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THESIS

U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT

by

Christopher M. Davis

June 2001

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For the last two decades, the United States and Iran have fostered a relationship of enmity and distrust. The United States imposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic, in an effort to isolate the regime and limit its ability to finance terrorist activity or to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Since 1996, however, Iran has undertaken a diplomatic “charm offensive” aimed at opening up to regional rivals and to the international community. It has sent some signals that it seeks to distance itself from terrorism and from antagonistic relations with its neighbors. Its burgeoning relations with Europe has left America alone in its implementation of sanctions, and has put Washington at odds with its European partners.

This thesis looks more closely at the nature of U.S. policy against Iran, examining key issues with regard to its conventional and unconventional security posture, the regional security environment that defines that posture, and the linkage between Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its sponsorship of extremist organizations such as Hizballah. It argues that Iran has legitimate security concerns that drive its current foreign policy. In this context, there may be room for rapprochement with Tehran.
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U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

For the last two decades, the United States and Iran have fostered a relationship of enmity and distrust. The United States imposes sanctions against the Islamic Republic, in an effort to isolate the regime and limit its ability to finance terrorist activity or to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Since 1996, however, Iran has undertaken a diplomatic “charm offensive” aimed at opening up to regional rivals and to the international community. It has sent some signals that it seeks to distance itself from terrorism and from antagonistic relations with its neighbors. Its burgeoning relations with Europe has left America alone in its implementation of sanctions, and has put Washington at odds with its European partners.

This thesis looks more closely at the nature of U.S. policy against Iran, examining key issues with regard to its conventional and unconventional security posture, the regional security environment that defines that posture, and the linkage between Iran’s proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its sponsorship of extremist organizations such as Hizballah. It argues that Iran has legitimate security concerns that drive its current foreign policy. In this context, there may be room for rapprochement with Tehran.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

U.S. policy on Iran is rooted in preventing the Islamic Republic from proliferating Weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the Islamic regime in 1979, Iran has been the subject of unilateral sanctions by the United States, despite sentiment from Western partners that sanctions are counterproductive and ineffective. Washington's goal is to foster regional stability, prevent extremist groups that Iran sponsors from acquiring such weapons, and to ensure the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been viewed as a dangerous and destabilizing entity in the Middle East. If not for Saddam Hussein, Iran would still be perceived as the most dangerous state in the region. Viewed from this perspective, Washington is quite right in its commitment to preventing a weapons buildup in Iran, as well as its attempts at diplomatic isolation of the country.

However, Iran's history with its neighbors and with the West provides incentive for Tehran to pursue conventional and unconventional capability. I argue the following:

• Iran has a history of insecurity, dating back to the Shah. This has contributed to a "siege mentality" in Iran. Its borders have been infiltrated, militarily and politically, from expansionist Communism to Western oil cartels, to hegemonic neighbors with significant WMD capability.

• The inordinate expense and lack of technical expertise inside Iran may limit its ability to pursue a substantial nuclear inventory. This explains Tehran's retention of a chemical weapons inventory - the "poor man's nuclear bomb" - since they are relatively inexpensive. Comparison with other Gulf countries will place its conventional military buildup in perspective, and will show that, while it remains a dominant military power in the Gulf, its spending trends remain comparable to its neighbors.

• Iran is a sponsor of international terrorism, especially to Palestinian groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. U.S. policy links Iran's unconventional weapons buildup to terrorism, by implying that such a
capability provides these groups access to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. None of these groups have a history of chemical weapons use, however, despite the fact that Iran has had such capability since the 1980s. I argue that the WMD threat posed by these groups must be analyzed in terms of the group's organization, ideology, aspirations and operational history. These factors, as well as the political issues imposed by state sponsorship, constrain the activities of groups such as Hizballah, relative to apocalyptic counterparts such as Aum Shinrikyo, which launched a chemical attack in 1995.

- Finally, sanctions have served to isolate the United States, not Iran. They are not popular with America's allies, who perceive of the sanctions as ineffective and a violation of their sovereignty. An open relationship with Iran could allow the United States to shape the future of Iran's WMD capability, rather than alienate us from our allies and foment an already festering enmity toward the West in the region.
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The author would like to thank Professor Harold A. Trinkunas and Professor Ahmad Ghoreishi for their assistance and guidance throughout the completion of the thesis process. Their patience and mentoring proved integral to what I hope is a focused and inciteful study of prospects for rapprochement between the United States and Iran. The author would also like to thank Professor Glenn Robinson, who truly hones students' writing skills. I did not learn how to write scholarly work until I took his classes.

Finally, the author would like to thank his wife Marcia, and his children Jordan, Patricia, and Stephen, who serve as the inspiration for all that I do. Without you, this would have little meaning.
I. INTRODUCTION

U. S. policy on Iran is rooted in preventing the Islamic Republic from proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the advent of the Islamic regime in 1979, Iran has been the subject of unilateral sanctions by the United States, “without multilateral support, which if nothing else makes Iran an interesting case study of the use of sanctions when the United States disagrees with its allies about how to proceed.”¹ These sanctions have been modified and extended, and have included the following:

- Following the November 1979 embassy takeover in Tehran, President Carter made it illegal for Americans to purchase goods directly from Iran, and froze $12 billion in Iranian assets in the U.S. In 1980, he extended the sanctions, to include a ban on all commerce and travel between Iran and the United States.

- Between 1984 and 1987, restrictions on economic ties with Iran increased following then-Secretary of State Schultz’s designation of Iran as a supporter of international terrorism.

- On October 6, 1987 Congress passed resolutions calling for a ban on all Iranian imports. President Reagan signed an executive order prohibiting nearly all imports from Iran.


- The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 extended restrictions on U.S. exports to Iran. It also included mandatory sanctions against foreign governments aiding Iran in proliferating weapons of mass destruction, as well as “a ban on sale...of items on the U.S. Munitions List, suspension of

dual-use technical exchange agreements, and an end to any economic aid."2

- On August 5, 1996 President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA, also called the D'Amato Act after its sponsor, Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato). It targets only investment in Iranian oil and gas development in excess of $20 million.

- In August 1997, despite some speculation that U.S.-Iran relations might improve, President Clinton issued a new executive order banning U.S. exports to third countries "when the goods are destined for reexport to Iran."3

The goal is to foster regional stability, prevent state-sponsored terrorists from acquiring such weapons, and to ensure the free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been viewed as a dangerous and destabilizing entity in the Middle East. If not for Saddam Hussein, Iran would still be perceived as the most dangerous state in the region. These issues, quite rightly, have forced the United States to be firm in its commitment to preventing a weapons buildup in Iran.

However, Iran's history with its neighbors and with the West provides incentive for the Islamic Republic to pursue conventional and unconventional weapons capability. I argue the following:

- Iran has a history of insecurity, dating back to the Shah. This contributed to a "siege mentality" in Iran. Its borders have been infiltrated militarily and politically, from expansionist Communism to Western oil cartels, to hegemonic neighbors with significant WMD capability.

2 Ibid., 86.

3 Ibid., 9.
• However, given the inordinate expense involved in acquiring nuclear weapons, the Iranian economy may limit Tehran's ability to pursue a substantial inventory. This explains Tehran's retention of a chemical weapons inventory, since they are relatively inexpensive. Comparison with other Gulf countries, however, indicates that Iran is not pursuing a massive military buildup, conventional or otherwise. While it remains a dominant power in the Persian Gulf, its spending trends remain comparable to its neighbors’.

• Iran is a historic sponsor of international terrorism, especially to Palestinian groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. U.S. policy links Iran's weapons buildup to terrorism, by implying that such a capability provides these groups access to weapons of mass destruction. None of these groups have a history of chemical weapons use, however, despite the fact that Iran has had such capability since the 1980s. Why? I argue that the WMD threat posed by these groups must be analyzed in terms of the group's organization, ideology, aspirations, and operational history. State sponsorship constrains the activities of such groups as Hizballah, relative to apocalyptic counterparts such as Aum Shinrikyo, which launched a chemical attack in 1995.

• Sanctions have served to isolate the United States, not Iran. They are not popular with America's allies, who perceive the sanctions as ineffectual and a violation of their sovereignty. An open relationship with Iran could allow the United States to shape the nature of Iran's WMD capability, rather than alienate us from our allies and foment an already festering enmity toward the West in the region.

International relations theory forms the framework for my first argument. I draw mainly from the security dilemma theory put forward by Robert Jervis, and the regional security analysis provided by Zeev Maoz. This will provide some insight into an insecurity that was borne not out of the Islamic Revolution, but one which goes back to the 1950's, to the height of the Cold War, when a young Mohammed Reza Shah sought U.S. patronage in order to satisfy his own security needs. Iran is distinct in that, from a security standpoint, it experienced two distinct revolutionary periods during the twentieth century. The first was the post-colonial experience, when it first struggled to establish
sovereignty and with it security; the second was the post-Islamic Revolution experience, when it established new rules for foreign and domestic policy. At both times, the new regime had to provide for the security for the state. I believe that historical perspective will offer some insight as to why Iran pursues the foreign and security policies that it does.

