Counter-radicalization best practices in the United States and lessons learned from abroad

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COUNTER-RADICALIZATION:
BEST PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
LESSONS LEARNED FROM ABROAD

by

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September 2011

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Counter-Radicalization: Best Practices in the United States and Lessons Learned from Abroad

Examined are the effectiveness and impact of a number of currently implemented counter-radicalization strategies and community outreach programs in the United States, particularly by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, as well as in countries abroad in the United Kingdom (UK), Amsterdam and Scandinavia. Best practices recommendations for implementing effective community outreach programs and developing a multi-agency counter-radicalization policy throughout the United States that aim to counter-radicalization and prevent violent extremism are based on promising findings derived from the research literature, selected case examples from the UK and Amsterdam, and professional expertise in community affairs.
COUNTER-RADICALIZATION: BEST PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM ABROAD

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ABSTRACT

The proposed thesis analyzes the threat and impact of homegrown radicalization on members of Muslim communities, its development and process in the United States and Europe, as well as unified efforts to counter radicalization that emphasize the need for interagency coordination and interdisciplinary approaches among all levels of government. Examined are the effectiveness and impact of a number of currently implemented counter-radicalization strategies and community outreach programs in the United States, particularly by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, as well as in countries abroad in the United Kingdom (UK), Amsterdam and Scandinavia. Best practices recommendations for implementing effective community outreach programs and developing a multi-agency counter-radicalization policy throughout the United States that aim to counter-radicalization and prevent violent extremism are based on promising findings derived from the research literature, selected case examples from the UK and Amsterdam, and professional expertise in community affairs.
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<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Community Affairs Bureau</td>
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<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive</td>
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<td>CCRB</td>
<td>Complaint Review Board</td>
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<td>CLP</td>
<td>Clergy Liaison Program</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Community Oriented Policing</td>
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<td>CTCIB</td>
<td>Counterterrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>JRIC</td>
<td>Joint Regional Intelligence Center</td>
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<td>Joint Terrorism Task Force</td>
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<td>LA</td>
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<td>LMSI</td>
<td>Lower Manhattan Security Initiative</td>
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<td>MAHSC</td>
<td>Muslim America Homeland Security Congress</td>
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<td>National Counter Terrorism Academy</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>New Immigrant Outreach Unit</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has expanded over the years and will continue to evolve as terrorist groups gain power and control with the use of technological advances, progressive training, and excessive propaganda. The threat of large-scale terrorist attacks has pushed government and law enforcement officials toward deterrence and prevention rather than “criminal apprehension” (Jenkins, 2010. p. iii).

According to Neumann (2009, p. 15), three variables describe the transformation from old to new terrorism: 1) organizational structure of terrorist groups, 2) aims or activity goals, and 3) methods implemented for change. Perhaps the most notorious face of terrorism today is Osama Bin Laden, which was not the case back in the late 1980s, early 1990s. The historical aspect of terrorism defines its evolution today. The rise of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda began from 1988–1992, when Bin Laden was on the move from Sudan to Afghanistan and Pakistan in which he built non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and renewed them between 1996–1998 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 63).

The embassy bombings occurred during the Clinton presidency, during which authorities were ordered to respond to the attacks. Although perpetrators were taken into custody and convicted, the legal system at the time failed to examine the extent of the new threat facing the United States (U.S.). The fusion process involves the integration of the public safety and private sectors in allowing information from all sources to be gathered, analyzed and exchanged by providing access to a variety of databases (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 75). The goal is to achieve a unified force among all levels of law enforcement agencies. Such unity allows for maximization of abilities to prevent and respond to terrorism and other criminal acts to safeguard the U.S. homeland effectively. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011) urges the empowerment of local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States, which further suggests that achieving this aim requires the cooperation and engagement of all levels of government to develop counter-radicalization initiatives effectively. “Actionable
knowledge” is the result of developed policies, managed resources, and evaluated services by administrators on all levels of government, in which the collaboration of numerous resources maximizes such operations while moving in unison towards a common goal (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 357).

Living within the community, Muslim-Americans are presumably in a position in which they may become aware of any unusual activity occurring in their neighborhoods. Yet, obstacles occur that may prevent community members from feeling a part of the society they have joined, such as communication barriers and discriminatory practices or experiences, which are the very same situations that make radicalization prevalent. Research findings have shown that even those who are not susceptible to radicalization may still harbor a sense of alienation, which may ultimately prevent them from sharing information (Benard, 2005). An influence of internal and external factors, as well as making new associations with “like-minded” individuals, is prevalent among members of the Muslim community who are prone to adopting this ideology. In the United Kingdom (UK), for instance, concerns over “indirect encouragement” of terrorism have led to even greater concerns in regards to members of the Muslim community exercising freedom of expression (Article 19, 2006). Even greater concerns may arise from such anti-terror laws that can impose pressures on Muslim communities and possibly impact counter-radicalization efforts.

Cases of domestic terrorism attempted by homegrown terrorists are on the rise; the planned radioactive bomb attack in 2002, the Madrid and London attacks in 2004 and 2005, the Fort Dix Army base assault weapons case and plans to destroy Kennedy airport in 2007, and the 2010 bomb-laden SUV in Times Square. These series of attacks only underscore the seriousness of homegrown terrorism as an emerging threat. Whether having succeeded in destroying their target or whether having been thwarted, all individuals in these incidents share one glaring similarity: they were all residents of the cities/countries in which they planned—and in some cases executed—their attacks. Living, working, eating, shopping, socializing, and worshipping alongside fellow Muslims, in predominantly Muslim communities, the “front line” for intelligence could have implications for the difference between tragedy and averted tragedy.
According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), efforts to counter radicalization involve two main elements, prevention and disruption. By denying terrorists entry into the United States and disrupting terrorist operations, it is possible to deter the terrorist threat and prevent the emergence of violent extremism and radicalization in the battle of defeating homegrown terrorism (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007, p. 23). The threat of radicalization in the United States and European nations is real. Empirical examination of the radicalization of homegrown terrorists yields insights on the underlying factors contributing to the radicalization process. According to a study conducted by Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009), religious ideology plays a central role in and is a strong factor in homegrown terrorists’ radicalization; 20% had a spiritual mentor who provided guidance and approval for violent activity during the radicalization process, and 40% claimed a religious motivation for their actions. Other findings pointed to influencing factors including demographics and international connections; 40% traveled abroad for training and to “fight jihad,” and 12% received religious instruction overseas (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009).

Research suggests that a main cause of homegrown radicalization is the inability of individuals to undergo the acculturation and assimilation process successfully that would enable them to become fully productive members of their “host” society, which then leaves them vulnerable and susceptible to the influences of radicalizing forces (Pressman, 2006, pp. 149–179). Law enforcement agencies, including the New York Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles (LA) sheriff’s office, as well as other agencies in Europe, have attempted to intervene to bridge the gap, but have been unable to establish fully a relationship with Muslim communities that encourages its members to share information for the cause of identifying individuals within the community who pose potential threats. Like every immigrant community, the vast majority of Muslims migrate to the United States to improve the quality of their lives and is prepared to overcome any obstacles to achieve that goal for themselves and their families. They have a vested interest in preserving and protecting the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and one of the ways in which they
do so is by helping make their communities safe and prosperous (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010). Muslims in the United States are more resistant, but not immune, to the message behind radicalization efforts.

The main issue among Muslims in communities remains that of building a trusting relationship with the police, due to preconceived notions regarding outreach programs that seem to target rather than engage Muslims viewed as being prone or susceptible to committing acts of terrorism in comparison to other ethnic groups (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Law enforcement officials must be aware of this underlying issue; as such preconceived notions could potentially lead to radicalization and greater mistrust between the community and the police. Counter-radicalization efforts must then be narrowed down to specifics in examining the root problems: restoring community trust, building bridges, and developing educational programs aimed at gaining the cooperation of both the Muslim communities and a given population as a whole (Baca, 2011). Ongoing efforts to address radicalization in the United States and Europe are continuous, as law enforcement agencies shift focus onto implementing community outreach programs as a means of reaching out to members of the Muslim community aimed at long-term success in the fight against radicalization.

Building resilience against violent extremism begins at the local level. A number of research findings account for effective counter-radicalization strategies best achieved through the engagement and empowerment of individuals and groups. The United States recognizes the threat faced by Al-Qaida and radical efforts to divide the nation, and therefore, is in a challenging position to defend all Americans against violent extremist ideologies while avoiding potential backlash against Muslim Americans (The National Security Strategy, 2011); backlash that may be due to the violent extremists preying on the feelings of alienation brought upon by discrimination in luring Muslim Americans into the radicalization process. In its defense, the United States acknowledges the importance of keeping families, local communities and organizations informed about community-based approaches to countering radicalization to (terrorist) violence. In turn, communities can assist in confronting the threat of radicalization because, by remaining well informed, they gain insight on the reality that extremists are targeting their children

A. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION

What current counter-radicalization strategies/models utilized by the NYPD and LA Sheriff’s Department are most effective in combating violent extremism/radicalization in these metropolitan cities?

B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What best practices being utilized in the United States may apply nationally to combat violent extremism/radicalization throughout the country?
- What best counter-radicalization practices being utilized in the UK, Amsterdam, and Scandinavian countries can be implemented domestically in the United States to combat violent extremism/radicalization more effectively?
- How do socioeconomic factors, demographics, leadership in community relations, and religion impact radicalization and possibly affect efforts of community outreach?
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature supporting this topic is extensive, stemming from studies conducted by government agencies, universities, and law enforcement agencies. The literature review focuses on the prevention of radicalization, divided into two subcategories, literature pertaining to efforts to counter radicalization in Muslim communities abroad, and literature pertaining to efforts to counter radicalization in Muslim communities in the United States. Furthermore, this review attempts to assess the efficacy of current outreach methods/strategies utilized in the NYPD, LAPD, and LA sheriff’s department to determine best practices to implement domestically throughout the United States. The importance of interdisciplinary approaches and inter-agency coordination are emphasized as a means of strengthening nationwide counter-radicalization efforts. Furthermore, examining European counterterrorism policy highlights the European Union’s strategy to combat radicalization, and therefore, may provide additional insight on lessons learned abroad.

