A "special relationship": bridging the NATO intelligence gap

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THESIS

A “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: BRIDGING THE NATO INTELLIGENCE GAP

by

Wesley R. Curtis

June 2013

Thesis Advisor: Erik J. Dahl
Second Reader: David C. Tucker

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A “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: BRIDGING THE NATO INTELLIGENCE GAP

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Master’s Thesis

During each conflict, intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but NATO’s operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. intelligence support. The lack of an independent NATO intelligence capability presents a problem for the United States, which needs a NATO capable of conducting operations in the event of a simultaneous conflict in another region.

Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, it is unlikely that European governments will provide additional funding to establish a comprehensive NATO intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. should establish an enhanced intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO to offset the paucity of NATO intelligence support and operational resources. Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and allow for greater burden sharing among allies. This is most aptly demonstrated by the United Kingdom-U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed during World War II, which arguably provided the foundation for the ‘special relationship’ between the U.S. and the U.K. today.
A “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: BRIDGING THE NATO INTELLIGENCE GAP

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Despite NATO’s long history of close military cooperation and coordination, the Alliance cannot fully support major multinational operations. Tested by conflicts in the 1990s through to the recent war in Libya, NATO capabilities have consistently fallen short. During each conflict, intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but NATO’s operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. intelligence support. The lack of an independent NATO intelligence capability presents a problem for the United States, which needs a NATO capable of conducting operations in the event of a simultaneous conflict in another region.

Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, it is unlikely that European governments will provide additional funding to establish a comprehensive NATO intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. should establish an enhanced intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO to offset the paucity of NATO intelligence support and operational resources. Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and allow for greater burden sharing among allies. This is most aptly demonstrated by the United Kingdom-U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed during World War II, which arguably provided the foundation for the “special relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K. today.
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<tr>
<td>BRUSA</td>
<td>Britain–United States Signals Intelligence Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>BSC</td>
<td>British Security Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air Operations Center</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined-Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Communications Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Government Code and Cipher School</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force–Bosnia</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff–NATO</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAC</td>
<td>Joint Analysis Center Molesworth, U.K.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIOCEUR</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence and Operations Center Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIFC</td>
<td>NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAF</td>
<td>Operation ALLIED FORCE</td>
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<td>OUP</td>
<td>Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Radio Security Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>U.S. Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force–Bosnia</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
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Brogan and Andrew, hard to say thank you enough to my little ones for the laughter and love you show every day and for understanding when Daddy has to work.

For all the time, love, and support, whether home or away, I am eternally grateful to my wife, my partner, Nicole. Amidst all the upheaval of this military life of ours, and no matter where we are, you carve out a loving home. Thank you.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Despite NATO’s long history of close military cooperation and coordination, the Alliance cannot fully support major multinational operations. Tested by conflicts in the 1990s through to the recent war in Libya, NATO capabilities have consistently fallen short. During each conflict intelligence played a key role in securing victory, but NATO’s operational successes were made possible only through substantial U.S. intelligence support. The Alliance has no independent ability to provide intelligence support to major NATO operations. This lack of an independent NATO intelligence capability presents a problem for the United States who needs a NATO capable of conducting operations in the event of a simultaneous conflict in another region.

Given the rise of austerity measures in Europe, which are designed to reduce government spending, it is unlikely that European governments will provide additional funding to establish a comprehensive NATO intelligence capability. Therefore, the U.S. should establish an enhanced intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO to offset the paucity of NATO intelligence support and operational resources. The current U.S.–NATO intelligence-sharing relationship, however, has major problems because it is largely focused on augmenting NATO operational intelligence support and capabilities only during times of crisis. This mode of intelligence cooperation has created a crisis-sharing mindset where the U.S. provides additional intelligence support during major NATO operations, thus preventing the development of a comprehensive NATO intelligence support mechanism. No enduring framework exists for effective sharing outside of crisis so that NATO intelligence can independently support Alliance operations.

Intelligence sharing can increase international cooperation and allow for greater burden sharing among allies. Military intelligence cooperatives are particularly well adapted for this circumstance. This is most aptly demonstrated by the United Kingdom-U.S.A. (UKUSA) series of signals intelligence agreements developed during World War
II, which arguably provided the foundation for the “special relationship” between the U.S. and the U.K. today. ¹ UKUSA has additional applicability here because during the two decades preceding their alliance in World War II, the Americans and the British were potent enough rivals that the U.S. conducted extensive war planning against the United Kingdom. Concerns over British intentions and trustworthiness during the initial phase of World War II echo contemporary U.S. concerns with NATO on information security and inter-alliance rivalries.

The lack of a structurally sound intelligence-sharing policy may have a negative effect on U.S. foreign policy interests in Europe, Africa, and the Near East, particularly as America shifts focus to East Asia. Despite NATO’s longevity, it appears the U.S. intelligence-sharing relationship with NATO requires rebuilding so the U.S. and NATO can become even more reliable and effective foreign policy partners.

This thesis will examine the following major research questions: Why is there a NATO intelligence capability gap? What do NATO’s post-Cold War conflicts tell us about the U.S.–NATO intelligence sharing relationship? And finally, what lessons can we draw from the U.S.’s most successful intelligence sharing-program, the UKUSA signals intelligence agreements, that are applicable here?

B. IMPORTANCE

The subject of intelligence-sharing agreements is critically important for the U.S. and NATO because the United States provides the bulk of NATO’s intelligence capability because the Alliance never elected to create an operational intelligence support mechanism. Early in NATO’s history members saw intelligence as a tool for internal (NATO) political gain at the strategic level and this left the Alliance disinclined to develop operational intelligence support mechanisms or organizations. Wide recognition

¹ UKUSA is the most common term used to refer to American and British signals intelligence cooperation, but is not technically accurate. The term UKUSA was first used in the signals intelligence cooperation agreement signed between the two countries in 1951. A previous agreement in 1943, however, had no specific name, while subsequent agreements in 1946 and 1948 were titled “British—U.S.A Communications Intelligence Agreement” (BRUSA). For simplicity’s sake, and because of its common usage, generic references to U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation are referred to as UKUSA, unless otherwise specifically noted. Most often however, this thesis discusses the formation of the 1943 agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School.
of NATO’s inability to provide operational intelligence support was identified during the campaign in Bosnia, NATO’s first major “out of area” operation, and reiterated during operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. During each conflict the U.S. and its NATO allies developed complex networks of intelligence sharing agreements and systems that have benefited all countries involved. But that capability has been sorely tested in Afghanistan, where many experts argue that intelligence support to U.S. and allied troops has been inadequate. U.S. ability to provide additional capabilities to support NATO contingency operations might be unavailable because ‘the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region,’ has prioritized operations in the Far East, which may have serious consequences stability and security in the NATO sphere of influence.

This thesis looks to these potential problems and examines the 1943 signals intelligence agreement between the U.S. War Department and the British Government Code and Cipher School (GCCS) which initiated the large UKUSA agreement series as a potent example of successful intelligence sharing that had salient effects on foreign policy. While historians at the National Security Agency (NSA) documented the origins of the 1943 UKUSA agreement, the NSA declassified an even wider array of primary source documents in June 2010. Before this release, many noted intelligence historians identified that it was the peacetime establishment of signals intelligence sharing that formed the foundations of the U.S.–U.K. special relationship. These newly released documents, however, reveal that the foundations for comprehensive intelligence sharing began with the agreement in 1943. A thorough examination of these primary source documents and historical works reveal important dynamics that made the UKUSA intelligence relationship successful and offers a significant model for U.S.–NATO intelligence sharing.

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2 The term “out of area” refers to those areas outside of NATO’s traditional sphere of influence as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

3 In the fall of 2011, President Obama announced a “pivot” or “rebalancing” of American foreign policy and defense interests toward the Asian-Pacific region.
C. PROBLEMS

The principal problems with this subject surround the premise that NATO intelligence is unable to meet NATO operational demands, which makes the Alliance dependent on U.S. intelligence for success. Furthermore, the U.S.-NATO intelligence sharing relationship is not well developed outside of operational necessity and exhibits severe fluctuations. Those propositions further support the notion that in order to improve NATO intelligence support the U.S must broaden its sharing relationship. Because this thesis proposes to deal with a specific instance of intelligence sharing, we must examine the limited information available on NATO intelligence sharing since the Cold War to identify key dynamics or intelligence sharing characteristics within the Alliance. Finally, the ability to identify or measure the effectiveness of intelligence sharing is necessarily predicated upon the ability to in some way cite an intelligence sharing agreement or its inputs and outputs. In this case, the procedures for U.S.-NATO sharing are necessarily obfuscated or classified.

Evaluating intelligence agreements is difficult because the pacts are typically enacted to protect information not available to the public. As the information itself is secret, so too is the agreement that governs how the information is shared. The recently declassified documents surrounding the UKUSA Signals Intelligence agreement are unique in that they offer insight into the circumstances in which the arrangement was formed and the political and bureaucratic environment in which the formation of the agreement played out. Initial research indicates that the UKUSA agreement established a formalized convention of intelligence sharing that enabled a predictable series of interactions between the U.S. and U.K. that over time facilitated a closer, more trusted sharing relationship.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The problems that bear out from this subject necessarily lead to two primary areas of scholarship for further exploration: the history of NATO intelligence sharing since 1990, and the UKUSA Signals Intelligence agreement. Generally, the scholarship in each area is thin and, with one notable exception, the literature in each topic area is derived
from specific events where authors have tried to contextualize noteworthy occurrences into an overarching framework.

This contextualization is particularly true with regard to intelligence sharing theory. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the future focus of domestic and foreign intelligence communities became part of the debate as the communities’ primary target, the U.S.S.R, faded. A long-time scholar on intelligence and intelligence cooperation, Jeffrey T. Richelson, provided the first response in his article, “The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation,” followed in 1996 by H. Bradford Westerfield’s, “America and the World of Intelligence Liaison.” In addition to emphasizing the need for intelligence cooperation or ‘liaison,’ each article identifies the types of intelligence sharing that occurs as well as the costs and benefits for each. Unique to this dialogue is Richelson’s proposal that intelligence sharing agreements can drive the individual value of both costs and benefits, thus potentially weighting the equation toward establishing a sharing relationship.

After, and likely in response to, the changing environment produced by September 11, 2001, as well as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the scholarship on intelligence sharing theory continued using the terminology of economics and business to describe the factors and constraints on cooperation. A 2006 article by Jennifer Sims “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” states her intention is to, “help governments manage costs, risks, and gains of intelligence operations among states.” Further, she proposes that liaison is in fact, “a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.” The transactional argument for intelligence sharing culminated in James I. Walsh’s book The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing.

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8 Ibid.
Here, Walsh looks to relational contracting as the key to understanding sharing relationships. He states, “Intelligence is a valuable commodity, and states bargain with one another to obtain the best possible return before agreeing to share it.” In his scheme, states are driven by the fear of defection of various sorts to enact structures that reduce uncertainty.

Apart from explanations for why states share, or the frameworks they establish in intelligence agreements, there is even less literature that covers why states or organizations do not share potentially valuable intelligence. As James Wirtz has pointed out, the sharing of intelligence or intelligence relationships may prove domestically untenable. Furthermore, Bjorn Fagerstein argues that state-to-state relations are not the only factors that determine a relationship’s effectiveness, but bureaucratic negative incentives may actually inhibit sharing. In 2012, Adam Svendsen goes further and identifies the complexity and interconnectedness between international relations and intelligence sharing by identifying eight levels where intelligence sharing occurs. Transactional costs play less a role in Svendsen’s theory; he instead relies on schools of international relations theory to identify sharing causation, but notes that at various levels one must apply multiple theories to offering comprehensive understanding of intelligence sharing relationships. Critically, Svendsen identifies the limits of this approach and the lack of general theories to understand this discipline.

The dialogue over intelligence sharing, while not as robust as other disciplines, tends to focus on the reasons states share while limiting the influence of other, external factors. Through the examination of the UKUSA model we discover that the relationship most closely aligns with Svendsen’s ideas on a practical model for intelligence sharing.

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10 Ibid.


that functions at multiple levels. This does not, however, abandon Walsh’s prevalent theory on the regimes established to establish and solidify reliability between partners.