The second argument requires an examination of recent trends in conventional as well as unconventional proliferation, in comparison to the rest of the Gulf. Chapter three examines the military balance in the Gulf, in an effort to shed further light on the real motivation behind Iran’s proliferation efforts. Iran and Iraq stand as the two powers in the Persian Gulf. This notwithstanding, evidence indicates that Iran now places far less emphasis on a massive conventional military buildup. Further, domestic economic pressures coupled with the need for Iran to drastically improve or replace existing inventories may prohibit the country from seeking a rapid buildup.

Still, Iran continues to pursue WMD capability, including chemical and biological. Such technology is far cheaper than its nuclear counterpart, even if it is not as "glamorous," and Iran has demonstrated its ability to develop and employ such weapons. While chapter two seeks to answer why Iran pursues such a security posture, chapter three seeks to place Iran’s WMD pursuits in proper perspective, and further examines the real nature of the military balance in the Gulf. We should ask ourselves whether Iran possesses a significant military advantage over its neighbors, not only in terms of quantity, in terms of quality - in technology, maintenance, and personnel. Just as important, in terms of Iran’s aggregate proliferation capacity, is Iran’s desire for such weapons part of a policy of substitution for a strong conventional military, given the
current state of its army? From an economic standpoint, Iran’s proliferation may be driven by rational concerns of cost. It may, in fact, be more economical to procure such weapons than it is to rebuild its conventional forces.

Third, I argue that a key concern for Washington is the prospects for unconventional weapons falling into the hands of “terrorists.” Iran remains on Washington’s list of state sponsors of terrorism, and the availability of weapons of mass destruction inside Iran poses the threat of such weapons becoming part of the arsenal of such groups as Hizballah and Hamas, both of which have historically been sponsored by Iran. This poses grave implications, not only for the security of the Persian Gulf, but for the Middle East peace process, which is already in dire straits. Both groups are firmly against the process, and the availability of such weapons could give them a powerful role in forestalling future negotiations.

Iran began its chemical and biological weapons programs in 1987, making such weapons available to groups such as Hizballah, which was established in 1982 during the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. None of these groups show a history of using such weapons, particularly in the context of regional security. Key factors as to why these groups have not opted for the WMD threat may include the very nature of their relationship with the states that sponsor them. Hizballah, in particular, provides an interesting case, given that it is was most directly established by Iran, and has received much of its training and financing from Tehran. When compared to apocalyptic groups like Aum Shinrikyo or “freelancers” such as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida, Hizballah clearly does not have the incentive of freedom of activity of its counterparts. Chapter IV
looks more closely at these groups, and assesses the real threat of whether Iranian proliferation means terrorist proliferation.

Finally, we can make a point that a closer relationship with Iran would allow the United States greater ability to shape the nature of Iran’s military capacity. America’s current policy isolates, not Iran, but America. States Jahangir Amuzegar, "Washington has tried and failed to enlist its major allies in its campaign against Iran." The European Union, Japan, even some of its partners in the region regard American sanctions against Iran as unrealistic and ineffective. Most of the allies have pursued a more pragmatic relationship with Iran. They argue that trade and investment do more to moderate Iran than do sanctions. According to Anthony Cordesman, "Most such states feel the U.S. is pursuing a policy that is mong history of tension and violence. While many scholars have offered their analysis of security and international politics, I borrow mainly from two such theorists – Robert Jervis and Zeev Maoz. I find their work particularly pertinent to my analysis of the U.S.-Iran relationship.

Each chapter explores an element of my argument. Chapter II looks more closely at Iran’s regional security environment, and seeks to place in perspective Iran’s motivation for pursuing an arms buildup. It uses international relations theory as the theoretical framework, and argues that the hostile nature of the Middle East security environment poses a significant security dilemma for Iran to pursue a heightened security posture.

Chapter III examines the Persian Gulf military balance in order to further place in perspective Iran’s proliferation activities, particularly in the 1990s. It argues that, given
the capabilities and spending patterns of neighbors such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s conventional proliferation patterns are in fact modest, and cannot be perceived as destabilizing to the region.

Chapter IV looks at the issue of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism. I argue that U.S. policy inaccurately places state-sponsored extremist organizations in the same category as other organizations, such as the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo, which was responsible for the 1995 sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway, by linking Iran’s unconventional arms buildup to these organizations. For instance, in a 1999 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, former U.S. Secretary Madeleine K. Albright observed that, in the struggle against terrorism, “our adversaries [terrorist organizations] are likely to avoid traditional battlefield situations because there, American dominance is well established. They may resort, instead, to weapons of mass destruction....”

This chapter compares Aum Shinrikyo with Hizballah, which is sponsored by Iran. I believe that state-sponsored groups, as an instrument of state policy, will necessarily have constraints not present for groups such as Aum. Chapter IV argues that Hizballah, distinct from Aum Shinrikyo, is also constrained by its ideology, goals, and the constituency to which it attempts to appeal, and from which it seeks new recruits. As the state sponsor, Iran is also constrained in its willingness and ability to provide such weapons to Hizballah. It is constrained by some of the same factors as the organization,

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such as ideology and the constituency to which it would like to appeal; it is also constrained by the repercussions of such an attack upon its interests. This includes diminished deniability, physical and political damage to its neighbors, and the probability of retaliation from such pro-Western powerhouse states as Israel or Turkey, or even from the United States.

Chapter V presents my conclusions, and examines whether there is indeed room for improved relations between the two very different states. Based on the facts I intend to present, I argue that there is, and that the time is now.
II. IRANIAN SECURITY

A. THE MIDDLE EAST SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The perplexing reality of Iran is that the very threat that it poses to the rest of the Middle East – and to U.S. interests in the region – is Iran’s complex geo-political environment, which is quite different from the United States’. While America enjoys a political stability and geographic isolation from any menace, this is not the case for Iran. The current relationship between the United States and Iran is quite similar to that shared by Britain and Austria in the period after the Napoleonic Wars. Jervis summarizes.

The differences between highly vulnerable and less vulnerable states are illustrated by the contrasting policies of Britain and Austria after the Napoleonic Wars. Britain’s geographic isolation and political stability allowed her to take a fairly relaxed view of disturbances on the Continent...Austria, surrounded by strong powers, was not so fortunate; her policy had to be more closely attuned to all conflicts...So it is not surprising that Metternich propounded the doctrine...which defended Austria’s right to interfere in the internal affairs of others, and that British leaders rejected this view.6

In this chapter, I argue that, in a region replete with historic dispute and territorial conflict, Iran can just as easily be viewed as a country securing itself in a hostile environment as one that has caused the hostility. Zeev Maoz provides an interesting analogy that I think exemplifies the Middle East security environment and its impact, not only on Iran’s psychology, but that of the region, as well as the U.S.-Iran relationship.

6 Ibid., 173.
Consider a residential neighborhood. The residents of the neighborhood are directly impacted by events in the neighborhood, as such events affect "their lives and their well-being." There are outsiders, such as those who live in other areas but who own businesses in the neighborhood, who have a stake in the neighborhood as well. States Maoz, "Security in any community is determined by the extent to which members of the community feel safe, or by the extent to which outsiders feel safe when entering the neighbourhood." The level of safety in the neighborhood can be assessed by examining such issues as crime rate. High crime rates, or an increase in the crime rate for a given neighborhood will indicate security problems, and will impact both the residents and the outsiders who have a stake in the security of the neighborhood. Just as crime rates are an indication of the security level of our hypothetical neighborhood, rates of conflict serve as an indicator of the extent of security problems in a regional context, for a "region with numerous conflicts has more security problems than a region with few conflicts."

This is a telling analogy for Iran. Consider its neighborhood, where international and regional intrigues have characterized the region throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These intrigues in the "neighborhood" of the Middle East have impacted the region, and Iran in particular. They include, among others:

- Soviet involvement in the secessionist governments of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in northern Iran in 1946;

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8 Ibid., 3.

9 Ibid., 4.
Prior to unification, civil war within South Yemen, as well as periodic warfare between North and South Yemen between 1972 and 1986. This conflict, which actually began with the British disengagement from the region beginning in the 1960s, engulfed the entire region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, and became for Egypt what Vietnam was for the United States, costing Gamal Abdul-Nasser millions of dollars and committing thousands of Egyptian troops;

Long-standing territorial conflict – dating back to 1939 – between the Persian Gulf states of Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar islands and the Fasht Al-Dibel and Jarada rocks, which possess “potentially rich... oil and gas deposits.” This conflict nearly led to war between the two states in April 1986, and was resolved only after intervention by the International Court of Justice in 1991.\(^{10}\) Worth noting is Gulf Cooperation Council – of which both states are members – efforts to resolve the conflict failed repeatedly between 1986 and 1990; and

Continued hostilities and an arms race between India and Pakistan, both of whom possess nuclear capability.