Radicalization subsets of issues including socio-economic factors, leadership styles in community relations, demographics, and religion are also highlighted as it is important to first assess how related factors impact or influence radicalization to develop and effectively implement counter-radicalization strategies/models. A few studies have examined the social affiliations of homegrown terrorism; however, empirical evidence is lacking in the examination of the underlying process in which terrorists are radicalized, which constitutes a large gap in the literature. According to Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman (2009), understanding the influence of relatively significant factors that contribute to the radicalization process may lead to the implementation of successful and effective counter-radicalization strategies throughout the United States. One countermeasure that emerges among several research findings as an essential aspect of the counter-radicalization process is Muslim engagement, which is a major focus of the present thesis in recognizing proper implementation and successful outcomes of community outreach programs in the United States.
According to the research literature on counter-radicalization strategies currently implemented in European nations, policy makers place great emphasis on finding root causes of radicalization in externalities (e.g., political and economic conditions). A significant gap in the literature entails that less focus is warranted for setting out measures that address causal factors at the social level, and even less attention is paid to causes existing at the individual level. It is argued in the literature that further research for causes for radicalization evidenced in and directly influenced by the environment is necessary when shaping counter-radicalization policies and strategies, whether it is in Europe or domestically in the United States. Examining causes of radicalization in social environments and individual dynamics, as well as other subsets of issues discussed in subsequent sections, may contribute to the long-term success of counter-radicalization strategies in thwarting terrorist acts and preventing formations of new terrorist networks.

A. EFFORTS TO COUNTER RADICALIZATION IN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The literature pertaining to community oriented policing in Muslim communities in the United States is not as widely available as the literature from the UK. However, several reports exist from the U.S. government, law enforcement agencies, and government sponsored research by private agencies. One study, for example, attempts to answer a critical question: “how do we counter the seductive influence on youth of radical ideologies (e.g., as found in extreme fundamentalist Islamic groups), and the links among youth of adoption of these ideologies and the enactment of behaviors counter to peace, democracy and civil society?” (Benard, 2005). Similar to the results of studies conducted in the UK, Scandinavia and the Netherlands, the Benard (2005) report attempts to answer this question by emphasizing on refocusing youth energy on civic engagement in potentially yielding counterradicalization.

An international study published in the Journal of Applied Psychology discusses the acculturation and adaptation of immigrant youth into society. It identifies factors that contribute to the integration of youth into a specific society and what factors contribute to youth becoming estranged, isolated, and disaffected (Homeland Security Institute, 2006).
Many have come to a similar conclusion that acculturation is a powerful experience that has potential benefits for both disaffected youths and the society they are resistant to embrace. Supporting these findings are American-Muslims themselves, whose own campaign to eliminate radicalization in their communities employs numerous techniques being studied and tested by government and law enforcement agencies in the United States and Europe (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010).

The NYPD anti-terrorism initiative is comprised of synchronized efforts, which is beneficial on several levels and consists of efforts between the department’s intelligence division and counterterrorism bureau (Cannon, 2011). More importantly, officials must aim public safety efforts at the local level given the demographics of metropolitan cities like New York City (NYC) and LA with vast immigrant populations. Officers who have knowledge of the neighborhoods can best handle securing these communities. Community relations’ focus must revolve around pre-emptive methods of terrorism prevention. All levels of government (the private sector, and non-governmental organizations) should work together to prepare, prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist and criminal events, a process known as data fusion.

This process constitutes the coherent, unified approach among all levels of government around which the fusion center concept revolves. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), four failures emerged from the 9/11 attacks: imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. Public safety officials should be “imaginative” and not become complacent, which begins with understanding the gravity of a given threat without it being based on actual intelligence, which in turn grasps the concept of “imagination.” In an era in which terrorist threats are imminent, no threat is too unrealistic. Major policy agencies of the government do not meet contemporary terrorist threats and diplomatic efforts are therefore ineffective (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 63). The government must examine existing policies and use imaginative approaches to revise and reconsider how any given threat could have potential costs, controversies, and disruptions to the security system as a whole.
In the LA County Sheriff’s Department, counter-radicalization efforts in community outreach utilize a nationally recognized model that has proven successful. Community leaders engage in community relations and then share their experiences and intelligence with contacts nationally. Strengths include professional diplomacy efforts, in particular, which led members of the sheriff’s department to enhance counter-radicalization efforts to countries abroad (Baca, 2011), to promote international cooperation and apply it where necessary. A lesson learned from the European experience, shared by Commanding Officer Downing (2007) of the LAPD, is the importance of identifying the underlying threat that alienated communities pose for developing breeding grounds and potentially forming a safe haven for terrorists within the population.

Searching for early indicators of radicalization is one benefit; however, the real solution lies within efforts directed towards strengthening societal structure and economics while weakening political power bases. LAPD strategies and initiatives have mainly focused on a combination of education and prevention. However, perhaps a more pre-emptive prevention strategy would serve beneficial to implement counter-radicalization models effectively. Furthermore, the weaknesses point to a significant gap between the police and the community mainly in regards to a lack of trust. Community policing in metropolitan cities should aim at creating a shared sense of threat in which society as a whole fears the same fears (Downing, 2007). The present thesis assesses counter-radicalization measures taken by departments, such as the LAPD and NYPD, as well as policies implemented abroad, to determine the extent to which these measures curb radicalization by examining the causal factors.

The literature highlighted in this review presents recommendations based on studies that focus on the prevention of homegrown radicalization, which has become a very real threat, and creates a very real need for law enforcement and other governmental agencies to understand the factors that aid in its growth. What seems promising is that the strategies outlined in these studies that address and counter homegrown radicalization are strategies law enforcement has effectively utilized in other “fights” against drugs, for example. Seeking the community most directly affected by the problem in question is a
proven method of both prevention and intelligence-sharing efforts in the fight against homegrown radicalization. Although a considerable amount of empirical studies has not been conducted to address related counter-radicalization issues, existing research contributes to gaining a better understanding of such strategies and proposes ways to expand current programs further.

B. EFFORTS TO COUNTER RADICALIZATION IN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, AMSTERDAM, AND SCANDINAVIA

A vast amount of literature exists regarding community-oriented policing efforts in Muslim communities in the UK. Reports from governmental organizations, universities, and law enforcement agencies discuss policing efforts in Muslim communities overseas. Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, stated, “communities defeat terrorism” has become the mantra of the police, and has created safer neighborhood teams that mix traditional bobby work with cultural awareness (Paris, 2007). Community outreach, however, does not seem to be focused or tailored specifically to combat extremism/radicalization. Law enforcement, intelligence analysts, educators, and social workers can aid in “targeting outreach efforts, identifying early warning indicators in a community, and informing initiatives to influence the process of recruitment and assist disengagement” (Benard, 2005).

A related study highlights the obstacles to the Muslim community’s engagement in the Pathfinder program in the UK, in which prevention policy and community engagement were analyzed based on significant obstacles that prevented facilitation of the program. More importantly, the major weakness identified within the circumstances of the program was the lack of community trust in the police (McDonald & Mir, 2011, pp. 32–44) that initially led to reluctance. This finding is in keeping with the study conducted by the Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies in The Hague, the Netherlands, whose in-depth study, Countering Radicalization, analyzed immigrants living in Holland and their experiences with assimilation and discrimination and Dutch natives and their attitudes towards immigrants and the impact they have on the assimilation process.
The CONTEST strategy, arising out of Britain’s assessment of homegrown threats, contains four major elements: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011). The most controversial of these elements is the *Prevent* program, which promotes “mainstream” forces in Muslim communities. The controversy revolves around the program’s aim to prevent radicalization through securitizing relations between Muslim communities and the government. The *Prevent* program was heavily criticized by the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee and the Local Government Committee as reports claim that many Muslims portrayed the program’s objective as a means of “spying” on them by supporting intelligence analysis and information gathering, and as a program designed to promote resilience among Muslims, which could potentially lead to mistrust.

The “Channel Project,” a community outreach program established as part of the CONTEST strategy, has proven successful in encouraging police and other representatives of Muslim communities to detect individuals at risk of radicalization and develop interventions accordingly. It was reported in June 2011 that between 2007 and 2010, 1,120 “at-risk” youth were identified and referred to the program for intervention (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011). What British officials favor in approaching members of the Muslim community is a kind of outreach strategy that stresses heavily on factors related to building relationships with Muslim community leaders and authoritative figures. Developing a successful strategy will depend on an establishing an integrated society defined by participation, integration, and a sense of co-existence among Muslim and British communities.

Recommendations for local and national governmental agencies for implementation to encourage diversity and assimilations serve beneficial to accomplishing the objective. One limitation of the study is the creation of psychological tests to identify both those vulnerable to radicalization and those prone to homogeneity (Precht, 2007). Cost effectiveness and method of the selection process detracts from the realization of the measure and overlooks actual parameters. British policy response to the threat of terrorism includes enhanced police standards together with outreach to the Muslim community; challenges to this approach are also imminent (Paris, 2007).
Taking a more individualistic approach, another study examines factors that lead to youth radicalization in Scandinavia. Substantial relationships between how youth acculturate and adapt existed within the findings, further revealing two forms of adaptation, psychological and sociocultural (Benard, 2005). The results are consistent with and relevant to the thesis recommendations. The results of these studies are hopeful, and provide a variety of methods that, when consistently applied and in combination with each other, yield promising results. The municipal approach to counter-radicalization in Amsterdam revolves around three elements: general prevention, specific prevention and tackling radicalization (Mellis, 2007). In directing the counter-radicalization strategy, however, Amsterdam’s public safety officials have adopted a “supply and demand scheme,” as radicalization begins when supply meets demand.

Several factors including socio-economic factors, social pressures, identity issues and religious ideologies contribute to the scheme. According to Mellis (2007), young Muslims in the West are not accepting of traditional culturally bound Islam and related religious ideology. For such reasons, young Muslims continue to seek answers concerning their identity and religion. Once an active supply of radical ideas begins to spread, the breeding ground develops, which attracts seekers and resilience becomes the top priority for law enforcement officials. Mellis (2007) explains the importance of a variety of factors that could accumulate and break down the barriers of resilience, including economic and political frustrations, enhancing social cohesion, bridging ethnic gaps, and strengthening the common identity all Amsterdammers and continues to be a satisfactory [broad] preventative strategy for diminishing breeding grounds and increasing resilience in Muslim communities.

