Cooking up Psychological Operations the ingredients of successful PSYOP

Bemis, Bret M.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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COOKING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL PSYOP

by

Bret M. Bemis

June 2011

Thesis Advisor: Heather S. Gregg
Second Reader: John Arquilla

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Cooking up Psychological Operations: The Ingredients of Successful PSYOP

Bemis, Bret M.

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

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Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives. During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies’ will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. Academics and practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP. There has also been a large body of literature written about communication theory. What the literature fails to do is to address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP. Drawing from communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP products during the development phase. The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully.

Psychological Operations, PSYOP, Psychological Warfare, PSYWAR, Korea, Communication Theory,
COOKING UP PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL PSYOP

Bret M. Bemis
Captain (Promotable), United States Army
B.S., Eastern Kentucky University, 2001

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Author: Bret M. Bemis

Approved by: Heather S. Gregg
Thesis Advisor

John Arquilla
Second Reader

Gordon McCormick
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis
ABSTRACT

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been integral to U.S. military operations in times of war and peace. Using radio broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeakers, and other forms of media, the U.S. has directed PSYOP toward influencing the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives. During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies’ will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. Academics and practitioners have written a large body of literature over the last seventy years that addresses both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP. There has also been a large body of literature written about communication theory. What the literature fails to do is to address the important linkage between PSYOP and communication theory and how the relationship between the two affects the success or failure of PSYOP. Drawing from communication theory literature, this thesis builds a model for evaluating PSYOP products during the development phase. The thesis then applies this PSYOP model to Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War, in an attempt to identify the conditions under which PSYOP products are crafted and deployed successfully.
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<tr>
<td>1st L&amp;L</td>
<td>First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st RB&amp;L</td>
<td>First Radio Broadcast and Leaflet Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Coordinator of Information</td>
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<td>CPI</td>
<td>Committee on Public Information</td>
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<td>MISO</td>
<td>Military Information Support Operations</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Measure of Performance</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) have been used, to some extent, in almost every type of conflict since biblical times. During times of war and times of peace, it is directed toward the behavior of a target audience (TA), in order to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning in support of the accomplishment of national aims and objectives.\footnote{William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz, \textit{A Psychological Warfare Casebook} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1958), 2.} During war, tactical PSYOP is used to lower enemies’ will to fight and ultimately lead them to surrender. The importance of PSYOP can be seen in its elevated use throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. Beginning in World War I, the United States has tasked a number of organizations to conduct PSYOP, including the Propaganda Sub-Section, established in 1918, the Office of War Information (OWI), created in 1942, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), established in 1951, and since 1967, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG).

In its use of PSYOP, the United States has learned that, in order to influence the behavior of a target audience, one must properly plan the operation in order for it to be successful. However, more than just planning is required in order for PSYOP to be successful; it is also important to consider the best medium for sending the message, the receptiveness of the target audience, and the creation of metrics to evaluate the success of the operation. Literature on communications theory is particularly useful for understanding the necessary conditions that make planning and executing PSYOP successful. In this thesis, I will conduct research on communication theory and Psychological Operations, in particular its use during the Korean War, in an attempt to better understand what makes for successful psychological operations. The aim of this research is to help inform the planning process of future operations in order to execute successful PSYOP.
A. BACKGROUND

A considerable body of literature has been written over the last seventy years that describes cases of PSYOP and communication theory. There are a number of books and reports written on PSYOP during the Korean War, the first great Cold War conflict, and one in which PSYOP were prominently featured. Stephen Pease, George Pettee, Stanley Sandler, Herbert Friedman, and Alfred Paddock provide the information needed to describe who was responsible for the planning and execution of PSYOP, how it was employed, and the effects it had on the target audience during the Korean War. However, these authors do not focus sufficiently on the importance of PSYOP messaging and how it relates to the success or unsuccess of an operation.\(^2\)

Communication theory literature offers a great deal of information on what makes for successful communication. Communication models by Harold Lasswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, Wilber Schramm, and David Berlo provide the foundation for the PSYOP model that will be introduced in this thesis, in particular, the importance of the source, message, medium, and receiver.\(^3\) However, surprisingly little has been written that identifies the practical use of communication models in PSYOP planning. For example, Philip Katz gives a comprehensive detail of communication theory and how it relates to PSYOP but does not identify a way to use communication models in PSYOP

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This thesis aims to address these shortcomings by creating a model and matrix, using the PSYOP messaging variables, to evaluate PSYOP planning and operations.

Specifically, this thesis argues that, in order to understand what causes PSYOP to be successful or unsuccessful one must look at the source’s in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message being sent, the medium that is used to send the message, and the receptivity of the TA. These variables, drawn from communications theory, are necessary for PSYOP to be successful, but to what degree? Is one of these variables more important than another for successful PSYOP? Do all four variables have to be strong or can one or more variables be weak and still achieve the desired effects of the operation? This thesis aims to investigate these questions in order to better understand successful planning and execution of PSYOP operations.

B. METHODOLOGY

Building from literature on PSYOP and communication theory, this thesis begins by defining what PSYOP is and identifies four variables that are necessary for successful PSYOP messaging: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, a clear message, the correct medium, and the receptiveness of the target audience. These four variables make up a PSYOP model and matrix which will be used to evaluate U.S. PSYOP operations during the Korean War, in particular Operation MOOLAH, which aimed to encourage the defection of a MiG-15 fighter pilot with his aircraft, and the U.S. military’s use of leaflets and loudspeakers to spread PSYOP messages during the war.

The Korean War is an ideal case to test the PSYOP model and matrix for several reasons. First, there is an abundance of literature written, not only on the Korean War, but also on the use of PSYOP throughout the conflict. Second, since the Korean War took

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5 Although there are a number of variables present during PSYOP, the four that have been chosen coincide with the variables within communication theory. These variables are identified in communication theory and make communication successful.
place over fifty years ago, there has been enough time to evaluate the effectiveness of the PSYOP that took place. Also, documents that were otherwise secret have been made available for study. Third, according to Arend Lijphart, a single case study such as the Korean conflict is a valid and important means of testing theories. “The great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case, that case can be intensively examined…Indirectly, however, case studies can make an important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building.”

The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II offers a definition of PSYOP, drawn from U.S. Army manuals, and offers a brief overview of PSYOP’s history, particularly since World War I. Chapter III uses communication theory to develop a PSYOP model and matrix, arguing that four variables are particularly important for understanding the success of PSYOP products: in-depth knowledge of the target audience, the clarity of the message, the medium used to send the message, and the receptiveness of the TA to the message. Chapter IV uses the PSYOP model and matrix to evaluate U.S. PSYOP during the Korean War, specifically Operation MOOLAH and the use of leaflets and loudspeakers. Chapter V will draw general conclusions and their implications for PSYOP today.

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II. WHAT IS PSYOP?

From the time they were founded in 1775 and 1776, the United States Army and the government of the United States have used many forms of media to send well-crafted and sometimes not-so-well crafted messages to populations around the world. These messages were intended to persuade, influence, and/or change the behavior of populations or target audiences in favor of U.S. objectives. Crafted during times of war and during times of peace, these messages have been the backbone of U.S. strategic communications, public diplomacy, and psychological operations. Strategic communications and public diplomacy have been used extensively to inform foreign populations about the United States, and Psychological Operations have been used extensively during wartime to lower the morale of enemy combatants.

This chapter offers a brief history of Psychological Operations, including its definition, how PSYOP messaging is developed, the roles it plays in U.S. military operations and in support of embassy activities, and its evolution since World War I.

A. DEFINING PSYOP

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)\textsuperscript{7} is the term that has been used the longest to describe how the U.S. Army uses selected media to send messages and influence target audiences. PSYOP has outlived the terms “propaganda” and “psychological warfare” (PSYWAR) by more than twenty years each. Just as the term PSYOP has changed over the years, which will be discussed later in this chapter, the definition has also changed. Broadly defined, PSYOP is the actions taken by an organization to decrease an enemy’s morale and efficiency, lower their will to fight, and ultimately cause them to surrender. In order to disseminate the selected information, the organization develops a product or message, which can be audio, visual, or combination of both, and decides on the appropriate media that will have maximum effect in reaching the target audience.

\textsuperscript{7} Most recently, the U.S. Army has proposed changing the name of PSYOP to Military Information Support Operations (MISO). While the new term is still being debated, this thesis will continue to use the term PSYOP.
In the United States Army, the organization that conducts PSYOP is the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG). The units within the 4th POG conduct PSYOP across the range of military operations and, according to Field Manual 3-05.301, [PSYOP] are the “planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of Psychological Operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.”8 In order to influence foreign TAs, PSYOP is employed across all instruments of national power to include diplomatic, information, economic measures, and military operations.

PSYOP is used to amplify the effects of military operations. Used during offensive and defensive operations, PSYOP is employed to hasten the eventual defeat of enemy forces through a number of ways, including undermining the will of the enemy to resist and, undercutting the credibility of enemy leadership, increasing unrest among the civilian population in enemy areas, fostering desertion or surrender of enemy forces, reducing civilian interference with military operations, increasing acceptance of friendly forces in occupied territory, and countering enemy propaganda.9 Also used during stability operations, PSYOP supports counterterrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and humanitarian assistance.