Maoz also states that a “shift in the locus of conflict from one region to the other indicates a shift in the security problems in various regions.”\(^{11}\) He highlights, for example, studies that have found that such conflict has shifted from Europe and Latin America, where conflict characterized those regions prior to World War II, to other regions, such as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa following the War. That is, “Europe, which was the more dangerous place to live in during the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, became a relatively ‘safe’ region during the nuclear era.”\(^ {12}\) While the relative safety of Europe is debatable, Maoz offers some interesting observations for the reasons for such security. According to Maoz, regions may experience a relatively low


\(^{11}\) Maoz, 4.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 4.
level of violence because incentives for such violence have disappeared. More accurately, disincentives for such violence have been established by the states in the region. He elaborates:

Rather, visible levels of violence in the region may have diminished because the members of the region may have employed was of deterring others from attacking them. These measures may be individual, such as changes in resource allocation for national [defense], bilateral or multilateral, such as alliance structures, or collective, such as the formation of a regional security organization that works above the main state.13

Each of these aspects of regional security is important to Iran. Individual measures by states within the region have had a direct or an indirect impact on Iranian security. Iraq’s development and subsequent employment of chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War had a direct impact on the country’s security. Pakistan’s and Israel’s nuclear weapons capability, and with it their relationship with other states in the region have a significant impact on Middle East regional security. The impact of Israel’s nuclear capability in the shadow of the Middle East Peace Process will be examined later.

Bilateral, multilateral, and collective relationships from outside states may have also had a profound psychological impact on Iran. The Anglo-American operation that removed Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq from power in 1953 exacerbated an already festering suspicion of Western imperialism and greed, and left in its wake a bitterness that exists to this day.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 as, among other things, a security cooperative among its member states. It includes only Arab Gulf states,
meaning it excludes Iran (and, ironically, Iraq). From a security standpoint, the effectiveness of the GCC is arguable, but its implications cannot be ignored. Politically such an arrangement isolates Iran, a key member in the Gulf, and offers questions as to its intentions.

While there has been no military conflict between Iran and the GCC, the ramifications are quite comparable to those of Russia and the NATO security arrangements, which the former Soviet Union still finds threatening a decade after the end of the Cold War. This, as well as the frosty relationship between Washington and Tehran, has provided Iran ample incentive to seek security relationships elsewhere, including with Russia and China, traditional rivals of the United States. In other words, unlike Europe, the disincentives for violence (or rather, for potential violence in Iran’s case) have not taken shape in the Middle East. Iran, like any other state, has chosen to seek security where it can find it—in the arms of our “enemies.”

**B. THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND IRAN**

Iran’s desire for arms—both conventional and unconventional—is not new. In the 1950s and 1960s, under Mohammed Reza Shah, Iran engaged in a substantial military buildup motivated by his need for internal and external security. His main sponsor—the United States. Rouhallah K. Ramazani suggests that the Shah perceived that the greatest threat to Iranian security was from the outside. States Ramazani, “His basic assumption must be extracted from his perception of Iranian experience in international politics. In the last analysis, the Shah...viewed Anglo-Russian imperial rivalries as the most

13 Ibid., 5.
fundamental problem of Iranian foreign policy." In fact, the Shah was so occupied with security concerns that he made it his top priority. He linked all other aspects of Iran's welfare to security. Thus, "The attainment of social, economic and political development as well as true independence, all hinged, in the last analysis, on the achievement of security." Between 1950 and 1978, the Shah received almost $1 billion in military aid and thousands of military advisors from the United States. The most assistance came in 1958, when Iran received $104.9 million in military aid from the U.S.16

The global political environment has changed quite significantly since then. The conservative mullas (religious clerics) seized power, overthrowing the Shah in 1979. The Soviet Union collapsed, ending the Cold War. The United States stands alone as the single superpower. Some things did not change, however. With the Iranian Revolution came new ambitions, including the export of the Revolution throughout the Middle East, and sponsorship of extremist cells in the Gulf, in the Levant, and in Africa. With it also came perceptions of new threats, from among its neighbors and from the West. This new insecurity led Iran into its fruitless eight-year war with Iraq from 1980-1988.

International relations theory provides some insight into Iran's history of insecurity. Iran typifies the state engulfed in Robert Jervis' "security dilemma." Security dilemma theory suggests that states will attempt to increase its security at the expense of its neighbors. These could take the form of arms buildups, territorial expansion, or, if

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14 Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975), 256.

15 Ibid., 259.

states are linked "between domestic and foreign policy...the quest for security may drive states to interfere pre-emptively in the domestic politics of others in order to provide an ideological buffer zone." 17 Iran has used various methods that support Jervis’ theory:

- It has purchased arms, despite sanctions, from Russia, China, and North Korea, among others;
- It has a territorial dispute - going back to the nineteenth century - with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa, three islands located in the southern Persian Gulf north of Dubai; and
- It has undermined the Middle East peace process by sponsoring terrorist organizations in southern Lebanon (Hizballah) and the West Bank (Hamas), and has come under criticism from Bahrain for allegedly fomenting Shi’ite unrest in the Southern Gulf country as a result of its unsatisfied claim on Bahrain.18

Security dilemma theory suggests that a state will make subjective security demands based on its perceptions of its vulnerability in relation to its neighbors. States Jervis, “A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly than a state that sees its environment as benign.”19 Iran fits this description. It shares borders with historic rivals and unstable governments, including Iraq, the former Soviet Union, Persian Gulf States, and the hotbed of Central Asia. Iraq employed chemical weapons on Iranian citizens and soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War. It is speculated that Iraq retains a substantial inventory of these weapons, in spite of UN sanctions against that country. As aforementioned, Iran has had historic territorial disputes with its Persian Gulf neighbors, many of whom enjoy


18 Cordesman and Hashim, 137.

19 Jervis, 175.

15
an economic and military relationship with the United States. It shares a border with Pakistan, a country with an ongoing nuclear race with India. In short, Iran’s environment is far from benign. Under these circumstances, one must question whether Iran is as much a threat to stability to the region as the United States perceives it to be.

It is, in fact, our perceptions of one another that have driven our respective postures toward one another, for better or for worse. In fact, according to some contemporary international relations theorists, so-called “psychological dynamics” can have a significant influence on decision makers. That is, as Jervis puts it, “people perceive what they expect to be present.”20 Decision-makers will assume that the arms of others indicate aggressive intentions, especially as they develop a hostile image of the other, despite “ambiguous and even discrepant information.”21 In the case of Iran and the United States, much of this is driven by history.

As alluded to earlier, Iran has developed a perception of the United States as intrusive and imperialistic. Following World War II, the United States appeared to side with Great Britain in its desires to retain control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AOIC), an enterprise that exerted significant control over the government of Iran. Washington also consorted with London in Operation Ajax, the operation that removed the nationalistic Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq from power and replaced him with the pro-Western Shah. America also aided Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War.


21 Ibid., 68.
From the U.S. perspective, the revolution that removed the Shah, the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran twice in 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis that helped remove a president was incentive enough to enact strict sanctions against Iran, to freeze millions in Iranian assets in the United States, and to paint Iran as a nation of fanatics. It has been over twenty years, a "moderate" parliament has come of its own in Iran, and our ally in the Iran-Iraq War has become the biggest threat to the region. With new presidential administrations since the Iran-Iraq War came new policies, but what has not changed since the 1979 embassy takeover in Tehran, is U.S. perceptions of Iran as fanatical and threatening to U.S. interests in the region.

As evidenced by our current policy, these perceptions persist, however. As Jervis states, decision makers "frequently assume...that the arms of others indicate aggressive intentions. So an increase in the other's military forces makes the state doubly insecure—first, because the other has an increased capability to do harm, and, second, because this behavior is taken to show that the other is not only a potential threat but is actively contemplating hostile actions."22 This appears to be exactly America's perception of Iran.

Exacerbating the dilemma is the opposing state's perception of itself. The arming state perceives of its policy as merely defensive in nature. It further perceives that other states know this. In other words, while the United States—and some of its partners in the region—may perceive of any Iranian buildup as aggressive, Iran does not perceive of itself in this way. Naturally, this leads to a further cooling of relations, as resentment at

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22 Ibid., 68.
such perceptions by Iran sets in. Consider the following observation by Lord Grey, the British foreign secretary before World War I:

The distinction between preparations made with the intention of going to war and precautions against attack is a true distinction, clear and definite in the minds of those who build up armaments. But it is a distinction that is not obvious or certain to others... Each Government, therefore, while resenting any suggestions that its own measures are anything more than for defense, regards similar measures of another Government as preparation for attack.23

This observation can be equally applied to diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran, as these conflicting conceptions of one another have maintained the tension between the two governments for almost fifty years. Consider, again, the example of the Mussadiq Affair of 1953. Prior to the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mussadiq, the United States enjoyed a very positive reputation among Iranians, and was in fact invited into Iran as a third party balance against what they perceived was an intrusive and imperialistic Britain. Following the coup, however, Iran viewed America as “imperial, arrogant, and contemptuous.”24 The coup, from the Iranian perspective, was a malevolent act, and in the eyes of Mussadiq’s constituency, the Prime Minister held a “mandate from the people and, as such, his removal from power was illegal and criminal.”25

The British and American view was quite different, however. They viewed the coup as a benevolent gesture of rationality and caution. Major American media viewed

23 Ibid., 69.


25 Ibid., 73.
Mussadiq as fanatical and unreasonable. In other words, the West viewed its intervention in Iran as necessary for the good of Iran. These contrasting perceptions persist to this day. While America views its posture in the region as necessary to ensure the security and stability of the region against a hegemonic threat, Iran views it as imperial, unfair, and intrusive.

