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## Countering radicalization: refocusing responses to violent extremism within the United States

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**NAVAL  
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**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**THESIS**

**COUNTERING RADICALIZATION: REFOCUSING  
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES**

by

Christopher J. Brown

December 2011

Thesis Advisor:  
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**COUNTERING RADICALIZATION: REFOCUSING RESPONSES TO  
VIOLENT EXTREMISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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## **ABSTRACT**

The Obama Administration designated the local community as the first line of defense against violent extremist radicalization in the United States. In doing so, they called on communities to utilize existing structures such as community policing and to draw on successful models such as the Department of Justice's Comprehensive Gang Model. Research to date, however, has not shown how this model should be adjusted at the local level to address the specific mechanics of radicalization within the United States. Insufficient attention has been paid to the specific mechanics of recruitment at the individual level within vulnerable communities at the front end of the radicalization cycle. The purpose of this thesis is to identify strategy options for community policing within Muslim populations to counter radicalization before individuals turn to violent means. Prevention programs need to act in the same way and at the same level as the violent extremist activists within the target population to be successful. In a time of budget cuts and reduced resources these options can allow the community to be a force multiplier in the creation and effectiveness of counter radicalization programs. This paper attempts to provide a strategy and framework upon which to base future counter radicalization efforts.



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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACCESS	Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services
ADC	American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
AIC	American Islamic Congress
ALPACT	Advocates and Leaders for Police and Community Trust
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union
AMPAC	Arab Muslim Police Advisory Council
BEST	Bringing Everyone's Strengths Together
BRIDGES	Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity
CAIR	Council of American-Islamic Relations
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Community Oriented Policing
CTIO	Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers
DOJ	Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HSP	Homeland Security Policing
ILP	Intelligence Led Policing
ISGP	Islamic Society of Greater Portland
ISNA	Islamic Society of North America
ISOS	Islamic Services of Oregon State
ITS	Islamic Thinkers Society
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
MAS	Muslim American Society
MET	Muslim Educational Trust



MPAC	Muslim Public Affairs Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NYPD	New York Police Department
PD	Police Department
PRNS	Department of Parks, Recreation, and Neighborhood Services
SNT	Safe Neighborhood Teams

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## I. INTRODUCTION

As extremists try to inspire acts of violence within our borders, we are responding with the strength of our communities, with the respect for the rule of law, and with the conviction that Muslim Americans are part of our American family.

*-President Barack Obama, State of the Union, January 2011*

The terrorist operations of 9/11 caused the United States and other nations to begin looking inward towards their Muslim populations and asking the question, what do we know about our Muslim communities? How do individuals in these communities move from being functioning citizens to individuals who are willing to join or participate in violent terrorist groups? How are they radicalized and/or recruited? Can we prevent home-grown radicalization and terrorism? In an effort to gain the knowledge necessary to answer these questions, the United States and European nations such as Britain and France have turned to community policing as the ideal tool for interacting with Muslim communities. In recent years this focus has become more intense within the United States, caused by the arrests of ‘homegrown terrorists’ such as the attempted Times Square bomber, drone bomber, and cells in Lackawanna, California, New Jersey, Portland, and North Virginia. Federal agencies and local police departments are now trying to get to the ‘left of the boom’ by identifying potential radical threats and countering radicalization before terrorists become operational within the United States. Recently, the Obama Administration released guidance on this process in the form of two important documents: the *National Strategy For Counterterrorism* and *Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States*<sup>1</sup>. These documents recognize the cases of radicalization within the United States inspired by violent extremist ideologies and name the local community as the primary actor in counter radicalization efforts. The Administration recognizes that the Muslim communities, whose children are being targeted by activist and militant extremist ideology, are best

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<sup>1</sup> The White House “National Strategy For Counterterrorism,” Washington, 2011. and The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States,” Washington, 2011.

positioned to lead counter radicalization efforts due to their personal connections and local knowledge of the community. Research conducted by the PEW Research Center in 2007, and again in 2011 reveals that Muslims living in the United States show no indications of increasing alienation or support for violent extremism. In fact, Muslim Americans reject violence to a greater degree than Muslim populations' centers.<sup>2</sup> The American Muslim community also advocates a hands-on approach when dealing with extremists with 48% saying that Muslim leaders have not done enough to speak out against extremists.<sup>3</sup> A majority (70%), holds unfavorable views of al-Qaida and even larger majority (81%) of Muslims in America feel that violence is never justified.<sup>4</sup> Muslim communities have also been active in helping law enforcement with the threat of homegrown terrorism. The recent study by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Public Policy, found that "Muslims tipped off and/or cooperated with law enforcement in 22% of the cases of U.S. residents which were charged or convicted of some form of extremist activity."<sup>5</sup> Beyond individual Muslims the, "national Muslim organizations such as the American Islamic Congress (AIC), the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim American Society (MAS), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the Islamic Supreme Council of America- have acknowledged that Muslims have a responsibility to counter al Qaida's narrative."<sup>6</sup> This acknowledged responsibility by the Muslim community should be seen as an opportunity to incorporate their help into the fight against extremism in America.

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<sup>2</sup> Pew Research Center, *Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism*, Polling Data, (Pew Research Center: August, 2011), 1.

<sup>3</sup> Pew Research, *Muslim Americans*, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Pew Research, *Muslim Americans*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School Study, "The Homegrown Threat," *New America Foundation*, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>

<sup>6</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 34.

The community based approach promoted by the White House advocates a focus on our shared experiences with community-oriented policing (COP) at state and local levels. COP is characterized by problem solving and partnerships between local stakeholders, leaders, families, and law enforcement. In an era of restricted budgets and a struggling economy, this approach provides an ability to create counter radicalization programs from existing local structures and provides a local link for the federal government to partner with.<sup>7</sup> In the document on empowering local partnerships the Administration promotes three examples of existing COP models which have been successful at engaging other forms of violence and extremism: the Comprehensive Gang model, Building Communities and Trust Initiative, and the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative.<sup>8</sup> These models provide the basis for communities as they look to implement counter radicalization programs within areas they have deemed at risk to violent extremists' influences. The primary goal of these programs as stated by the Administration is "to prevent violent extremist and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence."<sup>9</sup> However, the planning, preparation and implementation of such programs require not only an understanding of community-oriented policing in its various models, but also an understanding of the violent extremist ideology and how it is used to move an individual along the trajectory of radicalization to the point of accepting violence. Without a basis for understanding how these two elements ( radicalization and the capabilities of community policing) interact;- future programs run the risk of being ineffective by either failing to properly engage the individuals being targeted or being seen by the Muslim community as invasive and violating their civil rights.

This paper specifically looks at one model; the Comprehensive-Gang Model to provide the reader with an understanding of how counter radicalization programs can be

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<sup>7</sup> The White House "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States," Washington, 2011, 3.

<sup>8</sup> The White House "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States," Washington, 2011, 4.

<sup>9</sup> The White House "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States," Washington, 2011, 3.

structured within the community to counter extremism. In addition, past and current efforts at community policing and counter radicalization efforts in Muslim communities are assessed to provide U.S. communities with a new and effective strategy on which to base future counter radicalization programs.

## **A. THE PROBLEM**

The literature and case studies contained in this paper will show that the process of radicalization has been identified down to the mechanisms at the individual level and that the government has chosen a strategy capable of countering it- yet there remains a gap between knowledge and execution at the local level. Many of the current policing models within Muslim communities correctly focus on integration and assimilation in order to address problems of alienation, isolation, economic mobility, and discrimination which can create the openings necessary for radicalization. While these are important first steps in engaging the community and must be present before counter radicalization programs can be developed, they are not capable of counter-radicalization in their current form and must be modified. To date, no specific models or techniques have actually been identified to enable the proper utilization of the capabilities of community policing within the context of counter radicalization. As a result current practices are engaging the community but fail in countering radicalization or the possible subsequent recruitment into violent extremist organizations. According to Wiktorowicz, “A focus on the process of persuasion allows one to examine patterns of joining that are specific to particular movement types. In the case of radical Islamic groups, socialization is needed to indoctrinate individuals into the movement ideology so that they are willing to sacrifice themselves for a radical cause. Prior processes, such as cognitive opening, religious seeking, and frame alignment, all affect the prospect of successful socialization and thus participation.”<sup>10</sup> A potential model that will enable community policing techniques to focus on this process is presented below.

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<sup>10</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajirun and Radical Islam” (paper presented to the conference, The Roots of Islamic Radicalism, Yale University, May 8–9, 2004), Accessed February 13, 2011, [www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/](http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/)

While no universal profile of who is susceptible to violent extremist ideology exists, there are similarities in their pathways to violence that can be targeted by the community. While some argue that social bonds are dominant over ideology and others argue that ideology is dominant over other factors, this paper will argue that they are in fact symbiotic. The radical ideology is the driving force that supplies a sense of legitimacy to the actions of the group and in circular fashion it is the dynamics within the group that introduces or inflates the impact of the ideology. This socialization through group dynamics is accomplished within social networks based on bonds of kinship, friendship and discipleship.

During this socialization, informal recruiters, or those who sympathize with Al-Qaida and its ideology and proselytize on its behalf, interact with young males within the three recruitment grounds described by Peter Neumann as places of congregation, vulnerability, and recruitment magnets.<sup>11</sup> Activists create bonds by playing the role of “father”, “friend”, and “spiritual guide”. This method is similar to the concept of re-parenting which is often used in community policing. Interviewed extremists often refer to summer camps, white water rafting trips and paintball, activities designed to strengthen interpersonal bonds and group identity.<sup>12</sup> This again is very similar to community policing techniques which compete at the individual level for the needs of young men in efforts to divert them from gangs or criminal activity. Activists operate at the same level within the community as community oriented policing prevention techniques. To effectively counter this socialization within networks by extremists, community policing techniques should focus on strengthening the bond between the individual and community while weakening the links between the individual and the networks delivering the extremist ideology. Counter radicalization programs must compete directly with activists for the attention of the young male population to successfully disrupt the radicalization process and provide alternative pathways. Through this model parents and the community can weaken the *extremists* bonds of friendship, kinship, and

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<sup>11</sup> Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe*, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 28.

<sup>12</sup> Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe*, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 39-41.



discipleship and counter the radicalized message which focuses on cognitive openings, frame alignment, and justification for violence. This thesis proposes that this model can bridge the gap between academic knowledge and operational execution at the tactical individual level within Muslim communities and disrupt the socialization process of radicalization.

## **B. SCOPE OF RESEARCH**

The purpose of this thesis is to identify and explain strategy options for community policing within Muslim populations to prevent radicalization. In a time of budget cuts and reduced resources these options can allow the community to be a force multiplier in the creation and effectiveness of counter radicalization and prevention programs. Specifically, this thesis will describe how community policing programs should be tailored in terms of strategy, organization, and level of interaction to prevent the radicalization of Muslims by violent extremists within the United States.

The primary scope of this research is to examine radicalization pathways and define the characteristics of effective counter radicalization programs. Basically stated, the community needs to act in the same way and at the same level as the violent extremist activists within the target population.<sup>13</sup> Radicals and activists have changed from a direct strategy (active recruiting, taking over mosques and public places, top-down direction) to an indirect strategy (social networks<sup>14</sup>, bottom-up self selection, cells guided by inspiration). In response, community policing approaches need to shift in order to be effective in countering radicalization. As the case studies will show, actions within prevention styled programs are most effective when they are indirect, decentralized, and operating at the individual's level within the community.

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<sup>13</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment*, Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2.

<sup>14</sup> The tenets of friendship, kinship and discipleship which are proposed by Marc Sageman as the primary building blocks of cliques which can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics.

## **C. LITERATURE REVIEW**

There are major bodies of work and theories, which answer the two research questions: how are youth being radicalized and what should be done within the context of COP, to prevent and counter the radicalization of our youth? A robust amount of research exists on the radicalization process. These radicalization theories address the social, political or familial issues which may cause individuals to begin to radicalize. There is also an abundance of research stating that COP is the ideal platform to conduct counter radicalization programs. However, what was not found were theories on how these responses should be organized or implemented within the framework of COP. Currently, the U.S. finds itself with a domestic threat that demands flexible and sustainable strategies that go beyond short term suppression or reactionary prosecution. Answering the question of how to shape prevention programs to counter radicalization will give state and local leaders another tool to achieve security and maximize public safety.

As the U.S. moves forward with counter radicalization programs, state and local policy makers require new, non-resource intensive, non-invasive and sustainable means to achieve security objectives. These programs not only deal with a domestic threat but an international community conscious of their immigrant and minority status and of ethnic ties to geographical origins outside the U.S. Community policing prevention programs tailored with an understanding of radicalization, the role of the Muslim community, and the primacy of civil liberties can balance these issues while disrupting domestic radicalization and serving homeland security interests.

### **1. Conceptual Literature**

The process of radicalization has been well documented and is best described in terms of activity within the community by social networking theory. This theory is centered on works addressing al-Qaida and its affiliates which have concluded social bonds facilitate delivery and acceptance of the radical ideology. These are informal networks are based on family, friends, or religious circles "religious mentor" type relationships. Group dynamics facilitate the ideological radicalization which precedes

the joining of a formal group or network or committing a violent act. These and similar theories are also sometimes referred to as the “Bunch of Guys” or “Halal” theory and are based on the one common variable among individuals who have conducted or attempted to conduct operations in the name of extremist militant organizations; they have made a link with violent extremism.<sup>15</sup> A majority of the time this link was made through social networks in which the individual was already a member. This suggests that a formation of networked friendships and socialization within these networks is a crucial element before recruitment into an extremist militant organization. Several works in this field contribute significantly to this understanding of radicalization trajectories and are worth reviewing. Marc Sageman’s work<sup>16</sup> in many ways pioneered the idea that social networking plays a significant role in the socialization process which proceeds radicalization and subsequent recruitment. This theory was then built upon and expanded in 2006 by Edwin Bakker and then again in 2008 by Peter R. Neumann<sup>17</sup>. Thomas Precht’s works in Europe for the Danish Ministry of Justice and Michael Jenkins’ works on U.S. domestic terrorism also describe a very similar radicalization process within their studies.<sup>18</sup> The findings in the NYPD report by Silber and Bhatt are similar but focus more on the role of religious ideology during this process as does the study by Garnstien-Ross and Grossman<sup>19</sup>.

The other schools of thought on radicalization, the structural-psychological approach and the political process model, attempt to explain radicalization through the

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<sup>15</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 135.

<sup>16</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (2004) and *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (2008).

<sup>17</sup> Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe*, Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: Routledge, 2008)., Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in Which They Joined Jihad* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment Testimonial*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007)., Thomas Precht. *Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalisation in Europe* (Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007).

<sup>19</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009)., Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt. *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* Monograph, (New York: New York City Police Department, 2007).

effect of ‘root causes’ on individuals which then move them to collective action. The types of root causes discussed in structural-psychological models are socioeconomic, cultural, identity-based and political.<sup>20</sup> The basic argument of this approach is that factors such as poverty, over-population, discrimination, unemployment, and poor economic mobility lead to feelings of isolation and alienation which in turn lead to radicalization. These arguments follow the relative deprivation arguments made by Ted Gurr in his book *Why Men Rebel*. These conditions result in a ‘bulge’ of young angry men who become an available pool that al Qaeda and similar organizations then recruit from. The political process or social movement approach attempts to explain radicalization by examining the political environment in which the individual lives, the resources available, and the ideological framework they adhere to.<sup>21</sup> However, these approaches are too vague to be properly measured and they downplay the role of ideology by assuming that Islamists only turn to terrorism and violence when political options are exhausted.<sup>22</sup> While these social and political factors may indeed be necessary in the radicalization process none of them are sufficient to explain radicalization.<sup>23</sup> If they were sufficient the millions of other young men in similar conditions would also be turning to terrorism yet only a small minority radicalize and only a smaller portion of this minority then continue all the way to violence. Root cause and grievance approaches are broad, difficult to quantify and not useful when trying to draw from them the specific strategies needed for countering recruitment at the individual level within the Muslim community.