Current military doctrine calls for a seven-phase PSYOP process. “The seven-phase PSYOP process is a standardized, nonlinear framework by which PSYOP are planned and conducted in support of a broad range of missions.”10 Phase I, or planning, is where the Psychological Operations objectives (PO), supporting Psychological Operations objectives, potential target audiences, initial assessment criteria, and baseline

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data are identified. The PO is “a general statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral change of foreign TAs… [a Supporting Psychological Operations Objective] SPO is the specific behavioral response desired from the target audience to accomplish a given PO.”

In order to accomplish the PO, two or more supporting PSYOP objectives are needed.

Phase II, or target audience analysis, is where “the PSYOP arguments used (the overall argument and approach to obtain the desired behavior from the TA) and recommended actions that the U.S. military and its allies can take to influence the behavior of selected foreign audiences” are identified. Also during this phase, the medium that will be used to carry the message to the TA will be identified. PSYOP planners use the best medium to disseminate the message to the TA. There are a number of mediums that are identified that have the capability to disseminate or communicate the message, including face-to-face communication, broadcast communication such as radio and television, print material such as newspaper, handbills, leaflets, and posters, and digital dissemination such as the Internet.

Phase III, or series development, is where a “complex, creative, and collaborative process that creates synergy between multiple products and actions to achieve the desired behavior change for a single target audience” takes place. Series development is the bringing together of a number of products or messages that will aid in the accomplishment of a single SPO. It usually takes more than one product or message to change the behavior of a single TA.

Phase IV, or product development and design, is when the product/action worksheet is created using information from phases I through III. The worksheet “is a source document and conceptual tool for creating products [messages] and providing guidance for pretest and posttest questionnaires.”

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12 Ibid., 2-1.

13 Ibid., 3-1.

14 Ibid., 4-1.
Phase V, or approval, is where the PSYOP series goes through an internal review board, after pretesting and appropriate changes are made to the products, and then “staffed out for review and signature by the official approval authority.”\textsuperscript{15}

After approval is granted, Phase VI begins. Phase VI, or production, distribution, and dissemination is where the products [messages] are mass produced, moved to the dissemination point, and then is disseminated, which is “the actual delivery of the PSYOP message to the TA.”\textsuperscript{16}

Post-testing of products also takes place during this phase, which “helps the PSYOP Soldiers determine which products in the series are reaching the TA, what portions of the PSYOP argument are resonating with the TA, and what degree of influence the PSYOP series has on the TA.”\textsuperscript{17} With the information obtained during post testing, products can be modified or dropped from the series if they are not achieving the desired effects on the TA.

Phase VII, or evaluation, is the “process for evaluating [the] achievement of [the] SPOs and assessing the overall impact of [the] PSYOP series on [the] TA behavior.”\textsuperscript{18} PSYOP evaluation is achieved through the monitoring of impact indicators, which answer the assessment criteria questions. “PSYOP assessment criteria are the objective measures used to monitor and assess changes in TA behavior over time…impact indicators are specific, measureable, and observable behavior performed by the TA…analysis of the impact indicators over time will show behavior trends, which determine whether the SPOs are being achieved.”\textsuperscript{19}

In addition to its military mission, PSYOP provides support to ambassadors and country teams in order to reinforce diplomatic efforts through a number of operations including counterdrug operations, humanitarian mine action, and peace building. United

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 6-9.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 6-17.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 7-1.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 7-2.
States government information efforts are supported by PSYOP under the auspice of military support to public diplomacy (MSPD). Since foreign audiences are often targeted by specific information, PSYOP has been used more frequently by the U.S. government. For example, PSYOP can be used to support economic measures in the establishment of an exclusion zone. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zone), sea (maritime), or on land to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. PSYOP can be used to inform and influence the target audience to act or not act within that zone. Historically, most of the information written about PSYOP is about PSYOP in support of military operations.

B. CRAFTING THE PSYOP MESSAGE

PSYOP messaging consists of four variables: in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium and the receptiveness of the TA.

The first variable present is the in-depth knowledge of the TA. Studying the enemy before and during conflict gives the PSYOP planner the necessary knowledge to properly employ PSYOP against it. Learning everything they can about the culture, attitudes, emotions, values, and ethics gives valuable insights as to why the TA behaves the way it does. In order to change the behavior of the TA, one must understand why the TA behaves the way it does. An in-depth knowledge of the TA allows the PSYOP planner the ability to understand the behavior and what they need to do to change it.

Initial research on the area of operation which the TA is in should have already been conducted. “PSYOP [planners] should keep abreast of current events and study the history, culture, society, and political makeup of their respective target countries or regions to increase their awareness of long-standing and emerging PSYOP-relevant issues.” This initial research allows the PSYOP planner to have a base knowledge of the TA and its surroundings. To build on this base knowledge, the PSYOP planner

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21 Ibid., 2-5.
conducts in-depth research on the TA during Phase II, Target Audience Analysis. Researching PSYOP-specific intelligence, open source information, supported unit documentation, finished intelligence products, and special PSYOP studies and assessments by the Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) allows the PSYOP planner to identify the conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibility, and accessibility of the TA which will allow them to effectively target the required behavioral change.23 The PSYOP planner will also identify any differences in meaning between the TA’s and planner’s language. The differences of meanings in languages, called semantics, can cause the TA to misunderstand the PSYOP message. If the TA misunderstands the PSYOP message, then there is a possibility that the message will not achieve the desired behavioral change that it was intended to do.

The second variable present is the message. Crafting a message is a difficult task and current doctrine does not give enough guidance on how to craft a message. Field Manual 3-05.301, dated 2007, gives step-by-step instructions on how to develop the PSYOP argument, supporting argument, appeal, techniques, and primary influence tactics that will be directed towards the TA. The field manual states, “the main argument is the reason that the TA should engage in the desired behavior…the supporting arguments are used to provide factual evidence, address causes and effects, and exploit vulnerabilities…an appeal is the overall approach used to present the main argument…techniques refer to the specific methods used to present information to the TA… [and] primary influence tactics will magnify the persuasiveness of PSYOP products and actions.”24 The field manual, however, does not explain how to link them together and develop the appropriate message. However, it does state that the PSYOP argument “is not a slogan or tagline and does not provide the specific message or wording for individual product development, which is conducted in Phase IV.”25

24 Ibid., 2-23, 2-27.
25 Ibid., 2-24.
The word “message” is used sixty-seven times throughout Phase IV, but nowhere in the field manual does it explain how to craft the message. It does cover how and where the message should be inserted or displayed on the product that is being disseminated, whether it is audio, visual, or a combination of both. Dealing with print products, the most useful information on messages that Phase IV provides is “factors contributing to effective message writing include the following: a good practical knowledge of the TA language, recent residence in the target location and familiarity with current happenings in that area, familiarity with the organization of the TA’s leadership, equipment, and arms, familiarity with the civilian population and the political, sociological, economic and psychological environment, and access to personnel with experience in advertising, journalism, public relations, or marketing.”26

Field Manual 33-1-1, dated 1994, gives better instructions on how to craft a message. The field manual states, “PSYOP messages come in many forms...whatever the kind of message, however, they have a common characteristic—they ultimately have the same kind of purpose and the same need to be attended, understood, accepted, and acted upon.”27 Appendix J of the same manual goes on to explain, “the copy text is the written message...it contains a detailed discussion of the appeal being made, supporting and justifying it. A good text convinces the reader that only by accepting the course of action stated or implied in the text can his needs be fulfilled. The text must contain terms, phrases, and vernacular familiar to the target audience.”28 Just as with print products, current doctrine has left out key information that the PSYOP planner needs to write a message inside a script for an audio product, such as a loudspeaker or radio broadcast. FM 33-1-1 addresses these issues by listing a number of principles and factors that the PSYOP planner should follow in order to properly script a message that would be used in radio and loudspeaker operations.

28 Ibid., J-2.
The third variable is the medium. During Phase II, the best medium is selected, and during Step Six, determining accessibility, the “PSYOP Soldiers determine which media can reach the TA and to what degree the TA can be influenced by each media type.”\textsuperscript{29} There are a number of tasks that the PSYOP planner completes in order to choose the best medium. These tasks include:

deciding how the TA currently receives information, deciphering current media patterns and usage, determining how the TA uses the medium, discovering how involved the TA is in the process, understanding whether the TA assesses the media individually or with others, debating what new media can be used to access the TA, including all of the information on the target audience analysis worksheet (TAAW), and articulating the technical aspects of each media. Once these tasks are complete, they will help answer the question, ‘What types of media will effectively carry [the] PSYOP [message] to the TA?’\textsuperscript{30}

The fourth variable is receptiveness of the TA. Current doctrine discusses susceptibility of the TA but fails to address TA receptiveness. During phase II of the seven-phase PSYOP process, the PSYOP planner implements the Target Audience Analysis Model (TAAM). The TAAM “is a practical research and analysis method that yields the necessary information for developing PSYOP products and actions.”\textsuperscript{31} Determining TA receptiveness is not identified in any of the seven steps. If the TA is receptive, then they are ready or willing to receive favorably or open to arguments, ideas, or change. For the TA to be influenced by the PSYOP message, they first need to be receptive of the message.

C. \textbf{EVOLUTION OF PSYOP}

Since World War I, the act of using media to send a message to a target audience has evolved through a number of names and definitions, and by those who practice it. “Propaganda” was the first term that people on all sides of the war used, meaning any


\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 2-21.

form of communication which affected the minds, emotions, and actions of a particular group. Military propaganda, defined by Paul Linebarger as “the planned use of any form of communication designed to affect the minds and emotions of a given enemy, neutral or friendly foreign group for a specific strategic or tactical purpose,” was used extensively by all sides during the war. In the United States, several agencies were responsible for the employment of propaganda throughout the First World War, which included the Committee on Public Information (CPI), better known as the “Creel Committee” and the military Propaganda Section inside the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces.

