Hizbullah's Women: Internal Transformation in a Social Movement and Militia

Baylouny, Anne Marie

repertoire of contention, embodied in *hisba*, to changing circumstances, using violence where it felt it was necessary and applying other less aggressive methods or toning *hisba* down when it felt it was counterproductive. The flexibility of *hisba* became apparent again when the movement was smashed and it could be transformed in revisionist writings into a principle supporting an Islamic civility. The irony of the new situation was that by that time the Jama'a al-Islamiyya found itself in a situation similar to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hemmed in by an authoritarian and repressive regime, it relinquished all claims to creating an autonomous Islamic space and developed *hisba* into a weak instrument of claiming rights and reframing the relationship with the state as a contractual one of obligations and duties.

**HIZBULLAH'S WOMEN**

Internal Transformation in a Social Movement and Militia

Anne Marie Baylouny

How and when do movements transform? Change in social movements has been attributed to external, structural political opportunities and to repression, generating either moderation or radicalization, respectively. Locating all change outside the movement, however, neglects large categories of change, particularly the agency of members. Even when the influence of members is acknowledged, it is still generally limited to internal political battles for control or is viewed as reflecting changes in external political opportunities. Yet factors outside political opportunities can change members’ priorities for the movement and their view of their own place in it. Economic and historical factors falling outside social movement analysis can profoundly affect extant members, while new constituencies and generations can enter the movement with different ideas. Particularly in the developing world and in authoritarian countries, much mobilizing takes place within the informal, everyday realm and within movement institutions—such as social services and the media—that are not geared to formal politics. In short, Social Movement Theory (SMT) as currently formulated omits the capacity of members, in realms outside those geared to formal politics or control of the organization, to affect the movement as a whole.

In this chapter I begin the task of melding historical, gender, and everyday perspectives with SMT to delineate the dynamics of internally driven transformation within a movement. Gathering data on internal change, as opposed to externally induced change, is difficult. Witnessing debates and deliberations within a movement can be impossible for outsiders, especially in groups labeled as terrorists. With the rise of media information technology, then, a new public view of the movement is afforded for some organizations through their own media. Media can provide insight into the battles and configurations of power within a movement. Media shows who participates, giving a view of the movement’s community including its peripheral and occasional adherents beyond its core, activist constituency.
Studying the gender programming on the television station al-Manar of the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah facilitates analysis of intramovement transformation and the factors responsible for the specific direction of this value change. Women’s programming on al-Manar demonstrates a transformed vision of women and their place in the movement and in society, along with the surpassing of religion as the predominant idiom of the movement, and the abandoning of reliance on an exclusively Shi’a and religious constituency. The debate and variety of views in talk programs on Hizbullah’s television—assumed to be a propagandistic mouthpiece—yield a different picture of a movement that accommodates and even facilitates discussion beyond its core stances. These programs promote gender equality in work and housework, a diminution of male prerogative, education and careers for women, married or not, and an end to domestic violence, broadly construed. Contrary to talk shows that promote one expert opinion, these programs focus on the audience and their ideas. The method of communication is not dictatorial but contains significant community participation, ending in no single, authoritative solution. Pushing the bounds of ideology to include the secular, the programs do not promote secularism but do actively include other religious communities and the nonreligious. Women’s programming is a window into substantive movement transformation, particularly since private life—women and the family—has been considered the last domain closed to debate in Eastern and Western societies alike. Tolerance of change and diverse lifestyles within the family is a strong indicator that change has taken place.1

I argue that these substantive developments in Hizbullah’s media are due to the central role of women in the organization. This is clear not only from the prominence of women in the media but also in shifting norms that entail changes in male roles—a situation that departs from nationalist movements’ promotion of modern women for the movements’ own purposes. I begin by theorizing movement transformation and value change, and the differential power of subconstituencies. I discuss prior conceptions of women in the organization and their mobilization due to war. I then introduce the media and Hizbullah, delineating how the organization has changed over time. Women’s programming demonstrates the depth of this change, as it encompasses shifting boundaries of the community, changed norms for the family and for men, and an embrace of Western and specifically American concepts of rights and civil society.2

**MOVEMENT TRANSFORMATION AND SUBCONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE**

SMT commonly ascribes movement change to external political opportunities, such as elections, or to the denial of opportunity through repression.3 This prime role attributed to structural factors neglects agency and change from within the movement itself (Goodwin and Jasper 2004). Understanding movement transformation necessitates moving beyond political opportunities and events outside the movement to internal dynamics.

