International training for peace support operations: models, assessments, and implications

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INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: MODELS, ASSESSMENTS, AND IMPLICATIONS

by

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March 2002

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In the decade following the Cold War, the frequency and complexity of United Nations-mandated Peace Support Operations (PSO) significantly increased. Consequently, international, regional, and national organizations developed various training programs to prepare military personnel for diverse mission requirements. This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of PSO training by examining the United Nations international model, the regional approach of the Nordic Countries, and national training programs of the Canadian Forces, the German Armed Forces, and the United States Military. Based on strengths and weaknesses of these models, this research identifies significant criteria and implications for developing a viable, institutionalized PSO training program in the United States Military.

This study draws the following conclusions: The United Nations lacks a unifying doctrine for PSO and associated training required to coordinate subordinate programs among Member States and regional organizations effectively; The Nordic coordination program for PSO training at the regional level represents a unified commitment to promote interoperability and knowledge management for future missions; The United States Military lacks an institutionalized PSO training program to meet long-term operational requirements at the tactical level for individuals and units.
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ABSTRACT

In the decade following the Cold War, the frequency and complexity of United Nations-mandated Peace Support Operations (PSO) significantly increased. Consequently, international, regional, and national organizations developed various training programs to prepare military personnel for diverse mission requirements.

This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of PSO training by examining the United Nations international model, the regional approach of the Nordic Countries, and national training programs of the Canadian Forces, the German Armed Forces, and the United States Military. Based on strengths and weaknesses of these models, this research identifies significant criteria and implications for developing a viable, institutionalized PSO training program in the United States Military.

This study draws the following conclusions: The United Nations lacks a unifying doctrine for PSO and associated training required to coordinate subordinate programs among Member States and regional organizations effectively; The Nordic coordinated program for PSO training at the regional level represents a unified commitment to promote interoperability and knowledge management for future missions; The United States Military lacks an institutionalized PSO training program to meet long-term operational requirements at the tactical level for individuals and units.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM

In the decade following the Cold War, the frequency of Peace Support Operations (PSO) mandated by the United Nations increased tactical level training requirements to prepare both individuals and units for various operations. Further, deficiencies in United Nations operations within Somalia during 1993 compelled many nations and regional organizations to either enhance pre-existing training programs or establish specific PSO training centers. However, without an institutionalized PSO training program, the United States military continues to lack adequate tactical-level training.

B. OBJECTIVES

This research presents a comparative analysis of several PSO training programs at the international, regional, and national levels to identify criteria and curricular components essential for developing a tactical level PSO training program in the U.S. Military. Specifically, in addition to examining the UN model for PSO training at the international level, this research analyzes several Euro-Atlantic PSO training perspectives by examining the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) regional organization and the national training programs of the Canadian Forces, the German Armed Forces, and the U.S. Military. Further, training program criteria are utilized to identify training program strengths and weaknesses of these models. Although a specific PSO training curriculum for the U.S. Military is not prescribed, this research identifies critical criteria for developing a viable program by examining commonalities, strengths, and weaknesses of pre-existing models.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Primary research question: Upon completing a comparative assessment of several PSO training models, what curricular considerations, educational areas, and instructional methodologies are pertinent to a tactical level PSO training program in the U.S. Military?
Secondary research questions:

1. How many PSO training models currently exist throughout the world?

2. What organizations are responsible for developing and implementing PSO training programs within selected countries? Are the programs centralized in the form of joint training or decentralized by service departments?

3. What are the curricular components of current PSO training programs?
   - Residential versus distance learning
   - Degree/certificate completion
   - Length of curriculum
   - Balance of general and specific/contextual training
   - Other

4. What training methodologies, such as simulation, classroom instruction, and electronic learning, are being utilized to provide instruction?

5. How have national strategies, cultural sensitivities, lessons learned, and other factors contributed to the development of PSO training models?

D. RESEARCH SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS

This study does not seek to identify and prescribe a specific curriculum for an “ideal” PSO training model within the U.S. Military. However, through a comparative analysis of several pre-existing training models, the researcher seeks to identify organizational structures, curricular components, and essential relationships for developing an effective training model.

Research limitations developed primarily from time constraints for obtaining specific information concerning each training model. Further, when communicating and coordinating with representatives from PSO training programs in other countries, language complications, in terms of written translations and the availability of applicable data, limited the scope of analysis. While general information and historical references could be obtained from the library and Internet resources, specific curricula content and training methodologies for each organization required extensive research and follow-up. Ideally, as completed in first-hand observations of
the Canadian Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) program, the researcher would obtain the most accurate and realistic data through observations of all selected training models. However, time constraints and funding deficiencies limited the collection of participatory, onsite data.

With respect to environmental factors, this research assumes that political, social, and economic factors affect the development of PSO training programs within their larger organizations, whether at the international, regional, or national level. Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations provided in this research focus on a specific aspect of PSO training—improving performance of personnel and units at the tactical level of PSO. Repercussions in other areas of training or within the overall system are not formally examined.

E. BACKGROUND

Following the Cold War, Peace Support Operations (PSO) changed considerably in their nature and complexity; likewise, military training requirements for personnel involved in such operations evolved and developed. In the case of Operation Restore Hope, which took place in Somalia from 1992 to 1993, military contingents became entangled in a bloody civil war while providing humanitarian assistance to the local populace. In March of 1993, 21 countries were participating in a UN peacekeeping force dedicated to providing humanitarian relief and promoting nation building. However, following the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers by belligerent Somalis, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution to capture those responsible for the crimes and bring them to justice. Further, the mission focused on the capture of General Aidid, a dominant clan leader, who criticized UN efforts. As the UN mandate changed, the Somali people perceived certain contingents of the multi-national force, most notably the United States and its subordinate units, as aggressors. Actually, military units that were once respected and admired were no longer viewed as impartial peacekeepers. Serving as Director of Operations, General Anthony Zinni, USMC, stated “(Military units) were no longer in peace enforcement or peacekeeping...(they were) in a counter-insurgency or some form of war” (“Ambush in Mogadishu”). Then, as the hunt for General Aidid continued, 18 U.S. Army Rangers were ambushed and killed on October 3, 1993 during a hotel raid to capture the warlord and his lieutenants. Ultimately, the dynamics of PSO in Somalia represent only a fraction of the complexities facing military personnel assigned as modern-day peacekeepers. Therefore,
training models for PSO require flexible, yet standardized, curricular components to prepare service members for such missions.

Currently, the United Nations and the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, are further enhancing their respective PSO training programs to prepare for future missions. Also, from a Euro-Atlantic perspective, the Canadian Forces and the German Armed Forces continue to develop their own national programs, while strengthening relations with other PSO training organizations. However, the United States Military has not established an institutionalized program for conducting PSO training at the tactical level for individuals and units. Further, the New York Times reported that the Army Peacekeeping Institute, which develops U.S. Military PSO doctrine and maintains liaison with international peace organizations, might close (“Army May Shut Peacekeeping Office” 12 Mar. 2002). While this organization does not directly address tactical-level training issues, it symbolizes a commitment to long-standing peace within the international community. Additionally, the Army Peacekeeping Institute could play an integral role in developing and overseeing training programs at the individual and contingent levels.

F. METHODOLOGY

1. Overview

This section discusses the research methodology used to identify criteria and curricular components essential for further developing tactical level PSO training for U.S. Forces. Rather than limiting the research to national programs, aspects of regional and international training were examined as well. Specifically, national PSO training models of the United States Army, the Canadian Armed Forces, and the German Military were studied. Additionally, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) were examined at the regional and international levels, respectively.

Initially, the background chapter developed a framework to identify requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes of military personnel designated for PSO. Subsequently, based on specified training program criteria, a comparative analysis of the training models was conducted. Finally, based on commonalities, strengths, and weaknesses of current training models, this research
identified critical considerations for examining alternative PSO models for the U.S. Armed Forces; however, a specific curriculum for a U.S. Military PSO training program was not prescribed.

2. **Research Design**

This research utilized a case study analysis to assess and compare PSO training programs at the national, regional, and international levels. For this exploratory study, methods of inquiry and data collection included the following:

1. Archival research. Training program materials and documentation were obtained from books, academic studies, Internet web sites, and multimedia sources.

2. Informal discussions with staff members of the selected PSO training programs and associated subject matter experts (SME) provided further information.

3. Participatory observation. First-hand, observational data pertinent to the Canadian Forces model was obtained by attending a one-week basic PSO course at the PSTC, Canadian Forces Base Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Contextual information, such as student class participation, motivation, and interactions with staff members, provided additional insight into the academic model. In addition to course materials and documentation, demographic data for student attendees were obtained for 717 personnel who attended one of 27 course sessions in 2001. However, statistical findings related to these participants cannot be considered a random sample among all students who received training sponsored by the PSTC. Comparable participant demographic data could not be obtained from the other training models examined.

4. Informal interviews. Depending upon the model, phone interviews, e-mail correspondence, and onsite dialogue with instructors, program managers, and command representatives provided relevant data.

For conducting the comparative analysis, training program data were qualitatively examined with respect to the following criteria/characteristics:

1. Mandate
In addition to historical overviews, the training programs were analyzed based on curricular characteristics, such as program duration, training locations, instructor requirements, implementation of training standards, and methods of training feedback and evaluation.

Rather than determining the “success” of these PSO training programs, this thesis focuses on exploring practical and effective means of improving PSO training for U.S. Military personnel. Therefore, this research does not conduct a quantitative assessment in comparing training models. Perhaps, in this regard, further research could examine the occurrence of casualties among personnel who completed different training programs. From a military perspective, limiting the loss of personnel is extremely important to both the deployed unit and its country of origin. However, the desired end state of establishing or maintaining long-standing peace may not be correlated with such quantitative measures. Also, comparing personnel performance with respect to training programs completed would be extremely difficult considering the vast number of variables related to factors at the strategic and operational levels, such as force size and degree of participation in various missions. Ultimately, the “success” of a PSO training program does not correspond to commonplace measures of productivity or cost-savings. Alternatively, PSO training should result in learning among individual participants, while the military organization maintains stability in the mission area. Ultimately, diplomatic measures seek success through either achieving relative peace or maintaining societal security.

G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II provides a literature review of United Nations PSO, including functions/types of missions, training fundamentals, and an overview of personnel roles, required knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) of participants, and task differentiation.
Chapter III presents data on the United Nations model for PSO training, primarily focusing on the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Chapter IV presents data on the Nordic Countries regional model for PSO training, specifically the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) program.

Chapter V presents data on the Canadian Forces model for PSO training by examining the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) designated for preparing military personnel for PSO.

Chapter VI presents data on the German Armed Forces model, focusing on the German UN Training Center within the German Infantry School.

Chapter VII presents data on the U.S. Military model for PSO training, specifically focusing on the Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site under the U.S. Army Infantry School.

Chapter VIII assesses data collected from the PSO training programs through a comparative analysis of specific program criteria.

Chapter IX addresses the initial research questions, while providing conclusions and recommendations generated from the analysis. Additionally, implications for future research are identified.
II. OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A. NATURE AND TYPES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A state of peace, as it relates to social interaction, has been defined in several ways to include: 1) “freedom from war or civil strife, 2) “freedom from public disturbance or disorder; public security; law and order”, or 3) “freedom from disagreement from quarrels; harmony; concord” (Webster’s New World Dictionary). Apart from envisioning a mythical Utopian society, peace is often described in relative terms from various perspectives. Despite a lack of consensus in defining and identifying peace, Peace Support Operations (PSO) are conducted either to maintain the current level of peace or to facilitate the development of peace, while diplomatic means are sought to resolve the underlying causes of conflict. In recent years, the nature of PSO has shifted from predominantly peacekeeping requirements, such as those identified in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, to a wider range of complex operations, covering a broad spectrum of conflict intensity levels. As a consequence, the UN recognizes five different types of PSO (UN CD-ROM).

1. Preventive Diplomacy (PD)-action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of conflicts if they occur

2. Peace-making (PM)-diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement through such peaceful means as those referenced under Chapter VI of the UN Charter

3. Peacekeeping (PK)-a UN presence that normally involves both military and civilian personnel with the consent of the conflicting parties, to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (ceasefires, separation of forces, etc.) and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) or to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian relief

4. Peace enforcement (PE)-needed when all other efforts fail; authorization of enforcement prescribed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; includes the use of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations in which the security
council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression

5. Peace building (PB)-critical in the aftermath of conflict; includes the identification and support of measures and structures which will promote peace and build trust and interaction among former enemies, in order to avoid a relapse into conflict

From the terminology and definitions presented above, the spectrum of PSO can be best understood as a blurred continuum, as depicted in Figure 1.¹

![Figure 1. Peace Operations Continuum](image)

These operations differ significantly from the nature of war fighting, which utilizes the application of military force as an extension of foreign policy. UN guidelines state that peacekeeping is incompatible with the use of force (other than in cases of self defense), such as that necessitated in peace enforcement (UN CD-ROM). Furthermore, according to UN guidelines, peace support operations should not transition from one operational type to another

like amalgamous points on a continuum. However, an undesirable shift in UN operational type may occur based on changes in posture or status between disputing parties, regardless of UN intentions and strategic goals. Ironically, under exceptional circumstances, UN operations may be mandated to concurrently carry out both PK and PE operations in a single mission area.

Whether supported by the interests of individual nations or under UN authority, military units assigned to PSO are not directed to “seek out, close with, and destroy” an enemy force. In contrast, military forces serve as facilitators and mediators in fostering/maintaining peace. Therefore, training requirements to support PSO must remain flexible and responsive to ambiguous, often precarious, situations. Finally, PSO types vary significantly across missions, so training programs may be designed to emphasize a certain section of the PSO continuum. For example, in the disputed Golan Heights area between Israel and Syria, traditional peacekeeping principles may apply to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) personnel, while peace enforcement techniques may be required for other missions. Ultimately, military units deployed to any mission should be aware of other PSO types, since operations could escalate or deescalate with respect to the application of military force.

B. EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

As described in Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, traditional peacekeeping occurs with the consent of disputing parties and is carried out by a neutral and lightly armed contingent. Further, force is authorized only in self-defense, since a ceasefire agreement is typically in effect between belligerent groups. The objective of such a mission is to sustain peace while diplomatic efforts resolve the underlying conflict. Military personnel may be assigned to observer missions or unit-sized forces may be involved. A long-standing example of traditional PK is the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), initiated by a disagreement between Greeks and Turks over control of the island (UN CD-ROM). According to the United Nations, these “Chapter 6” missions are generally classified into one of three categories (UN CD-ROM):

1. Supervision activity—refers primarily to a military observer mission; verifying, supervising, and monitoring

2. Interpositioning—placing UN military units/observers between warring parties to prevent recurrence of fighting
3. Humanitarian assistance (relatively new)-refugee relief, monitoring human rights, and demining

Further, traditional peacekeeping is based on the following principles (Last 45):

1. Impartiality of the force
2. Consent of the belligerents (disputing parties)
3. Minimum use of force
4. Clarity of mission purpose

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 and the termination of Cold War hostilities, “second generation” PSO emerged that sought to implement and oversee a political settlement already accepted by the parties of a dispute. In addition to traditional PK duties, such as those required for the UNFICYP mission, UN PSO duties expanded to include organizing elections, disarming guerrilla forces, providing law enforcement, resettling refugees, and giving humanitarian relief. (Benton 38-39) Instead of waiting for hostilities to occur between disputing parties, preventive deployments occurred as an anticipatory type of UN mission designed to prevent armed conflict from occurring (UN CD-ROM). UN deployments to Macedonia and the former Yugoslav Republic are examples. In the late 1980’s, the UN undertook unprecedented missions that focused on implementing comprehensive settlements by supervising ceasefires, demobilizing/regrouping military forces, and conducting various activities to restore societal functions (UN CD-ROM). UN operations in Namibia and Mozambique were two such missions. Finally, the UN played a critical role in overseeing and ensuring the conduct of humanitarian missions in the midst of ongoing struggles between disputing parties (UN CD-ROM). While humanitarian missions appeared quite simple in terms of delivering rations and supplies to suffering individuals, belligerent struggles led to turmoil in both Yugoslavia and Somalia PSO.