After World War I, the United States lost most of its interest in the use of propaganda because many believed that its employment was not necessary in a peace times. The Army disbanded both the CPI and the military Propaganda Section and almost all of the experiences and lessons learned during the war were lost over the next twenty years. In 1920, J.F.C. Fuller analyzed the lessons learned from the employment of new weapons in the war. He prophesied that, in the future, traditional warfare fought on the battlefield would be replaced by a “purely psychological warfare.” The term psychological warfare (PSYWAR) would come into play when the United States went to war against Germany and Japan during the Second World War (WWII). This change, from propaganda to PSYWAR, was the result of a translated German document that claimed “psychology should be employed in all phases of combat.” However, during this time, both propaganda and PSYWAR were used interchangeably.

Just as in WWI, when WWII broke out the United States did not have a unit dedicated to conducting PSYWAR. President Franklin D. Roosevelt attempted to correct

33 Ibid., 39.
34 Ibid., 67.
the problem by appointing Colonel William Donavon as the Coordinator of Information (COI) in 1941. Over the next four years, the control of PSYWAR would be wrestled between a number of civilian and military agencies. The COI, later renamed the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), disbanded the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) within the Military Intelligence Service at the end of 1942; ten months later, the PWB was resurrected as the Propaganda Branch within the Military Intelligence Division (G-2). The Office of War Information (OWI), and a number of other agencies fought back and forth for the rights to conduct PSYWAR throughout WWII. In 1944, the Psychological Warfare Branch was established in General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area Command and the Psychological Warfare Division was established in General Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. It was not until 1945 that all the agencies involved would finally be integrated in some way or another to practice PSYWAR. Military historian Stanly Sandler argues:

The military relationship had been clarified. The new [Propaganda Branch] undertook no operations whatever, but connected War Department with OWI and OSS for policy and liaison....military needs in psychological warfare had been settled by regarding the Theaters in this respect as autonomous, and leaving to the respective Theater Commanders the definition of their relationships with OWI and OSS, and their use of each.

Throughout World War II, PSYWAR had a difficult time in establishing itself within an appropriate agency, either civilian or military. The military finally decided to place the capabilities of PSYWAR within the newly established Propaganda Branch in the G-2. Although short lived (only four years) the Propaganda Branch was finally taken out of the G-2 branch in 1946 and, in early 1947, moved to Plans and Operations under the G-3. During this same period, Major General M.S. Eddy, who was the chief of

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information, raised concerns over the term psychological warfare and that it would have to be carefully defined “so as not to arouse public indignation or fear of ‘gestapo-ism’ and authoritarianism in our own country.”\textsuperscript{40} Military historian Paul Paddock argues:

Director of Plans and Operations was overall responsible for the general supervision of Army psychological warfare activities…[but] several War Department agencies were given pieces of the pie… Real centralization of psychological warfare activities did not occur until January 1951 with the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), headed by General McClure.\textsuperscript{41}

According to OCPW’s mission, “it was to formulate and develop psychological and special operations plan for the Army.”\textsuperscript{42} One of the major divisions that McClure organized his office into was Psychological Operations. The name of the division would later help in transitioning the term PSYWAR to Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in the 1960s.

When North Korea attacked South Korea in the summer of 1950, the only active duty unit that focused on PSYWAR was a small Army detachment based at Fort Riley, Kansas. This detachment, later designated as the 1\textsuperscript{st} Loudspeaker and Leaflet (L&L) Company, was sent to Korea in the fall of 1950. Once again, interest in PSYWAR increased within the U.S. government and the Army in response to this new conflict. In 1951, with the need for increased PSYWAR capabilities, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet (RB&L) Group was organized and sent to Korea to help support strategic propaganda activities. Throughout the war, the 1\textsuperscript{st} L&L Company conducted PSYWAR using mobile loudspeakers and the 1\textsuperscript{st} RB&L group conducted PSYWAR using print media and radio stations. Even though PSYWAR capabilities increased during the war, once again, at the end of the war and over the next ten years, these capabilities were greatly degraded. Despite this, General McClure was able to establish the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in May 1952, which is most likely why

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 95.
PSYWAR capabilities did not disappear altogether. Because the Warfare Center trained both PSYWAR and Special Forces units, the name was later changed to the Special Warfare Center in 1956.

In early 1960, the term that represented the act of sending messages using various types of media changed once again. According to Paddock,

Psychological operations replaced psychological warfare...Psychological operations, or PSYOP, encompassed psychological warfare, but the latter indicated propaganda directed only against enemy forces and populations for divisive purposes. The new and broader term could also be used to describe propaganda employed toward friendly and neutral audiences for cohesive purposes.43

Recognizing the need for PSYOP capabilities in Vietnam, the 6th PSYOP Battalion was activated in country in 1965. Two years later, the size of U.S. Army PSYOP had increased to a group, identified as the 4th PSYOP Group, which consisted of four PSYOP battalions. Once again, having limited and degraded PSYOP capabilities before the war started, the Army spent time during the war to build up and employ the capabilities that were needed. By the end of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. Army had a robust PSYOP capability able to conduct PSYOP at the tactical and strategic levels. This all changed after the war as the U.S. government began to draw down the military. By 1974, the only active duty unit that was capable of conducting effective PSYOP was the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, but it was understaffed and poorly equipped. The term “psychological operations” took hold during this period and would be used for the next 30 years.

From 1974 to the mid-1980s, PSYOP forces managed to survive at Fort Bragg. In the mid to late 1980s, PSYOP forces were increased in size and the equipment that they used was modernized. This was the first time such actions took place when the U.S. was not at war. New interests in PSYOP began to rise and, according to Colonel Curtis Boyd, there were a number of things that helped in the growth of PSYOP. Colonel Boyd states,

The impact of President Ronald Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive 77 (1983), the Department of Defense PSYOP Master Plan (1985) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1987) provided permanent PSYOP staff authorizations within the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army and the U.S. Special Operations Command as well as the permanent establishment of two reserve-component PSYOP Groups, an enlisted military occupational specialty (37F), [and] the recognition of the importance of PSYOP planning at Combat Commands.44

During the next 30 years, PSYOP forces were used extensively throughout the world supporting missions that expanded across the spectrum of conflicts.

Operation Enduring Freedom, the War on Terror, and Operation Iraqi Freedom presented new challenges for the PSYOP community. With PSYOP forces constantly being deployed to support these operations, the need to increase the size of the community grew every day. In 2006, the PSYOP Branch was created and an authorization to increase the number of soldiers and officers within the 4th PSYOP was given.

Another challenge to the community in the post-September 11 security world was the term PSYOP. Since the origins of PSYOP came from a long history of misunderstandings and name changes, individuals in the government and the Army saw the need to hide what they were doing by calling it different names. Military Support to Public Diplomacy, International Public Diplomacy, and even Information Operations have been used to soften the reputation that the term PSYOP gives.45 After years of mistrust, misunderstandings, and misuse, a new “softer” term was needed to cover all that PSYOP does and to help employ PSYOP not only in the tactical and strategic area, but also in the political realm. Military Information Support Operations, or MISO, took the place of PSYOP in 2010 and transition to this new term began in 2011. For the purpose of this thesis, the term Psychological Operations will be used because it is well known and has a longer history than Military Information Support Operations.


D. FUTURE

Currently, the state of PSYOP is in flux. Doctrine is being rewritten to cover how to plan and execute PSYOP effectively, but before this can be done, the PSYOP community must learn what makes for successful PSYOP. The community can learn this by looking into the past and by considering communication theory.

The Korean War is a great case to study to find out how to construct, execute, and measure successful PSYOP because there was a standing unit, although small, that was ready to conduct PSYOP when the war began. Also, PSYOP was conducted by all sides in the war and we have had a long time, over fifty years, to analyze the outcomes. There is a lot of information about loudspeaker operations and leaflet drops that were conducted during the Korean War which can be analyzed to find out what made them successful or unsuccessful. One well known case, Operation Moolah, provides excellent information on the effects, or lack thereof, of a leaflet drop that offered a reward for a North Korean pilot to defect with a Soviet MIG.

Even though the name of PSYOP has changed over the last one hundred years and the job to plan and execute PSYOP has moved from one organization to another, the “act” has always stayed the same—sending messages using various types of media to change the behavior of a targeted audience. The next chapter will use communication theory to analyze the process in which a sender sends a message to a receiver. In this case, the sender is the PSYOP organization, the message is the PSYOP message intended to change the behavior of the TA, and the receiver is the TA.
III. COMMUNICATION THEORY

Measuring PSYOP effectiveness has always been a difficult task. Military historian Stephen E. Pease argues, “Judging the effectiveness of a PSYWAR operation is almost impossible…There usually is no immediate and observable link between the cause (the PSYWAR) and effect.”46 Most of the information on PSYOP’s use during conflict has focuses on measures of performance (MOP) rather than measures of effectiveness (MOE). MOP such as the number of leaflets dropped, the number of hours of radio broadcasts are made, and the amount of money spent on operations are almost always reported. Rarely is the actual effectiveness of these leaflets, radio broadcasts, and money spent reported in an appropriate time to measure the success of the PSYOP operation. The tendency to report MOP and not MOE is the result of a number of factors. First, commanders typically want to know the immediate results of PSYOP. The problem with this demand is that almost all PSYOP aims to change the behavior of a TA, which takes time. There are a few instances where the effectiveness of PSYOP can be measured fairly quickly, such as a surrender appeal to enemy troops. Effectiveness can be easily measured by the number of enemy surrenders. However, immediate results are the exception, not the norm in PSYOP. Second, in order to prove that they are participating in the operation, PSYOP planners usually report MOP. Because measuring the effects of the PSYOP product takes time and commanders want results now, MOP is easily substituted in place of MOE to give the commander something.