Various internal dynamics can change a movement. Movements depend on their memberships’ approval, tacit or active, of their stances. While many analyses focus on leaders, other evidence indicates that members themselves have a strong role in movement direction (Wickham 2004). Organizations are subject to internal authority contests that can determine the direction of the movement (Kurzman 1996). Schwedler’s (2006) comparison of two Islamist parties concludes that internal factors such as decision-making practices and leadership structure were important variables. Where members had more of a say in the group’s direction, the Islamist group could evolve over time by redefining the boundaries of legitimate behavior and practice. Clark and Schwedler (2003) demonstrate that Islamist women were able to promote their own role in their organizations, taking advantage of divisions and spaces left while Islamist men were occupied with other concerns. In Hamas, the leadership actively sought member input on the trajectory of the movement through questionnaires (Mishal and Sela 2002). Ultimately members can resign in protest; over five hundred women walked out of an Algerian Islamist party en masse, declaring that the party did not listen to them.4 More generally the literature on framing insists that movement messages and symbols resonate with the grassroots membership. Leaders must craft their messages in line with the culture and priorities of potential supporters (Snow et al. 1986; Swidler 1986).

The influence of members is recognized by SMT but is attached to the internal political battles of the movement, or is in response to changes in the formal political realm. The notion of “the political” itself must be enlarged. Much transformation occurs through both the dynamics of everyday life and member involvement in movement institutions that are not geared to formal politics. Institutions such as social services that are not aimed at elections are recognized as having a political impact, as are informal networks (Singerman 1995; Clark 2004a). These institutions affect the movement, although the overwhelming focus of research on Islamist movements has been on how such institutions aid the leaders’ stated goals; research has neglected change that arises...
from members in these institutions. Bottom-up change can occur from realms not focused on elections or on control of the organization.

How and why the underlying priorities and preferences of the constituencies change has been analyzed as historical fact outside of the models of social movements. SMT's bias toward the formal and overtly political neglects the politics of the everyday—encompassing history, economic conditions, informal networks, and prior activism and agency to name a few areas—and the ability of these everyday politics to ultimately alter the power dynamics within movements (Bayat 2010). I link what Bayat terms the feminism of everyday life to social movement analyses in order to understand the real-life changes within a key Hizbullah institution. I argue that female members are making changes spurred by daily life within a realm that is not overtly political, the movement's media. This power results from the position of women as a key constituency supporting the organization's military roles.

Members do not all matter equally to the movement; internal power differentials exist. The specifics of whose approval matters (and when it matters), of how desires are communicated, and of how different types of members, varying external conditions, and potential constituencies affect internal movement transformation are unclear. The membership of a movement is made up of a number of subconstituencies such as youth, women, core or original members, and new members. A subconstituency's importance to the movement can be historical and symbolic, or current and either organizational or strategic. The different roles can coincide, as when a subconstituency is a symbol of the movement's founding, is integral to the daily functioning of the organization, and represents the potential for strategic alliances with other groups deemed part of the group's strategy for success. When one subconstituency holds all three roles, that group has a wider range to maneuver within the organization and can push for new points of view. To determine which groups hold such positions, a historical analysis of the movement's founding and development, along with an assessment of its current position in the political structure and its future goals, is necessary.

Women can be an important subconstituency organizationally. The organizational needs of Islamist movements to mobilize large constituencies place a premium on organizing the general population (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007). As in other religious movements, while men are the visible face of the movement, women perform the grassroots daily functions that have built and sustained those movements (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001). Women in Islamist or-

organizations have been associated with increased public participation; for example, as they reached out to peasant women in Turkey (Arat 2005). Women participate in large numbers in Jordan's Islamist party (Clark 2004; Clark and Schwedler 2003), in Hamas (Cobban 2006), and in Islamist movements generally (Nachtwey and Tessler 1999).

