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I

INTRODUCTION

Intent of the paper. The main purpose of this paper has been to instruct the author. The theme chosen was largely arbitrary, merely as a focus around which I could concentrate while delving into the primary materials dealing with the foreign policy and foreign relations of the People's Republic of China (PRC), in order to acquaint myself with the kinds of material available and their content, organization, and peculiarities. Secondly, by comparing these materials with non-Communist and therefore more objective (or at least less ideological) sources covering the same events, I sought to gain experience in the analysis and interpretation of Communist sources, as well as insights into the way the Chinese view the world beyond their borders.

Though arbitrarily chosen, the subject is nonetheless of considerable intrinsic interest, both intellectually and operationally. Northeast Asia is an area in which the United States has interested itself (whether justifiably or not is immaterial to the purposes of this paper) for over a century. This was at first an almost purely commercial interest, but by the second third of the twentieth century it had come to be what was conceived of as a primarily security interest. As a Pacific power we have engaged in two major wars in the area. Today we maintain large contingents of ground and air forces on the Asian continent as well as on the peripheral islands, and in the waters of the western Pacific we maintain the greatest
fleet in the history of naval operations, the United States Seventh Fleet.

Military involvement has been both cause and result of political involvement in one of the most complex international situations to be found in the world today. Northeast Asia is the center of a four-way power involvement among the three greatest industrial powers of the modern world and the most populous state in the world. It is the scene of direct confrontation between the major socialist and capitalist states, and between the two main rivals for influence among socialist states. What happens in this corner of the world can have the most serious effects imaginable upon the entire course of world history during the next half century, not excluding the possibility of bringing that history to an abrupt close.

With four powers involved there are six bilateral relationships, each of which affects and is affected by the others. The unravelling of all these relationships is a most difficult task. One cannot understand the situation completely without first understanding each of the six relationships independently. Yet one cannot understand any one relationship without some reference to the other five. I recognize this dilemma, but for the purposes of this study I have had to ignore it. I have chosen to elucidate just one of these six relationships, that between Japan and the PRC. The impingement of the other powers on this relationship will be discussed only where it can be shown to have had a direct effect, where Sino-Japanese
relations cannot be understood without bringing in the acts of a third or fourth power. I will keep such expansion of my subject to a minimum.

I have restricted still further the scope of this paper to concentrate primarily on the Chinese side of the relationship. Consideration of the Japanese side will be limited to those matters which are directly relevant to explaining Chinese behavior. Of course I can be much less rigorous about excluding this half of my theme than about excluding Soviet or American matters. Much of Chinese behavior consists of reactions to Japanese actions; still more of Chinese policy is determined by the PRC's view of what is happening in Japan and what they want to happen there. Purely Japanese matters are unavoidable in a study of this type, but time and space limitations require that the Japanese side be treated only in the most summary fashion.

I intended originally that this paper be primarily analytical, but I found that a historical description of the events did not exist. As a result I have had to write the history myself and the first half of the paper, therefore, will be a detailed narrative. Only in the second half will there be an attempt to analyze these events and seek answers to the more important questions about Sino-Japanese relations.

I have chosen the decade of the nineteen sixties as the time frame for three reasons: First, the fifties have been covered well by secondary sources and I can add little to what has been done
already. Second, this paper is in the nature of a sequel to a paper written by John F. Knowles at the Fletcher School covering the period from 1949 to 1962. Third, the decade as a whole has an integral character: it opened with the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty and is closing with what seems to be another basic decision on that treaty, its indefinite continuation. The decade has seen the birth (if not the conception) and development of the apocalyptic split between Soviet and Chinese Communism. As we shall see later, the sixties have also seen what is probably one complete major cycle in Sino-Japanese relations. Finally the decade has been a kind of entr'acte between the events of the post-war world and what will probably be a whole new act in the drama of world politics.

A word is necessary as to why I have chosen 1960 as a starting point, in view of Knowles cut-off date of 1962. Unknown to him at the time he wrote his paper, the end of 1962 was to witness an event which would represent the culmination of the events of the preceding two years in Sino-Japanese relations. 1960 and 1961 cannot be properly understood without the hindsight possible from the signing in November 1962 of the Liao-Takasaki Memorandum Trade Agreement. Consequently the history of those two years must be retold here.

One final word on the organization and content of the paper. In order to make it stand on its own, I am including a brief resume'
of the background to the period. I hope by this not only to make the body of the paper more intelligible to readers who may not be acquainted with that background, but also to highlight what I think are the continuities in Chinese policy which a restriction of the paper to the sixties alone would conceal. Where there have been significant changes, they too will stand out all the more clearly by being contrasted with what has gone before. An example of the changes is the divergence between Chinese and Soviet policies toward Japan. An example of the continuities is the consistent view of the Chinese concerning the US-Japan Security Treaty.

Comment on sources. In sheer volume the Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) has been by far the most important primary source which I have consulted. It has also been predominant in the matter of relevant substance. Other Chinese documents have been less useful. Peking Review and the several translations series on Communist China by the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), including Translations from Hung Chi and the Communist China Digest, have contained little on Sino-Japanese relations, and that little has been duplicated almost entirely in the SCMP. The Summary of China Mainland Magazines and Current Background also contained very little useful material. Radio broadcast materials compiled by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) were also largely duplicative, as far as PRC sources are concerned, of the SCMP. FBIS Reports, however, have been extremely useful for their translations from the Japanese press, and have in fact been a major source
of factual information on the events of the decade. It will be noted that these are all English language sources. The author does not have any competence in the languages of the area.

Other primary sources have been the chronology sections of several periodicals, particularly the *China Quarterly*, *Japan Quarterly*, and the *Japan Annual of International Affairs*. The *Asian Recorder* and *The New York Times* have been thoroughly searched, although with surprisingly little result as far as factual detail is concerned. Journalists today seem to have a penchant for speculation rather than for reportage. Finally, some material from the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has been found to be useful. This material was found in the form of clippings in the files of the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and not by a personal search through the newspapers themselves.

As far as secondary sources are concerned, the selection available is of very mixed quality. No book covers the subject as a whole and only a few deal with it at all except in the most summary fashion or else with regard to extremely narrow and specialized concerns. There is also a dearth of factual reportage in the scholarly journals, as well as a conspicuous lack of analyses of current events and an emphasis on speculation and prediction. Finally, most analytical or descriptive articles I did find were strong on Japanese policy toward China but weak on Chinese policy toward Japan.
The annotated bibliography at the end of the paper contains detailed comments on specific articles. It is not, of course, anything like exhaustive, but what I have left out of the bibliography is either only marginally relevant to the specific subject of the paper, or else so general and speculative as to be of little use to someone intent upon his own analysis.
II
BACKGROUND

Chinese foreign policy goals. Every discussion of Chinese foreign policy and foreign relations seems to begin with a statement of China's foreign policy goals. There are two main reasons for this. First, Americans have been ambivalent in their attitude toward China for over a century, and particularly since the last war. Having found ourselves at odds with the PRC in 1949, we have sought to understand and perhaps explain the hostility between us by asserting their aggressive intentions. Yet we have by no means convinced ourselves that they are in fact intent upon foreign adventures, and as a result every American who writes about China is constantly looking for evidence one way or the other. Preoccupation with goals is thus a function of our own uncertainty. It is also, of course, a function of what appears to be the great discrepancy between the bellicosity of China's statements and the prudence of its actions. We don't know quite what to believe.

The second reason for this preoccupation is that a general discussion of goals always sets the framework within which the student will discuss Chinese foreign policy. By setting down what he believes those goals to be, he is making a tacit statement of his own biases and theoretical framework, either intentionally or unconsciously giving the reader notice to help him evaluate what he finds in the work. The goals he chooses and the way he organizes and discusses them will reveal much about the author: whether he
is a political scientist or a historian; a Pekingologist or an Old China Hand; a believer in realpolitik or a subtle practitioner of explication de texte. With this warning, I will leave my own biases implicit in what comes next, rather than attempt to make them explicit.

I believe China's fundamental goals are largely self-evident. Defensively it aims at preserving its own security, in the sense of defending the state, its territory, and its governing regime from potential or actual foreign or domestic enemies. Offensively it aims at achieving a great power status commensurate with its national pride in its history and its great size and population. The place of Japan in this scheme is varied and multifaceted. First, as a great power in its own right, Japan is both a past invader and conqueror and a potential future one. Whether on its own, as a base for US power, or in cooperation with US power, Japan is a very real danger to Chinese security. Japan is also a potential rival for the kind of hegemony which China seeks in Asia. Whatever influence Japan is able to wield in the nations on China's periphery, China itself cannot wield. To the extent that these other Asian nations are friends, allies, or clients of Japan, thus acting as sources of Japan's power and prestige, they automatically are not available as sources of Chinese power and prestige.

Conversely, Japan is itself a source of great potential for the accomplishment China's offensive goals. Japan has much of the modern technology which China lacks and wants very badly. It would
be of immense benefit to China if Japan were to assist it, rather than compete with it. As far as status and prestige are concerned, having a great power as a client would immeasurably enhance China's own standing. It would be a great jump from a precarious equality to clear predominance.

Putting these considerations into concrete terms, it is reasonable to view China's maximum goals as something like the establishment in Japan of a government which would subordinate its own foreign and domestic policies to China's, which would look to China for guidance on its attitude toward the rest of the world and the policies it should follow within its own borders, which would most definitely not compete with China in any way but on the contrary cooperate with and assist China in every way and on China's terms. This does not necessarily mean that China wishes to conquer Japan, incorporate it within its own boundaries, or directly govern it. It does mean that China would like to have the advantages that such courses would offer, but is not anxious to face the problems that such courses would entail.

With the above as its maximum goals, what would its minimum goals be? If one puts cooperativeness and subservience on a scale with plus and minus signs, China's minimum goal must be seen to be a neutral or zero position for Japan, for as long as it cannot obtain a positive position. Thus China wants as a minimum a Japanese government which would not compete with China, which
would not ally itself with any other states against China, which
would permit Chinese relations and dealings at least on a par with
all other nations, and which if not cooperating with China vis-a-vis
the rest of the world would at least not oppose it. First and fore-
most, it would wish an end of the US-Japanese alliance and an end
to Japanese recognition of the government of the Republic of China
(ROC).

As good Leninists, the Chinese operate with both a maximum
and a minimum program constantly in mind. It is this which lends
such great continuity to its basic policies. Its tactics and individual
actions are designed to achieve the minimum program at any one
time, without prejudicing the maximum program, and if possible
making progress toward it. It is most important when discussing
Chinese foreign policy to keep both maximum and minimum programs
in mind; it makes what might otherwise seem irrational quite under-
standable,

The reader will note little reference to Communism or
Maoism in the above discussion of goals. I believe China is guided
primarily by raison d'etat in its foreign policy. Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist ideology enters in mainly as a complicating and qualifying
factor. Ideology prescribes what kind of a Japanese government
would be considered friendly. Ideology sets the framework and
provides the competing models for the guidance of the rest of Asia.
It gives a special fillip to China's dealings with various groups in
Japanese society. It has a complicating effect in terms of economic and trade relations. Finally, ideology provides the language in which Chinese policy is expressed. Ideology gives color to the ends, and often prescribes the means; it does not substitute for national interest as a goal of Chinese foreign policy.

The nineteen fifties. T. Ishikawa, a Japanese political scientist writing in 1962, was impressed by the continuity of Chinese foreign policy during the nineteen fifties. He saw mostly evidence of consistency in both goals and tactics throughout the period, although he also saw briefer sub-periods of what he spoke of as more or less flexibility or militancy in pursuing these goals. The militant periods he described as 1949 to 1952 and 1958 to 1961; the flexible periods he described as 1952 to 1957 and 1960 to the (then) present. 1

William Hinton divides the period into two sub-periods at the year 1957, although he does not characterize either sub-period by any general theme or topic. 2 M. Y. Cho, a Chinese scholar working in Germany, has used a third scheme of subdivision in an informative article in AuBenpolitik. 3 Knowles breaks up the decade into three main phases and six sub-phases. 4 All of these scholars are

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4 Knowles, p. 10 ff.
well versed in the facts of the period, yet all chose a different scheme of subdivision to describe the period. Obviously the dividing up of time in a subject as subtle as the relations between two powers is not a simple or self-executing task. All of the schemes referred to have elements of truth in them, but there can be no denying that the whole process is in some measure arbitrary. Which scheme one chooses depends upon which aspects of foreign relations one wishes to emphasize. It also depends upon the personal tastes of an author in defining the turning points in foreign relations. Should one, for example, begin an era when a new policy is first introduced, or when it has matured and is at its peak of influence on overall policy?

Arbitrary or not, some form of subdivision is necessary, in order that the author and reader may have manageable blocs of data to work with. It is an essential middle ground between the popular journalist who sees a revolution between the lines of every routine government press release, and the Olympian historians of Spenglerian or Toynbean stature who see consistencies and continuities over the course of centuries. I have chosen to follow Knowles' scheme in this chapter only because it is convenient, it is complete in its coverage of the subject, and it does not mislead the reader. It is also a scheme which shows most clearly the tie between domestic and foreign policy formation in China. Finally I intend to use a similar method of division in the main body of this paper dealing with the sixties.
As mentioned above, Knowles sees three main phases in Sino-Japanese relations during the fifties: hard from 1949 to 1954, soft from 1954 to 1957, and hard again from 1957 to the time of his study (1962). The first phase is further divided into the period of the Occupation and the period of adjusting to a newly independent Japan in alliance with the United States. The third phase is subdivided into three sub-periods: a transition from mid-1957 to mid-1958, a deep freeze from mid-1958 to mid-1960, and a transition back to more flexibility from 1960 on.

During the Occupation, China's policy closely followed that of the Soviet Union. It was aimed at minimizing US influence in Japan, defending against a recrudescence of Japanese military power, and participating in the peace settlement. It sought to prevent an alliance with the United States from superceding the Occupation relationship between the two major non-communist powers of Asia and the Pacific. China approved, as far as we can tell, of the COMINFORM resolution of January 1950 directing the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to reverse its moderate course and to go on the offensive. The anti-Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 25 February 1950 was an indication of a security and defense concentration. Another sign of the hardness of the Chinese line during

5 Unless otherwise noted, the data in this chapter hereafter are from Knowles.
this phase were the repeated mentions of the possibility of extensive war claims. These showed a marked increase during the Korean War when China, along with the Soviet Union, sought to minimize the utility of Japan as a base for United States prosecution of that war. With respect to the question of diplomatic relations between the two countries, a question constantly in the minds of politicians on both sides throughout the period, the Chinese position is clearly stated in the Common Program of the People's Consultative Conference: the PRC "was prepared to negotiate and establish diplomatic relations...with any foreign government that will sever relations with the Nationalist reactionaries and assume a friendly attitude toward the People's Republic of China."6 We will find echoes of this policy in the three political principles enunciated later in the decade.

This first half of the first phase ended with the signing of the peace treaty and the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, both of which went into effect on 28 April 1952. These two treaties signalled the end of the Occupation and also a total failure of Sino-Soviet policy towards Japan during the first sub-phase. They had failed to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States. They had failed to foment a communist controlled revolution. They had failed to play any role at all, let alone a favorable one, in the process of defining the peace settlement. (Not that this failure is evidence of any errors

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6Quoted in Szczepanik, p. 311.
or mistakes on the part of the Chinese or Soviets; the U.S. simply held all the cards). They now had to redefine their relationship to the newly independent state. They began this process by denying the validity of both treaties, and by characterizing the U.S.-Japan alliance as merely a concealed continuation of the Occupation.

The second half of the first phase was still one in which China by and large followed the Soviet lead. The Korean War was still on during this period and efforts to hamper the U.S. war effort continued. But the means used toward this end changed. China began to experiment with "people's diplomacy", that is trying to establish contact with discrete groups within Japanese society which would, for various reasons, put pressure on the Japanese government to lean more towards the PRC and away from the U.S. Unofficial contacts were tried with receptive groups in Japan, although the Yoshida government's restrictions on travel visas to China made this relatively unproductive. Japanese prisoners-of-war were released in batches. The releases were timed to show Chinese appreciation for "friendly" acts; cessation of the releases was timed to show anger at "unfriendly" acts, especially acts which could be attributed personally to Yoshida. In an effort to forestall Japanese accession to the CHINCOM agreement on trade restrictions with China proposed by the United States, the Chinese signed their first informal, unofficial, short term trade agreement with private Japanese traders on 1 June 1952. Japan welcomed the trade, but the
government acceded to the CHINCOM agreement anyway that August.
A second trade agreement, slightly expanded, was signed in late 1953. While these economic and propaganda offensives were being tested, China maintained an officially hard position: she would not deal with Japan at all unless Japan first renounced both the US and ROC treaties. Another evidence of the softness growing underneath the official hard line was China's statement in the fall of 1953 that she would have no objection to Japan maintaining a limited self-defense force.

Knowles sees this phase as a hard one on China's part. I think it clear, though, that it was really in the nature of a transition to the softer phase to follow, a transition in which the Chinese were experimenting with various tactics and techniques, seeking a formula which would enable them to exert the maximum pressure on the Japanese government. Until such a formula was found, their formal stance remained cold and correct and gave away nothing of consequence. Murthy\(^7\) actually sees 1952, while the Korean War was still going on, as the beginning of a soft "people's diplomacy" phase in Sino-Japanese relations.

Knowles' second phase runs from October 1954 to July 1957. It is characterized by a continued adherence on China's part to the line established by the Soviets, but with increasing reluctance, in-

creasingly only in *pro forma* public statements, and with increasing divergence from the Soviet line in matters of substance. On 12 October 1954 a joint Sino-Soviet statement was issued in Peking announcing the partners' readiness to discuss normalization of relations with Japan. It was not specific as to any concessions that would be demanded in return for such normalization, but the tone indicated that the Soviets were more prepared to compromise than were the Chinese. The PRC was most unhappy over the Soviets' pursuance of this policy without insisting on progress in Sino-Japanese relations as a prerequisite for improvements in Russo-Japanese relations. In 1956 the Soviet Union and Japan established diplomatic relations and the Soviet Union withdrew its veto on Japanese admission to the United Nations. In 1956 and 1957 the two countries signed official governmental trade agreements.

The Chinese moves toward a normalization of relations were slower. They were not willing to make concessions themselves or to reduce very much the concessions they were demanding of the Japanese. Chou En-lai did tease a Japanese mission in October 1954 with the possibility of a non-aggression pact between the two countries, but was careful to make no substantive promises. There were actually four tenders of negotiations during this period. On 17 August 1956, in a letter from the Chinese Consul General in Geneva to his Japanese counterpart, the PRC announced its willingness to receive an official delegation in Peking to discuss trade matters. On 4 November, via the same channel, China offered to
discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. Chou himself on 30 January 1956 published a statement that the PRC was ready to discuss diplomatic relations, and on 11 February a communique from the PRC Foreign Ministry was issued to the same effect. In none of these, however, was any softening of China's conditions for such relations proposed or offered. They were merely offers to talk.

This half-hearted, noncommittal diplomatic maneuvering was paralleled by a rapid acceleration of people's diplomacy after the Yoshida cabinet was replaced by the Hatoyama cabinet in December 1954, and the new cabinet relaxed the travel restrictions to the PRC. China used this opportunity to expand its ties to more and more groups of Japanese, in the hope of putting more pressure on the Japanese government to make concessions. The first Chinese mission to Japan since the Communists had come to power visited Japan in October 1954. People-to-people contacts were supplemented by the first fisheries agreement between the two countries on 15 April 1955, by a third trade agreement on 4 May 1955, which was twice extended on 18 May and 15 October 1956. In June 1956 the bulk of the remaining POW's were released and several war criminals still held in China were repatriated.

The last major development of this period worth noting was the switch from private contacts with pro-Chinese elements of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), presumably members of the radical Heiwa Doshikai faction, to public support in the press and on the
radio for JSP positions in both foreign and domestic matters. This process culminated on 22 April 1957 when Secretary General Asanuma Inejiro of the JSP made the first official party visit to Peking. At this meeting the PRC made some noncommittal remarks about the possibility of a collective security pact for the Pacific area, and also made its first real diplomatic concession: it offered in effect to cancel the anti-Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet Treaty if Japan would first abrogate the US Mutual Security Treaty. The Chinese attitude towards Japan at the time of this visit was a high point for this moderate phase. It is significant that such a concession should have been offered through the JSP. China was initiating a tactic, later frequently used, of trying to ensure that any favorable steps or agreements would be reached with groups who could then capitalize on their relations with China in Japanese election campaigns. (The analogy between this tactic and that of North Vietnam in releasing US prisoners-of-war through US "peace groups" is striking.)

The beginning of the third phase of Sino-Japanese relations in the fifties is put by Knowles in July 1957, coincident with the first major propaganda attack on the new Japanese Prime Minister Kishi. A transitional sub-phase to a harder line actually overlaps the preceding moderate phase, beginning with Kishi's assumption of office in February 1957. He was a man not known for pro-Chinese sentiments, and was expected to be closer to Yoshida than to Hatoyama in his policies. Nevertheless China withheld its fire until July. In
that month Kishi made one pro-Chinese move, ending the "China differential" by which the anti-Communist embargo was tougher on China than on the Soviet Union. However he accompanied this by reaffirming his support for the U.S. alliance, by visiting Taiwan and reaffirming his recognition of the Chiang Kai-shek government, and by making a tour of Southeast Asia, during which he proposed a Southeast Asia Development Bank with major Japanese financial support. This last step represented to China a public avowal of Japan's intention to compete with China for influence in the rest of Asia.

China's response to Kishi was to refuse to extend or renew the unofficial trade agreement which expired on 4 May 1957, and to launch a full scale propaganda attack in Jen Min Jih Pao on 29 July. That this was still a transitional phase, however, was shown by China's permitting trade to continue without an agreement. The next step was cancellation of scheduled trade fairs, ostensibly over the issue of Kishi's insistence on fingerprinting all visitors to Japan.

On 10 September negotiations for a new trade agreement were opened, but Chinese demands in return for an agreement were increased. It was particularly insistent upon the need for establishing at least semi-official trade missions in Japan which would have the right to fly the national flag of the PRC. It should be noted that these conditions had been posed in previous negotiations, but China had not insisted on Japan meeting them. Rather it had accepted their word toward meeting these conditions at some time in the future.
In 1957 China became adamant about meeting these conditions before an agreement was signed. The negotiations continued for seven months, with the Japanese side seeking a formula which would satisfy the Chinese without actually meeting the substance of their demands. On 5 March 1958 they finally signed an agreement even though Kishi was still maintaining reservations to the Chinese conditions and the Chinese were still refusing to accept Kishi's proposed compromise. Apparently it was hoped that some kind of compromise could be worked out in practice which would satisfy both sides.

This proved impossible however. Taipei objected strongly to the new agreement and Kishi appeased Chiang with promises that no official status would be given to any trade mission from the PRC and that no special status, including the right to fly the national flag, would be accorded to any PRC personnel. At the same time he tried to mollify the PRC by assuring it that its mission would be permitted to reside in Japan. On 13 April China reacted: it refused to be reassured and insisted on its right to fly the flag and on the official status of its mission. At the same time it repeated its earlier comments about the possibility of raising the war claims and reparations issues. It paralleled this hard tactic with a soft one: it released eight more war criminals and returned the remains of some Japanese war dead. Thus it applied pressure to Kishi and the Japanese public in the hope of defeating Kishi at the polls. The capstone of this policy was put in place on 2 May when China took advantage of an incident at Nagasaki (where some rightist Japanese toughs had torn down the
PRC flag from over the trade mission offices) to announce the cancellation of all trade agreements, including negotiations then underway for a long term agreement on the barter of coking coal for Japanese steel. At the same time it mounted a frenzied propaganda attack on Kishi as being personally responsible for these setbacks in relations. The general elections were held in Japan on 22 May 1958 and Kishi's party was retained in power. China had thus failed in its hope of getting a more cooperative government in Tokyo, yet it was by now committed to a hard line. The Nagasaki incident and the Chinese reaction to it signalled the end of the transition and the beginning of the deep freeze of phase three.

The transitional phase paralleled the growth of the radical movement in Chinese domestic policy, and the setting in of a very hard line paralleled the announcement of the Great Leap Forward and the Commune program. It can be viewed both domestically and internationally as characterized mostly by impatience. As far as Japan was concerned, the substance of China's demands were unchanged. The difference was that in 1958 China was unwilling to accept any further delay in meeting those demands. There were other elements in their policy toward Japan which reflect the radical shift: their expressed confidence in the ability of Japan's "masses" to overthrow Kishi, and their avowed expectation that the assumed shift in the post-Sputnik strategic situation would engender more Japanese cooperation. It is also possible that because of the bad harvests of 1958 China would have been hard pressed to meet export
commitments, thus using a trade cutoff to conceal its internal difficulties. If true, this would not have been the first time that Peking sought to make a virtue out of necessity.

The hard phase firmly established in 1958 was confirmed by the end of all Chinese visits to Japan and reductions in the number of Japanese visitors to China. Propaganda attacks were also increased, especially when in September 1958 Kishi announced his intention to renegotiate the U.S. treaty. Propaganda themes began to include allusions to the danger of war, capitalizing on the extreme pacifism then current in the Japanese public.

On 11 June 1958, China refused to renew the fisheries agreement which existed between the two countries' fishery associations. The refusal message also contained the first mention of the "three political principles" or conditions for normalization of relations. These principles were that Japan must cease its hostile policies, cease advocating a two-Chinas policy, and cease obstructing the normalization of relations. On 7 July Jen Min Jih Pao extended these three principles to all matters at issue between China and Japan.