However, research suggests that more specific prevention strategies that emphasize inter-agency coordination may yield more effective outcomes. A guide for local partnerships in the UK proposes efficient guidelines, which shed light on the need for a multi-agency panel to develop appropriate safeguards and information-sharing networks, and guidelines that may be utilized in U.S. metropolitan cities to further strengthen counter-radicalization efforts (HM Government, 2010). The consequences of analyzing prevention methods lie within the limits of law enforcement and public safety.
officials’ capabilities in effectively combating radical ideology. The need for inter-agency coordination is prevalent once again. For example, the local government cannot be held responsible for stimulating and financing an alternative supply of “answers” that the young Muslims are seeking (Mellis, 2007). Furthermore, very little experience exists to claim a sole effective strategy or model as a best practice when it comes to interventions that work within community relations. This concept enforces the need for inter-agency coordination among public safety and law enforcement officials on all levels of government.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADICALIZATION

In recent years, a growing number of analysts and policymakers have referred to the doctrines guiding Al-Qaeda and its associates as an ideology. Radicalization stems from “Jihadi-Salafi” ideology, which is defined as “…the driver that motivates young men and women to carry out autonomous jihad via acts of terrorism” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). This ideology demands great loyalty and commitment on the part of the individual member. For acquiring an understanding of radicalization in the West, an assessment of the various reported models of radicalization retrieved four critical phases: 1) pre-radicalization, the point of origin 2) self-identification, exploration of Salafi Islam and identity issues 3) indoctrination, beliefs are intensified and 4) Jihadization, self-designation as holy warriors (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The evolution of religion is comparable to the rise of globalization, particularly when examining the impact and role of religious ideology in both old and new terrorism. In understanding how religious ideations play a role in acts of terrorism, or religiously inspired terrorism, modernity and globalization are both influencing factors. Knowledge, progress, and technological innovations are only part of the globalized efforts that continue to lead the evolution of the contemporary world. To many who thrive on advancements and growth in the pursuit of successful change, modern improvements or shifts in U.S. lifestyles are viewed as positively rewarding aspects of what contribute to an ever-changing world. However, when the concept of religion comes into play, a conflict of interest occurs comparable to that of the contradictory and opposing views of scientific and religious beliefs (e.g., the creation of mankind).

It is believed by many that progress, increased knowledge, and dramatic societal transformations lead to a decline in religious beliefs and practices (Neumann, 2009, p. 15), possibly due to the insecurities created by underlying fears of change, lifestyle shifts, and renovations. The movement of Islamic revivalism has influenced the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. The degree of influence by religious doctrine, however, varies significantly (Neumann, 2009, p. 15). A discussion of political
influence may be more relevant than religious influence in this matter. Religious ideology, in terms of religiously inspired Islamic terrorism in particular, is a sensitive issue as many hold differing views about the impact of Islam in acts of terrorism. Through its discourse on revivalism, the Quran permits the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities (Venkatraman, 2007, pp. 229–248). This statement, in particular, might cause discomfort or even rage among some members of the Muslim community, while other members of the same community might agree to preach the word.

Some members of the Muslim community may argue against this statement, claiming that Islam is a religion that promotes peace and strong faith. Based on the Quranic principle of “Ijtihad,” Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually (Talev, 2011). It is then plausible to imply that, determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran, terrorists emphasize the Quran’s doctrine on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a basis for the use of violent acts of terror to preserve the “Shariat” in an Islamic community. The influence does not only stem from the Quran’s doctrine. The cultural contexts from which these movements arise are of great importance and must be addressed to justify all possible facets of religiously inspired terrorism. According to the New America Foundation Study, “over one-fifth of indictments involving Americans who waged Jihad, communities and families provided tips and support to federal and local investigators” (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011).

The present chapter outlined the development of radicalization and considered root causes and critical phases of radicalization, the evolution of religion and the degree of influence on the emergence and progression of violent Jihad in contemporary times. Also highlighted is the importance of identifying terrorist inspired threats to intercept plots before attacks occur. Having considered the development of radicalization and the need for interactions between all government agencies and the community, the following chapter considers the subsets of issues, which influence the process of radicalization:
globalization, identity, demographics and assimilation, leadership from the Islamic perspective, psychological paradigms, social constructionism and adaptiveness, and religious ideology.
IV. THE PROCESS OF RADICALIZATION: SUBSETS OF ISSUES

According to the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions report (2011), 40% of all extremist plots were thwarted as a result of strong community ties and tips received from the public. The Obama administration’s new counterterrorism strategy is the nation’s first to focus on Al-Qaeda’s ability to attack the United States from within. Assessing the reality of the homegrown threat is key to establishing valid counter-radicalization strategies successfully. The question remains, how effective are such policies in successfully countering radicalization in the West?

The strategy calls for building “a culture of resilience” in the United States that combines interagency coordination and an emphasis on Muslim-Americans as “welcome members of society who can help prevent terrorism” (Talev, 2011).

The recently published National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights plans currently being implemented to allow the administration to partner with communities to prevent violent extremism. The terror attacks of September 11 and the Pentagon, among others worldwide, have led researchers and intelligence analysts to the conclusion that it is important to identify terrorist inspired threats at the point at which radicalization begins to intercept plots before attacks occur. Extremist/religious ideology legitimizes terrorism “…as a tool to affect societal change” (Silber& Bhatt, 2007). Radicalization subsets like socio-economic factors, demographics, and identity issues emerge because of the religious belief system in which it acts as a catalyst for homegrown threats while under the influence of western culture and values.

Radicalization contains many subsets of issues; socio-economic factors, leadership in community relations, demographics, and religion are focal points. To develop and effectively implement counter-radicalization strategies, it is important to first assess how related factors impact or influence radicalization. Socioeconomics play an important role in contemporary terrorism. A relationship exists between underlying conditions and terrorist activity (e.g., social, economic, political, and demographic conditions). According to Newman (2006), some underlying conditions give rise to
terrorism, and in turn, build up the terrorist threat while others may simply be irrelevant. From a methodological perspective, studying how terror networks flourish and determining the root cause of terrorist activity is challenging; it is often a one-sided argument. However, in examining the role of socioeconomics in contemporary terrorism, the underlying conditions may provide a critical look into the root causes of terrorist activity, and offer an understanding of how societal, economic, political, and demographic shifts contribute to the socioeconomic framework of terrorism and religious ideology.

Poverty is a breeding ground for political extremism, which in particular, instills feelings of resentment, despair and hatred among a given population. It is believed that terrorism stems from underdeveloped, poor or weak governance that has been referred to as “black holes within which fanaticism emerges” (Newman, 2006, pp. 749–772). Additionally, poor societies lack the sufficient capabilities to prevent the expansion of terrorist activities, which only complicates counterterrorism efforts. Sudden economic and social declines have also been shown to contribute to patterns of extremism. Although a true relationship exists between poverty and contemporary terrorism, studies show that supporters of most terrorist organizations are not poor or uneducated. In fact, research shows that the level of support for violent attacks does not decrease among those with higher education (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166). Social conditions play an important role in the local relationship between the community and law enforcement agencies.

Significant demographic conditions (e.g., rapid population growth and population shifts across different ethnic groups) are also contributing factors. Having direct relation to growing terrorist activity is the migration and shifts in the ethnic, religious, and social balance of a society (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166) and, more importantly, urbanization combined with poverty. Both conditions enable terrorist recruitment and organization, which stem from inequality, segregation, and exclusion. Under such circumstances, exposure to crime and violence becomes the norm or the expectation. Exclusion and social inequality are sources of conflict, which can grow in combination with other factors/conditions. For instance, social tensions and heterogeneity
can result in social upheaval, extremist politics, or even civil war (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166) that are also linked to terrorism. Such factors contribute to the contemporary terrorist ideations and are of critical importance to researchers who continue to examine the complex role of socioeconomics in terrorism.

Ideological or religious terrorism has been posited as a root cause of certain types of terrorism, which has also been compared to globalization efforts. The perception of cultural imperialism is the result. It is believed that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists detest modernity, and any accompanying scientific or rational civilization created by freedom and democracy (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166).

Why? Globalization and democracy have resulted in economic instability, economic devastation, ethnic hatred, and overall violence throughout the developing world. Dramatic transformations in the social sphere are feared among Islamic fundamentalists (e.g., new generational values and gender equality) as traditional constants vanish (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166). The culturally authentic way of life is no longer in existence, and neither is a stable lifestyle. Religion is integrated into the socioeconomic framework of terrorism in this sense: religious lifestyles and the social realities of late modernity cannot possibly come to terms with one another. The Muslim community distinguishes itself from the rest of society in several ways (e.g., traditional/religious dress, customs, and religiously appropriate conduct). Conservative values are important for the existence of a sacred life, which remain the top priority for members of the Muslim community.

In the public safety field, understanding the facets and elements of transformational and pseudo-transformational leadership is relevant for both leaders and followers. A significant amount of research warrants attention to specific elements of leadership while placing a great deal of emphasis on charisma, affect, intrinsic motivation, and follower development. Perhaps the most relevant of the elements is the influence of a transformational leader on follower performance and development. As transformational leadership is most concerned with emotions, values, ethics, standards, and long-term goals (Grundstein-Amado, 2009, pp. 247–260), it is a process of transformation, nonetheless, that develops and guides followers to their fullest potential.
through the leader’s effective motivational skills, internal values and ideals. Emphasis in research should focus on leadership style in community relations and how religious ideology influences radicalization, as understanding the extent of these factors can set the stage for utilizing effective counter-radicalization strategies/models.

The following is a layout of the components of the radicalization process briefly discussed above.

A. GLOBALIZATION

Twenty-first century Islamic terrorism defines extremist behavior as having evolved as part of collective reactions arising out of particular global circumstances. For many, the West represents freedom and liberation from cultural traditions, values and beliefs. On the other hand, the West also represents a specialized identity into which non-westerners can “…merge, disappear, and lose all traces of authenticity” (Moghaddam, 2006). Globalization presents real and current threats to Muslims’ traditional identities and way of life. Research shows that the stronger their values and traditional ties, the more likely they are to defend their traditional identities against any and all threats.

According to Moghaddam (2006), the momentum and extent of globalization forces are leading to a sense of powerlessness, fear and injustice. Globalization not only appears to have affected the United States, but also the European Union in which local and national identities are on the rise rather than declining. In other words, globalization is “reviving local identities of members of the Muslim community,” mainly because they have less power and influence at the global level. Members of these communities feel particularly threatened by the impact of globalization. Globalization is the spread of democracy and the decline of ethnocentrism, which is the biased tendency to view the characteristics of an individual’s own group as correct and superior to that of out-groups (Beutel, 2007).

The end result is a perceived collective threat of being extinguished as an entire group; a context not viewed as morally correct or acceptable by fundamentalists. Such an impact leads to the rise of ethnocentrism and fundamentalism as the in-group strives to defend its heritage. Interestingly, globalized migrants are not motivated to change their
cultures or religions. According to research, the new Muslim immigrants are showing a sense of “modern” assertiveness—assimilating and melting away into local mainstream society is not a long-term goal, but rather they wish to embrace their cultural identities whilst integrating into the western lifestyle (Spalek, 2009).