According to Findlay, peacekeepers of today are typically involved in intra-state wars, such as the long-standing civil wars endured by Mozambique and Angola; such civil conflicts of this nature were not traditionally engaged by the UN (13). Further, current PSO are typically characterized by either limited or non-existent consent from the conflicting parties for a UN presence and its activities (Findlay 13). Although modern PSO vary in nature and type, troop-contributing Member States of the United Nations have learned that peacekeeping (PK) does not
equal peace enforcement (PE) (Benton 39). Even if peace enforcement does not develop out of a PK mission, new PK are more likely to use force, if only in either self-defense or defense of the mission (Findlay 29). Ultimately, Findlay describes the delicate balance as follows, “The proper use of force is critical in a peace operation. The use of force to attain a short-term tactical success could lead to a long-term strategic failure…. commanders should regard the use of force as a last resort.” (28)

C. REASONS FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS GROWTH

Following the Cold War, the U.S. and former Soviet Union began to participate in numerous PSO. Between 1988 and 1992, 13 PKO were initiated, which equaled the entire number undertaken during the 40-year existence of the UN (Jett 9). Paradoxically, the Cold War had actually deterred and stifled many smaller, regional conflicts; civil wars within these “new” nations and associated instability increased significantly. Along these same lines, the nature of armed conflict shifted from an East-West rivalry to myriad asymmetrical conflicts. Intra-nation struggles escalated between rebels and untrained armies, utilizing light weapons, guerilla tactics, and terrorism. Concurrently, the number of civilian casualties in war increased from 73% in the 1970’s to nearly 90% in 1990; a proportional increase in refugees necessitated greater humanitarian assistance (Jett 9). Next, humanitarian concerns stimulated the need for PSO. Rather than either taking no action or resorting to military force, humanitarian relief efforts, as part of PSO, were elevated to a higher level of importance within the international arena (Jett 10). Finally, advanced information technology allowed the media to disseminate information worldwide in a matter of minutes. Personnel images, ranging from senior government officials to the lowest ranking military member, could be immediately broadcasted. Such global communications gained the attention of numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which affected both the political climate and the tactical scene in the proliferation of PSO.

D. PARTICIPANTS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.”—Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold (FM 100-23, 1)
The key participants in PSO are military contingents from individual nations, regional/international organizations, governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, disputing parties to the conflict, and the local populace. With respect to the military component, personnel represent various rank levels and years of experience. Further, they may be reservists, such as those common to Scandinavian countries, or predominantly career soldiers, such as those from Canada or Ireland (Benton 87).

E. LEVELS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

In addition to the numerous types of PSO, planning, developing, and implementing such operations occurs at three separate, yet interrelated, levels:

1. **Strategic**: The UN, Member States, and non-state actors seek to contain, moderate, and resolve hostilities through diplomatic, economic, and military means; deterrence and coercion may be utilized to de-escalate conflicts; strategic decisions set the overall structure in which the operational and tactical levels function (Last 3)

2. **Operational**: Strategic goals are transformed by a force headquarters into a strategy of third party intervention that consists of forces to control and prevent violence; campaign planning at the operational level sets the framework for success in the prevention, containment, and moderation of violence at the tactical level; a tenet of peacekeeping involves avoiding violent conflict while facilitating de-escalation between disputing parties (Last 4)

3. **Tactical**: Units and staff members interact with the belligerents and the civilian populace to prevent further violence and to rebuild normal life, including a return to peaceful social relations (Last 4)

Accordingly, when developing PSO training programs, three basic levels of education must be considered from the highest to lowest echelons (UN CD-ROM):

1. **Strategic**: Required for individuals and institutions involved in shaping or influencing policies and goals at the international, regional, and national levels
2. **Operational**: Applicable to those personnel responsible for developing and implementing operational concepts and plans that will accomplish the UN mandate for a PK² mission; along with developing staff and managerial skills, training methods are explained.

3. **Tactical**: Conducted for units, teams, and individuals designated for or likely to be assigned to a PK mission.

F. **TASKS AND TECHNIQUES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

At the tactical level of PSO, personnel must be trained in accurate and impartial observation methods to obtain information about disputing parties and the operational environment. Static and mobile techniques for gathering information are commonly utilized; static forms consist of positions and observation posts, while mobile types are associated with patrolling, inspections, and investigations. Additionally, for peacekeeping operations, disputing parties must be supervised to ensure adherence to agreements concerning ceasefires, separation of forces, disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation of military personnel. (UN CD-ROM)

Within sectors of responsibility established at the operational level, military leaders at the tactical level use guards and checkpoints to monitor, limit, or deny access to their areas. Personnel assigned as guards require specific training to ensure tact, courtesy, and professionalism are maintained when interacting with the local populace. Although civilian police normally conduct crowd control, military personnel may be utilized in certain cases; the use of force, if required, should only be applied at the minimum level necessary to restore order. Frequently, military units are tasked as interposition forces to separate opposing factions and maintain peace. If utilized as a short-term means to quell a potential conflict, control measures and interpositions must be quickly followed by negotiations with the disputing parties. Paradoxically, while negotiations are sought, an immediate buildup of military force may effectively deter a conflict from escalating.

At every level of PSO—strategic, operational, and tactical—liaison between PSO representatives and disputing parties must be maintained for the purposes of negotiation and mediation. At the strategic level, policy makers and senior leadership should keep open lines of communication, while personnel at the operational and tactical levels maintain close, daily

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² Peacekeeping principles are addressed throughout UN guidelines; other types of PSO lack substantial reference.
contact with counterparts in the area of operations. For example, while diplomats strive to reach an agreement concerning overall peace, soldiers may need to negotiate with local leaders for freedom of movement in a certain area. Given the nature of PSO, a clear and efficient command and control structure is critical for communicating between the strategic, operational, and tactical command levels. While diplomats and politicians attempt to set an agenda for issues at the strategic level, military personnel involved at the operational and tactical levels must clearly understand the mission mandate and their associated duties (UN CD-ROM). Also, the need to carefully control and manage public information is essential at every level of PSO. In certain cases, disputing parties or the local populace may actually disseminate false information for propaganda purposes.

At the operational level of PSO, sectors of responsibility across geographical areas of operations may be assigned to military commanders. In turn, these sectors, often unique due to conflicts among the local populace and geographical features, are typically subdivided and allocated to subordinate leaders for oversight (UN CD-ROM).

G. TRAINING NEEDS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

While decisions and actions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of PSO directly impact each other, this research focuses on tactical level training programs for personnel assigned to mission areas. Despite variations in PSO types and related requirements, the roles of the modern peacekeeper have been categorized as administrator, mediator, and guarantor (Findlay 17-18). In addition to background information about the UN, the nature of PSO, and administrative requirements, training should be conducted in the following areas (UN CD-ROM):

1. Weapons Familiarity and Training
   - Completing training, range practicing, and testing of personal/crew-served weapons systems
   - Gaining familiarity with weapons, vehicles, and equipment being used in the area of operations
• Obtaining requisite knowledge of Night Vision Equipment (NVE), ground radars, and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) warfare

• Increasing knowledge of mine types, recognition of mined areas, and reactionary skills when mines are encountered

• Completing realistic field exercises that incorporate actual weapons in likely scenarios (use of sound effect simulators, engineer demolitions, and other special effects)

2. General Military Training Areas

• Continuing physical training to ensure troops are able to perform over extended operations and under specific climatic and geographical conditions

• Advancing map reading skills and general knowledge of the mission area

• Promulgating communication techniques for the unit’s radio net

• Completing first aid, hygiene, and sanitation instruction

3. Training in UN Operating Techniques

• Occupying tactical positions established as checkpoints, road-blocks, or other operations; manning observation posts or temporary positions

• Controlling movement and checking vehicles/pedestrians at static or mobile checkpoints/road blocks; conducting searches

• Learning the aims of patrolling; conducting various types of patrols, such as vehicle and foot-mobile

• Conducting operational investigations and completing required reports (most applicable to military police and officers)

• Negotiating with members of a disputing party or the local populace (common at checkpoints); mediating a dispute between representatives from opposing parties (usually conducted at the operational or tactical level); maintaining non-partisan liaison/communication with disputing parties

• Understanding the definition of force, principles of using authorized force, and application techniques
• Communicating with the media; maintaining media relations

4. Safety Measures and Precautions
• Setting up shelters for force protection and conducting operations
• Wearing appropriate personal protection equipment, such as steel/Kevlar helmets, fragmentation vests, and NBC suits
• Traveling procedures/restrictions within the area of operations
• Completing anti-hijacking drills
• Utilizing non-operational safety measures to reduce instances of suicide, fires, or other health concerns

5. Specialized Training Areas (may be required for unique missions or observers)
• Completing a driving skills test (primarily for military observers and service support personnel)
• Preparing for PKO helicopter operations in reconnaissance, logistics support, medical evacuations, or tactical lift
• Training for staff members in UN procedures and reporting
• Completing Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Explosives Ordnance Removal (EOR) instruction for qualified personnel

In addition to familiarization with weapons systems and equipment in the area of operations, understanding reactionary measures for mines and booby traps must be deeply engrained.

While the success of PSO depends upon factors at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, military personnel serving in the mission area require a robust skill set for peace operations, which focuses on interpersonal abilities and critical thinking. Concurrently, they must maintain proficiency in combat-related skills through effective, consistent, and continuous training. While traditional military war fighting and PSO roles share many similarities, the greatest distinction exists in the level interaction required by military personnel with the local populace, UN agencies, other military contingents, government organization, non-governmental organizations, disputing parties, and the local populace. Tactical level training for military
participants in PSO must be consistent, thorough, and standardized to ensure compliance with such myriad of requirements. In the following quote, Major Geordie Elms of the Canadian Forces captures the unique requirements for PSO training:

“Peacekeeping training entails much more than unarmed combat exercises, marksmanship, and obstacle courses; on the ground, the most important talent may be walking in the shoes of the native population...The quality you need most in United Nations peacekeeping is empathy. (Benton 85)

Regarding the compatibility of PSO skills with war fighting training, Taw, Persselin, and Leed conclude that PSO deployments have reduced war-fighting readiness for certain combat units, including infantry and armor elements (43-45). The mental acuity required for planning and executing PSO differs significantly from combat requirements. Further, since long-term pre-deployment training is not allocated to PSO, actual PSO deployments and associated requirements exert detrimental effects on combat readiness. In addition to negative effects on deployed units, cross-leveling (attaching personnel from external units to meet deployment requirements) and interruptions of collective/unit training detract from training in “remain behind” units as well. The researchers also emphasize that deployment requirements for U.S. Army personnel in PSO are likely to increase in response to nation building and providing humanitarian assistance. Consequently, additional training must be all-inclusive for personnel in unique military occupations, such as transportation, medical, military police, and legal specialties. Finally, the researchers reject the notion of developing a special PSO force within the U.S. Army, citing a lack of consistent and deep-rooted requirements.

To address the numerous types of PSO and to satisfy national policy objectives, various training programs and courses have been established within individual nations. As of March 14, 2002, the United Nations website identified 81 Member State countries that conduct peacekeeping training. Additionally, regional training organizations, international training initiatives, such as those sponsored by the UN, and cross-national programs have developed as well.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS – MODEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

In the wake of World War II, the United Nations (UN) organization formed on June 26, 1945, with the goal of maintaining international peace and security. Initially, founders believed that the five predominant powers—China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the former Soviet Union—would act in concert to deter military aggression worldwide. However, Cold War tensions between the U.S. and former Soviet Union decreased the organization’s resolve and effectiveness in conducting PSO. Therefore, during the Cold War’s span of nearly 40 years, other countries participated in a wide range of PSO, although not specifically addressed within either Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 the UN Charter. As a result, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold referred to these operations uniquely as “Chapter 6 ½” missions (Moore 1995).

When the Cold War ended in 1989, the United States had officially participated in two UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations—the UN Truce Supervision Organization (1948 to present) and the UN Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (1949-1954). As the Cold War bolstered American and Soviet war fighting capabilities, peacekeeping challenges, born predominantly from civil wars and ethnic struggles suppressed by the Cold War, supplied a greater challenge to the UN and its Member States. As of September 15, 2001, the UN had 15 ongoing peacekeeping operations; only 39 had been actually completed since the organization’s inception (United Nations DPKO website).

B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING

Under the UN Charter, three principal organs—the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat—share responsibilities related to PSO. Although regional organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, and other organizations may become involved in PSO, the UN Secretariat acts on behalf of the General Assembly and Security Council to develop and implement international strategies. Basically, the Security Council authorizes, the General Assembly budgets, and the Secretariat manages PSO-related issues and missions (McClure and Orlov 96). Planning and preparations are multi-dimensional, consisting of diplomatic, economic,
humanitarian, and military elements in pursuit of conflict resolution. After conducting an initial assessment of peacekeeping requirements and the overall nature of expected operations, the Secretariat determines personnel allocations, equipment, sustainability levels, and functions to be performed under the peacekeeping operation. Unlike a Member State’s government, the UN has no armed forces directly under its control, so the Secretariat maintains close contact with potential troop-contributing countries to identify those willing to provide troops and equipment and to what degree. In order to allow personnel preparation and training, normally 60 to 90 days, potential troop-contributing countries are involved in the earliest stages of the planning process (UN CD-ROM). According to the UN Charter, each member state is responsible for training and preparation of its personnel and units designated for PKO to “maintain an attitude of disciplined impartiality and professional performance in order to command the respect of conflicting parties” (UN CD-ROM).

As the number of PSO increased following the Cold War, the Secretariat in New York possessed little time to focus on training contributing forces for PSO (Findlay 16). As a result, the UN created a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 to administer and oversee PSO-related issues. Subsequently, the DPKO established a Training Unit element in 1994 to focus on preparing Member States for UN missions. Previously, some “new” peacekeeping nations had partially relied upon so-called veteran peacekeeping countries for training. For example, a Bulgarian battalion received one month of training from the Swedish military before deploying to Cambodia (Findlay 16).

Based on recommendations from the Brahimi Report, the General Assembly created the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) on January 1, 2001 to develop and provide standardized UN peacekeeping guidelines and advice through information sharing to Member States. Specifically, the Standardization and Evaluation (S&E) section was created under TES to provide standard training guidance and advice through the compilation of pre-existing training materials, which cover pre-deployment, in-mission orientation, military observers, staff officers, and training for soldiers and junior ranks. Based on a statement by the Secretary General in his report regarding implementation of the Brahimi Panel Report recommendations, mission specific training cells (TCs) were created, complete with SOPs and tables of organization for subordinate elements. Currently, TCs have been assigned to the UN Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING

Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of TES under the DPKO. Basically, the mission of TES is to coordinate and standardize training among Member States that contribute to peacekeeping operations.