These are the conditions under which we must consider Iran. As I have shown, many of Iran’s claims in the region are not new, and therefore cannot be viewed as products of a radical or destabilizing regime. It serves as a fitting example of a state immersed in the security dilemma. The Islamic Revolution did little to ameliorate the insecurity characteristic of pre-revolutionary Iran.

Given the regional security environment, the perception of Iran as the catalyst for destabilizing the region, in the post-Khomeini era, is simplistic, and doesn’t consider the “neighborhood” in which it is located. In the fifty years since the end of World War II, America has had to remain heavily involved in Iran, for better or for worse. Our relationship with Iran reached a dramatic turning point with the 1953 Mussadiq Affair, and set the impetus for the frosty relationship that culminated with the overthrow of the Shah. The Islamic Revolution only fomented the insecurity characteristic of pre-revolutionary Iran, as evidenced by its policies, including the embassy takeovers, the hostage crisis, its war with Iraq, and its support of international terrorism. The next section examines Iran’s contemporary security concerns, in terms of its conventional and unconventional weapons capability relative to the rest of the Gulf, as well as its economic capability to procure weapons.
III. IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE

A. INTRODUCTION – CONSTRAINTS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION CAPACITY

In order to understand the real threat of Iran’s proliferation capability, conventionally and unconventionally, we should examine her economic capacity to support it. Every state in the region must wrestle with the domestic implications of any policy decision it makes. Iran, as well as its Arab neighbors, is straight jacketed by the social pact it has with its citizens – the government provides jobs, services, and capital for private investment, in exchange for the people’s acquiescence in government matters. In Iran specifically, the rhetoric of social justice under Quranic principles has placed great pressure on the revolutionary government to produce real results in the socioeconomic sphere. Thus, any pursuit of proliferation necessarily undermines the political bases of the Iranian regime.

In this chapter, I argue that the revolutionary regime’s record has not been good. “Revolution, war, economic mismanagement, population growth, and political instability” has caused significant economic problems for the Islamic Republic. Central to its economic woes is its dependence on oil, a highly volatile market. The post-revolutionary period coincided with a massive rise in oil prices, and as such, the revolutionary regime engaged in excesses, centralizing virtually every aspect of the economy, confiscating royal land, and building a massive government sector epitomized by revolutionary foundations or bonyads. According to Bijan Khajehpour, these

26 Cordesman and Hashim, 29.
foundations have exercised control of the major sectors of the economy, even to this day.

He elaborates:

It is estimated that these foundations own some twenty percent of the asset base of the Iranian economy with a ten percent contribution to the country's GDP. Furthermore over the past decade, a large number of state-owned entities engaged in the establishment of semi-public and semi-private firms, which have taken over some of the privatized companies. Hence, if one includes all the mentioned semi-public entities, it is estimated that the public sector controls some eighty percent of the Iranian economy.27

In fact, the post-revolutionary Iranian economy has been characterized by economic distortions, including widespread price controls, trade and exchange restrictions, a heavily subsidized energy sector, multiple exchange rates, and tightly controlled labor and business practices.28 Added to this is an unemployment rate that has remained above fifteen percent since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and an inflation rate in the thirty to thirty-five percent range. This has placed great pressure on a revolutionary regime facing "a rapidly growing, young population with limited job prospects; heavy dependence on oil revenues (about half the state's budget and eighty percent of the country's hard currency earnings); $12 billion in external debt...expensive state subsidies on many basic goods; a large, inefficient public sector and state monopolies (...answerable only to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei); a serious drought; and international isolation and sanctions."29


These concerns have forced Iran to turn inward, and to focus on the social pressures these economic realities pose. The government has attempted to decrease subsidies, including those on petroleum, where prices have risen by seventy percent (even though its share of the country’s GDP has risen from seven percent in 1998-1999 to seventeen percent in 1999-2000). It has also privatized dozens of publicly owned enterprises in an effort to increase the role of the private sector. Worth noting also is the recent debate regarding foreign investment, which is seen as vital to the rejuvenation of Iran’s struggling and inefficient economy. International oil companies – inside and outside the Gulf – have expressed a desire for Tehran to offer “more enticing investment terms...to a country hungry for cash and Western technology for its ageing oilfields.”30

Needless to say, this has domestic and international implications. The mere discussion highlights the division between the “reformist” element in Iran (epitomized by Khatami) and the “radical” element (embodied by Khamenei), whose interests are threatened by any economic reform. From an international standpoint, this debate may signal Iran’s recognition that a cozier relationship with its neighbors, as well as the West, is essential to the economic well-being of the country.

B. IRAN’S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY

Now that we have established the baseline for Iran’s procurement capacity, we can now turn our attention to what any of this has to do with security in the Gulf. It is thus worthwhile to examine trends in Iran’s conventional weapons procurement in the 1990s, for this is the primary means by which it has threatened its neighbors in the Gulf.

Trends in the 1990s indicate that Iran has not placed a great emphasis on a massive conventional arms buildup. In fact, "Iran's military effort is only a small fraction of the share of GNP that Iran spent during the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran's increasing GDP is steadily reducing the impact of its military effort on its economy." When placed in context with other countries in the Gulf, Iran's military expenditures appear quite moderate. Table One shows that Iran's spending trends between 1995 and 1999 were comparable to its neighbors' in the Gulf, and indeed paled in comparison to Saudi Arabia's.

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Table 1: Gulf Military Expenditures 1995-1999 (SCurrent U.S. Millions).

This time period is significant in terms of the effectiveness of sanctions. First, in spite of sanctions, including ILSA, military expenditures by Iran – and the rest of the Gulf for that matter – increased. This is attributable to rising oil prices throughout the period, especially by 1999, providing each of these states the ability to spend more on their militaries. Second, it is noteworthy that Saudi Arabia has spent four to five times more on its military than has Iran, much of it on weapons from the United States, in spite of a substantial U.S. military presence in the Gulf since the Gulf War.


32 Ibid., 13.
Comparisons of other key military indicators are also revealing. Inventories of such key military components as advanced combat aircraft, infantry fighting vessels, and main battle tanks indicate that Iran is significantly outpaced by its neighbors Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Analysis of total arms deals demonstrates that, while arms purchases among key regional purchasers have fallen across the board, arms buys by Saudi Arabia have outpaced Iran's by a factor of five between 1987 and 1990, by almost twenty between 1991 and 1994, and by over five times between 1995 and 1998. The appendices to this text provide further elaboration on recent trends in conventional arms proliferation in the Gulf.

Iran's most significant advantage lies in its enormous population, which is approximately seventy million people, almost four times that of Saudi Arabia, and roughly three times that of Iraq. This provides Iran with a substantial pool from which to recruit and mobilize forces. As Appendix C shows, however, equipment shortages pose a dilemma for Iran's military. Among its components, Iran retains weapons that are archaic or obsolete. For their part, sanctions have limited Iran's ability to obtain sophisticated weapons and parts. Iran does boast an ability to manufacture some military weaponry, however, which suggests that economic and political factors, as outlined earlier, have restricted Tehran's arms buildup.

33 Ibid., 18
Other issues stand out as well. The issue for some Southern Gulf states is not whether Iran desires to assert hegemony in the region. In fact, many of these states fear each other more than they fear Iran. Cordesman makes the following observations about the Southern Gulf countries:

- The GCC is "a myth in war fighting and force development terms."\(^{34}\) There is no focus on common missions, and current arms inventories preclude standardization;

- Southern Gulf states cooperate more closely with the U.S. than with each other;

- Southern Gulf states are divided as to what they perceive as their primary threat. The lower Gulf states focus on Iran, while Kuwait and Saudi Arabia focus on Iraq. The GCC’s rapid deployment force is ineffectual, and cooperation between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia is poor; and

  - **All Southern Gulf states fear their neighbors:**
    - Bahrain versus Qatar
    - Fear of Saudi dominance (especially Qatar and Oman)
    - UAE internal divisions and fear of Oman
    - Kuwaiti concerns with Saudi Arabia over border issues
    - Saudi views Yemen as serious a threat as Iraq.\(^{35}\)

Therefore, Iran is not the only source of a regional arms race.

The issue here is not whether Iran’s behavior should be ignored. Indeed, the United States should be quite concerned over any arms buildup in the Middle East. What is not clear, based on this evidence, is whether Iran’s behavior should be perceived as inherently violent, offensive, or hegemonic, given the fact that many of the Gulf states fear one another more than they fear Iran. This leads them to engage in arms races to balance against each other, not only against Iran.

\(^{34}\) Ibid., 84.
C. IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRENDS TOWARDS MODERATION

Iran has in recent years demonstrated a willingness to open up to its neighbors in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, which suggests that Tehran is leaning toward a more pragmatic regional policy. President Khatami made an historic visit to Saudi Arabia in 1999, signaling an end to a decade of mistrust and hostility stemming from the 1987 clash between Iranian demonstrators and Saudi security forces at the Grand Mosque in Mecca.36 Nearly four hundred Iranians were killed, severing relations between the two countries. Since Khatami’s visit, the two countries have cooperated closely, engaging in economic talks, and working to manage oil prices for the good of both nations. In a 1998 interview with Abdul Rahman Al Rashed, Editor-in-Chief of Ashraq Al-Aswat newspaper out of London, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah expressed support for Iran’s arms proliferation:

Asked whether Iran’s growing armament and military maneuvers posed any threat to the region, Prince Abdullah said: ‘Iran has every right to develop its defensive capabilities for its security without harming others...We also do the same. All countries follow the same policy, then why only Iran is singled out here without mentioning others? Why don’t you ask the Israeli armament and its unlimited weapons development programs?’

