement program that ensures active and continued military-to-military engagement that addresses both internal and external security threats of the Philippine government.

⁷¹ Barrack H. Obama and National Security Council, "National Security Strategy 2010," (2010) 24.

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III. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN FOR EVALUATION OF JCETS

A. BACKGROUND

At the organizational level, US forces, including the SOF enterprise, are often viewed as overtasked, training in all human facets of war and performing “a wide variety of roles and functions.”⁷² These taskings are primarily due to the changing nature of the security environment and enduring security challenges posed by the enemies of peace, prompting high-security demands from allied and cooperative partners. With regards to the training perspective, several US security cooperation training programs and activities with its PNs are routinely conducted based on their importance and relevance to US national interest. Among those security cooperation engagement programs that possessed enduring return on training investments, the JCET program captures the center stage because of its dual dividends. One is the professional development of US SOF elements in mentoring, advisory roles, language, and cultural awareness. The other is the ability to shape or reshape the capacity and capability of its PNs security force elements to combat security threats, both internal and external. Since the Republic of the Philippines is the country of focus for this study, it is important to know the different JCET activities conducted in the Philippines each year.

B. JCETS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), in collaboration with SOCPAC, regularly conducts an average of 10 JCETs every year in the Philippines. The activities are included in the approved list of Security Engagement Board (SEB) activities deliberated during the previous year.⁷³ The AFP Major Services SOF (Army, Air Force, and Navy) have their respective JCETs to facilitate. Moreover, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Force (SAF) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

⁷² Christopher J. Lamb and David Tucker, *United States Special Operations Forces* (West Sussex, NY: Columbia University Press, 2007), 177; Thomas K. Adams, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 1998), 288; Adrian R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 381.

⁷³ Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”

(PDEA) have their respective JCET activities, which are focused on addressing counter-narcotics, law enforcement, and other objectives supportive of security sector reform initiatives.

Having a solid understanding of the JCET activities that are conducted in the Philippines (See Appendix A), this study applies the derived core concepts from two important training models: the Eight-Step Training Model and the ADDIE Model. These two training models are discussed in detail in the following sections, including their relevance to JCETs. As mentioned earlier, with the constraints in data and time, this study focuses on the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs. However, the results and implication of this study are potentially generalizable to other JCET activities as well as other bilateral PH-US related training programs conducted in the Philippines. Additionally, these findings may also be of use to other US bilateral relationships where security cooperation events are conducted.

C. THE EIGHT-STEP TRAINING MODEL AND THE CONDUCT OF JCETS

This study utilized the Eight-Step Training Model as the initial foundation to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of the JCET PH-US Army-to-Army activities conducted in the Philippines. This particular training model is used to emphasize the end segments of the training process, which are vital to the success of similar training events in the future. The Eight-Step Training Model comprises the following: “step 1 – plan the training, step 2 – train and certify leaders, step 3 – conduct a reconnaissance, step 4 – issue an order for the training, step 5 – rehearse, step 6 – execute, step 7 – conduct an after action review, and step 8 – retrain.”⁷⁴

In Step 1, preparation is the key to success. Planning the training such as JCETs needs a lot of preparation not only for the responsible training staff/coordinator but also for other functional staffs, in which training needs to be planned, coordinated, executed and evaluated. For example, in the case of the Philippine Army (PA), the PA training coordinator should ensure that the proposed list of bilateral training activities should be

⁷⁴ Matthew R. Little, The Eight-Step Training Model, April 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a560296.pdf>.

submitted to the international engagement officer who is responsible in incorporating all the proposed PA bilateral activities in the MDB-SEB list of activities (Figure 2). Moreover, the planning of JCETs should be coordinated with both participating units, considering the operational requirements of the HN and the US Geographic Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plan. On the one hand, the US SOF team, which planned the JCET, should be the one to execute the plan. This is to ensure continuity and achieve the objectives set forth by both parties. On the other hand, the HN planners should involve a representative or planner from the designated PA unit programmed to participate in the upcoming exercise. Doing this would entail that the training needs and demands of the participating units on the PA side is addressed.

In Step 2, soldiers train to learn. Equally significant is for leaders and key noncommissioned officers to do the reverse, which is to learn how to train. Both imperatives are necessary conditions for a successful training program. As mentioned in the opening chapter, JCETs are primarily designed to support the training of US SOF in the foreign country that affords different terrain, more ground and air spaces, and importantly, a different culture. For this reason, the training may be geared toward enhancing the advisory or instructor roles of US SOF, as well as leader development and cultural understanding. Whether the United States dominates the instructor role or PH SOF instructs a portion of training, both sides would benefit from instructors (both United States and PH) having undergone prior certification in order to meet the bilaterally accepted (through signing the APA) training standards throughout the course of JCET instruction.

In Step 3, just like any military operation, conducting reconnaissance is crucial to completion of the training plan. The training location, accessibility, and availability of training facilities, which includes live fire and impact areas, are some considerations that allow realistic training events. It is for this reason that pre-deployment site surveys are conducted during the initial planning of the JCETs. This is to make sure that the planned training events could be facilitated with respect to training considerations mentioned earlier.

In Step 4, issuance of training orders alerts subordinate units of upcoming training activities. For any other training programs such as JCETs, orders issuance allows the concerned participating units to execute their respective training plans based on the conducted initial and final coordinating conferences and the developed joint-combined training calendars and program of instruction.

In Step 5, conducting rehearsals is an extremely important undertaking. A rehearsal is used as a meter-gauge to show how well units are prepared for assigned tasks. With constant practice or rehearsal, troops or units will gain confidence in achieving the unit's mission. In the execution of JCETs, conducting rehearsals is foregone since more time is allotted to preparation and finalization of instructional packages and training POIs.

Step 6 encompasses training execution. During this time, some degree of flexibility is required, especially on the training directorate in shifting the training based on the circumstances and availability or non-availability of the required training resources or equipment. During JCETs, training plans are especially diverted on the request and demand of the unit commander or training officer who did not have the chance to participate in the planning conferences. Another instance is the failure to provide the correct skillsets needed by the HN SOF participating units. Again, AARs or ATRs from both sides could validate or deny these issues.

In Step 7, conduct of the AAR, both a formal (company level and up) and an informal (platoon level and below) review is crucial in the improvement process. This is done to reinforce the objectives of the training and understand how to better accomplish them. Leaders and soldiers need to understand and internalize discussed concepts for improvement to successfully execute future missions and further ensure future safety during similar training. During this step, unit or individual participants are given feedback on their actions on the given tasks. Corrections should be made to actions incongruent to the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). However, if in the case there were actions which detracted from traditional doctrine and TTPs but achieved favorable outcomes, then those actions must be recognized and integrated for the development of new TTPs. During the conduct of JCETs, informal AARs are usually

conducted as positive or corrective steps to provide immediate feedback to the training participants. Recommendations should form an integral part of the AAR and post-JCET report to provide the planners from both sides the necessary inputs and points of reference for the succeeding JCETs.

The eighth and final step revolves around retraining, and is time and resource dependent. Retraining allows a display of confidence and competency of the training within participants and concerned units. However, it may never happen after every JCET program since this task entails additional cost and extended time for both parties that are needed not only by other US SOF teams but also for HN SOF units in their respective sustainment training. Allowing more iteration of the training events within a given time frame could mitigate this if all considerations are satisfied. Depending on the eagerness, flexibility, and innovation of the unit leader, he could mitigate this concern especially by conducting follow on training during free time or while waiting for deployment. Therefore, this study considers retraining as the method of conducting a future JCETs, and implementing the lessons that were learned and discussed during previous AARs. Thus, the purpose of this step is to increase the effectiveness of future bilateral engagements.

D. THE ADDIE MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE TO JCETS


This study complements the Eight-Step Training Model with the Analyze-Design-Develop-Implement-Evaluate (ADDIE) model. The ADDIE model or process was introduced to the US Army in 1975 and became a dynamic training model in the mid '80s. The ADDIE acronym was first used or accepted after two decades from its initial introduction to the US Army. At the turn of the twentieth century, it took off from merely being a process and was said to be effective in conjunction with other performance models.⁷⁵ The 2011 US Army Manual coined the ADDIE model as “The Non-Linear ADDIE Model,” describing the model as a non-series process.⁷⁶ Figure 5 is the diagram

⁷⁵ Donald Clark, History of ADDIE Model, created July 13, 1995, updated September 6, 2015, accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.nwlink.com/~donclark/history_isd/addie.html.

⁷⁶ Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350–70: Army Learning and Policy Systems, accessed on September 28, 2015, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regis/TR350-70.pdf>.

of this model as embraced by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Figure 5. The Non-Linear ADDIE Model



Source: Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350-70: Army Learning and Policy Systems, accessed on September 28, 2015, <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/regs/TR350-70.pdf>.

