Feasibility analysis of an all volunteer Armed Force in Turkey

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June 2007

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# Feasibility Analysis of an All Volunteer Armed Force in Turkey

The military foundation of Turkish Republic has been forces raised by conscription based on citizens’ obligation to serve. This has, for the most part, worked very well both for the Turkish Armed Forces and for the Turkish people. However, conditions for Turkey have changed with a post-cold war national security environment, continuing economic growth, and increasing need for high-tech weapon systems. Accordingly, this project report provides a Draft versus All Volunteer Forces (AVF) analysis for the Turkish Armed Forces, by evaluating the feasibility and the desirability of an AVF for the Turkish Armed Forces.

Drawing upon the information about the economy and national security environment and its relation, we have compared the conscripted forces in place in Turkey with all volunteer forces (as found, for example, in the United States). This project contributes to policy discussions by specifying the 21st century manpower needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. It also assesses methods of acquiring those manpower resources—comparing the draft vs. AVF models in terms of economic and national security criteria. Hopefully, it will be useful in assisting implementation of the AVF concept in Turkish Armed Forces—if that is what national authorities decide to do.

## Abstract

The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

### Subject Terms

- All Volunteer Forces (AVF), Draft
FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF AN ALL VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE IN TURKEY

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FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS OF AN ALL VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE IN TURKEY

ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

Conscription is a general term for involuntary labor demanded by some established authority, but it is most often used in the specific sense of government policies that generally require male citizens to serve in the armed forces. Conscription is known by various names, for example, the most recent conscription program in the United States was known colloquially as “the draft”. Many nations do not maintain conscripted forces, instead, they rely on a volunteer, professional military. However, many of these countries still reserve the possibility of conscription for wartime and supply crises.

Conscription has also sometimes been used as a general term for non-military involuntary labor demanded by some established authority, for example, some translators of Old Testament commentaries use the term to describe the levies of labor used to build the Temple of Solomon. In Japan during World War II, Japanese women and children were conscripted to work in factories.

On the other hand, All Volunteer Forces are based on volunteer recruitment of citizens in order to serve in the military without coercion. They choose to be career soldiers with secure jobs, regular salaries, career goals and powerful beliefs that they are serving for the good of their nations.

Both the Draft and All Volunteer Forces have deep historical roots, and still shape the recruiting methods used in most countries. Nowadays, the decision about which of these two models would be more effective, has been an important discussion raised by changing security requirements. Every country surely has different requirements and expectations concerning national security. However, the key to the right choice is being able to establish the optimum balance between requirements and resources.

Following the establishment of the Republic after the Independence War during the World War I era, the Turkish Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting
system for a while. After the enactment of the new Draft Law, prepared by the republic’s new government, the recruiting system was changed. The new structure and view of the Turkish Armed Forces was established, of which, officers and petty officers formed the core. Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces has retained the identity established in the early years of the republic.

The military protected the republic and the freedom of Turkish citizens under the leadership of Ataturk in the post World War I era. During that time, the threat level was always high, and a draft system was indispensable. Furthermore, with the coming of World War II and the Cold War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. In today’s environment, it can still be considered that Turkey is situated in one of the most problematic security areas in the world.

However, times have changed. The Cold War era is over. Also, rapidly improving technology, changing economic structures and evolving needs of the country have consequently lead researchers to investigate alternatives to conscription such as the AVF.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this project is to examine and analyze the Draft versus All Volunteer Forces (AVF) for the Turkish Armed Forces by reevaluating the rationale for it in terms of economic and national security issues, and their effects on the benefits and disadvantages of the AVF. Accordingly, the primary research question is as follows.

“How well do All Volunteer Forces (AVF) fit the Turkish Armed Forces in terms of economic and national security issues based on the comparison with the AVF in the United States?”

C. METHODOLOGY AND THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The information and data regarding the draft forces in contemporary Turkey will be analyzed to define cost elements of both models, as well as to determine the benefits (or efficiencies) and disadvantages of the AVF for the Turkish Armed Forces.
In order to answer the research question, the inquiries and analysis will focus on, but not be limited to, the specific areas of economic and national security issues regarding the draft versus the AVF in the Turkish Armed Forces: budgetary costs, opportunity costs, tax distortions, manpower efficiency, readiness of the Armed Forces in accordance with the strategic situation of Turkey and its armed forces and the quality and eligibility of military manpower, collected from the draft forces enforced in Turkey and the AVF in the United States.

D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY

The results of this MBA project report may help determine how well the All Volunteer Forces (AVF) model fits the Turkish Armed Forces. Furthermore, it may help clarify the manpower needs of the 21st century’s Turkish Armed Forces. In addition, methodology for acquiring those manpower resources in terms of economic and national security issues by analyzing the comparison between the draft forces enforced at the present time in Turkey and the AVF in the United States are also discussed.

Finally, according to the results of this study, the research question stated above will have been answered and which will hopefully contribute to the ongoing discussion of the best method to recruit manpower for the Turkish Armed Forces.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT

The following chapters study the feasibility research and analysis of the All Volunteer Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces based on national security and economic issues.

Chapter II presents an extensive background and literature review focusing on the Draft and the All Volunteer Forces.

Chapter III highlights the strategic situation in which Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces has been facing.
Chapter IV discusses and presents a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces.

Finally, Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the research and study, proposes recommendations and potential areas for further research.
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

Draft and All Volunteer Forces, which have extensive backgrounds, continue to be the principal methods of recruiting in most countries. The relative effectiveness of these two models has been an important national security issue in those countries. While every country has different requirements and expectations about its national security, the key is to establish the optimum balance between requirements and resources.

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the Independence War during the World War I era, The Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting system for a while. After the republic’s new Draft Law of 1927 (Code No 1111), the recruiting system was changed; the new structure of the Turkish Armed Forces was established with officers and petty officers forming the core. Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces have preserved this identity in the manner in which it was established.

In the early 1900’s when the threat was always high, a draft system was indispensable. Furthermore, with the upcoming World War II and the following Cold War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. Today’s Turkey is still located in one of the most problematic areas of the world.

However, after the end of the Cold War, due to rapidly improving technology, changing economic structures and the needs of the country have consequently been causing researchers to investigate other alternatives such as the AVF system which has received renewed attention.

B. DRAFT FORCES

1. First Implementations

The draft system features compulsory enrollment for service in the armed forces rather than inducing them to join voluntarily. The first implementation of the draft
occurred in the modern state system in revolutionary France. However, systems based on obligatory military service occurred in previous eras.

Also in military history, the Constitution of Italy called “nove di ordinanza e militia” is an example of one of the first draft forces which was originally advocated in the 16th century by Machiavelli. All Florentine men between the ages of 18-30 could be called for military duty. This system may seem comprehensive, however, the enforcement of the law was restricted to men working in the agricultural sector. Moreover, even in Toscana where implementation took place, care was taken that agricultural production would not be disturbed.¹

The Draft was not limited to Toscana. The forerunners were the establishment of mandatory service in the French Navy, enforced by Jean Baptiste Colbert, and similar systems implemented by Hesse in Hannover.²

2. Draft Forces in the Modern Military History

The first implementation of the modern draft system occurred in the 1793 Convention in France.

Article 1: From this moment, until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach the hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.³

The most important reason for draft forces, known as “Levee en Masse,” was the French Republic’s situation in those times. At the end of the 18th century, France was

about to collapse under enemy attack. The government looked for solutions, and consequently, decided to institute draft forces in order to mobilize the manpower it needed to defeat its enemies. After the establishment of the draft forces, the government managed to recruit approximately 600,000 men. This was far more than any other European country at that time.

However, the draft system, in practice, was not fully enforced until 1798 with the Jourdan Law. After 1793, the revolutionary movement started to falter with serious declines in the level of military recruitment.4

3. Nationalist Government Movements

The success of the French draft forces induced other European countries to change to conscription: 1812-Sweden, 1814-Norway and Prussia, 1831-Spain, and 1849-Denmark. Later, it spread worldwide.5

Reasons other than just the military motivated an increase in the use of draft forces. Although volunteer forces had been quite common prior to the French revolution, conscripted manpower was able to provide national security to a national armed force due to rising nationalism.

At the same time, the role of the draft forces in creating ideal citizens was especially valued in the nationalist movements. Although this situation was valid for the 19th century, the requirement for draft forces was conspicuous in the nationalist governments established post World War I and during the establishment of countries from former colonies after World War II. Furthermore, while strengthening national unity by assigning the responsibility of defense to all individuals, the draft system was perceived as a school for citizenship. For example, Revolutionary France was the first of

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the nationalist movements in the world. Nationalist governments, established following the Revolution, were nations built by patriots with common values. In this system, conscript was perceived as integral to national unity.6

Building nationalism is done with three basic methods. These methods are: school (education), armed forces (draft), and election (political attendance). Drafted forces defend the precious lands of the country with national unity accordingly strengthened. The draft system also performs the role of a citizenship school. Creating recruited soldier’s literature is one task associated with this role.7

4. A New Concept: Total War

The draft system also changed the conduct of war. Wars were limited to the frontlines and took place solely between armed forces before the 1793 Convention. After the establishment of the draft system, a brand new concept appeared and continues still: Total War.

Total War is basically the use of all the power of a country against all enemies. By definition, Total War requires not only the use of armed forces but all power and resources of a country to defeat the enemy. In other words, national defense is not just for the military; the entire nation is available for military purposes. Likewise, the political and national industrial capabilities can be mobilized to win the war.8

Napoleonic Wars in the 19th century were the first manifestations of the total war concept. Also, World War I and II constitute good examples of this concept. Whole nations were aroused for war. Also, unlimitedly, all the resources and capabilities of the countries were used in pursuit of victory.

7 Ibid., 106.
5. **Draft Forces Today**

Today, Turkey and many other countries (such as Germany, China, Russia, Greece, Sweden and Israel) continue the draft system. There are several requirements for implementing a draft system successfully. First of all, an effective census of population must identify the suitable military. This implies an extensive and effective bureaucracy organization outside the armed forces. In order to execute recruitment processes, as well as to prevent soldiers going AWOL, draft laws must be enforced. Furthermore, in order to provide for the transportation of troops, food, shelter, clothing, armament, healthcare, education, and pay for the soldiers, the government must be at an economic level sufficient to undertake all these expenses.

6. **The Draft System in Turkey Today**

   a. **General Principles**

   National service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by law.