The authors discussed above offer several options which can be useful to communities and police departments who have Muslim communities with at risk youth. Sageman argues that among other options we should focus on providing young Muslims

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<sup>20</sup> Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 19.

<sup>21</sup> Omar Ashour, *The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 25.

<sup>22</sup> Ashour, *De-Radicalization*, 25.

<sup>23</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 95.

with alternative role models within the Muslim community for the young to emulate.<sup>24</sup> Garnstein-Ross and Grossman argue for Muslim civic engagement projects at several levels (i.e. children in Cub Scouts or parents involvement in school boards) initiated and led primarily by the Muslim community. The NYPD report proposes that the need to identify those entering the process at the earliest possible stage makes intelligence the critical tool in helping thwart an attack or prevent planning of future plots. Thomas Precht's four counter radicalization measures parallel and complement these approaches: societal measures such as integration policies, counter ideology efforts to confront the radical Islamic narrative, awareness training for social workers, policemen, teachers and Imams, and increased public diplomacy to dispel myths about Western foreign policy. However, none of these suggestions lay out a strategy for incorporating these efforts into the existing structures of community policing and integrating programs to fully disrupt the radicalization process.

This understanding of recruitment and radicalization is critically important as the United States faces a changing threat with increasing domestic implications. Extremist activists are increasingly decentralized, networked and operating at the individual level within Muslim communities. Countermeasures must be able to counter radical narratives, disrupt and impede radicalization, and ultimately divert individuals from trajectories which can end in terrorism. Successful attacks within the United States have the potential of draining our resources, affecting our economy, and threatening our way of life. In order to formulate strategies to counter these attacks, federal and local governments must truly understand the capabilities and responsibilities of law enforcement, communities, and their respective roles in prevention.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

This thesis will use a mixed methods approach to explain how to successfully conduct counter radicalization and prevention programs within community policing. The

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<sup>24</sup> Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University Of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 159.

process-tracing methodology will enable the causal chains to be identified in each case study to illustrate how the interplay of strategy, organization and level of interaction lead to prevention. This inductive approach will allow the study to break historical cases into causal chains, highlighting effective practices within each individual case study and applying them towards an effective model for counter radicalization. There are several strengths to this research design. First, it does not require a good deal of empirical data, which is good since counter radicalization is a relatively new area of study for which there are limited cases. Second, while data is scarce for counter radicalization there are well documented cases of individual radicalization trajectories, Community policing efforts in Muslim communities, and anti-gang efforts within community policing which will facilitate inducing a counter radicalization model.

## **E. OUTLINE**

### **1. Chapter I: Introduction**

The Obama Administration has named the local community has the first line of defense against violent extremist radicalization in the United States. In doing so, they call on communities to draw on existing structures such as community policing and to utilize successful models such as the Department of Justice's Comprehensive Gang Model. Research to date, however, does not address how this model should be adjusted to address the specific mechanics of radicalization to be effective. This paper will attempt to fill the void between knowledge and operational execution by offering a strategy and framework upon which to base future counter radicalization efforts.

### **2. Chapter II: Radicalization**

How radicalization is defined and discussed is extremely important to understanding and defining the problem and for the subsequent formation of a counter radicalization program. This chapter will familiarize the reader with terms and definitions common to the process of radicalization and then will break down the actual process of how an individual is moved along the radicalization trajectory towards

accepting violence as a way of achieving a political agenda under the influence of a radical ideology.

### **3. Chapter III: Shadow Parenting: Radicalization Mechanisms**

Shadow parenting differs from previous research as it looks at the relationship between ideology and networks as a symbiotic process where neither is routinely dominant. This process differs in each individual but is a common, visible process which isolates the individual from the community and inserts the extremist as a substitute authority figure which provides guidance to the individual. This visible process works in a decentralized, informal way to radicalize the individual through internalization of the extremist ideology and gradual acceptance of the justification for violence. The concept of shadow parenting provides the community a lens through which to look at, and understand, the mechanisms of radicalization. This lens can then allow targeted disruption of radicalization pathways to divert individuals from a trajectory of violence and counter the effects of violent ideology.

### **4. Chapter IV: Community Policing**

Community policing has undergone many changes since its inception and as it is applied locally in response to different problems within different cultural and geographical influences. This chapter will discuss its evolution and will assess the implementation of the comprehensive gang model along with current community policing efforts in Muslim communities.

### **5. Chapter V: Community Policing and Counter Radicalization Efforts**

To date there has been only one formal counter radicalization effort aimed at preventing radicalization and subsequent recruitment into violent extremist organizations. This program is the United Kingdom's PREVENT program which operates under the umbrella of a larger counter terrorism effort called CONTEST II. This chapter will provide an overview and assessment of this ongoing program in order to provide the reader with an understanding of best practices in integrating community policing and counter radicalization efforts.

## **6. Chapter VI: Proposed Model**

This chapter will integrate material covered in the previous chapters into modifications which utilize the theory of strategic interaction to frame the correct strategy, organization, and level of interaction to be used within the community to achieve prevention.



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## II. RADICALIZATION

### A. DEFINITION OF RADICALIZATION, IDEOLOGY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS

How radicalization is defined and discussed is critical, not only to properly understand and state the problem of violent extremism, but also in the proper formation and structuring of prevention programs. This chapter will provide the working definitions and framework for an educated discussion of radicalization, violent ideology and terms commonly associated with the process of radicalization. A study of two individual case studies highlighting the different paths of radicalization will conclude the chapter and provide an introduction to the mechanics of socialization within radicalization pathways.

Radicalization in America provides little in the way of actual recruits, as stated in a 2009 testimony to the Senate Homeland Security and governmental Affairs Committee when referring to the 100 individuals arrested post 9/11 for terrorist activities, “With roughly 3 million Muslims in America...100 terrorists represent a mere 0.00003% of the Muslim population- fewer than one out of 30,000.”<sup>25</sup> This number now stands at roughly 188 cases in 2011, with a perceptible increase in recent years as almost half of the cases occurred between 2009 and 2011. This idea of scope and context must be applied to communities as leaders and government officials begin to craft counter-radicalization and prevention programs.

Radicalization is a relatively small problem, “only four of the homegrown plots since 9/11 progressed to an actual attack in the United States, attacks that resulted in 17 deaths.... by way of comparison, according to the FBI, between 2001 and 2009, 73 people were killed in hate crimes in the United States.”<sup>26</sup> Extremism connected with al-

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<sup>25</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Going Jihad: The Fort Hood Slayings and Home-Grown Terrorism*, Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 4.

<sup>26</sup> New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School Study, “The Homegrown Threat,” *New America Foundation*, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview.1>.

Qaida and its affiliates is confined within a specific ideology and should be similarly treated as a social problem when speaking in terms of prevention.

The Islamic terms being used by violent extremist to justify their ideology also have multiple meanings and connotations for the Muslim community; misuse of these terms can create misunderstandings that block open dialogue between community leaders and local and state authorities. As John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Terrorism noted, “Violent extremism is neither unique nor inherent to any one faith. Violence is something that every faith rejects but every faith has had to confront.”<sup>27</sup> General themes and terms common to radical ideology and violent extremists’ propaganda will be briefly discussed and defined below to provide a common understanding of extremist ideology and why it resonates among some individuals. Other links and resources will be cited for the reader if they wish to research this area further. The focus of this paper however, will remain on the mechanics of radicalization and not on the specifics of extremist ideology.

**Radicalization:** Marc Sageman, the author of *Understanding Terror Networks* defines radicalization as “The process of transformation from ordinary individual into a terrorist willing to kill and sacrifice life. Radicalization has four prongs: A sense of *moral outrage* for events locally and globally, this outrage is then *interpreted in a specific way* namely as a war against Islam. This ideology appeals to certain people because it *resonates with their personal experience* of discrimination and makes them feel they are part of the larger war. A few of these individuals are then *mobilized through networks*, both face-to-face and online to become a terrorist.”<sup>28</sup> However, he maintains that social bonds are a critical piece throughout this process and the intensity of these bonds directly relates to the speed of the radicalization process and subsequent recruitment. This is a very useful definition as it describes crucial elements along the entire trajectory of

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<sup>27</sup> John Brennan, in a speech at New York University, New York, February 13, 2010. Text found in: Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 31.

<sup>28</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 135.

radicalization that can lead an individual to violence. Violent extremists can then manipulate this process to attract alienated and seeking individuals to their cause.

**Counter-Radicalization or Prevention:** It should be clearly understood that in this paper the terms counter-radicalization and prevention refer to efforts that seek to influence the same population that extremists are trying to influence the young and alienated individuals seeking answers. It is not a de-radicalization program which seeks to change the minds of extremists but rather a focused effort to reduce the potential pool of recruits they affect. The goal of counter-radicalization is not to criminalize people or to seek prosecution, it is to influence people and offer alternatives to the extremists' message and vision of the world.

**Recruitment:** A clear distinction must be made between radicalization and recruitment when dealing with and creating prevention programs in order to focus efforts at the right end of the radicalization-recruitment-violence spectrum. Radicalization is the internalization of a set of beliefs as described earlier in which jihad and violence is seen as the ultimate test of one's convictions.<sup>29</sup> Recruitment, on the other hand, is the end of the spectrum where an individual physically goes operational, by joining an extremist organization or forming a cell, with the intent to seek out the materials and means to conduct an actual attack.

**Violent Extremists:** For the purpose of this paper, violent extremist are defined as "individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals."<sup>30</sup> The ideology and political goals referred to in this case are al-Qaida and its affiliates and adherents. The term violent extremist will be used in the place of Jihadist, terrorist or Islamic militant. Al-Qaida and associates refer to themselves as Jihadists but this term misuses the true meaning and intention of the word Jihad as it is understood by the vast majority of the Muslim community.

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<sup>29</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment*, Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2.

<sup>30</sup> The White House "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States" Washington, 2011, 1.

**Radical Ideology:** The ideology espoused by extremists is based on the belief that Muslims and Islam itself have become corrupt by failing to follow the path of the righteous. This corruption has caused the countries of the Middle East, despite their economic advantage of oil reserves, to fall politically and economically behind the rest of the world, even Israel, and lose the prominence and status once held in the Golden Ages. In order to regain to their rightful place the Muslim community must return to the “authentic faith and practices of the ancient ones, namely the Prophet Mohammed and his companions.”<sup>31</sup> In order to better achieve this, extremist’s advocate a strict adherence to the Quran and the *hadith* (words, acts, deeds, that are attributed to the Prophet Mohammed). These two documents are seen as the only legitimate messages from God through which legitimate beliefs and practices can be found. As noted before, instituting this involves a redefining of jihad and al-shari’a as the appropriate mechanisms to form the ideal society free of western influences.<sup>32</sup> As a religious basis for their ideology, extremists have tried to elevate the importance of jihad and place it as the missing sixth pillar of the five pillars of Islam (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and pilgrimage). This allows them to claim that jihad is an individual duty for every Muslim; a duty which cannot be ignored since Muslim lands are controlled by apostate regimes, the “near” enemy, or occupied by the West, the “far” enemy. This ideology blurs the distinctions between the traditional notions of “offensive” and “defensive” jihad and instead makes it a “permanent revolution against internal and external enemies who usurped Gods sovereignty”.<sup>33</sup> Only when the “far” enemy has been conquered can the extremist focus on the “near” enemy, which has been propped up and supported by the West, and institute a truly Islamic state which will be pleasing in the eyes of God. To start this revolution, a “vanguard” (selected few) is needed to start the battle and lead the *ummah* (global Muslim community) along the righteous path. The attraction and strength of this ideology to alienated and seeking individuals is its radical and simplistic

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<sup>31</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* ( Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 4.

<sup>32</sup> Ahmad Moussalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the Enemy?” *Conflicts Forum: Beirut- London- Washington*. Conflicts Forum, January 2009. 21.

<sup>33</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4.

interpretations of the complex Islamic doctrines. This ideology directly challenges the established schools of jurisprudence and permits direct study of the sacred texts for guidance by the individual Muslim.<sup>34</sup>

## **B. THE NATURE OF RADICALIZATION**

When looking at the potential radicalization pathways or trajectories of individuals towards violence, it is necessary to consider the networks which they are a part of and how these networks affect them. These networks consist of connections between the individual and their family, friends, and or religious peers and leaders. Violent extremists and those with similar views use these community networks to spread their message by using their understanding of these relationships to promote their ideology and prepare seeking individuals to join their groups. In the past, extremists groups such as al-Qaida have sporadically used recruiters, but now rely on like minded extremists and activists who speak on behalf of jihad through speeches, social media, online forums, and publications. This style of radicalization is decentralized, localized, and informal.<sup>35</sup> Radicals and activists have changed from a direct strategy (active recruiting, taking over mosques and public places, top-down direction) to an indirect strategy (social networks, bottom-up self selection, cells guided by inspiration). This method is unique as it recruits one person at a time and can be tailored to take advantage of that person's current situation. As Michael Jenkins, a senior RAND advisor notes, "the message from the global jihad is aimed directly at the individual." As stated before, this message argues that Muslims face challenges from western infidels and apostate regimes and is threatened by military attack, foreign occupation, social disintegration, and passivity of the Muslim Ummah. The message delivered is that of duty; it is the duty of the individual young man to combat this attack on Islam. This call of duty is mixed with romantic notions of adventure, a noble cause, feelings of belonging, and a sense of meaning. It is a message that can resonate deeply with individuals who may be suffering

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<sup>34</sup> Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),7.

<sup>35</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment*, Testimonial, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 2.

from feelings of anger, alienation, economic frustration and estrangement from their historical roots.<sup>36</sup>

This evolution in radicalization from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy has been well documented and is best described in terms of activity within the community by social networking theory. This theory is centered on works addressing al-Qaida and global extremists which have concluded social bonds facilitate delivery and acceptance of the radical ideology. While Sageman argues that these social bonds are dominant over ideology and Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman argue that ideology is dominant over other factors, this paper will argue that they are in fact symbiotic. The radical ideology is the driving force that supplies a sense of legitimacy to the actions of the group and in circular fashion it is the dynamics within the group that introduces or inflates the impact of the ideology. To reach this conclusion, the 188 post 9/11 confirmed cases of homegrown terrorism within the United States were studied to identify the presence of informal friendship, kinship, and discipleship networks. These cases as compiled by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School study can be seen in Appendix A.<sup>37</sup> This analysis found that informal networks were present in a clear majority (71%) of the cases. These informal networks are based on family, friends, or religious circles "religious mentor" type relationships. While research shows that most often this occurs in face to face interaction, a small percentage of the time these informal networks interacted over the internet in virtual relationships. Group dynamics facilitate the ideological radicalization which precedes the joining of a formal group or network or committing a violent act. A majority of the time the link to extremist ideology was made through pre-existing social networks in which the individual was already a member or through a network that was formed in the seeking phase. This suggests that a formation of networked friendships and socialization within these networks is a crucial element before recruitment into an extremist militant organization.

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<sup>36</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment*, Testimonial, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007, 3-4.

<sup>37</sup> New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School Study, "The Homegrown Threat," *New America Foundation*, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>

The social networking school of thought argues against the notion of ‘top-down’ recruiting from within this pool of available recruits and instead emphasizes the role of ‘bottom-up’ recruiting or self selection. These self selected individuals are increasingly radicalized and willing to conduct acts inspired by radical or violent ideology without formal links to militant groups or organizations. These individuals seek out answers either on the internet or face-to-face from like minded individuals who are most often friends or kinsman or find a group which fulfills this function. They then learn and radicalize within these groups and networks as the radical ideology is amplified and internalized. Two good examples which highlight the different ways individuals can be drawn down the path of radicalization are those of Samir Khan, a 25 year old from Charlotte NC., who became editor for the al-Qaida magazine *Inspire* and Adam Gadahn, “Azzam the American” who grew up in rural California and converted at the age of 17 and later became a spokesman for al-Qaida.