Moving from theory to practice, insightful examples of NATO-U.S. cooperation are rare because it is hard to see inside an active intelligence sharing relationship. Few current records point to what specific intelligence the U.S. has shared with NATO since 1990, but we do have some understanding of the operational successes and failures of the relationship in the post-Cold War Era. In order to place post-1990 examples in context this thesis briefly examines the history of NATO intelligence. Intelligence estimates became tools for determining the number and type of forces required to hold back the Cold War Soviet threat. As NATO relied on collective defense mechanisms to ensure the security of its members, each ally had to allocate a portion of their defense resources toward the needs of the whole. Alliance members, however, leveraged intelligence assessments to lessen their national burdens and shift the requirements onto other. Thus, traditional attempts at burden-sharing, to distribute costs, became efforts toward burden-shifting, to transfer costs onto others. The inclination toward burden-shifting created an incentive for member nations to control intelligence dialogue, which hindered the development of a functioning NATO operational intelligence organization or mechanism. Major General Edward Atkeson (USA) provides a Cold War example of the dysfunction of NATO intelligence in his 1984 article, “NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms,” where he discusses the lack of a central NATO military intelligence authority to combat the uncertainty of a NATO-Soviet ground war on the plains of central Europe.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated in the early 1990s NATO faced an identity crisis that moved the Alliance from collective defense, to a collective security organization focused on a myriad of potential tasks. The break-up of Yugoslavia caused major power instabilities in the Balkans, and in 1994, NATO undertook peacekeeping in

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Bosnia to prevent further conflict. Again in 1999, set against the backdrop of renewed hostilities, NATO conducted an air campaign and deployed peacekeepers to Kosovo. Coordinated Air, Land, and Sea operations emphasized many of the incongruences in U.S. vs. European NATO capabilities.

Several publications have highlighted the gaps in U.S. vs. Allied intelligence capabilities. Writing for the Department of Defense, Larry Wentz in *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, states: “National intelligence support plans were closely held and therefore it was not clear to IFOR and others what nations would bring what capabilities in terms of intelligence systems to support IFOR requirements.” Other experience suggests the U.S. dominated intelligence production, but also that intelligence sharing in Bosnia was hampered by U.S. stove-piping.\(^{17}\) Additionally, this developed intelligence had to be shared in order to be effective.\(^ {18}\) NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999 revealed startling discrepancies in intelligence capabilities. Writing on NATO operations, David Yost in his article “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” provides the potential reasons behind the mismatch including defense procurement priorities, European conscription rules, and a U.S. emphasis on fighting abroad.\(^ {19}\) Yost writes, “Thanks in large part to its satellites, superior UAVs and reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, the United States met approximately 95% of NATO intelligence requirements.”\(^ {20}\)

This body of text is representative of a field of literature that covers the lack of European military ability to operate beyond their borders and the subsequent domination of U.S. intelligence when conducting coalition operations. It highlights the difference in outlook after the fall of the Soviet Union and the European desire to reap a post-Cold War peace dividend. While not specific about the amount or type of intelligence shared,


\(^{18}\) Ibid.


these texts give a sense of the technological gap between allies and indicate that, during times of crisis, the U.S. does share intelligence. Finally, the analysis contained here identifies when sharing occurs on a large scale and when it does not.

Absent from this discussion are the conflicts in Afghanistan, and Libya. Scholarship on the intelligence sharing aspect of NATO’s limited involvement and sharing operations in Afghanistan and Libya is still likely forthcoming. Press reports and congressional/parliamentary records provide some insight to these conflicts. The 2006 creation of the U.S.-led NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) also demonstrates American capacity to share intelligence, particularly in light of new NATO members and operations in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, sharing intelligence with NATO does not always improve the accuracy or timeliness of NATO intelligence assessments. Political concerns can often override the intelligence assessment process so that information gained to support a particular hypothesis in a given situation could advance a posture or policy stance that violates the national policy of an Alliance member. This situation is less likely for purely military problems or information, but remains a significant hurdle for indications and warnings of an impending crisis. The lack of comprehensive intelligence support at the operational level NATO commands can lead to competing assessments or an incomplete picture. Currently, the IFC is a framework organization operated under the auspices of the United States. It has no formal placement in the integrated military structure and therefore no codified duties toward the component commands or the Joint Force Headquarters.

The state of the NATO-U.S. sharing relationship is contrasted against the U.S.-U.K. relationship codified, first by the signals intelligence agreement in 1943 and later by the BRUSA agreement in 1946. This agreement was the foundation for the sharing of signals intelligence during the Cold War and the “special relationship” between the

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United States and United Kingdom that is so often cited by diplomats as evidence of Anglo-American foreign policy convergence. The U.S.–U.K. “special relationship” was never a foregone conclusion and was, in fact, forged despite the American military’s perception of Britain as a rival and potential enemy. The formation of an intelligence cooperative with a recent rival lends itself to the notion that, despite the accession of former communist states to NATO, establishing institutions of trust between former rivals is possible.

Critical to this work is the narrative told by NSA historians and the release of NSA and GCHQ documents from 1943–1955. Each organization released over 1200 document pages. Unique to this release is the disclosure of many classified notes between high-ranking military commanders, as well as the initial proposal to share from the U.K. Notably these memoranda shed light on the bureaucratic dynamic of how and under what circumstances states share intelligence.

Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball crafted the seminal work on the modern function of the agreement: *The Ties that Bind.* This work examines the intelligence structures and functions of both the first and second parties to the agreement, which include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, while demonstrating the origins and intent of the UKUSA agreement. Nearly equally compelling is the story of the creation of the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) by Richard Aldrich. These works bring together biography and history to contextualize the creation of the UKUSA agreement that began during World War II and continued into the mid-1950s. What they unfortunately lack, are the documents themselves. In June of 2010, both the NSA and GCHQ released the original agreements and background documents allowing this thesis to examine the biography and history in a new light. This release highlighted the source material for an early, but often neglected work on the formation of cryptologic support agencies during World War II. Authored by Robert Benson, this small, but vital work, relies on interviews and the source documents not released until

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2010 to complete the internal picture on cryptologic activity during this period.25 These documents illuminate both the circumstances of the series of agreements and reveal the underpinnings for the success of the relationship.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis examines current U.S.-NATO intelligence sharing and the potential for future problems while dissecting the UKUSA agreement to identify leverage points for reinforcing an enduring U.S.-NATO intelligence sharing relationship in military affairs. The sources used here focus on attacking the problems identified above. Scholarly sources are critical in identifying and sorting the mechanism that facilitate the sharing of intelligence between states. Assessing the state of the U.S. NATO intelligence sharing since the Cold War, however, requires sources of various types. Scholars have, at least in part, identified the sharing scenarios that occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo. Less scholarly work has been written on Afghanistan, and Libya; as such, this paper relies on congressional/parliamentary records as well as press reports and other official documents.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of two basic components with an introduction and conclusion serving as bookends. Chapter I, the introduction, introduces the basic research question and explores the methods used to answer it including sections that define intelligence and identify the overall scope of the paper. Chapter II examines the history of NATO intelligence as it relates to the development of an operational support capability as well as NATO-U.S. intelligence-sharing since the Cold War with a focus on coalition military operations. Chapter III focuses on the enduring signals intelligence relationship formed between the United States and United Kingdom during World War II, the 1943 U.S.–U.K Agreement. As such, it examines the UKUSA agreement’s underpinnings based on primary sources documents and secondary historical accounts. Last, Chapter IV explores conclusions and recommendations for strengthening the intelligence-sharing bond between the U.S. and NATO with policy prescriptions that include the U.S. strategic shift east and the potential for NATO (Allied) vs. NATO (U.S.)-led operations in the future.

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II. NATO INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. INTELLIGENCE: SEPARATE BUT NOT EQUAL

A. NATO: THE INFLUENCE OF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 as a check on Soviet power, but transitioned to something much more after the Soviet Union’s breakup in 1990. The treaty tied North America and Europe together in a collective defense scheme codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty whereby “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” This level of cooperation required intelligence estimates of the Soviet Union to help NATO defend its security interests in crises, which were in turn politicized and hindered the development of intelligence support mechanisms at the operational level. The lack of operational intelligence mechanisms during the Cold War created a significant gap in NATO intelligence capabilities, which had negative effects on the Alliance’s ability to support NATO operations in the post-Cold War era. During each major NATO operation the U.S. had to increase intelligence support disproportionately to bolster NATO capabilities. This situation created an unstable foundation for U.S. intelligence sharing with NATO whereby the U.S. temporarily bolsters NATO capabilities to ensure mission success, which hinders the development of autonomous NATO intelligence support.

This chapter seeks to identify the political problems that affected the Alliance intelligence structure in its early years, and the ramifications for NATO operations in the 1990s and early twenty-first century. First, we explore the influence of intelligence assessments on the formation of NATO strategy. The politicization of intelligence estimates disinclined the members to form operational intelligence support mechanisms. The key outcome we focus on here is the lack of a military operational intelligence structure, which led to poor intelligence support to NATO expeditionary operations. Second, we identify the shift in NATO’s strategic orientation in the early 1990s that transitioned toward “out of area operations.” This section examines post-Cold War major NATO operations beginning with a brief overview and moves to post-operation after-
action reports that highlight NATO’s capability gaps and U.S. efforts to bridge the gap ‘in situ.’ The third section concerns the effects of the NATO’s capabilities gap identified in the 1990s as the U.S. marched to war in Afghanistan in 2001 without the Alliance.26 The fourth section identifies the intelligence capability gaps from the Libya campaign in 2011. Despite new agencies and 10 years of close intelligence cooperation involving the United States and the other NATO Allies, significant Alliance intelligence support problems were identified during the Libya operation. Last, the conclusion to this chapter identifies the enduring NATO intelligence support problem and posits that because of the recently announced strategic rebalance toward the Pacific, the full range of U.S. assets may not be available for a major NATO operation. Consequently, the U.S. intelligence community should broaden and deepen its relationship with NATO to offset this potential contingency.

B. EARLY DAYS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Discussions on a formalized transatlantic agreement began in 1947 and played out against the galvanizing backdrop of 1948-1949 as the Soviets backed a coup in Czechoslovakia and later moved to block the land routes to West Berlin. Negotiations over a potential pact emphasized the principles of self-help and mutual aid, which became the focal points for future discussions on Allied defense production and allocation.

The collective defense obligations created under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty necessitated the creation of subcommittees and organizations allowed for under Article 9. The formation of the Military and Defence Committees in 1949 provided a means to define collective defense strategy and produced the intelligence assessments on

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26 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Alliance did vote for the declaration of Article 5 and the U.S. did request some limited assistance from NATO. That assistance was mostly logistical in nature, but NATO did provide Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) missions during Operation Eagle Assist to free up U.S. AWACS aircraft for operations in Afghanistan. See “Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States,” NATO HQ, Brussels, October 4, 2001, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm.
which NATO’s first strategic defense document, DC 6/1, were based. Intelligence exchange among NATO members at this time centered on the production of these types of estimates in order to formulate strategy, estimate the number and types of NATO forces required to defend Europe, as well as provided a guide for Allied equipment and production quotas.\(^{27}\)

In 1950, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the appointment of U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and endowed him with a small staff. The creation of a formalized military head, the SACEUR, reflected the acknowledged need for a reassessment of Allied strategy and accordingly, Soviet capabilities. His review of Soviet capabilities and intentions in light of the Korean War encouraged him to pursue a conventional and nuclear buildup on the continent. The outgrowth of his assessments became the NAC’s agreement on an ambitious force structure of 75 divisions, 6,500 aircraft, and more than 700 vessels assigned to the defense of Europe.\(^ {28}\) These force figures were driving intelligence exchange in order to produce strategic intelligence estimates of Soviet capabilities. The Allies were not focused on establishing operational intelligence mechanisms.

During the Cold War, the Alliance was disinclined to adopt another intelligence mechanism because even the debates over intelligence estimates had become highly politicized. NATO members manipulated force projection numbers and methods so the Soviet threat appeared more or less menacing, as political and fiscal needs dictated the willingness and ability of members to invest in NATO capabilities. In the early 1950s the best intelligence estimates indicated that Allied forces needed to muster 160 divisions for an attack; a number the Allies could not hope to match without throwing their economies into disarray.\(^ {29}\) This inability for the Allied forces to reach parity with the Soviets and the end of active fighting in the Korean War induced President Eisenhower to seek spending

\(^{27}\) Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 81, 96


\(^{29}\) Thies, *Friendly Rivals*, 61
cuts in defense through an increased reliance on nuclear weapons, which would extend to Europe as well. NATO codified the increased European reliance on American nuclear weapons through the adoption of the “massive retaliation” strategy in 1957.  