To alleviate the temptation of substituting MOP with MOE, PSYOP planners need to provide the commander with a pre-measurement of the effectiveness of the PSYOP product that will be deployed. This premeasurement can be achieved by using a Communication Theory model in the seven-phase PSYOP process. As an evaluation tool, the model can provide the PSYOP planner with insights on what makes for successful PSYOP. The model can also be used as a lens for analyzing PSYOP that has already been conducted to find out what made the PSYOP successful or unsuccessful.

This chapter offers a brief history of Communication Theory models. It then builds off of these models to construct a new communication model as an evaluation tool for PSYOP planning. This model will then be used as an analytical tool to evaluate past PSYOP, specifically PSYOP during the Korean War.

A. HISTORY OF COMMUNICATION THEORY MODELS

Communications have been taking place for thousands of years. Just as the interest in PSYOP increased over the last century, interest in how and why individuals communicate has too. The interest in communication has allowed individuals to create a number of models which describe how communication takes place. At its simplest form, a communication model has three elements: the sender, a message, and the receiver. Throughout the 20th century, political scientists, mathematicians, and communications theorists helped developed the communication models that we use today. Prior to the 20th century, one of the first individuals who discussed the importance of communication was Aristotle. Aristotle, writing in 350 B.C.E., defined the study of communication as “rhetoric” and described three parts that make up the process of communication. He explained, “Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in speech-making—speaker, subject, and person addressed—it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speeches end and object.” During his time, Aristotle already recognized the importance of the target audience while communicating. Aristotle’s definition can be described as the first communications model in which the speaker is the sender, the subject is the message, and the person addressed is the receiver.

Throughout the 20th century, with the increase of interest in communications, a number of individuals are attributed with laying the foundation of communication theory. A few of these individuals, Harold Lasswell, Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, Wilbur Schramm, and David K. Berlo, developed fairly simple models that show how communication takes place.

Harold D. Lasswell, writing in the first half of the 20th century, developed the model that states, “Who says what in which channel to whom with what effect.”

Lasswell expands on Aristotle’s definition by adding an additional part to his model. This part, the channel, can be described today as the medium. This four part model is still being used today to describe how communication works.

![Lasswell Model](image)

Figure 1. Lasswell Model

In 1948, while working for Bell Telephone Labs, Claude Shannon published a paper titled “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” In the paper, Shannon describes a communication system as having six parts: source, message, transmitter/encoder, channel, receiver/decoder, and destination. As a research mathematician, Shannon created this theory in order to help with the information flow over telephone lines. In 1949, Warren Weaver expanded on Shannon’s writing and published a paper titled “Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of Communication.” With the information presented in their two papers, Shannon and Weaver later published a book titled *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Both men are credited with what is now identified as the Shannon-Weaver Model of Communication. This model introduces noise into the communication process. Noise, as

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Weaver states, “may be distortions of sound (in telephony, for example) or static (in radio), or distortions in shape or shading of picture (television), or errors in transmission (telegraphy or facsimile), etc.”

![Shannon-Weaver Model](image)

Figure 2. Shannon-Weaver Model

Wilbur Schramm, a communication theorist, wrote a number of books and articles about communication throughout the 20th century. The contributions that Schramm made in the field of communications were paramount. In “Wilbur Schramm: Portrait of a Development Communication Pioneer,” Arvind Singhal states, “Without Wilbur Schramm, communication science could never have achieved its present status. Perhaps he should be considered a fifth founder of communication research.” In his book *The Process and Effects of Mass Communication*, Schramm introduced a model that had the same elements that Aristotle identified in his definition of Rhetoric, the source or speaker, the message or subject, and the destination or person being addressed. Unlike Aristotle, Schramm identifies that there needs to be something in common between the

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source and the destination for the communication to be effective. This is identified as the overlapping of the field of experience in Schramm’s model.

![Schramm Model](image1)

**Figure 3. Schramm Model**

In 1960, David K. Berlo, a communication theorist like Wilber Schramm, introduced a model of communication called the SMCR model. SMCR, which stands for source, message, channel, receiver, includes a number of factors listed under each element that are needed in order for each element to be effective in the communication process.

![Berlo Model](image2)

**Figure 4. Berlo Model**
B. PSYOP MODEL

For the purpose of this thesis, Berlo’s model will be used with elements from the Shannon-Weaver model. Also added are elements from PSYOP doctrine, which will allow easy analysis once the information is identified during the seven-phase PSYOP process. This model can be used to analyze a PSYOP operation to find out if it has the potential to be successful. The model can also be used to analyze past PSYOP operations to find out what made them successful or unsuccessful.

![PSYOP Model Diagram](image)

Figure 5. PSYOP Model

C. EVALUATION TOOL

As a very simple evaluation tool, this PSYOP model can be used to analyze the first four phases of the seven-phase PSYOP process to find out if you have the ingredients that make for successful PSYOP. At the end of phase IV, the PSYOP planner has enough information to use the PSYOP model. The source/sender is the PSYOP planner that is executing the seven-phase PSYOP process. The source/sender has to have an in-depth knowledge of the TA and their environment. In order to have an in-depth knowledge of the TA and their environment, the PSYOP planner must conduct a thorough TAA. FM 3-05.301 states, “Accurate and thorough analyses of the TA will yield vital information for the PSYOP Soldier. PSYOP TAA seeks to answer five key questions:

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What TAs will be most effective in accomplishing the SPO?

What are the reasons for the TA’s current behavior?

What are the best means of communication to reach the TA?

How can the TA be influenced to achieve the desired behavior?

What are the appropriate criteria by which to assess behavior change?"\textsuperscript{52}

The TAAM will provide the information that will be used to develop the PSYOP argument. As stated earlier, the PSYOP argument does not provide the specific message, but it does give you the appropriate information that will allow you to craft (encode) an effective message. An issue the PSYOP planner must be aware of while crafting the PSYOP message is semantic noise. Semantic noise occurs when the PSYOP planner uses phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that the TA does not understand. Once the appropriate PSYOP message is crafted, the best medium that was identified during TAA is selected. If the PSYOP planner conducted a thorough TAA, as stated earlier, then the appropriate medium will be identified that will have maximum effects on the TA. If semantic noise was introduced while crafting the message, then the TA will not understand the message when they receive (decode) it from the medium. Once the appropriate message is sent, without semantic noise, to the TA through the appropriate medium, there are two things that the TA has to be in order to receive the message. They have to be receptive and susceptible of the message.

When comparing the model with the information obtained during TAA, the PSYOP planner will insert the required data inside the model. Once inserted, the model will give a visual representation of the communication that will take place between the PSYOP planner (sender) and the TA (receiver). In theory, if the PSYOP planner has the in-depth knowledge of the TA, he/she will be able to craft the appropriate message, without semantic noise, and send it to a receptive and susceptible TA through the appropriate medium, and then the behavior of the TA will be changed.

D. PSYOP MODEL AS A LENS

The four variables of PSYOP messaging are present in the PSYOP model. As a lens, the PSYOP model can be used against PSYOP operations that have been conducted in the past to evaluate the effectiveness of the operation. The four variables, in-depth knowledge of the TA, message, medium, and receptiveness of the TA can be used to measure the outcome of the operation. By inserting the information obtained from the operation into the PSYOP model and using the matrix below as a checklist, it can be determined what variables are strong or weak and what impact they had on the operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONG</th>
<th>WEAK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-Depth Knowledge of the TA</strong></td>
<td><strong>In-depth research was conducted before and during conflict</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The proper resources were not used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MESSAGE</strong></td>
<td><strong>Clear of semantic noise</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TA understands message</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are used</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reaches a majority of the TA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Has credibility</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TA is able to receive the message through the medium (if a leaflet is used with written text, the TA must be able to read)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA</strong></td>
<td><strong>TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6. PSYOP Matrix
After inserting the information into the model and using the matrix, one will be able to measure the validity of each variable in the hopes of finding out what makes for successful PSYOP. For example, for PSYOP to be successful do all four variables have to be strong or can you have successful PSYOP when one or more variables are weak.

The next chapter will use the PSYOP model and PSYOP matrix as a lens to analyze PSYOP operations during the Korean War. The analysis will focus on one case, Operation Moolah, and two areas where the enemy was targeted for surrender, the use of the safe conduct pass leaflets and the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals.
IV. KOREAN WAR

This chapter uses the PSYOP model and matrix introduced in chapter three to analyze U.S. Psychological Operations during the 1950–1953 Korean War. In particular, the chapter investigates three operations from the Korean War: Operation Moolah, which aimed to acquire a Russian MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces; the use of leaflets that carried the safe conduct pass message; and the use of loudspeakers directed toward enemy forces, which aimed to reduce morale and persuade combatants to surrender.

The Korean War was chosen for several reasons. It was the first time in which there was a standing PSYOP unit ready to deploy when the war started. According to military historian Stephen Pease, “When the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel in June 1950, the only operational PSYWAR unit was the small twenty-person Tactical Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas. It was expanded and sent to South Korea as the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L), arriving on 8 November 1950.”