### **1. Individual Trajectories: Samir Khan and Adam Gadahn**

**Samir Khan:** Samir Khan was seven when he came to the United States in 1993 with his parents and lived briefly in Queens before settling in Westbury, New York. He was born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to his parents, Zafar and Sarah Khan who were originally from Pakistan. Samir lived on Long Island with his family, an older sister and younger brother, attending W.T. Clarke High School before graduating and moving with his family to Charlotte, N.C. when his father’s job took him in 2004.

By most accounts, Samir’s childhood was that of a normal child in the suburban middle class. In high school he played football and had common interests such as video games and girls. But it was during high school that classmates began to notice the increasingly extremist views held by Samir. He refused to recite the morning pledge of allegiance and sophomore year began to wear a kufi, a brimless round cap, along with jalabiyas, the traditional long white robes, and became more isolated as he became more



obsessed with religion.<sup>38</sup> His initial goals were laudable; according to his brother, “He said he just wanted to do good. He wanted to go to heaven. He’s like, ‘Before I was so bad, so I think I’m just going to follow my religion in the most proper way’—and he didn’t want to commit sin anymore.”<sup>39</sup> Yet his religious leanings were becoming more extreme and it was noticed by his parents. During this time Zafar Khan enlisted the help and advice of a family friend Steve Elturk, the imam of the Islamic Organization of North America in Warren, Michigan. Elturk found Samir to be separated from his classmates by feelings of alienation and isolation and as a result was turning to extremism for answers.

Family friends and classmates say he became increasingly interested in extremist ideology after 9/11 and began to openly express hatred for the United States. Some trace the turning point to 2002 when he attended a summer camp hosted by Tanzeem-e-Islami, a non-violent yet fundamental group.<sup>40</sup> It was at the camp that Samir first came in contact with the Islamic Thinkers Society (ITS), a branch of the extremist organization Al-Muhajiroun based in the United Kingdom which expanded to New York in 2000. ITS openly sympathizes with the extremist ideology and has had many connections to global extremists over the years.<sup>41</sup> Samir turned to blogging on the internet to express his frustrations; beginning in 2001 he began a steady process of posting online comments on his blog, *The Ignored Puzzle Pieces of Knowledge*, which was hosted by the Islamic Networking Forum. This Forum is a community well known among American extremists. Several prominent American extremists such as Daniel Maldonado, Omar Hammami, Tarek Mehanna and Ahmed Abu Samra have been linked to the forum.<sup>42</sup> Some even believe Samir’s blog was the inspiration of Revolution Muslim, a radical

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<sup>38</sup> Mathew Chayes, “Samir Khan, al-Qaida figure, grew up on Long Island,” *newsday.com*, October 06, 2011, accessed October 20, 2011, <http://www.newsday.com/long-island/samir-khan-al-qaida-figure-grew-up-on-long-island-1.3228104>.

<sup>39</sup> Chaves, *Samir Khan*, 3.

<sup>40</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 15.

<sup>41</sup> Aaron Y. Zelin, “American Jihadi,” *Foreign Policy*, September 30, 2011, accessed October 21, 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir\\_khan\\_dead\\_inspire\\_magazine](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine).

<sup>42</sup> Zelin, “American Jihadi” 2.

splinter group of ITS, whose most notable member Zachary Chesser rose to fame after threatening the creators of *South Park*. These postings turned more extreme in 2004, after viewing videos online of suicide bombers in Iraq, Samir openly expressed support online for Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida.<sup>43</sup> This radicalization continued with Samir even changing his name in 2007 to “Insha Allah Shaheed,” meaning “God Willing to be a Martyr,” and culminated in a pro al-Qaida website called *Jihad Recollections* which he created after his move to Charlotte. Friends in Charlotte say that by the time Samir arrived in North Carolina he was completely obsessed with extremist ideology. A friend, Adam Azad related that during their first conversation Samir was critical of the local mosque for not highlighting the injustices in the world.<sup>44</sup> Samir published four issues of *Jihadi Recollections* which proved to be a hit among American extremists with submissions from extremists like Portland’s Christmas tree bomber Mohamed Osman Mohamud. These actions continued to worry his parents who attempted to restrict his access to the internet and facilitated interventions with Muslim community elders.

The first formal intervention was initiated by Jibril Hough, a friend of Samir’s and spokesman for the Islamic Center of Charlotte, who invited Samir and his father to his house along with elders of the mosque. It was an attempt to convince Samir that the extreme ideology he had become fascinated with was flawed and did not represent Islam. But the intervention along with two follow on meetings did not work and Samir remained committed to his cause. Possibly feeling pressure from counter-terrorism officials after several of his online friends were arrested Khan left for Yemen in October 2009. In Yemen, Samir is thought to have helped the launch of the al-Qaida magazine *Inspire* which debuted six months after his arrival, an English-language publication which uses a blend of ideology, interviews, do-it yourself guides and testimonials by other extremists. He is believed to have edited seven issues of *Inspire* and even wrote his own articles in

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<sup>43</sup> Mark Schone and Matthew Cole, “American Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” ABC News, September 30, 2011, accessed October 20, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640.1>.

<sup>44</sup> Dina Temple-Raston, “American Editor Brings U.S. Savvy to Jihad Outreach,” *NPR*, October 12, 2010, accessed October 20, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=130439697.2>.

which he claimed “I am proud to be a traitor to America.”<sup>45</sup> *Inspire* has been found in the possession of several extremist plotters and was used by Naser Abedo as a bomb building guide in his failed attempt on Fort Hood. According to Aaron Zelin in an article for *Foreign Policy*, Samir Khan will go down in history as “One of the most important pioneers and influential figures in the history of the American jihadi movement,” due to his ability to make the extremist cause accessible to English speaking radicals and connect them not only to information but to each other.

**Adam Gadahn-** Born in Oregon, Adam grew up in rural California and was not a second or third-generation Muslim, but a convert at the age of seventeen from a “normal” yet slightly eccentric family. Adam grew up on a farm in the small settlement of Winchester with his parents Phil and Jennifer Gadahn. It was an austere life by choice; Adam’s parents chose to separate themselves from a world they viewed as chaotic in hopes of finding a more peaceful life. They raised goats and strove to be self sufficient while living in a cabin that they built with no running water or telephone and with electricity supplied by solar panels.<sup>46</sup> Adam was homeschooled along with his younger sisters and brother but was active socially, playing in Little League baseball and attending Christian home school support groups. Then, somewhere around 1993, Adam became interested in death metal and in its subculture found a community and world that he belonged in.

Quickly becoming engrossed in the genre and its fan base, Adam began to trade music, research artists and correspond with others who felt the same way about death metal, according to Spinoza Prozak, a former death metal DJ, he was “probably in contact with, minimum, several hundred people worldwide.”<sup>47</sup> Adam even experimented with making some recordings and mailed some of his tapes to his new friends. Adam left

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<sup>45</sup> Alice Fordham, “A ‘proud traitor’: Samir Khan reported dead alongside Aulaqi,” *Washingtonpost.com*, September 30, 2011, accessed October 20, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/a-proud-traitor>

<sup>46</sup> Raffi Khathhadourian, “Azzam the American,” *The New Yorker*, January 22, 2007, Accessed March 2, 2011, [http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/070122fa\\_fact\\_khathhadourin?4](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/070122fa_fact_khathhadourin?4).

<sup>47</sup> Khathhadourian, “Azzam the American” 7.

the farm at the age of sixteen in the summer of 1995 to live with his grandparents in Santa Ana with hopes of finding a job and maybe attending college.

It was at his grandparent's house that Adam found the internet and began research different religions in order to "fill that void."<sup>48</sup> It was during this online seeking that Adam found Islam and was attracted to its monotheistic message, and in the fall of 1995 went to a mosque to learn more. Adam read some of the literature given to him; continued research online and also read an English version of the Koran. A few weeks later he returned to declare the shahada (confession of faith) and at Friday prayers announce his conversion to those assembled at the Islamic Society of Orange County.

Adam was just as enthusiastic about his new religion as he had been with death metal; within a week he had written an essay about his conversion called "Becoming Muslim," and in it wrote about his personal failings up to that point and his desire to live a better life in the future. To accomplish this, Adam began to attend the mosque daily to pray five times and attend discussion groups. One of the discussion groups was made up of a small group of men with a legalistic interpretation of Islam who met to discuss the Koran and talk about the ongoing wars in Bosnia and Chechnya. They wore traditional turbans and robes and grew their beards and were critical of other Muslims who wore western style clothes or were perceived to behave in a secular way.<sup>49</sup> Adam quickly began to adopt the group's legalistic outlook and dropped his western dress for traditional robes, grew a beard and even gave up his death metal collection. As noted by Rafii Khatchadourian in his article for the *New Yorker*, "the discussion group was Gadahn's first real social environment outside of his family, and it was composed of men like him, who yearned for authenticity in their faith." Hitham Bundakji, a mosque leader at the Islamic Society, noted that the group was comprised of well educated and articulate men who would be "very convincing to someone like Adam Gadahn." The commitment to the group's legalistic and often extremist views grew as Adam moved into a small apartment with two members from the discussion group; an Egyptian

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<sup>48</sup> Khathhadourian, "Azzam the American" 10.

<sup>49</sup> Amy Argetsinger, "Muslim Teen Made Conversion to Fury," *Washington Post*, December 2, 2004.

national named Hisham Diab and an American citizen named Khalil Deek who had been born in Palestine.

Diab and Deek both had ties to international terrorism and would become Adam's mentors as he learned about his new religion. Diab's ex-wife, Sarah Olson, described the relationship as that of a father-son, "They were his parents, they were very strict and mean. But they were his parents."<sup>50</sup> Adam followed his new mentor's advice in all aspects of life, even to the way he addressed Olson and interacted with his parents. They would give him assignments such as memorizing the Koran and learning prayers in Arabic.<sup>51</sup> Adam was instructed to separate himself from his family due to their Jewish descent (His father's original name was Pearlman) and was even told that "if you're a good believer, you'll kill them."<sup>52</sup> This closed group became Adam's sole resource as his legalistic view of religion was blended into the radical political views held by Diab and Deek.

Adam's existence was described by Zena Zeitoun, a convert who knew some of the men, as isolated and totally absorbed into the group. The apartment they lived in was minimalistic with windows covered in sheets, newspaper on the floor to sit on, and Islamic writings decorating the walls. According to Zeitoun, "It looked like a dungeon".<sup>53</sup> This isolation began to merge Adam's goals and identity with that of the groups and Adam began to criticize other Muslims who fell short of his new standards. This evidenced itself dramatically when he struck Bundakji, a mosque leader, who had witnessed his conversion and even given him a job at one point. Bundakji was a target of the group due to his western dress and interfaith outreach in the community and was often referred to as "Danny the Jew"<sup>54</sup> by Diab and Deek who had been barred from the mosque by him for their extremist views. So when Bindakji reprimanded Adam for showing disrespect to the imam, Adam punched him. Adam was ousted from the mosque

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<sup>50</sup> Peggy Lowe, "Radical Conversion, Part 3," *Orange County Register*, September 26, 2006.

<sup>51</sup> Khathhadourian, "Azzam the American" 16.

<sup>52</sup> Peggy Lowe, "Radical Conversion, Part 3," *Orange County Register*, September 26, 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Khathhadourian, "Azzam the American" 14.

<sup>54</sup> Khathhadourian, "Azzam the American" 14.

following the incident and several months later, in late 1997, he went to Pakistan. Adam returned briefly the next spring and left a few months later after the funeral of his grandfather. In 2004 Adam reappeared in front of the camera as Azzam al-Amriki, a wanted man and an extremist spokesman who has been introduced on video by Ayman al-Zawahiri, leading ideologue and new leader of al-Qaida.

The cases of Samir Khan and Adam Gadahn represent two different but similar trajectories towards radicalization. Both grew up in relatively normal environments yet sought out Islam to fill a void in their lives. As they became more devout both were drawn into a sub-community which espoused radical ideology and a distorted view of Islam and its practice. For Samir, it was his online community in the Islamic Networking Forum and visitors to his blog and website. While Samir traveled to other mosques, it appears the hours spent in his parent's basement in an online forum created the network where he talked with like-minded people and found justification for his views from radical ideologues. This legalistic view came through in his conversations with friends and family and in the way he dressed. Both of these served to further isolate him and cause him to withdraw into his online persona. For Adam, Diab and Deek and their discussion group became his family and they became both his father and mentor as he left his old life behind and adopted his legalistic view of Islam. Their mentorship along with the physical as well as emotional isolation allowed almost seamless delivery and acceptance of extremist ideology. But how did this happen? Why did it happen to these two and not their siblings? What causes certain people to follow the radicalization trajectory to a violent end while most divert and how can this be manipulated? The following chapter looks at the specific mechanisms which allow violent ideology to resonate within some individuals and how this can be manipulated by activists who support al-Qaida and its affiliates.

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### III. RADICALIZATION MECHANISMS

How can communities counter radicalization if the motivations and experience for each person is unique? While we cannot consistently identify the type of individual most vulnerable to radicalization, or the type most likely to commit violent acts after being exposed to violent ideology, we do know vulnerable individuals travel on similar pathways as they radicalize. The concept of extremists' socialization within social networks provides the community a lens through which to look at, and understand, the mechanisms of radicalization. This lens can allow targeted disruption of radicalization pathways to divert individuals from a trajectory of violence and counter the effects of violent ideology.

To enable this understanding, looking at the social networking theory of Peter R. Neumann in his study on extremist's recruitment in Europe is useful.<sup>55</sup> Neumann's study separated radicalization pathways into the actual individual and structural mechanisms which can facilitate the socialization process within the community. Structural mechanisms are the physical places in which individuals attend activities or spend time; the individual mechanisms are the networks within these areas in which the individual interacted. In order to test whether this framework for understanding radicalization applied within the United States it was analyzed by studying confirmed cases of radicalization in the United States to evaluate the frequency of appearance by these mechanisms. As noted before, the data set used was the 188 confirmed cases of homegrown terrorism as compiled by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School study.<sup>56</sup> (Appendix A) This analysis found that social networks were present in a clear majority (71%) of the cases. These were then analyzed for the interplay of ideology within networks based on friendship, kinship, and discipleship. These bonds are proposed by Sageman as the primary building blocks of

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<sup>55</sup> Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe* Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: Routledge, 2008).

<sup>56</sup> New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School Study, "The Homegrown Threat," *New America Foundation*, 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>.



cliques that can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics. The networks studied were sometimes pre-existing and sometimes they were created during the seeking phase of the individual. The approach taken by this thesis differs from previous research as it looks at the relationship between ideology and networks as a symbiotic process where neither is routinely dominant. This process differs in each individual but is a common, visible process, which isolates the individual from the community and inserts the extremist as a substitute authority figure which provides guidance to the individual. While research shows that most often this occurs in face to face interaction, a small percentage of the time these informal networks primarily interacted over the internet in virtual relationships as was the case with Colleen LaRose also known as “Jihad Jane.” This visible process works in an informal way to radicalize the individual through internalization of the extremist ideology and through gradual acceptance of the justification for violence.