   This provision in The Constitution of Turkey (Article 72) makes military service mandatory for every male Turkish Republic citizen, as implemented by Law Number: 1111 Recruitment Law, 1927. This is also called the Liability System. The recruitment period starts at age of 21 and ends at 41 with a total service period of 21 years. However, this period can be lengthened or shortened up to five years at the request of the Chief of Staff, a proposal of DoD and approval by the cabinet.\(^9\)

   Today’s military service period consists of three phases: Call, Active Duty and Reserve. In the Call Phase, the recruiters’ health inspections and deployments are completed. This phase includes recruit elimination for health reasons. The Active Duty Phase is the period during which military service is performed in schools, battalions, or

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military/government/public organizations. During the Reserve Phase, reserve calls occur every year for men who have already completed their military service until the age of 41.10

b. Military Service Periods and Types

Excluding the Coast Guard and Gendarme (which are under the control of the Department of Interior) as of 2005, the manpower of the Turkish Armed Forces is 511,000, of which 442,000 are active duty personnel. The distribution of active duty personnel according to services is 373,000 in the Army, 35,000 in the Navy and 34,000 in the Air Force (including the officers and petty officers)11 as shown in Figure 1.

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Active duty service periods in Turkey were last determined in July 2003. According to the last regulation, every suitable citizen fulfills his duty according to the service types and periods stated below.

(1) 12 Month Service. As a Second Lieutenant, this is done by graduates of universities or faculties lasting four or more years.

(2) 6 Month Service. As a Non-commissioned Officer or Private, this applies to liable citizens eligible for serving as a Second Lieutenant as stated above. However, the Turkish Armed Forces recruit the surplus as short-term noncoms or privates.

(3) 15 Month Service as a Noncom or Private. This covers liable citizens who are graduates of schools less than four years or lower levels.

(4) Service in Exchange for Foreign Currency Service. This is a right given to people who legally live and work in other countries for at least three years. Those who want to exercise this right pay 5,112 Euro and complete 21 days of basic military training until they are 38 years old.

(5) Paid Service. Paid service is open to liable citizens born before January 1, 1973 and who have not yet started military service. This implementation was intended to compensate for financial losses from the Golcuk, Kocaeli earthquake of August 17, 1999. The ones who want to benefit from this right will be counted as completed service. They pay half the amount of 5,112 or 2,556 Euro and complete the 21 day basic military training until the age of 40. Those older than 40 years of age will fulfill their service obligation if they pay half the amount of 5,112 or 2,556 Euro without completing the basic military training required.

c. Draft Forces in Turkey from a Socio-Cultural Stand Point

(1) Education Mission of Turkish Armed Forces. Following the establishment of the Republic, the values such as modernity, secularism, and nationalism (some of the basic principles of the Kemalist national government) gained importance in all segments of Turkish society. In those years, the armed forces and
schools were designated as the two main institutions for transferring these values to all citizens. Accordingly, these two establishments have complemented each other from the very beginning of the Republic. It is not a coincidence that the two most emphasized titles of Atatürk are the Chief Instructor and the Commander in Chief.\textsuperscript{12}

Military service provided a unique and peerless educational opportunity, especially to youth in the rural areas which had relatively closed societies in the building phase of the Republic.\textsuperscript{13} The main reason for using the Armed Forces to accomplish missions not in the principal duties of the Armed Forces is the endeavor to fill gaps in the education of citizens. Hence, the propagation of the Kemalist values to society as a whole has been one of the most important goals of the Armed Forces. Moreover, Article 39 of the Turkish Military Service Code effective in 1935, emphasizes that “In addition to military subjects, knowledge, regarding Turkish literature, fatherland and life shall be instructed to the soldiers.”

Today, draftees still receive education activities, with the help of multiple institutions, including the departments of the Turkish government, and other national and international organizations.

(2) Military Nation Mentality. According to the Military Nation Mentality, every Turk is regarded as a natural born warrior. The military is not only one part of national defense, but also one of the foundations of the socio-cultural structure. Turkish history books state that:

The Turk is the best warrior. The Turkish nation has the most advanced military spirit; that means a nation which has experienced a deep, immense history of civilizations and cultures. It is certain that Turkish nation, which had been an ancestor of all main civilizations since the very beginning of mankind, has this spirit in this sophisticated manner.\textsuperscript{14}

Today, military nation values have been internalized by a large fraction of society; a military ethos and Turkishness are two integrated concepts in their minds. Therefore, military service has been represented as a major social value and made mandatory.

d. Draft Evasion

Draft evasion and desertion are widespread. The exact number of draft evaders is not known, but the number is estimated to be approximately 350,000.\textsuperscript{15} According to Article 63 of the Penal Code, draft evasion is punishable (in peacetime) by imprisonment of:

- One month for those who report themselves within seven days,
- Three months for those who are arrested within seven days,
- Between three months and one year for those who report themselves within three months,
- Between four months and 18 months for those who are arrested within three months,
- Between four months and two years for those who report themselves after three months,
- Between six months and three years for those who are arrested after three months,
- Up to ten years imprisonment in the case of aggravating circumstances, such as self-inflicted injuries and using false documents (Articles 79-81 of the Penal Code).

Desertion is punishable under Articles 66-68 of the Penal Code with up to three years imprisonment. Deserters who have fled abroad may be sentenced to up to five years imprisonment, and up to ten years in the case of aggravating circumstances (Article 67 of Penal Code).

The monitoring of draft evasion and desertion is strict. The military registration number is included on identity documents. Police and gendarme authorities are responsible for finding draft evaders and deserters and may conduct house searches and arrest them. In addition, they cannot leave the country without their registration numbers being checked.\textsuperscript{16}

There are no detailed figures available on the scale of prosecution of draft evasion and desertion, but military courts deal with approximately 60,000 such cases per year. About half of these cases reportedly deal with conscripts going absent for less than a week, mostly conscripts who do not report back in time after a period of leave.\textsuperscript{17}

Prison sentences of less than one year imprisonment for evasion of registration/examination for enlistment, or for desertion, are generally commuted into fines, which must be paid after the end of military service. Sentences for draft evasion for periods longer than three months, when the draft evader has not reported himself voluntarily, may not be commuted into a fine. Suspended sentences may not be imposed for evasion of registration/examination or enlistment or for desertion. Those who are convicted of draft evasion must still complete their term of military service. Repeated offenders may thus be sentenced again. Prison sentences for repeat offenders may not be commuted into fines. Those sentenced to less than six months imprisonment are usually confined to military prisons. Those sentenced to over six months are assigned to regular prisons. After their prison sentence, they still need to perform the remaining term of their military service.

In addition to the sentences outlined above, Turkish citizens can also have their citizenship withdrawn if they live abroad and do not return to perform military service within a certain time limit (Article 25(c) of the Turkish Nationality Law No. 403). The names of individuals who have forfeited their citizenship are published in the official Government Gazette.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
e. Conscientious Objection

Conscientious Objector (CO) status does not occur in Turkey. COs may be punished under Article 63 of the Turkish Military Penal Code for avoiding military service. COs who attract media attention or publish articles about their refusal to perform military service may also be punished to between six months and two years imprisonment under Article 318 of the Turkish Criminal Code for “alienating the people from the armed forces”. In 2004, a new Criminal Code was introduced (Law No 5237). Under the previous Criminal Code, “alienating people from the armed forces” was punishable under Article 155 with a similar term of imprisonment. Thus, a brochure published by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1999 states:

In our laws there are no provisions on exemption from military service for reasons of conscience. This is because of the pressing need for security, caused by the strategic geographic position of our country and the circumstances we find ourselves in. As long as the factors threatening the internal and external security of Turkey do not change, it is considered to be impossible to introduce the concept of conscientious objection into our legislation.19

C. ALL VOLUNTEER FORCES

1. A Misperception: Mercenary Force vs. All Volunteer Force

Since there is a misperception about All Volunteer Forces being a mercenary force in Turkey, it is worthwhile to explain the differences between the AVF and mercenary forces. In Turkey, the term mercenary force is usually used to describe the All Volunteer Forces. However, mercenary is a very different recruitment method. Use of mercenary forces depends on the relationship between the government and the national or international manpower market.20 Soldiery is basically a job for the mercenary. The

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19 Ibid.
motive is the profit gained from the service. Thus, although it seems relatively hard to see
the difference, mercenaries are individually or comprehensively recruited and they offer
service to every authority or corporation (or individual) that pays for their service.

Mercenary forces have been recruited since the beginning of time by the Hittites,
Assyrians, Israelis, Persians, Macedonians, and Romans\textsuperscript{21} However, it is certain that
mercenary forces as we understand them today, started in medieval Europe, as capitalism
and monetary economics spread. In that era, labor services were required of villagers in
less economically developed rural areas\textsuperscript{22}.

Many powerful countries in Europe used mercenary forces beginning during
medieval times. In this sense, while local forces were still recruited, mercenary forces
were called from farther places especially during war time. In the early modern period,
the Venetians, Spanish, French, Dutch and British were among those who used
mercenaries. The most arresting aspect of this era is that some of the nations specialized
in military service such as the Irish, Scottish, Swiss and some German states\textsuperscript{23}.

Mercenary forces were also very common in the Navy, appearing somewhat later
in the Army. In early Europe, only the Dutch Republic recruited mercenary forces in its
Navy. One of the leading forces in that period, the Ottoman Empire’s Navy, also used
mercenaries who were usually Albanians and Bosnians. As a matter of fact, Mehmed Ali
Pasha, who was responsible for Egypt, was originally Albanian, Cezzar Ahmet Pasha
who was in charge of Akka was originally Bosnian\textsuperscript{24}.

\textsuperscript{21} Serge Yalichev, Mercenaries of the Ancient World, (London: Constable and Company Press, 1997),
1.

\textsuperscript{22} Murat Belge, Osmanli’da Kurumlar ve Kultur, (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2005), 196.