*UN Principal Organs of the International Court of Justice, Security Council, General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council are not depicted.

http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart.html

Figure 2. Organizational Structure of TES under the DPKO.
D. MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF TES

Adapted from the UN website, TES has several core tasks, supplemented with additional responsibilities.

1. Core Functions of TES:
   - Collect, analyze, develop, revise and disseminate peacekeeping training material.
   - Provide training advice and assistance to Member States to enhance peacekeeping training capacities and to Training Cell in peacekeeping missions to maintain peacekeeping operational readiness.
   - Promote UN peacekeeping training standards and guidelines and evaluate performance requirements.

2. Additional Responsibilities of TES:
   - Share information through UN publications, the web page, correspondence courses, seminars, workshops, exercises and the TES News Bulletin.
   - Provide assistance to Member States in organizing, assessing, and conducting peace operations training.
   - Provide assistance in the development of qualified trainer cadres; conduct “train the trainers” courses
   - Serve as focal point in DPKO peacekeeping operations training.
   - Maintain contact with Permanent Missions to the UN regarding current training practices, standards, training policies and materials
   - Liaison with major regional and national peacekeeping training centers and encourage the establishment of such centers.
   - Develop, maintain, and distribute guidelines, standards, manuals, and other relevant materials.
   - Identify and train United Nations Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs).
• Serve as focal point for the African Training Initiative, including maintaining the African training database and coordinating donor activities and African training needs.

• Conduct seminars in mission management for senior officials.

• Conduct staff training courses.

• Provide pre-deployment training guidance to Member States.

• Provide support to other DPKO activities, such as promotional briefings, workshops, seminars, and conferences.

• Provide training activity information Member States by maintaining databases for peacekeeping training

Although the peacekeeping training centers of Member States may closely align with UN guidelines, the UN does not have authority over any training center at the international level. Following UN recommendations, the most comprehensive UN-associated training facility is located in Niinisalo, Finland to prepare peacekeepers from Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (Benton 86). However, monitors from Poland, Switzerland, Austria, and the U.S. have also trained at the organization. Completion of the officers training program takes five weeks, while the enlisted program lasts four weeks. In addition to basic English language training, UN Peacekeepers must have at least a fundamental understanding of the specific area of operations (AO) to include (Benton 88):

• History of the region

• Religions and taboos

• Sources of conflict; expected duration

• Status of disputing parties (arms, equipment, ideologies, leaders, etc.)

E. TRAINING CONCEPT

With respect to national defense of Member States, the UN asserts that countries should establish training programs to ensure national defense and security. If Member States agree to
participate in UN-sponsored PSO, Member States and regional organizations are expected to conduct pre-deployment training for specific missions and general training in accordance with UN guidelines. Depending upon the assigned mission, Member States may obtain specific pre-deployment training support from UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTAT). When units arrive in the JOA, these training cells coordinate induction training followed by sustainment exercises for the deployment duration. Instead of providing instruction directly to entire contingents, UNTAT members typically serve in a “train the trainer” capacity to improve organizational training proficiency.

The UNTAT system under the DPKO supports peacekeeping training by providing guidelines, manuals, and other support materials to training programs of Member States. Specifically, the purpose of these teams is “to provide a resource ‘pool’ of peacekeeping training teams prepared to readily provide assistance and advice to Member States, on request, in the development and implementation of national peacekeeping training programs” (United Nations DPKO website). Rather than employing pre-established teams, the DPKO task organizes a team of experts on standby who possess requisite experience and knowledge relative to the mission. Based on their prior peacekeeping experience and performance, officers from various Member States are selected as UNTAT personnel for a minimum period of two years. Personnel must participate in a comprehensive training seminar prior to being selected as UNTAT representatives. Additionally, UNTAT members must complete a follow-on seminar prior to deployment/assignment. Two seminars are conducted annually to ensure an adequate number of trained members. As a training reference, the Advisor’s Guidebook provides fundamental information and directives to enable personnel to provide official, credible, and consistent training advice to Member States (United Nations DPKO website). Each UNTAT member should be knowledgeable of the operational principles of peacekeeping that facilitate mission success. Additionally, operating techniques, force composition, planning elements, legal concerns, and conduct standards must be understood. UNTAT members must consider peacekeeping operations in multi-dimensional terms, focusing on the relationship between multi-national military contingents and a broad spectrum of civilian agencies and organizations. Coordination among these stakeholders, along with the disputing parties and the local populace, must be achieved to bring about a successful mission. In recent years, the UN has invested greater resources to improve communication between military and civilian peacekeeping
elements, such as civilian police and humanitarian personnel. UNTAT members emphasize the need to include civilian personnel as both participants and staff members in national training programs.

After UNTAT members are designated for a particular assignment, the team convenes to discuss specific requirements. UNTAT personnel typically respond to training assistance requests from Member States, but may be assigned directly by the UN under time constraints or critical circumstances. Teams normally consist of three to six officers with backgrounds in core specialties, such as logistics, operations, or communications.

In general, training provided by UNTAT focuses on promoting training continuity across organizations, in addition to mission/induction training. While mission headquarters are responsible for conducting in-theater operations, specialized staff training may be required to build organizational cohesion that adequately addresses the multi-dimensional aspects of peacekeeping responsibilities. Depending upon staff member experience, the TES may provide a six-day session for key military and civilian personnel assigned to a mission. Through lectures and small group instructional methods, 14 personnel, usually including a former force commander, provide four hours of daily training for current staff members.

Although the UN interacts with training centers worldwide, TES established a correspondence course for general training to reach a wider audience. The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Program of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations (POCI) holds administrative responsibility for managing the course. Based on its mission, the program facilitates standardized training and preparation of personnel from all nations. In fact, the U.S. Army Institute for Professional Development (AIPD) awards Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) credit hours for completed modules. Currently, correspondence modules are offered in the following areas:

- Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Methods and Techniques for Peacekeeping on the Ground
- International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict
- Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution
- Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations
• Global Terrorism

• The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War Period: 1945-1987

• The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following the Cold War Period: 1988-1997

• Peacekeeping in The Former Yugoslavia: From the Dayton Accords to Kosovo

• Logistical Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

• Operational Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Intermediate Logistics Course

• De-mining in the Aftermath of War: Preventing Casualties to Peacekeepers and the Civilian Population

• Serving as a United Nations Military Observer

• United Nations Civilian Police: Restoring Order Following Hostilities

• An Introduction to the UN System: Orientation for Serving on a UN Field Mission

• Security Measures for United Nations Peacekeepers

• The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations

A current list of available courses can be found at the UNITAR POCI website. Ultimately, this self-paced program was designed to promote interoperability and a unity of purpose among military officers, civilian employees, and diplomats.

In April 1995, the DPKO created the Lessons Learned Unit, consisting of eight permanent personnel and contracted external consultants, to analyze past peacekeeping efforts to help in the planning of future operations and the conduct of ongoing ones (United Nations DPKO website). Lessons learned are developed directly by visiting mission areas to obtain first-hand information for mid- and end-of-mission assessments. Additionally, staff personnel utilize published materials, media evaluations, independent research, and end-of-tour reports by mission
personnel and higher headquarters. To complete the lessons learned process, personnel empirically analyze and evaluate questionnaires completed by former/current mission personnel, workshop attendees, and seminar participants. Then, the Lessons Learned Unit ensures accessibility of lessons learned reports in the form of books, documents, and media materials from a centralized resource center. Ultimately, providing easy access to lessons learned ensures that future participants in PSO can implement strategies beneficial to follow-on missions.
IV. REGIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS – MODEL OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The first official military cooperation between the Nordic countries began in 1918, when Sweden gave Finland four aircraft to begin its Air Force (Ministry of Defense of Finland Home page). Subsequently, during the initial stages of World War II, Finland, Sweden, and Norway began talks to establish a mutual defense alliance. However, the plan failed based on Soviet Union objections compounded with Germany’s occupation of Norway in April 1940. As the war progressed, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland began to assist each other by trading intelligence along with personnel and equipment resources. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Nordic countries first discussed peacekeeping in terms of a UN position. Beginning in 1963, Finnish representatives began working in a civil servant group that planned Nordic cooperation in UN peacekeeping matters, especially in the area of training. In the following year, the Nordiska samarbetsgruppen i militära FN-ärenden (NORDSAMFN) espoused and initiated semi-annual meetings of the Nordic defense ministers. As the nature of peacekeeping changed following the Cold War, the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) formally replaced the NORDSAMFN organization in July 1998. To further institutionalize the role of NORDCAPS, a permanent planning body comprised of officer representatives from each Nordic country was established on October 1, 2000. Currently, the ultimate goal of the organization is to establish a crisis management contingent by 2003 that can be controlled by either an international or regional body, such as the UN, OSCE, EU, or NATO, for peacekeeping operations. The cooperation of Nordic countries has benefited each in terms of consistent training programs for personnel, economic cost savings for equipment, and defense administration for security planning. From an altruistic perspective, the Nordic countries view peacekeeping operations as “an expression of solidarity with the innocent victims of war” born out of a basic desire to provide assistance (Abrahamsen E-mail). Further, Nordic international security policies that were very restricted during the Cold War have loosened over the last decade.
B. OVERVIEW OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING

The Nordic countries approach peacekeeping from a traditional perspective, focusing on the following requirements³: 1) consent of the disputing parties, 2) neutrality and impartiality of military peacekeepers, and 3) a strictly defensive use of weapons. Further, peacekeepers are viewed as neutral observers, who neither act as combatants nor take part in hostilities. In order to remain impartial, peacekeepers rely on negotiation and mediation skills to achieve compliance when violations occur. If violations of the UN mandate occur, personnel immediately notify higher headquarters (Potgieter and Gamba 1996).

While the use of force should serve only as a last resort, the Nordic approach does support an explicit show of force, defined as “the use of impressive-looking equipment, vehicles, weapons and well-disciplined units with smart appearance”⁴. Consequently, the Nordic approach contends that an impressive show of force serves as an effective deterrent to conflict escalation. In summary, the Nordic countries view peacekeeping as incompatible and completely distinct from peace enforcement operations.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING

The NORDCAPS organization establishes Nordic multi-national contingencies to support either NATO or EU forces in PSO mandated by the UN. All Nordic countries, consisting of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, designate land, naval, and air forces towards a Nordic Pool of Forces Register (NPFR). Currently, NORDCAPS plans to develop an exclusive, brigade-sized land force for PSO deployments by July 1, 2003. Tentatively, the unit will consist of four national battalions, while the headquarters unit, combat support, and service support units will be multinational. Eventually, Nordic naval and air force units specialized for PSO will be established. To meet the objective of having a Nordic PSO contingent, extensive coordination occurs between individuals and organizations at the following levels:

- Defense Ministers from all four countries meet twice a year to discuss strategic issues. Preliminary meetings often occur at the department head level.

³ Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN), Nordic UN Tactical Manual
⁴ Ibid.
• The NORDCAPS Steering Group (NSG) consists of senior-level civil servants/Ministers of Defense (MOD) supported by high-ranking military officer (general officers level).

• The NORDCAPS Military Coordination Group (NMCG) conducts day-to-day business of the organization. Officers from the Defense Headquarters of each nation comprise the group, which meets every other month.

• The NORDCAPS Planning Element (PLE) consists of full-time officers from each Nordic country who function as a “secretariat” for the NMCG. The PLE focuses on knowledge management within the institution by preparing meeting agendas and maintaining all relevant documents.

• Working Groups (WG) are comprised of specialists who focus on various issues, such as logistics, combat support, and training.

Figure 3 depicts the relationship between these organizational elements.

With respect to PSO training, the NORDCAPS Working Group Course Directors (NWG/CD) are authorized to plan and conduct courses based on the following tasks:

1. Produce the course catalog to include:
a. A time schedule for conducting courses.
b. Student seats available.
c. Distribution and assignment of instructors.
d. Fact finding for documentation.
e. Planning instructor meetings.

2. Conduct the courses.

3. Improve and develop the courses to prepare students for participation in UN, OSCE, NATO, or EU operations.

4. Make suggestions for establishing new courses.

5. Conduct an annual “Official Visitors Day” for flag officers representing their respective countries. The event location will rotate based on the following cycle: Sweden-2002, Norway-2003, Denmark-2004, Finland-2005, etc.

6. Exchange information with other organizations involved with PSO training.

7. Report to the NMCG about initiatives undertaken and decisions made by the group (responsibility of the chairman).

NWG/CD members continue to work under the guidance of their respective militaries. Course directors from the various NORDCAPS courses comprise the working group, while each nation appoints a Senior Course Director (SCD). All decisions result from consensus among the member nation representatives. The Chairman of Training and Exercise Matters of the PLE (CJ7/PLE) serves as an observer for all course director conferences. Based on two annual course directors conferences, the location of meetings rotates among the Nordic country members in the following cycle: Norway-2002, Finland-2003, Sweden-2004, Denmark-2005, etc. Chairmanship of the meeting will be the responsibility of the host nation.

When the Nordic countries receive a request for a PSO contingent, a Nordic Coordination Group (NCG) is established. Comprised of representatives from all of the Nordic countries, this group coordinates the preparatory and deployment phases of the mission by responding to concerns from individual countries and addressing general concerns to all. Upon deployment of the contingent, authority is transferred to an allied higher force commander. Since tensions may
occur between the allied commander and subordinate leaders, the NCG remains in theater to address such issues. Upon mission completion, the NCG coordinates redeployment, as operational control (OPCON) remains with the CHOD (Chief of Defense)/MOD during both deployment and redeployment of troops.

D. MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING WITHIN NORDCAPS

Although every Nordic country conducts PSO training, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have specialized centers designed for PSO training. These organizations are the Finnish Defense Forces International Center (FINCENT), the Norway Defense Forces International Center (NODEFIC), and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center (SWEDINT). On the contrary, Denmark utilizes existing institutions to complete training. Although these centers focus predominantly on PSO theory, other training areas, such as map reading skills, command post exercises (CPX), and combined arms exercises (CAX), are addressed as well. In addition to unit preparations for army battalion, naval task force, and air task force operations, basic military skill development and language training for individuals are national responsibilities. For multinational contingents assigned to PSO, each Nordic country maintains responsibility for training in designated areas as depicted in Figure 4. In general, Finland provides training for military observers, Sweden for staff officers, Norway for transport and logistics officers, and Denmark for military police (Ministry of Defense of Finland Home page).
While complete course descriptions can be obtained from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations website, the Nordic countries will provide the following courses for PSO training in 2002:

**Norway**
- International Commanding Officers Course (INTCOC)
- International Senior Logistic Officers Course (INTSLOC)
- International Support Staff Officers Course (INTSUPSOC)
- United Nation Logistics Officers Course (UNLOC)
- NATO/Partnership for Peace Logistics Officers Course (NATO/PFPLOC)

**Finland**
- United Nations Military Observers Course (UNMOC)
- International Communication and Information Systems Course (INTCIS)
- OCSE & European Union Monitors and Observers Course (OCSE/EUMOC)
- Engineering and Mine-clearing (EOD)

**Sweden**
- United Nations Staff Officers Course (UNSOC)
- Partnership for Peace Staff Officers Course (PFPSOC)
- Partnership for Peace Junior Staff Officers Course (PFPJSOC)
- United Nations Junior Officers Course (UNJOC)
- International course for Press and Information Officers (PIO)

**Denmark**
- Nordic United Nations Military Police Course (UNMILPOC)
- Nordic Civil-Military Cooperation Course (CIMIC)
Course directors from each of the Nordic countries meet at least twice each year to establish curriculums two years in advance. They discuss the number of Nordic country applicants allocated to each course, while determining space available for foreign students who represent Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. Occasionally, course directors attend the other Nordic programs to coordinate teaching techniques.