Group dynamics within social networks facilitate the ideological radicalization which precedes the joining of a formal extremist group or network or committing a violent act. Many times this process starts with best of intentions; they want to be a better person, they want to help fellow Muslims, they want to donate money and time, but above all *they want to do something*. Studies have shown that group membership is driven by internal motivations, “The need to find, or restructure, a meaningful identity drives many towards extremist groups. Becoming a member of a group and sharing meaningful group identity, enhances an individual’s self-esteem, especially when self-esteem has been damaged.”<sup>57</sup> Beside the search for religious answers initial goals may have also been nationalistic (such as free Somalia), or may have been humanitarian (bring aid or give assistance to refugee camps in Afghanistan) and these desires can start the seeking behavior where individuals look for other people who have similar concerns. This seeking and need for fulfillment guides the individual into the radicalization pathway where good intentions can be transferred and ideals altered. See Figure 1.

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<sup>57</sup> Susie Driscoll, “The Psychological Motivation & Socialization of Suicide Bombers,” unpublished. Presented in lecture notes by Professor Dorothy Denning of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.




Figure 1. Radicalization Pathway (From: <sup>58</sup>)

Within this pathway, the individual seeks answers in recruitment grounds; here they interact with recruiters who utilize the environment to shape and deliver the message. For the individual this process starts with a ‘trigger’ or dissatisfaction with some aspect of their life. As noted before, relative deprivation (poverty, discrimination, alienation, poor economic mobility, perceived injustices) are necessary but not sufficient; these are the items which enable cognitive openings. These openings can be real or perceived personal crises which shake an individual’s personal beliefs and understanding of his or her place in the world leaving them open to the possibility of alternate views.

<sup>58</sup> This figure is based on work by Peter Neumann and Marc Sageman. The author has added the tenets of friendship, kinship, and discipleship which are proposed by Sageman as the primary building blocks of cliques which can facilitate the radicalization process through group dynamics. Peter R. Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe* Vol. Adelphi Paper 399, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 28 & 41).

These crises can be political, cultural, economic or personal.<sup>59</sup> Depending on the personal circumstances this leads the individual to seek answers in the areas of congregation, vulnerability or recruitment. Areas of congregation are common places where individuals voluntarily attend to interact with others such as community centers. Places of vulnerability differ in that attendance is usually not voluntary. The individual is driven to that area to fulfill a need or to fulfill a legal requirement. Recruitment magnets draw individuals by their very nature. These are areas that are publicly known to contain extremists propaganda. In these areas the individual interacts within his or hers pre-existing networks which are based on family, friends, or religious circles "religious mentor" type relationships or is drawn into groups which attempt to recreate these bonds.

Socialization within these networks helps to fill the void in the individuals' life and seeks to fulfill their needs in competition with normal institutions such as the family or community. Activist can either be or play the role of "father", "friend", and "priest", building bonds that when strengthened separate the individual from his family and friends. Interviewed radicals often refer to summer camps, white water rafting trips and paintball, all activities designed to strengthen interpersonal bonds and group identity.<sup>60</sup> During these activities, activists deliver the extremist message which is amplified through group dynamics. This process can lead to isolation from moderate influences such as friends and families and facilitates an acceptance of radical views and extreme ideologies. Isolation creates an environment where frame alignment ( the process of developing a us vs. them mindset) leads to the justification for violence and ultimately the link or catalyst to jihad.<sup>61</sup> The act of both physically and psychologically isolating

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<sup>59</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajirun and Radical Islam" (paper presented to the conference, The Roots of Islamic Radicalism, Yale University, May 8-9, 2004), Accessed February 13, 2011, [www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/](http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/).

<sup>60</sup> Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda*, 39–41.\* The Virginia Jihad Network or so called "Paintball Cell" is a prime example of this technique. A group of local young men were enamored with the teachings of an Islamic scholar named Ali-Timimi. Following 9/11 Timimi, the group's spiritual guide, pulled aside a select few of his followers and warned them that the attacks constituted the opening of a final conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims and that it was their duty to train for jihad and be ready to join the fight. Inspired by his speech several friends began to meet and train using paintball guns in the woods outside Fredericksburg. This activity, occurring under the guidance of one of the members who was an Army veteran, served to strengthen the resolve of the members by reinforcing their friendship and providing "skills" that would help them survive once they engaged in jihad.

<sup>61</sup> Neumann, *Joining Al-Qaeda*, 28.

the group from society and other community influences allows activists to successfully establish and legitimize group behavior and shape expectations through the use of orchestrated group behavior. This enables the group to effectively merge the individual into the collective group.<sup>62</sup>

In the following sections this process will be broken down and discussed step by step to illustrate the effects of shadow parenting throughout the radicalization process.

**Cognitive Openings and the Recruitment Grounds:** In the case of Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, the opening was the events of 9/11 and the following invasion of Iraq in 2003. The “triggering” event was when Pakistani forces raided the Red Mosque in Islamabad where he frequently worshipped during trips to visit Pakistan. This raid, along with ongoing drone strikes in the region where his family traced its roots, finally moved Shahzad to the far right of the radicalization spectrum where violence was the next step.<sup>63</sup> For Samir, the opening and “trigger” were the events of 9/11 and viewing videos of suicide bombers and for Adam it was the need to fill the “void” in his life and the physical confrontation with the prayer leader. This stage appears to be slightly different for new converts than born-in Muslims which re-engage with a long held belief system. Converts appear to move faster down the radicalization pathway once radical ideology is introduced whereas those born Muslim appear to take a more gradual and incremental approach.

It is during this period that new converts are weakest; the notion that understanding Islam does not require a central religious figure or religious training and can be understood and taught by anyone opens the door to radicalization. As Adam Gadahn said in his essay *Becoming Muslim*, “I discovered that the beliefs and practices of this religion fit my personal theology and intellect as well as basic human logic. Islam presents God not as an anthropo-morphic being but as an entity beyond human comprehension.....Islam has a holy book that is comprehensible to the layman, there is no

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<sup>62</sup> Susie Driscoll, “The Psychological Motivation & Socialization of Suicide Bombers,” unpublished. Presented in lecture notes by Professor Dorothy Denning, Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.

<sup>63</sup> J. M. Berger, (2011-04-30). *Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam* (Kindle Location 3128). Potomac Books Inc.. Kindle Edition.

papacy or priesthood that is considered infallible in matters of interpretation: all Muslims are free to reflect and interpret the book given sufficient education.” This aspect of Islam leaves new members susceptible to believing the initial person or group that takes the time to explain their new religion.<sup>64</sup>

Cognitive openings can result in seeking out the advice or thoughts of friends or relatives or spiritual leaders who may have more radical views or interpretations of Islam. These interpretations can be perceived by the individual as answering gaps or inconsistencies currently being experienced in life. This seeking takes place in the recruitment grounds—places of congregation, vulnerability or recruitment magnets. These are places where activists or people espousing radical ideology can be met and here the bonds of friendship, kinship, or discipleship are used to draw the individual seeker into groups with similar views. Spreading radical ideology can be done through several mediums; social media (blogs and personal websites), publications (newsletters, pamphlets, or something as formal as the *Inspire* magazine), online videos, internet chat-rooms, or face to face in prayer groups or smaller informal discussion groups away from the mosque.

**Recruiters and Frame Alignment through Shadow Parenting:** The American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, an example of discipleship (occurring in 4% of cases in the United States, as shown in Appendix A), was popular among American extremists because of his accessibility. He maintained a Facebook page, a blog, and posted YouTube videos in English; he answered the emails of curious seekers and offered guidance. Due to this wide array of media outlets, made accessible through the use of English, several American extremists responded to his messages. A quick list of those inspired by Awlaki includes Betim Kaziu, Shaker Masri, Antonio Martinez, Zachary Chesser, Barry Bujol, Nidal Hasan and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

The “Fort Dix 6” and the “D.C. 5” are a mixture, containing elements of both friendship and kinship networks (kinship occurred in 12% of cases in the United States). The North Carolina terror cell arrested in 2009, and led by Daniel Boyd, is a classic case

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<sup>64</sup> J. M. Berger, (2011-04-30). *Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam* (Kindle Location 2995). Potomac Books Inc.. Kindle Edition.

of kinship networks at play. Daniel Boyd, a halal butcher, recruited two of his sons along with four other men to conduct jihad. The men met in a prayer group at the Boyd's house and trained in military tactics to prepare themselves. According to the Department of Justice, Boyd radicalized the group to believe that jihad was a personal obligation and even took one of his sons to Palestine "to introduce him to individuals who also believed violent jihad was a personal religious obligation."<sup>65</sup> The direct link from father to son in this case is a clear example of how kinship can be used draw in young and impressionable individuals through the authority wielded by family members and reinforced by ideology.

The Virginia "Paintball Cell", the "Portland 7", "Liberty City 7", and the "Lackawanna 6" are all examples of friendship networks, (the primary network found, occurring in 68% of the 188 cases, as shown in Appendix A) some of which were manipulated by a spiritual guide or sanctioner. These results echo findings from the NYPD report and the Garnstein-Ross and Grossman report which found that 20% of cases in their sample had a spiritual mentor and 25.6% had a spiritual sanctioner who provided guidance.<sup>66</sup> This differs from discipleship as it is not a formal cleric in a Mosque or Madrassa setting but someone without clerical credentials who provides religious guidance. The NYPD report finds these archetypes necessary for the evolution from a "bunch of guys" to terrorist cell willing to plan and conduct operations.<sup>67</sup> This is key as the report notes, "for those groups who do not seek jihad abroad, the dedication and commitment of their leader to jihad is often the main factor in determining whether the group will commit a terrorist act or not."<sup>68</sup> The recent report by the National Security

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<sup>65</sup> Department of Justice, "Seven Charged With terrorism Violations in North Carolina, Office of Public Affairs, July 27, 2009, accessed October 27, 2011. <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html>.

<sup>66</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009), 14.

<sup>67</sup> Silber, *Radicalization in the West*, 9.

<sup>68</sup> Silber, *Radicalization in the West*, 10.

Preparedness Group also notes, “That extremist ideas are more likely to resonate if they are articulated by a credible or charismatic leader.”<sup>69</sup>

For the “Lackawanna 6” it was Kamal Derwish who acted as the spiritual guide and mentor to young Muslims in the Lackawanna area. Derwish was charismatic, engaging and fresh from Saudi Arabia; he was fluent in the Koran and seemed to be the perfect Muslim role model for the young restless men of Lackawanna.<sup>70</sup> Derwish, who saw Lackawanna as “virgin territory”, began to hold prayer meetings at the house he shared with Yahya Goba, one of the “Lackawanna Six.”<sup>71</sup> Derwish mixed his studies of the Koran with stories of fighting in Palestine and Bosnia and offered a sense adventure along with a distinct and simple interpretation of Islam to his avid listeners. The study group naturally tightened over time to a group of high school friends who at first attended more on the desire to hang out with friends rather than focus on religion.<sup>72</sup> Yet as time went on Derwish began to introduce a more legalistic view of Islam and introduced the group to the works of Sayyid Qutb. This introduction to radical ideology was followed by increasing criticism of the lifestyles of those in the group. These criticisms along with his interpretations of what was righteous created an “uncompromising religious atmosphere.” This change in focus was the institution of “frame alignment” or the isolation of the group members from society to create the necessary (us vs. them) mentality that leads to the justification of violence as the only way to reconcile the perceived schism between the group and their environment. To help those in the group along the right path Derwish recommended radical websites to help them find a way that they could make up for being “too American.”<sup>73</sup> In addition to recommending extremist literature, Derwish brought into the group a spiritual sanctioner, someone with the

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<sup>69</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 15.

<sup>70</sup> Dina Temple-Raston. *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror* (p. 32). Kindle Edition.

<sup>71</sup> Dina Temple-Raston. *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror* (p. 37). Kindle Edition.

<sup>72</sup> Dina Temple-Raston. *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror* (p. 46). Kindle Edition.

<sup>73</sup> Dina Temple-Raston. *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror* (p. 62). Kindle Edition.

credentials to tell the young men that jihad was the only way to salvation. The sanctioner was a young imam who had fought with Derwish in Bosnia and had similar extremist views. The imam told the young men of Lackawanna that jihad was the only way to save their souls and that they must train; God needed men of action. Within days Derwish and five of his followers had decided to travel to Afghanistan and train for jihad.<sup>74</sup>

It is also important to note that the individual seeker can also be the catalyst for forming the group and pushing its radical agenda. Tarik Mehanna is an example of such a seeker. After 9/11 he constantly surfed the internet looking for videos, articles and material related to the attack. He also became interested in the ideology of al-Qaida and the concept of jihad. Ahamd Abousamra, a childhood friend, was receptive when Tarik shared propaganda with him and began to actively search with him for others to join their newfound cause. During this process they met Daniel Maldonado, a recent convert who was of similar age.<sup>75</sup> In Maldonado, the two found a like mind and the three became activists in their own rights publishing CD's and posting on extremist blogs. The three were soon spending their free time viewing jihadist video propaganda and discussing their newfound sense of duty. Both Mehanna and Maldonado became active participants in online forums such as the Islamic Awakening forums, Islamic network, and Clear Guidance.<sup>76</sup> It is here that Maldonado became friends with Omar Hammami, an American and member/leader in al-Shabaab, and decided to move to Somalia and join the fighting there to fulfill his dreams of jihad.

As demonstrated by these examples, the real or created bonds of friendship, kinship, and discipleship form the mechanism which enables the individual's identity to be fused into group identity through frame alignment and facilitates the acceptance of extreme ideology and the identification of the individual with a larger cause. This process results with the individual taking on the characteristics of the group; in the same

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<sup>74</sup> Dina Temple-Raston. *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in an Age of Terror* (p. 88). Kindle Edition.

<sup>75</sup> J. M. Berger, (2011-04-30). *Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam* (Kindle Location 3745). Potomac Books Inc.. Kindle Edition.

<sup>76</sup> J. M. Berger, (2011-04-30). *Jihad Joe: Americans Who Go to War in the Name of Islam* (Kindle Location 3762). Potomac Books Inc.. Kindle Edition.



way that Adam Gadahn began to emulate the legalistic example of his spiritual guides, Diab and Deek.

**The Visible Signs of Frame Alignment-** Prior to becoming operational (or reaching the far right of the radicalization spectrum where violence becomes justified), groups and individuals often become more religious and extreme and will attempt to impose their beliefs on the community often focusing on family or close acquaintances.<sup>77</sup> This intensification of religious beliefs is described in Garstein-Ross and Grossman's work on domestic radicalization in the U.S. and U.K. as being manifested in six distinct ways:<sup>78</sup>

1. How rigidly or (legalistically) one may interpret one's religion
2. Who he come to trust and not trust
3. How he/she views the relationship between the West and Islam
4. Manifesting a low tolerance for religious deviance
5. Attempting to impose one's beliefs on others
6. Expressing radical views

The first three indicators are personal and will often shape the 'seeking' behavior of the individual as they look for answers and other like minded people with which to discuss their ideas. The last three indicators are good signs of the socialization and intensification process described by Neumann. The stronger the group identity and more intense the radicalization, the more the group will try to change or act out against those around it who do not conform or follow what they believe to be right. It is important to note that while radicalization is necessary for the trajectory to terrorism it does not automatically commit the individual to violence.

The process of radicalization is not linear; some individuals need multiple drivers (grievance, ideology, and mobilization) and years to reach a point where they accept

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<sup>77</sup> Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe*, 41.