Knowles, along with most other commentators, has exaggerated the depth of this freeze. In late summer 1958 an agreement was reached with friendly Japanese on maintaining cultural relations.  

Japanese visits did not drop off more than a small amount. An agreement on special trade was signed with SOHYO, the Japanese leftist trade confederation, in February 1959 designed to gain favor from the small artisans in Japan who depended upon Chinese raw materials for their work. During 1959 a fisheries agreement on emergency boat shelter was signed. 9 On 8 June 1959 another cultural relations agreement and a joint statement were signed which spoke of the friendship which existed between the two peoples. 10

At the same time, China continued its efforts at building ties with the JSP. Asanuma made a second official visit to Peking in March 1959. During this visit, the Chinese emphasized that the three political principles and their acceptance by Japan were a pre-requisite to resumption of trade relations. They insisted upon abrogation of Japan's treaties with the U.S. and the ROC, and on the inseparability of politics and economics (the separability of them being the Japanese official policy at the time). They also extracted from Asanuma his famous statement that U.S. imperialism was "the common enemy" of China and Japan. Simultaneously with all this the Chinese talked about a collective security pact among the four major Pacific powers; they adopted as their own an earlier Soviet

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9 New China News Agency (NCNA), English, Peking, 9 Nov. 1963. Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 3100, p. 47. (Hereafter all Chinese and Japanese press sources cited will be assumed to be from English language editions unless otherwise noted.)

proposal for a nuclear free zone in the Pacific. They even repeated a moderate phase statement that they would understand if Japan felt it necessary to maintain a small defensive army. Their formula for Japan, "peace, independence, and democracy" was now supplemented with a fourth slogan, "neutrality".

Thus the hardness of this phase consisted primarily in the severity of their propaganda attacks on the Kishi regime and the U.S. security treaty negotiations, and withholding trade in the hope of getting Japanese traders to oppose both Kishi and the treaty. They also sought to appeal to the Japanese masses, especially through the JSP, to foster opposition to the treaty. But they did not break off all contacts or even all trade.

This phase culminated and ended with the massive propaganda attacks during the final phase of the treaty revision discussions, and Chinese support for the mass demonstrations which accompanied the ratification of the new treaty by the Diet. Although the treaty was signed and ratified, thus representing a failure of China's foreign policy similar to the 1951 failure, China took comfort from the fact of the radicalization of some elements of Japanese society, especially youth and the JSP. They also gained satisfaction from the subsequent cancellation of Eisenhower's visit and Kishi's resignation in the summer of 1960. From this point on, the end of the radical phase in domestic policies was paralleled by a new search for better relations with Japan, a search which will be the subject of our next chapter.
Preliminary conclusions. From this brief review of the events of the fifties, what preliminary conclusions can we draw? We can list some of the major Chinese policy objectives with respect to Japan: abrogation of the treaties between Japan and the US and the ROC, and an end to both the US alliance and recognition of the Taipei government. China is anxious to prevent Japan from competing in the economic penetration of Southeast Asia and from exercising political influence there. They want to prevent any close ties between the Soviet Union and Japan in which China does not participate; they want the Soviet Union to consider Chinese interests in its dealings with Japan and to refrain from concessions to Japan while Japan is withholding concessions from China.

As far as Japan itself is concerned, China desires that Japan not remilitarize, although it is apparently willing to accept small, purely defensive forces. It would prefer a Communist government in power, failing that a Socialist government, and failing that a conservative government headed by friendly members of the conservative parties. They want freedom to deal with their supporters in Japan and for their supporters to have complete freedom of action to actively push Chinese interests.

With regard to tactics, the most important is their version of people's diplomacy, that is the selective cultivation of specific elements within Japanese society. They tailor many of their policies, or at least the expression of those policies, to suit the desires and
prejudices of these groups in order to build a reservoir of sentiment and obligation. These groups are then used wittingly or unwittingly to exert domestic pressure on the Japanese government to follow policies favorable to China. Among them are the JCP, the JSP, labor unions, traders, manufacturers of potential Chinese imports, small businessmen and artisans dependent upon Chinese raw materials, relatives of prisoners-of-war, fishermen, people living near American military bases, etc.

The second major tactic is straight propaganda: press and radio stories and articles attacking the Japanese government for unfriendly acts, threats of the dire consequences likely to be incurred for hostile acts, and support for Japanese dissidents, demonstrators, and rioters (without much regard for the substance of dissent as long as it is anti-government). Propaganda themes include playing on widespread Japanese pacifism and fear of war and nuclear weapons, discontent with the behavior of U.S. military forces, guilt feelings over Japanese aggression against China, feelings of racial and cultural sympathy, prospects for vastly profitable trade, etc.

Trade itself is a tactic, although the evidence is insufficient to determine if it is only that or is also an end in itself. Offers of trade and threats of withholding trade are frequently addressed to the Japanese nation as a whole, as well as in specific public and private statements to individual trading groups.
Another general conclusion concerns the correlation between domestic and foreign policies during the fifties. There was a great deal of coincidence between the timing of policies in these two spheres in terms of tone and emphasis, flexibility and militancy, patience and impatience.

The decade also saw the definite end of the period in which China followed the Soviet line in its policies toward Japan, even though the Sino-Soviet dispute had not become public by the end of the decade.

I am now going to turn to the main subject of my paper, the events of the nineteen sixties. In the course of this narrative, decisions as to what to include and what to exclude will be determined in part by the need to answer the following questions: What evidence can be adduced to confirm, deny, or modify the preliminary conclusions? To what extent is trade only a means for the Chinese, and to what extent is it an end in itself? What are the relationships between the CCP and the JCP? What is the likelihood that China will take major risks to accomplish its maximum program, or continue to be satisfied with progress on the minimum program? Finally, what new factors might be injected into the situation which would mean drastic changes in the course of Sino-Japanese relations?
III
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 1960-69

General. Dividing the first of the decade into periods is relatively simple. From the culmination of the hard phase with the passing of the revised U.S. security treaty in June 1960 until the signing of the Liao-Takasaki long term trade agreement in November 1962 there was a distinct period in which China gradually sought to establish a new, more moderate, and more profitable line with respect to Japan. During the second phase of the decade which then began, events proceeded at a relatively stable pace and policies remained consistent until the Cultural Revolution intervened in the latter half of the decade. As we shall see, the dividing line between the second and third phases is not as easy to draw. By the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967 and 1968 China's policy toward Japan had obviously turned around, but the process was by almost imperceptible stages, and was not by any means consistent across the entire range of relations between the two countries. Because of this gradualness I have chosen to end the second phase at the point where we had the first clear indication that change was imminent, namely the refusal by Mao to sign a communique with the visiting delegation of the JCP in March 1966. The third phase, which I shall call the Cultural Revolution phase for convenience, I regard as unstable and transitional in nature. It may or may not have reached a new equilibrium in policy toward Japan with the end.
of the domestic upheaval in 1969. The evidence is conflicting, but I am inclined to believe the third phase is still in progress at the time of writing. In summary, then, our scheme for the nineteen sixties is as follows: June 1960 to November 1962, transition to a new line; November 1962 to February 1966, the Liao-Takasaki Trade Memo period; March 1966 to the present, the Cultural Revolution.

**Transition to a new line: June 1960 to November 1962.** The ordinary observer might consider the ratification of the new U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty a defeat for Chinese foreign policy, but the PRC, like all communist states, is unable to admit failure or defeat if it is to maintain its legitimacy as a government ruled by scientific socialism. On 1 June 1960 a group of Japanese writers meeting in Canton were still repeating the basic Chinese line denouncing the treaty, Kishi's tactics in "ramming it through the Diet", and the U.S.'s semi-military occupation of Japan which the treaty represented. ¹ On the 12th *Jen Min Jih Pao* 's Commentator (a pseudonym for a highly authoritative source) in editorializing on the writers' conference repeated this theme, adding comments appropriately tailored to the conferees: on U.S. cultural aggression and the need for intellectuals to join the mass struggle against it. ² By the end of the month, with the treaty an accomplished fact, the PRC was claim-

¹NCNA Canton 1 Jun 1960, SCMP 2273, p. 28.
²NCNA Peking 12 Jun 1960, SCMP 2279 p. 35.
ing victory. On the 21st Mao Tse-tung issued a statement on the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi and the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit as evidence of the usefulness and effectiveness of mass action. 3 On the 14th the writers' conference had called for a united front of all anti-U.S. forces to include intellectuals, workers, and peasants to overthrow imperialism and its lackey, Kishi. 4 On the 21st Mao and Chou En-lai met with the writers and praised the people's struggle as representing a significant heightening in the people's political consciousness. 5

Having claimed success, the Chinese could justify to itself a move toward a more positive policy with regard to Japan without embarrassment. Kishi's resignation also helped them to explore the possibilities of renewed dealings with Japan without loss of face. On 17 July an agreement for the exchange of television newsreels was signed signalling their readiness to deal. 6 On the 20th, the new Prime Minister Ikeda responded and announced that cultural and economic relations with China were "desirable" and other relations "advisable", at the same time reaffirming Japan's friendship with the U.S. and its primary orientation to the West. 7

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3 Quoted in Knowles p. 45.
5 NCNA Shanghai 24 Jun 1960, SCMP 2288 pp. 32, 33.
6 NCNA Peking 17 Jul 1960, SCMP 2302, p. 33.
Ignoring this qualification in greeting several groups of friendly Japanese on the 26th, Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi emphasized that China was in favor of peaceful coexistence between states. He also denied the rumors then current in Japan that China had provided financial aid to the anti-treaty rioters. He balanced this friendly gesture with a reminder that the U.S. was against peaceful coexistence, and linked the patriotic struggles of the Japanese people with those of the people of Cuba, Turkey, and South Korea. The month was climaxed by the arrival of the first Chinese delegation in Japan since the May 1958 incident. Liu Ning-yi, Chairman of the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and a high party official frequently active in Sino-Japanese affairs, visited Japan to attend the convention of SOHYO, and the 6th World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (6th WC). At his meeting with SOHYO, Liu congratulated the Japanese people on the victory of their struggle efforts, and boasted of the friendly reception given him by both the JCP and the JSP. Since the main political tie of SOHYO is to the JSP, Liu's visit indicated a firm intention to use the JSP, as well as the JCP to further its aims in Japan, and to make its appeals on the widest possible basis.

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8NCNA Peking 26 Jul 1960, SCMP 2308, p. 33.
9NCNA Peking 29 Jul 1960, SCMP 2311, p. 36.
This intention was reaffirmed in his important address to the opening session of the 6th WC on 2 August. In this speech Liu sounded many of the themes which were to become common for the next several years. Liu's words were given high level support and emphasis in a message from Chou En-lai to the 6th WC on the 3rd.

First Liu reminded his audience of the ancient and close ties which existed between the Chinese and the Japanese people. Then he linked the two nations as jointly suffering under US occupation, the Japanese by virtue of the Security Treaty, and US bases, and the Chinese by virtue of the US alliance with Taipei. Common victims, the Japanese people were also common strugglers, linked in the worldwide mass struggle of the Socialist Camp, a struggle which the Japanese had shown could achieve great victories. A nationwide mass movement was the key tactic to bring about an end to the sufferings of the people, as it had been the source of the crushing defeats inflicted on the US imperialists and Japanese reactionaries by the overthrow of the Kishi regime and the exclusion of the American president. China was prepared to help in working toward an end to the people's sufferings and oppressions. It was guided by the ideal of peaceful coexistence and the five Bandung principles. It was willing to establish normal relations with the government of Japan as soon as, following the people's real will, it renounced the path of militarism and abolished

10 NCNA Peking 2 Aug 1960, SCMP 2314 p. 32.  
11 NCNA Peking 3 Aug 1960, SCMP 2314 p. 34.
the Security Treaty. Once this were done, Liu said, it would be possible to annul the anti-Japanese provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, establish an atom-free zone in the Pacific, and conclude a mutual non-aggression pact of all the major Pacific powers. The ball was clearly being passed to the Japanese people to bring all this about through struggle, while China stood on the side lines and cheered them on.

The rest of August was as busy as the beginning. On the 5th Peking staged a rally to promote Liu's themes. On the 6th Liu visited the headquarters of the JCP in Tokyo. On the 8th Liu broadened his approach at a friendly dinner given by Matsumura Kenzo, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese version of an "old China hand". Here Liu repeated the three political principles of 1957, but this time with the implication that they were a means to friendly relations, rather than an obstacle. He repeated that China and Japan could coexist peacefully, and that a non-aggression pact was possible once the U.S. treaty were abrogated.

(Having introduced Matsumura Kenzo, a digression here to explain his position is appropriate. In an article he wrote for Japan Quarterly in 1964, he expressed the conviction that China was not after all completely Communist. It had not abolished all

14 NCNA Peking 8 Aug 1960, SCMP 2316, p. 41.
15 "Bridging the Gap to China", Japan Quarterly, Vol. 11, no. 1, Jan - Mar 1964 p. 27.
religion, fully nationalized the economy, or fully collectivized the land. Its foreign policy goals reflected not Communism but Han pride and patriotism. The trouble between the U.S. and China was largely a result of the fact that the U.S. as a non-Asian nation simply didn't understand China. Japan did and could therefore act as bridge between the two unfortunately and unnecessarily hostile powers.)

On the 11th, Jen Min Jih Pao hailed the success of Liu's visit, and noted that it had been made possible by Kishi's ouster. Presumably Kishi's downfall would make other things possible. This was affirmed on the 12th when a new agreement to double import of Chinese lacquer for the use of Japanese artisans was announced by SOHYO, and on the 16th by the signing of a new cultural relations agreement and joint statement in Peking by Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Japan China Cultural Exchange Committee (JCCEC). On the 19th Suzuki Kazuo, member of the JSP, the Japanese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the Japan China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) arrived in Peking. On the 27th, Suzuki was received by Chou En-lai and the capstone to the new line was set in place.

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19 NCNA Peking 19 Aug 1960, SCMP 2325 pp. 37, 38.
20 NCNA Peking 27 Aug 1960, SCMP 2330 p. 40
    NCNA Peking 12 Sep 1960, SCMP 2340, p. 23ff.
In his meeting with Suzuki, Chou announced for the first time what have come to be called the "three commercial principles" as a supplement to the "three political principles". Chou blamed Kishi for the trade breakdown in 1958, and since Kishi was gone, trade could resume. The formula for trade could be three fold: (1) government-to-government agreements would be necessary for any long term trade, and would have to be preceded by progress in the normalization of relations (the three political principles still applied); (2) pending this state of affairs, however, private contracts between private Japanese firms and Chinese state trading corporations would be possible, provided the firms were friendly to China; (3) special trade, like the import of lacquer for SOHYO craftsmen, could also continue.

China was clearly signalling that it was ready to resume the trade relations which had been broken in 1958, but exactly how this trade was to be conducted was not clear at all at the time. The contents of the Chou statement to Suzuki were not published by the Chinese until 12 September, and in the interim were reported back to Japan only through JSP channels. The questions were what did China mean by progress towards normalization? Was this merely a way of ignoring the three political principles while still giving them lip service? What was the reason for using the JSP as a channel for this communication? What would make a private firm "friendly" in Chinese eyes and hence able to trade? The working out of the answers
to these questions was the main theme of Chinese policy toward Japan for the remainder of this phase. For the next two years Chinese policy sought a way to permit trade on a major scale without a public retreat from the three political principles, a search climax by the Liao-Takasaki agreement of November 1962. At the same time the "friendly trade" under the second commercial principle became routinized and grew in volume, with friendly firms being defined as those which do not trade with the U.S. or Taiwan, which provide financial assistance to pro-Chinese fronts in Japan, which publicly support pro-Chinese positions, and which use their influence on the government to adopt pro-Chinese policies. During this phase also, China cultivated the JSP as its main advocate in Japan, until it discovered that the socialists were far too divided to be relied upon or to achieve the necessary influence with the government, thus making a rapprochement with the pro-Chinese factions of the LDP potentially more productive.

While working out these new trade relations, however, China did not hesitate to excoriate the Japanese government for "hostile" actions. Building a united front for China included maximizing the groups supporting the front, but also excluding the "non-people" who actually govern Japan. As was explicitly avowed in a

joint statement signed by a several Chinese and Japanese organizations in Peking on 3 October, the people must work for the expansion of trade simultaneously with the unfolding of the mass struggle. Tatsunosuke Takasaki of the LDP was given a friendly reception on the same day that Commentator of the Jen Min Jih Pao published the first major attack on Prime Minister Ikeda since his assumption of office. Ikeda was attacked for sending delegates to Taiwan and South Korea (pushing for a "northeast Asia Treaty Organization"), for breaking off negotiations with North Korea on repatriation of Korean nationals, for supporting Tibet in a UN vote, for opposing a PRC seat in the UN, for his continued support of the U.S. Security Treaty, for his increase of the defense budget, etc. For the first time in this editorial, he was equated with Kishi insofar as hostility to China was concerned. Yet the three political and three commercial principles were repeated, and while large scale trade was implicitly not yet possible, small scale trade was encouraged between the two peoples, in the same editorial.

China's hopes for the JSP were made clear by other events: in October, the massive Chinese reaction to the assassination of JSP leader Asanuma by a right-wing Japanese extremist. In January 1961 a visiting JSP delegate, Kuroda Hisao, was received personally

22 NCNA Peking 4 Oct 1960, SCMP 2355 p. 33.
24 SCMP 2361 et seq.
by Mao.²⁵ A delegation of the ACFTU visiting Tokyo signed a joint statement with SOHYO on 14 February 1961 affirming China's strong support for SOHYO's current program.²⁶ On 26 February the JSP chairman Eda announced a new anti-treaty drive, along with a campaign to force a government-to-government trade agreement between the two countries.²⁷ In March a Japanese journalist noted that "friendly" firms increased from 11 to 47 in number during the month (it was later to grow to over 200) most of which were essentially dummy firms formed specifically for the purpose of the China trade by already existing Japanese commercial and industrial firms.²⁸ The designations were made by the Chinese People's International Trade Promotion Association (CPITPA) on the recommendation of the JSP/JCP controlled JCTPA.²⁹

The double-pronged propaganda offensive was made clear again in April 1961. On the 3rd in Djakarta, Ch'en Yi repeated that abrogation of the treaty with Taiwan was a pre-requisite for the establishment of relations,³⁰ but on the 20th at a banquet for visiting Japanese Chou En-lai emphasized peaceful coexistence and China's and Japan's joint objective to drive the U.S. out of Asia.³¹ Similar

²⁸ Ryozu Kurai, 1961 article already cited.
³⁰ Quoted in Knowles, p. 71.
³¹ NCNA Peking 20 Apr 1961, SCMP 2481, p. 54.
themes were sounded throughout this period as two way traffic in people between the countries grew rapidly, including delegations from front groups and organizations representing all sectors of society: women, youth, fishermen, unionists, writers, artists, "untouchables", lawyers, patients, calligraphers, and so on. Every conceivable channel was being exploited, although the emphasis on the JSP remained strong in this early part of the period.

The summer of 1961 brought increasing propaganda comment on purely domestic Japanese affairs, exploiting domestic grievances against the government as well as pro-Chinese sentiment. Ta Kung Pao in an editorial on 7 June\(^32\) attacked the "anti-political violence" bill introduced by Ikeda in an attempt to prevent further disruptions like that which surrounded the treaty ratification in mid-1960. On the 9th, Jen Min Jih Pao\(^33\) congratulated the Japanese people for the defeat of the bill. In August the Chinese press and Peking rallies made much of the Matsukawa case in Japan, a constitutional case on the Japanese government's right to try offenders for anti-U.S. terrorism during the Korean War.\(^34\)

In June another pro-Chinese LDP member Tokuma Utsonomiya visited China, talked with Chou, and came home calling for diplomatic relations with China.\(^35\) On 3 July a protocol was signed by the

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\(^{32}\)NCNA Peking 7 Jun 1961, SCMP 2515 p. 34.  
\(^{33}\)NCNA Peking 9 Jun 1961, SCMP 2517 p. 38.  
\(^{34}\)SCMP 2554 et seq.  
\(^{35}\)NCNA Peking 25 Jun 1961, SCMP 2529 p. 29  
JSP/JCP controlled Japan China Friendship Association (JCFA) agreeing on cultural exchanges and attacking U.S. imperialism in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, Korea, China (Taiwan), and South Vietnam, as well as Kennedy and Ikeda personally. At the end of the month a violent attack on Ikeda was occasioned by the Justice Ministry's refusal to grant an entry permit to P'eng Chen to attend a JCP Congress. In August the Chinese press attacked Ikeda for supporting Kennedy's "successor state" doctrine regarding Taiwan and for sending ex-Prime Minister Kishi on a mission to Taipei. Ikeda was accused of being no better than Kishi and Yoshida, and of joining with the U.S. to seek reconquest of Taiwan for the Japanese militarists and reactionaries. Yet a rally in Shanghai on 14 September for visiting Japanese emphasized that only "a handful" in Japan were hostile to China, a handful increasingly seen as unable to prevent the people from having their way.

In October another cultural relations agreement was signed affirming the people's friendship and attacking U.S. imperialism and Japanese reaction. In December Jen Min Jih Pao reacted strongly to

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36 NCNA Peking 3 Jul 1961, SCMP 2533 p. 44.
39 NCNA Shanghai 14 Sep 1961, SCMP 2582 p. 35.
Ikeda's offer of talks to the Republic of Korea (ROK), while Hung Ch'i printed an analysis of the way US imperialism was controlling Japanese monopoly capitalism to help it control Asia. Japanese monopoly capitalists were held to be willing tools of US imperialism in this article, but the emphasis was on their subservience, not on Japanese initiation of hostile acts and policies.

January 1962 saw the culmination of China's efforts to cultivate the JSP during this phase of Sino-Japanese relations and to exploit this cultivation in terms of influence within Japan. A party delegation was led to China by Mosaburo Suzuki on one of the by-then regular biennial JSP formal visits to China. Suzuki arrived on the first and was royally feted for two weeks: a banquet on 2 January received by Mao on the 3rd; a rally for Gensuikyo on the 4th, received by Chou and Ch'en Yi on the 11th, again received by Mao, Chou, and Ch'en on the 12th, and another banquet on the same day. Finally, on the 13th he signed a joint statement which showed the signs of long and arduous negotiation.

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41 NCNA Peking 30 Dec 1961, SCMP 2652.
43 NCNA Peking 1 Jan 1962, SCMP 2653.
44 NCNA Peking 2 Jan 1962, SCMP 2654.
45 NCNA Peking 4 Jan 1962, SCMP 2655.
46 Ibid.
47 NCNA Peking 11 Jan 1962, SCMP 2660 p. 27.
48 NCNA Peking 12 Jan 1962, SCMP 2661 p. 29.
Suzuki made every effort to avoid committing himself to
the starkness and simplicity of the original Asanuma statement of
1959 about US imperialism being the common enemy. The JSP was
already suffering some domestic consequences from its apparent
servility and obsequiousness to the PRC, both within the party itself
and in the Japanese press in general. He was anxious to obtain
Chinese support for the leftist candidate Sasaki in the forthcoming
party elections, but not to involve himself too closely and give the less
pro-Chinese Eda faction any ammunition. It was a difficult line to
have to draw, and the Chinese did not make it any easier. They were
anxious, of course, to obtain the most propagandistically useful
statement possible. Suzuki wormed his way out of a blanket affirmation
of the Asanuma statement by admitting only that US imperialism was
an enemy of both the Japanese and Chinese people, and that this made
it "objectively" a common enemy, although the struggles against it
were independent. To the discriminating reader he had avoided
ty ing himself to a joint Chinese Japanese struggle. Unfortunately
the sophistries were wasted on both Japanese public opinion and the
opposing factions and Suzuki was roundly criticized. Even a secret
letter he sent to the Party secretariat immediately after signing the
statement explaining his actions did not remove the intra-party odium
he had incurred. 50

50 Shinkichi Eto, "Japan and the Two Chinas", The New Japan:
Prospects and Promises, Princeton University Conference Series,
November 1962.
The New York Times 20 Jan 1962
If I may get ahead of the story here, this event was the beginning of a decline in China's concentration on the JSP for a while. Eda defeated Sasaki at the party election, thus bringing to power the Structural Reform faction of the party. This faction advocated a policy derived from the Communist Party of Italy and hence, at this stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute, anathema to the Chinese. At about the same time the Japan Teachers Union adopted a policy of reformism and economism, in place of revolution and politicism, and SOHYO began making tentative offers of closer cooperation with the more moderate ZENRO trade union federation. Finally, the Chinese were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the results of friendly trade being managed under the auspices of a JSP dominated association.

This estrangement from the JSP reached its breaking point in August with a breach at the anti-bomb congress, in which the JSP and SOHYO walked out in protest over the Soviet bomb test while China and the JCP supported the Soviet test. The JSP break with Gensuikyo which was to follow clinched its unreliability from China's standpoint. After the conference propaganda attacks against the JSP began to appear in the Peking press. The consequence of all

52 Eto.
53 Japan Quarterly, Vol. 9, no. 4, Chronology; Hinton p. 381.
54 NCNA Peking 10 Aug 1962, SCMP 2800 p. 26
   NCNA Peking 12 Aug 1962, SCMP 2801 p. 25.
this was for China to transfer the main focus of its attentions to the JCP and the pro-Chinese wing of the LDP. This process culminated in Takasaki's signing of the trade agreement in November, an agreement which had been foreshadowed by the announcement of the three commercial principles to Suzuki of the JSP in August 1960.

