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THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: TRENDS AND PRECEDENT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

by

Jacob P. Wilkins

December 1984

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**Afghanistan, Soviet decisionmaking, Soviet Third World Policy, peripheral politics, operational code of the Politburo, superpower involvement in the Third World, Afghanistan solution.**

**The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been explained routinely in terms of Soviet vital security interests inherent in that region's geopolitical setting. It nevertheless can be interpreted as the culmination of a trend in Soviet Third World policy toward the use of direct, unmitigated force in pursuit of national interests. This study examines the significance of Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, in the context of overall Soviet policymaking. Additionally, the impact**
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The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Trends and Precedent in Soviet Foreign Policy

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
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ABSTRACT

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been explained routinely in terms of Soviet vital security interests inherent in that region's geopolitical setting. It nevertheless can be interpreted as the culmination of a trend in Soviet Third World policy toward the use of direct, unmitigated force in pursuit of national interests. This study examines the significance of Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, in the context of overall Soviet policymaking. Additionally, the impact of recent reverses experienced by the Soviet Afghanistan policy on future Soviet decisionmaking is assayed.
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I. INTRODUCTION

December 1984 will mark the fifth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soviet occupational forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) today number 105,000, representing the largest Red Army contingent to engage in combat since World War II.\(^1\) Consequently, Soviet military casualties are on a scale unseen since that war; conservative estimates count 7,500 Soviets dead, and twice as many wounded.\(^2\) With the advent of a sixth year of conflict, the war will become the longest commitment of Soviet ground forces in four decades, with no end in sight.

The Kremlin has, nevertheless, made clear its resolve to stay in Afghanistan. Soviet withdrawal has been universally discounted by the Moscow leadership, "until the reasons that led to their being stationed there disappear" [Ref 1: p. 194]. In late 1983, the logistics structure supporting

\(^1\)During the Hungarian invasion of 1956, in which a quarter of a million Soviet troops were involved, the Red Army reportedly engaged a number of isolated Hungarian units and suffered some casualties. Nevertheless, the operation is generally credited with achieving its objectives without recourse to major combat.

\(^2\)This figure was provided by Charles W. Nass, a retired Foreign Service officer and regional analyst, in Proceedings. Afghan rebel sources predictably have voiced the highest casualty estimates, speculating that the 40th Army has sustained more than 40,000 killed and wounded by August 1984. Sources within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have offered a median figure of 30,000 casualties.
the 40th Army was expanded to provide for a protracted, large-scale conflict. Also that year, permanent cement block shelters and housing units were erected for major Soviet forces near Kabul. Moscow appears to have accepted the costs of a guerrilla war of attrition, giving evidence of neither a pullout nor an escalation of the conflict in an effort to bring it quickly to an end.

Tyrus Cobb resounds a popular opinion that the Afghanistan episode represents "an aberration, moreover a precedent in Soviet foreign policy."¹ Richard Pipes and others have attributed the Soviet action to a new era of Soviet militarism in which Moscow will pursue its policy interests by use of force. In its immediate contest, the occupation of Afghanistan heralds the beginning of direct Soviet influence in South Asia, and unprecedented influence in the volatile Persian Gulf region.

A more moderate view has been voiced by George Kennan and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, attributing the Soviet invasion to traditional Soviet paranoia over shows of instability and disloyalty along Moscow's borders. The debate has divided into camps portraying the "Afghanistan solution" as an offensive or defensive move, with accompanying implications for future Soviet policy initiatives. The question of

¹Taken from the personal notes of Tyrus Cobb, Soviet specialist for the National Security Council, dated 12 October 1980.
whether the Soviet action represents a harbinger of Soviet expansionism (per Pipes), or a shunned policy option tied to vital security interests (per Sonnenfeldt) is of obvious import to American decisionmakers today.

This thesis explores the significance of Moscow's Afghanistan policy in the broader context of Soviet international conduct. Ultimately this study will yield an appraisal of how the Soviet invasion fits into patterns of earlier Soviet decisionmaking, and what precedent is conveyed in the episode. Analysis is divided into two sections, addressing separately the motivations and influences involved in the decision to invade, and the forces impelling Moscow to weather the continuing conflict. The study of an episode in which Soviet ambitions have been dealt a major and unexpected setback provides insight into the workings of Soviet policymaking and crisis management.
II. POLICY FORMULATION

The first section of this thesis will focus on the Soviet decision to implement a policy of direct military intervention in Afghanistan. A study of the inputs to the decisionmaking process, including both the immediate situational factors and the orientation of the current foreign policy outlook, yields evidence of Moscow's true intentions and aspirations in the region.

This section will first provide an historic overview of Soviet/Afghan relations, identifying the local pressures and influences leading to the invasion decision. The situation then will be viewed in the context of concurrent Soviet policy patterns. Comparisons are drawn with the development of Soviet Third World policy, and the more timeless attributes of Soviet peripheral security doctrine. Subsequent analysis will determine the significance and precedent represented in the Soviet decision to invade.

A: BACKGROUND/RESUME OF EVENTS

1. Penetration of the Afghan Economy and Military

A significant turning point for foreign policies of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union occurred in 1954, as well as becoming a landmark year for relations between these nations. For its part, Moscow embarked on an unprecedented campaign to solicit support and allegiance from within the
emerging Third World, in poignant contrast to the views of the now deceased Joseph Stalin on the subject. Generous military and economic aid packages were offered to developing nations of Africa and Asia under the guise of "decolonization aid". In April, the policy achieved its first significant and (by appearances) totally unexpected success. With the acceptance of a Soviet economic assistance package worth a modest $12 million, Afghanistan abandoned a 112-year old policy of meticulous nonalignment among world powers.¹

Anthony Arnold, and others, portrayed this sudden and clearly dangerous shift in Kabul's orientation as the product of an inescapable chain of events following Great Britain's withdrawal from the region seven years earlier [Ref. 2: pp. 24-27]. At this crucial juncture, the United States proved unable and unwilling to fill the political void left by Britain. In response to Kabul's requests for military aid in 1952, Washington stipulated that inclusion in a regional security pact was first necessary. When subsequently pressed for an American commitment to the defense of Afghanistan, Washington declined, stating that the U.S. had neither the regional presence nor the capability to be a guarantor of Afghanistan's borders. Despite visible Soviet agitation over this exchange, Kabul determined to retain an all-the-more precipitous balance between East and West.

American efforts at economic assistance also proved ill-conceived and ill-fated. The Helmand River Project, begun in 1946, serves as a graphic illustration. An Idaho-based construction firm was commissioned to renovate four dams and build a network of irrigation canals west of Kandahar, in southwestern Afghanistan. The Afghan treasury was deemed more than adequate to absorb the $17 million price tag.

Plagued from the onset with logistics problems and gross mismanagement, the operation quickly overran projected costs. Construction was delayed for years while Kabul searched for additional investors to help finance the project, now estimated to cost $40 million. Finally, with U.S. funding obtained through the International Cooperation Administration, work was resumed. The project was still underway when in late 1978 Washington recalled all American workers from the region. (Soon thereafter, Czech workers resumed the operation, until they, too, were recalled in 1982.)

The total cost of the project at the time it was abandoned is estimated at over $74 million. According to official Afghan sources [Ref. 3], the work completed to date has been of "minor benefit to the Afghan economy."

In contrast, limited dealings with the Soviets in the postwar period had shown Moscow to be a generous and

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1 A June 1982 New York Times article claimed that Prague had ordered the withdrawal of all Czech workers from Afghanistan at that time, apparently due to escalated fighting in the region. Concurrently, Czech domestic press releases ended coverage of the conflict.
attentive trading partner. Following a particularly disappointing exchange between Kabul and Washington, the Soviets pressed through the signing of a trade agreement with Afghanistan in July 1950—the first in nearly two decades. The arrangement reduced trade barriers for Afghan exports, and provided extremely lenient terms of trade for Afghan agricultural and semifinished products. In the first four years of trade, Moscow proved conscientious and unquestionably reliable in its conduct of business. This limited venture in Soviet/Afghan ties went far to convince Kabul that contrary to traditional fears and prejudices, closer relations with Moscow was a viable political option.

The Soviets finally secured Afghanistan to the East through the skillful manipulation of a long-standing territorial dispute along Afghanistan's southeastern border. Though claimed as part of the traditional Afghan kingdom, the area had been incorporated into the Northwest Frontier Province of British India in the late 19th century. Kabul largely pursued the issue through diplomatic channels, however minor border disturbances by local tribesmen (only indirectly linked to the political issue) continued for half a century.

After World War II, London showed a new willingness to negotiate over the issue, in part as a reward for Kabul's

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1Langer, op. cit., p. 898 and p. 1031. The establishment of the arbitrary "Durand Line" in 1893 officially placed the area within the British Dominion.
"cooperation" during the conflict.¹ Hopes for a diplomatic solution were nevertheless dispelled with the British withdrawal from India, and the subsequent annexation of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) territory by the new nation of Pakistan. Moreover, by 1953 it became apparent that the United States was placing its support behind Pakistan in the region. Kabul's efforts to rally international support behind its claims were accordingly handed a major setback.

Moscow perceived an opportunity here. With essentially no national interests at stake, the Soviets expeditiously offered to back Kabul on the issue. The conflict over "Pashtunistan" (Kabul's politically expedient name for the area) would become central to Moscow's policy in the region. Periodically the Soviets would resurrect the issue whenever it appeared Kabul was drifting toward the West.

Still the government of Shah Mahmud Khan Ghazi was reluctant to expand ties with Moscow, which added to popular disaffection over Kabul's indecisive leadership. The consequent change of government in 1953 did, in fact, prove decisive, placing the nation firmly on the road to assimilation into the Soviet Sphere.

In September 1953, the reins of power in Kabul were handed to General Sadar Mohammed Daud Khan, first cousin of

¹From all available information, the extent of Afghanistan's assistance was in refraining from taking advantage of Britain's war crisis to seize the disputed region.
the King and Commander of the Afghan Army Central Forces Garrison. Daud brought with him a resolute determination to "bring Afghanistan into the 20th century," by means of large-scale modernization and economic growth programs.¹ For this monumental task, Kabul would require economic support as well as a strong military to enforce its severe policies.

Formerly, Moscow had performed excellently in the limited capacity outlined in the 1950 trade agreement. (Daud also intimated a degree of admiration for Soviet-financed progress elsewhere in Central Asia.)² There were few alternatives to Moscow for military aid. Regional allies were few, and traditional friends such as Turkey had committed the ultimate sin by establishing cordial relations with Pakistan. Renewed efforts to obtain American support again made little headway. Discrete ovations in late 1953 resulted in Daud's humiliation when Washington felt it necessary to inform Pakistan of the request [Ref 4: p. 18]. While the West expressed some interest in proposed

¹ This phrase is attributed to Daud by Muhammed Sharza, Pakistani news correspondent at the time of Daud's ascent to power.

economic ventures, Daud's professed need for military aid received little sympathy. Meanwhile on the sidelines waited a patient and ostensibly munificent Moscow.

Perhaps the crucial input into the decision to approach the Soviets was Daud's own personality. Those in his government contend that the Afghan leader recognized well the dangers of close association with Moscow, but felt that under his direction, Afghanistan could evade Soviet attempts at political subversion. The self-confident Daud believed he could outwit Moscow. He also may have been led to the assumption that the Soviets intended to use warm but separate relations with his nation as an example of Moscow's respect for, and harmony with, the Third World. Daud's estimate of his own abilities, and Moscow's liberality, soon proved grossly overrated.

In January 1954, four months after Daud came to power, Moscow extended $3.5 million in credit to Kabul for the building of several grain silos and a flour mill. Under Soviet direction, construction was completed in less than two years. During July, the Soviets financed a $1.2 million project to develop gas pipeline and storage equipment, and the following month, a $2 million plan to pave the streets of Kabul was approved. (The latter project received special notice in the Soviet press; the U.S. had flatly turned down a similar proposal several years earlier [Ref. 5: p. 34].) Czechoslovakia also was induced to "contribute to the

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the development of the progressive Afghan people," by sponsoring and directing the construction of three cement factories near Kabul and Herat [Ref. 6]. Moscow now had its foot in the door of Afghanistan.

Political ties with the West concurrently deteriorated, largely as a result of U.S. initiatives elsewhere in the region. In 1954, Washington provided Pakistan with $21 million in military aid, spawning official denouncements and anti-American rioting in Kabul. Soon thereafter, Washington's tacit support of Pakistan on the Pachtunisian issue caused new rifts in Afghan/American relations. Following renewed border hostilities in the spring of 1955, and a subsequent attack by demonstrators on the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, Islamabad formally closed the border with Afghanistan. Washington proved instrumental in pressuring its reopening three months later (allegedly to rescue the hapless Helmand project), however, Afghan gratitude was not forthcoming.

The U.S. may have been accorded one final opportunity to salvage its influence in Afghanistan with the proposed building of a thousand-mile highway linking Kabul with pro-Western Iran. After several months of negotiations, Washington deemed the project too costly.

Throughout 1955, the Soviets consolidated their economic foothold in Afghanistan. On 28 June, a new agreement provided for duty-free transit across the Soviet border.
An accord was reached on 22 August in which Moscow guaranteed the sale of the Afghan fruit crop in the Soviet/East European market. During the fall, talks opened on the upgrading of the Afghan highway system.

However, the most significant development of the year, and perhaps of the decade, came in December with the visit of Premier Bulganin and Party Chairman Khrushchev to Kabul. During their brief stay, it was announced that Afghanistan would receive a $100 million long-term loan. The "Afghanistan deal" would later be identified as a milestone in Moscow's policies in the Third World. Within the next seven years, agreements would be extended to Argentina ($60 million), Cuba, Ethiopia, and Indonesia ($100 million each).  

Soon thereafter, the Soviets also made a subtle change in the orientation of programs provided to Afghanistan and the Third World. The development of strategically expedient projects (such as the construction of airports and roads) now took a clear priority. A prime example is the 1956 Soviet plan to construct a 67-mile highway north of Kabul, with a two-mile long tunnel through the Hindu Kush. Fifteen years after its completion, this route was used by 60,000 invading Soviet troops.  

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1One of the best accounts of this apparent shift in Soviet Third World policy is provided in Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts (Toronto: D.C. Heath & Co., 1984), pp. 11-12

2Hosmer and Arnold both contend that the number of in-country Soviet military personnel probably did not exceed 700 until the Glorious April Revolution.
Soviet assistance in rebuilding the Afghan military held even graver consequences for the Daud regime and Afghanistan. A 1956 agreement to train and equip the Afghan Army opened the door for Moscow actively to recruit supporters from all ranks of the military. Understandably, extensive efforts were made to infiltrate the Afghan officer corps, an institution which historically has held the key to power in the nation [Ref. 7: pp. 22-3]. By formal agreement, one-quarter of all Afghan officers received training within the U.S.S.R. Allegedly the course of instruction included tactics, organizational theory, and "social development". Officers showing particular interest and aptitude were taken aside for personal training.

As a result of the military assistance program, Moscow established a sizeable presence in the country. Starting in late 1955, 1,500 instructor and advisor billets were permanently assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. The covert work of these personnel would later prove crucial during the Soviet intervention. Not only were invading forces provided with detailed intelligence reports, but many advisors also carried out sabotage missions in preparing for the Soviet advance [Ref. 8].

If Kabul was aware of Moscow's effort to undermine its control of the military, the Daud regime made no apparent move to put a stop to the program. Daud even was given cause to applaud Moscow's progress in rebuilding the army. In August
1959, a spontaneous uprising occurred in the capital following an official announcement that the veiling of women would no longer be enforced. Although a similar revolt several decades earlier had toppled the Afghan leadership, the Soviet-trained Afghan Army moved quickly and decisively to quell the disturbance. True to its word, Moscow had provided Daud with a potent military. Ironically, Daud’s creation would later serve as the instrument of his own ultimate overthrow.

Washington was slow to grasp the developing trends in Afghanistan. Belatedly recognizing Soviet gains in the region, the U.S. adopted a damage-limiting strategy in the late 1950’s. American policy was directed toward checking Afghanistan’s slow absorption into the Soviet sphere of control. Special Presidential Envoy James P. Richards was dispatched to Kabul in 1957 to assure Daud that the U.S. would support Afghan independence. However, no mention was made of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In December 1959, Eisenhower himself made a brief but highly successful stop at the Afghan capital. Growing wary of increasing Soviet presence, the Afghans warmly welcomed this show of American concern and support.

In turn, Nikita Khrushchev arranged a similar visit in early 1960 bringing offers to finance Afghanistan’s Second Five-Year Plan. When told that the program would entail a significant increase of Soviet advisors in the country, Daud respectfully declined the proposal.
This brief foray toward the West ended with the resurrection of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghan tribal raids into the region in September 1960 soon escalated into a sporadic border war, and led to an official break in diplomatic relations in August 1961. Once again, the Soviet Union alone proved willing and able to answer Daud's urgent call for military assistance. With its regional security interests inexorably tied to Pakistan, the United States could not hope to win at such a game.

Daud's resolute position on this most recent crisis inevitably proved his undoing. The closure of the Pakistani border deprived Kabul of essential customs revenue, and closed a primary trade route to the Indian subcontinent and the West. Soviet economic programs offered little immediate relief for Afghanistan's consumer market, and the nature of the crisis and the nonavailability of access routes precluded humanitarian aid from the West. Amid a growing public outcry, the Afghan King asked for Daud's resignation in 1963. Daud obediently handed leadership over to Muhammed Youseph after a rousing farewell speech to the nation [Ref. 9: p. 3]. Yet only three groups genuinely were sorry to see his departure: those "Daud loyalists" among the ruling elite, those loyal to Afghan claims in Pashtunistan, and those who now found their loyalty in Moscow.

* * *

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During Daud's first decade in power, the Soviet Union became a preeminent influence on the Afghan economy. Additionally, the vital underpinnings of the Kabul government, the military in particular, had been implanted with Soviet-loyal cadres. To Kabul and the West, the situation nevertheless appeared far from critical. Afghanistan clung to its illusory contention that it was still a politically neutral state, and Moscow ostensibly was satisfied to maintain the nation as a buffer state. However, Daud's approach to Afghanistan would change significantly following Daud's removal. His staunch authoritarian rule and independent-minded policies had prescribed limits to Soviet designs—short of political penetration. With his resignation, and the installation of a more moderate government, Moscow now sought to followup economic gains with political advances.

2. Political Penetration

Following the removal of Daud, Afghanistan embarked on a decade-long experiment with democracy. A new liberal constitution was adopted the following year, establishing the political framework for a parliamentary monarchy, and incorporating a number of Western ideals and institutions [Ref. 9]. Even without a strong Soviet influence, the success of such reforms would have nevertheless been dubious. The illiteracy rate in Afghanistan then exceeded 90 percent, and no comprehensive political structure as yet linked the large rural population with the government in Kabul.
Despite the adoption of unprecedented political changes, life continued on without pause for the great majority of the populace.

The venture into democracy under Youseph did engender one far-reaching change in Afghan society. The easing of domestic repression allowed the coalescing of dispersed liberal factions in Kabul and Herat. Typical of such was the convening of a small group of pro-Soviet leftists under Nur Muhammed Teraki in September 1963. Although the movement gained little popular support or notoriety over the next 15 months, the decision was made to form a political party. On 1 January 1965, at Teraki's home in the comfortable Shah Mina district of Kabul, 30 members founded the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. This body voted their host of the evening Secretary General. The party's allegiance was made clear from the onset. The official party organ Khalq (literally, the "masses") cited a goal to "further the development of the Great October Revolution in Afghanistan" [Ref. 10: p. 22].

In following years, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) successfully achieved representation in the Wulesi Jirgah, the Afghan lower parliament; however, its influence remained small. At the same time, the party directed its main efforts toward undermining the work of the democratic government. The PDPA's ability to mobilize massive student and worker demonstrations in opposition to government
policy proved a major asset in its climb to national power. A PDPA-instigated riot in Kabul was credited with forcing the resignation of Youseph in October 1965, and in general, with ensuring that the experiment in democracy inevitably failed.

Moscow's complicity in these activities is suspect. Although the PDPA leadership surely received ideological direction and advice from in-country Soviets, Moscow appeared a degree embarrassed over the party's violence-ridden methods. PDPA activities rarely received attention in the Moscow media. A 1966 publication conspicuously downplayed party efforts, giving passing reference to events as only "actions of an oppositionist nature" [Ref. 11: p. 183].

The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Mainwandwal, immediately embarked on a well-intentioned campaign to root out trouble-making elements in the streets and universities. This policy only added substance to PDPA claims of government repression, and rekindled unrest in the capital. In the spring of 1966, six opposition newspapers came to life, decrying the new crackdown. (Only one of these, the Khalq, voiced the PDPA position.) Maiwandwal's subsequent closing of four of these papers (including Khalq) sparked widespread protests and the establishment of a prolific underground press.

Harder times were ahead for democratic Afghanistan. As a result of its increasing commitment to the Vietnam conflict, Moscow reduced economic aid to Afghanistan, from
$44.7 million in 1967, to $28.4 million in 1970 [Ref. 12: p. 144]. (For the same reason, Washington also decreased aid to Kabul, from $12.7 million to $1.4 million.) The resulting unemployment created yet another round of violent demonstrations, bringing the Maiwandwal government to the brink of collapse. Yet the Communists failed to capitalize on this prime opportunity, largely due to a crisis within its own ranks.

In June 1967, the PDPA divided into two nearly equal rival factions, the "Khalq" under party figurehead Teraki, and the "Parcham" under Babrak Karmal. Apparently there was no insuperable ideological feud between these groups; the publicized disagreement was over tactics—the Khalqis' support of class warfare as opposed to the "united democratic front" of the Parcham [Ref. 13: pp. 51-52] was little more than the pretense for deeper traditional and personal divisions. The Khalqis' are largely Pashtuns, comprising over half the population of Afghanistan, and traditionally controlling key government posts and institutions (including the army officer corps). The Parcham comprises a mix of urban-dwelling tribes, and is identified more closely with Kabul's intellectual stratum. The neat division of party members down these lines soon after the schism underscores the contention that the rift was largely a product of traditional prejudices.

The split also reflected the intense ongoing rivalry between Teraki and Babrak. Tensions within the top party
leadership were visible as early as 1965, however, only after the schism would this confrontation become apparent. By August 1967, both Teraki and Babruk espoused loyalty to Moscow, while publicly ridiculing one another for "deviations from the true path of socialism" [Ref. 14].

Engrossed in such petty infighting, both factions lost sight of their common objective, and by dividing forces, the movement diluted its effectiveness in pursuing this goal. Alone each group was too weak to instigate political change in Kabul, as poignantly demonstrated during the crises of the late 1960's. When the capable forces of change did arrive in 1973, neither could offer resistance to the reimposition of authoritarian rule.

On 17 July 1973, Muhammed Daud again came to power--this time in an unopposed and nearly bloodless coup.\(^1\) Within hours, legislation was signed abrogating the constitution, civil rights, and all democratic gains of the previous government. Shortly after his takeover, Daud had erased all trace of Afghanistan's grand, but ill-starred experiment.

Daud began efforts to aggrandize even greater power and control than had his earlier regime. Key to this was the expulsion of the royal family and banishment of the King, then visiting Europe. Dr. Ralph Magnus [Ref. 15] points to

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\(^1\)Arnold recounts that the only casualties in the operation were a tank commander (who drowned after his vehicle was driven into the Kabul River) and seven policemen who mistakenly attacked loyal forces, p. 55.
this action as a fatal faux pas in Daud's plans. Although Daud commanded the loyalty of much of the officer corps (invariably it was the military that now brought him to power), the King retained significant support as historical figurehead of the nation. Daud's irreverent disregard for such tradition undercut his popularity in the ranks. Adding to Moscow's progress in penetrating the Afghan military establishment, this disaffection would prove crucial during the Communist coup six years later.

Afghan Communists, in fact, played a limited role in the Daud coup. Both the Khalq and Parcham had been approached months before by a Daud confidant, in hope of soliciting their support. The Khalqis' predictably balked at the idea, claiming that the coup was not a genuine revolution; however, the Parchamis placed their allegiance with Daud. The Parcham likewise recognized its own impotency at the time, as well as the practical advantages of allying with the Daud forces. Surely the Parcham leadership was promised a place in the new government? Participation could thus be justified as proffering the party a more strategic position from which it could vie for power as Daud's successor.

It is evident that Moscow encouraged this alliance, seeing an opportunity to gain influence within the framework of the Kabul government, and to apply direct pressure on Pakistan. The Soviets were well-aware that what progress had been made in infiltrating Afghanistan had been accomplished
when Daud was last in power. Among his attributes, Daud also was ardently dedicated to the dispute over Pashtunistan—an issue over which Moscow cleaved the influences of the U.S. and Red China from the region.

The Soviets had been far from satisfied with the politics of democratic Afghanistan. Since 1963, the Pastunistan issue had been essentially ignored by Kabul in an effort to normalize relations in the region. Additionally, Kabul recently began to take an interest in establishing closer economic ties with the West. In March 1973, the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan was founded, in which Britain, France, and the U.S. took a 40 percent interest in the development of the country, with Kapul holding the remaining shares.

Even more foreboding was the recent formation of the Progressive Democratic Party under former Prime Minister Maiwandwal. This ardently Islamic faction, it was rumored, was planning its own coup in the near future. In this light, Daud's sudden seizure of power may well have been an act of preemption, salvaging the interests of Moscow and, for the moment, Daud. The Daud takeover was exceptionally well-timed in this regard. Maiwandwal and his staff currently were rallying Muslem support abroad. Upon his return, Maiwandwal immediately was arrested and imprisoned. Amid rumors that his followers were organizing, he was strangled in his cell on 20 October [Ref. 16: p. 60-61].

Regardless, the Soviets were soon to become disenchanted with the new regime. Between 1973 and 1976, Daud meticulously
pulled all Parchamis from strategic positions within the regime, most often reassigning them to politically-mute administrative roles. Daud also continued his predecessors' policies of creating stronger ties within the regional community, and with the West. In particular, Kabul began negotiations to acquire Persian Gulf oil—a commodity central to Soviet/Afghan relations for the past 14 years.\textsuperscript{1} This proposed deal also presaged warmer relations with pro-Western Iran, as manifested in Teheran's July 1974 offer to finance $1 billion in commercial and industrial development.

The last straw for the Soviets was perhaps Daud's complete reversal on the issue of Pashtunistan. During 1975-1976, the government embarked on a propaganda campaign to soften public opinion on the subject. Kabul subsequently announced its willingness to move toward diffusing the confrontation, and to create a more harmonious basis for relations. Pakistan reciprocated positively, and offered to host negotiations for a political settlement. This spirit of detente and good-will was demonstrated following a series of earthquakes and flooding in Afghanistan in the spring of 1976, when Pakistan provided desperately needed humanitarian aid and relief.