<sup>78</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009), 12.

violence while others may be convinced by a single event.<sup>79</sup> As noted by Brian Jenkins, “Radicalization is a pre-requisite to terrorism—there are no moderate bombers—but radicalization does not automatically and inexorably propel one all the way to violence.”<sup>80</sup> Many individuals become disillusioned with the process and de-radicalize or stop short of violence because of: family intervention, inconsistencies in ideology, hypocrisy, and hardship caused by membership, or a change in environment such as moving away from the groups influence.<sup>81</sup> These are aspects that counter radicalization and prevention efforts must seek to replicate. Extremist actions and ideologies have inconsistencies that can be used against the extremist to disrupt the radicalization pathways of vulnerable individuals. This understanding of radicalization reveals important insights into elements of the radicalization process and the central role of religious ideology and socialization within networks. Radicalization is a “visible process” it occurs within networks known to the community and the community infrastructure. Manifestations of radicalization are first felt by family and close friends making them the first actors in any prevention or counter radicalization programs. This finding underscores the importance of Muslim civic engagement efforts and their role in future programs. According to the Garnstein-Ross and Grossman, “Such engagement efforts seem most effective at countering radicalization when they come from the Muslim Community itself”.<sup>82</sup>

## **A. CURRENT U.S. POLICY**

What is current U.S. policy and how does it address these trends? Acknowledging the apparent increase in the tempo of “homegrown terrorism” Homeland

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<sup>79</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 15.

<sup>80</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009), 8.

<sup>81</sup> Michael Jacobsen, *Terrorists Dropouts: Learning From Those Who Have Left*, (Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy: 2010), 1.

<sup>82</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009), 15.

Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano has expressed the view that, “the threat today may be at its most heightened state since the attacks nearly 10 years ago.”<sup>83</sup> Some of the most serious plots and attacks since 9/11 have taken place between 2007–2010, highlighted by the New York subway plot, the Fort Hood shootings, the attempted Times Square bombing, and the most recent plot by Rezwan Ferdaus involving remote controlled planes destined for the Pentagon. The Department of Justice and the White House have both advocated a community based approach by emphasizing the fact that prevention efforts should empower the communities that are targeted by extremist and remain distinctly separate from counter-terrorist efforts which target the extremist themselves. These communities need to be “protected, strengthened, and empowered in order to help them resist violent extremism.”<sup>84</sup>

The recently released documents by the White House on this process have been described in a report by the National Security Preparedness Group as laying the framework for the creation of “a ‘Fourth pillar’ of its response to terrorism to tackle domestic radicalization and, in doing so, complement the other three pillars, that is, ‘hard’ counterterrorism at home and abroad, as well as the strategy for countering violent extremism overseas.”<sup>85</sup> The Administration recognizes that the Muslim communities, whose children are being targeted by activist and militant extremist ideology, are best positioned to lead counter radicalization efforts due to their personal connections and local knowledge of the community. However, the planning, preparation, and implementation of such programs require not only an understanding of community-oriented policing in its various models, but also an understanding of the violent extremist ideology and how it is used to move an individual along the trajectory of radicalization to the point of accepting violence. This need has been recognized by the White House and it is reflected in their proposed areas of action: 1) enhancing federal engagement with and

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<sup>83</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 12.

<sup>84</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 18.

<sup>85</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 39.

support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists, 2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and 3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.<sup>86</sup> This strategy reflects that the approach to counter radicalization should be multi-themed and not restricted to a single policy. To be effective, prevention programs should be implemented through multiple channels and embedded within programs already dealing with public safety or immigrant community education.<sup>87</sup> These areas of action highlight a heavy emphasis on community involvement, community leadership, preemptive problem solving, and cooperation and trust- *all tenants of community policing*. As noted in the beginning of this paper, community policing is an evolving concept which is executed uniquely within different jurisdictions. The following chapter will discuss this evolution and look at case studies of successful models which can lay the basis for counter radicalization programs.

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<sup>86</sup> The White House “Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States,” Washington, 2011, 5–6.

<sup>87</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 18.

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## IV. COMMUNITY POLICING

### A. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing within Muslim communities has undergone major changes in the past 10 years in response to the growth of international and national ‘homegrown’ terrorism. Pre- 9/11, police departments sought to reduce crime, fear of crime, and disorder through increased interaction within their communities. These interactions used problem solving and communication to address factors which contributed to crime.<sup>88</sup> Post- 9/11, community policing shifted to a focus specifically designed to reach out and understand Muslim communities within a counterterrorism context. Under pressure to incorporate and meet federal counter-terrorism agendas, community policing responded in three ways: 1) Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) characterized by an emphasis on contacts, informants and gaining access to the Muslim community, 2) Homeland Security Policing (HSP) with a focus on counter terrorism, law enforcement, immigration and prosecution of acts associated with terrorism, and 3) the original Community Oriented Policing (COP) concept consisting of a partnership between the police and community leaders, with an increased responsibility put on the community and more emphasis put on protecting civil rights and liberties.<sup>89</sup> Each policing approach has its merits and place in the spectrum of law enforcement duties necessary to ensure homeland security. This spectrum involves interaction in the prevention, intervention, suppression and prosecution levels of law enforcement. The approach that best fits prevention style programs is COP due to its cooperative interaction with the parents, teachers, leaders and agencies which interact daily with individuals prior to any formal entrance into the legal system.

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<sup>88</sup> Jones, Chapin and Stanley B. Suppinski, “Policing and Community Relations in the Homeland Security Era,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 43. (2010) 2.

<sup>89</sup> This approach is also based on the assumption that the majority of the Muslim or Arab-American communities are the same as any other community, i.e. they are good, law-abiding citizens who wish to live in a country free of terrorism.

## 1. Intelligence Led Policing

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent government reports and commission findings have shown the vital role that intelligence plays not only at the strategic level but also at the local law enforcement level. In response, efforts have been made to restructure intelligence infrastructures and enhance state and local law enforcement intelligence capabilities. These changes make it possible for state and local law enforcement agencies to be integrated into homeland security. The U.S. department of Justice (USDOJ) defines this change as:

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years. To implement intelligence-led policing, police organizations need to reevaluate their current policies and protocols. Intelligence must be incorporated into the planning process to reflect community problems and issues. Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice. Most important, intelligence must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The development of analytical techniques, training, and technical assistance needs to be supported.<sup>90</sup>

A drawback to this approach is that police departments must carry out normal duties while working to prevent terrorism and meeting the intelligence and agenda requirements of higher agencies. The forms of collection commonly used in this approach are: physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, confidential informants, undercover operators, newspaper and internet reports and activity, and public records. An example of an agency operating according to this philosophy is the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) who is promoting a convergence method in which community policing and counterterrorism strategies are merged under the umbrella of intelligence-led policing. This allows the LAPD to focus and integrate operations on a spectrum that ranges from petty crime to terrorists acts within their jurisdiction.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Marilyn Peterson, *Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture*, Bureau of Justice Assistance, September 2005, accessed March 8, 2011, <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf>, vii.

<sup>91</sup> Michael p. Downing, "Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department's Convergence Strategy," *Police Chief Magazine*, February 2009, accessed March 8, 2011, [http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display\\_arch&article\\_id=1729&issue\\_id=22009](http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1729&issue_id=22009), 7-9.

However, this approach can cause suspicion and paranoia in targeted populations when it is used to ‘profile’ or ‘predict’ potential terrorists as evidenced by the LAPD’s failed effort to ‘map’ their Muslim communities in 2007. The stated purpose of the program was to “help Muslim communities avoid the influence of violent, ideologically-based extremists by identifying at risk communities.”<sup>92</sup> However, this was not how it was perceived and the subsequent protests and indignation by the Muslim community resulted in the cancellation of the program and severe damage to the relationship between the LAPD and Muslim community. A current version of this story is playing out in New York where the NYPD has partnered with the CIA and is operating a Demographics Unit responsible for mapping Muslim neighborhoods. The NYPD has sent “rakers” or ethnically appropriate officers into Muslim mosques and places of business to act as a “walking camera” and gather information about attendees.<sup>93</sup> This revelation, from reporters of the Associated Press, has led to similar negative reactions from the New York Muslim population and has further strained relations which were weakened after the “Ground Zero” mosque debate.

## **2. Homeland Security Policing**

With the increased threat of domestic terrorism, funding has shifted from traditional COP programs to homeland security focused programs in response to political pressure and public opinion. These pressures have also caused a shift in training and execution; departments are developing new investigative functions, cooperating more openly with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, increasing the safety and security of critical infrastructure and overall increasing surveillance over local communities.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Chapin Jones, and Stanley B. Suppinski, “Policing and Community Relations in the Homeland Security Era,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 43. (2010), 8.

<sup>93</sup> Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “With CIA help, NYPD moves covertly in Muslim areas,” *Associated Press*, August 23, 2011, accessed November 03, 2011, [http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn\\_082511a.html](http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn_082511a.html).

<sup>94</sup> Jason Vaughn Lee, “Policing after 9/11: Community Policing in an Age of Homeland Security,” *Police Quarterly*, 2010, accessed March 8, 2011, <http://pqx.sagepub.com/content/13/4/347>, 351.



Within this model, federal immigration and counterterrorism agendas backed by the PATRIOT ACT take priority over the police-immigrant relations valued by traditional COP. This was readily apparent in early 2002, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that it would send teams of federal, state, and local law enforcement agents to apprehend individuals who had remained in the country after being ordered deported. However, this focus by the DOJ, placed solely on individuals who were from countries with al-Qaida links, strained the local law enforcements' relationships with Muslim communities who saw the initiative as racial profiling. Another example of this was in Dearborn, Michigan, when in 2001 the DOJ announced a plan to interview 5,000 individuals who were temporary visa holders and from countries linked to al-Qaida. Local Dearborn police officers were asked to help conduct the interviews. However, due to the community concerns aired during working groups with community leaders the local police helped facilitate the interviews but did not conduct any themselves.<sup>95</sup> This action by the Dearborn Police averted a potential crisis and preserved the bonds of trust, which had been established through prior COP.

### **3. Community Oriented Policing**

Community policing is an integrated, problem solving approach that focuses on building local relationships between the police and the community's leadership and inhabitants. Community policing techniques have been successful in cities such as: New York City, Chicago, Boston, San Jose, Dearborn and San Diego. Due to these successes, COP techniques are being widely adopted in smaller municipal and county police departments across the United States.<sup>96</sup> Many definitions and variations of COP exist but the following definition provided by the Homeland Security Institute will be used for this study, "a policing strategy and approach aimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime through proactive engagement with the community. This assumes greater accountability

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<sup>95</sup> Chapin Jones, and Stanley B. Suppinski, "Policing and Community Relations in the Homeland Security Era," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*: Vol. 7: Iss. 1, Article 43. (2010), 5.

<sup>96</sup> Homeland Security Institute, "Community Policing Within Muslim Communities: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature," prepared for the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, 27 December 2006. (HSI Publication Number RP06-99-01).

for the police, a greater role for the community in collaborative problem solving, and a greater concern for civil rights and liberties.”<sup>97</sup> These strategies all involve four elements: prevention, intervention, suppression and prosecution.<sup>98</sup> The weight given to each approach depends on the community and law enforcement actors involved. Prevention is focused on denying recruitment of youths into gangs or criminal activity by offering alternative avenues or activities. Intervention strategies are designed with similar tactics but are meant to separate youth from illegal activities after they have already joined or committed criminal acts. Suppression techniques involve methods which make it physically harder to commit crimes or raise the cost of participation. Prosecution techniques involve warrant sweeps, law amendments to address certain behavior, and/or interaction with federal and judicial agencies.<sup>99</sup>

COP is the ideal platform for prevention programs at the front end of the law enforcement spectrum due to flexibility gained through its ability to engage multiple organizations in dealing with individuals who have not yet committed any criminal activity. In prevention and intervention, the community and parents play the major role and are supported by city and county resources. The last two elements, suppression and prosecution, are characterized by heavy law enforcement action supported by intelligence gained from the community.<sup>100</sup> This far end of the spectrum can be better served by ILP and HSP style programs which focus on individuals actively plotting or committing acts either individually or within larger criminal or terrorist networks.

#### **4. Community Policing and the Comprehensive Gang Model: San Jose**

For the last 17 years, the city of San Jose has been slowly becoming one of the nation’s leading examples of the comprehensive gang model in COP. Their strategy,

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<sup>97</sup> Jose M. Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the Local Law Enforcement Level” (Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. March 2005), 2.

<sup>98</sup> James C. Howell, “Youth Gang Programs and Strategies,” prepared for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, August 2000. (Publication number 95-JD-MU-K001).

<sup>99</sup> Howell, “Youth Gang Programs and Strategies,” 5, 14, 21.

<sup>100</sup> These insights were gained by the Author’s interaction with the Salinas Gang Project, 2011.

which incorporates prevention, intervention, suppression and community values, is based on two basic features: the Mayor's Gang Prevention Task Force and the Bringing Everyone's Strengths Together (BEST) fund. The success of San Jose's approach is evident by the reduction of crime by nearly 50%, lowering of the school dropout rate, and reduction in Juvenile Hall admissions along with reductions of commitments to the California Youth Authority and foster care.<sup>101</sup>

The San Jose model remains resilient and sustainable due to a sense of ownership from the community, a whole of government approach, and through the creation of internal funding, accountability, and strategy adjustment mechanisms. Ownership by the community ensures continuity between electoral and budgetary cycles; which allows the Task Force and BEST fund to continue under "three mayors, four city managers, and three police chiefs".<sup>102</sup> The foundation of the San Jose success story is the overall sense of ownership felt by the community, when questioned after an election a community activist was asked whether the incoming mayor would support the pre-established Task Force. He replied, "of course it will continue, it's not his, it's ours."<sup>103</sup> The backbone of city involvement is the Police Department and the Department of Parks, Recreation, and Neighborhood Services (PRNS) which provide the bulk of the staffing and organization for Task Force events and meetings. San Jose has also been able to maintain its strategy while delegating tasks through the separation of duties between a Policy Team and a Technical Team.

The Policy Team is responsible for incorporating public opinion as well as making decisions on policy and strategy adjustments. This team is composed of a wide range of representatives including but not limited to, "city parks and recreation, courts, law enforcement, faith-based community organizers, gang intervention experts, and the

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<sup>101</sup> Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, *Implementing a Citywide Gang Violence Reduction Strategy: Three Promising Examples*, Paper, California Cities Gang Prevention Network, 2006.

<sup>102</sup> Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, *Implementing a Citywide Gang Violence Reduction Strategy: Three Promising Examples*, Paper, California Cities Gang Prevention Network, 2006, 3.

<sup>103</sup> Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, *Implementing a Citywide Gang Violence Reduction Strategy: Three Promising Examples*, Paper, California Cities Gang Prevention Network, 2006, 3.

state parole office and U.S. Attorney.”<sup>104</sup> For a sample of agencies and organizations that can be involved in COP planning, see Figure 3.




Figure 2. Sample Agencies and Organizations

The Technical Team, which functions as the staff of the Task Force, is made up of volunteers and employees from city, county, and community agencies. This team meets monthly and is composed of police officers, school officials, PRNS staff members, along with other community representatives that have specific expertise in the areas being addressed by the team. These two teams allow the Task Force to stay focused and flexible as strategic adjustments become necessary.

The San Jose model is also based on five strategic goals: Service Delivery, Education and Public Awareness, Capacity Building, Crisis Response, and Local, State,

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<sup>104</sup> Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, *Implementing a Citywide Gang Violence Reduction Strategy: Three Promising Examples*, Paper, California Cities Gang Prevention Network, 2006, 4.

and National Collaboration.<sup>105</sup> The overall vision is: “Safe and healthy youth connected to their families, schools, communities, and their futures.”<sup>106</sup> This plan is reviewed by the Task Force in detail every three years at an annual retreat with solicited input from the Technical and Policy teams along with community input. This collaborative process measures past success, and evaluates policies for the future, resulting in a new Strategic Work Plan, which then guides the Task Force over the next three years.<sup>107</sup>

The San Jose model has been successful in reducing gang violence and has remained sustainable due to its strategy, organization and ability to decentralize functions to community agencies. The Mayors Prevention Task Force has maximized an inter-agency and whole of government approach along with a built-in funding capacity, accountability, and recalibration mechanisms. This model allows the city to engage violence across the entire spectrum of law enforcement yet remain flexible enough to change focus on an annual basis to stay on top of changing conditions.