The ADDIE training process is pertinent to this study, as it captures the overall training life cycle. It is relevant to the conduct of JCETs since the phases of this model could influence the planning, execution, management, and evaluation of JCETs. Moreover, the same types of JCETs are conducted every year, which affords the opportunity to implement the necessary training adjustments. However, the ADDIE model also needs some refinement. It should include the integration of lessons learned

and new TTPs borne out of the previous training. Recommendations for future engagements should be integrated to prevent repetitive training events that would exhaust both the instructors and the participants. JCET training evaluations and assessments should integrate a more comprehensive analysis of the training exercise that would eventually result into more synchronized and synergized training activities, which further meet the expectations of both audiences (provider and receiver).

In lieu of the Army Transformation Roadmap 2028, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Education and Training, OG8, Philippine Army adopted an effective system of integrating the core training imperatives of analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate in all PA training programs.⁷⁷ The training programs incorporate PA units participating in bilateral/multilateral engagement trainings such as JCETs. The PA special operations command (SOCOM) has a high demand for the continuance of the JCET program because of the program's impact on sustaining and enhancing individual and collective combat skills, and the proficiency of PA soldiers and front line units. Unfortunately, PA SOCOM and higher echelons of the AFP organization lack a grand strategy for utilizing JCETs as a tool of security cooperation engagement to optimize capacity or capability development of the Philippine SOF units.

E. CORE TRAINING TASKS AND CONCEPTS


This study develops the core training tasks and concepts based on the Eight-Step Training and ADDIE models essential for the training process: plan, execute, manage, and evaluate. Lacking any of these essential tasks in any training exercises or engagements such as JCETs would result in either a training fiasco at worst or a suboptimal training outcome at best. For example, if a certain type of JCET engagement lacks proper management and planning, the evidence would appear in the post-training reports or related documents mentioning such shortfalls or inefficacies.

This study first identified what the key elements are in conducting combined training exercises like JCETs. This eventually led, through the use of the Eight-Step

⁷⁷ Philippine Army website, OG8 Strategy Roadmap, accessed on September 28, 2015, http://www.army.mil.ph/Army_Sites/PAET/pdf/strategymap.pdf.

Training and ADDIE models, to the determination of five core concepts for JCET evaluation, which are illustrated in Figure 6. These core concepts are drawn from US security cooperation policy objectives, higher policies, legal frameworks, and our knowledge, experience, and understanding in the conduct of JCETs.

Figure 6. Core Concepts for JCET Evaluation



The first core concept concerns the agreed-upon training needs or required events. Prior to any JCETs, it is assumed that both sides understand and prioritize their respective training needs. For example in the case of US troops, the leadership would look more into enhancing their mentoring and instructor skills while sustaining their war fighting competencies. In short, US participants are looking to enhance their expertise in how to train indigenous forces. In contrast, Philippine soldiers typically aim to improve their mastery in basic warfighting skills. This may be due to frontline exigencies as the Philippine military is constantly confronted with various security challenges. Hence, warfighting skills are the much-needed expertise that enhances the level of confidence of the soldiers in combatting internal and external threats. The last element of this core concept evaluates the training duration and whether it was lengthy enough to accomplish the pre-established goals.

The second core concept is flexibility in the execution of JCETs. No amount of preparation can ensure that things will go perfectly. In reality, changes will occur. Therefore, flexibility is a crucial ingredient to ensure that the training encompasses the correct tasks as initially planned or conceptualized, and having the ability to adapt to emergent training needs during the JCET as necessary. Overall quality of training, such as realistic training scenarios and culminating exercises (CULEXs), are also evaluated under this core concept.

The third core concept evaluates shared bilateral commitment of training support. The conduct of training exercises and/or combat operations are functions of available resources for the tasks. It is the commitment of each party to provide the appropriate training support that allows a certain bilateral engagement to be conducted. For instance, during JCET pre-exercise planning conferences, the APA is crafted to provide the administrative and logistical support for the actual training exercise. If the support from either side conducting training is unfulfilled, a considerable impact results on the exercise. For example, non-availability or delay of rotary aircraft or the required transport vehicle during the infiltration or exfiltration of the CULEX could hamper the CULEX execution and affect the smooth flow of the training for the entire JCET.

The core concept of a shared legal framework allows both sides to conduct the same training. A legal framework that is unilaterally imposed by one party may result in some unintended training consequences. For instance, the strict implementation of the Leahy Vetting affects the conduct of JCETs. Though some measures could be taken by the PN to assist in clearing the military units for participation, the vetting is an arduous process that entails a considerable amount of time. Hence if strictly imposed, individuals and units are stripped of the opportunity to participate in the JCETs.

Last is the institutionalization of JCETs. Every training engagement should be geared toward the transfer of learning from one partner, specifically individuals or units. In this regard, the military and doctrine centers are the crucial entities that ensure the continuity and direction of these bilateral exercises. JCETs can easily complement the local sustainment training conducted by the SOF units of both countries and assist PA SOF schools with developing the correct training package that advance individual and collective skills in wartime and peacetime contingency operations.

F. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

The training process and models presented here have laid the groundwork of our analysis of JCETs. The Eight-Step Training Model was modified to accommodate and focus more on the steps that are usually not given equal attention—AAR and retrain. The ADDIE model provides a general framework for a training process, which was embraced by the US Army in the early '80s to enhance training outcomes. As a result of the combination of the two training models, this study conceptualizes the design for JCET evaluation. Specifically, this study developed the JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) to objectively analyze and evaluate the success of the conducted JCETs.

The core concepts for the JEF were selected from strategic policies, guidance, directives, and other mechanisms pursued by the United States and Philippines defense establishments, executing agencies, and geographic combatant commands. In developing the JEF, this study also infused the personal experiences of the authors in the conduct of JCETs. These concepts are validated through the use of AARs and ATRs of the

conducted PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs in the Philippines. The results and outcomes of the data analysis are explained in the next chapter.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE JEF AND OUTCOMES

A. INTRODUCTION

The JEF is validated through the use of US and PH after action reviews (AARs), after training reports (ATRs), and post-training reports. Several documents including, but not limited to administrative procedures agreements (APAs), concept of operations (CONOPS) or training concept, training calendars and/or schedules, and available fund utilization documents complement the primary documents in conducting the descriptive analysis of PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs. This study researches post-training reports from 10 different US-PH JCETs conducted within the last five years; however, the analysis only represents data from eight of the 10 engagements.⁷⁸ Table 1 summarizes the information that this study gathered for each JCET.

Table 1. JCET Post-Training Data Sources

JCET Event*	AAR/ATR	APA	Training Calendar	Storyboard	By Name Roster
1	PH/US	PH/US			PH
2	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH
3	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US		
4	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH
5	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH	PH
6	PH/US	PH/US	US	US	
7	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH	PH
8	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH	PH
9	PH/US	PH/US	PH/US	PH	PH
X	US		US		

*JCET Identification Numbers are generic for security purposes

⁷⁸ Of these post-training reports, this study collected both PH and U.S. comments for all JCETs except one (Event X), which will not be referenced in this study since it only describes the U.S. viewpoint without a PH report for comparison. Also, JCET Event 9 was not referenced in the analysis since this event is the only Vector Balance report collected; it would need to be compared to other Vector Balances in order to properly analyze trends. Only unclassified sources and unclassified sections of classified documents are referenced in this thesis. All source reference information, including report titles and authors, has been sterilized in order to preserve the classification of the sources.

B. ANALYSIS/PROOF OF EVALUATION DESIGN FOR JCETS


This study examined and compared the PH and US post-training reports utilizing the JEF's core concept criteria for a detailed evaluation of the JCETs conducted over the last five years. A synopsis of the unclassified data collected is consolidated by JCET in Appendix B. The following charts and descriptions discuss the pertinent data after it has been scrutinized using the core concepts of the JEF.

1. Agreed Training Events

JCET training events are discussed during the pre-exercise planning conferences—initial planning conference (IPC) and final planning conference (FPC). Ideally, both parties should present respective training needs or training concepts during the IPC. However, recent practice is that the PH planners will present the CONOPS or training concept and the US planners provide comments or inputs on the training concept. Based on the post-training reports (see Figure 7), the majority of planned training events were conducted, and the United States dominated in the instructor roles of these training events. The dominance of US instructors is supportive of the US objectives in conducting JCETs.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, *AR 12–15: Security Assistance and International Logistics Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*, 21.

Figure 7. Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Agreed Training Events)



Once training events are agreed upon during the pre-exercise planning conferences (initial and final), representatives of both parties draft and sign the APA. These APAs are subject to change, and the attached training schedules are adjusted to accommodate the emergent needs of either unit. The post-training report of one recent JCET highlights this fact, noting that the APA was written and agreed upon on the AFP side by a G8 representative, not a representative from the actual unit to train.⁸⁰ Once US SOF arrive for the JCET, the difference in perceived/planned versus actual required training is discussed between PH-US SOF units, and the training plan is altered to fit the emergent needs.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Nicholas Ulrich (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2011.) 4. This document is classified Secret.

⁸¹ Ibid.