Afghanistan's new rapproachment with the non-Communist world failed to receive notice in the Soviet press,

\textsuperscript{1}In 1960, Afghanistan depended on the Soviet Union for 90 percent of its oil imports, as stated in Dupree, Afghanistan's 'Big Gamble' Part II, AUFS, LD-4-60, p. 3. By 1973, the Soviet monopoly was undoubtedly greater.
nevertheless, the subject was pursued at discreet levels. Allegedly, during a visit by Daud to Moscow in 1977, General Secretary Brezhnev ordered the Afghan leader to get rid of those imperialist advisors in his country. Daud indignantly retorted that when Afghanistan no longer required the presence of advisors, they all would leave. [Ref. 17: p. 65]

It was during the summer of that year that preparations for Daud's overthrow were begun. A major step was taken with the political fusion of Khalq and Parcham parties into a rejuvenated PDPA. In view of the bitter rivalry between these factions, poignantly demonstrated only a year before, Soviet complicity is a certainty.

Concurrently, Moscow continued to make preparations within the Afghan military. It is generally agreed that the Soviets' efforts in organizing allied military cadres in the capital were integral to the success of the subsequent coup. At the time of the takeover, the military appeared far more prepared than even the PDPA leadership. It is unlikely, however, that Moscow played any part in the spontaneous turn of events that spawned the Glorious April Revolution.

3. The Communist Takeover

A symptom of the turbulent domestic climate of the time, Kabul fell victim to a rash of politically-connected

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1The year 1976 is identified as the apex of the Khalq-Parcham animosity. During the year, Teraki allegedly accorded Karmal the ultimate insult to a fellow Communist in speculating that the latter had CIA connections.
assassinations beginning in mid-1977. Two sensational murders in the fall of that year involved a leftist-leaning strike organizer, and the Afghan Minister of Planning, Ahmad Ali Khoram. Yet neither of these actions evidently was aimed at the regime's top leadership, or leading PDPA figures. Consequently, the direct involvement of either of these factions was generally discounted.

Out of step with these events was the 17 April 1978 murder of Parcham ideologue Mir Akbar Khyber. The reaction within the PDPA was immediate and scornful, alternately accusing Daud's secret police and the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the killing. At Khyber's funeral two days later, Afghan Communists mobilized 15,000 demonstrators. True to form, the orderly march soon turned into violent rioting, requiring the callup of regular army units to augment the beleaguered police force.

Fearing beginnings of a popular revolt, Daud moved quickly to arrest the top PDPA leadership. Here the Afghan leader repeated a timeless error in dealing with insurgency, clearly analogous to Paris of 1789, and Petrograd of 1917. In the maelstrom of the day, he sought neither to reach accord with the rebels, nor decisively defeat them. Daud inevitably chose a policy between the two. Preventive measures were potent enough to provide the rebels with sufficient pretext for revolution, yet were grossly inadequate in forestalling actions against the government.
Only the top echelon of the PDPA was taken into custody, Teraki among them. At midnight on 26 April, Hafizullah Amin, the Khalqi liaison with the pro-Soviet elements in the military, was placed under loose house arrest. Most of the party substructure remained free, and the military cadre was not approached. This tactical error would soon cost Daud his life.

To the detained PDPA leadership, the government crackdown surely appeared to be the leading edge of a new campaign of repression. Believing that a purge of pro-Soviet factions within the army was imminent, Amin determined that the revolution must begin at once. Throughout the night his sons carried messages to key party and military figures, apparently with no interference by his guards. When Amin was taken to jail at 10:45 the next morning, the overthrow was underway.

As a result of 22 years of Soviet preparations, the majority of the Afghan Army was either incapacitated or fought alongside the rebels. By all indications, only the 7th Division, the 15th Armored Division, and the Republican Guard remained loyal to the regime and fought into the early morning hours of the 28th. At that point, the 2,000-man Republican Guard alone held the grounds of Duralaman Palace, where Daud and his family had taken refuge. Accounts of the final coup de grace appear more sensationalized fiction than fact; what is certain is that 24 hours later, Daud, his family, and the entire Republican Guard were dead.
Several Western correspondents that published accounts of the revolution speculated that the Soviets played an active role in the overthrow. Soviet pilots were alleged to have flown sorties against the royal palace, apparently based on the uncharacteristically effective performance of the Afghan Air Force [Ref. 18: p. 110]. Soviet personnel were seen in the area of the International Airport, however, what—if any—connection this had to the takeover is uncertain.

A better case is made for administrative and political support provided by in-country Soviets. It is known, for instance, that Amin's instructions of early 26 April were received in photocopy form. The only conceivable means by which this could have been accomplished in pre-dawn Kabul was via equipment available in the Soviet Embassy. The Embassy also seemed keenly aware of the course of events, and well-prepared for the outcome. Although the coup was ostensibly "improvised" on short notice, Moscow was first to recognize the new regime (as in 1973) a matter of hours after the fall of Duralaman Palace. Interestingly, the announcement came on a Sunday, amid Soviet celebrations during the May Day weekend. It later became known that the initial Soviet declaration had originated in Kabul, yet remained unconfirmed by Moscow on 1 May [Ref. 19: p. 58].

4. Founding of the DRA/Prelude to Invasion

The new Communist regime was founded with the intention of perpetuating the uneasy alliance between Khalq and
Parcham, nevertheless, power asymmetries were evident from the beginning. Teraki, PDPA leader since the party's miraculous reunion in 1977, became prime minister. The posts of deputy prime minister and foreign minister were given to Amin, the Khalq party strongman, who by virtue of his strong ties with the military, held perhaps the most personal power in the new regime. Teraki's nemesis, Babrak Karmal, also was made a deputy prime minister, however the responsibilities and duties of his office were never publicly articulated. Of the top governmental seats, the Khalq held a clear advantage.

Below this stratum the Parchamis held three key cabinet positions: the ministers of defense (traditionally the strongest office below prime minister), communications, and the interior. However, on the next lower level the Khalqis predominated. The final product was a coalition government structured with sequential layers of Khalq control, then Parcham control. The advantage was ultimately with the Khalq. The highest level of Parcham dominance, the ministries, was insulated between Khalqi control of the top national leadership and the top departmental functionaries.

Within the Soviet and Kabul media, obvious efforts were made to portray the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan as involving only domestic politics; allegedly no shift in the nation's foreign policy orientation had taken place. Kabul Radio described the new regime as "democratic, Islamic, reformist, and nonaligned" [Ref. 20]. Moscow paid tribute
to the "patriotic forces (representing) true nonalignment." Paradoxically, a TASS broadcast the same day espoused "fraternal ties with the newest member of the socialist family" [Ref. 21].

Closer ties with Moscow were immediately in evidence, however. Within the next month, hundreds of additional Soviet advisors arrived in Kabul. By June, Soviet military personnel assigned to Afghan Army units doubled, to approximately 700 [Ref. 22: p. 111]. The Soviet Embassy subsequently was expanded to accommodate a significantly larger staff, and a direct communications link between the Embassy and the Kremlin was established. Afghanistan's indisputable shift to a closer Soviet orbit was made manifest by the signing of a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in December 1978.

As predicted by many Western analysts, the new Communist regime was almost immediately beset with dissonance, within the country and within its own ranks. In power was a small revolutionary cell composed of rival factions with little popular support outside of Kabul. The regime's power base was drawn almost totally from the allegiance of a limited number of key military personnel, while Daud-loyal and "royalist" factions were still clearly present. In its hour of weakness, it is ironic (though palatable, in terms of the Afghan political culture) that the new regime should first engage in party purges and factional infighting that would inevitably cut its meager popular support in half.
Had Moscow expected the coalition of Khalq and Parcham to be held together by Soviet inspiration and a governmental structure intermeshing party loyalties, it sorely underestimated the weight of social and racial prejudices within the PDPA. Moreover, Soviet policy only added to the party's decay. Some time before the coup, Moscow had shown a clear but discrete preference for the Parcham, the least radical of the factions and the more receptive to Soviet interests.

It was soon apparent that Moscow had bet on the wrong horse. The Khalq, counterposed in theory by equal representation in the regime, yet bearing stronger military ties,\footnote{The Khalq was composed predominantly with Pashtuns, a tribe that also monopolizes the Afghan officer corps. Additionally, Amin (Khalq party strongman) closely associated with high elements of the military command.} began to consolidate its advantage by June. In typical Afghan fashion, the top Parcham leadership was gradually placed in "diplomatic exile", assigning them to honorable posts abroad in Afghan Embassies. In July it was announced that Babrak Karmal had stepped down from his position as deputy premier and had accepted an appointment as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The Khalq's climb to power also was aided greatly by the discovery of an apparently genuine Parchami plot to overthrow the regime, made public on 17 August [Ref. 23: p. 79]. In the resulting purge, the capable Minister of Defense, General Abdul Qadar, was arrested, along with the Parchami ministers
of planning and public works. (Interestingly, no indications have come to light suggesting any outside complicity [Ref. 24].) The vacated positions subsequently were filled with figures of proven loyalty to the government.

At the time of the Communist takeover, the PDPA membership numbered a few thousand in a nation of 15 million; allegedly the summer purges had reduced the party roster to probably no more than 1,200. In view of the regime's new frailty, a moderate domestic policy, prudently avoiding the further alienation of the populace, would appear to be in order. Prudence was never a part of the Khalqi's modus operandi, however.

In a country with an 85 percent rural population, the Khalq filled its ranks with urban activists. The party's "urban mindset" showed little appreciation for, or sensitivity to the traditions and values of the great majority of Afghans. Allegedly as a result of pressure by the hard-line Amin, Teraki initiated vast land reform measures and radical policies obtrusively challenging Islamic doctrine. A poignant illustration was the unveiling of a new national flag, replacing Islamic green with a blood-red derivative of the Soviet banner. The action was roundly condemned by the church, and resulted in flag-burning throughout Kabul and Herat. The

\[^{1}\text{From the personal notes of Tyrus Cobb, Soviet area specialist for the National Security Council.}\]
issue remained a source of open enmity toward the regime until Babrak Karmal reinstated the old flag in 1980.

Violent opposition to Teraki's reforms surfaced in the early fall of 1978, with spontaneous and largely uncoordinated revolts nation-wide. Reflective of the Afghan culture in general, the rebellion apparently was not so much a reaction to the drastic social and land reform measures, as a violent rejection of the Khalq's anti-Islamic rhetoric. The last such revolt, in 1973, protested Daud's relaxation of government-enforced rules of Islam; his extensive modernization programs engendered no such reaction.

Desperate times necessitated desperate methods. In the face of growing popular unrest, the government resorted to rule by terrorism. In-country sources contended that by mid-September, 8,000-10,000 Afghans had been executed by the regime, and over 30,000 were being held as political prisoners [Ref. 25: p. 272]. The regime proved undiscriminating in such purges; ex-Daud elements, Parchamis, Islamic Traditionalists--all factions not ardently pro-Khalq--were eliminated. Moscow allegedly abhorred these measures, and in fact attempted to intervene politically when Kabul began arresting the Islamic clergy in late 1978. The Soviets concurrently began belated efforts to reinstate Parchami leaders to the PDPA, seeing now an increasing need for that party's moderating influence.

The most dangerous shortcoming of the regime's new policy of repression was the undercutting of its own support
within the military. Ostensibly preempting "nationalist elements" within the army, the officer corps was decimated by government arrests. Disaffection spread rapidly through the ranks, encouraging mutiny and desertion to insurgent forces ruling the countryside. As a direct consequence, a Soviet military presence became all the more necessary. The number of Soviet personnel continued to rise, and beginning in early 1979, selected Soviet advisors assumed direct combat and leadership roles in the DRA army, causing even greater discord within the ranks.

A dramatic display of the regime's inability to maintain domestic stability was shown to the world following the kidnapping of American Ambassador Adolph Dubs in February 1979. In an incident still extremely vague, Dubs and four gunmen were surrounded by the Afghan police in downtown Kabul. Despite the vehement protests of U.S. diplomats on the scene, Soviet-directed security units engaged in a gunfight with Dubs' captors that resulted in the death of the Ambassador. Two gunmen evidently survived the barrage and were seen being led away from the scene. Later that day, however, they were displayed before the press, quite dead.

The involvement of either Moscow or the Teraki regime is deemed unlikely today in view of the obvious embarrassment of both governments over the episode. Kabul Radio initially condemned the action, while Moscow, hyper-typically, refused comment. When the international fervor over the matter began
to subside, the Soviets "unofficially" offered the ludicrous conclusion that the kidnapping was, in fact, an obscure CIA plot, intent on rupturing Afghan/American relations [Ref. 26: p. 42]. Spaced over the next several years, Moscow published the somewhat contradictory findings of an "investigation by impartial authorities" looking into the murder. The current consensus within the West holds that the act was committed by an independent radical traditionalist faction, determining that an American target would yield the most publicity with the least chance of provoking substantive retaliation.

In March 1979, the outlying provinces of Afghanistan erupted in a major revolt against the Teraki regime. The rebellion soon spread over two-thirds of the country's 28 provinces, decisively defeating DRA forces in several. Undaunted by public condemnation from Washington,\(^1\) direct Soviet involvement increased with every DRA setback. During March and April, Moscow accelerated armament deliveries, and expanded the program to include updated offensive weapons systems.

The Soviets also began to assume a role reminiscent of Moscow's involvement in Ethiopia in providing direct troop mobility and artillery support. Soviet-piloted air support sorties became more the rule than the exception, and Red Army

\(^1\)On 28 March 1979, the State Department publically warned Moscow against further involvement; allegedly a personal note to the Kremlin had been delivered several days earlier. Re-counted in Hosmer, p. 238.
advisors (numbering about 1,000 in May) now were assigned down to the battalion level. Consequently, Soviet casualties began to increase significantly, resulting not only from rebel resistance, but also from an increasing number of DRA army mutinies. During the spring it is estimated that several hundred Soviet personnel lost their lives in the Afghanistan conflict.

In view of the deteriorating situation, Teraki abdicated the office of Prime Minister on 27 March. It was determined that Amin, the leader most closely identified with the military, could better lead the nation from under the current crisis. Supposedly, at Moscow's insistence, Teraki maintained the key posts of Secretary of State and Defense Minister. Acceptance of the top post in the nation nevertheless gave Amin the political boost to aggrandize his personal power in the regime, and to challenge Teraki for overall leadership of the PDPA.

It is believed at this time, Moscow first took seriously the option of military intervention. Perhaps in response to the recent massacre of Soviet personnel in Herat, Soviet General A. A. Yepishev was dispatched to Kabul. Coming with him was the largest and highest ranking military delegation to visit the country to date. The Yepishev mission was undoubtedly

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1Various sources report that between 30 and 100 Soviet advisors and their families lost their lives in a spontaneous rebellion in the old quarter of Herat.
tasked with making a complete analysis of the current military situation, however, no indication was given that its findings were particularly distressing [Ref. 27: p. 113].

Possibly connected with this visit was the massacre of the entire male population (estimated at 1,100) of the pro-rebel town of Kerala. The operation was conducted apparently without Soviet complicity, and perhaps without their prior knowledge. It has been offered that this action was intended as a show-of-force by Amin to impress his Soviet guests. Moscow's receptiveness to such methods is debatable, however it did serve to rally even greater support for anti-government forces.

Also visiting Kabul in April was Soviet diplomat Vasily S. Safronchuk, allegedly to induce Amin to pursue a political solution to the conflict [Ref. 28]. Safronchuk resounded Moscow's opinion that Kabul's radical policies should be temporarily suspended in an attempt to regain a measure of stability in the country. In view of subsequent DRA actions, Moscow's advice was totally ignored. Safronchuk's failure fueled the Kremlin's growing impatience with the leadership of Amin, and may have marked the beginning of the conspiracy against him.

In the early fall, the growing conflict assumed a more ominous dimension. In August a mutiny took place inside Kabul's strategic Bula Hissar Fortress. The rebellion was finally quelled after a four-hour battle in which Soviet
units and helicopter gunships found extensive use [Ref. 29]. The next week, an entire Afghan armored brigade killed its Soviet staff and went over to the rebels taking its Soviet equipment with it. By September, desertion had brought the Afghan force level down to less than 30 percent; units still loyal to the regime refused to venture into the countryside, then uncontestably in the hands of insurgents. Even worse, the loss of control of the rural areas deprived Kabul of its major source of army recruitment. With two-year conscriptions due to run out shortly, Kabul faced the total dissolution of its power base.

Moscow's answer to these developments was twofold. Advisory staff again was increased significantly, to peak at 4,000 military and 3,000 civilian personnel in October. Also the Bagram Air Base, 11 miles north of the capital, was taken over from the Afghan Air Force (supposedly without Amin's initial consent). Soon squadrons of fire support aircraft began to arrive, including a wing of 30-40 of the new MI-24 helicopter gunships. In contrast to earlier operations, Soviet support and small combat units now began to work independently, with little or no direct contact with corresponding DRA commands.

Concurrently, General Ivan G. Pavlovskii, commander of all Soviet ground forces, quietly arrived in Kabul with a staff of 50 officers. In contrast to Yepishev's earlier trip, this visit escaped all notice in the Kabul and Moscow
media. The Pavlovskii group also showed little interest in the pretentious socializing that characterized the Yepishev visit, but met with DRA leaders behind closed doors.

During the late summer the Soviets apparently devised their own political solution to the deepening morass in Afghanistan. On 10 September, Teraki made a brief stop in Moscow (probably at Moscow's beckoning) during his return from a meeting of nonaligned nations in Havana. No less a personage than Leonid Brezhnev met his arrival, and the Soviet domestic and international services carried detailed reports of his visit. In a series of private meetings, Teraki was said to have talked with Babrak Karmal, then maintaining a portfolio in Czechoslovakia, but also evidently spending time in the Soviet Union and East Germany. It has been suggested that Teraki's approval of a plan to reinstitute a Khalq-Parcham coalition government was obtained at this time. An answer to the problem of Amin was also in the making.

Four days after Teraki's return to Kabul, the party leader was severely wounded in a gun battle with Amin, and arrested. By one unverified account, Teraki and the Soviet Ambassador A. M. Pusanov had summoned Amin to the royal palace, implementing an assassination plan conceived during Teraki's

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1 This author found references to three visits by Karmal to Moscow, and two to East Germany. Apparently three of these junkets were several weeks long. This information was taken from FBIS reports on Soviet/East European news releases during this timeframe.
Moscow visit. The wary Amin escaped the initial attempt, and returned with loyal forces to overthrow Teraki.

The Kabul media was silent to these events for more than 24 hours; the first indication that major changes were afoot came with a 15 September report that three key ministerial positions were to be filled by Amin loyalists. A surprisingly brief announcement in the Kabul Times the next day stated that Amin had assumed all of Teraki's posts, following the latter's "retirement". On 9 October, Kabul Radio reported the untimely death of Teraki "after a long, serious illness" [Ref. 30].

Whatever the true circumstances, Moscow found itself in jeopardy of fumbling away its hold on Afghanistan. The Kremlin would approach this unsettling development with characteristic caution, and characteristic cynicism.

By 18 September Moscow felt the situation in Kabul sufficiently stabilized to issue an official statement. That day Brezhnev and Kosygin dispatched a congratulatory telegram to Amin, wishing him the best on his recent "election as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the DRA" [Ref. 31]. An announcement of solidarity with the new regime was carried by domestic and all international services, clearly intended to disguise Moscow's perilous position from the rest of the world. A more definitive policy was already being formulated, however. Planning for military intervention presumably began the same day.
5. **Preparations for Military Intervention**

In the final months before the invasion, the Soviet press understandably avoided any mention of Teraki save a two-line obituary in *Pravda* on 10 October. Additionally, with the mechanism of his ultimate overthrow in motion, Amin was treated far more cautiously than was his predecessor. In the 98 days between Moscow's recognition of the new regime and the beginning of the invasion, *Pravda* reported on the Amin government a mere dozen times. Of these articles, only four mentioned Amin by name, and each of these scrupulously avoided any objective appraisal of the leader, but covered Amin's praises of his nation's "fraternal brotherhood with the U.S.S.R." [Ref. 32: p. 5] Amin's expulsion of Teraki's ally, Ambassador Pusanov, on 8 November was covered on the last page of *Pravda* that day. The three-line statement announced that Pusanov "has been relieved of his duties...in connection with his transfer to other work" [Ref. 33: p. 6].

The last reference to Amin prior to the invasion came on the anniversary of the Afghan/Soviet Friendship Treaty on 6 December. Typically no reference to Soviet support of the Amin government was made. In dark irony, it quoted Amin's speculation that "relations between Afghanistan and...the Soviet Union will rise to a qualitatively new level" [Ref. 34: p. 4]. It is relevant to note that this broadcast was made to the southern Soviet provinces, and to the Russian-speaking Asian audience, but not repeated in the central domestic media.
The Soviet press also took advantage of extra-regional events to draw international attention away from Afghanistan. In this regard, the developing American crisis in Iran proved a windfall. Initial Soviet reports covering the seizure of the U.S. Embassy were, at worst, noncommittal. However, in late November, the Moscow media embarked on an unmistakably pro-Khomeini campaign. Additionally, the Kremlin kept Teheran informed of U.S. force buildups in the Persian Gulf, and publically threatened Washington with "grave consequences" should the U.S. take military action against Iran. Moscow inevitably had a large stake in ensuring that the crisis continued. In part, it provided a focus for American decisionmakers to keep from noticing the extensive Soviet preparations for invasion which were then coming into view.

Western analysts first noted unusual Soviet activity in Central Asia soon after the announcement of Teraki's death. It was reported in October that Red Army troops were replacing Afghan units in the capital, ostensibly to free national forces for operations in the country. Intelligence sources also estimated that Soviet military personnel in-country now numbered 5,000, "including well over 1,000 in Soviet combat units" [Ref. 35].

Washington's first show of concern followed a report that Soviet troops in Turkmenistan had been put on a condition of "limited readiness", with reserves mobilized in the
Central Asian Military District. The Carter Administration issued the first of four private warnings to Moscow, with little apparent deterrent effect on the Kremlin's plans.

In early December, U.S. intelligence noted a significant shift in the deployment of Soviet Central Asian forces. Troops and tactical aircraft in place along the border with Iran now began to appear east of the Amu Darya, north of Afghanistan. At the same time, Western attachés and diplomats in the Soviet Union were denied permission to travel in the Central Asian Union Republics.¹

Renewed concern in Washington followed a 9 December intelligence report announcing the arrival of 1,000 combat-outfitted soldiers at Bagram. This action constituted the largest transfer of Soviet troops to Afghanistan since September. Ten days later, a large portion of this force was in place at the Salang Pass along the Kabul-Qonduz highway. The unit would hold this strategic point until 28 December when it would link with the 357th Mechanized Rifle Division, the lead element of the invading Soviet 40th Army.

¹A Canadian military attaché recounts how on a flight in mid-December from India to the Soviet Union his aircraft was diverted to Tashkent due to weather. He noted from his cabin window "about 40" AN-22 aircraft parked along the apron of Tashkent airport. In view of the fact that the entire Soviet inventory of such aircraft was then little more than 60, it was concluded that a major evolution was planned for the near future.
6. The Soviet Invasion Operation

The first elements of the invasion force landed at Bagram on 22 December. The sudden arrival of 1,500 paratroops with heavy weaponry apparently raised no eyebrows in Kabul; the move was no doubt interpreted as an effort to bolster DRA forces around the capital. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. government issued its only public warning to Moscow prior to the invasion, citing the troop buildup at Bagram and the recently disclosed presence of 30,000 Soviet troops in a state of high readiness south of Tashkent. Had Moscow felt compelled to reconsider its plans in light of new international attention, it is doubtful the massive operation already underway could have been brought to a grinding halt. In any event, the plan continued without pause.

On 24 December the first of 200 flights by AN-12, AN-22, and IL-76 aircraft began arriving at Bagram and the Kabul International Airport. By 27 December, 6,500 men of the 106th Airborne Guards Division were in place to seize strategic objectives in and around the Afghan capital.

Covert operations for the coup began that day. By one account, all batteries in DRA military vehicles were surrendered to Soviet maintenance personnel for "winterizing". Later a commando team led by Soviet Minister of Communications N. V. Talyzin appeared to relieve Afghan Air Force personnel manning the Afghan Central Communications System.
That afternoon Talyzin hosted a reception for Afghan dignitaries at the International Hotel at the conclusion of which all present were promptly arrested. At the same time, Afghan Army officers were attending a cocktail party in the Soviet Kabul barracks. About 1830, the Soviet hosts discreetly disappeared leaving behind a generous supply of liquor. With sounds of gunfire in the direction of the royal palace, the Afghan guests attempted to leave, only to find they had been locked in.

H-Hour had, in fact, begun at 0715 that morning. Two motorized rifle divisions entered the Afghan frontier in three spearheads, fanning out toward Herat, the Pakistani border, and Kabul. An additional four divisions initially were held in reserve, however, in view of the sparse resistance encountered by the lead elements, this force too headed south by the end of the year. By 1 January, 50,000 Soviet troops had crossed into Afghanistan [Ref. 36: p. 96].

Typically, events surrounding Amin's ouster from power and his subsequent death are (and probably forever will be) exceedingly obscure. One story tells of a final attempt by Moscow to persuade Amin to "invite" Soviet troops to Afghanistan, thereby establishing a legal justification for an action already underway. A Lieutenant General Victor S. Paputin of the Internal Security Forces (MVD) met with Amin shortly before the invasion and coup, and may have carried such a mission. Somewhere in the maelstrom of
events that followed, Paputin died. (A Pravda obituary later claimed that his death had occurred on 28 December, the day after the coup.) Moscow sent rumors afloat that upon his return to Moscow, Paputin had committed suicide over the failure of his "peace mission".

A defecting KGB agent, A. Kuzichkin, gives a colorful account of what had followed Paputin's meeting with Amin. A specially-trained KGB death squad entered the palace grounds early on the 27th with orders to leave no witnesses alive. According to his account, the unit proved too thorough; its leader, Colonel A. Bayerenov, was mistakenly killed in the fracas [Ref. 37: p. 16].

What is known is that apparently Amin and his whole household were dead by late that day. Moscow's domestic and international services carried a 1,500 word release announcing the overthrow of the "bloody apparatus of Hafizollah Amin and his minions...agents of American imperialism" [Ref. 30]. Less than ten hours later, the domestic service submitted a brief followup:

DRA and UPI news agencies, quoting Kabul Radio, have reported that Hafizollah Amin has been brought before a revolutionary tribunal. He was found guilty of crimes against the Afghan people and sentenced to death. The sentence has been carried out [Ref. 39].

Early on the 28th, the new government under Babrak Karmal (reportedly flown in that day) received a congratulatory telegram from Brezhnev and Kosygin, strikingly similar to the one sent to Amin 102 days earlier.
This news coverage marked the first step in constructing Moscow's official interpretation of events. The Soviet Union desired to divorce itself from any involvement in the palace coup, as blatantly demonstrated by the referencing of other news sources in the above release. Another 12 hours would pass before the invasion was to be announced in an effort to further isolate the two incidents.