\textsuperscript{23} M. Tanju Akad, trans., Devletin Silahlanmasi: Ortadogu’da ve Orta Asya’da Zorunlu Askerlik
(Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2003), 8.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 9.
Nevertheless, especially in reserve forces and privateers, it is certain that recruitment was conducted comprehensively via intermediaries. Recruitment of privateers was common in both the Muslim and Christian worlds until the 1850’s. The best known example in the Ottoman Empire was the recruitment of North Africans by privateers in the Ottoman service.\textsuperscript{25}

Surely, it is possible to find similar mercenaries on land via intermediaries. For example, horsemen were recruited in Italy as mercenaries starting in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century. Soldiers, known as Condottieri, offered military service to whomever would pay for it.\textsuperscript{26} Both the Ottomans and the other European countries frequently used these forces against each other. Furthermore, use of the native people on the coasts of the Danube River by the Ottomans against western enemies can be considered as another example of mercenary forces.\textsuperscript{27}

However, with the establishment of the national armed forces in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, mercenary forces started to lose their importance and effectiveness, since the need for recruiting soldiers with money (or equivalents) substantially disappeared. However, it is not right to conclude that it was completely eliminated. Mercenary forces continued to be effective during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century’s colonial wars and independence wars in Latin America. Following World War II, mercenary forces played an important role in the independence and colonial wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Moreover, Southeast Asian and American mercenaries financed and trained by the CIA were used effectively in the fight against communism in Vietnam. Also, during the 1980’s, American mercenaries played an important role against the counter revolution fights in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{28}


\textsuperscript{26} Demirhan Erdem et al., trans., Modern Stratejinin Yaraticilari (Ankara: Asam Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi Yayinlari, 2003), 6.


Certainly, mercenary forces are still in existence today. As a matter of fact, American and European mercenaries collaborated with Bosnians and Croatians while Russian mercenaries collaborated with Serbians in the Bosnia War. In 1997, the government of Papua New Guinea recruited a number of South African mercenaries against rebels in the country. As a recent example, in the last Iraq war, the United States employed private security companies to support its armed forces which are also a form of mercenary forces.

2. Emergence of the System

The basics of military service requirements were met by mercenary forces in Europe during the 18th century. Mercenary forces, which were usually assembled during wars and which did not have an effective organization and command structure, constituted big problems for militaries. They were poorly trained and profit was their only goal. Since they did not have any non-material motives, they could easily retreat when their lives were threatened, and they could also change sides according to the amount of money they were offered. This situation could seriously affect good order and discipline.

At the same time, commanding officers were generally not qualified to manage mercenaries as the officers during that period were either aristocrats or also mercenaries. For an aristocratic officer, war was nothing but a pursuit of fame and a hobby. Consequently, these aristocratic officers had no training. They commanded soldiers only during wartime and could not succeed in their vocation of military service. Therefore, despite being good fighters and swordsmen, aristocratic officers frequently did not succeed in war.

The draft system, which was first established in France, resulted in important changes in military practices among European armed forces. This change would also be

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31 Ibid.
the starting point of the process for the establishment of modern All Volunteer Forces. The establishment of national armed forces not only eliminated the mercenaries, but also caused aristocratic officers to be discharged. For the first stage, officer personnel requirements for command were met by line officers who cooperated with the revolutionaries and middle class intellectuals. However, the new structure of the French armed forces demonstrated that it would be difficult to train new officers.32

At the end of the 19th century, the establishment of the All Volunteer Forces started to emerge similar to today’s AVF system. These new soldiers did not serve in wartime just because of personal honor or feudal relationships, and they did not serve anyone who would pay them. They were soldiers under service to their government. They had secure jobs, regular salaries, career goals and powerful beliefs that they were serving for the good of their countries and nations. Thus, volunteer soldiers started to work full time, and this helped people to see and understand the difference between civil and military realms for the first time.33

3. Grounds for Change

These circumstances are certainly not enough to explain the development of an All Volunteer Forces. Dr. Samuel Huntington stated that some other factors affected the establishment of an AVF.34

First of all, battlefields became more complex because of technical developments, which rendered the requirement for a new and more professional military indispensable. Furthermore, the rise of nationalist governments caused rival nationalisms. Therefore, it was essential for governments to recruit specialist career personnel devoted to their countries’ national security. Moreover, changes and developments in democratic ideals of the nations brought about the idea of commissioning officers not by birth but in accordance with the will of the citizens. Finally, the establishment of only one national

authority helped the development of the all volunteer forces. All Volunteer Forces thus consist of people who wish to serve the nation. Therefore, All Volunteer Forces will not perform efficiently in the absence of national unity.\footnote{K. Ugur Kizilaslan, trans., Asker ve Devlet, Sivil-Asker İlişkilerinin Kuram ve Siyasasi, (İstanbul: Salyangoz Yayınları, 2004), 43-51.}

From an economic perspective, debates about the all-volunteer forces often focus on limitations reflected in problems of recruitment, retention and personnel costs. Some critics advocate a return to conscription which they claim will solve these problems by providing an adequate quantity of recruits which would be cheaper than a voluntary system. Compared with regular personnel, critics make the point that conscripts are relatively cheap, they need little support since they are not accompanied by families and they have little leave so that they are almost always available for service. Critics also point to the sustainability requirements of modern armies on operations (e.g., peacekeeping): a modern army requires five or six people on active service for every one soldier in the field.\footnote{Keith Hartley, The All Volunteer Force: An Economics Perspective, http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/documents/research/avf.pdf (accessed May 3, 2007).}

Military personnel are a major cost for the armed forces. The recruitment, training, retention and efficient utilization of military personnel raises a set of human resources issues where economists, and especially defense economists, can apply their theories, empirical techniques and critical evaluations of alternative policies.

Analysis of the draft involved the application of standard microeconomic theory comparing market price systems with the draft system. Abolition of the draft made military personnel relatively more expensive. Economic theory predicts there will then be incentives to substitute relatively cheaper inputs for more expensive inputs. An AVF will make military personnel more expensive, leading to substitutions between equipment (capital or weapons) and labor, as well as between military personnel and cheaper labor inputs (such as civilians and less skilled labor). If defense output remains unchanged, defense spending will increase. Other results of an AVF include lower labor turnover costs (e.g., training costs), improved motivation resulting in higher productivity, the end
of draft-induced uncertainty which distorted the patterns of investments in human capital and family planning, and the end of efforts to avoid or defer the draft. The final outcome of an AVF would be improved allocation of resources, with the pay of military personnel reflecting relative scarcities (their alternative-use value or opportunity cost). Also, the draft is criticized as a form of involuntary servitude which imposes in-kind taxes on the young adult section of the population.37

Empirical work has estimated supply functions for military personnel, mostly for the United States. Such models usually include a relative pay variable reflecting military and civil pay as well as other variables such as civilian unemployment, wars and advertising campaigns. Typical relative pay elasticity ranged between 0.5 and 1.0 and unemployment elasticity varied between 0.5 and 1.4. Retention is an alternative to recruitment, and a study has been made of the cost-effectiveness of re-enlistment in the U.S. Navy. Analysis shows that where experienced and inexperienced men are substitutes, raising the re-enlistment rate can be cost-increasing.38

A number of U.S. studies have measured the economic benefits of military service. (There are also costs in injuries and deaths) Benefits include training and the transferability of the resulting human capital to the civilian economy. A U.S. study of nine military occupations found that for transferable skills (e.g., electrical/mechanical/electronics equipment repair), military experience was a close substitute for civilian experience. For specialized or specific military skills (e.g., combat skills), military experience increases civilian earnings, but not at the same rate as civilian experience.39

The new world order following the end of the Cold War has generated a new strategic environment. Armed forces have experienced downsizing leading to smaller but better equipped forces designed for new roles ranging from war-fighting to peace-keeping, crisis management, humanitarian aid and disaster relief. New missions demand

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
new skills and new force structures. However, together with smaller forces, the result is reflected in a higher number of resignations and difficulties in recruiting. Technical progress and continued downward pressure on defense budgets is forcing armed forces to re-think some of their traditional methods of doing business, and thus generating a new research agenda for defense manpower economics. Nonetheless, the established theoretical and empirical literature remains relevant. Significantly, U.S. economists dominate the recent literature and address policy-relevant issues following the end of the Cold War.40

Downsizing at the end of the Cold War led more nations to abolish conscription and adopt an AVF. The issue is ultimately empirical and hinges on questions about the elasticity of supply, the extent of the external threat, and the productivity differences between volunteer and conscripted forces. Subsequently, these qualifications were clarified in three propositions. First, because volunteer forces are (usually) more productive than draft forces of equal size, conscription need not be the more efficient procurement method even if the draft force costs less. Second, the case for conscription has probably weakened over time due to improvements to military technology, which have served to increase the relative productivity of volunteer forces. Third, the case for conscription strengthens when the demand for defense is high, as in times of extreme, pervasive threats to national security.41

More recent studies of the draft have focused on its relationship with the degree of unionization in an economy and on the magnitude of its budgetary savings. A public choice analysis found a positive relationship between the degree of unionization and the presence of the military draft, and thus supporting the hypothesis that unions benefit from the draft: the draft protects union members from low-skilled younger competitors. Estimates have also been made of the budgetary savings from conscription as part of the

41 Ibid.
debate about burden-sharing in NATO. The results show that the value of conscription as a percentage of national military expenditures averaged 9.2% in 1974 and 5.7% in 1987.42

Other contributions in the 1990s have dealt with pay and recruitment. According to the studies based on pay and benefits (e.g., housing and medical support) as components of military compensation, the wage-benefit mix can have a significant and predictable impact on hiring, retention, labor costs and the characteristics of individuals who constitute the armed forces. According to the quit rates to estimate compensating wage differentials in the U.S. military, the U.S. Navy would have to pay wage premiums ranging from 4% to 24% to achieve the same re-enlistment as the USAF for single white males.43

Downsizing in the U.S. military in the early 1990s was the basis for a number of labor supply and recruitment studies. New insights occurred into the labor supply to the U.S. Army and the links between institutional incentives and the effectiveness of resources used for recruitment. The findings state that the labor supply for the U.S. Army was positively, but inelastically, related to relative pay and unemployment and that marginal recruit seemed to be very sensitive to monetary incentives (e.g., enlistment bonuses). The problem considered is that of maintaining the U.S. reserve forces in an era of military drawdown which will reduce the pool of trained, experienced personnel available to the reserves.44

4. An AVF Precedent: U.S. Armed Forces

In 1973, the idea of shifting to an all-volunteer force was opposed by most senior U.S. military leaders, by many in Congress, and by influential academics. The first decade of the new force was rocky and marked by calls to revert to some form of national service.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
During the first three years of the AVF, the services generally met their overall requirements for staffing and quality. During those early years, however, the number of first-term enlistees who left the service before completing their contracted terms of service rose from 26 percent to 37 percent, pushing turnover rates (the annual requirement for enlisted recruits divided by the total size of the enlisted force) to nearly 22 percent—far exceeding the 13 percent anticipated in studies commissioned before the change. The high attrition rate meant that more recruits were needed every year than anticipated. The constant churning of the force translated into lower levels of experience and expertise in units as well as higher costs for recruiting and training. As a result, the share of the military budget devoted to personnel actually rose during the first few years of the AVF, despite a small reduction in the size of the force.