President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sought to change this calculus through the intelligence estimate process. In 1961, President Kennedy sought to create legitimate conventional force capability options on the European continent in order to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet conventional force attack as part of his “Flexible Response” doctrine. Towards that end U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara changed the U.S. intelligence contribution to NATO intelligence by emphasizing the qualitative differences in Soviet vs. Allied divisions. The changes in these calculations would allow the Allies to achieve parity with Soviet military through modest additions to Allied conventional forces in Europe.

In 1967-1968 NATO adopted the Flexible Response strategy of preparedness for measured escalation, but the Alliance never fully acquired the proposed additions to the conventional force structure. The debate over conventional capabilities emerged again in the early 1970s, this time at the behest of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Well before the debates over the “dual-track” strategy, the Schlesinger Initiative looked to raise NATO conventional capabilities. Once again, the debate between U.S. and European NATO members centered on assessments of Soviet capabilities. According to Schlesinger’s estimate, many of the 175 Soviet divisions were not at a level of readiness that would support employment in combat, and based on the locations of a portion of the Soviet garrisons it was not feasible for them to enter a conflict in a timely manner. Therefore, the SECDEF argued that NATO and Soviet forces were already at a rough parity and that the addition of a few more military divisions to the Alliance would swing

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32 Ibid.
conventional superiority toward NATO. European assessments, on the other hand, included every Soviet division, regardless of its readiness level or geographic proximity as a potential combatant, which increased the size of the Soviet threat. According to a RAND report, “From the European perspective, NATO’s conventional inferiority legitimized the continued emphasis on NATO’s nuclear elements.”

1. **WHY NATO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES MATTER**

Some critics have argued that the lack of a credible NATO military intelligence capability is the result of a lack of European investment. While this might be true, it is indicative of a deeper cause that reaches back to these debates over intelligence assessments. As a result, NATO members were disinclined to allow the formation of operational intelligence organizations during the Cold War. Intelligence dialogue at the operational level would inevitably affect the intelligence estimate process and could result in a scenario where an individual NATO member would shoulder what it viewed as an undue burden on its national assets.

2. **NATO INTELLIGENCE: DESIGN FOR DISFUNCTION**

Early in the Alliance’s history it was not obvious that a coordinated operational intelligence organization was necessary, but by the 1980s there was clearly a need for some mechanism to bridge the gap between the strategic and operational levels of war. During the Cold War, NATO plans called for operational commanders to focus on breaking out from their garrison positions to confront Soviet armor division rushing through the Fulda Gap. The tactics of the tank engagement outweighed any concerns over intelligence sharing until the front was stabilized. Once the front was stabilized, it was assumed Corps commanders would exchange information as needed, just as they did during World War II. As military tactics and weaponry became more sophisticated, this

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33 Ibid., 12–14
34 Ibid., 41
approach became untenable. Allied forces required greater integration and unity of effort, which required increased information pushed down to the operational level.\textsuperscript{36}

The first indication we have that NATO operational intelligence was malfunctioning was during the 1980s when Maj. General Edward Atkeson recognized that operational commanders needed a robust, redundant NATO intelligence mechanism. Instead, according to Atkeson, NATO members organized their combined military structure to avoid dealing with intelligence altogether on a collective basis:

Not only is the operational command system virtually blind, but the subordinate national entities have intelligence capabilities so varied as to promote conflicting views of the battlefield among the various national and international headquarters. Instead of enhancing the effectiveness of the defense, the NATO intelligence system—which exists more by accident than design—seems to offer more opportunities for dysfunction than for positive support of the enterprise. Without a common intelligence system, over which it has some influence and directive authority, the Alliance is virtually doomed to drift, while a few concerned member nations—most particularly the U.S.—seek inefficient quick fixes for treating the symptoms of a disease that, if put to the test of combat, has high probability of proving fatal.\textsuperscript{37}

The crux of his argument is that NATO never incorporated an operational intelligence structure that coordinated information across Corps commanders during peace and that, in the event of a war, the Allies’ success was clearly at risk as a result of this failure. Critically, he also states that, according to SACEUR General Bernard Rogers, 90 per cent of the intelligence SACEUR receives comes from the U.S.\textsuperscript{38} This tendency for the U.S. to continue providing the overwhelming majority of intelligence support becomes more evident in NATO’s post-Cold War conflicts.

\textbf{C. NATO’S POST-COLD WAR STRATEGY AND EVOLUTION}

In late 1989, the threat presented by the U.S.S.R. began to fade and the impetus for large-scale NATO defense planning and assessments lost momentum due to the lack

\textsuperscript{36} Edward B. Atkeson, “NATO Intelligence: A Contradiction in Terms.”
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
of a serious enemy and existential threat. In 1991, the Alliance began a slow march from policies centered on providing for a common defense toward the pursuit of complex collective security responsibilities.\(^\text{39}\) The 1991 NATO Strategic Concept identified the uncertainty of the new security environment and the potential for “serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries.”\(^\text{40}\) Well into the 1990s, tasks for the Alliance continued to build on the 1967 Harmel Report’s recommendation for the development of political dialogue, especially with former adversaries, and a complementary conventional military capability that ensured NATO’s security.\(^\text{41}\) The promotion of stability in former Eastern Bloc or non-aligned countries required that NATO undertake a role in crisis management and conflict resolution. The language of the 1991 Strategic Concept, however, underscored the notion that Alliance interests remained focused on collective defense within the territory defined in Article 6 of the NATO Treaty.\(^\text{42}\) By 1992, however, this same document facilitated a transition toward out of area tasks and intervention in out of area conflicts.\(^\text{43}\)

The shift in NATO’s post-Cold War outlook was also accompanied by a transformation from static forces toward the U.S.-influenced Combined Joint Task Force concept whereby multinational, multiservice commands were created for specific operations. The U.S. shifted toward this model after the 1984 Goldwater-Nichols Act, and from an intelligence support perspective, the U.S. Joint Task Force relied on national intelligence architectures to support expeditionary operations. During NATO’s slow transition toward this concept, however, no mechanisms were established to incorporate that same design for operational intelligence support. Furthermore, the concept was originally launched in 1993, but never fully implemented by the integrated military

\(^{39}\) David S. Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}. \\
\(^{40}\) NATO, 1991 Strategic Concept, part I, para. 5 and 9. \\
\(^{42}\) Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, 192. \\
structure until 1999, after the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo. Despite NATO’s transition to expeditionary operations in the Balkans, this unaltered NATO force structure left serious gaps in operational intelligence support, which were only filled by the U.S. to ensure success.


NATO’s willingness and ability to conduct major out of area operations was first tested during the crisis in Bosnia from 1992–1995. The Alliance began conducting Operation Maritime Monitor in July 1992 to enforce an arms embargo on the warring factions in the former Yugoslavia vying for independence amid the breakup of Yugoslavia. This operation was quickly followed with the more aggressive maritime blockade of the former Yugoslavia during Operation Maritime Guard later that same year. In 1993, NATO began Operation Deny Flight along with a combined naval operation with the Western European Union (WEU), Operation Sharp Guard, to continue the enforcement of United Nation Security Council resolutions 713 and 757. American participation during these phases of the Bosnian conflict consisted primarily of support to NATO coordinating authorities utilizing existing U.S. command, control, and intelligence support functions.

In 1994, NATO continued efforts to enforce UNSC sanctions and the no-fly zone over Yugoslavia. Two events pushed the Alliance toward intervention: a Serbian mortar attack on Sarajevo killed 28 civilians and the Serbs attempted to contravene the no-fly zone. NATO responded through limited bombing and by shooting down four Serbian tactical aircraft. These actions began an increase in NATO operations over Bosnia as United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) commanders called for Allied tactical air

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45 NATO conducted smaller out of area operations as early as 1990 to monitor Turkey’s border with Iraq during the non-NATO Operation DESERT STORM. A comprehensive list of NATO operations can be found at http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/21/NATOOperations, 1949-Present.pdf.

46 Yost, NATO Transformed, 194.
support against Serbian targets with increasing frequency. Operation Deliberate Force was the culmination of this bombing campaign in August-September 1995 as Allied forces conducted two weeks of intense strikes against Bosnian Serb critical nodes in response to the second attack on civilians at a Sarajevo market. The bombing campaign pressured all sides toward negotiation, and an agreement was reached on November 21, 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton Accords called for the deployment of a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). A smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR one year later. NATO’s tasks were to command and administer the forces that would oversee the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal or redeployment of the belligerents, as well as the process for creating lines of demarcation and separation between ethnically sensitive areas.

2. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN BOSNIA AND U.S. SHARING

The Deliberate Force bombing campaign and the deployment of troops in support of IFOR found NATO intelligence capabilities wanting, which compelled the United States to fill the operational intelligence gaps. In this context, intelligence gaps derived from the lack of personnel, systems, and equipment to support operational requirements.

Previous military actions in Bosnia throughout 1992 and 1993 were single reactionary events. Violations of the blockade or of the no-fly zone had to occur in order to provoke a NATO military reaction, which was limited in scope to a single event. The assets and coordination required to perform these operations never pushed NATO, the organization, beyond its command and control limits. Once a deliberate bombing campaign had been decided upon, coalition personnel, particularly U.S. military leaders serving in a NATO role, recognized the Alliance’s inability to conduct major operations similar to Desert Storm. Accordingly, U.S. military leaders performed a complete “Americanization” of the NATO Combined Air Operations Center in order to ensure the center’s readiness.47 This included efforts to reform the ‘backward’ and ‘unpracticed’

47 Robert C. Owen ed., Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2000), 482. This included “several hundred TDY augmentees” and a “flood of state-of-the-art communications, intelligence, and automated planning systems.”
NATO staffs unfamiliar with intelligence support to strike operations, specifically Battle Damage Assessment.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, the U.S. airborne intelligence missions constituted 92\% of the total of 169 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights. In Electronic Warfare (EW) the U.S. also provided 89\% of the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions.\textsuperscript{49} The two-week bombing campaign stretched even the American ability to bolster NATO intelligence, but the campaign brought an end to active fighting and facilitated the negotiation of the Dayton Accords.

The gaps in NATO intelligence support mechanisms became more pronounced as the Alliance moved toward ground operations in Bosnia. This situation induced NATO, including the U.S., to rely on American intelligence capabilities to meet operational demands. For command, control, and intelligence purposes, the United States provided 46 out of 48 satellite channels, according to German General Klaus Naumann, head of the NATO Military Committee.\textsuperscript{50} He pointed out that it would be impossible for the other Allies to conduct sustained NATO operations without U.S. support because the U.S. provides all satellite intelligence, jamming, and technological contributions and the Americans flew two-thirds of all sorties.\textsuperscript{51} Even with U.S. support, IFOR experienced significant obstacles because of communication and encryption compatibility problems as well as differing classification standards.\textsuperscript{52}

In the run up to Operation Deliberate Force or prior to the deployment of IFOR there appears to have been little planning for operational intelligence support. This was particularly evident in U.S. after action reports. Writing for the U.S. Department of Defense, Larry Wentz explains “there was no single doctrine for multinational intelligence operations or intelligence architecture. The nations developed their own


\textsuperscript{50} Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, 212.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Ian Q.R. Thomas, \textit{Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination} (Lanham, UK: Rowman and Littlefield), 53–54.
approach to establish the foundation on which IFOR built its coalition intelligence operation.”

Accordingly, the Americans, the British, and the French deployed national intelligence teams to conduct intelligence operations under the Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), but national intelligence support plans were closely held, so it was not clear exactly how the national teams supported IFOR as a whole. For the United States, this created a dual support structure with U.S. support to U.S. units and U.S. support to NATO as a whole. The dual structure created further concerns over local responsibility to disseminate and release intelligence because of the multitude of conflicting rules and procedures. Despite doctrinal changes early in the operation, the new guidelines were not followed by the end of 1996. The inability to enact a coherent policy on intelligence dissemination revealed the lack of planning and coordination among NATO members.

Eventually, the U.S. reformed its intelligence support practices to encompass a multinational environment. By the end of the IFOR mandate U.S. intelligence sharing efforts increased so that “intelligence flowed smoothly across channels, with U.S. support nearly transparent to NATO.” While the operation revealed the weakness of NATO operational intelligence support, it also showed the willingness of the United States to increase its intelligence efforts to ensure the success of the mission. On first glance, European support capabilities to Deliberate Force and IFOR appear wanting, but this was not a European effort. It was a NATO effort. The NATO post-Cold War defense planning process failed in the creation of intelligence capabilities that support the Alliance as a whole.