At midday on 28 December, a full 28 hours after Soviet tanks rolled into Afghanistan, the operation was reported in a remarkably short and vague release. A domestic broadcast stated that the government of the DRA had appealed for "political, moral, and economic aid, including military aid...in accordance to the 5 December 1978 Soviet-Afghan Treaty" [Ref. 40]. Shortly after, the announcement was repeated, this time adding to the last line "including military aid that the government of the DRA repeatedly requested of the U.S.S.R." This surely was meant to invoke a perception of earnestness and legitimacy to the Afghan request, and possibly a sense of Soviet hesitancy to infringe on the sovereignty of another nation.

The ensuing tide of international scorn necessitated an immediate and equally scornful rebuttal. A 30 December Pravda article spelled out Moscow's interpretation of the situation, as devised no doubt months before. The recent coup was a matter wholly internal to the Afghan Government: "the working people of the country took their destiny into
their own hands." A Soviet presence was needed to counter "outside influences" wishing to reverse the gains of the April Revolution. It was repeatedly stressed that Moscow was "legally" fulfillment its treaty commitments.

Still Moscow was acutely aware of some rather blatant flaws in its initial account. Foremost was the original Soviet contention that Amin had requested intervention (thus lending support to the Paputin peace mission theory). This later was revised to claim that Babrak had, in fact, requested assistance upon his assumption of office on the 28th. Avoided was the fact that some 30,000 Soviet troops were well on their way to lending "fraternal assistance" by then.

Moscow's explanation for Amin's overthrow was equally mishandled. Struggling for a convincing account, an unofficial Soviet release (put afloat, no doubt, to guage world reaction) offered the absurd contention that Amin was actually a CIA agent. Several Soviet allies, Bulgaria and the new DRA regime in particular, blindly reverberated this theme in official releases. A Kabul Radio report professed to have proof that Amin had received several years of CIA training in the U.S. (This probably refers to Amin's three semesters at the University of Wisconsin, an institution not widely known as a hotbed of CIA operatives.) Sofia followed suit by describing a tenuous CIA connection in several government releases. The incredulous reaction of the West, and even of some Soviet friends (such as Rumania and East Germany) ended Soviet mention
of the claim, official or not. Soon thereafter, the subject quickly disappeared from other Communist presses.

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Relations between Russia/U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan span over three centuries, however direct Soviet involvement in the country essentially began only 25 years before the invasion. Moreover, the establishment of a significant presence preceded the invasion by only 20 months. The significance of this sudden and historic expansion of the Soviet sphere has not escaped the West; it has, in the words of Jack Matlock, "provided an awesome display of Soviet capabilities and intent."¹

Nevertheless, the events of 1979 cannot readily be portrayed as the product of a Soviet blueprint for establishing control over the region. As illustrated in this study, Moscow's policy in Afghanistan ultimately pursues such a result, however specific doctrine has been shaped largely by the course of events in the region. Indicative of the Kremlin's approach to the Third World in general, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan can be characterized as pragmatic, reactionary, and highly opportunistic.

¹Interview with Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, National Security Advisor to the President, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on 20 August 1981.
B. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY PATTERNS

The political implications of the Soviet decision to invade, added to the pure physical magnitude of the operation, demands a reassessment of Soviet policy patterns. The fact that direct, large-scale Soviet intervention in the region defied prediction in the West throws to question our grasp of current Soviet policy interests and priorities. The implications for future Soviet policy initiatives have justifiably become an urgent issue.

Conclusions published to date have been fairly evenly distributed along the spectrum of possibilities. Interestingly enough, the extremes in the debate have been provided by the most respected authorities on the subject of Soviet political behavior, proceeding from essentially the same base of information. George Kennan has been outspoken in portraying the invasion as a defensive move—an action impelled by the Russians' much-written sensitivity to border security, and intended only as a temporary action to restore stability to the region. Richard Pipes ascribes a more offensive intonation to Soviet designs in Afghanistan. He has labeled the episode "the first, premeditated step...to acquiring unprecedented influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region." Other noted sources on the subject, including Dr.'s Jiri

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1 Interview with Richard Pipes, Professor of History and director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, on 17 August 1984.
Valenta and Vernon Aspaturian find merit in both arguments, and suggest the presence of a scheme complementing vital national interests with power-building ambitions in the Soviet decisionmaking process.

Debate over the true significance of the invasion decision stems from the inability to correlate easily the Afghanistan case to any single pattern in Soviet foreign policy development. As a product of its geopolitical setting and socio-political condition, Afghanistan is, in fact, fairly unique. It unquestionably has been viewed by Moscow as a Third World actor. For a quarter of a century prior to the Glorious April Revolution, the course of Soviet/Afghan relations has closely paralleled the development of Soviet Third World policy in general, rarely exhibiting what could be construed as evidence of a special relationship. For the great majority of the post-World War II period, Afghanistan's Third World status apparently was central to its interaction with the Soviets. It played a remote and unexceptional role in Moscow's international enterprises.

Most Soviet initiatives leading to, and culminating in the invasion have been widely interpreted as a product of "periphery politics." Helmut Sonnenfeldt has been a major voice in this argument. The invasion decision is offered

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1This term is attributable to Dr. Pipes, in the aforementioned interview.
as clear evidence that Soviet interests in the region transcend the temperate political "gamesmanship" characterizing Moscow's Third World policy in general. Afghanistan's status as a Third World actor is negated accordingly by the fact that it shares a 1,500-mile border with the Soviet Union.¹

This study proceeds down these lines, with the purpose of assessing the decision's applicability to established patterns in Soviet foreign policy. First, events leading to the invasion will be viewed in the context of Soviet Third World politics. As suggested by Stephen Hosmer and Thomas Wolfe, the Afghanistan episode can be offered as a logical extension of a trend toward militarism in Soviet foreign policy [Ref. 41: pp. 157-161]; such a conclusion would clearly portend a new, more ominous demeanor for Soviet policymaking. The more conventional perspective stressing the proximity factor then will be considered. While not disputing an apparent trend toward freer use of direct, uncollaborated Soviet power, categorizing the decision as the product of traditional security concerns, analogous to Soviet interests and policies in 1956 Hungary, and 1968 Czechoslovakia, holds less of an immediate threat to the West.

1. Afghanistan and Soviet Third World Policy

The Sonnenfeldt argument can be accepted readily when applied to Soviet/Afghan relations during the Stalinist era.

Joseph Stalin's preoccupation with periphery politics, focusing Soviet interests and initiatives on East Europe, Red China and North Korea, did bequeath a small but politically significant place for Afghanistan in Soviet foreign policy. Soviet interest was made manifest in the signing of the 1950 Soviet/Afghan trade agreement, an accord which at the time was unique among Moscow's Third World relations [Ref. 42: p. 30].

Yet Stalin's rigid ideological standards prescribed limits to Soviet dealings with Afghanistan, and the Third World as a whole. An approach allowing cooperation with various "nationalist-bourgeoisie" elements during the war and the immediate postwar years was abandoned with the pronouncement of Andrey Zhdanov's two-camp thesis in 1947. The policy inevitably yielded a net decline in Soviet influence abroad. Consequently, in the first surge of newly decolonized Third World nations, nationalist factions generally predominated over Soviet-backed Communist cadres. COMINFORM-supported bids for power were hamstrung by the secondary priority Stalin attached to such efforts. The few Communist uprisings of the era were (as a whole) badly organized, poorly funded, and destined for failure.

Moscow's adherence to strict party dogma probably did not erode Soviet influence in Afghanistan, however, here too opportunities may have been missed. For over a century, Afghanistan had been accorded its independence via its status as a buffer state between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. The
withdrawal of Britain from the region in 1947 initiated Afghan attempts to draw an American presence to regain this equilibrium. As mentioned earlier, regional alignments and issues precluded Washington's compliance. It is conceivable that the more aggressive use of Soviet pressure and inducements may have achieved significant gains in Afghanistan years prior to the landmark 1954 economic agreement.¹

One of many policy innovations to spring from a comprehensive doctrinal review in the aftermath of Stalin, Moscow in 1954 identified a new purpose and interest in dealing with the Third World. Against the views of Vyacheslav Molotov and others, a leadership coalition in Moscow slackened ideological bonds to allow that nationalist independence movements could play a pivotal role in the world revolutionary process. Beginning in late 1955, Nikita Khurshchev spearheaded efforts to court the developing nations of Asia and Africa, and soon after, the Middle East. These early initiatives were essentially reactive and defensive in nature, intended to check Washington's progress in building a pro-Western consensus in the emerging Third World, and in constructing a wall of containment around the Soviet Union.

a. The Tools of Soviet Third World Policy

For nearly two decades to follow, Soviet efforts to compete with the U.S. in the Third World took the form of

¹Hosmer, pp. 3-6, provides a detailed account of the ideological restrictions placed on Moscow's Third World policy, and speculation on political opportunities consequently missed during this period.
economic and military aid packages. Axiomatic of Moscow's approach to the Third World, the new program was entered carefully and incrementally, testing the response of America and the West prior to a major Soviet commitment. Economic aid proposals were offered to a select few, in regions where an American presence was small. Afghanistan was the first recipient in 1954, followed by India a year later. Military aid packages were understandably handled with even greater care. Such programs were bequeathed to Third World leaders only after numerous requests and careful Soviet consideration. Gamal Nasser lobbied for 14 months prior to the signing of the September 1955 Soviet/Egyptian arms deal; Afghanistan's Daud had to petition for military aid for nearly two years. Indicative of efforts to maintain a low Soviet profile, Czechoslovakia was initially used to front all Soviet military programs until Moscow dropped the facade in the wake of the Suez Canal crisis [Ref. 43: p. 59].

Afghanistan rode the crest of this new wave of Third World initiatives. Here Soviet purposes were clearly defensive; the U.S. had achieved a succession of victories in forming an anti-Soviet alliance network in the region, including now Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the containment wall. By choice, Afghanistan stood away from such arrangements, largely as a result of traditional animosities and feuds. As Nilolay Bulganin later confided, passing by the opportunity in Afghanistan would make inevitable Kabul's coming to
accord with Washington, and Afghanistan's eventual inclusion in the anti-Soviet Western alliance.

That Moscow recognized the potential to pursue actively the Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the Third World is apparent in the 1956 shift in the orientation of Soviet aid programs to strategically important projects. Soviet plans to upgrade Afghanistan's road system paralleled the initiation of programs to build harbors and airfields for its Third World clientele.

Although Afghanistan was the first Third World benefactor of Soviet economic aid, the opportunity to receive military assistance brought Kabul to Moscow's doorstep. Like virtually every other recipient of Soviet arms aid of the period, Daud had been rebuffed by Washington on several occasions over similar requests. As seen in later trends in Soviet aid programs, Moscow soon recognized that it held a marked advantage in competing with the U.S. in this area.\(^1\) American inhibitions concerning what Harold Wilson termed "arming the world for World War III," and Washington's restriction of arms aid to avowed allies were seen as the Achilles' heel of American Third World initiatives. Early Soviet arms programs held few such requirements. To exploit this advantage, Soviet Third World aid made a significant shift toward military-intensive programs beginning in 1961.

\(^{1}\)Hosmer credits this Soviet conclusion with the eventual emphasis on military assistance in Moscow's Third World aid programs. Compare, for example, Hosmer p. 74 and p. 76.
Growing national confidence engendered by Soviet technological advances can be seen in Moscow's Third World policy in the late 1950's. The last ideological restrictions were dropped with the acceptance of a doctrine supporting "national democracy"; nationalist-bourgeoisie leaders now could be bargained with on the basis of their anti-Western, and not necessarily pro-Soviet orientation. This consequently led to the geographic expansion of the program, to now include Iraq, Ghana, and Congolese and Algerian freedom fighters.\(^1\) The doctrinal change opened wide Moscow's doors to the Third World (though caution remained the primal tenet of Soviet policy) and, as Tyrus Cobb said, introduced a good measure of pragmatism into its Third World relationships.

Khrushchev's last years in office witnessed a significant expansion of Moscow's Third World aid program, to focus now on the continent of Africa. To a large degree, this was in response to initiatives in the area by the new Soviet rival, Communist China. The Soviets actively pursued closer ties with the Casablanca Bloc, and later the OAU, and competed with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over aid to Algeria. Epitomizing Moscow's liberalized standards in approaching the Third World, Khrushchev bestowed Algeria's Ben Bella and Egypt's Nasser with the title "Hero of the Soviet Union" although neither subscribed to Marxist dogma.

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\(^1\)Hosmer, p. 25, describes Soviet initiatives in the Middle East and Africa during this period.
The extension of the Soviet military aid program to new African clients increased total Third World recipients by 45 percent. Although this growth boosted the Soviet military aid budget to a record $2.5 billion [Ref. 44: p. 345], it produced a net decrease in deliveries to individual clients—especially in quiet, uncontested regions of the globe.

Afghanistan is a case in point. Red China as yet showed only mild interest in associating with Kabul, and American aid to the nation posted a general decline during the period. As the consequence of more pressing needs elsewhere, Moscow cut back on the Afghan aid program from $200 in 1955-60, to $100 million during 1960-64 [Ref. 45: p. 343-347]. A notable drop in the program in Khrushchev's last year may have been in reaction to Daud's removal and the establishment of a more Western-leaning democratic government.

In the second half of the decade, the Soviets suffered a number of setbacks in the Third World. In 1965 Ben Bella was overthrown, and Communist designs in Indonesia were ended with a brutal counter-coup by the military. The following year a coup in Ghana ousted the pro-Soviet regime there, and in 1968 Soviet influence in Mali similarly came to an end.

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1 Kanet illustrates that the Indonesian coup was an especially costly blow to Soviet Third World policy; reportedly, Moscow had invested $1 billion in military, and $600 million in economic aid by 1965.
Moscow identified the "ideological excesses" of Khrushchev as the source of these distressing developments. It was concluded that earlier policies had skipped necessary stages in the world's procession toward communism, by entrusting revolution to non-Communist elements. Consequently, Soviet Third World policy began to shift away from dealings with nationalist-bourgeoisie leaders. Now stressed was the organizing and support of Communist vanguard parties, which conceivably could carry on the revolution process even with the loss of the top party leadership.

This policy change coincided closely with the development of the PDPA in Afghanistan. Although Teraki had organized the Communist faction in 1963, Soviet interest and support essentially began with this reorientation around 1966.\(^1\) Moscow nevertheless placed limits on the extent of its political and financial support, apparently as a result of its inability to control radical elements high within the PDPA ranks.\(^2\) Conceivably the 1967 splitup of the PDPA into the independent-minded Khalqis and the more pro-Soviet Par- chamis benefitted Moscow. Although the development cut the Communists meager popular support in half, the formation of

1Arnold, op. cit., 46-50, illustrates.

2Hosmer nevertheless takes the view that Soviet inattentiveness was primarily due to Moscow's more pressing concerns elsewhere.
a political cadre more pure to Soviet interests provided Moscow with a more efficient "tool of revolution." 

Late in the decade, Soviet military and economic aid to Afghanistan again became the victim of more pressing needs elsewhere. Increasing Soviet commitment to the conflict in Vietnam, and the need to rearm Moscow's Middle Eastern clients in the wake of the Six Day War took a clear priority. Additionally, the Soviet military aid program to the Third World continued to expand, now including 21 recipients. As an aggregate result, Afghan military aid dropped to $80 million during 1967-70 [Ref. 46].

During this period Moscow also attempted to reorient its economic assistance programs to projects that ultimately would lessen the resource burden of Moscow's growing Third World commitments. Pure economic inducements posted a significant decline, and programs for the development of local raw material resources were emphasized. The fruits of such efforts were used to Moscow's benefit in a CMEA barter scheme [Ref. 47: pp. 30-33].

Afghanistan had little to offer this new arrangement. Since the rapid expansion of Soviet/Afghan ties in 1954 trade relations had been asymmetrical, the Soviets drew political advantages while Afghanistan reaped

1 The fact that Moscow needed to join both factions prior to the coup can be justified in the fact that Parchami membership was at the time less than 1,000. Arnold offers that Moscow had believed that the Parcham would grow significantly larger after the initial PDPA split.
economic benefits. At the time, the Soviets exploited only Afghanistan's modest supply of natural gas and coal to their financial advantage. As a whole, Moscow saw little reason not to channel Afghan funds to more volatile and promising regions of the globe.

In 1968 the foundation for a more aggressive Soviet Third World policy was established. That year a revised edition of Marshal Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy stipulated that "the U.S.S.R. will, when necessary, also render military support to people subjected to imperialist aggression" [Ref. 48: p. 222]. Concurrently, the Soviets' power projection capabilities dramatically increased, surpassing the U.S. inventory of airlift and sealift assets. This growth was by no means the product of a recent revolution in Soviet political doctrine, but a continuum of earlier efforts to rectify the U.S./Soviet strategic imbalance begun early in the Khrushchev years. Moreover, the display of a more offensive modus operandi can be portrayed as a step, albeit a small one, toward realizing this new potential. Indicative of Soviet Third World initiatives in general, Moscow's policies in practice lagged far behind Soviet capabilities.

Supportive of this is Moscow's early reluctance to implement its new aggressive policy outlook. During both instances the commitment never materialized. Also during this period Moscow provided Hanoi with 3,000 advisors engaged
in "various fields of the national economy and the defense of North Vietnam," [Ref. 49: pp. 35-36], and direct military assistance during the civil wars in Yemen in 1967 and the Sudan in 1969. Direct Soviet involvement played a minor role in these conflicts, with limited contingents of Soviet personnel staying well away from combat areas. The Soviets' newfound zeal apparently was tempered with practical caution. However, coincident with the continued growth of Soviet power projection capabilities, inhibitions to pursuing national interests by means of force would gradually fall away.

b. The Precedent for Military Intervention in the Third World.

The 1970 Canal War represents a milestone in the development of Soviet Third World policy. Between March and June of that year, the Soviet Union deployed 10,000 military personnel within Egypt to counter Israeli deep penetration air raids. Soviet forces consisted primarily of surface-to-air missile crews, and a limited number of "volunteer" pilots. As with earlier Soviet involvements in Third World conflicts, the move was intended as a temporary fix until local forces could regain a measure of stability and fighting competence. Axiomatic of such policies, direct Soviet military assistance was loaned only when it appeared that negative developments in the war had placed the safety of its client--in this case the Nasser regime--in jeopardy.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War witnessed a less obtrusive but more common role for Moscow. For the first time, the
Soviets made extensive use of their growing logistics and transportation capability. In the period of just under three months, 63,000 tons of equipment and supplies were provided to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq to rebuild the defeated Arab armies. The successful operation went far in building Soviet confidence in its power projection potential; the plan would be repeated with few variations in Angola and Ethiopia.

More foreboding for the West, Moscow's threat to intervene militarily in the October War (once again, only when the defeat of its Arab clients appeared likely,) was given credibility by vigorous sword-rattling. During the conflict, the Fifth Eskadra in the eastern Mediterranean was increased from 60 to 96 ships, with anti-carrier groups closely shadowing the U.S. Sixth Fleet Task Force off the coast of Cyprus. Additionally, seven Soviet airborne divisions were placed in a condition of increased readiness, and an airborne command-and-control post was put into operation. Still there is a measure of caution in evidence here. The upgrading of U.S. Forces to Condition III in reaction to Soviet preparations is widely credited with encouraging Moscow to channel efforts to reaching a political solution.

This Soviet victory came only a year after one of the greatest defeats for Moscow's Third World policy. During 1972, Anwar el-Sadat expelled over 5,000 Soviet advisors and diplomatic personnel, reportedly over Moscow's attitude that it "enjoyed a privileged position in
Egypt" [Ref. 50: p. 230]. Soviet involvement there had been the cornerstone of Moscow's approach to the Third World for 15 years. Since the 1955 Czech arms deal, Moscow had invested more in Egypt in aid and assistance programs than in any other non-Communist country to date.

The release of this economic burden found ramifications throughout the Soviets' Third World clientele, including Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Kabul's military assistance program was increased to aggregate $150 million during 1970-74 [Ref. 51]. A late surge in aid may also have indicated Moscow's positive reaction to Daud's return to power, an event in which the Soviets played an indirect part. However, as a result of Afghanistan's rather unsensational role in international events, the country dropped from seventh to eleventh in Moscow's priority list for economic aid.

Another milestone for Moscow's Third World policy was reached in 1976 with the Soviet-orchestrated intervention into Angola by Cuban forces. Beseiged MPLA forces were said to have requested the presence of Soviet troops as early as the spring of 1975. Fearing a hostile American reaction, Moscow deferred the appeal, but recommended that Fidel Castro be approached [Ref. 52]. About mid-September, U.S. intelligence reported the arrival of approximately 1,500 Cuban combat troops at Luanda in Cuban merchant ships. It has been suggested that this contingent was intended to be used only in an advisory and support capacity, but subsequent developments precluded Cuban plans for a limited commitment.
A month later, the conflict threatened to escalate into a regional war with the intervention of Zairian forces from the north, and a South African spearhead from the south. Havana and Moscow were faced with the inevitable options of pulling support from the MPLA, or significantly increasing their commitment to the conflict. Rather than accept a very visible defeat for Soviet Third World policy, the latter was chosen. This first Soviet venture into direct intervention, albeit cooperative intervention, ironically appears to be a reluctant response to unforeseen events. That the choice of greater commitment was made is highly significant. It indicates the high risks and costs Moscow is willing to accept in the interest of salvaging prestige and interests in the Third World.

In view of earlier trends, the Soviet decision to intervene in the Angolan crisis is understandable, and perhaps predictable. Although conducted on a smaller scale, the Soviet logistics and transport operation mirrored Moscow's actions during the Yom Kippur War. Moreover, the policy concurred with a decade-old principle that the endangerment of a client warrants direct Soviet involvement. Soviet actions during the Canal War offer a ready example. The undeniably offensive character of the policy must, nevertheless, be provisioned with the fact that the alternatives were few. Cooperative intervention was, in fact, the least drastic solution that would assure the survival of the MPLA and save face among other Third World clients.
Consistent with earlier Soviet decisionmaking patterns, the operation was also a fairly safe move. The ever-present concern for the American reaction was dispelled by Washington's clarification of its position on the crisis. The U.S. Government issued its first warning on 24 November 1975, three weeks after the beginning of the Cuban invasion (although Cuban force levels in Angola were less than 5,000). The warning made apparent Washington's intention to retaliate politically against Soviet adventurism. Any remaining worries disappeared with the December 1975 Senate vote prohibiting aid to UNITA/FNLA forces, and President Ford's subsequent promise to stay out of the conflict. After a careful weighing of these inputs, Moscow correctly determined that the policy decision was, in the words of Jack Matlock, the safest of bets.

The 1977 decision to intervene in Ethiopia, this time employing Soviet ground troops in a direct support mission, was perhaps even less of a risk. The action was necessitated by the fairly successful Somali invasion of the Ogaden region in October 1977, and the failure of Soviet engineered diplomatic solutions to the crisis. A month earlier the Carter Administration had curtailed arms shipments to Somalia in protest of obvious Somali designs in the Ogaden. Additionally, in October Washington assured the world audience that the U.S. would exercise restraint in the growing crisis, and would support political efforts to end the fighting. President Carter openly rejected Zbignew Brzezinski's advice to
send an aircraft carrier task force to the area, apparently to demonstrate that a military option was not a consideration. This policy emanated from the current American outlook intent on "not dramatizing the East-West factor in Africa...A negative, reactive American policy that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement would be dangerous and futile." ¹

Once again, Washington's efforts to delay American and Soviet fears of a superpower confrontation in the Third World proved central to Moscow's decision to embark on a bold new policy.

The character of Soviet involvement in the Ethiopian crisis appears a logical projection of earlier policy trends, taking Soviet forces one step closer to direct combat roles. Whereas in Angola Soviet transport assets were used to supplement Cuban airlift and sealift capabilities, the Soviets now monopolized and controlled such operations. Between late 1977 and the spring of 1978, 17,000 Cuban troops and $850 million worth of Soviet military hardware had been transferred to Ethiopia [Ref. 55: p. 1].

As in Angola, Cuban units shouldered the majority of ground operations with the assistance of local forces in "supporting actions". However, the battle for the Ogaden now found Soviet forces near the war zone, contributing with air defense and artillery support. It was reported that Soviet pilots were alleged to have provided close air support for

¹Hosmer, p. 93, quotes Anthony Lake, State Department director.
Cuban operations. The move toward more direct Soviet involvement was done cautiously and carefully; it appears that Soviet casualties in Ethiopia were no more than the number sustained during the Angolan crisis.

The Somali army withdrew from the Ogaden in March 1978 following a successful flanking operation by Cuban forces a month earlier. Amid rumors that the Communist counteroffensive intended to continue into Somalia, Washington informed Moscow that it considered resuming military assistance to Mogadishu. Cuban operations in the Ogaden immediately slackened, and Moscow publically assured the U.S. that no such action was planned.

Just prior to the Afghanistan invasion, Soviet participation in Third World conflicts assumed a more portentous dimension. Following the signing of a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Hanoi, the Soviets assisted in the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea with its airlift/sealift might. A portion of the 5,000 Soviet "advisors" then in Vietnam are known to have accompanied the invasion force, and to have lent direct assistance in subsequent operations to suppress Khmer Rouge insurgents.¹ Following the punitive attack on Vietnam by PRC forces in February 1979, Soviet airlift assets ferried Vietnamese forces near

¹On 21 March 1980 the Reagan Administration published a detailed report on Soviet activities in the Third World, specifically concerned with the Soviet use of chemical warfare. Red Army troops from the Chemical Service were alleged to have been used against Khmer Rouge guerrillas following the invasion.
Saigon to the new front. China's early articulation of the action as a "limited measure" may have convinced Moscow that no greater Soviet response was needed beyond very vocal threats and warnings.

Close Soviet complicity is also accepted in the invasion of North Yemen by PDRY forces in late February 1979. The operation was limited in both scope and depth (the 3,000 South Yemeni troops ventured little farther than the immediate border area [Ref. 56: p. 33]); however, Soviet and Cuban personnel are alleged to have provided direct artillery and close air support. The subsequent mobilization of Saudi forces and Washington's announcement of support for North Yemen, to include the presence of an American carrier task force in the area conceivably persuaded the Soviets and the PDRY to accept a political solution well short of a substantive victory.

Soviet Third World policy exhibited a new facet in the actions in Southeast Asia and North Yemen. Without a doubt, neither operation was planned by Moscow, and evidence suggests that the Soviets may have even attempted to moderate Vietnamese and PDRY designs. However, both episodes witnessed active Soviet support of purely offensive operations, at a time when neither client state was in danger of defeat or collapse. Moreover, Moscow was not entrapped in an Angola-like dilemma, and presented with a do-or-die policy decision. Although in both Vietnam and Yemen Moscow recognized that the possibility of a superpower confrontation was remote, in
evidence is a new Soviet willingness to use force to pursue direct or indirect national interests.


The dramatic evolution of Soviet Third World policy within the last decade can be explained readily in terms of Moscow's often-espoused "correlation of forces". The Soviets' power projection capability in the Third World had reached formidable dimensions by the late 1960's, as the eventual product of a building program christened two years after Stalin's death. By 1969 the Soviet airlift arm counted nearly 200 aircraft; the merchant marine fleet grew during the second half of the decade by more than 50 percent, to a total of 1,395 ships.