Women in Hizbullah represent a confluence of important roles. A core constituency of the organization, women were symbolically affirmed for generating fighters by giving up their husbands and sons, and for supporting the resistance generally. Women are integral to the current daily operations of the organization. The Women's Association of Hizbullah outfits the fighters, and women run the large and prominent social services network, which generates much prestige, legitimacy, and new members. Beyond filling internal organizational needs, women are able to bridge the gap to new constituencies for the organization. Women's prominence has increased as Hizbullah has sought to institutionalize itself within the Lebanese arena—or "Lebanize"—making itself a fully national actor. Here women are a political symbol, as they often are throughout the world. Certainly in the Muslim world, in the proclamations of both Islamists and their opponents, women and the family are a central focus. For many, the vision of a veiled woman means women's oppression, and the prospect of an Islamist group being a powerful political actor in Lebanon conjures preconceived ideas regarding an Islamist lack of regard for minority and women's rights. Women are an essential part of the modernity discussion, as they have been central concerns of the West, colonizers, socialist Arab states, monarchies, leftists, and Islamists alike (Abu-Lughod 2002; Editorial: Sexuality, Suppression and the State 2004; Brand 1998; Browsers 2006; Zine 2006). Lebanon is not only a country with a significant and politically involved Christian community but also one intensely tied to the West. By allowing space for contemporary and progressive women's issues to be discussed in its media, with the participation of Christian scholars, experts, and audiences, Hizbullah communicates tolerance for diverse female and minority lifestyles.

Women or other subgroups have power in a social movement when their contribution is integral to the movement. But that power is limited by threats to the organization's survival, which take precedence. The substance of this power, what it is used for, and its duration depend on the larger employment structure of society and women's integration in the movement during the protracted political struggle Gramsci terms a "war of position." Societal context, history, and economic development matter. Educated professional women able to fill roles
in the movement beyond traditional or even violent ones have a reticulating effect in the Lebanese context, reinforcing the progressive stance of the organization toward women and its need to rely on and cultivate this source of support.5

THE MEDIA SPHERE OF HIZBULLAH

Media programs are windows into movement debates. Arab media and the use of information technology have exploded in recent years, as has movement use of media. According to some, the proliferation of new Arab media and establishment of hundreds of new satellite stations have altered the face of Arab civil society and created a new public sphere (Lynch 2006; Anderson 2003; Eickelman and Anderson 2003). The dominant Arab television, such as al-Jazeera, is regional because national or state media is mainly censored. But there is a third type of media that is partisan or sectarian (Cochrane 2007), joining party and media. Such stations broadcast a definite point of view and do not attempt neutral journalism. Pioneered during the Lebanese Civil War, when each militia established its own media, government and opposition factions now have their own television stations. This is a growing trend. Stations of Islamist groups, sectarian groups, and militias in Iraq and Hamas are some examples. The Internet has been an especially prolific domain for sectarian messages. Younger generations of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood have aired their internal and sometimes politically sensitive debates on Internet blogs (Lynch 2007).

This type of television is not new; political parties worldwide own their own media. Yet the relationship between a political party and its media has not been theorized. Anshu Chatterjee (2004) shows that such television expands beyond simple transmission of the party line in order to respond to market and global competition for an audience, as do other media. In her Indian case, both the media affiliated with the local political party and that owned by the national state competed successfully with the transnational media corporations in the marketplace of ideas by providing local-language programming that focused on a wide spectrum of local issues in order to maintain their constituencies. While it does communicate a point of view, party-owned television cannot be considered simply propaganda.

Al-Manar (the beacon, or lighthouse) is the land and satellite television station of Hizbullah, an Islamist social movement, militia, political party, and participant in government. Hizbullah began its television station in 1991, broadcasting locally in Lebanon. Beginning as a “resistance media,” a station linked to the fight of Hizbullah against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (Jorisch 2004), al-Manar’s start was politicized and religious. In May 2000 al-Manar began transmitting by satellite. It is generally available throughout the Arab world, and in Lebanon over land, but is banned in Europe and the United States. Al-Manar has bureaus and correspondents around the world, and is most famous for its coverage of Hizbullah’s military operations against the Israeli army in southern Lebanon, through reporters “embedded” with Hizbullah troops. It has also been viewed as one of the new, politically independent media (Sharabi 2003). Al-Manar operates in a media environment where political media are the norm (Dajani 2006), with channels such as Future TV, the representative of Lebanon’s governing coalition.