The next few years brought the AVF close to crisis. During that period, the U.S. economy grew briskly and private-sector wages rose sharply. Military pay raises did not keep up, and budgets for recruiting and advertising were cut back. Congress suspended the GI Bill, which provided college money for military veterans and had served as an important enlistment incentive.45

During that period, overall force levels were not a big problem. The services generally came close to meeting their targets for overall staffing; the largest proportional shortfall in total end strength was just 1.2 percent, in 1979. Unfortunately, however, the quality of entering personnel plummeted. By 1980, nearly 50 percent of U.S. Army enlistees (compared with 28 percent in 1968) fell in the bottom 30 percent of American youth in terms of cognitive aptitude, while only 29 percent scored above the median on the military entrance test (compared with 49 percent at the end of the draft). Across the four services, the proportion of low-scoring enlistees was worse than at any time since the Korean War.46

People with higher cognitive aptitudes do better at most military tasks, people whose aptitudes fall in the bottom 30 percent have difficulty acquiring the skills they

45 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
46 Ibid.
need to be successful in the military. Thus, the high number of entrants who scored at the bottom of the test meant a lower-quality force, more work for trainers and leaders, and greater attrition for the entrants (too many of who grew discouraged or were pressed to leave when they could not handle their assigned duties). In addition, that period coincided with a time of reduced investment in military equipment resulting, some said, in a hollow force. Some experts held that problems stemming from reduced investment translated into morale problems that compounded the difficulties of getting the AVF started.47

Fixing the problems cost money, but by the early 1980s, a combination of efforts brought the U.S. military out of its transitional problems. Perhaps the most important was to raise military pay for recruits and, later, all ranks. Although pay raises lagged during the late 1970s, double-digit increases in 1981 and 1982 brought pay levels for most military people above the seventy-fifth percentile for people with similar levels of education and experience in private-sector firms. Despite the widely reported “pay gap” of the late 1980s and the 1990s, military pay continued to compare favorably with pay in the private sector throughout the second and third decades of the AVF. Today, U.S. military pay raises are explicitly linked to average wage hikes in the private sector.48

In addition, the United States expanded bonus programs to entice high-quality youth to join up and to induce people in critical occupations to reenlist. Following the mistaken decision to reduce educational benefits, the nation developed a new program that provides generous benefits for service members who wish to go to college or technical school after leaving the military. The services were also permitted to design educational bonuses of their own, an extra tool to attract people they most want to bring in. Money for post-service education proved to be particularly useful in attracting the high-aptitude people most likely to be successful in the military.49

The services also worked to identify and put a stop to traditions that had little real military value but annoyed members greatly. Two emotionally charged issues were

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47 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
haircuts and “KP” (kitchen police) duty, which required soldiers to handle menial tasks on a routine basis. The issues pitted military commanders and veterans in Congress—who typically saw military “buzz cuts” and menial tasks as rites of passage supportive of good order and discipline—against the desires of recruits, who saw them as lifestyle detriments. Ultimately, the desires of recruits won out. While the services still enforce haircut standards, they are more relaxed than during the draft era, and KP is largely a thing of the past.50

Another initiative of the American transition was a focus on the quality of life for military families. Recruiters emphasized the benefits of family housing, health care, and cut-rate groceries, and money was added to budgets to improve the facilities, goods, and services that families appreciate. In the late 1980s, the Department of Defense opened its own child-development centers to provide subsidized, high-quality child-care services on military bases. The initiative probably paid off in improved recruiting and retention. It also had a side effect that raised costs for the military, and complicated things for both commanders and the people who serve, that is, the proportion of military people with young families grew.51

In addition, the United States greatly expanded the pool from which talented recruits might be drawn by removing a 2 percent limit on the share of women in the forces, opening numerous jobs to women and transforming the conditions under which women serve. The proportion of women in the force rose from 1.9 percent in 1972 to 9.3 percent in 1983 and has since climbed to about 15 percent. The proportion of minorities who serve also increased, as individuals found better opportunities in the military than in the private sector.52

Finally, the military built a professional cadre of recruiters and invested heavily in marketing research and mass-media advertising. The general sales pitch emphasized the training and other opportunities the military can offer, plus a rich array of family benefits,

50 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
good pay, a chance for an adventurous and yet more ordered life, as well as patriotism, a chance to be part of something important, and other intangibles. Increased advertising and recruiting can be the quickest and most cost-effective means to improve recruitment levels, which typically lag when the state of the economy improves.53

a. Improving Cost Effectiveness from U.S. and NATO Perspectives

Whatever a nation’s reasons for suspending conscription, AVF advocacy has raised expectations that abolishing conscription would ultimately lead to improved military effectiveness and lowered personnel costs, and thus narrowing the transatlantic capabilities gap. At first glance, the numbers seem compelling. In 2000, the United States spent just 27 percent of its military budget on personnel, compared with 34 percent in 1970, before the advent of the AVF. Today, countries with AVFs generally devote smaller shares of their budgets to personnel expenditures and larger shares to developing and purchasing new equipment than do those that retain conscription. For example, taken together, the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—three NATO countries with long-standing AVFs—devote 28 percent of their total defense budgets to modernization. In contrast, the combined share of defense budgets dedicated to modernization in all the other countries of NATO comes to just 16.6 percent.54 Figure 2 gives the number of active duty troops in NATO countries.

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53 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
54 Ibid.
Figure 2. Active-Duty Troops of Selected NATO Countries (From: Transatlantic Roundtable 2003: Filling NATO's Ranks: Military Personnel Policies in Transition)

A somewhat more focused example compares NATO Europe’s three biggest spenders: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. While the three countries’ total defense budgets are roughly similar, Germany keeps more people under arms than the other two countries. Of the three, only Germany still has conscripts. France ended conscription in 2001 and is still in the throes of transition. Germany’s conscripts add to the size of the Bundeswehr and at the same time drain money that would otherwise be available for modernization, with the result that Germany spends only one-quarter as much money on equipment modernization per active duty service member as the United Kingdom.55 Figure 3 gives modernization spending per active duty service member in selected countries.

55 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
More generally, the U.S. experience appears to validate the arguments made in favor of all-volunteer forces on the basis of economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, both the U.S. experience of the middle to late 1970s and the early indications from Europe suggest that the transitions in Europe will be at least as difficult as in United States.56

5. All Volunteer Forces Today

Today, many countries’ recruitment systems are based on All Volunteer Forces system. In the early 2000’s, major countries with All Volunteer Forces are the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Also, European Union countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Latvia have tried to change their military structure to an All Volunteer Force system. Thus, the establishment of an AVF has been quite typical at the beginning of the 21st century.57

It is certain that all of the countries that have been working on a change to an AVF, or an AVF in place have certain economic developmental levels. Besides, they use

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56 Cindy Williams, From Conscripts to Volunteers: NATO’s Transitions to All Volunteer Forces, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0J1W/is_1_58/ai_n14858430/pg_3 (accessed May 3, 2007).
their armed forces in international operations rather than the past national defense mentality. This is not a simple coincidence. Thus, an AVF cannot be observed in third world countries today, because of economic concerns and problems, as well as certain security risks.

6. First Interferences for Change in Turkish Armed Forces

Even though draft systems have been in existence for centuries, All Volunteer Forces have been one of the most important topics on today’s policy agenda for the Turkish Armed Forces. Recruitment of specialist sergeants since 1986 can surely be considered as the first serious initiative for establishing an All Volunteer Forces in Turkey. Thus, it was stated in the rationale of the 1986 law that the recruitment of specialist personnel was essential and cost efficient as stated below;

…Because of today’s rapidly developing technology, it has been essential to equip the armed forces with expensive weapons and equipments and the Turkish Armed Forces has happened to use more highly developed technologies. Together with the difficulties in training the personnel for the technical specifications of these expensive equipments in only 3 months, the damages and losses which would be followed by misusing these equipments would also be quite high. Because of the shortage in the staff of officers and petty officers, sergeants were used especially in these technical duties until now. However, sergeants who haven’t had enough knowledge and experience on these areas could not be efficient in operating and maintaining these equipments on the operations. On the other hand, in country’s civilian industry sector, the need for technician personnel has been increasing day by day and this also leads to shortage in technician personnel in the armed forces because of early retirements or resignations in order to work in civilian sector for higher incomes… Our country’s geopolitical position requires employment of more powerful and experienced personnel… While evaluating the additional burden of the specialist personnel to the defense budget according to this proposal, the savings that would be gained in result of employing specialists should be taken into account. With this approach to the issue, the benefits in result of use and maintenance of the expensive equipments by specialists will be higher than the employment costs and continuity and efficiency will be provided in training of the personnel and preparing the equipments and weapons to war…58

However, it will be helpful to mention some of the past attempts for this new method from which intended efficiency could not be received.

The first step for an AVF was Code No 5430, the law pertaining to the training of specialist sergeants, established in 1949. The rationale for this law, prepared by the Department of Defense, was the recruitment of engine technicians and operators who would operate and maintain newly fielded weapon systems and the new structuring of the Turkish Armed Forces. The law authorized the Department of Defense to train the privates and the new specialist sergeants who would want to join the armed forces.

Another step taken toward an all volunteer system was Code No 6320, the Law of Sergeants and Specialist Sergeants established in 1954. Rationale for this law, also prepared by the Department of Defense, was to correct the deficiencies regarding the training of specialist sergeants, dating from 1949 (Code No 5430). With the new law, the period required to select specialists was lengthened, and additional regulations were put in place to make the job more attractive to the target market.

The most attention-getting step for change was the additional article to the Turkish Armed Forces Personnel Law (Code No 4678) in 2001. This new regulation allowed the Turkish Armed Forces to employ contractual officers in special areas with special needs.