As this trend continued into the 1970's, American projection potential, both materially and spiritually, was on the wane. The commitment of much of America's airlift, sealift, and naval strength to the Vietnam conflict, and the subsequent reduction of such forces in the aftermath of that war, degraded Washington's physical ability to contest Soviet initiatives in the Third World. Moreover, America was drained of its willingness to challenge Soviet moves as a direct result of the failure of Washington's Vietnam policy.

The Yom Kippur War served as a confidence-building experience for Soviet power projection capabilities, and soon thereafter the gap between policy and potential began to close.
Soviet actions in Angola, Ethiopia, and Kampuchea and North Yemen can be seen as an incremental growth of Soviet participation in Third World conflicts: from proxy supply to direct proxy support in the defense of clients, to direct support of offensive initiatives by client states. Third World policy ambitions have grown correspondingly, from efforts to deprive the Third World from the Western alliance, to active support and guarantee of vanguard parties. Donald Zagora identifies current Soviet objectives in the Third World as the construction "in Africa and Asia [of] a looser version of the Warsaw Pact" [Ref. 59].

Stephen Hosmer cites a number of interrelated "constants" apparent in the Third World. The first ascribes attributes of adroitness and caution to Soviet policymaking. As illustrated throughout this study, the evolution of Soviet Third World policy has occurred in carefully calculated, incremental steps; incidents portraying rashness in Soviet initiatives are rare, and most often are attributable to Soviet miscalculation [Ref. 58: pp. 135-154].

A prime example of Moscow's "testing of the waters" prior to implementing a decisive policy was given during the 1970 Canal War. The introduction of a 50-man Soviet military contingent in Egypt to man surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites was, in fact, a test of U.S. and world reaction. When none was forthcoming, the size of the force was increased significantly, and Soviet personnel were moved steadily toward the
war front. Had a substantive Western response taken place initially, Moscow likely would have withdrawn its small lead element without loss to Soviet prestige or credibility. Once the primary initiative was begun, however, the Soviet policy proceeded unalterably. It appears to be a formidable challenge for American decisionmakers to be able to detect and counter Soviet test initiatives prior to such policies becoming irreversible.

Adding to this theme, Moscow consistently has pursued the lowest-cost solution to crises in the Third World. Perhaps with the exception of Soviet participation in Indochina in 1978-79, and North Yemen in 1979, policies prescribing direct Soviet support have been addressed as a last resort. In Angola and Ethiopia, pro-Soviet regimes were clearly on the brink of collapse, requiring nothing short of direct intervention. Still, the use of proxy forces was preferred to direct Soviet assistance, inferring less of a material and political risk to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets also have shown a proclivity for "sure bets", as insurance against the escalation of the conflict out of Moscow's total control. In the past decade, Soviet and Cuban forces have fought against insurgents and minor Third World powers, but never against a modern army. The performance of a Cuban force against a South African unit in Angola in 1976 indicates that Communist forces
of intervention are not always quite as awesome as they seemed to have been portrayed.¹

Furthermore, every scene of Soviet intervention in the past had been thoroughly researched and reconnoitered prior to the operation. Cuban military advisors were seen in Luanda six months before Castro's commitment of ground forces to Angola. Moscow had sent a military delegation to Addis Ababa prior to the intervention in Ethiopia. (The Soviets also had a firm grasp on the organization and performance of the Somali Army--a force Moscow essentially had equipped and trained.)

Yet Soviet calculations have proven deficient on occasion, especially in estimating crises involving popular-based insurgency movements. Evidence exists that operations in Angola and Ethiopia were intended as decisive, temporary moves to reestablish client control. The continuing conflicts in both these countries have necessitated the continued presence of major Cuban forces to guarantee the Marxist regimes.

Another timeless attribute of Soviet Third World policy is the strict avoidance of situations which possibly could draw Moscow into a direct confrontation with Washington. As mentioned, "test" actions are a common mechanism for guaging American response prior to the implementation of a

¹Evidenced in the limited contact between Cuban and South African forces, the latter had better tactical-level leadership and performed better in mobile combat.
more bold and massive policy. In instances where Moscow has already committed itself to a major initiative and Washington had delivered belated but credible threats, the Soviets have been careful to allay American fears, and perhaps to modify policy slightly to avoid a major Soviet/American crisis. During the Korean War, Moscow made clear its policy of maintaining only material support for the North [Ref. 59: pp. 136-137]. Carter's warnings over a conflict were reciprocated with emphatic Soviet assurances, and a temporary cessation of hostilities at the border.

As illustrated earlier, Washington often has simplified Soviet calculations by announcing America's firm position in the early stages of crisis. Angola and Ethiopia offer obvious examples. Moscow could as well predict little U.S. reaction to the offensives in Kampuchea and North Yemen: Washington had shown only enmity for the Pol Pot regime, and no precedent existed for a major American commitment to the Yemeni conflict. Moscow's confidence in its ability to discern American interests was thus justified. Prior to the Afghanistan invasion, the Soviets posted an impressive record of successes in calculating and implementing Third World policies.

d. Applicability of the Afghanistan Case

It becomes evident in this study that the course of Soviet policy in Afghanistan paralleled the development of Moscow's approach to the Third World in general. The
establishment of economic ties with Kabul was part of a larger Soviet program to compete with American, and later Red Chinese, influence in the Third World. Initial efforts to induce Afghanistan were aimed at forestalling Kabul's assimilation into the containment wall of the West by drawing it into a closer Soviet orbit.

For most of the past three decades, Afghanistan has played an exceedingly minor role in international politics, and Soviet aid programs to Kabul have suffered accordingly. In the early 1960's, Afghan economic aid dropped by 30 percent as a result of concerted Soviet efforts to compete with the PRC in Africa. Soviet assistance to Egypt and Vietnam at the end of that decade again came at the expense of Afghan programs. Although military aid to Afghanistan rose substantially in 1973-74, its priority in Moscow's overall Third World aid program dropped.

Interestingly, the Afghan aid program appears in retrospect to be one of a limited number of victories for such Soviet efforts in the Third World. Of the top 15 recipients of Soviet military aid in the past quarter-century, only Kabul and three others are presently aligned with Moscow. Of the top 10 benefactors of Soviet economic assistance programs, Afghanistan alone has evolved into a Socialist state [Ref. 60: pp. 18-20]. Moscow has paid $1 billion in military aid, and $1.4 billion in economic aid for the "triumph of communism" in Afghanistan [Ref. 61]; yet the Soviets have made even greater sacrifices to maintain this achievement.
It also is apparent that the Communist takeover in Kabul is not reflective of Soviet designs or planning. As covered earlier in this study, the Glorious April Revolution was not the product of Soviet-orchestrated attempts at subversion, but was accomplished largely through the efforts of local Communist leaders, Hafizollah Amin in particular. (It must be added that Moscow's 22-year penetration of the Afghan military was key to the success of the coup.) Tyrus Cobb describes the coup as an unplanned, qualified victory for Soviet foreign policy; "a local Communist takeover, carrying with it implications for greater Soviet support and guarantees, was suddenly dumped in Moscow's lap."¹ This observation offers with it the inference that even in early 1978, Afghanistan held no exceptional import in Soviet policymaking.

Soviet military assistance for the new DRA government had parallels in concurrent Soviet policies elsewhere in the Third World. At the time, the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan was actually smaller than the group participating in Vietnamese operations in Kampuchea, and comparable in size to the "advisory staff" directing the small South Yemeni army in 1979. Soviet aircraft and artillery support in operations against Afghan rebels also was seen in the Yemeni and Ethiopian crises. Opposing the view that Moscow's early military role in Afghanistan constituted "a harbinger

¹Cobb interview.
of a bold new Soviet policy,"¹ Soviet assistance to Kabul actually was unexceptional in the context of current Soviet Third World policy.

Additionally, the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan can be explained in terms of current Soviet modus operandi. In accordance with a fundamental dictum in Soviet policymaking, the drastic Soviet initiative was in response to a dire emergency. From all evidence, the invasion was intended to be a quick and decisive solution to rebel uprisings in the country. Amin's overthrow was conceivably a contingency, providing for Amin's refusal to "invite" Soviet forces to Afghanistan. This speculation proceeds from the theory that the visit of Lieutenant General Viktor Paputin to Kabul just prior to the invasion was an attempt to pressure Amin into acquiescing. That such efforts were continued up until the time of the coup may be evidenced by the fact that Paputin apparently died in Kabul in the early stages of that operation [Ref. 62: p. 93]. Moreover, the Soviet media seems to have been primed for the eventuality of winning the Afghan leader over, initially issuing fallacious accounts that Amin had requested Soviet military assistance.

In general, the invasion decision reflects Soviet policy guaranteeing the safety of a client Marxist regime.

¹Pipes interview.
Few dispute the fact that, had Soviet force levels not been drastically increased, the DRA army and government would have soon collapsed. The policy decision is reminiscent of the Soviet dilemma in the early stages of the Angolan crisis when choices were limited to expanding the Soviet commitment or abandoning a Marxist ally. In view of the unprecedented character of Moscow's Afghanistan solution, the policy manifests an even greater willingness to use the Soviets' power projection capability to meet this commitment.

Yet the invasion option no doubt appeared the lowest-cost solution readily practicable. Invariably there were few alternatives to direct Red Army involvement that would have yielded satisfactory results. Here again, the predicted ramifications of a Soviet political "defeat" in Afghanistan, specifically the consequential damage to Soviet credibility among clients and the West, and the implications of accepting a very visible ideological setback, were deemed of sufficient weight to warrant a radical and perhaps more risky policy.

Conceivably Soviet calculations and preparations prior to the invasion were even more thorough than those paving the way for actions in Angola and Ethiopia. A sizeable Soviet in-country presence had been sustained for a quarter-century. Moscow's early emphasis on the development of strategically important projects (the construction of the main highway connecting Kabul to the Soviet Union is a graphic
illustration), and the frequent dispatching of geographic
survey teams into the Afghan countryside proved instrumental
in the success of the invasion operation. Furthermore, the
Soviets could be confident in their estimate that the DRA
military would not oppose the intervention. After two decades
of close association, and with added insurance provided by
last-minute sabotage operations, the Afghan Army was, in fact,
completely neutralized. Finally, the Yepishev and Pavlovskii
missions provided current high level analyses of the situation,
a procedure followed in the planning of every major military
initiative since Angola.

Afghanistan surely appeared to Soviet policymakers
as an area far divorced from American interests and concerns.
Throughout the postwar period, the U.S. had shown little
interest in improving its position in Afghanistan, essentially
in deference to Pakistani views on regional issues. Follow-
ing the Glorious April Revolution and the Dubs murder, and
in view of the escalating conflict in the countryside, America
began to withdraw its small presence in Afghanistan. Just
prior to the invasion, American involvement was at its lowest
point since World War II. In the Soviet view, this develop-
ment was merely the predictable outcome of an American regional
policy which tacitly accepted that Afghanistan laid within the
Soviet sphere of control for the past 20 years.¹

¹Cobb and Matlock contest the notion that the U.S. recog-
nized Soviet preeminence in Afghanistan. Rather it is stressed
that Washington historically has lacked the capacity to pursue
"American security concerns" in Afghanistan.
Washington gave no indication of genuine concern during the final preparations for the invasion. It should be remembered that only four private warnings (all of which Carter later admitted were "tempered with caution") preceded the invasion. In light of the concurrent American crisis in Iran, Washington sought an ally in Moscow, not an adversary. The only public warning came after the invasion operation essentially had already begun. This message, too, proffered a mild warning, expressing "concern" over current indications.

Jack Matlock adds that an American capacity to contest such a Soviet move directly was also visibly absent. Beyond historically dubious political admonishments, the U.S. could do little more than "make some noise with naval forces in the Persian Gulf, 500 miles away." ¹

The fact that Moscow used massive, uncollaborated force in its Afghanistan solution is cited routinely as a major precedent in its dealings with the Third World. While this view is fundamentally correct, the unique character of the policy can be portrayed as an extension of other Soviet policy patterns, tailored to the unique situation in Afghanistan. While Soviet forces were committed to direct ground combat roles for the first time in the Third World, the progenitor for such a policy is seen in Soviet involvements in Ethiopia, Kampuchea, and North Yemen. The role of the Red Army contingents in each of these episodes transcended the passive support role seen in earlier Soviet initiatives.

¹Matlock interview.
The use of proxies in Afghanistan was understandably discounted, if for no other reason than the distance to such assets, and the nonavailability of access routes outside of Soviet territory. The staging of Cuban or East European invasion forces across the Soviet border would be a ludicrously transparent move, and the ramifications and implications would be little different from action by Soviet troops. This issue will be examined further in the following pages.

Two additional precedents have been widely attributed to the intervention. The episode included the overthrow of an established Marxist government, and the commitment of major forces to the region without the approval of Kabul. These are rather shallow observations; as mentioned earlier, the coup probably was a late, shunned option, and the lack of genuine justification for the invasion was likely the result of a miscue between the invasion forces and those working to procure legitimacy for the action. The true significance of the episode may lie in the basic fact that Moscow chose to abandon its traditional low profile in Third World operations, and exhibited a new willingness to use direct force in a unique and carefully prepared situation.

A final precedent which has been offered by Hosmer involves the text of the 1978 Soviet/Afghan treaty. Article IV of that agreement vaguely prescribes "appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial
integrity of the two countries,"¹ was unique among similar accords within the Third World, and was not coincidentally the basis for Moscow's legal justification for the invasion. Hosmer attributes much importance to the specific wording of such agreements, and speculates that future treaties may evidence the extent of Soviet interests and ambitions in a specific region [Ref. 63: p. 261].

In summary, many characteristics of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be found in earlier Soviet military initiatives in the Third World, including the fundamental goals, interests, and strategies involved. Furthermore, the precedent implicated in Moscow's decision to invade can be portrayed as an extension of earlier Third World policy trends. In many ways, Moscow's Afghanistan solution is applicable to the conduct of Soviet Third World politics as a whole. The true significance of the Soviet invasion decision lies in the uninhibited use of Soviet military power as a solution to Third World conflicts: nevertheless, this conclusion must be provisioned with an articulation of the unique circumstances present in the Afghanistan scenario.

¹FBIS, Daily Report, The Soviet Union (6 Dec 1978), p. J-11. Hosmer places significance in the fact that the Soviet/Afghan treaty was uncharacteristically vague as to preconditions warranting intervention. Earlier treaties stipulated action would follow a "threat to peace" or a "breach of the peace"; the Afghan agreement merely mentioned "appropriate measures to ensure peace". See also, Hosmer, p. 261.
2. Reflections on Soviet Periphery Politics

Survival is the most fundamental objective of any polity. Historically, national security has been the single inexorable interest of all governments. Traditional, cultural and ideological adherences ultimately have been jettisoned in the interest of perpetuating the ruling elite and the nation-state. Such a conclusion no doubt prompted a 19th century Italian nationalist to offer the theory that the machinations of kings and ministers were fleeting, and that only nations and people are eternal.

Among the many facets of national security, the most primal is tangible, physical safety—security "within the vision of thine own eyes". Accordingly, polities historically have subscribed to the principle attributed to Otto von Bismark that the stability of one's borders is the most essential of all national goals. In the age of global power projection and intercontinental nuclear strike potential, this philosophy still holds true.

Soviet political history has exhibited both a fundamental interest in survival and a preeminent concern for border security. As the product of a turbulent past, the Russian culture traditionally has been attributed with xenophobia and regard for national security bordering on neurosis. The ascent of a movement espousing class unity which transcends national borders and cultural barriers has done little to reform this fear and prejudice. During Lenin's lifetime,
the simple realization was made that survival of the state was synonymous with survival of the regime, and thereafter, the "Bolshevist zeal" of Moscow has been tempered in practice with the practical needs of the state. The latter became the major force behind Soviet politics in the Stalin years, with the subordination of ideological pursuits to efforts to normalize the U.S.S.R. within the bourgeoisie state system.

Russians and Soviets historically have equated the survival of the state with the stability and subordination of peripheral actors. (Henry Kissinger aptly offers: "Absolute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for all of its neighbors" [Ref. 64: p. 118].) In the postwar years, this vital national interest has taken form in a system of allied and subjugated border states, facilitated by the maintenance of client Marxist regimes. The current cordon sanitaire constitutes not only a military, but a psychological and ideological buffer to insulate the U.S.S.R. from contaminating bourgeoisie and nationalist influences.

Joseph Stalin, the system's architect, has been accused of vision extending no farther than his artillery range; his preoccupation with regional politics (specifically European affairs) has acknowledgeably come at the expense of Soviet extraregional interests. Yet the importance of Moscow's eastern buffer has remained preeminent in Stalin's aftermath. As observed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the Soviet Union's transition from a regional to a global actor apparently
has not diminished the primacy of peripheral security, but only opened the door to new, extraregional commitments of secondary importance.

Recent history supports this notion. The Soviets have demonstrated that they are highly reactive to shows of instability or disloyalty along their border. The limit of Soviet tolerance has been shown in two episodes of direct military intervention prior to 1979, and in several instances where such a definitive solution was threatened. Whereas Moscow's Third World policy has vacillated in an escalating pattern of expansion and consolidation, the Kremlin's interest in maintaining control of its buffer system has been constant.

The applicability of Afghanistan to Moscow's peripheral security system has been the subject of heated, though somewhat imbalanced debate. Sonnenfeldt [Ref 65: p. 18] has spoken for the majority of academia in submitting that peripheral interests were a "dominant consideration" for Soviet decisionmakers in the episode. In a May 1983 interview with Der Spiegel, Yuriy Andropov supported this view by addressing the Afghanistan issue in the context of mutual spheres of influence:

...Far from being a matter of indifference to us [is] what is happening directly on our southern border. Washington even goes as far as arrogating for itself the right to judge what government must be there in Nicaragua, since this affects U.S. vital interests. But Nicaragua is over 1,000 kilometers away from the U.S.A., and we have a rather long common border with Afghanistan [Ref. 66].
The Afghanistan case is clearly portrayed here as a product of vital Soviet border concerns and interest.

Dr. Valenta [Ref 67: pp. 86-87] and others, approach this generalization more cautiously. Although admitting that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is comparable to interventions in Eastern Europe, two anomalies are apparent. First the Soviets have not proved convincingly that the priority placed on peripheral interest has, in practice, extended beyond Eastern Europe. While Moscow's approach to this region has been largely nonnegotiable, the Soviets have, for example, failed to press postwar claims against Turkey and Iran. Moreover, the Soviets only recently have shown concern for stability within Afghanistan. As seen earlier, Soviet/Afghan relations traditionally have been more representative of Moscow's Third World policies than the Soviet conduct of "periphery politics" seen in Eastern Europe.

The balance of this analysis ultimately will conclude how the Afghanistan case fits into Moscow's peripheral security scheme, and will speculate on the patterns of, and the precedent for, military intervention in the conduct of Soviet periphery politics. This area of the study will briefly review three earlier examples of Soviet decisionmaking where border security was perceived to be jeopardized. In two cases a policy of intervention was decided upon; in a third case the option was considered, but discounted. Comparative analysis will determine what role Afghanistan's geographic setting may have played in the Soviet decision to invade.
a. Hungary 1956: The Challenge from Without

The 1956 Hungarian episode witnessed one of the most blatant challenges to Soviet regional hegemony since the establishment of East European cordon sanitaire. Soviet policymakers faced a threat from outside the party apparatus, espousing anti-Communist and anti-Soviet rhetoric, and endangering the stability of the newly-formed Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

The Hungarian invasion appears in its historical setting as a prominent departure from current Soviet policy trends prescribing greater political tolerance. In the years following Stalin's death, the Soviet Union had come to equitable terms with Greece, Turkey, and Iran over a host of postwar disputes. Additionally, in 1954, Nikita Khrushchev headed efforts to mend relations with Tito's Yugoslavia (a policy that would later become a casualty of Moscow's Hungarian initiative). This new policy outlook, pursuing military, economic, and political ties in place of crude Stalinist control mechanisms, was interpreted wrongly by various regional factions as a recession of Soviet claims in Eastern Europe.

The easing of political repression in the region sparked a series of revolts in Poland in June 1956. A popular uprising within the Polish labor force ostensibly yielded concessions from Warsaw and Moscow. Pro-Soviet elements within the Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) were summarily
ousted, and Wladislaw Gomulka (who earlier had been imprisoned for pro-Titoist tendencies) was allowed to accept the post of Polish Party Secretary. Concurrently, Polish labor was promised a greater voice in the planning of state economic goals. In addition to political and economic concessions, Khrushchev also agreed to the removal of General Polossovsky as head of the Polish People's Army, and to the reduction of in-country Soviet military personnel.

Also in June, Matayas Rakosi (an avowed Stalinist and long-time leader of the Hungarian Communist Party) was deposed, amid growing support for a Hungarian "revisionist" movement. His successor, Enrő Gero, proved no more effective in quelling the growing rebellion. On 23 October, the situation became a crisis when an anti-Communist revolt erupted in Budapest. Unlike the recent Polish episode, Hungarian reformists demanded full national independence, prescribing the dissolution of the HCP and Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

For more than a week, the Kremlin groped for a political solution to the confrontation. Soviet interests in Poland had been salvaged largely by manipulating and pressuring the Warsaw regime; the Hungarian reform movement under the new Prime Minister Imre Nagy showed no such malleability. Ultimately a decisive "show move" was decided upon, intended to demonstrate dramatically the boundaries of Soviet patience and tolerance, and consequently to reverse a perceptible trend toward challenging Soviet hegemony.
On 4 November 1956, a quarter of a million Soviet troops spearheaded by nearly 5,000 tanks entered the country. The Hungarian military (which earlier had given indications that such a move would be opposed) had been cleverly dispersed through the efforts of in-country Soviet advisors. The invasion also took full advantage of a truce between Soviet and Hungarian forces, making possible the capture of key Hungarian military leaders and their staffs [Ref. 68: p. 77].

The operation had been planned to minimize international repercussions in regard to this unprecedented action. The concurrent Suez Canal crisis had already cleaved deep divisions within NATO (which, ironically, found the U.S. and the Soviet Union in close accord on the issue) and was instrumental in diluting Western reaction.

The decision to invade was influenced, no doubt, by repeated American assurances that the United States would not intervene in the area, Radio Free Europe (RFE) broadcasts notwithstanding. Speaking specifically in regard to the Soviets' handling of the Polish crisis, but holding clear implications for Hungary as well, John Foster Dulles publically stated that a NATO military option would not

1Radio Free Europe broadcasts are credited by some with fueling the Hungarian revolt with empty promises of American support and assistance. No evidence can be found that this was a major consideration for Soviet policymakers.
be considered. Not coincidentally, the announcement preceded the invasion decision by a matter of days. As later recounted by President Eisenhower, at that time, Washington took seriously the possibility that Moscow would resort to nuclear war to defend its hold on Eastern Europe [Ref. 69: p. 88]. In the words of Dulles, it was feared that American military intervention would "precipitate a full-scale nuclear war [in which] all these people [Eastern Europeans] would be wiped out" [Ref. 70].

Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion had significant political ramifications throughout the world community, although the true costs of the policy were not immediately apparent. Soon after the crisis, a complacent Pravda scoffed at "anemic attempts" of the United Nations to rally opposition to the move. However, subsequently Moscow discovered it had lost significant support among the intelligensia of Europe—a sector that earlier had expressed a measure of sympathy and support for Soviet interests [Ref. 71: p. 78]. Although a united opposition failed to materialize, the event served to establish the foundation for an anti-Soviet consensus in the West.

Moscow also noticed some uneasiness among Soviet allies over the episode. The Kremlin had justified its actions to the Communist community by identifying "American designs" in maverick Hungary. In his own inimitable style, Khrushchev [Ref. 72] ventured: "The
saliva of the imperialists was running in their mouths at the prospect of Hungary's leaving the Soviet camp." Some negative reaction was evident among Moscow's clients, however. The most vocal rebuff came from the Soviets' African and Asian allies, who took pause from condemning the West's role in the Suez debacle to express "deep concern" over Moscow's methods.

Obvious efforts to close ranks were made in November 1957, on the 40th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. The celebrations produced a "declaration of unity", recognizing Moscow's ideological and political lead, and denouncing all forms of "revisionism".

A prominent Soviet lesson taken from the Hungarian episode identified the continued need for "Red Army diplomacy". Military force, not ideology, bonded the Eastern alliance. Soviet decisionmakers also came away from the event with a new appreciation for the forces of nationalism in Eastern Europe, even within the Communist leadership. In the interest of retaining the loyalty of Moscow's East European clients, WTO regimes subsequently were allowed a degree of freedom in conducting domestic politics. Soviet toleration of Janos Kadar's extensive economic reforms in Hungary stands as a case in point.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the Hungarian crisis was the tacit acceptance by the West that Moscow can, and will, act as it sees necessary in Eastern
Europe. The recognition of Soviet peripheral interests convinced Moscow that the use of military force within the region was a viable option in the future.

b. Czechoslovakia 1968: The Challenge from Within

In contrast to the Hungarian episode 12 years earlier, Czechoslovakia in 1968 presented a challenge to the Soviet security scheme from within the very mechanism of Soviet control. Efforts of the Czech Communist Party at socioeconomic revisionism portended a less direct, but prospectively more serious threat to Soviet national security. The Prague Spring was seen as the first symptom of an unobtrusive cancer, slowly and passively undermining the Marxist brotherhood within East Europe by testing the limits of the "many roads to socialism" doctrine.

Warning signs within the region surfaced a year before the Prague Spring at a meeting of European Communist Parties at Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967. General Secretary Brezhnev apparently intended to use this forum to build a regional consensus supporting action against internal threats to the Warsaw alliance. According to one Polish source, the Soviet ovation met with "unrestrained opposition" from several allies. During the October celebrations later that year, the Kremlin made preparations to reinstate Soviet preeminence by scheduling an 18-Party meeting to be held in Budapest in three months--the first such gathering in eight years.
The immediate chain of events leading to the invasion began in January 1968 with the ousting of Soviet puppet Antonin Novotny from the post of General Secretary of the Czech Communist Party, and the rise to power of Alexander Dubcek. As Dr. Valenta [Ref. 73: p. 168] points out, this development appeared at first to be only a clash of personalities; the revisionist implications of the change would not become apparent until the early spring. But in effect, the first preparation for a Soviet invasion option (in particular, the establishment of an extensive logistics cadre outside Czechoslovakia) was visible as early as mid-February.

Moscow now faced a threat strikingly different from that seen in Nagy's Hungary. With the coalescing of a strong Dubcek base of support, proposals were heard to establish a parliamentary government "free of party control", to eliminate censorship, and to de-Stalinize the Prague regime. Novotny later was bumped from national power with the ascent of Ludvik Svoboda to the office of President, and soon Dubcek factions gained control of the Czech Central Committee.