All of this was yet to come in January 1962, however. At that time the Suzuki joint statement represented a definitive statement of Chinese policy. Van BrieBen insists the statement should be taken literally as a pronunciation of Chinese policies. I would prefer to characterize it as a statement of China's minimum program during this period. Essentially it called for Japan to abrogate the US and ROC treaties, expel all US forces and bases, establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, and sign a formal treaty of friendship and nonaggression. The anti-Japanese clause of the Sino-Soviet treaty would then become automatically a dead letter. Japan's desire not to join the socialist bloc, but to maintain "positive neutrality" was noted by the Chinese, although not agreed with. Japan's desire for a treaty with the Soviet Union as well was "appreciated" by the Chinese. Finally the Chinese promised not to "interfere" in Japan's domestic affairs.

China renewed its attacks on Ikeda in February, re-emphasizing its sensitivity to Japan's intra-Asian relations. A whole

series of editorial attacks were published in response to Ikeda's trip to Southeast Asia the preceding November, the Foreign Minister's trip to Taiwan, some published articles by ex-Prime Minister Yoshida, the ongoing talks with the ROK and Ikeda's attack on the Suzuki statement. These attacks all equated Japan's economic offensive in Southeast Asia and its diplomatic efforts toward rapprochement with the ROK with pre-war Japanese military expansionism. Hinton sees this as partly evidence of special Chinese sensitivity resulting from its security crisis with India then brewing, but there is really nothing in these editorials and speeches which is significantly different from earlier and later statements on the same theme. In May one new item did surface, however. Jen Min Jih Pao's observer, taking note of Kennedy's increase in the number of advisors in South Vietnam, claimed that Ikeda and Kennedy were planning to use Japanese troops in Vietnam, an obvious attempt to exploit Japanese fears of involvement in actual hostilities. From this point on the danger of war in Southeast Asia and the danger of Japanese involvement became gradually more frequent and more extreme in Chinese propaganda aimed at Japan. One sign that

NCNA Peking 4 Feb 1962, SCMP 2677 p. 37.
NCNA Peking 24 Feb 1962, SCMP 2688 p. 25.
NCNA Peking 26 Feb 1962, SCMP 2687 p. 25.
NCNA Peking 27 Feb 1962, SCMP 2690 p. 23.
NCNA Peking 13 Mar 1962, SCMP 2700 p. 25.
57 Hinton, p. 381.
58 NCNA Peking 18 May 1962, SCMP 2745 p. 32.
China may have been especially sensitive, although her response was not particularly unusual, was an attack made on Ikeda in June for approving a loan to the Taipei government, at a time when Chiang Kai-shek was (according to Peking) preparing an attack on the mainland. Yet a fortnight later the press items commemorating the anti-Japanese war anniversary (the 1937 incidents) were milder than usual.

As the JSP break grew, in September Matsumura Kenzo was invited to China by Chou En-lai and Ch'en Yi for conversations. He arrived at Canton on 13 September. On the 14th he arrived in Peking and a heavy schedule of talks was opened. During these high level talks, the Chinese restated their fundamental adherence to the three political and three commercial principles, and the inseparability of politics and economics. However they also agreed with Matsumura on a desire to promote trade and, significantly, the possibility of improving relations by "gradual and cumulative steps". This was obviously a concession by the Chinese, reducing their minimum program in return for some kind of trade agreement.

   NCNA Peking 7 Jul 1962, SCMP 2776 p. 1
61 NCNA Canton 13 Sep 1962, SCMP 2821 p. 34.
62 NCNA Peking 14 Sep 1962, SCMP 2821 p. 35.
   NCNA Peking 15 Sep 1962, SCMP 2822 p. 33.
63 NCNA Peking 14 Sep 1962, SCMP 2824 p. 28 ff.
Agreement in principle was reached on an expansion of trade, an exchange of newsmen, and the establishment of direct air service between the two countries. 64 China agreed, in essence, to permit progress in economics a step at a time, in return for political progress a step at a time, rather than insisting on a dramatic political advance as a prerequisite for any large scale trade. 65 This was interpreted in the Japanese press as tacit Chinese acknowledgment that it was impossible for Japan to simply break with Taiwan and the U.S., and that China would settle for less, at least temporarily. 66

We have already considered the reasons for China's choosing to deal with LDP members with reference to expanding trade at this time, but this does not answer the question of why China was in fact willing to make concessions politically in return for trade. We will discuss this subject more thoroughly in the next chapter, but briefly here let it suffice that many observers in Japan, the U.S., and Europe attribute the move to economic necessity resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward combined with sufficient recovery from the Great Leap Forward to permit major exports. 67 Japan represented

64 The New York Times, 21 Sep 1962. The actual agreement has never been published, but newspaper reports as to the content are generally supported by subsequent events.
65 Mainichi, 26 Sep 1962.
66 Ibid.
one of the few good markets for Chinese raw materials. At the same
time, they feared Soviet competition, both with the Japanese govern-
ment and with the JCP. Ch'en Yi gave a hint of this in a press con-
ference of 9 November when he noted that the good harvest of 1962
permitted trade expansion. He also noted that he viewed the agree-
ment as in a way both private and governmental. After all, Takasaki
was a leading Japanese political figure.

The Japanese responded quickly, and Tatsunosuke Takasaki,
ex-Minister of International Trade was dispatched to China at the end
of October to work out the details of an agreement. He was
accompanied by an economic mission representing 41 Japanese firms.
On 9 November he signed an agreement with Liao Cheng-chih called
the Liao-Takasaki Memorandum Trade Agreement (L-T agreement).
The news release announcing the agreement emphasized that Liao
and Takasaki acted as individuals and that this was a non-govern-
mental agreement, that it represented a further development of
private trade (thus by implication tying it to the second of the three
commercial principles, although neither they nor the political prin-
ciples were referred to explicitly), and that the basis of the agree-
ment would be "equality and mutual benefit" and the "improvement

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68 Kashin "Bamboo Curtain" and Cho "Sechs Phasen"
69 Asahi 10 Nov 1962.
70 NCNA Peking 28 Oct 1962, SCMP 2851 p. 32.
71 Japan Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 1, Jan-Mar 1963, Chronology
72 NCNA Peking 9 Nov 1962, SCMP 2860 p. 39 ff.
of trade by gradual and cumulative methods".\textsuperscript{73} This last phrase was to become the standard line for the next few years, largely supplanting the three political and three commercial principles in Chinese pronouncements.

Specifically, the agreement provided that:

(1) long term comprehensive trade would be initiated for a five year period ending in December 1967 at an average annual level of 36 million pounds sterling;

(2) commodities involved would be coal, iron ore, soya, maize, beans, salt, tin from China and rolled steel, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, agricultural machinery, farm implements, and whole-set machinery (i.e., complete factories) from Japan;

(3) transactions would be in the form of contracts between private Japanese firms (no mention was made that they must be "friendly") and the China National Foreign Trade Corporation;

(4) sales would be paid for by letters of credit guaranteed in sterling or other agreed currencies;

(5) deferred or installment payments were to be the subject of further discussions;

(6) the exchange of technical information would be promoted;

(7) questions of arbitration and commodity inspections were to be resolved by further discussion;

(8) the agreement could not be unilaterally annulled;

(9) revision would be possible after further talks; and

(10) the agreement would be valid immediately, running from 9 November 1962 to 31 December 1967.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
The provision for immediate effectiveness was not an idle one; implementation began immediately. On 16 November a Council was formed in Tokyo under Takasaki's chairmanship to act as liaison for implementing the China trade, and in Peking Nan Han-chen gave a banquet on the 23rd for all visiting Japanese traders, both non-affiliated firm representatives and members of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association and Japan International Trade Promotion Association, both of which were already involved deeply in "friendly" trade. On 14 December a number of Japanese traders who had been waiting in Hong Kong were permitted to enter to begin trade contract talks. On the 17th Nan gave a reception at which he spoke brightly of the fabulous prospects for trade, and on the 27th Nan and a group of Japanese signed a protocol to expand "friendly trade" and agreeing to exchange industrial fairs in Peking and Shanghai in 1963 and in Tokyo and Osaka in 1964. By the new year contracts under the LT agreement were already being signed and a new phase in Sino-Japanese relations had opened.

76 NCNA Peking 23 Nov 1962, SCMP 2868 p. 34.
77 NCNA Peking 15 Dec 1962, SCMP 2883 p. 36.
78 NCNA Peking 17 Dec 1962, SCMP 2884 p. 31.
79 NCNA Peking 27 Dec 1962, SCMP 2890 p. 28.
CCP-JCP relations 1960-1962. While the main line of Chinese policy was being worked out during this phase with first the JSP and then the pro-Peking wing of the LDP as the main targets of negotiation, Chinese relations with the JCP were more clearly related to the developing Sino-Soviet split and less directly to Sino-Japanese relations. Accordingly I have withheld discussion of CCP/JCP relations during this phase for separate treatment.

The JCP began this period ambiguously in the Chinese camp. Although it eschewed any attacks on the Soviet Union or the CPSU and was very mild in its support of the CCP, it did support it. At the June meeting in 1960 of the World Federation of Trade Unions, at which the Chinese began their anti-CPSU factional activities which were to so enrage Khrushchev, Japan voted with China. At the June meeting in 1960 of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the JCP was prominent at most other functions Liu attended. In September 1960 at the Hanoi conference of the Lao Dong Party, the JCP maintained a generally neutral position. In November at the preparatory conference of the 81 Communist Parties in Moscow, the JCP took a moderately pro-Chinese position, that is, it supported China in its position on what the Declaration should say. At the full conference in December

81 NCNA Peking 6 Aug 1960, SCMP 2315 p. 36.
82 Griffith Albania, p. 49.
83 Ibid., p. 57.
they took a noticeably weak position, refusing to support the Soviet Union's positions, and refusing to join with the Soviets in attacking Hoxha and the Albanian party. On the 13th of December, the JCP delegation made a point of stopping off in Peking on the way home from Moscow. Although only briefly in the capitol, the delegation was greeted at the airport by P'eng Chen.

In early 1961 there was little mention of the JCP in the Chinese press, and the JCP itself maintained a discreet silence. It did, however, cooperate with the JSP in helping build up "friendly" trade through membership in the trade promotion associations. And JCP fronts continued to send delegations to China which were received in a friendly fashion, and helped welcome Chinese delegations visiting Japan. It is noteworthy, though, that most of this front and visiting activity vis-a-vis China did not emphasize JCP participation, but rather general "progressive" collaboration between the JCP and JSP.

In June 1961 there was a burst of friendliness between the JCP and CCP. A JCP delegation visited China between 13 and 25 June. They were greeted by a highly laudatory editorial in Jen Min Jih Pao on the 16th which praised the JCP's "correct line" on the

84 Ibid., pp. 72, 73.
85 NCNA Peking 13 Dec 1960, SCMP 2400 p. 34.
86 NCNA Canton 13 Jun 1961, SCMP 2519 p. 43.
87 NCNA Peking 16 Jun 1961, SCMP 2522 p. 35.
world liberation struggle. On the same day they were given a major banquet by Chu Teh. On the 19th they were the honored guests at a major Peking rally which was given unusually large coverage in the Chinese press. On the 20th they were received by Liu Shao Ch'i, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. On the 21st they were received by Mao and met with the Chinese National People's Congress, and at a reception given by Peng Chen received much verbal support for their united front activities in Japan. On the 22nd a joint JCP-NPC statement pointed out the correctness of the JCP line and its adherence to Marxism-Leninism. It also noted the unique Japanese combination of proletarianism and patriotism. Both parties in commenting on the major issues of the Sino-Soviet disagreement concentrated on support of the Chinese position without a direct attack on the Soviets, although Japan did express support for China's Great Leap Forward, and did oppose revisionism. On the 23rd, a Jen Min Jih Pao editorial came out with high praise for the joint statement. In spite of the discretion with which the Japanese supported the Chinese side in the growing controversy, on the 7th of July the JCP startled Japan with a purge of three Executive Committee members, and the resignation of seven other party members, on a charge

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88 Ibid.
90 Ibid., p. 42.
92 NCNA Peking 22 Jun 1961, SCMP 2527 p. 35.
93 NCNA Peking 23 Jun 1961, SCMP 2527 p. 35.
of being pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese. The ostensible charge was anti-party activities; apparently his Soviet patrons were pressing him too hard for a pro-Soviet line which, as we shall see later, the JCP structure wanted to avoid. On 25 July a message from the Central Committee of the CCP to the JCP was released (it could not be delivered in person because the Japanese government, to the indignation of the Chinese, had refused an entry permit for Peng Ch'en to visit the JCP convention. The message again praised the JCP's correct line, loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, and proletarian internationalism. It noted the JCP contribution to the purity of ideology and the solidarity of the movement.

On October 11th, the expelled JCP pro-Soviet members formed a new group called the "Voice of Japan", an organization which was never to achieve much strength, but which was to remain as a faction of the Japanese left always ready to act as a mouthpiece for the CPSU. The main stream itself sent one of the few fraternal delegations to the Albanian conference of its women's association in the same month. During October a JCP delegation to the 22nd CPSU Congress in Moscow maintained a neutralist position at the

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96 Ibid.
98 Griffith, Albania, p. 88.
conference, and visited Peking on the way to Japan. On the 28th they were given a banquet by Liu Shao-chi, held cordial talks with Teng Hsiao-ping, and were seen off at the airport by a group which included Teng and the Soviet charge. Thus while definitely leaning toward the Chinese and away from the Soviet Union, the JCP was attempting to maintain as neutral a stance as possible and was being actively wooed by both.

In November another step towards the CCP was taken when Akahata announced the publication in Japanese of the works of Mao Tse-tung, described as the successor to Marx and Lenin. During the same month an Akahata and a JCP delegation were in Peking for meetings with CCP high officials, including Mao himself on the 23rd and Liu Teng on the 25th. In December the JCP balanced this pro-Peking move by supporting the Soviet line on the dangers of atomic warfare at the Stockholm conference of the World Peace Council.

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99 Ibid., p. 104.
101 Ibid.
102 NCNA Peking 15 Nov 1961, SCMP 2623 p. 32.
103 NCNA Peking 23 Nov 1961, SCMP 2628 p. 28.
105 Griffith, Albania, p. 126.
On 29 December, Akahata in an editorial emphasized its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It noted that the JCP 8th Congress had resolved against both right and left opportunism, wanted Communist Parties to be able to assume independent positions, and wanted to avoid a split of the international communist movement.  

In January 1962 Akahata noted JCP attendance at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, but mounted an attack on the revisionists in general and the Voice of Japan people for their ideas on structural reform. In February it published three days of strong anti-revisionist editorials. This neutralist, anti-Soviet interference line continued fairly stable through the remainder of the first half of 1962. In July Akahata revealed that at the 8th Congress the previous summer had approved the expulsion of the Voice of Japan group for anti-party activity. The following month the JCP lined up with both the Soviet Union and the CPR in attacking the JSP for its disapproval of the Soviet H bomb test.  

In December 1962 at the conferences of the East European communist parties, the JCP stuck to its moderately pro-Chinese position and refused to join in the mounting public attacks on Albania.  

107 Ibid., 29 Jan 1962.  
108 Ibid., 19-21 Feb 1962.  
110 Hinton, p. 381  
NCNA Peking 8 Aug 1962, SCMP 2798 p. 25.  
It also had a five man delegation in Peking the same month. 112

Finally two Chinese ideological journals during the month included articles on the quality of the JCP struggle being waged in Japan against U.S. imperialism and Japanese monopoly capitalism. 113

This process of gradual moving over to the Chinese side was thus growing in strength as this phase of Sino-Japanese relations ended. It was not to reach its climax, however, until the following summer, with the split over the Test Ban treaty and the final public explosion of the Sino-Soviet Rift.

The period of LT trade: November 1962-February 1966: Picking out the trends during this period is difficult. After the LT agreement relations on the surface remained stable between Japan and China until well into the depths (or heights depending upon your viewpoint) of the Cultural Revolution. Trade between the two countries grew steadily in volume. Even though the signing of contracts was occasionally made more difficult by Chinese intransigence or sensitivity, the totals at the end of the year always added up to respectable gains over the previous year until 1968. Conversely propaganda attacks of some virulence by the Chinese on the Japanese government were sprinkled liberally throughout the period. The Chinese in effect

112 NCNA Peking 12 Dec 1962, SCMP 2881 p. 25.
ignored undesirable Japanese policies and events when dealing with the substance of their trade relations; and the Japanese in turn were prone to shrug off the fulminations of Commentator and Observer as if they were almost parts of an accepted and not too important ritual. Yet below this stormy and disturbed surface currents were flowing.

In 1963 and till December 1964 there were genuine signs of a detente between the two countries, with much of it a function of competitive Chinese and Soviet wooing of Japan\textsuperscript{114} in a decreasingly bi-polar world where Japan gave the impression to both communist states that it was to a degree loosening its ties with the United States and pushing for a more independent line. There are definite improvements in Sino-Japanese relations during this phase, plus many signs of a potential for far more improvement.

In December 1954, however, with the election of Eisaku Sato to the prime ministership (an echo of the fifties, Sato being Kishi's half brother) a sudden and distinct chill fell over the relations between the two countries, a chill which deepened throughout 1965 even though the surface relations remained ostensibly warm (that is a mixture of growth in trade and periodic propaganda attacks). By the beginning of 1966 this cold current became dominant and it is fair to say a new phase had begun, even though this current did not affect trade and propaganda for another year or two.

In this chapter the main actors are the government and the LDP on the Japanese side, so developments in PRC relations with both the JSP and JCP will be considered separately. I will relate the events of the two sub-phases first: the plateau of 1963 and 1964 followed by the increasing decline of 1965. I will then go back and pick up individually the developments with the two leftist parties during these two periods.

January 1963 set the stage for the development of economic relations during this phase. On the 10th a Chinese delegation arrived in Japan to begin a study of the vinylon industry; on the 12th the first large contract under the LT memo was signed (silk for fertilizer); on the 19th agreement was reached on financing trade by direct letters of credit between Chinese and Japanese banks instead of through London as was the case previously; on the 22nd a fisheries agreement was reached on starting formal talks. Also during the month, however, Japan and the US held their third annual security conference, Japan and the USSR initialed a liberalized trade agreement, and Ikeda decided in principle to admit US nuclear powered submarines to Japanese ports. Also the Justice Ministry announced it would not permit the Chinese (or any communist countries)

to send delegates to a Japanese leftist youth conference. China's relatively mild response to these steps was indirect. On the 7th of February, New China News Agency (NCNA) announced a signature campaign in China for a petition to be sent to Ikeda demanding a Japanese apology for the deaths caused by Japan in China during World War II; a Japanese "war criminal" was also released after having been forced to read a statement denouncing Japanese war crimes; and a moderately strong message was sent by some Chinese organizations to Japan expressing support for a "united action" (read demonstration) against the Japan-ROK talks; and against US nuclear submarine visits. This mildness was repeated in a joint statement signed by a visiting delegation of Japanese jurists in March, which made no reference at all to the Japanese government, restricting its attacks entirely to US imperialism.

This dual pattern continued over the next months, amounting in effect to what the Japanese have always insisted on as "the separation of economics and politics". A large contract was signed exchanging feed for fertilizer in April; Japan received its first NIKE and

121 NCNA Peking 7 Feb 1963, SCMP 2917 p. 27.
122 NCNA Fushun 13 Feb 1963, SCMP 2921 p. 29.
125 NCNA Peking 14 Mar 1963, SCMP 2941 p. 28.
126 Japan Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 3, Jul-Sep 1963, Chronology
HAWK missiles from the United States the same month; 127 China released two more war criminals 128 and in its Okinawa Day editorial attacked the US only, not mentioning "Japanese reactionaries". 129 In May agreement was reached on shipping between the two countries and ports of entry, 130 the Dai Nippon company reached preliminary agreement with China on the sale of a vinylon manufacturing plant, 131 and Nan Han-chen gave a banquet to more than 100 Japanese traders in Peking. 132 Politics during the month consisted of editorials and messages of support for united actions against nuclear submarines and F105D aircraft newly deployed to Japan, this time attacking not only the US but also Ikeda, Japanese reactionaries, "right wing social democrats" (read Eda faction of the JSP), and revisionists (read pro-Soviet splinter of JCP). 133 This latter article by Jen Min Jih Pao Commentator is interesting in that it separated Japanese monopoly capitalists into a different category from US imperialists. Both were still enemies but the jointness of their hostility is not emphasized. 134

In May and June 1963, as the final rupture in the Sino-Soviet split was about to burst out, Japan and the Soviet Union reached a new,
more liberal trade agreement and an agreement on Japanese fishing and seaweed collecting in northern waters, and talk of Japanese collaboration in the economic development of Siberia began. The Soviets also released some previously captured Japanese fishermen. On the 14 June a highly optimistic joint statement was signed by the Chinese and a large group of "friendly" traders containing not a word of political attacks on Ikeda or even the US. On the political side there was a whole series of editorials and messages of support for "united actions" (now being serially numbered by the Chinese as was their practice during the treaty crisis of 1960).

Commentator, in noting the united actions and the anniversary of the US security treaty, cast Kennedy and the Japanese military in the villain roles, but made no tie between them and Japanese businessmen or capitalists.

On 1 July, Ch'en Yi had a friendly talk with representatives of the Kurashiki Rayon Company and on the 13th a contract was signed for the sale of a complete vinylon plant. On 20 August the Japanese government approved deferred payment for the plant.

135 Murthy, p. 16.
139 NCNA Peking 20 Jun 1963, SCMP 3006 p. 28.
During the same two months the Chinese objected strongly to Japanese limits on the activities of a youth delegation in Japan\(^{142}\) and the visit of the Chinese ACFTU delegation to the 9th Anti-bomb Conference.\(^{143}\)

An interesting article was published in *Hung Ch'i* during August,\(^{144}\) noting the deepening economic misery in Japan, and implicitly foreseeing an imminent crisis in which Japanese monopoly capitalists would seek to win their independence from US domination. Thus the Chinese found an ideological justification for their increased dealings with Japanese capitalists, in spite of Japan's still existing ties to the United States and the Capitalists continued support for the Ikeda government.

The Kurashiki deal produced a protest from the ROC, which requested that deferred payment not be granted to the PRC for such contracts. The Japanese government refused to cancel the approval of the deferred payment, but in a private letter ex-Prime Minister Yoshida soothed Chiang Kai-shek, assuring him that Japan had no intention of providing economic aid to the PRC by extending inexpensive credit, and would in no way give discriminatory advantages to the PRC. He emphasized that the Kurashiki deal was a straight commercial transaction, and that the deferred payment was a standard

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\(^{142}\)NCNA Peking 11 Jul 1963, SCMP 3019 p. 22.

\(^{143}\)NCNA Peking 2 Aug 1963, SCMP 3035 p. 34.

six percent loan arrangement. Chiang was apparently satisfied and said no more, but the Yoshida letter was to become a major bone of contention between China and Japan in ensuing years.

In September 1963, closeness and cooperation in economic affairs continued to grow, while the staccato drumfire of propaganda blasts also continued without noticeable effect on the former. The second year agreement under the LT memorandum was signed on 23 September accompanied by mutual congratulations on the progress being made in trade expansion and, this time, agreement on inspection of commodities and commercial arbitration. Nan Han-chen and Liao Cheng-chih held a series of large banquets and receptions for visiting Japanese traders, including representatives of "small and medium business" interests, "friendly companies", big LDP-connected industries, and exhibitors at the forthcoming Peking Fair. A common theme at these meetings was the glowing prospect for expanding trade, with only the US and a "handful" in the Japanese govern-

146 Jerrold Schechter, "The Political Price of Japan's China Trade", The Reporter, Vol. 33, no. 5, 23 Sep 1965. I have not found the text of the letter anywhere, hence am unsure as to its exact contents. The description in this article is close to what both the Chinese and Japanese imply whenever they mention the letter. I am therefore satisfied that this is its operational meaning, whatever its exact wording.
148 NCNA Peking 12 Sep 1963, SCMP 3061 p. 22.
   NCNA Peking 15 Sep 1963, SCMP 3063 p. 20.
   NCNA Peking 29 Sep 1963, SCMP 3073 p. 34.
ment putting up "obstacles" (that is, Japan's refusal to permit a few items to be exhibited because of the CHINCOM agreements). Some more war criminals were also released. 149 The propaganda activity was largely related to the growing Japanese demonstrations against the Vietnam War, US submarines and aircraft deployments, and some high publicized anti-radical court cases in Japan. 150

In October the Peking Fair opened 151 accompanied by friendly meetings between the Japanese figurehead President of the exhibit, Tanzan Ishibashi of the LDP, and the highest Chinese officials including Mao himself. 152 On the day before the opening, the China Japan Friendship Association, the only such association formed by the Chinese with a country not ruled by a communist Party, was founded officially. 153 China's reasonableness during this month was truly phenomenal. In an article in Jen Min Jih Pao on the 5th, Nan Han-chen blamed only the US and Chiang for being obstructionists. 154 In an editorial the next day there was no mention of conditions or principles, only "mutual friendship, refraining from hostility, equality

149 NCNA Fushan 3 Sep 1963, SCMP 3055 p. 30.
150 NCNA Peking 3 Sep 1963, SCMP 3055 p. 31.
NCNA Peking 11 Sep 1963, SCMP 3060 p. 25.
NCNA Peking 13 Sep 1963, SCMP 3062, p. 27.
NCNA Peking 17 Sep 1963, SCMP 3064 p. 31.
154 NCNA Peking 5 Oct 1963, SCMP 3076 p. 43.
and mutual benefit". At a conversation with Ishibashi, Chou En-lai was reported to have "understood" Japan's difficulties with Taipei and to have expressed the feeling that China was in no hurry but would be patient about the ending of this particular obstacle to normal relations. At a big reception, Nan Han-chen looked on approvingly while a Japanese speaker urged Japanese "national capitalists" to work for Japan's independence (i.e. end the US-ROC ties). The peak of this fulsomeness came in a Peking Review article on the 11th, which blamed the US for the 1958 break in trading relations, completely ignoring the arch-villain Kishi earlier held responsible. On the 28th, Ch'en Yi told a group of visiting Japanese correspondents covering the fair that trade would continue to grow as China's solvency grew (a clear admission that internal Chinese economic conditions do limit trade), that ambassadorial relations between the countries were desirable but would have to wait till the ambassador from Taipei left Tokyo, and (calmly slipping it in) that China was of course developing nuclear weapons. On 9 November, the anniversary of the LT agreement and the midpoint of the plateau of good relations, a major fisheries agreement was signed delineating

159 NCNA Peking 28 Oct 1963, SCMP 3091 p. 32.
fishing areas and emergency harbor procedures. In December the Japanese fair in Shanghai opened and another cultural relations agreement was signed, in which the only "principles" mentioned were those of Bandung.