Certainly, these laws and regulations are important steps toward the establishment of an all volunteer forces. However, it cannot be said that these regulations lead to their intended results. In the laws with Code No’s 5430 and 6320, attractive conditions for the prospective applicants could not be created, and in the law for contractual officers (Code No 4678), regulations for the implementation of the law could not be put in place effectively. Consequently, current initiatives toward a volunteer system have not been fully successful due in large part to existing regulations.
III. TURKEY’S STRATEGIC SITUATION, DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMY

A. INTRODUCTION

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the Independence War during the World War I era, the Republic continued the Ottoman Empire’s recruiting system for a while. After the republic’s new Draft Law of 1927 (Code No 1111), the recruiting system was changed; the new structure of the Turkish Armed Forces was established with officers and petty officers forming the core. Currently, the Turkish Armed Forces have preserved this identity in the manner in which it was established.

In the early 1900’s when the threat was always high, a draft system was indispensable. Furthermore, with the upcoming World War II and the following Cold War, draft forces in Turkey continued to be essential. Today’s Turkey is still located in one of the most problematic areas of the world.

However, after the end of Cold War due to rapidly improving technology, changing economic structures and the needs of the country have consequently been causing researchers to investigate other alternatives such as the AVF system which has received renewed attention.

This chapter highlights the Turkish strategic situation with special consideration given to demographic changes and its economic growth.

B. TURKEY’S STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

During the Cold War, the Turkish security environment was mostly shaped by its proximity to the Soviet Union. Soviet territorial demands in 1945 and the threat of communism compelled Turkey to seek Western support for its defense. Once Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Turkish security policies were conducted mostly in parallel with NATO's allies.
The sole exception was Turkey's conflict with Cyprus and Greece. In 1974, Turkey intervened to ensure the security of the Turkish community. Greek policies in regard to Cyprus, the delineation of the Aegean Sea and the militarization of the Greek islands adjacent to the Turkish coast were perceived as threats. As a result, Turkey developed some security policies independent of NATO.

During this period, as retired Air Force General Sadi Erguvenc noted, the Middle East was not a priority in Turkish security calculations. However, the Cold War's end created a dramatically altered environment, leaving Turkey in the midst of two zones of instability: the first stretching from the Arctic Circle down through Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East, and the second along the southern shore of the Mediterranean. In contrast to the Cold War era, Turkey has become a geopolitically unique country, bordering several regions that are very different from each other, and thus, posing a variety of security challenges.59

European territories make Turkey a Balkan country. The largest Turkish city and a significant proportion of its population and industry are located in Europe. For historical, religious and ethnic reasons, Turkey has strong ties to the Balkans.

Turkey is also a Black Sea country. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's trade and economic cooperation with countries around the Black Sea has expanded significantly.

Turkey also has close ties to a large number of Muslim and Turkish communities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Over the last few years, Turkey's relations with these countries have acquired growing political, economic, and security importance.

Finally, Turkey is a Middle Eastern country whose security as well as stability and prosperity have become intimately tied to developments in the Middle East.

59 Kemal Kirisci, “Post Cold War Turkish Security and the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 1, No. 2 (1997).
1. Changing Environment after the Cold War and Turkey’s Geopolitical Role

The end of the Cold War did not improve Turkey's security environment. New threats and challenges dictated a broader security agenda. Despite initially positive expectations, disintegration of the Soviet and Yugoslavian federations and, (not least) the de facto partition of Iraq caused increased insecurity for Turkey. Moreover, the terrorist PKK’s armed insurgency gained momentum after Baghdad’s authority broke down in northern Iraq. It remained the epicenter of Turkey’s security concerns for the 1990’s. As a result, the “asymmetrical” and “non-conventional threat” required the army to change its mindset, force structure, operational codes and even its weapons inventory.60

Turkey’s vital place in the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve. The country’s size, geographic position and powerful armed forces ensure that its significance is well understood. During the Cold War, Turkey was regarded as a reliable partner and a bulwark of the West because of its proximity to Russia. In more recent years, its position connecting Europe to the Middle East makes it an equally valued strategic partner. Recently, however, there has been anxiety expressed that the West might lose Turkey. Opinion polls, for example, the Transatlantic Trends survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, regularly reveal hostility to the United States in Turkey. Turkish attitudes to the European Union have also soured, as negotiations over accession have run into trouble.

Nevertheless, for the moment, military relations between Turkey and the United States and NATO remain close. Turkey also has a close strategic relationship with Israel. After a major debate, Turkey agreed to deploy peacekeepers to Lebanon. With over a half million active troops and a potential for one million men under arms, Turkey has the largest armed forces by far in Europe. It is believed that if Turkey does eventually join the European Union, it will go a long way towards solving the major difficulty with the EU’s nascent “security and defense policy”: a lack of deployable manpower. Turkey is also potentially crucial in alleviating Europe’s dependence on Russian energy supplies

and pipelines. The opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline earlier this year allows the transport of oil to the Mediterranean Sea without passing through Russia or Iran. A major gas pipeline has long been mooted along a similar route. On the other hand, a gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey is already up and running and the Russians are keen to expand it. Bringing Turkey into the European Union could clearly play a big role in mitigating European energy and military anxieties. However, whether the EU will regard extending its frontiers to the borders of Iraq and Syria as a strategic boon remains to be seen.61

a. Post September 11 Impacts

Turkey has traditionally been an important country because of its geographic location between Europe, the Middle East and Asia with its easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. Moreover, thanks to its character as a democratic country with a majority Muslim population, Turkey stands culturally as a bridge between Western and Islamic civilizations.

Turkey's strategic value became more visible following the events of September 11. Turkey and Turkish foreign policy started to receive greater interest, and the tenor of discussions about Turkey and its strategic importance was usually optimistic.

The first effect of September 11 was growing acceptance toward the Turkish approach to the fight against terrorism. Turkey itself had long struggled against separatist terror and politicized Islam in a domestic context. Since the 1970s, Turkey has fought against terrorism, and continues to be one of the major targets of terrorist activities, both at home and abroad.

Besides trying to raise the terror issue in several political and diplomatic fora, Turkey did not hesitate to employ the military instruments as well. To meet the rising challenge of separatist terror in the South Eastern Anatolian region, Turkey employed a stubborn, and at times harsh, policy based predominantly on military

measures intended to, first stop the terror activities conducted by the PKK, and then root out the terrorist groups and their support bases. Emphasis on the use or threat of force outside Turkish borders was a logical correlate of this policy. Numerous Turkish incursions into northern Iraq are cases in point. The authority vacuum which emerged after the imposition of a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq enabled the PKK to use the region as a base for terrorist attacks on Turkish territory. Based on a somewhat complicated mixture of hot pursuit and an expanded interpretation of the right of self-defense, Turkish armed forces were dispatched into Northern Iraq to destroy PKK guerillas and training camps and to PKK on Turkish soil. While some of those operations were limited in scope, some were large scale involving thousands of troops. At times, 35,000 Turkish soldiers crossed the border backed by tanks, artillery, and helicopters.62

b. Changing Security Perceptions

The dynamics of Turkish politics have been transformed since Turkey received EU candidate status in December 1999. Increasing prospects of EU membership have exerted a tremendous impact on Turkish foreign policy. This impact arguably had multiple roots. First, in accordance with the EU’s inclination towards vertical integration, Turkey’s security and foreign policy environment has diversified at an unprecedented pace. Turkish society has become more receptive to open debate as interest groups developed, and they are now far better organized to pursue their agendas across Europe through peer associations within the Union.63

Increasing involvement of non-state actors in the formulation of security and foreign policy in Turkey has become one of the new aspects of domestic politics. As newly emerging groups begin to exert influence over security and foreign policy issues, the official apparatus has lost its predominance in economic and financial affairs. Foreign policy from below or grass-roots statecraft has its own manifestations in Turkey.


Globalization, the EU integration process and customs union brought about their own effects on Turkish statecraft. A vast spectrum of civic organizations are involved in activities formerly pertinent to the security sector and are thus becoming the agents of a de-securitization process in Turkey. Their impacts are becoming visible in debates as to how the national interest may best be defined. These new actors supported those who pursued revisions in major national policies. As was the case with Cyprus, traditional circles have failed to mobilize large sectors of society to support their positions.64

It was, therefore, not a coincidence that debate over national interest undermined the state’s position on one of the issues that was traditionally considered a major national cause: Cyprus. Stated briefly, the debate over Cyprus undermined the case for Turkey that it was keeping its troops for the sake of Cypriot Turks. The revised version of the argument, however, asserted that Turkey’s presence had been required for Turkey’s own security needs. Thus, the new approach required the policy be further securitized. It is beyond the scope of this project to delineate the details of the Annan Plan, yet the end result was an impressive compromise among contending agents of the security and foreign policy. The compromise gave more freedom of maneuver to the new AKP government. A diplomatic initiative taken by the AKP government led to the April 2004 referendum, redefining all the parameters of the Cyprus imbroglio and freeing Turkey from the role of scapegoat for the post-1974 stalemate on the island.65

Second, Ankara would definitely like to avoid any conflict with its neighbors because it would obviously be to the benefit of those who claimed that Turkey’s EU accession should be delayed because its neighborhood was still perilous. The way certain sections of the Turkish polity stood against U.S. unilaterality on Iraq was bolstered, if not inspired, by the EU’s stand on the issue. The Turkish position on Iran and Syria also seems influenced by Brussels. With EU accession in mind, observed an expert, Turkey wanted to treat its Middle Eastern neighbor’s à la Europe.66

65 Ibid.
So truly, given that both Iran and Syria became de facto neighbors of the United States after the occupation of Iraq, the treatment à la Europe has paid more dividends. Therefore, the possibility of Turkey’s unilateral intervention in regional affairs will be limited by further Europeanization of its security and foreign policy sector.67

Consequently, having said all of these facts regarding national security concerns of Turkey in this rapidly changing security environment, Turkish military should be and “is” moving to modes of combat requiring a high degree of soldier skills.

2. Turkish National Defense Strategy

The Turkish Defense Policy and Military Strategy, presented in Appendix, are officially declared by the Ministry of Defense and highlight some of the basic principles as follows:

**Turkey’s National Defense Policy:**

...At the end of the Cold War and the struggle between blocks, there was a search for a new world order directed at globalization, which also changed the concepts of threat. While the concept of threat was previously evident and large at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has become multi-directional, multi-dimensional and variable and instabilities dominate the environment. The traditional concept of threat has now started to contain new threats and risks emerging in the form of:

– Regional and ethnic conflicts,

– Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries,

– Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles,

– Religious fundamentalism,

– Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and

– International terrorism.

Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, where the new threats and risks are concentrated. Turkey is in a region where the interests of the global powers and formations intersect. This situation, stemming from Turkey’s geo-strategic location, has not changed until the present and will not change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that the importance and place of Turkey in the new world order will become even more strengthened…

**Turkey’s Military Strategy:**

Turkey’s Military Strategy contains four important matters to be able to support the specified defense policy:

– Deterrence,

– Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in Crises,

– Forward Defense and

– Collective Security…

…The formation of a force structure conforming to the defense policy and strategy, of which the main principles are summarized above, is of great importance. For Turkey to attain a military power having the resources and capabilities of supporting the National Security Policy of Turkey, which is subject to multifaceted threats due to her geopolitical and geostrategic position, maintaining and developing this force according to the requirements of the conditions and the period, constitute the basis for Turkey’s Defense Policy and Strategy in the twenty-first century.68

**C. TURKEY’S DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH**

1. **Overview of Turkey’s Demographics for the Eligible Manpower Pool**

   According to the composition of the population, total military manpower availability in Turkey is approximately 17 million while the fraction suitable for military

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service is approximately 14 million as of 2005 (excluding the female population under the current constitution). However, since Turkish Armed Forces have already deployed female officers in the military, in the case of an AVF option, it seems obvious that some portion of draftees will be enrolled from the female population.69

Consequently, the total (male and female) military manpower available in Turkey is approximately 33 million while the fraction suitable for military service is approximately 26 million, which indicates a relatively large population compared to the other countries with AVF. The current military manpower pool is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military branches:</th>
<th>Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Turkish Land Forces, Turkish Naval Forces, Turkish Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military service age and obligation:</td>
<td>20 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>males age 20-49: 16,756,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>females age 20-49: 16,051,706 (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower available for military service:</td>
<td>males age 20-49: 13,905,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>females age 20-49: 13,335,812 (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower fit for military service:</td>
<td>males age 18-49: 679,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>females age 20-49: 659,090 (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower reaching military service age annually:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditures as percent of GDP:</td>
<td>5.3% (2005 est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Military Manpower Pool in Turkey (From: CIA The World Fact Book)

2. Turkish Economy

Turkey's economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along with traditional agriculture that still accounts for more than 35% of employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private sector, yet the state still plays a major role in basic industry, banking, transport, and communication. The largest industrial sector is textiles

and clothing, which accounts for one-third of industrial employment, it faces stiff
competition in international markets with the end of the global quota system. However,
other sectors, notably the automotive and electronics industries are rising in importance
within Turkey’s export mix.70

The Turkish economy has done extremely well in recent years. In 2005, its
growth was approximately 7.5%, following a growth of approximately 8% in 2004. Encouragingly, Turkey managed to withstand a mini-crisis when emerging markets
sagged and inflation rose unexpectedly in 2006. In previous times, such events might
have led to a full-scale financial crisis such as the one in 2001. However, the Turkish
economy held steady.71

Turkey is currently growing much faster than the European Union average driven
in part by rising productivity, increasing exports, and a recent influx of foreign direct
investment. Only a stagnating services sector seems to have held back recent
performance. Nevertheless, the country’s economic success story is not just high growth.
Inflation, which has bedeviled the country in the past, is now largely under control at
around 5%. Moreover, government finances are also in much better shape. The
government is now running a primary surplus helped by sharp cutbacks in agricultural
subsidies. The biggest macro economic worry is Turkey’s very large current account
deficit.72

Agriculture remains a huge sector, accounting for almost a third of jobs and
around 12% of the GDP. However, Turkish citizens are steadily drifting off the land, and
moving to urban locations. With an estimated 25% of the population under the age of 15,
the labor force will be fast-growing and youthful for years to come. Thus,
competitiveness may depend on the ability not only to provide education for its young
population, but also to create job opportunities. In addition, unemployment remains at

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(accessed February 24, 2007).
71 “World Economic Forum in Turkey,” (paper presented at the meeting for World Economic Forum
in Turkey, Istanbul, Turkey, November 23-24, 2006).
72 Ibid.
double-digit percentages, while employment growth has been estimated at less than 1% per year currently. The government itself has calculated that Turkey needs to create some 500,000 new jobs a year in order to keep the unemployment rate constant.73

Fortunately, the Turkish private sector is strong and growing. The government has pressed ahead with a major program of privatization, including the sale of Turk Telecom and Tupras, an oil refiner. Banks have also been privatized and have attracted a lot of foreign interest. Major recent investors in Turkey include Fortis of Belgium and National Bank of Greece. Turkish banks and finance houses are well positioned to serve as a regional hub for business from the Middle East and the Caspian region. As a result of successful privatizations and the growth of the private sector, the three biggest Turkish companies are now privately-held. Turkey is internationally competitive in a number of important business sectors, including textiles, financial services and automobiles. Toyota and Ford are both major exporters from Turkey.74

Prior to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey averaged less than $1 billion annually, but recent economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership boosted FDI up to $9.7 billion.75 Total privatization sales since 1985 are currently approaching $26 billion.76 Oil began to flow through the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline in May 2006, marking a major milestone that will bring up to 1 million barrels per day from the Caspian region to market.

Tourism is also booming. The country welcomed 21 million tourists in 2005 and the number of arrivals has grown by over 20% for the last two years. Turkey’s three biggest markets are Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. However, in tourism, as in so many other areas of the economy, Turkey will depend on an open and friendly

74 Ibid.
relationship with both Western Europe and the Middle East. As a bridge between East and West, the country could be unusually vulnerable to any escalation in international tensions.77

Some important points regarding Turkish economy which should be taken into consideration are shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size of GDP in million US Dollars</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
<td>459.8</td>
<td>420.9</td>
<td>453.9</td>
<td>492.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>6816</td>
<td>6135</td>
<td>6520</td>
<td>6971</td>
<td>7687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volume index of GDP per capita</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evolution of GDP</td>
<td>Real GDP growth</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>-7.495</td>
<td>7.942</td>
<td>5.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment rates</td>
<td>Gross fixed capital formation</td>
<td>22.353</td>
<td>18.165</td>
<td>16.588</td>
<td>15.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gross fixed capital formation: housing</td>
<td>5.259</td>
<td>5.238</td>
<td>3.821</td>
<td>3.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>GDP deflator</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>54.81</td>
<td>44.13</td>
<td>22.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value added by activity</td>
<td>Value added in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>14.19</td>
<td>11.736</td>
<td>11.672</td>
<td>11.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value added in industry, including energy</td>
<td>23.482</td>
<td>25.021</td>
<td>25.454</td>
<td>25.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value added in construction</td>
<td>5.245</td>
<td>5.039</td>
<td>4.143</td>
<td>3.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value added in transport, trade, hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>34.423</td>
<td>35.753</td>
<td>35.529</td>
<td>35.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Value added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services</td>
<td>8.471</td>
<td>8.252</td>
<td>8.934</td>
<td>9.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Consumer price indices (CPI)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>154.4</td>
<td>223.825</td>
<td>280.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPI: food</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>149.082</td>
<td>223.001</td>
<td>282.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPI: energy</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>192.194</td>
<td>279.94</td>
<td>337.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Producer price indices (PPI)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>161.627</td>
<td>242.615</td>
<td>304.634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor market</td>
<td>Employment rates by gender</td>
<td>48.897</td>
<td>47.799</td>
<td>46.708</td>
<td>45.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment rates: total</td>
<td>71.669</td>
<td>69.324</td>
<td>66.869</td>
<td>65.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment rates: women</td>
<td>36.971</td>
<td>35.282</td>
<td>33.03</td>
<td>30.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment rates by age group 15-24</td>
<td>56.766</td>
<td>55.52</td>
<td>54.621</td>
<td>53.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Employment rates for age group 25-54</td>
<td>36.404</td>
<td>35.916</td>
<td>35.298</td>
<td>32.705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Selected Macroeconomic Trends and Data of Turkish Economy (From: OECD Statistical Profile of Turkey on OECD website)

3. Effects of the Draft System on Turkish Economy

The draft system mandates a proportion of the society to yield their potential earnings in favor of the nation. In a sense, an individual citizen’s foregone income can be considered a hidden tax, which can also be called a conscription tax. Therefore, when analyzing the draft, the question to be considered is whether the cost of defense should be paid by all taxpayers or imposed on a group of young people in the military manpower pool. The following sections will highlight significant cost elements of the draft system on the economy.

a. Budget Costs

Budget costs can be calculated simply by multiplying the average wage by the number of draftees which will obviously be lower in the draft system compared to the AVF option since in an AVF, wages would be calculated on the basis of supply and demand variables, more specifically equal to the supply price of the last volunteer enlisted.

According to Figure 4, W1 is the budget cost and as can be seen, when all the eligible manpower pool has to serve, which is the case in the draft system in Turkey, budget costs exceed the economic costs in AVF. This point brings up the argument of
Cooper, who claims that conscription is the standard method of manpower acquisition when a country maintains a very large military force relative to its population. However, when the proportion of the eligible manpower pool, which has to serve, decreases, budget costs will decrease relatively to the economic costs. The difference between wages and the supply is defined as the economic rent to the suppliers which brings up another decision point: how much economic rent would be acceptable to transfer from taxpayers to prospective volunteers.78

Figure 4. Supply Curve Analysis for Military Manpower Pool

b. Economic or Opportunity Costs

Opportunity cost, or economic cost, is the cost of something in terms of the benefits that could be received from an opportunity foregone, or the most valuable forgone alternative (generally second best alternative). Generally, opportunity costs are assessed in monetary terms, but can also be assessed in terms of anything that is of value to those doing the assessing.79

78 Cooper Richard, Military Manpower and the All Volunteer Force, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1977), 93.
79 Ibid.
In this case, the supply price of an individual is a good measure which combines the individual’s opportunity cost incurred by serving in the military. Figure 4 again, under the assumption of military requirement as a number of personnel is \( B \) and \( W_1 \) is the wage which induces all prospective volunteers to join the military. However, when wages decrease to \( W_2 \), only ‘a’ would voluntarily join the military and the remaining portion would be either unwilling to serve or be drafted.