As yet, Dubcek's Czechoslovakia offered no overt challenge to Soviet hegemony. Prague never seriously questioned the Czech position in the Warsaw Pact or COMECON. Communism and the Communist Party would remain national institutions, though in the hands of revisionist elements, and no shift in Czechoslovakia's foreign policy orientation was
envisioned. As a firsthand witness to the episode later recounted, Dubcek's regime was by no means against the Soviets or communism, but was for progress. Our efforts were for the benefit of the party and the alliance.

Soviet concern over events was made manifest in menacing Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Czechoslovakia in June and July. Units involved in this exercise were afterwards instructed to remain in-country until 20 September [Ref. 74: p. 174]. Additionally, a meeting of Soviet and Czech leaders was held at Cienna-on-Tisa; all but two of the Soviet politburo attended, evidencing the gravity with which Moscow viewed the situation. The conference ended with a verbal agreement between the parties to move bilaterally to diffuse the escalating crisis.

Ostensibly the Dubcek regime reached accord with the rest of the regional community at the Bratislava meeting of the Warsaw Pact (minus Rumania) on 3 August. The product of the conference--the vaguely worded "Bratislava Declaration"--called for the withdrawal of WTO forces staged across the Czech border (although units within the country were not addressed). The agreement was hailed publically as a decisive political victory for Dubcek, which inevitably prodded Moscow toward a less appeasing, more definitive solution to the crisis.

In the early morning hours of 21 August, 17 days after the promulgation of the Bratislava Declaration, the
forces of five Warsaw Pact nations moved to end the Prague Spring violently. The action was tactically similar to the 1956 Hungarian operation, utilizing in-country assets to prevent organized resistance, and using deception and deceit (as apparent in the flagrant violation of the Bratislava convention) to achieve complete surprise. Once again the use of overwhelming force minimized the possibility of the move becoming a protracted conflict. The participation of East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops (most of which played an indecisive role in the operation) was unquestionably a politically astute and expedient move to convey the image of a "united front" against the excesses of Prague.

Valenta concludes that although an invasion contingency evidently was prepared by mid-summer, the actual decision probably preceded the action by a matter of weeks. Soviet decisionmakers were divided on the issue according to their respective bureaucratic interests; members of the pro-invasion faction generally were responsible for internal Soviet affairs, and those against the invasion inevitably would have to deal with the policy's international ramifications.

Apart from the ideological challenges implicated in the Prague Spring, those supporting invasion cited an alarming rise in nationalism in Czechoslovakia, spreading to neighboring areas. This proved a particular concern to party apparachiks in the Ukraine, a region culturally similar
to Czechoslovakia, and historically susceptible to such movements. Additionally, Czechoslovakia's neighbors expressed anxiety over the issue; both the GDR's Ulbrecht and Poland's Gomulka allegedly petitioned for direct intervention. Spillover had been evidenced in worker dissent in several East German cities, and in student demonstrations in Warsaw. Particularly, in Gomulka's case, there also was a measure of personal jealousy for Dubcek's broad popular support.

Of Czechoslovakia's neighbors, only Hungary's Kadar was probably against the decision, seeing the Czech reforms as unquestionably making his own move toward revisionism harder. By all evidence, Kadar remained silent during the debate, and agreed to token support of the operation to avoid Moscow's disfavor. Kadar was engaged in bilateral negotiations with Dubcek to find a political solution at the time the final preparations for the invasion were put into motion.

The decision to invade also was supported by the Soviet KGB. During the late spring, the Dubcek regime began expelling Soviet intelligence personnel from the country. This affront to the institution, supplemented by the practical problems of collecting intelligence with limited resources no doubt galvanized the KGB position. Soviet intelligence later aided the pro-invasion movement by finding American arms caches hidden along the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) border. It escaped notice that the weapons were wrapped in Soviet-made bags [Ref. 75].
The Soviet military was divided on the issue, with perhaps a general consensus tending toward invasion. As possibly evidenced by the resignation of the Soviet Chief of Staff for Soviet Decisionmaking of the WTO, General M. I. Karakhov, a faction within the army saw the invasion of a traditionally loyal Soviet ally as detrimental to alliance cohesiveness. However, the strategic importance of the nation as a buffer for Soviet border security, made relevant to the crisis by Prague's new reluctance to station Soviet troops in-country, outweighed such reasoning. No doubt this opinion compelled Soviet General A. A. Yepishev [Ref. 76: p. 170] to announce early in the crisis a willingness to lend military assistance to Prague "to safeguard socialism".

The Soviet foreign service predicted high costs for the invasion within its sphere of responsibility. Having no Suez Crisis to detract Western attention and dilute world reaction, outrage over the invasion could be expected to be unprecedented. In particular jeopardy was the pending Soviet/American agreement on strategic delivery systems. Alexi Kosygin, a noninterventionist, attempted to limit the political damage by agreeing to a summit meeting and an October start for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the day before the operation was put into motion.

Additionally, the election of Richard Nixon, a leader then seen as ardently anti-Soviet and an advocate of "superiority", undoubtedly would be aided by the move.

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Possibly a push toward closer U.S./PRC relations would also result? Finally, the reaction among Soviet clients could be expected to have negative facets again, which could be accorded a forum at the upcoming World Communist Conference in November.

A deadline for the decision was established for 9 September, coinciding with the convening of the 14th Extraordinary Party Congress in Czechoslovakia. (Not coincidentally, WTO troops within Czechoslovakia were scheduled to end their deployment on the last day of this conference.) It was predicted that during these proceedings the purging of pro-Soviet elements in the Prague regime would be completed, and the reformist movement would legitimize its hold on the government. Legal justification for an invasion would pose a major problem thereafter.

A pro-invasion consensus in the Kremlin was reached probably in early August, impelled by three factors. First, as a result of the closure of information avenues between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, the KGB and the Czechs' pro-interventionist neighbors monopolized the Kremlin's intelligence flow. An especially dark picture of developments in Prague consequently was provided. Inflated reports of nationalism within the Ukraine also surfaced, and Warsaw and East Berlin resounded their tribulations from reformist spillover.

Secondly, the Soviet military brass was united in its opinion that a military solution could be accomplished...
quickly and effectively, with no opposition from the Czech Army. The Czech military had earned a reputation as something less than a formidable force; one Soviet commander ventured that the speed of advance will depend only on the top speed of our tanks. Lending credence to this was the removal of General V. Prchlik, a popular Czech leader who had supported resistance to a Soviet invasion. Dubcek had requested his dismissal, in part to appease anti-reformists within his government. Additionally, the product of fact-finding missions by Yepishev and Pavlovskii (the latter of whom would lead the invasion force), both avowed pro-interventionists, buttressed the notion that a massive invasion could be completed with minimal direct cost.

Thirdly, a major Soviet consideration once again was America's interests in the region. And, once again, Washington helped Moscow solve its dilemma. In July 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk inferred that American interest in SALT transcended the evolving crisis. (It should be noted that the invasion would cause a one-year delay in the talks.) Also that month, U.S. Forces in West Germany were instructed to avoid activities near the Czech border, which could be construed as supporting events in Czechoslovakia. The Soviets additionally noted that the U.S. held a degree of animosity toward Prague; Czechoslovakia was third only to the Soviet Union and the PRC in arms deliveries to North Vietnam.

Soviet caution over the American reaction would play a part in policy planning. On the day before the
invasion, Washington received a cryptic note stating: "We proceed from the fact that the current events should not harm Soviet/American relations, to the development of which the Soviet Government, as before, attaches great importance" [Ref. 77: p. 86]. Moreover, the Soviet invasion forces made obvious efforts to stay away from the FRG border, thus minimizing the chance of direct confrontation.

Reportedly, the institutionalized procedure of Soviet consensus-building had run its course by 18 August. General Secretary Brezhnev, the kingpin of the process, had adroitly detached himself from the debate until the consensus waxed toward intervention. Then he cast his lot on the winning side. Brezhnev probably was a degree disappointed in Dubcek—a figure Moscow earlier had expressed "the utmost confidence" in.

The Soviet interpretation of events published during the invasion claimed that anti-revisionist forces, with the full support of the Czech people, had overthrown the Dubcek regime and requested Soviet fraternal assistance [Ref 78: p. 82]. In an episode which would be repeated in Afghanistan, the Soviet military performed its task flawlessly while efforts to prepare political justification were bungled. Unlike Afghanistan, Moscow was fixed to its account when Dubcek and Svoboda publically stated that Prague, in fact, never requested assistance.

An attempt at ex post facto justification came five days after the invasion in an official statement in
Christened the Brezhnev Doctrine, Moscow here claimed a right to intervene within the Socialist world to save socialism. Although the doctrine of "many roads to socialism" was reaffirmed, the Kremlin identified a responsibility:

...for the fundamental interests of other Socialist countries, and of the entire working class movement which is striving for socialism. This means that each Communist Party is responsible, not only to its own people, but also to all the Socialist countries, and to the entire Communist movement. [Ref. 79: pp. 82-88]

Herein, Moscow relegated itself to the position of sole judge, jury, and enforcer in the Communist community.

In the years since the Czech invasion, Moscow has endeavored to use existing regional Communist forums, such as COMECON and the WTO, to keep members within the Soviet fold. The Soviets have skillfully utilized consensus-building tactics in creating peer pressure against maverick policies. Soviet control of such evolutions is ensured by the increasing dependence of Eastern Europe on Soviet supply of raw materials, and by the adept use of traditional prejudices in the region.\(^1\) Additionally, the development of a WTO "army of intervention" under Moscow's direction, and the presence of 30 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe have guaranteed Soviet interests there. Ironically, ideology--the perennial justification for such intervention--remains the weakest bond in the Eastern alliance.

Many Soviet policy "constants" are seen in the Czech invasion. The decision was based on the fear that the Soviet security system would be undermined, in this instance by the ideological corruption and nationalistic tendencies. Alternatives that were acceptable to Moscow had been exhausted; moreover, the value of another "show" move was not overlooked. The operation was dramatic in character, yet was carefully estimated, analyzed, and prepared. Local, regional, and international considerations were factored into the policy. The use of surprise, deception, and overwhelming numbers afforded an expeditious end to the operation.

The true significance of the episode lies perhaps in its applicability to such dictums of Soviet policy. It also presents another dimension to the attributes of Soviet periphery politics, implying that ideological, in addition to political, excesses warrant drastic measures. In its essence, the Czech invasion stands as yet another example of the limits of Soviet tolerance when national security is perceived to be endangered, and of the inexorability of Moscow's control over its security mechanism.

c. Poland 1980-81: The Limits of Soviet Risk-Taking

The lesson to be taken from the Polish episode of 1980-81 can as well be drawn from earlier crises in that nation. The special case of Poland represents a high risk and cost gamble that Moscow did not take. Its significance is compounded by the fact that Poland of 1980 comprised
perhaps a greater threat to the Soviet security system than any earlier peripheral episode.

The 1980-81 Polish crisis can be seen as the convulsion of 1,000 years of Polish/Russian animosities, and four decades of hard-eyed Soviet policy in the region. A wedge between the Polish Government and people was driven in 1948 by Warsaw's open dealing with, and espoused allegiance to, an historical enemy. Under Moscow's scrutinizing eye, the Polish regime was neither able to take effective action against the dissent, nor to introduce reforms to alleviate the formidable economic problems. The lesson of Czechoslovakia was too clear; unilateral action in either regard ultimately would bring Moscow's fraternal assistance to Warsaw's doorstep. What resulted was a Polish domestic policy well short of either solution, which (in the words of Tyrus Cobb) "lets the Polish workers yell, but won't help them out."\(^1\)

The true significance of the rise of the Solidarity Trade Union lies in the fact that it incarnated a nationwide movement; the Polish people had already united, at least in spirit, against a regime they saw as a "lackey at Moscow's beckoning". The movement historically has received a measure of support from every sector of Polish society--most importantly, from the church. Officially the Catholic church has stayed neutral on the subject, however, its identification with, and sympathy for, the plight of the

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\(^1\) Cobb interview.
the Polish people has helped galvanize the movement. Solidarity was, by proclamation, the embodiment of all grievances and aspirations of the Poles. In its short life it provided the vehicle for perhaps the first "people's uprising", pulling intellectuals in its wake, and drawing broad support from a large public base.

Government officials predicted that by its very nature, Solidarity would shortly collapse in a morass of personal bids for power and factional infighting. To Warsaw's lament, the union was an immediate and unqualified success. In its first two years of existence, membership grew to 10 million (nine times as great as the government-sponsored Polish Worker's Party) [Ref. 80: p. 37]. A May 1980 poll showed that 90 percent of all Polish workers voiced support for Solidarity, while only 32 percent expressed confidence in the PUWP [Ref. 90].

In face of massive public support for the union, the Polish regime had little choice but to deal with Solidarity. In the summer of 1980, the PUWP announced its willingness to allow Solidarity members in its ranks; Vernon Aspaturian has suggested that this evidences a policy pursuing "control

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1 As prescribed by the Solidarity congressional declaration, the union was representative of no set philosophy beyond the general welfare of the Polish people. It was a union of purely complementary interests. Understandably, it was believed that the union's charismatic leadership, as typified in Lech Walesa, was the primary bond of these disparate factions.
through assimilation." A Solidarity official was later appointed to a prestigious, though ineffectual, position in the Worker's Party. By fall, Polish First Secretary Stanislaw Kania adopted a new outlook in favor of open bargaining with the union (in an attempt to moderate its platform through negotiation), under the label of "socialist renewal". By late 1980, union leaders found everything coming their way. Boasted an organizer in Danzig, "we no longer work under the government, but with the government."

Predictably, Warsaw's new soft-line attitude appalled policymakers in Moscow. Special envoys from the Kremlin pressed Kania for a tougher stand against a situation the Soviets defined as a "massed and organized uprising" [Ref. 82: p. 39]. Using the Soviet-directed Polish secret police, Moscow meanwhile attempted to incite a confrontation with the union. On 20 May 1981, two days after Poland was given an excellent view of the "Soyuze '81" WTO exercise, a worker's rally was violently dispersed. In the ensuing riot three Solidarity members and one bystander were shot and killed. Moscow and the new Prime Minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, pushed for the imposition of martial law. Fearing a de facto rebellion, Kania balked at the request.

This episode may have proved to be the last straw for Moscow, which now viewed Kania as a weak and

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1Dr. Vernon Aspaturian, "Poland and Soviet Peripheral Interests," a lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 20 September 1984.
ineffectual leader. Soviet support for him began to be withdrawn, culminating in a 13 June Pravda article accusing him of "succumbing to counterrevolutionary pressures" [Ref. 83: pp. 108-09].

Following the "Zapad '81" wargames in September, featuring the largest naval maneuvers in the Baltic since the Second World War, Warsaw came under renewed pressure to crack down on Solidarity. Kania is said to have received a personal letter from the Kremlin, threatening to implement a "Soviet solution" to the unrest. Under the fear of Soviet invasion, Kania began half-heartedly to purge a limited number of revisionist elements in Warsaw.

Here Solidarity exhibited a lack of perception and political savvy that inevitably would spell its doom. Interpreting Kania's moves as the first step toward restoration of total government control, union leaders called for even more concessions. The same month, the Solidarity Congress adopted a radical reform program, calling for the ejection of the PUWP from Polish industry; the union demanded that the "worker's party" be taken out of the work. This "September declaration", submitting an unmistakable challenge to the regime's authority, sealed the fate of the Union and the Polish experiment in socialist renewal.

Moscow immediately began preparations to replace Kania. On 30 September, the poignantly named "Committee of National Salvation" was formed under General Jaruzelski's
leadership. Systematically the committee began to usurp the responsibilities of the Kania government. On 18 October, the coup was complete, with Jaruzelski's "election" as First Secretary of the Polish Worker's Party.

For nearly two months, all union efforts to bribe, beckon, and blackmail the Jaruzelski regime to the bargaining table were stonewalled. Finally the crisis came to a head on 13 December when, after 16 months of steadily building tensions in the region, martial law was instituted. Within a week the military government purged the Solidarity leadership, the reform element within the Communist Party itself, and other "liberalizing elements" at large in Polish society. The policy of renewal was officially at an end.

Evidence indicated that the action was not a response to any immediate provocation by Solidarity. As shown in the degree of coordination and efficiency exhibited in implementing the policy, the decision surely was made months earlier—possibly during Jaruzelski's meeting with Soviet officials just prior to his "election". Planning the action for December, the coldest month of the year, purportedly would minimize public backlash.

Furthermore, the policy clearly was the product of thorough analysis and planning. In the belief that the disparate factions in Solidarity were held together by the union's charismatic leadership, a strategy of "political decapitation" was used. Being very careful to avoid creating martyrs the government arrested and isolated Walesa and
his lieutenants while the power structure of Solidarity could be dismantled. Similarly, reform elements within the regime were quickly and quietly removed. All activities were accomplished by the highly respected Polish military, adding legitimacy to the policy. Although it is known that Soviet "advisors" were prevalent in Warsaw at the time of the crackdown, the appearance of the operation as a totally "internal" affair was carefully cultivated by Warsaw and Moscow.

In terms of immediate objectives, the policy was unquestionably a success. Nevertheless, the enormity of the task, the complete subjugation of a national movement, and the restoration of authoritarian rule could scarcely be accomplished in a week-long operation. The upper echelons of Solidarity still free went underground to form the "All Polish Resistance Committee". Throughout the winter, leaflet-passing was common in every major city, and in the spring, Radio Solidarity came into existence, instigating anti-government rallies and strikes. Still, the 13 December action proved to be fairly effective in undercutting the movement's ability to organize, and in general, to influence the policies of the regime.

It can be argued convincingly that the situation in Poland in 1980-81 presented a far greater danger to Soviet security interests than any episode since the conclusion of World War II. First, the economic crisis in Poland was far greater (with the exception of the situation in Afghanistan,
which was hardly consequential to the conduct of the Communist market). The Polish workers' revolt threatened to exacerbate an economic morass that already had dragged the entire CMEA membership into recession.¹

The Polish crisis also comprised the largest organized uprising experienced by a Soviet ally. The 10 million-member independent workers union not only boldly defied the political authority of a Soviet-installed Marxist regime, but also presented a challenge to the ideological precepts of Soviet communism. In stark contrast to the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian episodes, where change was inspired by a high stratum of the intellectual elite, the Polish crisis represented a true "revolution from below". In Poland, the Soviets faced Opposition from nationally-organized workers, consistently able to mobilize massive forces in protest of government policies. One union leader even ventured that Moscow should find more in common with the movement (ideologically speaking) than in contrast with it.

More than even Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the Polish crisis threatened to spread throughout Moscow's western dominions. In 1980, Solidarity attempted to organize independent trade unions in Czechoslovakia, with limited success, and in Hungary, where such reforms were viewed "with miad

¹In addition to a multitude of other problems, the Polish crisis required that Moscow channel funds slated for the rest of the Eastern bloc into the Polish economy. In 1980, Poland received almost 70 percent of Soviet ruble credits to Eastern Europe.
interest" [Ref. 84: p. 39]. Additionally, the Polish experience may have buttressed the defiant polities of Rumania's Ceausescu, and unquestionably triggered a harsh crackdown on workers in the GDR. The greatest reaction may have occurred in the U.S.S.R. itself. In the late 1970's, internal security forces violently suppressed attempts to form independent trade unions in the Ukraine [Ref. 85: p. 40].

Moscow's apprehension over developments in Poland was shared by Soviet allies in the region. Purportedly, East Berlin and Prague initiated requests for direct intervention in the crisis, fearing inevitable spillover. Mirroring the Czech episode, Soviet ideologues and bureaucrats concerned with internal affairs no doubt supported this position. Apparently Soviet economic planners also looked favorably on the intervention option, seeing a definitive solution to the Polish uprising as requisite to the stabilization of the Polish economy. That Soviet decisionmakers opted against such a policy is attributable to a pragmatic appraisal of the current situation in Poland and the world, and an understanding of the unique character of the Polish people.

The Soviets appear to have learned during the 1956 Polish crisis the powderkeg upon which the Polish Communist regime rests. Moscow has since shown a capacity unique among its relations in the region, to tolerate a large measure of open dissent in Poland. As seen in the 1970 and 1976 uprisings, Moscow ostensibly has limited its involvement to
proffering Warsaw "support and advice" in dealing with the crises. Additionally, according to Dr. Valenta and others, the Polish Government has been allowed an unprecedented degree of freedom in implementing reforms. In the special case of Poland, military intervention historically lies low on the menu of Soviet policy options.

Despite the critical nature of the developing situation in Poland in 1980-81, Moscow discounted the military option for three general reasons. First, a Soviet invasion was predicted to produce only negative results in the Polish economy. If resistance was encountered (as expected) it would be likely that industrial facilities would be damaged. Additionally, Polish workers openly warned that forced labor would be countered with sabotage and passive resistance. Lech Walesa allegedly commented in 1981, "the Soviets can occupy us, but they can't make us work" [Ref. 86: p. 62]. Thus in the post-invasion scenario, Moscow would assume responsibility for a Polish economy on the brink of collapse, and much worse off than if Kania's policy of appeasement had been allowed to continue. This argument found its greatest voice, incidentally, among Warsaw economists.

There also was reason to believe that the Polish military would react adversely to invasion by massive Soviet ground forces. In invariably Moscow had faced such a possibility in every Polish crisis since the end of the war. In 1956 and 1970, the Soviets heard rumors of "prepared defenses"
along the eastern border of Poland, in a region garrisoned by units of the autonomous Territorial Army. Most analysts also agree that had the Red Army crossed the border during the 1976 crisis, it would have been opposed by major Polish forces [Ref. 87: pp. 278-279]. In 1980 and 1981, the Soviet military was largely against an invasion option, speculating that a monumentous effort would be needed to overcome the quarter of a million-man Polish Army, and meet with results as seen in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

This is not to say that an invasion option was not prepared, however. The establishment of a logistics framework, perennially the first step in a military buildup, was noted within the Soviet border in early 1980. Moreover, the Soyuze '81 and Zapad '81 exercises conducted in and around Poland unquestionably were used to reconnoiter the situation and to invest the Polish defense system. It has been offered that the completion dates of these exercises constituted deadlines for invasion contingencies. The fact that Moscow initiated new efforts to pressure Warsaw immediately following both maneuvers may signify that twice the intervention option was considered, but decided against.

Finally, the Polish episode may represent a rare occasion where Washington took effective preemptive action to forestall such a policy. American interests in Poland clearly surpassed those in either Hungary or Czechoslovakia, based largely on the constituency of seven million Polish
Americans, and to a lesser extent, on America's $2 billion investment in that nation. Early in the crisis, Washington's concern in the Polish issue was made obvious. In 1980 the U.S. and its European allies met to discuss possible sanction options should Moscow decide on military intervention. During the height of the crisis, Carter spoke publically of "the most negative consequences" of such an action, and reportedly sent Brezhnev a personal message threatening to transfer advanced weaponry to Red China. Following his election, President Reagan continued to pressure Moscow, tying Soviet restraints to arms talks and economic aid to Poland [Ref. 88: p. 94].

From this universe of influences and inputs, it was determined that a policy utilizing martial law was the most appropriate and cost-effective option. The decision not to invade does not signify a Soviet concession to external pressures, but only indicates a shift to a longer-term solution using "indirect intervention--utilizing the Polish military.

Although Moscow made a conscientious effort to downplay any Soviet presence in Poland prior to and during martial law, it is likely that the Soviets were instrumental in its planning. Following Jaruzelski's election in October, all overt pressures on Warsaw (such as the menacing WTO maneuvers in the region) immediately ceased. At the same time, Poles noted the appearance of Soviet "surveillance teams" around the country, ostensibly left behind after the
spring military exercises. In November there began an influx of Soviet advisors and diplomatic staff, culminating in an unofficial visit by Marshal Victor Kulikov just prior to the imposition of martial law. Moreover, the 13 December crackdown made extensive use of the Polish secret policict—an organization created, trained, and currently directed by the Soviet KGB.

From the beginning, Moscow has demonstrated confidence in General Jaruzelski's ability to handle the crisis and aftermath. According to one analyst, the Soviets have allowed the Polish leader to "garner more power to himself than any man since Josef Stalin" [Ref. 89: p. 356]--a convincing tribute from a nation perennially fearful of "Bonapartism". It also demonstrates pragmatism at the base of Moscow's policy in Poland; exceptional cases require exceptional measures.

d. Conclusions on Soviet Periphery Politics

Before speculation can be offered on Afghanistan's role in the Soviet border security scheme it is first necessary to define Soviet periphery politics, as seen in its practical application. Looking at these three examples, an impulse is to affix Soviet border interests to a purely regional dimension: invariably, the demonstrated "extremes" of Soviet policymaking (i.e., the consideration of an invasion option) suggests that peripheral politics simply equates Moscow's outlook toward Eastern Europe. This region has
traditionally been far more central to Soviet politics and security than any other border area. It is supportable that, by virtue of its geopolitical setting alone, the area is perceived to warrant a unique approach in Soviet decision-making.

Yet a closer analysis reveals similarities that can as well be applied to Soviet policymaking elsewhere on the Soviet periphery. Specifically, the Hungarian, Czecho-slovakian, and Polish crises all represent scenarios where the Soviet security mechanism was perceived to be in jeopardy. Far from "spreading communism at the point of bayonets", these actions were essentially defensive in nature, intent on salvaging Moscow's security holdings.

The fact that such "defensive" policies have been reserved for Marxist regimes is relevant in two respects. As addressed earlier, the maintenance of a supplicant Marxist clientele has served as a means to pursue security interests, by guaranteeing a measure of direct "control-ability" and influence in the internal affairs of these nations. As seen in the Angolan and Ethiopian episodes, this operational code need not be limited to peripheral scenarios. Secondly, restricting the intervention option to scenarios within the recognized Soviet sphere of influence, as delineated by ideological alignment, ensures that American interests there are few. The recent Polish crisis (a notable exception to this rule) not coincidentally represents a case where the intervention option was decided against.
Thus Soviet periphery politics may well apply outside of Eastern Europe, however policy restrictions have forbade the active pursuit of such interests. More succinctly, Moscow places great importance on continued stability along its borders, but refrains from forcefully ensuring this unless an ideo-political justification is clearly present.

A graphic example of a case where Soviet vital interests were implicated, yet the intervention option apparently was not seriously considered is seen in revolutionary Iran. Soviet anxiety over the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into the U.S.S.R. (population-wise the fourth largest Muslem state in the world) led to the deployment of major Soviet forces near Azerbaijan and west of the Amu Darya. U.S. intelligence sources, nevertheless, claim that the size and structure of this force did not imply an army of intervention. For example, the construction of a logistics framework suitable for supporting an invasion, which was seen early in the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Polish crises, never materialized. It has been offered that this deployment was intended as an "iron buffer", to prevent the export of the Iranian revolution to the Soviets' Islamic southern provinces.

This philosophy finds ready application in the dictums of the Russian political culture. As Dr. Robert Bathurst expounds, Soviet strategy seeks "not a force-on-force confrontation, but pursues national interests by means of
deceit and manipulation. Only when all facets of a situation are in total control, and success is certain, will the Soviets unleash the full potential of their policy apparatus."  