As befitted his stature as China's chief ideologue (and showing his emergence from his post-Great Leap low posture) Mao in January tied up all this sweetness into a neat package: the policy of Intermediate Zones between the Socialist camp and the leading imperialist enemy. Japan was placed in the second intermediate zone along with the small capitalist powers of Western Europe as objects of Chinese overtures, countries to be wooed away from the United States even if they could not immediately be expected to become allies of Communist China. This policy was aimed most directly at the French, who recognized the PRC in the same month but was also explicitly applied by Mao to Japan when he received a delegation from Japan's Afro-Asian organization on the 27th. That this was not, however, a call for complete coexistence between China and the governments of such countries was also made clear by Mao's insistence that the need was for struggle, for a world wide people's united front against US imperialism, a front to include all people including even big entre-

160 Current Background, No. 724, 6 Dec 1963.
161 Japan Annual of International Affairs, Vol. 3/4, 1963/64, Chronology.
163 Hinton, p. 383.
164 NCNA Peking 27 Jan 1964, SCMP 3150 p. 17.
preneurs. Mao's statement was to be quoted for years thereafter, memorialized on anniversaries of its pronouncement, and became the standard definition of the broadest united front China ever envisioned. There was a parallel hint that even capitalist governments might be included in this anti-US united front. An article reporting an Ikeda speech on Japan's independent policy was completely without hostile remarks on that policy. 165

January 1964 also saw the resolution, to China's satisfaction, of the Chou Hung-chi case. A member of a Chinese delegation to Japan in October, Chou had sought asylum in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo. He had then been taken into custody by the Japanese who held him while Peking, Taipei (and presumably Moscow and Washington) expressed their views on what should be done with him. In the end, Chou decided he wanted to go back to China and the Japanese sent him back. 166 Taipei reacted by withdrawing some embassy personnel from Tokyo and canceling all Taiwan's government (not private) procurement in Japan. Yoshida eventually was sent to Taipei to appease Chiang, but it is hard to deny that the PRC saw this decision on Japan's part as a very favorable sign of the positive results of permitting trade between the two countries. 167

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165 NCNA Peking 22 Jan 1964, SCMP 3147 p. 28.
167 NCNA Lushun-Talien 12 Jan 1964, SCMP 3140 p. 27.
In February 1964 Nan Han-chen carried Chinese optimism to new official heights when in a speech he expressed an expectation of victory in the struggle for diplomatic relations, the end of Japan's dependence on the US and its recognition of the ROC. On the 18th, talks between Liao Cheng-chih and visiting LDP Diet representatives resulted in preliminary agreement (to be formalized by later negotiations) on the exchange of newsmen, stationing of permanent trade representatives, expansion of trade, initiation of direct air service, and visiting rights for Japanese relatives at war dead cemeteries in China. Similar views were being conveyed at the same time in Tokyo by Chao An-po, a visiting Chinese delegate. After duly protesting the government's limiting of the size of his delegation, Chao was very conciliatory and optimistic, although slightly more militant than either Nan or Liao in that month. At the end of the month several Chinese officials, led by Chou En-lai were very cordial in expressing their condolences on the death of Tatsunoke Takasaki.

On 6 March, China released the last of her store of Japanese war criminals. On 4 March, in an editorial praising Japanese memorial meetings to protest the Bikini bomb tests, Jen Min Jih Pao noted the possibility of admitting the LDP and big businessmen to the anti-US united front.

168 NCNA Peking 5 Feb 1964, SCMP 3156 p. 27.
169 Kyodo News Service 18 Feb 1964.
170 Kyodo News Service 2 Feb 1964.
172 NCNA Fushun 6 Mar 1964, SCMP 3175 p. 37.
Except for the matter of airline services (which Japan saw as impossible until diplomatic relations were established), Japan was quick to take up the Liao-LDP talks of 18 February and to exploit the agreement in principle then reached. Matsumura Kenzo arrived in Peking on 12 April to begin negotiations (still, of course, unofficial). At the same time Nan Han-chen was invited to Tokyo by Ishibashi Tanzan to represent China at the opening of the Chinese trade fair in Tokyo. Nan spent the rest of the month being received by industrialists all over Japan, spreading a sanguine view of the potential of the China trade, while in Peking Matsumura quickly got down to cases and, on the 19th, signed an agreement to establish trade liaison offices in Tokyo and Peking for expediting LT trade, and to exchange news correspondents. In reporting back to LDP headquarters, the mission to China noted that China was very cooperative, but extremely sensitive to the public posture of the Japanese government. The implication was that China would be satisfied if the government became friendly (or even neutral) in public, whatever its policy was in substance. It was also reported that the Chinese were anxious to negotiate a long term fertilizer contract completely outside the LT or friendly trade formulae. Matsumura did some preliminary dealing on this, but the Japanese government was reluctant to commit

176 NCNA Peking 6 Apr 1964, SCMP 3195 p. 28.
177 NCNA Peking 19 Apr 1964, SCMP 3205 p. 27.
itself to such an agreement without some solid guarantees. During this peak of cooperativeness on China's part, it was almost as though they were advocating the separation of politics and economics, in the hope that the former would follow the latter inevitably. The few hostile remarks in the Chinese press during these spring months were addressed almost exclusively at the right wing socialists and the revisionists in the JCP.

In May Nan continued his rounds of the Japanese geisha houses making friends and winning influence among industrial and financial circles until his departure on the 21st. An additional impetus was given to the Chinese drive for increased relations by the visit in this month of Soviet leader Mikoyan to Tokyo. Probably in response to this visit, Chou En-lai gave an interview on the 15th in which he offered still more trade expansion. At the same time in his talks with LDP representatives he spoke of increasing talks on cooperative resource development within China (as Mikoyan had mentioned re Siberia), technical cooperation, etc. He suggested a top-level mission from the Japanese government go to Peking to talk about these things, or the Japanese Consul-General in Hong Kong

179 Kyodo News Service 18 Apr 1964.
180 NCNA Osaka 6 May 1964, SCMP 3217 p. 21.
NCNA Fukuoka 9 May 1964, SCMP 3219 p. 28.
NCNA Kitakyushu 10 May 1964, SCMP 3219 p. 29.
NCNA Tokyo 20 May 1964, SCMP 3226 p. 32.
could approach the NCNA representative there on the same subject. Ambassadorial talks in third countries were also suggested. Chou's price for such talks was a public affirmation ("clear cut policy") of Japan's intention to proceed toward diplomatic recognition of China, and attendance at the 2nd Afro-Asian solidarity conference then being sought by China to bolster its position against the CPSU. 181 He agreed not to insist on a break in US-Japanese relations as a prerequisite to Sino-Japanese relations. 182 While these overtures were being made, the three responsible Japanese ministries were maneuvering over the April Matsumura agreement on LT trade offices. MITI was pro from the beginning, the Foreign Ministry and Justice were reluctant and insisted on conditions, particularly guarantees against any political activity by the Chinese representatives planned for Tokyo. 183

These offers of governmental talks were not taken up by Japan. And the Justice Ministry continued to follow a very restrictive policy on entry permits for Chinese, especially from youth organizations, a policy which was met with loud complaints from China, but not from very high levels. 184 Foreign Minister Ohira on the 4 June said that ambassadorial level talks were not yet needed. 185 Yet the

182 Mainichi 31 May 1964.
184 NCNA Peking 6 Jun 1964, SCMP 3235 p. 34. NCNA Peking 11 Jun 1964, SCMP 3239 p. 25.
Chinese Fair in Osaka opened amid much fanfare and much talk of trade potential and people's friendship. 186

This unresponsiveness on the part of the Japanese government, which China perhaps was surprised at in view of their hopes from the trade arrangements they had permitted, continued into July and generated the first real signs that the plateau of friendly relations was not permanent. In a sense relations reach their peak this month, when Mao announced his support for the Japanese claim to the southern Kuriles 187 to a visiting JSP delegation, but the seeds of decline were nonetheless sown. The Japanese government agreed to the establishment of a Chinese trade office but only on the basis of a verbal promise of no political activity and only with the understanding that the representative be purely a private, unofficial, non-governmental representative. 188 On the 18th Taiwan lifted its ban on governmental purchases from Japan. 189 (What Taiwan likes, Peking can be sure to hate). Peking saved its displeasure for the next provocation, when Japan insisted on limiting the size of the Liu Ning-yi delegation to the 10th WC on atomic weapons, at which the Chinese were determined to make points against the Soviets. 190 Ta Kung Pao's Commentator protested this exclusion as a hostile act endangering the friendship of the two countries at the behest of foreign powers. The editorial

186 NCNA Osaka 13 Jun 1964, SCMP 3240 p. 32.
187 See below in the section on CCP-JCP relations during this phase.
189 Ibid.
190 NCNA Peking 26 Jul 1964, SCMP 3269 p. 25.
further reminded Japan that the two countries were still officially at war, since Peking had never signed a peace treaty. It contrasted Chinese hospitality to visiting Japanese with Japanese rudeness. The bite of the editorial was reduced, however, when they singled out the Justice Ministry for attack, rather than making a general attack on the Japanese government as a whole.

This hint of declining relations remained just that. Liu attended the conference, reduced delegation notwithstanding, and his speeches, as well as the Chinese press stories and messages of support from Chinese mass organizations, concentrated their fire exclusively on the US, the Soviet Union, and various shades of revisionists (including a rather violent speech against the JSP right wing given to SOHYO). 191

In August the Japanese continued to refuse any concessions in their policies, but the Chinese were so busy with the party battles that they did not react. During this month the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a statement defending the US bombing of North Vietnam, and the government gave its final approval to visits by US nuclear submarines to Japanese ports. 192 At the same time the Chinese trade representatives arrived to take up their Tokyo posts, a tourist agreement was signed with a Japanese travel agency, and

NCNA Peking 1 Aug 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 40.
NCNA Peking 31 Jul 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 45.
NCNA Peking 6 Aug 1964, SCMP 3276 p. 28.
the Japanese government gave its preliminary approval to the exchange of correspondents by newspapers. On the 26th the Chinese also announced a three year contract for the import of chemical fertilizer. Politics might be lagging, but economics still advanced.

In September the Chinese were still being restrained. A few messages of support for anti-nuclear submarine and anti VN war demonstrations were printed, but they were not especially violent or high level. Tourist travel agreements were signed, and the first Japanese tourists arrived and were given red carpet treatment. The correspondent exchange was finally agreed to and publicly announced and the trade representatives were mutually feted and banqueted in both capitals.

In October the Chinese appeared to be hopeful still, but signs of the coming decline began to grow. On the 4th Ta Kung Pao's Commentator wrote of the successes achieved in Sino-Japanese relations since the founding of the CJFA a year previously, but raised anew a demand which had been ignored for a year and a half, that the Taiwan treaty be abrogated. On the 5th a joint statement

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193 Ibid.
195 NCNA Peking 7 Sep 1964, SCMP 3297 p. 27.
196 NCNA Peking 7 Sep 1964, SCMP 3297 p. 28.
197 Kyodo News Service 26 Sep 1964
198 NCNA Peking 17 Sep 1964, SCMP 3303 p. 23.
199 NCNA Peking 4 Oct 1964, SCMP 3314 p. 31.
by groups in the friendly trade category mentioned the three political and three commercial principles for the first time in many months.\textsuperscript{200} On the 8th a cultural agreement promised expansion of relations, but raised the demand for Japanese eschewal of a two-China policy.\textsuperscript{201} A similar joint statement appeared on the 9th signed by the JCFA and the CJFA.\textsuperscript{202} On the 16th China exploded her first nuclear device and all but the JCP and left wing of the JSP in Japan condemned the test with varying degrees of firmness. China's initial reaction to the criticism was to emphasize the peaceful nature of her weapons, and to support her peaceful intent by a proposal for a summit meeting to agree on a total abolition of nuclear weapons. This initial reaction was probably intended to cool Japanese fears, rather than as a real desire for negotiations.\textsuperscript{203} China quickly changed to the offensive on the nuclear issue, supporting the massive Japanese demonstrations against US nuclear submarine visits (which were, conveniently, just about to begin) mounted by Japanese leftists prior to the scheduled general elections.\textsuperscript{204} These attacks did not mention the Japanese government critically, but concentrated on US imperialism and the Johnson government.

\textsuperscript{200}NCNA Peking 5 Oct 1964, SCMP 3315 p. 33.
\textsuperscript{201}NCNA Peking 8 Oct 1964, SCMP 3317 p. 36.
\textsuperscript{202}NCNA Peking 9 Oct 1964, SCMP 3318 p. 28.
\textsuperscript{204}NCNA Peking 9 Nov 1964, SCMP 3337 p. 29.
NCNA Peking 13 Nov 1964, SCMP 3339 p. 32.
NCNA Peking 14 Nov 1964, SCMP 3339 p. 33.
The break came in late November. On the 20th, Sato's government refused an entry permit for P'eng Chen to visit the JCP in Tokyo. On the 21st a massive outpouring of protest signaled the end of the plateau of good relations and the beginning of a gradual decline into increased invective and propaganda and inter-governmental hostility, although there was almost no real effect on trade until well into the Cultural Revolution.

Growing invective and the transition to the Cultural Revolution, November 1964 to February 1966. On 20 November, the Japanese government refused an entry permit for P'eng Chen to visit Japan in connection with a JCP Congress. The Chinese reaction was quick and violent. On the 21st the Foreign Ministry issued a protest accusing Sato of being unreasonable and viewing the situation as very grave, reflecting a possible hostile attitude toward China on Sato's part. On the 21st the Foreign Ministry issued a protest accusing Sato of being unreasonable and viewing the situation as very grave, reflecting a possible hostile attitude toward China on Sato's part. The same day a rally in Peking was staged to protest an unresponsive reply by the Japanese government to a demand from China for information on Chinese laborers abducted during the war. On the 23rd Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator made a blistering attack on Sato, raising a number of themes which were to be worked out and embroidered upon in the coming months. Sato's action was laid to hostility and a desire to undermine Sino-Japanese friendship. Such acts, it was

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206 NCNA Peking 21 Nov 1964, SCMP 3344 p. 23.
208 NCNA Peking 23 Nov 1964, SCMP 3345 p. 29.
warned, would endanger relations, but the statement was carefully couched in terms of warnings not threats. Sato was also attacked for inviting US nuclear submarines, even though it was the US which endangered Japan, not China. On the 24th, Jen Min Jih Pao's Observer extended the propaganda attack. Sato was accused of blindness to political realities. He was taken to task for Japanese attacks on China's nuclear weapons tests, and reminded that Japan would be the main sufferer in a nuclear war, and that it would have only itself to blame if it continued to be subservient to US imperialism. On the 25th, Observer further deepened the intensity of its attack, and attributed more of the initiative to Sato, with less emphasis on his subservience to the US. There was mention of a new "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", of Sato being worse than Kishi, and of Sato as the willing tool of US imperialism.

The Chinese emphasized their displeasure by stalling on the negotiations for the third year of the LT trade agreement, and asking some scheduled LDP visitors and a Diet traders group to postpone their visit. The ambiguity of this economic sanction was underlined, however, by the fact that individual contracts were still being signed during this month, even though the overall agreement was being held up. Sato refused to be pressured in this way,

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209NCNA Peking 24 Nov 1964, SCMP 3346 p. 29.
210NCNA Peking 24 Nov 1964, SCMP 3346 p. 31.
211Asahi Evening News 3 Dec 1964.
however. He was quick to make conciliatory statements about his desire for friendship with China and the possibility of ambassadorial talks in third countries, but he did not withdraw the ban on Peng's visit. 212

Peking underlined its displeasure with Sato on 12 December, Jen Min Jih Pao's Observer again wrote a blistering attack on him, this time for his foreign policies. 213 Sato was attacked for his "despicable" UN policy (voting with the US on the China question), his adherence to a two-China's policy, his "slanderous" attack on China's nuclear program, loans to Taiwan, Kishi's visit there, even his giving a medal to General Le May of the US Air Force. Ta Kung Pao's Commentator echoed this attack on the same day, adding a phrase which was also to become standard: the peoples of the two countries would not allow such hostility to stand in the way of improving relations. 214 This was to become the formula under which continued trade and cultural relations were to be permitted regardless of Japan's official actions and China's propaganda responses.

China's view of Sato was not enhanced by events in January and February 1965. The communiqué released after his US visit acknowledged Japan's independent stance vis-a-vis mainland China, but also reaffirmed Japan's basic western facing attitude. 215 MITI

213 NCNA Peking 12 Dec 1964, SCMP 3358 p.25.
214 Ibid., p.27.
approved deferred payment plans for the second whole vinylon plant
ordered by China, but denied a low interest Export-Import Bank
credit. 216 (Even this compromise, of course, brought a protest
from Taipei.) 217 US Nuclear submarines made a more port calls,
Japan and the Soviet Union signed a new trade agreement, and MITI
refused EIB credits for a freighter ordered by China. Sato during
this time also refused to renounce the Yoshida letter as government
policy, though he did admit it was only binding indirectly. 218 China's
reaction included the cancellation of a scheduled visit to Japan by
Liao Cheng-chih, 219 more anti-Sato press items 220 hard words by
Ch'en Yi to a pro-Peking LDP man visiting in Peking, 221 and can-
cellation of a contract for a five million dollar urea plant. 222

China's reaction was not entirely negative, however. It
continued to apply the carrot along with the stick. Ch'en Yi was
bitter in his talk with Utsonomiya (the LDP visitor) but he repeated
Mao's support for Japanese claims in the Kurile Islands, and approved
of the pro-Peking conservatives' idea of Japan as an intermediary
between the US and China. Nan Han-chen, in talks with Okazaki

218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
Tokyo Sankei (Japanese) 20 Jan 1965.
(successor of Takasaki as LT head) was very favorable about the prospects for trade and friendship. And Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator in a 12 February article implied that the only real obstacle liable to affect trade was the Yoshida letter.

On 17 February, the Chinese press became highly incensed over the disclosure of a Japanese Self Defense Force contingency war plan known as "Three Arrows". It was used as a focus for strong attacks on Japan's militarism and aggressiveness. But the attacks went out of their way to attribute these qualities only to "a handful", and not to the Japanese government as a whole. The same restraint was not part of the Chinese response to the initialing of the treaty with the Republic of Korea on 20 February, after years of on and off negotiations. All the old charges about Japanese imperialism, lackeyism, a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization, and collusion with the US in Vietnam were revived in articles by Commentator and Observer, in editorials, in a formal statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and a massive Peking rally.

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223 NCNA Peking 29 Jan 1965, SCMP 3391 p. 29.
226 NCNA Peking 22 Feb 1965, SCMP 3405 p. 32.
   NCNA Peking 21 Feb 1965, SCMP 3405 p. 33.
   NCNA Peking 24 Feb 1965, SCMP 3407 p. 27.
   NCNA Peking 23 Feb 1965, SCMP 3407 p. 28.
   NCNA Peking 1 Mar 1965, SCMP 3409 p. 28.
   NCNA Peking 27 Feb 1965, SCMP 3407 p. 32.
Having apparently vented its bile by this massive outpouring of invective, China was almost totally silent in March 1965. The only event of the month was conciliatory; agreement was reached on the resumption of parcel post service between the two countries.\(^{227}\) Perhaps China was giving Sato time to react to its warnings. In April the freighter was canceled in a letter which made the Yoshida letter and denial of EIB credits the causes of the action.\(^{228}\) China then gave Sato still another month before cancelling the vinylon plant contract in May, because of Sato's "hostile acts".\(^{229}\) Sato's response to these charges and cancellations was studied silence; he continued negotiations of specific agreements with the Republic of Korea on fisheries, property claims, and treatment of Korean aliens in Japan. These agreements brought a new round of invective from China in a whole series of articles and editorials.\(^{230}\)

On 19 April Kawashima Shojiro, Vice President of the LDP and Sato representative, held brief talks with Chou En-lai during a visit to Djakarta, in what amounted to an attempt to appease China's anger and resentment without making any significant changes in policy. Official results published for the talks were non-committal. But various Japanese journalists apparently had better sources. Kawashima

\(^{227}\) Japan Quarterly, Vol 12, no. 3, Jul-Sep 1965, Chronology. 
\(^{228}\) NCNA Peking 6 Apr 1965, SCMP 3435 p. 32. 
\(^{229}\) NCNA Peking 10 May 1965, SCMP 3457 p. 35. 
\(^{230}\) NCNA Peking 7 Apr 1965, SCMP 3436 p. 32. NCNA Peking 8 Apr 1965, SCMP 3437 p. 27 ff.
was reported to have told Chou that the Japanese did not consider
the Yoshida letter binding, but Chou was incredulous in view of the
denial of EIB credits. Kawashima also raised the possibility of
ambassadorial level talks in Switzerland, which Chou refused.
The tone of the conversations was reportedly quite sharp on Chou's
side. He categorized the denial of EIB credits as interference in
China's internal affairs (i.e., support for the reactionary Chiang
Kai-shek), and discrimination against China. He also was angry
over Japanese denial of a visa to P'eng Chen and Japanese support
for the US policy in Vietnam. Clearly, the PRC was not going to be
mollified by gestures. 231

On the other hand it was not going to allow its indignation to
interfere with normal friendly and LT trade. A major rice contract,
the first since 1957, was signed on 15 April; 232 Nan Han chen told
the Hitachi board chairmen that the freighter would be reordered if
EIB credit were approved; 233 most of the comments in the Chinese
press emphasized third party responsibility for the obstacles, that is
Taiwan and the US; and Japanese traders at the Canton Spring fair
reported business was better than ever. 234

231 Schechter Reporter article.
Tokyo Yomiuri 25 Apr 1965.


In June the Korean Treaty and four supplementary agreements were formally signed, and China reacted with violent charges about NEATO, collusion with the US and ROK in Vietnam, Japanese militarism making a comeback, etc.\(^{235}\)

In July and August, the Chinese took advantage of the 11th WC on nuclear weapons to bring their propaganda attack onto Japanese soil. Liu Ning-yi arrived in Tokyo on 23 July and immediately attacked the government for its failure to progress toward normal relations with China, as well as for denying visas to delegations from North Korea and North Vietnam.\(^{236}\) Much of Liu's speeches, as well as messages from Chou En-lai and various Chinese organizations, were taken up with matters related to the Sino-Soviet split, and CCP relations with the JSP and JCP. Liu went out of his way, however, to bring up all China's grievances against the Sato government, and to call for peoples' struggle to correct these grievances. He did not, however, identify Sato by name as the chief villain, only by implication.\(^{237}\) Liu repeated his charges in a third major speech, and a similar line was taken by a delegate of the ACFTU before the

\(^{235}\) Communist China Digest no. 153, 19 Jun 1965, p. 42.

\(^{236}\) NCNA Peking 23 Jul 1965, SCMP '3506 p. 34.

\(^{237}\) NCNA Peking 28 Jul 1965, SCMP 3510 p. 35 ff.
SOHYO convention. In Hiroshima Nan Han-chen attacked the Japanese government for putting up obstacles to trade, and said that trade depended upon the government's taking up a friendly attitude and carrying out friendly policies. Nan refrained from direct threats of economic retaliation, but the warning was clear and, to the Justice Ministry, insulting. Yet at the same time unidentified Chinese officials were reportedly offering talks on expanding trade.

August of 1965 also saw a sudden spate of long articles memorializing the anti-Japanese war, and the CCP's successful use of people's war against the Japanese. Most of these articles were part of the debate then going on in China over foreign and defense policy vis-a-vis the Vietnam war and the Soviet dispute. Only one was clearly aimed at Japan. On the 31st, Ta Kung Pao used the occasion to warn Japan about a revival of militarism. Finally during August the propaganda buildup for a massive Youth Festival for Japanese young activists began, with Mao and Liu Shao-chi leading the welcoming parties, and with much invective against Japan for limiting the size of the delegation permitted to attend.

238 NCNA Peking 31 Jul 1965, SCMP 3512 p.43.
NCNA Peking 1 Aug 1965, SCMP 3512 p.38.
239 NCNA Hiroshima 5 Aug 1965, SCMP 3514 p.22.
Japan Quarterly, Vol. 12, no. 4, Oct-Dec 1965, Chronology
For the next five months, from September through the beginning of February 1966, there was a fairly steady trend in Sino-Japanese relations. In matters of trade and other economic relations China was pragmatic rather than dogmatic. At the same time she mounted a continuous and ever-increasing propaganda campaign against the ROK-Japan Treaty in her propaganda organs, and Ch'en Yi in a series of announcements gradually hardened the political stance of China. These three sequences do not seem to have been precisely coordinated in each detail, proceeding simultaneously at the same pace; but by the end of the period a new balance was achieved.