When asked at that time whether Saudi Arabia had engaged in any secret military or security arrangements with Iran, the Crown Prince responded, “We don’t need such

35 Ibid., 84.


secret agreements as we tell things openly...and we don’t fear anybody except Allah.”

It may be due to U.S. presence and arms assistance, but this does not reflect the tone of a leader fearful of Iran.

Recent arms agreements appear to reflect a dependence on arms from Russia. In reality, however, imports from Russia have dropped to only a quarter of what they were just prior to the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Arms sales agreements with Russia dropped to only $200 million in 1992-1995, compared with $2.5 billion during 1987-1990. Iran’s relationship with Russia has not gone unnoticed by the United States, however. Washington has called for Moscow to discontinue its agreements with Iran. This has served only to highlight the loopholes endemic in ILSA.

These Russian-Iranian arms agreements should be taken in context, however. Russian arms sales to Iran diminished significantly after the Iran-Iraq War. Iran has procured weapons from China, Eastern Europe, and North Korea. Most of these are of low grade or near-obsolescence. Iran has shifted from dependence on the West during the Shah, to dependence on Asia (including North Korea and China), to dependence on Russia, creating problems in conversion, spare parts, and standardization of equipment. Iran’s relationship with Russia thus has disadvantages as well as well as advantages.

38 Ibid., 2.


D. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In its most recent analysis of proliferation trends in the Middle East, the Office of the Secretary of Defense outlines several U.S. goals for the region, including a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Arab world, security arrangements that "assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its petroleum reserves," and combating terrorism.41 In the report, the Secretary lists Iran among those states whose pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological technology threatens the stability of the region and undermines America's goals in the Middle East. Table Two outlines the Defense Department's concerns.

Russia is completing construction of power reactor at Bushehr and recently agreed to additional nuclear cooperation; China has pledged not to sell a key facility and other nuclear technologies.

Acceded to the NPT and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

**Biological**

Possesses overall infrastructure and expertise to support biological warfare program.

Pursues contacts with Russian entities and other sources to acquire dual-use equipment and technology.

Believed to be actively pursuing offensive biological warfare capabilities; may have small quantities of usable agent now.

Ratified the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

**Chemical**

Began chemical warfare program during Iran-Iraq war; employed limited amounts of agent against Iraqi troops.

Possesses weaponized stockpile of agents; capable of agent delivery; trains military forces to operate in contaminated environment.

Seeking to improve chemical precursor production capability.

Ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

**Ballistic Missiles**

Has force of SCUD B, SCUD C, and Chinese CSS-8 SRBMs; producing SCUDs.

Main effort is to produce Shahab-3 MRBM, based on North-Korean No Dong; effort involves considerable Russian and Chinese assistance.


Seeking to develop additional longer-range missiles, such as MRBMs, IRBMs, and possibly an ICBM.

**Other Means of Delivery Capability**

Land-, sea-, and air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles; air launched tactical missiles; none have NBC warheads.

Aircraft: fighters.

Ground systems: artillery, rocket launchers.

Table 2: Iran's NBC Weapons and Missile Programs

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Other reports regarding Iran’s NBC capability appear less than conclusive, however. In a 1998 report for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf acknowledge that the only evidence of a viable nuclear facility in Iran is the one at Bushehr. Even this facility appears adequate for only civil purposes. Financed by Russia in 1995 for an astonishing $800 million, the facility (which was badly damaged during the Iran-Iraq War) has “already cost Iran billions of dollars.”

The problem for Iran remains its ability to pay for the facility, its ability to run the facility, and its ability to obtain the materials. As it is, Iran has historically had problems obtaining even Russian assistance in getting this program off the ground. Iran and Russia actually signed their first protocol on the project in 1990, according to Koch and Wolf, but it was delayed by technical and financial problems. They tried again in 1993, with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Iran’s AEOI signing a contract for the construction of two reactors at Bushehr. State Koch and Wolf, “That contract was never entered into force because Iran asked for a postponement of the fixed time limits due to financing problems.” While the construction of any nuclear facility in Iran would provide Iranian scientists opportunity to glean the expertise necessary to develop nuclear weapons, even this would take some time. Iran has suffered from financing problems, and has been unable to procure dual-use materials (even Russia halted

42 Ibid., 35


44 Ibid., 2.
provision of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and a large research reactor, and has vowed not to supply Iran with hardware capable of delivering WMD). 45

Consider also the feasibility of such a WMD attack from Iran in the context of the Middle East Peace Process. One of the tenets of revolutionary Islam is the destruction of the state of Israel. At face value, this is certainly reason enough to prevent proliferation of NBC weapons by Tehran. Regional political considerations force us to look more closely, however. Consider the demographics and geography of the Levant. Just over one million Arabs populate Israel, making a nuclear attack on Israel an attack on Arabs. 46

Geography poses the same dilemma. The Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese capitals of Amman, Damascus, and Beirut, respectively, are in potential fallout ranges of a serious WMD attack against Jerusalem (43.6 miles, 134 miles, and 146 miles respectively). In this scenario, the attack would then force Arab states into the fray. It could also give leverage, both regionally and internationally to Iran’s real threat – Baghdad.

These are scenarios, but they are ones that are grounded in reality, and supported by history. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam was able to capitalize on Arab versus Persian enmity following Iran’s attacks of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf. He also capitalized on U.S. support as a result of U.S. disdain for Iran, given its terrorist acts against the U.S. Such an attack could cause history to repeat itself, at least from the Arab


regional context, undermining Iran's efforts to open diplomatic ties with the region and with the West. In Arab eyes, only Saddam would be able to counter the Persian threat.

However, the region does not publicly demonstrate fear of Iran's activities. Our closest partner in the region, Saudi Arabia, does not fear Iran. Russia has vowed not to supply hardware capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to Iran. Iran's conventional inventory is mediocre at best. It continues to be a country of valuable geo-strategic interest. Iraq remains the biggest hegemonic threat to the region, and even our policy there is unpopular in the region. Now appears to be the time to act diplomatically and decisively in Iran.
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IV. IRAN AND TERRORISM

In a feat that shocked the world, on March 20, 1995 the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo carried out a chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system with the nerve gas sarin. Twelve people were killed and upwards of three thousand were injured. With this came a new attention to the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. It has also justified sanctions against such “rogue” nations as Iran, who have historically sponsored extremist organizations worldwide, and whose weapons proliferation programs have been linked to this sponsorship.

This chapter examines the accuracy of such a linkage. Preventing the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to extremist groups is certainly important. It is, however, simplistic to arbitrarily lump all extremist organizations together, as such a linkage tends to do. I propose that state-sponsored terrorist organizations must be distinguished from their apocalyptic counterparts (Aum Shinrikyo), or even from “freelancers” with whom they may share more in common (such as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida). State-sponsored terrorist groups, in my opinion, are necessarily bound by certain constraints that are not present for other types of organizations. These constraints are levied by internal factors such as the ideology and goals of the organization, which are more limited than those of an apocalyptic group, and by external factors such as the constituency to which the organization seeks to appeal and to draw its membership. As an instrument of a state’s policy, such organizations are also limited by politics emanating from the state benefactor, which is itself constrained by considerations such as

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diminished deniability, relationships with other states, and the prospects for retaliation by the victimized state or its allies. There are no such constraints on apocalyptic or freelance organizations, so they enjoy a freedom of activity not possible for state-sponsored groups.

By making this distinction, I seek to examine the current threat of such an attack from Hizballah, Iran's most notorious beneficiary, based on the group's organization, political relationships, ideology, and history of operations. When compared to those of Aum Shinrikyo, we see that there are certain internal and external limiting factors that constrain the organization's willingness and ability to acquire such technology, and as such, pose a WMD threat to U.S. interests. My argument is made mainly in the context of the Middle East political environment, as this has been the primary focus of my thesis. I focus on the chemical and biological threat, because that is the most likely WMD method currently available; as I have shown, Iran's nuclear capability is in its developmental stages and is rudimentary at best.

I first examine the organizational and ideological constraints upon Hizballah, as compared to the freedom of activity offered by the same elements of the Aum Shinrikyo cult. It is necessary to show that group ideology and makeup will go far to limit the lengths to which the organization will go in order to further its cause. Next, I compare the groups' access to chemical weapons and their operational effectiveness, in the context of group objectives. I look at chemical weapons because in both cases this seems to be the weapon of choice based on availability. I will demonstrate that, in Hizballah's case, political ramifications of a chemical attack for the organization and for its benefactor,

Iran, will also limit the appeal of such an act. I offer that such a comparison provides a much more realistic assessment of the actual nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons threat that Iran-sponsored extremist organizations pose to U.S. interests in the region.