Defense planning in the United States was and has always been based on a deployable force projection posture with appropriate intelligence support, but the United States neglected to insist on the extension of this concept to its NATO Allies even during

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54 Ibid., 60, 75, 81.
55 Ibid., 75.
56 Barrett K. Peavie, “Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia,” Monograph for School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (2001), 4–5.
57 Mark C. McLaughlin, “Combat Assessment,” 181; Peavie Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia,” 17, 4.
58 Wentz, “Intelligence Operations,” 93, 88.
the debates over out of area operations. The unwillingness of the NATO Allies, including the United States, to immediately confront these gaps in the NATO command structure probably represented a continuation of the burden-sharing/burden-shifting debates that have characterized Alliance relations since 1949. If the U.S. recognized this problem within its own forces, but never confronted the lack of intelligence support for Allied operations, the blame for deficient NATO intelligence capability investment in the 1990s falls on the U.S. for not raising this issue as much as it does on European and Canadian governments for not providing resources against the problem once operations in Bosnia made it clear. Furthermore, this lack of intelligence capability investment at the NATO command level created a cycle of dependence on U.S. intelligence-sharing during crises, which enabled the Alliance to put these problems aside during times of peace or lack of conflict. This intelligence capability gap and propensity for U.S. ‘crisis-sharing’ become clear once more when we examine the 1999 events in Kosovo.

3. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO 1999

Following the relatively successful NATO operation in Bosnia, the situation in the Balkans once again began to deteriorate, which prompted the Allies to intervene. This time the relationship within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between the government in Belgrade and the formerly autonomous region of Kosovo broke down over potential independence for the province. As the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, led by Slobodan Milosevic, forced the Kosovars toward greater integration with the rest of Serbia and strengthened Belgrade’s authority over the province, conflict broke out between ethnic Albanian Kosovar guerrilla elements such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serbian regular and paramilitary forces. Both sides conducted brutal campaigns in the region, but the Serbs created a serious humanitarian situation in 1998 as they drove ethnic Albanians from Kosovo en masse, which, to some observers, appeared as a move toward genocide.

In September 1998, the United Nations Security Council issued resolution 1199, which called for an end to the violence and the return of all refugees to their homes. Serb units, however, continued to act against the KLA in contravention of the UNSCR. By
mid-October 1998 NATO responded by authorizing the activation of several units for potential air strikes and establishing an air surveillance mission, Operation Eagle Eye, to complement the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) de-escalation and monitoring efforts. Serbian transgressions against the ethnic Albanian Kosovars continued and eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The failure by President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo prompted NATO to launch a seventy-seven day air campaign, Operation Allied Force, on March 24, 1999.\footnote{Notably, the goal of the operation was to enforce UNSCR 1203, but the operation was undertaken without the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council.} Eventually, Serbian forces were withdrawn from Kosovo and NATO deployed a peacekeeping force, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which has maintained a continual presence in the region to this day. The combat phase of this operation dwarfed that of Bosnia, and as such, the successes and difficulties experienced by the Alliance here underscore the lack of a NATO operational military intelligence organization and the role the United States played in securing victory.

4. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN KOSOVO AND U.S. SHARING

The operation, and more specifically, the political dialogue that accompanied the operation, were successful, but to read the U.S. after action reports it would appear that many military and government officials were alarmed at the discrepancy between U.S. and European military capabilities. For our purpose here, the intelligence difficulties encountered during the operation hinged on the structure and function of the various NATO elements and their interaction with the U.S., or dealt specifically with coalition intelligence sharing. The ‘capability gap’ identified first during Bosnia, and now reiterated during Kosovo, also became a theme for scholars, politicians, and NATO governments, which responded with the Defense Capabilities Initiative in 1999.

The size of the operations in Kosovo exposed another key weakness in NATO intelligence support at the political-strategic level, which negatively affected the ability of the organization to respond effectively to operational developments. NATO intelligence at the political-strategic level was supported through the International Military Staff
(IMS). At the time, the IMS contained a small, by U.S. standards, intelligence division of 25 officers, few of whom had prior experience in intelligence. The division’s mission was to support the political and military decision making process through the Military Committee and the North Atlantic Council. In addition to the paucity of intelligence experience, the staff, and NATO as a whole, had no organic collection resources and relied on information supplied by member countries. Additionally, the intelligence production process within NATO required that any official product must have the full consensus of all NATO members. The lack of collection resources and the consensus rule hampered the production of early baseline estimates on the problems within the former Yugoslavia.\(^{60}\) As the Alliance moved toward Operation Allied Force and national governments shared less with the Alliance in response to heavier internal intelligence demands, the NATO Intelligence Division could not accommodate the quickening pace of political-strategic change and instead had to focus on internal NATO developments and actions, which delivered an incomplete picture to NATO policy makers. By the end of the operation Admiral Guido Venturoni, the new head of the Military Committee, commented, “Indeed, without the United States’s [sic] assets the European Alliance members and Canada could never have mounted a successful air campaign such as this. Quite frankly, they simply do not have the capacity.”\(^{61}\) The admiral noted the requirement to acquire systems and capabilities that deal with the politically sensitive elements of the targeting process.

NATO intelligence was overwhelmed by the number of ongoing tactical operations and lacked the technological ability to support a large, complex campaign. The U.S. gradually began to provide more intelligence support until finally the U.S. Task Force Anvil provided the majority of the targeting support and the U.S. Joint Analysis Center at RAF Molesworth, UK, functioned as the primary combat support agency for


intelligence. Thanks to its mature operational networks and capacity the U.S. met 95% of NATO intelligence requirements, which included over 22,000 intelligence products provided by JAC Molesworth to NATO. The shift toward U.S. dominance of intelligence support functions also revealed U.S. unfamiliarity with NATO procedures, and problems with U.S. integration. These problems reignited debates on target selection: whether to strike infrastructure targets that attacked Belgrade’s political will and ability to continue the offensive, or the equipment and weapons used against the Kosovars.

Dissemination practices also became problematic because American agencies tended to write products primarily for U.S. units at the highest classification available instead of writing for the widest NATO dissemination possible. As noted above, the U.S. had difficulties determining need-to-know in a coalition environment. Additionally, American access to a wide range of intelligence, especially ISR-related data, led other Allies to perceive the U.S. as arrogant, while U.S. personnel felt that they gave much more information than they received from other NATO members.

Intelligence sharing was not just an American problem. Interviews conducted after OAF indicate that the French utilized tactical SIGINT intelligence collection sites in Macedonia, but that information never made it into NATO databases. Information flow was hampered among the Allies, and this was exacerbated by the tactical targeting approach required for the operation. Many of the targets were fleeting, and so required immediate identification, assessment, and kinetic action, which was beyond European

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63 Yost, NATO Transformed, 212; Thomas, Promise of Alliance, 52; James R. Everett III, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Kosovo and the Implications for Intelligence,” U.S. Army War College (2000), 9, see also footnote 96: “In terms of relative contribution, the U.S. cell provided about 95% of the intelligence that arrived at [the] Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) via a National Intelligence Cell (NIC).”

64 John E. Peters et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Barbara: RAND Project Air Force, 2001) 72; Wentz, “Intelligence and Situation Awareness,” 469, Thomas, Promise of Alliance, 47.

65 Wentz, “Intelligence and Situation Awareness,” 466.

66 Ibid., 467.

67 Everett, “Implications for Intelligence,” 14.
capabilities. Operation Allied Force clearly demonstrated that NATO European allies could not gather and disseminate information or intelligence in real-time, and as a result U.S. reliance on U.S. technological capabilities drove a wedge between American and European support doctrines. General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted these problems during the campaign: “Kosovo revealed a host of technical and training problems, shortcomings in the equipment of given allies, and the inability to create the kind of fusion of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, battle management and strategic reconnaissance systems needed to fight with maximum effectiveness and interoperability.”

NATO’s reliance on the United States for the lion’s share of intelligence support also exposed difficulties with U.S. information sharing with the Allies outside the intelligence sphere. The advanced platforms and weapons employed by the U.S. prompted the Americans to strictly define releasability procedures for the Air Tasking Order (ATO). The ATO delineates aircraft takeoff times and locations as well as assigned target areas. The U.S. was reluctant to disseminate information on the operations of its B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft as well as the employment of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM). The dissemination of two ATOs, one U.S. only and another for NATO as a whole, created great confusion for NATO radar operators as U.S. assets appeared with no warning. Additionally, the U.S. restricted the dissemination of Battle Damage Assessments (BDA), which inhibited the ability of NATO planners to assess the need for restrikes and probably caused the unnecessary re-targeting of Serb targets by Allied aircraft. These restrictions were perhaps the result of U.S. distrust in Allied personnel security qualifications and requirements in light of the arrest of a French

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68 Peters, European Contributions, 31
69 Ibid., 50.
70 Cordesman, Lessons and Non-Lessons, 278, as quoted from Aviation Week and Space Technology May 17, 1999 p. 33.
71 Peters, European Contributions, 39–40.
officer who passed targeting information to the Belgrade government.\textsuperscript{73} Additionally, there were suspicions within the SACEUR staff that Greek nationals were also passing information to Belgrade officials.\textsuperscript{74}

The picture presented by many after action reports is that Alliance intelligence sharing is complex and difficult. At the tactical and operational level units involved in KFOR, the ground peacekeeping element, exchanged intelligence so that the cooperation was defined as ‘good.’\textsuperscript{75} Nevertheless, there were substantive recommendations made to remedy the problems identified. Within the realm of intelligence sharing, both the United Kingdom and France focused on ensuring access to complete operational information for members of the coalition; in practical terms this meant Europeans having access to American intelligence.\textsuperscript{76} Many organizations expected the NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative, which began in 1999, to plot a way forward. As early as 1996, the NAC appointed a High Level Steering Group which directed members toward increasing European intelligence capabilities and forcing NATO planners toward a joint construct so information would flow seamlessly to all member nations from NATO institutions and vice versa.\textsuperscript{77} This proposal included exercises that focused on political consultation and coalition building so the targeting process could incorporate the full political context of sensitive targets, which necessarily depend on the incorporation of comprehensive intelligence.\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, Admiral Venturoni recommended the acquisition of intelligence platforms and systems to deal with the political issues that accompany coalition warfare.\textsuperscript{79} The DoD in its official After Action Report to Congress noted the requirement to study how coalition allies receive information and how the information flow can


\textsuperscript{74} Everett, “Implications for Intelligence,” 9.

\textsuperscript{75} Wentz, “Intelligence and Situation Awareness,” 452.

\textsuperscript{76} Peters, \textit{European Contributions}, 57.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 93.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid, 94; Cordesman, \textit{Lessons and Non-Lessons}, 137.

\textsuperscript{79} Cordesman, \textit{Lessons and Non-Lessons}, 274.
maximize data fusion at facilities like NATO’s CAOC. Reflecting back on his experiences in Kosovo, General Wesley Clark noted the need to bolster intelligence capabilities NATO-wide because the fundamental basis of managing any crisis has to be a common perception of what the crisis entails and what an acceptable strategy would be in dealing with it, I think it’s important to strengthen intelligence-sharing within NATO. In the Kosovo operation, the majority of the intelligence came from the United States. We need a much broader-based intelligence process, and other nations need to contribute more to the common intelligence picture. That way we can build on that picture rapidly in an emergency.”

It is clear that the intelligence capabilities of non-U.S. NATO Allies could not provide the necessary information to conduct the campaign. Considering the technical and procedural gaps in the Canadian and the European militaries, assistance had to come from the United States. This was the second time since the end of the Cold War that the U.S. had to provide the majority of intelligence support to NATO operations. Despite the lessons identified after the Bosnia campaign, NATO member countries, including the United States, refused to reform the NATO organization to deal with what General Clark called the “fundamental basis of managing any crisis.” This refusal left the most capable member of NATO, the U.S., with the responsibility to share in order to meet operational requirements. The rebuilding and refortifying of NATO intelligence by the U.S. during the Kosovo campaign indicates that the Alliance never fully implemented any post-Bosnia intelligence reforms. Instead, the Allies chose to pursue a strategy that required European political mobilization to support the addition of European capabilities to the Alliance without much serious thought to building on the costs already incurred during Operation Allied Force.

Despite the substantive recommendations from member countries noted above, NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative report contained more bombast than practical
commitment toward expanding NATO capabilities. During a NATO seminar in May 2001 outgoing U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow concluded that “rhetoric has far outpaced action when it comes to enhancing capabilities,” and gave the alliance a “failing grade.”