Hizbullah and its media have changed overall. Both have become more sophisticated, addressing themselves to a broader audience not based on religious sect (Dellios 2000). This “Lebanization” process, or becoming more Lebanese than Shi’a and changing the community references accordingly, was sped up by two major events in Hizbullah’s history (Harb and Leenders 2005; Alagha 2006). The first was the decision to enter the 1992 Lebanese elections as a political party, which necessitated a decision to relinquish the goal of an Islamist state. Second was the withdrawal of the Israelis from southern Lebanon in 2000, which has been viewed as causing an identity crisis for Hizbullah, since the original justification for the organization’s militia was fighting Israelis in the south. The second Palestinian intifada began soon after the withdrawal of the Israelis, possibly substituting issues for the station. But the station and Hizbullah also broadened their community of reference, attempting to reach additional audiences (Hamze 2004; Dallal 2001). Two recent events changed al-Manar further. The 2005 removal of the Syrian army from Lebanon left Hizbullah on its own and arguably sped up the Lebanization process. Al-Manar has become critical and open to contending points of view in its cross-fire programs in order to increase its viewership and expand its support. For the same reason, interviews began to encompass all the communities and political ideologies in Lebanon. This constituency broadening was partly challenged by the effects of the July 2006 war with Israel, which promoted militarization of the party and affirmed the public relations value of al-Manar to the military.

Women-centered programs have been almost completely ignored in research on the station, despite their being aired more than any single program except the news. Research has focused almost exclusively on news and spots promoting Hizbullah. Women’s programs are aired nine times a week for a total of thirteen and a half hours. One women’s weekly program recently celebrated
its one hundredth episode. The oversight in research reflects a bias of male and (the few) female researchers alike—an assumption that these programs are pure propaganda and need not be studied, or a belief that women in an Islamist organization would surely be portrayed negatively. Indeed all media in the Arab world are generally viewed as promoting a negative, traditional, and submissive view of women (Allam 2008). Even al Jazeera is seen as promoting a traditional view of women, contrary to its promoted self-image of challenging the Arab status quo (Dabbous-Sensenig 2006). Yet women have entered the Arab public and media spheres, changing the dialogue considerably (Moghadam and Sadiqi 2006; Skalli 2006). Sakr (2004) argues that the Middle Eastern media has become more pro-female as a result of the entrance of women.

WOMEN AND CHANGING NORMS

The substantive ideas currently depicted on Hizbullah’s media represent a significant change from the organization’s stand at its founding.9 At first, women were not much dealt with except that they should adhere to what Deeb (2006) has called “authenticated Islam,” the version of Islam that rejects tradition for modern religious practices and interpretation. The emphasis was on the unity of the Shi’a community, women’s duty to that community, and their role in supporting fighters and producing the next generation. Motherhood and women’s public demonstration of religious practices and piety were prized (Deeb 2006; Zaatari 2003). Women and men fulfilled equal but distinct complementary roles in society, and family duties were women’s first priority (Firmo-Fontan 2004). During the ongoing fight with Israel, Hizbullah utilized a discourse that emphasized male military achievements or “confrontation and triumphant masculinity” (Holt 1999). The United States along with Israel were the enemies, and relations with the Lebanese Christian community were extremely poor prior to the end of the civil war, in 1990.