E. TRAINING CONCEPT

With respect to each of the Nordic countries, military preparations for a UN mission conclude with approximately three months of mission-specific training. Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark all utilize a conscription system to meet manpower requirements; however, a cadre of professional officers leads troop contingents. While contingents receive a
preponderance of training within their respective militaries, the multinational commander of a land brigade, sea task force, or air task force coordinates training requirements through the NCG.

At the NORDCAPS organizational level, joint exercises entitled “Nordic Peace” began in 1997 to develop mutual understanding and cooperation between the Nordic countries in peace operations (“NORDCAPS-Nordic Co-operation in Peace Operations” Online posting). To promote Partnership for Peace objectives within the NORDCAPS framework, these exercises emphasize cooperation between the military and civil authorities in international operations. Additionally, the training focuses on command and control, communication systems, procedures, and closer cooperation among leaders. For “Nordic Peace 2000” exercises, military personnel from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, along with several non-military groups, joined the NORDCAPS countries to expand training.

F. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

Currently, the NORDCAPS organization does not utilize training standards within its various programs. However, with respect to land forces, the program intends to have such standards incorporated between the end of 2002 and summer of 2003. Looking towards the future, similar standards may be institutionalized for naval and air forces by 2006 (Sandnes Email)
V. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: MODEL OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The history of Canada’s military participation in PSO, which reaches back to service in Kashmir between 1949 and 1979, has greatly influenced the evolution of personnel training and preparation. Actually, Canada regards its military participation in PSO as a proud legacy; however, Canadian military officials are quick to emphasize its traditional involvement in major wars, citing 1,600 casualties in the Korean Conflict.\(^5\) While typical military functions center on national security and homeland protection, the motivations behind Canada’s PSO heritage are intriguing. As a veteran peacekeeper country, the altruistic nature of PSO, especially during the early years of only sparse operations, is often cited as a driving force behind policy. However, given a dramatic increase in UN-sponsored missions, the national prestige and respect achieved through PSO participation serve as modern motivators (Findlay 7-8). In turn, Canadian society has generally come to accept the relevancy of PSO in the international arena.

B. OVERVIEW OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION TRAINING

From a Canadian perspective, the nature of PSO has changed from traditional peacekeeping missions, such as manning outposts on well-known boundaries in Cyprus, to more complex missions, exemplified in the Somalia Mission of 1993. In addition to the loss of 18 U.S. Army soldiers in Somalia, the deadly force used by Canadian soldiers on a Somali citizen compelled the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (DCDS) to order an examination of current training methods used for PSO. While this study revealed the overall efficiency of personnel in traditional military roles, shortcomings in PSO were blamed on a training program that lacked consistency and depth. Some areas of concern were negotiation skills, culture and language familiarity, and the application of Rules of Engagement (ROE). The overall findings revealed the need for more consistent and thorough PSO training through an institutionalized program.

\(^5\) Available [Online]: <http://www.dnd.ca/menu/legacy/history_e.htm>
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING

In response to the DCDS study, two primary centers were established in the mid-1990s for peace training. The Lester B. Pearson Peace Center (PPC) opened in 1995 “to support and enhance the Canadian contribution to international peace, security, and stability through the provision of quality research, education and training in all aspects of peacekeeping.” While the PPC provides primarily strategic and operational level training to both military personnel and civilians, the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC), which opened in 1996, focuses on the tactical training for the Canadian Military. Located several miles from the Royal Military College (RMC), the PSTC is part of the Canadian Forces Base, Kingston, Ontario.

D. MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER

Since the mission of any organization is critical for determining training needs, the Land Force Command (LFC) Implementation Directive of May 28, 1996, prescribed the desired end state for the PSTC:

“To provide a nucleus of expertise within the Canadian Forces (CF) responsible for the development of peace support techniques based on lessons learned, training methodology, training standards and the provision of training and training support.”

Subsequently, five tasks were assigned to accomplish this mission:

1. Training prospective PSO personnel
2. Providing training assistance to Canadian contingents/departments and ally nations
3. Completing in theater evaluation and validation of actual instruction given at the institution
4. Developing peace support operations training standards and SOPs
5. Maintaining a close liaison with other peace-related organizations

A critical element of the PSTC training model is the training feedback loop, comprised of the following evaluation and validation techniques:

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6 Available [Online]: <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca/About/Mission.htm>
7 Ibid.
1. Evaluation: student questionnaires, end of course debrief, staff After Action Reports (AAR), and End of Course Report (ECR)

2. Validation: travel to theatre (observation of effectiveness), on-the-job questionnaires, supervisor questionnaires, and discussion/focus groups.

The criteria used by PSTC staff to evaluate training success extend beyond classroom instruction into the actual operational environment. Also, trainers realize that not all skills will be applied during every peacekeeping deployment. Thus, building personnel confidence through constant preparation proves critical when unique challenges do arise. While the relevance of these measures is undoubted, further research must be completed with respect to their reliability and freedom from bias.

To stress the importance of PSO within Canada’s military strategy, all military personnel, regardless of rank or specialty, are required to complete one-week of PSO-specific training. Prior to deployment, personnel either attend the PSTC basic course or receive equivalent unit training at their commands. Just as the United States Marine Corps (USMC) utilizes The Basic School (TBS) to train all lieutenants prior to entering the “fleet,” Canada provides mission-specific training at either the unit level at home bases or for individuals at the PSTC. Additionally, the PSTC offers a nineteen-day onsite course for personnel assigned to military observers missions. This course covers significantly more detailed information than the basic course. Canada does not use conscription to meet manpower requirements, but focuses on training and maintaining a professional force.

E. PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

Within the Canadian Forces command and control structure, the PSTC is subordinate to the Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) of the Land Element as depicted in Figure 5. Actually, the PSTC occupies the first floor of a building shared with the LFDTS. Due to the joint nature of training personnel from the land, sea, and air military elements, the PSTC has been authorized direct liaison with the DCDS on critical issues.
Figure 5. Canadian Forces Command Structure
The organizational structure (Appendix A) of the PSTC is differentiated into four sections:

1. Headquarters Element
2. Training Support
3. Training
4. Standards Section

The Headquarters element maintains responsibility for administration of the center, while the commandant leads the organization. The Training Section provides onsite instruction at the PSTC, while Training Assistance Teams conduct mobile courses for units throughout Canada. Training teams are comprised of one officer from any military element and a combat arms warrant officer. Additionally, the Training Support Section ensures that all necessary educational aides and materials are available. Finally, the Standards Cell oversees the evaluation of training by both students and instructors, culminating with the validation of training within the actual area of operations. Also, this section develops training materials and course documentation. For example, a Peace Support Operations Field Book is distributed to each student who participates in PSO training.

F. TRAINING CONCEPT

The Canadian training model for PSO utilized by the PSTC focuses on three primary elements. The first component concentrates on occupational skills required for assigned occupational specialties (i.e. U.S. Navy rate), while combat training and physical stamina comprise the second. For PSO, the building blocks of training, such as mission-specific knowledge and comprehension of ROE, represent the most critical facets of developing situational awareness and force protection. Similar to U.S. Army training for PSO, the Canadian military has devised a training progression schedule that covers a 90-day time period, beginning and ending with “No-Go” and “Go” measures respectively (Figure 6).  

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8 Compare: [http://www.army.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/documents/brief/PSTC-New_Speaking_Notes_e.PPT]
G. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

While courses at the PSTC cover a wide range of both individual and unit training needs, individual skill requirements for PSO receive utmost attention. Basic military skills are complemented with PSO-specific training in the following areas:

1. History and fundamentals of PSO
2. Specific mission concerns for current operations (i.e. geography, mission operations and intelligence)
3. Peace support duties (applicable to the military observers course)
4. Mine awareness
5. Hostage survival skills
6. Negotiation and mediation
7. Preventive medicine
8. Media awareness
9. Equipment recognition of weapons systems
10. Stress management
11. Application of force and ROE understanding
12. Cross cultural awareness
13. Legal Issues and personal conduct
14. Administration, allowances, and benefits

The schedule in Appendix B. identifies the Canadian Forces training standard (i.e. 402.01), course title, instructor (not cited), and room assignment for each area of training. Per Table 1, the center maintains an environment conducive to PSO training by dedicating rooms according to geographic location of the mission. For example, the schedule below outlines training for personnel deploying to either the Golan Heights (Operation DANACA) or Egypt (Operation CALUMET). Throughout the hallways and classrooms of the PSTC, mine displays, historical information, and commemorative displays to Canadian PSO military casualties imbue both students and faculty with a sense of patriotism and pride.
Table 1. Room Assignments for Mission Area Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Room Assignment</th>
<th>Region/Area</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>OP DANACA</td>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>OP CALUMET</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Mine &amp; Weapons Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H. STUDENT DEMOGRAPHICS

While the training teams of the PSTC focus on unit training within the Canadian Forces, some individuals serving in unique military or in a reserve capacity may require onsite training at the PSTC. Although a random sample of military personnel who received PSO training could not be obtained, demographic characteristics for 717 service members who attended the PSTC Basic Course are provided in Appendix C. Between January 16, 2001 and November 29, 2001, the PSTC conducted 26 segments of the Basic Course, consisting of 20 to 40 attendees per segment. By mandate of the DCDS, the PSTC is tasked and funded to provide a total of 28 basic courses and four observer courses annually. In total, approximately 5000 Canadian military personnel are trained either onsite at the PSTC or by mobile training assistance teams per year.

Since training program developers must tailor their curricula to both mission requirements and student characteristics, demographics for students attending the onsite PSTC basic course provide valuable insight into model development. When assessing the needs for a PSO training model, participant ages, military service time, rank/grade, gender, marital status, education level, regular/reserve status, service branch (element), and, most importantly, prior PSO experience must be considerations for the training program. Among valid responses from 717 students who attended basic courses from January 16, 2001 to November 29, 2001, the average student was approximately 37 years of age, with nearly 16 years of military service. Further, the course consisted of 82% males, and 84% of students served in the regular component of the Canadian Forces. As expected, a preponderance of students (63.4%) was part of the “Land Element” (Army), 26.1% hailed from the “Air Element” (Air Force), while the remaining 10.5% had a “Sea Element” (Navy) background. However, out of 717 attendees, nearly 30% of attendees did not provide an element/branch of service, which could indicate the
“joint” nature of many administrative billet assignments. Approximately 15% of students at the PSTC course had received previous training onsite. Appendix C. contains further statistics concerning the ranks, marital status, education, years of service, and prior PSO experience of participants.
VI. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: MODEL OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Following its official national reunification on October 3, 1990, Germany has taken part in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), including PSO, in terms of economic, material, and personnel support (Eyth 7). Basically, the German Government shifted its focus away from domestic concerns towards projecting national sovereignty and importance within the international arena (Bauer 1997). PSO participation represents an altruistic means for Germany to bolster its political and military status without investing substantial resources or assuming an aggressive posture. For example, the following timeline demonstrates some of Germany’s contributions to either UN or NATO missions since its reunification (Eyth 7):

- May 1992-November 1993: 150 medical personnel deployed to Cambodia to establish a field hospital in support of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
- July 1994-December 1994: One B-707 and two C-160 transport aircraft along with 30 airmen provide logistical support for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
- August-December 1995: Germany contributes personnel to a Franco-German Rapid Reaction Force (two brigades) tasked to ensure freedom of mobility to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- December 1996-Present: 1800 personnel deploy to the SFOR in Bosnia, marking the first deployment of troops directly into the area of operations for a crisis
- June 1999-Present: Nearly 5000 personnel assigned to KFOR to establish security for the Southern zone within the Province of Kosovo
• August 2001-Present: 500 personnel participate in NATO Operation Essential Harvest to expedite the turnover of arms belonging to Albanian rebels in Macedonia. Further, 600 soldiers are being assigned to protect EU and OSCE observers for the follow-on Operation Amber Fox

• November 2001: Germany pledges 3900 military personnel to the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, including 100 Special Forces commandos

B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING

In response to military experiences in UNOSOM II, the German government decided in 1993 that a central peacekeeping training center was required to enhance future preparations for such missions. Specifically, the organization should focus on developing expertise in assessing future mission requirements. On August 25, 1994, the Army Chief of Staff tasked the infantry school in Hammelburg to design and implement a peacekeeping school. Under guidance from the United Nations, the UN Training Center of the German Armed Forces officially opened on October 27, 1999. In contrast to the U.S. Army and Canadian Forces training programs, the overall function of the German school is to train both military personnel and civilian officials for peacekeeping operations. In fact, nearly 54,000 soldiers and civilian personnel combined have been successfully trained from the organization’s inception through the year 2000 (Greb E-mail).

In a February 2002 speech, Colonel Hans-Jürgen Folkerts of the PSO Training Center stated that the German Armed Forces, especially the German Army, intends to modify both commander and unit training to meet current operational requirements. Traditionally, military training has emphasized combined arms combat, while secondary emphasis has been given to preparing contingents for UN missions or NATO missions under a UN mandate. Since these missions were considered an exception to the rule, training programs did not thoroughly integrated related topics within their curricula. Colonel Folkerts recognizes the irony in deploying officer candidates who recently completed combined arms training to the Balkans in support of a peace support operation. Therefore, staff members of the German UN Training Center contend that PSO training, generally categorized as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), must be a compulsory component in the training of commanders and units. Further, contingents training should be mission-specific, while PSO/OOTW training should be instituted on a universal basis.
With respect to future basic and advanced training for infantry commanders and leaders, fundamental elements of mission training in the extended range of tasks (ERT), including PSO/Stability and Support Operations, should be taught as course-related regular training for all officers and NCOs of the German Army. As a result, incremental school training enables officers and NCOs to serve in commanding/staff functions during support and stability operations. Such training facilitates progressive leader development through course advancement. Ultimately, the ERT training should be adapted for and integrated into all command courses at the appropriate level.

The German Heeresamt, the Ministry of Defense, and the Army Staff generally agree with the integration of support and stability operations training, including PSO, into the course curriculum. However, officials disagree over the proportion of ERT training relative to traditional war fighting skill development, especially within the Officer Candidates’ Course. Most concur that ERT training should occur prior to completing university studies, since some officers may not attend a university or may fail to complete their university education.

Regarding PSO course duration at the German UN Training Center, the current course objectives and those associated with ERT cannot be achieved without expanding and diversifying the course curriculum. Accordingly, the proportion and magnitude of general military training elements, such as physical fitness preparations, may need to be reduced relative to increases in PSO training. Further, certain training subjects, notably the role of military law/legal implications for support and stability operations, may need to be re-evaluated as well.

Following initial PSO training in conjunction with combat arms training, officer candidates do not receive follow-on instruction, unless assigned to a crisis reaction unit. Therefore, the German UN Training Center contends that branch-specific components of both the officer candidates training and the advanced NCO training programs should receive additional PSO instruction. As a result, these curricular enhancements should ensure comprehensive training for future commanders and leaders at the onset of initial training.

In February of 2002, Colonel Folkerts of the German Peace Training Center chaired a working group for a recently-developed Training and Education for Peace Support Operations (TEPSO) program. At this meeting, representatives from NATO and PfP countries presented information regarding their respective training programs. Relevant to this research, Canada,
Germany, and the Nordic Countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were all represented at the meeting, while the United States did not attend. United Nations representatives plan to be present at the next conference to provide guidance.