Also, there was a Psychological Warfare Section, within the Far East Command, that was able to produce and disseminate leaflets within twenty-four hours after President Truman committed U.S. troops to Korea. By having a PSYWAR section in the Far East Command and a standing unit ready to deploy, the Army did not lose any valuable time in training or planning in PSYWAR for the Korean War. Second, there have been multiple reports and books written on the outcomes of PSYOP conducted during the war. This data provides the necessary information to which the PSYOP model and matrix can be applied to better understand the successes and failures of PSYOP products and methods of messaging during the war. Finally, despite the fact that the PSYOP model and matrix were constructed using current doctrine, it is argued that the matrix and model


are useful tools for analyzing past and present PSYOP products and means of messaging; it is therefore the purpose of this chapter to test the overall utility of the model and matrix.

Overall, analysis based on the PSYOP model and matrix suggests that the four variables identified for PSYOP messaging were not always strong during the three cases investigated. Despite this, successful PSYOP did occur when three of the four were strong. In the use of safe conduct pass leaflets, three strong variables (message, medium, and receptiveness of the TA) and one weak variable (in-depth knowledge of the TA) resulted in successful PSYOP. In another case, Operation Moolah, all four variables were considered weak, causing PSYOP to be unsuccessful, although the operation was considered a success due to secondary effects. In the last case, loudspeaker surrender appeals, two strong variables (message and medium) and two weak variables (in-depth knowledge of the TA and Receptiveness of the TA) accounted for PSYOP to be successful a majority of the time.

A. CASE STUDIES: OPERATION MOOLAH, SAFE CONDUCT PASS LEAFLET, AND LOUDSPEAKER SURRENDER APPEAL

During the Korean conflict, PSYOP planners had to rely on the August 1949 Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations to plan and execute their operations. The main focus of the manual was to lower the morale of enemy forces and to persuade them to surrender or desert. Field Manual 33-5 states: “Psychological warfare consists of activities, other than combat, which communicate ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy…for the purpose of reducing the enemy morale and will to fight.”

It further states that, “the basic aim of psychological warfare conducted by a military command is to assist in expediting the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. It achieves this basic purpose by seeking to: Decrease the combat efficiency of the enemy by lowering the morale of his forces; Induce enemy forces to surrender or desert; [and] Sustain the morale of friendly

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elements in enemy areas.” Therefore, PSYOP operations conducted during the Korean War dealt mainly with lowering of morale and surrendering of enemy forces.

1. **Operation Moolah**

Operation Moolah was an attempt by U.S. forces in Korea to acquire a Russian MiG-15 jet fighter from enemy forces. The U.S. offered $100,000 to the first pilot who defected to South Korea with a combat-capable MiG-15.57

In the fall of 1950, UN air forces were at a disadvantage when it came to air combat. The Russian MiG-15 jet fighter wreaked havoc in the skies over Korea and the UN did not have fighters that could match the power and speed that the MiG-15 brought to a dogfight. The U.S. military needed to study a fully operational MiG-15, fitted for combat, in order to understand how the MiG-15 was designed, its capabilities, and how to fight effectively against it in the air. The U.S. government also wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was actively contributing to the Korean conflict. The Soviet Union claimed it was neutral; however, UN pilots reported hearing Russian being spoken over their radio frequencies and UN POWs claimed that Soviet pilots interrogated them while in captivity.58 The U.S. government, therefore, wanted to prove that the Soviet Union was not only supplying the MiG-15 to North Korean forces, but that it was also providing Soviet pilots to fly the MiG-15 in combat. Ultimately, the operation was aimed at encouraging either a Russian or North Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-15 jet fighter.

Several stories persist on the origins of the operation, but according to retired SGM Herbert Friedman, Edward Hymoff was the one who came up with the idea of offering $100,000 to an enemy defector for a combat-ready MiG-15.59 In the fall of 1952,


58 Ibid., 67.

Hymoff, who was the Bureau Chief of the *International News Service* in Korean, presented the concept of a reward for a MiG-15 to General Mark W. Clark while on a flight to Tokyo. From there, the idea made its way to Washington and the Pentagon “authorized [General] Clark to offer a reward for a North Korean Air Force jet fighter.”

Although many consider Operation Moolah as the “greatest PSYWAR triumph in the Korean War,” it can be argued that it actually was not a success because it did not achieve its goal—the defection of an enemy pilot with a combat-capable MiG-15. Two months after the armistice was signed, in 1953, a North Korean pilot defected and the United States got its hands on a MiG-15, but this defection happened independent of Operation Moolah. The pilot claimed he did not see any of the leaflets dropped or hear any of the radio broadcasts connected with the operation.

However, despite the inability of Operation Moolah to successfully encourage an enemy defector with his MiG-15, there were important secondary effects that U.S. PSYWAR soldiers observed after the operation began. Pease argues that “The Russian-language broadcasts were blocked by a powerful jammer in North Korea… [And] MIG flights dropped drastically. For eight days, there were no MIG sorties at all, an unprecedented stand down.” U.S. troops also noted that, following Operation Moolah, “the quality of the MIG pilots was noticeably poorer after regular sorties resumed…the MIG pilots compiled the worst record of the entire war. UN Sabres downed 165 MIGs to only three losses, a fifty-five-to-one ratio!” Military Intelligence believed that the Soviet pilots were no longer flying the MiGs and that the “Koreans were only letting the most politically trustworthy pilots fly, which may have kept their best pilots on the

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61 Ibid.


63 Ibid., 72.

64 Ibid., 72–73.
In other words, even though Operation Moolah did not succeed in persuading an enemy pilot to defect with a MiG-15 jet fighter, the operation did have an unintended, measurable effect on air operations.

Operation Moolah consisted of radio broadcasts and leaflet drops in the Korean, Chinese, and Russian languages. U.S. forces dropped over a million leaflets over North Korea and radio broadcasts transmitted approved scripts on two separate occasions in April and May 1953.

a. Analysis of Operation Moolah

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. In-depth knowledge of the TA: The source of the leaflets and radio broadcasts was Headquarters, 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group.66 The 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group arrived in Tokyo in August 1951 to help the Far East Command’s Psychological Warfare Section in its job to wage PSYWAR in Korea. The 1st RB&L Group was largely manned by reserve officers with backgrounds in journalism, newspaper printing, novel and script writing, artwork, and radio technology. Even though the training that these officers received on Korean customs, language, and social details did not provide them with the in-depth knowledge of the TA that they needed, Korean nationals helped the officers in developing and targeting and, within a year, the Group was able to produce leaflets in sixteen languages and dialects.67

Two years prior to Operation Moolah, in 1951, George Pettee, a research analyst working in the Operations Research Office at The John Hopkins University, wrote a technical memorandum titled “US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War,” in which he made the following observation:

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Research for psywar, to provide summary data on enemy culture, morale, issues, idiom, personalities, etcetera, has barely been initiated. The large volume of bulk intelligence and basic reference materials available, containing pertinent information and data, makes research a requirement for any large scale psywar program.\(^{68}\)

Overall, the 1\(^{st}\) Radio & Leaflet Group did not have the in-depth knowledge necessary of the Chinese, Russian and North Korean TAs. For example, in a conversation between Lieutenant No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected with the MiG-15, and retired SGM Herbert Friedman, Lieutenant No stated, “We had no concept of the value of the dollar…My salary was 500,000 Chinese Won per month, which was worth about $50 in U.S. currency…I was absolutely ignorant of what could be purchased with $100,000 then.”\(^{69}\) In other words, the offering of $100,000 did not mean anything to the North Korean pilots.

The incomprehension of the true worth of the $100,000 reward created “semantic noise.” Semantic noise, identified in Chapter III, occurs when the PSYOP planner uses phrases, symbols, language dialects, slangs, etc., in the PSYOP message that the TA does not understand. In this case, the ignorance of the value of American dollars by the North Korean pilots caused the message to be weak and misunderstood.

2. **Message:** There were three variations of the Operation Moolah leaflet that was dropped. Each leaflet was written in the Russian, Chinese, and Korean languages. The main text of the leaflet reads as follows:

To: Brave Pilots of Jet Aircraft

Subject: A Road to Freedom

Pilots! The Far East Command offers its help to all brave pilots who wish to free themselves from the vicious whip of the Communist regime and start a new and better life, with proper honor in the Free World.


The Far East Command offers you refuge, protection, human care and attention. You are given full guarantee that your names will remain secret if you do desire. Pilots! Your brave move will bring you to freedom and will give you opportunity to live in the future without fear for your well-being. Besides that, your heroism and decision will help others by pointing to them the road to freedom.

The Far East Command will reward $50,000 United States dollars to any pilot who delivers a modern, operational, combat-type jet aircraft in flyable condition to South Korea. The first pilot who delivers such a jet aircraft to the Free World will receive a bonus of an additional 50,000 US dollars for his bravery.

Following is a list of instructions to all pilots who desire to free themselves from the Communist yoke. Escapee pilots will fly to Paengyong-do Island, fifty (50) kilometers south of Chodo Island. From Paengyong-do escapee pilots will proceed to Kimpo Air Base at 6100 meters altitude, descend over Kimpo Air Base, and proceed to make an immediate landing. UN Aircraft will accompany escapee remaining always above and behind, unless low clouds or visibility prevent escapee from locating Kimpo Airbase. If escapee is unable to make a visual let-down, he will proceed to the Seoul area at 6100 meters and circle with his gear down. A United States aircraft will then fly close abreast and lead the way to the landing field. Upon initial contact with UN Aircraft, or if at any time UN Aircraft attempts attack, escapee will immediately lower landing gear and rock wings violently.