In the economic sphere the major development was the signing of the 4th year LT agreement (for 1966 trade) at the relatively early date of 18 September, and without any indications that the Chinese bargained very much harder than usual or attempted to insert more than the usual amount of propaganda into the documents.\footnote{NCNA Peking 18 Sep 1965, SCMP 3543 p. 36.}

In October a Japanese industrial exhibition was held in Peking, at which the speeches made pro-forma reference to US and Japanese reactionary "obstacles" to trade, but were otherwise quite business-like.\footnote{NCNA Peking 4 Oct 1965, SCMP 3554 p. 31, 33, NCNA Peking 16 Oct 1965, SCMP 3562 p. 36.}

Talks on the improvement of shipping between the two countries were opened in October.\footnote{Jiji News Service (radio) 2 Nov 1965.} In November and December talks were held on fisheries and a joint statement resulted which was more restrictive than the previous agreement, but still relatively
amicable. The Shanghai Japanese exhibition in December repeated the general non-political atmosphere of the Tokyo fair.

At a reception for Japanese businessmen in December, Nan Han-chen took a rather ambiguous stand, speaking of the glowing prospects for trade, while at the same time referring to the political and commercial principles and the potential difficulties raised by Sato's hostility.

Attacks on the ROK treaty emphasized the dangers of the revival of Japanese militarism and collusion between the US, Japan and the ROK, as well as the good results in the anti-treaty struggle movement which mounted massive demonstrations to oppose ratification. The high point of this campaign was a Jen Min Jih Pao editorial (unsigned) on November 15th after the treaty was ratified by the lower house of the Diet. The essence of this attack was that the treaty was an actualization of a combined US, Japanese, and Korean military threat to China, as well as an oppressive denial of the real will of the Japanese people. This was all repeated again when the treaty was ratified by the upper house in December.

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NCNA Peking 25 Nov 1965, SCMP 3587 p. 34.
NCNA Peking 17 Dec 1965, SCMP 3603 p. 27.

247 NCNA Shanghai 1 Dec 1965, SCMP 3591 p. 25.


NCNA Peking 14 Sep 1965, SCMP 3539 p. 34.
NGNA Peking 8 Nov 1965, SCMP 3577 p. 28.

NCNA Peking 16 Nov 1965, SCMP 3581 p. 27.

The Ch'en Yi pronouncements began on 29 September when he stated that normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations could only follow an end to Japanese subservience to the United States, that Sato's desire for trade with China but political relations with the US would not work, and that while the existing level of trade could be maintained, expansion was out of the question. On 30 December, in an interview with an Akahata correspondent, Ch'en echoed the general line on the ROK treaty, characterized Sato as a running dog of US imperialism, and stated flatly that there could be no improvement in Sino-Japanese relations until Sato changed his policies. The stage was now set for the 4 February 1966 article in Jen Min Jih Pao which was to inaugurate the next phase in Japanese policy.

CCP-JSP Relations, 1963-1965. We have already discussed how relations between the CCP and JSP during the early sixties were cooling as China turned to the LDP as a potentially more profitable contact point in Japan. During the plateau of the mid-sixties this relative emphasis on the LDP continued, but additional causes for tension between the JSP and China were added. The central issue during these years was that of nuclear weapons, and the failure of the JSP to continue with a foreign policy both hostile to the West and subservient, or at least not contradictory to, that of the socialist camp.

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253 NCNA Peking 4 Jan 1966, SCMP 3612 p. 29.
The first manifestation of this trend came in March of 1963 when Gensuikyo split over the issue of condemning Soviet as well as Western nuclear tests. The JSP elements in Gensuikyo, while no doubt deploring American bombs more than Russian ones, still felt it necessary to condemn both. As the JCP elements adhered to a more usual line, the two parted company. This jump off the bandwagon was reaffirmed at the 9th WC in August 1963 when the question of the test ban treaty, over which the Chinese and Soviets were so hopelessly divided, effectively destroyed the little remaining cooperation between the JSP and JCP in the anti-bomb movement.

The JSP and SOHYO representatives walked out of the conference, held one of their own, and issued their own statement supporting the Soviet position on the test ban. The party was not totally united on the details (or for that matter on the major point: the hard line pro-Peking leftists of the Heiwa Doshikai faction did not approve of any of this). Narita eventually forged a compromise position acceptable to the pro-Soviet Wada faction which embodied total opposition to nuclear weapons, but acceptance of the test ban treaty as a step in the right direction. He also articulated the policy of "positive neutralism" which reaffirmed that Japan should not become attached to any military bloc of states. The Chinese reply was a renewed and vicious attack on the JSP, which asserted collusion between Soviet

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revisionism, US imperialism, and "right wing social democracy", the Chinese phrase for the center right of the JSP. The attack also named SOHYO as being corrupted by right wing social democracy.\textsuperscript{256}

This attack did not, of course, apply to the whole party. The pro-Peking factions continued their active membership in the various trade, cultural, and friendship associations, and a large delegation made a friendly and widely publicized visit to China in the fall of 1963, although it was not an official party visit.\textsuperscript{257} At the next party elections in February 1964 the centrist factions of Kawakami and Narita won, and the pro-Peking left factions boycotted the elections.\textsuperscript{258} The centrist factions were being careful however, in spite of the Chinese attacks, to avoid giving Peking more reasons for the attacks. The party supported the Chinese request for three rather than the two industrial fairs in Japan allowed by the government.\textsuperscript{259} In spite of this, Radio Peking made a particularly violent attack on the JSP and Narita on 2 March 1964, accusing them of supporting a two-China's policy. The JSP quickly denied the charge, but there was considerable shock in Japan over the virulence of the Chinese attack on a party that was believed essentially friendly

\textsuperscript{256} NCNA Peking 24 Aug 1963, SCMP 3049 p. 32 ff.
\textsuperscript{257} NCNA Peking 21 Sep 1963, SCMP 3067 p. 32.
NCNA Peking 24 Sep 1963, SCMP 3069 p. 27.
\textsuperscript{258} Japan Quarterly, Vol 11, no. 2, Apr-Jun 1964, Chronology
\textsuperscript{259} Kyodo News Service 11 Feb 1964.
to Peking, and over the JSP's submissiveness in the way they reacted to the attack. 260 The consequence was a JSP decision to delay a formal visit to Peking previously scheduled for May, and to consider a proposal to visit the Soviet Union before visiting China. 261 By June, however, public reaction in Japan had eased, and two simultaneous missions departed for the Communist capitals: Sasaki to Peking and Narita to Moscow. 262

Sasaki's trip was extremely well publicized by the Chinese, and he was extremely cooperative in making statements in support of Chinese policies. 263 It was during this trip that Mao chose Sasaki as the recipient of China's ideas on the right of Japan to the southern Kuriles. 264 Sasaki reaffirmed all three of the earlier CCP-JSP joint statements, including explicitly the Asanuma statement of 1959. Some of the more extreme members of his party joined the Chinese attack on modern revisionism. Sasaki himself, however, stuck to the JSP line on the test ban. 265

Yomiuri 4 Mar 1964.

261 Kyodo News Service 4 Mar 1964


263 NCNA Peking 1 Jul 1964, SCMP 3252 pp. 32, 33.
NCNA Peking 2 Jul 1964, SCMP 3253 p. 27.

264 NCNA Peking 10 Jul 1964, SCMP 3258 p. 28.

265 NCNA Peking 10 Jul 1964, SCMP 3258 p. 29.
Sasaki's faction was still not in command, however, and the 10th WC in August 1964 was a three way affair, with three separate conferences held under the auspices of three separate organizations: Gensuikyo and the JCP supported by Peking; Gensuikin (dominated by the JSP and SOHYO) supported by the Soviet Union; and Kaikin Kaigi (DSP and Domei) blandly blessed by the US. At the Gensuikyo rallies, the Peking representative repeated China's attacks on "right wing social democrats", but did not attack the JSP by name and made a plea for an end to the disunity of the ban the bomb movement.

This conciliatory gesture was repeated by the Chinese in October, at a rally commemorating Asanuma's assassination. While attacking "right wing social democrats", the main speakers noted that there was much agreement between China and the JSP in spite of the disagreements over nuclear policy. The gesture was presumably a sop to Narita's prestige, as he was about to arrive on a fence-mending mission, which was at least temporarily successful. In spite of China's exploding its first nuclear device during Narita's visit, a compromise was worked out which accepted the JSP disagree-

267 NCNA Peking 1 Aug 1964, SCMP 3273 p. 40.
NCNA Peking 6 Aug 1964, SCMP 3276 p. 28.
ment over nuclear policy, while pointing to the large number of common goals and objectives of the two parties. 270

This CCP-JSP rapprochement made it easier for the Sasaki wing in December to improve its position in the central executive committee of the Party 271 and was at least not a hindrance in Sasaki's election as Chairman in May of 1965. Peking's congratulations to Sasaki on his election were fulsome. 272 Sasaki reciprocated by an attack on US policy in the Dominican Republic. 273 In July, Peking joined in congratulating the JSP on its successes in the local elections held that month. 274

The rapprochement was to be short-lived, however. As Chinese policy towards Japan as a whole became more stringent during 1965, Peking became less willing to accept the JSP's opposition to its nuclear program. At both the 11th WC and the SOHYO convention in August, China radically raised its price for friendship. 275 To SOHYO, the ACFTU speaker was blunt and insulting. Anyone who didn't support China's nuclear program had to be a tool of American

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272 NCNA Peking 13 May 1965, SCMP 3459 p. 31.
273 NCNA Tokyo 13 May 1965, SCMP 3460 p. 27.
imperialism. The speaker was jeered and walked out of the conference, and the JSP disappeared from the Communist press for the rest of the year. Essentially, the hard line came to the JSP almost six months before it solidified with respect to Japan as a whole in February 1966.

**CCP-JCP relations 1963-1965.** During this period the JCP moved from a moderately pro-Peking but largely autonomous line to a position more pro-Peking, reaching a peak with its support of the PRC nuclear explosion in October 1964. In 1965, however, as China became more demanding of subservience and public support of its side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and became generally more radical in its view of the role of communist parties in capitalist countries, the JCP moved away from its pro-Peking stance. The JCP announcement of a policy of "United Action" in Vietnam on 4 February 1966 was the key to the JCP-CCP split, which then grew, becoming more public later in 1966, but essentially complete as early as March, when a JCP visit failed to produce a communique. The period ended with the JCP again basically neutral but more receptive to Soviet overtures.

These developments are not at all clear on the Chinese side. Most of what can be said about Chinese policy has to be deduced second hand from the affect of this policy on JCP actions and state-

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ments. Ostensibly throughout this period, and even after the split for several months into the next phase, the Chinese were openly supporting the JCP as a leader of the Japanese struggle movement, against the interference in JCP affairs of the CPSU. It is not until late 1966 that Chinese moves against the main stream of the JCP become visible. We can only, therefore, review the events of these three years briefly, drawing what inferences we can in terms of Chinese policy inputs to them.

In January 1963, a delegation of the JCP was received in Peking by Mao, Liu, and T'eng. Mainichi on 10 January noted that Akahata was giving equal space to both Chinese and Soviet polemics, but that debate within party circles was strong and that the neutralists within the main stream were having difficulty resisting demands from the pro-Peking factions for a more positive stand. An Akahata editorial on 24 January was still denying any split, but by the end of the month Asahi reported that pro-Soviet party members were being purged, largely because they were guilty of factional activities, trying to split the party, and not submitting to party discipline. The pro-Peking groups were simply being more circumspect and less factional. Akahata in its 26 February issue reaffirmed its neutral position, but was slightly more hostile to revisionism than to dogmatism, again on the grounds of the revisionists anti-party

278 Mainichi 10 Jan 1963.  
279 Akahata, 31 Jan 1963.
activities. China proved its friendship and anti-splittist role by publishing in March, with much fanfare, a flattering history of the JCP and a collection of JCP speeches, and by a major radio attack on the anti-party activities of the revisionists in April. In May another JCP book was published in Peking. The JCP reciprocated by supporting China and opposing the test ban treaty during the 9th WC in August 1963.

In September a JCP delegation was again given flattering treatment, seeing both Mao and T'eng during its visit. No communique was issued on the group's departure, and on the 29th Chairman Nosaka of the JCP was explicitly neutral in remarks on the Sino-Soviet split. In reporting on the CCP 7th Plenum in November, however, the JCP took a line which clearly raised revisionism as a greater danger than dogmatism.

In March 1964 a delegation from the JCP visited Moscow, stopping in Peking enroute and on the way home. At both times China

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281 Radio Peking NCNA 23 Apr 1963.
286 Akahata, 10 Nov 1963.
mounted huge, banner waving receptions for the visitors. On 25 March, NCNA reprinted a major Japanese speech claiming leadership for the JCP in the Japanese struggle movement, a speech which was actually given a month previously. The delegation also made a side trips to Pyongyang and Hanoi from Peking, as well as widely publicized tours in South China with major Chinese Communists as hosts all along the route. Again, however, no communique was issued on their final departure.

This wooing apparently paid off, however. In May the JCP delegations voted against ratification of the test ban treaty by Japan, and the JCP members of both houses who broke party discipline to vote for ratification were expelled by the Party. (They were later to join and promote a separate pro-Soviet organization called the Voice of Japan, but it never amounted to much.) In June 1964, the JCP also publicly opposed the CPSU call for an international conference to ex-communicate the Chinese from the movement.

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NCNA Peking 23 Mar 1964, SCMP 3187 p. 22.


289 NCNA Peking 27 Mar 1964, SCMP 3189 p. 41.
NCNA Shenyang 3 Apr 1964, SCMP 3194 p. 29.
NCNA Peking 5 Apr 1964, SCMP 3195 p. 29.
NCNA Peking 10 Apr 1964, SCMP 3199 p. 25.


In July, Akahata finally came out in the open with a series of letters the JCP had exchanged with the CPSU, each growing more critical as the JCP rejected Soviet calls for cooperation against the CCP. The letters were dated 6 March 1963, 22 October 1963, and 10 January 1964, and revealed that the Soviet pressure on the JCP was deeply resented. In the same issue justification was given for JCP opposition to the test ban and the international conference. The paper did not, however, balance its anti-CPSU attacks with any pro-CCP material. While leaning away from one party to the split, it was still resisting leaning toward the other. At the 10th WC on atom bombs in August, the JCP again stood with the CCP organizationally, although it did not participate in the anti-Soviet polemics.

In September the JCP Secretary-General Miyamoto paid another visit to China, where the welcome was more fulsome than ever. He spoke with every leader of importance including Mao, and the toasts were reported in unusual detail and completeness and were unusually warm. Yet in a TV interview on his return to Japan, Miyamoto would only say that he regretted the Sino-Soviet split, wanted to restore unity, and attacked only the Shiga Voice of Japan group, noting that Moscow was quoting Shiga's speeches.

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293 Akahata, 22 Jul 1964.
295 NCNA Peking 9 Sep 1964, SCMP 3298 p. 34. NCNA Peking 10 Sep 1964, SCMP 3298 p. 34. NCNA Peking 13 Sep 1964, SCMP 3301 p. 24.
296 Tokyo domestic television service, 23 Sep 1964.
A Central Committee plenum in September confirmed the expulsion of the pro-Soviet faction leaders on the grounds of their acting as Soviet agents and permitting interference in internal party affairs. In October, the JCP officially supported the Chinese explosion of a nuclear device. Hakamada, a leader of the mainstream faction with pro-Peking tendencies, gave a secret speech on 17 October, in which he explicitly accused Krushchev of financing the Voice of Japan group through a CPSU representative in the Soviet Tokyo Embassy. The results of this plenum included the most anti-Soviet statements of the era. Revisionism was characterized as becoming more and more dangerous, and struggle against it more and more important; attacks on China and Albania were denounced; Yugoslavia was attacked by name for revisionism; the interference of "certain members" of the CPSU in internal JCP affairs was denounced; the Soviet capitulation over the Cuban missile crisis was denied; the call for an international communist conference was opposed; and Zhukov was denounced for splittist activities during his stay in Tokyo in the Spring of 1963.

This plenum was preparatory to the JCP 9th Congress held in November 1964, to which P'eng Chen was invited, and whose being denied an entry permit signalled a violent CCP attack on the new Sato government. Failing a delegation, the CCP sent a series of messages

299 Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 5 Dec 1964.
300 Akahata, 6 Nov 1964.
of support, including one from Mao himself. The messages were highly flattering. The Congress approved the plenum's proposed line and confirmed the expulsion of the anti-Party groups, but re-elected an essentially neutralist slate of officers, with only the slightest pro-Peking caste.

Miyamoto was again in China in February and March 1965, and again left without a communique being issued. In April an editorial in Ta Kung Pao praised the JCP stand opposing the US actions in Vietnam and Sato's concurrence in the US actions. In Djakarta in May the JCP and CCP delegations exchanged calls, the substance of which was not reported. In June a meeting was held in Peking. None of these meetings produced any reports, and in fact the silence from both Peking and Tokyo was almost unprecedented. The first indication of a policy development for the entire year was a speech by Miyamoto published in Akahata for 2 July 1965, in which he noted JCP agreement with the CCP on the subject of US imperialism, but in which he emphatically denied that the JCP was a tool of the CCP. Thus in this critical year, when the hostility between Japan and China was growing on the official level, the Vietnam war was rapidly increasing in intensity, the Indonesian coup was to take place, and the

302 Akahata 4 and 9 Dec 1964.
303 NCNA Canton 6 Mar 1965, SCMP 3413 p. 36.
two parties were undergoing a considerable cooling of their relations.
At the 11th WC in August, at which Liu and Nan made their antagonistic remarks on Sato, the JCP were hospitable to their Chinese guests but notably silent in the debate that occurred.  

Satomi Hakamada, the pro-Peking central executive and secretariat member of the JCP was in Peking from 14 August to 2 October, without a word being published as a consequence of his visit.  

Except for ceremonial announcements (like a JCP man's speech at the anti-ROK treaty rally in November) the year ended with the unusual silence between the two parties almost unbroken. Later events have led some observers to speculate that the year must have been spent in hard discussions between the two parties, especially over Vietnam policy, but as yet there is no real evidence to support this speculation.

On 15 January 1966, The Japan Times announced that a major visit to China was planned by Miyamoto for mid-February. On 4 February, Akahata printed an editorial supporting "United Action", that is universal Communist cooperation, against the US in Vietnam, a policy clearly on the Soviet side which had already been denounced by Peking. Thus even before his trip, which was to seal the split between the two parties, Miyamoto had reversed the partial pro-Peking attitude of a year before.

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307 NCNA Peking 11 Aug 1965, SCMP 3518 p. 18. This is a typical example of several similar articles. The JCP is hardly even mentioned.
The Cultural Revolution Phase 1966-1969

I have described 1965 as a year of transition in Chinese policy towards Japan, transition towards a freezing of relations. It must be emphasized that by this I meant a freezing of the status quo, and not in any sense a break in relations or a decline in the volume of those relations. As far as government-to-government relations are concerned, the best way to characterize the four years 1966 to 1969 is refusal on the part of the Chinese to make any more concessions in the way of economic ties, unless the Japanese made some major political concessions. Also, in return for keeping the existing level of trade, they exacted more in the way of propagandistic support for their international views. Their hostility to the SATO government itself became more shrill and virulent as the decade drew to a close, but none of this significantly reduced the level of trade between the two nations, which was after all what the Japanese were mainly concerned with.

In inter-party relations the situation was quite different, and we shall again consider these matters separately. It is sufficient to say here that during this period the JSP regained a great deal of its favor with China, while the JCP became more and more publicly estranged from it.

February and March 1966 saw a whole series of extremely critical articles in the Chinese press on Japan. We have already mentioned the 4 February article. There were others on February
10th and 27th, and March 15th, 19th, and 29th. All of the editorials, articles, and speeches at rallies emphasized Japanese militarism and its combination with other hostile forces, including the United State, the Soviet Union, India, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam, and all saw these various combinations as aggressive conspiracies planning war against China. Yet the bitterness and virulence of these general propaganda attacks was not as disruptive of actual relations between the two countries as disagreement over specific issues. Liao Cheng-chih had requested from Sasaki an invitation to the JSP convention in March, and been duly invited as a representative of the PRC Institute of Foreign Affairs. The government, in accordance with its usual practise of refusing foreign participation in domestic political party congresses whenever possible, refused Liao an entry permit. The Chinese reaction was quick, violent and prolonged, and included an equation of Sato with Tojo by the most authoritative of China's pseudonymous authors.

The result was a cancellation of a scheduled visit to China by a group of LDP Diet representatives. 314

This hard line also affected trade negotiations, if not trade volume. An unofficial representative of a Japanese government-sponsored trade office returned from Peking on 31 March complaining that he had been treated like a tourist, that China was going to shift some of its trade away from Japan to Western Europe, and was threatening to retaliate against Japanese newspapers if they carried through their plans to open offices in Taipei. 315 In a message to Matsumura Kenzo, Liao Cheng-chih agreed to discuss in general the future of the LT agreement only on the condition that Matsumura not bring up his pet idea of being a bridge between China and the US. 316

In the negotiations themselves, Chou took a very hard line on Sato while agreeing in principle that the LT agreement would be extended. 317

All this evidence of a Chinese shift to a more intransigent attitude, which has since been attributed to the growing intensity of the Cultural Revolution in China, was only related explicitly to the Cultural Revolution for the first time on 27 May, when a delegation of the Japan China Friendship Association first publicly praised the Cultural Revolution and the thought of Mao Tse-tung. 318

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316 Tokyo Mainichi, 30 Apr 1966.
   NCNA Peking 19 May 1966, SCMP 3704 pp. 29, 30.
318 NCNA Canton 27 May 1966, SCMP 3709 p. 49.
ment for such obeisance became more and more stringent after this, both from friendship and cultural delegations and from trading delegations. From this time on, in fact, press item which once would have noted only "cordial and friendly talks", contained formalistic references to the Cultural Revolution, Mao-think, or both. Growing Chinese militance was also reflected by the hard and (to the Japanese government) insulting and interfering line taken by a friendship delegation from Kwangtung Province which visited Japan in May and June. In one speech they made an obvious if only an implied reference to Sato as a lackey of the US, language not used before by Chinese while visiting in Japan. More explicitly, a group of Chinese correspondents gave a press conference in Tokyo accusing Sato of "lies" and "slander" in referring to their coverage of anti-submarine demonstrations as interference in Japanese political affairs. Prior to this, Chinese in Japan had been fairly careful about giving Japanese authorities cause to complain. Not wishing to exacerbate the increasingly difficult relation, the Sato government ignored these incidents, as they did a later one in the same vein when the Chinese head of the LT liaison office in Tokyo denounced bitterly Japan's refusal of an entry permit for Liu Ning-yi to attend the 12th WC. This same refusal of Liu's visit, when coupled with a US-

319 NCNA Tokyo 31 May 1966, SCMP 3711 p. 32.
322 NCNA Peking 27 Jul 1966, SCMP 3750 p. 35.
NCNA Tokyo 29 Jul 1966, SCMP 3752 p. 35.
Japan security conference at Hakone and a visit by the Soviet official Gromyko, produced a series of propaganda attacks against the Sato foreign policy. The most thorough of these attacks charged that the US, the USSR, and Japan had formed a new "Holy Alliance" against revolution and especially against China.

The group of LDP Diet representatives which had cancelled their visit in March finally went to Peking in August and September. In talks with them, Chou and Ch'en Yi took a rather strong anti-Sato line, but made some ambiguous remarks about the potential for US-Chinese relations which emphasized that substantive policy was much less militant than the words in which it was cloaked. Chou also announced that trade talks in the fall on extension of the LT agreement were still desired by China, and that he expected step by step improvement in relations towards diplomatic recognition, although this was expressed more in terms of long range hopes than immediate expectations.

During all this relatively high level political maneuvering and posturing, the substance of economic relations proceeded at a relatively stable pace. Negotiations for individual contracts continued

323 NCNA Peking 27 Jul 1966, SCMP 3750 p. 35.
NCNA Peking 28 Jul 1966, SCMP 3751 p. 27.
324 NCNA Peking 31 Jul 1966, SCMP 3753 p. 29.
327 Tokyo Yomiuri 26 Sep 1966.
with hard bargaining but no real stubbornness on either side. Friendly trade in particular was progressing nicely, probably because "friendly companies" were not reticent about giving lip service to Mao-thought, the Cultural Revolution, and the three political and commercial principles. This was especially noteworthy at the Chinese fair in Kitakyushu in October and the Japanese fair in Shanghai in December. What confusion and disruption did exist in this period in friendly trade was largely a matter of CCP-JCP hostility which will be discussed later.

Negotiations for the final year (1967) of the original LT agreement began in November as scheduled. They were held up by a Chinese demand for Japan to buy more rice than it wanted in return for Chinese fertilizer purchases, but there was no indication of political demands affecting the talks in any way, and an agreement was signed on the 21st. In talks with an economic delegation in December, in Peking to discuss specific contracts under the LT agreement, Ch'en Yi emphasized the political conditions necessary for trade expansion, that is progress toward diplomatic recognition. He characterized Sato as the worst premier yet from China's point of


329 NCNA Peking 3 Nov 1966, SCMP 3817 p. 35.

view and urged the Japanese businessmen to use their influence to propose a more cooperative policy to the Japanese government.\footnote{Jiji News Service 13 Dec 1966.} This was one of the most explicit moves yet by the Chinese to remove the distinction which had existed till then between LT trade and Friendly trade, or to attach political and propagandistic demands to LT trade.