The overall goal of TEPSO is to achieve harmonization and standardization of PSO training among participating nations. Specifically, the TEPSO working group aims to maximize multi-national interoperability by recommending objectives for PSO education and training. The group addressed the following questions:

- Which basic documents are used in PSO training?
- Which Rules of Engagement (ROE) are used in PSO training?
- How is PSO training organized?
- What are the key training areas in national programs?

The findings of this initial session will be further evaluated prior to commencing a follow-on meeting in the fall of 2002 (Williams E-mail). Ultimately, by focusing on a diverse cohort of PfP and NATO countries, the TEPSO program has tremendous potential for advancing and standardizing future training.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PSO TRAINING IN THE GERMAN MILITARY

Currently, PSO training in the Germany Military remains theater-specific, rather than being collectively embraced in all training programs. Therefore, examining the overall training plan for the KFOR Task Force, German soldiers initially receive traditional military skills in conjunction with a PSO skill foundation at the division level. Teams comprised of experienced PSO personnel deploy from the Peace Training Center to support unit preparations in garrison. They utilize a “teaching and coaching” strategy, which focuses on achieving common goals through a spirit of cooperation (Greb E-mail). By maintaining open dialogue among all participants, viable solutions can often be determined for challenging situations. Unit training at the division level focuses on basic combat skills and the following complementary training areas:

- Civic education and leadership development
- Combat/marksman training
• Protection (general)
• Mine awareness
• Essential area protection
• Checkpoint control
• Patrolling techniques
• Driving skills
• Security procedures
• Medical, engineering, communications basic knowledge
• Military police duties

Thereafter, units complete an intensive fourteen-day course at the PSO training center in Hammelburg. As discussed more fully in the succeeding section, the PSO course focuses on the following areas:

• Basic organization of the task force
• Missions types:
  o Patrolling
  o Headquarters/command post fundamentals
• Integration of air transportation, counter-insurgency operations, and military police duties

For missions requiring special training, such as advanced armory techniques for KFOR, personnel transfer to specialty schools to complete preparations. For example, prior to deploying for Kosovo, personnel who specialize in armor receive the following instruction at the Armor School in Munster:

• Field firing (section/platoon level)
• Field firing (reinforced platoon)
• Command post exercises
• Integration training at the company team level

Specialized school training at the unit level typically concludes pre-deployment training for most units.

Per Figure 7, the organizational structure of the German UN Training Center closely follows the conceptual framework for training. To support the training center staff of 21 officers, 22 petty officers, 3 enlisted, and a civilian psychologist, experienced media and press personnel are employed from the Department of Defense information military staff, in addition to civilian press teams that advise the military in public affairs techniques. SME and prominent guest speakers from universities are frequently invited to the center for special briefings on unique areas of concern. For example, in the wake of military operations in Afghanistan during 2001, the training center requested several guest speakers to educate staff personnel and deploying personnel on cultural aspects of Afghanistan.
Figure 7. Organizational Structure of the German UN Training Center
D. TRAINING CONCEPT

Since the training program at the German UN Training Center in Hammelburg trains both military and civilian personnel, three training areas have been established to meet diverse and ever-changing requirements. Per Figure 7, UN representatives work closely with German officials to maintain organizational control, primarily in the form of concept development and guidance.

Training Component 1 conducts courses involving international cooperation and support. Specifically, personnel assigned to military observer courses must attend the UNMOC as a prerequisite for deployment. By July of 2001, the UNMOC had trained 813 participants from 49 countries. Initially, the program focused on training only “leaders”; however, its scope has been significantly expanded to encompass a wider audience. Interestingly, special courses catered to civilians, such as journalists and humanitarian relief workers, provide instruction on personal security and the role of relief organizations. Essentially, these courses were offered to reduce the rift between the media and military organizations by emphasizing commonalities and cooperation.

Training Component 2 emphasizes unit level training, specifically focusing on current missions such as KFOR, SFOR, Task Force (TF) FOX, and the Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF). As required by the mission, individuals with unique military specialties augment baseline units to form an enhanced lead division, which will unilaterally deploy to the mission area. For requisite training, soldiers are taught how to integrate and function within the Partnership for Peace Program of NATO. Camaraderie and teamwork are highlighted as groups work together to overcome challenges in role-playing scenarios that reflect a dynamic and unpredictable environment. As a result, the training program is constantly updated and adapted to real world changes with respect to the mission areas. Feedback from deployed personnel plays an important part in shaping the training regimen.

Training Component 3 originated as a team of experts in force protection that expanded in October 1998 into a course covering convoy, area, object, and personnel protection. For example, students learn about the employment of explosives sniffing dogs within the mission area. Advisor teams play a key role in consulting and preparing troops on an individual level.
To supplement onsite training at the German UN Training Center, staff members have developed a multimedia CD-ROM to provide participants with additional resources and information. While this media provides general PSO information, mission-specific operating procedures and data for current deployments are provided as well. For example, the KFOR contingent, which supports the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), receives information in the following areas:

- Symbols of military units common within the area of operations
- Identification card types of various organizations
- Briefings on history, geography, culture, and other aspects of the mission area
- Force protection measures, such as dress code and threat conditions/alert states
- Report formats commonly required for incidents (i.e. military police records)
- Pictures of uniforms and equipment common to the area

Likewise, the training CD-ROM provides personnel involved in SFOR (contingent to Bosnia) with comparable information.

Other subjects covered extensively on the CD-ROM media include the following:

- Standard Operating Procedures, such as instructions for protecting spaces, objects, convoys, and entrusted persons
- Mine awareness information with pictures, explicit photographs, presentations, SOPS, and related websites
- Photos and video clips of mission areas, equipment, and scenario demonstrations
- Points of contact for UN Training Center staff members

Of great importance, the training CD-ROM includes a detailed appendix of all articles, pictures, presentations, videos, and even MP3 music files for the entire media production.

E. SKILL AREAS AND TRAINING STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

Skill requirements and associated training needs are aligned with current trends in PSO mission areas. With respect to the ROE for specific deployments, the Zentrale
Truppenausbildung (ZENTRA) for centralized troop training and the Einsatzverbandsausbildung (EVA) for unit mission training are closely adapted to mission requirements.

At the Peace Training Center, evaluations/examinations of student performance are not formally conducted. If an instructor discerns performance weaknesses among participants, those areas are remedied through additional instruction, while contingent leaders are notified of the shortcomings. At this time, individual training standards have not been developed for courses provided at the training center.

The German Military differentiates PSO training requirements at the officer and NCO rank levels. Per Figure 8, officer training focuses at the beginning and intermediate experience levels. To meet increased PSO training requirements for officer candidates, training hours may be extended, general military training may be shortened, and special training activities incorporated. On the contrary, Figure 9 demonstrates the permeation of PSO training throughout all NCO rank levels. Reflecting on Colonel Folkers’ speech, a disparity exists between officer training and that of NCO.

Currently, the German Army continues to integrate training for support and stability operations, including PSO, with relative success. However, program developers still seek a homogenous training approach that unifies fundamental requirements for all military branches involved in operations within the ERT. This requirement extends beyond the infantry to include other combat arms units and those assigned to combat service support organizations and secondary roles. Further, the timeline for ERT training requirements must be considered within the overall curricular framework for both officers and NCO.
Course extension (one week) to focus on the following subjects:
- Planning and organizing Training to Meet the Extended Range of Tasks (ERT)
- Training Methodology
- Political Education and Law
- Selecting Commanders and Personnel
- Personnel Welfare

Course Subjects:
- Mine Awareness
- UN Operating Techniques
- Political Education and Law
- Fighting Irregular Forces (supplementary instruction may be required)

Focus shift to specific training elements:
- Legal Implications (ROE, mandates, legitimization)
- Stress Management
- UN Operating Techniques

Tentative planning to include the following courses:
- UN Operating Techniques (Requirements for checkpoints, patrolling, observation posts, and force protection)
- Political Education (Discussion of mandates and ROE)
- Fighting irregular forces
- Stress management

Operational Concepts concerning the Extended Range of Tasks (ERT) taught and trained at the appropriate level
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VII. NATIONAL TRAINING FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: MODEL OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY

A. HISTORICAL RELEVANCE OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Although somewhat transfixed during the Cold War, U.S. Military forces, principally the U.S. Army, have participated in various PSO since 1948. For example, soldiers served as members of a multinational force and observers (MFO) group in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Sinai (since 1982) (FM 100-23). Recently, President George W. Bush requested the continued support of Congress in the deployment of troops to the NATO-led international security force in Kosovo (KFOR) and to other areas pertinent to that mission (Bush 2001). As of May 18, 2001, approximately 6,000 U.S. military personnel were contributed to KFOR, while an additional 500 personnel supported operations in Macedonia, Albania, and Greece. In terms of former President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), current polices reiterate the initiative that “peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue our national security objectives.” (Clinton 1994)

B. OVERVIEW OF PSO TRAINING

While all U.S. Military Services have participated in various PSO, the levels, types, and extent of training programs vary significantly across branches. In comparison to the Canadian model of a joint training center, the U.S. Military utilizes decentralized and intra-service training to prepare for PSO. At the War College for each service, UN strategic concepts and force deployment are taught to field grade officers. In the U.S. Army, a select group of junior grade officers receive PSO-specific training at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, while advanced infantry and armor courses may incorporate scenario-driven MOOTW training (Becker A6+). In the United States Marine Corps, all company grade officers (lieutenants and captains) are required to complete two phases of an Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) military education course. However, out of approximately 324 hours prescribed for the course, only 16 hours or 5% are designated for studying Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Further, PSO are not referenced in the accompanying handbook that familiarizes officers with other MOOTW, such as counter-drug operations and combating
terrorism. Regarding enlisted personnel, they do not receive specific PSO training in their professional military education (PME) unless assigned to a unit deploying for such operations.

PSO most directly involve military ground forces, leaving naval and air components to function primarily in support roles. While the United States Marine Corps has earned the reputation as “first to fight” in combat operations, formal PSO training in a school environment is virtually non-existent in the Corps (Thomas Interview). Therefore, among the military branches, both active duty and reserve U.S. Army units receive most mission assignments for PSO, especially those of a long-standing nature. Additionally, National Guard units have been assigned to peacekeeping operations in recent years. As a result, the Army possesses the most advanced doctrine and associated training programs for PSO. This chapter begins with a general discussion of PSO fundamentals within the U.S. Military, followed by a discussion of the Army’s model and training strategies for PSO.

Despite different PSO training programs across the U.S. Military, the Joint Warfare Center Handbook provides some general guidelines for commanders to consider when conducting training. Pre-deployment training should be designed upon completion of a thorough mission assessment with respect to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) (JWC XI-1). Upon deployment to the JOA, training must be continuous at both the individual and unit levels. Also, training for PSO does not vary significantly from war fighting training, except for an expanded and enhanced personnel skill set (JWC XI-1). These skills can be further developed by focusing on the following training areas (JWC XI-1):

1. Individual military skills
2. Ind. And collective preventive medicine procedures and practice
3. First Aid-Individual and “buddy”
4. Terrorism awareness and prevention
5. Unit training (mandatory rehearsals)-based on projected operations
6. Staff training to include training with multi-national and nonmilitary organizations; as the number of multinational forces and non-military organizations increase, team building will be critical
7. Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, economic, and historical background of the situation and populations of the JOA

8. Adversary capabilities

9. How to communicate with the populace via the news media-public information

10. Negotiation and mediation

11. Language training (key phrases at a minimum)

12. Situational Awareness
   - Mine & booby trap awareness
   - Recognition of weapons and associated systems

13. ROE (to include both Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, “Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces,” and additional measures specific to the operation

14. Law of War (law of armed conflict)

15. Crowd Control-use and employment of riot control agents

Although training areas are presented above, the manual does not prescribe specific skill sets with standardized learning objectives. In broad terms, pre-deployment training should encompass all elements of the contingent force, to include the training of Naval Forces aboard ships. These personnel should be brought ashore to receive individual skill training, ROE instruction, guidance on media relations, and situational/cultural awareness of the JOA (Joint Warfighting Center (JWC) XI-1). Non-military organizations, such as NGOs and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), should be allowed to participate in training exercises. Additional training requirements may include the following (JWC XI-3):
1. Proper personal conduct
2. All military personnel, especially junior officers, SNCOs, and NCOs receive instruction on PSO fundamentals
3. Review the supported combatant commander’s JMETL for guidance on military force capability as it relates to training requirements
4. Train those to whom you lend equipment
5. Consulting other organizations and sources for training

“A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the best foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force.”—Lieutenant General T. Montgomery, USA, Senior Military Representative to NATO

Affirmed in the above quote, Field Manual 100-23 on Peace Operations asserts that essential combat and basic soldier skills form the foundation for conducting peace operations. However, within this 131-page manual, only one paragraph of the main body is devoted to force training; an appendix on training accounts for four additional pages. The reference contends that leaders will be imparted with the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes from schools, while unique aspects of peace operations should be addressed in pre-deployment training with assistance from mobile training teams (MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and, if time allows, training at combat training centers (CTCs). Despite alluding to several sources of training guidance, the manual states, “Peace operations are not a new mission and should not be treated as a separate task to be added to a unit’s mission-essential task list (METL). Paradoxically, although peace operations tasks may deviate significantly from warfighting skills, training “can be summed up as just enough and just in time” as stated in the manual.

FM 100-23 emphasizes the importance of adjusting attitudes and approaches of military forces for PSO, but reiterates the relevance and applicability of traditional military training. Opportunities for foreign intelligence and terrorist activities are a key concern for a peacekeeping unit, while observing and reporting duties represent the primary functions of such a force.
In terms of unit training, the manual maintains that units require typically four to six weeks of specialized training. Uniquely, FM 100-23 does address the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in terms of key subjects that should be addressed for each. Unit training for peacekeeping missions should include:

- The nature of PK
- The establishment of lodgments
- The performance of relief in place
- Regional orientation
- Establishment of a buffer zone
- Supervision of a truce of cease-fire
- The monitoring of boundaries
- Contributions to maintenance of law and order
- Negotiating skills
- Mine and booby trap training and awareness
- Assistance in rebuilding of infrastructure
- Checkpoint operations
- Investigation and reporting
- Information collection
- Patrolling
- Media interrelationships
- Staff training
- Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a permissive environment
- ROE
With respect to peace enforcement, the following subjects are relevant:

- Fighting a meeting engagement
- Conducting movement-to-contact and search and attack
- Performing air assault
- Enforcing UN sanctions
- Protecting the human rights of people
- Protecting humanitarian relief efforts
- Separating warring factions
- Disarming belligerent parties of heavy offensive weapons
- Restoring territorial integrity
- Restoring law and order
- Demilitarizing forces and geographical areas in a non-permissive environment
- Opening secure routes
- ROE
- Civil-military relations
- Control of multinational units
- Intelligence fusion and dissemination
- NGO operations
- Multinational logistics
- Psychological operations
- Intercultural communications
- Raids, attacks, and defense
- Public affairs media training
Although FM 100-23 differentiates peacekeeping from peace enforcement training subjects, the manual does not justify or explain the rationale behind each. According to FM 100-23, the single greatest factor behind the success of a peace operation may be leader development in terms of skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Also, professionalism, impartiality, and inquisitiveness are expected among training participants. Upon arriving in the mission area, soldiers participate in unit training to sustain traditional war-fighting skills as outlined in the Mission Essential Task List (METL). Additionally, when working as part of a multinational contingent, FM 100-23 states that commanders should coordinate training to avoid alarming both the local populace and the disputing parties of the peace operation. Subsequently, upon completion of the peace operation, commanders are reminded to reorient their soldiers to a traditional mindset developed by focusing on a wartime METL. FM 100-23 indicates that war-fighting skills must be redeveloped to counteract the dissimilar nature and related impact of peace operations on unit readiness.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

After the United States Forces Command analyzes mission requirements and identifies a PSO, the individual Corps Commander is ultimately responsible for unit training and ensuring its readiness for a PSO. Although the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia, previously developed PSO doctrine, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, now maintains cognizance over Support Operations and Stability Operations (SASO). In addition to the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, the Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) at Carlisle Barracks, focuses on the strategic and operational levels of PSO policy, rather than tactical training. Established in 1993, the Army PKI was designed to “engage with the Army leadership, various elements of the US Government, International Organizations, and the International Community on the military aspects of peace operations” (PKI Website). Although a centralized organization for tactical level training does not exist, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and the Army PKI, in addition to specialty schools, provide assistance to PSO unit commanders upon request.