The Free World shall welcome you as an old friend as well as a hero.

Mark W. Clark

General, United States Army Commander-in-Chief

Far East Command

All three messages were almost exactly alike. The back of the Chinese and Korean language leaflets had an additional message that read: “This is a message from

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the Americans to any jet pilot who reads Russian. If you know such a person, please give it to him. It tells him how to escape to the UN Forces.”

Using the PSYOP model as an analytical tool, we can further identify mistakes that were made when the message was crafted. In addition to the meaningless sum of money offered, the instructions given to potential defectors were also culturally inappropriate and introduced semantic noise. Critiquing the instructions on the leaflet, LT No stated the following:

During the last 90 days of the war, MiGs seldom flew to North Korea. Chodo is 100km (62 miles) southwest of Pyongyang in the Yellow Sea. To fly to Chodo would be all but fatal at that time. Moreover, flying from Chodo to Paengyong-do, 50 km (31 miles) over the sea does not make any sense. Nobody had ever heard of Paengyong-do in the Yellow Sea. Finally, proceed from Paengyong-do to Kimpo, 200 km (124 miles) at 6100 meter (20,000 feet) altitude. Any MiG following the above flight path for defection would have been an easy prey for the Sabre jets.

In other words, the instructions given to the pilot did not make any sense. Although the source of the message perhaps could not have known that North Korean pilots had not heard of Paengyong-do, they should have known that at the altitude they gave, 20,000 feet, MiGs would be easily attacked and possibly shot out of the sky by Sabre jets.

3. Channel/Medium: Leaflets and radios were the medium of choice for this operation. Millions of leaflets and fourteen radio stations carried the message to the TA. As with the message, several problems occurred because of the medium. The leaflets were not dropped in the right place. Furthermore, the TA did not have access to a radio in order to listen to the broadcasts. According to Lieutenant No, “When the two B-29s dropped those million Moolah leaflets along the Yalu River, my MiG-15 Squadron was stationed in Tunghua Air Base, about 50 miles north of Manpo on the Yalu River. The Americans dropped no leaflets there and we had no radio. I do not believe any North

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73 Ibid.
Korean pilots saw the leaflet. Our unit had returned to the Dandong airbase in early July 1953. All the MiG-15s flew to combat from China most of the time.”

This statement clearly shows that both mediums were ineffective in reaching their TA.

4. Receiver/TA: The intended TA was any pilot who flew a MiG-15. Ideally, the United States wanted a Soviet pilot, but a Chinese or Korean pilot would do. In order to persuade a communist pilot to defect to the West, the receiver would have to first be receptive to the message. The message and the medium are both important for influencing TA receptivity, specifically both needs to be credible in order for the TA to be open to the idea of defecting. In order to produce receptiveness, the message should have included something that the pilot wanted and understood. LT No stated, “The defecting pilot had to be an anti-Communist who wanted political asylum in the United States. Therefore, a statement in the leaflet of guaranteeing freedom and a job in America after defection would have been more effective.” In the case of LT No, the defector was not receptive to the idea of defecting for a cash payment, freedom and political asylum would have been more effective incentives.

b. Operation Moolah PSYOP Matrix

Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze Operation Moolah yields the following findings. In this case, all four variables—in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak. Since the overall intent of the operation was to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15 by a defecting pilot, and it did not do this, it can be argued that the operation was unsuccessful.

However, the operation had positive secondary effects that allowed the PSYOP planners to come to the conclusion that the operation was successful. Since these secondary effects—the drop in sorties and the increase of MiG-15 shoot downs—were not the original intent of the operation, they cannot be used to measure the success or

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75 Ibid.
effectiveness of the operation. Even though Operation Moolah was considered the most effective PSYWAR campaign in the Korean War, it had little by way of in-depth knowledge of the TA, messaging, the mediums chosen, and creating receptiveness in its TA, in addition to failing to acquire a combat-capable MiG-15. The findings are summarized in Figure 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Depth Knowledge of the TA</th>
<th>STRONG</th>
<th>WEAK</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, susceptibility, and accessibility were not identified</td>
<td>• No information on what research was conducted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Semantics were not identified</td>
<td>• Believe defectors would defect based on the money offered, not wanting freedom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Semantics were introduced in the messaging thus proving that semantics were not identified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESSAGE</td>
<td>• Has semantic noise</td>
<td>• TA did not understand the concept of the value of the U.S. dollar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TA does not understand message</td>
<td>• An appeal should have been made in terms of guaranteeing freedom and a job in the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are not used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>• Does not reach a majority of the TA</td>
<td>• Leaflets were not dropped in the right area (According to LT No)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does not have credibility</td>
<td>• No one could have trusted the authenticity of the offer (According to LT No)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TA is not able to receive the message through the medium (if a radio broadcast is used, a majority if not all of the TA have to have a radio</td>
<td>• TA could not receive the message through the radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECEPTIVENESS OF THE TA</td>
<td>• TA is not open to arguments, ideas, or change</td>
<td>• The TA was not open to the idea of defecting because of the financial offer (To be receptive, an offer of freedom and a job offer in the U.S. would have been better suited for the TA to be open to the idea of defecting)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. PSYOP Matrix (Operation Moolah)

2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets

During the war in Korea, U.S. forces used leaflets, loudspeakers, and radios extensively to carry the PSYOP messages to civilians, friendly forces, and enemy

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76 Friendly forces were the South Korean troops who were fighting the North Koreans before the U.S. or UN arrived.
troops. The most preferred method, leaflets, were dropped by aircraft, delivered by artillery and, on rare occasions, patrols left leaflets “in the most-traveled areas behind the enemy lines.”

Because leaflets dropped from aircraft would be scattered over a large area, “the 105mm howitzer remained the principal artillery piece for placing propaganda-loaded shells on pinpoint targets.”

Over the course of the war, hundreds of millions of leaflets were scattered across the Korean peninsula. These leaflets, described as “printed advertisements” by military historian Stephen Pease, varied in size with the smallest measuring 3 by 5 inches to the largest being the size of a newspaper.

The first leaflet dropped occurred less than twenty-four hours after “President Harry Truman announced that U.S. troops, supporting United Nations decisions, would come to the assistance of the invaded Republic of South Korea.”

This leaflet targeted South Korean troops and civilians; it was very basic in design and informed the troops and civilians that help was on the way and to stand firm. Weeks later, the first leaflet targeting enemy troops was dropped. For the remainder of the war, more than one hundred types of leaflets were dropped that were focused on three major military objectives: weakening the effectiveness and resistance of the North Korean (and, later, the Communist Chinese) People’s Army; bringing the truth about the war to the people of North Korea; and bolstering the morale of the South Korean troops and civilian population.

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The safe conduct pass, which aimed to weaken the effectiveness and resistance of the North Koreans, would become the most famous leaflet used during the war. The safe conduct pass played on the terrible conditions that enemy troops faced, including lack of food, shelter, medical supplies, and their freedom. The leaflet gave instructions for how to surrender and promised food and humane treatment for those who defected. The Far East Command’s Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army’s Psychological Warfare Division developed several different variations of this message, all encouraging enemy surrenders and defections. However, after learning that “more than thirty percent of the surrendering soldiers were functionally illiterate, able to read only road signs and the simplest instructions,” safe conduct passes and surrender leaflets changed and included an easy to read map that showed the best way to UN positions.

Another change to the surrender leaflet occurred when PSYWAR planners learned that the black bars they used in photographs to hide the identity of the POW’s picture on the leaflet were being exploited by Communist officers. “Communist political officers were explaining [to their troops] that the black bars were there to hide the scars from disfiguring chemical warfare experiments.” As a result, the black bars were removed so the POW’s picture could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong with them.

a. **Analysis of the Safe Conduct Pass**

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. **In-depth knowledge:** Just as the previous case study, in-depth knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. There is evidence that the Eighth Army’s Psychological Warfare Division lacked the proper resources needed in

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84 Ibid., 40.

85 Ibid., 81.
acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that was needed. In the technical memorandum *Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War*, it states that:

EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no library...there is actually no library for the division as a whole. The Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and books. These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow’s Five Hundred Million Customers, Osgood’s *Ethnology of Korea*), Chinese and Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger’s *Psychological Warfare*, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various kinds.86

The strongest evidence that the Far East Command’s Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army’s Psychological Warfare Division had insufficient knowledge of the TA is the fact that they printed elaborate instructions and were unaware that a significant portion of the TA was illiterate. Once this was discovered, they made improvements to the safe conduct pass and included a map. Furthermore, after the Psychological Warfare section learned that the black bars on the leaflet pictures were believed to be hiding marks of torture, the black bars were removed so the POW’s picture could be seen and to show that there was nothing wrong with them.

2. **Message:** The Far East Command’s Psychological Warfare Section and the Eighth Army’s Psychological Warfare Division created several variations of the safe conduct pass and each leaflet was written in the Korean, Chinese, and English languages. Although each pass varied, they usually carried the same message to the enemy, which stated:

WHEN YOU COME OVER TO THE U.N. FORCES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW THESE STEPS.