In January 1967 there occurred the first instances of physical disruption of trade because of the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese head of the LT liaison office returned to Peking for his health on the 10th (ideological health?).\footnote{Jiji News Service 10 Jan 1967.} Export delays, due primarily to shipping problems, were reported\footnote{Jiji News Service 12 Jan 1967. Kyodo News Service 14 Jan 1967.} and traders experienced some difficulty in conducting negotiations on specific contracts.\footnote{Asahi Evening News, 13 Jan 1967.} Sports exchanges were also postponed because of the upheavals in China at the time.\footnote{Kyodo News Service, 14 Feb 1967.} Another indication of internal problems in China affecting Japanese relations was the appearance of a Red Guard article in \textit{Jen Min Jih Pao} attacking Sato with the usual charges of militarist, one of the earliest indications that the party and the Foreign Ministry were not the only participants in foreign policy making at this time.\footnote{NCNA Peking, 5 Mar 1967, SCMP 3894 p. 24.}
The spring of 1967 saw a gradually increasing militancy in the details of Sino-Japanese relations. A major attack was mounted on Japanese restrictions on products to be displayed at the Tientsin fair (17 items out of several thousand were prohibited by Sato because of CHINCOM rules) and Japanese traders had to display considerable indignation with Sato before the fair was opened.  

Similarly traders at the Canton fair were required to carry Mao's *Little Red Book* with them.  

In July Ch'en Yi told Utsonomiya that while China wanted trade to continue after the LT agreement expired, the time was not yet ripe for negotiations on an extension. 

Accordingly talks were postponed for two months, pending Japanese concessions on EIB credits and willingness to buy more Chinese meat (which the Japanese didn't want because of sanitary problems).  

In late July, six Japanese businessmen were interrogated by Red Guard groups who searched their houses and offices, and finally arrested them for spying.  

Other businessmen, mostly from friendly companies, could not get their residence permits extended.

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Akahata 24 May 1967.  
NCNA Tientsin 1 Jun 1967, SCMP 3953 p. 36.  
341 Tokyo Domestic Television Service, 4 Jul 1967  
Yomiuri, 26 Jul 1967.
during this time as China sought to reduce the foreign presence in Peking. Attacks on Japan for the usual offenses, official visits to other Asian nations and refusals of entry to some Chinese visitors, were most pronounced during this period from Chinese trade organizations, rather than newspaper editors and columnists. Among these the Chinese head of the Tokyo LT liaison office was most vociferous, particularly over Japanese police interference in rioting between pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese groups of the Japanese left.

The Japanese press came under attack at the same time. Three newspapers' correspondents were expelled for anti-Chinese activities. Yomiuri's sponsorship of an exhibition of Tibetan art, attended by the Dalai Lama, was attacked as an anti-Chinese act and its correspondents were expelled from Peking. Significantly the announcement of the correspondents' expulsion was made by the head of the LT liaison office in Peking, just as the most virulent denunciation of Sato's trip to Southeast Asia came from the head of the Tokyo LT liaison office.

Negotiations for a new agreement or an extension of the LT agreement were not even officially mentioned during the fall months.

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344 NCNA Tokyo 8 Sep 1967, SCMP 4020 p. 33.
345 NCNA Peking 10 Sep 1967, SCMP 4021 p. 32.
346 NCNA Lhasa 26 Sep 1967, SCMP 4031 p. 32.
   NCNA Tokyo 28 Sep 1967, SCMP 4033 p. 29.
   NCNA Peking 12 Oct 1967, SCMP 4043 p. 35.
347 NCNA Tokyo, 8 Sep 1967, SCMP 4020 p. 33.
In October Jen Min Jih Pao called Sato "the number one running dog of US Imperialism" and Soviet revisionism because of his Southeast Asia trip. Sato's talks with President Johnson in November brought an equivalent series of charges and attacks, as did the visit of Chiang Ching-kuo in December and Japanese police searches of offices of the Japan International Trade Promotion Association (friendly trade coordinator). Yet at the same time Yawata Iron & Steel was invited to deal at Canton for contracts, without any pretense of "friendly" cover. During this whole period, when China was resisting public negotiations on extension of the LT agreement, and friendly firms were required to be more and more friendly, other firms were permitted to trade without any political conditions at all. And the final result of all this was essentially that aggregate Chinese trade with Japan was hardly affected by the Cultural Revolution at all. It is significant that at this peak of intransigence China was willing to be quite so flexible.

In January 1968 the Chinese finally indicated a willingness to begin talks on extending the LT agreement. Chou En-lai told a group of visiting JSP delegates (the channel indicating clearly who was in favor with Peking at the time) that negotiators would be

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349 NCNA Peking 21 Nov 1967, SCMP 4066 p. 32.
NCNA Kwangchou 27 Nov 1967, SCMP 4069 p. 35.
NCNA Tokyo 4 Dec 1967, SCMP 4076 p. 35.
351 Nihon Keizai, 29 Nov 1967.
welcome. According to the socialists, he said that China desired trade and was unhappy with Japanese reluctance. He also told them China was genuinely concerned about a revival of Japanese militarism. According to Japan's major financial newspaper, however, the reason for the shift may have been more some signs that Japanese industrial circles were prepared to pressure Sato for concessions. These signs included a resolution asking Sato to announce a definite pro-trade policy, renounce the Yoshida letter finally and unequivocally, and remove other "political" obstacles to trade. Whatever the reason negotiators left Tokyo before the month was out, and their entry permits were granted by Peking, even though Sato's only statement on long term credits was that they would be handled on a case by case basis, neither affirming nor denying the Yoshida letter.

The negotiations were the most difficult ever as far as the Japanese were concerned. They lasted from 3 February 1968 to 6 March, and were characterized by repeated Chinese demands for public acceptance of the three political principles before economics

352  Nihon Keizai, 24 Jan 1968.
353  NCNA 18 Jan 1968, SCMP 4105 p. 27.
354  Asahi, 21 Jan 1968.
could even be discussed. When the negotiators gave in on public agreement with China's views (that economics and trade were inseparable and that Sato's government was the main obstacle to trade) the Chinese became demanding on the trade issue itself, insisting that Japan agree to buy more rice and meat. An agreement was finally signed on 6 March, together with a joint statement which agreed to the three political and three commercial principles, that economics and politics were inseparable, that the primary obstacles to trade were US imperialism and the Japanese authorities, and that the Japanese would make efforts to overcome these obstacles. In essence, this was putting LT trade into the same category as friendly trade propagandistically if not organizationally. (Friendly trade was still run by left-dominated Japanese trade associations with much more direct ties to Chinese policies.) The communique was officially denounced by the Sato government, and the working out of details of the trade agreement continued for several months more, but the formal existence of an agreement to some degree reinstated

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the conditions which had been temporarily in abeyance during the last half of 1967 at the height of the Cultural Revolution. Trade went on and polemics continued. Disruptions did not completely end, however. Chou requested cancellation of the fairs planned for China in 1968 because China was "too busy" to have them. 360

The polemics covered the usual topics during this period. Among the targets were all Japanese relations with other non-Communist Asian states and the Japanese defense industry and Self Defence Force, 361 Suharto's visit to Japan in April, 362 Japanese nuclear energy programs, 363 and repression of anti-US demonstrations. 364 A new topic, soon to become one of the most frequently mentioned, was Sato's "scheme" to maintain the US Security Treaty in 1970. 365 A high point of the tirade during this period was the article by Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator on 20 April. 366 This article hit all the major themes from political and commercial principles to Taiwan visits. Sato was called the most reactionary of all postwar premiers.

At the same time, however, and for the first time since the Djakarta talks in April 1965, ambassadorial level contacts between the two countries were begun in third countries, among them Laos

361 NCNA Peking 26 Jan 1968, SCMP 4110 p. 16.
362 NCNA Tokyo 3 Apr 1968, SCMP 4154 p. 29.
364 NCNA Peking 11 Apr 1968, SCMP 4159 p. 34.
365 NCNA Peking 10 Apr 1968, SCMP 4158 p. 27.
366 SCMP 4164, p. 18.
and Switzerland. The Chinese never publicized these talks, and the Japanese only admitted them when the press leaked the story. No substance was ever reported on the discussions. The mere fact that such talks did take place, however, indicates some easing in China's stance at this time.

The remainder of 1968 was relatively uneventful. China was indeed busy at home with little time or energy to devote to foreign affairs. The polemics continued but were much less frequent than usual. The volume of LT trade for 1968 was finally fixed in June and Japanese traders at Canton continued to praise the thoughts of Mao. There were also isolated "struggles" against Japanese newsmen and an occasional arrest. The year ended with a blast at Sato for sabotaging trade by adhering to the CHINCOM restrictions on the display of certain products at an industrial exhibition scheduled for 1969.

1969 was almost a replay of 1968. Trade negotiations were delayed and frequently stalled by Chinese demands for Japanese self-criticism, but finally settled with the issuance of a joint statement

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368 NCNA Peking 6 Jul 1968, SCMP 4215 p. 28.
NCNA Peking 5 Dec 1968, SCMP 4316 p. 33.
NCNA Peking 20 Dec 1968, SCMP 4326 p. 18.
369 Jiji News Service 7 Jun 1968.
370 Kyodo News Service, 10 Jun 1968.
371 NCNA Peking 29 Dec 1968, SCMP 4331 p. 28.
which the Japanese government then repudiated. Talks on the extension of the LT agreement did not begin until 19 February, when the chief Chinese negotiator made a speech insisting on the three political and commercial principles and the inseparability of politics and economics, and accusing the Sato government of frantically accelerating militarism and fascism, tailing after US imperialism, and suppressing the people's just and patriotic struggle. 372 On 4 April an agreement and a joint statement were signed which acceded to China's views of the situation, but which went even further than the 1968 statement in admitting Japan's fault in all problems between the two countries. It even went so far as to state that Peking was the only legal government of China, that Taiwan was the inviolable territory of China, and that the US Security treaty was a serious threat to the peace of all Asia and an obstacle to Sino-Japanese relations which the traders would work hard to abrogate. 373

Exhibitors at the Peking industrial fair, no doubt at Chinese instigation, actually initiated a suit against the Japanese government's restrictions on products 374 and participated in demonstrations when the exhibit opened accusing Sato of obstructing trade and being hostile to China. 375 One sign that Chinese militance had not really eased was the cancellation of the scheduled Shanghai fair, not because China was too busy but because of Sato's continued adherence to the CHINCOM

373 NCNA Peking 4 Apr 1969, SCMP 4393 p. 35.
restrictions. Pure trade issues were also difficult to settle during 1969. Chinese demands that Japan accept more meat were strong and repeated and ultimately Japan found a way to accede to them. In pite of all of this, contracts were signed and trade did continue during the year.

Polemics during 1969 continued at a high level of intensity. Foreign affairs continued to be the main subject, but the Security Treaty was attacked more frequently, and the university riots and the anti-riot bills were new items. Commentator, for example, in an early article praised the demonstrators highly and explicitly approved of the use of violent tactics against government suppression, while condemning the counter-revolutionary violence of the police. Much of this rhetoric was directed at the JCP, as we shall see when we discuss inter-party relations. Sato's comments on Okinawa as a Japanese defense base drew a strong rebuke, as did his frequent other remarks on defense leading up to talks on Okinawa reversion, and his reception of a Taiwanese ambassador. This last generated a promise to "sooner or later settle accounts for the crimes of aggression against Taiwan and the 700 million Chinese people". Collusion with

379 NCNA Peking 11 Feb 1969, SCMP 4361 p. 27.
381 NCNA Peking 28 Feb 1969, SCMP 4320 p. 23.
382 Ibid.
the Soviet revisionists was another favorite topic, especially after
the Sino-Soviet border incidents began. The polemics built up
during the year until the climax in November when the Nixon-Sato
communique on the reversion of Okinawa was issued. The volume
of attacks produced by this communique was unique, although the
intensity of the invective was by no means unprecedented. The
thrust of them all was, of course, that the whole thing was a trick,
and that Okinawa was not only not going to revert, but that the real
reason for the agreement was to open up Japan itself to nuclear
weapons while at the same time wining votes to keep Sato in office.

Informal remarks by Chinese officials, especially Chou
En-lai, to Japanese visitors during the year reinforced the impressions
given by the polemics and the hard-nosed trade stance. Talking to the
chief Japanese LT negotiator in April, Chou refused to accept an in-
formal ambassador from Sato, insisted on an end to the CHINCOM
restrictions, and state that trade could not expand until relations were
improved. To Utsonomiya Chou again refused to accept the proferred
ambassador (former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama), and em-
phasized that his main reason for a hard line was that no real progress

383 NCNA Peking 27 May 1969, SCMP 4429 p. 28.
 NCNA Peking 26 Nov 1969, SCMP 4549 p. 27.
 NCNA Peking 28 Nov 1969, SCMP 4550 pp. 40, 42, 44.
had been made in Sino-Japanese relations since 1960, that all the step-by-step improvements had turned out to be just window dressing. 386

Sporadic attacks on Japanese in China also continued during the year. In May four Japanese traders were arrested in Canton, two for "political" reasons, and two for urinating in public. 387 Another correspondent was arrested for espionage, but was expelled rather than imprisoned. 388 While the Cultural Revolution was supposed to be over in China, there was no discernible easing of the militancy of its posture towards Japan. The decade ended in 1969 with no sign that the policies of the 1966 to 1969 period were changing or even about to change. Hence the recitation of events must cease at this point without our being able to close out a phase in Sino-Japanese relation.

**Interparty relations JSP-CCP, 1966-1969.** In the previous phase, we have seen how the Chinese hard line disrupted its relations with the JSP during and after the 1965 anti-bomb conference in August, causing a hiatus in relations for the last half of 1965. This attitude on the part of the Chinese was dramatically reversed at the beginning of 1966. As CCP relations with the JCP suddenly worsened in February and their ties to the ruling party became more difficult, China turned to the JSP as its main source of contacts and support in Japan,

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386 Kyodo News Service 12 Apr 1969.
and thereafter ties between the CCP and JSP remained generally very close for the rest of the decade. As usual, their ties were strongest with the leftist factions of the JSP, and the rightist factions tried to avoid too close a tie, but the party as a whole was definitely pro-Chinese for this entire phase of Sino-Japanese relations.

That the JSP was worth cultivating was brought home to the Chinese when the pro-Peking factional leader Sasaki was reelected to the chairmanship on 22 January 1966. In February, Liao Cheng-chih wrote to Sasaki, asking him for an invitation to visit a forthcoming JSP conference in Japan. In March a Japanese newspaper reported that China was urging the JSP to try to reunite the anti-bomb movement or face the total loss of Chinese support. These urgings were to remain for a while a long range affair, however, as the Sato government refused to permit Chinese visits to the JSP, a refusal which brought a predictable attack from the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs, the organization of which Liao was head, and from Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator. The refusal was also the subject of a meeting for young Japanese Socialists visiting Peking, and for a message of support from China to a Tokyo rally objecting

391 Yomiuri, 8 Mar 1966.
394 NCNA Peking 5 Apr 1966, SCMP 3675 p. 34.
to the visa denial. The joint statement signed by the young socialists on 22 April probably represents what the Chinese would like to have obtained from a visit to JSP headquarters in Japan, namely a memorial to Asanuma and his famous statement, as well as a statement of support for North Vietnam not in terms of the then current Soviet line of "united action". This statement can be seen as a clear differentiation between the JSP and JCP in early 1966, with the former being wooed to replace the latter as champions of the CPR. That at least some elements within the JSP were more than willing is testified to by the visit of a delegation of JSP "activists" to China in May and June, during which they contributed to the chorus of praise for the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution. At the same time JSP headquarters in Tokyo announced a new drive for diplomatic recognition of mainland China.

In August 1966 the improvement of CCP-JSP ties continued on several levels. A group of JSP Diet representatives spent three weeks in China, where they were given strictly VIP treatment, being received and banqueted by Liao and Ch'en yi, and taking a tour of South China. Simultaneously a group of Chinese youth were present

NCNA Peking 8 Apr 1968, SCMP 3677 p. 41.
396 NCNA Peking 22 Apr 1966, SCMP 3685 p. 34.
NCNA Peking 13 Aug 1966, SCMP 3763 p. 35.
at a youth festival sponsored by the JSP and Young Socialist League in Tokyo. 400

The Dietmen's trip became the cause of a donnybrook within the party. The leading representative, Tate Kenejiro of the Sasaki faction, was much too anti-Soviet and pro-Cultural Revolution to suit the rightest and neutralist factions of the party. They charged the Sasaki faction was being sucked in by the Chinese to replace the JCP as China's fifth column in Japan. 401 In view of the frequent mention around this time of the need for revolution to keep US troops tied down and to thereby prevent a US attack on China, the "fifth column" metaphor was not too inappropriate. This was re-emphasized as young Japanese, mainly from the Socialist Youth League, attended the Second China Japan Youth Festival in China, which occupied itself largely with Red Guard demonstrations in praise of the Thought of Mao. 402 When the Japanese government limited the number of exit permits for Japanese to attend the youth festival, the Peking press raised the level of its invective, to the point where a Red Guard article praised Japanese youth for "rising in revolt" against the Sato government. 403

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402 NCNA Peking 17 Sep 1966, SCMP 3785 p. 34.
403 NCNA Peking 22 Sep 1966, SCMP 3789 pp. 28, 29.
   NCNA Peking 23 Sep 1966, SCMP 3789 p. 31.
In September the fractionalization of the front organizations in Japan began. The "friendly" trade organizations were divided into two: the JCP dominated Japan China Trade Promotion Association and the mixed Japan International Trade Promotion Association, which had JCP, JSP, and LDP membership. On 18 September, a minute signed by the latter group in Peking thoroughly adopted the current Chinese line (praise for the Cultural Revolution and Mao thought, condemnation for Sato, US imperialism, and Soviet revisionism, support for the three political and three commercial principles) and at the same time attacked the former organization for anti-Chinese hostility, promising to assume all the coordinating functions formerly carried out by both organizations. This splittist movement extended to the Japan China Friendship Association in October, when the JSP and left JCP members walked out and formed their own organization, thenceforth known to the Chinese as the Japan China Friendship Association (Orthodox). In November the split extended to most other front organizations, including Afro-Asian solidarity, women's league, and journalists. These splits had their violent moments, beginning with a riot between JCP and JSP activists at the Chinese industrial exhibition in Nagoya in November 1966, riots initiated over the attempt of the JCP to stop the sale of Mao Thought

404 NCNA Peking 18 Sep 1966, SCMP 3786 p. 39.
propaganda items, and the attempt of the pro-Peking JSP to stop the JCP. The violence brought a rebuke to the JCP from Narita for obstructing Sino-Japanese relations. 

Another evidence of China's wooing of the JSP was the visit of a delegation from the ACFTU to SOHYO in December 1966. The line they took was a very soft one, to cool the resentments they had generated the previous year in arrogantly demanding support for China's nuclear policy. They agreed to accept SOHYO's disagreement with their nuclear policy, and on an expanded personnel visit exchange. On the 6th, Sasaki was reelected chairman of the JSP, but Eda managed to get over 48 percent of the votes, to Sasaki's less than 52 percent. Clearly the pro-Peking wing had only a bare majority, nothing like the general consensus needed to control in Japanese organizations.

For the next several months, the JSP pro-Peking fronts continued to lend themselves to the Chinese propaganda machine, which now attacked the usual targets plus the "handful of obstructionists" and "betrayers" in the un-named JCP. This propaganda extended to violence once again in March, when a riot occurred at the Tokyo headquarters of several of the Chinese fronts. Polemics on these

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408 Akahata, 3 Dec 1966.
410 Mainichi, 5 Dec 1966.
412 Akahata, 2 Mar 1967.
NCNA Tokyo 7 Mar 1967, SCMP 3896 p. 22.
riots contained the first attacks on the JCP by name. By May Chinese polemics had settled on the "four enemies" as standard topics of attack: US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, Japanese reactionaries, and the Miyamoto clique of betrayers, targets to be repeatedly referred to in minutes, communiques, and joint statements signed by visiting JSP led front delegations. 412

This alliance of the JSP with China was obnoxious not only to the JCP but also to the moderate factions of the JSP. In late May these two groups met to seek ways of avoiding a split in their domestic collaboration in local elections. 413 Eda publicly called on the JSP to stop issuing pro-Peking circulars, 414 and in June Akahata urged Narita to annul the pro-Peking circulars being published by his party. 415 But Sasaki was still in command, and in July was demanding the government approve entry permits for Chinese to attend the JCFA(O) convention. 416 This was, however, his last major act as Chairman. In August he was forced to retire, and in new elections Katsumata (of the Narita faction) and Eda were elected, bringing an end to the domination of the pro-Peking wing of the JSP. Katsumata began his chairmanship with a call for "Japanese-oriented socialism", a clear call for neutrality

415 Akahata, 10 Jun 1967.
in the Sino-Soviet and CCP-JCP splits. This did not stop individual JSP members from continuing their activities in the pro-Peking fronts, nor from visiting China and signing propaganda statements as individuals or as members of the JCFA(O) or JITPA; it did mean an end to official party support for pro-Peking causes. JSP official cooperation had, however, played an important temporary role in maintaining Chinese influence in Japan after the JCP split, and while the revolutionary left of the JCP was getting organized.

In January 1968 the Chinese tried to revive their ties with the JSP leadership. A JSP delegation visiting Peking was urged by Chou En-lai to increase their militance, to overcome the factionalism within the party, and to form a united front with the left JCP and the pro-Peking "new right" in the LDP to oppose Sato's revival of militarism. Chou also chose this group to carry a message back to Japan that he was ready to talk about extending the LT agreement. The JSP response was ambiguous. Although keeping to its desire to stay out of the JCP-CCP invective exchange, it did renew its call for diplomatic recognition of mainland China in a campaign begun in April. It also made the point that this campaign would not be tied organizationally to the JCFA(O). Chinese acceptance of this limited effort signalled to an anti-Sato article on 20 April which praised the JSP for

418 Nihon Keizai, 24 Jan 1968.
Asahi, 21 Jan 1968.
Kyodo News Service 29 Jan 1968.
419 Tokyo Shimbun, 9 Apr 1968.
Kyodo News Service 24 Apr 1968.
its opposition to Sato's policies.\footnote{NCNA Peking 20 Apr 1968, SCMP 4614 p. 19.} This limited support and limited neutrality did not satisfy the JCP however.\footnote{Akahata, 23 Sep 1968.} Akahata in September printed a bitter article denouncing the JSP for splitting the anti-Sato forces and allying itself with the CCP.\footnote{Akahata, 23 Sep 1968.} JSP neutrality was reinforced in October, when Narita and Eda were elected as Chairman and Secretary-General respectively, in a convention which studiously avoided any mention of China.\footnote{Japan Quarterly, Vol. 16, no. 1, Jan-Mar 1969, Chronology.} The JSP continued this neutral policy for several months, and in fact has made no major change as of the end of 1969. The only two events of significance during the year were an article in Akahata on 9 April pleading with the JSP to break officially with the JCFA(O), which Narita refused to do, and a letter from the JSP to Chou En-lai which tacitly restricted JSP cooperation to the campaign for diplomatic recognition, a letter much resented by the pro-Peking Heiwa Doshikai faction.\footnote{Yomiuri 31 Jul 1969.}

Interparty relations 1966-69, CCP-JCP. The split between the JCP and the CCP that developed during the course of 1966 and 1967 has been well described already by Simon and Kyosuke, and need not be repeated in detail here.\footnote{Kyosuke Hirotu, "Trouble Between Comrades", Current Scene, Vol. 5, no. 4, 15 Mar 1967. Sheldon W. Simon, "Maoism and Inter-Party Relations: Peking's Alienation of the Japanese Communist Party", China Quarterly, No. 35, Jul-Sep 1968.} The rift was a result of disaffection on both sides:
the JCP was disturbed over the results of the Indonesian coup d'etat attempt in 1965, remembering its own experience with a radical line resulting from COMINFORM orders in 1950. It was also becoming convinced that the Mao-Lin line was completely inappropriate to Japanese conditions, that Japan was in no sense part of the "world countryside", and that the "parliamentary road" was probably the only road the JCP could take to power. The Chinese, as the Cultural Revolution increased in intensity, more and more demanded positive anti-Soviet steps on the part of those parties friendly to it, steps which the JCP was unwilling to make. Thus from the time of the March 1966 Miyamoto meeting with Mao, in which Mao refused to issue a compromise communique worked out by Liu, T'eng, and Miyamoto, relations gradually cooled between the two parties, with veiled attacks beginning in the summer of 1966, and finally open and direct polemics in the spring and summer of 1967. It is noteworthy that the JCP did not initiate the open polemics, preferring when possible to avoid a public split, but did defend itself when the Chinese began to attack them in public and by name. As 1967 drew to a close, China has switched to a policy supporting the JSP, and pro-Peking factions within the LDP and JCP, and the JCP was openly and avowedly neutral, refusing to support either side of the Sino-Soviet split.

In 1968, however, as the Chinese gave more and more support to leftist factions in Japan who were making a concerted drive on the JCP, Miyamoto and the JCP main stream found themselves being pushed into the Soviets' arms in self-defense, and their neutrality has since been eroded to the point where they may be characterized as
moderately pro-Soviet. In internal Japanese politics this has meant emphasis on peaceful revolution, the parliamentary road, economic reform, and opposition to the violent tactics of the new left. Chinese tactics have essentially concentrated on varied and broad front support for all anti-JCP forces in the left camp of Japan. We can now review the details of developments which occurred in 1968 and 1969, after the two articles cited above were written.