In response to the unique tactical requirements for peace support operations, the Commanding General of the United States Army Infantry School authorized the activation of the
29th Infantry Regiment Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site in February of 1997 (Speer E-mail). Aimed at preparing soldiers for deployments to the Balkans, the commander of the 29th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for ensuring all personnel received core instruction on theatre specific tasks. The Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) developed and monitored the program of instruction (POI). Initially, instructors were pooled from all Fort Benning tenant units, including the 29th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry Regiment, 75th Ranger Regiment, 36th Engineer Group, and the Non-Commissioned Officers Academy. Instructors conducted training for both deploy units and individual replacements.

After only three months of operations, Commander, FORSCOM assumed responsibility for the TSIRT program. Commander FORSCOM tasked the commander of First U.S. Army to provide instructors (34 instructors and one NCOIC) to train all deploying units. The 29th Infantry Regiment maintained responsibility for training individual replacements with a training cadre of 27 instructors, one OIC, and one NCOIC. To ensure adherence to tactical and technical standards, the 29th Infantry Regiment retains control of training. However, CINCEUR maintains cognizance over the POI, while the 7th Army Training Command (ATC) develops and implements the curriculum.

Through February 2002, the TSIRT site trained a total of 20,783 personnel, consisting of 338 units and the remainder comprised of individual replacements. Although the 29th Infantry Regiment remained committed to soldier training, manpower constraints and mission creep, defined as negative consequences of constantly changing missions, necessitated the requirement for greater training resources. As a result, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed in March of 2001 integrated assistance from the 5th U.S. Corps.

Currently, the 1st Army provides nine instructors to TSIRT, while the 5th Army provides an additional nine. These personnel serve 14 to 30 in support of TSIRT, specifically Operations Joint Forge and Joint Guardian. Further, the 29th Regiment provides four full time civilian personnel and one NCOIC for additional support. Depending upon operational tempo at the TSIRT site, six instructors, two drivers, and two combat lifesavers are provided as well by the 29th Regiment. Per Appendix D., personnel from active duty, reserve, and National Guard units receive theatre-specific training through the TSIRT site. As depicted, instructors from the 29th Infantry Regiment, 1st Army, and 5th Army provide instructors for the program. The TSIRT site
does not have any civilian personnel or representatives from external agencies assigned as instructors.

D. TRAINING CONCEPT

The foundation for PSO training is deeply rooted in the requirements for completing combat operations. In fact, the Army contends that at least 60% of PSO tasks parallel combat mission requirements at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command. Training occurs in three general phases: pre-deployment, mission area, and post-operation. After an Army unit is assigned or alerted to a PSO, the unit conducts PSO-unique training approximately 90 days prior to deployment. Upon assignment of the mission, the commander completes a mission analysis prior to commencing pre-deployment training. Initially, key information is collected from the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), Field Manuals, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Manuals (TTPs), Mission Training Plans (MTPs), and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). The TTPs and Field Manuals provide principal guidance to soldiers at the operational and tactical level. Unit leaders obtain further information through early reconnaissance missions into the AO, close contact with the present unit staff members (i.e. video teleconferences and battlefield updates), information from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Higher Headquarters Directives (EUCOM, USAREUR, FORSCOM), and After Action Reviews. For example, prior to deployment in October 2001, the 29th Infantry Division Headquarters visited Bosnia on several occasions to develop a training plan and to gain familiarity with higher HQs directives.
E. SKILL AREAS FOR U.S. ARMY TRAINING UNDER THE “CRAWL, WALK, RUN” MODEL

The Army utilizes three levels for assessing training (Bankus 19):

- Level 1: “Crawl”-unit has just completed a major staff turnover; untrained personnel or limited practical application
- Level 2: “Walk”-unit fairly cohesive and experienced; practical application completed in a majority of tasks
- Level 3: “Run”-unit has completed extensive practical application; considered “trained”

Based on the Army Forces Command Directive and U.S. Army Europe guidance, numerous training exercises are completed at each level to ensure individual soldiers and entire units are prepared for deployment. The 49th Armored Division, 101st Airborne/Air Assault, and 25th 28th and 29th Infantry Divisions have utilized this training model. At the apex of training, the unit conducts a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) to replicate upcoming theatre operations. The exercise emphasizes collective staff skills and unit tasks, in addition to individual competencies delineated by rank. Training aids include antagonist role players and realistic town scenarios that emulate likely situations. The MRE has a multinational and task force focus, which utilizes observers and controllers who provided guidance throughout the exercise. Also, After Action Reviews (AARs) are conducted at every level for program feedback. Finally, direct liaison is continuously maintained with staff members of the Multinational Division North (MND-N) in the mission area for realistic input. The following terminal learning objectives apply to the MRE:

- Rehearse/execute contingency plans (e.g. oversee elections)
- Integrate force protection measures
- Execute timely, accurate, and complete reporting
- Refine reconnaissance and surveillance plan in accordance with the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)
- Conduct negotiations and liaison procedures
• Rehearse Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWC) actions

• Conduct joint patrols with multinational brigades

• Inspect weapons storage sites

• Maintain detailed documentation of actions/events

• Track and monitor mine clearing operations

• Conduct countermine/counter-obstacle operations

• Destroy confiscated weapons caches

• Sustain the force

• React to displaced personnel and refugees

• React to civil unrest

• Integrate ROE measures into the military decision making process

Currently, the MRE is conducted at either the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hoensfels, Germany or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana. Under extenuating circumstances, personnel augmentations or replacement may occur just prior to a unit’s PSO deployments. In such cases, these soldiers are processed through the Continental United Stated Replacement Center (CRC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Figure 10 presents an example schedule for CRC training.
In comparing traditional combat tasks and techniques to those required for PSO, the Army’s research shows that 87% are the same for combat-arms units at the platoon level and 84% the same at the company level (Bankus). While these tasks are applicable to both combat-related missions and PSO, the situational environment and means of employment are quite different. At the platoon, company, and small unit leader levels, the Army identifies the following PSO-unique tasks:

- Small Unit Leader Tasks
  - Exchanging information
  - Working with an interpreter
  - Conduct negotiations
- Company Tasks
  - Conduct negotiations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Subject/Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In-processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medical screening and USAREUR driver training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Soldier Readiness Processing, Organizational Clothing Issue, M16A2 Pre-Marksmanship Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Protective mask fitting and confidence training, M9, M16A2 and other qualification ranges. Soldiers qualify with the weapon they carry into theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>General and Theater Specific Training (Preventive Medicine/ Environmental Threat, SAEDA, OPSEC, Code of Conduct, Law of Land Warfare, Country Overview, Rules of Engagement, Media Awareness, Anti-Fraticide, and Anti-Terrorism) and USAREUR driver testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Individual Replacement Training (Day One). Students rotate through six stations (MEDEVAC procedures, Driving Hazards/Convoy operations, Countermine Operations, Mine Awareness, and Force Protection Skills)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Individual Replacement Training (Day Two); students rotate through two lanes to practice skills; Situational Awareness (Media Interview, Conduct Searches, Local Security, Encounter Civilians); Force Protection (Mines, Booby Traps and Unexploded Ordinance, React to Artillery/Ambush/Snipers, React to Factions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Out-processing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. U.S. Army Schedule for CRC Training
- Controlling civil disturbances
- Controlling checkpoints
- Securing a route
- Conduct coordination with other units/groups
- Conducting presence operations (as a deterrent)
- Processing confiscated documents, equipment, and materials

- Platoon Tasks
  - Operating observation posts
  - Conducting a presence patrol
  - Conducting civil disturbance operations
  - Operating a checkpoint
  - Securing a route
  - Searching a building
  - Processing confiscated documents, equipment, and material

At the battalion and higher levels of command, contact skills are even more critical in terms of interacting with belligerents, the local populace, and other organizations. Also, leaders must have a complete understanding of the political context and underlying issues associated with a PSO.

Within the actual area of operations for a given mission, the Army uses Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) to systematically ensure that all elements of a unit’s combat power are effectively brought to bear in accomplishing the mission. However, after action reviews from operations in Bosnia conducted by the 49th Armored Division, a Texas Army National Guard unit, revealed that BOS factors are quite different between combat missions and PSO. Basically, combat functions of fire support and air defense are substituted with requirements for information operations, inter-military coordination, and civil-military operations. As a result, commanders must consider these factors when developing training plans.
Since the timeframe for PSO deployments impacts pre-deployment training programs, a unit deployment schedule has been established for operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Of particular note, six units out of eight units designated for upcoming deployments are Army National Guard unit. Ultimately, such emphasis on the “One Army Concept” has great implications for training at both the unit and individual levels.

F. TRAINING FOR U.S. ARMY RESERVE UNITS

The Leader Development and Education For Sustained Peace (LDESP) program at the Naval Postgraduate School offers a 6-day graduate education program for units deploying to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Classroom instruction is preceded by a web-based preparation course, while mission-specific training opportunities are available after the course. The course utilizes lessons learned to facilitate consistent and continuous training, concentrating on knowledge management within the areas of operation. Within the operational environment, constant coordination, lessons learned, and knowledge management help to diminish consequences associated with senior military personnel turnovers approximately every six months. Ultimately, the LDESP program provides a conceptual framework for graduates, primarily senior leaders, to understand the likely effects of military decisions made in a rapidly changing, complex, and ambiguous PSO environment.
VIII. DATA ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This research analyzes various models for PSO training at the international, regional, and national levels to identify implications and provide recommendations for enhancing PSO training within the U.S. Military. From an organizational systems perspective, the UN serves as the principal organization responsible for authorizing, establishing, and coordinating PSO at the international level. Accordingly, the UN training program for PSO, promulgated through the TES of the DPKO, represents the foundation for regional and national programs to emulate and build upon. Subsequently, these programs develop processes to meet tactical-level training requirements for individuals and units assigned to UN missions. For this research, the PSO training programs of the UN, the Nordic countries, the Canadian Forces, the German Military, and the U.S. Military are evaluated based on the following criteria:

1. **Mandate.** Decisions made at the strategic level that set the direction for establishing or enhancing PSO training. The mandate may result from external influences, such as an event within the environment, or from internal shifts within the system.

2. **Structure.** A centralized or decentralized framework designed to support the training of personnel at the tactical level of operations. Programs may be either institutionalized as a distinctive organization or developed ad hoc to meet immediate requirements. Further, while programs may address training needs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, this research focuses on preparing individuals and units at the tactical level of operations.

3. **Curricular formalization.** The degree of consistency in developing training standards and academic lesson plans.

4. **Coordination and communication mechanisms.** Capabilities of the institution or training provider to interact within the organization (internal) and cooperate with outside agencies (external).

5. **Participants.** The intended recipients of the training curriculum, which may be directed towards military personnel, civilians, or a combination thereof. Further, these participants may have various levels of seniority and differing degrees of PSO
experience. The training program may be prescribed for a single military service, a joint body, or even a multi-national contingent.

6. **Evaluation methods.** Techniques for determining if critical success factors for training have been achieved. In the mission area, PSO personnel seek to maintain or develop a stable environment conducive to diplomatic efforts that lead to resolution of the underlying issues. Therefore, critical success factors focus relate to the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the training program. However, difficulties in measuring these elements may require the use of proxy variables, such as the number of military and civilian casualties, mission completion time, duration of peace sustained after PSO personnel withdraw, and resources expended in terms of personnel and financial support.

7. **Feedback mechanisms.** Based on training results in the form of outputs, outcomes, and cultural effects, the responsive and adaptation of training programs to environmental factors and performance evaluations. Feedback may be immediate from personnel in the mission area or formally stated in subsequent after action reports/lessons learned.

B. **COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT**

Per Table 2 through 6, a chart for each model depicts the current status and key factors associated with each program criterion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mandate                                 | • “Establish the minimum training, equipment, and other standards required for forces to participate in UN peacekeeping operations” (Brahimi Rpt 35)  
• Develop standby teams of qualified officers to participate in advanced training with troop contributing Member States (35) |
| Structure                                | • Centralized body that collects, coordinates, and disseminates training materials to subordinate training organizations at the regional and national levels  
• Decentralized in terms of training support and programs; lack of onsite training facilities |
| Curricular formalization                 | • General guidelines and basic training materials provided to regional and Member State programs  
• Documentation focused strictly on methods and techniques for peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO)  
• No established PSO doctrine  
• No official training standards |
| Coordination and communication mechanisms| • Mobile UN Training Assistance Teams support personnel training of subordinate organizations  
• Information, training materials, and correspondence courses available via the internet; chat room initiated 2/28/02 |
| Participants                            | • Participants must request assistance to the training organization; UN training assistance not mandatory for participants  
• Correspondence courses available to both military and civilian personnel at a monetary cost |
| Evaluation methods                      | • Limited  
• UN correspondence courses graded online |
| Feedback mechanisms                      | • Lessons Learned Unit completes the following:  
  o Obtains first hand information from mid- and end-of-mission assessments observing units and questioning personnel  
  o Gathers data from secondary sources, such as publications, media evaluation, and end-of-tour reports from key personnel  
  o Conduct empirical analysis of after-action questionnaires distributed to key personnel and workshop/seminar attendees  
  o Ensure accessibility of obtained information a resource center |

Table 2. United Nations PSO Training Program Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>• Develop a functional, multi-national crisis contingent by 2003 controlled by either an international or regional body, such as the UN, OSCE, EU, or NATO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Structure                        | • Centralized for administration and planning  
• Decentralized to national programs for providing training in designated areas |
| Curricular formalization         | • Course materials developed by national organizations; shared with other members  
• No official training standards  
• Focused strictly on methods and techniques for peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO) |
| Coordination and communication mechanisms | • Strategic talks among national defense ministers  
• Operational planning among staff representatives to NORDCAPS  
• Information sharing with other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) |
| Participants                     | • Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish military personnel for national training; high experience levels  
• Multi-national participants from foreign countries  
• Civilian police |
| Evaluation methods               | • Training center staff members observe trained personnel in the mission area |
| Feedback mechanisms              | • Varies based on national program components |