1. Wait for a favorable time to escape from your unit.

2. Destroy or bury your weapons.

3. Make your way to the nearest UN forces during daylight hours only.

4. Come down an open road in single file, with both hands raised above your head.

5. Bring your wounded brothers with you.\(^87\)

The English portion of the message stated:

Attention all soldiers of the United Nations Forces. This leaflet guarantees humane treatment to any North Korean desiring to cease fighting. Take this man to your nearest commissioned officer at once.\(^88\)

Another leaflet stated:

1. This is from the UN, to you soldiers. If you have a friend you can trust, please let him read it, too.

2. If you want to escape, try it at night.

3. The UN soldiers will warmly welcome you.

4. Please come safely and the UN will give you food, a warm place, and medical treatment. You will be happy and welcome.\(^89\)

Because the message was basic, easy to read, and had clear instructions, it was very effective in informing enemy combatants that could read the best way to surrender. Following the discovery that roughly 30% could not read, the pass provided a visual map for the enemy troops to follow. Semantic noise was not introduced in the message, making it clear and easy to understand.

3. **Channel/Medium:** The medium that was chosen to carry the safe conduct pass was the leaflet; millions were dropped all over enemy positions. Because enemy troops could be executed for carrying these safe conduct passes, U.S. forces

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\(^{89}\) Pease, *PSYWAR*, 81.
designed many of them to resemble banknotes, which allowed enemy troops to conceal the safe conduct pass from their superiors until the time came for them to be used. The leaflets had credibility because they “carried the signature of the United Nations Commander, General Douglas MacArthur or his successor, General Matthew Ridgway…the Eighth Army [safe conduct pass] was signed by General James Van Fleet.”

4. Receiver/TA: The intended TA was enemy troops. Because of the conditions that enemy troops faced—lack of food, shelter, medical supplies, and freedom—they were receptive to a message offering these things in return for surrendering. In one survey of 750 POWs, the “prisoners asserted the greatest obstacle to surrender was the fear of being killed…The promise of cigarettes and freedom from hard labor as well as safety from aerial attack were important to these captives, most of whom claimed that they believed the ‘happy POW’ accounts in many leaflets.” In the following list from technical memorandum US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War, dated January 1951, the following number of POWs was recorded.

---


Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report Date</th>
<th>POWs Rptd</th>
<th>Battle Conditions</th>
<th>Separation from Unit</th>
<th>Physical Condition</th>
<th>Deser-tion</th>
<th>Psywar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Sept</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Sept</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sept</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sept</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Oct</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Oct</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nov</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Nov</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Nov</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2728</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>904</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Reasons for Surrender\textsuperscript{92}

Because the PSYWAR column in the table is not further broken down into what type of PSYWAR was the cause of their surrender, either by leaflet, loudspeaker, or radio, it is hard to tell what percentage of the total number of surrenders were actually influenced by a safe conduct pass leaflet.

\textbf{b. Safe Conduct Pass PSYOP Matrix}

Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze the case yields the following conclusions. In this case, three of the four variables—the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered strong. One variable, in-depth knowledge of the TA, is considered weak. (See Figure 9.)

Various accounts claim the success of the leaflets in terms of the number of enemy troops that surrendered, "Some estimate that more than 100,000 North Korean and Chinese soldiers surrendered as a result of US PSYWAR activities;"\textsuperscript{93} however, there was no distinction between what type of PSYWAR influenced the enemy.

\textsuperscript{92} George S. Pettee, \textit{Technical Memorandum ORO-T-3: US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War} (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 42.

to surrender and if there were other causes that prompted enemy troops to desert. It is difficult to say with certainty that the safe conduct pass leaflet accounted for a definitive amount of enemy surrenders throughout the war, despite the high number of defectors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONG</th>
<th>WEAK</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The proper resources were not used to acquire the needed knowledge of the TA</td>
<td>No information on what research was conducted</td>
<td>Eighth Army lacked the resources needed to conduct the proper research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear of semantic noise</td>
<td>Semantics were not introduced in the messaging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA understands message</td>
<td>TA understood the message</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, influence tactics are used</td>
<td>Identifying the need for food, medical supplies, and proper treatment allowed for an effective message</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaches a majority of the TA</td>
<td>Leaflets were dropped all over enemy positions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has credibility</td>
<td>The leaflet had credibility because it was signed by General MacArthur and General Van Fleet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA is able to receive the message through the medium (if a leaflet is used with written text, the TA must be able to read)</td>
<td>Although a majority of the TA was illiterate, a simple map showed them how to surrender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change</td>
<td>Because of the conditions that enemy troops faced, they were open to the idea of surrendering because of the offering of food, medical supplies, and humane treatment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. PSYOP Matrix (Safe Conduct Pass Leaflet)

3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals

Loudspeakers were rarely deployed during the early months of the war. In January 1951, seven months after the war started, George Pettee explained in the technical memorandum *US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War* that “Public address, or loudspeaker equipment, has been used on a scale so small as to be little more than
experimental. Although widely and effectively used by many forces on both sides in World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, and what has been available has been used with little effect.”

The unit responsible for conducting tactical level PSYWAR was the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company. This unit, which was originally the twenty-person Tactical Information Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas, was expanded, renamed, and sent to Korea, arriving in November 1950. Within this deployment, the Loudspeaker Platoon was pushed down to commanders to be utilized along the front lines. Although the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company was issued three loudspeakers, which were mounted on one-quarter ton trailers, only two of the loudspeakers had arrived in Korea by the end of November 1951; of the two that had arrived, only one was working. However, over the next few months, the 1st Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company increased in size, and early in 1951, “there were 12 to 21 [loudspeaker] teams, with four or more usually posted to each corps and one per division on the line.”

According to military historian Stanley Sandler, there were a number of advantages that loudspeakers had compared to leaflets. “[A loudspeaker] was not ‘wasted’ like approximately ninety percent of the tens of millions of leaflets produced in this war, it had obviously more of an appeal to semi-literate peasants than leaflets, and the Korean language (Hangul) seemed more suited to the spoken than to the written word. In addition, enemy cadre could hardly forbid their men to listen, as they could

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96 Ibid., 22.


prohibit their picking up leaflets.”\textsuperscript{99} The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams was the surrender appeal. Because the “range of the loudspeaker was 1,000 yards to one mile,”\textsuperscript{100} teams were brought to the front lines to broadcast their appeals to the enemy.

A May 1951 command report attributed success to the loudspeaker teams, arguing that:

Nine (9) teams operated during the period with all American divisions, and with other United Nations forces, conducting a total of forty-eight (48) missions... A known total of two thousand nine hundred forty three (2943) prisoners surrendered as a direct result of ground loudspeaker broadcasts. This is a considerable increase over the preceding period.\textsuperscript{101}

\textit{a. Analysis of Loudspeaker Surrender Appeals}

The PSYOP model produces the following analysis:

1. \textbf{In-depth knowledge:} Just as the previous case studies, in-depth knowledge of the TA can be considered weak because there was no information on the research conducted before developing the safe conduct passes. Also, just as with safe conduct passes, it can be said that the Eighth Army’s Psychological Warfare Division lacked the proper resources needed in acquiring the in-depth knowledge of the TA that was needed. The \textit{Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War} states that:

\begin{quote}
EUSAK [Eighth United States Army in Korea] Psywar has little or no library...there is actually no library for the division as a whole. The Projects Group does, however, have a small collection of materials and books. These include three Hong-Kong newspapers, Chinese and Soviet picture magazines, several books on China and Korea (e.g., Crow’s \textit{Five Hundred Million Customers}, Osgood’s \textit{Ethnology of Korea}, Chinese and
\end{quote}


Korean dictionaries, Army psywar manuals, Linebarger’s Psychological Warfare, a college textbook on psychology and collections of the speeches of Mao Tse-tung and Ghu The, as well as official reports of various kinds.\footnote{Willmore Kendall, \textit{Technical Memorandum ORO-T-17(FEC): Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War} (Chevy Chase, Maryland: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1951), 32.}

Although the Eighth Army initially lacked the required resources needed to better understand the TA, by the summer of 1951, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Leaflet & Loudspeaker Company had acquired “more than 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel, (which included 10 professional Chinese and Korean translators and interviewers).”\footnote{Stanley Sandler, \textit{“Cease Resistance: It’s Good For You!”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations} (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command Historical Monograph Series No. 9, 1999), 216.} These indigenous personnel and professional translators helped in the development of loudspeaker scripts, thus reducing semantic noise. Thus, the in-depth knowledge of the TA improved over time and with the acquisition of indigenous help.

\textbf{2. Message:} The message of choice by the loudspeaker teams was the surrender appeal. Examples of broadcasted statements include:

Soon you will be committed to battle again to be sacrificed in the UN’s sea of fire. Think of the thousands and thousands of your comrades who have already died for nothing in this foreign land. Friends, be wise, come to the UN lines, at the first opportunity you are guaranteed good treatment.

Or

Here’s how to escape and come to UN lines. Listen carefully to the instruction which follows...Listen carefully...This is the way to escape your unit and come over to the UN lines:...

Sandler claims that “typical U.S. loudspeaker messages avoided overt political themes and usually offered a way out for the individual enemy soldier.” Furthermore, because indigenous personnel and professional translators were used, the

messages were easy to understand and did not have semantic noise introduced unknowingly by U.S. forces. Messages were kept short, between 60 to 90 seconds, and followed the following guidelines:

1. Be used as a tactical weapon, with no lofty strategic (or “political”) messages (“End the War!” “Fight Communism!”).

2. Use simple, easy-to-understand messages.

3. Take a firm note.

4. Always repeat “punch line.”

5. Sound “official” in tone and language.

6. Personalize target, by name, if possible.

7. Give directions on how to surrender.

8. Preface message with English-language warning to friendly forces not to shoot defectors coming across the lines (easier said than done).