B. IDENTITY

Social identity theory, a highly influential theory, argues that individuals are motivated to achieve a positive and distinct identity, and therefore, wish to belong to groups both positively evaluated and are perceived to be different in some important respect (Moghaddam, 2008). However, according to research, a greater emphasis on the need for acquiring a positive identity exists than the need for distinctiveness. Muslim immigrants could abandon their heritage, culture and identities, and assimilate into western culture with the objective of gaining positive evaluation from members of the “out-group,” however, they would lose distinctiveness and the characteristics that set them apart from westerners. Islamic communities are confronted with the great threat of “foreign” cultural systems and identities, and are overwhelmed by societal pressures (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Islamic fundamentalists view foreign, western values and beliefs as a serious threat, including democracy, human rights, and the “liberation” of women. The role of women in Islamic societies is a role that serves as a vital foundation for Islamic communities, which is why women are particular targets of Islamic fundamentalists (Beutel, 2007).

Researchers emphasize that Islamic fundamentalists’ goals are to return Islamic societies to their “pure” Islamic form, and not to have Islamic societies become reformed or changed. According to Moghaddam (2010), the tactics employed by some fundamentalists should be viewed as “…reactions to the perceived threat from an out-group and the fear of collective annihilation” (Moghaddam, 2010). Fundamentalists who express radical Islamic views experience a deep insecurity, according to some researchers, and are, therefore, defensive about maintaining their identities. Their insecurity leads them to reject out-groups including westernized culture (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224). The staircase to terrorism describes how the radicalization process
functions and grows. On the ground floor, people are particularly concerned with their identities; “what kind of person am I? What kind of group do I belong to?” They are motivated to be positively evaluated and to be seen as distinct; as having an identity that is in some ways different or unique. Their greatest concern is justice, or being treated fairly in a westernized world, because many feel they are being treated unfairly, and therefore, may experience “inadequate” identities. According to researchers, becoming a terrorist is more than just participating in terrorist activities, it is “…transforming the self to arrive at a particular identity” (Spalek, 2009).

Achieving a sense of identity is integral to the psyche, mainly because it allows some measure of “individual autonomy and differentness.” Furthermore, by achieving group identity, individuals come to acquire a sense of belonging to the group, as well as an opportunity to develop close-knit relationships that keep a community secure. Separate from group identity, however, each individual also has a distinct personal identity. According to Moghaddam (2010), the context of collective identity should be given priority when considering the role of identity in Islamic communities. Key elements to the reactions of Muslim youth to the collective identity crisis have to do with becoming “copies” of western ideals (e.g., influenced by role models). For example, the series of terror attacks that occurred in Europe in 2004–2005 emphasize the views that Muslim communities in Europe are facing major integration challenges (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

The importance of identity in the life of the young is highlighted in the major theories of human development. For example, in Erik Erikson’s 8-stage model of lifelong development, the main developmental challenge at the stage of adolescence is moving from childhood to adulthood by “…evolving a healthy, clear sense of identity” (Moghaddam, 2008). The young are more likely to question the nature, adequacy and product of the group identity. Outreach programs targeting Muslim youth are consistent with successful outcomes in countering radicalization. According to Erikson, those who are challenged or pressured to develop a healthy identity experience role confusion, face more challenges as adults and are more likely to be psychologically and socially dysfunctional (Broderick & Blewitt, 2006).
C. DEMOGRAPHICS AND ASSIMILATION

Since the 1970s, a gradual growth of Muslim populations has occurred in Western Europe, and an increasing number of members of the community have come to identify themselves as “Muslim.” According to “the Distance Traveled Hypothesis,” the greater the distance that immigrants must travel to reach the destined country, the more material and intellectual resources they need to achieve success (Jiménez, 2001). Consequently, immigrants who reach the United States from any given part of the world must be more resourceful than others to integrate into westernized culture effectively. Certain observable patterns emerge from the hypothesis, which aid in understanding the situation of Muslims in terms of demographics and related pressures experienced by Muslim communities. Muslims in Europe, for instance, are relatively [geographically] closer to the “Islamic heartland.” Muslim immigrants in North America, on the other hand, are further away and find it more difficult to maintain ties to their countries of heritage (Rotella, 2009). However, previously discussed factors of globalization and localization provide a more solid understanding as to why Muslim immigrants in both Europe and the United States may find difficulties in acculturating to trends of modern society.

Muslims with less material and intellectual resources find it easier to move to Europe than to the United States. However, Muslim immigrants in the United States are characterized by higher educational and financial achievements, which is one reason why many migrate to the United States. Overall, radical Islam is having a greater impact on Muslims in Europe, and the consequence is the result of a greater threat of homegrown Islamic terrorism in Europe. Muslims are facing great difficulty in assimilating into mainstream society in Western Europe, and are, therefore, more likely to identify with the global Islamic cause (Githens-Mazer, Lambert, Baher, Baher, & Pieri, 2010). Additionally, Muslim immigrants feel pressures to assimilate and “become part of mainstream society.” The assimilation process aims to develop a common culture, language and values shared by all. However, the American solution has been to develop a strong legal framework instead, which has proven to be a successful approach to embracing a multicultural society with a minimum level of shared values and norms.
D. LEADERSHIP FROM THE ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Historically, Sigmund Freud is well known for his theoretical conceptualization regarding the role of the leader in directing negative influence onto out-group targets that appear to have unrelated or contradictory values and beliefs. Freud further argued that the only groups capable of effective and organized action are groups with strong (fundamentalist) leaders; in other words, group members emotionally bound together (Newman, 2006, pp. 749–772). Displacement of aggression and intergroup dynamics, as emphasized by Freud, explains how groups can maintain in-group consistency by displacing the negative effect onto target out-groups.

Some leaders in Muslim communities based in Western Europe now endorse the view that terrorism is justified to protect Islam, mainly because they have adopted a morality that condones terrorism. The bottom line is that Islamic terrorists are fighting for the survival of their “moral order” (Jiménez, 2001). In particular, the leader can help direct the energies of the group members outward to achieve group goals and maintain group structure against external threats to survive and function collectively. Islamic leaders have “…felt the strong pull of the West” (Beutel, 2007), and experience the need to present themselves as civilized, or at least in some way, copy the western model.

E. PSYCHOLOGICAL PARADIGMS

Maslow’s hierarchy of needs arranges individual motivational factors in a pyramid fashion, each of which identifies five types of human needs: physiological, security, affiliation, esteem, and self-actualization (Ortmeier & Meese, 2009). The theory suggests that individuals have a need to develop and grow in an ascending order based on the five needs. However, Maslow’s later formulations of the theory revealed a satisfaction-progression hypothesis. The hypothesis entails that movement in the hierarchy can occur in both an ascending and a descending order (Rotella, 2009). In other words, people have needs that serve as motivators for satisfying a certain goal. Once that need is met or satisfied, another need surfaces; however, lower level needs, such as those basic to human survival, must be fulfilled before higher level needs, such as personal
achievement and recognition (Rodriguez-Campos & Rincones-Gomez, 2006, pp. 157–166). The reasoning behind this order is to increase commitment and motivation so that higher needs could be reached and fulfilled.

In contrast to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Alderfer’s ERG theory establishes only three categories of need: existence (E), relatedness (R), and growth (G) (Rotella, 2009). Alderfer’s growth needs are similar to Maslow’s esteem and self-actualization needs, however, including desires for personal development and achievement. Although the ERG theory recognizes Maslow’s hypothesis, Alderfer’s frustration-regression hypothesis provides a different perspective on frustration, and how obstacles faced when seeking higher-level needs lead to “…a reemergence of lower-level needs” (Rotella, 2009).

With regard to leadership in public safety organizations, one example of how this theory applies to the field of policing is the many ways in which police officers can implement collaborative efforts to help improve quality of life in a trouble neighborhood to motivate the community’s desire for personal growth and ease that frustration. McClelland’s learned needs theory also contrasts with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, in that McClelland suggests that individual needs are developed through interaction with the environment (Rotella, 2009), as opposed to an innate hierarchy of needs. The theory’s key motives (affiliation, achievement, and power) are developed throughout the life span; however, a great deal of emphasis is placed on societal culture (Githens-Mazer, Lambert, Baher, Baher, & Pieri, 2010), as McClelland proposes that understanding association between societal behavior and an acquired need is vital for tolerating potential conflicts that may arise as a result.

F. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND ADAPTIVENESS

The social constructionists examine how individuals and groups instinctively interpret the world and create social realities to follow. Social reality is collectively constructed by the human kind as a whole and is embraced by individuals through participation in a “collective life.” Social constructionists, more importantly, pay close attention to variations found in the kind of gender relationships considered “correct” or
“morally acceptable” across different cultures. However, this approach does not entail a “natural” path; it is a matter of choosing the path. Therefore, those who participate will eventually come to see the path as “natural” although it may not necessarily be the case (Bradley, 2011, pp. 98–224), which constitutes the legal framework of most terrorist networks.

For example, according to several studies, important characteristics shared by most members of terrorist groups and organizations are age, sex, and marital status (Spalek, 2009); most are in their late teens and early twenties, male, and unmarried. For better understanding why this trend emerges, examining the composition of a terrorist network and striving to identify it as “a form of rebellious, risk-taking behavior” typically conducted by young, single males in Muslim communities is important (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224). Four primitives, or environmentally shaped behaviors essential for the survival of humans, play a vital role in the context of the Middle East: 1) the psychological social contract, which includes the psychological processes involved in the integration of individuals in the larger sociopolitical order, 2) trust, which is the minimal level of interpersonal and intergroup trust that must be present for a society to function effectively and survive, 3) psychological control, which is a perceived level of control that individuals need to adopt to feel secure and autonomous, and 4) identity needs, which is the fundamental need for positive and distinct identity that needs to be satisfied (Spalek, 2009).

The key factors that determine the level of adaptiveness are conceptualized as being two types: 1) factors that help defend the group, and 2) factors that attract competitors to begin aggressive contact. Radicalization and terrorism are best understood in this evolutionary context as examples of “defense mechanisms” adopted by human groups that feel threatened by extinction. While some researchers have assumed genetic explanations of human thought and action, little emphasis has been placed on cultural evolution and practices associated with human thought and action. This point must be emphasized in attempting to counter radicalization in western communities. In examining
the various sociological theories, terror management theory claims that, like all other organisms, human beings are “...self-aware and motivated to preserve their own lives” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

From the viewpoint of relative deprivation theory, on the other hand, terrorism is “an outcome of rising, unmet expectations and increasing frustration among young people who feel they have no voice, no hope, and no possibilities for a brighter future;” but in their own (in-group) societies or communities, they see no opportunities to achieve such a life (Spalek, 2009). From a materialist perspective, the resource mobilization theory proposes, “...group discontent and those who control resources can shape collective movements;” unconscious forces, fear of “the other,” feelings of deprivation, perceptions of injustice, a tendency to want to support an individual’s own kin and ethnic group, and the struggle for material resources are among the most important factors that play a part in terrorism as suggested by the major theories (Newman, 2006, pp. 749–772).

G. RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

Theories of modernization and secularization predict that religion would lose relevance in the modern world, with “...science replacing religion as a basis for belief and action in everyday private and public life” (Spalek, 2009). The rise of religious movements has been historically associated with increased intergroup conflict, and even terrorism. In fact, empirical evidence shows that religiosity is associated with prejudice and closed-mindedness and that religious individuals, for example, tend to be prejudiced against less religious individuals (Alexander, 2010). Religious pluralism, for instance, might blame globalization for creating a religious marketplace. The “new religious pluralism,” however, is associated with “intolerance, closed rather than open societies, and increased prejudice against other religions” (Ortmeier & Meese, 2009). Global images associated with religion concern insecurity and instability, as well as violent extremism. The interdependencies and interconnected changes bring forth sudden intergroup contact, which breed homegrown terrorism, and therefore, result in increased threats to national security.
Religion plays a powerful and central role in human security, particularly in helping individuals to achieve a positive and distinct identity because it is essential to human needs (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224); the social identity theory proposes this concept. Furthermore, religion reminds members of an in-group of the distinctiveness or differences that exist within. On the other hand, faith can serve to create or promote peace and help individuals better cope with external changes or even conforming to westernized culture (Spalek, 2009). However, Muslim fundamentalists and traditionalists have taken a solid position and are determined not to allow western values and lifestyles influence or overcome traditional values. For example, the “hijab” or Islamic veil may be just a piece of cloth to westerners, but to fundamentalists, it is a piece of cloth for which some people are willing to die (Spalek, 2009). In some parts of the world, violence is being used against women to enforce the wearing of the veil, and some women are forced to wear the veil from childhood. Through globalization, sacred values that might have remained limited in their influence at the local level have, in some cases, become globally important.

Having covered the subsets of issues that influence the process of radicalization in this chapter, the following chapter briefly highlights guidelines on counter-radicalization practices, and emphasizes the need for inter-agency coordination and the use of interdisciplinary approaches among all levels of government—including civilian agencies, such as educational and social service organizations—in an effort to combat radicalization through a coordinated citywide approach, and develop effective counter-radicalization programs, that may be implemented throughout the United States.
V. COUNTER-RADICALIZATION PRACTICES

Several studies pertaining to the challenges faced by the nation’s government officials post 9/11 argue that law enforcement officials have been confronted with the task of maintaining a balance between protecting national security interests and preserving the constitutional rights of American citizens. Since some members of the Muslim community may never completely trust law enforcement officials or organizations (Stainbrook, 2010), employing a third-party approach may be beneficial in contributing to a successful outcome. For example, communicating with both public and private social service organizations can help law enforcement better integrate into or engage in community affairs. Some members of the Muslim community may be more comfortable in reporting information directly to these organizations, as opposed to the police (Lord, Nagl, & Rosen, 2009). High-level interaction between law enforcement and governmental, as well as non-governmental agencies, can help bridge the gap among the police and Muslim communities.

Acquired best practices for domestic counterterrorism and community outreach in the United States, based on nationwide evaluations of successes and mistakes, focus on implementation of the following guidelines.

- Reducing the role of counter-radicalization programs
- Treating members of the Muslim community as citizens of the United States
- Maintaining committed counterterrorism divisions within law enforcement
- Ensuring the proper use of informants in related cases
- Improving or enhancing counterterrorism education guidelines and standards
- Building government and law enforcement expertise for focusing on methods of prevention
- Countering violent extremist propaganda and enhancing engagement of local communities in related efforts
• Facilitating local partnerships and building robust training programs to expand the standards of today’s community-oriented policing efforts
• Enhancing cultural proficiency and related foundations for effective community engagement (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011)

Enhancing federal engagement with and support to local Muslim communities that may be targeted by violent extremists has been referenced in the literature as a means of effectively implementing positive community-based approaches to counter radicalization. Community engagement is an essential part of good governance (The National Security Strategy, 2011). This type of commitment may be accomplished by reaching out to communities directly or by convening information and educational-based approaches to keep community members well informed. In particular, multifaceted engagement is emphasized in building new relationships to address issues of security. Community-based efforts, including outreach and related programs, to prevent violent extremism must focus on the following elements.

• Information sharing of timely and meaningful concerns about the threat of radicalization to terrorist violence in a given community via groups and organizations involved in public safety issues
• Effective response and mitigation efforts to community concerns about counter-radicalization policies, actions, and strategies
• Expanding research and methods of analysis to more effectively support community-based solutions, and further increasing vigilance in identifying, predicting, and preempting new developments
• Acquiring sufficient resources to maintain a dedicated intelligence team or counterterrorism division
• Building a network of individuals, groups, organizations, private sector entities and other stakeholders to support community-based efforts to counter violent extremism (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011)

Countering the various ideologies employed by violent extremists to recruit and radicalize individuals is a challenging step; however, by defying justifications for terrorist violence, the United States may take active measures in unifying rather than dividing American citizens by promoting community inclusiveness and integration for members of the Muslim community. This approach is based on a paradigm of engagement that fosters mutual respect, religious freedom and pluralism manifested in partnerships and networks.
of government officials, law enforcement, community organizations, private sector entities and other stakeholders. In leveraging U.S. potential to bridge the gap between members of the Muslim community and law enforcement, good governance programs that promote integration and engagement may help prevent radicalization that leads to terrorist violent extremism.

A. THE NEED FOR INTER-Agency COORDINATION AND INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES

An ideal information and intelligence sharing project, fusion centers were developed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) intelligence and information sharing working group to assist local and state agencies in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating terrorism-related intelligence by developing a set of guidelines and tools to be followed by administrators. The fusion process involves the integration of the public safety and private sectors in allowing information from all sources to be gathered, analyzed and exchanged by providing access to a variety of databases (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006. p. 75). The goal is to achieve a unified force among all levels of law enforcement agencies. Such unity allows for maximization of abilities to prevent and respond to terrorism and other criminal acts to safeguard the United States effectively.

“Actionable knowledge” is the result of developed policies, managed resources, and evaluated services by administrators on all levels of government, in which the collaboration of numerous resources maximizes such operations while moving in unison towards a common goal. Fusion center functions include an array of tasks to ensure one final outcome, identification of terrorism-related leads. Such functions include: 1) rapid identification of emerging threats, 2) support of multidisciplinary, proactive, and community-focused problem-solving activities, 3) support of predictive analysis capabilities, and 4) improvement in the delivery of emergency and non-emergency services (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006). Achieving this aim requires that all levels of government—federal, local, state, the private sector, the general public—work together to develop effective programs and initiatives.
The federal government can foster partnerships to support communities through law enforcement, the private sector, and other associations to prevent violent extremism and combat radicalization. Although each discipline will not need the same level of detail in receiving and disseminating information, law enforcement authorities are better suited to coordinate statewide and local fusion mainly since the law enforcement discipline’s established relationships between crime and terrorism, and it serving as the foundation of the fusion center guidelines: intelligence-led policing, community policing, and collaborative services. However, private sector entities’ involvement in fusion centers is also essential to the overall concept. The need for a two-way educational process is necessary for understanding the operations of each entity and how each can enhance operations with the other (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 75).

Preventing radicalization must begin at the local level by supporting local capabilities and programs that address radicalization and violent extremism. Counter-radicalization efforts vary from counterterrorism initiatives, and therefore, require greater cooperation between a vast range of other government and state departments, as well as other civilian agencies in hopes of developing a citywide counter-radicalization program. Education is key, and cooperation with educational and social services may further the initiative to educate the public about the radicalization process, what is being done to prevent it, and how ordinary citizens can assist with counter-radicalization efforts. Implementing a wide range of good governance programs in cooperation with organizations that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement (The National Security Strategy, 2011), including those responsible for addressing community safety issues, may help prevent radicalization that leads to violent extremism. Building partnerships and providing community support is part of combined efforts based on mutual trust and understanding.

B. CONCLUSION

Although law enforcement authorities are better suited and may be held accountable for the efficient administration of fusion centers, all levels of government (e.g., the private sector and non-governmental organizations) should work together to
prepare, prevent, respond, and recover from terrorist and criminal events. This process is known as data fusion (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006, p. 75), which is what constitutes the consistent, unified approach among all levels of government around which the fusion center concept revolves. Fusion centers, however, raise serious privacy issues at a time when new technology and federal powers in the war on terror are combining to threaten Americans' privacy at an unprecedented level; their setup has become a weakness. The use of technology has progressed in the field of public safety and is considered an intelligence asset and liability; terrorists’ renewed interests fall within these limits. Analysis, security, and early counterterrorism efforts are strictly part of the advanced, or “new terrorism,” routine. Collaborations and partnerships are likely to continue to evolve to enhance U.S. understanding of what works, what does not, and why.

The following chapter addresses an overview of current counter-radicalization strategies and programs being utilized in the NYPD and the LA Sheriff’s department, as well as a brief overview of community outreach efforts undertaken by the LAPD. Additionally, a brief overview of the evolution of community oriented policing (COP) is included to highlight strengths, weaknesses, and advancements in efforts taken by law enforcement to create and maintain positive community relations with members of the Muslim community.
VI. NYPD AND LA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT

A. THE EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES

COP was developed and adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, and has since changed the relationship between local law enforcement and communities served. Creating and maintaining positive, working relationships with community residents, remains the objective of law enforcement agencies that have changed their model of policing to adapt to new responsibilities while still holding value for traditional control and prevention efforts (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224).

However, this relationship has been historically unstable. Although the majority of members of the Muslim community have expressed a desire for engagement with law enforcement and inclusion into Western society, some remain skeptical about the real objective behind such programs; that related outreach programs portray distrust between Muslim-American communities and law enforcement and are implemented as a way to “spy” on Muslims, further labeling or categorizing all Muslims as prone to radicalization. Furthermore, obstacles identified in NYC included distrust as the main complication followed by lack of cultural awareness among officers and other law enforcement officials, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status (Silber & Bhatt, 2007).

Since utilizing counterterrorism measures aimed at combating terrorism “are likely to undermine trust” (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224), it is understandable why some researchers have questioned the appropriateness of law enforcement/community policing roles in comparison with homeland security responsibilities. The roles may not have been clear in the past; however, the contemporary community-oriented policing objective holds up to the homeland security standards: cite intelligence gathering, covert investigations, information sharing, and immigration enforcement (Lord, Nagl, & Rosen, 2009).
Several studies suggest that improvements since 9/11 have centered on increasing contact between police and members of the Muslim community, mainly through individualized community outreach programs to sustain contact between members of the police department and community leaders. This contact has been a major goal for the NYPD that has established several successful community outreach programs over the years and continues to implement new and effective ways to integrate Muslim youth into programs, such as the NYPD cricket and soccer leagues. NYC has been the focus of much research on police and community relations (Bradley, 2011, pp. 198–224), and research has shown that building relationships is most critical before, not during, a time of crisis.