D. NATO AND AFGHANISTAN

September 11, 2001, changed American national security priorities. The scale and dramatic fashion of the attack shocked the Western world. Less than twenty-four hours after the attacks, as a show of solidarity toward the United States, the Allies invoked the mutual defense principle of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. On October 2, 2001, U.S. Ambassador Frank Taylor briefed the NAC on the results of Washington’s investigation and upcoming plans for the invasion of Afghanistan. On October 7, 2001, the U.S. began striking Taliban targets. Over the next six months U.S. operations, in concert with limited coalition and local support, swept and cleared much of the country. Despite the Article 5 declaration, the U.S. never called on NATO to discuss the use of its military forces for assistance. There were three potential reasons for the U.S. not to request NATO assistance in Afghanistan: 1) The invasion force would have required a vote of consensus, which the U.S. might not have been able to muster; 2) the time required to incorporate European forces would have pushed the American timeline too far to the right; 3) European forces, to a large extent, would have likely depended on American support capabilities, including logistics, force protection, and intelligence, thus increasing the initial U.S. footprint to an even greater extent.

The U.N. assumed responsibility for the rebuilding of Afghanistan and during the initial years individual NATO countries took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on a rotational basis. NATO’s transition toward the leadership of ISAF first began as support to German and Dutch ISAF commanders, which eventually led to NATO taking full responsibility for the mission in August 2003. Inside the country, NATO, supported in many ways by the United States, has established an

array of intelligence support functions that have largely been the result of ISAF’s evolutionary command structure since 2003.

Despite these impressive gains, some military leaders have noted significant problems with the U.S. and Allied approach. First, it focuses too much on highly classified technical intelligence and is not adapted toward peacekeeping or stability operations. In 2010, General Michael Flynn and his coauthors noted the U.S. military intelligence community’s inability to take on the cultural intelligence duties required to combat the Taliban insurgency.\textsuperscript{84} Second, despite 10 years of conflict the U.S. and NATO as a whole still have difficulty sharing intelligence and information. The report of a DoD Inspector General investigation states:

Impediments to intelligence information sharing between U.S. force and coalition partners have existed for years. However, the impediments continue to include: inadequate information sharing training; outdated foreign disclosure policies and procedures; and the absence of a source registry for coalition forces to de-conflict counterintelligence and human intelligence source data. This has resulted in information not being tactically useful by the time it is authorized for release.\textsuperscript{85}

1. A NEW NATO INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE – THE NIFC

This thesis argues that although NATO and the United States will always continue to provide limited intelligence to suit the current operational needs, the Alliance lacks investment in a comprehensive intelligence support mechanism to support independent NATO major operations. To this end, this section briefly examines the NATO intelligence support mechanisms that exist today and then reviews the outcome of the intelligence support to operations in Libya in 2011. It is important to note that the sharing mechanism established in Bosnia, and then rebuilt for operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan (with limited success) had to be reestablished for Libya. Despite the addition


of new U.S.-funded operational intelligence organizations and changes in NATO functions, investment within NATO organizations for intelligence continues to fall short.

The response to many of the interoperability challenges identified by the Bosnia and Kosovo after action reports was the U.S.-led creation of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). The center grew out of the commitments laid out during the Prague Summit of 2002. The declaration from the Summit encouraged states to improve intelligence capabilities, but makes no mention of a specific course of action. A Canadian Forces history of the NIFC indicates that NATO military heads met in 2003 and proposed the organization because they “recognized...a shortfall in the intelligence process within the alliance.” As the framework nation, the U.S. provided the majority of funding during the construction phase and still continues to offset the operating costs. SACEUR acting under his EUCOM role saw the project to completion. According to two senior officers serving in EUCOM at the time of NIFC’s creation, the organization served several practical functions: long term investment in non-U.S. NATO personnel to ease the U.S. intelligence burden, the correction of missteps made in the Balkans during the 1990s, the ability to incorporate and align different levels of intelligence input from new member states, and as a means to capitalize on the momentum of intelligence practices for ongoing operations in Afghanistan.

E. OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND OPERATIONS IN LIBYA 2011

The organization created out of the lessons identified during previous NATO missions found its first real test during Operation Unified Protector (OUP), and unfortunately it failed to bridge NATO’s intelligence capabilities gap. Upswells of social unrest in the Middle East and North Africa created the conditions for the toppling of governments during the ‘Arab Spring’ movements of 2011. In Libya, forceful protests


88 Author interview on March 15 and March 21, 2012.
began around February 17, 2011, with the so-called ‘Day of Rage,’ which dissenters staged around various cities in the country. Libyan security forces moved in and killed several protesters. Eventually, the cities of Misratah and Benghazi became the headquarters for the various movements that opposed Muammar al-Gadhafi’s regime. In an effort to crush the rebellion, Gadhafi deployed his most loyal military units to take Misratah and then move toward Benghazi. With the humanitarian crisis increasing and civilian casualties mounting in Misratah, the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 1970, which called for an immediate end to the violence and imposed an arms embargo and sanctions on the Libyan regime. In light of the continuing hostilities, the U.N. approved UNSCR 1973 on March 17, 2011, which authorized the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory as part of a broader package designed to ensure the protection of civilians. Coordinated strikes by U.S., French, British, and Italian assets began on March 19 under the U.S. rubric, Operation Odyssey Dawn.\textsuperscript{89} Using attack aircraft and a number of standoff weapons, including Tomahawk missiles, the coalition disabled the Libyan air defense network and set the conditions for NATO to assume command of the operation.

The U.S. transferred responsibility for Libyan operations to NATO on March 31, 2011, and the Allies began Operation Unified Protector. After destroying or disabling Gadhafi forces that were threatening the civilian population, the Alliance provided material and close air support to Libyan Transitional National Council forces that moved toward Tripoli. Gadhafi eventually fled the capital, and after some time at his fortified hometown of Sirte, the former leader was killed on October 20, 2011 while trying to flee yet again. Unified Protector officially ended on October 31, 2011, after more than 26,500 sorties and 5,900 targets destroyed along with substantial maritime operations in support of the arms embargo and humanitarian relief.\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{89} French national operations and contributions to NATO were conducted under Operation Harmattan, while the United Kingdom military forces operated under Operation Ellamy.

1. NATO INTELLIGENCE DIFFICULTIES IN LIBYA AND U.S. SHARING

Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was a complex mission that required comprehensive political and military support. Despite some members’ partial support, the operation was considered a success.91 Several militaries even “punched well above their weight class” in terms of the application and continuity of strike operations. OUP relied on a number of factors for its success, which included preparation of the battlespace by the Odyssey Dawn operations to enforce a no-fly zone, and a significant number of special force units to train rebels and enhance their capabilities.

Many of the country and organizational after action reports for OUP are not yet public, but commentary by U.S. public officials points to a continued gap in NATO intelligence capabilities. Evidence of this occurred during the operation itself as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made “NATO’s serious capability gaps and other institutional shortcomings laid bare by the Libya operation” one of the themes of his last policy speech as the SECDEF at a NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels. Gates emphasized the success of the Libya operation, but also cited the number of U.S. personnel required to augment the facilities at the NATO CAOC in Poggio Renatico as evidence that NATO European Allies were not living up to their commitments.92 Further indications of American dissatisfaction with NATO capabilities appeared in Foreign Affairs as the current U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daadler, and the then-SACEUR, Admiral James Stavridis, cited the same augmentation requirements as Secretary Gates, but also noted that 75% of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data was supplied by the U.S.93 Their focus on ISR is warranted because, despite the operation’s small size and short duration when compared to Kosovo and Afghanistan,

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91 Germany abstained from voting for Libya operations in the UN Security Council thereby allowing the motion to go forward. Although German military units did not participate directly, German NATO staff members remained in place and German AWACs crews transferred to Afghanistan to allow other Allied members to return for OUP. Similarly, Poland did not contribute to the operation directly but did sell needed munitions and other weapons to NATO members.


OUP relied on ISR more heavily than previous NATO operations because of the requirement to fully identify the target and minimize collateral damage in light of NATO’s mission to protect the civilian populace. Despite the U.S. not committing its full complement of available combat resources, including an American aircraft carrier operating in the Red Sea, the United States still had to make up for the paucity of NATO assets and processing capability.

F. CONCLUSION

NATO’s inability to support modern combat operations is well documented. This stems from the politicized debates over intelligence estimates during the Cold War and the apparent failure to invest in an operational intelligence capability during the transition to a NATO expeditionary force. These decisions became the foundation for NATO’s post-Cold War structure and perpetuated intelligence capability gaps during the era of modern combined and joint warfare. The willingness of the U.S. to supplement NATO intelligence with both assets and information during the Balkans crises ensured Allied success, but prolonged the intelligence capability problem for NATO and created a crisis-sharing mentality that dominated American intelligence-sharing strategy, if there ever was such a thing.

For NATO, the creation of the NIFC in 2006 was a step in the right direction, but the NIFC still lacks the capability to support the full range of NATO military operations as demonstrated by the Libya campaign. The period of investment whereby NATO intelligence could have grown naturally with the rest of the organization’s abilities passed in the 1990s. Without huge additions of infrastructure and personnel, it is unlikely that NATO intelligence will be able to support major Allied operations. Furthermore, the U.S. has provided intelligence support assets in past NATO operations that may not be available during the next NATO conflict. With defense budgets shrinking and the U.S. strategic pivot to the Pacific, both the U.S. and its NATO allies must consider the development of an independent support capability. One method to bolster NATO intelligence capabilities is through a broadening and deepening of the intelligence sharing arrangements between the United States and the other Allies. This would both prepare NATO for the next conflict and engender a greater degree of reliability and trust between the United States and its NATO partners.
III. AN ENDURING “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”: UKUSA

A. INTRODUCTION

The idea of an Anglo-American special relationship first appeared during Winston Churchill’s address to Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, in 1946:

Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States…Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges.\footnote{Winston S. Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946.}

Little could Churchill have known, that very day representatives from both the United Kingdom and the United States signed a signals intelligence-sharing agreement, which marked the establishment in peacetime intelligence-sharing.\footnote{National Security Agency, British—U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement March 5, 1946, accessed June 1, 2013, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf. This agreement was signed by British Army Colonel Patrick Marr-Johnson and American Army Air Corps Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg.} It was the broadest and deepest intelligence sharing cooperative that had existed up to 1946 and it is arguably the most intimate connection that exists today. This new “special relationship” was, in fact, not merely based on common language and heritage, but was a series of small moves that enabled trust to replace suspicion. This process and these agreements provide a powerful guide to the establishment of a “special relationship” with NATO. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation was one of the first formalized transitions to U.S.–U.K. “special relationship” and it emerged as the result of a crisis of cooperation that established the framework for reliable and predictable intelligence interactions. Similar cooperation move between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO could create the conditions necessary for a competent and capable military power and reliable foreign policy partners.
This chapter will explore the formation of the U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence relationship to identify the qualities that created an enduring and fruitful exchange, which became the cornerstone for the special relationship. First, we will explore the adversarial views of American foreign policy and military planners in the 1930s, which demonstrated the suspicion that had to be overcome to make cooperation successful. Second, we will briefly review the history of Anglo-American signals intelligence cooperation from 1940 until late 1942 when an incident involving the British cryptologist Alan Turing would highlight the fragmented and uneven nature of the sharing relationship. Next, Turing incident’s aftermath facilitated the formation of the Britain-United States signals agreement. Here, the elements of cooperation led to the development of peacetime intelligence exchange through the UKUSA signals intelligence agreement. In the fourth section we will briefly explore the results of that cooperation from the 1950s to today. Finally, this chapter will identify the principles of the UKUSA intelligence agreement as they played out during the agreement’s formulation and execution.

B. U.S. WAR PLANNING 1920-1941

The international arena remained precariously balanced after World War I. The Treaty of Versailles was both a stunning achievement and conspicuously flawed. The creation of the League of Nations as part of the Treaty was a significant step toward establishing an international system of stability and order that could rectify perennial European problems over nationalism and territory. It and later the Kellogg-Briand Pact reinforced the notion that war was an unacceptable solution for the new international system. The treaty’s ineffective enforcement mechanism and the inclusion of tremendous war reparations along with the German war-guilt cause, however, laid the foundation for significant friction. The U.S. Senate, fearing the establishment of entangling alliances and the effect a collective security pact might have on their constitutional ability to declare war, rejected Versailles and the League of Nations. The U.S. retreated toward modified isolationism that enabled the participation, but not action, in international affairs. As a result, American military power atrophied and emphasis shifted to war planning as a means to test theories and map future requirements.
During the 1920s and 1930s, American military planners in the War and Navy Departments developed at least 23 different color-coded war plans. Based on potential threats, priority was given to war contingencies against Japan, War Plan “Orange,” and Britain, War Plan “Red.” In the Orange scenario, aggressive Japanese foreign policy focused on economic expansionism coupled with the increasing influence of military action as an adjunct to the island nation’s approach. According to military planners, this policy would begin to conflict with U.S. interests in China and threatened potential U.S. outposts in the Philippines and S.E. Asia.