9. Give up-to-date news.

10. Use native-speakers if at all possible, to avoid foreign accent.105

3. Channel/Medium: Along with leaflets, the medium that was chosen to carry the surrender message was the loudspeaker. With the range it had, loudspeakers were particularly useful on the front lines. It can be inferred that these broadcasts were threatening to enemy troops because loudspeaker broadcasts were fired upon by the enemy. According to Sandler, one study reported, “Hardly a day went by during the last year of the war without reports that the enemy had countered broadcasts with a generous amount of mortar or artillery rounds...a good many of the ground loud-speakers...were

destroyed by enemy counter fire.”\textsuperscript{106} Also, because the loudspeakers were so effective in reaching the enemy, Communist officers usually ordered their men to make noise to drown out the broadcast. Soldiers were told to fire their weapons, bang on containers, ring bells, and sing in hopes that they would not be able to hear the message.\textsuperscript{107} These activities point to both the effectiveness of the medium in reaching the enemy and the message it carried.

\textbf{4. Receiver/TA: } As with the safe conduct pass leaflets, the intended TA was enemy troops. Loudspeaker surrender appeals seemed to work best after a major offensive took place. Sandler again observes: “After the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Division’s task force had flanked and decimated the targeted enemy, the loudspeaker team chief drew up a “threat-surrender” message for the survivors and “many” enemy troops surrendered.”\textsuperscript{108}

Sandler reports that “From January 1951 to the Armistice of 27 July 1953, 8\textsuperscript{th} Army loudspeaker teams made 20,000 distinct broadcasts”\textsuperscript{109} Although General McClure, who was head of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, “claimed that something like one-third of enemy surrenderers had been “influenced in their decision” by U.S. psywar,”\textsuperscript{110} it is not known how many of them surrendered because of loudspeaker broadcasts. However, one can come to the conclusion that loudspeaker broadcasts could account for a fair amount of these surrenders based on the large number of broadcasts made.


b. **Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal PSYOP Matrix**

Using the PSYOP model and matrix to analyze the loudspeaker surrender appeal yields the following findings. In this case, two of the four variables—message and medium—are considered strong and the other two—in-depth knowledge of the TA and the receptiveness of the TA—are considered weak. (See Figure 10.)

As with leaflets, the use of loudspeaker surrender appeals correlated with high numbers of defectees. This can be observed by taking into account the number of broadcasts made throughout the war and the number of enemy personnel who surrendered. As stated earlier, it is estimated that more than 100,000 enemy troops surrendered due to U.S. PSYWAR and over 20,000 distinct broadcasts were made directed toward enemy troops. From this information, one can infer that the loudspeaker broadcasts had had some effects toward the enemy and ultimately caused them to surrender.
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Out of the three cases analyzed, none of them had four strong variables. One case had four weak variables, Operation Moolah, one case had three strong variables, and one weak variable, safe conduct pass leaflet, and one case had two strong variables and two weak variables, loudspeaker surrender appeals. In-depth knowledge of the TA was weak in all three. Message was weak in one, Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker surrender appeal. Medium was weak in one, Operation Moolah, and strong in the other two, safe conduct pass leaflet and loudspeaker surrender appeal. Receptiveness of the TA was weak in two, Operation Moolah and loudspeaker surrender appeal, and strong in one, safe conduct pass. The findings are summarized in Figure 11.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONG VARIABLES</th>
<th>WEAK VARIABLES</th>
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| **OPERATION MOOLAH** | • In-depth knowledge of the TA  
|                   | • Message  
|                   | • Medium  
|                   | • Receptiveness of the TA |
| **Safe Conduct Pass Leaflet** | • Message  
|                   | • Medium  
|                   | • Receptiveness of the TA |
| **Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal** | • In-depth knowledge of the TA  
|                   | • Message  
|                   | • Medium  
|                   | • Receptiveness of the TA |

Figure 11. Summary of Findings
V. CONCLUSION

After analyzing communication theory and applying the PSYOP model and matrix to three cases of tactical PSYOP in the Korean War, this thesis offers the following general conclusions. First, PSYOP is not successful when all four variables are weak in the PSYOP message. Second, successful PSYOP is possible, when there are two or more strong variables present in the operation. Finally, since the three case studies can be classified as tactical PSYOP, the general conclusions made here cannot be applied to strategic or operational PSYOP. Each of these points will be elaborated below.

A. THE FOUR VARIABLES

The strength of the four variables studied in this thesis—in-depth knowledge of the TA, the message, the medium, and the receptiveness of the TA—offers insights on the potential success of a given PSYOP operation.

1. In-Depth Knowledge of the TA

In all three cases, in-depth knowledge of the TA was weak. One can come to the conclusion that, for tactical PSYOP, in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessary for tactical level PSYOP; the PSYOP planner only needs to have a basic knowledge of the TA in order to be effective.

The following questions can provide the basic knowledge that the PSYOP planner needs of the TA to execute successful tactical PSYOP:

- Can the TA read?
- Can the TA understand basic drawings and pictures?
- What conditions, such as weak leadership, lack of food and medical care, fear of death, or lack of training, can be exploited to cause the TA to surrender?
- What medium can best reach the TA?

The overall intent of the cases was to cause the enemy to surrender or defect.
There may be more questions but, with these basic four questions, the PSYOP planner will gain enough knowledge of the TA to craft an effective PSYOP message.

2. **Message**

In two of the cases, the message was strong. These two cases, safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, were successful in influencing the TA to surrender. By contrast, a weak message, which was present in Operation Moolah, caused that operation to be unsuccessful. From these cases, one can conclude that, for tactical PSYOP, the message needs to be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be successful. The message is considered strong when it does not contain semantic noise, the TA is able to understand it, and the proper conditions, vulnerabilities, legitimate appeals, persuasion techniques, and influence tactics are used when it is crafted.

3. **Medium**

In two of the cases—safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal—the medium correctly fit the operation and therefore was strong. Operation Moolah, by contrast, had an ineffective medium, which contributed to its lack of success. From these observations, one can conclude that, for tactical PSYOP, the medium needs to be strong in order for the PSYOP operation to be successful. The medium is considered strong when it is able to reach a majority of the TA, and it has credibility. For example, the TA need to be literate in order to read a leaflet with words.

4. **Receptiveness of the TA**

In two of the cases, receptiveness of the TA was weak. Of these two cases, loudspeaker surrender appeal and Operation Moolah, only loudspeaker surrender appeal was successful in influencing the TA to surrender; Operation Moolah was unsuccessful. A strong receptiveness of the TA, identified in safe conduct pass leaflet, is necessary for tactical PSYOP to be successful. Receptiveness of the TA is considered strong when the TA is open to arguments, ideas, or change.
B. THE THREE CASES

1. Operation Moolah

Analysis of Operation Moolah shows that if all four variables are weak, then the PSYOP operation will be unsuccessful. Even though the unintended effects of the operation were profoundly positive, the operation’s goal— influencing a Soviet or North Korean pilot to defect with a combat capable MiG-15 jetfighter— was not met.

2. Safe Conduct Pass Leaflets

For both safe conduct pass leaflets and loudspeaker surrender appeal, in-depth knowledge of the TA was weak. However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the PSYOP planner to choose the right medium and craft the right message to be successful. Analysis of the safe conduct pass leaflets demonstrates that if the two or more variables that are strong include the message and the medium, then the likelihood of the PSYOP operation’s success will increase. The fourth variable, receptiveness of the TA, is more complicated. Ultimately, enemy soldiers were receptive to the message and surrendered in large numbers. However, it is unclear whether they were receptive when they received the message, or became receptive over time. Further analysis of this variable can bring about insights as to how receptive the TA was when the safe conduct pass leaflet was dropped.

3. Loudspeaker Surrender Appeal

Analysis of the loudspeaker surrender appeal also demonstrates that if the two or more variables that are strong include message and medium, then the likelihood of the PSYOP’s message will be successful increases. Analysis of the fourth variable, receptiveness of the TA, shows that loudspeaker surrender appeal was most effective when it was broadcasted to the TA after a major attack or aerial bombardment. In other words, the TA’s receptiveness of the loudspeaker surrender appeal significantly changed after friendly forces did something to cause them to want to surrender. The TA’s original conditions were not enough to cause them to be open to the idea of surrendering. As with
safe conduct pass leaflets and Operation Moolah, in-depth knowledge of the TA was also weak. However, a basic knowledge of the TA allowed the PSYOP planner to choose the right medium and craft the right message, aiding in the success of the operation.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYOP TODAY

The practitioners of PSYOP today can learn from both successful and unsuccessful PSYOP from past operations. These cases offer valuable insights on what the PSYOP planner needs to focus their time and effort. For tactical PSYOP, the importance of a strong message and the choice of a strong medium can cause the operation to be successful; in-depth knowledge of the TA is not necessarily needed while executing tactical PSYOP. Second, receptiveness of the TA can be further enhanced when friendly forces do something before the PSYOP is executed. Further analysis of in-depth knowledge of the TA for strategic and operational PSYOP is needed in order to understand its importance for PSYOP operations at this level.

Furthermore, PSYOP planners can improve the effectiveness of their PSYOP products by applying the model and matrix presented in this thesis to their planning process. Specifically, PSYOP planners can compare the PSYOP matrix with their operation and make changes accordingly to any weak variables that they identify.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
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