The recent publication of the National Security Strategy for counterterrorism highlights current community-based approaches, priority goals, and guiding principles for combating radicalization and violent extremism in the United States. Building resilience against violent extremism is the main goal, and taking defense against radicalized ideologies is shaped by the objective of community-based outreach programs that seek to educate and equip families, local communities, and local organizations with the intelligence and information necessary to prevent radicalization. As programs and initiative are implemented to meet the needs of members of the Muslim community, partnerships and connections are being fostered with all levels of government to support these communities.

B. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CURRENT NYPD AND LA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT COUNTER-RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES

The NYPD Community Affairs Bureau (CAB) has utilized recently expanded community outreach programs including the formation of “NYPD UNITED,” which is a soccer league for new immigrant communities of Muslim youth and the NYPD cricket league to fulfill the department’s initiative that aims to establish positive ongoing relations with new immigrant communities. Additionally, the NYPD holds a pre-Ramadan program to educate its members and broaden its outreach (Silber & Bhatt,
Similar community outreach programs and advocacy groups tailored to the objective of the NYPD’s overall mission to bridging the community with the police continues to expand, including the following.

- The New Immigrant Outreach Unit
- The Clergy Liaison Program
- The Community Partnership Policing Program

Law enforcement officials in charge of related special affairs programs make great efforts to visit community-based organizations, businesses, and Islamic schools to raise awareness of availability and promote knowledge of such programs (Millard & Collins, 2006). On the other hand, non-Muslim police officers are also receiving attention by having the opportunity to engage in cultural sensitivity training to better understand how to deal with members of the Muslim community, and to further build on their professional knowledge base by truly grasping the concept behind cultural differences. Advocacy groups created for Muslims, in part with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), have also been part of the collective effort for establishing community cooperation and communication with the police (The EU Counterradicalization Strategy, 2008). A large number of complaints have been reported since the attacks of 2001.

The NYPD’s anti-terrorism initiative is a synchronized effort between the department’s intelligence division and the counterterrorism bureau. The demographics of NYC, given the vast immigrant population, contribute to the success of such programs as security is best handled by police officers who have familiarized themselves with the city’s neighborhoods. Another initiative known as NYPD “Operation Nexus” functions on the premise that law enforcement must stop attacks before they occur (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), which has yielded positive outcomes specifically within building and maintaining positive and trusting relationships between Muslim communities and the police.

The LAPD community outreach efforts are comprised of nationally recognized models that have proven successful in countering potential terror activities throughout the city (Baca, 2011). Similar to the initiative of the NYPD, LAPD officials share their experiences with contacts across the nation. The department plans to incorporate inter-agency collaborative efforts into their nationally recognized model in an attempt to
ensure long-term success. The LA Sheriff’s department has reported a number of successful interactions with the Muslim community in LA County because of developments in community outreach noting historical achievements throughout the years.

- Establishment of the Muslim American Homeland Security Congress in 2005, which fosters education and understanding between the Muslim community and the Sheriff’s department to prevent acts of terrorism
- Establishment of a Muslim Community Outreach Program in 2007 to restore community trust and develop educational programs to benefit both members of the Muslim community and the Sheriff’s personnel
- Establishment of the Muslim Community Affairs Unit and a Muslim youth training program in 2008 to build stronger relationships for better understanding and cooperation with law enforcement
- Establishment of a law enforcement outreach coordinators group in 2009 for coordinating efforts of outreach among the different law enforcement agencies
- Establishment of a Young Muslim American Leaders Advisory Council (Young MALAC) in 2010 for engaging young Muslim professional adults to encourage civic engagement with the community at large, launching of a website to educate the community on outreach efforts and social services, developing a training video entitled, “Law Enforcement Interaction with the Muslim Community”
- Establishment of a jail/custody outreach program in 2011 for connecting jail inmates with support units and organizations upon their release

Los Angeles County has pursued several public trust policing programs with one goal in mind, to achieve “interfaith harmony” (Baca, 2011). The Interfaith Advisory Council was developed on behalf of the Sheriff’s department as a means of promoting professional diplomacy efforts, which have spread to countries, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, the Netherlands, among others, as part of the collaborative and inter-disciplinary approach. A major theme emerges when looking at both NYPD and LAPD initiatives in bridging the community with the police, playing the role of an educator by strengthening family structure and the economic base, and in turn, weakening political power bases. Combining education with prevention, the LAPD and Sheriff’s department now have Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) who serve as chief point of contact for terrorism information. The recently employed community project by the LAPD attempts to
examine Muslim history closely, demographics, language, and culture, in an effort to further expand outreach programs to ensure long-term success in the fight against radicalization (Downing, 2007).

C. COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTER-RADICALIZATION EFFORTS IN NEW YORK

The NYPD has progressively enhanced independent procedures and outreach programs through the counterterrorism division and the intelligence division for defending the city against terrorism and radicalization. According to Fishman & Lebovich (2011), the NYPD “has the most comprehensive and aggressive counterterrorism program in the U.S.,” following federal guidelines and occasionally working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on select cases post-9/11. In comparison to the U.K., however, the United States does not employ a unified national counterterrorism plan like the British CONTEST strategy mainly because the radicalization problem is greater in Europe. Statistical relevance on the radicalization process, particularly in NYC, shows that 12 terrorist plots occurred in which individuals were radicalized accounting for nearly 25% of Jihadi activity in the United States since 9/11. In more detail, NYPD counterterrorism operations are categorized into five main processes.

- Support for the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF); of the 350 NYPD officers assigned to counterterrorism missions in NYC, 130 officials work within the JTTF
- The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI), providing “near real-time video surveillance” across much of public space in lower Manhattan
- The counterterrorism coordinator, contributing to teams like “Hercules,” as well as rapid-response force in the event of an actual attack
- The counterterrorism division, which prepares and trains for chemical biological radiological nuclear explosive (CBRNE) attacks and improves physical security of potential terrorist targets while operating the NYPD shield program and working with local businesses to encourage reporting of suspicious activity (e.g., Operation Nexus, Operation Sentry)
The intelligence division, which is the most controversial element of the program charged with identifying and disrupting terrorist plots through a system of informants and surveillance (e.g., prevention and deterrence) (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011)

Unlike the initiatives of the British Prevent program, the NYPD recognizes the distinctions between implementing counterterrorism strategies and counter-radicalization strategies through community engagement functions, and therefore, emphasizes efforts to reach out to immigrant and religious communities from a separate bureau (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010). Distinguishing community-building programs prevents alienation and reduces the likelihood that members of the Muslim community will gain a sense of mistrust with such efforts to counter radicalization. Despite these assurances on behalf of NYPD officials, some activists and other human rights groups contend that such “bureaucratic distinctions and…surveillance of peaceful people” through assignment of informants cannot be justified (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011). Strong indications exist that counterterrorism divisions currently employed by the NYPD do help to establish and maintain positive relationships with the Muslim community.

For example, Muslim community leaders in Brooklyn confirm their cooperative relationships with the NYPD but claim to resent intelligence operations (Millard & Collins, 2006), particularly informants secretly placed within the community to monitor mosques and other popular sites. The CAB programs, such as the New Immigrant Outreach Unit (NIOU) and Clergy Liaison Program (CLP) among others, support youth sports leagues, focus on improving relations between local precincts and mosques to promote engagement not only in Muslim community affairs but also a wider range of issues (e.g., hate crimes, drug use, and gang violence). Related efforts continue to progress, as the department’s initiatives broaden to protect the city against any and all terrorism-related threats.

D. LA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT COUNTER-RADICALIZATION INITIATIVES

Like the NYPD, the LAPD has focused its counterterrorism programs on improving inter-agency coordination particularly in information sharing, surveillance of
at-risk communities, and use of confidential informants. Given that LA has not suffered a terrorist attack, compared to NYC or European countries, the city has yet to establish a counter-radicalization program dedicated to engaging members of the Muslim-American community effectively. LA’s largest reform since 9/11 has been the establishment of a Counterterrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau (CTCIB) in 2003 (Downing, 2007), which was “built from scratch” to address and monitor non-criminal behavior on several accounts.

- Collaborating with the local JTTFs and Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), including the FBI, DHS, and LA Sheriff’s department
- Implementing a Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program that serves intelligence and reporting initiatives by first responders and citizens in collaboration with the TLO program
- Establishing Operation Archangel, focusing on hardening critical infrastructure by working primarily with the private sector to better understand threats
- Establishing the National Counter Terrorism Academy (NCTA), which teaches a select number of personnel from various agencies intelligence-led policing theories and practices
- Establishing the Hydra program, enabling select LAPD and disaster officials to work together on best practices for emergency management
- Developing the Muslim Forum, bringing together LAPD personnel and Muslim community leaders to facilitate outreach efforts
- Implementing an iWatch (outreach) program, which resembles the NYPD SHIELD program, in which the LAPD solicits tips and reports from citizens (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011)

The LA Sheriff’s department has also taken extensive measures to conduct a number of counterterrorism initiatives in the form of community outreach groups to members of the Muslim community in the aftermath of the 7/7 attacks in London. This group is known as the Muslim America Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC), which is comprised of local and state law enforcement officials and representatives from various Muslim organizations who serve to protect and defend all Americans alike from acts of terrorism. The Sheriff’s department’s particular efforts have grown since, which has led to the development of similar youth programs to that of the NYPD that utilizes a Young
Muslim American Leaders Advisory Council, which is a joint effort with the Community Affairs Unit to plan training and other group activities (Downing, 2007; Fishman & Lebovich, 2011; Baca, 2011).

Additionally, like the NYPD, the LA Sheriff’s office engages Muslim-Americans on addressing issues related to hate crimes, drug abuse, racial profiling, and more. Although such initiatives have been implemented as part of the overall effort to combat terrorism, the LAPD still lacks the clear articulation of a distinct theory of counter-radicalization (Baca, 2011). It has particularly been difficult for the LAPD counterterrorism programs to distinguish between intelligence-led operations and community-based engagement. The Muslim Mapping project developed in 2007 closely resembles Britain’s Prevent program in that it aims to create a shared sense of threat among all citizens alike, by identifying at-risk communities for facilitating outreach efforts. However, the project was discontinued due to outcries from the Muslim community and civil liberties groups in LA who oppose the objective of the project and claim that it unfairly singled out and subjected Muslims to unreasonable monitoring (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011; Baca, 2011; Downing, 2007).