An article in Jen Min Jih Pao in January 1968 reviewed the development of a revolutionary left mass movement in the preceding year, based on the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and predicted continued growth in the movement and the violent struggle of this movement against Japanese reactionaries and their "cohorts" (the JCP). 425 The same month Suslov and Kirilenko arrived in Tokyo, on the invitation of the JCP, to open formal talks between the two parties. 426 On 8 February, Akahata printed a communique which, while preserving the JCP's formal independence and autonomy (they still refused to attend an international conference to excommunicate the CCP from the movement), nevertheless represented a rapprochement between the CPSU and the JCP. They agreed to maintain close relations. China's reaction was a charge that JCP was a Second International revisionist party and an attack on JCP talk of Japan's justification for maintaining an independent self-defense force. 427

In March 1968, a branch of the revolutionary left (calling itself the JCP Left) was formed in Tokyo, joining those previously formed in Osaka, Yamaguchi Prefecture, and other areas in the southwest of Japan. Akahata replied on 10 March by publicizing the fact that China pays its front organizations with trade concessions in order to get them to follow its propaganda line. In the same month occurred an incident which showed up Chinese tactics very clearly. The JCP had argued against turning a planned national railroad strike into a violent confrontation, and urged the holding of the strike on a non-violent basis. China's press quickly picked this up and charged that the JCP was opposed to the strike in toto, thus revealing its reactionary, anti-worker character.\(^\text{428}\) The JCP was forced on the defensive and could do little else but issue a denial which did not reduce the effect of the Chinese charge on many elements in the Japanese left.\(^\text{429}\) The following month, however, the JCP made a few points more effectively. They complained about cooperation between the JCP left with the Sasaki faction of the JSP in southwest Japan. At the same time they charged that two years previously Liao Cheng-chih had told a group of visiting Japanese educators that students should "rise up in arms" to overthrow the reactionary Sato regime,\(^\text{430}\) and that in April 1968 a pro-Peking JCFA(O) member had quoted Chou En-lai as stating there hadn't been enough blood at a recent demonstration in Japan.


\(^{429}\)Akahata, 26 Mar 1968.

\(^{430}\)Akahata, 15 Apr 1968.
Chou was quoted as saying "the number of victims was too small" to arouse the populace. The same month a delegation left for Moscow to open a liaison office there.

The CCP-JCP split became essentially a contest for control of the leftist movement in Japan. In May Miyamoto made a major bid for a united action front of all leftists to bring about the abrogation of the US security treaty. He also stepped up his campaign to attract nationalist sentiment in Japan by repeating his support in principle for a position of armed neutrality, including readiness to form an independent self defense force. He attacked violence and "Trotskyites" as bad tactics which gave the government an excuse for repressive counter-action, and characterizing the JSP-CCP tie as a form of flunkeyism.

The high point of the JCP-CPSU rapprochement came in mid-August with a communique from Moscow promising to expand cooperation between the two parties in the future, but the trend towards support of the Soviet Union was brought to a rapid halt by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 21 September Akahata made a blistering attack on the Soviet Union for the invasion, and on the Voice of Japan faction (ex-JCP right) for supporting the Soviets' actions in

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431 Akahata, 22 Apr 1968.
432 Nihon Keizai, 19 Apr 1968.
433 Akahata, 29 May 1968.
434 Japan Times, 19 May 1968.
435 Jiji News Service, 10 Jun 1968.
East Europe. This event returned the JCP squarely to the autonomous-independent camp in the international communist movement, a position from which it has never strayed since.

The same month Akahata again attacked the JSP for being Chinese flunkeys, and replied to a blast from Peking about its "following the parliamentary road", by reminding the Chinese that Japan had learned the lessons of ultra-leftist adventurism and violence in 1950, and was not about to repeat the mistake.

In November there was a spurt of propaganda from Peking, quoting its friends in Japan in their praise for the decisions of the Chinese Central Committee Plenum of that month, and trying to give the impression that all true leftists in Japan supported China's policies. Akahata maintained a studious silence. In December Jen Min Jih Pao's Commentator accused Miyamoto of collusion with Japanese reactionaries in seeking an anti-Chinese Russo-Japanese alliance.

In January 1969, Miyamoto's opposition to the student rioting was used by the Chinese to accuse him of being a tool of US imperialist repression of Japanese liberties. At the same time an article

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436 Akahata, 23 Sep 1968.
437 Akahata, 20 Sep 1968.
NCNA Peking 12 Nov 1968, SCMP 4301 p. 29.  
NCNA Peking 14 Nov 1968, SCMP 4302 p. 35.  
NCNA Peking 27 Jan 1969, SCMP 4351 p. 27.
by a "group of workers" was printed on the need to "smash the parliamentary road and the legal struggle." The JCP maintained silence this time. In March, it reinforced its neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split by condemning both sides equally for the border incidents. In April it returned to the attack, accusing the Chinese Ninth Party Congress of having undemocratically installed the Maoist "Junta" in power, and again attacking the Japanese "Trotskyites" for needless and provocative violence. It also attacked the LDP for truckling to China in signing the 1969 LT agreement with its fawning communique. Again attacking violence and "Trotskyites", Akahata accused the NCNA of trying to turn Okinawa Day celebrations into a bloody riot which would antagonize the masses and damage the struggle for socialism. It attacked the designation of Lin Piao as Mao's heir, the new constitution passed by the Ninth CCP Congress as undemocratic and a result of Mao's packing of the central committee. They also again pleaded with the JSP to break with the JCFA(O) and return to support of the JCFA. The Chinese reaction

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442 Akahata, 9 Mar 1969.
443 Akahata, 2 Apr 1969.
444 Akahata, 5 Apr 1969.
445 Akahata, 7 Apr 1969.
446 Akahata, 15 Apr 1969.
447 Akahata, 29 Apr 1969.
448 Ibid.
449 Akahata, 9 Apr 1969.
to all of this was to ignore Akahata, and reprint congratulatory articles written by pro-Peking leftists.  

In July and August the JCP reaffirmed its neutrality by refusing to attend a Moscow conference and repeating its attack on the Soviet Union for its Czechoslovakian policy. It also attacked Radio Peking for Trotskyite adventurism in supporting violent demonstrations. Miyamoto also made an attempt to reunite the anti-bomb movement in August, but the three separate organizations held three separate meetings. The decade ended with Japanese leftists hopelessly divided into a number of mutually antagonistic groups and with the JCP itself maintaining an autonomous stand in the movement, its only foreign allies being the Koreans, the Italians, and the Rumanians.

450 NCNA Peking 19 May 1969, SCMP 4423 pp. 22, 23.  
452 Akahata, 29 Jul 1969.
IV

SINO-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS

From the review of Sino-Japanese relations during the nineteen sixties presented in the last chapter, it is obvious that trade between the two countries makes up a large portion of their relations. If one takes a materialistic viewpoint, trade makes up the largest portion of the substance of relations: relatively insubstantial propaganda and polemics are the only competitors for importance, with cultural relations taking a distinctly minor place in the scheme. Indeed, we have characterized the most stable, productive, and close phase of relations in the nineteen sixties by the operation of the Liao-Takaski Memorandum Trade Agreement.

Trade is also important because the Japanese say it is. It is their explicit desire to be free to conduct mutually beneficial trade with China to the maximum extent possible, without at the same time involving them in difficulties with other nations with whom they have close ties, the United States and the Republic of China. This is the policy repeatedly expressed by all post-occupation prime ministers: the "separation of politics and economics". The importance of this phrase is increased by explicit Chinese denial of the possibility of separating politics and economics, insisting on combining the two, and at different times and under various circumstances forcefully merging the two in their trade negotiations with Japan.
A look at Sino-Japanese relations inevitably raises the question of whether politics and economics can in fact be separated, whether China will let Japan benefit from trade relations without paying a political price. A first attempt to answer this question involves reviewing the history of trade between the two countries, seeking for evidence that points in one way or the other. Unfortunately there is a multitude of evidence pointing in both ways. The whole idea of "friendly trade" is that companies wishing to trade with China must pay a political price: financial support for pro-Chinese organizations and fronts in Japan, domestic political pressure on the Japanese government to adopt policies the Chinese want, public expressions of friendship for China, support for China's views, praise for China's accomplishments, and kowtows to Mao's thought. This same concept applies to non-friendly, or LT trade, only more subtly and less publicly (at least until 1968 when the distinction between friendly and LT trade began to break down). In return for LT trade, China clearly hopes that big business circles would put the opportunity for profit ahead of their ideological objections to communism, and seek to move Japan away from the US and toward China. The public rationale for permitting LT trade given by the Chinese was that it would help in fostering and making easier gradual steps to a closer political relationship between the two countries.

Evidence on the other side is less clear but equally compelling. Several times Chinese leaders have tied potential increases in trade with Japan to economic conditions within China, saying something to
the effect that "a good harvest this year enables us to trade more". Similarly many observers of the Chinese scene have noted that the Chinese need some goods from overseas, and they need to sell their own goods to earn foreign exchange to pay for imports. Trade is desired by China, irrespective of the fact that they want to use it to extract political concessions. The conclusive evidence, however, is the LT agreement itself. The Chinese did permit trade to increase rapidly between 1963 and 1966, at a time when the Japanese made no particular concessions to them in political terms.

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**Annual total trade figures in millions of dollars:**

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c. Source Japan Finance Ministry

d. Source *Japan Economic Yearbook 1967*, Oriental Economist

e. Source *Japan Economic Yearbook 1968*, Oriental Economist

The most dramatic single event in this area itself points both ways. The cancellation of contracts for a freighter and a vinylon plant in the spring of 1965 because of Japanese "hostility" can be adduced as evidence that trade is ultimately a political tool for China. Yet it is equally valid to argue that, since China couldn't get good credit terms to buy these two items, they simply could not afford them on the terms they were offered. They therefore cancelled them primarily for economic reasons no matter what public face they put upon their action.

If analysis of the facts of Sino-Japanese trade does not help answer the question, the same can be said for the facts we have on the domestic Chinese economy. In this realm, however, the cause of the difficulty is largely the utter insufficiency of data and information. In an issue of *Communist Affairs* which devoted a major amount of space to this very question, three of the most authoritative analysts of the Chinese economy concluded that there are domestic constraints on China's trade which play a large but undetermined and, ultimately, indeterminable role in forming Chinese trade policy. The extent of this role is ultimately unknowable because foreign trade is, after all, a very small part of overall Chinese economic activity, and the reliability and accuracy of the data available are so poor that the total foreign trade could be comprehended within the margin for error which must be allowed in dealing with the data. 2

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It seems valid to conclude, therefore, that the question has no answer which we can get at with any degree of reliability. If this is so, then perhaps we are really asking the wrong question to begin with. What, after all, does "the separation of politics and economics" really mean. By any ordinary definition of the term politics, it is clear that China and Japan do have a political relationship with each other. The only relationship they don't have is the formal diplomatic one in which ambassadors are mutually exchanged and officially received. What the Japanese government means by their slogan, then, can be nothing more than a desire to trade with China, while at the same time not establishing diplomatic relations with Peking and breaking them with Taipei. By contrasting, then, economic and formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, it is not at all difficult to make some kind of an answer to the question of the relation between the two.

First, it is clear that Japan has no desire to break with Taipei and establish relationships with Peking unless it has to. It is unhappy with the present dilemma, but fears it less than possibilities of trade disruption which would result from action to break out of it. Second, China has made it equally clear that it will use trade offers and trade threats to gain a maximum of concessions, but without going to the extreme of presenting Japan with an ultimatum of "no recognition, no trade". To do so would be to reduce its ability to exert pressure on Japan through trade channels. Given the overwhelming importance of Japan's trade with western countries, any posing of the issue in terms
of either one or the other could have but one answer in terms of Japan's best interests. Such a confrontation would be foolish for China. Trade policy is not likely to be the determinant of the question of diplomatic recognition.

Japan will one day see it in her interest to reverse the present situation of formal relations with Taipei and informal relations with Peking (in a recent address one authoritative American observer of the Asian scene expected this to occur by the middle seventies). But when it does so it will be a political decision for political reasons, and it will reflect the changing political realities of Asian international politics and not the result of a Chinese trade policies.
SELECTED ANALYSES OF CHINA'S JAPAN POLICY

Perspectives on international politics. A careful reading of the policy statements about Japan in the Chinese press for the past ten years reveals a considerable amount of consistency and continuity in Chinese foreign policy. That this period encompassed eras in which China was controlled by competing sections of its elite at different times underscores the consistencies. (In a subsequent section of this chapter the differences in policy between the Maoist and non-Maoist phases will be discussed.) Comparison of this decade with the conclusions of scholars who have studied preceding decades also emphasizes the continuities in basic Chinese foreign policy.

The first major theme, in terms of the frequency of its mention and the intensity of its exposition, is the desire to remove United States influence from Japan, from Northeast Asia, and in fact from Asia as a whole. China has consistently demanded abrogation of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the expulsion of all US military forces from the Japanese islands. She has consistently objected to every incident of consultation, cooperation, or even discussion between the United States and Japan in matters pertaining to defense, security, or strategy. She has repeatedly condemned economic ties between the United States and Japan as being hostile to China, imperialistic as regards to Asia as a whole, and as a means whereby the US maintains its control of
Japan and carries out its aggressive designs on Asia through its domination of Japanese monopoly capitalists. Whether Japanese capitalists are seen as willing or unwilling tools of the US depends upon the circumstances and attitudes of the moment. China has consistently characterized every aspect of US-Japanese relations during this decade as imperialistic, exploitative, aggressive, and as a continuation of the Occupation.

A similar, though more recent concern of the PRC has been Japanese cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union. This concern only became overt after the public rift between China and the USSR in 1963. Since that time articles, editorials, and other comments have objected to Russo-Japanese ties with almost the frequency of US-Japanese ties. In the matter of intensity, some of the language used to refer to the Soviet Union has exceeded that used to refer to the US. Again, every aspect of Russo-Japanese relations has been attacked: trade, political talks, air transport agreements, fisheries agreements, economic aid, cooperation in Siberia, etc. All such events have been seen as displaying hostility towards China, of representing collusion or conspiracy directed against China.

The same consistency is evident in Chinese views on Japan's relations with lesser powers in Asia. In every case Japan's foreign dealings have been attacked: with South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, Tibet, Southeast Asia in general, Australia and New Zealand, and the Phillipines. The attack has covered every aspect of these relations: strategic, political, trade, cultural, and economic aid.
Objection has been voiced whether these relations are in an Asian or a world context, whether multilateral or bilateral. In every case these relations are viewed as hostile to China, as indications of either Japanese or (through Japan) US aggressiveness and warmongering. I cannot find one single instance in the primary materials of the sixties in which China remarked on Japan's foreign dealings with other Asian powers either favorably or indifferently.

The only relationship between Japan and the rest of the world upon which China has looked with favor is that of a four non-aggression pact between China, Japan, the US, and the Soviet Union, an eventuality which is not distinguished at this point in Asian history by its degree of likelihood or feasibility.

I conclude, therefore, that China wishes Japan to have no foreign relations except with China. It can be argued that the existence of the US treaty, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and Japan's aggressive history make such a stance reasonable and understandable for China. My answer is that if an honest and genuine security concern were behind China's position on this subject, it would be obviously to its benefit to encourage peaceful and non-threatening ties between Japan and other Asian states which would reduce Japanese dependence upon either the US or the Soviet Union, and would lower the incentives for Japan to build up its own military forces. It has done nothing of the sort.

China's stated positions on Japan's foreign relations resemble nothing so much as Stalin's views on foreign relations among the East European
satellites and between them and Western powers in the period from 1945 to 1953, a period when it was easier to go from Czechoslovakia to West Germany than it was to go from Prague to Warsaw.

This policy of China's can be looked at from several perspectives: the classical Chinese tribute system, traditional balance of power politics, or the world revolution. From any of these perspectives it is inescapable that China wants and hopes to achieve hegemony in Asia, to prevent any other major Asian power from enhancing its role through alliance or cooperation with other Asian or non-Asian powers. Whether China wishes to conquer other Asian powers in the traditional sense of the word is not the point. It is that, by whatever means is necessary and appropriate, China wishes to exercise a controlling veto on any ties between Japan and the outside world. Japan's foreign policies, in short, must be satisfactory to China. They are only likely to be satisfactory if they are to a large measure coordinated with and subservient to China's own foreign policies, and are in no sense competitive or conflicting with them.

This may strike the reader as an extreme conclusion, so I must emphasize that I am speaking here about what I believe China would like to see develop. I am not referring to a situation which I think China is going to actively pursue by any and all means. After all, it could be argued that a dominant influence over the foreign policies of neighboring states would be the secret wish of diplomats in Washington as well as Peking. The wish is neither case is likely
to be father to deeds of an extreme nature. Nevertheless the fact of the wish (what at least I believe to be a fact) is important for one major reason: it shows that China and Japan are not likely to achieve any kind of harmony of policies and programs except in the case of domination of one by the other. In the nature of things today Japan and China are and will indefinitely remain rivals for influence in Asia, not to speak of the world at large, and that any true rapprochement or detente between the two major Asian powers is likely to be limited in either time or scope or both, and in fact is extremely unlikely except in the event of a major threat to both developing from a single external source which both perceive to be a common threat and a serious one. Such an eventuality is clearly what China means to foreshadow in its constant iteration of the 1959 Asanuma statement that US imperialism is the common enemy of China and Japan. But not even the JSP really believe this in any operational or strategic sense.

**Perspectives on Japan's domestic politics.** During the past ten years China has concerned itself with, and been under no compunctions to express itself about, almost every aspect of Japan's domestic life. It has expressed opinions on legislation before the Diet, cases before the Supreme Court, decisions of the Cabinet, and acts of the various executive departments. In articles and editorials in the party press, in messages from various official and semi-official mass or functional organizations, in speeches before mass rallies held in Peking, in speeches given by visitors in Japan, and in conversations with Japanese
visitors to China, all reported and publicized in both Japanese and English by NCNA, China has attacked some aspects of Japan's domestic life, praised others, and actively supported some groups against others in domestic Japanese conflicts and controversies. It has repeatedly provided moral and verbal support to a wide variety of domestic protestors, dissenters, and rioters. Through its sponsorship of "friendly" trading companies it has helped provide financial support to leftist groups either engaged in or supporting or organizing demonstrations. Through direct contacts, both in China and Japan, between its own and Japan's leftist youth organizations it has participated in the indoctrination of young militant radicals. Through public pronouncements, private manipulations, and the bestowal of trade privileges it has sought to influence the policy and personnel of Japan's three major political parties. In brief, short of actual physical force, China has used every modern technique of organization and communications to interfere directly and substantively in Japan's domestic affairs.

In the majority of these cases, but by no means all, China's concern has been with domestic matters having foreign policy implications; but all of these interpositions can be categorized as support for opposition, dissent, or revolution against the authorities, conformity, and stability, for parties of the left against parties of the right; for socialist decisions against capitalist decisions. More significant, China's support has been for causes and organizations which are in sympathy with its own current interpretation of the correct general line, rather than leftist causes in general.
I believe that these facts of the past decade, taken together with the explicit statements of Mao, Lin and others, lead to the inescapable conclusion that China wants, is working for, and in the long run expects a revolution in Japan which will overthrow the existing government and constitution and put in their place a government and constitution similar to that of China itself, a government which will coordinate its domestic as well as its international policies with China.

Again it is important to note that there is no indication of any intent on the part of the Chinese to use any means to achieve this end other than those it has already used up to this time. In every case in which threats of force have been either explicit or implicit, including mention of nuclear weapons, the subject has been purely international (particularly with regard to the use of US bases for operations in Asia) or with reference to the plans and equipment of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. In no case have such threats been used where the subject matter was purely domestic.

It could be argued that what I have described above does not represent China's maximum program or goal for Japan, but is only a Chinese reaction to what it sees as the present danger to its own security created by the US presence in Japan and the gradual rebuilding of Japan's own military forces. Such an argument would interpret Chinese interference in Japan during the past decade as merely a means to a much more immediate and more limited end, namely the expulsion of United States forces from Japan, an end to the US-Japanese alliance, and pending that development maximum inhibitions on the use of either
Japanese or US military forces in Northeast Asia. Chinese support of anti-US demonstrations can be interpreted as attempts to reduce the level of US military presence and circumscribe US freedom to use its forces; attacks on various laws before the Diet can be seen in turn as helping to prevent the government from interfering in those anti-US demonstrations. Maneuvering to bring about a defeat of the LDP in favor of the JSP can be seen as an effort to install a government which would be more likely to abrogate the Security Treaty and expel US military forces. Such an argument would deny that China's maximum program has any substantive interest in Japan's domestic politics, and that domestic interference today has a purely international purpose.

The answer to this argument lies in Chinese actions today vis-a-vis the Japan Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party. Both these parties have repeatedly expressed, and worked towards the implementation of policies which would meet every reasonable security interest of the PRC. Yet in the case of the JCP, as soon as it adopted a position which was opposed to that of China with respect to Vietnam, that is "united action" within the international communist movement against the US war in Vietnam and a "parliamentary road" to the achievement of socialism in Japan, China immediately mounted a massive attempt to force it to change those policies, and failing at that, to build a new leftist movement in Japan which would compete with and, eventually, supplant the JCP as the "vanguard" of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist united front. With regard to the JSP, China has consistently condemned the JSP policy of "positive neutralism"
in international policies and "structural reform" in domestic politics, both policies which, if implemented, could represent no conceivable threat to China's essential security interests. The only time China has been willing to ally itself with a faction of the Japanese left which did not give complete concurrence with Chinese policies was during 1967 and 1968 when the Narita faction of the JSP was in power in the party, a period when the break with the JCP was complete and thorough and before the JCP left groups were organized and operating. This was the period when the potential allies for China in Japan's political life were limited to the Narita led JSP and China had little choice but to accept an ally which was in general though not complete agreement with China's policy positions.

Chinese views with respect to Komeito are very difficult to determine at this stage. I have found no specific reference to this party in any of the Chinese documents nor any mention of a Chinese policy toward Komeito in any secondary sources. This absence of a stated policy may be due to Chinese uncertainty as to the real intent of Komeito similar to our own ignorance on the matter. But it is fairly clear the Komeito does oppose the US Security Treaty, the presence of US military forces, and the growth of the Japanese military. If China's interests were in fact nothing more than her own security, one might expect her to express some approval of Komeito for advocating such policies. She has not.
China's words and actions with regard to the anti-bomb movement in Japan are equally indicative of its belief in its right to interfere in Japanese domestic politics. China has consistently demanded the right to exercise a veto over who may or may not attend the annual conferences, and over the resolutions to be discussed and passed at those conferences. When its demands have been ignored by the Japanese sponsors, it has refused to continue to participate and recalled its delegates to Peking for rallies and speeches putting forth its own line without opposition. One of the most blatant (and offensive to the Japanese left) acts or interference during the entire decade occurred in August 1965 when a delegate of the ACFTU in speaking before a SOHYO convention arrogantly demanded that SOHYO change its position on rather mild condemnation of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, and press the JSP to do likewise.

I do not believe a sense of threat to its own security interests can explain the totality of Chinese policies and program with respect to Japan's domestic policies in the past decade, although it can be considered related to many of them. Consequently I believe that the maximum Chinese goal does include what amounts to hegemony in Japan, in effect a role which is comparable to the role Japan tried to play in Manchuria and North China from 1900 to 1937, but without the use of military forces to support that role.
Foreign policy and domestic crises. The parallel shift in the fifties in domestic and foreign policy at the time of the Great Leap Forward inevitably raises the question of whether there has been a similar parallelism in the shifts of the sixties. Has the pendulum swung from moderation to extremism in both foreign and domestic affairs simultaneously? An immediate answer, based upon the obvious surface facts, must be affirmative.

As the Chinese moderated their domestic affairs from the end of the Great Leap Forward, they also became easier to deal with in Japan. From 1960 to 1963 as the radicalism of the Great Leap receded more and more into the background, China progressively lowered the political price for a resumption of trade relations. In 1963 and 1964 at the extreme rightward end of the swing, trade with Japan grew rapidly and with relatively little demand for political concessions in return. Propaganda and polemics were discernibly milder than theretofore, and less frequently involved personal vituperation against the Japanese prime minister as opposed to rather general attacks on un-named reactionaries. The united front which China urged be formed within Japan to struggle against US imperialism was extended to include almost everyone in Japan except the US ambassador and the ghost of Tojo. Japanese monopoly capitalists, although not identified as such, were wined and dined in Peking along with their more progressive compatriots, and Chinese officials like Nan Han-chen and Liao Cheng-chih were not averse to being seen and heard in what cannot be called anything but reactionary ruling circles.
As the Cultural Revolution gradually appeared in 1965, this aura of friendliness and accommodation began to disperse. At the very beginning of 1965, the contract for a vinylon plant was cancelled because of a denial of Export Import Bank funding, even though the year before a similar contract, also not funded by a low rate EIB credit, was carried out without demur. Attacks in the press on Japan became more virulent and more personal, and aimed at wider circles within Japan. Those who during the early sixties were seen as unfortunate tools of US imperialism, themselves suffering under the oppression of US monopoly capitalism, were more and more characterized as equally guilty and equally profiting and equally oppressive and aggressive with the US. Talk about the unbreakable friendship between the Chinese and Japanese people, was turned into talk about the iron will and unflinching resolve of 700 million Chinese to resist aggression, and prevent the rebirth of Japanese militarism.