Similarly, the U.S. perception of British desires to continue their empire necessitated the development of plan Red in 1930. While the initial planning for Orange was based on hypotheticals and speculation, War Plan Red played on historical, albeit low-level, enmity between America and Britain. U.S. military officers considered U.S.–U.K. military cooperation during World War I an aberration and viewed Britain as especially aggressive in the maintenance of its commercial empire. Naval planners could easily envision a scenario where U.S. and British spheres of influence caused enough friction to start a war. A Naval War College analysis of the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 cemented feelings of competition between American and British Navies because, while the British and U.S. enjoyed parity in numbers of capital ships and tonnage, British firepower and armor were far superior to that of the United States. The stalemate at the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 led Captain Frank Schofield, head of Naval War Plans Division to conclude that the British were holding on to a decisive advantage in naval warfare. Army planners, on the other hand, feared the British


100 Ibid., 171-172.
would use Canada as a staging point for an attack.\textsuperscript{101} In the event of war, American plans should focus on severing British lines of communication with North America with a follow-on offensive to the north by U.S. ground forces.\textsuperscript{102} Fear of a coalition war also dominated military thought at this time during the preparation of the Red-Orange plans, which assumed a military alliance against the U.S. by both Britain and Japan with possible help from Mexico.\textsuperscript{103} Notably, after 1928 the Army directed much of the planning effort for Red while the Navy concentrated on Plan Orange.\textsuperscript{104}

The Japanese offensives on Mainland China and the ascent of Hitler as dictator in 1938 forced planners toward a more refined view of possible British aggression. Most naval planners viewed Britain as either neutral or a potential ally, while the army continued to emphasize the threat of invasion from Canada as a likely contingency.\textsuperscript{105} Considering the potential for wars in the both the Atlantic and Pacific, the Navy began to focus on leveraging Britain as a possible ally that could hold the Atlantic area while U.S. forces focused on the Pacific. By 1936, Army policy toward the status of the U.K. was torn between those who recognized war with Britain was unlikely and those who insisted on planning for it anyway.\textsuperscript{106} The conflict over Army policy was representative of an ideological struggle of isolationism vs. internationalism that was already prevalent in American society.\textsuperscript{107}

Until 1936 Britain was still viewed as a competitor and while that mindset had evolved by 1939, American support for British interests was never a foregone conclusion. The German invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939 never prompted automatic American

\textsuperscript{101} Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 2000) 9; Braisted, “American Red and Red-Orange Plans,” 168.

\textsuperscript{102} Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 9.

\textsuperscript{103} Braisted, “American Red and Red-Orange Plans,” 178. An alternate plan included Mexico and was known as the Red-Orange-Green Plan. Mexico’s participation in this scenario reflected the perception of the German attempt to build an anti-American coalition during World War I uncovered in the Zimmerman Telegram, another potent example of U.K–U.S. intelligence exchange.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 182.

\textsuperscript{105} Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 8.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 10.
support for the subsequent British and French declaration of war on the Nazi state. Staff officers in the War and Navy departments feared that military support to Europe would drain the resources needed in the event of American military build up.\textsuperscript{108} The U.S. only finally met with the French and British officers in 1940 to discuss full cooperation, and despite the ongoing Battle of Britain Army and Navy leadership continued to oppose significant aid for Churchill and the British. Some officers were reluctant because they thought Britain was on the brink of defeat and any aid delivered into the country now would only fall into German hands later.\textsuperscript{109}

In October 1940, Chief of Naval Operations Harold Stark prepared a strategic planning memorandum that tied U.S. interests directly to the European balance of power scheme. In the event of U.S. entry into the war, the plan called for support to the United Kingdom toward a Germany first strategy that relied on assuring victory in the Atlantic while taking a defensive posture in the Pacific. Stark’s memo, Plan Dog, was accepted at the highest levels of government because it clearly established principles for victory based on strategic plans that explicitly favored U.S. not British interests.\textsuperscript{110} The distribution of the plan was followed by a U.S. – British conference from January – March of 1941 that focused on the formulation of joint strategy if the U.S. entered the war. The ABC-1 conference document followed the propositions laid out in Plan Dog, but the U.S. delegation constantly fended off what they viewed as British attempts to capitalize on U.S. participation in the furtherance of the Empire.\textsuperscript{111}

Suspicions over British strategic concerns continued well into 1941 during the Atlantic Conference and were likely only overcome through the close alignment of American and British political leadership during the Atlantic Conference in August of that year. Both Roosevelt and Churchill committed to “make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 28
  \item\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. There were smaller individual officer exchanges on both the American and British side since 1930, but nothing comprehensive.
  \item\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 29
  \item\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 38
\end{itemize}
hopes for a better future for the world.”

This declaration was released to the world on August 14, 1941, forcing American military leaders toward greater cooperation with their British counterparts.

From 1922 until the very eve of U.S. entry into World War II, American military suspicion over British war aims clouded diplomatic and military cooperation. The American military establishment feared the United Kingdom, who appeared to have greater unity and better foreign policy coordination, would dominate the direction of the alliance. The U.S. felt that the influence of British imperial holdings abroad would dilute or skew allied strategy toward British interests, which might place the U.S. in a more precarious strategic position and prolong the war itself. American fears must have seemed well founded as the British advocated for a strategy that focused on attacking the German periphery in North Africa instead of the European continent while they repeated requests for U.S. assistance to British forces trying to hold Singapore in the Far East.

C. THE BEGINNING OF SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Thus, Anglo-American signals intelligence cooperation began during a period of mistrust and suspicion. During this period, the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS), headquartered at Bletchley Park, coordinated British signals intelligence.

Early attempts at American coordination, however, first came in 1940 from the British Security Coordination (BSC), a covert Security Intelligence Service (SIS or MI-6) office that operated out of New York City. Focused on counter-intelligence operations, the BSC cultivated relationships with the FBI and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for American domestic issues while pursuing connections with Army and Navy signals organizations and the newly formed OSS.

These attempts by the BSC revealed how

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112 Stoler, Allies and Adversaries, 26. By 1941 President Roosevelt had already overridden objections by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on providing assistance to the United Kingdom, including providing 50 mothballed destroyers to the U.K. in exchange for 99 year leases of British property for U.S. bases.


114 Benson, Communications Intelligence During World War II, 57. The other organization was Radio Security Service, which coordinated the collection of radio signals in concert with GC&CS.

115 Ibid., 2.
badly the U.S. intelligence structure was fragmented. Unlike the British organization, there was no single organization that coordinated domestic or foreign SIGINT. Army and Navy efforts were also disjointed with the Army attacking Japanese Army and diplomatic intercepts while the Navy focused on the Japanese Navy. These messages were deciphered and then sent to their respective departments with little or no crosstalk. Not only was American and British coordination uneven, but American internal policies also prevented full disclosure to other agencies. Despite the military environment and U.S. intelligence community disarray, episodic coordination on intelligence with Britain did occur prior to U.S. entry into the war.

The efforts at establishing a cooperative framework began in 1940 after initial Anglo-American staff talks for coordinated planning. On July 8, 1940, Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States, proposed a secret technical exchange to President Roosevelt that would provide Britain access to ultra short wave radio technology in exchange for information on the United Kingdom’s “method of detecting the approach of enemy aircraft at considerable distances, which has proved so successful.” Subsequent to the acceptance of this memo, General George V. Strong, the U.S. Army’s head intelligence officer (Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G-2), was appointed as the Army coordinator for this exchange. General Strong, in tandem with Rear Admiral Robert Ghourmley, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, was dispatched to London for the talks. During sessions with his British counterparts, Strong revealed that the U.S. was already decrypting Japanese diplomatic and military cables, codenamed “Purple,” and he offered to share this technology. This offer was a shock to the Navy, who did not want to reveal this capability especially since the British had offered nothing in return and they believed the technology behind the “Purple” machine would compromise U.S. codes and systems.

116 Ibid., 4-7.
118 Benson, Communications Intelligence During World War II, 18. Purple was the codename for both the decryption machine and the encrypted message traffic. Once the traffic was deciphered, the intelligence became known as “Magic.”
Nevertheless, an exchange moved forward in the hope that cooperation with the British would give the U.S. access to foreign tactical and operational traffic not available through U.S. sources and might illuminate any German or Italian designs on Latin America and the Panama Canal. In December of 1940 two junior officers, Army Captain Abraham Sinkov and Lieutenant Leo Rosen, delivered the Purple machine to the British over the protests of the Navy Department. The two spent several weeks in Britain exchanging notes with the cryptanalysts there. They also learned about British success in cracking German diplomatic and military field traffic, codenamed “Enigma,” and the products named “Ultra.”

Intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. appeared coordinated, reasonable, and highly active, but the appearance of cooperation hid real dissatisfaction in the way signals intelligence was handled. Much of this was the result of a fragmented U.S. intelligence effort. The Army Signals Intelligence Service relied on British support to decrypt some German intelligence, which was delivered to Washington, and even had some analysts at Bletchley Park working with GC&CS, but they were not granted access to the German Enigma decryptions. After December 11, 1941, when Germany declared war on the U.S., the Navy was quick to attack the Enigma problem because of the direct danger to U.S. naval ships. Noting the danger to Allied shipping, the British had previously supplied Enigma traffic that might affect the transatlantic convoys. In February 1942, however, the addition of a fourth wheel to the German naval cipher ended the high fidelity intelligence delivered to the U.S. Navy. By October 1942, the U.S. Navy had devoted considerable effort toward solving the Enigma problem and during a technical exchange that month, the British reluctantly agreed to limited exploitation of the Enigma material to help protect the Atlantic convoy from German U-boat attacks.

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119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 19.
121 Ibid., 20.
122 Ibid., 19, 58. The Army was exposed to the Enigma material during the Sinkov-Rosen visit. During another meeting in 1942, British Army Colonel Tiltman visited Washington DC regarding communication intelligence coordination, but, according to Benson, Enigma was not a topic of discussion.
123 George F. Howe, American Signal Intelligence in Northwest Africa and Western Europe (Fort Meade, MD: National Security Agency, 1980), 117.
Named for U.S. Navy Captain Carl Holden, the Holden Agreement of 1942 solidified the British recognition of “U.S. desire to attack submarine and Naval problems.”\textsuperscript{124} In June 1943, the Navy began decoding Enigma material with tacit British consent.\textsuperscript{125}

**D. THE TURING INCIDENT**

Despite some advances in cooperation during 1942 for both the Army and the Navy, the progress was fragmented and uneven because of the disjointed structure of the military intelligence community, British sensitivity over the Enigma decryption outside of the U.K., and continued American military reluctance to engage in British Imperial conquests. American dissent on the non-dissemination of signals intelligence climaxed during Operation Torch in late 1942. Both Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of the British Staff Mission to Washington, Field Marshal John Dill, felt that Allied forces operating in North Africa under General Eisenhower were taking unexplained, unwarranted, and unilateral actions based on Enigma material to which they had no access.\textsuperscript{126} This provided additional tinder for a spark that would ignite a review of the U.S.–U.K. SIGINT relationship.

The problems hidden by the episodic sharing noted above surfaced in December 1942. As part of the secret technical exchanges that had been occurring since the Lothian memorandum of July 1940, Alan Turing, a leading cryptanalyst at Bletchley Park, filed a request to visit Bell Labs to review their progress on the U.S. Army’s attempt at creating new, high-speed analyzers for Enigma decryption.\textsuperscript{127} Considering the technological revelations that would accompany such a review, the request, filed through a relatively junior officer in the Army’s Military Intelligence Department (MID), was serious enough

\textsuperscript{124} Benson, *Communications Intelligence During World War II*, 61; As quoted from the Holden Agreement of 1942 (not available).

\textsuperscript{125} Howe, *American Signal Intelligence*, 119.