In the case of Turkey, with its current draft system, the military wage for new recruits is very vague. Therefore, if this amount of wage is applied to the graph in Figure 4, the whole area below the supply curve will be the opportunity cost of the draft system, which is quite large. Moreover, a scenario in which (a) manpower requirements decrease, (b) eligible manpower pool increases and (c) skilled (rather than numerous) skilled personnel are needed makes the AVF process more efficient for society as a whole. Therefore, in order to find the best level for both the government and the individuals, the equilibrium is the intersection of supply and demand curves where no deadweight loss occurs and social gain is at maximum.

c. **Conscription Tax**

The military draft can be regarded as a tax on both the present and the future earnings of the draftees. The discounted value of this tax can be interpreted as a human capital burden which alters the stock of human capital from what it would have been in the absence of the draft. For this reason, the comparison of draft forces with alternative manpower acquisitions has centered on the AVF where the conscription tax is zero.

Conscription tax is basically the difference between the individual draftees’ military wages and the wages they desire to join a volunteer based military which was called the supply price in the previous sections. Cooper states that the conscription tax is a means of income redistribution at the expense of the male individuals who have to serve in the military. There are two significant issues related to Cooper’s statement. The first is the intergenerational transfers of income and the second
is the intragenerational transfers of income. The intragenerational transfer occurs because the eligible male population is obliged to serve under law. Since the entire eligible male population has to serve in the military, this transfer might be justified. A more problematic form of income redistribution is the intergenerational redistribution since those who have to serve are carrying the tax, while others avoid it. As a significant and simple example, consider two individuals with different income levels of $1,000 and $10,000, which is quite possible in Turkey. If drafted, the second individual’s earnings would be a lost opportunity to him and a deadweight loss to the Turkish economy. On the other hand, if he tries to avoid serving, it will be considered a conscientious objection (a crime) in case he finds a way to avoid it legally, and he will be censured by Turkish society. In other words, the draft system as currently practiced in Turkey redistributes the income from poorer to wealthier, which is also unfair.

Conscription tax is visualized in Figure 5,

![Conscription Tax Visualization](image)

Figure 5. Conscription Tax Visualization

---

where

\( W_1 \) = Market value of military wage to attract \( S_1 \) amount of enlisted personnel.

\( W_2 \) = Current military wage

\( A \) = Conscription tax

\( B \) = Total rent (with AVF)

\( C \) = Avoidance cost

\( S_1 \) = Number of enlisted military personnel required

In case the government pays the market price to attract volunteers, it would pay the supply price of the last volunteer in the supply curve. The lower group will earn a rent equal to the difference between their supply prices and the current military wages. When conscription is executed, this rent would be largely lost since everyone obtains the same amount and enrollment is mandatory.

More specifically, in order to ascertain the individual variables of this figure, a mathematical model can be used as stated below.

Expected income \( (y) \) of an individual is the sum of

- the probability of not serving times the supply price less the cost of the draft
- and the probability of having to serve times military wages less the cost they incurred to avoid the draft

\[
y = (1 - p)(w_1 - c) + p(1 - c)
\]  

(1)

where

\( p \) = Probability of serving

\( w_1 \) = Supply price

\( c \) = Avoidance cost

If simplified, the equation will be,

\[
y = w_1 - c - pw_1 + p
\]  

(2)

which means an individual can change his/her expected income by controlling \( c \).
By differentiating $y$ with respect to $c$, the optimum income can be calculated for an individual whose supply price is higher than the military wage in draft.

$$\frac{\partial y}{\partial c} = \frac{\partial p}{\partial c} (1 - w_1) - 1$$

(3)

Then,

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial c} = \frac{1}{1 - w_1}$$

(4)

A plausible functional form for $p(c)$ is:

$$p = e^{-\beta c}, \beta > 0$$

(5)

where $\beta$ equals a variable controlled by the government that can affect the degree of success for an individual who incurs draft avoidance costs. Therefore, if the government allows more draft deferments, $\beta$ would be larger. Using Equation 5:

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial c} = -\beta e^{-\beta c} = -\beta p$$

(6)

By incorporating Equation 6 with Equation 4:

$$p = \frac{1}{\beta (w_1 - 1)} \text{ where } (w_1 - 1) > 0$$

(7)

The appropriate interpretation of cases where Equation 7 implies $p > 1$ is that of a corner solution; people who cannot satisfy the condition in Equation 7 are those for whom the gains associated with reducing the probability of induction are so small that no expenditure to do is justified. These people will simply permit themselves to become drafted, or they may even volunteer but they would not do so in the absence of conscription. Individuals able to satisfy Equation 7 enter the military only as draftees.

The avoidance costs spent by individuals can be identified by making Equation 5 equal to Equation 7 as follows:

$$c = \frac{1}{\beta} \left[ \ln \beta + \ln(w_1 - 1) \right]$$

(8)

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IV. PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF AVF OPTION FOR TURKEY FROM AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE

A. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1900’s, a draft system was indispensable in Turkey due to major military threats. Furthermore, with the coming World War II and the Cold War following, drafted armed forces continued to be essential. And, Turkey today is still in one of the most problematic security areas of the world.

However, with the end of the Cold War, rapidly improving technology, and changing economic structures, alternatives like the AVF system have received increasing attention.

The transition to an All Volunteer Force is not just a management or manpower issue. It has many economic, social and national security related consequences. Although there are still debates on the costs and efficiency of an AVF in the United States, the AVF without a doubt has shown its effectiveness in the battlefield for the United States so far. Such a benefit is invaluable and immeasurable.

There are two main concerns about the transition to an AVF in Turkey: (a) the costs (especially the personnel costs) and (b) the effects of decreasing the number of soldiers.

This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces while considering various elements of budget costs and opportunity (economic) costs as well as a conscription tax.

B. BUDGET COSTS OF AVF OPTION FOR TURKEY

1. Payroll Costs

Budgetary costs (payroll costs of enlistees) will be considered since they are the greatest concern and argument against transitioning to an AVF. Payroll costs can be
calculated simply by multiplying the average wage by the number of draftees. This will obviously be lower in the draft system since in an AVF, wages would be calculated on the basis of supply and demand in the labor market, and more specifically, equal to the supply price of the last volunteer enlisted.

However, as a starting point, several assumptions should be made in order to roughly estimate these costs for Turkey.

- The transformation process to an AVF away from the draft system will be ignored. In other words, all current draftees/enlistees will be considered as all volunteer active military members. Therefore, enlistment bonuses will also be ignored since it will not be realistic to recruit all military members at the same time.

- With the establishment of an AVF system, not all of the eligible manpower pool will be recruited—only enough volunteers to meet manpower needs. Therefore, a significant reduction in the number of enlistees will occur. However, since deciding on the number of enlistees is strategic and should be made by the Chief of Staff, the same number of current active military personnel, which is 442,000 as stated in Chapter-II, will be assumed to be the worst case scenario from a cost perspective.

- The monthly salary of an enlisted will be assumed to be the lowest monthly salary of a civilian government employee which is $600 as of 2007.\(^{82}\)

- The monthly salary of a draftee will be assumed to be zero since it is considered pocket money and quite small.

- Training expenses will be regarded as fixed since they have been incurred in the draft system as well. These would also be less in an AVF because of a decreased number of enlistees.

- Accession processing expenses will also be regarded as fixed since they have been incurred in the draft system as well. These would also be less in an AVF because of a decreased number of enlistees.

Under these assumptions, the annual payroll costs of an AVF in Turkey can roughly be estimated at $3.2 billion.

However, another consideration is the tax revenues of these salaries, which should be considered as savings from the AVF. Based on their income level, enlistees will be in the lower tax proportion which is roughly 15% in Turkey. Therefore, net payroll costs of enlistees will be $2.7 billion.

2. Other Cost Considerations

a. Advertising Costs

Advertising is critical to recruiting efforts because convincing young adults to join the military is difficult. The U.S. Department of Defense has been trying to convince more than 200,000 people each year to join the military. To assist in recruiting, the military services advertise on television, on radio, and in print and participate in promotional activities. The total U.S. Department of Defense advertising budget for fiscal year 2004 was $592.8 million\textsuperscript{83} while the total defense budget was approximately $380 billion\textsuperscript{84} at that time which accounts for 0.1% of the total defense budget.

Turkey’s defense budget is approximately 3.3% of the GDP as of 2007\textsuperscript{85} which is $15.4 billion. Thus, from the standpoint of the U.S. example, and assuming that 0.1% of the total defense budget will be spent on recruitment advertising costs, they can roughly be estimated as $15.4 million annually for Turkey. However, considering the income levels compared to those of the United States and the eligible manpower pool, which is approximately 26 million in Turkey, this model can be considered a worst case scenario like the model used to estimate payroll costs.

b. Medical Expenses

Analyzing medical expenses in the two scenarios, an AVF vs. a Draft, is very complicated and should be considered a future research topic. However, it is highly


likely that there will be a significant decrease in terms of the burden that the government bears with an AVF since the government compensates all medical expenses under the current draft system in Turkey. Therefore, there is ample incentive for draftees to visit doctors, even for minor problems (for which they would not normally visit a doctor).

However, in the case of an AVF, since enlistees themselves will likely pay a fraction (perhaps 20%) of their medical expenses, which is the rate for government employees in Turkey, that would create incentives leading to a decrease in medical expenses.

c. Training Expenses

Training expenses can be regarded as fixed since they are incurred in both the Draft and AVF systems. However, they certainly are going to be less eventually in an AVF option because of a decreased number of enlistees.

d. Accession Processing Expenses

Accession processing expenses can be regarded as fixed since they are incurred in both the Draft and AVF systems. However, they certainly are going to be less eventually in an AVF option because of a decreased number of enlistees.

C. OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF CURRENT DRAFT SYSTEM

Opportunity (economic) cost is the cost stated in terms of the benefits from an opportunity foregone, or the most valuable forgone alternative (generally the second best alternative). Generally, opportunity costs are assessed in monetary terms, but can also be assessed in terms of anything that is of value to those doing the assessing. The measurement of opportunity costs is explained in detail in Chapter III. If assumed numbers are applied to Figure 6 below,

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86 Cooper Richard, Military Manpower and the All Volunteer Force, (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1977), 69.
Figure 6. Supply Curve Analysis for Military Manpower Pool

\[ W1 = \text{Annual income of a draftee} = 0, \]
\[ W2 = \text{Annual income of an enlisted} = $7200, \]
\[ B = \text{Required eligible manpower pool for military service} = 442,000 \text{ (Demand)} \]
\[ a = \text{Number of people willing to serve in the military if } W1 \text{ is paid. (It is expected to be 0 in Turkey's case since } W1 \text{ is assumed to be 0.)} \]

Therefore, the entire area below the supply curve will be the opportunity cost of the draft system in Turkey, which is $1.6 billion annually.