However, it is important to note that PA G8 staff members are not planning the activities or training events by themselves. They initiate communication to projected training units, commanders, and training/operations officers asking them what training events or training they need, the number of participants they can provide, and other requirements they need for the upcoming JCET. The G8 staff then consolidates and visualizes the proposed training concept based on the inputs submitted by the lower units. On the financial side, the G8 office also verifies that the requirements submitted are supportable based on the available or programmed funds for the JCETs—accordingly, the G8 office is the attesting signatory, because it can distinguish between supportable and unsupported requirements.

The post-exercise documents described the successful completion of a majority of planned training events. Also, several of the post-training reports mentioned those training events that were not planned, but requested during the actual conduct of JCET events, such as pistol marksmanship and communications training that were specifically requested by the hosting PA SOF unit commander.⁸² In one of the conducted JCETs, the PA SOF unit commander praised the US SOF training directorate on the latter's ability to adjust the training schedule based on the PA SOF unit's training demand, highlighting the successful conduct of the JCET.⁸³

On the contrary, unplanned training events such as Maritime Operations (MAROPS) and riverine operations were requested by the PA SOF unit but were not conducted.⁸⁴ One of the PA Special Forces BN Commander requested a focus on MAROPS for his JCET, which was noted in the USSF post-initial planning report and planned as two days for MAROPS tactics and planning, three days for beach landing site surveys and scout swimming, and a day-and-a-half for a MAROPS infiltration practical

⁸² Joseph Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2013) 2. This document is classified Secret.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Kevin Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2013) 2. This document is classified Secret.

exercise.⁸⁵ However, the actual training during the JCET focused on combat marksmanship, devoting only a partial day to a MAROPs lecture.⁸⁶ With the post-training reports written as they are, it is difficult to ascertain where the disconnect occurred and why the initially agreed-upon training was altered. It is possible that the USSF team scheduled for that particular JCET lacks the expertise in the actual conduct of MAROPS.

PH ATRs mention that most of training events were completed during the training dates of JCETs. Accordingly, US SOF rarely request for additional training since they are enhancing cross training within their own team simply by instructing AFP participants. In some instances, training events were shortened to accommodate emerging training needs or demands from PH participating units. Moreover, there was an instance where the training duration was shortened due to effects of weather. While enroute to the Philippines, the US SOF team was stranded in Japan due to a strong typhoon that entered the Philippine area of responsibility. This typhoon incident caused the postponement of the exercise for more than two weeks. Thus, the JCET that was initially planned for a month was reduced to only 12 days. As a consequence, all training events and instruction were compressed and some were even cancelled.⁸⁷

Overall, US post-training reports mention that the majority of the training events planned during the pre-exercise planning activities (IPC and FPC) were conducted during the actual JCETs. In the data studied, an average of two unplanned training events were added to the schedules and conducted during the training exercises. Commanders and/or operation officers specifically requested these training events to complement the unit's individual and collective skills enhancement training. Examples of such training events are pistol marksmanship and mission planning. Moreover, most US SOF teams recommended for the extensive focus on Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) or medical training instead of Small Unit Tactics (SUT). The lack of knowledge and

⁸⁵ Travis Milgrim (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Initial Planning Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013.) 4. This document is classified Secret.

⁸⁶ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

⁸⁷ Ian Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2011) 7. This document is classified Secret.

expertise in TCCC has been identified as reoccurring and preventable cause of fatalities of Filipino soldiers in the frontline.

2. Flexibility in Execution

Sometimes training schedules need to be adjusted due to unplanned circumstances. In the case of one JCET, the planned training was downgraded to a lower level, which limited the overall training goals. This was due to the SR participants (who according to the APA were supposed to be an SR-qualified cohesive company) that participated as a composite unit of which 25% were not even SR qualified.⁸⁸ The PH ATR for this same JCET denotes that the training schedule was changed many times due to the delayed arrival of the USSF team, which impacted the POI and the smooth flow of the training.⁸⁹ The PH ATR further states that the training was rushed in an effort to achieve the initial agreed-upon training, but with only half of the planned duration.⁹⁰

Realistic training events were visible in almost all post-training reports (see Figure 8) that this study has access to. Five out of eight JCETs executed training events considered to be quality CULEXs. Of the remaining three JCETs, one PA SF BN commander canceled the planned CULEX due to perceived issues associated with the conduct of CULEX that involved local populace in the impact areas.⁹¹ The consistent high demand for CULEX events is directly indicative of their perceived training value by both nations. However, neither the United States nor the AFP reports seem to truly capture what about the CULEXs made them successful or how to improve upon them for future training.

⁸⁸ Joshua Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011) 8. This document is classified Secret.

⁸⁹ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 7.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

Figure 8. Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Flexibility in Execution)


Flexibility in Execution	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Accepts changes in the training schedule 2. Collaborates with US planners in developing realistic training scenarios 3. Welcomes additional training requests from US counterparts but none has been noted in the ATRs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Initiates training schedule shifts, updates the training calendar, and informs all training participants 2. Collaborates with Filipino planners/unit commanders in scenario development (realistic) 3. Accommodates training requests if time and budget allows
PH	US

US post-training reports fail to describe the training that was planned, but not executed. That information is solely derived from the PH ATRs. This is perhaps because the format of the US reports does not include a section where these comments should be annotated. It is important to note these differences between intended and actual training in order to educate and prepare future planners for similar exercises, thus preventing the continual process of relearning the same issues.

3. Shared Bilateral Training/Logistical Support

Money is a necessity for all engagements and a key factor that contributes to the success of a given engagements like JCETs. The commitment to provide the appropriate training support is clearly manifested in the provisions of the APA. The availability of training and billeting facilities, exercise area, weapons, ammunition, fuel, air and ground transport vehicles are predictive of a successful JCET. Of course, the timely delivery and availability of this bilaterally agreed training and logistic support is another consideration for uninterrupted flow of bilateral training. Figure 9 summarizes the US-PH reports and each nation’s concerns regarding logistical support during JCETs.

Figure 9. Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Shared Bilateral Training/Logistical Support)



Most of PH SOF ATRs mention numerous problems and challenges in the areas of logistic system or sustainment operations. PH participating units repeatedly raised issues and concerns pertaining to defective rifles, mismatched U.S.-provided ammunition, lack of PA riverine or maritime assets, and non-availability of rotary and ground transportation vehicles during the FTX or CULEX. The unresponsiveness of the PH logistic support system is the culprit of these challenges; hence the PA pushed for the capability upgrades in terms of firearms and other much-needed ground assets. On a positive note, the PH Defense Department and the AFP have intensely strengthened their effort to modernize and professionalize the force. New rifles are now issued to the line units to raise the morale of the soldiers in the frontline.⁹² Post-training reports also mention that the United States provided a sufficient amount of POL, ammunition, and incidental repair of training facilities that transpired as a result of the conducted JCET.

⁹² Maxdefense, <http://maxdefense.blogspot.com/2013/12/3-projects-to-modernize-assault-rifle.html> (accessed November 16, 2015).

Post-exercise report of US SOF cited that the main cause of training pause during JCETs was due to defective firearms issued to the participants. One JCET post-training document mentioned that instead of providing or focusing on developing the required skillset like basic rifle marksmanship, the activity was focused first in fixing or maintenance check of individual firearms.⁹³ Again, this suggests a less than desirable training outcome for a specific training event. US SOF listed other examples of resources not procured between the planning conference and execution time. During a CT-focused JCET, the training location did not have a CQB training facility that was both useable and safe.⁹⁴ That same event also fielded post-engagement report comments regarding inadequate hygiene facilities; the report listed two functional toilets to support 60 personnel for the duration.⁹⁵

Between the US and PH after activity reports, gaps exist between how each side views their capabilities. Four out of 10 US reports describe the need for an increase in Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) medical training. One report even recommends assembling a continuous TCCC mobile training program that would continuously engage PH SOF units.⁹⁶ During a different JCET, the US post-engagement report states that US SOF extended TCCC training by three days in order to increase the participants' knowledge of this critical skill.⁹⁷ However, only one out of nine AFP ATRs mentions the importance of increasing knowledge of TCCC.⁹⁸ This same disconnect is evident in the reports when discussing the need for increased planning capabilities. None of the AFP reports indicate a need to adjust planning methods or increase the capability. However, four out of 10 US reports describe a need to increase the PH SOF's planning capability at battalion level and below. This may be due to a cultural difference and the US military's

⁹³ Christopher Raabe (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013.) 7–8. This document is classified Secret.

⁹⁴ Daniel Smiley (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2014) 5. This document is classified Secret.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Jason Pacquin (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2012) 6. This document is classified Secret.

⁹⁷ Ulrich (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 4–5.


⁹⁸ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 8.

need to always use a standardized planning process known as the military decision-making process (MDMP). If the two sides would openly and candidly share AAR comments and recommendations, the views on the importance of TCCC and MDMP could be addressed.

4. Shared Legal Frameworks

Legal frameworks guide the conduct of security cooperation program and activities such as JCETs. Since most of the JCETs are conducted inside AFP installations, camp rules, regulations, and cultural awareness are lectured during the opening phase of the JCETs. In adherence to the Leahy Law, a human rights seminar is typically conducted immediately following the opening ceremony to prevent human right violations during and after the exercise. Under the supervision of the SEB, JCETs may address nontraditional security concerns, including, but not limited to counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, among others. Figure 10 summarized the trends from the US-PH reports in relation to legalities.