The SAR program has also led to conflicts between the American Civil Liberties Union, which has criticized the program’s initiative as having potential consequences on the private affairs of innocent Muslim-Americans without just cause; the LAPD, however, provides a training program that emphasizes the importance of “behavior-based policing and…privacy and civil liberties protections” (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011). Despite prevalent failures, the LAPD vows to continue with efforts to reach out to and communicate with members of the Muslim community, and to gain a better understanding of the social or cultural environment in distinguishing between intelligence and community-based operations.

Having provided an overview of counter-radicalization initiatives utilized by the NYPD, LAPD, and LA Sheriff’s department, the following chapter focuses on counter-radicalization and community outreach efforts abroad in the UK, Amsterdam, and Scandinavia. The European Union (EU) counterterrorism strategy is discussed, as it contains in its development relevant measures that recognize the contributions of social
and ideological features of radicalization. An overview of current counterradicalization strategies utilized in the UK, Amsterdam, and Scandinavia is provided along with a select number of case studies and statistical analyses derived from the UK and Amsterdam.
A. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

The EU counterterrorism strategy is based on four pillars: preventing individuals from becoming radicalized, protecting citizens and critical infrastructure, pursuing terrorist groups, and responding to terrorist attacks (The EU Counterradicalization Strategy, 2008). Policy measures are designed specifically to counter the threat of recruitment into the radicalization process and provide the basis for other measures of counterterrorism. The strategy further addresses the influence of causal factors of radicalization, and contains within its development measures that primarily recognize the contributions of social and ideological features of radicalization. The main threat posed against the EU is the recruitment to Islamist-inspired terrorist groups; nonetheless, the focus of the strategy is to counter radicalization and recruitment, and the “prevent” element becomes the main point of focus.

Preventing radicalization in the EU begins with promoting “good governance, human rights, democracy, education, and economic prosperity” (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75). Such efforts may also target underlying issues of inequality and discrimination, and therefore, build a sense of trust between Muslim communities and law enforcement officials. Furthermore, promoting “inter-cultural dialogue” and integration of members of the Muslim community via participation in community outreach programs may increase cooperation and overall efforts to prevent recruitment. Efficiently countering radicalization issues requires adoption of a set of key priorities that fall under the “prevent” element.

- Developing approaches or strategies that aim to deal with problem behaviors or factors related to the radicalization process
- Promoting good governance, education, and democratic approaches to shed light on related efforts
• Encouraging intercultural communication between law enforcement officials and members of the Muslim community (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75)

• Developing effective policy responses for better understanding the underlying issues

Curbing the threat of violent radicalization is the main objective of the EU counterterrorism strategy by successfully disrupting the activities of radical Islamic networks and groups from recruiting individuals. By monitoring suspicious behavior within a community, particularly extremist propaganda, efforts to thwart recruitment initiatives become the main premise. Although the strategy proposes essential steps to address radicalization, the EU continues to develop a greater understanding of overlapping elements (e.g., religious ideology, socio-economic factors, individual and group identity) to progress counter-radicalization efforts (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75). One main theme emerges from the EU strategy, which targets long-term integration of members of the Muslim community through integration and change of unfair perceptions of Islam.

B. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CURRENT COUNTER-RADICALIZATION STRATEGIES IMPLEMENTED IN THE UK, AMSTERDAM, AND SCANDINAVIA

In the UK, a vast amount of reports exist concerning counter-radicalization derived from governmental organizations, universities and law enforcement agencies that discuss policing efforts in Muslim communities abroad. Law enforcement officials in the UK have developed teams that mix traditional bobby work with a bit of cultural translation (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010). In other words, law enforcement officials are attempting to understand better the underlying cultural differences—including religious ideology and family structure—to achieve better outcomes in the fight against radicalization. Law enforcement, intelligence analysts, educators, and social workers in the UK can aid in “targeting outreach efforts, identifying early warning indicators in a community, and informing initiatives to influence the process of recruitment and assist disengagement” (Benard, 2005).
The “Pathfinder” program was a recent development in the UK, which aims to bridge the gap between the community and the police by enforcing better communication and inclusiveness; however, obstacles in the Muslim community’s engagement prevented facilitation of the program. The major underlying issue identified within the circumstances of the program was the lack of community trust in the police (Grundstein-Amado, 2009, pp. 247–260), which initially led to reluctance. Similar issues have surfaced in community outreach programs in the Netherlands, as well domestically in the United States as previously discussed. Recommendations for local and national governmental agencies for implementation to encourage diversity and assimilations serve beneficial to accomplishing the objective. British policy response to the threat of terrorism includes enhanced police standards together with outreach to the Muslim community; challenges to this approach are also imminent (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010).

Taking a more individualistic approach, Scandinavians examine substantial relationships between how youth acculturate and adapt to their environment, further revealing two forms of adaptation, psychological and sociocultural (Benard, 2005). This approach is in keeping with the need for better understanding how radicalization subsets, such as socio-economic factors, demographics, religion/religious ideology, and identity issues, can impact the radicalization process. By gaining a better understanding of how these subsets of issues influence radicalization or de-radicalization, law enforcement officials can use this intelligence for information sharing and as key information for further developing successful counter-radicalization methods/strategies. The municipal approach to counter-radicalization in Amsterdam revolves around three elements: general prevention, specific prevention and tackling radicalization (Mellis, 2007).

In directing the counter-radicalization strategy, however, Amsterdam’s public safety officials have adopted a “supply and demand scheme,” as radicalization begins when supply meets demand. According to Mellis (2006), young Muslims in the West are not accepting of traditional culturally bound Islam and related religious ideology. For such reasons, young Muslims continue to seek answers concerning their identity and religion. Once an active supply of radical ideas begins to spread, the breeding ground
develops, which attracts seekers and resilience becomes the top priority for law enforcement officials. In implementing best practices, countries abroad tend to examine the underlying factors (e.g., religious ideology, and family structure), and use these as a basis for developing successful community outreach initiatives.

Mellis (2006) explains the importance of a variety of factors that could accumulate and break down the barriers of resilience, including economic and political frustrations, enhancing social cohesion, bridging ethnic gaps, and strengthening common identity of all Amsterdammers has and continues to be a satisfactory (broad) preventative strategy for diminishing breeding grounds and increasing resilience in Muslim communities (Mellis, 2007). However, research suggests that more specific prevention strategies that emphasize inter-agency coordination may yield more effective outcomes. A guide for local partnerships in the UK proposes efficient guidelines, which shed light on the need for a multi-agency panel to develop appropriate safeguards and information sharing networks. These guidelines may be utilized in U.S. metropolitan cities to further strengthen counter-radicalization efforts (HM Government, 2010).

The consequences of analyzing prevention methods lies within the limits of law enforcement and public safety officials’ capabilities in effectively combating radical ideology. The need for inter-agency coordination is prevalent once again; for example, the local government cannot be held responsible for stimulating and financing an alternative supply of “answers” that the young Muslims are seeking (Mellis, 2007). Furthermore, very little experience exists to claim a sole effective strategy or model as a best practice when it comes to interventions that work within community relations. This concept enforces the need for inter-agency coordination among public safety and law enforcement officials on all levels of government.

C. CASE STUDIES AND STATISTICAL ANALYSES IN THE UK AND AMSTERDAM

The following section examines case studies of European radical Islamists in the UK and Amsterdam and is intended to further understanding of experiences in countering radicalization abroad, as well to understand what is being done at the national and local
levels. As neither country has a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy, the availability of resources must be examined to analyze effectiveness in undertaking the issue at hand; particularly at the local level. Both the UK and Amsterdam recognize the need to reach out to members of the Muslim community to achieve strategic objectives. As highlighted in the EU strategy, preventing radicalization involves several steps and specific measures.

- Challenging violent extremist ideology
- Working with educational and religious institutions
- Developing individualized or specific measures for countering radicalization on the local level (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75)

According to the National Youth Agency’s data and national demographic statistics on the UK Muslim community, Muslim communities are among the most deprived educationally and economically. Furthermore, in examining subsets of issues, such as religious ideology and social identity, statistical analyses from the Home Office Citizenship Survey reveal that religion and faith among Muslim youth, in particular, ranked second after family while only about 30% of Muslims reported participation in civic or community activities. Such analyses contribute to the need for community outreach programs in promoting social integration and cohesion, and further provide support for what may be the answer to countering radicalization in Muslim communities (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75).

Initiatives that have been developed and deployed to counter radicalization in the UK range from a variety of Muslim outreach programs and resources, including a focus on integrating Muslim youth in campus activities and student groups. Such programs build on the social identification factors and persuade Muslim youth that they can be both Muslim and British. The overall objective is to: 1) intensify communication initiatives and information sharing with Muslim communities, 2) address the risks of radicalization, 3) understand the perceptions of Muslim communities, and 4) forge closer relations with organizational officials within the Muslim community. Increasing relations with authority figures within the Muslim community is consistent with the EU’s efforts to enhance communication and outreach (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75).
Also in line with the EU’s strategy is the focus on community monitoring and information sharing to reduce social exclusion. The UK’s Community Cohesion Team seeks to gain insight into the Muslim community’s social interaction, and has taken action by implementing a system for monitoring community tensions in key areas. Curbing extremism and recruitment continue to be of top priority to department officials and public authorities. Addressing faith-based inequality has also been a goal for tackling discrimination against members of the Muslim community, as well as combating Islamophobia by creating focus groups that address the interpretations of Islam by Muslim youth. It is evident from related case studies that the UK continues to place great emphasis on the importance of understanding the perceptions of Muslim communities and societal changes within them, as both government and non-government officials continue to take proactive steps to counter radicalization, which demonstrate increased awareness of the radicalization problem. General points of continuous action include the following.

- Improving understanding of the extent and causes of extremism among Muslim youth
- Combating recruitment and violent extremism by terrorist organizations
- Building communication ties and leadership capacity with Muslim youth
- Bridging the gap between members of the Muslim community and law enforcement (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75)

Focusing on the Dutch approach to countering radicalization, the efforts of the city of Amsterdam have considered the risks that pose a threat to the stability of the Amsterdam community. Aimed at decreasing social unrest and polarization, the Wij Amsterdammers action plan focuses on preventing the emergence of Islamic radicalization by analyzing the potential underlying factors. Parallel to the UK statistics, a fairly large percentage of members of the Muslim community residing in Amsterdam are concentrated in low-income neighborhoods with high levels of crime, as well as education and employment inequalities. While no statistics on the extent and scope of radicalization in Amsterdam exist, according to the Dutch Intelligence Service report, an increase in Islamic radicalism has occurred, particularly among Muslim youth, since
In recognizing such trends, the Wij Amsterdammers program has taken extensive measures aimed at integration, participation, and cohesion of the Muslim community.