Moreover, in an AVF manpower requirements decrease, and skilled (rather than numerous) personnel are needed. Thus, the AVF process becomes more efficient for society as a whole. Therefore, in order to find the best level for both the government and individuals, it is necessary to meet the equilibrium, which is the intersection of supply and demand curves where no deadweight loss occurs and social gain is at maximum.

D. CONSCRIPTION TAX

The military draft can be regarded as a tax on both the present and the future earnings of the draftees. The discounted value of this tax can be interpreted as a human
capital burden which alters the stock of human capital from what it would have been in the absence of the draft. For this reason, the comparison of draft forces with alternative manpower acquisitions has centered on the AVF where the conscription tax is zero.

Conscription tax is basically the difference between the individual draftees’ military wages and the wages they desire to join a volunteer based military. Cooper states that the conscription tax is a means of income redistribution at the expense of the male individuals who have to serve in the military.87

If the model built in Chapter-III is applied to the current draft system in Turkey, the resulted situation is depicted in Figure 7 below,

\[
\text{Figure 7. Conscription Tax Visualization}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
S1 & = \text{Number of enlisted military personnel required} = 442,000 \\
W1 & = \text{Annual income to attract } S1 \text{ amount of enlisted personnel} = $7200 \\
W2 & = \text{Current annual income} = 0 \\
A & = \text{Conscription tax}
\end{align*}
\]

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Therefore, specifically in the case of Turkey, the entire area below the supply curve until S1 will be equal to the conscription tax, which is $1.6 billion annually.
V. CONCLUSION

A. BRIEF SUMMARY

This project has provided a Draft versus an All Volunteer Forces case analysis for the Turkish Armed Forces by evaluating the feasibility of the implementation of an AVF in the Turkish Armed Forces.

Chapter II presented an extensive background and literature review focusing on past and present Drafts and All Volunteer Forces.

Chapter III highlighted the strategic situation in which Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces has been facing in terms of national security issues.

Chapter IV discussed and presented a preliminary assessment of the All Volunteer Forces in the Turkish Armed Forces from an economic standpoint.

Finally, Chapter V discussed the conclusions of the research and study, proposed recommendations and potential areas for further research.

B. WHAT TO DO?

Previous chapters have provided the necessary data and information for a Draft versus an All Volunteer Forces (AVF) case analysis for the Turkish Armed Forces by evaluating the feasibility of implementing an AVF in the Turkish Armed Forces.

Drawing upon the information and data about the economy and national security, environment and its relation, we have compared the conscripted forces in place in Turkey with all volunteer forces (as found, for example in the United States). Those chapters have defined the specific cost elements of both models and helped assess the benefits or efficiencies, as well as the disadvantages of the AVF. Moreover, they have discussed Turkey’s military manpower needs for the 21st century as well as the methods of recruiting (and retaining) those manpower resources -in context of Turkey’s current economic and national security environment.
The post-Cold War security environment has significantly changed the threats against Turkey. Today, in addition to the classical homeland defense mission, the Turkish Armed Forces must also successfully engage in asymmetric warfare, such as counter-terrorism, prevention of smuggling and multinational military operations.

Furthermore, rapidly advancing technology has greatly complicated the battlefield environment. This makes even more difficult the operation of new complicated and hi-tech weapon systems in the Turkish Armed Forces’ inventory. Gaining the needed proficiencies for effective military operations requires longer and more expensive training periods—especially for uneducated and untrained draftees.

Certainly, one of the major means to meet these new requirements is to recruit well educated and trained specialists for the military with All Volunteer Forces as one means of doing that.

Indeed after the Cold War, the Turkish Armed Forces have considered these needs and highlighted the recruitment of specialists. In this light, new laws and regulations have enabled the recruitment of specialist sergeants and contracted officers, especially in the technical and critical fields discussed in Chapter II.

Furthermore, from an economic standpoint (based on the cost elements analyzed and discussed), it can be concluded that an All Volunteer Forces fits into the contemporary Turkish economy as well. Moreover, when opportunity costs and the conscription taxes are considered, the draft is arguably hurting the Turkish economy and the well being of the Turkish people.

However, there are significant concerns over the transition to an All Volunteer Armed Forces in Turkey. First of all, a structural change to an All Volunteer Armed Forces will certainly lead to significant personnel reductions in the armed forces. In consideration of the security environment which Turkey has experienced since the end of the Cold War, such reductions in the armed forces might be taken as sign of weakness. However, this problem can be alleviated by acquiring more modern weapon systems, keeping the inventory up-to-date.
On the other hand, regardless of economic and national security issues, the military nation ideal is a significant concern from a socio-cultural standpoint. Most of the draftees perceive military service as a duty in terms of the nationalist government mentality, established at the very beginning of the Turkish Republic.

Therefore, a transition to an All Volunteer Armed Forces from a draft would certainly not be an easy process. The best strategy for a transition would likely involve proceeding step by step. For example, establishment of a joint force with officers, petty officers and specialist sergeants that the Turkish Armed Forces already has, can be a good point which to start. Such a pilot brigade can be observed and compared to a similar brigade with the exact same mission, efficiencies and differences.

Secondly, new laws and regulations should be put into effect in order to enable the recruitment of specialist volunteers—primarily a political issue. Also, from an economic standpoint, as already discussed in Chapters II and IV, a significant surplus of draftees exists in Turkey, and when the population and expectations regarding said population are observed in Chapter III, this surplus is expected to increase. Thus, another action should be personnel cutbacks in terms of soldiers, especially draftees. This would have the additional advantage of enabling additional basing and support structure reductions based on cost and benefit considerations.

Finally, to diminish the perception of All Volunteer Forces as mercenaries, citizens should be well informed through the use of the press. These measures would both improve general knowledge of the AVF issue and facilitate recruiting volunteers for military service.

In this study, significant elements regarding both the feasibility and transition to an All Volunteer Armed Forces in Turkey were analyzed together with other concerns. All these things considered, it can be concluded that an AVF is a viable policy option for Turkey now, and may well be a necessity in the near future, as the Turkish security environment changes, as the armed forces move increasingly to high-tech systems, and as the economy continues to grow.
However, there are certainly more issues to consider before reaching a final decision regarding a Turkish AVF. Some of them were left out in this study, due to its focus on the economic issues, that is, those remaining issues should be deeply researched and analyzed. These include the following:

- A more accurate determination of opportunity costs of draftees, specifically the ones with high education and prospects for high income
- The full cost of draftees, to include shelter, food, medical care, training, and the inefficiencies associated with less-skilled personnel.

Most importantly, there should be a careful analysis of the comparative effectiveness of the AVF and draft forces in 21st century military operations.
APPENDIX. TURKISH DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

A. TURKEY’S NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

The threats and risks directed at Turkey's security in the post-Cold War period are rather different from those in the past.

At the end of the Cold War and the struggle between blocks, there was a search for a new world order directed at globalization, which also changed the concepts of threat. While the concept of threat was previously evident and large at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has become multi-directional, multi-dimensional and variable and instabilities dominate the environment. The traditional concept of threat has now started to contain new threats and risks emerging in the form of:

- Regional and ethnic conflicts,
- Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties in the countries,
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles,
- Religious fundamentalism,
- Smuggling of drugs and all kinds of weapons and
- International terrorism.

Turkey is located at the center of the triangle formed by the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, where the new threats and risks are concentrated. Turkey is in a region where the interests of the global powers and formations intersect. This situation, stemming from Turkey's geostrategic location, has not changed until the present and will not change in the twenty-first century. It is evaluated that the importance and place of Turkey in the new world order will become even more strengthened.
Turkey's Defense Policy is directed at defense due to her natural characteristics and is prepared to protect and preserve national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country. For that reason, the following are the targets of Turkey in her National Defense Policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century as a requirement of the period:

- To contribute to peace and security in the region and to spread this to large areas,
- To become a country producing strategy and security that could influence all the strategies aimed at her region and beyond,
- To become an element of power and balance in her region and
- To make use of every opportunity and take initiatives for cooperation, becoming closer and developing positive relations.

The basic principles of the Defense policy determined in the framework of the principle, “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” set forth by Atatürk, are as follows:

- To make a maximum contribution to reducing all kinds of international tensions and provision of just and lasting peace,
- To preserve and protect independence, territorial integrity and the republic,
- To take all measures to prevent crises and conflicts and
- To take an active part in collective defense systems and to fulfill the responsibilities entrusted to it.

B. TURKEY’S MILITARY STRATEGY

Turkey's Military Strategy contains four important matters to be able to support the specified defense policy.

1. Deterrence

Maintaining a military force that will provide a deterrent influence on the centers of risk and threat in the environment of instability and uncertainty surrounding Turkey constitutes the foundation of the National Military Strategy.
2. **Military Contribution to Crisis Management and Intervention in Crises**

In the crises concerning Turkey's security, for the peaceful solution of the disagreements in conformity with the diplomatic, economic and other crisis management measures, for the Turkish Armed Forces to be ready to contribute to reducing tension, preventing them from transforming into armed conflicts or restricting the aggressor, is one of the most important elements of its strategy.

The contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces to the international efforts for the solution of crises threatening peace and stability within the United Nations and Alliances to which it is a party, in connection with political decisions along with the crises in its region and to be ready to preserve, establish and maintain world peace are also in the lead among the subjects that cannot be relinquished.

3. **Forward Defense**

To be able to determine as soon as possible the scope of a probable aggression and when subjected to an actual external aggression, the principle of stopping this aggression constitutes the foundation of forward defense.

4. **Collective Security**

Active participation in international and regional alliances/organizations existing, with NATO and the WEU in the lead, and those being formed, such as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), continues to be one of the basic elements of the Turkish National Military Strategy.

To contribute with military forces to international organizations, alliances and related states in accordance with the national security and foreign policy of Turkey, continuation of providing cooperation, technical assistance and training related to military subjects constitute the basis of Turkey's collective security concept.
The formation of a force structure conforming to the defense policy and strategy, of which the main principles are summarized above, is of great importance. For Turkey to attain a military power having the resources and capabilities of supporting the National Security Policy of Turkey, which is subject to multifaceted threats due to her geopolitical and geostrategic position, maintaining and developing this force according to the requirements of the conditions and the period, constitute the basis for Turkey's Defense Policy and Strategy in the twenty-first century.88

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