Figure 10. Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs (Shared Legal Frameworks)



PH SOF ATRs seldom cite legal mechanisms except for the unintended effect of the Leahy Amendment to the regular units participating in the JCETs. As mentioned in the preceding sections, there were instances that less than half of the number of the originally planned PA participants were accommodated in the JCET even if there were available alternate soldiers who were supposed to fill the vacated positions. Moreover, the leftist group filed HR complaints against the Philippine SR regiment, which deny the entire unit to participate in the JCETs for several years.⁹⁹ It was only recently that the unit was cleared and rejoined the JCET program.

Furthermore, the AFP institutionalized human rights training in every professional military education course POI. This makes the US SOF led human rights training during

⁹⁹ Cabahug, “SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation’s Perspective.”

the opening day of JCETs antiquated. Training time that has been spent on human rights training could be spent on other events that are more relevant to the agreed-upon training. However, the discussion of human rights at the start of a JCET ensures a common understanding of internationally recognized human rights among all participants.

5. Institutionalization of JCET

In order to maximize the enduring results of JCETs, the proper participants should be involved. Certified trainers in a PA SOF school program would be able to directly impart newly honed skills into the next generation of Filipino SOF soldiers. Therefore, incorporating PH SOF school instructors into JCETs could maximize this important cultivating benefit. Also, these PH SOF instructors should be previously certified in the topics that will be focused on during the JCET. This baseline knowledge will not only assist in the two-way transfer of information with US counterparts, but will also provide a foundation that can be built upon during the JCET training. If fundamentals are already understood, more advanced skills can be exchanged throughout the event. In the future, post-training reports should be exchanged between participating units in order to provide an honest assessment that will provide each unit the information to build upon for future JCETs.

Recent PH ATRs pointed out the importance of including planners from the schoolhouses during JCET pre-exercise planning conferences to contribute in the development of the training POIs.¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, the PA SOCOM and PA training division failed to include them during the coordinating conferences.¹⁰¹ A majority of conducted JCETs do not include participants from SOF training schools (see Figure 11). As a result, the acquired learning only goes to the units who participated in the JCET. For this reason, US SOF recommended that train-the-trainer events should immediately follow JCETs in order for AFP JCET attendees to effectively spread their newly gained

¹⁰⁰ Rodrigo Torres (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2014) 4. This document is classified Secret.

¹⁰¹ Harold Shirley (U) *Administrative Procedures Agreement between Company X, X Battalion, X Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command, Philippine Army* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2014). This document is classified FOUO.

knowledge to the PA SOCOM force.¹⁰² Effective transfer of expertise is done if instructors have the right skills and motivation to teach. The projected instructors should have learned beforehand how to train; hence, certifying instructors is a better way to ensure uniformity in teaching design, approach, or methodology.

Figure 11. Descriptive Comparison of PH and US AARs/ATRs
(Institutionalization of JCET)

JCET Institutionalization	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very few JCETs include planners/participants from Schoolhouses; no JCET POI development 2. Instructor development/certification was not included 3. Exchange of JCET lessons learned & TTPs is anecdotal & not incorporated in the next training POI 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Earlier JCETs failed to include participants from Schoolhouses; limited bilateral POI development for JCET 2. No program for instructor certification 3. TTP exchanges and lessons learned sharing were subjective
PH	US

The collected PH ATRs do not mention AFP instructor certification. This area needs to be considered in future JCET engagements. Additionally, the exchange of lessons learned and TTPs were merely anecdotal and do not specifically describe what lessons have been learned or what TTPs have been exchanged. All of the PH and US ATRs mentioned the sharing of lessons learned and exchanging TTPs, but no evidence directly supports that the sharing and exchanges actually happened. If this is true then

¹⁰² Dustin Smith (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2012). This document is classified Secret.

everyone should be proficient in the JCET training events, which are basically repetitive in nature considering the number of JCETs that have been conducted all over the Philippine Archipelago.

Looking at US post-exercise reports, there are some instances during early JCETs where US planners tried to involve PA SOCOM schools, but this effort yielded results that were lower than the expectations of the participants. The intent was for the USSOF team to train together with the PA SOCOM school instructors, followed by assisting those same instructors with training a PA SF line company. Several PA SOCOM school instructors did indeed participate in the training; however, not enough attended to properly train the SF Company.¹⁰³ Just like the Filipino instructors, US SOF elements do not have formal instructor certification. Most ODAs conduct internal training and instructor certification of the classes to be taught, prior to deployment. Junior operators are typically paired with more senior operators in an effort to pass along JCET lessons learned. In addition, ODAs currently assign operators specific skills to instruct that correlate to their military schooling and certifications. For example, a US SOF operator will not lead the instruction of a sniper POI unless he himself is Special Forces Sniper qualified.

The primary benefit for USSOF team members during JCETs is to develop their instructor and mentoring skills. This leads to a general assumption that US troops are more knowledgeable in most of the training events than their Filipino counterparts. However, there are some events that PA SF and SR units are more knowledgeable in than their US counterparts, especially in jungle operations, riverine operations, small unit tactics, and civil-military operations, because of the PA SF and SR units' greater training access, knowledge, and operational experiences in the field.¹⁰⁴ These are the training events where USSF gains most of the tactical returns out of U.S.-sponsored JCETs.

¹⁰³ Glen Miller (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013) 4. This document is classified Secret.

¹⁰⁴ Eduardo Pagan (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2012) 2–4. This Document is classified Secret.

C. SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

This framework highlights several existing trends. Training schedules are often flexible and allow the units on the ground to discuss their needs and circumstances that may have changed since the IPC and/or FPC. Also, delays in travel plans can directly lead to significant training plan alterations. In order for training to still be successful, a free line of communication between participating units is mandatory.

For newly trained skills to propagate among other units that are not participating in the actual JCETs, either a train-the-trainer program should be established, or cadre from the PA SOCOM schools should participate in the training. Instead of losing the valuable insights and TTPs shared, these ideas could be propagated through the force. In addition, training quality rises if the units participating are homogenous units with standing SOPs and a high level of combined unit training. A certification process could ensure that participants are at a high enough level of training to both share and receive relevant TTPs.

The misalignment of the training needs and desires should be mitigated at the onset of the JCET process. The prioritization of the unit commander on the skill sets that his unit needs should be the primordial basis for training. In the future, there is potential value if observers from other SOF units could provide constructive criticism and a candid training evaluation. In the case of JCETs, constructive criticism should be a two-way street. It is imperative that both PH-US SOF units look into a way to accomplish a bilaterally agreed post-exercise report format and exchange these reports as a method to improve succeeding JCETs. In this study, only two of the eight exercises reported the conduct of a combined AAR at the conclusion of the respective JCETs.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Andrew McDougal (U) *PH-US Balance Piston XX-X Combined Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013). This document is classified FOUO.

Mark Cruz (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2014). This document is classified Secret.

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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

Systematically evaluating or assessing the effectiveness of a certain training program like JCETs is a difficult task to undertake, especially with constraints in data and time. Perhaps this study would have been more precise if more data were available for examination and coupled with surveys and interviews with the PH and US security cooperation planners; subject matter experts; and unit commanders, staffs, and participants involved with the conducted JCETs. However, even with these limitations, it is worth noting that this study is relevant in the future conduct of JCETs and related programs and activities of security cooperation.

From the time of the JCET program's inception, there is no evidence that a deliberate effort has been attempted to evaluate JCET effectiveness. One partial exemption is a USG GAO report in 1999.¹⁰⁶ The report recommends civilian oversight of security cooperation activities, particularly those that could be categorized or fall at the boundaries of security force assistance in which the JCET program fundamentally fits in. The Leahy Amendment resulted, which supposedly strengthened the grip of the DOS on the security assistance engagements provided to PNs executed by the DOD. More often than not, there has been a collision between achieving the broad US national interest against current security demands of PNs. When this happens, current security demands in US regional combatant commands upend or circumnavigate existing legalities such as the Leahy Vetting. Interestingly, a number of countries that allegedly have violated human rights continued to receive US training assistance under the guise of JCETs in the same time frame as this study.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, several publications mention the successful conduct of JCETs, but these accounts are only anecdotal. No evidence yet has been marshaled to support the claim that an executed JCET was successful based on any measure of objective analysis.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Military Training: Management and Oversight of Joint Combined Exchange Training* (Washington: D.C., July 23, 1999).

¹⁰⁷ Nick Turse, "Secret Warfare."

Of course, one would tend to first ask what constitutes a successful JCET? Thus, this study defined success as the byproduct of bilaterally-agreed training events and objectives based on training needs, the bilateral flexibility in JCET execution, shared commitment on the planned training support stipulated in the APA, adherence to shared legal frameworks, and the institutionalization of the JCETs.