The principles governing Soviet peripheral politics will now be elucidated, by identifying decisionmaking patterns evidenced in these three examples. Analysis will be conducted in four general areas: the nature of the threat, Soviet operational code in decisionmaking, implementation, and justification.

(1) The Nature of the Threat. Reviewing these cases, initially there appear to be more disparities in the nature of the crises than similarities. Hungary of 1956 posed a direct political challenge to Moscow, with obvious ideological implications. The Nagy regime sought to cast off ideological and political ties with the Soviets; Soviet concessions would only encourage similar shows of disloyalty in the region. In the 1968 Czech crisis, Moscow saw the rise of nationalism and the decay of Communist fundamentalism (or rather, Moscow's interpretation of it) in a regime espousing continued allegiance. The continuing Polish episode involved a Moscow-loyal government dealing with the political and ideological challenge of a jacquerie.

The lowest common denominator in each of these cases is a perceived danger to the Soviet security system,

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through either a blatant challenge to Soviet authority or ideological corruption. In each episode there was the fear that the cohesiveness of the WTO would fail ultimately, primarily as a result of the spread of nationalism. This presents an even greater threat to Soviet internal affairs, as demonstrated by dissent within the Ukraine in 1968 and the late 1970's.

In short, the grounds for a policy of intervention appear to be based on a direct or implied threat to Soviet national security. As mentioned earlier, Moscow equates its own vital security interests with stability and controllability of its periphery. This interest, however, is tempered with practical caution, which stipulates that decisive and overt action must be confined to the accepted Soviet sphere of influence.

(2) Soviet Operational Code in Decisionmaking. Identifiable in each episode are the timeless precepts governing Soviet political conduct. It is apparent that Moscow approached each problem with an eye toward cost minimization. Central to this is the consideration given the predicted U.S. and world response to a radical Soviet policy. In the Hungarian case, the Suez Canal crisis provided a diversion and a means by which united Western opposition could be prevented. The case for intervention undoubtedly was helped when Secretary of State Dulles made clear that America would not intervene in the "recognized" Soviet sphere of influence. Similar
assurances were provided by Washington during the Czech crisis. U.S. interests here were visibly less; Washington withheld its support of the Prague Spring largely because "Czech arms are today killing Americans in Southeast Asia" [Ref. 90]. In contrast, the U.S. has consistently declared its interest in, and concern for, events in Poland, and Washington has succeeded in maintaining world focus on the region. Dr. Valenta [Ref. 91] identifies a veiled "American victory" in the Polish episode, attributing continuing Soviet restraint to such American efforts.

Attributes of risk avoidance and caution also are visible. Despite the dramatic nature of Soviet intervention solutions, the decision to invade was addressed with the utmost care, taking into account a spectrum of inputs and implications. In the Hungarian and Czech episodes, it can be argued that direct intervention was a final alternative after political solutions had been exhausted. Accordingly, Poland represents a scenario where the costs and risks were perceived to be high; the Soviet objective of regaining stability was achieved by less decisive, more long-term means. An image of caution in Soviet policymaking is supported by the fact that the invasion decision routinely has been delayed until the last possible moment, allegedly preceding the invasion by three weeks in Hungary's case, and three days in the case of Czechoslovakia.

(3) Implementation. Consistent with attributes of caution and attentiveness in Soviet policymaking, the
Hungarian and Czech invasions were bold, but extremely safe operations. The Soviets were thoroughly familiar with both nations' geography (Moscow has offered the use of Soviet surveying teams to almost every Soviet ally), and both national armies. Abundant in-country personnel provided near real-time intelligence, and also carried out covert missions in preparation for the invasion. Deceit also was a favored tool; both invasion episodes witnessed the flagrant violation of recently signed military accords to achieve surprise and prevent organized resistance.

The invasion operation itself left nothing to chance. Soviet and allied forces were used in numbers that guaranteed an expeditious victory. In 1956, the Red Army outnumbered operational Hungarian forces eight to one; in Czechoslovakia, the WTO advantage exceeded nine to one. The size and speed of operations were not only intended as a "show move" but also to ensure that the initiative remained short-term. Conforming to operational principles prescribing cost and risk minimization, a quick and successful invasion stymied Western backlash, and lessened the chance of intervention by a third party.

(4) Justification. The so-called Brezhnev Doctrine has been portrayed as a carte blanche for Soviet intervention within the Socialist world. Promulgated as an ex post facto justification for the Czech invasion, this proclamation only resounded the demonstratd Soviet philosophy on intervention.
Moscow provided ideological justification for both the Hungarian and Czech invasions, identifying a self-appointed responsibility to safeguard socialism. The Soviets have, nevertheless, attempted to find legal and rational justifications, with dubious success. A prime example is the Soviet claim that intervention into Czechoslovakia resulted from urgent requests from within Prague. Hypertypically, Moscow deftly maintained this interpretation even in the face of obvious evidence to the contrary.

In general, these three episodes evidence Moscow's continued willingness to use unmitigated force in pursuit of national interests. Invariably, Soviet policymaking is restrained only by Moscow's calculation of what it can accomplish with low costs and risks.

e. Applicability of the Afghanistan Case

The conclusion that Soviet periphery politics is motivated essentially by statist security concerns brings to question the applicability of the Afghanistan case. The Soviets themselves have made obvious attempts to establish such a linkage. In 1983, Georgi Arbatov offered Moscow's interest in border stability as the preeminent reason for intervention: "Our border with Afghanistan is 2,500 kilometers long. It was a very friendly and quiet border for several decades" [Ref. 92: p. 193]. Yet if this was truly the Soviet motivation, it represents an unprecedented shift in Moscow's outlook toward the region. In the last century, Afghanistan has experienced more years of war and revolution than peace.
Moscow showed little concern when the pro-Soviet Daud was forced to resign in 1963 amid public unrest. During the turbulent latter half of the 1960's, the Soviets exhibited no alarm over the political upheavals in Kabul. Inevitably, Moscow's concern for stability on its southern border first appeared soon after the country had found its way "to a glorious Socialist future".

It can be offered that prior to the Glorious April Revolution, Moscow had no effective means to pursue stability in the region. The founding of the DRA provided the Soviets with yet another mechanism of control, analogous to Moscow's relationships within Eastern Europe. This view holds that Soviet vital interests always have been attached to Afghanistan, however, Moscow's cautious and incremental approach to such objectives forbade a bold move to subjugate a non-Communist regime. As will be addressed in the following pages, this interpretation tends to fit more evenly into the framework of modern Soviet political thought.

Analogies also can be made with other general attributes of Soviet periphery politics. First, the nature of the perceived threat in Afghanistan was similar to the basic motivation for intervention policies in Europe. Here the danger to Soviet security appeared to be the spillover of Islamic fundamentalism across the Soviet border. The Kremlin evidently perceived that the popular uprising in Afghanistan following the April 1978 coup was propelled by
events in neighboring Iran. Whereas Moscow was hamstrung in taking action against the Iranian rebellion, the Marxist regime in Afghanistan afforded a means and justification for intervention.

Soviet policymaking patterns evident in Eastern Europe are also visible in the formulation of the "Afghanistan solution". Moscow, in fact, had exhausted less drastic answers to the conflict in Afghanistan, including the export of advanced weaponry, and tripling the size of Soviet advisory staff in-country. Yet the DRA Army continued to disintegrate, and the Soviets found themselves playing an increasingly more central role in the war. As shown in the background and resume of events, a political solution also was pursued. On numerous occasions, Moscow attempted to modify the hard-line policies of Amin. With the benefit of hindsight, the intervention option appeared to be the logical, and only decisive remedy to the situation.

There were reasons for Moscow to speculate that Washington had neither the inclination nor the capacity to contest a Soviet intervention policy. Since 1960, America had shown little interest in Afghanistan. Following the Glorious April Revolution, U.S. presence there was insignificant. Moreover, America's track record in substantively opposing recent Soviet moves in Angola and Ethiopia was dismal. Finally, the Carter Administration had failed to show genuine concern over the danger signals pointing to
a Soviet invasion. Until mid-December, Washington limited overtures to discreet personal notes to the Kremlin, while attempting to rally Soviet support in the ongoing Iranian crisis. These inputs tend to add credibility to Moscow's professed confusion and outrage over Washington's harsh reaction to the invasion.

The Afghanistan invasion operation itself is amazingly similar to intervention plans used in Europe. The details of the operation allegedly were taken from an invasion contingency prepared in 1941. However, the strategy and tactics used mirrored closely the Czech operation. The utilization of in-country personnel for sabotage operations, and overwhelming force finds ready application. The operation was, in fact, another show move. Evidence exists that the invasion and occupation was planned to take no longer than six months; the move reportedly was intended to "shock the rebels into submission...by virtue of the sheer magnitude of the operation."¹ It is relevant to note that General Pavlovskii, planner of the Czech intervention, had a major input in preparations for the Afghanistan action.

The use of deception in the Afghanistan operation also is comparable to efforts made prior to actions in Eastern Europe. As illustrated earlier, Moscow maintained cordial relations with the Amin government until the day of the invasion. In dark irony, Soviet-staged celebrations commemorating "the fraternal ties with the DRA" were used to begin the coup.

¹Matlock interview.
Soviet justification for the act paralleled the interpretation initially attempted in Czechoslovakia. This time, however, Moscow entrusted the "internal coup" only to an elite Soviet death squad. The overthrow of a legitimate Marxist government by the Soviets occasionally is identified as a foreboding precedent, heralding an era in which Moscow will endeavor to make political opportunities. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the action probably was a last-minute amendment to the intervention plans. The mission of Lieutenant General Paputin conceivably sought to obtain Amin's invitation to invade. Amin's refusal necessitated his removal, and an account crediting "revolutionary forces" with the coup and assistance request was constructed. The initial confusion within the Soviet media concerning these events supports the notion that the overthrow was a late addition to the operation. In view of the failure of local forces in carrying out a coup in Prague, it is understandable that the Kremlin should assign its own assets to such a mission.

Herein lies the true significance of the Afghanistan invasion in the contest of periphery politics. The scenario presented a rare opportunity in which the Soviets could control all facets of the event. Evidenced in the Afghanistan episode is not a shift in Soviet policy outlook, but a glimpse of what Moscow can, and will, do in pursuit of security interests—if the chance presents itself.
The following discussion will review the attributes of historical Soviet policy in the Third World, and in the U.S.S.R.'s periphery. Conclusions will be reached as to the applicability of the Afghanistan case to each of these areas of Soviet decisionmaking. The product of this analysis will speculate on the significance and implications of Moscow's decision to implement its Afghanistan solution.

C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS/PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

1. Comparative Patterns in Soviet Decisionmaking

A necessary first step in appraising Afghanistan's role in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, the attributes of Moscow's Third World and periphery policies will be compared. First addressed will be the universe of similarities between these approaches. Apparent in both studies is a continuity in Soviet behavior evidencing, perhaps, a fundamental operational code governing the Kremlin's policymaking. Invariably these general inclinations and prejudices reflect not only the ideological modus operandi bequeathed by Lenin, but find roots in the timeless tenets of the Russian political culture.¹

The Soviet decisionmaking process has in practice adhered to the three interrelated "c's" of Moscow's political philosophy: caution, calculation, and control. Despite an

¹An excellent study of the Russian political culture is provided in Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976).
apparent Soviet willingness to implement bold intervention policies worldwide, policy formulation has exhibited care and a cold reckoning that has minimized the inherent risks and costs in such initiatives.

As seen in the conduct of both Soviet periphery and Third World policy, Moscow has tempered its pursuit of national interests abroad with requisites of caution. This is no more apparent than in the careful consideration given to American interests implicated in a given crisis situation. Moscow has identified Washington as the challenger and nemesis of Soviet ambitions, and has gone to great lengths to ensure that America's will and ability to contest Soviet moves are minimized.

U.S. reaction historically has been the critical input to intervention decisions. As seen in the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Angolan, and Ethiopian episodes, Washington's public assurances of American restraint have coincided closely with the initiation of Soviet intervention policies. The Polish crisis of 1980-81, a single case where the U.S. articulated its interests and concern over developments, and where warnings were issued early in the episode, not coincidentally saw the implementation of a Soviet policy short of a "definitive" solution.

1It can be argued that Washington first officially commented on the Angolan crisis three weeks after the Cuban airlift had commenced. However, at that time Cuban force size numbered no more than two battalions; the body of the invasion did not arrive until after the U.S. announcement. In Ethiopia the major airlift/sealift effort waited until after U.S. assurances.
An obvious lesson here cites a necessity to assert actively American interests in all global crises, even when a high risk of direct Soviet/American confrontation is present. The Angolan and Ethiopian episodes show that Moscow is adept at playing on American fears of a superpower conflict. As in the Angolan crisis, where the Soviets expressed concern over a Soviet/American "crisis where U.S. interests are not involved" [Ref. 93], a U.S. commitment not to intervene has often been obtained.

Soviet foreign policy accordingly has been the product of careful calculation, taking into account local, regional, and international factors to minimize the costs and risks of a Soviet solution. A most relevant testimony to this is the general success of Soviet intervention policies, especially in isolating foreign interests from the crises. The only shortfalls have come from miscalculating local factors, where a patented "Hungarian solution" has satisfied the immediate objective of buttressing the local client regime, but has failed to achieve the long-term goal of stability. In particular, this points out Moscow's inability to deal with popular-based insurgency movements in client states. Ready examples are seen in the continuing conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Another facet of Soviet policymaking pervading caution is the requirement that an intervention policy be consumately controllable. This prescribes first the isolation of outside
influences from the local crisis. When possible, this is accomplished by exploiting events outside the immediate area of concern, such as Moscow's use of the Suez crisis in the Hungarian episode, and the Iranian crisis in the Afghanistan case. The intervention operation itself also is planned to ensure that the Soviet initiative is not relinquished by utilizing massive forces in a surprise blitzkrieg-type operation. A short-term action consequently minimizes the possibility of third-party intervention, and of the conflict escalating out of Moscow's total control.

The fundamental objectives of Soviet interventions in the Third World and periphery also have been similar. In all cases, the operation can be portrayed as essentially a defensive action, attempting to salvage Soviet holdings and interests in the area. Soviet long-term objectives notwithstanding, these policies do not imply an obtrusive expansion of Soviet interests worldwide. As seen in the rise of the MPLA in Angola, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, and the evolution of communism in repatriated Eastern Europe, Moscow has used the establishment of a client status as justification for intervention. This has been facilitated by the ideological alignment of the client state, which Moscow has interpreted as sufficient grounds to warrant the gamut of Soviet policy options. It can be argued that the decision to implement a military solution historically has been a last resort, when the use of direct force appeared
to be the only way to save a client regime and protect Soviet interests there.

Finally, in evidence is a strategic and tactical model for Soviet intervention policies. In every invasion scenario, Soviets, or Soviet proxies, have repeated a process of early logistics buildup, then the introduction of elite mission-oriented units, followed by massive invasion by heavily armed forces. Invariably, each operation in the Third World and the periphery appear derivatives of a basic strategy, tailored to the unique local and international situation. The reliance on a basic plan of action is commonly attributed to the limited spectrum of Soviet power projection assets; Moscow lacks the ability to respond to a danger short of full-scale military commitment.\(^1\) However, also apparent is the often-written inflexibility of Soviet military doctrine, counting on a tried-and-true means of forceful intervention. As seen today in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan,\(^2\) this has not always proven to be the definitive answer.

\(^1\) It also can be submitted that Moscow places great value on a massive show-of-force that small-scale surgical operations will not provide, but it is evident that in every Soviet military initiative to date, the Red Army was geared for an European-style conflict, reminiscent of the Great Patriotic War.

\(^2\) Since the summer of 1980, the Soviets have made several admirable attempts at small-scale, combined forces counter-insurgency operations. However, according to a U.S. military intelligence source, the dubious success of such operations (apparently due to lack of experience) has prompted a shift back to more armor-intensive tactics.
The significance of the Afghanistan episode rests in the difference between the Soviet approaches to the Third World and the periphery. This inevitably settles into a question of national priorities. Although the Soviets have demonstrated a common strategy in their intervention policies, the willingness to use this solution ultimately has been a function of the proximity of each case to Soviet vital interests. The debate over whether Afghanistan is looked upon as a Third World, or a peripheral interest, now becomes expedient. The identification of "vital" Soviet concerns in the Afghanistan episode (a connection the Soviets have long endeavored to make) would imply less of a precedent in the invasion, and less of an immediate threat to the West.

As discussed earlier, Helmut Sonnenfeldt [Ref. 94: pp. 1-2] concludes that Soviet border security is a primal, constant national interest, while Moscow's pursuit of interests in the Third World largely have been subordinated. Invariably, Moscow has only to fear costs of international prestige and credibility as a result of the loss of a Third World client (although this is demonstrably a weighty Soviet concern). In Eastern Europe, Moscow additionally faces a formidable challenge to its internal security and its external security system.

The limited number of intervention cases provides little proof of such prioritizing in Soviet policymaking. However, offered as an indication is Moscow's common use
of policy "tests" prior to the implementation of a military solution. Nearly every Soviet initiative in the Third World has been preceded by this tactic. As evidenced in Egypt in 1970, Angola in 1977, and Ethiopia in 1978, this usually takes the form of a small combat contingent, arriving as much as six months prior to the intervention operation. If no substantive U.S. or world reaction is encountered, the force is augmented to support the invasion. At some point thereafter, the test phase ends, and the policy becomes irreversible.

It is relevant to note that Moscow has reserved use of this tactic for Third World operations, yet no such action can be discerned in the Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, or Polish episodes. Although world reaction is obviously a major concern, and in-country personnel have filled the same military mission as the "test" contingent, this apparent "testing of the waters" for invasion has not materialized. The absence of a perceived need to fathom outside reaction conceivably supports Dr. Valenta's observation [Ref. 95: p. 98] that "Soviet interests [in the periphery] are largely nonnegotiable."

Additionally, Hosmer cites the Soviet use of Cuban forces in the Third World as evidence of the secondary importance affixed to such initiatives. The obvious tailoring of the intervention model in deference to predicted U.S. and world reaction constitutes, in the words of Hosmer, a mere "change of cast". Cuban troops, supplemented as needed by
Soviet assets, were deemed the least obtrusive solution that would achieve policy goals.

No such compromise is evident in the implementation of intervention policies on the periphery. Disregarding the transparent effort at showing a united front in the Czech episode, which intended only to demonstrate that it was a WTO action and not a singularly Soviet solution, Moscow has entrusted its border security interests to the Red Army alone.

The median between Soviet Third World and peripheral policies is thus determined by the boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence. Paraphrasing what Raymond Aron has called the "unwritten law of the atomic age", Moscow will pursue its own interests, by its own means, in the universally recognized area of Soviet dominance [Ref. 96: p. 77]. The question then follows as to the applicability of the 1979 Afghanistan case to this principle.

2. The Significance of Afghanistan in Soviet Policymaking

The true significance of the decision to invade Afghanistan draws from the conclusions of both Hosmer and Sonnenfeldt. It is undeniable that Moscow historically has shown little interest in implicating itself with Kabul beyond the context of Soviet Third World relations. The fact that no special relationship existed, or more precisely that Moscow failed actively to pursue vital interests in Kabul resulting from Afghanistan's peripheral location, has little bearing on the region's importance in Soviet policymaking. Equating inaction with disinterest is an error.
The Hosmer observation does not contest the general view that Afghanistan was, in fact, a proximity issue, but serves to illustrate a major principle governing Soviet periphery politics. Moscow identifies vital national interests in all its border areas, for obvious internal security reasons. Soviet initiatives in pursuit of these interests are, nonetheless, limited to a finite number of scenarios, each of which presents a politico-ideological justification for intervention. Such pretext historically has been a necessary precondition, even when vital security interests are involved.

More specifically, the founding of a Marxist client regime in Kabul, and the subsequent signing of the Soviet/Afghan friendship treaty, provided Moscow with a means now to guarantee Soviet interests there. Moreover, action could be taken against a formidable threat to Soviet internal security in the form of Islamic nationalism. In comparing once again the Afghan and Iranian crises, the nature of the threat was essentially the same (although some will argue that Iran offered more of a danger as an exporter of revolution). In the Iranian scenario, which involved no Marxist alliance and hence no pretext for invasion, Moscow simmered, but did not boil. In Afghanistan, a decisive and radical solution was implemented with little apparent hesitancy.

Soviet caution in decisionmaking when justification is not present is evident in Moscow's limited participation
in the Glorious April Revolution. The episode exemplifies Soviet reluctance to pursue overtly Moscow's interests, vital or not, in non-Communist nations. A clear precedent for such an action has yet to be established. Axiomatic of Soviet political style in general, Moscow traditionally has remained a distant accomplice to Communist bids for power within the non-Communist world, but has resolutely staked a large claim on any nation that ventures into the Soviet camp. And as Tyrus Cobb observes, "the gate into the Soviet camp has proven one-way."¹

Soviet restraint is invariably tied to the perceived interests and predicted response of the U.S. and the world. As Hosmer has suggested, the steady growth of Soviet power projection capabilities in the face of waning American resolve to challenge Soviet moves may engender a less restricted operational code. As will be discussed, the Afghanistan case may find applicability here.

The conclusion that Moscow's decision to invade Afghanistan was primarily a defensive action by design (i.e., to save its prestige and its regional interests) does not dismiss the offensive implications of the move. Predictably, and undoubtedly bearing a measure of truth, the Soviets have steadfastly discounted the strategic potential of their position in Afghanistan, while citing vital security interests for the move. As Arbatov has offered:

¹Cobb interview.
Both the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean are already close to the Soviet Union. And had we planned to get closer, we would have never chosen Afghanistan, with its very difficult terrain, as a springboard. As an American friend of mine put it, it would be like California attacking Oregon through Nevada...The push toward warm water seas...would invite World War III. Contrary to American propaganda, nobody is going to see Soviet tanks or soldiers on the shores of the Persian Gulf or other warm seas [Ref. 97: p. 193].

American strategists agree that it makes little military sense to choose Afghanistan, over perhaps Iran, to gain a strategic advantage in the region. Moreover, at current 40th Army Force levels, which provide little more than the protection of vital lines of communication between the U.S.S.R. and the DRA, Moscow is ill-prepared to exploit such an advantage. Yet, Soviet political "style" must be considered here. Although the Red Army presently fills a limited, defensive mission, Moscow surely recognizes the future opportunities proffered by its presence in Afghanistan.

Additionally, as offered by Matlock, Afghanistan may have appeared a safe, controllable opportunity to expand south. A similar venture into Iran obviously would involve enormously greater risks and costs.

In short, the fundamental consideration in the decision to invade Afghanistan probably was defensive, to regain stability on the Afghan border, and to salvage a Marxist client. However, the strategic value of the Soviet presence there is appreciated, and may in some future scenario find Moscow attempting to exploit this advantage. In the least,
the Soviets will (in the words of Cobb) "apply direct pressure on Pakistan and Iran, and achieve an unprecedented measure of influence in South Asia and the Persian Gulf region." According to Cobb and others, the extent to which the Soviets will pursue this advantage is a function of America's willingness to assert its own interests in the region. This thesis will be addressed more fully.

3. Implications for Future Soviet Initiatives

Studies of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan commonly cite four general precedents implicated in Moscow's decision to intervene. First is the fact that the Kremlin chose to implement a direct military option in a nation that only 20 months earlier had professed, somewhat legitimately, political nonalignment. Moreover, a solution normally reserved for the universally recognized Soviet sphere of influence was chosen for a region where Soviet hegemony is historically unprecedented, and world interests are, in the least, vague. Accordingly, a new, bolder Soviet policy outlook is identified.

Such a conclusion must, nevertheless, be tempered with two points. Soviet peripheral interests are basic and timeless; the fact that the Soviet/Afghan treaty was only a year old offers no precedent in Soviet policymaking. Inevitably, the Hungarian invasion came within a year of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty. Additionally, Moscow has shown itself willing to pursue secondary interests outside its

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1Cobb interview.
recognized areas of control, in Angola and Ethiopia. Once again the common denominator apparently is not so much the accepted Soviet sphere of influence (although this has demonstrably determined the Soviet means to pursue interests) as an evaluation that, at the time, the U.S. has not the ability or the desire to contest the move. Intervention is a viable option wherever America allows it to be.

A second precedent focuses on the fact that Moscow planned and executed the overthrow of an allied Marxist regime, and the intervention of major Soviet forces without genuine justification. Both points bear truth, however their significance is questionable. Amin's overthrow is unique only in the violent means by which it was carried out. Moscow saw fit to intervene in client regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the coup appears a secondary option in attempting to gain legal justification for Soviet intervention. The fact that the invasion was carried out without this justification is attributable to a miscue in operations, where the puppet Karmal regime was established and intervention requested ten hours after Soviet units crossed the border.

Thirdly, sources have attached significance to the policy in that it prescribed "the commitment of major Soviet forces to a prolonged conflict...the first such action since World War II." ¹ Again this can be attributed to miscalculation in Soviet policymaking. The Afghanistan solution is,

¹Pipes interview.
in fact, typical of Soviet intervention policies (especially comparable to other peripheral actions) that in this case proved vastly inadequate to the tasks assigned. This point will be discussed at length later.

Finally, Hosmer places importance on the fact that Moscow has abandoned its inclination to maintain a low profile in its initiatives abroad. Although this view must be provisioned by the unplanned circumstances of the policy noted above, the identification of a new Soviet willingness to use military power is both valid and relevant to the Afghanistan case. The recent growth in Soviet power projection potential has allowed Moscow to consider an intervention option more seriously in its global policymaking. Recent Soviet initiatives in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan have made extensive use of this new capability. Undeniable is the fact that the potential for a new era of Soviet military diplomacy is present.

In summary, the immediate political implications of the decision to invade Afghanistan do not bespeak a significant precedent. The purpose of the invasion was tied to internal security concerns, and the policy itself can be paralleled with similar interventions along the periphery. However, the fact that the invasion was the third Soviet military initiative in a period of three years must not be overlooked.

Admittedly this brief period of militarism coincided the nadir of American resolve to contest Soviet global
ambitions, and the U.S. today stands as more of a threat to Soviet machinations. The Afghanistan episode provides a glimpse of Soviet ambitions and uninhibited political conduct, in the absence of an American challenge. The correlation of forces equation, factoring Soviet and American will and capabilities, will provide a major input into when a future "Afghanistan solution" will be decided upon.

Focusing on the decision to invade Afghanistan, a projection of future Soviet policy initiatives predicts that Moscow will view intervention as a more viable option. Soviet policymaking will, nevertheless, adhere to a philosophy of caution, shunning a direct Soviet/American confrontation. Future sections of this thesis will address how developments since the Afghanistan invasion (both local and international) have affected this prediction.
III. POLICY OUTCOME

From today's perspective, the decision to invade Afghanistan appears a classic case of miscalculation in Moscow's decisionmaking, attributable, perhaps, to a measure of Soviet overconfidence engendered by the general success of earlier such policies. Here the intervention solution has proven both inadequate and inappropriate to the intended task. The situation has been complicated further by international pressures and the professed irreversibility of the policy, which have precluded the implementation of a more definitive answer. As Richard Pipes stated, the Soviets have "fallen into a tiger pit of their own making."¹

If the invasion decision represents the culmination of a trend toward "Red Army diplomacy", the policy outcome may serve to arrest, or perhaps even reverse this tendency. This final part of the study attempts to ascertain what lessons the Soviets can take from the Afghanistan case, and how this may reflect on future Soviet decisionmaking.