## **5. Community Policing in Muslim Communities: Dearborn and Portland**

There have been several stated reasons for applying community policing to Muslim communities: it can promote outreach from the local government and police to the Muslim community, decrease isolation, promote integration, and potentially reduce alienation and other factors that can help lead to radicalization. Also, it can provide the human intelligence resources needed to understand the language and cultural barriers associated with the Muslim community while identifying potential radicalization or terrorist activities. Several programs focused on Muslim communities have been

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<sup>105</sup> Mayor’s Gang Prevention Task Force, “Action Collaboration Transformation”, City of San Jose, 2008.

<sup>106</sup> Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, *Implementing a Citywide Gang Violence Reduction Strategy: Three Promising Examples*, Paper, California Cities Gang Prevention Network, 2006,4.

<sup>107</sup> Mayor’s Gang Prevention Task Force, “Action”, 8. and Andrew Moore and John Calhoun, “Implementing,” 3.

implemented in France, Britain, Washington D.C., Boston, Dearborn, New York, Chicago, and Saint Paul.<sup>108</sup>

*a. Dearborn*

Home to the highest concentrated Arab population (380,000) within the United States, Dearborn and southeastern Michigan have a long history of community policing and interaction between local government and Muslim community.<sup>109</sup> Due to this large population, Dearborn has an extensive number of local service-oriented organizations and national organizations such as: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Arab American Chamber of Commerce, Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), American Civil Liberties Union- Michigan (ACLU-MI), Advocates an Leaders for Police and Community Trust (ALPACT), and the Michigan Alliance against Hate Crimes (MIAAHC). This extensive history of political and social organization allowed easier integration with community policing initiatives after 9/11.<sup>110</sup>

Following September 11, these organizations initiated efforts for mutual training and education for FBI, state and local law enforcement agencies so they could anticipate cultural issues that might arise with the increased focus and interaction with the Muslim community. The Dearborn PD has recognized that individual patrol officers are the link between the government and the community and have accordingly focused on making this interaction positive. Patrol officers are trained on core ideologies in an effort to be educated and knowledgeable about the cultural and religious backgrounds of the citizens within their daily beats. This mutual training also focused on Muslim citizens

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<sup>108</sup> Dennis L. Jensen, "Enhancing Homeland Security Efforts by Building Strong Relationships Between the Muslim Community and Local Law Enforcement" (Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 2006).

<sup>109</sup> Ronald Haddad, "Building Trust, Driving Relationships with the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab American Community," *The Police Chief*, March 2011, 42.

<sup>110</sup> Deborah A Ramirez, Cohen O'Connell, Sasha, Zafar, Rabia, *Developing Partnerships Between Law Enforcement and American Muslim, Arab and Sikh Communities: A Promising Practices Guide* (Northeastern University, May 2004), 18.

with the distribution of pamphlets informing community members on what to expect during encounters with law enforcement as well as advising them of their rights.

The relationships between the Dearborn Police Department and the Muslim community are characterized by open communication and preemptive problem solving. An example of this relationship is the handling of the Muslim communities' protests of the imminent invasion of Iraq by the U.S. in 2003. Due to its relationship and ability to communicate with the local community the police department was able to organize the event in a way which protected the participants while allowing them maximum visibility to exercise their first amendment rights.<sup>111</sup> This fair handling of the event satisfied all involved and further solidified the trust between the Dearborn police department and its citizens. This trust resulted in the formalization of communication through the establishment of the Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity group (BRIDGES) which includes a hotline between police and community leaders.

The success of the Dearborn program is due to the substantial pre-existing organizations and networks within the Muslim community, the priority placed on relationships and trust by the police department, formal and open lines of communication and the ability to preemptively solve problems collaboratively. This emphasis is due to the view by the Dearborn Police Department that its role in Homeland Security is community protection. They are focused on protecting their communities from terrorist attacks, whether "it's through preventative patrols against possible targets, target hardening, or improving emergency response."<sup>112</sup> These actions, done for the benefit of the community, result in trust between the community and the police. Trust results in communication. Communication results in a better informed police department (and better informed Mayor) who are then positioned to prevent threats to public safety due to intelligence gained from the community.

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<sup>111</sup> Ramirez, *Developing Partnerships*, 21.

<sup>112</sup> Douglas Page, "Community Policing or Homeland security: Sophie's Choice for Police?" September 12, 2011, accessed November 03, 2011, <http://www.officer.com/article/10325312/community-policing-or-homeland-security-sophies-choice-for-police>.

**b. Portland**

Home to a significant Muslim community, Portland's COP experience has been seen as largely successful and mutually beneficial.. Several Muslim organizations are present to serve and represent this population: Arab Muslim Police Advisory Council (AMPAC), the Muslim Educational Trust (MET), Islamic Social Services of Oregon State (ISOS), and the Islamic Society of Greater Portland (ISGP). Portland's Muslim community has a history of communication and engagement which resulted in positive relations which aided post 9/11 efforts on both sides. These positive relationships appear to come from the social organizations proactive stance in the community and their involvement in inter-faith dialogue, cultural awareness seminars, and community outreach programs. Portland's community policing effort is most known for its refusal to help enforce immigration laws and rebuffs of homeland security agendas which it felt violated the traditional aspects of law enforcement.<sup>113</sup>

Portland's case is unique in that it is the initiative of Muslim leaders that keeps communication open keeping the community involved rather than isolated by events.<sup>114</sup> Another unique aspect to the Portland case is the involvement of the Oregon U.S. Attorney, Dwight Holton. Holton was involved in indicting Mohamed Mohamud for the Christmas tree attempt and saw it as a personal opportunity to get involved with the community. He visited the Islamic Center of Corvallis where Mohamud prayed, met with a local refugee organization, chaired a town hall meeting, visited a youth center and spoke to young Muslims.<sup>115</sup> By continuously engaging the community he has made several friends in the community and even invited several of them to dinner at his house so they could freely discuss topics such as U.S. foreign policy, homegrown terrorism, and FBI "sting" operations. Holt's goals are to network with Muslim community leaders and give them the resources and support so they can counter radicalization on their own.

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<sup>113</sup> Immigration Policy Center, *Balancing Federal, State, and Local Priorities in Police-Immigrant Relations: Lessons from Muslim, Arab, and South Asian Communities Since 9/11*, accessed March 1, 2011, 6. <http://www.immigrateionpolicy.org/special-reports/balancing-federal-state-and-local-priorities/>.

<sup>114</sup> Immigration Policy Center, *Balancing Federal, State, and Local Priorities*, 7.

<sup>115</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 37.



The Muslim community in Portland has also been active in engaging young Muslims to prevent their participation in criminal activity and help with civic education and leadership training. The Center for Intercultural Organizing is run by a Somali-American whose goal is to “tackle young people’s grievances and make them better citizens.”<sup>116</sup> This a good example of the local organizations (ethnic, cultural, athletic, professional) that are available and can act as pre-existing structure with which to link future prevention projects.

The programs described in Dearborn and Portland, which focus on addressing grievances and building trust, have met with success resulting in closer ties and integrated projects between the community and law enforcement which benefits the Muslim community as a whole. The COP approach allows the Muslim community to interact with the government on many levels and also allows law enforcement to deal with issues that are created externally but still impact locally. As noted by Ronald Haddad, Chief of Police for the Dearborn Police Department, “the perception of cultural bias in issues such as unfair national immigration policies, reported recruitment of informants within the local mosques, and racial profiling can all elicit a passionate community response. These issues add a continuous burden on the local police department in building trust with the community in areas that were not created by- or in the control of- any police department. These factors cannot be allowed to impede progress. Adhering to a community-oriented policing philosophy continues to be significant in overcoming these obstacles.”<sup>117</sup>

However, these programs in the United States operate in the spectrum of law enforcement duties and have not yet been tailored to target the specific mechanics of radicalization. Community policing programs, the correct vehicle from which to employ an effective counter strategy, are currently focused at the upper community level; but in their current form would fail to reach the granular level needed to counter the effects of radicalized messages being delivered in the recruiting grounds where cliques and activist

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<sup>116</sup> Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Group Findings, (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), 34.

<sup>117</sup> Ronald Haddad, “Building Trust, Driving Relationships with the Dearborn, Michigan, Arab American Community,” *The Police Chief*, March 2011, 44.

circulate and socialize. These current COP models need the addition of a counter radicalization program that is specifically and locally tailored under the local COP umbrella. Britain's COP based *Prevent* program focuses, in concept, on several aspects of radicalization and is the only formal counter-radicalization program to date that has attempted to prevent radicalization with a national program that is implemented at a local level.

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## V. COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTER RADICALIZATION EFFORTS

### A. UNITED KINGDOM: PREVENT MODEL

The United Kingdom's current community policing efforts are a hybrid of counterterrorism and community oriented policing. In 2003, the UK's government announced the CONTEST program as its new multidimensional counter-terrorism strategy which consisted of four priorities: *Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare*.<sup>118</sup> In 2009 the UK launched CONTEST II, which shifted focus by making *Prevent* their priority and placed counter radicalization at the forefront of counterterrorism work within Britain. The *Prevent* strategy incorporates a wide range of community-based social programs to assist in undercutting local drivers of extremism. This campaign, currently operated by the Department for Communities and Local Governments, features a bottom-up approach that unites local moderate Muslim leaders and organizations with law enforcement authorities to counter radicalization.

The *Prevent* plan works to raise awareness of Islamic radicalization within Muslim communities by focusing on at risk youth; it does this through the establishment of networks of diverse Muslims and by funding local organizations that provide youth alternatives such as sports, volunteering, and employment opportunities. *Prevent* is delivered locally but stays within a national framework which has five distinct objectives which guide the overall effort:

- Challenge the ideology behind violent extremism
- Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and offer support
- Support individuals vulnerable to recruitment

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<sup>118</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism- Communities and Local Government Committee*, United Kingdom Parliament, accessed March 8, 2011, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6504.htm>, 2.

- Increase community resiliency
- Address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting<sup>119</sup>

*Prevent* is a fully funded national strategy with a long term focus which relies on its integration into all levels of government to be successful. This holistic approach encompasses government and interagency involvement at all levels including community organizations. The U.K. has delegated responsibility down to the local level but with clear guidance delineating the role of each participating agency, firmly nesting their goals and agendas under the framework of the national *Prevent* strategy.<sup>120</sup> While the police are the most visible component, with each of Britain's 43 Chief Constables being charged under law to develop and deliver *Prevent* within their jurisdiction, it also relies heavily on active community involvement and participation.

*Prevent* is based on a cohesive set of teams that implement its strategy at all levels within the community, these teams are: Safe Neighborhood Teams (SNTs), Gold groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and faith based organizations. Safe Neighborhood Teams are dedicated team of policeman who deal with local issues and concerns. Their time is spent patrolling in the community, meeting community members and addressing their concerns. These strategies place SNTs in a position to identify community tensions, grievances or at risk individuals and intervene in a timely matter. Gold groups are networks of key community members (faith, business, or other influential persons) which can be assembled in the aftermath of significant events which affect the community such as an attack or terrorist related arrests.<sup>121</sup> These groups can act as a trusted liaison in times of increased tension to facilitate crisis management and soothe community fears through clear communication. The final piece of the network are the Faith based organizations and NGOs that form the direct link to the community leadership and infrastructure. These can also include ethnic, cultural, athletic,

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<sup>119</sup> U.K. Home Office, "Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners," August 2009, 6.

<sup>120</sup> Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, "Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies," Discussion Paper, 2008, 9.

<sup>121</sup> Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, "Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies," Discussion Paper, 2008, 3.

educational and vocational organizations that are already active within the community and interacting with members. These teams work together to deliver *Prevent* projects and initiatives within their jurisdictions in a way that is tailored to local issues and local citizens.

One such initiative is the Channel Project; the Channel Project is a national initiative developed to provide support to protect and safeguard vulnerable individuals from being drawn into violent extremism.<sup>122</sup> Channel uses a case management approach to identify at risk youth and guide them into targeted intervention programs. Participants include representatives from police, probation, local government, school systems, social services, health services who act as a multi-agency panel tasked with evaluating and placing referrals. If the panel assesses a person to be at risk it will then assign the individual to the agency best suited to provide the style of intervention necessary. Participation by the individual at this point is strictly voluntary since the program is preventative in nature and the individual has not committed any crimes.

Intervention efforts vary within Channel based on the tier concept; those who are merely at risk of being exposed are treated differently and nominated for different programs compared to those who are in the process of being radicalized. Interventions can range from career development and educational opportunities for low-risk individuals, to targeted ideological intervention for high-risk individuals.<sup>123</sup> Support for individuals referred under the Channel project can include: mentoring and counseling, theological guidance and discussion, educational projects, civic engagement, and working with the support network of the referred individual (family and peer networks) to help them challenge the influence of extremism within the individual.<sup>124</sup> This wide range of options allows a tiered response to each individual case which can disrupt the radicalization process. This graduated response based on a 4-tier system allows *Prevent*

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<sup>122</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent extremism- Communities and Local Government Committee*, United Kingdom Parliament, accessed March 8, 2011, 4.<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/6504.htm>.

<sup>123</sup> Seth D. Rosen, "Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom's Approach To Counter Radicalization" (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 28.

<sup>124</sup> U.K. Home Office, "Delivering the Prevent Strategy: An Updated Guide for Local Partners," August 2009, 12.

programs to simultaneously execute short term and long term strategies and initiatives within the community. See Figure 4. The majority of *Prevent* activity takes place within the lower three-quarters and highlights the primary role of community and NGO programming in the counter radicalization process. Police participation and presence in these lower tiers consists of COP, outreach programs, vulnerability assessments and identification of at-risk individuals through their presence in SNTs.




Figure 3. The Intervention Pyramid (From <sup>125</sup>)

While the *Prevent* program has received praise because it enables a forum for ideas, empowers local Muslim organizations, and gives voice to a broad array of moderate Muslim voices, it has its drawbacks. Due to the position of *Prevent* within a broader counterterrorism program it has several of the problems associated with HSP style programs. As stated by the Institute for Community Cohesion in the U.K. House of Commons 2010 report *Preventing Violent Extremism*,<sup>126</sup>

<sup>125</sup> Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, “Building Community resilience to Violent Ideologies,” Discussion Paper, 2008, 16.

<sup>126</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism*, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, London: The Stationary Office Limited, March 30, 2010.

The real problem with the *Prevent* agenda is simply that it is presently situated within a counter-terrorism strategy and implemented by a team dedicated to counter-terrorism and is therefore viewed through this lens with suspicion and apprehension; there is a strong belief that the community will be spied upon, wrongly accused and treated unfairly; or simply that the community is made guilty by association with terrorism.<sup>127</sup>

This association is visible through the use of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) in *Prevent* which link MI5 and Special Branch to neighborhood reporting obtained by the local police.<sup>128</sup> This relationship with counter-terrorism is counterproductive for counter radicalization programs and can “alienate the very community that it seeks to engage and influence positively, unwittingly heightening potential vulnerabilities to radicalization by terrorist propaganda.”<sup>129</sup>

Another negative aspect associated with *Prevent* is the law enforcement terminology used and the misunderstandings it can cause in the Muslim Community. Terms such as “project monitoring” and “community mapping”, while common and simply descriptive within law enforcement, can cause the Muslim community to feel like the target of unwarranted attention. Even the title of the program, *Prevent*, has caused misunderstanding. The term, “prevent”, seems to imply that there is something inherently wrong and internal to Muslims that must be stopped. This perception results in the community receiving the negative message that, “we are here to stop you from being bad.”<sup>130</sup> This has prompted the U.K. to allow local partners to rename the program to a theme that resonates positively with local participants.