The progressive ideas now aired on al-Manar appear counterintuitive. Lebanese Islamist women suffer from conditions often held to decrease women’s status: they are not only involved in a revolutionary organization that has engaged in warfare (promoting male fighters), but they are also Islamists. Women’s path-breaking roles in revolutionary organizations, either as combatants or major supporters, have not been lasting. While they are almost universally used in the rhetoric promoting militarization (Bayard de Volo 2004), women in conflict situations are typically seen as victims during and after war (Al-Ali 2005; Henderson and Jeydel 2007). After the Algerian revolution (Turshen 2002) and World War II in the United States, gender boundaries were not permanently affected, as women returned to their role as homemakers. Nationalist and right wing movements have prioritized the nation over women; even when women’s organizations fight to assert their status, their gains have been forsaken in the name of the nation and male employment (Henderson and Jeydel 2007). In Islamist movements images of policing women’s dress and conduct in public space come to mind.

War can be a catalyst for widespread changes in women’s notions of their possibilities and rights, and their vision of optimal family relations. Women may take on new, transformative roles during conflict. Rights-based struggles have often come out of other struggles. For example, the US women’s movement grew in part from dissatisfaction with women’s status in the civil rights movement (McAdam 1995). Although such roles can alter accepted boundaries of public versus female private spheres, men typically do not regard them as threatening, since they contribute to confronting the enemy: from carrying munitions to visiting prisoners and even taking up arms. Under conditions of repression when male political opportunities are limited, women’s realm for maneuver can open (Noonan 1995). In some cases the lack of men, due to death or imprisonment, has spurred women to take their place. Women are not universally peaceful. They join militias and terrorist groups (Shehadeh 1999; Ali 2005). Such political activism can be transformative (Sharoni 2001). The bravery and risks these women assume may alter perceptions, as was the case with female journalist during the war years in Lebanon (Abu-Fadil 2007). The traditional realm of women in these circumstances extends from family to community, justifying a broad realm of activism under conditions of conflict or repression that can promote alternative views of women’s correct role. In some instances the role of women caretaking and improving society may continue after war, expanding their previously private-sphere duties to the public in peacetime (Bayat 2010).

The observation that popular conflict and religious mobilization can be positive for women is qualified by their employment and educational status, their position of importance within the movement, and their external references. The dynamic of expanding women’s rights and self-image in a progressive direction depends on women themselves pushing the boundaries and taking advantage of opportunities in the party. Previous experiences when women did not consolidate gains from conflict may be situational rather than perennial outcomes, contingent on the ability of women to hold important (educated) positions within the organization and on their institutional importance to the organization.
I argue that Lebanese Islamist women benefited in some ways from the civil war and from their mobilization in an Islamist group. The case of Hizbullah's women confirms the conclusions of a Carnegie study that the entrance of educated women into Islamist parties is partly responsible for those parties' increasing attention to women's issues (Abdellatif and Ottaway 2007). Broad economic changes have generated many of the issues discussed here, particularly around women working outside the home (Taraki 1995).

WOMEN'S PROGRAMS:
PROGRESSIVE ISSUES AND INCLUSION ON AL-MANAR

Women's programming on al-Manar demonstrates value change in several areas. The view departs from that of women solely serving religion, the family, and nation, and goes beyond the promotion of "modern" women as evidence of the organization's achievements. The programs push the boundaries of maleness along with femaleness and bring the intimate sphere of the family into open debate. The programs advance individual rights for women and children, not communal ones as Islamist groups often do, and they accept international concepts of human rights. Further the community participating in the programs is multiconfessional, incorporating, physically and rhetorically, respect for different religions and ways of life. Where the United States has been viewed as anathema, here American norms and research findings are presented as authoritative, to be admired and imitated. Lastly the programs and the range of programs on the station are multivocal, not uniform, indicating that segments of Hizbullah's constituency are promoting views that other parts oppose, and that this diversity of views is being played out partly in the media.

The multiple voices on al-Manar are a significant change from Hizbullah's roots and image in the West as a monolithic and authoritarian organization. These programs tackle core issues of family and private life presenting multiple views from experts who are often not religious and not even Muslim. One women's program, Problem and Opinion, was previously named Problems and Solutions (Mashakil wa-hulu'), demonstrating the shift to multiple voices and offering no authoritative solution. Some programs are remarkably nonideological and devoid of Hizbullah's religious rhetoric, while others present problems from a more religious and traditional point of view.