A. HIZBALLAH VERSUS AUM SHINRIKYO

1. Organization and Ideology

It is worthwhile to look more closely at the three types of extremist organizations mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. I place particular interest on the word "types" because that is what they are, distinct types of terrorist organizations, with distinct motivations, access to unconventional weapons, and freedom of movement. State-sponsored organizations such as Hizballah act as an instrument of the state's foreign or domestic policies. They could be used to suppress opposition at home, or the the case of Hizballah, act as an oppositional force to the state's enemies abroad. The state provides funding, training, and weapons to the group in pursuit of its policy. The organization in turn acts upon the direction of the state sponsor. This relationship, I argue, places constraints on the organization's activities, based on the will of the sponsor, which in turn must respond to the political environment abroad.

Independent organizations, including apocalyptic groups such as Aum, don't enjoy such state resources, but they are not constrained by the whims of the state sponsor, either. This gives them a freedom of action not enjoyed by the state-sponsored organization. In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, their religious ideology allows them to commit unthinkable acts of violence, as it is not a means to an end, but the end itself. I thus compare the Lebanese Hizballah and Aum Shinrikyo, in order to shed light on the
real threat of a chemical, biological, or nuclear threat from the Iran-sponsored group. I look first at structural and ideological differences between the two.

Hizballah is among the most notorious of the groups sponsored by Iran, and has received training, funding, and direct orders from elements inside Iran since its founding in 1982. It was established as a resistance to the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, and has served as the spearhead for Tehran's fight against Israel, and has launched a variety of paramilitary and terrorist attacks into Israel from its base in Lebanon. According to the Israel-based International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism (ICT), Hizballah has received a variety of weapons from Iran, including mortars, Sagger anti-tank rockets, mines, explosives, and small arms. The largest came in February-March 1992, following clashes between Israel and the Hizballah.48 Training comes mainly in the form of advice and supervision, as basic instruction is conducted by the organization itself. According to ICT, higher level training is conducted by the Guardians of the Revolution in Iran at the al-Quds Force training base in northern Tehran.

The Office of International Criminal Justice has placed funding at $50 million to $600 million a year, including a monthly stipend of $150 to $200 a month to Hizballah militiamen.49 It also receives funding from the Palestinian Diaspora worldwide,


including those inside the United States. Its operations are directed primarily by Syria, its other sponsor. This was in fact codified with the signing of the 1989 Ta‘if Agreement, which effectively ended Lebanon’s civil war. In it, Hizballah was forced to conform to Syrian dictate, and has since received its orders directly from Damascus, particularly during the reign of Syrian President Hafez al-Asad.

Hizballah was established in the context of Palestinian nationalist resistance to Israeli expansionist activity, including its occupation of southern Lebanon; it has continued to resist any negotiations with Israel in the context of the process; and it is committed to the destruction of Israel, withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Middle East, and the establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine, along the lines of Iran. It is this nationalist ideology that forms the basis for Hizballah’s structure. While it does in fact have a “loose confederation of militant groups” that forms the operational arm of the group, Hizballah is, in fact, a political party. Its structure mimics that of the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It has a seventeen-man consultative Supreme Shura (counsel), which “decides on administrative, legislative, executive, judicial, political, and military matters.”50 Its Executive Committee is formed from the four area councils of Beirut, Southern Suburbs, Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, and is headed by a Secretary-General. Regional Shuras run daily activities of each district, and the fifteen-member Politburo supervises the committees and departments created within the party “as the need arises.” It publishes numerous newspapers and periodicals within Lebanon and across the Middle East, and operates a radio station inside Lebanon itself. It

50 Ibid., 688.
has provided social services to the population of southern Lebanon, including schools, clinics, and mosques.

Context is important in our discussion of terrorist organizations. Such political inclinations constrain its ability to conduct “total war,” as most people are extremely averse to such methods as chemical or biological terrorism. Hizballah is also distinct from Aum, in that it does not enjoy the freedom of activity of the latter. As Kaplan observes, a “contributing factor to Aum’s behavior was the degree of impunity the cult enjoyed. Despite an extraordinary six-year crime spree, the sect met with surprisingly little resistance from Japanese officials, who were hampered by jurisdictional problems, a reluctance to probe religious organizations, and a lack of investigative initiative.” This is not the case with Hizballah. Military clashes with Lebanese militia forces during the civil war in Lebanon, and subsequent confrontations with the Israeli Defense Forces and the South Lebanese Army, as well as political antagonism with Yasser Arafat’s PLO, have constrained the organization’s activities. This, coupled with the political constraints of answering to government authority, especially Syria, places the group at the whims of its sponsor.

This clearly political character of Hizballah distinguishes it, and its motivations, from those of “religious extremists” such as Aum Shinrikyo. As stated earlier, Hizballah clearly desires the establishment of an Islamic state reflective of Iran. But it is this politicization of religion that distinguishes it from the Japanese group. The Encyclopedia of World Terrorism characterizes Hizballah as a religious extremist organization similar to Aum Shinrikyo. It argues that many contemporary extremist organizations have a
religious background (such as the Catholic-dominated Provisional IRA or the Protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland), but it is "the nationalist or separatist aspects of these groups that predominate."\textsuperscript{52} It distinguishes the motives of religious organizations as theologically-based, and has a "god-driven aspect" not present with secular groups:

Secular groups attempt to appeal to sympathizers, members of the communities that they claim to defend, or the aggrieved people they say they speak for. But some religious terrorists are engaged in what they regard as a "total war." This sanctions almost limitless depths of violence, and anyone who is not a member of the terrorists' religion may be seen as a legitimate target...Religious terrorists usually want the greatest benefits for members of their faith only...Secular terrorists see violence primarily as a means to an end. But religious extremists, because of the divine element of their motivation, often view violence as and end in itself.\textsuperscript{53}

This definition is problematic, in that it incorrectly over-generalizes the role of religion for groups such as Hizballah. While this definition may adequately describe apocalyptic groups such as Aum, it does little to characterize the real motives behind such groups as Hizballah. Aum Shinrikyo's structure, for one clearly distinguishes it from that of Hizballah's. Consider the cult's doctrine. It holds that, by following Shoko Asahara (the "father" of Aum), members would "gain supernatural powers, including the ability to see through walls and to levitate. An important, increasingly dominant doctrine of the cult dealt with the inevitability of Armageddon."\textsuperscript{54} According to David E. Kaplan, it was this belief in Armageddon that motivated the group's attempts to arm itself with

\textsuperscript{51} Kaplan, 223.

\textsuperscript{52} Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha Crenshaw and John Pimlott, vol. 1, Religious Extremism (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997), 211.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 211.

\textsuperscript{54} Kaplan, 208.
weapons of mass destruction. Its desire to speed the coming of Armageddon drove its biological and chemical weapons program, which began as early as 1990. It was financed completely by the organization itself, whose financial resources were substantial. For example, the cult paid a reported $100 million to electronics companies outside Japan.55

Hizballah, despite being characterized as a religious organization, has demonstrated no such interest in Armageddon, or in speeding it up. Indeed, this goes against the very tenets of Islam, the official religion of much of the region, and the foundation upon which Hizballah would like to establish a state. It’s tactics, particularly the practice of suicide bombings, are influenced by Shi’a Islam, the branch of Islam practiced by Iran. This seemingly irrational and inconceivable act is viewed by its practitioners as a fitting means to forward their cause and gain entrance into paradise by becoming martyrs in the struggle against the oppressor. This too is a cornerstone of Shi’ism. This is a means by which the bomber can become like Husain, grandson of Muhammad himself. Husain was martyred at the ancient city of Karbala, where his tiny resistance was wiped out by the Sunni government in power. This, according to Charles Lindholm, was “the great turning point in Shiite history – the equivalent to Christ’s crucifixion for Christians.”56 Husain has since taken on a mystical symbolism, one that has been quite useful in mobilizing in the Middle East. It was first practiced during Iran’s 1980-1988 war with Iraq, when over 100,000 “ideologically committed”

55 Ibid., 210.

volunteers were called into action against Iraq, "some members even carried their own shrouds to the front in the expectation of martyrdom." By mid-1982, the "war of attrition" began, with "human wave" attacks by these volunteers being conducted in the face of Iraqi artillery. It is in this spirit that extremist suicide bombers face their demise, without hesitation or regret.

The mysticism of martyrdom should, however, be distinguished from the apocalyptic fetishes of Aum. Like the secular terrorists to which Crenshaw and Pimlott compare religious extremists, suicide bombings are "a means to an end," as opposed to "an end in itself." Shi’a Islam is similar to messianic Christianity, in that it preaches that the Hidden Thirteenth Imam will one day come, as in Christianity Christ will return for the believers. There is no call for believers to hurry or interfere in his return in any way. In fact, the Ayatollah Khomeini, upon whose principles the Hizballah bases its cause, was never quoted as referring to himself as the Hidden Imam. In other words, as violent as the group’s activities are, in this context it is religion that may in fact constrain their desire to seek unconventional weapons. Thus, in the history of the organization, there has been no such act committed. This is important in our understanding of the motives of extremist groups, especially if we are to understand the real threat of a WMD attack from these groups. Other elements pertinent to our discussion of the WMD threat from the group may explain why there has been no nuclear, biological, or chemical attack conducted.