As the Cultural Revolution set in in earnest in 1966 and succeeding years, the violence of the polemics increased, correspondents and businessmen were abused, arrested, and expelled, and visitors and traders were compelled to make formal obeisance to the thought of Mao Tse-tung and the excellence of the Cultural Revolution, and to admit the criminality of their own government's policies. From talk of struggle against imperialism, Jen Min Jih Pao began to talk of armed and violent struggle, and (at least so it was charged by Akahata) even such a moderate as Chou En-lai was reported to have been distressed because there weren't enough victims at a Japanese street demonstration.
There is another evidence of this parallelism in which Sino-Japanese relations are particularly illuminating. Most of the Cultural Revolution can be described in terms of the gradual ascendancy of the Mao-Lin line over the Liu-T'eng line as guides for Chinese policy, the former being more militant and less compromising than the latter. In the development of the dispute between the CCP and the JCP this duality of line and the predominance of one over the other is clear and unequivocal. The evidence is overwhelming that in 1965 the JCP began to have grave doubts about some aspects of the policy being recommended to it by Peking. It was concerned over the adventurism seemingly condoned by the Chinese in Indonesia, over the militancy of the Lin Piao thesis on people's war, over the growing pressures from China to raise the level of violence and militancy within Japan and decrease the effort to accomplish economic reforms and to progress toward socialism by parliamentary as well as extra-parliamentary methods. The JCP chose to make its stand on the issue of the correct road in terms of supporting "united action" of all socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, against the Americans in Vietnam. I think in this case the policy of united action can be taken as the symbol of a general line of relative detente in international politics, emphasizing peaceful coexistence rather than national liberation. In February 1966 Miyamoto went to China to try and sell this line to Peking, and made side trips to Hanoi and Pyongyang presumably to garner Vietnamese and Korean support for this proposal. In his negotiations with the CCP leadership he is reported to have succeeded in reaching a compromise
with Liu Shao-chi and T'eng Hsiao-ping, a compromise which was embodied in a communique to be issued on his return to Japan. Before he left, however, he spoke to Mao, and Mao flatly refused to authorize the compromise communique, preferring to issue none at all. Mao thus completely overruled Liu and T'eng in this matter.

Miyamoto came back to Japan and had his position approved by the central executive committee of the JCP, thus refusing himself to submit to Mao's will. In return by the end of the year the Chinese press began to make more and more overt attacks on the JCP, at the same time instituting a campaign to weaken the JCP by splitting all the front organizations which were its main source of funds, public support, and workers. By the Spring of 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution and the domestic attacks on the "capitalist roaders", the split with the JCP was total and public.

The point has been made that the decision on foreign policy in 1965 represented by the Lin Piao speech, was for a policy of strategic defense rather than offense, paralleled with an emphasis on irregular warfare to defend China against attack, rather than an emphasis on modernized armed forces to give China a more effective offensive military capability. In this analysis, the foreign policy associated with the Cultural Revolution is seen as verbally loud but actually restrained. In the matter of Sino-Japanese relations, however, I do not think this analysis is very enlightening. Chinese policy towards Japan has been about 99 percent verbal under all circumstances. At no time since the founding of the PRC has there been any visible sign of physical
aggression toward Japan. Hence with regard to Japan, as opposed to India, South-east Asia, or the Soviet Union, the increased militancy of the verbal war can be viewed as applying to Chinese overall policy toward Japan. It represented a political offensive and not just a defensive posture covered by bluster.

Effects of the Sino-Soviet split. The gradual development of public hostility between China and the Soviet Union during the sixties has been perhaps the most profound and widely significant event of the decade. It has produced a total rearrangement of the worldwide international power equation which is likely to continue to affect the whole world for some time to come. Japan, both as an Asian power and as a world power, has been no more immune to the effects of this development than any other state. We have already mentioned above very briefly one effect of the split, namely the Chinese fears of, and political attack against, any combination of Soviet and Japanese power in East Asia. The question now is what has been the total effect of the Sino-Soviet split upon Sino-Japanese relations.

The most obvious effect, and perhaps in the long run the most important for Japan has been the effect upon the Japan Communist Party. From a situation in which the JCP was a bona fide member of the international communist movement, subordinating some if not all of its policies and programs to the interests of the Soviet Union and China, there has arisen a situation in which the JCP is by and large an independent political party, concerned primarily with Japanese interest, although it still shares some general goals and policies with the major
socialist countries. These goals and policies are now interpreted in almost entirely Japanese terms and are concerned with the development of Japanese society and government for what they conceive of as the betterment of that society and government, rather than as the development of a pawn in the international power struggle to be played as Moscow or Peking might see fit. The direct consequence of this autonomy has been a change in the JCP from a party of revolution to a party of reform, from a party seeking a destruction of the existing polity to a party seeking to effect change within the existing polity. It would not be impermissible to speculate, I think, that this change in the programs and attitude of the JCP may in the next decade or so permit what heretofore has been impossible, a majority government of the left in Japan somewhat similar to the center left coalition which has been trying to govern Italy. This in turn could have profound and lasting effects on the entire future course of Japanese history. In terms of international relations this could mean, in the long run, a Japan adopting a distinctly more neutralist position between the US and China or between the US and the Soviet Union than is now the case.

A subsidiary effect of this JCP autonomy has been the rise of a new revolutionary left in Japan not under the somewhat restraining hands of the JCP. This too may prove to be a momentous development in Japanese politics, with consequences we cannot at all foresee now. It should be noted, however, that this new left in Japan is distinctly Maoist in ideology and probably has very close ties with China. The consequences of this are not really predictable. The militancy of the
new left may be controllable by China or it may not. As long as China maintains a militant posture on such matters as violent revolution it is likely that the interests of the new left and China will coincide. The possibility, however, that the pendulum in China will swing back towards moderation cannot be denied, and in that event the kind of relationship which will exist between the new left and China cannot even be guessed at today.

There is a certain amount of irony in this complex of developments within the Japanese left. None of them can be really regarded as having been intended by either China or the Soviet Union. It is fairly clear that the autonomous position of the JCP today is primarily a result of first Soviet and then Chinese truculence and intransigence. The JCP made every conceivable effort to avoid antagonizing either side in the split. They only moved towards one side or the other during the past decade when they felt it necessary to avoid the excessive interference in their own affairs being exerted by one of the competitors. The shift toward China in the early part of the decade was undoubtedly a result of Soviet meddling and insistence on JCP cooperation against China. The shift back toward the Soviet Union in the latter half of the decade was similarly almost entirely a result of the same tactics on the part of Peking: Had either or both been willing to leave the JCP in a position of neutrality between them, I have little doubt that such neutrality would not have developed into the independence and autonomy which is the case today.
The effects of the split on the Japan Socialist Party have been in some ways similar to its effects on the JCP, although of course the starting point and the process itself were quite different. The JSP was never a member of the international communist movement in any sense, and has always been primarily nationalistic and Japan centered. The only real tie between the JSP and either the Soviet Union or China has been the unique pro-Peking wing of the JSP, the Heiwa Doshikai. There has been no comparable pro-Soviet wing as there was in the JCP. The major ties between the JSP and the communist countries in general has been mainly a matter of similar views on ideology and politics and a consequent sympathy for communist interpretations and positions in the east-west conflict of the post-war years. This sympathy has played a definite role in the JSP's urging the government of Japan to adopt policies more in tune with those of China. The Sino-Soviet split, however, led to a Chinese attempt to establish considerably more influence within the JSP than any but the Heiwa Doshikai were willing to accept. The consequence has been a renewed determination on the part of the main stream of the JSP, now apparently in reasonably solid control of the party, to escape from the dragon's embrace and to maintain its policy of neutrality in the east-west conflict. Again the irony comes into play which I pointed to with respect to the JCP. Had China not tried so hard to achieve so much, she might have ended up with far more influence on the JSP than she now has.

As far as state relations as opposed to party relations are concerned, the Sino-Soviet split has had much less direct effect on Sino-
Japanese relations. The Soviet Union has done a great deal to woo Japanese friendship and cooperation during the past decade, and there is little doubt that the pace and the scope of these efforts has been affected by her dispute with China. But the China dispute has by no means been the only motivation behind Russia's diplomatic and economic offensive in Japan and it is unlikely that it has made a substantive difference in Soviet policy. It has, of course, meant opportunities for Japan to benefit from closer relations with the Soviet Union than might otherwise be the case.

The Chinese effort during the sixties can hardly be described as wooing in the same sense. Mao's comment on the justice of Japan's claim to the southern Kuriles hardly falls in this category. It was the very epitome of a self-serving and cheap way of posing as the friend of Japan. It meant a small propaganda success in Japan incidental to Mao's real aim, which was to indicate to the Soviet Union that making a fuss about borders was more dangerous to the Soviet Union than to China. It was an inexpensive statement because no one could ever really expect him to do anything to help Japan realize its claim.

Other than this one non-event (as I think it was) China has done no wooing at all. There is no evidence that the Chinese have ever said to Japan "don't deal with the Russians on such and such a matter, we will offer you a better deal". The Chinese response to the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement has been almost exclusively a political offensive to characterize Soviet-Japanese relations as hostile to China, collusive
and conspiratorial, and dangerous to Japan because likely to incur disastrous consequences or at least postpone indefinitely a rapprochement with China. Whereas Russia has offered the carrot, China has only brandished a stick (albeit a purely verbal one). The result does not seem to have vindicated China's tactics. Japan is and probably will continue to reap some economic and political benefits from Soviet policy, but does not seem to have been deterred from dealing with the Russians because of Chinese polemics. It is even possible to argue that China's intransigence has been so severe on this point that the Sato government has seen no likelihood of improving things by making concessions, and has therefore largely ignored the Chinese propaganda.

The past in this matter is, of course, no kind of guide to the future. Should China adopt more moderate policies during the seventies, including more in the way of economic and diplomatic competition with the Soviet Union for Japanese friendship, the results might be quite different from what they have been till now. This again, of course, is only speculation. The only solid result of the Sino-Soviet split which is likely to be irreversible for the next several years is the continuation of a state of affairs in which Japan is not faced with a combined Russo-Chinese hostile force, and in which, therefore, there is greater safety for Japan, greater opportunity for her to maneuver for her own benefit, and in the long run the prospect of a more pluralistic and fluid power situation in the whole of East Asia.
Japan's place in China's world. All communist states devote a great deal of time and verbiage to defining or prescribing the place of their foreign protagonists in an ideological schema. This is true of China with respect to Japan. Articles in theoretical journals are devoted to analyzing Japan for purposes of fitting it into the Marxist-Leninist schema. Similar definitions and ascriptions can be found implicitly in speeches and editorials which deal with specific problems or topics. Finally China's view of Japan can be inferred from specific policies and programs which are a part of China's actual foreign relations. A review of all these types of sources discloses that Japan's place in China's world is ambiguous.

In theoretical articles, Japan is fairly well defined as an advanced capitalist/imperialist country. She is seen as a country with a highly developed capitalist system, where the bourgeoisie are in firm command, and where capitalist concentration into monopoly capital has proceeded quite far. Frequent reference in economic analyses to the imminence of impending breakdown because of the intense number and level of antagonistic contradictions, make it clear that in purely theoretical terms at least, Japan is classed with the United States and western European countries. Among the important consequences of this classification are the belief that contradictions between Japan and other advanced capitalist nations, including the United States, are also highly antagonistic and likely to lead to conflict. Internally the high level of capitalist concentration also presupposes an advanced state of "immiseration" on the part of the masses, with an
accompanying advanced state of class consciousness in a well developed proletariat which ought thereby to be ripe for revolution, a revolution which it is China's proletarian internationalist duty to support and foster.

This is the ideological basis for much of China's word output on Japan especially the numerous editorials, articles, and messages from Chinese mass organizations supporting various aspects of the Japanese people's "struggle". The demonstrations against US bases, nuclear powered submarine visits, continuation of the Security Treaty, "repressive" Diet legislation proposal, treaties and agreements with Taiwan and South Korea, student riots, demonstrations, and campus occupations, and the more violent and prolonged labor disputes are all seen as both evidence of the internal contradictions and as means for heightening the class consciousness of the masses in preparation for the socialist revolution.

In this perspective, the main enemy must of course be identified as the Japanese monopoly capitalists and the instruments of the state power which they control, as well as the foreign power which props up that class and those instruments, the United States. The support which the US gives also is convenient as an explanation of why the socialist revolution has not already occurred and, even though the country is ripe for it, probably will not occur very soon. Thus there is no need to allude to theories of protracted conflict or guerrilla warfare to justify the need and expectation of a long and difficult struggle before the revolution takes place.
This image of Japan is reinforced by Chinese comments on Japan's role in Asia. Seeing Japan as a political and commercial rival to her own influence in the less developed countries of Asia, China can attack Japan's foreign activities as aspects of the exploitative imperialism common to an advanced capitalist nation. In almost every article or editorial condemning Japanese dealings with Korea, Taiwan, or the countries of South-east Asia, there is some reference to imperialist aggression, capitalist exploitation, revival of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", or the like. Japan's participation in the Asian Bank and the Mekong project, for example, have been characterized as both evidence of her "dream of domination" and as ways for Japan to dump her surplus production and export her surplus capital.

This view of Japan was not totally inconsistent with another temporary view of her, namely as a country of the "second intermediate zone" in Mao's intermediate zones policy of the mid-sixties. It is perfectly legitimate in Marxism-Leninism to differentiate between the bad and the worse, to put nations on a scale of hostility, and to pick out one nation above all others as the main enemy. Having done so it is perfectly legitimate, as China briefly did, to cooperate with lesser enemies like France and Japan, against the main enemy, the United States. This policy was maintained explicitly by China for only a very short time, and was then dropped when no other countries of this second intermediate zone followed France in breaking with Taiwan and recognizing Peking. It has nonetheless continued to be current
in Chinese foreign policy toward Japan, as well as to some of the countries of western Europe. China still from time to time holds out the offer of friendship and collaboration with the Japanese state as now constituted, in return for cooperation in opposing the main enemy of the era. This is one of the justifications for China's continued dealings, uneven as they may be, with individuals of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, and its unofficial dealings with the government of Japan with regard to matters of trade, shipping, fisheries, postal services, air transport, and other functional activities. The changes in Chinese tactics over the course of the decade also reinforce this image. Since dealing with capitalists always has something of the character of "rightist deviation" one would expect that an intermediate zones type of policy would occur during relatively moderate phases, and that in radical and leftist phases such a policy would recede from prominence. That has been the case during the sixties. It must be emphasized, however, that this is not an on-off, either-or type of situation. Chinese policy operates on many levels and in many directions at all times. Leftism and rightism are matters of emphasis and concentration. Even at the peak of radicalism during the Cultural Revolution, when relations with Japan and the LDP were becoming increasingly strained, it was still clear that China was willing to deal with Japan, and refrain from pushing her maximum program with respect to Japan, as long as the possibility of driving a wedge between Japan and the US existed. The decline in relations was never brought to the point of a complete break and total refusal to deal with the Japanese capitalists.
I think this general view of Japan as an advanced capitalist country, but one with whom a temporary alliance is possible in order to concentrate on the main enemy, is the primary image on the basis of which China decides most of her policy questions. I think it has been the primary view for the entire history of China since 1949, and will very likely remain dominant for several years to come. But it is not the only image which China has of Japan. Japan is also an Asian country, a colored country, and a country which was once subject to Western colonialism. There is also, therefore, a tendency in Chinese policy to categorize Japan with the Afro-Asian world, or Mao's third intermediate zone, rather than with the advanced world. (It should be noted that the matter of color has never been explicitly referred to by the Chinese in its relations with Japan. Many of its phrases however imply a sense of racial community, and the Chinese have never to my knowledge objected when Japanese like Matsumura Kenzo have explicitly alluded to their common racial status.) At Peking rallies, banquets, and other ceremonial occasions, the Japanese are almost always on the same platforms with other Afro-Asian countries. Japanese members of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee are among the more frequent visitors to Peking, as well as participants in congresses of Afro-Asian writers, journalists, youth, etc. One of the major figures in Sino-Japanese affairs, at least during the early sixties before the Cultural Revolution, was Liao Cheng-chih, a high official on the Chinese Afro-Asian Committee. Considerable effort was expended during the early days of the Sino-Soviet split in getting Japan to agree
to attend the abortive Second Bandung conference as an Afro-Asian power, regardless of its status as a developed capitalist country solidly in the capitalist bloc.

Undoubtedly much of this effort at dealing with Japan as ex-colonial rather than colonialist is a matter of taking what allies one can find and not bothering too much about the niceties. More likely however, is it seen as one very good way to split Japan off from Western Europe and the United States. Japan's national and racial pride may be less outspoken than it was during the thirties, but it is real and present in Japan today, and is one factor unifying the major targets of Chinese pressure - the JSP and the old China hands of the LDP. By concentrating propaganda on the common interests of Asian nations against those of Western nations, China sees the possibility of striking damaging blows at US influence in Japan. The fact that this cannot easily be reconciled with the socio-economic classification of Japan is simply ignored.

Japan's capitalist status is also ignored in one of the major propaganda themes which has been directed at Japan over the decade, the need for a mass united front of all classes and groups to oppose the alliance with the US and its various instruments. China has had no compunctions about including in this proposed united front the biggest capitalists in Japan. Indeed at times it seems that the united front she would like to see formed would include everyone in the country except the prime minister himself, and since 1966, the Communist Party. The subordination of an anti-capitalist revolution as a goal to
that of expelling the United States troops and ending the alliance is clear from every piece of primary documentation I have reviewed for this study.

One aspect of the JCP-CCP split is instructive in this regard. As a part of its general policy decision in 1965, China chose to mount a campaign to publicize the imminence of a US invasion of the mainland, probably as part of the Vietnam war effort. This was partly aimed, no doubt, at building up a martial spirit within the country and a willingness on the part of the Chinese people to accept extreme measures. It may also have been intended in part to deter the US from making any such attack by warning us that they were ready for us.

As far as Japan was concerned, however, one corollary of this policy was a demand by China that the JCP get ready for an armed revolution in Japan to so upset the situation in Japan as to prevent the US from using Japan as a base for operations against the mainland. JCP leaders were frankly appalled at the thought of mounting an armed revolution at that time. They remembered the 1950 fiasco which had resulted in the long term disruption of their party organization and hence their prolonged ineffectiveness during most of the fifties. They observed the consequences of extreme steps taken in Indonesia in the same year and they were totally convinced that the Japanese situation was in no way ripe for revolution. They therefore refused to follow Mao's lead in this, and this refusal was one of the major reasons for the split which developed between the two parties in the last half of the decade. China was clearly willing to sacrifice the JCP and what the JCP saw as the
best policy for the circumstances, in order to protect China against what was in itself a phony threat which they had created themselves out of whole cloth for reasons of their own. As a result the JCP lost its status in China's eyes as the vanguard of their proposed united front, a status then ascribed to the revolutionary left splinter organizations which sprang up after the JCP-CCP split. Even under these circumstances, however, China did not end its talk of a united front, nor did it exclude large capitalists from potential membership.

Having spoken of the ideologically phrased image of Japan held by China's leaders, brief mention of more traditional Chinese images are appropriate. These images are still real, even in a Communist China, and they are not necessarily inconsistent with the ideological image. The cultural affinity needs no extensive discussion: China is conscious of it as is Japan. Both are conscious, too, that culturally Japan has always been peripheral to China, in a sense subordinate (tributary if you will), and not a rival or equal competitor. China would see nothing improper in a state of affairs which saw Japan as younger brother showing filial respect and obedience to elder brother. China should lead, Japan should follow.

Japan has on occasion, however, been a very unruly and unfilial younger brother. China has not forgotten the Japanese aggressions in the past hundred years, and has a healthy respect for Japanese military potential. While frequently expressing a willingness to forgive and forget, while emphasizing the eternal friendship between the two
peoples, China continues to view Japan's rearmament with considerable alarm, and loses no opportunity to attack it. Conversely China does not forget that she herself has never really made a serious attempt to invade and conquer Japan, and frequently plays on the theme of her own peace-loving nature, her self-sufficiency and total lack of incentive to ever become a serious military threat to Japan. This attitude (it has seldom been explicit enough to be called a policy) has indeed been well understood and largely accepted in Japan, where fear of Chinese military invasion is all but non-existent. Even when threats of military action have been made, as in China's remarks about US bases making Japan into a nuclear target, she has succeeded in not arousing any fear of an attack upon Japan itself. And it is probably true that China does not see Japan as a potential invader under any but the most remote contingencies.

In summary, China sees Japan as a potential enemy, both ideologically and traditionally, but distinctly subordinate in danger to the main enemy of the era, the United States, and hence a potential temporary ally against the United States.
VI

CONCLUSIONS

The overwhelming weight of evidence in the history of the past ten years of Sino-Japanese relations must be thrown onto the side of continuity of purposes and goals in Chinese policy, and against any significant changes in either. Although the tactics with which these goals are pursued may vary in the combination employed at any given time, or in their tone and militancy, there is little sign that the substance of Chinese policy toward Japan has changed, even over the course of the last twenty years. These goals are a combination derivable from traditional *raison d'état*, and ideological interests and values, with the emphasis on the latter two. More exactly, *raison d'état* supplies the major goals, but they are expounded, explained, and justified in ideological terms.

We have not considered Japanese goals and interests in this paper to any extent, but it is fairly safe to assume that they are essentially based on similar considerations of national interest: a desire for prestige and influence in Asia and the world commensurate with their economic power, access to the world economy to permit them to maintain and enhance their economic power, and maximum independence and freedom of action to pursue their own policies in their own way.

Making this assumption, it is extremely unlikely that the goals of the two powers can in any way be seen to be compatible. China's
desire for predominance in Asia is not likely to be satisfied with anything less than a subordinate status for Japan, a status which Japan will not accept. Even should Japan assume a far more neutralist position in international politics than she does today, we can expect China to be unsatisfied and to continue to press for Japan to "lean more to one side". We can expect Japan to continue to resist. The consequence is likely to be a continuation of the present four way division of power in North-east Asia, with each power seeking to avoid a combination of the others against it, and with each power avoiding any overcommitment to another, so as to preserve maximum freedom of action. North-east Asia is likely to remain, therefore, an arena for the playing out of classical power politics among a group of nations increasingly evenly matched.

Were this a non-nuclear age, the potential for violence in such a situation would be high. Since it is a nuclear age, however, inhibitions on violence are strong, and it is likely that the players will restrain themselves. Until and unless there are basic changes in the internal domestic politics of some of the actors, we can expect an indefinite prolongation of the present situation.

The only western commentator who seems to have picked up the rumor that Mao in '65 gave a revolutionary pep-talk to visiting Japanese youth which may have gone so far as to urge them to the barricades.


Good analytical treatment of the interaction of trade and politics and the balance of power in East Asia by a German political commentator. The first article makes the excellent point that politics and economics are both separable and inseparable for both China and Japan, and the slogan each uses to refer to its own policies cannot be taken on its face.


A good discussion of the reasons the JCP split from CCP in 66/67 in terms of the inapplicability of Mao thought to Japanese circumstances.


A periodization of Sino-Japanese relations from 1949 to the end of the pre-Cultural Revolution period.


Three very brief articles by Robert F. Dernberger, Dwight H. Perkins, and Alexander Eckstein which are enlightening for two reasons; first they show that domestic economic constraints have a large influence on China's
foreign trade; second they make clear that the information on those internal circumstances is so incomplete and unreliable that it is really impossible to know exactly how the constraints operate. Consequently it is by and large possible to argue quite contradictory theories on the internal/external relationship with equal validity (or invalidity).


A good resume for one year, of data which for other years is only available piecemeal.


Interesting details on internal JSP debates over China.


The best description of the traditional tribute system of Imperial China I have seen, described as an international system hence very useful as a model against which to compare China's present conception of what an international system should be.


A good example of the sceptical optimism with which many Japanese view the prospects for the China trade.


Interesting comparison of China's nuclear policy toward Japan as contrasted with her nuclear policy toward other Asian states.


Good resume of the fundamentals on both sides.

Good introduction to the JCP-CCP break of 1966-67.


Chapter 14 is a very good overview of the subject from 1949 to 1964, with emphasis on China's policy towards Japan. A critical realpolitik perspective.


A good statement of the position of the pro-China faction of the LDP of Japan.


A critical and illuminating analysis of the standard cliches.


A detailed study of the Japanese political process as it affected the decision of the government to deny export credits to China for a 1964 contract for the purchase of a factory. Excellent and detailed analysis of the many internal factors which played a role in this decision. Of minor utility as far as Chinese policy is concerned.


A good example of the way the fragmentary character of the economic data on China can make sound analysis difficult. His analysis here is impeccable, but his conclusions remain debatable (and in the event proved largely irrelevant).

Straightforward data conveniently arranged, but summary data only. No more than is available periodically in Oriental Economist, Far East Economic Review, or the Japan Yearbook. Total annual figures with selected comments on individual commodities but no detailed breakdown of all commodities.


A useful survey with an emphasis on the interaction between trade and policy, and an attempt to understand the bases of Chinese policy, finding them mainly in China's desire to expell the U.S. from East Asia.


Good brief summary of Japanese policy toward China at the times written, by a member of the analysis and research section of Asahi Shimbun. Journalistic approach but informative.


A good view of Japan feeling less bound by history in its relations with China, and more concerned with its place in the modern world.


A good preliminary view of some major factors in determining Japan's view of China.

Sees the three-way relationship between Moscow, Peking, and Tokyo as based on very fundamental *realpolitik* considerations which remain stable even while the specific policies of the three countries may vary from time to time.


A more analytical follow on to the Langer article.


Clear statement of Japan's current problems and dilemmas vis-a-vis Peking, Moscow, Taipei, and Washington.


An excellent study of the subject, lacking in detail descriptively but with interesting analysis of the causes of the CCP-JCP break.


Articles by N. Sun, S. Okita, T. Ishikawa, and T. Ueda are pertinent though not earthshaking.


A good review of recent overall China policy, helpful as background to a study of Japan's place in that policy.