A heterogeneous, nonideological, and nonreligious community is particularly apparent in two women's programs. I recorded data on guest dress for twenty-nine episodes of one program: 57 percent of guests were unveiled women in Western dress; 11 percent were veiled; and 33 percent were men. Often the only one veiled on stage was the hostess. Seven percent were religious leaders; they appeared particularly during programs whose content, such as adoption, men contributing to housework, societal restrictions and stereotypes of divorced women, and violence in the family, pushed the boundaries. A substantial number of the unveiled women and many men were Christian, which was apparent either from their names or language use. Some were unable to express concepts except in French, or peppered their language with French words (in one case a professor could hardly speak Arabic but kept speaking in French while the hostess translated). The audience and callers mirror this pattern. Audiences for one program were half nonveiled. (In these programs audience, callers, and participants were predominantly although not entirely female.) In Problem and Opinion a skit is acted out to illustrate the problem for that week, presented by a viewer. The skits demonstrate veiled and nonveiled women, depending on the week. In another example a Christian man brought a problem to the station, indicating that different religious communities participate in all capacities on al-Manar; they also turn to this Shi'a station for help.

Religious solutions and interpretations were marginalized. Hostesses would ignore (the very few) comments coming from the audience or callers that religious practices were the solution. In one case an audience member stated that memorizing the Qur'an was a solution to the day's question, which focused on raising the self-esteem and confidence of all family members (Wujhat naazr, 10/7/07). The hostess cut him off and did not repeat the question to the guest when the latter had failed to hear the question. "Never mind," she stated, and moved on to ask the guests another question. During the same show, a caller attempted to remind the audience of the need to confront Israel and of the needs of the nation, and the hostess cut him off. Despite the occasional presence of sheikhs on the programs and more often their call-in opinion at the end of the show, religion itself was almost completely absent as a solution, and then the interpretation was ecumenical.

Women are substantially present in al-Manar, not only in the audiences mentioned above but also in its journalistic work (Abu-Fadil 2007; Firmo-Fontan 2004). Women host thirteen out of twenty-four programs, and two more that have both male and female hosts. They are not present merely for appearance but are hard-hitting and assertive, interrupting and cutting off guests and callers, including sheikhs. A woman is the face of Hizbullah's international English language program. The two women's weekly programs demonstrate
views, such as questioning marriage itself, that are sometimes an extreme, progressive departure, certainly from traditional standards but even from many in Western countries. The programs promote a more equitable distribution of responsibility and tasks among all family members. This includes more responsibility for men in sharing housework, from chores to childcare. The subject of one program was care of the house, and men's role in it (Wujhat nazr, 3/13/08). The assumption was that women work outside the home. The audience, mainly men, protested. One man stated that he works all day and comes home tired. The hostess responded, "OK, your wife works outside the home all day too, and then comes home and works inside the house. Do you see the problem here?" The sheikh stopped short of demanding that men help out but asserted that they should, and that this is religiously approved. Similarly where a stepmother is involved, it is the man's responsibility to be aware of what occurs between his new wife and his children. If they are oppressed, it is his duty to protect them (Wujhat nazr, 4/24/08). This issue also demonstrates a new spin on an old problem, placing duties on the husband in the old situation of combined families.

Outside work for women is seen not only as economically necessary but also as fulfillment for a woman, an outlet for her own separate source of self-esteem. No longer does a woman just marry and have children; now she should not marry unless she has a profession and diploma in hand. When a woman had a problem with her rebellious children, the first thing the guest experts wanted to know was whether she had her own life and her own work (Mushkila wa-rai', 2/4/08). The woman could be feeling empty and unfulfilled and be placing her life expectations onto the children, and that is negative. Promotional spots show girls at the computer, and suggest that a girl's future could be as a doctor and that she should be encouraged. In the midst of news coverage commemorating the third anniversary of the historic (for Hizbullah) March 8, 2005, demonstration, which coincided with International Women's Day, the news "shed light on different examples of women." It began with a profile on a woman running her own photography studio with her husband. "They say behind every great man is a woman, but what if next to every successful woman is a successful man who encourages her as she does for him." Her husband taught her photography, and he stated that she was now better than he. Another working woman's situation was different: her husband died, but like the other woman, said the narrator, she did not give up. "I am everything to my kids... Just because my husband died doesn't mean my life is over." The social and legal rules have changed regarding women's work, the narrator stated, easing women's access to work.