First the nature of the current Soviet dilemma in Afghanistan will be reviewed, followed by an analysis of the costs of the policy, both local and international, tangible and intangible. The conclusion will speculate on the impact of the Afghanistan episode on the principles of, and trends in, Soviet policymaking.

¹Pipes interview.
A. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN SOLUTION

1. Events in Post-Invasion Afghanistan

During the first month of Soviet occupation, the unexpected level of Western outrage was counterposed by the overwhelming success of the initial military operation. Although sporadic guerrilla attacks were reported in the northeastern provinces, Afghanistan as a whole was in quiet shock. A tribute to the efficiency and decisiveness of the operation, the invasion plan was complete in eight days, with the 40th Red Army sustaining less than 50 casualties.¹

The feeling of confidence was apparent in the Soviet press. Within a week after the invasion, reports from Kabul doubled in size and frequency. In response to Western reports of fighting in the capital, Pravda (no doubt truthfully) proclaimed that the streets of Kabul were peaceful, and life was returning to normal. The apparent acceptance of the new regime by the people was noted in Moscow's Islamic News Service, broadcast throughout South Asia and the Middle East. The problem of contradictory Western reporting was solved by the expulsion of all foreign news correspondents, "under orders of the Afghan people's government", on 3 and 18 January [Ref. 98: p. A-8].

¹Casualty estimates have ranged from the 3,000 claimed by rebel sources to the "several dozen" speculated by a French correspondent. It appears the invasion army suffered few, if any casualties in operations to the north, however forces involved in the Kabul coup are known to have suffered some killed. The figure of 50, submitted by American correspondent Gary Bennet, has been quoted by several authors as "credible".
With the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal evidently secure, Moscow began steps to gain international acceptance of the new Afghan leadership. First, beginning on 3 January, the presence of Soviet troops in the streets of Kabul was significantly reduced, while DRA units reassumed peacekeeping duties in the capital. Concurrently, the Soviet press began a reporting campaign stressing the "operationally limited role" of the 40th Army. The obvious intention was to promote an image of stability in the nation and the government, and to bolster Soviet claims that, in the words of Viktor Glazunov [Ref. 99], "the event was a purely internal affair... with the Soviet Union providing limited amounts of aid and support."

A second step was taken at a Soviet-organized press conference on 12 January, in which selected Western journalists were introduced to Karmal. Later a French reporter humorously recounted how uniformed Soviet personnel could be seen dodging and hiding from the foreign media throughout the royal palace.

During January, the Soviet press received its greatest challenge from political, rather than military developments. By early February, over 400,000 refugees had fled across the Afghan border into Pakistan and China [Ref. 100: p. A-12]. Deprived of in-country sources, the international media provided extensive coverage of the Afghan plight, complete with graphic refugee accounts of Soviet operations and atrocities.
Moscow initially denied reports of the magnitude of the emigration, conceivably out of genuine disbelief. When the dimensions of the problem were verified, the Soviet press chose to ignore the issue rather than admit a setback in the "Afghan Socialist program". At the same time, Soviet armored columns were dispatched to the Pakistani border to stem the exodus. Although such forces remain to date, the tactic has proven totally ineffective.\(^1\)

Soviet problems compounded in the first week of February with a perceptible rise in rebel resistance. By the 11th, two towns in Budakahan Province garrisoned by DRA troops were overrun, and the regional capital of Fauzabad came under siege. Four days later, under the cover of a heavy snowfall, the Mujahadeen cut 30 miles of the only major highway between the capital and the city of Jalalabad.

Characteristically, the Soviet media was first silent to these developments until the situation, and the official interpretation were clarified. The first reference to a new military challenge came in a 17 February domestic broadcast, reporting that the April Revolution was now going through a period of difficulties. Counterrevolutionary marauders and riff-raff were reported to be conducting attacks primarily

\(^1\)In the summer of 1980, the Soviet press began a series of reports announcing the return of Afghan refugees, "which had been disillusioned by imperialist propaganda," in groups of 500 to 1,000. Even if such reports were true, the number returning has made little impression on the steady current of refugees leaving. By late 1983, refugees in Pakistan and China totalled 3.5 million.
against the peaceful citizenry; villages allegedly were burned and abominable acts committed. It was promised that DRA forces were nevertheless "making gains" against the enemy, and popular support for Kabul was on the rise. As was normal media procedure, no mention of Soviet troops was made.

The realization that the conflict in Afghanistan was far from over necessitated a new approach to the subject of insurgency. Treatment of the disjointed rebel efforts in January had been depicted as "the feeble work of mercenaries", in support of official Soviet claims that foreign intervention perpetuated the war. However, in view of this new and potent threat, a more serious portrayal was deemed in order. Periodic reporting of Mujahadeen atrocities began in March, and essentially has continued to the present. Most accounts concern attacks on the local peasantry and militia, and favorite themes include the murder of teachers, assaults on women students, and the abduction and execution of Islamic clergy-men.¹ Such reports have been almost totally devoted to the Soviet domestic and Islamic audiences.

¹Several attacks have, in fact, been verified by rebel groups, such as the attack on the Afghan field hockey team returning from the Moscow Olympics on 15 July 1980. The report of the murder of Islamic official Ulema Ahad Shah Masud on 23 November 1982 "while praying at home" is also admitted to by the rebels. Recounting the event, Pravda failed to mention that the Ulema was a leading spokesman for the puppet National Fatherland Front. See "Killing of Senior Afghan Clergyman Reported," Moscow International Service broadcast in Dari to Afghanistan, 1709 GMT, 23 November 1982.
War came to Kabul soon after the rebels' February offensive. On 21 February, a general strike was declared in the capital, and the following morning anti-Soviet rioting swept the city. Premature Western reports of tank battles in the streets were harshly (and validly) refuted by Pravda as "a fantasy". While some dissidence and protesting was indirectly acknowledged,\(^1\) it was stressed that DRA forces were in firm control of the city. The intensity of rioting increased however, and by the third day, the Kabul regime was compelled to begin massive arrests. Finally on 25 February, allegedly in response to repeated personal requests by Babrak, Soviet armor was called into the capital. Moscow would later admit to "several casualties" in the ensuing battle, however Western estimates have ranged from 300 to 3,000 Afghan civilians killed and wounded.

Moscow first informed the Soviet public and the world of the episode the next day. A short statement assured its audience that Kabul was returning to normal. Later that day a longer report was issued, listing reforms to be instituted by Kabul—notably in the area of increased religious tolerance. The contention that only "outside agents" instigated the conflict was abandoned, largely as a result of a preponderance of Western evidence to the contrary. Instead

\(^1\)For example, the first mention of unrest found merely that DRA units in Kabul were taking action against "local hooligans" on the second day of the revolt.
[It was admitted that] rebel groups were able to involve a certain confused section of the population in the adventure...the enlisted declassified elements and criminals among them [Ref. 101: p. 5].

Typically neither report mentioned the Soviets' major contribution in quelling the uprising.

The pacification of Kabul lasted less than a month. On 8 March, amid rumors of renewed strikes, Soviet armored units conducted an impressive show-of-force throughout the city. Beginning on 29 March, several minor strikes were organized, and each time Soviet tanks were called in immediately. Violence at Kabul University on 2 May, in which helicopter gunships (reportedly flown by Soviet pilots) were involved, resulting in 32 students dead and 80 wounded [Ref. 102].

In the face of such events, Moscow daily attacked Western reports of unrest as "a lie...wishful thinking", and denied a sizeable Soviet presence in the capital. The existence of a 2200-0400 curfew was likewise denied by Pravda in late March, however the next day the newspaper announced a reduction of the present Kabul curfew by one hour [Ref. 103].

The Soviets' liberal use of force in suppressing public dissent prompted rebels to initiate a terrorist campaign in downtown Kabul, which continues to date. Although infrequent reports in the Soviet media have mentioned only attacks on schools (a December 1981 article claimed that 60 percent of all schools in the city have been destroyed), Soviet soldiers and Afghan political figures apparently are primary targets. An indication of the continuing tension
in the capital was given in February 1981 when Kabul's chief of police was shot mistakenly by Soviet soldiers when it was noted that he carried a pistol.

The first major Soviet offensive since the invasion began on 3 March 1980 with operations in the Kunar Valley. Using tactics reminiscent of the late stages of World War II, massed armor columns encircled the valley in four days, leaving pockets of resistance to be eliminated by infantry attack. By the end of the month, Moscow claimed that both Kunar and Badakistan Provinces were secure.

Although the Soviet forces unquestionably carried the weight of the operation, their role was downplayed once again by Kabul and Moscow. Babrak publically supported this perception on 3 April calling the Soviet troops "reserve forces" and contending that the DRA army had accomplished the bulk of the fighting. Such treatment contributed to low morale and general discontent at all levels of the Soviet military.

Throughout April and May the victory in Kunar was repeated in Ghazni, Qondoz, and Ghowr Provinces. In late May, Moscow estimated that three-quarters of the countryside was pacified. However, Soviet strategists soon noted an alarming pattern. Having secured an area, Soviet forces would withdraw to the capital, leaving DRA garrisons behind. Within a matter of days, the Afghan troops would come under fierce organized attack, requiring the return of Soviet armor to conduct "repatriation operations". As seen in the fighting
for Jalalabad, this evolution would be repeated several times a year. For the first time in 50 years, the Red Army was introduced to large-scale guerrilla warfare.

By early June no area outside the capital could be called secure. On 8 June it was reported that Mujahadeen forces were massing only 20 miles north of Kabul, and Soviet and DRA forces braced for the expected offensive. Two days later, the 40th Army conducted a ruthless preemptive attack, reportedly destroying 50 villages around the capital and killing thousands of civilians. Typically, the Soviet media carried no reports of the fighting until its successful conclusion.

Following the June offensive, the strategic situation settled into a stalemate. The now wiser Soviet/DRA command understood that at current force levels, Communist forces could do little more than maintain control of the cities, major highways, and lines of communication back to the Soviet Union, with occasional strikes on Mujahadeen strongholds in the countryside. Rebel groups freely roamed the rural areas, and frequently organized hit-and-run operations deep within the Soviet zone of control. In spite of a major readdressal of military doctrine and mounting of large-scale counter-insurgency operations in future months, this equilibrium remains up to the present.

A revision of Soviet military doctrine was encouraged by the effectiveness of Mujahadeen guerrilla tactics, but necessitated by the political restrictions placed on
Moscow's Afghanistan policy. In line with efforts to minimize military involvement, a ceiling was established on forces committed to the conflict. By May of 1980 it became apparent that the 98,000 man force was grossly inadequate for the task at hand. The DRA army had proven wholly unreliable, and the Soviets lacked the manpower to conduct infantry sweeps throughout the countryside and also repress dissent in the cities. Additionally, the 40th Army's increasing role in the conflict and the use of outmoded and inappropriate tactics produced Soviet casualties on a level not sustained since the Second World War.1

The choice became whether to expand the Soviet role in the war (The U.S. Defense Department [Ref. 104: p. 50] has speculated that four times the manpower would be required), or to adopt less soldier-intensive tactics. In the face of worldwide condemnation of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the latter was chosen. In early July, a force of 15,000 Soviet troops, specially trained in counterinsurgency warfare, arrived in Kabul. The event coincided with the widely publicized withdrawal of a Soviet armored division from Afghanistan, a move heralded in the Soviet press as "an important step aimed at promoting a political solution... a concrete step."2

1Several sources offer that Soviet casualties in the first half-year of the war numbered 5,000-7,000, or about one-quarter of all casualties sustained to date.

2See "Afghan Peace Proposals Cannot be Ignored," Moscow domestic Service in Russian, 1930 GMT, 1 July 1980. (Continued on next page.)
By mid-July, a change in Soviet strategy became visible. Direct contact with the rebels was now minimized. Ineffective armored assaults and costly infantry sweeps were replaced with tactics stressing the use of firepower and air support. As seen in the continuing conflicts in Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet forces apparently intend to wear down the Mujahadeen's will to fight with an unrelenting policy of repression.

Soviet tactics now resembled those used by the Amin regime a year earlier, which at the time had been condemned by the Kremlin. Between 10 and 15 July, over 50 Mujahadeen villages were reported being bombed and strafed, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Napalm was also used on farming communities in outlying provinces, implementing a scorched earth policy. In an event reminiscent of the Kerala episode 15 months earlier, Soviet units surrounded and shelled the pro-rebel town of Jaldak for three days, killing most of the 700 residents.

(Cont'd) The original withdrawal announcement came on 22 June, within hours of a meeting of Western foreign ministers in Venice. The agenda at that meeting was known to include sanction proposals. Although many countries discounted the withdrawal report as being "extremely vague", no substantive measures came out of the conference. Moscow originally criticized Western optimism over the Soviet report (Carter is said to have speculated that "a political solution is now possible") however within a week, the Soviet press lauded the move "done in the name of peace". A 3 July New York Times article put an end to the speculation by reporting that only 5,000 of the promised 11,000 had actually been removed, and these forces had been replaced by larger counterinsurgency units, bringing the Soviet force level in Afghanistan to a new high.
Offensive ground tactics have been limited to small-scale operations by highly specialized combined forces, heavily supported by air and artillery. Air assault brigades also have been organized to react quickly to Mujahadeen buildups. Such operations exhibit a degree of flexibility and initiative unprecedented in Soviet military doctrine.

In spite of such efforts, the situation remains at best a stalemate, with the Mujahadeen making some modest gains. The majority of Soviet/DRA operations have attempted to protect the tenuous hold on the cities and lines of communication, with varying degrees of success. The Soviets have suffered major setbacks in efforts to neutralize the Panjashir Valley, 11 miles north of Kabul, and running along the vital Kabul-Qonduz highway. After several earlier attempts, Soviet Special Forces mounted a major offensive up the valley in June 1982. Three weeks after the commencement of the operation, Moscow announced a major victory; Soviet forces began to be withdrawn soon thereafter. On 15 August it was, nevertheless, reported that the valley was in rebel hands again, and Soviet convoys again were coming under organized attack.

To date, the Soviets have conducted seven campaigns to eliminate the Panjashir stronghold. In the most recent (August 1984), strategic bombers were used against Mujahadeen positions up the valley. However, the area remains indisputably in the hands of the bushmen.

Additionally, the Soviets have had to resort to extreme measures to maintain control of the cities. As
recently as May 1984, part of the city of Herat was captured by Mujahadeen forces; major Red Army units took two weeks to restore control. Rebel sources report that 5,000 residents were killed in the struggle. The Old Quarter of Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, has erupted in revolt on four occasions. During the last, Soviet artillery and air-strikes destroyed one-third of the city.

Perhaps most alarming, guerrilla activity has increased significantly in the capital. Rocket attacks on Soviet and DRA bases, police patrol ambushes, and the assassination of Soviet and Afghan officials are daily occurrences in and around Kabul. In the spring of 1984, the headquarters building of the KGB and Afghan intelligence personnel was destroyed by a Mujahadeen bomb. The Soviets responded to this new wave of terrorism by instituting a dusk-to-dawn curfew, and issuing shoot-on-sight orders for citizens exhibiting "suspicious conduct".

In Soviet efforts to achieve a degree of stability and control in Afghanistan, the DRA army has proven a questionable asset. Following the invasion, the Soviets directed a concerted attempt to rebuild Afghan security forces as well as the military—apparently with the expectation of passing the burden of fighting to national forces. A government "recruiting drive" in the winter of 1980 boosted the DRA army roster to over 90,000. The Soviets assisted in training the new recruits, sending almost 20,000 to camps
within the U.S.S.R. It has been reported that East German advisors have directed the development of the KHAD, the Afghan secret police.

The new Afghan Army has proved little better than its progenitor. During the winter and spring of 1980, DRA static defenses were constantly overrun by qualitatively inferior rebel bands. The Afghan Army's participation in the Soviet spring offensive consequently was limited to mop-up operations. Even in this capacity, Red Army units needed to maintain close contact; an infantry sweep by DRA forces in the Kunar Valley in May 1980 bolted in retreat upon encountering a much smaller Mujahadeen unit.

Disaffection with Kabul and the Soviets has caused desertion to be even more prevalent than during the Teraki and Amin periods. By the summer of 1981, the DRA army was reduced to 30 percent of its listed strength. During the fall of 1981 the government began forced conscription of males 16 to 42 within the cities. Unit revolts also have increased significantly. Garrisons in Jalalabad and Herat have murdered their Soviet and DRA leaders and switched sides en masse. Perhaps most distressing is the revolt within units deemed to be the elite among DRA forces. During October 1980, the Afghan 4th and 15th Armored Brigades at Puli-Charki engaged in a firefight with Soviet tanks, following a Soviet advisor's refusal to come to the aid of a beleaguered Afghan unit four miles away. After this event, the Soviets reportedly
took command of all heavy weapons units, especially antitank, antiair, and rocket forces within the DRA army [Ref. 105]. Fear of disloyalty within DRA forces may also have impelled the Soviets to shift most tactical (and all strategic) aircraft squadrons to bases across the Soviet border in December 1982.

Also coming to light is a host of problems within the Red Army itself. Soon after the invasion operation, Soviet officials became alarmed at instances of fraternization between Soviet troops and the local populace. The invasion army carried a large percentage of Central Asians, in part as a "show" move to blunt the impact of a foreign invasion. They also constituted an available manpower resource at a time when Slavic elements were unable to fill the ranks of the invasion force. By March 1980, the problem of desertion among such troops became so large that the Soviet 40th Army was transformed into a totally Slavic force within three months.¹

Discipline problems have become an increasing concern. With alcohol a limited commodity in the Moslem state, troops have resorted to the prolific drug market. The bartering of weapons for hashish has become a source of weapons supply for the Mujahadeen. Defection to Pakistan also is

¹An excellent study of this evolution, and Soviet racial policies within the 40th Army is given in S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, Soviet Central Asian Soldiers in Afghanistan, N-1634-NA (Santa Monica: Rand, 1981).
reported on the rise. A confidential source holds that deserters crossing the border have averaged 40 per month by mid-1984. The Mujahadeen have initiated a policy of amnesty for defectors which apparently has been effective in encouraging the exodus.

Finally, dissonance has appeared on the homefront. Until the spring of 1983, the Kremlin went to great lengths to keep the extent of Soviet involvement in the conflict from Soviet public notice. In the media, the 40th Army was never mentioned by name, but referred to as a "limited military contingent". Mounting casualties were handled by constructing "care units" in remote areas of south-central U.S.S.R., and by sending wounded to East European hospitals. Returning coffins were unmarked, or stamped with "Died for International Duty" (instead of the customary "Died in Defense of the Motherland").¹ Funerals were kept discreet, with infrequent mention in the press.

However, as early as 1982, signs of unrest within the U.S.S.R. became evident. Several domestic publications received a wave of letters from indignant and distressed mothers and girlfriends demanding an explanation for the rising death toll. A Soviet radio commentator denounced the occupation as "outrageous imperialism" in three broadcasts

¹Cobb interview.
before he was silenced. Red Army troops leaving for the war were reportedly denounced or entreated to desert.

In response to this trend, and possibly as a consequence of pressure from the military to receive more credit in the press for its efforts, Moscow embarked on a new tack in March 1983. Coverage given the conflict was greatly increased, and for the first time accounts of battles and casualties were given. Although reporting loyally extolls the virtues of Soviet involvement in the conflict, the tactic apparently has failed to prevent the antiwar movement from gaining strength.2

In recent years, the conflict in Afghanistan has become increasingly costly to the Soviets, however the present situation does not demand an expedient solution. Soviet forces maintain control of the major highways and urban areas, and although the tempo of operations has decreased since 1982, the 40th Army retains the ability to strike at will at Mujahadeen buildups in the country. At current Soviet force levels, the Kremlin could not hope for more.

The high costs of the war, both in human (an estimated 25,000 casualties) and economic ($3 billion, 1980-83) terms, is deemed by American policymakers as "affordable".3

1 Interview with Volodya Krasnow, Soviet defector and former director of Soviet propaganda, in Monterey, California, on 10 June 1984.

2 Ibid.

3 Cobb interview.
Immediate benefits include the opportunity to battle test weaponry, including chemical agents, and to train a cadre of combat-tested Red Army officers.

The costs are even more palatable in view of the foreboding alternatives. It is universally agreed that should Soviet troops pull out of the present conflict, the regime of Babrak Karmal certainly will fall. S. Enders Wimbush speculates that the record size of current Mujahadeen forces results from the transformation of a local civil war (one of countless such conflicts in Afghan history) to a holy war, with the intervention of Soviet ground troops. The DRA army, traditionally the key to power in Afghanistan, remains an ineffectual tool of Kabul. The withdrawal of the 40th Army would pit the DRA army against an ardent Mujahadeen force twice its size.

On 21 January 1980, an official U.S. Government release claimed that the Soviets had been using chemical warfare against insurgents since the Teraki regime. The announcement referenced refugee accounts that nerve gas had been used soon after the invasion in the northeastern provinces bordering the Soviet Union. For reference, see "U.S. Offers Report to Show Soviet Use of Chemical Weapons," New York Times, 23 March 1982, p. A-1. For months the Soviet press refused to make an official comment on the U.S. accusation. Finally on 10 April Moscow launched its own verbal attack, contending that American-made gas grenades were being supplied to the rebels. Containers allegedly captured after a 25 March rebel attack were found to be labeled "Made at Federal Laboratories, Salisbury, PA".

The Soviet press has infrequently addressed the subject in recent years. The presence of the Army Chemical Service in Afghanistan was finally acknowledged in August 1983. A journalist's report then explained to the domestic reader the military value of "smoke screens" provided by the service. See "Soviet Chemical Troops in DRA," Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 August 1983, p. 1.
There also are immense international implications. The apparently unexpected reaction to the invasion within the Communist and non-Communist world has invariably shaped the development of Moscow's Afghanistan policy. Whereas events in the region have deliniated the requirements for a Soviet victory, external forces have placed restrictions on how Moscow is to pursue its policy objectives.

2. International Ramifications and Costs

Soviet policymakers, in deciding to intervene in Afghanistan, either can be faulted with a costly miscalculation of world reaction to the event, or having embarked on the initiative willing to accept universal scorn and condemnation. Although validity can be found in both arguments, the truth no doubt lies closer to the former.

Moscow itself unabashedly has professed surprise and confusion over the level of international opposition. The Soviet press continues to resound a theme initiated in the first days of the invasion, attacking efforts of the Carter Administration to whip up a war hysteria, and trumping up events in Afghanistan far out of proportion to their true significance. American policymakers tend to believe that this rebuttal is not simply an effort to debate the significance of the event, but reflects genuine bewilderment over world reaction. Tyrus Cobb's conclusion that the invasion was the costly product of a misinterpretation of world interest in the region is widely accepted. Jack Matlock offers:
a policy created without regard for international reaction would [represent] a bold departure from a Soviet outlook emphasizing caution and calculation. It would also signify the abandonment of Soviet hopes for reinstating détente...[a policy which] Moscow was then trying to salvage.¹

It also can be argued that, although Moscow may have underestimated world response, Soviet policymakers were willing to accept a measure of reproof, and "pick up the pieces of détente later" [Ref. 106: p. 31]. The disjointed and transitory attempts at opposing Soviet policies in Angola and Ethiopia may have convinced Moscow that reaction to Afghanistan would be equally ineffective. As a Pravda commentator concluded in 1979, American-instigated sanctions, especially economic sanctions, have historically failed in their mission to coerce the Soviet Union, and soon collapsed in despair. The view that the U.S.S.R. could weather whatever opposition it encountered surely had an input into the invasion decision.

United and effective opposition to the Afghanistan solution was immediately evident, however. On 14 January 1980, less than two weeks after the invasion operation was completed, Moscow suffered its worst defeat in a United Nations General Assembly vote since the Korean War. Of 104 ballots cast on a declaration for "immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal", only 18 went against the measure. A dozen of these represented the Soviet bloc, and the remainder (Ethiopia, Angola, Afghanistan, Grenada, Mozambique, and

¹Matlock interview.
South Yemen) consisted of clients heavily dependent on Moscow's munificence. Among 18 abstentions from the vote were several nations traditionally sympathetic to Soviet interests including India, Syria, and Algeria, and the socialist-oriented countries of Rumania, Libya, Nicaragua, the Congo, Benin, Guinea, and Madagascar. The West, the Islamic world, and the Communist nations of Yugoslavia, Albania, Kampuchea, and the PRC were united in their unambiguous condemnation of the invasion.

Neither was the global backlash transitory, as Moscow had hoped, and perhaps expected. Ramifications of the Afghanistan solution invariably have dictated the course of Soviet and world politics since the invasion. The remainder of this discussion will study the implications and costs of the intervention in three major policy areas, analyzing reaction within the Islamic, Western, and world Communist communities.

a. Regional/Islamic Reaction

As earlier addressed, the Moscow press made several attempts at minimizing the backlash from within the Muslem world. Prior to the invasion, the Soviet media stressed Moscow's admiration and respect for Islam, and during the action articles recounted Soviet/DRA efforts to "ensure the continued religious freedoms...of the Afghan people" [Ref. 107]. Kabul has since created a phalanx of Soviet-loyal Afghan religious leaders who have made trips throughout Islam, in addition to attempting to pacify local dissent.
At the Islamic Conference at Islamabad on 27-29 January 1980, Moscow was informed of the unmitigated failure of such efforts. The primary topic of the meeting was the Soviet action occurring only 200 miles to the north, and although Moscow surely petitioned its clients to boycott the proceedings, only six of 42 member-states failed to attend. The Karmal regime predictably was not represented at the meeting, however several independent Mujahadeen groups sent delegates. Among traditional Soviet allies in attendance was Iraq—a nation linked to the Soviets through a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and heavily dependent on Soviet arms aid. Nevertheless, Iraq proved a major voice denouncing the Soviet move and supporting the demand for an end to Soviet involvement in the Afghan conflict.

The resulting resolution signed by all participants prescribed the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on Afghan territory. Additionally, Karmal's Afghanistan was permanently ejected from the organization, and a pledge was made by the membership to refuse to recognize the new Kabul regime.

The first Soviet move to salvage relations in the Islamic world was aimed at tempering regional opposition. This took the form of a proposed agreement between Islamabad, Teheran, and Kabul (and guaranteed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R.), which promised noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from the region would
then ensue. In view of the intense conflict then raging in the Afghan countryside, Moscow probably never intended to fulfill such an offer; the initiative no doubt intended to gain de jure recognition of the Kabul regime. For this reason, among others, Pakistan and Iran refused the Soviet proposal.