\textsuperscript{127} Howe, *American Signal Intelligence*, 120. This new analyzer used distinct fusing which differed from the Navy’s mechanical system for decryption.
to warrant further review. Turing’s application was denied outright, and so the scientist appealed to Field Marshal Dill for help to gain access to the new device.¹²⁸

Dill corresponded with Army Chief of Staff Marshall to lobby on Turing’s behalf. Marshall, in turn, sought the advice of his G-2, General Strong, who previously offered unparalleled coordination with the U.K. General Strong, suspicious of British attempts to gain access to U.S. technology, warned against “backdoor” efforts to compromise American technology. In his response to Dill, General Marshall stated that this equipment was restricted to the “ultra secret category” and that “there is not interchange concerning these ultra secret developments.”¹²⁹ Clearly this was a reference to the British classification system used for Enigma material and indirectly indicated a tit-for-tat policy on the exchange of material and technology.

On December 15, 1942, Field Marshall Dill assured Marshall:

I was horrified when I learnt that we were not giving you all our ultra secret developments in this field and took action accordingly. I am now told that we hide nothing from your duly authenticated people and even keep them informed of projected developments. If any of your people still have any doubts about this, I hope you will let me know.¹³⁰

A flurry of correspondence among the Army staff ensued whereby they attempted to consolidate their position with regard to disclosure of new information and outline the interactions with their British counterparts. After briefly reviewing the British delegations reasons for Dr. Turing’s access, the American position was summarized by Colonel Carter Clarke of the Army’s Special (Cryptographic) Branch, subordinate to General Strong: “In my opinion, this is merely another attempt to gain technical information on our secret cipher machines and ultra secret scrambling device...” Further, the British have failed to provide “German clandestine traffic, the German Army Field traffic, cryptographic material derived from Slavic nations, or the details of their high speed


After several exchanges and further research from both sides, Field Marshal Dill explained, “Our position, I understand, has been made quite clear. We are prepared to show your people everything in England [emphasis in original], but we reserve the right to refuse to all “exploitation” in the U.S. of vitally secret traffic where we are chiefly concerned, unless we are satisfied as to the necessity.”

Initially, the American military was driven toward cooperation with the British by President Roosevelt and the realization that in a two front war, Europe and the Pacific, that the U.S. needed military allies. By early 1943, the Americans realized the value of the Enigma material, but had no access to it without the British. For their part, the British cooperated on this specific issue to maintain the military and technical alliance already established.

Despite two years of close cooperation between Allies from 1940-1942, however, the established patterns of sharing never produced enough trust to overcome doubt about the other’s intentions. The partners failed to formulate a coherent sharing strategy that reduced uncertainty and covered the areas necessary for strategic cooperation. At the operational level in North Africa, the potential failure of the Allied campaign helped the British to overcome their security concerns, which facilitated sharing of the Enigma messages with General Eisenhower and his staff, so clearly the British made exceptions to policy just as Field Marshal Dill stated. The lack of any significant mechanisms to ensure security while establishing patterns of reliable interaction between the Allies heightened the fear of intelligence compromise and defection. In this sense, defection was the notion that the U.S. or U.K. would use the intelligence relationship to gain some form of leverage and either break from the common strategic direction already forged by the political leadership or use it as an advantage in the post-war environment. Additionally, the U.S. failure to consolidate its signals intelligence structure, which was itself the result of competing military departments, was also to blame as London could reach agreements with some parts of Washington, through the Navy’s Holden Agreement, but not find

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consensus with the Army G-2. This forced the British to deal with multiple agencies and likely allowed them to secure an overall more favorable position to their cause because they could form relationships with individual American organizations based on their needs without full consent of the U.S. government.

E. A NEW FORMULA FOR SIGINT COOPERATION

By January 9, 1943, however, Acting Chief of Staff for the Army General McNarney granted Dr. Turing access to the device and reiterated Field Marshal Dill’s emphasis on the value of full reciprocity between the two allies. One month later another potential crisis in intelligence relations surfaced as the Army Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) revealed that they had solved the Enigma problem and created their own decryption machines, making exploitation possible in the U.S. They also realized that successful exploitation of the code would require significant British assistance. An internal memo written on February 8, 1943, by the head of communications research for the SIS, William Friedman, noted the special procedures and special information required for the operation of the machines and that developing these, “would take several years.” Friedman advocated strengthening the U.S.–U.K. relationship with regards to the Enigma material and outlined specific arguments that might advance the SIS cause.

Formal requests for this information and support were delivered to the GCCS representative in Washington and Field Marshall Dill. The issue here was beyond Dill’s scope of responsibilities, but the British Chiefs of Staff in London provided a response that formalized the definitions of signals intelligence and the Enigma material while imposing exploitation responsibilities. This was the first effort to establish an intelligence relationship that encompassed the entire scope of American and British interactions:

133 Acting Army Chief of Staff Joseph T. McNarney to British Lieutenant General G.N. Macready, Washington DC, January 9, 1943, accessed on June 1, 2013, http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/early_papers_1940-1944.pdf. At this time General Marshall and General Dill were likely traveling to the Casablanca Conference (January 14-24, 1943) and the matter was left to their subordinates.


135 Ibid.
The intention is to cover all matters connected with SPECIAL [Enigma related intelligence] and “Y” Intelligence [intercepted radio signals], Interception, Cryptography, and Security, from the decoding of Axis messages in their highest grade cyphers down to the extractions of Intelligence from plain message telephony transmitted from aircraft and field stations. We feel sure that the American “Y” Services will welcome this suggestion as it must be as difficult for their officers to deal with ours as for ours with them and they are, as we know, as anxious about security as we are.136

For the next three months proposals and counterproposals flew back and forth from the U.S. and the U.K. At the outset, the differences in schemes placed the partners far apart in terms of organizational goals: the British wanted security and accountability while the Americans wanted total independence.137 In April and May 1943, delegations of experienced intelligence officials from both sides traveled to gain further insight on the other’s organizations. The U.S. vowed to refine their organization and the British began to accept the idea of full reciprocity of information and exploitation methods toward a common cause.138

The two sides came to an agreement drafted on May 17, 1943, and implemented by the U.S. on June 15. Known un-poetically as “The Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain ‘Special Intelligence,’” it covered many of the points each side requested. The exploitation scheme remained favorable to Britain and the main organization for the Enigma intelligence while the U.S. received training, personnel, and raw material for the development of its own Enigma capability. The agreement did not cover the diplomatic or commercial channels for enemy nations nor did it discuss neutral countries.139

It was this agreement, and to a lesser extent the Holden Agreement of 1942, that formalized full reciprocity for exchange between the two countries, established common

security principles for their programs and codified the language used to decrease organizational confusion. Forged during war, the parties pledged to share the methods of detection, identification, and exploitation of all Axis military services, including the German intelligence services.\textsuperscript{140} Furthermore, the document establishes the serious nature of the information and highlights the special handling measures required for intelligence transmission as well as the restricted access to program material by designated officers and the limited ability field commanders had to take action based solely on Special Intelligence.\textsuperscript{141} The agreement also included a simple list of terms used by the signals intelligence organizations to identify Special and “Y” Intelligence.\textsuperscript{142} These elements were critical in establishing a common framework for conceptualizing intelligence exchange.

It would be a stretch to believe that signals intelligence-sharing from this point forward operated smoothly, but that was not the intent of this agreement. The purpose was to provide a framework to reduce organizational and personal uncertainty on the use and handling of intelligence once the relationship was established. It was not meant to mitigate the effects of state or government actions. Under this framework, intelligence-sharing could continue despite sour diplomatic relations. Just as easily, though, the state could use this agreement to end intelligence cooperation. The war was the impetus for the allies to work together and this agreement facilitated dialogue and increased the ability for each side to predict the other’s reactions as well as give the bureaucrats/officers involved in this process a common understanding as those officers served as the functional gatekeepers for cooperation. Over time, this created the conditions for intelligence-sharing between the U.S. and the U.K. on multiple levels from strategic to personal for specific functions or because of an assumed convergence of interests.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., para. 4-9.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., para. 16.
F. THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT

The agreement was successful enough at facilitating cooperation that a new, more comprehensive arrangement, known as Britain–U.S.A (BRUSA) was reached on March 5, 1946 to monitor the growing tensions between the West and the Soviet Union. BRUSA was modified throughout the late 1940s and well into the 1950s to enable the addition of critical “second parties” to the agreement, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, while specifying dissemination and security regulations. The robust nature of BRUSA even facilitated the addition of 15 additional “third parties.”143 These second and third parties did not enjoy the same level of reciprocity between the U.S. and the U.K., but their inclusion is noteworthy. The amended agreements as a whole are typically referred to as the UKUSA, which centered on the U.S. providing technical resources and capability, while the British Empire provided collection sites to inaccessible collection targets inside the Soviet Union.144 The agreement marked an unprecedented peacetime sharing relationship between two previous competitors and several sources cite the UKUSA agreement as the “cornerstone” or “pillar” of the special relationship.145 Of critical significance here is the adaptation of a bilateral intelligence cooperative into a multilateral intelligence exchange.

While the initial intelligence-sharing relationship was first enacted to combat the Nazi threat, the post-war UKUSA agreements focused on strategic warning in the event of Soviet attack. Shared intelligence, however, did not ensure a smooth relationship even in the shadow of an existential threat and the formation of the NATO alliance. In 1956, for instance, the failure of the U.S. to support a British/French/Israeli attempt to seize the Suez Canal led to a temporary halt in intelligence exchange.146 State actions were not the

143 Matthew M. Aid, Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond (Portland, OR: 2001) 316. Third party countries include(d) Austria, Norway, Burma, the Republic of China, Denmark, Greece, Italy Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Turkey, and West Germany.


146 Wallace, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” 269.
only threat as the notorious Cambridge Five, a Soviet spy ring recruited during the 1930s 1950s and early 1960s, was uncovered over the course of the 1950s and 1960s. The Five had risen through the ranks of the British Secret Intelligence Service during World War II and were exposed to American secrets through the close U.S.–U.K. relationship. Despite those difficulties the relationship endured.

The continuity of the relationship, which weathered the turbulence of the 1950s and the decline of British defense resources in the 1960s during the retreat to east of the Suez, continued to play a vital role in assured access for the U.S. and brought exploited intelligence to the U.K. This became evident during the Falklands War in 1982 when, because of the lack of British assets to collect and exploit information from Argentina, the U.S. provided ninety-eight per cent of critical signals intelligence. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the UKUSA “magnitude [of cooperation] flared to an unprecedented brilliance within hours.” In 2003 the early support of the United Kingdom for intervention in Iraq was also arguably the result of the enduring intelligence relationship since the 1940s. While the initial conclusions of the intelligence might have been flawed, the British support for this U.S. policy demonstrated the strength of the intelligence bond. In summarizing the U.S.—U.K. special relationship on intelligence issues, a 2009 United Kingdom House of Commons special commission stated: “We conclude that, despite some recent frictions, the field of intelligence cooperation is one of the areas where the UK-US relationship can rightly be described as ‘special’. We further conclude that there can be no doubt that both the UK and US derive considerable benefits from this co-operation, especially in relation to counterterrorism.”

G. CONCLUSION

Relations between the U.S. and U.K. during the 1920s and 1930s were somewhat less than friendly. After cooperation in World War I they were the only nations with


significant military power still intact. Responding to this situation, American military planners prepared a series of war plans that painted Great Britain as a potentially dangerous enemy. Their naval power was second to none, they maintained a large standing army, and could call on support from their colonies to provide support in the event of conflict. The United States had every reason to be suspicious of Britain’s intentions.

As events played out during the 1930s, this view began to slowly shift. By 1939-1940 Britain was perceived as a potentially powerful ally. Limited cooperation ensued, but the Americans were still wary of British commercial interests outweighing U.S. strategic concerns. In 1941, cooperation was underway in earnest and this facilitated the sharing of significant signals exploitation capability. The limited agreements reached and uneven cooperation created concerns over the amount and type of material exchanged, particularly as the Allies kicked off the offensive phases of the war during Operation Torch. American dissatisfaction with this situation culminated in the response to Turing’s request to view sensitive U.S. intelligence developments in late 1942. The outcome of this incident, along with the increasing competency of American intelligence capability, was the Holden Agreement of 1942 and, more significantly, the signals intelligence exchange agreement reached in May 1943. The reciprocal nature of the agreement along with the enactment of specific terms and guidelines provided a framework for intelligence-sharing so that the partners could eventually broaden its scope and deepen its sensitivity. This provided an opportunity to build a “special relationship” with each other and extend some of that “specialness” to second and third parties.