Domestic abuse by fathers was the subject of a segment of another program (Mushkila wa-rai', 7/7/08). This demonstrated the consciousness of traditional practices being out of line with the rest of the world; the acknowledgment of the patriarchal system, but not the acceptance of it; changed economic prospects for women and the family; and information globalization as a solution. The woman, a thirty-year-old Yemeni teacher who had not married in order to help support her family, was being beaten along with her sisters by her father. The woman turned to the Internet to write and ask for help from al-Manar in Lebanon. She could not take it anymore, she wrote; even knowing that society taught her father these behaviors, she was a university-educated woman and could not tolerate the lack of respect. She could not stand a society where "the word of the father is all and a mother has no opinion."

The acceptability of women remaining unmarried is a departure from traditional and religious views of women. An episode called "Women Under the 'Microscope'" focused on the treatment of divorced women (Mushkila wa-rai', 4/14/08). Divorced women are looked at disrespectfully, treated differently, and assumed to be easy or willing to marry anyone. "This woman has paid the price," the sheikh said, "and has twice been oppressed, by her husband and now her family." In another case a thirty-five-year-old woman refused all proposals for marriage and wondered what was wrong with her (Mushkila wa-rai', 3/17/08). She was a professional and supported her family. The host stated that this situation is increasingly common. As men migrate and women become more educated and enter professions, women's demands of men change. No longer do fathers tell women what to do; this is no longer allowed. The advice of the guests was both essentialist and progressive. On the one hand, she was taking the role of a man, the guest stated, and there cannot be two men in the family; on the other, the guests affirmed her ability to live this life and the acceptability of her staying unmarried. The sheikh, consulted by phone, proclaimed that if she was happy, she did not need to marry. Partners in marriage need to share, each bringing some important capital—emotional, material, or intellectual—to the marriage, he stated. Girls unfortunately are raised to believe that their goal in life is marriage, and that life ends with it. Girls live without freedom, waiting for marriage, a view he argued against. This woman was mature and conscious, and could make her own life choices.

The appropriateness of diverse lifestyles is viewed as relative to the family's or the community's lifestyle. On one program guests stated that they had heard of fathers staying home and mothers going to work. How that would
work would depend on the particular family. Styles of female dress, quite controversial, were judged relative to their surroundings. In a discussion of rape it was mentioned that some people attribute rape to a woman's dress style. The guest responded that this is a sensitive topic, and some people could feel she was provocative if she dressed a certain way; however, if one lives in a country where women dress that way, people should get used to it and understand that it is not provocative.

The reputed xenophobia of Hizbullah, or at least its animosity to the United States, is not evident in these programs. American scientific studies are used as proof and to demonstrate points. Western countries are lauded for their safe houses for battered women, their creativity-inspiring education, and the strong role of civil society. Hostesses discuss needing to "think outside the box"—stated in English and translated into Arabic—and the importance of "quality time." Arab education is derided and compared negatively to education in the West, which encourages free thinking. In one program discussing spanking, a caller decried the discussion of alternatives, saying that especially at this time of cultural onslaught Easterners and Lebanese should stick to their culture. He was completely ignored by the women in the audience and the hostess, who simply moved on with their discussion. The audience, veiled and nonveiled, Christian and Muslim, working and stay-at-home mothers, all agreed they should find alternatives to spanking but were frustrated as to how they could still discipline their children. This demonstrates a consensus on ideas also becoming the standard for the international Western world. And "quality time" was again discussed in the context of mixing work with family care.

In addition to domestic violence, other violent situations in daily life were presented as serious problems. Violence against children, and teachers hitting students, were portrayed as wrong. One program for youth discussed the list of human rights for children, showing UN posters of children's rights (Tāḥt al-'aṣhrīn, 4/11/08). Violence portrayed in video games was another problem, particularly since the way to win the game was to kill. This was a value the women's program did not want imparted to children (Mushkila wa-rā'ī, 7/21/08).