Table 3. NORDCAPS PSO Training Program Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Increase consistency and depth of PSO training through institutionalized programs-DCDS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Structure                                | • Centralized PSTC that directs and oversees training of military personnel; actual training may be conducted onsite or by assigned training cells mobilized to unit locations  
• Decentralized responsibility of unit commanders to meet individual and unit training requirements prior to deployment  
• Pearson Peacekeeping Training Center designated for strategic studies and research (primarily civilian attendees) |
| Curricular formalization                 | • Focused strictly on methods and techniques for peacekeeping (no support for other types of PSO) training  
• Participants evaluated according to training standards and practical application exercises |
| Coordination and communication mechanisms| • Information sharing with other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) |
| Participants                            | • Military personnel from all service elements, representing a wide range of experience levels and officer/enlisted ranks |
| Evaluation methods                      | • Evaluation techniques:  
  o Participants complete questionnaires regarding the quantity and quality of the training program  
  o End of course debrief and associated reports  
  o Staff After-Action reports  
• Validation techniques:  
  o Staff members observe and query trained personnel in the mission area  
  o On-the-job questionnaires to troops  
  o Supervisor questionnaires  
  o Discussions/Focus groups |
| Feedback mechanisms                     | • Outcome of the evaluation methods: on-site (training facilities) and off-site (mission area) forms the basis of revisions to the program curriculum  
• Lessons Learned Center publishes detailed information on PSO |

Table 4. Canadian Forces PSO Training Program Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandate</strong></td>
<td>• Establish a central peacekeeping training center to enhance future preparations for PSO missions; organization should focus on developing expertise in assessing future mission requirements-German Government responding to experiences in UNOSOM II in 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>• Centralized training center-requisite for all military PSO participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Curricular formalization</strong></td>
<td>• No official training standards</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Coordination and communication mechanisms** | • Mandatory attendance for military personnel and units assigned to PSO reduces communication requirements (formalized command and control)  
• Civilians, primarily civil service, journalists, and police, request training/preparation for assignments supporting/reporting PSO |
| **Participants**                             | • German Army soldiers (Officers and NCOs) for national training; high experience levels  
• Multi-national and multi-service participants from foreign countries  
• Civilians (civil service, police, and journalists) |
| **Evaluation methods**                       | • Training center staff members observe trained personnel in the mission area |
| **Feedback mechanisms**                      | • Pertinent information relayed to the training center about changes in the mission area  
• Training center personnel dispatched for further inquiry and insight  
• After-action reports based on PSO experience  
• Oral discussions with experienced personnel returning from the mission area  
• Lessons learned incorporated into the training program for future missions |

Table 5. German Armed Forces PSO Training Program Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Status</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Mandate                        | • None; training “summed up as *just enough* and *just in time*”-FM 100-23  
• PSO do not represent new missions; should not be added to a unit’s mission essential task list (METL)                                                                                                                                                  |
| Structure                      | • TSIRT: Theatre-specific training site (tactical level) developed to meet training requirements for personnel deploying to the Balkans  
• U.S. Army PKI: Strategic level organization developed to enhance doctrine and senior leadership education  
• Limited interaction between the U.S. Army PKI and TSIRT                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Curricular formalization       | • No formal Program of Instruction (POI) or official training standards  
• Lesson plans, course outlines, and presentations developed onsite to prepare personnel deploying to the Balkans  
• Theatre-specific focus; short-term perspective  
• Focused on mission familiarization training                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Coordination and communication mechanisms | • TSIRT attendance mandatory requirement for all personnel assigned to the Balkans  
• Minimal communication with other peace training centers-TSIRT not an official center (designated internally as a “site”)                                                                                                                                                  |
| Participants                   | • U.S. Army soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, Red Cross personnel, contracted personnel (i.e. interpreters), and Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) representatives assigned to PSO in the Balkans  
• Not specified for joint training of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Evaluation methods             | • Instructors complete After Action Reviews (AAR) upon completion of each training area  
• Limited evaluation of participants; focus on familiarization  
• Student surveys completed upon training conclusion; pertinent recommendations submitted to the 7th ATC for possible POI modifications  
• TSIRT representatives periodically observe personnel in the mission area                                                                                                                                                                           |
| Feedback mechanisms            | • Contact with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)  
• Task force commander utilizes chain-of-command to express training concerns                                                                                                                                                                                            |

Table 6. United States Military PSO Training Program Analysis
C. EVALUATION OF THE UN MODEL

At the international level of military PSO training, the current UN program, developed primarily in response to the Brahimi Report, represents a positive shift in the perception of training relevance through the institutionalization of the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the DPKO. However, since the UN does not maintain control over a standing military force, training methodologies revolve around a decentralized process, which relies upon regional and Member State organizations to conduct training at all levels—most notably tactical preparations—to meet mission requirements. Since the United Nations does not conduct onsite tactical training for individuals and units, the TES focuses on mobile UNTAT, correspondence courses, and online information to influence training on all levels. Currently, Member States are not required to either request or receive training from these mobile teams prior to deploying for PSO. Although the UN serves as the lead agency for international PSO, a doctrinal training strategy and associated performance standards for units and individuals have not been developed. These shortcomings limit the organization’s ability to oversee and support personnel training of contributing Member States. Further, UN training principles distributed via CD-ROM and online information limit PSO guidelines strictly to peacekeeping operations. While a broader spectrum of PSO, including peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace building are referenced in UN publications, such dimensions fail to be sufficiently addressed within training reference materials.

D. EVALUATION OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES’ MODEL

Regarding regional PSO training programs, the common views of peace support requirements between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden evolved into the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support (NORDCAPS) programs. The framework for NORDCAPS focuses on establishing multi-national contingencies to support either NATO or EU forces assigned to UN-mandated PSO. To prepare personnel for these contingencies, differentiated training responsibilities are assigned to individual nations. Serving as an administrative body, NORDCAPS representatives plan training exercises within the Nordic countries, while coordinating externally with other organizations and nations. Additionally, strategic level discussions occur annually between defense ministers and senior military officials. By obtaining the support of national leaders, NORDCAPS has successfully institutionalized its
importance within the realm of PSO. Further, coordination continues to occur at the operational level between NORDCAPS staff members. The close relationship between the Nordic countries regarding PSO training facilitated development of the EAPC on the international level.

Although the Nordic countries cooperate in strategic planning, the training programs of individual nations vary. As a result, training area specialization and associated expertise have grown among all four contributors. For example, rather than focusing on all aspects of PSO training, national programs focus efforts on certain areas, such as Sweden’s role in educating staff officers. Although lacking training standards across national organizations, these countries effectively share the burden of resource expenditures, while simultaneously taking advantage of specialized national programs. Comparable to the UN perspective on PSO, the NORDCAPS model and its component programs focus strictly upon peacekeeping, rather than addressing other dimensions of PSO. The marked distinction between peacekeeping and other PSO resulted in a unilateral focus on peacekeeping training. Although peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter are preferable to the uncertainties of other PSO, primarily peace enforcement missions, future operations will likely challenge participants with aspects of all types.


When examining initial mandates relative to the three national-level programs, both the Canadian and German Governments responded to operational failures in Somalia by investigating, identifying, and implementing training strategies to lessen the likelihood of such shortcomings in future operations. Further, these countries institutionalized training programs and associated infrastructure within three years of the UN mission to Somalia. However, the U.S. Military responded to shortcomings in Somalia by developing doctrine and disseminating publications, such as FM 100-23. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) developed such doctrine to improve strategic level planning and coordination. However, an institutionalized PSO training program at the tactical level never materialized.

The Canadian Deputy Chief of Defense established the PSTC in 1996 to better prepare military personnel for PSO in numerous areas worldwide. Likewise, the German Army Chief of
Staff instructed the development of a peacekeeping school in 1994. Subsequently, in the mid-
1990’s, when regional conflict erupted in the Balkans that required peacekeeping personnel, both
the Canadian Forces and the German Armed Forces addressed training challenges by adapting
course curricula within their respective training institutions. However, lacking a centralized
organization for PSO training, the U.S. Army developed an impromptu, theater-specific TSIRT
site to prepare personnel for missions to Kosovo and Bosnia. Although lacking an
institutionalized framework, the TSIRT site has gradually developed lessons plans and course
materials to prepare both military personnel and particular civilians for Balkan deployments.
The scope and detail of these training areas has not reached the level of official training
standards, such as those utilized by the Canadian Forces. With respect to Department of the
Army doctrine, FM 100-23 emphasizes that PSO tasks should not be considered as part of a
unit’s Mission Essential Task List (METL). Without an institutionalized organization and a
curriculum centered on PSO-specific training standards, the U.S. Military’s ability to respond in
an effective and efficient way to future PSO may be severely hampered.

With respect to coordination and communication elements within the three national
models, the PSTC, the German Training Center, and the TSIRT site all exist as subordinate
organizations/elements within the Department of the Army or, with respect to Canada, the Land
Element. PSO training within Canada has developed in a rather dualistic manner; only military
personnel receive training at the PSTC, while civilians and senior military officials attend the
Pearson Center. Regarding German PSO training, conducted at the German Infantry School,
military personnel, primarily Army soldiers, journalists, police, and other civilians can receive
applicable training. The TSIRT remains dedicated to theater-specific training for U.S. Army and
support personnel deploying to the Balkans.

As institutionalized PSO training programs, the PSTC and the German Peace Training
Center maintain contact and conduct liaison with similar organizations worldwide. For example,
both institutions submit course information to the EAPC for distribution. This communication
facilitates institutional knowledge sharing and promotes a sense of teamwork among staff
members assigned to these organizations. As an unofficial training site, the TSIRT program
lacks credibility and faces challenges in gaining support from established training centers.
Further, the TSIRT site maintains limited contact with training representatives from other Army
organizations, while communications among military services is nearly non-existent.
In terms of evaluating the performance of training participants, the PSTC, the German Training Center, and the TSIRT site utilize similar personnel observation techniques in mission areas to ascertain measures of training effectiveness. While the German program appears to lack direct feedback from course participants, the PSTC and the TSIRT site utilize student questionnaires to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of training. Finally, all three organizations rely upon After Action Reports/Lessons Learned to modify and improve their respective training programs.
IX. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A. INTRODUCTION

In summary, this thesis presents the following findings regarding the initial research questions:

Primary research question: What curricular considerations, educational areas, and instructional methodologies are pertinent to a tactical level PSO training program in the U.S. Military?

Curricular considerations:

- Intended audience (Service-specific/joint, civilian participants, experience levels, student demographics)
- Type of courses-basic, specialized, or mission-specific
- Training Medium-residential, distance learning, or mobile training teams
- Identification/training of instructor pool
- Scope of PSO instruction-peacekeeping or expanded to include other PSO types
- Development of training standards and course materials
- Methods of evaluating training effectiveness
- Feedback mechanisms for modifying and improving the program

Training for PSO should focus on the close interaction of U.S. service members with other national militaries, civilian organizations, the disputing parties to the conflict, and the local populace. Additionally, personnel require training in the following educational areas:

- History and fundamentals of PSO
- Specific mission concerns (i.e. cultural awareness, geography, mission operations, and intelligence)
- Peace support duties (applicable to military observers)
• Patrolling skills specific to PSO
• Mine awareness
• Hostage survival skills
• Negotiation and mediation
• Preventive medicine
• Media awareness
• Equipment recognition of weapons systems
• Stress management
• Application of force and Rules of Engagement (ROE) understanding
• Cross cultural awareness
• Legal Issues and personal conduct
• Administration, allowances, and benefits

Instructional Methodologies:

• Classroom presentations/guest speakers
• Practical applications exercises
• Command Post exercises
• Web-based learning
• Correspondence courses
• Simulation training/virtual environments

Secondary research questions:

1. How many PSO training models currently exist throughout the world?

As of March 14, 2002, the United Nations website identified 81 Member State countries conducting peacekeeping training. A preponderance of training programs focuses on traditional peacekeeping, rather than addressing the multi-dimensional
nature of PSO. Additionally, regional training organizations, international training initiatives, such as those sponsored by the UN, and cross-national programs have developed as well.

2. What organizations are responsible for developing and implementing PSO training programs within selected countries? Are the programs centralized in the form of joint training or decentralized by service departments?

Based on the national training models examined, the Army branch or equivalent land service maintains cognizance over PSO training. However, the actual training programs may be institutionalized within a designated training center, such as the Canadian Peace Support Training Center (PSTC), or subordinated to an infantry school command, as exemplified in the German and U.S. Military (i.e. U.S. Army) models. Based on land force requirements for PSO, training programs have focused on preparing such forces for UN missions. However, the interoperability of Canadian military personnel, primarily among administrative specialties, has facilitated joint training within that model.

3. What are the curricular components of current PSO training programs?

From the national models examined, most PSO training occurs residentially, either onsite at a designated training center or at a unit’s home station. Distance learning, in terms of correspondence courses and web-based education, has only been implemented within the decentralized training model of the United Nations. At the national level, Canada offers a certificate of completion for PSO courses, while the German Army and U.S. Army programs simply mandate completion. Depending on the training model, between one and two weeks of PSO-specific training are designated during an overall pre-deployment training window of approximately 90 days. Further, while the Canadian PSTC and German UN Training Center conduct training for all current PSO missions, the U.S. Army provides only theater-specific courses. Finally, the balance of general military training with mission-specific training varies across models.
4. What training methodologies, such as simulation, classroom instruction, and electronic learning, are being utilized to provide instruction?

- Extensive classroom instruction with presentations and guest speakers
- Practical application exercises for certain techniques, such as prodding for mines and conducting crowd control techniques
- Command Post (CP) exercises for staff members
- Limited use of electronic learning, except for the German multimedia CD-ROM and the United Nations publications CD-ROM and web-based information platform

5. How have national strategies, cultural sensitivities, lessons learned, and other factors contributed to the development of PSO training models?

Although national strategies and cultural factors affect military PSO training, this research did not focus on the diversity of national interests and associated strategic policies. However, within the international arena, the end of the Cold War greatly impacted the frequency and types of PSO and related training. Further, repercussions from lessons learned in Somalia (UNOSOM) operations brought about substantial changes to many PSO training programs, particularly among the national models of Canada and Germany.

B. CONCLUSIONS

This section provides conclusions regarding PSO training commonalities, strengths, and weaknesses of the United Nations model, the NORDCAPS regional program, and the national models of Canada, Germany, and the United States.

Although establishing the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) increased institutional emphasis on PSO training, the organization lacks a unifying doctrine for PSO and associated training required to coordinate programs among Member States and regional organizations effectively.
Based on recommendations in the Brahimi Report of 2000, the TES implemented a decentralized PSO training program at the international level. Since the United Nations does not command a standing military force, PSO training among subordinate organizations at the regional and Member State level is loosely coordinated through online information, a training CD-ROM, and correspondence courses. Also, mobile training teams are dispatched to assist Member States that request additional training support for upcoming UN Missions. Ultimately, the TES serves in a primarily administrative role, rather than operational, in collecting and disseminating information from subordinate training programs.

Although the United Nations PSO training program serves effectively as a collector, disseminator, and limited coordinator of subordinate training program information, the organization lacks control over the international arena of PSO training. Without an international doctrine for PSO, Member States and regional organizations rely upon various curricula, training methodologies, and standards to prepare personnel for UN-mandated PSO. Further, the UN does not require Member States to obtain “face-to-face” training time with UN Training Assistance Teams (UNTATs). Alternatively, UN representatives from the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should play an active role in developing PSO courses and programs within Member States by conducting periodic visits to training areas and allocating time to serve as onsite, liaison staff members. Developing a working relationship with staff counterparts of Member State PSO programs could improve the effectiveness of UNTATs through close interaction and constant feedback.

The NORDCAPS program between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden represents a unified commitment to promote interoperability and knowledge management at the regional level of PSO and associated training.