The basis for the Amsterdam Against Radicalization program is the IMES study entitled, “Processes of radicalization: why young Muslims in Amsterdam radicalize,” which recommends the following.

- Increasing societal trust through programs that promote community integration and cohesion
- Reaching out to mosques and leading community figures to ensure open communication and improve information-sharing efforts
- Eliminating breeding grounds and enhancing de-radicalization efforts
- Improving and intensifying cooperation with key partners (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75)

Amsterdam’s approach to counter radicalization distinguishes it from the UK strategy in that it incorporates hard and soft approaches to balance out efforts between countering radicalization in the political, economic and cultural spheres. In contrast to the UK strategy, which considers causes of radicalization through a general or broad policy, the Amsterdam approach examines the causes at the individual level (e.g., psychological characteristics and personal experiences). Amsterdam’s strategy is implemented in three main phases: 1) a hard and repressive approach employed against “doers,” 2) a soft power approach aimed at “thinkers,” and 3) a preventive approach intended for increasing resistance against radical thoughts aimed at vulnerable individuals (Mellis, 2007).

The first approach aimed at the “doers” targets violent extremists driven to commit acts of violence with the intention of achieving ideological goals. With an emphasis on the active prevention of radicalization, privileged action has been extended to local police and security forces in executing this initiative and disrupting terrorist plots. The second approach seeks to identify individuals prone to radicalization because they follow radical ideologies; not necessarily because they are willing to complete actual violent acts. Law enforcement and security officials are focusing on this particular approach as these individuals are “thinkers” and may be more vulnerable to becoming
radicalized, and steps to turn around the radicalization process are being developing by suitable interventions (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75). Finally, the preventive approach is intended to eliminate breeding grounds for radicalization and increase resistance against radical thoughts among individuals who may be sensitive to these ideas. Existing strategies are constantly being improved based on the three premises in combating radicalization. Current measures emphasize the external and social level as key areas of focus and progress.
Strategies for radicalism and terrorist attack prevention require coordination and robust cooperation between public and private sectors. Local, state and federal governments should continue to expand scholarships and fellowships for minority applicants that encourage public service and public policy career tracks. After 9/11, the FBI utilized a “forward-learning” approach to terrorism focusing on the overall mission to preventing future terrorist attacks. In focusing heavily on state sovereignty concerns and federalism, the federal government is overlooking where national action is indeed necessary (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011).

Law enforcement is a local issue to be dealt with by city, county, and state officials. The role of the federal government in local concerns is “justifiably limited by the federalist structure of the American system of government” (Quillen, 2002, pp. 60–75). In the U.S. federal system, one downfall has been the split between federal and local responsibilities in which officials create their own [separate] counterterrorism programs;, which has created conflicts between federal and local agencies, and has impacted responsibilities in overall efforts. Furthermore, the lack of “uniform standards” for counterterrorism training negatively impacts inter-agency coordination efforts and flow of information between agencies and communities. Counterterrorism programs are more diverse in the United States than in the UK, for example, with objectives that aim to do the following.

- Increase information sharing within and among agencies at all levels
- Facilitate electronic surveillance
- Use confidential informants/sources on behalf of federal or local agencies, which have become more prevalent in law enforcement investigations (Fishman & Lebovich, 2011)
A. BEST PRACTICES: WHY COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAMS WORK

Thus far, not enough experience or empirical evidence exists to claim effective best practices for countering radicalization through increasing community outreach programs, and promoting community integration, participation and cohesion. The NYPD has the most comprehensive counterterrorism program in the United States, under which related operations evolve significantly in response to the Al-Qaeda threat and focused on intelligence-gathering and surveillance of communities that are estimated to pose a risk of radicalization. Community outreach programs, such as the NYPD UNITED Soccer and NYPD Cricket Leagues previously discussed, have greatly contributed to de-radicalization and further promote positive relations between law enforcement and members of the Muslim community. Although empirical evidence is lacking, community outreach programs have proven successful in their overall mission to bridge the gap between the police and Muslim communities, which is evidenced by decreased terrorist activity and attacks against the United States, particularly NYC.

The federal government now realizes the potential for community-based outreach programs targeting the Muslim community in the long run. Such programs may offer long-term solutions for preventing radicalization and recruitment of vulnerable individuals, violent extremism, and terrorist activity or attacks against the homeland. The Obama administration’s newly implemented counterterrorism strategy calls for active engagement between law enforcement and Muslim-American communities to build a relationship that fosters cooperation and trust. Additionally, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has recently employed a community awareness briefing to shed light on the importance of outreach to Muslim youth as part of the answer to countering radicalization and violent extremism. The DHS has also recognized such efforts, and plans are underway for developing a working group designed specifically to promote community outreach in impacted communities, as well as a training program to assist officials at all levels of government to spot the telltale signs of extremism.

Amsterdam, through its specific prevention strategy, has expanded the role of police in partnership with counterterrorism agencies/networks. The main area of focus for
this program in particular has been on the long-term sustainability of the society in which Islam has a place. Amsterdammers have continuously focused on elements, such as community integration, cohesion, participation, among other important components like decreasing discrimination toward Muslim-Americans and promoting an environment of equality particularly for youth. Furthermore, by building resilience with the Muslim communities, Amsterdammers were able to provide specific prevention strategies as an alternative action to combating radical ideologies. Additionally, implementing formal and informal networks of informants (e.g., reporting early warning signs of radicalization and possible extremist behavior) including members of the Muslim community has allowed law enforcement officials to target individual cases as early as possible and proceed accordingly with responding.

B. FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

The New Immigrant Outreach Unit was formed after 9/11 by the NYPD CAB to reach out to new immigrant communities. It incorporated officers from Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, Palestine and other Asian American countries who understand customs and are familiar with some members of the community; some of the officers involved currently reside or have resided in that community. It strives to keep members of the Muslim community current regarding current events and issues occurring in their home countries, and liaison with the embassy/consulate to assist with contacting family members. It cares for the community, and its efforts are slowly but surely building trust, cooperation, and bridging the gap. It holds community events, such as health fairs, which are erected within parts of the community and involve other agencies to assist with the affairs. Typically, these teams consist of members from the NY Fire Department, the Department for the Aging, the Department of Education, the Department of Buildings, Social Services, and local politicians. Literature translated into the various languages is disseminated to the crowd.

The Clergy Liaison Unit consists of members of all faiths, but more importantly, it focuses on Muslim liaisons to be the eyes and ears of community, to disseminate the message, and to help calm community unrest during times of crisis. The Pre-Ramadan
conference is an annual event during which prominent members of the Muslim community are invited—including Imams, Sheikhs, etc.—along with the executive staff of the NYPD, commanding officers, and community affairs officers from the city. The program begins with a video presenting all members of the Muslim faith (South-Asian, Arab, African, etc.) engaging in community integration with NYPD officers in the various outreach programs offered, and consists of discussions related to security concerns, community concerns (e.g., hate crimes). Halal food is served for community members as NYPD Cricket and NYPD United Soccer League winners are awarded trophies. Also, it promotes youth programs in particular by having available literature on NYPD community outreach programs for pickup.

It ventures out into the Muslim community to provide presentations on identity theft, Internet safety, gangs, etc. By doing so, it is outreaching to the community on matters that affect common families. The “Ride-along” program offers members of the Muslim community the opportunity to ride along with officers around areas of the communities in which they reside, which allows community members to experience up close and personal what officers do on the job, day in and day out. A reciprocal relationship builds a sense of trust, respect and cooperation between the police and members of the Muslim community as both sides learn about each other during the interaction. The Community Partnership Program is another program offered for officers who have graduated from the police academy the opportunity to understand, learn and experience first hand the culture, traditions, and religion of Muslim members of the community. These officers visit houses of worship, coordinate with Imams, visit mosques and learn the customs of Muslims at the same time as developing ties with members of the Muslim community. As a result, Imams offer to visit the department to give speeches at roll calls prior to Ramadan, which gives them a chance to raise community concerns and introduce themselves to officers who usually patrol areas of their communities.

The NYPD Cricket and NYPD UNITED Soccer leagues provide outreach to Muslim youth and further bridges the gap between the community and the police as teens and officers engage in sports games they enjoy and have culturally grown up around. A total of 400+ teens comprise 10 soccer teams consisting of mostly youth from Arab
communities, and 12 cricket teams of mostly South Asian teens. The fourth year since the department first initiated the program was just completed, and the outcome continues to be a successful and promising one. The department, year after year, supplies the newest uniforms similar to their professional counterparts, fields, permits, transportation, food, drinks, and everything in between to secure a pleasant environment for all involved. Over the course of the years, strong ties have been developed with the teens, as well as getting to know them on a one-to-one basis. It also follow-ups by keeping in touch with youth members and their families, with the hopes of one day recruiting them to join in law enforcement efforts for keeping their communities safe. As of yet, the NYPD Cricket league has received a great deal of attention from the social media, and games have been covered by the New York Times, CNN, CNBC, 60 Minutes, and other local news.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MULTI-AGENCY COUNTER-RADICALIZATION POLICY

It is important for any and all law enforcement agencies seeking to deploy similar community outreach programs to consider that social conditions play an important role between the community and police departments. For example, if a given community’s concerns are addressed—such as crime rates and gang activity—social conditions that matter are likewise addressed. In addition, the more effectively these social conditions are addressed, the stronger the relationship is that will develop as a result. Such efforts ensure a better working relationship with community members, and therefore, help with counter-radicalization efforts. Another important note is the availability of resources.

The reality is that the majority of police departments in the United States do not have the sufficient amount of resources to execute independently dedicated intelligence-led or counterterrorism divisions. Law enforcement agencies that experience this shortcoming in implementing outreach programs must work in collaboration with other agencies/departments in to address counter-radicalization concerns effectively. Fusion centers are a good start; however, adjoining departments/jurisdictions must combine their efforts, integrating community involvement and assistance from the private sector.
Any critical coverage and undercover operations have a negative impact toward community outreach. One example is the latest article published regarding NYPD crawlers. Even if these matters are not true, critical press coverage has a negative effect on all the positive counter-radicalization programs that the department has successfully conducted with the Muslim community throughout the years. Additionally, critical press coverage provides those who always question these efforts with a platform. Issues like these are exactly why the NYPD recognizes that it is necessary to develop relationships during times of calm. In the end, the strength built withstands and the long-term outreach efforts will continue to soar above and beyond, into a promising future.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Cannon, E. (2011). Homegrown terrorism and Muslim radicalization: A complex but real threat. The examiner, Clarity Digital Group, LLC.


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