Embracing Western solutions and norms for numerous daily life issues does not translate into protest against Hizbullah's militia or its foreign policy. Rather, women's use of Western studies, idioms, knowledge, and experts suggests a distinction between opposition to Western foreign policy and opposition to everything Western. The two can and do coexist in numerous societies, as women eschew violence in their personal lives but partake in war, even supporting patriotic aggression. While support for progressive women's rights can coexist with support for an aggressive foreign policy, the foreign policy concerns or threats take precedence. In times of foreign crisis or during religious events, all programming is preempted, marginalizing coverage of women's issue. Threats to the movement generate a retreat and prioritization of the military, pushing all other discussion and debate to the sidelines until the crisis ends.

Furthermore not all programs within Hizbullah's media align with these views. Programs such as To the Heart (Ila al-qalb) present a religious view of family and personal life. This spectrum of views on the media is a sign of openness to multiple constituencies, while attempting to maintain the old ones. Space is afforded for diverse segments of Hizbullah supporters and potential supporters. According to Firmo-Fontan (2004), many watch al-Manar selectively for particular programs. For some segments of al-Manar's audience the difference between religious or political programs and women's programs is not a contradiction. For others, particularly nonreligious viewers or those from other religious communities, the women's programming is distinct from Hizbullah's view of the news.

The variety of voices on the station is not unlimited; it is arguably affected by self-censorship, a situation comparable to that observed in Western media. Callers using insulting language toward a person are cut off; in other cases the caller's position, if contrary to the program, is ignored. No statements crossing the line of disagreement with Hizbullah itself as an organization were witnessed. This could be because of the high degree of approval of Hizbullah in Lebanon or the nonparticipation in the television shows of those in disagreement. In the case of the 2005 elections al-Manar broadcast a series ("Word to the Nation") in which civil society leaders were asked their opinion on Hizbullah's militia. Some voiced disapproval of the militia; most did not. However, some voiced other misgivings about the organization.

**CONCLUSION**

The dynamics of internal movement transformation can illuminate core changes in organizations. The views aired on Hizbullah's women's television programs are nontraditional and in some cases overtly opposed to inherited patriarchal norms. While Hizbullah's view of women generally could be characterized as more progressive than the views of many groups, states, and media in the Arab world, women are going beyond this on the television station, challenging male privilege. They deploy a rights-based discourse that is
individual, not communal; that is, elevating the priorities of the individual above those of the community. Solutions to problems, when offered at all, are multicommmunal and multivocal, suggesting an openness to diverse lifestyles. Violence in daily life and society is eschewed.

The concerns of the subconstituency of women have changed. Middle-class and working women’s concerns are apparent in these programs. Some women in the organization, having lost a husband to military battles, are now single mothers supporting families; wage work is necessary. As a result of their increased entrance into the workforce and professions, women have encountered barriers to full inclusion and have experienced the double standard enjoyed by men, particularly in the home. They believe that Islam does not endorse this double standard, as many are believers and have fought in an Islamist organization. Women are crucial parts of the organization, both on the logistical support level in outfitting fighters, and increasingly in the performance of professional tasks in Hizbullah’s media. Women have taken advantage of their importance and pushed the boundaries. Clerics have conceded their points or have at least not contradicted them on these programs.

Gender programs reveal a different side to Hizbullah regarding international affairs as well, embracing as they do global information and the use of American studies as positive examples. The progressive gender ideas and the use of the West as a role model for civil society do not translate into nonviolence in foreign policy. Domestic and societal nonviolence coexist easily with a foreign policy of fear and belligerence toward the enemy. Indeed foreign policy concerns set such movements as Hizbullah off from the usual social movement cases. The sense of external threat and the fear of attack strongly influence the direction of programming, creating tension and even halting the sphere of debate and exploration of domestic and social issues. The result is not the civil society imagined by the West, although it may hold many of the same values as the West. Hizbullah’s programming is inclusive, creating alliances and expanding the community instead of limiting the community to Shi’is. While it is attractive to other communities as progressive and participatory, the framework of a religious party and militia remains.