58 Crenshaw and Pimlott, 212.
2. Terrorism and Chemical Weapons – Access and Operational Use

A comparison of access and delivery of chemical weapons provides further argument against Crenshaw and Pimlott’s definition of religious extremism, at least as it applies to Hizballah. We have already examined ideological differences, degree of operational impunity, and political relationships. Let us look more closely at access and feasibility of employing such weapons, based on these factors.

Aum Shinrikyo serves as a useful case of access to such weapons. The group took full advantage of human resources available to it by placing emphasis on recruiting young scientists and technicians. Many studied at Japan’s top universities, in such fields as medicine, biochemistry, biology, physics, and electrical engineering. It took advantage of the availability of weapons technology and know-how available in the former Soviet Union. It set up branches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Vladivostok. It also took advantage of financial resources available to it through donations, business interests (including a chain of computer stores, “at least eight restaurants,” training centers, a fitness club, trading companies, etc.), and the tax break available to religious organizations. Various “cover activities,” such as health clinics, manufacturing, and scientific research allowed it to purchase such technology with little problem. Given the impunity with which the group operated, access to such weapons technology also proved relatively easy.

Hizballah, through its relationship with Iran, should have been able to acquire such weapons with little problem. There are key advantages to chemical (and biological)
weapons that offer incentive for their use. Consider the following advantages, offered by researchers at California Polytechnic State University: 60

- Detection – delivery systems can be quite rudimentary, making them difficult to detect. Aum placed its sarin solution into unassuming nylon polyethylene bags.

- Availability – Production of such weapons is comparable to the production of illegal narcotics. A "moderately competent" chemist could produce such weapons. In the case of Hizballah, it has a ready supply of chemical technology from Iran, which, according to some estimates, is capable of producing as much as one thousand tons a year of various mustard, phosgene, and cyanide agents. 61

- Reputation – use of such weapons provides the necessary psychological effect of fear and intimidation. This provides the user with the necessary message that it is to be taken seriously.

- Efficiency – as Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated, these weapons cause substantial casualties at very low cost, thus the term "poor man's nukes."

So, why has Hizballah not used chemical weapons? It has certainly demonstrated a willingness to resort to incredible acts of violence, as illustrated by its history of activity. The group enjoyed its hey-day, so to speak, in the 1980s, when their attacks claimed the lives of numerous Americans. In April 1983, a suicide bomber destroyed the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing forty-nine (sixteen American) and wounding 120 others. In October, a suicide bomber attacked the French and U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, killing fifty-six French and 241 Americans. In November, another bomber

59 Ibid., 213.


destroyed the Israeli Defense Force headquarters in Tyre, South Lebanon, killing fifty-nine.62 Since then, the group has resorted to various tactics, including kidnappings, assassinations, knifings, hijackings, as well as suicide bombings.

Ideology, constraints upon their activity by their patrons, and the proficiency of their military adversaries provide some deterrence to the use of WMD by Hizballah. Linked to these are other factors that also limit the attractiveness of such weapons. Consider the group’s operations. Their activities have garnered them tremendous international media attention, which provides it with an outlet for its message and for recruiting and fundraising. It may fall into Crenshaw and Pimlott’s category of organizations that “prefer the immediate, dramatic effect produced by a hijacking or a bombing.”63 Put differently, there is little incentive to resort to a chemical attack, due to the effectiveness of conventional tactics.

There are also inherent disadvantages to using weapons of mass destruction in an extremist attack. Consider again the California Polytechnic Institute’s report:64

- Image – as I stated earlier, there is a distinct aversion to such weapons as inhumane and terrible. Such an aversion could undermine group efforts at legitimacy (such as acting on behalf of the Palestinian people), recruiting, and even international funding.

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62 Buitla, 692.

63 Crenshaw and Pimlott, 235.

• Acquisition – manufacturing and handling of such weapons is extremely dangerous, sometimes resulting in loss of life of would-be terrorists. Biological weapons also pose a threat to the manufacturer. According to terrorism analyst Jonathan B. Tucker, members of Aum "reportedly became infected with Q-fever, a rickettsial disease they were preparing as a biological weapon. Even ...Asahara is believed to have acquired the debilitating illness."\(^\text{65}\)

• Retaliation – improvements in government response to terrorism internationally, and Israeli willingness to respond disproportionately specifically, poses deterrent considerations for the extremist. This is exacerbated by the political concerns of the state-sponsored group’s benefactors, as the international community will often hold the state sponsor accountable for the activities of the extremist group. This is evidenced by U.S. sanctions against Iran and other "rogue states," as well as by Iran’s own “charm offensive” with such European nations as Germany, which only recently re-opened diplomatic ties with Tehran because of terrorist activity.

A chemical or biological attack would certainly be in keeping with Hizballah’s desire to destroy the Israeli state, but there is another impediment to such an attack – demography. Palestinians constitute eighteen percent of the total population of Israel – just over one million out of a total population of 5.75 million.\(^\text{66}\) Furthermore, this population is spread throughout Israel, including Nazareth, Rahat, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and a significant Arab population in Jerusalem that is expected to increase substantially from the thirty-one percent of the current total, to about forty percent by 2020.\(^\text{67}\)


In other words, such an attack would be counterproductive, given the potential for collateral damage to sympathizers or to potential recruits. Chemical and biological attacks require agents in sufficient quantities or of highly virulent quality in order to inflict noticeable damage, and once released, they are difficult to control. An attack aimed at an enemy would in fact hurt members of the group’s constituency. This would have a devastating effect on the group’s image, and would minimize (or possibly destroy) the organization’s political position. It has criticized the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) “concessions” to Israel and the U.S., and its stance has met with some agreement among Palestinians in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. Casualties to this constituency would provide impetus for it to move into the PLO camp, or even to support Israeli or U.S. action against Hizballah.

From Iran’s perspective, providing such weapons to extremist beneficiaries would have significant spiritual ramifications. Among Tehran’s goals is to claim a leadership role in the Islamic world, despite the ethnic differences among Persians and Arabs. The collateral damage of such an attack would further alienate Tehran from the Arab Muslim world, dashing any hopes of such a leadership role. Where would such an attack take place? Virtually every inch of the country possesses religious significance, from Nazareth to Jerusalem.

There is also a significant political element to such an attack. As stated, it is difficult to control the agent, once it has been delivered. Prevailing winds from the Mediterranean could risk affecting the entire region, from the West Bank or Gaza, to Amman, Jordan, which is only 43 miles from Jerusalem. As stated earlier, such an attack
by Hizballah would have potentially profound political ramifications for Tehran. This is the disadvantage of state-sponsored terrorism versus other types. Both sides are constrained by the implications of the organization’s activities. This will necessarily drive the sponsor to circumscribe the group’s activities.
V. CONCLUSION – REASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON IRAN

As one can see, there is room for a reassessment of U.S. policy on Iran, with certain policy issues standing out most prominently:

- It is inconsistent with political realities in the region. Domestic issues in the Middle East drive their foreign policy, and Iran has served as a symbol through which subversives can rally against the United States and its partners in the region;

- It reflects a powerful pro-Israel lobby, and highlights the fact that domestic issues in the United States drive its foreign policy; and

- It is unilateral, unpopular with our allies, and is riddled with loopholes whereby interested nations can bypass it without penalty.

Iran has dramatically improved relations with Saudi Arabia since Khatami ascended to the presidency. He has also improved relations with Qatar, Yemen, and Kuwait, offering the latter a 500-kilometer pipeline that would carry water from a dam in Iran to the coast of Kuwait.\(^6\)\(^8\) What stands out most about the recent détente between Iran and its neighbors is that they all share two political commonalities – apprehension about Israeli dominion in the Middle East, and the unpopularity of U.S. support for the Israeli state. Saudi Arabia has struggled with opposition movements – including terrorist cells – bent on removing the U.S. presence from Saudi soil. It most recently joined Syria, a state with which the United States just last year sought assistance in brokering peace between the Arabs and the Israelis, in denouncing the February 2001 U.S.-led bombing

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attacks on its rival, Baghdad.\textsuperscript{69} In fact, U.S. presence may have served to destabilize the region, as it was initially Iran to which Saudi placed blame for the terrorist bomb attacks against U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia in 1995-1996. Khatami has issues of his own with regard to the United States. He must deal with conservatives and reformists alike that view U.S. policy as threatening. States Geoffrey Kemp,

For most Iranians, the key issues that prevent better relations with the United States begin with the troubled historical relationship including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s role in the 1953 coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power. This grievance is exacerbated by the mistaken belief that the United States still controls billions of dollars of Iranian assets that were frozen during the 1979 revolution. It is compounded by the fact that the United States maintains sanctions on Iran’s participation in energy projects in the Caspian Sea. Iran is also publicly critical of the strong U.S. military presence in the Gulf and its vigilance in preventing the Iranian importation of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.\textsuperscript{70}

This places constraints on how much Tehran is capable of meeting the United States half way, and this must be done in order for the two sides to foster a relationship that is fair, meaningful, and long-lasting.