*Prevent* is currently the most comprehensive counter-radicalization program in the world, however, its relationship with the community and subsequent effectiveness is suffering due to its association with a larger counterterrorism program. This relationship has caused the Muslim community to eye *Prevent* with suspicion as it is associated with

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<sup>127</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism*, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, London: The Stationary Office Limited, March 30, 2010.8.

<sup>128</sup> Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, “Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies,” Discussion Paper, 2008, 3.

<sup>129</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 2010, 8.

<sup>130</sup> House of Commons, *Preventing Violent Extremism*, 2010, 8.



such activities as intelligence gathering, monitoring, and ‘mapping.’ While not exportable wholesale to the American community, overall the U.K. *Prevent* model along with the Comprehensive Gang model are a good starting points and promising frameworks which can be tailored to counter the specifics of shadow parenting at the individual level.

## **VI. PROPOSED MODEL**

### **A. HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL**

The current task facing communities vulnerable to extremist messaging is the need to build counter radicalization programs throughout the community through the effective use of existing structures such as COP or existing social programs. Well thought out and integrated prevention programs can provide law enforcement and community leaders with a pro-active, local solution that meets counter radicalization needs. As this paper has shown, radicalization through social networks is a visible process that can be challenged and disrupted. Yet, to successfully disrupt the informal processes of socialization, community leaders must first assess their communities as to whether they have vulnerable individuals, extremist activity, and the support of the community before moving forward with counter radicalization programs. Once a recognized need is established they must create strategies that meet the unique challenges of their specific jurisdictions. This chapter will lay out a framework which can guide community leaders as they develop and implement counter radicalization efforts.

Assuming that social networking theory is correct in its interpretation of the role of networks and that the mechanics of radicalization as proposed by this paper are representative; is community policing as it is currently configured in Muslim communities ready to effectively counter and prevent radicalization? The answer is no. Specifically, current models fail to address the system of socialization at the individual level among the networks of kinship, discipleship and friendship. Counter radicalization techniques should focus on the individual relationships within the vulnerable social networks that are identified by local members of the community. In order to counter these networks, programs must strategically interact with the strategy of the extremists to find a successful counter. As stated before, extremist activists have changed from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy involving social networks; therefore, community policing

responses need to shift as well in order to be effective in countering radicalization. These actions need to be indirect, decentralized, and operating at the individual's level within the community.

A tailored approach would enable programs to strengthen the bonds between the individual and parents/community while weakening the link between the individual and extremists. This approach should focus on restricting "cognitive openings" by making vulnerable individuals resistant to extremist messages and providing positive alternatives for people suffering from alienation or other grievances. Programs should be designed not only to compete directly with activists for the attention of the young male population but also to shape the environment they live in. Creating an effective counter radicalization and prevention model within these competing social networks is a problem of strategy, organization, and level of interaction.

### **1. Strategy (Indirect)**

The strategy necessary to successfully counter the indirect methods used by extremists is to support and enable *non-law* enforcement approaches which are initiated and led primarily by the Muslim community within the areas of vulnerability, congregation or those areas that contain recruitment magnets. This approach should include efforts which address social issues such as integration and immigration policies, awareness training for social workers, policemen, teachers and Imams, and increased public diplomacy to dispel myths about Western foreign policy. As noted before, the local community is often affected by events outside of their control, international or national events which can resonate locally with different constituents. Each Muslim community has unique geographical and ethnic ties to the global community which affect their daily life here in the United States.

An indirect strategy must identify and empower key Muslim and non-Muslim community leaders and available organizations to develop and lead local prevention programs. Participation by community representatives will ensure programs are representative of local needs and are able to identify individuals within vulnerable networks that are at risk, or have been exposed to extreme ideologies. However, if local

leaders, who are representative of the target population, are not used communities will run the risk of developing generic programs which may not answer the diverse religious, ethnic, and cultural needs of each community.

Much like the approach used in San Jose, programs should delegate guidance and authority down to local organizations and leaders which carry out the day to day activities autonomously but within the bounds and direction of the overall strategy. An indirect strategy approach is defined by “big” community involvement and “little” law enforcement visibility. The key is to avoid the stigma that prominent counter terrorism agendas, intelligence gathering activities and federal agency involvement can bring. The best help that local police can provide in support of counter radicalization programs is a solid base of positive community interaction as seen in the Portland and Dearborn case studies. This trust built at the upper levels will reflect down through all levels of interaction between the local government agencies and the community, facilitating the open dialogue critical for success. Success is dependent on the recognition by local leaders and law enforcement that prevention programs and counter radicalization efforts are within the realm of social services and must be kept that way, with civilians in primary roles and law enforcement involvement limited to the supporting roles discussed above.

Prevention programs and efforts should be based around generating awareness of extremist’s activities within targeted communities, empowering alternative groups (Figure 3), reducing isolation and alienation for immigrant members, challenging the ideology of extremism and reengaging individuals within Shadow Parenting networks to weaken the bonds among members. This works to shape the environment of the targeted individuals and give them competing narratives which include them in the community and give them a sense of belonging. These strategies will be most effective in the early stages of recruitment and group socialization before the individual’s identity has begun to merge with the group and before frame alignment is achieved

## 2. Organization (Decentralized)

Organization of counter radicalization programs should be structured to ensure an integrated approach, which covers Tiers 1–3 of the Intervention Pyramid (See Figure 4). This “whole of community” approach must take into consideration the presence and effects of extremist socialization within each tier and develop distinct approaches to engage the individuals and sections of the community that may have differing views on and level of acceptance of extremist ideology. Different agencies or organizations will be better situated within each tier to interact with vulnerable individuals; outreach efforts will also be unique within each tier as they meet the needs of different demographics. Coordinating these multiple level efforts requires a well researched and well defined set of goals which can act as an umbrella, providing guidance to ensure efforts overlap, remain integrated, and do not conflict with stated goals of the overall strategy.

Under the tier concept this range of involvement will span engagement of the broader community to the specific engagement of individuals that are in the process of being radicalized. Civic engagement projects should be initiated and coordinated at several levels ranging from involvement in Cub Scouts to parents involvement in school boards. The community can identify the social networks and the places where they intersect with areas of vulnerability and plan ways to protect or offer alternatives to individuals attending these places. The specialty teams mentioned within the case studies can provide the community with a framework to achieve this. Subordinate efforts should consist of teams and projects styled after the U.K.s PREVENT model or the Comprehensive Gang model. Safe Neighborhood Teams already exist in COP within the U.S. and can be dual tasked within vulnerable neighborhoods to assist with counter radicalization. The Gold teams from the Dearborn example or cross functional teams (CFT’s)<sup>131</sup> can provide the liaison between the community and the government on a wide array of issues and can be used to mediate and ensure transparency during times of crises. Teams should be physically placed within community centers or other similar areas to

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<sup>131</sup> Cross functional teams are components of COP programs and are small, specifically designed teams which consist of agency and service representatives that operate within certain geographical limits to provide at risk neighborhoods with key services in order to more responsive to community needs.

provide onsite help and immediate assistance to alienated individuals within vulnerable communities. This places the counter radicalization effort directly within the recruiting grounds and allows them to contest the extremist for the individual's attention on a daily basis.

Once vulnerable places or networks are identified, programs can be specifically designed to interact in each unique area and with each unique network. Examples of this could be after school programs or summer programs led primarily by the Muslim community that can provide alternate networks and activities designed to keep individuals engaged within the community. Communities can develop and implement counter ideology efforts within these programs to confront the radical extremist narrative. Moderate Imams or political groups can coordinate seminars to educate people on factual and correct interpretations of Islam. However, as evidenced by lessons learned in the PREVENT case study, the government should not attempt or become involved in defining "good" or "bad" Islam. This must be an organic act of the Muslim community and should be strictly separated from any formal guidance by the government.

The primary focus during organization should be to build overlapping programs that can prevent individuals from falling through the cracks and being missed by the community. If an individual is not engaged at the mosque they will be engaged at the community center. If they are not engaged at the community center, they will be engaged at school. If they are not engaged at school, they will be engaged after school in athletic programs. If they are not athletic they will be engaged by student civic activities or other extra-curricular activities. The organization of counter radicalization programs must be engineered to provide redundant programs that maximize the individual's exposure to the positive message of counter radicalization and maximize the chances of being diverted from extremist networks. These efforts should be decentralized and guided by the inspiration and guidance of Muslim leaders and elders who have the trust and respect of their communities.

Strategy development and organization similar to the San Jose model of community ownership, where the overall agenda is defined and agreed upon by a strategy committee after consultation with the community, would allow programs to best reflect

community concerns. This requires an honest assessment done through either surveys or town hall meetings to assess the goals, attitudes and willingness of the community to engage. This strategy is then delegated down to community organizations which work under the program's umbrella but are largely autonomous in their execution. This structure provides balance and allows for flexibility when it comes to incorporating the many different ideas and goals, which will be present in diverse communities. This flexibility recognizes the fact that there may be many different types of Muslims (different nationalities, ethnicity, and religious sects...etc) which may be represented in one geographical area

### **3. Level of Interaction (Individual)**

Personalized intervention programs, which interact at the individual level, are the most effective way to accomplish these goals and help prevent the fulfillment of the radicalization process.<sup>132</sup> The proper level of interaction is the most important aspect of prevention programs. Without reaching the level of the vulnerable demographic, programs will fail to deliver the services and narrative necessary to divert individuals from radicalization pathways. Effective counter-radicalization, which utilizes strategic interaction, recognizes that it is a one-on-one individual struggle to successfully counter the effects of extremist socialization. As one youth activists remarked in London, "First you need to find out what the driver (of vulnerability or alienation) is and what are his individual desires and habits. Then you can start to build a project around him. The idea is to get them into an environment where they become vulnerable to our messaging, rather than the extremist messaging."<sup>133</sup> If the strategy and organization of counter radicalization efforts are properly developed, programs will be able to be placed in areas that physically as well as ideologically challenge the effects of socialization at the individual level.

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<sup>132</sup> Seth D. Rosen, "Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom's Approach To Counter Radicalization" (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 22.

<sup>133</sup> Seth D. Rosen, "Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom's Approach To Counter Radicalization" (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 23.

Intervention and prevention efforts can develop within two broad categories of programs: societal/diversionary and ideological/rehabilitative.<sup>134</sup> These broad categories address the two main areas of cognitive openings which can trigger seeking behavior among individuals. The first category focuses primarily on individuals within Tiers 1 and 2 while the second focuses on individuals within Tier 3 who may already be becoming radicalized.

Programs which focus on societal needs or that provides diversionary activities in areas safe from extremist influence can be designed to reach certain demographics rather than being individual specific. These could be social outreach programs that help immigrant parents understand English, immigration procedures, their rights, the rights of their children, how to apply for aid and even educate them on the dangers of extremists activities in their neighborhood. For the kids, social projects could be civic engagement projects that engage the students in government and their community. Diversionary programs can range from after school activities to summer camps and volunteer activities. Efforts can be tailored to specific areas such as university campuses, coffee shops, or community centers. Each effort should be designed to draw individuals into places that are safe and free of negative influences while delivering the messages of the counter radicalization strategy. Prevention programs should also focus on providing young Muslims with alternative role models within the Muslim community for the young to emulate and admire. In these programs, children and teens can be introduced to positive Muslim role models and shown the positive relationships between the Muslim community and the larger community. However, broader programs such as these should also retain the ability to engage an individual that later becomes identified as vulnerable with specific services or refer them to an organization that deals with individuals.

Programs that deal with ideological issues and offer rehabilitative services primarily focus on individuals entering or residing in Tier 3 and can deliver the specific, tailored, individual programs necessary to counter extremist ideology. Programs must be tailored after a careful assessment by the community to identify recruiting grounds and

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<sup>134</sup> Seth D. Rosen, "Pathways To Prevention? Evaluating The United Kingdom's Approach To Counter Radicalization" (Thesis, Georgetown University, April 2010), 24.



recruitment magnets within each community. Community leaders and parents who know their communities are best positioned to focus these efforts in a non invasive manner. Whether it is a radical bookstore or an internet chat-room, the radical message and those who deliver it need to be directly challenged at every turn by community members intent on defending their communities. Families and religious leaders or teachers can identify cliques of youth who appear to be radicalizing or who are beginning to seek and ensure their involvement in prevention programs. These can be individuals referred from other programs as previously mentioned or recommended by a CHANNEL type board made up of members of the community, SNT's, or CFT's. These chosen representatives interact daily with individuals within community areas and are best positioned to notice extremist networks at play among the population and design counter programs. As with the CHANNEL model in the U.K., attendance must be voluntary and offered to the individual and their supporting networks in a transparent non-threatening manner. Following the concept of strategic interaction individuals should be invited into programs along with the friends or relatives they are networked with. An individual may not want to attend programs simply out of the desire to be with their friends, but by inviting their friends it increases the chances of participation.

## **B. CONCLUSION**

Through this proposed model of interaction, the community can effectively weaken and disrupt the socialization bonds of friendship, kinship, and discipleship which threaten their children. This model, within the wider context of community policing, can empower communities and enable them to counter radicalized messages which focus on cognitive openings, frame alignment, and justification for violence. Proper use of strategy, organization, and level of interaction can bridge the gap between COP infrastructures and counter radicalization efforts at the individual level within Muslim communities and disrupt the socialization processes of radicalization. While this model offers a way for communities to develop counter radicalization efforts there are still many obstacles and considerations for programs that deal with religion and may appear to intrude on civil rights. These programs not only deal with a domestic threat but an

international community conscious of their immigrant and minority status and of ethnic ties to geographical origins outside the U.S. Community policing prevention programs tailored with an understanding of radicalization, the role of the Muslim community, and the primacy of civil liberties can balance these issues while disrupting domestic radicalization and serving homeland security interests.

Counter measures must be able to counter radical narratives, disrupt and impede radicalization, and ultimately divert individuals from trajectories, which can end in terrorism. These are not de-radicalization programs, which seek to change the minds of extremists but rather focused efforts to reduce the potential pool of recruits they affect. The goal of counter-radicalization is not to criminalize people or to seek prosecution, it is to influence people and offer alternatives to the extremists' message and vision of the world. There are several lessons from the U.K. PREVENT and the Comprehensive Gang Models which can be applied to the context of counter radicalization programs. Programs must be based on a comprehensive understanding of Muslim culture and the different pressures they face, and be heavily dependent on, and responsive to, community participation. Community planners must have well defined and transparent intentions during the strategy and organization phases of developing prevention programs. The U.K. has delegated responsibility down to the local level but with clear guidance delineating the role of each participating agency, firmly nesting their goals and agendas under the framework of the national *Prevent* strategy. This successful framework should be copied but participation should be voluntary. Counter radicalization programs must not be mandatory but developed in answer to a recognized community need.

The community must feel that the program is beneficial and places the benefit of the individuals first or they will not provide the participation necessary for success. Planners and leaders must also have thick skin and be able to incorporate criticisms. Though the PREVENT model was attacked by critics on several sides but the U.K. government learned from their mistakes, becoming more transparent and in the end has delivered a very successful model. No program will be successful on the first try and planners must build in the flexibility and mechanism, which allow the community to reassess progress, incorporate criticism, and anticipate future community needs.

Programs can achieve this by incorporating the San Jose model's internal methods of funding, planning teams, flexible strategy, and adjustment mechanisms. These factors enable resiliency and the longterm focus which is critical as counter radicalization programs look to counter the effects of extremist activities.