This study focused on the micro-level assessment of JCETs conducted in the Philippines, especially the PH-US Army-to-Army JCETs utilizing available AARs, ATRs, and post-training reports of the same JCETs from both sides complemented with APAs, CONOPS, a training calendar, and fund utilization reports. The evaluation criteria were based on higher policy documents, commander's intent, and the experiences of the authors in the conduct of these JCETs.

Not all AARs and ATRs are perfectly reliable data sources. There may be some diplomatic constructive comments in the articulation of these reports that possibly made them more subjective than objective. Taking into account the respective culture, this study assumes that the AARs and ATRs used in this analysis are somewhat neutral in their comments to minimize their offensive nature, which may affect the broader objectives of security cooperation. However, even with subdued comments, this research divulges common trends with regard to substantial factors or elements that may serve as determinants of success in the planning and evaluation of JCETs.

As it turned out, the Filipino post-exercise reports or ATRs were more detailed, and focused more on the conduct of the JCET itself, than were the US reports. PH SOF AARs and ATRs include the list of both PA and US participants of the JCETs, the training calendars and daily training schedule, comments, observations, and recommendations for the next JCETs. On the other hand, US post-training reports focused more on the logistical portion and other factors such as weather effects and descriptive summary of entry and movement through the country with equipment. US Special Operation Force (SOF) post-training reports do not include the names of the US participants or main planner of the JCET in which the succeeding US SOF Team could collaborate or leverage to sustain and improve portions of the previously conducted JCET.

The Administrative Procedures Agreement (APA) is the driving document for the common JCET event. It specifically stipulates the administrative and logistical support that should be provided by both armies in the exercise. On the one hand, the PA is usually responsible for making available the training venue or exercise area, training facilities, billeting of all participants including USSOF, transportation, and other requirements of the JCET. The United States, in turn, is usually responsible for providing the training package, training POL and ammunition, limited medical supplies, food and water for US SOF, incidental repairs, aircraft, and base clearance request, among others. Moreover, JUSMAG-Phil facilitates base access and Human Rights Vetting (HRV) procedure (90 days prior to the exercise). With the long HRV process and the operational demands on the battlefield, PH SOF participants who were supposed to participate in the exercise were committed to combat operations during the actual JCET training dates. As such, the PH participants were trimmed down by almost half of the original training participants. There were training fillers on the PH side, but they were not allowed to participate in the training because they were not vetted early. As a consequence, the bilateral exercise was not maximized, considering the amount of resources and efforts poured in for the JCET to make it happen. Again, the unintended consequences of the Leahy Vetting resulted in a suboptimal training outcome, as evident on some instances that fewer troops participated in the exercise.

Beside the fact that there is no bilateral strategy for utilizing JCETs as a means to enhance and capacitate the Philippine security force elements, this study additionally found no exchange of unilaterally-written AARs or ATRs from either PH or US participating units. It is worth noting that part of the objectives of every JCET is to learn and exchange tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in whatever skillsets that both parties are trying to achieve. However, without providing feedback on the results and outcomes of the conducted JCETs, it appears that JCETs are repetitive in the way that training events and objectives are conceptualized without looking for its strategic relevance and long-term goals. The issues and concerns in the reports are recurring, which denotes that the JCET program itself lacks the necessary evaluation process to

address the chronic problems and challenges encountered during the conduct of JCETs, ensure judicious use of money, and ensure proper return of training investment.

The JCET Evaluation Framework (JEF) advanced in this study are validated and provide notable trends in the planning, execution, and evaluation of JCETs in the future. The first trend relates to the increasing number of US SOF members participating in Balance Pistons over the last five years; that is, USSOF is launching multiple teams to different areas or locations under the same JCET umbrella. In turn, this allows for an increased number of AFP training participants for a certain JCET. Another trend is that the AFP appears to be sending more of what this study has defined as the “correct units” to participate in JCETs. This trend focuses on nonoperational units that are cohesive, while further integrating the SOCOM schoolhouses during the training. The third trend is the emergence of combined post-training reviews. Only two examples of combined AARs existed, but they occurred in the last two years. It is inherently necessary that units inform each other on what they can improve so that they can change those things for the future. Another trend is the increase in the number of executed planned events. Not only were fewer events cancelled during the later JCETs, the reports also show that additional events were added throughout the engagements. This trend suggests that more skill sets are developed and enhanced during the JCET event. Lastly, the AFP’s intermittent issues and concerns in logistics directly impact the conduct of JCETs. The current AFP system is unresponsive when attempting to address the specific requirements of JCETs throughout the country.

B. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Even though this study focused solely on U.S.-sponsored JCETs in the Philippines, the findings may prove to be generalizable to other U.S.-sponsored bilateral JCET programs. At the foresight, JCETs will continue to be used as a crucial SOF engagement tool with PNs due to its enduring investments in forging a relationship, and at the same time achieving the main objectives of training US SOF personnel in foreign countries. JCET activities provide an edge to boost the US SOF arsenal by its continued and persistent engagement, acquiring an unparalleled advantage in terms of operational

and cultural understanding and exposing its personnel to other aspects of security cooperation. There are challenges in the continuity of the JCETs, especially when there is no overall combined strategy from both sides. This includes a lack of shared vision for primarily utilizing JCETs to enhance USSOF teams' mentoring and instructor skills, cultural awareness and understanding, and other skillsets inaccessible to US training facilities such as jungle training and survival. Another challenge is to enhance war fighting skills and the capability of PH SOF in addressing internal and external security threats. Therefore, this study recommends the following.

1. Post-Training Report Standardized Format and Exchange

This study concluded that it is important that both the PH and US executing agencies or organizations design a standard format of post-training reports and look for secured ways and means to exchange these reports. The purpose is obvious, as well as the objective of the exchange. Both parties need to know what had been achieved up to the current point, how and when to attain the shared goals, and what areas need more attention. JCETs should not mean business as usual, but rather they should be employed to signal the importance of security engagements not only in building partnerships but also in making those partnerships instrumental in achieving the broader aspects of security cooperation. By exchanging notes and giving honest feedback from concerned PH SOF and US SOF headquarters, the planners would have a better understanding to improve and achieve the objectives of JCETs. The dividends of this program are clear. Foremost, the interactions and exchanges will benefit both sides. Moreover, leaders and soldiers will acquire a different mindset that the highest form of cooperation and collaboration is done with a candid exchange of information or feedback, not only during training but also during actual combat coalition operations. It has been said that "victory in war starts in training,"¹⁰⁸ but it would be more effective if leaders and soldiers not only train to learn but also learn to train and, more importantly, learn to exchange that learning in the most efficient way.

¹⁰⁸ Cabahug, "SOF Joint Combine Exchange Training from a Host Nation's Perspective."

2. Develop a JCET Strategy

Based on the collected post-JCET reports, it is evident that there is no strategy employed either by US SOF or PH SOF in optimizing the utilization of the JCET program. Without a solid plan of action for JCETs, the results of this exercise will be mediocre or suboptimal. Therefore, it is imperative to develop the right strategy for JCETs because at the end of the day, both parties are spending the taxpayer's money. Philippine and US militaries are accountable to the people they both swear to serve. Having a sound strategy for JCETs would discard or negate the leftist or anti-US groups in spreading false allegations or charges against the use of public money by the military for expensive yet suboptimal training exercises.

3. Improve Sustainment Operations

The recurring concerns during any bilateral exercise such as BALIKATAN or JCETs is the slow and/or unresponsive logistic system of the AFP. Most of the bilateral exercises were affected by the untimely delivery of supplies and equipment (or perhaps lack of equipment), lack of standard training facilities, and non-availability of air or ground transport vehicles during the actual field training exercise. In short, too much bureaucracy coupled with a lack of attention in providing the much-needed training support impedes effectiveness and efficacy. This eventually results in a suboptimal training outcome or worse, a training fiasco. Sustainment operation must be exercised during the training so that it would be more effective or efficient during the actual conduct of combat operations. Therefore, the AFP in general or the PA in particular needs to enhance and align its logistic or sustainment system to cater the needs of its most important human resource—the soldiers. It is imperative that the soldiers are provided with substantial training and logistic support to realize the vision of the AFP in professionalizing the force.

4. Include Alternate Participants for HR Vetting

In order to maximize the training opportunities of the PN security force elements and optimize the value of the taxpayer's money from both forces, PNs should include alternate participants in the HR Vetting process. Since the HR vetting process (90 days or

three months prior the exercise) is mandated by US law to all participants of security assistance and security cooperation like JCETs, PNs must comply—because of this, it would be wise to include alternates to avoid low personnel attendance during the training due to current or emerging operational demands, which is a priority over the training. This occurred in one particular JCET, which only trained 31 AFP participants.¹⁰⁹ The APA originally planned for 65 AFP participants;¹¹⁰ however, due to ongoing operations the available training pool changed, and the time had expired to conduct HRV on soldiers not listed 90 days in advance.