In the next meeting of the OIC in late May, pro-Soviet members were in complete attendance. These delegates made a united and very transparent attempt to focus the conference on the unresolved Palestinian crisis. (Interestingly, a Pravda article the same week claimed that America's "inflated concern" over Afghanistan intended to take pressure off of Israel over the "more pressing problem of Palestinian refugees.") Soviet-orchestrated efforts to detract attention from the Afghan crisis were aided by the failed American rescue operation in Iran a month earlier. Islamic condemnation of this episode needed no Soviet prompting. A Pravda editorial cited the action, in the epitome of cynicism, as "proof of America's disrespect and disregard for the Islamic world in general." [Ref. 109: p. 3]

Yet the conference resolution proved only moderately less vehement than its predecessor. The call for a complete Soviet withdrawal was repeated verbatim, and over $25 million was made available to Afghan resistance movements. America's Iranian operation failed to dilute the fervor over Afghanistan, but produced only a joint condemnation of
Washington and Moscow. The only notable achievement of pro-
Soviet elements was to gain conference approval for OIC
negotiations with Kabul and Moscow, to exclude participation
by Afghan Mujahadeen delegates.

The anti-Soviet consensus within the Islamic community has degraded since the summer of 1980 however, due primarily to two factors. First, the Afghan freedom fighters have proven totally incapable of forming a united political voice. As a consequence, the OIC membership has diversified aid and support among the various Mujahadeen factions. The lack of a coordinated, overall aid program, making use of pooled resources and united political support has invariably been detrimental to the rebel movement as a whole.

Additionally, the Islamic alignment over the Afghanistan issue has decayed as a result of the outbreak of the war between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. The conflict has divided loyalties within the OIC membership, as well as drawing political attention and material support from the Afghan resistance effort.

A prominent rift in the anti-Soviet coalition was seen in early January 1981, with a Pakistani offer to engage in bilateral negotiations with the PDPA. While not conceding on the recognition issue, and proposing little beyond what had been agreed upon in principle at the May 1980 OIC Conference, the event was significant as the first OIC-implicated overture to Kabul. According to Wolfgang
Berner [Ref. 110: pp. 279-280], this initiative ended all chance of joint OIC action against the Soviet policy in Afghanistan.

The disintegration of Islamic unity on the issue has since followed, propelled by interorganizational disputes over Egypt's indiscretions with Israel, the war between Iran and Iraq, and continuing confrontations in Yemen and the western Sahara. The subject of Afghanistan has surfaced at most every Islamic conference, however united opinion and action has been precluded by other national interests and concerns.

Nevertheless, Moscow faces a subliminal threat from the Islamic community, with the potential to engender major costs. Relations between Islam and the Soviets bear permanent scars. Following the Afghan invasion, Anwar Sadat ventured that the Arab world would forever see the Soviet Union in a new light. With Arab opinion generally and consistently biased against Moscow on the Afghanistan issue, the evolution of Islamic unity in the future would undoubtedly mean greater political focus on the conflict, and increased aid to the Mujahadeen.

b. The American Response

In his first press conference after the Afghanistan invasion, President Carter confided that his opinion of the Soviets had changed more in the last week than at any time earlier in his administration. Had Moscow been unsure on how to interpret Carter's professed new attitude toward
the Soviets, Washington made unmistakably clear its position in the weeks to follow. The major costs of the Afghanistan solution stemming from the American response follow:

(1) **The Suspension of SALT.** It is unlikely that Moscow failed to recognize this cost in pre-invasion calculations. The Soviets were aware that ratification of the SALT treaty within the U.S. Congress was in jeopardy. Only a month before the invasion an editorial in Novoye Vremiya lamented Washington's distressing refusal to take steps in the name of peace as would be manifested in the approval of the strategic arms agreement by the U.S. Senate. It has been suggested that Moscow was willing to accept the demise of a treaty that had little chance of becoming operational. Moreover, by forcing Washington to suspend SALT, the Soviets would be able to claim that the U.S., and not the U.S.S.R., was standing in the way of progress in the nuclear arms limitation agreements.

(2) **Scientific and Technological Exchange Sanctions.** The suspension of scientific and technical exchange programs had proven a preferred punitive measure in earlier Soviet/American confrontations. Here too, Moscow probably expected and accepted such a cost. As demonstrated in other episodes, a third party within the West could always be found to act as a middleman for the transfer of American technology. Accordingly, such sanctions were historically short-lived. Soviet espionage also could be counted on to lessen temporary inconveniences.

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(3) **The Wheat Embargo.** As in the above sanctions, Moscow undoubtedly estimated that such a measure was a possible ramification, however the chances of Washington holding firm to such a policy probably was seen as small. The embargo was announced within two days of the beginning of the U.S. Presidential campaign; among the first vital primaries were many agricultural midwestern states. The Soviets conceivably believed that Carter would not risk his reelection with a measure costly to America's economy, and of dubious effectiveness.

The embargo, nevertheless, proved much more effective than anticipated. Surprisingly, Washington maintained the policy for more than a year, until the Reagan Administration withdrew the measure in the spring of 1981. Although the Soviets ultimately found other avenues to acquire foreign wheat, the policy was reported to have had a major impact on the Soviet economy during 1980.¹ Key to this was the dismal failure of the 1980 Soviet wheat harvest.

(4) **The Olympic Boycott.** It is likely that the Soviets addressed but discounted this possibility for a number of reasons. America had traditionally claimed that the games transcended political gamesmanship; at no earlier time of peace had such a sanction been seriously considered.

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¹In "From Russia With Doves; A Final Research Report," West Point, New York, 1981. Tyrus Cobb recounts how he was beseeched to end the wheat embargo "as your allies already have done." Apparently at the time of Cobb's visit (fall of 1980), the suspension of wheat shipments was paramount in the minds of Soviet policymakers.
Moreover, such a policy in sports-minded America, in the midst of an election year, appeared to defy all reason and logic.

The effectiveness of the boycott is still open to wide debate. The action admittedly deprived Moscow of a very visual propaganda opportunity, and the American initiative served to rally massive world support and attention on the Afghanistan issue. In light of the fact that the policy was invariably a preventive measure, forestalling Moscow's efforts to reinstate itself in the world community, the absence of a more tangible measure of effectiveness is quite understandable.

(5) Encouragement of a U.S./PRC Connection. Had the Afghanistan policy gone as planned, and had a stable, pro-Soviet DRA been achieved shortly after the invasion, a Peking/Washington alignment would not have been as effective or likely. The expansion of the intervention operation into a long-term battle of attrition has afforded an opportunity for each nation to contest the Soviet policy--for the mutual benefit of both. Although the Mujahadeen aid programs of both powers apparently are autonomous, Washington and Peking have since found a new commonality of interests. Anthony Arnold [Ref. 111: p. 98] speculates that this connection may comprise the most significant long-term ramification of the invasion.

(6) The 1980 U.S. Presidential Campaign. Prior to Afghanistan, Moscow exhibited confusion and irritation over the policy vacillations of the Carter Administration,
however Washington's inactivity during the Ethiopian and Kampuchean episodes had been recognized and appreciated. The Soviets' toleration of Carter ended with the promulgation of the "Afghanistan sanctions", in early and mid-January 1980. This development was viewed by Moscow "with astonishment, and more than a little enmity."¹

Thereafter, the Soviet press assumed a vehemently anti-Carter theme, which essentially would continue until the last weeks of the campaign. Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, who initially had been viewed as a "right-wing extremist", was, nevertheless, spared the level of animosity heaped upon his opponent. Although Soviet effectiveness is very questionable,² by negation Moscow helped the election of Reagan, a candidate embodying America's distrust of, and hostility toward, Moscow in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion. In this regard, the Afghanistan solution has put Soviet influence in superpower relations at a net disadvantage; Moscow faces an American administration wary of Soviet intentions and motives.

The specific measures of the U.S. sanctions policy have, in fact, proven transient and debatably effective. The most significant results have involved more long-term implications on alignments and policy trends within

¹Cobb interview.

the world community. The United States remains watchful and wary of Soviet ambitions, and the Third World has identified a common interest with the U.S. in preventing future Soviet encroachments. The world as a whole now appraises Soviet interests and intentions with a more careful, less sympathetic eye.

c. Reaction and Consequences Within the Soviet Bloc

Although several members of the Soviet bloc had made some sizeable investments in pre-invasion Afghanistan, the Soviet intervention apparently was accomplished without direct assistance from Moscow's allies. Moreover, little substantive evidence exists as to whether Soviet allies were even informed of the planned invasion. However, if reaction within the regional presses provides a valid indication, possibly Czechoslovakia and the GDR--but no others--were privy to Moscow's intentions.

Following the invasion, Moscow found its most loyal support from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Of all Soviet allies, Czechoslovakia held the greatest stake in the Afghanistan conflict. At the time of invasion, Prague had contributed nearly 28 percent of the $1 billion Soviet bloc economic aid program provided Kabul since 1955 [Ref. 112: p. 74 and 76]. Furthermore, the Czech presence in Afghanistan was second only to that of the Soviets; allegedly, over 500 Czech workers and economic planners assisted efforts to "build socialism in Afghanistan".
Although Czechoslovakia evidently played no role in the intervention operation, Prague was the first ally to announce support for the action, only hours after Moscow informed the world of its Afghanistan policy. In general, Czech reporting on events in the region exhibited a timeliness and accuracy which suggests close complicity with Soviet news- and policy-makers.

Interestingly, Poland was second among Moscow's allies in assisting the Soviet aid program in Afghanistan. Although no Polish presence could be discerned within the region, Warsaw provided needed agricultural goods through the CMEA scheme. And like Prague, Warsaw espoused loyally the Soviet line of legal and ideological justification for the invasion.

However, unlike Czechoslovakia, the Polish media appeared quite unready for the sudden rush of events in Afghanistan. The initial invasion announcement in Poland came nearly 14 hours after the Soviet account. Polish reporting reverberated the Soviet text verbatim, following the Soviet media blindly into the pitfalls of trying to find an acceptable interpretation of the invasion. In general, the slow and uninformed nature of Polish news coverage supports the view that Warsaw was taken by surprise by the Soviet action.

Similar conclusions can be reached concerning Hungary and Bulgaria. Reports typically followed Soviet announcements by as much as a day, and could add nothing more to the Soviet accounts. The fact that neither of these nations
identified national interest (in the form of economic investments) in the region adds to the conclusion that addressal of the issue was largely lip-service paid to Moscow. In this light, a Soviet decision not to inform these allies of the impending operation is somewhat justifiable.

East Germany and Rumania present interesting cases where the Soviet line was toed, however not without visible signs of discord with Moscow over the issue. The GDR, which was third among WTO nations in economic assistance to Kabul, and which played a small part in implementing the Afghanistan policy,\(^1\) provides the most perplexing case. The East Berlin media gave all indications of being forewarned of the invasion; East Germany was behind only Czechoslovakia in announcing its steadfast support of the Soviet initiative, and reporting generally was more concise and timely than that seen in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. Throughout the episode, the Honecker government consistently voiced the spirit, if not the word of Moscow's official interpretation.

Nevertheless, surprisingly, the East Berlin press let it be known that all East Germans were not firmly behind the Soviet position. Between late January and mid-February 1980, the East German domestic service published three articles describing incidents of public outrage over

\(^1\) According to Cobb, the GDR was instrumental in training the DRA secret police. It is believed that a small GDR contingent is still present in Kabul.
the invasion. In the streets of Leipzig and Dresden, anti-Soviet leaflets were reported handed out. In the capital, a small demonstration by students and workers was noted. A sign was alleged to have been painted across a downtown wall exclaiming: "Why are the Soviets in Afghanistan? We want coal, not tanks!"

Although official accounts of these incidents could not be called sympathetic, they were plainly and uncharacteristically devoid of editorial comment. It is likely that East Berlin intended to send a subtle message to Moscow in such coverage. The Afghanistan invasion had recently necessitated a 20 percent drop in Soviet raw material supply to the GDR; the reporting of anti-Soviet activities (an obvious embarrassment to Moscow) made the Soviets well-aware of the Honecker regime's dissatisfaction over recent trade developments. The final reference to public dissent coincided within days a visit by the GDR foreign minister to the Soviet Union, supposedly at Moscow's summoning. Within a month, Soviet deliveries to the GDR were perceived to be on the rise (despite the increasing costs of the Afghan war), and a similar episode in the East German media has not been noted since.

Nicoale Ceausescu's Rumania predictably proved the least sympathetic and acquiescent to Moscow's justification and interpretation of the invasion episode. The initial Rumanian report of the event, coming nearly a day after the first Soviet announcement, contained such careful assertions as "Moscow alleges", and "according to Soviet sources".
Although Bucharest adroitly avoided reporting that could be construed as challenging the Soviet account of events, such a reluctance to accept Moscow's version was unique among regional presses.

In the summer of 1980, the Rumanian Ambassador to Morocco brought Bucharest a bold new tack in stating that "Moscow must reconsider its policy in Afghanistan" [Ref. 113]. During the next two years Ceausescu met with British and French diplomats, and publically supported the Western European view that "the continuing conflict in Afghanistan can only serve to heighten tensions between East and West" [Ref. 114]. Although Bucharest's outspoken criticism of the Afghanistan solution dropped noticeably following a series of quiet visits by Soviet emissaries, Rumania has remained a solitary voice of opposition on the issue within the WTO.

Other Soviet clients and acquaintences have been less considerate in their criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Yugoslavia labeled the invasion as a "dangerous and militaristic action", only four days after Moscow announced its decision to lend fraternal assistance. Red China called the act a blatant and unlawful attack on a sovereign nation and people. Many Soviet-leaning Third World countries joined this chorus. Of the top ten recipients of Soviet economic aid at the time of the invasion, only Karmal's Afghanistan (number six) publically supported the action.  

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\[1\]Compare Berner, p. 276, and Hosmer, p. 74 and p. 76.
Among the top 15 benefactors of Soviet military assistance, Ethiopia (number seven), Afghanistan (number eight), Angola (number twelve), and South Yemen (number fifteen) sided with Moscow, while seven others opposed the Soviet intervention. Major Soviet clients, such as India, Syria, and Libya have generally chosen to step out of the way of universal condemnation, rather than commit themselves to the beleaguered Soviet position on the issue.

In summary, Moscow suffered perhaps the worst political defeat and humiliation as a result of the Afghanistan invasion in nearly three decades. The true costs of the episode cannot be measured in terms of immediate economic or political implications. Its significance lies in what Richard Pipes calls "the shift in global perceptions of Moscow." 1 Although the action ostensibly was justified in the Soviet mind, the invasion has sensitized the world community, including Soviet friends and foes alike, to the underlying ambitions and potential of Moscow's political philosophy.

It warrants note that the magnitude of world reaction to the invasion has been enhanced considerably by the Soviets' inability to close the chapter on the Afghanistan episode. The failure of efforts to pacify the Afghan people, creditable to the sheer tenacity and determination of the Mujahadeen, has placed the Soviets in the role of oppressor. The valiant freedom fighters have earned the admiration and sympathy of the world community. The miscalculation of world

1Pipes interview.
reaction, and of the perseverance of the independent-minded Afghans, has created the political morass in which Moscow now stands.

The final analysis will speculate on Soviet political options for Moscow's Afghanistan policy, and on the most desirable course of action for American policymakers. The final conclusions will offer judgment on how developments in post-invasion Afghanistan have changed the course of Soviet policy trends.

B. CONCLUSIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICYMAKING

1. Soviet and American Options for the Afghanistan Crisis

The Soviet Union presently has several options available to extricate itself from the predicament in Afghanistan, all of which carry high risks and costs. As recently as August 1984, Moscow has denounced the idea of withdrawal; this would surely have ramifications throughout the Soviet sphere of influence. In 1983, by which time the Soviets had expended $3 billion, and had suffered 15,000 casualties in the conflict, Yuriy Andropov [Ref. 115] declared resolutely that the Soviet presence in the region would remain "until the reasons for their being there disappear." The issue has transcended the immediate political and economic interests that led to the invasion decision, and has become a matter of credibility and honor.

The Soviets know well that under the current Soviet policy, the problems in Afghanistan will never "disappear".
There is evidence that a faction within the Soviet military have pressed for a significantly greater presence in the region, "to bring the issue to a quick and violent close." The Kremlin, however, has shunned such an option. At a time when Western unity is perceived to be on the rise, and when 85 percent of the international community has spoken out against the war, the political costs of escalation could be expected to be immense. It also has been offered that increasing the size and tempo of Soviet operations may precipitate expansion of the war beyond Afghanistan's borders. Since the invasion, the Soviets have carefully handled the issue of border raids and the training of guerrillas in China and Pakistan. DRA forces have largely been tasked with maintaining border security, and preemptive air strikes into Pakistan (accomplished in aircraft with DRA markings) have been small and infrequent. The implementation of a more definitive solution to the conflict would necessitate a more serious addressal of the problem. Taking the war beyond Afghanistan's borders would directly challenge the interests of the U.S., the PRC, and the Islamic world in the region.

Additionally, a final, massive effort would produce greatly increased Soviet casualties, and would not guarantee that stability would, in fact, return. The Soviets then must address more vital internal security concerns; anti-war sentiments have been noted within the U.S.S.R. since 1982.

1 Cobb interview.
Invariably, the least costly and risky option entails a continuation of the present long-term solution. Moscow has decided to weather the storm, estimating that iron-willed Soviet resolve and overwhelming firepower superiority inevitably will wear down the Mujahadeen's will to fight. As a Soviet defector recently commented, the Soviets "intend to cling to their holdings until the Mujahadeen come in from the fields with their rifles over their heads, willing now to embrace communism." ¹

Moscow likely recognizes the absurdity of this expectation, however in view of the monumental costs of a more decisive answer to the current situation, the present policy appears affordable. Lately efforts have been made to decrease the direct costs of the war, evidencing what Matlock has called Moscow's desire to make the best of a bad situation. The operational tempo of the 40th Army slowed perceptibly during 1983, and DRA forces have been accorded a more direct (but not autonomous) role in combat. As a consequence, Soviet casualties were reported in 1983 to be the lowest since the first months of the war; DRA losses may be at a new high. ²

¹Krasnow interview.
²Bennett and other sources have noted that static defenses have been manned almost exclusively by DRA forces, while the Soviets have worked from autonomous bases well within the Soviet/DRA zone of control. DRA garrisons on the periphery of that zone have sustained heavy casualties from rebel attacks; additionally, such forces are used as fast-reaction assets for counteroffensive operations. With the decreased tempo of Soviet operations, the DRA army has sustained the majority of Communist casualties in the conflict.
Nevertheless, operations in 1984 tend to point toward yet another shift in Soviet strategy prescribing a more active role for the Red Army in the conflict.

The Soviets also have attempted to derive as many advantages as possible from the situation. Afghanistan has become a testing ground for the latest battlefield weaponry and tactics. Even more important, a cadre of combat-tested junior and middle-ranked officers have developed within the Red Army.

If America identifies its interests in forcing the Soviets out of their tolerable position in Afghanistan, the course of action is obvious. The U.S. must ensure that Moscow's Afghanistan policy becomes unaffordable, to a level where the costs of escalation and withdrawal appear more palatable. This can be accomplished by increasing American aid to the Mujahadeen, to include sorely needed weaponry such as anti-tank rockets, and surface-to-air missiles. Currently the rebels obtain 85 percent of their weapons from defectors, or through capture. Sources contend that the PRC provides almost half of all outside aid, with the U.S., Britain, and several Islamic nations contributing the rest. According to Jiri Valenta [Ref. 116: p. 12], Washington's reluctance to play a more substantive role in the conflict extends from a tacit recognition of Soviet peripheral interests. In light of recent Soviet arms deliveries in Central America, a less conciliatory outlook appears to be in order.
Concurrently the U.S. should attempt to create a diplomatic avenue for a political solution to the conflict, to make that option appear less costly than escalation. Cobb offers that Moscow has shunned the idea of negotiations in the past because the price of the conflict was deemed acceptable, and because no outside power had sufficient leverage in the region to force the issue. Accordingly, direct American aid to the Mujahadeen may engender a Soviet outlook more receptive to a political solution. Such American efforts would thus pressure Moscow into a policy decision on the Afghanistan dilemma, while providing an "escape route" to influence Soviet policymaking in the direction of American interests.

The expectations of such a policy must be tempered. Even with a Soviet military withdrawal, the return of Afghanistan to a truly nonaligned status is hardly likely. Such an evolution would present too visible a defeat for Soviet foreign policy, and the security problems which motivated the Soviet invasion would remain unsolved. The most practical goal for Washington is to achieve a "Finlandisized" status for Afghanistan. Moscow would be allowed a measure of influence in the foreign affairs of Kabul, without being accorded the opportunity to exploit strategic advantages inherent in Afghanistan's geopolitical setting.

Admittedly this policy has prominent weaknesses. Such a political solution would entail dialogue between Kabul/Moscow, and the insurgents—an event that would be unprecedented in Soviet political history. Moreover, an equitable
agreement requires that the Mujahadeen speak with a common voice. This, too, would be an historic first. Under present circumstances, such an American policy appears, at best, a long-term answer.

Yet, America has little to lose from pursuing such a course of action. In terms of purely American interests, Washington can only profit. A Soviet withdrawal would close an avenue of strategic potential in the region. Soviet escalation would foster a worldwide anti-Soviet coalition, and other unpredictable foreign policy costs—and might well not prove a decisive solution to the conflict. (Volodya Krasnow speculates that Soviet control will inevitably be achieved over "an empty, peopleless nation.")

The decision to maintain a limited Soviet presence there, despite increasing costs produced by growing American arms aid, would tie down more Soviet resources, and would provide no solution at all. America's pursuit of a diplomatic answer would promote an image of Washington as a peacemaker, and would further serve to rally international opposition to Moscow's policies. Without doubt, increased American political and material involvement in the Afghanistan conflict would promise significant Soviet costs, at a minimum risk to American interests.

2. Implications for Future Soviet Policymaking

As concluded earlier, the decision to invade Afghanistan is unexceptional in the motivation, style, and strategy

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1 Krasnow interview.
involved in the policy, yet bears significance as the culmination of a recent trend toward militarism in Soviet foreign policy. Specifically, the precedent to be identified here is not in the military solution itself, but in Moscow's new willingness to use it. Following his 1980 trip to Moscow, Tyrus Cobb came to a similar conclusion, observing that:

there is no indication that the Soviets saw [the invasion] as a 'progression of international communism behind the bayonets of the Red Army'...They argue that Moscow's Afghanistan policy is the product of constant security interests. Whereas we saw it as a military progression warranting sanctions, they perceive it in the immediate context; the Soviets do not perceive the significance of a trend toward more liberal use of military force.¹

Yet, the unsettling outcome of the Afghanistan solution has very conceivably had a major impact on Soviet policymaking patterns. The Afghanistan invasion represents a case where tried-and-true methods of pursuing security interests tried and failed. Understandably, Moscow has taken a step back to reappraise its policy outlook. What has resulted is a half-decade hiatus on Soviet intervention policies, during which Moscow has exhibited a measure of restraint and caution absent from Soviet policymaking for more than a decade. However, unlike those earlier times, Moscow today holds a formidable power projection potential capable of resuming a policy of "Red Army diplomacy" at any time.

This is a new period of Soviet restraint--inexorably linked to a rejuvenated American confidence and will to contest

¹Cobb interview.

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Soviet moves abroad. As seen in Lebanon and Grenada, the U.S. has indicated that the use of "military diplomacy" is no longer a spurned policy option, even when the risk of superpower confrontation exists. Consistent with earlier Soviet policymaking patterns, Moscow consequently has given more weight to American interest and the predicted American response in subsequent policy decisions.

Thomas Wolfe and others view recent Soviet policy trends as more than the product of an "American Stigma". The correlation of forces equation is seen as even more fundamental to Soviet policymaking, and the advantage that Moscow perceives it holds in this calculation will determine whether American interests and response remain a primal consideration. Here too, the U.S. appears to be on the right track. Coincident with Washington's new willingness to challenge Soviet initiatives, the American potential to do so is increasing. The Soviet propensity for safe and controllable ventures dictates that an overwhelming Soviet advantage precedes a possible superpower confrontation. The recent American emphasis on military potency has accordingly forestalled the chance of a Soviet/American conflict.

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1 This term is creditable to Krasnow, who offers that the Soviets have historically prejudiced policymaking with feelings of inferiority to the U.S.

2 An opposing argument holds that the increased military potential of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. only increases the chance of an accidental engagement becoming a major superpower conflict. Such a view correlates the growth of military capabilities with an increased willingness to use such assets.
It appears that Soviet policy will proceed from the Afghanistan episode on one of several paths. According to Cobb, the military option no longer will be viewed as favorable, however Moscow will continue its expansion into the Third World via less overt means. The political environment permitting the unchallenged use of force in Soviet foreign policy has changed in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion. Conceivably, Moscow will shift policy emphasis to utilize espionage, subversion, and indirect forms of intervention to pursue national interests and ambitions.

A second view predicts a period of Soviet inactivity beyond Moscow's present position in the world, during which the Soviets will consolidate the gains of the past decade. As observed by Hosmer, Soviet policy has in the past exhibited a pattern of expansion, and then consolidation: lulls in the pursuit of Soviet interests abroad can be discerned in the late 1950's and mid-1960's. It can be offered that the latest series of Soviet initiatives, culminating in the Afghanistan invasion and occupation, has depleted Moscow's policy resources. As seen in the late 1960's, a period may follow where Moscow will attempt to make its new holdings more cost-effective. Accordingly, the continuing crises in Angola, Ethiopia, and

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1 In Hosmer, pp. 30-33, the point is made that Moscow's commitments in the Middle East and Vietnam in 1967 required temporary sidetracking. A similar, though less prominent pattern is noted between 1958 and 1960.

2 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
Afghanistan must be resolved, or at least be made less costly, prior to Moscow embarking on new commitments abroad.

In the final analysis, the Afghanistan episode appears to be the apex of a Soviet trend toward militarism in exploiting international opportunities, and protecting interests—as provided by a highly favorable correlation of forces. The decay of the Soviet material and spiritual advantage, and the unexpected, continuing costs of the Afghanistan conflict, have brought this era to a close. Before the "Afghanistan solution" again becomes a primary policy option, the political and economic burden of current commitments must be lightened, and the gap between the superpowers' military potential and political resolve must widen considerably.

A fundamental lesson for us to take from the Afghanistan episode is the necessity to assert and support U.S. interests in every corner of the globe. Demonstrably, America has recognized its responsibility in the bipolar world system to prevent the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. Washington must hence consistently prove its determination to contest Soviet initiatives when and where they occur. Key to the success of such efforts is obviously a timely and accurate assessment of Soviet aspirations and capabilities.

Additionally, the Soviet use of military force must be recognized for its true significance. "Red Army diplomacy" is historically the most expedient and decisive means
to solve political problems or exploit opportunities. Moscow's withdrawal from a doctrine favorably viewing military intervention does not imply that the Soviets have abandoned, even temporarily, their global ambitions. As poignantly demonstrated in the 1981 Polish episode, Moscow is capable of less overt, more long-term solutions for the same ends. U.S. policymakers must assume that the shark has not gone away, but merely has gone deeper underwater. Perceptiveness and care are the watchwords for dealing with Soviet expansionism in the future.
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