In the end, programs must be responsive to the community's *real* needs, not national security agendas or a city council's perception of what is needed. Programs must deliver a strategy which is centralized at the policy level, yet remains highly flexible and decentralized at the execution level. Long term organizational commitment, coupled with proper succession planning, is critical to ensure sustainability. And above all, planners must remember that prevention is not primarily a police task nor is it a government task, it is a community task involving elements of health, social, community, faith, and NGO services, all delivered at the individual level.

## **APPENDIX A: RADICALIZATION CASES POST 9/11**

This study draws heavily on the work done by Peter Neuman in his book *Joining Al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe*, in this work Neuman develops the pathways through which individuals radicalize and are then recruited to acts of violence. This paper has slightly modified the mechanisms and focused on the manipulation of networks based on kinship, friendship and discipleship.

However, the problem remains that this original work was done on cases in Europe; are the mechanisms similar in cases of radicalization in the United States? To answer that question this paper looked at the 188 cases of radicalization as compiled by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School study.<sup>135</sup> Those cases were then analyzed to see how the elements of *Recruitment Grounds*, *Recruiters*, and *Shadow Parenting* were represented in American cases of homegrown terrorism. The standard for the presence of a mechanic was that it was clearly visible in open source reporting on the case. It was not judged on strength or duration but simply on its clear presence and relation to extremist ideology in the individual's life. For a majority of cases in which the mechanics were not applicable, it was because the individual had spent a significant portion of their life outside the United States and had returned radicalized. For a smaller portion of the non-applicable cases there was simply not enough information or a clear enough relation between a mechanic and their extremist activities.

### **FINDINGS**

This paper found that the mechanics of socialization within informal social networks were present in a clear majority (71% ) cases.

The internet was clearly a dominant factor in the seeking phase and radicalization of only 29 (15%) cases.

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<sup>135</sup> Data set is compiled from the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School study of the 188 cases of radicalization post 9/11. *New America Foundation*, "The Homegrown Threat," 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>

Using the definitions by Garnstein-Ross and Grossman a spiritual guide/mentor (a more experienced Muslim who gave specific instruction and direction during the radicalization program) or sanctioner (an individual with perceived religious authority who provided specific theological approval for the violent activity)<sup>136</sup> was apparent and influential in (13%) of the cases. While more several cases were linked to Anwar al-Awlaki it was not clear that he had a direct role.

Discipleship occurs only 14 times

Friendship was by far the dominant network occurring 128 times.

Kinship occurred 23 times.

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<sup>136</sup> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, and Laura Grossman. *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Monograph, (Washington, D.C.: FDD Press, 2009).14.

NAME	RECRUITMENT GROUNDS	RECRUITER	SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS
<b>2002–16 cases</b> <sup>137</sup>			
James Ujaama	Mosque, Internet	Radical imam	Discipleship, Kinship (brother)
Yassein Taher	Lackawanna 6-friends	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner (Derwish)	Friendship
Shafal Mosed	Lackawanna 6-friend	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
John Walker Lindh	Madrassa, Internet	friends	Friendship Transference
Yahya Goba	Lackawanna 6-friend	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Faysal Galab	Lackawanna 6-friend	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Kamal Derwis	Used the mosque to target the L-6	Was an Activist and spiritual sanctioner	Friendship
Charles Bishop	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sahim Always	Lackawanna 6-friend	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Shueyb Mossa Jokhan	Mosque	friend	Friendship
Mukhtar al-Bakri	Lackawanna 6-friend	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Semi Osman	Mosque	n/a	n/a
Imran Mandhai	Mosque	friend	Friendship
Hesham Mohamed Hadayet	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ali al-Marri	n/a	n/a	n/a
Adham Hassoun	Mosque	n/a	n/a

Table 1. 16 Cases of Radicalization in 2002

<sup>137</sup> Data set is compiled from the New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School study of the 188 cases of radicalization post 9/11. *New America Foundation*, "The Homegrown Threat," 2011, accessed October 25, 2011, <http://homegrown.newamerica.net/overview>.

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2003–23 cases</b>			
Donald Thomas Surratt	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Randall Royer	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Masoud Ahmad Khan	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Seifullah Chapman	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Hammad Abdur-Raheem	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Yong Ki Kwon	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Khwaja Mahmood Hasan	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Ibrahim al-Hamdi	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
Muhammad Aatique	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual Sanctioner	Friendship
October Martinique Lewis	“Portland 7”	Family	Kinship
Patrice Lumumba Ford	“Portland 7”	Friends	Friendship
Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal	“Portland 7”	Friends/Family	Friendship
Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal	“Portland 7”	Friends/Family	Friendship
Jeffrey Leon Battle	“Portland 7”	Friends	Friendship
Habis Abdulla al-Saoub	“Portland 7”	Friends/the group’s leader and prime motivator..former mujahedeen	Friendship
Hasan Akbar	“101st” N/A	N/A	N/A
Iyman Faris	N/A	Friend	Friendship
Jaber A. Elbaneh	Associated w/lackawana 6. Same Mosque	Activist-Spiritual Sanctioner (Derwish)	Friendship Discipleship
Uzair Paracha	n/a	Family (father)	Kinship
Hemant Lakhani	n/a	n/a	n/a
Majid Khan	n/a	Family (uncle and cousin)	Kinship
Nuradin Abdi	n/a	Friend	Friendship

Table 2. 23 Cases of Radicalization in 2003

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2004–8 cases</b>			
James Elshafay	Bookstore	Friend/FBI informant may have acted as the religious guide and father figure	Friendship
Clifton L. Cousins	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ryan Anderson	Internet	n/a	n/a
Ali al-Tamimi	Virginia “Paintball Cell” leader who held private meetings at his home	Al-Timimi was the Spiritual sanctioner	Friendship
Mohammed Mosharref Hossain	Mosque-Aref was his imam	Spiritual guide	Friendship Discipleship
Mohammed Babar	Internet, mosque	Radical imam	Discipleship
Abdullah Warsame	n/a	n/a	n/a
Yassin Muhiddin Aref	Mosque-he was an imam for Hossain	Was the sanctioner	Friendship Discipleship

Table 3. 8 Cases of Radicalization in 2004



<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2005–12 cases</b>			
Levar Washington	Prison	friend	Friendship
Kevin James	Formed cell in prison and recruited others	He was the activist	He used friendship
Gregory Patterson	Mosque-recruited by Kevin James	friend	Friendship
Tarik Shah	n/a	He was the activist	n/a
Jose Padilla	Prison	n/a	n/a
Brent al-Mutazzim	Attended martial arts training with Tarik Shah	friend	Friendship
Ahmed Omar Abu Ali	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kifah Jayyousi	n/a	n/a	n/a
Hammad Samana	Mosque-recruited by Kevin James	Friend	Friendship
Rafiq Sabir	n/a	Friend was Tarik Shah	Friendship
Ali Asad Chandia	Virginia “Paintball Cell”	Al-Timimi Spiritual sanctioner	Friendship
Shahawar Matin Siraj	Bookstore	Friend/FBI informant may have acted as the religious guide and father figure	Friendship

Table 4. 12 cases of Radicalization in 2005

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2006–18 cases</b>			
Kobie Diallo Williams	Camping trips	Friend	Friendship
Adnan Babar Mirza	Camping trips	Friend	Friendship
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee	Internet	Friend	Friendship
Syed Haris Ahmed	Internet	Friend	Friendship
Narseal Batiste	Leader of “liberty City 7”	Friend	Friendship
Patrick Abraham	Liberty City 7	Friend	Friendship
Stanley Grant Phanor	Liberty City 7	Friend	Friendship
Rotschild Augustine	Liberty City 7	Friend	Friendship
Burson Augustin	Liberty City 7	Friend	Friendship
Hamid Hayat	Lodi CA/ n/a	Family(father)	Kinship
Naveed Haq	n/a	n/a	n/a
Adam Gadahn	Mosque	Friend-Spiritual Guide	Friendship
Mohammad Amawi	Shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Marwan El-Hindi	Shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Wassim Mazloun	Shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Mohammed Taheri-Azar	n/a	n/a	n/a
Abdulrahmane Farhane	Bookstore owner where Tarik Shah and Sabir went	n/a	n/a
Syed Hashmi	n/a	Gateway org	n/a

Table 5. 18 Cases of Radicalization in 2006

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2007–15 cases</b>			
Paul Hall (Abu Jihaad)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Derrick Shareef	n/a	n/a	n/a
Christopher Paul	n/a	n/a	n/a
Daniel Maldonado	Internet-Islamic Network Forum	Friend	Friendship
Khaleel Ahmed	n/a	Family	Kinship
Zubair Ahmed	n/a	Family	Kinship
Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Serdar Tatar	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Agron Abdullahu	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend	Friendship
Shain Duka	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend, Family(brothers)	Friendship Kinship
Eljvir Duka	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend, Family(brothers)	Friendship Kinship
Dritan Duka	“Ft Dix 6”Paintball, shooting range	Friend, Family(brothers)	Friendship Kinship
Russell Defreitas	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed	University	n/a	n/a
Houssein Zorkot	University	n/a	n/a

Table 6. 15 Cases of Radicalization in 2007

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2008–5 cases</b>			
Troy Matthew Kastigar	Mosque, Somali basketball league	Friend	Friendship
Ruben Shumpert	Barbershop, converted in jail	Friends	Friendship
Jamal Sheikh Bana	Gym, University	Friends, Family	Friendship Kinship
Shirwa Ahmed	Gym, University	Friends, Family	Friendship Kinship
Aafia Siddiqui	n/a	n/a	n/a

Table 7. 5 Cases of Radicalization in 2008

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
<b>2009–43 cases</b>			
Aman Hassan Yemer	“D.C 5” Mosque, Internet	Friend	Friendship
David Williams	n/a synagogue plot	Friend/Family	Friendship Kinship
Onta Williams	n/a synagogue plot	Friend/Family	Friendship Kinship
James Cromitie	The leader synagogue plot/ mosque	Friend	Friendship
Laguerre Payen	n/a synagogue plot	Friend	Friendship
Bryant Neal Vinas	n/a	n/a	n/a
Carlos Bledsoe (Abdulahakim Mujahid Muhammad)	Internet	n/a	n/a
Ahmad A. Minni	“D.C 5” Mosque, Internet	Friend	Friendship
Waqar Hussain Khan	“D.C 5” Mosque, Internet	Friend	Friendship
Ramy Zamzam	“D.C 5” Mosque, Internet	Friend	Friendship

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
Umar Chaudhry	“D.C 5” Mosque, Internet	Friend	Friendship
Betim Kaziu	Internet	Friend and Spiritual Guide (Anwar al-Awlaki)	Friendship
David Coleman Headley	n/a	n/a	n/a
Daniel Boyd	Leader and father, broke from local mosque- led prayer and military trng in NC	Friend Family	Friendship Kinship
Dylan Boyd	Family house/military trng	Family	Kinship
Zakaria Boyd	Family house/military trng	Family	Kinship
Ziyad Yaghi	Prayer group/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Anes Subasic	Prayer group/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Hysen Sherifi	Prayer group/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan	Prayer group/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Nidal Malik Hasan	Mosque Internet	Spiritual Guide	Discipleship
Omar Hammami	Mosque	Spiritual Guide/Friends	Discipleship Friendship
Jehad Serwan Mostafa	n/a	n/a	n/a
Michael Finton	Prison	n/a	n/a
Abdifatah Yusuf Isse	n/a	n/a	n/a
Salah Osman Ahmed	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Najibullah Zazi	n/a	Family	Kinship
Mahamud Said Omar	n/a	n/a	n/a
Hosam Smadi	Internet Forum	FBI acted as a brother	Friendship

<b>NAME</b>	<b>RECRUITMENT GROUNDS</b>	<b>RECRUITER</b>	<b>SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS</b>
Tahawwur Hussain Rana	n/a	Friend of David Headley	Friendship
Omer Abdi Mohamad	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kamal Hassan	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Mahmoud Hassan	n/a	n/a	n/a
Burhan Hassan	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Tarek Mehanna	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Ahmad Abousamra	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Caabdullaahi Ahmed Faarax	Mosque, prayer group	Friend	Friendship
Mustafa Salat	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Ahmed Ali Omar	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Zakaria Maruf	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Abdiweli Yassin Isse	Mosque Prayer Group	Friend	Friendship
Khalid Mohamud Abshir	Mosque	Friend	Friendship

Table 8. 43 Cases of Radicalization in 2009

NAME	RECRUITMENT GROUNDS	RECRUITER	SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS
<b>2010-33 cases</b>			
Shaker Masri	internet	Inspired by Anwar al-awlaki/ Radical imam	n/a
Colleen LaRose	Internet	Friend	Friendship
Wassam al-Hanafi	Internet	Friend	Friendship
Sabirhan Hasanoff	Internet	Friend	Friendship
Mahmoud Alessa	Gym/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Carlos Almonte	Gym/military trng	Friend	Friendship
Faisal Shahzad	n/a	n/a	n/a
Khaled Ouazzani	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mohamed Osman Mohamud	University Internet	Friend	Friendship
Adis Medunjanin	Zazi Case- High school friends	Friend	Friendship
Zarein Ahmedzay	Zazi Case- High school friends	Friend	Friendship
Antonio Martinez	Internet	Friend/FBI Informant, also allegedly inspired by Anwar al-Awalki	Friendship
Raja Lahrasib Khan	n/a	n/a	n/a
Hawo Hassan	Charity	n/a	n/a
Amina Ali	Charity	n/a	n/a
Adnan el-Shukrijumah	n/a- Zazi's AQ recruiter/Saudi Born	n/a	n/a
Issa Doreh	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Abdisalan Ali	University Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Farooque Ahmed	n/a	n/a	n/a
Nima Ali Yusuf	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mohamud Abdi Yusuf	n/a	n/a	n/a

Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Basaaly Saeed Moalin	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Farah Mohamed Beledi	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Duane Mohamed Diriye	n/a	n/a	n/a
Zachary Chesser	Internet	Friends- also inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki	Friendship
Barry Bujol	Internet	Friends- also corresponded w/ Anwar al-Awlaki	Friendship
Abdikadir Ali Abdi	Mosque	Friend	Friendship
Jamie Paulin-Ramirez	Internet	Friends with Jihad Jane and Zazi online	Friendship
Abdi Mahdi Hussein	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sharif Mobley	n/a	n/a	n/a
Anwar al-Awlaki	Mosque	n/a	n/a

Table 9. 33 Cases of Radicalization in 2010



NAME	RECRUITMENT GROUNDS	RECRUITER	SOCIALIZATION NETWORKS
<b>2011-15 cases</b>			
Khalid Ali-M. Aldawsari	n/a	n/a	n/a
Ahmed Farhani	n/a	n/a	Friendship
Mohamed Mahdou	n/a	n/a	Friendship
Hafiz Khan	Mosque He was the imam	Family	Kinship
Irfan Khan	n/a	Family	Kinship
Izhar Khan	n/a	Family	Kinship
Waad Ramadan Alwan	n/a	Family	Kinship
Mohanad Shareef Hammadi	n/a	Family	Kinship
Ahmed Hussain Mahamud	n/a	n/a	n/a
Khalid Abdul-Latif	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Walli Mujahidh	n/a	Friend	Friendship
Emerson Begolly	Internet	n/a	n/a
Naser Jason Abdo	Internet- Inspire Magazine	n/a	n/a
Jubair Ahmad	n/a	n/a	n/a
Rezwan Ferdeus* <sup>138</sup>	Internet	n/a	n/a

Table 10. 15 Cases of Radicalization in 2011

<sup>138</sup>\* Not in the New America Foundation study's original data set (it occurred post study).  
[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/28/rezwan-ferdaus-terror-plot\\_n\\_985759.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/28/rezwan-ferdaus-terror-plot_n_985759.html)

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