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is the product of a bill written by New York Senator Alfonse D’Amato, with “expert advice from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), often referred to as the voice of the Israel lobby.”\textsuperscript{71} This has not gone unnoticed by Iran, or by more “moderate” regimes in the Middle East. In fact, the United States has made its support of Israel a matter of record. In its recent report on the


\textsuperscript{71} Clawson, “Iran.” 87.
Middle East, the Defense Department listed among its priorities for the Middle East, “securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab parties,” while at the same time proclaiming “a steadfast commitment to Israel’s security and well-being.” The report singles out Iran by stating that it “especially has demonstrated a commitment to developing long-range ballistic missiles, which can reach deep into neighboring countries and to Israel.”\(^2\) Israel’s history has shown, however, that it is capable of defeating any Arab threat that presents itself, or any combination of threats for that matter. Its victory in 1948 over an Arab onslaught won it independence. In 1967, it defeated Egypt and Syria in six days, and caused the Arab leader Gamal Abdul Nasser to step down until he was asked to return to the Egyptian presidency. In 1973, it recovered from an Egyptian surprise attack to repel them handily.

This is a key element in our analysis of the Middle East “neighborhood.” Israel’s own nuclear capability has deeply alarmed the Arab world. In May 1999, the member states of the Arab League sent a request to the International Atomic Energy Agency for it to include in its Forty-third General Conference an item on Israeli nuclear capabilities, citing Israel’s unwillingness to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to “place its installations under the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards system, thus upsetting the balance needed to achieve peace in the region and exposing the region to nuclear risks.”\(^3\) In fact, a 1998 book entitled *Israel and the Bomb*, by Israeli scholar

\(^2\) Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Proliferation: Threat and Response,” 34.

Avner Cohen, asserts that Israel’s nuclear program goes back to the 1950s. According to Cohen, on the eve of the 1967 war, Israel put two nuclear devices on alert. He further asserts that the United States had knowledge of the Israeli nuclear building program, in the late 1950s, but then-President Eisenhower “chose to do nothing.” This is further evidence that Iran may in fact not be as big a threat to stability as U.S. policy makes it out to be.

As far as terrorism is concerned, indeed Iran, through state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism, uses violent measures to meet its political objectives. Those objectives could include withdrawal of American forces from the region, violent resistance to Israeli occupation, or a position of prestige in the Arab world. This last element is essential. The terrorist elements in the region are Arab. Their membership is Arab; their constituency is Arab; those that hold the operational reigns of power are Arab. This has significantly limited Iran’s role in their activities, despite its sponsorship of their activities. In fact Iran, in its “charm offensive” with Europe and its Arab neighbors, has distanced itself from international terrorism aimed at those governments, and as such has opted for a more pragmatic approach to more moderate regimes, including Saudi Arabia; as such, there appears to be no overt attempts at toppling moderate governments in the Gulf.

These issues further limit the lengths to which Iran will go in its sponsorship of terrorist groups. Assuming that states will act rationally in their international pursuits

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75 Ibid., 2.
(which this thesis does), facilitating a terrorist WMD attack in the region would prove to be counterproductive in this context. Still, Tehran must send a clear signal to Washington that it denounces terrorism in any form. It is one thing to continually dismiss U.S. allegations of Iranian involvement in terrorism as "propaganda"; it is another to make that dismissal and then host annual conferences, such as the April 2001 international conference to support the current Palestinian uprising, featuring such extremist notables as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Islamic Jihad.76

Finally, the unilateral sanctions are vulnerable. They are not popular with our allies, as the threat of penalties to any firm, foreign or American, which invests in Iran's petroleum program encroaches on their sovereignty. In fact the European Union filed formal complaints against the United States in the World Trade Organization following ILSA, forcing the U.S. to sign a Memorandum of Understanding regarding it and the Helms-Burton Act, which initiates sanctions against individuals and firms doing specified business transactions with Cuba. The Memorandum was signed in April 1997, but even then there was disagreement over the spirit of the Memorandum, as the EU interpreted it as suspending the application of ILSA and Helms-Burton, while the U.S. disagreed.77 The European Commission warned then, "If action against companies or waivers as described in the Understanding are not granted or are withdrawn, the Commission will


77 Clawson, "Iran," 91.
request the WTO to restart or reestablish the panel handling the complaint."78 In fact, Europe has placed the United States' back against the wall in its defiance of ILSA. In 1996 a consortium of three firms, Total of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia, closed a deal to develop the South Pars oil fields of Iran, in direct violation of ILSA. In November 1999, Royal Dutch Shell of Great Britain made an $800 million deal with the National Iranian Oil Company to develop its Soroush and Nowruz offshore oilfields.79 The Total deal ended with the United States granting a "national interest" waiver, and the Royal Dutch Shell agreement is in its final stages.

This is the reality, from a security perspective, of U.S. policy on Iran. We have shown that, essentially, Iran's national security goals are not the product of a radical regime that has been in power for the last two decades, but of a nation whose interests go back before its independence. It has always had border disputes with its neighbors in the Gulf, and it is only now, under President Khatami, that Iran has sought cooperation with historic adversaries. Its arms pursuits do not appear to reflect a country building up to exert hegemonic influence in the region, but one reacting to a volatile environment with limited results. Finally, with the U.S. acting alone in the implementation of sanctions against Iran, it has isolated itself, not Iran. Iran has established closer ties, not only with its neighbors, with Europe, Russia, and Asia, in one way or another. Now is the time to pursue rapprochement with Iran.

78 Ibid., 91.

LIST OF REFERENCES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


11. Maoz.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.


38. Ibid.


40. Broder, John M., “Despite a Secret Pact by Gore in '95, Russian Arms Sales to Iran Go On,” The New York Times. October 13, 2000. In fact, the previous administration came under heavy fire as a result of recent arrangements with Moscow regarding Iran. In June 1995, former Vice President Al Gore signed a secret agreement with then-Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chemomyrdin calling for an end to Russian sales of conventional weapons to Iran by 1999. The Gore-Chemomyrdin agreement allowed Russia to fulfill existing sales contracts for specified weapons, including a diesel submarine, torpedoes, anti-ship mines, and tanks and armored personnel carriers. All sales were to have ceased by December 31, 1999. In exchange for Russia’s agreement, the U.S. agreed not to pursue penalties against Russia under the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act of 1992, otherwise called Gore-McCain after its sponsors, then-Senator Al Gore, and Senator John McCain. The Gore-Chemomyrdin agreement sparked intense criticism in Washington and further highlights the inconsistencies prevalent in U.S. policy, as the 1995 agreement appeared to “undercut” the 1992 law. It allowed for the sale of some of the same weapons that the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act expressly prohibits.


42. Ibid.


44. Ibid.


46. Arab Association for Human Rights, “The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel,”


50. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


55. Ibid.


59. Ibid.


65. Tucker, Toxic Terror.


71. Clawson, “Iran.”


75. Ibid.


77. Clawson, “Iran.”

78 Ibid.

80-82. Cordesman, *The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf in 2000*. Appendices are adapted from here, as Cordesman offers a comprehensive examination of conventional military expenditures in the Persian Gulf. Those adapted here are for those Gulf countries spending the most in military equipment from abroad.
APPENDIX A. COMPARISONS OF ARMS INVENTORY OF MAJOR GULF ARMS BUYERS\textsuperscript{80}

1. Advanced Combat Aircraft:

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<tr>
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<th>Total Fixed Wing Aircraft</th>
<th>Modern Combat Aircraft</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>286</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>48</td>
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</table>

Table 3: Holdings of Advanced Combat Aircraft.

2. Advanced Armored Infantry Fighting Vessels, Reconnaissance Vehicles, Scout Vehicles, and Light Tanks in 2000:

- Iran – 555
- Iraq – 1104
- Saudi Arabia – 2385
- Kuwait – 355

3. Main Battle Tanks:

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<tr>
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<td>2700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>700</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1055</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
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<td>198</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>385</td>
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</table>

Table 4: Trends in Total Main Battle Tank Inventory, 1995-2000.

\textsuperscript{80} All figures adapted from Cordesman, "The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf in 2000."
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<td>6200</td>
<td>1900</td>
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Table 5: Arms Buys Among Leading Gulf Arms Purchasers.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
APPENDIX C. IRANIAN DEPENDENCE ON DECAYING WESTERN-SUPPLIED MAJOR WEAPONS

Land Forces

Chieftain tank (140) – worn, under-armored, under-armed, underpowered. Fire control and sighting system now obsolete. Cooling problems.

M-47/M-48 (150) – worn, under-armored, under-armed, and underpowered. Fire control and sighting system now obsolete.

AH-1J Attack Helicopter (100) – worn, avionics and weapons suite now obsolete. Growing reliability problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Air Force

F-4D (35-50) – worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates and parts.

F5A/B (10-20) – worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due to lack of updates and parts.

F-14AWX (60) – worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates and parts. Cannot operate some radars at long ranges. Phoenix missile capability cannot be used.

Navy

Alvand FFG (3) – worn, weapons and electronics suites obsolete. Many systems inoperable or partly dysfunctional due to critical problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Bayandor FF (2) – Obsolete. Critical problems due to lack of updates and parts.

Hengemann LST (4) – worn, needs full scale re-fit.

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82 Ibid. Numbers in parentheses indicate quantity in inventory.
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