5. Conduct Effective Survey

Immediately following any bilateral training exercises such as JCETs, survey questions should be conducted to the planners, participants, opposing forces, training directorate, and logistics and training support teams to gather inputs, observations, comments, and recommendations on the conducted training events and the overall conduct of the JCET itself. The individual impression and evaluation of the conducted training is a realistic form of feedback that allows for JCET modification or innovation to better suit the circumstance where and when the exercise is to be conducted. A more accurate, reliable, and cost-effective means of getting feedback of a certain activity or program is to conduct an effective survey that must adhere to research-based and well-established principles. Accurate and reliable surveys improve better organizational decision-making and better assessment of program needs, priorities, and performance.¹¹¹ Recommended survey questions must include feedback on training venue, logistical support, duration, effectiveness of POI, attainment of training goals, and quality of instructors (among others) that could further the research initiated in this study.

¹⁰⁹ Raabe (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 1.

¹¹⁰ Travis Milgrim (U) *Administrative Procedures Agreement between ODA XXXX and Special Operations Command, Philippine Army* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013) 2. This document is classified FOUO.

¹¹¹ Walt Whitmer, *Conducting Effective Surveys Means Knowing the ‘Rules of the Road’* (Economic and Community Development), December 23, 2014, <http://extension.psu.edu/community/ecd/news/2014/conducting-effective-surveys-means-knowing-the-rules-of-the-road>.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH AND WAY AHEAD

With the limited data about conducted JCETs, it would be relevant to conduct extensive research on this field because of the importance of JCETs in the overall conduct of US security cooperation. As this program continues to be conducted in the future, it would be worthy to examine the returns of JCETs in terms of training investment. It would not only justify the needed funding but would perhaps magnify or vividly illustrate the significance of this program in enhancing US troops' instructor and mentoring skills, and acquire better awareness and understanding of PNs' culture as well as in shaping or reshaping the PNs' capacity and capability to be aligned with US security cooperation policy objectives.

APPENDIX A. JCETS REGULARLY CONDUCTED IN THE PHILIPPINES

(1) Vector Balance Piston

Vector Balance Piston is a yearly PH-US Army-to-Army JCET, which focuses on enhancing the interoperability and capacity of both forces in counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. US 1st Special Forces Group (A) and the former Philippine Army (PA) Light Reaction Battalion (LRB), which is upgraded into a Light Reaction Regiment (LRR) are the participating units for this particular JCET.¹¹² To add complexity and reality in the frontline, the PNP SAF are regularly invited to participate in this exercise to specifically provide more on the law enforcement and document exploitation portions of the exercise. The PNP SAF also participates in the associated friendship jumps or military free fall training events.¹¹³

(2) Balance Piston

Balance Piston is a PH-US Army-to-Army JCET, which is conducted twice or thrice a year. This JCET is geared on enhancing the interoperability of both forces in war-fighting skills to address internal threats and insurgency. BP training events include but are not limited to airborne operations, civil-military operations, day and night air operations, internal defense operation, information operations, live fire exercises, marksmanship training, medical or tactical combat casualty care training, maritime or riverine operations, small unit tactics, special reconnaissance and direct action, and unconventional warfare.¹¹⁴ Philippine Special Forces (SF) and Scout Rangers (SR) are the regular training participants for the PH side while the SOF Team or Teams from different US Army Special Forces Groups¹¹⁵ are the participating elements from the US

¹¹² Stephen C. Cohn, *Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific: Why the U.S. Should Pursue Force Sustainment Training in the Republic of the Philippines* (Monterey, CA: NPS Press, 2006), 71.

¹¹³ Stukaph's Weblog, U.S. Naval Special Warfare, NWU Type III—AOR 2 Camouflage Uniform on Assignment in the Philippines, accessed 21 September 2015, <https://stukaph.wordpress.com/2011/01/22/>.

¹¹⁴ Cohn, *Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific*, 70.

¹¹⁵ 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) is the main U.S. partner in these engagements, however 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has also participated in US/PH JCETs.

side. In order to expose field units to joint and combined training and exercise, division reconnaissance companies (most of the soldiers were SF and SR qualified) also participate as training participants for BP training exercises.

(3) Teak Piston

Teak Piston is a PH-US Air Force-to-Air Force JCET with emphasis on “low-level flight navigation, infiltration, and air drops.”¹¹⁶ C-130 aircraft maintenance training is also included as part of the exercise.

(4) Flash Piston

Flash Piston is a PH-US Navy Seals JCET, which focuses on small unit tactics, marksmanship, and demolition, among others. Flash Piston incorporates trainings on maritime close quarter battle and jungle survival.¹¹⁷ Moreover, small boat operations, assault tactics, tactical combat medical care, and casualty evacuations were also included as part of the exercise.¹¹⁸

(5) Lantern Piston

Lantern Piston is a JCET traditionally participated by the PH and US Marines. However, in recent years the PNP SAF has also participated in this exercise. For example, Lantern Piston 13–3 is specifically designed to cater to the training demands of PNP SAF.¹¹⁹

(6) Fusion Piston

Fusion Piston is a joint-interagency JCET, which supports counterterrorism and counter-narcotics operations. The AFP and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency are

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Cohn, *Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific*, 68.

¹¹⁸ Katherine Sanchez, U.S., Philippines Special Operations Forces Train Together as Part of Flash Piston (JSOTF-Philippines Public Affairs), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=38131.

¹¹⁹ Asian Defense Military Review, Lantern Piston 13–3 (PNP SAF) Closing Ceremony, accessed September 21, 2015, <https://www.facebook.com/aseanmildef/photos/a.515982831809429.1073741854.172244062849976/515983058476073/?type=3&theater>.

the lead agencies for this type of JCET. On the US side, the Drug Enforcement Agency and US Navy Seals participate in this bilateral training exercise.¹²⁰

(7) Baker Piston

Baker Piston is a law enforcement JCET, which focuses on enhancing the effectiveness of Philippine counter-drug agencies to facilitate successful prosecution of drug-related offenders. The training events include but are not limited to advanced marksmanship, cordon and search, instructor training, medical training, mission planning, movement techniques, special reconnaissance, trail interdiction, and urban terrain small unit tactics, among others.¹²¹

(8) Badge Piston

Badge Piston is PH-US JCET participated by the PNP SAF and US SOF. It focuses on enhancing the capacity and capability of PNP SAF in hostage rescue, commando-type unconventional warfare, search and rescue, and other special operations with national and international implications.¹²² Training events include, but are not limited to, basic and advanced combat marksmanship, close quarter combat, medical training, and mission planning and execution.¹²³

¹²⁰ Cohn, *Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific*, 68.

¹²¹ Cohn, *Realignment of United States Forces in the Pacific*, 67; Philippine National Police (PNP) Homepage, PNP Maritime Group Officially Initiates Baker Piston 14–2 Training in Palawan, accessed on September 21, 2015, <http://pnp.gov.ph/portal/index.php/press-news-releases/more-media-news/38-regional/1446-pnp-maritime-group-officially-initiates-baker-piston-14-2-training-in-palawan>.

¹²² Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action Force (SAF) website, Mission of PNP SAF, accessed September 21, 2015, <http://pnp.gov.ph/portal/index.php/press-news-releases/more-media-news/38-regional/1446-pnp-maritime-group-officially-initiates-baker-piston-14-2-training-in-palawan>.

¹²³ PNP SAF Badge Piston Video Clip, accessed September 21, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_5jXSTejL3U.

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APPENDIX B. CONSOLIDATED JCET DATA

A. INTRODUCTION

Initial assessment criteria for this study included many predictors for success: cultural awareness, quality of advisors, planning, training venues, and time invested, as well as how the value of JCETs relate to the overall theater campaign plan. However, some of these criteria are near impossible to substantiate. The quality of advisors, although clearly a subjective variable, could possibly be determined if the post-training reports had discussed the individual trainers. The reports that were analyzed did not describe the quality of the advisors, neither PH nor United States. Therefore, advisor quality has been dismissed as a variable. The quality of training resources was an initial variable as well. However, just like the quality of instructors, there was not enough data to quantify the variable. Post-engagement writers were able to describe overwhelming flaws in resources, but failed to mention any positive comments, nor anything of importance in great detail regarding resources.

JCETs, although designed for training of US operators, supports the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) by enhancing the capabilities and inter-operability, while fostering good relations between the US and PH armies.¹²⁴ This objective is listed in all of the reviewed post-training assessments and is a TCP priority directly linked to the National Security Strategy. In this sense, the incidental benefits gained by participating Partner Nations are of greater importance than the actual training benefits received by the executing US SOF unit.

The Philippine Army (PA) Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and the Lessons Learned Office (LLO) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) are the main sources of these post-JCET reports. It should be noted, however, that records prior to the establishment of the LLO are difficult to acquire. Also, while some units are proactive in ensuring that the LLO receives valuable

¹²⁴ Lester Garcia (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2013) 1. This document is classified Secret.

training information, some units maintain the information locally. While consolidating the JCET information for this study, the LLO individually contacted the subordinate US SOF units and requested that the information be locally maintained.