This model provides a potent example for the U.S.-NATO intelligence relationship as it stands now. The previous chapter examined NATO intelligence capabilities since the Cold War. Each conflict that NATO participated in found those capabilities wanting. In each case the American intelligence establishment provided additional operational support. This thesis argues in the concluding chapter that a broadening and deepening of the U.S.–NATO intelligence relationship is possible through the mechanisms found in the U.S.–U.K. relationship, and is necessary to build a more effective foreign policy partner.
IV. CONCLUSION

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that NATO’s intelligence support has significant problems, but these problems can be addressed through increased sharing by the American intelligence community. Considering the recent U.S. strategic pivot to Asia and current defense-spending constraints, this policy also provides a means to build an independent NATO intelligence support capability in the event of a major NATO operation while U.S. assets are involved in operations in the Far East. The agreements reached on U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation during and after World War II offer a lesson on the implementation of broad intelligence exchange even between untrusting partners. The implementation of such a regime—that is, exchange based on full reciprocity in specific areas—could provide more reliable and effective security and foreign policy partners.

B. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS CHAPTERS

Chapter II briefly examined the history of NATO intelligence and traced the lack of an operational intelligence mechanism to Alliance burden-shifting debates. In the early years of the alliance, intelligence estimates were critical for establishing NATO force levels in Europe and for the development of NATO strategy. These estimates became a tool in the internal NATO political struggle as European nations attempted to ensure the integrity of European collective defense. As these intelligence estimates were politicized, the Alliance was reticent to establish an intelligence organization at the operational level. As the Alliance transitioned to a post-Cold War expeditionary environment, the gap in NATO intelligence capabilities became more evident.

The paucity of NATO intelligence support was obvious during operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Libya. During each of these conflicts NATO success hinged, in many ways, on American intelligence support. Comprehensive American intelligence support was initiated only during these conflicts, which established a fragmented and uneven sharing relationship with NATO and perpetuated the Allies lack of investment in
a NATO operational intelligence support capability. The transition to expeditionary operations in the early 1990s should have been accompanied by immediate investment in operational intelligence support. The failure of NATO, as a whole, has today resulted in the inability for NATO intelligence to support major operations. The United States must continue to bolster NATO intelligence through a broad program of exchange to build an independent NATO capability. Building comprehensive sharing between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO is critical when considering the potential military and foreign policy convergence possibilities as demonstrated by the U.S.–U.K. special relationship.

Chapter III looked to U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation during World War II as an example for the formulation of intelligence exchange between competitors or untrusting partners which demonstrate the potential gain intelligence-sharing can bring despite significant impediments. The contingency war plans developed in the 1920s and 1930s for a potential war with Britain demonstrated the degree that the U.S.–U.K. relationship, from an American perspective, centered on competition or rivalry. Military cooperation between the two was only initiated after Britain was at war with Germany and then against the advice of the top military officers. These were the same men responsible for the U.S. intelligence effort. In 1940–1941, President Roosevelt provided the political impetus for cooperation despite these institutional and personal barriers. The fractured and uneven nature of early attempts at intelligence cooperation nearly sunk the entire enterprise. It was only after cracks in the sharing relationship were revealed by British cryptologist Alan Turing’s request to see a U.S. scrambling device in December 1942 that cooperation could be rebuilt to establish a system of reliability based on established common terms and a security verification regime. Codified in the May 1943 agreement between the War Department and the Government Code and Cipher School, that system of reliability facilitated a series of predictable intelligence-sharing interactions that, over time, established broad sharing during peacetime as the foundation of the “special relationship.” The creation of such a “special relationship” with NATO is in our national interests so that the U.S. has greater flexibility in deploying its elements of national power.
C. REASONS FOR CREATING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Broadening and deepening the U.S. intelligence community’s relationship with NATO follows strategic guidance from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the National Security Strategy of 2010, President Obama highlights the tenets of a successful American engagement strategy, which in part depends on our intelligence agencies’ cooperation with foreign governments “to anticipate events, respond to crises, and provide safety and security.” He in fact further posits, “We are strengthening our partnerships with foreign intelligence services and sustaining strong ties with our close allies.”

Regarding NATO specifically, Former Secretary of Defense Bill Gates in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance asserts, “The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond. Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it.”

Critically, the 2011 National Military Strategy identifies that “NATO members act as a stabilizing force on its perimeter, which ranges from the Middle East and the Levant, Northern Africa, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.” Taken individually, these concepts could justify increased intelligence-sharing with NATO, but together they represent a position of consensus that the United States should deepen its intelligence relationship with NATO as a means to develop partner capacity and reliability.

D. INTELLIGENCE-SHARING THEORY: BUILDING AN ANARCHIC INSTITUTION

The system of reliable interaction facilitated by the 1943 agreement and solidified during the peacetime Britain—U.S.A. Communications Agreement in March 1946, demonstrates the theories of intelligence sharing advocated by James Walsh and Adam Svendsen. Walsh posits that the cost of monitoring (e.g., determining if the other side...


abides by restrictions in the use of shared intelligence) means that sharing must promise large potential gains if it is to take place. Clearly here he means that both sides must possess a compelling reason for sharing because the nature of secret institutions means that one state will not have insight as to the actions of the second state once information has been transferred. There is an understood potential for defection or misuse of secret information by cooperative states. Secondly, Walsh asserts “states share intelligence through anarchic institutions if they believe their partners are unlikely to defect.”

Anarchic institutions are understood to mean broad intelligence-sharing relationships whereby the partners do not monitor individual transactions, but establish common principles for exchange. Individual agency takes a role here so that low and mid-level managers are responsible for moving intelligence across state borders. Provided the organization has not established negative bureaucratic incentives for intelligence exchange, managers act in good faith as the gatekeeper’s of intelligence. As opposed to the hierarchical relationships established in Walsh’s other models, sharing through “anarchic institutions” has the potential to reap more rewards for both sides because this type of sharing facilitates a greater amount of intelligence exchange and may, if intelligence influences policy in both countries, facilitate the confluence of foreign policy between two states. This framework of sharing through anarchic institutions is the mechanism by which U.S.–U.K. operates and what the U.S. must transition to in its relationship with NATO.

In his book Walsh focuses more on the hierarchical and verification relations created to guard against defection instead of fully explaining this anarchic institutionalism. Svendsen, while avoiding a connection with Walsh’s terminology, provides a description of how this type of relationship operates. For the U.S.–U.K. relationship in particular, he capitalizes on the work of Alex Danchev and John Baylis who assert there are three schools of thought covering this relationship: evangelical,

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154 Ibid., 133.
functional, and terminal. According to Danchev and Baylis, these schools provide the basis for the “special relationship,” which focus on the emotional ties behind the relationship, the specific purposes for the relationship, or the deceptive dimension of control inside the relationship. Svendsen applies those schools of thought across eight levels of relations from broad to narrow: ideological, theoretical, strategy, policy, operational, tactical, individual (professional), personal. In these dynamics, Svendsen describes the “anarchic institution” intelligence sharing portrayed by Walsh.

Critically, and despite the multiple motivations, levels, and actors presented inside Svendsen’s description, he emphasizes that intelligence sharing should not be part of “crisis management.” This approach undermines risk management and constantly places the sharing relationship in a reactive mode. Rather, professionalized intelligence cooperation enables the strategic management of intelligence resources through broad spectrum sharing with enough detail so that intelligence remains effective. In other words, sharing intelligence only when needed, during crisis, cannot build an anarchic institutional-type relationship that creates the special dynamic enjoyed by the U.S. and the U.K.

The 1943 agreement for U.S.–U.K. signals intelligence cooperation established the foundation for the anarchic institution method of exchange, which had far reaching benefits for both the United States and the United Kingdom during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Intelligence exchanges between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO, however, are best described as part of Svendsen’s “crisis management” scenario. This became clear as the intelligence exchange mechanisms between the U.S. and NATO required constant reconstruction during each major NATO operation throughout the 1990s and well into the twenty-first century.


157 Ibid.

158 Ibid., 123.

159 Ibid.
E. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The current state of intelligence-sharing with NATO is untenable, while the benefits of a strong U.S. foreign policy and security partner in Europe with the capability to deploy are necessary to ensure security on the periphery of Europe, the Levant, and the Middle East. Further, limited U.S. equipment and personnel resources, if dedicated to operations in the Pacific Ocean, will not be available for NATO’s use; thus, making the temporary bolstering of NATO capabilities impossible. By permanently increasing the intelligence-sharing effort between the U.S. intelligence community and NATO, the European Allies may become less dependent on U.S. capabilities. Intelligence cannot replace physical capabilities, but intelligence can produce more efficient operations, which eases the need for the employment of equipment and personnel. For instance, intelligence cannot replace air-to-air refueling, but accurate intelligence can lower the number of sorties required for reconnaissance or strike, thus lowering the need for air-to-air refueling capabilities.

Enacting the terms of a 1943 style agreement with NATO is possible. The goal for the creation of such a pact should be to work toward anarchic institutional sharing established through a system of reliability that relies on common terms and a verification regime that facilitates predictable interactions among mid-level officers. Leveraging these gatekeepers is the key to creating a culture of sharing with NATO that focuses on military intelligence. In terms of complete reciprocity, the good news is that the U.S. already enjoys all the benefits of NATO intelligence. As a founding member of the Alliance we have clear insight into the organization and can lobby for changes in intelligence security procedures, if necessary. As noted earlier, however, the other NATO Allies do not have clear insight into American intelligence agency processes, procedures, and production.

One method for ensuring greater clarity between partners is the appointment of a U.S. intelligence agency to act as the executive agent in establishing a closer partnership with NATO intelligence. As NATO is primarily a military alliance, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is best placed to carry out this function. The Secretary of Defense should give DIA a broad mandate to increase the breadth and quality of material
produced for NATO. In order to stimulate the sort of multi-level, multi-motivational sharing envisioned by Svendsen in his model of U.S.–U.K. relations; DIA should adopt a policy of rotating personnel directly to the NATO staffs and the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC). Furthermore, DIA should offer NATO intelligence professionals exchange opportunities to work in the DIA cell that supports NATO operations, policy, and contingency planning. Leveraging its relationship with the Joint Operations and Intelligence Center Europe (JIOCEUR), DIA should change JIOCEUR’s mandate for support to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) as its primary mission. Secondary to this is support to Commander, European Command (EUCOM).

As both positions are held by a U.S. four-star admiral or general this slight change appears inconsequential, but this would also pressurize JIOCEUR to support NATO as its primary mission, producing material to the U.S. EUCOM staff only on an as-needed basis, a stark reversal from the current formula.

The NIFC is an organization established under a Memorandum of Understanding, paid for by the United States. This organization is best placed to become the operational intelligence hub for NATO and should be fully incorporated in the integrated military structure with formalized duties to support upper echelon NATO staffs as well as NATO component commanders. The current configuration for the NIFC delineates support to the SACEUR for the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Combined-Joint Task Force (CJTF) operations, but does not, technically speaking operate under the Allied Command Operations (ACO). Integrating the NIFC places an operational military intelligence organization in the heart of the integrated military structure on the same level as the newly inaugurated Joint Headquarters components in Brunssum, Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.

Signals intelligence itself has become a fundamental capability for any competent organization. NATO’s ability to collect, process, and exploit signals intelligence is weak.

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160 JIOEUR is more commonly known by its previous name as the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth, UK.

U.S. signals intelligence sharing policy with NATO is weak as well. Using the NIFC as a point of departure, the U.S. should sponsor a small MOU signals intelligence organization inside the Intelligence Fusion Centre. The National Security Agency in its Cryptologic Security Service role to the military is the natural agency to lead such an organization. The proliferation of mobile communication devices such as cell phones, smart phones, and tablet devices along with advancements in wireless computing networks make these types of intelligence sources valuable to the development of independent NATO capabilities. These technologies are expanding at an exponential rate and, as a global leader in signals intelligence, the National Security Agency has an opportunity to help shape NATO policy in this regard.

The United States faces some severe budget gaps between what national strategy calls for and what the U.S. military can provide. From an international standpoint, NATO has certainly become what Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called “an exporter of security.” While the U.S. does not want to disengage from this framework, the fiscal constraints of a global presence require that we balance our force structure toward areas of potential instability. American dedication to the transatlantic alliance remains firm and one of the principal mechanisms for ensuring and expanding that commitment is through the creation of a U.S.–NATO special relationship.


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