By coordinating training programs among the four national participants, each maximizes expertise in certain area, while reducing manpower and resource requirements. Further, in addition to knowledge management within the regional body, training participants develop a unique camaraderie and a share a reinforced commitment towards common goals. Although lacking training standards among component organizations, the NORDCAPS program provides a mechanism for sharing ideas and perspectives essential for improving training.
The U.S. Military lacks an institutionalized PSO training program to meet long-term operational requirements at the tactical level.

Among the United States Armed Forces, the U.S. Army maintains primary responsibility for undertaking PSO and developing associated training. While the U.S. Army utilizes the Army Peacekeeping Institute to address doctrinal issues at the strategic and operational levels, a comparable tactical-level training organization does not exist. Therefore, training responsibilities for personnel and units deploying for PSO fall directly upon the unit commander. In response to training needs for Bosnia and Kosovo missions in the Balkans, the Commanding General of the United States Army Infantry School authorized the 29th Infantry Regiment Theatre Specific Individual Readiness Training (TSIRT) site in 1997 to conduct theater-specific training for soldiers and support personnel. However, since the U.S. Army does not consider PSO-related tasks as requisite additions to a unit’s mission essential task list (METL), the TSIRT site remains a short-term solution specific to training requirements for the Balkans. If additional PSO requirements develop, training platforms, in addition to manpower and resource allocations, will require a significant transformation to meet those operational training needs. Additionally, since PSO remain under cognizance of the U.S. Army, the other Armed Services continue to lack sufficient training for either direct combat roles or supporting missions for PSO. For example, the Marine Corps may be called upon to act in a peace enforcement capacity before a peacekeeping force of the U.S. may be deployed. As stated in Field Manual 100-23, U.S. Military doctrine properly recognizes the differences between certain PSO, notably peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

At the international level, the TES of the United Nations DPKO should actively develop and coordinate all levels of training among Member States and regional organizations that participate in PSO mandated by the UN.

Prior to deploying for the mission area, United Nations’ representatives should oversee and assist with standardized personnel training for all participating Member States and regional organizations. Regardless of political and economic circumstances affecting troop-contributing nations, prerequisite training serves a critical function in uniting all contingents under a common
perspective and developing analogous skill levels. While some nations may require advanced training support from the UN, all troop-contributing bodies should meet established training criteria by maintaining direct liaison with UN training representatives. Despite lacking a doctrine for PSO, the UN should periodically provide onsite training assistance to national organizations to develop and enhance programs following UN guidelines. Further, the United Nations should solicit feedback from the recipient organizations to modify and improve upon the effectiveness and efficiency of these training teams. As a centralized method for improving training, the United Nations could sponsor conferences, seminars, or planning sessions to assemble representatives from training programs worldwide. In this capacity, the TES would serve in a coordination role comparable to that of NORDCAPS at the regional level.

Based on the NORDCAPS regional model for promoting PSO training, Canada and the United States should consider developing a closer relationship to advance PSO training through sharing course materials and developing a mutual understanding of PSO.

As an institutionalized training organization, the Canadian Forces PSTC developed training programs adapted for mission requirements, taking into account the demographics and experience levels of training participants. By maintaining a flexible training program for UN missions worldwide, the curriculum for Canada’s basic PSO course can be modified to include both general information and mission-specific requirements. In contrast, the TSIRT site utilized by the U.S. Army for training personnel for theater-specific missions to the Balkans lacks the institutional support and curricular depth to develop as a viable, long-term training program. When PSO missions and associated training requirements for the Balkans conclude, the U.S. Military, likely the U.S. Army, will be forced to improvise another training program in response to future PSO missions. By developing a closer relationship with the Canadian PSTC, information sharing provides a partial solution for developing and improving PSO training in the U.S. Military. Also, as a member of NATO, the United States should actively participate in the TEPSO Program to improve international relations, while advancing PSO training at the tactical level. Finally, within the United States Department of the Army, the tactical-level TSIRT site would benefit tremendously from coordination and cooperation with the Peacekeeping Institute at the strategic and operational levels.
If the United States Military continues to participate in PSO, the Department of Defense should examine alternative models for PSO training at the tactical level. Given the complexity and frequency of PSO in the last decade, a comprehensive training program must be developed to address the myriad operational requirements facing personnel in the mission area. However, prior to setting a certain direction for PSO training, a thorough cost-benefit analysis and further research should be conducted.

Comparable to the German Peace Training Center, PSO training could be expanded under the Army Infantry School; however, since PSO typically involve either combat units or support elements from the other Armed Forces, participants should not be limited to Army soldiers and support personnel. Such an arrangement would reduce infrastructure requirements, but would symbolically project a close relationship between traditional combat training and that necessary for PSO. However, referring to the Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) of the Canadian Forces, an organization separate from ground forces training could be created to focus strictly on preparing for PSO. Although a subordinate organization under the Army Infantry School could achieve credibility, a designated organization, whether within the Department of the Army or developed as a joint command, may have greater flexibility and deference in working with other peace training centers worldwide.

Regardless of the organizational structure developed to support PSO training, a training needs assessment should be conducted for each curriculum. General training areas, such as the roles and importance of civilian organizations, should be imparted to all PSO participants. Course curricula for PSO training must address the following requirements:

- Training standards based on knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) essential for success in the mission
- Experience levels and student demographics of participants to focus directly on student needs
- Instructional methods, such as classroom instruction, practical application and role-playing exercises, correspondence courses, and website learning resources, that thoroughly immerse participants within the curriculum
• Evaluation methods, consisting of written examinations, practical application exercises, and personnel observations within the mission areas, that validate student mastery of the training standards

• Feedback mechanisms, based on participant questionnaires, after-action reports, and lessons learned, that provide critical information for developing and enhancing PSO training

Further, while similar peacekeeping missions may be conducted simultaneously in different regions of the world, training requirements will vary based on Rules of Engagement (ROE), cultural sensitivities, geographic differences, and other factors specific to the mission. Thus, individual training curriculum must be mission-specific and tailored towards the participants preparing for deployment.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

While this research examined several PSO training models at the international, regional, and national levels, subsequent studies could focus on a particular aspect of a training curriculum, such as instructional methodologies/types, to identify specific applications for PSO. For example, given the global use of the Internet, curricular components could be differentiated by those best suited for either distance learning or an educational portal.

For researchers investigating the development of a specific PSO curriculum, a detailed content analysis of several similar courses at the national level, such as a military observers course, could be beneficial for identifying particular strengths and weakness of existing models. Also, a cost-benefit analysis of various models could help to identify the most advantageous program with respect to the U.S. Military.

Regarding a quantitative assessment of PSO training models, further research could evaluate training effectiveness by utilizing proxy variables in terms of casualty statistics (military and civilian), mission duration, or time elapsed between mission “completion” and a re-emergence of conflict. However, additional variables, such as contingent assignment, number of personnel deployed, and type/frequency of PSO involvement, must be controlled for across training models.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAFES  Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAR    After Action Report
AC     Area of Operations
ACCP   Army Correspondence Course Program
AIPD   Army Institute for Professional Development
ATC    Army Training Command
AWS    Amphibious Warfare School
BOS    Battlefield Operating Systems
CALL   Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAX    Combined Arms Exercise
CCA    Cross Cultural Awareness
CCIR   Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
CD-ROM Compact Disc Read-Only Memory
CDS    Chief of Defense Staff
CF     Canadian Forces
CHOD   Chief of Defense
CIMIC  (Nordic) Civil-Military Cooperation Course
CINCEUR Commander-in-Chief Europe
CIS    Communication and Information Systems
CJ7/PLE Chairman, Joint Planning/Planning Element
CJCSI  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CLFSCC Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College
CMTC   Combat Maneuver Training Center
CMTF   Civil-Military Task Force
CONUSA Continental United States Army
CPX    Command Post Exercise
CRC    Continental United States Replacement Center
CTC    Combat Training Center
DAG    Departure Assistance Team
DCDS   Deputy Chief of Defense Staff
DPKO   Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAPC   Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECR    End of Course Report
EDP    Electronic Data Processing
EOD    Explosives Ordnance Disposal
ERT    Extended Range of Tasks
EU     European Union
EU COM European Command
EVA    Einsatzverbandsausbildung (German)
FINCENT Finnish Defense Forces International Center
FORS COM Forces Command
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>INTCIS</td>
<td>International Communication and Information Systems Course</td>
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<td>INTOCC</td>
<td>International Commanding Officers Course</td>
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<td>INTSLOC</td>
<td>International Senior Logistic Officers Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTSUPSOCC</td>
<td>International Support Staff Officers Course</td>
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<td>JMETLC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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<td>JWC</td>
<td>Joint Warfare Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>International Security Force in Kosovo</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSAs</td>
<td>Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDESP</td>
<td>Leader Development and Education For Sustained Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFC</td>
<td>Land Force Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFDTSC</td>
<td>Land Force Doctrine and Training System</td>
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<td>LL</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>LOG</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MFO</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers</td>
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<td>MNDN</td>
<td>Multinational Division North</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mission Rehearsal Exercise</td>
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<td>MTOE</td>
<td>Modified Table of Organization and Equipment</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mission Training Plan</td>
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<td>Mobile Training Teams</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NATO/PFPLOC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Partnership for Peace Logistics Officers Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCG</td>
<td>Nordic Coordination Group</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer-in-Charge</td>
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<td>NMCG</td>
<td>NORDCAPS Military Coordination Group</td>
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<td>NODEFIC</td>
<td>Norway Defense Forces International Center</td>
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<td>NORDCAPS</td>
<td>Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support</td>
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<td>NORDSAMFN</td>
<td>Nordiska samarbetsgruppen i militära FN-ärenden</td>
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<td>NPFR</td>
<td>Nordic Pool of Forces Register</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>NORDCAPS Steering Group</td>
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<td>NWG/CD</td>
<td>NORDCAPS Working Group Course Directors</td>
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<td>OCSE/EUMOC</td>
<td>Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe and European Union Monitors and Observers Course</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe</td>
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<td>PP</td>
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<td>PFPSOC</td>
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<td>PKI</td>
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<td>Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>Planning Element</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>POCI</td>
<td>Program of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<td>PPC</td>
<td>Pearson Peace Center</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operation</td>
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<td>Peace Support Training Center</td>
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<td>Private Voluntary Organizations</td>
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<td>RMC</td>
<td>Royal Military College</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>S&amp;E</td>
<td>Standardization and Evaluation</td>
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<td>SAEDA</td>
<td>Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the US Army</td>
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<td>Service Income Security Insurance Plan</td>
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<td>Subject Matter Experts</td>
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<td>Staff Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>The Basic School</td>
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<td>Training Cell</td>
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<td>Training and Evaluation Service</td>
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<td>Task Force</td>
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<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>(U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<td>TSP</td>
<td>Training Support Packages</td>
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<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Manuals</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNJOC</td>
<td>United Nations Junior Officers Course</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>UN Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<td>UNLOC</td>
<td>United Nations Logistics Officers Course</td>
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<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMILPOC</td>
<td>(Nordic) United Nations Military Police Course</td>
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<td>UNMOC</td>
<td>United Nations Military Observer Course</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia II</td>
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<td>UNSOC</td>
<td>United Nations Staff Officers Course</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTAT</td>
<td>United Nations Training Assistance Team</td>
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<td>USAREUR</td>
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<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>Vice Chief of Defense Staff</td>
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<td>WG</td>
<td>Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZENTRA</td>
<td>Zentrale Truppenausbildung (German)</td>
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## APPENDIX B. CANADIAN FORCES TRAINING SCHEDULE FOR PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Time/Date</th>
<th>20 NOV</th>
<th>21 NOV</th>
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<td><strong>0750-0830</strong></td>
<td>Indoctrination Rm 114</td>
<td>401.04 Risk and Threat Rm 114</td>
<td>406.01 Preventive Medicine Rm 114</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness OP DANACA Rms 114, 102, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>406.02 Stress Management Rm 114</td>
<td>407.01 Legal Rm 114</td>
<td>404.01 Mine Awareness (Theory) Rm 123</td>
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<td>Introduction Theatre</td>
<td>401.04 Risk and Threat Rm 114</td>
<td>406.01 Preventive Medicine Rm 114</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness OP DANACA Rms 114, 102, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>406.02 Stress Management Rm 114</td>
<td>407.01 Legal Rm 114</td>
<td>406.03 Protection Rm 114</td>
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<td><strong>0930-1010</strong></td>
<td>401.02 History &amp; Evolution of PSO Rm 114</td>
<td>405.01 Code of Conduct/Law of Armed Conflict Rm 114</td>
<td>402.07 Canadian Veteran OP DANACA Rms 114, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>403.02 Media Awareness Rm 114</td>
<td>403.01 Negotiation Techniques (Theory) Rm 114</td>
<td>404.01 Mine Awareness (Practical) Mine Awareness Training Area</td>
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<td><strong>1025-1105</strong></td>
<td>402.04 Terrain; OP DANACA Rm 114; OP CALUMET Rm 110</td>
<td>405.02 Use of Force Rm 114</td>
<td>406.01 Cross Cultural Awareness OP DANACA Rms 114, 102, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>403.02 Media Awareness Rm 114</td>
<td>402.04 Terrain; OP DANACA Rm 114; OP CALUMET Rm 110</td>
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<td>402.06 Mission Operations; OP DANACA Rm 114; OP CALUMET Rm 110</td>
<td>405.02 Use of Force Rm 114</td>
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<td>402.05 Mission Intelligence Rm 114</td>
<td>405.03 Use of Force-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, 104, 105; OP CALUMET Rm 106</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness (CCA) Rm 114</td>
<td>403.04 Foreign Weapons Rm 123</td>
<td>407.02 OP DANACA DAG Rm 114</td>
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<td><strong>1410-1450</strong></td>
<td>402.05 Mission Intelligence Rm 114</td>
<td>405.03 Use of Force-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, 104, 105; OP CALUMET Rm 106</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>407.02 OP DANACA DAG Rm 114</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1505-1545</strong></td>
<td>401.01 Conduct Rm 114</td>
<td>405.03 Use of Force-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, 104, 105; OP CALUMET Rm 106</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>403.03 Equipment Recognition Rm 114</td>
<td>407.02 OP DANACA DAG Rm 114</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1555-1635</strong></td>
<td>401.05 Peace Partners Rm 114</td>
<td>402.01 Cross Cultural Awareness-Mission Specific OP DANACA Rms 114, 104, 105; OP CALUMET Rm 108</td>
<td>403.03 Equipment Recognition Rm 114</td>
<td>407.02 OP DANACA DAG Rm 114</td>
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APPENDIX C. BASIC COURSE DEMOGRAPHICS FOR THE CANADIAN PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER

Rank Distributions for Students

- Enlisted: 69%
- Warrant Officers: 11%
- Company Grade Officers: 13%
- Field Grade Officers: 7%

Student Education Levels

- Non-High School Graduate: 7%
- High School Graduate: 50%
- Trade/Technical School: 12%
- College Diploma: 14%
- 1 Year University Diploma: 7%
- 2 or 3 Year University Diploma: 9%
Number of PSO Missions Completed Among Experienced PSO Students

Marital Status of Students

Years of Military Service for Students
Abrahamsen, Torgny. “Re: More NORDCAPS Questions.”
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Miller, Laura L. “Who should be the Peacekeepers?” University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Sociology. United States Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, July 1998.

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<http://odin.dep.no/fd/engelsk/publ/periodika/010001-990023/index-dok000-b-n-a.html>


Sandnes, Torleif. E-mail to the author. 21 Feb. 2002.

Speer, Michael. E-mail to the author. 20 Feb. 2002.


Williams, Gareth. “Re: TEPSO INFO.” E-mail to the author. 13 Mar. 2002.
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