The data presented in this study is a consolidation of relevant facts from over 900 pages of mostly classified documents. Only unclassified sources and unclassified sections of classified documents are referenced in this document. All source reference information, including report titles and authors, has been sterilized in order to preserve the classification of the sources. In an attempt to streamline the content of the main thesis, this information is located in the appendix and serves as a reference for the overall document.

B. JCET QUALITATIVE INFORMATION

1. JCET Event 1

During Event 1, the combined participants conducted fellowship socials to develop camaraderie¹²⁵ and jointly planned, coordinated, and executed two Civil Military Operations (CMO) activities¹²⁶ (a MEDCAP and a VETCAP). The Filipino planners also coordinated with local corporate sponsors (McDonalds) for the conduct of the CMO activities.¹²⁷ Overall, Event 1 involved 14 US Special Operations Force (SOF) and 57 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) participants¹²⁸ and the training days totaled 12 days.¹²⁹ Training priorities were addressed for both nations and all units were satisfied with the overall training.¹³⁰ However, more than two weeks of training were lost due to the delayed arrival of the US SOF (due to Typhoon Mina).¹³¹ A culmination exercise (CULEX) did not occur during Event 1. The AARs indicate that both sides viewed the training as a venue to share lessons learned and exchange tactics, techniques, and

¹²⁵ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 6.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 2.

procedures (TTPs) between each respective nation's participating units;¹³² however, both the United States and the AFP noted in their respective AARs that the duration of the engagement was too short and failed to build strong rapport between the United States and AFP units.¹³³ The AFP also noted that the training schedule was compressed to allow most events to be accomplished in the original allotted timeline, thus reducing what would have been great events.¹³⁴

The AFP participants were a composite unit assembled only for this event and a third of SR soldiers participating in the training were not actually Scout Ranger qualified.¹³⁵ The combination of being a composite unit and the lack of SR experience severely slowed the training pace.¹³⁶ Additionally, soldiers from the local PA Infantry division were integrated into training with the soldiers of the PA SF Battalion.¹³⁷

Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective chains of command, the post-training reports showed no evidence of a conducted combined AAR by the participants.¹³⁸ In these reports, the AFP complained about the need to rush training in the observation section of the report,¹³⁹ yet the recommendations section states that they were still, overall, satisfied with the training.¹⁴⁰ For the US side, the participating US SOF did not feel as though the training was adequate and mentioned the need for a longer duration of training in its post- engagement report. Moreover, the US post-engagement report mentioned defective rifles and poor

¹³² Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 7.

¹³³ Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 7.

¹³⁴ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 7.

¹³⁵ Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 8.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 2.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

¹³⁹ Santos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 7.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

equipment maintenance of the Filipino participants, which also consumed a considerable amount of training time to rectify.¹⁴¹

2. JCET Event 2

The number of active participants during this event was eight US SOF and 55 AFP soldiers.¹⁴² The AFP participants consisted of a composite mix of PA Special Forces and Scout Ranger soldiers assigned to operational units, which greatly impeded the training.¹⁴³ The total number of training days for Event 2 was 38 days.¹⁴⁴ Event 2's training schedule addressed the concerns for all parties¹⁴⁵ and was constantly modified throughout execution due to training complications with the host battalion's ongoing combat operations in the area.¹⁴⁶ Also, a CULEX was properly coordinated and executed.¹⁴⁷ During the JCET, the AFP led several training events: knot tying, survival, traps and snares, rope bridges, river crossing, and improvised cooking techniques.¹⁴⁸ Also, cultural exchanges frequently occurred during the engagement to include showing videos of PH and US respective Ranger and Special Forces units.¹⁴⁹ All training records for Event 2 indicate that all planned training events were executed without any additions.¹⁵⁰

Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands, the post-training reports showed no evidence of a combined AAR conducted by the participants.¹⁵¹ The AFP participants were, overall, satisfied with

¹⁴¹ Rhodes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 7.

¹⁴² Pagan (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 1.

¹⁴³ Pacquin (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 6.

¹⁴⁴ Pagan (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 1.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Pacquin (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Smith (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis*

¹⁴⁸ Pagan (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 2–4.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Pacquin (U) *Balance Piston 12–2 Post Training Report*.

the training.¹⁵² However, US SOF did not feel as though the training was adequate and recommended that US SOF partner with nonoperational AFP units during future engagements.¹⁵³

3. JCET Event 3

The number of active participants during Event 3 was ten US SOF and 31 AFP soldiers.¹⁵⁴ The participating AFP soldiers consisted of a cohesive unit, but due to ongoing operational demands, some personnel that should have benefitted from this JCET were unable to participate.¹⁵⁵ No additional units beyond the single cohesive unit were involved in training during the JCET.¹⁵⁶ The total number of training days for this event was 32 days.¹⁵⁷

A CULEX was planned and executed, but overall training did not address the concerns of the hosting AFP commander.¹⁵⁸ The PA Special Forces battalion commander requested a focus on maritime operations (MAROPS), which was noted in the US SOF post-initial planning report and planned as two days for MAROPs tactics and planning, three days for beach landing site surveys and scout swimming, and one and a half days for a MAROPs infiltration practical exercise.¹⁵⁹ However, the actual training during the JCET focused on combat marksmanship, devoting only a partial day to a MAROPs lecture.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the AFP's after training report only describes the U.S.-led training with no mention of the PH participants ever instructing,¹⁶¹ and neither the US

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Pacquin (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 7.

¹⁵⁴ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 1.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Milgrim (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Initial Planning Report*, 4.

¹⁶⁰ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

SOF post-engagement reports,¹⁶² nor the AFP post-training reports¹⁶³ mention any cultural or rapport building events.

Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands, neither the US SOF post-training report¹⁶⁴ nor the AFP post-training report¹⁶⁵ indicate that the participants conducted a combined AAR. Several events planned during the planning conference¹⁶⁶ were not executed.¹⁶⁷ Although US SOF considered the engagement a success,¹⁶⁸ the AFP counterparts did not; the AFP desired to train more on MAROPs.¹⁶⁹

4. JCET Event 4

The number of active participants during Event 4 was nine US SOF and 84 AFP soldiers¹⁷⁰ and the total number of training days for this JCET was 47.¹⁷¹ According to reports, the training accommodated the needs of all participants,¹⁷² but a CULEX was not conducted and the training did not accommodate any unplanned events.¹⁷³ Also, all participating units conducted a fellowship social to establish initial rapport early in the JCET.¹⁷⁴ US SOF instructed AFP instructors from the PA Special Forces Company Refresher Training (CRT) Committee at the PA Special Forces School (SFS), who in turn instructed other AFP soldiers.¹⁷⁵ The US SOF then assisted during CRT alongside a

¹⁶² Raabe (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

¹⁶³ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*.

¹⁶⁴ Raabe (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

¹⁶⁵ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*.

¹⁶⁶ Milgrim (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Initial Planning Report*, 4.

¹⁶⁷ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

¹⁶⁸ Raabe (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

¹⁶⁹ Ocampo (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

¹⁷⁰ Garcia (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 1.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² Miller (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

¹⁷³ Garcia (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Miller (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 4.

nonoperational cohesive PA Special Forces Company.¹⁷⁶ However, only a few CRT instructors participated in the JCET; insufficient numbers of CRT instructors participated in the preliminary training to see effects during the actual CRT rotational training.¹⁷⁷

Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands, the post-training reports show no evidence that participants conducted a combined AAR.¹⁷⁸ Also, training records for Event 4 indicate that all planned training events were executed without any additions.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, a discrepancy exists in that US SOF believed that the JCET was not quite a success, but would have been successful if more CRT instructors had participated.¹⁸⁰ The PH participants claimed that Event 4 was a success.¹⁸¹

5. JCET Event 5

The number of active participants during Event 5 was 14 US SOF and 95 AFP soldiers¹⁸² and the JCET lasted for 19 days.¹⁸³ The AFP participants consisted of complete PA Special Forces teams; however, they were in an operational status.¹⁸⁴ No additional AFP units were involved in training.¹⁸⁵

According to documentation, the training accommodated the needs of all participants¹⁸⁶ and was able to adjust in order to devote more time to prioritized events.¹⁸⁷ However, the CULEX that was originally planned was not conducted due to

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Garcia (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Miller (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 4.

¹⁸¹ Garcia (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 1–2.

¹⁸² Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 1.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ McDougal (U) *PH-US Balance Piston XX-X Combined Post Training Report*.

¹⁸⁷ Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2.

issues involving the local populace near the impact areas.¹⁸⁸ Additionally, the reports state that the US SOF and AFP each instructed various events¹⁸⁹ and the AFP reports specifically mention the importance, with regards to building added rapport, of having the US SOF stay at the camp near their AFP counterparts.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, the combined JCET participants jointly planned, coordinated, and executed a CMO project at a local school.¹⁹¹ The project was planned at the initial planning conference¹⁹² and allowed sufficient time to properly coordinate with the Local Government Unit (LGU). The level of rapport with the local government was so great that LGU allowed the JCET participants to utilize the government's heavy equipment.¹⁹³

The available combined written AAR¹⁹⁴ implies that a combined oral AAR was also conducted. Each participating unit submitted unilateral written AARs to their respective commands as well. Training records for Event 5 indicate that more events were added to training than were dropped. Although the CULEX was not conducted and a day of MAROPS training was cut, multiple days of pistol marksmanship were added, as well as a day of PH requested communications training.¹⁹⁵ All participating parties claimed that the event was a success in their post-training reports.¹⁹⁶

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Derek Kaiser (U) *Administrative Procedures Agreement between ODA XXXX and Special Operations Command, Philippine Army* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013) 3. This document is classified FOUO.

¹⁹³ Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 3.

¹⁹⁴ McDougal (U) *PH-US Balance Piston XX-X Combined Post Training Report*.

¹⁹⁵ Reyes (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 2–3.

¹⁹⁶ Andrew McDougal (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2013). This document is classified Secret.

6. JCET Event 6

The number of active participants during Event 6 was six US SOF and 60 AFP soldiers¹⁹⁷ and the total duration of training was 60 days.¹⁹⁸ The AFP participants consisted of cohesive nonoperational units¹⁹⁹ including soldiers from both the PA Special Forces School and the PA Special Forces Regiment.²⁰⁰ The planners had coordinated for Philippine Air Force (PAF) support, but the PAF cancelled at the last minute due to mission requirements.²⁰¹

Participating units conducted a fellowship dive to establish rapport.²⁰² Also, a friendship jump was scheduled, but it was canceled due to adverse weather.²⁰³ The documents elude that the training fulfilled the needs of all participants, and flexibility in training execution was mentioned, which accommodated much-needed training events although resources available for the JCET changed. A CULEX was planned and conducted, but with some inefficiencies in logistics.²⁰⁴ The US SOF and AFP each instructed various topics, shared TTPs, and imparted lessons learned.²⁰⁵

Although the United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands, the post-training reports show no evidence of a conducted combined AAR by the participants.²⁰⁶ All parties involved viewed Event 6 as a success.²⁰⁷

¹⁹⁷ Jeff Bautista (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2014) 1. This Document is classified Secret.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Stewart Johnson (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C. This document is classified Secret.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Richard Godspeed (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2014) 5. This document is classified Secret.

²⁰² Bautista (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report*, 2.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Johnson (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis*.

²⁰⁵ Stewart Johnson (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Training Calendar* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2014). This document is classified FOUO.

²⁰⁶ Godspeed (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

²⁰⁷ Johnson (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Photos and Synopsis*.

7. JCET Event 7

The number of active participants during Event 7 was 34 US SOF and 77 AFP soldiers.²⁰⁸ The AFP participants consisted of cohesive nonoperational units and instructors from the Special Forces School (SFS)²⁰⁹ and the total number of training days for this engagement was 26 days.²¹⁰ Participating units conducted a friendship jump to establish rapport.²¹¹ Also, US SOF stayed at the school compound to build cohesion,²¹² and all PH and US holidays were observed.²¹³ According to reports, the training accommodated the needs of all participants²¹⁴ and all planned events appeared to be executed.²¹⁵ A CULEX was planned (and also included in the APA)²¹⁶ and executed. Reports also noted that the US SOF and AFP each instructed various topics.²¹⁷

A combined written AAR is attached to the After Training Report, signifying open discussions between the units.²¹⁸ Combined AARs appeared to be conducted regularly throughout the JCET. While the US SOF viewed Event 7 as a success,²¹⁹ the AFP felt that the US SOF did not have a training schedule and almost exclusively focused on cross training themselves.²²⁰

²⁰⁸ Mark Cruz (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines, 2014) 1. This document is classified Secret.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Shirley (U) *Administrative Procedures Agreement between Company X, X Battalion, X Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command, Philippine Army* 3.

²¹⁷ Philip Ramos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2014). This document is classified Secret.

²¹⁸ Cruz (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 20–35.

²¹⁹ Ramos (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*.

²²⁰ Cruz (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 41.

8. JCET Event 8

The number of active participants during Event 8 was 23 US SOF and 65 AFP soldiers.²²¹ All participating units were internal to the Special Forces Regiment, which consisted of cohesive nonoperational units.²²² The total number of training days for this engagement was 33 days.²²³ The documents portray that the training accommodated the needs of all participants, and a CULEX was planned and executed.²²⁴ Also, participating units conducted a friendship jump, an unspecified cultural visit, and a boodle fight to establish and strengthen rapport.²²⁵ Further strengthening the cultural bond, the US SOF and AFP each instructed various topics throughout the JCET.²²⁶

A combined Oral AAR was listed in the training calendar.²²⁷ There was no evidence of a combined written AAR; all participating parties submitted unilateral AARs to their respective commands. The after training reports suggest that the events planned were the same as the events that were executed²²⁸ and all parties involved viewed Event 8 as a success.²²⁹

9. JCET Event 9

The total number of participants during this engagement was 193 US SOF and 268 combined AFP soldiers and PNP officers²³⁰ and the total number of training days for this event was 25.²³¹ For US SOF, these numbers include US Army rotary wing

²²¹ Joshua Mendoza (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report* (Department of National Defense: Republic of the Philippines. This Document is classified Secret. Declassify according to the regulations of the Philippine Department of National Defense, 2015) 1.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Jarend McMaster (U) *Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report (AOB)* (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., 2015) 1. This document is classified Secret.

²²⁴ Mendoza (U) *Balance Piston XX-X After Activity Report* 14.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Smiley (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 1.

²³¹ Torres (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 1.

personnel and US Air Force Airman. The AFP participants consisted of cohesive nonoperational units and instructors from the training directorate.²³² Participating units included the LRR, the Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG), the 205th Helo Wing, local PNP, and the PNP-SAF.²³³ The training accommodated the needs of all participants and a CULEX was planned and executed.²³⁴ The reports note that the US SOF and AFP each instructed various topics.²³⁵ Also, participating units conducted a friendship jump and an icebreaker social.²³⁶

A combined oral AAR is listed in the training calendar,²³⁷ but there is no evidence of a combined written AAR. The United States and the AFP submitted unilaterally written AARs to their respective commands. The post-engagement reports indicate that events that were executed were the same as those that had been planned²³⁸ and all parties involved viewed Event 9 as a success.²³⁹ Note that Event 9 will not be included in the following chart. This event is the only Vector Balance Piston that this study addresses and will skew the data.

C. VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF JCET DATA

Table 2 illustrates some of the easily quantifiable facts from the eight JCETs: number of personnel (both US SOF and AFP) and the duration of the events from opening ceremonies to closing ceremonies (not including set-up or clean-up days). It also displays whether or not a combined AAR was conducted with representatives of all participating units together. Only two out of the eight JCETs conducted combined AARs.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Smiley (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X Post Training Report*, 1–2.

²³⁴ Torres (U) *Vector Balance Piston XX-X After Training Report*, 3.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Table 2. JCET Quantifiable Data and Notation of Combined AARs Conducted vs. Not Conducted by Event

Event	# US SOF	# AFP	Duration (days)	Combined AAR Conducted
1	14	57	12	N
2	8	55	38	N
3	10	31	32	N
4	9	84	47	N
5	14	95	19	Y
6	6	60	60	N
7	34	77	26	Y
8	23	65	33	N

Table 3 highlights the types of AFP units that trained during each respective JCET. If another unit participated outside of the hosting battalion, then that exercise receives a “Y” for “yes” in the column. The AFP units are also annotated on whether they were in an operational status during the event, if the units were a cohesive (Y) group or a composite (N), and whether or not the JCET integrated PA SOCOM school instructors.

Table 3. Data Depicting Types of AFP Units Trained During Studied JCETs

Event	Multiple Units Integrated	PA SOCOM School Instructors Integrated	AFP Non-Operational Units	AFP Cohesive Units
1	Y	N	N	N
2	Y	N	N	N
3	N	N	N	Y
4	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	N	N	N	Y
6	Y	N	Y	Y
7	Y	Y	Y	Y
8	N	N	Y	Y

Table 4 displays data related to flexibility of training schedules, CULEX execution, and adherence to the agreed-upon training schedules.

Table 4. Data Depicting Variation in Planned vs. Executed Events During Studied JCETs

Event	Executed All Planned Events	Adjusted Schedule to meet AFP SOF needs	Executed CULEX
1	N	N	N
2	Y	Y	Y
3	Y	N	Y
4	Y	N	N
5	Y	Y	N
6	N	Y	Y
7	Y	N	Y
8	Y	N	Y

Finally, Table 5 compares US and PH comments related to success in the respective post-engagement reports. In order to be viewed as a success, the report contained a preponderance of positive comments related to the training. On the contrary, non-successful reports contained multiple negative comments regarding the training during the JCETs.

Table 5. Data Depicting Discrepancies between US and PH Views of Success Per JCET

Event	US Viewed JCET as a Success	AFP Viewed JCET as Success
1	N	Y
2	N	Y
3	Y	N
4	N	Y
5	Y	Y
6	Y	Y
7	Y	N
8	Y	Y

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